

**MILITARY COUPS D'ÉTAT
AND
FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR**

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PREFACE

PREFACE

So long as the State is taken as the basic unit in the study of international politics, it would be necessary to understand the causes and nature of its behaviour in the international milieu. The question that would be important then is 'Why States act as they do?' The present study is a modest attempt to examine the foreign policy behaviour of States under the military régimes. It has a two-fold purpose: it seeks to know how a country's foreign policy is affected when its civilian democratic government is overthrown in a coup d'état and replaced by a military government. Secondly, it proposes to see whether the armed forces have any distinct ways of formulating foreign policies and whether they display any general propensities for distinctive foreign policy outcomes.

Brazil and Peru have been selected as cases for the present study. The military's involvement in politics is by no means unique to the Latin American countries, but the involvement there goes back to much earlier period than in the countries of Asia and Africa. The armed forces of the Latin American countries, in whatever form they existed, played an

important role in shaping the political processes of their respective countries during the independence struggles and since the achievement of independence in the early nineteenth century. Therefore, the military institutions of these countries, as much older ones, deserve to be studied as foreign policy actors.

The military institutions of Brazil and Peru may not be the typical examples of Latin American military institutions, but they provide good examples of sufficiently professionalized institutions with a fair degree of corporate consciousness. In fact, without these elements, a coup cannot be an "institutional coup" and cannot produce, what can be strictly called, a "military government". At best, it would be a coup struck by a powerful officer or a group of officers which results not in a "military government" but in a government headed by a military strong-man. This differentiation is important because in order to study the foreign policy behaviour of the military governments, the involvement of the military institutions as a whole is necessary.

Institutional coups as distinct from factional ones were staged in Brazil in 1964 and in Peru in

in 1968. Brazil had experienced more than one coup before 1964, but they cannot be characterized as institutional coups and did not result in military governments. They were staged mainly either to overthrow a civilian government or to ensure the constitutional succession of a President. The Governments established after the coups were transitional in nature and were eventually replaced by civilians. But the 1964 coups represents an institutional one and produced a lasting military regime. In Peru, there were five successful coups before 1968, and none except the 1962 coups can be characterized as an institutional one. But this coups produced only a transitional government that lasted only for an year. The 1968 coups produced a military government that lasted till 1980. Therefore, the foreign policies of Brazil and Peru, since their 1964 and 1968 coups respectively, are studied and contrasted with those of their civilian governments to find out whether the military governments had effected any change in the foreign policy behaviour of these countries.

The study is organized into five chapters. In Chapter I three general hypotheses are formulated on the military, the military regimes, and foreign policy

behaviour. Chapter II deals with the development of the military institutions in Brazil and Peru and examines the orientations and attitudes of the military personnel in these countries. In this chapter, it is also examined how the system of governance underwent a change in these two countries following the coups and the establishment of military governments. Chapter III has two sections: The first deals with the main trends of the foreign policy pursued by Brazil till the 1964 coup d'etat. The second gives an account of the dominant themes of the foreign policy pursued by the military government. Similarly, the first section of Chapter IV discusses the predominant themes of Peruvian foreign policy till 1968, and the second section deals with the foreign policy pursued by the military government. The foreign policies of Brazil and Peru before the coups are discussed to contrast them with the foreign policies of their respective military governments. Chapter V concludes the study by showing how the three hypotheses that were formulated in the first chapter are supported by evidence from Brazil and Peru.

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CHAPTER - I

HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE MILITARY, MILITARY REGIMES,
AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR

CHAPTER - I

HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE MILITARY, MILITARY REGIMES, AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR

Military coup d'etat and the consequent establishment of military governments is one of the most important phenomena in the world, especially after the World War II. Considerable amount of research had been done on the causes of the occurrence of the coup during the 1950s and 1960s, without paying such attention to the study of the performance of the resulting military governments. However, some hypotheses were formulated about the nature of the governments and their role in economic modernization, without such empirical observation. The conjectural nature of these formulations is understandable as not enough time had elapsed by then to enable empirical study of the performance of these governments. Starting from the late 1960s, researchers, equipped with considerable amount of data, turned their attention towards the study of the performance of military governments. The economic performance of these governments had received the utmost attention of these research efforts. Perhaps

this was so because the military overthrew the civilian regimes for what they claimed as failure on the part of the civilians to bring about rapid economic development and political stability.

It is quite intriguing, however, that little work had been done on the foreign policy performances of the military governments. It deserves attention for two inter-related reasons. First, as a consequence of the coup, military personnel will replace the civilians in most of the important policy-making units. It needs to be studied how different are the orientation and outlook of the military towards their foreign policy goals and the choice of means to serve these goals, from those of the civilians, and how this difference affects the country's foreign policy behaviour.

Secondly, it can be argued that the changeover from civilian regime to a military regime signifies a major change in the system of governance of the polity. It also needs to be seen how far the form by which a country is governed influences its foreign policy and how it is affected if the form changes.

From the writings¹ on the nature of military governments and the role of military in politics, we can infer some characteristics of the military personnel and the military regimes which differentiate them from the civilian politicians and the civilian regimes. Thus, it is possible to formulate the following hypotheses:

1. The following works are mainly relied upon to infer the characteristics: S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics (London, Penguin Books, 1975); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (London, Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1977); Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1977); William Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States (London, Pall Mall, 1964); Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr., (eds) The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1978); John J. Johnson, (ed) The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962); Asbjorn Eide and Narek Thee, (eds) Problems of Contemporary Militarism (London, Croom Helm, 1980); Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett, (eds) The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980); Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974); John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1964); Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1972).

HYPOTHESIS I:

The military personnel's characteristics, orientations and outlook on governing the society, their view of national interest and the choice of means to serve it are qualitatively different from those of the civilians.

HYPOTHESIS II:

As a consequence of hypothesis I, the military adopts a different style of governing by closing the regime for popular participation, suspending the legislatures, imposing restrictions on the media of mass communications, which collectively result in a major change in the system of governance.

In context the first hypothesis, one can argue that the military is only another group in the society to assume power and it may not differ qualitatively from the civilians, and if at all any difference can be noticed, that is no more significant than the difference between two civilian groups representing different political parties. There would be

differences in outlook, orientation and policy preferences between two contending political parties also.

Since the two hypotheses are related, contesting one affects the other as well. When the characteristics of the military are no more significantly different from the different characteristics and orientations of two opposing civilian political parties, the regime resulting from a military takeover will not represent a change in the system of governance any more than that resulting from the changeover from one civilian administration to another. Hence, there does not arise the question of a change in the system of governance as such. But these objections are very general and based on simple assumptions. A brief discussion of the political sociology of the officer corps would show that the hypotheses are formulated on reasonable grounds.

To gain a proper understanding of a unit in the society, to start with, it is better to isolate it from all influences from its immediate social and international environment. This helps us in understanding the intrinsic properties and characteristics of the envired unit. However, this is not to say that a unit

like the military establishment is free from any influence and completely isolated from the rest of the society. Admittedly, the complexities of a unit cannot be understood fully in isolation from the society to which it belongs. Therefore, to begin with, we analyze the characteristics of the military personnel and the military regime in isolation, and subsequently deal with the various influences that work on these two to understand the specific characteristics they assume as a result of these influences.

The traditional liberal-democratic view places the military completely outside the political system, thereby according the civilians the exclusive right to participation in the political processes. Military intervention² into the political sphere was considered as something undesirable and an aberration from the normal political process. If one accepts the view at

2. W.R. Thompson in his, "Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup", Comparative Politics, (New York) Vol.7, No.4, July 1975, p.467, f.n.1, draws our attention to the connotation attached to the term 'intervention' by James N. Rosenau, who said that it implies that the intervener crosses some conventional boundary abandoning a prior mode of conduct. See, Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention", Journal of International Affairs, (New York), vol.XXII, Summer, 1968, pp.165-76.

a normative level that the armed forces ought to be subordinate to the civilian authorities, the implicit assumption is that they are not capable of managing the society as much as the civilians are. Or that the governance by the armed forces is not desirable. Although not explicitly spelt out, this implies that the armed forces are characteristically different from the civilians. However, this normative view that does not recognize the military as a political actor is not tenable in the face of the hard realities in the third world where the military is a very effective political actor. There are even some civilian regimes which are sustained only due to the support of the armed forces.³

This reality warrants an explicit recognition of the armed forces as yet one more group competing for political influence, if not power. But recognizing them as political actors is not to place them in the same category as the civilian groups. If one understands the political sociology of the officer corps, one can see the marked differences between them and the civilian politicians.

3. S.B. Finer, Comparative Government (London, Penguin Books, 1980), p.535.

The differences which we find later were not conspicuously present ever since societies started arming some institutions for maintaining internal order and defending their frontiers. However, some scholars trace the differences, especially between the diplomats and the generals concerning war and negotiations during the olden times also.⁴ But traditionally there was a considerable overlap between the civilian elite and the military elite.⁵ The aristocratic families used to provide recruits for both the political as well as military professions. This overlap can be explained by the narrow base of recruitment and the absence of professionalization of the armed forces. Between the political and military elites there existed connections of birth, family, and common ideology. The military and the political elites were functionally and socially integrated.⁶ In such a context, there were no striking differences between them in characteristics, attitudes and orientations. Normally, civilian control over the military

4. For instance, Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York, King's Crown Press, 1936) p.8.

5. S.L. Finer, n.1, p.189.

6. Morris Janowitz, n.1, p.187.

was not a major problem because the men who led the armies and the ones who ruled or held the state power were one and the same, or at least part of the same ruling oligarchy.

But with the constantly improving military technology, low level of professionalization could not be sustained for long. The military had to be and is being increasingly professionalized. With the advent of sophisticated weapons, the military personnel require specialization and expertise. It also requires the armed personnel to engage themselves full-time in acquiring the skills of systematic application and management of force. These new trends require recruitment at an earlier age and longer periods of training than before. This long training, and during that the process of socialization and attitude formation they undergo make them differ from the civilian politician, as they develop a different kind of orientation toward the society, its governance and the national interest.

Modern armed forces strikingly differ from any other civilian groups by virtue of their following characteristics:⁷ (1) Centralized command; (2) Hierarchy;

7. S.E. Finer, n.1, p.6.

(3) Discipline; (4) Intercommunication; (5) Espirit de Corps and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency. Even the most poorly organized and maintained armed forces also are far more highly and tightly structured than any other civilian group.⁸ Three civilian groups--the Roman Catholic Church, Firms and Bureaucracies, and Communist Parties of the "popular democracies"--have proximate characteristics with the armed forces organization.⁹ They too have all the above five characteristics. But even these groups differ from the armed forces' organizational format in two fundamental ways. First, these three are voluntary organizations and one can leave them at will without the fear of severe penalties. Whereas in the armed forces, desertion is punished severely and in some extreme cases even with execution. Secondly, all these organizations have to operate in close connection, both physically and psychologically, with the society. In contrast, the armed forces differ in function from the society that surrounds them and this requires them to be separate and segregated.

8. *ibid*, p.5.

9. *ibid*, p.6

The attitudes of the officer corps towards political order, political activity and the governance of the society mainly stem from the format of the military establishment. This format had been characterized by hierarchical structure and organizational cohesion especially after the process of professionalization had set in. Hierarchy had become more forceful, extensive and explicit. Authority in the armed forces establishment flows downward and responsibility upward.¹⁰ As authority is depersonalized, it is owed to the rank and not the man.¹¹

The relations among the military personnel, determined by this hierarchical structure, will not allow for insubordination, bargaining and compromise with regard to command and obedience. As a result of a long training dominated by such values, the military personnel tend to transfer their conception of order on to the civilian sphere. This leads them to feel the total absence of "order" in the political sphere. Political order to them means the absence of highly competitive politics with demonstrations and strikes.

10. Eric A. Nordlinger, n.1, p.44.

11. S.E. Finer, n.1, p.6.

Political activity in such a context is viewed by the officer corps as self-serving and harmful as it divides the society into various factions. Lyle M. McAlister points out that the Latin American officers commonly believe that "politics is 'dissension'; political parties are 'factions'; politicians are 'scheming' or 'corrupt'; and the expression of the public opinion is 'insubordination'".¹² Even though they are nationalistic, they are hostile to organized politics especially as practiced by partisan political groups.¹³ This view of political activity is also rooted in the hierarchical structure and organizational cohesion of the military establishment. As the hierarchical imperative will not allow for the expression of personal interests within the military establishment, so too should politics minimize the articulation and expression of individual and group interests. As every military man respects and obeys his superior officers, likewise the citizens should also keep themselves in a state of political acquiescence towards the governing authorities.¹⁴

12. "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of Military in Latin America". Latin American Research Review, (California), no. 1, 1966, p. 192. Also see, Eric A. Nordlinger, n. 1, p. 56.

13. Morris Janowitz, n. 1, p. 180.

14. Nordlinger, n. 1, pp. 56-57.

In most of the developing countries, the military establishment is technologically the most advanced unit in the society. This technological superiority leads them to think that they are more capable and advanced than the civilians. This feeling will assume more intensity if the military perceives that the civilians are failing to bring about rapid economic development.

The raison d'etre of the armed forces is to defend the national frontiers from external aggressions. This very purpose of their profession leads them to think that there exists a national interest which is above any partisan or class interests. By fighting the aggressor, they defend the whole nation, not any class or sectional interests. This leads them to hold the view that they are the people who could really understand the national interest of their country and defend it.¹⁵ This notion reinforces the feeling that political parties and groups are not representative of national interest, but only expressions of sectional interests which are detrimental to the society as a whole.

Generally, in the political arena, decisions are arrived at by considerations of mutual advantage, trade-

15. *ibid*, p.59.

offs, the cumulation of political resources and the attainment of popular support.¹⁶ But by the very nature of their profession, the officer corps tend to view that decision-making should be very rational, calculated to achieve very specific goals most effectively, efficiently and by the quickest means possible. Every problem would have a "correct" solution. To allow for bargaining and compromise instead of rational and scientific arguments, would produce solutions which are illogical, inefficient and even detrimental. This kind of values about decision-making make them more of administrators than of political managers. They adopt more of technical criteria to arrive at the "correct" solutions to various problems.

This examination of the organizational characteristics of the armed forces and the political sociology of the officer corps gives a reasonable basis for formulating the Hypothesis I.

Now the question that should be posed is whether all these characteristics of the military officers effect a change in the system of governance of the polity after they seize power and establish the government?

16. Ibid, p. 119.

After the overthrow of the civilian government, the military generally, if not invariably, establishes a closed regime. This is irrespective of the ideological position the military claims. Immediately after assuming power, the military suspends the constitution and the legislatures of the country. It imposes severe restrictions on the media of mass communications, if they are not completely banned, restricts or fully curbs the political rights of all or some very active political parties or groups. Thus the military concentrates all the powers fully in its hands. All these measures result in the severe restrictions on, if not complete elimination of, popular participation in the political process. Thus a military regime system differs from a civilian democratic system mainly in terms of, what might be called, its political dimension. We cannot establish a substantial difference between them on the basis of their economic performance, budget allocations for the armed forces and other criteria.¹⁷

17. See R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohen, "Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regimes", American Political Science Review, (Washington), Vol.70, No.3, September 1976, p.863.

Earlier there were some attempts made¹⁸ to show that major socio-economic changes in a country lead to the occurrence of military coup. We can try, though it is far-fetched, to connect the socio-economic changes and the type of regime that results from the coup. But the studies¹⁹ which tested these hypotheses later on, could not conclusively establish their validity. But at the same time they have not been decisively refuted. Hence we cannot accept for certain that major socio-economic changes precede the military coup which might account for the change in the regime structure.

18. For example, Samuel P. Huntington, n.1; Jose Nun, "The Middle Class in Military Coup", in Claudio Veliz (ed), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London, 1967), pp.66-118; Martin C. Reedler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America", American Political Science Review, Vol.60, No.3, 1966; and Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and Revolutionary Change (New York, 1968).
19. William R. Thompson, "Systemic Change and the Latin American Military Coup", Comparative Political Studies, (California), Vol.7, No.4, January, 1975.

Another explanation for the characteristics of the military regime could be based on the nature of the coup. One of the Huntington's hypotheses is that the military takes over the government in the more developed countries among the developing countries to preserve the status quo and to prevent the populist leaders from achieving political power.²⁰ Therefore, a regime that is established to preserve the status quo does not necessarily lead to a change in the system of governance. But this kind of argument overlooks one important dimension to it. Perhaps maintenance of status quo does not require any major changes in the structure of the regime. But, if the theory is accepted, the military intervenes to preserve or protect a status quo which it deems as collapsing. Therefore, it is required to take some drastic actions such as suspending the constitution and with it the political rights of all or of a particular articulate group of citizens, curbing the media of mass communications, etc. Thus, though the coup in itself is meant for preserving the status quo, it has its own logic and effects a change

20. Samuel P. Huntington, n.1. Cited by Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States", American Political Science Review, Vol.64, No.4, 1970, p.1144.

in the system of governance of the country.

One more alternative explanation could be given as to why the military take-overs produce closed regimes. After the takeover, the military has to see that the opponents to its regime are neutralized or incapacitated to gain popular support in order to overthrow the regime. This needs drastic actions such as those described above.

We cannot decisively say that none of the above explanations is correct. These may also be the reasons, singly or in combination, for the military's style of governing. But a more convincing explanation seems to be the one which traces the structure of the regime to the inherent characteristics of the officer corps. Generally, military regimes lack the legitimacy to govern the society. From this lack of legitimacy stem the reasons for the regime being repressive and closed. And this lack of legitimacy is caused by the very nature of the military. Hence it would be more appropriate to explain the reasons for the regime structure that emerges after the coup in terms of the military's characteristics and their attitudes towards various aspects of governing.

It is relevant here to briefly discuss whether the attitudes and belief-systems of the decision-makers play a role in influencing their decisions and performance. Considerable number of studies have been undertaken to show that the relationship between belief system, perceptions and decision-making is an important one.²¹ A decision-maker acts upon his "image" of the situation — which results from his belief-system and attitudes — rather than upon the "objective" reality.²² The attitudes and perceptions are to a large extent shaped by training and the process of socialization. Psychologists Hans Toch and Richard Schulte demonstrate this in the case of trainees of police administration.²³

21. For example, see R.C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and B. Capin, Decision-making As an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954). R.B. Smith, and R.W. White, Opinions and Personality (New York, Wiley, 1956); and Rockcach, H., The Open and Closed Mind (New York, Basic Books, 1960) All cited in Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Image: A Case Study" in James R. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York, The Free Press, 1969) p.543.

22. Ole R. Holsti, n.21, p.544.

23. "Readiness to Perceive Violence As a Result of Police Training", British Journal of Psychology, LII (November 1961), p.392. Cited by Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Micperception", World Politics (Princeton, New Jersey), Vol.20, No.3, 1968, p.469.

Both advanced students and beginners of Police Administration training were shown ambiguous pictures. The advanced students perceived more violence in the pictures than did the beginners. The explanation that is given by Toch and Schulte is that "the law enforcer may come to accept crime as a familiar personal experience, one which he himself is not surprised to encounter. The acceptance of crime as a familiar experience in turn increases the ability or readiness to perceive violence where clues to it are potentially available."²⁴

As the characteristics, orientations and the attitudes of the officer corps have already been discussed earlier, it is not necessary to repeat them. However, a brief mention of them and the explanation of their relation to the regime structure seems in order.

