

MUSLIMS AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1940s IN INDIA

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

RIE OKUNO



CENTRE FOR HISTORICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI – 110067


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
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
(Rie Okuno)

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before examiners for evaluation.


Professor Neeladri Bhattacharya
(Chairperson)


Professor Bhagwan Josh
(Supervisor)

CHAIRPERSON
Centre for Historical Studies
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110067


Dr. Indivar Kamtekar
(Supervisor)

Centre for Historical Studies
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	i
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE: THE CABINET MISSION PLAN AND ALLIED EVENTS	19
CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF THE NATIVE PRESS IN THE FREEDOM-STRUGGLE – A CASE STUDY OF URDU NEWSPAPERS	59
CHAPTER THREE: BECOMING THE MUSLIM REFUGEES	111
CONCLUSION	163
APPENDICES	168
BIBLIOGRAPHY	197

List of Illustrations

FIGURE 1 MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE COUNCIL OF ACTION.....	56
FIGURE 2 'TWO DIVISIONS'.....	107
FIGURE 3 THE MAP OF BAHADURGARH	127
FIGURE 4 THE MAP OF HUMAYUN'S TOMB.....	139
FIGURE 5 THE MAP OF ALWAR AND GURGAON.....	151
FIGURE 6 THE MAP AROUND QUEEN'S GARDEN IN 1942	159

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I am entirely responsible for the contents of this thesis. Any errors of fact or style are unintended, but mine alone.

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INTRODUCTION

The historical process that led to India's Independence and Pakistan's¹ creation was a long and complex one. Complicated negotiations were conducted between various leaders of British India and the British government at this time, and the shape of these negotiations changed repeatedly during this process. At the same time, a battle was fought between the All India National Congress and the All India Muslim League over a number of issues, the most central one being over the creation of a Muslim-majority state called Pakistan. The ideology of Pakistan spread among people, assuming varied interpretations as it did so. The actual territory of Pakistan was made clear only soon after Independence Day. It is indeed ironical that British rule in South Asia, which lasted over two hundred years, was terminated in hectic and relatively brief negotiations over territorial boundaries.

Although high politics provides the background, the central concern of this thesis is not with the decision-makers, but with people who were affected by decisions made far above them. I ask the questions: how could people understand the situation around them? Could they choose a country in which to stay, and if so, on what basis could they do so? My specific concern is with Indian Muslims, and how they imagined the new country that was created in their name. This thesis will address these questions as I perceive a neglect of these issues in Partition and transfer of power historiography. Partition historiography has mostly centred on high level discussions between the British government and Indian leaders, and on the clever tactics of famous political leaders. Since the spotlight is on the decision-makers, the public is left in the dark. This thesis aims to shift the spotlight to a specific section of

¹ In this thesis, unless mentioned otherwise, 'Pakistan' refers to West Pakistan alone, and does not include East Pakistan.

the pre Independence Indian public: the Indian Muslims. It examines their reaction to the political events of the time. They are chosen here not only because of their minority status in India as a whole, but also because they were supposed to be the beneficiaries of the creation of the new state of Pakistan.

Partition Historiography

As is to be expected, the Partition and transfer of power have been subjects of much academic interest and research since 1947, and a considerable number of studies have been conducted on these events and the processes leading up to them. Even today, the Indians and Pakistanis hold very different opinions on whether Pakistan was the product of historical accident, or historical necessity. To answer this question in academic terms would require a comprehensive study of the Partition, and would involve consulting a wide variety of documents pertaining to the British Government, the Indian Government, the Pakistani Government and the Bangladeshi Government. Apart from academic studies, journalists and novelists have also relied on different sources or the creative imagination to discuss these seminal events. The number of works, both academic and literary, on Partition is so huge that some kind of classificatory scheme becomes essential. On the basis of the background and perspective of the historian writing them, a very simple scheme is to divide Partition historiography into the following: that from the British perspective, the Indian perspective and the Pakistani perspective. But there are many shades of opinion and analysis within each of these, and I shall now discuss a few representative and influential examples of some of them.

The History of the Pakistan Movement

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who is widely considered the creator of Pakistan and addressed as *Qaid-e-Azam* (the great leader) in Pakistan even today, has naturally been the subject of many historical works. The most prominent of these is Ayesha Jalal's *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, published in 1985, and considered sensational by many historians and readers at the time of its publication. At that time, the general trend in Partition historiography emanating from India was to consider Jinnah in a negative light and to blame him for the bloody Partition. Jalal's work cast serious doubts on this image of Jinnah by taking a fresh look at the negotiations leading to Pakistan. Her basic idea was that the demand of Pakistan was just a tool of political bargaining, and that Jinnah's real aim was not to attain a separate state, but to attain equality for India's Muslim minority within a united state. The question then arose as to who led the movement to divide India into two states. According to Jalal, 'It was Congress that insisted on partition. It was Jinnah who was against partition.'² It is Jalal's opinion that the 'Congress's overweening policies'³ promoted the separation of states because the Congressmen needed a strong Central Government. This perspective is the exact opposite of the one offered by Anita Inder Singh who argues that the Congress did not have any responsibility for dividing India.⁴ Although I agree with some of the points made by Jalal, I differ with her on her insistence that the Pakistan movement was a just tool to attain equality for Muslims. Although Jalal's study of Jinnah is based on solid empirical evidence, she also undertakes a psychological analysis of Jinnah at times. While discussing the Muslim National Guard during the Partition of Punjab

² A. Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Lahore, 1985;1999), p,262.

³ *ibid.*, p,263.

⁴ A.I. Singh, *The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987)

and Bengal, Jalal adds that 'the leaders were more concerned with protecting their own political futures than that of the province or even the people they purported to lead.'⁵ My contention is that although Jalal has examined the process by which leaders protected their own political futures, she has neglected to study in any detail the 'people they purported to lead'. This thesis studies these very people.

R. J. Moore also shares Jalal's view about Jinnah's role in the Pakistan Movement. He explains that 'the campaign for a "Muslim" nation was hardly embedded in the "historical logic" of the two-nation theory'. As proof for his theory, he cites the opinions of those people who felt the Pakistan demand was either a form of bargaining, or a reverie.⁶ In Moore's opinion, 'the Pakistan demand was no pet scheme of which he [Jinnah] dreamed alone but an ideal to which he was converted by others, colleagues of long standing like Haroon, thinkers in the line of Muhammad Iqbal, scholars of the Aligarh school.'⁷ In other words, for Moore, the true founder of the Pakistan demand was not Jinnah but various other Muslim leaders. However, this opinion underestimates Jinnah as a political leader of Muslims. Even though Jinnah did not observe many of the fundamental tenets of his religion, he certainly possessed the talent of a great politician to point out the dissatisfaction among Muslims generally. Moore also acknowledges this: 'Jinnah articulated not the Koran's promise of political power nor memories of the Mughals but the Muslim's sense of persecution at the sudden threat to all that he had achieved in the twentieth century.'⁸

⁵ Jalal, *Sole Spokesman*, pp,263-264.

⁶ R.J. Moore, 'Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand', in Mushirul Hasan, ed., *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (OUP, Delhi, 1993;2006), pp,161-162.

⁷ *ibid.*, p,195.

⁸ *ibid.*, p,194.

Subaltern Studies and Partition Historiography

Concern with conducting research around the people affected by Partition has been steadily growing. Some researchers have already started to approach issues of how the masses accepted and experienced both Independence and Partition. The Subaltern Studies approach focuses on the non-elite. However, even this approach cannot neglect conventional history that focuses on the political elite. The merit of this school lies in enriching historiography by supplementing it with the views and perspectives of ordinary people. In his early work *Modern India: 1885-1947* by Sumit Sarkar, for example, explains not only class-conflicts but also caste-conflicts, tribal-conflicts, and sometimes gender-conflicts.

Gyanendra Pandey, as a brilliant historian about the Partition working from this Subaltern viewpoint, occupies a prominent position in the Subaltern Studies approach. Although he has written some articles about the violence during Partition, *Remembering Partition* is his masterpiece. The basic aim of his research is to show how the local comes to be part of the national in new kinds of ways. On the Partition of India, he states that 'in the history of any society, narratives of particular experience of violence go towards making the "community" and the subject of history.'⁹ Pandey examines the event from the position of three communities: Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. He reviews the event using terms used by ordinary people to describe it: 'as migration, *maashal-la* (martial law), *mara-mari* (killings), *raula*, *hullar* (disturbance, tumult, uproar).'¹⁰ According to Pandey, people had united into local groups or classes, and only during the campaign for the election in 1945-1946 were these groups re-constructed into religious communities such as

⁹ Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001;2003), p,4.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p,15.

Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, and 'our people' turned into 'us' and 'them'.¹¹ Thus, in Pandey's view, 'violence happens and can only happen at the boundaries of community.'¹²

Very recently, two new books have appeared that tackle people-oriented themes. Yasmin Khan's *The Great Partition* and Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar's *The Long Partition*. Both works share a common concern with relegating the examination of complex political negotiations to second place, and giving more importance to the examination of the events centred around people, for example, communal riots and refugees. Khan shows 'how uncertain and ambiguous the meaning of Partition and Pakistan were to people living through these events,'¹³ while Zamindar explains the events from the Muslim perspective. Zamindar traces the transfer of people between Delhi in India and Karachi in Pakistan using Urdu newspapers as a source. She uses the term 'boundary' not in the territorial sense, but in the sense of barriers between communities. Her aim is to recover a remarkable history of how two postcolonial states comprehended, intervened in, and shaped the colossal displacements of Partition. It is her view that,

In important ways, then, what actually happened at Partition, and the ways in which Partition is rhetorically invoked and socially remembered, are tied to each other to produce what could be called *Partition effects*. In other words, the Muslim predicament in India today and the making of contemporary *muhajir* politics in Pakistan must be understood as both a product of this history of the long Partition and of the ways in which this history has been narrated within the ideological frames of nation.¹⁴

¹¹ *ibid.*, pp,197-198.

¹² *ibid.*, pp,188.

¹³ Y. Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (Penguin, New Delhi, 2007), p,5.

¹⁴ V.F. Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories* (Penguin, New Delhi, 2008), p,238.

Both these works may thus be termed 'Partition Effects' studies.

The historians who use official documents for research about prominent political leaders, and others who research about the masses using local and individual narratives, are naturally critical of each other. Pandey points out the insufficiency of focusing on high politics (as is done by Jalal). On the other hand, Jalal insists that 'the problem is compounded by his [Pandey's] insistence on the need to write a history of violence on its own terms without reference to particular historical contexts or any notion of broader historical change',¹⁵ and 'the peoples' history of violence we learnt from Pandey himself was not much different from what he derides as the historians' history.'¹⁶ David Gilmartin gives a shrewd and neutral analysis of both sides when he says that,

For historians, the roots of the problem lie in the marked disjunction in the historical literature between the story of the "high politics" of Partition, the negotiations between the British, the Congress, and the Muslim League that, led to the creation of Pakistan, and the narrative of popular history, of "history from below". ... But the scholarship on the "high politics" of Partition has nevertheless tended to posit a realm of political agitation relatively uninfluenced by the everyday politics of local life.¹⁷

Gilmartin proceeds by explaining the important role of 'history from below'. Some historians have examined how different groups of people remember the Partition as

¹⁵ A. Jalal, 'Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of 'Communalism': Partition Historiography Revisited', *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. 33:1, (1996), p.98.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p.102.

¹⁷ D. Gilmartin, 'Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 57:4, (1998), p.1069.

violence, the resettlement of refugees, abducted women and so on. It is needed to record individual memories and experiences about the Partition. Urvashi Butalia's *The Other Side of Silence*¹⁸ is famous for collecting memories of ordinary people, especially women, who underwent the traumas of the Partition. However, historians need to analyze these memories very carefully in order to piece fragments into a narrative.

Partition Literature and Partition History

Jalal, Pandey, Gilmartin and other historians have at least one point in common: they are unanimous in their praise of the novelist Saadat Hasan Manto, especially of his short story *Toba Tek Singh*.¹⁹ Each scholar has drawn on one or the other idea from Manto's oeuvre. For example, Jalal admires his expression of the self-definition of a new country and the experience of abducted and assaulted women described in *Khol Do*, another work of Manto.²⁰ Gilmartin points out the dislocation of place as Manto's fundamental idea.²¹ The literature of the Partition focuses in large part on women's suffering, as Jalal has explained,

The narratives in the literature force a deep ethically-informed understanding of the condition of these women by viewing the predicament from within their subjectivity and offer empathy. ...

Secondly, whereas the political discourse failed to, or did not want to,

¹⁸ U. Butalia, ed., *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India* (Penguin, New Delhi, 1998).

¹⁹ The brief sketch of the story: Bishan Singh, known as Toba Tek Singh, is an inmate in a mental hospital. One day he hears that Pakistan is founded. He asks his fellow inmates 'Where is Toba Tek Singh? Is he in India or Pakistan?' But, no one answers. When he is transferred to India (because he is a Sikh), he collapses in a no man's land between India and Pakistan.

²⁰ In this connection, it is an interesting fact that Jalal's father, Hamid Jalal is a nephew of Saadat Hasan Manto. See A. Jalal, 'Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of 'Communalism': Partition Historiography Revisited', *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. 33:1, (1996), pp,100-101.

²¹ D. Gilmartin, 'Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 57:4, (1998), pp,1084-1085.

imagine the horror that these women were suddenly confronted with, it is this “otherness” that the narratives evocatively apprehended.²²

Urdu stories particularly deal with violence against women.²³ The Urdu literature, according to *Partition of India: Literary Responses*, narrates not only the sorrow of refugee women but the sorrow of all others who left India. ‘Their works are serious comments upon the contemporary leaders’ behaviour and their failure to keep the country united.’²⁴ The Urdu authors were not willing to shift from India (where their culture and even Urdu was growing) to Pakistan. In fact, a literary organization founded in the mid-1930s called ‘The Progressive Writers’ Association’ had an unfavourable attitude towards the Partition. The members implied their political opinions in their works. ‘The activities of this Association gave Urdu literature a vital stimulus, a new vigour and a liberating consciousness.’²⁵ However, historians cannot use Urdu literature as the proof that all Urdu authors supported united India. Since many famous novels about the Partition are also memoirs written after the Partition, they cannot be taken as proof of events because they are very coloured by memory. Hence, it cannot be said that all Urdu authors were supporters of united India, and it seems that some Urdu authors wrote columns and short stories concerned with Pakistan. The main role of literature in historical studies is to add liveliness to the historical narration of events and facts.

²² D. Mookerjee-Leonard, ‘Divided Homelands, Hostile Homes: Partition, Women and Homelessness’, *The Journal of Commonwealth Literature*, Vol. 40, (2005), p.142.

²³ ‘A large body of Partition literature has been written in Hindi, English, Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi and Bengali, and some in Pashto, Dogri, Gujarati and Marathi. ... Some Urdu authors talk about social change due to Partition, other attack the fanatics, or expose the brutalities associated with Partition.’ See S.R. Chakravarty and Mazhar Hussain, ed., *Partition of India: Literary Responses* (New Delhi, 1998), pp.16-17.

²⁴ *ibid.*, p.17.

²⁵ M. Hasan, ‘Nationalist and Separatist Trends in Aligarh, 1915-1947’, in A. K. Gupta, ed., *Myth and Reality: The struggle for Freedom in India 1945-47* (Manohar, Delhi, 1987), p.120.

The reason why many researchers examine refugee migrations and their rehabilitation is due to the quantity of historical sources. After the Partition, the government of India set up some organizations to rescue 'abducted' women from Pakistan. These organizations and the Ministry of Rehabilitation hold many records concerned with the matter. On the other hand, many people who experienced being refugees are alive now and open to being interviewed. In the case of the Partition, historians insist that those people evacuated from violence were cases of involuntary migration.²⁶ An article, 'Escape from Violence' explained that 'the reason has to do with the essence of structural violence, namely, it is structured. Economic violence of this kind is not incidental or random but is a characteristic of certain socioeconomic systems and, to some extent, is necessary for their functioning.'²⁷ Moreover, it pointed out the socioeconomic feature of migrations that 'a large proportion of the urban than of the rural Muslim community migrated presumably because their property (if any) was more mobile. When the minority community largely had immovable property (land and shrines), and especially when the property was big (the *zamindar* holdings), the owners tended to move only in the face of imminent, physical violence.'²⁸ The view that the people whose property was mobile could emigrate easily is a sound one. However, we must also note that that the Muslim League which promoted the Pakistan movement was manned by many landowners, and people sometimes criticized the League as 'the party of *zamindars*', or 'the party of Sir'. Actually, the landowners of the Muslim League held a movement to reject the

²⁶ 'To the extent the term *involuntary migration* has an objective meaning, it was here. Millions fled, literally to save their lives from the murderous mobs engaging in orgies of physical violence.' See A.R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*, (OUP, New York and Oxford, 1989), p.129.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p.134.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p.131.

titles given to them by the British government. Of course, their main job was that of politicians, not *zamindars* any more.

Novels, autobiographies, and articles of history and sociology describe the life of refugees. Some principal cities accepted a large number of people, for example, Delhi, Lahore, Karachi, Calcutta and Dacca. Delhi was full with refugees who were leaving for Pakistan, coming from Pakistan, and running away to Delhi. 'Delhi had become a veritable 'refugee-istan', he [Ebadat Bareilvi] recalls.'²⁹ Ranjana Sengupta writes about the refugees in Delhi.³⁰ The coming and going of refugees was surely the turning point in the twentieth century history of Delhi. Pandey and Zamindar describe the situation of Muslim refugees in Delhi vividly. Pandey described how Muslims were attacked by other communities and forced to run away. His explanation about some communal riots in Delhi is vivid and clear. On the other hand, Zamindar tracked Muslim families as they became divided between Delhi and Karachi. In her opinion,

This story of long Partition unsettles this national closure giving to Partition's displacements, by recovering the contingency in which people left their homes in Delhi and Karachi, as well as their numerous attempts to return to them in the ensuing years. Therefore it is with purpose that I use the word *displacement* and not *migration*, to describe the momentous movements of people at this time. The word *migration* came to imply both a movement with the intention of permanent relocation as well as a voluntary exodus, and acquired bureaucratic and juridical meaning in attempts to control, legislate, and ultimately fix

²⁹ Ebadat Bareilvi writes his autobiography titled *Azadi ke saaye mein*. See Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, pp,199-200.

³⁰ See R. Sengupta, *Delhi Metropolitan: The Making of an Unlikely City*, (Penguin, Delhi, 2007).

these displacements – produce, with some force, bounded citizens of two-nation states.³¹

Her analysis of political cartoons and articles in *Jang* (a newspaper of Pakistan) and *Al-Jamiat* (a newspaper of India) is valuable. Of course, just two studies are not enough to show the situation of Muslim refugees in many places. There are many ex-Muslim colonies and neo-Muslim colonies in Delhi. Even the Muslims who went to Pakistan felt Pakistan was not ‘their’ country. ‘The exclusion from the new state of about thirty-six million Muslims (including those in the Indian State) left in the Dominion (late Republic) of India, confronted thinking Pakistanis with dilemmas of their own identity and of their relationship with their past.’³² On the other hand, the Muslims who remained in India also felt a dilemma: ‘the demand for integration into a nominal secular polity counterbalanced by the danger of losing a religious and cultural identity, being a *de facto* minority.’³³ The foundation of Pakistan caused dissatisfaction to Muslims who stayed in India and to those who migrated to Pakistan.

The Pakistan Movement and the Islamic Studies

To examine the Partition from the point of Muslims, we need to understand the situation of Muslims in India. ‘In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries South Asian Muslims, along with Muslims elsewhere in the world, experienced religious change of revolutionary significance.’³⁴ Many historians have discussed Muslim separatism. This idea of separatism is linked with the two-nation theory which Muhammad Ali Jinnah proposed and even some political and religious leaders

³¹ V.F. Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories*, p.7.

³² P. Hardy, *The Muslim of British India*, (CUP, Great Britain, 1972), p.253.

³³ J.P. Hartung, ‘Affection and Aversion: Ambivalences Among Muslim Intellectual Elites in Contemporary South Asia’, *South Asia Research*, Vol. 21:2, (2001), p.194.

³⁴ F. Robinson, *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia*, (OUP, New Delhi, 2000;2006), p.105.

implied. The discussion between Francis Robinson and Paul Brass is important in this regard. According to Robinson, 'Pakistan did seem the better of two poor alternatives, and two strands seem prominent in the thought of those prepared to support the idea. One, which appeared to dominate the thinking of all, was fear of Hindu domination, fear that without power Muslims would not be able to survive as proper Muslims.'³⁵ Robinson points out that elite Muslims tried to unite Indian Muslims behind Pakistan. 'The ideas associated with creating and sustaining "the best nation raised up for men" contained in the Islamic tradition have continually influenced many north Indian Muslims towards trying to realize the ideal religio-political community.'³⁶ The Muslim leaders of UP had an important role in this. On the other hand, Brass suggests that the process of nationality-formation is one in which objective differences between peoples acquire subjective and symbolic significance, are translated into group consciousness, and become the basis for political demands.³⁷ In Brass's explanation about the contemporary violence in India, communal violence is done by those people who create confusion for their own interests, and it does not happen due to communal hostility itself.³⁸ Brass's special focus is on the connections between languages and religions. Mushirul Hasan compares both opinions and states: 'Brass argues that the ideology of Muslim separateness did not flow out of the objective differences between Hindus and Muslims but out of the use made of those differences through a conscious process of symbol selection. ... Robinson arrived at a similar conclusion'. Hasan proceeds to state that 'the threat of becoming backward, rather than backwardness itself, encouraged UP Muslims to organize themselves separately. ... Robinson has sought to

³⁵ *ibid.*, p,199.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p,201.

³⁷ P.R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, (Delhi, 1974;1975), p,43.

³⁸ See P.R. Brass, *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*, (OUP, New Delhi, 2003)

establish a 'fundamental' connection between Islamic traditions and 'political separatism'.³⁹ Brass' and Robinson's theories are similar only till a certain point, but they have different ideas about the origin of the Muslim separatism. Francis considers that three groups of the modernist Muslim leaders led the people. They were from Aligarh, Deoband and Firangi Mahal (Lucknow). The Aligarh modernism formed the background to Muslim separatism and the eventual demand for Pakistan.⁴⁰ According to Francis, 'the *sharif* classes ... tended to go to Aligarh and the lesser bourgeois of the *qashbah* which tended to go to Deoband'.⁴¹ However, Robinson does not produce clear proof of this tendency.

Mushirul Hasan, who has been mentioned above, has written a large number of articles concerned with Islamic cultures, literatures, the Independence of India and Pakistan and so on. Hasan supports the bargaining counter-theory which Jalal suggests. Although his analysis about Nationalist Muslims and Muslims in India is excellent, he tends to ignore the Muslims who had shifted to Pakistan. According to R.J. Moore, this is a serious problem with much of the historiography as,

History has denied to Muslims, and nowhere more brusquely than in what is now called, out side the Republic of India, 'the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent', the political unity and the exclusive political power which most instructed Muslims have taken to be (whether rightly or wrongly in Allah's sight is not for the non-Muslim to judge) the necessary condition for obedience in this idiom.⁴²

³⁹ M. Hasan, ed., *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization*, (OUP, New Delhi, 1993;2006), p,36.

⁴⁰ F. Robinson, *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia*, p,11.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p,111.

⁴² R.J. Moore, 'Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand', in *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization*, p,255.

We need to discuss the position of Muslims in the struggle for Independence as a whole and take into account the opinions of both Pro-Pakistan Muslims and Pro-United India Muslims. This is something this thesis aims at doing.

The Role of Urdu Journalism

How were Indian Muslims involved in the political movements of the time? Urdu newspapers are a very valuable source to answer this question as many Muslims used to speak and read Urdu in north India. Surprisingly, there are few studies about Urdu publications around 1947. Some essays explain the background or history of Urdu newspapers, but this is not enough. The history of Urdu journalism has been examined in some detail from the time of *Al-Hilal* which Maulana Abul Kalam Azad published from Calcutta since June 1912. *Al-Hilal* had a great impact on people with strong opinion against the British rule and the loyalists in Aligarh University. *Al-Hilal* reached a circulation of 26,000 copies per week within two years, a figure which was until then unheard of in Urdu journalism. Azad stated that 'there were number of dailies, weeklies and monthlies published in Urdu from the Punjab and U.P. but their standard was not high. ... I decided my journal should be attractive in get up and powerful in appeal.'⁴³ Historiographies of journalism in India have analysed some famous Urdu newspapers and magazines, for example, *Pratap*, *Milap*, *Jang*, *Nawa-e-Waqt* etc. after *Al-Hilal*, but many others have been neglected. The reason for this seems to be the shortage of materials since some Urdu press owners migrated to Pakistan. What is clear is that the tension between the Congress and the Muslim League distressed the press. Secondly, the press was also involved in the communal disturbances surrounding the Partition, including the events of Direct Action day⁴⁴ on

⁴³ R. Parthasarathy, *Journalism in India; From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, (New Delhi, 1989), p,223.

⁴⁴ 'There were, of course, the Muslim League newspapers strong in Bombay, the Punjab and Bengal which formed one arm of the direct action movement: there were strong Hindu newspapers pulling the other way: there were Communist journals functioning since the war with the British Government's approval and riding on the tide of their past in the Royal Indian Navy troubles.' See S. Natarajan, A

16 August 1946.

Ather Farouqi studies the features of the Urdu journalism before Independence in a brief article. He explains the situation of the Urdu publications as 'the Urdu weeklies, fortnightly and monthlies largely reflect the mind of the Muslims of the North in general and the influence of the Muslim leadership of Delhi in particular. ... The weeklies published from Delhi have more readers than others.'⁴⁵ It was true that weekly and monthly newspapers were more common than dailies before Independence. However, it cannot be insisted that Delhi had the most readers of Urdu publications. Lahore was also a Mecca of Urdu journalism as were some cities in U.P. Lahore was the centre of Punjab where Urdu had a position of an official language along with English. For example, Lucknow published many Urdu publications because many educated people stayed there. Before Independence, educated people in North India, whether they were Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs, read Urdu rather than Hindi. Farouqi does not offer any data to support this opinion. Moreover, he insists that the migration to Pakistan was a limited phenomenon only in a few large cities in South India because the limited reach of Urdu prevented the movement for Pakistan from reaching south India.⁴⁶ However, this idea is not entirely correct. It is true that Urdu was used mainly in north India, and south Indian areas were far from Pakistan geographically. There was some gap among the readers who read Urdu newspapers and those who read regional newspapers. However, the people in south India showed their strong reaction to the Muslim League which demonstrated for the Pakistan movement. 'From October 1946 to beyond August 15, 1947, the date of Partition, the Marathi Press of Bombay and Poona rivalled the Urdu

History of the Press in India, (Bombay, 1962), p,282.

⁴⁵ A. Farouqi, 'The Emerging Dilemma of the Urdu Press in India', *American Journal of Economic and Sociology*, Vol.53:3, July 1994, p,361.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

journals in their provocations. And the Marathi writings were more wounding to the government because they commented bitingly on the weaknesses of the Congress policy.⁴⁷ This suggests that the masses noticed the activities of Urdu press in their areas.

Thesis Plan

Various preconceived notions even among scholars that Urdu was the language of Muslims, and refugees in Delhi were Hindus, have prevented scholars from studying Urdu newspapers. They have not so far been examined to the extent that they deserve as historical sources. This thesis aims to do precisely this.

Chapter 1 of the thesis analyses the gap between political leaders and the people they led, with reference to views and activities surrounding the Cabinet Mission to India. While the political leaders talked about the future of India, the people suffered communal violence and hunger. The people could not understand and even join in the discussions that were to determine their future. Chapter 2 concentrates on the Urdu journalism around 1947. This is a comparative study of three Urdu newspapers with different perspectives on the same issues. Chapter 3 describes the Muslim refugees in Delhi. Not only the refugees, but the Islamic culture was in danger at that time.

This thesis uses documents of the Delhi Police and Delhi Commissioner's Office as primary sources. Since they described people's activities, these documents are closer to the people's lives than other official documents. The purpose of the present study is to understand and explain the hardship of those people who could not

⁴⁷ N.K. Murthy, *Indian Journalism: Origin, Growth and Development of Indian Journalism* (University of Mysore, Mysore, 1966), p.111.

celebrate their 'Independence' from bottom of their hearts. This analysis may be of some help in understanding the status of the Muslim minority in India in the present day.

CHAPTER ONE: THE CABINET MISSION PLAN AND ALLIED EVENTS

1946 was a crowded year in Indian political history. In this chapter we will consider some of the fateful events of 1946, and how Muslims of various persuasions reacted to them. Muslims' reactions to the events of previous years had been highly influenced by their political inclinations and the social classes to which they belonged. Regional differences were also considerable. In the 1930s the dominance of the pro-British, landlord-dominated, Unionist party in Punjab was not seriously challenged; on the other hand, no landlord-dominated party could possibly hope to gather Muslim support in Bengal, where the tenants were predominantly Muslim. The Muslim League, which the taluqdars of Awadh favoured, had only a weak presence in the United Provinces during the 1930s. In the 1940s, these previous diversities were to some extent reduced, as a larger number of Muslims rallied behind the Muslim League and its leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Conclusive proof of this reduction of differences was provided by the results of the elections held in 1946, under the provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935. The results were a triumph for the League, which swept to success in the Muslim seats. The Muslim League's opponents could and did point out that the franchise was restricted, suggesting that the League's mandate was incomplete. Supporters of the League could retort that there was no evidence that the Muslims who did not have the vote were thinking differently from Muslims of the upper-classes.

All were agreed that this was a very important phase. The future existence of Pakistan depended, in large measure, on the election results. Knowing this, Muhammad Ali Jinnah had worked towards the systematic functioning of the League.

He had in effect lost the elections in 1937; to do so again would have meant consignment to the wilderness. Therefore, he tried to win over the public.¹

Muslim students played a particularly active role in the election campaign. They were the ones behind the election activities and carried the Muslim League's propaganda everywhere.² Their participation proved to be crucial for the elections and hence even for the Pakistan movement. The fact that a student leader could report directly to Jinnah illustrates their importance. One of them wrote to his leader:

Dear Qaid-e-Azam [Jinnah], I have just now returned back from a tour in the Eastern Pakistan. I feel I must acquaint you with the situation here. By the grace of *Allah* our position is good in Bengal. However, this is not the case with Assam. The Assam Parliamentary Board committed certain mistakes at the time of granting League tickets. ... The fishermen's community as a whole is hostile towards the Provincial League. Subsequently I fear ... the League may lose so many seats. Pandit Nehru has already toured the province. I understand, Maulana Hussain Ahmad is also going there soon. Mr. Gandhi will be reaching Assam just before the election.³

¹ A great deal of Muslim League propaganda from this period survives. Of particular interest is a pamphlet entitled *Why I have joined Muslim League* which contains the statements of prominent Muslim Leaguers after the failure of the Simla Conference. See the Report from Intelligence Bureau, Home Department, Government of India, dated 4 January 1946. *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.37, Mohd-29, volume17. 'All India Muslim League (January - April 1946)' NMML.

² See Mukhtar Zaman, *Students' Role in the Pakistan Movement* (Karachi, 1978), and Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza, *The Punjab Muslim Students Federation 1937-1947* (Islamabad, 1991). Primary sources on this theme are available in Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza, *Muslim Students and Pakistan Movement: Selected Documents 1937-1947* (Pakistan Study Centre University of Punjab, Lahore, 1988-89).

³ Letter dated 3 January 1946 from M. Moinne Haque Choudhury, General Secretary, All India Muslim Students Federation, Aligarh. *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.37, Mohd-29, volume17. 'All India Muslim League (January - April 1946)'. NMML.

The same passage does indicate, however, that in certain areas people were still against the League. And in other areas like Sind, the lacklustre condition of the Muslim League required quick action, as someone wrote to the future Prime Minister of Pakistan:

Dear Nawabzada Sahib [Liaqat Ali Khan], In the absence of any provincial organization the condition of the Muslim League in Sind is getting worse. There is nobody to organize even the volunteers who are willing to work for the official candidates. The student community is doing something to maintain the prestige. It will be impossible to inflict a defeat upon Khan Bahdur Maula however, unless reinforcements in the form of students and Ulema come from Aligarh and the United Provinces.⁴

But while the Muslim League looked to Aligarh as a source of energy, it also took regional diversities into account. An official election manifesto did not emanate from the power centres within the Muslim League. Rather, in order to incorporate attention to local problems, the manifesto which was announced was in fact made by each Provincial Muslim League.⁵

It was frequently remarked upon at the time that students from Aligarh played a major role in the Pakistan movement. Jinnah went so far as to describe them as the arsenal of Muslim India.⁶ He often visited Aligarh to talk with the

⁴ Letter from Dr. A.H. Siddiqi, Sind Muslim League, Karachi, no date (but before the 1946 elections, according to the sequence of the documents). *ibid.*

⁵ Sho Kuwajima, *Muslims, Nationalism and the Partition: 1946 Provincial Elections in India* (Manohar, Delhi, 1998), discusses the specific background of the 1946 provincial elections, examining also each provincial manifesto of the Muslim League.

⁶ This is a tribute from Jinnah to Zahid Husain, dated 5 December 1945. See M. Hasan, 'Nationalist and Separatist Trends in Aligarh, 1915-1947', in *Myth and Reality: The struggle for Freedom in India 1945-47*, p.131.

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students, adopting in his speeches the tone and the role of a stern disciplinarian. When Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan were invited by the Students' Union in April 1940, their lecture inspired the Aligarh students very much.⁷ Jinnah indicated his desire to bequeath his worldly assets to the Islamia College at Peshawar, the Sind Madrasah at Karachi and the Aligarh University.⁸

The Aligarh Muslim University was a beacon for Muslims not only in the United Provinces, but also in other parts of India. The university was a matter of pride for the Indian Muslims in the field of education and politics. An Aligarh student could refer to himself as "*lig ka bachcha*" (the child of the League).

The political outlook of the university was greatly influenced by the attitude of its Vice-Chancellors. Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad, who was a Vice-Chancellor of this university for almost six years, was an active member of the League.

For many students at Aligarh Muslim University, the word "Independence" meant the achievement of Pakistan. However there were among the students varied ideas for attaining independence. The students were drawn from different places; and their thinking was often diverse. The university reflected a multiplicity of thinking processes, as elite students as well as the faculty started taking part in the political activities. Although Aligarh was a small *qasbah*, the activities in the university extended its influence over vast distances.⁹

⁷ M. Hasan, 'Nationalist and Separatist Trends in Aligarh, 1915-1947', p,124.

⁸ The paper was dated on 30 May 1939. See H. Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan* (OUP, Karachi, 1954;2006), pp,37-38.

⁹ A fine detailed regional study is the work of E.A. Mann, *Boundaries and Identities: Muslims, Work and Status in Aligarh*. He pointed out that Aligarh was a town with a predominantly Muslim image through not with a majority Muslim population. Its image arose from the existence of a powerful Muslim landed gentry and the influence of elite *qasbah* culture. Incidentally, *Qasbah* derives from *qasaba* in the Arabic of the Maghrib dialect. The original meaning of *qasbah* is 'a centre city of region'.

Mushirul Hasan has examined in detail the role of the Aligarh Muslim University in the Pakistan Movement.¹⁰ His answer to the question of why Aligarh turned to Jinnah, raises three themes. Firstly, he points out that the local Muslim intelligentsia was ambitious, and anxious to play a large part in major political events. In a political sense, it was keen to stake Aligarh's claim to leadership of an All-India Muslim constituency. Secondly, communal consciousness generated by previous pan-Islamic ferment favoured Jinnah. Aligarh scholars, who valorized a Muslim identity during the Khilafat euphoria, emphasizing their distinct Muslim-ness, in effect ended up making the two-nation theory intelligible. Finally, Jinnah's own considerable efforts won him supporters within the University.

Jinnah's endeavours were assisted by some Aligarh old boys among the professional and landowning classes. David Lelyveld, who studied Aligarh Muslim University in the nineteenth century, observed the solidarity in the University as the product of a limited, educated space.¹¹ Whether students and faculty were loyalists or nationalists, the traditional solidarity in the small area of the university intensified their political response.

The people at Aligarh University published their writings in both Urdu and English in the *Aligarh Magazine* and the *Aligarh Institute Gazette*,¹² pronouncing their opinions on literature, or on organizations like the Progressive Writers' Association. Many of the students' political activities occurred in hostel called Aftab Hall. The students founded the Students' Union and the All-India Muslim Students'

¹⁰ Mushirul Hasan, 'Nationalist and Separatist Trends in Aligarh, 1915-1947', pp,125-126.

¹¹ See D. Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India* (OUP, New Delhi, 1996;2003).

¹² The *Aligarh Institute Gazette* started as a weekly paper in March 1866. See D. Lelyveld, pp,80-81. Its ideological tendency depended on the editor of the moment. Similarly the *Aligarh Magazine* had a pro-Congress attitude in 1938. After Mohammad Noman Zuberi became the editor, the magazine became pro-Muslim League.

Federation in 1936, which overlapped in their membership. Another reason for the political importance of the students lay in their mobility, which was certainly greater than that of their teachers, and possibly greater than that of the politicians as well. When they went to their home towns, or elsewhere, their propaganda went with them.

Overall, the Muslim League won the overwhelming majority of the separate seats for the Muslims in the 1946 elections.¹³ However, the party was not successful in the North West Frontier Province.¹⁴ Despite such small setbacks, the students of Aligarh enjoyed the League's victory. Perhaps they received some confidence in their own ability to change the Indian political future, and identified themselves as a part of the Pakistani nation.

According to Phillips Talbot, a fellow of the New York-based Institute of Current World Affairs, the Muslim League shouted the slogan, "To be ruled by Hindus is death for Muslims. Islam in Danger", effectively in order to penetrate urban Muslim classes and even to some degree the villages. In a letter written at the time from Simla, he described the changed atmosphere, and the longer social reach of the Muslim League, in the following words:

This spring I return to India to find that the cry for Pakistan has become a Muslim article of faith. Except in the Northwest Frontier Province, where the Congress mass movement reached the Muslim Pathans many years ago, the League in the recent elections carried

¹³ The League won 428 out of 492 Muslim separate seats, including the women's' seats. In Bengal, it won 113 seats out of 119; in Punjab, 73 out of 86 seats; in Sind, 27 out of 34. See Table 1 in the appendix to this thesis.

¹⁴ The debacle in the NWFP was not expected. According to a letter from Malibur Rahman Kayani to Liaquat Ali Khan, dated 1 March 1946, Kayani expected that the League in Southern Districts (Kohat, Bannu and D.I. Khan) would take nine seats out of 12. They never expected the League in the NWFP to move towards such a sad defeat. The results in this area showed that the League got only 17 seats. *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.37, Mohd-29, volume 17. 'All India Muslim League (January - April 1946)'. NMML.

practically all of the legislative seats which are reserved for Muslim constituencies. Taxi drivers and shopkeepers know the League now. Yesterday I asked the coolie who had carried my baggage to this hotel if he would take a letter to the Yarrows. He was an ordinary load carrier who had demonstrated no particular personality up to then. But when by way of clarification I explained that the Yarrows is Mr. Jinnah's house, he pulled himself up straight, gave me a terrific salute, and said the equivalent of "Yes, sir." In 1939, I might have elicited a similar response from a servant-class Indian if my letter had been for Gandhi or Nehru. Now, obviously, the League too has become a mass organization.¹⁵

In previous years the Congress had projected itself as a mass organization, and the Muslim League as an elite one. Now it seemed that the two organizations could not be judged by different yardsticks, at least as far as mass support was concerned.

