

**EGYPTIAN POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT
UNDER PRESIDENT NASSER**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SATYANARAYAN PATTANAYAK

WESTASIAN DIVISION
CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI, 110067, INDIA
1992



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND
AFRICAN STUDIES,
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dated: 03/01/92

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled
"EGYPTIAN POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT UNDER PRESIDENT NASSER",
submitted by MR. SATYANARAYAN PATTANAYAK in partial
fulfilment for the award of the degree of MASTER OF
PHILOSOPHY (M.Phil.) of this University, is his own work and
may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. To the
best of my knowledge this dissertation has not been submitted
for the award of any other degree of this University or of
any other University.

PROF. ANEERUDHA GUPTA
CHAIRPERSON

Chairman
Centre for West Asian and African Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
NEW DELHI

PROF. K.R. SINGH
SUPERVISOR

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T

Here comes the opportunity to convey my gratitude to those persons whom I oblige a lot for the successful completion of this work.

At the very outset I owe my special gratitude to my reverend Supervisor **PROF. K.R. SINGH** without whom it would have been improbable to complete this work. His sincere guidance and suggestions are beyond expression. It remains with the one and only heart that feels but fails to express.

I thank to **PROF. ANEERUDHA GUPTA**, Chairperson of the Centre, for his kind co-operation and sincere help.

I am very much indebted to **J.P. SHARMA**, Lecturer in History, Shyamial College, Delhi University who encouraged me in every step for the successful completion of this work.

I am also thankful to the staffs of J.N.U. Library, I.C.W.A. Library, I.D.S.A. Library, Ratan Tata Library, Delhi University Library and Nehru Memorial Museum & Library for providing me sufficient materials to carry out this work.

My sincere thanks goes to my friends whom I love so much and a mention of whose names, I am told, would irk them a lot.

And last but not the least I tender my heartfelt thanks to **MR. K. MURALIDHARAN** who took a lot of pain in assisting me in typing the Dissertation within the stipulated time.

PLACE - NEW DELHI
DATE - 3.1.92

Satyannarayan Pattanayak
SATYANARAYAN PATTANAYAK

C O N T E N T S

			Page no.
Acknowledgement			
Preface			i - ii
CHAPTER	I	INTRODUCTION	1 - 19
CHAPTER	II	ROOTS OF EGYPTIAN NON-ALIGNMENT	20 - 40
CHAPTER	III	EGYPT'S PRO-SOVIET TILT	41 - 64
CHAPTER	IV	EGYPT AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT	65 - 88
CONCLUSION			89 -102
Bibliography			103 -111
Appendix I			i - vi
Appendix II			
Table - 1			i - ii
Table - 2			i - ii
Appendix III			
Table - 1			i -iii
Table - 2			i
Table - 3			i - ii
Table - 4			i - ii

P R E F A C E

The emergence of the charismatic authority of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt after 1954 had a profound impact upon its foreign relations. Egypt, under him, followed a vigorous foreign policy in which non-alignment became a cardinal point. Though Egypt had a framework of the non-aligned policy before Nasser came to power and even it continued to be pursued with some vigour during President Hosni Mubarak, still the Egyptian policy of non-alignment could reach a high water mark only during the days of President Nasser. Nasser pursued an activist non-aligned policy and broadened it from its narrow confines of anti-imperialism and gave it a Third-World focus as well. He also played a pioneering role in laying the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the global sphere. So it is impossible to ignore his contributions to the Egyptian policy of non-alignment.

The first chapter is an effort to give a conceptual framework of the non-alignment policy and its back-drop in Egypt.

The second chapter deals with the roots of Egyptian non-alignment. The political, economic and military factors in the domestic front have been taken into account. Moreover the change in the Communist world and the Arab-Israeli factor linked to pan-Arabism of Nasser have been given prominence.

The third chapter throws abundant light on the Pro-Soviet tilt of Egypt from 1955 till Nasser's death and the demarcating years in Egyptian foreign policy like 1955 and 1965 have been highlighted.

The fourth chapter embodies the contributions of Nasser towards the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Fifth Chapter i.e. the conclusion is an analysis of Nasser's role and personality. Moreover, it is a substantiation of the reversal of Nasserite foreign policy under the new leadership of President Sadat.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

NON-ALIGNMENT: CONCEPT AND EVOLUTION OF THE TERM

Non-alignment is a post-World War II concept and began as a response to the Cold War. The Cold War had sought to divide the world into two water-tight camps and the newly emerged independent states were forced to opt for one bloc or the other. While some of these states joined this Cold War alliance system, others resisted the pressure. They found it as a constraint on their decision-making as newly independent sovereign states. Those who resisted this pressure of the Cold War rivalry sought to evolve an independent policy. Initially that policy was called by various names like neutralism or positive neutrality till the term non-alignment acquired universal acceptability. Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ghana, Yugoslavia etc. were the pioneers of this policy of non-alignment. Thus non-alignment is a policy of keeping out of alliances in general and military pacts in particular. Its essence lies in its unity of purposes and a diversity of opinions. According to President Nasser, the policy of non-alignment is for 'peace based on justice'.¹

1. *Egypt's role in Non-alignment*. Cairo: State Information Service, Ministry of Information, Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, p.3.

The term non-alignment was first called 'neutrality', then 'dynamic neutrality', which passed into 'positive neutralism', that later became 'uncommitted' and finally 'non-aligned'.² In popular usage these terms are synonymous and responsible statesmen, commonly associated with this policy, have often equated these terms and used them interchangeably. It was not until the Belgrade Conference of 1961 that these statesmen formally accepted the term non-alignment in place of other labels.

As a concept, non-alignment does not mean neutrality in its classical sense. Nor does it simply imply equi-distance between two rival power blocs. It does not even imply equi-distance between two friendly nations when they are engaged in a dispute. It has never implied human inactivity, inertness and non-involvement in any given environment. It does not preclude the countries from aligning against aggression, exploitation, racialism, colonialism and imperialism. This policy also does not seek to create a third bloc. President Nasser put it unmistakably in this form:

We do not wish to insinuate directly or indirectly that the states following the policy of non-alignment aim to create a third world bloc. We live in a world suffering from the strife between two blocs and we cannot imagine that a third bloc should enter the arena

2. G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment*, London: Faber and Faber, 1966, p.115.

and increase the tension of this strife instead of easing it.³

Because of the then prevailing conditions, non-alignment acquired an anti-imperialist and anti-neocolonial overtone. Some also perceived it as a world peace and disarmament movement while others felt that its major responsibility was to bridge the gulf between the rich North and the poor South. While these may be various facets of the policy, "the core of the policy of non-alignment lies in the refusal to have a nation's action and judgement limited and curtailed by a *a priori* commitment to any of the *colossi*".⁴

Non-alignment is only one of the various aspects of the foreign policy of a country that claims to follow it. Like neutrality, isolation and balance, it is also one of the dimensions of a foreign policy and is essentially a tactical posture struck in response to specific international situations. Moreover, the non-aligned aspect of a country's foreign policy is influenced by the domestic components like regime legitimacy, economic development, ideological framework and national security which are in turn influenced by the existing international environment at different levels

-
3. The Government of Yugoslavia, *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries*, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961, p.44.
 4. K.A. Babaa, "Arab Positive Neutrality", *Middle East Forum*, Beirut, vol.XLI, no.1, Winter 1965, p.11.

such as regional, Afro-Asian and global. So the non-aligned stance of a given state would reflect those variables.

Non-alignment is the ability to exercise political independence - the crowning act in the drama of national liberation. It is the mark of sovereign existence. Little wonder then that the passion for non-alignment has shown itself to be strongest among the newly liberated nations of Asia and Africa. Moreover, Afro-Asian non-alignment is a response to a political and ideological struggle so extensive and profound that no state anywhere can avoid the decision to take sides or not take sides.

BACK-DROP OF NON-ALIGNMENT IN EGYPT

After the end of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War, some of the leaders of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, conceived of the policy of non-alignment with the primary objectives of protesting against colonialism, opposing apartheid, non-adherence to the multi-lateral military pacts, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, strengthening the United Nations and constructing a new international economic order. Most of the newly independent countries have been inclined to accept this policy because of the anti-colonial and anti-feudal heritage of their freedom movements and ultra-sensitiveness about their sovereignty. Egypt falls within this category.

Among the Arab states, Egypt was one of the first to formulate and pursue this policy. Moreover, of the non-aligned regimes of the Arab world, Nasser's alone has assumed the character of an international political force, the impact of which has been felt outside the Arab world. Thus a study of the Egyptian policy of non-alignment, especially under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, would highlight not only an important aspect of Egypt's foreign policy but also the general trend in the Arab world in that direction.

Inasmuch as non-alignment or neutralism as was then called) is essentially an attitude toward the Cold War, it may sound somewhat paradoxical to state that non-alignment came into being in Egypt with no reference to the ideological issues or politico-military antagonisms of the Cold War proper. The Egyptian policy of non-alignment lay not in the relationship between Egyptian society and Cold War, but in the national experiences, problems, struggles and aspirations of Egypt and the Arab world.

Initially the Egyptian policy of non-alignment was formulated as a matter of national expediency. It was an expression of an attitude of opposition to foreign domination and resistance to the great-power-influence. Hence, its intimate relationship was with Egyptian nationalism. It will not be wrong to say that the voice of Egyptian non-alignment was the voice of Arab nationalism in general and Egyptian nationalism in particular. Failures on the part of the West

to understand and come to terms with Arab nationalism contributed to this policy.

The Egyptian mind has faith in Western justice. Yet, Western statesmen, with a Western sense of timing, and a vestigial air of patronage frequently aggravated a partial cleavage by insisting upon a black and white public choice.⁵ Moreover, they expected Egyptians to behave as loyal allies while being treated as conquered subjects. Non-alignment in Egypt began as a protest against the imperialism of the West. It appeared in the Egyptian mind as an act of despair with the West rather than as an act of faith in the East. The Western act of despair is quite conspicuous if we cast a view to the reiterated Egyptian demand for the revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty during the post-World War II period.

REVISION OF 1936 TREATY

The Egyptians, during the post-World War II period, demanded the revision of 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty that negated their national independence and sovereignty. The Treaty, which was signed on 26 August 1936, was detrimental to the Egyptian independence as it could easily make Egypt a

5. Georgiana G. Stevens, "Arab Neutralism and Bandung", *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, Vol.2, no.2, Spring 1957, p.140.

satellite of Britain by the so-called Sudan question and the question of Suez Canal base.

The Sudan Question

Sudan was a part of Egypt since its conquest by Mohammed Ali. Due to financial and administrative mismanagements, Egypt lost Sudan to local uprising after the British occupied Sudan in 1882. In 1898-99 Sudan was reconquered and an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was established. Since 1899, the British had developed a corps of able administrators for the Sudan who treated the country no differently from their other African colonies. Only perfunctory lip service was paid to the notion of Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Unity of the Nile Valley had become a part of the nationalist movement in Egypt. But Britain over-looked it. Montgomery, the then Field Marshal who arrived in Egypt in June 1946, believed that it was vital for Britain to remain strong in the Sudan, in case of difficulties with the Egyptians. He commented "the weaker our position in Egypt, the greater need for strength in the Sudan — so as to control the Nile — the life blood of Egypt".⁶ Thus the fellow Egyptian anger was aggravated. It became more so because the Sudanese were looked upon as an integral part of the Egyptian people. The Egyptian claim for re-union with the Sudan was based on

6. Peter Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971, p.287.

historical, ethnic, cultural, economic and strategic considerations.⁷ So to make any concession on the principle of *Wihdat al-Nil* (Nile Unity) in the part of any Egyptian ruling elite might have imperilled his leadership in Egypt. The Sudan question had assumed serious proportion after World War II and was adversely influencing Anglo-Egyptian relations.

Suez Canal Base

The Egyptian policy of non-alignment that evolved after the Second World War because of an anti-imperialistic struggle also amply testified in the context of the Suez Canal base. The Suez Canal base was completely subservient to the British dominance as under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1936 negotiated by Eden and the Wafd Party then ruling over Egypt. In that Treaty Egypt's independence was recognised and the international character of the Suez Canal was reaffirmed. However, the British retained the right to maintain upto 10,000 troops in the Canal Zone. At the end of a period of twenty years after the signing of the Treaty i.e. after 1956, there had to be agreement on the future shape of the Suez Canal base. Thus the Treaty provided sufficient scope for the continuing British domination upon Egypt. In spite of the persistent

7. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Berkeley, 1952, p.415.

Egyptian demand, for the revision of the Treaty, the British imperialistic outlooks did not yield.

Whatever be the legal niceties on either side about the continuation of the 1936 Treaty, the political and military realities were quite clear. An army which stays on the territory of another sovereign state without its tacit approval of and in defiance of its request to leave, becomes, in practice if not in law, an occupying and not an allied force.⁸

The Egyptian effort in 1947 to secure the assistance of the United Nations Security Council in the evacuation of the British garrison from the Suez Canal Zone and the withdrawal of British forces from the Sudan failed to accomplish any result. Thus the Egyptians became further harassed. It was reflected on their struggle against British imperialism. The year in which the world witnessed the birth of the East-West conflict was the year on which Egypt's struggle against continued occupation of a part of its national territory by a major Western power reached new heights of frustration. No Egyptian Government, therefore, could have retained its legitimacy if it had acquiesced to the British presence either in the Sudan or in the Suez Canal Zone.⁹

8. Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971, p.71.

9. K.R. Singh, "Egyptian Non-alignment", *International Studies*, Vol.20, no.1-2, January-June 1981, p.316.

Impact of the Cold War

The first few years of the Cold War coincided with Egyptian pre-occupation with the mounting struggle for the evacuation of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone and the Arab-Israeli turmoil of 1948-49. Not only the Western Bloc but also the Soviet Bloc had supported Israel against Arabs at that time. The Western hegemony over the Arab world finally culminated in the American-British-French Declaration of 25 May 1950 which was in essence an arms control imposed by the West upon the Arabs. The U.S.S.R. was largely unconcerned with the Arabs. Its main concern was the Northern Tier; Iran and Turkey. So the advent of Cold War *per se* and the division of the North into two blocs was met with unconcern and disinterest by the Egyptians whose attention was directed towards matters closer at home.

The Egyptian policy of non-alignment and the Cold War were wide apart, at least in the initial phases. If they touched one another, it was only tangentially, the sole point of contact between them being that one party to the Cold War, the West, was in conflict with the rising Arab nationalism in Egypt. Thus initially Egypt's response to the Cold War was a "Neither/Nor" in the context of "Either/Or" posed by the East and the West.

Soon things began to change and the very powers whose policies made Egypt remain indifferent to Cold War issues

summoned Egypt to participate in their global military strategies. Feigning unawareness of Egyptian and other Arab grievances, and making no effort to redress the past injustices, the Western powers embarked upon a campaign of pressure and inducement to bring Egypt, and through it the rest of the Arab world, into alignment with the West.

It may be recalled that, in accordance with the Western strategy of containment of the Soviet Bloc (*vis-a-vis* Communism) collective security pacts were concluded in Europe and the Far East in the first few years of the Cold War. In Europe, where the first manifestations of East-West trouble were felt, the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949 formed the back-bone of Western Cold War arrangements. When the victory of Communism in China and the invasion South Korea brought the Cold War to the Pacific area, two bilateral treaties and one tripartite pact were signed in rapid succession. They were the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Philippines of 30 August 1951, the Tripartite Security Pact between Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. (ANZUS) of 1 September 1951 and the Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan of 8 September 1951.

West Asia was the only region which had not provided any framework for the Western collective security system. The power-politics of alliance and strategic facilities had,

to the West, the character of a giant spider's web poised to the north.¹⁰ The increasing feebleness of Britain as well as the mounting Egyptian restiveness to the British presence and the threat of Communism had shaken the complacency with which the future of the Western position in the Egyptian *vis-a-vis* Arab World had been viewed. The Egyptian Government, in desperation, passed a law on 8 October 1951 which declared Sudan as a part of Egypt and proclaimed King Faruq of Egypt as the Emperor of Sudan. Thus Egypt by law was seeking to unilaterally resolve the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. It was precisely at this stage that the Western proposal for a Middle East Defense Organisation (MEDO) was presented by the U.S.A., the U.K., France and Turkey, to Egypt on 13 October 1951; five days after the unilateral abrogation of the clauses of the 1936 Treaty by the Egyptian Government.

The idea of such an organisation was first expressed by Ernest Bevin of England a year earlier, in the course of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the future of the British forces in the Canal Zone. But it was not until the negotiations had broken down due to the imperial life line concept of Britain and the unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty by the Egyptian Government on 8 October 1951, that the proposal for a Middle East Defense Organisation was formally

10. Erskine B. Childers, *The Road to Suez*, London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962, p.81.

advanced. The proposal now was advanced not by Britain alone, but by Western powers as a group.

The MEDO

In presenting the proposal to Egypt, the governments of the U.S., the U.K., France and Turkey added that "invitations to participate in the Defense Organisation have been addressed to Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, who have.....agreed in principle".¹¹ The four Western powers announced also that they expressed Egypt to furnish to the proposed organisation "such strategic defense and other facilities on her soil as are indispensable for the organisation in peace-time of the defense of the Middle East", and to "undertake to grant forces of the Allied Middle East Defense all necessary facilities and assistance in the event of war, imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency including the use of Egyptian ports, air-fields and means of communication".¹² In return for this, three promises were dangled before Egypt. First, that "facilities to train and equip her forces will be given to Egypt by those participating members of the Allied Defense in a position to do so".¹³ Second, that, "if Egypt is prepared

11. U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents*, Volume II, Washington, D.C.: 1957, p.2180.

12. *Ibid.*, p.2181-82.

