EXAMINING THE ROLE OF TRUST IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND PALESTINE

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MANASI PRITAM

DIPLOMACY AND DISRAMAMENT DIVISION
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation titled **"Examining the role of Trust in Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of Northern Ireland and Palestine"** submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

Manasi Pritam

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

(Prof. Swaran Singh)
Chairperson

Chairperson
Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

(Dr. Happymon Jacob)
Supervisor

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Chapter 1
Introduction

This study, *Examining the role of Trust in Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of Northern Ireland and Palestine*, seeks to develop an understanding of how trust affects, influences and plays out in diplomacy, and in engaging non-state armed groups with the state. The role of trust in conceiving and guiding relations in armed conflict, especially with regard to non-state armed groups, has by and large been ignored in scholarship. This study will revisit and revise trust in international relations and probe its role in bringing adversaries to the negotiating table; we shall determine the different aspects that impact trust among groups and how perceptions, motivations and bargaining moves of actors are guided by the levels of trust or mistrust between them.

Rationale of the study

Trust among states and non-state armed groups, seems unfathomable when a conflict is at its peak. Yet, we have seen some successful peace processes, even if they are few and far in between, that have engaged non-state armed groups and managed to transcend differences between bitter adversaries to overcome mistrust and churn out inclusive and sustainable resolutions to intra state conflicts, some examples being Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Mozambique, Tajikistan and South Africa. What has made these negotiations successful in mitigating violent uprisings= over others?

A common basis for arguing against negotiating with non-state armed groups is that they cannot be trusted to form credible commitments. Such a stance overlooks the importance of enabling trust that is not forced (by militarily defeating armed dissent), but rather inculcated by talking with these groups in order to address the root issues of the conflict. However, even though there is a growing realization about the need to talk with non-state armed groups in order to attain trust that is sustainable, it is difficult to get these groups to the negotiating table, convince them of the state's sincerity and trust the breakers of the law of land under the state. A similar dilemma is endured by non-state armed groups about whether or not to trust the state and other international institutions in order to engage with them. This study attempts to understand the nuances that

underlie and influence the cultivation of trust between two groups which are or have been in a state of war.

How does trust play out in these multidimensional and overlapping relations? How does one engage with an adversary that one does not consider as a legitimate party to begin with? What are the factors that influence trust among and between these entities and lead to cooperation? Does cooperation on a bargain imply that there is trust between the parties? Does trust tend to be manipulated and exploited in such situations? Is it even possible to manipulate trust as if it were a rational strategy? Can trust, in a violent milieu where lives and livelihoods are at stake, remain rational? Do factors beyond rationality impact trust between states and non-state armed groups? How? Do public voices and emotions influence trust in decisions of the states and non-state armed groups? To comprehend these questions, a thorough study of the concept of trust is necessary in the context of negotiations. It is evident through these questions that not only the role of trust between actors, but the entire notion of trust needs to be revisited altogether.

The aim of this research is to redefine trust and explore its role in the relationship between states and non-state armed groups during a peace process. This study shall attempt to congregate literature on trust in the fields of sociology and psychology, and apply it to international diplomacy. The theory shall then be tested against the cases of Northern Ireland and Palestine, two of the most protractile conflicts in history. The cases of Northern Ireland and Palestine provide for an interesting study because of the contrast in the roadmap of their peace processes despite a similar background, communal hatred, violence and a painful history that arouses intense emotions. The concern of this study is to draw attention to the contradictions inherent in how governments and non-state armed groups view each other through the prism of trust/ mistrust and how various other cognitive and social factors influence these perceptions. The study also points out the limitations of a rationalist approach to trust, and the need to look at approaches, methodologies and techniques beyond those that already exist and limit the scope of studying trust in international relations.

Literature Review

Trust, as a concept, has been a relatively marginalized topic of study in the field of international relations. Mistrust, on the other hand, is a fairly common assumption that is used to characterize the international system and relations between states and groups in mainstream literature, especially in security studies. This is because in the field of World Politics, trust has predominantly been seen with respect to a situation of anarchy which is taken as a given in a majority of the scholarship prevalent.

According to realist thought, war is a state of nature, human beings are essentially selfish and therefore mistrust is a given characteristic and a fundamental concept of an anarchic international system. States, then, are security seekers by nature, and therefore tend to pursue aggressive policies in order to survive. In such a scenario, actors are forever faced with a "security dilemma", a term first coined by John Herz, which is based on the assumption of mistrust in the international domain. According to him, the security dilemma is "A structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening" (1959: 157). In neorealism, Waltzean focus on the structure of the international system pays no attention to the behavior and personality of states, or to human nature, thereby leaving no scope for trust to exist. In liberalism, cooperation is the central theme of the international relations. However, this cooperation is based on the recognition of mutual gains and absolute profits rather than trust.

Therefore, in the dominant strands of international relations theory, mistrust is a constant, like anarchy. This has led to ignoring the notion of trust for a larger part in the history of international relations theorizing, although a fair amount of recent scholarship has sprung up to the challenge of conceptualizing trust in world politics (Kydd, Wheeler, Rusizka and Larson). However, this scholarship tends to view trust from a strategic, if not rationalist, perspectives- as a means towards an end, rather than as the bond of relationships, thereby exposing glaring gaps in literature.

Although Hobbesian thought has inspired the conceptions of anarchy, self interest, perpetual war, and therefore mistrust, there is a key element of Hobbes' thinking which standard International Relations literature misses out on- emotions. According to Hobbes, "Humans in their natural state are radically untrustworthy not simply because of the logical outcome of their pursuit of their individual desires creates a war of all against all, but because the situation itself gives people a peculiarly destructive set of emotions" (Anderson 2003: 55) where he defines emotions as "*perturbations* of the mind" because they frequently obstruct 'right' reasoning (Anderson 2003: 56). In accommodating emotions to his conception of trust, Hobbes gives trust a refreshing non-rationalist and non-strategic definition unlike how it is defined in contemporary literature. This study shall attempt to do the same, albeit by revisiting John Locke's literature instead of Hobbes' which gives more space to the trusting behaviour of human beings.

Here, it is important to note that Hobbes also gives scope to 'trust' contrary to popular perception. However, this trust can only be possible within contract based societies or communities which humans are driven to build against the state of nature because of their "fear" of violence and destruction, and from their experience of pleasure or displeasure. But he also points out that at the end of the day, a contract is merely a bond of words, and words alone "are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger and other Passions" (cited by Anderson 2003: 56). A contract, according to Hobbes, is the only way out of mistrust. He does not deem human beings capable of trusting otherwise. A look at Locke in the first chapter shall provide with a counter argument of the human capability to trust, which is more in sync with the objectives of this study.

However, the cynicism towards trust in international relations' literature compares nothing to literature in international diplomacy's distrust of trust, wherein trusting an adversary is considered a weakness that can be exploited. A classic model that continues to guide mediation tactics of states in international negotiations, and exemplifies "ideal" diplomacy is the 'Inherent Bad Faith Model'. It is a model of information processing that was introduced by Ole Holsti into academic literature, wherein he conceptualised how diplomats deal with an opponent, based on American diplomat John Foster Dulles' beliefs on the USSR. According to this model, the other state is presumed to be implacably hostile and any indications that show otherwise are

conveniently overlooked and dismissed as ‘propaganda ploys’ or ‘signs of weakness’. The personal narrative is extremely biased. During negotiations the parties pretend to come together or reach a settlement without any intention of following up. ‘Intention’ is the key word here. There is no intention on part of either of the parties to actually negotiate, or to compromise their position in anyway. The negotiations are held for political effect and nothing more (Stuart, Harvey 1981).

In international relations, rational choice theory forms an prominent part of literature on trust. The Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Cooperation Games are the most common models that are used to analyze trust (Kydd 2005). However, these models by themselves fail to provide a wholesome and adequate understanding of the concept of trust and are merely to assist a simpler conceptualization of trust. In being prudent, the rationalist approach tends to reduce the actors to non feeling, non thinking, almost robotic individuals who are trained to seek self interest over everything else. This study seeks to look beyond and acquire a more wholesome understanding of trust by acquiring a sociological and emotional perspective into how trusting decisions of state and non-state actors are influenced during negotiations.

More recently there has been a fair amount of scholarship on the concept of trust that does not rely on rational choice theory. There are studies that suggest that trust between parties can be general stretching over the totality of their interactions with one another in diverse areas-economic, social, political, etc. (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1988). Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler define trust as "a situation where two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of each other's attitudes and behavior believe that the other(s) now and in the future, can be relied upon (at a minimum) to desist from acting in ways injurious to their interests and values (and at a maximum) to promote each other's interests and values" (Wheeler, Booth 2008).

Robert Jervis (1999: 42) emphasizes on the importance of flow of information among negotiating parties in order for a more cooperative attitude to emerge. In comparing the realist and neoliberal perspectives on cooperation, he raises the important question of whether changes in preference over strategy would foster greater cooperation, and therefore trust. Neoliberals argue that this is often the case and that it is the role of institutions to build on these preferences

and maneuver them towards a cooperative relationship. Realists, on the other hand, argue that these institutions eventually end up being used as tools of statecraft and therefore only a change in strategy can actually build trust.

Trust involves risk, predicting the other's actions, and it includes the perceptions of the parties on the other's responsibility to fulfill the trust placed on them while bearing a cost to reach a compromise. Some define trust in terms of the willingness to take risks, while others believe that along with a willingness to take risks trust also includes the expectation that others will honor particular obligations. Hoffman (2002) suggests that equating trust with the willingness to take risks disables the researcher's capacity to distinguish between cases of trust and cases of mistrust. He proposes that trust be defined not just by the risk factor but a combination of the concepts of risk as well as obligations.

Herbert Butterfield wrote in 'History and Human Relations' that "Diplomats may vividly feel the terrible fear that they have of another party but they cannot enter into the other's counter fear, or even understand why they should be particularly nervous" (cited by Wheeler 2007). He elaborates how it is very hard for one party to realize or keep in mind that the other party can never have the same assurance of their intentions that they have of themselves. Therefore, entering into the other's counter fear is very important for the state and the non-state group.

Kydd defines trust as "a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation, and mistrust, as a belief that the other side is untrustworthy and prefers to exploit one's cooperation" (2005: 6). He believes that the topic is important because the notions of trust and mistrust can make the difference between peace and war. Kydd also points out how difference in ideologies is an important trigger for fostering mistrust. He notes, "Communist ideology, founded on class conflict, posited a relationship of general enmity between the socialist state and capitalist world. Ideology, therefore, gave the Soviets a high level of gains from conflict and low levels of trust. American anticommunism ultimately provided a similar set of ideological lenses" (Kydd 2005: 8).

Ideology and narratives, indeed, form important elements that guide the level of trust or mistrust in negotiations just as they do in intractability of conflicts, because as explained in the earlier chapter they are influenced and instigated through the emotional psyche of the parties involved (Scheff 1994). It therefore becomes important to investigate the deadlock in trust in negotiations through an emotional perspective. What is lacking in the negotiations in both these case studies is the acknowledgement of the suffering that has been endured by the parties in conflict. Both sides, in their attempt to justify their actions and to fulfil their feeling of the need to be heard, tend to stifle the other party's narrative and suffering stories. In the case of Palestine, the Israelis do not think that anything could "equal" the pain and hurt of the Holocaust. In that, the Palestinian stories of suffering and anguish of having been forced into being refugees in order to accommodate Israel are lost. This remains the biggest block to empathy, and therefore, any possibility of trust to garner. It is up to the mediator, then, to make sure that the emotions of either side are not blocked.

It is often argued that to build trust between parties where conflict is deeply ingrained, one of the parties has to take a leap of faith and take initiative to show that it is interested in peace. Scholars such as Deborah Larson argue (Larson 1997) that the Cold War saw many missed opportunities on the part of both sides to end conflict due to the lack of trust that a "policy of reassurance" by any one side could have encouraged cooperation and diminished rivalries. She cites the example of Gorbachev's initiatives such as the INF Treaty of 1987, withdrawal from Afghanistan, where such policies of reassurance that contributed to the end of the Cold War (Larson 1997: 703).

The key mechanism that makes reassurance possible is what Larson, Kydd, et al call "costly signaling", that is, making small but significant gestures that serve to prove that one is trustworthy. Booth and Wheeler call this the "leap of trust" wherein the leaders must be prepared to take risks and costs of misplaced trust in order to begin building trust. It is also claimed by scholars that the lower the level of trust, the lower is the size of costly signaling and vice versa. Also, prevailing literature claims that weaker states will send stronger signals in order to avoid conflict (Booth and Wheeler 2008).

Looking at how trust has been defined, certain questions are pertinent to this study. Is it enough to define trust merely in terms of expected behavior and actions of the actor, as has been the case with most existing scholarship? What about the actor's hopes, expectations and motivations behind anticipated actions? How do emotions affect this behavior? How do perceptions of the 'other' translate into trust? How do ideologies and emotional narrative trigger trust? Is the 'Leap of faith' a pre requisite for trust to exist or a demonstration of trust that already exists?

Does costly signaling work in the case of conflicting states and non-state actors where the latter groups do not even recognize the organization's legitimacy to exist? What kind of 'leaps of faith' can be adopted by states to convince non-state armed groups to bargain with them? These form the lacuna in research in international negotiations and trust that this study seeks to fill.

Research Questions

Some other research questions that the study asks are:

How and to what extent has trust, mistrust and suspicion shaped the course of diplomacy among states and non-state actors in dealing with non-state armed groups? Which are the factors that influence trust between states and non-state groups besides 'interests' and 'incentives'? How do emotions affect trust in negotiations? Why is it that in spite of the same mediators, i.e. the US heads of state, in more or less the same period of time, Palestine and Northern Ireland, and similar secession demands and violence, the Catholic Irish made headway and the Palestinians failed to do so?

Argument

The crux of the argument that is presented in this research project is that the understanding of trust in international negotiations is limited to a rationalist view that revolves around 'incentives' and 'interests'. The role of emotions, particularly, is found to be crucial and fundamental to the study of negotiations between the state and non-state armed groups because of the high intensity of emotions that violent resistance movements have the potential to unleash. An emotional overview of trust provides us with a better understanding of why the Northern Ireland negotiations have been relatively more successful than negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.

Structure

The first chapter, *Understanding Trust*, is an attempt to delve deep into the multidimensional and multilateral nature of trust, rather than constraining to a rationalist or realist point of view, which is how a majority of literature in International Relations has viewed trust. We inculcate the examination of trust in various other fields of research such as Sociology and Psychology, and iterate the relevance of other discipline's work on trust in International Relations and Diplomacy to increase the scope of understanding. We use John Locke's approach to provide the basis for countering Hobbesian notions of 'anarchy' and 'self interest' in literature that influence trust.
The above methodology is used to dig into a deeper explanation of trust to understand so as to understand negotiations with non-state armed groups better.

In Chapter 2, *The Emotional Aspect of Trust in Negotiations*, the reductionist view with which human nature has been theorized in world politics is exposed, and trust is redefined in terms of a complex of emotions. We inspect the limitations of the rationalist approach in understanding trust. An examination of how emotions play a role in creating bias and alienation of groups is done to aid the understanding of legitimacy in negotiations, wherein anger's role in trust has been specifically looked at. The role of emotions in affecting trust in negotiations between people has been contextualized to negotiations of states with non-state armed groups.

Chapter 3, *Trust in Negotiations in Northern Ireland and Palestine*, is an overview of how trust plays out in the engaging paramilitary groups, prominently Sinn Fein, in Northern Ireland, and with the Palestinian occupation resistance groups, particularly the PLO. The emphasis is on a psychological understanding of the situations, and to determine how emotions such as anger, humiliation, fear, empathy are significant in shaping levels of trust among adversaries, especially those who deem each other illegitimate.

The Conclusion reiterates and organizes the arguments made in the three main chapters.

Conclusion

In this study, therefore, we shall begin by looking at why rationality provides an inadequate understanding of trust. The present literature on trust in international relations focuses too much

on the functional and behavioral characteristics of trust. It is often overlooked that trust is a systemic social reality that human beings, who have a complex emotional and psychological structure, engage in. These psychological dimensions of trust shall be explored in negotiations, and be later applied to the case studies of Northern Ireland and Palestine.

Trust involves an unavoidable element of risk and uncertainty, which makes it difficult to predict and theorize thereby inducing a trust dilemma. This dilemma to trust shall be understood through an emotional perspective. It shall be established that emotions such as anger, fear, humiliation, pride, which are remnants of any intractable conflict, are bound to have a significant impact on trust between conflicting parties.

It shall be also be proved in the course of this research that the reason for the failure of negotiations between state and non-state armed groups is more likely to be lack of emotional trust and understanding rather than differing ‘national interest’ or incentives.

Chapter 2

Understanding Trust

Introduction

> "But although trust is an obvious fact of life, it is an exasperating one. Like the flight of the bumblebee or the cure for hiccups, it works in practice but not in theory."
>
> -Martin Hollis (1998: 5)

In the field of international relations, particularly, the assumption in mainstream literature about self serving and 'interest' driven states in an anarchical world order makes it near impossible to conceptualize or even imagine trust, except as a strategy. This chapter takes up this challenge and tries to understand the role of trust in society and political practice, in order to help recent growing attempts in international relations literature to theorize trust, and of course, to facilitate the examination and exploration of the role of trust in negotiations between states and non-state armed groups. Most importantly this chapter seeks to define/ understand trust, not as a means towards an end, but as it is, as it exists- between people, political entities (state and non-state), and societies. It is an attempt to look at trust as something that is beyond a functional necessity for peace and/ or progress to prevail.

The intention of any negotiation is to reach a compromise- that puts the parties out of their comfort zone, which is not the optimal desired outcome of any of the parties but is somewhere in between- in order to settle a dispute or resolve conflict between the actors. This chapter is based on the premise that a sustainable and practical compromise can only be reached if there is a certain level of trust between the parties. This trust does not merely entail confidence or a certain degree of reliability in the 'other' to fulfill the promises made during the course of negotiations. It extends to trust on the establishment in place, the mediators, the international community and the institution of negotiations itself- the belief that they will lead to a progressive outcome, if not an entirely favorable one.

The study of trust within the particular structures of any political, economic or social relations is a pressing issue in the understanding of any political situation in the contemporary world. According to John Dunne, the most fundamental question in politics is always that of what particular human beings have *good reason* to 'do'. He claims, then, that it is this elemental puzzle of political philosophy that calls for an imperative study of trust and its rationality in relation to the causal field of politics, because what human beings do "depends directly and profoundly on how far they can and *should* (emphasis added) trust and rely upon one another" (1984: 279). Nothing could sum up better the logic behind the conception of trust as it has been in mainstream literature which views trust in terms of a rational and problem-solving approach- as an indispensible *necessity* to cooperate in the production of goods and services and to uphold *morality* in order to hold human society together. However, does trust exist only because it is necessary? Do we trust only because it is the *right* or a *good* thing to do in the long or the short run? Do relationships not exist where trust exists in spite of debacles, differing goals and even treachery? Can enemies never turn into trusting friends or vice versa? Have leaders not existed who have chosen to base their policies on trust despite it seeming the most 'irrational' thing to do in a given situation with respect to that particular time and space? Is trust not a feeling/ emotion, or is it just something that one *decides* to do? Is trust between agents something that can be or always has to be manipulated by a higher authority, or even thoughts, ideas, norms and values? Can trust be manipulated and regulated at all? Will there be a lesser sense of betrayal from trust if it is regulated and does not come naturally? These are some of the questions that need serious introspection in order to add to the existing literature on trust, and that shall be the aim of this dissertation.