Local Rioting

On 23 March 1946, some Muslims celebrated the day as 'Pakistan Day'. Aggressive action that took place on this important day triggered communal riots. In her recent book, the historian Yasmin Khan notes that in one place:

A riot erupted less than a week after noisy celebrations marked 'Pakistan Day' and the League's electoral success in the province. A few Aligarh students buying cloth from a local Hindu cloth merchant quibbled over the price of a bolt of fabric. An altercation broke out, a

¹⁵ To American Mission, Bahawalpur House, New Delhi. 'India in the Spring of 1946' written in Simla on 27 May 1946. See P. Talbot, *An American Witness to India's Partition* (Sage, New Delhi, 2007), pp.178-179.

crowd formed. In the arson attack that swiftly followed at least four people burned to death and the thatched market area of the town was left in ashes.¹⁶

Not far away, however, relative peace prevailed in Delhi, if the C.I.D. reports are to be believed. One of the C.I.D. accounts about Delhi read as follows:

The procession comprised about six thousand persons. Pro-Muslim League and anti-Government slogans were shouted, but the procession terminated peacefully at a park outside the Jama Masjid [Delhi] at 6 A.M. where a Muslim League flag salutation ceremony was performed by Nawab Qadeer-ud-Din.¹⁷

To many people, it seemed that the emergence of Pakistan was now to be decided by the Cabinet Mission. There was a widespread belief that the Muslim League had become a representative party of the Indian Muslims, and stood at the same level as the Congress as a Hindu party. At the same time, a series of communal disturbances happened among the people. Some of Jinnah's supporters manifested their enthusiasm for the movement in violence. It is a moot point whether this enhanced the status of the League as a leader of the Muslims.

According to the speeches made by the leaders at the Muslim League Legislators Convention held in Delhi, communal bitterness was being greatly aggravated by both Hindus and Muslims, who were believed to be collecting *lathis*, swords, hatchets etc. for offence and defence in case the Cabinet Mission failed to

¹⁶ Y. Khan, *The Great Partition*, p.41.

¹⁷ Extract from C.I.D. Urban Diary Report, dated 23 March 1926. *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.37, Mohd-29, volume 17. 'All India Muslim League (January - April 1946)'. NMML.

resolve the Indian political situation.¹⁸

Not surprisingly, the tension between Hindus and Muslims increased tremendously. Even where Hindu-Muslim hostility was initially not great, or where it was small, some political formations fanned its flames, and egged on the communalists.

In Aligarh, a communal riot occurred for six days after the Pakistan Day.¹⁹ It began with a quarrel between students of the AMU and a Hindu cloth dealer. The latter was beaten and apparently fired two shots without injuring anyone. However, a rumour was spread maintaining that a student had been killed; Hearing the rumour, some 200 students collected. They set fire to thatched roofs in Kalyanganji and to a few shops in Mahavirganji. The roofs burned for 20 hours and some 50 shops were gutted. This was a fairly typical case of how rumours instigated communal violence.

The Muslim residents of Karol Bagh in Delhi feared that they would be attacked, as they were in a minority.²⁰ The hostile attitude of the majority community around them combined with the rumours which were prevalent those days to make them anxious and uneasy. 'We are anxious that the peace of the residents should not be disturbed and we feel that the activities of the persons at night are a cause of alarm and are interfering with peace of the residents of these quarters,' said one letter received by the police from Karol Bagh.²¹ Less than a month later, a letter dated 21 May 1946, addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Police, read as follows:

¹⁸ Extract from Delhi C.I.D. Daily Report, dated 15 April 1946. *Home Department Political Branch*, File No. 5/6/46 Poll(I), 'Communal Tension in Delhi'. NAI.

¹⁹ Report dated 3 April 1946 from C.W. Longman, M.B.E., Deputy Secretary to Government, United Provinces, to Internal Administration Department. *Home Department Political Branch*, File. No. 5/3/46 Poll(I), 'Communal Riots in Aligarh'. NAI.

²⁰ There were approximately 550 government quarters of all types in this locality, out of which Muslims occupied nearly 150 quarters scattered all over the area. The remaining 400 quarters were occupied by Hindus. Typically, two or three families were living in each quarter.

²¹ Letter to the Senior Superintendent of Police from the residents of Karol Bagh, dated 25 April 1946. *Home Department Political Branch*, File. No. 5/6/46 Poll(I), 'Communal Tension in Delhi'. NAI.

For the past several months some people from the city gather in the Ramlila ground early in the morning outside Angoori Darwaza. They parade on the military lines and train themselves in the use of knives, etc., shout slogans, salute the yellow flag and disperse after more than an hour. ... Only yesterday (20-5-1946) a mild argument started between a Hindu and a Muslim which as usual was settled after a few minutes. Fortunately, for them, there happens to be a structure, which is the seat of vagabond mendicants to which they have given the name of "temple ". Lathis and other fighting equipment are concealed in this "temple ". These goondas yesterday took out these lathis from there and attacked the unarmed Mussalmans who happened to be very few in number. ... The police authorities when they had reached the spot were asked to search the "temple" to see what material for the purpose of aggression was stocked there but they did not take any action. A Sikh Sub-Inspector searched the mosques in the Minto Road area a few days back to see if lathis were stocked there specially on an occasion when there was no disturbance...²²

The residents, whether Hindu or Muslim, passed almost every day in fear of indiscriminate bloodshed, which they apprehended would occur with the use of weapons. They asked the police for help against the 'enemy'.

However, the police could hardly handle the situation. Moreover, it was not always the case that neighbours attacked each other. Neighbours could try to help each other and maintain communal sanity: there were local organizations of the people to maintain peaceful relations. For example, a meeting was held among the

²² Letter to the Senior Superintendent of Police from the residences of Circular Road, dated 21 May 1946. *ibid.*

residents of Mohalla Turkman Gate, Qabristan Bazar and Kalan Masjid.²³ About 350 Muslim and Hindu residents attended the meeting to elect members of the Civil Defence Committee of Mohalla Turkman Gate. The meeting was based on the Ward Committee which had been in existence since 1942. The people who met prepared the local committee for some disturbances expected in Delhi. Both the Hindus and the Muslims promised to live cordially with each other. In another ward, the residents opened their local meeting with both Hindu and Muslim presidents promising to live like brothers and promising to distrust the rumours which were being spread to destroy the peace of the city.²⁴

The League and the Cabinet Mission Plan

On March 15 1946, just before the dispatch of the Cabinet Delegation to India, the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, used these words:

I hope that India and her people may elect to remain within the British Commonwealth. I am certain that they will find great advantage in doing so. If she does so elect, it must be her own free will. The British Commonwealth and Empire is not bound together by chains of external compulsion. It is a free association of free people. On the other hand, she elects for independence, in our view she has a right to do so. It will be for us to help to make the transition as smooth and easy as possible.²⁵

The British Cabinet Mission of March to June 1946 suggested a loose

²³ Report dated 23 April 1946. Mr. Mohd Akram was in the chair. The committee submitted a list of members. The Muslims were a majority while the Christians and Hindus were few. However, the resolution decided to add a Hindu president soon. *ibid.*

²⁴ The Joint Meeting of Hindus and Muslims of Ward No.8 was on 24 April 1946. It was held in the residence of Nawab Aziz Ahmed under the Presidentship of Lala Shindu Mal. *ibid.*

²⁵ S.M. Roy, ed., *White Paper on Indian Constitution, 1946: With elucidation by the Cabinet Mission and Correspondence between the Mission, Congress and the League*, (Calcutta, 1946), pp,9-10.

three-tier confederation in India. This was to have a weak Centre controlling only foreign affairs, defence and communications with the existing provincial assemblies being grouped into three sections while electing the constituent assembly: Section A for the Hindu-majority provinces, Sections B and C for the Muslim-majority provinces of the north-west and the north-east (including Assam). The Sections or groups of provinces would comprise various regional units. They would have the power to set up intermediate-level executives and legislatures of their own.

The press informed the public in India about the progress of the Cabinet Mission. There was great interest in the news, not only because of its political implications, but because the outcome would determine the possibility of violence. So people wanted to know the details of various meetings, as they might hold a solution to volatile situation. One C.I.D. report conveyed the information that 'Although the Congress is in a favourable mood there is still deep down a feeling of uncertainty on the part of the Muslim League.'²⁶ It was learnt that the Congress had submitted detailed amendments to the plan, while the League was having difficulty taking any decision. The League leadership was disappointed by the fact that the Cabinet Mission rejected their theory of a separate Muslim nationality. Some members of the League eagerly waited for Jinnah's decision, assuming that it would be the best possible in the circumstances. Others thought that the League would agree to join the Interim Government.²⁷

For both the parties—the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League—it was not easy to reach a decision regarding the Cabinet Mission.

²⁶ *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, Mohd-29. volume18. 'All India Muslim League (May-June 1946)'. NMML.

²⁷ Reaction to the British Cabinet Proposals. Extract from C.I.D. Urban Daily Report for 17 May 1946. *ibid.*

Moreover, the Congress had also to take into account the attitude of the Congress Socialists, who had been very active a short while ago, during the Quit India Movement. The Congress Socialists attacked the proposals in a newspaper, *Janata*, which was published by Achyut Patwardhan. Achyut Patwardhan insisted that the Congress had been dangerously uncertain about the Cabinet Mission Plan and seemed anxious to prevent a breakdown of negotiations. He further pointed out that the Congress leadership did not give a fitting response to the attitude of the Muslim League, which according to him had stooped very low, to the extent of using blackmail during the conference, in order to achieve their ultimate goal, which was Pakistan.²⁸ In the Congress Socialist view, a peaceful transfer of power by imperialism was not a real possibility, and so moves like those of the Cabinet Mission were to be looked upon with extreme suspicion.

According to another report about the Congress, the three powerful groups in the party were Gandhi's group, Nehru and Azad's group, and Patel's group. Patel was especially strong in his opposition to the demand for Pakistan. When the Congress asked for amendments to the plan of the Cabinet Mission, it put them forward as demands of the Congress Working Committee.²⁹ Rather optimistically, some members of the Congress tried to persuade Jinnah to postpone the matter of Pakistan till India attained her independence.

The League was less united than it superficially might have seemed to be. Its Working Committee was ostensibly the most important body and behind all the

²⁸ Comments and Statements of the Cabinet Mission. *Home Department Political Branch*, File. No. RR-1/79/46/2. 'Comments and Statements of the Cabinet Mission'. NAI.

²⁹ The major points involved the grouping of the provinces, and the composition of the Constituent Assembly and the Interim Government. Among other things, it was demanded that each province should be given the liberty to choose or decide what it thought was the best for its own interests; that the Constituent Assembly should be a sovereign body, one with full powers to hammer out and adopt a constitution.

decisions that were taken. There are indications that the Working Committee had a conflict with Jinnah regarding the Cabinet Mission. This was seen as an interesting issue as Jinnah feared a disagreement brewing among the members of the League. When the Cabinet Mission decided to invite the Working Committee members of the Congress and the Muslim League to tea, there was a danger that the differences might be exposed. Invitations were sent to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and to Jinnah. Azad accepted the invitation and attended with his Working Committee; but Jinnah rejected the invitation and even his Working Committee did not attend. Jinnah's stated reason for being absent was the invitation card was formally addressed only to him. Jinnah would indeed have been in an embarrassing situation as president of the League if his followers attended, and it then turned out that they did not agree with his viewpoint.³⁰

According to the report of C.I.D., there were within the League three groups which supported the proposals of the Cabinet Mission.³¹ These groups were led by Chaudhry Khaliqzaman, Nawab Ismail and the Raja of Mahmudabad. The C.I.D. report said that these leaders had almost complete support from the United Provinces. But some people were opposed to the plan: for example, Hasrat Mohani violently criticized the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan, because he felt that accepting it was as if one was obeying British rule. And Mohani was a famous leader of the United Provinces.

³⁰ Casual Source Report dated 15 April 1946 from C.I.D. *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.37, Mohd-29, volume17. 'All India Muslim League (January - April 1946)'. NMML.

³¹ It is not certain which meeting of the League was meant by the C.I.D report dated 6 June 1946. It might merely reveal a general summary of the tendencies of the League, or, more precisely, the contents of the council meeting held on 6 June 1946. I cannot be sure because there is no account of the council meeting in the standard work, *Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947*, vol-2, (New Delhi, 1970;1982), edited by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada.

The opinion about the Cabinet Mission was not the same in all the provinces. There were differences even within the central organization. The main leaders of the League, that is to say Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, were dissatisfied with the Cabinet Mission as it did not agree to the demand for Pakistan, which had been articulated six years previously in the Lahore Resolution. Among the members of the League there was a difference between those who regarded the emergence of Pakistan as a goal to achieve or attain at any cost, and the others. Jinnah wanted to create Pakistan at any cost. On the other hand, some League members who supported the Cabinet Mission were prepared to reach a compromise on important issues. It would be fair to say, however, that the most important leaders from the United Provinces showed a willingness to compromise.

It has seemed peculiar to some historians that the United Provinces, a Muslim minority area, played such an important role in the Pakistan movement. Why should the Muslims of a province, which stood no chance of being included within the geographical boundaries of a future sovereign state of Pakistan, endorse and promote the Pakistan scheme? It was the improbability of such a situation which led to the appearance of a revisionist historiography. Ayesha Jalal, who propounded the revisionist thesis about the creation of Pakistan, argued that Jinnah's demand for Pakistan was a bargaining-counter. She held that this was so even though Jinnah (who was not only the top leader of the League, but was also famous for his doggedness) kept demanding a separate state of Pakistan as the only way forward for Indian Muslims.³² Ayesha Jalal reasoned that Jinnah, being the president of the

³² One report of the discussions held on 5 May 1946 over the Simla Conference, indicates that the Muslim League Working Committee was divided into two sections. Thirteen out of all twenty members opposed the seven members who were solidly behind Jinnah. The report said: 'It is heard that a majority of top ranking Muslim Leaguers are tired of Mr. Jinnah's intransigent attitude.' Source Report dated 6 June 1946. *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.38, Mohd-29, volume 18. 'All India Muslim League (May - June 1946)'. NMML.

League, had the duty to unify all its members behind the same programme and the same flag. I believe that Jalal exaggerates Jinnah's strategic and tactical approach (quoted from Jinnah's documents related the creation of Pakistan), and that Jinnah was not willing to compromise to achieve his goal. Contrary to this, Jalal asserted that by using the Pakistan demand as a bargaining counter, for the ultimate aim of greater power at the centre in a single India, Jinnah was keeping in mind the interests of the Muslims in the Muslim minority-states. His concerns embraced the position of Muslims in states like the United Provinces and Bihar on the one hand, and the position of Muslims in Muslim majority provinces like Punjab and Bengal, on the other. In short, Jinnah would be the representative of all the Indian Muslims.³³

Jinnah and other politicians' premonition proved right in the meetings of the Muslim League. At the meeting of the Working Committee, Jinnah was still unwilling to accept any proposal which did not include Pakistan. Other members expected that 'in case the Committee would not see eye to eye with him, then he would allow the members who would not agree with him to join the interim Government.'³⁴ On the other hand, the report was spreading that he planned to form a "Pakistan League" in place of the Muslim League in case the Working Committee and Council did not follow his directions. These expectations showed that Jinnah might have been pushed into a corner. Jinnah was in favour of negotiations with the British and the Congress on the subject of Pakistan. He did not have complete support from the League. However he did not do away with the League as he was facing a lot of problems and did not want to compound them by doing so.

³³ Incidentally, Jinnah declared in the concluding address of the League Legislators' Convention on 9 April 1946 that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state.

³⁴ Extract from Casual Source Report dated 24 May 1946 made by Bhagwan Dass Jain, Sub-Inspector of the Delhi C.I.D. *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.38, Mohd-29, volume 18. 'All India Muslim League (May - June 1946)'. NMML.

On 6 June 1946, the Cabinet Mission's proposals including a 'diluted Pakistan'³⁵ were accepted by the League. However the League withdrew support from the plan on the last day of the League Council meeting held on 27-29 July 1946. Initially all the major parties accepted this plan. But the agreement was short-lived because it was based on mutually opposed interpretations of the plan. The League wanted grouping to be compulsory, with Sections B and C developing into strong entities with the right to secede from the Union in the future. The Congress wanted that provinces be given the right to join a group. It was not satisfied with the Mission's clarification that grouping would be compulsory at first, but provinces would have the right to opt out after the constitution had been finalized and new elections held in accordance with it. Ultimately, therefore, neither the League nor the Congress agreed to the Cabinet Mission's proposal. This was a most crucial juncture *after* which partition became more or less inevitable, with the top Congress leadership, except for Mahatma Gandhi and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan of the N.W.F.P., agreeing to it. Moreover, some members of the Muslim League felt that the proposal put forward was changed by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in favour of the Congress.³⁶ After the rejection of the Cabinet Mission, the Muslim League again took up the Pakistan issue. 'Mr. Jinnah is reported to be feeling nonplussed by the Congress tactics this time as they would not give the final verdict until the League decision is known, for which reason the Congress Working Committee will meet after the League concludes its deliberations.'³⁷ Jinnah thought it possible that the proposal could be changed by the actions of the Congress.

³⁵ Quotation from Jinnah's address in the Legislators' Convention, April 1946. 'In another recent speech, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was good enough to offer a "diluted Pakistan" under the suzerainty of a strong Central Congress Government.'

³⁶ The members list made by the Viceroy had not included any Congress Muslims.

³⁷ Source Report of C.I.D. dated 6 June 1946. *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.38, Mohd-29, volume 18. 'All India Muslim League (May - June 1946)'. NMML.

The Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan once, but rejected it later. This decision was difficult for the members of the Muslim League. There were mainly two choices for the League. Firstly, if the Congress did not negotiate with the Muslim League, then the Muslim League would make the Constitution of Pakistan. However, it would be possible that the British Government did not accept the Constitution. Secondly, the Muslim League would accept their mistake of their decision about the Indian Union, and start the Pakistan Movement again. Most of the members approved the later approach. Some members took the middle-path of these ideas.³⁸ Even the other members insisted that the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan was not a mistake.

In the meeting, they decided upon the political tactics of the League. Firstly, the Muslim League tried to anticipate the situation and thought of two different courses of action: either they could wait until the Congress ousted the British from India as it was much easier to deal with one enemy rather than two, or the League could struggle for freedom under the British rule, i.e. before the British left, otherwise the League would be oppressed by the Congress after the withdrawal of the British. The members of the League preferred the latter attitude. Jinnah intervened in the debate on what course the Muslim League should adopt in view of the new situation that had been created, he left the decision to the organization, arguing, 'I am not prepared to accept responsibility for any decision as to the future, unless you force it down my throat. It is your bounden duty to decide what we should now do, for you are the parliament of the Muslim Nation. The President and the Working Committee will carry out any policy laid down by you.'³⁹ It might be true that Jinnah was an

³⁸ The League would return to the demand of Pakistan if the Congress could not accept any negotiations with the League. At the first, it had to join to the constitutional assembly.

³⁹ At the League Council Meeting held on 27-29 July 1946. See S.S. Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. 2, p.553.

obstinate person and did not listen to other members. However, he had to organize his party and satisfy its members as much as possible. The negotiation over the Cabinet Mission made Jinnah cautious about revealing his opinion because the failure of the Simla Conference cast a shadow over both parties. The acceptance and the withdrawal of the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan were based on the consensus at the meeting of the League, and not on Jinnah's own authority.

The Cabinet Mission in front of the People

The League was re-united for attaining Pakistan and started preparing for Direct Action Day. There is a further question that needs to be asked. How did the people react to the matter of the Cabinet Mission Plan? It was too complex to grasp what would happen in India at the next stage. Even Jinnah was puzzled. Many people had already suspected that Pakistan would emerge and that it would be divided into two parts, east and west. The real problem for the people was not the demand for Pakistan but the formation of an interim government.⁴⁰

The Press should be examined as the bridge between the political and the public sphere. A good place to start is to examine the summary of the native newspapers. The Nationalist press in Delhi was awaiting its cue from the political parties. Often the press did not give a clear idea about the proposals.⁴¹ Some articles in the press wished that the national leaders would cooperate with the Cabinet Mission. The papers which were published in Delhi had a common opinion about the Plan and the Interim Government. The so-called nationalist newspapers gave

⁴⁰ Casual Source Report C.I.D. dated 15 April 1946. *The Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.37, Mohd-29, volume17. 'All India Muslim League (January - April 1946)'. NMML.

⁴¹ The major newspapers carried the following articles: *The Statesman*, 'Opportunity Regained', *The Hindustan Times*, 'A Sincere Effort'; *The National Call*, 'A Rose with Thorns'; *The Dawn*, 'Award'. See *Home Department Political Branch*, File No. RR-1/79/46/2. 'Comments and Statements of the Cabinet Mission'. NAI.

comments about the result of the Cabinet Mission Plan, indicating that it made India's future unclear. Under the Cabinet Mission Plan, the government was imagined in three layers: Unitary at a top, a Federation and a Confederation. However the writers could not make anything out of the situation. Some of them said that the main purpose of the Cabinet Mission seemed to be to make a way for an interim government and thought it strange that it should do so. Even if the Cabinet Mission succeeded in making the formation of an interim Government, there was a certain possibility that making a long-term plan would be extremely difficult.⁴²

One newspaper, *Vanguard* which was the paper of the Democratic Party in India, attacked the Cabinet Mission's proposals as a 'Smoke screen'. This paper represented and was the mouthpiece of the Radical Democratic Party in India. On the other hand, the newspaper *Dawn* founded by Jinnah also considered it carefully. Talking about Pakistan and the Cabinet Mission Plan, a writer in *Dawn* just commented that only Muslim opinion made a difference to Pakistan. His article did not expose the chaos and mayhem that was going on in regard to the Pakistan process.

The papers in the United Provinces also dealt intensively with Pakistan in their articles. 'Three of the more prominent newspapers, *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Allahabad), *Nation al-Herald* (Lucknow) and *The Leader* (Allahabad) display the words "Decent Burial to Pakistan" in their streamer headlines, while *The Pioneer* displays a matter of fact presentation of the news', a report said.⁴³ These newspapers were on the side of the Congress and waiting for the final judgment of the Congress Working Committee.

⁴² The comment from *The National Call*, 'A Rose with Thorns'. *ibid.*

⁴³ *ibid.*

The *Civil and Military Gazette* in Punjab stated that the Muslims could benefit only if they agreed to the demand of Pakistan. The Mission plan did not want to give any absolute sovereignty. However, it was prepared to provide safeguards at every stage.

Two of the notable features of the above English newspapers were: one, they said that it was impossible to make Pakistan and two, they were comparatively positive about the Mission's proposals. The editors were just waiting for information from the parties and the Mission. None of newspapers ever reported on the ongoing confusion in the various political parties. The attainment of Pakistan was in the immediate future impossible in the opinion of the UP newspapers. The people of UP seemed highly interested in the emergence of Pakistan. On the other hand, *Dawn*, the League's paper, asserted that the future of Pakistan would be decided by the Muslims alone.

The Reaction of Newspapers about the Cabinet Mission

With these issues in mind, the case of Urdu newspapers will be examined. There were many Urdu newspapers in India around 1947. For convenience, only three Urdu newspapers are taken as examples. First, *Tej* which was published from Delhi, frequently carried material about the Cabinet Mission.⁴⁴ The headlines generally mentioned the Congress, and the news about the League and Sikhs followed it. The newspaper dated 11 June 1946 informed about the resolution of the League Conference.⁴⁵ The article entitled 'Playing Chess-game' emphasized the demand of the League. First, the author of the article informed about the cooperation of the League for an interim constitution. Then, the writer wondered about the equality

⁴⁴ Ideally, we should be able to compare each newspaper on the same date, for example, 18 May 1946. *Tej* which I have include is in the custody of NMML. Unfortunately, NMML does not have the issue of that date.

⁴⁵ *Tej (Weekly)*, 11 June 1946. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

that the Muslim League was eager to get after the complex discussion in the Muslim League Council. Moreover, he mentioned that the creation of Pakistan would be a problem. Even if the Muslim League cooperated with the Constituent Assembly, it was a bargain that the Muslim league would attain Pakistan using its sovereign authority. The article described Jinnah as a person who compared politics to 'playing a game of chess' in his speech. Further, the article explained, Jinnah said that there was no final or last word in politics. *Tej* gave the opinion that it did not trust Jinnah's attitude in the Assembly. Another reason why the Muslim League would accept the Plan was given by the writer. According to the article, most members of the Muslim League were not people who could bring about revolutionary movement to overthrow the British government, because they were landowners and rich men. 'In this situation, it was clear that there was no remedy without taking partnership.' As a suggestion for this, the article commented about the League proposal that there would be five members of the Congress, five members of the League, one Sikh and one Christian in the Central Government.⁴⁶ The article commented about the demand of the League, 'we do not know how the idea comes.' The discussion about the communal proportions in the Interim Government led to the Simla Conference. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's opinion was quoted and this was that the fundamental idea for the constitution of new Government should be political, not religious. It is a noteworthy point that in the newspapers of the time, the ideas of Maulana Azad were compared with the ideas of the League and Jinnah, whenever some question about Islam and Muslims occurred. *Tej* concluded that it was the time to consider what was the concept of equality.

⁴⁶ 'The viceroy said that he had seen Mr. Jinnah who had taken a very strong line about the Interim Government and had said that the Muslim League would not be prepared to come in except on the basis of 5: 5: 2 distribution of portfolios between the Muslim League, the Congress and the minorities.' See Record of Meeting of Cabinet Delegation and Field Marshal Viscount Wavell on Saturday, 8 June 1946. N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon, eds., *The Transfer of Power 1942-1947: Constitutional Relations between Britain and India*, Vol. 7, (London, 1979), p.843.

Tej provided detailed information about the politics concerned with the Cabinet Mission, which was not mentioned by other Urdu newspapers. For example, *Sidiq* did not give any comments about the Mission Plan on 18 May 1946 when many newspapers covered it in their own words. The headline in *Sidiq* was the 'worship' of Gandhi.⁴⁷ An article dated 22 May pointed out that the Congress had a tendency to take the offensive against anyone: the tendency was called the hostility of the Congress. Even Gandhi also had the tendency because he had sometimes destroyed the unity in the Congress by insisting that his own opinion prevailed.⁴⁸ On 15 June 1946, *Sidiq* had already expressed worries about the great transfer of power and said that if Pakistan was founded 'the minority-people will start to run away towards Pakistan. Thousands or hundreds of thousands of people...'⁴⁹ *Sidiq* did not discuss the Cabinet Mission Plan with exactitude but generally mentioned attitudes and viewpoints of various political movements.

⁴⁷ This column criticized the worship of Gandhi in the tradition of the Hindu worship of their gods. It said that the photo which was taken by other newspaper was a proof of the strange worship, and even other Hindu leaders and Nationalist Muslim leaders, like Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Maulana Husain Ahmad, were worshipped. See *Sidiq*, 18 May 1946. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, 22 May 1946.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 15 June 1946.

As another example, *Roshni* also did not discuss the Cabinet Mission. There was a column titled 'The High-Ranking Officers' Mission' in the newspaper dated 5 April 1946. Main news in this paper was always concerned with Sheikh Abdullah, while some other newspapers discussed the outlook of the Cabinet Mission at the same time. The news on 24 May 1946 was about the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah⁵⁰, and his famous 'Quit Kashmir Movement (*Kashmir Chor Do*)' from 6 May 1946.⁵¹ The people in Kashmir got information about the Cabinet Mission Plan through their leaders and through their discussion of local matters. The National Conference started the Quit Kashmir Movement as an agitation against both the Hindu ruler who ruled Jammu and Kashmir and the British government. The members shouted 'Withdraw Treaty of Amritsar! Leave Kashmir! (*Bainama Amritsar tod do, Kashmir chor do*)' as a slogan. On the other hand, Jinnah and the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference did not support the movement. The Muslim League tried to persuade the Kashmiri Muslims to get support during the negotiation with the Cabinet Mission. However, the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference protested against the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference and the Muslim League. After the movement, Sheikh Abdullah was arrested on 19 May. Even Jawaharlal Nehru came to meet him during the meeting with the Cabinet Mission. *Roshni* was published by the Lahore Ahmadiyah sect which supported the Muslim League. Its general opinions about Sheikh Abdullah were negative and asserted that they could not understand what Sheikh Abdullah was doing supporting the Congress.

⁵⁰ 'Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah had been arrested with other fellows. The military came into the whole city. Some people were killed by bullets.' *Roshni*, 5 April 1946. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

⁵¹ To explain the background briefly, Kashmir became a native state after the Treaty of Amritsar with the British government on 16 March 1846. The subjects in the state were mostly Muslims. They were frustrated economically and politically by their Hindu ruler. The conflict between the masses and the ruler led to the foundation of the All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference which was managed by Sheikh Abdullah. The aim of the party was to unite various sections of Islam into one banner. Later, the party was reorganized as the All Jammu & Kashmir National Conference on the line of the Congress in June 1939 while the All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference was re-founded by Chaudri Gulam Abbas as a supporter of the Muslim League in October 1940. The National Conference was the most major party there. Sheikh Abdullah got strong support from Jawaharlal Nehru because his party, the National Conference, struggled for secularism and socialism in politics.

Supporting the Muslim League

While the negotiations of the Cabinet Mission were going on with Indian political leaders, the Indian people expressed their reactions in many ways. Dr. Syed Hussain published one pamphlet titled 'Mr. Jinnah and the Future of India Mussalmans' in order to draw the attention of Muslim youth to study the situation and form their independent opinion.⁵² The pamphlet is one key to understanding the image of Jinnah among the Muslims. The most interesting opinion was about the attitude of Jinnah towards the Interim Government. Hussain concluded, 'I particularly commend it to Mr. Jinnah in all sincerity and in the hope that his leadership may yet be rescued from a tragic anti-climax.'⁵³ To support Jinnah, Hussain said Jinnah was as the only person who could make judgements based on rational logic. He was weary of communal emotions. 'It is a terrible business to be singing eternal hymns of hatred against those with whom you are destined – or doomed – to live for ever.'⁵⁴ Moreover, he recognized the trouble with Jinnah thus: 'Mr. Jinnah has run the Muslim community into a *cul-de-sac* and as conditions now are he alone can extricate them.'⁵⁵ Jinnah himself was not a better Muslim than Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, either in his knowledge or his practice of Islam.⁵⁶ Although Jinnah claimed to be the sole leader and spokesman of the entire Muslim community of India, the claim was both indefensible in principle and incorrect because such a demand would be contrary to Islamic precepts and tradition.⁵⁷ If we analyze Hussain's opinion of Jinnah, we find that although he was very critical of him, he also pointed out that there was no leader other than him. He talked about those

⁵² 'Mr. Jinnah and the Future of Indian Mussalmans' (1946), *Private Manuscripts of Dr. Syed Hussain* (1921-49), File No.22. NMML.

⁵³ *ibid.*, p.4.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p.2.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p.4.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p.3.

people who supported Jinnah as a theoretician, and others who respected Jinnah as a leader of Muslims. Communal riots created two sections among people: those who intensified their religious sense of belonging and those who were suspicious of religious fanaticism. Jinnah took advantage of the difficult situation unconsciously or consciously to get supporters from both sections. Everyone wished for the same thing: that Jinnah would somehow be able end the horrible riots soon. It needed a great revolution to change the present situation completely. Jinnah took a position which other politicians could not take. An example, the people who supported Jinnah as a leader for Indian Muslims was a student of Aligarh Muslim University, and who enunciated his determination to take part in the coming *Jihad* for Pakistan and explained that his parents were also proud to offer him for the sake of Islam.⁵⁸

Direct Action

The Council Meeting of the Muslim League on 19-27 July 1946 was a turning point. Two important resolutions were accepted in the meeting. One was to withdraw the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan and the other was to practice Direct Action. Jinnah took the floor during the discussion and stated the following:

It is true the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy have betrayed the Muslim nation. We accepted their proposal as a whole, both long-term and short-term. But since they have scrapped the interim proposals, you have to decide what we should now do, for the proposals are interdependent and inseparable. ... I am not prepared to accept responsibility for any decision as to the future, unless you force it down

⁵⁸ The Letter from M.A.Humayun Aziz, AMU to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Muslim League, 30 August 1946. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29, volume19, 'All India Muslim League (June - September 1946)'. NMML.

my throat. It is your bounden duty to decide what we should now do, for you are the parliament of the Muslim Nation.⁵⁹

After Jinnah's comment, the matter of the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan was argued heatedly.⁶⁰ As the result of the argument, the Working Committee decided to withdraw the acceptance of the Cabinet Delegation's proposals. The Muslim League started shouting the demand of Pakistan again, and suggested taking Direct Action. According to a contemporary document,

The Council of the All India Muslim League is convinced that now the time has come for the Muslim nation to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination. ... This Council directed the Working Committee to prepare forthwith a program of Direct Action to carry out the policy enunciated above, and to organize the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and when necessary.⁶¹

Jinnah concluded with his famous phrases, and referring to take Direct Action, said:

We have taken a most historic decision. Never before in the whole life-history of the Muslim League did we do anything except by constitutional methods and constitutional talks. We are today forced

⁵⁹ S. S. Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, p,553.

⁶⁰ The members tried to decide whether the Muslim League would fight with the British or the Congress first, and whether the League should go to the Constituent Assembly or not. For example, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, who was famous as a Nationalist Muslim, suggested that the Muslim League's acceptance of the Mission's proposals be withdrawn and it must revert back to the demand for a sovereign Pakistan. Almost all leaders supported the resumption of the Pakistan Movement. See *ibid.*, pp,550-554.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p,560.

into this position by a move in which both the Congress and Britain have participated. We have been attacked on two fronts - the British front and the Hindu front. To-day we have said good-bye to constitutions and constitutional methods. Throughout the painful negotiations, the two parties with whom we bargained held a pistol as us; one with power and machine-guns behind it, and the other with non-co-operation and the threat to launch mass civil disobedience. This situation must be met. We also have a pistol. It is not only that we played a part on a high level, but I do not think any responsible man could have allowed the situation to give rise to bloodshed and civil war. The situation was such that we did, in all anxiety, try to come to a peaceful settlement with the other majority party.⁶²

However, Jalal pointed out that 'he [Jinnah] had neither party organization nor resources to direct a movement which the more formidable it looked the less be controlled. To make something of 'direct action' day the ramshackle provincial Leagues had to call in the *mullahs* and the *pirs*. The meetings under the League's banner had nearly all taken place in and around mosques after the customary Friday prayers.'⁶³ There was no explanation of how to take Direct Action, while the resolution for Direct Action was passed with strong agitation against the Congress and the British rule. Later, the Muslim League decided that the date of Direct Action was on 16 August and people should take action in well-ordered ways like meetings and strikes. It is certain that Jinnah also did not suggest taking recourse to violence as part of Direct Action in the above speech. Just two days before Direct Action, Jinnah urged Muslims that Direct Action should be a day of peaceful reflection, not

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ A. Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, pp,216-217.

for the purpose of resorting to Direct Action in any form or shape.⁶⁴ One day before Direct Action, Jinnah insisted in newspapers that all members of the League should observe it by holding peaceful meetings and in a completely disciplined manner.⁶⁵ However, the voice of the League was not obeyed the people compliantly. In fact, communal riots started in many places on the day as if the people who were oppressed by various sufferings vented their dissatisfaction and worry in communal riots. The masses were haunted by the famine, the shortage of food and the political confusion after the Second World War.

Muslim masses reacted to the Direct Action resolution in a positive way. Some articles in Urdu newspapers about Direct Action showed a positive attitude towards it. The image of Direct Action was that of as a good revolution for something. However, the perspective of the Muslim League and the people in India was completely different from the facts on the ground.

On 16 August, Direct Action day started with bloodshed in Calcutta. The Muslim League ministry in Calcutta led by Suhrawardy's government declared a public holiday on this day.⁶⁶ In the large-scale communal riots, over 4,000 - 5,000 people were dead and around 10,000 people were injured by 19 August.⁶⁷ Around 150,000 people left their homes in panic.⁶⁸ More Muslims seemed to have died than Hindus according to Wavell and Sardar Patel.⁶⁹ Of course, the League and the

⁶⁴ C.M. Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1967), p.75.

⁶⁵ Report titled 'Calcutta Riots' dated 30 August. See P. Talbot, *An American Witness to India's Partition*, p.189.

⁶⁶ 'The city itself has three Hindus for every Muslim. But the provincial government is always Muslim-dominated because of the preponderance of Islamic converts who live in rural eastern Bengal. The Muslim League ministry now in authority attempts, naturally enough, to improve the lot of the Bengali Muslim; also naturally, its efforts do not always avoid offense to the Calcutta Hindu.' See *ibid.*, p.186.

⁶⁷ S. Sarkar, *Modern India 1885-1947* (New Delhi, 1983;2006), p.432.

⁶⁸ P. Talbot, *An American Witness to India's Partition*, p.191.

⁶⁹ S. Sarkar, *Modern India 1885-1947*, p.432.

president of the party, Jinnah could not avoid strong blame from the people as the contriver of Direct Action.

People trembled at the bloodshed in Calcutta on Direct Action day. The people believed rumours about coming riots elsewhere. Some Hindus in Delhi were worried that they would be next targets for Direct Action. Certain Hindu residents in Karol Bagh, who worked in the Government offices, asked for protection of their lives and property because they were minority in the area.⁷⁰ Even a nationalist Muslim was worried by a rumour that he would be killed during a disturbance in Delhi. He asked for permission to possess some arms to protect himself before the coming riots in Delhi. He explained that the place where he lived near Jama Masjid was dangerous because the area was the Centre of Pakistani Goondas [hooligans].⁷¹ The relations between the members of the League and the Nationalist Muslims were deteriorating daily due to provocative utterances, especially in Ballimaran.⁷² Among Indian Muslims, the gap between the Muslim Leaguers and the Nationalist Muslims became larger than before. A member of the Muslim League reported the situation of minor Muslims sects to Jinnah. The smaller Muslim groups like the Shias, Ahrars, Momins and some others were helping the Congress. They did not hesitate to work in the Congress governments. For the Muslim League, as the Muslim Leaguers went on to say, it would be the best way to turn out those 'quislings' and show them how small their groups were⁷³

⁷⁰ The application from Hindu Bhratri Sabha, Anand Nagar to the Secretary, Home Department dated 22 August. See *Home Department Political Branch*, File No.5/6/46 Poll(I), 'Communal Tension in Delhi during 1946'. NAI.

⁷¹ The application from Aziz Hasan, "*Weekly Hurriyat*" to the Chief Commissioner on 20 August. See *ibid.*

⁷² Extract from C.I.D. Daily Report for 25 September 1946. The members of Jamiat-ul Ulama-e-Hind complained to the police because some members of the League shouted anti-Nationalist Muslims slogans. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29, volume19, 'All India Muslim League (June - September 1946)'. NMML.

