

**THE CONTEST FOR HEGEMONY – THE PORTUGUESE AND
THE DUTCH IN COROMANDEL AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SMARIKA NAWANI



CENTRE FOR HISTORICAL STUDIES

School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi –110067

India

2002



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067, INDIA

CENTRE FOR HISTORICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

25 July, 2002

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “**The Contest for Hegemony – The Portuguese and the Dutch in Cormandel and Southeast Asia in the Seventeenth Century**”, submitted by **Smarika Nawani** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, of this university is her original work and has not been submitted in parts or full for any other degree or diploma in any other university.

We recommend that it may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Dr. Yogesh Sharma
(Supervisor)

Centre for Historical Studies
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

(Chairperson)

CHAIRPERSON
Centre for Historical Studies
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

*Dedicated to my Parents
and my Zusje*

CONTENTS

	PAGE NO.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
INTRODUCTION	1-11
CHAPTER-1	12-35
THE SETTING	
	36-78
CHAPTER-2	
DIMENSIONS OF EXPANSION OF THE ESTADO DA INDIA IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY	
	79-125
CHAPTER-3	79-125
THE DUTCH CHALLENGE TO THE PORTUGUESE HEGEMONY 1600-1662	
CHAPTER-4	126-147
THE DUTCH COMMERCIAL HEGEMONY AND THE RISE OF ENGLISH AS A RIVAL POWER	
CONCLUSION	148-155
BIBLIOGRAPHY	156-163

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to my supervisor Dr. Yogesh Sharma who has always encouraged me and helped me by pointing out my shortcomings. Without his motivation and guidance it would have been difficult to complete this work.

I would like to thank Dr. Jose Leal – Ferreira (Jr.) who taught me Portuguese and helped me to translate the Portuguese primary sources. During the course of the language-learning programme, he told various things about the Portuguese expansion, which encouraged me to work more towards the theme.

A word of thanks to my parents for helping me in every possible way and motivating, supporting and encouraging me to be honest and sincere in my efforts. My sister, Shounkie had been of great help. Besides pampering me, she did the proof reading of the dissertation which made things easy. I cannot forget the caring nature of my loving Big Mom and also her family members, who were always there whenever I was in need.

I would like to express my thanks to my friends – Archana for proof reading besides bearing with my anxieties and Tina for lifting my spirits .

I am thankful to all those people who helped me when I was not keeping well.

I would like to express gratitude to my senior, Rashmi, who gave her valuable time and suggestions and also Ajanta, who had been a good companion during my visits to the Archives and other libraries.

I am also grateful for the facilities I received at National Archives of India, The Indian Council for Historical Research Library, The Vidyajyoti Library, The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, The Central Secretariat Library, The DSA Library (Centre for Historical Studies, JNU) and the JNU Library. I am thankful to the librarian and staff of the above libraries who greatly helped me during the course of my visits.


I am thankful to The Indian Council for Historical Research for providing me with a financial grant for this programme.

Last but not least, I owe my special thank to Mr. Mahender S. Rana and Mr. Shekharan who undertook the task of typing the manuscript.

New Delhi
25 July 2002

Smarika Nawani
SMARIKA NAWANI

THE INDIAN OCEAN COMMERCIAL NETWORK, 1500-1650 A.D.



SOURCE: SUBRAHMANYAM, SANJAY, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMERCE 1500-1650, CUP, 1990, p.107

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Ocean has been a theatre of maritime activities since the birth of the first urban civilizations on its littoral.¹ Ever since then, its bays and seas have been criss-crossed by various people leading to the development of maritime contacts. One such linkage had developed between Coromandel coast in Southeastern India and ~~Southeast~~ Asia around the first century A.D. The contact continued and when the Portuguese discovered the region, they started exploring the arteries of this commercial world. In the course of about hundred years, they had monopolized the spice trade. The Portuguese were followed by the Dutch and the English who ventured in the east as trading companies. As the motives of the Dutch was to monopolise trade, it resulted in the contest for hegemony with the Portuguese in the seventeenth century. The strife between the two took interesting turns in Southeast Asia as well as Coromandel, when both of them tried to control the lucrative spice trade.

The topic under consideration is thematically derived from the literature which is either Coromandel centric or the

¹ i.e., the Harappan and Mesopotamian Civilizations.

one with a focus on Southeast Asia or just with a pan-Asian view. The early works on Coromandel are centred around the regional political history. The economic aspect of the writing of the history of Coromandel was first touched upon by Tapan Raychaudhuri, in his, "Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690" published in 1962. It basically pertained to the activities of the Dutch East India Company in the region. In the context it also briefly mentioned the rivals of the Dutch on Coromandel. This work thus belonged to the theme of regional commercial history like Ashin Dasgupta's "Malabar in Asian Trade, 1740-1800" (1967), or Sushil Chaudhuri's "Trade and Commercial Organization in Bengal, 1650-1720" (1975). The aim was to establish the role of a European Company in a region. So it was different from the way K.N. Chaudhuri portrayed the English Company in his "The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint Stock Company 1600-1640" (1965) or in his later work "The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760" (1978).

In the 1960s, one also starts coming across the writings of another known historian, Sinnappah Arasratnam. His writings are highly varied. The first ones focus on the Coromandel trade in consonance with the Dutch Company.