13. *ibid.*, p.2181.

to cooperate fully in the MEDO in accordance with the provisions of the attached annex, His Majesty's Government for their part would be willing to agree to supercession of the 1936 Treaty and would also be willing to agree to withdraw from Egypt such British forces as are not allocated to the MEDO by agreement between the Egyptian Government and the governments of other countries also participating as founder members";¹⁴ And third, that "the present British base in Egypt would be formally handed over to the Egyptians on the understanding that it would simultaneously become an Allied base within the Allied Middle East Command..."¹⁵

The proposal was given to Egypt after other countries from outside the Middle East region had already been invited, and had agreed to join it. Moreover, the very substance of the offer was such as to virtually compel the Egyptian Government to reject it immediately. Because the handing over of the Suez Canal base to Egypt was admitted to be fictional; and the promised withdrawal of unspecified portions of the garrison was made contingent upon agreement by the countries --- including the U.K. and three other members. Thus an attempt was being made to impose an international domination over Egypt in place of only one party --- British domination.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, p.2182.

The Western effort to bring Egypt into the "containment" system failed due to its methodology, timing and approach. The Egyptians rejected it and other Arabs scorned it as a thinly disguised effort to maintain foreign military bases and occupation on Egyptian territory in a new guise and under a new name at a time when nationalist sentiment was demanding nothing less than unconditional evacuation and total liberation.¹⁶

Nasser reportedly told the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, during his Cairo visit, that "a mere change of flag from the British to the MEDO would not satisfy the Egyptians".¹⁷

The failure of Western powers to enlist the support of Egypt, which would also act as an incentive to other Arabs, in their military alliance system compelled them to seek new avenues. The whole strategy of the defense of the Middle East was reorganised. The previous strategy, which centred round the Suez base, was abandoned in favour of the Northern Tier concept. The Northern Tier concept was favourably received by only one Arab state — Iraq. But the Iraqi Government could not openly side with the West without

16. Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., *The Dynamics of Neutralism In the Arab World: A Symposium*, San Francisco: Chaldler Publishing Company, 1964, p.178.

17. *Egypt's Role in Non-alignment*, n.1, p.4.

crushing all the nationalist forces which were against this concept.

The Egyptian foreign policy did not change basically despite the 1952 *coup d'etat* and then coming into power of a military regime. It would be wrong to presume that the Egyptians were not security conscious but what they wanted was that in their attempt to maintain their security they tried to rely more on themselves rather than on the West. It would also be wrong to conclude that the new government, after the *coup d'etat* of 1952, had any intention of turning to the Communist Bloc in its confrontation with the West. In fact, the Egyptian Communist Party was suppressed soon after the *coup d'etat*. Also during this period the Soviet Union under Stalin was hostile towards Egypt. So Nasser's adherence to the Communist camp was not feasible.

Nasser believed in strengthening the internal front in order to combat Communism. He emphasized the clash between nationalism and Communism during his meeting with Dulles in 1953. He warned Dulles:

I think you are complicating the foot-ball game. Colonialism is played out, and now the match is between two teams — communism and nationalism. And if you insist on playing, you are going to spoil the game for others".¹⁸

18. H. M. Heikal, *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and his Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels and Statesmen* New York: Doubleday and Company, 1973, p.41.

Thus Nasser had no intention to align with the East. In fact, he was searching for an honourable deal with the West that would safeguard Egypt's national interest while protecting the strategic interests of the West, as seen from the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954. At this juncture, the fear of Communism induced the Western mind to reach an agreement with Egypt to secure the Western defense system in Egypt. Washington reportedly pressurized London to reach a settlement on the basis of the Suez Canal Zone that would be acceptable to Egypt. Soon London gave up the idea of MEDO and in its place initialled a new formula to Egypt on 27 July 1954. It was significant that the Cairo delegation was led by Colonel Nasser himself.

The Suez Base Agreement

Under the new Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, which was formally signed on 19 October 1954, "Egypt was formally not made a member of the Western alliance system, but under Article 4 of that agreement, the evacuated bases could be used by Britain, whenever Britain, or any member of the Arab League, or Turkey was threatened".¹⁹ That suggested a concealed link of Egypt with Western Bloc in the Cold War as Turkey had already become a member of the North Atlantic

19. For the Text of the agreement, see *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956: A Documentary Publication*, Department of State Publication, 6392, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1956, pp.20-23.

Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the seeds of the Baghdad Pact were germinating. Thus by the new formula, Egypt allowed the West to occupy it in case of war, thereby almost joining the Western Bloc.

Though the Cold War inched its way ominously toward the Arab world during 1953-54 by several pacts like the Turkey-Pakistan Pact, the Pakistan-U.S. Agreement etc., it was not until the Baghdad Pact of 24 February 1955 that it entered into the Arab world and directly challenged the Egyptian policy of non-alignment.

The possibility of finding a mutually acceptable formula for voluntary association between a free Egypt and the Western powers, which was obtained in 1954, was destroyed by the advent of the Baghdad Pact. Whereas alignment had been opposed on the past records of the Western powers with the suspicion that it would perpetuate foreign control, it came to be unconditionally opposed by Egypt after 1955.

The year 1955 was a turning point in Egyptian foreign policy. Nasser had consolidated himself in the domestic power politics. Events of Gaza in February 1955 showed the possibility of an open military clash between Egypt and Israel. Egypt's search for arms was not yielding results. Finally the new turn given to the Soviet policy by Khrushchev opened new options for Egypt. Soviet Union, in its search for new friends in the Afro-Asian world, was willing to support

Egypt's economic developments, military requirements and to offer political support in the United Nations. These were powerful incentives that Egypt could not ignore. Consequently, non-alignment which was peaceful and moderate in nature and was marked by anti-imperialism took a vigorous turn in 1955. "The year 1955", as Dekmejian opined, "constituted a main turning point in the evolution of Nasserite 'neutralism' from a quiescent to a positive or active phase".²⁰

20. R. Hrarir Deknejian, *Egypt since Nasir: The Elements of Foreign Policy* London: University of London, 1972, p.111.

CHAPTER II

ROOTS OF EGYPTIAN POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

CHAPTER II


ROOTS OF EGYPTIAN POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

The emergence of non-alignment as a basic tenet of Egyptian foreign policy was the result of a variety of factors. Its roots lie both in the domestic and foreign policies of Egypt. The domestic policy is to be analysed in the context of political, economic and military factors whereas the foreign policy is to be analysed in the context of the new development in the Communist Bloc and the Palestine cause linked to the Pan-Arabism of Nasser.

The political factors in the domestic front influencing Egypt's policy are the policies pursued by the Wafd, the Ikhwan, the Communists and the newly emerging military elite.

The WAFD

The Wafd Party was discredited among the Egyptians primarily because of its failure in liberating Egypt from the Western clutches. The Wafdists had achieved neither complete national independence nor an economically developed Egypt. The essence of relationship of Britain with Egypt between 1922 and 1952 was that the British sought to promote strategic interests by means less than full colonialism but consistently short of cooperation with freely self-determining and indigenous government of Egypt. The Wafd-



dominated Parliaments failed to find a diplomatic *modus operandi* to match the passionate hopes of the Egyptians during the post-World War II period.

On 20 December 1945, Mohammed Nokrashy Pasha, who had succeeded Ally Maher as Premier, approached the British officially to negotiate for a revision of the 1936 Treaty. Egypt's claims had already been hardened. Under nationalist pressure. Nokrashy was demanding the complete and immediate withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the Sudan and the unity of the two countries under the Egyptian crown. The demands were popularly expressed in the slogans of 'Evacuation' and 'Unity of the Nile Valley'. But Nokrashy's proposal was coldly received by Britain. The British answer to this overture in 1945 was that while preliminary conversations would be opened with the aim of placing Anglo-Egyptian relations "on a footing of full and free partnership, as between equals", "the essential soundness of the fundamental principles", underlying the 1936 Treaty had been demonstrated by World War II.¹

TH-3868

The reply was very disappointing and it led to serious student riots in Cairo. It resulted in 170 casualties from police fire, known as the 'Abbas Bridge Massacre', and riots

1. Quoted, Georgian G. Stevens, "Arab Neutralism and Bandung", *Middle East Journal*, Washington, Vol. II, No. 2, Spring 1957, p. 142.



by workers in Alexandria and elsewhere. There had been large-scale industrial strikes as well as bomb outrages and other attacks in the Suez Canal Zone.

From 1946 to 1951, negotiation was continued sporadically but the British price, in terms of military alliance and the status of the Sudan, was more than Egyptian Government could accept and survive.² Negotiations with the British Government, through the British Embassy, were reopened in 1950 and dragged on intermittently for the next eighteen months. In 1951, the Wafd tried the second course. On 8 October, 1951 Nahas unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which he himself had signed fifteen years earlier. However imprudent this gesture might have been, public opinion was excitedly waiting for it. But the national question still existed. The British forces took such forcible action as was necessary to maintain themselves in the Canal Zone. However restricted it was, the occupation of territory by a foreign force was humiliating and a permanent source of indignation.³

Once the legal action of unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty proved abortive, the nationalists resorted to more direct methods of putting pressure on the British. By

-
2. Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971, p.72.
 3. Jean and Simon Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition* London: Methuen and Company, 1958, p:105.

the middle of October the Wafdists attempted to make the British presence in the Suez base difficult by non-cooperation and by launching guerrilla warfare. But this policy got out of hand, and indirectly brought down the Wafd and hastened the revolution in Egypt without getting rid of the British.⁴

The Wafd, which could not present any permanent solution to Egypt's independence, also lost its power to attract the loyalty of the thousands of unemployed or ill-paid young graduates from university and the educated and semi-educated younger generation of the lower middle class in town and country side. The over-emphasis upon foreign policy at the cost of domestic socio-economic development was partly responsible for it. Thus the Wafd was discredited. Not only was its credibility being eroded, other political groups were also emerging in Egypt which were ideologically opposed to liberation. Among these groups were the Ikhwan and the Communists.

Ikhwan

The Ikhwan represented a strong and growing force in Egyptian politics that believed in basing the domestic and foreign policies of Egypt on the Islamic tenets. The Ikhwan

4. Robert Stephens, n.2. p.72.

was formed in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna and by the end of the Second World War had grown into a strong politico-religious group. It was anti-monarchy and also anti-West. It took active part in guerrilla attacks against the British and gave full support to the Palestinian cause. Some of the officers of the Egyptian armed forces were also close to it. Thus, Ikhwan was emerging as a serious political force. It confronted the Free Officer group also after the 1952 Revolution. The struggle for power between the Ikhwan and the Free Officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, ended by 1954.

As early as 31 July 1952, the Free Officers, dominated by Nasser, tried to appeal to the masses directly rather than established political channels. They stressed that army was a part of the people and did not aspire for power. They reiterated their struggle against imperialism. They asked the Egyptian mass for their support. In doing so, they were also trying to weaken the popular support for the Ikhwan. Moreover, they sought to gain legitimacy by dissociating themselves from the previous regime and by identifying themselves with the moderate Islamic ethos. They preached from the pulpits of mosques stressing the Islamic character of their planned reforms. To appeal to the masses, their adherence to Islam was clear. Even Nasser in the book, 'Philosophy of the Revolution' talks about the Islamic circle. Nasser's pilgrimage to Mecca in August 1954, during his struggle with the Ikhwan, was a clear indication that,

although he had to suppress opponents who based their message on Islamic principles, he was no less a Muslim than they were.⁵

In an attempt to undermine the influence of the Ikhwan in Muslim States, the Revolutionary Command Council (R.C.C.) founded the Islamic Congress in September 1954 with Anwar Sadat as Secretary General. It was an agency of the Presidency and thus was under the control of Nasser. It was founded, when the struggle with the Ikhwan was in its last stages, as a demonstration that army officers too were defenders of the Islamic faith. The assassination attempt on Nasser in October 1954 made Nasser more popular and gave him the excuse to further contain the Ikhwans.

Communists

One of the most prominent factors in the domestic front influencing Egyptian foreign policy was the presence of the Communists. In the early days of Stalinism, Communists had challenged the ideological framework of non-alignment. Non-alignment was seen as a wise policy to steer clear the two ideological extremes: Capitalism and Communism. Arabs did not want to make a choice between these two extremes. While

5. Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-86*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982, p.95.

Communism was unacceptable to them due to its ideology. Capitalism was a complete denial for the injury it inflicted upon them.

The new Egyptian ruling elite, in order to maintain its legitimacy, suppressed the Communists soon after the *coup d'etat* of 1952. In the winter of 1953 a large number of Communists were rounded up and detained. The army junta, in its efforts to consolidate its power, had deposed the monarchy and stripped the old political parties of power. Instead, it had set up a 'National Liberation Rally' as the only legal political organisation. The Liberation Rally was not designed initially to be a party but a means of rallying the people round the new rulers, an organisation to mobilise popular support and to squeeze out potential opposition. But it had the seeds of the single party system in Egypt.

By 31 May 1954, Nasser had 252 Communists in gaol. He told a conference of the Liberation Rally leaders that Communists can live only in chaos and in this they have the support of the Zionists' and that they were working in the interests of a foreign power.⁶ The fact that the U.S.S.R. had voted for the partition of Palestine and also the presence of large number of Jews in the Egyptian Communist

6. Tom Little, *Modern Egypt*, London: Ernest Benn, 1967, p.149.

Party gave credence to that charge. Nasser had also simultaneously suppressed the other political groups like the Waifd and the Ikhwan. The Free Officer group, led by Nasser, was gradually consolidating power in its hands. But between 1952-54, Egypt signed two major agreements; one dealt with the Sudan question and the other with the evacuation of the British base in the Suez Canal Zone.

The Liberation Rally, as an organisation, was consolidated as a single party system in 1955 with the framework of the National Union. It was subsequently given a place in the Constitution of 1956. Nasser seemed to feel the need to establish this political organisation even if he had no intention of giving it real power. It was meant to exclude other groups from political power. The Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.) was later formed in June 1962 explicably with the same idea when some Communists joined in it and others were imprisoned.

Nasser's suppression of the Communists and the hostile Stalinist era in the U.S.S.R. hampered the evolution of a lenient Soviet attitude towards Egypt. Though Egypt was trying hard to resist the Western pressure, the ideological intransigence of the U.S.S.R. at that time precluded any rapprochement between Egypt and the Communist Bloc states. Even the change in Egypt after the 1952 Revolution failed to evoke any immediate favourable response. The Anglo-Egyptian

Agreement of 27 July 1954 for the evacuation of the Suez Canal base was interpreted as a concession to the West. The Soviet Radio and Press bitterly criticised Egypt for having jumped on the American band-wagon.⁷

Egypt, till 1955, could not get any Communist help either political or economic. Thus, left with a duck option, Egypt had to please the West and it became more so when her economic development became a cardinal point of Egyptian policy. It should be remembered that, despite his differences with the West, Nasser was not anti-Western. In an interview to the *U.S. News and World Report*, he said:

We must not sit down and write a confession that we are on the side of the West. In spite of everything, we must be on that side because we are far away from the Russians. If there is any government here that wants to be on the side of the Russians, I don't think it can be this government".⁸

It was the rejection of Egypt by the U.S.S.R. as well as the suppression of the Communists in Egypt that prompted the U.S.A. to lean more towards Egypt at that time. The signing of the Suez Canal Base Agreement of 1954 also helped. Thus the U.S. continued to give economic aid to Egypt and even approved of the Aswan Dam aid. A World Bank study,

7. Quoted Walter Z. Lacqueur, ed., *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (London: 1959), p.196.

8. Quoted. Korany Bahgat, *Social Change, Charisma, and International Behaviour*, Geneva: 1976, p.270.

prepared largely in Washington, showed that Egypt required \$1.350 million to finance the construction of the High Dam. It was calculated that Egypt would probably be able to raise \$550 million locally, necessary to defray the costs of local labor and material, in Egyptian pounds. Also, the government would launch a bond drive, combining it with a strong patriotic appeal, to coax some \$400 million out of rich Egyptians. This left \$400 million to be obtained abroad in foreign currency to pay for raw materials and technical help. That was to be raised from the U.S.A. and other international markets. The World Bank expressed its readiness to grant a ten-year \$200 million loan if Egypt fulfilled certain conditions. The participation of the U.S. in the project was considered essential. American influence was strong in the World Bank and much of the material needed for the project was to come from the U.S. It was agreed that the U.S. and Britain would offer \$70 million, of which the U.S. share would be \$56 million and Britain would put up \$14 million in "blocked sterling".* The U.S. and Britain also said that they would favourably consider the additional grants for the final phase of the construction.

It should be noted that after the World War II Egypt could obtain economic aid and military aid only from the

* Money owed to Egypt by Britain for goods and services during and after World War II.

West. The economic aid, from the U.S. till 1955, amounted to \$102.8 million. Of this \$19.6 million was provided from 1946 to 1952. From 1953 to 1955, the aid was \$83.2. In 1955, Egypt had received a large sum amounting to \$66.3 million. Vide (Table-1 (Appendix - 2)). The aid of 1955 should be viewed in the context of the rapprochement of relation between Egypt and the West due to the Suez Base Agreement of 1954, a contribution of Nasser.

During the said period no Soviet military help was also possible to Egypt. All the military help it could get was only from the West. The British air-crafts like Avro Anson, Super-Marine Spitfire F-22, Gloster Meteor F-8, D.H. Vampire, F-52 and T-55 were supplied by Great Britain whereas Curtiss C-46, Beech C-45 and Douglas C-47 were provided by the U.S. Vide Table - 1,2,3, 4 (Appendix - 3).

1955: The Watershed in Egyptian Policy

Things began to change in 1955 when Nasser acquired new options in his foreign policy. Egypt henceforth foresook the anti-imperialist stance it had taken hitherto and adopted the new slogan of non-alignment (or positive neutrality as it was then called).⁹ This was the result of a combination of two

9. *Egypt's Role in Non-alignment*, Cairo: State Information Service, Minister of Information, Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, p.4.

events: (1) Change within the Communist world and (2) Closer co-operation among some of the newly independent Afro-Asian states seeking to pursue an independent foreign policy.

