

THE WARSAW PACT : 1954-62

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PREFACE

Preface

This study entitled, "The Warsaw Pact: 1954-62" deals with the rise and growth of the Warsaw Pact between 1954-62 as a multilateral socialist alliance which was a reluctant strategic device contrived by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to face the challenges and threats arising from the Cold War, the German rearmament, the European Defence Community project and the increasing crescendo of war hysteria in Europe.

In spite of numerous proposals and steps taken by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to settle the German problem peacefully and conclude an European Collective Security Treaty to prevent the rise of Germany and preserve peace and security in Europe, the western countries didn't come forward on the pretext of the threats arising from the Soviet Union's so called expansionist moves. Rather the German rearmament went on in full gusto, NATO's military build-up and the presence of Americans in Europe continued.

This dissertation is all about these; and thereby attempts an analysis of them.

Chapter One deals with the Soviet approach to the problems of security and war and peace and introduces the problem.

Chapter second deals with the Cold War, the German rearmament and the conclusion of the Warsaw pact; its aims and objectives.

Chapter third deals with the essential features of the Warsaw Treaty and the various followup measures taken in the military sphere during 1954-62.

Chapter Four deals with the rise and growth of the Warsaw Pact during 1954-62.

Chapter Fifth deals with the economic and political administrative aspect of the pact as to how economic integration has helped in the integration and consolidation of the Pact.

In the last chapter Conclusion, an analysis has been attempted of the different issues involved.

In writing this dissertation, I am highly grateful to Professor Zafar Imam, my Supervisor, whose unstinted help, cooperation, guidance and supervision at every stage made me finish this piece of research work. While his

academic talks have broadened my knowledge of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, his constant emphasis on acquiring "professional academic rigour" has gone a long way in writing this dissertation. I am indeed thankful for his inspiring words.

Ranjan Kumar Padhee
- Ranjan Kumar Padhee 18 July 1988

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CHAPTER ONE

Chapter One

SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEMS OF SECURITY, WAR AND PEACE - PROBLEMS OF SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST STATES

Since 1917, security for the Soviet Union has been a question of its very survival. It is so to say a 'historical phenomenon' itself. The question remained as pertinent in the post - Second World War period as it was in the interwar years.

However, the situation had changed in the post-Second World War period. The Soviet Union had emerged stronger as the socialist bastion during its long travails, and a community of socialist states had come into being. It was no longer alone; the socialist states were with it. This led to further challenges from the western alliance not only against the Soviet Union but also against the newly emerged socialist states.

The perception by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of these challenges, particularly its security aspects has been quite characteristic, given the nature of their socialist state structures.

This Chapter deals with the Soviet approach to international relations, theoretical formulations on the question

of security, war and peace and the main issues relating to the question of security in a historical perspective with a view to produce a backdrop for understanding the emergence and growth of the Warsaw Pact.

Soviet Approach to International Relations

"The historic events that are unfolding before our eyes can be understood only if we analyse, in the first place, the objective conditions of the transition from one epoch to the other...Only on that basis, i.e. by taking into account, in the first place, the fundamental distinctive features of the various 'epochs'...can we correctly evolve our tactics".¹ And the distinctive features which characterize the present epoch are delineated by Marxist-Leninist 'world view' to be the crisis of capitalism, wars and revolutions, the deconstruction of the colonial and imperial systems, and the construction of Socialist formations. The Leninist understanding conceives of the present epoch as the world crisis of capitalism passing through 'historical phase' - is marked by 'revolutionary ebb and flow'.²

1 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow), vol.21, p.145.

2 K. Ivanov, "The National-Liberation Movement and the Non-Capitalist Path of Development", International Affairs (Moscow), no.9, September 1964, p.35.

Soviet doctrine on international relations constitutes part of a unified theory that provides parameters both for the understanding of phenomena and for action programmes. Yepishev says, "...The dialectics of the present epoch is such that the historical confrontation between the two social systems, between the forces of progress and reaction, is taking place in the conditions of the growing superiority of the socialist community and the revolutionary forces over imperialism, over the forces of reaction and war".³ The Leninist theory is misunderstood that all historical developments are reduced to a "zerosum struggle" between two groups and so its transplantation to international relations boiling down to the "two camp doctrine". If Marxism-Leninism continues to pervade the Soviet domestic life, it also continues to be the prescriptive framework for Soviet foreign policy.

The October Revolution in 1917, marked a "historic break" in the history of mankind. Lenin pointed out the epoch making significance of the October Revolution as "the beginning of a world-wide change of two eras in world history - the era of the bourgeoisie and the era

3 Adam B. Ujam, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.74.

of the bourgeoisie and the era of socialism".⁴ Lenin noted that the question of war and peace "has been the keystone of all policy in all the countries of the globe...It is a question of life and death for millions upon millions of people...In this question too, our October Revolution marked the beginning of a new era in world history".⁵ The great victory of the Russian working class and the massive support by the international working class movement brought about a new "co-relation of class forces" in the world which radically changed the international situation and created new conditions for solving the problems of peace and security. The principles of peace, equality and cooperation among states of the world were clearly defined in the Soviet government's first basic document - the 'Decree of Peace' and in its other foreign policy acts. These principles were formed as the Decree of Peace says, in accordance with the same justice of democrats in general, and of the working classes in particular".⁶ It reflected the fundamental understanding that "socialism and peace are inseparable". It thereby branded

4 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow), vol.29, p.230.

5 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow), vol.33, p.55.

6 Ibid.

imperialist wars as crime against mankind and thus called upon all the states to work for peace. Since the beginning, the Soviet Union started supporting the revolutionary gains, national liberation movements and opposed imperial and colonial plunder. The Leninist theory of socialist revolution laid the foundation of the policy of "peaceful co-existence". The understanding was that, capitalism could not be usurped overnight and that long drawn struggles are ahead but he did not deny the necessity of socialist consolidation. He wrote, "I see no reason why a socialist state like ours cannot have unlimited business relations with the capitalist countries. We are not opposed to using capitalist made locomotives and farm machines, so why should they object to using our socialist wheat, flax and platinum".⁷ The Soviet programme of peace and security was proclaimed at the Conference of Genoa in 1922. "The Russian people are animated by an intense desire for peace and co-operation with other nations", said People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgi Chicherin. The Decree of Peace adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets on 8th November 1917, proclaimed the democratic principles of international relations which became the foundations

7 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow), vol.40, p.152.

of the Soviet state's foreign policy. The principle of "proletarian internationalism" and the principle of "peaceful coexistence" are dialectically intertwined and are the expressions of Soviet state's foreign policy. Whereas 'proletarian internationalism' broadly outlines its foreign relations with other socialist countries and revolutionary movements, "peaceful coexistence" outlines its policy framework towards the capitalist system.⁸ In its Decree on Peace, the Soviet republic offered peaceful relations to the capitalist states. In his report on peace to the Congress of Soviets, Lenin offered to sign a peace treaty, with countries of different social and political system.⁹

The principle of peaceful coexistence does not signify any reconciliation between the communist and bourgeois ideologies, on the other hand, ideology is one of the principal sphere of struggle in which socialism has distinct advantages over the capitalist ideology. Neither does peaceful co-existence imply any kind of relaxation of struggle.

8 Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR (Moscow, 1958), p.298.

9 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow), vol.29, pp.254-55.

The Soviet policy based on this principle does not believe in the thesis of "export of revolution".

Theoretical Formulations on the Question of Security:
Transition from Capitalist Encirclement to Bipolarity

The Second World War ended in a crushing defeat of the Fascist states which had acted as the bullwark of world imperialism. The Soviet Union as the world's first socialist state contributed greatly to this defeat. However, the threat to the socialist system did not diminish - rather it increased.

Before the war, Stalin had said: "The defeat of the first intervention did not destroy the danger of new intervention, in as much as the source of the danger of intervention-capitalist encirclement-continued to exist. Neither would the danger of intervention be destroyed by the defeat of the new intervention if the capitalist encirclement continued to exist".¹⁰ His address to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1937, explains quite neatly the concept. He said: "Capitalist encirclement is no empty phrase. It is a very real and unpleasant feature. Capitalist encirclement means that there is one country, the Soviet

10 J. V. Stalin, A Short History of the CPSU, (Moscow) 1938, p.274.

Union, which has established the socialist order on its own territories and besides this there are many countries, bourgeois countries, which continue to carry on a capitalist mode of life and surround the Soviet Union waiting for an opportunity to attack it, to break it, or at any rate to undermine its power and weaken it. Our Comrades forget this fundamental fact. But it is precisely this fact which determines the basis of relation between the capitalist encircling countries and the Soviet Union".¹¹ "Capitalist encirclement", was one of the most important "operational concept" embodied in the theory of class struggle to formulate Soviet foreign policy responses. The concept has political as well as strategic connotations. In its political intent, it aims at explaining the unending conflictual postures generated by the capitalist system towards the socialist system. At the strategic level the concept attempts to explain the various manoeuvres, strategic gameplans of the capitalist countries unleashed against the socialist system with a perpetual desire to control and manipulate it, and

11 J. V. I. Stalin, "Report to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B)", 3 March 1937, in Mastering Bolshevism (New York, 1937), p.11.

thereby subvert it. Armed intervention by capitalist states into the socialist system was one of the fundamental mode along with creating international dissension that constituted the practical policy directive based on the theory of capitalist encirclement.

This is how the capitalist intervention was prevented for over twenty years by tactical manoeuvring and exploitation of the inter-capitalist contradictions as was evident from the treaty of Rapallo in 1922, Berlin in 1926, with France in 1934, with Nazi Germany in 1939 and with Great Britain and the United States in 1941. The exploitation of the 'breathing spell' by manipulating the 'temporary balance of forces' was the important segment of Soviet foreign policy till 1941 when the intervention occurred. Even during this period, Soviet Union's deft handling of international affairs procured the temporary alliance of the Atlantic states for the duration of the threat from Germany. Throughout this period, the Soviet Union was the only socialist country surrounded by 'capitalist encirclement'. But, just as the First World War created the socialist state of the Soviet Union, the Second World War created a number of socialist states which finally ended the period of capitalist encirclement and created.

'two camps' - the 'friendly socialist states' or the 'people's democracies' and the capitalist camp. Andre Zhadnov, brilliantly summed up this transition from 'capitalist encirclement' to 'two camps' in September 1947, in his speech during the formation of the Comintern. He said: "The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct becomes two major trends in post-war international policy corresponding to the division of the political forces operating in the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp on the one hand and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp on the other".¹² And so, Malenkov in the Nineteenth Party Congress declared: "Comrades! The Soviet State is no more a lovely island surrounded by capitalist countries".¹³

However, if the concept of 'Capitalist encirclement' has been subordinated and has not been further elaborated, it does not mean that it has been completely disparaged, since, the thematic content of it has been used to explain the doctrine of 'inevitable clash'.

12 A. Zhadnov, The International Situation (Moscow: FPH, 1947), p.7 and 17.

13 Malenkov, "Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the KVP (B)" Bolshevik, no.19, October 1952, p.63.

For instance, it is evident from what Kosev wrote in Pravda in 1953: "Certain would be theoreticians have even gone so far as to say that since the powerful camp of socialism has been formed imperialism has ceased to be a danger to us. Such discourses are anti-Marxist and harmful".¹⁴

Thus, every 'peace programme' was conceived as a tactical move and 'peaceful coexistence' as prevailing 'breathing spell' for the growth and consolidation of socialism for the final and the 'inevitable clash'. In the post war scenario, two major factors prevented any imperialist intervention - (1) the growing strength of the Soviet Union, and (2) the inter-imperialist contradictions.

Stalin commented that the inter-imperialist contradictions were of much more intensity than that of the contradiction between imperialism and socialism - something which would inevitably liquidate capitalism. He wrote: "...War with the USSR, as a socialist country, would be more dangerous to capitalism than war between the capitalist countries, for if war between the capitalist countries poses only the question of the supremacy

14 Kosev, "On Revolutionary Vigilance", Pravda, (Moscow), 6 February 1953.

of some capitalist countries, war with the USSR should certainly pose the question of the continued existence of capitalism itself".¹⁵ His emphasis on 'inter-imperialist aggressiveness' and 'warring tendencies' was widely interpreted to mean soft-peddling of cold-war and thereby concentrate all the energies on aggravating the contradictions among the capitalist states.

In the post war situation, Soviet foreign policy emphasized on (1) consolidation of the Soviet social system, (2) consolidating the wartime, territorial and economic gains (3) building the Soviet might, (4) integrating the East European socialist countries together to form a socialist community of nations, (5) to stimulate the contradictions between the imperialist countries and the contradiction between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and (6) support to the national liberation and revolutionary movements.

The post-Second-World-War 'world strategy' was shaped by the Nineteenth Party Congress, which set the guidelines where Malenkov set forth the Soviet objective as the "preservation and consolidation of the peace

15 J. V. Stalin, Bolshevik, (Moscow), no.18, 1952, pp.191-99.

throughout the world", and the ultimate objective being "the victory of communism throughout the world".¹⁶

Briefly putting, the Soviet assessment of the world situation contained the following understandings:

That, the world is divided into two camps, the capitalist camp is preparing for war with the socialist camp, the preparation for this war is aggravating the contradictions in the capitalist camp, this will lead first to an economic crisis and then to a war, the Soviet interest lies in postponing this war until it is fully prepared and sure that it takes place only between the capitalist powers and that this war would finally fulfil the strategic objective of Soviet foreign policy, since as Malenkov said: "There is every reason to believe that a third world war will cause the disintegration of the world capitalist system."

Malenkov set forth the primary task, as "to continue to struggle against the preparation and unleashing of a new war, to unite for the consolidation of peace, the mighty anti-war democratic front, to strengthen the hands of friendship and solidarity with Peace Partisans the world over, insistently to expose all preparations

16 History of the CPSU (B): Short Course (Moscow: FLPH, 1950), p.2.

for a new war, all machinations and intrigues of war mongers".¹⁷ He further added, the second task being "to implement...in the future a policy of international co-operation and the development of business relations with all countries".¹⁸ Malenkov set forth, the third and the fourth task being "to strengthen and develop the indestructible and friendly relations with the Chinese people's Republic, with the European People's Democracies...with the German Democratic Republic, with the Korean Democratic People's Republic, with the Korean Democratic People's Republic, with the Mongolian People's Republic",¹⁹ and "to constantly strengthen the defensive might of the Soviet State and raise our preparedness and administer a crushing rebuff to any aggressors".²⁰

That, the ultimate project of World Communism, is not given up, is very clear. R. Judson Mitchell rightly says: "Conceptually Marxism-Leninism is thus a model of structural disequilibrium. Since, all partial structures are imperfect and subject to contradictions, history is a process of dissolution of all partial struc-

- 17 J.V.G. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow: FLPH, 1947), p.606.
 18 Ibid.
 19 Ibid.
 20 Ibid.

tures, culminating in the Communist Utopia, which is the realisation of a single universal structure".²¹

And the fulfilling of this kind of a project requires, first of all, defending the 'state interests of the Soviet Union' and this of course includes rendering support to the fraternal parties and supporting the 'just wars' about which Stalin spoke, "wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of liberation, waged to defend the people from attack and from attempts to enslave them or liberate the people from capitalist slavery, or lastly to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of imperialism..."²²

The strategy is, to exploit the indirect reserves of contradictions in the capitalist camp which means the contradictions between the United States and other capitalist countries and more specifically between the United States and the defeated capitalist nations - Germany, Italy and Japan. Though the United States is considered to be the leader of the imperialist system, the strategic priority is shifted to unsettling the

21 R. Judson Mitchell, Ideology of a Super Power Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations (California: Stanford University Press, 1982), p.12.

22 Short History of the CPSU (B) (Moscow: FLPH, 1950), p.206.

'ruling groups' in these countries and supporting the peace-loving and democratic forces in these countries and make alliances with them.²³

Let us now analyse the Soviet views on war and peace: as to how they are grounded on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and related to the Soviet approach to international relations.

Soviet Theory of War and Peace: Aspects of Doctrine and Science

In Soviet thinking, wars are specific socio-historical phenomenon which carry class struggles into the sphere of international arena. Wars are neither ahistorical nor classless. The Soviet theory of war is based on this schema of historico-philosophical doctrines of Marxism. In the terrain of Soviet literature there is no specific reference to the existence of a "theory of war" but the detail elaborations pertaining to what they call is the Marxist-Leninist callings on war and the army point out the existence of an intangible

23 Ibid.

theoretical construction regarding war and the army.¹

Being part of historical materialism, Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is closely linked with military doctrine and military science. It is in fact an intermediary link between dialectical and historical materialism and Soviet military theory. This teaching is the philosophico-sociological theory of war and the army - it is the philosophy of war. It fulfills important methodological functions in Soviet military doctrine and military theory. The methodological functions are: (1) The Marxist-Leninist teaching is directly linked to the class struggle in the international arena and reflects the antagonisms of the contemporary epoch. It indicates the directions of social forces and development. (2) The most important concepts of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, reflecting the essence and content of war, are an instrument in the ideological struggle. It helps in fighting the bourgeois ideological theories and doctrines of imperialism. (3) It provides the general theoretical basis of Soviet military science

1 Georgi Arbatov, War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations: The Imperialist Doctrine, Methods and Organisations of Foreign Political Propaganda (Moscow, Progress), 1973, p.

and military doctrine, of the whole aggregate of knowledge on military matters. It solves the problems of military art, strategy - like choice of targets being politically determined. (4) It is of great importance to the troops in their practical activity in the preparation of a possible war. An understanding of the essence of revolution in the military sphere is one of the conditions for working out a course - military-technical and organising research work in the military field. It studies the objective and subjective conditions for preparing every socialist country for a possible world war, in increasing the defence capacity of the country. (5) It helps in educating the army and the people. (6) It dialectically links the Soviet military doctrine, military science and military strategy.

Views of Marx and Engels

Marx and Engels viewed war as a socio-historical phenomena - it is the manifestation of class struggle. Engel's inveterate interest in war and army earned him the nickname, the 'General'. Whether analysing the Crimean War, the Russian situation or the German Question, Engels delineates war, as the product of the dynamics of class struggle. His application of dialectics to the

development of weapons system is indeed unique. Some of the critics wrongly point out that in this, Engels sounds technically banal rather than Marxist.²

Views of Lenin

Lenin's views on war and peace are grounded on the bedrock of Marxism. Lenin with his sociological acumen modified the Clausewitzian dictum into "war is the continuation of politics by violent means".³ It is the class struggle transferred to the international arena. Lenin projected the decay of capitalism in his book, "Imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism". Taking the Hobsonian views about the 'warring tendencies' in the world capitalism, Lenin pointed out that contradictions within imperialism would inevitably produce warring situations which might become conducive to revolutionary upsurges. Hence, the dialectical links between capitalism, imperialism, war and revolutionary situations.

In the epoch of imperialism, wars are nothing new or unusual. Hence, war is the product of inter-imperialist contradictions - the international class

2 Bernard Semmel, Marxism and the Science of War, Oxford 1981, pp. 10-11.

3 V.I. Lenin, "Socialism and War" (1915), Collected Works (Moscow, 1964-5), xxi: 304 f.

struggle.

The Soviet theory of war is based on the Marxist-Leninist teachings on war - that war is the product, of class struggles projected into international arena.

The Soviet theory of war comprises not only a theoretical perspective but also military doctrine, 'military science', military strategy and tactics.⁴

Soviet Military Doctrine

This is a scientifically based and harmonious system of ideas and principles defining the basic tasks of strengthening the country's defensive capacity and military development. It finds its covert expression in the military policy and field regulations.

Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the assumption that the imperialists are preparing a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR and the socialist countries. At the same time they consider the possibility of waging military operations with conventional weapons which might lead to nuclear escalations.

⁴ V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York, International Publishers, 1939), pp.82-85.

Soviet Military Science


It is the unified system of knowledge about preparation for and waging of war in the interests of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries against imperialist countries. It is the aggregate of diverse material and psychological phenomenon of armed combat being studied and analysed for elaborating practical recommendations for victory in war. It is the system of knowledge about the character of war, laws, preparing the armed forces and the methods of warfare.

The Soviet military theory studies the essence of war and the army, their origin and the development of military power and the armed forces of different states. It studies the being of war as Lenin talked about them "armed uprising is a special form of political struggle subject to special laws".

The Soviet theory of war dismisses and disparages the bourgeois theories about the developments, essence and the roles of war in history.

The Soviet theory of war schematically distinguishes wars in the contemporary epoch into the following types:

TH-1910



1. Just and Unjust Wars

Any war that is waged by a people for the sake of freedom and social progress, for liberation from exploitation and national oppression or in defence of its sovereignty against an aggressive attack, is a just war. The social character of modern wars should be determined from the standpoint of the proletarian interests, social revolution and the national liberal revolutions.

2. Wars Between Opposing Social Systems

The military teeth of the US monopoly capitalism is getting sharpened everyday. It has been manifested in so many conflicts like in Vietnam and Korea and in the Cold War. The most important task today is to defend the socialist state systems.

3. Civil War Between the Proletariat and the Bourgeoisie

As early as 1871 Marx wrote: "We shall act against you probably where this will be possible for us, by force of arms when this becomes necessary". In this context Lenin's views against Kautsky's intrastatism becomes pertinent. Here also, war should be conceived

from the point of view of the interests of the proletariat. In 1919, the Entene troops fought against the Soviet Union to destroy the Soviet socialist system.

4. Wars Between the Colonialists and the People's Fighting for the Independence

As Lenin said: "The socialist revolution will not be solely or chiefly a struggle for the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie - no, it will be a struggle of all the imperialist - oppressed colonies and countries of all dependent countries against international imperialism". The breakdown of the system of colonial slavery under the impact of national liberation movement, is a development second in historic importance only to the formation of the world socialist system. A national liberation war is always a response to the oppression and violence of the colonialists. The colonial and neo-colonial policy of and imperialists was and remains the source of regular uprisings and national liberation wars.

5. Wars Between Capitalist States

As Lenin's theory indicated inter-imperialist wars are much likely in the path of imperialism because of

capitalist competition for markets, raw materials, etc. The most important of all these is the war that will be necessary in the defence of the socialist motherland.

The need to defend the socialist gains against all attacks by international imperialist reaction, the armed defence of two socialist countries is one of the general laws of the transition from capitalism to socialism and communism, one applying to all countries making this transition while the world imperialist system and the constant threat of military attacks by the imperialists against the socialist countries continue to exist.⁵

II. Soviet Theory of War in the Nuclear Age

The Soviet theory of war in the nuclear age is based on the same tenets of Marxism-Leninism and of elaborations into the Soviet theory of war in general.

The post-Second World War international relations witnessed the development of a new threat - the atom

5 Georgi Arbatrev, War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations: The Imperialist Divisive Methods and Organization of Foreign Political Propaganda (Moscow, Progress) 1973.

bomb. The atomic explosion in Hiroshima and Nagasaki called for a serious thinking about international relations in the Soviet Union. Stalin adopted a dual strategy. First, he dispelled publicly the threat of atom bomb by saying that atomic weapons could threaten people only with weak nerves. Thereby, he boosted the morale of the socialist system and undermined the over-emphasis put on the atomic bomb. Second, Stalin gave directions for the making of the atom bomb as soon as possible to counter the Western threat and establish the balance which had been reached after the Second World War. Critics wrongly point out that during Stalin's time strategic thought and thinking about war stagnated. This is not so given the development of what has been known as Stalinist military science".

However, it is only during Khrushchev's time that a rethinking about military affairs was called upon given the acknowledgement that a renovation in military affairs had been brought about.⁶ New academics and institutes have established and strategic thought flourished. Khrushchev's acknowledgement of the impor-

6 David Halliday, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (Yale University Press, 1983) p.32.

tance of atomic weapons - led to the cut in the conventional systems and development of strategic forces. Khrushchev's espousal of the apocalyptic nature of modern war made him branded as a revisionist who had lost faith in the masses.

Soviet military writings often convey the impression that policy springs fully armed from Marxist-Leninist theory like Athena from the head of Zeus. They play down disagreements in order to emphasise the monolithic unity of the Communist Party and the Soviet state.⁷ For instance in 1954 Malenkov argued that a nuclear war would lead to the destruction of world civilization and had criticised for holding this view.

In the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev said that World War was not fatalistically inevitable but he did not endorse Malenkov's views. He said:

"In these circumstances certainly the Leninist precept that so long as imperialism exists, the economic basis giving rise to wars will also be preserved, remains in force. That is why we must display the greatest vigilance. As long as capitalism survives in the world

7 David Halloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (London: Yale University Press, 1983), p.163.

the revolutionary forces representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies will continue their drive towards military gambles and aggression, and may try to unleash war. But war is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war, and if they actually try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans".⁸

In Soviet military thinking, deterrence is more a political than a military concept. The line of thinking that wars are less likely because the Soviet Union has been capable of preventing it, has remained one of the central formulation. That the prevention is not only a military problem but also political one. Khrushchev's declaration that the future world war would be a nuclear rocket war followed a cut in the number of men under arms. At the same time Khrushchev insisted that if the imperialists unleash a nuclear war it would bring down to capitalism - in this the Soviet Union would come out victorious because of the immediate advantages of socialism over capitalism.

8 N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, London, Soviet News Booklet, 1956, p.28.

However, there have been considerable debates about the utility of nuclear weapons and possibility of waging a nuclear war. If people like Maj. General Talenski dismissed the idea of using thermonuclear weapons as a means of politics as illusory other like Lt. Col. Ye Rybkin wrote "to assert that victory is not at all possible in a nuclear war, would not only be untrue on theoretical grounds, but dangerous as well from a political point of view."⁹

It implies that the Clausewitzian view of war was not given up during the debates in the 60s but they were much more sombre in pronouncements regarding the practical utility of nuclear weapons as a means of waging politics. Irrespective of the differences, opinions however centred on as to how to wage and win a nuclear war. This was made clear in 1962 in Marshal Sokolovskii's Military Strategy. He characterized nuclear strategy as follows:

"Military strategy in the conditions of modern war, becomes the strategy of deep rocket nuclear strikes in combination with actions by all services of the armed

9 Lt. Col. Ye Rybkin quoted in Edward L. Warner III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1977), p.88.

forces, with the aim of simultaneously striking and destroying the economic, potential and the armed forces of the enemy's territory for attaining the objectives of the war in a short time".

Further elaborations of the Soviet theory of war were done by Soviet theoreticians like Shakolovsky Gorashkov, Byely, etc. Shakolovsky's work "Soviet *Military* Strategy" was acknowledged as the best theoretical work after Soviet's strategy. Later, Soviet theoreticians established that nuclear war is not inevitable but if it occurs it has to be fought. In any confrontation between the two systems the socialist system is bound to win because of its innate advantages over the capitalist system. In a situation like this the Soviet Union gets prepared for all kinds of contingencies.

III. Soviet Theory of Peace

The Soviet theory of peace is dialectically linked with the Soviet theory of war. War, peace and socialism all stand in the same continuum. The basis of it is also Marxism-Leninism. Peace is both a short term goal and a long term goal. Peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition are often stressed. According to the long

term scenario, until and unless the rule of labour is established completely, there is no permanent peace.¹⁰

Marx addressed to the International Workingmen's Association:

"In answer to the warlike proclamations of those who exempt themselves from the impost of blood, and find in public misfortunes, a source of fresh speculations, the protest, we who want peace, labor and liberty; whatever turn the impending horror war may take, the alliance of the working classes of all countries will ultimately kill war...in contrast to old society, with its economical miseries and to political delirium, a new society is springing up, when international rule will be peace because its national ruler will be everywhere the same - Labour"!

Lenin analysed the nature of imperialist wars. In his "Letters from Afar", he referred to the Guchekev Milykov Russian Cabinet to conclude a democratic peace is like "preaching virtue to brothel keepers". The Soviet theory of peace got its first practical implementation in Lenin's Decree on Peace - 1917.

10 Nikolai Luzin, Nuclear Strategy and Common Sense, Progress (Moscow, 1981), pp.72-73, 74, 75.

With these in background - the Soviet theoretical formulations on the question of security and its views on war and peace, we can now proceed to analyse the main issues relating to the problem of the security of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

Soviet Security Perception: The Issues

In the post-war situation, the basic questions of security for the Soviet Union and the European Socialist countries related to:

1. The German Question;
2. The security and stability of the Socialist countries of Europe;
3. The American atomic test in 1945; and
4. The extension of American hegemony over Europe as the Leader of the world imperialist system.

The fear of a rearmed Germany is crucial to any understanding of Soviet foreign policy after the Second World War. For a thousand years the Germans had pursued their Drang nach osten of constant war and colonisation against the Slavs. A.J.P. Taylor wrote: "From Charlemagne to Hitler, the Germans have been converting the Slavs, from paganism, from orthodox Christianity, from Bolshevism,

from being Slavs".¹¹

After the war Stalin did not underestimate the threat that the 'fascist revival' in Germany posed. One of the fundamental objective of the Soviet foreign policy after the war was the settlement of the German question in a way that would strengthen international security, meet the interests of the nations, including the German people and would be in accordance with the agreements reached between the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. This policy of the Soviet Union was supported by the progressive forces of the German people and the People's Democratic Government of the Central and South-East European states who shared a deep interest in the remoulding of life in Germany on democratic principles to prevent the revival of fascist militarism in Germany. The position of these countries was reflected in the 1948 Warsaw meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the USSR and Yugoslavia, on the German question. This Warsaw meeting condemned the separate decisions which had been taken shortly before at the meetings of the representatives

11 A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History (Methuen, 1961), p.2.

of the USA, Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg in London on the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany - decisions which went against the resolution of the Berlin conference and other agreements worked out by the USSR, the USA and Britain during the war.

The Western states led by the USA were deliberately planning to divide Germany and install a reactionary regime so that remilitarization could proceed smoothly. And this kind of a policy finally led to the 'blockade' which began on 20 March 1948 and then to the final division of Germany.

After the war and West tried its best to install reactionary puppet regimes in the East European states but miserably failed, since very soon socialist governments came to power in these states. One misinformed author says, "The Soviets played an essentially opportunistic non-ideological role in Eastern Europe's initial developments. They cared little about the previous policies or the ideology of the men in power in the coalition governments so long as they were not anti-Soviet".¹² Another observer said of Stalin,

12 Joyce and Kelko, The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1945-54, Harper and Row 1972, p.214.

"As a result of this ideology and methods, his personal experience and historical heritage, he trusted nothing but what he held in his fist and every one beyond the control of his police was a potential enemy".¹³ And of course Milovan Djilas said of Stalin's interpretation of the Declaration on Liberated People (as Stalin told him) "This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system".¹⁴ Such misunderstandings are rightly contravened by Leonoid Yagodovsky and Iger Chelyshev when they say: "One of the major outcomes of this historical process were the victorious socialist revolutions in a number of countries of Europe and Asia and the formation of a world socialist system as a socio-economic and political community of countries advancing towards socialism".¹⁵ Enhanced revolutionary activity of the broad popular masses in these countries in the mid and late 1940s led by the Communist and Workers' parties brought into existence socialist states. In Poland for instance, Britain and the USA sought to establish

13 Milovan Djilas, Conversation With Stalin, Penguin, 1969, p.68.

14 Ibid.

15 "Social Sciences Today" Editorial Board, "The Struggle of the USSR for Peace and Security" (Moscow, 1984), p.99.

reactionary governments made up of the representatives of the bourgeois emigre government in London. On 28th June, 1945 following the talks in Moscow, the representatives of the Krajana Rada Nasodawa (KRN) which was Poland's supreme organ of power a number of emigre political figures, a Polish provisional government of National Unity was formed. After the defeat of the Polish reactionary forces, Soviet-Polish relations got improved. The new Polish-German border was established along the Oder-Neisse Line at the Berlin Conference. Besides, Poland's primordial territory west of Kenisberg was returned to her. And after the Berlin Conference, a Soviet-Polish Treaty was concluded.¹⁶ Strategically of course Poland was important to the Soviet Union as Stalin said at Yalta, "For the Russian people the question of Poland is not only a question of honour but also a question of security... Since in the past 30 years our enemies, the Germans have passed into Russia (through Poland)".¹⁷ It is in this sense that Stalin had an interest in the Polish Communist Movement which later on established the government.

16 Ibid.

17 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (Harper and Brothers, 1947), p.30.

During the Second World War itself, USSR had already developed friendly relations with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. A treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war co-operation was signed between the USSR and Czechoslovakia in 1943. The USSR signed allied treaties with the democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Polish Provisional Government. The basic premise of the treaties was that even after the defeat of Germany the danger of the revival of fascism was not over. This along with other agreements helped to strengthen the unity and co-operation among democratic and socialist forces.

Similarly, the Kasia Programme for the development of new Czechoslovakia which was made public by the government of the National Front of the Czechs and Slovaks on 5th April, 1945 declared as a basic principle the desire for a lasting alliance and cooperation with the USSR in the military, political, economic and cultural fields.¹⁸ Here again, the desire of the reactionaries to bring Czechoslovakia to the Western fold was decisively foiled by the struggle of the working class, the efforts of the Communist Party and the support lent by the USSR.

18 "Social Sciences Today", Editorial Board, The Struggle of the USSR for Peace and Security (Moscow, 1984), p.101.

Cooperation between the socialist forces in Yugoslavia and the USSR had developed during the war. The support of the USSR went a long way in foiling the plans of internal and external reactionary forces to establish a puppet reactionary regime. The Communists dominated the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation formed in March 1945.¹⁹

In the early post war period relations between the USSR on the one hand and between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the other was largely of military and political nature. However, soon economic relations got established. In 1944 and 1945 the first and second Soviet Polish economic agreement were signed. The USSR agreed to supply fuel, raw materials, transportation and other goods which included armaments and ammunition.²⁰

The USSR extended the help of 40 million roubles to Czechoslovakia in 1945 and 600,000 tons of grain during the 1947 drought.²¹

19 Ibid.

20 Countries of Central and South East Europe in the Second World War: A Military Historical Reference Book (Moscow, 1972), p.255.

21 The Great October Revolution is a source of the strength and a guarantee of Czechoslovakia's Socialist Development (Moscow, 1967), p.119.

Contractual economic relations established between the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1945.

"The Soviet Union actively supported the measures of a democratic, anti-fascist nature in all countries whose reactionary governments had sided with Nazi Germany during the war. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania where the Soviet troops were stationed, the Soviet Union facilitated the steady implementation of the agreements signed between the members of the anti-Hitler coalition on the extirpation of the vestiges of former fascist regimes. The progressive anti-fascist forces in those countries had a loyal ally in the person of the USSR which reliably safeguarded them against direct interference by outside imperialist forces and also against internal reaction - unleashing a civil war".²²

Likewise, extensive help was accorded by the USSR to the People's Republic of Albania.

In the Berlin Conference, the Western powers tried to influence the developments in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. However, the successful intervention by the

22 "Social Sciences Today", Editorial Board, The Struggle of the USSR for Peace and Security (Moscow, 1984), p.104.

USSR scuttled the West's manoeuvre and safeguarded the interests of these countries and this led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between them and the USSR before the signing of the peace treaties.

In 1948, the USSR signed treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The socialist countries on their part concluded treaties of mutual assistance with each other - in 1946 treaties were signed between Poland and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia and Albania, in 1947 between Poland and Czechoslovakia, Albania and Bulgaria, in 1948 treaties were signed between Bulgaria and Romania, Hungary and Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland, Hungary and Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia, in 1949, Poland and Romania and Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In all, those countries along with the USSR signed 35 bilateral agreements with each other in the late 40s. It ensured them peace and security, on the path of socialist construction under the leading role of the USSR. They were of great importance not only for the security of these countries but also for the security of the Soviet Union.

On 7th October 1949, the German Democratic Republic was formed and was recognised by the USSR and other socialist countries. This became the western most out post of the socialist system.

In 1949, Stalin proposed the creation of a unified Germany which would be neutralised and disarmed. This proposal was rejected by the West even though it was popular in many quarters on the ground that it was a Soviet device to drive a wedge between the Western Allies and the German people. It would have prevented the re-emergence of German threat and would have created a large buffer zone between Soviet and Western territory.²³

Churchill's Fulton speech on 5th March 1946, in which he described Russia's hold on Eastern Europe as an 'iron curtain' gave the green light to the Cold War. After Potsdam onwards East-West relations soured. Certain things had been decided there - the zones of Germany and Austria and the sectors of Berlin and Vienna and some issues were ducked, the peace treaties and reparations and some like Poland and the UNO idea had been partially resolved. Moscow wanted the recognition of

23 Peter J. Mooney, The Soviet Super Power - The Soviet Union 1945-80 (London: Heinemann Education Books, 1982), p.95.

the West of the crystallization of the socialist bloc alongwith the East European socialist states. Churchill's doctor wrote, "Stalin's tenacity and obstinacy have no counterpart on our side. He knows exactly what he wants and he doesn't mind how he gets it. He is very patient too and never loses his temper".²⁴ Stalin was disappointed over reparations and the USA and UK refused to break off relations with Franco's Spain or grant the USSR a trusteeship of Italy's ex-colony of Libya. However, Germany was decided to remain a single economic unit.

The successful test on 16th July 1945, the day after the Conference opened of the world's first nuclear device at Alamgordo, New Mexico added to the complexities of the straining relations. It added to Stalin's fears and suspicions and drove a rift at the Potsdam.

Adding to this, the American Lend-Lease Shipments to USSR were suspended on 8th May 1945, by Truman. Stalin felt that it had been ended "in a scornful and abrupt manner" and as a means of showing American displeasure with the USSR.²⁵

24 Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-65 (Constable, 1966), p.279.

25 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (Harper, 1948), p.793.

But one of the most important issue which was much dear to the Russians and highly misunderstood by the West was that issue of reparations. Daniel Yergin wrote, "The Americans could never comprehend the emotional intensity the Russians attached to reparations. Reparations may well have been a "test case" for the Russians as East Europe was to become for the Americans"²⁶ On the other hand, the West continued to misunderstand the Russians. Truman wrote that he had realised at Potsdam that "the Russians were planning world conquest"²⁷ In fact, facts belied this kind of an understanding. Stalin's pronouncements never gave any inkling of this kind. The Red army was demobilised rapidly from a peak of 11,365,000 in May 1945 to 2,884, 000 by early 1948. And moreover the sixty Red Army divisions in Eastern Europe were performing merely police roles and were not deployed as spearheads against the West.²⁸

26 Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, pp.64-65 (Andre Deutsch, 1978).