The Officer corps' attitude towards political order and political activity influences them to drastically curtail the political participation of the masses. In order not to arrive at, what they feel, irrational or incorrect decisions, participation in the decision-making process needs to be severely restricted. The

24. Quoted in Robert Jervis, n.23, p.469.

restriction of participants and the reliance on technical criteria will result in what is known as "decision-making without politics".²⁵ Not only the actors are limited and selected, but the views and the sentiments of the politicians and the general masses are not considered as valuable criteria. This is not to say, however, that no discussion takes place at all in arriving at decisions. Janowitz notes,²⁶ that even when the military oligarchy is dominated by a leading personality, a high level of internal negotiation takes place among specialists and administrative leaders. But the point that is to be emphasized here is that the inputs from the society are minimized. In other words, the influence of the non-elite masses from the society on the governmental decisions will be minimum unlike in a civilian-democratic regime. The civilian leaders tend to become populists since they mainly depend upon the votes of the masses. Whereas the military regime can ignore the public opinion to a large extent. Thus as a result of the minimization of the politicians' role, the senior civilian bureaucrats

25. Eric A. Nordlinger, n.1, pp.117-124.

26. Morris Janowitz, n.1, p.163.

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and technocrats gain ascendancy. This might be explained by the fact that both these groups share with the military officers their antipathy towards politicians and politics. Thus the "inputs" into the decision-making mechanism would be different in a military regime from that of a civilian regime both in quantity and in quality. The military regime establishes new types of decision-making institutions and structures.²⁷

As a result of the restrictions on political participation and the ban on political parties, the institutions that articulated and aggregated the interests during the previous civilian regime tend to atrophy.²⁸ Under some military regimes, the military itself floats a political party and often this is the only representative institution permitted to function. But the party's function is not really to represent popular interests but to restrict electoral participation and political representation.²⁹

So far we are dealing with the military establishment and the characteristics of the military government

27. See Anna Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennet (eds), n.1, Introduction, p.18.

28. *ibid.*, p.20.

29. *ibid.*

in abstraction. But abstractions do not always conform to the specificities of the situations. The military establishment and the military government may not be as insulated from the influence of the society as they are assumed to be. But this examination gave us an insight into the intrinsic characteristics of the armed forces. We can take these intrinsic characteristics as the raw material upon which the influences from the immediate and distant environment work to produce different mutations found in the characteristics of the military in different societies.

For an understanding of the military personnel and the governments established by them, we need to analyze the interactions between the military and its society. The level of this interaction determines the degree of conformity with the intrinsic characteristics described earlier. This level of interaction in turn depends upon the permeability of the boundaries of the military establishment. That is to say, to what extent the influences of the society and its political processes can seep into the military establishment. It depends upon the extent to which the military interacts with the society.

One common occasion for this interaction is, when it is called in to assist the civilian authorities during floods, earthquakes and other major natural disasters. But these are only minor openings for the societal influence to tell on the military establishments. Other important occasions are when the troops are deployed to quell riots and suppress insurgencies. This opening would be minimum if the state develops adequate paramilitary forces.³⁰ Still more important factor that determines the specific nature of the officer corps and the military establishment is the extent to which the autonomy of the military establishment is interfered with and made use of by the civilian politicians for partisan ends.

The specific class origins of the officers is also a factor that is said to influence their characteristics and outlook.³¹ But the extent of the influence and how long it can be sustained are critically determined by the degree of "declassification" they might undergo during their training and socialization process in the military establishments.

30. Morris Janowitz, *ibid.*, especially see the Chapter I "Paramilitary Forces in the Developing Nations".

31. Martin C. Neidler, *An Introduction to Latin American Politics: The Structure of Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall, 1977), p.46.

All these influences might mould the officers more or less in conformity with the intrinsic characteristics. If the influences are less, the degree of conformity will be more. On the other hand if there is constant and too much interference with the military establishment by the civilian politicians, the officer corps might develop, what Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr., call, an attitude of "anti-politics."³²

Likewise, to understand the specific forms the military governments assume, we have to go into the details of the civil-military equation in each individual country, the organizational format of the military, their capabilities and skills to rule the country. Generally, the military personnel lack the knowledge and skills in managing the affairs of such departments as law, public finance, education. A concrete understanding of their capabilities will help us understand to what extent the military can rule the country without coopting the civilians and to what extent the regime can be insulated from the society.

32. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr.,
n. 1, pp. 1-13.

Depending upon these factors, there can be many kinds of executive arrangements in military government. Broadly three patterns are to be found:³³ (1) The predominantly military executive, in which at least 90% of the cabinet positions are held by the officers; (2) The mixed military-civilian executive; and (3) an exclusively military council along with a mixed cabinet. The first type of arrangement is found in 15% of the regimes and the second and third in about 40% of the regimes.³⁴ Notwithstanding the specific arrangement adopted by the regime, the military will dominate the executive as a senior military officer assumes the position of the head of the Council, Prime Minister or President.

There is one more possibility. Immediately after the seizure of power, the military might establish a council consisting only of military personnel. But after establishing an effective control over the government, it might feel the necessity of the civilian skills to run the country. Because, for any military, seizing power is not as difficult as governing the country.

33. Eric A. Nordlinger, n.1, p. 109. An elaborate account of the nature and forms of military governments can be found in S.E. Finer, n.3, pp.548-554.

34. Eric A. Nordlinger, n.1, p. 109.

Thus, the military takeover of the government may result in many forms of governing structures. But the point that should be clearly noted here is that whatever form it might assume, it is characteristically different from the civilian regime structure in its governing style, and the nature of its relationship with the society. The extent of the difference depends upon the particular political context of the society.

HYPOTHESIS III:

Since one of the important factors that influences the foreign policy of a country is the system of government by which it is governed, it logically follows that if the system of governance undergoes a change, ceteris paribus, the foreign policy of the country necessarily undergoes a change.

The recognition of national attributes as factors influencing the foreign policies of states is not

totally a new phenomenon.³⁵ But what is new is that apart from explicit recognition by those who theorize on foreign policy, considerable number of empirical studies were conducted in an attempt to relate various characteristics of states to their foreign policy behaviour.³⁶ This is a relatively new phenomenon because for a long time national attributes and their influence on the shape of the foreign policy behaviour of a state have not received much attention. Conventionally, students of international relations saw the state as a kind of hard-shell entity (or a billiard-ball) whose actions were only in the nature of reactions and responses to the stimuli coming from outside the shell. It was generally held that all states act similarly and

35. As far back as 1938, Nicholas J. Spykman noted, "The factors that condition the policy of states... include, apart from the geographic factor, population density, the economic structure of the country, the ethnic composition of the people, the form of government, and the complexes and pet prejudices of foreign ministers; and it is their simultaneous action and interreaction that create the complex phenomenon known as "foreign policy". See his, "Geography and Foreign Policy I", American Political Science Review, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1938, p. 28.

36. For a survey of these studies, see, Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1975).

possibly with similar motivations, notwithstanding the differences among them in size, geographical location, the level of economic development, etc. These attributes of states were considered as irrelevant as explanans of their foreign policies. However, this perspective has largely been abandoned and was replaced by a concern also for the processes and factors from within the states which influence the making and conduct of foreign policy.

As there are a host of internal factors that are potentially influential in shaping a country's foreign policy, the problem that had to be resolved was establishing their relative importance in accounting for the difference in the foreign policy behaviour of various states. Two hundred and thirty six factors were analyzed and social scientists from various disciplines came to the consensus that a country's size, economic development, and political system were more important than other factors. These factors account for 40% of the total variance in the behaviour of states.³⁷ As a result of

37. These findings were reported by R.J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and their Behaviour", World Politics, Vol.21, 1969, pp.226-241; and "Indicators of Cross-National

these findings, speculation on the sources of foreign policy with more precise conceptualization was made possible. Theorists identified three important external factors (or, what are known as relational attributes) corresponding to the three national attributes. In the studies that employed dyads as the case-for-analysis, they are: (1) distance; (2) socio-cultural homogeneity; and (3) military balance, between the dyads.

After the explicit recognition and conceptualization of both internal and external factors (or national and relational attributes) that influence a country's foreign policy, the question that was attempted to answer was which of the either sets is more potent in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of a country. Two extreme answers were advanced: One contending that internal factors solely account for the behaviour of states and the other contending that external factors

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and International patterns", American Political Science Review, Vol.63, 1969, pp.127-147. The 256 factors were collected for Dimensionality of Nations (DON) Project. See also, J. Sawyer, "Dimensions of Nations: Size, Wealth, and Politics", American Journal of Sociology, Vol.73, 1967, pp. 145-172. Cited by Maurice A. East and Charles F. Hermann, "Do Nation-Types Account for Foreign Policy Behaviour?" in James N. Rosenau (ed.), Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1974), pp.270, 300.

are decisive. However, a middle road was not absent. It was hypothesized that both internal and external factors equally influence the shape of a country's foreign policy. But all these answers were advanced without much empirical analysis.

A major attempt to empirically test the relative strengths of internal and external variables was undertaken by Rosenau and Hoggard.³⁸ The study was based on the data collected under the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project. They consist of 7,781 cooperative acts and 5,759 conflictful acts initiated under dyadic circumstances by 130 nations over a 44-month period -- from January 1966 through August 1969. These 130 nations formed 16,512 dyads when classified in terms of relational attributes.³⁹ The authors expected that the multiple-sources of foreign policy hypothesis would be supported. But to their surprise, it was falsified by the data. Interestingly, the data clearly showed that national attributes are more potent sources of both foreign conflict and cooperative behaviour than are relational attributes.⁴⁰

38. James N. Rosenau and Cary D. Hoggard, "Foreign Policy Behaviour in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a Pre-Theoretical Model", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), n.57, pp.117-149.

39. For further details on the data, see, *ibid.*, pp.129-132.

40. *ibid.*, p.141.

These findings provoked doubt and disbelief in the authors themselves and prompted them to see whether other data sets also support them. Data generated by conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) and Comparative Research on Events of Nations (CREON) Project were analyzed by Rosenau and Ramsey, Jr.⁴¹ The COPDAB data consisted of 13,277 events initiated by 28 nations towards each other in 756 dyads for the same period as the WEIS data (1966-69). And the CREON data set consisted of 5,394 acts initiated by 35 nations towards each other in 1,190 dyads during the randomly selected quarters of each of the years from 1959-68.⁴² The analysis of these different data sets also yielded similar results confirming the original finding that national attributes are more potent than relational attributes in influencing a country's foreign policy.

The study had taken into account the problem of weighting also. That is, instead of according the same

41. James N. Rosenau and George R. Ramsey, Jr., "External Vs. Internal Sources of Foreign Policy Behaviour: Testing the Stability of an Intriguing Set of Findings", Paper presented to the IX World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Montreal, August 25, 1975).

42. For further details on data, see *ibid.*

weight to every cooperative and conflictual act, they were assigned some weightage derived from a 15-point scale adopted by the COPDAB data set. This is done because a cooperative act may differ in intensity from another cooperative act just as one conflictual act differs from another. In other words, instead of giving the same weight to a verbal conflictual act and an actual armed conflict, they were assigned different values. But even after assigning this weightage, the findings were not altered. Weighting had almost no effect at all.

It is important, however, to note some of the limitations of these studies. They employed the dyad as the case-for-analysis. It is pointed out that the conceptualization of the international environment in the form of three relational attributes was inadequate because they only take into account the distance, socio-cultural homogeneity and the military balance between the dyads.⁴³ This narrow conceptualization amounts to analysing the behaviour of, for instance, China and the United States towards each other only in terms of

43. See William O. Chittick and Jerry B. Jenkins, "Re-conceptualizing the Sources of Foreign Policy Behaviour", in J.R. Rosenau (ed.), In Search of Global Patterns (New York, Free Press, 1976), pp.281-291.

the distance between them, the degree of socio-cultural similarity/dissimilarity and the military balance between them without taking into account the Soviet factor and other aspects of the international environment. This is obviously a major flaw. It is also pointed out that two of the factors which were conceptualized as relational attributes -- socio-economic homogeneity and military balance -- in fact fall under national attributes.⁴⁴ One can reasonably argue that if the external factors had properly been conceptualized, the findings and conclusions might have been different. But this study is mainly a generalized analysis cast at a highly abstract level.

Though the question of relative potency of the internal and external factors in influencing a country's foreign policy behaviour has not been conclusively resolved, on the basis of the empirical work done so far and in the absence of concrete studies with contrary findings, it is safe to take them as a point of departure. Further, it is reasonable to say that the system of governance of a country is one of the major factors that influence its foreign policy.

44. *ibid.*, p.285.

However, another question needs to be discussed in order to give a better justification to the hypothesis III. After establishing that the three national attributes -- size, level of economic development, and political system -- are more potent in influencing a country's foreign policy, it is important to see whether these three attributes exert additive or interactive influence on the shape of the foreign policy. That is, whether each of these attributes influence the foreign policy separately and independently of other factors, or only in combination with others. If the latter is correct, then a change in one attribute might not have considerable impact on the foreign policy because it has no independent influence. If the former is correct, logically, to the extent the nature of the influencing attribute has undergone a change, the foreign policy should also undergo a change.

The additive hypothesis is generally used in empirical research as well as in the literature on foreign policy. In these studies, the combined effect of the three variables on foreign policy is considered to be the sum of their individual effects.⁴⁵

45. For example, see, David N. Moore, "Deriving Cross-national Measures of Governmental and

The presentation of the interactive approach can be found in James N. Rosenau's "pre-theories" essay.⁴⁶ After identifying size, economic development, and political accountability as the three important national attributes, Rosenau uses them as dimensions for classifying nations. Each attribute is divided into two levels -- large, small; developed, less developed; open, closed -- and were combined to form the following eight types of nations:

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Societal Attributes, Inter-University Comparative Foreign Policy Project, prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Juan, 1971, Cited by East and Hermann, n.37, p.271; and "Governmental and Societal Influences on Foreign Policy in Open and Closed Nations", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.) n.37, pp.171-199, G.A. Salmore and C.F. Hermann, "The Effect of Size, Development and Accountability on Foreign Policy", Peace Research Society Papers, 14, 1969, pp.15-30. Cited by East and Hermann, n.37, p.271. For examples from text book literature, see for instance, A.F.R. Organski, World Politics (New York, Knopf), 1961, p.161; N.J. Padelford and G.A. Lincoln, The Dynamics of International Politics (New York, Macmillan, 1962), p.67. Cited by East and Hermann, n.37, p.271.

46. "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R.B. Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp.27-32.

large, developed, open
large, developed, closed
large, less developed, open
large, less developed, closed

small, developed, open
small, developed, closed
small, less developed, open
small, less developed, closed

The underlying assumption was that the effect of the attributes is not additive, but an interaction between the size, development and the political system (open/closed) might produce different effects depending upon the nature of the variables. For example, the effect of size on the foreign policy behaviour might be conditioned by whether the country is developed or less developed. And the effects of the interaction between size and development might be modified by whether the country has open or closed political system. To put it differently, the effect of size on the foreign policy behaviour of a developed country may be different from the effect it has on a less developed country. Likewise, economic development may have different effects on the foreign policy behaviour of nations with open and closed political systems.

An attempt was made to empirically test both these additive and interactive hypotheses by Maurice A. East and Charles F. Hermann.⁴⁷ They analysed the

47. East and Hermann, n.37, pp.269-303.

data that has been collected under CREON project.⁴⁸ Their findings generally supported the additive hypothesis. Among the three national attributes, size was proved to be the most important factor affecting the foreign policy behaviour. And accountability (or the nature of the political system) was only next to size in importance. Interestingly, the third important factor was a combination of accountability and development. East and Hermann conclude that the "...three variables -- size, accountability, and accountability-development -- typically accounted for most of the variance explained in the foreign policy measures and all but three of the statistically significant relationships. The separate variable of development ranked next to last in the average amount of variance experienced. The three way interaction contributed least to the explanation of variance."⁴⁹

Therefore, it seems unjustified to formulate eight distinct nation-types based on the interaction of the three dichotomized national attributes to employ

48. For details on the data and method of analysis, see, *ibid.*, pp.283-290.

49. *ibid.*, p.299.

as a means of explaining foreign policy behaviour. However, it is important to be aware that the findings of East and Hermann are based on an examination of only thirty-three countries and nine classifications of foreign policy behaviour. But a still more important fact to be noted is that these findings confirm the analysis of another study by Salmore.⁵⁰ This is significant because, these two studies employed different data sets drawn from different periods of time and used different sets of foreign policy behaviours (i.e., dependent variables).⁵¹ Therefore, on the basis the findings of these studies and in the absence of empirical studies providing otherwise, it is reasonable to accept that the national attributes exert additive influence on the foreign policy of a country.

Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize, as we did, that since the system of government (open/closed) by which a country is governed is an important attribute with additive influence on the country's foreign policy, if it undergoes a change, ceteris paribus, the foreign policy also necessarily undergoes a change.

It is generally held that the societal variables

50. S.A. Salmore, "Foreign Policy and National Attributes: A Multi-variate Analysis", Ph.D. Dissertation (Princeton, Princeton University, 1972), Cited by East and Hermann, n.37, p.300.

51. East and Hermann, n.37, p.273.

are more strongly related to policy outcomes in open than in closed politics. Soon after the assumption of power, as noted earlier, the military severely restricts all political activity and destroys the institutions and procedures which hitherto, under the civil government, aggregated the societal interests and acted as pressures on the government. Hence, in the military regimes, there is less pressure on the leaders of the government and officials to respond to the non-governmental of societal demands.

The discussions on the "issue-area" implicitly establish a relationship between the resources needed to implement a policy and the policy outcomes.⁵² It is held that if few or no resources are needed, or perceived to be needed by those who make or influence the policy, then the relative independence of the decision-makers would be greater than when many resources are needed. A civilian-democratic regime's leadership is dependent on popular support to continue in office and to be re-elected. This dependence forces them to formulate

52. See J.N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.) Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, Free Press, 1967), pp.17-50. Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory", World Politics, Vol.16, July, 1964, pp.677-715.

policies which are acceptable to the electorate. This makes them yield to the pressures of various groups in the society. On the other hand, the military government, which does not depend upon the electorate to come to power as well as to continue in office can afford to ignore the societal pressures. This relative independence of the military government insulates it from the influences of the society. Probably, the main group on which it is dependent is the military establishment.

It can be argued that the societal factors do not exert significant influence on the foreign policy of the developing third world countries. Unlike in the advanced western countries, pressure groups and lobbies do not exist in these countries. Majority of the public is not much concerned about the foreign policy of the governments. Foreign policy matters in these countries do not constitute the major issues in the election campaigns. All this might be true. But it is equally true that economic issues and issues of nation-building are more crucial for these countries. They have to conserve and acquire the necessary resources for their development. Foreign policy is not purely political but closely linked with the economic needs of the country also. It is said that some governments of the third world states use foreign policy as an instrument to foster the spirit of nationalism

among their peoples.⁵³ Thus, the influence of the society on the foreign policy of a third world country may be more indirect than in an advanced western country, but it is not totally absent. In addition to these indirect pressures, in a civilian-democratic regime, there will be the pressures from the political parties and various groups which try to sharply articulate and channelize these pressures from the society.

Under a military government or any closed regime, the activities of these political parties and other groups will be severely curbed and thus the sources of foreign policy might lie more within the government. David W. Moore, in a study,⁵⁴ examined the following hypotheses: (1) Societal variables are more potent than governmental variables in open nations; (2) Governmental variables are more potent than societal variables in closed nations. This study was based on the 1963 data regarding the following seven foreign policy measures: (1) Cold War; (2) Intervention in Africa; (3) Supra-nationalism; (4) Alignment; (5) Defense;

53. See H.C. Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States", in L. Martin (ed) Neutrality and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs (Proeger, 1962), p.5.

54. See his, "Governmental and Societal Influences on Foreign Policy in Open and Closed Nations", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), n.37, pp.171-194.