The death of Stalin in March 1953 brought new leaders to the Kremlin. The post-Stalin leaders of the Kremlin embarked upon a gradual relaxation of Stalinist inflexibility and reactivated the Leninist policy of support to national liberation movements, even though they happened to have bourgeois in leadership, as a means for weakening imperialism and capitalism. By 1955, they had launched a vast programme of aid to and trade with several non-Communist Afro-Asian countries, beginning with India and Afghanistan.

The visits of Nikita Khrushchev and Bulganin to the countries like Afghanistan, Burma, India and Indonesia in November-December 1955 opened a new vista for improved relations between Egypt and the Communist Bloc states. Though these two leaders did not visit Egypt at that time, still under the leadership of Nasser, Egypt became acceptable to them. So was the case with Syria. This modification should be viewed in the context of the Baghdad Pact which had been opposed by these Arab states.

Once the Soviet policy changed, Communists stopped calling Nasser "American fascist, Gamal, a torturer and traitor" and in the Nawat and Dalshin leaflets he became the

"brave defender of the nation's peace and independence".¹⁰ In 1955, Vatoline, a Soviet expert, wrote an article praising internal as well as external policies of Nasser's government saying that they were "objectively progressive actions".¹¹ The Soviet penetration into the Arabian Sea along the eastern Mediterranean coast and down the Red Sea seems to be a well-planned move of the new Soviet-Egypt relationship. Not only did it outflank the Baghdad Pact but also enabled the Soviets to thrust out into the Indian Ocean.

By this new turn in the Soviet-Egypt relationship, the Soviet Bloc extended its economic aid, military aid as well as political support to Egypt even in the United Nations. Low-interest loans, satisfactory terms of repayment, liberal credit and helpful trade agreements, adequate supply of arms, and scrupulous abstention from political demands — all these were made possible by the post-Stalin metamorphosis of Soviet strategy, which came into its own precisely at the time when Egypt's economic needs were becoming pressing and its needs for arms desperately urgent.

Though the U.S.S.R. had voted for the partition of Palestine and had recognized the state of Israel, soon

10. Jean and Simone Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition*, London: Methuen and Company Ltd., 1958, p.266.

11. Quoted, Walter Z. Lacqueur, *Middle East in Transition* (London: 1958), p.492.

Soviet-Israel relations began to deteriorate. The strong links fostered by Israel with the Western Bloc states like the U.S.A., Britain and France, soon after its independence, made Israel a suspect in the eyes of the U.S.S.R. Thus it began to support Arabs against Israel. In 1952-54 the question of passage through the Suez Canal for Israeli ships and cargo assumed international dimension. The question was raised in the United Nations in which the U.S.S.R. supported Arabs against Israel. For example, on 29 March 1954, she supported Egypt by vetoing the U.N. resolution which was moved against Egypt in favour of Israel by the New Zealand delegate Sir Lesley Monroe calling upon the Egyptian Government to comply with the Constantinople Convention and offer free passage to Israel through the Suez Canal.

Palestine Factor

Among the regional factors influencing Egyptian foreign policy, the Palestine question linked to pan-Arabism of Nasser draws our attention quite effectively. The Palestine question, about which an Arab is so emotional that he was not prepared to acknowledge even the existence of Israel, has deep roots. For him Palestine is a part of the Arab nation which was, contrary to the British promise during the First World War, given to the Jews. An Arab looks at Israel as a state carved out of the Arab land; an outpost of Western

imperialism because according to him, Israel was created not only by the Jews but also by Great Britain and above all by the U.S. which, after the Second World War, took active steps in this regard.

American dollars financed the Palestine War of 1948 and the same source continues to finance the state of Israel even today. The attitude of the Big Powers in the Palestine War had hurt the Arabs. So it was quite natural that Egypt, the leading Arab nation, should sympathise with the cause of the Palestinians.

While Egypt had played a leading role in supporting the Palestinian cause, Nasser made it as a major plank of his foreign policy. If leadership of the Arab world was one of the objectives of Nasser's foreign policy, supporting the Palestinian cause and therefore opposing Israel, not only politically but also militarily, became a major instrument of Nasser's Arab policy. Such a policy, besides giving Nasser a great deal of credibility at home, would also enhance Egyptian influence in the neighbouring states. That would also constitute a first line of defense against pressure from Britain or other great powers against Egypt's tenuously independent foreign policy. In 1955, Nasser began his campaign against the Baghdad Pact and it at once electrified the Arab world at least at the popular level.

Given the situation, confrontation between Egypt and Israel was inevitable. David Ben-Gurion became the Defence Minister of Israel on 17 February 1955 and hardly eleven days later Israeli troops smashed across the Armistice line at Gaza in a meticulously planned and heavily armed attack that killed thirty eight and wounded thirty-one Egyptians and Palestinians. It was by far the heaviest attack across the Israeli-Egypt line since 1949.

This attack was condemned by the U.N. Security Council on 29 March 1955 in resolution 5/3378.¹² The attack was however, defended by the Israeli Government as a "reprisal" against the "savage hanging of two Jews in Cairo on 31 January 1955" and the "Egyptian seizure of the Israel vessel *Bat Galim*" as well as against the infiltration into Israeli-controlled territory of Palestinian refugees who had been living in refugee camps in the Gaza strip since 1948.¹³ But neither U.N. reports nor official U.S. intelligence nor reliable Western Press analysis substantiated this claim.¹⁴ There had not been any significant increase in raids into Israel. According to the former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt,

12. Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., *The Dynamics of Neutrality in the Arab World: A Symposium*, San Francisco: Chaldler Publishing Company, 1964, p.192.

13. Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., *Ibid*, p.193.

14. Erskine B. Childers, *The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962) p. 132.

Henry Byroade, Israel was responsible for this attack.¹⁵ Also, according to him, at that time Egypt was not half as strong as Israel.¹⁶

The Gaza raid of February 1955 was the first in a long list of Israeli military operations which kept the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Demarcation Lines ablaze for several months and culminated in the full-scale invasion of Sinai on 29 October 1956. It was also important because it was the first military incursion into Arab territory since the Armistice Agreement of 1949, for which the Israeli Government publicly assumed official responsibility. The Gaza raid was one of the determining factors in Egyptian foreign policy for which Nasser had to seek modern arms.

The Egyptian Government did not immediately contact the Eastern Bloc for arms but tried to obtain them from countries of the Western Bloc. Negotiations with Washington were urgently resumed. Egypt insisted that it would buy the arms so as to keep free of political strings. But despite long negotiations and even assurances, Egypt's requirements remained unfulfilled. This, of course, meant the end of negotiations in Washington. The Israeli lobby, which was

15. *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session on S.I. Res. 19 and H.J. Res. 117, Joint Resolution, United States, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1957, 11, p.746.*

16. *Ibid.*, p. 755.

very active in the U.S., had also prevented large-scale arms transfer to Egypt. That summer, Egypt got from Britain only forty Centurion tanks - but shipped without one round of ammunition. On protest, ten rounds per tank were sent -- not enough even for preliminary firing tests.¹⁷

While the Egyptian search for arms was continuing, Nasser, on 7 September 1955, publicly referred to the existence of secret France - Israeli arms agreement which, he alleged, included the sale of one hundred French tanks and several latest Mystere jet fighters to Israel. But the world took little note. At this juncture, feelers were sent out from the Eastern Bloc countries that they would be willing to sell heavy arms to Egyptians on barter basis. The proposition was very attractive and contracts, known as the Czech-arms deal, were officially announced on 27 September 1955.

On 10 November 1955, *Life* magazine published an interview with Nasser about the Czech-arms Deal in which Nasser said, "one thing I am not going to use the arms for is to start a war".¹⁸ But, he said, Egypt had signed the Deal thinking, not of Israeli strength as it was then, but as it would be when her "secret arms deal with France" was completed".

17. Childers, n. 14, p.133.

18. Quoted, Childers, *Ibid.*, p. 135.

Though the Head of a state had publicly levelled this allegation of secret Franco-Israeli military supplies, once again, and now more than ever in the sensation of Egypt's Czech-arms deal, the world took no note of it. Such comments, as there were, simply dismissed Nasser's charges as fabrication. But he had given the *Life* reporter a list of the alleged French weapons that included 70 mystere jets, 100 tanks, 100 heavy 155 mm guns, 150 high velocity 75 mm anti-tank guns.¹⁹ In late 1956, when Israel's use of the French weapons in Sinai became known and were detailed by close observers, they corresponded almost exactly, in type and quantity with Nasser's detailed list of 1955.

The Czech-arms deal was a major step in Egypt's foreign and defense policy. By concluding this deal with Czechoslovakia, Egypt paved the way for the Arabs to assert their sovereignty both in defense and foreign affairs.²⁰ The deal did mark a major shift in the power equation in West-Asia. While it ended the Western monopoly over transfer of arms to the Arabs, it also enabled the Soviet Union to bypass the labouriously created Western-screen in the Northern Tier Plan. While this development startled and angered the West, it was welcomed throughout the Arab world.

19. Childers, *Ibid.*

20. *Egypt's Role in Non-alignment*, n.9, p.6.

The Western arms transfer towards Asia, especially to the Arabs and to Israel were governed by the 25 May 1950 Declaration by the U.S.A., the U.K. and France. This Tripartite Declaration, a statement of policy for the Middle East stated in part:

The three governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their obligations as members of the U.N., immediately take action, both within and outside the U.N., to prevent such action.²¹

It also imposed a *de facto* arms control in the region by a carefully calculated transfer of arms to the Arabs and Israel. The new Egyptian regime was trying to break through this unilaterally imposed restriction. The British who did not trust Nasser, not only resisted American initiatives to meet Egyptian request, but also refused to deliver planes and tanks for which the Egyptian had already paid.²² It is true that Egypt's relation with U.K. and U.S.A. had improved since the settlement of the such base problem in October 1954. But no sooner had the old clouds vanished, than new clouds

21. *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 22, no.570, June 5, 1970, p. 886.

22. Amin Hewedy, "Nasser and the Crisis of 1956", Louis, W.M. Roser and Ower Roger, eds.; *Speez 1956; The crisis and its consequences*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) p. 162,

gathered on the horizon. Nasser began to take foreign policy steps not liked by the West like the recognition of the People's Republic of China and opposition of the Baghdad Pact. Egypt was leaning more towards non-alignment. The Gaza raid and the subsequent Czech-arms deal became two important events in the non-aligned foreign policy of Egypt. 1955 was indeed a turning point in Egypt's history.

CHAPTER III

EGYPT'S PRO-SOVIET TILT

CHAPTER III

EGYPT'S PRO-SOVIET TILT

As noted earlier, 1955 was a major turning point in Egyptian foreign policy. The willingness of U.S.S.R. and China to compete with the Western Bloc states in terms of political, economic and military support, so as to enhance influence in the Afro-Asian world, offered new options to Egypt. Also, by 1955, the change of government in Israel has brought a more boisterous regime there. Arab-Israeli confrontation was bound to increase. By 1955, Nasser had acquired a firm control over power in Egypt and was all set to pursue a vigorous foreign policy, especially in the Arab world, to put Egypt as the dominant Arab power. 1956 saw the further deterioration in Egypt's relations with the West and an increasing reliance upon the East. It had profound impact upon its policy of non-alignment.

THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1956

It passed through several phases. It began with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt and ended with the Tripartite Aggression. The Czech arms deal and the mood it had generated in the West had deep repercussions in the subsequent year. It had an immediate impact upon the future of Aswan Dam aid programme.

The project for a high dam at Aswan was aimed to cut down imports, boost foreign exchange reserves, render

possible the erection of a chain of industries by generating more power and to increase the annual national income of Egypt by a billion dollars. Against a runaway birth rate, the Aswan Dam was represented as the only hope of maintaining the standard of living. From 1954 onwards, the High Dam was a popular vision of Egypt. Therefore, the Egyptian Government approached the West and the World Bank for financial support to implant the project. The question was widely discussed and it was announced in Washington on 17 December 1955 that the U.S. and Great Britain would give Egypt financial support. The World Bank, largely influenced by the U.S.A., also announced its readiness to fund the project.

But, all of a sudden, on 19 July 1956, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles announced America's withdrawal from the offer. It was a surprise not only to the Arabs but also to the U.S. Ambassador in Cairo who came to know about it only through newspapers.¹ The sudden withdrawal of the American grants did not, as was sometimes supposed, come to Britain as an unpleasant surprise.² The British Government also announced its withdrawal the next day. The World Bank

-
1. *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services*. United States Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session on S.1. Res.19 and H.J. Res.117. Joint Resolution, United States, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957, II, p.717.
 2. Keith Kyle, "Britain and the Crisis, 1955-56", W.M. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p.110.

offer, which was conditional on the U.S. and British participation, was also withdrawn.

The reason for America's refusal to have a hand in the financing of the High Dam was probably simple. In the view of the State Department, Cairo had become too deeply committed to Moscow with the arms deal and the recognition of the Communist Chinese regime, and by financing the Dam, the U.S. would be indirectly financing the Kremlin.³ There was talk of 'slapping Nasser down for his neutralism'. World Bank spokesmen were so annoyed that they scarcely concealed their view that no new factor had altered the merit of the High Dam, or Egypt's ability to finance the share of its cost.⁴

The cancellation of the Aswan Dam aid was a calculated snub to Egypt. It generated its own responses. Egypt's 'man of destiny' could not tolerate any denigration of his regime. He seized this opportunity to nationalize the Suez Canal Company.⁵ On 26 July 1956, he announced the nationalization of

3. Emil Lengyel, *The Changing Middle East*. New York: The John Day Company, 1960. p.87.

4. *The Times*, Report from Washington, 21 July 1956.

5. President Nasser, in his speech on 26 July 1956, explaining the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company said that the revenues of the Canal would be used to finance the High Dam. Explaining the Western refusal to finance the High Dam he said that they were 'punishing, Egypt because it refused to side with military blocs'. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1956, p.107.

the Suez Canal Company and declared that since the Western powers refused to finance the Dam, Egypt was compelled to raise her own money.⁶ "The income from the Canal, a hundred million dollars a year", he said, "would be used to build the Dam". This figure was based on the previous year's gross income from the Canal, which was \$97,596,000.⁷

This new action of Nasser affected the West severely and Britain particularly. The Government of the U.K. was the largest single holder of the Canal company, *Campagne Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez*, a private corporation with a special status, operating under the French and Egyptian laws. Moreover, the Cold War role of the Suez was also important. Western shipping used the canal for more than that of the Soviet Bloc. Since the NATO countries obtained 80 per cent of their vitally needed oil from the Gulf, the Suez Canal was their most important petroleum tanker route.

The announcement of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company thus took the breath away from the Western diplomats. In their desperate attempt to maintain control over the Suez Canal, they committed themselves into an

6. A.I. Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab world: The Elements of Foreign Policy*. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976, p.15.

7. Emil Lengyel, n.3, p.89.

uncompromising position by attempting to equate the Suez Canal with the Suez Canal Company. They agreed that Egypt had the right to nationalize the Suez Canal Company but in the same breath they argued that she had nationalized the Suez Canal. And, when they could not argue on legal grounds they descended to the level of abuse and started accusing Nasser as a 'dictator attempting to choke the life-line of the Western economy'.⁸ They sought to gain complete control over the Suez Canal through the London Conference of 16 August 1956 and the Suez Canal Users' Association of 19-21 September 1956. There were twenty-two participants in the London Conference. A majority plan was produced by eighteen nations. It called for the establishment of an international organisation to operate the Canal — the Suez Canal Board. The minority report was endorsed by the Soviet Union, India, Indonesia and Ceylon. Under the minority plan, the Canal was to remain under Egyptian management but with an advisory board of the representatives of international user. However, only the majority plan was presented to Nasser by the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Gordon Menzies. It failed. The Egyptian offer of convening an international conference to reaffirm the principle of free navigation through the

8. K.R. Singh, "Positive Neutrality", K.P. Karunakaran, ed., *Outside the Contest: A Study of Non-alignment and Foreign Policies of Some Non-Aligned Countries*, New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1961, p.146.

Canal. in other words, the reiteration of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, was also ignored. The signatories to the Constantinople Convention of 1888 were the Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German and British empires, the Kingdom of Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, and the Republic of France. Egypt inherited the rights and obligations of the Ottoman Empire under the Convention.

Upon the failure of the first plan, a second Conference was convened from 19-21 September 1956. Fifteen countries led by U.S.A., Britain and France, now decided to form the Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) which would employ its own pilots, collect the tolls and pay Egypt appropriate fees. But it proved objectionable to Nasser and succumbed to a Soviet veto. Virtually every major newspaper in the world had by then reported that SCUA was conceived in London and Paris as a calculated Trojan Horse.⁹

However, suffice it to say that discussions aimed at solving the issues led to deadlocks and the attempts of the Western powers towards the *status quo ante* nationalisation failed. In desperation, and in order to cover their humiliation, Great Britain and France used Israel to perpetrate an international crime.

9. Erskine B. Childers, *The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations*, London: MacGibbon and Ker, pp.223-24.

The Suez controversy at this point got linked with the conflict between Israel and Egypt. Two seemingly unrelated hostilities between Israel and Egypt, on one hand; and Britain in league with France against Egypt on the other, eventually merged and ended not far from the banks of the Canal.

There had been blows and counter blows; infiltration into Israel across her meandering frontiers, across the hills of Judaea and Samaria; on the plains where the Philistines had dwelt; from Gaza strip along the Mediterranean. The counter blows were against the Fedayeen encampments in Gaza and elsewhere. During the height of the Suez controversy there were apprehensions that Israel was contemplating drastic action to discourage fedayeen attacks. At the same time, in France, the upholders of the French national *gloire* in Egypt seemed to have obtained the upper hand. In Britain too, the vocal 'Suez group', which had maintained that the line had to be drawn somewhere and that this was the line, was chafing under new restraints. U.S.A., sensitive to trouble, cautioned restraint all around, and President Eisenhower transmitted a message to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, warning against armed action. But what went on behind the diplomatic curtain of silence in Paris, London and Jerusalem was not known at that time but did not remain a mystery for long.

