


**BRAZIL'S STAND ON THE QUESTION OF GOA:
A STUDY OF DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS OF
INDIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
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
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
I declare that the dissertation entitled "BRAZIL'S STAND ON THE QUESTION OF GOA: A STUDY OF DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS OF INDIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS" submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


BINAY PRASAD

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra
Chairperson, CCUS &LAS


Prof. Abdul Nafey
Supervisor

Acknowledgement

It takes courage on the part of researcher and support from the side of Research Supervisor, to carry out a primary level research at the level of Master of Philosophy. I am grateful to my Supervisor Prof. Abdul Nafey for at first approving the theme and instilling a confidence in me for carrying out a study which would have collapsed anytime in the process having been unaware in what way this research would bend and conclude eventually.

With this anticipation that this process would finally bring something substantial, I kept sifting through hundreds of files, letters, correspondences and telegrams recently declassified by Indian Ministry of External Affairs which are presently archived at National Archives of India.

This dissertation is an outcome of such an unpredictable journey, which knew no end. I have tried my best to give a Latin American touch to the dissertation having known that repeated references have to be made to Goa and Portugal in a work that primarily relates to Brazilian foreign policy.

My sincere thanks goes to Priti Madam, for inculcating interest in Latin American Studies in the first instance. She has been the one who taught me the courses under Latin American Studies Programme during MA. She helped me better understand the Latin American issues during the Master of Philosophy coursework.

Despite being a study based on primary sources, use of secondary sources have been and hence, I owe my thanks also to all the staffs at the Central Library, Jawaharlal Nehru University from where I obtained most of my secondary literature. My personal thanks goes to R. C. Gaur, Chief Librarian, for all the new subscriptions at the library.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. Origin of Diplomatic Relations between India and Latin America

The recently declassified documents of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India seem to question the long - held myth among academicians and policy planners alike that Latin America and India have long remained ignoramus of each other. While that may still be largely true, the recently declassified documents of MEA reveal that, historically speaking, both at least had a sense of familiarity with each other's problems and issues. In particular, print media in Brazil, its coverage of significant political events and foreign policy issues developing and concerning India reinforces this point. The familiarity however should not be mistaken as a complete factual understanding of all the issues.

India has been a familiar region among the elite sections of the Latin American societies as is reflected especially in the writings of Latin American litterateurs. This argument is further solidified by the way Latin American countries responded to several foreign policy and external security issues of concern to India. The issues of Kashmir, 1962 Sino-Indian border skirmishes, 1971 Bangladesh case, the issue of Khalistan in 1984 – all of them were seriously debated in the political and diplomatic circles of the Latin American region. Similarly, Indian embassies and consular offices in the LAC region kept Ministry of External Affairs informed on what actually India's position should be in cases like the new Cuban government in the wake of 1959 revolution, or on American intervention in Dominican Republic in 1965. Perhaps the current spurt in Latin America-India relations is an outcome of the increased capability of both, albeit one, which has some continuity from the past. And the argument that, India-Latin America relations being of recent origin is nothing but itself an outcome ignorance on the part of recent generation of diplomats and scholars in connection with the history of this relation. It must be remembered that diplomatic or trade representation of India in Latin America predates even India's

independence. This is true of Argentina, where Indian Trade Mission was set-up way back in 1943. This would also stand true, in case of Panama where Indian representation was, as a part of the British legation due to the fact that large numbers of indentured labourers from India were working at Panama.

While one may not realise; the importance of Latin America for Indian policy makers since India's independence in 1947 was quite evident from the problems and dilemma of Indian population post-partition of India and the anti-India¹ Propaganda that followed the unfortunate incident in LAC. While similar problems did appear in other regions of the world, but tackling such a problem in a region where Indian diplomacy was still in nascent phase posed additional problems. In simplified terms; India's bad image had to be countered in a region where there was perhaps no Indian image at all. Even excluding these problems of the late 1940s; Latin America was still important in the foreign policy issues that India had to confront with. These issues include the case of Goa, in which Brazil was involved as it was protecting the interests of Portugal in India. There were other issues in which importance of Latin America was from the fact that, during the phase in consideration various Latin American countries were serving their term as non-permanent member in United Nations in Security Council. Even when such was not the case; it appears from the declassified documents of MEA that building up a consensus in favour of India was deemed important. This was quite evident in two cases; namely a) question of Kashmir; and b) Chinese aggression on India. Importance of Latin America in both the two issues was for two different reasons. In the issue of Kashmir, propaganda from the side of Pakistan had to be countered in Latin America, also owing to anti- India reporting in the Argentine Press to name one. Indian embassies based in Latin America had an important duty to make diplomatic circles informed about India's stand. Apart from this, many Latin American countries having served a non-permanent term at United Nations Security Council during the phase the Kashmir issue was in discussion at Security Council made Latin American countries even more important. To cite an

¹ Indian Embassies in LAC had to tackle the propaganda from the side of Pakistan and the press in Latin American region. Sometimes, few accusations had religious connotations, and hence influenced the opinions of British Indians in LAC in reference to citizenship issues.

example; the 1964 debate on Kashmir at Security Council bore the fruit on India's part. Bolivia and Brazil both were members during the period. While Brazil to the unexpected, went against the Indian position i.e. supported plebiscite as the mode of solution to Kashmir issue, Bolivia was wholly on the side of India. In the copy of the speech delivered by Castrillo Justiniano, Representative of Bolivia, perhaps there was nothing that can be deemed as against the Indian position on Kashmir.

In 1962, Chinese aggression on India was criticised by majority of Latin American countries with the exception of Cuba and Brazil. In relation to the aggression, Venezuelan Parliament went to the extent of passing a resolution against the Chinese aggression.

Similarly in 1971 during East Bengal crisis, Latin American countries were wholly supportive of India's position. In context of 1971 crisis, the Latin American Parliament (*El Parlamento Latino Americano*) at Caracas on 27 August, 1971 passed a unanimous resolution against the atrocities committed by Government of Pakistan and that of Pakistani Army. Out of the total ten members in Latin American Parliament, nine voted in favour of the resolution and Brazil abstained. In reference to the Conference of Latin American Parliament, it would be interesting to know that, India was the only invitee from outside the Latin American region.

Again in 1984, in the issue of Khalistan, Ecuador got involved, as Ecuador's Capital Quito was one of the hotbeds of pro-Khalistan elements. In the reference to it, Ecuador was said to have recognised Khalistan, though it was promptly rejected by the Ecuadorian government later.

II. India's Relation with Brazil

Brazil comes under the class of those countries who had established diplomatic relations early in the year 1948, after India gained independence. Increased interaction had also prompted India to set up consulates, apart from the embassy it already had at Rio de

Janeiro which was later shifted to Brasilia in 1971. Brazil's relation with India has always acted as a reference point for India-Latin America Relations owing to not only complementarity of interests but also for historical and economic-developmental reasons. Embassy of India in Brazil kept MEA informed of the events in the region as a whole; and this very role has caused Wayne Selchar to call this embassy as a 'listening post' for India in the continent. Brazil and others either were participants or at least had a stand, even if a neutral one, on the happenings or events that were unfolding in India in the aftermath of its independence. All these developments and Latin American views on them can be ascertained from the recently declassified documents of MEA India, which not only consist of dispatches from Indian diplomats based in Brazil, but also commentaries from Brazilian diplomats, news reports appearing in Brazilian newspapers and official record of statements from *Itamarati*. This very reason qualifies the declassified documents of MEA for an analysis so as to be able to reflect on how Brazilian government viewed various issues in reference to India.

The most significant case was that of Goa, where it was not only sympathetic towards Portugal, but also represented its interest after the ties between India and Portugal were snapped on 1 September, 1955. This unique case becomes significant in the sense, as currently bilateral relations move up the ladder it continues to be a phase that denoted diplomatic tension between India and Brazil. Though both have moved beyond the so-to-say 'aberration' of 1961, it remains an important phase to be put to analysis, as in what context did Brazil take such a decision, if indeed it really did? More so, as the issue remains one of the most understudied one in the gamut of India-Brazil relations; it will also always remain questionable – more so now, as India keenly watches the foreign policy conduct of one of its 'strategic partners'. It will always be asked, why Brazil, a democratic country with a Third Worldist foreign policy under Jânio Quadros² in 1961 did 'support' Portugal, a country ruled by the then dictator Salazar, on the Goa question. Further, even though Brazil's UN representatives did support the principle of self-determination in Security Council, one sees several deviations in its foreign policy

² Though Quadros had resigned in August, 1961, the Goulart regime was also a continuation of Quadros' policy. In the context of it, criticism of India's action to liberate Goa, would remain questionable.

behaviour on the specific question of liberation of Goa and other Portuguese colonies. Declaratory statements at UN notwithstanding, Brazil did send military personnel to quell the uprising in Portuguese colonies. In 1966, Brazil agreed to send naval ships to Angola, which was criticised by Brazilian media, so what went behind is not clearly known, but a visit of naval cadets was 'contemplated' by Brazilian Navy. It is the same Angola, in whose case at UN in the year 1962, Brazilian representative Afonso Arinos took a bold step in suggesting Salazar to revise its policy in reference to self-determination.

The nature of Brazil-Portugal relations also remains to be studied to understand what prompted Brazil to support its former colonial ruler? The *Treaty of Friendship and Consultation* signed in 1953 between Brazil and Portugal was an outcome of political and military help needed by Portugal from Brazil to handle the wave of self-determination in Portuguese colonies. The Treaty was post Portugal's wish (not proposal) to ask for military help from North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in early 1950s, which was turned down by NATO members.

The so-called "special relation" between Portugal and Brazil, in fact also mars the claim of Brazil adopting an independent foreign policy. Though serving as Portugal's representative, suffice it to say that Brazil was supportive of Portuguese claim, but it remains unknown, whether Brazil ever went on record to officially state its stand specifically on the question of Goa.

As the declassified documents reveal there were paradoxical statements, divergent considerations and shifting stances in Brazilian approach to the question of Goa. For instance, though the official policy remained anti-colonial, Brazilian president Café Filho during his visit to Portugal in 1955 made a significant statement that "Brazil would stand by Portugal in any part of the world". The statement of the president was defended by Brazilian diplomats in the light of forthcoming presidential election in Brazil. This event also coincided with successive visits to several military-autocratic countries like Bolivia, Peru and Argentina. Though, these visits were later cancelled citing domestic reasons.

Similarly, Quadros' new foreign policy and Brazil's voting pattern at UN in the years 1962-1963 were marred by a statement of Brazilian president Costa e Silva in Lisbon in the year 1966. Silva affirmed that Brazil would offer Portugal its full support at UN against the Afro-Asian moves in reference to Portuguese colonies. Such type of statements at that time became more significant because, Brazil was holding a non-permanent seat in Security Council. In 1967, proposed dispatch of naval units to Angola and application of sanctions on Rhodesia also followed that. As far as views of officials in foreign office is concerned, the then Secretary General of Foreign Office, Pio Corrêa³ was more explicit to present his opinion in favour of Portugal.

The question of Goa should be seen in the actual period of its occurrence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was a phase of decolonisation, fall of European colonial powers, rise of the United States, heightened Cold War contest and, of course, rise of Brazil and its ambition to be great power in its own right under Jânio Quadros. Another important issue for conceptual understanding of the case is the perceptions and beliefs of Brazilians and whether their stand in support of Portugal was in ambiguity or complete unfamiliarity of the actual situation in Goa.

Significantly, speech act by most Brazilians created noise in LAC region and beyond in the Luso-Brazilian world. In this reference, it must be seen who said what and where and whether it was the official reaction if not the considered national position of Brazil. For that matter, what constitutes an official stand also needs to be reviewed again and again, keeping in mind the fluctuating political temperature of the Brazilian government and utterances of its diplomats in world's capitals in the early 1960s.

Brazil's ambition to be among great powers also deserves attention; whether the former would take a decision that may stand in contrary with its old European allies. Somewhat controversial a statement but Jânio Quadros perhaps made the first serious attempt to disentangle Brazilian foreign policy from its European moorings. A lot has also been

³ Actual term is not known to the researcher; however, it is known that, he was the Secretary General of *Itamarati* in the phase of late 1960s.

talked about the economic dimension of Brazilian foreign policy; in that context, perhaps Goa mattered little is well understood. The point to be studied is whether for that very reason, Brazil was less concerned about its own foreign policy independence; as it was found to be more vocal in support of the decolonisation of Portugal's African colonies.

III. Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

Foremost rationale for carrying out the Master of Philosophy-level research, was to make full and exhaustive use of the recently declassified materials by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Given the accessibility to important files, the researcher has analysed how, and whether, these documents add or altogether throw a new light on the important issues that have been viewed until now, with the information that was already in the public domain. In public domain, Brazil's sympathy for Portugal on Goa question is well understood, the researcher in the present study verified whether the same fact applied in actuality in the declassified documents. More clearly, the research monograph highlights the paradoxes, divergences and nuances that marked Brazilian position on Goa. This is possible because, the declassified documents also contain Brazilian sources along with inputs from Indian Embassy in Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian sources range from news reports, editorials to official statements and comments from Brazilian diplomats and ministers on the question of Goa.

Absence of any secondary source literature specifically on Goa question has been the second important reason to look at the primary documents as well as the context under which Brazil viewed the Goa question. There were certain limitations too of the secondary source material, which made the scholar trace and place the Goa question in the midst of substantial literature available on anti-colonialism question in reference to Brazil. Utilisation of this particular source also proved to be the strength of the present study; and as well as indicated the chapterisation schema and the choice of research methodology.

Thirdly, as far as the Goa issue for Brazil is concerned, it is important to note that the chronological proceedings of the issue are spread over some two decades. The story neither began nor ended in 1961; it has a decade back and forth of relevance. Simplification of this issue to the extent of Brazil being a representative of Portuguese interests and official criticism of 1961 use of force, often belittles the importance of the event in the study of Brazilian foreign policy.

There are strands and stands with varied diplomatic-political shades and nuances; and each and every point have been analysed in depth: Brazil's support to Portugal at UN in 1961 on Goa, but criticising the same country for its colonial policies though under some reservations, during the 1962-1963 voting. The 1962 voting was in reference to independence of Portuguese possessions in Africa. The paradoxical situation is that, Brazil remained more vocal in case of African colonies probably because of Lusophone linkages and also because Lusophone Africa could provide tangible economic opportunities for Brazil, as referred "under the blessings of Portugal". Goa did not receive such a privileged attention probably both for historical-cultural and economic reasons. Many a time, post-Salazar democratic governments in Portugal as well as governments in Brazil have expressed their embarrassment in press and other official statements, over their previous postures on the Goa question. Now the point that is to be analysed is that, as Brazil explained its stand on the question due to sentimental and 'special relations' with Portugal, what Brazilian position actually was in 1961 remains un-clarified.

Fourthly, for that matter, even Asia did not loom large for Brazil's equation of strategic interests; even till 1968, as visible from the speech of the then President. Putting it differently, would Brazil have maintained the same position if Goa would have been in geographical proximity like in case of Africa and if independence of Goa would have provided immediate economic and strategic benefit to Brazil. Ascertaining Brazil's Asian view through position on Goa makes the study relevant and interesting.

Fifthly, in general, the explanation proffered by Brazil and easily accepted by scholars for its postures on colonial question is an outcome of “special relation between Brazil and Portugal”; in reality, was not true. The present study has verified such statements and analysed how ‘special’ the relation really was in the second half of 20th century.

Finally, in context of broader utility of this study, as far as the field of Latin American studies and Brazilian studies is concerned, the question adds new insights into; i) Brazil's position on the questions of anti-colonialism and self-determination; ii) the worldview including the values and foundations of Brazilian foreign policy; and iii) Brazil’s stand on Portuguese possessions in Asia, a field of research understudied by scholars.

IV. Research Methodology

The type of methodology applied for the study is what relates to surveying the primary archival documents. Historical methods expect sifting through voluminous and disorganised material and identifying the constants in Brazilian foreign policy on the issue of Goa. The secondary sources available were limited; as far as the contributions of the secondary sources, are concerned, they provide a background for initiating the study. The secondary literatures were critical to the understanding of Brazil’s general policy on the decolonisation issue, so as to draw parallels and differences with that of the Goa issue.

To survey the evolving circumstances and unfolding events, the declassified documents of MEA, which are available at National Archives of India, were of extreme importance and relevance. These files consists of correspondences, fortnightly, monthly and annual reports received from Embassy of India in Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia as well as reports from Information Service of India. Press coverages in the Brazilian newspapers received through the Press Attaché were of utmost utility in assessing the opinion of the Brazilian presses on specific issues. While none of the files alone satisfied the requirements but

when combined, provided the minute details for building the linkages between the disparate and scattered elements. As the caution is required to verify the reporting of events, two-way verification mode were deployed – one from the Indian side and another from the Brazilian side. This has been done by using newspaper archives of Indian newspapers as well as Brazilian newspapers, which are mostly available online. Limited number of other international newspapers has also been retrieved from Google newspapers archive. Two other important databases have also been used namely *Foreign Broadcasts Information Service* and *ProQuest Historical Newspapers* database, for accessing the international reporting of the events taking place in Goa and in Brazil around the period of consideration for research i.e. 1950s and 1960s. Disparate references to *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* were also made, just to assess the international reporting of events. However, in none of the cases reports of the newspapers have been used as a sole source of information for the study.

The important part of the research is going through the sources that are in Portuguese language, which have been somehow managed by the researcher with the help of online tools and limited knowledge of Portuguese language.

The limitation of the study, in fact is that, the researcher being based in India, did not have the privilege to go through the archives based in Brazil, which would have otherwise provided a better insight into the problems. Therefore, as a conclusion, output is what has been extracted from the resources that were available and accessible to the researcher in the National Archives of India, New Delhi. It must however be stated that the study is not a final one on the subject using the declassified documents. This is so, as there were numerous documents that were not accessible to the researcher during the period of research at National Archives. Added to it, it is to be emphasised that, the present research has been conducted in the light of recently declassified documents of MEA. The primary objective of the research is to highlight those nuances of foreign policy decision making of Brazil during mid-20th century, using the case of Goa.

V. Research Hypotheses

- Paradoxical position and nuanced stance characterised Brazil as its foreign policy betrayed little or no understanding of Asia, much less of Goa question.
- The Brazilian position has been of dual nature in reference to the case of Goa, balancing India and Portugal at the same time.

IV. Chapterisation

The introductory part of the dissertation places the historical antecedents of India-Latin America relations in reference to how the recently declassified documents of MEA can throw a new light on the issues that have been viewed till now with the information that was available in the public domain. Most prominently, a plot for dealing the case of Goa in reference to Brazil has been laid in this part.

The Second Chapter deals with the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy during the period of 1950s and 1960s. Since the question of Goa is itself a case of colonialism, so the Chapter basically analyses the process of foreign policy decision making during the era and the determinants of Brazil's stand on decolonisation. This part of the Chapter deals how actually Brazilian point of view were being shaped during the process of decolonisation and how Brazil perceived the image of Afro-Asian region in the period stated.

Third Chapter of the dissertation makes an effort to ascertain the official position of Brazil on the question of Goa as resembled by the speech acts, voting patterns and official statements from the *Itamarati*, form the basis of the Chapter. Given the bent of the present study i.e. towards Brazilian studies, substantial effort has been made to add the instances of domestic politics of Brazil wherever required.

Fourth Chapter analyses the unofficial position from Brazil; as ascertained from, what appeared in the Brazilian press. The Chapter largely also fulfills the deficiency of the declassified documents in uncovering several complex aspects of the Goa issue. Added to it, however clear and consistent the official position of a country may be, it is not complete on its own until supplemented by the perceptions of the People residing in its territory and the Press as the organ of public opinion.

The concluding part of the dissertation synchronises the available findings to analyse the Brazil's stand on the question of Goa and the reasons for the same. It would help identify specific stances and nuances to understand distinct aspects of Brazilian foreign policy during the period of mid -20th century.

CHAPTER TWO

Evolution of Brazilian Foreign Policy through 50s and 60s

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH 50s AND 60s

Brazil's stand on the question of Goa was one of the several cases associated with its perceptions and stands on the decolonisation of Portuguese colonies in Asia and Africa. The special distinction the case of Goa holds is that being not located in Africa, made it different in the sense; Brazilian understanding on African situation (if at all there was any) may not be applicable in the same way. This is the very reason the Chapter apart from focusing on Brazil's position on the question of decolonisation attempts actually at the evolution of Brazilian foreign making during the phase and complexities attached to the process.

The Chapter has been broadly divided into three sections. First section traces the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy since its independence from Portugal till the phase of late 1960s, and challenges of the mentioned era. Second section largely deals with Brazilian perception of Afro-Asia, if at all there was any, and how Brazilian foreign policy community viewed the process of decolonisation in Africa and Asia. Third Section, which is the last part of the Chapter focusses on the complexities of foreign affairs community, from where foreign policy decisions of Brazil actually originated.

I. Evolving Perceptions, Principles and Parameters of Brazilian Foreign Policy

Brazil's international relations was and remains heavily conditioned by the views, conceptions and perceptions of policy elites from the point of view of how they view Brazil's place in the world (Schneider 1974: 31). The elite perception is also derived from the way Brazil had been described by foreigners all through the 19th and 20th centuries. Brazil's description in 'superlative' terms led Brazilians to remain satisfied with themselves and not work in real terms to anyway enhance and develop their country (Palmer 1957: 189). The term 'superlative' here denotes Brazil's description based on its

size and population, which was directly related by the foreigners to its 'greatness' and the potential it had in economic, political and military terms. Palmer explains that, Brazil worked a lot in developing (industrialising and urbanising) its frontier regions around Argentina, to overcome any inferiority complex owing to perceived military threats from Argentina. In other regions, Brazil remained content, where, there were no external threats and hence no initiative for development of it was undertaken.

Surprisingly, Brazil since its independence has been little aware of the strength it possessed for decades, until recently when it finally realised that it has the potential to lead not only those inside the Western Hemisphere but also a bloc of third world countries.⁴ Despite possessing the capability; exaggeration of national capabilities has not been much prevalent in Brazil as compared to several others including for instance India, in such a club (Schneider 1974: 32). In fact, it was never explicitly mentioned or declared until the military government (1964-1985) came to power and did if so. This is not to say that, there did not exist a foreign policy to project Brazil abroad. In fact, during the first two decades of 20th century, Brazil participated at various international conferences, the one most noteworthy was Brazil's participation at second Hague peace conference with one of the largest delegation at the conference. In fact, the adoption of foreign policy by Brazil predates even its independence from Portugal on 7 September, 1822 (Rodrigues 1962: 324). This is in reference to the foreign policy adopted by Dom Pedro, which included sending missions to major European nations to further the process of Brazil's recognition as an independent state.

⁴ It would be interesting to mention here that, the US had ever since Brazil's independence delegated Brazil as the 'moderator' in the South American region, which led Brazil staying away from creation of any bloc in the region. Brazil's stand against creation of any bloc in South America is also proved by Brazil's repeated attempt to 'abort' any such plan by Juan Peron, President of Argentina. Probably these two reasons also accounted why Brazil understood very late, its potential to lead Latin American countries. Additionally, Brazil's plan to stay away from creation of any such bloc may be primarily for the reason that, it did not want to annoy the United States, as such a bloc may prove anti-US, due to unpopularity of the United States' policy in the region during the Cold War period.

