


**CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST ASIA:  
PEACE INITIATIVES UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION**

**Dissertation Submitted to  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the Award of the Degree of  
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST ASIA: PEACE INITIATIVES UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree to this university or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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*Dedicated*

to my

Parents



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and my brothers are the source of my strength. I express my gratitude, love and admiration to my family through this work.

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For all the errors and omissions in this Research Work I am solely to be held responsible.

Priyadarshini Panda.  
Priyadarshini Panda

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## — PREFACE —

America's rise to imperialism and the simultaneous increased overseas involvement has led it to a position where it could mediate between two conflicting parties in a conflict. Its position along with certain situations presented it as the sole mediator between the Arabs and the Israelis. America's increasing power made it as the most important actor in international relations which had maintained its hegemony over the region for many years; and for that reason, any effort towards peace in the region must include the United States. While holding American values as supreme it wanted to pass on those values to other parts of the world, the United States thought it as an opportunity to impose its ideas, ideals, and ideology while mediating in the Arab-Israeli issue. In addition to it, the vast hydro-carbon resources like oil was also significant in drawing the Americans close to the cause of the West Asian region. Right from the creation of Israel in 1948 till date the Arab-Israeli conflict has persisted despite stated American effort. Many Administrations have come and gone, leaving the issue still unresolved.

'Conflict Management' as a concept has several pre-requisitions. In order to reach out a solution, as per the theory of 'Conflict Management', one has to follow a well-defined policy. And that well-defined policy was absent for a long time in American foreign policy, particularly, towards this region. Still the Americans manage to claim themselves the sole peace broker in the conflicts of the region for quite a long time. Now, when the voices of 'hatred' and anti-Americanism is growing within the Arab world; the US government, as a response, tried to satisfy the Arabs by making promises of an independent Palestinian state.

After the September, 2001 attacks, the US had showed some renewed interest towards this region. In the War against Terrorism, America also needs the support of the Arabs, and for that matter, the lineal attitude would serve its interests best. These are the dynamics which come into play while we study the American policy of 'Conflict Management' towards West Asia.

Chapter- I describes the early American involvement in the region before the creation of Israel in 1948. This early engagement would be helpful in making out the real nature of America's concern and policy making towards this region. And as the early involvement was ambiguous, it could be said that there was no



defined, well-established US policy towards the region in that period. The main focus was to check the local and regional conflicts to spread further.

Chapter- II explains the various 'war' situations and the respective American policy of 'Conflict Management'. It also analyzes the US objectives behind those policy formulations and implementations. As the period from the creation of Israel up to the present Bush Administration had witnessed several violent wars; it is an over all 'failure' of American policy of "Conflict Management'. The United States could not restrain either the Arabs or the Israelis from going to war. Rather it was seen taking sides with Israel and supplying Arms to Israel.

Chapter- III analyzes the policy of 'Conflict Management' under the George W. Bush Administration. The Bush Administration started with an indifferent attitude towards the Arab-Israeli issue, but the terrorist attacks of September, 2001 was responsible for its renewed efforts to gain the confidence of the people of this region and as a part of it, to mediate in the Palestine-Israel conflict. The US policies, however, remained ambiguous and did not have clear well-defined goals. The US tried to satisfy both the sides not to convince them for peace but to generate support for its War on Terror.

Chapter- IV focuses on the domestic challenges of foreign policy making and the regional challenges of that policy's implementation. It focuses on the constraints imposed on the Presidency by the Congress, the Jews Lobby, Intra-agency rivalries. It also examines the regional implication of US policy.

Chapter- V concludes that as per the theories of 'Conflict Management', the United States failed to approach the Palestinian-Israeli issue in a tactful way as to come to a lasting solution. It could not satisfy the minimum pre-conditions which a mediator should adopt. Contrarily, it always took sides with one of the parties and that is avoidable in the theories.

The methodology of the study is descriptive and analytical. It used the data in a general framework and analyzes these data to come to logical frameworks. The theories of 'Conflict Management' have been explained applied to the American policy of 'Conflict management' towards West Asia. The study referred both primary and secondary sources of information and data. The primary sources include available reports of the US Government and the Israeli Government. The

secondary sources include books, journal articles, newspaper reports, and other relevant materials available in the internet.

CHAPTER-I

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\*\*\* HISTORICAL  
BACKGROUND \*\*\*

## CHAPTER- I

*How did two peoples become attached to the same piece of land? History and religion helped create two communities in each of which a national consciousness grew that was fixated on the same territory, Palestine. Thus, two strong nationalisms evolved at odds with each other and still blocking peace efforts. Can they be overcome?*

--- **Roskin & Berry**

American “conflict management” policy in West Asia is very complex in nature. It is because of two reasons: the regional politics itself is too complicated, and secondly, the character of early US involvement in this area was rather ambiguous. To understand the true nature of America’s role in ‘peace initiatives’ such as ‘peace building’, ‘peace making’ and ‘peace keeping’, there is a need to look into the history of US policy for simplifying the complexity of the issue.

During the nineteenth century, there was not much American involvement in West Asia. Initial American contacts were limited to private individuals, or groups aiming at particular interests, missionary or philanthropic in nature. There was no direct US governmental concern or any involvement of official policies or decisions relating to political or military affairs of this region.<sup>1</sup>

By the twentieth century, America’s rise as a world power had resulted in an expanded overseas involvement in several parts of the world, including West Asia. After World War I, the dismembered Ottoman Empire was converted into many independent states. In this process, there was some American involvement in the form of participation in discussions about the region’s future, although, it was actually worked out through the dominant British influence. President Woodrow Wilson was personally present in the post- World War I peace conference and participated in the planning of the post -war settlements. But, Wilson’s “idealism” presented in the form of “Fourteen Points Programme” and

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<sup>1</sup>. Finnie, David. H. (1967), *Pioneer’s East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Howard University Press. p. 126.

his endorsement of Balfour Declaration (1917) could not be implemented concretely. After all, the US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

In the mean time, an investigating commission was sent by the United States in 1919 to the region to acquire information and regional suggestion regarding the future of this region. It indicated American desire to keep itself vigilant of West Asian affairs. During the inter-war years, domestic politics prevented the US government from playing a major role in this region. This process is often characterized as the contradictory domestic tides of 'isolationism' and 'internationalism.'

### **Support for Jewish Homeland:**

When the U.S. was about to begin its political involvement in this region, it was pushed back to zero as a result of American isolationist sentiments. However, one important development could be noticed in this phase that though the U.S. withdrew its efforts towards political involvement, its commercial involvement had already started to grow particularly related to oil business. And in the ensuing decades, the oil factor became so important that no American policy could ignore it while dealing with the politics in the region, including Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>2</sup>

While there was no comprehensive US policy or strategy towards the West Asian region prior to World War I, the United States did show some concern for the Jewish homeland. A limited US political commitment was there in the form of a vague expression of support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Things began to change in the midst of World War II. The focus of attention and activity of the Zionist movement shifted from London to the United States.<sup>3</sup> The Biltmore Program of 1942<sup>4</sup> sought the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. This was regarded as an important landmark in American Zionist

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<sup>2</sup>. Arad, Ruth, Seev hirsch & Alfred Tovias (1983), *The Economics of Peacemaking: Focus on the Egyptian-Israel Relations*, London: Macmillan. p 46.

<sup>3</sup>. Reich, Bernard(1967), *Quest for Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, New Jersey: New Brunswick, Transaction inc. p. 211.

<sup>4</sup>. The Biltmore Program, 1942, was a plan adopted in one of the sessions held by the World Zionist organizations. It got a strong support from the American Jewish community. While declaring its immediate goal of establishing a Jews state in Palestine, it urged American pressure on Britain to bring it about.

activities, which resulted in increased and more intensive efforts in support for a Jewish state in Palestine.

Like this, there are many other explanations regarding the early American involvement and the motives behind it. Most of the explanations are, however, insufficient, if not inaccurate or incorrect. The real character of the politics of this region is far more complex.

World War II was more or less responsible for an increasing strategic value of West Asia. The hydro-carbon resources, especially 'oil' added to the importance of this region in the eyes of American analysts. Along with that, the emergence of the United States as a super power at the end of World War-II changed in many ways the American thinking and policy. It was again time for "Reverse Monroe Doctrine", as "expansionism" in the form of "internationalism" was the order of the day. The United States felt the necessity of a 'defined policy' towards various regions of the globe including the "Middle East".<sup>5</sup> While up to this point the Americans could manage their activity in this region through 'proxies', now the planning was being made of a 'direct presence' as part of discharging responsibility of a super power. It is important to note here that the U.S. could not successfully formulate a specific or comprehensive policy for the whole region, though it recognized the need to prevent local conflicts that could further amplify the problems into international conflicts. Thus, up to this phase, even if the U.S. had started showing more concern over the establishment of peace in this region, it was purely based on the larger framework, that is the fear of international impact of West Asian conflicts.

In September 1946, **Loy W. Henderson**, the then Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs of the Department of State summarized the U.S. policy in the "Middle East" as ;

"The main objective of the United States in the Near and Middle East is to prevent rivalries and conflicts of interest in that area from developing into open hostilities which eventually might lead to a third World War.... Until all the countries of the Near and Middle East are politically and economically sound, and until their governments become stable and are

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<sup>5</sup> Carnevale, Peter J. 1986. "Strategic Choice in Mediation," *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January, pp. 41-56.

able to preserve internal order and to take measures to improve the living standards of their populations, the Near and Middle East will continue to present a temptation to powers outside the area. As long as this temptation exists, the danger of conflict which may lead to war will continue to be present.”<sup>6</sup>

The approach followed at this time appeared to be a routine work of a super power. There was no special concern over problems and issues of this region. At the end of World War II, the British faced a problem of Jewish refugees' influx. They were forced to open the gates of Palestine to massive immigration. It was an impossible task of keeping order, for them, in a situation where many of the Jewish population had turned to violence and the Palestine Arabs to non-cooperation. The then British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin felt compelled to seek American cooperation as the only way of getting a temporary or more lasting solution.<sup>7</sup>

It was then up to the United States to decide on the relative importance of several conflicting interests: cooperation with the British for the common security, the goodwill of Arab governments, the urgency of seeking Jewish-Arab agreement on the future of Palestine, and the need to use Palestine to reduce the agony of Europe's remaining Jews.

The Anglo-American talks of cooperation about the future of Palestine proved to be a failure as the situation in Palestine continued to deteriorate. Finally, the British decided to give up the mandate system. As a result, the Palestine's future was thrown into the lap of the United Nations. The United States welcomed this opportunity for the world organization to find a solution. With the British out of the picture, the main question was how to balance the two communities: Arabs and Jewish. From this moment, the United States assumed a slightly active role in the search for such a balance.<sup>8</sup>

The U.S. government explained this active role in terms of humanitarian concern, particularly about the security of the displaced persons and emigration issues. The U.S. wanted the maximum Jewish immigration; this was mainly due to its sympathy for the European Jewish communities and to provide them with

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<sup>6</sup> Henderson's speech available at <http://www.us.gov.news/releases/2002/04/20020404-1.html>

<sup>7</sup> Kerr, Malcom H.(1975), *The Elusive Peace in the Middle East*, Albany: State University of New York Press. p 16.

<sup>8</sup>. Kerr, Malcom H.(1975), *The Elusive Peace in the Middle East*, Albany: State University of New York Press. p 8.

homes and livelihoods. More importantly, President Harry Truman believed in need of redeeming the pledges concerning the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.<sup>9</sup>

The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine in 1947 produced a report of its proceedings. Majority of its members recommended partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state plus an international territory of Jerusalem. A relatively small minority of members favored a single federal state of Palestine.

The US decided to support the majority report stating that it seemed the only practical way out. The desire of the Jewish community in Palestine for statehood was equally strong. They could hardly be denied statehood without the use of force of their opponents. Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, moreover, had reached the point where the degree of cooperation necessary to a common state was missing. True, the partition proposal could be faulted on the same ground.<sup>10</sup> It drew the boundaries of the new states in such a bizarre way that they could not exist without freedom of movement and economic unity. It was questionable whether the partition plan could ever work? Moreover, if the Jews were certain to oppose by force any solution other than partition, the Arabs were as adamant in their intention to use force to prevent partition.

In supporting the resolution, the U.S. took a significant political decision with regard to Palestine and the future state of Israel. **President Truman** described his approach in the following words:

“My purpose was then and later to help bring about the redemption of the pledge of the Balfour Declaration and the rescue of at least some of the victims of Nazism. I was not committed to any particular formula of statehood in Palestine or to any particular time schedule for its accomplishment. The American policy was designed to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of the promised Jewish homeland and easy access to it for the displaced Jews of Europe.”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 93.

<sup>10</sup> Campbell, John C (1975), “American Efforts for Peace” in Malcom Kerr (1975), *The Elusive Peace in the Middle East*, Albany: State of University Press. p. 268.

<sup>11</sup> . Truman speech on the declaration of independenc of Israel available at <http://www.us.gov.news/releases/2002/04/20020404-1.html>



Hence, the partition resolution set the stage for the establishment of a new state of Israel and the U.S. relationship with the new state. It also sets the background for U.S. policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute.

**Truman Doctrine:-**

In the spring of 1947, when the broad contours of American foreign policy were being drawn for post-war years, by assuming responsibility for supporting free people of Greece and Turkey against communist forces under the “Truman Doctrine”, the United States took on the task of defending the “Middle East” against possible Soviet expansion as well.

Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, pointed out to Congress that if Greece and Turkey lost their independence, other states would soon lose theirs and the West would then lose the strategic bases, lines of communication, and resources of the ‘Middle East’.<sup>12</sup> The problem of Palestine became more and more intertwined with the US strategy of ‘containment’ with every passing year.

During the Cold War period starting from the spring of 1947, American ‘conflict management’ policy was implemented mainly as a part of the ‘containment’ policy. Therefore, from the time of creation of Israel to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the politics of this region was much affected by the tides of Cold War as the world politics was dominated by the superpower rivalry during the period. Both the United States and the Soviet Union tended to be involved managing the local conflicts of West Asia because they took it as their responsibility towards this region as superpowers. While during this period, there were many conflict situations, there were only limited peace efforts which can be termed as organized efforts aiming at peace.

**Diversity of Views:**

There are no unanimous views that explain the early American involvement in the West Asian region. According to one view influenced by the Marxist ideas and supported by scholars like Gilbert Achcar and Noam Chomsky<sup>13</sup>, oil is the main

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<sup>12</sup> Campbell, John C (1975), “American Efforts for Peace” in Malcom Kerr (1975), *The Elusive Peace in the Middle East*, Albany: State of University Press. p. 269.

<sup>13</sup> Chomsky, Noam (1974), *Peace in the Middle East: Reflections on Justice and Nationhood*, New York: Vintage.p. 18.

reason why the United States took interest in this area. As per this view, the United States wanted its companies to acquire some shares in the production of oil with the British and the French oil companies when the area was still under 'mandate' system. In fact, at the time of creation of Israel, American companies had acquired nearly forty percent shares in Iranian Oil Production. These arguments generally are given to prove that the United States from the very beginning has been a reluctant peace broker; its main interest and concern in this area revolving around 'oil' only, till date.

Another view developed around the Cold War strategy. And as per the Cold War perspective,<sup>14</sup> the United States was largely guided by Cold War considerations i.e., 'containment' of the Soviet Union in this region. Israel turned out to be the keystone of the containment strategy.

The third view emerged on the American involvement in West Asia is one of oscillations. According to this view, The United States, while firmly supporting Israel cultivated closer ties with a few Arab countries as well. Consequently, it followed a dual policy of making peace initiatives on one hand and supplying arms to various conservative regimes in the region on the other.

In their distillations of historical experience, academic analysts have posited three basic strategies for warding off confrontation stemming from conflicts: 'conflict resolution', 'conflict management' and 'conflict avoidance'. A great deal of conceptual confusion surrounds these strategies with profound implications at both the policy and the theoretical levels. "Conflict Management" and "Conflict Resolution" can be viewed as complementary and consecutive sequences of activity to which both the parties in conflict resort in order to constrain and then mitigate acutely threatening 'adversary crises of the local balance'. There are, of course, significant differences in the implementation of these policies. "Conflict Management" merely requires constrain adversarial situations whereas "Conflict Resolution" implies the more ambitious objective of persuading protagonists to abandon ideological passions or irreconcilable aims in favor of more pragmatic and accommodative policies. Nevertheless, both

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<sup>14</sup> Spiegel, Steven. L ed.(1992), *Conflict Management in the Middle East*, Colorado: West View Press. P.31.

approaches are essentially interventionist, though at different points on the spectrum of involvement. "Conflict Avoidance", on the other hand, is driven by the logic of non-involvement. The record of the United States in the West Asian region reveals that it has not been successful in resolving the conflicts among the regional clients; it has been more successful, however, in managing regional conflicts. And, regarding 'Conflict Avoidance', the record has been mixed.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Spiegel, Steven. L ed.(1992), *Conflict Management in the Middle East*, Colorado: West View Press. p. 272.

CHAPTER-II

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\*\*\*\* THE US ROLE  
IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT  
IN WEST ASIA \*\*\*\*

## CHAPTER- II

*Lately we have seen the possibilities of, literally, a religious war- the Muslims returning to the idea that the way to heaven is to lose your life fighting the Christians or the Jews.*

**----President Ronald Reagan**

Ever since the creation of Israel, there has been a constant struggle over the same piece of land between the Palestinian Arabs and Jews. Even prior to the creation of the independent state of Israel, there were sparks of conflict during the partition plan. This truth has been repeated several times, in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and so on. These wars contributed to a great extent to the volatility of the region. This area was of a great importance for the superpowers: economically, geo-strategically, politically and perhaps ideologically. That is one of the reasons why both the United States and the Soviet Union began showing considerable interests towards the problems of this region despite the great degree of volatility. Their involvement in the area presented them as the “peace maker”<sup>1</sup> during the conflicts. But, contrarily, the region became a victim to the superpower rivalry that significantly added to the complexity of the main issue of Palestine.