The aim of this chapter is to explore dimensions that go beyond the existing mechanical and patronising methods that go into theorizing trust and iterate the importance of these extra perceptions to understand the concept of trust in a more coherent way, especially in the realm of world politics. What are these dimensions that exist beyond rational approaches and ethical wisdom on trust? Does looking beyond help us understand the relationship between states and non-state actors any better? How so?

Defining Trust

Trust has been defined in a wide range of fields- economic, political, sociological and psychological- and unsurprisingly, a very miniscule body of research on trust exists in the field of international relations. In this section we shall look at how scholars have defined trust in existing literature and evaluate their relevance.

A majority of the research on trust focuses on the functional properties of the phenomenon. As such research on trust has seen the concept as the basis for self centered and interest seeking states (realist thought), individual risk taking behavior (Coleman, Game theory models), cooperation and international society (liberal, constructivist thought, game theory, Gambetta, et al), reduced social complexity (Luhmann), order (Mitzal, Locke, Dunne, et al), social capital (Marxist thought) and so on. However, merely a functional definition of trust in terms of its behavioral consequences takes the concept of trust for granted and does no justice to understanding this widely acknowledged phenomenon of social or political systems. The purpose of this chapter shall be to look beyond these functional properties of trust and add to the existing literature.

Mollering defines trust as a “state of favorable *expectation* (emphasis given by self) regarding other people’s actions and intentions” (2001: 404). Her idea of trust is based on sociologist Georg Simmel’s (1858-1918) works, who in turn was inspired by key scholars in the field of trust such as Luhmann and Giddens. In particular, Simmel introduced a ‘further element’ in trust similar to faith, which later took the form of a ‘leap of trust/ faith’, a term that is often used by many contemporary scholars in their theses on trust. Bernard Barber defines trust as that which exists in a social system insofar as the members of that system act according to and are secure in the *expected futures* constituted by the presence of each other or their symbolic representations (1983). It is the mutual "faithfulness" on which all social relationships ultimately depend (Simmel 1978: 379). Consequently, trust may be thought of as a functional prerequisite for the possibility of society in that the only alternatives to appropriate trust are "chaos and paralyzing fear" (Luhmann 1979: 4).

Jonathon Mercer contends that what defines trust is ‘certainty beyond observable evidence’. While he is correct to maintain that trust cannot be based on observable evidence, he is mistaken to define it in terms of ‘certainty’. Can there truly be certainty by one party that the ‘other’, however strong the relationship is, will definitely fulfill their promise and not even *imagine* the *possibility* of betrayal, or the possibility of a deterring situation? What Mercer, perhaps meant by ‘certainty beyond observable evidence’ to define trust, was ‘faith’ or ‘hope’ of something that can be *expected* in various degrees but cannot be known.

As Simmel puts it: ‘Without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself would disintegrate, for very few relationships are based entirely upon what is known with *certainty* (emphasis added) about another person, and very few relationships would endure if trust were not as strong as, or stronger than, rational proof or personal observation’ (1978: 178-9). Trust is one of the mechanisms by which humans try to cope with life’s risks and uncertainties (Luhmann 1979:24-30; Barbalet 2009: 4). At the same time, it is indisputable that trust and uncertainty are mutually implicated. This is because trust always develops under conditions of uncertainty and never entirely escapes it (Hoffman 2006: 377).

Barbalet (2011) defines trust as a means to overcome the lack of information and evidence regarding the future behavior of the the other party in a cooperative activity. ‘A person will know whether trusting another will lead to the outcome they anticipate only after the trust has been given’ (2011: 41). Barbalet’s definition aptly explains the emotional basis of trust. The trust-giver is choosing to depend on someone else in spite of incomplete information regarding the outcome of the behavior of the trust-taker. The act in itself is almost irrational. The trust-giver is attaching their hopes and expectations to another without caring for the result.

Andrew Kydd’s who has given one of the most coherent rationalist accounts of trust, defines trust as the belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is the belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it (Kydd 2005: 6).

Booth and Wheeler (2008) describe Trust as existing when two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of each other's attitudes and behavior, believe that the other can be relied upon, in the present and future, to desist from acting in ways that will be harmful to their *interests* and values. They explain: 'For trust to become embedded in political units, it is necessary for positive relationships between decision makers to be replicated at the inter-societal level, and vice versa, through a mutually learning process' (2008: 230). Although their (working) definition is derived after a thorough critique of the rationalist conceptualization of trust, it has somehow fallen in the same trap of being 'interest' and 'value' laden/ guided, and with the intent of influencing policy. There is a sincere attempt to understand trust, but with the tendency to objectify it by giving trust the role of something that is usually achieved through certain policies and individual attitudes (what they call the 'human' factor')- the role of the emotion of trust is recognized and reviewed but underplayed.

At this point, it is important to clarify that the emphasis of this chapter lies in exploring the multi dimensions of trust- sociological, emotional and psychological. One is not discounting the understanding that policy based or interest defined accounts would give. It would be hypocritical to say so especially in the context of this particular dissertation, since it involves exploring state behavioral patterns, attitudes and policies towards non state armed groups and vice versa in its case studies, and that too with regard to track one/ one and a half negotiations which at the end of the day are a part of policies to facilitate cooperation among conflicting parties. One is merely saying that such an analysis is prevalent way too much in mainstream literature, and there is a need to fill the lacuna that lies in research on trust at present by treading away from the beaten path, which may help provide new insights on why the levels of trust differ in similar conflict situations and how it affects the negotiation process.

Revisiting John Locke's 'state of nature'

John Locke has perhaps written one of the first thorough works exploring trust, and sees it as central to sustaining a society in operation. He went against the convention, rather rule, of his times, battling Hobbesian thoughts and ideas throughout his life- and chose to take a more sophisticated view of the state of nature, human behavior and society, believing in the ability and the *natural* instinct of human beings to trust. That is why it is important to revisit his thinking.

In his theses (and one sees an attempt to study trust throughout his body of work), he sees trust as making possible most of people's capacity to cooperate, not merely by means of cognitively rational calculation but by also taking into account how *hopes* and *expectations* form trust and determine levels of trust (Dunne 1984).

Locke (1660) attributes 'faith' as being part of the 'law of nature' and as the 'bond' of human society. According to Locke, if there were no trust in human life and the law of nature was founded solely on worldly advantage and utility, then the duties of people would be at odds with one another. Later, Luhmann builds up on this part of Locke's conceptualization by defining trust as a phenomenon that reduces the social complexity of human lives (1969), which shall be discussed later. Locke holds trust or *fides* as something that is opposite to having complete knowledge about the future, and as a characteristic that replaces this knowledge. This makes trusting or being trustworthy completely irrational:

> "*Fides* (faith) stands in epistemic contrast to *cognitio* (knowledge). But it also stands in practical contrast to the vice of untrustworthiness. The virtue of keeping one's promises is the virtue of *fides*. What reason could there be, on this presumption, for fulfilling a promise when to do so (trust) would be to one's own personal disadvantage? On the assumption that individual worldly advantage is the basis of the law of nature, no coherent account of the content and binding force of human duties can be constructed. Any real conception of a society is subverted, and with it, *fides* (trustworthiness), the *vinculum* (bond) of society" (Locke 1660 cited in Dunne 1984: 286).

There are some profound assumptions about trust, rather faith, in Lockean thinking. Firstly, that any acceptable, progressive and established human society depends on the recognition of values and moral duties which cannot be derived from rationality and a sense of material purpose *alone* (as opposed to Realist and later Marxian thought). And secondly, that trust is the bond of human society and that untrustworthy acts work *against* the law of nature and against human 'interests'. Here, it is important to note that while Locke admits to the *functional purpose* and *reasoning* for trusting, which is safeguarding the interest of human beings, he believes that mistrusting as a tendency is unnatural. The difference between Locke asserting the *necessity* of trust in society for cooperation and progress, and scholars doing the same before and after him, lies in him acknowledging that trust is a natural human trait and not merely guided by reason/ rationality. It

is not just that humans only trust to cooperate or achieve higher ends; but cooperation is merely a by-product of the human ability to trust.

However, while he acknowledges trust to be an important characteristic, he realizes that trust is not a *given* attribute of human nature. It does not have to be built, but it is and has to be practiced (Locke 1660). Therefore, trust for Locke, is not a state of nature but a *law* of nature.

Locke also draws an important distinction between individual terrestrial interest and individual moral duty (1667). In his later works, he appears to agree with traditional realist philosophy on the point that there is no reason to trust in the moral validity of any individual or group or the morals that people in a particular society are socialized with (Dunne 1984). However, being trustworthy, according to him, is a *virtue* and a *duty* that is more important than the prevailing convention or following laws framed by the society- positive or negative. A state or a non state actor is not more trustworthy if they are deemed moral. Rather, the *act* of being trustworthy is a moral responsibility for human society.

To espouse the act of trusting, there have been claims to the extent that promise breaking is irrational because it is literally self-contradictory (William Wollaston 1738; Michel 2011). According to Locke, however, the problem with breaking a promise is that it is morally objectionable and that is that it deceives others into shaping their *expectations* according to the promise made. Therefore, one is morally bound to act in a trustworthy manner.

However, the gap in Locke's theory is exposed here. Even if humans are bound by the law of nature to keep promises in order to keep society functioning, the act of trusting is a choice at the end of the day. It is entirely possible for any agent to find it more advantageous or fulfilling for rational, cogent or emotional reasons to break a promise in practice (Coleman 1983). Another paradox is evident in Locke's theory of trust. What about acts of trust and cooperation among partners in crime, say conning or a terror attack or, for that matter, as in seen in a Prisoner's Dilemma game? What about the law being misused by the state in an organized way? Would trust among the participants in the above be a moral virtue and responsibility to society? To avoid this fundamental flaw or dilemma, contemporary scholars avoid theorizing trust in terms of

morality. It is much easier to conceptualize it in terms of behavior or choices that individuals or groups make, which is why there is a plethora of literature that indulges in the Game Theorization of trust. While I would have loved to pursue the question of morality in trust, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation and my knowledge on the subject.

To the question 'How far can men be trusted?' Locke, like most philosophers who have written on trust, has no simple or logically valid answer that can be generalized. According to Locke, it depends on many different kinds of considerations primary among them being- the unpredictability of the individual character, the constraints that the prevailing culture of a particular community, and the practical structures of material interests which are at issue (Coleman 1983).

In Locke's analysis, human beings are free agents, responsible for their own actions. They are in principle capable of taking responsibility for many aspects of their own beliefs (Dunne 1984: 295). This consideration, according to me, is actually basic to the understanding of human trustworthiness because human beings have the ability conceive as to what is at stake in their choices, what reasons constitute to see someone as worthy of their trust or be trustworthy, and most importantly how they *feel* about laying their trust with someone or something. These abilities are guided by a variety of emotions (passion, pride, anger, love, etc.), interests, psychological demeanor and the prevailing societal norms and values. However, that is not to discard the role of human beings as 'rational animals'. We also trust because as humans we have a good reason to anticipate and long for a peaceful future life, and are perfectly capable (even though we may or may not make use of this capability) of being rational and overlooking passions, personal/ relative interests, etc. to build trust around them and avoiding delirious consequences that come with approaching problems with mistrust. On a lighter note, as a dialogue from a famous science fiction comedy series goes, "Society is never going to make any progress if we don't pretend to like each other" (from *Futurama*, Matt Groening 2002). Ultimately, however, rationality is no foolproof safeguard for us to co-exist and trust is important.

Types of Trust

Pettit (1995), and later, Seligman (1997) (cited in Wright 2010), divide the uses of the word trust in three different categories. Firstly, it is used to describe a relation between an individual or group and an abstract system or principle (Pettit 1995: 204; Seligman 1997: 17-8), e.g. the trust in democracy or trust in the nuclear non proliferation regime or world/ regional cooperation organizations. Secondly, trust is used to describe a purely functional relation between and among individuals and groups, e.g. the trust that a patient has in her doctor (Pettit, 1995: 204; Seligman, 1997: 17-8). Finally, trust describes a quality in more intimate relationships which exceeds pure functionality and exhibits a stronger emotive and multi-dimensional basis, e.g. trust between friends or family members (Seligman, 1997: 17-8).

Andrew and Weigart (1985) devise another way of studying trust. They divide trust into three distinctive analytical dimensions- cognitive, emotional and behavorial- which, according to them correspond to the three basic modes of the human social experience. These dimensions are intermixed and supporting aspects of the one, combining and sole social experience called 'trust'. 'The roots of trust extend to every modality of human experience but it does not thereby lose its unity.' Trusting behavior may be motivated primarily by strong positive affect for the object of trust (emotional trust) or by 'good rational reasons' why the object of trust merits trust (cognitive trust), or, as is usually the case, some combination of both.

Luhmann hypothesizes that the stronger the emotional content relative to the cognitive content, the less likely contrary behavioral evidence will weaken the relationship. Taken to an extreme, if the trust were only emotional in nature, we would be left with 'blind faith' or 'fixed hope'. As Luhmann puts it, 'Love and hate may make one blind' (1979: 81). On the other hand, if all emotion were removed from trust and only its cognitive element were taken into account, it would become a cold prediction or a 'rationally calculated risk' and what Luhmann describes as, "the ultimate war game in which the only logic is self interest and kill ratios." Trust in everyday life is a mix of feeling and rational thinking (Weigert 1981), and so to exclude one or the other from the analysis of trust leads only to misconceptions that conflate trust with faith or prediction. Andrew and Weigart provide with a visual representative chart of Luhmann's idea (1985: 971).

RATIONALITY	EMOTIONALITY: High	EMOTIONALITY: Low	EMOTIONALITY: Virtually Absent
High	Ideological Trust	Cognitive Trust	Rational Prediction
Low	Emotional Trust	Mundane, Routine Trust	Probable Anticipation
Virtually Absent	Faith	Fate	Uncertainty, Panic

Figure 1. RATIONALITY AND EMOTIONALITY BASES, TYPES OF TRUST, AND BOUNDARY STATES

Here, it is observed how a range of emotional and rational aspects of human nature determine human trusting behavior, thereby deriving a variety of trusts. High presence of emotions may determine trust varyingly according to the amount of rationality ranging from Ideological trust (trust in a political system, theory), to emotional trust (inter personal, inter community, nationalism/ patriotism), to blind faith (trust in god). Similarly, a high incidence of rationality and different levels of emotions lead to different kinds of trusting behavior, eventually leading in rational prediction or cold calculation where emotion is absent.

Trust as a Social Reality

A sociological perspective is important for the study of trust between states and non state armed groups because it allows us to do a reading wherein trust is conceived as a property of collective units rather than isolated individuals and their behaviors, because at the end of the day trust *is* a collective attribute. Besides considering the individual psychological and rational decision making state, one also needs to understand systematically why collective groups choose to trust or mistrust, in spite of the fact that individuals' emotional, rational, cognitive ability to reason varies. In conflict ridden societies which have seen prolonged war, for instance, suffering

communities sometimes choose to put aside their differences and traumas, which vary from individual to individual in degree, and come together to allow a favorable environment of trust to emerge in order to give peace a chance. It would be unfair to view such acts and instances of trust merely through the prism of the nature, characteristics and tendencies of individuals and appropriate it to the behavior of collective groups.

Andrew Weigart and J. David Lewis (1985), while noting the gap in literature on trust, point out that there is a large quantity of research on trust by experimental psychologists and political scientists which appears theoretically non-integrated and incomplete from the standpoint of a sociology of trust. “These researchers typically conceptualize trust as a psychological event within the individual rather than as an inter-subjective or systemic social reality. They also tend to use methodological approaches that reduce trust to its cognitive content through psychometric scaling techniques or to its behavioral expressions in laboratory settings” (1985: 289). Sociologists such as Luhmann, Barber, Simmel, Mollering, Andrew and Weigart, have over the decades presented a refreshing prism through which trust can be studied making it an irreducible and multidimensional social reality. Contemporary everyday examples such as lying, family exchange, monetary attitudes and litigation illustrate the centrality of trust as a sociological reality.

Luhmann makes a clear and necessary distinction between individual trust and trust that exists within systems. He argues that while trust in political, social and economic systems is grounded in the very existence of these institutions- which may differ from time to time, community to community and place to place- individual trust is not so reflexive in its base because it is founded upon the feasibility of trust itself. (1979: 5). The issue of trust in the international system, therefore, depends not just on direct human relations, ethics and emotions but also on the systemic factors, history of conflict and the causal analysis of the political entity.

According to Luhmann, trust, fundamentally, is a technique for coping with the freedom of other human beings (1979: 30). Trust directly enables and influences the working of all complex political or economic institutions, government bureaucracies or monetary systems. It is on trust

that we base our social communities and system- from inter-personal relationships to the family to large groups sharing similar values, interests, language or culture. The way a society functions depends on the trust generated in the more intimate and cognitively accessible contexts of each human being's everyday life (Luhmann 1979: 16). In fact, it would be safe to say that without trust or confidence in their own expectations of others, women and men would barely be able to get out of bed in the morning. As Booth and Wheeler ask, “Would you ask a stranger the time unless you could count on a true answer? Could an economy progress beyond barter, or society beyond mud huts unless people relied on one another to keep their promises? Without trust, social life would be impossible and there would be no philosophers to try casting the light of reason upon it” (2008: 231).

When two conflicting parties decide to sit for negotiations and talk about their issues, it is an act of trust in the very system, which enables them to live in an organized society. It is with a certain level of faith in the negotiations to bring about comparatively favorable results that the parties decide to discuss their problems in the first place instead of resorting to or continuing with violence and armed struggles. Negotiations are essentially based on the parties’ trust based on the belief that in order for society to progress and flourish, and the conflict to be resolved, one’s freedom and interests must not encroach upon another’s.

Luhmann also points out, in contrast with Locke’s view, that trust in contemporary societies is less based on the normative idea of how society should function and more on how cognitive factors, emotions and rational expectations that guide individual levels of trust (1984). However, he concedes that both play an important role in determining how trust runs society. It can be deciphered from the same logic, then, that trust during negotiations and the trust required to bring disagreeing parties to the table depends less on how the international community or major powers view about what the ideal situation is and more by each parties’ own levels of interests, their emotional condition, hopes and expectations, and visions for their future.