(6) Conflict; (7) Diplomatic participation. The analysis of the data clearly supported the hypotheses.⁵⁵ In addition, another pattern was also noticed. For the three policies -- defense expenditures per capita, conflict, and diplomatic participation -- which appear to require large amounts of resources, governmental variables exert very little influence in both open and closed nations. However, on two of these issues -- defense expenditures per capita and Conflict -- governmental variables were nevertheless proportionately more potent in closed than in open nations.⁵⁶

Under an open democratic regime it would be difficult to specifically relate the foreign policy behaviour of the country and the influence of the military establishment, because apart from the military's influence a host of other influences from the society will be working on the government. But in a closed regime in which the governmental variables are more potent than the societal variables and in such a case if the governmental power is assumed by the military, it would be relatively insulated from the societal pressures. The predominant

55. *ibid.*, p. 190.

56. *ibid.*

influence on the government will be exerted by the military establishment itself. Therefore, in such a situation the military personnel and the military establishment lend a better opportunity for an analysis of their foreign policy behaviour. Thus we can study how the military differs from the civilians as foreign policy actors.

To sum up, we have hypothesized that the military personnel markedly differ from the civilian politicians in characteristics, orientations, and outlook on governing the society, their view of national interest and the choice of means to serve it (H_I). As a consequence of this, the regime established by the military differs from the civilian regime, which means that the system of government of the society undergoes a change (H_{II}). Since the system of government is one of the important factors influencing the foreign policy of a country, if that system undergoes a change, ceteris paribus, the foreign policy of the country necessarily undergoes a change (H_{III}). One additional aspect will also be examined. Since it is held that in closed regimes governmental variables are more potent in influencing policy making, and a military regime

is generally a closed one, the military personnel would be the major influence on the foreign policy making, with less influences from the society. Hence we can examine how distinct is military from the civilians in making foreign policy.

However, we do not assume that all military regimes might behave similarly. For this amounts to assuming that all non-military or civilian-democratic regimes behave similarly. Apparently, these assumptions would be false. But it would be worthwhile to ask the following general questions about the military regimes' foreign policy behaviour:⁵⁷ How military regimes relate themselves to the groups in the society that have foreign policy concerns? Do militaries make foreign policies in distinct ways? Are there any propensities that the armed forces have for particular foreign policy outcomes? Do military regimes perceive the role of superpowers differently than do the civilian regimes? Are militaries more disposed to take into account the potential for conflict resolution through military means?

57. These questions were suggested by Henry Bienen in the context of Africa. See his, "Research Report: African Militaries as Foreign Policy Actors" International Security (Cambridge), Vol.5, No.2, Fall, 1980, p.168.

CHAPTER - II

THE MILITARY AND MILITARY REGIMES IN BRAZIL AND PERU

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The specific characteristics assumed by the military personnel and the military institutions in Brazil and Peru in the process of the interaction with their respective societies need to be viewed against the political environment obtaining in the continent of Latin America. Compared to South and Southeast Asia, Latin America may be characterized as one of low-conflict areas. With relatively few international conflicts, Latin America is generally at peace with itself. This international environment has informed the development of military functions, their concerns and to a large extent their ideologies. In the absence or relatively low level of international conflicts, the armed forces of these countries remain non-operational for long periods. The military personnel have less combat experience. Therefore the criteria for promotion in the military institution will have to be sought in other qualifications rather than in experience in the combat. Since the frontier defence against the external aggressor does not engage them fully, the

the military had the scope for diverting their attention towards the internal problems of their societies. This concern and an education in those problems generally led to the development of the new national security doctrines with a concern for the overall socio-economic problems of their societies, to replace the old frontier-minded ones. These new doctrines inevitably led to the politicization of the armed forces in both the countries.

Although the international environment is an important factor in shaping the attitudes, orientations and outlook of the military personnel and the development of the military institutions, equally important are the unique factors obtaining within each country. For instance, the wars and external expeditions that engaged a country's armed forces, the nature of the European military missions that trained them, the predominant socio-economic groups and regions in the country that provided the recruits, and the nature and extent of the political interference that pulled the officers into direct involvement in politics, are some of the factors that went to shape the military personnel and institutions. Therefore to understand the nature of the

military personnel and, how and to what extent they characteristically differ from the civilian politicians in Brazil and Peru, we need to survey the nature of these influences in each country. This also helps us to understand and explain how far the regimes established by them differed from the previous civilian regimes they overthrew.

1. Characteristics of the Brazilian Military Institution and Military Personnel

In 1964 when the Brazilian armed forces staged a coup and established a military regime, they were considered to be sufficiently advanced and professionalized by the Latin American standards.¹ The hierarchical structures and bureaucratic norms were considerably well-established to resist any meddling with them by the civilian political groups from the society.

1. The organization of the Brazilian army does not fit into the common stereotype descriptions of the Latin American armies as top-heavy with colonels and generals, and where rational professional procedures are absent. The distribution of ranks in the Brazilian army is fairly similar to that of the United States army, with the Captains as the largest single group. For details, see Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 49-50., especially see Table 3.8.

But this relatively advanced professionalization did not produce, as it is commonly believed to do, a completely apolitical military in the European sense. The Brazilian military had the history of intervening into the political processes of the country, sometimes either to overthrow a regime or to ensure the constitutional succession of a government. It played largely a "moderator" role² among contending civilian political groups without directly taking over the governmental power to establish a military regime until the 1964 coup d'etat. Therefore, the possibility of characterizing the Brazilian military as conforming totally to the "ideal type" of military institution is completely ruled out. But it is also true that it did not display any long-term political ambitions, and held governmental power only during periods of crises until a civilian government could be established. Therefore, equally it does not yield to the characterization as a completely politicized institution. It still maintains its institutional identity and some degree of separation from the society, from which flow certain characteristics of its personnel that differentiate them from other civilians,

2. Ibid., Part II, "The 'Moderating Pattern' of Civil-Military Relations: Brazil, 1945-1964", pp.57-121.

especially political, groups. To understand the nature of the military institution, its relative separation from the society, and the characteristics, attitudes and orientations of the military personnel, it is necessary to examine the factors that shaped the institution. This will help us in finding out how the Brazilian military personnel differ from the civilian politicians in their attitude towards politics, their view of national interest and the means to effectively realize it. It is also possible to understand, as a result of these differences how the regime they established differed from the civilian regime they overthrew.

The development of the Brazilian military institution was shaped by many factors such as the wars it had fought, the foreign expeditions it undertook, the foreign military missions that trained its military personnel, its educational system, and the regional and socio-economic bases that provided its recruits.

The Paraguayan War (1865-70) in which Brazil had to pay a very high price for a complete victory, had an important influence on the military officers. The experience had instilled in them a mystique that they must save their country from the evils of inept and unpatriotic

civilian leadership under the monarchy.³ The experience sowed the seeds of distrust of civilian politicians among the military officers.⁴ As the military's status suffered because of the war, the officers compensated for it psychologically by counterposing it with a belief in their spiritual superiority. "There was a generalized conviction that the men in uniform were pure, were vigorous, were patriots; whereas the civilians were corrupt, were vice-ridden, without any public sentiment".⁵

In 1919, Brazil had contracted a French military mission led by Gen. Maurice Gamelin. The training by the successive French missions influenced the Brazilian military's professional as well as political aspects. As a result of the training, the Brazilian army came to be led by elitist officers who believed that they were morally superior to the civilian interest groups. They tended to blame the civilians and the "ispotent" Old

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3. Robert A. Hayes, "The Military Club and National Politics in Brazil", in Henry H. Keith and Robert A. Hayes (eds) Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil (Tempe, Arizona, 1976), p.139.
 4. See Frank D. McCann Jr., "Origins of the New Professionalism" of the Brazilian Military", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, (California), Vol.21, no.4., 1979, p.510.
 5. Lima, M.D. Oliveira, "O Ocaso do Imperio", Quoted by McCann Jr., op.cit., p.509. Italics in the original.

Republic for virtually all professional shortcomings.⁶ The training had the effect of making the Brazilian armed forces more capable of being intensely political for professional reasons.⁷ As a result of the training, the Brazilian officers became concerned with the overall society. At the same time, the reorganization effected by the French missions contributed to the development and consolidation of modernization of the Brazilian military institution, and laid foundations for the bureaucratic norms, hierarchical structures and code of discipline that differentiated and to a certain extent isolated it, as an institution, from the rest of the society.

As the military institution of any country is basically a part of its society, the links between them are inevitable, and the military institution cannot be completely separated from its society. The primary link between them is the recruitment structure itself. Through this link, there is a possibility of the societal influences seeping into the military

6. Frederick M. Nunn, "An Overview of the European Military Missions in Latin America" in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr., (eds) The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1978) p.40.

7. Ibid., p.41.

institution.

The Brazilian army's recruitment policy generally favoured some regions to others. Due to the uneven development of the country, some states had provided more recruits than the others.⁸ As each garrison recruited men largely from its neighbouring areas, and were also stationed there, the national army garrisons resembled state militias to some extent. Because of this recruitment policy, there was a possibility of the Brazilian military personnel retaining their original regional loyalties. This trend sometimes resulted in crisis of loyalty during disputes between the states and the Brazilian federal government.

The recruitment structure of the Brazilian military evidences that progressively, the base is shifting away from the upper classes and increasingly the middle-class representation is growing.⁹ This means that the army officers do not come from either of the major economic elites -- the fazendeiros (large landowners)

8. For a comprehensive idea of the states' representation in the Army Cadet Corps, see Stepan, n.1, Table 3.5, p.38.

9. For example, in the 1941-43 period, 19.6 per cent of the cadets were sons of upper class fathers. But by 1962-66, they were reduced 6.0 per cent. See Stepan, n.1, p.31.

or the Sao Paulo industrialists. On the other hand, the representation of the lower classes is also declining. The major section of the officers were provided by the middle class. Their representation had increased from 76.4 per cent in 1941-43 period to 78.2 per cent in the 1962-66 period.¹⁰ The point to be noted here is that the Brazilian military institution does not evidence any close link with either the dominant socio-economic elite class on the one hand, or the majority lower sections on the other. In addition, due to their long training, professional socialization and military education, even the links to the middle classes also become weak. This is mainly because of the long time gap between the recruits' entry into the service at the age of 16-19 years and, attainment of a relatively high position.

It is important to note, in this context, the Brazilian officers' perception of themselves and other sections of the society. They feel that they do not come from the upper classes or the elite. They admit that they come from the middle class, but see themselves

10. Ibid., p. 34.

as a non-class group.¹¹ They see the traditional elites as having narrow personal interests and the economically lower sections, particularly the urban trade union workers, as championing narrow sectarian goals. Both these classes, in the view of the officers, are opposed to the overall national well-being. In contrast, the officers, as a non-class group, see themselves as a social and organizational group whose interests coincide with or contribute to national development. Thus, the Brazilian military personnel attitudinally differentiate themselves from the other civilian groups.

The successive Brazilian constitutions have vested in the military the task of maintaining law and order in the country and of guaranteeing the continued normal functioning of the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature.¹² The provisions defining

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11. See Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1971), R-585-008, p.91.
12. The constitutional provisions dealing with the military are: 1891 Constitution, Article 14; 1934 Constitution, Article 162; and 1946 Constitution, Articles 176-78. See Stepan, n.1, p.75.

the military's relationship with the executive were rather vague and were amenable to different interpretations. The provisions made the military obedient to the executive only "within the limits of law." In practice, this meant that the military's obedience to the President was discretionary. These constitutional provisions formed the basis for different civilian groups' manipulation of the military to their support.¹³ As we see below, these manipulations and the vagueness of the constitutional provisions to some extent influenced the development of the ideology at the Escola Superior de Guerra -- Brazil's national war college.

One of the direct results of the Brazilian participation in the World War II was the founding of Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG). The basic philosophy behind it was that, for a developing country like Brazil, the question of a strong armed force could not be separated from the question of economic development, nor the question of national security from that of education, industry, or agriculture.¹⁴ The courses at the ESG

13. For a detailed discussion on the cooption of the military by the civilian political groups, see *ibid.*, pp.67-79.

14. Einaudi and Stepan, n.11, p.81.

of the Brazilian society. Consequently, during the 1950s and the 1960s, the ESG developed an ideology that emphasized the interrelationship between national security and national development. It stressed that as the modern warfare involved the will, unity, and productive capacity of the entire nation, those charged with the national security problems could not restrict their attention to mere frontier defence. National security was seen by the ESG as a function of rationally maximizing the output of the economy and minimizing all sources of cleavage and disparity within the country.¹⁵ As a result, the political factors were generally regarded by the ESG as obstacles to the reform measures and therefore to be removed. The ESG felt that political parties were unauthoritative as they were seen as representing only sectional and partisan interests, and wanted to reduce their number.¹⁶

Civilian participation was also allowed in the ESG courses. By 1966, many from the key sectors of political and economic power structures of Brazil had

15. Ibid., p.82.

16. See Stepan, n.1, pp.181-182, f.n.27.

graduated from it,¹⁷ And the civilian participants were mostly technicians, who later contributed their skills in running the military government.

The ESC's ideology can be described as an embodiment of the military institution's reaction to the various processes of its interaction with Brazil's political, economic and social conditions. The development of this ideology further sharpened the attitudinal difference between the military personnel and the civilian politicians. The military personnel viewed the national interest in terms of national security which in turn was closely linked with the overall national economic development. As the ESC felt that the country's political processes were characterized by personalism and factionalism, which were incompatible with the goal of national development, it developed an attitude of anti-politics. The ESC ideology rationalized the military officers' contempt for civilian politicians and politics, their intolerance for opposition and their propensity to centralize authority.¹⁸

17. Binsudl and Stepan, n.11, p.81.

18. For a discussion on the ESC, see Loveman and Davies Jr., (eds), op.cit., pp.10-11.

2. Characteristics of the Brazilian Military Regime

After taking over the governmental power in 1964, the Brazilian military did not immediately abolish the Constitution. But it proclaimed a series of Institutional and Complementary Acts that in practice neutralized the document.¹⁹ Through these Acts and finally by framing a new Constitution in 1967, the executive of the military government acquired absolute power reducing the legislature and the judiciary to a mere vegetative existence.

The state of affairs that was effected by the various Institutional and Complementary Acts was legalized by the new Constitution promulgated on the 24th January, 1967.²⁰ With this Constitution, the Congress lost a substantial part of its legislative powers. The provisions in the Constitution strengthened the executive, making it responsible for the elaboration of national policies, especially economic ones. The

19. For details and summary of the series of the Acts, see Riorden Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976), Chapter 6, "The Post-1964 Military Republic", pp. 133-140.

20. For a summary of the Constitution, see, Kessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 16, 197-68, p. 21940.

constitution had imposed stringent time limits for the ratification of the executive proposals. Law-by-decree was institutionalized and the Congress was prohibited to make amendments or changes of any sort to the executive bills. The legislature also lost the right to make laws that regulated financial matters, created offices, duties, or jobs, raised salaries, in any way increased public expenditures,²¹ changed the composition of the armed forces, or made any changes in the administration of the federal districts or of the territories.

Prior to 1964, a majority of the bills approved by the Congress were of its own initiative. But after the establishment of the military government, there was a reversal and the bills initiated by the executive increased to over 90 per cent of the total number of approved bills.²² The legislature attempted to compen-

21. Candido Mendes, "The Post-1964 Brazilian Regime: Outward Redemocratization and Inner Institutionalization", Government and Opposition, (London), Vol. 15, no. 1, p. 60.

22. See, Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, "Military Authoritarianism and Executive Absolutism in Brazil", Studies in Comparative International Development, (New Jersey) Vol. 14, Nos. 3-4, Fall-Winter, 1979, Table 6, p. 114.

state for this loss in the legislative functions, by close supervision of the executive. High civil servants and even ministers of state were summoned by the Congress to provide detailed information regarding the activities of their ministries. But with the promulgation of the Institutional Act No.5 in December 1968, the legislature lost even this function.²³ Thus the Congress was made unable to lobby or effectively interfere in any significant way with the decisions of the executive. It remained, by and large, only as a forum for debate and for the ratification of the governmental decisions, giving to them the stamp of popular approval.

With the Institutional Act No.2, promulgated on the 27th October 1965, the military regime had re-ordered the executive's equation with the judiciary. The Act excluded all actions of the Supreme Revolutionary Command and the Federal Government from the judicial competence. The number of the members of the Supreme Court was raised and the Act reserved the right of nomination of all federal judges to the

23. For details on the Congress's overseeing functions, see *ibid.*, pp.117-119. See especially Table B, p.118.

President.²⁴ Simultaneously, it reorganized the Supreme Military Tribunal and extended its jurisdiction over civilians accused of crimes against national security.²⁵ Thus the regime deprived the judiciary of any effective control over the executive.

The executive under the military regime which gained absolute powers was predominantly controlled by the military personnel and the civilian tecnicos who were their ideological allies in the ESG. Though the civilians who were coopted by the military were not politicians, the military personnel did not allow them to play a dominant role in the government. This was evident when the military prevented the civilian Vice-President to succeed President Costa e Silva when he was incapacitated in 1969.²⁶ The staff of the public

24. See Roett., op.cit., p.138.

25. Ibid., p.138.

26. For details of the incident, see Roett, n.19, p.150.

bureaucracy was made up according to the criteria of position within the armed forces or by the necessity to provide know-how to the technocracy. Purely political leadership or the protagonists of the civil society were not allowed to share power.²⁷

The regime had eliminated every significant opponent from participating in the political process or running the government by means of forcible loss of electoral mandates (cassacoes) and compulsory retirement (aposentadorias) from various jobs such as college professors, civil servants, etc. By January 1978, 4,877 persons had lost their jobs, had been forced to retire, or had their electoral mandates cancelled.²⁸ Prominent and active politicians had their political rights suspended.

The military regime effected major changes in the political party system existing under the civilian regime. On July 15th 1965, the military government promulgated two laws which imposed severe restrictions on the requirements that political parties should meet

27. Candido Mendes, n.21, p.66.

28. Billon Soares, n.22, pp.114-115.

to maintain legal status.²⁹ As a result, only two parties emerged -- the government sponsored party, National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) and the official opposition party, Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) -- replacing the existing 14-party system. The MDB and ARENA were dubbed, respectively, as the parties of "Yes" and "Yes, Sir".³⁰ This two-party system operated largely within the parameters set by the military regime, till 1979. As the opposition MDB gained strength by mid-1978, the government terminated both the parties and created one government party and allowed the formation of many opposition parties. As a result, Social Democratic Party (PDS) was created as an official party and five opposition parties were formed.³¹ This move on the part of the government was mainly motivated to divide and weaken the opposition which was growing stronger.

29. For details of the laws, see Roett, n.19, pp.137, 139.

30. Jan Knippers Black., "The Military and Political Decompression in Brazil". Armed Forces and Society, (Chicago), Vol.6, No.4, Summer 1980, p.626.

31. For details about the parties and their strength in the Congress, see Keasing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.26, 1981, p.30639.

The military regime severely curbed the freedom of the press. On January 22nd 1967, Press Law was promulgated which tightened the censorship rules. As a result of the Law, the government assumed virtual control of all news media covering the transmission of both printed and spoken word.³² Again in September 1972, press censorship was further tightened and new regulations were announced that precluded criticism of economic policy, comments on political liberalization, amnesty for political prisoners and speculation on the presidential succession.³³ This trend continued until the 1978 Institutional reforms were adopted which lifted the prior censorship. But informal restrictions still prevail as the 1978 incident involving the prestigious newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo evidenced.³⁴ Radio and television are still offlimits to the opponents of the regime.³⁵

Thus the Brazilian military established a regime that eliminated any meaningful participation in and/or influence on the governing process, from the civil society. Therefore, the only constituency that could exercise any significant influence on the government could be the military institution.

