


THE ASIAN ALTERNATIVE TO SUPER POWER MODELS FOR
REGIONAL SECURITY

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CHIRIKANT B. PARANJPE




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C O N T E N T S

	<u>Pages</u>
MAP: ASIA, POLITICAL	
PREFACE	i
INTRODUCTION	1-4
CHAPTER I : ORGANIZING IDEAS FOR SECURITY IN ASIA	5-29
CHAPTER II : GOLD WA R IN ASIA : U. S. ALLIANCES	30-61
CHAPTER III : RUSSIA IN ASIA : BREZHNEV PLAN FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY	62-93
CHAPTER IV : THE ASIAN SYSTEM TODAY	94-121
CHAPTER V : CONCLUSION	122-128
APPENDIX	1-xxxii
APPENDIX I : SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY, UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES AND PACI- FIC CHARTER	1
APPENDIX II : ASEAN'S SHARE OF ITS OWN TRADE	xiii
APPENDIX III-A GROWTH OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DELIVERY FORCES, 1964-1975	xiv
APPENDIX III-B COMPARATIVE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC FORCES IN MID-1974 AND MID-1975 (USA, USSR)	xv
APPENDIX III-C COMPARATIVE SOVIET-US NAVAL FORCES	xvii
APPENDIX IV : ESTIMATED SOVIET BLOCK AID TO THIRD WORLD OR NEUTRAL ASIA, 1954-1968	xix
APPENDIX V : MEMBERSHIP OF SOME IMPORTANT REGIONAL ORGAN LATIONS	xx
APPENDIX VI : VALUES OF EXPORTS FROM MAJOR WEAPON PRODUCING COUNTRIES BY REGIONS	xxi
APPENDIX VII : COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA	xxiii
BIBLIOGRAPHY	xxxiii-1111



PREFACE

The post-war history of Asia, that also saw the decolonization process formulate and take shape in this part of the world, was never a period of peace. Consequently, concern, born either through on coming reality of actual or potential danger, or the perception of such a reality has always dominated most of the security thinking of the Asian elite. If the so-called solutions to problem of security of the earlier years are dubbed today as being erratic, of the present state it cannot be said with certainty, that it is not haphazard. However, one finds the Asian elite becoming increasingly aware of the problem, so that, the demand now is self-respect and not simply recognition, in deciding the future of the region.

The scope of this present study has been limited to South and South-East Asia and consequently it excludes from its purview, except where reference becomes necessary, such other equally critical areas as West Asia, Indian Ocean or the N. E. Asia. I was lucky to gain the stimulating guidance of Mr M. L. Sondhi in my endeavour for which I shall be ever thankful. My thanks to all those who helped me at my efforts in the JNU library as well as Sapru House Library of ICWA, to my friends and well wishers for encouragement and help and to my typist who was most efficient at his task.

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INTRODUCTION

This is a period of significant change in the continuing process of detente. Attention is not focused on some dim and distant vision derived from historical and philosophical views. The debate and confrontation of ideas on the evolution of stability in interstate relations in Asia requires a new type of expertise on a wide range of strategic, political and economic issues. If the overriding interest of mankind today has shifted to survival, the most likely condition to assure it need not be merely avoidance of a global war, as a short-term, if not immediate, solution. For mere survival, that aims at avoiding a nuclear catastrophe through preventing a global war and limiting other conflicts to manageable proportions, is also only a negative aspect of 'order'¹ (Chapter I).

This study neither aims at projecting a 'Grand Design' formula for security nor is an attempt at pronouncing value judgements on such arrangements already tried, or in process of trial. It is concerned more with the 'Asian' perception and the projection of views of Asian decision-makers in the light of what environmental influences are, and what is sought to be influenced. A curious feature of the present state of affairs is an upset in the older order

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Modelski, George, Principles of World Politics (New York, 1972), p. 314.

that had clear-cut ideas, accepted and implemented, through concepts such as spheres of influence, hegemony, sovereignty and the like. Today small states tend to display an unwanted independence of choice and action, while great powers cast about, with indifferent success, for ways to make their putative dominance again a reality.² It is apparent that attitudes and perceptions of Asian countries cannot be the same as that of the great powers. Admittedly there will be intra-regional disputes and confrontation. But that does not probably call for a broad political-military organization either of the alliance type, like SEATO (Chapter II) or a collective security type as projected by the Brezhnev Plan (Chapter III). The source of danger for their national security may at one time be the Soviet Union, at another time the United States and at yet another time, China. It is plausible to argue that the various international security schemes have relevance to the power relations among the US, Soviet Union and China rather than the needs and compulsions of security as perceived by Asian states themselves.

This perception is reflected in the varied attempts projected by the Asian elites as an effort at

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Lerche, Charles (Jr.), and Said, Abdul, Concepts of International Politics, 2nd edn., (New Delhi, 1972), pp. 183-84.

reduction of risks rather than a post-facto solution of crisis management. It includes a broad range of proposals like the Indian Ocean Peace Zone concept, Neutralization of South-East Asia scheme, disarmament and development plans as also attempts at reducing ideology-oriented politics through accommodation of interests. Consequently, one observes the tendency to remain a threshold nuclear power rather than go into actual nuclear armaments.

We shall not be attempting to chart out policies and proposals on a clean state, as it were, for the conscious political will of these areas has to operate on an existing stock of policies, plans and ideas, either cogently formulated or dormant (Chapter IV) . They also have enough basic support in form of natural resources either through geographic location or through mineral wealth. While there is considerable ground to believe that these countries, given the option, are likely to keep out of power-politics, one cannot deny regional aspirations cherished by some of them. This also gives rise to some awkward questions arising out of resultant regional dominance or a indigenous power-status levels. But all this does not rule out the urgent need of, on one hand, circumscribing, institutionalizing or dispersing conflict, and on the other, of seeking ways and means to develop normal relationships. The present study is an attempt at developing, at a regional level, certain norms of relationship that,

both, depend on already set policies, and the capacity to adjust to ones' own specifications, or be adjusted by, the international system. In final analysis, whatever pattern that emerges, needs to balance internal restraints and external constraints.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZING IDEAS FOR SECURITY IN ASIA

Setting : The System

Post World War II academic work in international relations can be broadly considered under two categories: conflict and co-operation.¹ The former reflects national security as primarily concerned with maximizing national power; the later is based upon the assumption that international security in the long run will enhance national security.

The assumption, that this present system is essentially conflictual in character, is based on the postulate that the nature of the political environment, the habits which the states have acquired and the immanent clashes of interests among states, preclude a harmonious image of the system.² It would follow that international conflict need not be the product of man's inbuilt aggressive tendencies, destructive nature or peculiar institutions, but the function of the larger nation-state system itself. Differences existing in various societies, thus,

1 Berkowitz, Morton and Bock, P. G., "National Security", In: International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1968), Vol. XI, p. 41.

2 Singer, J. David, Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament : Towards a Synthesis in National Security Policy (Ohio, 1962), p. 4.

exaggerate the conflict, not cause it. Conflict we accept as a way of life, for a state of conflictlessness, as presupposed by religions, or utopias, goes against social needs.

In the following analysis, we shall distinguish, between national security and international security, while concentrating mainly on the former. International security, many times mistakenly equated with peace, we shall consider to be a product of national security, rather than the other way round. This, however, is not to exclude the effect that the environment bears upon a national system.

The developing or changing international scene since the world war has highlighted two facts on the part of nation-states as actors in the environment: one, the constant need for an effective and acceptable 'governing image';³ and two, the construction or resetting of values, goals or structures, so as to collaborate with the "governing image" of the times. The "governing image" essentially becomes international in character, though created by a nation or a group of nations; and the adjustment on the part of the national actor is the adjustment vis-a-vis the environment.

In concrete terms, the post-war world, then primarily dominated by the European or western interpre-

3. Whitson, William W., Foreign Policy and US National Security (New York, 1976), Chap. 22, p. 327.

tation of international events was characterised as bipolar. Subsequently, developed the idea of containment and the restructuring of collective security. The United Nations itself was a product of the war-time alliances, the then image of the free-world uniting against the oppressors, as much as it was a product of the need for a forum or a platform for co-operative efforts and debate. Yet in a decades' time most of the Asian countries gained independence and nationalist movements elsewhere gained strength. In an unprecedented occurrence came the projection of an alternative 'governing image' on the part of the leaders of the Third world. It projected itself initially as a reluctance to get entangled in the manifestations of the bipolar image, came as a simple philosophy of non-commitment and later took form as nonalignment.

However, even as during the formative years of Bandung, the acceptability of this image as an alternative, ceased to be an effective appeal and diversity and disparity opened up in Asia, now dominated by three distinct images - the free world against the communist, the fight for international communism and nonalignment. Consequently, Asia could not unite itself into a bulk force for either side of the cold war rivals, or project a total nonaligned solidarity, whether or not so desirable.

Much happened to erode the original image of bipolarity. In the confusion that developed no definite

identity could be sought. What started as 'containment', changed to 'detente', and then shifted to the problem of 'survival'. Asia, and the Third World at that, was affected by it, to the extent, that it had its repercussions in this area. In the midst of it all, the original punch of non-alignment continued to fade, and to date no equally forceful governing image' has been formulated.

This present flux or uncertainty in organizing ideas for security exists both, at the level of Super Powers and at the level of the Third World. Admittedly, the nature of the problem facing them both, is different.

Our discussion on National Security would be essentially, analytical in the next part where we shall try to pose certain conceptual problems in the Asian context. To the extent the part dealing with National Goals tends to acquire a normative character, depends mainly on the fact, that, the demand for a policy of national security is a normative demand. In the final part we shall aim at a synthesis, to seek further solutions in the form of organizing ideas for security in Asia.

National Security : Values, Power and National Interest.

Asia and the Balance of Power .

National Security defined either in the classic Lippmann style: A state is secure to the extent to which

it is not in danger of sacrificing core values, if it wishes to avoid a war and if it is challenged, maintain them by victory in such a war;⁴ or considered in terms of keeping the National Interest intact; or yet been given a new meaning in the nuclear world, of relation between chance and damage;⁵ has essentially a military undertone to it. In effect it comes down to mean a state's ability to defend and deter that what it cherishes as values, goals and the like. Even when Professor Manning defines it to mean simply a 'freedom from insecurity';⁶ insecurity defined as a feeling of danger that arises out of a feeling that the order of things in which we live is unstable, means in essence protection from aggression or use of force to prevent change.

Two considerations follow: what connection does value as an objective have, either, in the sociological sense, or otherwise, with the concept of security. And consequently, what values, if any, do states try to preserve. Secondly, to what extent is a state capable of preserving its security interest, and what role does force and power play in it.

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- 4 Lippmann, W., quoted in Twitchett, K. J., "Strategies for Security : Some Theoretical Considerations", In Twitchett, K. J. (ed.), International Security: Reflections on Survival and Stability (London, 1971), p. 4
- 5 Niezing Johan, "Security Policy as a Contradiction", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, (2), 1976, pp. 173-74.
- 6 Manning, C. A. W., quoted in, Garnett, John (ed.), Theorie of Peace and Security : A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought (London, 1970), p. 31 (Introduction).

Morton Kaplan suggests that the needs of the system are set by the structure of the system. The objectives of a system are set by its needs in its environment, as it understands that environment. The objectives of the system are the values for the system. It is for us to deduct the relation between values of the system and its actions, the values and its behaviour.⁷ It may be a matter of debate as to whether security is a value in the sociological sense, as far too many interpretations are attached to it. Yet the specific content, the principle of security, can function as a value.⁸

Again, the interpretation of national interest in objective terms, nevertheless, security described either as a freedom from insecurity, a state of tranquility or a state of detente as in Europe; a maintenance of status quo, or yet, simply, a state of mind, is essentially a subjective phenomenon. It is a negative value. Also, it becomes a value that a state can acquire more or less and aspire to have greater or lesser. It has much in common with power or wealth. While wealth measures material comfort; power the ability to control; security in an objective sense, measures absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.⁹

7 Kaplan, Morton, System and Process in International Politics (New York, 1957), p. 149.

8 Niezing, Johan, n. 5, p. 172.

9 Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, 1962), p. 150.

Broadly speaking, the core values can be generalized as maintenance of territorial integrity, autonomy, or basically, the survival of the state. Asian attitudes towards the core values came to be developed in the formative years since independence. In countries like Burma, Indonesia and Thailand, the liberation armies were assimilated as regular troops and as such they came to have a telling influence upon external behaviour. The influence that the military gathered in Pakistan, added to by the continuous feeling of insecurity vis-a-vis India, played its role there. In India the National Liberation Army was dissolved. Besides these were the memories of colonial days and the legacies of foreign rule and other factors that set the value structures.

In a conflicting international system where a nation is determined, either, in conserving its core values, or extending its national goals, it is obvious that nations are likely to pursue their aims irrespective of the effects on others. Security becomes a function of power, and since power is relative, an increase in one nation's absolute power would reduce the relative power of another, and consequently, its security.¹⁰ Understandably, the quest for security often translates itself into quest for coercive power, when survival, territorial integrity or independence are threatened.

However, the notion that nations seeking security place total reliance on power is shortsighted. Security and power need not be looked upon as synonymous. For the understanding of security demands consideration of some further factors: organized force and war, and its use today; and the utility of use of power to counter power.

The recurrent element in discussion on national security, is the management of force. In Asia, force, has not, yet, come to bear the degree of unacceptability it holds in Europe or the West in general. The existence of force is not in itself a threat to peace. The use of force has, in fact, always been the normal way to ensure peace. The new developments in nuclear weapon technology have, however, created an imperative for avoiding situations leading to war. Security postures, have now become a continuous management of crisis, of different durations, types and magnitudes.¹¹ There is in contrast a greater possibility of wars occurring in industrializing societies, for the probability of it escalating into nuclear war is very low. There is also a definite limitation on intensity and time-length of wars here.

An interesting facet of war in the nuclear age

11

Subramanayam, K., Perspectives in Defence Planning (New Delhi, 1972), p. 116.

is its continuing political utility.¹² There is no clear-cut reason to show that war has lost its political utility. For most wars that have occurred in the past, have either been between two non-nuclear powers; or between a nuclear and a non-nuclear power. When conflicts occur between two nuclear powers, the prospect of political exploitation of force is greater. Such wars either turn into wars by proxy, or become a crisis. It is no doubt realized in the First World that inspite of the apparent relative decline in productivity of conventional military force, it continues to have its positive and negative functions of influence and interference, and deterrence respectively and that conditions where these can be implemented, do, in fact, exist.¹³

The problem in Asia rests on a dual footing. In the first place the traditional role of organized violence, it being one of the major determinants of the shape of the international system, continues to hold ground. And second, nuclear powers hold entrenched interests in Asia which conflict with the emerging threshold powers. This calls for a changed interpretation of the role of war.

12 Hoffmann, Stanley, "Acceptability of Military Force", pp 6-7; and Martin, Lawrence, "The Utility of Military Force", pp. 20-21. Both in Force in Modern Societies: Its Place in International Politics, Adelphi Paper 102 (IISS, London, 1973).

13 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

Asia, minus China and Japan, constituting a major bulk of the Third World, has been a continuous recipient of these positive and negative functions from the First World, yet accumulation of military force has not helped any in solving the dilemma of more arms and less security. In military terms, this inverse proportion created a vicious circle leading to further pile up of arms; in political terms, while straining neighbourly relations it increased dependence on outside powers; and in economic terms it created an unnecessary drain on the treasury that had to be accounted for as 'necessary expenditure'.

Acceptance of a traditional definition of security, as being a product of deterrence and defence, produced such concepts like balance of power, security dilemma, disarmament, and the like. The concept of the Balance of Power in Asia, is an adequate description of the interest doctrine, in, that, it demands, that wars be fought as far away from ones' territory as possible. The idea was incorporated into Asia, originally, as a 'containment' doctrine,¹⁴ and later grafted at various levels. And Asia, caught in the turmoil of this conflictual situation, faced a western interpretation of its security

problem. There developed a super structure of Great Power competition, essentially tripartite; and a substratum of indigenous Asian politics.

The balance of power politics exposed two conditions in Asia: The concept of Asia, geographically or historically, cannot be isolated from global politics. Legitimate or otherwise, the Super Powers are bound to have interest here. Second, the development of a vastly complex pattern of intra-regional balancing, that has torn Asia with contradictions, conflicts and incompatibilities, they being the product of ideological rivalry of cold war days, or later, or of being played by proxy, goes to show that at any time the search for national security in Asia cannot be made in a collective fashion. Approach towards Asian problem must be essentially bilateral in character.

As to whether balance of power works in Asia as a restraint of the environment upon the national system, or as a means to further national interest depends upon the goals projected by the national system. Similarly, it is upon the approach towards the problem of security, a nation adopts, that depends what role values as preferences and power as means can play. To this we now turn.

National Goals and Foreign Policy

Problem of Development in Asia

A nation can be considered as a goal pursuing organization, even though a goal may be, on occasion, a little more than a search for ways of minimizing losses, or minimizing future restraints on its freedom of action.¹⁵ Such activity, or the lack of thereof can flow from a set of three variables;

- (a) There are preferences that stem from cultural values, norms, ideologies and aspirations of the nation;
- (b) Such restraints or incentives as provided by the environment; and
- (c) National power as the capacity to overcome restraints.¹⁶

In the preceding analysis we have tried to analyse the role of values, power, and restraints in the context of Asia. Our perception towards the three was to consider them as a product of the national security idea. In the following part we shall proceed to analyse the role of

15 Singer, J. David, "National Goals" (editorial note) in Singer, J. David (ed.), Human Behaviour and International Politics: Contributions from Social-Psychological Sciences (Chicago, 1965), p. 103.

16 Ibid., pp. 103-4.

national security as a primary or central factor in national goals and consequently the foreign policy of the nation concerned. In a way we shall be taking a little turn. The demand for a policy of national security is a normative demand. It implies that besides being analytical we shall be having a prescriptive tone also.

Asian politics speaks of interaction of regional states among themselves and with others in pursuit of national goals. The Asian elite included preservation of national independence and sovereign equality as the primary goal, and peace and friendship with all, mutual aid for development, abolition of imperialism etc. as secondary goals.¹⁷ The proposed means that included non-violence, co-operation, consensus, non-interference and sought to exclude all 'power politics' belied the full implication of their option for sovereign equality. In trying to come to terms with the international system the Asian leaders had to modify and change much that they had cherished, sometimes to the extent of accepting what they had earlier rejected and sought to change.

Identification of ideas of security has been done at various levels. Super Power level, substratum or

intra-regional, as well as ideological and nationalistic level. It is evident, that in Asia, the question is not of 'Asian security' as a region, it is that of security of individual nations in Asia, their national goals, values and other cherished aspirations. This led us to call for a bilateral rather than collective approach. In the above analysis we discussed the problem of security, with survival, national independence and territorial integrity as core values to be defended and preserved, as essentially a military function. We concluded that Asia continued to face dilemmas. This brings us to another dimension of the problem, ignored until late, that of development.