27 Harry H. Truman, Memoirs, vol.I, Signet Books, 1955, p.455.

28 Joyce and Kaliko, The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1945-54 (Harper and Rao, 1972), p.33.

Lot of efforts were undertaken to bridge the nuclear gap. However, even if the Americans had the nuclear monopoly till the USSR exploded its first A-bomb in 1949, it was of little military value. The only instance in which the Americans used nuclear diplomacy against the Soviets in the 1940s was in July 1948 when at the start of the Berlin blockade, B-29 atomic bombers minus bombs were moved to the UK although this had no discernible effect on the crisis.²⁹ And to bridge this 'nuclear gap', Stalin wanted to build his own bomb: that is the reason why he rejected the Baruch Plan which ^{was} thought to be discriminatory.

The Russian drive for security for itself and the socialist system has been highly misunderstood by some as ultrapatriotism, ultranationalism and ultraslavophilism. Historian Konstantin F. Schteppa said "a new Slavophilism negating Western influence extolled Chernyshevsky, Lenin and Stalin at the expense of Marx himself"³⁰ has developed. And this kind of an analysis has been further extended. Karen Dawisha writes, "The Soviet

29 James F. King Jr., "NATO: Genesis, Progress, Problems" in Gordon B. Turner (ed.), National Security in the Nuclear Age (Praeger, 1960), pp. 150-51.

30 Konstantin F. Schteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962), p. 147.

conception of Europe is contradictory. The source of that contradiction is deeply embedded both in Soviet history and Soviet ideology. Dating from 1836 with the publication by Peter Chaadeyev of the "First Letter", Russian political life was divided into the two schools of 'Slavophiles' and 'Westernisers'.³¹ And of course Marxism could not remove the 'slavophilism'. Trying for security for itself and its fraternal allies was nothing but an expression of Slavophilism. This only befogs the strategic needs of the Soviet Union in the post war scenario.

However, by 1947 East-West relations were really getting strained.

In 1947, the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed and the Marshall Plan was launched with the desired intention to rehabilitate West Europe and turn it into a major bastion of their political and military strategy - to split Germany and turn its western segment into a bridgehead in the fight against the USSR. The Truman Doctrine provided for military aid to Turkey and Greece and support for the reactionary forces the world over

31 Karen Dawisha in Edwina Moreton, ed., Soviet Strategy Towards Western Europe (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p.21.

through military and economic aid. Walter Lippman wrote that, in proclaiming the Truman Doctrine the USA targeted its policy on Greece and Turkey not because they really wanted its assistance, but because they provided it with a strategic gateway to the Black Sea.

In January 1949, leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the USSR met in Moscow, discussed the forms of co-operation for economic development. To facilitate such a task it was decided to set up the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) with the object of exchanging economic experience, providing each other with technical aid and mutual help with raw materials, foodstuffs and equipment. Albania joined the CMEA in February 1949 and the GDR in September 1950.

"The establishment of the world's first multilateral organisation of the socialist nations on economic cooperation led to the beginning of a new stage in building international relations of a new type based on the principles of internationalism. The work of CMEA, has been built on the Leninist principles of equality, respect for the sovereignty and national interest of its members, mutual benefit and comradely assistance. One of the organisations' basic goal has been to promote genuine

co-operation between peoples strengthen peace and friendship and to ensure the security of the socialist countries.

The formation of the CMEA strengthened the positions of the peace forces in Europe while its further development and expansion of co-operation between its member states and the growth of their economies favourably influenced the international situation in Europe and throughout the world. The struggle waged by the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies of Central and South East Europe against the threat of a new world war became even more meaningful".³²

The economic resurgence of Western Europe and moves toward integration in the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, coupled with the political confidence of the region brought about by America's new found commitment to the defence of the West in the North Atlantic Treaty posed serious challenges to the Russian policy planners. NATO provided a framework within which Western military might could grow under the US nuclear umbrella and moreover American troops returned in strength to Europe.

32 "Social Sciences Today, Editorial Board, The Struggle of the USSR for Peace and Security (Moscow, 1984), p.111.

The move to rearm West Germany, enshrined in the European Defence Community idea first originated in the French National Assembly on 24 October 1950.³³ John Foster Dulles's "doctrine of roll-back" which argued that a forceful American foreign policy might help the East Europeans to roll-back the occupying Russians and thereby dismantle the Iron Curtain, and his belief in 'brinkmanship' - the ability to get to the verge of war without getting into war in his dealings with Moscow - coupled with the plan of rearming West Germany and simultaneously increasing the strength of the NATO posed serious threats to the security of the socialist countries. The decision reached at Potsdam in 1945 to demilitarise and democratise Germany was disparaged by the West - it partitioned Germany by forming Bizonia and Trizonia and finally in 1949, formed a Bonn state based ^{and} deriving its sustenance from reactionary monopoly capital and clerical support. The refusal of the West to sign a collective treaty as proposed by the Soviet Union and its going ahead with German militarization and its integration into the NATO system posed severe threats to the security of the USSR and other socialist countries.

33 Peter J. Mooney, The Soviet Super Power - The Soviet Union, 1945-80 (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1982), p.96.

Thus, in this chapter we have analysed how the Soviet foreign policy developed after the October Revolution on the basis of 'peaceful coexistence' and 'proletarian internationalism' in the face of 'capitalist encirclement' to which the Soviet Union was subjected to. This ended after the Second World War when the socialist camp also came into existence and resulted in a situation of bipolarity. As has been enunciated, in the post-war period the Soviet Union emphasised on consolidating the Soviet system, consolidating the war time territorial and economic gains, support for the national liberation movements, integration of the socialist countries to form a socialist camp and exploit the contradictions between the imperialist countries themselves and between them and their colonies.

We also analysed the Soviet views on war and peace. According to the Soviet thinking which is based on the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, wars are neither ahistorical nor classless in character; that wars are historical phenomenon which carry class struggles into the sphere of international arena. Here also we dealt with the Soviet views on just and unjust wars, wars between opposing socialist system, between the bourgeoisie

and the proletariat, between the colonies and their masters and between the capitalist states. Then we dealt with the Soviet views of war in the nuclear age and the debates concerning it. During the analysis we came to view that the Soviet Union continuously strives for peace and emphasises on peaceful co-existence and given the nature of imperialism, it also prepares itself for all kinds of contingencies including a nuclear war.

With this theoretical perspective, we discussed the security issues that the Soviet Union faced - the German question, the security and stability of the socialist countries, the problems arising out of the American atomic test in 1945 and the extension of American hegemony over Europe.

The West went along with German rearmament, this further endangered the security of Europe. The Soviet Union responded by making efforts to consolidate the socialist camp to face the challenges.

Thus in this chapter we analysed the security problems that the Soviet Union and the European Socialist countries faced in the post-war period in the light of the Soviet theoretical perspective on the questions of security, peace and war.

CHAPTER TWO

Chapter Two

COLD WAR, WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WARSAW PACT - AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

In the last chapter we analysed the security issues faced by the Soviet Union and the socialist camp in the post-war period given the perspective of ~~ten~~ ^{the} broad theoretical framework of the Soviet Union on the question of security, peace and war. In this chapter, we go on to analyse the question of German rearmament in detail and how the Soviet Union and the socialist countries responded to it by signing the Warsaw Pact as a defensive measure.

It was all a diplomatic version of the Ecclesiastes - western diplomacy getting woven around the Bonn-Washington Axis. "The prototype of the western foreign minister is the immortal Figaro. Figaro here, Figaro there, Figaro in Paris, Figaro in Washington, Figaro upstairs, Figaro downstairs".¹

The British Chancellor of the Exchequer said: "The rearmament programme unprecedented in times of peace imposed a heavy additional strain on the economy".² The

1 New Times (Moscow), no.1, p.13, 1954.

2 Ibid., p.8.

direct military expenditure of the fourteen NATO countries in 1952-53 totalled 75,000 million dollars and more than four fold increase compared with 1958. Nearly 10% of the US budget was meant for armaments and maintenance of armed forces.

The boosting of the West German rearmament, the plan to make it the chieftains of "Little Europe", belied the myth of Soviet menace. The Soviet government had already proposed the peaceful use of atomic energy in industry, agriculture, medicine, technology etc. It said: "The countries party to the Agreement guided by the desire to lessen international tension shall give a solemn and unconditional undertaking not to employ atomic, hydrogen or any other weapon of mass destruction".³

The European Army Project - the idea of European Defense Community were promoted in the face of supposed Soviet threat. Adenauer told in Paris: "A defense community would make war between two or more of its members impossible for all time. That indeed is the principal aim of the European Defense Community; to make war between the European states, particularly between France and Germany permanently impossible".⁴

3 Ibid., p.20.

4 Ibid., p.15.

That only a united economic bloc from Bordeaux to Sofia could give Europe the necessary vitality to maintain its position in the world - that it would be the realisation of the thousand year dream of the Reich. Here was hanging the image of a 'Pan-Europe'. In this scheme of things, an independent rearmed Germany would be powerful, perhaps the most powerful nation in Europe, even if its economy was tied to the Schuman plan and its strength was part of the European Defense Forces. Rightly wrote Drew Middleton, the Chief of the European bureau of the New York Times: "The U.S. wants to fight the Russians and will use the Europeans as cannon fodder and Europe as a battleground".⁵

The defence expenditure of the European NATO nations, (excluding Greece and Turkey) in the year ending 30 June 1955, was estimated at \$12.3 billion a year, which was double of what it had been in 1950. In the beginning of 1955, the NATO powers had the capacity to raise 100 divisions by way of total mobilisation and possessed more than 6,000 planes⁶ an eight fold

5 New Times (Moscow), January 16, 1954, no.3, p.30.

6 Report on Mutual Security Programme submitted by the US President to the Congress, p.44.

and fifteenfold increase respectively over the 1949 figures, whereas in 1951, the NATO had only 10 airfields capable of handling jets and not more than 21 aerodromes, by 1952, the US could now make use of 142 airfields in any emergency. And to feed these bases NATO was building 4000 miles of pipeline.

The signing of the Paris agreement in October 1954, was a major step in consolidating NATO. Adenauer observed: "The basic idea was that the anti-German character of the Brussels Treaty should be abandoned and that the Treaty should be extended by the admission of Germany and Italy."⁷

The NATO Council in December 1954, recommended that the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe should plan its defensive strategy taking into account the developments in weapons technology - which basically meant that NATO strategy was to be based on nuclear weapons. This further alarmed the Soviet Union. By 1955, the U.S. had succeeded in forging other multi-lateral military alliances such as the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and in concluding bilateral

7 Konrad Adenauer, "Germany, The New Partner", Foreign Affairs (NY), vol.33, p.178.

pacts with Japan, Korea, and the Republic of China. By 30th June 1955, the US had shipped \$11.4 billion worth of military equipment to bolster up the defense efforts of more than 35 friendly countries. Of this sum, \$ 8 billion went to its European allies.⁸

"It should be preferably clear that the persistent efforts of the US Secretary of State to create an overall atmosphere of war hysteria in the capitalist world have a very definitive object. On the one hand, they reflect the vain attempts to block further relaxation of tension in international relations and poison the world atmosphere and on the other they are meant to frighten the American citizen so that he will uncomplainingly continue to bear the cost of the colossal program of war preparation, with the high profit it brings to the US monopolies. That is the line of those who spread fear and war hysteria, of those who have no faith and for whom there is no future".⁹

Thus, remilitarisation and war hysteria kept increasing in crescendo. General Gruenther, NATO Supreme Commander said: "In the next three or four years we will

8 J.P. Jain, Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact, 1973, Bombay, p.4.

9 Pravda (Moscow), March 26, 1954.

have the potential for launching an attack by long and short range aircraft, by guided missiles and by artillery. I am talking about atomic weapons".¹⁰

The Soviet government made it clear again and again that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not defensive in character as it was professed to be.

The Bonn and Paris treaties were signed. The American plan basically involved the building up of a Franco-German machine against Moscow. According to the Paris treaty, the armed forces of the six European states would be under American command. The Russian proposal for collective efforts at solving the German problem was not acceptable to the western nations. They were not interested in solving the German problem but managed to continue the partition and thereby continue remilitarisation. They did not trust the German democratic forces.

The West German army, was to have an initial strength of 550,000 but with an understanding that the numbers would be raised to 2,000,000 within a very short period.

10 New Times (Moscow), March 20, 1959, no.12, p.5.

Moreover, 100,000 former Nazi officers were included in the Register.

Rightly, V.M. Molotov asked: "What does this 'position of strength' policy of the ruling circles of the U.S. and other countries of the Anglo-American bloc imply? He continued: "The formation of a military bloc of six European countries - West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg would mean setting them up against the rest of Europe, aggravating the decision of Europe and increasing inter-regional tension and would constitute a threat to the vital interests of all the European nations including the interests of the German nation".¹¹ He further continued, "The task is to guarantee peace and security for all the nations of Europe to assist the promotion of universal peace, to make possible collective efforts by all the European states anxious to attain these aims".¹²

Grim were the signs in the horizon - the rearmament, the European Defence Community Project, the gradual aggressiveness of the NATO were making things nightmarish.

11 New Times (Moscow), no.7, February 13, p.2, 1954.

12 Ibid.

Ilya Ehrenburg wrote in Pravda on 1st January 1955:
"Long, long ago, at a time when people feared evil spirits, they believed that devils and witches held their sabbath late in the night. They were convinced that the evil spirits were particularly outrageous in the hours just before the dawn. This is a fairy tale, but every fairy tale contains an element of truth. The closer the dawn, the more savage and mad grow the forces that love the pitch black night".¹³

Contrary to the Soviet perception of the worsening of international relation due to war mongering, Mr. Dulles said: "The Soviet Union professes to fear that this new community which is born (i.e. the European Defence Community might be dangerous to it. This community, it is true will make Europe healthy, more prosperous and in that sense more strong but that is nothing to fear if at the time Europe is made more peaceful".¹⁴

However, facts were quite different According to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the U.S. government

13 Elya Ehrenburg, Pravda (Moscow), 1 January 1955.

14 New Times (Moscow), no.6, February 6, 1954, p.6.

was allotted 100 million dollars for every species of sabotage and subversion in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Albania and in the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria.

The tripartite declaration made by USA, France and Britain on May 27th 1952, published in connection with the signing of the Paris Agreement said: "If any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity and unity of the community, Britain and the United States will regard this as a threat to their own security and will act in accordance with Article 4 of the Atlantic Treaty".¹⁵

In Berlin, the Soviet Union proposed the creation of a General European system of collective security with measures which would neutralise Germany. V.M. Molotov suggested the following agenda for the Berlin conference:

1. Measures for lessening international tension and the convening of a conference of Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, the USA, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese People's Republic.

15 Ibid.

2. The German question and the safeguarding of European Security.
3. The Austrian State Treaty,¹⁶ Molotov continued:
"The Berlin meeting is for our four countries to desist from attempts to pit themselves against one another at least as far as the interests of peace, the interests of European Security are concerned. A way out will not be difficult to find if we all agree that the resurgence of German militarism must not be allowed".¹⁷

However, the Western Powers didn't favour the idea of the inclusion of Germans in the talks - the Great German Reich was to be created which would bring a new order in Europe. The German Wehrmacht continued. The Reynolds News of January 17, wrote: "There are to be twelve divisions in the new German army. Backed by the power of the Ruhr, it will be the most powerful single fighting force in Western Europe. The history of this century teaches that when the Germans are strong they use their strength to aggrandise German power. In all our life time,

16 New Times (Moscow), no.5, January 30, 1954, p.6.

17 Ibid.

Germany's conception of good Europe has been a Europe with Germany at the top. There is still time to stop this blunder. France does not want it. Italy does not want it. The bulk of the British opinion is against it. Only the Americans are insisting that Germany must be rearmed. Britain's voice should be heard with those of tens of millions of other Europeans who say that Germany is a great threat to peace.¹⁸

The World Peace Council declared: "It is not true that there is only one path open to the peoples of Europe namely that of division and war. There is another path open to them - a system of collective security embracing all European states and precluding the domination of any one of them, a system based on respect for their national independence conforming to their aspirations and facilitating a general reduction of armament".¹⁹

The tests at the Bikini atoll further deteriorated East-West relations. The Washington Post wrote in March 28, 1954: "The poisoning of fish in the Pacific by the Bikini explosion gives every sign of poisoning

18 Reynolds News, January 17, 1954, London.

19 New Times (Moscow), April 10, no.15, 1954.

American relations with unnumbered potential friends in Asia and indeed throughout the world".²⁰

Inspite of oft-repeated pronouncements by the Soviet government that the capitalist and socialist systems can live side by side in peace and engage in economic competition, the war hysteria continued to be generated by the West. Moreover, in France radical and socialist leaders as Merriat and Daledier, prominent Gaullist Marshal Twin and Vincent Auriol, the socialist ex-President of France and hundreds of bourgeois political leaders in Italy, Belgium and Germany did oppose the European Defence Community project and the posturings of NATO as the 'new edition of Holy Alliance' - History was being ignored - that formation of alliances and pacts in the past had proved detrimental to European nations. By 1907, Europe was divided into two blocs: the Austro-German Italian (Central bloc) and the Anglo-Franco-Russian (the Tripple Entene). World War-I was the culmination of this groupings. World War II was also the product of bloc formation: German-Japan-Italy, the Anti-Comintern Pact forming the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle. Even in 1933 the

20 Washington Post, March 28, 1954.

Soviet Union had called upon other countries to sign a convention defining aggression. And this is how the Soviet Union signed a number of agreements with France and other countries.

The Soviet Union proposed a general European treaty as an alternative to the European Defence Community project to prohibit German designs and guarantee European security. John W. Wheeler - Bennet, British Foreign Office historian says in his book "The Nemesis of Power, The German Army in Politics 1918-1948": "In a far shorter period, there was the case after the First World War, German rearmament is now in operation not however in secret contravention of treaty provisions but with the open and tacit approval and the material assistance of the Western Allied Powers themselves".²¹

Bonn had proposed a counter project to the Soviet proposal i.e. series of regional alliances and then proceed to merge them under the aegis of the UN. "The System of war bases is an integral part of the collective security...Actually these bases on the territory of other foreign countries are merely a physical expression

21 New Times (Moscow), June 19, 1954, no.25, p.4.

of the collective security system".²²

On August 14 1954, the US state department announced the convening of a conference to discuss plans for a South East Asian Military alliance in Phillipines. Mr. Duellles's plan for a South East Asian Military Pact (SEATO) was in full swing. Mr. Y. Thukov wrote: "For it does not require much penetration to realise th t organising collective security in Asia without the Asian countries, is trying to make an omelette without eggs".²³ He further continued: "The inclusion of South Korea, and Taiwan in SEATO is a preliminary American move to the creation of a Japan-Taiwan-South Korea military alliance".²⁴

SEATO was vehemently denounced by the peoples in every part of Asia -- India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon.

The Czechoslovak Rud-Pravo wrote: "A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, as proposed by the Soviet Government in its statement of August 4, might undoubtedly pave the way for a broader conference of all the countries interested in collective security.

22 Foreign Affairs, April 1954.

23 New Times (Moscow), no.34, August 21, 1954, p.4.

24 Ibid.

An exchange of opinions on the German question at the proposed meeting of the four ministers would be only natural, since the German question and the question of European collective security are so closely interconnected that it is impossible to explore a solution to the problem of collective security without striving at the same time to find ways and means for reaching agreement on individual aspects of the German problem.²⁵

With the decision of the French National Assembly not to ratify the Paris and Bonn treatise, France disagreed on the plan for rebuilding Nazi Wehrmacht in West Germany under the signboard of the EDC and the European Army.

