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MODELS   OF   NATION-BUILDING:

A   SURVEY   OF   THE   LITERATURE.

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fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Philosophy

By

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New Delhi   August 1974

DECLARATION

Certified that the material contained in this dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.

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SYNOPSIS

MODELS OF NATION-BUILDING :
A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

At the very outset, it would be useful to define the scope and strategy of this research, spell out the methodological procedures and sources of data adopted for this work, and to make the necessary conceptual elaborations.

I. Scope and Strategy

The scope of this research has been conceived of as surveying the existent literature on nation-building, with the specific strategy of critically analysing the models of nation-building presented therein. This complex task is proposed to be exeduted in three stages. The first is a brief discussion on the classical Western-experience of nation-growth, highlighting the major phases through which the nation-state system came into being in the West. The second is a discussion on the models that various scholars have suggested about the nation-building activity going on in the nouveau monde, embracing Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And finally an attempt is made to explicitate the various assumptions underlying the models under discussion.

II. Methodological Notes

The research paper being a written result of careful investigation of a chosen topic, it is also necessary to spell out the sources from which the data have been drawn up, and the method adopted for the investigation.

The sources of data available to this researcher have all been secondary ones: only a survey of the existing literature is made here. The existing literature includes only published works, both books and articles, and does not cover unpublished manuscripts, microfilms, etc.

As for the method of developing the topic, three possible ways were open to the researcher: (a) combining the concrete and the abstract; (b) combining two or more concrete objects; and (c) combining one abstraction with another. Of these three, the third method has been adopted here. The exercise throughout is of a theoretical nature, trying to summarise and scrutinise the generalisations on nation-building.

III. Conceptual Elaborations

Nation, nation-growth, nation-building, and models are the four concepts calling for elaboration in this study.

1) Nation

For the purposes of this dissertation, the definition of a nation is that given by Karl Deutch, based on the postulates of Karl Friedrich.

A nation, says Karl Deutsch, is any sizable population or group of persons which can be called:

i) <u>independent</u>, in the sense that it is not ruled from outside;

ii) <u>cohesive</u>, by virtue of its markedly more effective habits of easy and varied social communication and co-operation, compared with their corresponding capabilities and motivations for communication and co-operation with out-siders;

iii) <u>politically organized</u>, in the sense that it provides a constituency for a goverhment which exercises effective rule within it;

iv) <u>autonomous</u>, in ~~the sense~~ that it accords to this government such acclaim, consent, compliance, and support as to make its rube effective; and

v) <u>internally legitimate</u>, in the sense tht its habits of compliance with and support for the government or, at least, toward mutual political co-operation and membership in the nation, are connected with broader beliefs about the universe and about their own nature, personalities, and culture so that their support for the nation, even in times of adversity is likely and thus ensures its endurance.[1]

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1   Karl W. Deutsch, "Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research", in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, (eds.) <u>Nation-Building</u>, Aldine-Atherton, (New York: 1971); pp.11-12.

2. Nation-Growth

·The concept of nation-growth is an organismic one, used in order to refer to the historical process through which the present nation-state system evolved in the West. The image portrayed by the concept of "nation-growth" is often interpreted to suggest an organismic image, depicting the growth of a living thing that cannot be dissected without injuring or killing it and, moreover, a growth process that is expected to pass through certain fixed intervals of time and through certain fixed qualitative stages toward a maturity the form of which is known, and beyond which there are only decline and death or reproduction which starts a new, but essentially identical cycle.[2] Usually this concept is used to describe the relevant historical processes in retrospect.

3. Nation-Building

When many historians speak of the "growth of nations" a good many of the present day statesmen and policy-oriented social scientists speak of "nation-building". As opposed to the organismic concept of "nation-growth", the concept of "nation-building" is a voluntaristic and architectonic or mechanical one. The implication is that as a house can be built from timber, bricks, and mortar, in

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2   Ibid., p. 3

different patterns, quickly or slowly, through different
sequences of assembly, in partial independence from its set-
ting, and according to the choice, will and power of its
builders, so a nation can be built according to different
plans, from various materials, rapidly or gradually, by
different sequences of steps, and in partial independence
from its environment. [3]   The most frequent use of this con-
cept is in recent literature dealing with the political
processes of the new nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.

4. Models

A model could be defined, following Richard E. Dawson,
as "a physical or symbolic representation of that object,
designed to incorporate or reproduce those features of the
real object that the researcher deems significant for his
research problem" [4]   In the last analysis models are like
theories, viz. systems of generalizations based on empirical
findings. If one were to give a more complete definition of
theory, a theory basically involves a set of (at least two)
statements, called either laws or propositions which are
related to each other and which express relationships between

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3   Ibid.

4   Richard E. Dawson, "Simulation in the Social Sciences,"
        in Simulation in Social Sciences: Readings, ed. Harold
        Guetzkow, Englewood Cliffs: 1962), p. 166.

variables under varying states of the system.[5]

It has to be kept in mind that although some tentative or untested theories are too hastily called models, a model and a theory are only roughly identical - roughly, because a model has a more static cannotation. Unlike concepts, models are not arbitrary, and can be confirmed or disconfirmed, They differ in the degree of isomorphism (= the degree to which elements of the model correspond on a one-to-one basis with elements of the modelled, and the degree to which relations between the elements are preserved) they have with the modelled phenomena. In the social sciences, one should remember, a model is not a concrete or "real" structure, for that would be complete and idyosyncratic, from which it would be difficult to develop generalisations. One possible distinction between theory and model is that the model has primarily predictive power, while a theory has both predictive and explanatory power. But this distinction is difficult to adhere to in all cases. Apart from making predictions, models can also direct us toward new materials and ground not yet covered, helping us to discover more relationships, thus

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5   See G.D.Mitchell, A Dictionary of Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul (London, 1973), p. 211; and G.K. Roberts, A Dictionary of Political Analysis, Longman (London: 1971), See also May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Sciences, MacMohan & Co. (New York: 1970), p. 213.

serving a heuristic function.[6]

Having thus defined (a) the scope and strategy of the research, (b) the source of data and the method of treatment, and (c) the key concepts used as tools for analysis, the stage is set for the presentation of the ressearch repolt itself. The report, as already indicated earlier, is divided into three parts, dealing with: (i) nation-growth in the West; the Historical Model; (2) Nation-Building in the Nouveau Monde : the Analytic and Prescriptive Models; and (3) Models and Assumptions: a Criticism and an Evaluation.

In Conclusion, a summary is made of the findings of the study. And a select bibliography, comprising published books and articles on nation-building, brings the report to a close.

ONE

NATION-GROWTH IN THE WEST: THE HISTORICAL MODEL

The present discussion is meant to focus on the land-marks, the philosophical foundations, and the final outcome of nation-growth in the West.

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6   Stephen L. Wasby, Political Science: The Discipline and its Dimensions, Scientific Book Agency, (Calcutta: 1972), pp. 62, 74.

I. Landmarks

The classical model of nation-growth in the West has the barbarian <u>regnum</u>, the royal state, and the nation-state system as the milestones around which the growth of nations is explained.[7]

As rightly observed by Joseph Strayer, the roots of modern European states go back to the barbarian <u>regna</u> (to be vaguely and imprecisely interpreted as "kingdoms") which arose in the period of the collapse of the Roman Empire and the concomitant migration of peoples.[8] Although it is difficult to say what exactly in essence the barbarian <u>regnum</u> was it was certainly not a state. The usual pattern of a <u>regnum</u> was a dominant warrior group, drawn from several Germanic peoples, ruling a subject population which was Latin Celtic, or Slav.

1. Pattern of Organization

Although it was usual for the ruler of a <u>regnum</u> to take on an ethnic title, such as <u>rex</u> <u>Anglorum</u> (King of the English) or <u>rex</u> <u>Francarum</u> (King of the Franks), most of the <u>regna</u> were not ethnic units. The Franks, for instance, were themselves a federation of peoples: they conquered and

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7   In presenting the following model, the author has heavily relied upon Joseph R. Strayer, "The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe", in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.) <u>Nation-Building</u>, Aldine-Atherton (New York: 1971), fourth printing, pp. 17-26-

8.   ibid., p. 17.

gradually merged with other Germanic groups, such as the
Burgundians and the Alemanni; they also ruled Romanized Gauls,
Italians, Celtic refugees from Britain, and a certain number
of Slavs. Thus the _regnum_ was not even a cultural unit, not
to speak of an ethnic one: it implied many dialects,
frequently many languages, different customs, and usually
different laws for each of the constitutional groups.

Not even geographic contiguity counted much; for a
regnum was only roughly a geographical unit. Although it
might have had a core, still it would be hard to define its
boundaries: there were everywhere, contested districts and
loosely attached, more or less autonomous dependencies like
Aquitaine for the Franks, and Wales for the Anglo-Saxons.
The _regnum_ had, in effect, to be defined in terms of its
king, or better, its royal family. That is to say, a _regnum_
was made up of the people who recognized a certain family as
their royal family. Though this group may have fluctuated its
size and the territories which it occupied, as long as a
sizable number of people held a certain man to be their king,
a _regnum_ was in existence

2. Principle of Loyalty

By no means did the _regnum_ have any resemblance to a
state. In fact, it is doubtful whether in the early Middle
Ages, anyone had a concept of a state. Although some memory
of the state lingered among the better-educated members of

the clergy, even they were not able to express the idea
very clearly. Taught by the Church and, perhaps, by surviv-
ing Roman traditions, some kings did try to preserve some
of the governmental apparatus and public authority of a
Roman emperor, but only to meet with frustration. The
reason for their failure was that most members of the ruling
class had no idea of an impersonal continuing public power.
In other words, loyalty was to individuals or to families,
not to the state. As a result, political power more and
more entered the domain of private law: it was a personal
possession which could be transmitted by marriage or divided
among heirs. And, being personal, political power was hard
to exercise at a distance or through agents. This resulted
in a constant tendency for local representatives of the King
to become independent rulers, and this tendency was aggravated
by the low level of economic activity which made each
district almost self-sufficient. Thus the three principles
of feudalism, viz. (a) the emphasis on personal loyalty, (b)
the treatment of public power as a private possession, and
(c) the tendency to local autonomy, existed long before
feudalism it was established.

The reqna which were the intermediary between the
Roman Empire and European feudalism, were to set the stage
for the evolution of the state. Amorphous and ephemeral, some
of the reqna survived and merely by surviving, took the first

step in nation-growth in the West. Very slowly and very gradually, they built up a persisting identity: certain peoples, long constituted and were occupying certain areas, desired to go on constituting a certain _regnum_. And, simply because their _regnum_ endured for many generations, there began to be a feeling that it was a permanent part of the political landscape and it should continue for ever.

II. Philosophical Foundations

Out of the shambles of the barbarian _regnum_, sprang up the skeletons of the royal state. But the process of building a state out of the quite unpromising elements (viz. emphasis on personal loyalty, treating of public power as a private possession, and the tendency to local autonomy) offered by the barbarian _regnum_ took a long time. The delay was caused by the fact that the creation of the state was done almost entirely with internal resources: the existing Byzantine model had little influences, and the Roman model was not very well known until the revival of legal studies in the twelfth century when some of the essential steps in state-building had already been accomplished.

When completed, the royal state rested upon two pillars -- the institution of judiciary, and a political theory upholding the sovereignty of the state and the supremacy of secular power.

1. Judiciary as the Nucleus

It may not be altogether wrong to conceive that the process of state-building had been started by purely practical considerations. As the mass of the population suffered from petty wars and general insecurity, it was only spontaneous to look for a better and more powerful government, capable of administering justice. And this popular desire for peace and justice was backed by the Church, which was then at the height of its power: the Churchmen played important roles in every prevailing government and consistently taught that justice was the highest attribute of a king. Any effort from the side of the king to improve the administration of justice received the high prestige and administrative skill of the clergy. And the rulers themselves, in their quest to preserve and increase their political power and to hand it on unimpaired to their heirs, found that the best way to do so was by trying to satisfy the popular demand for law and order. Thus they adopted the tactics of supressing violence, by forcing powerful men to settle their disputes through the courts and, as a result, they gained a much greater degree of control over their vassals and subjects than they had ever before.

The law-and-order based strategy of the kings necessitated the development of systems of law and regularly functioning courts. It was necessary for the kings to get a

monopoly of all the important cases for their courts, and to create a corps of judges and administrators entirely dependent on them, and these agents of justice had to be rotated from district to district, and from office to office. Such an effort, finally, required the creation of stable and enduring institutions, and these institutions, fabricated in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, became the nuclei around which states were formed.

2. Political Theory

The fabrication of judicial offices and institutions was accompanied by the evaluation of a political theory upholding the sovereignty of the state and the supremacy of secular power. This happened as a result of two main developments. One the one hand, as a great revival of learning took place, the logical, scientific, and political works of Aristotle were translated into Latin and the Corpus Juris of Justinian was studied with greater and greater intensity. And, on the other hand, the appearance of universities as learning centres centres coincided with this, and several university graduates became judges and administrators. In the universities themselves, a considerable number of teachers of law, philosophy, and theology began to speculate on political subjects. It was out of this new-born intellectual ferment that a systematic theory of the state began to develop, upholding the sovereignty of the state, and the supremacy of secular power.

(a) Sovereignty of the State

The political theory that emerged from the new-born
intellectual ferment at the end of the thirteenth century,
contemplated a Europe divided into a number of sovereign
states. Although the word "sovereignty" had not yet been
invented, the fact of sovereignty was very much a reality
even if it took a series of phrases to describe it. And
the concept of sovereignty though yet in a rudimentary form,
contained the idea of external sovereignty and internal
sovereignty.

(i) External Sovereignty

As there were already in existence a number of
political units which were entirely independent of one
another, phrases were soon found to describe their independence.
Thus the idea of external sovereignty was rather easily
accepted, and there was not much difficulty in defining it.
It is apt, in this connection, to recall Pope Innocent III,
speaking of a "king who recognizes no superior in temporal
affairs."

(iii) Internal Sovereignty

But the case of the idea of internal sovereignty was
different: it was more difficult to accept and to state in
unambiguous terms. When one school thought of internal
sovereignty in terms of organic analogy, another school
resorted to mystical analogy. The first school held that

since the state is a body, all members much obey the head
and that all the members must work together for the common
welfare. The second school held that the body politic was
a corpus mysticum (just as was the Church), which would
simply that it should be preserved at all costs, even giving
power to the head of the state to demand the lives and
goods of all other members of the body politic to preserve
the common welfare or establish the common defence[9]

(b) Supremacy of Secular Power

A development parallel to the emergence of the sovereignty of the state was the evolution of the supremacy of
secular power. This in essence meant the transfer of basic
loyalties from the Church to thesecular state; and this change
more than anything else, marks the end of the Middle Ages
and the beginning of the modern period.

The Middle Ages had seen the triumph of the Church's
control of the secular power. It was in the period between
the Gregorian reform (c. 1075) and the middle of the
thirteenth century, that the Church had set the standards and

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9   For further elaboration of these issues, see Robert
    W. Carlyle and A.J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval
    Political Theory in the West, Blackwood, (London: 1928)
    E.H. Kantorowixz, The Kings Two Bodies, Princeton
    University Press, (Princeton: 1957);

and goals of European society. During the period, whenever its policies were questioned by the kings, the Church had the support of the bulk of the population, and had often been able to coerce the rulers by urging their subjects to rebel against them. But, in after 1250, this tactic became increasingly ineffective, because habits of obedience to secular governments had been established, and a certain attachment to the laws of the country and the person of its ruler had developed among the people.

Not that, except in a very rare cases, a full-fledged patriotism had developed: it was only the spreading of a feeling that no outside authority should intervene in the internal affairs of an established political community. The transfer of loyalty from the Church to the State had not yet reached a stage where people were very eager to give up their lives and property for any cause: they were just more willing to make these sacrifices for the state than for the Church. The real test came when Pope Boniface VIII (r. 1294-1303) entered into open conflict with the kings of France and England and found that he had almost no support in either country. To his greatest frustration, even the clergy told him that they would lose all influence if they were suspected of disloyalty to their kings. Thereafter, the only loyalty which had much chance of being built up into a powerful, emotional factor was loyalty to the state or to the ruler who embodied the state.

Thus with the establishment of offices and institutions for the admihistration of justice, and the development of a systematic political theory upholding the sovereignty of the state and the supremacy of secular power, the foundations were already laid for the modern nation-state system of the West.

III. Final Outcome

To some extent, the nature of the regnum was responsible for the different patterns that the process of state-building followed, and the same influence was visible also in the next stage, viz. changing the state in to a nation. A significant difference was to be noted between the regnum which became a single state, and the regnum which splintered and gave birth to many states. While England and France are examples of the first type, Germany and Italy are examples of thesecond. Equally important also was the difference between the unitary state with no significant provincial liberties, and the "mosaic" state in which a king had slowly extended his authority over one province after another, and in which, as a result, each province had time enough to develop its own peculiar laws and institutions. When England offered the best example, and one of the few early ones, of the unitary state, France proved to be $_\wedge^{a}$model of the mosaic state. Because of the continuing impact of these latter category of differences upon the process of nation growth they deserve closer attention.