Since independence and until the end of 19th century, predominance of Great Britain was quite evident, in continuation of Brazil's relation with Britain since the Portuguese colonial era. The linkage here is directed towards the period of sugar plantations, which was mostly owned and controlled by Britain, and other European nations. Post-independence of Brazil, closeness to Britain was also due to the dominance of sugar producing areas in politics, which gave Brazil many diplomats and foreign ministers who favoured good relation with Britain (Burns 1967: 202). After late 1880s and certainly after 1930, the dominance of sugar producing north-east gradually eroded and hence the class insisting strong relations with Britain went weak. By the end of 19th century and beginning of 20th century, Brazil's own yearning to get free from this neo-colonial baggage, made it closer to the United States under a new leadership and new principles. The closeness to the United States was officially marked by a famous and highly competent diplomat and statesman Rio Branco, who wanted to enhance the Pan-American influence in the zone and at the same time delegating the US as a leader of the same. However, this was not the only reason of Brazil's closeness towards the US. This is to say that prominence of the US in trade or otherwise was also due to Brazil's power being dominated by coffee elites (after downfall of sugar elites) who directed Brazil's relation towards the US, where most of the coffee was sold. But for an extended period, pro-American stand led Brazil to be a country 'taken as granted' by the United States (Palmer 1957: 196). While this specific stand and stance acted favourably for the US, it led to Brazil being more concerned in normal situations of the US' reaction of its action.

i) Brazilian Politics in the period, 1930-1960

As stated earlier; for several decades since Brazil's independence and until 1930s, Brazilian foreign policy has been run by the elites that represented oligarchs, so consistency and coherence was maintained in the foreign policy decisions that served the interests of elites in the country. But with centrality and dominance of oligarchy weakening due to successive anti-oligarchic movements in Brazil, ambiguity over the priorities of external partners increased inside the foreign ministry.

With the beginning of 20th century, followed by two world wars, onset of Cold War, Brazil got entangled in a set of possible choices or options that it found difficult to choose. The set of choices refer to the conflicting ideologies and blocs that emerged after Second World War. The transition at external level, coincided with the replacement of Portuguese elites at various levels with those of Brazil and this very transition was full of complexities which marked a signal for the new beginning on the part of foreign policy elites⁵. Another reason for such a transition was due to downfall of old elites in political positions with a class of new elites as the regions of southern Brazil were taking over from the north, which dominated earlier in Brazilian politics. This resulted into a foreign policy of consistencies being replaced by inconsistencies on several fronts not only due to changed external environment, but also due to the fact that Brazil while in transition to structures of foreign policy decision making came across several challenges; that there were no clear policy for anything until late 80s, when Brazil was actually able to do so. Changes at external level refer to several events like rise of decolonisation movement at the global level, and the rise of non-alignment as a policy to name a few.

In reference to non-alignment, Latin America in general and Brazil in particular, though under North American influence during mid-20th century, witnessed also rallying around non- alignment. In reference to Cold War, it is important to emphasise here that the question of Latin American participation was an issue of divided opinions between and among superpowers and other great powers namely US, USSR and Britain (Rakove 2014: 8). This was so because in any case Latin American region was seen as a separate bloc by superpowers and other great powers where one's influence was a considerable factor. Most important point here is that of Brazil's adoption of 'independent' foreign

⁵ The arguments are drawn from the article entitled "The foundations of Brazilian foreign policy" by Honório Rodrigues, wherein he writes that the transition of 1950s and 1960s denoted for the first time, first and second generation of Brazilians (of non-Portuguese descent) coming to the positions of political leadership, which was earlier dominated largely by the ethnic Portuguese community.

policy till 1964 (military coup) which in and around 1961 also 'flirted' to varying extent with non-alignment and neutralism (Hershberg 2007: 373).

Post Second World War, Brazil was passing through a phase of heightened nationalism, the country witnessed criticism on various fronts and foreign policy was no exception to it (Linhares 1962: 533). Rise of Getúlio Vargas in 1930s, was also a phase of the rise of nationalist groups in Brazil. Nationalists were the ones who can be held responsible for introducing emphasis on the principles like self-determination and non-intervention, and faith in organisations like the United Nations. The nationalists pledged the support to Afro-Asian colonies for securing independence (Burns 1967: 203; Linhares 1962: 536). Though, nationalists' agenda and suggestions were praiseworthy, these remained nothing more than a dream until Jânio Quadros came to power in 1960-61.

Challenges and changes at the domestic level, as stated earlier, were more profound. By the end of 1950s, substantial restructuring went on in *Itamarati* to make it more efficient to work along commercial lines, anticipating in future a wider presence in Afro-Asian regions (Selchar 1970: 42). To enhance Brazil's image in Africa and lessen the damage incurred out of Brazil's charms for the US and western culture, political positions were modified accordingly as *Itamarati* started withdrawing its support for colonialism and at least in principle, the idealistic terms like 'anti-colonialism' and 'self-determination' started appearing more often in the speeches by diplomats in Brazil and also while on visit abroad.

In case of Brazil, in a period of five years from 1955-1960 many conflicting things went alongside like for example Kubitschek administration started developing close relation with new African nations but did not criticise the Portugal's colonial policies as well (Rosenbaum 1969: 531). In 1960, Kubitschek supported United Nations declaration on the Concession of Independence to Colonial People and Countries. In the same year i.e. 1960 Kubitschek recalled, Brazilian ambassador to South Africa. It is to be stressed that, these actions were taken by Brazil, despite having known that Brazil and Portugal had

signed a Treaty of Friendship and Consultation some years back in 1953⁶ and in case of South Africa, Brazil was a good trade partner of South Africa (Rosenbaum 1969: 531). Though much emphasis cannot be given to Kubitschek for his support to anti-colonial forces, as he continued 'secretly' to support Portugal over the latter's colonial policies and interestingly, his love for Portugal was well known in public (Davila 2010; Location no. 589, Kindle eBook). The 'secret' support to colonial policies of Portugal should not be interpreted as really 'secret'. It refers to support for such policies through popularising the cultural linkage between Brazil and Portugal. Luso-Brazilian community was also set up during Kubitschek term, which later turned out to be mere a 'rhetoric'⁷. Juscelino Kubitschek's visit to Portugal in 1960 for ratification and operationalising the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation signed in 1953, despite wide opposition by Brazilian press and people preempts any superficial action to support self-determination on Kubitschek's part. Kubitschek visit took place after Eisenhower's visit to Portugal, where Eisenhower visited Portugal while returning from Paris. The visit by the US president was not only criticised in the United States but also in Brazil. The criticism was primarily due to the 'triad' that had developed comprising the US, Brazil and Portugal, due to successive and subsequent visits of diplomats and leaders, to each other's country.

The presidential election of 1960 was unique in many sense; for the first time election was campaigned highly on the nationalistic lines; presidential candidate vouched for an independent foreign policy and finally the victory of Quadros with the highest ever votes'

⁶ Researcher is aware of the fact that the Treaty was signed in 1953 but could not ascertain the exact period in which the "Treaty of Friendship and Consultation" was ratified and became enforced between Portugal and Brazil. Secondary literatures on the subject also give varying dates in this reference. It is in this context, researcher wishes to use flexible dates from 1953 through 1955, in the Chapter and the dissertation. The confusion regarding the year could not be clarified even from the Political Reports sent by Indian Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to Indian Ministry of External Affairs, at that time, which forms the basis of the dissertation. It is however important to mention that, for the first time the dispatches in 1953 made a mention of it.

⁷ Rhetorical nature of this community has been explained later in the Chapter. For the time being, it would be sufficient to mention here that, even from official side of Portugal this community was remarked as a 'rhetoric'.

share on the presidential position. The significant feature of the period was a public opinion in support of independent foreign policy, an unlikely period in the history of Brazil, when Brazilians were looking at the international events unfolding with the same attention to those at the domestic level (Linhares 1962: 532). It was also for the first time, when Brazilians showed the much required interest in foreign policy issues and heard about foreign policy much often in the public arena.

It is a normal phenomenon that exists even now that priorities of a new president (or head of state or government) in terms of countries are basically indicated by the initial visits of the elected president. In that sense, Quadros' visit as President-elect was mostly to the developing countries, which also included India, and the countries of the socialist bloc. The successive visits to third world countries by Quadros, was in contrast with the previous president Juscelino Kubitschek who as a president-elect visited mostly the western nations which included the United States and Portugal as well (Selchar 1970: 43). It is important to mention here that Quadros was invited by the US too, but he went on for his official visit to the United States later and not in the initial period of his presidential term.

In 1960s, Kennedy was in power in the United States and he was one of the few American presidents who held sympathy for anti-colonial forces and was not much against Brazil's alignment with neutralist nations (Hershberg 2007: 375). This implies, at least during Kennedy's term, it was easy for Quadros to give support to anti-colonial forces while being unconcerned with the US. This is not to say that such a norm was present at all the levels of American diplomacy at that time. One evidence of it is that; by the end of 1950s, when Quadros came to power, his postures were carefully watched by American officials, while Brazil was normalising its relations with the communist bloc. The concern revolved around the question of the extent to which actions of Quadros would take Brazil away from the United States (its old ally) and how the United States can penalise Quadros for such actions (Hershberg 2007: 376).

Brazil's expansion during late 1950s and all through 1960s, through its diplomatic missions, brought the whole world under its umbrella comprising also unlikely regions like Albania, Algeria, Ceylon and Thailand (Burns 1967: 205). Though, it was widely questioned "whether close relations or association with the countries like India, Egypt and Yugoslavia would serve the Brazil's primary interests" (Burns 1967: 206). The same debate was reflected in the editorial comments made by famous and influential newspapers in Brazil namely *Jornal do Brasil*, *Folha de São Paulo*, *Estadão de São Paulo* and *O Globo*. A detailed analysis of the news reports that appeared on the subject in Brazilian newspapers will be covered in the Fourth Chapter, which specifically deals with how Brazilian media viewed the Question of Goa during the period under study. In reality many diplomats learnt later that (as opposed to the earlier belief); the underdeveloped countries may rather prove to be a competitor of Brazil, than a prospective customer of Brazilian products. However on these arguments which may be either based on facts or assumptions, Quadros' policy could not be countered and rejected easily. This was because, Quadros being an elected leader that too on the agenda of 'independent' foreign policy, if not followed by *Itamarati*, would not only mean the 'denial and dilution' of the will of President but also the electorate, which elected him (Selchar 1970: 50). This was the basic reason despite internal disagreements among diplomats nothing much could be done. The unpopularity of Quadros among foreign policy bureaucrats was also contributed by extension of office hours at *Itamarati* and a twenty percent deduction in diplomatic salaries to fund Quadros' grand initiatives in Africa.

Adding to the discontent; the varying interpretations Quadros was making in reference to the foreign policy devised by him particularly angered the Brazilian military. Quadros' own party i.e. the National Democratic Union (UDN) was itself critical of Quadros' independent foreign policy. On the contrary, Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) favoured Quadros' 'independent' foreign policy (Rosenbaum 1969: 535). There may be another reason for support by PTB which was composed of past members of communist parties (banned in Brazil at that time) and trade unionists. The important reason was that Goulart who was a vice-president during Quadros term, was a labour minister during Vargas

regime and had already won the hearts of communists, labour unions and labour class that time. Apart from that, he has been classified for long in the category of political-left.

ii) Brazil and Non- Alignment

With political crisis at domestic level deepening and differences of opinion becoming clearer, Brazil eventually decided to send observer to 1961 NAM Conference at Belgrade. This is not to say that there was no discomfort among Brazilian officials over the issue of sending an observer as visible from fact that, at eleventh hour, Brazil started convincing other Latin American countries also to send observer to NAM summit.

This was basically done for two reasons; a) Cuba was the only participant to the conference from Latin American region; and b) Brazil did not want itself to be singularly pointed out by the US attending a conference of 'uncommitted' nations. Since all the persuasions failed, Brazil at the last minute decided to send its representative though the participation was at best 'limited' participation (Hershberg 2007: 374).

While arrangement were being made for the NAM Summit, frictional speech acts and statements were exchanged between the United States and Brazil, on the ground of breaking or staying away from its commitment to Western Hemisphere. This also led Cabot, who was the US' ambassador to Brazil, sending alerts to State Department over Quadros' postures. It is visible from the telegrams being exchanged between the US State Department and Cabot who was an appointee of Dwight Eisenhower in Brazil (Rakove 2014: 8).

Though Quadros sensing the anger of Cabot, who was the US' ambassador to Brazil and fearing the cut-down of US' aid, tried his best to normalise the feeling of outgoing US diplomat (Hershberg 2007: 377). The US concern was over chances that Quadros' attendance (being a head of the state) may receive high profile importance at the conference (Hershberg 2007: 377). Off late it proved to be wrong, as there was no official invitation made to Brazil, hence Brazil could neither claim 'a rightful place' nor

send head of state just as a mere observer, because Brazil was not a participant (Hershberg 2007: 377). Some information suggest that, official invitation was made to Brazil, but Quadros backed down in response to the wide opposition inside *Itamarati* to his participation at NAM Summit. As the conference neared, attempts by the United States to influence and to be more explicit, 'intimidate' Brazil had reached the organisers, hence Yugoslavia sought guidance from the United States to persuade Latin American countries to attend the conference, which was of course rejected owing the US' insistence on the commitment of Latin America towards Rio treaty and Organisation of American States (OAS) (Hershberg 2007: 378). Britain as opposed to the United States, was encouraging Mexico and other Latin American countries to attend the conference, as it may result into some sort of moderating influence (Hershberg 2007: 380). In fact, Britain was in a better position as compared to its European peers like France and Portugal, having recognised and accepted the wave of decolonisation early (Rakove 2014: 4)

With no certainty, whether Brazil was still determined to send an observer, and who the person as a representative would be, came the resignation of Quadros, almost some days before the Belgrade conference was to be held (Hershberg 2007:381). This incident too was capitalised by Cuba, accusing US imperialism for the unfortunate incident. With high instability inside Brazil, Brazil at first had decided not to send observer and surprisingly this information was delivered not by the Brazilian foreign ministry, but by Brazilian embassy in Washington, further adding to the confusion and suspicion to the whole episode (Hershberg 2007: 382).

Eventually Brazilian ambassador at Bern was sent to attend the conference, but since the post- Quadros regime lacked legitimacy, so the participation of Brazilian diplomat was openly questioned by Cuba (Hershberg 2007: 383). In such an environment took place the Brazilian participation that Kennan's cabled words "high spirited confusion prevailed to last minute over Brazil's relationship to the conference" stands near to true. J.G. Hershberg ascertains from the Brazilian official records that in reference to non-alignment even Brazilian diplomats were unclear what their independent foreign policy permitted and what it did not.

II. Brazil's Imagination of Afro-Asia and Brazil's Move towards Asia and Africa

Brazil had left League of Nations for having not received a permanent seat in the League of Nations: was not in touch with the fast moving events at the international level i.e. rise of anti-colonial movements across the globe. It did not actually expect the demand for freedom coming so soon and that too in the form of armed resistance in Africa and Asia. This ignorance may be an outcome of Brazil's own freedom way back in 1822 being a bloodless one. Brazil's initiative as well as attempt at distancing itself from the problems and complexities of Cold War was the very reason that brought Brazil closer to the Afro-Asian region (Burns 1967: 203). The basic idea (in some sense a privilege) with which Brazil moved near the Afro-Asian region was that Brazil, due to its racial composition and being the most 'Africanised' country in the American continent, could step-in to take Afro-Asian countries out of 'racial dilemma' and in the process and in a course of time would acquire 'prestige' (Linhares 1962: 536; Selchar 1970: 93).

The act of taking up a role of mediator also has relation to the '*Itamarati* ethos'. Striving towards promoting '*Itamarati* ethos', directly related to enhancing the 'prestige of Brazil' has also been the ultimate goal of Brazilian foreign policy practitioners and diplomats. The reason that Brazil was itself once a colony adds further to its 'legitimate status' as a mediator in the third world, apart from the fact that, Brazil itself never practiced imperialistic policies.

Quadros' rise was also seen as 'repudiation' of many of the policies prioritised by the Kubitschek's regime and introduction of 'independent foreign policy' in Brazil (Davila 2010; Location no. 714, Kindle eBook). This also meant loosening ties with Portugal owing to its colonial policies. An interesting revelation about Quadros is that he, before his visits to third world countries, had no 'real interest' in those regions but got impressed with it in a course of time; Policy-wise, Africa became a priority, though on paper there was no absolute neglect of Asian continent (Selchar 1970: 138). Some scholars claim that, his interest was developed by his careful observation of things in Africa and Asia.

An interesting point made by Wayne Selchar is that only 'factual knowledge' and 'optimistic illusion' accounted for what was written in Brazil in reference to leadership opportunities that Brazil had in those regions. The authors, who wrote about Africa in Brazil, did not actually know about Africa, and their thoughts centered on Brazilian point of view rather than that of Africans (Linhares 1962: 537). Added to it, Brazil which due to developmental reasons and in search of new markets had stepped in Africa; found later that these regions had little that they could sell to Brazil in exchange (Rosenbaum 1969: 533).

All these events may give an unambiguous impression of Quadros being the first leader ever to direct Brazil's policy towards the third world, which actually is not true. Even before Quadros came, the period of 1956-1960 marked Brazil's involvement in South Asia as far as the 'third world' is concerned (Selchar 1970: 132). This was obviously in reference to Brazil's task of protecting Portuguese interests in India in the Goa case. This is not to say that, Brazil's involvement in South Asia was an outcome of any grand strategy comparable in any case with that of Quadros. Brazil's involvement in South Asia was merely by default.

Brazil's entry and diplomatic involvement in South Asia predates those in Africa through *Operação Brasil- Ásia* and *Gondim Mission* in 1959, which were basically intended to look at the trade prospects in the Asian continent, but Quadros' emphasis on Africa, preempted the focus on Asia as a whole at least for the moment (Selchar 1970: 186). In statistical terms, leave Asia, even India, where it was in charge of protecting interests of Portugal did not matter much on the Brazil's diplomatic umbrella, as compared to other Asian countries at that time. That is resembled by the number of Brazilian diplomatic officials posted in India which was much lower than those in several other capital cities of Asia at that time (Selchar 1970: 226). Even on trade, figures between the two were negligible except an agreement on rice that too with the help of the United States (Selchar 1970: 226).

i) Ideological underpinning of Brazil's stand on decolonisation process

Brazil's reluctance to oppose any colonial power is rooted in the European charm for Latin elite classes (Selchar 1970: 244). This also worked vice-versa as cultural sentimentality for European and American things by Latin elites was no less. Hence, Brazil stayed away from any opposition to those who held a fascination for its culture. Added to it, Gilberto Freyre's work on 'racial democracy' and 'Luso-Brazilian linkages' had created large ideological- cultural base in Brazil for the support of Portugal (Davila 2010; Location no. 339, Kindle eBook). Jerry Davila in his book *Hotel Tropic* has collected several accounts related to this famous scholar, in relation to Portugal's admiration for Freyre and that it sponsored his regular trips to Africa and Portugal as well as published his scholarly works on regular basis.

Another explanation as opposed to the ideological basis is in the practical terms. That is during the Cold War period, anti-colonial stands and postures were connected and clubbed with communist regimes and often the cause of self-determination and anti-colonialism was championed by the communist bloc to de-legitimise the western colonial countries on moral grounds. This might also have prompted Brazil to not only support the colonial powers, but also carefully avoid any language against European colonial regimes at the United Nations. Brazil all through remained anti-communist (though its intensity varied with time), although supported self-determination principles in 'idealistic' terms (Selchar 1970: 242). This support for the principles of self-determination can be adjudged from regular speeches at United Nations, Presidential messages to the Congress or foreign ministers' or presidents' speech at the graduation ceremony of Rio-Branco Institute, where Brazilian diplomats are trained, on regular basis. The speeches at Rio-Branco Institute holds special importance, as that is what presidents or foreign ministers of Brazil expected graduating diplomats to accomplish.

With time though Brazil criticised colonial practices at various platforms, where it did not feel anything going against its interests. However, complexity increased with the point, when the issues pertained to decolonisation of Portuguese colonies. Brazil felt that

rejecting Portuguese colonialism would also mean a rejection of its own Portuguese past and cultural milieu it has inherited from the same and at the same time an outcome of which would help it become the leader of 'Luso-Brazilian world' (Selchar 1970: 103). Stress over emphasising the Portuguese past of Brazil was repeatedly advocated by Gilberto Freyre as well, a respectable academician and scholar both inside Brazil and the academic world outside it. Attack on Portugal over its colonial policies⁸ was countered by him, referring to Brazil's record of treatment of its own indigenous people. This complexity gave a feel of seriously divided opinion on colonialism even on ideological basis. Some opined that Brazil must escort Portugal in its 'civilising mission'. Another belief was that voices of anti-colonialism would also resonate against the 'interests' of western countries as a whole, a traditional ally it always related to. In reference to alignment with the western world; Brazil as a country belonging to the western Christian world was never questioned in fact even by Quadros. Jânio Quadros in his article "Brazil's New Foreign Policy" published in *Foreign Affairs* magazine seemed defending Brazil's association with the West. Brazil's move towards third world was projected by Quadros to be an attempt to extend western ideals (which Brazil claimed was already imbibed with!) to the underdeveloped African countries.

In 1933, Portugal amended its constitution to introduce a term called 'overseas territories', making Portuguese colonies overseas provinces of Portugal. Though under international law this definition was debatable – Brazil defended Portugal's overseas territories' definition at the United Nations and cited constitutional provisions of Portugal as the most 'authoritative' source. This legalistic bias of Brazil visible at all international platforms repeatedly, may not be only a reflection of the academic training of its foreign ministers and diplomats in law. It may also be an intelligent way to save itself from any accusation as Brazil justified its stand citing legal provisions.

⁸It requires a mention here that Gilberto Freyre was one of the many scholars in Brazil, who criticised the India's military action on Goa.

Horácio Lafer who held the post of foreign minister of Brazil (1959-1961), explained in an interview with Wayne Selchar that President Kubitschek had clearly instructed *Itamarati* to vote in favour of Portugal in normal situations; whereas in situations where it was difficult to take clear positions, it would be fine to first consult Portugal and support its stand at international platforms.

Role of Brazil at UN for defending Portugal came handy as Brazil had served repeatedly several terms as a non-permanent member of Security Council. In 1955, on a visit to Portugal, Café Filho showed his sympathy for Portugal at United Nations in reference to any attempt by Afro-Asian states to move a resolution against Portugal, in favour of self-determination of the Portuguese colonies. In the year 1960 at UN General Assembly, Brazil voted in favour of Declaration on Independence for colonial countries and peoples (Resolution 1514 and Resolution 1541). Though, it voted against Resolution 1542 of December 15, 1960, which actually mentioned all the Portuguese territories by name. Interestingly, this vote was after the representations were made by Portuguese delegates at UN referring to the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation. Another evidence of the Brazil being uncomfortable with any action which may annoy the Portuguese and Portuguese sympathisers in Brazil was two versions of the Presidential message to the Congress. The Presidential message to the Congress in 1963, was modified ‘at the behest of Foreign minister, Hermes Lima’ by removing the line mentioning a commitment towards the independence of Portuguese colonies to not only silence the Portuguese but also their sympathisers in Brazil (Selchar 1970: 266)⁹.

ii) **Myth of sentimental ties and the Luso-Brazilian community**

Though the emphasis of ‘sentimental ties’ between Brazil and Portugal and existence of a Luso-Brazilian world have been stressed over and over again by Brazil and Portugal both, at the same time, such rhetoric have not only been countered from the Brazilian side but also officially by Portugal. On September 13, 1974, Mario Soares, the Foreign minister of Portugal at a press conference in Lisbon on the question of its relations with

⁹This incident was originally documented by Honório Rodrigues in his book, *Brazil and Africa*.