The discussion of the problem of development in Asia is not to be done only in terms of economic-socio-cultural progress and modernization. It assumes a will to develop and a capacity to do so, and as such it becomes a political problem.¹⁸ In the colonial days some idea of development did exist, however, it was linked to the interest of the imperial state. Known then as 'progress', it was not theorized, as it was accepted then as an 'end' rather than a 'means', as development today has come to

18

Soedjatnoko, in SEADAG/Asia, "A Special Report on Social Science Research in S. E. Asia" (New York Asia Society, 1968), pp. 85-86. Cited in Badgley, John, Asian Development: Problems and Prognosis (New York, 1971), p. vii (Introduction).

mean. However, despite the high hopes raised, development continues to remain illusive. Various reasons have been cited, main being:

- (a) That the socio-cultural setting is not congenial enough to accept and imbibe development;
- (b) That there may be flaws in the theory itself;
- (c) That there is a flaw in application of theory to practical circumstances.¹⁹

While the roots of the present turmoil may be traced to the failure to modernize, one need not accept the argument that there is need to change the socio-cultural setting itself. For, development need not be achieved by disrupting a system, it must essentially be an indigenous product. The apparent lack of relationship between the problems as presented, and as actually experienced, exposes the need for an Asian, rather than a western approach to the problem.

It is understandable that in the immediate years after independence, Asian countries placed primary priority on steel and atomic plants, at the expendability of the traditional means of work and livelihood, agriculture. But both the order of priorities and the pace of development

19

Ahmad, K., "Third World's Dilemma of Development" in Nonaligned Third World Annual, 1970 (Missouri, 1970), p. 11.

satisfied nobody for long. The United Nations entered with assistance programmes along with unilateral aid from USA and Europe. The Soviet Union followed suit. Original plans were revised and redrawn and emphasis was increasingly shifted to fixing, before all else, the main pivots of modern industrial society.²⁰

However, to identify security, as McNamara does, with development²¹ would be simplistic, if not a naive prescription. Economic infrastructure, industrial and agricultural development with a political will, will no doubt become a basis for stability that is generated from its inherent self-reliance. It would definitely help to usher in an era of relations based on equality. It may not be idealistic to hard headed nationalists or an utopia even to realists; however, problems cannot be solved by segregating them from the environment. And where the problem is security, its multi-dimensional picture is most clear.

The constant problem in human society of balancing social order with social change had in the inter-war

20 Klatt, W., "Prerequisites of Modernization in Asia" in Hudson, G. F. (ed.), Reform and Revolution in Asia (London, 1972), p. 31.

21 McNamara, Robert, The Essence of Security. Reflections in Office (London, 1968), p. 149.

years been solved by the clique of 'peaceful change', which meant avoiding war by progressive adjustment of the map to changing needs.²²

Yet in practice the actual behaviour of nations does not affect the normative proposition, that nations are called upon to give priority to national security - defined now in the multi-dimensional context - and thus consent to any sacrifice of value that will provide an additional increment of security. The demand for a security policy is a normative demand and is supposed to indicate what the foreign policy of a nation must be, in order to be either expedient - rational means towards accepted goals, or moral - the best or the least evil course of action.²³

A broad consideration of various countries of Asia shows a distinct lack of harmony in their relations. This is not to mean a state of continuous war with all relations severed, it only means lack of peace. The first decade after the Second World War that saw Asian states gain independence, also saw the cold war come to


22 Northedge, F. S., "Order and Change in International Society" in James, Alan (ed.), The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C. A. W. Manning (New York, 1973), pp. 1-2.

23 Wolfers, Arnold, n. 9, p. 157.

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Asia. Split on one hand on ideological issues and on the other an independent non-aligned approach, there was seen in-fighting among the aligned also. Taken to be a policy on part of the Super Powers to intra-balance their own allies so as to prevent any one being unnecessarily powerful; or as a product of built-in contradictions, the fact remains that there existed overt differences. Alignments on either side brought in economic-industrial aid, but that did not come in as basic industry. It remained in some form of arms aid, loans or some concession on purchase of primary product. Nonaligned states were no exceptions to this phenomenon. In such a situation the defence expenditure remained considerable. The trend of this increasing defence expenditure, which their economies could ill afford, did not necessarily express their military spirit. Nor was it a release of subjective impulses clamouring for expression. If this be true, reduction on defence expenses entails finding out other means of tackling problems they had been tackling through arms. In economic terms, this can be done by increasing mutual dependence by trade exchanges based on some level of regional division of labour; or to be more ambitious some form of income redistribution. In socio-cultural terms, increasing easy communication and transport facility, and easy 'flow of ideas' could help. But is this viable in political terms?

The extent of its expediency in application depends to a large degree on what 'governing image' Asia continues to hold in times to come. The expression 'international order' is expected to convey that states, far from responding to each other in an entirely random fashion, in fact, conduct their relations on basis of certain shared assumptions, norms and procedures, which not even the most revolutionary power can long repudiate.²⁴ But 'international order' has never acquired a status of 'governing image' in Asia.

In the recent past Asia has experienced dissolution of alliances due to their dysfunctional nature, rise of nationalism as against international communism in form of more than one ways to socialism, and adjustments by the nonaligned countries; all this has done much to erode the earlier conflicting images. This is not to call for a Pan Asian sentiment; the wartime Japanese effort was the last such experiment. The fact is that most Asian states are not willing or are too preoccupied with their immediate domestic problems, to try and create an effective counterweight to balance expanding China-- their common concern, or consider the Super Powers -- their only alternative. They are too weak or too closely

located on the fringe of Chinese influence, or too divided amongst themselves to align against Chinese pressure without outside help. Most of them are not strong enough to adopt a truly neutral posture, even if the policy of nonalignment had been adopted. It has already been proved, that hasty interference by outside powers, aggravates, rather than improves the situation. On the other hand, their exclusion is not possible. The conclusion, then, it would appear, is that it is very difficult to develop a consensus image, or even a broadly acceptable one of the foreign policy postures of Asian states. This, however, seems a hasty conclusion.

Beyond Problem of Priorities

Search for Security and Order in Asia

The aftermath of the war saw a highly complex situation in Asia. The desire to develop fast, the nationalistic urge for sovereign independence, the problem of internal strife and border defence, the consequent solution of aid, the resultant reduction in autonomy if not independence, and the concern for foreign relations at all levels, have ushered in many adjustments in initial aims, sometimes drastic, sometimes total. To maintain that Asia has found herself again, is true to the extent that nationalism continues to be a force of

reckoning, that can be channelled into a good and just force; that in spite of the prevalence of authoritarianism in these transitional societies, giving rise to what Max Weber calls 'Charismatic Personalities', these societies have ushered in much that is considered development; and that memories of colonial days are still bitter, sharpened by the experience of Vietnam, where the warring sides were proxies of the Super Powers. We need not speak of security in Asia as 'Asian security' but as security of individual states in Asia. Security, definitely, is multidimensional, and as such it cannot be decided by military force alone, or development alone. The crucial questions are those of priorities facing governments with scarce resources of priority.

But to simply state that security in Asia is a problem of deciding upon priorities is to leave it half said. For security cannot be a stagnant concept and as such it involves change - change that need not mean a continuous breakup of order. Further, there is the role that national image plays in deciding the nature of priority.

Security and stability have often been related, in fact equated. It is true that change, even if it be for good, is a frightening thing, for it presents the unknown or the unpredictable, and as such it is natural for it to encounter resistance. International order has

been essentially a man-created order. It is a continuous tradition, a continual culmination, a perennial adaptation. It cannot be one set of orders for one set of time, neither inevitable nor self-sustaining. The contemporary international order is but the present (and always changing) aspect of a tradition which can be preserved, adapted, transformed or dissipated.²⁵ It makes its appearance at various levels, each vulnerable to various problems. In so far as it exists upon a military balance, changing weapons, technological developments, alliances etc. alter it. In so far as we consider order in terms of certain stable patterns of economic activity, this again is the function of the continuous shifts - in the worldwide balance of economic power and currents of trade and investment. In so far as it depends upon what the other country's foreign policy would be, changes in governments and public opinion have to be accounted for. International order is thus a composite of a number of orders - military, diplomatic, economic, legal, and perhaps, moral.²⁶ Taken together, the roles that New States would play in them can alter or modify them just as these states themselves are influenced by the composite order.

25 Lyon, Peter, "New States and International Order" in James, Alan (ed.), n. 22, p.

26 Ibid., p. 58.

In cold war days, the alliance system and non-alignment had come to signify such an order. In case of the former, its short-term character was obvious. Non-alignment also failed to provide an enduring perspective. To view the present as in flux is not to discard it as a disorder. For the designation of certain activities and arrangements as an order, the characteristic ways in which they are described and justified, the supporting concepts employed in such descriptions and justification - all these matters are controversial in some degree, and also normative in evolving evaluation. Yet, neither is, this a rationalization of the present state. The 'returns' of international order can only be expected through eternal vigilance: either against the recurrent ambitions of various Great Powers to establish universal empires, or against unmitigated anarchy at local level. What it calls for is, that each Asian state build up a self-sustained foreign policy, not that it excludes relative dependence on external forces, but that it becomes cost-effective.

This also reflects the role that the national image - an image projected by the nation to the environment - and the 'governing image' - as national image of international order that can be held as largely acceptable - play in building up security in this region.

The policy of flexible response was not a product of the old reluctance to participate in mass war taking its current form in the nuclear age. 'Flexible response' has come to mean a significant increase in the incidence of 'local wars'. To create a comprehensive image as called for above is, no doubt, difficult in Asia. The international system has never operated on the basis of peace at all costs, even where the stake was survival. And in Asia, where diversity reaches an extreme, security ceases to be a problem, simply of global stability. West Asia has its own intra-Arab problem besides Israel. South Asia has seen drastic changes in recent years and has yet to settle down to a pattern. So has South-East Asia, where a changed Indo-China has become a focus of concern. In East Asia, Korea still is a knotty problem. And besides concern for Super Powers, China remains a common ambiguity.

Simultaneously, all these countries, with the exception of Japan, are caught up in a race to modernize. Buying arms need not be just a matter of recycling of petro-dollars. It has serious effects on ones' range for autonomy and independence when ones' armed forces machinery is in hands of foreign experts. A collectivist approach as against an unilateralist approach, either of the balance of power type or collective security

type, may not be correct solutions for security. But non-commitment has not been effective, either. On the other hand, a pure developmental solution cannot function as a total substitute. We cannot stop by saying that it is a problem of priorities, we have to go beyond it. Besides, one set of priorities cannot be universally applicable. Increasing trade, better transport and communication can build up a transnational attitude that stops just short of political understanding. In the final analysis each nation is riddled with different problems, in different settings and has different ways of appreciating it. Definitely, there exists a comity of nations, an international community transcending ideological and other barriers; either through law, conventions, understanding or recognition of disagreement.²⁷ In Asia, however, it is not a task of re-establishing an old order, the problem is of creating a new one. It is a task to be handled at various levels.

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Howard, Michael, "Military Power and International Order" in Garnett, John (ed.), n. 6, pp. 45-46.

CHAPTER II

COLD WAR IN ASIA : U. S. ALLIANCES

The Strategic Setting

In recent history, until the recognition of the United States as an Asian Power, that came only after the Korean war, S. E. Asian politics had not experienced many deliberate attempts at establishing any international order either by regional powers or outsiders. Though India and China wielded some influence in this area a concerted attempt, however reluctant, to establish 'order' in S. E. Asia came only from the British in India. Japanese war-time efforts at establishing 'New Order' ended with defeat in the Pacific War. S. E. Asia had never been a 'bulwark of peace and prosperity'; but if K. M. Pannikar was right in claiming that stability in S. E. Asia depends upon the partnership of India and China,¹ then such a partnership seems remote. But this statement also reveals a common disposition to assume that actions and attitudes of certain outside powers are crucially important in determining local events.

The US policy in this area before the war was as the then Secretary of State, Hull adequately put it, 'orderly

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Pannikar, K. M., The Future of South East Asia (New York, 1943), pp. 11-12, 103-05.

process in international relations be maintained'.² In the interwar years it had simply implied, despite reluctance to so admit it, that U. S. would not tolerate domination of any single power, at that time Japan, in Asia. The then U. S. policy of 'Open Door' towards China, as in case of the new one towards Red China later, was also the manifestation of a similar concern: that balance of power forces be allowed adequate play in maintenance of stability in the region. In case of Communist China the policy was slightly modified to accommodate a self-contained, strong, yet definitely limited China. It was this Communist menace and Japan's position that made U. S. take to a policy of 'inter-position'.³ However, implementation of such a balance had its problems. It was extremely difficult to draw territorial demarcations for they were likely to call in undesired intervention. The internal problems of S. E. Asia, a product of revolutionary state of affairs, marred by violence and insurgency, disturbed by instability, required both prudence and flexibility in approach. There was a need for a 'priorities approach'

2 Department of State, Press Releases, January 15, 1938, pp. 100-05, in Gordon, Bernard, Towards Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy (New Jersey, 1969), pp. 45-46.

3 Greene, Fred, US Policy and Security in Asia (New York, 1968), p. 62.

so as not to rely on a single theory like balance of power but that approach was in itself inadequate in providing guidelines in long term and unforeseen problems. Domino theory is a variation of the cost value theme of 'priorities approach'.⁴

It cannot of course be proved that the earlier balance of power, that which ended in 1916, did in fact provide for security and stability in East Asia. But it is clear that when the multipolar structure did deteriorate, the thirty years of increasingly bipolar politics did lead to a war. It would be to avoid such a conflagration again that a multipolar balance would be desirable. The balance of power as exists in Asia is more, to use Inis Claude's terms, a policy rather than a system or a situation.⁵ To promote their separate interests, the USA, the Soviet Union, China and Japan now find it desirable to stabilise competition for influence and advantage in Asia. Steps to normalize relations continue, but this does not warrant calling it a system.

But then the 'stability' that the classical balance provided was for the maintenance of a state system

4 Ibid., p. 60.

5 Claude, Inis (Jr.), Power and International Relations (New York, 1962), pp. 10-21.

in which Great Powers would coexist without any one power dominating the system. Such a balance was unlikely to be of any comfort to the lesser powers for it did not provide any means for preventing wars, annexations, bilateral settlements or dismemberment of smaller states. And if Asian balance of power is only a matter of policy, neither institutionalized nor descriptive of a genuine balance, then it is subject to all the vagaries of shifting interest and sudden opportunities.

Geneva Conference on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos producing the July 1954 settlement, followed by the Manila Conference in September 1954, leading to the creation of SEATO, marked the watershed of U. S. policy in this region. Through the events of 1954 emphasis of U. S. policy in S. E. Asia shifted from decolonization to security. The changed perception of security, identified by SEATO as insurgency and subversion became increasingly evident. The sun had almost set on the Western Empire, but many in Washington feared it was rising on the future Communist realm. The implication of this concern was to condition U. S. policy for years. The near completion of formalities of decolonization in 1954, practically coincided with U. S. commitments to mainland Asia. However haphazard, uncertain or unstable, it was a hurried U. S. response to the breakup of an older order and an attempt at creating

a new, if not just a transitory, order in S. E. Asia.

The Security-Solidarity Formula : SEATO

Obsolescence of 'Korean' System of Alliances

There may be something in the claim that North Korea would not have attacked South Korea in June 1950 had it been in the U.S. defence perimeter. The Korean crisis brought about a system that may be described as a 'Korean' system of alliances.⁶ This coalition was an instrument dealing with two problems: (a) Balancing or containment of conventional military power deployed by the Soviet Union and China in the Eurasian Landmass - The maintenance of independence of smaller states being the rationale or the value justifying it.

(b) Employment of a global nuclear deterrent: While advances in weapon systems have sufficiently altered the value of various bases, hence also alliances, the alliance system probably still remains indispensable as a condition of effectiveness for fundamental basis of U. S. posture.⁷

6 Modelski, George, "U. S. Alliances : Obsolescence of the 'Korean' System?" In World Affairs, 139(2), Fall 1976, p. 78.

7 Ibid., p. 78.

The defence perimeter which included Ryuku islands, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand was no longer regarded as an outer line of defence; it was to represent the starting point of further U. S. commitment in the area.⁸ But this American initiative in S. E. Asia came only in 1954 and by then the Asians had done much to counter the claim that Dulles was the spiritual father of the S. E. Asia Pact concept. In 1949, Philippine's President Elpidio Quirin proposed one such alliance that was initially to compose of Nationalist China, Korea and Philippines and was to have economic functions also.⁹ The Korean war experience induced the U. S. to enter into a series of treaties with Japan (1951), Philippines (1952), Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS, 1952). The timing of the latter two, so close to the Japan Treaty reflected an inescapable political fact. Only by making a pact with them

8 The House Naval Affairs Committee had recommended three belts of bases. The Northern to extend from Aleutians to Kurile Islands; The Western to include Hawai, Micronesia and the Philippines; and the Southern from Admiralty Islands to New Hebrides, New Caledonia and New Samoa (Congress of the U. S., Committee on Naval Affairs, House Report 2741, January 1947, p. 16).

Cited in Pollak, W., "What Were SEATO's Aims Twenty Years Ago?" In Aussen Politik, 26(1), 1975, p. 107.

9 Manila Chronicle, January 16, 1949, pp. 1, 5.

Cited in Pollak, W., n. 8, pp 108-09.

would U. S. win their support for a settlement with Japan.¹⁰ All three distrusted Japan, and Australia in particular was fast losing faith in the Commonwealth.

This Australian dilemma becomes more clear when Eisenhower announced that Britain was not 'indispensable' for a S. E. Asia Pact.¹¹ For, while the pact was only a strategic necessity for the Western powers, it had immediate security implications for Pacific Asia. The British were ready to commit themselves only if a settlement was reached at Geneva. The British cabinet approved that 'we can give an assurance now that if a settlement is reached at Geneva we shall join in guaranteeing that settlement.' The cabinet gave no assurance as to the course of future action in event of a failure to achieve a settlement.¹²

The initiative at Geneva Conference that was in

10 Greene Fred, n. 3, p. 76.

11 President Eisenhower at Press Conference: "The Members of the Commonwealth most directly involved in S. E. Asia are Australia and New Zealand. The defence system can be created with them and with Asian countries. It may not be all that is desired, but it will be something."
Cited in Kundra, J. C., SEATO Seen Through Indian Eyes: A Study of Differential Perception in News Reporting (ICWA, New Delhi, 1956), p. 12.
Statesman, May 20, 1954, carried the news as: "S. E. Asia Pact Without Britain Possible - Mr Eisenhower's Statement, June 20, Target Date".