⁷³ Letter from M.M. Ismail, Forman Christian College, Lahore to Muhammad Ali Jinnah dated 28 September 1946. *ibid.*, NMML.

The Muslim League became strong enough by this time to kick out the Muslims who supported the Congress by labeling them 'Quislings' and minorities among the Indian Muslims. The Muslims who supported the League were in the ascendant because of the revival of the Pakistan demand. Some Muslim students in Delhi re-started a torpid organization called 'The Delhi Muslim Students' League' with an office in Nizamuddin. They published a series of papers on behalf of the Muslim students against the nationalist Muslims. This students' organization had been founded in 1936 to do social service at the time of Muslim festivals in Delhi. Now, the purpose of the group changed to a political one, and it became a supporter of the Muslim League.⁷⁴ Not only the students of Aligarh Muslim University, but the Muslim students in Delhi and other places also joined the political activities through their own networks and organizations under the banner of the Muslim League. Advertisements for Pakistan were frequently placed and slogans shouted everywhere by common people, and not only by politicians. M.A. Hussain, who was a bookshop owner in Lucknow, published 'Pakistani Literature' and 'Pakistani goods' including Pakistani pads, envelopes, postcards, notebooks and calendars. He was interested in starting a Pakistan Daily in Urdu.⁷⁵ Communal disturbances including Direct Action demonstrated the power of the League. Some Muslims worked for establishing Pakistan, while the other Muslims criticized the attitude of the League.

⁷⁴ The Delhi Muslim Students' League had thirty-five volunteers. Their uniform were Khaki trousers, bush-shirts, black Jinnah caps and steel helmets on some occasions. These seemed to indicate that it would be possible for them to plunge into dangerous movements. See Extract from C.I.D. Daily Report dated 7 October 1946. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.40, Mohd-29 volume20, 'All India Muslim League (September - October 1946)'. NMML.

⁷⁵ Letter from M. A. Hussain, proprietor Oudh Kitabghar near P. O. Aminabad, Lucknow to Mohammad Abbas Ali Khan, the president of the London Branch of All India Muslim League, and Altaf Hussain, the editor of *Daily Dawn* dated 12 September 1946. See Criminal Investigative Department dated 16 September. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29 volume19, 'All India Muslim League (June - September 1946)'. NMML.

Communal Hostilities after the Riot in Calcutta

At this time, the people started believing all rumours. They did not try to preserve communal harmony around them after the catastrophe in the glorious city of Calcutta. Large-scale riots happened at Bombay, Bengal, U.P., Punjab and so on by the end of 1946. There is no doubt that Direct Action in Calcutta was a trigger for these disturbances; however, the occasion and situation of each riot was different. 'Noakhali day' on 25 October inflamed the tension between peasants' groups and landowners, traders and professional groups. Both sets of groups were recognized as different communal groups based on religions – Hindus or Muslims.⁷⁶ On the day of *Diwali* on 24 October, a communal riot occurred at Ludhiana in Punjab. The Chief Secretary to the Government in Punjab commented about the disturbance, 'false rumours have caused a lot of trouble and there is still considerable panic in the town'.⁷⁷ He did not explain exactly why the disturbance occurred. When the police was busy for *Baqr Id*, a communal riot also occurred in Meerut. On 6 November, the riot started because of a rumour that a Jat girl had been molested by some Muslims. The event was analyzed by the government thus: '[the rumour] even if true, can hardly account for a conflagration so widespread. Everything points to the fact that the disturbances, far from being spontaneous, were well planned.'⁷⁸ If this official opinion was true, some communal riots, at least this riot in Meerut, were planned in advance by people who had deliberated how to start riots around them. In

⁷⁶ In east Bengal, peasants were mostly Muslims while landlords were mostly Hindus. The Hindus owned seventy-five percent of the land while they were eighteen percent of the total population. In Bihar, many Hindu peasants started to attack Muslims on day. See S. Sarkar, *Modern India 1885-1947*, pp,433-434. and S. Mahajan, *Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India* (Sage, New Delhi, 2000), pp,230-242 and pp,258-269.

⁷⁷ The trigger was that three Hindus were attacked about midnight in a Muslim quarter in Ludhiana. In November, another riot started in Rohtak because three Hindu Jats desecrated a certain Muslim shrine. See *Home Department Political Branch*, File No. 5/19/46 Poll(I) , 'Riots- Communal- Punjab during 1946'. NAI.

⁷⁸ *Home Department Political Branch*, File No. 5/5/47- Poll (I), 'Communal Disturbances- reports of in the United Provinces'. NAI.

the disturbances in Bengal, there were certain persons who seemed to be starters of the riots. The governor of Bengal noted that,

Trouble in South East Bengal is not a general rising of Moslems against Hindus but activity (apparently organized) of a body of hooligans who have exploited existing communal feeling and who, as they range the countryside, are temporarily joined in each locality by belligerent Muslim roughs. Operations, in which 5 companies of troops and some 300 armed police are participating, are directed towards isolating main (? leader)s and localizing the disturbances. ... As I see it, there are three problems: (1) to crush the roving bands who are responsible for the flare-up. ... (2) Relief for displaced persons. ... (3) Third problem is that of rescuing Hindus still isolated in turbulent areas and inducing refugees to return to their homes, specially those from areas in which there have been no disturbances.⁷⁹

The communal riots seemed to break out due to the communal hostility. However, the origin of the disturbances did not depend on the religious relations but ordinary complaints around peoples' lives. Social and economic agitations of the masses were replaced by the communal riots.

One example of a well-planned rumour should be given here. A large number of Punjabi Muslims had shifted to Hyderabad from August to October 1946. There was a rumour that they could be given land for cultivation by authorities of Hyderabad who wanted to make them State subjects. However, this rumour was completely false. Neither the State Government nor the Muslims of *Majlis*

⁷⁹ Sir F. Burrows (Bengal) to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, 20 October 1946. N. Mansergh ed., *Transfer of Power 1942-7: Constitutional Relations between Britain and India* vol. 8, (1979), pp.753-754.

Itehad-ul-Mussalman knew of such a scheme. 'It may be presumed that perhaps the propaganda might have been made by the Hindus in order to lessen the Muslim population and at the same time to give a bad name to the State Government.'⁸⁰ Although this rumour did not lead to any riots, but it shows the kinds of things that were prevalent. Some rumours were created by certain communities to propagate their own interests. Rumours caused many disturbances in many areas.

A communal riot which broke up in a place was not only the problem for that place. The news of communal riots spread, of course, to other areas. Moreover, some fugitives from dangerous areas arrived at other places in order to get help and relate their horrible experiences there. The narratives by those people would spread over the different areas. The local refugees gathered especially in Delhi because powerful politicians stayed. Mohammad Rahim Chaman, a shoe merchant in the Agra Shoe Market came to Delhi to report to Jinnah about the circumstances in Agra in which innocent Muslims were arrested for communal riots by the local authorities.⁸¹ Four Muslims came to Delhi from Bihar on 7 November to ask the Muslim League about fund-raising for rehabilitation of the Muslims in that province.⁸² Then, Imamuddin gave his speech in front of about 600 Muslims at Fatehpuri Masjid in Delhi. He criticized the attitude of the Congress Ministries towards Muslim minorities and of the Muslims elsewhere who did not come forward to help Bihari Muslims.⁸³ In December, it was planned in the Assembly of Pakistan

⁸⁰ Letter from Supdt. Majlis-i-Itehad-ul-Mussalmin Mamlakat-e-Islamia, Hyderabad to Liaquat Ali Khan dated 7 October 1946. See Criminal Investigation Department dated 12 October. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.40, Mohd-29 volume20, 'All India Muslim League (September - October 1946)' NMML.

⁸¹ Chaman could not meet Jinnah but stayed with Nawab Mohammad Ismail, a member of the Committee of Direct Action. He stayed in Delhi for five days from 2 October 1946. See Casual Source Report dated 7 October 1946. *ibid.*

⁸² Extract from the C.I.D. Daily Report dated 11 November 1946. *ibid.*

⁸³ Imamuddin asked the audience to help distressed Muslims with money and clothes. See Extract from the C.I.D. Daily Report for 14 - 15 November 1946. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29 Vol.19, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

(*Bazm-e-Pakistan*) that evacuees from Bihar and Sir Feroz Khan Noon who had observed what had happened in these places would narrate the events at Jama Masjid.⁸⁴ Delhi was the best stage from which to appeal to many people and to ask for help. There was frequently tension between Hindus and Muslims who lived in adjoining areas in Delhi. This was the reason why it was reported that: 'Members of Hindu and Muslim communities living in areas of the city predominately inhabited by members of other communities are moving house and a number of people have sent their families away.'⁸⁵

The first stage of those communal riots had a role in showing the power of the Muslim League. Some people also joined the activities. However, a series of disturbances in many places gradually eroded the image of many political parties, including the Muslim League and the British government. 'Some of the Muslims of Delhi have lost confidence in the Muslim League as they believe that it cannot properly look after their interests so much so that it could not arrange for bails for the Muslims arrested in connection with the riot cases.'⁸⁶ This was a complaint against the Muslim League on behalf of the Muslims who asked some measures for Muslim leaders arrested in Delhi. On the other hand, certain Hindus in East Bengal caustically criticized Jinnah regarding Direct Action:

Oh, Cruel Muslims! Yours is not a religion, Mr. Jinnah - Head of Savages, Selfish. Your statement on the situation in Bihar published in

⁸⁴ A poster in Urdu appeared in Delhi on behalf of the Assembly of Pakistan in which it was stated that Friday, 13 December 1946, would be observed as the "Martyr Day", See Casual Source Report dated from 13 December 1946. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29 Vol.19, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

⁸⁵ Extract from the C.I.D. Daily Report for 21 November 1946. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29 Vol.19, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

⁸⁶ Extract from Source Casual Report dated 23 November 1946 by D.S.P./C.I.D. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29 Vol.19, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

the papers shows that no boundary for most mischievous and dangerous unlawful activities of your League. This misconstrued statement creates more pain and distress among the Hindus than the most barbarous and inhuman actions of your Muslim people taking place in Eastern Bengal, really which has no paradise in the world. ... Especially your "Direct Action" resolution has brought this anarchism in this Indian land. ... We are carefully watching as a class, especially the leaders of the Muslim League are always cruel and inhuman in habit and no other community is giving any such horrible trouble to the Hindus.⁸⁷

Many people suspected the motive for Jinnah's action, according to one letter intercepted by the Delhi Police:

Obstructionist attitude of his [Jinnah's] League towards the Constituent Assembly and the communal disturbances in various parts of India have once again convinced the non-League elements of Muslim India to think seriously about the desirability and the need for bringing the Nationalist Muslims on a common platform with this end in view the representatives of various organizations, such as Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Majlis-Ahrar, Momin Conference, Syed Group and Sind Praja Krishak Party.'⁸⁸

Nationalist Muslims had a meeting on 22 and 23 December under the Presidentship of Ahrar leader: Syed Atta Ullah Shah Bukhari. In this assembly, they recommended

⁸⁷ Copy of a letter dated November 1946, from K.R. Ramaswami, V.S. Sabapathi, M. Baskaram, J. Mahalingam, Amyaguham Colony, Egmore, Madras, to the President, Committee of Action, Muslim League, New Delhi. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29 Vol.19, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

⁸⁸ Copy of a letter dated 20 December 1946, from Madan Gopal, Lahore, to L. Durga Das, New Delhi. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29 Vol.19, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as the only personality who could handle the confusion and pull various Nationalist Muslims together.

On the other hand, the Muslim League Council of Action discussed about launching Civil disobedience as Direct Action, and collected funds for the requirements of the National Guard.⁸⁹ They suggested a plan to bring the nationalist Muslims of U.P. under the influence of the Muslim League. The Muslim League insisted to the Muslims in U.P. that the Muslims in Muslim minority-provinces could not be safeguarded. The result of Direct Action created a bad image of the League. However, the Muslim League became the Muslim party which could mobilize the Muslim masses through their plan. At least, the Muslim League leaders were stronger than the other Muslim leaders. In the meeting of the Council, these Muslim League leaders suggested measures for the relief of the families of those Muslims who had been killed in the disturbances.

⁸⁹ Casual Source Report dated 10 September 1946. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.39, Mohd-29 Vol.19, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

Figure 1 Members of the League Council of Action

LEAGUE COUNCIL OF ACTION



The picture shows members of the League Council of Action, who have been holding meeting at Gul-i-Rana, New Delhi.

Standing from left to right (1st row), Messrs. Abdur Rab Nishtar, Liaquat-Ali Khan, Ismail Khan and Nazim-ud-Din. Behind them are Messrs. Essak Saif, Mumtaz Daultana and Abdul Matin Chaudhry.

In fact, some Muslims aggressively supported the Muslim League actions. Certain Muslim who lived in Bangalore appreciated the bravery of the students of the Aligarh Muslim University and Muslims in Calcutta. This is indicated by a letter which reads: 'Already after the incidents in Aligarh and Calcutta, our enemies the Hindus are shaking in their bones.... But what have our Hindu enemies done? They have been cooperating with the Britishers right up to yesterday, enjoying life and making money, and now they want equal favour with us, shameless fellows.'⁹⁰ Direct Action divided Muslims into two groups: those who supported the Muslim League, and those who criticized it Muslim League.

⁹⁰ Letter from C. Abdulla, Bangalore to Malik Feroze Khan Noon, Muslim League Working Committee, Delhi, dated 7 October 1946. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.40, Mohd-29 Vol.20, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

Zahir Shah of Deoband expressed his view.⁹³ He treated the presence of the Muslim League as a symbol of non-cooperation with the Congress and a part of the Direct Action campaign. This attitude showed that the League decided to take Direct Action within the Government, not with the Congress backed by the Administration. A more positive view of the decision to join in the Assembly came from S.H. Rahman, President of Muslim Employees Association in the Directorate General of Industries and Supplies, who reported that the members of the Association were satisfied with the League's judgments. He wrote, 'The Muslim employees of the Directorate General of Industries and Supplies, New Delhi, adhere to their faith in the Qaid-e-Azam and believe that whatever steps he has taken and he may take in future will always tend to establish communal harmony and promote better feelings in all classes of people.'⁹⁴ On the other hand, some Muslims had a negative opinion about the Muslim League. Jalal cites the case of a Muslim who wrote Jinnah saying, 'what we common people of the nation understand is that we have been misused by your [Jinnah's] colleagues who are just after ministries and nothing else.'⁹⁵

Based on my analysis of these primary sources, it seems to me that the decisions of the League did not depend on only Jinnah but also on its other members as well. However, the Muslim masses could perhaps not understand their situation in India clearly, when the party claiming to represent them tried to found a Muslim State. This meant that while the idea of Pakistan stood in front of people as a brilliant banner, the exact dimensions and content of this idea were not accessible to them. The blood-curdling riots of this time gave the strong impression to Indian Muslims that the Muslim League was serious about achieving Pakistan, despite the objections of the British and the Congress.

⁹³ Source Report dated 21 October 1946. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29 Vol.19, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

⁹⁴ The resolution passed by the Executive Committee of the Muslim employees of the Directorate General of Industries and Supplies, New Delhi, held on 18 October 1946. The letter from S.H. Rahman, President of the Directorate General of Industries and Supplies Muslim Employees Association to Liaquat Ali Khan dated 19 October. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, File No.39, Mohd-29 Vol.19, 'All India Muslim League (June - October 1946)'. NMML.

⁹⁵ Nazim Sufi to Jinnah, 25 October 1946. See A. Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, p.228.

CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF THE NATIVE PRESS IN THE FREEDOM-STRUGGLE – A CASE STUDY OF URDU NEWSPAPERS

As we retrace the developments leading to independence, the intricate process in the political struggle becomes clear. There were various political parties that aimed to attain independence. However, a simple question is raised here. How much of their own position did people in India understand in the unheard-of confusion and communal riots? How did they get the information concerned with their freedom? The answer to these questions will also partly answer the central questions raised in this thesis: how did Muslims decide whether to live in India or not?

The Role of Urdu before and after Independence

In this chapter, three Urdu newspapers are picked up to examine how the ideology of Independence was created. Why do I do this? Firstly, newspapers are a tool to inform and lead the common people and a mirror of their reactions. Secondly, Urdu is still the symbolic language of Indian Muslims today. Urdu was also the most popular native language in India until Independence. Languages sometimes develop a relationship with religions. Urdu is also not an exception. Urdu has now come to be recognized as the language of Muslims. Urdu is famous for its grace and prestige as the court language of the Mughal period. However, the language could not keep its elevated position in independent India.⁹⁶ There are some

⁹⁶ See B. Puri, 'Plight of Urdu-Speaking Muslims', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XLII, 2007, pp. 999-1000. This article retraces the history of Urdu-speaking Muslims. Puri starts the discussion about the terrorism on the Samjhauta Express on 18 February 2007. He pointed out that Urdu-speaking Muslims formed the majority of the victims.

reasons for the downfall of Urdu in India. Firstly, Urdu was fundamentally a product of the Mughal court. After that period, people started using their own languages and stepping away from Urdu. Yet Urdu did remain an important language of popular communication. But – and this is the second point – the language controversies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, killed Urdu as a popular language. It came to be associated increasingly with Muslims, as Hindi was distinguished from Hindustani. Thirdly, Muslims who spoke Urdu were scattered after the partition of 1947. Their languages changed with the local languages. Lastly, the partition of India created a gulf among religions: Hindu and Muslim, and also among languages: Hindi and Urdu. And now, many people think that Urdu is the language of Indian Muslims. However, the population speaking Urdu as a first-language is only 7.6 percent in Pakistan.⁹⁷

Paul Brass discusses the *Islamization* before and after Independence in his work in general saying that ‘The evocation of Islamic unity in the pre-independence period in India led to the development of a powerful mass movement behind the demand for the creation of Pakistan, causing the formation of two successor states to the British empire instead of one.’⁹⁸ He adds that, ‘the differences have been most pronounced in discussions of the origins and development of Muslim separatism and the Pakistan movement.’⁹⁹ To use this aspect for explaining Urdu, it can be said that the strong connections between Islam and Urdu were artificially created as part of Pakistan propaganda. As regarding Urdu, Brass also gave his analysis of Urdu in detail¹⁰⁰. According to him, Urdu was needed to separate Hindu and Muslim for the political

⁹⁷ The census of Pakistan (1981). Pakistan chose Urdu as its national language because Urdu could be understood in larger area than other languages.

⁹⁸ P.R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, p.3.

⁹⁹ P.R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, (New Delhi, 1991;2003), p,75.

¹⁰⁰ See P.R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.*, ‘Chapter 4: Urdu and Muslim Grievances in North India, 1947-71’.

interests before Independence and to protect the separate culture later. In this way, he explains the conflict between Hindi and Urdu during the Independence movement. The elites caused the discord and separation between Hindi and Urdu and not the common people. On the other hand, Urdu supporters insisted that Urdu was the common language for both Hindus and Muslims in India, and that it was the language of brothers. In other words, the educated people identified themselves and their own community as Hindi speakers or Urdu speakers while the common people used both languages just as an instrument of communication, to get information, and to live their everyday lives.

Then, what was the position of Urdu newspapers? Newspapers are generally created by educated people to circulate ideas and information. If this is so, then we need to ask a set of questions: Did the Urdu newspaper have a tendency to support Urdu and Islamic culture, or not? It is important to look at the role of the Urdu newspaper and also who were the main readers at that time.

Before Independence, Urdu was more popular in India than today. Urdu became the national language of Pakistan and the official language in Jammu-Kashmir province. To estimate how many people used Urdu before the Independence is difficult because Urdu was not defined as an exact language. The censuses before the Independence also used the term Hindustani which is a mixture of Hindi and Urdu. Both are almost the same language except their scripts, Nagari or Persian. It can be said that any area of Hindi-speakers has many Urdu-speakers. However, to put the spot-light on readers of the newspapers, it is necessary to discuss who read Persian as a mother tongue or daily language. The Urdu reading-areas were composed of the areas of Hindi speakers and the Muslim majority areas because the Muslims generally read the holy *Quran* written in Arabic script. According to

Brass's summary of the censuses 1881-1961,¹⁰¹ the people who used Urdu as a mother-tongue, as a language used ordinarily, and as a home language was an average of 9.1% in U.P. and 3.7% in Bihar. In Punjab, people whose mother tongue as Urdu were an average of 4.5% on the censuses 1911-1961.¹⁰²

This number shows that Urdu was not a majority-language in India. However, Punjab designated Urdu and English as official languages that some schools and some official institutions used¹⁰³. Punjab was composed of Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus who used Urdu, Punjabi and Hindi as a mother tongue. Punjabi was more used than Urdu as a speaking-language while Urdu was the best medium as a literature¹⁰⁴. Moreover, the elite class in Punjab tended to use Urdu and English. To summarize the above situation, it can be said that Urdu had quite an important role of advertising media for elite class, middle class and educated people in Punjab at that time. This also means that the Urdu speakers settled in urban areas because of the condition of education and civil services. According to Paul Brass, Urdu newspapers had first position in Punjab in terms of publication (see Table 2 and 3 in the appendix to this thesis). K. Narendra, the editor of *Pratap*¹⁰⁵, retraced the readers of Newspaper in Lahore and stated that the upper class often read the English newspapers and the middle class read Urdu newspaper. There was some gap among

¹⁰¹ P.R. Brass, *ibid.*, pp,190-192.

¹⁰² P.R. Brass, *ibid.*, p,295.

¹⁰³ See P.R. Brass, *ibid.*, 'Chapter 6: Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab, the Development of Social and Political Differentiation'. pp,277-336.

¹⁰⁴ About the relation of the Partition Urdu literature, see S.R. Chakravarty and Mazhar Hussain, ed., *Partition of India*. According to the Introduction of this work, Urdu litterateurs rejected communalism as referring point in their work and were filled with sorrow when they left India.

¹⁰⁵ The Urdu daily which suffered for its part in the freedom movement was *Pratap* of Lahore, started by Mahshe Krishan in 1919. It vigorously supported Gandhi's policies and the Congress objective. It was a victim of government harassment and was forced to furnish securities at frequent intervals which were forfeited. Between 1919 and 1936, the papers suspended publication many times. See R. Parthasarathy, *Journalism in India: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, p,225.

readers that depended on which class they belonged.¹⁰⁶

The readers of Urdu newspapers came from all social classes and for some the newspaper was too expensive. The cost of daily newspaper was, in case of *Tej*, two annas for weekly and two pices for a copy of the daily paper.¹⁰⁷ However, it was not so expensive for those who were educated. Most readers were middle class-people in terms of their economic aspect and literacy. According to my personal interviews, many people got information by word of mouth at that time.

To summarize about the role of Urdu in the late colonial period, it is clear that Urdu had multiple importance for various peoples and various condition. The language was treated as a product of Islamic culture before, as it is today. Some Muslim editors, especially those who decided to stay in India were proud to publish in Urdu and sometime appreciated Islamic culture in their papers. This tendency was seen among the sophisticated Muslim elite who lived in traditional Muslim cities. For example, the *ulama* who were active in politics and social movements, particularly in the Jamiyat-al-*ulama*, also spread Urdu at the leading *ulama*-dominated school at Deoband in UP, Hyderabad and even Kerala. Aligarh is also the centre for elite Muslims who founded the Aligarh movement.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, editors who belonged to other religions also started Urdu newspapers as it was a convenient language which many people could understand, in places like Punjab. Brass explains this attitude with the comment of Gopal Mittal,¹⁰⁹ who argues that, while Hindus may not be generally hostile to Urdu, they have no special strake in its

¹⁰⁶ The personal interview with K. Narendra (1913-) in New Delhi, February 2008. He is the editor of *Pratap* who also migrated from Lahore to Delhi after the partition.

¹⁰⁷ During 1835-1957, 1 rupee = 16 annas = 64 pices = 192 pies. India won its independence on 15 August, 1947. During the period of transition India retained the monetary system and the currency and coinage of the earlier period. While Pakistan introduced a new series of coins in 1948 and notes in 1949, India brought out its distinctive coins on 15 August, 1950. As a measure of the living standard, the monthly salary of one journalist in Delhi was Rs.100 just after Independence. See the Journalist's book, K. Nayar, *Scoop! Inside Stories from the Partition to the Present*, (New Delhi, 2006), pp,9-10.

¹⁰⁸ P.R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, pp,89-90.

¹⁰⁹ Gopal Mittal (1909-93) is a journalist who started a monthly Urdu magazine *Tahrik*. He edited until his death after his migrating from Lahore to Delhi after the partition.

preservation. The necessary enthusiasm to preserve Urdu can be provided only by the Muslims 'because, more than any other language, Urdu expresses their peculiar genius and is a symbol of their culture.'¹¹⁰ K. Narendra also explained the reason why his father and he published the newspaper in Urdu. He said that Urdu was most useful to spreading messages to all residents in Lahore at that time though the ideas that this newspaper spread was that of *Arya Samaj*¹¹¹: However, he added that Hindus read the paper more than Muslims after it became famous as a newspaper of *Arya Samaj*.¹¹² Moreover there were many editors like Narendra who shifted from Lahore to Delhi and got jobs as journalists in Delhi, again. They also started writing their articles in Urdu even after the partition.

The former set of editors tended to categorize readers into one group to unite the group. The aim of the second set of editors was to spread their new ideas and thinking among people at large. The object of reading Urdu newspaper was different among these editors. It also meant that the notion of Independence was different in their papers.

Did the newspapers give people any hints that helped them decide their migration during the partition? According to the common opinion, most of the immigrants who moved to Pakistan lived in cities before they left their old homes. 'Most of the educated middle class Muslim families, government servants and traders opted for Pakistan, but majority of those living in rural areas stayed back.'¹¹³ Why was this so? One reason given is the following:

A larger proportion of the urban rather than that of the rural

¹¹⁰ P.R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, p,188.

¹¹¹ A religious and social organization founded in the 19th century with the aim of reforming and revitalizing Hinduism and its practices. Swami Dayananda Sarasvati started it at Mumbai in 1875.

¹¹² The personal interview with K. Narendra (1913-) in New Delhi, February 2008.

¹¹³ S.R. Chakravarty and Mazhar Hussain, ed., *Partition of India*, p,15.

Muslim community migrated, presumably because their property (if any) was more mobile. When the minority community had mostly immovable property (land and shrines), and especially when the property was big (the zamindar holdings), the owners tended to move only in the face of imminent, physical violence.¹¹⁴

In this case, some scholars presumed that those who had good jobs decided to go to Pakistan. In addition, the role of newspaper in urban areas should be discussed. People who lived in cities read more newspapers than those in rural area. They gathered information about Independence and partition to foresee their future. It is possible to suggest that the encounter with communal violence is not the only reason for people to shift. The information from media including newspapers would be another reason. So we can talk of two type of immigrants: those who were forced to go to Pakistan and those who chose to shift to Pakistan.

The common people obviously could not meet the political leaders and understand the complex process toward Independence. Looking back, a journalist, Kuldip Nayar,¹¹⁵ writes that 'in 1947, television had not been invented. The medium of communications was confined to radio and newspapers.'¹¹⁶ However, editors published newspapers, and these were powerful means of propagating ideas, and circulating information. In the following sections, I will focus on a set of Urdu newspapers to explore the ideas they circulated.

¹¹⁴ A.R. Zolberg, A. Suhrke and S. Aguayo, *Escape from Violence*, p,131.

¹¹⁵ Kuldip Nayar is a journalist who shifted from Sialkot to Amritsar and Delhi after the partition. He started his job as a journalist of Urdu newspapers in Delhi, *Anjam* and *Wahadat*. The salary was Rs.100 per month. He resigned the work to go to America because Hasrat Mohani advised that Urdu had no future in India.

¹¹⁶ K. Nayar, *Scoop! Inside Stories from the Partition to the Present*, p,12.

The Situation of the Press : The Case Study in Delhi

The press sometimes had great influence on people, shaping their political views. The 27th annual session of the All India Muslim League held on 22-24 March 1940 is famous because the League members passed the Lahore Resolution¹¹⁷. This resolution is often called the Pakistan Resolution. However, the resolution did not include any term 'Pakistan'. Khaliqzaman affirmed;

Finally the resolution was adopted with great enthusiasm and thunderous applause by midnight of 23 March 1940. The next morning, the Hindu Press came out with big headlines 'Pakistan Resolution Passed', although the word was not used by anyone in the speeches nor in the body of the Resolution. The Nationalist Press supplied to the Muslim masses a concentrated slogan which immediately conveyed to them the idea of a State. It would have taken long for the Muslim leaders to explain the Lahore Resolution and convey its real meaning and significance to them. Years of labour of the Muslim leaders to propagate its full import amongst the masses was shortened by the Hindu Press in naming the resolution the 'Pakistan Resolution.'¹¹⁸

The expression and comments of newspapers surely defined the political situation

¹¹⁷ The first resolution was passed on 23 March. 'The areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.' See S.S. Pirzada. *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. 2, p,341.

¹¹⁸ C. Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, (Lahore, 1961), pp,236-237.

among the people, popularizing slogans that often did not express the original idea. In the above case, the Hindu press promoted the Pakistan movement by using the term 'Pakistan Resolution'. It was a slogan that was to soon capture public imagination.

As a feature of the press at that time, weekly and monthly newspapers were many more in number than daily newspapers. According to one report about the press in Delhi, the number of monthly publications was around 54, and there were about 30 weeklies and 12 dailies. In addition of these numbers, there were many more periodical papers.¹¹⁹

The All India Newspaper Editors' Conference is a large meeting for the press- editors. There are some similar conferences larger or smaller in other areas. It is possible to gauge the policy of the newspapers from the discussions in the conference. The first session of the Editors' Conference was held at Allahabad on 16 and 17 February 1946. Jawaharlal Nehru gave the statement in the session. Nehru doubted the accuracy of information in Hindustani newspapers. He was worried about the changes that his words underwent when his speeches in Indian languages was translated into English, and then re- translated back into local languages and published in local newspapers.¹²⁰ He urged that that the press in India should devote more time and space to villages and rural life and conditions in the rural area, and have a foreign news service of its own without promoting their own interest.¹²¹ It is suggested that many newspapers had some limitations both to collect and to inform the news. The Urdu newspapers invariably have the possibility to take the same process that Nehru pointed out. It meant the paradox that native newspapers were

¹¹⁹ *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 8th Installment, File. No. 468, Press- 25. 'Press and persons (1948)'. NMML.

¹²⁰ N.N. Mitra, ed., *The Indian Annual Register*, (January – June 1946) vol.1, p,333.

¹²¹ *ibid.*

written for the masses of people, however the contents became far from true. Even the contents were not enough as the newspaper because they could not cover all events including international news. However, some doubt remains about developing the news to rural news. It is not to be denied that there was a shortage of newspapers in rural areas. However, it is also difficult for rural editors to deal with larger information. An important point to emphasize is the structure in the Indian press that the facts were narrated by various and specific newspapers. It would be impossible to inform everything by only one newspaper.

The most noteworthy point is how to report the communal riots in the newspapers. In this conference, Nehru warned that news of riots got into the papers but conditions which led to riots were often ignored. That kind of news about disturbances was avoided under the control of the British government. In fact, there were seldom articles about the communal riots in any newspapers that compared of the different stories which the people told about their horrible experiences. Detailed discussions of the background of the riots was also edited out by the censorship.

In 1946, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, W. Christie, held a conference with the editors of papers to discuss the communal situation, especially the situation in Delhi. The secret report of the Home Department tells us that Christie reached an agreement with the editors. According to Christie's report:

Unfortunately, the editor of Dawn did not come to the meeting but the remaining editors were unanimous in agreeing that fiery and fanatical as well as provocative speeches and writings must be stopped. We discussed the orders which were issued last week-end by the Punjab Government and the similar ones which

were recently issued by the U.P. Government in which a warning was given to the public and to the press that speeches and writings advocating violence or deliberately intended, or which were obviously likely, to stir up communal bitterness would not be allowed in future and those responsible would be firmly dealt with irrespective of position or party onto which they may belong.¹²²

The government was convinced of the cooperation of the editors. It applied to the Congressmen and the Communists: moreover it tried to control *Dawn* in its present attitude of defiance by other ways. It was clear that the influence of newspapers in Punjab, U.P. and Delhi was so serious to incite the communal riots.¹²³ It was quite likely that the communal violence was led by those people who took inspiration from the news of the local newspapers. To expand this idea into the period after the self-control by the editors, how the people knew the disturbances and decided to leave from their home is open to discussion. However, it is too complicated to be examined in detail here because the reason of the violence would be out of the field of the press.

The government took action against the spark that touched off the communal violence. The Press-Advising and Advisory Committee checked a large number of newspapers details.¹²⁴ Let me give a few examples (the underlined- sentences were

¹²² The Immediate Confidential dated on 27 August 1946 from W. Christie to A.K. Porter. *Home Department Political Branch*, File No. 33/25/46- Poll (I) 'Issue of Warning to the Press and Public in Delhi by C.C. Delhi – Communal Riots'. NAI.

¹²³ The Standing Committee of the All India Newspaper Editors' Conference held on 13 and 14 October 1946 took the consideration of recent action taken by the governments of Bengal, Punjab and Delhi against newspapers. The covered area was limited in north India according to these topics in both meetings. See *Home Department Political Branch*, F.No. 33/36/36- Poll (I). 'All India Newspaper Editors' Conference 1946'. NAI.

¹²⁴ Statements on communal matters press advised by the as hoc, Press Advice Committee, Delhi – Officer on special duty (March, 1947). See *Home Department Political Branch*, File No.33/11/47-Poll (I). 'Press-Advising and Advisory Committee' NAI.

the ones that were eliminated):

1. Dated 23 April, 1947, Calcutta. (*A.P.I.*):

In the very centre of Rawalpindi, Attock and Jhelum district the local representatives of the Muslim League, Mr. Dewan Chamanlal said, “who took the lead in all the dreadful things that had happened , in roasting people live, in murder rape and arson, and in the wholesale conversions at the point of the dagger. ... Coercion was the order of the day and when that succeeded partly, then wholesale attacks on the lives and properties of the minorities followed. The object obviously is to tell the minorities how Pakistan will be beneficial for them, and by violence to install a Ministry in the Punjab. ... I cannot see that there is any other way open for the minorities also in Bengal. For the Punjab, at least all talks of ministry making is at an end. And I think the sooner friends like Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan understand this the better would it be for peace and tranquility not only in the Punjab but throughout India.

2. No Date (*The Hindustan Times*):

Detail have begun to emerge of the technique follow by rioters in the worst affected parts of North-Western India. The facts revealed by thousands of refugees who had fled from these areas into Hardwar disprove that the risings were spontaneous or unplanned. ... In every town and village attacked by them

[the rioters in districts of Cambelpur, Abbotabad, Kohat, Bannu and Hazara.], they invariably of complete safety and protection. ... Meanwhile, large-scale smuggling of arms was being carried on from the tribal territory. In the villages, every blacksmith's shop was turning out daggers and spears months before the riots actually broke out. ... At the dead of the night a cry was raised that the Sikhs had invaded, and the village had been raided. Refugees from dozens of villages and towns have corroborated the fact that the rioters always raised the cry that the Sikhs had come immediately before launching their attack.

3. Dated 19 May, 1947, Peshawar. (*The Hindustan Times*):

Over 10,000 men, women and children are still living in about half a dozen-relief centres located in various temples, gurdwaras and schools in the city ... It is far less than what League prisoners in Frontier jails are being allowed. ... The worst tragedy had taken place at Mallana village, about seven miles from Dera Ismail Khan, where 54 men, women and children are alleged to have been burnt alive and about half a dozen kidnapped.

4. Dated 22 May, 1947, Lucknow. (*Indian News Agency Telegrams*):

What the people of these provinces expect of the provincial government is as follows: Firstly, it should not fight shy of

coming to the help of these unfortunate men and women who had to run away from their own provinces for want of protection to their life and honor, because they happen to be Hindu and Sikhs.

5. Dated 9 June, 1947, Jaipur. (*Reuter Telegram*):

The interior of Kotkasim district was good. In the morning of June 4 however a Muslim and a couple of Jats had an altercation in Kotkasim proper and as tempers of both the communities was already very high owing to what was happening around Kotkasim this incident developed into a major clash between Muslims and Hindus.

The above samples indicate which part the government was anxious to ban. The elimination is characterized by information about which community was attacked and which did it. As the result of this censorship, the people could not specify whether the riots around them were religious conflicts or not. Of course, the indescribable ways to massacre were not reported because they could possibly have prompted violence among the people as revenge. It is inferred from the efforts of the government and editors that some riots and violence would not occur. However, it was possible that the people were frightened of the hostility from rumours and uncertain information. The people did not have room to know the sketch of communal rivalry for Independence even on the level of public people. Over and above, it is also possible that the local and minor newspapers could inform the communal news by evading.

It is necessary to keep in mind that the editor of *Dawn* did not attend either the conference held by Police and the All India Newspaper Editors' Conference

perhaps. *Dawn* was the organ of the All India Muslim League. The reason of the League's absence is thought that the leaders of the All India were occupied by the Congress leaders : Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhai Patel. There is considerable validity that the League felt the conference as the meeting under the Congress rule. Moreover, the League showed its defiance against both the government and the Congress and kept informing the communal issues on *Dawn*. The articles of *Dawn* were read carefully and submitted to the government.

In the fact, the newspapers of the Muslim League were poorest of all political organs. The supporters of the Muslim league had submitted the demand to improve the mass-communication between the Muslim League and the people inside and outside of India.

Muslims have no propaganda machinery in the Foreign Countries and they have also no proper arrangements for provincial interchange of their news. It is all because the Muslims have no reliable news service of their own. ... On the other hand, if the Muslims are killed even in great numbers, then, their death news are not published in the papers and the News Service. People content themselves simply by saying that a few people are killed in the communal riots that broke out at Ahmedabad, Bihar and other places, but we do not get any information about the true state of Muslims there. ... Under these circumstances I propose that the Muslim League should either subsidize the Orient Press or should start their own News Service.¹²⁵

¹²⁵ The letter was passed through the postal inspection of Criminal Investigation dated on 11 September 1946. Sadiq Hussan, Bar-at-Law (M.L.A. Punjab), Amritsar wrote the Urdu letter to different Muslim League Committees. See *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.39, Mohd-29, volume 19. 'All India Muslim League (June - September 1946)'. NMML.

The sender of the letter pointed out that there was medium through which news, specially about communal riots, could be circulated to Muslims. As stated above, the news about disturbances was controlled to some extent. But the point that was made is important: Muslims had no reliable news service of their own. It means that Muslim felt that they were backward in the field of the journalism, and they were unable to know what was happening to other members of the community. Even they did not know the detail of what action the Muslim League was taking as their representative.