The collusion between Israel, Britain and France was evident since the unfolding of events in October-November 1956. On 29 October 1956, the Government of Israel announced that it was striking out to wipe out the Fadayeen bases. It also attacked Egypt and penetrated into the Sinai by paradropping on the passes there. At this point, the Sinai campaign became a part of a larger conflict. On 30 October Britain and France dispatched joint ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, demanding that they should cease fighting and withdraw their forces to position ten miles on either side of the Suez Canal. In order to safeguard these operations, the two countries called on Egypt to accept the temporary occupation of Port Said, Ismailia, Suez and other key points along the Canal. Prime Minister Eden announced in the name of the two allies that unless the ultimatum was complied within twelve hours, their armed forces would intervene. Israel accepted but Egypt rejected the proposal. After all, Israeli forces were far away from the Canal and there was no threat to the shipping in the Canal at that time. Also, Nasser had no intention of obliging Israel, Britain or France by withdrawing not only from the Sinai but also from the West Bank of the Suez Canal. After the time of expiry of the ultimatum, the Anglo-French forces began the bombardment of Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. Egypt had no option but to order a quick withdrawal of its forces from the Sinai trap. In that process, Israeli forces, allied

with the British and French forces inflicted a heavy loss on Egypt and occupied Sinai. The Tripartite British-French and Israeli aggression came to a halt on 5 November 1956 under pressure of the United Nations Command Force. The U.S.A. strongly criticised the Tripartite aggression. Also the Soviet Union warned that it would send Soviet citizens as volunteers to take part in the Egyptian struggle for independence. The world knew from previous experiences in the Far East what "Volunteers" meant in Soviet language.

By this aggression, the West had thought that they would be able to overthrow Nasser and entrench somebody who would be more amenable to their will. But in this attempt the West failed miserably. Instead of demolishing Nasser they made him a hero. The Suez War was a victory for Nasser.

The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by Nasser not only led to this Tripartite aggression but also to an economic blockade of Egypt by the West. Egyptian foreign currency holdings in USA, Britain and France were immediately frozen. Figures for the value of these assets vary but are generally of the order of some £110 million in the No.1 and No.2 accounts in London and perhaps \$27 million on the U.S.¹⁰ Thus, the Suez crisis provided a striking example of the militant use of financial power. Historically Nasser said,

10. Quoted. Roger Owen, "The Economic Consequences of the Suez Crisis for Egypt". Lewis and Owen, eds., n.2, p.364.

The meaning of Suez is that there is an end to the methods of the nineteenth century, that it was impossible to use the methods of the nineteenth century in the twentieth century.¹¹

The Suez crisis was an important test case for the non-aligned foreign policy of Egypt. While the Czech-arms deal was a signal of Egypt's willingness to deal with the Soviet Bloc, the rejection of the Aswan Dam aid, and the subsequent Tripartite aggression followed by the economic blockade by the West became the major force that propelled Egypt into the Eastern camp. Though the U.S.A. played a little more positive role during the Suez crisis, it soon lost its advantage by propounding a new theory --- Eisenhower Doctrine on 5 January, 1957.

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

The Eisenhower Doctrine was a policy statement on the Middle East issued in January 1957 by the American President, Dwight David Eisenhower and was authorised by the Congress in March 1957. It was meant to bolster the pro-Western Arab regimes by granting military and economic assistance to them. It also authorized the use of U.S. military forces to protect the territorial integrity of any state threatened by Communist aggressions. The U.S. President said in the statement:

11. Quoted Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971, p.247.

The action which I propose would have the following features. It would first of all, authorize the U.S. to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence... in the second place, authorize the executive to undertake in the same region programmes of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid... in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the U.S. to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism".¹²

Only two Arab regimes, the Iraqi and the Lebanese, accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. Iraq was a member of the Baghdad Pact and her acceptance was taken, more or less, for granted. But Lebanese acceptance, because of the pro-Western Chamoun Government, had far-reaching consequences. In other Arab countries the Doctrine was widely criticised. Even Prime Minister Nehru, the then Indian Premier, wrote to Eisenhower of his dislike of a "military approach to these problems" — an approach which, he thought, "might excite... passions and create divisions among the Arab countries and thus add to the tension".¹³

Egypt criticised not only the so-called vacuum theory but also the assumption that the U.S.A. could fill that vacuum.¹⁴ It saw all this as another attempt to escalate

12. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House years: Waging Peace 1956-1961*, New York: Doubleday, 1965. pp.180-3.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Egypt's Role in Non-alignment*, Cairo: State Information Service, Ministry of Information, Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, p.6.

Cold War in the region. Hence it was rejected by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria also rejected it. Rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine by Egypt became one more hall mark in its policy of non-alignment. Nasser not only rejected it but Egypt also led the opposition to that doctrine in the whole Arab world.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was discussed first at the Cairo Conference on 19 January 1957. It was attended by President Nasser, King Saud, King Hussain and Sabri al-Asali. They rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine. After the Cairo conference King Saud left for the U.S., ostensibly, to convey the Arab view about the doctrine. But his subsequent statements in Washington showed a change in the Saudi policy. Probably the fabulous red carpet treatment meted out to him was partly responsible for his deviation from the avowed aim of the visit. King Saud further reaffirmed his faith in the Eisenhower Doctrine in the joint communique signed after the visit of Richard's Mission to Riyadh on 11 April 1957.¹⁵

In Jordan, the reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine was negative in the initial stage. Premier Nabulsi even went to the extent of terminating the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948 on 13 March 1957, thereby severing the last tie with Great Britain. There was also a possibility of exchanging

15. *Department of State Bulletin*, Washington, 36 (6 May 1957), p.731.

diplomatic missions with the U.S.S.R. Indeed the spirit of non-alignment was running pretty high in that country. It, however, received a big shock when in April the same year martial law was proclaimed and political parties were banned by King Hussain. Soon after that the Jordanian foreign policy gradually drifted away from the policy of Non-alignment to pro-Westernism.

ARAB UNITY AND THE EGYPTIAN POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

By the summer of 1957, Nasser had only one ally left: Syria and she was also in the midst of a national and international crisis. Syria, despite the restraining influence of President Shukry al-Quwatly, was drifting towards the left. Consequently, the U.S.-Syria relations deteriorated further. During this time, arms supply to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan was stepped up by the U.S.A. It was at this time that the Syrian-Turkish border tensions developed. The inevitable result was that Syria was virtually thrown into the homes of the Communists. The liberal politicians in Syria became alarmed at the pro-Soviet orientation in Syria and sought closer support from Egypt which was granted. But by that time, the crisis had simmered down, yet the ill-feelings against U.S.A. remained. The result of this was that the pro-Arab Unionist forces those led by the Baath Party, embarked upon a concerted effort of campaigning for unity with Egypt. Nasser was also committed

to form the Egypt-Syria unity as a part of the larger Arab unity and also to buttress his policy of non-alignment.

The Syrians, encouraged by the Baathists among them, surprised Nasser by demanding more than the expected federal union. Nasser argued that if federal union was not a viable proposition, then union should be total and this meant the complete and organic merger of Syria and Egypt, with the condition that the Syrian political system should follow that of Egypt.¹⁶ On this basis, the U.A.R., under the Presidency of Nasser, was announced on 4 February 1958.

After the union between Syria and Egypt, the new state UAR adopted the single-party system. Consequently the Syrian Communist Party which was the then strongest Communist Party in the Arab world, became illegal and had to stop its activities. Khaled Bagdash, the Syrian Communist leader, went into exile and started attacking the U.A.R. government in general and Nasser in particular. It had a direct impact upon the relation of U.A.R. with the Eastern Bloc. At this juncture, the Iraqi revolution of 14 July 1958 and its repercussions created conditions which had far-reaching consequences upon Egypt's foreign policy and its relations not only with USA but also USSR and China.

16. A.I. Dawisha, n.6, p.20.

The Iraqi Revolution of 1958 unleashed the pent-up political energies and all the political parties which had been suppressed under the previous regime re-emerged into active political life. Of them the Communist Party was the strongest and the most influential and was able to have a dominating influence in Iraq. Naturally it became the rallying point not only of Arab Communists but also of the Communist Bloc as a whole. The Eastern Bloc thus became involved in the controversy between the Arab Communists and the UAR government.

The UAR-Iraq controversy started after the dismissal in October 1958 of Col. Abdul Salam Arif of Iraq who was a baathist and was spearheading the movement for union with the UAR. The UAR press and radio accused not only the Iraqi but also the Arab Communists in general of working against Arab unity. In his Port Said speech on 23 December 1958, Nasser even criticised the Syrian Communists of trying to separate Syria from the UAR.¹⁷

Again, on 11 March 1959, while speaking in Damascus, President Nasser criticised the Arab Communists in general and the Iraqi communists in particular for being foreign agents and for working against the unity of the UAR.¹⁸ His

17. U.A.R. Information Department, *President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews*, 1958, Cairo, p.355.

18. *Nasser's Speeches*, 1959, p.123.

criticism must be read in the context of the Communist led anti-Baath revolt in Mosul in March 1959. Also, at that time, there was a strong rumour of a Communist plan for the 'Red Fertile Crescent' — a union of Syria, Jordan and Iraq. The inclusion of Syria in this plan went against the unity of UAR.

These developments not only created a rift between Nasser and the Communist Bloc but also severely tested the Egyptian policy of non-alignment. What had started as a policy of non-alignment directed primarily against the West, assumed an anti-Communist orientation as well thereby justifying a certain degree of non-alignment.

The deteriorating relation between the Communist Bloc and Egypt had a direct impact upon Egypt's economy. Egypt received absolutely no economic aid from the U.S.S.R. in the year 1959 whereas it had received approximately \$275 million in the two years of 1957 and 1958.¹⁹ During these two years (1957-58), Egypt's acceptance of economic aid from the U.S. was almost nil as it could manage to get only \$1.6 million.²⁰

19. James Richard Carter, *The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid*, Praeger: 1969/71.

20. U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, 21 March, 1962. *U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organisation, Obligations and Loan Authorities*, Washington D.C. July 1, 1945-June 30, 1961.

EGYPT - U.S. RELATION - (KENNEDY PERIOD)

But while there was an unevenness in relations between UAR and the Eastern Bloc states, new changes were taking place in international sphere which had a direct impact upon the non-aligned aspect of Egyptian foreign policy. John Fitzgerald Kennedy stepped into the White House in 1961 as the new President of the U.S.A. President Kennedy tried to delink US policy from the purely Cold War framework and sought to develop ties with the non-aligned states also. He tried to cultivate good relationship with Nasser. Nasser too had a good opinion about Kennedy. Hence cordial relations developed between these two leaders. However, these relations deteriorated soon because Nasser did not favour the U.S. policy of supplying Israel with arms. Nasser also believed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was directly responsible for the break up of the United Arab Republic in 1961²¹.

Moreover, the United States was using its wheat loans as a political lever. Negotiations, were delayed, and the agreements were often for short periods ranging from three to six months. Thus a steady deterioration set-in in Egypt-U.S. relations. Assassination of President Kennedy and the coming into power of Johnson as the new US President also contributed to this drift.

21. K. R. Singh, "Egyptian Non-alignment", *International Studies*, Vol. 20, No.1-2, Jan.-June 1981, pp. 315-36.

EGYPT'S ISOLATION FROM THE WEST

Growing Egyptian isolation from the West was conspicuous in 1964-65. That was because of issues like the opposition to the recognition of East Germany by West Germany, U.S.A.'s total commitment to Israel and the growing alliance between the traditional Arab regimes led by Saudi Arabia and the West.

Egypt did not favour the U.S. policy of supplying Israel with arms, a policy initiated by President Kennedy, that attained new heights during President Johnson. Following the Hawk SAM missile deal during Kennedy period, arms negotiation between Washington and Israel was accelerated and Israel got the powerful Patton tanks. Moreover, Egypt did not favour the U.S.' positive attitude towards Israel when the Arab-Israeli conflict became more intense after the confrontation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (P.L.O.) in 1964 and the clashes over the Israeli attempts to divert the waters of River Jordan. The debate over the issue of Jordan River waters serves to illustrate both the Egyptian outlook at that time and the interlacing of the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab rivalries.

Shared usage of the Jordan River waters has been a persistent issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Eric Johnson's mission in the early 1950s had offered the framework of an agreement between Israel and other Arab States like Jordan

regarding the distribution and utilization of the waters that would have allowed Israel to build its National Water Carrier System in stages. No agreement was, however, signed. But Israel unilaterally went ahead with its scheme.

During the last months of 1963, while the Arab States were engaged in their quarrels, Israel was approaching the completion of its project to divert the head waters of the River Jordan from the Sea of Galilee. The Arabs, in the past, frequently declared that such a diversion would be regarded as an act of aggression by Israel and as such would be met by force.²²

As in many earlier instances, Arab action did not match Arab rhetoric and Israel was allowed to continue to work on the project unhampered. By 1964 the work was nearly completed. Though Egypt was not directly involved, it was concerned as an Arab leader. Nasser, was however, not anxious to be dragged into hostilities through the precipitous action of another state, especially Syria and her demagogic Baathist leadership. Moreover, an assessment of the objective capabilities of the two disputants convinced the Egyptian elites that Israel should not be militarily engaged except by the forces of all Arab states, using all elements of their power, operating under a unified command and executing a

22. Dawisha, n.6, p. 43.

concerted and pre-determined plan. Thus on 23 December 1963, in a major speech, Nasser declared:

In order to confront Israel, which challenged us last week, when its Chief-of-Staff stood up and said, 'we shall divert the water against the will of the Arabs and the Arabs can do what they want', a meeting between Arab Kings and Heads of state must take place as soon as possible, regardless of the conflicts and differences between them.²³

Nasser convened the First Arab Summit, for the above reasons, in Cairo in January 1964. At the meeting, the Arab League decided that its members should proceed with plans to divert the river waters. The Arab Kings and Heads of State addressed broader issues. They affirmed that "they will regulate their political and economic relations with other countries according to the stands of these countries towards the Arab's legitimate struggle against Zionist designs in the Arab world". They accused Israel of "continuous acts of aggression", "practicing racial discrimination against the Arab minority", having "evicted the Arab Palestine people from their home", and subjecting Afro-Asian states to "Zionist, imperialist dangers and designs particularly in Africa".²⁴ To put teeth into these accusations, they placed

23. *Nasser's Speeches, 1963*, p. 311.

24. Egyptian Information Department, *The First Arab Summit Conference*, 13-17 January, 1964, pp. 17-19.

their armies under a Unified Arab Command. The Conference also began the discussions that led to the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (P.L.O.) in March 1964 at the Arab Palestinian Congress in (Jordanian) Jerusalem.

However, while the Arabs were trying to evolve a common front against Israel, they were far away from being united among themselves. The great cleavage between the so-called "progressive" and "traditional" Arab regimes was widening. The socialist and Pan-Arab waves from Cairo were challenging the stability of the "traditional" regimes. The Yemeni coup of 1962 and the large scale Egyptian military involvement on the side of the republican regime of President Sallal heightened the confrontation. The "traditional" regimes, which by and large leaned towards the U.S., tried to group themselves under the banner of the 'Islamic Pact' in 1965. The growing rivalry between Egypt and Saudi-Arabia, which in the 1950s were strong pillars of the Arab Non-aligned Movement, was undermining Arab unity.

CLOSING THE OPTIONS: LEANING ON U.S.S.R.

By 1965 while Egypt was getting more and more isolated not only from the Western powers, as well as the pro-western regional powers, it was sucked deeper into Arab-Israeli confrontation. Egypt, therefore, had to lean much more upon the U.S.S.R. and its East European allies not only for political and military but also for economic support. That

dependence was final during and after the 1967 War.

From 1965 till the Arab Israeli War of 1967, Egypt got as many as twenty MiG-21D, fourteen Su-7, fifty MiG-19, one-hundred MiG-21, twenty Il-28 aircrafts. During this period it also got the modern missiles like anti-tank AT-1, "Snapper" and SAM SA-2 in large quantities. It also acquired naval vessels like the "R" class Submarines, "Osa and Komar" class missile boats, "Shershen" class Motor torpedo boats etc. (See Table, 'C' in the Appendix III).

In 1965 Egyptian debt payments were suspended and an arms debt of \$ 460 million was written off by the Soviet Union.²⁵ Since then Egypt has paid little, if anything, for military aid. In this case, as in a number of others, what started out as credit has ended up as a grant-in-aid.²⁶

From 1965 till 1969 Egypt had spent approximately \$ 300 million on arms in comparison to its arms cost of \$ 700 million from 1961 to 1964²⁷

25. Quoted. Gur Ofer, "The Economic Burden of Soviet involvement in the Middle East", *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, January 1973, p. 333.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974*, Department of State, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington D.C., 1975, pp.12-14.

The Soviets also benefited from their close cooperation

with Egypt and Syria. Despite the post 1962 detente, the Super Power naval rivalry had intensified not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the Mediterranean. By 1964 the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean began to show a steady increase. Since Soviet Union had no direct land base in the Mediterranean it depended upon the Arab to provide some facilities to its naval force in the Mediterranean. Egypt reportedly provided naval facilities in Alexandria and Mersa Matruah and some air-base facilities for maritime reconnaissance by Soviet land-based aircraft. Thus, the growing Soviet Egyptian relations benefited both the parties though in that process Egypt got sucked into the Cold War rivalry of the two Super Powers and the USSR got indirectly involved in the regional Arab-Israeli conflict on behalf of the Arabs, thereby legitimising the open and massive U.S. economic, political and military aid to Israel, specially after 1964 and much more after the 1967 War.

