

RISE AND FALL OF ONE-PARTY SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA

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SARAT KUMAR PANDA

**CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN & AFRICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110 067
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**TO
MY PARENTS**



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

Centre For West Asian
and African Studies
School of International Studies

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Certified that the dissertation entitled, *RISE AND FALL OF ONE-PARTY SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA*, Submitted by Mr. Sarat Kumar Panda in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University and is his own Work.

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PROF. MOHAMMAD SADIQ
CHAIRPERSON


PROF. ANIRUDHA GUPTA
SUPERVISOR

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New Delhi


SARAT KUMAR PANDA

PREFACE

PREFACE

The year 1989 saw one climacteric event taking place in tiny East European country of Poland which changed the destiny of many one party regimes world over. The monolithic one-party communist regime of ^{that country} had been brought down by a popular mass movement for democracy based on multi-party system. This one event spraked off a series of chain reaction in other one-party communist regimes of Eastern Europe leading to dislodging of respective one-party regimes. The impact of this movement for multi-party democracy was not confined to Eastern Europe only; it had its impact felt in far off Africa too. Within no time this wind of change (from one-party regimes to multi-party democracy) swept through many countries of Africa. Between 1989 and 1991- that is within a span of just three years, some 38 out of 45 Sub-Saharan African countries had transformed themselves into multi party state systems. It is, therefore, both interesting and significant that, we study deep into this new development to unravel the wide complex of factors and processes that worked underneath.

In this dissertation we have chosen to study, the rise and fall of one-party system in Zambia which provides a typical case. Starting with a multi-party system, at the time of independence in 1964, the country had deliberately switched over to a one-party democracy in 1972. But interestingly enough, the country had again to revert to

multi-party system on 24th November' 1991, after a stretch of twenty years. In this dissertation, an effort has been made to make a comprehensive and holistic study^{of} the entire process of emergence, working and subsequent downfall of one-party system in Zambia.

The study is mainly analytical in nature. Secondary materials, such as, books and journals have been the main source of reference for the purpose.

The dissertation begins with general introduction to one-party system in Africa in general.


The first chapter covers the emergence of one-party system in Zambia (1964-1972). An attempt has been made to analyse the broader social, economic and political contexts within which the entire process took place.

The second chapter deals with one-party system at work (1972-1980). It discusses various, socio-political trends of the one-party system, and its response to various challenges which the Zambian society was faced with during the 1970s.

The third chapter analyses the downfall of one-party system in Zambia (1980-1991). An attempt has been made to trace out the various factors, that caused its downfall.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC African National Congress
CAF Central African Federation
COZ Credit Organisation of Zambia
FOREX Foreign Exchange Reserve
GRZ Government of the Republic of Zambia
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
K Kwacha
KK Kenneth Kaunda
LME London Metal Exchange
MCC Member of Central Committee
MMD Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
SG Secretary General
TNDP Third National Development Plan
UNIP United National Independence Party
UP United Party
UPP United Progressive Party (Kapwepwe)
ZCTU Zambian Congress of Trade Unions
ZMU Zambia Mineworkers' Union



Southern Africa

INTRODUCTION

Many African countries started their post-independence life as democracies in the early 1960s. The governmental and administrative apparatus inherited from the colonial authorities, however, remained hierarchical and authoritarian. The new leaders also lacked discipline, purposefulness, vision and strength of character to advance democratic principles and values. They exhibited every selfish inclination for the use of newly acquired state power for personal aggrandizement. The vast majority of rural masses were neglected. The unity that ^{was} forged during the nationalist movement broke up. The leaders became alienated from the masses. Mutual hostility replaced nationalist cooperation. Democracy came to be regarded as a luxury, which the leaders thought, the fledgling nations could ill afford. The leaders were of the view that, the African condition was not conducive for democracy, because of, illiteracy, ethnicity, poverty, and foreign intervention, etc. With their boundless ambition to remain in power and enjoy the "fruits of independence", they devised various curious institutional alternatives to democracy.

The categories were:

- 1) The single party regimes enjoying absolute monopoly of power (as in Ivory Coast). This was in continuation of the nationalist tradition;

(2) the regimes which have banned formal competition but which nevertheless allowed upon elections under the hegemony of a single party (Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya);

(3) the military regimes which control power but have, as was true of Amin's Uganda, lost all sense of tradition;

(4) the military-cum-political regimes which try to legitimize authority by means of single party.

It is important to note that, all these institutional orders discussed above have two important features in common, i.e. political unanimity and personalized authority. What is obvious is that, they have banned opposition for political power. The existence of organized opposition groups is unacceptable to all thus systems. The second feature is that; the political authority is centralized in a single individual, what is called the personalized aspect of politics.

It can be argued that, the emergence of personal authority is an outcome of the nationalist movement in which a particular leader acquired the characteristics of what Weber defined as Charisma.¹

It is these charismatic leaders who unified different elements in a traditional society, led them to political

 1. According to Max Weber, Charisma is "a certain quality of individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and women and treated as endowed with super-natural, super-human or at least specifically exceptional power or qualities. For details, see, Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation* (New York), 1947 ed.), pp.358-59.

action and negotiated with the colonial rulers.² Also, it was partly because of the manner in which power was transferred to the nationalists, that these leaders could establish personal control over both the party and the administration. In the French-speaking countries, for instance, the constitutional arrangements, as derived from the Gullist Constitution, helped establish absolute authority of the top leader. In some of the English-speaking countries, on the other hand, the success of the dominant nationalist party raised the prestige of the top leader.

It is worthwhile to see, how the two common features-political unanimity and personalized authority-combined to give rise to the one-party system. In order to establish political dominance, the ruling party needed a unifying symbol in the person of the leader himself. The later, on the other hand, wanted unified loyalty from his followers to be able to exert his charisma. But in order to ensure this, it was necessary to stress his outstanding qualities. One such quality was the infallibility of the leader. Another was his role as an ideologue to enunciate the philosophy of African personality, Pan-Africanism, Socialism, etc.³ As Head of the state the leader acquired power to form ministerial council, dissolve assemblies, appoint or dismiss judges, and give general directions to

 2. See "Introduction" in A.R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order : The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago, 1966).

3. See "The One-Party Ideology" in *Ibid.*, pp.37-65.

the party and the government. Since his authority was indisputable, parliament or other elected bodies were forbidden from debating his decisions.

It is at this point one can see a causal link between personalized authority and the establishment of one-party rule. In the context of political authority described above it was important for the leader to be able to retain the absolute loyalty of his followers. It could not be achieved, however, as long as the followers enjoyed options to desert him in some point of time or the other. In a multi-party system, the followers might change sides and join the opposition groups thus threatening the absolute position of the leader. To avoid this, it was necessary to root out opposition groups and to establish political unanimity through one-party rule. Of course, the time and manner in which this came about differed from country to country. Thus, in the Ivory Coast and Tanzania where the nationalist party acquired absolute majority through elections in the final phase of colonial rule, it was not difficult to legalize one-party rule by legislative means. In Kenya, it took more time for the ruling KANU party to establish a de jure one-party system by amending the electoral laws. In Zambia, the single party system was ushered in when a split in the ruling UNIP during 1971-72 threatened to bring down Kaunda's government.

In one-party system the personalized aspect of political authority widened the gap between the top, middle

and grass-root level leadership. In such a situation the cult of personality was bound to grow at the cost of the collective methods of decision-making, thereby weakening the collective leadership. Thus, the importance of the party also diminished. Despite claims of party's primacy over the government, the fact remained that it came to be increasingly used as an instrument of authority rather than as a counterforce to balance political absolutism with popular representation.

The late 1970s and early 1980s were the years of serious economic crisis for most African Countries. An unsustainable gap prevailed in their balance of payments. Most of these African countries have import-dependent economies, relying on the production and export of a few primary products-copper, cotton, cobalt, groundnuts, fish, coffee, cocoa, tea and patroleum-and import almost everything else, including foodstuffs, consumer durables, gasoline, spare parts for transport vehicles, machinery, fertilizers and capital equipment. During much of 1970s and early 1980s, inflation in the west pushed up the prices of most of the imports, leaving the Africans increasingly poorer in relation to the rest of the world. By the begining of 1980s, the gap between what these African countries wanted to import and what they could afford to import had widened so much that they found no alternative but to reduce imports. The alternative but to reduce imports. The contraction resulted in far fewer imported consumer goods, a

shortage of spare parts and raw materials for continuing production.

Mismanagement, corruption and lack of political accountability has been identified as the major causes of the continent's economic setback. This has been pervasive since independence period. On attaining independence, African governments assigned the state a major role in promoting development. The government machinery was already large in the colonial period and the new leaders simply took over and expanded it. Governments controlled economic activities, usually regulating prices, wages, interest rates, internal and external trade, transport and investment. A large number of them nationalized the key economic sectors and ran them as public enterprises, with this, the role and power of the major functionaries of the state-politicians, bureaucrats and technocrats-were enhanced, which they often used for their personal enrichment. This trend became ubiquitous during 1980s. The African government lacked the capacity to check this trend, to manage efficiently a large and complex bureaucracies, to plan wisely, and to take prompt decisions during crisis.

Towards the end of the 1970s, the after-effects of economic mismanagement combined with international recession turned the worsening economic situation into a full-blown crisis.

When an increasing number of governments found that they could no longer sustain their economics, they had to go

in for the help of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and other donor countries. The loans from these institutions, IMF, and World Bank require the observance of a number of stringent conditionalities. The condition of IMF's stabilization programme typically include., currency devaluation; reduction in government deficit (either through increased tax revenues, reduced expenditures or both); and restriction on domestic credit creation. Similarly, the requirements of World Bank loans include, increases in producer's price, reduction or elimination of subsidies, price, wage and credit controls; privatization of the state-owned enterprises and reduction in the size of bureaucracy.

In the late 1980s, stabilization and structural adjustment programmes forced most of the African countries to persue austerity measures-reducing real government spending, laying off civil servants, reducing educational expenditure and restriciting public services, such as, health and water, while charging more for them.

The above austerity measures provoked demonstration and strikes, which were soon transformed into demands for political liberties and multi-party polity. Protests took place in countries, such as, Mozambique, Zambia, Zaire, Gabon, Madagascar, Guinea, Benin, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Ghana and Kenya. Initially the incumbent governments respnded with repression, evasion, and often reluctant announcements that single-party systems would be dismantaled and other political parties world be allowed to compete for

power. But, eventually, the rising discontent and demonstrations, internal and external pressures by international financial institutions and major aid donors forced the single-party rulers to agree to hold multi-party election.

It is against this theoretical framework that a comprehensive analysis of the rise and fall of the one-party state in Zambia has been attempted.

CHAPTER - I
EMERGENCE OF ONE-PARTY SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA

BACKGROUND

The area now known as Zambia was settled by Tonga iron-working agriculturists over a period beginning around 100 B.C. By A.D 1500-Lunda and Luba (people of Congolese Origin) empire had established themselves, probably in the eastern and western part of Zambia. Their culture extended to the coast and through Arab and Swahili intermediaries long distance trade was established. Between 1850 and 1870 new dynasties and alternative empires including Bemba, Ngoni and Lozi followed. Thus by the final decades of the nineteenth century, major migration of these tribes had transformed the human geography of the region and left a complex and heterogeneous society.

The colonization of Zambia was undertaken by Cecil Rhode's British South Africa Company in 1880s and the colony was named Rhodesia (Northern) in his honour.¹ Till 1924 Northern Rhodesia remained under company rule. For mainly economic reasons, it then handed over its administrative role to the British Colonial Office. Though, Britain retained control of the 'protected territory' until independence, in 1953, despite strong protests from Africans, created Central African Federation (C.A.F). This united Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, where rich copper deposits had been discovered since 1930s, and Nyasaland. For a period of almost ten years Northern

1. G. Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia," *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 6, n.3, pp.197-234.

Rhodesia became the milch cow of predominantly Southern Rhodesian whites interests. The African agricultural sector was neglected, Southern rather than Northern Rhodesia was purposely developed as the manufacturing base of the federation.²

It is unnecessary to trace the entire history of colonialism and the subsequent nationalist movement in Zambia.³ Instead, we shall draw attention to certain characteristics of the both, which may help us to interpret the post-independence developments in Zambia.

The pattern of colonial development in Zambia (or then Northern Rhodesia) left a sizable chunk of European population which split the society on racial lines. Politically, the Europeans failed to dominate the African majority, but because of their contribution to the key sectors of the economy-plantation and mining industry-and especially because of their connections with the settler population in Southern Rhodesia, they were able to exert a disproportionate influence on colonial policy.⁴ The formation of Central African Federation further encouraged to nurse political ambitions. In 1962, when a two-tier

2. See D.C. Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence*, London, 1966, pp. ff. and R.I. Rotberg, *Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, Cambridge, Mass, 1965, pp. ff.

3. Ibid.

4. See J.W. Davidson, *The Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council*, London, 1947.

franchise threw open the door for inter-racial competition, the European-organised United Federal Party (UFP) made a final bid for capturing power.⁵ After the territory gained independence, under African majority rule (1964), the European attitude changed from uneasy acceptance to full endorsement of Kaunda's government.