### **Creation of Israel:-**

According to Mostafa-Elwi Saif, there were actually two crises instead of one during this period: the first concerned the UN partition plan in 1947 and the other one was the result of the creation of the independent state of Israel in 1948.<sup>2</sup>

The crisis of 1947 was a result of the UN resolution seeking partition of Palestine into two states-one Jewish and the other Arab; the second erupted as a response to the creation of Israel as an independent state. The conflicts were mainly due to the opposition of the Palestinians and their Arab neighbours against the creation of Israel on the land that they considered belonged to them.

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<sup>1</sup> Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov (1994), "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Learning Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 31, No.1, February, pp. 75-92.

<sup>2</sup> Spiegel, Steven. L ed.(1992), *Conflict Management in the Middle East*, Colorado: West View Press. p.122.

Though the superpower rivalry had already begun by this time, it had not spread to this region, yet. Later on, the politics of this region also got very much affected by the superpower rivalry. According to Steven L. Spiegel, at the time of creation of Israel, the Arab-Israeli confrontation was not yet part of the super power rivalry. In fact, both the super powers gave recognition to Israel. As the US support to Israel became more and more evident, some Arab countries began to approach the Soviet Union for assistance. By mid-1950s, Moscow had already established arms-supply relationship with important Arab countries, such as Egypt and Syria.<sup>3</sup>

Until then US policy towards West Asia could be characterized as: sympathy towards Jewish national inspiration and recognition that Israel could ultimately serve the purpose of terminating the British presence in the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>4</sup>

### **Sinai Campaign:-**

The 1956 war, also known as the “Suez Crisis” and “Sinai Campaign”, illustrates the role of outside powers in starting and ending Arab-Israeli wars.<sup>5</sup> Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser was a new breed of Arab leader who saw himself not simply as an Egyptian nationalist but also as the leader of a pan-Arab movement. In the Gaza Strip, under Egyptian control since 1948, some Palestinians became *fedayeen*,<sup>6</sup> who made raids to Israel. They were armed and trained by Egypt as part of Nasser’s policy of using conflict with Israel to arouse and unify all Arabs under his leadership. Israel retaliated with major raids on Egyptian posts in the Gaza Strip.

Enraged by these acts, Nasser sought arms. The United States and Britain refused, but the Soviet Union was happy to sell enormous quantities. With the Soviet weapons, Nasser built up his forces in the Sinai facing Israel, and Israel grew nervous. Disappointed that Nasser was turning to the Soviets, the United States and Britain withdrew their offer to help fund construction of Egypt’s

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<sup>3</sup> Spiegel, Steven. L ed.(1992), *Conflict Management in the Middle East*, Colorado: West View Press. p.154.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 157.

<sup>5</sup>. Roskin, Michael & Nicholas O. Berry (2002), *The New World of International Relations*, New Delhi: Prentice Hall Publications. P. 130.

<sup>6</sup>. *Fedayeens* were the Palestinian self-sacrificers.

'hydrological dream', the Aswan Dam on the Nile. Angered by this withdrawal, Nasser nationalized the British- and French-owned Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. It was a vestige of colonialism, he argued.<sup>7</sup>

Enraged by Nasser's canal takeover, Britain and France quietly colluded with Israel to set up an excuse to take the canal back. Israel would strike first, and they would come in to 'protect' the canal. On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces streaked through the Sinai toward the Suez Canal. London and Paris issued ultimatums to both sides to withdraw ten miles from the canal, and invaded and seized the canal zone on November 5.

The 1956 war ended with Israel in possession of the Sinai and Britain and France in possession of the canal. Nasser was beaten but not defeated. The American President, Dwight Eisenhower was angry that London and Paris moved on Egypt against US advice as this last gasp of British and French imperialism would only push Arab nationalists closer to the Soviets, he argued. The United States supported a UN resolution to oust the invading forces and used economic pressure to get the British and French to withdraw from Suez, which they did in December. Israel took more persuading; it was threatened by economic sanctions and promised to get Egypt to open the Tiran Strait to Israeli shipping. With a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to patrol the Sinai, Israel pulled out in March, 1957. In 1956, as in subsequent wars, the victors had not won, and the war settled nothing.<sup>8</sup>

It was towards this "Suez Crisis" that the superpowers gradually expanded their competing global interests into the region. The United States took the lead in getting the UN resolution passed on this crisis. The American stance during the 1956 crisis, and particularly after can be explained as a strategic maneuver aimed at eliminating the last remnants of British and French influence and replacing them as the leader of the Western bloc in this region. Thus, whatever initiatives the United States had undertaken towards this crisis, can be defined in terms of pure long-term American interest in this region.

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<sup>7</sup>. Roskin, Michael & Nicholas O. Berry (2002), *The New World of International Relations*, New Delhi: Prentice Hall Publications. P. 130.

<sup>8</sup>. Ibid.

In addition, one more point of crucial importance lies in the fact that Americans were taking active part in the passing of the UN resolutions but they seldom took any real interest in getting to the root of the conflict or to analyze the nature of the conflict. Washington was keen to participate in the peace conference instead of managing the conflict. Peace conference or peace talks are necessarily a post-war phenomenon; whereas conflict management is a much wider concept. In conflict management, the mediator has a greater role to play than usually assumed; otherwise, it would be landing at the futile peace talks without any serious outcomes. Conflict management strategy should ideally include much research and knowledge related to the parties in the conflict, their interest and demands, the reason behind such demands, the nature of the problem, the history of the conflict and most importantly the attitudes and beliefs of the people(s) involved in the conflict. It may be argued that in politics, there is no place for beliefs. Conflict management needs to avoid it in order to make the efforts less complicated. After all, the political history of this region is itself characterized by complexities and interplaying of several factors at a time. Therefore, analyzing this conflict situations and applying the conflict management theory must include these complexities into account.

And here, the United States hardly attempted to bring the complete solution to the problem. Washington was too busy in promoting its own interest and hardly differentiated between the Arab and Israeli. They happened to be just the opposite parties to the conflict. Their belief-system and nationalism were not considered much. Later, when Arab nationalism stood as a wall against American interest and appeared more friendly to socialism, the United States took it seriously. Soon, objecting to Soviet military presence constituted a permanent pillar in U.S. policy towards the region.<sup>9</sup>

### **Six Day War:-**

As Arab nationalism was growing with the support of socialism it became a major problem for the United States during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In this period the American policy became more complicated, often having more than

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<sup>9</sup> Larson, Deborah W. (1994). "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 15, No. 1, March, pp. 17-33.



one objective behind a particular step. When American interests in this area particularly in oil became more salient,<sup>10</sup> the Arab world was becoming more and more radical. Arms-supply from the Soviet Union also had its impact on the Arab countries like Egypt and Syria; they began to support communist ideas. Powerful Arab nationalism along with emerging socialism was the main reasons for America's concern.

During this period, America's involvement in the Lebanese crisis of 1958 was aimed at striking against the dream of Arab unity. And some U.S. marines were placed in Lebanon to serve that purpose. American position and policy was focused as to how to manage these events directed against it. They had to make a careful assessment of Soviet reaction and face the challenge coming from within the Arab world. These tasks seemed difficult particularly in the absence of the British who had served as the proxy for the Americans for a considerable period. And the main concern was to find out a legal justification to carry out all these activities. The actual articulation of these U.S. interests and objectives became more obvious during the 1967 crisis.

One result of the 1956 war was that Egypt and Syria became Soviet clients and the United States became Israel's principal supplier of arms. Fedayeen raided and Israel retaliated. In 1963, Israel began a project to divert water from the Jordan River angering Syria and Jordan. Regional tensions mounted. By spring of 1967, events took hold of Nasser and pushed him toward war. Israel was surrounded by hate-filled Arabs screaming "war". Israel's narrow neck between Jordan and the sea was, in places, less than ten miles wide. Israel's attitude grew out its geographical situation: "either we strike first or we are doomed", a doctrine called 'preemption'.

Israel quietly began mobilizing reservists in early June. The last straw came on June 4 when Jerusalem learned that the United States would not force open the Tiran Strait as pledged in 1957. America was bogged down in Vietnam. Israel felt

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<sup>10</sup> Levy, Jack S. (1994). "Learning from Experience in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy" in Manus I. Midlarsky, John A. Vasquez, and Peter V. Gladkov, eds., *From Rivalry to Cooperation: Russian and American Perspectives in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: HarperCollins. p. 69

endangered and abandoned and on June 5 preempted. The results were breathtaking and horrifying. The three Arab countries of Egypt, Syria and Jordan lost fourteen thousand soldiers, Israel only seven hundred. It looked like a brilliant, astonishing victory, a model of training, daring, morale, and competence. But again, the war settled nothing. Israel had not taken an Arab capital city or penetrated into the heartlands of its three foes; the superpowers saw to that.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 was fought the time when the Johnson Administration was deeply involved in the quagmire of Indo-China. Unlike in Southeast Asia, there was no direct involvement of either of the superpowers in the West Asian wars, but this six-day war and the aftermath proved beyond doubt that the Cold War rivalry had entered West Asia in a big way. The US support for Israel became more pronounced after the 1967 war. The tone of US diplomacy also changed after this war.

Washington frequently began to declare its commitment to preserving peace in the region and called upon regional parties to practice self-restraint. Moreover, it explicitly opposed Egypt's mobilization of troops in Sinai and rejected its request for the withdrawal of UNEF and the closure of the Straits of Tiran. More importantly, the United States had taken a mixture of persuasive, accommodative and coercive moves in its contacts with Egypt and the Soviet Union. In addition, Washington moved the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean in a deterrent move directed at the Soviet Union to prevent the latter from intervening. The emerging U.S. policies created a remarkably favorable setting for a harshly coercive Israeli response to Nasser's moves. This manifested itself later on in an Israeli-initiated air strike against Egypt.

Termination of Nasser's influence in the Arab world and the values, attitudes and thoughts that he represented, one of the major objectives of both the United States and Israel.<sup>11</sup> Ironically, instead of settling the disputes which is a part of conflict management, Washington got actively involved in the regional politics taking sides with Israel. From this time onwards, the United States maintained a 'special relationship' with Israel, which made the whole Arab world

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<sup>11</sup> Mandell, Brian S. (Spring, 1990). "Anatomy of a Confidence-Building Regime: Egyptian-Israeli Security Co-operation," *International Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 202-223.

suspicious about the honesty and impartiality of the United States in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

There was no pressing need for the Arabs to 'sue for peace' as in classic diplomacy. Instead, they announced in a Khartoum meeting that September: "no negotiation, no recognition, no peace." The United Nations passed the evenhanded Resolution 242, the basis of peace plans ever since, that asked Israel to withdraw and the Arabs to accept Israel's existence on peaceful terms. Both sides ignored 242, each claiming it couldn't trust the other side. The stage was set for the 1973 war.

Israel, in the flush of victory, also did not notice that it was acquiring a major problem. The recently seized West Bank and Gaza Strip contained over one million Palestinians, most of them refugees from the 1948-1949 war or their descendants. Israel would now have to govern the people it wanted to get rid of in 1948.

#### **October War:-**

During the seventies, *Détente* was the phase prevalent worldwide in the Cold War scene. In West Asia, the 'Basic Principles Agreement' was concluded between the two superpowers during this phase regarding the imposition of a state of military relaxation in West Asia as a part of *détente*. But some regional events forced the agreement to fail which resulted in the restoration of the some old Cold War politics. According to Mostafa-Elwi Saif,<sup>12</sup> the 1973 war proved that *détente* could not constitute a U.S.-Soviet condominium capable of ruling the world.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who took over upon Nasser's death in 1970, believed that Israel's occupation of the Sinai, Golan Heights, and West Bank had to be challenged, partly to change the defeatist psychology of Arabs and the victorious psychology of Israelis, and partly to make the superpowers take an active interest in the developments in the region and sorting out a solution to it.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> "Arab-Israeli War of 1973" available at [http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\\_761564886/Arab-Israeli\\_War\\_of\\_1973.html](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761564886/Arab-Israeli_War_of_1973.html)

<sup>13</sup>. Roskin, Michael & Nicholas O. Berry (2002). *The New World of International Relations*, New Delhi: Prentice Hall Publications. P. 133.

On October 6, 1973, Egyptians and Syrians struck a surprised Israel. Over two thousands Soviet-made Syrian tanks penetrated the Golan Heights. Israel repelled them in the biggest tank battle in history known as the “October War” or the “Yom-Kippur War.”

At this point, the United States and USSR, after desperately re-supplying their clients, tried to enforce another UN cease-fire. Moscow threatened to send troops to aid the Egyptians. President Nixon then put US forces on worldwide alert to deter Soviet intervention. The war jolted the world. Arab members of OPEC embargoed oil shipments to countries deemed pro-Israel and then, quadrupled the price of petroleum. This kicked up world inflation for years. Militarily, the world’s armies took careful note, for the war demonstrated that small, guided missiles could knock out jets and tanks.<sup>14</sup> Thus, it was again the situation of Cold War.

In managing the 1973 crisis, the United States resorted to the whole spectrum of crisis-bargaining tactics ranging from persuasion to accommodation and/or coercion. It insisted on a cease-fire with a return to the earlier lines of ‘5th October’. The then National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger even warned if the order in West Asia disintegrated, there would be no *détente*. And more importantly, coercive military measures had been taken. Only when the situation in the battlefield became more complex the United States moved from coercion to persuasion, accommodation and even cooperation to produce a cease-fire resolution. However, there was a continuous violation of the cease-fire on the part of Israel.

Moreover, the crisis of 1973 was one more opportunity through which Washington advanced its national interest in the region.<sup>15</sup> Arab countries realized that Soviet’s arms were not adequate to challenge the Israelis to which the United States was supplying arms. Therefore, from this time onwards, the Arab countries also turned to acquire arms from the United States. That made the Soviets out of the scene and paved the way for the United States to be the sole mediator between the Arabs and Israelis in future.

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<sup>14</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> “Arab-Israeli War” available at <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0856666.html>

### **Camp David:-**

After the October 1973 war, as a part of the peace process between Israel and Egypt, both the countries pursued a personal diplomacy<sup>16</sup> towards each other; and the United States played a major role in building Egyptian-Israeli peace through what is known as the "Shuttle Diplomacy." The US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger flew back and forth between capitals of West Asian countries for months in an effort to bring about peace after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The central feature of his "American Plan" was separating the ceasefire from long-range problems and more importantly, minimizing Soviet involvement in the process.

The Carter administration took office with a commitment to seek a West Asian settlement like the last preceding leadership.<sup>17</sup> It differed in its approach in three important respects, however:(a) it considered that the step by step method of putting together a peace in the area had run its course and that the time had come for a comprehensive settlement; (b) it was far more ready than its predecessor to accept the need for a Palestinian entity on the West Bank; (c) it believed that in return for withdrawing from the occupied territories, Israel should receive from the Arab states a 'full' peace rather than only the nonbelligerency provided for in Resolution 242. Within a few months of his inauguration, President Jimmy Carter had laid down three key elements of what he conceived to be a just settlement: a homeland for the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal to borders essentially those before 1967 war, and a 'full' peace.<sup>18</sup>

After an unsuccessful attempt to get Arab and Israeli agreement on a more detailed and precise basis for negotiation than was contained in Resolution 242, the U.S. turned, in the late summer of 1977, to an all-out effort to reconvene the Geneva conference by the end of the year in order to set in motion the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement. A major, though not the only, stumbling block was the question of whether all Arab participants would negotiate all aspects of the

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<sup>16</sup>. When diplomacy is used as a means for personal goals and achievements.

<sup>17</sup> Spiegel, Steven. L. ed.(1992), *Conflict Management in the Middle East*, Colorado: West View Press. p. 278.

<sup>18</sup> Mendelsohn, Eerett (1982), *A Compassionate Peace: A Future for the Middle East*, Penguin Books: New York,p. 172

peace, as it affected all Arabs or whether each Arab state would negotiate with Israel separately about its own front.

There was much opposition to this proposal from various points. The Syrians wanted negotiations focused not on fronts<sup>19</sup> but on elements of a settlement such as borders, security measures, etc. The Egyptian outrightly rejected this approach. Furthermore, the Israelis strenuously objected to any explicit inclusion of the PLO. These issues and the general level of Arab-Israeli distrust disrupted the negotiations. Two other U.S. initiatives during this period bear mention. Seeing merit in establishing some contact with the PLO, the U.S. sought a formula whereby the PLO could accept Resolution 242 while at the same time reserving its position on the resolution's inadequate treatment of Palestinians. This would allow the U.S. to overcome the restrictions earlier promised to Israel. Secondly, in the late September, 1977, the U.S. and the Soviet Union issued a joint communiqué setting out an agreed-upon basis for the West Asian peace efforts. But unfortunately, this was not satisfying either to the Arabs or to the Israelis. Largely because of Israeli pressure, the U.S. government subsequently issued a second statement that had the effect of negating the communiqué. Thus, while circumstances were quite ripe to present the U.S. as the 'most efficient' mediator, there was no wide acceptance in the Arab world to Washington as an honest broker. In fact, even the Israelis behaved independently and disagreed with several US proposals for negotiation quite often.

Certain events made America's role in the region, particularly in the peace process very limited and difficult. The dynamics of the region was drastically altered when President Anwar Sadat of Egypt traveled to Jerusalem in November, 1977. Washington had encouraged Sadat to take the lead in a new political move to establish peace in the region. In the process, the United States was caught between the Egyptians and Israelis trying to befriend both and annoy none at the same time. Thus, the American role as an 'honest broker' was somewhat under

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<sup>19</sup>. Each of the Arab countries had made its own front in order to negotiate in the Camp David talks. Syria demanded for talks based on 'elements' which the Arab countries could put forth as a whole.

scrutiny. Israel was a major 'strategic asset' for the United States<sup>20</sup> and there was a strong pro-Israel lobby in Washington; but on the other side, the increasing U.S.-Egyptian relation was expected to serve long term American strategic interest. In the mean time, US support to Egypt led to a successful division of Arab opinions and weakened Arab solidarity.<sup>21</sup>

Against this backdrop, President Carter invited Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Camp David to negotiate a peace between them. The Camp David talks lasted for twelve days. Sadat pointed out in his public remarks following Camp David that the US's role in peace negotiations was crucial to the success of the peace process, projected by the agreement.<sup>22</sup> Thus, Washington did the job of impressing the Egyptians quite nicely, while other Arab parties, including Jordan, reacted with dismay. They interpreted the accords as an Egyptian sell-out, stage-managed by the U.S. The Palestinians, focusing on the autonomy provisions for the West Bank and Gaza, saw the agreement as giving Israel continued control over all the issues of importance to them. Almost at once, beginning on the night the Camp David results were announced, Israeli policy and actions demonstrated that Arab suspicions were well founded. They realized that American goodwill was not to be credited beyond a point. The subsequent repeated Israeli assertion that Israel would remain sovereign on the West Bank after the transition period convinced the Arabs that the so-called self-governing authority on the West Bank and Gaza was intended by Israel to be nothing more than an agency of Israel's continued occupation.