1. Underline Model

Where a whole _regnum_ became a single state, the development of nationalism was quick and smooth, with no great strain or exaggerated emotional appeals. In such a state, people were gradually brought into closer and closer association with each other. As the boundaries of the state cut them off, to some extent, from the rest of the world, they were forced to work together and to adapt to each other. It was easier for them to gain a clear sense of identity, to smooth out some of their regional differences, and to become attached to their ruler and the institutions through which he ruled. Moreover, where the framework of the state was strong and persistent enough, it even created a common nationalism out of very different linguistic and cultural groups. Thus, although Languedoc was very like Catalonia and very unlike north France, finally it became thoroughly French.

It is also important to observe that the central government of a unitary state did not have to worry about provincial privileges, or to create a huge, and often unpopular, bureaucracy to coordinate and control diverse and quarrelsome local authorities. Nor was it necessary to look on the local leaders with suspicion as men whose primary loyalty was to their provinces: they could safely

be used to explain and adapt the government's programme
to their communities. The people of such states gradually
began to think in terms of the national interest, mainly
because there were no provincial interests to distract
their attention and divide their loyalty. This made it
easy for common laws and institutions to create a greater
sense of identity than there was in countries where a man
from one province could not understand the governmental
procedures of a neighbouring province. Thus, England was
already a nation-state in the fifteenth century, when the
French Prince, the Duke of Burgundy, was still hoping to
split off provinces from France and combine them with his
holdings in the Low Countries to make a new Kingdom.

2. Mosaic Model

Where several states grew up within a splintered
regnum, the process of building a nation-state was much
more difficult. When many such states were too small to
satisfy any political emation except the desire for law
and order, even some larger ones found it hard to appeal to
the same sentiments that were so easily tapped by the Govern-
ments of France and England.

In the states formed out of the splintered regnum,
there was no correspondence between the political framework
and the ancient traditions of the people: the historical,

cultural, and linguistic group to which people felt they
belonged was a lways larger than the state to which they
were supposed to give their allegiance. Nevertheless, many
of the splinter-states developed strong administrative
and military systems which could not easily be overthrown.
As a result, when, in the nineteenth century, nationalism
seemed to ensure both political success and psychological
satisfaction, violent efforts were still needed to make the
state and the nation coincide.

Thus, the Germans and Italians could assemble and
hold together the fragments of their old _regna_ only through
repeated wars and only by pitching nationalist appeals at a
dangerously high emotional level. And the Habsburg monarchy
was in even worse shape, since it was a mosaic state largely
made up of splinters of several _regna_: no nationalism could
be developed for the state as a whole, and considerable
confusion prevailed as to which nationalisms were appropriate
for each of its fragments. Finally, the European provinces
of the Ottoman Empire too were in a somewhat similar condition.
And how the resulting instabilities in the latter two areas
caused one of the major European tragedies of the twentieth
century is too familiar a fact to deserve further comment -
only its outcome needs to be stressed here.

As the first World War came to an end, in 1917-18, the
imperial principle which was based on rule from above and
heedless of the claims of nations lost its major European

strongholds and, in the peacemaking, formally surrendered to the right of peoples to decide their own destinies. And Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia-in-Europe, and the Ottoman Empire gave way to a sorting out of the nations which meant the end of an old order of nations, and the beginning of a new: it was the inauguration of the nouveau monde the full evolution of which was to be completed with the end of the IInd World War. In the apt expression of Rupert Emerson, "through global conquest the dominant Western powers worked to reshape the world in their own image and thus roused against themselves the forces of nationalisms which are both the bitterest enemies of imperialism and, perversely, its finest fruit." [10]

The classical model of the historical experience of nation-growth in the West has been outlined here just as a preliminary step towards the major task at hand, viz. to analyse and scrutinize the models of nation-building in the nouveau monde. Hence, no further consideration of this model is deemed necessary for the purposes of the present study. What deserves greater attention is the section that follows.

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10.   Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Scientific Book Agency, (Calcutta: 1970), pp. 16-17.

TWO

NATION-BUILDING IN THE NOUVEAU MONDE : DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE MODELS

Nearly fifty percent of the states of the world today have attained their independence and sovereignty only since 1945. The most prominent among such "new" states are: India, Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, United Arab Republic, Libya, Tunisia, Cyprus, Morocco, Algeria, Mauretania, Sudan, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Togoland, Cameroons, Mali, Senegal, Guinea, the Republic of Congo, Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Trinidad, Jamaica, and Bangladesh.[11]

The new nations engaged in a form of social change that makes nation-building and material development simultaneous political problems offered a vast field of research and a grist for the social scientists'mill. And out of this virgin field were raised a host of models of nation-building and political development.

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11. Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States", in Clifford Geertz, (ed.) Old Societies and New States, Amerind, (New Delhi: 1971), p. 1.

While dealing with the models of nation-building in the nouveau monde, one should keep in mind that the scholars in the field have offered two types of models, viz. descriptive or analytic models, and prescriptive or recommendatory models. Based upon several methodological assumptions, the descriptive models have been presented to describe, and analyse and interpret the nation-building activity that is going on in the new nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And the prescriptive models, based upon several normative assumptions, are meant to suggest and prescribe and recommend what the scholars consider as best to be done to make the nation-building activity in the new nations a success.

Whether descriptive or prescriptive, both types of models are preoccupied with the process of nation-building as a highly voluntaristic activity, a fact to be kept in mind for a full understanding of the models themselves. Hence the discussion at this stage is to start with the scholars' focus on activity in the nation-building process, to be followed by considerations of the descriptive and prescriptive models. Discussion on the assumptions underlying the models are reserved for the ensuing section.

I. Focus on Activity

Nation-growth in the West, and nation-building in the nouveau monde are viewed differently, and for obvious

reasons, of course. Karl Deutsch made this point clear

when he said:

> "Where in the past the formation and rise of nations
> were merely observed by scholars, today statesmen
> and voters increasingly want to do something about
> the process. They may want to establish or strengthen
> some national political entity of their own, or to
> merge it with or separate it from some other such
> entity. Or they may wish to strengthen, weaken, or
> otherwise change some other national political entity
> so as to promote values and interests of their own." (12)

Everywhere it is all activity: activity aimed at break-

ing up old empires, building new nations, and establishing

new federations and communities. Peoples and nations are

not left as they were found by the statesmen and voters.

The expansion of communication networks and trade

transactions, cultural contacts, technological innovations,

and the over-all impact of modernization are moving people

out of their villages and traditions into a new world of

mobility, insecurity, shortage of commodities, and the need

for more and more political and governmental services. Formal

and informal political participation getting intensified day

by day is the common experience all around. This process of

social mobilisation makes the new states harder to govern

by their own traditional elites in their own tradition and

ways, and still harder to govern by foreigners from abroad. [13]

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12. Karl W. Deutsch, "The Study of Nation-Buidling, 1962-1966",
in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, (ed.) op. cit.,
(No. 1), p. v.

13. Ibid. p. viii.

Not only does this nation-building activity center around insistence upon self-rule and resistance to foreign rule, but it also implies a quest for self-discovery. Just as finding the size for any state at which it will be cohesive and stable is in part a process of historical trial and error, so does the art of nation-building in the new states depend on the art of nation-limiting. That is to say, if the nations-in-creation are to be large enough to be economically viable they should also be small enough to be governed effectively by a government close to the people, responsive to popular needs, and sustained by popular support.[14]

Recent scholars in social science have it to their credit that they have discovered that the breaking and making of nations is a process, that is now occurring in most parts of the world, and that it is a process that must be studied in its general and uniform aspects, especially if the unique features of each country and epoch are eventually to be understood better than they have been so far. The key questions deemed apt to be asked in such an endeavour to understand the nation-building process are: how and when do nations come into existence, how and when do they pass away, and how and when can men decide the outcome of their own actions? And much more pertinent are also the questions: how and when do nations break away from larger political

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14   Ibid., pp. ix-x.

units, and how do they triumph over smaller units, such as tribes, castes, or local states, and more or less integrate them into the political body of the nation?[15]

The attempt by political scientists and sociologists in recent times to answer these questions has given rise to a number of models of nation-buidling, and these models are proposed to be discussed here under two categories, viz. descriptive models, and prescriptive models.

II. Descriptive Models

A number of studies on the nation-buidling process in the new states endeavour to produce models for describing, analysing and interpreting what is going on in those states. A general trend of all such studies is to focus upon the aspects that are common to all the new nations. The two such common aspects focussed attention upon are the common background and the common challenges of the new states.

1) Common Backqround

Colonial subjection, new sovereignty, and elite culture are often referred to as the elements constituting the common background of the new states. Occasionally, cultural traditionality and technological backwardness too are adduced to form

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15. Karl W. Deutsch, "Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research" in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, (eds.) op. cit. (No. 1), pp. 1, 2, 4,

this common background.

a) Colonial Subjection

Colonial subjugation was the most common experience of most of the new states. India and Pakistan, Malaya and Indonesia, Ceylon and Singapore, Mali and Madagascar are to be mentioned only as the most striking examples. It was only as a response to this common experience of being subjected to and exploited by foreign rulers that nation-alism started developing in these new states.

As observed by Rupert Emerson, the colonialist subjugation evoked three three distinctive responses from the subject states and that too in three successive phases. The first reaction of the peoples on whom the West imposed itself was generally a xenophobic defence of the existing order stirred, of course, by a drive for self-survival. The next phase was a swing in the direction of an uncritical self-humiliation and acceptance of alien superiority. And the third phase was, in the typical fashion of the Hegelian dialectic, a nationalist synthesis in which there was an assertion or re-assertion of a community with pride in itself and in its past, but still looking, at least as far as its leaders were concerned, in the direction of modernization and Westernisation.[16]

16.   Rupert Emerson, op. cit. (No. 10), pp. 10-11.

It was only a historical irony that imperialism
"forged the tools with which its victims could pry it loose"[17]
Thus, again to quote Rupert Emerson himself," through global
conquest the dominant Western powers worked to reshape the
world in their own image and thus roused against themselves
the forces of nationalisms which are both the bitterest enemies
of imperialism and, perversely, its finest fruit."[18]

b) New Sovereignty

It was only after 1945 that the new states could
attain their sovereignty before the eyes of the world. As
they have all been, until recently, colonial territories or
were otherwise less than wholly self-governing, the very
novelty of their sovereignty defines them all as new states.
Thus this novelty of sovereignty too is as common an
experience for the new states as colonial subjugation and
imperial rule.

As observed by Edward Shils, the above minimal
uniformity of situation and the common experience of being
ruled by Western metropolitan powers and of seeking to free
themselves of that rule, carry with them a number of attendant
phenomena. For one thing, the constellation of common situa-
tion and common experience -- and, to some extent, the aware-

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17. Ibid., p. 18

18. Ibid., pp. 16-17

ness of this community of situation and experience — has generated a more or less common outlook too among the new states. To some extent, these together have defined the major tasks of the new states, and these tasks have far-reaching ramifications which are in many respects similar from state to state.[19]

c) Elite Culture

A third element constituting the common background of the new states is what can be called the elite culture. In nearly all the new states, the governing elite has received a modern education, and that too, often to a high level. More often than not, that education has been metropolitan in its source, and modern in its content, and the leaders would, in their turn, like to give a similar education to their people. But, in contrast with the leaders, the mass of the population has usually received no formal modern education whatever. As a result of this juxtaposition of an elite educated in a tradition of exogenous inspiration and a mass rooted in a variety of indigeneous cultures engenders problems that crop up throughout the world of the new states. For one thing the elites are almost always nationalistic. In most of the new

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19.   Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States", in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States, Amerind, New Delhi: 1971), pp. 1-2.

states, the ruling elites and their rivals still belong to the generation that conducted the agitation for independence from the foreign colonial powers. They are concerned not merely with self-rule, but also simultaneously to elevate the dignity of their traditional culture and their standing in the world. Further, it is also usual for them to wish to have, for the sake of attaining cultural modernity and economic progress, a modern culture diffused through the medium of a modern educational system running from the early years up to the university level.[20]

d) Cultural Traditionality

The culture of the new states is by and large traditional, in the sense of having (i) a predominantly agrarian society, (ii) mostly village communities, (iii) highly stratified social life, (iv) static and passive attitudes, and (v) generally a tradition of autocratic government. Peter Merkl's characterisation of the static nature of a traditional society is remarkable. In a traditional society, he says,

> "Visible change from generation to generation
> is so small as to encourage the belief that
> given forms of social, economic or political
> relations are God-given and natural. A thick
> crcest of custom builds up over many genera-
> tions and provides a restrictive setting into

20.　　Ibid., pp. 2-4.

which a person is born and which he will
probably not transcend in his life time. Sons
know that they will never grow beyond the
station of their fathers. Women and inferior
classes know their place in society and nourish
no hopes of emancipation. An air of fatalism
pervades the whole culture, often sublimated
in religions that place no value on material
achievements and promise rewards only in a
life after death." (21)

In the traditional society, people are born and brought

up with a "constrictive self", never able to imagine to be or

do anything other than what one is and does. Change is not

only impossible, but is also an evil. (22)

e) Technological Backwardness

The new states are also in common marked by techno-

logical backwardness and the absence of large-scale industrial-

isation as compared to their older counterparts.

Technology, in simple terms, is the science of tool-

making. It is "a systematic, disciplined approach to objectives,

using a calculus of precision and measurement and a concept

of system" [23]   Not only has recognition been given to the

fact that human culture is dependent on its technological

foundations, but it is also being accepted that man is a

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21   Peter H. Merkl, Political Continuity and Change, Harper
        and Row, (New York: 1967), p. 430.

22.   See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society,
        Free Press, (New York: 1958).

23.   Daniel Bell (ed.), "Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress"
        Special Number of Daedalus, 96 (Summer, 1967), p. 643.

technical animal, and that technological change is the
fundamental factor in human evolution.[24]

Due to several historical reasons, the industrial
revolution and its rewards -- growing supplies of land, labour
capital, organising ability and big machines, all leading
to sustained economic growth -- have remained the privileges
of the West. The new states were -- and still are -- greatly
deprived of industrialisation and technological innovations
and this deprivation too constitutes an element to the
common background of the new states.

Thus colonial/subjugation, new sovereignty, elite
culture, cultural traditionality, and technological backward-
ness all give an air of likeness and similarity to the new
states.

2. Common Challenges

Having had a common background, it is only to be
expected that the new states would have also to face a number
of common or similar challenges. At least five such challenges
have been identified by scholars in the field. They concern
the creation of (a) an effective government, (b) a modern
economic system, (c) cultural modernity, (d) a national
language, and (e) national integration.

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24.   Victor C. Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the
      Reality, Scientific Book Agency, (Calcutta: 1971), p.27.

a) Effective Government

Without exception, all the founders of the new states have, in varying degrees, face or have faced the problem of establishing an effective government and staffing it with the indigeneous personnel. This problem has essentially two aspects. On the one hand, the new ruling elite confront or have confronted the necessity of legitimating themselves before their people. On the other hand, they all have also to accept the task of organising and maintaining a modern political apparatus, that is, a rationally conducted administration, a cadre of leaders grouped in the public form of a party system (whether in a one-party system or in a multy-party system), and a machinery of public order. Their task is made more difficult by the fact that the establishing of an effective government has to be done in the context of a traditional society, or more frequently, in the context of a plurality of traditional societies.[25]

b) Modern Economic System

The new states have all sprung up from traditional societies with an agrarian economy. Such an economy, employing traditional techniques of cultivation, is an impoverished

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25.   Edward Shils, op. cit. (No. 19), p. 2.

one by contemporary standards of material well-being. The
elites in the new states set their ambition on creating a
new, modern economic system to replace the inherited one.
This task entails the development of new economic institu-
tions and techniques, and persuading or coercing the ordinary
members of the society into their acceptance.

The modern economic system is said to possess several
characteristics. Thus it is said that an economy is modern
when: (i) the basic economic structure has been established and
remains relatively stable or steady; (ii) the economies of
scale are relatively well exploited so that there will be
little increased efficiency from increasing the size of the
production units; (iii) few new industries (in terms of the
percentage of total) develop; (iv) demand is great for a
wide variety of high quality products, and (v) a large degree
of dependence upon each other exists among various industries
and among various geographical areas.[26]

In an attempt to identify when exactly an economy starts

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26. Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis
    of Economic Development (An Adaptation), Vakils, Feffer
    and Simons Private Ltd (Bombay: 1966), p. 10.

off to be modern, Walt Rostow presented a model of the stages of economic growth. He defined five stages of economic growth: (a) traditional; (b) conditions necessary for take off; (c) take-off; (d) effort to attain maturity; and (e) a high level of mass consumption. Rostow identified the take-off stage by the presence in a society of three factors:

(i)   A rise in the rate of productive investment from, for example, say, 5 per cent or less to more than 10 per cent of national income or net national product (NNP meaning income after deduction of expenses);

(ii)   The development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors or areas with a high rate of growth;

(iii) The existence of quick emergence of a political, social, and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external eco economy effects of the take-off, and gives to growth a continuing character. (27)

The point to be noted here is that when scholars are busy developing models of economic growth, the statesmen and politicians in the new states are busy worrying how to impart to their countries a more modern economic system.