The implications of a racially divided society were, however, more acutely felt in the socio-economic field. Since Europeans feared African competition, right from the beginning they opposed African advancement in education and other skills. The urbanisation of African labour especially on the copperbelt, was not encouraged. "Native education" by and large left to the initiative of the missionaries. During the entire period of Federation (1953-63), average expenditure on education worked out to 103 pounds per European child and only 9 pound per African child. The result of such racial-based educational policy became obvious when in, 1964, it was estimated that in the entire country there were only 100 African graduates a number of those with school degree did not go much beyond 900.⁶

Since European settlement and activities were largely confined to towns and the "line of rail," highest priority was given to developing these areas. Most towns were served

5. For a detailed account see D.C. Mulford, *The Northern Rhodesia General Election 1962*, Nairobi, 1964.

6. UN/ECA/FAO account see, *Economic Sunday Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia*, Ndola, 1964, pp.92-93.

with road, electricity, housing, school and hospital while the villages where Africans lived were left to vegetate in unrelieved economic and social backwardness. The disparity in urban- rural development thus reflected very neatly the racially segregated character of the colonial society. (See Appandix No. 1.1).

The inherited structure of the economy seems to have affected post-indipendence developments in two ways. First, rapid pace of Africanization has given rise to a new wage earning class of Afrcians in the urban sector. Secondly, the disparity in the income of urban and rural Africans increased. Thus around 1968, whereas a Zambian, living in town earned Kwacha 789, his couterpart in the village recived around Kwacha 145 per year.⁷

Another feature of the economy has been its overwhelming dependence on the copper industry. Although the industry employs only five percent of the country's labour force, it accounts for 50 percent of the GDP, 95 percent of government revenues. In order to diversify the economy, the government initiated a number of economic reforms-including nationalization, acquisition of majority of shares in mining, wage freeze, etc. Nevertheless, these reforms could not succeed in changing the essential of mono-type economy.

The rapid pace of Africanization and the entry of Africans into the monetary sector in larger numbers had

7. ILO. (Turner), *Report on incomes, Wages and Prices in Zambia*, Geneva, 1969, p.9. One Kwacha = 60 pence.

brought about vast change in the socio-economic life of Zambia. To begin with, there was not even a rudimentary ^{But later} ~~Zambian~~ middle-class, [^] one notices a multiplicity of economically organized groups with each trying to protect and advance its own interests. This gave rise to four major types of cleavages, i.e. between the urban and rural population; (b) between various income groups in towns ;(c) between wage earner and the unemployed, especially on the copperbelt, and (d) cleavage between the economically organized and unorganized groups.

Yet running parallel to and sometimes cutting across these lines of cleavage, were divisions, based on tribal and provincial affinities which in later years became politically important. Zambia has a large number of tribes (77 in all). In broad sense, there are four tribal or, more correctly, linguistic groups occupying a dominant place in Zambian politics and government. Among the four, the Bemba, who are numerically the largest, reside in Northern and Luapula provinces and constitute majority of the mine workers. Being the most militant in nationalist politics, the Bemba gave maximum support to the United National Independence Party (UNIP) ever since it was founded. Traditionally, the Bemba are said to have ruled the Ngoni of the Eastern and central provinces. Though numerically small, the Ngoni have tried to form informal coalitions with other tribes in order to check Bemba dominance in politics.

In the southern province are located the lla-Tonga speaking tribes who, as a cattle-rearing people and also because of higher exposure to European enterprise, have a very different social culture. In politics the lla-Tonga have given unswerving support to Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress(ANC), which started the anti-Federation struggle in the early 1950s. Also they have never forgiven the UNIP leaders for having broken away from the parent nationalist organisation. In the Western province of Zambia, previously known as Barotseland, live the Lozi who, because of the protectortate status of their province until independence, have maintained their traditional social structure under a paramount chief called Litunga. It was not until very late in 1962 that the Lozi were able to participate in politics. But, it was partly because of the contribution made to the party and partly because of the superior administrative talents they possessed that the Lozi were given an important place in Kaunda's first government. The situation, however, was changed with the growing misunderstanding between Bemba and Lozi factions within UNIP which erupted in 1967.

Thus the emergence of new cleavages further aggravated the traditional ones. Yet notwithstanding these differences, within less than a decade, Zambia too has come to accept one-party rule. It is not our concern to determine whether the Zambian option is the correct or not, but it is well worth investigating the factors which induced Kuanda to

accept a path which he had, until as late as 1969, considered inadvisable for his country. It is thus, keeping the end point in view, that we shall try to analyse the course of Zambian politics since independence.

Political Participation

It was because of the fear of European domination that Africans became politically activated in the 1950s. The anti-federation movement launched by Nkumbula set the stage for mass politics in the territory. But the movement itself was rather unorganized and remained confined to a few urban centres.⁸ By 1958, because of internal bickering and dissatisfaction with Nkumbula's leadership, the Younger and more militant elements left the ANC. After several attempts they formed, in early 1960, the United National Independence Party under leadership of Kenneth Kaunda.

Though starting as a splinter group, UNIP gained wider measure of popular support than the ANC. This was so partly because UNIP's militant nationalist posture suited the African mood of the time. Also, it drew its most active cadre from among the unemployed youth in towns and was able to penetrate the countryside through well-organized political campaigns. By June 1962, UNIP claimed to have set up as many as 1,800 branches in the country.

8. See R.L. Epstein, *Politics in the Urban African Community*, Manchester, 1958, pp.23-67.

But organizationally, UNIP was neither a strong nor a disciplined party. Its local leaders represented tribally important persons who acted more or less as brokers between the central leadership and the local communities. As such the chain of command downwards remained generally weak. further, UNIP failed to establish its hegemony over other organized groups. The powerful mineworker's Union, representing some 40,000 workers, refused to accept its leadership although from time to time it sided with its political demannnds. Within the party tribal elements became active almost as soon as the leadership decided to switch from agitational politics to fight the 1962 general elections. With this change in tactics, a futher cleavage appeared between the party militants and the new elements whom Kaunda recruited in order to impress the voters, especially the Europeans, that UNIP was not a party of unruly youth but a party of teachers, doctors, and lowyers willing and responsible enough to govern the country. After the elections, when UNIP formed a coalition goverment with the ANC, Kaunda found it extremely difficult to reconcile these elements.⁹

In Zambia, even after the electiory of 1962 and 1964, UNIP failed to obtain majority support in all parts of the territory. In the Southern province and in some

9. K.D.Kaunda, *A Humanist in Africa*, London, 1966, p.104.

constituencies of Central province ANC votes outnumbered UNIP's share of votes. On the other hand, since there was a disproportionately large measure of votes for UNIP in the Bemba-speaking provinces, the non-Bemba elements in the party feared that unless they took special care they would be swamped over by the Bemba. This fear of the Bemba was exploited by NKumbula to keep his hold on the people of the Southern province.

At independence, thus UNIP inherited a mixed legacy, despite ANC's entrenched position in a particular area, it had emerged as the dominant African party with 55 out of 75 elected seats in the parliament. Also, it was able to allay the European fear that it was a mere racist party. This was possible partly because of the obvious sincerity with which Kaunda proceeded to build a non-racial society and partly because of the persuasion of colonial officials and the mining companies to help the Europeans adjust themselves to the new situation.¹⁰ Finally there emerged at the central level of the party a team of able leaders who were waiting to serve and cooperate with Kaunda.

On the other hand far from uniting the country, UNIP itself was a divided house. Its accession to power merely exacerbated the intraparty rivalries. Failure to dislodge

 10. Also, on their part, European MPs, representing ten reserved seats, were not slow to realize that the days of organized politics for their community were over. Hence, 1966, they dissolved their party and began functioning as independent from a united opposition.

the ANC deprived it of balanced representation from the Southern province. Antagonism between the Bemba and Lozi, on the other hand, injected the virus of tribalism into the administration. In remote areas, UNIP branches functioned in terms of power politics within the local communities. The unemployed youth, who had joined the party during its days of agitational politics, now refused to abide by the directives of the central leadership, they continued to harass and terrorise people local people. Above all, there were demands from all sections that or their past "sacrifices" be counted for the distribution of jobs and rewards.

Issues in politics 1964-67

With such a legacy, it was not possible for the new government to initiate any radical reforms. The former pattern of racial domination made it obligatory on its part to Africanize the administration at a top speed. For this reason, it had to promote Africans to responsible jobs and the same time introduce crash programmes of training the local people for all administrative and technical posts. Since it was impractical to dispense with the services of the "expatriates" the government tried to proceed with caution. This gave rise to numerous complaints from among the party ranks.

There were other auxiliary problems owing to the scarcity of indigenous talents, the first round of

appointment and promotion was made almost wholly on political grounds. As a result , a large number of UNIP workers came to hold important official posts even though they were insufficiently equipped to discharge their responsibilities. Secondly, in order to ensure political support at the grass-root level, provincial local administrations were brought under the close supervision of the party. In each of the eight provinces president Kaunda appointed a resident minister to act as his agent and to look after the government and the party affairs. For a brief period the resident minister was assisted by political assistants who were UNIP men. At the district level, the role of the district secretary, who was a civil servant, was drastically attenuated until, in 1966, he was replaced by a district governor who was an office bearer of the party.

At the centre, the distinction between politicians and bureaucrats was, however, scrupulously maintained. Kaunda himself warned against interference by the UNIP leaders in the work of the civil service. The independence constitution vested in the president more or less the same powers as enjoyed by the colonial Governor. He was empowered to exercise executive authority either directly or through officers subordinate to him. It was he who appointed the vice-president, the cabinet and junior ministers from among members of the national assembly, the attorney-general and the chief justice, as well as held the office of commander-in-chief. The cabinet's function was to give advice "with

respect to the policy of the government and with respect to such other ministers as may be referred to it by the president."

In picking up his colleagues Kaunda tried to keep balance between the old guards and the new men in the party. Even though a large number of ministers were drawn from the party's central committee, he was able to induct non-party men who had acknowledged administrative abilities.¹¹ In addition, there was the problem of securing representation of important linguistic and tribal groups. According Mulford, Kaunda had to placate the fears of the many leaders of dominance by Bemba-speaking North, and at one point, the Lozi-speaking leaders threatened to withdraw from the party altogether unless they were given adequate representation in the cabinet. In the event, Barotse province secured more cabinet seats than its population warranted. There were four Lozi speaking ministers as against three Bemba-speaking ministers, excluding Kaunda who was born in Chinsali district of Northern province but who, as the son of a Nyasa missionary, was generally regarded as non-tribal in origin. There of the other ministers were drawn from the Eastern province, two from Southern and one from the Central

11. Of the sixteen Cabinet Ministers, eleven were members of the central committee. Also, there was an informal understanding that the person holding the post of national vice-President of the party should be made vice-President of the Republic.

provinces.¹²

During the first few years of independence, Kaunda did not appear to contemplate any change in the political structure. He was much too preoccupied with maintaining discipline and ensuring smooth running of the administration to give time to larger political issues. Personally, he was not averse to one-party rule, which in his view, was the best possible power structure for mobilizing national resources, but he did not want one-party rule to be imposed through forcible means. Instead he called on his followers to achieve the goal through hard work and persuasion. To this end, therefore, new strategies were devised. An intensive card-driving campaign was launched to renew old and enlist new members. The party coined a new slogan, "it pays to belong to UNIP," which suggested to the ordinary citizen that his best interests lay in joining the party. Or negatively, those who chose to stay outside were not be considered for jobs, housing, license and other benefits. In the urban areas, especially in the mining towns, UNIP youths unleashed a campaign of violence to stamp out of existence small pockets of ANC supporters.

Yet notwithstanding these methods, the ANC managed to survive. Its hold on the Southern province remained

12. Mulford, n.98. pp.329-330. also W. Tordoff "Political crisis in Zambia", *Africa quarterly*, vol. 10, No.3, October-december 1970, pp.225-236.

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unimpaired. Even the official policy of bestowing favours with threats failed to make much impression. Thus, under the first national development plan, the government allocated a large sum of money for the development of the province presumably with the hope of winning the gratitude of the local people. But Nkumbula skilfully used the situation to his own advantage by pointing out that so long as his tribesmen stayed out of UNIP, they were bound to get such extra concessions from the government. This was the language of politics which the Southerners rightly understood. This was demonstrated during the elections to the local councils (set up in place of local authorities) when most seats in Southern province were contested by the ANC. Although UNIP won all but 15 of 985 seats all over the country, it failed to achieve a degree of political unanimity that could be used to dissuade the local people from voting for the ANC. The second setback came in March 1968 when four by-elections were held in the Southern province. These elections were occasioned by the resignation of four ANC MPs from their own party, which obliged them, under a new law, to vacate the national assembly and seek re-election. Treating the occasion as of historic importance, the government places its prestige and resources at the disposal of UNIP. Yet, the results were disappointing. In all the constituencies, the new men put up by Nkumbula defeated the UNIP candidates. As we shall see, the results were further confirmed by the general elections by December, 1968.