12 Eden, Anthony, Full Circle (London, 1960), pp. 105-6. Cited in Watt, Alan, Australian Defence Policy, 1951-1963: Major International Aspects, Working Paper, No. 4, 1964 (Dept. of International Relations, Australian National University), p. 34.

the hands of Britain and France due to U. S. reluctance over recognizing China had soon passed over to Australia, it being more of an Asian power. Yet Australia was unwilling to underwrite the Franco-American policy on Indo-China and it sought to disentangle the two specific but related proposals: The backing of Vietnam regime through intervention and second, the creation of a mutual security pact to halt further expansion of communism.¹³ The confusion within the two proposals was likely to jeopardize the Asian support for plans to 'band together' free countries to declare a common concern for freedom of S. E. Asia. The international guarantee that finally materialized as SEATO remained limited in character and membership only to be criticized by such nonaligned countries as India as being a Munroe Doctrine for South-East Asia.¹⁴

The Manila Pact had two crucial features: One military, and one political.¹⁵ First, it served as a device to put on more permanent basis the staff consultations that had previously been held concerning security

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- 13 Fitzgerald, C. P., "Australia and Asia", in Greenwood, Gordon and Harper, Norman (ed.), Australia in World Affairs, 1950-1955 (Melbourne, 1957), pp. 224-26.
- 14 Kundra, J. C., n. 11. p. 18.
- 15 Modelski, George (ed.), SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne, 1962), p. xiii (introduction).

in S. E. Asia. The treaty served as a framework for continuation of these contacts and specified circumstances - as armed aggression in Treaty Area, in which case the plan would gain a military significance. Second, the treaty was an expression of wider political alignment on part of a number of states concerned with S. E. Asia, an alignment that formally placed them on the side of the U. S. on matters concerning security and political future of this area. For Asian states the choice represented a 'western' orientation to international relations, a cause that was to elicit much criticism as it assumed the formula 'security for solidarity' running both ways.

The Treaty, however, marked the first ever explicit recognition of dangers of subversive activities in S. E. Asia. Its Article 2 provided for measures 'to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against territorial integrity and political stability' (SEATO, Art. 2). The threat of subversive activities, it was pointed out, was particularly acute in S. E. Asia where Communist forces have attempted to capture revolutionary and anti-colonial movements, and in the post-war age, this threat has increased. The obligation of parties 'to consult immediately in order to agree on measures which should be taken for common defence' (SEATO, Art. 4(2)) was clarified by Dulles: "A revolutionary

movement... would be a grave threat to us. But we have no undertaking to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult together as to what to do about it". In response to further questioning he assured that if any action had to be taken as a result of such a consultation it would be in accordance with our constitutional processes.¹⁶

Article 4 that deals with aggression constitutes the real activating operative core of the treaty. The obligation of U. S. under this article, however, is limited by virtue of an 'understanding'.¹⁷ It reflects the special position of the U. S. as the only Treaty member which does not have any territory of its own in the protected area. It also establishes the U. S. concern with the area is not primarily with local disputes but with the spread of Communism as a threat to the security of U. S. and the free world. For the remaining signatories, however, the treaty deals with any and all acts of aggression which might disturb the peace of the area and in such cases the

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The S. E. Asia Collective Defence Treaty.
Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations
on Executive 'K' (U. S.), 83rd Congress, 2nd
Session, January 25, 1955 (Washington, 1955),
p. 8.

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Refer Appendix I for details of the 'Treaty'
and 'Understanding'.

U. S. agrees to consult with other parties as provided for in Article 4(2).

Another special feature of the treaty was the creation of 'Protocol States' which were included as being under protection of SEATO. The northern limit of the Treaty was fixed as 21° 30' N. Lat.

The failure to agree on military measures of any concrete character arose not merely out of 'Congressional sentiment that has hardened against a NATO style commitment' or of the impending shift in U. S. defence policy from massive mobilization to flexible defence. It arose primarily out of radical divergence between strategic priorities as seen from Washington and London.¹⁸ U. S. interests in this area were basically peripheral and negative in character; and Britain, after Indian independence held a tenuous line of defence here.

This conflict of priorities remained unresolved even after Bangkok Council meeting of 1955 that created Thailand as the centre for SEATO activity. For financial reasons Britain was reluctant to shift from Singapore while U. S. that had always given Manila a central place in its defence perimeter was equally reluctant to shift to Bangkok. Bangkok was to remain an inconclusive

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Harper, Norman, "Australia and United States", in Greenwood, G. and Harper, N. (ed.), n. 13, p. 184.

irony of the treaty was, it setback the same without which it could never function effectively as a security organization. It caused divergance between two major non-communist countries in Asia, Australia and India, it sharpened the existing differences between three Commonwealth nations of Asia and was denounced by India, Burma and Indonesia as neo-colonial.

SEATO turned to an extra-rational side track at Karachi Council meeting of 1956 when Kashmir issue was brought in by Pakistan, this despite the fact that both Britain and Australia had made it clear to Pakistan, right at the inception of SEATO, that they would not assist Pakistan in event of a conflict with India.²¹ Pakistan was the only colonial Power to join the pact and immediately after joining it left the profound anti-communist stand it had fostered earlier. After the end of Dulles era the U. S. revised its policy from pro-Pakistan as did Soviet Union who left initial equidistance in favour of India. Pakistan's Western allies too tended to go the same way. Pakistan's eventual courtship with China was predictable to the extent that U. S. did not sufficiently honour

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Millar, T. B., "Australian Defence, 1945-1965", in Greenwood, G. and Harper, N., Australia in World Affairs, 1961-1965 (London, 1968), p. 269.

Pakistan's previous markedly pro-Western policies. Incidentally, the Secretary-General of SEATO was to maintain that SEATO had nothing to do with such a development, besides it was welcome as a peace-making move.²²

When trouble erupted in Laos in 1960, Washington charged China and Vietnam of seeking to keep tensions alive in S. E. Asia. Throughout the development of the crisis there was a strange silence on part of Washington about SEATO. The Washington SEATO Council meeting (1960) did not do much more than call for more vigilance. The situation in Laos continued to worsen, unabated. The prospect for military intervention under SEATO had never looked so encouraging. But at the Bangkok Council (1961), that met amidst the explosive situation the Western powers gave an indication that they would not go that far.²³ Thailand, the country most concerned, was understandably puzzled at any suggestion that SEATO might not, after all, be used for the job it was intended for. This explains the forceful opening statement: "Thai delegation will not dodge the problem.... If lack of determination and unity of purpose is so weakened that we should yield to

22 Interview of Sec. Gen. Konthi Suphamongkhon taken by Asia Magazine, reproduced in SEATO Report 3(4) August, 1964.

23 The Economist, April, 1961, pp. 9-11.

a superior force of destruction, the collective security system on which the organization is based shall prove to be a failure.²⁴

Doubts about the military effectiveness of SEATO led to a feeling in the Philippines that it should be written off as an effective anti-communist force. Predictions that SEATO would not survive this crisis were confirmed by the political agreement of the members that 'if there continues to be an active military attempt to obtain control of Laos, SEATO members are prepared, within the terms of the Treaty, to whatever action may be appropriate under the circumstances.'²⁵ Philippines also went ahead to suggest the exclusion of Britain and France and that Australia take a fresh initiative with the backing of U.S. to form a NATO type organization. Neither U.S. nor Australia took any steps to reconstitute SEATO, although by 1966 there were suggestions that Thailand, Philippines and USA were contemplating on widening of SEATO to include Indonesia, S. Korea, Japan and Taiwan.²⁶

24 Opening Statements by Members of the Council, Seventh SEATO Meeting of the Council at Bangkok, March 27-29, 1961 (Bangkok).

25 Harper, Norman, "Australia and United States", in Greenwood, G. and Harper, N. (ed.), n. 21, p. 363.

26 Sydney Morning Herald, June 9, 1961, cited in Harper, Norman, Ibid., p. 363.

Importance of Thailand was once again made felt with the Rusk-Thanat Pact (1962) by which the US had agreed to defend Thailand without prior agreement of SEATO.²⁷ This brought in the explanation that SEATO commitment was individual as well as collective, a product of SEATO's impotence at Laos and consequent Thai fears. Thai commitment to SEATO represented 'a choice of friends you have known, tested and found reliable, your friends too, had to be enemies of your enemies.'²⁸ That the inherent flexibility of Thai policy would have diluted this commitment at the slightest show of U. S. weakening is only a polite statement of Singapore's views that Bangkok would enter into the same sort of agreement with Peking if attacked, as that concluded with Tokyo in 1942.²⁹

SEATO did not have much to celebrate at its Tenth Anniversary Council meeting at Manila (1964). They seemed to have had inherited French troubles in Indo-China while France now appeared with the only proposal for solu-

27 Thanat-Rusk Agreement, March 6, 1962. In Smith, Roger, M. (ed.), S. E. Asia: Documents of Political Development and Change (London, 1974), p. 74.

28 Modelski, George, "Asian Participation in SEATO," in Modelski, George (ed.), n. 15, p. 129.

29 Straits Times, Singapore, March 18, 1955, cited in Ibid., p. 91.

tion which could bring peace to the unfortunate peninsula. Apart from telling each other that SEATO was well and provided 'stabilizing influence', the eight members were well aware of the internal rot of the artificial edifice.

The Conference Communique expressed Council's 'deep interest and sympathy for the Government and people of Vietnam', but it was known that U. S. was getting even more deeply involved with no visible SEATO support.³⁰ Britain received no support from U. S. in Malaysia except verbal and Pakistan sat calmly so as not to jeopardize its understanding with China. Philippines remained uncertain and Thailand criticized French proposal of neutral Indo-China as playing into the hands of others.

As war in Vietnam escalated Council meetings of SEATO focused their discussions on increasing strength of Communists and the need for support for Vietnam. When the crisis spread to Cambodia SEATO found itself incapable to act. There were bitter debates at Manila meeting (1970) as Philippines and Thailand attacked U. S. policy. It was believed that U. S. had persuaded Cambodia not to apply for SEATO as it would have been the crunch of the matter.³¹

30 Eastern World, xviii (5), May 1964, pp. 5-6 (Editorial).

31 Harper, Norman, "Australia and United States", in Greenwood, G., and Harper, N., Australia in World Affairs, 1966-1970 (Melborun, 1976), p. 287.

All it could do was call upon the 1954 Geneva members to ensure independence and neutrality of Cambodia and praise actions of South Vietnam and U. S. Mr Thanat (Thailand) opened his opening speech by saying that unless the meeting was ready to preside over liquidation of SEATO, Thailand would have to do something more than join hands in making believe rituals commemorating a passing faith while still unwilling to accept change.³² The final communique highlighted this military incapacity.

Curiously enough, the Secretary-General Konthi Suphamongkhon took certain odd positions on regional problems. He maintained that SEATO had not been created to tackle regional problems like Indonesian 'confrontation', Indo-Pak dispute on Kashmir or Thai-Cambodian dispute. SEATO did not enter unless a member specifically asks for it.³³

Malaysia, faced with Communist insurgency threat after its independence and later with Indonesian confrontationist attitude continued to rely on Britain for security but did not join SEATO. In later years Malaysia increasingly turned towards neutrality. Nonaligned

32 Ibid., p. 287.

33 Konthi, Suphamongkhon, n. 22.

India did not take much interest in S. E. Asia after Indonesian independence, this being due to the growing differences within the nonaligned camp and increasing Chinese influence in S. E. Asia, or even due to the fact that S. E. Asia did not accept India as within their region.

The 'Korean' system of alliances that had attempted balancing or containing communism and deploying a global nuclear deterrent thus had two other characteristics:

- (1) Its lack of Overarching political structure.
- (2) Its Eurocentric character,³⁴

The whole alliance system focused and ultimately rested upon the U. S. as the center of action. There was no overarching structure that might help deliberations upon global policies, elaboration of strategic plans or exploration of nuclear contingencies of the whole alliance system. There was no mechanism for coordinating global action, nor reconciling conflicting interests nor for reaching understanding, on the use or nonuse of nuclear weapons, soon recognized as the real basis of the structure.

Strategically, SEATO had been assigned with the basic role of holding the 'Communist frontier' that

stretched through the demarcation line of Vietnam and along Thai and Laotian borders. The 'Treaty Area' that was limited to 21° 30' N. Lat. excluded all such areas of riposte as Hong Kong, South Korea and Formosa, which would have been effective strategically against the only significant threat: China. Yet had a wider definition been adopted in 1954 it was likely that British and French interests would have opted out. Further, the islands under Nationalist China besides Formosa had been set under protection of Seventh Fleet of USA. U.S. remained the only power whose participation was the only fear China held from an otherwise impotent SEATO. And Chinese success since Bandung with its policy of 'peaceful coexistence' and 'popular diplomacy' paid rich dividends. China succeeded in finalizing boundary agreements with most of its S. E. Asian neighbours, increased trade relations with Malaya and Indonesia and gained a favourable image in Thailand.³⁵ The power imbalance combined with geographic limitation created a strategic impotence, such that it was a mere pretence to assume that in a major Asian war SEATO would decide on ground strategy and execute decisions. More important, SEATO

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Byod, Gavin, "Communist China and SEATO", in Modelski, George (ed.), n. 15, pp. 173-74, 182-85.

could not undertake a 'power dialogue' before a crisis and thereby prevent it.

The Laotian crisis of 1961 showed that SEATO could not be used for 'local' as against 'strategic' purposes either. The alliance would have acted as in Korea and entered the scene declaring the area to be within the 'defence perimeter' after the Communists had gained an upper hand, perhaps, this is what happened in Vietnam in 1962-64, but this does not prove SEATO working any better. As for subversion, besides the lack of an accepted definition no common values were held. Thus in Australia the Communist Party was legal while in Thailand the Communists were summarily shot dead. In Malaya and Singapore the British fought a war against communists who were regarded with tolerance at home.³⁶

Whether out of disillusionment or apathy, the US took to disregarding SEATO. Consequent uncertainty made its Asian members reach out for individual rather than collective interest, only to generate a feeling of strategic impotence within SEATO. Finally in July 1975, Philippines and Thailand called for a gradual dismantling of the alliance.³⁷ Though it was initially decided that

36 Narain, Ronald, "SEATO : A Critique", in Pacific Affairs, XLI (1), Spring 1968, p. 9.

37 The proposal of gradual dismantling of SEATO

SEATO as a political structure be maintained the idea did not last long and on February 20, 1976 the SEATO was formally disbanded.

The Asian attitude towards Manila Pact had puzzled the Western observers who tended to be exasperated by the fact that S. E. Asian did not apparently view the threat of Communist domination as real danger and resolutely refused to ally with the West to resort it. This was considered particularly unfortunate as a S. E. Asia Pact had to have the cooperation of a majority of regional powers. The Western powers had therefore been in an invidious position of wishing to defend countries, which did not wish to be defended, from dangers, the existence of which they denied in public.³⁸

Dysfunctioning of Alliance System

Search for a new Order in S. E. Asia

The alliance system had come to represent, as

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"to make it in accord with the new realities of the region" was contained in the joint communique issued at the end of a four day visit to Manila by Thai Premier, Kukrit Pramoj (July 24, 1955). The leaders, however, called for the retention of the 'Pacific Charter', the document appended to the SEATO Treaty, which urged 'common action to maintain peace and security in S. E. Asia and the Pacific.

On September 4, 1975, the decision on phasing out was formally taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in New York.

Ref: Facts on File, 1975, pp. 583, 700.

we saw above, an 'order' in world politics in the context of the cold war image of bipolarity and confrontation. Its early most manifestation was NATO in Europe where the Communist threat seemed an obvious reality. In the post-war Asia where nations that had newly emerged independent got tied up in alliances mainly for their own domestic or immediate interests rather than a prevailing concern for communist expansion. However, independent Asia had also presided over an alternative image represented as nonalignment and noncommitment; the result being such an abnormality as a SEATO with only two S. E. Asian powers.

The only real challenge to the Alliance System came first, not in Asia but in Europe from General de Gaulle in 1958.³⁹ He explained that the sharing of risks incurred in NATO was not matched by indispensable co-operation on decisions taken and responsibilities actually shared. He followed up with a proposal of a three-power directorate of U. S. Britain and France as a substitute to U. S. primacy. The weakness of the proposal lay in the fact that even in 1958 a world security organization could no longer be built by the U. S. primarily upon the support of its two European allies. However impracticable, the proposal struck at the heart of the problem of US alliance

system: decisions bearing on world security cannot reliably be made by U. S. either entirely on its own or in crisis consultation with the governments most affected. Over the long haul de Gaulles' proposals called for a permanent organization with shared participation.⁴⁰

As the growing irrelevance of the cold war image of international relations came to be realized, the changed problem of security from classical war defence to insurgency and subversion came to be accepted and as the indispensibility of recognizing China became evident, The U. S. caught between military containment and forward defence for allies faced some bleak strategic choices:

- With regard to deterrence: (a) Perpetuation of a high level of conventional forces; (b) Fundamental reliance on nuclear weapons; (c) acknowledgement of a higher probability of enemy initiative.

- With regard to initial defence; (a) Maintenance of rapid deployment; (b) Early recourse to tactical nuclear weapons; (c) Accepting risk of loosing allied territory.

- With regard to terminating wars: (a) Large commitment of troops; (b) Use of nuclear weapons, tactical

and strategic; (c) Recognition of a stalemate, tantamount and a defeat.⁴¹

The only solution that could transcend this triangle of unsatisfactory choices was to reevaluate and restate goals and objectives. Both the Nixon Doctrine and Ford's Pacific Charter,⁴² were efforts in this direction.

To a degree that may be surprising, S. E. Asian countries had a common concern about Nixon doctrine, that U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam should not presage a total U. S. pullout. U. S. presence was desirable as long as intervention and confrontation could be avoided. But none could deny the disaster in Vietnam. Nixon Doctrine's stress on self-reliance in local defence finds its counterpart in demand for 'tools' to do the 'job' themselves. In theory, at least, a S. E. Asian balance of power will not keep internal war from happening, but it will reduce the directness of U. S. involvement. One characteristic of this less direct involvement is the deterioration of the alliance system so assiduously developed during Eisenhower days.

41 Ravenal, Earl, "Nixon Doctrine and Asian Commitments", in Foreign Affairs, 49(2), January 1971, pp. 201-17.

42 Mitrovic, T., "Ford's Pacific Doctrine", in Review of International Affairs, 636, October 5, 1976, pp. 25-27.

The changing balance of extra-regional forces in S. E. Asia was more of a reassessment rather than an end to external competitive interests, and to a great part it came as a product of reprisal of strategic U. S. interests - the 'decoupling' of regional priorities from global priorities as attempted by the Nixon doctrine.⁴³ While American concern for a multipolar set up was not new, S. E. Asian countries themselves had acquired a wider regional perspective. In immediate matters of defence, China had provided an 'environment' for regional cooperation: a common perception of threat. In matters of regional economic and political cooperation it was realized that India and Japan had limited roles to play. Besides India's obvious reluctance, S. E. Asian did not consider India to be a part of their system. Japan held a position of first trading partner, a wartime legacy, but overdominance by Japan remained a concern. Both the Association of South East Asia (ASA) (1961-1967) and the Malphilindo marked the second phase of Asian regionalism by excluding extra-regional participation rather than as had been done earlier with ECAFE, Colombo Plan or SEATO. Admittedly, the sustained extra-regional parti-

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Leifer, Michael, "Regional Order in South East Asia : An Uncertain Prospect", in Round Table, (255), January 1974, pp. 309-10.

icipation that had discouraged or constrained S. E. Asia from taking initiative, also had helped indirectly by providing 'time' for Asia.⁴⁴

Lack of a cohesive image around which the region could rally round in search of some set pattern in international relations became increasingly evident with the dysfunctioning of the alliance system that had to break the older order. This region had seen little institutionalization of authority and changes in regimes occurred constantly. Political fragmentation has made foreign policy increasingly vulnerable to domestic events. Nationalism is still holding the minds of man. Decisions continue to be dictated by immediate national needs compounded by conflicting determination, if not aversion against, to remain sovereign. One major implication of all this, considering the capacity to adjust, accommodate and realign, is that S. E. Asia for some more time to come is likely to continue to experiment in foreign policy.