There is another example to illustrate how poor the public relations of the Muslim League was as compared with the Congress. One Muslim who lived in Singapore described in his letter, 'the Congress is running so many papers here and they are all full with their propaganda. Muslims are also running two weeklies but they are not up to the standard. ... I hope you must be aware of the recent Hindu- Muslim clashes in Singapore which is sufficient to denote our relations here.'¹²⁶ This report was about the situation in Singapore. However, it was clear that publication of newspapers was helping the spread of Congress influence. It seems quite probable that the power of the Muslim League papers was less than the Congress in India. There were some local newspapers which supported the Muslim League by the public. A C.I.D. report stated: 'The *Payam*, *Anjam* and *Wahdat* are reported to be writing communal articles in their columns and they are trying to incite the Muslim mass.'¹²⁷ These three newspapers, especially *Anjam*, had a close relation with the Muslim League. They

¹²⁶ The letter was passed through the postal inspection of Criminal Investigation dated on 16 September 1946. Munawar Hussain, Singapore wrote the letter to Zafar Ahmed Ansari, the Secretary in the Committee of Action. He asked Ansari to send all literatures of the Muslim League including *Dawn* and all addresses of editors and offices of the Muslim League newspapers. See *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.39, Mohd-29, volume 19. 'All India Muslim League (June - September 1946)'. NMML.

¹²⁷ Extract from a Casual Source Report for 24 September 1946 made by Pt. Jagan Nath, D.S.P., C.I.D. Delhi. 'Abdul Hamid-Shimlavi, proprietor of the *Payam*, has his office in a flat near the Jama Masjid and adjacent to that flat is situated the office of the *Bazam-i-Pakistan*. Shibli s/o Bhaiya Ahsan-ul-Haq is an enthusiastic worker of this organization and is a moving figure to cause incitement amongst the Muslims.' See *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.39, Mohd-29, volume 19. 'All India Muslim League (June - September 1946)'. NMML.

took part in the political actions of the Muslim League, and mobilized Muslim opinion in favour of Muslim League.¹²⁸

The Muslim League did not have any reporter of its own or spokesperson who handled the media and the press. Therefore, each editor of local newspapers could interpret the propaganda of the Muslim League based on his own thinking. These newspapers were influential, and managed to circulate their ideas widely. The Muslim League on its part allowed the local newspapers to interpret their own idea of Pakistan and Independence. The Muslim League thus could expand the social basis of their supporters through the local newspapers. There is no doubt about the value of the local and minor newspapers for the Muslims.

The Example of Urdu Newspapers

We need to examine the Urdu newspapers in more detail. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find access to the Urdu newspapers issued around Independence, though the Urdu press had a major role to play in the politics of the time. The condition of newspapers that are available is also not good. They are not well preserved and are difficult to read. Some papers are torn; some are missing or have become dark-coloured. I have tried to consult a number of these papers in the institutions and libraries in Delhi, and chosen three Urdu newspapers to understand their reactions concerned with Independence. These newspapers are: *Tej* (Delhi), *Sidiq* (Lucknow) and *Roshni* (Srinagar). These newspapers are not famous and have not been widely used in the research which many historians have already done. However, as we will see, they are important and are available as a series.

¹²⁸ A tea party was held for the members of the Council of Action, the Muslim League by the Muslim members of the Beadon Club on 16 September 1946. They talked about the Direct Action after the failure of the negotiation among Jinnah, Nehru and the Viceroy in the future. The representatives of *Dawn* and *Daily Anjam* also presented. The above matter was quoted from the Casual Source Report dated on 19 September 1946. See *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.39, Mohd-29, volume19. 'All India Muslim League (June - September 1946)'. NMML.

Daily and Weekly Tej: Delhi

Let us first look at the contents of *Tej*. *Tej* is the most prominent of the newspapers that have been selected for study. It was issued both daily and weekly. Even the number of daily copies was 10,000 and the circulation was the most in Delhi.¹²⁹ The press could finance itself through only the sale of papers. It was popular and had avid readers in Delhi.

Tej was founded in 1923 by Swami Shradhanand. The price of the newspaper was around two annas for the weekly and two pices for the daily. Usually, the newspaper ran to eight pages and the weekly one runs to twelve pages. The paper enjoyed a wide circulation in Delhi, U.P., Rajasthan and Punjab. Its founding editor was the leading Congressman¹³⁰ and Delhi leader, Lala Deshbandu Gupta. The newspaper was committed a free society based on democracy. The report stated that after independence, *Tej* was treated as pro-government organ. However, it is also true that the press faced government rage many times and paid the penalty. In addition, it was banned in a number of native states.¹³¹ Even Gupta had been to jail seven times during last twenty five years for his political convictions. He was released last in February 1945.¹³²

Tej is the most cultivated newspaper and similar style with the present newspapers. The newspaper covered all subjects, like politics, economy, local and international events and political cartoon. *Weekly Tej* has a column for children and

¹²⁹ This file shows the list of the press in Delhi after Independence, 1948. There are basic information of thirty-three presses and persons. This report defines *Tej* as Nationalist and pro-government organ. About other presses, it researched the background more detail. See *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 8th Installment, File No.468, Press-25, 'Press and Person (1948)'. NMML. and Table 8 in the appendix to this thesis.

¹³⁰ His name was listed to attend the open session of the Congress held at Meerut on 23-24 November 1946. He was one of 59 well-known Congress delegates and visitors from Delhi. See *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.40, Mohd-29, volume20. 'All India Muslim League (September - October 1946)'. NMML.

¹³¹ These basic information are from R. Parthasarathy, *Journalism in India: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, (1989), p,225.

¹³² See *Indian Year Book and Who's Who 1945-46*, pp,1110-1111.

photograph concerned with hot news. Many advertisements of shops and companies on the paper show how popular the newspaper was among the people. This paper generally stood on the neutral position and gave an eminently fair decision. However the writers of columns were sometimes the Congressmen. The headlines were often occupied with the information around the Congress. The contents were also proper for all readers; Hindus, Muslim, Sikhs and so on. Moreover, the newspaper adapted more pictures to explain political issues than other newspapers. *Tej* could almost monopolize many people in Delhi where various communities and political leaders lived because *Tej* was still universally accepted and cultivated as a mass media.

As the regarding to Independence, *Tej* purchased it through the daily news. In the weekly *Tej*, the journalists enjoyed showing their opinions more than the daily paper. Their main thought was completely against separatism and Pakistan. However, it was also few articles which exalted Gandhi and Nehru directly. To focus on the articles concerned with Muslim issues, the attitude of the paper was frigid and sometimes gloomy about the politics of the Muslim League. Even the term of Pakistan did not appear until May 1947 when the disturbances happened in Punjab and Bengal.

Sidiq: Lucknow

Weekly *Sidiq* was a successor of *Sach* newspapers Lucknow. The advanced subscription per year was six rupees and the cost of each paper was two [annas]. The paper ran to eight pages. The editor was Abdul Majid Daryabadi (1892-1977) who was named just Abdul Majid on the paper.¹³³ He is more famous as the scholar of Islamic studies and interpreter than as a journalist. As for political activity, he

¹³³ Daryabadi is perhaps not a real name. It means 'Abdul Majid in Daryabandi'. As the proof, there is the address on the newspaper which reveals Daryaband District, Barabanki. The district is around 60km east of the central city of Lucknow.

took a part of the Khilafat Movement. This city, the provincial capital of U.P., is so important from the regarding of politics, economy, especially sections of agriculture and industry and culture in India.

Sidiq could be called a magazine rather than newspaper. The volume is more than only eight pages and it does not have much content. Many topics in the paper are concerned with the local issues and Islamic ideology. However, the most valuable point of *Sidiq* is the style in which the journalists give their comments, quoting other articles from various newspapers and magazines. The articles included discussion on the issue of Pakistan. Compared with *Tej*, this paper had more interest in Pakistan. The important question is not whether *Sidiq* favored Pakistan or not. Sometimes there were columns about the history of Islam, the education in *madrasah* and so on. Especially, the paper spared the space periodically about appreciations of new books. It is reasonable to suppose that the readers of *Sidiq* were sophisticated Muslims of Lucknow.

The response to Pakistan on *Sidiq* is cool-headed but not critical. The active comments appeared in the paper after India got its independence. Almost all subjects discussed showed the anxiety of Muslims who lived in Lucknow as a minority. Even the journalists criticized the present politics, but they did not support or wish to prevent the readers from going Pakistan. Their real worry was about to the preservation of their own culture, and Islamic doctrines. They also saw Urdu as a great cultural production of *qashbah*.

This traditional city also experienced the confusion of the partition. Imtiyaz Ahmad explains that 'Lucknow enjoyed a reputation as a city where peace prevailed even during the worst post-partition violence and rioting. A very large number of

Punjabi refugees came to Lucknow and eventually made it their home.¹³⁴ One notable point is that the people who left Lucknow did not avoid any communal violence there. Immigrants from Lucknow decided to go to Pakistan.

The confusion of people's exchange in Lucknow was not so worse than other major cities within one month later of Independence. The Lucknow Muslim National Guard held a meeting on 26 September 1947 to gather a batch of people which would go to Delhi, Lahore etc. to maintain peace there.¹³⁵ On the other hand, the speakers, Syed Shahid Husain and Naib Salar Shahr asked people to move in every *mohalla* (neighborhood), and they asked both Hindus and Muslims to maintain peace, and they requested the Muslims not to run away from Lucknow for fear of violence. The reactions of the Muslims are reflected in their demand. Communal riots did not happen there, however Muslims could not stop feeling fear against Hindus who also stayed more than before. The number of displaced persons was 29,478 during the decade 1941-50. 90.3% of the total came from West Pakistan, and 81.0% shifted during 1947.¹³⁶ The immigrants settled in the city and cantonments. The proportion of immigration per 10,000 is 525 including 298 males and 227 females. As the census of 1951, only 73.5% of the district population was born in the same district, and 19.2% in other district of U.P., 2.2% in somewhere of India and 3.1% in outside of India including Pakistan. As the other reason of the large migrations before Partition, many labourers from villages and cities came to get job in Lucknow which had large-scale factories, including presses.

¹³⁴ V. Graff ed., *Lucknow: Memories of a City*, (OUP, Delhi, 1997), p.278.

¹³⁵ The report dated 27 September 47 by an officer of the U.P. S.B. regarding a meeting of the Lucknow Muslim National Guard held on 26 September 1947. See *Delhi Police Record*, List No.30, 5th Installment, File No.61, Mohd-75, volume 6, 'Muslims (1947-49)'. NMML.

¹³⁶ About these numbers, see V.C. Sharma, *Gazetters of India: Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow*, (1959), pp.70-71.

The Lucknow Muslims became worried about their future seriously not before Independence but after that. They had already criticized the Congress government formed after the provincial election in 1937, but now these complaints became stronger. They were also critical of the Muslim League leaders and supporters, who were determined to found Pakistan, regardless of what the wider section of Indian Muslims felt.

Roshni: Srinagar

Roshni weekly had the relation with a particular group; the *Lahore Ahmadiyah*¹³⁷. The editor was Abdul Aziz Shura, known as Abdul Aziz Kashmiri¹³⁸. He started his paper *Roshni* in February 1943 as a fortnightly. Then it became a weekly and since May 1977 it is being published as a daily. Now after his retirement, his son is publishing the paper. The cost was five rupees for the advanced subscription per year. This paper was the more compact than the other two newspapers. The news that was published was mostly concerned with the local issues in Kashmir. For example, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah¹³⁹, so-called *Sher-i-Kashmir* (the lion of Kashmir) is a more important and popular political leader for the Lucknow residents

¹³⁷ Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) founded the Ahmadiya Muslim Jamaat in 1889 at Qadian, Punjab. He claimed himself as the promised *Messiah* and *Mahdi* to reconstruct the Muslim society. He explained the excellence of Islam in all religions and practiced *jihad* on the way of spirit not violence in front of many followers. Sunna and Shia do not recognize the followers as Muslims. The community was divided into two communities; so-called the section of Qadian Ahmadiya and the section of Lahore Ahmadiya in 1914 because their opinion differed about the doctrine and successor of the founder and the conduct of the community.

¹³⁸ He was born on 10th June, 1919 in Srinagar. He joined the Lahore Ahmadiya Movement in 1932. He was a regular subscriber to the weeklies *The Paigham-i Sulh* and *The Light* of Lahore. As a journalist, he joined the staff of weekly *Al-Barq* in 1938 (*Al-Barq* was edited by Maulvi Muhammad Ayub Sabir, son of the late Maulvi Muhammad Abdullah), and sometimes worked in the weekly *Khalsa Gazette* owned by Sardar Gaur Poorab Singh.

¹³⁹ Sheikh Abdullah (1905-1982) was the important leader and the Prime Minister of Kashmir soon after its controversial provisional accession to India in 1947. He got education in Lahore and Aligarh. Especially, he got influenced by the liberal and progressive ideas at Aligarh Muslim University, then tried to use these thoughts for the welfare and democracy of Kashmir. His famous plan, so-called *Neya Kashmir*, addressed his idea well that the common people in Kashmir should attain a democratic constitution. He was a founder of the Muslim Conference(1931), later re-named National Conference(1938) to encourage the movement for the people against the feudal role of *Maharaja*. He took a prominent part of the movement of Quit Kashmir (*Kashmir chor do*), and arrested and prisoned some times.

than other leaders like Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and even Jinnah. The scope of information of the articles published in the newspaper was not so large but covered Punjab, Delhi and some major events.

Comparing with these cities; Delhi, Lucknow and Srinagar, Srinagar was the smallest city from the aspect of the population.¹⁴⁰ However the political role of the city was as important with other cities. The situation of Srinagar was different from other cities because of the relationship between the subjects and the ruler mainly, and issues in the neighbour. It made particular communal issue which other area did not have in India. The conflict was not between Hindu and Muslim as usual. The Muslim leaders were classified into some group and sometimes fought one another with getting support from their familiar politicians outside. They were busily engaged in collecting information and negotiation from Srinagar to Lahore mainly. Srinagar got influenced so much from Lahore.

We need to understand the background of the political situation in Srinagar and even Lahore before examining the contents of the newspaper *Roshni*. Many newspapers in Lahore published news about the situation in Kashmir and almost all journalists in Srinagar had some inspirations from them. 'In the absence of a Kashmir-based press, prohibited by the Dogra¹⁴¹ rulers until 1932, newspapers from Punjab had consistently filtered into the valley, carrying with them their editorializing opinions on the situation in Kashmir.'¹⁴² However, this opinion may be misleading but there was a Kashmir-based newspaper before 1932 when the new Press Law was

¹⁴⁰ The population of Delhi was 521,849, Lucknow was 387,177 and Srinagar was 207,787 in 1941. See *Indian Year Book and Who's Who: 1945-46*, p.34.

¹⁴¹ Dogra is one community of the Indo-Aryan ethnic group who speaks the Dogri and stays in Jammu and neighborhood. Most of Dogra are Hindu. The last Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hara Singh (1895-1961) and his family were also Dogra.

¹⁴² M. Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir*, (New Delhi, 2007), p. 261. Rai explains more in the footnote as the following. According to the British resident in Kashmir, the situation in July 1931 was deteriorating because of the censorship of especially Muslim owned newspapers and the prohibition on Muslim leaders from India entering. Since 1931, the tension between Kashmiris and Dogras had been aggressive as the freedom struggle. Sheikh Abdullah brought the idea of the social revolution against the elite Muslims at the same time. According to C. Bilqees Taseer, her brother in the law, Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Sheikh Abdullah often discussed about the socialism. See C.B. Taseer, *The Kashmir of Sheikh Abdullah*, (Srinagar, 2005).

enacted and the formation of political parties was admitted. The first newspaper was *Vidya Vilas* published every week in both Urdu and Hindi. Baikat Ram Shashtri started it in 1867. Until 1932, several newspapers were started but they were short-lived.¹⁴³ Weekly, *Ranbir* was a newspaper that was named after Maharaja Ranbir Singh and was published in 1924 by Lalla Mulk Raj Saraf. Many more newspapers were started after 1932. The first newspaper under the new Press Law was *Vatasta* by Prem Nath Bazaz which allowed space for Aziz Kashmiri's journalistic capabilities. However, this paper was also closed soon because of its nationalist policy.

In Srinagar there were various communities, and people with different political positions. They can be divided into Muslim owners and Hindu owners in general. They also represented the National Conference, Kashmiri *Pandits* including Dogras, the *Ahmadiyah* community, Sikhs, pro-Congress, Pro-Government and so on. In this work, the newspaper of the *Ahmadiyah* community is taken up as a case study in Srinagar.

Kashmiris were divided into two groups based on Lahore. One was supported by the *Ahmadiyahs*, and another was supported by the *Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam (Ahrar)*. Both groups were opposed to each other. The former group stood against Dogra rule and the Kashmiri Muslim elite and got support from Kashmiri Muslims who lived in Punjab. The latter group was supported by the urban Muslims and the upper class Muslims and the reformist *Ulema* who sympathized with the Congress. The All India Muslim Kashmiri Conference founded at Lahore to react to Kashmiri problems won the Kashmiri Muslims to its side, and its directors were also occupied by the *Ahmadiyah* of Qadian. The leaders

¹⁴³ For example in Srinagarh, *Tohfa-i-Kashmir* was started in 1876 by a Lahore journalist, Munshi Harsukh Rai. Munshi Nissar Ali Skohrat founded *Jammu Gazzete* in 1884. See C.B. Taseer, *ibid.*, pp.226-227.

could use their own connection to collect the fund for the struggle. The *Ahmadiyahs* of both Qadian and Lahore often united against the Ahrar and united India because the general opinion of *Roshni* which was issued by the editor of the Lahore-e-*Ahmadiyah* also criticize the Congress and united India. At that time, both sections of the *Ahmadiyah* had their own newspapers and it was easy for them to publicize news to their followers and ask for help¹⁴⁴.

The general opinion of *Roshni* was in favour of the idea of Pakistan. In addition to short reports and comments, it published special articles about Islamic history and doctrines. The political news concerned with the formation of Pakistan was explained through the activities of local political leaders. They trusted Jinnah as the *Qaid-e-Azam* (The great leader). His photographs were sold along with the advertisement on the paper.¹⁴⁵

The *Ahmadiyahs* supported Jinnah because Jinnah openly recognized the *Ahmadiyah* as Muslim. This continued to be a communal issue among Muslims in the years after the formation of Pakistan.¹⁴⁶ The following anecdote about Jinnah is famous among the *Ahmadiyahs* and Srinagar. Aziz Kashmiri, the editor of *Roshni*, invited Jinnah to the Kashmir Press Conference at Srinagar in 1944. The leading editors asked Jinnah a lot of questions. Aziz Kashmiri asked the question as to who can be a member of the All India Muslim League.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ The personal interview with Burham Ahmad Zafar on 6 February 2008. He is the representative of the Qadian-e-*Ahmadiyah*. According to him, there are some materials about the partition at their library in Qadian. His father remained India because he should do direct and practice the regional ceremonies for the followers who still stayed in Qadian, Punjab.

¹⁴⁵ *Roshni*, 24 September 1946. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁴⁶ The *Ahmadiyah* was divested of the institutional position as the Muslims in 1974. Moreover, they were prohibited to mission by the government of Pakistan in 1984.

¹⁴⁷ According to the explanation of M.A. Sabir, editor of *Al-Barq*, the Kashmir Muslim Conference had debarred the *Ahmadiyah* to be its members at that time. The situation made Aziz Kashmiri ask the question to Jinnah.

I have been asked a disturbing question, as to who among the Muslims can be a member of the Muslim League. The question has been asked with particular reference to the Qadianis¹⁴⁸. As far as the constitution of the All-India Muslim League is concerned, it is clearly mentioned that every Muslim irrespective of his belief or sect can become a member of the Muslim League, provided he agrees with its beliefs, policy and program, and fills in and signs the membership form and pays the subscription of two annas. I appeal to the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir that they should not raise such sectarian questions and should gather together on one platform and under one flag. The success of Muslims lies in unity and this is the only effective way of making progress in political, social and economic fields. And this is how Muslims of Kashmir state and for that matter all other nations can also progress. [As the reply to Sabir who insisted that *Qadianis* should be declared as out of the pale of Islam] What right I have to declare a person as a non-Muslim when he claims to be a Muslim.¹⁴⁹

Jinnah's statement is not strange because he needed to gather all groups of Muslims in support of the idea of Pakistan, instead of making strong distinctions between them. Therefore, groups like the Ahmadiyahs saw him as a political leader who was tolerant and understanding. Aziz Kashmiri sent all newspapers of Kashmir including his *Roshni* and prominent newspaper of

¹⁴⁸ This sentence is not quoted in some documents.

¹⁴⁹ See 'Mr.Jinnah Regarded Ahmadias as Muslims', *The Light & Islamic Review*, Vol.69:1, Jan-Feb 1992, pp.15-18. and N. Ahmad, *Biography of Abul Aziz Kashmiri*. Both documents were quoted from the website of the Lahore Ahmadiyah.

Lahore to Jinnah. Jinnah expressed appreciation of Kashmiri's work in his letter dated on 20 May 1944.¹⁵⁰ The supporters of Pakistan in Srinagar had different emotion from the other pro-Pakistan people.

The Comparative Studies of Three Newspapers

In 1946, all newspapers were not busy explaining the need for a Muslim or Islamic state – Pakistan. Many of them started considering how Muslims should live in India, again. This question connected with the two-nation theory (*Do Qaumi Nazariyah*) which was named from Jinnah's speech in the 27th annual session of the Muslim League. Jinnah asserted as follows:

The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature. They neither intermarry, nor interact together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting idea and conceptions. Their perspective of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that

¹⁵⁰ 'Dear Sir, I am in receipt of your letter of May 16, and I shall certainly be glad to meet the local journalists as desired by you. If you would care to come to this place, which is no doubt very far from Srinagar city, and is convenient to you all. I shall be pleased to receive you all on Tuesday, May 23, at 11 a.m. at the above address.'

may be so built up for the government of such a State. ... I have already published a little pamphlet containing most of the things that I have been saying, and I think you can easily get that publication, both in English and in Urdu, from the League Office.¹⁵¹

This speech became the basis of the two-nation theory. However, it is inferred from the base of the theory had already appeared before in the Muslim League. In the Working Committee of the Muslim League held on 18 September 1939, Muslims had been defined as one of the many nations in India and this implied the need for a federation of plural and independent states:

That while Muslim India stands against exploitation of the people of India and has repeatedly declared in favour of a free India it is equally opposed to the domination of the Hindu majority over Mussalmans and other minorities and vassalization of Muslim India and is irrevocably opposed to any "Federal objective" which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and a parliamentary system of government. Such a constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the peoples of the country which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a nation State.¹⁵²

How did newspapers reflect and debate the idea of two-nations? Newspapers help us understand not only what the leaders thought but what the common people felt. In the newspapers I study the idea of two-nations (*do qaumen, do qaumi*) is continuously discussed. *Sidiq* and *Roshni* sometimes published special articles about histories of Muhammad, the Mughal emperors and the ancestors of the Indian Muslims. These articles can be treated just as a cultural knowledge. The effort of

¹⁵¹ S.S. Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, pp,338-339.

¹⁵² N.N. Mitra, ed., *The Indian Annual Register*, 1939, p,351.

the articles was persuade the Muslims to become proper Muslims, and create an idea of who a proper Muslim was.

Tej challenged Jinnah's two-nation theory. In February 1947, it published a series of columns entitled 'Hindu and Musalman are not two nations!' Most writers emphasized the common history of Hindus and Muslims in India. In one such article, the writer, Ram Prakash, at first, wrote about the riots and the communal massacres in Bihar and Bengal. Then, he asked whether Hindus and Muslims were as different as two nations.

Can we forget – just because of these killings – that the believers of the two religions are so similar to each other in language, dress and rituals? Then, how can we say that they are apart from one another? ... The difference between a Muslim mosque and a Hindu temple vis-à-vis their value and respect for the people is only as much as it between a Protestant and a Catholic church in the West. There are people who are devout Hindus yet opposed to idol worship. In both religions there are personages deified by both the communities and worshiped by both the religious equally. ... We should realize that there are some individuals and organizations who because of their own selfish interest seek to create a schism between the two communities. We should stop giving them any opportunity to do this.¹⁵³

It is clear that *Tej* insisted on seeing how Hindus and Muslims had shared elements in

¹⁵³ *Tej*, 4 February 1947. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

their daily life. Prakash objected to the two-nation theory. He found no logical reason to explain the unity of the communities, but gave some good examples about their shared life. He thought the respect for Subhash Chandra Bose, who organized the Indian National Army composed of any communities, as the best example of friendship that cut across differences between religions. The other writer who gave his opinion with the same title is Rajendra Prasad. His famous work; *The Divided India* was quoted by the column to promote the sympathy among religions.

On the other hand, *Roshni* declared '*musalman ek alaihdah qaum hain*' (Muslims are one separate nation)¹⁵⁴. This newspaper was apprehensive of the possibility of Islam's survival in India. Some of the articles in *Roshni* expressed the fear that danger of Islam to meet their own demands. 'However, we can surely say that Islam is facing a danger. If Muslim will not practice according to the *Quran* now, even then they will at least live after parting from Hindustan.'

In discussing the idea of Pakistan, *Roshni* referred to three names: Bhai Parmanand, Cohdra [Choudhary] and Ambedkar. It did not only talk of Iqbal or the leaders of the Muslim League.¹⁵⁵ This idea is not an original idea of *Roshni*. Before this article, Shaukatullah Ansari, in examining the demand for Pakistan, had already mentioned the above three persons.

According to the writer of the column, Bhai Parmanand was the first to suggest the idea of Pakistan. When he was in the Andaman prison, Parmanand wrote *The Hindu National Movement*. In this book, he floated the idea of a separate land for the Muslims. 'Hindus would be independent,' he said, 'and it is a way to protect Hindu culture that the Muslim area and other area would be separated from

¹⁵⁴ *Roshni*, 17 May 1947. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁵⁵ *Roshni*, 16 April 1943. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

Hindustan.’ He suggested that Hindus respected the history of Hinduism and see Muslims as invaders of India.¹⁵⁶ It can then be said that Parmanand insisted on a version of the two-nation theory. So we see that the ideas of the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha were linked at one level: both groups recognized the separatism of Islam and Hinduism and they carried this idea into the political sphere.

What did *Roshni* say about Choudhary - namely Choudhary Rahmat Ali? We are told that Rahmat Ali was a Muslim under-graduate [of Cambridge University], and reached the conclusion that Muslim majority-areas ought to be independent. He sent this scheme to a conference of Communists. The Communist leaders accepted the scheme. In historiography of Pakistan, Choudhary Rahmat Ali is important because he coined the word PAKISTAN.¹⁵⁷ In 1933, when he proposed this idea, no member of the Round Table Conference was interested in his plan. Yusuf Ali referred to this original plan of Pakistan as ‘only a student scheme’, while Zafarulla Khan declared that it was ‘chimerical and impracticable’.¹⁵⁸ However, Rahmat Ali did not only create the name of Pakistan but considered the scheme in detail. Ansari compared Ali’s Pakistan plane with Iqbal’s Pakistan image.¹⁵⁹

What about Ambedkar? Why did *Roshni* refer to him in discussing the idea of Pakistan? The newspaper quoted Ambedkar as saying in his book *Thoughts on Pakistan*: ‘If Muslims will be forced to live in Indian Union against their principal, the situation could become very dangerous in the country.’ The interesting point of the article is that the writer in the newspaper insisted in denying that the Muslim

¹⁵⁶ S. Ansari, *Pakistan: The Problem of India* (Lahore, 1944;1945), p,18.

¹⁵⁷ Rahmat Ali got the name from Punjab, Afghan Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. He proposed this idea in *Now or Never* dated 28 January 1933. See *ibid.*, p,5.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p,6.

¹⁵⁹ ‘Ali’s plan to maintain the individuality of each of the five provinces covered by his scheme of Pakistan. He condemns the existing inclusion of Muslim provinces into “India” and calls for their immediate separation from “India”, christens the five provinces Pakistan, and demands its recognition as a new country and a sovereign State outside India. In view of the dangers of the Federation, strengthened and saved the Muslim position by this scheme, first by the creation of a separate and sovereign Federation of Pakistan and then by the recognition of the independent nationhood of Bengal and of the sovereignty of Usmanistan. He defined his scheme as the only means of political salvation of Muslims.’ See *ibid.*, pp,5-6.

League leaders were the original founders of Pakistan. It suggested that the idea was supported not only by Hindu and Muslim leaders, but also by Ambedkar, who leader of 'untouchables' who fought against Hinduism and was to become a Buddhist. However, Ambedkar seemed not to entirely agree with the founding of Pakistan even when he recognized the strength of nationalism which he felt was always double-edged. 'The two communities can never forget or obliterate their past, because their past is embedded in their religion, for each to give up its past is to give up its religion.'¹⁶⁰

We now come to consider the reaction of *Sidiq* to the idea of Pakistan. The newspaper frequently had special column about the Islamic studies and principles, and published information about the growth of the Pakistan Movement.¹⁶¹ *Sidiq* was a fortnightly newspaper that was published from Amritsar. It became an organ of the Central Pakistan Federation. It stated that the young have already readied themselves to hear what the newspaper had to say. *Sidiq* suggested that the centre of the Pakistan Movement would be in Amritsar which would be in United India. The supporters of the movement would be the young people.

Tej criticized the scheme of Pakistan and the Muslim League itself. It declared that the Muslim League was not the spokesman of Muslims. If Muslims were a nation, then they were bound to be divided by the creation of Pakistan: 'At the very time India is divided, the Muslim nation will be divided.'¹⁶² Emphasizing that the Muslim were one nation, the writer said:

¹⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p,18.

¹⁶¹ *Sidiq*, 10 February 1941. Title is 'Pakistan: Amritsar'. It gave the address of the organization as the following: Secretary Office, Central Pakistan Federation, Amritsar.

¹⁶² *Tej*, 18 March 1947. 'What will Muslims do?' Translated from Urdu. My translation.

The Muslims of India will be divided. Fifty million Muslims will live in Pakistan and forty million Muslims will live in India. ... Mr. Jinnah wants to forget forty million Muslims in India to acquire Pakistan. Muslims did not join the association because Jinnah leaves them without thinking. Muslims should protest against the idea of Pakistan now. A Cabinet is needed to consider for the Muslims in the A group.¹⁶³

It is clear that the journalist thought that Pakistan was not a land of all Muslims. It could not be a land for Muslims who lived in India. It means that *Tej* addressed Jinnah as the spokesman not for all Muslims but only Pakistani Muslims. It appears that the readers of *Tej* were both Muslims and Hindus in the territories marked out in 'A' group by the Cabinet Mission proposal.

Tej asked: who is Pakistan for? It stated that 'the Muslim history of India is a history of the struggle of some Muslim majority-states. ... There was the Punjab and Bengal yesterday and there is the demand for Pakistan now days. Pakistan demand appears to be the product of a Punjab-conspiracy. The central government of Pakistan will be in Lahore'¹⁶⁴ *Tej* concluded that Pakistan was the interest for the Muslims only in Punjab, not of Muslims living in other places. In addition, it criticized the former policy of the Muslim League which was the separate election.

The Muslim League came up because the Congress governments oppressed Muslim minorities. And, the [minority] Muslims would be protected by The Muslim League.

¹⁶³ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*

The Muslim League demanded Pakistan, in 1940 ... However, where will Pakistan be? – In Punjab and Sindh where Muslims are in majority.¹⁶⁵

It must be noted that the journalists publishing in *Tej* did recognize the idea of two-nations. But it did not believe in Partition, in seeing these nations as territorial units, separated from each other. It saw nation as a community, living together. One of them wrote: 'this is also the truth of India politics that the way of unity is successful when two nations live together in this country.' Then, that the newspaper said: 'Now we should not consider *what Muslims will do* but *what forty million Muslims will do* because these wise humans have been torn into two in the name of nations.'

In reading the articles in *Tej* it appears that the writes in the newspaper were convinced that the Congress-newspapers recognized the existence of two nations; Hindus and Muslims, and many of them did not oppose the demand for Pakistan. Moreover, *Tej* insisted that the Muslim League was cold-blooded enough to desert the Muslims who stayed in India and supported the party.

What did *Sidiq*, which was issued in a Muslim minority-state, think about the idea of Pakistan before Independence? *Sidiq* was more careful to show its opinion about Pakistan than *Tej* and *Roshni*. Its main purpose was think of how Muslims would survive in the Hindu majority-state. This anxiety haunted *Sidiq*.¹⁶⁶ It was clear that the journalists of *Sidiq* did not trust the Congress. It regarded the leaders of

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ See *Sidiq*, 27 December 1946. 'How is the development of Muslims possible in India?' written by Manzur Khan, Haidarganj, Lucknow. 'Even if the demands made by Muslims in India are accepted, rather even if they are given additional rights, it does not lead to the domination of Islam. This is because in that case too the majority will be of non-Muslims and rights will be in their hands only.' 'If we preach Islam in non-Muslim communities, especially those that are downtrodden (socially and economically backward), these very communities, that are currently considered as dangerous for Islam, can turn out to be helpful for Islam and can actually become a cause for enhancing the glory of Islam.' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

the *Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind*¹⁶⁷ as higher than the Congress leaders as Nationalist leaders. The following article is not written by the hand of a journalist of *Sidiq* but quoted from another newspaper *Payaam*.

Today, a huge responsibility has fallen on the Congress. ... We ask the Congress that if the party's present approach, being carried away by its majority- status in the subcontinent, could not arrange for a threat- free system for the minorities the day is not far when communal feelings in India will be extremely intense. Consequently, the sacrifices being made by Congress to attain India's independence will go in vain. ... We want to say it quite clearly that if in these mass killings the Bihar Congress leaders are anywhere responsible (and there is nodenying that the responsibility is their's), they should be presented before the law at the earliest possible time. The voice of Jamiat-al-Ulama is undoubtedly the most impressive of all the nationalist parties' voices. And being a "national" organization, the Congress has no other option but to listen to this voice. If Congress does not listen to this voice, the party will have to do away with its national status.¹⁶⁸

According to the opinion, the disturbances in Bihar, perhaps also in U.P. were produced by the fault of the Congress policy. The Congress should accept the emotion of the real Nationalist leaders who were members of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama.

¹⁶⁷ *Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind* (The Union of Indian Ulama) is founded from the meeting among Ulama at Delhi in 1919. The main Ulamas in the union were composed from the Deoband. They basically opposed the foundation of Pakistan and insisted the unity of India with the Congress from the aspect of locality. Husain Ahmad Madani(1879-1957) is famous for the leader of the union.

¹⁶⁸ *Sidiq*, 10 July 1947. 'The Demands of Nationalist Muslims from the Congress' quoted from *Payaam*. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

While this comment is not that of *Sidiq*, we must note that the journalist of *Sidiq* did not criticize the article by *Payaam*. It means that the *Sidiq* had also the same opinion about the Congress and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama at the least.

Just before Independence, *Sidiq* made comments showing its anxiety about how the interests of Muslims would be affected by the demands of Pakistan and how the demand itself was to be viewed by Muslims. The journalist gave his comments on the address of *Bazm-e-Pakistan* [the Assembly of Pakistan], to the people of the country [India] who had said: 'today, acknowledging the presence of God, I pledge that even if the establishment of Pakistan by means of dividing India demands the last drop of my blood, I will not hesitate'.¹⁶⁹ The response of *Sidiq* to the statement is the following;

Anyway, what is to be said is that these words are quite stimulating, and only an example of the widespread imbalance found in the nation. It should be clearly understood that Pakistan is a violent decision, of a big Muslim group. Related to its obligation and necessity, neither is there any verse of the Holy Quran, nor is there any saying of the Prophet, nor are the Islamic learned scholars favouring it on any logical stance. The way in which this decision has been considered today, it is quite possible that perhaps in the future, when the circumstances change or people have more experience, the decision is found wrong.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ *Sidiq*, 4 April 1947. 'Pakistan Oath of Allegiance' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁷⁰ *ibid.*

The notable point is that the writer thought the demand of Pakistan as a violent step and the demand was un-Islamic. It looks like that even some Muslims feared the enthusiasm for Pakistan and saw the demand as a mistake, a fact that others would realize in future. Similar to the ideas expressed in *Sidiq*, one article titled 'the Emperor of Pakistan' was quoted from a newspaper *Hamdam*¹⁷¹.

"The Emperor of Pakistan" is the extremely blame-worthy phrase and a dangerous shout. ... When Pakistan was the demand of the League, it was also wrong to shout "The Emperor". Pakistan demand was made for Islam not for sovereignty or general ship. Now, this phrase is not wrong but dangerous. If even one side of Pakistan raises this voice, the consequence will be harmful for both Pakistan and Hindustan. The position of emperor is synonymous with oppression and violence.

The article criticized some people who consecrated Jinnah too much and thought he was showing the right way. The writer of this column said, to call him the emperor of Pakistan was wrong at the beginning of the Pakistan movement. However, it became not wrong but dangerous later. It can be interpreted that the foundation of Pakistan would be thought as the impossible dream and impractical resolution from the very beginning. At the time when the article was written in the newspaper, the plan of Pakistan had already started in there was an atmosphere of Jinnah-worship. Pakistan did not become just a dream of the future, it got the many supporters.

Tej also avoided making its criticism about the Pakistan movement clear on

¹⁷¹ *Sidiq*, 20 June 1947. 'The Emperor of Pakistan' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

its paper. However, the news informed the difficulty of making Pakistan whatever happened. For example, *Tej* suggested the impossibility to make the Muslim League minister in Punjab through Jawaharlal Nehru's visiting after the Punjab disturbance.¹⁷² The situation of Punjab was the worst as the people in North western Punjab were controlled by the army, Amritsar was burned mercilessly, and Multan was destroyed by the army. Punjab was divided into three political powers at the time. It was impossible for Punjab to accept the ministry of the Muslim League in the confusion. About the meeting with Gandhi, Jinnah and the Viceroy to think the matter of independence included Pakistan, *Tej* just gave the spotlight on the different thinking among them.¹⁷³ Gandhi urged to choose making Pakistan or not. On the other hand, Jinnah insisted to consider a remedy after the Partition. The assembly was set up to find political solutions and arrange matters for Independence. However, one interpretation of the meeting is that their negotiation had been already based on different presuppositions. To put it plainly, Gandhi wanted to make sure that Pakistan would be really need or not. Pakistan had established in only Jinnah's mind, and Jinnah started going ahead to debate on a political bridge between India and Pakistan. Jinnah explained briefly that some difficulties would appear among Muslims without making Pakistan now. The process to Independence was always unclear on the news. *Tej* could always pursue who met with whom and what they talked. On the other hand, the decision for the partition of Punjab and Bengal and for making Pakistan was suddenly announced on the top pages.