These initial setbacks, however, did not affect UNIP's overall political position. So long as Nkumbula's political party continued to draw support from a particular linguistic group, it is easy to denounce it as "tribalistic". Also, the performance of the ANC MPs in the national assembly did not unduly bother the government. On the other hand, it was not inter-party competition but UNIP's relations with Zambia Mineworker's Union (ZMU) that assumed greater political significance in these years. As a party anxious to establish hegemony over all sections of society, UNIP could ill-afford to have the ZMU function as an autonomous body. The importance of copper industry also suggested that the new government must at any cost acquire a determining influence in that industry. Finally, in view of the acute disparity in urban and rural incomes, it became imperative to bring the mineworkers in line with the programme for general economic development of the nation.

To achieve this, two strategies were evolved. First, new laws were passed to bring the ZMU in line with other trade unions under a government-sponsored federation, called the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The federation was to take orders from the minister of labour who, by 1965 ordinance, was empowered to take decisions on all trade union matters. Secondly, UNIP was encouraged to infiltrate the ZMU and capture its leadership. But the Union fiercely guarded its organisational autonomy. The confusion resulting from ZMU-UNIP competition is too complicated to discuss

here;¹³ suffice it to mention that UNIP's efforts were met with resounding rebuff. In 1966, when elections were held to the reconstituted ZMU branches pending its membership of ZCTU, UNIP candidates only polled only 12 per cent of votes. This underscored the fact that neither UNIP's prestige as a governing party nor its coercive tactics made the slightest impression on the minds of the miners. Subsequent development in industrial relations showed that UNIP had learnt three important lessons from its reverses viz., (a) so long as it left the mineworkers to manage their own affairs, they were willing to accept its political leadership; (b) it was not possible to achieve industrial peace through using rough tactics, and (c) workers would not accept drastic cut in their income and allowances in order to meet the requirements of a planned economy.

Thus, if the ANC resisted UNIP's in a particular province, the mineworkers union succeeded in restricting its role in matters involving industrial relations. But neither ANC nor the ZMU posed any threat to its political dominance. The threat came from within UNIP itself in the shape of inter-faction rivalries based on tribal affiliations. We have noted that Kaunda found it difficult to reconcile the rival groups while constituting his cabinet. The problem became all the more intractable because

 13. Trade Unionism and Politics in the Copperbelt a Chapter Written by A. Gupta in William Tordoff (ed.) *Politics in Zambia*, Manchester, 1974, pp.288-320.

of two related factors :first, the party constitution provided for election to the central committee which gave rise to intense intra-party competition, and second,since a majority of central committee which were also cabinet ministers, any competition for party posts affected the stability of the government. The result of the inter-action of these two factors did not become immediately apparent but a crisis originated when in 1966, two Lozi ministers were dropped from the cabinet on charges of corruption. Although they were replaced by two other Lozi, complaints were raised that justice was not being done to the people of Barotseland. There were also misgivings over the fact that, among all the provinces, Barotseland remained economicly least developed. Further, a government decision banning labour migration from the province to South Africa aggravated Barotseland's chronic problem of unemployment.

It was at this point that N.Mundia, one of the dismissed minister, started the United Party (UP), which received some measure of support on the copperbelt and in Barotseland. This led to violent clashes among the supporters of UNIP and UP, severely straining the relations of different factions of UNIP. The more UP seemed to grow stronger, the more the Lozi leaders were being threatned by the Bemba-speaking faction. The acknowledged leader of the latter faction was Simon Kapwepwe, who was a close friend of Kaunda. At the beginning of 1967, the Lozi leaders formed an informal alliance with the Ngoni-speaking leaders of the

Eastern and Central provinces for an eventual power contest within the UNIP. The Bemba-speaking made in turn an alliance with Ila-Tonga speaking group which was represented by Manzia Chona, a bar-at-law.¹⁴ Notwithstanding rumours about intra-party rifts, Kaunda announced that election would be held from around 5,000 UNIP delegates for the central committee. The elections, which took place at the party's Mulungushi Conference August 1967, witnessed one of the worst contests among rival groups ever known in the history of the party. Not with even some irregularities in the counting of votes, the Kapwepwe faction emerged victorious by winning all but one of the contested seats. The most important result was the defeat of the incumbent President, Kamanga, in the hands of Kapwepwe. Accordingly, Kaunda asked Kapwepwe to take over the Vice-Preridency of the Republic.

Post Mulungushi Development

Subsequent developments in Zambian politics and government must be interpreted against the background of the Mulungushi conference and its immediate results. Tordoff has tried to summarize these results as follows : first, the central committee of UNIP lost its importance and it did not meet regularly until 1968. Kapwepwe had difficulty in securing importance as national Vice-President outside the

14. Tordoff, n.6, p.106.

Bemba-speaking area. The second effect was an increase in provincialism. In the Eastern province a new slogan, "unity in the East", was coined. Personal recriminations with their racial overtone reached such a point that, in February 1968, Kaunda angrily reacted by announcing his resignation as president.¹⁵ A third effect of the Mulungushi ~~•~~ was an increase in Kaunda's own personal authority. As Tordoff observes, "in the months which followed he seemed more disposed than formerly to act without the occurrence of the cabinet. Thus, the important reforms announced by president Kaunda at Mulungushi in April 1968 were not previously discussed in the cabinet or even with individual ministers. Similarly, Zambia's recognition of Biafra the next month was above all, a presidential initiative."¹⁶

Clearly, abandoning the practice of working in close cooperation between with his ministers the President was assuming new roles. It is in this context that the economic reforms initiated by Kaunda should be understood. In the first series of reforms, in April 1968, the Zambian government acquired majority control in more than a score of big foreign owned companies. A year later, in August, Kaunda announced far-reaching changes in the copper mining industry which virtually ^{am} mounted to nationalization. Finally, in

 15. He had not, however, taken any constitutional step to make his resignation effective.

16. Tordoff, n.6, p.228.

November 1970, the government took control of foreign banks and insurance companies. It was also announced that all "expatriates" engaged in wholesale trading would have to sell their business within fourteen months, all retail trade would pass into Zambian hands by January 1972.

The reforms of 1968-69 clearly sprang from intra-party developments forcing Kaunda to take a bolder stand on economic matters in order to rally the support of the party ranks. It is important to note that, the economic steps were taken at a time when there was a grave crisis in the party and Kaunda was apparently unable to discipline the contending factions. As such, his reforms emanated from a position of weakness.

Judged differently, it would appear, Kaunda had committed himself to a definite course of action in order to obtain centralized control of the government, enforce discipline on the party ranks, and eventually impose political unanimity on the country accordingly, it became necessary to introduce radical changes in the structures of the party and government. We shall try to examine these in a historical perspective.

The fear that Lozi might desert the party just before the 1968 election led to banning of the United Party (UP) in August 1968. Mundia and his colleagues were put behind bar for an indefinite period.¹⁷ But these actions not with

 17. See R. Rasmussen "Political competition and One-party dominance in Zambia", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.7, No.3, 1969, pp.407-24.

standing, Kaunda reiterated that he would not impose one-party rule from above and ordered the holding of elections as scheduled inspite of some opposition from UNIP ranks. It is possible that, in acting this way, Kaunda was demonstrating his faith in the propriety of democratic methods. Or, it is quite possible that he wanted to revitalize the party through electoral competition. Whatever, may have been the case, the leaders of the banned UP outmaneuvered the government by immediately merging with the ANC. The merger was welcome to Nkumbula as it gave him the chance to extend his area of operation beyond the confines of Southern province. From the point of view of the UP leaders, on the other hand, merger was the only way to contest elections in the Lozi-speaking areas.

The result of the elections, however, came as a shock to UNIP. In both the Southern and Barotse (now Western) provinces it was met with humiliating defeat. In the Western province, where UNIP had captured all the seven seats in 1964, eight out of eleven seats went to ANC. Though the percentage of polling was the lowest in this province (between 55 and 67), the ANC received above 60 per cent votes in six constituencies. In the Southern province 13 out of 14 constituencies voted ANC with more than 65 per cent votes. Further UNIP's share of registered votes in the country as a whole went down from 65 in 1964 to 56.4 per cent. This trend was maintained when in 1969 referendum to carry out a constitutional amendment, only 56.3 per cent

of voters turned out to cast votes in favour of the amendment.

The results also made it evident that UNIP's idea to bring a one-party system into being through organizational methods would simply not work. On the contrary, it began fearing that the success of its opponents in the elections would affect the loyalty of its own supporters. To prevent this, strict measures were taken against the ANC. Thus, when the new parliament assembled, the speaker refused to grant recognition to congress as an opposition party. Several of its members were punished or suspended from the assembly during the course of 1969-70. On governmental level, civil servants were required to become pro-UNIP so as to hold their jobs. For a time all permanent secretaries were made ex-official member of the UNIP National Council.¹⁸

These measures taken apparently to strengthen UNIP, failed to end factional bickerings. Instead things moved in the opposite direction. In August 1969 the situation became so desperate as a result of the spread of Anti-Bemba feeling inside the party that Kapwepwe tendered resignation from vice-presidency in order, as he claimed to "avoid bloodshed," Kaunda acted swiftly: under the emergency power vested in him by the party's 1961 constitution, he dissolved the central committee and substituted for it an interim

18. See Robert Molteno, "Zambia and One-Party State", *East Africa Journal*, vol.9, No.2, February 1972, pp.6-18.

excutive with himself acting a secretary-general. At the same time he resuffled the cabinet, retaining Kapwepwe still as vice-president but with a drastically reduced portfolio. He also appointed a commission under the chairmanship of the attorney-general, Fitzpatrick Chuula, to recommend revision of the party constitution.

Thus, by the middle of 1969, president Kaunda had taken resolute steps to rescue the party from internecine squabbles. From a factional view point, the Bemba suffered a reverse since they lost pre-eminence they had gained at Mulungushi. A year later, Kapwepwe also lost vice-presidency and was made simply the minister of culture. The frustration of the pro-Kapwepwe faction burst into the open, in early 1971, when a member of former Bemba minister, John Chisata, accused the government of discriminating against the Bemba-speaking people. He was supported by the minister of trade and industry, Justin Chimba, who declared that Bemba would carry on their fight "at section level, interim committee level, cabinet level and at parliamentary level. At the same time, unofficial committees of "UNIP militants" sprang up in Lusaka and the copperbelt towns which openly supported the Bemba faction. Discipline in the party deteriorated so far that even the regular activity of enrolling new members was neglected. The show-down came when, following the resignation of some Bemba-speaking leaders, Kapwepwe came out of the government on August 22, 1971 and announced the

formation of a new party, the United progress party (UPP)
 Birth of the One-Party State.

From August 1971 event moved with a rapid speed. In less than a month, all UPP leaders except Kapwepwe were rounded up and thrown into prison. On february 4, 1972 the UPP was banned and, twenty days later, the President announced the appointment of a high-powered national commission to report on the establishment of one-party democracy.

After consulting public opininon in all parts of the country, the commission submitted its report in october. A month later, the government published a summary of the recommendation it had accepted and on December 12, 1972, the national assembly passed an amendment making Zambia a one-party system.¹⁹ Having secured legislative sanction, a draft constitution was prepared which was submitted for adoption by the UNIP's national council in August 1973. The new constitution thus adopted, provided for elections to an all UNIP national assembly to be held in December 1973. With that the process of transition from competitive to one-party system was complete.

In reviewing these events one wonders, why kaunda and his government showed near signs of panic almost as soon as the UPP was formed.²⁰ One also wonders why kaunda who had

19. Ibid.

20. See Cherry Gertzel, *The Dynamics of One Party State in Zambia* (ed.) Manchester 1984, pp.1-29.

consistently opposed the introduction of one-party rule, through legislative means, agreed to do so at the end. One may ask, if he was so keen on popular participation, did he not ask the commission to enquire first and foremost whether or not his new system was acceptable to the people? Why did he take the precaution in foreclosing their options? These are the key questions relating to the unfolding political processes of Zambia, here we shall try to deal with only a few of them.

Tracing the various factors leading to the formation of the UPP in an article, Robert Molteno has drawn attention to the following circumstances : (a) spiralling inflation and economic hardship caused unrest specially among the town workers, (b) birth of the UPP involved the loss of some of the ablest organisers of UNIP; (c) being Bemba-based, the new party got support in those areas where UNIP had so far held absolute sway; and (d) UPP meant further "sectionalization" of political competition in Zambia.²¹ With such "sectionalization" it would have doubly become difficult for the government to achieve rural mobilization for the successful implementation of Kaunda's developmental programme on the basis of "Humanism".²²

21. Molteno, n. 114, p.9.

22. In this work we have deliberately avoided any discussion of "Zambian Humanism". for detailed account see H.S. Meebolo, *Main current of Zambia's Humanist Thought*, Lusaka, 1973, R. Molteno, *Zambian Humanism: The way Ahead*, *Zambian University*, 1973.

Although grave, these factors do not explain the decision to push the country hurriedly towards one-party rule. It is partly true that the birth of Kapwepwe's party threatened to deprive UNIP of a sizable section of Bemba support. In such an event UNIP might have in a future election lost seats in the Northern and Luapula provinces, in addition to those lost to the ANC in the Southern and Western provinces thus losing its majority at the centre.