Nonetheless, the Camp David talks are claimed to be a landmark in the American efforts for conflict management in West Asia, essentially from an American perspective. But, there are different dimensions that provide those attempts a different meaning altogether. While by going to the heart of the issue,

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<sup>20</sup> Zartman, William I. (1985). "Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution." in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, eds., *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. Washington: Brookings Institution.p.184.

<sup>21</sup> Jureidini, Paul A. (1981), *Beyond Camp David: Emerging Alignments and Leaders in the Middle East*, New York: Syracuse University Press. p. 9.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 36.

one finds that Washington truly regarded the Camp David attempts a 'victory', not for the success in solving Arab-Israeli dispute, but in terms of retaining its long-term interest. One should follow the policy of 'non-involvement' while playing the role of an 'honest broker'; and necessarily one should not be supportive of any of the parties in the conflict. But the U.S. appears to have gained at Camp David, both Israeli confidence and Egyptian friendship.<sup>23</sup>

President Ronald Reagan took office with the hope that he could downgrade the Arab-Israeli conflict, put aside the Palestinian problem and focus instead on its own 'Middle East' agenda. The West Asian region, the Reagan Administration believed, could best be understood through the lens of worldwide U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation.<sup>24</sup> Regional disputes and local problems in this new formulation were secondary, for Washington, to the need to deal with the Soviet military advantage. The Reagan Administration provided direct support to Israel, named Israel "a major strategic asset to America" and considered aid to Israel not as charity but an investment in U.S. security.<sup>25</sup> President Reagan expressed his belief that Israel's West Bank-Gaza settlements were legal. He was flatly opposed to an independent Palestinian state, and he consistently objected including the PLO in any peace negotiations, calling them a "terrorist organization".<sup>26</sup> Thus, his attitude toward the Camp David process was lukewarm, and while he seemed to favor a Jordanian solution to the Palestine problem, his overall view was to oppose an activist U.S. role in the peace process.<sup>27</sup>

The Camp David Accords are the landmarks in the Arab-Israeli peace process, but between Camp David I and Camp David II, there were many situations which prove that 'the issue has a vulnerable side and it may explode at

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<sup>23</sup> Mendelsohn, Eerett (1982), *A Compassionate Peace: A Future for the Middle East*, Penguin Books: New York. P. 177.

<sup>24</sup> Mendelsohn, Eerett (1982), *A Compassionate Peace: A Future for the Middle East*, Penguin Books: New York. p. 179.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Mendelsohn, Eerett (1982), *A Compassionate Peace: A Future for the Middle East*, Penguin Books: New York. p. 179.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.



any point of time if the sparks are not taken seriously'. The Iranian Revolution, Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War witnessed to this fact.

### **Iranian Revolution:-**

Between 1953 and 1963 when much poverty remained among the Iranian people, one of the great landowners was the Shah (king), Muhammad Reza Pahlavi.

The Shah was in conflict with a section of his people who advocated banning tobacco, alcohol, movies, gambling foreign dress, the veil for women and punishments such as cutting off a hand. The Shah increased Iran's tie with the United States. His agreement with a western oil consortium annoyed many, and some were annoyed by the presence of many Americans. Some Iranians saw the United States as having taken the place of the British. Some discontented Muslims formed an underground group called the *Fedaiyan-e Islam*. They tried to assassinate the Shah's prime minister. The Shah responded by repressing the *Fedaiyan-e Islam* and executing a few of its members.

The Shah was worried about the opinions of Iran's ultra-conservative Muslims, while he enjoyed the support of Iran's upper and middle classes. He had support from some clerics who saw him as an alternative to the politically Left. Some other clerics were uncomfortable with the monarchy. And some clerics, including the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, were offended in the early 1960s when the Shah gave himself the authority to initiate legislation.

The shah launched an effort to modernize Iran economically and socially. He sought to balance his increase in power with reforms that would win more favor from common Iranians. Landlords and some clerics were outspokenly opposed to these reforms. Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa<sup>28</sup> against his reforms. The government-owned radio station responded with ridicule. The Shah announced that his reforms would take Iran into the jet age while the *mullahs* wanted to remain "in the age of the donkeys." Numerous clerics went over to the side of Khomeini.

Ayatollah Khomeini called the Shah's rule tyrannical. Then the government retaliated against Khomeini. For many Iranians, Khomeini became an anti-Shah

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<sup>28</sup>. Religious edict.

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hero. The Shah's government sent Khomeini into exile, Khomeini settling in a Shiite community in southern Iraq. From Iraq Khomeini continued his attacks on the Shah.

From 1963 and into the seventies, the Shah struggled to modernize Iran - with help from the U.S., where foreign policy strategists saw him as a stabilizing force in the 'Middle East' and appreciated his acceptance of the existence of Israel. With help from the United States, Iran laid plans for a proliferation of atomic power plants, and the new economic development included the introduction of new fertilizers and pesticides. Between 1963 and 1967 Iran's economy rose dramatically.

But the stigma of the 'bloody' repression in 1963 remained, and the Shah continued his repression against clerics hostile to his modernization. In 1966 he established book censorship, with police agents raiding mosque libraries. In 1967 new laws gave women the right to apply for divorce without the husband's permission, a man had to secure his wife's consent before taking a second wife, and legal matters involving families were transferred from religious to secular courts.

Despite the booming economy, many Iranians were still struggling economically. The government was managing the economy poorly. The prosperity was benefiting only a few. Corruption had emerged among government officials eager to acquire some of the wealth, while the income of common Iranians failed to keep up with rising prices.

In early 1977, Jimmy Carter became the President of the United States, and he put human rights into his foreign policy agenda. The Carter administration suggested that if Iran did not improve its human rights record, aid, including military assistance, might be terminated. The Shah acted on Carter's wishes. Some would view this pressure on the Shah and Carter's reluctance regarding the Shah crushing opponents as responsible for the Shah's fall. The Shah had been diminishing in power by his method of trying to retain it.

From Iraq, the Ayatollah Khomeini was giving guidance to people eager to overthrow the Shah, and he ordered work stoppages that swept the nation. The Shah responded by managing to have Khomeini expelled from Saddam Hussein's

Iraq, and Khomeini flew to Paris, where he found that he had more freedom of action, and to newsmen he began giving four to five interviews per day. There were more demonstrations in Iran and more killings by the army.

On November 7, 1978, the Shah broadcast on television a promise not to repeat past mistakes and to make amendments to his earlier policies. The next day he had thirteen prominent members of his own regime arrested. By November 18, the Shah was deeply depressed. Many soldiers were no longer willing to carry out his order and fire into crowds. The question whether the Shah should crush opposition to his rule with overwhelming military force was no longer relevant. Military protection for the Shah's regime was melting away - as it had for Tsar Nicholas Of Russia in February 1917. The Shah agreed to go abroad for a vacation. He accepted a new government led by an old opponent, the head of the dissident National Front, Shahpour Bakhtiar. On January 6, 1979, Bakhtiar pledged to launch "a genuine social democracy" and to end the corruption and abuses of the past. On January 16, 1979, the Shah and his family left for Egypt. Therefore, 'the fall of Shah' according to Fawaz A. Gerges 'was disastrous strategically for the United States and politically for Carter himself.'<sup>29</sup>

### **Iran-Iraq War:-**

A few years after the emergence of Islamic Republic of Iran, a war took place between Iran and Iraq. The war was commonly referred to as the 'Gulf War' or 'Persian Gulf War' until the Iraq-Kuwait conflict i. e., 'Operation Desert Storm' incident took place in January-February 1991. The Pan-Islamism and revolutionary Shia Islamism of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and the Arab nationalism of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime were central to the conflict. Saddam Hussein was keenly interested in elevating Iraq to a strong regional power. A successful invasion of Iran would enlarge Iraq's oil reserves and make Iraq the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region.

Iraq started the war believing that Sunnis of Iran would join the opposing forces, failing to fully appreciate the power of Iranian nationalism over historically clan-centered differences, and the power of Iranian government control of the

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<sup>29</sup>. Gerges, Fawaz A. (1999). *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?*, UK: Cambridge University Press. p.61.

press. Though, few of the ethnic Arabs of Khuzestan or Sunnis of Iran collaborated with Iraqis.

On September 22, 1980, Iraq announced that her planes had hit ten Iranian airfields and that her troops had penetrated into Iranian territory on three major fronts. A full scale war had been launched. Its purpose, according to Saddam Hussein, was to blunt the edge of Khomeini's ... movement and to thwart his attempt to export his Islamic revolution to Iraq and the Persian Gulf states.<sup>30</sup>

The objectives of Iraq's invasion of Iran were:

- Control over the Shatt al-Arab waterway
- Acquisition of the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.
- Annexation of Khuzestan to Iraq.
- Overthrow of the revolutionary regime in Tehran.

After the failure of their 1982 summer offensives, Iran believed that a major effort along the entire breadth of the front would yield the victory that they desired. Iranian numerical superiority might have achieved a break-through if they had attacked across all parts of the front at the same time, but they still lacked the organization for that type of assault. During the course of 1983, the Iranians launched five major assaults along the front. The attacks on the Iranian cities did not destroy the Iranian government's resolve to fight. , the Iranians launched a major attack against the central section of the front where the Second Iraqi Army Corps was deployed. Despite a heavy Iraqi counterattack coupled with the use of mustard gas and sarin nerve gas, the Iranians held their gains and would continue to hold them almost until the end of the war

In 1982 with Iranian success on the battlefield, the U.S. made its backing of Iraq more pronounced, supplying it with intelligence, economic aid, normalizing relations with the government broken during the 1967 Six-Day War, and also supplying weapons. President Ronald Reagan decided that the United

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<sup>30</sup>. SaddamHussein's speech available at [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_hb5244/is\\_200701/ai\\_n20941022](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5244/is_200701/ai_n20941022)

States "could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran", and that the United States "would do whatever was necessary to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran." President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) to this effect in June, 1982.

However, U.S. attention was focused on isolating Iran as well as freedom of navigation, criticizing Iran's mining of international waters, and sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 598, under which it skirmished with Iranian forces. During the 'Operation Nimble Archer' in October 1987, the U.S. attacked Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tanker *Sea Isle City*.

Therefore, it could be said that the US failed in managing and resolving the conflicts. Because, firstly, it could not avoid the conflict to turn into a war situation: Iran and Iraq fought a rigorous war for a long period of time from 1982-1988, and secondly, the United States could be seen in taking sides in those conflicts quite often. So, how it could try to make an impartial solution to the wars is somewhat questionable.

During the war, Iraq was regarded by the United States as a counterbalance to post-revolutionary Iran. The support of Iraq took the form of technological aid, intelligence, the sale of dual-use and military equipment and satellite intelligence to Iraq. While there was direct combat between Iran and the United States, it is not universally agreed that the fighting between the U.S. and Iran was specifically to benefit Iraq, or for separate, although occurring at the same time, issues between the U.S. and Iran. American ambiguity towards which side to support was summed up by Henry Kissinger when the American statesman remarked that "it's a pity they [Iran and Iraq] both can't lose." More than thirty countries provided support to Iraq, Iran, or both. Iraq, in particular, had a complex clandestine procurement network to obtain munitions and critical materials, which, in some transactions, involved 6-10 countries.

**Gulf War:-**

Within a few years after the end of Iran-Iraq War, yet another crisis erupted in the Persian Gulf. The **Persian Gulf War** from 2 August 1990 to 28 February 1991<sup>31</sup> was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force from 34 nations<sup>32</sup> authorized by the United Nations and led primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom in order to return Kuwait to the control of the Emir of Kuwait. The conflict developed in the context of the Iran-Iraq War and in 1990 Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing Iraq's oil through slant drilling. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops was met with immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by some members of the UN Security Council, and with immediate preparation for war by the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait began in January 1991 and was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, which took over Kuwait and entered Iraqi territory. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and bordering areas of Saudi Arabia. Iraq also launched missiles against targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel in retaliation for their support of the invading forces in Kuwait.

Shortly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, US President George H.W. Bush started to deploy US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard units to Saudi Arabia i.e., 'Operation Desert Shield', while at the same time urging other countries to send their own forces to the scene. UN coalition-building efforts were so successful that by the time the fighting i.e., 'Operation Desert Storm' began on January 16, 1991, twelve countries had sent naval forces, joining the regional states of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, as well as the huge array of the US Navy, which deployed six aircraft-carrier battle groups; eight countries had sent ground forces, joining the regional troops of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the seventeen heavy and six light brigades of the US Army and nine Marine regiments, with their large support and service forces; and four countries had sent combat aircraft, joining the

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<sup>31</sup>. Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/cron>

<sup>32</sup> Available at <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/facts/gulfwar>.

local air forces of Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the US Air Force, US Navy, and U.S. Marine aviation, for a grand total of 2,430 fixed-wing aircraft.

**Oslo Process:-**

In August, 1988 Hamas<sup>33</sup> published its covenant, which rejected the legitimacy of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In addition, it rejected any compromise with the state of Israel. All of Palestine, it stated, belonged to Muslims, and Hamas proclaimed a holy war (*Intifada*) against Israel as well as corrupt elements within Palestinian society. As the *Intifada* intensified, it resulted in violence between Israel and Palestine. Such regional turmoil was interrupted by international events that directly affected Israel. On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein decided to invade Kuwait. Joining with the United States, Israel demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. In response, Saddam agreed to an Iraqi withdrawal as long as Israel and Syria withdrew from southern Lebanon and Israel also departed from the occupied territories. At a summit in Helsinki on 8 September 1990, President George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev discussed this proposal; as peace brokers, although Gorbachev wished to accept it, the Americans disagreed.

On 17 January 1991, a coalition of allied forces attacked the Iraqi army in Kuwait. Israel was encouraged not to participate in this conflict. Although there was resistance among leading figures in the government, Israel complied despite Iraq's use of Scud missiles against the country. When Saddam was defeated, the people of Israel were greatly relieved. Nonetheless, the *Intifada* continued. In December of that year, another conference took place in Washington dealing with the procedures for future talks. After these talks, Jews and Arabs met in a number of cities to explore various practical issues. The first of these talks took place in Moscow and focused on water sharing and economic cooperation. In Ottawa, the refugee problem was of central importance, whereas in Vienna, water sharing was of critical importance. In Brussels, the main topic was economic cooperation.

When Yitzhak Rabin became the Prime Minister of Israel right after these talks, he emphasized that the peace process would be reactivated and that

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<sup>33</sup>. Hamas is the acronym of 'Harakat Muqawama Islamiyya' (Islamic Resistance Movement), which became the umbrella organization, created virtually overnight at the outbreak of the *Intifada* in late 1987 in order to bring together all the local Muslim Associations of years past.

Palestinians would be partners with Israelis in the quest.<sup>34</sup> Aware of Palestinian suffering in previous decades, Rabin proposed a form of Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza strip. Despite these steps, tension mounted in the West Bank and Jerusalem. And in the midst of violence, talks between Israel and PLO began again on 20 January 1993. At a villa outside Oslo, representatives met for three days.

The Oslo Accords served as the framework for the peace process and a basis for Israeli-Arab cooperation. The form of self-government authorized at Oslo and the withdrawal plans provided a basis for eventual Palestinian statehood. In Arafat's view, such self-governing institutions were vital to the future of Palestine as a nation state. However, just as in 1947, the Palestinian Arabs were being encouraged by more radical groups to oppose a two-state solution, now, Israeli extremists were also set to sabotage the Oslo accords.

#### **Camp David II:-**

In mid-May, 2000, it was disclosed that the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government had been involved in a secret dialogue in the Swedish capital, Stockholm. The negotiations had been facilitated by the U.S. administration apparently anxious to see an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement before that year's November U.S. presidential election.<sup>35</sup> On 5 July, President Bill Clinton invited Israeli premier Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat to an open-ended summit meeting at Camp David to forge the all-important framework agreement on 'final status' issues. Both Barak and Arafat announced to their respective constituencies that any agreements on a permanent status would be subject to 'national referendums'. Talks opened at Camp David on 11 July, and after fifteen days of exhaustive negotiations, brinkmanship and a virtual news blackout, the summit broke up in acrimony, with the Israelis and Palestinians each accusing the other of responsibility for the failure.

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<sup>34</sup>. Cohn-serbok, Dan & Dawoud El-alami (2003), *The Palestine-Israeli Conflict*, London: Oneworld Publication.

<sup>35</sup> "Arab-Israeli Relations 1967-2004" available at <http://www.europa.world.com>



Camp David II is, from both 'content' and a 'process' point of view, still somewhat of a black box.<sup>36</sup> It is unclear to what extent the depth of the Israeli concessions offered were a result of U.S. pressure or a strategic decision by Barak. It is also not clear to what extent Barak was prepared to accept the Clinton proposals as given, or only as a basis for further negotiation. The tactical component of the attempt to balance Israeli and Arab interests that of brokering an Israeli-Palestinian agreement was thrown into crisis by the failure of Camp David II.