On the eve of the French National Assembly debate, the Wall Street journal's commentator Cronley wrote: "The United States will go ahead and rearm Germany. We will do it, whether France goes along or not, and whether or not there is EDC treaty. President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and the National Security Council have made up their minds on that".²⁶

25 Ibid., p.12.

26 Ibid., no.36, September 4, 1954, p.5.

Karl Jaspers wrote in the Foreign Affairs: "The destruction of German military might created a vacuum in Europe which can only be filled by a new Wehrmacht".²⁷

At the moment four proposals were being considered:

1. An independent West German army as part of NATO.
2. A coalition army of six countries: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg.
3. A big coalition army to include in addition to Britain, the Scandinavian countries, Greece and Turkey.
4. Outright resurrection of the Wehrmacht in West Germany.

After the French disagreement over EDC the foreign ministers of USA, UK, France, Italy, Canada, West Germany and other Benelux countries met in London on 28th September, 1954. The American proposal was interpreted by the Observer, London: "West Germany is to start rearming unilaterally with tacit American blessings and support even before there is agreement on her

27 Foreign Affairs, July 1954.

admission to either the NATO or the Brussels Pact".

The formation of the Western European Union took place in the London Nine Power Conference: It was hailed as a great event, a great coalition of free nations which disguised the fact that it was in fact a bullwork of anti-communist hysteria.

The argument for such military build-up given by the West was - "Somewhat mechanistically, one may estimate the "power efficiency" of the Soviet empire by its ability to convert GNP into power. By that standard, we may say that the Soviet system is roughly five times as efficient as the alliance that embraces the United States, NATO, Europe and Japan. Since, the combined GNPs of those countries are roughly five times as great as the Soviet while their conjoined power is at best equal".²⁸

This kind of a view did not take into cognisance the threat that the rearmament of West Germany and the military build-up of NATO posed to the security of the Soviet Union. Rightly, J.P. Jain says: "The fear of West Germany's remilitarisation was indeed real for the

28 New Times (Moscow), December 4, no.49, 1954, p.115.

Soviet rulers. They were aware of the fact that there was no Atlantic between the Soviet Union and Germany, not even a channel, and memories of the German invasion, when a nation of eighty million attacked a nation of sixty million, devastated its western provinces and almost reached its capital, were still fresh in the minds of the Soviet leaders".

He further continues: "In view of these considerations, the assurance given by the Western powers that the twelve West German divisions would be to quote the words of Sir Anthony Eden, "under the control of obviously peace loving countries such as France and Holland and also ourselves that Germany's armament production would be under international control...could hardly seem convincing to them".²⁹

A note sent by the Soviet Government to the Governments of Europe and the USA on 13th November 1954, mentioned the threat posed by the rearmament. It said: "An armed force is to be created in Western Germany which in the very near future will number 500,000-520,000 men and will possess large air and tank units

29 J.P. Jain, Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact, New Delhi, 1973, p.8.

and have its own military staffs...The West German army is to be formed under the direction of German Generals who commanded the Nazi army in the Second World War and who were accomplices in the fascist aggression and in establishing Hitler's ferocious "new order", in European countries. The London and Paris agreements would also give the West German militarists and revanchists a free hand for unlimited armament production. The West German armed forces will likewise be allowed to possess atomic weapons which will greatly enhance a destructive atomic war in Europe".³⁰

The West German military plutocracy like Krupp, Abs, Langan, Dinkelbach, Harpehr Bergban, Laurent and Schneider were working in close alliance with American monopolies towards the direction of German rearmament.

The Soviet Response to Rearmament - Emergence of the Warsaw Treaty

The Soviet government on 13th November 1954, proposed to convene a General European Conference in Moscow or Paris in November to consider the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe: an idea which was supported by Poland and Czechoslovakia.

30 New Times, (Moscow), 13 November 1954, pp.2-4.

A conference of European countries on safeguarding European Peace and Security opened at 3 p.m. on 29th November 1954, in Moscow.

It was attended by delegates from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and a representative from China attended as an observer. In it, the head of the Soviet Delegation V.M. Molotov said: "The fact should not be lost sight of that the aggressive element in certain countries well known to all, are resorting to every means of pressure to expedite the remilitarisation of West Germany and its inclusion in their imperialist military alignments...Krupp, Abs, Zangen, Dinkelbach and other West German monopolists who were among the Chief organizers of the militarisation of the German economy on the eve of the Second World War, are already playing a leading role in the remilitarisation of West Germany. Now, as before the Second World War, the West German militarists are receiving extensive material support from the big U.S. monopolies. He further continued: "If their security is to be firmly guaranteed, the peaceful European states must cement their forces and strengthen them considerably in the event of the Paris agreements being ratified and

implemented. For this they must duly prepare to adopt such measures for strengthening their defensive power as the present situation calls for. This requires that the countries represented at the conference shall take joint measures in the sphere of organisation of their armed forces and their command as well as other measures, so as to reliably protect the peaceful labours of their peoples, to guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and to provide defence against possible aggression".³¹

The Prime Minister of Poland Jozef Cyrankiewicz said: "The Polish people are fully alive to the threat inherent in the remilitarisation of Germany. At thousands of public meetings, rallies and demonstrations, they have made their attitude on this quite plain".^{31a} Therein, he expressed his support to the position taken by Molotov in the conference. He also called for the peaceful settlement of the German question and an end to remilitarisation.

The Czechoslovak delegation represented by the Prime Minister Viliam Siroki said: "The Paris 'guarantees' against the menace created by the re-emergence of

31 New Times (Moscow), 4 December 1954, Supplement, p.4.

31a Ibid., pp.16-23.

German militarism are actually no guarantee at all. The only guarantee is not to allow it to re-emerge to prevent the re-militarisation of Germany. That is the only possible way of assuring that the security of European nations will not be threatened by German militarism which has always been the inveterate enemy of their liberty and independence". He continued further: "...the ratification of the Paris agreements - a direct consequence of which would be resumption of the old Drang nach osten policy of German militarism".³² That, apart from constituting a threat to the security of Czechoslovakia, posed grave dangers to European security.

Otto Gotewohl, the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic declares that the aggressive German militarists believe that a West German Wehrmacht, coupled with a policy of strength, would enable them to bring the German Democratic Republic and the East European countries under their domination. They were only emulating Hitler's policy of setting up a "new order in Europe".

The conference declared: "It should provide for consultation whenever, in the opinion of any of the parties the danger of an armed attack should arise in Europe, in order to take effective measures to remove the danger.

32 New Times (Moscow), 4 December 1954, pp.30-33.

To be effective, this system must provide that an attack on one or several states in Europe shall be regarded as an attack on all the parties to the general European treaty, and that each party shall assist the state attacked with all the means at its disposal including the use of armed force, for the purpose of re-establishing and maintaining peace and security in Europe.

Such an all-European system of collective security would fully accord with the promotion of international co-operation based on the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of countries large and small and of non-interference in their internal affairs. It would, in a large measure, facilitate the settlement of the German problem since, it would rule out the conversion of West Germany into a militarist state and would create favourable conditions for the restoration of Germany's unity...

The parties to this Conference are determined to continue to insist on the necessity for a system of collective European Security, being convinced that only the concerted efforts of the European states can provide the basis for stable and durable peace in

Europe".³³

In conformity with the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the European states for safeguarding peace, consultations and deliberations among the governments of the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of Poland, the Republic of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Hungary, the People's Republic of Romania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the People's Republic of Albania took place. It concerned the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, co-operation, and mutual assistance among the eight states which participated at the conference and also the organisation of a 'unified command' of the states party to it.

And so on 11th May 1955, the Warsaw Conference of European Countries on Safeguarding European Peace and Security was called upon in which Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia participated.

In the conference, Bulganin made it clear that 'in the new situation' created by the ratification of the Paris Agreements and the "activation of the aggressive forces" throughout the world the bilateral treaties

33 New Times (Moscow), 4 December 1954, pp.64-65.

treaties were considered to be no longer enough.³⁴ The need was felt to take effective measures to unite their forces and further strengthen their ties of friendship and cooperation.³⁵ He talked of not only German militarism, encouraged by the U.S. and its threat to European peace and security, he also talked of similar threats posed by the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East in the Far East, and in the South East Asia. The proposed treaty as he said, would define obligations of joint defence in the event of an armed attack on any of its parties. If such an attack should take place each of the parties to the Treaty in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with the other parties come to the assistance of the state or states attacked, with such means as it deems necessary including armed force. In such an event the parties to the Treaty should immediately consult as to the measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.³⁶

34 Document 18, New Times (Moscow), 21 May 1955, pp.6-16.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

Thus, it provided for the establishment of a "Joint Command" of the armed forces. It was also envisaged that the parties to the Treaty would adapt other co-ordinated measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power in order to guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and so to provide defence against possible aggression.

Further, it provided for mutual consultations among the parties on the important international issues affecting common interests. And more significantly, cooperation was not limited to defence only, but also it embraced the development and expansion of their economic and cultural relations.

Views of the Leaders of the Socialist Countries

The Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia Viliam Siroki, voiced serious concern over the remilitarisation of West Germany. He said: "The resurgence of militarism in West Germany, and the latter's incorporation into aggressive western blocs create another drastic factor of general tension, a threat to the peace, security and freedom of the nations. The United States is enlarging its military bases in West Germany

Germany in close proximity to the borders of our republic it is more actively sending saboteurs and spies into our country. The American occupation authorities in West Germany are giving increasing encouragement to the revanchist elements and fully support their provocative actions against our country".³⁷

He further continued: "In view of the seriously enhanced activity of the western blocs in preparing their armed forces for warlike action, it is of the highest importance to co-ordinate our efforts...The joint command of the armed forces assigned by our countries will draw on the good results and experience of our economic and other forms of assistance and cooperation will be backed by the continued economic progress and development of our countries by our deep rooted idea of mutual friendship and co-operation by the unshakable unity of the countries of the democratic camp".³⁸

The Prime Minister of Poland Jozef Cyrankiunicz said: "The Paris agreements are the most striking manifestation of the so called 'position of strength' policy

37 Document 19, New Times (Moscow), 21 May 1955, pp.17-22.

38 Ibid.

a policy aimed at war...where do the Paris agreements lead? The militarist forces are being recreated, a neo-Hitlerite Wehremacht is being built-up which, from the very start will have over 500,000 effective, in addition to the internal security and policy forces... Nazi General Zimmermann said in an interview published in the London Sunday Express on September 14, 1954, that to crush Russia, a preventive war against her must be waged with every kind of atomic weapon. And he further said: "This Treaty will protect our sovereign rights and will be their effective guarantee. It will ensure mutual defence of the sovereignty of all its signatories. For the first time in our history, it will associate Poland, through multilateral obligations, with other countries in a way that will make Poland's interests their interests, and those of each of the other signatory nations - Poland's interests. The most important feature of the projected treaty is that it is not directed against any country and is open to all countries desirous of concerting their efforts with ours in defence of peace".³⁹

The Treaty was in accordance with the UN Charter. Moreover, attempts were to be further made for a general

39 Document 20, New Times (Moscow), 21 May 1955, pp.25-32.

European Collective security treaty. Rather than being aggressive the Treaty had the most basic task of defence - defence against the aggressive designs of the western countries.

The Polish Premier rightly believed that the Treaty would ensure the security of Poland, the Polish boundary on the Oder and Neisse by the help of the joint command supported by the mighty Soviet forces.

Otto Grotewohl, the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic said in the conference: "By resorting to diverse manoeuvres, the American and German militarists have managed to bludgeon the Bonn Bundestag into endorsing the Paris agreements. This represents a further step in deepening the division of Germany and converting her western part into a war base and strategic vantage ground of American and German imperialism".⁴⁰

He maintained that the Paris agreements were in complete opposition to the wishes of the German people who were against remilitarisation. That the West German junkers and capitalists wanted to rob the people of GDR and restore the old order...that the GDR would not

40 Document 21, New Times (Moscow), 11 May 1955.

remain passive to all these developments. And so he continued: "The Warsaw Treaty will strengthen the patriotic forces of Germany and enable them to continue their advance along the path of peaceful unification."⁴¹ That it was in accordance with the concept of a general European collective security treaty and defensive in nature.

Andras Hegedus, the Hungarian Prime Minister proclaimed: "Of all the aggressive natures of the western powers, the most dangerous to the peace and security of the nations is the resurrection of German militarism...The Hungarian people suffered for centuries from German militarism and they realise very well where the remilitarisation of Western Germany tends..."

The Hungarian government delegation will sign the Treaty for the reason that it will further the national interest of the Hungarian people the interest of European peace and the interest of all other peaceable nations".⁴²

41 Ibid.

42 Document 22, New Times (Moscow), 21 May 1955, pp.40-44.

Mehmet Shehu, the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Albania said that German imperialism always looked upon the Balkan peninsula as an important objective of its Drang nach osten - that Albania was committed to honourably discharge the obligations following from the Treaty.

Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, Prime Minister of Romanian People's Republic said: "The conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance by the nations represented at this conference and the organisation of a joint command will serve to enhance cooperation between our eight countries in every field, will strengthen their international position and will create the confidence that they will not be taken unawares by an aggressor".⁴³

Vylko Chervenkov, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria said that the rebirth of German militarism had led to intense activities by the aggressive forces all over the world. Then he quoted the Greek newspaper Te Nee, "the forces defending the Dardanelles were meant for attack rather than defence". He said: "We do not want military blocs; we do not want to see one group of states pitted

43 Document 24, New Times (Moscow), 21 May 1955, pp.52-55.

against another, we want peaceful co-existence, regardless of the difference in social systems...The Treaty which we shall sign here on behalf of our government will serve the cause of peace".⁴⁴

Thus, in this chapter we analysed the German rearmament along with the plan to go ahead with the European Defence Community; the threats it posed to European security and the oft repeated proposals of the Soviet Union to settle the German question, to sign an all European Collective security Treaty which was ignored by the West which forced the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to conclude the Warsaw Treaty as a defensive measure with the hope that once a general European Security Treaty is signed it would cease to operate. The leaders of the socialist countries who concluded the treaty were of the unanimous opinion that it was a defensive measure to safeguard the security of the socialist countries.

44 Document 25, New Times (Moscow), no.21, May 1955, pp.55-59.

CHAPTER THREE

Chapter Three

ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE WARSAW PACT - ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY, VARIOUS FOLLOW-UP MEASURES IN MILITARY SPHERE DURING 1954-1962

In the last chapter we discussed the problems of European security that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries faced and to overcome which they concluded the Warsaw Pact as a defensive measure. In this chapter, we discuss and analyse the essential features of the Warsaw Treaty and various military developments relating to the Pact.

The Origin of the Warsaw Pact

The "Note of the Soviet Government to the Governments of Europe and the USA" on November 14, 1954 warned: "The plans drawn up at the London and Paris conferences for resurrecting German militarism and incorporating the remilitarised West Germany in military alignments cannot but complicate the situation in Europe. Realisation of these plans will inevitably strain relations between the European nations. It will therefore be natural if the peace-loving European nations find themselves obliged to adopt new measures for safeguarding their security".¹

1 Pravda (Moscow), November 14, 1954.

And the new measure adopted was the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955. The Warsaw Treaty was rooted in Soviet and East European fears of a rearmed Germany. Specifically, it grew out of Moscow's campaign to prevent the West German membership in the West European Union (WEU), which was the way Bonn came to participate in NATO".²

The Soviet policy, as was then reiterated by Bulganin in May 1955, was one of peace, disarmament and detente and socialist cooperation. Bulganin had said: "The relations between our countries are an embodiment of the noble principles of socialist internationalism, of the noble idea of fraternal friendship between free and equal nations".³

The Warsaw Treaty was based on the "principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-interference in their internal affairs". The parties were guided by the objective and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2 Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution, MIT Press, 1971, p.10.

3 Statement of N.A. Bulganin, New Times (Moscow) 21 May 1955.

Thus, because of the threat posed by ratification of the Paris Agreement and envisaging the formation of the Western European Union, the participation of the remilitarised West Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, the Warsaw Pact was concluded among the participating states.

The Treaty

The contracting parties in accordance with the UN Charter were determined to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in such manner as will not jeopardise international peace and security".⁴

They expressed their desire to "participate in a spirit of sincere cooperation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security and strive for effective measures for universal reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction",⁵ and shall

4 Article 1, The Warsaw Treaty, New Times (Moscow), 21 May, 1955.

5 Article 2, *ibid.*

consult with one another and have immediate consultation when "a threat of armed attack on one or more of the parties has arisen in order to ensure joint defence and maintenance of peace and security".⁶

In accordance with Article 5 of the Charter of the UN, the members in the exercise of the right to individual and collective self-defence "either individually or in agreement with the parties come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary including armed force"⁷ - measures which would be intimated to the Security Council.

The parties agreed to establish "a joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the parties shall be assigned to the command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles"⁸ and along with it "a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up in which each of the Parties to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another specifically appointed representative".⁹

6 Article 3, *ibid.*

7 Article 4, *ibid.*

8 Article 5, *ibid.*

9 Article 6, *ibid.*

That the Parties decided "not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present Treaty".¹⁰ That on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of each other, they would cooperate "to further developing economic and cultural intercourse between them".¹¹

That the Treaty was not a closed grouping but an open one to which other states irrespective of their social and political systems can accede by expressing their readiness to participate in it".¹²

It mentioned that the Treaty would remain in force for a period of twenty years during which efforts for a General European Treaty of Collective Security would be made and in the conclusion of which the present Treaty would cease to be operative.

Marshall of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces to be assigned by the signatory states which shall be

10 Article 7, *ibid.*

11 Article 8, *ibid.*

12 Article 9, *ibid.*

subject to examination by the Political Consultative Committee, which would take into consideration the defensive power and the organisation of the Joint Armed Forces.

The Ministers of Defence or other military leaders of the signatory states would serve as Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces and shall command the Armed Forces assigned by their respective states to the Joint Armed Forces. A Staff of this was to be set-up under the Commander-in-Chief and would include permanent representatives of the General Staffs of the signatory states. Its headquarter was located in Moscow.

The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory states will be effected, by agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defence.¹³

Unlike the bilateral treaties concluded by Stalin with East European Countries the new multilateral treaty (i.e. Warsaw Treaty) was not limited to the prevention of an attack on the part of Germany or any other power

13 Document 31, New Times (Moscow), 21 May 1955, p.68.

associated with Germany. Nevertheless, the common fear of the remilitarisation of Germany at whose hands almost all the Soviet bloc countries had suffered badly during the Second World War was made use of in forging this alliance over and above the net work of bilateral treaties of the Stalinist period. But before forging this new alliance among the European Socialist countries, the Soviet Union made every effort to prevent the ratification of the Paris Agreements. Germany being in the heart of Central Europe, touched the borders of a number of these socialist countries. To preserve it as a "buffer zone", free from hostile military alignment and consequently free from foreign bases and nuclear weapons was therefore, of great military advantage to the Soviet Union. Neutrality in Soviet eyes had primarily a military significance.

The main intention of the Soviet Union in agreeing to sign the Austrian Peace Treaty was the desire to prevent Austria getting trapped into the Western defence system and also present Germany with a pattern to follow.

R.A. Remington says that about the institutional structure of the Warsaw Pact little was known except the creation of the (PCC) Political Consultation Committee.

In a closed session in January 1956, during the PCC meeting it was decided that it would meet twice a year with the Chairmanship to rotate among members. This also created¹⁴ a Standing Commission to work out recommendations on questions of foreign policy and a Joint Secretariat which was to be staffed by the representatives of all the Treaty members and these were to be located in Moscow.