Brazil expressed his wish to strengthen relations with Brazil. On Luso-Brazilian community he remarked that “Luso-Brazilian community have been so far an expression of rhetoric, without anything to make it effective” (Soares 1974: 59). He was of view that when he meets Brazilian diplomats in near future, he would like to and wish to make this community a reality in economic, political and cultural terms. On relation of Brazil with Portugal, José Honório Rodrigues has claimed that despite ‘community of feeling’ that bound together, the national objective of Brazil did not actually coincide with that of Portugal and that sentimental and linguistic basis of common linkage was for namesake. He accused Salazar’s colonial policy for further alienating Brazil. Rodrigues in his book *Brazil and Africa* also rejects the existence of a Luso-Brazilian community, citing the reasons suggested by Portugal as insufficient for such a community to come into being while Portugal’s colonial policy continues. Added to it, Portuguese colonies had no right in such a community, without which the primary objective of setting up of such a ‘community’ stands questionable.

So in reality, Brazil's emphasis on such rhetoric is an outcome of the lack of braveness on Brazil’s part to speak against Portugal or in general against western nations. Another point of relevance here is that as discussed by Wayne Selchar, Brazil actually lacked the strength to have a strong and clear policy towards Afro-Asian region. That is so because at least during the Cold War for a country to have a strong Afro-Asian policy required also a firm and clear stand against any form of colonialism, which however was not the case.

iii) Fall of Quadros and the Post Quadros era

Considering as unrealistic the Quadros- Goulart policies, there was a strong urge among foreign policy elites to return back to the traditional (foreign) ways than continue with the current ones (Burns 1967: 206; Davila 2010; Location no. 669, Kindle eBook). In Foreign Service community, the actual execution of independent foreign policy by Quadros and Goulart, was not only criticised by traditionalists but also by those, who were once supportive of independent foreign policy (Rosenbaum 1968: 389). This is

specifically in reference to Cuba that brought the most problems. In 1962, Brazil conferred the highest non-military award to Che Guevara fuelling the anger even more.

Another debate that continued in Brazil was the one between 'generalists' and 'specialists'. The distinction is drawn from the point, whether they are 'specialists' in a field or general practitioners. It is also to be noted here that, 'specialists' out-numbered 'generalists' in their support to independent foreign policy (Rosenbaum 1968: 389). This also included specialists who were economist. It is interesting to note that 'third world alignment' was heavily criticised on the reason of not being beneficial to Brazil largely from an economic point of view. While debate between 'generalists' and 'specialists' continued, a diplomat further observed that Brazilian foreign policy only has a leg for operational functions, and another leg, which is supposed to carry out the intelligence and planning, is missing (Rosenbaum 1968: 387). This remark holds a special significance as Brazilian foreign ministry and the lack of inter-ministerial coordination shows that Brazilian diplomats indeed failed in the operational part on many occasions in the 1950s and 1960s.

The most significant development under Jânio Quadros was that despite having a wise policy, his policy suffered a backlash owing to reasons that were related to his personal independence (Rosenbaum 1969: 532). He expected too much within a small time period; that too despite the internal resistance from several diplomats within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Selchar 1970: 78). Irving Peter Pflaum in his book *Arena of Decisions: Latin America in Crisis* discusses in a Chapter on Brazil, the very strategy of Quadros of expecting benefits from both the blocs. Pflaum opines, Quadros expected getting regular American aid while also negotiating barter deals with the communist bloc. He followed a nationalist policy not only because he was a nationalist, but also because he wanted the loyalty of military which was necessary for his regime to survive. He wished to impress everyone and garner support from all the sides by maintaining a secrecy over his actual position. This made him incapable to explain his position simply because of the 'duplicity' of his character (Pflaum 1964: 136).

A point worth mentioning here is that the policy devised by Quadros, was actually left for Goulart to implement. This was so, because just after eight months of serving as President, Quadros in wake of extensive opposition to his policies, resigned, after which Goulart became the next president. The first problem was exactly that the policies devised by Quadros were non-deliberately passed on to the next generation of leaders. Secondly, the problem on Goulart's part was, as he is said to have failed in implementing the policies in a more intelligent manner. Thirdly, Goulart regime lacked legitimacy and that his nomination as a President was an act of compromise to save Brazil from a political vacuum after the resignation of Quadros. The absence of such an expertise brought Brazil in a wrong picture. Invitation to Marshall Tito was seen as Brazil's acceptance of 'Castroist expansionist design' as Tito was supporter of the same and had championed the cause of Cuba. Though most scholars while discussing the inconsistencies in Brazilian foreign policy during the period did not feel much problem with the foreign policy, than with the process of decision making in Ministry of Foreign Affairs. H. Jon Rosenbaum believes that President was often the lonely entity who often had to take quick decisions and issue declaratory statements on foreign policy matters that too on urgent basis. Prevalence of undemocratic attitude owing to some diplomats having more freedom than others and hence the influence on decisions, was also one of the problem.

In the backdrop the events described earlier, it is being stated that, several events in foreign policy arena that followed were contrary to what Brazil had been doing in the past. Like, for several decades Brazil had been defending its policies towards Cuba, but Brazil broke its diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1964. In the case of China, Quadros after coming to power had infused an environment of pragmatism over acceptance of Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) at United Nations. Quadros even promised that he would request Brazilian delegation to UN to vote in favour of PRC (Quadros 1962: 26). Surprisingly, Brazilian delegation voted against seating of Peoples' Republic of China as a UN member. Brazil expressed its solidarity with the United States' policy in Vietnam and if this was less, Brazilian troops participated in intervention in Dominican Republic in 1965.

So to say, the three Ds namely Disarmament, Decolonisation, and Development had become an integral part of Goulart's policy. Nevertheless their implementation was not consistent and divergences did exist. Be it disarmament or development, Brazil's action did not show consistency and sometimes the outcome often contradicted Brazil's posture. In relevance of the present study, decolonisation was no exception to the inconsistency that was visible in Brazil's posture. Two relevant examples in this case are a) the case of Angola, and b) the case of Goa. In case of Goa, it criticised India's use of force on Goa, despite having projected itself as anti-colonialist on international platforms like for example at United Nations. In case of Angola, on some occasions it supported the self-determination of Angola but sometimes it sided with Portugal at United Nations depending on the specific situation. In response to the military opposition over Cuban question, Quadros resigned on 25 August, 1961, whose resignation has since then remained a mystery like his very nature. João Goulart took the lead afterwards but his regime was inflicted with economic problems, followed by suspension of aid by the United States, distrust on the part of public and military, huge number of leftists having penetrated the system had brought real as well as perceived threats to the sustainability of the regime (Selchar 1970: 50). It is to be emphasised that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already increased in size and personnel over the years, so these problems in Brazil had large implications on overall foreign policy matters.

With the policy of nationalists falling apart, conservatives were waiting and expecting an intervention by Brazilian military, not necessary to mention the sympathy of the United States. The same was reinstated with a coup d' etat of April 1, 1964, accusing Quadros-Goulart policies to be much distanced from the reality. In the words of Burns this period denoted a 'significant innovation' in the history of Brazilian diplomacy as for the first time there were two different and opposite policies being advocated at the same time (Burns 1967: 210). It was almost obvious that *Itamarati* was still not eager to embrace Afro-Asia and the Eastern bloc. Brazil in fact chose the West between the two options namely, East and West.

The 'independent' foreign policy was abandoned and Brazil was back in a club of western nations. Due to the conservative and increasing radicalism in military, Brazil became one of the most anti-castroist country in South America (Rosenbaum 1969: 540). The 1964 coup was instigated by the discontent arising out of the ills that had accumulated during Brazil's tryst with 'independent' foreign policy (Selchar 1970: 144). With total revival at all levels, the class that evolved post 1964 was completely new and renovation has been even more gradual thereafter in services like armed forces as well as foreign service – denoting greater continuity (Schneider 1974: 6).

One important reason for the Coup was also, the discontent over serious economic situation in Brazil at that time. In backdrop of the stated circumstances, it is important to emphasise that, economic reasons, irrespective of the political situation in the country, were important determinants through 50s and 60s. Brazil's development goals became significant in wake of oil crisis of 1973, as reflected from the Brazil's alignment towards Soviet Union and pro-Arab votes at United Nations (Schneider 1974: 3). The primary intention to mention this point here is that for a country like Brazil, economic dependence on developed countries posed limitations on its foreign policy as well.

In the first half of 1960s, Brazil exhibited huge interest in United Nations as resembled from its hyperactivity at UN. It defended the strengthening of United Nations, and issues related to it. The total numbers of diplomats, importantly also the mean size of delegation, sent to UN in the time period of 1961-1966 increased. However, Brazil's plan to take over leadership role at first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) went in reverse with Castello Branco coming to power prompting a return to old alignments with the United States. Voices in support of neutralism were heard no more and full support was given to Portugal on the colonial question (Selchar 1970: 60). This point is worth mentioning to stress that despite disenchantment for independent foreign policy, the diplomatic presence in Afro-Asia did not witness any reversal. In Costa e Silva's regime, diplomatic presence in Afro-Asian region again increased (Selchar 1970: 64).

The coming of Costa e Silva indicated, as visible from what he and his foreign policy advisers opined, that foreign policy may no longer remain a priority issue of Silva's government. The small section on foreign policy in his presidential address also bears evidence to it. In fact, such a case propped up because, Silva's government felt that there were other domestic issues of priority, which must be looked up first. During Silva's rule, support for decolonisation went along with maintaining good relations with Portugal (Rosenbaum 1969: 541).

During the military rule (1964- 84), support to Portugal and disenchantment with 'neutralism' as well as third world becoming a less priority issue for Brazil, is evidenced by following actions and reactions as H. Jon Rosenbaum mentions in his article entitled "Brazil among the Nations":

- i) Brazil started refraining from criticising colonial policies of Portugal.
- ii) While on an official visit to Lisbon, Foreign minister Magalhães reacted sympathetically to a suggestion made that a Luso- Brazilian African Community should be established with Brazil and Portugal sharing control of Angola.
- iii) In January 1967, Brazil sent naval cadets to Angola, which created much noise inside Brazil among African diplomats. While official note by *Itamarati* denied any political implication of such an action, though many believed since it was thought necessary by the foreign ministry to come out with an official note itself proves that the ship had some political objectives. Added to it, the sympathy for Portugal by the captain who was heading the ship was well known in public.
- iv) To promote area studies, the Brazilian Institute of Afro-Asian Studies was established in the year 1962 by Goulart, which was funded by Brazilian government. During military rule successive regimes completely suspended any financial assistance.

III. Brazilian Foreign Service; Bias, Secrecy and Foreign policy

It is not only the academic background of foreign ministers in the field of law, but also overemphasis on the legal training at Rio-Branco Institute where diplomats were trained, that can be said to have reinforced legalistic mindset in Brazilian foreign policy. As the legalistic bias of Brazil is derived from the academic background of its foreign ministers, so is the 'pro-Americanism' which is derived from the pro- American bent of *Itamarati* (Selchar 1970: 34). The pro-American bent of Brazilian foreign policy was deeply rooted in the teachings of Rio-Branco whose thoughts have over the generations remained sacrosanct for the practitioners of Brazilian foreign policy (Burns 198: 1967). This has resulted in Brazil most often voting at various organisations and to be of the same view and in agreement with the US' stand (Selchar 1970: 35). On multilateral issues, Brazil invariably judged the appropriateness of position based on what great powers were doing (Schneider 1974: 95).

Additional point deserving attention here is that since Political Science was not recognised as a discipline in Brazil at that time, so it was absent from the curriculum at Rio- Branco and a course on international relations that existed, was mere a survey of the field and nothing beyond that (Rosenbaum:1968: 385). This might be a probable explanation of why even diplomats lacked a fair understanding of the issues of international importance. Though the cause of this ignorance did not apply in the same manner with the veteran diplomats who had spent a long time in the field.

Either at the foreign service school or while in foreign service, it was not easy to publicly express one's opinion, denoting the low level of freedom of speech at Rio Branco or at *Itamarati*. One specific aspect of the Institute as pointed out by H. Jon Rosenbaum was that (as opposed to those in the US foreign service), most students were not openly critical of the way Brazilian foreign policy was being carried out, but some indeed disagreed with the specific aspects of the foreign policy, but were afraid to speak it out of the campus. It is however a questionable point that student were satisfied with the foreign

policy, given the crisis situation in which Brazilian foreign policy was in 1960s. The fear of expressing one's opinion in Rio-Branco, was present inside the Brazilian foreign ministry to even higher extent. During Pio Corrêa's term (as a Secretary General of *Itamarati*) during mid-1960s, forget about expressing outside the foreign ministry, the diplomats favouring independent foreign policy were afraid even to let their opinion on foreign policy be known inside the foreign ministry (Rosenbaum 1968: 389). Maintaining secrecy is also a distinct characteristics of Brazilian Foreign Service or for that matter foreign policy. José Honório Rodrigues in his book *Brazil and Africa* has called this specific character to be an inheritance of Portuguese colonialism. The secrecy often gave 'greater latitude' for independent actions by diplomats.

i) Elite structure of foreign affairs community

In Brazil, the foreign policy of 50s and 60s have been in general, extremely confined into the hands of executive, and depending on the specificity of the issue, sometimes discussed in the Brazilian Congress but with almost little or no involvement of political parties and media or academia (Rodrigues 1962: 336). Brazilian president was vested with enormous and in some sense exclusive power and control, which shaped the foreign policy (Schneider 1974: 2).

This might also be due to the reason that foreign policy has been always a subject for elites and an outcome of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which continued to be a closed institution (even till now in some sense), composed of career diplomats, who took decisions with almost no or little consultation with the specialists in national and international affairs (Rodrigues 1962: 337). Despite several initiatives for reform in selection process to Rio-Branco, like by offering scholarships, so as to normalise or moderate the elite structure of Foreign Service it was unlikely, as most scholars believe and agree that any substantial change occurred beyond the character of elite. This is to say that, a new section of elites gradually replaced the old one. The training of all the to-be diplomats at Rio-Branco Institute i.e. at one institute in some sense guaranteed 'intellectual conformity', so that as a diplomat their actions are in sync with the common

ideals they have been trained for (Rosenbaum 1968: 382). It is however an interesting case that since service officers largely came from the same type of class and geographical profile i.e. upper middle and urban, this training was only a way to 'strengthening' such a conformity.

A major criticism that have been all through the period that Brazilian foreign affairs community did not really reflect the true public opinion of Brazilians at least in the issues that really concerned Brazil's bad image at international level. This mostly concerned to orientation towards independent foreign policy, anti-colonialism, unexplained and unclarified solidarity towards Portugal in reference to the issue of self-determination of Portuguese colonies. This has been largely an outcome of the elite-status that the Brazilian foreign policy community has retained while being distanced from the general public. The level of elite status of the foreign policy domain can be judged from the fact that it remained unchallenged even by the public opinion in times of utmost crisis like when views of Brazilian people and that of *Itamarati* were totally opposite; by late 1950s to get free from dependence on the US, or in 1962 in response to Chinese aggression on India, when Brazilians were openly critical of China or in 1967, in response to sending navy fleet to Angola to quell the uprising. These are the significant instances to support the argument that why autonomy of foreign affairs remained substantial and unconcerned with public opinion (Burns 1967: 202; Schneider 1974: 155).

Despite several turns or so called 'aberrations', Brazilian foreign affairs community was also adaptive to the changed circumstances and environment and were relatively unified (Schneider 1974: 150). Ronald Schneider has not actually explained what he intends to say by this particular statement. It perhaps implies rigidity in Brazilian Foreign Ministry but not indifference to change in absolute terms. Excepting *Itamarati*, it was a widely held view that foreign affairs community is new and relatively inexperienced at least in the policy arena (Schneider 1974: 151).

ii) Distinct aspects of foreign policy decision making in Brazil

Supremacy of President-

President's principal role over foreign policy decision is directly an outcome of the strong president, having exclusive and final command over it, after consultation as and when required. At least this trend is valid in the period of consideration for study i.e. during 50s and 60s. The era of Vargas, Kubitschek, Quadros and Goulart, bear validity to the statement. Even this argument of Brazilian president having principal role was applicable in the post 1964 era. This was so because of military presidents in power. Military in general circumstances as well, 'dictated' and 'fixed limits' to foreign policy as centrality of *Itamarati* in foreign policy matters of Brazil was gradually eroding during military rule period (1964-1985). Like Presidents in pre-1964 period; military presidents also differed in their approach, some were more inclined than others to the problems at domestic level than an external one. The case of Castello Branco's regime bears relevance here. During Castelo's regime, he himself being more inclined to domestic issues primarily economic ones was not much concerned about the foreign policy. During his regime an environment of 'consensual' decision making developed as all the foreign policy dissidents were purged and supporter of independence movements in Portuguese colonies jailed (Schneider 1974: 58; Davila 2010; Location no.772, Kindle eBook). Roberto Oliveira Campos, a career diplomat as a foreign policy adviser also helped a lot. In this context, it is important to add here that, influence of presidential advisers also remained considerable in influencing Presidents' decision indirectly influencing foreign policy of Brazil. To add further, Jânio Quadros was fortunate to have Afonso Arinos as his adviser. However, with time foreign policy did not remain so simple with the complexity of issues rising, and more and more agencies/ ministries getting involved in the same decision making process, like for example finance ministry, military and other agencies getting involved in the issues over Portuguese territories.

Itamarati approach-

Brazilian officials generally took a 'common sense approach' to broad policy questions, retaining flexibility and avoiding any frozen positions on specific issues (Schneider 1974: 96). The appearance of foreign ministry's officials as ideological has largely given some sense of consistency to foreign policy (Schneider 1974: 96). Either by training at Rio Branco or by experience, foreign policy officials were aware of the limitations of Brazilian diplomacy, hence this understanding had given a traditional bent to Brazilian foreign policy (Schneider 1974: 96). In general terms, *Itamarati* officials did not enjoy much freedom of action but *Itamarati* had a major voice in narrow questions of diplomatic relations and international law, though ability to function in these areas was chiefly reactive (Schneider 1974: 101). It implies foreign ministry of Brazil did not take decision in advance and its decision evolved as in response to a particular event. Additional aspect deserving mention here is that, diplomats being distanced from their society and political leadership, had generally adopted a more 'militantly nationalist positions' than general public to defend their stands in the society (Davila 2010; Location no.146, Kindle eBook).

In the post-1964 era is when ideally foreign policy of Brazil was becoming more relevant, foreign service had relatively lost its importance, basically for the reason that, Brazil's expanding international role was 'keyed to economic goals than to diplomatic goals' (Schneider 1974: 95).

The military establishment-

The basic goals and limits of foreign policy were set in a fundamental sense by the military, but the very influence of military was made effective through President (Schneider 1974: 68). In normal situations though military did not veto, provided authority for guiding or revising the foreign policy decisions (Schneider 1974: 68). So barring situations of military considerations, foreign policies were carried out by

institutions having greater international legitimacy and acceptability (Schneider 1974: 68). This is not to say that, Brazilian Armed forces were submissive to government. In fact, differing factions did exist and hence due to complex organisation of Brazilian Armed forces, consensus was not always a norm (Schneider 1974: 68). This often led to serious consequences.

It is important to emphasise here that military's view of the world and that of *Itamarati's* were not one and the same (Schneider 1974: 69). The armed forces did set the tone and limits to foreign policy debates, still not having a specific position on policy questions (Schneider 1974:69). In reference to the present study, it is to be stressed that relations with Portugal had become a militarily sensitive issue (Selchar 1967: 120). The question of Angola raised several doubts in military circles over competence of Brazilian diplomacy, which eventually led Brazilian military to put some limit on the third world alignment and independent foreign policy in reference to the regions of Brazil's strategic arena (Schneider 1974: 74).

Almost around the same time, *Itamarati* had also understood that favouring the Afro-Asian countries would bring diplomatic gains, but it was an attempt that would annoy Brazilian military. This initiative was in reference to recognising the Soviet backed parties (Marxist-Leninist), as such parties successively won the elections in several Portuguese colonies for example in Mozambique or Angola, and Brazil abstained from recognising the same (Davila 2010; Location no.114, Kindle eBook). So this issue was also a major reason of friction between *Itamarati* and military circles.

It is now interesting to mention here that linkages between *Itamarati* and military was primarily due to family and social connections than a formal link between the two (Schneider 1974: 76). Though during military rule, setting up of National Security Council in 1968 institutionalised the role of military in Brazilian foreign policy. For the good in many sense Brazilian military was more concerned as its role as a moderator and

mediator for moderate- conservative stabilising influence and enforcing constitutional processes and not military rule per se (Palmer 1957: 192).¹⁰

Non-state actors-

The political parties were not significant factors in foreign policy and their role have been largely marginal if not non-existent (Rodrigues 1962: 336). Foreign policy being an executive responsibility, has kept political parties at bay and apart from that even if parties received a chance, their contribution remained marginal as their views on foreign policy issues have never been coherent (Schneider 1974: 137). It is also true that, though influence of political parties on foreign policy was minimal but exceptions did exist.

Press and academics-

The role of press has been rather indirect than direct due to absence of any institutional mechanism, but press has always felt a great obligation and responsibility to analyse the foreign policy of Brazil from time to time (Rodrigues 1962: 338). The strategy followed by Brazilian press during mid-20th century had been to smuggle the internal reports to foreign press and once it has been printed abroad, then to reprint it quoting the same (Schneider 1974: 138). This was often done, when press could not print something it wanted due to press censorship or otherwise, to save itself from the problems of expressing its opinion, and hence cited foreign newspapers. Some influence may be due to personal ties.

In reference to pro-Portuguese slant in Brazilian newspapers, it is to be noted that, the mainstream press in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro in particular was largely pro-Portugal, as

¹⁰ The argument drawn from a book published in 1957, i.e. before military rule in Brazil, does not mar its relevance, as it discusses the general temperament of Brazilian military, irrespective of the phase.

press in Brazil was largely owned by 'wealthy and influential' ethnic-Portuguese community (Davila 2010; Location no.552, Kindle eBook).

Influence of foreign press was also miniscule, but it sometimes determined specific factors for Brazil and the ideal way in which Brazil must conduct and 'operate' its foreign policy at the international level, but in any case public opinion did not account as an important determinant in foreign policy decision making (Schneider 1974: 139). Same thing applied on academicians as well, as they did not concern themselves with foreign policy issues so as to be taken seriously by the community which are involved in the decision making process (Schneider 1974: 140).