33. Roett., n.19, p.153.

34. For details of the incident, see Jan Knippers Black., n.30, p.632.

35. Ibid., p.632.

3. Characteristics of the Peruvian Military Institution and Military Personnel

When the Peruvian armed forces staged a coup and established a military regime in 1968, they were considered to be one of the most developed and effective military institutions in Latin America. The effectiveness was not due to their size but due to their level of professionalism. Bureaucratic norms and hierarchical structures were strongly established in the institution and it enjoyed considerable autonomy, aided by secrecy (even from government agencies) in such matters as finance, personnel, and organization.³⁶ It had one of the most developed military education systems in Latin America.

But the development of professionalism did not prevent, as it is commonly believed to do, the Peruvian military from intervening into the political processes of the country. During the pre-professional phase, the Peruvian military leadership considered it as their right to occupy the country's Presidency.³⁷ Though it

36. Luigi R. Einaudi, "The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis", Memorandum R01-6048-RC (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1969), p.3.

37. For a detailed discussion on the various stages of the political role of the Peruvian Military, see Stephen L. Rozman, "The Evolution of the Political Role of the Peruvian Military", in Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 4, Oct. 1970, pp. 539-564.

acknowledged in 1872 the right of a civilian to occupy the Presidency, it did not completely withdraw itself from politics. Therefore, the possibility of characterizing the Peruvian military as an apolitical institution completely conforming to the "ideal type" is ruled out. But at the same time it cannot reasonably be characterized as an institution completely politicized and sucked into the society so as to be identical or similar to the other civilian political groups. The military institution retains its distinct identity, attitudes and organizational autonomy. Therefore, it is more appropriate to say that it is somewhere in between the two extreme points. To understand the nature of the military institution, its relative isolation from the dominant sections in the society, and the characteristics, orientations and attitudes of the military personnel, it is necessary to examine the factors that shaped the development of the institution, and as a result, how it reacted to and interacted with its society. This will help us in finding out how the Peruvian military personnel differ from the civilian politicians in their attitude towards politics, their view of national interest, and the means to effectively realize it. And as a result, how and to what extent the regime they

established differed from the civilian regime that they overthrew.

The development of the Peruvian military institution was shaped by many factors such as the wars it had fought, the campaigns it undertook to suppress the guerilla movements, the foreign military missions that trained the military personnel, its educational system, and the shifts in the regional and socio-economic bases of its recruitment structure.

After Peru had experienced a crushing defeat in the hands of Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), it was realized that the Peruvian army was more political than military.³⁸ One of the first attempts directed at creating an army which was technical, professional and with no other desire than serving an institution dedicated to the task of national defence, was made by the government of Nicolas Pierola (1895-1899).³⁹

38. For more details on the effect of the war on Peru, see Lewis Hanke, Contemporary Latin America: Text and Readings, (D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., Princeton, 1968), p.127.

39. Victor Villanueva, "Military Professionalization in Peru", in Loveman and Davies Jr., (eds), *op.cit.*, p.79.

A French military mission headed by Paul Clement was contracted by Peru in the year 1896. Between 1896 and 1940, about 75 French officers trained the Peruvian military.⁴⁰ The French influence was strongly felt as large number of Peruvian officers studied in the French Academies.⁴¹ The influence was both on professional and political aspects. In 1896, Paul Clement introduced a rigid promotion system that allowed only academy graduates to rise above the rank of second Lieutenant. He made suggestions which had long term influence on the Peruvian military. For example, the echoes of his emphasis on the development of lines of communications so that the frontiers are accessible from the capital both in times of war and peace, can be found in the proposals emanating from the Peruvian national war college, Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM).⁴² Even the establishment of CAEM which played a significant role in moulding the attitudes of the Peruvian officers, can be described as a direct result of the French emphasis on continued education for the high ranking officers.⁴³

40. F. Nunn., n.6, p.43.

41. Einaudi., n.36, p.7.

42. F. Nunn., n.6, p.43.

43. Ibid., p.44.

Alongwith imparting professional training, the French missions also made the Peruvian officers politically concerned, as the French military was no less political at the time they were training the Peruvians. But paradoxically, the Peruvian officers developed at the same time a "contempt for politics and therefore the entire parliamentary system".⁴⁴ As a result of the training, the officers saw themselves as a superior class with a monopoly on patriotism.⁴⁵ Their concern for politics was more directed towards the study of various problems the country was facing, such as the national integration, economic development, etc. Thus, the French military training made them feel concerned for politics, but at the same time laid foundations for an institution with its own bureaucratic norms, heirarchical structures and code of discipline that differentiated and to a certain extent isolated it from the rest of the society.

The military institution of a country is basically a part of its society. Therefore, the links between the military institution and its society are inevitable. The primary link between them is the recruitment structure

44. Villanueva, n.39, p.83.

45. Ibid., p.83.

itself. Through this link, there is a possibility of the societal influences sweeping into the military institution.

An examination of the Peruvian military's recruitment structure evidences that during the colonial period, the officers were mainly drawn from the aristocracy. Since the war of the Pacific, due to the loss of prestige suffered by the military, the recruitment from the aristocracy had declined. Since then, the recruitment structure shows an increased representation from the "popular classes" in the officer corps.⁴⁶ And this had been the predominant trend since the turn of the century. The recruitment of the Indian peasant was also very little due to the educational and height requirements. Thus, the Peruvian military institution does not have any direct link with either the powerful oligarchy or the backward Indian peasantry.

The recruitment structure also evidences that its base had progressively shifted away from the regions which traditionally provided the major portion of the recruits. The percentage of officers from the coastal urban centres, and especially from Lima, had declined,

46. Einaudi, n.36, pp.4-5.

and that of the rural provincial towns of the interior had increased. For example, during the period between 1955 and 1969, 56 per cent of the men who attained the rank of general in the army were either born in the central highlands (Sierra) or in the Amazon jungles (Selva).⁴⁷ During the same period, 94 per cent of the directors of Peru's largest corporations came from either Lima or other places in the coastal region.⁴⁸ The officer corps, especially in this century, has not been identical with Peru's social and financial elite. Nor has it any direct links with the rural Indian peasants. As a result of the regional and socio-economic differences between the Peruvian military personnel and the socio-economic elite, the military personnel feel a sense of apartness from the latter. Moreover, the elites tend to be whiter in skin.⁴⁹ The sense of apartness was further enhanced considerably by the high level of military training and education.

With considerable training and professionalization, the Peruvian officers came to see themselves as profe-

47. Ibid., p.6.

48. Ibid.

49. Einaudi, "Peruvian Military Relations with the United States", (The RAND Corporation, p-4389, 1970), p.21.

sonals with virtues of discipline and efficiency. For most of them the significance of discipline "lies less in its concrete military usefulness than in the fact that discipline is the one characteristic of an officer which unequivocally distinguishes him from a civilian..."⁵⁰ As it was feared that continuing contact with the civilians might lead to the loss of discipline -- which was the distinguishing characteristic -- it was kept always at a tolerable level. Officers who frequently involved themselves in partisan politics were transferred to inactive positions by their superiors.⁵¹

The Peruvian military personnel have an attitude of viewing politics in a fundamentally apolitical light. And historically, they evidenced a fundamental dislike for the civilian politicians. This dislike was also extended towards their fellow officers who "play politics" within the military.⁵²

Constitutional provisions that defined the Peruvian military's relations with the civilian authorities

50. Einaudi and Stepan, n.11, p.13.

51. See Einaudi and Stepan, n.11, p.13.

52. In 1962, Gen. Bossio was transferred for the same reasons. See *ibid.*, p.14.

were rather vague. Article 213, Title 12 of the 1933 Constitution provided that, "the purpose of the Armed Forces is to guarantee the rights of the Republic, the fulfilment of the constitution and the laws, and the conservation of Public Order".⁵³ The significance of this provision is that it is meant to vent in the military the role of a moderator in the struggle for power among different civilian groups. Therefore, on the basis of this provision, the civilians, whose constitutionally guaranteed rights were attacked by the executive, appealed to the military to curb the executive's inroads into the constitution. And to counter this, the executive also tried to enlist the military's support for its action. Thus the military had acted as a moderator in the conflicts among the pro-regime forces. But allowing the military to play this role of a moderator cannot be interpreted as an effective recognition of it by the civilian political groups as yet another political actor. The role only allowed the military to overthrow a government which was deemed as subverting the constitution, and assume governmental power temporarily until a new civilian government is

53. Einaudi, n.36, p.3.

formed.⁵⁴ Concerning the military's relations with the anti-regime forces, there is no clear evidence to show that the military was sought by them as an ally. But the pro-regime forces and the executive used the armed forces to suppress the anti-regime forces' activities which manifested in the guerilla movements. And this use of the military by the pro-regime forces in conflicts among themselves and to suppress the anti-regime forces' resulted in creating a feeling among the armed forces that they were manipulated into the role of a protector of the status quo. The education of the military in socio-economic problems of Peru and the realization that the civilians failed to initiate any structural transformation of the society, further enhanced their hatred towards the civilian politicians.

Over the years, Peru had developed one of the most sophisticated military training systems in Latin America.⁵⁵

54. By executing the coupe in 1914, 1919, 1930, 1949 and 1962, the Peruvian armed forces had performed the "guardian" or moderator role. See, Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith., Military Role and Role: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations (Duxbury Press, North Scituate, 1974), p. 161.

55. For details, see Einsaedi, n.36, pp.6-7.

As noted already, because of the low combat experience of the Peruvian military personnel, military training and education were emphasized in the promotion process. This had made the Peruvian military perhaps the most merit-oriented sector in the State bureaucracy, if not in the society.⁵⁶

Among the various military academics, the CAEM (Centro Alto de Estudios Militares) had played the most important role in developing and articulating the Peruvian military ideology. The relatively low level of external defence functions led the military to think whether the source of the threat to national security was internal or external. And the military leaders began to see the national security problems as extending beyond the conventional border security, mainly because many of the existing social and economic structures seemed inefficient or unjust to create conditions for revolutionary violent protest, and therefore a threat to national security. With the Cuban experience in mind, the military also felt that these conditions would ultimately threaten their institution itself.

56. For a different point of view, see, Carola Astis and Jose Z. Garcia, "The Peruvian Military: Achievement Orientation, Training and Political Tendencies" in The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 25, no. 4, December 1972, pp. 667-685.

National security was seen by the CAEM as part of a total economic, social, psychological, and military package.⁵⁷ This preoccupation with the internal security led them to study at the CAEM a wide range of socio-economic problems facing Peru and formulate policies and reforms that would, according to them, ensure stability.

The courses in the CAEM included the study of national reality and national potential. The difference between the reality and potential formed the basis for the development of strategies to bridge the gap. In developing these strategies, the military had drawn from the experience of civilians also, as they were also allowed on a minor scale to participate in the programmes. These civilian participants also shared, by and large the military's views.⁵⁸

Though the military education led to the development of strategies for national security and development, it took the guerilla movements, especially of 1965-1966, to confirm the military in their commitment to social

57. Einaudi and Stepan, n.11, p.29.

58. Einaudi, n.49, p.21.

reform.⁵⁹

Thus, national interest was viewed by the military mainly in terms of national security, and threats to national security included internal revolution and guerilla movements. Therefore, the elimination of the sources of threats to national security through socio-economic reforms was seen as the primary means to effectively serve the national interest, as the military was concerned with the overall Peruvian national interest rather than the interests of any particular sections of the society. The training at the CAEM gave the military personnel the necessary competence to administer the State.

59. For details on the guerilla movements, and their effects on the armed forces, see, James Petras, "Revolution and guerilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Peru" in J. Petras and M. Zetlin (eds), Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett, 1968), pp.329-59; and Alain Houque, "Military Revolutions and National Independence in Latin America: 1958-71" in Philippe C. Schmitter (ed), Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1973) pp.21-23.

4. Characteristics of the Peruvian Military Regime

The Peruvian armed forces, in 1968, established a "Revolutionary Government" with the declared goal to "transfer the social, economic, and cultural structures" of Peru and to create a "new Peruvian man..."⁶⁰ In their attempt to achieve their goal, the armed forces have effected a very significant change in the regime structure, as a result of which the military government became insulated, to a large extent, from the direct societal pressures. More importantly, the military government neutralized considerably those influences which worked effectively on the previous civilian regime.

During the civilian rule, the Congress was vested by the Constitution with a degree of authority as found in parliamentary systems, notwithstanding Peru's presidential form of government. It made the council of ministers partly responsible for it as it could summon them collectively or individually to account for the policies of the executive branch. At times, it could

60. See the Manifesto of the Revolutionary Government. Reprinted in Loveman and Daview, Jr., n.6, pp.208-210.

even force a minister's resignation.⁶¹ The Congress under the civilian regime generally acted as a powerful organ to protect the interests of the oligarchy, blocking any reformist legislative initiative by executive. The military, immediately after assuming power, suspended the congress and never reconvened until after the 1980 elections. It replaced the elected municipal bodies by its own nominated men, and purged the judiciary to neutralize its influence on the executive.⁶² Thus the executive under the military regime at the expense of both the legislature and the judiciary.

The predominant executive was composed of a military President and an all-military cabinet, except in 1975 when a civilian was appointed as a minister for the first time. In July 1977, another civilian was appointed in a cabinet reorganization.⁶³ But the civilian strength in the cabinet was very little not only in terms

61. See, Marvin Alesky, "Peru", in Ben C. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson (ed) Political Forces in Latin America: Dimensions of the Quest for Stability (Wardsworth Publishing Co., Inc., Belmont, 1970), p.391.

62. See Stephen Clissold, Latin America: New World, Third World (Pall Mall Press, London, 1972), p.161.

63. At no point of time, the civilian strength in the cabinet was more than two. And notably, the military had not coopted any civilian politician.

of the number but also in terms of the influence they exerted. This was demonstrated when the civilian minister for Economy and Finance had to resign on 6 July, 1977, following his failure to gain approval of the predominantly military cabinet for the implementation of a deflationary plan.⁶⁴ The near elimination of the civilian participation in the decision-making process at the cabinet level, and thus the minimization of the direct civilian influence on the government can perhaps be traced to the military personnel's distrust of and dislike for the civilians. Moreover, the officers' education at the CAEM had given them enough competence and confidence in dealing with the country's major socio-economic problems. The civil-military participation at the government level under the military regime is thus significantly different from that of the previous civilian regime where generally only the three ministries related to the Army, Navy, and the Air Force were under the military personnel. To this extent, the military regime marks a change from the civilian regime.

64. For details of the event, see, Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.23, p.28547.

One of the most important steps the military government had taken was the promulgation of the land reform programme. It was intended to bring about "a reordering of Peruvian society and an alteration in the structure of economic, political and social power".⁶⁵ Till then Peru had one of the worst land distribution structures in Latin America. About 1,200 of the country's biggest landowners representing only 0.1 per cent of the total number of owners possessed 60 per cent of the country's total cultivated area, while 668,000 small holders, representing 83 per cent of the total owners held only 3.8 per cent of the cultivated area.⁶⁶ This means that the political power was mainly exercised by the oligarchy during the civilian regime. The land reform programme, though not a full success,⁶⁷ had certainly affected the power of the landowners in that it broke their stranglehold on Peruvian politics.⁶⁸

65. President Velasco, quoted in Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1970, Vol. 17, p. 24164.

66. Ibid., p. 24165.

67. See, Abraham F. Lowenthal., "Peru's Ambiguous Revolution" in Lowenthal (ed), The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change Under Military Rule (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975) pp. 3-43.

68. Penny Lerneux, "Return of Belaunde: Old Face, New Problems in Peru", The Nation (New York), Vol. 230, No. 23, June 14, 1980, p. 719.

This attack on the Peruvian oligarchy can be accounted for by mainly two reasons. As noted earlier, the military officers were quite removed from the landowners in terms of their socio-economic and geographical origins. And secondly, the ideology that was developed by the Peruvian officers identified the guerilla and insurgency movements as constituting the main threat to national security and the sources of these threats lie in the socio-economic inequalities, especially in the rural areas. The CAEN programmes suggested that effective implementation of land reforms was needed to remove these sources of threats.

From December 1969 onwards, the military government took a number of measures designed to control the press. On December 30th 1969, the government decreed a law on the "freedom of the press" which, though formally forbade all censorship except in times of war, prescribed fines and imprisonment as penalties for publication of any articles deemed to endanger the security of the State or the country's monetary or economic stability.⁶⁹ Far reaching action against

69. For details, see Kessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 18, 1971-72, p.24923.

the press was taken by the government in July 1974. Under the Press Law (The 1974 Press Decree D.L. 20680) six major daily newspapers which had a national circulation of over 20,000 copies or sold in more than half of the country's departmental capitals, were taken over by the State. The newspapers were assigned to specific organized sectors⁷⁰ to ensure "genuine freedom of expression".⁷¹ It was planned, initially, that for the first year the papers would be placed under interim editors appointed by the government, who would work closely with the sector representatives who had been elected to a "Civil Association" in each paper. It was decreed that the papers should express the aspirations, necessities, appreciations, criticisms, and points of view of the respective sectors, but within the parameters of the Revolution. The government appointed editors who were sympathetic towards the military regime, and in designating the appropriate sector representatives, important organiza-

70. For details about sectoral allocation of newspapers, see Dennis Gilbert, "Society, Politics, and the Press: An Interpretation of the Peruvian Press Reforms of 1974", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.21, No.3, August 1979, p.380.

71. President Velasco, quoted in Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1974, Vol.20, p.26683.

tions hostile towards the government were denied access.⁷² The complete transfer of the papers to the sectors was not carried out as the government did not relinquish its formal control over the papers and the power to appoint the editors.

The control of the Press by the military government meant significant change in the role of the press, considering the fact that at least two newspapers -- El Comercio and La Prensa -- were setting the agenda for national debate under the previous civilian government.⁷³ Perhaps it is true that the press did not lose its freedom under the military regime as it did not enjoy any during the civilian regime.⁷⁴ During the civilian regime, the press was controlled by the pattern of ownership by a small circle of wealthy families and the oligopsonistic power of a few advertisers. Therefore the press under the civilian regime voiced the opinions of its owners and patrons. But the direct takeover of it by the government effected a qualitative change in the role of the press in at least two ways: First, the press could no longer put pressure on the

73. For details, see, Gilbert, n.70, p.383.

74. Lowenthal, "Dateline Peru: A Sogging Revolution" in Foreign Policy, No.38, Spring 1980, p.165.

military regime to serve the oligarchy's interests. On the contrary, it became an object of direct governmental control. Secondly, it neither reflected the independent voices of the sectors to which it was allocated, as the "Civil Associations" of these sectors were practically ineffective.⁷⁵ Therefore, it is possible to say that the influence of the press on the government under the military regime was to a large extent neutralized.

Within eighteen months of assuming power, the military government had succeeded in effectively reducing the old political parties to impotence.⁷⁶ As most of the trade unions were aligned to one or the other existing political party, to neutralize their influence on the trade unions, the government launched a different type of participatory structures. (Notably, the Peruvian military regime had not established a mass party). These structures were constituted in such a way as to enable citizen participation in terms of their contribution to the implementation of attempted socio-economic reforms, but without threatening political disorder or constituting a broad-

75. Ibid., p.384.

76. Stephen Glissold, n.62, p.161.

based, mobilizable challenge to the military's pre-
dominance.⁷⁷ The industrial, mining, and fishing commu-
nities and the various types of agricultural coopera-
tives that were established, served as structures
which both define and confine the popular participa-
tion to the local spheres. These structures, though
officially intended to bridge the distinct local-
national dichotomy in the military regime's partici-
patory system, had little functional importance as
their strictly circumscribed duties prevent them from
extending local influence to policy-making at the
national level.⁷⁸

To coordinate local participation units, the
National Social Mobilization Support System (SINANOS)
was established on June 24th, 1971. This governmental
agency was primarily designed to insure that political
parties, pressure groups, and foreign ideologies do
not take advantage of citizen organizations for their
"private" benefit.⁷⁹ The geographic organization of

77. See, Kevin J. Middlebrook and David Scott
Palmer, Military Government and Political
Development: Lessons from Peru (Sage Publi-
cations, Beverly Hills, 1975) p.17.