According to J.F. Brown and Brezezinski, there was no public mention of the activities of the Secretariat, the standing policy Commission or any organisational decisions.¹⁵

However, at that period of time organisational aspect didn't matter much for Moscow since it was using the Treaty as a bargaining prop - that, once a General European Treaty would be concluded the present Treaty would cease to operate.

Moreover, the Soviets had further proposed that the NATO bloc and Warsaw Pact countries should conclude a Treaty promising not to employ armed force against each other and providing for consultation in the event

14 J.P. Jain, Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact, Bombay, 1973, p.9.

15 J.F. Brown, The New Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1966). Brezezinski, "Organisation of the Communist Camp", World Politics, 23, no.2, January 1961.

of disputes that might threaten the peace.¹⁶

Military Aspect of the Warsaw Pact

By 1950, the Communists had consolidated their positions in the East European armed forces during national front coalition period of the people's democracies. Once the communists occupied the top military hierarchies disloyal elements were removed and intense political indoctrination was undertaken.¹⁷ All high officers were required to take courses in political military institutes and many East European officers were sent for political as well as technical training. In some cases the Officers of the East European armies were in fact Russians.¹⁸ Technical and military matters were co-ordinated with Soviet usages such as style of uniforms, marching and drill.¹⁹

Soviet tanks, motorised weapons, airplanes, armed personnel were found everywhere. Thus, Remington writes: "In sum, even prior to the Warsaw

16 New Times (Moscow), 31 July 1955, p.28.

17 Ichiel de Sola Pool, et. al., Satellite Generals: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere (Stanford, California, 1955).

18 Hans Van Kr , Command Integration within the Warsaw Pact, Military Review, 41, no.5, May 1961.

19 Ferenc Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, Cambridge, 1964.

Pact, the Soviets had remoulded the armed forces of the People's democracies into a separate subordinate arm of the USSR army...Thus, by and large a copy of the Soviet pattern had been imposed on East European armed forces by 1950".²⁰ Many like Dinerstein view that East Europe served merely as an extension of the Soviet early warning and air defence system²¹ and that Soviet military intentions with respect to it was couched in vague terms.

Malcolm Mackintosh writes about the organisational set up: "Good many points seem to stand out about the organization of the Warsaw Pact - first of all, there is no indication that the Headquarters or the staff has any operations, signals, transportation or supply services which would enable it to function as an independent Headquarter in war time. Indeed we know from press material covering the big exercises in Poland, East Germany and Hungary immediately before the invasion of Czechoslovakia that the multinational force was supported logistically by the supply, communications and transport elements of the Soviet ministry of Defence. Secondly, there appears to be no integral

20 Remington, The Warsaw Pact, MIT, 1971, p.20.

21 H.S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, New York, Praeger, 1959.

element in the Warsaw Pact Headquarter responsible for air defence".²²

In the military field, the Warsaw Pact did coordinate the training of the East European armies, conducting large scale exercises and developing weapons standardisation. However, it remained a kind of multinational 'war office' grafted on to the Soviet Defence ministry.²³ Each country's forces was adapted for its likely task in the event of general war in Europe. The Soviet High Command after taking into consideration of political loyalty, military efficiency and geographical deployment would select those elements of the East European armies, navies and air forces when it believed, it would require for any specific operation.

Joint plans produced contingency plans embodying the detailed division of labour. However, many key posts in the Pact Headquarters were held by Soviet Officers - for instance the Commander-in-Chief, his deputy, the Chief of Staff, his Deputy, senior political officers etc. Many believe that the Warsaw Pact merely provide an administrative military Headquarters through

22 Malcolm Mackintosh, Survival, June/July 1974, p.124.

23 Ibid.

which to harness the resources of Eastern Europe to the job of protecting Soviet ~~security~~. *Union*.

In this scheme of things, the Warsaw Pact primarily symbolised a buffer between West Germany and the Soviets. So, it extended Soviet military involvement in Eastern Europe, for the Warsaw Treaty legalised *the presence* Soviet troops that otherwise should have been withdrawn from Hungary and Romania after the Austrian Treaty. Albania, with whom Moscow had no bilateral military assistance pact was included. Yet, there is little evidence that initially the Warsaw Treaty was needed or seriously expected to serve as a channel by which to speed up military integration of Soviet and East European armed forces.²⁴

Thus, there began in the middle-1950s a new stage of development of the world system of socialism by the further strengthening of the political and economic might of the USSR. Lt. General, I.S. Medhikov wrote: "The defense of socialism has become the state policy of all the countries of the Warsaw pact and of the friendly armed forces. "We are class brothers and comrades in arms".²⁵

24 Robin A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact, MIT Press, 1971, p.19.

25 Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, Praeger, 1981, p.258.

'Class brothers', 'combat brothers', 'comrades-in-arms' are almost used interchangeably. The 'combat confederation' of the armed forces of the socialist confederation is characterised by all round co-operation and close ties embracing all sides of the life and activity of the fraternal armed forces. It is clearly manifested in the relations among the armed forces of the fraternal defense alliance - the Warsaw Pact.

Marshall Iakubavski in the Soviet Military Encyclopaedia writes: "One of the most important directions of socialist military cooperation is the co-ordination of efforts in the further development of military theory and in a working out of a unity of views on the character and methods of waging war, On the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology. For these purposes, business like contacts have been established among military scientific institutions, theoretical conferences are regularly conducted and there is a joint working out of military-historical studies".²⁶

The formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in 1955 placed before Soviet military strategy a new task

26 In AA. Grecho (ed.), Soviet Military Encyclopaedia, pp.525-29. (As quoted in Christopher D. Jones, op.cit., p.209).

in the formulation of the common basis of the military confederation in which the international and national interests of the allied countries are organically confined".²⁷

In the Warsaw Pact, the primary function of the Soviet military doctrine is to prevent Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia from adopting military decisions of 'territorial defence' similar to those of Romania and Yugoslavia. The pact members have common views on strategy, operational art, tactics which is suggested by the military exercises. The limited information available suggests that the Pact exercises train Warsaw Treaty forces mainly for the conduct of offensive rather than defensive actions".²⁸

The Soviet conception of the organisation and development of a national defence system plays the central role in the achievement of unity of views among the Warsaw Pact states. However, the Yugoslavs and the Romanians both reject the theories and practice of the military-technical component of Soviet doctrine

27 Marshal Orgakov, in Ibid.

28 Ibid.

in favour of doctrines of 'territorial defense'. Both believe that the likely aggressor would use conventional rather than nuclear weapons. The troop training of each country emphasised the training of regular and paramilitary forces for "people's war". The Yugoslav military decision on territorial defense began in 1958 and the Romanians between 1958 when the Soviet troops withdrew from Romania and 1968 when the Soviet intervention took place in Czechoslovakia. It is believed that it was connected with the Soviet reformulation of their own military doctrine - the appearance of V.D. Sokolovskii's Military Strategy in 1962 and the Warsaw Pact's large scale multilateral military exercises.

"The military political axioms shared by the military doctrines of the loyal Warsaw Pact states accept the Soviet argument that the ideologically correct expression of the national sovereignty of a socialist state is the acceptance of a series of binding obligations including military organisation to the larger socialist confederation headed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics".

However, rightly adds Christopher Jones: "The Soviets do not depend on the intrinsic logic of their

military political axioms to persuade East European defense ministries to accept these axioms and their military-technical corollaries".³⁰ The fundamental political axioms are in fact provided by the force of bilateral treaties and scores of party programmes. The bilateral treaties of the Soviet Union with the five loyal members of the Warsaw Pact all contain articles specifying the need for socialist unity in response to the "aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction", they also contain articles pledging the signatories to the pursuit of general and complete disarmament". The individual socialist countries are well aware of the fact that it would be extremely difficult to withstand any attacks on them solely on the basis of their own strength. Colonel Timarin writes that the internal functions of a socialist military has three aspects:

- (1) As a psychological deterrent against anti-socialist forces;
- (2) As a back-up for internal security forces;
- (3) As a combat force.

30 Ibid.

In those cases when the opposition to socialism within a country acquires significant intensity, duration and sharpness (a counter-revolutionary uprising, mutiny, banditry, the unleashing of civil war).³¹

Marshal Iakukovski's volume on the Warsaw Pact points out that in executing its internal functions, a socialist army will not have to rely on its own forces but can count on fraternal assistance from other socialist armies.³²

General Epishev, in his tract "Ideological Struggle in Military Questions" rightly says that the defense of socialism is an exceptionally important international task.³³

Iakubovskii's text on the Warsaw Pact declares that the Soviet action in Hungary in 1956 and the Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia in 1968 are examples of the joint defense of the gains of socialism in each fraternal country against internal and external enemies.³⁴

31 Col. Timarin, "The Socio-Political Nature and Function of Socialist Armed Forces", in Christopher Jones, op.cit., p.160.

32 Iakubovski., The Combat Confederation of the Fraternal Armed Forces and Peoples, in Christopher Jones, op.cit., p.160.

33 General Epishev, "Ideological Struggles in Military Questions", in Christopher Jones, p.160.

34 Iakubouskii, ibid.

M.S. Kiri Chenko identifies some of the criticisms used to loosen the unbreakable unity of the armed forces of the Socialist states:

1. Soviet army exported socialist revolutions to Eastern Europe;
2. The Soviet Forces stationed in East Europe are occupation forces.
3. Soviet military specialists interfere in the internal affairs of East European forces; and
4. Soviet troops crushed "liberalisation" in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Iakubouskii and Kirichenko and others warn against the dangers to Soviet military doctrines posed by the possibility of the emergence of the nationalism of the armed forces with an ideological deviation of the ruling party to carry out a programme of national communism.

"A characteristic feature of the military structure is that it is based on the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army on the unity of purposes tasks and theoretical military views; on the Leninist principles of party leadership of the armed forces".³⁵ The combat

³⁵ General Sergei Shtemenko, Survival, July/August, 1976.

effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact army is strengthened by Communist indoctrination, mutual exchange and educational programmes, conferences, gatherings and meetings. One of the major line of thinking is that the main force in war has always been man - this is the reason, utmost importance is of the need to train military personnel and specialists in communist thinking and socialist goals and even a high percentage of them become the members of the communists parties. Thus, there pervades a spirit of socialist patriotism among them.

As has already been pointed out, the Warsaw Pact Headquarters functions under the overall guidance of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, this has been amply proved during the big exercises involving the multinational forces which were supported logistically by the supply, communications and transport elements of the Soviet Ministry of Defence.

Secondly, there appears to be no integral element in the Warsaw Pact HQ responsible for air defence. The reason seems to be that the Soviet Air Defence Command has overall responsibility for the air defence not only of the Soviet Union but also of the East European

countries".³⁶

The Warsaw Pact scenario of warfare against NATO forces assume "reinforced attack" and substantial and reliable participation of non-Soviet Warsaw pact forces - that is, over half of the Warsaw Pact's initial offensive force would consist of East Europeans. The Soviet "Lightning War Strategy" when developed since the early 1960s constitute the primary lever for ensuring substantial Northern Tier military participation in a Warsaw Pact offensive. In such a scheme, the Soviets would try to get maximum advantage in minimising consultation and preparation time and achieve quick multinational involvement of forces and early battlefield success. In such circumstances, the Soviets may realistically calculate that the motivation and opportunities for national political or military leaders to opt out would be very limited.³⁷

Given the realistic assessment of reliability of the East European forces, the Soviets calculate that it is only a "lightning war strategy" which permits them to achieve quick multinational involvement of forces and

36 Malcolm Mackintosh, Survival, June/July 1974.

37 A. Ross Johnson., Robert W. Dean., Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier, New York, 1981.

early battlefield success in which case the national forces or their political masters would be left with little opportunities to opt out of it. *Given the significant- strategic importance of the northern tier forces, now we discuss them.*

THE NORTHERN TIER FORCES

Polish Forces: The Polish military has partially revived its traditional ethos as the guardian of national Polish interests and has achieved a degree of institutional integrity that violates Leninist conceptions of Party control of armed forces,³⁸ even though it has accepted the offensive role envisaged for Polish forces by the USSR and programmed for a massive, rapid offensive onto NATO territory.

It is believed by Ross Johnson and others that these forces, lack certain kind of commitment to Soviet interests particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, the geopolitical position of Poland locks up it, into a kind of lightning war strategy. Since, the 1950s the Polish military has developed into a best equipped non-Soviet military force and is highly modernised in which a homogenous military elite has emerged which retains certain neutrality from the political leadership.

38 . Ibid.

The Polish fears of West German military power in the late 1950s and 60s constituted a national rationale for Poland's military posture within Warsaw Pact which leads at times to doubt its commitment to the Pact's interests. However, given the Soviet induced shift in the Warsaw Pact strategy around 1960, the Polish military has assumed to itself greater responsibility and commitment to launch massive and rapid operations into NATO territory and thereby not only fulfil the Pact's strategic calculations but also to prevent any West German incursions against its own territory which has been a constant source of fear for the Polish.

East German Forces: The East German National People's Army (NPA) is the youngest one which became a capable military force only in the 1960s, and has assumed a significant limited role in the Soviet planning for European military contingencies. Of all the East European military establishments the NPA seems to be more directly linked to the Soviet Forces - this is indicated by the pervasive presence of Soviet forces in East German territory and which is enhanced by a bilateral military agreements. Moreover, the East German Communist Party had much more control over the

military establishment which hindered the development of professional military institutions till late 60s and the 70s. Large scale indoctrination of the military personnel took place to dispel the doubts that operations against West German military would result in a Civil War.

The Czechoslovak Military: The Czechoslovak military was much more pliant and reliable prior to 1968 in which anti-Sovietism and Czech nationalism surfaced.

On the whole, the East European military establishments were experienced to play certain roles in the Warsaw Pact scenario inspite of the undercurrents of misgivings against the "Red Expert approach".

Military Development: "Although Soviet tanks cut off the Hungarian revolution and Albania faced economic sanctions and violent polemical attacks for its defiance, Romanian manoeuvring within the Warsaw Pact found decision in Moscow much further along the force persuasion continuum than had these earlier challenges to Soviet authority".³⁹

39 R.A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact, The MIT Press 1977, p.28.

The Soviet government declaration on the Principles of Development and further strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet and other Socialist States published in October 28, 1956 said: "In the process of the rise of the new system (of the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe) and the deep revolutionary changes in social relations, there have been many difficulties, unresolved problems, and down right mistakes in the mutual relations among the socialist countries. Violations and errors which de eaned the Principle of equality among the socialist states".⁴⁰

The Soviet Government declared that it was ready to discuss both economic and military grievances with the governments of other East European countries - military matters pertaining to the Warsaw Pact. It was in response to the so-called Polish October, the Hungarian uprising - the presence and the movement of the Soviet troops in Poland, Hungary and Romania.

On October 30, 1950, the Soviet government declared "For the purpose of assuring mutual security of the socialist countries the Soviet Government is prepared

40 Pravda, (Moscow), October 28, 1958.

to review with other socialist countries which are members of the Warsaw Treaty the question of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the above mentioned countries. In so doing, the Soviet Government proceeds from the general principle that stationing the troops of one state or another which is a member of the Treaty on the territory of another state which is a member of the Treaty is done by agreement - among all its members and only with the consent of the state on the territory of which and at the request of which troops are stationed or is planned to station them".⁴¹

It was in fact a unilateral extension of the Treaty by means of Soviet interpretation in that the January 1956 meeting of the PCC (Political Consultation Committee) had not reached the conclusion that withdrawal of Soviet forces required the collective agreement of the member states of the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the later withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania and the partial withdrawal from Hungary received only ex-post-facto sanction of the Warsaw Pact members. It was reported in Pravda of May 28, 1958, that the Soviet government

41 The Declaration of October 30, Pravda (Moscow), October 30, 1956.

signed an agreement with Hungary promising that Soviet troops would leave Hungary.⁴²

Although, one Soviet Division did withdraw in 1958, sizeable Soviet forces remained in Hungary. In fact, Kadar felt it necessary to deny rumours that Soviet forces would leave in 1964 after the nineteenth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary from Nazi occupation.⁴³

The Soviet position did recognise the desire to remove "bureaucratic distortions", and eliminate economic evils. However, it mentions that, "black reaction and counter revolution" was under way to subvert socialism in Hungary and so it was the "sacred duty" of the workers, peasants and the intelligensia to protect the socialist achievements.

The Soviet rationale, consistently emphasised on Soviet obligations under the Warsaw Treaty - that by 1958, the Soviets bluntly contended that the "active strength of the Warsaw Treaty manifested itself in the days of the counter-revolutionary events in Hungary."⁴⁴ Regarding the role of the Warsaw Pact joint command during

42 Pravada (Moscow), May 18, 1958.

43 New York Times, March 30, 1964.

44 F.T. Konstantinov, from R.A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact, MIT Press, 1971, p.37.

the crisis, Khrushchev spoke of Hungary as having given the necessary rebuff to international reaction and the counter-revolutionaries with the help of the "socialist camp".

Remington believes that under the pressure of the Hungarian uprising, the original Soviet assertion that the Warsaw Pact was a collective self-defense agreement in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, made a 180° turn.

The Soviet delegate Sabolev spoke in the United Nations: "It has been asserted that end measures taken in Hungary against fascist elements constitute a violation of the human rights guaranteed under the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. We feel obliged to point out that these assertions are that only absolutely unfounded but that the Hungarian Government in taking measures to put an end to the criminal activities of counter-revolutionary elements has acted in full conformity with Article 4 of the Treaty of Peace, under which Hungary agreed not to allow the existence of operation of organisations of a fascist character pursuing the aim of depriving the Hungarian people of their democratic rights".⁴⁵

45 Document 79. GAOR. Special Emergence Session 2, Plenary Meeting, 564, p.2.

The Soviet delegate quoted the four Cabinet ministers of the Nagy Government, "we were prompted to take this serious step by the knowledge that within the Government of Imre Nagy, who fell under the influence of reactionaries and became inactive...The new legitimate government of Hungary appealed to the Soviet troops which were in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact, for assistance in suppressing the counter-revolutionary elements which were trying to influence the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary".⁴⁶

The Soviet-Polish talks on 22nd November 1956, jointly declared, "The parties came to the conclusion that, in view of this state of affairs, and also of the present international situation, the temporary stationing of Soviet troops on Polish territory is still advisable and this movement owing to the necessity of retaining Soviet troops in Germany on the basis of international treaties and agreements".⁴⁷

Likewise, the Soviet-Romanian talks on 3rd December, 1956 expressed satisfaction over the role of Soviet troops and the cooperation of all other socialist countries in defeating the counter-revolutionary elements in

46 Ibid.

47 New Times (Moscow), 22 November 1956, pp.39-40.

Hungary and thereby upheld the revolutionary socialist gains attained by the Hungarian people. It voiced concern at the aggressive postures of NATO and the imperialist bloc and threats posed to European security. It declared: "In the existing conditions, however, when Western Germany is being remilitarised and the revanchist elements are being increasingly active, and when the United States and the other NATO countries maintain numerous forces and bases in close proximity to the socialist countries and decline the course of disarmament and peaceful settlement of international disputes, the Soviet Union and the Romanian People's Republic cannot remain oblivious to the danger threatening all peace loving states".⁴⁸

Likewise, the Bulgarian position was quite clear. It defended the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary on the basis of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and this was well within the arrangement of the Warsaw Pact.