The Role of Trust in Reducing Complexity

Luhmann argues that the function of trust is 'the reduction of complexity' (1979: 9). This *complexity* is seen in the temporal aspects of social life. What is he referring to as complexity? Society, especially modern industrial society, is organized by complex and tightly integrated temporal structures (see Lewis and Weigert 1981: 443). The individual human being has the twin problems of fitting together her or his *unique* set of social time-tables while simultaneously coping with other's time tables as well as unexpected and unforeseen events that may crop to disturb what the individual would ideally like to do. Now, if one were to take into account all of these unplanned events that may happen in the future, one would be unable to take any rational action in the present. Any such action, in fact, is impossible to theorize or conceive due to the impossibility of knowing what exactly the future holds and its infinite complexity. Therefore, theorists *assume* (especially in scientific and rational choice social science theories) that the probability of unforeseen and unexpected future events is zero for practical purposes. This reduces the vast complexity of predicting rational actions in the present on the basis of the future to manageable proportions.

There are certain futures that are highly probable and certain that are too unlikely to require serious consideration in present planning. However, such predictions are limited and expose huge gaps in literature. A rational analysis, even if it takes into account the cognitive and emotional dimensions, is incomplete. "Even if we assume a deterministic universe, we do not have the necessary time and resources to rationally predict and control the effects of oncoming futures" (Lewis and Weigart 1985: 967). Trust, therefore, is a functional alternative to rational prediction for the reduction of complexity. Indeed, trust succeeds where rational prediction alone would fail, because to trust is to live as if certain rationally possible futures will not occur. Thus, trust reduces complexity far more quickly, economically, and thoroughly than does prediction. Trust allows social interactions to proceed on a simple and confident basis where, in the absence of trust, the monstrous complexity posed by contingent futures would again return to paralyze action (Simmel 1964).

Lewis and Weigart recognize that while trust is a substitute for rational prediction, mistrust also reduces complexity by dictating a course of action based on suspicion, monitoring, and activation of institutional safeguards. Ultimately, however, there is no foolproof safeguard, and suspicion eventually gives way to knowledge or realignment, so that actors must fall back on some kind of trust. Although, as Barber suggests, both trust and distrust may be functional, the dynamics of each would lead to different kinds of systems, the former tending toward solidarity and the latter toward atomism (Lewis and Weigart 1985).

Trust as a function of Communication

When one examines trust, one must also understand how the flow of information between the parties that are involved in the negotiations determines trust. One of the chief objectives of negotiations is to transform attitudes of the parties into that of a more trusting one for the purpose of a more (sustainably) peaceful future. And, one of the major factors that foster trust is transparency. However, to be realistic, complete transparency in a negotiation process between two conflicting parties is a desirable virtue but not an achievable one.

Nevertheless, it seems that even familiarity with each other and a controlled flow of information, as long there exists some, can induce trust or at least give incentive to trust. Luhmann states, "Familiarity is the precondition for trust as well as distrust, i.e., for every sort of commitment to a particular attitude towards the future" (1979: 19). In fact it would be safe to say that a complete transparency or flow of information between conflicting parties can actually undermine the trust and ability to reach a mid level consensus between them. As Simmel observes, trust involves a degree of cognitive familiarity with the object of trust that is somewhere between total knowledge and total ignorance (1978; also see Weigart and Lewis 1985). If one were omniscient, actions would be completely defined and certain, leaving no need, or even possibility, for trust to develop. In fact, one reason that it becomes so difficult for non state armed groups to trust governments and vice versa and reach a compromise is because of the excessive familiarity with the other's approach.

Even in everyday life, one can observe that it is relatively much easier for a fairly ignorant person to trust the government and the state than for someone who follows its actions regularly. On the other hand, when faced by the totally unknown, we can gamble but we cannot trust.

Weigart and Lewis accommodate the materialization of trust due to a controlled flow of information by defining the concept in the ‘cognitive level of experience’:

> “The manifestation of trust on the cognitive level of experience is reached when social actors no longer need or want any further evidence or rational reasons for their confidence in the objects of trust. Although some prior experience with the object of trust is a necessary condition for establishing the cognitive element in trust, such experience only opens the door to trust without actually constituting it. The cognitive element in trust is characterized by a cognitive "leap" beyond the expectations that reason and experience alone would warrant-they simply serve as the platform from which the leap is made.”

The interesting thing to note in this profound conceptualization of trust is that it allows us to not only look *beyond* a rational explanation of trust but almost goes as far to argue that there is little that is rational about the act of trust in the first place. Reason and rationality merely provide a base in order for trust to exist- a pre condition. They are necessary (but not even sufficient) conditions for trust to foster. Once they exist, trust eventually becomes about taking that ‘leap of faith’ and takes a life of its own which rarely depends on rationality. Even in game theory, for example, which is often referred to give the maximum number of rational theories and conceptualizations of trust or mistrust, when two or more parties end up reaching a Nash equilibrium or a Cournot equilibrium or a Cartel, it is not due to the ‘leap’ of trust, but because taking into account the actions of the other parties, these are the most rationally optimal strategies that can be followed. Cooperation in Game Theory, therefore, is not due to trust that parties decide to forego their individual optimal strategies, but after taking into account the ‘interests’ of others that could pose hinder one’s *own interests* in the game in the long run. Therefore, it then becomes more viable and beneficial to cooperate than to defect.

Therefore, trust and the possibility of trust depends on the levels of communication and degree of familiarity between negotiating parties or antagonistic communities. Reason provides a basis to trust but levels of reason need not determine the level of trust. In fact, for trust to exist, a balance has to be struck between too little and too much familiarity (which breeds reason). If there is too little reason, it is ideological and circumstantial faith rather than trust that exists within conflicting communities. If actions of the two communities towards one another are only based on reason, then it is incentive based cooperation rather than trust that guides their relations.

The Leap of Trust/ Faith

Simmel first introduced the concept of the 'Leap of Faith', but left it underdeveloped and placed it somewhere in between trust and blind faith. Theorists such as Luhmann, Giddens, Weigart, Mollering and more recently Wheeler and Booth have developed on this concept. Luhmann (1984) describes this cognitive process as 'overdrawing' on the informational base. According to him individuals take the leap not only because of their psychological orientation but because of the assumption that others in the social world will join the leap. Here he is laying emphasis on the cognitive content of trust. While he does not discard the relevance of individual psychology and rational state of mind, he is asserting that a leap of faith or trust transcends these realms of individual decision making. And, herein, lays the theoretical significance of Luhmann's claim that the cognitive base of trust lies in "trust in trust". Each trusts on the assumption that others trust or will trust eventually.

Wheeler and Booth (2008) note that in the field of international relations, particularly, such a leap in politics usually involves people with certain virtuous characteristics such as "courage, conviction and vision". What is more, these risky initiatives are sometimes highly dangerous to the people making them owing to potential domestic opposition; the threat of assassination to those who have tried to bring about change is far from unknown in international history.

They have to be prepared to be rebuffed, exposed and betrayed. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, for example, was murdered for wanting to take a significant "leap of faith" in Arab-Israeli negotiations by publicly recognizing the right of Israel to exist and giving out an interview empathizing with the position of the Israelis.

Wheeler and Booth also point out in their conceptualization of trust, the importance of being able to empathise and sympathise with the conflicting party, which can only come from having a vision of a peaceful future. They recall how David Trimble, the leader of Ulster Unionist Part, used a similar imagery after a significant advance in the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Trimble challenged Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams: "Now, Mr. Adams, its over to you. We've jumped. You follow." (also see Hoffman 2006:23, Wheeler and Booth 2008: 234). A capacity to empathise with the fear and suffering of one's adversaries is indeed a critical precondition for building trust. As Dag Hammerskjold, former United Nations Secretary General, said in relation

to a problem of medication, “you can only hope to find a lasting solution to a conflict if you have learnt to see the other objectively, but at the same time experience his difficulties subjectively”.

Weigart and Lewis argue that the attitude required for taking a ‘leap’ is present in all forms of trust, but ‘the experiential and rational platform from which the cognitive leap is made varies considerably from one type of trust to another’ (1985: 969). Different types of trust therefore exist due to differing rationalities and experiences. What is rational for one individual or a collective group of people may not be rational for another. This is a major drawback of trying to define trust in terms of rational theory. Rationality differs from person to person and group to group based on their experiences, cultures, history, leaders in groups, ideology, situation, etc. Therefore, the moment to take that ‘leap of trust’ will also differ. While the Sinn Fein and eventually even the IRA found it rational to give up their arms and take that leap of trust in order for the Northern Ireland Peace Process to be successful (although it took visionaries like Gerry Adams within the leadership of the organizations to lead the way to disarmament), the Hamas can hardly be expected to think so in the wake of Israeli policies and rhetoric spewed by Israel’s leaders and decision makers.

In all of this, the ‘human factor’ that Wheeler and Booth introduced cannot be discounted. The attitude of the leader/s provides that eventual push to take the leap forward.

Emotional base

One of the most important aspects of understanding how trust is formed, why mistrust persists between groups or why trust is broken, can be acquired by acknowledging the emotional value of trust. Simply put, people do not trust because they do not want to be emotionally vulnerable. It is often claimed that even though the emotional component is present in all kinds of trust, it is normally most obviously prevalent and intense in inter personal relationships such as those of friendship or love. However, can this claim be taken at its face value when one examines the relationship between states and non state groups? One way to gage the intensity of trust in any relationship is by the reactions of parties to a breach of trust. It can be noticed that betrayal of trust particularly arouses some of the most extreme emotional actions among non state groups- from self immolation to protest occupation of a people and their culture (passion, inducing guilt), to suicide bombings to teach the state a lesson (revenge), to terrorist attacks to scare the state into

submission of its demands (inducing fear). These emotions are aroused because states are recipients of public trust, and when that is used to their personal advantage and not in favor of a certain public, they are breaching that trust. Anger towards the state then, is not due to a simple illegality, but a betrayal of trust and faith.

"Trust creates a social situation in which intense emotional investments may be made, just like in the emotional bonds of friendship and love" (Weigart and Lewis 1985). That is why the betrayal of a personal trust arouses a sense of emotional outrage in the betrayed. The betrayal of trust strikes a deadly blow at the foundation of the relationship itself, not merely at the specific content of the betrayal.

However, in spite of the difficulties that a rational analysis of trust posits, Barber (1983) points out that there is undeniably a rational aspect to even emotionality in trust. "The practical significance of trust lies in the social action it underwrites. Behaviorally, to trust is to act as if the uncertain future actions of others were indeed certain in circumstances wherein the violation of these expectations results in negative consequences for those involved. In other words, the behavioral content of trust is the undertaking of a risky course of action on the *confident expectation* (emphasis given) that all persons involved in the action will act competently and dutifully" (Barber 1983). Why is this risky course of action important? When we see others trusting us, we automatically are more inclined to trust them and vice versa (Luhmann, Larson, Kydd, Barber, Wheeler, Booth, et al). Whether that is the case with non-state armed groups and states engaging, remains to be seen through the course of the case studies that shall be examined later.

Trust and Uncertainty

Although trust in general is indispensable in social relationships, it always involves an unavoidable element uncertainty, potential doubt and therefore risk. The uncertainty that potentially trusting partners might have about each other's future motives and intentions has led some social psychologists, writing about inter group conflict and cooperation in business and other contexts, to posit the existence of a 'trust dilemma'. They explain this as the vulnerability

that arises from the dangers of misplaced trust in situations where actors seek to secure values that could not be realized in the absence of trust (Kramer 1999).

A particular conceptual difficulty with a rationalist study of trust which scholarship on trust has recently done is that it continues to look at trust merely behaviorally. When Andrew Kydd (2005) applies trust in Game Theory, for example, behavioral trust is treated as a definite indicator of cognitive trust. However, this is mostly not the case. For instance, one may feign trust behaviorally without actually trusting, which is the main reason for the uncertainty that persists. In such cases, Game Theories such as the Prisoner's Dilemma Game are restrictive in their approach. Any overt display of trust or any emotion does not necessarily mean that the emotion is true and felt. And this is especially true of world diplomacy. Representatives of two nations or entities may be the biggest of rivals and yet behave as the best of friends at international summits. Trust may be feigned under pressure of a higher authority, veiled long term interests, societal and public expectations and a number of other situations. States may feign trust in negotiations as they give in to public pressure or pressure from a hegemonic state. Similarly, non-state armed groups may pretend to trust and agree to ceasefire at a losing point in war, only to gain time to rebuild their armies and ammunition. Therefore, for a wider, deeper and clearer understanding of trust, one has to look beyond what appears to be- one has to delve into the emotional and psychological aspects of trust. This is what is missing in the present literature on trust, not only in international relations theory, but in general.

Martin Hollis argues that rationalists can never give up the chance to exploit others if their utility will be benefited by such action. "Trust requires actors to be prepared to eschew the satisfaction of their own utilities. When promises and agreements are represented in consequential terms, in the manner of rational egoism, they lose their power to bind" (Martin Hollis 1998: 160).

Aaron Hoffman writes that "trust refers to an actor's willingness to place something valued under another actors' control" (Hoffman 2006: 4). The actors must be willing to accept their vulnerability to betrayal if their positive expectations about the motives and intentions of others prove misplaced. Therefore, there is always an underlying uncertainty that comes with trusting. Annette Baeir commented in the same vein, "Trust is acceptance of vulnerability to harm that others could inflict, but which we judge that they will not in fact inflict." (1995: 152, also see Hoffman 2006). Hoffman further argues that there is an inverse relationship between the

willingness to trust on the one hand, and on the other the importance of the issue and the related margin of safety available. He wrote, 'We can expect that willingness of actors to grant one another control over their interests will wane as the issues are stake increase in importance (Hoffman 2006: 41).

However, Hoffman falls into a trap with this conceptualization. When he says that willingness of actors to trust wanes with increase in the importance of the issue at hand, he is indicating . However, his very definition of trust is about accepting vulnerability and the fact that one could be taken advantage of.

Wheeler and Booth argue, "To trust to any degree is to risk betrayal". They give the example of Argentina and Brazil, and later South Africa. "Presidents Alfonsin and Sarney would have been unusually trusting for state leaders had they not borne this consideration in mind when they met in 1985 in Foz de Iguacu to pledge once more that their nuclear programmes were solely for peaceful purposes. Nonetheless, they pressed on without guarantees that the other party was not feigning trustworthiness as a cover to pursue a weapons programme. What is more, risks continued to be accepted despite suspicions on part of some elements in both governments that the other might be secretly developing nuclear weapons". (2008: 242)

Luhmann notes, trust is not mere prediction: "Trust is not a means that can be chosen for particular ends, much less an end/means structure capable of being optimized" (1979: 88). According to him, predictions and behaviors which are based on reductionist models are "functional equivalents for trust but not acts of trust in the true sense". As explained before, trust, just as prediction is meant to reduce complexity albeit in different ways. "Trust begins where prediction ends. The over-rationalized conception of trust, by reducing it to a conscious, cognitive state presumably evidenced by cooperative behavior, totally ignores the emotional nature of trust." (Lewis and Weigart 1985: 974).

The outcome of any negotiation, then, depends on whether trust prevails in spite of uncertainty or not; if the environment breeds trust it would lead towards solidarity, and if there is mistrust there would be atomism. It is imperative to note here that solidarity may not imply cooperation. One may cooperate in being divisive, regressive and oppressive also- as for instance, governments and armies cooperate to suppress socio-politico movements, or for that matter, vice

versa where an army may cooperate with non-state armed groups to topple a ruling government. Trust, therefore, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for cooperation to occur, but necessary for solidarity to emerge.

Conclusion

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to conceptualise trust taking into consideration its multidimensional and multilateral nature. It has been argued that trust as a concept is relatively less researched, and that the research that exists is limited to rationalist and realist conceptions of trust. The limitations of the rationalist approach are pointed out and the sociological and cognitive aspects of trust have been explored. This chapter borrows from how trust has been defined in various other fields of research and an attempt is made to assert the relevance of other discipline's work on trust in International Relations and Diplomacy literature.

It is discovered that the little research that exists on trust in the field of international relations is restricted to the functional properties of trust, i.e. how trust helps in cooperation. There is also a tendency to confuse trust with cooperation, which we dispel through this chapter, by acknowledging the elements of uncertainty and vulnerability in trust. It is established that trust significantly depends on the levels of communication and that the scope to trust arises when there is not too much information so that it becomes a rational prediction rather than trust, or too little information so that trust becomes 'blind faith'.

This chapter revisits John Locke's works in an attempt to seek a new perspective to mainstream international relations literature on trust which is influenced by the Hobbesian notions of 'anarchy' and 'self interest', and we realize that it is the human capability of overlooking stark personal interests that make it possible for them to coexist and progress making trust the 'bond of society'. There is also an attempt to look at trust through a sociological prism, wherein we distinguish between trust as a social systemic reality and as a psychology of a single human being. Further, an emotional basis to trust and its importance in guiding trust in negotiations particularly is recognised, which we shall evaluate at length in the following chapter.

Questions on trust relevant to the context of negotiations between states and non-state armed groups have been posed throughout the chapter. We conclude that there is a need to dig into a deeper explanation than a rationalist explanation of trust to understand World Politics and Diplomacy better. Treating trust behaviorally or functionally is a very narrow approach because behavior is hardly ever an independent variable and is affected by the social milieu, emotions, differing perceptions, varying rationalities, and can be feigned.

Chapter 3

The Emotional Aspect of Trust in Negotiations

Introduction

> "History teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives."
>
> - Abba Eban

The above quote portrays quite accurately what is thought of trust in mainstream literature -that it is only used as a last resort, and precisely what this chapter seeks to challenge. Research on trust in the field of international relations (the little that exists), treats it as a function that can be learnt over time, that is usually exercised only as a last resort by nations and states and political entities, as a tool and skill that can be used as a strategy to manipulate and seek interests. The fact that trust is a feeling at the end of the day seems to have slipped the minds of most theorists. This chapter seeks to prove that emotion is an elementary component of trust and any study that ignores this goes risks going on the same track of rationalist accounts of trust that cloud mainstream international relations theory. A radical break with the prevailing methodological and theoretical apparatus in IR seems necessary even if it necessitates the "abandonment of a manipulative mentality" (Euben, 1990: 16) which structures many approaches in this field, in its "predominant pursuit of systemization, replicability, controllability and practical relevance" (Michel 2011: 11). While International Relations theory acknowledges the role of human nature in influencing state or nation behavior, it tends to identify human nature in a way that is more characteristic of either self absorbed and survival seeking jungle animals or that of mechanical robots. When we speak of world diplomacy, particularly, it is assumed that representatives of states and other non state entities are always perfunctory schemers who are supposed to think only in a particular, and often predatory way in case of the more powerful parties, which if they do not abide by, they shall be punished by the system. It is assumed that to have the right to survive and to progress, one must impede on someone else's rights and squeeze as much advantage as possible from a situation to stay ahead. Complex emotions and sensitivity, which I strongly believe are the one main characteristics that distinguish an evolved human race from

most other species, and have enabled us to co-exist and progress together in organised societies, are completely ignored. It is no wonder, then, that trust is not deemed important or possible in an 'anarchical' world order. Trust is often conspicuous by its absence in international relations not because it is impossible to exist, but because it is not given a chance. Therefore, in order for trust to be taken seriously, its emotional aspects needs to be brought to fore.