This crisis forced a re-examination of the assumptions behind the U.S. tactics of "evenhandedness," particularly in response to the violence resorted to by the Palestinians following Camp David II. But the contrast between Clinton's immediate Post-Camp David stance and the change in tone once the Palestinian attacks began serves to illustrate this distinction between a truly fair approach and what is called "evenhandedness." In his statement summing up almost two weeks of talks at Camp David, Clinton fairly described why the parties failed to reach agreement:

"Prime Minister Barak showed particular courage and vision, and an understanding of the historical importance of this moment. Chairman Arafat made it clear that he, too, remains committed to the path of peace....[T]he Prime Minister moved forward more from his initial position than Chairman Arafat....[M]y remarks should stand for themselves, because not so much as a criticism of Chairman Arafat, because this is really hard and never been done before, but in praise of Barak."<sup>37</sup>

According to Steven Spiegel, U.S. administrations have pursued three general strategies in the Middle East<sup>38</sup>-

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<sup>36</sup> Singer, Saul (15 December 2000), "American An Evenhandedness In The Middle East Peace Process: Lessons From Camp David II And The Al-Aqsa Intifada" *Jerusalem centre for Public Affairs*, vol.18, no. 444.

<sup>37</sup> "Statement by President Clinton on the Middle East Peace Talks at Camp David, July 25, 2000" available at <http://www.europa.world.com>.

<sup>38</sup> Spiegel, Steven, "What should America's strategy be in the Middle East?" available at [http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol8\\_1.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol8_1.htm).

**Globalist:-**

"Globalist" policy is similar to a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. Followed only by Republicans, of whom the current President George W. Bush may be the ultimate example, its aims include:-promoting democracy, waging a global war on terrorism, and protecting the world economy by protecting oil supplies.

**Localist:-**

The opposite extreme is a "localist" policy, followed by every Democratic president. It does not regard the Middle East as a monolithic region. Localists take a pragmatic and piecemeal approach to the region's problems, relying on conflict management and mediation.

**Regionalist:-**

The third approach is "regionalist," and it has so far been tried by only one President, George H.W. Bush. It is an attempt to integrate the various piecemeal issues such as Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Lebanon through a multilateral process aimed at building peace in the region. President Bush Sr. defended Kuwait against Iraq, for example, but balanced that with the historic 1991 Middle East peace conference in Madrid, the first initiative of its kind in 43 years.<sup>39</sup>

Regarding the overall policy towards West Asia, there has been both continuation and change that could be noticed in American policy. Every administration applied its own method of dealing with the Arab-Israeli dispute and contributed in its own way to the peace process, yet having the sole motive of keeping America's 'national interest' at the apex.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

CHAPTER-III

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\*\*\*\* PRESIDENT BUSH'S  
PEACE INITIATIVES AFTER  
SEPTEMBER 11 \*\*\*\*

## CHAPTER- III

*I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts. If the Palestinian people meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrangements for independence.*

**-George W. Bush**

Until the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy in the region was pulled between those who wanted to cast the lot with the Arab nations and those who looked to Israel as the key partner in the region. That debate has been replaced since the early 1990s by one in which the question is not whether to support Israel, but how.<sup>1</sup> A look at the policies of eleven U.S. presidents, since the creation of Israel in 1948, provides useful clues to a sound and viable strategy in the region. Some of the succeeding Administrations of the Carter Administration, according to Spiegel, saw Israel as a burden; whereas some made a point of their close relations with Israel. Further, in terms of their approach, Administrations can be divided into two: 'active' or 'passive'. Accordingly, the Administrations of Clinton and George W. Bush Sr. were active, and the current one, that is the Bush Administration in considered as 'passive'. Among all the administrations, the best was the Bush senior Administration.<sup>2</sup>

According to Robert Freedman, the George W. Bush Administration from the very beginning followed a 'hands off' policy towards the Arab-Israeli issue. This was evident from: first, when Special 'Middle East' Envoy, Dennis Ross retired in January 2001, no replacement was named and it was not until late May that a 'Special Assistant' for the 'Middle East', William Burns was appointed; secondly, the U.S. did not send a representative to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Taba which took place at the end of January, just before the

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<sup>1</sup> Spiegel, Steven, "What should America's strategy be in the Middle East?" available at [http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol8\\_1.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol8_1.htm).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

February, 2001 Israeli elections; and finally, Bush supported the Israeli position that the offers made by Israel's Labor government at Camp David II and at Taba, were 'off the table' once a new Israeli government headed by Likud leader Ariel Sharon was elected on February, 2001 elections.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, arguments were given in support of the Bush administration's stand regarding its role towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. The government tried to justify its role by giving reference to the fact when the newly appointed U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell's first foreign trip was organized, it was to the 'Middle East' only. True, but here, it should be noted that Powell's purpose in this trip was not to deal directly with the al-Aqsa Intifada, but rather to convince the Arab states to support his plans for 'smart sanctions' against Iraq. And the 'Iraq factor' has a significant role in determining the Bush administration's policy towards the region as a whole and to Arab-Israeli conflict in particular.

Since time immemorial, America has always considered that it is its right to civilize the peoples of the world. Instances are there of Americans civilizing the world sometimes through 'Manifest Destiny', sometimes 'Open Door', and sometimes 'Promotion of Democracy', and so on. The United States has held American values as 'supreme' and, therefore, should be taught to all even by imposition. But, now this America under the new Administration has acted so liberal in its policy towards the Arab-Israeli issue. This was a clear deviation on the policy front. It was clearly evident while Colin Powell gave a major speech on the 'Middle East' to a conference of the pro-Israeli AIPAC lobbying organization on the eve of the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon's visit to Washington in mid-March, 2001, he repeated the Bush administration's position that 'the United States would assist, but not impose a peace agreement':

"The United states stands ready to assist, not insist. Peace arrived at voluntarily by the partners themselves is likely to prove more robust.....than a peace widely viewed as developed by others, or worse yet, imposed".<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>. Freedman, Robert, "The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: the Record of its First Four Years," available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue1/jv9no1a4.html>

<sup>4</sup>. Collin Powell's speech available at <http://www.us.gov.org>.

Sharon's visit was more or less successful as Powell supported Sharon's position on Palestinian violence, noting that the starting point for talks had to be the end of violence. In a clear indication at Arafat, Powell publicly stated that "leaders have the responsibility to denounce violence, strip it of legitimacy (and) stop it". Again, President Bush in a conference took a tough stance on the Palestinian leadership:

"The Palestinian Authority should speak out publicly and forcibly in a language that the Palestinian people (understand) to condemn violence and terrorism...The signal I am sending to the Palestinians is to stop the violence and I can not make it any more clear".<sup>5</sup>

While on one hand, Washington advocated peace arrived at by the Palestinians and Israelis themselves without much U.S. involvement; it still supported the cause of Israelis once tensions arose. The Mitchell Report in mid-May of 2001 which was intended to determine the causes of 'Intifada'<sup>6</sup> ways to bring the fighting to a halt<sup>7</sup>, ended up in merely describing each side's position. And in many ways, the Mitchell Report was supportive of the Israeli position in the conflict. It called for a ceasefire before negotiations, for the Palestinian authority to condemn incitement and denounce terrorism and arrest terrorists and for it to prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli populated areas and Israeli military positions. It also did not blame Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif for precipitating the Intifada. Therefore, the Bush Administration started with an ambiguous policy regarding West Asia. Though, they started with a non-insisting attitude towards the Arab-Israeli issue, soon they became sympathetic towards the Israeli cause.

Powell continued to argue that the United States would not directly intervene to put forth its own comprehensive solution to the conflict. Meanwhile, he praised the Mitchell Report and in addition to that, appointed a 'special assistant' to help implement it. William Burns, the U.S. ambassador to Jordan

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<sup>5</sup> President George W. Bush's speech available at <http://www.us.gov.org>.

<sup>6</sup> Intifada is movement of Palestinian uprising.

<sup>7</sup> Freedman, Robert, "The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: the Record of its First Four Years," available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue1/jv9no1a4.html>

who had been nominated to become the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, was given the task of trying to establish a 'time-line' of Israeli and Palestinian confidence-building measures that might bring about the unconditional ceasefire urged by the Mitchell Report. Hence, though the clarifications were made by the administration of not being imposing its ideas, the United States was very much imposing in its approach towards the Arab-Israeli dispute only to support Israel. This is one of the reasons why the Arabs have developed an anti-American attitude; and which in turn, any effort for peace by the US-initiatives proves a failure. This is a 'cycle of support and hatred' that is a major roadblock in the peace process.

President Bush repeatedly insisted that "Arafat must put hundred per cent effort into stopping the terrorist activity before the beginning of peace talks and do a better job of quashing violence".<sup>8</sup> Despite calls by America's Arab allies, such as Egypt, for the United States to take a more active role because "America is the only sponsor of the peace process", U.S. policy makers concluded that Arafat would not implement any ceasefire or help make real progress towards peace. This attitude of the U.S. made the French Foreign Minister comment that "America is just washing its hands off the Middle East".<sup>9</sup>

### **The September 11 Terrorist Attacks:**

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon had a significant impact on the U.S. policy towards the West Asian region. The United States immediately sought to build a coalition including Arab states against Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization. And in this effort to gain Arab support, the United States announced its support of a 'Palestinian state'. Now, the Bush administration pressed the Sharon to agree to a meeting between Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat to establish yet another ceasefire. However, this time the proposal of

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<sup>8</sup> Melissa Radler, "U.S. Backs Israel at UN, Opposes International Monitors", *Jerusalem Post*, August 21, 2001.

<sup>9</sup> The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Record of its First Four Year available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue1/jv9no1a4.html>.

a ceasefire came despite the fact that Palestinian violence had not stopped as Sharon had demanded as a price for talks. Therefore, the same U.S. which earlier considered necessary the end of all violence before going to any negotiations, while suggesting a ceasefire, resumed talks amidst of violence. This was a significant policy change. And this change occurred mainly due to the terrorist attacks on the United States.

The attacks of 11 September 2001, in a major way have changed the U.S. attitude towards the rights of the Palestinians in particular, and the Arab-Israeli dispute in general. The U.S. administration has described itself a sympathetic one towards the plight of the Palestinians as a result; it portrayed their President, George W. Bush as 'a chosen leader committed to peace.' The 'reluctant' administration now became active in promoting the cause of 'peace' in the region. The US government advocated the plan put forward by the Arab states that recognized Israel's place in the 'Middle East' for the first time" and along with it. Basically, the US was keen to justify its two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. Therefore, it wanted the international community to support this idea of two-state solution. According to the US government, a level of consensus on this idea has generated within West Asia that was seen never before; thus, it was the right time to put a step forward toward the Palestinian statehood. The creation of a 'democratic' Palestinian state would ultimately serve the interests of all including the Palestinians. The Bush Administration believed the response of aggression and terror demonstrated by the extremist groups like Hamas were devastating to the cause of Palestinian right; rather Palestinians should make a choice between 'terror' and 'peace'. According to Bush,

"This is a moment of clarity for all Palestinians; and now comes a moment of choice. The alternatives before the Palestinian people are stark. There is the vision of Hamas; by following this path, the Palestinian people would guarantee chaos, and suffering, and the endless perpetuation of grievance. There is another option, and that's a hopeful option; it is the vision of (Palestinian Authority) President Abbas; it is the vision of their government, 'it is the vision of a peaceful state called Palestine as a homeland for the Palestinian people'. To realize this vision, the leaders (of Palestinian Authority) are striving to build the institutions of a modern democracy;



they are working to strengthen the Palestinian security services, so that they can confront the terrorists and protect the innocent".<sup>10</sup>

This is the same Bush administration which did not hesitate to work on the suggestions of the Israeli Premier, Sharon, not to invite Arafat to the White House unless he publicly called for an end to the violence, and this was even endorsed by nearly 300 members of the US Congress. The Bush administration had taken the PLO mainly as a terrorist organization before the incident of 11 September 2001; but the incident completely changed the attitude of the administration towards the organization, towards the cause of Palestine, and this incident had also resulted in a dramatic shift in the strategy and policy formulations of America towards the whole issue altogether. The Israeli Prime Minister reacted to these developments negatively saying that the U.S. was sold out to the Palestinians. However, the basic issue of Israeli suspicion remained unresolved as the idea of an independent Palestine got strength. Later, it became a cause of friction in the U.S.-Israeli relations. This is how the Israeli suspicion towards Washington started. This suspicion coupled with the age-old Arab suspicion further makes the peace efforts a difficult task.

Therefore, the Bush administration got trapped in its own diplomacy; suspicions developed both within the Arab world towards the pro-Israeli attitude of the U.S. which was not easy to change and newly added Israeli suspicion about America's sudden sympathy towards Palestine: rights of Palestinians and Palestinian Homeland. Later, the administration wanted to come out of this dilemma as soon as possible and the U.S. policy was mainly aimed at balancing the two sides to gain the confidence of the parties: the Israelis and the Palestinians, not to revive the peace talks or make a permanent solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, but to convince them to be with America in its war against terror.<sup>11</sup> Thus, 'peace efforts aiming at the solution of the Arab-Israeli issue' was not the immediate goal of American strategy in the area; Washington had always tried to promote its own interest in the name of 'peace initiatives'. And the Bush

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<sup>10</sup> Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020404-1.html>

<sup>11</sup> Tim Weiner, "Israel Rebuffs U.S. Demand to End its West Bank Raids," *New York Times*, October 24, 2001.

administration was no exception to it. The only variation was that the administration had to adapt and adjust its policies according to the renewed circumstances as a response to the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Robert Freedman describes the U.S. strategy during this period of the aftermath of the September terrorist attacks as a 'two-fold' strategy. While the U.S. efforts to build a coalition for an invasion of Iraq, simultaneously, it intended to significantly influence its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>12</sup>

This was the kind of policy the Bush Administration followed in its efforts to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite two major U.S. actions, one in June and one in November-December 2001, Palestinian terrorism which Arafat was unable or, more likely, unwilling to control, sabotaged the U.S. efforts to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This pattern was to continue over the next three years as the Bush Administration was to make two additional attempts to resolve the conflict, one in March-April 2002 and another with the publication of the "Road Map" in April 2003.<sup>13</sup> But, one thing can be noticed here that the Bush administration's earlier stand of not being insisting in the Arab-Israeli dispute later on turned into a very active policy, because of two reasons: one, the United States soon discovered that Israel continued to be an asset and it would cost if the administration do not identify its interests with Israel's, and secondly, the United states wanted to gain support for the War on Terror and for this reason, it had to be active towards the Arab-Israeli issue. Therefore, the policies in this period were designed to shape the course of the Arab-Israeli negotiations in an American way.

In a broad sense, the earlier US stance of 'non-insisting attitude' is best to adopt as a mediator while trying to 'manage the conflict' between two parties; that will ensure greater 'objectivity' and so more successful. But, when the mediator starts insisting on a particular kind of 'peace', often for its own interests, the scope of 'conflict management' becomes very narrow. That exactly happened with the

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<sup>12</sup> Freedman, Robert, "The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Record of its First Four Years," available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue1/jv9no1a4.html>.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

Bush Administration. According to William Zartman,<sup>14</sup> the task of a mediator is to believe that the perception of a way out need not identify a specific agreement, but rather merely the belief that an agreement can be found. Third parties or mediators may involve directly but only to carry each party's perception of a possible agreement to the other. Contrarily, the U.S. announced its intention to give increased aid to Palestine in addition to its already existing assistance to Israel to further complicate the problem. President Bush said-

"We are strengthening our financial commitment. Immediately after President Abbas expelled Hamas from the Palestinian government, the United States lifted financial restrictions on the Palestinian Authority that we had imposed. This year, we will provide the Palestinians with more than \$190 million in American assistance -- including funds for humanitarian relief in Gaza. To build on this support, I recently authorized the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to join in a program that will help generate \$228 million in lending to Palestinian businesses. Today, I announce our intention to make a direct contribution of \$80 million to help Palestinians reform their security services -- a vital effort they're undertaking with the guidance of American General Keith Dayton. We will work with Congress and partners around the world to provide additional resources once a plan to build Palestinian institutions is in place. With all of this assistance, we are showing the Palestinian people that a commitment to peace leads to the generous support of the United States."

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Giving aid is not immoral, but, contrary to the view of the advocates of market capitalism, economics seldom plays a neutral role in international relations. Here, the main objective of the US behind giving aid and assistance is to shape the attitude of the two parties to the conflict, Israel and Palestine: towards America so that it could generate support from the countries for the 'war on terror'; and towards the 'peace process' so that the parties would agree to a solution shaped by America and that would serve American interest in this region.

By this analysis, it can easily be understood there was the problem of inefficiency in carrying out the policy of the Bush Administration in 'managing the conflict' between the Arabs and the Israelis. America's direct involvement coupled

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<sup>14</sup>. Zartman, William (2003), "Ripeness Promoting Strategies", *The Conflict Resolution Information Source*, available at [http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/fisher\\_hb.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/fisher_hb.pdf).

<sup>15</sup> Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020404-1.html>

with taking sides might be best serving its interest, but it had been proved fatal to the Arab-Israeli relations. The escalation of violence, for a mediator, should be used as a tool to convince the parties in a conflict about the devastating effects of war and perpetual conflict. It is often called the 'ripeness' theory; according to this, when the war is at the peak, the theory of 'ripeness' is at the apex, because the conflict is 'ripe' for resolution. And this is the time when the third party should make an effort to convince the parties realize that they cannot win with further escalation, and the status quo is un-acceptably damaging. But the United States encouraged mutual suspicion and hatred in the West Asian region instead of managing it in a tactful way. The mounting tensions could be described as the result of a set of US policy; therefore where the Americans could take the opportunity of convincing the parties about the devastating effects of conflict whenever it reached a peak, it did not even try to make an effort in that direction.

The United States, since after the September 11, 2001 incident has been describing the creation of a 'Palestinian State' as the solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and for the successful foundation of that state, it thinks there should be well-functioning political institutions, security forces, and leaders; and more importantly, the guiding factor should be 'democracy'. According to President Bush,

"With the proper foundation, we can soon begin serious negotiations toward the creation of a Palestinian state...Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. A stable, peaceful Palestinian state is necessary to achieve the security that Israel longs for. So I challenge Israel to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state."<sup>16</sup>

Here, three points are clear:

- The Bush administration had deviated from the main issue that is the 'conflict management' of the Arab-Israeli dispute to which 'creation of a Palestinian state' is not a solution.
- The administration tried to enter into the internal dynamics of Palestinian politics through the 'building of democratic institutions' as the base for a 'democratic Palestinian State'. Therefore, the United States again resorted

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<sup>16</sup>. Available at <http://www.mideastweb.org/bushspeech1.htm>.

to the idea of 'democracy promotion' in the region though in a different manner.