Moreover, the Polish and the Hungarian events extended the Warsaw Pact further - four bilateral treaties were concluded by the Soviet Union with Poland, GDR,

48 New Times (Moscow), 6 December 1956, p.14.

Hungary and Romania which spelt out the details of the presence of the Soviet troops in these countries with rationalisations. The first such agreement was concluded with Poland on 17 December 1956, which stated unequivocally that the presence of the Soviet troops around in no case impair Poland's sovereignty and interference in Poland's internal affairs.⁴⁹ It provided for special agreements to: (1) define the number of Soviet troops in Poland to be stationed and their location, (2) to regulate legal aid with regard to the crimes and misdemeanours and, (3) to determine the communication line time limits, procedures and terms of payment for transfer of Soviet troops as well as military shipments through Poland.⁵⁰

As Remington says, "The crux of the Treaty was that it made Polish consent mandatory for troop movement, training and manoeuvres outside the base area".⁵¹ A joint Soviet-Polish Commission was to be set up in Warsaw to settle any disputes arising under the treaty.

Treaties of similar nature were concluded with the East Germany on March 12, 1957, with Romania, April 15, 1957⁵²

49 Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Ann Arbor, Michigan), vol.8, no.51, pp.3-4.

50 Pravda (Moscow), December 18, 1956.

51 Remington, p.38.

52 See the Treaty Document in the Appendix.

and Hungary, May 27, 1957, which have been conveniently extended to the Warsaw Pact. Whereas in these countries the Soviet troop movements required the consent, in case of GDR the Soviet Union agreed to consult only.

The fundamental justification given for Soviet troop movements was "to save socialism" - that it was the "duty" of the Soviet Union to protect the socialist community of nations.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

There was no Warsaw Pact reaction to the events of 1956 - the so-called charges of Nagy or to the rumbblings in Poland. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact didn't meet in 1956 or 1957 and when they met there was no condemnation of either Gomulka or the followers of Nagy. The PCC met in 1958 which rather hailed the Soviet action in defeating the counter-revolutionaries.

JOINT EXERCISES OF THE WARSAW PACT ARMED FORCES

By the middle of 1960s, Albania and Romania had developed their "territorial defense" strategies and thereby had made their national armed forces unavailable to the Warsaw Pact against the NATO forces.

The system of Joint exercises was introduced in 1961 by Marshal A.A. Grecho in 1961 with the intention of:

- (1) The denial of territorial defense capabilities to the East European armed forces which agreed to participate in joint exercises.
- (2) To prevent other East European countries to follow the Romanian or Albanian model.
- (3) To prepare the Warsaw Pact armies for nuclear war with NATO, increasing their combative and operational capacities.

According to Marshal I.I. Iakubouskii, the Soviet and East European armies had participated in joint exercises during the late 1950s "primarily on a tactical level", then beginning in 1961, they began to take place regularly on the operational and strategic scales with the participation of almost all types of armed forces and types of troops.⁵³

Col. Oleg Penkovskii, a Soviet Officer who allegedly worked for the western intelligence, maintained that during the joint exercises the "decisions of the

53 Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, Praeger, 1981, p.110.

satellite countries were included in the T O of the Soviet army. This is necessary because they still do not trust them; they might turn their guns against the Soviets or turn to the West".⁵⁴ If this statement is correct then the Soviets doubted the reliability of the East European armies. However, such a statement appears to be misleading.

Joint exercises, simply at the "tactical level" were carried out in August 1957 (with 11,000 GDR forces with Soviet detachments) and August 1958 (when Soviet air force and Bulgarian ground and air forces and navy conducted joint exercises in Bulgaria.

It is to the credit of Marshal Grecho that he successfully carried out these exercises.

In October-November 1961, Grecho personally conducted the "Buria" manoeuvres - the first large scale - multilateral manoeuvres of the Warsaw Pact forces. It included the ground, air and naval forces of the USSR, GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia. And the following year Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and GDR and USSR participated. The aim was to:

54 Frank Gibney (ed.), The Penkovskii Papers, (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p.245.

- (1) Drill the Warsaw Pact forces for nuclear offensive against the West in order to render them incapable of conventional defense against the East.
- (2) Prepare the Warsaw Pact forces for conventional interventions against the member states of the fraternal alliance.⁵⁵

Christopher D. Jones maintains that the basic purpose of these joint exercises were not to prepare the Warsaw Pact armies for war with NATO, rather its basic purpose was to prepare the grounds for Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe by reinforcing the West's preoccupation with defense. But, this is not borne out by evidence.

However, the system of joint exercises led to the Soviet officers and troops in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria where earlier Soviet troops were not stationed.

These exercises gave an opportunity to the Soviet officers to evaluate the East European officers and their detachments which help them to build up united command structures.

55 Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, (New York: Praeger, 1981), p.111.

Speeches, films, visits to war memorials, cultural, programmes are part of the propaganda and indoctrination procedures conducted during the exercises.

It is believed that, rather than the "military-technical aspect", the "military political" aspect is emphasised during the exercises and this refers to the interventionist character of the exercises according to Christopher Jones.

THE UNITED COMMAND OF THE WARSAW PACT

The United Command of the Warsaw Pact was formally created in 1955, which began to detach service branches and elite combat detachments from the East European defense ministries and to assign them to configurations in which each national component became dependent on other allied forces for the execution of any large scale sustained military action.

Thus in this chapter we discussed the essential features of the Warsaw Treaty, its military aspect and military development. Here, we discovered that the Warsaw Treaty was signed by the socialist countries under the leadership of the Soviet Union to safeguard the security of these countries and maintain peace in Europe.

That it is an open treaty - which would cease to operate once a general European Collective Security Treaty was signed. This multilateral socialist alliance conformed to the objectives and principles of the UN Charter and this was purely defensive in nature.

The Warsaw Pact functioned (during the period under consideration) in the military sphere largely under the overall guidance of the Soviet Union; This however, does not belittle the roles and joint participation of the member states. The Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist community of nations provided the theoretical guidelines and practical considerations involving policies, principles, strategy and tactics and helped in the training of armed forces, indoctrinating them in socialist goals and values and it initiated joint exercises to prepare for future contingencies. That the basic objective of the Soviet Union has been to protect the security of the socialist camp in the face of western threat - that the Soviet Union has taken upon itself the task of not only preserving its own security but also to preserve and protect the socialist community of nations as its leader. Thus the Soviet behaviour during the Hungarian, Polish, and Czech crises should be viewed in this perspective: that during this there was no underlying motive of Soviet Union of petty nationalist and territorial gains. Under the

guidance and leadership of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact grew militarily in a substantial manner to counter the threat posed by the German rearmament and the NATO.

CHAPTER FOUR

Chapter Four

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WARSAW PACT, 1954-1962

In the last chapter, we discussed and analysed the essential features of the Warsaw Treaty; specifically its military aspect in detail along with the military development. In the light of this, we proceed to discuss the growth and development of the Warsaw Pact during the period 1954-62; the security concerns of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries and their responses.

The Warsaw Pact's Striving for Peaceful Co-existence and its Response to the Cold War Situation in Europe

"The year 1955 was a crucial one in the post-Stalin era. In foreign policy, the year saw several momentous developments. They were either directly or indirectly related to the problem of the bipolar division of the world into spheres of influence - one sphere inclining towards the United States, the other towards the Soviet Union. The "uncommitted" world was also profoundly affected.¹ It is believed that,

1 Albert L. Weeks, The Other Side of Co-existence, Pitman Publishing Corporation, N.Y. 1970, p.161.

Stalin's foreign policy was based on pre-atomic age calculus, even if Soviet Union had already tested the bomb in 1949. The basic parameters, within which the Soviet foreign policy operated were - looking for advantage in the western imperialist system and the fusion of ideology in the foreign policy, countering NATO militarily and politically, consolidating the gains of socialism in the central and Eastern Europe and the Balkan, and that, the next world war would be between the imperialist states only and carry on the ideological offensive against the imperialist bloc.

With the disappearance of Stalin from the scene, there was a reformulation of some policy prescriptions: there was some relaxation in Moscow's control over the East European states which was marked by the "New Course", as Weeks says, Stalin's radical "shock brigade" idea was given-up leading up to the concept of 'popular front cooperation between the non-communist socialists and the communists both in the capitalist and the colonial countries' which was the result of the development of the hydrogen bomb. Lenin's concept of "communism by example replaced Stalin's concept of 'War as a means of spreading Soviet type revolution' - said Khrushchev:

"You cannot drive people to participate with a club or drive them to communism by means of war; when people realise that communism alone will give them a truly free and happy life, they will come running of their own free will".²


"The New Course" was characterised by the workers riots in Pilsen, Ostrava and other Czech cities, the East German uprising, and the speech of Imra Nagy of Hungary.³

Thus, Stalin's capitalists capital was replaced by capital vs. colonies, peaceful co-existence replaced the fatal inevitability of war, and the atomic policy was outlined by "the biggest bang for the smallest number of roubles invested".

Given the chaotic situation during the 1956, the pace at which Moscow and the East European states managed control was rather remarkable. The Soviet aim was two fold - (1) to assert firmly the pre-eminent position of the Soviet Union among the socialist states.

2. Michael P. Gehlen, The Politics of Co-existence - Soviet Methods and Motives, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p.65.

3. Robert Bass, The Post-Stalin era in Eastern Europe Problems of Communism, no.2, March/April, 1963, Vol.X, pp.69.



(2) to effect a bloc-wide rejection of revisionism. Except for some temporary resistance on the part of Gomulka the Soviet Union had no real difficulty in making its position accepted which resulted in the "Statement of the Twelve Ruling Communist Parties" issued in Moscow in November 1957.

This document identified the USSR as the first and the mightiest member of the socialist camp and singled out revisionism as a greater danger to the communist movement rather than Stalinist dogma.⁴

The policy of peaceful co-existence enumerated by Khrushchev in 1956, allowed for the peaceful existence side by side of states with differing social systems. There was no place in this theory for reunification.⁵ From 1955 onwards, the West till 1969, harped on reunification a fact which Soviet Union had already bypassed. After 1955, the Soviet stake in East Germany increased - it had been the most important trading partner in COMECON - its armed forces were closely linked to the Warsaw Pact - that it had been

4 Robert Bass, The Post-Stalin Era in Europe, Problems of Communism, no.2, March/April 1963, vol.XII, p.73.

5 Edwina Moreton, The German Factor, in Moreton (ed.) Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984, p.117.

the most loyal ally of the USSR; a process which culminated in the erection of the Berlin wall. East Germany thus occupied one of the most important place in the Soviet strategic thinking. The divisions in East Germany could be swiftly reinforced from the further eleven Soviet and thirty seven allied divisions from elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It creates an advantage of interior lines. It also has significant geographical advantage in the Warsaw Pact strategic thinking, that except the front in Northern Norway, the pressure points in Central Europe are contiguous from the Baltic coast to the Balkans.

In 1946, the US enjoyed nuclear monopoly; in the 1950s and 1960s the Western Alliance still enjoyed perceived superiority in both intercontinental and short range nuclear weapons over the Soviet Union. The strategic shift occurred only in 1967 when the Soviet Union deployed its own ICBMs and short range missiles in Eastern Europe.

In 1960, the destruction of the Gary Power's U-2 reconnaissance aircraft near Sverdlsk by SA-2 ground launch missile, marked the end of the invulnerability of the aircraft and strengthened the air defense of the Soviet Union.

A month later both Khrushchev and Marshal Malinovsky announced that the USSR would strike if need be with nuclear weapons on those countries that permitted flights over Soviet territory. Thus the Soviets promised military protection to all the countries of the socialist camp:

The Berlin crisis continued to worry Europe. In July 1961, 30,000 citizens of the GDR fled to the West which shocked the Ulbricht regime. On August 12, the Warsaw Treaty powers published a statement relating to the Berlin crisis. It said: "The western powers, far from having made any efforts to normalize the situation in West Berlin, on the contrary, continue to use it intensively as a centre of subversive activities against the German Democratic Republic and all other countries of the socialist commonwealth. In no other part of the world, are so many espionage and subversion centres of foreign states to be found as in the West Berlin, and no where else can they act with such impunity. These numerous subversion centres are smuggling their agents into the German Democratic Republic for all kinds of subversion, recruiting spies and inviting hostile elements to organise sabotage and provoke disturbances in the German Democratic Republic".⁶

6 Statement by the Warsaw Treaty Member States, 13th August 1961, Pravda, 15th August 1961.

The Warsaw Treaty member States put all the responsibility for the existing situation on West Germany and the NATO bloc.

The more the socialist countries voiced their belief on peaceful co-existence, the more the Western bloc violated the principles of co-existence by assuming aggressive postures. As early as 1958, International Affairs wrote: "We have indeed every reason to conclude that the position of those who support co-existence between countries with different social systems has become now stabler than before. The world has entered a new stage of co-existence. When the violation of this leading diplomatic principle of our time threatens inevitable destruction to the violaters, when any attempt by the imperialists to launch a new world will inevitably boomerang against the entire capitalist system and lead to its complete downfall".⁷

Peaceful co-existence has been a principle of Soviet foreign policy ever since the days of Lenin, however, under Khrushchev it received added impetus. This policy was also the declared policy of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

7 International Affairs (Moscow), February 1958.

The German Question still remained unsettled. The threat to Europe still continued. As a prelude to the German unification, Otto Grotewohl of GDR proposed:

- "1. Outlawing the distribution and manufacture of atomic bombs and weapons on German territory and an agreement on outlawing atomic war propaganda.
2. Withdrawal of the German States from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, abolition of conscription and agreement on the number of troops which each side would maintain.
3. Joint or separate requests to the four powers to gradually withdraw their forces from the whole of Germany in the near future".⁸

The Soviet Union also proposed the liquidation of foreign bases, withdrawal of forces from other countries and conclusion of a treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact members binding them not to resort to force along with an agreement on disarmament: all these aimed at promoting European Collective Security. The growing threat that, West Germany would pose by being an atomic power-keg in the middle of Europe was currently sweeping European hearts. This was quite clear in the Rapalki statement in the UN General Assembly on 2nd October 1957.⁹

8 Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Ann Arbor, Michigan), vol.9, no.32, 18 September 1957, pp.18-19.

9 GAOR, Session 12, Plenary Meetings, pp.236-37.

In these years, the Soviet Union unilaterally reduced its forces by nearly 2,000,000 men. In its decision of December 21, 1957, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had ruled a new reduction involving 300,000 forces including more than 41,000 in GDR and 17,000 in Hungary.¹⁰

In the meantime, in the 24th May 1958 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact states, Khrushchev^R rightly declared that given the existing development of rocket weapons in the West European bases the Warsaw Pact states would be compelled to initiate similar measures.¹¹

In the PCC meeting, the cut in the number of armed forces was announced and also the cut in the number of Soviet troops in other countries. Thus, there was a total cut of 419,000 men of the Warsaw Pact forces. It voiced its concern over the continuance of the Cold War; that NATO continued to pose increasing dangers i.e. during 1950-57 it spent more than 400,000 million dollars on war preparation -- that UK, France, Italy and Turkey had given rocket launching

10 International Affairs (Moscow), February 1958, pp.21-22.

11 N.S. Khrushchev^R, For Victory in the Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (Moscow), 1959, pp.405-33.

facilities to the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany was being armed with rocket and nuclear weapons.¹² All these were being undertaken on the false pretext of "danger of international communism". It called for a summit conference between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact states.

Furthermore, it proposed a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact states which could be based on the following commitments:

1. Not to resort to the use of force against each other, or to the threat of force;
2. To refrain from any interference in each other's internal affairs;
3. To solve all disputes that may arise between them by peaceful means only, in a spirit of understanding and justice, through negotiations between the parties concerned;
4. To hold mutual consultations when a situation arises that might endanger peace in Europe.

12 Soviet News (London), 28 May 1958, pp. 173-37.

It declared: "the international situation is such that in taking new steps to end the "Cold War", to reduce armed forces and to create conditions for peaceful existence, we all have to show sober minds and a sense of responsibility for the security of our socialist countries and must not allow the sense of vigilance of the peoples of the socialist countries to weaken for the peaceable efforts by the Warsaw Treaty states do not as yet meet with a response from the governments of the NATO countries which are seeking to continue to worsen the international situation and intensify the arms race. It is necessary to continue in the future all our efforts to prevent the creation of conditions under which advocates of the "positions of strength" policy could resort to the use of force against the socialist states. This means that, in seeking interestingly for a detente in international relations, the Warsaw Treaty states will in no degree whatsoever relax their concern for the security of their peoples. Let the governments of countries basing their policy on "positions of strength" and trying to balance on the "brink of war" always bear in mind that war against the socialist countries can only bring the aggressor to his doom".¹³

13 Ibid.

The Soviet Union also proposed the creation of a de-nuclearised zone in the Central Europe and prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons test for ever.

The Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries which noted with satisfaction over the prospects of relaxation of international tension also asked to remain vigilant. It proposed that the conclusion of a German Peace Treaty would solve the German problem.

The proposed de-nuclearised zone would include 248,000 sq.km., under the jurisdiction of the NATO states while the comparable area Warsaw Treaty states would control, was 547,000 sq.km.

The Political Consultative Committee meeting of the Warsaw Pact states on 4th February 1960 noted with satisfaction the above towards relaxation of tension. It said: "The world has now entered a phase of negotiation on settlement of the fundamental disputed international issues with a view to establishing lasting peace; the proponents of the "Cold War" are suffering defeat".¹⁴ It further declared: "...the Cold War-ice

14 Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Ann Arbor, Michigan), vol.12, no.5, pp.8-12.

was broken in relations between the two mightiest powers of the world - the USSR and the USA - and a new stage was opened up in the development of international relations as a whole".¹⁵

However, it also noted that some countries of the NATO, SEATO, CENTO continued their arms build up inspite of the fact that the Warsaw Pact since its inception, had reduced the total numerical strength of the armed forces of the member countries by 2,596,500 men. The GDR itself reduced its forces to 90,000 men and refused to introduce compulsory military service.

The Soviet Union decided not to conduct nuclear tests in future provided the western powers do not resume their test explosions. It declared its desire for universal and total disarmament. It said: "Why is the FRG government so persistently impeding the conclusion of a peace treaty? It is so daring primarily because the aim of a peace treaty is to consolidate the situation that has developed as a result of war, including the German state borders and the FRG government is against this".¹⁶ And further: "The Warsaw states

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

declare with the utmost resolve that these calculations of the West German Government are doomed to failure".¹⁷ It blamed the West German leadership for its non-acceptance of the desire to conclude a peace treaty. The Warsaw Pact states expressed the desire to conclude a non-aggression pact as soon as possible and for this goal each state would have to make its best efforts.

The Political Consultative meeting of the Warsaw Pact member states on 29th March 1961, expressed its concerns about the German rearmament going on in great haste and the arms race, including the stockpiling of modern missiles. The imperialist powers were mounting great threats and resorting to the suppression of national liberation movements. It said: "The Warsaw Treaty member states cannot remain indifferent witnesses of the grave military preparations by the imperialist states. The socialist states have not and will not stop their efforts in favour of general and complete disarmament, a halt to the arms race, relaxation of international tension...The Warsaw Treaty member states solemnly desire peaceful co-existence and are ready at any moment to take most broad measures agreed upon with

17 Ibid.

other states, with a view to ensuring peace and security of the peoples".¹⁸

The western powers, far from having made any efforts to normalise the situation in West Berlin and paving the way for a German peace treaty continued to intensify the subversive activities against the GDR and the socialist commonwealth; this included partial military mobilisation on the borders of the GDR. Espionage and subversive centres kept mushrooming against the socialist countries.

The threat to GDR kept mounting so much that the socialist camp proposed to establish and secure the German border properly so as to block the way for subversive activity.

The Conference of the defence ministers of the Warsaw Pact states on 12 September, 1961, emphasised the need to increase the defence capacities of the Warsaw Pact.