The aim of this chapter is to delve into the cognitive and emotional aspects of trust and reveal the importance of emotions in studying and nurturing trust. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to take account of each emotion and its effect on trust, the goal is to understand how emotions in general affect trust, and to reiterate as relatively few have already done before, that they do. The study of trust in International Relations tends to ignore the aspect of emotions therefore exposing glaring gaps. This chapter shall identify those gaps and try to answer them through the prism of emotions.

Nicholas Wheeler, one of the recent scholars to acknowledge the role of emotions on trust, broadly identifies two major ways in which trust emerges. First, trust can develop spontaneously as in the case of the end of apartheid (2007: 3; Both and Wheeler 2008: 242-243;) or it can develop through a process of small "strategic" exchanges such as the leap of faith, etc. These strategic exchanges increase reliability and confidence between the two adversaries, leading to trust as was the case between Brazil and Argentina (Wheeler 2009: 9-15). While Wheeler's attempt at bringing trust to prominence in international relations literature, most particularly on the topics of nuclear disarmament and security dilemma, is commendable, there remain some glaring gaps in his works and questions that are left unanswered. In the above classification, for instance, when Wheeler talks of strategic exchanges leading to trust, the correlation seems almost oxymoronic. Strategic exchanges would mean that the behavior of the trustee and the trustor are driven by an assessment of their interests. What role, then, does trust have to play in the explanation of this behavior? Does cooperation always tantamount to trust? Is trust synonymous with a well charted out 'strategy' based on interests and incentives?

Jonathon Mercer (2005: 99) points out, "Rationalists drain the psychology from trust by turning it into a consequence of incentives. Emphasising incentives as the basis for trust eliminates both

the need for trust and the opportunity to trust" (Mercer, 2005: 95). Although Wheeler's account is by no means only a rationalist account and far more profound, this is a breach he has not been able to address. Even though recent analysis agree to the role of emotions in trust, these conceptions overlook the central role of emotions in acts of trust by presenting trust as a mere political choice which is open to agents in specific interactions (Lahno 2001, Jones 1996, Michel 2011). Michel (2011) points out that most recent critiques on trust are lackadaisical in a serious engagement with emotions and psychology. According to him, most of these critiques assume that trust becomes an option or choice that can be achieved by following a certain set of rules to increase reliability. However, if trust is defined in this manner, what is the difference between trust and strategic cold calculations at all? Aren't we again following into a functionalist trap where trust is merely serves the purpose of achieving certain ends, wherein we claim that we can twist trust the way we want to as if we have full control over it? This chapter shall try and point out some of such inconsistencies in research on trust, and merge our evaluation of trust in the previous chapter with relevant studies on emotions.

In the context of this research, it becomes even more important to incorporate emotions in our analysis of trust because conflicts between states and non state armed groups are particularly intense emotion wise. In this case, the non state entities are groups of people often from among the country's own civilian population that is disgruntled and feels betrayed by the state or the system under the jurisdiction of which it has been compelled to live, and would rather not. They may not identify with their government physically, culturally, politically and underneath it all they don't connect emotionally. They challenge state legitimacy and accuse it of discriminating against their group and/ or those who they claim to represent. The fact that emotions are intense in conflicts between states and non state armed groups is evident by how these groups are willing to resort to violence and put their lives and livelihoods at stake, even though they usually start off with much smaller numbers than the state's organised legal armed forces and much less resources, which is why they have to use unconventional warfare tactics such as guerrilla warfare, terrorising and holding hostage the civilian population in order to get the state's attention towards their demands which range from partial autonomy to secession.

Any group or entity that does not belong to the established state structure, and uses means of violence for furthering its aspirations is doing it “illegally”. However, the group that is illegal today while it is not a part of the state establishment, may come to power tomorrow, some of the most prominent examples being the Taliban and Khmer Rougue. Moreover, with increasing globalisation, state boundaries are becoming less rigid, sovereignty is being questioned, and conflicts are becoming more complex than ever.

In that vein, it is interesting to examine Locke’s and Lockeans’ perspective on building trust. Even some present Lockeans such as John Dunn (1984) find it imperative for a legitimate government authority to exist in order for trust to be fostered. Does this cliché hold true for contemporary world politics as well, where, in an increasing number of cases organized groups apart from the government enjoy much more ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of the people that they represent? Who decides what is legitimate, after all? During the rule of the Shah in Iran for instance, Ayatollah Khomeini enjoyed much more trust than the government from the people of Iran. The Hamas and Hezbollah are prominent examples which command more respect and popularity than the ‘legitimate’ government authorities among the Palestinians and the Shia Muslims of Lebanon, respectively, as does Syed Ali Shah Geelani in the Kashmir valley. In Nepal, the Maoists overthrew the government and were later elected to power. Clearly, then, there is a need to revisit this particular claim about Lockean as well as mainstream analysis. In fact, there is a need to revisit legitimacy in negotiations and trust with respect to non state armed groups. However, that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Nevertheless, it is important that we acknowledge this discrepancy to understand and normalise the emotional perspective of the non state armed groups against the legal state authority. It is important to understand that the high level of suspicion that exists between the state and non state armed groups is not merely due to a conflict of interest, territory or scramble for power, but there are also stories of violation of human rights, murder, betrayal, unhappiness, despair that each blames the other for that lead to a negative and untrustworthy environment.

Due to high running emotions, the tendency to break promises in a setting where state authorities and non state armed groups are negotiating, is even more. States have been known to often

breach contracts with non state groups (armed, violent as well as non violent) once they get them to follow their demands, due to lack of 'incentive' to keep their side of the bargain. On the other hand, non state armed groups often flit between giving up arms and continuing with their armed struggle due to lack of *sufficient* reason or a *determining* motive to observe restraint and engage with the state, or to come to power.

A fatalist voice would argue that trust is in short supply in contemporary world politics and impossible in an engagement between state and non state amed groups, but perhaps more tellingly, that to trust can actually be "dangerous" in such a scenario. It is often assumed that governments and non state armed groups alike, would always prefer the risks of mistrust to those of betrayal, and believe they have no choice. However, history has showed us time and again that it is not impossible for former adversaries to come together, although usually after a calamity, when emotions run at their peak to even melt the hearts of the coldest diplomats. The purpose of this dissertation, and of relating emotion and trust is to add to literature that can help make a breakthrough in such difficult settings.

Some Problems with Rationality

To establish the importance of studying emotions in trust we must probe the limitations of a rational analysis of trust, which seems to be the predominant form of analysis in literature on world politics and negotiations.

A very oft repeated example of trust between former adversaries given is the relationship between Argentina and Brazil that was mentioned earlier. The fact that they have developed mechanisms and institutions over the years to increase transparency regarding their nuclear programs is apparently a proof of the trust that exists between them. However, isn't transparency, a proper checks systems and various forms of controls too narrow a definition of trust? Mercer (2005: 95) observed: "If trust depends on external evidence, transparency, iteration, or incentives, then trust adds nothing to the explanation. Such an arrangement eliminates the need for trust and the opportunity to trust." The way trust has come to be defined whether you take the above example or an arms control treaty is usually on the basis of incentives such as transparency and institutionalization, and then of course the eventual incentive

of ‘survival’. Would we say trust exists between a couple if they allocate spies on each other to monitor behavior? Or in a parent-child relationship if the parent decided to keep a continuous check on where the child went and what he/ she did? Would you say trust exists between neighbours who would not be comfortable inviting each other to their homes for fear of getting robbed some day? No. And yet, in the field of international relations monitored relationships qualify as trusting relationships. There is a need to revamp the definition of trust to give states, entities and non-state actors scope *to* trust. As Mercer further examines, “if observers attribute cooperation to the environment rather than the person, then trust cannot – and need not – develop because incentive-based behaviour is not a substitute for trust-based behavior” (Mercer, 2005: 95). It seems that the attitude towards others in trust-relationships is not characterised by any form of functional supervision or control.

On this, Lagerspetz (1998) points out the difference between trust and reliability. He argues that what Argentina and Brazil have is a mechanism to ensure reliability and not trust. Although mistrust has been overcome, trust has not yet been achieved. An act of reliance exhibits all the characteristics of rational choice decision making, wherein every risk taken is well calculated and every step is a strategic move towards achieving an incentive or an objective. Reliance may be guided through preferences, but it differs from trust in the fact that there is a lesser degree of emotion involved in guiding the moves towards building reliance. When rationalists like Kydd, Macy, etc. define trust in terms of even improvised rational choice theories, they are actually defining reliance.

Wright (2010) explains the difference between reliance and trust through a weighing of emotions. He observes that one can rely on an alarm clock to wake oneself up in the morning, but one does not trust it. The reason for this it lacks a deliberative capacity that allows it to take part in my act of trusting. There is a lack of choice, just as a plethora of mechanisms to ensure non proliferation of nuclear arms strips Argentina and Brazil of much of choice, and it is fear that holds them back, not so much trust. Trust, then, is much more based on the actual interaction between the human agents involved.

Moreover, trust exceeds the mere functionality of reliance and presents a richer, emotionally based attitude that is more than the sum and outcome of rational decision-making (Lagerspetz, 1998: 38-39). Rather, "genuine trust is an emotion and emotions are, in general, not subject to direct rational control" (Lahno, 2001: 172). The emotive component is also exhibited by the fact that when someone who you trust breaks it, there is a feeling of betrayal, whereas when someone who you rely on does not comply, there is only disappointment. Betrayal only gains meaning when it is used in relation to human agents. It would be strange indeed if we would say we felt betrayed by an alarm clock because it failed to wake us up or by a car because it broke down (Wright, 2010: 616). "Subsequently, betrayal is a violation that exceeds disappointment qualitatively as it involves a deeper emotional as well as existential challenge. It is an experience that does not only show a misjudgement or miscalculation on our part but also strikes deeper in a more existential sense" (Wright, 2010: 617).

A rational approach not only snatches trust of its emotional and cognitive element, but also has a tendency to treat trust's emotional aspects or displays as irrational- as a 'problem' that needs to be solved. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the human capacity to trust is the key to a harmonious and peaceful life, and is the reason that the humans are able to coexist and progress in societies. In fact, a rational approach tends to treat all challenges in our social, political and economic lives as problems that have to be overcome and the promise that human existence is capable of providing straight solutions to all the complexities of life. That is why there is a need for a more nuanced approach to trust, which we shall attempt to achieve to an extent through this chapter.

The Inherent Bad Faith Model

If there were a 'classic' theory regarding trust, rather mistrust, it would be the Inherent Bad Faith Model in International relations and political psychology. It is a model of information processing that was introduced by Ole Holsti into academic literature, wherein he conceptualised how diplomats deal with an opponent based on American diplomat John Foster Dulles' beliefs on the USSR during his reign as an official. According to this model, the other state is presumed to be implacably hostile and any indications that show otherwise are conveniently overlooked and

dismissed as propaganda ploys or signs of weakness. The personal narrative is extremely biased. During negotiations the parties pretend to come together or reach a settlement without any intention of following up. ‘Intention’ is the key word here. There is no intention on part of either of the parties to actually negotiate, or to compromise their position in anyway. The negotiations are held for political effect and nothing more.

Dulles held a closed, negative image of the Soviet Union which he was able to maintain over time by selective attention to new information and by acknowledged behaviour which according to him "explained away non hostile Soviet actions according to the exigencies of weakness”. In his analysis, Holsti (1962) demonstrated that a strong relationship existed between Dulles' beliefs about the USSR and his attributory behaviour. According to Holsti as a result of his "inherent bad faith" image of the USSR, Dulles would either associate perceptions of decreasing Soviet hostility with decreasing Soviet success in foreign affairs and maintain a stable, low evaluation of the USSR ("close to the evil pole of the scale") in spite of perceived changes in Russian hostility (Stuart and Starr 1981).

This model represents a case of how international relations theory has always blatantly not given trust a chance, always assuming the other party is upto something fishy even if the evidence shows otherwise. With no role for emotion to play, negotiations are reduced to a mere symbolic gesture and often as a means to try and take advantage of the adversary and gain as much as possible. Bad faith or mistrust is innate in the political exchange where any display of trust is either feigned or ignored. The unfortunate part is that even six decades after diplomats such as Dulles, not much has changed when it comes to international negotiations. Old rivals continue to view each ‘others’’ policies and moves with suspicion no matter how many gestures are made towards trust and reconciliation.

The Effect of 'Incidental Emotions' on Trust

Various factors in existing literature have been attributed to influencing the trustworthiness of an individual or a collective group. Butler (1991) recognises that chief among them are ability, benevolence and integrity of the trustee which is gauged from their past behaviour or reputation or intentions, to be the defining variables of trustworthiness. But, surely, perceptions pertaining to trust cannot be merely based on past accounts and behaviour. In my view, the above variables are certainly very limited. Would it be fair to say that a truster or trustee can never experience a 'change of heart' that is not in sync with the evidence or information present? If we were to take everyday routine examples, would you trust an angry and fuming hair dresser with a cutting your hair, even if you do eventually get it done from the same person (remember, trust is not synonymous with cooperation)? Haven't we noticed all too often how our moods may affect our judgement of people and situations? Isn't it a lot easier to believe a salesperson selling his product what you otherwise thought to be useless, if we are in a jovial frame of mind? Don't we ever find ourselves trusting someone merely because we are in a 'trusting mood'? Therefore, emotions may be affecting our judgements, and automatically our perceptions of whether someone is trustworthy or not, more than we would like to admit. Let us explore this possibility in the context of International relationships.

Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) offer an interesting analysis on how emotions, which are unrelated to the trustee - what they refer to as 'incidental emotions', and what we shall call emotional moods - influence perceptions of trustworthiness. They claim that emotional moods (happiness, sadness, etc) are more pervasive in decision making than general emotions towards the trustee (such as disappointment or admiration) as moods can be invoked easily and quite suddenly in everyday life (eg, a quarrel with a friend, or a tragedy in the family), thereby catching you unawares. Therefore, they are more likely to affect our judgement of the trustworthiness of a person.

"Incidental emotions have weaker control appraisals than emotions, and are therefore more likely to be misattributed to a variety of targets (e.g., another person, oneself, or an event) than emotions." (Forgas and George 2001, cited by Dunn and Schweitzer 2005: 737). It could be

deciphered from this that emotions that lack strong 'control appraisals' or what we may call emotions that weaken rational evaluation are more likely to influence a wide variety of judgments and therefore trust. Emotions that their study has pointed out to be lacking in strong control appraisals tend to be negative emotions such as anger, frustration, anxiety, etc.

An evaluation of the above research work in the context of this study reveals some interesting results that are relevant diplomacy and negotiations between two wildly conflicting parties. First, emotions and moods significantly affect the judgement of people and groups towards people and groups. And since the trustworthiness of a person is gauged by the trustor's perception/ judgement of the trustee (Butler 1991, Forgas and George 2001, et al), emotions tend to affect the parties' the willingness to trust. Negotiating parties at loggerheads are bound to have different trust levels than negotiating parties that are allies, or have resolved their differences through peaceful means. The former's perception of each other and each other's proposals is bound to be clouded by negative emotions such as anger, annoyance and disappointment (emotions with weak control appraisals), leading to a sceptical attitude towards the 'other', therefore breeding mistrust. The latter, on the other hand, is more likely to express positive emotions based on positive perceptions and expectations from each other, and therefore are more likely to deem each other as trustworthy.

Second, incidental or sudden emotions (moods) are more likely to affect our judgement of the other party than general emotions. A negotiation between a state and non state group at the brink of war, after a suicide bombing, or through blackmail (eg taking hostages from the opposing camp, forcing negotiations by intervening party by imposing sanctions, etc.) is bound to be a disaster as far as trust is concerned even though it may work as a short term strategy. The Indian state's policy towards North Eastern insurgent groups of bringing them to the negotiating table after militarily exhausting them/ breaking down on their camps and then getting them to talk is often marvelled at in strategic circles. However, by using tactics of military might and forcing to negotiate, is the state alienating the insurgents even more, and choosing to only manage conflict in the short term rather than resolve it? Only time will tell. The one thing that is certain is that the state would rather build a relationship of fear in the insurgents than trust. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, on the other hand, is the classic example of dealing with

emotions to nurture trust. Negative emotions of anger, rage and contempt were transformed into positive emotions of forgiveness, regret for misdoings and understanding, which led to a more or less successful peace process and transition to democracy.

Third, Dunn and Schweitzer's study also goes on to claim that incidental emotions influence judgments of the potential trustor about a potential trustee with whom the trustor is already familiar, but not *too* familiar (2005). This, perhaps, explains why parties that have been involved in conflict for a long period and are too familiar with each other's tactics, are more stubborn during negotiations. No amount of manipulation of emotion such as appeasement policies and carrots and stick methods seem to deter them from their stand. This has particularly been seen with countries that have defied the nuclear non proliferation regime over the years for instance. Factors such as a change in leadership, a shift in balance of power, and a change of mediators/ intermediaries are likely to bring in a positive atmosphere of emotions and therefore more hope for trust to emerge as there is bound to be a decrease in the familiarity of the process of working and negotiation abilities of one another providing an opportunity to start afresh with a more open mind. At the same time, the findings also prove it takes some degree of familiarity that comes with time and repeated interactions for the decision makers to make judgements about the trustworthiness of the other. Here, familiarity does not only have to be built during the negotiations. ASEAN has been relatively successful than other regional organisations in mitigating conflict and carrying out successful negotiations because of the strong personal rapport that the leaders of the ASEAN member countries share with one another wherein they socialise outside their official commitments often. This is called track one and a half diplomacy, and is crucial for it provides with a ventilated space for the parties to be able to relate to each other, empathise with the other if need be, and connect with the other on an emotional level. Being familiar is being emotionally aware of the other's case, and therefore opens up opportunities for trust to foster.

Role of deception in cultivating negative emotions in Trust

"Trust is precarious in so far as the act of trusting renders the actor vulnerable to deception or worse. In attempting to overcome uncertainty trust generates risk" (Simmel cited in Barbalett 2005: 1). The previous chapter delves into how trust needs to be looked at from beyond a

behavioural perspective because a lot of times trust can be feigned. Any overt display of trust or any emotion does not necessarily mean that the emotion is true and felt. And this is especially true of world diplomacy. Representatives of two nations or entities may be the biggest of rivals and yet behave as the best of friends at international summits. States may feign certain emotions opportunistically in negotiations under pressure of a higher authority, veiled long term interests, societal and public expectations, and a number of other situations. Similarly, non-state armed groups may pretend to trust and agree to ceasefire at a losing point in war (hurting stalemate), only to gain time to rebuild their armies and ammunition. Therefore, the role of deception in negotiations becomes important to study.