- The Bush Administration has planned to come up with an independent and democratic state of Palestine as the solution because it would bring peace to Israel. Therefore, the Administration would advocate for the proposal of Palestinian independence to serve the Israeli interests only.

Martin Kramer has made some remarkable comments on this issue of 'promotion of democracy'. Kramer describes mainly how 'democracy' as a concept developed. After the 9/11 incident, the common belief among the American mindset was that the United States should use its vast power to promote democracy in the 'Middle East'. Because democracies are more open systems, that would drain away the intolerance and hatred that pervade these societies, including the hatred towards America and the desire to eradicate Israel. On the contrary, Kramer does not believe that the only alternative to the existing authoritarian order in West Asia is democracy. Certainly it is the desirable alternative, but if it is set to the mission of democratizing the Arab world, there is more than a risk of unintended consequences.<sup>17</sup> He further argues that the basic building blocks of democracy are attitudes- above all; a 'tolerance' of political differences indeed a celebration of political differences, debate openly and decided freely the issue in hand. Yet, America cannot forcefully impose democracy on any one, and first of all, America must be taking these essences of democracy as 'tolerance' into account. If there is one thing worse than an authoritarian state, it is a 'failed' state, and a 'pro-democracy' policy could create them if there is no consensus about its prospect within the region.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Kramer, Martin (2002), "Should America Promote A Liberal, Democratic Middle East?," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, available at <http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/Landsdowne2002.htm>.

<sup>18</sup> Halperin, Morton H., Joseph T. Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein, *The Democracy Advantage: How*

*Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace*, New York: Routledge.

### **Middle East Partnership Initiative:-**

On 12 December 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the creation of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a program designed, in the words of Secretary Powell, to be a “continuation, and a deepening, of our longstanding commitment to working with all peoples of the Middle East to improve their daily lives and to help them face the future with hope.”<sup>19</sup> MEPI was a key component in the Bush Administration’s policy of promoting democracy in the ‘Middle East’.

In addition, the *9/11 Commission Report* reiterated the importance of formulating policies that seek to expand opportunities, particularly for young people in the Arab world and Muslim-majority countries. According to the report, “A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children’s future.”<sup>20</sup>

MEPI’s objectives were divided into four overarching categories: political reform, economic reform, educational reform, and women’s empowerment. In order to meet these goals, MEPI officials, in conjunction with Arab governments, invest in programs geared toward strengthening Arab civil society, encouraging micro-enterprise, expanding political participation, and promoting women’s rights.<sup>21</sup>

Underlying the four pillars of the Middle East Partnership Initiative, it was the stated desire of the Bush Administration to help improve living conditions in a

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<sup>19</sup> “The Middle East Partnership Initiative: Building Hope for the Years Ahead,” U.S. Department of State, December 12, 2002.

<sup>20</sup> “What To Do? A Global Strategy,” *The 9/11 Commission Report*, section 12.3, p.379.

<sup>21</sup> In order to secure Arab cooperation with MEPI, U.S. officials have stressed that MEPI is a “partnership” with the Arab world and not an attempt to impose a set of values on the region.

According to some outside observers, MEPI is an attempt to find a middle ground, where the United States can encourage reforms without challenging the legitimacy of the host Arab government.

region that has seen stagnant economic growth over several decades. Despite a region-wide 3.1% growth rate in the period 1991-2000, Middle Eastern economies faced serious economic and social challenges. Most importantly, Arab countries combined generate only 1% of the world's non-oil exports. According to the United Nations' *Arab Human Development Report 2002*, 14 million Arab adults lacked the job skills to provide enough income for even the most basic of necessities. From a demographic standpoint, many Arab countries continued to experience steep increases in their populations, which could lead to as many as 50 million more Arab workers crowding job markets in the next eight years.<sup>22</sup> In addition, the *Arab Human Development Report* concluded that out of the seven world regions, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom score in the late 1990s. Thus, it was a matter of concern that slow growth, in conjunction with rapidly rising populations and restrictions on personal freedoms which vary from country to country, could lead to expanding regional instability in the years ahead. And how the United States dealt with these complexities which have serious impact on the Arab-Israeli relations is under scrutiny.

#### **The Road Map to Peace Process:-**

The U.S. State Department in April 30, 2003 released the text of the "roadmap" to a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The roadmap specifies the steps for the two parties to take to reach a settlement, and a timeline for doing so, under the auspices of the 'Quartet': the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia.<sup>23</sup> The 'road map' provides for a three-phase, three-year peace plan proposed in 2000 by the 'Quartet'. Phase I would deal with 'ending terror and violence, normalizing Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions' in the specified period of May 2003; Phase II would be handling the 'transition' that would occur due to the independence of Palestine as a new 'democratic' state and the specified time for this was June, 2003 to December,

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<sup>22</sup> "Arab Human Development Report 2002," The United Nations Development Program, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 2002. available at <http://www.un.org>.

<sup>23</sup> "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," published by the U.S. Department of State, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>.

2003; phase III would be witnessing a 'permanent status agreement and end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict' based on consensus judgment of Quartet by 2005.

While the road map talked of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through an end to violence and terrorism, in turn, it gave birth to a new dilemma: the Israelis thought it to be implemented *sequentially* (step by step) whereas the Palestinians thought that it should be implemented in *parallel*.<sup>24</sup> Under the US 'road map', Israel was expected to withdraw from Palestinian areas re-occupied since September 2000 and to place a freeze on the construction of Jewish settlements. US President George W. Bush hailed the Congress's move as 'a sign of progress' in long-awaited Palestinian reforms. The appointment of a Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority was a condition set by the United States to begin work on an internationally-backed plan for peace between Israel and the Palestinians before the implementation of the 'road map'.<sup>25</sup> However, the proposal was severely criticized as having impractical objectives as:-

- **The plan by President Bush had no chance as he had shown no willingness to confront Israel:**<sup>26</sup> Unless there is an effort to be neutral in the two parties' conflict, mere peace proposals are futile.

The 'pro-Israeli' policy of the Bush Administration failed to arrive at peace due to two reasons: firstly, this policy had made Israel believe that its occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip were justified and democratic, and it could continue with these occupations because the world's oldest democracy supports it; secondly, because of this 'pro-Israeli' policy adopted by the Bush Administration, there was suspicion and 'hatred' mounted against the Administration within the Arab world making the peace proposals further difficult to be implemented.

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<sup>24</sup> Clyde Mark, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Palestinians and Middle East Peace: Issues for the United States, April 26, 2005.

<sup>25</sup> "Middle East Peace", available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking\\_point/2851763.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/2851763.stm).

<sup>26</sup> "Middle East Peace", available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking\\_point/2851763.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/2851763.stm)



- **President Bush was only window dressing the idea of Middle East peace to get ready for war on Iraq:**<sup>27</sup> The War on Terrorism and Iraq War were the main objectives behind the increased US interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The earlier stand of the government, 'not every effort has to be an American effort', had completely changed as the situations became adverse towards the US proved by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. The Administration started taking interest in this region, not because of the grave dangers of the Palestine-Israeli problem but for generating support for the war on Iraq.
- **The violence on both sides would continue. President Bush was weak in not giving Sharon an ultimatum:**<sup>28</sup> While playing the 'mediator' between the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the Bush Administration often forgot the core principle of mediation that a mediator has to be impartial and firm enough to convince both the parties to come to a solution. On the other hand, the Bush Administration was reluctant to take any action against Israeli unilateralism; in fact, the 'pro-Israeli' policy had got strengthened and stood on the way to peace.
- **Dual policy:**<sup>29</sup> While President Bush's Administration was supportive of the Israel, mostly, there had been an increased amount of aid being sanctioned for Palestine. This made to believe that the administration was following a 'dual policy' instead of an 'impartial' one.

On 30 April 2003, when the 'Quartet' officially presented the 'road map', Mahmud Abbas, the President of the 'Palestinian Authority' accepted it; whereas the Israelis expressed some reservations against it. On May 23, 2003, the Bush Administration stated that Israel had explained its concerns and that the United States shared its view "that these are real concerns and will address them fully and

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<sup>27</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>. "Middle East Peace", available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking\\_point/2851763.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/2851763.stm).

seriously in the implementation of the Roadmap”, leading Sharon and his cabinet to accept ‘steps defined’ in the Roadmap ‘with reservations’ on May 25., 2003<sup>30</sup>

### **Palestinian Statehood:-**

President Bush had supported the idea of a ‘two-state’ solution for the Arab-Israeli problem, but it is under scrutiny whether the parties involved consider it as ‘the’ solution of their problem. The US government made it clear that Washington was seeking diplomatic progress towards a two-state solution wherein the two democratic states, Israel and Palestine can reside side by side in a lasting peace with freedom. There were different problems that had to be addressed in order to reach out a solution of the Israel-Palestine issue. And some of the fundamental issues revolve round the Palestinian refugee problem. It is doubtful if the ‘two-state’ solution could be adequate to address the whole range of fundamental issues, because the creation of an independent Palestinian state would require the territory which the Palestinians believe belongs solely to them; ironically, the Israelis also have a sacred notion of belongingness with the same piece of land. Thus, the creation of a new state of Palestine would require the same issues to be addressed which the Bush Administration wanted to avoid through a two-state formula, rather this two-state formula might complicate the issue. The administration had to consider the refugee problem, border problem. Along with this, a major issue had to be addressed which has a psychological aspect too: the belief among both the Israelis and the Palestinians that Palestine belongs to them and to them only. Therefore, how the Bush Administration would address this issue because upon this the fate of the Arab-Israeli conflict depends. And until this issue gets resolved, no formula could succeed in ending the conflict.

As per the theories of ‘conflict management’, before taking any further step, it is always wise to address the fundamental issues first so that there would be less amount of ambiguity while implementing the policies of conflict management. That was something the Bush Administration failed to understand with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute. The continued violence which the Bush Administration believed to be an obstacle in the way to peace was nothing but a manifestation of

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<sup>30</sup> “Israel’s Response to the Road Map”, available at [http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap\\_response\\_eng.htm](http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap_response_eng.htm).

this failure. While, the Administration stressed on the culmination of violence for any kind of peace efforts to begin<sup>31</sup>, but it failed to understand that it was the result of its own policies only.

Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister acknowledged as per the 'road map' that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the history of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people's right to their homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return to Israel.<sup>32</sup> However, Sharon declared, "to keep 3.5 million people under occupation is bad for us and them," using the word 'occupation' for the first time.

Voices of discontent with government policy were heard in Israel. On December 18 2004, Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister declared that, "to ensure a Jewish and democratic Israel," he would unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians by re-deploying Israeli forces and relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip and intensifying construction of the security fence in the West Bank. On February 13, 2004, the White House held the view that an Israeli pullback "could reduce friction," but that a final settlement "must be achieved through negotiations."<sup>33</sup> After an upsurge in violence, Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin on March 22.<sup>34</sup>

The US President welcomed Israel's plan to disengage from Gaza and restated the U.S. commitment to the 'Roadmap'. He noted the need to take into account changed "realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers or settlements", asserting "it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be full and complete return to the

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<sup>31</sup> "Bush Calls Mideast Leaders Seeking Support for Peace Process" available at <http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=E6B52AD6-4D83-41B6-8670-A291D1F70A5B>.

<sup>32</sup> "Sharon, 'Certain' of Passing 'Painful Concessions' in Knesset," *Ma'ariv*, Apr. 15, 2003, FBIS Document GMP20030415000091.

<sup>33</sup>. White House releases available at <http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=E6B52AD6-4D83-41B6-8670-A291D1F70A5B>.

<sup>34</sup> "Sharon Outlines Disengagement Plan from Palestinians in Herzliyya Speech," Parts 1 and 2- Voice of Israel, Dec. 18, 2003, Open Source Center Documents GMP20031218000215 and GMP200312180002167.

armistice lines of 1949.” The American President stated that a solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, “rather than in Israel,” thereby rejecting a “right of return.” He called for a Palestinian state that is “viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent.”<sup>35</sup>

Yasser Arafat died on 11 November 2005. Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the PLO and, on 9 January 2005, was elected President of the Palestinian Authority. Abbas called for implementing the Roadmap while beginning discussion of final status issues and cautioned against interim solutions to delay reaching a comprehensive solution.

The ‘historic’ *disengagement* decision taken by the Israelis was much appreciated in the United States, especially by the Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice. She appointed Lt. Gen. William Ward as Middle East Security Coordinator and emphasized the importance of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation for the disengagement.

On 20 February 2005, the Israeli cabinet adopted a revised route for the security fence closer to the pre-1967 border in some areas, taking about 7% to 8% of the West Bank that includes major settlement blocs. On March 16, Israel transferred Jericho to the Palestinian Authority. On 17 March, 13 Palestinian groups agreed to extend a “calm” or informal truce until the end of the year. On 21 March, Israeli forces transferred Tulkarem to the Palestinian Authority. On 20 March, it was reported that the Israeli defense minister had approved the building of 3,500 new housing units between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and East Jerusalem, in the E-1 corridor. It was believed that the construction would cut East Jerusalem off from Palestinian territory, impose a barrier<sup>36</sup> between the northern and southern West Bank, and prevent a future contiguous Palestinian state. Secretary Rice asserted that the plan was “at odds with American policy.” On 11 April, President Bush conveyed to Sharon his “concern that Israel not undertakes any activity that contravenes Roadmap obligations or prejudices final status negotiations.” Sharon responded, “It is the position of Israel that the major Israeli

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<sup>35</sup> <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Press+Releases/2004/04/Speeches7864.htm>

<sup>36</sup> Israel refers to the barrier as a “fence” and the Palestinians and other critics refer to it as a “wall.” Neutral observers often use the word “barrier.”

population centers will remain in Israel's hands under any final status agreement," declared that Ma'ale Adumim is a major population center, and, therefore, Israel is interested in contiguity between it and Jerusalem.<sup>37</sup>

Israel evacuated all of its settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern West Bank between 17 August and 23 August. On 29 August, Sharon declared that there would be no further disengagements and that the next step must be negotiations under the Roadmap. He affirmed that while the large blocs of settlements would remain in Israeli hands and linked territorially to Israel, not all West Bank settlements would remain, but this would be decided in the final stage of negotiations.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, Israel was assertive to come to a solution in its own way by transferring some of the lands to Palestine. It aimed at securing its position and to gain America's confidence when the US had started giving concessions to Palestine, especially when the US came up with a plan for an independent Palestine.<sup>39</sup>

After an upsurge in Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel, Hamas announced on 25 September 2005 that it would halt operations from Gaza, but, on 27 September, it claimed responsibility for kidnapping and killing an Israeli settler in the West Bank. Israel responded with air and artillery strikes, closure of charities linked to terror groups, mass arrests including likely Hamas candidates in Palestinian parliamentary elections, and targeted killings of terrorists. On 20 October 2005, at the White House, President Bush pressed Abbas to "confront the threat armed gangs pose to a genuinely democratic Palestine," but did not urge him to prevent Hamas from participating in parliamentary elections or to request that candidates renounce violence. Abbas asserted that legislators should be asked to renounce violence after election. However, violence continued.<sup>40</sup>

According to Edward P. Djerejian, these incidents of violence presented a fundamental challenge for U.S. policy towards the region; and also, an

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<sup>37</sup>. Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>

<sup>38</sup>. Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>

<sup>39</sup>. CRS report for Congress, "Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy," 10 April, 2007

<sup>40</sup>. Ibid.

opportunity to move from 'conflict management' to 'conflict resolution'.<sup>41</sup> The Hezbollah-Israeli confrontation has further proved that there is no viable military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even with its military superiority, Israel cannot achieve security by force alone or by unilateral withdrawal from occupied territories. Nor can Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and similar groups destroy Israel. Peace can come only from negotiated agreements that bind both sides.

### **Multilateral Efforts:-**

After Hamas's victories in December 2005 Palestinian municipal elections, speculation increased about its possible effects on the peace process if Hamas were similarly successful in 25 January, 2006, parliamentary elections. On 28 December, the Quartet stated that a future Palestinian cabinet "should include no member who has not committed to the principles of Israel's right to exist in peace and security and an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism."<sup>42</sup> On 11 January 2006, Secretary of State Rice asserted, "It remains the view of the United States that there should be no place in the political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence, recognize Israel's right to exist, and disarm."<sup>43</sup>

On 4 January 2006 Israeli Prime Minister Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke and Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became Acting Prime Minister. On 12 January, Olmert told President Bush that peace efforts could not progress if terrorist organizations like Hamas joined the Palestinian government.

The Quartet stated that "future assistance to any new (Palestinian) government would be reviewed by donors against the government's commitment

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<sup>41</sup> Djerejian, Edward P. (November/December 2006), "From Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution", *Foreign Affairs*, pp

<sup>42</sup>. CRS report for Congress, "Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy," 10 April, 2007

<sup>43</sup>. Available at <http://www.state.gov>.

to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap.”<sup>44</sup>

While analyzing the role of the quartet as a multilateral effort towards Arab-Israeli peace, there is a significant similarity with American policy can also be seen. The Quartet is also emphasizing on the terror-free environment and for that purpose it is exerting pressure on the Palestinian Authority. It is true that for a peace process to be successful, it is necessarily a pre-condition that all kinds of violence and terrorism should be stopped in order to create an environment towards building peace. But, the Quartet with the United States is somewhat taking sides with the Israelis as on one hand it accepted the Israeli reservations on the ‘road map’, but does not really want to admit the Palestinian side of the problem.