The origin of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a regional organization can be traced to one common feature it held with West Europe where such an organization was made possible: a strongly

held, well articulated extra-regional threat to existence - China. But that was in 1967 when internal and domestic insurgency threat and external threat blended into one.

Behind the official postures of hospitality and hope that Ford's Pacific Doctrine was initiative in wake of Communist take over in Indo-China there appeared to be a good deal of disquiet over actual Communist advances. By April 1975, Malaysia complained of Communist insurgency along Thai-Malaysia border; President Mares had ordered 'self-reliance' posture for national defence; Indonesia called in for 'national resilience' in all fields. Singapore shared the same feeling though it did not join what Admiral Sudomo of Indonesian State Security Agency called 'current panicky rush' to Peking.⁴⁵

In view of all this one set to wonder to what extent the ASEAN gesture of invitation to Indo-China to join in, was merely a gesture of good will and willingness to seek cooperation or to what extent it represented an acceptance of a new Communist power centre in Indo-China and mainly Vietnam, that was independent and

45

Vander Kroff, "South East Asia after Vietnam: Security Problems and Strategies", in Pacific Community, 7(3), April 1976, pp. 378-81.

likely to continue to be^{free} of Sino-Soviet influences in a major way. In June 1975, Thai Premier, Pramoj came out with a categorical statement that 'North Vietnam is giving support to insurgency movement.'⁴⁶ Yet whatever the present polarization of forces in Indo-China - the reported Soviet-North Vietnamese influence on Laos and cooling of Soviet-Cambodian relations - in terms of Sino-Soviet rivalry; adjust^{ment}, if not political accomodation of China is bound to be a policy priority for ASEAN States. The question is how to develop a format for accomodation. Therefore, any invitation to Indo-China of ASEAN would depend on defacto Sino-Soviet agreement as well as U. S. concurrence to effectively 'neutralize' S. E. Asia as cherished by 1971 Kuala Lumpur declaration.⁴⁷

This raises certain fundamental questions on ASEAN's likely future posture. The 1971 Malasian initiative for neutralization was severely criticized by Indonesia. While this criticism may spring from the

46 Bangkok Post, June 29, 1975.
In Van der Kroff, "S. E. Asia : New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation", in World Affairs, 138(3), Winter 1975-76, p. 183.

47 Vander Kroff, n. 45, p. 401.

hope of staking claim in initiation of new patterns of S. E. Asia, the smaller countries like Singapore had expressed genuine fear of regional power domination.

ASEAN is unlikely to replace SEATO in the military-alliance sense of the term. True, Malaysia had expressed its desire of keeping alive the political dimension of SEATO while dismantling it militarily so as to have a 'low profile' activity of extra-regional powers before SEATO was actually dismantled. But at the same time 'Bangkok Post' editorially observed: "While we are putting away SEATO shield to show our goodwill towards neighbours" the North Vietnamese backed by Soviet Union are continuing to take over Indo-China, and 'hence is our government confident that expanding communist power would stop at the Thai border?' Indonesian military spokesman writing in 'Berita Yudha' on September 11, 1975, called that Indonesian Navy will hold joint exercises with Singapore and Philippines Navies 'in accordance with increased co-operation among countries that are part of ASEAN'. Later Indonesian-Malaysian co-operation was cited as efforts at 'regional resilience'.⁴⁸

Yet if ASEAN that has shown a poor record where its primary function of trade is concerned,⁴⁹ and

48 Ibid., pp. 402-03.

49 Ref. Appendix II for Intraregional trade of ASEAN.

persists to occupy itself with defence, the net product is likely to be largely separate bilateral alliances that fall well short of military alliances, for that would inevitably get in the super powers and China. Perhaps it is for that reason that alongside the non-threatening call for regional resilience and strengthening of economic ties, ASEAN in the near future is likely to retain a 'Western' orientation, that can be a 'minus-military' version of SEATO, or the Five Power Commonwealth Defense agreement. Further, U.S. is still very likely to remain in the periphery of Asia, along Korea, Japan and Australia - New Zealand, and Indian Ocean, therefore, implicitly in Indo-China militarily or economically; and this seems to be the essential underpinning of Ford's Pacific Doctrine.

The conflicting strategic demands tend to produce statements of potentially diverse security implications. Malaysian Home Affairs Minister, Gazali called for preserving an 'equilibrium' of super-power presence and yet maintain an 'equidistance' policy (October, 1975), Philippine Foreign Secretary called for a unanimous demand that U.S. should stay (November 24, 1975), and Singapore's Rajaratnam struck a different note when he called for regional cooperation (December 14, 1975).⁵⁰

The roots of uncertainty in S. E. Asia lie in the course of relations that the non-communist and anti-communist ASEAN states take with Indo-China states and in the degree to which big power interests get involved again. Much would depend on to what extent S. E. Asian states, Communist and non-communist solidify their cooperation, and upon their ability to remain 'equidistant' but in equilibrium.

CHAPTER III

RUSSIA IN ASIA : THE BREZHNEV PLAN FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The Range of Goals

The last lap of nineteen fifties and the early sixties showed a marked change in affairs of Europe, to USSR they signified an era of stability as halmarked by the West's relative unconcern if not indifference to occurences in Hungary in 1956; which is why the Soviet Union seemed to have given more attention to Asia after late sixties. Traditionally Communist countries have always encouraged instability in the world in order to further their revolutionary expansionist goals. In contemporary Asia, however, the Soviet Union has more to gain by promoting stability than by formenting a revolution which is likely to redound Peking's benefit. Moscow's increasing concern for security in this area has made it less dependent on commitment to an ideology-oriented politics and more concerned with domestic stability. This has led it to cultivate its relations more on government to government basis - as would explain a series of developments since Taskent in 1965, increased economic ties with Japan, arms supply to Pakistan, diplomatic relations with Malaysia and Singapore and friendly overtures towards Thailand and Philippines.

Soviet pressure for an European Security Conference was a recognition of the special need to reduce the explosive potential of that areas' unsolved problems. Earlier a preoccupation in Europe was possible due to absence of any major threat elsewhere. However, with Communist China, despite ideological ties, a dispute did arise, and for the first time in the last twenty odd years it became necessary to take note of an united and hostile China. However insignificant China may be as a Global Power, its ability to fight a regional war had been proved in Korea and against India. Added, was the proximity of Soviet industrial centres. Earlier Soviet posture that a nuclear China could help maintain an equilibrium among Nuclear Countries of the world was subsequently modified. The inceptient growth in the Indo-Pacific region of a multipolar balance, it was realized, could creat more hazards, because of the danger that one of the participants would find the other linked against it. while Soviet analysts had good reason not to mention the fact that it was their doing that probably gave a decisive impulse for an accelerated rapprochment between China and United States, this especially with attempts to link Mongolian Republic with Warsaw Pact; Soviet Union must have already realized the temporary nature of Sino-U. S. antagonism. A comprehensive analysis of Sino-Soviet relations published in Moscow before Kissenger's visit to Peking in

July 1971 listed six areas of potential or actual Sino-US understanding: Taiwan, Indo-Pak, Vietnam, question of united action in Vietnam, anti-Sovietism and nuclear armament.¹ Because of numerous Sino-American talks, Soviet Union was apprehensive of the region being divided into spheres of influence counter to self-interest, especially with the strong U.S.-Japan links. Soviet claims to Sino-American 'condominium' were further confirmed when China withheld criticism on Diego Garcia and U.S. kept silent on Chinese occupation of Parcel islands in January 1974.²

Certain other developments that cast their shadow on Soviet thinking include the British reassessment of their commitments that led to a 'withdrawal East of Suez' policy and the twist that the Vietnam war got causing a change in U.S. policy. Nixon administration had announced a reduction in American troops and an initial pull-out had already taken place. This move was confirmed a month later by 'Guam Doctrine'.

1. Glaubitz, J., "Some Aspects of Recent Soviet Policy towards East and South-East Asia", in Whetten, Lawrence (ed.), Political Implications of Soviet Military Power (New York, 1977), p. 120.

2. Ibid., p. 126.

While opinions differ on the nature of role played by the Soviet Union in post-Vietnam and post-Cultural Revolution Asia, it is generally agreed that Soviet Union took to a more active Asian policy. This policy that comes as a sharp contrast to those policies followed by USA and Britain in late sixties is a product of a variety of factors in Soviet politico-military thinking. Perhaps the most fundamental issues facing the Soviet Union was whether to pursue a long term policy predicated upon little or no let-up in military competition with the U. S. and therefore dictating a need to preserve maximum unilateral room for decision, or whether to be satisfied with a negotiated relationship of military equality aimed at dampening arms competition with the U. S., and requiring acceptance of lasting constraints on unilateral military planning. The record would suggest the movement towards the latter, and the linkage between detente and Soviet military power underlies the same. In Asia, however, Soviet Union seems to be moving in first to gain such an equity that had until recently been denied to it. Similarly in the strategic nuclear arms field the Soviet Union faces the issue of whether to break explicitly with the established doctrinal view that Soviet preparations should not stop at deterrence along but also be capable of waging a war and ensuring the survival of

Soviet society in case deterrence fails.³

As testimony to the value accorded to the build-up of Soviet strategic power by the incumbent regime, the successive programmes it has pursued without pause for more than a decade tend to speak for themselves. The growth of USSR's strategic offensive since 1964 shows almost a fivefold rise during 1964-75.⁴ The Soviet Union holds today an abundant array of theater forces at both ends of the Eurasian continent. It has several thousand miles of borders to secure against potential threats, not the least of which is posed by China - a country against which joint defense provisions of Warsaw Treaty cannot be set in motion. Indeed, one of the most striking shifts in Soviet military planning over the past decade has been a substantial strengthening of Soviet theater forces in Asian regions facing Red China, a build-up accompanied not by reduction on Western frontier but by additional mobilization.

Two important, both long awaited conferences occurred in mid-1969 that were to lay foundation to new

3 Wolfe, Thomas, "Military Power and Soviet Policy", in Griffith, William (ed.), The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente (Lexington, 1976), pp. 188-89.

4 Ref: Appendix III-A, III-B, III-C.

developments in Asia. The Ninth National Congress of Chinese Communist Party, April 1969, at Peking, held with a limited audience, among other things brought Lin Piao into front line and severely criticized the Soviet Union. The second was the 'International Conference of Communists and Workers Parties, Moscow, June 1969 where Brezhnev used similar terms to criticize China. In the full text of his most important and second formal speech of June 7, he devoted considerable attention to four types of Soviet inspired international organizations: Warsaw Treaty Organization, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the need for 'a sound alliance of all progressive and anti-imperialist forces', a new 'worldwide anti-imperialist front' to combat the rival system of capitalism-imperialism, 'above all U. S. imperialism, the main power of world reaction', and 'a system of collective security for Asia.'⁵

The last item, coming at the end of a long three part speech, had received a careful buildup in the preceding text. It rested on the analysis of 'communist assistance to and support of these young countries of

5 Trager, F.N. and Bogodonaro, R., "Ninth C.C.P. Congress and World Communist Conference: Their Meaning for Asia", in Orbis, 13(3), Fall 1969, p. 758.

Asia and Africa, their roles in anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle, their class composition and national liberation struggles. Brezhnev pointed out that European Communist parties had addressed themselves to a 'concrete programme of achieving security of European peoples, stability of frontiers and peaceful cooperation of European states.' Now, he stated, 'the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.' He omitted, at this point, Africa.⁶

The Plan and Asian Reactions

Izvestia article of May 28, 1969 by V. Matveyev contained the first Soviet reference to collective security.⁷ He noted the withdrawal of U.S. from Vietnam, the proposed British withdrawal and called in for a pooling of efforts by Asian countries to consolidate peace and repulse efforts of imperialist expansion. 'The socialist countries' the article continued 'will contribute as they have always done to every effort helping to ensure....'

6 Ibid., p. 758.

7 For detail article Ref: Appendix I, Noorani, A.G., Brezhnev Plan for Asian Security : Russia in Asia (Bombay, 1976), pp. 367-69.

dependable peace and security in Asia despite anti-popular designs of bellicose reaction'. Hints as to whom he meant by 'imperialist expansionist forces' and 'bellicose reaction' emerged when he criticized 'Mao and his henchmen' of having definite designs in a number of countries in this part of the world. Matveyev also named India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Singapore and Cambodia as nations striving to 'consolidate their sovereignty and economic independence', ostensibly in face of Chinese threats. This list of countries also gives clue to the security calculations of Moscow.

A week before Brezhnev proposal and coincidental with the above article came Kosygin's announcement: 'The Soviet Union would like to see Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and other states in this region developing mutual relations of friendship and constructive cooperation. The Soviet Union would do its utmost to facilitate this' (May 30, 1969).⁸ This explicit offer of sponsorship followed Kosygin's visit to the area. The Soviet Premier also persuaded Afghanistan to call for a conference of India, Pakistan and Iran, probably also to include Nepal and Turkey, to discuss trade and transit. The Conference, however, did not materialize due to sharp Pakistani

8 Noorani, A. G., "The Kosygin Plan", in Jain, A. P. (ed.), India and the World (Delhi, 1972), pp. 193-94.

criticism. In fact initially President, Yahya Khan, even expressed his ignorance of having discussed such a proposal, later he criticized it as anti-Chinese and therefore counter to Pakistan's national interest.⁹ Pravda (June 2, 1969) seemed to connect economic and political aspects when it claimed that the Soviet Union had been doing everything to promote cooperation between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan which was needed 'both in fields of economic and struggle for preservation of universal peace.'¹⁰ Shortly after Kosygin's visit came the first Soviet Navy Flagship demonstration in Indian Ocean when friendly port calls were paid to Madras, Bombay and Karachi harbours. Five days after the Pravda comment came the Brezhnev Plan for collective security.

The basic document of June 1969 Conference did not criticize China directly, but ~~also~~^{about} Asia it read: 'S. E. Asia and Far-East is one of the main areas in which imperialists conduct their policy of aggression and military adventures.... In addition to SEATO and ANZUS and the so-called Security Treaty with Japan there is a

9 Ibid., pp. 193-94.

10 Quoted in Ibid., pp. 193-94.

virtual occupation of South West Pacific and Indian Ocean by American armed forces. This entire system is aimed primarily against the socialist countries of Asia and national liberation movement as well as neutral states.... in this area.¹¹ The boycott of the June Conference by most Asian Communist parties reaffirmed the defacto split in the World Communist movement and denouncement of Moscow's leadership in Asian sector. This outcome had led Soviet Union to court Asian neutrals even more vigorously without, or despite, Communist movement here.

Two moves added to the operational dimension of the Plan: Kosygin's plan for economic cooperation as referred above and Gromyko's notification to the UNO that Soviet Union was prepared to work with Asian countries for a security system.¹²

Subsequent clarifications and expositions of the Proposal made by leading diplomats and academicians have reflected a consistency of thought both in structure and principles so as to justify the claim that the Proposal was very carefully thought out. In December 1969, Prof.

11 Pravda, June 18, 1969. Cited In: Krish, Marian, "Soviet Security Objectives in Asia", in International Organization, 24(3), Summer 1970, p. 465.

12 Gromyko's 'Appeal' was not, however, endorsed by the General Assembly when formally introduced

Zadorojnyi gave the first 'unofficial' detail of the plan, when talking about trends in Soviet policy at Tokyo.¹³ A year later writing in 'Soviet Land' Kapitsa considered non-Asian membership for the Proposal.¹⁴ The weeks following the proposal were heavy with expectations that a specific Soviet proposal for a Conference would follow. Soviet Ambassadors to various countries were recalled for consultations. It was also reported that shortly before Brezhnev's speech Mikhail Kapitsa (Chief, S. E. Asia Desk, Soviet Foreign Ministry) had embarked on an unusual trip to Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and Burma during which it was speculated he must have tested reactions to collective security idea.¹⁵ Officially, however,

previous F.N.

on October 10, 1969. The Resolution 2006 on 'The Strengthening of International Security' which the Assembly adopted on December 16, 1969, was not even the anemic version of the Soviet Draft.

Noorani, A.G., n. 7, p. 10.

13 For details of Prof. G.P. Zadorojnyi's talks Ref: Appendix II, Noorani, A.G., n. 7, pp. 370-391.

14 Kapitsa, M. S., "Collective Security System for Asia," in Soviet Land, December 1970. Article reprinted in Appendix III, Noorani, A.G., n. 7, pp. 392-94.

15 New York Times, June 14, 1969. Cited in Horelik, Arnold, "Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security Proposal: A Club in Search of Members", in Pacific Affairs, 47(3), Fall 1974, p. 271.

Soviets were silent on the question of membership, especially when charges were made as to whether China would find place in the system. Moscow seemed to be waiting for the general reaction though privately, questioners were directed to refer the Matveyev's Izvestia May 28, 1969, article.

Potential targets and objectives of the proposal remained under sharp speculation and 'U. S. policy planners' were cited as believing that North Vietnam was the keystone that would help Moscow maintain a foothold in S. E. Asia.¹⁶ It is possible that the Soviet leaders were able to predict a rethinking on part of the U. S. and determine the approximate date of the Nixon Doctrine. The approximate coincidental timing of both Soviet and U. S. doctrines does not entirely exclude the possibility that the Soviet leaders at least felt that a new approach was being studied at Washington and that attempts to reduce Chinese and American influence would stand a better success if Soviet Union offered what appeared to be a programme of security and

16 New York Times, June 14, 1969. Cited in Horelik Arnold, Ibid., p. 272.

cooperation as an alternative to the Nixon Doctrine.¹⁷ Moscow subsequently opened up criticism, of the doctrine as calling 'Asians to fight Asians'. By then Soviet Union must have also been aware of an oncoming Peking-Tokyo-Washington axis, given the close U.S.-Japan ties, that would most definitely be anti-Soviet Union in nature. One byproduct of this was an urgent conclusion of Indo-Soviet treaty, that as admitted later had been under discussion for over two years. With the intensification of Sino-Soviet struggle coming after U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam both Communist countries sought to present viable and attractive Asian policies for security of the region.

The Russians have, apparently a two-fold interest in sponsoring collective security proposals:

- (a) To help put Asians in a habit of cooperation, economic and political and eventually military so as to preclude exploitation by China in any regional conflict.
- (b) To protect the eastern borders of USSR, it being a continuation of an attempt after failure to entangle Warsaw countries into it.¹⁸

17 Ghebhart, Alexander, "Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia", in Asian Survey, 13(2), December 1973, pp. 1076-1077.