78. Ibid., p.18.

79. Ibid., p.18. For a detailed discussion of the
organizational format and functioning of
SINANOS, see Ibid., pp.18-26.

SINANOS more or less conformed to that of the military. And the generals in charge of the principal military regions of Peru, with a few exceptions, were also in charge of the corresponding regions of SINAMOS.⁸⁰ The organization of popular participation under SINAMOS consisted of a carefully ordered hierarchy involving central, regional, zonal and local offices, as well as offices representing sectoral, as opposed to territorial groupings. The SINAMOS performed the role of a "gate keeper" of the new system in channelizing the demands from the bottom in an official and bureaucratized manner. Thus, the organization of political participation under the military regime neutralized the influence of political parties and other organized groups that were hostile to the regime and put the mobilization process under the leadership of the military personnel themselves.

With all the pressures and influences that worked on the previous civilian regime being thus reduced or eliminated to a large extent, the military government of Peru was left with only one major constituency to which it was responsible: The military institution.

80. See Julio Cotler, "The New Mode of Political Domination in Peru", in A.F. Lowenthal (ed), n.67, p.76.

Therefore, one can reasonably trace the policies of the military government to the military institution. Since the Peruvian military institution cannot be said to be a monolith,⁸¹ the major shifts in the direction of policies could be traced to the corresponding shifts in the power equations within the military institution.⁸² These shifts might be a result of the changing nature of the country's problems and the officers' assessment of them. But the important point to be noted here is that there is very little possibility of a direct influence on these shifts from the civilian constituencies.

To sum up, the military personnel of Brazil and Peru had displayed distinct characteristics and were different from the civilian politicians in their

81. Kimudi, n.36, p.3.

82. From within the military institution, the most important influence that worked on the government was exerted by Comite de la Presidencial (COAP), a specially created all-military presidential staff which was primarily charged with developing and coordinating legislation. For details, see Lowenthal, n.67, pp.37-39.

view of politics, the management of the State, national interest and the means to effectively realize it. Largely because of their attitudes and characteristics, the regimes they established were very much different from the civilian regimes they had overthrown. Both the military regimes, by and large, effected quantitative and qualitative changes in the influences that work on the government by keeping to the minimum the influence of the legislature, the judiciary, the organized political groups, the press and other groups from the society. In both the countries, their respective military institutions remained as the main influences on their governments.

CHAPTER - III

FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR OF BRAZIL BEFORE AND
AFTER THE 1964 MILITARY COUP D'ETAT

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1. Before the 1964 Coup D'etat

Brazilian foreign policy may be broadly divided into three phases on the basis of the dominant themes pursued.¹ The first phase which lasted until 1917 was mainly concerned with territorial diplomacy that consolidated the frontiers. The second phase which coincided with the inter-war period saw Brazil initiated into extra-continental affairs. The third phase which began in 1945 after the World War II may be said to be characterized by Brazil's search for an effective direction in world affairs. Though it is the third phase that is more relevant for the purposes of this study, the first two phases merit a brief survey as they were the foundations of Brazil's present foreign policy.

1. This division into phases is not without overlapping and perhaps cannot be so as the preoccupations of a State during one phase do not completely disappear at the beginning of the following phase. In the case of Brazil, territorial problems have not been fully solved by 1917. See, Nelson De Souza Campaio, "The Foreign Policy of Brazil", in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth E. Boulding (eds.) Foreign Policies in a World of Change (Harper & Row Publishers, New York, N.Y., 1953), p.626.

During the first phase, in addition to a concern with the expansion and consolidation of the territory, the Brazilian foreign policy was aimed at evolving a buffer zone consisting of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia to prevent other major powers -- Argentina, Peru, and Chile -- from gaining dominance over the South American heartland.² The main architect of Brazilian foreign policy in this period was Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Baron of Rio Branco. He was successful in bloodlessly incorporating more than 200,000 square kilometers into Brazilian territory. He gave great importance to a close relationship with the United States and shifted Brazil's diplomatic focus from London to Washington.³ This trend set by Rio Branco was to continue for a long time and sometimes even at the cost of particular interests of Brazil.⁴ The Brazilian

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2. Brady B. Tyson, "Brazil" in Harold Eugene Davis and Larman C. Wilson (eds.) Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis (The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1975), p.227.
 3. E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy", Journal of Inter-American Studies (Florida) Vol.IX, No.2, April 1967, p.198.
 4. Riordan Roett and William Perry, "Recent Trends in Brazilian Foreign Policy", The World Today (London) Vol.33, No.8, August 1977, p.296.

relationship with the United States had virtually developed into an "unwritten alliance" between the two.⁵

In the inter-war years, for a brief period, Brazil played a role on the world stage. She entered the World War I on the allied side and subsequently became a member of the League Council and continued until 1926. She took a strong position against the League extending to all countries the programme of protection of national minorities carried on by the world body. However, frustrated in her desire to become a permanent member of the League Council, Brazil withdrew herself from it in 1926.⁶

Getulio Vargas who seized power in 1930 was largely uninterested in foreign policy affairs and rarely attempted to set guidelines for his diplomats.⁷ He had a brief flirtation with the Axis powers but ended it under the pressure and persuasion of the US.

5. The term "unwritten alliance" was popularized by the historian E. Bradford Burns in The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian American Relations (Columbia University Press, New York, 1961).

6. De Sousa Sampaio, n.1, p.629.

7. Brady B. Tyson, n.2, p.229.

Vargas, however, used his bargaining leverage to acquire the resources from the US to build Brazil's first major steel mill in 1939. This was perhaps the first time in Brazil that foreign policy was consciously used to aid national economic development. Also, this was the first time that Brazilian nationalism and national development were identified in the public mind with foreign policy.⁸

During the second term of Vargas' Presidency, he associated himself with the nationalists who saw the American corporations more burdensome than beneficial. Consequently Vargas took a number of measures to control foreign investment and remittance of profits. In 1953-54, he terminated the US corporations' efforts to exploit Brazilian oil resources and set up a State corporation, Petrobras, with a monopoly of petroleum production.⁹

Vargas' foreign policy was not revolutionary in its international orientation, but its significance lies in the introduction of nationalism as an important input into its formulation.

8. Ibid., p.230.

9. Robert Vernon, The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1981), p.20.

The consequences of the infusion of nationalism and populism as inputs into the making of foreign policy did not immediately manifest in their entirety. The dynamics of modernization, the rising aspiration for economic development and the practice of populist politics combinedly resulted in the acceptance of 'developmentalism', at least as a rhetoric, as the major national goal both domestically and internationally during the term of President Juscelino Kubitschek (1955-1961). Under him Brazilian foreign policy was inspired by the consciousness of her being a developing country.¹⁰

President Kubitschek was dissatisfied with Brazil's role in international affairs. He said, "On the world scene, we do not participate except symbolically in the directing of international relations, nor are we often heard or consulted...All this is no longer agreeable..."¹¹ Brazil under Kubitschek initially acted

10. Jose Honorio Rodrigues, "The Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy", in Carlos Alberto Astiz (ed.), Latin American International Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities, and the National Interest of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame and London, 1969), p.210.

11. Quoted in Jon H. Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: Developmentalism and Beyond", Orbis, Vol. 16, no. 1, Spring, 1972, p.58.

with the belief that integrating herself firmly in the Western economic system would lead to economic development. Accepting the thesis of interdependence propagated by the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, efforts were made to attract foreign capital to Brazil to aid the national development.

But Brazilian national sentiments were hurt when the United States in 1956 refused to sell Brazil an aircraft carrier because of Argentine objections. Decidedly annoyed, the Brazilian government ordered a carrier from Britain.¹² Brazil started moving towards the establishment of better relations with Spanish America, thereby attempting to reduce her reliance on the US. Brazilian leadership in Latin America implied opposition to the US. Kubitschek became critical of the US for neglecting Brazil and even questioned the value of loyalty. He began exploring the possibilities of trade with the Communist countries, even though there were no official relations with the communist bloc since the beginning of the Cold War.

12. Robert Merson, n.9, p.22.

Brazil also began to develop more intimate relations with the newly independent African nations. In accordance with a United Nations resolution, the Brazilian ambassador to South Africa was recalled during 1960, and in the same year, Brazil supported the United Nations declaration on the Concession of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries.¹³ It is important to note that these actions were taken even though Brazil had signed a treaty of Friendship and Consultation with Portugal in 1955, and South Africa was Brazil's major African trading partner.

Kubitschek devoted the last two years of his Presidency largely to initiating and then to trying to vitalize a scheme for the economic development of Latin America and stimulation of Pan Americanism. The programme, proposed in 1958, was named "Operation Pan America", and was similar in style to the Marshall Plan. The United States was embarrassed by the proposal and finally did not respond favourably.

The policies of economic nationalism and independence the Brazilian government attempted to practice

13. H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Brazil Among the Nations", International Journal (Toronto), Vol. 26, No. 3, Summer 1969, pp. 551-52.

were symbolized in the dramatic rejection by Kubitschek of the fiscal austerity imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as conditions for a loan. During this period, Brazil signed trade agreements with the Soviet Union and other East European countries and also sent trade missions to these countries.¹⁴

Towards the end of Kubitschek's term of office, Brazil's relations with the United States became less cordial, particularly in the areas of finance and investment.

Till the late 1950s, Brazil had no clearly formulated policy on the limitation of nuclear armaments. President Kubitschek took interest and attached much importance to world disarmament. His logic was that if the developed countries spent large sums on arms, the developing countries would be deprived of the funds which were very necessary for their development. He felt that the developing countries should benefit from the resources released by a reduction of expenditure on armaments. At the opening session of the Twelfth United Nations General Assembly in 1958, the Brazilian representative put forward this idea. Two

14. Robert Werson, n.s., p.22.

years later at the Ninth General Assembly Session, this position was stated more formally by the Brazilian foreign minister Honoracio Lafer.¹⁵

For the first time in Brazil, international problems assumed importance in the 1960 Presidential campaign.¹⁶ Janio Quadros won the Presidency promising more development, more nationalism, an end to corruption, and an efficient administration. Quadros believed that Brazilian economic development could only occur if the centres of economic decision-making power in Brazil could be 'Brazilianized'. During his brief Presidency (he resigned abruptly in 1961) Quadros clearly formulated what came to be known as the Independent Foreign Policy.

Quadros had declared that Brazil had given up "the subsidiary and innocuous diplomacy of a nation aligned with worthy though alien interests..."¹⁷ Admitting that by geographical situation, historical, cultural and Christian background, Brazil was a predominantly

15. H. Jon Rosenbaus and Glenn M. Cooper, "Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", International Affairs (London), Vol.46, No.1, January 1970, I.n.5, p.76.

16. De Causa Sampaio, n.1, p.639.

17. In his article, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.40, No.1, October 1961, p.19.

Western nation, and common ideals of life and organization drew Brazil and the major nations of the Western bloc, he however, declared that he could not accept "a set of national position exclusively on the basis of the above premises."¹⁸ Quadros also recognized that Brazil's economic situation "coincides with the duty of forming a single front in the battle against underdevelopment and all forms of oppression" with the neighbouring countries of Latin America and with the Afro-Asian nations.¹⁹

During Quadros' Presidency, the main elements of Brazilian foreign policy may be stated as follows:²⁰

1. Brazil would deal with the East and with the West; she was no longer exclusively oriented towards the US or to the inter-American point of view, but rather toward a global point of view.
2. She would enter into ties without regard to the line of demarcation between the ideological or power political groups.

18. Ibid., p.21.

19. Ibid., p.22.

20. See Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy: From Nonalignment to Solidarity With the West", in Carlos Axtiz (ed.), n.10, p.275.

3. She would keep out of the present political struggle for supremacy in the world and would not remain allied to any of the major powers.

Brazilian foreign policy was not merely cast to be neutral in the cold war between the two power blocs. Brazil began to play an active and positive role in the world affairs by espousing the cause of the Third World countries and declaring her opposition to racial discrimination. "Anti-racism on the international plane", Quadros declared, was "merely a corollary of the Brazilian 'ideology' of being a racial democracy".²¹ Brazil's policy towards the Afro-Asian nations was based on the opposition to colonialism and racialism. The anti-colonial policies specifically formulated with Angola and Mozambique in view led to the tensions with the Salazar government of Portugal. Under Quadros, Brazil played an active role in the efforts to stem the nuclear armaments race.

Quadros attempted to establish friendly relations with Cuba even in the face of strong US opposition. He conferred the Order of the Southern Cross -- the highest

21. Quoted in De Sousa Campos, n.1, p.636.

Brazilian award -- on Che Guevara. Quadros persistently refused to negotiate with the US on Cuba. He told his emissaries to the US to inform President Kennedy that Brazil's position on Cuba was not negotiable.²²

In contrast to Kubitschek's belief that international influence and 'real' independence would result only from economic advancement, Quadros thought that the development process itself might be used to increase Brazil's prestige, and an exercise of greater diplomatic independence might improve the country's economic position. He, therefore, tried to stimulate foreign trade with East European countries, the Soviet Union, and Africa -- a process which was timidly initiated by Kubitschek -- and attracted economic assistance from new sources declaring Brazil's independence from the Western bloc led by the United States. Quadros also sent a trade mission to Communist China in search of markets for Brazil's products.²³

After the abrupt resignation of Quadros, the Vice-President Joao Goulart, who was in China on a trade mission, was recalled to assume the leadership of Brazil.

22. Rosenbaum, n.13, p.534.

23. Burns, n.3, p.204.

Like Quadros, Goulart too understood national development and dignity to mean more independence from the United States' influence and control. Initially, however, he tried to allay the fears that had developed in the US under the Quadros administration. He said that Brazil was following an independent line only on some foreign policy issues and was above all a western country.²⁴ But the independent line followed on "some issues" was enough to create an estrangement between Brazil and the United States.

In the January 1962 Punta del Este Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Organization of American States, Brazil abstained from voting for the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS. And during the second half of 1963, Brazil became the foremost Latin American opponent of the anti-Cuban measures that the United States sought to make the hemispheric policy.²⁵

Goulart continued the policy of Quadros by welcoming a Chinese trade mission to Rio de Janeiro and by establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow and

24. Jon Roscnbaum, n.13, p.536.

25. Werson, n.9, p.27.

other East European countries, which were suspended since 1947.²⁶

Goulart called his foreign policy as one of "development, disarmament, and decolonization", known as the 3Ds.²⁷ Brazil, along with Mexico and India, took a leading part in developing nuclear test ban proposals for the non-aligned bloc at the 17-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. In the General Assembly meeting of 15 January, 1962, Brazilian representative called upon Portugal to take the lead in freeing Angola and transforming that country into a friendly independent country.²⁸ Goulart tried to project a foreign policy that would make Brazil a spokesman for and leader of the Third World.

In 1961, a law was passed (which, however, came into effect only shortly before the fall of Goulart) limiting the repittance of profits of the foreign corporations to 10 per cent of investment. These measures drew adverse reaction from the United States. During

26. Burns, n.3, p.204.

27. Tyson, n.2, p.232.

28. Rosenbaum, n.15, p.536.

Goulart's Presidency, USAID directed most of its loans to state governors who were selected by the US government. This was called the islands of sanity policy of the US. In the fiscal years of 1961, 1962 and 1963, the total assistance from AID to Brazil was only \$177.6 million.²⁹

By the time Goulart was overthrown, the main elements of Brazilian foreign policy can be summarized as follows:

1. Disengagement from the Cold War and independence from the influence and control of the United States;
2. Anti-racism, anti-colonialism and defense of the principle of self-determinations of peoples, and disarmament;
3. Increasing relationship with African and Asian countries;
4. Maintenance of commercial and diplomatic relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc;
5. Efforts to achieve leadership in Latin America and the Third World.

29. Tyson, n.2, p.235.

The policy was a coherent and carefully thought-out effort at wresting the greatest political and economic advantage possible for Brazil from the prevailing crisis within the Western hemisphere and the world at large.³⁰ Brazil's diplomatic vision widened to include the whole world within its scope as she spread out her diplomatic missions in such areas as Albania, Algeria, Ceylon, and Thailand. She made efforts to disengage herself from the cold war alignments and pursued an active role in the United Nations. Contrary to her traditional policy of isolation and passiveness in the OAS, Brazil, especially during the Quadros-Goulart years, pursued an active role and constantly engaged in US baiting. At the annual review meeting of the Alliance for Progress in November 1963, President Goulart asserted that Latin America's problems could be solved by the joint action of cooperating Latin American countries without reliance on "palliatives" from industrialized countries. Goulart even questioned the validity of the Alliance for Progress as a useful method of assisting Latin American development.

30. Frank Bonilla, "Brazil Challenges United States Leadership" American Universities Field Staff Reports (East Coast South America Series) Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1962, p. 1.

Brazil vigorously pleaded for world disarmament. She argued that non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but merely a step towards complete and general disarmament. The Brazilians, realizing that there was an intimate relationship between disarmament and development, urged at various international forums that money spent by the Powers on arms be transferred to programmes designed to fight poverty in the underdeveloped countries. She implored the nuclear powers to accept a programme of "disarmament, inspection, and economic reconversion". She took a leading role in framing the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlateloco).³¹

Because of her policies of anti-racism, decolonization, and disarmament, Brazil came closer to the Third World nations and began to express solidarity with them against the richer nations.

By the beginning of 1964, the nationalist and independent orientation in Brazil's foreign policy reached dizzy heights.

31. Rosentbaum and Cooper, n. 15, pp. 76-77.

2. After the 1964 Coup d'etat

When the armed forces overthrew the civilian regime on 1 April, 1964, a United Nations Third World Conference was in progress. The Brazilian position in its debates was immediately changed from mounting an attack on the rich industrialized nations to taking a position more favourable to the United States.³² More dramatic changes in the external behaviour of Brazil followed as a consequence of a complete reorientation of her foreign policy.

Rejecting the nationalist and independent policy pursued by the previous civilian governments, the President, Gen. Humberto Castelo Branco declared, "In order to pursue the national objectives that were extolled, there were two options which were compatible with the preservation and development of Brazilian self-determination: a policy of independence or a neutralist position. The expression 'policy of independence' has been disfigured and has lost descriptive utility. It was presented as an unavoidable innovation, failing to recognize that the concept of independence alone is operational only after the practical conditions are determined.

32. Werson, n.9, p.50.

You treat it as an objective end not a method. In the present context of a confrontation of bi-polar power, with radical political-ideological divergence between the two respective centres, the preservation of independence presupposes the acceptance of a certain amount of interdependence, whether in the military field, in economics, or in politics".³³ The military regime viewed the international scene as a "gigantic confrontation" between the East and the West in which no neutral position was possible and Brazil must choose sides. As essentially a Western nation upholding Christian values, the new leaders felt, Brazil must ally herself with the Western bloc led by the United States. Behind this policy there was also an obsession with security which was perceived as endangered by the communist influence.³⁴ Since communism was an international movement, the defence of the nation required appropriate external (as well as internal) policies.

33. Brazil, Ministerio das Relacoes Exteriores, Departamento de Administracao, Divisao de Documentacao Secao de Publicacoes, A Diplomacia de Revolucao Brasileira, Discurso de Presidente Castelo Branco (Rio, 1964) quoted in Rosenbaum, n. 13, pp. 938-39.