C) Cultural Modernity

From a historical perspective, modern or modernizing societies have developed from a great variety of different

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27.   Watt W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, University Press, (London: 1960), p. 39.

traditional, pre-modern societies. When in western Europe, they developed from feudal or absolutist states with strong urban centres, in eastern Europe they emerged from more autocratic states and less urbanized societies. And in the United States and the first Dominions like Canada and Austrarlia, they have developed through processes of colonization and immigration, some of which were rooted in strong religious motivations and organised in groups of religious settlers, while others were based mostly on largescale immigration oriented mostly to economic opportunity and greater equality of status. Thus, however, was the story of the past. Today, modernization and aspiration to modernity are probably the most overwhelming and the most permeating features of the contemporary scene. In other words, most nations are now-a-days caught in the web of modernization -- either becoming modernized or continuing their own traditions of modernity. From these activities of the past and the present, a definition of modernization could be abstracted. In the words of S.N. Eisenstadt,

> "Modernization is the process of change towards
> those types of social, economic and political
> systems that have developed in Western Europe
> and North America from the seventeenth century
> to the nineteenth and have then spread to other
> European countries and in the nineteenth and
> twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian
> and African countries." (28)

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28. S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change, Prentice-Hall of India, (New Delhi: 1969), p. 1.

The concept of modernity involves both socio-demographic aspects as well as several aspects of social organization. Denoting most of the socio-demographic aspects of modernization Karl Deutsch coined the term "social mobilization". As defined by Deutsch himself, social mobilization is:

> "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour." (29).

Karl Deutsch has further indicated that some of the main indices of modernization are: (i) exposure to aspects of modern life through demonstrations of machinery, buildings, consumers goods, etc; (ii) response to mass-media; (iii) change of residence; (iv) urbanization; (v) change from agricultural occupations; (vi) increased literacy; and (vii) growth of per-capita income. [30]

As aspects of social organization indicating modernization, at least seven indices have been pointed out, viz. role-differentiation, voluntarism, high level technology, democratic ethos, expansion of communication media, secularism, and humanism. [31]

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29. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review, 55 September 1961), pp. 494-95.

30. Ibid.

31. S.N. Eisenstadt, op. cit. (No. 28), pp. 2-5.

i) Role-Differentiation

Separation between the different roles held by an individual in all the major institutional spheres -- especially among the occupational and political roles, and between them and the family and kinship roles -- forms another important characteristic of a modernized society. As ably described by Karl Marx in his studies of the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of the industrial system, such a separation of roles has taken place first and, perhaps most dramatically, between family and economic occupational roles during the industrial revolution. This development meant chiefly two things. First, that the occupational of any given role within one institutional sphere -- e.g., the occupational sphere -- does not automatically/entail the incumbency of a particular role in the political or cultural spheres. Secondly, within each institutional sphere, such as the economy, polity, social organization, etc., there developed distinctive units that were organized around the goals specific to each such sphere and that were not fused, as in more traditional societies, with other groups in a network based on family, kinship, and territorial base.[32]

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32. On this point, see, George Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life" in P. Hatt and A. Reiss, (eds.) Cities and Society Free Press of Glencoe, (New York: 1957). and F.Tonnies, Community and Association, trans. Charles Pl Loomis, Routledge and Kegan Paul (London: 1955).

ii) Voluntarism

A modern society is said to be marked by the prevalence of voluntarism and selection based upon merit as opposed to membership by ascriptive kinship, territorial xxxxx or estate framework. Not only are the modern societies highly differentiated and specialised with respect to individual activities and institutional structure, but also these specialized roles are free-floating in the sense that admission to them is not determined by ascribed properties of the individual, but by performance ability and personal choice. In the same way, even wealth and power are not ascriptively allocated -- at least as much as it is done in the traditional societies. Such a mode of voluntaristic recruitment is to be seen in institutions like markets in economic life, voting and party activities in politics, and instrumentally recruited bureaucratic organisations and mechanisms in most institutional spheres.[33]

III) High Level Technology

The separation of roles and voluntarism were followed by

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33. For this point, see, Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Free Press of Gelenco (New York: 1958); Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, Free Press of Glencoe (New York: 1959); B.F. Hoselitz, "Noneconomic Factors in Economic Development", American Economic Review, 47, (May 2, 1957(, 28-71.

thedevelopment of a very high level of technology which was,

first, based on and combined with Newtonian science , and

secondly, fostered by the systematic application of knowledge,

the pursuit of which became the province of specialized

scientific institutions, as well as by the secondary

(industrial and commercial) and tertiary (service) occupations,

as against the primary extractive ones.[34]

iv) Communication Expansion

        Parallel to the development of a high level technology

is the expansion of the media of communication and the grow-

ing permeation of such central media of communication into

the major groups of the society. Such a media penetration

evokes a wider participation of the major groups of the

society in the cultural activities and organizations created

by the centrally placed cultural elites.[35]

v) Democratic Ethos

        As far as the political sphere is concerned, modern-

ization implies two developments. In the first place, there

is said to be growing extension of the territorial scope and

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34   See T.S. Ashton, The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830,
      Oxford University Press (London: 1968); W. Moore, "The
      Social Framework of Economic Development", in R.
      Brailbanti and J. Spangler, (eds.), Tradition, Values
      and Socio-Economic Development, Duke University Press
      (Durham, N.C.: 1961, pp. 57-82.

35.   Lucian Pye (ed.) Communication and Political Development,
      Princeton University Press (Princeton, N.J.: 1963).

an intensification of the power of the central, legal,
administrative, and political agencies of the state. Second-
ly there occure also a continued spread of potential power
to wider groups in the society ultimately to all adult
citizens, and their incorporation into a consensual moral order.
An interesting development to be noted is that the rulers who
seek to maintain themselves effectively in power and receive
support for the specific goals they propagate and the policies.
they want to implement come to believe that they must seek
continually the political support of the ruled, or at least
of large or vocal pa rts thereof, through elections, plebicites
and acclamatory surrogates. Thus, unlike the rulers of
traditional autocratic regimes, even the rulers of the
totalitarian regimes accept the relevance of their subjects
as the objects and beneficiaries. As a result, the difference
between modern domocratic or semi-democratic and totalitarian
regimes lies not necessarily in the genuineness of these
beliefs, but in the extent to which they are given institu-
tional expression in pluralistic political organizations, in
public liberties, and in welfare and cultural policies.[36]

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36   See S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Develop.
ment" in J. La Polambara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political
Development, Princeton University Press (Princeton,
N.J.: 1963) pp. 96-120; and S.N. Eisenstadt, "Political
Modernization: Some Comparative Notes", International
Journal of Comparative Sociology, 5, 1 (March 1964) 3-24.

vi) Secularism

The modern socities are also said to be characterized by the decline of traditional legitimation of the rulers with reference to powers outside their own society (God, reason and by the establishment of some sort of ideological account-ability, usually also institutional of the rulers to the r ruled, who are alleged to be the ultimate holders of the potential political power. This development is facilitated by the differentiation of the major elements of the major cultural and value systems, i.e. religión, philosophy, and science; the spread of literacy and secular education; a more complex intellectual institutional system for the cultivation and advancement of specialized roles based intellectual disciplines.[37]

vii) Scientific Humanism

A new cultural outlook which is best termed as scientific humanism is the culmination of the series of developments taking place in a modernizing society. This new cultural outlook is characterized by an emphasis on progress and improvement; on happiness and the spontaneous expression of abilities and feeling; on individuality as a moral valuep on the dignity of the individual, and on efficiency. This

28 37. Edward Shils, "Political Development in New States", Comparative Studies in History and Society (Spring-Summer 1960), 265-92, 379-411; and Karl Manneim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, Routledge and Kegan Paul (London: 1940).

trend has been amply manifest in the development of some
new personality orientations, traits, and characteristics;
greater ability to adjust to the broadening societal horizons;
greater ego flexibility; widening spheres of interests;
growing empathy with other people and situations; a growing
evaluation of self-advancement and mobility; and a growing
emphasis on the present as the meaningful temporal dimension
of human existence.[38]

Thus the task of the ruling elite in "modernizing"
their societies is a multidimensional one. It involves the
creation of role-differentiation, voluntarism, high-level
technology, communication expansion, democratic ethos,
secularism, andscientific humanism.

d) National Language

The adaptation of traditional forms of literacy and
artistic as well as moral culture to the technique and content
of modern education, and the development of modern studies of
traditional culture is a major problem throughout the new
states. From this confrontation of the exogenous and the
indigenous of the foreign and the native, of the modern and
the traditional, arises a major problem that frequently

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38   See A. Inkeles,"Industrial Man: The Relation of Status
      to Experience, Perception and Value", American Journal
      of Sociology, 66, 1 (July 1960), 1-31; and David Lerner,
      op. cit. (No. 33); and E. Shils, op. cit. (No. 37)

agitates many of the new states; viz. the language problem.
In some of the new states, the language problem centres
around the medium of instruction. Nearly all the new states
face a situation in which the language of their modern
culture is the metropolitan language that was the language of
the former, colonialist rulers. Their modern culture too
is usually derived largely from their contact with the
metropolis. Usually the language-more frequently the
languages -- of·the natives is neither highly developed nor
universally spoken or even understood throughout the
territory. Yet consciousness of self-respect and national
dignity has made it imperative to adopt the indigenous
language or one of the indigenous languages for all official
and cultural uses: to go on using a foreign language is
regarded as an act of self-derogation. In fact, the use of
the indigenous language would reduce the gap, so painfully
felt by so many of the highly educated ones in almost all
the new states, between the masses and the intellectuals.[39]

e) Nation<u>al Integration</u>

In almost all the new states, the societies consist of
relatively discreet collectivities such as ethnic,communal,
caste, religious, or linguistic ones that have little sense
of identity with one another or with the national whole.

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39.   Edward Shils, <u>op. cit</u>. (No. 11) p. 3.

Practically none of the new states of Asia or Africa has
reached a stage where the people it rules have become a
nation, more or less co-terminus with the state in the
territorial boundaries, and possessing a sense of identity in
which membership in the state ruling them is an important
component.

Scholars, statesmen, and politicians alike have not
been sparing in the use of phrases like "dual" or "plural"
or "multiple" societies, "mosaic" or "composite" social
structures, "tribalism", "parochialism", "communalism",
"pan-national" movements, "states" that are not "nations",
and "nations" that are not "states". One is used to speaking
of communalism in India, referring to religious contrasts;
the same phrase is used to refer to racial contrasts in
Malaya and tribal contrasts in Congo. Regionalism is the
concept often employed to refer to disaffections in Indonesia
and differences in the customs of Morocco. When the Tamil
minority in Srilanka (Ceylon) is set off from the Sinhalese
majority by religion, language, race, region, and social
custom, the Shiite minority in Iraq, is set off from the
dominant Sunnis virtually by an intra-Islamic sectarian
difference alone. While pan-national movements in Africa are
largely based on race, and in Kurdistan on tribalism, in

Laos it is based on the Shan States and in Thai and on language.[40]

Although all these sectarian movements appear to be different phenomena, at closer analysis they prove to be, in some sense, of a piece. Hence the need for a theoretical framework to anlayse and interpret those movements. The attempt of Clifford Geertz to offer such a framework seems to be a successful one.

As observed by Geertz, the peoples of the new states are simultaneously animated by two powerful, thoroughly inter-dependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives, viz. the desire to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions "matter" and the desire to build an efficient, dynamic, modern state. The first is a search for an identity, and a demand that that identity·be publicly acknowledged as being important: it is a quest for a social assertion of the self as being somebody in the world. The second is a more practical one. It is a demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, for a more effective political order, for greater social justice, and beyond all

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40 Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civic Polities in the New States", in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States, Amerind (New Delhi: 1971); pp. 106-107.

that, for playing a part in the larger arena of world
politics and for exercising influence among the nations.[41]

The two motives are, it is to be noted, most intimately
related, because citizenship in a truly modern state has more
and more become the most broadly negotiable claim to personal
significance, and because what Mazzini called the "demand
to exist and have a name" is to such an extent fired by a
humiliating sense of exclusion from the important centres of
power in world society. Yet, the two are not the same
thing: they stem from different sources and respond to
different pressures. In fact, it is the tension between them
that is one of the central driving forces in the national
evolution of the new states, at the same time, it is one of
the greatest obstables to such evolution.[42]

The dichotomous, yet interdependent, situation needs
to be further explained. The tension between the desires
for self-assertion and state-building tend to take a peculiarly
severe and chronic form in the new states for two reasons:
first, because of the great extent to which their peoples'
sense of self remains bound up in the gross actualities of
the blood, race, language, locality, religion, and/or
tradition; secondly, because of the steadily accelerating

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41   Ibid., p. 108

42   Ibid.

importance in this century of the sovereign state as a positive instrument for the realisation of collective aims. It is to be noted that the populations of the new states -- multi-ethnic, usually also multilinguistic, and some times multi-racial as they are -- tend to regard the immediate, concrete, and to them inherently meaningful sorting implicit in such "natural" diversity as the substantial content of their individuality. As they perceive it, to subordinate these specific and familiar identifications in favour of a generalized commitment to an overarching and somewhat alien civil order is to risk a loss of definition as an autonomous person, either through absorption into a culturally undifferentiated mass or what is even worse, through domination by some other rival ethnic, racial, or linguistic community that is able to imbue that order with the temper of its own personality. The need for a reasonably large, independent, powerful and well-ordered polity as the only means of attaining social reform and material progress too is seen by them -- clearly by the elite, and dimly by the rest. Much of the political processes in the new states are to be seen as attempt at reconciling the two tendencies. [43]

To sum up the discussion on the descriptive models, these models have been suggested as the results of attempts

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43   Ibid. pp. 108-109.

at describing, analysing, and interpreting the political
processes of the new states. Often the focus has been on
two spheres: the common background of the new states com-
prising of colonial subjugation, new sovereignty, elite
culture, cultural traditionality, and technological back-
wardness; and the common challenges of the new states,
comprising the creation of an effective government, modern
economic system, cultural modernity, national language, and
national integration.

III. Prescriptive Models

Some of the scholars exploring the political processes
in the new states were not satisfied with merely offering
models for describing, analysing, and interpreting what
they came across. They went one step further by attempting
to presdribe what they considered best to the well-being
of the new states. Such prescriptions were, of course,
heavily loaded with the value preferences of the particular
scholars offering them, but this is a point to be considered
later in this dissertation. It is enough, for the time being
to bear in mind that the one common foundation on which the
proponents of the prescriptive models based their perceptions
and prescriptions was the concept of political development
And it is the burden of this section of the essay to first
to explain the concept of political development and its
meaning, and then to discuss the various models of political
development.

1. Political Development

Ever since Captain A.T. Mahan, one of the major theorists of twentieth century American expansionism, spoke of "growth" and the stage of "political development" characterizing civilized nations in comparison withother communities of the world,[44] a host of political scientists, especially in the American academic circles, have devoted their time and energy to operationalizethe concept of political development. While some of them were busy mainly discussing and clarifying the meaning of the concept of political development, some others were busy evolving "models" of political development - models for interpretation, for prediction, and also for prescription.

It is proposed here first to examine the way the concept evolved, and then to indicate the different meanings in which it has been used.

a) Evolution of the Cocept

Philosophically, a concept is an idea of the attributes common to a class of things. thus we have the concept of "horse giving us a mental picture of an animal of day-to-day experience⋅for a social scientists, a concept is a "term referring to a descriptive property or relation"[45] -- very

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44 See A.T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia (Boston: 1900), p.3

45 May Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning, and Theories", Symposium on Sociological Theoryed. Llesellyn Gross (New York: 1959), p. 377.

often, it is a tool that a social scientist uses to discover
the relations among different social phenomena: thus we
have the concept of "power" referring to man's political
actitities.

It is interesting to note how academic fascination
for the concept of political development evolved and increased.
Feeling ill at ease with the barren treatment of "foreign
government" in the centres of political studies, European
political scientists, especially their American counterparts,
started looking for a more fertile way of studying "comparative
polities" [46] Such an approach necessitated a focussing upon
common political activities instead of the traditional way
of comparing the forms of governmental institutions. Having
fixed their attention on the categories of political activities
common to all political systems, it was only a matter of
time before the scholars would look for indices to measure
the degrees in which these activities had developed" in
various political systems. And in this quest they stuck upon
the concept of "political development", to be measured by
the forms and degrees of political activity.