18 Krish, Marion, n. 11, p. 45B.

The development of an indigenous system of cooperation was meant for keeping China in check and preventing her from isolating individual Asian countries as she attempted to isolate India; to prevent the internal structure of countries from deteriorating to a point where she deems them ripe for revolution, as she judged Indonesia to be between 1963 and 1965; and to prevent their relation with each other from deteriorating to a point where she acquires a diplomatic opportunity as she did several years ago in case of Pakistan. It is fascinating that the first Soviet mention of Collective Security in Asia came two months after its failure to enlist East European support on Sino-Soviet borders.

A fresh spurt of attention came in later half of 1971 reflecting two developments: Nixon's China trip and Shanghai communique and Indo-Soviet treaty. The Shanghai communique confirmed earlier Soviet fears about China, and the Indo-Soviet treaty explicitly pointed to the desirability of bilateral alliances. Soviet Union's downgrading of the 'Grand Design' formula of Pan Asian security system and its swing towards bilateral treaty making with several selected countries - culminating in 1971-72 in friendship treaties with Egypt, Iraq, Yemen - was foreshadowed by Brezhnev in his report to the 24th

CPSU Congress when he ignored Collective Security proposal and stated that 'for its part, the USSR invites those countries which accept our approach to conclude appropriate bilateral or regional treaties.'¹⁹ If time were not ripe for a collective security, Moscow seemed to suggest an overlapping piecemeal solution.

The Indo-Pak war of 1971 had underscored the fact that Soviet support did pay dividends in Asia. Perhaps it is not entirely coincidental that Iran began edging towards endorsement of Soviet proposal towards the end of 1972 shortly after Soviet Union-Iraq treaty, and in 1973, Iran became the first Asian state with the exception of Mongolia to declare jointly its intention of cooperation in realization of Asian Collective Security.²⁰

With peace restored in the subcontinent and Soviet image better in a series of speeches from March 1972 through 1973 Brezhnev and other leaders repeated their claim that the Plan represented a long term Soviet

19 Pravda, March 31, 1971, cited in: Horelik, Arnold, n. 15, p. 274.

Also Ref: Soviet Land, September 1973, for article by Simonov referring to bilateral treaties as being bricks to a building of Collective Security.

20 Horelik, Arnold, n. 15, p. 275.

peace plan, and was well thought out and feasible.²¹ In S. E. Asia the task of explaining the proposal fell on able ambassadors at Singapore, first Safranov and later Bezrukavnikov. The latter was particularly anxious to allay suspicion that Russians had already proposed a detailed plan which would restrict sovereignty of Asian states, he also called in for proposals and welcomed ASEAN neutrality declaration of Kuala Lumpur.²²

Ever since 1969 the proposal has been repeated often but no definite conceptualization of either 'collective security' or 'system' has ever been attempted. While a military buildup is denied, alliances are called in to be criticized, only vague alternatives are proposed. A tactical aspect of Soviet Proposal lies in the attempt to present certain patterns in order to legitimize the idea of collective security. History of 1930s is cited to present Soviet Union as a creator and promoter of the Collective Security idea. Reference to two historical

21 Brezhnev's following speeches:

- (a) XV Congress of Soviet Trade Unions (Pravda, March 21, 1972).
 - (b) USSR's Fiftieth Anniversary Celebrations (Pravda, December 22, 1972).
 - (c) Alma Ata Speech (Pravda, August 16, 1973).
 - (d) World Peace Congress (Pravda, October 27, 1973).
- All cited in, Korelik, Arnold, *Ibid.*, p. 275.

22 Brezrukavnikov Boris' Speech at Luncheon given at Foreign Correspondence Association of S. E. Asia, on November 30, 1973 (Soviet News' Press Release: 59(90), December 5, 1973, Soviet Embassy, Singapore) cited in noorani, A. G., n. 7, pp. 101-02.

conferences help to provide a historical continuity: Bandung Afro-Asian Conference, and the Helsinki European Security Conference.²³ This tactical measure makes Asian countries aware that they have already formulated such principles as have met approval of the Soviet Union and consequently are consistent with the security proposal. Reference to Bandung also helps widen the scope to Africa, and the inclusion of Helsinki conveys importance and relevance of European decisions outside the region. However, this reliance on Bandung and Helsinki has its own limitations. As an allegedly non-Asian power the Soviet Union was not included at Bandung. Further, the final communique mentions 'renunciation of agreements on collective defence which serve particular interests of any Great Power' which runs against Soviet proposal. At Helsinki the Soviet Union gained recognition of its Eastern influence borders as inviolable the Soviet Union's similar initiative here is against interests of both Japan and China.

Denunciation of the Plan by China as an attempt to encircle it by an anti-China alliance; as an 'embroidled

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Glaubitz, J., in Whetten (ed.), n. 1, p. 129.

step taken by Soviet revisionism' etc. continues since 1969.²⁴ In order not merely to reject the proposal China developed a conception of its own concerning Asia. In this endeavour it has proceeded with far more pragmatism than Soviet Union. Without offering any 'system' they simply ask their neighbours to reject attempts for hegemony by third states or group of states in Asia. While at first glance Soviet position appears more positive, political reality confirms that it is more easy to agree on what to reject, than to determine on what to agree. Moscow grasped the importance of this 'anti-hegemony' clause, first included in Shanghai communiqué, only when China was insistent on including it in treaty with Japan.²⁵ China's objection to the Proposal remains

24 New China News Agency (NCNA), June/1969: /19,
 "All puppets and lackeys of U. S. imperialism in this region are to be unified in a general anti-China system which will serve as a tool for U. S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism...."

NCNA, June 28, 1969: Described the Plan as an 'unbridled step taken by Soviet revisionism...'
 NCNA, July 25, 1969: Compared the Plan to SEATO.
 NCNA, September 4, 1969: In a major statement once again criticized the Plan.

All cited in: "Asian Reaction to Soviet Proposal for Asian Collective Security", collected by Chintamani, China Report, 6(3), May-June 1970.

25 Glaubitz, J., "Antihegemony Formulas as Elements of China's Foreign Policy", in Asian Survey, March 1976.
 - China apparently succeeded from 1973 to 1975 in incorporating 'anti-hegemony' clause in 19 govt. or press communiques, 12 of these were signed by Asian States.

the only real stumbling block for the Soviet Union. China was neither mentioned nor excluded in the earlier lists though Soviet attitude was made evident at every opportunity. While Sino-Soviet relations hold the possibility of either continuing at present state, there occur detente or a military conflict; the last seems a little unlikely. If so, it would imply that an increasingly stable Sino-Soviet military balance along borders would permit both Soviet and Chinese decision-makers to devote more attention and military might outside their region.

Soviet policy towards North-East Asian region centers on Japan, deriving from historical background and domestic political factors - the 1905 defeat, world war experiences, primary preoccupation of Soviet Union in Europe and Japanese western orientation of domestic elite - and depending upon global-regional relationships with U. S. and China.

With respect to Japan, Moscow pursues the following goals:²⁶ First, strategically, it attempts to loosen the bonds of Japanese-American Treaty which has converted a demilitarized Japan into a potential war

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Robinson, Thomas, "Soviet Policy in Asia", in Griffith (ed.), n. 3, p. 308.

machine. Moscow seeks to avoid having to face an unfriendly and armed Japan, prefers to see Tokyo unattached to Moscow's opponents in the global strategic triangle (and still weak militarily) and wishes ultimately to transfer Japanese politico-military dependence to itself.

- Second goal is economic. Knowing Japan's near total dependence on raw materials and perceiving Japan's enormous industrial and technological potential, Soviet Union would like to gain Japanese help in development of Siberia.

- Third is political. Soviet Union wishes to see Japan end its ties with USA, and thus aid Moscow to break the American centered alliance system in Asia. On the other hand, Krenlin does not want Japan to fall into the hands of China or worse to add China to the existing U. S. -Japan alliance. As long as Sino-Soviet enmity and Soviet-American global competition continues, Japan retains the option to go nuclear or to vastly increase her conventional forces, and Japan tends, as at present, to become more of a free agent in N. E. Asian balance of power structure, Japan will be the center of N. E. Asian political machinery and Moscow will have to compete for her allegiance. Since Japan also wishes to attain its own economic and security goals, and assuming only marginal change in current Asian political

situation, Moscow will be unlikely to wrest Japan from her ties with the U. S. Any development in closer Japan-China relations also seem unlikely without a radical shift in domestic setting within Japan. A rational Japanese policy would be, as presently followed, of seeking a balance between Moscow and Peking while retaining a generally pro-American stance.

The real choice for Japan is whether it wishes to purchase security through a treaty with USA and hence avoid remilitarization and/or nuclear option or whether its desire to free itself from excessive dependence upon U. S. requires a redefinition of its security interests and heavy rearmament. Japan seems to see in the Brezhnev Proposal a three pronged thrust, military, diplomatic and economic, reflecting a new pattern of Soviet moves in India.

In S. E. Asia no indigenous state has the capacity to play a role in world politics though one regional power, Vietnam, threatens to dominate the scene. But Chinese opposition has also meant that Communist countries, independent and neutral in Sino-Soviet conflict withhold opinions. Soviet Union has also carefully avoided tendering explicit invitations or requesting endorsement publically from Hanoi or Pyongyang, the latter having studiously ignored the matter. North Korea did not sign

the 'anti-hegemony' clause in the joint communique with China issued in April 1975, and Vietnam refused to sign any communique at all while simultaneously not accepting the Soviet Proposal. Cambodia appeared on Soviet lists time and again, but Laos was a tricky proposition. In Indo-China Soviet attitude resembled a 'wait and watch' stance.²⁷

Moscow's main goals in S. E. Asia reflect the difficulty in moving into the region. Moscow wishes to be accepted in S. E. Asia as a Super Power that is concerned even beyond regions of its close proximity. Moscow also fears a Sino-U. S. condominium which would be worse if joined by a militant Japan. Precluded from Communist Indo-China states of S. E. Asia, Soviet Union has paid attention to non-communist states. Though Taiwan is a bleak possibility so far as positive reaction to the proposal is concerned Moscow has done nothing to curb rumours of developing good relations with Taiwan.²⁸ For a variety of reasons Soviets had initially concentrated on two states: Indonesia and Burma. But the Sukarno-Indonesian Communist Party fiasco of 1965, the increasing

27 Horelik, Arnold, n. 15, p. 277.

28 Ibid., p. 279.

isolationism of Burma, the Soviet break with Peking and Vietnam war combined to forestall or render still born most Soviet initiatives in this region, so much so that by 1970 Soviet Union had little to show of its large economic and military aid investment here.²⁹ Bangkok also expressed little more than polite interest in the proposal. Thailand, significantly affected by U. S. proposal to withdraw showed considerable caution in looking round for defence postures. Mr Thanat Khoman frequently expressed his Government's belief in alliances now being obsolete. It appears that Thailand would prefer a more loose arrangement, 'if Soviet Union is merely trying to broaden the base of its cooperation with countries in the region on all matters, not excluding defence, and is not planning to set up an anti-Peking front for its own reasons, the Soviet move deserves careful attention.'³⁰

Although Moscow's proposal has received little S. E. Asian support, it might yet obtain some receptive hearing were the Russians to explain a little of what they exactly had in mind. Whether they intend construct-

29 Ref. Appendix IV for details.

30 "Asian Security - Soviet Style", by Review Correspondent, Far Eastern Economic Review, 65, July 24, 1969, pp. 203-04, 245-47.

ing a 'cordon sanitaire' around China, to fill up the vacuum left by U. S. withdrawal or forestall any such regional security arrangement that would exclude itself, one thing is certain; the proposed system has nothing to do with the traditional definition of 'collective security', the term 'collective defense' would be more appropriate.

In the South Asian circle the plan was first mooted in Afghanistan despite known advantages of India. This reflected the key position held by that country for any access from Soviet Asia to the subcontinent. Following the 1973 coup de tat Soviet Union holds a better position in Afghanistan. With a firm foothold here Moscow tried, unsuccessfully to persuade Pakistan; the latter severely criticized the proposed conference at Afghanistan of India, Pakistan, Iran, Nepal, Turkey and USSR and Pakistani refusal resulted in the conference proposal being dropped. Initially President Yahya Khan (of Pakistan) maintained that he was unaware of the proposal and that Kosygin had not discussed it earlier. On June 10, 1969 he added that Pakistani attitude depended upon what was contained in the proposal, and on the same day foreign office spokesman rejected the plan as of 'little economic advantage to Pakistan.' The spokesman also revealed that the Plan was first mooted at

Taskent (1965) and had now been renewed because of Sino-Soviet conflict.³¹

Despite Pakistani rebuff Moscow since 1971 continued to support every move at straightening rift between Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. Mr Hutto too acknowledged this 'positive influence' of USSR, but Soviets made it equally clear that they considered this normalization as a move towards collective security.³² The scheme, however, suffered unforeseen misfortunes. The energy crisis of late 1973 shifted economic priorities of oil importing countries, and the Soviet Union failed to adequately compete with the OPEC and as a result lost some influence. It was summarily dismissed from Egypt, but it is significant that in December 1972, five months after the expulsion of Soviet advisers, President Sadat extended the 1968 Agreement of right of Soviet Navy to use Egyptian port facilities which were to expire in March 1973.³³ Bangladesh, with Mujib's Moscow

31 Noorani, A.G., in Jain (ed.), n. 8, pp. 193-94.

32 Braun, Dieter, "The Indian Subcontinent and Indian Ocean: The Soviet Union as an Asian Power", in Whetten, Lawrence (ed.), n. 1, pp. 101-02.

33 Kohler, F.D., etc., The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War: Implications for Detente (Washington, 1974), p. 34. Cited in, Haselkorn, Avigdor, "Soviet Collective Security System", Orbis, 19(1), Spring 1975, p. 238.

visit in March 1972 and Asian Peace Conference at Dacca, March 1973, was considered an asset. But by 1975, Prayda commentary entitled, "Alarming situation in Bangladesh" underscored Moscow's concern that Dacca Government might swing into a fulfilled pro-Peking or pro-west course.³⁴

To be effective the system would have to have a pivot and in South Asia the obvious choice was a treaty bound India. While the notion of a satellite would be inappropriate India certainly holds a special relationship with the Soviet Union. The Indian dilemma stems from its aims - the desire not to be an 'object' in international relations and as such be a power in its own right; and be recognized as a major regional power. Neither aims are achieved and India continues to rely on Super Powers for economic aid, and consequently is not taken seriously by neighbours. This frustration is at times expressed in an expressly anti-Western outburst or is channelled into technological and nuclear science developments. Mrs Gandhi's call for 'guarantees' by major Powers, subsequently diluted to 'political assurances' after Nixon's India visit (July 1969),

34 Braun, Dieter, "The Indian Subcontinent and Indian Ocean : Soviet Union as an Asian Power", in Whetten (ed.), n. 1. p. 102.

remained a non-starter. Both the 1969-1970 and 1970-71 Ministry of External Affairs Reports³⁵ mention the proposal only to be dropped in 1971-72 report³⁶ in favour of a general statement. Though Soviet Union had not specific interest in the Indian Ocean Peace Zone concept, its mention was made in the communique issued at the end of Brezhnev's visit to India in 1973. Izvestia commentator V. Kudryavtsev linked this with Soviet plan: 'Peace Zone' could become an integral part of Asian Collective Security System which the Soviet Union has advanced and which is supported by many governmental and public circles.³⁷

Neither USA nor China has influence in India anywhere near to that of the Soviet Union, yet it is

35 The Report states: "The Government of India have reiterated the earlier proposal made by the Prime Minister regarding an international convention to safeguard the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of countries of this region....."

Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1970-71
(Government of India), p. 20.

36 Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1971-72
(Government of India), pp. 31-34.

37 Kudryavtsev, "Indian Ocean and Plans of Imperialism", International Affairs (Moscow), November, 1974, p. 118. Cited in Braun, D., "Indian Subcontinent and Indian Ocean: Soviet Union as an Asian Power", in Whetten (ed.), n. l. p. 109.

they who can, if they wish, bail New Delhi out of its excessive reliance on the Soviet Union. Only U. S. can supply food and other economic assistance necessary and counter the Soviet drive to enhance its security position in South Asia and Indian Ocean. And only China can lessen its border conflict with India, the chief reason for India's security tie with Moscow. Two other factors complicate the situation. The strategic rivalry of Soviet Union, China and the U. S. in Indian Ocean and the new uncertain factor, Iran, especially in the South Asian balance.

In so far as Indian reaction goes, Brezhnev seems to have used a wrong phrase. 'Collective Security for Asia' raked up all the antipathies which had become part of Indian thinking during the long years of Dulles. Characteristically, though, New Delhi rejected the proposal without saying 'no'. This like the knack of accepting - without saying yes - American stipulations against trading with Cuba, North Vietnam and North Korea, is a part of India's search for a policy which will do for it what nonalignment did in another era.³⁸

38 "Asian Security - Soviet Style", n. 30, pp. 203-04, 245-47.

Strategy and Policy

Considering it from the strategic angle, a system can prove its effectiveness through various functions. From Moscow's point of view one must consider its utility by its direct ability to deal with threats posed to the Soviet Union proper rather than its subsystems. In this case one can present three such subsystems tied up with Soviet Union - The Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Middle East subsystem including treaties with Somalia (1974), Syria, Yemen, Egypt and Iraq and the Indo-Soviet treaty subsystem - in strategic mutual support to each other.³⁹ This strategic mutual support between the Warsaw countries and Middle East subsystem was evident in 1973 Middle East war, both for logistic and defence purposes. Similarly one can see the link between Middle East and India in 1971 Indo-Pak war when Soviet offer of arms aid could come only through the Middle East corridor. Interestingly, in both cases, Soviet Union justified, its intervention because the conflict was taking place 'in the immediate vicinity of its borders' and 'consequently affecting its own security.'⁴⁰

39 Haselkorn, A., n. 33, p. 246.

40 Quoted in, Ibid., p. 246.

Basically the strategic utility of the system for Moscow depends upon its structure i. e. contents of various treaties and number and identity of its members. Hypothetically, inclusion of Taiwan could be very much desirable due to its impact on China. But even without it, the present structure seems formidable. If the Middle-East appears to be only of transitory value, connecting Warsaw and Indian subsystem, it still holds its own importance.

Eight years have passed since the proposal was launched to seize the diplomatic initiative in Asia, but nothing much has come of it, one rarely hears of it today, though it continues to be a fixed element in Russian rhetoric. It would require a radical transformation of the entire political and military environment of Asia for a working Pan Asian security structure such as seems to be implied by the proposal, to be realized. Chinese hostility ensures that any such proposal remain a non-starter and even an invitation to hold any such conference be unlikely to receive supporters. While only a radical improvement in Sino-Soviet relations can ensure new hopes, this in itself would present new difficulties, for it would fundamentally alter security perspectives of most Asian states. Whether Asian states conclude that prudence required accomodation to the

threat inherent in Sino-Soviet rapprochement by adherence to a security system managed jointly by Moscow and Peking, would depend critically on the availability of U.S. and Japan as balancing sources of military power and influence in Asia.