Whatever may have been the chances of the new party in a future election, its continued existence would most certainly have caused damage to UNIP's discipline. For, in a dominant party system, as soon as the opposition exerts influence to entice away even a section of the ranks of the ruling party, the latter begins to feel very insecure. In the other hand, Kaunda had already committed the country to a definite path which required centralization of authority in a secure footing. This was impossible to achieve so long as the party discipline was undermined by the elements outside the UNIP. Further, if it was only a question of peaceful change of government, Kaunda might have followed inter-party competition to continue. But the stakes involved in such a competition extended far beyond a mere change of government. For by 1971, UNIP had already come to be identified with a particular goal, and ideology, and a way life. Pressed by political circumstances, Kaunda had taken far-reaching decisions in regard to social and economic matters, which in turn demanded that he must follow a

particular political path. In other words, the decision to intervene in non-political affairs had narrowed the range of Kaunda's political optimism.

CHAPTER - II
ONE-PARTY SYSTEM AT WORK 1973-1980

One-party system in Zambia was established at a point of time, when the country was undergoing a severe economic crisis. Under the new party constitution (1973), the institution of presidency became all the more powerful. Maximum effort was made to consolidate the one-party regime. No serious attention was given to check the fast economic downtrend. As a result, the general suffering of the masses increased, income gap widened and frictions between the emerging classes sharpened. Perhaps, the early success of the 1960s left many leaders complascent and unconcerened to the signs of economic decline, which ultimately affected the functioning of the one-party system. As the 1970s unfolded, the parameters of the crisis and the paralysis of the government mainfested themselves, After 1975, there began a flagrant competition for money and power by the governing class. It is important to note that, during 1960s the competition for state's scarce resources was at a sectional, tribal and provincial level. However, in the one-party system, the compitition went on at both class and ethno-provincial level. Another development that was conspicuous during this period was the gradual weakening of UNIP due to some drastic policy decisions taken by the central leadership of the party. To name a few: the enforcement of merit as the basis for employing civil servents and denial of salries and allounces to the party officials, etc.,. These policies of the leadership disenchantd the

local party officials, there by affecting the overall functioning of the party at the grass-root level.

In the mid-1970s the rapid decline of the Zambian economy (see-Appendix, 2.1 and 2.2) was due to two reasons notably; (i) disrruption in the production and export of copper and (ii) sharp flactuation of copper price in the international market.

Zambia is a mono-type economy. This is evident from the fact that copper contributes 45 per cent of the country's gross domestic product and provides 96.5 per cent of its total exports. (See appendix 2.2) In terms of employment, although the industry employs only 19 per cent of the total labour force, it pays about 38 per cent of the country's wage bill.¹ It is again the copper, that provide a major share of expanses involved in the execution of various developmental projects and national development plans. The overwhelming dependence of the state structure can be understood from the fact that any sustained fall in copper production or in the world price would not only reduce government revenues but also affect developmental plans and result in widespread unemployment and social tensions.

In the mid-1970s, liberation struggle broke out in neighbouring Rhodesia and Angola. In the later's case, it was

1. Deposition by Mr Mars-jones on behalf of the mining companies to the Brown Commision on 20 May 1966, *Times of Zambia*, 21 May, 1966.

followed by bloody civil war for political ascendancy.² It is unnecessary to trace the history and nature of these struggles. However, it is imperative to discern the overall repercussions of these wars on the Zambia's economy and polity.

Zambia had to incur heavy defence spending to ward off any violation of its international boundaries.³ Further, it created serious transport and communication problems. Much of Zambia's earlier success in rerouting export and imports away from the south (following its introduction of sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965)⁴, which had been achieved at a considerable cost, was lost. The Angolan war closed the Benguela railway at a time when Lobito bay had become country's major import export port. This in turn significantly reduced Zambian government's room for manoeuvre especially after Zambia's own closure of Rhodesian border in January 1973. The hope for improved communications through independent Mozambique failed to materialize when that country closed its border with

2. In 1975 civil war broke out among three factions i.e. Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the National Front For the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

3. From 1970 defence spending was included in constitutional and Statutory expenditure, and not therefore subject to public scrutiny. It is difficult therefore, to give figures for this increase.

4. R. Brown. 'Zambia and Rhodesia: a Study in Contrast', *Current History*, vol.48, (April 1965).

Rhodesia in 1976. Again, the Tazara railway, linking Zambia with Dar-es-Salaam, which began operation in 1976, quickly ran into difficulties. Thus, from 1976, Zambia faced acute interruption to her export of copper and import of essential goods.

Moreover, the social consequences of recession was equally serious. First, notwithstanding attempts by government and the mining companies to avoid redundancies, jobs were at risk in both public and private sector. The wage employment declined by 2.4 per cent between 1975 and 1980, from 393, 490 to 384,090.⁵ Second, urban workers suffered a decline in the real value of wages. Third, shortages of basic commodities, including cooking oil, flour, soap, candles, and meat became a regular features of life. Public services deteriorated as government expenditure was cut. Living standards, therefore, fell and estimates in the late seventies suggested that 25 per cent of urban households were living below basic needs of food and income.⁶ Further, there was a fundamental deterioration in the rural area especially in the more distant provinces off the railway. An estimate indicates that 80 per cent of rural households lacking resources to satisfy minimum needs.⁷

5. Bank of Zambia Report, 1980, p.52, *Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series 22-6* (July 31, 1985): 7814A.

6. Robert Chambers, and Hans Singer, *Poverty, Malnutrition and Food in Zambia, Country Study for World Development Report IV*, University of Sussex, 3. November, 1980.

7. Ibid; see also Rene Dumont and Marie France Mottin, *Towards Another Development in Rural Zambia* (Lusaka, 1979, Mimco), pp.17-19.

Lastly, urban unemployment and rural stagnation gave rise to social violence and crime. Yet in political arena, there was little acknowledgement of any need for change in overall strategy of development. Politicians attentions were focussed elsewhere.

Politics in a One-Party System

Despite the severe economic crisis and its follow up social consequences, Zambian leaders were preoccupied with solidifying UNIP's control over the one-party state. Consolidation of the relationship between the party and the bureaucracy become their prime concern. By implication, this meant adjusting power relations between national politicians, civil servants and technocrats. Manoeuvring took place from 1973 to 1975; the strongest current was the steady accumulaton of power in the hands of the president and his executive establishment. By 1975, the trends were quite well established.

In a curious way the formalization of one-party system meant not only the banning of the opposition but also-and more particularly-the subordination of the ruling party to the leader's wish. By enacting the system, president Kaunda succeeded in severing the tie between the party and the government at the top. As a result, both became separate instruments for him to be used for the furtherance of larger political goals. It is in this connection one should note

that Zambia's One-Party constitution *did* not include the party constitution adopted by UNIP's national conference in September 1973. It remained, instead, a separate document.

In the first year many famous leaders of the banned opposition parties-UPP, ANC and UP-joined and rejoined UNIP's ranks. Harry NKumbula and Nalumino Mundia joined with, while the militant Simon Kapwepwe opted for temporary retirement. Grumbling over the end to legal opposition did not tip over to violence; the December 1973 general elections (for MPs and President went off smoothly). Kaunda won the Presidential election easily, but surely a disconcerting note for UNIP organizers was the low voter turn out. The electoral system provided for elections to the new assembly in two stages: first, at the primaries to select candidates, and second, at the constituency level with one of the three UNIP candidates to be elected by voters. The overall turnout did not exceed 40 per cent of the 1.7 million registered voters. As a spokesman of the election office in Lusaka commented, "Voting ranged from 18 per cent to 52 per cent and this was the lowest ever in the history of Zambia.⁸ Thus, it is easy to see that the introduction of one -party rule had not created much of enthusiasm among the Zambians.

A much more important feature was the lack of popular response to the presidential election. As Kaunda was the

8. *Africa Diary*, January 1, 1974, pp.6787-88.

only candidate, it was expected that all votes in the parliamentary contests would tally with the total votes polled by him. But this was not the case. Although the people voted for UNIP not all of them exercised Franchise in regard to the president. This would mean that individual candidates standing on UNIP tickets campaigned only for themselves and not for their president, or else, people voted for individual candidates without voting for Kaunda. The interesting aspect was that even with a low percentage of votes cast, 20 per cent of voters said "No" to Kaunda's candidature. The highest number of "No" votes was registered in the Southern province which was 30 per cent followed by the Western province with 20 per cent and the Northern province 15 per cent.

If the elections were any indicator, these forces remained as active as ever. In many constituencies, candidates canvassed for votes on tribal lines. The Zambia Mail reported a statement of the mayor of Lusaka that the elections in his area were characterized by "tribalism and corruption"⁹. Nonetheless UNIP remained uncontested in the political arena and Kaunda preeminent within UNIP.

Adjusting the relationship between the different organs of government (the executive, the legislature and the judiciary) as well as levels of government (central,

9. Quoted in Ibid.

provincial, district and ward) and especially between the government and the party became all the more difficult. However, the new constitutions made it clear that the party was to be supreme over the government. Thus, the relationships between the national politicians, civil servants and technocrats was supposed to shift so that politicians in UNIP's central committee gained greater authority over the bureaucracy. From this time onwards, a member of the central committee (MCC) out-ranked the ministers whose portfolios fall within his competence. The cabinet was relegated to "policy implementation rather than policy formation agency"¹⁰

Things did not work out as the designers of new regulation expected. With the well-known tendency for any bureaucracy to defend itself tenaciously, the civil servants and technocrats clung to power through their control over day-to-day administration. In some highly publicized incidents, a MCC's decision took precedence over an already announced decision of a minister, permanent secretary or senior civil servant. According to Ian Scott's study of Zambian bureaucracy, in the long run the conflict between party officials and civil servants was "entirely resolved in favour of the latter" under the one-party system.¹¹

10. See C. Gertzel (ed.), *Dynamics of the One-Party, State in Zambia*. Manchester 1984, pp.45-46.

11. Ian Scott. *Party Administration Under the One-Party State*, ed., Tordoff : Manchester, 1980, pp.115-51.

Whatever the power allocations below, at the apex of the party and government hierarchies sat the president. His first lieutenant was the secretary-general of the party who outranked the prime minister. The secretary-general headed the party apparatuses, oversaw the work of the sub-committees of the central committee and acted as the spokesperson of the party to the nation.

In a one-party system the prime minister's power had been greatly curtailed, although he sat on the central committee of UNIP. The post of secretary of state for defence and security emerged from the president's office to become the fourth-ranking position in the central committee. The president used to keep a close eye on this post as it had sensitive connections with the military. KK appointed only close associates to this job. All districts had an office of security forces located there; the employees had a palpable presence in town with ears" in bars and seebeens.

In institutional terms, the game of musical chairs in the one-party system ended with the cabinet losing ground, primarily to the president and senior civil servants. The central committee which was supposed to gain power, could not wield it as a unofficial political force but rather acted as the closed shop of national politician. Although some key positions had grown in power and influence-notably the secretary general-all important positions in the party and its government were clearly subordinated to the president and

State House (government's head quarters), whose powers grow commensurately.

Executive power had also expanded in parliament.¹² Bills originated (by and large) in the departments, ministries, and the president's office. They move to the cabinet office and Freedom House (party headquarter) for clearance and then to national assembly. If the president withheld his assent to a piece of legislation, the assembly could not override them. After 1972 MPs became unwilling publically to oppose the president directly, perhaps because individuals running for office now had to be vetted by the central committee, firmly under KK's control. Despite the structural diminishments of its autonomy, national assembly elected in December 1973 did not become a rubber stamp for the executive. There were still some members who were vocal in their statements, which were often probusiness,) cirtical of regimes' policies. In June 1975 KK publically rebuked MPs for the "anti-party and anti-government mouthings."¹³ In the Watershed speech deliverd on June 30 of the same year the president reaffirmed the country's committment to socialism. He reinforced this with the abolition of freehold tenure of land. He attacked the inefficiency of the parastatals and

12. The President and National Parliament erm the Parliament in Zambia. Tordoff: "Residual Legislatires : the cases of TanZania and Zambia," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 15, 3 November 1977, p. 243.

13. Ibid, p.240.

denounced the capitalistic tendencies appearing in Humanist Zambia, pointing a finger again at the MPs. By the end of 1975, even the sympathetic observer William Tordoff noted that the national assembly was functioning primarily to legitimise government policy through debate and passage of bills rather than as an independent and countervailing force to the executive.¹⁴

In contrast, the judiciary managed to hold on to many powers handed down to it by the independent constitution. The supreme Court remained the final court of appeals and the superior court of records, although in practice, it was the high court that usually gave the final word. The president appointed judges of both of these courts (on the advice of the judicial service commission) but could revoke the appointment of a justice after investigation by a tribunal. This accorded a judge a considerable degree of security of tenure.

In summary then, the accumulation of power in the hands of the executive under the one-party system occurred at the expense of the legislature, cabinet, and to a lesser degree the central committee and the courts. National politicians loyal to the President and civil servants had tended to develop competing loci of power—one was based in the party and the other in the bureaucracy. Ultimately the president controlled both party and government and governed more and more

14. Ibid., pp.240-247.

unilaterally with his advisers. There ~~was~~ no in-built mechanism to check the institution of presidency being dominated by one man.