Equally interesting it is to note what made the political
scientists shift their attention from "foreign governments" to

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46   See Stephen L. Wasley, Politican Science: The Discipline
      and its Dimensions, Scientific Book Agency, (Calcutta:
      1972). pp 486ff.

"comparative politics". In the introduction to <u>Comparative</u> <u>Politics</u>: <u>a</u> <u>Developmental</u> <u>Approach</u>, Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, address themselves to this question. [47]

They point/out that political science prior to World War II suffered from three major drawbacks. viz. Parochialism, configurativism, and formalism.

i) <u>Parochialism</u>

As a coherent discipline, the pre-World War II studies of comparative government was largely confined to the European area -- Britain (and the old Commonwealth) France, Italy, Germany, and Russia. Studies of the political systems of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were carried on by a small group of generally isolated individual scholars, or in the context of "area-studies" rather than in the context of a general discipline of comparative government. As a result the dominant core of the field consisted of the European "Great Powers", and whatever there was of general theorizing about forms of government and patterns of politics was based upon this small though salient, sample of political systems.

ii) <u>Configurativism</u>

Moreover the dominant approach to the study of "foreign governments" was configurative, viz. concerned with illuminating

47   Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.
      <u>Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach</u>, Little
      Brown and Co. (Boston: 1966: pp. 2ff.

the peculiar characteristics of individual political systems.
There was little systematic comparative analysis, aimed at
highlighting the political activities common to all political
systems under consideration.

Iii) Formalism

Finally, the whole approach was too formalistic: the
focus tended to be on institutions (primarily governmental
ones) and their legal norms, rules, and regulations, or on
political ideas and ideologies, rather than on performance,
interaction and behaviour. Whatever behavioural studies were
made, especially by such men as Merriam, Lasswell, Herring,
Schattschneider, and Odegard in the 1920's were limited to
the American sphere and had not made much headway; and even
in the case of these scholars, their "optimistic faith in
the inevitability of democracy, especially strong in America,
dampened curiosity and interest in nondemocratic forms of
government."[48] The same mood prevailed also during the
period between the two wars, when even communism and fascism
were viewed as temporary disorders or political pathologies:
teaching in the field of comparative government was carried
on under the rubric of "democracy and dictatorship", with
dictatorship representing error and political pathology, and
-democracy representing truth and political health.

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48. Ibid., p. 5

But after ~~the~~ World War II this state of affairs
took a new turn. Soon the naive conception of democratic
progress, and the intellectual structure of the discipline
of comparative government which it had produced and main-
tained, became untenable. This sudden development was brought
about mainly by three factors viz: nationalist explosion,
power diffusion, and communist challenge.

a-i) National Explosion

By nationalist explosion is here meant the sudden
emergence of a number of new states in the Middle East, Asia,
Africa, with a bewildering variety of cultures, social
institutions, and political characteristics.   ·

a-ii) Power Diffusion

The nations of the Atlantic Community lost their
dominance. International power and influence diffused into
the former colonial and semicolonial areas.

a-iii) Communist Challenge

The emergence of communism as a powerful competitor
in the struggle to shape the structure of national politics
and of the international political system posed a new and
major threat to the prospects of democracy.

Faced with this new situation, the Western, especially
American, political scientists gave a new colour to their

discipline: the change was marked by four characteristics --
(1) the search for more comprehensive scope; (2) the search

for realism; (3) the search for precision; and (4) the

search for theoretical order. Out of this four-fold

quest emerged the new comparative politics whose offspring

is the concept of political development.

Among the stimulants mentioned above, inducing the

scholars to give a new orientation to their field, the

most important one was their concern with the future of

democracy. As the American political scientist Stephen

Wasby puts it,

> "Political scientists were worried about the
> preservation of democracy as the dominant
> form of government in the world or simply
> about the best way of assuring that the
> fragile systems newly emerging would have the
> best opportunity for stable development." 49/

The political scientists started asking themselves

why events like the two World Wars and the great depression

that followed brought be about the reversal of democratic

trends in some countries while accelerating such trends in

others. Their fear of instability and War on the one hand,

and zeal for the diffusion of democracy on the other, induced

them to watch and measure "political development" in other

countries. Thus was fertilized the *lka ovum of* the concept of

"political development", and it developed in the womb of

"comparative politics".

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49. Stephen L. Wasby, <u>Political Science: The Discipline
    and its Dimensions</u>, Scientific Book Agency (Calcutta:
    1972) p. 489.

b) Different Meanings

Although generated against the background of (a) a fear of political instability, wars, and revolutions, and (b) an overenthusiasm as to how to promote the democratic forms of government all over the world, the concept of political development means different political phenomena to different political scientists. Surveying these different interpretations, Lucian Pye has listed ten such meanings.[50]

    i) Political development as the political prerequisite of economic development;

    ii) political development as the politics typical of industrial societies;

    iii) political development as political modernization;

    iv) political development as the operations of a nation-state;

    v) political development as administrative and legal development;

    vi) political development as mass mobilization and participation;

    vii) political development as the building of democracy;

    viii) political development as stability and orderly change;

    ix) political development as mobilization and power;

    x) political development as one aspect of a multi-dimensional process of social change.

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50. Lucian W. Pye, "The Concept of Political Development", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (March, 1965), pp. 1-13.

Abstracting from these various definitions Pye isolates

three characteristics of political development which seem to

be most widely held and most fundamental in general thinking

about the problems of development.[51]

b-i) Equality

A general spirit or attitude toward equality is the

first broadly shared characteristics which is found among

various approaches to political development and it is said

to imply three aspects:

Participation: Most of the views of the subject seem to

involve mass participation and popular involvement in politi-

cal activities. However, participation may either be

democratic or a form of totalitarian mobilization: but the

key consideration is argued out to be that subjects should

become active citizens and at least the prefense of popular

rule are necessary.

Universal laws.

Equality is also meaht to imply that laws should be of

a universalistic nature, applicable to all and more or less

impersonal in their operations.

Achievement Criteria

Thirdly, equality means that recruitment to political

office should reflect achievement standards of perfomance and

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51. Ibid., p. 12-13.

not the ascriptive considerations of a traditional social system.

b-ii) Capacity

The overall capacity of a political system is a second major theme ᵏ found in most of the concepts of political development. The concept of capacity, which relates to the outputs of a political system and the extent to which the political system can affect the rest of the society and economy, is meant to imply three concepts.

Government Performance

In the first place, capacity entails the/sheer magnitude scope, and scale of political and governmental performance. The/assumption, of course, is that the developed systems will be able to do a lot more and touch upon a far wider variety of social life than the less developed systems can.

Effectiveness and Efficiency

In the second place, capacity means effectiveness and efficiency in the execution of public policy, the assumption being that the developed systems not only do more than others, but also perform faster and with much greater thoroughness.

Rationality and Secularism

Finally, capacity is also meant to imply rationality in administration and a secular orientation toward policy.

b-iii) Differentiation and Specialization

Role differentiation and structural specialization is
a third major theme found in almost all treatments of poli-
tical development. Three factors are said to constitute
this development:

Structural Differentiation and Specialization

This development is said to take place when offices
and agencies tend to have their distinct and limited func-
tions, leading to the emergence within the realm of govern-
ment an equivalent of a division of labour.

Role Specialisation

With the differentiation and specialisation of structures
there should also come about an increased functional
specificity of the various political roles within the system.

Integration

The third development that should occur is an integration
of the complex political structures and processes in a system:
differentiation is not fragmentation and isolation of the
different parts of the political system, but specialization
based on an ultimate sense of integration.

Thus Lucian Pye recognises that equality, capacity, and
differentiation in the way he has defined them are at the
heart of the developmental process. While not admitting the
fact that these are the values to be desired as goals in the

process of development, he grants that the historical tendency
has shown that there would be acute tensions between the
demands for equality, the requirements for capacity, and the
process of greater differentiation: pressure for greater
equality can challenge the capacity for the system and
differentiation can reduce equality by stressing the import-
ance of quality and specialized knowledge. He also grants the
fact that development is not unilinear: it may be possible to
distinguish different patterns of development according to
the sequential order in which different societies have dealt
with the different aspects of the developmental syndrome.
Moreover, all the three aspects of political development, viz.
equality, capacity and differentiation are intimately
related to the political culture prevalent in a system. Hence
he feels, in the last analysis the problem of political
development revolves around the relationships between the
political culture, the authoritative structures, and the
general political process.

2. Models and Stages

Scholars of political development can be said to have
followed three lines of theorizing, thus generating three
major types of models, viz. the continuum model, the stages
model, and the intermittent model. A brief discussion of each,
based upon the treatment by Stephen L. Wasby,, is given
below.[52]

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52. Stephen L. Wasby, op. cit. (No. 46), pp. 505-508.

a) The Continuum Model

The continuum models of political development as suggested by Lerner, Pye, and Kautsky [53] tend to view the development process in terms of a series of discrete variables, each identified by a range of possible states that national entities may be in at various times with respect to some specific criteria. There are three ways of doing this:

i) Quantitative Analysis

Nations may be ranged according to the level of Gross National Product per capita, percentage of the adult population that is literate, number of hospital beds per thousand population; or according to more strictly political criteria such as percentage of the working population employed by the central government; or percentage of the adult population participating in national elections.

ii) Qualitative Analysis

There are other ways, as well, of projecting this model. Thus for instance, less quantifiable, more judgemental criteria may be employed, such as the degree of bargaining which takes place between autonomous political groups, or the extent to which merit criteria are employed in the recruitment and promotion of government employees; or the extent to which charismatic leaders tend to prevail at the national level.

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53   See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Free Press, Glenco: 1958), Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press (Princeton: 1965), and John Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization. John Wiley (New York: 1972).

iii) Multi-factor Analysis

Yet a third attempt is to subject variables of both
quantitative and judgemental nature to multi-variable analysis
or factor analysis, with the object of testing hypotheses as
to the relationships between variables. Theorists who posit
a common movement along a broad array of fronts from less
modern to more modern conditions, and who see a functional
relationship between social, economic, psychological, and
political indicators of modernization find this type of
conceptual model as an economical and highly systematic way
to portray the phenomena which interests them. The drawback of
this approach is the danger of fragmentation of concern,
especially in the/absence of/any over-arching theory. It is
easier to succeed when only a relatively small number of
variables are thought to be interconnected and subjected to
empirical testing. More elaborate schema ordinarily tend to be
overwhelmed by a richness of potential relationships.

b) The Stages Model

The/stages model[54] positing distinct stages of political
development, is said to be intellectually more stimulating;
but it does fail to satisfy the most exacting standards of

54. See, especially, A.F.K. Organski, The Stages of Political
Development, A. Knopf (New York: 1965); and W. Rostow,
Politics and the Stages of Growth, Cambridge: 1971.

precision. Scholars following the stages model either opt
for a ~~Mordeian~~ Marxian -like confinement to one explanatory factor as
the key to the transition from one stage to another, or make
an attempt to bring together a configuration of interrelated
factors which are expected to alter in ~~uneson from~~ unison from forms
appropriate to a given stage of development to those appropriate
to the succeeding stage. In general, whenever an attempt
is made to develop a stage-model for application to countries
all over the world, at least three stages are usually
postulated; viz. the traditional, transitional, and modern.

i) Traditional Stage

The traditional stage is said to be characterized by
an overwhelmingly rural society and agrarian economy, with
appropriate political forms.

ii) Transitional Stage

The transitional stage, still with a rural society, is
characterized by an economy embarking on the early stages of
industrialisation and a political system which is accordingly
undergoing transformation.

iii) Modern Stage

The modern stage is claimed to be characterized by a
largely urban society and a mature industrial economy with
the appropriate political forms.

As a rule, the political system is shown as moving from
(a) the traditional focus upon local concentrations of power

with little articulation between the centre and the periphery to (b) the _transitional stage_ in which structures are emerging to involve the increasingly available masses in the political system while improving upon the technical means of expanding the power of the centre into the periphery, and from there to (c) _the modern state_ with its centrally engineered economy and its perfected institutional means of involving the whole of society in the daily affairs of the individual and at the same time making the individual involve in the national endeavour through whatever official means of participation are available to him. In the process, the sub-systems of the political system, notably the administrative sub-system and the political culture, too undergo this process of development by stages.

c) The Intermittent Model

The intermittent models are partial approaches to political development, stressing particular aspects and dealing with them systematically.

The functional categories suggested by Gabriel Almond, for instance, are to be viewed as political variables which are dependent upon changes in the socio-economic context of the political system.[55] As the society undergoes modernisation,

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55 Gabriel A. Almond, and G. Bingham Powell, _Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach_, Little, Brown and Company, Boston: 1966.

political structures are said to become more functionally
specialized as well as more highly centralised, while
political culture undergoes secularisation, and, beyond a
certain point, develops pragmatic, bargaining strains. In
addition, as power is centralized in the structures of the
system performing the functions of rule-making. rule
application, and rule-adjudications, specialized national
structures are developed for the channelling of inputs into
the system (associational interest groups, aggregative poli-
cal parties, and the media). Moreover, structures of both
the input and output varieties develop considerable autonomy
vis-a-vis one another: is

As far as subsystems like political culture is concerned,
the structural developments are shown to be accompanied by
attitudes congruent to them. Thus people are said to become
conditioned to see limits to the power which the various
structures may exercise and to tolerate limitations upon
their own objectives. Restraints upon the part of competing
groups, and, hence bargaining on behalf of the attainment of
proximate, partial objectives is said to become a virtue as
the interdependence of elements within the system gains
better appreciation. Industrialisation and urbabization
bringabout the break down of community in the traditional
sense and throw man up against his fellowman in an impersonal
setting. As a result, man seeks community in class, religious,

or ethnic groupings that transcend the local community
and he is brought to war with his fellowman in competing
groupings ever broad and poorly understood abstractions.

Now what is the strength of each of these models? An
assessment is in order.[56] Amomg these three types of models,
the second one, viz. the stages models, have been criticized
by more rigorous methologists for their tendency to over-
simplify highly complex phenomena and for foreign forcing the
experiences of particular countries into a mould perhaps
more appropriate for some countries than for others. Both
the first and second categories, viz. continuum and stages
models, have been criticized for being general theories of
political development suffering from an absence of any coherent
political model of the developmental process: The analysis is
often left at the point where extra political factors have set
the stage for political change. As a result, political change
itself has tended to be dealt with the time-honoured tools of
the historian than with the analytical tools of the political
scientist. As against this, the intermittent model, especially
the one suggested by Almond, has been recognized as being
rich in potential for analysis of the general trends of politi-
cal development; but it suffers from the lack of categories

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56   Stephen L. Wasby, op. cit. (No. 46) pp. 506-508.

for examining the dynamics of the process of change itself .
One is to made to think that as a society modernizes, its
corresponding political system, Will go through the phases
of structural and cultural modernization which are indicated
by Almond, but just how this happens is not accounted for.

In fine, all the three models, although they claim to
be models of "political development", fail to deal with
political change in a satisfactory way. And this failure
arises from the fact that these models are more in the nature of
Prescriptive models rather than explanatory and predictive
ones -- they are models based upon fallacious assumptions and
filled with normative suggestions, meant for the adoption of
the "developing" nations. This is brought out by a closer
analysis of the assumptions underlying.these models.

THREE

MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS : A CRITICAL EVALUATION

Although proposed with jubilation in apparently innocent and scientific form, the concept as well as the models of political development have not escaped seathing critism by perceptive scholars. One of the severest criticisms have come from S.K. Arora, whose line of thinking has been follow-ed up in the following critique too.[57] The criticism here focusses attention upon (a) the philosophical assumptions, (b) the normative assumptions, and (c) the methodological assumptions that underlie the concept and models of political development.

I. Philosophical Assumptions

The philosophical assumptions underlying the concept and models of political development can be identified as : (a) the Evolution Philosophy and the unilinear view of history; (b) the European political and Industrial Revolutions as criteria; and (c) "March" towards civilisation.

1) Evolutionist Philosophy and Unilinear View of History.

One of the dominant preoccupations of Western philosophy

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57   S.K. Arora made this criticism in a paper delivered to the Soziataet Seminar at the University of Heidelberg in 1967. See his paper "Pre-Empted Future? Notes on Theories of Political Development", Behavioural Sciences and Community Development, Vol. 2, No. 2, September, 1968.

and a foundation stone of social science since the Encyclopaedists and Compte has been a unilinear view of history, which itself is an offspring of the evolutionist philosophy, accompanied by beliefs about the notions of progress and unidirectional change. The central theme of this thought pattern that developed during the 18th and 19th centuries is as follows: Just as a child, given proper training, develops into a matured person, savage societies, too, -- with proper training - develop into a civilized people. Attempts were also made, with this assumption, to range societies along a continuum stretching from savage to civilized..[58]

2) Europepan Political and Industrial Revolutions

Scholars like Ernest Gellner tend to envision history as a "succession of cliffs and plateau$ without any underlying, so to speak, geological connection explaining an overall slope."[59] Agreeing with Gellner is another scholar, Reinhard Bendix[60] The general tendency of such scholars is, rather than evolving conceptual frameworks which could apply to ancient as well as modern societies, to base their analyses

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58   For a clear example of this kind of thinking, see,
      Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, Norton, (New York: 1950).