Deception is a negative form of emotion regulation and according to Jack Barbalett emotion regulation is a universal aspect of human emotions (2005: 2). Emotion regulation is the "process by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience these emotions" (Grross 1998: 275, cited by Barbalett 2005: 2). Barbalett believes that emotions can be regulated (in a positive or negative direction in two ways. First, through interaction between people where one's emotions can be modified by the apparent response of another person to them, which he calls the implicit social regulation of emotions. Second, a person may self monitor themselves and regulate one's own emotions which is known as explicit social regulation of emotions.

There has been a fair amount of emphasis on the influence of deception on trust and trust recovery (Bok 1985; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2004). However, deceptive practices are looked at through a moralistic or normative perspective, rather than as a means of emotional manipulation. Sissela Bok' s work (1985) on lying as a moral choice in private and in public offers a relevant perspective on trust. According to her, regardless of the justifications that are usually presented for lying, every lie undermines the general trust of people in society, institutions and the system. Bok writes that ". . . trust in some degree of veracity functions as a foundation of relations among human beings; when this trust shatters or wears away, institutions collapse" (33). Here, deception is a betrayal of the promise made leaving the trustor in a vulnerable position that may induce fury and wrath once the deception is revealed.

Allred, Mallozi et al. (1997) demonstrate with their work that the amount of joint gains and headway towards trust that the negotiators earn is directly influenced by whether the negotiating groups are approached with negative emotions like anger, or positive emotions such as compassion. Therefore, it becomes very tempting for parties who otherwise hate each other's guts to put on a deceptive image wherein they pretend to be more understanding than they actually are and lie their way through the negotiations. Deception to gain the trust of the other is oxymoronic but a fairly common practice, particularly by 'rational egoists', of whom there appear to be fair many on the world diplomatic stage. As Martin Hollis states, 'Rationalists can never give up the chance to exploit others if their utility will be benefited by such action. Trust requires actors to be prepared to eschew the satisfaction of their own utilities' (1998: 190).

According to the study of Allred et al., the way that one party approaches another also determines the willingness of the negotiating parties to continue with the negotiations in the future. For a party that may not want to negotiate on certain demands and finds itself cornered, it can use emotional deceptive tactics of being angry so as to not have to make a compromise and listen to the other party's demands. It is a common practice for parties to play spoilsport by acting out anger during negotiations or 'walk out' of the talks at times defying all logic and reason in many negotiations and proceedings to avoid admitting to mistakes and answering uncomfortable questions. Emotional deception such as portraying hurt, false anger, etc. are therefore a prominent feature that determine the path that negotiations acquire. Emotional deception on a regular basis by either or both parties leads to erosion of trust, as they become *too familiar* with each other's ways as the process of negotiating proceeds, and as explained in the previous chapter too much information leaves no scope to trust.

Developing on the Human Factor/ Empathy

Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler note that mainstream literature "raises interesting psychological and emotional questions on trust but does not answer them, except in terms of strategic choices" (2008). Their answer lies in introducing a 'human factor' or 'personality factor' to the concept of trust. "Trust is elusive, both conceptually and in the games that nations

play. The human factor/ individual (inter personal trust) remains the fore, because relations between the concerned units take place through the agency of human actors playing a political role" (Wheeler and Booth 2008: 230). They elaborate through the example of the Cold War where they claim that the reason for trust developing at its height between the United States of America and Russia, was because Gorbachev and Reagon set aside their ideological fundamentalism and ethnocentric blinkers that had traditionally gone with their official roles, embraced the 'human' factor and exercised security dilemma sensibility in the "interest" of common humanity as well as the state, was personality dependent, and therefore could not develop subsequently. In contrast, they point out that trust did become embedded among the traditionally warring states of Western Europe, following the initiatives of a number of key figures in the aftermath of one of the most destructive wars in history (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 228).

Through their thesis, they give various examples from history, such as the policy initiatives of Mandela, Rabin and Saadat, among others to build on their 'human factor' as a significant determinant of trust building policies. However, as mentioned in the earlier chapter, Booth and Wheeler seem to fall into a trap of the same rationalist egoist thought that they set to critique by defining the personality traits in terms of behaviour and astuteness surrounding the subject's policy decisions. The human factor builds around the shrewdness and deftness of the personality, but does not delve deeply into *humaneness* itself, making itself perfectly compatable with rationalist thought. The emotional aspect of the personality factor in nurturing trust, and the emotional factor that helps these leaders garner public support for their policies is explored only but once- in terms of empathising and sympathising with the adversary, where they make a keen observation and value addition to an emotional analysis of trust.

They give the example of Anwar Sadat's brave decision in 1997 wherein he told the editor of an Egyptian magazine that "Jews had lived in fear for thousands of years. They lived in ghettos fearing majority populations everywhere. They were exposed to many massacres and persecutions.. life itself is their problem.. they are threatened in merely maintaining an existence"

(quoted by Mangold 1990: 63). Wheeler and Booth call this gesture of Saadat a ‘unique act of reconciliation’. Surprisingly, in the same breath they note how he had to ‘pay’ with his life for empathising and sympathising with the Jews, a remark which clearly has a realist undertone rather than admiration. Furthermore, they deliberate whether a theory of trust rooted in the ‘human factor’ is compatible with self interest. In my view, Saadat’s gesture was truly remarkable given the fact that Egypt had fought three wars with Israel in a span of three decades. While Saadat was unfortunately killed for his show of compassion and for possessing an understanding of the Israeli case besides his own, it will be seen in the later chapter that his attitude towards the Israel during the Camp David and Wye negotiations was in sharp contrast. It goes on to show how emotions are sidelined and rationality and self interest are privileged when it comes to world diplomacy, which prevents the potential to trust. In my view, there is little scope for trust and understanding to emerge if emotions are not given a chance.

An example of how emotions such as empathy can lead to trust building is the role that Muslim women have played through the Women in Security, Conflict Management,and Peace (WISCOMP) project to promote dialogue over conflict in Kashmir. The vision that guides this project is that trust will only come from parties internalizing the emotions/ feelings and psychological realities of the other, and realizing that the pain, loss and suffering are shared experiences (Fierk 2005). Karin Fierk has argued that the purpose of such therapeutic interventions is to create a space in which each side can acknowledge how the acts of the ‘other’ have been conditioned by their own experience of suffering (2005: 148). Analytic empathy of this kind represents an acknowledgement of how each side has contributed to the suffering of the other, thereby breaking down the absolute conviction in one’s own victimhood. This provides an opening, according to Fierke, ‘for beginning to re-describe the conflict such that an integrative solution, rather than a mutually exclusive bargain, might be possible’ (2005:148).

Bonding occurs when actors translate a level of empathy and sympathy into a political relationship and the forging of a new collective identity. Such bonding is invariably a difficult and lengthy process, especially if there is an enmity between the political units involved going

back to generations. Fierke's observation about finding an integrative solution based on emotional consideration rather than a mere bargain fits right into our understanding of trust in negotiations. Perhaps, if a trustor and trustee show understanding and compassion at the negotiating table instead of skilful diplomacy and listing down 'reasons' to cooperate, we would have scope for real trust to emerge. Such an evaluation helps us shift from a 'human' (personality) evaluation of trust to a 'humane' evaluation which helps us integrate emotions into trust effectively. In my view, there is an urgent need to accommodate a 'humane factor' into negotiations, especially when it comes to resolving long standing disputes for sustainable cooperation based on trust to occur.

At the same time, it must be recognised that compassion, empathy, sympathy, understanding and such positive emotions cannot be just injected into a negotiation process, more so among a state and rebelling parties. Emotions, especially positive emotions, develop over a period of time and with increasing familiarity among parties. And since emotions take their time and space to come to surface, so does trust. "Trust does not develop overnight but rather is accomplished after a lifetime of common experiences and through sustained interactions and reciprocal exchanges, leaps of faith that are braced by the verification offered by organizations, trial-and-error, and a historical legacy of actions and encounters that deposit an environment of certitude not withstanding the uncertainty that accompanies social life" (Barnett and Adler, 1998: 414 cited by Booth and Wheeler 2008). If it were possible that trust develop overnight, that trust could be controlled, it would come out of rationality and logic. However, since trust always carries a significant emotional baggage with it, it is difficult to attain and control at will.

Bias and Alienation in negotiations

Locke (1660) points out in his work, *Two Tracts of the Government*, how the twin threats of the partiality of individual judgment and the cultural heterogeneity of evaluative standards pose very significant 'threats' to human nature and the study of trust. He points out how cultural heterogeneity especially prevents a reliable and general identification of the 'law of nature' and poses 'practical' obstacles to it:

> "There is almost no vice, no infringement of natural law, no moral wrong, which anyone who consults the history of the world and observes the affairs of men will not readily perceive to have been not only privately committed somewhere on earth, but also approved by public authority and custom. Nor has there been anything so shameful in its nature that it has not been either sanctified somewhere by religion, or put in the place of virtue and abundantly rewarded with praise" (1660:166-7).

Mercer (2005) explains this bias due to heterogeneity in terms of identities of groups. He argues that just as notions of shared identity generate cooperation between groups, the same shared identity may create mistrust and rivalry with another group (2005:9). He applies this insight to argue that while the major European states had escaped self-help and power politics in their relations with each other, this had been achieved by creating a new European superstate, which in turn would provoke security dilemmas in relations with other entities (Mercer 1995: 250-2). But how do shared identities encourage mistrust? Why do differences in identity provoke bias in judgement? One could attribute emotions such as arrogance, pride, confidence/ belief in one's own identity to indulge in partiality towards one's own group, eventually leading to each eying the other with suspicion.

In the case of negotiations between States and Non-state Armed Groups, particularly, the mistrust arises from this very bias against the 'other' and, in the majority of cases, from cultural heterogeneity and perceived differences between identities. Each negotiating party in negotiations between states and non state armed groups has at some or all points viewed the other as 'evil', 'immoral', a non-believer, etc. and at the same time justified and glorified its own acts. There is a wide range of emotions that result from, as well as lead to, such a bias ranging from hatred to fear to awe to envy/ jealousy towards the other party. The fact that one party does not even recognise the legitimacy and the right to exist of the other, as is generally the case through a majority of the course in negotiations with non-state armed groups makes these emotions even more intense inducing feelings of alienation. Intense negative emotions are likely to cloud reason and ignore the rational element of trust which is necessary to overcome bias, leading to an unending chain of mistrust. It is clear, then, a major way to clear bias is by striking its roots and manipulating emotion. Engaging with the emotional aspect of trust, then, is important to gradually transform negative emotions to positive so as to give an opportunity to trust.

Scheff (1994) proposes that isolation between disputing groups cause protracted conflict by not letting trust to develop. The feelings that arise from alienation tend to result in fanatical nationalism wherein every act of the nation is sought to be justified no matter how wrong. He says, “It is much easier to imagine union with the unknown members of one’s sect ("imaginary communities") than to do the demanding work of making relationships in one’s real interpersonal network more liveable”. Feelings of the group are taken personally, then, by each member who recognises themselves at part of that group. If one member faces an act of humiliation, the entire group takes it personally. This leads to shame/ anger spirals that cause deep mistrust (Retzinger 1991). It is not just the feeling of alienation that prevents trust from taking shape. More importantly, it is the denial by participants of the alienation, which is hidden beneath rage and fury.

Anger and Trust

Different forms of anger and aggression are probably the most identifiable forms of emotion in negotiations during conflict. As mentioned in the earlier chapter, anger against the ‘other’ is a major invoking factor of persistent mistrust over a period of time. Unfortunately, while in literature on trust there seems to be no consideration of anger affecting levels of trust at all, literature on mediation/ negotiations merely provides a common prescriptive advice for mediators which seems to be too simplistic, i.e. “allowing venting of anger” (Fisher, Ury, et al. 1991: 31). However, venting out anger can prove counter-productive at times. If every adversary on the negotiating table were allowed to vent out their anger without any form of control, a proper discussion would not be able to take place to allow the transformation of anger into empathy. A mutual understanding would be difficult to achieve in such a scenario which would probably include a lot of name calling and disrespect, which may end up doing the opposite of building trust. To imagine such a scenario, one can merely think of the unabashed screaming and throwing of furniture at the Indian ‘Parliament’ sessions! Allred et al. (1997) note how venting of anger which is mixed with other negative emotions can be dangerous, especially when it is mixed with shame, feelings of rejection or humiliation, sheer contempt and disgust. Such a concoction of anger is therefore bound to be disruptive in building trust during negotiations, as the aggressive party would be venting anger to put the ‘other’ party to shame, to seek vengeance

at arather than to make them understand and empathise, thereby going against the objective of the negotiation.

It is pertinent to ask, then, can portrayal of anger, and emotions in general, be shown to influence trust in a positive way? How so?

To answer these questions, it is important to understand why strong emotions such as anger come to fore during negotiations, where you would expect the two parties to come to the talking table with a particular mindset that is willing to engage with the 'other', and ready to "trust in trust". 'Rational egoists' would say that conflicting parties join in negotiations not to try and understand the 'other' in order to mitigate the conflict, but to forward their interests. They would say that even if the negotiating parties are looking to resolve their differences it is because the instrumental costs of conflict far outweigh the 'benefits'. However, this explanation barely gives a clear picture.

Retzinger and Scheff's (2000) 'victim ideology' provides an emotional point of view on why most negotiations involving intractable conflicts end up in angry stalemate. They point out how ideology plays an indispensible role in the prolonging of conflict and even in welling up of emotion. Ideology provides a justification for actions wherein one tends to demonise the 'other' and idealise oneself. Through this ideology both sides award themselves with a story, a narrative- the history and the future of the struggle- which generates a great amount and variety of emotions from pride, to hatred and most importantly anger against the enemy[1]. Therefore, Aggressors often feel that being victimized themselves justifies their aggression.

From the Nazis during the World War 2 to the Serbians and Israelis today, from the Irish Republican Army to the Hamas- all think that their aggression is/ was justified because they *are*

[1] They claim that changes in ideology and narrative are most crucial to changing the trajectory of the conflict.

(not just have been) victims. And it is true that they all have been victims at some point or the other. However, these narratives are partial and distortive. What is left out in each of these narratives is the perspective of the adversary, that if they are victims they are also perpetrators of violence on the innocent. And this is how emotional mistrust breeds. There is raw anger against the other party's crimes, but not enough information and willingness to know and admit to one's own crimes which leaves no scope to generate empathy, and therefore trust.

Frances Conway (1951) gives the example of the "Speak Bitterness" meetings in the early days of the Chinese Communist Revolution, where entrenched narratives were overturned through sharing. The Chinese communists used social psychological means wherein they tried to liberate peasants who had lost all hope by organising 'Speak Bitterness' meetings wherein everyone was allowed to share their stories of oppression. The process started with a lot of anger and always resulted in mass weeping encouraging empathy.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was helpful in the same way by encouraging emotions of forgiveness by encouraging the sharing of true stories and forming new narratives that paved the way for trust to emerge. It is by sharing these stories that anger and other negative emotions such as fear and contempt that stand as obstacles to trust were overcome.

Mistrust among long time adversaries becomes more difficult to overcome with time, because of the deeply entrenched distorted and incomplete narratives, versions of history, ideology and a tendency to victimise oneself but ignore the agony of the other. When these factors are not addressed for a long time, they lead to intensification of anger against the 'other' that becomes difficult to control. Each move of the adversary, then, is seen with suspicion, regardless of its motive or intention. Therefore, anger breeds deep feelings of hatred against the 'other' and

therefore perpetual mistrust till it is not addressed through mediation that encourages empathising with the 'other'.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to challenge the notion that trust is used as a last resort in relations between nations, states and non state armed groups, by introducing the variable of emotions in trust within world politics. The reductionist view with which human nature has been theorized in world politics is exposed, and trust is redefined in terms of a complex of emotions. The limitations of the rationalist approach in international relations and negotiation theory are best revealed through a study of emotions. Here, we also evaluate the recent works in international relations that looks at the aspect of emotions in trust, albeit in an inadequate way, often giving more importance to a rational and 'strategic' explanation of trust by treating trust as a characteristic that is *needed* for cooperation, when trust is actually existential.

It is ascertained that rationalists reduce trust to a consequence of incentives, and realists diminish the definition of trust to a means to further interests. An emotional approach, particularly in a study of non state armed groups is imperative, because of the intensity that violence brings to a conflict. Regarding emotions helps us to distinguish between trust and reliability, wherein reliability exhibits characteristics of rational choice decision making rather than trusting decisions.

The effect of incidental emotions on trust explored and it is recognised that emotions have the ability to determine our judgment, perceptions, moods, behavior, and therefore, trust. It is acknowledged throughout the chapter how emotions can be manipulated to influence trust in positive and negative ways, and how deception of emotions itself is a part of negotiations that needs to be dealt with.

Further, the role of emotions in creating bias and alienation of groups is probed, from which we concur that this relation can lead to increasing the intensity of negative emotions (spiraling

anger, fury, humiliation, hatred), which in turn leads to deeply imbedded feelings of suspicion and mistrust. Finally, a relationship between anger and trust is built and the need to listen to the adversary to transform anger into positive emotions like empathy, compassion and understanding is established.

It must be kept in mind that by digging into the emotional aspect of trust we are not trying to prove that trust is irrational. In fact, even if trust were fully emotional in nature it could not be irrational, since we can have logical reasons to emote too, and then of course, as mentioned earlier emotion is even feigned at times to achieve ends. In the case of trust, however, the motive of this study is to prove that trust is not completely rational and has multiple dimensions and layers to it where emotion is one of the basic ones.

We can give reasons for why we trust someone. However, the sum of those reasons will hardly ever fully explain the phenomenon of trusting. That is not to say that emotion fills in the gap entirely. There are many more aspects to trust such as ethics and morality which need to be delved into to fill in the lacuna in research on trust in international relations, but they are beyond the scope of this research project. We may trust someone because of certain characteristics and reasons, but that does not entail that we trust all people possessing those characteristics. Equally, we can easily trust someone with only few or none of these characteristics (Michel 2011). The emotive element of trust proves that the act of trust consists of more than strategically calculated moves required for policy or decision making.

Chapter 4

Trust in negotiations in Northern Ireland and Palestine

Introduction

> "If we could read the secret history of our enemies, we would find sorrow and suffering enough to dispel all hostility."
>
> -Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1857)

In the previous chapters, we tried to identify and fill the gaps in research on trust and an attempt was made to contextualise the revelations to literature in world politics, with a focus on the area of negotiations between states and non-state armed groups. Here, we analyse two of the most protracted and intractable conflicts in history through the newly acquired prisms on trust. The reason for choosing these two conflicts for a comparative study is their similarity in terms of communal discord, the historical experiences of discrimination, and the secessionist demands of the non state armed groups.

Even though the conflicts seem similar in nature on the surface, which would involve similar approaches of resolution, trust has played out very differently when it has come down to resolving them through negotiations. A lot of it is blamed on the differing attitude and approach of the main mediator in both the cases, i.e. the United States of America, wherein a realist approach would claim that the negotiations have been tweaked in tandem with the US interests and are therefore determined by whichever community has had a strong lobby in the US Congress- the Catholic Irish immigrants in the case of Northern Ireland, and the Jewish Diaspora in the case of Palestine. This chapter shall seek an explanation that goes beyond this thought while exploring the cognitive factors involved in the negotiations.