Contrary to *Tej*, *Roshni* in Srinagar criticized the Congress policy and even Gandhi. *Roshi* explained the politics of the Congress negatively with the summary which Dr. Ram Pratap Bahadur indicated. 'The usual politics of the Congress are to tell a lie, to cheat and to injure the others for own advantage in these days. Do we

¹⁷² *Tej*, 18 March 1947. 'The Muslim League minister can not be built in Punjab' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁷³ *Tej* 28 March 1947. 'The Congress Accepted the separation of Pakistan' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

loose the right to tell that all arrangements are wrong? Did the politics come from Gandhi's political and social aspects? ... It is very difficult for the people to walk on the correct way with the knowledge of Gandhi's philosophy.'¹⁷⁴ According to the article, *Roshni* judged the politics of the Congress which Gandhi might arrange as the wrong way for the people. Even *Roshni* suspected the famous movement of Gandhi that he tried abolishing the untouchable caste. It raised an example in Rajkoht to insist the difficulty to spread the Gandhi's philosophy among the common people.¹⁷⁵ The article on 11 July 1947 which was concerned with the newspaper *Young India* judged Gandhi as 'the director of the Hindu Congress'.¹⁷⁶ For the Muslims in Kashmir, Gandhi was Hindu at first and a something of a special man. They did not have any room to accept Gandhi because he was the exact Hindu who could not tolerate Islam culture. The reason to deny Gandhi was so stereotypical without deliberation. In the other word, it was so simple to make the people understand why Gandhi was enemy for them. It is likely that Nehru was not convenient to be criticized as the leader of the Congress on the paper. It might be a reason that Nehru sometimes enjoyed popularity in Kashmir as the famous Kashmiri Pandit. *Roshni* promoted the activity of the Muslim League against the Congress as the representative of the Muslims in Kashmir.

After Independence, 15 August 1947

On the Independence Day, the attitudes of both *Tej* and *Roshni* were

¹⁷⁴ *Roshni*, 8 February 1947. 'The Congress Politics' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁷⁵ *Roshni*, 11 July 1947. 'Untouchable and Hindu'. Rajkoht, 1. July: The students of Ahmedabad Hostel started strike against one order of the principal yesterday. The principal gave this order that the high caste should take foods [live] with their untouchable caste. The students also did demonstration in Mumbai State. They get peace if untouchable should be kept distance, but some person can not be forced with someone. Its should be understood that Mr. Gandhi and other Hindu because all real Hindu cannot be Hindu without following the order of *veda* and *shastris*. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁷⁶ *Roshni*, 11 July 1947. 'The Muslims in Kashmir do not trust Mr. Gandhi. Gandhi Ji is a leader for only Hindu and an enemy against Muslims. The Kashmir government will not fall in the trap of Gandhi'. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

completely different each other on their papers. *Tej*, of course, celebrated Independence of India. On the other hand, it imagined the dark future for Pakistan.¹⁷⁷ It suspected the creation of Pakistan as the base of Pakistan depended on selfish, terror, faithless and badness. In addition, the article suggested the relationship hereafter with Pakistan that 'if it is true that its end is never bright, but it does not mean that we should only stay with closing eyes toward Pakistan to take revenge.' It insisted that that Hindustan was constructed against the British rule and stood by itself. *Tej* appealed the readers not to damn the birth of Pakistan but to observe it against the British rule. It speculated the possibility that Pakistan would be exploited by the British through its getting help because the economy of Pakistan would be poor. It might be destroyed after the British exploitation and not expect to develop more at last.

The foundation of Pakistan is evil. Pakistan will learn from the development of Hindustan for itself. (As translation of this sentence is not clear it is better to delete it) Even Muslims in India cannot blame the British if the conditions in Pakistan become bad. Because Pakistan has a relationship with the British and it separated from Hindustan. It meant the British victory.¹⁷⁸

According to *Tej*, Pakistan was born by the British scheme. Hindustan would not attack Pakistan but could not help her. The analysis about Pakistan was not good at all. Pakistan became a foreigner for the residents in India after the partition.

¹⁷⁷ *Tej*, 15 August 1947. 'The Future of Pakistan' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*

On the other hand, the all space of *Roshni* was full of joy after the birth of Pakistan. The picture of the flag which was designed with stars and a crescent was put beside the name of *Roshni*. *Roshni* reported the situation of the city in detail as the following;

Srinagar. 15. August: Today, the flags of the crescent moon was raised and waved inside out in Srinagar because of the joy of founding Pakistan. There was no house which did not hang out the Pakistani flags. The people had prepared in their houses with happiness since even the morning. The wonderful emotion was cheerful. The slogans as 'Pakistan, Congratulation!', 'Long live, Islam! Long live, Pakistan!' and 'Lift high! Our Flag!' were heard one another around Muslims. It made you notice that exact the day [today] is *id* of Muslims. ... The Muslims of the National Conference displayed the supporters' flags. However, they showed the demand in public that they would not bring the Pakistani flags because Maulvi Yusuf Shah and Abdul Salam D(w)lal talked about Independence against Shaikh Abdullah. However, we did not oppose to Pakistan.¹⁷⁹

Whether the report was true or not, it is clear that *Roshni* celebrated Independence of Pakistan as new country. The article informed that the common people enjoyed the celebration while the political leaders did not celebrate because of their political position. Of course, Kashmir did not join in Pakistan at that time, and even now. According to the report of *Roshni*, some people in Srinagar tried making Kashmir join

¹⁷⁹ *Roshni*, 17 August 1947. 'Pakistani Flags raised on waves in the report of Kashmir. The activities of the occasion for *qaumi id* (the national great festival) in Kashmir. Congratulation, Pakistan!' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

in Pakistan just before Independence. The news was quoted from the newspaper *Hamdard* as the following;

New Delhi: The announcement is made that some Muslim League leaders from Lahore and some from the Muslim Conference from Kashmir come to meet Mr. Jinnah. And it is said that their meeting is extremely important because Kashmir government did not decide at all whether it will join in India or be independent. So, the Muslim Conference leaders started conversation with Mr. Jinnah because they want that Kashmir will join in the Pakistan Union. The Muslim Conference leaders want to welcome Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah to Kashmir to force Maharaja Bahadur into joining Pakistan.¹⁸⁰

It was clear that the powerful Conference made arrangements to persuade with the Maharaja through the meeting with the Muslim League leaders including Jinnah. On the other hand, the Kashmir government itself could not decide its position between India and Pakistan almost two weeks before Independence. There was the gap between the official decision and public expectation about their independence. Later, Kashmir area was involved with the Indo-Pakistan war. The newspaper was busy to inform the creation of the Kashmir government and the war around the people in

¹⁸⁰ *Roshni*, 3 July 1947. 'Kashmir will join in Pakistan' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

Kashmir. It is doubtful how much the public in Kashmir understood their complex situation while they celebrated Independence of Pakistan. They still believed the friendship between India and Pakistan for their development while *Tej* felt gloomy about the economic growth in Pakistan.¹⁸¹

Perhaps, it was also serious matter for the Kashmiri people that Lahore was included in Pakistan area. Lahore was the most important city for Srinagar because Kashmiri people had cultural, economic and social exchange with Lahore through the main road between the two cities. At that time, the highway from Srinagar reached Lahore *via* Jammu, Amritsar and Atari. Delhi was not so familiar with Srinagar from the aspect of their daily life before Independence. At the least, Srinagar became far from the important big city after the partition.

The reaction of *Sidiq* is interesting after Independence. *Sidiq* kept more quiet about the politics than other newspapers until Independence Day. *Sidiq* changed its stance after the partition. The journalists gradually felt anxious about the persecution under the Congress government. The Muslims' tension to stay in India as a minority was clear on the newspaper just after Independence Day. 'We do not want to show about it [suspicious and confusion] on this occasion that we will indeed watch whether this independence is for only Hindus or for even Muslims after today. The majority is feeling that forty and fifty million Muslims in Hindustan are slaves of principal slaves because of the partition of the country. Because they became the slave for Hindu now after becoming free from the slave for the British. According to this, it will be worse that they will not find the safety of their culture and language in

¹⁸¹ *Roshni*, 3 July 1947. 'The Necessary of Muslim Scientists and Prominent People' New Delhi: Mr. Liyaqat Ali Khan said in an appeal that Reconstruction is so necessary in Pakistan. The list of those people, all Muslim scientists, technicians, Specialists and Prominent people, is needed to be arranged. So, the benefit will be achieved for the service. As regarding to this, Ishteyaq Husain Qurashi, an officer of Delhi University, submits it. (quoted from *Hamdard*) NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

Hindu *raj*.’¹⁸² This comment clearly shows the confusion to stay as the minority even who decided to stay in India by himself. It is also suggested that the Muslims who remained in Lucknow did not set a time limit for their shifting to somewhere. Firstly, they stayed calm enough to judge what the new government would do for them. Secondly, the place allowed them to think as their pace because there were not so many riots in Lucknow. Thirdly, they were not addicted to the dream of Pakistan from the beginning itself but just interested in it.

The Muslims faced the first problem after Independence. Their proud language, Urdu faced a crisis under the new government of United Province. When the U.P. declared Hindi in Devanagari script as the official language, Gandhi stated in the evening prayer that ‘Muslim stay in Indian Union as one fourth of the number of the population in United Province. ... You should understand that all people and Muslim are equal. Please respect the script of Urdu as the behaviour of this equality demands and do not make a situation that Muslim can occupy for themselves. ... The true service of Hindustan and Hindu religion is that Muslim will neither be finished, be kept away from this country nor be oppressed in any way.’¹⁸³ *Sidiq* added its comments about this matter that this was the question what was happen in the council of U.P. for the official language without Muslim officers after this announcement. At last, it voted on the right for making Hindi as the official language. The journalist concluded that ‘in this situation, the emotion of honour-spirit lives in mind!’¹⁸⁴

Sidiq, as mentioned, blamed the U.P. government for the position of Urdu.

¹⁸² *Sidiq*, 5 September 1947. ‘After the Independence’ quoted from *Haqiqat*. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁸³ *Sidiq*, 24 October 1947. ‘The Loss of Urdu and Gandhi Ji’. This is a part of the quotation from A.P.M. dated 15 October in New Delhi. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.*, The comment of *Sidiq* about the news of A.P.M.

However, it never opposed to Gandhi and even thought him as the political leader who could understand how important Urdu was. On the other hand, *Roshni* also raised the subsistence of Urdu as the important issue.¹⁸⁵ It explained that Gandhi published in Hindi and destroyed Urdu language to make Hindi noble as a selected language. Then, the culture of Muslims would be injured. According to the article, Gandhi openly said that Urdu was Muslim's language created in the letter of the *Koran*, Muslim empires created from it, and Muslims want to keep and spread. *Roshni* declared that the fall of Urdu depended on Gandhi's behaviour. Even *Tej* did not take Urdu as the serious problem in India.

It is an interesting point that the line of *Sidiq's* opinions was unsettled. First, *Sidiq* was confused about the Muslim League which created Pakistan.

We hear that there was a powerful organization, named the Muslim League, on the earth [India]. ... That is a question where the party is after 15 August. ... Perhaps, it is the most critical moment for Indian Muslims, and who will come. They [the Indian Muslims] are deprived of their leaders of the Muslim league again now. Hindi became the official language. The slaughter of cows has been prohibited everywhere. Thousands of Muslims were killed. Their houses became rivers of bloods. Their newspapers were banned. Their shops were robbed off. Their process for business was destroyed. They were deprived of their full

¹⁸⁵ *Roshni*, 11 July 1947. 'The Muslims in Kashmir do not trust Mr. Gandhi. Gandhi Ji is a leader for only Hindu and an enemy against Muslims. The Kashmir government will not fall in the trap of Gandhi'. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

right from government!¹⁸⁶

From this article, we notice that the existence of the Muslim League gave comfort to Indian Muslims. However, the Muslim League would not do anything for them after the partition while they were suffered as the minority community. The emotion that they were abandoned by the Muslim League leaders sprang up in their minds. However, some opinion about Jinnah is not so wrong in the same newspaper, *Sidiq*. It is likely to screen him from blame and estimate, again. The article doubted to call Jinnah self-interested person and insisted that 'Hindustani Muslims should understand Qaid-e-Azam very well' and 'it should be known that Jinnah Sahib is tiptop clever politically'.¹⁸⁷ The writer confronted the question who started calling Jinnah with the bad name, 'the slave of lust', 'the distrusted hypocrite' and so on. He wondered whether the person was the Congress leader, the Muslim editor, Tandon Ji, Mastar Tara Singh or someone. Jinnah is often addressed as the wrongdoer who divided Hindustan into two countries still now. However, it is interesting point that *Sidiq* inserted the advice to reevaluate him as the greatest political leader just after the partition.

Sidiq used Jinnah to criticize the U.P. government which the newspaper of Nehru, *National Herald* informed. The news informed that the provincial government decided to make separate and special coaches in trains for the protecting Muslims in the future. *Sidiq* commented on the decision as the following,

Horrible, horrible! U.P. government will be also the follower
of Jinnah, and countless travellers for Pakistan have been left

¹⁸⁶ *Sidiq*, 17 October 1947. 'The Muslim League Dead' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁸⁷ *Sidiq*, 31 October 1947. 'Self- interested Jinnah' from one editor on the National Day. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

in this province. ... So many Pakistans will rise in Hindustan!
The leaders and beadles also did not think about the painless
government and the death of 'two nation theory' in night and
day. The death is need. Oh, it is showing strong life, 'the
two-nation theory'!¹⁸⁸

This response is also notable to think the Muslim's reaction after Independence of India. The main demand of the Muslims who stayed in India was to seek protection as the minority as compared with Hindus. The Muslims needed to keep their own culture and identity without any oppression. However, the fact was that the policy to protect Muslims by the government was different from the demand which the Muslims needed as in the case of the special coach in trains. The policy for the protection was sometimes treated as the segregation and the suppression of the Muslims in India. Here, the policy of the segregation was called 'Pakistan in India'. The Muslims in India were sensitive to being treated as equal to other communities.

Only one Pakistan was enough for them, and it was needed for them when they faced many serious problems to shift there. Jinnah was only one person who could attain Pakistan for the Muslims in India. *Sidiq* did not blame the people who shifted to Pakistan, but did not commend the birth of Pakistan. These complex emotions appeared on the newspaper are so important to examine the mind of Muslims who stayed in Lucknow as a minority.

What is Pakistan?

From what has been examined above, it can be found that these newspapers

¹⁸⁸ *Sidiq*, 24 October 1947. 'Pakistan in Hindustan'. *Sidiq* gives the comment on the *National Herald's* news dated on 14 October. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

did not mention Pakistan in detail before Independence. They did not even that insist the readers decide whether the people should shift to Pakistan or not. After the partition, the three newspapers turned cold shoulder to Pakistan as if they understood Pakistan as a different country. As an interesting example, we analyze one magazine that explained the meaning of Pakistan before Partition. The magazine *Nai Zindagi* was published in Allahabad featured on Pakistan in 1946. The usual editor was Anis ul-Rahman and the special editor for the Pakistan number was Dr. Sayyid Mahmud. Nine famous political leaders like Husain Ahmad Madni, Rajendra Prasad, Tufai Ahmad Manglori wrote their ideas about Pakistan in 244 pages. Those people mainly opposed to the Pakistan movement.

The special issued of *Nai Zindagi* was summarized and commented in a monthly magazine *Tarjman ul-Qran* (the translation of the Koran)¹⁸⁹, which was edited by Sayyid Abdul Ala Maududi¹⁹⁰. According to a reviewer, the Pakistan number has two faces; '*watani qaumiyat* (the homeland - nation)' and '*muslim qaumiyat* (the Muslim nation)'. 'The theory of Pakistan' was created from the political fears among the Muslim nations and made it true with the fear. Some positive proposal could remove the fear but the special number did not have any proposal. 'Anyway, there is only one in this [number] that there are the supporters for '*watani qaumiyat*' and some important articles.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ *Tarjman ul-Qran*, Vol.29: 1, June 1946, Lahore. (Ans.4 for piece and Rs.5 for one year), 'Reviews', p,64. The Library of Jamia Hamdard University, New Delhi. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

¹⁹⁰ 1903-1979. He is famous as the journalist and the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami founded in 1941. *Tarjman ul-Qran* was started from 1932 in Hyderabad.

¹⁹¹ *ibid.*

Figure 2 'Two Divisions'



See 'Two Divisions', Pakistan Number, *Nai Zindagi* (1946). Note at the bottom translates as : "Serving an Exciting Story as an Example of the Ancient Period. Two Suitors for One Child and Judge, the time of Judgment." The child is a metaphor in India or Punjab and Bengal. Two women are the Congress and the Muslim League, and the Judge is the British side.

To return the original document of *Nai zindagi*'s Pakistan number, it is sure that the columnists gathered to make Pakistan clear at their own meeting. The basic aim is that the number would be published with the columns written by intellectuals who had different ideas rather than with only one side idea. 'It is not easy to discuss about Pakistan. So, the meaning of Pakistan has not been understood until today.'¹⁹² The organizer held the symposium to discuss for the Pakistan number. However the date is not mentioned when the symposium was set up.

About people of the reading-writing occupation from all political groups in India, the Communists were the most and the Muslim League members were the least. ... Among the supporters of Pakistan, I [Sayyid Mahmud] saw that only the Communists discussed rationally not emotionally although our respected brothers of the League usually talked and discussed with only the point; "Hindus are the enemy of the Muslims.

¹⁹² *Nai Zindagi*, Vol. 6:1, 1946. 'Introduction', p.3. The Library of Jamia Hamdard University, New Delhi. Translated from Urdu. My translation. The editor of *Nai Zindagi* was Dr.Sayyed Mahmud.

The practice of Hindus is very evil for the Muslims. Moreover, the Hindu *raj* is founded. So, the foundation of Pakistan is extremely needed.” Our respected brother forgot the point because of their emotions that they could not confirm the necessity of Pakistan and Pakistan could not overcome the complaint.

On the other hand, one person who opposes Pakistan called the supporters of Pakistan ‘the enemy for the Independence’. ... This time the country of Pakistan is the biggest problem after the complete independence. We should discuss about it with the cool-mind and give enough lights from all sides.¹⁹³

The report shows that there is the vivid gap between the Muslim League members and the others, especially the Communists regarding talk about Pakistan. The opinion of the Muslim League is likely that they need Pakistan blindly with using the term of Islam. And Rahman pointed out that some Muslims who supported Pakistan tended to label the other Muslims who opposed to Pakistan as ‘the enemy of Islam’ because they believed Pakistan as ‘the Islamic government’. Even the people of Jamiat-ul-Ulama and Abul Kalam Azad also could not escape from the blame of ‘Hindu worship’. The editor wondered whether Pakistan would be Islamic state or not as a basic question. He reported that many Muslims in the Muslim League were following the demand of Pakistan because of their Islamic emotion. On the other hand, he also doubted the prospect from Jinnah’s speech.

Mr. Jinnah said last year for the interview of *Delhi Worker*

¹⁹³ *ibid.*, p.2.

(London) that Pakistan would have the democratic government of the present style. The people of all religions will get equal rights there and nobody will treat the religious origins with distinction. Why has the name of Islamic government appeared if the meaning of Pakistan is like this? What is different from the Unionist party in Punjab from the aspect?¹⁹⁴

The editor knew that Pakistan should be democratic and secular state if Jinnah would practice his imagination. The questions which he asked as the above is natural and the people also feel strange after their retracing the past even today. The conversation in the symposium makes the point that the supporter for Pakistan tended to wish Pakistan just with applying the name of Islam rigidly. It can be said that the opponent of Pakistan should persuaded them with rational reason, then it was need for the Nationalists to research and analyze the scheme of Pakistan much more than the supporters of Pakistan. As a result of the number, the editor concluded that 'The people of Pakistan will not be able to make the happy condition because the interest of the development for the trade and skill is poor in west and east Pakistani areas. So, we should make effort for Independence of Hindustan and remove the fear of Hindus.'¹⁹⁵ The conclusion is a favourite trick of the Nationalists to attack the demand of Pakistan. Maududi perhaps defined the writers of the number as the non-supporters of Pakistan because of this opinion.

The political leaders and people who were anti-Pakistan unintentionally played a part in defining the shape of Pakistan. The supporters of Pakistan disagreed with their opponent's theoretical opinions and pushed forward the idea of Pakistan

¹⁹⁴ *ibid.*, p.3.

¹⁹⁵ *ibid.*, p.5.

with the simple and perfect name of Islam. The masses who disliked Pakistan also used the term of Pakistan to persecute the Muslims¹⁹⁶. The Congress newspaper *Tej* also displayed this tendency.

¹⁹⁶ *Sidiq*, 18 October 1946. There is one news quoted from the newspaper *Riyasat*. 'According to the people who came from Calcutta, there was very bad news. When some burned fire well, they caught the walking Muslims and threw them into the fire with saying "Go, Pakistan!" ...' NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

CHAPTER THREE: BECOMING THE MUSLIM REFUGEES

Q: How did you get to know the founding of Pakistan?

A: Through the elections ... between the Congress and the Muslim League [in 1946].

wahan voh azad ho gae, yahan yeh azad ho gae!

(They had been independent there, they had been independent here.)¹

'The huge migrations accompanying the 1947 Partition of the Indian subcontinent were probably the largest and most concentrated in time that have been recorded in modern history. About fourteen million people moved between 1947 and 1951. This migration may also have been the most violent. About 600,000 were killed and hundreds of thousands injured. To the extent the term involuntary migration has an objective meaning.'² From the global standard, Partition of Hindustan was the most important event of all. The subjects of this violence were the common people who lived daily life without joining the political activities. It has been suggested that the people started to migrate because they escaped from the communal riots everywhere. That is to say, the people did not choose to shift the new land but had to shift there under duress refugee.³ This chapter shows what happened to the common people around the "independence days" of India and Pakistan.

¹ Personal interview with Abdur Rashid, 81 years-old on 11 March 2008. As if he is seeing both independence of India and Pakistan as a third party because he is referring to both as *voh* and *yeh* (they), not as *ham* (we). He evacuated from Nizamuddin in Delhi to Bijnor in U.P. on the Partition. According to him, Delhi became danger than before, and sheltered in Bijnor. 'Around Bijnor, some riots happened. But, Bijnor was safe because Bijnor was *qasbah*.'

² A.R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo. *Escape from Violence*, p,129.

³ In Pakistan, 'refugee (*muhajir*)' was included as a category in the 1951 census and defined as a person who had moved to Pakistan as a result of Partition or fear of disturbances connected therewith. See *ibid.*, p,132.

From 1947 to 1948, Punjab and Delhi became disorderly areas. On the other hand, the people who lived in the east side of Hindustan started migration through those areas where communal riots were taking place. In Bihar, about thirty thousand Muslims were killed in one week. They were on the way to East Pakistan.⁴ The large disturbance happened at Lahore first in May 1947. Before the riots, the Muslim League had started 'civil liberties' in Punjab on 24 January 1947. The principal leaders of the Punjab Muslim League were arrested in Lahore because they obstructed the police from carrying out a search in the headquarters of the Muslim League National Guards. At last, the police seized more than 1000 helmets and many volunteer badges bearing the insignia of a dagger, sword and revolver.⁵ The Muslim League held 'Punjab Day' on 2 February 1947.⁶ Around 30,000 people joined the public meeting. The Chairman of the meeting criticized the action of the Punjab Government and insisted that the present agitation of the Muslim League was not a communal one but designed to restore the civil liberties of the people. After the meeting, about 6,000 persons including about seventy women paraded and shouted slogans against Khizr Hayat Khan, the viceroy and the British government. At the same time, *Dawn*, the newspaper of the Muslim League was not accepted in Punjab because the Punjab government prohibited the entry.⁷ The public meeting of the Muslim League in Punjab was useful to appeal to the people, especially those who could not get any information about the Muslim League. The point of the above

⁴ *ibid.*, pp,130-131.

⁵ R.Ahmad, 'Agitation against Khizr Hayat's coalition ministry', *The website of the Dawn Internet* (30 December 2006). <http://www.dawn.com/events/pml/review17.htm>

⁶ The organizer was supposed to be the Delhi Provincial Muslim League. The leaders of the march were Anis Ahmed Hasmi, K.M.Ahmad and Irfanul-Haq Shibli. Shibli was the prominent leader those days. See The Extract from C.I.D. Daily Report for 1-2, February 1947. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.41, Mohd-29. 'All India Muslim League (1946-1947)'. NMML.

⁷ The private meeting of the Working Committee of the Delhi Provincial Muslim League passed the resolution congratulating the Punjab Muslim League leaders condemning the Punjab Government for prohibiting the entry of *Dawn* in Punjab. See The Extract from the Source Report made on 2 February 1947 by Pandit Jagan Nath, Deputy Supdt of Police,C.I.D. Daily. *ibid.*

statement of the chairperson was that he did not treat the Muslim League leaders who had been arrested as communal riots. This clearly shows that the political leaders did not want to take any responsibility for the violence. In fact, many leaders were imprisoned in Lahore. According to a young Muslim Student who sent the unsigned letter, all his leaders were inside jail and there was no one left outside to direct the activities of the Muslim masses.⁸

Toward a Divided Punjab

Punjab has a special importance for the Muslim League movement. Punjab was the symbol of the success for the Pakistan movement in India. There was one demonstration in Delhi on 5 February 1947.⁹ Irfanul Haq Shibli¹⁰ collected a batch of volunteers at the Jama Masjid. His plan was that the batch would parade through the main bazaars in the city before leaving for Lahore by the night-train.

The progress of the Muslim League was a great concern to the political circles. The Nationalist Muslims gathered at the residence of Abul Kalam Azad to consider founding new organization. They were under the necessity of uniting all nationalist Muslim organizations into one body against the Muslim League.¹¹ The Nationalist Muslims treated the Muslim League as the threat which at one time had been poor and a smaller party than the Congress Muslims. They could not

⁸ The writer reported that the press did not believe that the police beat the Muslim leaders unreasonably. He mentioned 'our movement in the Punjab as you know, is now in its 11th day.' It means the day of the agitation of civil liberties. See the letter dated 3 February 1947 to Nawab Ismail Khan, President Muslim League Committee of Action. *ibid.*

⁹ Shibli did not go to Lahore with the batch because he was supposed to celebrate 'Rashid Day (Rahid of the Indian National Army) with the Delhi Provincial Muslim League on 11 February 1947. See the inspection for postal letters by C.I.D. *ibid.*

¹⁰ Shibli was a fanatic member of the Muslim National Guards and was introduced as 'the enthusiastic chap' in the interesting episode with Jinnah. I.H.Kausar, *Bacha Muslim League and the freedom struggle*, The website of the Dawn Internet (2006).

¹¹ The Report informed the date of the meeting on 15 March 1947. However, The date of the inspection is indicated 28 February 1947. It is possible that the meeting held on 15 'February' 1947. See Souce Report, *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.41, Mohd-29. 'All India Muslim League (1946-1947)'. NMML.

understand the rise of the Muslim League. The Muslim League attained the position of the representative party of Muslim in India instead of the Jamiatul-Ulamae-Hindu and the Ahrars. There was a rumour in N.W.F.P. that Jinnah bought famous *pirs* to get support against the Congress and the government through their local influence.¹² It was true or not, the local connection was the most important for the Muslim League. The Congressmen suggested that they need to concentrate on the poorer classes among the Muslims in order to gather them in Muslim areas under the banner of the Congress.¹³

Even the Khaksar party tended to support the Muslim League while it was founded to carry favour with the Congress Muslims. Since February 1947, the activities of the *Khaksar*¹⁴ based on Punjab had stood out. It has been recognized that the Khaksar always opposed the demand of Pakistan because of the pursuance for Islam. However, this article does not partly agree with the general view about the Khaksar. The vantage of the Khaksar was the equality and popularity among the Muslims. The Khaksar mobilized the people into the political agitations. The leaders had addressed the people many times and pressed for violent measures. The eighteen members of the Khaksar supported the Muslim League in Punjab and the struggle for Pakistan when they appealed to release their members arrested at Fatehpuri Masjid in Delhi.¹⁵ However, there were some groups in the Khaksar who

¹² This is the report from Maulana Habibur-Raheman of Ludhiana and Maulvi Mohammad Ghulam Shos of N.W.F.P. to Jawaharlal Nehru on 13 January 1947. According to the report, the anti-government propaganda in N.W.F.P. was led by the Muslim League, and Jinnah had distributed Rs.65/- thousand to the *Pirs* there through Abdul Reb Nishtar and the *Pir* of Manki Sharif. The reporters gave copies of 2 pamphlets in Pashto. In these books, the Muslim League explained that the Muslims were not permitted to make friendship with the Hindus or tolerate their Government under the Quran and the Holy Prophet. See Copy of Source Report by Manzur Wahid, Inspector M, C.I.D. Delhi on 15 January 1947. *ibid.*

¹³ This is the suggestion in a private meeting of the Congress Workers of Shahdara on 9 February 1947. See Casual Source Report. *ibid.*

¹⁴ The 'Khaksar' was founded by Allama Mashriqi in 1931. They worked for Independence from the British rule and the advance for the Muslim masses.

¹⁵ C.I.D. Report for 21 February 1947. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.41, Mohd-29. 'All India Muslim League (1946-1947)'. NMML.

had different ideas for Pakistan and the freedom for the people in India. The other members of the Khaksar started their appeal through the plans of dividing Punjab and Bengal.

Toward a Divided Bengal

Before Bengal was divided, there were some Muslims¹⁶ who opposed the Muslim League because Bengal would be divided into two. They insisted that the Muslims in East Pakistan would be isolated from the other Muslims who would stay in India. According to the daily newspaper *Nabajug*¹⁷ in Dacca, some Muslims were dissatisfied with the result that Bengal would be divided for a truncated Pakistan. They criticized Jinnah and other leaders of the Muslim League who accepted the plan and fired at the Jinnah Hall and Jinnah's portrait.¹⁸ The negotiations of Jinnah were a treacherous action for the Muslims who had supported him. The idea of the United Bengal planned by the members of the Bengal Muslim League and the Congress on 20 May mirrors the emotion of the mass of the people in Bengal and the signal against the guidance of Jinnah.

On 8 June 1947, a meeting of the Khaksar was attended by 4,000 persons at Jama Masjid. Allama Mashriqi explained that Muslim leaders were misleading their nation by raising the slogan of Pakistan and accepting only part of it. He also stated that the riots committed by the Hindus in Bihar were without parallel. The Bihar officer noted about the Khaksars in Bihar as the following. 'The influx of Khaksars in the province has created panic in the minds of the Hindus. Muslims also do not

¹⁶ Muhul Amin, Maulana Akram Khan, Ahmad Ispehani and their supporters.

¹⁷ The newspaper was started by Nazrul Islam (1898-1976) from 1920. The editor was Fazulu Haq (called *Sher-e-Bangla*), but Islam mainly worked as the editor. The paper gave the political and social comments. It was the famous reason to be banned that Islam put his article 'who is responsible for killing the refugees?' against the British government.

¹⁸ British Plan of 3 June 1947, Delhi Police Records, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.41, Mohd-29. 'All India Muslim League (1946-1947)'. NMML.

like their presence here because Allama [Allama Mashriqi] is accused of doing proparganda against the Muslim League. Two pamphlets entitled *the Khaksar Soldier (Khaksar Sipahi)* and *Tears of the Khaksar (Khaksar Ke Ansu)* have been widely circulated in town and villages. ... a report was received from Muzaffrapur that relations between the Khaksars and the Muslim Leagues in that town had become strained as a Khaksar flag was put on the local mosque.¹⁹ Someone shouted 'Qaide-Azam, Zindabad!' and this triggered the fight between the Khaksar and the Muslim League supporters. A demonstration outside of the Imperial Hotel where the Muslim League Council was to meet. 500 members of the Khaksar had the plan to go there and urge to achieve full Pakistan or give their lives.

...if Delhi were left in Hindustan the Jama Masjid would be used as a stables. If the Muslims would follow him [Allama Mashriqi], he would give them Pakistan including the whole of the Punjab and Bengal, Sind, the Frontiew, Baluchistan, Assam, Delhi and Ajmeer.²⁰

This statement of the Khaksar showed displeasure with the Muslim League. The public meetings in local places were likely to give the impression to the people. Firstly, Mashriqi criticized the Muslim League because the communal disturbances were happening due to the fanatic slogan for Pakistan. Secondly, his insisted was an original idea of Pakistan which did not agree with United India demanded as the Congress nor Pakistan demanded by the Muslim League.

¹⁹ Extract from D.I.G. C.I.D., Bihar's note on the activities of Khaksars in Bihar from January to June 1947, *Home Department Political Branch*, File No.28/4/47, 'Volunteer Organisations – Khaksars'. NAI.

²⁰ See Extract from C.I.D. Daily Report for 7-8 June 1947. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.41, Mohd-29. 'All India Muslim League (1946-1947)'. NMML.

The Muslim League Council Meeting was held in the Imperial Hotel on 9-10 June. The meeting started with the violent clash between the Khaksar and the Muslim National Guards²¹ outside and even the top floor of the hotel. Jinnah rejected the hail of 'Emperor of Pakistan (*Shahenshah-e-Pakistan*)'²² by the supporters, and answered 'I am a soldier of Pakistan, not its Emperor.' The council accepted the resolution for Partition of Bengal and conferment of Dominion Status with 400 members voting for it and eight against it.²³ The resolution was decided by the members and Jinnah. The presence of Jinnah was the symbol of Pakistan for the supporters as well as for the opponents.

The Khaksars' idea of Pakistan was still insisted at Jama Masjid, again. About the 5,000 Khaksars and other Muslims gathered there on 1 July 1947. The leaders²⁴ were committed to secure a full-fledged Pakistan and attain Independence for the united India instead of the New India Plan which was accepted by the Congress and the Muslim League.²⁵ Later, some members shouted slogans from Fatehpuri Masjid : 'Short live, Gandhi! Short live, Nehru! We will make Delhi Pakistan! (*Gandhi Murdabad, Nehru Murdabad, Ham Delhi ko Pakistan*

²¹ There was the volunteers-group to support Pakistan which tended resort to force. Some Muslim personnel of the Indian Army enlisted to the Muslim League Army since 1938. The Army included two main sections: the Muslim League Volunteer Corps and the Muslim National Guards. The Muslim National Guards was composed of marauders, murderers and gangsters. It means that this troop was private army because it did not have official link with the Muslim League, while it had the same flag as that of the Muslim League. It can be said that the Muslim League controlled the Muslim National Guards secretly. Jalal addresses the Muslim National Guards as the following. 'Following the communal carnage in various parts of the province, organized less by the Muslim League than by the para-military wing, the Muslim National Guard – a hurried conglomeration of demobbed soldiers under the leadership of Shaukat Hayat – the leaders were more concerned with protecting their own political futures than that of the province or even the people they purported to lead.' See A. Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, pp,263-264.

²² About the reaction of the nick-name. See the articles of *Sidiq* in Chapter two.

²³ About the detail of the conference, See S.S. Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*. volume 2, pp,567-568.

²⁴ The leaders were Mohammad Yasim, Qamar Saheb, Ahmed Shah Wakil and others.

²⁵ See Intelligence Bureau (H.D.) Copy of a report on the Delhi Khaksar Camp received on 2-7-47, from D.C.I.C., Delhi, *Home Department Political Branch*, File No.28/4/47, 'Volunteer Organisations – Khaksars'. NAI.

Banaiengen)'. They also denounced both the parties.²⁶

The police kept watch on the activities of the Khaksars everywhere. The Khaksars had their own network. The members from Rawalpindi and Lahore came to help their gangs in Delhi and Patna because of the debacles there.²⁷ According to the report of the Delhi Police dated 2 July, 'more Khaksars are pouring in and the total number of Khaksars who have arrived in Delhi so far is roughly 7,000 to 8,000.'²⁸ The Ahrars and the supporters of the Indian National Army had joined hands. Some members of the Khaksars in Sindh shifted to the Muslim National Guards.²⁹ On the other hand, the Khaksars were supported because the local Muslims demanded action against the government if the Muslims had been killed.³⁰

Their battle often happened just around the daily life of the people. On 24 July 1947, three members of the Khaksars went out from Fatehpuri Masjid in Old Delhi with bombs. They were arrested by the constables after the shoot-out. Later, the police raided there and arrested 54 members of the Khaksars. They recovered and seized tear gas materials and 98 bombs from the Masjid during the night. Maulana Muzaffar Ahmad criticized both the Khaksars and the certain police in front of about 2,000 Muslims at the Fatehpuri Masjid: 'the Masjid had been desecrated by the action of a Sikh police officer³¹ who had entered it with his shoes on and fired at

²⁶ On 14 July, batches of the Khaksars marched on streets and bazars in Delhi. The agitation in Fatehpuri Masjid was one of them. See Intelligence Bureau (H.D.) Extract from the Delhi situation Report dated 15 July 1947, Delhi, *ibid.*

²⁷ See Defiance of prohibitory orders took out resulting in a clash with the Police. *ibid.*

²⁸ See Intelligence Bureau (H.D.) Copy of a report on the Delhi Khaksar Camp received on 2-7-47, from D.C.I.C., *ibid.*

²⁹ The Khaksars in Sind tried increasing their activities but did not attain much success. The Salar of Hyderabad along with some other Khaksars has left the organization and joined the Muslim National Guards. See Intelligence Bureau (H.D.) Exact from the Fortnightly Report of the Central Intelligence Officer, Sind, for the second half of June 1947. *ibid.*

³⁰ *ibid.*

³¹ Muzaffar Ahmad add the unfavourable explanation about him. The police officer had failed to take any action when the Muslim National Guard were attacked by Sikhs outside the Kotwali.

Muslims.’³² Public utilities and places were used to store weapons, and the assembly halls were used by some gangsters.

This situation was anything but satisfactory for the people. Both, the Hindus and Muslims, suspected the organization. ‘In view of the extreme suspicion with which these men are looked upon by all communities and the general disregard for law and order shown by them, no one would be sorry if this organization is banned in the provinces.’³³ However for the Muslims, it was no reason to prevent them from carrying on the propaganda regarding the oppression on the Muslims. It means that the Muslims needed the organization to wreck their revenge on other communities whenever they were attacked. The dilemma was clear: people hated the violence, but they also wanted to revenge if they were attacked by someone.

The Role of the Muslim National Guards

Not only the Khaksar but also the Muslim National Guards became active supporters of the Muslim League at the same time. The Muslim National Guards was led by Manzurul-Haq³⁴ mainly. The members always presented themselves at the places wherever some political meetings were held. Their main members stayed in Old Delhi and patrolled in and around the city wearing casual clothes. Even they went to distant places, like NWFP and Sylhet to help the Muslim League during the

³² Muzaffar Ahmad insisted about the Khaksars at the same speech as the following : “ 1) The Khaksars is and organization of goondas. 2) They had not the sympathy of the Muslims. 3) Every Muslim had the right to stay in masjids and if any action were to be taken against the Khaksars, this should be done outside. ” He added that he had never put his signature on any posters [to promote this activities]. See Extract form the C.I.D. Daily Report for 24 July 1947. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 5th Installment, File No.61, Mohd-75, volume 6. ‘Muslims (1947-1949)’. NMML.

³³ Intelligence Bureau (H.D.) Exact from the Bihar situation report No.88 dated 11 June 1947, *Home Department Political Branch*, File No.28/4/47, ‘Volunteer Organisations – Khaksars’. NAI.