Ethnic Portuguese community-

The pressure from the highly wealthy and influential Portuguese community in the major cities of Brazil, namely São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro weighed considerably on the Brazilian Politics (Davila 2010; Location no.300, Kindle eBook). Their presence in electorally important constituencies largely added to such an influence. Portuguese community in Brazil due to their well organised structure, were better off as a pressure group in influencing political decisions and financed the election campaigns and managed press coverages during elections. In reference to the Portuguese ethnic group, Ronald Schneider was of belief that, the Portuguese community seemed 'divided' between for and against of Salazar's regime and other colonies that often solidified a generalised and vague conception of 'special ties' with Portugal. Given from this view, Brazil, to be more specific, *Itamarati* thought it would be beneficial to align with free Portuguese colonies of Africa and improve Brazil's standing in Afro- Asian world. As far as Portuguese people in Brazil are concerned, many of them who immigrated into Brazil in 1950s and 1960s or later were the ones who had escaped from the atrocities of Salazar or the one from one of the several Portuguese colonies hence were not supportive of Salazar, as compared to those who immigrated earlier.

Conclusion

The Chapter goes a long way in making the mid-20th century transition of Brazil familiar. It also throws a light on the complexities which Brazil was facing while balancing both its European allies and the Afro-Asian friends. Bringing out the serious weakness on the part of Brazilian foreign making process it emphasises the supremacy of President as well as limitations of foreign ministry and diplomats. The section on Brazil's mingling with non-alignment denotes the enthusiasm over 'independent foreign policy' in Brazilian politics coinciding with the Belgrade conference. The emphasis of discomfort over Belgrade conference despite huge interest as visible from the Brazil's preparation for the conference brings out a contradiction between what appears outside the foreign ministry and what actually took place inside. The Chapter also establishes the interference of the US in Brazilian foreign affairs as resembled by its interference over Brazil's participation in NAM Summit at Belgrade, on the issues directly or indirectly related to interests of the United States. In terms of influence, in most cases, centrality of President in decision making process was quite evident, during the period of study.

Not in terms of the space allotted as a section but as the very objective of the Chapter is to focus on Brazil's understanding of Afro-Asian region and former's policy on the issue of decolonisation. The Chapter largely brings out the rhetoric over the much emphasised 'Luso-Brazilian' community also highlighting the myth of sentimental ties between Brazil and Portugal. A point of utmost importance; the ambiguous understanding of Brazil on Afro-Asia comes out clear and hence the weakness of Brazil's Afro-Asian policy, not required to mention Asia did not matter much.

CHAPTER THREE

Brazilian Position On The
Question of Goa

CHAPTER III

BRAZILIAN POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF GOA

The previous Chapter of the dissertation has dealt with the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy through the 50s and 60s throwing light on the complexities of the era, under which the decolonisation process unfolded. The primary objective of Chapter Two, was to trace Brazilian foreign policy making in the said period and how Brazil actually saw the whole process of decolonisation, and decolonisation of Portuguese colonies in particular. The previous Chapter was basically directed to deduce the general understanding on the subject from the secondary literature available in the field. In the backdrop of Chapter Two, the present Chapter makes utilisation of the declassified documents of India's Ministry of External Affairs to ascertain: how the issue of Goa in particular and Brazilian understanding on the decolonisation process in general, unfolded. It is to be informed that, at least until late 1950s, even when Brazilian leaders did not explicitly referred to Goa in their statements; their statements on Portuguese colonies did reflect their position on Goa, as that was the only issue warm in Brazilian diplomatic circles and no armed revolt were witnessed in the Portuguese colonies of Africa. So, the issue of Goa unfolded in a period when it was the one and the only issue in reference to Portuguese colonies, in the period of 1950s.

The present Chapter traces the question of Goa in chronological terms with the required analysis and finally comparing the Brazilian position on Goa, with its position on the issue of Kashmir and Brazilian response to Chinese aggression on India to identify the constants, so as to build up a wholesome analysis of Brazilian precept about India, and Asia in general. The Chapter is broadly divided into five sections; first three section deals with the developments related to Goa in Brazil until 1961; fourth sections deals with the developments in post-1964 period and the last section i.e. fifth section basically compares official position of Brazil on Goa with that on Kashmir issue and the Chinese aggression on India.

I. Brazil's role as a Protector of Portuguese interests in India

As mentioned in the introductory part of the dissertation; limiting the 'case of Goa' to the year 1961 preempts the various aspects of this significant incident. In reality, the case of Goa neither started nor ended in 1961, but has at least one decade before and after the incident of relevance. In reference to the present study: an important aspect of the event around the case of Goa is Brazil's role as mediator between India and Portugal. The specific aspect of Brazil's involvement in South Asia in the field of academic research has various objectives; a) it denotes a specific period of India-Brazil relations which was marked by diplomatic tensions on both the sides; and b) it also denotes a specific phase of the Brazilian foreign policy towards decolonisation process that too, in the Asian continent.

Most scholars on India-Brazil relations limit the Goa question to the Brazil's official criticism of India's use of force by *Itamarati* and by Brazilian representative at United Nations. This approach limits the importance of Goa question in reference to several perspectives it can highlight (two of which has been mentioned above). The very objective of the present dissertation and the Chapter, is to move beyond the narrow approach followed till date by the academicians in the field.

Brazil's stand on the question of Goa has been an evolving one; the first phase is 1947-1960 followed by the second period i.e. 1961-1974. In 1974, Goa and Dadra and Nager Haveli were eventually recognised by the new government of Portugal to be an integral part of India and hence diplomatic relations were reinstated on 31 December, 1974. In 1974, once and for all ended the question of Goa for discussion either for Brazil or Portugal. This was almost 20 years after relations between India and Portugal were snapped in 1955, due to diplomatic tension over Goa and during the phase, Brazil took up

the task of protecting interests of Portugal in India, which is to be studied in the present Chapter.¹¹

Before India's independence, Brazil had only a consular representation in Calcutta. With India becoming independent in 1947, Brazilian diplomatic mission in India was elevated to the status of Embassy. In 1948, diplomatic relations between India and Brazil were established, but nothing much substantial took place during the early years of 1950s as far as diplomatic activity is concerned. However, the importance of Brazil-India relations became evident (as mentioned earlier), while India was negotiating with Portugal over the case of Goa. Brazil's request for setting up a Consulate at Bombay to protect Portugal's interests was accepted by the Indian government. Now the issue of Brazil taking up the role of protecting Portugal's interests is interesting, because Brazil's own diplomatic relation with Portugal were not so warm at that time¹². It was in this context, discussions were on: why did Brazil come to mediate in the first place? There were several discussions, whether Brazil came on its own to mediate the process or India asked Brazil for the same. There were also speculations that the US might have asked on behalf of Portugal to facilitate the peaceful resolution of dispute over Goa. Owing to the strong US' influence over Brazil at that time and strong aid that Brazil continued receiving from the United States, also gave a signal; Brazil's stand on Goa might have been a reflection of the American position on Goa. However, as opposed to the position of the US on African possessions of Portugal, Goa did not matter much to the US directly. In reference to Portuguese possessions in Africa, the US had interests as it maintained some military bases in the colonies that were under Portuguese control. A declassified document of the US government suggests that in 1961 National Security Action Memorandum in one of the correspondence suggested three countries that the US government should propose as mediator. Besides Vatican and Spain, Brazil was named (US, Unclassified Item no. PD00713). Such directives might have been issued long back, as the details on the

¹¹ Brazil's role as a protector of Portuguese interests in India predated snapping up of diplomatic relations between India and Portugal.

¹² Brazil having achieved its independence from Portugal way back in 1823, nothing much had existed beyond a normal trade.

complexity of Goa were already available with the US Government as (US, Unclassified Item no. HN00859) suggests.

Though official explanation over the suspicion did not become clear until *Itamarati* came out with an official clarification on January 5, 1956.¹³ The official note issued by *Itamarati* reads: “Brazil has never offered to India or Portugal its services as a mediator in the territorial dispute over Goa, Daman and Diu.” The official note clarifies further: “at Portugal’s request and with the consent of the Government of New Delhi, Brazil is in the charge of protecting Portuguese citizens in India.”

Despite the clarification by Brazilian Foreign Ministry, the ambiguity over selecting Brazil as a mediator leaves various doubts, to which the complexities of the period may have an answer. It was a period of Cold War contest; a phase which also challenged Portugal’s legitimacy to continue its hold over its colonies. Additionally, Portugal had weakened and was not strong enough to overwhelm India’s ambition. With India becoming more assertive on Goa, intention to take over Goa by force was reinforcing with time. It is to be reminded that none of the African colonies possessed such a military power to the magnitude India possessed and could use (to liberate), making Goa a more militarily sensitive issue as well. To measure up to this deficiency; Portugal for military support rallied around North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which was turned down out of embarrassment as NATO did not want itself to be seen and projected as defending colonialism (US, Unclassified Item no. HN00859)

Brazil was a power in its own right, by then with implicit goal and militarily as well it was better off than Portugal. Even more important, Brazil having served several terms as a non-permanent member at the United Nations Security Council, could prove to be more

¹³ Though it is to be emphasised here that the official clarification was in connection to the news reports circulating in the Indian newspapers: Brazil’s request to act as representative of Portugal has been rejected by Nehru. But, since this official communique also explains the point being raised above, so it has been mentioned here irrespective of the incident in whose response the clarification came.

than a friend in the time of crisis which Portugal was grappling with. In this context, it is added that, Brazil sponsored Portugal's membership to UN. It needs emphasis here: United Nations' role in the decolonisation process had become more evident with active involvement in several initiatives like the Committee of 24, and setting up of the UN Trusteeship Council. Apart from that numerous resolutions supporting self-determination of all non-governing colonies with the sympathy of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) had almost become a norm. Added to it, most of the European powers were willing to let their colonies attain independence as soon as possible.

Portugal viewed Brazil as an old friend that could protect Portuguese interests inside UN and also beyond that. It was in such an environment that *Treaty of Friendship and Consultation* culminated in 1953-1955 between Brazil and Portugal.¹⁴ In addition to trade it consisted clauses for military assistance in a time of need (though not explicitly mentioned). What clauses were mentioned in the treaty, remained away from the public information. Despite denial by Brazilian government it is to be mentioned that Portugal referred to this treaty in the case of Angola, raising suspicion to the point that whether the treaty also meant military assistance. The treaty was projected by both Brazil and Portugal to be an act of reviving old friendship and not otherwise. Though careful addition here would be that irrespective of how many times the emphasis of 'special relation' would have been made from Portuguese or Brazilian side, such arguments have been countered to the highest possible extent.

In a related context, similar treaties were signed before 1953 as well, but non-ratification of such treaties, give an indication; the treaty signing process was mere an act of quorum to satisfy a select elite class. In reference to a cultural treaty between Brazil and Britain

¹⁴ Researcher is aware that the Treaty was signed in 1953, however, great deal of confusion exists regarding the actual year in which the Treaty was ratified and came to effect, as most of the secondary literature on the subject mention differing periods for the same. Even the Political dispatches received from Indian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro fails to clear the doubt. Though first mention of the Treaty was made in the Annual Report of 1953 from E/I, Rio de Janeiro, as far as declassified documents of MEA are concerned.

signed in 1950, Annual Political Reports for 1949 made the following comments as a contrast: “Brazilian Government had concluded cultural agreements with France and Portugal in December, 1946, which have not as yet been ratified by the Congress.” The reason for non-ratification of the treaty, however, is not known.

II. Developments during 1953-54

Now coming directly to case of Goa; requires a brief description of the events of 1953-1954 in reference to Goa. In a brief period of 1953-1956, many significant events took place namely – (a) signing of Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, (b) expulsion of Jimmy Heredia, and finally (c) the closure of Brazilian consulate at Bombay.

(i) Brazilian Consulate in Bombay

The Brazilian Consulate was opened in Bombay by Brazil in response to the increased task it was handling while protecting Portugal’s interest in India. It continued to perform its task with whatever little resources it had. It was headed by Brazilian Consul, Jimmy Heredia, who was of Goan origin and was Indian by nationality. It was in 1954 that Heredia at a private meeting at his residence (which was also his office) raised the issue of the freedom of Goa from Portuguese rule to his Goan friends. This issue flared up, and on this issue, the discussion did not go well eventually with the Brazilian government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil, pulled him and Mr. Heredia resigned. Though official statement issued by *Itamarati* reported that Heredia has not resigned in fact, Brazilian government did not accept his resignation but expelled him from his position. The expulsion, official statement says, was in reaction to Heredia holding a political discussion at his official residence, which was a violation as per Brazilian law. Even Brazilian public opinion, as visible from the Brazilian press, suggested that the action by Brazilian government was justified as Heredia was serving as a representative of Brazilian government in India and that his actions did not reflect the same. It is important to mention in this context that Heredia had been a Brazilian Consul since 1933 and this single incident led to his expulsion. It is important to mention in this regard that official

communique issued by *Itamarati* declared this incident to be the ‘first victory’ for Portugal in the Asian continent.

Here it is important to bring in contrast the words in the two dispatches from Indian Embassy in Rio de Janeiro; one before the Heredia’s incident and one after it, as to how the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation might have influenced the events.

Annual Report on Brazil from Indian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro (henceforth referred as Annual Report) for 1953 mentioned: “Brazil’s new treaty with Portugal promising to consult with each other on all matters affecting the interests of each other, may not have implications other than purely sentimental, as both countries are close to each other already.” It looks as if this information by Indian Embassy has been ascertained from the reports appearing in Brazilian newspapers, as there are no political explanation of this ‘closeness’ mentioned in the political dispatch. On this Treaty, newspapers exhibited much enthusiasm. In reference to the treaty, and its relation with the case of Goa, the Annual Report for 1953 mentioned: “The question of Goa is there, but apart from offering her services as mediator, there is little that Brazil could do or can be expected to do. The Government would not touch the question seriously as public opinion, biased, prejudiced and ill-informed at the best of times, is wholly for Portugal. All our efforts to change this unfortunate state of affairs have met with little success so far.”

The Heredia’s affair changed the previous perception of Indian Embassy in Rio de Janeiro as is visible from the words in the dispatch after the incident. Monthly Political Report for April, 1954 reads: “The effect of the recent Portugal- Brazil Treaty of friendship is becoming very evident in Brazil’s one sided support of Portuguese interests in Goa.” The report added “Our protest might make some difference, but there is no indication so far.”

The importance of Heredia's incident can be judged from the fact that it was the first incident in the history of India- Brazil relations that brought both Indian Ministry of External Affairs and *Itamarati* in direct confrontation over the Goa question.

The way the *Itamarati* dealt the Heredia issue also throws some light on their posture and complexities vis-à-vis the Goa question. Despite, J. Sen Mandi, Indian ambassador to Brazil having explained the Indian position to Brazilian government, was of no use. The Political Report for May, 1954 reads: "In spite of the ambassador himself having explained the situation to *Itamarati*, our position was not much appreciated." The day to day events that went in between Brazil and Portugal are also important to mention here. The dispatch informed: "The Foreign minister of Portugal took the opportunity of sending a congratulatory telegram to the Foreign minister here thanking Brazil for the support in their dispute with us." The report further added: "Recently Goan Association has been formed in Rio and a delegation of that association also waited on the Foreign minister and congratulated him on similar lines as expressed above."

The Political Report of May, 1954 also laid reasons that might have given an ugly turn to the incident. The first one is; "the premature issuing of statement by Mr. Heredia in Bombay papers prior to the finalisation of orders on his resignation weighed considerably with the authorities here in not in accepting his resignation." The report further reads: "Coupled with this was the statement from Brazilian Embassy in Delhi saying that Brazil was neutral in the dispute between Portugal and India." Second reason in the opinion of Indian ambassador is also mentioned in the dispatch which said: "I think, however that some of the people here had lurking feeling that Brazilian ambassador in New Delhi, Sr. Ildelfonso Falcão did not handle the matter as tactfully as it might have been handled; otherwise it should have been possible to avoid the matter assuming the importance which it did." The dispatch also explained about the response of officials at Brazilian Ministry of External Relations on the explanation made by Indian Embassy in Brazil. The report reads: "The opinion generally in the Ministry of External Relations was that while the feelings of Mr. Heredia as an Indian could perhaps be understood in the context of the dispute, he should not have those feelings to compromise the position of Brazil by

violating, according to them, the administrative rules and regulations governing his appointment by holding meetings in the premises of the consulate which was of course his house.”

In August, 1954, the peaceful march of nationalist Goans to Dadra and Nager Haveli took place, which attracted widespread criticism in Brazil and Portugal. Inside Brazil, domestic crisis in relation to chances of impeachment of Getúlio Vargas, had taken an ugly turn. In August, Indian ambassador to Brazil, J.Sen Mandi paid visits to several states in the northern and central Brazil whose accounts were also mentioned in the regular dispatches received from Indian embassy in Rio de Janeiro. Monthly Political Report for August made mention of the visit which was two weeks long from 7 August to 20 August. Mandi mentioned: “All the usual facilities were extended to us by the respective Governments and in spite of the Brazilian feeling on the question of Goa, those whom we came in contact with at least did not show that there were any ill-feelings regarding the matter in their minds, no matter what they felt inwardly. It may be noted that at least in the capital of the state Bahia (i.e. Salvador) some of the papers reported, an interview which they had with me in general matters regarding Goa.”

The very next month i.e. in September, Dr. Paulo Cunha, Foreign minister of Portugal, who had postponed his visit to Brazil, in response to events unfolding in Goa eventually arrived in Brazil. The Monthly Political Report for September, 1954 mentioned: “The Foreign minister of Portugal, Dr. Paulo Cunha was given a rousing reception when he arrived and was feted out both by the governments and the people.” It is important to pay attention to fact that government of Brazil was equally involved in the ‘rousing reception’ accorded to Dr. Cunha. For obvious reasons Dr. Cunha ‘harped’ on the Goa issue pointing out the march of nationalist Goans as an act of ‘aggression’.

Another important incident in 1954, was the visit of S. Radhakrishnan, the Vice-President of India, to Brazil for attending UNESCO conference at São Paulo. He initially arrived in Rio de Janeiro on 5 November where he met the Brazilian President and the

Foreign minister. He also visited the Congress and Press Association in Brazil. The Political Report for November, 1954 reads: “Whatever the inner feelings of the Brazilians, worked up by the Portuguese embassy, may be or may have been towards India vis-à-vis the Goa issue, on which they are openly in favour of Portugal for obvious reasons, the speeches made at the Senate were all praise and appeared to be sincere, couple of course with platitudes.” On the question of Goa; Radhakrishnan wished the peaceful solution to dispute over Goa and praised Brazil’s participation in issues of international importance at United Nations. In the very same Month, first Indian Press delegation¹⁵ visited to Brazil, which is being dealt in Chapter Four of the dissertation.

Perhaps the Heredia’s episode and the following events were the first stance, when Brazil which was seen to be a ‘friend’ of India, showed its rigidness towards the question of Goa and the process of decolonisation in respect to Portuguese possessions in India. In 1954, after the Heredia’s episode Brazil decided to close its Consulate at Bombay.

(ii) Presidents and their statements

Official positions of a country in general are spelled out by the Presidents, the Foreign ministers, the diplomats and their Foreign Ministry. In context of the foreign policy issues in Brazil, centrality of President has been discussed in the previous Chapter. In reference to the specific aspect two statements; one by Getúlio Vargas in 1953 and another by Café Filho in 1955 deserve mention.

a) Vargas on Colonialism

On the eve of “Columbus day” i.e. 12 October in 1953, Getúlio Vargas delivered a speech at Spanish Embassy in Rio de Janeiro. The Political Report on Brazil for 1953

¹⁵ The word “delegation” should not be misinterpreted as an Official Delegation, visiting at Brazilian government’s request. The three journalists that visited Brazil, were actually participants of World Congress of Press Entities, which was held in São Paulo.

from Indian embassy in Brazil mentioned: “Vargas suddenly slashed out at ‘colonialism on American continent’ referring obviously (though later denied) to Guiana situation which had exploded just then.” The report further added that: “Though beyond this speech and a possible talk with the British ambassador, little was done by Brazil in the way of follow-up, and neither there is any intention of doing much.”

This incident has been mentioned here so as to deal case by case how successive Presidents of Brazil saw the question of Goa, if at all they did.

The importance of the statement by Vargas mentioned above can be ascertained in the events that followed. The statement by Vargas refers to the ‘threat from communism’ to Guiana (British Guiana). On speech act of the Brazilian President, the Indian Embassy positions the view of Vargas regime in reference to Goa. The dispatch said: “It is important to note however that the emphasis was on colonialism in the ‘American’ continent. One is left with the feeling that perhaps they think it is not such a bad thing if it exists elsewhere! How far this ‘anti-colonialism’ of Brazil will influence her view on Goa question has yet to be seen for Governmental opinion here, in the marked contrast to that of the press, is remarkably reticent and it is no easy matter to get it out of the Foreign Office.”

This issue was raised with greater enthusiasm in Pan American Conference held in January, 1954 in Caracas. The importance of the conference for Brazil can be adjudged from the fact that Foreign minister, Dr. Vicente Rao himself headed the Brazilian delegation to the conference. Before leaving for the Caracas, Foreign minister Rao had informed that, apart from social, political and economic questions, the question pertaining to existence of foreign colonies in South America would also be raised at the conference. The Monthly Political Report for January, 1954 mentioned: “The government appears to have taken up the matter seriously only after the epoch making speech of President Vargas in the Spanish embassy on the Centenary Day of Columbus. In other words it meant that South American countries would press Britain, France and

Holland, particularly Britain which will be hard nut to crack, to grant independence to these three areas as soon as possible.” The general belief that can be ascertained from the dispatches from Indian embassy is that, anti-colonialism of Brazil should not be limited to South American continent alone and they must equally stand against the Portuguese colonialism in Goa.

At the Pan American Conference in Caracas, two resolutions; one against spread of communism in the Southern hemisphere and another against the foreign colonies was passed. On the issue Argentina and Mexico abstained, and Guatemala voted against the resolutions. Though it is required to mention here – Brazil’s support to colonial issue was not unanimously entertained by *Itamarati* and political establishments. The Monthly Political Report for March, 1954 on this issue mentioned: “Senator Chateaubriand accused the Foreign minister, Prof. Vicente Rao, of having carried out a mandate, mainly on behalf of the President, for which *Itamarati* could not be held responsible, as according to Senator they were not in favour.” The dispatch from Indian embassy cleared any possibility of involvement of the United States but mentioned: may be Senator even did not want to ‘antagonise’ Britain. The dispatch also quoted a statement by Chateaubriand that, “Brazil appears to have forgotten that it was the British navy which saved Brazil twice.”