How did trust affect the course of negotiations for both the conflicts? What are the factors that block trust from developing in spite of repeated negotiation attempts in Palestine? What made Northern Ireland achieve a breakthrough in 1998 despite the roots of conflict penetrating deep into history and rampant, intense rivalries between the Irish Catholics and Protestants? How does emotion play out in determining levels of trust between adversaries within these conflicts? Does including an explanation of the role of emotions help us understand the negotiations of the conflicts any better? How does the psyche among the societies in Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine affect trust between states and non state armed groups during negotiations? How have historical experiences affected trust in both the conflicts? These are some of the questions that we shall try and address through this chapter.

Retzinger and Scheff propose that there is an emotional societal system which is partially autonomous just like the capitalist system in societies. Emotions and society interact in complex ways. The more the emotionality in a relationship increases, the lesser significance the material interests begin to hold (2001). This theory especially holds for the intractable conflicts of Northern Ireland and Palestine. For instance, in Northern Ireland, all the four main parties to the conflict- the Protestant and Catholic factions in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and England- have spent vast amounts of money to engage in or defend against asymmetrical warfare. England, according to estimates, till not so long ago, tried to keep peace by mere show of force that cost them almost six billion dollars a year. Israel remains one of the highest military spenders in the world in spite of being one of the smallest nation states territorially. The costs incurred to keep a military show and the security dilemma posed by such an action, is surely more than any benefits or incentive by any ‘calculation’, especially if it has not succeeded in striking enough fear in the hearts and struggles of non state armed groups in Palestine so far, and some of those in Northern Ireland even after successful negotiations.

No rationalist accounts revolving around incentive, or realist analysis based on material interests could possibly explain such behaviour to hilt. Impediments to reconciliation and negotiations,

then, lie in deep seated emotions such as prestige, anger against discrimination, fear, etc. According to Whyte,

> "Anyone who studies Northern Ireland must be struck by the intensity of feeling which the conflict evokes. It seems to go beyond what is required by a rational defence of the divergent interests that undoubtedly exist. There is an emotional element here, a welling-up of deep unconscious forces. It is worth examining what contribution psychology can make to an explanation of the conflict" (1990 quoted by Scheff 1994).

This psychology of conflict is particularly helpful in explaining how trust plays out between adversaries. It is seen that whenever negative emotions run at their highest levels, it is more difficult to garner the trust of the parties regardless of the concessions and incentives that are offered to them for cooperating. Kashmir is a classic example. In spite of endless economic packages, electricity concessions, pumping of job opportunities, the mistrust of the Muslim majority towards the Indian state never seems to waver because of deep seated emotions of humiliation, sheer anger, and even revenge that have accumulated due to the callousness and reductionist approach of the Indian state over the decades.

Therefore, cognitive factors have to be considered. However, even when cognitive factors affecting conflict and negotiations are considered, they are often given a subsidiary status in mainstream international relations theory. This chapter seeks to privilege cognitive and emotional factors over the realist and rational ones and argues that the former combination of factors provides a better understanding of negotiations in the following case studies.

Northern Ireland

Background

The Northern Ireland Conflict has a history engulfed in inter group mistrust that goes up to a century, some claim. For years, beginning with "The Troubles" of the 1960's, the governments of the Republic of Ireland and England sought to facilitate a political settlement for Northern Ireland. There were many impediments to these negotiations, of course. To get a gist, in the

words of George J. Mitchell, a key mediator between the Irish and the British governments, “We had about 700 days of failure and one day of success” (Abunimha 2010). On April 10, 1998, after many ups and downs, the Belfast Agreement or the Good Friday Agreement was signed instituting a power sharing arrangement between the pro-British unionists and the Irish nationalists. The Agreement called for a devolved government— which accommodated the transfer of power from London to Belfast— in which unionist and nationalist parties would share power within the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive Committee. More importantly, the agreement also provided for action on decommissioning (disarmament), UK security normalization (demilitarization), policing, human rights, and the status of prisoners.

The case of Northern Ireland is considered a success by and large, and is the most cited case study from where lessons can be learnt in engaging with non state armed groups. However, even though the agreement was a success, it can be argued that trust has not gained a stronghold between the two conflicting communities, although the Unionists and Nationalists in Ireland have definitely come a long way since the success of the negotiations in resulting an agreement and a political solution. There are still freak incidents such as violence perpetrated by splinter factions of the IRA, and minor riots now and then. However, more or less, it can be said that the two communities have learnt to live with a considerable amount of trust, which is continuously fostered through various inter group interaction programs on ground. To evaluate the level of trust that persists between the Unionists and Nationalists today, one need only look at the big news that a simple handshake between the Queen of England and the former IRA commander and Northern Ireland’s deputy First Minister, Martin Mc Guiness, in June 2012 made, 14 years after the signing of the Belfast Agreement. Significantly during this rare meeting where the Irish President and Northern Ireland’s First Minister were also present, he emphasised on the need to acknowledge the *pain* of all victims of the conflict and their families. It shows how emotion acknowledgement of emotion is important for any resolution to take place. It shows how long it takes for trust to build between two communities who have had a protracted and troubled history of conflict. More importantly, it shows how trust is a much deeper and multidimensional concept than cooperation. Mere ‘leaps of faith’, though necessary for trust to persist and are important symbols of showing willingness to cooperate, are hardly ever sufficient platforms for trust to

take off or begin with, as many theorists of trust have argued before. As we shall see ahead, the track one negotiations in Northern Ireland were supplemented with a variety of other talks and initiatives by all four parties to the conflict- the Protestant Unionists in Northern Ireland, the Catholic Nationalists of Northern Ireland, England and the Republic of Ireland, the mediators, as well as initiatives by the society.

John Darby (2003) traces the pattern of violence during the troubles of the 1960's and the rise of paramilitaries thereafter. Besides citing the civil rights movements for equal rights and a yearning for the end of colonialism, he notices how it was really the *feeling of alienation* from the large British presence of the army and police forces and exclusion from political and civil rights that perpetuated extreme Irish nationalism and a desire to join the Irish state, which further resulted in the formation of several republican paramilitaries such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). The pattern of violence changed through the Troubles. By 1990's there had been 3500 deaths due to armed violence from a small population of about a million people. Acknowledging this feeling of alienation is important to understand the escalation of anger, the deepening of community divisions and the perpetuation of old and new grievances during the conflict as well as the negotiations that proceeded later.

Between 1974 and 1994, the year when there was ceasefire, there were in all seven attempts to reach a political and constitutional arrangement (Leary 1997). All of the initiatives were led by London and always proposed an element of power-sharing between Catholics and Protestants. All these attempts faltered in the face of local opposition due the deeply entrenched mistrust in society. In 1985, having failed at all previous attempts and unable to take control of the situation, the British government in a desperate situation reached an agreement with the Republic of Ireland. This gave way to the Anglo-Irish Agreement through which the Irish government got a consultative role in Northern Ireland's affairs. The Irish government was now in the position to act as a formal guarantor for Northern Ireland's nationalist community (Darby 2003). In return,

the Irish government recognised the existence of the State of Northern Ireland for the first time. For the first time it accepted the 'principle of consent', that Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom while a majority there wished it. The Agreement also paved the way for increased security co-operation between the two governments and was an important precursor of the post-1994 peace process. This agreement was significant because for the first time all the stakeholders in society to bring about trust between the communities were recognised. Although the feeling of alienation, and the rage that came with the Troubles, was hardly addressed, there was a leeway that was carved for peace to prevail.

Automatically and slowly but steadily, a number of events in the 1980's and 90's fell in place for the peace process to flourish. A number of steps were taken alongside the negotiations to increase trust in societies and make the peace process more inclusive. New legislations were introduced to deal with religious imbalances in education and employment (Gallagher 1995).This period also saw further development of civil society in Northern Ireland, a development that was vital for creating the conditions for wider political change over the subsequent decade (Gallagher 1995).

It was because of the attempt to address emotion at the ground level that from the mid- 1980's the militant strategies of the republican movement of the Irish Nationalists began to be questioned. The 'long war' designed by the militant Republican movement the motive of which was to wear out the British government (Darby 2003) out of Northern Ireland had exacted a heavy toll on the nationalists in terms of the lives lost, prison indictments and opportunities towards a better quality of life. These losses were acknowledged when the British government decided to acknowledge the pains of the Irish people through multiple people policies, and most importantly by giving Ireland a direct stake in the peace process. Moreover, as Darby (2003) points out, continuation of violence led to exclusion and lack of legitimacy of the republicans because it seemed like the British were serious about listening to the 'other'. The voices of dissent were finally being heard. There was a gradual realisation seeping that more violence was only stalling the chances to live a normal life. Although, this may seem a rationalist explanation for the beginning of questioning violence, the Nationalists would not have felt so had they not

been convinced of British sincerity in terms of understanding their problem, had they not felt that their emotions were important.

This was also a period that saw the emergence of new visionaries for the Irish nationalists such as Gerry Adams, the President of the Sinn Fein, and John Hume, leader of the SDLP. These leaders provided with refreshing ideas that moved towards a sound political solution to deal with the situation other than violence (Darby 2003). Although, John Hume's peacemaking models and approach was not popular in the beginning, it paved the way for the republicans to seek a more political approach nevertheless.

On seeing the reform, rather what Wheeler, Larson et al. would call 'Leaps of Faith', on part of the Irish nationalists, some Unionists and British loyalist paramilitary organisations also began showing change in their positions and seemed more willing to compromise (Gallagher 1995). From the changing trajectory and efforts made by the Sinn Fein, reduction of attacks by the IRA and other paramilitary groups, there was a sense of realisation by the Unionists that a power sharing arrangement was possible, and reassured them that the future with the Nationalists need not be feared so much.

Admittedly, the emergence of Irish American lobbyists in the United States also contributed to the changes by persuading the Clinton administration to take interest in the Northern Ireland Peace Process. However, Clinton was "pushing a door already half open" (Ginty 1997: 41). At the same time, the granting of a US entry visa to Gerry Adams by President Clinton in January 1994, did make an impression, and acted as a significant symbol for the Irish people that they were not alone in their struggle (Ginty 1997). Meanwhile backchannel talks between the Sinn Fein and the government of Ireland, and between the British government and various paramilitary groups continued, arriving at similar conclusions owing to the changing perceptions

and emotions on ground wherein feelings of alienation and anger were transforming into feelings of empathy and understanding, with larger efforts being made towards cooperation.

Events leading to Belfast 1998

On August, the 31st 1994, the IRA announced ‘a complete cessation of military operations’ (Framework Documents 1995). The main Unionist paramilitary groups followed within a few months. However, there still lay suspicion by the British Government and certain Irish Unionist factions over the IRA ceasefire, and they refused to engage with the Sinn Fein on a track one level till the ceasefire could be established. Total decommissioning of arms became a formal precondition for Sinn Fein’s entry into the talks. This move had repercussions later as it increased feelings of vulnerability among the nationalist factions of Northern Ireland by not being even considered as legitimate parties to the conflict in spite of making significant concessions through the years. The Sinn Fein saw this move as one that exposed the underlying reluctance of the British to enter into any serious negotiations. On the other hand, the predicament of the British government and the Unionists must not be overlooked, as they did not want to strike a deal, and hand over shared rule to a group that had the capacity to rearm later and make them vulnerable in turn, spiralling back into the situation of “The Troubles”. The emotions of fear and pride, therefore, have acted as impediments to trust between the two factions continuously.

In February 1996 the IRA detonated a bomb in the London’s Canary Warf, calling off the ceasefire. It accused John Major and unionists of “squandering this unprecedented opportunity to resolve the conflict” (Belfast Telegraph 1996). Although the talks continued thereafter with the rest of the parties, a tremendous blow was received with violence over the Orange Order parades which were anti Irish and anti Catholic parades in those days. They were parades that displayed the pride of the Protestants by commemorating the birth of Protestant king William of Orange that have turned triumphalist, supremacist and offensive over the years in Northern Ireland and led to serious rioting and clashes all over Northern Ireland in 1997, particularly. Eventually, the

Good Friday Agreement accommodated rules for the Orange Order parade too, giving an example of the sentiments of the minority being taken into account to make the peace process successful.

It was the election of Tony Blair to power in 1997 that paved the way for negotiations to be inclusive again. Under him, the demand for decommissioning as a precondition to draw Sinn Fein into the negotiations was abandoned.

This move had a major significance, because it now treated the Sinn Fein at par with the political groups representing the Unionists in the talks from Ireland. There was a sense of impartiality now at least as far as engaging the various stakeholders in the peace process was concerned. The earlier move of imposing the precondition of decommissioning of the Sinn Fein had reinforced even more strongly the sense of alienation that the Irish nationalists had already felt for decades, as a minority in Northern Ireland and as the politically weaker party/ community in the talks (in spite of the inclusion of the Ireland). Giving the Sinn Fein the benefit of doubt showed that they were needed in the peace process and would not be the unprivileged party in the talks- that the arrangement would be an inclusive and fair one. This way at least some of their fears were dealt with. Soon after, within the same year, the IRA declared another ceasefire, after which the Sinn Fein entered the talks in July 1997 (O' Leary 1997).

However, this did not go down well with the Unionists who had throughout believed that they had the upper hand, and they refused to talk with the Sinn Fein directly. Here, the leadership of David Trimble provided with the impetus by sometimes taking decisions that went against the popular opinion, by treating the Sinn Fein as an equal, as described in an earlier chapter.

9th April 1998 was set by George Mitchell, chairman of the talks, as the target date was an agreement to be reached in order to facilitate a referendum. After overcoming many issues at the table, and different ideas on how power should be shared, the Good Friday Agreement was delivered to every home in Northern Ireland in April 1998.

Trajectory of Approach to Conflict

Senator George Mitchell, key mediator in the peace process in the second half of the 1990's, believed that mistrust between communities was the central challenge which was deeply rooted in the sediments of history. Mistrust, he said, is "the heart of all problems in Northern Ireland. Centuries of conflict have generated hatreds that make it virtually impossible for the two communities to trust each other. Each disbelieves the other. Each assumes the worst about other. If there is ever to be durable peace and genuine reconciliation, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mindsets in Northern Ireland. That means that trust and confidence must be built, over time, by actions, in all parts of the society." (Mitchell 1999: 37)

After the latest phase of "The Troubles" began in 1969, the subsequent search for some settlement over the next two decades, according to Ruane and Todd, took a 'realist form', accepting the situation as inherently conflicting and seeking a deal or compromise in which each side furthered some interests while conceding others (2005: 237). The approach could never secure trust that Mitchell looked for because it was informed by "a rational egoist stand point" (Booth and Wheeler 2008, Michel 2011) which is incompatible with trust.

After more than two decades of communal violence, riots and bombings by the non state armed groups, along with endless failed attempts at reconciliation, the British and Irish governments in the early 1990's showed an increasing willingness to allow emanicipatory aims and rhetoric to run along "realist strategies". There was a growing realisation that merely give and take cooperation techniques are not enough to build trust. The emotions of the society needed to be transformed. The insecurity about each other's intentions and the fear of alienation needed to be dealt with by involving each of the parties at every stage in the negotiations. Trust was not only given a chance in negotiations between the governments and the non state armed groups, but there were also many ground level government sponsored as well as non state actor sponsored programs which encouraged people from the two conflicting communities to interact, and share each other's emotional stories- their fears, aspirations, anger, grief, suffering and interests. These programs are still in practice, even after more than a decade of the Good Friday settlement,

showing true commitment to the building of trust, and more importantly a wholesome understanding of trust.

Therefore, the Belfast Agreement was a result of a different approach to the conflict, wherein empathy and contextualisation were formed. Here is an excerpt from Article 2 of the Good Friday Agreement that shows that a humane approach was the focus to resolving the conflict,

> "We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust" (Article 2 of the Belfast Agreement, signed April 10, 1998).

The Agreement explored trust building rather than 'deal making', and involved an attempt to resolve rather than merely manage the communal conflict by transforming the 'social and cultural bases of existing conflicting interests and identities' (Ruanne and Todd 2005: 238). At the very core of the agreement was the search for an agreed set of principles and values that would lead to the renunciation of the use of violence for political ends and the establishment of democratic institutions (Mitchell 1999:35-8).

In April 2003, the British and Irish governments issued a joint declaration regarding the Northern Irish situation:

> "A key impediment to completing the evolution to [a stable society] in Northern Ireland is that both major traditions have lacked confidence and *trust* in each other. The two Governments wish to see the devolved institutions restored as soon as possible. But devolved government in Northern Ireland can only flourish on the basis of *trust* between the parties. . . . The two Governments recognise that Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided society, with ingrained patterns of division that carry substantial human and financial costs. They recognise the importance of building *trust* and improving community relations, tackling sectarianism and addressing segregation, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education and mixed housing. (emphasis added; Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments, cited in Darby 2003).

Even after the agreement, the Peace Process Continues till date, focussing on ending the communal segregation of society and dealing with prejudice, grief and anger, in order to foster trust (Gallagher 1995), showing a recognition that trust is a continuous and long process that

extends well beyond cooperating, and that sustainable peace cannot be achieved without deeply ingrained inter community trust among all the people of Northern Ireland.

Palestine

Background: A Psychological Understanding of the Conflict

Why has a stalemate persisted between the Arabs and Israelis in spite of negotiations happening for almost six decades? Why is it that despite coming closer to finalising an agreement with each round of the negotiations, the talks ultimately fail? Why, in spite of clear concessions having been agreed to on ground, both the sides continuously fail to adhere to the ceasefires that they themselves agree to? Why is it that in spite of the same mediators, i.e. the US heads of state, in more or less the same period of time, Palestine and Northern Ireland, and similar secession demands and violence, the Catholic Irish made headway and the Palestinians failed to do so? It is clear that an approach that looks beyond physical incentives to both the parties needs to be adopted. It is very apparent that the mistrust that exists is deep rooted and emotional, rather than a fight for merely territorial aspirations. To understand the bone of contention, then, there is a pressing need to delve into other dimensions of the conflict, particularly emotional and psychological. This section of the chapter shall delve into these psychological explanations for how trust has played out in the conflict and negotiations. It shall argue that every conflicting issue has a deep emotional significance which needs to be addressed if any progress in negotiations is desired. It shall argue that the deadlock that exists is because of the mindset that has been nurtured over decades among both the Israelis and Palestinians through the narratives that have been nurtured by and fed to the public. In principle, such a mindset prevents either side from considering new ideas that might lead to resolution. We shall try to perceive and interpret the nature of the discord between them in a biased and selective way so as to gain an empathetic point of view with respect to both the Israelis and the Palestinians. It is often argued by both sides that the ‘other’ is not interested in peace at all. What if that is actually true? We need to acknowledge this too and consider what could make both sides *prefer* conflict to a peaceful coexistence.