In any kind of conflict situation, it is of first and foremost importance to consider the views of the parties involved and then to convert these views into practicalities whether they are realistic enough to achieve in mutual consent. The key factor that governs the conflict management strategy here is that no solution can be drawn if one party's demands are unacceptable to the other party; and for this process to be successful, a degree of impartiality is also required so that the best possible solution could be reached. And lastly, the fundamental issues should not be avoided as in the case of the Arab-Israeli case, the United States has been trying to avoid the issue of the Palestinian refugees and the border problem by repeatedly talking of an independent state of Palestine as a two-state solution to the problem. A democratic state of Palestine along with the state of Israel side by side in the region would be possible only when the fundamental issues are adequately addressed. Democracies need a defined territory; spirited people for the cause of the nation, an economically independent system- all these issues are to be addressed first to make Palestine a true democracy. And most importantly, democracy can never flourish if it is imposed from outside by an outsider; it should develop from within the system itself.

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<sup>44</sup> “UN: Statement by Middle East Quartet,” available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm>.

CHAPTER-IV

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\*\*\* DOMESTIC CHALLENGES  
AND  
REGIONAL DIFFICULTIES \*\*\*



## CHAPTER- IV

Making of foreign policy comes under the tides of domestic policy and politics. When discussing America's policy towards the Arab-Israeli issue thus, the domestic politics of the United States should be considered. And in addition to that, the regional dynamics of the Arab world along with Israel should be taken into account in order to find out the real difficulties in implementing the peace efforts.

Challenges in implementing the initiatives taken under the peace process are many. They can be divided into two- the challenges from the domestic politics of the United States, and the regional challenges coming from the West Asian region. The main challenges from the domestic tides of the United States are Congressional politics, Jews lobby, intra-agency rivalry, energy security, etc; and the regional challenges can be studied as anti-Americanism, military intervention in Iraq, Lebanon crisis, alleged Iranian ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, etc.

### **Domestic challenges:-**

Domestic aspect of foreign policy making or the dynamics of domestic politics plays a noticeable role in American foreign policy making too. The 'Isolationist' and the 'Internationalist' sentiments are the domestic tides which had altered the course of foreign policy in a significant way for a long period. And guided by these domestic sentiments, American leaders had to give a twist to their overseas involvement. The effect of the domestic politics and the challenges from the domestic front, therefore, needs to be studied in a careful manner. While discussing the domestic challenges in implementing the American peace efforts towards the Arab-Israeli dispute, the following comes to mind which had shaped the America's 'Middle East' policy.

### **Congressional Politics:-**

Congressional influence as a domestic factor in the United States' policy towards the Arab-Israeli issue usually has a number of different yet inter-related complexities that are the integral part of American foreign policy-making.

In *Federalist No. 8* John Jay noted that ‘it is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.’ As the likelihood of international conflict became clearer in the 1930s, Congress granted the President broad authority to act in foreign affairs. In *United States vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation* (1936), the U.S Supreme Court upheld the right of the Congress to grant this authority.<sup>1</sup> In this ruling, the Supreme Court recognized the primary importance of the President in foreign policy and affirmed that the national government did not share power over foreign relations with the states.

It has been noticed many a time that though the President is more powerful in foreign policy matters, the influence of Congress cannot be ruled out when it comes to extend cooperation with other countries through economic assistance or putting constraints on regimes by imposing sanctions.

Among other issues, giving financial aid and economic assistance to countries is a prime aspect of U.S. foreign policy. And generally, Congress exercises and influence over the White House in these money matters. Foreign assistance plays a key role in advancing U.S. foreign policy goals in the West Asian region as well. Congress both authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance and conducts oversight of executive agencies’ management of aid programs. As a region, West Asia is the largest annual recipient of U.S. economic and military aid.

The United States has a number of interests in the region, ranging from support for the state of Israel and promoting Israel’s peaceful relations with its Arab neighbors, to the protection of vital petroleum supplies and the fight against international terrorism. U.S. assistance helps to maintain the 1979 Camp David peace accords between Israel and Egypt and the continued stability of the Kingdom of Jordan, which signed its own peace treaty with Israel in 1994. U.S. funding is also meant to improve Palestinian civil society, and aid officials have worked to ensure that U.S. aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip is not diverted to terrorist groups. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has established new region-wide aid programs directed to promote democracy and encourage socio-economic reform in order to undercut the forces of radicalism in some Arab countries.

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<sup>1</sup> *United States vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation*, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

Foreign aid has been used as leverage to encourage peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors, while strengthening bilateral relationships between the United States and Israel and between the United States and moderate Arab governments. Foreign aid has worked to cement close military cooperation between the United States and governments in the region, discouraging local states from engaging in uncontrollable arms races. Economic aid also has had an underlying strategic rationale, as U.S. funds have been employed to promote development in an attempt to undercut radicalism in partner countries.

Critics of U.S. aid policy, particularly some in West Asia, have argued that U.S. foreign aid exacerbates tensions in the region. Many Arab commentators insist that U.S. assistance to Israel indirectly causes suffering to Palestinians by supporting Israeli arms purchases. Another common argument asserts that U.S. foreign aid bolsters autocratic regimes that share similar strategic interests with the United States. Some observers have called U.S. aid policy “contradictory,” accusing the United States of bolstering its ties with autocratic regimes through military assistance, while advocating liberalization in the region with fewer funds dedicated to reform and development aid. As noted above, however, other analysts believe aid has helped protect Israel’s security and stabilize the region. In 1962, Israel purchased its first advanced weapons system from the United States (Hawk anti-aircraft missiles).<sup>2</sup>

Thus, the Congress while playing a significant role in directing U.S. aid to different regions, often play the game of ‘favoritism’. If the economic and military assistance is analyzed taking West Asia region as a whole, Israel has got the maximum in any given period. Therefore, Congressional politics is tilted towards the cause of Israel and Israelis only, often against the Palestinians.

#### **Restrictions on Aid to the Palestinians:-**

Annual Foreign Operations Appropriations measures include several limitations on funding for Palestinian organizations and institutions including the following provisions:<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> “America’s Staunchest Mideast Ally,” *Christian Science Monitor*, August 21, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Morro, Paul, CRS Report RS22370, “U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians”.

***Limitation on Assistance to the Palestinian Authority:-***

There are bans on direct U.S. assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) unless the President submits a waiver to Congress citing that such assistance is in the interest of national security. The waiver can be for up to one year, and must be accompanied by a report to the appropriate congressional committees on PA actions to stop terrorism.

***Limitation on Assistance for the PLO for the West Bank and Gaza:*** Bans aid to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) for the West Bank and Gaza. No U.S. aid has ever been provided to the PLO. This provision states that no funds may be provided to the Palestine Liberation Organization for the West Bank and Gaza unless the President has waived Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

***Restrictions Concerning the Palestinian Authority:*** Bans using U.S. funds for a new office in Jerusalem for the purpose of conducting diplomatic business with the 'Palestinian Authority over Gaza and Jericho'.

***Prohibition on Assistance to the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation:*** Bans U.S. assistance to the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC).<sup>4</sup>

***Auditing USAID'S West Bank and Gaza Program:*** Calls for annual audits of all U.S. assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to ensure that funds are not being diverted to terrorist groups. This provision also states that the Secretary of State shall certify to Congress that the Comptroller General of the United States has access to financial data on the "Economic Support Funds" (ESF) for the West Bank and Gaza. And, the Secretary of State 'shall take all appropriate steps' to ensure that no U.S. assistance is provided to any person or group engaged in terrorism. The Section states that the U.S. AID Administrator should ensure that all contractors and subcontractors are audited annually, and sets aside ESF funds for the U.S. AID Inspector General to conduct audits.

***Palestinian Statehood:*** Bans U.S. assistance to a future Palestinian state unless the Secretary of State certifies, among other things, that the leadership of the new state has been democratically elected, is committed to peaceful coexistence with Israel, and is taking appropriate measure to combat terrorism. The President can

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<sup>4</sup>. Israel accuses the PBC of inciting violence against Israelis.

waive the certification if he determines that it is important to U.S. national security interests.

Regarding the Arab-Israeli issue, the Presidents tend to have a 'balanced' approach towards both the parties in conflict while the Congress is prone to various kinds of influences by interest groups and lobbies which offer us emotional and moral arguments rather than a legal one. The Executive is also vulnerable to various influences and pressures, but the Presidency is best known for its 'independence' in decision-making as the final decision is always taken by the President particularly in foreign policy matters. Therefore, differences may arise between the executive and legislature. For any kind of policy, the cooperation between the executive and legislature is needed; otherwise it poses a challenge in the way of implementing the policy.

#### **Jews Lobby:-**

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt are of the opinion that the enormous support that the United States has been providing to the state of Israel since its creation and even before that is due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the 'Israeli lobby'.<sup>5</sup> The most significant contribution of the Israeli lobby according to them is to convince the Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical.<sup>6</sup>

There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel's case. Israel's backers advocate for the United States' support on the following basis:-

#### **It is weak and surrounded by enemies:-**

The image often created by Israel before the Americans and the world is that of a weak and helpless state. While this image has been carefully nurtured by Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, the opposite image is closer to truth if facts are taken into analysis. During the War of Independence from 1947 to 1949, the Zionist had larger, better-equipped and better-led forces and thus, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy victories in subsequent wars against

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<sup>5</sup> Mearsheimer, John & Stephen Walt, "The Israeli Lobby," available at [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01\\_.html](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html)

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.aipac.org/>

Egypt (1956), Jordan (1967) and so on. This was the position before large-scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel. Although these victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational ability, and military prowess, most importantly, they reveal that Israel was far from helpless even in its earliest years.

Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the West Asian region. According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, "the strategic balance decidedly favors Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neighbors."<sup>7</sup>

**It is a democracy, which is a morally preferable form of government:-**

Very often American support to Israel has been justified by the rationale that the latter is a 'fellow-democracy' surrounded by dictatorships. The rationale sounds more convincing than the previous one, but it does not suffice explaining the 'current level' of support because of two reasons: first, there are many democracies around the world, but none receives the lavish support that Israel does. In fact, there are evidences that prove that the United States did not even hesitate to overthrow democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when this was thought to advance U.S. interests, and in addition to that, it has good relations with a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies nor explains America's support for Israel. Second, the 'shared democracy' rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood kinship.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses their right to live in Israel.

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<sup>7</sup>Amos Harel, "Israel Maintains Its Strategic Advantage, Says Jaffee Center," *Ha'aretz*, November 23, 2005

<sup>8</sup> Blackburn, Nicky, "Better a Jew," *Ha'aretz*, April 21, 2004

**The Jews people have suffered from past crimes and therefore deserve special treatment:-**

The third moral justification is 'Jews prosecution'. The rationale advanced was that because Jews were prosecuted for centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish homeland, Israel deserves 'special' treatment from the United States.

This history though provides for a strong moral case for supporting Israel's existence, fails to explain the additional crimes attached with the creation of the state of Israel particularly against a third party which is more innocent- the Palestinians.

As former Prime Minister Barak once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he "would have joined a terrorist organization."<sup>9</sup>

It is true that Europe's crime against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for Israel's right to exist, but, this tragic history of the Jewish people does not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does today.

**Israel's conduct has been morally superior to its adversaries' behavior:-**

The final of the rationale to support Israel is in the way of portrayal of Israel as a country essentially seeking peace in the midst of hostile surrounding and environment. In order to pursue this objective, Israel had showed a great level of constraint even when revoked. The neighboring Arabs, by contrast, always have been acted with great wickedness.

This rationale has been strongly supported by some Israeli leaders and Americans like Alan Dershowitz.<sup>10</sup> But, this is yet another myth; because in terms of actual behavior, Israel's conduct is not 'morally' distinguishable from the actions of its opponents.

The core of the Israeli lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it advances

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<sup>9</sup> Maxwell,

Bill, "U.S. Should Reconsider Aid to Israel," *St. Petersburg Times*, December 16, 2001

<sup>10</sup> Dershowitz, Alan, (2003)*The Case for Israel* Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons cited in Mearsheimer, John & Stephen Walt, "The Israeli Lobby," available at [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01\\_.html](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html).

Israel's interests.<sup>11</sup> Their activities go beyond merely voting for candidates who are pro-Israel to include letter-writing, financial contributions, and supporting pro-Israel organizations.

But contrary to popular belief, not all Jewish-Americans are part of the lobby; because Israel is not the key issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly thirty-six per cent of Jewish-Americans said they were either 'not very' or 'not at all' emotionally attached to Israel.<sup>12</sup>

Jewish-Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the Key organizations, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally supported the 'expansionist' policies of Israel's Likud Party, including its hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the Palestinians and a few groups- such as Jewish voice for Peace strongly advocate such steps.<sup>13</sup> Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel. American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli officials so that they can maximize their influence in the United States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, "It is routine for us to say: 'this is our policy on a certain issue, but we must check what the Israelis think'. We as a community do it all the time."<sup>14</sup>

Jewish-Americans have formed an impressive 'array' of organizations to influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and well-known.<sup>15</sup> The lobby includes prominent Christian evangelicals (like Gary Bauer, Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson; Dick Arme, And Tom DeLay,

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<sup>11</sup> Mearsheimer, John & Stephen Walt, "The Israeli Lobby," available at [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01\\_.html](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html).

<sup>12</sup> M. Cohen, Steven, The 2004 National Survey of American Jews, sponsored by the Jewish Agency for Israel's Department of Jewish-Zionist Education, February 24, 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Goldberg, J.J. "Old Friend, Shattered Dreams," *Forward*, December 24, 2004

<sup>14</sup> Nir, Ori, "FBI Probe: More Questions Than Answers." *Forward*, May 13, 2005

<sup>15</sup> Mearsheimer, John & Stephen Walt, "The Israeli Lobby," available at [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01\\_.html](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html)



former leaders in the House of Representatives). They believe Israel's rebirth is a part of the 'Biblical prophecy', hence support its expansionist agenda. They also believe that pressuring Israel is contrary to 'God's will'.<sup>16</sup> The lobby has some neo-conservative members (like John Bolton; the late Wall Street Journal editor, Robert Bartley; former Secretary of Education, William Bennett, former U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will) too.

The interest group politics in America has resulted in giving the Israeli lobby powers unmatched and the ability to play the game in the most efficient way. In its basic operation, it is like every other interest group, but the 'extraordinary effectiveness' lies in the spirit of the Jewish-Americans and their Christian allies in making no stones unturned towards success; it is not about doing a different thing but doing the same thing in a different way. And more importantly, when a comparison is made, pro-Arab groups are weak to 'non-existent'.<sup>17</sup>

The most important pillar of the lobby's effectiveness is its influence in the Congress.<sup>18</sup> Generally, in other issues, there is a debate in the Congress; but where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall silent and there is hardly any debate at all. Dick Armev once said "My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel."<sup>19</sup> The lobby also has significant leverage over the executive branch along with the media. And key organizations in the lobby also directly target the administration in power.

### **Energy Security:-**

American policymakers have often employed the politics of 'foreign aid' to achieve their objectives in a particular region. West Asia as a region gets assistance under this strategy. Thus, despite changing geo-political conditions, U.S. foreign aid to

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<sup>16</sup> Hamburger, Tom and Jim VandeHei, (, May 23, 2002), "Chosen People: How Israel Became a Favorite Cause of Christian Right," *Wall Street Journal*.

<sup>17</sup> Boustany, Nora, "Palestinians' Lone Hand in Washington," *Washington Post*, April, 19, 2002.

<sup>18</sup> Mearsheimer, John & Stephen Walt, "The Israeli Lobby," available at [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01\\_.html](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html).

<sup>19</sup> Tapper, Jake, "Questions for Dick Armev: Retiring, Not Shy," *New York Times Magazine*, September 1, 2002

the region has historically been more of a function of U.S. 'national security interests' in the region.<sup>20</sup> And the United States, therefore, has pursued a foreign policy that seeks stability in the region with abundant energy reserves. And in addition to it, the volatility of the region gives it the opportunity to play the politics of 'peace' as a means to access the oil and hydro-carbon resources of the region. Involvement in the region is expected to give the United States access to the huge resources whereas solving the conflict at a time and getting out of the region would be costly. Hence, the 'management of conflict' remains confined to managing the parties in conflict after violence has occurred every time.

President George W. Bush has expressed his concern over the matter as, "Keeping America competitive requires affordable energy. And here we have a serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world...."<sup>21</sup>

Thus, there are security implications that follow from this oil 'addiction'. According to Gary J. Schmitt, this dependency of energy (oil and natural gases) constrains U.S. policy making in general and American foreign policy in particular. The revenue extracted by major oil-producing states from the American taxpayers is diverted towards supporting foreign and domestic policies which often contradicts America's interests.<sup>22</sup>

Almost two-thirds of the world's natural gas reserves can be found in five countries: Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Indeed, Russia and Iran have almost half the world's natural gas reserves. The other major sources of reserves are found in West Africa and Latin America. Needless to say, these are not countries or areas marked with strong democratic credentials. Therefore, higher demand on the part of the United States for gas at today's higher prices would provide vast new revenues for those states and help

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<sup>20</sup> Morro, Paul, CRS Report RS22370, "U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians".

<sup>21</sup> President George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address by the President," Office of the White House Press Secretary (Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2006), available at [www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html)

<sup>22</sup> Schmitt, J. Gary (2006), "Energy Security, National Security, and natural gas," *National Security Outlook*, available at [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24223/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24223/pub_detail.asp).

sustain some governments creating problems for Washington in turn.<sup>23</sup> And America's allies are not in a position to challenge these countries because of their own dependency of oil.

But, it may be observed that the truth has a different implications altogether; America does not really hesitate to support some of the autocratic regimes in order to pursue its interest in the West Asian region. National interest rather than 'moral' or democratic values are the defining strategy of the United States' policy, particularly the foreign policy. And foreign aid and assistance are serving as the means to achieve this objective.

Thus, while supporting Israel for 'democratic values', a justification often given by the American government. Washington also supports some of the autocratic regimes in the region which are strongly in violation of democratic values and norms. Hence, how far the United States is justifying its role in managing the Israeli-Palestine dispute on the ideological front is doubtful.