The basic purpose of explaining the whole episode here is to throw a light on the narrow view of Brazil on colonialism and the extensive influence of President on foreign policy matters as well as the existence of friction among different establishments and actors in Brazil on foreign policy matters. The primary reason; Brazil’s opinion on colonialism remained narrow is owing to the fact that Brazil remained more concerned championing moral causes in the Latin American region, where it wanted to emerge as a leader.

b) Filho's visit to Lisbon

Not very far from all these events was the visit of President Café Filho to Lisbon. Café Filho a journalist by profession, who after the suicide of Getúlio Vargas was elected as the next President of Brazil. While on a state visit to Lisbon he gave a statement that created noise elsewhere, i.e. his support to stand by Portugal anywhere in the world. Political Report for April, 1955 inferred from the statement – “What it actually means is rather difficult to say but knowing the policy and views of Brazil regarding our position in Goa, it can be safely assumed that the support of Brazil i.e. so far as Portugal is concerned, it is not likely to be anything than a moral based on sentiment.” The dispatch from Indian embassy directed upcoming elections in Brazil also to be one of the reason. This implied – the whole intention was to satisfy the ‘pro-Portuguese elements’ in Brazil. The monthly report also added: “Besides so long as the foreign office is headed by the present Chief (whose views on such matters are somewhat behind the times) such statements on behalf of the government are to be expected and we must not attach too much importance to them.” Similar arguments were also laid in the Monthly Report for May, 1955. The Report reads: “Even in other matters, for instance the case of Portuguese territories in India, Minister Raul Fernandes, I understand is very much out of tune with the events of today though he is an experienced statesman, and naturally those in *Itamarati* who may be inclined to be more realistic and favour a progressive and enlightened policy find themselves coming up against an ancient rock.” In reference to the President's influence over foreign policy the report adds: “...under the system which exists here if President wanted to do anything different and felt that he had public support he could, I think cross or bypass this ancient hurdle.” This point goes further in strengthening the argument pertaining President's exclusive role over Brazilian foreign policy.

Another point deserving mention here is that, in the same period, Brazil sponsored the UN membership to Portugal.

iii) Issue of decolonisation and the Goa question under Kubitschek regime

Juscelino Kubitschek's regime has been classified by many scholars of Brazilian studies to be the one, most attached to Portuguese nostalgia and having presented the most evidences in favour of Portugal's colonial policies. It may either be related to the ratification (renewal?) of Treaty of Friendship and Consultation with Portugal or the establishment of 'rhetorical' Luso-Brazilian community or voting against the resolution introduced in United Nations Trusteeship Council in 1960 requiring Portugal to furnish the information about all the Portuguese colonies.

Numerous evidences support Kubitschek following the Salazar's directives. Such instances became quite evident in the year 1960, which marked the end of Presidential term of Juscelino Kubitschek. As a contrast, 1960 was also the year when demand for 'independent' foreign policy was the highest and it was also a phase when Kubitschek's colonial postures suffered widespread criticism from the Brazilian public and the Press. This was primarily due to the rise of 'heightened nationalism' in Brazilian politics.

In January, 1960 Brazilian government banned a conference in São Paulo called by the sponsors from all over Latin America with the objective of demanding amnesty for all the political prisoners in Portugal and Spain. Press reports like the one in *Correio da Manhã* – suggested that such actions reflected Salazar's directives to Brazilian government. This action was criticised heavily in Brazilian Press. The Political Report for January, 1960 reported: "Presumably, in view of these protests and representations by Sr. Álvaro Lins, Brazil's former ambassador in Lisbon, the Government revoked its decision and allowed the conference to be held."

In Kubitschek's term, Treaty of Friendship and Consultation signed between Brazil and Portugal in 1953, was renewed despite criticism from all the quarters – be it the Press, public or even Brazilian government officials.

The Political Report for July, 1960 mentioned about the Kubitschek's visit to Portugal, in a detailed manner. The report mentioned: "Inaugurating the monument to Prince Henry the Navigator, the President declared "Brazil to be the legitimate child of the era of Portuguese explorers which will be Portuguese so long as Brazil is Brazil." The report added: "The occasion was taken to sign in Lisbon the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation between two countries. Also a declaration that there is a perfect identity of views between them in regard to the international situation. The Treaty provides for double nationality, diplomatic and consular representation, tourism, passports, extradition and cooperation in criminal jurisdiction. Briefly it aims at establishing equality of rights for Brazilian residents in Portugal and of Portuguese residents in Brazil."

Apart from criticisms by the Brazilian Press, criticism also did come from the circles of Brazilian government officials. The dispatch from Indian Embassy reads: "The reception accorded to the Treaty in Brazil has been far from enthusiastic. The President of the Tribunal of Justice of Guanabara (the old Federal city of Rio) says that the Treaty as regards extradition is unconstitutional and contrary to democratic principles. It provides for extradition of foreigners for political crimes which the Brazilian constitution specially prohibits." This presents enough evidence that the Treaty was not only 'rhetorical' way of supporting Portugal's colonial policies but also had little regards to the principle of sovereignty of Brazil.

The Political dispatch mentioned: "On leaving Lisbon, the President Kubitschek sent a message of fraternal greetings to the Portuguese overseas. He named all the Portuguese colonies including Angola, Mozambique and Goa and even little Macau. He said that they were true outposts of Portuguese civilization in the East." The dispatch also mentioned that these statements basically reflected the 'spur of the moment' and much importance should not be attached to same. It is to be noted that such vocal and explicit statements from Brazilian Presidents and diplomats were only visible while on visit to Portugal. Such instances are visible all through the period of decolonisation; it seems Brazilian leaders had gathered extensive expertise in showing different faces at different places.

iv) Rise of Quadros

As discussed in the Chapter Two, Quadros' focus on Africa preempted any attention on the part of Brazilian Foreign Ministry towards Asia, though in reference to India several events retained India's importance in Brazilian diplomatic circles, primarily due the issue of Goa. While Quadros was the President of Brazil, S.K. Patil, Food and Agricultural minister of India visited Brazil in June, 1961 and was received by Jânio Quadros. What is more important in context of the present study is the issue of Goa. Political report of June, 1961 mentioned an important revelation by Jânio Quadros to S.K. Patil in relation to Goa. The report mentioned: "...the President disclosed that two months back he had given Portuguese government clearly to understand that they could no longer rely on the support of Brazil in the conduct of their colonial policy." It represents in fact a good sign from the side of Brazil before two major events that were about to take place one of which remained unknown i.e. Indian military action on Goa. The events which was known and in relation to which Brazil was enthusiastic enough was the NAM conference to be held in Belgrade in August, 1961. However, it is to be noted that liberation of Goa did not take during Quadros' term.

III. Indian Military Action in Goa

Now the most important incident which denotes an important aspect in India-Brazil relations, i.e. Indian military action to liberate Goa. It deserves mention here that, Brazilian government criticised the Indian action on Goa, in harshest terms. Most academicians¹⁶ cite the official criticism by Brazilian Foreign Ministry as the Brazilian position on the Goa question. It requires a mention here that Brazilian Foreign Ministry was not the first one to criticise the Indian action on Goa and of course not the only one from official circles. The Monthly Political report for December, 1961 mentioned: "The Brazilian government's first statement was made through their ambassador in Lisbon."

¹⁶ The statement refers to contemporary academicians like Monica Hirst and Oliver Stuenkel, who in their articles on India-Brazil relations, distinctly points out only one aspect in reference to Goa, i.e. Brazil's criticism of India's use of force to liberate Goa.

The Report also mentioned the actual statement: “Having taken note with greatest concern of reports which have been circulating regarding possibility of military action against Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, Brazil reaffirms her formal rejection of employment of armed force and expresses its confidence that Indian Union will abstain from any measures contrary to the provisions of the Charter of United Nations.”

The Brazilian ambassador to Lisbon also laid stress on the “Treaty of Friendship and Consultation” in reference to Goa question. The ambassador said: “Brazilian government with principles which form the basis of Treaty of Friendship and Consultation between Portugal and Brazil, continues to follow events with greater attention, ready to offer its full cooperation so that peaceful means of solution of dispute, traditionally upheld by most illustrious leaders of Indian Union, are applied to present differences with Portugal.”

The ‘second statement’, as the dispatch by Indian Embassy suggests, was by the Brazilian Foreign minister, Santhiago Dantas. It appears that Brazilian ambassador in Lisbon had already set the tone of Brazilian posture towards the prospective statements and that statement by Foreign minister of Brazil on behalf of Brazilian Foreign ministry was only a kind of follow-up of what Brazilian ambassador at Lisbon said. The monthly report mentioned the statement by Dantas: “Reports that armed forces of the Indian Union have supported war operations against Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman and Diu have painfully surprised the people and the Government of Brazil.” Relation between the Brazilian ambassador and the statement by *Itamarati* is established by the next few lines of the statement by Dantas. He said: “Recently Brazil’s ambassador in Lisbon had publicly expressed the Brazilian Government’s apprehensions in regard to military preparations being made in the Indian Union and reaffirmed our faith that principles of peaceful solution of disputes should prevail. These hopes have been dissipated by events the Brazilian people share in the feeling of the Portuguese people in face of these grave events which amount to a flagrant violation of the Charter of United Nations.” This instance is also resemblance of the legalistic bias of the Brazilian foreign policy which

has been dealt in the previous Chapter in a detailed manner. It would also be a worthy mention that Foreign minister San Thiago Dantas was an eminent jurist of Brazil having also worked at UN representing Brazil.

In the previous Chapter as well in the present Chapter, the posture of Juscelino Kubitschek has been categorised to be more on the side of Portugal. Now his stand on issue of Goa also became clear after Indian action on Goa. The Political Report for December, 1961 mentioned: “At a public meeting to manifest Luso-Brazilian solidarity, ex-President Kubitschek took a leading part in condemning India.” His actual statement included “seventy millions Brazilians could never understand nor accept an act of violence against Goa.”¹⁷ In the book, *Hotel Tropico*, Jerry Davila has interpreted the statement, as a warning to Nehru.

At the United Nations as well, Brazilian representative Afonso Arinos, protested against the Indian military action on Goa. The Monthly Political Report for January, 1962 informed: “Arinos went on to explain that in the matter of Goa, Brazil had demonstrated its impartiality and objectivity as in that case the action taken by India had been contrary to the Charter.”

Despite such criticism some bold steps were taken by Brazil and the Annual Political report for 1962, makes a mention of such a step. The dispatch informed: “In the United Nations, Brazil maintained an anti-colonial attitude. In the debate on Angola, the Brazilian representative, Sr. Afonso Arinos, took the bold step of recommending to Salazar the policy of self-determination for colonial possessions.” This denoted a positive shift on the part of Brazil; having a history of being Pro-Portuguese country to the extent of even justifying Portugal’s colonial policies by citing Portuguese constitution as the most authoritative source, at United Nations. Notably, US also voted in favour of the Resolution 1742, which was in reference to Angola's right to self-determination.

¹⁷Cited in *Hotel Tropico*, by Jerry Davila, an official document of Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PROC 922 PAA 283

In this tense phase an important revelation is made by File no. WII/407/6/71 (Secret) titled “Issue of permanent visa for staying in India to Mr. José Leal Ferreira” which though a case of 1971, some important references have been made to the incident of 1961 as well. Ferreira earlier worked as Charge d’ Affaires at Brazilian Embassy at Delhi, but after he was ‘pensioned off’ by the Brazilian Government, he made a request for long term visa to MEA. The File basically contains a recommendation made to Ministry of Home Affairs and Intelligence Bureau of India to give clearance in the case. In a note by Director of External Publicity (MEA), S.K. Singh mentioned some important aspects of Ferreira and his relation with India’s liberation of Goa from Portuguese rule. Singh wrote: “He is at present the Foreign Correspondent for South Asia of the well known Brazilian paper *O Estado da São Paulo* from São Paulo, Brazil. He was of immense help to us immediately after re-unification of Goa with India in 1961. It was his on-the-spot report which prevented a number of Latin American countries and Western countries from taking a point of view which from the public relations angle would have hurt our interest. I have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Leal Ferreira has been a friend of India.”

IV. Brazilian position on decolonisation process under military regime

For the reasons discussed in Chapter Two; the ever rising discontent and disenchantment with Quadro- Goulart led ‘independent’ foreign policy, had prepared a perfect ground for Brazilian military to step-in. Military regime (1964-1985) in Brazil did continue the policy of supporting anti-colonialism and self-determination as far as declaratory statements at all major platforms are concerned. The major platforms comprise – Presidential messages to the Congress or Presidential message to the country and speeches by Brazilian representative at UN debates.

After the coup of 1964, Marshall Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco became the new President of Brazil. His speech on foreign policy entitled “Foreign Policy of the Brazilian Revolution” had set the tone of how Brazilian foreign policy would go reverse in many aspects. Some of the sections of his foreign policy laid down the trajectory of Brazilian

foreign policy in the days to come. The points that deserve attention and mention, in relation to the subject here are as follows:

- a) 'conventional neutralism' is a policy foreign to Brazil's genius
- b) Anti-colonialism is one of the guarantees for the maintenance of our own national power since it ensures that no power may interfere in the internal affairs of another country.
- c) However, our anti-colonialism policy is complicated by the friendly and political bonds which unite us to Portugal.

In reference to the speech, a dispatch entitled "Brazil-General Correspondence" by Indian Embassy was sent that contained the full copy of the speech with the analysis to MEA. The Indian ambassador to Brazil, B.K. Acharya wrote: "The statement will also indicate that the interest of the present government in Afro-Asia or non-aligned countries is not very great. In fact in paragraph 3 of the statement President Branco has roundly criticised "neutralism" and has stated categorically that "conventional neutralism" is a policy foreign to Brazil's genius. B.K. Acharya adds: "In the last paragraph, (paragraph 7) of his statement, where the President expounded Brazil's foreign relations with different groups of states, you will find that relations with Afro-Asian countries have been put at the very end."

File no. 101(7) WII/64-(Secret), titled "Special Political Report from Embassy of India, Rio de Janeiro" also makes a mention of his speech. The dispatch stated: "...in the inaugural speech of the President on April the 15th. The President said: "The independence of Brazil will constitute the basic postulate of our international policy. All friendly country may count on the loyalty of the Brazilians who will honour past treaties and agreements. All the democratic and free nations will be our allies as also all peoples who wish to be free by democratic means may count on the support of Brazil for their self-determination." The dispatch is based on the communique released by *Itamarati* commented: "Goulart's external policy would be partly reversed, at least to the extent that Brazil will be a close supporter of the US in hemispheric matters."

Some important things also took place in reference to Brazil-Portugal relations. File no. W-II/101(18)/66(P) (Secret), titled, “Annual Political Report on Brazil, Venezuela and Bolivia for the year 1965” mentioned about the same. The reports said: “Some tentative moves were made by Portugal to establish closer relations with Brazil. The Foreign Minister of Portugal stated that Portugal had proposed the creation of Brazilian free ports in Portuguese territories and the extension of the present Brazil-Portugal Friendship Treaty.” On the statements made by the Portuguese foreign minister, the dispatch wrote: “He revealed that Portugal had proposed the extension of 1960 Treaty to cover all Brazilian and Portuguese territories and discussed the evolution of a common external policy to “guarantee and defend our common territorial, cultural and moral interests.” He added that though he could not vouch for the Government of Brazil, the impression that he gained during his recent visit to Brazil was that his views were shared by the Brazilian leaders. “We place no limit on our collaboration with Brazil”, he said. In his opinion Brazil had recently been taking a more active role to support Portugal against attacks in specialised meetings of international organisations.”

In reference to the Goa issue, two important events took place, namely

- a) Returning of a note delivered by Brazilian Embassy, New Delhi wherein Portuguese government had made accusations on Indian government
- b) Visit of Brazilian Parliamentary delegation to India

a) Return of a note delivered by Brazilian Embassy, New Delhi

In November, 1964, Portuguese Government sent a letter via Brazilian Embassy in New Delhi accusing Indian Government of several charges. File no. 117(1)-WII/64, “Return of a note concerning Goa handed by the Brazilian Embassy in New Delhi” makes a mention of those charges, which says: “The Portuguese government quotes: denial of recognition of Portuguese passports by Indian authorities; refusal to issue exit visas to the

holders of Portuguese passports born in Goa, Daman and Diu and re-entry visas to those who had left; and confiscation of property of persons living (Portuguese persons) in India or abroad or those who refused to adopt Indian nationality.” This note was returned back to Charges d’ Affaires of Brazilian Embassy José Leal Ferreira, an act which was made a huge issue by the Portuguese Government. The Portuguese Government classified this act as ‘grave discourtesy to the Brazilian Representative in India’. In reference to the issue, MEA consulted the Legal and Treaties Division which informed that, ‘third state’ cannot in anyway claim equal status and that note may be returned if Indian Government did not agree to it. Moreover as inferred from the dispatches – charges were serious and as claimed by Indian Government, baseless so Indian Government was not bound to accept such a slanderous letter. Legal and Treaties Division cited several such instances wherein returning of notes unacceptable to the recipient, is followed internationally. The dispatch also mentions that, the third state (i.e. Brazil) must have used its discretion and moderation in handling such a delicate issue. For resolving the issue, V.H. Coelho, Indian ambassador to Brazil met Acting Secretary General of *Itamarati*, Ambassador Arnaldo Vasconcellos. A Letter dated 22.12.1964 mentioned about the meeting in which Vasconcellos made the following points:

- i) The return of a Brazilian note to Brazilian Charges d’ Affaires in New Delhi is interpreted by the *Itamarati* as grave discourtesy to the Brazilian Representative in India;
- ii) Brazil is an intermediary in this matter of the protection of Portuguese interests in India, a position which has been accepted by the Indian Government and if Brazilian Notes are to be returned by the MEA, it implies that Brazil’s role served no purpose, and
- iii) Brazil was not concerned with the substance of a Note nor could it, as an intermediary, refuse of its own accord to present a Note sent to it by the Government of Portugal.

Paulo Coelho in the Letter wrote: "Ambassador Vasconcellos suggested that, to set the matter right, we might take the initiative of accepting the Note either here or in New Delhi, while, at the same time, rejecting it in writing on the grounds that had been advanced to Charges d' Affaires, a rejection which they would convey to the Portuguese Government." V. H. Coelho also mentioned that he tried his best to convince Vasconcellos that this action did not intend to disrespect Brazilian Charges d' Affaires. Coelho said: "I assured Secretary General, that there could be nothing farther from our thought than to be in anyway discourteous to Brazilian Charges d' Affaires." Coelho further added, "I also argued with him that the Note was obviously for no purpose other than propagandist or purely of nuisance value, especially as the basis of the Note had been made known two weeks or so earlier in official statement" i.e. through Press. However, Coelho had one doubt pertaining to the reason; Brazilian Embassy still went ahead with forwarding the Note despite knowing its slanderous nature. The point which expresses his agreement with what Vasconcellos said on the question has been mentioned by Coelho. He wrote: "There seems to be some force in the point that a protecting power cannot or should not pre-judge the substance of a Note which they are asked to present. This seems, however, a matter of international law and its practice and I should, therefore be grateful to be informed of the reply I should give to *Itamarati*." The reply to the Letter was made by B.K. Sanyal, Director (West), MEA in a letter dated 29.12.1964. Sanyal clarified that the suggestion by Vasconcellos is unacceptable 'considering the abusive language' used. Some important things become clearer in the Letter regarding the whole episode. Sanyal wrote: "The Brazilian Embassy here are well informed and for your personal information, I would like you to know that Brazilian Charges d' Affaires was quite apologetic when I returned the note to him (10 days after it was received by Hardev Bhalla) and privately explained to me that he had tried his best to persuade his Government not to insist on his handing over such a note as this is likely to cause offence to the Government of India." B.K. Sanyal suggested V.H. Coelho to put this matter to rest. He further added that, since public opinion in India is wholly against Portugal, so even if toned down message is delivered to Indian Government, the act of accepting such a letter would not be acceptable in public.

In a subsequent conversation with Vasconcellos, Indian ambassador V.H. Coelho raised the issue of the “Movement for the Liberation of Goa” in Brazil. In a letter dated 5.4.1965, Coelho wrote that, he mentioned about “latest pamphlet on the shrine of St. Francis Xavier, which I handed to Ambassador Vasconcellos suggesting that Brazilian government might consider action to stop such undesirable activities directed against India.” Coelho was assured by Vasconcellos that he would consult authorities for the same. In the Letter, Coelho also mentions that he was asked by Vasconcellos regarding the suggestion made in reference to the Note, i.e. accept the Note and reject in writing. The reason pointed out by Vasconcellos was that, when he meets Portuguese authorities regarding India’s request for release of Indian prisoner Mohan Laxman Ranade in Portugal, he would also be asked regarding the proceedings in the issue of Note.

b) Visit of Brazilian Parliamentary delegation to India

In a letter dated 31.07.1964, Indian ambassador to Brazil, V.H. Coelho had sent a suggestion for MEA to invite Brazilian Parliamentarians to India for better understanding of India’s democratic set-up. A remarkable point made by Coelho is that, “I should also add that despite the change in the government Parliament continues to function, by and large, in a democratic manner.” This statement is relevant here as the phase denoted military dictatorship in Brazil.

Thirty one member delegations which also included their spouses and children as well as Under Secretaries of Parliamentarians arrived on 27 December, 1964. In reference to the dissertation, their views on Goa dispute bears relevance as they were Parliamentarians. Some dispatches also suggest that, V.H. Coelho was clearly instructed by MEA, to pay attention to the statements of the Brazilian delegation members on their visit to India, more specifically on Goa issue. In this reference, a letter dated 17.02.1965, mentions about the conversation of Coelho with Senator Camillo Nogueira da Gama, who had headed the Delegation to India. Coelho in the letter mentioned: “Speaking on Goa, Senator Gama said that the action India had taken was the only possible one as both he

and the other members of the delegation clearly saw that the entire population, with the exception of a very small number, were Indian in all respects. He added that, unlike Brazil where the Portuguese had adopted a different colonising policy, Goa had evidently been ‘neglected’ by them.” Coelho further added from the conversation: “In passing he mentioned that one or two people whom the delegation met, who evidently belonged to the small minority influenced by the Portuguese culture, did not seem altogether happy with the merger, but he did not attach any importance to them.”

Another statement was by Senator Afonso Arinos at the airport addressing the Brazilian press. It is important to make a reference to the point that Arinos was the UN Representative of Brazil when Indian military action in Goa had taken place. Afonso Arinos was the one, who as a Brazilian Representative protested at UN, against India’s military action on Goa. He was also adviser to President Quadros.

At the Galeao airport, he made a reference to Goa. File no. 121(30)/W-II/64, mentioned: “‘In Goa’, said the Senator, I found, in certain ways a Brazilian atmosphere. The deep roots left by the Portuguese colonisers in culture, architecture and in other fields remind us of aspects of our own country.” From the statements mentioned above, it is, in fact difficult to interpret what he intended to say, but one thing is clear that, he was very much in Portuguese nostalgia while making such statements.

i) **Position on Decolonisation in successive military periods**

Post- Branco era, Costa e Silva took over as the next President of Brazil. In his foreign policy address he affirmed his stand in support of ‘liquidation of colonialism’ which was appreciated by everyone in general. The mention of this statement was made in the letter dated 27 April, 1967 in the file entitled “Special Political Dispatches from Embassy of India, Rio de Janeiro” sent to MEA.