The continuing confrontation between Israel and Egypt regarding the division of the Jordan River waters approved by the Arab League pushed Egypt further into the Soviet orbit. Though Egypt was fighting the so-called Arab battles, no Arab state with financial resources helped Egypt.

The Arab Israeli War of 1967 made Egypt completely subservient to the Soviet Bloc. The War of 1967 which came about due to several factors like the El fatah raids organised from Jordan and Syria, involving the Palestine

Liberaton Army and the Israeli massive retaliations at ES-Samu and in the air battles over Syria and Jordan. Public and Private statements by Israeli authorities indicating the probability of drastic retaliation and the U.A.R. Government's decision, whether by intent or accident, to command the Strait of Tiran, forced Egypt to seek the Soviet help as much as possible. Though the Arab Summit held in Khartoum in 1967 after the Arab defeat gave verbal support to Egypt's un-official war with Israel and some oil-rich states promised to pay Egypt \$ 100 million a year to make good its losses due to the closure of the Suez Canal, still Egypt had to shoulder the burden of the War alone or with the support of the Soviet Union. There was no Arab material support for her fight against Israel.

Nasser, a captive of his pan-Arab ideals, drained his country's life-blood for an Arab cause while the majority of the Arab regimes were directly or indirectly undermining his position.

The Arab defeat in 1967 made Egypt more dependent upon USSR. More than 80 per cent of Egypt's loss of military equipment was replaced after the June War. Number of Soviet advisers and technicians increased from 500 to 3000 by the end of 1967.

28. *Soviet Arms Trade with the Non-Communist Third World in the 1970's and 1980's*, Washington Econometric Forecast-int Associates, Washington D.C. (Report prepared by Robin Laird for a Seminar held on 11 October 1983).

CHAPTER IV

EGYPT AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

CHAPTER IV

EGYPT AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

The policy of non-alignment evolved in each state in the environment particular to that state. Thus, the policy of non-alignment of Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia had different thrusts keeping in view their different domestic and foreign policy compulsions. These states had a few things in common in the context that created a common bond between them. At one time, some argued that these non-aligned states would form a third bloc of their own as distinct from the two rival blocs of the Cold War. But that temptation was resisted. However, these states did need a forum to voice their common concern on issues dealing with world peace, nuclear disarmament, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism as well as the economic problems facing the countries of the South. Thus, much against the wishes of some non-aligned leaders, a loose grouping did emerge under the term Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). After the first conference of these states in Yugoslavia, the movement grew stronger over the years. Egypt, under Nasser, played a pioneer role in the NAM and even now continues to be an important member of the NAM.

Egypt played a crucial role in organizing the non-aligned movement in its formative period. Non-alignment in its most basic form was viewed by a state as a maximiser of

national good and a minimiser of what is bad for it and it was in these broad terms that Egypt accepted the policy of non-alignment as a movement. The role of Egypt under Nasser, as a founder member of the non-aligned movement, has assumed much importance in global sphere.

President Nasser along with other senior leaders like Jawaharlal Nerhu, Joseph Broz Tito, Sukarno etc. gave a shape to non-alignment as a movement in the Belgrade Conference of 1961. The Bandung Conference which had tremendous impact upon Nasser is considered to be the corner-stone towards the evolution of such a movement during that time.

Egypt's affinity with the non-aligned movement grew out of its new close contacts with the newly independent states of the South. In April 1955, a few weeks after the Israeli attack on Gaza, and the Iraqi decision on joining the Western alliance system, Nasser made his first journey to the East to Pakistan, India, Burma and to Bandung. Nasser's previous contacts with Asian leaders had been in Cairo where Prime Minister Nehru had made a habit of stopping off on many of his trips to London. There is evidence that Nehru's persuasion was required to get Nasser to accept the invitation to attend the first Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung.¹ The first Arab reaction to the proposed conference

1. G.G. Stevens, "Arab Neutralism and Bandung", *Middle Eastern Journal*, Vol.II, no.2, Spring 1957, p.146.

had been cool. But when Pakistan's insistence on the exclusion of Israel was finally accepted by the other sponsoring powers -- India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia Arab interests quickened. Egypt's interests increased when it became known that a large African delegation would attend. It seems that the chief attraction for Nasser in the journey lay in the prospects of closer ties with India and also with other Afro-Asian states.

A treaty of friendship between Egypt and India was signed in Cairo on April 7. Nasser hoped for strengthening that relationship. Nasser was a man with a mission. He hoped to convince Nehru of the justice of the Arab case in Palestine and to win India's support for it in the United Nations. Moreover he wanted to finish colonialism and imperialism in toto.

The common denominator which gave the leaders at Bandung, a sense of genuine community of purpose, was the need to share in decisions affecting their own countries. The Conference had to be recognized first of all as a protest against the habit of colonial and Western powers of making decisions on Afro-Asian matters without consulting with those who involved in it.

The First Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung had a great impact upon the evolution of Egyptian policy of non-alignment. Earlier, Arabs in general and Egypt in particular

had a narrow pan-Arab view which was confined largely to the Palestine issue and their own treaty relationship with the West. In Bandung, Arabs were exposed to a large Afro-Asian ethos. Egypt, as the leading Arab state, and a state that had opted for a policy of non-alignment, gained valuable friends and supporters. Thus, it will not be wrong to say that the Bandung Conference widened the Egyptian foreign-policy-horizon from the narrow Arab angle to a wider Afro-Asian environment and subsequently to the non-aligned movement itself.

The Bandung Conference, which was held in Merdeka (Freedom) Hall in the small resort town of Bandung in Java island in Indonesia from 18 to 24 April 1955, was attended by 340 delegates representing twenty-nine countries. It was the first Afro-Asian Conference. The participating countries proclaimed that the maintenance of international peace and security would be assisted by friendly co-operation between states in keeping with the following ten principles:

- "(1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- (2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
- (3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations: large and small.

- (4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
- (5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- (6) (a) Abstention from the use of arrangement of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.
- (7) Refraining from acts of threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
- (8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
- (9) Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.
- (10) Respect for justice and international obligation".²

The Conference also reached the following agreement:

- (a) in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end;

2. Quoted. Yevgeni Rummyantsev, *The Bandung Spirit Today* New Delhi: Allied Publishers Limited, 1990, p.17.

- (b) in affirming that the subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights and is contrary to the Charter of the U.N. and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation;
- (c) in declaring its support to the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples, and
- (d) in calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples".³

President Nasser, speaking from the rostrum of the Bandung Conference, said that the best thing that countries of the world could do was to establish a lasting and permanent peace on earth. The President also emphasized on that point which meant not merely the absence of war, but also such relations among states which called for vigorous and persistent efforts to create a climate of international stability, economic progress and social justice.

The Bandung Conference became the first major piece of action by the Afro-Asian countries on the world scene based on a common anti-colonialist, anti-war and democratic platform. Meeting on equal terms with Pandit Nehru, Chou En-lai and other senior Asian statesmen, Nasser could feel that

3. *Texts of Selected Speeches and Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference*, Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24, 1955, p.40.

4. Quoted, Romyantsev, n.2, p.21.

his forecasts about Egypt's potential role in the world were coming true.⁵ Egypt and China also came closer during that Conference that paved the way for close Sino-Egyptian cooperation after 1955. Thus the Bandung Conference had a tremendous impact upon Nasser. His active role in the Conference exercised a profound impact even in Egypt.⁶ Arriving home in Cairo after the Conference, Nasser was hailed as a hero whose three week trip had "propelled us three centuries forward".⁷ In response Nasser stressed that the states of Asia and Africa had met for the first time without the participation of those powers which dominated them and elaborating on this theme, he stressed that Egypt desired that the world should go hand in hand and that its states should not be playthings of the big powers in the arena of competition.

Meanwhile, in July 1955, Nasser was host to both Nehru and Indonesia's President Sukarno, issuing in each case a joint communique stressing renewed interest in peace and cooperation. The Ttripartite Conference at Brioni in July 1956 also strengthened Nasser's ties with Nehru and Tito.

-
5. Peter Mansfield. *Nasser's Egypt*. Middlesex:1965. p.85.
 6. K.R. Singh. "Positive Neutrality", Karunakaran, K.P., (ed.). *Outside the Contest: A Study of Non-alignment and Foreign Policies of Some Non-aligned Countries*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House. 1968. p.242.
 7. G.G. Stevens. n.l. p.148.

The Brioni Conference provided an incentive to hold regular consultations either in the form of personal contacts or of exchanges of messages on the most important problems. The Brioni talks, in fact, established the pattern of close contacts of Nasser with other leaders of the Afro-Asian world.

The abortive attack on Egypt following the Suez crisis which followed soon after the Brioni Conference brought about the reassertion of the Bandung and Brioni spirit. The perpetuation of the Bandung principles and the necessity of establishing a forum for voicing the aspirations of the dependent countries of Africa and Asia, was one reason that prompted Egypt to take the initiative in inviting an Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Cairo in December 1957. Representatives of forty-five nations came to attend this Conference which was nick-named "The Peoples' Bandung". It established a permanent Secretariat in Cairo and a Council which was to meet in regular sessions once a year.

Unlike the Bandung, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was attended by public organisations and not by official representatives. But the stances of those peace and freedom-loving organisations were supported by the concerned governments and prominent political figures of Asia and Africa. In full accordance with the Bandung spirit, this Conference laid down the political, social, economic and

organisational foundations of the Afro-Asian Solidarity movement. Its political foundations were the struggle against imperialism and its aggressive political stances were the struggle for the economic destruction of colonial and racist regimes, support in every area for nations fighting for freedom and independence and the struggle for peace and international security against the threat of nuclear war.

The Bandung Conference and the subsequent Brioni as well as Afro-Asian solidarity conferences were the vital forces for strengthening the Egyptian policy of non-alignment. It gained further momentum when on April 26, 1961 President Nasser together with Yugoslav President Tito addressed a joint letter to the Heads of States or Governments of the twenty-one countries suggesting that "in view of recent world developments and the dangerous increase in international tensions, a conference should be held for the improvement of international relations, the relinquishing of the policy of force and the constructive settlement of pending world issues and conflicts."⁸ The response of the addressed governments was swift and Egypt thus hosted a Preparatory Meeting in Cairo from 5 to 14 June, 1961. The Cairo Preparatory Meeting was attended by delegates of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana,

8. Quoted, Fayer A. Sayegh, ed., *The Dynamics of Neutrality in the Arab World: A Symposium*, San Francisco: Chaldler Publishing Company, 1964, p.253.

Guinea. India. Indonesia. Iraq, Mali, Morocco, Nepal. Saudi Arabia. Somali, Sudan. the U.A.R., Yugoslavia and the Provisional Algerian Government. "Brazil was represented as an observer".⁹

The Cairo Preparatory meeting discussed suggestions for the agenda of the Summit and recommended a draft agenda which included the following subjects for discussion:

1. The international situation
2. The establishment and strengthening of international peace and security
 - (a) respect for the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, struggle against imperialism, liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism.
 - (b) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states: non-interference and non-intervention in international affairs of states.
 - (c) racial discrimination and apartheid.
 - (d) general and complete disarmament; barring of nuclear tests; problem of foreign military bases.
 - (e) peaceful co-existence among States with different political and social systems.
 - (f) role and structure of the United Nations and the implementation of its resolutions.
3. Problem of unequal economic development: promotion of international economic and technical co-operation.

9. *Documents of the Gatherings of Non-aligned Countries, 1961-1978*. Beograd, 1978, p.3.

Beside the sub-committee on 'time and place', the preparatory conference had another sub-committee which was entrusted with the task to draw up the criteria of non-alignment to be made applicable to the countries of the world. Sub-committee, which formed the part and parcel of the Cairo meeting, projected the infra-structure of the proposed Non-aligned Belgrade Summit. The Cairo participants agreed on the five-point criteria to be applicable to the invitations. The criteria were that

1. The country should have adopted an independent policy based on the co-existence of states with different political and social systems and on Non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy.
2. The country concerned should be consistently supporting the movements for National independence.
3. The country should not be a member of a multi-lateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.
4. If a country had bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or is a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.
5. If it has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made on the context

of Great Power conflicts.

Indeed, the Cairo Preparatory Conference was a more thorough affair than the Bogor Meeting which had preceded the Bandung Conference.

While the policy of non-alignment can be traced back to the post-World War II period, the non-aligned movement (NAM) is generally traced to the first conference of the Heads of State and Government of these States that was held at Belgrade in 1961. Egypt, thanks to the important role in the Cairo Preparatory Conference, was one of the major founder-members of the NAM. The Belgrade Conference, which came as the logical sequel to the Cairo Preparatory Meeting and also to the numerous meetings held on African and Asian soil, was the first formal conference of the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries. It was known as the First Non-aligned Summit and was held at Belgrade from 1 to 6 September 1961. It was attended by twenty-eight countries and three Latin American countries, viz. Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador as observers.

The significance of the Conference was that it was represented by nine Arab countries namely Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, U.A.R., Yemen, Algeria and Tunisia. That marked the Arabs to contribute substantially to the movement. The Arab viewpoint according to one Arab

writer was based upon six premises:

- "(1) The importance of the Conference lies not only in analysing and taking an attitude toward the situation prevailing in the world today and the acute aspects of crucial international issues, since in its historical aspect the Conference is not the product of a momentary situation, but the expression of a long evolution and crystalization of the motive power of modern history. In his address President Nasser reviewed this historic development since the Bandung Conference.
- (2) The basic platform to be developed at the Belgrade Conference should not be reduced to the mere statement that the countries concerned do not wish to be aligned with any bloc, since this statement would not afford a sufficient basis for active potential dealings. The joint action of the non-aligned countries is not to be conceived of as the basis for an imposed discipline in a bloc sense, for this would be untenable.
- (3) The Arab delegates refrained from offering solutions to such pressing international questions as the Berlin issue, as it was felt that the decisive factor was not what to do, but rather how to establish confidence between the two blocs and relax tensions.
- (4) Non-alignment, in the Arab point of view, did not mean

isolation from the two power groups. The assumption that the division of the world is ideologically, as well as politically, final and irrevocable, was rejected as essentially a false and dangerous premise.

- (5) The Arabs outlined the need for stimulating capital investment in developing countries, preferably through international agencies so as to initiate the essentials for a self-generated economy.
- (6) The Arab delegation felt that it is incumbent upon them to reopen the Palestine issue in the interest of peace and progress".¹⁰

Nasser with the other inner-group members like Nehru, Tito, U nu, Sukarno and N'krumah placed unequivocal emphasis on the issue of colonialism and imperialism. The summit accepted the view that 'neo-colonialism' was a new manifestation of imperialism. The participants resolved "to make a concerted effort to put an end to all types of neo-colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations".¹¹ Arab nationalism was Nasser's vehicle for throwing off the shackles of Western imperialism. And non-alignment provided the right ideological cover for accepting

10. Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., n.8. pp.255-7.

11. *Documents of the Gatherings of Non-aligned Countries*, n.9. p.6.

military or economic aid from either bloc, when there was, in fact, no alternative. The holding back of Israel's expansion and cutting it down to the size ordained by the United Nations when it partitioned Palestine was considered an Egyptian national aim; and geography and history had cast Egypt in the natural role of a leader. The non-aligned movement possessed the additional moral and psychological resources that Nasser needed.

The Belgrade Summit gave rise to a movement -- Non-Aligned Movement and Egypt became one of its founder members. though the Non-aligned Summit of Belgrade did not decide the holding of similar conferences in an uninterrupted manner still it accelerated the movement and conferences were held with the initiative of its founder members.

Only two months after the Belgrade Summit, Nasser invited Tito and Nehru to an economic conference. It was held at Cairo from July 9 to 18, 1962. Nehru was initially reluctant for such a conference. However, the initiative provided by Nasser and Tito brought about the conference and it was sponsored by ten countries that had earlier come for the Belgrade Conference. They were Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Mali, Sudan, the UAR, and Yugoslavia.

The Cairo Economic Declaration was a statement reflecting the approach of the have-nots to the problems they

faced as part of the world's economic structure with some indication of what could be done to help them and what they could do to help themselves. Though the Conference could not foster any instant success in economic sphere among the non-aligned countries, still it strengthened the ties of cooperation among the non-aligned.

The Cairo Non-aligned Summit of 1964, one of Egypt's major contribution to the movement of non-alignment and a landmark in the history of the movement itself, was the second non-aligned summit Conference held in Cairo from 5-10 October 1964.¹² This meeting held at Cairo University, on the banks of the Nile, was one of the biggest historical events held on the banks of that eternal river. This meeting was not an ordinary event but marked a major step in the evolution and the strengthening of the NAM.

The Cairo Conference fully confirmed the basic principles of the Belgrade Declaration and evolved a more comprehensive programme for safeguarding security, expanding international cooperation and preserving peace. The agenda for the Conference covered wide-ranging subjects like universal disarmament, peaceful co-existence, elimination of colonialism, the role of the United Nations in international affairs, economic cooperation and development, etc.

12. *Egypt's Role in Non-alignment*, Cairo: State Information Service, Ministry of Information, Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, p.7.

Like Belgrade, Cairo owed as much to the pressure of events as to personalities for its occasioning, but, in contrast to the former, there was a marked improvement in the world situation. While the Belgrade Conference was held at the height of the Cold War military confrontation, the Cairo Conference followed the detente of 1962. As the Cairo Document stated, "this second Non-aligned Conference being held at a time when the international situation has improved as compared with that which existed between the two power blocs at the time of the historic Belgrade Conference."¹³ Not only the Cold War tension, prevailing at the time of the first conference, had eased considerably but also a large number of former colonies had become independent and, in their attempt to overcome social and economic backwardness, were struggling against imperialism and neo-colonialism. Despite this, improvement in international environment, some dangerous political issues remained - the future of Berlin, Cuba, control of nuclear weapons, racial discrimination etc.