Khrushchev, in his address to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU on 17th October 1961, further reiterated the proposal to dissolve all military alliances as a

18 Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Ann Arbor, Michigan), vol. 12, no. 30, pp. 26-27.

solution to the problem of peace.¹⁹

The Political Consultative Committee meeting of the Warsaw Pact member states on 10 June 1961, discussed and exchanged views over the reports of A.A. Gromyko, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, regarding the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. It, categorically made it clear that the reluctance of the western powers to pave the way for a German Peace Treaty would only force the Soviet Union to conclude such a treaty with the GDR, which would regard the West Berlin as a free demilitarised city.²⁰

By 1957, the Soviets diagnosed the situation as entering the "third general crisis of capitalism". This was not preceded by any World War. This was followed by the Soviets making the United States vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction which gave tremendous confidence to the Soviets. At last, the long period of "capitalist encirclement" had ended.

19 Pravda, 18 October 1961, pp.2-11, taken from the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol.13, no.41, pp.5-6.

20 Daily Review, 11th June 1962.

The emergence of the socialist countries had kept the capitalist blocs at bay.

Richard Lowenthal believes that the Western Alliance was able to withstand the so-called Soviet onslaught because of:

1. Substantial American forces had been stationed in Europe - this includes the increase in nuclear as well as conventional arms and a determination which the US displayed during the 1962 Cuban crisis that it could use nuclear arms if it was necessary.
2. That the West European states preferred the American protection rather than preferring none.
3. That the Soviets themselves knew that they could not advance their offensive strategy without risking a nuclear war.

This does not take into consideration the often emphatic insistence of USSR on following the policy of peaceful-co-existence. In 1959, Khrushchev declared: "Our desire for peace and peaceful co-existence is not prompted by any time serving or tactical considerations. It springs from the very nature of socialist society in which there are no classes or social groups

interested in profiting by means of war or by seizing or enslaving foreign territories...The main thing is to keep to the sphere of ideological struggle...In our day, there are only two ways-peaceful co-existence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way.²¹

In 1960, 81 communist parties issued the world Communist Declaration which said:

"Peaceful Co-existence of countries with different social systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it means intensification of the struggles of the working class, of all the communist parties for the triumph of socialist ideas. But ideological and political disputes between states must not be settled through war".²²

In 1958, with all seriousness, Khrushchev had proposed the settlement of the Berlin problem. He said, in his note: "Berlin may be compared to a smouldering

21 Khrushchev quoted in D.W. ^{are}Beardett, The Search for Peace (RKP), 1972.

22 Quoted in Crozier, The Future of Communist Power, (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1970), p.32.

fuse that has been connected to a powder-keg. Incidents arising here, if they seem to be of local significance, may in an atmosphere of heated passions, suspicions and mutual apprehensions cause a conflagration which will be difficult to extinguish".²³ And of course, he gave six month deadline offer which West would have to deal directly with the GDR.

The four Foreign ministers met in Geneva unsuccessfully in 1959, which followed Khrushchev's American trip where in he proposed a four year plan for disarmament in line with his unilateral suspension of nuclear tests in 1958.

The Paris Summit was rocked by the U-2 incident; this reconnaissance aircraft had been flying from bases in Turkey or Pakistan to Norway across the USSR. Khrushchev proposed that the summit be postponed for eight months.

In 1961, Yuri Gagarin's first space flight boosted Khrushchev's and Soviet Union's prestige. Khrushchev decided to deal with the new American incumbent Kennedy with added confidence and directness.

23 Mooney and Brown, Truman to Carter: A Post War History of the United States of America, p.34.

Khrushchev's proposal to Kennedy to settle the Berlin question and sign a nuclear test ban was disparaged which forced Khrushchev's to abandon the plans to cut military manpower and thereby increased defence spending by one-third.

And likewise, on 25th July, 1961, Kennedy called for increasing NATO manpower. After a heavy fleeing of people from East Germany (2 million) the Berlin wall was erected as a desperate expedient and this was followed by the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union in 1962.

After the Cuban crisis erupted, Berlin subsided as an irritant.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Soviet explanation of the Cuban missile crisis states that the victory of ^{the} revolution in Cuba provoked the imperialist circles to export counter revolution to it. It states: "United States policy vis-a-vis Cuba is and most unbridled, reactionary policy. To declare that Cuba threatens America, or any other country and on this plea to usurp a special right to act against Cuba

is monstrous".²⁴

Thus, a largescale military invasion of Cuba was launched - about 100,000 men, 183 warships with 85,000 naval personnel were bent on attacking Cuba buttressed by the NATO forces. In the face of this Cuba, requested the Soviet Union to help it defend itself. Khrushchev said: "Our aim was only to defend Cuba. Everybody saw how the American imperialists were sharpening their knives and threatening Cuba with a massed attack. We could not remain impartial observers in face of this bandit like policy which was contrary to all the standards governing relations between states and contrary to the United Nations Charter. We decided to extend a helping hand to Cuba".²⁵

And so, a couple of score of Soviet IRBMs were taken to Cuba, which didn't have any other intention other than protecting Cuba from the "imperialist quarantine".

This meant that the Soviet forces and the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries were alerted. Its only when the Soviet government agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba that America agreed to lift the quarantine. Kennedy promised not to invade Cuba.

24 Khrushchev, Report to the Supreme Soviet, 12 Dec 1969 taken from H. Manak, Soviet Foreign Policy, Since the Death of Stalin, RKP, London, 1972, p.125.

25 Ibid., p.128.

Khrushchev gained some credit from this.

Khrushchev wrote later: "The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would, I thought restrain the United States from precipitative militarization against Castro's government...In addition to protecting Cuba our missiles would have equalised what the West like to call the 'balance of power...' The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you".²⁶

The Western logic goes that the Americans could have invaded Cuba, if it would have been necessary and Khrushchev did recognise that he couldn't defend the island with strategic missiles. Khrushchev, on the other hand reported that since the desired goal of preventing American invasion of Cuba was achieved by the American promise, there was no question of capitulating before the imperialist show of strength and thus he defended the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba. And therefore this didn't undermine the position of the USSR or the socialist bloc.

26 Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet, Pravda,
13 December 1962.

Kennedy in his interview with Izvestia (Moscow) on 4 December 1961, had categorically stated, "it would be helpful if NATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in a commitment to live in peace with each other".²⁷

The Soviet Union did welcome this, in fact, this was in line with the oft repeated Soviet proposal of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact states which would considerably normalise the European situation. The position was also repeated by V.A. Zorin of the USSR in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva on 28th March 1962. Zorin stated: "We believe that urgent priority should also be given to the question of a non-aggression treaty between the NATO countries and the members of the Warsaw Pact...The conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the NATO countries and the Warsaw treaty countries would be an expression of the fact that the state members of the two blocs have no aggressive designs. It would contribute to greatly improving the situation not only in Europe, but in the whole world".²⁸

27 Izvestia, 4 December 1961, p.2, in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol.13, no.49, p.4.

28 Quoted in J.P. Jain, "Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi 1973, p.380.

The Soviet Union then had proposed the consideration of:

1. The idea of de-nuclearised zones around the world;
2. Non-aggression treaties and agreements; and
3. Prohibition of war propaganda.

However, the Athens session of the NATO Council in 1962 again assumed hawkish posture. It spoke of "nuclear intimidation". It declared NATO as a "defensive alliance". The American government during the time had declared its intention of putting five polaris submarines armed with atomic missiles at the disposal of NATO Command and to exchange information about nuclear weapons and their use in war among the NATO member countries.²⁹

In fact, the NATO Secretary General declared that a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact was not necessary since the UN Charter already existed.

In the Political Consultative Committee meeting of the Warsaw Pact on 10th June 1962, the same proposal of a

29 Pravda, 13 May 1962, p.5, taken from the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol.14, no.19, p.24.

non-aggression treaty was repeated. It talked of the artificial delay that the western powers were causing in settling the German question and on peace talks. It also resolved to defend peace and safeguard security in case the western countries procrastinated unduly.³⁰

The attitude of the Western bloc along with NATO, CENTO, SEATO kept the world further divided.

Thus, we discussed in this chapter the development of the Warsaw Pact during the period 1955-62 when the Warsaw Pact under the leadership of the Soviet Union continuously strove for the achievement of peaceful co-existence in the face of Cold War hysteria: the German rearmament, the Berlin Crisis, the aggressiveness of NATO etc. However, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries did not neglect the security aspect; thus they consolidated their own strength to counter NATO militarily and politically, unleash ideological offensive against imperialism and exploit the weaknesses in imperialist system.

The policy of peaceful co-existence took a positive turn after the arrival of Khrushchev. However, this didn't

30 Daily Review, 11 June 1962, taken from J.P. Jain. Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1973, p.385.

mean convergence with capitalism. In spite of repeated proposals by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, the German problem remained unsettled culminating in the erection of the Berlin wall. Even the proposal to create a de-nuclearised zone in Europe floundered. Successive Political Consultative Committee meetings noted with grave concern the disparagement of the questions of European peace and security, however, it thereby didn't undermine the importance of consolidating the defence of the socialist state systems, rather it gave significant importance to it.

The Cuban missile crisis was a case in point in which the Soviet Union and the socialist camp displayed its strength in the face of imperialist attempts to sabotage the Cuban revolution by endangering its security. It proved that in crisis situations the socialist camp ~~can~~ ^{could} act decisively to protect and safeguard its security.

CHAPTER FIVE

Chapter Five

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE-ASPECT OF THE WARSAW PACT

In the last chapter, we discussed and analysed the growth and development of the Warsaw Pact - the challenges posed by the German rearmament, the Cold War aggressiveness and the responses generated by the Warsaw Pact to meet these threats. We discussed the different Political Consultative Committees' (PCCs) views on the questions of security and the decisions to face such problems by the socialist states. We also discussed the Cuban crisis and the way the socialist camp handled it.

In this Chapter we are going to discuss the economic and political-administrative aspect of the Warsaw Pact. We would see, how economic integration and the political-administrative aspect has further integrated and consolidated the "socialist Commonwealth".

Socialist integration model as it has evolved over the decades contains three basic dimensions: (1) Political; (2) Economic; and (3) Military.

The political dimension sanctioned that the socialist bloc countries are to be ruled by Communist

or workers parties governed by the ideas of Marx and Lenin -- this postulated the abolition of private property and elimination of all vestiges of previous modes of productions. It was achieved in the post-war period of Stalin's leadership.

Even if bilateral arrangements did exist between the USSR and East European countries the relations did contain seeds of future multilateral cooperation which was later on institutionalised. The Cominform was created in 1947 which reflected the primacy of political and ideological dimensions in bloc relations, and so it was organisationally institutionalised. Rightly does Ushakov¹ says that the idea of "proletarian internationalism" which governed socialist relations did exercise a "normative force".

The economic dimension received its impetus as the second important dimension in the socialist integration model - the creation of the Comecon in 1949; it was the institutional structuration. Roger Kanet, believes that the Comecon was initially created not for economic but political purposes and so he quotes from the communique:

1 Quoted in Roger E. Kanet, (ed.) Soviet Foreign Policy and East West Relations (Oxford, 1982), p.128.

"the USSR and the East European states did not consider it appropriate that they should submit themselves to the dictatorship of the Marshall Plan, which would have violated their sovereignty and the interests of their national economies".²

The third dimension - the military aspect - got institutionalised on 14 May, 1955, in the form of the Warsaw Pact. It ended the bilateralism of the earlier period and emphasised on multilateral cooperation and closer integration. It "was the single most important formal commitment binding the states to the USSR", according to Brzezinski.³

The socialist integration model, thus evolved, had emphasised on political and ideological dimensions much more in the earlier period.

This was to facilitate socialist consolidation and integration within the bloc. The conclusion of the Warsaw Pact brought about closer integration and bloc unity with the prospect of its becoming a single monolithic

2 Ibid., p.128.

3 Brezezinski, Z.K., The Soviet Bloc (New York: Praeger, 1965), p.171.

structure. It had of course irritants like the Yugoslav, Polish, and Rumanian questions. However, the Warsaw Pact had its own dynamics of compulsions - intense co-operation in the military field demanded closer economic integration between the member countries.

Western scholars, like Michael Kaser and John Pinder, who have vigorously studied the institutionalisation of socialist integration, have considered it as an end in itself. These views are in contrast with the views of the Soviet scholars like M. Senin who have argued it as a "process". Most of the western studies have been merely summary accounts which do not take into consideration the dialectics of the socialist alliance system and the principles underlying its integration mechanisms. Moreover, as Stanislav J. Kirschbaum writes, "In addition, Western scholars studying East European politics since World War II have laid primary stress on those events and policies that have marked a departure from expected patterns of behaviour: the riots in East Berlin and Pilsen in 1953, the Polish and Hungarian events of 1956, the Romanian opposition to the international socialist division of labour as well as the Romanian independent foreign policy, etc., etc. ...Yet the fact remains that since World War II, Eastern Europe has also reached a fairly acknowledged degree of cohesion

that in theory at least, should augur well for the achievement of an integrated area. It is well worth stressing that on the ideological level, these systems are uniformly dedicated to the achievement of a classless society and a socialist mode of production, that their respective political systems are almost interchangeable and that their social structures are reasonably parallel...In fact, most of the sufficient and necessary conditions are present to achieve just about any level of integration.⁴

And Brzezinski's ironical statement that "the East European states at one time could have been incorporated into the USSR as Soviet republics"⁵ did contain a grain of truth regarding the level of integration achieved.

Soviet scholars perceive socialist integration at the political, economic and military level quite differently - specifically at the level of economic integration - it is not construed as few practical steps to bring together the divergent economic elements

4 Stanislav, J. Kirschbaum, "Comecon and Political Integration in Europe", in Roger Kanet, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy and East West Relations (Oxford, 1982), p.125.

5 Z.K. Brzezinski, op.cit., p.166.

together; rather integration is sought as more or less forming a single whole and this operationalisation is achieved under the specific guidance of Marxist-Leninist principles.

The Warsaw Pact as heralding the principles of proletarian internationalism has been guiding the achievement of socialist economic integration. This was clearly illustrated during the events in Hungary, Poland, Romania etc., in which it helped to subvert and defeat the reactionary elements and thus preserve the socialist system in its economic and political essentials.

Till May 1956, there was no significant change in the economic relations between socialist states who had been following a policy of "autarkic industrialisation" in line with the Soviet Union and that only trade was used in economic coordination.⁶ It was in the seventh session that the Soviet Union showed some real interest in economic integration - all due to the initiatives of Khrushchev.

6 Uschakow, as quoted in Stainslev, J. Kirschbaum, p.130.

By 1954, proposals for the coordination of national five years plans of member states were already drawn up. These required institutionalisation which was achieved only in the 7th session when twelve standing commissions were created underlying which manifested the principles of international socialist division of labour. Each Commission was allotted a separate economic activity like trade, engineering etc., in which except Albania all states participated. The Commissions further undertook consultations through conferences, etc.

Bilateralism of the earlier periods was replaced by multilateral arrangements. Joint ventures, joint investments, multilateral projects like the "Friendship Pipeline" were undertaken.

In 1960 finally a Charter came into force. Its first article proclaimed the principle of national sovereignty which was taken from the 1949 communique. However, by 1960s it was abundantly clear that if economic integration was to be achieved more intensely, certain aspects of the national sovereignties had to be pruned. Plan coordination required a "unified planning organ" empowered to compile common plans and decide organisational matters as suggested by Khrushchev.⁷ In fact the

7 World Marxist Review, September 1962.

Soviet leader was suggesting the creation of a "supranational authority". Then the International Bank for Economic Cooperation was institutionalised alongwith a transferable rouble. Article 1 of the Comecon Charter explicitly stated: "The purpose of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is to promote by uniting and coordinating the efforts of the member countries of the council, the planned development of the national economy, the declaration of economic and technical progress in these countries, the raising of the level of industrialisation in the industrially less developed countries, a steady increase in the productivity of labour and a constant improvement in the welfare of the peoples of the member countries of the Council".⁸

Khrushchev in his article in the *Kommunist* (№ 12 1962) declared that international division of labour, international specialisation, coordination of plans, and cooperation in other economic activities like trade would facilitate further socialist economic integration. That the imperialist circles were talking of "Atlantic

8 The Comecon Charter from Michael Kaser, Comecon (Oxford, 1967), pp.235-40.

partnership", and in fact the common market and the organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and earlier the European Coal and Steel Community were used to reinforce NATO - that state monopoly capital had created some interstate alliance inspite of economic competition. These efforts were directed at strengthening the western alliance that is NATO against the socialist alliance.⁹

As early as 1953 signs of strain in the economic relations between Rumania and other members of the CMEA had been visible.¹⁰ Subsequent Soviet-Rumanian manoeuvrings within the Warsaw Pact was partly a logical extension of Rumania's disparagement of Moscow's views on "supranational planning".¹¹

M. Horovitz in an article in 1959 said: "The advancement of the socialist countries towards communism will not develop on the basis of the directives of any

9 Khrushchev, Vital Questions of the Development of the World Socialist System, in Kommunist (World Marxist Review), no.12, 1962, September 1962.

10 John Michael Montias, Economic Development in Communist Rumania (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1967), p.187.

11 See Remington, p.56.

s pra-national organ but will be accomplished under the leadership of the Communist and workers parties of every socialist country acting separately without any meddling from afar in the internal affairs of other countries".¹²

Fadayev, the General Secretary of the CMEA had asserted in 1962 that the Council was not a supra-national planning organ. It did not attempt any single plan and that the resolutions were subject to the approval of the member states.¹³

Even Khrushchev had clarified that international division of labour would not harm industrial development in the socialist countries and that such cooperation would be advantageous to economic developments.¹⁴

Marshal D. Shulman believes that COMECON was soon becoming an instrument in which the East European states were getting absorbed into the Soviet economic complex.¹⁵

12 M. Horovitz, "The Simultaneous Transition of Socialist Countries to Communism", see Remington, n. , p.65.

13 New Times (Moscow), 24 January 1962, pp.3-6.

14 Khrushchev, Izvestia, 26 June 1962.

15 Marshall D. Shulman, "The Communist States and Western Integration", International Organization, vol.17, no.3, Summer 1963, pp.649-62.

However, he misunderstood economic integration as economic absorption. Khrushchev had rightly declared, "The socialist world system is not just a socio-political union of countries, it is a world economic system. It follows then that co-ordination should be pursued not within the restricted limits of each socialist economy but on the scales of the socialist world economy, which means overcoming the exclusiveness inherited from the past. Our planned production will enable us to do this successfully".¹⁶

Kirschbaum maintains that the Warsaw Pact was used to spearhead proletarian internationalism by subverting any move for liberal economic and political reforms in countries like Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.¹⁷ This is how the Warsaw Pact was used as an instrument for economic integration. The Warsaw Pact has successfully subverted the reactionary forces in these countries opposed to socialist economic integration.

16 Khrushchev, quoted in J.F. Braum, "Rumania Steps out of Line", Survey, vol.49, October 1963, p.25.

17 Kirschenbaum, in Roger E. Kanet, n. , p.132.

According to Paul Marer,^{17(A)} CMEA was the political reply to the Marshall Plan. During the formative years the Soviet model was imposed on these countries because:

1. The Soviets thought it to be the correct one.
2. That it was not challenged by the East European leaders.
3. It had its political ramifications, that it placed limits on the mutual interactions among these countries which was intended to prevent the rise of a politically stronger Eastern Europe.
4. Orient their trade to the benefit of the USSR.