However, the most important point which requires attention was a statement in favour of Portugal, by Marshall Costa e Silva (who was the President of Brazil at that time) at a Press conference in Lisbon. This news was reported by a Brazilian newspaper *Jornal do Brasil* on 16 December, 1966. The statement as reported by *Jornal do Brasil* was – “Do you people remember the last “voting” in the United Nations? Brazil voted in favour of Portugal and will continue to do so.” In reference to this statement Indian ambassador to Brazil, B.K. Acharya in a letter dated 26 December, 1966 informed Foreign Secretary (MEA), C.S. Jha, about the rigid policy of Brazil in reference to Portuguese colonies. The letter mentioned: “Brazil, however, though itself an ex-colony of Portugal, is apparently prepared not only to give full support to Portugal on the question of African colonies, but also to feel proud in doing so.” The letter also informed about the Brazilian government’s decision to send “naval forces” to Angola, a news that appeared in the Brazilian press. On this issue the letter mentioned: “We have also seen very recently, on the 24th December, a news item in the Brazilian press indicating that Brazil has agreed to send a naval unit to Angola. This government proposal has already been criticised by the press and it is not yet definite that government will go through with this. A Brazilian Admiral has stated that the news about dispatch of “naval forces” to Angola is baseless, though a visit of naval cadets was in fact contemplated.” The importance of the statement can be judged from the fact that MEA also sent a copy of this letter to the Permanent Representative of India to the UN, G. Parthasarathi, at New York. This must have been obviously done by MEA to make the Indian mission at UN aware of Brazil’s posture towards Portuguese colonialism to counter it at the debates and discussions.

If the statement made by Costa e Silva shows the position of military government in Brazil then another letter to be referred here reinforces the argument that such a type of thought process was not limited to military governments alone, but *Itamarati* as well, and that Brazilian Foreign Ministry remained as colonial as it was in the past. Another letter dated 5 January, 1967 by B.K. Acharya, Indian ambassador to Brazil to Foreign Secretary mentions about his talks with Meira Penna, Assistant Secretary General of *Itamarati* and Pio Corrêa, Secretary General of *Itamarati* regarding the question whether Costa e Silva’s statement represented the Brazilian policy towards Portuguese colonies.

The letter based on the reply from Meira Penna, puts the following points:

- i) He had not yet seen an official text of Costa e Silva's statement.
- ii) Brazil's policy remained anti-colonial.
- iii) Brazil however, had special relations with Portugal and refrained from indulging in criticisms and condemnations of Portuguese policy in Africa mainly on the ground that, unlike what was happening in Rhodesia or South Africa, Portugal's Africa policy was (according to him) free from racial overtones. Portugal's policy of gradually "assimilating" all Portuguese subjects and giving them equal rights was generally approved by Brazil. Penna, however admitted that "assimilation" of non-whites in Angola and Mozambique had been slow.
- iv) Penna countercharged that, in their criticism and condemnation of colonialism, Afro-Asian countries seemed to follow some kind of "racial discrimination" in reverse. For example, Afro-Asians criticised the continuance of Australian rule over East New Guinea but condoned Indonesian rule over West Irian maintained without any "self-determination."
- v) Penna admitted that formerly Brazilian policy on colonialism had been "more to left". But Portugal remonstrated, pointing out that Brazil's policy towards American Indians in Amazonas etc. was no more progressive than Portugal's policies in Africa and that Brazil could not, therefore, afford to "cast stones" at Portugal.

B.K. Acharya mentioned that: "Throughout talk Meira Penna was somewhat shamefaced and on the defensive." It is interesting to note that the arguments put forth by Meira Penna was similar to what Portugal has been saying for all these years defending its colonial policies while casting stones at others.

The most surprising part were the opinions of Pio Corrêa, Secretary General of *Itamarati* who was more explicit than the Assistant Secretary General of *Itamarati* in presenting his as well as Brazilian government's position i.e. in agreement of Portugal.

The exact words mentioned in the letter were: "However, the Secretary General, Pio Corrêa, with whom also I took up the matter, was much more brazen. He said that while he also had not seen an official text of Costa e Silva's statement, he had no doubt that in its essentials, the statement reflected correctly the official Brazilian policy in matter. He bluntly stated that Brazil had agreed to support Portugal in those and several other matters."

It becomes pretty clear that, while policy must have been same, much was dependent on the individual nature of the person concerned, in explaining it in public. It would also be important to mention here that as H. Jon Rosenbaum wrote in his article entitled "A critique of the Brazilian foreign service" and the point that has already been cited in the previous Chapter of the dissertation is that, during Pio-Corrêa's term as a Secretary General of *Itamarati*, diplomats were afraid even to let their opinion on 'independent policy' be known even inside the Foreign Ministry. This also adds new angle and perspective on the leadership factor under which decisions were being carried out.

Even more important is the point that while this whole episode was unfolding, Brazil was a non-permanent member in United Nations Security Council.

If one sees the general trend of all the statements made by Brazilian Presidents' in favour of Portugal some constants are clearly visible; all these statements were made in Lisbon and not in Rio de Janeiro or Brasilia. Added to it, is the point that though similar statements were made in Brazil as well, the Presidents remained more vocal and explicit while in Portugal.

Though reactions of the Brazilian press on issue of Goa and decolonisation process is primarily under the scope of Chapter Four, a report by Newton Carlos would add weight to the accusation here; Brazilian government's posture in reference to India has been not very appreciable. Dispatch by Newton Carlos, a Brazilian correspondent to UNCTAD-II was published in the noted Brazilian newspaper, *Jornal do Brasil*. Fortnightly Press Review for the period – 16th March to 31st March, 1968, made a mention of the news report which said the following things:

- a) That Brazil's relation with India were (in some quarter) effected by Portuguese nostalgia;
- b) That the Cultural division of *Itamarati* (the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations) was most contaminated by this sentiment which prevented a real Indo-Brazilian approximation;
- c) That India invited two delegations from Brazil (a parliamentary and a press delegation) but Brazil had not invited one; and
- d) That Brazil was the only country not to have joined Asian, African and other Latin American in their movements of censure and protest against South Africa and Rhodesia! Was it because of close relations between Portugal and these countries?

On protocol matters also Brazil's actions were no less annoying. There were incidents of Brazilian Embassy in New Delhi issuing Portuguese passport to the Indians of Goan origin that brought some friction in India's relations with Brazil. A Telegram dated 20.11.1968 sent by MEA to Indian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro brought the attention to this serious issue. The telegram reads: "Brazilian Embassy in New Delhi as a protecting power for Portuguese interests in India has been issuing Portuguese passports to Indians of Goan origin in accordance with instructions of Portuguese Government. It has been alleged by African students in India that some boys on arrival in Portugal are recruited in the Portuguese Army to fight against the freedom fighters in Portuguese colonies in Africa." It must also be mentioned that when this issue was raised by MEA with Brazilian Charge d' Affaires in New Delhi, he agreed to look in to the concern raised.

The telegram mentions: “C.D.A. fully agreed with my views and said that Brazilian Embassy was in fact in a predicament. On the one hand their relations with India were involved and they would like to strengthen these relations and on the other they had to carry out the wishes of Portuguese Government. He had therefore on his own realising gravity of situation stopped issuing Portuguese passports except to wives, minor children and aged parents of Goans living in Portugal.” Brazilian Charge d’ Affairs also informed about the initiatives taken on his part to address the issue. The telegram mentioned: “He had also referred our strong views in this matter with Brazilian Foreign Office and emphasise that no Portuguese passports should be issued to Indians of Goan origin without consulting us.” This instance again presents a situation when Brazilian government addressed the concerns of India, that appeared unfriendly, but only after India protested of such an act.

In fact, if one identifies the constants; statements, actions were carried out being in accordance of directives issued by Portuguese government, but in personal talks with Indian diplomats, Brazil also understood and agreed with India’s position while also explaining its complexities.

It seems Brazilian posture resembled carrying out the directives of both Indian government and that of Portugal, taking an intelligent and clever position to balance both in the face of crisis between the two.

It is also important to ascertain whether such postures of Brazil were visible also in cases where Portugal was not involved. This would help verify whether Portuguese colonialism was the sole reason for Brazil’s ambiguous position on Goa, or Brazil in general situations as well maintained such a posture in all such cases in relation to India.

V. Brazilian Position on the issue of Kashmir and Chinese Aggression on India

Two other cases that would help to have a better overview of Brazilian posture would be; a) its position on Chinese aggression in India; and b) its stand on the Kashmir issue.

(i) Brazilian position on Chinese Aggression

File no. 118(74)-WII/62 (Secret) titled “Reaction in various countries on Chinese aggression against India” contains documents that explained the reactions of various Latin American countries (apart from other European countries) on Chinese aggression in India. What can be ascertained from the file which contains hundreds of letters, official communique and news reports is that, with the exception of Cuba, Brazil was the only country having not criticised the Chinese aggression, despite representations made by Indian Embassy in Brazil and the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to Brazil.

Letter dated 24 October, 1962 by R.S. Hussain, Indian Ambassador to Brazil to Joint Secretary, MEA, S. Gupta mentioned: “We have given to the Foreign office all the material available in the Embassy for a detailed study of the boundary question. While the people in Foreign office privately condemn Chinese aggression the Brazilian government have not so far made any official comment.” Another letter dated 21 November, 1962 by R.S. Hussain to MEA mentioned a detailed Brazilian posture towards the incident. Hussain wrote: “Yesterday while delivering another letter of our PM addressed to Brazilian Prime Minister Hermes Lima, I took the opportunity to have a general discussion with Assistant Secretary General Bittencourt and explained the latest position in regard to China¹⁸. In explaining the reason for the type of reply given he said that it had been drafted by PM (Hermes Lima) himself. The PM did not feel that he was in a position to go any further as in this very complicated border question they only had one side of the case, that is ours. Hussain in his letter added: “I have also heard from

¹⁸ The first letter by Nehru had already met a cold reply from the side of Brazilian government, an act which was heavily criticised in Brazilian Press.

other sources also that the Foreign office, if left to themselves, would have given a more favourable reply and there is possibility that even now if something new occurs the tone of future letters might be different.” An important revelation was also made to Hussain, which is mentioned in the same letter: “He also said that Nationalist Chinese mission had also sent them a note that, they did not recognise the Mc Mohan line.” Hussain opined this might have also contributed to Brazil’s position on staying silent on this issue. Did India’s armed action in Goa cause Brazil not to support India in the case of Chinese aggression? Probably, the news reports in Brazilian and American Presses might have prompted Indian ambassador to raise the issue with Brazilian Foreign Ministry officials. To be noted, all such reasons were denied by the Assistant Secretary General of *Itamarati*.

Two other reasons were mentioned in the letter out of discussion with the Bittencourt

- a) Arrival of a Communist Chinese Trade Mission (a day before the discussion between R.S. Hussain and Bittencourt took place)
- b) A 32 page telegram by Chou-en-lai to Brazilian government¹⁹

As one sees in the following events, Brazil followed a trajectory to achieve the best of both worlds, still not losing anything on part of so called ‘independent’ foreign policy.

¹⁹ Nothing could be known to the Indian ambassador regarding the 32 page telegram by Chou-en-lai as it was in Spanish, and was in the process of translation while Indian ambassador had the meetings in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry.

(ii) **Brazilian position on the Kashmir issue**

Another issue of importance is the Kashmir issue in which Brazil had maintained an impartial position from the beginning either inside United Nations or outside it. However the surprise surrounded at the speech by Mr. Bernardes, Representative of Brazil, in Security Council on 15 February, 1964. The controversial statement pertained to Bernardes insistence on plebiscite in the territory of Kashmir as a mode of resolution to this dispute. The actual words were: "We are told that a plebiscite would raise more problems than it would solve. We are not in a position to judge what the impact of full implementation of the principle of self-determination of Kashmir would be throughout the Indian sub-continent. One thing, however, remains true and evident to us; no settlement of any territorial question will last in peace if the will of the people who live and toil in these land is not fully respected."²⁰ Argument of Indian government to reject 'plebiscite' has been on the ground of changed circumstances as compared to the situation that existed in the year 1947. The argument of 'changed circumstances' was not accepted by the Brazilian representative as opposed to the United States and Bolivia, which agreed with the India's argument though the US still supported 'plebiscite' as the mode of resolution to this dispute.

Opinion about Brazilian representative's statement being against India's interest was also shared by other representatives. Telegram no. 24635 sent by MEA to Indian Embassy in Rio de Janeiro mentioned: "The above points were sought to be made out discreetly and in a guarded manner. But the sum total of their implication was clearly adverse to us. This was also the view of other members of the Council who spoke privately to us and commented on the disparity between the Brazilian representative's attitude as President and his statement as Brazilian Representative." In the telegram 'attitude' of the Brazilian representative was praised as the President of the Council, and further added that such

²⁰ Without doubt this line points finger at the Indian position that has carefully distanced itself from a scope of plebiscite in the case of changed circumstances.

changed postures may be due to various other reasons. These suspicions became true while S.K. Singh in discussion with Houiss, Minister of Brazil expressed the Brazilian Foreign Ministry's agreement with what Bernardes spoke at UN.

Another important information that can be ascertained from the File no. 118(79)-WII/62 entitled "Reactions of various countries on Goa and Kashmir" about the changed posture of Brazilian representative. In a conversation with the Brazilian foreign minister, Indian ambassador got to know that: Brazil in fact received a letter from Pakistan Embassy on 24th January, 1964 that presented the argument of Indian government having 'disregarded' resolutions of Security Council on Kashmir and that plebiscite is the perfect solution of Kashmir issue.

Conclusion

From all these cases, it can be inferred: Brazilian position has neither been consistent nor very firm or rigid. In cases of representations from the other side, Brazil was bound to pay for its approach to follow Portugal. This in fact solidifies the arguments of Ronald M. Schneider who on Brazilian foreign policy making emphasises the prevalence of 'common-sense approach' and the avoidance of 'frozen position' by decision making actors. This categorises Brazilian foreign policy making in a class of 'flexible' position taking approach by Brazilian diplomats and the *Itamarati*.

On Goa issue, Brazil's dual nature is quite evident, given the instances when it carried out actions in favour of Portugal, but in personal interaction with Indian diplomats, agreed with the Indian position, though cited their excuses in relation to 'sentimental ties' between Brazil and Portugal.

CHAPTER FOUR

Assessment by Brazilian Press of the Goa Question

CHAPTER IV

ASSESSMENT BY BRAZILIAN PRESS OF THE GOA QUESTION

Brazil's stand on various issues of international concern was an expression of the views held in Brazilian foreign ministry. Many a time when position of *Itamarati* on various foreign policy issues were rigid, the views of Brazilian press and public were totally liberal. This is reflected in the position of Brazilian media in reference to the issue of colonialism, dependence on the United States, stand on Salazar's Portugal, Chinese aggression on India in 1962, the decision to send the navy fleet in 1967 to Angola, etc. Press on regular basis reflected on various foreign policy issues, indirectly also throwing a light upon the thoughts of Brazilians in general.

As far as the subject of the present study is concerned – Goa issue is of relevance here. A critical review of the influential and major newspapers in Brazil largely indicates the views held by general public.

One objective of the Chapter is also to know the unofficial position of Brazil on Goa case as opposed to the official position, if at all there was any difference. By unofficial position, it is intended to refer to all such positions on Goa, which originated outside the *Itamarati*. It must be remembered that Brazilians not only constituted liberal Brazilians but also those elite group; small pro-Portuguese, pro-Salazar groups based in Brazil, Portuguese immigrants based in Rio de Janeiro, whose interests and opinions also got prominence in the Brazilian press on regular basis. It is also required to mention here that only few newspapers covered international events on regular basis that too mostly the newspapers based in cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Though there were intermittent appearances of reports on Goa on other newspapers of Brazil as well.

While a survey of the press serves the purpose of ascertaining Brazilian position on various issues, it is not sufficient. As has already been discussed in the Chapter Two, that

interest over foreign policy issues among Brazilians in general went up during the election of 1960, now it is worth mentioning that whether the interest and awareness over foreign policy continued to exist several years after that or not. Various news articles and editorials in the newspapers which project the enthusiasm of Brazilians towards the issues of international importance, is contradicted by the opinion polls conducted by the same newspapers. Even in 1968, as some opinion polls conducted by *Jornal do Brasil* suggests that the familiarity to new developments at global level was meager.

In September, 1968, the opinion poll by *Jornal do Brasil*, revealed that only half of those surveyed affirmed the existence of neutralist bloc. The awareness about India also remained limited. Specifically in reference to India, even after Indira Gandhi's visit to Brazil, only 30% people surveyed for the poll, knew India was following a policy called an 'independent' one. Surprisingly, about 40% had no opinion or idea about India's stand. These survey despite their small sample size (i.e. 525-536), are of much importance as they were conducted in the cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo that were more exposed to international events as opposed to semi-urban areas.

For the present Chapter, it must be remembered that the newspapers whose archives are at present accessible online makes it possible to verify the related incidents, but in cases where they are not accessible or the newspaper no more exists now, the translated versions of the news articles sent in the regular dispatches by Embassy of India, Rio de Janeiro form the basis of analysis.

The Chapter is broadly divided into four sections; the first section deals with the freedom of press in Brazil; second section specifically deals with the news coverages on Goa question until 1961; third is wholly devoted to the coverages of Indian military action to liberate Goa and fourth section analyses, how Goa question was perceived by the press during military period.

I. Press, Freedom and Censorship

During the Cold War, the freedom of press in Brazil remained limited and even when press censorship was not in institutionalised form – anti-government reports brought numerous complications for the concerned press. So as a strategy, most often actual news based sometimes on conscience but true, appeared in foreign press. This was often done by Brazilian newspapers, who smuggled out the news to foreign press and news agencies based abroad and once it was printed in a newspaper abroad, they reprinted it citing the same (Schneider 1974: 138). This was often done to save themselves from being targeted, as excuse of having picked up from somewhere else, worked. The purpose of mentioning this phenomenon here is that, to ascertain the Brazilian press and public, only referring to Brazilian newspapers is not sufficient, but also coverages of foreign press in reference to Brazilian position on Goa are also important. One specific and distinct feature of Brazilian press is that, despite serving the interests of the elites, the press felt its obligations to review the foreign policy of Brazil on regular basis (Rodrigues 1962: 338).

In case of Goa and in several other cases as well, apart from the reporting of events the type of editorial comments that appeared in various newspapers were also dependent on the varying political shades of the newspapers. The situation in the late 1940s, in reference to coverages related to Goa and report on events related to India by the Brazilian media, was mentioned in the Press Report, Jan- June, 1950 from E/I, Rio de Janeiro. The Report mentioned: "It must be mentioned that on the 26th January, the Press made an exception in our case and went all out to publish news and articles on India with favourable comments." The Report added: "This, however, does not apply to other news releases from India. It was mainly due to an all out effort made by us to approach the leading journalists and columnists consistently." However, in reference to Goa, the failure on the part of Press Attaché has been clearly mentioned: "Our efforts failed completely when we wanted the Press to publish factual information about Goa."

Another information in relation to Goa has been also mentioned in the same Report: "Pandit Nehru's statement in the House on the 7th February about merger of Goa with India evoked strongly worded editorials in the Press here, fed and flamed by long telegrams from Lisbon." The Report in addition mentioned: "The Brazilians are Portuguese by origin and in spite of the fact that they have cut away from Portugal, still have a sense of loyalty to their fatherland – 'scratch a Brazilian and he is a Portuguese'". It appears that even Indian diplomats had fully accepted the myth of 'sentimental' ties between Brazil and Portugal.

a) Visit of first Indian press delegation to Brazil

In 1954, though Heredia's incident, which has also been referred in the previous Chapter, had already warmed up the Goa issue in Brazilian press, the same year World Congress of Press Entities was held in São Paulo, on 6-14 November. Three Indian journalists, A.D. Mani, K. Rama Rao and A.R. Bhatt also participated at the conference. With the help of Indian embassy based in Rio de Janeiro at that time, first ever formal interaction between Indian delegation of journalists and the Brazilian editors and journalists took place after the conference. However, these arrangements by the Indian embassy and visit, and should not be mistaken as 'Press delegation' at the request of Brazilian government. To add further, Brazilian government did not invite any such delegation till the year referred.

The meeting with over 60 newspapermen in Brazil included discussions on India's foreign policy, the problem over Goa, and on India-Brazil trade. Indian ambassador also discussed of India's publicity problem in Brazil with the Indian journalists, which was a serious issue owing to pro-Portuguese orientation in majority of Brazilian presses.

After the discussion, the Ambassador as mentioned in the Report got a feel that: neither he nor the delegates from India, were briefed by the Indian government what was expected out of this meeting and how would it actually help counter anti-India propaganda in Brazil on the dispute over Goa.²¹ Upon discussion with the officials in Indian Embassy the following agenda was finalised –

- i) discussion with prominent international commentators, columnist, newspapers editors and others on India's position in world affairs
- ii) exploration of the possibility of some Brazilian newspapers receiving Indian news and comments either from special correspondents in India or from Indian newspapers and agencies
- iii) to study how best, important news of India could be transmitted to the press here
- iv) study of the reasons, for the attitude of some publishers hostile to India, and efforts to remedy them, and
- v) the possibility of publishing articles etc. on Indian affairs in press here.

At the end of the process, some articles on Goa were contributed by the Indian journalists to Brazilian newspapers. A.D. Mani, editor of *Hitavada* and A.R. Bhat granted interviews to newspapers in São Paulo on the dispute revolving around Goa question. The interest over Goa was high in Brazilian press as is visible from the fact that, where ever they went they were 'showered with the questions on foreign affairs and Goa'. The dispatch reads that the discussion with them (Brazilian journalists) 'left the other party convinced' of India's position and claim.

²¹ Since all the three journalists expressed different areas of interest like India- Brazil trade, Brazilian culture, foreign policy of Brazil, Indian embassy thought that this visit may remain nothing more than a casual tour. The main objective of Indian embassy was to counter the anti-India propaganda in Brazil over the Goa dispute by promoting interaction between Indian presses with those of Brazil.

Questions were also raised by international commentators like Luiz Alberto Bahia of *Correio da Manhã*, Barreto Leite Filho of *Diário Associados* and Osorio Nunes of *Diário de Notícias*. A well-known columnist Maria Pedroza was also present at the meeting.

Dantas, who was the owner and editor of *Diário de Notícias* newspaper, on Goa question initially defended Portugal's stand but of late in the discussion after hearing from Indian journalists, he expressed surprise at the different version of the story regarding Portuguese possessions in India that was available to them in Brazil concerning the racial, linguistic and economic situation.

The meeting of Indian journalists at the office of *Correio da Manhã* newspaper was also organised. At the meeting Paulo Filho, the Chief Editor, Otto Capeaux, head of foreign section and Luiz Alberto Bahia, the secretary and a commentator on foreign affairs were present who agreed with the Indian point of view on Goa issue. They revealed during the discussion that in *Correio da Manhã*, the pro-Portuguese slant was directly an outcome of the 'financial and other pressures' being put by Paulo Bittencourt, the owner of *Correio da Manhã* through a Portuguese journalist Tomas Colaço who wrote for them. This was despite their 'united opposition' to Portuguese colonial policies and reporting in favour of the same. They informed that all the persuasion has failed, since they could not take Paulo Bittencourt out of their support for Portugal.