As argued earlier, historical experiences are one of the primary factors for mistrust to persist. Fear of betrayal tends to have a heavy impact on trusting relations. It could be betrayal on part of the present adversary, or betrayal and humiliation from anyone else. The party in question wants to shield itself from making the 'mistakes' that it made in the past and ensure that it does not have to face the same humiliation again. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict too, there are traumatic scars that each side carries from the past. Let us see how it might have affected the negotiations.

The Jewish experience is considered one of the most unfortunate in history, and it is often considered a foregone explanation for Israel's expansionist and aggressive policies. The historical experience of the Jewish diaspora was one which was filled with discrimination, persecution, anti-Semitism and expulsion, concluding in the Holocaust, during which the Nazis sought to extinguish a powerless Jewish people. Palestine was the land chosen to ensure the communities protection. Even when many Jews tried to avoid death camps by immigrating, they were denied entry into Palestine (Ben-Mier 2012), which brings out yet another layer to the dreadful past experiences that the Jewish people came to associate with the very land that they were later granted for protection. There is no doubt that the Jews have been unable to get over the past and this very past is evident in the very political culture of Israel, wherein, every political act is related to the holocaust, and every step towards violence is justified by it. The very motto of the Israeli special armed forces is 'never again'. The view, that the holocaust can happen again if they do not remain relentless in protecting themselves at any cost, is very strong among the Israelis and Jewish Diaspora around the world. Additionally, the State of Israel for the Jews does not only hold the sentiment of this past and seen as the last 'refuge', but is also the realization of the Zionist mission and the biblical realization of the return of the Jews to their ancient homeland, which must be guarded with absolute and unwavering zeal (Lapierre and Collins 2006).

It is this sense of victimization and self promoted injustice that has served to nurture the loyalty that each Israeli feels towards the state and to each other with a naturally borne, negative emotional sentiment towards the enemy. Moreover, this sense of victimising oneself always has

led to an utter lack of empathy towards the enemy and avoiding one's own responsibility, for example, disregarding the Palestinian refugee problem while claiming self righteousness.

From the Palestinian's point of view, the experience of Nakba post the 1948 war is no less horrifying, during which they were suddenly evicted from the land where they had been living for centuries, suddenly finding themselves as refugees. The Nakba, or the Palestinian Exodus as it is also known, occurred when approximately 711,000 to 725,000 Palestinian Arabs left, fled or were expelled from their homes, during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine that preceded it. This traumatic experience has been continuing for decades and has served to unite the Palestinians together in the same way that the Jews did following the Holocaust (Kelman 2010).

The Palestinian plight has been further aggravated by the continuous violent clashes between the two sides and which has seen scores of death, destruction, and even more displacement on the Palestinian side. Moreover, the vicious Israeli settlement project provides a daily reminder of the Palestinian helplessness exposing their vulnerability and humiliating them repeatedly on a daily basis. All this has further deepened the rage and hostility against the Israelis.

Not only have the Israelis overlooked the Palestinian refugee experience, and its psychological impact, which leaves them in a position to desire no reconciliation with Israel, they consider the Palestinian refugee problem as a de-facto swap for the displacement that the Jews had to fact during holocaust (Ben-Mier 2012). By holding this view, the Israelis not only completely ignore the emotional trauma of the Palestinian historical experience, which ironically is similar to theirs, but also disregard the Palestinian national aspirations for a homeland. Narratives have been built in such a way that either side cannot even come to grips with the desire for a peaceful coexistence, and wants to evict the other out.

Both the sides have had the tendency to reject the other's historical claims over the land. "From the Palestinian perspective, Palestine is the only land they have known. It is their ancestral land, which they have occupied for centuries. Although they recognize that a small Jewish community has always lived in Palestine, they have never psychologically or emotionally conceded their right to Palestine" (Ben Mier 2012). On the other hand, Israel holds the emotional significance of the "promised land" to the Jews, for which they have waited for millenniums, to defend which they will go to any lengths.

There is a strong religious component to the conflict that further complicates the issue and deems a psychological prism to look at the conflict necessary. The Israeli narrative is best embodied in the recent May 2012 speech of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in the US Congress, "This is the land of our forefathers, the Land of Israel, to which Abraham brought the idea of one God, where David set out to confront Goliath, and where Isaiah saw a vision of eternal peace. No distortion of history can deny the four thousand year-old bond, between the Jewish people and the Jewish land"[2].

In fact, owing to public narratives built over the years, many Israelis have also come to view the West Bank as the ancient biblical lands of Samaria and Judea, and it is inconceivable for them to imagine West Bank or Jerusalem under the Palestinians because it has been engrained in their psyche as the "promised land" (Lapierre and Collins 2006).

Similarly, Arabs are unwilling to compromise on Jerusalem because of the religious convictions tied to some of the holiest shrines of Islam in Jerusalem- the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock on the Haram al-Sharif. Many Muslim scholars also believe that Muhammad made his voyage from Mecca to the Al Aqsa Mosque (literally, 'furthest mosque') in Jerusalem before he

[2] Full text of speech available at http://www.algemeiner.com/2012/03/05/full-text-of-netanyahu-speech-to-aipac-2012/

soared into heaven. These beliefs are not only limited to the Palestinians but shared by all Muslim believers around the world, further complicating any solution to the future of Jerusalem.

Further, the trauma experienced by both sides prior to, and resulting from, the founding of Israel has been reinforced by wars and misdeeds by each side that has fostered a deeply-embedded culture of mistrust between the two peoples. The refusal of the Arab states to accept the 1947 United Nations' partition plan is imprinted in Israeli minds as an indication that the Arabs were never interested in peace to begin with. The wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 have only strengthened the Israeli conviction and the biased narratives that the Arabs seek only the annihilation of, rather than peace with, the State of Israel which has led Israelis to adopt a powerful and intractable siege mentality.

The emotional significance of the Palestinian movement and ideology can be gauged by how rebellious acts of non state armed groups against Israel are not only lauded and celebrated, but consciously made a part of the narrative. Lori Allen discovers the new "martyr geography" that the second intifada has imposed. "Certain streets came to be referred as Martyr's Passing, Martyr's Street and Martyr's Square" (2008: 456). There are martyr posters commemorating and distinguishing the places that were famous clashes, or notable for how many people were killed by Israeli offensives in a particular area. Lately, these unofficial labels have actually made their way into daily reference by locals and outsiders alike. "Neither Israel's bombardments and invasions, nor the PA's inability to thwart them, defined how Palestinians oriented themselves in space and time. New places became landmarks with sedimented meanings, meanings that were continually dislodged and reconfigured throughout the years of the uprising" (Allen 2008: 456).

Allen labels these acts as "routinisation of violence". This routinisation of violence has a great political and social implications for trust between the Palestinians and Israelis, because the fact that people routinely dies is being etched into the memories of people by making it a part of their everyday lives. Just like the memories of the Holocaust guide the political culture and policies in Israel, the naming of streets after martyrs and incidents, reminds the Palestinians everyday of the

discrimination that they go through at the hands of Israel, wherein violence is a routine, but not normal. For instance, many parts of Afghanistan have been *normalised* into the Taliban's brutal code of conduct in spite of having a relatively liberal history before them, particularly in the cities under the Russians. Under the Taliban's rule, however, many of them submitted to their fate and started believing that the Taliban's prescribed way of life was for the best. Another example is of how China has managed to mitigate its numerous tribes, cultures and languages into one. It is surprising to see how people living in Tibet cannot speak the Tibetan language anymore and have little knowledge of their histories and cultures. The Palestinians, on the other hand, seem determined not to be normalised into the subjugating tactics of the Israeli police and defence forces that involve purposefully disrupting daily life by announcing curfews, etc.

Glorifying the martyrs, therefore, is a strong indication of how emotion forms an important part of the Palestinian narrative and ideology, which in turn shapes the deep feelings of hatred and mistrust against the Israelis (Scheff 1994). Clearly, there is something beyond political and material "incentives" and "objectives", which inspires the Palestinians to endure the Israeli blockades, curfews and Israeli methods of collective punishment, and continue their fight against the discrimination- something irrational and illogical- and it is emotions of patriotism, pride, anger, and determination. It is these emotions which drive the Palestinians to not succumb to Israeli pressures and prefer to deflect during negotiations rather than cooperate. It is these emotions that power deep mistrust.

Trust during Oslo

The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Governments or the Oslo Accords was orchestrated with the idea that a long term Israeli- Palestinian coexistence needed the political foundation for trust building. They involved potentially workable agreements for the short term by intellectuals from both sides, with the most contentious issues being deferred, notably the status of Jerusalem and the right of return, until a virtuous circle of trust had been generated (Corbin 1994: 209-10 cited by Wheeler and Booth 2008). These accords are considered to be the closest the two sides came to trust. In this section we explore whether the two sides were anywhere even near to trust as it has been defined by us, in the multi dimensional sense of the term.

According to Wheeler and Booth, the ‘Leap of faith’ was provided not by the leadership, but by the non-governmental contributions and civil society efforts which were kept secret till the very end. Important roles were played by two Israeli academics particularly-Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundick (Rifkind 2002). On the Palestinian side the key negotiator was Abu Ala, the treasurer of the PLO. The Norwegian government played the role of a mediator during this phase of the talks, and a slightly better one than the US at that.

The risks of betrayal and disappointment were ever present throughout the peace process, as they always are. On the Palestinian side, the leadership took the risk that Israel might ‘freeze negotiations halfway through the process- after the PLO abandoned its armed struggle’ (Agha et al. 2003: 30). On the Israeli side, the PLO was for the first time recognized in the Declaration of Principles as the legitimate authority of the Palestinian people, and there was the fear that the PLO may not adhere to its ceasefire.

A degree of empathy and bonding at the interpersonal level was important to the progress made, encouraging the negotiators to take unique approaches. Abu Ala recalled how he gradually overcame his initial antipathy to the idea of talking to the enemy. He describes how at a crucial point in negotiations, he and Uri Savir, Director General of the Israeli foreign ministry, took a walk in the forest, encouraged by the Norwegian facilitator Larsen, who insisted ‘that a personal conversation outside the formal context of the negotiations would create a human relationship between us, and that some chemistry might have time to develop between us, which would help overcome whatever obstacles might have arisen’ (Wheeler and Booth 2008).

Given the bitter history of relations between Israel and the Palestinians since 1948, the main participants at the Oslo peace process often seemed under pressure to be dealmakers rather than trust-builders, as there was a tendency to hide emotion. It seems there was not only a lack of willingness to understand the other’s perspective, but also a tendency to hide one’s own fears. The shadow of the past from the perspective of both the sides was so dark that realist bargains

invariably seemed to be the most that could be hoped for- and for many observers even these seemed optimistic.

Arie Nadler and Tamar Saguay argue that there is an essential difference between 'socio emotional reconciliation' and 'trust building reconciliation' (Wheeler and Booth 2008). In my view, however, in the case of intractable conflicts, trust building reconciliation cannot possibly be achieved unless there is socio-emotional reconciliation. The South African TRC is a successful example of the 'socio emotional reconciliation' as it was veered towards confronting the dark past and emotions of betrayal, fear and anger instead of denying them, as turned out to be the case in Oslo. The TRC encouraged those who have suffered to let go of the painful past by telling stories and having these validated by society leading hopefully to a process of healing and forgiveness (Wheeler and Booth 2008). On the other hand, since the there was a lot of pessimism regarding Oslo to begin with, it was based on merely short term objectives and 'issues' that needed to be confronted rather than emotions. The premise was 'cooperation in the present as a vehicle to achieve a more trustworthy and reconciled future' (Nadler and Saguay 2004: 32). Clearly, a rationalist approach was used, wherein cooperation was emphasised, and assumed as a pre condition for trust to exist.

Arafat and the PLO had to somehow believe Israeli assurances that the establishment of a new Palestinian authority under the Accords would lead to a Palestinian state eventually, making possible a final and comprehensive settlement of Jerusalem, the future of the Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank, the right of return of Palestinians to their homeland (Wheeler and Booth 2008). Wouldn't this qualify as a major 'leap of faith'? Then, why did it not work to bring about trust between the parties and end in the negotiations being successful? This is because the whole negotiation was based on the wrong premise to begin with- that cooperation would lead to trust. As we earlier stated, cooperation may provide a platform for trusting but it is in no way a sufficient condition for trust to formulate. This is because the act of cooperating is devoid of complex human emotional structures, and can be achieved and sustained even without trust. Moreover, even if the idea of cooperation did soften the grounds for trust to exist, it remained

short lived. Soon after Oslo, Rabin was assassinated, and the non state factions in Palestine continued with their armed struggles. Israel did not eventually fully adhere to even a single part of the agreement- whether it was return of refugees or abandonment of Israeli settlements in West Bank and Gaza.

The events that followed Oslo, in fact, raise further questions about trust. Even if the properties of trust can be realized at the level of leaders, can they become embedded at the inter-societal level? Might powerful feelings and forces at the society level indefinitely postpone trust becoming embedded? The evidence is not hopeful. Once Oslo became public, it exposed deep divisions on both sides regarding the trustworthiness of the other. Those Israelis and Palestinians who applied enemy images to each other's motives and intentions, believed negotiations like Oslo are used as a ruse to create a false sense of security which can be ruthlessly exploited. Uri Savir, who had done so much with Abu Ala to make a success of the Oslo peace process, reflected in 1998 that Oslo was so difficult for many Israelis to accept because trusting the PLO meant 'delivering ourselves into their hands' (1998: 303). Such feelings of vulnerability expose the deep mistrust that exists in the Palestinian and Israeli societies. "What for some was the beginning of reconciliation was for others a nightmare which would lead to further blood being shed" (Savir 1998: 292, 303 cited in Wheeler and Booth 2008). Rabin had initially been mistrustful about the PLO's commitment to peace, but had taken the risk and backed Oslo, even as Hamas carried on with suicide bombings against Israeli targets during the negotiations (Rifkind 2002). However, even though the leaders seemed committed to the process of cooperating, if not trust, the society was not ready because of the inability of the leaders to communicate the need for trust, and the constant denial of the other's emotions throughout the process. And, nothing has changed since.

The election of the Likud's leader Binyamin Netanyahu in 1996 brought to power an individual who viewed Oslo as exposing Israel in great danger, and showed how the peace process had failed to overcome negative images and stereotypes of the Palestinian enemy among influential sectors of Israeli society (Steinberg 2002). The previous pattern of antagonistic identities and

violent conflict resurfaced as the dominant contour of Israeli- Palestinian relations. Arafat's decision in 1996 to clamp down on Hamas by arresting key members and confiscating weapons was not sufficient to convince the new Israeli government that the Palestinian leadership could be trusted. In fact, Arafat was seen in by a few quarters as having planned the violence in the first place (Boooth and Wheeler 2008).

After the outbreak of the Al Aqsa intifada in September 2000, and during the final stages of the unsuccessful US- mediated Camp David peace process between Ehud Barak (Netanyahu's successor) and Arafat, many argued that "Israel lost all trust in Palestinian leadership and in Arafat personally" (Ranstorp 2006 cited in Booth and Wheeler 2008).

How far the parties remained from a condition of embedded trust was reflected in some words of King Hussein, which deserve quoting at length. Peace, he said, "is the tearing down of barriers between people. It is people coming together, coming to know one another. It is the children of martyrs on both sides embracing… it is people getting together and doing business. Real peace is not between governments but between individuals who discover that they have the same worries, the same concerns, that they have suffered in the same way and theat there is something they can both put into creating a relationship that would benefit all of them. (Quoted by Shlaim 2000: 545). Booth and Wheeler iterate, "Oslo was temporary trust between leaders not embedded trust between societies" (2008: 251).

Fear and Aggression in Israel's Approach

Aggression is certainly an emotion that is related to any and every movement that is seeking national independence. This is because the evolving nation claims certain territorial boundaries and territory, which now define this evolving nation and differentiate it from foreign rule (Shalit 1994: 415). "The independence movement will view aggression in its life-ensuring aspect, while the object of aggression naturally sees it as destructive" (Shalit 1994: 415). This is exactly how the Palestinians and Israelis view both the Intefadas, respectively. At the same time, this is how

the Arab world has come to view the Zionist project- as a destructive movement, while the Israelis see it as a means of survival against persecution.

The emphasis on Zionism in Israeli policy, in fact, could be a strong reason for its aggressiveness. Zionism is often described as an identity of “strength”, courage and the “mystique of violence” (Elon, 1981: 223) as a response to persecution and threats of annihilation that the Jewish people have faced throughout their history. Shalit gives an illustration of how the Zionist movement’s fundamentals are based on aggression,

"Besides being motivated by ideological and existential needs, early Zionist pioneering involved a teenage act of aggression and revolt against the parental generation, especially as regards the father's ways, norms, traditions, and life structure. In Oedipal opposition, the early Zionists left their fathers' home, in order to find their way to unite with and work the ancient Motherland. With romantic fever they would dig into its earth and farm its fields. Transforming myth, spirit, and religion (as in the age-old prayer ‘Next year in Jerusalem’) into concrete and political reality, they violated their fathers' elaborated codex and belief system. The enormous impact of this can be understood by the intense opposition to Zionism by the ultra-Orthodox Jewry” (1994: 416).

In a way, this aggression is also a result of fear of history repeating itself. And history did repeat itself again and again in posing a threat of existing to the Jews. In fact, Zionism among the Jewish community in Palestine even before the creation of Israel had come to rely on strength and force because of the circumstances that the Jews were continuously exposed to. However, the aggression at that time was mostly latent and Jewish concerns were more clouded by fear of annihilation than anything. It was following the event of the Six Day War in 1967 that a certain confidence was acquired after resisting the attack. The war paved the way for a glorious sense of victory, strength and power. As a result, aggression eventually came as if to assume a life of its own in the collective mind, and this was aggression that was devoid of fear. However, this aggression turned out to be far more ruthless than what it was with a combination of fear. As Shalit explains, “In its extreme, aggression disconnected from fear actually evokes the very existential anxiety it was supposed to protect and defend against, since the split-off fear is projected and fuses with the actual threat of the enemy. It is not accidental that the story of Masada-collective suicide following supreme heroism in view of the threat of annihilation-has

become an Israeli national symbol, the conscious emphasis being on heroism, with the suicidal feature residing in the subconscious" (1994: 423).

The newly found aggression was evident first from the Lebonon war, which was based on a rigid and extreme sense of power, more than to deal with the previously held 'fear of annihilation' (Shalit 1994). Rather, it was for the purpose of showcasing its newly found strength, believing that it would ward off enemies. It is blatantly expressed in an interview that the Israeli author Amos Oz (1984, p. 89) conducted with a right-wing Israeli extremist:

> "Maybe the world will finally begin to fear me instead of feeling sorry for me . . . quaking in fear of my whims instead of admiring my nobility . . . Let them quake. And let them call us a mad-dog nation. Let them realize that we're a wild country, deadly and dangerous to everyone around, awful, crazy, capable of suddenly going nuts because they murdered one of our kids-even one!-and running wild and burning up all the oil fields in the Middle East".