Despite this overt accumulation of power, Kaunda remained (at least until 1986) quite popular with the average citizen. Charges were often raised against politicians and grumbling was heard over the avracious behaviour of the civil servants, but little negative commentary was aimed at president Kaunda. Some silence may be attributed to legislation that prohibits strong public criticism of the chief excutive. But, the lack of criticism stem^{ned} more from wide spread cognition of the president's own austere life-style (he is both a teetotaler and a vegetarian) and his warm and friendly personality. Kaunda's charm and political deftness have enabled him to define a particular brand of personal politics that disarms his opponents and tends to protect other national politicians when public comes for an accounting.¹⁵

In kaunda's brand of politics, a politician or a civil servant or a technocrat is shown public favour until he is loyal to the president and accepts his principles and philosophy. The moment he differs with the president and utter an anti-establishment statement, he is immediately

15. For example in July 1984 President Kaunda Publically exonerated a member of the central committee of UNIP for wrongdoings attributed to him by the wider public. See C. Gertzel (ed.), "Dissent and Authority in the Zambian are-party state" 1973-80", in *Dynamics of One-Party State in Zambia*, Manchester 1979, pp.96-98.

cast off of the political house. However, after sometime in "political wilderness" if the affected begs a public apology, makes amends for his folly, and seeks the forgiveness of the president, Mr. Kaunda would condescend to forgive him and re-habilitate him in some appropriate position.

It seemed like a kind of political drama ^{being} played again and again on the national stage. One result of this political drama ~~was~~ that unlike the case in so many other societies, political battles and rapid changes in the fortunes of prominent individuals do not end in bloodshed. President Kaunda ^a ~~was~~ outstanding as a restrained national leader; Zambia had well-deserved reputation as a country with a good human right record yet there ~~was~~ a negative side of it, as well. Capable young politicians, civil servants and technocrats whose ideas ~~vary~~ from those of the president or the accepted orthodoxy of the day ~~were~~ unable to express their opinions in public without risking the loss of office and sometimes even of their livelihood. An example of this is the former Zambian high commissioner to London and former chairman of the Standard Bank of Zambia Ltd., Elias Chipimo. In April 1980 he had dared to criticize the one-party system (and by implication president KK) saying, "the multi-party system is the surest way of avoiding coups and eliminating the disgraceful tendency of Presidents ending up with

bullets in their heads.¹⁶ Kaunda ^otook umbrage at this comment, charged Chipimo and his other allies with attempting to incite the army to over-~~take~~ the government and ^{as}assinate him. In October 1980 Chipimo was arrested with others and charged with treason. Although later released, he lost his post with the Standard Bank, and after a long period of domestic troubles, his wife deserted him as well.

Opponents and critics of one-party system and Kaunda's leadership were effectively silenced by the combination of paternalism and by the iron fist of the state. One-party rule in Zambia is not just the accumulation of power in the hands of one person. It had evolved into the centralization of political power and use of that power to monopolize major party decisions, to sideline or threaten contenders, and to offer patronage to others, leading to a general inflation of the government. The much needed critical political debates which were essential for apprising the system's functioning got confined to the party (UNIP). The only prescription for economic and social ills coming from the president's office was to continue as before and hope for a major recovery in the fortunes of copper.

During the period between mid-1975 to 1980, also luck did not visit the Zambian people. The same declining trend of the economy persisted. The mines began to run into serious production problems as well as obstacles to sales.

16. *Times of Zambia*, April 21, 1980, p.1.

The result was serious shortage of foreign exchange (FOREX) and its ultimate impact on import dependent agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Their contribution to the government revenues, as well, came down. Three general trends in governments finance deserve mention here. First, despite some temporary reductions, total expenditures continued to expand, moving from K 855 million in 1975 to K 1.302 billion in 1980.¹⁷ Secondly, the government increased direct and indirect taxes to obtain finances, making the burden more regressive. Finally, the government repeatedly resorted to direct financing to bridge the gap, borrowing locally from the Bank of Zambia and from external sources, i.c, International Monetary Fund and other bilateral donor countries (Britain, W.Germany, France). Debts accumulated both in Kwacha and in FOREX. During 1975 the external debt shot up from U.S \$ 1.377 million to \$ 2.657 billion by 1980, according to the World Bank Debt Reporting Service.¹⁸ In a delayed reaction to the economic bind, the government in 1978 announced austerity measures-cutting subsidies and placing tighter control over import licensing and remittances.

Inevitably, the overall development strategy was derailed in the crisis. The welfare programmes of the

17. *World Bank, Zambia*, table 4.02, p.87.

18. *Ibid.*

government were curtailed. Finally, the announced intentions of Third Development plan, 1980 (TNDP), such as, move towards true socialism, shifting of investment to agriculture and labour intensive industrialization, were simply remained in pen and paper. For instance despite assertions that TNDP would emphasize agriculture, the budgetary projections for 1983 indicated a reduction by 34 per cent of the revenue available to the two key ministries that deal with agriculture: the ministry of cooperatives and the ministry of Agriculture and Water Development.¹⁹ Thus, attempts to control public spending and direct investment into the more vital areas were often futile. It was due to the absence of a well-integrated industrial and agricultural plan. This was partly the outcome of struggles within the governing class itself, and partly because of the weakening of UNIP, and partly a reaction to pressures from outside.²⁰

Intraclass Struggles, Corruption And The Weakening of the UNIP.

Amidst the persisting crisis, the late 1970s had witnessed the signs of political rot pervading the national politics. Intraclass rumbling of discontent made the regime uneasy and sometimes vindictive. Decline of the party and

 19. Patu Simoko, "What the Budget Means to all", *Times of Zambia, Times Review*, February 6, 1983, p.3.

20. A.C. Mills, "Dependent Industrialization and Income Distribution in Ghana," *Industrialization and Income Distribution in Africa*, (ed.), J. Rweyemamu (Senegal: Codresia, 1980), the situation described pertains to Zambia as well.

corruption became more evident. UNIP had withered at its roots despite its uncontested position, and monopoly of the president and his advisor continued and expanded.

In 1979 general elections held in Zambia Both Kapwepwe and Nkumbula contested KK's ascendancy within the party.²¹ They appealed to the UNIP cadres and the general economic policies of the regime. They gained some support before they were outmanoeuvred by UNIP officials in September 1978.²² Despite some fears within UNIP circles, Kaunda received an 80 per cent "Yes" vote in December 1979 elections, with 67 per cent of the electorate turning out.²³ Since 1978, KK's powers continued to expand, while the era of flamboyant politicians climed with the early death of Kapwepwe in 1980 and Nkumbula in 1983.

However, an end to the opposition did not translate into coordinated and unified national policies. Sections of local level party members and civil servants connected to the state and the party directed their energy to the grab of personal wealth and power. Sizable amounts of nation's

21. The election procedure under One-Party system has already discussed in the same chapter, while discussing the 1973 general elections in Zambia.

22. The general conference of UNIP, september 1978, adopted amandments to party Constitution whose effect was to ban Kapwepwe, Nkumbula and Rober Chilwe from contesting the nomination within the party on the grounds that they had not been UNIP members for a sufficiant length of time. Kapwepwe and Nkumbula petitioned in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the matter, but in August 1979, that case was dismissed. See Tordoff, *Administration in Zambia*, p.263.

23. Ibid.

precious FOREX went for personal consumption of politicians and civil servant.²⁴ Some civil servants and managers of the state firm (often technocrats) and national politicians milked state firms and engaged in all sorts of illicit behaviour, which is evident from the yearly reports of the auditor general. It turned up the improper activities, ranging from misuse of funds by ministries to actual corruption by public officials.²⁵ From January through March 1979, eleven political leaders were suspended for corruption or involvement in illegal activities such as poaching.²⁶

To give some of instances of these happenings in 1976, the governor of Bank of Zambia was dismissed for allegedly receiving government property illegally. (He later appealed to the Supreme Court, was successfully reinstated in January 1981). In 1977, a senior army official in charge of the Mechanical Services Division was caught in corrupt practices and three senior ministers were dismissed from cabinet for alleged corruption and misuse of power. A Railway commission reported in 1978 the existence of widespread corruption, inefficiency, and tribalism, public officials (including another former cabinet minister, a provincial secretary, a -

24. For an overview of corruption of the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Klaas Woldring, "Survey of Recent Enquiries and Their Results", *Beyond Political Independence*, ed., pp.183-207.

25. *African Research Bulletin*, Political Series 16, (3 April 15, 1979):5191.

26. Woldring, pp. 188-197, and Szeftel, pp.4-21.

district governor and a district secretary) over accused of selling relief supplies donated to victims of flood (the Knayama scandal).²⁷ These are not isolated incidents. The number of corruption handed by the police had increased by 500 per cent from 1979 to 1980.²⁸

In 1980, the government introduced the Corrupt Practices Bill, which was supposed to give the authorities more power to stem this trend. But the avracious and increasingly blatant behaviour of those with money or power had not been ~~tempered~~. Instead, when the supply of ready cash dwindled and when financial resources for public and private ventures became more scarce, scramble for accumulation of wealth from whatever sources available, legal or not, became more rampant especially among the civil servants, national politicians and technocrats. Sometimes friends and relatives turned against each other to entrench position or defend the potential to accumulate land, business, or money, thereby poisoning social relations. These battles within the governing class, in turn, affected its ability to plan and policies in every conceivable area.

In the midst of such struggles, the core institutions of the UNIP began to wither at its roots. It was due to unfulfilled ambition of some of UNIP's regional office-holders and the disaffection of (unpaid) UNIP constituency

27. Ibid.

28. *African Contemporary Record*, 13 (1980-1981), (ed.), Colin Legum, (New York : African Publishing Company, 1981), p. B209.

and branch officials, that resulted in weakening the party organization at district level.

During the First Republican period (1962-1972) UNIP by using patronage was able to maintain its support base (especially in the areas where the party was strongly established, such as Northern and Luapula provinces). It had often used its dominant voice in the issue of loans and licenses and to pressurize district heads of departments to employ local men as messengers and labourers, UNIP farmers were given easy access to credit through Credit Organization of Zambia (COZ). Similarly, well-off urban members received overdraft facilities from the banks.

However in the 1970s, given the downturn of the country's economy, the party could no longer provide the relatively extensive patronage of the immediate post-independent period. The bankrupt COZ was wound up and its successor, the Agricultural finance Company (AFC), was much more concerned with the creditworthiness of borrowers than with their political standing. Further, in september 1975, the government inaugurated, under a legislation, a unified and transferable government service, with control over it vested in a local Government Service Commission. Due to this move, the UNIP branch and constituency officials (concillors) were deprived of their control of employment opportunities on the councils. Party officials were also denied access to positions in the central government. It is indeed, more than before, merit and long political service,

which were made the basis to recruitment to civil service. They were even able to hold office of the party. Thus, the political status of the carrier civil servants was improved in the one-party system. This in turn came as a disgrace to the party officials. Finally, to add to their disenchantment with the party and its policies, the UNIP branch and constituency officials were not paid allowance, despite the recommendation of the Chona Commission.²⁹ All this combinedly led to distinct loss of morale among UNIP officials.

soon thereafter, many UNIP local organizers left the party and party also lost its membership. In 1982 the Secretary General (SG) announced that only 89,000 out of 3 million youths were member of UNIP.³⁰ Unofficial reports indicate that women did not enroll in the women's league in large number either. This in turn, affected the communication and implementation of party's central policy decisions.

In Kaunda's administration, the rural development functions were assigned to the local party organization. At both ward and village level, it was supposed to communicate governments policy and assist the committees in mobilizing the people for development. However, in the great majority of cases it did not perform these tasks; the gap between regional party officials and the villages widened, and the

29. Set up in February 1972 to investigate the establishment of One-Party State.

30. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 14 (1981-1982), p.841.

party's mobilization role in relation to development was virtually non-existent.³¹

This failure of local party organization can be partially attributed to Kaunda's highly centralized decision-making process. Majority of vital decisions affecting the rural masses were taken at Lusaka (at State House) by Kaunda and his advisers. Further, there was some policy conflict between the central committee and cabinet and an absence of direction, long range planning and co-ordination in the ministries. An effective delegation could have been a solution but Kaunda seemed unwilling to do that.³²

Disillusionment with the party became public during 1980s. On the front page of the Times of Zambia on September, 1984, an editorial started with : "Could the United National Independence Party (UNIP) have spearheaded the freedom struggle at its present administration and Organisation? The answer to this question was an emphatic No". According to it, UNIP was thriving on its past glory. Except for a few leaders at the top echelons, the majority were not committed to the cause of the nation the average Zambian was alienated further and further from decisions

31. "Tordoff, Political Parties in Zambia", *Political Parties in Third World* (ed.), pp.26-27.

32. William Tordoff, p.115.

that affected his or her life. Certainly there was growing perplexity at the inability of the leaders to protect the people from the economic tidal waves that threatened to engulf the nation. The last five years were even worse for the economy and for the middle-income people and urban and rural poor in particular.