Apart from that, it became pretty clear that, since Indian news was distributed by foreign press agencies to the Brazilian press, it posed a challenge for Indian embassy in Brazil to counter it as there was no other source of getting Indian news from direct channels, which was obviously discussed to look at the possibilities, that could help resolve the problem.

b) India's interests in Brazil and the Brazilian press

The 1955, File no. 2-1/55-AMS (Secret) listed out Brazil's major newspapers that would be important for India's interest as far as reaction to India's foreign policy and more specifically coverages on Goa are concerned. It listed out *Correio da Manhã*, *Diário da Notícias*, *O Jornal*, *Diário da Noite*, *Última Hora*, *O Estadão da São Paulo*, *O Mundo* and *Tribuna da Imprensa*.

Almost a decade later a dispatch from Indian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, titled "Broad objective of our policy in Brazil and Latin American countries" was sent which also discussed how India's relation with Brazilian press fared, as well as contained information related to political orientation of the newspapers. Most of the influential newspapers in Brazil were in support of the hemispheric solidarity and exhibited pro-western orientation in the reporting of events.

Sources of pro-western and pro-US orientation in case of *O Globo* newspaper was the extensive financial support from the US and western sources that was received on regular basis. There were also newspapers who despite their pro-west leaning were not all out opposed to non-alignment or the policy of neutralism. *Jornal do Brasil* was one such a newspaper which while being a supporter of government and Brazil's close ties with the American hemisphere and western countries was not in any way 'opposed to non-alignment'. However, a very influential newspaper based in São Paulo, *O Estadão de São Paulo*, though supporter of hemispheric solidarity was very much 'anti-socialist and anti-non-alignment'. There were also prominent newspapers like *Correio da Manhã* and *Folha de São Paulo* that maintained a liberal and left of centre position. In the dispatch, *Folha de São Paulo* has been praised for its 'intellectual standards, whose criticisms either on internal policies or external policies of Brazil was based on the individual merit of the case. The report also informs that, at least in recent times reporting in the Brazilian press have been generally in favour of India, and not in favour of Pakistan as opposed to the case earlier. It is important to add that many a time Monthly and Annual Reports from

E/I, Rio de Janeiro mentioned: sometimes news based on fiction than on fact, favouring India also appeared in Brazilian press. This mostly refers to the coverages on developments related to the issue of Kashmir, where Brazilian press maintained a pro-Indian stand. Several political dispatches had also expressed a concern that Brazilian press were not much informed with the history of Kashmir issue.

Either in reference to India, or even the international events were not reported on day to day basis by newspapers in Brazil. Indian Embassy informs that 1965 marks, for the first time, three newspapers namely *Jornal do Brasil*, *Folha de São Paulo* and *Correio da Manhã* started covering stories on India extensively. The coverages included stories on Indian politics, its foreign policy and economic plans as well, like the successive Five year plans.

II. Dispute over Goa and the Brazilian Press

Given the long period over which the Goa question remained unresolved, reporting was at best 'intermittent'. There have been two phases of tension between India and Brazil, in whose case, the position of Brazilian press so as to say in comprehensive way was against India. First incident was the dismissal of Brazilian Consul, Jimmy Heredia (an Indian citizen), and the second incident was the Indian military action on Goa on 18 December, 1961, which was reported in the Brazilian newspapers on 19th December, 1961. Added to it, the march of Satyagrahis in 1954 was also an incident that received the required attention in Brazilian press. In general, all the three events mentioned above were marked by criticism of India's position.

For Brazil, 1953 marked the signing of *Treaty of Friendship and Consultation* between Brazil and Portugal; an important news receiving wide coverage in Brazilian press. In reference to Goa as the subject of the research, the events that followed after it is of much interest. The implication of the Treaty on Brazil's action in the cases that evolved afterwards is also to be seen.

Jimmy Heredia, an Indian citizen, who was Brazilian Consul at Bombay, at a meeting with Goan friends, expressed his views on freedom of Goa at a private meeting at his residence which was also his office that sparked a row of discussion. Having all the diplomatic solutions failed, Brazilian foreign ministry actually expelled Heredia, news of which got huge prominence in the Brazilian press, supporting the position of Brazilian government. The Monthly Political Report for May, 1954, reads "Practically all the newspapers supported Brazilian government in the unfortunate action they took against their honorary consul in Bombay, Mr. Heredia. The main contention appears to have been that being a Brazilian employee, the Consul should not have done anything which was likely to affect the very close relation which existed between Brazil and Portugal and which have been further cemented by the treaty of collaboration and friendship." This was the first known instance when Brazilian press unitedly stood in the support of the action of *Itamarati* (in reference to the issue of Goa). The rigid stand of *Itamarati* and support by Brazilian press did highlight the attitude of Brazilian press. This is also visible from the fact that newspapers highlighted the Consul's action contrary to Brazil's 'good relation with Portugal' and Brazil's agreement of thought with Portugal.

The removal of Indian mission in Portugal, and subsequently in India, the march of satyagrahis in Dadra, also sparked serious criticisms against the Indian government. Monthly Political Report for July 1954 from Rio de Janeiro mentioned "Brazilian feelings have been mounting since we removed our mission from Portugal. Since, the Goan satyagrahis marched into Dadra, the Brazilian newspapers and the Portuguese community in particular in particular have become hysterical."

In Brazil a mass rally was organised by the Federation of Portuguese Associations, protesting against the 'invasion by India of Portuguese territory'. In the rally Portuguese Ambassador Dr. Antonio de Faria was also present, who expressed his thanks to Brazil for 'patriotism and sympathies' in the present struggle. The President of the Association also expressed thanks to Vargas government for 'solidarity' of Brazil on the Goa issue.

The Embassy of India dispatch reads on these events, "The press here has been all out unfavourable to India in the reports they have been publishing about the present trouble in the Portuguese possessions." The press reports held the responsibility of cropping of all the troubles on India's part and not to that of Portugal's colonial policies. The report further mentioned the initiatives taken by the Embassy: "This gross lie is being counteracted both in writing and personal talks." Added to it, the absence of any direct channel to receive news from India became clear, which was discussed when the first Indian press delegation visited Brazil in 1954. During that time, some initiatives were taken so as to provide stories from New Delhi directly to the newspapers based in Brazil, which did bring some relief. The Report mentions: "It is however, a relieving factor that the news they publish from New Delhi agencies contain the correct position though Portuguese version takes bold headlines.

As opposed to the incidents till 1955, the succeeding years give an illusion of positive developments in the Brazilian press. Some years later, in the Annual Report for 1958, in the section on Annual Publicity Report (July, 1958- June, 1959) mentioned that: "The press has been on the whole very cooperative. The difficulties and prejudices which became obvious when the Goa conflict was at its peak have now largely subsided and we have little hostile propaganda to contend with." As a part of the initiative by Indian Embassy the Report explained: "We have kept the Brazilian press informed of the more important events in India through our daily press releases and feature articles supplied to them from time to time."

In 1958, Brazilian newspapers carried anti- Salazar news as well. Political Report for December, 1958, informed that Brazilian press reacted sharply to the act of arresting Portuguese intellectuals by Salazar's government. The dispatch made the point clear: "Even papers normally very friendly towards Portugal said that Salazar's quarrel with church were the signs of his government's impending collapse."

a) The phase of early 1960s

To a marked contrast however, with the wave of nationalism rising high and demand for independent policy becoming more appealing by the 1960s, genuine concerns were being addressed by the Brazilian newspapers, even in cases it meant criticising Portugal (so called its friend). Political Report for January, 1960 described such an incident, which was the decision of Brazilian government to ban a conference, which was to be organised in São Paulo with the objective of demanding amnesty for political prisoners in Portugal and Spain. The conference was to be organised by the people from all over the South America. The condemnation by *Correio da Manhã* is remarked by the words about the incident: "Brazilian government's submissiveness to Salazar and Franco at whose request the conference was apparently banned." Similar criticisms did also appear in *Diário de Notícias* which wrote – "these requests of Portuguese and Spanish ambassadors as insolence." As an outcome of all these, report mentions: "Presumably, in view of these protests and representations by Sr. Alvare Lins, Brazil's former ambassador in Lisbon, the government revoked its decision and allowed the conference to be held. In the same month President Eisenhower came on an official visit to Brazil, which Political Report for February, 1960 mentioned "reception accorded was the greatest accorded to an official dignitary." Eisenhower's visit was no exception to press criticisms. Jânio Quadros who was main contender for the presidential position in election of 1960, remarked critically to President's visit which was given prominence in Brazilian press. Quadros remarked "Brazil has not yet shed the inferiority complex of the colonial country. It really has no policy of its own and follows the dictation by other powers." In the same month an article written by Captain Henrique Galvão also appeared in *Última Hora*. Captain Galvão was Portuguese exile in Argentina. In reference to rejection of the visa to Captain Galvão, *Última Hora* alleged that, "his request for visa to come to Brazil has been frustrated because of pressure from Salazar."

While negative reports had started appearing in reference to Portugal's colonial policies, the tone of some Brazilian newspapers greatly improved praising India and its policy. In January, 1960, *O Estadão de São Paulo* published an article titled "Nehru's success" praising Nehru's non-alignment to be working fine at least till the time. Several press on Eisenhower's visit also highlighted the fact that be it Khrushchev or Eisenhower, their visit to India is an initiative to improve their relations with India. Political Report for February, 1960 reads "These comments indicate the changing attitude of the Brazilian press to India's position." In the following month i.e. March, the government of Portugal banned a Brazilian drama company which was performing a play by Berthold Brecht in Lisbon. This instance in succession of similar incidents mentioned earlier, 'created much annoyance'. The newspaper projected it as "one more instance of lack of freedom under Salazar's regime." In the same month i.e. March, World Court (International Court of Justice) gave its verdict on Dadra and Nagar Haveli, which was though published by Brazilian newspapers but not with much prominence. The dispatch from Embassy of India, Rio de Janeiro reads "There was no editorial comment, but an article giving Portuguese interpretation of the judgment appeared in *Correio Paulistano*, which paper was also requested to print also the Indian version of the case."

In May, 1960, with the news reports appearing that Treaty of Friendship and Consultation signed between Portugal and Brazil may now be ratified, came severe criticisms. In reference to these events Political Report for May, 1960 mentioned "It is urged that the *Itamarati* should speak up and reflect the true feelings of the people of Brazil who are essentially liberal and democratically minded." The Report directly referred to the Declaration of Santiago, to which Brazil was also a party, which emphasises: the dictatorships to be incompatible with the spirit of 'Latin America'. The criticism also came on the US president Eisenhower who visited Portugal while on the way returning from Paris. The *Diário de Notícias* said "It means an apparent approval not only of dictatorship but also of Salazar's method in the colonies of Portugal."

In June 1960, *Correio da Manhã* and *Diário de Notícias* published articles criticising several aspects of Brazilian position in the international fora on the issues like racial discrimination in South Africa and need for an independent foreign policy, as well as accepted the prominence of neutralist nations.

The *Diário de Notícias* published over 25 articles in a row criticising the forthcoming visit of President Kubitschek to Portugal. The expression of criticism comes out clear with the words like “visit would compromise the honour, dignity and prestige of Brazil. The paper said: “The Brazilian President, as a co-host with Portuguese President of Lisbon celebrations, would play a secondary role to Salazar’s protégé.” Despite internal resistance in Brazil, Kubitschek’s plan to go to Portugal aroused serious criticism from the Brazilian press.

Estadão de São Paulo expressed regret that the President would by his presence, add to the prestige of the Salazar’s dictatorship. “Our people know too well what the Vargas has cost them, to agree to their President going officially, and appearing in full view of the world on the side of Salazar and Franco. To the best of knowledge the dictator of Spain will be apart from Sr. Kubitschek, the only chief of state to attend personally the festivities in Portuguese capital. This one fact should have been enough for the chief of the Brazilian nation to desist from this visit.”

On the same subject, *Diário de Notícias* raised surprise over Kubitschek’s own mind-set. The exact words of the paper were “It is to an inhuman dictatorship in his last stage of police terror and public crimes that Sr. Kubitschek will join his name for ever; it is with a declining dictator living his last moments among the abject people who now support him only as accomplices that Sr. Kubitschek intends to identify and personally, aiming to demonstrate that it is with people of this kind that he feels at home.”

The respect accorded to Juscelino Kubitschek kept the press amazed. The signing of Treaty and praise of Salazar by Kubitschek also came for the renewed criticism. *Correio da Manha* pointed out the contrast of Brazilian principles with this specific event. The paper wrote “Brazilian government has always unequivocally protested against colonial system, counting on unanimous support of the public opinion of this country. The President of the republic cannot suddenly and without sufficient justification change this attitude, a change which would not be approved and understood in Brazil.”

Such a widespread criticism of Kubitschek, for lending support to Salazar may give an illusion that, Brazilian press was once and for all ready to accept any statement in favour of Goa’s freedom (or for that matter, any other Portuguese colony). Here comes the surprise; Nehru’s statement in Indian parliament on the subject of future of Dadra and Nagar Haveli brought ‘widespread attention’ in Brazilian press not necessarily in positive sense. The news headlines of the stories that appeared were; ‘Nehru threatens annexation’; ‘Nehru claims Portuguese territories’; and ‘Portuguese territories are going to be part of India’.

In September, 1960, the first congress of nationalist movement was held on 19th September in Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian press ‘noticed’ the proceedings of the Congress. At the congress a resolution was passed demanding the independence of all Portuguese colonies, including Goa. Political Report for September, 1960 stated about the resolution which said: the “freedom struggle in these colonies was nothing, but a repetition of Brazil’s own struggle for independence against Portuguese domination and appealed to the Brazilian government to use its influence with Salazar’s regime in the cause of colonial peoples.”

In October, 1960, when UN was in session, Brazil’s inactivity and attitude was criticised by several newspapers. *Jornal do Brasil* wrote “Brazil is not a great power, nor a nation which can be considered neutral but today it matters and it can take an active attitude in favour of world peace, in an hour of crisis. ” In the UN debate, Brazil voted against the

resolution requiring Portugal to give information about all its colonies. The Political report for October, 1960, reported that; “Pro-Salazar Portuguese community in Rio de Janeiro protested and submitted a memorandum to the Portuguese ambassador pointing out this attempt by United Nations an intervention in the internal affairs of Portugal.” *Diário de Notícias* commenting on this incident said: “If it is just a question of crying, the Salazarist dictatorship knows how to make people do it. In Angola, Goa and Macau, there is evidence that a lot of crying goes on; there are enough tears to flow like river. But there is difference; crying here is free, there it is the oppressed and those who are hungry for justice that cry.”

Annual Report for 1960, discussed at greater length Brazilian press coverages related to India. The report reads: “News coverage of India has greatly improved. Our own Information Service Office is doing what it can within the limits imposed by finance and staff to project a true image of India. There is greater understanding of the foreign policy of India as expounded and applied by the Prime Minister and the leader of our delegation in the United Nations.” On Goa, the dispatch informed: “we have stepped up our publicity, so has the Portuguese Embassy though not by way of retort. But the press takes little notice of either. The people do not seem to be greatly interested in colonial questions.” By way of an interpretation; Brazilian people, given the period in consideration, though were against colonialism but their interest for such issues were not so high that, they would champion it.

Annual Publicity Report (July, 1960- June, 1961), discussed about the Goa publicity in Brazil as well as the challenges faced by the Press Attaché of Indian Embassy. On part of S.K Das, Press Attaché, the aims and objectives have been discussed in the report which reads: “One of our main interests in Brazil has been to secure public approval on Goa’s fight for independence. In the past there has been reluctance on the part of newspaper editors and commentators to commit themselves on this question. The position is still substantially same. Most newspapers are unwilling to discuss this issue and editorial comments for or against are extremely meagre. We have been successful, however, from time to time to get a certain amount of publicity on Goa through personal contacts with

politicians and newspapers.” The report also mentioned the activities pertaining to circulation and distribution of literature to various organisations in Brazil. The report mentioned: “Substantial amount of literature on Goa has been distributed through the Brazilian Students Union, Union of Democratic Portuguese Students in Brazil and through members of the Nationalist Front (who are outspoken against colonialism). In addition, as the Goa question became topical from time to time, we distributed pamphlets on Dadra and Nagar Haveli directly by post. These efforts have resulted in some influence on public opinion.”

The period 1960-1961 has been the phase when the issues of foreign policy were brought in under the ambit of general public and it was a phase when Brazilians heard about the foreign policy matters more often than in the past. In Chapter Two, similar arguments were discussed reinforcing the rise of Quadros, coinciding with the internationalisation of Brazilian public opinion. The present Chapter discusses, how that actually took place at the level of Brazilian press; what were the issues that were being discussed in press, and how the question of colonialism in general and Goa in particular were being seen in 1961, the year whose end also marked the end of Portuguese rule in Goa? The year of 1961 witnessed regular comment on the need for a change on the part of Brazilian foreign policy. The Political Report for January, 1961, reads: “The dissatisfaction with Brazil’s foreign policy in relation to Portuguese colonies continued to manifest itself in press comment.” The report discusses about Amilcar Alencastre, a journalist and politician of the Nationalist Front. He wrote an article in a magazine *Mundo Ilustrado* entitled, “Brazil cannot betray liberty” and argued that, “in Goa as well in other colonies Brazilian national heroes are looked down upon as symbols of inspiration in the struggle for liberty. In contrast, the present government followed a pro-imperialist policy in the United Nations. Another article entitled “Crisis in Goa and Angola” was published in *Diário Carioca*. In this, he gave an account of ‘how the metropolitan country kept its colonies poor and backward.’

Some other issues that deserve attention here; refusal of the Portuguese embassy in Rio de Janeiro to give passport to Paulo de Castro invited to United Arab Republic,

Yugoslavia, and India “led to some anti-Salazar comments.” Another issue that Brazilian press paid attention to is the arrival of Manuel Serra in Brazil, another anti-Salazar figure. This was not an isolated incident as arrival of anti-Salazar figures had become almost a norm in Brazil. In the same month, a book by Brazil’s former ambassador in Lisbon, Alvare Lins, entitled *Mission in Portugal* created the ‘considerable interest’ and Brazilian newspapers commented on it too. The Political Report of January mentions: “Part of the comment was directed at the abuses of Salazarism. But the other part dealt with the failure of the Brazilian government to measure up to the changing conditions which needed closer relations with rising nations of Africa.”

The most sensational news that kept Brazilian press busy for several months was however, the capture of Portuguese ship Santa Maria by Captain Henrique Galvão as a way of protesting against the government of Portugal. *Correio da Manhã* wrote: “Captain Galvão is a man of character who has suffered much in prison and concentration camps for being a democrat, a citizen of the free world to which Portugal belongs. It is he who today defends the noble and indomitable Portuguese traditions.” The paper agreeing with several other newspapers in Brazil suggested that: if ship came to Brazil, the case should be handled with justice. Santa Maria case and Angola debate were at least two issues that kept newspapers in Brazil busy for several months in foreign affairs during the phase.

In March, rebellion in Angola led to critical comments by *Estadão de São Paulo*. Other newspapers also commented critically. *A Noite* published an article by R. Magalhães Jr. wherein he expressed the dissatisfaction with the policy of Brazil in relation to Goa. The Political Report for February, 1961, mentions about *Jornal do Brasil* which published a full page article by João Cabral, the leader of Goan freedom movement in London and Shakuntala, analysing the various anti-colonial movements conducted from London.”

Though ‘independent’ foreign policy garnered support from the Brazilian public, criticism did surface from the side of Brazilian press. This was most often related to rumours that, even inside United Nations, Brazil would remain firm in its anti-colonial

stand. The opinions expressed in Brazilian newspapers highlight some important aspects related to such ambiguous nuances. *O Globo* wrote: "It has hurt to know that in World Assembly (UN), Brazil voted against Portugal. We know that every country has a right to vote in the manner it likes, but we should have felt some restraint in following others. We would have lost nothing by abstention on this question." *O Jornal* gave a peculiar twist: "Brazil's vote will give support to the international conspiracy promoted by communists to dislodge Portugal from her colonies."

The Monthly Report for March, 1961 informed: "Press later carried reports that Portuguese ambassador had seen President Quadros to discuss matters and as a result Brazil will abstain when question of Angola come up in United Nations. This vacillation upset those currents of Brazilian opinion which has welcomed President Quadros' bold stand on colonialism." The *Correio da Manhã* expressed surprise over the issue. The paper wrote: "for this is a change in our policy our special ties with Portugal are being cited. These ties exist and nobody wishes to cut them." The paper added, "We have our obligations to American countries, but before everything we have obligations to ourselves. For all this we do not believe in a change of policy and also we do not believe this, because Sr. Jânio Quadros is a man who recants."

The fact that freedom of press being limited in Brazil has been discussed by many and earlier in the chapter as well; but the optimism infused by Quadros gave a feeling of Press becoming more free in expressing its will, which however was not the case. Quadros' regime was no exception to restraints on press. One incident to convince this argument was Quadros' order to close down *Radio Jornal do Brasil* for three days having broadcast the news of Brazilian government's decision to cut down its defence expenditure. Quadros' excuse was, such a news may hamper relations with the friendly countries²². Political Report of June, 1961, reads: "The President has approved a committee of inquiry into the working of the foreign press." Quadros was of view that:

²²There should not be any doubt that 'friendly countries' referred here primarily includes the United States. This is to say that reduction in military expenditure may annoy Americans as their economic interests would be hampered. This action also reinforces the argument that despite what Quadros was doing, he did not intentionally wanted to annoy the United States.

“the news sent out does no justice to Brazil, is of a tendentious and sensational character.” An evidence of Brazilian pressure on foreign press and press agencies was; threat to local director of Associated Press, Tom Masterson, to ‘mend his ways’ or bear expulsion. In July, 1961, President Quadros also set up a working group to examine the prospect of creation of a Brazilian Information Agency. Political Report of July, 1961 from Embassy of India, Rio de Janeiro informed about the agency which would be “composed of a network of correspondents abroad to keep the world press informed of political events in the country.” The political dispatch added, “There will be no participation of the state in the Agency.”

Months of June and July also witnessed appearance of news articles on Goa in the Brazilian press. Captain Galvão who had become champion in the Santa Maria incident wrote three articles in relation to Portuguese colonies in the *Estadão de São Paulo*, wherein he stood against giving immediate freedom to Angola. He asserted that giving immediate freedom to the people living under tribal life would produce disastrous results. On Goa, as the political dispatch informs, he was “prepared to have immediate plebiscite for self-determination.” An article by Gilberto Freyre also appeared in *O Cruzeiro* wherein; he stressed upon the Portuguese and countered the attack on Portugal over its colonial policies with those of Brazil’s own record of mistreatment with indigenous communities based in Amazon.

Political Report for July, 1961 informed that, Paulo de Castro, international editor of *Diário de Notícias* to Goa. After his return, he wrote four articles ‘strongly supporting the Goan freedom movement.’ The political dispatch reads: “Uncompromisingly, anti-fascist Castro expressed with emotion and arguments underlining the basic facts of Portuguese misrule in Goa. As a complaint on the part of India’s government he says that, “Indian government was not helping the Goa nationalists as much as it should, blaming this lack of enthusiasm on ‘bureau advisors’ of Nehru.”