59   Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, (London: 1967), p. 45

60   Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building and Citizenship, John
      Wiley, (New York: 1964).

upon the assumption that before the 18th century there was

no political development; after the 18th century, especially

after the political revolution in France and the industrial

revolution in England, it is possible to identify the criteria

for and the evidence of politically developed states.

3) "March" Towards Civilization

There are also scholars entertaining the idea that

"advancement" can be geographically - if not racially -

defined. The attempt of such scholars is to arrange the nations

of the world along the allegedly logical spectrum beginning at

one end with a traditional stage, and moving from there to a

transitional stage, and then to a modern or developed stage,

as discussed earlier while dealing with the stages model.[61]

Upon this theoretical spectrum is superimposed a geographic one:

the Western nations lying at the other end, with the most

extreme of the latter positions usually ceded to great Britain

and the United States. Thus emerges the conclusion that "the

Anglo-American politics most closely approximate the model

of a modern political system"[62]

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61   One of the earliest explicit statements of this scheme
      was made by Daniel Lerner in his The Passing of Traditional
      Society, (Glencoe: 1958).

62   James Coleman, "Conclusion: The Political Systems of the
      Developing Areas", in Gabriel A. Almond and James S.
      Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton:
      1960), p. 533.

II. Normative Assumptions

It is in the above philosophical watershed that much of the theory-building about political development have taken place, and it is worthwhile to attempt an exposition of the normative assumptions underlying the proposed indices of political development. For purposes of discussion, it is possible to group the indices under two heads, viz. the political contents and the non-political contents of development.

i) The Political Contents of Development

Mainly three factors have been proposed as the typically political contents of political development, viz. participation, stability and capability. A brief discussion of each is taken up here.

a) Political Participation

Assuming that participation is a key variable in the description of a developed polity or modernized society, it is often asserted that a "modern society" must be first and foremost "a participant society"[63]

In the attempts at identifying the indicators of participation, three factors have been usually pointed out, viz. universal suffrage, percentage of voting turn out, and competition.

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63   Daniel Lerner, "Modernization" in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (Macmillan: 1968), Vol. 10, p. 393.

i) Universal Suffrage

There is general agreement that "universal suffrage" is
an obvious characteristic of developed democratic polities.
But it is often forgotten that past its rhetoric function,
"universal suffrage" can serve only limited use and that it is
a concept difficult to operationalize. Can we, for instance,
rate a country higher in the developmental spectrum if some or
all of its citizens qualify for vote at the age of 18 rather
than 21? Was not Switzerland often considered as a model of
democracy despite the fact that till of very late one-half of
of its population, viz. women, were disqualified from voting?

ii) Percentage of Voters

A second and more frequent indicator cited as a criterion
for political development is the percentage of qualified voters who
actually exercise their right to vote. But in a number of
cases, various conditions are stated in order to accommodate the
political preferences of the scholars concerned: this is done
for fear that by the criterion of voting turn out, without any
other conditions, the communist countries would surely surpass
the democratic countries in their degree of development. Thus,
for instance, Lipset side-tracked this difficulty by altogether
leaving the communist countries out of the analysis[64] and Michael
C. Hudson chose to rank nations according to the percentage of

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64   S.M. Lipset, Political Man, (New York: 1960), pp. 77-96.

[65]

voters in national elections for non-communist secular parties.
In a similar fashion, Phillips Cutright narrowed his participation variable by confining the measure to number of years "a nation was ruled by a chief executive who was in office by virtue of direct vote in an open election where he faced competition or was selected by a party in a multiparty system" [66]

There are also other difficulties. Thus for instance, illiterate populations of "underdeveloped" countries may exhibit a higher turn out percentage than their literate counterparts in the "developed" countries. [67] Are we to construe this turn out by itself as sufficient evidence to draw meaningful conclusion with respect to the relationship between political participation and political development? How meaningful an indicator will it be even if used in conjunction with others? The correct answer to these questions can be had only if one considers the relationsip between motivation, awareness, and coercion on the one hand, and the act of voting on the other. But evidence there is to indicate that although both the economically dependent peasant in India,

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65   Michael A. Hudson, "A Case of Political Underdevelopment", _Journal of Politics_, V. 29, (November 1967).

66   Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis", _American Sociological Review_, Vo. 28, (1963), p. 256.

67   See, Bruce Russett et al, _World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators_, (New Haven: 1964) where the United States barely ranks in the fifth percentile of nations ranked according to voters in national elections as percentage of voting-age population.

and the poverty-stricken urban dweller in America turn out

in large numbers at the polls, both are, despite the secret

ballot, often coerced into making their particular choices. [68]

iii) Competition

With the assumption that "competition" is an indicator

of political development, Coleman has arranged the under-

developed nations in a classification scale as competitive,

semi-competitive or authoritarian. [69] Making this assumption

more explicit, Millikan and Blackmer assert that

> "One central test of development toward demo-
> cracy is the degree of competitiveness per-
> mitted to all who would be legitimate parti-
> cipants in defining and executing the society's
> business" 70/

Having done this much, they went on to express their hopeful

"concern that political development be coupled with increas-

ing degrees of competitiveness" [71] Cutright too agrees with

them on this point. [72]

Difficulties, however, arise because of the fact that

suggesting competition to be a measure of political development

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68   See, for India, the concept of "vote bank" in M.N.
      Srinivas, "The Social System of a Mysore Village", in
      McKim Marriott (ed.) Village India (Chicago: 1955)
      p. 31 and, for America, William Foote Whyte, Street
      Corner Society (Chicago: 1955), pp. 309-317.

-69.   James S. Coleman op. cit (No. 62) pp. 532ff.

70.   Max Millikan and Donald Blackmer, (ed.) The Emerging
      Nations, (Boston: 1961). p. 89.

71.   Ibid, p. 90

72.   Phillips Cutright, op. cit. (No. 66), p. 256.

facilitates neither the assessing of the degree to which
competition is desirable, nor the determining of the optimum
which is correlatable with the highest degree of political
development. The reconciliation of participation with stability
to be generated through consensus and cleavage, in the process
of development is one of the most important and least
resolved problems in the analysis of political development.
It is interesting to note that two of the most ardent advocates
of participation viz. Almond and Verba, while asserting that
as compared to Mexicans, Germans and the British, "Americans
more often accept norms of participation" and that "where
norms of participation, perceived ability to participate and
actual participation are high, effective democracy is more
likely to flourish", had also to admit the fact that successful
government is dependent on a citizen's assuming ~~their~~ his
additional role as a subject and on a careful distinction
between consensus and cleavage within a given eledtorate.[73]

b) Stability

By and large, there is almost a unanimous agreement
among the scholars of political/development that stability is
an essential attribute of political development.

When Karl von Vorys suggests that the goal of the
development process is to "provide for the functional require-

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73   K̶a̶r̶l̶ ̶v̶a̶n̶ ̶V̶o̶r̶y̶s̶,̶ ̶"̶T̶o̶w̶a̶r̶d̶ ̶a̶ ̶C̶o̶n̶c̶e̶p̶t̶ ̶o̶f̶ ̶P̶o̶l̶i̶t̶i̶c̶a̶l̶ ̶D̶e̶v̶e̶l̶o̶p̶-̶
      m̶e̶n̶t̶"̶,̶ ̶T̶h̶e̶ ̶A̶n̶n̶a̶l̶s̶,̶ ̶v̶ ̶ ̶3̶5̶8̶ ̶(̶M̶a̶r̶c̶h̶ ̶1̶9̶6̶5̶)̶ ̶ ̶

      Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Vivic Culture
      (Princeton: 1963), pp. 178 and 474.

ments of long term persistence" [74], Lipset states that "the main criteria used to define European democracies are the uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I, _and_ the absence over the past 25 years of a major political movement opposed to the democratic rules of game" [75], And Gutrights' ranking system gives points for the number of years a state has given evidence of measuring upto his various other criteria. But, interestingly enough, he utilizes for his measures the twenty-year period between 1940 and 1960: the fact that this includes a long and major World War in which the countries of the Western hemisphere had to make perhaps the least adjustments in their governmental structures gives the sample a rather built-in bias.

The systems theory of David Easton is one of the theories most frequently used by scholars of political development. Following the system-maintenance model of Talcott Parsons [76], Eastern placed a great emphasis on the need for system-maintenance: he, however, preferred to use the term

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74   Karl von Vorys, "Toward a Concept of Political Development", The Annals, v. 358. (March, 1965).

75   S.M. Lipset, Political Man, (New York: 1960), p. 48

76   Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Macmillan, (New Yrok: 1951).

"system-persistence" in order to give greater stress to the adaptability of systems. [77] J.S. Nye, in his paper "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis" defines political development in such a way as to mean growth or decline "in the capacity of a society's governmental structures and processes to maintain their legitimacy over time". [78]

At least two main drawbacks from which the theoretical frameworks of the advocates of stability as a criterion for political development suffer could be pointed out. On the one hand, most writers on the subject of political development, ostensibly committed to democracy, usually stop short of the point of reconciling the need for stability with participation -- one of the most essential aspects of democracy. There is a reluctance to come to grips with the fact that swift extensions of power are often accompanied by cataclysmic changes within bodies politic; and that it is usually only where diffusion of power has been a long and gradual process that internal social conflict is minimal, with the viability of the state remaining assured. [79]

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77   David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, N.J: 1965) pp. 77ff.

78.   J.S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis", American Political Science Review, v. LXI, June 1967) pp. 418-19.

79.   S.K. Arora, op. cit. (No. 57), pp. 93ff.

On the other hand, it is also interesting to note
that whereas theorists of political development often observe
that too much competition may have particularly disruptive
consequences for the stability of a country, few of them
attempt to explore the fact that the socio-economic condi-
tions of a country may themselves evoke from differing strata
differing degrees of participation, and indeed legitimate
demands upon the political authority. More pertinently,
where patterns of resources-distribution differs, might there
not also be a need to consider the appropriateeness of
differing political formulae? But whereas such a problem
would logically appear to call for consideration of possible
structural changes in the economy or more effective modes of
participation and communication between government and those
whose needs are high, these aspects of the problem are rarely
met with in the American literature on political development.[80]

c) Capability

Along with participation and stability, a third widely
agreed upon attribute of political development is the degree
to which a government possesses power capacity.

Lucian Pye, for instance, cites as one of the most
important dimensions of development the extent to which a
government can command resources to produce "outputs". The

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80   Ibid., p. 95.

assumption is, of course, that democracy (or the "pretense" of it?) Will accompany this, in as much as the capacity to mobilise resources is "usually crucially affected by the popular supprt which the regime commands".[81] Similarly, Von Vorys, while making no mention at all of popular participation, goes even so far as to advise that progress along with the route to political development should be measured by "increments in the government's capacities to coerce and persuade".[82] In the same vein of thought Almond and Verba affirm that the "analysis of the capabilities of political systems, including potential capability and the support bases of capability, provides a useful conceptual tool for the study of political development".[83]

What is interesting to note, however, is that these writers ignore the fact that such a model resembles more a doctrinaire socialist rather than a liberal Anglo-American model. Is not their argument also painfully reminiscent of the utilitarian's argument that liberation and the free-

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81   Lucian Pye op. cit., (No. 50), p. 10.

82   Karl von Vorys, op. cit. (No. 74), p. 19

83   Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Little, Brown and Co., (Boston: 1966), p. 207.

market-place-of-ideas are suitable for England, while the

imposition of colonial policies is appropriate for the

"uncivilized" world? Finally none of the theorists of

political development referred to here appears to endorse

the desirability of a strong government at the developmental

stage, with the idea that once the developed stage is

reached, such government should, to some extent at least,

wither away: rather these ideas are presented in a manner

to indicate that not merely is such power necessary to become

developed, but also to be developed as well.[84]

2) Non-Political Contents of Development

Political development is closely associated to, but

never identical with, the process of modernization, a concept

employed to deal with the non-political contents of political

development. The principal aspects of modernization have been

listed by Daniel Lerner as urbanization, industrialisation,

secularisation, democratisation, education, and media

expansion.[85]

a) Rationalism and Secularism

According to Samuel P. Huntington, modernisation has

a prychological, intellectual, demographic, social and economic

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84   S.K. Arora. op. cit. (No. 57), p. 96

85   Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society,
       Free Press (Glencoe: 1958), p. 438.

dimensions.[86] At the psychological level, it involves "a
fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations".
As against the traditional man who expected continuity in
nature and society, and did not believe in the capacity of
man to control or change either, the modern man is expected
to accept the possibility of change and believe in its
desirability. The modern man is said to have a "mobile
personality" that easily adjusts to changes in his encironment.
And these changes necessarily require the broadening of
loyalties and identifications from concrete and immediate
groups (such as the family, the clan, and the village) to
larger and more impersonal groupings (such as class and
nation).

With such changes, of course, comes an increasing
reliance on universalistic rather than particularistic
values and on standards of achievement rather than ascription
in judging individuals. This, in essence, is the process of
secularisation itself. More technically secularisation is,
as defined by Almond and Powell,

> "the process whereby traditional orientations
> and attitudes give way to more dynamic decision-
> making processes involving the gathering of
> information, the evaluation of information, the
> laying out of alternative courses of action,
> the selection of a course of action from among

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86   Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
        Societies, (New Haven: 1969), pp. 32-33.

these possible courses, and the means whereby
one tests whether or not a given course of
action is producing the consequences which
were intended". 87/

When, on the one hand, secularisation implies the

emergence of a pragmatic empirical orientation, it demands,

on the other hand, a movement from diffuseness to specificity
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of orientations.

b) Social Mobilisation and Urbanisation

On the intellectual plane, modernisation involves an

expansion of man's knowledge about his environment, and the

diffusion of this knowledge through out the society by means

of increased literacy, mass-communications, and education-

demographically, it means changes in the pattern of life, a

marked increase in health and life-expectancy, increased

occupational, vertical and geographical mobility, and in

particular, the rapid growth of urban population as against

the rural. Socially, it tends to supplement the family and

other primary groups having diffuse roles with consciously

organized secondary associations having much more specific

functions. A technical concept utilized to describe this

process is social mobilization, defined by Karl Deutsch as the

process by which "major clusters of social, economic, and

psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people

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87   Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, op. cit. (No. 83),
        pp. 24-25.

88   Ibid., p. 58.

become available for new patterns of socialisation and behaviour.[89] The process is sometimes referred to also as urbanisation.

c) Industrialisation and Economic Development

At the economic level, there occurs a diversification of economic activity. The traditional pattern of a few and simple occupations give way to many and complex ones. The level of occupational skill rises. The ratio of capital to labour increases. Subsistence agriculture gives way to market agriculture, and agriculture itself declines in significance as compared to commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural activities. With the expansion of the geographical scope of economic activity, and the centralisation of such activity at the national market, there occurs a sudden growth in the national source of capital as well as national economic institutions. Eventually these would lead to greater economic well-being and a gradual decline of economic inequalities.[90] This complex process is often referred to as the process of industrialisation and economic development.

At the outset, the above picture of modernisation is rosy and innocent. But a closer analysis reveals a different reality. In the analysis of the assumptions underlying the

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89 Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilisation and Political Development", American Political Science Review, 55, September 1961), p. 494.

90 S.P. Huntington, op. cit. (No. 86), pp. 33-34.

typically political contents of political development, it was found that most of the standard studies present a definition of political development in such a way that the Anglo-American model appears in the most developed bracket. The same line of thinking has been also betrayed in the treatment of the non-political contents of political development.[91] Thus, for instance, Almond and Verba in the Civic Culture seeks to demonstrate that of all the five countries studied, Britain and America not only represent the "two relatively stable and successful democracies", but also that they "approximate the civic culture", i.e. the ideal concomitant infrastructure for a politically developed and presumably desirable political system.[92]

From these considerations, the methodology of comparative analysis as utilized by Almond and Verba appears to be meant to wxamine not whether or not the other nations in the study might have something to contribute in their favour by virtue of a slightly different arrangement of parts, but rather to measure the degree to which the psychoٔcultural phenomena found in the American data occur in the states which differ from America in their presumed degree of commitment to democracy.

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91   See, S.K.Arora, op. cit. (No. 57), pp. 96-103.