³⁴ The Khaksar members had agitated to protest against the arrest of Manzurul Haq. See Extract from the Monthly Report on Volunteer Organizations in the Delhi Province for the Month Ending the 30 June 1947. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 5th Installment, File No.61, Mohd-75, volume 6. ‘Muslims (1947-1949)’. NMML.

time of voting. They also worked to collect their arms and supplied the same to the *Meos*³⁵ of Gurgaon and other Muslims as a preparation for emergency. Some members were listed on the black list of the Delhi Police.³⁶

Manzurul-Haq gathered about 1,000 volunteers of the National Guards for the meeting at the *Idgah* on 12 July.³⁷ They gave the caution to hoist the national flag on the Red Fort and other places belonging to the Muslims by the Congress on 15 July. The National Guards took part in various activities and some communal riots. Manzurul-Haq demanded his 500 members in the session before Independence to remain united in order to protect themselves from the Congress Government, and asked them to assist those employees of the Government of India who were proceeding to Karachi to join the Pakistan Government.³⁸ The Muslim League also had a plan to shift the office from Delhi to Karachi on 6 August 1947.³⁹ On the other hand, the Jamiatul-Ulama-e-Hind decided to celebrate the independent with illumination.

The National Guards took the role of the police for the Muslims, and supported the work of the political leaders at the mass level. However, they could not avoid the criticism by the ordinary people because they were likely to prefer the violent measures. The group, at least, was closer to the mass of the people than the

³⁵ A tribal group in north India who were originally Hindus, but converted to Islam. As the result, they live the mixed cultural practices of Hinduism and Islam.

³⁶ 1) Mohd. Ahmed Mirza, Office of the Provincial Muslim National Guard. 2) Irfanul-Haq Shibli [see the above quotation] 3) Rafi Qureshi of Qassabpura, Sadar Bazar 4) Khalil of Jama Masjid 5) Mehbub Ilahi, Sare Dasta of the Muslim National Guards 6) Col. Irshad Ali of Mori Gate. See the name list dated 8 July, *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 5th Installment, File No.61, Mohd-75, volume 6. 'Muslims (1947-1949)', NMML.

³⁷ From Pre-Page [Extract from C.I.D. Daily Dept for 12-13 July 1947] Report it Reveals That the Local Muslim National. *ibid.*

³⁸ The meeting was held at Jama Masjid on 16 July 1947. About 300 members out of 500 who attended were in their uniform. Many members had their steel helmets and green colour-flags. See Extract from the C.I.D. Daily Report for 17 July 1947. *ibid.*

³⁹ Syed Shamsul-Hassan and Zafar Ahmed Ansari had gone to Karachi to select the place for the office and their residences. See Casual Source Report. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30, 2nd Installment, File No.41, Mohd-29. 'All India Muslim League (1946-1947)'. NMML.

political parties, like the Muslim League because they directly concerned with the people's life and the people also could join in the group easily if they had wished.

The Communal Proportion in the Delhi Police

The position of the police in Delhi also effected the communal riots. It is reasonable why the Muslims should have asked the Muslim National Guards for some help though they were not in favour the Guards from the bottom of their hearts. It was due to the number of Muslim officers in the Delhi Police. The problem had already started in 1946. A report of Government of India mentioned about police officers and higher rank of Inspectors in Old Delhi and New Delhi.⁴⁰ According to the letter, the Home Member had observed that there was a preponderance of European and Muslim elements in the Delhi Police.⁴¹ This fact aroused suspicion against the police among the local people when communal riots started. This unjust management had to be adjusted by the Chief Commissioner and the officers in the police. Later, the Chief Commissioner suggested the Senior Superintendent of Police, W. D. Robinson to adjust the number of officers according to the proportion of population in Delhi.⁴² Robinson took the decision to replace Muslim policemen with Hindu and Sikh officers.⁴³

⁴⁰ The secret letter dated 11 December 1946 from A. E. Porter in Home Department, Government of India to Christie, the Chief Commissioner. The letter is the reply for the former letter of Christie's Home Secretary dated 12 November. *Confidential Report*, File No. 27/47 Part-C. 'Correspondence regarding the increasing of strength of Hindu and Sikh officers in Delhi police'. DSA.

⁴¹ Above the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police : 12 officers (Europeans – 7, Muslims – 4, Hindu – 1). Inspectors of Police : 21 officers (Muslims – 10, Europeans or Anglo-Indians – 4, others – 7). At the same time, the report, 'Statement showing the names of the Delhi Police Officers stationed in Old Delhi, the Notified Areas and New Delhi of and above the rank of Inspector' was submitted. The information of thirty four officers was listed.

⁴² This is a report of the meeting between the Chief Commissioner and Home Member on 30 January 1947. *Confidential Report*, File No. 27/47 Part-C. 'Correspondence regarding the increasing of strength of Hindu and Sikh officers in Delhi police'. DSA.

⁴³ On 3 February 1947, Robinson reported seven Muslim officers who could shift the present position with the least problems. Moreover, he was asked in Porter's letter dated 21 March to submit the monthly list about the situation of the staffs to the Government of India by the 5th of each month.

The Delhi police had familiar relationship with the Punjab government. After the transfer of the Muslim Deputy Superintendent of Police back to the Punjab Police, Lala Chunni Lal negotiated with the Punjab Government to post another Hindu or Sikh Deputy Superintendent of Police in Delhi. The Chief Commissioner decided to replace the present Muslim officers of Punjab with Hindu officers from the United Provinces. The Senior Superintendent of Police did not agree with the opinion, and insisted that the high rank officers would be drawn from Punjab because the Delhi Police was linked with the Punjab Police.⁴⁴

From March to June 1947, the Police Force employed seventy-five Hindus and Sikhs and thirty-eight Muslims. However, the Government decided to recruit non-Muslim officers more because the proportion of the policemen in Delhi was not according to the proportion of the population as yet.⁴⁵

The position regarding the inspectors would be composed of four Anglo Indians, eight Muslims, four Hindus and five Sikhs on 1 July 1947. Some Muslim officers would be replaced by Hindu or Sikh officers while they would leave for Punjab on the same date.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the Chief Commissioner still insisted on his opinion that three officers out of thirteen Muslim officers should be replaced by non-Muslim officers from U.P. He pointed out that the Punjab cadre tended to keep their position as before. It would be possible to solve the matter of the proportion by accepting the officers from U.P.⁴⁷ Moreover, the Chief Commissioner recorded the ratio of the officers for 1 July as shown in Table 9 and 10 in appendix to this thesis.

⁴⁴ The Report from Christie, the Chief Commissioner to A.E.Porter, Home Department dated 25 April 1947. *Confidential Report*, File No. 27/47 Part-C. 'Correspondence regarding the increasing of strength of Hindu and Sikh officers in Delhi police'. DSA.

⁴⁵ The paper is forwarded to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Delhi for favour of necessary action dated 13 June 1947. *ibid.*

⁴⁶ This is the report from D.C.Lal, Office of the Senior Supdt. of Police to Rai Bahadur J.P. Ray, Home Secretary to the Chief Commissioner dated 20 June. *ibid.*

⁴⁷ It is the report to R.N. Banerjee, Esqr, Secretary to the Government of India on 26 June 1947. *ibid.*

However, the above expectation was not fulfilled in fact. The exchange of officers was taking place slower than was anticipated. As a result of Partition, the number of Muslim officers decreased, and completely became zero in the level of above rank of Inspectors by 1 October 1947. Especially, there was no Muslim officer on the higher positions than the Inspectors after Partition. The reason why the Muslims left their position was that they reverted to Punjab. Only one Inspector returned to U.P. because of the termination of the session of the Constituent Assembly. It seems quite probable that the communal distribution of the high officers was not irrelevant to the lower ranks of the policemen. At least, the reason to start decreasing the Muslim officers was that the mass of the people were dissatisfied with the unjust ratio of the policemen. The officers of the lower rank were more familiar with the life of the people. After Partition, it was possible that the Muslim people could not trust many of the policemen because of the communal difference with them. The Muslim organizations, like the Muslim National Guards, took over the role of the police for those Muslim masses. It can be said that the Muslim officers in the Delhi police were excluded from Delhi.

After Partition

The situation in both India and Pakistan became anarchic after independence. Delhi was one of cities where horrible riots occurred successively. Moreover, Delhi was the most important place as the city of transit between United India and West Pakistan. The communal situation in the rural area around Delhi was also tense. The Khaksars also gathered their members from other places to Delhi for the independent day.⁴⁸ Some groups of Hindus attacked the Muslims with arms and drove them out. Then, a number of Muslims fled to other Muslim villages and safe

⁴⁸ 'Some Khaksars are still present in some mosques and it is very likely that Khaksars from other places may again come to Delhi to create trouble on the 15 August when Freedom Day is to be observed and the National flag will be hoisted.' See Intelligence Bureau (H.D.) Copy of the Delhi situation report dated 25.7.47, received from D.C.I.C', Delhi, *Home Department Political Branch*, File No.28/4/47, 'Volunteer Organisations - Khaksars'. NAI.

areas and the jurisdictions of Police Station, for example, Punjab Khor, Nangloi, Gadaipur, Chatarpur and Hauz Rani in Mehrauli. On the other hand, the Muslim people also prepared to defend themselves with weapons.⁴⁹ The mass of the people, especially young people, in each communal group armed themselves with guns, daggers and so on. It is inferred from the confusion that the people had some connections with army-organizations to procure the weapons.

The Khaksars and the Muslim National Guards changed their strategy after Partition. Both organizations planned to assassinate famous politicians. They did not reveal the reason why they decided the targets. For example, Inayatullah Asghar as the head and some members of the Khaksars started the secret work with the intention of assassinating ministers of the Congress Government. It was said that they had a plan to kill Abul Kalam Azad.⁵⁰ On the other hand, some members of the Muslim National Guards also hold a secret meeting to assassinate Sardar V.B. Patel and other leaders. The inflammatory speech by Abdul Qayun, the Chief Minister of N.W.F.P. inspired them.⁵¹

However, the both organizations decreased their activities after Partition. The reason seems to be the loss of the prominent leaders. The Criminal Investigation Department summarized the activities of the prominent members of the Muslims National Guards by 15 August 1947.⁵² According to the report, the organizer of the Provincial Muslim National Guard for Delhi was Manzurul-Haq. The guide was Nawab Sadiq Ali. Their aim was to look after the interest of Muslims

⁴⁹ About the communal situation of Delhi. See Intelligence Bureau (Home Ministry), Extracts from the Delhi Daily Reports dated 2 September 1947. *Home Department Political Branch, 28/8/1947 Poll(1)*. 'Report regarding pressure of Khaksar in Delhi'. NAI.

⁵⁰ Inayatullah Asghar attended a party held by Abul Kalam Azad and waited an opportunity to shoot him. See *ibid*.

⁵¹ See Strictly Secret Source Report dated 5 November 1947. *Delhi Police Records, List No.30, 5th Installment, File No.61, Mohd-75, volume 6. 'Muslims (1947-1949)'*. NMML.

⁵² See Criminal Investigation Department dated 6 November 1947. *ibid*.

and protect their lives and property and to do underground work for the Muslim League. After Manzurul-Haq's leaving for Pakistan, he did not concern with the Delhi branch any more. Mirza Mohammad Ahmed, Raffi Qureshi etc. replaced Manzurul-Haq and started the activity at the same level with him. However, the National Guards was shattered totally because many prominent leaders had gone to Pakistan and the disturbances had happened many times. The organization could not grow any more. The Muslim National Guards had lost their leaders because of their migrations.

On the other hand, the Khaksars had lost their leaders in India. The High Commissioner for Pakistan in India, Zahid Husain received the letter about the transfer of the prisoners of the Khaksars from India to Pakistan.⁵³ The demand of the letter was that the prisoners⁵⁴ in both Delhi and Bihar shall be released and sent to Pakistan when trains service started. However the Indian Government did not accept the demand, then Zahid Husain was asked to mediate between the Pakistan Government and the Indian Government as 'these Khaksars are in fact the prisoners of Pakistan Dominion'.⁵⁵ To put it briefly, many leaders had already been arrested, and had a plan to be sent to Pakistan.

⁵³ See the Letter dated 27 November 1947 from Raja Sher Zaman Khan, Member Resident Lujnai Hisabat, Al Ishah, Ichhra, Lahore to Zahid Husain, High Commissioner for Pakistan in India, New Delhi. *Home Department Political Branch*, File No. 28/11/47 Poll (1). 'Volunteer Organizations of Khaksars'. NAI.

⁵⁴ These prisoners were arrested on 4 July as the result of the Khaksars movement. They protested against the arrest of the Khaksars in Bihar and asked to release them by peaceful demonstrations.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

Zahid Husain also faced the danger to be attacked. He demanded to set three or four trained gunmen around his residence in Harding Avenue⁵⁶, and even asked the Inspector General in the West Punjab Police to accept the guards from the West Punjab.⁵⁷ Not only Husain but also his partners in the office fared communal riots around their residences in Lodi Road Colony. Lodi Road Colony placed near certain refugee camps where Sikh refugees especially stayed. Safdarjang refugee camp was seemed to be one of them. The Muslim residents suffered from the threatening shout in order to do away with the Muslims and the threatening papers written in certain dialect. Many Muslim employees of the Indian Government stayed the colony before, but they were surrounded with non-Muslim refugees. It was the only way for the Muslim officers to shift Pakistan immediately in order to avoid communal riots. According to the report of the office of the High Commissioner for Pakistan in India, the fifty families out of eighty families had a plan to leave for Lahore or Rawalpindi within a week. Zahid Husain suggested detail measures to protect the Muslims to Khurshid Ahmad Khan, ICS, Chief Commissioner by himself.⁵⁸

The communal riots were the more important matter for the mass of the people than the political interests. Some people could shift their home with the information about Independence while the other people escaped out of the disturbance. The gangster-organizations took part in the struggle for the freedom. It is no


⁵⁶ Now, the place is called Tilak Marg.

⁵⁷ From the Secretary of the High Commissioner for Pakistan in India to the Chief Committee on 20 and 25 August 1947. *Confidential*, File No.63/47-C. 'Protective arrangement for the High Commissioner for Pakistan in India and other Muslims in general'. DSA.

⁵⁸ Husain suggested two way. (1) To gather Muslims in one block would make easy to protect them by the Police. In this case, he recommended Block – 15 where was the Muslim majority area in the colony as the suitable block. (2) To strength the patrol would be effect to give relief from tension. The patrol should be taken once or twice at the night. S.Khurshid took up to consider the former measure which Husain favoured. The application was sent on 30 August, and the replay was written on 1 September between Zahid Husain and S.Khurshid. *ibid*.

exaggeration to say that the organizations had greater influence on the mass of the people than the political parties. The people also needed some help from the organizations to obtain the arms in order to save themselves and their families. Many of them could not expect to go to the new country but just took care of themselves in the city where communal riots were taking place.

Figure 3 The Map of Bahadurgarh



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The trains on the Eastern Punjab Railway became the suitable target for attacking Muslims. Even the records of the government as well as passengers could not reach Karachi. 'Some of these have been interfered with and our information is that two or three trains have already been burnt. One of these trains was stabled at Bahadurgarh station about eighty miles from Delhi. 'I have received information that this train is being looted now by a mob of six to seven thousand people. I cannot, of course, vouch for the correctness of this information but finding a Pakistan baggage train standing in the yard made it its first target.'⁵⁹ According to the Senior Superintendent of Police in Delhi, the Delhi Police did not have any solution for the matter out of Delhi because the Police did not have the authority to do anything there. The Senior Superintendent of Police in Delhi suggested to take escorts of the Punjab Railway Police or the Military on those trains otherwise the trains should not be

⁵⁹ The letter from Zahid Husain, High Commissioner for Pakistan to R.N.Banerjee, Secretary, Home Department dated 31 August 1947. *Confidential*, File No.63/47- C. 'Correspondence regarding protective arrangements for trains band for Pakistan'. DSA.

allowed to run.⁶⁰ It meant that some officers had known the danger of the trip to Pakistan by the train. The railway staff also sought help from police whenever they faced any problem. However, they could not manage the serious matters because of the different liabilities and the chaos of communal riots. The Muslim residents also did not have any choice to take trains because they wanted to leave Delhi as quickly as possible.⁶¹ At last, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India asked all provincial governments and Chief Commissioners to strengthen the administrative and executive control of the Provincial Police authorities, both civil and Railway with all efforts for preventing the attack on the trains.⁶² As far Delhi, the Railway Police watched railway stations and trains themselves in their jurisdiction. The armed policemen were also set with every train after some disturbances.⁶³ The train traffic completely returned normal without any tension in March 1948.⁶⁴

Some Muslims was successful to move between India and Pakistan by the air-route. There was a record about the number of Muslim passengers who used Willingdon and Palam Airport⁶⁵ for some days.⁶⁶ This list informed how many families of the passengers also accompanied, and where they would go or came. It is not possible to know whether those passengers wanted to shift Pakistan or not from

⁶⁰ The documents from D.C.Lal to Sahibzada Khurshed Ahmed Khan, Chief Commissioner dated 2 September 1947. *ibid.*

⁶¹ 'A representative of villagers of Tehar represented that immediate arrangements be made for their evacuation to Lahore. Trains were laid out for these villagers at two occasions but were cancelled.' See the daily report from M.S.Randhawa to R.N.Banerjee, *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

⁶² The letter dated 4 December 1947. *ibid.*

⁶³ The comment of D.W.Mehra, the Dy. Inspector-General of Police dated 14 January 1948. *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Home Secretary informed that the special protect would not be need any more on the trains in the report dated 12 March 1948. *ibid.*

⁶⁵ Willingdon Airport is known Safdarjang Ailport where Delhi Flying Club uses now. The airport worked as the main airport by the birth of Indira Gandhi International Airport. Palam Airport also renamed Indira Gandhi International Airport for domestic lines. The place of the former Palam Airport is used as the Tarminal 1 now.

⁶⁶ The record is 'The list of incoming and outgoing passengers at Willingdon and Palam Airport, Delhi'. This lists were reported by Criminal Investigation Department to both Superintendent of Police and Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs in Delhi. See Delhi Police Records, List No.30, 3rd Installment, File No.76, Misc-159, volume 6, 'List of Muslims who came from Lahore on 17 November 1947 (1948)'. NMML. and Table 11 and 12 in the appendix to this thesis.

the number of the Muslim passengers.⁶⁷ The passengers came and went between Lahore, Karachi, Calcutta, Bombay, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Jodhpur, Bhopal and some cities. The clear feature is that the leaving Muslims took more families than the arriving Muslims who usually came alone. Moreover, the Muslims who left Delhi stayed at Muslim majority-areas in Delhi⁶⁸. It is difficult to identify the class of Muslims who used the aircrafts. Some passengers listed their positions and their offices, for example, the British High Commissioner, High Commissioner for Pakistan, Industries Civil Supplies, and some famous factories. However, almost Muslims did not mention their works. Some passengers had a plan to stay with acquaintances and relative, but other passengers had a plan to stay in refugee camps at first. Of course, the ticket of the air-plain should be more expensive than the ticket of the train. The high class officers could take the plane by themselves or under business. However, some Muslim passengers who were not rich, got the chance to take it somehow. M.S. Randhwa described thus, 'The tendency among the Muslims, particularly of the lower middle class shopkeepers and labours, is to sell off their belongings and to go to Pakistan. I have seen in the Muslim areas like Pul Bangash, Bara Hindu Rao, Sadar Bazar and Jama Masjid that the Muslim spread their household belongings on pavements for sale.'⁶⁹ These areas were the Muslim majority-areas where many of passengers stayed before leaving. Randhwa's report suggests that the lower middle class Muslims sold their property for shifting to Pakistan. Some of those people, perhaps, could get the tickets for flying to Pakistan.

⁶⁷ It can not deny the possibility of group tours. In fact, eight Muslims came Delhi dated 25 December 'on a pleasure trip to Calcutta and Bhopal'. However, to identify the member of families might be refugees. Certain Muslims informed the name of the Refugee Camp in Lahore as the destination.

⁶⁸ For example, Billimaran, Nizam Palace, Bara Hindu Rao, Jama Masjid, Lal Khan, Chandni Chowk, Shahganji, Turkman Gate, Hauz Qazi, Sadar Bazar, Karol Bagh, Mori Gate, Fatehpuri Masjid, Ajmeri Gate, Connaught Place and so on.

⁶⁹ The Monthly Report to R.N. Bannerjee, Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs from M.S. Randhwa, Deputy Commissioner dated 18 October 1947. Confidential, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

According to an official report, a system of reciprocal repatriation of population between India and Pakistan was in force at the point of October 1947. The detail of the system is as following,

The Central Control Room was issuing permits to Muslims desirous of going over to Pakistan. These persons used to be carried by planes which on return used to bring back refugees from the Western Pakistan. There were two defects in the system. Firstly sometimes permit-holders did not avail of travel facilities in time and planes went without sufficient passengers and this involved unnecessary expenditure on the part of the Government. Secondly, at that time the Pakistan authorities held to the rule of "man for man". ... This held up the progress of evacuation.⁷⁰

Both governments perhaps helped the fugitives economically and politically. However, those Muslim passengers who went journeys from Delhi had to pay their fares either to the airline-company or to the Air Co-ordination officer, Central Control Room in Delhi.⁷¹

The graph of the Muslim passengers shows the tendency of decreasing departures. This seems to suggest that the circumstances had begun to calm and Muslims did not need to rush, or the government stopped giving any help.

⁷⁰ From N.M. Patnaik, Home Secretary dated 29th July 1948. *Confidential*, File No.87/48-C, 'Transport of Evacuees, Special Charter of Aircraft Engaged in Audit Report'. DSA.

⁷¹ From P.C. Mukherjee dated 10 April 1948. *ibid.*

The Homeless and Partition

The Partition brought chaos and made people homeless. The Ministry of Rehabilitation was set up in September 1947 and the Military Evacuation Organization managed the problems with refugees.⁷² Twenty-five relief camps were built in Delhi by December 1947.⁷³ Delhi had various communities largely inside the metropolitan during the British colonial period. Delhi became the target of violence. Every community attacked one another who lived side by side in the city. Moreover, the city was full with refugees around Partition. Studies about the refugees have focused on the immigration from Pakistan: the Hindus and the Sikh as main communities. This article is intended to retrace the situation of the refugees in Delhi from another angle, the Muslim refugees.

It is needless to say that a lot of Muslims stayed in Delhi. Those Muslims did not just run away to Pakistan. Some Muslims remained to stay in Delhi. Even some Muslims came to India from Pakistan to depend on their relatives. The other Muslims in Delhi were the people who waited for taking trains to Pakistan. Some Muslims also came from other areas to go to Pakistan. There were the Muslims who just escaped from their places to Delhi without thinking of going anywhere. In Delhi, there were some points where the refugees gathered and stayed. They had the tendency to gather in the area with the same community.

⁷² P.N. Luthra, *Rehabilitation* (Delhi, 1972), p.4.

⁷³ *ibid.*, p.5.

Kunwar Mohammad Ashraf⁷⁴ described the situation of Delhi after Partition well. This article appeared in *Sidiq* dated 24 October 1947 as the quotation from the newspaper *Khilafat* in Mumbai. The title was 'the Event of Mutiny in Delhi' connected with the mutiny in 1857. This article is notable to understand the situation of Delhi. First, he reported the joyful atmosphere on the independent day that 'Independence in August was celebrated. Hindus and Muslims lived together like milk and sugar [friends]. 700,000 people were crowded at the space in front of Lal Qilah. The Hindu Sabha had a program to oppose the acceptance of Independence, however, no one was interested to oppose the national flag.'⁷⁵ Some political organizations had plans to disturb the celebration. However, it is clear that the people did not wish any disturbances and agitations against Independence. Next, Ashraf pointed to the problems of the Muslims who remained India who stayed back in India.

Another difficulty is that great leaders and notable Muslims have gone to Karachi and the others were also arranging the air-tickets. Everyone is thinking for himself, and nobody thought what would happen to the nation (*qaum*) after their leaving. There were 95% of Muslims with the Muslim League. However, they [the members of the Muslim League] did not have a time to stand with the people for organization, nationalist, liberal and so on. ... This [rumour] run among whole Muslims that they were going to be attacked.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ K.M. Ashraf (1903-1962) is the famous politician and medievalist. He had his education at Aligarh Muslim University, Jamia Millia Islamia and London School of Oriental Studies. The book, *Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan* is based on his Ph.D. thesis. As the politician, he was elected member of the AICC for 1934- 1945 and worked with Abul Kalam Azad and Jawaharlal Nehru. He was the head of the Muslim Mass Contact Campaign. After that, he worked in the head quarters of the Communalist Party of India in Mumbai during 1943-46. His works in Urdu are translated by Jaweed Ashraf, his son. The collection of his manuscripts also is conserved in NMML, however it is closed at this time (2008). More information about K.M.Ashraf, See H. Kruger, ed. *Kunwar Mohammad Ashraf: An Indian Scholar and Revolutionary 1903-1962*, (New Delhi, 1969).

⁷⁵ *Sidiq*, 24 October 1947. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

⁷⁶ *ibid.*

The Muslims were afraid to be attacked by other communities. They were hopeless of their party, the Muslim League. The leaders were waiting for the day of departure to Pakistan without taking care of Muslims who stayed in India. He gave the details of the communal riots, in Sabzi Mandi, a village near the bank of Yamuna River and Pahar Ganj, between the Muslims and the Hindus in Delhi.⁷⁷

Ashraf addressed about the refugee camps for the Muslims as the following,

Now, the biggest Muslim camp in Delhi is Jama Masjid. There are safe localities near it, inside of Jama Masjid and the open-space where refugees stays. There is one camp in Nizamuddin Auliya. Muslims lost their population and gathered to villages near Nizamuddin Auliya. Another camp is in Purana Qilah which is fallen under the system of Pakistan government, and the foods etc. are sent directly by air from Karachi. Muslims treated well with refugees each other. ... Muslims near Jama Masjid gave foods to 3000 refugees from their homes for two days.⁷⁸

What this example makes clear was that there were some refugee camps for the Muslim refugees. The main places were Jama Masjid, Nizamuddin Auliya, Purana Qilah, Humayun's Tomb, Idgah and houses of Muslim Cabinet ministers such as Abul Kalam Azad and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai.⁷⁹ Many Muslims temporary stayed in religious buildings and areas, like Jama Masjid and Nizamuddin Auliya because other

⁷⁷ The Muslims in Sabzi Mandi who was middle-class people had some revolvers and so on. One day, they did shoot-out from 10 to 1 o'clock in the night. On the next day, Muslims left Sabzi Mandi. One village of Musalman milkmen (*Ghosi*) near the bank of Yamuna river had about 500 residents of milkmen. They were attacked and they also resisted. On the next day, 150 people came to Jama Masjid from there. After this, Pahar Ganji was attacked one day.

⁷⁸ *Sidiq*, 24 October 1947. NMML. Translated from Urdu. My translation.

⁷⁹ See G. Pandey, 'Partition and Independence in Delhi, 1947-48', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 32:36, 6-12 September, 1997, p,2263.

Muslim refugees also gathered them and helped one another without fear. Purana Qilah was convenient for Muslims to stay and wait for the trains to Pakistan.

Finally, Ashraf showed the attitude of great leaders for the Muslim refugees. Gandhi visited to encourage the Muslims who had felt disappointed in their lives. Dr. Zakir Husain protected one life of a Sikh at Jama Masjid. Jawaharlal Nehru insisted the self-reliance among Muslims over the radio, and even went to Jamia Millia Islamia alone by his car when there was rumour about the attack there. According to Ashraf, other Congress leaders made efforts to help the Muslim refugees, and the Sikhs also protected them. The National Guards stayed near Jama Masjid to help the Muslims.

In the above article, Ashraf concluded that the confusion in Delhi gradually was over. However, the communal riot was still continuing in Delhi.⁸⁰ Zahid Husain's suggestion did not avail against the situation on the Muslims in Delhi. Other Muslim-areas, namely Delhi Muttra Road and Wellesly Road needed patrolling by the police because communal attacks had started to happen around the biggest Muslim refugee camp: Purana Qilah and Sher Shah Mess in front of Purana Qilah. Zahid Husain addressed to Jawaharlal Nehru about Sher Shah Mess, 'the Sher Shah Mess is now the only place where my staff can live with some measure of confidence even though under most difficult and trying condition. If full protection cannot be guaranteed even for this place it would become absolutely impossible for any Muslims to remain in New Delhi. I must, therefore, impress upon you that it is quite impossible for my office to carry on unless they can feel assured of the maximum

⁸⁰ Ashraf's article was written in Mumbai before 24 October 1947. Husain reported the situation on the beginning of November 1947. The report by Husain is more realistic because of the date and the place though he worked to support Muslims in India and Ashraf supported the Congress.

protection and of complete safety in all circumstance.’⁸¹ This expression vividly shows how precarious the condition on the Muslims was in Delhi. The feature of the assassinations was that some Muslims who just went and came to Muslim refugees’ camps tended to become targets for street-killers. Certain injured Muslims were carried or run away into the nearest Muslim refugee camp at first, then they rushed to some hospital⁸². Refugee camp was not just a place to live with the same religious people. At least for Muslims in Delhi, Refugee camp was a *sanctuary*.

The role of refugees’ camp was different between the Hindu – Sikh community and the Muslim community even in the same city. It was the common point to supply foods, place, security and relief in any camps. However, Delhi changed the sense in itself for those communities. Delhi became the end of the horrible way from Pakistan for the Hindus and the Sikhs who would peacefully live there. On the other hand, Delhi became *dar-ul-harb*⁸³ for the Muslims who kept their graceful legacy there. The safety for Muslims was guaranteed only in certain Muslim camps. *Dar-ul-Islam*⁸⁴ was artificially created in Pakistan. The Muslims were oppressed by other communities that Muslims should move away for their new country, Pakistan because others had come their new country, India. The prejudice that Muslim refugees were supported to go to Pakistan is the main reason for little attention being paid to the research about the Muslim refugees in Delhi.

⁸¹ Dated on 3 November 1947. *Confidential*, File No.63/47-C. ‘Protective arrangement for the High Commissioner for Pakisnta in India and other Muslims in general’. DSA.

⁸² Irwin Hospital near Delhi Gate was frequently raised its name on the report of the Government where injured people were transported after communal accidents. Irwin Hospital changed the name as Lok Nayak Jaya Prakash Narayan Hospital.

⁸³ Literally, ‘land of warfare’, an Islamic term for a land where Islamic practices could not be observed. Usually this term is used in India to struggle against the British. In this case, the word is used to address the hostility between the Muslims and the others from my view. In *dar-ul-harb*, two measures can be taken as the reaction. One is *jihad*, namely to wage war. Another is *hijrah*, namely to depart.

⁸⁴ It is the contrast situation against *dar-ul-harb*. Literally, ‘land of Islam’ where Muslim can practice their religion and stay peacefully.

The Double-Faced Relationship among Communities

It is sure that the situation of Delhi became a lawless zone after Independence. On the other hand, it was also true that there was the communal harmony among the people in Delhi. This double-faced situation occurred in Delhi at the same time. On the first *Id* after Independence, the Muslims in Bara Hindu Rao celebrated with the Hindu residents in Pahari Dhiraj, and had tea together. Indira Gandhi, Ram Manohar Lohia, Maulana Sayeed Ahmad, Mir Mushtaq Ahmad and Hafiz Aziz Hasa Baqai also attended the ceremony.⁸⁵ M.K. Gandhi's fasts in order to promote the communal harmony effected the minds of the people.⁸⁶ When Gandhi was murdered by Nathuram Godse on 30 January 1948, the people appreciated the ban on communal organizations under the demand of the Government, especially against *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (generally so-called R.S.S.) to which Gose belonged.⁸⁷ Gandhi was the symbol of communal harmony for the people. The masses could not agree with any violence which the political organization practiced for the religion and the political interest. In other words, they prefer the peace to the communal interest. However, still some riots occurred at the same place in the same month.⁸⁸

Then, why did the riots happen among the people in Delhi? Why was the standard of Muslims life going worse after Independence? The real tragedy for all communities was concerned where they stayed, namely securing homes for refugees.

⁸⁵ The Weekly Report from M.S.Randhawa dated 8 November 1947. See the daily report from M.S.Randhawa to R.N.Banerjee, *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

⁸⁶ The Weekly Report from to Khurshid dated 18 January 1948. See the daily report from M.S. Randhawa to R.N. Banerjee, *ibid*.

⁸⁷ The Weekly Report from M.S. Randhawa to Khurshid dated 9 February 1948. *ibid*.

⁸⁸ For example, some bombs were thrown into vacant houses and shops which were owned by Muslims in Nai Abadi near Bara Hindu Rao on 27 November 1947. See the daily report from M.S. Randhawa to R.N. Banerjee, *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

The refugees got impatient at the Government reaction which did not allot them residences quickly.⁸⁹ In Sadar Bazar and Pul Bangash, around thirty percent of the Muslim residences were left vacant.⁹⁰ In front of the refugees who suffered the frozen wind of winter, there were so many vacant homes which would be opened only for the Government officers. 'A large number of refugees, many of whom have families and children are extremely discontented. They are suffering great hardship, especially in the present cold wave. Many of them have become so desperate that they have no hesitation even in going to jail. It is persons such as these who invade empty Muslim houses.'⁹¹ Those refugees had nothing to lose any more. They were not afraid to be arrested because they could get rooms in jails. They forced their action to occupy vacant houses and even residence which would be vacated by Muslims. This incursion into empty housing led to other attacks in other Muslim areas. It was for this reason that the Government did not supply the places for refugees. 'I suggested some time ago that these houses should not be given to refugees but may be requisition for Government servants such as policemen and clerks. The presence of Government servants in Muslim *Mohallas* [blocks] would give added confidence to the local Muslim.'⁹² This care involved Muslims in worse troubles ironically. Perhaps, the refugees thought that they could not stay in comfortable places because of the existence of Muslims there. Deputy Commissioner suggested the construction of buildings in Qarol Bagh for 50,000 refugees.⁹³

⁸⁹ The government consistently did not allow the refugees to stay the houses which the Muslims left vacant. See The Weekly Report from M.S. Randhawa to Khurshid dated 29 November 1947, *ibid.*

⁹⁰ The Weekly Report from M.S. Randhawa to Khurshid dated 14 December 1947, *ibid.*

⁹¹ The Weekly Report from M.S. Randhawa to Khurshid dated 22 December 1947, *ibid.*

⁹² The Weekly Report from M.S. Randhawa to Khurshid dated 14 December 1947, *ibid.*

⁹³ The Weekly Report from M.S. Randhawa to Khurshid dated 22 December 1947, *ibid.*

This situation about the vacant residences in Delhi was a vicious circle unfortunately. Basically, the refugees did not hate the other community and religions at all. However, the extreme suffering of the hard winter, homelessness and late rehabilitation made the refugees nervous and violent. It is also pointed out that the Government management for the Muslims made non-Muslim refugees hostile towards Muslims.

The Recurrent Evacuation to Delhi

Refugees kept coming to Delhi in 1948. Those refugees were worried about the rumour that more people would pour into Delhi from the border between India and Pakistan in Punjab.⁹⁴ 'As already observed in my previous reports rumours are circulating about the impending war between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir issue. Though people are confident of the strength of our Government but they feel that sufficient measures are not being taken to meet impending crisis and demand starting of organizations like National Volunteer Corporations members of which should be trained in the use of arms.'⁹⁵ The move of refugees depended on the political matters whether they lived far from Delhi or not. Still vacant residences of Muslims were not allotted to refugees, though the government decided to grant them to the Congress workers who came from West Punjab at first.⁹⁶ The first suggestion of Randhawa was to provide the Muslim workers those housing, however the Congress workers were perhaps Hindus as regarding with the refugees from West Punjab to Delhi.


⁹⁴ 'People living in the frontier districts of Ferozepore, Amritsar and Gurdaspore are reported to be panicky and I am afraid that refugee population in Delhi city is likely to increase.' The Weekly Report from M.S.Randhawa to Khurshid dated 29 December 1947. *ibid.*

⁹⁵ The Weekly Report from M.S.Randhawa to Khurshid dated 2 January 1948. *ibid.*

⁹⁶ The Weekly Report from M.S. Randhawa to Khurshid dated 10 January 1948. *ibid.*

According to one report, the numbers of the people who came from the western area of Pakistan is some 4,700,000 by 1949, and the people who came from East Bengal are 5,280,000 by 1971.⁹⁷

Figure 4 The Map of Humayun's Tomb



Source: The attached map of the matter about Humayun's Tomb dated 11th February 1948, File No.D.C.5/1947. DSA

The refugees occupied every open space in Delhi, for example, any plains, ruins, temples, musjids and shrines. The space was not enough for refugees to stay, then they started making new plains by themselves. 'I have the honour to state that the refugees at the camp are busy in cutting down trees inside Arab Sarai, a Central Protected Monument. When our *chowkidars* [guards] stopped them from felling the trees, the Muslims showed force and ran after the chowkidars with their axes to kill them. It is a pity that the protection afforded to the Muslim refugees is being

⁹⁷ To add this number, it also reported that the refugees from Pakistan completed to settle down by 1960. In the case of the refugees who came from East Bengal, out of these 3,500,000 had resettled by 1971. See P.N. Luthra, *Rehabilitation*, p.2.

reciprocated in terms of aggression!’⁹⁸ The refugees could not care their historical monuments to secure their land. Arab Sarai locates in the south western area next to Humayun’s Tumb. The Muslim refugees were flooded out from Humayun’s Tumb.

Those Muslims who opened the area left to Pakistan in January 1948.⁹⁹ However, many refugees who could not be identified Muslims, Hindus or Sikhs kept staying around Humayun’s Tumb. The confusion took a heavy toll of lives in the camp. The situation was reported as the following. ‘It has been reported to me by the Patwari of this office that refugees in Humayun’s Tomb are burying their dead bodies illegally in No.594 shown as XX in the plan attached. I, therefore, request you kindly to see that arrangements are made for this purpose in a sanctioned burial ground so that Nazul land is not spoiled.’¹⁰⁰ The attached picture shows how large the area of Humayun’s Tomb was as compared with the present Tomb, and that the refugees occupied the south area of the tomb, so-called Nizamuddin East today.

As pointed the above, not only Muslim refugees inhabited in the Islamic heritages and masjid. Especially after Muslim refugees’ leaving for Pakistan, other communities, Hindu and Sikh refugees also used the places. Humayun’s Tomb and Purana Qilah which were managed as the Muslim refugee camps firstly were turned in to Sikhs refugee camps. ‘on the 26 March, 1948, quite unexpectedly a large congregation of Sikhs collected at Humayun’s tomb and most of them began to make fuss and behave in an unseemly manner. Our choukidars on duty did their best to bring them under control. But the congregation would not listen to them and

⁹⁸ From Shankar Das, The Assistant Superintendent, Archaeological Survey to Camp Commandant, Humayuns’ Tomb dated 20th November 1947, File No.D.C.5/1947, ‘Damages caused to any occupation talen of protected monuments during disturbances’. DSA.