CHAPTER - III
DOWNFALL OF ONE-PARTY SYSTEM 1981-1991

From 1981 onwards the economic crisis deepened. Increased production costs combined with inflated cost insurance freight (c.i.f) (charges on mineral exports) pared away the profitability of the mines. Despite efforts at increasing production, the tonnage of copper mined and sold stayed stubbornly below 6,00,000 metric ton mark,¹ automatically constraining increase in FOREX earning. This naturally handicapped the government to keep afloat the import dependent manufacturing and agricultural sector.

The parastatal companies and INDECO (Industrial Development Corporation) (Zambia) owned companies were operating at about a third of their capacity. This abysmal capacity utilization were connected to the shortage of allocations, of foreign exchange to purchase raw materials, machinery, and spare parts. The under utilized capacity means shortage of essential goods and low or no profitability to many firms, thus fewer revenues to state's coffers. Same was the condition of commercial agriculture which was depending on imported inputs such as fertilizers pesticides and machinery. Shortage of items due to less FOREX allocation, resulted in reduction in agricultural output. Hence in 1981 K 50.7 million was spent in importing food.² The national press, however, reports, the bottleneck

1. ZCCM Ltd., 1981 Annual Report (Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines, Ltd).

2. *Sunday Times of Zambia*, July 22, 1984 p.7.

for agriculture was due to-poor distribution of inputs such as fertilizers and seed, and late collection of crops by national marketing board and provincial cooperative unions. Local councils were often failed to build roads and bridges, making private haulers unwilling to risk their trucks to collect crops. Furthermore, fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds delivered long after planting reason; and farmers facing delays of several months in payment of their crops.³ Thus, the blames of such inefficiency often partly fall on incompetent and corrupt managers.

New Policies

As we have seen, the contribution of three major sectors mining, agriculture and manufacturing to the national economy declined for one or the other reasons. In order to squeeze more revenue from the economy, the government ended most subsidies in January 1983 by announcing the introduction of "economic pricing." Essentially "economic pricing" has meant rapid increases in the prices of the basic consumer goods. For the same goods and the services purchased in 1975, low income groups in 1983 were paying over 150 percent more.⁴

3. *Times of Zambia*, November 26, 1982, p.1.

4. According to *Zambia Daily Mail* (June 13, 1985, p.3) inflation was 23.6 percent in December 1984, and by March 1985 it had reached 31.9 percent. This was before auctioning, after which estimates have been that the inflation increased from 100 to 150 percent.

Despite such unpopular policies and some negative outcomes, the government was still desperate.

Public Finances: Fiscal Crisis

From 1981 through 1982 revenues to the state stagnated while expenditure expanded. Deficit of five million Kawacha or more became the rule rather than the exception.⁵ Even in 1983 and 1984 when there was a slight improvement in government revenues expenditures still outstripped the money coming in. What accounts for the chronic overspending? Allocation to directly productive ministries (Agriculture, mines, commerce and tourism) remained around 10 percent from 1980 through 1984. However GRZ's commitment to populist programmes continued despite a quandary over where to find the funds. Within ministries, wages took a steadily increasing bite (from 20 percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1984 budget)as did general operating expanses.⁶ Debt servicing grew to absorb 19 percent of the domestic budget by 1984 while capital expenditure shrank to 13 percent.⁷ With the prevailing patronage system, it was not easy for national politicians to reduce the number of civil servants.

5. *Bank of Zambia, 1984 Annual Report*, p. 54.

6. *Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Series* 22,10 (November 30, 1985) p.7970 B.C.

7. *Ibid.*

Furthermore, the governing class's commitment to its own aggrandizement meant that slashing top level salaries and the number of supernumerary posts was not likely either. So wage expenditure continued to grow, while marginal increases in the revenue did not make up the differences. When the Third National Development Plan was terminated in 1983, it was widely acknowledged as a fiasco, primarily due to the scarcity of investment resources both domestic and foreign.

ZAMBIA'S WALTZ WITH INTERNATIONAL LENDERS

Faced with chronically steep balance of payments deficits, the Government of Zambia negotiated a series of facilities with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, as well as loans from private banks and foreign donor governments. Loans from IMF started flowing but with the usual stringent conditions attached to it —

— essentially demanded a major restructuring of the economy.

The country's IMF total foreign debt was about \$ 3,500 million at the end of 1984 but had passed two years later \$ 5,100 million and reached 6,000 million by 1988 and 7 billion by 1990. The indebtedness of Zambia was unusually high in comparison to its export earnings. Indeed, it was spending in February 1985 some 65 percent of its foreign exchange earnings on loan repayments and subsequently its

obligations went on further.⁸

In 1981 IMF promised Zambia a loan of \$ 1 billion and the drawing to be disbursed from 1981 to 1984. However, the IMF attached some guidelines to it. In line with fund guidelines, the GRZ promised to devalue the Kwacha, reduce price controls on many staples, and invoke rigorous foreign exchange restriction on Zambia's personal bank accounts while liberalizing them on foreign company accounts.⁹ A very unpopular part of the package was the low ceiling (10percent) placed on wage increases, which in the end, provoked a series of strikes.

In 1982 The IMF suspended funds for the announced reason that Zambia had failed to settle arrears with its major creditors. A quick way to pay the external debts was to squeeze the major FOREX consumer, the mines. The mines were forced to cut operating costs by 17 percent, costing approximately 2,600 jobs.¹⁰

Again in late 1984 IMF had cut off funds to the GRZ because of its reluctance to devalue kwacha to the full degree demanded by Paris Club (some doning agency). In october 1985, following the strong IMF advice the GRZ

8. *World Bank, Zambia*, Table 5.02, p. 91.

9. *The Economist*, 12 September, 1987, 20 february 1987 and 20 June 1988, *Times* (London) 29 June, 1990.

10. *Adrian P.Wood*, " An Economy Under Pressure : Some consequences of Recession In Zambia." *Times* (London), January 1984, p.7.

undertook a new FOREX allocation system called auctioning. The logic of ^{the} system was that free bidding should establish the real value of the Kwacha and drive out the black market in currency that had been thriving in Zambia. Auctioning was supposed to encourage the most productive and profitable managers and entrepreneurs, because it was those with the largest amount of Kwacha who could obtain the FOREX. There were few restrictions on the purchases to be made with this FOREX. So free market, which had been the persistent demand of the donating agencies, prevailed at last. However, the "free market" Logic enhanced the import of luxury goods and the lure of fast money, already so prevalent in Zambia. Vital raw materials for industry were not given priority.

Certainly, the foreign governments and multi-lateral agencies, by employing various controlling mechanisms increased their influence in Zambian economic planning and policies. One effect of these debts tagged with conditionalities had been that it pulled national development planning in so many directions as to leave to no discernible direction at all. Moreover, much of the burden of these IMF/Paris club-inspired policies was borne by those Zambians, who were least able to bear it—the working class, the unemployed, and the middle-income group. How did the regime stay afloat under such conditions? Why not Zambian leaders fashioned an alternative strategy to adjust the imbalanced economy: and lessen domestic pain? Why did not the Zambian leaders rejected major foreign loans even though

the prescriptions suggested were unlikely to help the country out of the economic chaos? Let us try to answer some of these pertinent questions.

Briefly, the regime stayed afloat on loans extended by the industrial nations and several multi-lateral financing agencies, such as, World Bank, IMF and Paris Club. A tacit agreement with roots in foreign policy alliances and compromises, seemed to exist between kaunda's government and western countries. Despite Zambia's clear inability to repay, the IMF and Paris club members and private international banks still lent money to Zambia.¹¹ Such pouring of funds kept the government operating and sustained the factions of the governing class-the politicians, civil servants, and technocrats within the GRZ. GRZ's spokespersons, however used the IMF and others as whipping boys on domestic ills and unpopular policies.

State Mishmanagement and Waste

The indebtedness and the consequent domestic suffering would not have been so much had it not been for the mismanagement and waste which took place at the top levels of one-party state. The ineffective implementation of often ill-thought out policies decisions had been partly responsible for the escalating national debt and high budget

 11. In july 1985 foreign banks loaned Zambia K 243 million to cover the fuel bill, see The Economist, 12 September, 1987.

and the subsequent economic crisis.

Zambia's excessive indebtedness was avoidable, and there had been no absence of advice precisely on that score. In February 1985, Edward Jaycox, a regional officer of World Bank, said that the country should seek a cheaper source of funds, such as, the International Development Association (I.D.A.), as it could not borrow money at 9.3 percent interest just for consumption.¹² The director of planning in the ministry of Agriculture admitted towards the end of 1986 that most of the externally funded projects in his sector were performing below par, and that they had to be properly designed and monitored if aid was not to continue to be wasted.¹³

But the Government continued to seek and receive further aid from IMF and Paris club and perform badly. At a meeting of donors in Paris, the representative of world bank Jochen Kraske, pointed out that Zambia's extraordinary debt problems was notably due to the poor management of foreign exchange by the Bank of Zambia.¹⁴ On this score, President Kaunda hardly disagreed when he admitted that, "we have made some mistakes, as some of the programmes have been made on false assumptions"¹⁵

12. *Times of Zambia*, 11 February 1985 and 14 May, 1987 and *The Economist*, 12 September, 1987.

13. *Times of Zambia*, 2 February, 1986.

14. *Times of Zambia*, 24 December, 1986.

15. *Ibid.*, 21 November, 1987.

Another instance of mismanagement was the aid to agriculture extended by International fund for Agricultural Development (I.F.A.D) in 1986. Under an arrangement I.F.A.D announced two soft loans totalling \$ 20.5 million.¹⁶ Later on, it was revealed that Zambia had failed to utilize most of the funds which had previously been intended to provide assistance to small scale farmers and entrepreneurs.

Other instances of mismanagement were: in January 1988 it was revealed that an unnamed Ministry had ordered 500 second-hand and badly defective Land-rovers from Belgium at a cost K 24.2 million, paying in the process double the price (\$ 5,500 rather than \$ 2, 500) for each vehicle.¹⁷ In February same year it was reported that more than 1,758 tonnes of fertilizers imported for the 1987-1988 season were missing between Dar es Salaam and Zambia,¹⁸ and in March the Minister of Commerce and Industry stated that a staggering 30 percent of annual maize output was currently being smuggled out of the country i.e, as many as 5 million 50 k.g. bags.¹⁹ This was a debilitating loss since, due to long neglect, the country did not enjoy self-sufficiency in this staple crop necessitating costly imports.²⁰

16. See *The Economist*, 12 September, 1987.

17. *Times of Zambia*, 27 January, 1988.

18. *Zambia Daily Mail*, 17 February, 1985.

19. *Ibid.*, 17 March, 1988.

20. See Kenneth Good, "The Introduction of Weakness in State and Agriculture : Zambia experience", in *African Affairs* (London), 85,339, April, pp. 239-65.

The gross inadequacies of governmental policies was exposed by several knowledgeable critics. Alaxander Chikwana, former Minister of finance, said in November 1987 that state planning contained 'a lot of contradictions and distortions' being often based 'not only or inaccuracies but in most cases pipedreams.'²¹

Furthermore, various statements in annual parliamentary documents constitute a strong indictment of Kaunda and his administration. In 1986 the Auditor-General provided sample evidence of mismanagement of government finances. According to his published report, the state's financial accountability was meaningless and maladministration worsening: misappropriation of public funds, accounting irregularities, and unconstitutional and unauthorized expenditures were all increasing.²²

THE POWER AND PROFLIGACY OF THE LEADERSHIP AND CORRUPTION

The constitutional arrangements and political practice of the one-party ~~System~~ in Zambia meant that mismanagement was directly connected to UNIP's monopoly of power and personal rule of Kenneth Kaunda.²³ The president needed consult no one in making a decision, and no legal

21. *Times of Zambia*, 22 October, and *Zambia Daily Mail*, 16 November, 1987.

22. *Report of the Anditor-General*, pp. 1 and 139.

23. On the powers of the President, see B.C.Chikalo, *Electoral Politics in Zambia's Second Republic* (University of Zambia, Lusaka, 1986), pp.125-27.

opposition was permitted. He could appoint, sack or transfer anyone of importance in the party and the government, and the powers had been used to keep an oldguard of uncritical supporters in top positions regardless of their level of incompetence. Kaunda frequently exercised wide and almost unquestioned powers of detention and it was he who determined limits of public debate on most matters.

Parliamentary candidates had also not been able to speak during election campaigns on national issues, such as the state of the economy, which were the preserve of the President and his close associates. In addition, those party members who were subsequently outspoken in the National Assembly face the danger of lost their future endorsement by UNIP's central committee. In the 1978 elections 30 candidates were vetoed', in 1984 46 out of 812 were dropped, and 1988 a record total of 138 out of 747 aspirants were denied the leadership's endorsement. One M.P. Who lost his seat, told the press that 'those coming to parliament will not be able to speak their minds. They will be confined to petty issues'; and another said that he would not appeal because doing so would be like 'pushing one's head against a brick wall.'²⁴

Direct intimidation of voters by those in authority also occurred when the secretary of the state for Defence

24. *Times of Zambia*, 24 September, 1988.

and Security, Alex Shapi, told a rally in October 1988: 'those who will not vote or vote "no" will be regarded as an enemy.'²⁵ This apart, the regime also facilitated the acquisitiveness of the political elite, and this further manifested the close connections between single-party, mismanagement, and debt in zambia. To give illustration: in 1985 the zambian goveranment initiated a policy to procure expensive car for some parastatal, parliamentary, party and bureaucratic chiefs. The proclaimed justification behind this government policy was to reduce the government expanses on official cars provided to these dignitaries. In August 1987, the Zambia State Insurance Corporation spent K 529, 034 on purchasing a new marcedes for its managing director because his predecessor had move with his car to the National Building, society.²⁶ Due to this kind of ill-conceived policies, the national coffer was drained of precious foreign currencies, when the government was defaulting on its loans and was short of currencies.