#### **Intra-agency rivalry:-**

The major actors in 'Middle East' policy-making process are the President, his national security advisors, the State Departments, the Bureau of 'Near East' and South Asian Affairs, Bureau of International Organizations and the Policy planning Staff, the Department of Defence together with the Joint Chief of Staffs and the International Security Agency, the Intelligence Community with the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency playing key roles, the Congress, the press, interest groups(both pro-Israeli and the oil companies supplementing the pro-Arab organizations) and last but not the least, the public opinion.<sup>24</sup>

According to Bureaucratic Actors model, the different segments of bureaucracy do not necessarily have the same interests and objective while dealing with various domestic and specifically in foreign policy matters. And often these differences of interests lead to clash of interest and competition among

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Quandt, William (1973), "Domestic influences on United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East: the View from Washington", *The Middle East Journal*, pp264-67.

different departments. This is also evident in Arab-Israeli issue. If the State Department is in favor of a policy of balance towards both the parties, Pentagon may be straight forward in promoting the cause of Israel, for example.

Foreign policy-making can be a function of calculations by rational decision-makers working for the national interest, the result of competition between governmental agencies or the influence of domestic interest groups on policy decisions.<sup>25</sup>

### **Regional Difficulties:-**

The United States faces a complex, interconnected set of four crises in the 'Middle East': the need to achieve a stable and more peaceful Iraq; to strengthen the democratically elected government of Lebanon against Iran's, Syria's, and Hezbollah's attempt to unseat it; to block Iran's nuclear and regional ambitions; and to establish the foundations for peace between the Israeli and the Palestinian people.

These problems are interconnected and have their influence in the peace efforts between the Israeli and Palestinian people. Thus, accordingly, America's policy stance regarding these issues has its repercussions on the Arab-Israeli relations as a whole and the peace efforts in particular.

### **Anti-Americanism in the Arab world:-**

While America has been involved in the conflict management over the Israel-Palestine issue, there has been an upswing in anti-American sentiments growing in the Arab world making the peace efforts further weak. Abdel Mahdi Abdallah has expressed this phenomenon in a different perspective. He believes that as the Arab mass media is under a 'continuous', and 'concentrated' campaign against America, many Arabs found themselves without much choice except to hate America and Israel and their leaders, and consequently, to join or to passively support Islamic movements or terrorist organizations.<sup>26</sup> In April 2003, *Business Week* stated that hostilities against American policies in the Arab world have never

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<sup>25</sup> Quandt, William (1993), *Peace Process*, Berkeley: UC Press. p. 8.

<sup>26</sup> Abdallah, Abdel Mahdi, "Causes of Anti-Americanism In the Arab World: A Socio-Political Perspective", available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue4/jv7n4a6.html>

been higher, thanks to the Arab news media.<sup>27</sup> And Keefe believes these feelings have increased in Arab countries today as the war in Iraq continues and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved.<sup>28</sup>

It is very important to know whether this negative image is caused by a resentment of American values, United States foreign policy, or poor communication. In the words of Miles, many Americans perceive that this resentment is directed toward our values, culture and lifestyle.<sup>29</sup> Significantly, most Arabs do not resent America's freedom and wealth. They respect American culture, enjoy American television and movies and many foster aspirations of living in America.<sup>30</sup> And more importantly, most Arabs appreciate many aspects of American culture and values. A Zogby International Survey of ten nations showed that a majority of people in five Arab countries had a favorable view of America's freedom and democracy. This Arab majority also looked favorably upon American products and education. However in this same poll, most people expressed a negative view of American foreign policy. Only a third of the Arab and Muslims polled supported the global war on terrorism and almost ninety percent viewed American policy in the Middle East unfavorably.<sup>31</sup> In March 2002, a survey found that eighty-six percent of Saudis surveyed said their frustration with the United States was due to its foreign policy.<sup>32</sup> On the policy front, there is a very crucial problem arising: anti-Americanism is growing within the Arabs as a result of the failure of the United States to come to a solution to the Israeli-Palestine problem,

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<sup>27</sup> Lee Walczak (2003), "American & the World with victory in Iraq Near, All Sides Must Focus on

Repairing Relations," *Business Week*, Issue 3829, pg 34.

<sup>28</sup> Mark O. O'Keefe (2002), "U.S. gives money to Muslim group to help image." *The Christian Century*, Chicago: Vol 119. Iss. 12: pg 17.

<sup>29</sup> Hugh Miles, *Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging the West* (New York: Grove Press, 2005), 372.

<sup>30</sup> . *ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> Telhami, Shibley (2002), *The Stakes: America in the Middle East, The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, , 48.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

and this anti-Americanism again is standing in the way of a firm solution to the Israeli-Palestine problem. Thus, this particular issue has taken a very complex shape; in fact there has been created a vicious circle of 'hatred' that is further complicating the problem.

There are many reasons described for growing anti-Americanism among the Arabs: U.S. unilateralism, keeping American national interest at the apex, and most importantly, pro-Israeli policies of Washington. Most of the Arabs believe that America and American policy favors the Israelis only. Lenore Martin states, "The two oft-cited American interests in the region after the end of the Cold War are the security of oil supplies and the security of Israel."<sup>33</sup>

#### **Military Intervention in Iraq:-**

According to Robert Freedman, the decision of Iraq invasion and the Bush Administration's policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are two major issues President Bush's 'Middle East' policy. And importantly, these two issues influence one another.<sup>34</sup> Among other issues, the Bush government's 'War on Terror' and 'Iraq War' are responsible for persistence of the trend of anti-Americanism.

As many scholars have noted, the incidence of September 11, 2001 has played a great role in reviving the interest of the Bush Administration towards the Arab-Israeli issue. If there were any renewed effort on the part of the American leadership to negotiate on that particular issue, it was only regarding the proposed 'War on Terror' or 'War against Iraq'. Washington wanted the support of all the Arab states in the region in its 'War on Terror' and that is the reason it wanted to satisfy the Palestinians *vis-a-vis* the Israelis for the first time regarding the Israel-Palestine issue. Though one cannot see any major policy shift in favor of the Palestinians, the talks of a Palestinian statehood is of much importance. And, for the first time, the United States officially used the phrase 'occupation' to sight

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<sup>33</sup> Lenore G. Martin (2003), *Assessing the Impact of U.S.-Israeli Relations on the Arab World* Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 4.

<sup>34</sup> Freedman, Robert O. "The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue1/jv9no1a4.html>

Israeli occupations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These are the milestones the U.S. has covered regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict in the midst of the War on Terror and the Iraq war.

**Lebanon Crisis:-**

The Lebanon crisis is much related to the Arab-Israeli problem, though indirectly. Since the June 1967 war, Lebanon has been used as a basement for the Palestinians against the Israelis many a time. Thus, from the side of Israel too, there are air strikes on Lebanon as was seen in June 2006 crisis. Apart from this, it is also believed that Lebanon's militant groups like Hezbollah are getting support from some Palestinian terrorist groups. Consequently, there are calculations about the Hamas and Hezbollah; together giving a rapid growth to the terrorization of the region as a whole and predominantly against Israel.

**Alleged Iranian Ambition to Develop Nuclear Weapon capabilities:-**

Iran's suspected nuclear weapon program has caused tensions among the American policy-makers as Iran has remained defiant despite all the proposals and pressures on it to shut down the program. Though the U.S. intelligent assessment plays down any early threat of an Iranian weapon, the American leadership does not want to take any risk.

Beyond its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Iran has endeavored to sow chaos and instability throughout the region, particularly in the precarious democracies of Iraq and Lebanon, where Iranian-funded militants seek to thwart the democratic will of the Iraqi and Lebanese people. And as the regime has escalated its long-standing and violent rejection of a 'Middle East' peace settlement between the Israeli and the Palestinian people, its human rights record at home has once again taken a dismal turn. The United States thus, according to some should continue its efforts to discourage the Iranian regime's support for terrorism and extremism, while expanding engagement with the Iranian people as this issue is related to the Arab-Israeli problem.

After analyzing the domestic challenges and the regional difficulties, one can deduce that these are the real problems in advancing towards the escalation of the 'Middle East' peace efforts. These are one of the most 'fundamental'

issues/problems and thus, needs careful handling. It has been observed in the history of international relations that those issues involving psychology, ideology, religion, and border/boundary, refugee, etc., are often tend to be long-term; even remain unsolved if not handled 'tactfully'. In that respect, the Israel-Palestine issue has every qualification to be a truly 'sensitive' one which essentially requires much deeper positive enthusiasm and sensitivity from both the side of America and the parties themselves in order to stop the violence and stop it from spreading over the region.



## CHAPTER-V

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\*\*\*\* CONCLUSION \*\*\*\*

## CHAPTER-V

Conflicts in West Asia in recent decades present scholars and policy makers alike with daunting complexity, making simple models and solutions problematical. Some literatures treat international conflicts as mixed-interest games (such as prisoner's dilemma) and promote a combination of reciprocity and cooperative initiatives as a formula to overcome the dilemmas inherent in such games. Any attempt to analyze the American strategy and policy of *conflict management*, therefore, must deal with the theoretical complexities of the study. But before going into the details of the complexities, it would be wise to look into the concept of *conflict* and *conflict management* itself.

### **Theory of Conflict Management:-**

The main aim of *conflict management* is conflict regulation. However, it is very important to define and clarify the meaning of the term 'conflict' in order to understand the concept of *conflict management* and to distinguish between its associated concepts like *conflict prevention* and *conflict resolution*, etc. Any definition or the concept of *conflict* uses a framework in shape of a 'continuum of war and peace', where the intermediate points on the continuum were different stages of conflict. *Crisis*, on the other hand, is a term that refers to a tense situation that is immediate or present. It is important to make a clear distinction between *conflict* and *crisis* because the interpretation of a term and its application to describe a certain situation has direct implications on the measures or policy suggestions put forward to approach the situation. Since there is a significant difference between the tools used in, for example, *crisis management* and *conflict management*, this issue of terminology is important.

*Conflict management* as a concept is generally perceived to entail an aspect of 'learning to live with' a conflict. It has been seen as a way of reducing the incentive to escalate the conflict as well as a way of handling an already open conflict. It should be noted that conflict management share some characteristics especially with direct *conflict prevention* in so far as it attempts to prevent the escalation of a conflict. Even

though it can be argued that the concepts of *conflict prevention* and *conflict management* overlap to some extent, there is a general agreement that the solution is not to merge the two terms, but that both terms are needed since they entail different functions. However, it is worth mentioning that *conflict avoidance (prevention)* through measures such as cease fires and deterrence could lead to an increase of the conflicting parties' capability to escalate the conflict.

Hamad Ahmad argues that there has been considerable inaccuracy in defining the concept of *conflict management*. The term has been given a far narrower meaning than it deserves.<sup>1</sup> Historically, it has been understood to mean the 'containment' or 'suspension' of a conflict. The linguistic and conceptual meanings of *management* in disciplines such as *business management* are much wider than the conventional meaning of the term in conflict studies. *Conflict management* covers every action taken by the parties to the conflict to handle the situation. Therefore, the definition of the term should be extended to cover a whole discipline, which includes the 'initiation' of a conflict, its 'escalation', the ensuing 'complications', 'containment', 'resolution' and 'transformation' as sub-topics.

He further opines that a more comprehensive definition would cover the study of the various dimensions of the conflict. It would encompass 'understanding', 'containment', 'settlement', 'resolution', 'transformation', and other associated concepts and theories of *conflict*.

*Conflict management*, as a concept, has been conventionally associated with *conflict containment*. According to Hugh Miall, *conflict management* theorists 'see violent conflicts as an ineradicable consequence of differences of values and interests within and between communities.' These theorists regard 'resolving such conflicts as unrealistic; the best that can be done is to 'manage' and 'contain' them, and occasionally to reach a historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside and

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<sup>1</sup>. Ahmad, Hamad, (July 2005), "The Reconceptualisation of Conflict Management", *Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 7. available at <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk> .

normal politics resumed.<sup>2</sup> This definition assumes that conflicts are irresolvable and that handling is limited to containing them and ending the violence.

However, other theorists believe that it is possible to eliminate conflicts. Therefore, they see *conflict management* as a stage in the handling of conflicts which could be followed by later stages. For instance, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary have divided what they call 'ethnic conflict regulations' into two main sections: *conflict management* and *conflict termination*. This distinction is based on the idea that the former is concerned with the handling of the consequences of differences between adversaries, whereas the latter is concerned with terminating them.<sup>3</sup>

John Burton, in turn, distinguishes between 'settlement of conflict' and 'resolution of conflict'. He defines a conflict as settled if the outcome entails a loss for one side and a gain for the other, or a compromise in which all or some of the parties are losers to some degree. An example is a situation where the parties are obliged to share a scarce resource so that none is completely satisfied. In some cases, this can be the result of coercion.<sup>4</sup>

However, the conflict is resolved if the outcome fully meets the needs and interests of all the parties concerned. This situation occurs where the parties agree to exploit and share a resource in such a way as to completely satisfy everyone's values and interests.<sup>5</sup>

Peter Wallensteen emphasizes the 'containment' function of *conflict management* method and theory. According to him, *Conflict management* typically focuses on the armed aspects of conflict: bringing the fighting to an end, limiting the spread of the conflict and, thus, containing it. On the other hand, *conflict resolution* is

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<sup>2</sup> Miall, Hugh "Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task", *Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation*, available at [www.berghof-center.org](http://www.berghof-center.org).

<sup>3</sup> McGarry, John & Brendan O'Leary, (1993) *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, London: Routledge, , p.4

<sup>4</sup> Burton, John W. (1984) *Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis*, Brighton, Sussex, UK: Wheatsheaf Books, , p.143.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

more ambitious, as it expects the parties to face jointly their incompatibility and find a way to live with or dissolve it.<sup>6</sup>

It could be concluded, therefore, that the main trend in conflict studies is to define *conflict management* as being on the same level as *conflict settlement* or *containment*. In other words, the general view of *conflict management* is that it is less advanced or that it covers a narrower range of treatment of conflict in comparison with other more ambitious or advanced methods of dealing with this problem. Fisher et al. is of the view that while they make 'no claim' that there is a 'universally accepted' typology for the methods used in addressing conflict; there are consistent terms, seen as 'steps in a process': each step taken includes the previous one. The author classifies these steps as *conflict prevention*, *conflict settlement*, *conflict management*, *conflict resolution* and *conflict transformation*. In his view, the definition of *conflict management* is that it 'aims to limit and avoid future violence by promoting positive behavioral changes in the parties involved.'<sup>7</sup>

However, these attempts to define the concept of *conflict management* became subject to some criticism of which the following points are notable.

#### **Exaggerated Realism:-**

The *conflict management* theory assumes that conflicts are irresolvable, or at least very difficult to resolve or rarely resolved. Therefore, only 'containment' and 'suspension' of violence are possible and realistic. This attitude does not satisfy many researchers and such a pessimistic view is considered to be exaggerated.

#### **Lack of Realistic View:-**

On the other hand, there are critics who hold the opposite view, namely, that conflict management theory is unrealistic,<sup>8</sup> because it assumes that conflicts can be contained

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<sup>6</sup> Wallensteen, Peter, (2002), *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, London; Thousand Oaks, CA; & New Delhi: Sage Publications, p.53.

<sup>7</sup> Fisher et al., Simon (2000), *Working with Conflict: Skills & Strategies for Action*, London: Zed Books, p.7.

<sup>8</sup> Burton, John, (1990), *Conflict Resolution and Prevention*, London: Macmillan, p.13.

and suspended. However, in many cases, it appears that there are frustration and concerns under the surface, which can provoke a fresh eruption of conflict at any moment. These scholars think that containing conflict is not possible in the long term, and therefore other strategies are needed to deal with the problem.

**Lack of Analysis:-**

There is a noticeable lack of analysis in works classified as conflict management research and theory. Alan C. Tidwell expresses this view in his discussion of the concept of 'conflict resolution', a term that he uses to include conflict management.

The lack of analysis has become largely structural in the theory and practice of *conflict management*. This situation has been caused mostly by the trend of interpreting *conflict management* as *conflict settlement* and *containment*. The focus is always on action and practical steps, usually in an atmosphere of *crisis* and urgency. Therefore, very little attention has been given to the analysis of the problem itself and the theoretical framework required to study it, as well as recognizing and examining the consequences of the many recommended courses of action and types of settlement suggested by scholars or advisers.

The literature on *conflict resolution* focuses on 'how to do it', with scant attention paid to situational and contextual issues. Yet, a more textured and mature approach to *conflict resolution* demands examination of these concepts and situations.<sup>9</sup>

Tidwell rightly points out that *conflict resolution* and *management* as is usually applied by scholars is directed at the problem rather than at the person with whom one is in conflict with.<sup>10</sup> In justifying the need for a theory of *conflict transformation*, Miall says that it is necessary to have it, 'if we are to have an adequate basis for the analysis of (any) conflict.'<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>. Tidwell, Alan C (1998) *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*, London & New York: Pinter Publishers, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>. Miall, Hugh "Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task", *Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation*, available at [www.berghof-center.org](http://www.berghof-center.org)

### **Conflict Management and the Conflict Curve:-**

The discourses available on the concept of *conflict management* include a discussion of a wide range of issues. To make it simple for our analysis, we can have a look at these issues one by one. But, it should be remembered that these issues are often present simultaneously and function in managing a conflict.

### **Issue of Actors:-**

The issue of actors has often been brought up while referring to *conflict management* and *conflict prevention*. To analyze the practical measures of these concepts, it is important to be aware of who the actor is using and/or engaging in these measures. The effectiveness, if not success, of certain measures of *conflict prevention* and *management* may vary depending on the kind of actor that implements them. In the case of Israel-Palestine issue, the parties are very different from each other with very strong sense of nationalism. On the other hand, the mediator is a superpower i. e. the United States.

The position of the parties in the conflict along with the position of the intervening party as an actor in international situation has much influence on the *conflict* and *conflict management* strategy. Israel is a powerful state and Palestine is equally a powerful counter-force to it in terms of nationalism. Had any one of them been a less influential or capable actor, it would have been easy for the US to come to an easy solution of the problem. But taking into account the role religious sentiments has played in shaping the course of this conflict, anyone would prefer to be cautious while dealing with such a sensitive issue.