What all this implies is that it would then in face of such a stalemate be of advantage for Soviet Union to create a Soviet controlled tension policy which could ensure continued reference to the proposal. It is also likely that while such 'system wars' would seem more likely where hypothetically Warsaw members join India to counter China, direct military involvement by Soviet Union can be expected only if a member is likely to be liquidated. It would also mean that notions of hierarchical subsystems need to be abandoned.⁴¹

The Soviet Union it would seem has realized that it has already harvested the initial accumulation of influence and in future yields will be more costly and uncertain. The more Moscow tries to exert influence, the more likely it is to incur nationalist resentment and resistance. Increasingly, the Soviet Union will find

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Ibid., pp. 253-54.

its range of manoeuvre limited by variety of factors: the capriciousness and instability of Third World clients; the pervasiveness and importance of regional rivalries which exist apart from any considerations relating to Soviet-American struggle; the inevitable frictions that develop between small powers and great powers and growing disillusionment with quantity and impact of Soviet assistance.⁴² There are no compelling reasons to assume that Moscow will abandon its ambitious 'forward policy' in Asia. The Brezhnev Plan is no veiled invitation, and the unenthusiastic responses are unlikely to deter Moscow from advocating the essence of the policy in variety of forms.

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Rubenstein, Alwin, "Assessing Soviet Power in the Third World", Asian Affairs, 58, February 1971, p. 11.

CHAPTER IV

THE ASIAN SYSTEM TODAY

We have discussed security as a multidimensional concept that is not merely a function of military power of a state, and shown how it has acquired a new meaning in the developmental context. We also referred to international stability and order as being product and at the same time determinant of security of a state and called in for a generally accepted 'governing image' for the international system. In this context, we considered two attempts made by the Super Powers to establish security in Asia. In both cases we noted that the search of security took an alien stand, such that security of indigenous nations remained in danger. Despite whatever professions, the external powers remained more concerned with their own national interest and exhibited a willingness to sacrifice the interests of their smaller allies. In a way we are back where we started. Here we shall try to analyse the institutional solutions to security as experimented in Asia and seek out what Asians feel their role can be in developing a viable security for themselves.

Institutional Solutions to Security

Despite all such qualifications identified

earlier, survival of the state continues to remain the core value to be guarded in a nation state system. Primary safeguard of this value is the function of the military apparatus, either through mere possession, as today when the role becomes deterrence rather than actual war, or actual utilization. This is not to rule out the earlier argument that security has ceased to be only a military function, this is only to add that besides economic and political weapons that can be used today, military force continues to hold importance, though in a latent manner.

Broadly, two strategies, unilateral action and action in coalition or combination are used to acquire and maintain security.¹ Either strategies if developed to full have potentials to end the present system of nation states by creating either an empire or in case of the latter a world government. Unilateral strategy as an attempt to preserve values by ones' own action is dependent on both, ones' capacity and the nature of

1 Twitchett, K. J., "Strategies for Security : Some Theoretical Considerations", in Twitchett, K. J. (ed.), International Security : Reflections on Survival and Stability (London, 1971), p. 15.

international system. Two principle forms of this strategy are interventionism and isolation. Hegemony, opposite of self-abnegation represents a maximum of intervention. Effectiveness of isolation as of neutrality has been reduced today by advances in technology and communication. Alliance systems and collective security both represent a tacit acceptance of the fact that unilateral strategies are not going to work. Non-alignment may be a product of neutrality to an extent that it seeks to isolate itself from alliances but it does not profess isolation from the international system. Both 'balance of power' and 'collective security' are based upon deterrence and inherently assume rational behaviour by policy-makers acting to safeguard the interests of their state by preservation of the system as a whole. Both include a paradox of war for peace - peace being achieved through collective capacity and will to resist, and are concerned about preponderance by any power within a system.²

Collective security denotes a general alliance that eliminates what is called a 'pattern of competitive alignment' that is characteristic of the balance of power

system. It calls for an alliance based on the 'principle of concern'³ defined as a recognition of indivisibility of peace and an acceptance that violence against any one member constitutes violence against all other members. Collective security, that calls for an alliance in defence of order of the community and not conflicting and antagonistic grouping is different from collective defence that can be considered as a compromise between alliance system and collective security.⁴

There is also a certain relationship between alliances as a manifestation of balance of power politics and degrees of regional order. Liska points out that alliances between greater and lesser powers are likely to be most useful in implementing an international order that is maintained by interstate restraint, surveillance, intervention, legitimation and other forms of control.⁵

3 Hogan, Williard, International Conflict and Collective Security : The Principle of Concern in International Organization (Kentucky, 1955), p. 1.

4 Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration : Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, 1962), pp. 182-185.

5 Liska, George, Alliances and the Third World, Studies in International Affairs, No. 5 (Baltimore, 1965), pp. 42-43.

In systems built around a preponderant power, the result might be an informal imperial order implemented in great measure by means of alliances. Such alliances as between great and small powers play a less significant role in relation to an international order of a higher level, that of great power concert. But a minimum order in evolving international order cannot fully depend either on stalemated super powers or a controlling or ordering role by either of them. This makes significant and local or regional or similarly controlled subsystems. The limitations and opportunities generated by these alliances, however, create situations for great power involvement.

Oddly enough, the impact of increased need for security in international relations has heightened both conflict and cooperation. We have earlier identified reduction in involvement, elimination of enemies and acquisition of new resources either territorial or in terms of allies as methods for coping with security. Yet intervention by a big power in small states continues either on basis of treaty obligations or defined 'vital interests'. The contemporary system is also characterized by a large element of subsystem dominance. The fact that a nuclear war is unlikely, or that it is presumed to be so, has tended to concentrate attention on regional conflict to the extent that it is generally

assumed that most dangerous systemic threats come from escalation of a subsystem conflict.⁶ The value consensus that had characterized earlier period of international relations has changed. Alliance patterns have recorded this transformation.⁷ In the aftermath of war, ideology and security were twin goals of both super powers, but since the age of detente ideology has been less stressed upon. Diffusing of tensions and dangers of nuclear vulnerability have made political goals supercede military goals. In the earlier international system the essential bipolarity and the prevailant assumption that war was imminent granted small powers a transitory manoeuverability. In the contemporary system, with the power configuration still unclear, and the assumption being avoidance of war not its imminetness has increased the importance of small powers.⁸

The viability of nonalignment, as a tactical principle designed to extract maximum benefit from any particular configuration of power is then directly related to the power balance between the Great Powers. It both affects the balance and is affected by it. Yet its viability for a small power remains only so long as it

6 Rothstein, Robert, Alliances and Small Powers (New York, 1968), p. 240.

7 Dinerstein, Herbert, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems", in The American Political Science Review, LIX(3), September 1965, p. 593.

8 Rothstein, Robert, n. 6, p. 241.

is not directly threatened by a Great Power, in which case avoidance of alignment becomes difficult. Effective neutralization of any area does not create non-alignment; it is only an arrangement by the Great Powers to contain, if not eliminate, areas of conflict.

Today conflict tends to concentrate in areas where nuclear weapons cannot be used effectively or where states involved cannot justify their use. Conflict has also been transferred from formal military level to political, economic and paramilitary level. In one sense an overarching concern for security is a good thing because it tends to keep to minimal, objective of survival of a state. In terms of commitment and involvement, the fewer the better. The problem arises only when security is taken to be something final and absolute. Kissinger argues that an amount of insecurity is the inevitable corollary of sovereign independence.⁹ International stability can be maintained only if all major powers accept the fundamental framework of international system. Stability requires a general acceptance of rules of international behaviour. Kissinger points out that the distinguishing feature of a revolutionary power is not

⁹ Kissinger, Henry, A World Restored (New York, 1964), p. 2.

that it feels threatened - such a feeling is inherent in the nature of international system based on sovereign states but that nothing can reassure it. Only absolute security - neutralization of the opponent - is considered an absolute guarantee, and thus the desire for one power for absolute security spells insecurity for all others.

The Major Powers : Patterns of Interaction

The Super Power agreement that succeeded in temporarily containing war in Indo-China (Paris, in 1973) also succeeded in prolonging the life of a client state of the U.S. that held little or no local support or even an independent ability to survive; only to result into a third Indo-China war, which, had political constraints not acted, would have continued to worsen. The Paris Agreement also showed the willingness of the Soviet Union to compromise the interest of their Indo-Chinese allies. Such a 'sell out' by the Soviet Union or a 'bailing out' by the U.S. of its clients has not been unprecedented, the Soviet Union has almost always faced a stalemate in the Third World, and U.S. has adamantly continued to support anti-communist regimes that have seldom held local acceptance.

The 'dominance structures', as Shippée comments, which have characterized the American and Soviet

Asian policies presuppose an underlying harmony of interest in relationship to major powers (whether or not they perceive their long term interests as aligned or opposed) in as far as they: (a) Respect the priority of each others' international interests over that of peripheral allies; (b) Respect the priority of each others' domestic interests over local interests of peripheral allies; (c) and act on the operational premise that peripheral powers share interests and priorities of center powers in international relations.¹⁰ This 'implicit sovereignty' that is assumed by either in their relationship to their allies creates a center-periphery structure of alliances where the dominant center monopolizes the goal setting and value formation of the alliance. This applies to both, the U. S. alliance system as developed in cold war days and Brezhnev's attempts to forge a new order in Asia. In case of other major powers, China, Japan and to an extent India are extremely powerful, but all except Japan, that too only economically, are regional powers.

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Shippee, John, "S. E. Asia and Super Powers : Structural Obstacles to Learning from History", in Journal of Peace Research, 13(2), 1976, pp. 131-147.

Major power interaction in Asia can be witnessed at three main levels:¹¹

1. The uneasy triangle between U. S., Soviet Union and China is likely to dominate the global strategic situation in the near future. On one hand, strategic near parity and other domestic compulsions would induce the U. S. and Soviet Union towards some kind of a global adjustment in the nuclear and conventional military field and contain the urge to push towards superiority. On the other hand, mutual fear of success in enticing China is bound to keep alive uncertainty and tensions. China on her part is likely to keep a lookout for any signs of a U. S.-USSR collusion or understanding, a concern that is equally shared by smaller powers also. Super Power interaction is further complicated by the ubiquitous position of Japan.

Paradoxically it is both easy and difficult for U. S. to deal with Soviet Union in Asia. It is easier because the U. S.-Soviet Union issues are of comparatively little concern to Asia, because their rivalry is expressed more directly and in greater relevance in other geo-

11 Soedjatnoko (Ambassador of Indonesia), "Role of Major Powers in New Asia", in Walker, Richard (ed.), Prospects in the Pacific (Washington D.C. 1972), pp. 27-34.

graphical areas. It is also difficult because both find themselves in a policy strait jacket with a limited number of policy options. Both states, further, must decide their Asian policies from the character of their own bilateral relations, particularly in strategic nuclear realm and from the structure and changes in the global strategic and economic triangles. If Mr Carter (USA) would continue to insist on ground-troops withdrawal from Asia, despite known Soviet intentions of a more active Asian policy, its implications for a greater reliance on tactical nuclear weapons must also be noted.

2. At the theater of regional level major power interaction can be studied in the context of crucial issues relevant to the region as a whole. This would include the economic position of Japan in relation to major powers and its neighbours; growing trends in regional cooperation and also continued Super Power intervention in disputes of the region.

In as much as Japanese role in the region is a function of Japan-U. S. relations one might say that the operation of the multipolar balance is dependent, in a crucial way upon the Japan-U. S. treaty. A Japan out of alliance, consequently a military, nuclear power, can create more hostility and generate more uneasiness in the present set-up. Within the ASEAN there is a feeling

that Japan is far from being helpful, there also is a feeling of bitterness that Japan continues to be motivated by excessive self-interest in trade and aid dealings. There is irritation that Japan is too slow to shoulder its responsibility in South-East Asia. It was made clear at the recent EEC-ASEAN joint meeting at Brussels that ASEAN considered EEC as a counterweight to Japan so as not to be too dependent upon Japan.¹² Asian regional cooperation faces other problems also, these being the product either of differences in ideology or simply conflicting national interests. Asia also has such problems as those of divided states like Korea, the problem of Taiwan and until recently Bangladesh.

3 Third level of interaction encompasses all the major powers in their interaction with the nations in Asia. All major powers, except China, until recently, had a stake in the stability of the region. China

¹² Jenkins, Peter, "ASEAN sees EEC as Counterweight to Japan", in Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 1977.

At the Kuala Lumpur ASEAN meeting of 1977 Premier Fukuda (Japan) has, however, agreed to help ASEAN efforts to step up exports to Japan, establish the 'Stabex' (stabilization of exports) scheme and consider giving various technical aid (Bernama, Kuala Lumpur, August 7, 1977).

Reported in Times of India (New Delhi), August 8, 1977.

seemed to operate on the premise that continued instability was likely to create conditions favourable for China. At the same time, while important, no 'vital interests' are at stake of any of the major powers, except China, which has direct geographic border contact here. We shall continue to consider China as an extra regional power when we consider specifically South and S. E. Asian problems as done ahead. Such a position, besides geographic reasons, has been allocated to China due to, among other things, it being a 'Great Power' or a 'Major Power' when compared to other Asian countries.

Structures, Arrangements and Processes

The much coveted January 27, 1973 Paris 'Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam' did not, however, 'replace the threat of war' and bring a 'threat of peace' as the Philippine Secretary of State had thought it had. It was followed by the third Indo-China war and Asia once again plunged into another chaos only to end with American defeat on the Asian rimland. Importance of the post-Vietnam era does not lie in the continuance of hostility at a low level but in that it brought about a total change in the

context of international relations in Asia.¹³ In the first place it brought an end to the lingering doubt that security and stability rests, to a large extent, on the outcome of the struggle between the 'free world' and the 'Communist world'. Bipolarity had ceased to be a fact, so much so that Vietnam took to an independent stance in Sino-Soviet relations. Secondly, it ushered in the actual implementation of the Nixon Doctrine that called for a troop pull-out by the U. S. Finally, it had given a new context to Sino-American rapprochement that could have potentials for upsetting the older order.

Earlier we identified certain patterns of relationship in interaction of major powers. Behind all such questions as to what foreign power can be identified as hostile, to what extent internal dissidents are supported from outside, or what regional power is seeking to over-extend its regional dominance, there is a

13 Somsak di, Muto, "Prospects for Security and Stability in Post-Vietnam South-East Asia", in S. E. Asia Today : Problems and Prospects, Papers presented at Seminar organized by the Institute of S. E. Asian Studies, Singapore, April 6-7, 1973; Current Issues Seminar, 3, (Institute of S. E. Asian Studies, Singapore, March 1973), pp. 2-4.

fundamental question, that is whether these problems of security and stability and how they are resolved are not dependent on how they are managed by the leaders of these states.¹⁴ Threats to a state we can identify as extra-regional, intra-regional or domestic. In Asia we shall have to ask to what extent did U.S. and Soviet Union constitute a threat and second to what extent concern about China is real. Asian irritation with Japan may seem a little unreasonable if we see that a similar irritation is not felt towards the developed West. But there is a justification in expecting a regional power to work for the region. Within the region, the slow progress in cooperative ventures and reluctance to admit new members in such regional organizations already existing,¹⁵ and also uncertainty about regional leadership, plague security considerations. In Asia external powers have always remained determinants in security considerations though it seemed that S. E. Asia was unduly concerned

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- 14 Lau Teik Soon, "Question of Security and Stability in S. E. Asia: Nature of Threats", in Economic and Political Trends in S. E. Asia, Papers and Proceedings of a Seminar organized by Institute of S. E. Asian Studies in Singapore, March 23, 1973. Current Issues Seminar (Institute of S. E. Asian Studies, Singapore, June 1973), p. 16.
- 15 In May 1967, Government of India suggested a more broadly based Asian organization than the then planned ASEAN. This suggestion remained 'dormant' till reawakened in January 1968. The member states then indicated that India, Pakistan and Taiwan were not welcome in ASEAN. Times of India, January 16, January 20, 1968.

about American withdrawal. There is this anxiety because in spite of the fact that conflict persists in the region, there did exist an overarching system of international order. The Great Powers had established among them certain parameters of spheres of influence. The international order that had enabled states of South and South-East Asia to fashion their foreign policy as well as domestic options, was now in a flux. With Sino-American understanding there arose an uncertainty about the roles of U. S., Soviet Union, China and Japan. This anxiety does not originate from specific discernable threats by Great Powers but from the inability of these states to see clearly what new order is going to replace the old.

Over the period of time there came modification in their role in international relations as perceived by the Asian elite. They showed greater concern for topics concerning immediate national interest and lost some of their earlier solicitude for uses of the world. Most indigenous ideas and proposals for security held certain common threads. Asian elite showed a greater awareness for the general need for development and modernization. Traditional inertia as well as alien character of the forces for change were taken into consideration. The need for a drastic change was at times

identified as need for 'modernization of the soul.'¹⁶ It was also realized that the governments by and large lack the authority otherwise traditionally wielded. The revival of Asianism in late sixties was much less emotional, and this time the utility of extra-regional guarantee was recognized. It is, however, unlikely that Asia accept any singular sponsorship of an extra-regional power. In a way this sentiment is understandable. In both the subregions South and Southeast Asia there exist problems arising out of territorial disputes, leadership, minorities etc. The vast disparity of power that exists say between India and her neighbours in South Asia, or the potentials of an united Vietnam and an ambitious Indonesia in S. E. Asia generate the need for smaller powers to have extra-regional guarantees. The question¹⁵ whether, within a region, an order of states in terms of power status is really a necessary condition for stability and security, ~~within the region~~ for if it was necessary and yet not possible, the

16 Soedjatmako, in SEADAG/Asia, A Special Report on Social Science Research in S. E. Asia (New York Asia Society, 1968), pp. 85-86.
Cited in Badgley, John, Asian Development: Problems and Prognosis (New York, 1971), p. vii (Introduction).

pressures for formation of such an order would create instability. Further, any arrangement that is associated with such concepts like hegemony and leadership presupposes the power potential of the said power. To accord a particular power status to someone who does not possess it is to spell insecurity. In the present situation the need may be to deter excessive external influence, not to eliminate it.

The initial impulse of most of the new states was to isolate themselves from global context of their region or in general to minimize the effect of world politics upon it. Both efforts having failed they tried to influence world politics so that certain unavoidable effects may be beneficial. They had tried to achieve this by creating (1) an 'area of peace' from which implications of world politics could be excluded; (2) An Asian solidarity strong enough to enforce such isolation; (3) A regional subsystem of international relations in which local problems could be solved without interference from outsiders.¹⁷

Indonesian policy, for instance, had continued to rely on the U. S. for national development and regional

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Levi, Werner, The Challenge of World Politics in South and South-East Asia (New Jersey, 1968), p. 154.

security umbrella. This was evident even as late as when President Ford had assured Jakarta of a continued presence when on his Peking visit.¹⁸ Yet, Adam Malik had called a conference on Cambodia in May 1970. The decision, he said, was based on 'realistic calculations that in the end Asian peoples themselves determine the fate of Asian peoples.'¹⁹ It was shortsighted to assume that regional security could always depend upon foreign forces and therefore each Asian state must increase its 'national resilience' in all spheres. However, it was the responsibility of the Great Powers to keep the region clear of conflict and not make it a 'battle arena' so that Asians can have a fair chance of developing themselves in a congenial environment. Historically, Adam Malik seemed justified in his claim that Indonesian policy had anticipated the evolution of the new American policy under Nixon administration. The Guam Doctrine represented not so much a new policy as a process of

18 This assurance was reportedly given by President Ford in December 1975. Van der Kroff, "South-East Asia : New Patterns of Conflict and Co-operation", in World Affairs, 138(3), Winter 1975-76, p. 179. Also Ref. Mifrovic T., "Ford's Pacific Doctrine", in Review of International Affairs, 638, October 5, 1976, pp.25-27.