⁹⁹ ‘Enquiries made revealed that all the refugees, who were putting up in Arab Sarai have since left for Pakistan.’ See The document from S.G. Button, The Deputy Inspector General of Police to The Deputy Commissioner dated 13 January 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ From A.R. Malhotra, The Chairman, Delhi Improvement Trust to The Deputy Commissioner dated 11 February 1948. *ibid.*

actually started dismantlement of stone-jalies, benches, leaves etc. They then reported the matter to the Police post as Nizamuddin but it was too late to rush in any aid as damage to the monuments had already been committed though the police constable did reach the precincts soon after.'¹⁰¹

From this report, it is considered that many Sikhs had transited into Humayun's tomb by March 1948. It is unlikely that the Sikh refugees stayed with the Muslim refugees, and even the report does not mention about the Muslim refugees there. The Muslim refugees were replaced with the Sikh refugees there in turn. The situation of Purana Qilah also changed and had a different problem. 'The refugees at Purana Qila have formed a Gurudwara inside the Talaqi Gate where as usual they have placed with honor Guru Grant Sahib. They further propose to fix railings, chowkhats and door leaves to the existing openings. This, it is learned, is being done with the approval of the Camp Commandant.'¹⁰² This case also makes it clear that the Sikh refugees occupied instead of the Muslim refugees. However, it is difficult to affirm the truth of the report because there is no vestige left of the gurdwara in Purana Qilah at present.

'Refugees from West Punjab first occupied that Humayun's Tomb in thousands and then shifted to Safdar Jang's Tomb forthwith. They have occupied every available space inside and outside the enclosure and are keeping their luggage on the pavilions, main tomb and the arcaded structures all over. They have started giving shakes to the godown locks and are threatening to open them. A vast congregation unchecked by military or police is prowling all over the area and offer a

¹⁰¹ From Shankar Das, the Assistant Superintendent, Department of Archaeology to the Deputy Commissioner dated 14 April 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁰² From Shankar Das, the Assistant Superintendent, Department of Archaeology to the Deputy Commissioner dated 8 May 1948. *ibid.*

gigantic problem for our *chaukidars* to cope with the situation.’¹⁰³ The refugees in the report were thought to be the Sikh refugees who stayed in Humayun’s tomb. They did not have any choice to shift to other areas. Even they could not mind that the buildings in which they would stay were Islamic heritages or not. As the result of the refugees’ long staying, the Safdar Jang’s tomb got damaged because the refugees used some parts of the building and the gravestone for their life.¹⁰⁴ In other cases of destroying monuments, the refugees built their houses, hotels and shops attached with the ruins and decorated the space as they felt comfortable. For another example, the tomb of Nizamuddin Auliya’s mother was not respected by local people.

I have the honour to state on the road from New Delhi to Mahrauli there is a village by the name of village Achni [Adh Chini]. There is in this village the tomb of the mother of Hazrat Khwajah Aulia. The Government of India are, I am sure aware of the position of Hazrat Khawjah Nizamuddin in the spiritual and religious life of the Muslims of India as also of other Muslim countries of the world. ... A few days ago I happened to visit this tomb and found that the grave stone has been removed and the ground has been leveled. The compound of the shrine is being used by the villagers for stabling their cattle and storing cowdung. This sacrilege is bound to cause horror and indignation in the minds of Muslims and I therefore bring it to the notice of the Government.’¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ From Shankar Das, the Assistant Superintendent, Department of Archaeology to the Deputy Commissioner dated 26 May 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ ‘The walls have been covered with Gowdung cakes. Clothings are being washed on the stone slabs by beating with wooden thapis hereby damaging the stones. Plinth floor has been excavated for 2 ovens for cooking purposes. A stone slab from the water tank was stolen and broken to pieces and utilized for sitting and washing purposes fain building is being littered with refugees and the flight of steps leading to the first floor of the main building is used as urinal.’ See The document from Randhir Kishore, Secretary of Relief and Rehabilitation to the Chief Commissioner dated 19 May 1949. D.C.21/1945, ‘Damages caused and occupation taken for protection of monuments during the disturbances’. DSA.

¹⁰⁵ From Zahid Hussain, High Commissioner for Pakistan in India to the Secretary to the Government of India dated 14 February 1948.

According to the personal interview with the manager of the above tomb, he also heard the same story about the tomb.¹⁰⁶ He told that many Muslims stayed around the *dargah* [shrine] before Independence. Almost all Muslims ran away to Pakistan after some riots there, then, the local Hindus started using the area. The local people and refugees did not intend to insult the Muslim monuments. This was the reason to use the space for camps because the capacity of the camps was over.¹⁰⁷

Just after Independence, the report of the Department of Archaeology was worried about the disorganization of the Muslim legacies in Delhi. 'regarding the damage to ancient Muslim buildings in Delhi Province, during the riots. ... It is hoped that with conditions returning normal such acts of Vandalism will not be repeated.'¹⁰⁸ However, the acts of Vandalism still kept going in May 1950. 'People have already little respect for these Muslim monuments and with proceedings launched against the Havildar acts of vandalism would become a daily routine with serious repercussions on the general administration of this Circle.'¹⁰⁹ Many musjids, shrines and gates were reported to be occupied, re-constructed and damaged by the refugees.¹¹⁰ Some Muslims sometimes felt the action as an affront. Hafizur-Rahman complained about these destructions and insisted that the matters of places of worship and shrines harmed the religious sentiments of Muslims. 'If we protest in public the matter may acquire communal colouring and become a source of embarrassment to the

¹⁰⁶ The personal interview with Mr.Chishti, the manager, on 19 June 2008. His age is almost 60 years old.

¹⁰⁷ About the unauthorized occupation by refugees of Badi-ul-Isar Mosque off Chitra Gupta Road, the report informed no accommodation of Tis Hazari Camp. From S.R. Chaudhri, Inspector General of Police to The Deputy Commissioner on 18 May 1948. D.C. 5/1947, 'Measures for the protection of ancient monuments in Delhi Province'. DSA.

¹⁰⁸ To R.E. Mortimer Wheeler, Director General of Archaeology in India from Ratan Lal, Office of Chief Commissioner dated 19 December, 1947.

¹⁰⁹ From N.K. Puri, Superintendent, Department of Archaeology to Shree Jia Ram, Senior Superintendent of Police dated 29 May 1950. D.C.21/1945, 'Damages caused and occupation taken for protection of monuments during the disturbances'. DSA.

¹¹⁰ For examples of monuments, (1) Bacchuwali mosque, (2) Mosque off Queensway in front of the Western Court, (3) Masjid Kotla Mubarakpur, (4) Pir Ghaib, (5) Tomb of Nizamuddin Auliya's mother, (6) every Gate of Old Delhi.

Government at this critical juncture. ... We, therefore, after much consideration chose to address this protest to you in silence and request you to help Muslims in this respect.'¹¹¹ This demand is a representative opinion of the Muslims who watched the situation in Delhi. Perhaps, the Muslims also noticed that the refugees could not take care of those Muslims constructions. Moreover, the Muslim officer regretted that he did not have the right to criticize the acts of Vandalism openly. He was worried that the protection of those monuments would be considered as a favour to the Muslim community in Delhi. It is also easy to imagine that there was no place for the Muslims who would come back to Delhi again. The Muslims' famous sanctuaries and heritages were occupied by other communities after their leaving from Delhi.

The Information of the Muslims' Returning from Pakistan to Delhi

The refugees were constructing Delhi for their lives. They were just about to start a new life when some news came among them. That was that a number of Muslim refugees would come back to Delhi soon. 'Refugees who are in possession of Muslim houses say that unless their houses are returned to them in Pakistan, they should not be disposed. The arrangements which have been made for removing pavement stalls have also given rise to a misunderstanding that discrimination is being exercised against refugee stall keepers.'¹¹² The Government did not allow the refugees to stay in vacant houses from the beginning. However, the mass of the people had already managed by themselves and issued illegal permission to live in some residences. The Ahrars volunteers also allotted vacant homes to the refugees

¹¹¹ The document does not have the date, but around December 1948 to February 1949 on the supposition. D.C.21/1945, 'Damages caused and occupation taken for protection of monuments during the disturbances'. DSA.

¹¹² From M.S. Randhawa to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 13 March 1948. Confidential, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

without asking the Government.¹¹³ Some villages were prepared to accept the Muslim refugees while the villagers did not share their fields with the Muslims.¹¹⁴ Some refugees were building their stores inside and outside in New Delhi with a rush. In this case, they also had illegal tickets which they believed for constructing their shops there. The stall-keepers in Connaught Place and Chandni Chowk got in panic when the Government asked them to remove their stores. Some refugee stall-holders who were evicted and some arrested from near the Clock Tower came to the courts and shouted 'We want shops and we are given jail!'¹¹⁵

Some Hindus and Sikhs did not return their new homes to the Muslim refugees because they had paid large amounts of cost to possess. As regarding with returning their houses to the Muslim refugees, the non-Muslim refugees felt that 'it would have been better for them to embrace Islam in Pakistan rather than suffer ignominy in India.'¹¹⁶ On the other hand, the Muslims who would return to Delhi from Pakistan and U.P. also were also worried whether they would stay in their former residences. 'While every facility is given to Muslims in the Indian Dominion, there is no reciprocation so far as Pakistan is concerned. The result is that many more Muslims are returning to Delhi than the Hindus and Sikh refugees leaving for the Western Pakistan. The result is that many more Muslims are returning to Delhi than the Hindus and Sikh refugees leaving for the Western Pakistan'¹¹⁷ At last, Delhi attracted all people: Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims from all areas. Some Muslims were disappointed with the actuality of Pakistan and the others just ran away to

¹¹³ From M.S. Randhawa to Bannerji, Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs dated 23 March 1948. *ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Chandan Hula village and Fatehpur Beri village prepared under the negotiation. From M.S. Randhawa to Bannerji, Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs dated 23 March 1948. *ibid.*

¹¹⁵ From M.S. Randhawa, Deputy Commissioner's Office to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 5 April 1948. *ibid.*

¹¹⁶ From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police to the Chief Commissioner and Inspector General of Police dated 27 March 1948. *ibid.*

¹¹⁷ From M.S. Randhawa, Deputy Commissioner's Office to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 29 March 1948 *ibid.*

Pakistan or other provinces in India temporarily. They imaged brilliant days when they would stay peacefully in Delhi again. However, Delhi as they knew had already changed the shape before their arrival in Delhi. There was no space for the Muslims to re-settle again because the first refugees, Sikhs and Hindus were already creating their new life and society in Delhi.

The Matter of the Muslims' Re-Settlement in Delhi

Great discontentment is reported among the non-Muslim refugees in Delhi as a result of the return of a large number of Muslims from Pakistan to re-establish here.¹¹⁸ According to them the situation would grow from bad to worse as a result of their rehabilitation as when they are not able to get any accommodation in the city without them how could the Government be able to solve their housing problem.¹¹⁹

As the above explanation, the reaction of Hindus and Sikhs who started to stay and spend their second life was not feeling to welcome the Muslim refugees. However, the Government openly insisted to help the Muslim refugees as much as possible and noticed some confusion concerned with the right of land and housing. 'As it is the declared policy of the Government of the Indian Dominion that all reasonable facilities will be given to Muslims returning from West Pakistan, I see no reason to agree with Randhawa that the presence of the Muslims in Delhi would give rise to a serious law and order situation.'¹²⁰ The Government showed their acceptance of the Muslims from Pakistan while the residents in Delhi were dissatisfied with the matter. In fact, the Government of India also recognized the

¹¹⁸ See Table 13 in the appendix to this thesis.

¹¹⁹ Daily Diary for 24 – 25 March 1948, *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30. 5th Installment, File No.61, Mohad-75, vol.6, 'Muslims (1947-49)'. NMML.

¹²⁰ From M.S.Randhawa, Deputy Commissioner's Office to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 30th March 1948 Confidential, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

difficulty as 'the return of Muslims in large numbers to India is taxing the public mind and it is being regarded as an unhealthy sign in view of changing political conditions.'¹²¹ An article of the newspaper, *Tej* informed well about the situation in Delhi.

We will be glad if our Muslim brothers come to Hindustan and want to settle as *Hindustani*. The government also will take care of them. ... The government of Pakistan is still making effort to oust Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan. Those people who return to India are never banned to come. ... There is no space for hundreds of thousands of refugees. ... These are problems whether the people who return decided to settle in India as a real *Hindustani* and whether they should understand the *Hindustani* problems as their own problems and sacrifice for them. ... We are seeing that the promotion in order to put Muslims and Hindus is taken separately until now. Hindus and Sikhs do not get permission to stay although there are some places which have vacant homes in Delhi. ... From the legal point of view, it is suitable that Muslim should get their houses from anyone to rent them. (There was a tendency that some Hindu and Sikh house-holders did not rent their homes to Muslims.) ... We should decide the Muslims who return as our brothers and leave the feeling of separation and hate. And the Hindus and the Sikhs will live together as members of one family. Hindu refugees also will be getting their place like the returning Muslim live in vacant homes. ... They should live together like brothers.¹²²

¹²¹From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police to to the Chief Commissioner and the Inspector General of Police dated 17 April 1948. *ibid.*

¹²² *Tej*, 12 April 1948, 'The People Who Return from Pakistan'. NMML. Translated from Urdu.

The point of this article is that the writer asked to keep the communal harmony without any riots and supply vacant homes to Muslim refugees also. However, it was mentioned that there was the shortage of housing for not only the coming Muslim refugees but also Hindu refugees. There was no measure to solve this serious problem. The Muslims had to unite for negotiation in order to attain their place in Delhi. The Muslims of Paharganj and Karol Bagh which were the former Muslim majority-areas set up a committee with fifteen members to consult with the Government.¹²³ The main purpose of the committee was to secure the restoration of Muslim houses and the compensation for the loss. Moreover, the committee needed the security for Muslims against the recent disturbances in Delhi.

However, the situation of Delhi was going worse for the Muslims. The difficulties of the Muslim refugees can be classified into three points. Firstly, the Muslims could not get any place to stay peacefully. Secondly, they were suspected as a spy and betrayer by the people of India. Thirdly, they felt paradox to themselves that they hoped to stay in separate Muslim zones while India was developing the secularism. It is clear that the Muslim in India had become refugees twice and faced more difficult matters than other communities.

Firstly, any refugees who had started their new life in Delhi were not willing to evacuate their new places to the Muslim refugees. They, rather, had hostility to the Muslim community because the Government promoted to move the Hindu and Sikh refugees from their housings and heritages including musjids. 'They [refugees] were freely observing that the Government was unmindful of the hardship of the

My translation.

¹²³ From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police to the Chief Commissioner and the Inspector General of Police dated 3rd April 1948. Confidential, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

Hindus and Sikhs and was supporting the Muslim and this was evident from the fact that whereas the non-Muslim were left to rot the Muslims were being allowed to return to Delhi and resettle here. The younger element stated that though the police was getting the mosques and Muslim houses evicted of non-Muslims, the time was fast approaching when all the locks put on Muslim houses and mosques would be broken open and occupied by Hindus and Sikhs and at that time no Muslim would be allowed to occupy any house in Delhi.¹²⁴ This action of the Government to break the Hindu and Sikh refugees' residences and stores which they attained under their own society either legal or illegal made the Muslim refugees disturbed in the Indian society. It was impossible for those people who took homes and shops for unreasonable prices to ask them leave.

Secondly, the Government also marked the Muslims who came from Pakistan because some Muslims might be resistant to India. There was possibility that the hooligans and some members of the *Khaksar* would come Delhi to raise a large riot. 'There are some among them [the Muslims], who are returning without their families and are potential saboteurs and fifth [sic.] columnists. I have been told by a Muslim friend that some of them are actually saying that the Pakistan Army will celebrate next Id in the Jama Masjid of Delhi.'¹²⁵ The Indian Government needed to identify the large number of the Muslims who were streaming into Delhi whether they really wanted to stay as loyal citizens or not. According to another analysis, 'some of them [the Muslim refugees from Pakistan] may not have fitted in the economy of Pakistan. But most of them have come here without their families and their object

¹²⁴ From D.W. Mehra, Inspector-General of Police to S. Khurshid Ahmad Khan, Chief Commissioner, dated 10 May 1948. *Confidential*, File No.87/48-C, 'Transport of Evacuees, Special Charter of Aircraft Engaged in Audit Report'. DSA.

¹²⁵ From M.S. Randhwa, Deputy Commissioner to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 30 April 1948. *Confidential*, File No.56/48-C, 'Creating Trouble'. DSA.

may be to dispose of their property and go back to Pakistan if the present conditions in India do not suit them.’¹²⁶ This is the common point of each opinion that there was no check on the return of Muslims. Moreover, the second opinion pointed that ‘the Muslim National Guards may have also been poured into Delhi for sabotage work. ... They existed before Partition had complete training in modern weapons as was evidenced during the last communal disturbances in Delhi.’¹²⁷ Randhwa suggested a measure for security that all Muslims who were returning from West Pakistan should be placed in a quarantine Camp, Humayun’s tomb would be the best as the camp, for a specified period before they would be allowed to mingle with the population of Delhi. At the same time, the Government would check their proposed addresses and how many Muslims would stay in Delhi.¹²⁸ The Muslim evacuees were regarded spies with suspicion for a long time. In 1951, the Indian government still made effort to secure India against the spies from Pakistan. ‘The return of Muslim evacuees for resettlement in India is as a matter of facts, impregnated with potential danger to the security of the Indian Union. Pakistan is bound to utilize this opportunity to send its spies to India.’ Under the ‘Permit System Rules’, the Police marked particularly on the following two points: - (1) If they had actually left India during 1950, and (2) Their character and antecedents do not render them desirable to resettle in India. They checked suspect Muslims under watch and censorship.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ From Criminal Invest Department dated 29th March 1948, *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30. 5th Installment, File No.61, Mohad-75, vol.6, ‘Muslims (1947-49)’. NMML.

¹²⁷ *ibid.*

¹²⁸ *ibid.*

¹²⁹ Criminal Investigation Department from Rikhi Kesh, Superintendent of Police to Hooja dated 26 February 1951. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30. 5th Installment, File No.96, Mohad-84, ‘Resettlement of Muslims (1948)’. NMML.

Figure 5 The Map of Alwar and Gurgaon



Especially, the Delhi Police warned the Meos as one of Muslim communities. From the beginning of the Muslims' return, the Muslims were mostly the Meos of Alwar and Gurgaon.¹³⁰ The following report explains why the Police marked the group. 'The rapid influx of Meos to the District of Gurgaon via Delhi and the return of a large number of Muslims to this place from Pakistan have caused great perturbation among the people of Dehli and Gurgaon and with the scarcity of accommodation at both the places it is felt that some trouble is bound to restart. The consensus of opinion is that when the Muslims including the Meos, did not remain loyal to the Indian Union and they opted for Pakistan despite the assurances given to them by the leaders of the nation, how they could remain true to it now. They, therefore, suspect that some sinister object is behind their move to return to Delhi and Gurgaon and feel resentful towards the Government of India in allowing them all facilities to rehabilitate at the two places.'¹³¹ Gurgaon had a lot of black markets of weapons and arms. Gangsters sometimes gathered in Gurgaon to prepare their action, and conflicted with other communities. Any Muslims who returned from Pakistan were suspected to come to Delhi in order to overthrow India. This is also

¹³⁰ From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police dated 27 March 1948. Confidential, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

¹³¹ From D.W.Mehra, Inspector-General of Police to (1) R.N.Banerjee, Secretary to the Government of India, (2) V.Shanker, Private Secretary to the Dy.Prime Minister, (3) S.Khurshid Ahmad Khan, Chief Commissioner, (4) M.S.Randhawa, Dy.Commissioner dated 12 April 1948. Confidential, File No.21/48-C, 'Correspondence Regarding the Communal Troubles in Delhi'. DSA.

one of misunderstanding that the Muslims who came from Pakistan would do something wrong in India without regard to their individual situations.

Finally, the Muslim needed a certain security for their life in Delhi. Of course, they tried to re-settle in their former housing, though those residences had been occupied by other people. The Muslim refugees realized that there was no space for them and the residents in Delhi were unwilling to accept the Muslims. 'The refugees from the West Punjab, N.W.F.P., etc. who are living in houses vacated by Muslim can tolerate Muslims living in Muslim zones, but, under no circumstances are they going to tolerate the rehabilitation of Muslims in their houses in Karol Bagh, Pahrganj and Subzimandi. It is believed that if Muslims are put back in their houses in these areas they will be safe only as long as police protection is there.'¹³² There was hopeless for the Muslims to get back their sweet homes which they had left once. The communal riots also still occurred, and the reason was mostly concerned with the invasion of the Muslim refugees.

The return of Muslims in large numbers from Pakistan and the occupation of houses which have been lying vacant seems to be the major cause of these rumours. The refugees were living in the hope that they will be able to get these houses, but with the return Muslims, these hope are vanishing. Consequently they want to create panic among Muslims by spreading rumours that some trouble will take place. Creation of so-called Muslim zones which are nothing but miniature Pakistan is also resented. Common criticism is that if we are building a secular state then why this compartmentalization and zoning of citizens.¹³³

¹³² From D.W. Mehra, Inspector General of Police dated 15 May 1948. *ibid.*

¹³³ From M.S. Randhawa to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 1 June 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

It seems that the Muslim refugees did not have any solution to stay peacefully in Delhi. As a general thinking among Muslims in India, the Muslims thought that it would be more safe to live in Muslim majority-areas because there was possibility to start a war between India and Pakistan. 'In case of war with Pakistan which they think must break out in the near future these Muslim states will prove useful pockets and will be an asset to the Pakistan Government.'¹³⁴ However, they were forced to obey the respected secularism as loyal nations, and could not be accepted to be saved as a special community by the Government. The Muslim life depended on the communal harmony. On the other hand, a "Refugee State" was demanded by some refugees at the Kingsway Camp.¹³⁵ As the general thought of non-Muslim refugees, any refugees had the right to get enough rehabilitation from the Government without communal distinction. The remedy for the Muslim refugees would make the Muslim State, namely Pakistan realize how tolerate the Secular State, India was. Moreover, it was the best appeal that the Muslim refugees would choose India as their country by themselves after comparing with Pakistan. However, this attitude would treat the Muslim refugees with favour from non-Muslim refugees' aspect. If the Muslim refugees could stay at a separate colony, it means that they do not cooperate the Indian policy and live as Muslims first not as Hindustani. Making a separate Muslim area in Delhi was supported by some Muslim refugees persistently.¹³⁶

The Government of India set the limitation of refugees' evacuating to Delhi at last. The restriction by the Government promoted the local Muslims to decide whether they would shift permanently to Pakistan or make immediate arrangements

¹³⁴ From Superintendent of Police dated 20 October 1948. 5th Installment, File No.96, Muhd-84, 'Resettlement of Muslims (1948)'. NMML.

¹³⁵ 'Addressing a meeting (1,200) of refugees at the Kingsway Camp, Arjan Singh, Balwant Singh, Jai Krishan and others criticized the Government and demanded a "Refugee State" to be established.' See From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police dated 8 May 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

¹³⁶ 'some of the dissident elements continued to solicit Muslim support for the retention of separate Muslim zones in the city.' See From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police dated 2 October 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

for the repatriation of their families, now staying in Pakistan.¹³⁷ The Muslims were generally disagree with the limit on the Muslim refugees when the Muslim refugees were pouring into Delhi.¹³⁸ The Police and Government could manage the transfer of the Muslim refugees. 'There are many Muslims who come with requests for extension of permits which have been granted to them in Pakistan. Orders of the Government are necessary on this point, whether any extension can be given. There are also cases in which permits and now want to settle down permanently as citizens of this Dominion.'¹³⁹ As one reason why the refugees increased in Delhi, refugees' camps at East Punjab were closed in July.¹⁴⁰ A capital town where the people could accustom to a higher standard of living was need in East Punjab to keep the refugees in the area.¹⁴¹ 'The measures taken by the Government regarding rehabilitation have attracted more refugees from other places. ... Unless this [building a town in East Punjab] is done, there is no likelihood of pressure on Delhi easing.'¹⁴² As a more practical measure to prevent the refugee coming to Delhi, the Central Government would request the East Punjab Government to postpone the winding up of their refugee camps till the monsoon season¹⁴³ was over.¹⁴⁴ Ahmed Saeed advised in his statement that the Muslims of Pakistan would not come to Delhi unless they were in

¹³⁷ From S.L.Ahuja, the Deputy Commissioner to Shankar Prasad, Dated on 4 August 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

¹³⁸ From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police dated 29 May 1948. *ibid.*

¹³⁹ From M.S.Randhwa, Deputy Commissioner's Office to Shankar Prasad dated 21st August 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ After closing those camps in East Punjab, 'large groups of refugees have been noticed at Kishengunj and Delhi Main railway stations, Delhi in already over-full with refugees and on account of this additional population of about 5 lacs [500,000] all the health services are strained.' See From M.S. Randhawa to Shankar Prasad dated 28 July 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁴¹ From M.S. Randhawa, the Deputy Commissioner to Khursahid dated 17 July 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁴² *ibid.*

¹⁴³ At the same time, many camps in Delhi also had a serious problem of floods. 'On account of the onset of rains the refugees who are living in tents in Tis Hazari and Kingsway Camps are suffering from extreme discomfort. More than half of the tents in Tis Hazari were flooded and as a result of this the belongings of the refugees were thoroughly drenched. This camp has been located in a low lying area. ... The tents in Kingsway Camp are mostly old and most of them leak badly during the rains. The Refugee Minister, when he took charge of his office, gave a promise that he will provide accommodation to all refugees who are in Delhi before the rains set in. Refugees who are living in hope of getting some type of house, are disappointed and are in an angry mood.' See From M.S. Randhawa, Deputy Commissioner to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 13 July 1948. Or, From Rama Lal, Superintendent of Police to The Chief Commissioner dated 10 July 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ From M.S. Randhawa to Shankar Prasad dated 28 July 1948. *ibid.*

possession of permanent permits to stay on in India.¹⁴⁵ Delhi did not have any room to treat all refugees who had already settled down as regarding with geographical, political and economic matters. Muslim refugees would remain between India and Pakistan in dire straits. On the other hand, the direction to leave for Pakistan was wide open for Muslims than to Delhi.¹⁴⁶

A Local Community or a Religious Community

New political affairs made a great impression of Muslims directly. Some fundamental community tended to treat the Muslim refugees that they had to be citizens in Pakistan and they would protest against the Indian Government. The matters of native states, Kashmir and Hyderabad states¹⁴⁷, bothered the Muslims in Delhi, and the Muslims also joined the political activities in Delhi. As the level of the mass of the people, the joining of Hyderabad state was welcome for the Muslims in Delhi. The distrust of Hyderabad and Kashmir sometimes linked with religious matters.¹⁴⁸ Especially, the Kashmir trouble would lead to war between India and Pakistan. Once the war would be occurred, it was sure that the communal riots also happened in other areas. The report of C.I.D. suspected that the war would start to four fronts, (1) Hyderabad, (2) Bahawalpur, (3) North-West border of India, (4) East Bengal.¹⁴⁹ The situation in Hyderabad oppressed the mind of citizens in India, and

¹⁴⁵ From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police dated 28 August 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ For example, sixty Muslims who converted in a certain rural area were escorted to Pakistan by the Pakistan Police. See From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police dated 3 July 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ All native states excepting three native states (Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh states) agreed to join in the Indian Union by 15 August 1947. Junagadh was forced to join in India by the Indian Army on 29 November 1947. The problem of Kashmir was still going under the mediation of the United Nation, and it was a spark that touched off the war between India and Pakistan. Hyderabad was united in India on 18 September 1948.

¹⁴⁸ 'The Events in Hyderabad are having an unfavourable reaction in Delhi. The atrocities which are being committed by the armed gangs of Hyderabad forces on the local Hindu population and exodus of Hindus in large numbers from Hyderabad are events which cannot have but an unfavourable reaction on the communal situation.' See From Deputy Commissioner to Khurshid dated 13 April 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

¹⁴⁹ A Secret Source Report from D.W. Mehra, Inspector-General of Police to S. Khurashid Ahmad Khan, Chief Commissioner dated 5 May 1948. *Confidential*, File No.55/48-C, 'Casual Source Reports and Reports at the Political Situation of Delhi'. DSA.

people believed that India would fight on two fronts with Hyderabad and Pakistan.¹⁵⁰ The political meetings about the matter were always held at Jama Masjid. The mass of the Muslims felt sympathy with Hyderabad. However, they treated the joining of Hyderabad in India as the best proof that Muslims could be good citizens in India. 'Now it is for the Muslims to give a practical proof of their loyalty to the Indian Union by giving moral support to the people who are fighting the reactionaries of Hyderabad.'¹⁵¹ Delhi and Hyderabad do not have a familiar relationship geographically. Their sympathy and identity certainly depend on the Islamic community.

The Muslims in Delhi could not ignore the news of Jinnah's death. As if they had behaved ignore the news, but they could not hide their gloom.¹⁵² In Hyderabad, the police was on the watch for some troubles concerned with Jinnah's death. At last, the Nationalist Muslims applauded because there was no agitation in Hyderabad.¹⁵³ On the other hand, the Muslim shop owners kept their shop open because 'lest they should be labeled as Muslim Leaguers.'¹⁵⁴ It is difficult to identify those shop keepers were the members or supporters of the Muslim League. But, it is sure that some people suffered trouble just because they supported the Muslim League. In Delhi, almost all people had already linked the tragic Partition with Jinnah's policy with their hostility. The Muslim members who supported the party before their freedom lost it in India. There was no party for those people to save their life in India. Now, the Muslim League lost their only one capable leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. It is clear that Jinnah was the great politician and gave great influence to the whole Muslim world whether his action was right or wrong. The above situation considered, some Muslims grieved though they stayed in India not

¹⁵⁰ From M.S. Randhwa, the Deputy Commissioner to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 6 July 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

¹⁵¹ From Deputy Commissioner to Khurshid dated 13 April 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁵² From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police dated 21 August 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁵³ From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police dated 18 September 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police dated 11 September 1948. *ibid.*

Pakistan which Jinnah founded. They felt sympathy as Muslims through the death of Jinnah. They might expect that Jinnah could be a great leader and help the Muslims who stayed in India as Muslim leaders if serious problems would happen.

On the other hand, the Muslim refugees gradually entered into the new atmosphere of Delhi. Not only the Muslim, all refugees gathered and cooperated with the other refugees who came from the same provinces. There were sub-committees and meetings on behalf of each province to discuss and appeal problems in refugee camps. As regarding to religious difference, a committee was constituted by Chhutan Singh S. Nanak Singh took all the responsibility regarding the food and shelter of resettled Muslims.¹⁵⁵ It means that both religious and regional identities are important for refugees to make the foundation of their new life. For example, the certain opinion reported that the refugees in Nawabganji¹⁵⁶, Western Extension in Karol Bagh and Nizamuddin¹⁵⁷ stayed in the better mood against the communal hostility. The Government hoped that the mass would unite to solve the serious matter about their residences by themselves through the communal harmony. In facts, the Government did not have a detail solution for their housings, and just relied on the changeable atmosphere among the refugees. This tendency of the communal harmony was also limited and not become the critical measure to remove all difficulty among refugees.

¹⁵⁵ I.G.P. order dated 29 May 1948. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30. 5th Installment, File No.96, Mohad-84, 'Resettlement of Muslims (1948)'. NMML.

¹⁵⁶ 'I saw welcome demonstration of this in a Fruit and Vegetable Market, which I opened a few days ago, which the Muslims of Nawabganj and the Hindu and Sikh refugees have established by their joint efforts near Pul Bangash.' From M.S.Randhawa, Deputy Commissioner to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 1 June 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

¹⁵⁷ 'Work is going on satisfactorily at the sites of refugee townships on Western Extension in Karol Bagh and Nizamuddin. A large number of laborers are working and bulldozers are being used at Nizamuddin for leveling the ground. This mass created confidence among refugees and they realize that something is being done.' See From M.S.Randhawa, Deputy Commissioner to Khurshid, Chief Commissioner dated 28 July 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

After the First Anniversary of Independence as Refugees

In August 1947 when the Muslim dominated Provinces and States passed through blood bath and millions of helpless, homeless and awestricken people, after passing through a nightmare of unspeakable physical torture, mental agony and travail at base came to the heaven of Indian Union ...¹⁵⁸

One year after Partition made the refugees more nervous then before while the refugees had created their faith for one year. Refugees exhausted their little money they had, and still they could not get proper home. The police started striking tents in refugees' camps and temporary stores. All homeless people fretted when they had to be moved out without any rehabilitation. Rameshwari Nehru explained to clear up the misunderstanding that 100,000 people would stay in Delhi and the rest of them, 400,000 people should be left form Delhi.¹⁵⁹ However, the refugees in Delhi did not believe that 100,000 people could stay in Delhi, and the government would remove camps with a likely excuse.¹⁶⁰ In fact, it was no tendency to decrease the numbers of refugees in Delhi. Even a large number of Muslim refugees who came from Pakistan changed their temporally permission into permanent one to stay in India.¹⁶¹


¹⁵⁸ Memorandum from the Staff Union of the Kingsway Refugee Camp in 1948. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30. 2nd Installment, File No.26, Hindu-75, volume 2, 'Refugees Problems (1948-49)'. NMML.

¹⁵⁹ 'A refugee conference held at Nehru Park, which was presided over by Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru, attracted a good deal of attention. On account of quote of one lac of refugees fixed for Delhi, a misapprehension had arisen that the remaining four lacs of refugees will be pulled out of Delhi. The assurance given by Hon'ble Shri M.L. Saksena that it is not the Government's intention to evict the extra refugees who will not be provided for, had a re-assuring effect.' See From N.S. Randhawa, the Deputy Commissioner to Shankar Prasad dated 10 August 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

¹⁶⁰ From N.S.Randhawa, the Deputy Commissioner to Shankar Prasad dated 19 August 1948. *ibid.*

¹⁶¹ From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police to Chief Commissioner dated 11 September 1948. *ibid.*

Figure 6 The Map around Queen's Garden in 1942



Source: D.C.435/1942 'Plans and Map'. DSA

Some merchants were busy to keep their shop in good areas against the demands of the police and government. Refugee vendors who worked in Chandni Chowk were pushed out to other areas: the Lajpat Rai Market where many merchants had already been building their stalls and the Parade Ground where the refugees, however, could not stay because a military officer without informing any officer of the Local Administration chased them out. Instead of the Parade Ground, the Queen's Garden Park opposite the Delhi Cloth Market was designated for extraordinary place for refugee stall-keepers.¹⁶² As the result of this remedy, they did not shift from the Queen's Garden Park to the Parade Ground later because of their roaring trade. Many refugees' business was the cloth trade for their sustenance.

Unfortunately, communal riots did not finish in one year after Independence. The unsatisfied rehabilitation created *esprit de corps* among refugees, however it means the birth of hostility against the others. The local communities were based on each camp. The refugees crowded in the small area under the bad condition. It was easy that the people believed any rumours, held meetings and took actions against it

¹⁶² From N.S. Randhawa, the Deputy Commissioner to Shankar Prasad dated 2 September 1948. *ibid.*

with neighbours. The news of a communal riot led to a revenge attack on the other community. Refugees' complains depended on their life were connected with religious causes. For example, the Refugee Association in Karol Bagh criticized the attitude of the Nationalist Muslims including the Jamiat and Ahrar members for starting agitation against the Evacuee Property Law, and demanded the Government to practice the rehabilitation for the refugees by taking possession of the property left by Muslim evacuees.¹⁶³ This demand indicated the supply of housing for non-Muslim refugees as the people had asked the government many times. A speaker, Ishar Singh, Bar-at-Law, N.W.F.P. denounced the Government to deal firmly with the Muslims. 'According to him, the Delhi and U.P. Muslims were responsible for communal bitterness in the country.'¹⁶⁴ He mentioned Gandhi who had already died and asked the audience to boycott Pakistan goods in order to distress Pakistan economically. 'If M. Gandhi would had been alive he would have declared war against Pakistan in view of the existing state of affairs.'¹⁶⁵ Ishar Singh as a refugee who came from N.W.F.P. treated the existence of Pakistan evil. Pakistan and Partition was drawn by the Muslims in Delhi and U.P, in his opinion. Inevitably, this idea would be concerned with the antipathy against the Muslim community.

As a notable feature of the mass activities, refugee women and girls sometimes took an important part in active movements. There were two reasons why the women stood on the front. Firstly, the police, as the government pointed out, hesitated to oppress women and girls by arms. Secondly, any matters concerned with refugees directly gave influence to their families in daily life, not like political activities before Independence. 1,000 refugees, women went ahead to try occupying

¹⁶³ C.I.D. Daily Diary dated 24-25 September 1949, *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30. 2nd Installment, File No.28, Hindu-75, vol.4, 'Refugees Problems (1949)'. NMML.

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*

vacant homes in Khari Baoli and Phatak Habash Khan and shouted 'Short-live *Maulvi* Gandhi, Long-live Pakistan, Get out Muslims! (*Maulvi Gandhi Murdabad, Pakistan Zindabad, Musalmanon ko Nikal Do!*)'.¹⁶⁶ The term of 'Maulvi', a honorific Islamic title, seems to criticize the Gandhi's attitude that he treated the Muslims with favour. One group of refugee women, around 100 people, marched through Sadar Bazar to Red Fort with showing their resistance – wearing black armlets. They shouting that Independence of India was 'an unreal one', and criticized the present rehabilitation by the government.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, thirty-five refugee women who stayed in Pahar Ganj tried to force occupying vacant Muslim houses sealed by custodians in Bara Hindu Rao.¹⁶⁸ The above movements to get vacant housings were supported by the refugee women and girls. Their violent action as women showed how hard their life was. The refugee-women faced many indescribable situations and ventured themselves on the way between India and Pakistan. Both men and women had possibility to be killed and have their luggage stolen on the way. However, some women had more strong possibility to be in horrible accidents, namely to be assaulted and killed for honor by the hands of their families. After their arriving at their destinations, they were frightened to be molested by Muslim boys everyday.¹⁶⁹ Even the innocent girls suffered insanity, bad scars and worse venereal diseases.¹⁷⁰ The violence of Partition

¹⁶⁶ From Superintendent of Police on 5 January 1948. *Confidential Report*, File No. 21/48-C, 'Correspondence regarding the Communal Troubles in Delhi'. DSA.

¹⁶⁷ See C.I.D. Daily Diary dated 14 August 1948, *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30. 2nd Installment, File No.26, Hindu-75, volume 2, 'Refugees Problems (1948-49)'. NMML. and From Ram Lal, Superintendent of Police to the Chief Commissioner dated 14 August 1948. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-C, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA.

¹⁶⁸ C.I.D. Daily Diary dated 3 October 1948, *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30. 2nd Installment, File No.26, Hindu-75, vol.2, 'Refugees Problems (1948-49)'. NMML.

¹⁶⁹ 'In the months of May and June, 49 certain instances came to notice, where individual Muslims had molested some Hindu girls, which naturally caused resentment among the local Hindu residents.' See The note of Jia Ram, Senior Supdt. of Police dated 30 July 1949. *Confidential Report*, File No. 427/49-C, 'Report regarding Communal Tension in Subzimandi'. DSA.