92   Almond and Verba, Civic Culture (Princeton: 1963)
        p. 473.

For fear of being dogmatic, it is necessary to dissect the main non-political concomitants of political development discussed above.

i) Social Mobilisation and Urbanisation

First, the case of industrialisation and urbanisation. Scholars viewing urbanisation as a measure of industrialisation, or directly correlated with political development base their argument often on the assumption that although its direct effect upon democratic political development is negligible, it causes educational levels to rise, which in turn leads to higher levels of mass communications, which in turn finally produces political development. They consider that the urban centre is the key factor in transmitting "modern" values (that too in a unidirectional fashion) to the rural or the "traditional" elements in the society.[93] But this line of thinking suffers from two drawbacks.[94]   On the one hand, this argument, on the surface, appears eminently logical: Educating a population to wider identifications, and to a national and political action and values would seem facilitated if significant number of people are congregated in a single locale, rather than scattered over a wider area. With this assumption, Karl Deutsch, for instance,

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93   M. Nash, The Golden Road to Modernity, (New York: 1965), p. 3.

94   S.K. Arora, op. cit. (No. 57), pp. 98-99.

felt that it would be the workers rather than the peasants who would beable to inculcate the ideas and identities necessary for a revolution. And, of course, the fact that persons from differing places of origin working together in an urban centre is often reason enough to awaken ex-peasants to new identities. But on deeper reflection, one wonders whether, given technical advances and the modern means of communicationtoday, there is sufficient reason to hold so tenaciously to the above theory that urbanization should be utilised, either directly or indirectly, as a measure and indication of political development. Without congregating people together into urban centres, social and politican mobilisation can be encouraged through mass media, such as radio which can reach into the hinterland with ease, provided sufficient governmental investment is made. Or else, public elites can, with relative $_{\lambda}$ase and speed, travel to rural populations personally to convey information and value laden communications.

This consideration apart, there is some evidence at least to suggest that industrialisation of thevariety as developed in Japan, did not do so by luring everyone to urban centres, but rather by <u>decentralising</u> industry and other centres of power, production and guidance.[95] Moreover, cities in the

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95 See, Edward Nosbeck, "Common Interest Associations in Rural Japan", in Robert J. Smith and Tichard K. Beardsby, <u>Japanese Culture: Its Development and Characteristics</u>, (Chicago, 1962), pp. 73-85.

most "advanced" countries are today the locales of discontent
and political instability. Attempts are made there to
channel resources into projects of "urban renewal", and the
search for "green belts". The reason is that patterns which
emerge with industrial development are proving to have
produced undesirable and, in some cases at least, politically
dangerous results.[96] This is reason enough to seriously
question the desirability of "urbanisation" as a predictive
indicator of political development.

The availability and utility of increased communica-
tions arising out of industrialisation and urbanisation have
been over-emphasized by several scholars of political develop-
ment.[97] But they ignore the fact that channels are essentially
neutral-empty networks through which messages flow, and power
is exerted and influenced. Therefore, provided, of course,
that the government in power does not monopolize them, communi-
cation channels can provide the means for disruption as well
as affiliating or binding messages to be effectively trans-
mitted.[98]

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96   In this context Alvin Toffler, The Future Shock (London:
      1970) deserves special consideration wherein is argued
      that the Western pattern of industrialisation and
      technological advance has been accompanied by a pro-
      portionate increase in mental breakdowns among the people.

97   See Lucian Pye (ed) Communications and Political Develop-
      ment, (Princeton: 1963), Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and
      Social Communication, (Cambridge: 1953); Wilber Schramm,
      Mass Media and National Development, (Standord: 1964).

98   See Marshal McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extension .
      of Man, (New York: 1964), Kenneth Boulding, The Image,
      (Ann Arbor: 1954).

ii) Industrialisation and Economic Development

When Ernest Gellner defines political/development in terms of industrialisation and nationalism[99], Coleman asserts that "Following Lipset, our major working hypothesis is that there is a positive correlation between economic development and political competitiveness"[100]. The assumption has always been that the process of industrialisation itself, especially when guided by a governmental elite, is indicative of the capacity of government to harness resources and produce outputs through the exercise of effective power. It has been already pointed out earlier, while discussing rationality and secularism as well as social mobilisation and urbanisation, that many social scientists also argue that the attitudes accompanying industrial society - the industrial society of the West at least—contribute to a political culture which/can sustain political development.

What is interesting to note is the fact, that the type of economic development which took place in the West may have been accompanied by inhuman treatment towards those in the lower ranges of society appears irrelevant in the above theories.

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99   Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, (London: 1967), pp.33ff.

100   Almond and Coleman op. cit.   (No. 62), p. 537.

Barrington Moore, for instance, has pointed out the fact that the "enclosure acts", commonly cited as having given one of the greatest impetuses to economic development in England, practically eliminated peasants as a meaningful class in the social structure.[101]

iii) Rationality and Secularism

And how to take up rationality and secularism. Rationality and secularism are concepts of Max Weber, adopted by Talcott Parsons, and utilized for purposes of analysing the degree to which a society, maybe considered developed. According to this demand, rational behaviour within a bureaucracy, for instance, may demand that one come "straight to the point" and not waste time in non-related (irrational) exchanges. But we know that in several parts of Asia, such behaviour might, in the long run, defeat one's purposes, since much emphasis is placed upon forms of behavioural politeness, hospitability, and the like. Advocates of rationalism also assume that rationality demands that in relations with the external world, an individual places his own personal interests above those of the primary groups, especially when such interests tend to conflict. Yet we know that in Japan, for instance, it is by stressing the familial values and interests that the most efficient, that

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101   Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (Boston: 1966), p. 13.

is to say, rational- result tend to become optimized even in political and economic spheres. Moreover, there is also some evidence at least to suggest that personal ambition, that is to say, achievement motivation on the part of the individual living in a family based society is encouraged, if it is rationalized in terms of aiding or bringing honour to the family or assuaging guilt with respect to the family, rather than the individual himself.[102]

III. Methodological Assumptions[@]

The models of nation-building have something more in common, viz. the methodological assumptions on which they are based. Comparative in approach and behavioural in perspective, the models of nation-building have been erected on a group of tenets collectively known as structural-functionalism. Hence the need here of discussing comparative analysis behaviouralism, and structural functionalism.

i) Comparative Analysis

How the comparative focus in political analysis came into vogue has been already hinted at while discussing the evolution of the concept of political development. But much nothing was said about what exactly the comparative perspective meant. That task is taken up here.

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102   S.K. Arora. op. cit., (No. 57), pp. 101-102.

@   One may ask why this section is added here. This essay being a survey of the literature on nation-building an evaluation of the methodological assumptions under-lying the works is in place.

Laying down the guidelines for a comparative study of the new states, Edward Shils stated that the orderly understanding of the new states requires that they be seen sub specie asternitates (under eternal species), or at least within the categories of known human experience. It was his eontention that in order to escape from ad hoc explanations, in which the canons of explanation are historically accidental, the scholars should promulgate categories that are equally applicable to all states and societies, to all territories and epochs. Variations are to be subsumed only within these categories.[103]

Having stated the necessity of adopting a comparative perspective in studying the politics of the new states, Edward Shils went on to define what he means by a comparative study:

> "An inquiry may be considered comparative if it proceeds by the use of an analytical scheme through which different societies may be systematically compared to that, by the use of a single set of categories, their identities and uniqueness may be disclosed and explained. The analysis is comparative if the explanation draws on variables and the values of variables that are applicable to the description and analysis of societies widely different in time and place from that under immediate consideration. An inquiry into a particular society

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103   Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New
       States", in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and
       New States, Amerind, (New Delhi: 1971); p. 13.

will be considered comparative if its descrip-
tions and explanations assert, imply, or permit
the systematic juxtaposition of that society
or of some section of it with other societies
or their corresponding sectors." 104/

By giving the above definition of a comparative study,
Edward Shils was merely acting as the spokesman for a whole
tradition in social science, initiated by Max Weber and
adhered to by almost all of the scholars busy with studying
the political processes in the new states. Refining and
correcting the historicist traditions, Max Weber went
beyond historical particularity in his grandiose set of
categories for analysing the types of authority. Such an
approach had enabled him to set forth the affinities, the
identities, and the differences of the great historical
societies in a way that no other social scientist has ever
done before or since. It is even claimed that the great
sources of historicism -- Hegel, Marx, and Romanticism --
came to fulfilment in Max Weber's work in an idiom and
imagery necessary for the progress of empirical research.[105]

At any rate, the models of nation-building suggested
by the scholars dealing with the political processes in
the new states cannot be adequately understood except in the

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104   Ibid., pp. 17-18

105   Ibid., pp. 20-21.

context of their comparative perspective. Considering them-
selves as the beneficiaries of the achievement of Max Weber,
these scholars thought of the comparative study of the new
states not as a self-contained discipline, but as part of
the systematic analysis of human society, in which all
societies are seen as members of a single species.

While the comparative perspective has much to recommend
itself, it suffers from a major set back: the danger of
ignoring the cultural and historical uniqueness of states.
The states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are all looked
upon as "new states". But how "new" is India or China, for
instance, as compared to the states in Africa or Latin America?
Both these states have had the historical experience of
organized polity, even to a very sophisticated degree, from
the ancient days onwards. But this was not the case with any
of the "new states", in Africa or Latin America. In the same
way, both India and China had their own ancient literature
which included detailed treatments on organized social life,
and even what could be specially called sophisticated politi-
cal thought, and statecraft. No evidence is there so far
to suggest that any of the "new states" in Africa or Latin
America had such a tradition and historical experience. Hence,
to overlook these aspects of historical experience of the
states and merely basing on the fact of colonial subjugation
and the post-colonial new sovereignty, to club all the once-

colonized peoples as "new states" is highly misleading as it is inaccurate.

2. **Behaviouralism**

The present discussion of behaviouralism in political science is mainly focussing upon (a) its historical evolution, (b) main tenets and (c) major weaknesses.

(a) **Historical Evolution**

As pointed out by James C. Charlesworth, behaviouralism in political science, to be well understood, has to be located in its proper place in the history of the shifting trends in political analysis.[106] Among the methodological approaches preceding the emergence of behaviouralism, at least thirteen schools could be identified.[107]

i) **Allegorical**

The allegorical method has been adopted by Plato xx in his Republic, in which he used a sustained metaphor to elucidate the principle of the proper subordination of the elements in the make-up of a man.

ii) **Analytical**

The analytical approach is to be found in the case method, first exhibited by Aristotle in his Politics, in which

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106   James C. Charlesworth, "Identifiable Approaches to the study of Politics and Government", in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis, The Free Press (New York: 1967), pp. 1-10.

107   Ibid., pp. 2-3.

known ingredients are associated with known results.

iii) Authoritative-Revelational

The authoritative-revelational school presumes to know the mind of God and to enunciate an immanent natural law. Two of the most prominent votariew of this school are Thomas Acquinas and James I.

iv) Comparative

The comparatige school has its counterparts in religion, philosophy, and architecture. It has provided American students for many decades with the ham-and-eggs of political science.

v) Cyclical-Historical

The cyclical-Historical method has been employed to purport to show that political history repeats itself, so that wisemen are enabled to acquire that very rare faculty, viz. to learn and act from experience. The earliest exponent of this key to understanding was Polybius.

(vi) Descriptive

Although closely related to the comparative, the descriptive method is said to be far less illuminating. And yet, scores of text book writers on American government employ this device to introduce beginning students to a sui generis view of their republic.

vii) <u>Empiricist-Pragmatic</u>

The empiricist-pragmatic approach relates political institutions to political ecology. Among its advocates were Montesquieu, de Tocaueville, and Compte.

viii) <u>Jurisprudential</u>

The juriprudentialists are wrestling with the inscrutable question of whether law is anterior to and superior to government.

ix) <u>Metaphysical</u>

The exercise of the metaphysical school consists of first in the creation of undefinable words like "state" and "sovereignty", and then in spending centuries trying to define them.

x) <u>Polemical</u>

The polemicists like Calhoun, the monarchomachs, and the stentors on both sides of the medieval church-state dispute, believe that argument is an/avenue to the truth, As a result, they often degrade polarized discussion into court-room debates.

xi) <u>Presumptive-Logical</u>

The presumptive-logical school starts with a basic assumption of what political man is like, and then, with a strong show of adjectival logic, concludes that his political institutions must be thus and so. Foremost among the adherents of this school have been Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson, Rousdeau, and Condorcet.

xii) Realist

The realist school in political science was inaugurated by Machiavelli and Bodin in the sixteenth century. The main contention is that it is sufficient to portray what is, without moralizing as to what ought to be.

xiii) Skeptical

The skeptical method, examplified by Hume, sought to question validity rather than to devise a substitute for validity.

These thirteen schools as identified by James Charlesworth have been listed above mainly to show that it is in the watershed of much heated controversies regarding the correct method in political analysis that the new method known as behaviouralism came into vogue. Such a focus upon the place of behaviouralism in the historical evolution of political science could be sharpened by placing it also in the context of the evolution of social science itself.

As rightly observed by David Easton, historically all social knowledge was originally one and indivisible.[108] It was only at a later stage that the intellectual specialization of labour appeared on the scholarly scene in the Western world. For almost two thousand years, from the early classical Greek period to somewhere in the eighteenth century, men sasixakkx basically saw each other not as specialists but as

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108   David Easton, The Current Meaning of Behavioralism in James C. Charlesworth, op. cit. (No. 106), pp. 20-21.

general seekers after wisdom and knowledge, as philosophers
in the original sense of the word. Although as early as
the Middle Ages law, theology, and medicine stood as separate
n/ abd coordinate fields of learning and teaching in the univer-
sities philosophy continued to embrace the bulk of human
knowledge about man in society.

But by the eighteenth century, what came to be called
natural philosophy was distinguished from moral philosophy.
As knowledge in both these fields increased remarkably during
that century, their names underwent a further subtle modification
Under the heightening prestige of chemistry, physics, and bio-
logy, they acquired the names of natural and moral sciences.
And with further elaboration during the nineteenth century,
especially under the impetus of Saint-Simon and Auguste Compte
with their sharp focus on human relationships in society, the
moral sciences finally became known by the contemporary phrase,
viz. social sciences. Thus with increasing weight and
differential rate and direction of the development of knowledge
in the modern historical periods, the general corpus of know-
ledge previously known as philosophy, finally broke up into
specialized segments.

Now the question remains to be answered why, at a
particular moment, in its history, a significant part of the
social sciences has come to be called the behavioural sciences.

It was, so to say, an accidental development. At the time
a Senate Committee in America was exploring the need for a
national science foundation to stimulate and provide funds
for scholarly research, representatives of the social sciences
worked hard for the inclusion of their disciplines within
the scope of the proposed legislation. During the debate,
some senators insisted upon talking of social science as
socialist science. It is said that it was in an effort to
abort the growth of further confusion that the phrase
"behavioural sciences" was coined to refer to all living
systems of behaviour, biological as well as social. An
underlying idea was, of course, that the new phrase would
serve to identify those aspects of the social sciences that
might come under the aegis of a foundation devoted to the
support of hard sciences. And at about the same time the
Ford Foundation was being organized, and, in looking around
for an appropriate title for the section devoted to the
encouragement of the scientific development of social
knowledge, the decision was made to call it the Behavioral
Science Division. In fine, these two accidental forces
converged to popularize the new name.[109]

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109   Ibid. p. 21. See also J.G. Miller, "Toward a General
       Theory for the Behavioral Sciences", in L.D. White,
       "The State of the Social Sciences (Chicago: University
       of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 29-65.

b) Main Tenets

"The behavioral Persuasion in Politics", says Heing Eulau, "is concerned with what man does politically and the meanings he attaches to his behavior"[110] Man is taken to be the root, as it is impossible to say anything about the governance of man without talking about the political behaviour of man -- his acts, goals, drives, feelings, beliefs, commitments, and values. Since man has built nations and empires, created customs and institutions, invented symbols and constitutions, made wars, revolutions and peace, politics is looked upon as the study of why man finds it necessary or desirable to build government, of how he adapts government to his changing needs or demands, and of how and why he decides on public policies.[111]

What has been termed above as the "behavioural persuasion" is the outcome of adding two new ingredients to contemporary social science research, viz. a great demand for empirical theory at all levels of generality, and an attempt at locating stable units of analysis which might possibly play the role in social research that the particles of matter do in the physical sciences.

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110   Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, Random House (New York: 1963), p. 5.