Therefore, Israeli policy turned aggressive only after the Six Day War, after there was a denial of another emotion, i.e. fear. The new national image from here on was based on strength and self sufficiency. This has been reflected continuously in Israeli positions during negotiations as well as official government speeches and interviews. Israel, except perhaps during Rabin, has always been wary of being seen as in a giving position, as that has come to be associated with weakness. There is always a show of the pride, economic prowess, strength and self sufficiency that Israel has built from scratch, and a huge effort is made to portray this as if to say- 'don't you dare mess with us'. Fear has given way to aggression.

Besides, this transformation of its own fear to aggression, there is also a clear denial of the fear of the 'other'. The Palestinian's core psyche has also been that of fear- of deportation, of being driven out of their homeland.

Recent studies in Israel on regulating emotion

In September 2011, Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas appealed for full membership in the United Nations. For many Palestinians, this event symbolised the strong and since long awaited aspiration of Palestinian statehood. On the other hand, for the Israeli government and a majority

of the Israeli people, the Palestinians' bid for statehood proved to them that Palestinians were not committed to the ongoing peace process in the region. There was a range of emotions displayed and evident from the images, opinions and reactions splashed all over the media- from celebration to righteous bitterness, to hateful rage.

It was then that psychological scientist Eran Halperin of the Interdisciplinary Centre in Israel started conducting an experiment which studies whether people in an emotionally charged situation are capable of regulating their feelings and raw emotions into slightly refined ones that do not negatively affect engagement among two or more parties. A group of Jewish Israelis were trained in a technique called cognitive reappraisal. Reappraisal involves rethinking the meaning of a situation in order to alter the emotional response. The scientists showed all the volunteers a series of photos, chosen to spark raw emotions such as anger and hatred, but some of the volunteers were taught to react to these intense images impartially and analytically (Wray Herbert 2012). The remaining volunteers were given no brief and responded naturally. Then the scientists tried to provoke nationalistic anger. Apparently, among their various tests they put on a presentation about Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian response, including the launching of rockets, the election of Hamas, and the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier. The experiment showed a huge difference between the people who were trained in cognitive reappraisal and those who were not, wherein the former felt less anger towards the Palestinians. The result that is most relevant to this chapter is that on being asked various policy based questions, the trained volunteers were much more likely to endorse conciliatory policies and were much less likely to endorse an aggressive Israeli policy stand.

Although Halperin's findings are preliminary, they are provocative and open a wide scope for the discussion of emotional manipulation in building trust. From the above results, it seems that in a controlled environment, emotions and therefore attitudes can be transformed from anger to understanding, from hatred to empathy, and of course from fear to trust. A corollary to this finding could be that in the case of Israel Palestine, it is necessary for a psychological analysis of trust. Perhaps, that is the only method that can provide with an answer to why in spite of an understanding of the other's psyche and the acceptance by each side of the inevitability of coexistence, progress cannot be made on the negotiation front.

Conclusion

The cases of Northern Ireland and Palestine provide for an interesting comparative analysis of the role of trust in negotiations with non-state armed groups because of the different trajectories the peace processes have taken despite having similar characteristics. A common view is that the reason for this is the difference in the attitude of the mediator in the negotiations, i.e. the US, wherein the US has favoured Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, whereas it was relatively unbiased during the negotiations of Northern Ireland. This chapter attempts to look at beyond the explanations given by such rationalist 'interest' and 'incentive' based accounts. The answer is found when one takes a psychological view of the two conflicts.

In Northern Ireland, the deep felt and negative emotions of hatred and anger were a result of the 'feeling of alienation' that was felt by the Catholic Irish for centuries, which made them seek freedom from the British. However, over time there was an attempt to address the psychological aspect of the root causes, the most prominent being the recognition of the Sinn Fein, the political wing of the secessionist Irish Republican Army, as a legitimate stakeholder if any negotiations were to take place. This was the first 'leap of faith' that showed a willingness on part of the British government to bring an inclusive peace, thereby addressing the psychological concerns of the Irish Nationalists. Further, emotional wounds of the "Troubles" of the 1960's were redressed through various interactive programs on the ground bringing about empathy and support of the public for the Peace Process.

In the case of Palestine, on the other hand, the focus of analysing the conflict always stops at addressing the geopolitical considerations- an ally less Israel in the Middle East which had to resort to building a nuclear weapon, a threatened Arab neighbourhood, retaliation by the Palestinians to Israel's aggressive policies, and the thriving US-Israel relationship owing to the large Jewish lobby in the US Congress. This chapter gives a psychological understanding of both, the Israeli and Palestinian concerns. It can be concluded that the main reason for stalemate in negotiations between two communities which have faced a similar history of discrimination, is

that lack of effort to build empathy. Trust in this conflict, tends to be seen only with rationalist concerns. There is a severe need to address the emotional concerns of the people.

This chapter argues that the underlying reason for an aggressive Israeli policy is much more than geostrategic concerns- the fear of annihilation, the determination to not let history repeat its discrimination of the Jews which has roots in the Zionist movement of Judaism, the feeling of alienation in an Arab neighbourhood, and the feeling of alienation from the entire world including the United States at times. This leads to a spiralling of emotions into intense nationalist feelings, and an overwhelming suspicion of the 'other' no matter what their motives are. The Palestinians are victims of this aggression, of course. However, there is more to what meets the eye. The Palestinians have themselves faced a turbulent history where they were betrayed by their Arab brethren and had to leave their homes in 1947. They have been refugees in a land which their ancestors had inhabited for thousands of years. This coupled with Israeli policy of inflicting constant humiliation by interrupting their everyday regular lives, and a sense of alienation as not having been able to get legitimacy through statehood till date and facing constant abandonment by the international community has resulted in rage and fury. This has resulted in ultra nationalism spread throughout the region, leading to more intense negative emotions fed regularly by the government authorities on both sides, and more mistrust being fostered. There is no space for trusting because there is no space for empathy in the negotiations.

Conclusion

The idea that was presented at the beginning of the dissertation was that when it comes to the study of trust, it has by and large been ignored in mainstream international relations theory due to the classical 'Hobbesian' narrative that proclaims 'war as a state of nature' and 'anarchy' as *given* characteristics of the international system. This leads to a focus on mistrust rather than trust as a subject of study. Further, it encourages trust to be viewed as a strategy, rather than a complex of sociological, psychological, rational and cognitive elements.

Chapter one dispels rationality as a lens to view trust and points out its limitations. It establishes that a rationalist perspective focuses on only the functional and behavioral aspects in trust. A functional account of trust tends to view it as a means towards an end rather than a pure element in itself that can be a part of or define a relationship. Meanwhile, focusing on the behavioral manifestations of trust misses out on the fact that behavior (of human or entity) is not an independent variable and tends to be influenced by a variety of social, political and psychological factors such as emotions, ideology, national narratives, etc.

Further, John Locke's works are revisited, and it is established that hopes and expectations are important determinants of trust. He inspires a refreshing perspective on human beings and trust that clashes with the mainstream view, which is that the only reason that human beings have been able to coexist and evolve scientifically, politically and socially in differing from other animal species, is because they are "capable of *overlooking* personal interests" therefore building strong relationships with trust as the basis, rather than incentives or interests. He considers trust as the fulcrum that holds the society together. Locke's work paves the way for an understanding that moves beyond realism, anarchy, interests and incentives.

A distinction is made between the role of trust as a systemic social reality and interpersonal trust which is based on psychology, and it is established that both perspectives are important to understand the role of trust in negotiations between two conflicting entities in a civil secessionist conflict, because of the overlapping of inter personal and inter societal aspects of the relationship of the adversaries.

Through Luhmann, we also learn the significance of 'trust in trust' and that the aim of negotiations is not only to foster a trusting relationship between the antagonistic factions and stakeholders in a peace process but also to ensure trust in the politico-social institutions and system that are part of the process. In fact, trust in relationships between non-state armed groups and states also depends on one group trusting in the other to keep that trust.

The role of uncertainty is, perhaps, most significant to defining trust. When there is no uncertainty due to a perfect flow of information, one finds that there is no scope to trust, as decisions, judgements and perceptions can be made on the basis of a rationally calculated risk. On the other hand lays blind faith, where there is no evidence. Blind faith also cannot be categorized as trust because there is a complete lack of information flow about the event, person, etc. Trust that is based on no amount of certainty whatsoever eventually leads to a gamble based on prediction rather than a choice being exercised based on some amount of knowledge. The door of choice must always remain open for an element of trust to exist.

In Chapter two, through the use of emotions to understand trust, we successfully challenge the rationalist notion that trust is merely based on material interests and incentives. We evaluate and revise the existing emotional analysis of trust in International Relations, particularly the idea that a 'leap of faith/ trust' or 'leap into the dark' is a necessary prerequisite for trust between adversaries to blossom. It has been argued that an empathetic attitude is more effective in garnering trust by providing examples of how 'leaps of faith' have failed in the past to garner any trust.

There is a conscious effort in Chapter two and thereon to break from ‘strategic’ approaches and methodologies, and an emphasis on employing new tools of analysis to ‘understanding’ concepts and events better. It is often assumed that adversaries would always prefer the risks of mistrust to those of betrayal, and believe they have no choice. However, history has showed us time and again that it is not impossible for former adversaries to come together, although usually after a calamity, when emotions run at their peak to even melt the hearts of the coldest diplomats.

Through the tool of emotion to evaluate trust, an important distinction is made between trust and the act of reliance, which is usually mistaken for trust. An act of reliance exhibits all the characteristics of rational choice decision making, wherein every risk taken is well calculated and every step is a strategic move towards achieving an incentive or an objective. Reliance may be guided through preferences, but it differs from trust in the fact that there is a lesser degree of emotion involved in guiding the moves towards building reliance. “You can rely on your alarm clock to wake you up, but you cannot trust that it will wake you up” (Wright 2012). Therefore, between negotiating actors, cooperation that is coerced by power relations or helplessness of one of the sides is not trust, but reliance. Allies need not always be friends, and friends need not always be allies. The conspicuous difference between the two is trust.

In the second chapter, the importance of incorporating emotions in a study of non-state armed groups is recognized by arguing that the toll of violence, the risks to lives and livelihoods involved, the desperation to resort to violence against a much bigger an powerful state, the expenditures incurred that defy logic, and the historical experiences and narratives etched in mind make it imperative to use emotion as a tool to study trust.

We also gauge and compare the affect of ‘incidental emotions’ (short term emotions aggravated due to a particular incident) on trust by affecting our judgment, perceptions, moods, and behavior. The need is asserted, therefore, to provide a space to emote during negotiations. At the same time, the need for regulation/ manipulation of emotions is also established. Allowing

venting of feelings such as anger and rage is important but not always practical in negotiations. However, there is a need to *listen* to the reasons underlying that anger.

The trick to launching trust (which lies on the stronger party and the mediator) is, therefore, to manipulating negative emotions such as anger, rage, fury, fear, humiliation, feeling of alienation, etc. to positive emotions such as empathy, confidence, sympathy, realization, and eventually trust. As illustrated by various examples in the course of the previous chapters (Chinese 'Speak Bitterness' Meetings, WISCOMP initiatives, South Africa TRC, etc.). It is important to understand that the high level of suspicion that exists between the state and non state armed groups is not merely due to a conflict of interest, territory or scramble for power, but there are also stories of violation of human rights, murder, betrayal, unhappiness, despair that each blames the 'other' for, that leads to a negative and untrustworthy environment. These stories need to be shared to increase empathy, to show concern, to discard feelings of alienation and bias, and therefore give trust a chance.

We also develop on the 'Human Factor' developed by Booth and Wheeler (2008). The 'human factor' is the initiative of individual leaders in making strategic choices of establishing trust with the adversary. However, according to this study the 'human factor' in defining trust is incomplete due to its strategic approach. Wheeler and Booth tend to fall into the same trap of rationalist logic that they critique. This study proposes a 'humane factor' instead wherein leaders adopt an empathetic attitude towards the adversary to create a bonding, by showing the adversary that their problem is understood, by identifying the adversary as a legitimate partner in negotiations and by committing towards an inclusive resolution.

In the second chapter, it is discovered through various sociological and psychological studies how fear, anger and hatred are usually products of bias and 'feelings of alienation' (which further lead to feelings of humiliation through the denial of the feeling of alienation).

It is established that these feelings of alienation are fundamental to protracted conflicts that involve non state armed groups and deeply ingrained mistrust. The feelings that arise from

alienation tend to result in fanatical nationalism wherein every act of the nation is sought to be justified no matter how wrong. As Scheff points out, “It is much easier to imagine union with the unknown members of one’s sect (‘imaginary communities’) than to do the demanding work of making relationships in one’s real interpersonal network more liveable” (Scheff 1994). Feelings of the group are taken personally, then, by each member who recognises themselves at part of that group. If one member faces an act of humiliation, the entire group takes it personally.

Bias in conflict situations also tends to lead to feelings of hatred, fear, victimhood and envy. Denial of negative feelings leads to a spiraling of negative emotions. In this regard, Fierke proposes ‘analytic empathy’ to deal with such negative feelings of conflict. Analytic empathy represents an acknowledgement of how each side has contributed to the suffering of the other, thereby breaking down the absolute conviction in one’s own victimhood. This provides an opening, according to Fierke, ‘for beginning to re-describe the conflict such that an integrative solution, rather than a mutually exclusive bargain, might be possible’ (2005:148).

The third chapter views the case studies of Northern Ireland and Palestine through the newly acquired lens of trust that significantly requires a psychological and emotional understanding of the conflict. To do this, the histories of the conflict, issues of discord, and negotiations that determined levels of trust between the antagonist parties have been translated into a psychological perspective.

In the case of Northern Ireland, we find that a feeling of alienation perpetuated by discriminating British policies and a huge military presence led to the Nationalists being insecure. These feelings were aggravated over time due to failure to address them, and spiraled into the emotions of rage, anger and fury, that led to the formation of various secessionist paramilitaries during ‘The Troubles’ of the 1960’s.

After more than two decades of communal violence, riots and bombings by the non state armed groups, along with endless failed attempts at reconciliation, the British and Irish governments in the early 1990's showed an increasing willingness to allow emanicipatory aims and rhetoric to run along "realist strategies". There was a growing realisation that merely give and take cooperation techniques are not enough to build trust. The emotions of the society needed to be transformed. The insecurity about each other's intentions and the fear of alienation needed to be dealt with by involving each of the parties at every stage in the negotiations. Trust was not only given a chance in negotiations between the governments and the non state armed groups, but there were also many ground level government sponsored as well as non state actor sponsored programs which encouraged people from the two conflicting communities to interact, and share each other's emotional stories- their fears, aspirations, anger, grief, suffering and interests. These programs are still in practice, even after more than a decade of the Good Friday settlement, showing true commitment to the building of trust, and more importantly a wholesome understanding of trust. The 'Leap of Faith' to *portray* (as against launch) that they trusted the Nationalists, was when they decided to recognize the Sinn Fein as a legitimate party to the peace process without the precondition being put on the IRA to demilitarize. This, indeed, was a giant 'leap of faith' and was instrumental in leading to the signing of the Belfast Agreement of 1995, and eventually a commitment towards sustainable peace and to overcome communal mistrust. The fight to achieve these objectives continues till date fourteen years after agreeing in Belfast.

In the case of Palestine, however, it is evident that a rationalist, rather aggressive realist, strategy continues on part of Israel which refuses to recognize the Hamas, as a legitimate party to reconciliation, which is a blacklisted 'terrorist' organization in many countries apart from Israel. The Hamas is crucial to the Peace Process because of the widespread popularity it shares amongst the Palestinians, especially those in Gaza, where it was elected to power in 2006. However, currently, the Fatah is a recognized part of the administrative Palestinian National Authority which was formed after the Oslo Accords in 1994, the peace process has been dead since the Camp David Accords in 2000, although recent feeble attempts have been made to revive it by the United States.

We establish the reasons for this through a psychological view of the conflict identifying the emotions in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, leading us to a complex maze. The reasons for Israel's aggressive policy, for instance, lay in their turbulent history resulting in a fear of the Holocaust repeat; their geostrategic position resulting in constant humiliation through the feeling of alienation in a neighbourhood of Arabs; and religion which results in justifying their actions by reinforcing feelings of victimhood. The plethora and sheer flood of these negative emotions leads Israel not only to mistrust the Palestinians, but the entire world.

The Palestinians have similar emotions that are attached to the land which are rooted in history and religion. But most prominent among them is the anger of having to be refugees in a land that they have inhabited for centuries. These feelings of rage are also attached to feelings of humiliation on a daily basis due to the Israeli policy of regularly interrupting their daily lives.

The closest that both sides came to empathizing with each other was during the Oslo Accords, which were signed between Rabin and Arafat, followed by Camp David in 1995, even though there were faint 'leaps of faith' that have been made since Saadat's peace initiative that led to the 1978 Camp David Accords. The deadlock that exists in negotiations, then, is because of the refusal to acknowledge these emotions and allow a redressal of grievances, and the lack of empathy on each party's behalf in spite of sharing similar roots of emotions responsible for the persisting mistrustful perception of the 'other'

Therefore, it is clear from this study that trust is a bond that holds society together. In international relations and diplomacy, the opportunities for trust to exist and thrive are galore because of its role as an alternative to rationalist prediction which reduces life's complexities, but are prevented from seeing the light of the day by a strategic or rationalist attitude by the states. A sense of common identity, particularly, is the breeding ground for faith, and gradually trust, which is why intra-community trust is more prominent than inter-community trust. Moreover, intra community trust is a result of human to human interaction on a more regular

basis, thereby opening doors for emotional exchange. In fact, it is emotions that also make it difficult to engage non-state armed groups to build trust who tend to harbor a range of sentiments such as rage, anger, hurt, disappointment, humiliation, and alienation with respect to the state. However, dealing with such negative emotions and transforming them into positive ones through sincere engagement and gestures is the key to reconciliation in any conflict.

This study fills in the gap left by rationalist studies of trust through a sociological and an emotional understanding. This enables us to get to the crux of the problem of engaging with non-state armed groups, and identifies that it is attitudes and approaches that need to change, rather than 'strategies'. It also opens the doors wider for a more humane approach for mediators and the negotiating parties in international diplomacy. Although most of the objectives of the study have been achieved, the ambit of scope for research on trust is much wider and far reaching. A more thorough study of individual emotions with regard to trust, which was beyond the scope of the present study, needs to be done to understand trust even better. There are also wide ranging questions regarding morality, honesty, legitimacy, identity politics, and hegemony within trust which could not be probed in this study, and that lie relatively less explored in the area of international relations. It was realised during the course of the study how the field of international relations, in an attempt to move out of the dominant perspectives of realism, rationalism and liberalism, there is a tendency to fall in the trap of caricaturing previous discourses. I believe that a deep reading of classical realists such as Hobbes, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Clausewitz who laid a lot of emphasis on *human* behavior and emotions over characteristics of the state in the international system, can particularly provide interesting insights to the study of trust in world politics.

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