The incidence of (publicly acknowledged and reported) corruption in high places multiplied in 1980,s. Illicit activities expanded from domestic graft, poaching, and theft by public servant in the late 1970s to an involvement of diplomats, business persons, and politicians in smuggling heroin, marijuna, and mandrax. since 1981 several high-level

25. *Sedney Morning Herald*, 18 October, 1988.

26. *Times of Zambia*, 5 August, 1987.

officials and their wives²⁷ had been caught in the drug trade, often at European airports. In 1983 the long-time nationalist leader Sikota Wina (former cabinet minister and central committee leader) was detained in India, implicated in mandrax smuggling. Whatever was the final straw of the Wina affair, it pointed to the end of the nationalist era and disappearance of the high moral tone of independence.

The Inertia of the One -Party State

The trends discussed above, gave rise to concentration of wealth in the hands of a small minorities. While the lowest fifth of the households received only 3.4 per cent of national income in 1978, the highest fifth obtained 61.1 percent.²⁸ Between 1975-1983 the real wages fell about 40 percent,²⁹ and from 1980 to 1987, the real income per capita, on the governments's own figures, dropped almost 20 per cent.³⁰

 27. The former Chiwala MP M. Banda, serving as Zambian diplomat, was arrested in West Germany in connection with heroin smuggling in May 1983 ; former Central Committee member and cabinet minister Sikota Wina, along with Zambia Airways Marketing director Sam Kongwa, were picked up in 1983 in India for Mandrax smuggling; and Sujana Chakulya, the wife of former minister of defense and member of central committee Wilson Chakulya, was jailed for two years in England for drug, smuggling, *Times of Zambia* 8, 1984, p.1.

28. World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1985 (Washington D.C., 1985), p.228.

29. Neva Scidman Makagetla, 'The Theoretical and Practical Implication of I.M.F. conditionality in Zambia,' *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 24, 3, September, 1986, p. 402.

30. *Budget Address*, 1988, p.4.

Although the birth rate had been as high as 3.6 percent per annum, formal sector of employment was declining down from 3,6000 in 1966 to 356,000 in 1987.³¹ The living standards of the mass of the population estimated at around 7 millions, were bad and worsening. When illiteracy earlier was a relatively Modest 40 percent, it had risen in the late 1980s to about 60 percent. State infrastructural programmes were totally inadequate, as it could brought literacy to a neglegible 153,000 adults in 18 years upto 1984, and leaving more than 2.8 million in rural areas still illeterate.³²

Health was another area of grave concern in a country that had been neglected agricultural production. In 1972-1974 an estimated 34 per cent of all Zambians were undernourished as against 14 per cent in Malawi.³³ Evidence in Times of Zambia suggests that even starvation was not uncommon in some areas during 1980s. for example a high incidence of malnutrition was repeated in november 1987, in Solwezi Mwinilunga, and Kasempa in the North western province, where 169 children alleged to have died due to insufficient and inadequate food.³⁴

31. Ibid.

32. *Assessment of Juma Nyirenda*, 1988, p.5, Times of Zambia, 22 February, 1988.

33. Dharam Ghai and Samir Radwan (eds.), *Agrarian Policies and Rural POverty in Africa*, Geneva, 1983, p.14.

34. *Times of Zambia*, 22 November, 1987.

Coping with poor food production and distribution brought other difficulties for people in towns as well. Long queues, sometimes for days on end, were part of the trials of ordinary living, and stampade or riot, with consequent physical injuries easily ~~erupted~~^{erupted} if and when food supplies arrived. The Zambia Daily mail reported in january 1988 that two women had collopsed outside a shop in Kalulushi on the copperbelt, where more than 1,000 people were waiting patiently for mealie meal to be delivered;³⁵ and in march, the news claimed that a woman with a baby on her back had seen shot by police during a headlong rush for cooking oil land sugar in centre of Ndola.³⁶ UNIP officials in same places reacted to these shortages with further authoritarianism. For instance, they banned people who were not party members from buying mealie meal in state-owned shops in Solwezi in last maths of 1987,³⁷ and starving villages in Lukulu district in the Western Prvince were told in january 1988 that they would not recieve relief food until they bought party cards. The latter imposition came to light after more than 3,000 people had marched on the office of the governor to complain.

Parliamentarians who were to some extent participants in the one-party system, had responded to the impoverishment

35. *Zambia Daily Mail*, 8 January, 1988.

36. *Ibid.*, 31 March, 1988.

37. *Times of Zambia*, 16 and 26 October, 1987.

of the people had urged the Government to change its policies. Palakasa Chiwaya a parliamentarian even warned of widespread social unrest, unless the government check rapid pace of decline of the country. Dawson Lupungu directly connected these with personal rule in the one-party state, suggesting that the constitution should be amended so that in future no one could be president for more than two terms.³⁸

The government continued to proclaim its blamelessness for what it had created, and searched feverishly at home and abroad for those who could be held responsible for its own failures and exacerbated problems. Kaunda airily repeated the blameless claim in February 1988, saying, "the economy is basically sound , but what has gone wrong is something beyond our control."³⁹ But he had also endeavoured to stifle domestic criticism when he directly stated that whoever would say that the UNIP leadership had mismanaged the economy 'was an enemy.'⁴⁰

The hunt for scapegoates had sometimes taken novel and dangerous twists and turns. Responsibility for widescale food and anti-government riots in December 1966 was directed to several quarters, and urban unemployed, unnamed agitators, Pretoria, and private millers were variously

38. Ibid., 17 March, 1988, Lupungu and Chiwaya were among the sitting MPs ousted of the leadership in October 1988.

39. Ibid.

40. *Sunday Times of Zambia* (Lusaka), 27 February 1988.

accused of fomenting unrest. The milling companies on the copperbelt were said to have created artificial shortage of maize meal, and their properties were immediately seized by the state. Although no improvement in the supply of staple food resulted thereafter, the Government neither returned the companies to their original owners nor paid compensation to all of them. Kaunda declared in October 1987 that the millers, as he put it, had tried to torpedo the Government, and four months later the Prime Minister recognised reality only to the extent of admitting that they could not be categorically blamed. ⁴¹

Although both the IMF and the World Bank had been warmly praised by the leadership, they eventually became the cause of all the country's ills. In May 1987, Kaunda described the I.M.F reform programme as 'murderous', and suggested that the fund was against everything the government wanted for the people.⁴² Kaunda even accused the I.M.F. and the World Bank, the following year, of conducting what he termed a smear campaign against Zambia internationally.⁴³ These ill-considered remarks, frequently repeated by others in leadership, were the source of intended confusion among many sections of population.

41. *Times of Zambia*, 14 April, 1987.

42. *Ibid.*, 26 October, 1987 and *Zambia Daily Mail*, 25 January and 12 February, 1988.

43. *Times of Zambia*, 7 May, 1987.

Keeping all these domestic ills of Zambia in mind, a well informed representative of International Labour Organisation, Guy Mhone was partially correct in denying the off-repeated claim that external factor was the cause of Zambia's present ^epr_^dicament. It was instead, when accurately interpreted, an outcome of 'internally generated distortions."⁴⁴

Infact, the one-party state did not end patronage politics; it merely gave the centre more control over it. Parliament, Cabinet and party became increasing subordinate to the executive dictat. As Gertzel has observed, 'the dominant institution in the one-party state was not the party but the presidency, in which resided enromous power.⁴⁵ This power was needed to marginalise political activities. The security apparatus was developed and military offices were promoted into government positions of elected politicanss. Where the shortage or inefficiency brought the government into public disfavour, Kaunda took to blaming individual politicians publically; the list of notables sacked grew. In time, however, the process helped to undermine the one-party state: UNIP atrophied, losing its credibility; and Kaunda came to be both regarded as a despot and blamed for poor government performance.

44. *The Economist*, 30 April, 1988.

45. Cherry Gertzel (ed.) *Dynamics of one-party state in Zambia* (London, 1984), p.102.

Economic malaise, debt and stabilisation costs imposed huge political costs on the government . In December 1986, withdrawal of subsidies-resulted in high price for basic food items, which in turn produced food riots and in causing a number of deaths. Kaunda subsequently renounced the IMF stabilisation programme. Owing to this renunciation, Kaunda's government, internationally, became isolated, at home, its credibility and legitimacy eroded and a range of articulate critics was encouraged to attack it. The dissident element, while internally diffused, were drawn mainly from workers Union and business and trade unions. Zambian Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU), which was originally an ally of Kaunda's government, subsequently became critical of Kaunda's one-party state, following some of the Kunda's anti-workers measures. By the beginning of the 1980s Fredrick Chiluba, chairman of the ZCTU was unequivocal in laying blame for the crisis on UNIP and Kaunda.⁴⁶ Although, the business community owed much to the sponsorship of UNIP, it had also been critical of government for "too much of socialism," opposing for example, proposals for industrial democracy and calling for privatisation.⁴⁷ What united business and unionists was a growing tendency for them to favour a more explicitly capitalist system. In this they appealed to a popular mood : UNIP's state patronage had

46. *Africa Economic Digest*, 11 March, 1991.

47. *African Political Economy*, 20 March, 1992, p.77.

been represented by Kaunda as 'socialism'; if this was socialism then people groaning under material hardship and unpopular conditionalities wanted nothing to do with it.

Events in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s provided an important stimulus to this process. Although the situation in Zambia hardly parallels that of Eastern Europe, the overthrow of the single-party system there encouraged explicit questioning of the system in Zambia. Leading opposition figure, such as former Foreign Minister and founder of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) Vernon Mwaanga, thinks that Eastern Europe provided an example of how to destroy autocratic governments and oppose one party rule. He believes that Kaunda tried to ignore what had happened in Eastern Europe but that ordinary Zambians, particularly the students, had not. They had been encouraged by what had been achieved through mass demonstration and concerted public action.⁴⁸

Even more important was the message from international institutions, and Western governments. For a number of years, pressure had been growing within IMF and World Bank and among countries like the United States, Britain, France and Germany for aid to be tied more closely to human rights and basic freedom, precisely 'good government.' While it can not be suggested that the west acted to overthrow the Kaunda

48. *Carter Report* : 1,2, 1991.

government, it was not averse to its demise either. There appeared to be a consensus, congruous with the views of MMD, that Zambia's economic misfortunes were the consequence of the UNIP government's mismanagement. Thus the growth and organisation of internal discontent coincided with tacit approval by elements in the west for change in government.

In this climate, there was a rapid disintegration of the will and ability to defend the one-party system. Student riots broke out in June 1990 over food price rise and poor living conditions. The protests were put down by the army, with at least 20 killed (official report) and several injured. In addition to this, military coup attempts in 1988 and June 1990, the criticism of the president within UNIP (including an attempt to replace him as party leader) the proliferation of opposition, serious strikes in mid-1991, all combined to to a setp-by-step retreat from one-party constitution. After 1990 coup, plans announced in May 1990 for a referrendum on the question of ending one-party state, was replaced by a decision to move straght to multi-party elections in November 1991. This initiated widespread demand for the introduction of civil liberaties which had been dormant virtually since 1964. 1990 saw the formation of a number parties, most importantly MMD(in July 1990), the launching of number of news papers, criticisms from element such as churches, articulate opposition from trade unions, and contributions to public debate from such organisations as the Women's lobby and the Law Association.

The general elections of November 1991, held on scheduled time. These were being observed by the Zambia Voting observation project (Z-Vote, an operation with which former US President Jimmy Carter was prominently involved) a common wealth delegation, and individual country teams, as well as several local voluntary associations. UNIP and Kaunda were overwhelmingly defeated. Fredrick Chiluba, the former chairman of ZCTU became president, receiving 76 percent of the presidential vote, and the MMD took 83 percent of the parliamentary seats (125 of 150).⁴⁹ The result was hailed by international observers as a historic step in the country's return to multi-party politics and the embracing by the Zambian people of an opportunity for democratic change.⁵⁰ Local commentators saw it as entailing the establishment of a ' mature and stable democratic system of government in which constitutionalism would prevail,⁵¹ and emphasised the degree to which a return to plural politics should presage economic pluralism, and a more through stablization of the economy.⁵²

The general election of November 24, 1991, brought an end to the one-party system heralding multi-party democracy.

49. Ibid.,

50. *Weekly Post*, No. 14, 1991.

51. *Weekly Post*, No. 15, 1991.

52. Ibid.

CONCLUSION

The dissertation has sought to trace the dynamics of one-party system in Zambia. In the foregoing chapters the different phases in the life of one-party system, such as, its emergence, working, and subsequently its downfall has been analysed. The important landmarks of the same have been recaptulated below.