19 Polomka, Peter, Indonesia's Future and S. E. Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 104 (IISS, London, 1974), p. 17.

adjusting American diplomacy to a gradual breakdown of bipolar order. The Indonesian approach to the strategic situation of 1970s was threefold. (1) In order to take optimum benefit of the new world situation, strengthen regional cooperation. (2) Set up and improve efforts of taking a common stand vis-a-vis developed nations, including Japan, mainly in maintenance of our economic interests. (3) A policy of 'national resilience' based on:

- (a) an inward looking orientation;
- (b) effort to secure ones' own national identity;
- (c) improve bilateral relations in the region;
- (d) adopt a non-aggressive and non-belligerent attitude.²⁰

As Dr Malik pointed out, the two premises that worked into the formation of the ASEAN were the need for stability and prosperity and demand for security. The only way to make an impact on big powers was to act collectively.²¹ Regional cooperation was seen as an

20 Somitro, "South-East Asia's Strategic Power in Seventies", in The World of Strategy and the Foreign Policy of Nations. Papers presented at Second Franco-Indonesian Conference, July 2-8, 1973 (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Djakarta), pp. 14-15.

21 Malik, Adam, "The making of Foreign Policy in Regional Cooperation - The ASEAN Model", in "The World of Strategy and Foreign Policy of Nations", in *Ibid.*, p. 58.

effort to reassert ones' position and contribute to the concepts and goals of emergent change in the security constellation of the region. Earlier Sukarno had capitalized on this philosophy in his 'Doctrine of New Emerging Forces' and espousal of the slogan 'Asian solutions for Asian problems.' Economically oriented pragmatic outlook of post-1966 Indonesia represented not so much an abandonment of Sukarno's policy, at least in the regional sphere, as an alternative approach.²²

In contrast to Indonesia, other powers of the region banked more on extra regional participation. This includes Thailand and Philippines of the SEATO group; Singapore and Malaysia, both Commonwealth countries, and Australia as a power 'concerned' with the region. Both Malaysia and Singapore continued to look to Britain as the 'Five Power Defence Arrangement' could show. Malaysia, however, moved from a prowest policy to a neutral and nonaligned approach. Malaysian proposals, that came in part due to the realization that British withdrawal entails a greater defence budget and added insecurity, includes three foreign policy strategies that would have to be embarked upon before neutraliza-

tion can become a success. (1) The Great Powers in this region, defined by Malaysia as China, U. S. and Soviet Union must guarantee neutrality of S. E. Asia. This involves, among other things, a state of detente among the Great Powers, economic and diplomatic cooperation between South and South-East Asian countries and Great Powers and the latter's adherence to the principle of noninterference. (2) There must exist a state of neutrality within the region implying a collective declaration of neutrality and agreement on non-aggression pact. (3) National stability and regional cooperation within the region.²³

To Australia, Asia was also a source of potential threat to be guarded against, whether such measures be directed against Japan as at one time or at China as later. The prerequisite of security was strength and in the absence of a significant military and economic power among non-communist Asian states it seemed to Australia necessary to interfere Western strength between the more troubled Asian states and itself. This

23

Lau, Teik Soon, "Malaysia and Neutralization of South East Asia", in Low, Patrik (ed.), Trends in Malaysia, Proceedings and Background Papers of Seminar, Trends in S. E. Asia, No. 2., July 1971, (Institute of S. E. Asian Studies, Singapore), pp. 27-28.

idea of 'forward defence' was grounded upon suspicion, ignorance and self-interested disregard for the outlook and wellbeing of Asian countries, for while 'forward defence' was desirable from Australian point of view the countries where actual fighting would take place need not have shared the same view.²⁴

-The position of India in South Asia, as of Japan in Far East is a little odd. India as the only major military power in the subcontinent has not much to fear from subregional conflict. Indian concern is directed more towards extra-regional interference either in the domestic affairs or in the region it considers itself as of primary importance. More specifically Indian concern is for Chinese intentions and for that very reason India was pulled into major power rivalry. Whatever adjustment was done by India since Taskent and especially with Indo-Soviet Treaty in its early foreign policy stand has exposed her concern for security. Indian rejection for Brezhnev Plan reaffirmed Indian position that rejects the power vacuum concept and demands an

24

Greenwood, Gordon, Approaches to Asia-Australian Postwar Policies and Attitudes (Sydney, 1974), pp. 499-500.

Also Ref: Ban, Macmohan, "Australian Role in Asia", Eighteenth Roy Milne Memorial Lecture (AIIA, November 1967), p. 3.

Asian approach to Asian problems. But India continues to be reluctant to initiate any organization dealing with security and therefore the call for extra-regional guarantees in the neutralization proposal for S. E. Asia.²⁵

India supports the Indian Ocean Peace Zone concept and welcomes any understanding between the Super Powers that could limit their intrusion in the Indian Ocean but at the same time India rejects the Nuclear Free Zone Concept and thus keeps her options open. In contrast, Pakistan displayed her fears for her immediate neighbour and joined both alliances CEATO and SEATO. Pakistani overtures towards China later, as towards U. S. in cold war days represented a solution to redress the uneven balance of the subcontinent.

The case of Japan is even more curious. It has regional power potentials militarily but is an actual global economic power. Consequently, ~~it~~^{it} has alienated itself from the mainstream of Asia that ~~is~~ constituted mainly of developing countries. Once militant Japan

25 Mrs Gandhi had expressed the idea of neutralizing S. E. Asia with guarantees of major powers when on the Caribbean Tour in 1968.

Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1969-70,
Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1970-71,
p. 20.

today has no regional security threats and therefore the alliance with U. S., to face extra-regional threat. But since the 'Nixon Shocks' of 1971 Japan treads more warily, the Sino-American understanding has not ~~calmed~~ ^{calmed} her fears, while she continues to suspect Soviet hegemonic intentions. All told, nothing is as yet clear about the posture that either major power would adopt. Perhaps, paradoxically, it is Japan that is the key to the posture that the Great Power would in future adopt.²⁶

In the present situation we can accept the need to deter external or extra-regional influence though the question remains, that would absence of external involvement imply security and stability for the region. Such a question is basic to whatever structures and arrangements we would like to formulate, be it a proposal of regional organization or that of neutralization. We accept the proposition that the internal political conditions to a large extent determine stability of individual states and therefore, we seek to work at the national level. But we cannot ignore the effect of

26

When in Kuala Lumpur Premier Fukuda (Japan) was expected to discuss with the ASEAN leaders, inter alia, Japan's idea of a 'New Asian Order' that Japanese papers refer to as Fukuda's 'Asia Doctrine'.

Times of India (New Delhi), July 31, 1977.

the international environment on the nation-states as with or on regions as a whole. This takes us to discuss the problem on two levels.

'National interest' in the minimal sense of national survival in 'sovereign equality' had been the dominant objective, but the political systems that differed from country to country also determined policies. In most South and S. E. Asian states popular participation in decision making was low, consequently foreign policy became concern of a very small group usually not representative of any interest but its own. Limited popular participation or the lack of it made formulation of policies an individual enterprise and increased the importance of personalities. But the leaders in foreign policy were frequently similar in motivation and outlook. They had been conditioned by comparable crucial experiences, shared many western and class interests, were confronted by many like problems, lived in some wider environment and were responsible for states which shared numerous qualities. Their responses to international events were bound to have similarities.²⁷

At the regional level to what extent an 'equilibrium of power' can work depends upon the

triangular relationship of China, Soviet Union and USA. The problem is not just to what extent the major regional powers are going to effectively replace the extra-regional powers, it is whether the majority of Asian states are going to accept such a power order whereby there is scope for domination and hegemony by regional powers themselves. To this end, a total replacement could not be desirable and therefore the need for a continued but low level participation by Great Powers. It would no doubt be too much to expect such an equilibrium which would seek 'The ultimate goal of a new law of regional organization and functional cooperation to synthesize concept and practices of limited belligerency, specific reciprocity and community purpose. The decentralization of responsibility into a S. E. Asian form of 'functional federalism' could be the target of regional equilibrium... This form of 'functional federalism' could expand in widening concentric circles with a sequence of targets as confidence and experience of decision-makers, technicians and peoples developed. The new approach could also include guaranteeing respect for human rights, social minorities, promoting self-determination..

For any such structure that seeks alliance only among less developed countries cannot matter as contribution to world order if they are mere extensions of Great Power policies or if they serve chiefly to project or purge internal stresses. A positive role of such structures would depend mainly on two things: the extent to which less developed states can evolve themselves into viable sub-systems and the degree of autonomy and independence projected in evolution of foreign policy.²⁹ What Mr Rajaratnam (Singapore) referred to when he said that 'we must marry national thinking to regional thinking' was a mentality that did not really include regionalism as a concept. He was also referring to a style which Asia had not as yet achieved, 'national thinking.'³⁰ It is obvious that for some time now security has ceased to be a matter of unilateral defence. Even for the Super Powers security has been a condition of interdependence and mutuality. With nuclear parity a time has come when looking at the problem in terms of 'us' and 'they' becomes dysfunctional and ultimately self-defeating. Certain solutions based on acceptance of interdependence have to be formulated.

29 Liska, George, n. 5, p. 44.

30 Levi, Werner, n. 17, pp. 67-68.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Prospects

There is need to resist the temptation of explaining away the present problem in high flown jargon of balance of power, theory of deterrence or spheres of influence. This is not to deny the geopolitical imperatives that would make it impossible to keep this area sealed from extra regional influences. The Geneva accord (1954), the Taskent Agreement (1966) or much later the Paris Peace Talks (1973) are all in this sense inevitable. But in the ultimate analysis security must be based upon the stability and peace of each constituent unit of the system. It is possible to identify certain sources of insecurity as they operate in Asia:

- (1) China's intransigence and hostile attitude.
- (2) Intra-regional fears and rivalries.
- (3) Internal subversion, with or without China's support.
- (4) Economic backwardness and disparity in levels of growth.
- (5) Problem of minorities.
- (6) Presence of foreign troops.¹

1 Bhatt, S. C., "Stability Through Regional Co-operation in S. E. Asia : Problems and Prospects", in Problems of Stability and Security in South-East Asia, Seminar, March 10-12, 1969, I. S. I. S. (New Delhi).

In South Asia the problem revolves round China just as in S. E. Asia it is united Vietnam, with or without northern support that dominates present thinking.

In the first case three questions can be posed:

- 1) Is China a threat to Southern Asia and to what extent the Southern Asian states perceive it to be so?
- 2) Is China's threat primary in South Asia or are other subregional conflicts more dominating?
- 3) What is the concern about the nuclear capability of China?²

In case of S. E. Asia, Vietnam poses another set of questions:

- 1) What capacity does Vietnam have, actual and potential to prove a threat either overt or in subversive tactics to its immediate neighbours?
- 2) To what extent can Vietnam be a deciding factor in the subregional politics?
- 3) What special effects does Vietnam as a Communist state have on regional politics?

The problem thus needs to be analysed in a three-fold context: Actual and potential powers of the

2 The Security of Southern Asia, Resume of the Conference of Institute for Strategic Studies, August 16-18, 1969, California Institute of Technology (California), pp. 3-8.

states, including aspirations backed by capacity; ideological inclinations implying residual impact of cold war policies as well as Sino-Soviet disputes; and the role that major regional powers as also regional threshold powers can play in deciding the future of this region.

Japan is the only country in Asia (except of course China) that has legitimate claims for being an actual power. Until now Japan could exploit its military weakness to advantage in the economic and political fields, a 'low neutral posture' in the domestic affairs of other states can also help counter claims that Japan has hegemonic designs. But Japan's pacifism is fast being tempered by the realization that renunciation of military force by one country does not automatically create any world peace.³ In S. E. Asia both Vietnam and Indonesia could be considered as potential powers. In the South

3 Kahn, Herman, The Emerging Japanese Super State: Challenge and Response (London, 1971), p. 163.

Kahn adds: Japan Defence Agency announced that it aimed at creating 'a system capable of effectively dealing with all armed aggression involving localized or minor warfare and the use of conventional weapons.' The word 'localized' has not been defined. Kahn questions whether it is to include Korea also. (p. 163)

Asian subcontinent India is the only country holding this position confirmed through virtue of the 1971 war and the 1974 nuclear implosion. However, much claims Australia lays of being a part of South and S. E. Asia in matters of defence and security it continues to be a professed dependent of U. S. and Britain and there is likelihood of these ties being made more binding as local powers gain more say in regional affairs. In that case one cannot deny Herman Kahn's prediction of a future alliance between India and Japan in the field of nuclear technology at the help to satisfy the immediate ambitions of both and could also be extended to include Indonesia, and at one stage Australia.⁴ The prospect of Vietnam joining this group in the immediate future is low mainly for ideological reasons. Despite friendly overtures by India and Japan, S. E. Asia still holds apprehensions as to the aspirations of a united Vietnam.

As a regionalist solution for world order Richard Falk has projected three forms of models:

- (1) 'Regionalism which emphasizes an expansion, although not an even one, of regional actors in all parts of the world system; regional actors becoming very significant, if not dominant, participants in many realms of

international life, whereas the state actors and global institutions remain more or less constant....

(2) 'Regionalism in which the growth of regional actors as complemented by the absolute and relative decline in capabilities and competances of the main state actors....

(3) 'Regionalism in which there is a growth and proliferation of regional actors, both political and functional, complemented by drastic falling off of status and capability of state actors.'⁵

An objective analysis of the current situation in light of the prospects for a regionalist solution could lead to the following observations:

(1) Any proposed system of security must be based not on military arrangement but on political understanding. A new military arrangement among indigenous powers may be conceivable but is not feasible. Collective defence arrangements cannot be created because of a lack of cogently perceivable threat, even that of China, for regional powers since the aftermath of Vietnam have for a variety of reasons avoided committing themselves into a hostile posture vis-a-vis China. And local wars either of the Indo-Pak type or disturbances like the

Communist upsurge in Indonesia fail to generate enough rational sympathy in favour of alliances.

(2) The security system need not erode but must restore the principle of sovereignty.⁶ One of the inducers to regionalism was the need of small nations to project their identity, which if denied would, compel them to shy away from the same.

(3) Besides a political understanding, a congenial atmosphere must be created through economic interdependence and socio-cultural contacts. The former implies a greater exchange of intra-regional trade that ideally could be tried to be based on division of labour at regional level that can be of no extra-special advantage to any one of the country. Increased and easy flow of communication, information and travel can also help to build-up a better understanding of one's neighbour.


(4) Effects that the global environment has on the region must also not be ignored.

The concept of 'equidistant multipolarism'⁷ may fail due to asymmetry and variety of interests held by various states, and bilateral relations would gain

6 Altar, Chand, "Model of Asian Collective Security: An Outline", in Socialist India, April 13, 1974, pp. 18-19.

7 Scalapino, Robert, Asia and the Major Powers: Implications for International Order (Washington, 1974), p. 115.

importance. Such bipolar relations may not be confined to cold war alliance patterns, and it is unlikely that they remain confined to major states only. It is noteworthy that after ¹⁹⁷¹ Brezhnev shifted in his stress to bilateral relations when attempts at gaining common acceptance for his collective security proposal met with frustration. To what extent multilateral organizations can substitute effectively bilateral arrangements in the near future is debatable. The need for a new structure must be a compromise that can ensure participation of all the major regional powers with adequate inter-communication and mutual concern. The arrangement for our 'equilibrium of power' referred to earlier can rest upon a low, non-military, non-political involvement on part of the Great Powers while enabling them to play a supporting role in economic development and modernization. Such a concept of a low level intensity and specificity would require freezing of nuclear potentials, freezing and gradual reduction in armed deployment in the military field; increased free trade, untied aid and more joint ventures in the economic sphere; multiplicity of international organization, further dedication to understanding and cooperation and recognition of political realities on the political plane, with non-exclusivity of relations between regional countries and major extra-regional powers.



APPENDIX I

SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free

institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of government toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of

the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

This Treaty is
internationally

▼

Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific

area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, the eighth day of September, 1954.

For Australia:

R. G. CASEY

For France:

G. LA CHAMBRE

For New Zealand:

CLIFTON WEBB

For Pakistan:

Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan.

ZAFRULLA KHAN

For the Republic of the Philippines:

CARLOS P. GARCIA

FRANCISCO A. DELGADO

TOMAS L. CABILI

LORENZO M. TANADA

CORNELIO T. VILLAREAL

For the Kingdom of Thailand:

WAN WAITHAYAKON KROMMUN NARADHIP BONGSPRAPHANH

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

READING

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

H. ALEXANDER SMITH

MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD

I CERTIFY THAT the foregoing is a true copy of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty concluded and signed in the English language at Manila, on September 8, 1954, the signed original of which is deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Department of Foreign Affairs to be affixed at the City of Manila, this 14th day of October, 1954.

(Seal)

Raul S. Manglapus
RAUL S. MANGLAPUS
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

PACIFIC CHARTER

The delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America;

DESIRING to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific;

CONVINCED that common action to this end, in order to be worthy and effective must be inspired by the highest principles of justice and liberty;

DO HEREBY PROCLAIM:

First, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities;

Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional processes;

Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region;

Fourth, as declared in the Southeast Asia Collective defense Treaty, they are determined to prevent

or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

PROCLAIMED AT Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

(Initialed by R. C. CASEY)

Delegate of Australia

(Initialed by G. LA CHAMERE)

Delegate of France

(Initialed by CLIFTON WEBB)

Delegate of New Zealand

(Sgd.) ZAFRULLA KHAN

Delegate of Pakistan

(Sgd.) CARLOS P. GARCIA

(Sgd.) FRANCISCO A. DELGADO

(Sgd.) TOMAS L. CABILI

(Sgd.) LORENZO M. TANADA

(Sgd.) CORNELIO T. VILLAREAL

Delegates of the Republic of the Philippines

(Sgd.) WAN WAITHAYAKON KROMMUN WARADHIP BONGSPRABANDH

Delegate of the Kingdom of Thailand

(Initialed ad referendum by READING)

Delegate of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES

(Sgd.) H. ALEXANDER SMITH

(Sgd.) MICHAEL J. MASSFIELD

Delegates of the United States of

America

ASEAN's Share of Its Own Trade (\$ U. S. millions)

	ASEAN Members' Total Trade	ASEAN members trade with one another as a % of total
1970	13,470.2	15.5
1971	14,576.4	15.3
1972	17,236.5	14.77
1973	27,511.1	14.26
1974	45,570.2	12.55
1975	44,650.4	12.63

Sources: Asia Week, Vol. 3, No. 28, July 15, 1977, p. 32.