The decolonisation process led to a marked increase in the number of membership of the non-aligned movement. Forty-seven countries participated in this conference.

Several of them were the newly independent countries like Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus.

13. *Documents of the Gatherings of Non-aligned countries, 1961-1978*, n.9, p.19.

Mali, Nigeria, Uganda etc. There were also twelve observes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, the organisation of African Unity and the Arab League.

Many speakers at the plenary session of the conference felt the need to define non-alignment as it was argued that the non-aligned movement had lost its relevancy. But Nasser, the hero of Egypt, strongly refuted this argument by giving non-alignment a two-fold definition. He maintained that the policy of non-alignment was not a trade in the strife between two blocs, aiming at securing the highest portion of privileges from each. He said, "The proof lies on the fact that we have adopted our main efforts to the dissipation of this strife, to warning against its dangers and have taken positive action to evade it". The second point highlighted by him was that the policy of non-alignment was not passive, wishing to remain aloof from the problems of its world. He said, "the proof is that we have endeavoured to deal with all the problems of our age and have come out with solutions which we put before the policy of blocs. In every situation, we were bowed solely by the obligation to adoption attitude based on an honest view governed by no previous obligation, except the principles accepted by the peoples in the most cherished document they have reached through their

sacrifices namely, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of Peace based injustice".¹⁴

Whereas the first non-aligned summit had resolved not to make concrete proposals for the solution of all international disputes, the second conference had very much to say and to propose solutions to almost all important questions such as the situation in Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, South East Asia, Portugese Africa, South Africa and the problems of divided nations. The second Summit, like the first, adopted the method approach of peace through negotiation. It accorded to it the pride of peace because a separate sub-heading 'Settlement of Disputes without Threat or Use of Force in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter' pointedly called for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. The landmarks on the road to peace as enunciated by Nasser at the conference were eradication of imperialism, correction of painful disparity in living standards, removal of the barriers to freedom and a proper use of the United Nations. Egyptian President called for the complete elimination of imperialism in its old and new forms. Security problem were dealt with under four separate sections; on the codification of peaceful co-existence, on respect for sovereignty, nor settlement of disputes without force and disarmament. They were accorded greater attention

14. *Egypt's Role in Non-alignment*, n.12, pp.9-10.

in the Cairo Declaration. The Declaration also condemned the policy of forming blocs as it was a source of world tension.

The Cairo Conference was also significant because for the first time it put up the demand for the setting up of a new international economic order. The Conference devoted much more time and attention to economic problems. It stressed that economic liberation is an essential element in the fight to end political domination which means that political liberation cannot be completed without economic liberation.¹⁵ It also favoured the expansion of economic relations within the Third World for national development. The Cairo Declaration was a landmark in that direction since it suggested the creation of an Integrated and a Joint Fund Programme. A Soviet commentator has described the Declaration of the Conference as a document of tremendous international importance,¹⁶ whereas the *New York Times* termed the Cairo Conference as an extraordinary gathering of leaders and representatives of independent nations.¹⁷ The non-aligned countries' demand for a new international economic order launched in Cairo was accepted officially at the Sixth U.N. General Assembly Special Session on May 1974.

15. *Dawn* (Karachi), 22 October 1964.

16. *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 12 October 1964.

17. *New York Times*, 14 October 1964.

Egypt's emphasis on economic programme, basically an idea of Nasser, was pressed harder in the subsequent phases of non-aligned movement. President Nasser along with Tito, at their Alexandria bilateral conference of May 1966, expressed great anxiety at the unsatisfactory economic progress of the developing countries and blamed the affluent nations for not having done enough to promote international trade and development. Both the Presidents agreed that the critical period through which the world was passing required that all states joined efforts to establish peace and seek to ensure an appropriate atmosphere in which all the nations of the world could concentrate on developing their resources to promote their economies and raise their standard of living. Nasser also reaffirmed his support for the principles proclaimed by the Afro-Asian and non-aligned conferences at Bandung, Belgrade and Cairo as a basis for international dealings. He also stressed the importance of promoting international cooperation in accordance with the principles of peaceful co-existence, equal sovereignty, non-interference and respect for the economic and social systems adopted by states and to settle international disputes by peaceful methods.

The economic thrust was stressed at the Tripartite Conference held in New Delhi on 21 October 1966. In that Conference, Nasser with Mrs. Gandhi and Tito expressed great anxiety at the unsatisfying economic progress of the

developing countries. He said that the poor nations should resist all economic pressures that were applied by the aid-givers. The Tripartite Communique emphasised the importance of the economic problems facing the developing countries and denounced the use of assistance as instruments as pressure by neo-colonialist powers.

President Nasser with the other two Heads of Government emphasized the covert and overt political and economic pressures that were being exercised by the big powers on the newly independent countries and stressed that the wide disparity between the rich and poor nations should be ended soon to pave the way for a more equitable international relationship based on justice.

The Tripartite Conference also studied the international problems at that moment. Nasser initiated a joint appeal for an early end to the Vietnam conflict. The joint communique called for an unconditional cessation of the American bombing of North Vietnam and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam to enable the people of Vietnam to decide their own future. To a pointed question by an American correspondent whether in calling for a withdrawal of all outside forces from Vietnam the Tripartite Conference took into account the fact of the presence of North Vietnamese forces also in South Vietnam, President Nasser replied that the North Vietnamese continued to maintain that their forces were not there. On the other hand, it was well

known that there were American forces in South Vietnam. "When we talk about withdrawal, we refer to those who are there. If the North Vietnamese are there in South Vietnam, they have also to withdraw. But I am not sure whether they are there".¹⁸

Nasser also reiterated his firm opposition to colonialism and supported the just struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, South west Africa, Angola, Mozambique, the so-called Portuguese Guinea, Aden and the Protectorates.¹⁹ With Tito and Mrs. Gandhi he also opposed racialism as practised in South Africa, South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Thus the Tripartite Conference was another boost to the non-aligned movement. It drew the three pioneers of non-alignment together in their work towards strengthening the forces of the non-aligned movement.

Egypt continued to emphasize the economic aspects. On 23 December 1967, another Tripartite Economic Conference was held at Cairo at the initiative of Nasser. It was joined by President Tito as well as Mrs. Gandhi. That Conferences among other things discussed problems of grants of preferential tariffs, simplification of payments, arrangement and development of trade among the non-aligned nations. This initiative gave a new direction by which the non-aligned states could search for economic alternatives from among

18. *The Times of India* (New Delhi), 25 October 1966.

19. *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 25 October 1966.

their own resources through a system of mutual help instead of having to depend upon the Super Powers and their allies. That gave a new direction to the question of South-South Cooperation. Ever since the signing of that agreement the non-aligned countries have been arranging meetings between their Heads of governments and other leaders at suitable intervals in order to seek areas of cooperation in the economic and other fields.

Egypt's policy of non-alignment got a severe blow with the demise of President Nasser on 28 September 1970. Both Egypt and the world lost a pioneer of the non-aligned movement. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, could not maintain the Nasserite spirit in this movement. Rather, Egypt under Sadat underwent a total reversal of Nasserite policies. Egypt's subsequent close ties with the Western Bloc states and more of its willingness to recognize and sign a peace treaty with Israel isolated Egypt in the Arab-Israel world which constituted a major group in the NAM. It appeared that this group's demand for removal of Egypt from the NAM during the NAM summit at Havana would bring about break in the movement. But conciliatory policy of other members of the NAM including India prevented that break. Sadat's Egypt later became able to regain its previous position in the NAM. Yet it has not yet been able to acquire the revolutionary and radical image that it had under President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Though Egypt had a framework of a non-aligned policy before Nasser came to power and the policy continued to be pursued with some vigour during the days of President Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian policy of non-alignment had reached a high water-mark only during the days of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In a way, he lifted the policy from the narrow confines of anti-imperialism *vis-a-vis* Britain and gave it a Third World focus. He, along with other leaders, was also instrumental in laying the foundation of the non-aligned movement. Thus, one cannot ignore the contribution of Nasser to Egyptian policy of non-alignment. In that context, one needs to understand the personality of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

President Nasser was a remarkable man with strikingly intuitive approach towards politics. He was a man with whom the people identified national self-respect and a measure of independence and Arab adulation. That carried him and Egypt through their first difficult decade of independence. It was what Lacouture called 'the golden age of personification'.¹

Over the years since 1952, one man more than any other, Nasser embodied everything that the country stood for. Andre' Malraux remarked that 'regardless of everything,

1. Quoted, Anthony McDermott. *Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*, London, New York, Sydney: Croomhelm, 1987. p.276.

regardless of success or failure, victory or defeat, Nasser will go down in history as the embodiment of Egypt, just as Napoleon became the embodiment of France'.² His dominating personality introduced an element additional to and independent of the foundation of countries of historical continuity — namely the role of the leader, or *ra'is*. The name of Nasser and national dignity became inseparable. He came to represent Egypt the state and Egypt the revolution, which was to transcend national borders. Nasser's prestige was such that he was able to make convincing to others, particularly the Arabs his concept of the world within his terms of reference.

Eversince the Revolution of 1952, Nasser had faced repeated crises, and even thrived on them. Despite disasters, he had always bounced back. To some he had been the great hope for the liberation of Palestine from the Zionist usurpers, and of the Arab world from reactionary rulers and their imperialist masters, while to others, he was the only Arab leader potentially capable of making peace with Israel, and of stabilizing Arab society against continuous upheavals.³

The emergence of Nasser as a charismatic leader began in 1955 with the activation of his anti-imperialist policies.

2. Quoted, *Ibid.*, p.258.

3. M. H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abdal Nasser and his Rivals, 1958-1970*, London: Oxford University Press, 1974, p.153.

The major catalyst in the emergence of Nasser's charismatic leadership was undoubtedly the overwhelming enthusiasm with which his anti-Western policies were greeted inside Egypt and within the Arab world as a whole.⁴ Nasser's defiance of the West in a series of dramatic and rightly publicized acts coincided with the prevailing political orientations of the Arabs.

Egyptian prestige was enhanced by two important incidents that marked Nasser's foreign policy in 1955. The first was Nasser's active role in the Bandung Conference which was an indication that Egypt could play a positive role in world affairs and set an example for fellow Third World countries. The second was the conclusion of the Czech-arms deal which was a valuable symbol of the break with the former allies firmly labelled as imperialists and who had pursued a policy of divide-and-rule towards the Arab world. It was the course of Nasser's foreign policy which could be presented as positive and one which projected him as defending an Egypt under siege. Moreover it was Nasser's Arab-world policies which reinforced the feeling at home that Egypt's historical moment had arrived.

With this Nasser-led concept of pan-Arabism and Arab non-alignment went to the proposition that Arab unity was

4. A.I. Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976, p.103.

inseparable from socialism. It was a doctrine which gradually gathered strength and was presented as being an irresistible and inevitable force in which Arabs, with the Egyptians in the forefront, could take deep pride. Egyptian policy of socialism was not a doctrinist socialism but had evolved over a decade along with Egyptian policy of pan-Arabism and non-alignment in the context of domestic and foreign policy compulsions. Isolated gradually by the West, Nasser had no option but to depend upon the Communist Bloc states. Also, a restructuring of the Egyptian domestic economy for an accelerated and planned development led him to opt for socialism and a dominant role for state sector. Thus single-party system, pan-Arabism and non-alignment were not only interlinked but also represented a remarkable phase of Egyptian domestic and foreign policy, especially under Nasser.

Nasser, largely through his foreign policy, especially pan-Arabism, was able to acquire a popular following and was able to project involvement in other Arab states, even in the Yemen war, as a matter of principle, even though that policy proved costly both in terms of money and lives. His words stirred souls deeply and helped to stimulate the fulfilment of the popular wish that this was how Egypt stood and should be accepted in the international community. The journalist Mustafa Amin, who was imprisoned and tortured under Nasser, felt able to say: "Nasser has done a lot harm to me, my

friends and my country but I must admit that he has made me proud to be an Egyptian".⁵ This was a telling tribute from one of those who was prepared to give Nasser the benefit of the doubt because of the pride he had instilled among the Egyptians. The personal acclaim which Nasser had enjoyed had been so overwhelming that it had failed to convey to other fledgling organisations the sort of legitimacy which was fully accepted abroad and at home.

Nasser embarked on an ambitious course designed to set Egypt in the vanguard of Arab unity, Middle Eastern and African affairs.⁶ He had elaborated it in his book *Philosophy of the Revolution* where he had mentioned three circles — Arab, African and Islamic.

The first circle, which Nasser described as the most important of all, was the Arab world — 'a group of neighbouring nations welded into a homogeneous whole by every possible material and moral tie that would unite any such group of countries'. Here Nasser expounded the basic Arab nationalist thesis of unity. He cited for Arabs three sources of strength: 'the ties which make of our homeland an integral and indivisible whole'; the very geographic location

5. McDermott. n.1, pp.260-61.

6. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Egypt since Nasser", *Current History*, Philadelphia. Vol.62, no.365, January 1972, p.6.

of the Arabs 'at the world's cross-roads' and oil, 'the backbone of material civilization'. There was not, in so much as a suspended clause, a claim or hint either of Egypt or Nasser personally seeking 'control of the Arab states and the oil' as Mr. Lloyd directly charged.⁷ Nasser wrote, "this circle is as much as a part of us, as we are a part of it, that our history has mixed with it and that its interests are linked with ours ...we have suffered the same hardships, lived the same crisis...".⁸ The stress was placed on the common historical experience of the Arabs.

The second circle that Nasser posited was the African continent from whose nationalist struggle, he wrote, 'we cannot under any condition, even if we wanted to, stand aloof'. He wrote of his hope that one day Cairo would have 'a great institute' to explore Africa. But Mr. Lloyd claimed that he had read in those same passages a direct confession, an open statement of imperialist aims of Nasser like Hitler's.⁹ Nasser's third circle was that of Islam and

-
7. Erskine B. Childers, *The Road to Suez: A Study of Western Arab Relations*, London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962, p.216.
 8. G.A. Nasser, *Philosophy of the Revolution*, Ministry of National Guidance, Information Administration, Cairo, 1954, pp.68-70.
 9. Selwyn Lloyd, *Suez 1956: A Personal Account*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1978, pp.191-92.

he wrote of the need for closer cooperation between all Moslems throughout the world.

It is of significance that Nasser made no mention about the policy of non-alignment in his book *Philosophy of the Revolution* though that policy had developed roots by that time. It is important to note that in due course of time Nasser ignored the third circle, Islamic, and innovated the circle of non-aligned movement. In fact, despite the fact that Nasser was a firm believer in Islam, he had to face great opposition in his domestic policies through the Ikhwan and in his foreign policies through Saudi Arabia.

It would not be wrong to say that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 was a major water-shed in Egypt's foreign and defense policy. Egyptian Government signed an agreement that allowed the West to occupy the base under certain well-defined conditions. Seen from the Cold War framework, it linked Egypt to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West. But it also meant the framework for the evacuation of the British forces from there. They had become a symbol of British dominance over Egypt since 1982. Some argued that their removal would weaken regional security. But Nasser argued that the evacuation of the British forces from the Suez Canal Zone would not create a military vacuum in the region. Rather it would pave the way for strengthening the area's defense. To quote Nasser,

The defense of the Middle East must rest primarily with the inhabitants of the area. No outside forces can defend this soil as effectively as the people who live here. That is why Egypt has made every effort to strengthen the Arab League's Collective Security Pact. It is the best possible system to defend our part; of the world against any possible aggression".¹⁰

As noted earlier, the year 1955 marked the period of transition in Egyptian foreign policy. Significantly it coincided with Nasser's rise as a charismatic leader and the decisive ideological shift from Egyptian nationalism to Arabism.¹¹ By the spring of 1955, Nasser had already visualized the basic ideas of a policy by means of which small powers could join together for mutual protection and speak with a common voice in world affairs.¹²

Besides, Nasser put great emphasis on the real independence of a country. The principal nationalist aim, he insisted, was independence and the only way to achieve and maintain it was by breaking ties with the great powers and by binding the Arab states together into a solid bloc. Through a set of bold steps like full support to the Palestinians, the Czech-arm deal, the nationalization of the Suez Canal

-
10. G.A. Nasser. "The Egyptian Revolution". *Foreign Affairs*, New York, Vol.33, No.2, January 1955, p.210.
 11. R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics*, London: University of London, 1972. p.111.
 12. C.D. Cremeans, *The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy*, London: Praeger, 1963, p.247.

Company etc. Nasser became a symbol of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. "His popularity in the Arab world continued to grow."¹³ The Egyptian President inevitably became the hero of the articulate masses in neighbouring Arab countries.

According to Boutros Boutros Ghali, by 1958 every Arab revolutionary had come to regard himself as Nasserite irrespective of his willingness to relinquish his sovereign status in favour of Egyptian domination".¹⁴ In other words, in less than four years, a radical change had occurred in the orientations of the Egyptian policy. Pan-Arab thrust of the new policies elevated Nasser to the leadership of the Arab nationalist movement.

The logical sequence of the policy of pan-Arabism and leadership of the Arab world was the support to the Palestinians and the direct confrontation with Israel and its supporters. Nasser's insistence on liquidating the Israeli aggression on a part of the Palestine land was because of his determination to liquidate one of the most dangerous pockets of imperialism. His opposition to Israeli policy of infiltration in Africa was only an attempt to prevent Israel from bypassing Egypt and seek support in Africa, an important area where Nasser wanted Egypt to play a leading role.

13. Peter Mansfield, *Nasser's Egypt*, Middlesex: Penguin, 1965, p.56.

14. Quoted, J.P. Sharma, *The Arab Mind: A Study of Egypt, Arab Unity and the World*, New Delhi: H.K. Publishers, 1990, p.35.