III. Brazilian press reaction on Indian military action on Goa on 18 December, 1961

The first page of almost all the major newspapers on 19th December, 1961 in Brazil bears evidence to an important event that is India's military action to liberate Goa. The headlines that appeared in major Brazilian newspapers are as follows:

Folha de São Paulo – The forces of India complete the invasion of India (*As forças da Índia consumam a invasão de Goa, Daman e Diu*)

O Estadão de São Paulo – Indian troops invade the enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu (*Tropas da Índia invadem os enclaves de Goa, Damão e Diu*)

Jornal do Brasil – India announces that Goa is its (*Anuncia a Índia que Goa é sua*)

O Globo – Violent battle between Portuguese (Portugal) and Indians (India) in Goa (*Violenta batalha Portugêses e Indiana em Goa*)

It is not required to mention here that the story of Goa went as a page one story in all newspapers sometimes almost full page covered with several aspects of the incident; like stories on refugees, statements by the San Thiago Dantas, statements by other countries etc.

Monthly Political Report for December, 1961 described about the reaction of press in Brazil to India's action. The dispatch reads: "Reaction in Brazil to the events in Goa has been most unfavourable. There has been universal condemnation in the press and in statements by important politicians. The vehemence and tone depending on the political shade of paper. Apart from stating that Goa, Daman and Diu were Portuguese territory great stress has been laid on the fact that India committed an aggression contrary to the terms of the United Nations charter. Some moderate newspapers expressed surprise that

India which has always upheld ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ should have adopted the use of arms.”

The dispatch informed: “with one exception, the entire Brazilian press severely criticised the Goa operation.” The exception referred here in the dispatch is *Ultima Hora*, an evening newspaper with leftist orientation, published from Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte. The paper criticised the official note of Brazilian foreign ministry saying that: “The Brazilian protest strikes a note of apparent justice while condemning the employment of force, but it is tendentious.” The paper explains further; “We say apparent justice because while our foreign ministry condemns armed actions, invoking paragraph 3 of article 2 of the UN charter, it does not take into consideration all the circumstances of the Goa case, which is simply a chapter on colonialism, and Brazil repudiates colonialism. Our government cannot see the forest because of the trees. It ignores all the precedents of the case. India obtained the consent of France to leave her colonial zones in India. Why did not Portugal also do the same? Why did she refuse to do?” The paper also adds – “The vehement protest against armed aggression which however justifies a permanent aggression of many centuries focalizes our lamentable mission. The age of enclaves has ended in this world.”

Two other newspapers namely *Correio da Manhã* and *Jornal do Brasil*, which E/I, Rio de Janeiro dispatch describes them as ‘respected organs of public opinion’ also condemned the military action by India on Goa. *Correio da Manhã* was critical of Salazar but it also criticised the Indian action. The paper wrote “India’s war operation against Goa constitute aggression, which we have condemned vehemently whenever it has been practiced. Especially India should not have under any conditions used violence because non-violence preached by Gandhi is the very basis of her political expression as a state.” The contrast has been made of India’s action and thought with those of Hitler’s saying that, “India committed an act of suicide basing herself on inconsistent arguments. Her plea of geographical contiguity and racial and linguistic affinity recalls Hitler’s words used to secure the incorporation of Sudetans and dismemberment of

Czechoslovakia. As in 1938 so in 1961, this thesis negates all principles of international law.”

An interesting comment has been made in reference to Portugal as well as the dispute over Angola. The paper wrote: “Brazil is on the side of Portugal in this hour of affliction, desiring that act of violence and intervention be condemned. Brazil wants also that such acts are not repeated and Goa should serve as a lesson, so that spontaneous solution may be reached in the case of Angola before it is too late. This may be the only beneficial result of the lamentable events in India.”

Brazilian newspapers criticised Salazar’s policies as well. The *Estadão do São Paulo* has been described by Indian Embassy Report as ‘violently anti-Salazar’. The paper stated: “Although military methods of re-integrating Goa under Indian sovereignty are condemnable on juridical lines under the Charter of United Nations and morally by the standards of international behaviour of Nehru himself, the fact that European power should in the second half of the 20th century invoke historic arguments in order to maintain its colonies in the sovereign territory of an Asian power is something which the present age cannot but condemn.” An interesting point raised by the paper is over the dilemma of the United States and United Nations after action on Goa. The paper points out “The American faced the problem of condemning India without appearing to be accomplices of Portuguese colonialism; for Nehru, the most enthusiastic partisan and defender of peaceful co-existence and international cooperation, of which the United Nations is the expression, to be associated with the Soviet Union in exercise of its veto, boded ill for the world organisation.”

Indian Embassy had a good relation with Paulo de Castro, international editor of *Diário de Notícias*, who was not only anti-Salazar but equally a strong supporter of freedom of Goa from Portuguese rule. He before the Indian action in Goa had also visited India and met Goa nationalists. The Report of December, 1961 informed that: after the military action he deplored that the question of Goa had been solved by the use of force which

amounted to a violation of the UN charter. Nevertheless, the blame lies with Salazar who did not want to negotiate and consistently denied the right of self-determination to the Goan people. The editor also suggested that right should now be enforced by the UN which should also concern itself guaranteeing the rights of Portuguese citizens who might like to stay in Goa.

The E/I dispatch on the criticism of India's military action, by other Brazilian newspapers wrote: "Most of the remaining newspapers criticised our action from frankly colonialist point of view arguing Goa as a Portuguese territory was of much interest to Brazil as to Portugal herself. The loudest spokesman of this view was the evening newspaper *O Globo*, but several other organs of the press were remarkable for the violent language they used."

Another important comment was by *Correio da Manhã*, which in an editorial titled 'Deaf and Dumb' said: "Brazilian foreign ministry owed an explanation to the public why it had not acted more promptly as a guardian of Portuguese interests in India." The editorial avowed to the failure on the part of Brazilian embassy based in New Delhi, having not informed Portuguese government of such a danger well in advance. Notably, some American newspapers also did carry a report by United Press International (UPI) mentioning Brazilian Embassy at New Delhi, having informed Portuguese government only on 13th of December regarding military movements of the Indian army towards Goa.

Indian military action on Goa did not mean an end to the comments by Brazilian press on Goa, as reports continued to appear even several years after the incident, either in support of India's claim or against the same.

The Monthly Political Report for January, 1962 informed that the Angola debate followed in just after the liberation of Goa, in whose case the position of Brazil was criticised by the press. Newspapers also related the ambiguous nuances of Brazilian government with the case of Goa. *Correio da Manhã* said that Brazil adopted the only

possible attitude. The paper wrote “We severely condemned the violence used against Goa by India..., but on the other hand we have to make the maximum contribution so that Portugal may avoid the disastrous experience of war like in....other Portuguese colonies.” On Portugal, the paper wrote: “Portugal will be able to revive and strengthen full liberty of action if she listens to the appeal of giving Angola same freedom which the British have conceded to Nigeria or French to Gabon. The free Angola will be able to continue linked to Portugal by bonds stronger than civil or military administration.”

The dispatch from Indian Embassy also informed: “Articles mostly critical, continued to appear on Goa situation. On the other hand, Paulo de Castro wrote two articles in *Diário de Noticias* criticising the Salazar’s speeches and stressing Goa’s right to freedom.”

It can be ascertained that Brazilian press also had feeling to compare their judgment on Goa question with that of other countries, their citizens and diplomats had the opinion about it. This is so, because the new Iranian Ambassador Abdol Hossein Hamzani, was asked by the press his opinion about Goa question, in which he affirmed India’s claim, while rejecting the use of force as a justified one. This information was also sent in the Monthly Political Report for January, 1962. Though this is the only instance available to researcher’s knowledge, other press conferences could not be referred if it did occur.

As dispatch of February reads: “The Goa case did not arouse much comment.” The report however informed that Columnist Amilcar Alencastre wrote an article in *A Hora* newspaper, which basically reflected upon India’s liberation of Goa being a morally and historically right on India’s side given the past history of numerous resolutions being rejected at United Nations.

In April, 1962, Indian Embassy in Brazil informed MEA: “There were vague reports in some papers that several thousand Goans wished to migrate to Brazil after colony’s liberation. Immigration authorities said it had been suggested that they should pay the fares for these Goans, but point out that this was impossible.”

In addition to that, *O Globo* published a report suggesting that, “delay in repatriation of soldiers was due to Indian demand of indemnity for damages caused by the withdrawing Portuguese.” The dispatch by Indian Embassy informs that this was ‘promptly contradicted’ and later *O Globo* published the denial.

IV. Goa Question during Military period

In 1964, Portuguese Foreign minister’s comment of Pope’s visit to India got huge prominence in Brazilian newspapers. Report titled “Monthly Political Reports for Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela, October, 1964 mentioned about the incident. The dispatch reads: “The Portuguese Foreign Minister’s rather haughty comment on the Pope’s forthcoming visit to India as a ‘gratuitous insult’ was given wide prominence in the press.” However, the dispatch also mentioned news article which criticised Portugal over the issue. The dispatch mentioned: “Only the leading independent ‘Correio da Manha’ took the Portuguese government to task for their criticism of Pope’s visit. The paper said: “The Pope has no interest in Goa problem as leader of the Catholic Church. Perhaps the, Portuguese government would like to put the Church at the service of the Portuguese State for furtherance of its political and imperialistic ends.” These instances prove that, despite Pro-Portuguese orientation, some newspapers carried unbiased news reports.

Even after several years of Goa’s liberation by India, news reports either in support of India or Portugal or taking an independent stand continue to appear in Brazilian press. News reports on important events pertaining to Goa also continued to appear. Though much importance could not be attached to same, as whenever such ambiguous reports appeared, Indian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro (until 1971, which was later shifted to Brasilia) made representations to the specific newspapers which was accepted by the press without much hesitation.

One specific instance to cite here is that related to the “referendum” in Goa in 1967 regarding the will of Goans to either join Maharashtra or become an independent state. *O Globo* covered the news (as usual) in the negative manner (with respect to India);

drawing the contrast with the referendum to the Nehru's statement in the year 1961 when he said, Goa will be an independent state under Indian Union. The basic argument, *O Globo* wished to put was that: as opposed to Nehru's promise, Goa is forcibly being incorporated in the state of Maharashtra, showing India's dictatorial and imperialist designs.

To counter this, Indian Embassy, met Pedro Menezes, editor of *O Globo*, to explain the Indian position. The editor of *O Globo* later apologised for the 'mistake'. The letter dated 31 January, 1967 by K.H. Siddiqi, Second Secretary (Information) to MEA mentions: "Mr. Pedro Menezes apologised for publication of the criticism and assured me that the whole thing came in the paper inadvertently and actually no malice was meant, and promised to be careful in future."

This was not the first instance when *O Globo*, (a pro-Salazar and pro-American or pro-western, newspaper) carried the news on Goa with such a slant. To explain about the newspaper the dispatch sent by Indian Embassy actually also included a background note on *O Globo*. The background note says: "This newspaper has been playing an active pro-American role since the downfall of Getúlio Vargas regime (1930-1948 and 1951-52)." The paper also informed about the ownership of the newspaper that was under Marinho family, which not only had business interests with American and Western multinational companies but also had charges on them, of taking bribes from the 'Americans'. In reference to India, the background note reads, "The paper is vehemently opposed to the policy of non-alignment and had characterized our action in Goa as travesty of non-violence."

The declassified files of MEA also contains some letters, sent by the journalists expressing their approval with the India's neutralism. A letter dated 9.5.1961, by João Corrêa de Sa, who was a Brazilian journalist based in France, that was sent to J.L. Nehru is one of the several letters. Expressing optimism over the political environment in Brazil with the rise of Quadros, he wrote: "Brazil under strong penetration of American

economic and political interests, which is an alliance with the Catholic Church and powerful land and industrial plutocracy, are now fighting last ditch battle devised to prevent Brazil rallying the Neutralist group. A clear tendency towards neutralism is however already visible in the reactions of our public opinion and is being prompted by a pressure springing off directly from the people and directed by a section of our intelligentsia." His views deserve more weight as he had earlier worked for two years at the Brazilian section of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). This information supports the belief that, he had been correct in sensing the public opinion of Brazil."

To the contrary, Jerry Davila in his book *Hotel Tropico* comments about the conservative and pro-Portugal press in Brazil that dominated the era of 1950s and 1960s.

Jerry Davila writes, "The mainstream press in Rio was also predominantly pro-Portugal. Assis Chateaubriand, owner of the largest newspaper chain in Brazil, Diario Associados, was an outspoken supporter of Salazar's regime." Other newspapers were pro-Portugal, owing to the political influence of the Portuguese community (Davila 2010; Location no.551, Kindle eBook).

In the backdrop of the influence and control over Brazilian press, as visible from the dispatches, getting published a news report favouring India's position was largely dependent on personal contacts with the Brazilian journalists and editors.

Hence, coverages on Goa remained an issue of concern for Indian Embassy in Brazil until 1974 that is until when the new government of Portugal recognised Goa to be a part of Indian Union and diplomatic relations between India and Portugal were reinstated.

Conclusion

As is evident in the mentioned circumstances, reporting on the issue of Goa in Brazilian press was largely dependent on the political orientation and ownership of the paper. The Chapter draws chronological base of how Brazilian media viewed the Question of Goa over a specified period. It appeared that, with public opinion turning liberal around mid-20th century, Brazilian press as well exhibited moderate nature on their part. Added to it an interesting point that appeared is that, whenever, Indian embassy in Brazil made representations in reference to factually incorrect reporting, it was promptly accepted and an apology was made by the editor of the concerned newspaper. Most importantly, problems and challenges in getting pro-India reporting on Goa become quite clear, apart from those reports that were published due to personal contact.

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary and Conclusion

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The subject of the present dissertation is to ascertain Brazilian views and actions on the question of the decolonisation, more specifically on Goa. The declassified documents of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs have largely formed the primary sources of analyses. Wide literature available on evolving Brazilian position on decolonisation in Africa laid a good background for understanding the stances and nuances of Brazil in relation to Goa. The present study delves with two hypotheses:

- a) Paradoxical positions and nuanced stances characterised Brazil, even as its foreign policy betrayed little or no understanding of Asia, much less of Goa question.
- b) The Brazilian position has been of dual nature in reference to the case of Goa, balancing India and Portugal at the same time.

While the introductory part of the dissertation made an effort to question the general belief of India-Latin America relation being only of recent origin, succeeding Chapters deals more specifically with Brazil. By the way of declassified documents of MEA, researcher intended to explain that Latin American countries had positions and stands, on the important events pertaining to India's foreign policy and security concerns, even if a neutral one, in the period as early as 1950s and 1960s. The argument however limits itself to the diplomatic circles of Latin American countries. In Latin American press as well, the events in India, sometimes even domestic ones like the Communist Party's victory in Kerala, or issue of food crisis, received prominence. Even in the period as early as 1950s and 1960s, Press in Latin America reported news from India, though not factually in a correct way in most of the controversial cases, like Kashmir issue, to mention one.

The introductory part itself prepares a background of Brazil's involvement in Goa issue as a protector of Portuguese interests in India, raising curiosity over the position on decolonisation, more specifically on Goa, which has been so far reduced in the academic and public domain, to the statement that: Brazil criticised India's use of force to liberate Goa.

The Second Chapter delves into the subject more deeply by the way of secondary literature available on the subject. The Chapter attempts to offers an explanation of Brazilian ambition to project itself abroad, as visible from their active role at UN. This is also evidenced by Brazil taking up the role of mediator in the decolonisation of Portuguese colonies. This role has direct relation to the objective of Brazilian foreign policy, i.e. to enhance Brazil's prestige in the Afro-Asian region that would help it become the leader of Luso-Brazilian world, with the 'blessings of Portugal'.

As far as explanation on Brazilian policy towards anti-colonialism is concerned, it brings out the dual nature exhibited by Brazilian support to the issue of decolonisation at home i.e. through Presidential messages to Congress, Presidential messages to the nation, and Graduation speeches at Rio-Branco Institute, while at the same time, explicit statements in favour of Portugal's colonial policies by Brazilian leaders while on visit to Portugal. The reasons cited for the same as 'sentimental ties' between Brazil and Portugal fails to stand valid in the context, no explanation exist in any literature that have been referred by the researcher, on the subject for the sentimental ties beyond a connection, that too of 'cultural' one. The rhetoric over Luso- Brazilian Community, have also been countered by scholars, as well as officially from the side of Portugal. As Wayne Selchar explains, Brazil lacked the capacity to have strong Afro-Asian policy, is further proved by its lacking capacity to stand against Western countries in reference to their colonial policy.

The Chapter analyses the foreign policy of Brazil and its nature as well as deduces the Pro-American and legalistic roots, in the academic background of foreign ministers of Brazil and the academic curriculum at Rio-Branco. Drawing from the elitist nature of *Itamarati* and those who house them; the dissertation focussed on flexible approaches followed by the foreign policy officials, in agreement with the position of the US and other Western powers. Most importantly, it explains the centrality of President in foreign policy making in Brazil, during mid- 20th century. In context of Brazil's support to Portugal over its colonial policies, the Chapter, points out that, the pressure to support Portugal came primarily from huge ethnic Portuguese community in major cities of Brazil like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, as well as their presence in Brazilian Congress and *Itamarati*.

In reference to the first hypothesis, it is important to understand that Brazilian view of Afro-Asia to an extent started and ended with Quadros' era. The transition of late 1950s and the early 1960s gave the opportunity, for the first time to the first generation of Brazilians to achieve political positions, who wished to align with the third world and follow an 'independent foreign policy'. In reality, such a phase did not exist for long. Initiatives and beliefs of the Brazilian scholars and policy makers received a backlash when the economic opportunities projected for Brazil in those areas did not meet with success. As Rodrigues points out that, what was written by Brazilian scholars about Afro-Asia resembled Brazilian imagination of Afro-Asian region, than a reality of Africa or Asia. Even in reference to Quadros, his over-emphasis on Africa, preempted any major role of Asia in Brazilian policy. Hence, the secondary literature did not give much prominence to Asia, not to mention Goa in the Brazilian policy.

Chapter Three was specifically meant to study the Brazilian position on the Goa question, as ascertained by the declassified documents of MEA. The chronological explanation of events in reference to the issue of Goa validates the argument of dual nature of Brazilian foreign policy and diplomats, as they took two contradictory positions at the same time, though at different places in reference to anti-colonialism. The argument refers to the

positions taken by President Café Filho and President Kubitschek, who took different positions while in Brazil and then again in Portugal.

Either in reference to Heredia's incident or support to Portugal in declaratory statements made on the eve of march of Satyagrahis to Goa, 1954: prove that at personal interactions in most cases, Brazilian diplomats agreed with the India's position on Goa, but cited 'sentimental ties' for not coming out so in open. The excuse of 'sentimental ties' however, does not explain several other cases in which Portugal was not involved. It neither does explain why Brazil did not criticise Chinese Aggression on India. Nor does that excuse explain Brazilian support to 'plebiscite' as a solution to Kashmir issue in the 1964 debate at UN Security Council. It does not even stand as a valid explanation for Brazil abstaining from a resolution that was passed unanimously at Latin American Parliament, criticising the human rights violation committed by Government and Army of Pakistan in 1971 on East Bengal issue. To mention, Brazil was the only country to abstain from the voting on the resolution.

It is also required to mention here that, in all these cases, Brazil took a position that won't annoy the other side, playing a very intelligent game that too, safely. On India's military action, Brazil criticised India's action citing UN Charter, an old way followed by Brazil, to save itself from being accused, having cited legal provisions.

There are two instances in reference to the case of Goa that proves that Brazil did not want to annoy any side, following an intelligent and clever policy. First one is the return of a Note sent by Portugal to India through Brazilian Embassy at New Delhi, wherein serious accusation were made against the Indian Government. The return of the Note by Indian government which was sent by Portugal, through Brazilian government in 1964, became a serious issue in the process. In reference to the issue, V.H. Coelho, Indian ambassador to Brazil met Acting Secretary General of *Itamarati*, Ambassador Vasconcellos. Ambassador Vasconcellos in the personal interaction with Coelho, suggested that Indian government should accept the 'Note' and then reject it in writing,

about which they would inform the Portugal. The incident explains that, Brazil actually did not want itself to be seen as being partial on any side, saving itself from any accusation. Similarly, another case was visible in 1968, when Brazilian Embassy stopped issuing Portuguese passports to Indian nationals to residents in Goa. Though, the Brazilian Embassy stopped issuing the Passports only after Indian MEA made representation to the Brazilian diplomats.

Fourth Chapter of the dissertation largely viewed the Brazilian position on Goa, from the lens of Brazilian print media, which remained highly supportive of Portugal, at least on the dispute over Goa. The root causes were partly, financial, i.e. they were financially dependent on the assistance from the American as well as the Western sources, which in return, influenced their reporting. Another reason is, a dominant section of Pro-Portuguese class which dominated all the Brazilian Institutions, government as well as Press. A point explained in the book *Hotel Tropic* by Jerry Davila reinforces such arguments.

Coming on the Hypotheses, the vague understanding of Brazilian diplomats on Afro-Asia, much less about Goa, can be largely understood from the secondary literature available in the field, which have been discussed in the Chapter Two. The Second Chapter discusses in detail the Brazilian policy on decolonisation in general. The declassified documents primarily helps to verify such arguments, put forth in such a body of literature, as the documents of MEA provide a chronological base for ascertaining inferences from day to day events that took place in the diplomatic circles of Brazil. The unclear understanding is further explained by the events and debates that emerged in reference to ‘independent’ policy and the issue of sending observer at NAM Conference in 1961.

Second Hypothesis that pertains to Brazil’s ‘dual nature’ were also verified by the instances highlighted in the declassified materials of MEA. It is however, questionable that though Brazilian diplomats used the term ‘sentimental’ ties to explain their positions

on numerous instances, such as support to Portugal over its colonial policies, such excuses fail to stand due to the following reasons:

- i) Brazil having achieved its independence in 1823; absence of any strong links with Portugal have been strongly proved by the academic scholars. Nothing existed between Brazil and Portugal beyond a normal trade. Even until 1974, Portugal share in trade with Brazil was mere two percent.
- ii) Though ‘sentimental’ ties were often quoted by Brazilian diplomats and that is also resembled by some treaties signed between Brazil and Portugal, but the treaties took a long time to be ratified, sometimes also witnessed widespread opposition inside Brazil, mars the actual relevance of such agreements. To quote an instance: In the Annual Report of 1950 from Indian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, in reference to a cultural exchange treaty of Brazil with Britain which was signed in the year 1949, the dispatch pointed out that similar treaty was signed by the Brazil with France and Portugal in the year 1946, which was not ratified until 1950. It can be inferred that signing of such treaties were meant to appease select groups.
- iii) Similar actions and statements were made by Brazilian diplomats and political leaders on regular basis to satisfy the organised, influential and wealthy, Portuguese community based in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, i.e. in the constituencies that were electorally important for one’s victory.

Notably, in all the instances, Brazilian dual nature was quite evident. In reference to Goa, though in most cases, during the personal interactions, Brazilian diplomats agreed to India’s position, but such agreement of thought were not discussed in open or in the official declaratory statements. This stood also true of Brazilian press, as appeared during the visit of first Indian press delegation to Brazil in 1953, and also of Brazilian senators, during the visit of first Brazilian Parliamentary delegation to India in 1964. Over all Brazil's strategy was following an intelligent and clever policy of showing different faces at different places.

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