APPENDIX III-A

Growth of Soviet Strategic Delivery Forces 1964-75

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
ICBM	200	1,300	1,530	1,575	1,590
SLEM	120	280	510	660	700
Heavy Bombers	160	140	140	150	160

Original Source: 'Military Balance'

Taken from: Table I. Wolfe, Thomas, Military Power and Soviet Policy (Rand Paper Series, California, March 1975), p. 61.

APPENDIX III-B

Comparative Level of Strategic Forces Mid-1974 and Mid-1975

OFFENSIVE FORCES

	<u>Operational in Mid-1974</u>		<u>Operational in Mid-1975</u>	
	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
ICEM Launchers ^(a)	1054	1575	1054	1590
SLEM Launchers ^(b)	656	660	656	700
Intercontinental Bombers	496	140	498	160
Total:	2206	2375	2208	2450
SSEM Submarines	41	47-50	41	52-53
Missile Throwweight ^(c) (ICEM and SLEM)	3.8 mil. lb.	6.5 mil. lb	(approximately same)	
Force Loadings (Warheads and Bombs)	7940	2600	8500	2800

DEFENSIVE FORCES

ADM Launchers ^(d)	0	64	0	64 ^(e)
SAM Launchers	261	9800	0	10,000
Air Defence Interceptors	532	2600	405	2,500
Surveillance Radars	67	4000	67	4,000

(a) Excludes Launchers at test site

(b) Excludes Launchers on diesel submarines.

(c) Throwweight figures approximate, as given by Clarence, A. R. Jr., 'SALT Extension Trades Pondered', Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 27, 1974, p. 14.

contd....

- (d) Excludes launchers at test site.
- (e) Permissible total reduced from 200 to 100 by July 1974 protocol of AEM Treaty of May 1972.

Original Source: Schlesinger FY 1975 Report, p. 50;
Schlesinger FY 1976 Report, p. II-19;
Moorer, 'U. S. Military Posture for FY 1975,
pp. 20-22.

Taken from: Wolfe, Thomas, Power
Military/and Soviet Policy
(Rand Paper Series, March 1975), p. 63.

APPENDIX III-C

Comparative Soviet-US Naval ForcesMajor Surface Combat Ships

	<u>Soviet</u>	<u>U. S.</u>
Attack Carriers	-	15
Helicopter Carriers	2	-
Missile Cruisers	17	6
Gun cruisers	13	1
Missile Destroyers	43	59
Gun Destroyers	36	32
Escort	104	64
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	215	177
<u>Submarines (excludes SSBN)</u>		
Cruise Missile Subs:		
Nuclear	40	-
Diesel	25	-
	<hr/>	
Total:	65	
Attack Subs:		
Nuclear	30	61
Diesel	150	12
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total:	180	73
<u>Naval Air</u>		
Combat aircraft	715	1900

contd....

Original Sources: Military Balance, 1974-1975, pp. 6-7, 9-10, Moorer, US Military Posture FY 1975, pp. 9-76; Robert, Berman, 'Soviet Naval Strength and Deployment', in McGwire et al, eds., Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, Chap. 22.

Taken From: Wolfe, Thomas, Military Power and Soviet Policy (Rand Paper Series, March 1975), p. 65.

APPENDIX IV

Estimated Soviet Bloc Aid to 'Third World' or Neutral
Asia 1954-1968 (in US \$ million)

	<u>Military Aid</u>	<u>Economic Aid</u>
Afghanistan	\$ 250 million	\$ 709 million
Burma	- "	40 "
Cambodia	10 "	30 "
Ceylon	- "	82 "
India	610 "	1948 "
Indonesia	1340 "	635 "
Laos	under 5* "	
Pakistan	10 "	234 "

*now formally excluded

Original Source: US Dept. of State : Communist Governments
and Developing Nations : Aid and Trade in
1968

Taken from: Trager and Bordsnaeo : Ninth CCP Congress
and World Communist Conference: Their Mean-
ing for Asia, in Orbis, Vol. XIII, No. 3,
Fall 1969, p. 760.

APPENDIX V

Membership of Some Important Regional Organization

(1) ANZUS (1951)

Australia
New Zealand
United States

(2) SEATO (1954-1976)

Thailand
Philippines
Pakistan
Australia
New Zealand
Britain
France
United States

(3) A. S. A. (Association of South-East Asia), (1961-1967)

Malaysia
Thailand
Philippines

(4) MAPHILINDO (1963-1967)

Malaysia
Philippines
Indonesia

(5) R. C. D. (Regional Cooperation for Development), (1964).

Pakistan
Iran
Turkey

(6) ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), (1967)

Thailand
Indonesia
Philippines
Malaysia
Singapore

Values of Exports from Major Weapon Producing Countries, by region (US \$ millions, at Constant 1973 prices)

	<u>South Asia</u>				<u>Far East (excluding Vietnam)</u>				<u>Vietnam</u>			
	USA	USSR	U. K.	France	USA	USSR	U. K.	France	USA	USSR	U. K.	France
1950	-	-	44.1	-	63.4	25.4	0.1	-	-	-	-	-
1951	-	-	20.2	-	69.3	42.6	0.2	-	-	-	-	-
1952	-	-	19.1	-	54.1	28.2	0.2	-	-	-	-	-
1953	11.7	-	38.9	38.8	26.0	178.4	0.2	-	-	-	-	-
1954	41.5	-	23.4	38.8	157.5	6.0	4.0	1.3	4.6	0.6	-	4.0
1955	40.4	2.6	63.3	-	164.4	37.0	12.3	3.3	3.4	3.0	-	2.9
1956	56.3	1.8	115.6	-	169.4	48.4	4.8	0.3	4.1	3.9	-	2.8
1957	56.4	12.0	135.3	46.8	156.8	40.3	6.6	0.1	x	3.4	-	x
1958	91.5	7.3	270.1	110.8	174.8	49.1	7.3	-	1.6	3.6	-	2.4
1959	18.3	12.6	111.5	-	151.6	3.9	9.8	0.4	2.4	3.3	-	2.4
1960	20.1	51.5	132.9	-	383.3	14.9	3.1	0.4	14.8	6.7	-	2.4
1961	34.3	58.7	109.2	19.1	87.8	39.1	9.4	1.9	36.9	17.0	-	-
1962	77.0	47.0	17.8	-	95.6	158.8	7.8	7.9	41.3	13.3	-	-
1963	84.9	53.6	14.3	6.2	106.6	79.8	30.0	5.3	40.4	2.5	-	-
1964	20.5	20.1	12.3	-	155.2	82.9	33.7	7.8	20.3	10.7	-	-

contd....

	<u>South Asia</u>				<u>Far East (excluding Vietnam)</u>				<u>Vietnam</u>			
	USA	USSR	U. K.	France	USA	USSR	U. K.	France	USA	USSR	U. K.	France
1965	2.5	108.4	45.0	-	114.8	112.0	5.6	11.9	38.8	17.7	-	-
1966	4.4	190.8	37.7	1.6	180.8	112.4	23.3	2.5	20.3	151.6	-	-
1967	4.4	120.4	74.0	1.6	66.6	29.1	36.8	-	57.4	320.7	-	-
1968	-	90.0	37.7	76.7	87.7	75.8	17.4	0.3	79.5	282.3	-	-
1969	0.3	188.9	38.0	4.8	371.5	47.5	2.2	7.2	170.3	50.3	-	-
1970	-	161.0	31.8	21.3	135.5	47.5	20.0	1.2	232.0	82.1	-	-
1971	2.6	233.3	48.4	15.8	187.7	83.1	40.2	1.9	161.9	155.6	-	-
1972	0.5	127.9	63.7	28.9	74.9	10.2	16.8	2.0	531.3	367.0	-	-
1973	14.0	120.4	36.7	49.3	152.2	5.6	20.1	35.7	62.8	-	-	-

- Notes:**
1. x indicates: less than the smallest digit shown
 2. - indicates: nil
 3. South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka
 4. Far East: All countries East of Pakistan, except China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam is shown separately.

Source: Constructed from Appendix 2 of Arms Trade Registers : The Arms Trade with the Third World, SIPRI Publication, Stockholm (1975), pp. 152-155.

COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

(Chronology Chart Attached)

An attempt has been made at putting into a comparative perspective certain important events in South and South-East Asia since the post-war changes so as to try and perceive some identifiable trends and tendencies in foreign policy orientation of this region. Certain observations merit mention:

(1) By early 1950s most of these countries had gained independence and already foreign policy postures were taking shape. This period shows a wide range of disparity at both the intra-subregional and intra-regional level in deciding upon foreign policy postures. Pakistan in South Asia, as did most non-communist S.E. Asian states, opted for some sort of western military-defence aid. Attempts at fostering a totally different image came through Indian overtures towards China and Indonesia's Bandung Conference.

(2) The latter part of 1950s, until Camp David has shown a clearer marking of interests though there was continued overlapping in Super Power interests in Indo-China. By early 1960s this position becomes more clear.

(3) While the early 1960s saw a growing desire by most aligned states to assert themselves, the nonaligned states continued to grope in search of a cohesive role.

Consequently, one sees Pakistan becoming more conscious of its security, the ASA being formed, Federation of Malaysia created while India is engaged in a clash with China and Indonesia opts for 'confrontation' with Malaysia.

(4) Adjustment to regional and extra-regional compulsion began in late sixties with ASEAN and Mrs Gandhi's Plan for S. E. Asia. Indo-China states continued to be a part of Super Power rivalry.

(5) Active Soviet policy with Brezhnev Plan and Nixon's China dialogue changed the pattern of adjustment to regional problems. New patterns of co-operation emerged and one observes a greater sense of maturity and independence in action. This took concrete shape after ending of Vietnam war, in the dismantling of SEATO, stirring new enthusiasm in ASEAN and finally unifying Vietnam.

(6) Constant state of uncertainty precluded Indo-China states from developing any semblance of ordered pattern of relations. On the other hand, it would seem that the existence of some kind of order pattern among the pro-west aligned enabled the formation of indigenous order patterns. The non-aligned states continued to make unsuccessful attempts ^{to foster a different pattern. What it all shows is} that, perhaps, it is easier to transform existing patterns to new reality and make them acceptable rather than create new ones.

CHART : COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Dates	<u>South Asia (India, Pakistan)</u>	<u>S. E. Asia : Non-Communist States</u> (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines)	<u>S. E. Asia : Indo- China States</u> (Vietnam (North and South), Laos, Cambodia)	<u>International</u> (Extra-Regional)
1	2	3	4	5
1947	(a) Asian Conference in Delhi (b) Independence: India and Pakistan	(A) Philippines-US Military Treaty		
1949		(a) Independence: Indonesia	(a) Cambodia and Vietnam granted 'Associate' sta- tus under French Union.	(a) NATO Pact signed (b) China comes under Mao- tse-Tung.
1950	(a) Colombo Plan prepared	(a) Colombo Plan prepared at Commonwealth Conference (London)		(a) Korean War.
1951	(a) Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir (b) Premier Ali Khan (Pak.) assassinated (c) Colombo Plan comes into operation.	(a) Colombo Plan into operation		(a) Japan signs Peace Treaty (b) Japan-US Defence Pact

1	2	3	4	5
1952		(a) U. S. - Philippines Defence Agreement		(a) ANZUS created
1953			(a) Fighting in Indo-China	(a) Korean Armistice signed
1954	(a) Economic and military co-operation agreement between Pakistan and Turkey (b) Pak-US mutual Defence Agreement	(a) SEATO created	(a) Geneva Conference on Indochina. (b) Vietnam independence	(a) US-Nationalist China mutual defence agreement
	(c) Chou-en-lai visits Delhi (d) Nehru visits Peking			
1955	(a) Baghdad Pact (b) Nehru visits USSR	(a) Bandung Conference	(a) Cambodia independent (b) S. Vietnam proclaimed a Republic	(a) Warsaw Pact signed
1956	(a) Pakistan decides to remain in Commonwealth, declares itself Islamic Republic		(a) Sihanouk (Cambodia) visits Peking	(a) 20th CPSU Congress (b) Eisenhower Doctrine (c) Suez Crisis
1957	(a) Chou-en-lai visits India	(a) Political Crisis in Indonesia (b) Malaya granted independence		
		(c)next page		

1	2	3	4	5
		(c) Marshal Sarit's first coup in Thailand		
1958		(a) Singapore gains independence	(a) China-Cambodia establish diplomatic relations	(a) Krushchev is Premier
		(b) Marshal Sarit's second Coup		(b) China bombs Hanoi
1959	(a) Revolt in Tibet; Dalai Lama comes to India	(a) Indonesia-Malaya Friendship Pact	(a) Laos repudiates Geneva Agreement	(a) Krushchev visits USA: Camp David
	(b) Pakistan signs triangular barter deal with Indonesia, Czechoslovakia	(b) Singapore to return British Bases	(b) Border disputes: Cambodia-Thailand and North Vietnam-Laos	
	(c) US-Pakistan bilateral Defence Agreement.			
1960	(a) Ayub Khan seeks joint defence Pact with India	(a) Thai-Malaya operations against Communist insurgency	(a) Military coup in Laos	(a) 42 incident
	(b) Indus Water Treaty (India, Pakistan)	(b) Krushchev visits Indonesia	(b) Cambodia votes for neutrality in referendum	(b) Brezhnev becomes President
	(c) Krushchev visits India, Burma	(c) Burma-Thailand border Agreement		(c) Kennedy is US President

1	2	3	4	5
1961	(a) US-Pakistan Defence Agreement	(a) A. S. A. formed (b) USSR-Indonesia Arms Agreement	(a) Cambodia-China mutual nonaggression Pact (b) Cambodia severs ties with Thailand	(a) Kennedy-Kruschev Vienna meet.
1962	(a) Sino-Indian Border Clashes (b) USSR to honour MIG commitment to India	(a) Thailand-Philippines Mutual Defence Pact	(a) Laotian Neutrality signed at Geneva (b) US arms aid to Cambodia reported (c) US establishes military command in S. Vietnam	(a) Cuban Crisis
1963	(a) India signs Air-Defence Agreement with USA, Britain	(a) Federation of Malaysia created, Defence Agreement with Britain (b) Indonesian 'Confrontation' against Malaysia	(a) USSR 'gifts' MIGs to Cambodia	(a) 'Hot Line' established
1964	(a) RCD formed (Pakistan, Iran, Turkey)	(a) Meeting, Afro-Asian Preparatory Conference, Djakarta	(a) Cambodia charges US S. Vietnam of aggression (b) Soviet arms aid to Cambodia	(a) Brezhnev succeeds Kruschev (b) Johnson US President
1965	(a) Indo-Pak Conflict	(a) Indonesia proposes arms manufacture collaboration with Pakistan (b) Singapore secedes from Malaysian Federation	(a) US offensive in Vietnam	

1	2	3	4	5
1966	(a) Taskent Declaration	(a) Indonesia ends 'confrontation' against Malaysia (b) Singapore withdraws from Joint Defence Council of Malaysia (c) Philippines curtails military base facility to US to 25 years from 99 years.	(a) China-supports Cambodian claim to US aggression	(a) Cultural Revolution in China.
1967	(a) Soviet Arms to Pakistan (b) India not to renew arms aid agreement with USSR	(a) ASEAN created (b) ASA to be merged with ASEAN	(a) Sino-Cambodian relations strained	(a) Nuclear weapons in Outer Space banned with Three Power Treaty. (b) Britain's 'withdrawal from East of Suez.'
1968	(a) Mrs Gandhi announces neutrality for S. E. Asia plan on Caribbean tour	(a) Singapore: British troops withdrawn.	(a) Laos charges N. Vietnam of aggression	(a) N.P.T. signed
1969	(a) Kosygin visits Pakistan, Afghanistan	(a) Malaysian plea to Britain to delay withdrawal (b) Thailand-US secret defence Pact	(a) Cambodia charges Thailand of aggression	(a) Japan reports possibility of Soviet participation in ADB. (b) Sino-Soviet border clashes.

1	2	3	4	5
		(c) India-Philippine agreement on mutual cooperation in field of peaceful use of atomic power		(c) Brezhnev Plan for collective security in Asia. (d) Nixon's 'Gum Doctrine'.
1970		(a) Thailand proposes 'Defence Alliance' of Indochina states (Cambodia, S. Vietnam, Laos, Thailand) (b) Afro-Asian Islamic Summit at Bandung	(a) Sihanouk (Cambodia) deposed, Cambodia declared Khmer Republic	(a) SALT Talks open
1971	(a) Indo-Soviet Treaty (b) Indo-Pak war over Bangladesh. Bangladesh independent	(a) Five Power Defence Pact (New Zealand, Australia, Britain, Malaysia, Singapore). (b) Military base at Sangley Point returned by USA (c) ASEAN 'Neutrality' declaration (Kuala Lumpur meeting)	(a) US proclaims end of US offensive role in Vietnam	(a) Nixon to visit China (b) Commonwealth Premier's Conference discusses Security of Indian Ocean
1972	(a) Simla Summit talks between India and Pakistan	(a) Indonesia establishes border committees with Malaysia and Singapore for security operations	(a) Paris Peace Talks on Indochina begin (b) US resumes bombing in Vietnam	(a) Nixon Visits China (b) SALT Signed

1	2	3	4	5
1973	(a) Brezhnev visits India	(a) Malaysia announces withdrawal from ASPAC	(a) Paris Agreement on Indochina	(a) Helsinki Conference opens
1974	(a) Pakistan withdraws from SEATO (b) Indian nuclear implosion	(a) Tanaka (Japan) visits Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia	(a) S. Vietnam announces suspension of Paris Talks	(a) US Agreement with Britain on Diego Garcia (b) AEM Treaty
1975	(a) Pakistan offers Naval Base to USA (b) Indian offer of 'Non-aggression treaty' to Pakistan.	(a) Thailand withdraws base facility to US. (b) Thailand and Philippines call for dismantling of SEATO. Decision taken at Council meeting in New York	(a) Complete liberation of S. Vietnam announced	(a) Japan rejects Soviet Friendship Pact (b) Japan curbs entry of US Nuclear Submarine (c) Apollo-Soyuz joint flight. (d) Ford Brezhnev meet for SALT II.
1976	(a) Bhutto calls for Third World Summit (b) Colombo Nonaligned Summit	(a) SEATO disbanded (b) Britain Completes military withdrawal from Singapore (c) Thailand asks USA to close down bases	(a) Unification of Vietnam	(a) Ford's Pacific Doctrine

1	2	3	4	5
1977	(a) Change of Govt. in India, Congress Party defeated at Polls	(a) Thai-Malaysian border agreement	(a) Thai-Cambodia border clashes	(a) US to pull out troops from Korea-Carter Administration decision
	(b) India offers 'No War Pact' to Pakistan	(b) Philippines ends claim to Sabah Province of Malaysia	(b) Vietnam 'no' to participation in ASEAN	
	(c) Internal disturbances in Pakistan			

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