Zambia attained independence under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda and his party UNIP. It was his Charisma, which mobilized people of various sections of society, led them into a concerted action and subsequently gained independence. It was from this Charisma from which he derived personal authority. He wanted to maintain and consolidate it further. In pursuance of this goal, he embarked upon a definite course of action which could help him obtaining a centralized control of the government. This fact was evident in the massive state intervention in the economy; a series of socio-economic reforms were introduced under the Africanization and nationalization programmes. Though there were compelling circumstances which had necessitated state intervention in the economy, yet considerations for self-aggrandizement by Mr. Kaunda through this process of centralization could not be ignored. These reform programmes helped kaunda in putting an end to the settler's economy. Nonetheless, this further consolidated his position. All vital decision affecting the economy and

society were being taken at his initiative. In precise, these were partly the outcome of his personal ideology.

However the state sponsored development did not help Kaunda as it had, in the long run, led to growth of sectarian tendencies there. New cleavages emerged with the growth of classes, thereby added to traditional cleavages of the Zambian society. As we know, Zambian society has been traditionally divided by tribal, linguistic and provincial lines. There have been four major tribal or more correctly, linguistic groups, dominating the body-politics of Zambia. Among the four, Bemba numerically the largest linguistic group, constituted the main source of support of the UNIP. Thus, there was constant fear among the Lozi, Ila-Tonga and Ngoni groups that, they would be dominated by the Bemba section in politics. This fear of domination often motivated them to forge alliances and counter alliances. There was a constant urge to Kaunda to strike a proper balance among these groups, so that no group would dominate the others. It is however, important to note that, this fear was more with Lozi than any other groups which was evident from its repeated warning to the UNIP leadership that, "if they were ignored, or were not given their due share, they would leave the party." President Kaunda had made serious effort to allay these fears of Lozi and other non-Bemba leaders against the Bemba domination. In 1966, two Lozi leaders were dropped from the ministry under the charge of corruption. Mundia one of those ministers with his followers immediately left the

party and formed a new party called United Party. The fear that Lozi might leave the party led Kaunda to ban the United Party in 1968. But Mundia's banned United Party soon joined hands with Nkumbula's African National Congress. In 1968 election, their combined opposition won the majority of the seats in the Southern and Western Province, which came as shock to the President Kaunda. United Party thus, snatched away a part of UNIP's Lozi followers. In another event, in 1969, Kapwepwe a prominent Bemba leader was removed from Vice-Presidentship and was made a simple minister. The Bemba leaders accused the government of discriminating against the Bemba-speaking people. The major showdown came when, following the resignation of some Bemba-speaking leaders. Kapwepwe left the government and formed his new party, United Peoples Party, in August 1972. Thus UNIP suffered a setback.

The formation of United Peoples Party came as a major challenge to Kaunda's personal authority. The President apprehended that since Kapwepwe was a prominent Bemba leader, Bemba would certainly withdraw their support from UNIP. In such an event UNIP might have in a future election lost seats in the Northern and Luapula provinces, in addition to those lost to the African National Congress in the Southern province thus losing its majority at the centre. Further, Kaunda was committed to a particular path which required centralization of authority. This was not possible amidst constant bickering within and outside the

party. All these apprehensions led Kaunda to ban all opposition parties and introduced one-party system, in December 1972. In a sense, the leader accepted the one-party system because, more than any other thing, it makes his position absolute-both unquestioned and unquestionable.

The one-party system of Zambia started working when the country entered into a deep economic crisis. However, no serious attention was given to solve the economic problem. All efforts were directed to consolidate the newly emerged one-party system.

Under the one-party constitution, the institution of presidency became all the more powerful. All other organs of the government, such as, Cabinet, legislature and party central committee were made subservient to the President. Decision-making remained confined to Mr. Kaunda's and his few selected advisers. Everybody's concern both in the government and party was how to obtain the patronage of the party's leadership, and how to manipulate things for self-aggrandizement.

A sharp fall in the copper price due to recession and hike in the price of import goods due to inflation in the international market combinedly acted together, which in turn dwindled the country's FOREX reserves. As a consequence of which the country could not import the basic intermediary and capital goods to run its import dependent sectors. The cumulative result of all these was serious shortage of government revenue. Due to serious shortage of revenue could

neither embark on fresh development project nor could complete the ongoing ones. Chronic unemployment, underemployment, decline in the average standard of living became the order of the day.

However, this economic crisis can not solely be attributed to the external factors. Internal factors, such as, state mismanagement and corruption, in particular, were also partly responsible. No effort was made to formulate any effective economic policy to check the stiff downtrend of the economy. Instead, the privileged sections of the society viz., sections of party members and civil servants indulged in accumulating more and more wealth and power. This blind scramble for power at times led to civil servants and politicians rivalry as each was trying to outdo the other. As a result of this the government was rendered ineffective and implementation of the government's developmental projects suffered a setback. This process was further affected by the weakening of the UNIP's party organization. The main causes for the weakening of the party organisation were - (i) the patronage and privileges which the local party officials enjoyed before were stopped; (ii) Widening of the gap between top and local level party officials due to excess of centralization of authority; (iii) Alienation of party functionaries because of the policy of inducting civil servants into party organisation. With the weakening of the party organization particularly at the grassroots

level, the very foundations of the UNIP and thus the one-party system was shaken.

Ultimately, the analysis of political system depends on finding out how much load the system accumulates on itself and whether or not it can become durable. The two issues are closely inter-related. If the political leadership is in a hurry to do too many things in too short a period -- without first equipping the administration and the party to discharge their enlarged responsibilities -- there is bound to be tension and conflict until the system itself flounders under the load.¹ In Zambia's case, the political leadership went all out to restructure the material base of society without first seeking a social base for itself. It wanted to do too many things within too less a time. As a result, the system remained fragile.

When the party entered into 1980s, it had to face with deep social, economic and political crises, which had reached an unmanageable proportions. The unfavourable terms of trade for Zambian copper exports in the international market and serious fiscal crisis at home led the Zambian economy into a mess. To get over this economic mess, Zambia was left with the Hobson's choice of going to International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and other donor countries with the usual stringent conditionalities. This in turn, had

1. See, A. Gupta, *Government and Politics in Africa* (New Delhi), pp.150-151.

its deep socio-political repercussions, in the form of, unemployment, declining standard of living, shortages of staple foods, malnutrition, etc. All these problems reached a bursting proportion, when a series of strikes and riots broke out in the mid-eighties. On the political front, the trend of acquiring more and more power by the President and his executive establishment continued unabated. Political activities were banned, and politicians and civil servants opposing this were either ousted or dismissed. Yet the one-party regime could not continue the growing discontent of the masses. The business trade unionist groups were successful in organising masses against the one-party system under UNIP. They were partly encouraged by the fall of the one-party systems in Eastern Europe. And finally, with the increasing pressures from external financial institutions, and the Western countries, President Kaunda announced multi-party democratic elections. The general election was held on November 24, 1991. Fredrick Chiluba's (MMD) won the election, thereby ending the 20 year old one-party system. Thus began a new era of multi-party democracy.

At the time of independence, starting with a multi-party system and traversing through torbulant phase of one-party system from 1972 to 1991, Zambia has thus completed a full circle, with the reestablishment of multi-party system in 1991. Several factors have worked in varying degrees bringing about this change. The speed and fervor with which

the one-party system was dismantled and the new system was installed has generated great optimism in the country. However, it remains to be seen if the new dispensation would live upto the expectations and deliver the goods.

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APPENDICES

Table -

DISPARTITY IN URBAN- RURAL INCOME


	Appr. total no. 1968 ('000s)	Appr annual earnings 1968 (Kwacha)	Increase in real terms since 1964 %
Peasant farmer	800	145	3
Wage earners outside mines	270	640	52
Mineworkers	50	1,300	35
Expatriates outside mines	22	4,170	25
Expatriates in mines	6	7,600	16

Source; ILO, (Turner) Report on Incomes, Wages and Price in Zambia, Geneva, 1969, p. One Kwacha = 60 Pence.

APPENDIX - 2.1

POLITICAL ECONOMY IN DECLINE

FIGURE 2.2 Copper Prices in Pound Sterling (£) and the Terms of Trade for Zambian Copper, 1973-1983 (1970-1974 = 100)



Source: World Bank, *Commodity Trade and Price Trends*, 1983-1984 edition

TABLE 2

Copper and Cobalt Prices, Production, Exports, and Value of Exports, 1973-1984^a

Item	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980*	1981*	1982*	1983*	1984**
Copper Price												
£ per metric ton ^b	727	878	557	781	751	710	936	941	865	847	1047	1037
\$ per metric ton ^c	1786	2059	1237	1401	1306	1309	1985	2183	1742	1742	1591	---
K per metric ton ^d	1156	1327	794	1007	1016	1090	1572	1719	1514	1374	1985	2099
Copper Production ^e (in metric tons of blister and electrolytic)												
	681.2	702.1	640.3	712.9	659.8	655.8	564.8	609.5	560.7	584.5	576.0	551.0
Copper Exports ^e (in thousand metric tons)												
	680.0	673.4	641.2	745.7	666.6	589.8	611.8	681.1	551.8	606.6	588.3	589.0
Value of Copper Exports ^e (in million Kwacha)												
	698.3	838.5	472.0	688.6	644.9	597.7	897.2	872.4	835.4	855.4	867.8	1279.0
Cobalt Price (in Kwacha ^f per metric ton)												
	4455	4158	5462	6913	9529	20,389	43,300	41,667	17,727	10,792	14,655	15,652
Cobalt Production ^g (in thousand metric tons)												
	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.6	3.3	3.3	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.7
Cobalt Exports ^g (in thousand metric tons)												
	1.1	1.9	1.3	2.3	1.7	1.8	3.0	2.1	2.2	2.4	3.4	3.1
Value of Cobalt Exports ^g (in million Kwacha)												
	4.9	7.9	7.1	15.9	16.2	36.7	129.9	87.5	39.0	25.8	49.9	58.9
Total Value of Copper and Cobalt Exports (in million Kwacha)												
	703.1	846.4	479.1	704.5	661.1	634.4	1027.0	959.9	874.5	881.2	917.7	1338.0

* Provisional and likely to undergo revision. ** 1984 figures are for the corporate year ending March 31, 1984

APPENDIX - 2.2 contd

Notes to Table

- a) Zambian copper has been quoted on the basis of electrolytic wire bars' " cash and settlement sellers' price" with effect from June 1968 as listed on the London Metal Exchange. Cobalt figures are based on Zambian Official statistics.
- b) Pound price for copper taken from the LME figures averaged for the year.
- c) US \$ price for copper taken from World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trend, 1993-84 edition.
- d) Kwacha price for copper taken from GRZ, Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Zambia Mining Yearbooks and ZCCM Annual Reports.
- e) Production and export figure very due to different stockpiling methods used by the mining companies.
- f) Kwacha price for cobalt calculated through dividing export value by tonnage exported.

Source: Cooper figures from 1973-79 are taken from the Zambia Mining Yearbooks, 1970-1979; copper figures from 1980 to 1983 and all cobalt figures from Monthly Digest of Statistics 20, 12 (December 1984) Table 21 p.20, Table 48, p.45; 1984 statistics from ZCCM Ltd., 1984 Annual Report.

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APPENDIX — 2.3

TABLE 2.3
Contribution of Copper Industry to Gross Domestic Product, Revenue, Exports, and Value of Exports, 1970-1983 (at current prices)

Year	Gross Domestic Product (K million)	Contribution to Gross Domestic Product		Government Revenue (K million)	Contribution to Government Revenue		Copper and Cobalt	
		(K million)	(%)		(K million)	(%)	Value of Exports (K million)	Contribution to Exports (%)
1970	1,278	455	36	435	251	58	688	97
1971	1,189	268	23	316	114	36	454	95
1972	1,348	317	24	302	56	19	500	93
1973	1,591	506	32	385	108	29	703	95
1974	1,893	607	32	647	341	53	846	94
1975	1,583	204	13	448	59	13	479	93
1976	1,941	330	17	443	12	3	705	94
1977*	2,024	223	11	449	-1.2	nil	661	94
1978*	2,259	271	12	550	0.1	nil	633	94
1979*	2,566	450	18	685	-9.8	nil	1,034	96
1980*	3,038	520	17	719	42	6	960	80
1981*	3,449	473	14	820	11	1	875	88
1982*	3,564	382	11	940	nil	nil	882	89
1983*	4,206	639	15**	957	42	4	n.a.	n.a.

* Figures are listed as provisional in the official statistics. ** Adrian Wood estimates that the 1983 mining contribution to GDP was as low as 5.9% in "An Economy Under Pressure: Some Consequences of the Recession in Zambia," Paper read at Annual Conference of British Geographers, Durham, U.K., January 1984, p. 6

Source: for 1970-1980, Zambia Mining Yearbook 1980; for 1981, interviews with NCCM and RCM personnel; and 1982 and 1983 figures calculated using data from the Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, 20, 12 (December 1984), Table 21, p. 20, Table 27, p. 25, Table 50, p. 47, and Table 52, p. 49.