34. Burns, n. 3, pp. 207-208.

Foreign Minister Vasco Leitaó da Cunha had stated that the objectives of Brazil's foreign policy were: "To defend the traditional policy of the good neighbour in America and the security of the continent against aggression and subversion, whether external or internal; to strengthen all the ties with the United States our great neighbour and friend of the North; to broaden our relations with Western Europe and with the Western community of nations".³⁵ His successor, Juracy Magalhães reiterated the same guidelines in a major foreign policy speech. He acknowledged the United States as the "unquestionable leader of the free world" and the "principal guardian of the fundamental values of our civilization". The Foreign Minister asserted that Brazil's relationship with the US which was an "ally for over 140 years" must be especially intimate and cooperative.

Within weeks after the coup, Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and became one of the most actively anti-Castro regimes in the hemisphere. For a short time during the late 1964, Brazil even considered setting up a Cuban Government-in-Exile in Rio de Janeiro.³⁷

35. Interview on national network of radio and television, July 6, 1964. Quoted in Burns, n.3, p.207.

36. Quoted in Burns, n.3, p.207.

37. Rosenbaum, n.13, p.540.

At the Ninth Inter-American Conference of the OAS held in Washington in July 1964, Brazil introduced the outline of a statement to the Cuban people which expressed the hope that Cuba would rid herself in the near future of the oppressive tyranny of the communist regime and would establish in the country a government freely elected by the people that would guarantee respect for basic human rights.³⁸ Brazil played a leading role in the efforts to obtain a vote for an inter-American diplomatic and economic quarantine of the Cuban regime.

Brazil fully supported the United States intervention into the Dominican Republic and even sent troops to aid the Inter-American Peace Force in the operations. She became most enthusiastic supporter of a permanent Inter-American Peace Force and Foreign Minister Magalhaes visited seven South American capitals to urge support for the Force. These moves were justified in the name of the principle of self-determination. The military regime argued that it participated in the Inter-American Peace Force to prevent extra-continental intervention and to guarantee the self-determination of the Dominican people.

38. De Lubric, n.10, p.282.

In August 1964, President Castelo Branco expressed solidarity with the United States in connection with the Tonkin Gulf incident, when the North Vietnamese boats allegedly attacked US destroyers. Brazil even expressed a desire to send troops, and there were negotiations in 1965 and 1966. Finally, however, only a medical team was sent from Brazil.³⁹ The Foreign Minister Vasco Leites da Cunha stated that Brazil would "go to war in the event that the war in Southeast Asia should develop into a world wide conflict".⁴⁰

These measures brought Brazil closer to the United States. USAID had increased from \$117.8 million during 1961, 1962, and 1963 to \$490.6 million during 1964, 1965, and 1966,⁴¹ and the US had decided to grant Brazil a preferred status. The Johnson administration urged for a stronger international role for Brazil and offered to share with her the responsibility of Latin American security.⁴² Brazilian government repealed the 1961 law that restricted the repatriation of profits by foreign corporations. Castelo Branco accused the economic nationalism of the previous governments as "false nationalism" and equated it to pro-communism.

39. Werson, n.9, p.50.

40. Quoted in De Dubnic, n.10, p.274.

41. Tyson, n.2, p.235.

42. Rosenbaum, n.11, p.62.

Attempts by the previous civilian governments to play a major role in Latin America and in World affairs, were suspended and the new leaders were satisfied to lead Latin America by receiving delegated power as the main US agent in the hemisphere. The new leaders felt that Brazilian security depended upon effectively combatting subversion and indirect aggression in Brazil and in other parts of Latin America. To this end Brazil and other more developed Latin American countries should act as sub-leaders to protect the weaker countries from infiltration, thus placing collective security ahead of national sovereignty.⁴³

Brazil under Castelo Branco did not show much enthusiasm about increasing relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Castelo Branco declared that Brazil was ready to trade with anyone, even with the East, but only if such commerce "did not serve as the vehicle for unacceptable influences".⁴⁴ He made it clear that Brazil identified herself with the Western World in its struggle to protect her values threatened by the Soviet sphere.

43. Verson, n.9, p.51.

44. Quoted in Burns, n.3, p.195.

The Government of Castelo Branco showed less concern for world disarmament efforts. Under his administration Brazil began to criticize the diplomacy of international non-proliferation efforts. The Foreign Minister Juracy Magalhães warned that non-proliferation could not be achieved by a simple veto of the nuclear Powers but depended on the voluntary abdication of the non-nuclear countries. At the UN Disarmament Conference of 1966, Brazil gave a hint (and thus laying down the foundation) of her future reservations to the NPT. The Brazilian representative stated: "Among the reservations which could be made to the treaty, there is the fear that the non-nuclear Powers, by signing it, should not only be giving up the possibility of having the most dreadful weapons man's imagination has ever devised, but, at the same time, should be foregoing the benefits which derive from the peaceful uses of atomic energy".⁴⁵ About the Treaty of Tlateloco, the Castelo Branco administration voiced concern that it would cause difficulties for the defence of the Free World if Puerto Rico and Panama Canal Zone were not included in the proscribed area.

45. Delegation of Brazil, United Nations, "Statement by Ambassador Antonio Correa do Lago, Leader of the Brazilian Delegation to the Disarmament Conference", March 1, 1966, quoted in Rosenbaum and Cooper, n.15, p.77.

In all the major foreign policy statements by the Castelo Branco administration, Third World issues received very little mention. The main focus was always the United States and Western Europe. The military government's indifference towards the Third World was symbolized by the suspension of funds to the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiaticos (Brazilian Institute of Afro-Asian Studies).

The military government of Castelo Branco had changed Brazil's policy of decolonization and began to support Portugal in her struggle to retain the colonies in Africa. Foreign Minister Magalhães, during his visit to Lisbon, reacted sympathetically to a suggestion that a Luso-Brazilian-African community be established with Brazil and Portugal sharing control of Angola.⁴⁶ Brazil infuriated the African diplomats accredited to Brasilia during January 1967, by sending Brazilian sailors on a training cruise to Angola. A Brazilian Foreign office statement denied that the cruise had any political implications and stated that the ships were going to Angola at the invitation of the Portuguese authorities and would have gone to any African country if invited.

46. Rosenbaum, n.13, p.539.

But it was well known in the diplomatic circles that Ghana's ambassador to Brazil in fact tried unsuccessfully for five months to persuade the Brazilian government to send the ships to Ghana or to any independent African country rather than to Angola.⁴⁷

The military government under Castelo Branco was preoccupied with security and at the same time was aware of the nexus between security and development. But in the policy formulation security concerns received more emphasis than the concerns of economic development. Therefore the government of Castelo Branco adopted a foreign policy that had as its primary goal the maintenance of Brazil's security from external aggression and internal subversion. Both these threats were perceived as emanating from radical ideologies and/or international communist movement and guerilla movements which, the Brazilian generals felt, had sympathy and some direction from Cuba. This perception led Brazil to adopt a policy of allying with the Western bloc led by the United States to fight international communism, and rejecting the neutralist and pro-Third World policy of the previous civilian governments. Rather than gearing foreign

47. Ibid., pp.539-540.

policy to an aggressive campaign for economic development like the civilian governments, the Military government under Castelo Branco stressed defence against imagined threats of invasion from Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, and other weak neighbours.

It can be stated that Brazil's foreign policy after the military coup d'etat had departed from the policy of the previous civilian government mainly on the following points:

1. With regard to the relationship with Castro's Cuba; making efforts to achieve Latin American leadership independent of the US;
2. With regard to the goals of merging the underdeveloped countries as a third force against the developed countries; decolonization, and disarmament;
3. Disengagement from the Cold War and the effort for a stronger economic and cultural ties with the Soviet bloc and People's Republic of China.

In early 1967, Gen. Costa e Silva succeeded Castelo Branco to the Presidency and the period of

transition from the old to the new administration gave an opportunity for a reassessment of policy. The military intellectuals had felt that the root of continued agitation in the country was to be found not only in the activities of subversive groups but also in the lack of social integration or the excessive gaps between various social classes in terms of wealth and social welfare. It was felt that the policy which stressed security concerns was only a step toward achieving the development of the Brazilian society, and not the end in itself. They saw that Brazil would not have security from internal subversion until the country was developed. Costa e Silva, therefore, wished to use foreign policy as an instrument for achieving developmental goals.

The Foreign Minister of the new administration Magalhães Pinto stated: "We want to mobilize the potentialities of this House (The Foreign Office) in order to put diplomacy at the service of prosperity."⁴⁸ The title

48. Brazil, Ministerio das Relacoes Exteriores, Secretaria General Adjunta para of Planejamento Politico, Documentos de Politica Externa (15 March to 15 October, 1967) Rio de Janeiro, 1967, p.2, quoted in Rosenbaum n.11, p.63.

of his initial foreign policy pronouncement "A Diplomacy of Prosperity" became the principal theme of policy.

The diplomacy of prosperity had mainly focussed on three topics: (1) foreign commerce; (2) economic cooperation; (3) and technical assistance.⁴⁹ Foreign commerce was to be encouraged through the expansion and diversification of markets and exports and by seeking higher prices for Brazilian products sold abroad. For purposes of economic cooperation, Brazil wished to acquire additional financial assistance, favourably alter the conditions of borrowing, and diversify the sources of aid by depending largely on multilateral lenders.

Brazil under Costa e Silva most avidly sought modern technology. Perhaps this was the main reason for her reservations to the non-proliferation efforts. The administration felt that without the development of nuclear energy, the nation would be unable to compete economically in the future with the world powers. When signing the Treaty of Tlateloco, the Costa e Silva administration insisted that the Treaty does not oblige

49. For details, *ibid.*, p.64.

Brazil to refrain from producing nuclear instruments for peaceful purposes even when the explosions carried out involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons.⁵⁰ At Geneva in 1967, Brazilian representative declared that Brazil would produce nuclear devices for civilian uses "as soon as possible".

In response to the criticism of the nationalist faction within the military that Brazil was more and more "Canadianized" or "Puerto Ricanized", the administration acted to assert symbolically its independence. Brazil formally withdrew her support for the Inter-American Peace Force proposal. This move was more of symbolic significance than of significant departure from the earlier policy because by then the proposal lost its relevance. Brazil also attempted to broaden her relations with the industrial world. Arms were purchased from Britain, thus breaking the long US monopoly on Brazil's arms supplies. Brazil also started taking Third World positions and played an important role in the formation of the Group of 77 in the year 1968.⁵¹

50. Rosenbaum and Cooper, n.15, p.77.

51. Verson, n.9, p.58.

Brazil under Costa e Silva began to assume an active role in Latin America. She had taken a leading part in the creation of the Special Commission for Latin American Coordination (CECLA) which was designed to present a unified Latin American stand on matters of general concern for Latin America. However, she was careful enough to explain and demonstrate to the US that CECLA was not motivated by any wish to threaten the US interests in the area.⁵² But she did not display such enthusiasms for the Latin American Common Market concept.

Brazil's position on Africa and decolonization, however, remained unchanged. She continued to maintain friendly ties and important trade contacts with Portugal. Brazil also continued to have cordial relations with the Republic of South Africa, notwithstanding the latter's practice of apartheid.

Gen. Emilio Garrastazu Medici, who succeeded Costa e Silva, said in one of his first foreign policy statements, "The essential goal of my government can be

52. Rosenbaum, n.13, pp.541-42.

summed up in one single word: development."⁵³ His administration sought to use foreign policy as a means to acquire scientific and technological knowledge. Medici stated: "Brazil wishes to have its hands free in all sectors of scientific research and of peaceful application of its unlimited sources of energy, and refuses to compromise its future in binding itself to international commitments in which it is denied the rights and prerogatives allegedly the privilege of some."⁵⁴ Brazil under him more vehemently refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Brazil had extended the territorial sea limits to 200 miles which also included jurisdiction of overflights. She actively canvassed for the idea at the Special Latin American Coordination Committee, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) and at the Montevideo Conference on the sea. Brazil was so adamant in her claim that she did not budge in at the US persuasion during President Medici's 1971 visit to Washington, and during the US Secretary of State Rogers's trip to Brazil in 1973.⁵⁵ She even dissented from the

53. "Address by President Eulio Garrastazu Medici at the Ceremonies of Graduation of Diplomats of the Classes of 1968 and 1969 of the Instituto Rio Branco, Brasilia, April 20, 1970", News From Brazil (mimeo) (Embassy of Brazil, Washington) quoted in Rosenbaum, n. 11, p. 65.

54. Ibid., p. 66.

resolution of the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of the American States.⁵⁶ In 1971, there was even the danger of a confrontation between the US and Brazil over US shrimp fishing in Brazil's territorial sea.⁵⁷

As the Brazilian economy began to register impressive growth rates, the country's foreign policy no longer needed to conform to every wish of the donor nations, such as the US, in order to obtain economic assistance and investments. Aided also by the political "stability" at home and the relaxation of tensions in the international scene, Brazil started to assert her diplomatic independence to vigorously pursue her goals. During his 1971 visit to Washington, President Medici talked about gradually phasing out the US aid programme so that Brazil could deal with her on equal terms.⁵⁸ Brazilian foreign policy became more concerned

55. Michael Morris, "Trends in US-Brazilian Maritime Relations", Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol.27, No.3, Winter 1973, p.5.

56. *Ibid.*, pp.6-7.

57. *Ibid.*, p.23.

58. David N. Landry, "Brazil's New Regional and Global Roles", World Today (Washington, D.C.), Vol.137, No.1, Summer 1974, p.30.

with the questions of protectionism, the international monetary system, ownership of the seabed and territorial waters, arms sales, and so forth. Brazil began to oppose "containment" by the super powers, as by the UN Charter (giving great power status to France but denying it to Brazil), the NPT (closing the doors of the atomic club), international control of pollution, population control policies, and international trade structures favourable to the developed countries. All this brought Brazil closer to the Third World countries.

Till 1973, Brazil sided with Portugal in her bid to retain the African colonies. But when it became evident that the Angolan guerillas would win independence, she changed sides with a desire to increase her influence in Africa.⁵⁹ By this time, Brazilian foreign policy pronouncements had almost done away with the cold war ideological vocabulary. In 1974, diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China were established.

The concept of Brazil's international role was sketched out by President Medici in a series of concentric circles.⁶⁰ The first circle consisted of her

59. Vereon, n.9, p.61.

60. Lincoln Gordon, "Brazil's Future World Role", Orbis, Vol. 16, No. 3, Fall 1972, pp. 627-28.

neighbours in South America; the second, the Western hemisphere including the US and Canada; then a pair of somewhat divergent alternatives, "Western World" or "Christian World" or "Free World" on the one hand, and the less developed countries as a group on the other; and the fourth and final circle consisted of the global community.

By the time Gen. Ernesto Geisel assumed the Presidency in March 1974, Brazil achieved internal "stability" but faced a very uncertain international scene because of the energy crisis following the Arab oil policy, the possibility of a world recession and the culmination of detente into an "alliance" of the super powers against the third world to maintain the world balance of power.⁶¹

Since 1974, economic factors and energy crisis have dominated the formulation of Brazil's external policy. Brazil had to import eighty per cent of the oil she consumes to maintain her growing economy. And since the oil price hike, nearly two-fifths of her export earnings were spent to pay for the oil bill.⁶²

61. Tysan, n.2, p.240.

62. Ronald Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power (Westview Press, Colorado, 1976), p.3.

Brazilian diplomacy was increasingly geared to achieve free supply and to search for alternative sources. Brazilian policy at the United Nations was changed from pro-Israel to pro-Arab. In 1975, she voted for a UN General Assembly resolution that equated Zionism with racism. And in 1979, she recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as representative of the Palestinians. As nuclear energy is one of the alternative sources of energy, Brazil signed with West Germany an enormous deal of \$4 billion for the transfer of nuclear technology. In spite of heavy US pressure on Brazil to modify the deal, she did not yield.⁶³

During Gen. Geisel's administration, "No more automatic alignment" was the motto. In protest against the 'human rights assessments' by the State Department submitted to the US Congress in connection with the debate on the military aid bill, Brazil dramatically cancelled, in March 1977, a treaty of military aid with the US.⁶⁴ As ideology had become secondary to trade considerations, Brazil upgraded her relations with the communist States. In 1976, she recognized

63. For details, see Roger Fontaine, "End of a Beautiful Relationship", Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.), Vol.28, Fall 1977, pp.166-174.

64. Roett and Perry, n.4, p.299.

the Soviet-Cuban backed government in Angola. In order to diversify Brazil's relations, President Geisel had travelled to France, Britain, and Japan but stayed away from the US.

Brazil began playing an active role in drawing her neighbours into treaties of cooperation that favour Brazilian interests. In 1978, Treaty of Amazonia Cooperation was signed which provided for co-ordination among Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Ecuador, Surinam, and Brazil.⁶⁵ It was observed, however, that Brazil is concerned less with leading the Third World than with entering the First.⁶⁶

Brazil's present position in the international scene is well illustrated by President Jose Baptista Figuerido's (inaugurated in March, 1979) statement:

"We are no longer little boys to have our cars pulled".⁶⁷

65. For details on the Brazilian initiatives in the sub-continent in the economic, political, military/strategic and diplomatic areas, see, Norman A. Bailey and Ronald M. Schneider, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: A Case in Upward Mobility", Inter-American Economic Affairs, (Washington, D.C.), Vol.27, No.4, Spring 1974, pp.15-19.

66. Werson, n.9, p.61.

67. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.63.

Brazil's current Africa policy resembles that of the front-line black African states. In June 1980, the new Brazilian ambassador to Mozambique, while presenting his credentials to the President announced, "Brazil supports all the (Mozambican) positions in southern Africa".⁶⁸ The Brazilian Foreign Minister denounced South African incursions into Angola and Mozambique, and attacked the policy of apartheid as "a crime against humanity".

Brazil had increased her interaction with the Soviet Union and other Communist States. In 1980, Brazilian parliamentary delegations visited both the Soviet Union and China. In the 1970s, trade with the East European countries had increased seven-fold. Brazil condemned the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan and later, however, sent a full team for the Moscow Olympics. Ignoring the US calls for a grain boycott of the Soviet Union, Brazil signed, in July 1981, contracts to export 600,000 tons of soy, thus

68. Quoted in Jim Brooke, "Dateline Brazil: Southern Super Power", Foreign Policy, No. 44, Fall 1981, p. 173.

virtually wiping out the Soviet need to import it from the US. But relations with Cuba officially remain frozen, largely because of Cuba's aid to Brazilian guerillas in the 1970s.

Brazil rebuffed an initiative by the Reagan administration in July 1981, to enlist the Brazilian support for the US intervention into El Salvador.⁶⁹ She has not publicly supported any of the diplomatic initiatives by the US on El Salvador.

To sum up, the Brazilian foreign policy on the eve of the 1964 coup d'etat was aggressively nationalistic and asserted independence from the United States. But this policy was completely reversed immediately after the coup. Brazilian military leaders discarded the concept of 'independence' and accepted the Dullesian concept of 'interdependence'. The military regime saw an absolute necessity to take sides in the cold war confrontation between the super powers. It opposed Castro's government in Cuba, supported the Portuguese efforts to retain their African colonies and paid less attention to Third World issues and disarmament. On the whole there was a marked difference

69. Ibid., pp. 176-177.

between the policy pursued before the coup d'etat and after. The priorities were no longer Third World-oriented, but reflected an obsession with security concerns, both domestically and externally. The military regime viewed threats to national security as emanating from radicalization of politics and guerilla movements. There was a strong tendency within the military to suspect the involvement of Moscow and Havana in abetting the guerilla movements. Therefore the policy of strong anti-international communism was accorded the highest priority.