But Nasser, a captive of his pan-Arab ideals, had to pay a heavy price for his pan-Arabism. Because this policy brought him into confrontation with not only the Western powers and Israel but also with the conservative and pro-Western Arab states. Egypt, despite the natural endowments was a poor and less developed state. Nasser was deeply concerned with the economic and industrial development of Egypt. That needed resources mostly foreign aid and peace so that Egypt could devote itself to development. Both were denied to it. In 1956, not only was Egypt denied Western help for the construction of the High Dam but in turn was attacked by three powers when it nationalized the Suez Canal Company to acquire resources to build the dam. Again in 1967 when Egypt was half-way through its Second Five Year Plan phase, which had great emphasis upon industry, it was not only dragged into the June 1967 War but also to the long-drawn War of attrition that continued till August 1970 when a cease-fire was arranged under the Rogers' proposals. Thus, Nasser's desire to build a strong economy could not succeed. Yet his policy of non-alignment was largely geared to seeking resources for the economic development of the country. It is worth appreciating that despite all the constraints, Egypt was about to establish a strong economic infra-structure which was unfortunately destroyed by the short-sighted policy under President Sadat.

Nasser extended his hands for a meaningful international co-operation. Beside helping to launch the non-aligned movement, he also contributed actively to the cause of Arab unity. He also believed in pan-African movement and in Afro-Asian solidarity. He at once belonged to the two continents where the greatest battles of national liberation had been fought and won.

Given the thrust of Nasser's policies of non-alignment as well as pan-Arabism, it was understandable that they would lead to the isolation of Egypt from the West. Hence, over the years, Egypt was compelled to depend upon the U.S.S.R. when there was growing military threat from Israel backed by the West. The June War of 1967 made Nasser completely dependent upon the Soviet Bloc as discussed earlier. That had its impact upon Egypt's relations with Arab states. Many of them turned hostile to Nasser. But the popularity of Nasser and of his policies in the Arab world was so strong that even those Arab states, which were tilted towards one power bloc or the other, hesitated to align themselves openly with them against Nasser and strived hard to project a non-aligned image.¹⁵ Undoubtedly Nasser has his critics but he succeeded not only in acquiring but also in retaining the

15. *Egypt's Role in Non-alignment*, Cairo: State Information Report, Ministry of Information, the Arab Republic of Egypt, pp.12-13.

legitimacy of his non-aligned policy both in Egypt and abroad.¹⁶

The sudden death of Nasser stunned the world. It brought to an end an era of intensive political activity of Egypt especially centred around the non-aligned movement. The ultimate proof of the charisma of this pioneer of the non-aligned movement was the unabashed out-pouring of popular sorrow at his funeral. His demise altered the balance of forces in the Arab world. In Egypt where he had dominated the country for fifteen years, he left a gaping void.

Nasser was succeeded by Vice President Anwar al-Sadat. After becoming the President of Egypt, Sadat reiterated his country's commitment to non-alignment time and again. He declared that, "We shall adhere to the policy of non-alignment, as we learnt from Gamal Abdel Nasser. It is not a negative attitude. As practised by him, it means standing by our independence, standing for our freedom, for peace and progress. It implies that we should face up the dangers which threaten our values".¹⁷

But while publicly pronouncing in favour of non-alignment, Sadat could not provide the Nasserite momentum to

16. K.R. Singh, "Egyptian Non-alignment", *International Studies*, Vol.20, No.1-2, January-June 1981. p.336.

17. Egypt's Role in Non-alignment n.15, p.13.

the non-aligned movement. The initial policy of President Sadat, while seemingly similar to that of Nasser during 1967-70, exhibited subtle differences in emphasis which indicated basic shifts in the underlying elements of Nasser's policy. President Sadat signalled a *Volte face* in Egyptian foreign policy by expelling thousands of Soviet advisers and other personnel from the country. He gradually shifted Egypt's attitudinal position regarding the Arab world towards an increasing emphasis on Egyptian affairs. Moreover, his rapprochement with the U.S. tilted the balance in favour of the U.S.A. in the Arab world. It had far-reaching impact upon the main thrust of the non-aligned movement itself. It began to tilt heavily in favour of the West in the eighties.

Undoubtedly Nasser was one of the greatest leaders of the modern period in the Third World. His policies made the Arabs in general and Egyptians in particular, an important factor in International politics. His successors, however, failed to maintain that position. Perhaps the vital difference between the way Nasser and Sadat operated lay in their personal relationship with the Egyptian masses. For whatever reasons, the mood after the 1967 war, even though Egypt was defeated, was that Nasser had to stay on; there was no one else. But after the victory of 1973 War and the peace treaty with Israel, which subsequently followed, Sadat was rejected by the Egyptian masses and ultimately assassinated.

Though Sadat's successor, President Hosni Mubarak, has retrieved the position of Egypt somewhat, no Arab leader including him has been able to capture the imagination of the Arabs as Nasser had. There in lies the charisma of Nasser, both in his success and in his failure.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Primary Sources

- Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World* (U.S.A., C.I.A., ER 76-10372, 4 July 1976).
- Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist, Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-79* (National Foreign Assistance Centre, ER 80-103184, Washington D.C., October 1980).
- Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974* (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Service Special Report No.23, Washington D.C., February 1976).
- Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), 36 (6 May 1957).
- Documents of the Gatherings of Non-aligned Countries, 1961-1978* (Beograd, 1978).
- Documents of International Affairs, 1956* (Royal Institute of International Affairs).
- Egypt's Role in Non-alignment* (Cairo: State Information Service, Ministry of Information, Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt).
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1965).
- Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session on S.I. Res. 19 and H.J. Res.117, Joint Resolution, United States* (Washington: Government Birthday Printing Office, 1957), 11.
- Lloyd Selwyn, *Suez 1956: A Personal Account* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978).

Nasser, G.A., *Philosophy of the Revolution* (Cairo: Ministry of National Guidance, Information Administration, 1954).

_____, "The Egyptian Revolution". *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol.32. No.2. January 1955. pp.199-211.

_____, *Nasser's Speeches*, 1959.

_____, *Nasser's Speeches, Press Interviews*. January-December 1962.

_____, *Nasser's Speeches*, 1963.

Naguib, Mohammed, *Egypt's Destiny* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1955).

Texts of Selected Speeches and Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, April 18-24, 1955.

The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, September 1-6, 1961 (Government of Yugoslavia, Belgrade).

The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956: A Documentation Publication (Department of State Publication, 6392, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1956).

U.S. Aid: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1971 (Bureau for Progress and Policy Co-ordination, Agency for International Development, Washington D.C., 24 May 1972).

U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organization, Obligations and Loan Authorisation, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1961 (U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, Washington D.C., 21 March 1962).

World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer, 1964-1973 (Department of State, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington D.C., 1974).

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974
(U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington
D.C., 1975).

Secondary Sources

Books

- Adams, Michael. *Suez and After: Year of Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958).
- Ahmed, J.M., *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism* (London: Oxford, 1960).
- Bahgat, Korany, *Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour* (Geneva, 1976).
- Bhutani, S and Goyal, D.R., *Non-alignment and the Palestinian Question* (New Delhi: League of Arab States Mission, 1985).
- Bowle, Robert R., *International Crisis and the Role of Law: Suez 1956* (London: Oxford, 1974).
- Carter, James Richard, *The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid* (Praeger, 1969/71).
- Childers, Erskine B., *The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962).
- Cremeans, Charles D., *The Arabs and the World, Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy* (London: Praeger, 1963).
- Dawisha, A.I., *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1976).
- Dekmejian, R. Hrair, *Egypt under Nasser: A Study in Political Dynamics* (London: University of London Press, 1972).
- Dromnjak, Milos, *Policy and Movement of Non-alignment, 1961-1979: A Survey of Participants and Activities* (Beograd, 1979).
- Epstein, Leon D., *British Politics and the Suez Crisis* (London and Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

- Fontaine, Andre. *History of the Cold War: From the Korean War to the Present* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1970).
- Haim, S.G., ed., *Arab Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).
- Heikal, Mohammed Hassanein, *The Cairo Documents: The Inside story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels and Statesmen* (New York: Doubleday Company, 1973).
- _____, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: The Suez Through Egyptian Eyes* (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1986).
- Hopwood, Derek, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982).
- Izzeddin, Nelja M. Abu, *Nasser of the Arabs* (Beirut, 1975).
- Jansen, G.H., *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966).
- Joesten, Joachim, *Nasser: The Rise to Power* (London: Odhmas Press Ltd., 1960).
- Karunakaran, K.P. (eds.), *Outside the Contest: A Study of Non-alignment and Foreign Policies of Some Non-Aligned Countries* (New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1961).
- Kerr, Malcolm H., *The Arab Cold War 1958-1969: A Study of Ideology in Politics* (London: Oxford, 1965).
- _____, *The Arab Cold war: Gamel Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970* (London: Oxford, 1971).
- Kimche, David, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Policy of the Third World* (Jerusalem, 1973).
- Kovalenko, Ivan and Tuzmukhamedov, Rais. *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Soviet View* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., 1987).
- Lacouture, Jean and Simonne, *Egypt in Transition* (London: Mathuen and Company Ltd., 1958).
- Lacouture, Jean, ed., *Nasser* (Paris: Seuil, 1971).
- Lacqueur, Walter Z., *Middle east in Transition* (London, 1958).
- _____, *The Middle East: The Permanent Crisis* (London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd., 1971).

- _____, (ed.), *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (London, 1959).
- Legum, C., *Bandung, Cairo and Acra* (London, 1958).
- Lenczowski, George, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971).
- Lengyel, Emil, *Egypt's Role in World Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957).
- Little, Tom, *Modern Egypt* (London: Ernest Benn, 1967).
- Louis, W.M., Roger and Owen, Roger (eds.): *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
- Mansfield, Peter, *Nasser* (London: Methuen, 1969).
- _____, *The British in Egypt* (London: Widenfeld and Nicholson, 1971).
- _____, *Nasser's Egypt* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1965).
- Marlowe, John, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953* (London: The Crescent Press, 1954).
- McDermott, Anthony, *Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution* (London, New York, Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd., 1988).
- Nuseibeh, Hazemaki, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1968).
- Rassi, Mario, *The Third World: The Non-aligned Countries and the World Revolution* (New York, 1963).
- Rumyantsev, Yevgeni, *The Bandung Spirit Today* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Ltd., 1989).
- Sayegh, Fayez A. (ed.), *The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World: A Symposium* (San Francisco: Chaldler Publishing Company, 1964).
- _____, *Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfilment* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1958).

- Shoukri, G., , *Egypt: Portrait of a President, 1971-81: The Counter Revolution in Egypt: Sadat's Road to Jerusalem* (London: Zed Press, 1981).
- Singham, A.W. and Tran, Nandina (eds.), *From Bandung to Colombo: Conferences of the Non-aligned Countries, 1955-70* (New York, 1976).
- Stephens, Robert, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971).
- Stewart, Desmond, *Young Egypt* (London, 1958).
- The Arms Trade with the Third World* (SIPRI Arms Trade Register, Cambridge: MIT Press, March 1975).
- Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt: From Mohammad Ali to Sadat* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980).
- _____ (ed.), *Egypt Since the Revolution* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968)
- Waterbury, John, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983).
- Waterfield, G., *Egypt* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967).
- Wynn, Wilton, *Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity* (Cambridge: Arlington Books, 1959).

Articles

- Agwani, M.S., "The Arab World and Non-alignment", *International Studies*, Vol.20, Nos.1-2, Jan-Jun, 1981, pp.371-77.
- "An Interview with President Nasser: Eban Replies to Nasser", *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), Vol.13, March-April 1970, pp.60-70.
- Atyeo, Henry C., "Egyptian Nationalism", *Current History* (Philadelphia), Vol.XLIII, No.4, 1967, pp.43-9.
- Babaa, Khalid, "Arab Positive Neutrality", *Middle East Forum* (Beirut), Vol.XLI, No.1, Winter 1965, pp.9-16.
- "Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries", *Foreign Affairs Report*, Vol.10, No.9, September 1961, pp.80-97.

- "Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned Nations", *World Today*, Vol.17, No.10, October 1961, pp.411-13.
- Benin, Joel, "The Communist Movement and Nationalist Political Discourse in Nasser's Egypt", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.41, no.41, Autumn 1987, pp.568-585.
- Bowie, Leland, "Nasir's Role and Legacy: I Charisma, Weber and Nasir", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.XXX, Spring 1976, pp.141-57.
- C. Ernest Dawn, "The Egyptian Remilitarization of Sinai. May 1967", *Journal of Contemporary History* (London), Vol.3, July 1968, pp.201-24.
- Chejne, Anwar G., "Egyptian Attitudes Towards Pan-Arabism", *Middle East Forum*, Vol.11, no.3, Summer 1957, pp.253-68.
- Choucri, N., "The Non-alignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception and Behaviour", *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (Ontario), Vol.2, 1969, pp.1-17.
- Dimeshkie, Hadim, "The Impact of the Cold War on the Arab World", *Middle East Forum*, Vol.XXXIX, no.10, December 1963, pp.15-20.
- Entelis, J.P., "Nasser's Egypt: The failure of Charismatic Leadership", *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Vol.17, no.2, Summer 1974, pp.451-54.
- Feis, Herbert, "Suez Scenario: A Lamensable Tale", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.38, no.4, July 1960, pp.598-612.
- Harris, Christian Phelps, "The New Egypt After 1952", *Current History*, Vol.52, no.306, February 1963, pp.90-97.
- Howard, Harry N., "The U.S. in the Middle East Today", *Current History*, July 1969, pp.36-41.
- Ismael, Tareqy, "The United Arab Republic and the Sudan", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.23, No.1, Winter 1969, pp.14-28.
- Issawi, Charles, "The United Arab Republic", *Current History*, Vol.36, no.210, February 1959, pp.65-9.
- Kelidar, Abbas, "The Struggle for Arab Unity", *World Today* (London), Vol.23, no.7, July 1967, pp.292-300.

- Kenny, L.M.. "The Aftermath of Defeat in Egypt", *International Journal* (Toronto). Vol.23. no.1, Winter 1967/68, pp.97-108.
- Kerr, Malcolm H.. "Coming to Terms with Nasser", *International Affairs*, Vol.43, 1967, pp.65-84.
- _____. "Review of Egypt Under Nasir", *American Political Science Review* (Washington). Vol.64. no.3, September 1973, pp.1049-50.
- Kiovic, Bozldar. "Non-aligned and the Middle East", *Review of International Affairs*, Vol.24, no.567, November 20, 1973.
- Lenczowski, George. "The Objects and Methods of Nasserism", *Journal of International Affairs* (Columbia), Vol.19, No.1, January 1965, pp.63-75.
- Listowel, Judith, "President Nasser and Egypt", *Listener* (London), 77(1991), 25 May 1967, pp.673-5.
- Lyon, Peter, "Non-alignment at the Summits from Belgrade 1961 to Havana 1979: A Perspective View", *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.41. no.1, March 1980, pp.132-153.
- Mannin, Ethel. "Nasser and his Socialism", *Middle East Forum*, Vol.XL, no.2, February-March 1964, pp.17-21.
- Masannat, George. "Nasser's Search for New Order". *Muslim World* (Hardford). Vol.56. no.2. April 1966, pp.87-95.
- "New Crisis in Middle East: Exclusive interview with President Nasser of Egypt". *US News*, Vol.68, 18 May 1970, pp.60-63.
- Ofer, Gur, "The Economic Burden of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East", *Soviet Studies*, Vol.XXIV, no.3. January 1973.
- Rovcek, Joseph S., "The United Arab Republic Achievement", *New Africa*, no.10, September-October 1968, pp.6-8.
- Rubinstein, Alvin Z., "Egypt since Nasser", *Current History*, Vol.62, no.365, January 1979, pp.6-13.
- Seigman, Henry, "Arab Unity & Disunity", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.16, no.1, Winter 1962, pp.48-59.
- Sharma, J.P., "Nasser and the Non-Aligned Movement", *Detente*,

Vol.IX. no.6. March-June 1991. pp.6-8.

Singh, K.R.. "Egyptian Non-alignment", *International Studies*, Vol.20. no.1-2, January-June 1981, pp.315-6.

_____, "Roger's proposal and Arab Reactions", *Foreign Affairs Report* (New Delhi) 19 June/August 1970, pp.60-68.

_____, "The Soviet-UAR Relations", *Indian Quarterly*, Vol.25. no.2. April-June 1969, pp.139-52.

Stevens, Georgiana G., "Arab neutralism and Bandung", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.11, no.2, Spring 1957, pp.139-52.

Warren, L. Young, "American Interests in the UAR", *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), Vol.13, January 1970, pp.26-41.

Yost, Charles W., "The Arab Israeli War; How it began, the Consequences of Defeat", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.46. no.2. January 1968, pp.304-35.

Newspapers

1. *Dawn* (Karachi).
2. *Indian Express* (New Delhi).
3. *New York Times* (New York).
4. *The Hindustan Times* (Delhi).
5. *The Hindu* (Madras).
6. *The Statesman* (New Delhi).
7. *The Times* (London).
8. *The Times of India* (New Delhi).

APPENDIX - I

(Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base.
Cairo . October 19. 1954)**

*Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian
Government Regarding the Suez Canal Base*

Cairo October 19. 1954

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of
Egypt.

Desiring to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new
basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship.

Have agreed as follows:-

ARTICLE 1

Her Majesty's Forces shall be completely withdrawn from
Egyptian territory in accordance with the Schedule set forth
in Part A of Annex I within a period of twenty months from
the date of signature of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 2

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that the
Treaty of Alliance signed in London on the 26th of August,
1936, with the Agreed Minute, Exchanged Notes, Convention
concerning the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the

British Forces in Egypt and all other subsidiary agreements. is terminated.

ARTICLE 3

Parts of the present Suez Canal Base, which are listed in Appendix A to Annex II, shall be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the present Agreement. To this end they shall be organized in accordance with the provisions of Annexure II.