### **Issue of Primacy:-**

A model was developed by some scholars for taking into account the 'primacy' factor. The issues in a conflict as stated above are several. Of which one can, but does not necessarily has to find out the core issue. If consisting of several issues, a key question in managing a conflict involves deciding what issues to deal with first: the

issues where the parties are more likely to agree or those where the parties are far removed from each other's positions.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has multiple issues to negotiate. Some of them are very fundamental in nature as the border issue, creation of a Palestinian statehood, human rights, etc. And all of them are closely linked with one another. In this kind of volatile situation, the third party either can make or break the thing. Issues, if selected carefully one by one according to their importance, the problem may rapidly lead to successful resolution. However, if the mediator chooses to pursue its own interest above that of the parties' in conflict, it may quickly ruin the efforts. The United States, while dealing with the Arab-Israeli problem, has been mindful that the fundamental issues need to be settled for a lasting peace. Because, a fundamental issue, if unresolved, will crop up again and again. Therefore, without finalizing the border issue, there is no utility of talking of a 'democratic' Palestinian state "living peacefully with Israel". Some of the finest scholars have raised doubts on the possibility of a Palestinian state. Abed Rabbo believes that this is a secondary issue preventing the Palestinians from 'attacking the major issues and using the old recipe-direct negotiations.' Consequently, he agrees that the only option in the short run is a serious attempt to isolate the internal Palestinian crisis from the negotiations process.

#### **Issue of Appropriate Approach:-**


These different approaches impact what and when measures of *conflict management* and *prevention* are applied to a conflict. With regard to the choice of approach, the level of trust between the conflicting parties was deemed essential. The discussion on approach also touches upon the question of how issues in a conflict should be classified.

It can be observed that in the Arab-Israel case, the emphasis was more on bringing peace efforts than *conflict management*. Peace efforts have less to do with the long term policy of the parties in a conflict; its immediate aim is to come to a settlement through negotiations. While managing conflict involves the long term strategy of conflict avoidance and to have a coherent and well-defined policy towards the problem. The United States is yet to develop a coherent and well-defined policy



towards the Arab-Israeli problem. According to Abed Rabbo, while emphasizing on the negotiation process, 'direct negotiations' would be of necessity as well as viability. A majority of the Arab states currently support direct negotiations with Israel and have expressed a willingness to engage in active involvement in such an endeavor.

Taking 'issues' as a basic factor, we can further define the concept of *conflict* in the form of a 'curve' in a diagram. It would help us understanding the true nature of *conflict management*. Specifically, *conflict* diagrammatically represented in a curve acknowledges that a conflict is not made up by a single issue, but rather by a multitude of issues that each can exist on different points on the curve simultaneously. The status (in the conflict prevention, management or resolution phase for example) of each of these issues can be different with regard to the phases of conflict at any moment in time.



The conflict curve suggests the ways to make the *conflict management* approach correspond better to actual patterns of conflict. Firstly, the strategy of *conflict management* should not be depicting a single issue in a conflict, rather than the entire conflict. Secondly, rather than following a set pattern moving through the different stages of conflict, the line of the curve can be allowed to fluctuate and so as

the strategy too. In this way, it would better correspond with the movement of the issue between the different stages of the conflict.

**Factors in Conflict Management:-**

The efforts of studying America's strategy of conflict management must also include the factors which influence the strategy.

**Cultural Factor:-**

Culture, may be defined as a significant factor of influence in any conflict, being closely associated with the notion of identity. Despite the importance of a person's individual identity, culture is commonly regarded as a group phenomenon.<sup>12</sup>

Each person is partly like all others, partly like some others, partly like no-one else. In this sense, stress is placed on the deeper aspects of culture, values, beliefs, norms, which influence perceptions, assumptions, attitudes, and eventually behavior and traditional practices. Culture can be described according David Carment, as collective programming of the mind' or as an expression of all the experiences of a particular people or group over time which help shape their personality and manner of perceiving. People carry several layers of mental programming, Carment argues, which correspond to different culture levels, from the individual to the universal.<sup>13</sup>

Huntington, in this context, takes the stand that culture will be the main cause of future conflict, and that cultural differences are less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic matters, especially when religion is involved.<sup>14</sup>

Kevin points out that the greater the competition and inequalities between groups in heterogeneous societies, the greater will be both the salience of ethnic

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<sup>12</sup> Christopher A. Leeds, *Managing Conflicts Across Cultures: Challenges to Practitioners* available at [www.berghof-center.org](http://www.berghof-center.org)

<sup>13</sup> Carment, David. (1993), "The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflicts: Concepts, Indicators and Theory." *Journal of Peace Research*, 30(2):137-150).

<sup>14</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. (1993), "The Clash of Civilizations." *Foreign Affairs*, 73(3):22-49.

identities, and the prospect of overt violence. In other words, cultural distinctions add an extra sharper dimension that increases divisiveness and the intensity of conflict.<sup>15</sup>

Whatever view the scholars may have on the influence of culture in a conflict, the important thing to remember is that a conflict having culture, religion and boundary as the fundamental issue is less likely to come to peace easily. West Asia is a complex region where religion, culture, and politics are deeply intertwined in a powerful relationship. From the early days of the Arab nationalist experiment to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the early part of the century and beyond, the region's political movements have become a salient feature of its modern history and continue to be the subject of much heated debate and speculation.<sup>16</sup>

#### **Perception Factor:-**

The question of how self-interested actors in a protracted conflict can cooperate so as to manage, reduce, or even resolve conflict is one of the most important ones in the literature of conflict resolution. This literature essentially suggests situational and ripeness conditions that reflect developments in the real conflict environment and changes in the parties' perceptions in the wake of crucial developments. It is in this sense, the acts of the Palestinians are viewed as 'terrorist acts' while the Israelis are believed to be adhered to the democratic norms even if they are attacking someone.

Here, it should be taken into account the fact that the reality often invalidates the requirement due to 'perception' factor. Stability in the West Asian region, it is argued by many scholars, was in the interest of the United State because ultimately it would help safeguarding its vital interest. While the US showed interest in the Arab-Israeli issue, it failed to prove itself as an 'honest broker' and here the perception factor has played a major role over the years. Washington is seen as supportive of

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<sup>15</sup>Avruch, Kevin. (1991), "Culture and Conflict Resolution." In Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black and Joseph A. Scimecca, eds. *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. Westport CT: Greenwood Press.

<sup>16</sup> Halliday, Fred (2000), *Nation and Religion in the Middle East*, London: Saqi Books. P. 7.

Israel's acts against the Palestinians. As Israel is the only democracy in the region surrounded by authoritarian Arab regimes, the United States believes that it needs to be protected from the hostile neighborhood. All acts of Israel are, hence, justified in the name of protecting democracy. Understanding 'perception' is, thus, vital in order to allow for a more varied view on conflict.<sup>17</sup>

Since Woodrow Wilson's time, American public opinion has been formed and policy has been made from a vantage point or frame of reference that is primarily Israel-centered and tends to ignore the Palestinian perspective. The elements that have influenced US policymakers can be classified as American religious attitudes toward the Holy Land that legitimize the Jewish presence; sympathy for Jews derived from the Holocaust; a sense of cultural identity wherein Israelis are 'like us' and Arabs 'distant aliens'.<sup>18</sup> It makes the case that decades of negative portrayals of Palestinians have distorted US policy. It has made it difficult for the US to promote conflict resolutions based on equality and reciprocity between Palestinians and Israelis.

#### **Economic Factor:-**

Economy too plays a significant role in escalating or reducing international conflicts. It has been noticed that economic inequalities create a sense of hatred among the deprived towards the wealthy. Fred Halliday argues that economic unevenness is the main reason behind regional conflicts where some countries are very poor and a few are quite wealthy. He further states that if the economic, intellectual and political requirements are met in the Arab world moving beyond the politics of past decades is possible.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov , *Adaptation and Learning in Conflict Management, Reduction, and Resolution* available at [http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol8\\_1/Yaacov%20Bar-Simon-Tov.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol8_1/Yaacov%20Bar-Simon-Tov.htm).

<sup>18</sup> Christison, K (2001), *Perceptions of Palestine, Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy*, California: University of California Press. p.126.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

According to Ambassador Edward Djerejian, there are some factors that should be understood and dealt with in order to avoid continued violence and confrontation and foster instability in the region as a whole. The most important among them is the issue of politico-socio-economics. Economically, the rate of demographic growth are very high in this region; the increasing numbers of young people seeking employment in economies that cannot create enough employment opportunities (in some countries, more than 50 per cent of population is under 25 years of age).

Foreign direct investment in the region remains very low compared to other regions of the world. Accordingly, economic reform and a transition to private market economies have proven to be halting and difficult. The education system also, is not geared to produce qualified entrants into the marketplace who can meet the new challenges of globalization. And these structural problems are exacerbated by endemic corruption in the public and private sectors of society. Further, the large gap between rich and poor raises the fundamental issue of social injustice in the region. If it is taken as a whole into the Arab-Israeli context, the desperate economic plight of the Palestinians encourages extremism. . In the current context, the lack of employment, food, water, and basic services is fueling anger and resentment against Israel and the Palestinian Authority itself. In a broader regional sense, many regimes in the region are becoming increasingly vulnerable to their public opinions which perceive their governments' inability to deliver on urgently needed economic reforms, broader participation, and the peace process with increasing frustration.

**Various Approaches:-**

Conflict studies have been helpful in defining the meaning of various types of peace efforts like *conflict resolution*, *conflict prevention (avoidance)*, *conflict management*, *conflict transformation*, etc. In addition to that this discourse brings out some of the key methods to understand the real nature of the problem of conflict and its solution.

There are various approaches developed by scholars on this subject. These cannot be defined as theories as they lack coherence and a systematic and scientific approach. But, this available literature is of great help to any student of conflict studies.

### **Adaptation and Learning:-**

In the process from a conflict situation towards peace, there are several factors that decide the fate of the conflict; they can be defined as some explanatory variables. 'Adaptation' and 'learning' are some of these explanatory variables.

Theories of adaptation and learning, which recent studies of foreign policy have applied from social psychology, is referred in order to understand foreign policy shifts, and specifically the role of cognitive processes in major turning points in international conflict.<sup>20</sup> Adaptation and learning may mediate between structural and ripeness conditions, and are processes of evaluating conflict developments by decision-makers that may lead them to change their attitudes, beliefs, and even behavior in the direction of conflict reduction and resolution

According to Ernest Haas, an 'adaptation' process takes place when an actor changes its behavior in response to new events but without questioning its beliefs about basic causation or underlying values. Adaptation involves a realization that a previous set of measures or strategies are no longer effective in attaining one's aims. Although the ultimate goal remains the same, new paths of action are sought.<sup>21</sup> An adaptation process in a conflict may explain the shift from an unmanageable stage (zero-sum, or military and political decision) to a more manageable one (mixed-motive, or limited war or violence), or even to different manageable stages (shifting from one type of limited war to another), in which the parties use war and violence as a political means and a bargaining tool rather than as way of eliminating each other from the conflict. Adaptation may also lead the parties to perceive the conflict more realistically and to limit their political and military objectives.

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<sup>21</sup> . Haas, Ernest B. (1993), "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction." *Millenium*, 22(3):505-546.

Given the realities of protracted conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is reasonable to assume that adaptation is not possible without external intervention or support. Because of difficulties in keeping the conflict limited, the adversaries need help from an external party. The third party's role is mainly to influence the rivals to reduce the violent intensity of the conflict. To encourage an adaptation process in the conflict, the third party can use various approaches. It may act directly or indirectly (via another power) to persuade one or both sides of the limitations of using military means to resolve or achieve substantial unilateral gains. The third party may also stress the risks involved in resorting to violence, which may include not only the dangers of limited local war but also its possible expansion into a less limited war, including military intervention by an external power. The third party's main task at this stage is to make clear to both sides that they will not be permitted to attain a total victory in the war

**Ripeness Theory:-**

The ripeness condition is a necessary though not sufficient condition for conflict reduction and resolution. The rival parties can consider resolving their conflict only when the appropriate time or, more accurately, the appropriate set of conditions arrives. At the ripe moment, however, the adversaries must jointly perceive themselves to be in a costly hurting stalemate, and that unilateral military means are not only ineffective to accomplish their goals but also costly and risky. This may happen after an indecisive war or a series of such wars. The appropriate conditions are defined in terms of the conflict costs that are experienced by the rivals and their failure to gain any significant military or political advantages from existing strategies. In addition, the adversaries have some sense that there is a way out of the conflict via a negotiated solution

It depends on the interpretation of these conditions by leaders which determines whether the time, is indeed ripe. And the third party's significance lies in determining the 'ripe' situation and managing the conflict accordingly. America as a mediator between the Arab-Israeli conflicts could have make use of these tactics in order to manage the conflict in a better manner well-equipped with proper skills.

America had only contributed to escalation of conflicts, but it never tried to use the 'ripeness' formula to convince the Arabs and the Israelis about the devastating effects of war. Therefore, many wars have been fought between them which otherwise could have avoided.

**Conflict Limiting Approach:-**

The most important factors likely to influence the limitation of the conflict and major approach of *conflict management* are the following: the balance of power between the parties, the balance of means of punishment in case of violations, the balance of advantages of keeping the war limited, the degree of autonomy of the parties, and third-party intervention.

In acting as a patron, the United States, the third party, therefore may resort to threats or inducements to get its client to keep the conflict limited. On the one hand, the third party may threaten to suspend military aid or deprive the client of other vital resources, and to disassociate itself from the client in case of noncompliance. On the other hand, it may promise military supply and economic aid, and even a military umbrella, to reward the client's self-restraint. The third party may act to strengthen the client's deterrent capacity against its rival in order to avoid it from preemption or escalation. But, the United States failed to uphold these responsibilities as a peace broker.

A question comes to mind at the final stage of this analysis: If a broader frame of reference on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had been employed, allowing a less warped public discourse might not years of warfare have been avoided and steps toward peace achieved much earlier?

Edward Djerejian provides some guidelines that the leaders from both the parties (to the conflict) and the United States as a mediator should bear in mind that are evident from the successes and failures of the peace initiatives.



One major guideline of the peace process should be lifted from the model of the 16th century Pope, *Festina lente* that is 'make haste slowly'.<sup>22</sup> This is not a formula for indecision and lack of leadership or engagement. Rather, it means that the parties should engage seriously in direct face-to-face negotiations with the strong support of the international community, especially the United States to achieve in a deliberate manner, what is obtainable now and prepare the way for the next stages through a comprehensive settlement on final status issues.

This kind of strategy essentially needs a 'preparatory work' that will ensure 'trying to obtain what is obtainable as interim goals'.<sup>23</sup> And if consideration can be given on lesser goals than on the agreements on final status, the peace process would become more practical.

Another strategy would be to deal with issues separately first to reach out to some solution, then to come to a final settlement as a whole. But the viability and practicality of these methods depends on the willingness of both the parties in conflict and the United States as the mediator.

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<sup>22</sup>. Regional Dynamics in the Middle East and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace - Considerations for U.S. Policy, Amb. Edward Djerejian, Director, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Foreign Press Center Briefing Washington,DC., April 12, 2001.

<sup>23</sup>. Ibid.

# **APPENDIX-I**

## **The Camp David Accords**

### **The Framework for Peace in the Middle East**

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

#### ***Preamble***

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
- After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.
- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.
- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

### ***Framework***

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as

appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

**A. West Bank and Gaza**

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
  - a. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these

territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

- b. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
- c. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West

Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

- i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
- ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
- iii. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

- iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
- d. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
- e. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
- f. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

#### **B. Egypt-Israel**

1. Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view the achieving a

comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

### **C. Associated Principles**

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors — Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
  - a. full recognition;
  - b. abolishing economic boycotts;
  - c. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the



implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect of the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

For the Government of Israel:

Menachem Begin

For the Government of  
the Arab Republic of Egypt  
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

Witnessed by

Jimmy Carter,

President of the United States of America

### **Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel**

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

#### **It is agreed that:**

- The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

- All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
- Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;
4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
6. the stationing of military forces listed below.

### ***Stationing of Forces***

No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).

In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed:

1. in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and
2. in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

### ***Interim Withdrawal***

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter,

President of the United States of America

## **APPENDIX-II**

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman

April 30, 2003

### **A PERFORMANCE-BASED ROADMAP TO A PERMANENT TWO-STATE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT**

The following is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet [the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia]. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.

A two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below. The Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions between the parties as required. The plan establishes a realistic timeline for implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases may come sooner than indicated in the plan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.

A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors. The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah -- endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit -- calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties' performance on implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.

PHASE I: ENDING TERROR AND VIOLENCE, NORMALIZING PALESTINIAN LIFE, AND BUILDING PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS -- PRESENT TO MAY 2003

In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.

At the outset of Phase I:

-- Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.

-- Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.

#### SECURITY

-- Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.

-- Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.

-- GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan.

-- Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.

-- Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.-Egypt-Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.

\* All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.

\* Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.

-- Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.

-- All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account.

-- As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

#### PALESTINIAN INSTITUTION-BUILDING

-- Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate. Constitutional committee proposes draft document for submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions.

-- Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-making body.



- GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform efforts.
- Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. Completion of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.
- Establishment of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.
- Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.
- As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the context of open debate and transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multi-party process, Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections.
- GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and voting officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.
- GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements between the parties.

#### HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

- Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel.

-- AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort.

-- GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.

#### CIVIL SOCIETY

-- Continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.

#### SETTLEMENTS

-- GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.

-- Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).

#### PHASE II: TRANSITION -- JUNE 2003-DECEMBER 2003

In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state.

Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends

with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.

-- INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: Convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.

\* Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles described in the preamble to this document.

\* Arab states restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).

\* Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues.

-- New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalized and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution.

-- Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally established, consistent with draft constitution.

-- Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.

-- Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to

enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.

-- Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet.

-- Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible UN membership.

### PHASE III: PERMANENT STATUS AGREEMENT AND END OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT -- 2004-2005

Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.

-- SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.

-- Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force in preparation for final status agreement.

-- Continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained, effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.

-- International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian economy, in preparation for final status agreement.

-- Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.

-- Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.

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