¹⁷⁰ 'Some non-Muslim refugee girls who have recently been rescued from the West Punjab are staying at Jullunder and the words "Pakistan Zindabad" are tattooed on their forehead and breast. The frightful part of their pitiable plight is that most of these innocent girls have contracted venereal diseases of the worst type ...' See Casual Source Report from D.W.Mehra, Inspector-General of Police to Khurshid Ahmad Khan, Chief Commissioner dated 12 May 1948. *Confidential Report*, File No. 21/48-C, 'Correspondence regarding the Communal Troubles in Delhi'. DSA. DSA also hold the files about the consultant with mental patient on the Partition.

seems that 'the aim was not only to kill, but to break people.'¹⁷¹

At last, the Government started supplying vacant housings to refugee. However, the rehabilitation was not enough for them. The refugees protested against the stoppage of free rations to about 20,000 refugees in Delhi.¹⁷² In facts, the Muslim evacuees left about 175,000 houses in India while 2,300,000 refugees required 400,000 housings in only cities.¹⁷³ Delhi was short of residences and places for refugees, and re-constructed for them. 52,000 houses including tenements and 8,000 shops were built in 73 colonies, and 18,000 developed plots were constructed for refugees.¹⁷⁴ The Partition made the people homeless, and the advent of evacuees changed Delhi while Delhi was not divided and remained in India.

This chapter makes it clear that the Muslim refugees in Delhi stood on the different situation from the other refugees. Especially, the Muslim refugees who returned from Pakistan to India faced difficulties in Delhi where they had stayed peacefully at first. Their residences created the seed of riots in Delhi because all refugees scrambled for the houses. The Muslims lost their right to stay in India when Pakistan was born as a Muslim State. Non-Muslim refugees who came from Pakistan area confronted them with the right to stay in Delhi as new residents. Some refugees who had left their homes in Pakistan became more aggressive against the Muslims whose community had founded Pakistan. Just after Partition, the Muslims who returned to Delhi could be neither *Hindustani* nor *Pakistani*. They lost their local community which they had been familiar with before Independence, and they could not practice their religion openly because they were surrounded by non-Muslim communities, who sometimes, felt hostility towards Muslims.

¹⁷¹ Y. Khan, *The Great Partition*, p.6.

¹⁷² Dated 11 April 1949. *Delhi Police Records*, List No.30. 2nd Installment, File No.27, Hindu-75, volume 3, 'Refugees Problems (1947)'. NMML.

¹⁷³ P.N. Luthra, *Rehabilitation*, pp.7-8.

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p.8.

CONCLUSION

This study shows the distance between the policies implemented for achieving Pakistan and the mass movement for it. However, the people struggling for the achievement of Pakistan were prepared to accept it without understanding its political implications fully. The idea of Pakistan attracted a lot of people who thought that it would be beneficial for them. In the 1940s, many Muslims suffered economic distress as a result of communal disturbances. As a result of that, they wished to emerge from their hardship, and hoped that Pakistan's establishment would help. However, the ambiguous course of the Pakistan movement promoted communal riots. In many cases of violence, certain groups used rumours to promote their own ulterior motives. The people's response to hardship took a communal form. The people who were behind the riots, and those who suffered, both hoped to achieve Pakistan as soon as possible. They lived in such a situation that they were willing to accept Independence and Partition in any form. It was known very well that the political leaders had alienated themselves from the public, which ultimately led to a wide gap between the politicians and the common people. It was often difficult for the people to understand the opinions of the politicians. The people were waiting for any change in their hard conditions of life while the politicians were considering the future political shape of India in their meetings.

The frequency of the occurrence of the communal riots was partly because of the activities of the mass-media. The people could often not get enough information, at least as much as they wanted, about the process towards Independence. It was true that there were a large number of publications: newspapers, magazines and books. However, they were not able to collate information about the political situation all over the country. Also, newspapers were not free from bias, which

depended on the social section they represented, language and locality. People tended to choose their newspaper on the bias of their own class, religion, language and social situation. Often the political situation was too complex for the people to follow. Sometimes the politicians did not share the same opinion as the members of their political parties. For example, During the negotiations with the Cabinet Mission, members of the Congress and the Muslim League had at times changed their decisions. Their complex opinions were represented as simple images. This process integrated the political matters with stereotypical images and bipolar ideas among the people.

Some people got the influence of a complete conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. Others believed that their local relationship was above their communal differences. The reaction to communal riots was also varied. The diverse information in newspapers created political divisions. Moreover, there was a gap between those who could read publications and those who were illiterate and solely depended on oral information.

In the case study of Urdu newspapers, we noticed that Urdu had been already recognized as the language for Muslims. However, this view was a by-product of political developments. Earlier, Urdu was the common language in North India rather than the language of Muslims. According to the opinion of some Muslims, they felt that they did not have any newspapers which were mainly for the Indian Muslim community. The newspapers that were published were also under suspicion by them as they were written by non-Muslims. It was clear that many people did not mind using and reading Urdu, and did not have hostility towards Urdu as a language of Muslims at that time. Many journalists, especially, tended to write in Urdu as a convenient language. Even if the newspapers were in the same language, however, there could be differences among them.

Urdu publications had many different ideas about Pakistan, and it was difficult to classify their thinking without reading and comparing them with other newspapers. Some newspapers supported the goal of achieving Pakistan while the others criticized it. The Muslim League did not alone create the final shape of Pakistan; it was also the Congress leaders who defined the shape of Pakistan before its formation. They had examined the proposals for Pakistan in detail to explain the disadvantages of creating it. Some pamphlets were published by them, and they also wrote some articles against Pakistan. The notable point is that the newspapers against Pakistan also took a part in creating features of Pakistan. However, the analysis in the newspapers against Pakistan promoted the hostility and anxiety of the people who supported Pakistan. Those who opposed Pakistan were more sensitive to Pakistan than the people who supported Pakistan

After the achievement of independent India and Pakistan, some people were dissatisfied with their new States. In the case of Muslims in Delhi, they lost their homes, and to some extent their identities. Some Muslims were willing to shift to Pakistan. On the one hand, certain Muslims ran away from their home-towns, like Delhi; because the places became unsafe due to communal riots. Those Muslims who returned from Pakistan to Delhi were in a difficult situation. They had crossed the national border twice and meandered and it was too late for them to regain their former homes from other people who had settled here in Delhi. Their return was resented by the government of India and other Hindu and Sikh refugees who had already settled in the homes which the Muslims had left.

There was a common opinion in India that Pakistan was a Muslim State and Muslims should stay there. The Hindu and Sikh refugees who were forced to leave for India from Pakistan were especially more hostile towards the Muslim community.

The shortage of housing for non Muslim refugees was the most difficult matter for the government of India after Partition. The late rehabilitation by the Government made the refugees irritated and nervous. Some women and children took part in radical actions to get housing. The refugees were waiting to take over those residences which Muslims left behind in Delhi. However, the Muslims who remained in India were important for the government of India to demonstrate its secularism. The special concern for the Muslims by the Government made other communities dissatisfied. Muslims felt this even if they retained their erstwhile property in Delhi. They were sometimes treated as people who were responsible for the division of British India into India and Pakistan. Finally, many Muslims decided to stay in Muslim ghettos, called "mini-Pakistans", by hostile parties in India. People hostile to them alleged that they had created their own 'Pakistan' on the land where they had stayed for a long time.

The communal disturbances raised levels of suspicion written between the different communities. In this scenario, people expected further wars and conflicts between India and Pakistan. These apprehensions continue in both countries today.

What is, then, the answer to the questions which we asked in introduction to this thesis: 'How could the people understand the situation around them?', 'Could they decide which country they would stay in at that time?' and 'How did Indian Muslims imagine the new states?' It was difficult for the people to understand the situation properly unless they read and gathered information. The newspapers gave news from their own perspectives which were sometimes narrow and biased. Among the common people, there was a tendency to believe rumours. Some people made a deliberate decision that they wanted to go to Pakistan or not before Independence. On the other hand, some people just ran away from communal

disturbances. The Muslim refugees who returned to India from Pakistan had realized that Pakistan as it had actually emerged was quite different from what they had imagined.

It is important to discuss the predicament of the Muslims who returned from Pakistan to India, and to think about their identity and difficult circumstances. A detailed examination is required of what these people thought about the formation of Pakistan and independent India. Urdu journalism should be researched in detail in order to increase our knowledge of this theme.

APPENDICES

Tables and Figures

CHAPTER ONE

Table 1

**As the Congress Party Stands VIS-À-VIS other Parties in the Provincial Legislative Assemblies (1946)
after the Elections**

Province	Congress	Nationalist Muslim	Muslim League	Hindu Mahasabha	Scheduled Caste Federation	Radical Democratic Party	Communist	Others	TOTAL
N.W.F.P.	30	2	17					1	50
Punjab	51		73					51	175
Sind	18	4	27					11	60
U.P.	153	7	54					14	228
Bihar	98		34					20	152
Orissa	47		4				1	8	60
Bengal	86		113	1	1		3	46	250
Madras	165		29				2	19	215
C.P. & Bihar	92		13		1			6	112
Bombay	125		30	1		1	2	16	175
Assam	58	3	31					16	108
TOTAL	923	16	425	2	2	1	8	208	1585

Source: N.N. Mitra, ed. *The Indian Annual Register* 1 Jan-June (1946), pp.230-231.

CHAPTER TWO

Table 2

Percentage of Urdu, Hindi and Hindustani speakers as a proportion of total population in U.P., Bihar and Punjab, 1901-1951

Province		1951	1941	1931	1921	1911	1901
Uttar Pradesh	Urdu	6.80	N.A	8.53	10.36
	Hindi	79.82	N.A	91.16	89.36
	Hindustani	10.67	N.A	99.68	99.75
	Muslim	14.28	15.43	14.98	14.46	14.38	13.82
Bihar	Urdu	6.81	N.A	...	0.85	1.15	0.07
	Hindi	81.03	N.A	...	86.22	83.93	88.26
	Hindustani	...	N.A	86.73
	Muslim	11.58	12.91	12.72	12.25	12.03	12.05
Punjab	Urdu	N.A	N.A	N.A	9.80	2.69	N.A
	Hindi	N.A	N.A	N.A	13.16	13.94	N.A
	Hindustani	N.A	N.A	27.67	3.98	11.26	N.A
	Muslim	N.A	52.88	52.40	35.06	35.79	41.27

This chart is re-made from the information given by Brass. [...] means the difficulty to separate each language as Hindi, Urdu and Hindustani. See the original charts with the censuses: P.R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, 1975, p.190, 192, 295, 299.

Table 3

Newspapers and Periodicals Published in the Punjab by Script, (according to percentage of total) 1901-1931

	1931	1921	1911	1901
Urdu	64.77	67.04	77.29	81.33
English	13.99	16.67	10.92	10.24
Hindi	4.15	4.81	3.93	4.22
Gurumukhi	9.67	10.00	7.42	3.01

See P.R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, 1975, p.307.

Table 4

Numbers of the Population of Delhi, Lucknow and Srinagar

	1951	Difference (1951-41)	1941	Difference (1941-31)	1931
Delhi	1,743,892	1,222,043	521,849	174,310	347,539
Lucknow	497,594	110,417	387,177	359,708	27,469
Srinagar	N.A.	-	207,787	34,214	173,573

Source: *The Indian Year Book and Who's Who: 1950-51, 1949-50*, p.19.

Table 5

Percentage Distribution of the Populations of Delhi Territory According to mother-tongue, 1921-51

	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	
Hindi	97.9%	97.3%	97.3%	94.3%	77.4%	2,057,213
Urdu					5.8%	153,247
Hindustani					-	-
Panjabi					11.9%	316,672
Bengali	-	1.8%	1.0%	0.7%	1.1%	28,136
English	0.9%	0.8%	0.7%	0.2%	0.2%	4,138

Source: *Delhi Gazetteer*, Delhi: Delhi Administration, (1976), pp.137-138.

Table 6

Numbers of the Population of Rural and Urban Areas in Lucknow : 1941-1951

	Total	Rural	Urban
1901	793,241	512,007	-
1911	764,411	489,146	275,265
1921	724,344	461,364	262,980
1931	787,472	487,642	299,830
1941	949,728	534,038	415,690
1951	1,128,101	607,577	520,524

Source: V.C.Sharma, *Gazetters of India: Uttar Pradesh*, Lucknow. (1959), pp,67-69.

Note: The de facto capital was shifted from Allahabad to Lucknow in 1934-35, and many government officers etc. also shifted. During the War and the immediate post-war period, many labours from villages came into Lucknow. At last, only 73.5% of the district was born in the district, 19.2% was born in other districts in U.P. 22% came from other places in India, and 3.1% came from outside including Pakistan.

Table 7

Numbers of the Populations of Lucknow According to Language, 1961-71

	1961	1971
Hindi	1,049,503	1,295,734
Urdu	233,162	269,288
Punjabi	22,227	25,301
Bengali	10,633	12,336

Uttar Pradesh District Gazetteers Lucknow (Supplementary), Lucknow: Government of Uttar Pradesh. (1988), p.13.

Table 8

The List of Papers and Persons in Delhi, 1948

	Name	numbers	editors, publishers etc.	detail
1	<i>Watan</i>	3500	ed) Shiv Narain Bhatnagar	National Congress
2	<i>Swarajya (Daily)</i>	2000	Shambu Nath	Hindu Mahasabha and pro-R.S.S. (Black-mailing)
3	<i>Hurriyat</i>	1000	Azizuddin	Nationalist Muslims (Black-mailing)
4	<i>Liberator</i>	2000	Gopal Singh	pro-Akali Sikh
5	<i>Rai Arma (Weekly)</i>	1000	Om Prakash Datt	Anti-Congress, Pro-Socialist, Pro-F.Bloc, Pro-Desh Sewak Saina (General Mohan Singh's Party)
6	<i>Nirala</i>	500	Kirpal Singh Bawa	story magazine
7	<i>Riyasat</i>	3500	Dewan Singh	Nationalist (Black-mailing)
8	<i>Preet Lari</i>	1000	Gurbakhash Singh	pro-communist
9	<i>Daler Khalsa</i>	-	Gurdit Singh	in Gurmukhi. Ceased Publication
10	<i>Milat</i>	-	Late: Maulvi Mohd. Jaffar	Not existence
11	-	-	Hori Lal Saxena	a journalist
12	<i>Ramjit Nigare</i>	2000		Pro-Akali
13	-	-	Puram ChandShakir	a journalist. He publishes <i>Hangama</i> in Delhi
14	-	-	Chander Mohan Krishan Singh	a journalist and a reporter of <i>Pioneer</i> (Lucknow)
15	-	-	Kanwar Kishore Seth	a journalist
16	<i>Khatun Mushraq</i>	500	Abdulla Farooqi	a social organ which sometime includes communal propaganda
17	<i>Nawan Rah</i>	500	Kumari Urmala	Pro-Communist
18	<i>Transport Worker</i>	1000	Sant Ram	Transport Paper, Contributed by labour workers
19	<i>Navpath</i>	1000	Ram Sarup Sharma	Sectional
20	<i>Ajit Urdu Daily</i>	2000	Hukam Singh	Pro-Akali organ
21	<i>Nationalist</i>	1000	Hori Lal Saxena	Pro-Hindu Sabhaist. Criticism of Congress and Government
22	<i>Ataliq Daily and Weekly</i>	200 / 750	Hans Raj	a social organ with pro-communist. Criticism Government
23	<i>Delhi Cycle Market Report</i>	200	Inder Sain Sharma	A commercial organ. Market report
24	<i>Hangana</i>	500	Puran Chand	a leftist publication, Social Reform
25	<i>Netaji</i>	2000	Pub) Mano Dev Shastri, Chief-ed) Vishwanath Vaisham Payam	Forward Blocist View, Bloc ideology
26	<i>Vishva Miter</i>	5000	Pub) R.S.Sharma, Chief-ed) Govind Misra	Nationalist, Independent views, Social reform

27	<i>Daily Sanmarg</i>	1000	Pub) Chander Shikar, Chief-ed) Shastri	Orthodox Hindu Paper, official organ of the Ram Roy Parishad contains anti-Hindu Code Bill and anti-Cow slaughter
28	<i>Vir Bharat</i>	8000	Pub) Chaman Lal, Chief-ed) Pritam Ziai	Nationalist, Orthodox Hindu organ and official organ of Pritinatisabha, Punjab
29	<i>Daily Tej</i>	10000	Pub) Panna Lal Jain, Chief-ed) Jamna Dass Akhtar	Nationalist, pro-government organ
30	<i>Bazar Monthly</i>	250	Pub) Madan Lal, Ed) Babu Singh	story magazine, cinema story
31	<i>Carvam</i>	500	Pub) Amar Nath, Ed) Wishva Nath	literary journal
32	<i>Sarita</i>	500	do	story magazine
33	<i>Mansarovar</i>	500	do	story magazine

Source: The Report from J. Sarup to Rikhi Kesh, C.I.D. dated 17 September 1949. *The Delhi Police Records*, 8th Installment Press-25. 'Press and Person, No.1/Press/48'. NMML

Note: No.6,9,11,12,13,18,22,23,24 were written that they shifted to Delhi on Partition. (From Lahore: 9, 12,13,24. From other places in Pakistan: 6,22,23. From Lucknow: 11. From others: 18.)

CHAPTER THREE

Table 9

The Communal Proportion of Deputy Superintendents and Inspectors in Police

Communities	The Interim Proportion for 1 July 1947		The Report of the Proportion on 12 November 1946	
	Deputy Superintendents	Inspectors	Deputy Superintendents	Inspectors
Anglo-Indians	3	4	7	4
Muslims	1	7	4	10
Hindus	4	6	1	7
Sikhs	-	5	-	

See, *Confidential Report*, File No. 27/47 - C. DSA

Table 10

Statement of the Strength of the officers and above the rank of Inspectors and their communal distribution for the month : March 1947 - January 1948

Senior Superintendent of Police (From September, replaced by Dy.Inspr.Genl. of Police)

	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan.1948
British	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anglo-Indians	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Christians	N.A.	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-
Muslims	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hindus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1
Sikhs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Superintendent of Police

	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan.1948
British	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-
Anglo-Indians	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Christians	N.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Muslims	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Hindus	1	1	1	-	-	-	3	3	4	3	4
Sikhs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Deputy Superintendent of Police

	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan.1948
British	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anglo-Indians	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	2	2	1	1
Christians	N.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Muslims	3	3	2	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
Hindus	1	2	2	2	2	3	6	6	7	9	8
Sikhs	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	2

Inspectors

	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan.1948
British	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anglo-Indians	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	2
Christians	N.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Muslims	9	9	10	10	9	9	7	-	-	-	-
Hindus	2	2	3	1	2	4	5	5	15	16	18
Sikhs	6	5	5	5	6	5	5	5	8	6	5

This chart is the original one based on ' the Strenght of the officers of and above the rank of Inspectors and their communal distribution for the month ' to the Government of India. See, *Confidential Report*, File No. 27/47 Part-C. DSA

Table 11

The Number of Muslim Passengers' incouming and outgoing at two airports in Delhi : Dec 1947- Jan 1948

Date	Leaving	Arriving
20/12	281	33
21/12	311	44
22/12	282	21
23/12	63	10
24/12	151	10
25/12	195	34
26/12	139	35
27/12	36	30
28/12	46	24
29/12	72	31
30/12	70	54
31/12	86	24
1/1	68	40

This table collects the numbers of Muslim passengers informed in *The Delhi Police Records*, 3rd Instalment Misc-159. Vol.VI. 'the List of Muslims who came from Lahore on 17.11.47.' NMML




Table 12

**The Number of Muslim Passengers' incouming and outgoing at two airports in Delhi
: Dec 1947- Jan 1948 (Detail)**

		Departure from Delhi				Arraival at Delhi			
Date	Airports and Total	Numbers	numbers as attendant family	Destinati on in India	Destinati on in Pakistan	Numbers	numbers as attendant family	From places in India	From places in Pakistan
	Palam Airport	229	166	11	218	11	1	9	2
	TOTAL	281	196	12	269	33	2	15	18
21-Dec	Willingdon Airport	80	56	1	75	39	23	3	13
	Palam Airport	*231	161	1	230	5	0	0	5
	TOTAL	311	217	2	305	44	23	3	18
22-Dec	Willingdon Airport	47	33	2	45	12	0	1	11
	Palam Airport	235	158	6	229	9	0	1	8
	TOTAL	282	191	8	274	21	0	2	19
23-Dec	Willingdon Airport	63	41	62	0	7	1	0	7
	Palam Airport	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
	TOTAL	63	41	62	0	10	1	0	10
24-Dec	Willingdon Airport	42	18	5	37	8	0	2	0
	Palam Airport	109	71	5	104	2	1	1	0
	TOTAL	151	89	10	141	10	1	3	0
25-Dec	Willingdon Airport	67	46	11	56	23	1	4	19
	Palam Airport	128	97	0	128	11	3	0	11
	TOTAL	195	143	11	184	34	4	4	30
26-Dec	Willingdon Airport	44	11	24	20	22	1	10	22
	Palam Airport	95	77	0	95	13	1	1	12
	TOTAL	139	88	24	115	35	2	11	34
27-Dec	Willingdon Airport	24	5	5	19	23	1	23	0
	Palam Airport	12	3	3	9	7	0	0	7
	TOTAL	36	8	8	28	30	1	23	7
28-Dec	Willingdon Airport	42	15	3	39	23	1	1	22
	Palam Airport	4	0	4	0	1	0	1	0
	TOTAL	46	15	7	39	24	1	2	22
29-Dec	Willingdon Airport	63	41	3	60	29	0	16	13
	Palam Airport	9	5	3	6	2	0	2	0
	TOTAL	72	46	6	66	31	0	18	13
30-Dec	Willingdon Airport	61	41	0	61	36	3	2	34
	Palam Airport	9	4	1	8	18	3	3	15
	TOTAL	70	45	1	69	54	6	5	49
31-Dec	Willingdon Airport	60	35	50	10	24	3	4	20

	Palam Airport	26	9	15	2	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	86	44	65	12	24	3	4	20
1-Jan	Willingdon Airport	58	42	0	58	31	0	0	31
	Palam Airport	10	5	0	10	9	0	0	9
	TOTAL	68	47	0	68	40	0	0	40

Source: This table counts the number of passengers' reports. See, *The Delhi Police Records*, 3rd Instalment Misc-159. Vol.VI. 'the List of Muslims who came from Lahore on 17.11.47.' NMML

*Hyderabad, Srinagar are included in India

*This table modified some miscounts.

Table 13

**Number of the Muslim Refugees' coming and going in
Delhi: March-November 1948**

	Muslim refugees returned from Pakistan	Muslim refugees left Delhi for different places in India and Pakistan
27-Mar	2,600	-
3-Apr	2,000	1,100
10-Apr	3,100	630
17-Apr	2,300	400
1-May	2,400	500
8-May	2,400	500
15-May	1,100	400
22-May	650	470
29-May	1,000	450
5-Jun	800	600
12-Jun	600	850
19-Jun	750	375
26-Jun	1,200	860
3-Jul	1,400	625
10-Jul	1,350	1,700
17-Jul	1,960	750
24-Jul	200	570
31-Jul	120	300
7-Aug	20	450
14-Aug	235	400
21-Aug	250	410
28-Aug	210	500
4-Sep	150	450
7-Nov	66	72

This table collects the numbers of Muslim refugees informed in Summary of Weekly Repots. *Confidential*, File No.68/47-B, 'Weekly Reports on the Situation in Delhi'. DSA




Table 14

The Notable Numbers of people in Delhi : Population, Density of Population, Religions

Variation in Population during Seventy Years

	Person	Decade Variation	Decade Variation (%)	Male	Female
1901	405,819	-	-	217,921	187,898
1911	413,851	8,032	1.98%	230,865	182,986
1921	488,452	74,601	18.63%	281,777	206,675
1931	636,246	147,794	30.26%	369,497	266,749
1941	917,939	281,693	44.30%	535,236	382,703
1951	1,744,072	826,133	90.00%	986,538	757,534
1961	2,658,612	914,540	52.44%	1,489,378	1,169,234
1971	4,065,698	1,407,086	52.92%	2,257,515	1,808,183

Source: Delhi Gazette, (1976), p.120.

Census of India, Vol.XIX, Part 2-A, P.44. and Census 1971, *Delhi District Headbook*, Series 27.

Table 15

Rural and Urban Destin of Population per Square Kilometer in Delhi from 1881 to 1971

	Rural Area	Decade Variation	Urban Area	Decade Variation
1881	121	-	8,786	-
1891	123	2	9,758	972
1901	135	12	10,568	810
1911	123	-12	11,798	1230
1921	140	17	1,812	-9986
1931	144	4	2,639	827
1941	171	27	3,470	831
1951	243	72	7,169	3699
1961	258	15	7,225	56
1971	403	145	8,172	947

Source: Delhi Gazette, (1976), p.126.

Note: As many as 95% of refugees were settled in the urban area in Delhi

Table 16

Population of Delhi by Religion, 1901-1961

	1901		1931		1951		1961	
Hindu	300,207	74.10%	399,803	62.85%	1,467,854	84.16%	2,234,597	84.05%
Muslim	98,533	24.28%	206,960	32.53%	99,501	5.71%	155,453	5.85%
Sikh	173	0.04%	6,437	1.00%	137,086	7.86%	203,916	7.67%
Jain	4,551	1.12%	5,345	0.84%	20,174	1.16%	29,595	1.11%
Christian	1,860	0.46%	16,989	2.67%	18,685	1.07%	29,269	1.10%

Source: Delhi Gazette, (1976), p.143.

OTHERS

Table 17


The Proportion of Muslims and Non-Muslims in Pakistan Areas from Census of 1941

North-Western Area		
	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Punjab	16,217,242	12,201,577
N.W.F.P.	2,788,797	249,270
Sind	3,208,325	1,326,683
Baluchistan	438,930	62,701
total	22,653,294	13,840,231
	62.07%	37.93%

North-Eastern Area		
	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Bengal	33,005,434	27,301,091
Assam	3,442,479	6,762,254
total	36,447,913	34,063,345
	51.69%	48.31%

See, S. M. Roy, ed. *White Paper on Indian Constitution, 1946*, pp.12-13.

1. A Written Oath of the All India Muslim League, April 1946



In the name of Allah, the Beneficent the Merciful.

Say: my payer and my sacrifice and my living and my dying are all for Allah, the Lord of the World. (Al-Quran)

I , a member of the Muslim League Party of the Legislative Assembly / Council do hereby solemnly declare my firm conviction that the safety and security, and the salvation and destiny of the Muslim nation in habiting the sub-continent of India lie only in the achievement of Pakistan which is the one equitable, honourable and just solution of the constitutional problem and which will bring peace, freedom and prosperity to the various nationalities and communities of the great sub-continent.

I most solemnly affirm that I shall willingly and unflinchingly carry out all the directions and instructions which may be issued by the All India Muslim League in pursuance of any movement launched by it for the attainment of the cherished national goal of Pakistan, and believing as I do in the rightness and the justice of my cause, I pledge myself to undergo any danger, trial or sacrifice which may be demanded of me.

Our Lord! Bestow on us endurance and keep our steps firm and help us against the disbelieving people. Amen!

Signature

Date

Muslim League Printing Press, Delhi.

*This translation is the original written by the Muslim League

Note: This is a written oath of the All India Muslim League. It seems to be published in April 1946. The report of C.I.D. dated 20 April 1946 informed the All India Muslim League Legislators held on 7, 9 and 10 April, and attached this written oath. It can be said that this was the official image of Pakistan among the members of the Muslim League in Delhi. The top and bottom of the letter was decorated the phrases of Quran. On the other hand, this paper insisted that Pakistan would be peace for every nationalities and communities, and the Muslim nation's destiny depended on Pakistan.

Source: *The Delhi Police Records*, 2nd Installment Mohd-29, volume17. NMML.

2. Figures of Muslims Returning to India from Pakistan **(Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation)**

A. Figures of Muslims Returning to India from Pakistan: -

An estimate of figures for Muslims returning to India from Pakistan, broken up month by month, it not possible that no regular information has been collected in this connection. ... The following information is available in the different sections of this Ministry.

- (1) Raja Ghazanfer Ali Khan, Minister of Refugees, Pakistan, in a conference that nearly 52,000 Muslims had returned to India during April and June 1948, by Jodhpur Railway route only.
- (2) High Commissioner for India at Karachi is reported to be issuing on an average 300 permits daily to Muslims at Karachi for coming to India. This is beside the permits issued by the Deputy High Commissioner for India at Lahore.
 - (a) Permits issued from Karachi : 19th August 1948 – 8th October 1948 ... 9,550
 - (b) Permits issued from Lahore : 19th August 1948 – 30th August 1948 ... 3,616
- (3) It has been reported that 30,000 Muslims had returned up July 1948. In addition, large number of Meos returned for re-settlement in the Matsya Union. Their number estimated as 10,000. The Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon, however, has placed their number at 20,000.
- (4) According to the information available in the Movements Branch, during the months of March and April, approximately 2,500 Muslims returned Bombay and Kathiawar, and approximately 1,000 Muslims returned to U.P. during the same period.
- (5) The Chief commissioner, Ajmer, is sending for nightly reports according to which 7,664 Muslims had returned to Ajmer-Merwara upto 15th September 1948.

B. Number of non-Muslims returning from Eastern Pakistan to India: -

Number of persons migrated from East Bengal estimated upto 31st August 1948 ... 1,350,000

C. Number of non-Muslims in Pakistan: -

- (a) East Pakistan : The total population has been estimated at 12,000,000. The estimated number of non-Muslims in East Pakistan is 10,500,000.

(b) West Pakistan : The total number estimated of non-Muslims remaining to be evacuated is about 300,000.

Source: Dated 2 November 1948. File 26-162/48 Poll (1) 1948. 'Facts and Figures regarding Muslims Return from Pakistan to India'. NAI.

The Summary of Some Interviews

1. Abdur Raseed (Nizamuddin) : 81 years old

I stayed at Nizamuddin until Partition. Muslims went to their homes because of riots on Partition. I ran away to Bijnor. Nizamudin was dangerous. Many people [Muslims] ran away to Pakistan. Few people remained here [Nizamudin]. They shifted to Pakistan because of the danger not of their supporting the Muslim League.

There was no information at that time. I had not known about Pakistan for a long time. My relatives left from Lahore to Karachi at that time. But, I have not got information from them for 8 years. Nigh years later from Independence, I understood what happened at that time.

2. Akbar Khan (Nizamuddin) : 72 years old

I stayed at Bhopal in 1947. There were so many riots, then India was divided. Jinnah attained Pakistan, and Gandhi was [the leader of] here. I noticed about Pakistan after appearing Pakistan. Gandhi was a good parson. Jinnah changed the people. Jinnah attained his country.

My property was here [India]. I did not go to Pakistan. I remained in Bhopal and the others also stayed in Bhopal.

3. Habibur Rahman (Nizamuddin)

Hindus and Muslims were one. Hindus and Muslims stayed toghathere under the government of Muhammad Shah [Zafar].

The Congress was an old party. Jinnah was a member of the Congress. The Muslim League was a small party. The Congress was the party for Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi was so nice. The Congress adopted good policies for both communities. Riots also occurred, but

the news about riots was hidden. There was no name of Pakistan [before Independence]. I noticed Pakistan after Independence. There were riots in Nizamuddin. Both Hindus and Muslims lived here [in Nizamuddin]. Some people remained here and the others left for Pakistan.

4. Fateh Muhammad (Sabzi Mandi) : 78 years old

I stayed in Sarghodha (now in Pakistan) before Partition. The life in India was fine, but sometimes problems happened in India because of Pakistan. I came to Meerut at first because I had relatives there. I had been in Meerut for 3 years. The railways worked at the time [when I came to Meerut.] However, the trains did not work well on Partition. Some roads between Pakistan and India were also closed at the time. So, I did not go to Pakistan. I could not get any information. Radio, newspapers...everything stopped on Partition.

5. Sharma (Sabzi Mandi) : 76 years old

I was born in Sabzi Mandi. I had many times seen that the Army brought dead bodies of Hindus and Muslims. I stayed with my family. In an area, so-called Punjabi Basti in Sabzi Mandi, Sikhs attacked Muslims. Hindu did not have enough arms, so informed the Police. Before Partition, The population of Hindus and Muslims were half and half in Sabzi Mandi. Some people were willing to shift to Pakistan and the others were not. I remember that Nehru gave his address at the part in front of the police station of Sabzi Mandi. I noticed about Independence from a radio program and newspapers. *Hindustan Times, Times of India, Pratap, Milap* and *Tej* were famous newspapers at that time. After Independence, there are many people who rent homes for new comers.

6. Raj Kamar (Sabzi Mandi)

I read *Pratap*, and knew about Partition in the newspaper. I was not willing to come to

India. I did not know that I had to shift to India and that Muslims came to remove us. Friends became enemies. Muslims said that Hindus were their enemies. I knew that Muslims informed 'Hindus were enemies' in masjids. They were taught to kill Hindus.

I did not know about refugees' camps in Delhi. I came to Sabzi Mandi, and started my life here.

7. K. Narendra (The office of *Pratap*) : 94 years old, the editor of *Pratap*

I was born in Lahore. Lahore was an old city. There was nothing there. On side was old street and the other side was new street there.

We had to learn Urdu as an official language in Punjab because the government of Punjab were a Muslim government. I started a newspaper in Hindi, *Arjun*, after coming to Delhi. At that time, there were many Urdu newspapers. For example, *Zamindar*, *Inqilab* and *Nawa-e-Waqt*. The editor of *Nawa-e-Waqt* was my good friend. He was so educated.

The founder of *Pratap* avoided creating relationship with politicians. *Pratap* stood with the Congress and took actions against the British rule. The political aspects were limited in newspapers.

The number of *Pratap* was about 40,000 per day. *Pratap* was read in Punjab. Many people could buy and read newspapers unless the poorest people. Almost middle-class people read Urdu newspapers, and high-class people tended to read newspapers in English.

At that time, the Unionist Party was always strong in Punjab. I noticed that British India would be divided because the British government preferred Partition. The relationship between Hindus and Muslims was wrong in Punjab, and Muslims were majority.

I stayed in Lahore for a while after Independence because Jinnah said that everyone

could stay in Pakistan. I left all records in Lahore, and came to Calcutta where my sisters stayed. One day, I went to our office to take records. A stone covered with a paper was coming in the office while I was searching documents. Then, I read the slip of the paper. The paper was written on 'Look Out!' My friend in the college threw it from a window, and he gestured 'Go Back! Go Back!'. I looked out, and found. About 150 Muslims were coming with *lathis*. I went to the roof and jumped to other roofs. I ran away by my bicycle.

There was a building in Lahore. People discussed whether the building was a masjid or gurudwala. One day, a messenger of Sikandar Hayat Khan came to the office of *Pratap*. He asked my father to support a side that people treated the building as a gurudwala. My father suspected this message, and said 'Why?' After the messenger's returning from the office, Sikandar Hayat Khan called and asked the same thing by telephone. Anyway, my father accepted his demand.

Political Cartoons in Weekly *Tej*
 My translation from Urdu
 4-Mar-47



The Green [false propaganda] of Pleasing Everyone

Note: The new statement of the British government and its impressions
 Mr. Attlee is holding three signboards. 'The Republic of Waliyan Long Live'(right), 'We will leave Hindustan'(centre), 'Pakistan, Long Live'(left). (Khalistan?)



18-Feb-47

Mr. Jinnah: (to Lord Wavell) Shoot It Down !

Note: It is the thinking of one authentic expert that the it is not the right of leaving the Constituent Assembly.
 Jinnah asks Load Wavell to shoot a plane written 'the Constitutional Assembly' with his sling.



**11-Feb-47
Hateful Child?**

Note: The Working Committee of the Muslims League said that the Cabinet scheme will not succeed.

Mr. Attlee and a woman holding a child meet Jinnah. Jinnah holds a bottle named Cabinet scheme. Perhaps the woman is a symbol of India, and she has her baby who is a symbol of Pakistan.



4-Feb-47

The connection of Mr. Jinnah with Mr. Churchill

Note: The Congress side gave the manifestation that the door of the Constituent Assembly is open for the cooperation of the Muslim League. And when it will come, then its benefit will precede.


Churchill and Jinnah are pulling each other. The poster of a pillar is written 'the Constitutional Assembly'.



18-Jun-48

Who Lives Long Enough to Vanquish Your Locks?

Nehru (right), Patel (centre back) and Jinnah (left) are holding Mir Osman Ali Khan's locks. The title is a quotation from famous Urdu poet, Ghalib's *ghazal*: *Aah ko chaahiye ek umr asar hone tak* (It takes an age for a sigh to bear fruit), *Kaun jeeta hai teri zulf ke sar hone tak*.



21-Jun-48

Now, Whither Will I Go!

The piece of Hyderabad is likely to be divided by two hands: India and Pakistan

Photographs




Photo 1. Jama Masjid in Delhi: 1890s.

This old photo shows that there was so large plain in front of Jama Masjid comparing with the present.

Source:

George Eastman House, T.H. McAllister & York Woodburytype

Catalogue of Photographic Optical Lantern Slides--. London, no date (c 1890s) p. 171.

Catalogued 04/89,



Photo 2. Chandni Chawk in Delhi: 1890s.

This old photo shows that there were so many Muslims in the left side and a row of wooden houses along the main street.

Source:

George Eastman House, T.H. McAllister & York Woodburytype

Catalogue of Photographic Optical Lantern Slides--. London, no date (c 1890s) p. 171.

Catalogued 04/89,




Photo 3. The North Side of Jama Masjid in Delhi: 1870s.

There was a large park in North side of Jama Masjid.

Source:

George Eastman House, T.H.
McAllister & York Woodburytype
No information about this photo




Photo 4. The Queen's Garden: 1890s.

This beautiful garden near the rail station were full with refugees and their temporary shops on the partition.

Source:

George Eastman House, T.H.
McAllister & York Woodburytype
Catalogue of Photographic Optical
Lantern Slides-- London, no date (c
1890s) p. 171. Catalogued 04/89,





Photo 5. The New Delhi Station: 1890s.

Source:

George Eastman House, T.H.
McAllister & York Woodburytype
Catalogue of Photographic Optical
Lantern Slides-- London, no date (c
1890s) p. 171. Catalogued 04/89,



A crowd of Moslems at the old fort of Purana Kila, outside D

**Photo 6 The Outside of Purana Qilah :
27th Sept. 1947**

Muslims used Purana Qilah as their camp. Some Muslims was waiting here to be transported to Pakistan.

Source:

Photograph from the Manchester Guardian, 27 September 1947

This image is now in the public domain because its term of copyright has expired in Pakistan.



Photo 7. A Young Refugee Sits on the Walls of Purana Qilah

This is a famous photo to show the grief of a boy from his face. Miserable tents spreads under the wall.

Source:

Photograph from Margaret Bourke-White, 1947

Downloaded from the BBC Web Site




Photo 8. Refugees in Purana Qilah

Source:

P. Mountbatten, *India Remembered: A Personal Account of the Mountbattens During the Transfer of Power* (New Delhi, 2007), p. 165.




Photo 9. A Crowd of Refugees in Delhi

Source:

Copyright © Scanpix




Photo 10. A Train to Pakistan at the Delhi Railway Station: 1947

The front of the train was written 'Paak' in large style. The polices and the onlookers on the bridge were waiting for the departure of the train.

Source:

Photograph from Margaret Bourke-White, 1947. Downloaded from the BBC Web Site.




Photo 11. Passengers of a train to Pakistan: 1947

The passengers were smiling and hanging out flags. The mark of 'a star and a crescent' is a symbol of Islam and the origin of the National flag of Pakistan.

Source:

Photograph from Margaret Bourke-White, 1947. Downloaded from the BBC Web Site.

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