111   Ibid., p. 3

As far *as* the quest for greater empiricism is concerned,
it is based on the assumption that the only way to under-
stand the man-in-politics is to observe him and record what
he does in the courtroom, in the legislative hall, in the
hustings, and is motivated by the hope of a science of
politics modelled after the methodological assumptions
of the natural sciences. In an attempt to spell out the
nature of such an assumption and goal, David Easton has
offered the following itemized list.[112]

i) <u>Regularities</u>: There are discoverable uniformities
in political behavior. These can be expressed in
generalisations or theories with explanatory and
predictive value.

ii) <u>Verification</u>: The validity of such generalisations
must be testable, in principle, by reference to
relevant behavior.

iii) <u>Techniques</u>: Means for acquiring and interpreting
data cannot be taken for granted. They are problem-
atic and need to be examined self-consciously,
refined, and validated so that rigorous means can
be found for observing, recording, and analyzing
behaviour.

iv) <u>Quantification</u>: Precision in the recording of data
and the statement of findings requires measurement

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112   David Easton, op. cit. (No. 108), pp. 16-17.

and quantifications not for their own sake, but
only where possible, relevant, and meaningful in
the light of other objectives.

v) <u>Values</u>: Ethical evaluation and empirical explanation
involve two different kinds of propositions that,
for the sake of clarity, should be kept analytically
distinct. However, a student of political behavior
is not prohibited from asserting propositions of
either kind separately or in combination as long as
he does not mistake one for the other.

vi) <u>Systematization</u>: Research ought to be systematic,
that is to say, theory and research are to be seen
as closely intertwined parts of a coherent and
orderly body of knowledge. Research untutored by
theory may prove trivial, and theory unsupported by
data, futile,

vii) <u>Pure Science</u>: The application of knowledge is as
much a part of the scientific enterprise as theo-
retical understanding. But the understanding and
explanation of political behavior logically precede
and provide the basis for efforts to utilize politi-
cal knowledge in the solution of urgent practical
problems of society.

viii) <u>Integration</u>: Because the social sciences deal with
the whole human situations political research can

ignore the findings of other disciplines only at the peril
of weakening the validity and undermining the generality
of its own results. Recognition of this interrelationship
will help to bring political science back to its status of
earlier centuries and return it to the main fold of the
social sciences.

As for the quest for the units of analysis, the first
thing to be kept in mind is the fact that in the course of
time scholars have experimented with several such units.
When George Catlin, for instance, turned to the Will as his
basic unit of analysis, Charles Merriam and others in the
Chicago School focussed on Power, and for that reason, the
latter had been elevated to a central position. Herbert
Simon going one step further, in his Administrative Behavior
adopted the decision-making process as the unit of analysis.
For Talcott Parsons, however, the Weberian derived notion of
action seemed to provide the most fruitful unit out of which
a common macrotheory might be constructed, so that it would
be of service to all of the social disciplines. For those
deriving from anthropology, functions of various kinds
supplied a rather broad and different kind of unit, some-
what slippery to handle, but yet a unit that could be dis-
covered and utilized in all of the social disciplines. The
most recent fascination is for systems as a possible focus,

beginning with the smallest cell in the human body as a system and working up through ever more inclusive systems such as the human being as an organism, the human personality, small groups, broader institutions, societies, and collections of societies, such as the international system.[113]

Thus the two chief tenets of the behavioural approach are that there are certain fundamental units of analysis relating to human behaviour out of which generalizations can be formed, and that these generalizations might provide a acommon base on which the specialized sciences of man in society could be built. And this new mood implies the adoption of a scientific method in data collection and data processing as well as a theoretical search for stable units for understanding human behaviour in its political aspects.

C) **Major Limitations**

While not doubting whether behaviouralism in its several forms has an important contribution to make in the study of political things, one is nevertheless compelled to question whether the behavioral approach is adequate in itself for an understanding of politics. And the answer, at the outset, is that the politisist must be much more than a behavouralist: he must be a historian, a lawyer, and an ethicist as well. As neatly stated by Mulford Sibley, the limitations of behaviouralism arise from five factors: (I)

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113   Ibid. pp. 24-25-

the very selection of subjects for investingation is shaped by values which are not derivable from the investigation; (ii) in the end, the concepts and values which do determine what and how one studies are related to one's judgements of the goals which one identifies with political life and to one's general "life experience"; (iii) once the investigation is launched, there are definite limits to what one can expect from behavioural studies; (iv) behaviourally oriented study will remove one from the stuff of everyday politics and cannot be related to that stuff except by means which would usually be regarded as non-behavioural; and (v) if clarification about policy-making is one objective of the politicist, behaviouralism, although destined to play a significant role, is restricted in what it can be expected to do.[114]

Among these five sources supplying behaviouralism with limitations, the third one, viz. the inherent limitations of the behavioural study, needs further elaboration. There are chiefly three such limitations; the behavioural method is not capable of (a) dealing with the behaviour of the behaviouralist, (b) stating what ought we to value in political life, and (c) forecasting the future.[115]

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114   Mulford Q. Sibley, "The Limitations of Behavioralism", in James C. Charlesworth, op.cit. (No. 106) pp.52-53

115   Ibid., pp. 59-66.

Thus although inaugurated with much fanfare, and accredited with much capabilities, behaviouralism suffers from a number of limitations, and as an approach for the complete understanding of the political realm, it is far from being adequate in itself.

3. Structural-Functionalism

Structural functionalism in political analysis is an offshoot of what the American political scientists call modern comparative politics. Disappointed with debating political ideologies and discussing the legal and institutional procedures, political scientists started focussing their attention on these political processes that are common to all political systems. In their attempt to sharpen their understanding of the common political activities, they stuck upon what they called political functions and political structures, and started analysing the political phenomena in reference to these two sets of concepts. ~~This essay is meant to be~~ A brief evaluation of this structural functional framework for political analysis is taken up here.

a) As an Analytical Framework

The intellectual roots of functionalism are to be found in the writings of social ~~anth~~ anthropologists like Redeliffe-Brown and B. Malinowski who studied pre-literate or tribal societies and "functionally" justified the role of rituals,

magic and religion, and emphasized their integrative role.
But it was Talcott Parsons, the prolific writer in Sociology
who developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for the
study of societies.[116]   And, applying the structural
functional analysis to political science, Gabriel Almond
developed a list of political functional requisites.[117]

The main attempt of the structual-functional framework
is to identify a society's functional requisites, that is
to say, the function which must be performed if the society
is to continue to operate. Four such functions are usually
identified, viz.

    i)   goal attainment, which is the principal function
        performed by the polity;

    ii) adaptation, involving activities which provide
        resources for the social system's operation;

  iii) integration, entailing the holding of the system
        together; and

    iv) pattern maintenance, also called allocation, in-
        volving the transmission of major values, the
        application of sanctions for violations of values,
        and the operation of tension management process to
        prevent the development of situations that increase

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116   See Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action,
        Allan and unwin (London, 1949); Structure and process in
        Modern Societies, Free Press (Glencos: 1960); The Social
        System, Macmillan, (New York,1951); T. Parsons and H.A.
        Shils, (ed.) Towards a Formal Theory of Action, Harward
        University Press, 1951.

117   G. Alwani, B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Develop-
        mental Approach, Little Brown andCo. (Boston: 1960).

the probability that large numbers of actors will
violate basic norms.[118]

Gabriel Almond, who developed a list of political
functional requisites, divides such requisites into four in-
put functions and three output (or governmental) functions.[119]
The four "input" functions are: (i) political socialisation and
recruitment; (ii) interest articulation; (iii) interest
aggregation; and (iv) political commication.[1] And the three
"output" or "governmental" functions are: (i) rule-making,
(ii) rule-application; and (iii) rule-adjudication, equi-
valent to what were conventionally called the tasks of the
three branches of government viz. the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary. It is claimed that all poli-
tical systems could be comparatively analyzed with the aid of
this framework.

b) <u>Basic Assumptions</u>

The structural-functional framework is based upon the
assumptions underlying the concepts of (a) the political systems,
(b) interaction between the system and the sub-systems, and
(c) stability as an outcome and as a goal.

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118   Robert T. Hold, "A Proposed Structural Functional
       Framework for Political Science," in Don Martindals (ed),
       <u>Functionalism in the Social Sciences: The Strengths and
       Limits of Functionalism</u>, (Philadalphia: 1965).

119   G. Almond and J.S. Coleman, (ed.) <u>The Politics of
       Developing Areas</u>, (Princeton: 1960), p. 17.

i) **Political System**

The unifying link for the structural-functional framework for political analysis is to be found in the concept of 'political system', first developed by David Easton.[120] Easton was primarily concerned with portraying the relationships between a system and the environment in which it was located. And so he directed his attention to the boundary between politics and other aspects of social life and postulated the existence of a close relationship between the system and the environment. The boundaries of a system are to be inferred from the frequency of relations between the units. He divided the basic components of his model into inputs, consisting of "demands" and "support" coming from the environment, and outputs, going out from the decision-making elite. The medium connecting the environment with the decision-making elite is the feed back process. Support is derived from satisfaction with the systems' outputs, and from more generalised or diffused support or approval from the system itself, the latter being a necessity because a systems' output cannot satisfy everybody. Easton distinguished between external demands coming from the environment, and internal demands coming from within the system. The objects of support

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120   David Easton. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics, IX (1957), 384. See also his The Political Systems Alfred Knopf, (New York, 1953), and A Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice-Hall Inc. ((Engewood Cliffs: 1965).

are (a) the political community, defined as a "group that
seeks to settle differences or promote decisions through
peaceful action in common"; (b) the regime, equivalent to
the constitutional order, including arrangements for the
processing of demands and implementation of decisions, and
(c) the government, which undertakes concrete tasks.

There is no doubt that the systemic concept of society
is fundamental to all the functionalists. It is assumed
that the society is a single, interconnected social system,
each element of which performs a definite function. Funtion-
alists are very clear on this. As correctly observed by
Alwin Couldner;

> "The intellectual fundament of functional
> theory in sociology is the concept of a "system".
> Functionalism is nothing if it is not the
> analyzis of social patterns as parts of larger
> systems of behaviour and belief. Ultimately,
> therefore, an understanding of functionalim
> in sociology requires an understanding of the
> resources of the concept of "system". 121/

ii) Interaction

The basic feature of the politiczl system, it is further
assumed, is the interaction of its components for the main-
tenance of equilibrium. Thus, for instance, Easten suggests

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121   W. Couldner, "Reciprocity and Antonomy in
        Functional Theory", in Llewellyn Gross (ed.) Symposium
        on Sociological Theory, Harper & Rowe, (New York: 1959),
        p. 241.

that a political system can be designated as those interactions

through which values are authoritatively allocated for a

society - In his theory the allocation of values for a society

and the relative frequency of compliance with them are the

essential variables of political life. He talks of demands and

supports which he calls the input functions, as he also

speaks of outputs. The feedback loop is introduced to explain

the way in which the system can cope with stress. Since

information is essential for meeting the demands and coping

with stresses, it is suggested that the communication net-

works should be kept sufficiently efficient to maintain the

system.

Similarly Gabriel Almond too, following the thinking

of Parsons, Easton and other functionalists, defines the

political system as

> "that system of interactions to be found in all
> independent societies which performs the functions
> of integration and adaptation (both internally
> vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employ-
> ment, or threat of employment, of more or less
> legitimate physical compulsion". 122/

The four assumptions on which Almond has based his

functional analysis are: (i) all political systems have

political structures; (ii) the same functions are performed

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122   G. Almond and J.S. Coleman (ed.) The Politics of
       Developing Areas, (Princeton: 1960), p. 7.

in all political systems with different frequencies and
by different kinds of structures; (iii) all political
structures are *multifunctional*; and (iv) all political
structures are "mixed" systems in the cultural sense.[123]

iii) **Stability**

Stability with equilibrium and continuity is assumed
to be the outcome of the systemic interactions. The function-
alists speak of the system as an on-going thing. David Easton
is very clear on this point:

> "The question that gives coherence and purpose
> to a rigorous analysis of political life as a
> system of behaviour is: How do political systems
> manage to permist in a world of both stability
> and change? Ultimately, to search for an answer
> will reveal what we may call the life processes of
> political systems — those fundamental functions
> without which no system could endure — together
> with the special modes of response through which
> systems manage to sustain them". 124/

Thus a major assumption of the structural functionalists
is that they are dealing with what Easton calls the life
processes of political systems. Hence the observation by
Carl Hampel that the functional analyst "seeks to understand
a behaviour pattern or a social-cultural institution in terms
of the role it plays in keeping the given system in proper
working order and thus maintaining it as a going concern."[125]

123   Ibid.

124   David Easton, (ed.) Varieties of Political Theory
       Prentice-Hall, Inc: (Englended Cliffs: 1966), p. 143

125   Carl G. Hampal, "The Logic of Functional Analysis", in
       Llewellyn Gross (Ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory,
       Harper & Rowe (New York: 1959), p. 278.

In fine, the assumptions underlying the concepts of political system, interaction, and sub-systems contain the key to the understanding of functionalism in political science.

c) Critical Evaluation

The strongest criticism of structural-functionalism has come from the Marxist Social Scientists.[126] Their attacks have been mainly on three fronts: They charge structural-functionalism (a) of being spiritualistic and metaphysical; (b) of having ignored the dimension of change; and (c) of being unable to deal with the future.

i) Spiritualistic and Metaphysical

The structural functionalists give the primary responsibility for the integrative function to the cultural elements, the main units of which are the family and the church (or religion). Although integration is said to be achieved by the coercive mechanism of the State, and the non-coercive mechanisms of the family and religion, the dominant role in value-integration is given to the latter. Such an approach has been criticised as being metaphysical and idealist: determining part of the system consists of "spiritual values", above all, religion as an element of the system discharging a necessary social function. Such a view is said to rule out the roles of conflicts and contradictions in society.

126   See, for instance, Alwin W. Gouldner, The Coming ~~Origin~~ Crisis of Western Sociology, Heinemann (London: 1971); Parey S. Calen, Modern Social Theory, Hainemann (London: 1968); Carl Hampel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis", in Llwwellen Cross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory, Harper & Rowe, (New York: 1959) ~~For a recent summary of these criticisms, See C.P.~~

ii) Neglecting Change

In their over-concern with stability, the structural functionalists ignores the problem of change. They fail to give adequate attention to the fact that the social "system" is never at rest, but always being subject to strains and conflicts. The little notice taken of change comes from their concern for order, stability, and survival of the system. Parsons, for instance, speaks of 'ordered process of change', and admits that "a general theory of the processes of change of social systems is not possible in the Present state of knowledge."[127] This statement has carned for Parsons and his followers the charge of conservatism and status-quoism. The charge is further made that the structureal-functionalists, viewing change on a gradual and adjustive process as against sudden and revolutionary, are ruling out the irreconsiliable antagonistic contradictions of a capitalist society. The sources of change are located in adjustment of the system to exogenous or extra-systemic changes, and not in mass revolutionary movements springing from within the system. The insistence is upon growth through structural and

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127   Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Amerind,
       (New Delhi: 1972), p. 486.

functional differentiation, as well as invention or inno-
vation by members of groups within the society. Thus class
struggle for resolving social contradictions and changing
society is not considered as a relevant source of change.[128]

iii) Pre-empting the Future

For the functionalists, the future seems to be a
pre-empted reality: the higher has already been achieved, (i.e
the capitalist social system?) It does not occur to them
that the present contains its own seeds of destruction, as
well as the seeds for the future order of things.

Having an already realized state of affairs as the
ideal, structural functionalism is simply teleological,[129]
and it has no real perspective for the future. Since the
structural-functionalists do not accept that the present
contains its own seeds of destruction they accept the
'master-instilations' of the present, and labour to preserve
them from major change or fatal destruction.[130]

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128   C.P. Bhambri, op. cit. (No. 126), pp. 461-63

129   Persy S. Coln op.cit. (No. 126).

130   C.P. Bhambri, op. cit. (No. 126), pp. 462-63.

Thus structural-functionalism appears unable to satisfactorily explain complex political reality in its entirety: its concern with the present and ~~its~~ stability is its strength and its weakness. While it can to some extent deal with the aspect of continuity in society, it is not able to do much about the changing/aspect of reality, for which the Marxian perspective is the strongest tool so far available. And yet, a down right rejection of it as altogether useless in political analysis may be, perhaps, too premature, and too drastic a step. If it can given concreteness in analysing the continuity aspect of reality, it does prove to be useful to that extent.

x x x   x x x   x x x

As shown above, the models of national building have been built in the light of the methodological perspectives that are shown here as being common to the scholars dealing with the political processes in the _noveau_ _monde_. And, as explicitated here, these methodological assumptions have imposed certain limitations on their very attempt to build models of nation-building, and those models of nation-building fabricated within the framework of these limitations have necessarily turned out to be defective ones in one way or other.

CONCLUSION

Although late in origin, the stream of literature on nation-building is considerably rich today. Certain common perspectives from which they have been written have made the different works on nation-building belong to a common stalk. The western experience of nation-growth taken as the background for a comparative approach; the focus upon nation-building in the new states as a wilful activity; the attempt at deriving models for describing, analysing and interpreting the political processes of the new states; the concerted and often concealed endeavour to suggest models for recommending ideal goals and value-structures for the new states; and the similar methodological assumptions underlying research upon the political processes in the new states -- all these are perspectives common to the vast literature on nation-building. And these common perspectives have offered a kind of homogeneity to the literature on nation-building. This is the main conclusion emerging from the present study.