Marer further says that the Soviet shopping list (what is known as the Soviet Embassy system) determined the pattern of industrialisation in these countries; first the post-war economic recovery of these countries was slowed down by the Soviets paying low prices for their goods and carting away machinery from the former enemy countries. The value of the unrequited flow of resources from Eastern Europe to USSR during the first post-war decade was estimated to be roughly \$14 billion.

When the USSR discovered markets for its raw materials in Western Europe it decided to abandon the

^{17(A)} In Sarah Meiklejohn Terry (ed) Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, Yale Univ Press, New Haven, 1984, p. 186.

parallel industrial development strategy. Khrushchev realised the wastefulness of this strategy and decided for relations on more equitable basis; hence followed the dismantling of the joint stock companies. According to J.F. Brown the USSR's basic dilemma was between the desire for alliance and cohesion and the desire for maintaining political stability.^{17b}

The data reveal that the USSR has had a large export surplus in two of the "hardest" commodity groups - fuels and non-food raw materials and semi-manufactures - and a large deficit in machinery and industrial consumer goods which on balance are "softer" commodities. This was due to the energy and raw materials intensive development strategy during the base 40s and 50s and also due to the low energy and mineral resource endowment of the East European countries.

However, the argument of Paul Marer and others who argue in terms of the Soviet imposing their own model forget that many of these countries came out voluntarily to accept the Soviet model because of the rise of communist and workers parties in these countries.

^{17b} J.F. Brown, quoted in John C. Campbell in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven, 1984.

TABLE 6.1. Soviet Trade with the Six East European Countries Combined, by Main Commodity Categories, 1960-80 (In millions of transferable rubles)

	Fuels	Nonfood raw materials and semimanufactures	Agricultural and food products	Machinery	Industrial consumer goods	Total
<i>Exports</i>						
1960	372	1,205	476	637	77	2,767
1961	438	1,335	424	784	80	3,060
1962	527	1,438	544	976	89	3,574
1963	598	1,482	504	1,081	83	3,747
1964	668	1,717	322	1,274	68	4,049
1965	679	1,758	340	1,241	79	4,097
1966	660	1,777	380	1,327	79	4,223
1967	682	1,836	485	1,442	91	4,535
1968	742	2,048	493	1,671	118	5,073
1969	846	2,228	559	1,826	119	5,578
1970	914	2,600	487	1,944	138	6,083
1971	1,051	2,653	576	2,090	147	6,517
1972	1,174	2,740	351	2,301	161	6,727
1973	1,324	2,849	347	2,682	179	7,381
1974	1,577	3,185	496	3,185	263	8,705
1975	3,138	4,344	455	3,581	347	11,866
1976	3,717	4,610	177	4,216	387	13,107
1977	4,692	4,878	326	4,982	388	15,266
1978	5,670	5,115	109	5,605	448	16,946
1979	6,977	4,968	260	5,908	436	18,549
1980	8,582	5,478	152	6,219	488	20,919
<i>Imports</i>						
1960	187	535	171	1,153	470	2,516
1961	173	586	247	1,198	536	2,740
1962	164	627	229	1,551	660	3,231
1963	164	680	267	1,806	816	3,732
1964	158	757	289	2,001	801	4,005
1965	171	741	366	2,113	815	4,205
1966	158	662	349	1,926	922	4,016
1967	159	733	400	2,175	1,117	4,583
1968	145	802	417	2,471	1,245	5,079
1969	148	865	475	2,645	1,278	5,410
1970	144	962	555	2,899	1,411	5,970
1971	174	1,001	639	3,048	1,671	6,543
1972	205	1,202	759	3,720	1,801	7,687
1973	211	1,152	728	4,214	1,788	8,093
1974	196	1,208	889	4,450	1,857	8,600

TABLE 6.1 (continued)

	Fuels	Nonfood raw materials and semimanufactures	Agricultural and food products	Machinery	Industrial consumer goods	Total
1975	418	1,630	1,317	5,616	2,330	11,312
1976	407	1,798	1,226	6,321	2,474	12,226
1977	411	1,981	1,358	7,331	2,771	13,852
1978	497	1,941	1,220	10,065	3,049	16,776
1979	471	2,155	1,506	10,196	3,163	17,491
1980	401	2,777	1,864	10,585	3,468	19,095

SOURCE: Official Soviet foreign trade statistics as compiled, reconstructed, or estimated in Wharton Centrally Planned Economies Foreign Trade Data Bank, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Wharton Econometrics, Jan. 1982).

TABLE 6.2. Soviet Trade with the Six East European Countries Combined, Total and by Main Commodity Categories, 1960-80 (In millions of transferable rubles)

	Fuels	Nonfood raw materials and semimanufactures	Agricultural and food products	Machinery	Industrial consumer goods	Total
1960	185	670	305	-516	-393	252
1961	265	749	177	-414	-456	320
1962	363	811	315	-575	-571	343
1963	434	802	237	-725	-733	15
1964	510	960	33	-727	-733	44
1965	508	1,017	-26	-872	-736	-108
1966	502	1,115	31	-599	-843	207
1967	523	1,103	85	-733	-1,026	-48
1968	597	1,246	76	-800	-1,127	-6
1969	698	1,363	84	-819	-1,159	168
1970	770	1,638	-68	-955	-1,273	113
1971	877	1,652	-63	-958	-1,524	-16
1972	969	1,539	-408	-1,419	-1,640	-960
1973	1,114	1,697	-381	-1,532	-1,609	-712
1974	1,382	1,977	-393	-1,265	-1,594	105
1975	2,720	2,714	-862	-2,035	-1,982	554
1976	3,310	2,812	-1,049	-2,105	-2,087	881
1977	4,281	2,897	-1,032	-2,349	-2,383	1,414
1978	5,173	3,170	-1,112	-4,460	-2,601	170
1979	6,506	2,813	-1,247	-4,288	-2,727	1,058
1980	8,181	2,700	-1,712	-4,365	-2,980	1,824

SOURCE: Calculated from table 6.1.

Moreover, they also ignore the nature and structure of the Warsaw Pact, COMECON and 'socialist integration' in general; that they are based on different principles - principles of Marxism-Leninism. This is the reason, why they are together referred to as the "Socialist Commonwealth".

The Political-Administrative Aspect

"One of the other organs of administration" of the Warsaw Pact appears to be a political directorate in charge of organising regular exchanges among the officers of the main political administration of the Warsaw Pact. These exchanges facilitate the conduct of joint political activities, most of which are bilateral Soviet-East European programmes...also facilitate the coordination of political education among the soldiers and officers of the Pact.¹⁸ The Soviet main Political Administration (MPA) serves as the clearing house for the joint activities of the Warsaw Pact political agencies in the absence of a political directorate of the United Command of the Warsaw Pact. Except Rumania all other countries participate in joint programmes.

¹⁸ Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1981), p.164.

The MPA's of other East European countries are modelled on the Soviet MPA which is divided into "administration" and "departments". It conducts the party political work in the military and controls all military publications and co-ordinates political activities.

The Generals and Officers of the MPAs of the socialist countries meet to discuss political and military matters.

"One of the responsibilities of the Soviet MPA is the strengthening of the fraternal cooperation of the Soviet armed forces with the armed forces of the other socialist countries".¹⁹

Regular contacts among generals, officers, workers and soldiers are arranged and they are trained not only in combat mechanisms but also in Marxist-Leninist thought. It facilitates exchange of experience among them and familiarisation with each other. Things pertaining to military-political importance are discussed and displayed through films and other aids - for instance themes like the aspects of imperialism, the role of the Warsaw Pact.

19 Soviet Military Encyclopaedia (Moscow, 1977),
Vol.2.

General Epishev of the Soviet MPA concludes, "The ties of the fraternal political organs, their cooperation and the wealth of joint forms of internationalist training have become an organic part of the general complex of relations among the armed forces of the fraternal socialist countries."²⁰

The military Institute of Leningrad helps the MPA to train officers and generals.

Christopher Jones argues that the basic mission of the Warsaw Pact political directorate is to prevent another East European State from offering resistance to Soviet military hegemony and offering territorial defense.²¹ In fact it conducts political work on three basic themes:

1. Socialist Patriotism
2. Proletarian internationalism
3. Class hatred of the imperialists.²²

However, things would appear different if one looks at from a socialist integration perspective -

20 General Epishev, Soviet Military Encyclopaedia (Moscow, 1976), p.527.

21 Christopher Jones, n. , p.171.

22 Ibid., p.172.

that the chief purpose of the political directorate is to achieve socialist integration among the East European countries in the face of mounting threats from the Western alliance.

Thus we analysed in this chapter the political, economic and military dimensions of the socialist integration model. This model is based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism - that the integrative mechanisms are attempted to unite socialist states which are based on the premises of the abolition of private property and the rule by the working class. This is the reason, this should be viewed differently, keeping in view the nature of their state structures. The Soviet Union has played a key role in knitting the socialist commonwealth - its various dimensions. The success of the Soviet model has led to its acceptance by the socialist countries. Over the years, the socialist countries have developed significantly as units of the socialist community of nations. Of course, the process has been marked by differences and debates - but these have only further advanced the process of integration.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

The problem of defence and security of the USSR has always preoccupied the Soviet leadership. During the inter-war years the problem certainly couldn't be resolved inspite of the best efforts of the Soviet Union. The result was the Nazi attack on the USSR and the catastrophic experience of the Second World War. Although the USSR emerged victorious from the war, the historical problem of Soviet security assumed new dimensions; on the one hand the Cold War had begun while on the other, East European socialist states were weak and underdeveloped as they were during the immediate post war years, ^{when} had emerged. Further the Soviet Union itself was engaged in restoring its war torn economy. The problem of Soviet security thus became wider given the weakness of the East European socialist states, and the monopoly of nuclear weapons held by the United States of America.

In the preceeding pages, we have described these historical developments, we have also tried to investigate a framework for Soviet policy of security for itself and its allies. We have shown that much of Soviet policy posture and concrete action were indeed

as a response to policies and actions of the western powers. Much of Soviet effort was concentrated during the immediate post-war years on bilateral arrangements with East European socialist states. However, by the beginning of the 50s West Germany began to be rearmed, earlier in 1949 NATO had already been established. As has been pointed out earlier, one of the basic assumption for the establishment of the NATO was that the Soviet Union was an expansionist power poised to overrun entire Europe; hence, a threat has to be used formally to counter a threat. However, various diplomatic moves by the Soviet Union during this period as we have discussed earlier, amply shows that such a threat perception by the western powers was not justified. A case in point here is the declaration of Stalin of 1952 regarding the possibility of the two camps living in peaceful coexistence. However, the western powers were reluctant to enter into a long term arrangement which could preserve the security of the Soviet Union and its East European allies as well as the West.

The signing of the Warsaw Pact in the summer of 1955 was thus logical; indeed a reluctant step by the Soviet Union. With the benefit of historical hindsight one wonders as to why did the USSR take so long in

concluding the Warsaw Pact and establish its various other agencies.

Thus, the German rearmament, the signing of the Paris agreements, the strengthening of the NATO, the refusal of the western powers to conclude a General European Collective Security Treaty forced the socialist countries to conclude the Warsaw Pact for self-defence and protect the socialist system and preserve European peace.

The Warsaw Pact is no 'Eastern NATO' or 'NATO's opposite number'. The Warsaw Pact and NATO should be compared along with their historicities rather than superficially. The Warsaw Pact is an alliance that binds socialist countries which are based on Marxist-Leninist principles and revolutionary changes. The characteristics of these societies are entirely different than those which have formed the NATO. These are non-exploitative egalitarian societies distinct from the capitalist-imperialist state structures. And it is purely defensive in nature. If NATO came into existence in 1949, the Warsaw Pact came into existence in 1955 as a desperate move when all the proposals of peace given by the USSR were turned down by the western powers. And for all these years NATO kept arming itself further

endangering peace in Europe.

As a military organisation, it has the added advantage over NATO. While NATO's military strategy and planning has been shaped by out-dated concepts and an exaggerated view of the Soviet strength, the Warsaw Pact strategy has been relying on conventional defence. It is a fact that the military HQ of the Warsaw Pact has been located in the Soviet Ministry of Defence since 1955. According to Mackintosh, it is a "multinational war office" grafted on to the Soviet ministry of Defence.¹ That all military policies spring from Moscow - that the armed forces are controlled by the Russians, that it has never hammered out a common defence or foreign policy, that the Political Consultative Committee met only rarely between 1955-1969.

However, joint consultations and meetings and agreements have often been arrived at among the countries regarding important matters. Of course the Soviet Union as the bastion of socialism has often played a leading and preponderant role - but this is only to defend socialism and the socialist states which embody within itself as a primary duty.

¹ Malcolm Mackintosh, The Warsaw Pact Today, Survival, June-July 1974.

By undertaking joint exercises these countries have been able to ensure military preparedness and ability to defend themselves. Its military structure is grounded on the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The Warsaw Pact has helped to achieve economic and political integration among the socialist countries by defeating the reactionary elements opposed to socialist economic integration and such other measures. It has provided the bulwark for COMECON.

The Warsaw Pact is criticised as just a buffer between the USSR and the West and the Soviet Union has deliberately created this buffer because of simple strategic reasons. This kind of ahistorical criticism only sounds banal. It overlooks the facts of socialist integration, socialist and proletarian internationalism and considers these as all bunk.

Rightly, Campbell² says that there is no evidence to testify that the Russian intervention in Eastern Europe was intended as a first step to launch an offensive against Western Europe; that it is not Soviet occupation that led to its influence in Eastern Europe but the rise of the Communist parties in these countries supported by

2 John C. Campbell in Sarah Meiklejohn Tery (ed.) Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, (London: Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984).

the working class and the people that gave rise to Soviet influence in this area. Moreover, one doesn't agree with Campbell when he says that Eastern Europe constituted the glacis providing defensive depth for the USSR - that it went beyond the parameters of mere security requirement - that the so called Soviet extension was concomittant with its newly acquired role of a global power.

Significantly Khrushchev brought about liberalisation in the Soviet-East European relations which led to Kadar's "Goulash ^{Communist} Commission", Gomulka taking part in the Polish, October and Gheorghiu Dej of Romania's rejection of Khrushchev's plan for integrated development through the CMEA.

These differences have however not halted socialist integration, rather have further enhanced it. Economic integration has taken place under the leadership of USSR in which other socialist countries have also equally participated and this is evident from the growth and development of their economies over the years. So ⁱⁿ the process of economic integration there has been mutual contribution marked by mutual development rather than any exploitation.

To view the Warsaw Pact as a "Russian strategic contraption" launched by the USSR is to miss the logic of Soviet strategic thinking. After all, as has been mentioned the Warsaw Pact was a desperate move by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to counter NATO and in general western war hysteria. It is then that the Warsaw Pact was concluded with the express pronouncement that once an all European collective Security Treaty is concluded for which the USSR would strive, the Warsaw Pact would cease to operate. However, it proved illusory. Call it, reticence, reluctance, gimic, or deliberate strategic manoeuvre, the western powers were not prepared to settle things at the bargaining table. And so issues like the German problem; its rearmament, European peace etc., were ducked.

Some of the critics who analyse the Warsaw Pact, concentrate their diatribes against the presence of Russian troops and Russian intervention into the affairs of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania etc. They forget that these have taken place under agreements to protect and preserve the socialist system. They also forget the amount of socialist integration it has helped to achieve and has provided security for the socialist countries

on the face of western military aggressiveness. The presence of Russian troops and the so called intervention (the Soviets provide evidence of invitation) was basically designed to preserve socialism in the country concerned against the onslaught of ~~revolutionary~~ ^{reactionary} elements who were bent on destroying the socialist framework. Thus Russian intervention was not designed for occupation or absorption but to protect the socialist state system.

As it has been pointed out the basic parameters of Soviet foreign policy were peaceful coexistence and proletarian internationalism. Soviet Union continuously strove to achieve peaceful coexistence but was always thwarted in its efforts by the policies of the western powers which generated war hysteria in Europe through the German rearmament, military build-up of NATO and carrying on with the European Defence Community Project.

Strategically, the Warsaw Pact under the leadership of the USSR has prevented the western powers from making inroads into the socialist countries; things which they had been trying for long to subvert the revolution in these countries and destroy the gains of socialism. All that penetration of spies and agent provocateurs into the GDR was a clear example. That

is, the Warsaw Pact has, over the years, successfully fulfilled its designed role of ensuring security for the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

APPENDIX

THE WARSAW TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION, AND
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
ALBANIA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, THE
HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC, THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THE RUMANIAN
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC

14 May 1955*

The Contracting Parties,

reaffirming their desire for the establishment
of a system of European collective security based on
the participation of all European states irrespective
of their social and political systems, which would make
it possible to unite their efforts in safeguarding the
peace of Europe;

mindful, at the same time, of the situation
created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris
agreements, which envisage the formation of a new
military alignment in the shape of "Western European
Union", with the participation of a remilitarized

* New Times (Moscow), no 21 May 1955 Supplement, pp 65-67.

Western Germany and the integration of the latter in the North-Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of another war and constitutes a threat to the national security of the peaceable states;

being persuaded that in these circumstances the peaceable European states must take the necessary measures to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe;

guided by the objects and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization;

being desirous of further promoting and developing friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of noninterference in their internal affairs;

have decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance and have for that purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries;

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania; Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania;

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria: Vylko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria;

the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic: Andras Hegedus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic;

the President of the German Democratic Republic: Otto Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic;

the State Council of the Polish People's Republic: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic;

the Presidium of the Great National Assembly of the Rumanian Peoples Republic: Gheoghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic;

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR;

the President of the Czechoslovak Republic: Viliam Siroky, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic;

who having presented their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in such a manner as will not jeopardize international peace and security.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere cooperation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security, and will fully devote their energies to the attainment of this end.

The Contracting Parties will furthermore strive for the adoption in agreement with other states which may desire to cooperate in this, of effective measures for universal reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international peace and security.

They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the parties to the Treaty has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of peace and security.

Article 4

In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 5

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defence against possible aggression.

Article 6

For the purpose of the consultations among the Parties envisaged in the present Treaty, and also for the purpose of examining questions which may arise in the operation of the Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up, in which each of the parties to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another specifically appointed representative.

The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as may prove necessary.

Article 7

The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties do not conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article 8

The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation with a view to further developing and fostering economic and cultural intercourse with one another, each adhering to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the other and non-interference in their internal affairs.

Article 9

The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states, irrespective of their social and political systems, which express their readiness by participation in the present Treaty to assist in uniting the efforts of the peaceable states in safeguarding the peace and

security of the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of the Parties to the Treaty after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

Article 10

The Present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The Treaty shall enter into force on the day the last instrument of ratification has been deposited. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall notify the other Parties to the Treaty as each instrument of ratification is deposited.

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For such Contracting Parties as do not at least one year before the expiration of this period present to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a statement of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the next ten years.

Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of

Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the Contracting Parties will unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty enters into force.

Done in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, in one copy each in the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all texts being equally authentic. Certified copies of the present Treaty shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all the Parties to the Treaty.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals.

For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania

Mehmet Shehu

For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

Vylko Chervenkov

For the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic

Andras Hegedus

For the President of the German Democratic Republic

Otto Grotewohl

For the State Council of the Polish People's Republic

Jozeł Cyrankiewicz

For the Presidium of the Grant National Assembly of the
Rumanian People's Republic

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

Nikolai Alexandrovich
Bulganin

For the President of the Czechoslovak Republic

Viliam Siroky

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