Since 1967, the military regime effectively realized the nexus between economic development and national security. There were considerable initiatives in the foreign economic policy since then but significant international political moves surfaced much later. And finally, with the registering of impressive growth rates by the Brazilian economy and the achievement of relative "stability" within the country, foreign policy became less political and more commercially-oriented. It was what the Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto termed as the "Diplomacy of

prosperity". Various foreign policy moves followed from this that almost resembled the 'Independent Foreign Policy' of the Quadros-Coulart years. But these moves can be satisfactorily explained by the changes in the economic factors, for by then the system of governance remained as a constant and the stage of economic development underwent a change. And immediately after the coup, the changes in the foreign policy behaviour of Brazil can be attributed to a change in the system of governance, as the other two factors, namely the stage of economic development and size, remained without any significant alterations. This causal relationship is shown in more detail in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER - IV

FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR OF PERU BEFORE AND AFTER
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1. Before the 1968 Coup d'etat

The striking feature of Peru's external behaviour was that the horizons of her diplomatic interaction were, by and large, confined to the Western hemisphere. The main issues that engaged her diplomacy were her necessity to forge a continental or a sub-regional defence system in order to preserve her independence and territorial integrity from her powerful neighbours and from possible encroachments by the European powers, and her relationship with the United States.

The factors that exerted dominant influence over the formulation of Peru's foreign policy were her geographical location and rich natural resources. Surrounded by powerful neighbours such as Chile, Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia, and with border disputes, Peru's international outlook was confined to the hemisphere even until the World War II. Her rich resources invited the presence of foreign economic interests, first of

the British and subsequently of the United States, that precluded the pursuance of an independent foreign policy.

Peru's concern with the establishment of a continental defence system was reflected in her participation in the Panama Conference of 1826 and the formation of the Peru-Bolivian confederation of 1836.¹ President Ramon Castilla (1845-51 and 1855-62) had reorganised Peru's diplomatic service and established many legations in other parts of Latin America and Europe. He took an active interest in the formation of a continental defence system. The fundamental goal of Peru's foreign policy during this period was to merge her national interests with those of other Spanish American Republics. But with the recedence of any possibility of a European armed intervention into the hemisphere, the objective of collective defence received less attention.

1. Thomas J. Dodd, "Peru: Foreign Policy: Directions, Problems and Choices", in Harold Eugene Davis and Larson C. Wilson (eds.) Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis (The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1975), pp.361-362.

After a humiliating defeat in the War of the Pacific, in a bid to recover her lost prestige, Peru concentrated on the settlement of boundary disputes. Since then the main theme of her foreign policy was bilateralism and territorial claims. Peru sought to settle her territorial disputes in accordance with the principle of uti possidetis as of 1810.² On the basis of this principle she claimed all the territory formerly under the jurisdiction of the Spanish colonial administration. Her claims were extensive as she was a Viceregal capital of Spain's New World Empire. Consequently, from the end of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the World War II, Peru frequently clashed with her neighbours, especially with Ecuador.³

During the World War II, Peru sided with the allied powers, but could not actively participate in the War as she herself was engaged in a border clash with Ecuador.

2. Ibid., p.365.

3. For details on Peru-Ecuador clashes, see Dale V. Slight, "The New Realities of Ecuadorian-Peruvian Relations: A Search for Causes", Inter-American Economic Affairs (Washington), Vol.27, No.1, Autumn 1975, pp.3-14.

Peru maintained cordial relations with the United States since the beginning of the twentieth century. She supported the US positions on almost all matters of hemispheric importance, such, as the acquisition of Panama Canal rights, all the inter-American Conferences, the Act of Havana (1940), the Rio Pact (1947), and in nearly all matters between the United States and the OAS. Peru, however, sought US economic aid and military assistance and support in her disputes with the neighbours, in return for her support to the US. Since the end of the World War II, Peru supported the US on almost all issues in the United Nations and on all Cold War issues. During these years, Peru entered into a number of defence and technical aid agreements with the US and in February 1952, signed a separate Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. US economic involvement in Peru also grew and by 1953, 74 per cent of the direct foreign investment in Peru was from the US.⁴

During the Korean War issue, Peru supported the US on every occasion. The Peruvian representative declared on the UN floor in January 1951, that "the

4. James C. Garay, Peru and the United States, 1900-1962 (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1964), p.119.

cause of the war was not the capitalist desire for profits, as the communists alleged, but rather the Soviet will to power".⁵ Peru felt that there was no course left but to declare China as aggressor. However, on the repatriation of prisoners of war she suggested compromises similar to the Indian proposal.⁶ She proposed for the establishment of a special committee to cooperate in the repatriation of the prisoners who chose to remain in a neutralized zone. They should thereafter be transported to neutral states ready to accept them or to the UN Trust Territories. In 1952, Peru, along with Chile and Ecuador, extended her jurisdiction over waters within 200 marine miles off the coast.⁷

Peru under Gen. Manuel A. Odría (1949-1956) gave "vigorous support" to the US intervention into Guatemala in 1954.⁸ In 1957, even before the actual onset of the cold war in Latin America, significantly,

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5. John A. Houston, Latin America in the United Nations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1956), p.123.
 6. Ibid., p.290.
 7. Herbert Goldhamer, The Foreign Powers in Latin America (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1972), p.12.
 8. L. Mehan, The United States and Inter-American Security (Austin, 1961), p.442.

President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche (1957-62) proposed linking the OAS with NATO. But the proposal was dropped when other countries of the hemisphere opposed it. He also called for a union of all Latin peoples in the New World and the old in order to forge what was vaguely termed a new Spanish force in international affairs.⁹ The Prado doctrine reflected some important practical considerations on the part of Peru. It sought to diversify Peru's export economy and enlarge the volume of trade with the European Common Market. During the mid-1950s, Peru opened additional diplomatic missions and concluded new commercial agreements with the European States.

Peru fully supported the US attempts to convert the OAS into an alliance against the international communism. In August 1960, the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the OAS was convened to review the situation that arose as a result of Nikita Khrushchev's hint at the possibility of Soviet missiles going into action in defence of Cuba. The Conference condemned communism and "extra-continental intervention", without mentioning Cuba. But even

9. J. Dodd, n.1, p.376.

this resolution roused considerable opposition and the Foreign Minister of Peru offered his resignation to President Prado, preferring not to sign the document as it was directed against Cuba though it was not mentioned by name. Then Peru's ambassador to the OAS signed the document. It is remarkable that the government of Peru preferred to sign it even when her own foreign minister had opposed it. It reflects Peru's decisive position against Cuba.

In the Autumn of 1961, Peru, along with Colombia, sought to convene a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS to get Cuba condemned by all Latin American countries. The Peruvian representative submitted a note to the Council of OAS, charging Cuba for:¹⁰

1. "Acts of force, intrinsically illegal, on the part of the ruling regime in Cuba, to the detriment of citizens of that nation and foreigners,...
2. Actions of international communism in the countries of America and incorporation of the Cuban Government in the Sino-Soviet bloc.

10. Quoted in General Secretariat, Organization of American States, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance: Applications, Vol. 2, 1960-1972 (Washington D.C., 1973), p. 61.

3. Communist infiltration by the Government of Cuba in the other countries of America...¹¹

The motive behind the Peruvian proposal was to appoint a committee to carry out "the study and investigation of the facts denounced by the Government of Peru" and in the event of a positive report from it, to impose collective sanctions against Cuba.¹¹ But the proposal drew opposition from countries like Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay, and in the wake of its unpopularity Peru had to withdraw it.

Colombia called for a meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS on November 9, 1961. The meeting was held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, and Peru alongwith Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and the Central American Republics, took a hard line and wished to impose harsh measures and sanctions on Cuba. In response to the Cuban missile crisis, Peru supported the OAS resolution calling for individual and collective action, including the use of armed force to halt the entry of the missiles from

11. Ibid., p.63.

becoming an active threat. Peru also offered troops to assist the measures.

During the later part of 1962, certain internal developments in Peru resulted in straining her relationship with the United States. In the elections held on 23 June, 1962, the US favoured the victory of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance candidate Victor Raul Hays de la Torre. But the Peruvian armed forces, due to their traditional rivalry with the APRA party, supported Fernando Belaunde Terry. Apprehending an APRA victory, the armed forces seized power (though temporarily) on July 18, 1962, and annulled the election. This drew a hostile reaction from the US. The US immediately suspended diplomatic relations with Peru and cancelled all important aid programmes.¹² It is argued that the US administration feared that the military junta would allow communists to gain positions of influence in Peru's government and labour unions. Also the US administration was not happy with the Peruvian military's political direction and its refusal to accept the prescription offered by Washington for Peru's problems of political instability, armed insurgency, and economic underdevelopment.¹³

12. John V. Van Cleave, "The Latin American Policy of President Kennedy: A Re-examination: Case: Peru", Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 4, Spring 1977, p. 30.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

In 1963, however, the armed forces relinquished power and under their supervision conducted elections. Backed by the armed forces, Fernando Belaunde Terry was elected President. Under Belaunde Terry, Peruvian foreign policy showed signs of independence and nationalism. Peru strongly disapproved the 1965 US intervention into the Dominican Republic and refused to support the US proposal to create an Inter-American Peace Force to occupy that country. At the Second Special Inter-American Conference held in Rio in November 1965, the US sought to get the approval for the creation of a permanent Inter-American Peace Force. Peru refused to endorse the proposal and asserted that the Council of OAS has not been given the power for the maintenance of peace. Under Belaunde, backed by the armed forces, Peru made attempts to diversify her external relations. From 1964-66, Presidents Heinrich Luebke of Germany and Charles de Gaulle of France and Britain's Foreign Secretary Michael Steward made highly publicized visits to Peru.¹⁴

However, Peru's dependence on the US continued and between 1956-65, she received \$103 million under

14. J. Dodd, n.1, p.376.

the US Military Assistance Programme (MAP).¹⁵ The US had near monopoly over arms supplies to Peru. By 1968, when the armed forces seized power, "more than 80 per cent of the industrial investment in Peru was foreign",¹⁶ a substantial part of which was owned by the US.

Until 1968, except for the mild attempts by Belaunde to assert independence, Peruvian foreign policy was by and large pro-US and confined to the hemispheric affairs. The observation that the "international outlook of the Latin Americans continues to be limited largely to the Western Hemisphere, and their primary concern is with the United States attitude and actions towards them"¹⁷, is perhaps best applicable to Peru's foreign policy behaviour until 1968.

16. Anibal Quijano, Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru A Study in Neo-imperialism. Translated by Helen K. Lane (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1971), p.30.

17. Paul S. Holbo, "Cold War Drift in Latin America", Current History, (Philadelphia), Vol.44, No.258, February 1963, p.65.

2. After the 1968 Coup d'etat

On October 3, 1968, the Peruvian armed forces overthrew the civilian regime of Belaunde for its alleged "moral decomposition". The military government declared its intention to follow policies that are "not of submission, but of dignity"¹⁸ to "make Peru economically independent."¹⁹ The new Foreign Minister Gen. Edgardo Mercado Jarrin declared that: "At the international level, we wished to consolidate the specific features of our country by independent, proud and sovereign behaviour enabling us to act with full liberty and to be present on the international scene in a manner that is in keeping with revolutionary thinking and the posture of Peru."²⁰ To realize the goal of creating a "new Peruvian man", the new regime proclaimed its intention to destroy imperialism, one of the traditional obstacles to the development of Peru.²¹

18. Erien Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., (eds.), The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1978), p.212.

19. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.17, 1970, p.24164.

20. Interview in Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol.22, No.515, 20 September, 1971, p.3.

21. J. Dodd, n.1, p.179.

In an attempt to realize these goals, the military government lost no time in expropriating and nationalizing the US-owned International Petroleum Company (IPC), the sugar plantations and chemical plants of W.R. Grace, and the vast mining properties of Cerro de Pasco. In response to these nationalizations, the US threatened to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment. The Amendment requires the US President to suspend aid to the nationalizing country if she does not pay "adequate" compensation within six months of nationalization. Finally, however, the US chose not to apply the Amendment but to negotiate. But the US assistance to Peru was reduced as a result of the IPC case.²²

The United States did not recognize Peru's 1952 claim for a 200-mile territorial waters. The military government sought to effectively implement the claim and seized all the US fishing vessels within the 200 miles and penalized for illegal fishing as they violated Peru's territorial waters. In retaliation, the US invoked Section 5(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (Pelly Amendment) which provides for suspension of

22. Goldhamer, n.7, p.179.

arms sales to a country which captures and penalises a US fishing vessel more than 12 miles off that country's coastline. The US applied pressure on Peru and finally suspended military aid. But Peru retaliated by capturing another US vessel and expelling the 70-man US Military Advisory and Assistance Group personnel.²³ On July 3, 1969, the US, however, lifted the suspension on arms sales. But again in 1973, the Peruvian navy captured 23 US fishing vessels and fined them \$742,860.²⁴

To offset the adverse effects of her strained relationship with the US, Peru attempted to diversify her external relations. She increased her interaction with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, Japan, began to increasingly identify herself with the Third World and attempted to normalize relations with her neighbours.

The Soviet official assessment was that Peru "was striving to find its own road to noncapitalist development" and that "once capitalism has been rejected",

23. Ibid., p. 175.

24. The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.),
12 April, 1973.

Peru would "choose the socialist road".²⁵ Peru established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on 2nd February, 1969. In connection with the signing of a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, Peruvian Foreign Minister Gen. Mercedes Jarrin said that the agreement "puts an end to the phase which channelled our trade in only one direction".²⁶ To some extent, this agreement helped Peru to withstand the investment freeze that followed the IPC nationalization. The Soviet grant of \$30 million in credit to purchase military hardware contributed to "break the strong US economic hold on Peru".²⁷ From 1970-1972, trade between the two countries registered a 27.5 fold increase. But the delayed and meagre aid provided by the Soviet Union during the 1970 Peruvian earthquake temporarily led to a drop in the Soviet prestige in Peru.²⁸ In September 1972, Peru signed a ten-year fisheries cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union for the survey and development of Peru's offshore

25. James D. Theberge, The Soviet Presence in Latin America (Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., New York, 1974), p.85.

26. The Times (London), 19 February, 1969.

27. The Daily Telegraph, 19 February, 1969.

28. Goldman, n.7, p.298.

waters and fishery resources. The USSR offered arms to Peru at discounted prices and low credit rates.²⁹ At the end of 1973, she supplied 200 T-55 tanks to Peru. With this, Peru became the first Latin American country, after Cuba, to purchase arms from the Soviet Union. In 1977 again, Peru purchased SU-22 fighter bombers from her. Relations with East European countries were also improved. During the period between 1968 and 1974, these countries provided \$175 million as economic credits to Peru. In 1973, the state mining companies of Romania and Peru established a jointly owned state mining enterprise to exploit the Atamina copper deposits.³⁰

Peru voted for the admission of People's Republic of China to the UN and soon after established diplomatic relations with her in 1971. In a joint communique, the Peruvian government called Taiwan "an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China" and the Chinese

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29. Norman M. Smith, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America", in Roger W. Fontaine and James D. Theberge (eds.) Latin America's New Internationalism: The End of Hemispheric Isolation (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976), p.265.
30. James D. Theberge, "Soviet, East European, and Chinese Communist Trade and Aid with Latin America: Scope and Trends", in Fontaine and Theberge (eds.), n.29, p.162.

government "recognized the sovereignty of Peru over two hundred miles of sea, adjacent to its coast".³¹ Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Peru has been exporting fishmeal, copper, lead and zinc to China.³² In 1971, China provided \$42 million aid to Peru.³³

Peru also improved her relations with Japan. Japan provided the following loans to Peru through governmental agencies: \$5,400 million in 1971 for electric power distribution network; \$13,600 million in 1972 for fertilizer plants; and \$4,000 million in 1972 for microwave construction project.³⁴ Peru supplies 4 per cent copper ore and 6 per cent iron ore of Japan's total consumption.³⁵

Peru under the military government adopted a favourable position towards Castro's Cuba and advocated

31. G.W. Crayson, "Peru's Revolutionary Government", Current History, Vol.66, No.378, February 1973, p.65.

32. J. Dodd, n.1, p.377.

33. Theberge, n.30, p.159.

34. Hiroya Ichikawa, "Japan's Economic Relationship with Latin America", in Fontaine and Theberge (eds.), n.29, p.75.

35. Ibid., p.85.

for the latter's readmittance to the OAS. In October 1971, a Cuban delegation was invited to attend the second ministerial meeting of the Group of 77 held in Lima. And in December that year, Fidel Castro was warmly welcomed when he stopped briefly in Lima on his return from Chile. In the April 1972 session of the OAS, the Peruvian delegation moved a resolution calling for an end to the collective sanctions against Cuba. Peru advocated that the prolonged isolation of Cuba became anachronistic with the relaxation of cold war tensions and the establishment of cordial relations between the US and China. Peru argued that Cuba no longer posed a danger to the peace and security of the continent. But the Peruvian resolution was defeated and Peru established diplomatic relations with Cuba in July 1972.³⁶ Cuban relief measures during the Peruvian earthquake had enhanced Peruvian cordiality towards Cuba.³⁷ After the establishment of diplomatic relations, Peru signed an agreement on fishing with Cuba and the latter sent three vessels to help the joint ventures in the Peruvian waters. Peruvian shipyards received a \$50 million contract to build 98 shrimp boats and 12 tuna boats for Cuba.

36. Richard W. Dye, "Peru, the United States and Hemisphere Relations", Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol.26, No.2, Autumn 1972, pp.70-71.

37. Goldhamer, n.7, p.298.

Since 1968, Peru pursued an active role in the Inter-American system and attempted to establish a cooperative relationship with her neighbours. Under the military government, Peru had invited the agencies in the Inter-American system, such as the Latin American Coordination Commission and the Inter-American Development Bank, together with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, to meet in Lima to consider the developmental problems. Peru repeatedly urged these international institutions to become exclusive instruments for the Latin American States in order to help them escape their dependency on the industrialized world.³⁸ She advocated for the reform of the OAS and recognition of ideological pluralism within the Inter-American system. Charging that the Inter-American system was under the hegemony of the US and was based on the principle of "extra-continental interference and intra-continental tutelage",³⁹ Peru moved a resolution, in the April 1973 session of the OAS, for the creation of a special commission to study the system.

38. J. Dodd, n.1, p.373.

39. Robert H. Swansbrough, "Peru's Diplomatic Offensive: Solidarity for Latin American Independence", in Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum (eds.) Latin America: The Search for a New International Role (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1973), p.119.

In the Spring of 1969, Peru actively promoted the establishment of the United Front of Latin American States. The Front States wanted the US to reduce interest rates and cut tariff barriers.⁴⁰

Peru successfully established cordial relations with her neighbours -- especially with Ecuador and Chile with whom she had traditional rivalry. This was aided by the establishment of the Andean Pact and the following economic cooperation among them. The growing cordiality between Peru and Ecuador was especially remarkable. In 1971, Peru strongly protested when the US curtailed military assistance to Ecuador after that country had seized American fishing vessels. She condemned this sanction as neither admissible in law nor tolerable in action, since Ecuador had only exercised sovereign control of her territorial waters. Peru's friendship with Chile, however, was short-lived and traditional rivalry and suspicions were revived since the fall of Allende and the establishment of a right-wing military dictatorship.

40. J. Dodd, n.1, p.375.

Peru played an active role in the adoption of the Code on Foreign Investment, known as "decision 24", by the Andean countries in December, 1970. This "decision" was closely patterned after Peru's General Law of Industries. The Code requires that no foreign investments are to be allowed in utilities, transport, communications, and banking. All new foreign companies are to be owned 51 per cent by local capital and all profits over 10 per cent on invested capital must be reinvested. It also requires the existing foreign firms to sell at least 51 per cent of their capital to national investors in 15 years.⁴¹ Peru points to this Code as an illustration of how collective actions help the Latin American countries to defend their economies against the power of multinational corporations.