I. Western Experience

R.M. MacIver is right in his observation that social protection and the ambition of power were the two most diverse but also most mingled motives which stimulated the formation of state-institutions. While the former impelled the rules from below, so to say, since their function as well as

their authority required them to consider the members or citizens of the state, the latter actuated them from within. And when and where the two motives combined to inspire the same course of action, there the state found its surest ground and quickest development. This, in short, is the history of the political institution of punishment, which involved the establishment of a judicial system, a code of criminal law, and an executive charged with its enforcement.[131]

As a necessary instrument of social order, the panoply of justice obviously increased the power of the government. Similarly, a combination of motives worked for the control of the state over property and for its regulation of the system of sexual relations, since in these matters the drive of human instincts is most apt to transgress the restrictions of custom and to cause social disintegration. And yet nowhere were the two motives so cunningly and so inextricably combined as in the provision of armed force against external enemies: here the demand for protection took on its most insistent form, and here also it most directly worked for the aggrandizement of political authority. Whereas elsewhere the exaltation of the ruler was the abasement of his subjects, here his exaltation was also theirs: the power of the chief was made manifest as the power of the people

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131   R.M. MacIver, The Modern State, Oxford University Press
        (London: 1966), p. 46.

as well. The people shared with him the necessity of

deliverance and security as ~~wxxxx~~ well as the feeling of glory

and triumph. And such a strong conjecture turned the grow-

ing state into an agency of dominance, creating peace within

and war abroad.[132]

i) **Italian Watershed**

Obviously this development was a gradual one. Although

the modern state began to evolve in the areas of Western

Europe such as northern Italy as early as the fifteenth

century, it was only by the seventeenth century that it be-

came a fairly general phenomenon and had taken on an un-

mistakable form. And yet, in the nineteenth century, however,

there were still some Western societies which had managed

to avoid the evolution toward a state form of government,

regional developments resembling states.

A word is in place about the kinds of governments

that existed before the development of the state. It is true

that the history of government goes back to primitive society,

in which politics was shrouded in the mysteries of custom,

kinship, and religious authority. And from there it was a

long way to the rationally organised Greek _polis_, which

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132   Ibid. pp. 46-47.

possessed one important element of the modern state viz. citizen-

ship -- although in a form rather undifferentiated from partner-

ship (in) in the entire social life of the community. There were

also the Greek concept of government as a joint enterprise of

the community, or an arrangement of offices", and notions of

office-holders as trustees responsible to the community. If

these political ideas did not blaze a trail toward modern

government, it was simply because theGreek _polis_ could not out-

last the rise of empires around it.[133]

2. Fall of Rome and its Aftermath

The rise of the Roman Empire, feudalism and the European

power politics were the key developments that paved the way for

the final evolution of the modern state.[134]

The Roman Republic and the Roman Empire made great strides

toward the modern state, with its elaborate and rational system

of law, its distinction of public and private spheres, and a

differentiated concept of citizenship. It is no exaggeration

to say that the Roman government came about as close as any

organized body politic to resembling the modern state: if it had

not been for the basic inability of Rome to maintain stability

and control over a vast multinational empire sprawled around the

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133   Peter H. Merkl, _Political Continuity and Change_, Harper
       and Row (New York: 1967), p. 58.

134   Ibid., pp. 59ff.

shores of the Mediterranean and as far north as England,
Rome might have become a modern state. But, as it happened,
this vast area could be held together only by alien armies
whose generals eventually turned against the republic, made
themselves emperors, and at times even turned the Roman
Empire into little more than a form of oriental despotism.

Feudalism arose out of the political chaos resulting
from the fall of Rome. Politics and government once more merged
with other social functions, particularly in the typical com-
bination with legal and quasi-property relationships between
feudal lords and vassals. Thus there was a reversal of the
trend toward the crystallization of political concerns:
instead of political relationship between rulers and citizens or
subjects, the feudal lord "owned" both land and people,
and loaned them out, so to speak, to lords of minor rank
in exchange for military and other services.

3. Enter the Modern Age

Most decisive in the rise of the modern state in Europe
were a series of incisive political, economic, and religious
changes that occurred at the decline of the Middle Ages and
helped to usher in the Modern Age, the most important among
these being the rise of (a) European power politics and (b)
absolutism.[135]

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135 Ibid. pp. 60-64.

a) European Power Politics

In the Middle Ages, under the sway of the Catholic
Church the European nations possessed a unity and comity.
But the decline of this unity and comity gave rise to the
European power politics. Religion started losing its hold
over the individual ruler and its power to prevent or at least
conciliate clashes of armed power among the members of the
European "family of nations" gradually declined. As the ruling
dynasty of each individual country achieved greater independence
from the European community and from the Church which used to
act as its moral guardian, the quest for greater national
power became more intense. With every country fighting either
for survival or for territorial aggrandizement, the scene of
what came to be known as the European power politics was well
on the stage. Wars and alliances of states were the order
of the day, and the concept of balance of power emerged both
as ap philosophy as well as a strategy.

b) Absolutism

Niccola Machiavelli (1469-1527) and his contemporaries
who witnessed and described the scene of the European power
politics were the first to formulate the word lo stato, the
state. Machiavelli's greatest contribution to an understanding
of the state as a historical phenomenon lies in the
formulation of the doctrine of the "reason of state", or the
"national interests" This doctrine postulated that the most

important interest ruling a ruler is the survival and
independence of a state, and thatta competent ruler is com-
pelled by circumstances to do everything in his power to
follow this basic interest.

The consequences of the rise of power politics and the
emergence of the doctrine of national self-interest were far-
reaching. In spite of the fact that the developments in the
various countries naturally differed from one another, and in
some cases took centuries to come to completion, there was
no mistaking the outcome: there arose a fundamental equality
before the law which united the citizens, or subjects of the
state, on a common political level. As the intermediate
bodies between the King and his subjects were eliminated, the
power of the state authority from now on could take direct
and equal effect upon all citizens collectively and
individually. With it came about also the consolidaation of
centralized territorial control, which is another typical
feature of the modern state.

The credit for the theory rationalizing the rise of
absolutism goes to the French writer and political philosopher,
Jean Bodin (1530-1596). It was his contention that in a well-
ordered state there has to be a person an agency, or a group
of office holders who exercise sovereignty, or supreme
authority, over all the other persons or agencies of the state.

He further argued that this sovereign   is <u>legibus salutus</u>,
in the sense of being above all laws or commands of another
except for the laws of rod, of nature, and the basic con-
stitutional order. A number of other writers too came up
to support Bodin's arguments, and to elucidate further aspects
of the concept of sovereignty and of the modern state in general
Among them were the Spanish *Jesuits*   and Dutch and German
Protestants such as Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Hugo Grotius
(1583-1645), Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) and Samuel
Pufendorf (1632-1694) who emphasized, in particular, the
international aspects of sovereignty. Their major theme was
that for a country to be sovereign in the international world,
it has to be independent and in full control of its external
relations. There were also theorists to concern themselves
with the sovereign authority of the state <u>vis-a-vis</u> other
social groups within the society such as the churches, business
establishments, and labour unions. Thus there was strong
philosophical/support for both external as well as internal
sovereignty of the state.

In brief, out of the European power politics of the
sixteenth century and the philosophical theories supporting
external and internal sovereignty of the state has emerged
the present nation-state system of the West. And it is against
the background of this Western experience of nation-growth
that most of the theorizing about the political processes in

the new states is done.

II. Descriptive and Prescriptive Models

When the western experience has been referred to as "nation-growth", it is customary today to speak of the political processes in the noveau-monde as "nation-building". The difference is one of focus, dictated of course, by the difference among the experiences themselves. While the former process, viz. the western experience, was one of gradual and unplanned evolution, the latter, viz. the experience of the noveau monde is one of accelerated, voluntaristic, and planned out manipulation. When the first was an evolutionary process, the second is a building process.

Having drawn their attention to the voluntaristic and goal-orientation aspects of the political processes of the noveau monde, political scientists have suggested both descriptive as well as prescriptive models of nation-building. While the descriptive models try to describe, analyse, and interpret the political processes of the noveau monde, the prescriptive models are under pain to suggest and prescribe what is best for the new states endeavouring to evolve themselves in to full fledged nations.

1) Descriptive Models

Although the different descriptive models of nation-building are not always the same in their focus and priorities of

interest, they do have certain common analytic perspectives.
For one thing, all of them without exception look upon the
political processes of the new states as a series of conscious,
voluntaristic, and planned out or goal-oriented activity.
They are also in agreement when they focus upon the common
background of the new states, viz. their colonial experience,
new sovereignty, elite culture, cultural traditionality, and
technological backwardness. Nor do the descriptive models
substantially differ in their definition of the nation-
building activity itself. Nation-building is generally
defined as a conscious and planned out political process
geared to the establishment of such political ingredients
as an effective government, modern economic system, cultural
modernity, national language, and national integration.
The assumption, of course, is that all such political ingredients
are the necessary attributes that a truly modern political
system should possess.

So far so good. But the descriptive models have failed
to focus upon certain important aspects. While all of them have
the western political systems as their points or sources of
reference for purposes of comparison, they fail to consider
the different historical and international contexts in which the
western nations emerged and the new states are paving their

way through. The significance of colonialism, for instance, for the western nations as its beneficiaries in economic and political terms and its positive contribution towards their modernization has not been adequately attended to. Nor does the impact of the two world wars on the western nations vis-a-vis the new states of the noveau monde find its deserving place. Nation growth in thewest is inadequately treated in the absence of these considerations, and natioh-building in the noveau-monde is illogically compared to the Western experience in the absence of such analytic perspectives. And the overwhelming role of economic considerations in the nation-building activity has been given only a disproportionate place in the descriptive models.

2) Prescriptive Models

The prescriptive models have been suggested under various value or normative assumptions and with the objective of produc- ingcertain desired results. The concept of "developmental syndrome" suggested by Lucian Pye best sums up the most important of such value norms and objectives.[136] Equality, capability, and Role specialisation are the three pillars on which the concept of developmental syndrome rests. While equality is said to imply the prevalence in a polity of

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136 Lucian W. Pye, "The Concept of Political Development", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (March, 1965), pp. 1-13.

universal laws applicable to every citizens, and achievement
criteria governing the system of all public rewards, capability
is adduced to imply a high degree of governmental performance
brought about through the adoption of rationality and secular
attitudes in officialdecisions. Role specialisation is
thought of as emerging along with structural specialisation
in the various functions of a political system, and is said
to be positively contributing towards integration among the
people rather than disintegration. In the light of these
assumptions, the prescriptive models endeavour to recommend
various measures for the speedy emergence of the "developmental
syndrome" among the new states.

III Models and Assumptions

A closer approach to the assumptions underlying the
models reveals their weakness. Mainly the philosophical,
normative, and methodological assumptions are to be picked up
for a trial of strength.

1) Philosophical Assumptions

By philosophical assumptions, the reference made here is
to the general philosophy of history underlying the models of
nation-building. The generally held philosophy is one or other
shade of evolutionism. While the evolutionist philosophy can
be maintained on logical arguments, one should also bear in
mind that what the advocates of evolutionism often bring in

for their support is more an optimistic faith in human progress rather than empirical evidence for it with explanatory theories. Conceding to overlook this, one cannot but be aware of the danger that, since evolutionism posits progress as _inevitable_, an undue adherence to evolutionism can relegate the role of human responsibility as well as creativeness. From the evolutionist perspective, all goals are inherent in the historical process. But the focus upon nation-building as a conscious voluntaristic, goal-oriented, planned-out activity, necessarily suggests that goals are to be posited by responsible individuals. And here is the hitch.

2) Normative Assumptions

It has almost become customary to speak of the stability of a political system, the over-all capability of a government, high rate of popular participation, accelerated economic development, widespread communications, the prevalence of rationality and secularism etc as the indicators of a developed and modern political system. But not much thought is given to the fact that these are attributes of the western political systems, abstracted by the Anglo-American political scientists and proposed as virtues to be aspired after by the rest of the world. Nor is enought attention given to the fact that any attempt at accepting these attributes as the goals and ideals for a new

nation indirectly implies the acceptance of a pre-empted future: the best has been already achieved, and there is no room or need for further experiments. Thus the two major drawbacks. of the existing models of nation-building taken up for discussion here are (a) the imposition of the Western values on the rest of the world, and (b) the acceptance of a pre-empted future.[137]

a) Imposing Western Values

There is no doubting the fact that the concept of political development, evolved through almost the exclusive efforts of Western scholars, has been based largely upon the historical experiences of Western Europe and the United States during the past two centuries. It is also true that the impetus for the development and elaboration of the concept has arisen largely within a context of the post-war political tensions existing between the proponents of "democratic" and "communist" models of nation-building.[138]

The approaches taken up in the models of nation-building have also tended to be self-limiting because they often overlook

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137 S.K. Arora, "Pre-Empted Future? Notes on Theories of Political Development", Behavioural Sciences and Community Development, Vol. 2, No. 2, September, 1968

138 Ibid. pl 85.

history prior to the 18th century, and history outside of the
Western world, with respect to its potential lessons for elites
of the new states. The account taken of the degree to which the
historical scale and life-cycles of politics outside of the
West differ (not merely in comparison with the West, but also
among themselves) has been often too inadequate to be scholar-
ly. Not all non-Western states have been victims of poverty
not all are overpopulated, not all are devoid of indigenous
culture. To put nations such as India and China on equal par
with the African states, for instance, is nothing short of
absurdity. Any discussion of political development, to be
relevant, has to be attuned to the historical backdrop of the
societies concerned, especially if the purpose of analysis is
enlightenment intended to lead to policy-recommendation. A
refined theory of nation-building and political development
requires a consideration of multiple approaches to progress
and varying assessments of the relationship of time and speed
of change to conceptions of progress. Need is there also
for greater sensitivity to the fact that members of ancient
politics often possess models in their own past which define
for them "civilization" and the notions of the good and the
desirable.[139]

But it is precisely in these considerations that the
existing models of nation-building betray their poverty most.

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139 Ibid. p. 86

Infact, most of the standard studies of nation-building
define political development in such a way that the Anglo-
American model appears in the most developed bracket. Almond
and Verba's <u>Civic Culture</u> for instance, seeks to demonstrate
that of all the five countries studied, Britain and America
not only represent the "two relatively stable and successful
democracies", but that they also "approximate the civic
culture", i.e, the ideal concomitant infrastructure for a
politically developed and presumably desirable political system.
It is also to be noted that the methodology of comparative
analysis adopted by Almond and Verba appears to be to examine
not whether or not the other nations in the study might have
something to contribute in their favour by virtue of a slightly
different arrangement of parts, but rather to measure the degree
to which psycho-cultural phenomena found in the American data
occur in states which differ from America in their presumed
degree of commitment to democracy. This is to say, the American
political system is the standard of measurement, and the
precise mixture of the various qualities exemplified by the
American "civic culture" is considered to be the ideal for the
rest of the world.[140]   One should also recall here the discovery
of James Coleman that "the Anglo-American politics most closely

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140   Ibid., pp. 96-97.

approximate the model of a modern political system-"[141]

b) Pre-Empted Future

Accepting the Anglo-American models as the ideals involves the rejection that any experiment for new models for the new states is valid. The future is clearly a pre-empted one. What the new states need to do, in order to become developed, is first to fashion themselves after the example of the Western states. But such an argument ignores a basic problem: the historical, international, and domestic contexts in which the Western political systems became developed and the new states are endeavouring to pave their way towards "development are not the same. The changed situation obviously calls for different strategies. Moreover, the struggle of the Western political systems is to maintain or sustain development, while that of the new states is to attain development.

In outlining the development strategy for a given nation it is imperative that its leaders should project that nation's own historical proctivities and value-preferences. Just as there are lessons to be learned from the historical and modern experience of other nations, it is perhaps as important to seriously take into account indigeneous historical memories, to

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141   Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton: 1960), p. 533.

stretch for the imagination to deal with new problems, and to
develop the flexibility and freedom of thought which can
facilitate veering from well-worn but not necessarily always
appropriate paths toward political development.[142]

Through a synthesis of various projections and by
directing attention to the particular effects which planned
institutional and structural change can be expected to have upon
the values preferred by a given population, the leaders of the
noveau monde may find that they are able to evolve new and
alternative paths towards even more rapid and less disruptive
political development. Nation-building then becomes a complex
process involving, first, the maping out of a given population's
political and economic requirements, second, gathering-in-of all
resources and energies that are available from its own historical
experience as well as the historical experience of other nations,
and finally evolving through creative imagination a strategy
suited to the task of fashioning an emotionally integrated and
economically well-based people.

x x x   x x y   x x x

x x y   x x y   x x x

x x x   x x x

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