ARTICLE 4

In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo on the 13th of April, 1950, or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively. These facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.

ARTICLE 5

In the event of the return of British Forces to the Suez Canal Base area in accordance with the provisions of

Article 4. these forces shall withdraw immediately upon the cessation of the hostilities referred to in that Article.

ARTICLE 6

In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint defence between Arab League States or on Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE 7

The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford over-flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of aircraft under Royal Air Force control. For the clearance of any flights of such aircraft, the Government of the Republic of Egypt shall accord treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the aircraft of any other foreign country with the exception of States parties to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States. The landing and servicing facilities mentioned above shall be afforded at Egyptian Airfields in the Suez Canal Base area.

ARTICLE 8

The two Contracting Governments recognise that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a

waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on the 29th of October, 1888.

ARTICLE 9

- (a) The United Kingdom is accorded the right to move any British equipment into or out of the Base at its discretion.
- (b) There shall be no increase above the level of supplies as agreed upon in Part C of Annex 11 without the consent of the Government of the Republic of Egypt.

ARTICLE 10

The present Agreement does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 11

The Annexes and Appendices to the present Agreement shall be considered as an integral part of it.

ARTICLE 12

- (a) The present Agreement shall remain in force for the period of seven years from the date of its signature.
- (b) During the last twelve months of that period the two Contracting Governments shall consult together to decide on such arrangements as may be necessary upon the termination of the Agreement.
- (c) Unless both the Contracting Governments agree upon any extension of the Agreement it shall terminate seven years after the date of signature and the Government of the United Kingdom shall take away or dispose of their property then remaining in the Base.

ARTICLE 13

The present Agreement shall have effect as though it had come into force on the date of signature. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Cairo, this nineteenth day of October, 1954, in duplicate, in the English and Arabic languages, both texts

being equally authentic.

(L.S.) ANTHONY NUTTING

(L.S.) RALPH SERINE STEVENSON

(L.S.) E.R. BENSON

(L.S.) GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

(L.S.) ABDEL HAKIM AMER

(L.S.) ABDEL LATIF BAGHDADI

(L.S.) SALAH SALEM

(L.S.) MAHMOUD FAWZI

According to the 1954 Agreement, the Seventy five year British occupation came to an end.

Source: *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956: A Documentary Publication* (Department of State Publication 6392, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1956) pp.20-23.

MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM EXPENDITURES

	U.S. FISCAL YEARS													Total	
	1946- 48	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960		1961
MSF ECONOMIC EXPENDITURES - TOTAL	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.8	2.7	4.2	19.1	12.3	8.4	0.4	12.6	4.1	64.7
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.8	2.7	4.2	19.1	12.3	8.4	0.4	12.6	4.1	64.7
DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OTHER MSF ECONOMIC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

a including Syria.

* Principal full repaid.

Sources:

(U.S. Agency for International Development Statistics and Reports Division, 21 March 1962). *U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organization, Obligations and Loan Authorization, Washington D.C. July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1961.*

Appendix II

Table - 2

EGYPT

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS													Total 1946- 1971	Repay- ments and Inter- rest 1946- 1971	less Re- pay- ments and Inter- rest
	Post- war Relief Period	Mars- hall Plan Period	Mutual Secu- rity Act Period	Foreign Assistance Act Period												
	1946- 48	1949- 52	1953- 61	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971			
A. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE																
A.I.D. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES																
- TOTAL	-	0.4	87.7	42.2	48.6	1.4	2.3	1.5	0.8	-	-	-	-	154.3	22.9	131.4
Loans	-	-	22.9	40.0	46.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	85.8	22.9	62.9
Grants	-	0.4	64.8	2.2	2.3	1.4	2.3	1.5	0.8	-	-	-	-	68.5	-	68.5
(Supporting Assistance)	(-)	(-)	(20.0)	(10.0)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(28.9)		
FOOD FOR PEACE - TOTAL	-	0.8	214.6	158.3	98.1	94.1	95.3	24.2	11.8	-	-	-	-	697.4	92.9	604.5
TITLE I - TOTAL	-	-	132.3	114.0	78.5	85.2	84.9	14.5	-	-	-	-	-	509.5	92.9	416.6
Repayable in U.S. Dollars-Loans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.5	-	-	-	-	-	14.5	-	14.5
Payable in Foreign Currency	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
- Planned for Country Use	-	-	132.3	114.0	78.5	85.2	84.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	495.0	92.9	402.1
(Total Sales Agreements, including U.S. uses)	(-)	(-)	(209.5)	(162.9)	(122.7)	(130.7)	(132.2)	(40.7)	(-)	(-)	-	-	-	(798.7)	(-)	(798.7)
Planned for Country Use.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Economic Development Loans and Grants	-	-	132.3	114.0	78.5	85.2	84.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	495.0	92.9	402.1
Common Defence Grants	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TITLE II - TOTAL	-	0.8	82.3	44.3	19.6	8.9	10.4	9.7	11.8	-	-	-	-	187.9	-	187.9
Emergency Relief, Econ. Development and World Food	-	-	-	23.8	-	-	1.6	-	3.6	-	-	-	-	29.0	-	29.0
Voluntary Relief Agencies	-	0.8	82.3	20.5	19.6	8.9	8.8	9.7	8.2	-	-	-	-	158.9	-	158.9
OTHER OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE	11.0	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.1	10.7	0.4
Peace Corps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	11.0	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.1	10.7	0.4
TOTAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE	11.0	1.3	302.3	200.5	146.7	95.5	97.6	25.7	12.6	-	-	-	-	862.8	126.5	736.3
Loans	10.7	-	132.1	141.1	124.8	85.2	84.9	14.5	-	-	-	-	-	570.0	126.5	443.5
Grants	0.3	1.3	170.2	59.4	21.9	10.3	12.7	11.2	12.6	-	-	-	-	292.7	-	292.7

U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

PROGRAM	Post-war Relief Period	Mars-hall Plan Period	Mutual Security Act Period	Foreign Assistance Act Period										Total 1946-1971	Repayments and Interest 1946-1971	Total less Repayments and Interest	
	1946-48	1949-52	1953-61	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1971	rest		
B. OTHER OFFICIAL																	
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LONG TERM ECONOMIC LOANS	7.1	0.2	30.6	-	9.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	47.8	33.2	14.6	
TOTAL ECONOMIC	18.1	1.5	332.9	200.5	156.6	95.5	97.6	25.7	12.6	-	-	-	-	910.6	159.7	750.9	
Loans	17.8	0.2	162.7	141.1	134.7	85.2	84.9	14.5	-	-	-	-	-	617.8	159.7	458.1	
Grants	0.3	1.3	170.2	59.4	21.9	10.3	12.7	11.2	12.6	-	-	-	-	292.7	-	292.7	

* Principal full repaid.

Source: US AID: US OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - JULY 1, 1945 - JUNE 30, 1971
 (Office of the Statistics and Reports, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
 Agency for International Development, Washington D.C., 24 May 1972).

APPENDIX III

Table 1

Arms Supplies to Egypt

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
		Aircraft		
1950-51	(2)	Bucker Bu 181 Bestmann	FR	Prior to start of local production
1950	(10)	Avro Anson	Germany	
1950	20	Supermarine Spitfire F.22	UK	Reconditioned
1950-51	12	Gloster Meteor F.8	UK	
1950-51	2	Gloster Meteor T.7	UK	
(1951)	(10)	Short S.A.6 Sealand	UK	
1953	(15)	DH Vampire F.52 and T.55	UK	
1953	30	DH Vampire Mk 5 and T.55	Syria	Syria received them from Italy may be Fiat Macchi Vampire
(1953-54)	(5)	Curtiss C-46	USA	
(1953-54)	(1)	Beech C-45	(USA)	
(1953-54)	2	Westland Dragonfly	UK	
1954-55	(12)	Gloster Meteor F.8	UK	
(1954-55)	7	Douglas C-47	USA	
(1954-55)	1	Grumman HU-16A Albatross	(USA)	
(1954-55)	(3)	Sikorsky S-51	(USA)	
(1954-55)	(5)	DH 104 Dove Mk 1	UK	
1955	15	NA T-6 Harvard 3B	Canada	
1955-56	8	Gloster Meteor NF.13	UK	
1955-56	86	MiG-15 and MiG-15 UTI	Czechoslovakia	
1955-56	39	Il-28	Czechoslovakia	
1955-56	(10)	Il-14	Czechoslovakia	
(1955-56)	(10)	An-2	USSR	
(1955-56)	(5)	Sokol Falcon M-I-D	Czechoslovakia	
(1955-56)	6	Zlin 326 Bohatir	Czechoslovakia	
1956	(3)	An-12	USSR	
1956	2	MiG-15	USSR	
1956	25	Yak-11	Czechoslovakia	
1957	10	Il-14	USSR	
1957-58	80	MiG-17	USSR	

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1957-58	(30)	Il-28	USSR	29 lost in June War 1967
(1957-59)	(30)	Yak-18	USSR/ Czechoslovakia	
(1958)	(3)	An-12	USSR	
(1958)	(4)	Mi-1	USSR	
(1958-61)	40	Mi-4	USSR	1 lost in June War 1967
1959	(3)	An-12	USSR	8 lost in June War 1967
1960	(3)	An-12	USSR	8 lost in June War 1967
1961	1	DH 204 Dove	UK	
1961-62	80	MiG-19	USSR	40 lost in June War 1967
1961-62	10	Tu-16	USSR	All lost in June War 1967
1962	40	MiG-21C	USSR	95 MiG-21 lost in June War 1967
(1962)	(15)	Tu-16	USSR	All lost in June War 1967
1963-64	50	MiG-21C	USSR	95 MiG-21 lost in June War 1967
(1965)	8	Mi-6	USSR	All lost in June War 1967
1966	20	MiG-21D	USSR	95 MiG-21 lost in June War 1967
1967	14	Su-7	USSR	
1967	50	MiG-19	USSR	
1967	100	MiG-21	USSR	
1967	20	Il-28	USSR	
1967	3	An-12	USSR	
1967-68	10	Helwan HA-200	Egypt/ Spain	Licensed production began 1964; only 10 have been completed
1968	25	MiG-21	USSR	
1968	50	Su-7	USSR	
1969	(50)	MiG-21	USSR	
1969-71	(60)	Su-7	USSR	
1970-71	120	MiG-21	USSR	
1970-71	80	Mi-8	USSR	

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1971	20	Mi-6	USSR	
1971-72	17	Tu-16	USSR	
1971	55	MiG-15 and MiG-17	USSR	
1972	(25)	Su-7/Su-20	USSR	Incl a few of the Su-20 swing-wing version
1972	25	MiG-21	USSR	
1972	72	MiG-21MF	USSR	Flown by Soviet pilots, reportedly turned over to Egypt.
1973	(50)	Mig-17	USSR	} War replacement; incl. 35-40 "Super MiGs" longer range MiG-21. In August 1974. Pres. Sadat denied having received replacements
1973	(30)	MiG-19	USSR	
1973	(110)	MiG-21	USSR	
1973	(45)	Su-7	USSR	
1973	(25)	Mi-8	USSR	
...	24	Westland Commando	UK	Ordered via Saudi Arabia; delivery from 1974.
...	6	Westland Sea King	UK	

Source: SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, March 1975), pp.43-46.

APPENDIX III

Table - 2

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
		Missiles		
(1961)	(159)	AS-1 "Kennel"	USSR	To arm Tu-16
1962-66	540-660	K-13 "Atoll"	USSR	To arm MiG-21
1962-67	(48)	SS-N-2 "Styx"	USSR	To arm 8 "Komar" class patrol boats
1963-65	150	SA-2	USSR	25 batteries
(1963-65)	(500)	AT-1 "Snapper"	USSR	
1967	150	SA-2	USSR	
1967-72	(480)	K-13 "Atoll"	USSR	To arm MiG-21
1968	24	"Frog 3"	USSR	
1968	20	"Samlet"	USSR	
1968	30	SS-N-2 "Styx"	USSR	To arm "Osa" class patrol boats
1970-71	(160)	SA-3	USSR	20 batteries
1970-72	(360)	SA-2	USSR	30 batteries
1971	(50)	"Frog-7"	USSR	
(1971)	25	AS-5 "Kelt"	USSR	
1972	60	SA-6	USSR	Supplied during autumn in part replacement for missiles withdrawn by USSR in summer
1972-73	(300)	AT-1 "Snapper"	USSR	
1972-73	(400)	AT-3 "Sagger"	USSR	
1973	(180)	SA-6	USSR	
1973	(500)	SA-7	USSR	
1973	40-60	SS-TC "Scud"	USSR	In 4 units; capable of carrying nuclear warhead. Manned by Soviet personnel
1973	(30)	SA-4	USSR	

Source: SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, March 1975), pp.43-46.

APPENDIX III

Table - 3

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1950	1	Naval Vessels Escort, "Hunt" class	UK	Displ. 1000t. completed 1940
1950	2	Corvette	UK	Displ. 672t completed 1941
(1951)	2	Motor torpedo boat	UK	Displ; 100t
1952	3	Motor launch	UK	Displ; 65t
(1953-54)	8	Coastal minesweeper	USA	Displ; 215t; 2 transferred to Algeria 1962
1955	2	Destroyer, "Z" class	UK	Displ; 1730t; completed 1944
1956	12	Motor torpedo boat, "P6" class	USSR	Displ;50t, ex-Soviet
1957	4	Fleet minesweeper, "T43" class	USSR	Displ;420t, ex-Soviet
1956	2	Destroyer, "Skoryi" class	USSR	Displ; 2600t; launched 1951
1956	6	Motor torpedo boat	Yugos- lavia	Displ.56t; ex.Yugoslav
1957	4	Submarine, "W" class	USSR	Displ.1030t surface, 1180t submer- ged;ex-Soviet
1957	1	Submarine, "MV" class	USSR	Displ.350t surface, 420t submerged; ex-Soviet
(1957)	2	Fleet minesweeper, "T43" class	USSR	Displ.410, ex.Soviet.
(1957-58)	18	Motor torpedo boat,"P6" class	USSR	Displ.50t; ex.Soviet.
1958	3	Submarine, "W" class	USSR	Displ.1300t surface, 1180t submer- ged;ex.Soviet
1962	2	Inshore minesweeper, "T-301" class	USSR	Displ.130t, ex-Soviet.

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1962	1	Submarine, "W" class	USSR	Displ. 1030t surface, 1180t submerged; ex-Soviet
1962-67	8	Patrol boat, "SOI" type	USSR	Displ. 215t light, 220t full load
1962-67	8	Patrol boat, "Komar" class	USSR	Displ: 75t; ex-Soviet.
1965	18	Landing craft, "MP" class	USSR	Displ: 22t light, 35t loaded. ex-Soviet.
1965	1	Rocket assault ship, "Polneony" class	USSR	Displ. 900t; new "TRV" type
1966	5	Submarine, "R" class	USSR	Replace 2 "W" class returned 1966.
1966	(5)	Fleet tug	USSR	Ex-Soviet
1966	12	Patrol boat, "Osa" class	USSR	Displ. 160t; ex-Soviet
1967	3	Motor torpedo boat, "Shershen" class	USSR	Displ. 150t; ex-Soviet
1968-70	3	Motor torpedo boat, "Shershen" class	USSR	Displ. 150t; ex-Soviet
1968-70	4	Patrol boat, "SOI" type	USSR	Displ. 215t light, 220t full load; ex-Soviet.
(1969)	1	Submarine, "R": type	USSR	Displ. 1160t
1970-71	4	Fleet minesweeper, "Yurka" type	USSR	Displ. 500t. ex-Soviet
(1970-71)	10	Landing craft, "Vidra" type	USSR	Displ. 300t. ex-Soviet

Source: SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, March 1975), pp. 43-46.

APPENDIX III

Table - 4

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
----- Armoured fighting vehicles -----				
(1951-52)	(25)	Charioteer	UK	
1954-55	150	M-4 Sherman	USA	10 lost in June War 1967
1954-55	32	Centurion Mk III	UK	
1954-55	151	Valentine	(UK/ Belgium)	Demilitarized
(1954-55)	20	AMX-13	France	20 lost in June War 1967
(1954-55)	(20)	AMX-105A	France	
1955-56	100	BTR 152	USSR	
(1955-59)	350	BTR 40	USSR	
1956	120	T-54/55	USSR	250 lost in June War 1967
1956	150	T-34	Czech- slova- kia	280 lost in June War 197
1956	(50)	JSU-152	USSR	
(1956-62)	150	Su-100	USSR	
1957-58	25	JS III	USSR	40 lost in June War 1967
1959	35	JS III	USSR	
(1960-64)	(250)	T-34	USSR/ Czecho- slovakia	
(1962-63)	(130)	T-34	USSR/ Czecho- slovakia	
(1962-66)	600	BTR 152	USSR	
1964	(150)	T-54/55	USSR	
(1965)	(30)	T-10	USSR	
(1965-66)	(100)	BTR 50	USSR	
(1966)	50	PT-76	USSR	
1967-68	300	T-54	USSR	
(1967-69)	(200)	BTR 152	USSR	
(1968)	(200)	OT-62	Czecho- slovakia	
(1968-69)	(200)	BRDM AC	USSR	
1969	250	T-54	USSR	
1969	250	T-55	USSR	
1969	100	PT-76	USSR	
1969-70	(200)	OT-64	Czecho- slovakia	

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1970-71	(350)	BTR 60 P	USSR	
(1970-72)	(850)	T-54/55	USSR	
1972-73	(100)	T-62	USSR	
(1972-73)	(150)	BMP 76	USSR	
1973	(300)	T-62	USSR	
1973	(150)	T-54/55	USSR	
1973	(150)	PT-76	USSR	
1973	(300)	AC/APC	USSR	

Source: SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, March 1975), pp.43-46.



1587