Peru under the military government had identified herself with the Third World. She energetically participated in the conferences of the Third World countries, such as the November 1971 meeting of the Group of 77 and the UNCTAD Conference held in Santiago in April-May, 1972. Addressing the 1971 Group of 77 meeting in Lima,

41. For more details, see Goldhamer, n.7, p.251.

President Velasco called for the creation of a permanent organization to deal with the Third World's common problems. In the meeting, both the President and the Foreign Minister of Peru had stated that the developing countries as a group can exert pressure on the developed world in the UN. Peru also proposed the formation of new monetary organization in which developing countries would have greater voting power than they have in the International Monetary Fund.⁴² In the area of natural resource protection, Peru had been most active. She argued that the offshore resources of many Third World countries were vital for their successful development and that access to them must be safeguarded. She persistently and severely criticized the developed countries at various international conferences convened to consider maritime disputes and the establishment of a new regime to govern the seas. In the UN General Assembly, Peru supported the efforts of Argentina to regain the Falkland Islands, and backed Guatemala in her claim against British Honduras.⁴³

Given the course of her foreign policy, it was perhaps natural that Peru was attracted towards the

43. J. Dodd, n.1, p.377

non-aligned movement. In the 1970 preparatory meeting of the non-aligned nations at Dar-Es-Salaam, Peru attended as an observer, represented by her Ambassador to Morocco. And at the 1970 Lusaka summit, Peru again participated as an observer and was represented by her Foreign Minister Mercado Jarrin. In his keynote address, Mercado Jarrin described Peru as "a leading country of some seventy nations whose nonalignment does not imply the possibility of an ineffective neutralism, but an offensive one of a powerful anti-imperialist element."⁴⁴ By clearly distinguishing between neutralism and nonalignment, Peru demonstrated her understanding and recognition of the most essential and important element of the movement. Mercado Jarrin described nonalignment as a "creative and driving dimension of modern international policy", because it is "based on the unrelenting endeavour to refrain from committing the destiny of its nations to the purpose of the large centres of world power — and to involve an overall conception of political independence and the reassertion of national identities."⁴⁵ Peru

44. Quoted in F. Parkinson, Latin America, the Cold War, and the World Powers: A Study in Diplomatic History (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1974), p.234.

45. The Pines of India (New Delhi), 5 July, 1972.

viewed the global struggle between the US and the Soviet Union as a "confrontation of giants" and rejected alliance with either of the blocs. She made efforts in the UN to avoid cold war conflicts between the US and the Soviet Union.⁴⁶

Peru became a full member of the nonaligned movement in 1973, at the Algiers Summit. She, however, emphasized more on economic issues such as offshore rights and better prices for raw materials in the non-aligned conferences. She argued that the offshore riches of many Third World countries were vital for their economic development and cited in evidence the rise of Peru's fishmeal industry into a key factor in the nation's economic growth. At the Fourth Non-aligned Summit Conference held at Algiers in 1973, Peru's resolution on the Law of the Sea was endorsed by over eighty percent of the members. The Peruvian Foreign Minister stated in the conference that safeguarding the sea resources was necessary to meet the "nutritional needs, health and economic progress of our people".⁴⁷ He alleged that imperialism took no

46. J. Dodd, n.1, p.377.

47. General Debate: The Fourth Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Algiers, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol.24, No.564, 5 October, 1973, p.20.

heed of the legitimate rights of the developing countries and misused the freedom of the seas as embodied in the prevailing international law. He showed the opposition of the developed countries, irrespective of their ideologies, to the 200-mile claim as evidence that they will not allow the developing countries to break the bonds of dependency and underdevelopment.

At the Algiers Summit, Peru called upon all raw material producing countries to emulate the example of the oil producing countries and form producers' cartels on the pattern of OPEC.⁴⁸ At the special UN session on raw materials held in 1974, Peru rejected the US proposal for an interdependent world without cartels, describing it as a euphemism to hide the reality of domination. She advocated for the establishment and strengthening of Third World producers' associations and coordination among them to gain just prices for raw materials. Peru also advocated for the setting up of a fund for financing buffer stocks to give staying power to countries hit by low prices of raw materials. At the 1975 conference of the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers, held in Lima, the nonaligned countries adopted the Peruvian proposal that cooperation in the field

48. Ibid.

of raw materials should be considered as a special sphere of cooperation among them. Opening the Conference, President Velasco declared that the "day of International Oligarchs is over and the balance between rich and poor nations must be corrected", because, "the world can not continue basing its existence on the profound disequilibrium of the two disproportionate parts".⁴⁹ He also urged the oil producing countries to invest their surplus finances in the developing countries instead of in the developed world.⁵⁰ He stressed the importance of technological cooperation among developing countries and proposed that joint programmes of research should be undertaken where such technology was not locally available.

Peru displayed skepticism about the fruitfulness of the North-South dialogue. She had instead advocated for a South-South dialogue and cooperation. At the Group of 77 meeting held in Lima, Peru suggested that an independent world conference be set up to go into the question of international financial reforms. She wanted the conference "to plan an entirely new monetary system independent of the hard currencies".⁵¹

49. The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 27 August, 1975.

50. The Indian Express, (New Delhi), 28 August, 1975.

51. The Times, 2 November, 1971.

Again, at the Third Ministerial Conference of the Group of 77 in Manila, in February 1976, she proposed the holding of a "Conference on Cooperation" among the developing countries to draw up a plan for the Third World's economic liberation. The Peruvian Foreign Minister stated that the problems of underdevelopment could never be resolved unless the existing unjust system was replaced by a new international economic order.⁵² At the Sixth Non-aligned Summit Conference held in Havana in September 1979, Peru's President Morales Beraudes expressed frustration on the failure of the developing countries in establishing an international order that was in accordance with the potential and rights of the Latin Americans.⁵³ He questioned the usefulness of continuing the North-South dialogue when the developed countries were determined not to part with their wealth and technical know-how. He told the conference that, "The time has come to turn to ourselves to develop efficient forms of cooperation among ourselves."⁵⁴ He

52. The Hindu, (Madras), 4 February, 1976.

53. Addresses Delivered at the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, Havana, 3-9 September, 1979 (Havana, 1980), p.594.

54. Ibid., p.600.

said that the developing countries could reinstitute the dialogue on a more solid ground and with increased bargaining power after the Non-aligned movement undertook the task of drawing up a broad and imaginative programme of cooperation among the non-aligned countries.⁵⁵

Since the second half of the 1970s, Peru faced serious economic and social problems, some the result of her policies and others completely beyond her control. These problems had caused a modification of her external behaviour in that she moderated her aggressive anti-US rhetoric and took less active part in the international forums. On the last day of the 1975 Lima Conference of the Non-aligned Foreign Ministers, President Velasco was deposed by Gen. Francisco Morales Bermudez in a bloodless coup. An official armed forces communique, however, informed the conference delegates that Peru would continue her "full identification with the precepts of non-alignment".⁵⁶ But as the pressures mounted, President Bermudez announced that "corrections" would have to be made in the revolutionary process, implying that Peru's aggressive

55. Ibid.

56. The Hindu, 31 August, 1975.

support for Third World and non-alignment would have to be modified.⁵⁷

By 1977, the social and economic problems assumed serious proportions. Peru was faced with an import bill swollen by direct and indirect effects of high oil prices, a large foreign debt as a result of previous over-optimism and over-borrowing, and low export earnings as a result of world recession. Internally, Peruvian society confronted the problems of falling food consumption, increasing infant mortality and rising unemployment.⁵⁸ Even the fishmeal industry which was Peru's main export earner in the late 1950s was severely damaged due to overfishing. The policy of anti-US rhetoric and nationalizations resulted in the suspension of foreign aid and growing debt as a result of the need to pay compensation and replace declining foreign investment. In the absence of an alternative, Peru had to come to terms with the international monetary system dominated by the Western bloc countries.

At the 1976 Colombo Summit Conference of the Non-aligned countries, Peru played a very subdued role.

57. The Guardian (Manchester), 21 May, 1976.

58. George Philip, "The Peruvian Tightrope", The World Today (London), Vol. 33, No. 12, December 1977, p. 464.

To sum up, the Peruvian foreign policy before the 1968 coup d'etat was largely characterized by a pro-US posture. But after the coup her foreign policy underwent a significant change. There was an abandonment of her total support to the US in all forums and her diplomatic concerns were no longer confined to the hemispheric issues. Peruvian external relations were diversified to an unprecedented extent. Continuous US-baiting and active Third World postures characterized her foreign policy. Peru joined the non-aligned movement; demanded reforms in the inter-American system; advocated for the establishment of an alternative international monetary system favourable to the Third World; purchased arms from the Soviet Union thus breaking the long US monopoly in arms sales to Peru; and supported Cuba advocating her readmittance to the OAS. On the whole, there was a significant difference between the policy pursued by Peru before the coup d'etat and after.

After 1975, serious internal socio-economic problems seem to have compelled the military government to modify its foreign policy postures. But the foreign policy behaviour of Peru immediately following the coup d'etat can be probably best explained by the

change in the system of governance rather than any other factor. For, following the com, it was only the system of governance that changed and other important factors, namely, size and the stage of economic development remained constant to a large extent. This is shown in more detail in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSIONS

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By the time they seized the governmental power in their respective countries, the military institutions of both Brazil and Peru were sufficiently advanced and professionalized by the Latin American standards. Both the institutions were far more highly structured and hierarchically organized than any other civilian groups in their societies. Bureaucratic norms have been firmly established and the criteria for promotion in the institutions have been more according to seniority and other professional qualities than as a result of political patronage.

It was hypothesized (H_1) that professionalization and advanced training generally remove the military institution from the political processes of a country and as a result minimize the officer corps' political concerns. But evidence on this point from both Brazil and Peru suggests to the contrary. Historically, the military institutions of these two countries displayed a concern for politics and more than once intervened into the political processes of their respective

societies. In fact, the Constitutional provisions which defined the role of the military in these countries were vague enough to provide an incentive to the military institutions to involve in politics. Therefore, the contention that professionalization and advanced training necessarily lead to the depoliticization of the officer corps and consequently remove the military institution from the political sphere may perhaps hold good in the context of European and developed Western nations, but it does not prove valid with regard to Brazil and Peru. In these countries, professionalization and a concern for politics have been simultaneous processes, mainly because of the nature of their training.

But the concern for and involvement in politics by the military institutions of Brazil and Peru were not to that extent as to completely politicize them and nullify the characteristics which result from intense training and professionalization that differentiate them from the other civilian, especially political groups. Both the military institutions maintained institutional autonomy and their recruitment structure evidenced that the officer corps did not

have direct links with any of the major sections of their respective societies. This was substantiated by the officers' self-perception as belonging to no particular section or class and constituting, what they called, a "non-class group". They frequently differentiated themselves from the civilian politicians on the basis of their discipline, honesty and patriotism. But self-perception of the officers may not provide reasonable grounds to conclude that the officer corps of these countries displayed a marked difference from the civilian politicians. Additional evidence was provided by the officer corps' historical dislike for politics, politicians, and parliamentary procedures. There was evidence, more explicitly from Peru, that the officers who "played politics" were disliked by their fellow officers themselves and were transferred to inactive positions. Thus, the military personnel of both Brazil and Peru evidenced a marked difference from the civilian political groups in their view of politics and political activity.

The Higher War Colleges of both Brazil and Peru (ESG and CAEM) formulated a coherent and well-thought ideologies for their military personnel. Both the

colleges placed the highest importance on security concerns. Their perception of security was different from the conventional one which saw security as threatened mainly from outside the frontiers. The officers perceived the threats to security emanating not only from outside the frontiers, but also, and perhaps more importantly, from within the frontiers. The revolutionary movements and demands from militant political groups for reforms were seen not as general political activity, but as threats to security. And as the military in these two countries equated the preservation of national security and order to national interest, elimination of these threats was seen as effectively serving the national interest of their respective countries. The Higher War College ideologies of these two countries, however, were well aware of the nexus between the national security and economic development. But their perception of political parties and other political groups as representing partisan interests which were detrimental to the overall national development made them feel that they were impediments to the achievement of national development. Therefore, to serve the national interest effectively, threats to security should be eliminated and order be restored.

Apart from suspension of militant political movements to achieve this end, economic development of the overall society should be achieved. To this end all the "political obstacles" need to be removed.

Thus, the military institutions and personnel of both Brazil and Peru characteristically differed from the civilian politicians in their view of politics, political activity, national interest and the means to effectively serve it. This was in spite of their involvement in politics. Therefore, it can be concluded that Hypothesis I which said that the military personnel characteristically differ from the civilian politicians, is proved valid in the cases of Brazil and Peru.

The Brazilian military after the coup maintained a facade of democracy. It did not completely abolish the Constitution, suspend the legislature and the Judiciary. But it did make significant changes in the structure of government through various Institutional Acts and finally by promulgating a new Constitution. By these measures, the institutions and groups that acted as an influence and check on the executive were reduced to mere vegetative existence and the

Executive assumed the predominant position at their expense. Thus, the Brazilian military effected a significant change in the structure of government and the extent of influences on it.

In Peru, immediately after the coup, the military abolished the Congress never to reconvene it during the entire period of the military rule, effectively neutralized the judiciary, and imposed severe restrictions on the press and other groups from the society. However, it established government-sponsored units, ostensibly to aggregate the demands from the various sectors of the society. But as is shown in Chapter II, they were in practice not allowed to exert any effective influence on the government. As a result, the military executive, composed entirely of military personnel except on two occasions, became the predominant organ of the government, thus effecting a significant change in the structure of government and the nature of influences on it in Peru.

This change in the structure of government effected by the military personnel of Brazil and Peru was mainly due to their orientations, characteristics and their views on politics, political activity and national

interest. Therefore, Hypothesis II which stated that the military takeovers result in a major change in the system of governance is proved valid in the cases of Brazil and Peru.

Immediately after the coups and the establishment of military governments in Brazil and Peru, there was clearly a change in their respective foreign policy behaviour. Brazil's foreign policy which was becoming more and more nationalistic, anti-US and taking active part in the Third World forums was immediately reversed to become an ally of the Western bloc led by the US in the struggle against the Soviet Union and international communism. Cold war issues received the most important place in the foreign policy concerns of the military government. An alliance with the Third World was rejected and taking a neutral position in the struggle between the US and the Soviet Union was even condemned. The military government's foreign policy behaviour clearly reflected an obsession with security, perceived as threatened by revolutionary groups within the country encouraged by Moscow and Havana. Though the nexus between security and development was realized by the military government, initially

security, defined in terms of absence of political activity received utmost importance. Since the achievement of a relative degree of "stability", development also received equal importance.

Peru's foreign policy which was completely oriented in favour of the United States and confined largely to the hemispheric issues was immediately changed by the military government. Peru became a very forceful critic of the United States in the inter-American system and other international forums, established relations with the Socialist countries and joined the Non-aligned movement. The Peruvian military government perceived the structures of dependence and imperialism as the main causes for the violent guerilla movements that threatened the security. The efforts to eliminate these causes necessitated measures such as expropriations and nationalizations which entailed an embitterment of relations between Peru and the United States.

It is important to see whether the change in the foreign policy behaviour of Brazil and Peru that followed immediately after the coups was merely a coincidence or in any way related to the military takeovers and the consequent change in the system of government.

It was hypothesized (H_{III}) that since the form of government by which a country is governed is one of the important determinants of its foreign policy, a change in the form necessarily results, all things being equal, in a change in the foreign policy. In the formulation of this hypothesis, three independent variables were taken as major determinants of a country's foreign policy: the country's size, the stage of its economic development, and the nature of its political system. These three independent variables were noted as having additive rather than interactive influence on the foreign policy behaviour of a country. But without examining whether there was any change in the factors other than the political system, it is not possible to establish a causal relationship between a change in the political system and a change in the foreign policy behaviour of a country.

During the period under study, there were no extensions or losses of territory by both Brazil and Peru and their size remained constant. Therefore, it is not likely that size, which remained constant, had effected a change in the foreign policy behaviour of these countries.

The process of economic development is continuous, dynamic, but a slow one and does not yield itself to be held constant. Therefore, it should be examined whether there were any major economic developments that would have caused a change in the foreign policy behaviour of these countries.

Table I: Per Centage Growth in Gross Domestic Product of Brazil (At Factor Prices).

Year	Rate of Growth
1961	05.8
1962	05.4
1963	01.6
1964	03.1
1965	07.3
1966	05.1
1967	04.8
1968	08.3
1969	08.5
1970	09.3
1971	11.3
1972	10.4
1973	11.4
1974	09.6
1975	05.7

Source: Compiled from the Year Books of United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America: Economic Survey of Latin America (United Nations, New York).

Table II: Per Centage Growth in Gross Domestic Product of Peru (At Factor Prices).

<u>Year</u>	<u>Rate of Growth</u>
1965	6.0
1966	6.3
1967	5.0
1968	1.4
1969	1.3
1970	7.5
1971	6.0
1972	5.8
1973	6.0
1974	6.6
1975	3.3
1976	3.0
1977	-1.2
1978	-1.8
1979	3.8

Source: Compiled from the Year Books of United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America: Economic Survey of Latin America (United Nations, New York).

The statistics from the above tables that the growth rates of both Brazil and Peru, immediately before and after their respective coups have not registered a continuous and sustained fall or increase so as to significantly affect their overall

stage of economic development. But it can be noticed from then that the Brazilian economy since 1968 had registered an impressive growth rate. The steady assertion of independence by Brazil since then can be related to these impressive growth rates. President Medici's statement in 1971 when he visited Washington, that he desired to gradually phase out US economic aid to enable Brazil to deal with her on equal terms, can be related to this growth. This growing economy made Brazil search for continuous and secure flow of oil and this would explain the shift in her position from pro-Israel to pro-Arab. In her search for alternative sources of energy, Brazil signed a nuclear deal with West Germany and consistently refused to sign the NPT.

The gradual fall in the growth rate of Peru which was further complicated by other serious socio-economic problems may account for her low key postures since 1973. This causal relationship may be established as the other two factors, size and the political system have not undergone any significant changes.

But immediately after the coups, it was the nature of the political system only that had undergone significant change. Therefore, it is possible to relate,

causally, the changes in the two countries' foreign policy behaviour to the change in the nature of their political systems. Thus, it is possible to conclude that Hypothesis III, which stated that a change in the system of government of a country will lead to a change in its foreign policy, is proved valid.

Based on a study of the Brazilian and Peruvian military governments' foreign policy behaviour, it does not appear possible to draw any generalizations about the armed forces as foreign policy actors. The course of foreign policy followed by the Brazilian and the Peruvian armed forces was to a large extent different with less similarities. The Brazilian armed forces viewed the role of super powers as very important and moved closer to the United States. On the contrary, the Peruvian armed forces viewed the US as causing obstacles to their country's development. Though both of them evidenced high sensitivity to questions of security, they have not resorted to arms. Generally all their moves, either friendly or hostile were of diplomatic nature. The Brazilian declaration of her intention to go to war if the situation in Southeast Asia developed into a worldwide conflict,

and the Peruvian seizure of the US fishing vessels cannot be enough evidence to establish their propensity to take up arms. There is also no enough evidence to say that the armed forces have any propensities to certain particular foreign policy outcomes. Even on issues which are more directly related to the armed forces, such as the NPT and disarmament, the Brazilian and the Peruvian armed forces did not take similar, let alone, identical positions.

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