Besides this, he also wrote about the South Indian merchants, their, roles and activities. It was in the 1970s's that Arasratnam began studying the relations between polities and trade concentrating on the foreign company and the Indian commercial groups. In the 1980's he brought a third angle in his writings, wherein he focussed on the social aspect.

Finally Arasratnam's three decades of writings culminated in his most distinguished work published in 1986 – "Merchants, Companies and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast 1650-1740". Arasratnam's writings move away from the Eurocentric approach. In his work, the European settlements of the Dutch and the English, their imports and exports along with their trading pattern and their competition at various levels have been discussed. When compared with the work of his predecessors, Tapan Raychaudhuri, his work brought into light the role played by the indigenous mercantile groups such as chettis, balijas and chulias. He also reflected the role of "political capitalism". The growing interest of the political elites in the overseas trade to Southeast Asia was an impetus to the already present network. Due to the role played by this group, the concept of the 'age of partnership' came into being. Thus Arasratnam has written on various themes pertaining to the

companies and the indigenous polities of our region. But the time period he has chosen is the second half of the seventeenth century, when the Portuguese were no longer a power to reckon with.

The recent work of appraisal on Coromandel are the two books by Sanjay Subrahmanyam – “The Political Economy of Commerce, Southern India, 1500-1650” and “Improvising Empire” – both published in 1990. Compared to Raychaudhuri’s and Arasratnam’s writings, his certainly of a different nature. In his first work, Subrahmanyam tries to explore the relationship between long-distance trade and the prevailing economic and political structures of Southern India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This comprehensive account deals with the trade structure, the centres of trade and the trading groups in the sixteenth century and the changes which took place in the mid-seventeenth century. He talks about the Luso-Dutch conflict at Pulicat as well as to a certain extent in Southeast Asia.

The study of the historiography development in Southeast Asia, particularly in relation to the commercial nexus with other regions can be divided into two phases – the studies before World War II and the works done thereafter.

One of the concerns of the studies done before the Second World War were the activities of the European powers from the sixteenth century onwards, to the gradual creation of commercial and territorial empires in Southeast Asia and to the colonial policies pushed therein. The writings on Southeast Asia as well as Coromandel seem to be moving on the same line in the said period i.e., giving importance to external influences rather than the internal dynamics.

Amongst the early writings a very significant work was that of the Dutch historian J.C. van Leur titled "Indonesian Trade and Society" published in 1934. van Leur attempted to write with the perspective of the region while the other studies were engaged with writing about the activities of the European powers. He characterized the Southeast Asian trade as a pre-capitalist peddling trade. A strong follow-up of van Leur's work was M.A.P. Meilink Roelofs's "Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago", published in 1962. Between 1934 and 1962, there are some oft-cited works like of George Coedès, D.G.E. Hall, B.J.O. Schrieke. But it was Meilink Roelofs's work which gave a broader perspective to the Southeast Asian studies. Dismissing van Leur's thesis on 'peddling trade', she said that besides the real peddlers and

hawkers of merchandise of little value, it has to include the dealers in luxury articles, merchants with capital. It also had to deal with the carrying of the bulk cargoes in the overseas network.

Meilink Roelofs focused on Melaka and in this context discussed the trade from Melaka to Coromandel. She also unveiled the assumption of van Leur that the European intervention did not bring about the change in the system. She was also critical of the dismissive comments of van Leur on Portuguese trade. Besides taking into account, largely the Portuguese sources, she also used the Dutch and the English records while trying to present a comprehensive account of the Indonesian archipelago. Thus a marked contrast can be seen in the writings of van Leur and Meilink Roelofs. But at other levels there are similarities too. For example, both the works are simple and straight in their approach when they discuss the coming of the Dutch in Indonesia.

Two years after the publication of Meilink Roelofs's work, Luis Filipe F.R. Thomaz's thesis "Os Portugueses em Malacca" threw a valuable light. There were many articles which he wrote concerning the Portuguese in Southeast Asia, but unfortunately most of his work is in Portuguese. There were

also works particularly pertaining to the polity of a region. For example Leonard Andaya's, "The kingdom of Johore" published in 1975 was one of them. It gave a fine analysis of how Johore became an ally of the Dutch against the Portuguese at Melaka. In 1992, Nicholas Tarting edited "The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia". Various themes were dealt in it from ancient times till 1800 A.D. Some of the noted authorities like Kenneth R. Hall, Anthony Reid, J. Kathirithamby-Wells, Leonard Andaya, Barbara Watson Andaya wrote articles as a part of this volume.

One of the historians of the Cornell group, Anthony Reid contributed an interesting perspective through "Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680", in two volumes. In these volumes, he claims in a rather explicit fashion, an intellectual affinity with the Annales tradition, especially Braudel. The first volume - "The Land below the Winds" published in 1988 was related to the social, cultural 'Structures' in Southeast Asia. In 1993, the second volume, "Expansion and Crisis" came into being defining the role of the commerce in the wider context of 'world economy', Reid pointed that the sixteenth century was a 'boom' century. Since

his concerns were different, so there is no direct reference to our them.

Besides these two groups of writings, which are either Coromandel-centric or Southeast Asia-centric, there is a third set of writings which pertain to maritime and commercial history in a pan-Asian context. C.R. Boxer, K.N. Chaudhuri, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam have been the prominent writers whose works have thematic bearing on the area and period of our study. Of the invaluable writings of C.R. Boxer on the Portuguese and the Dutch two of them – “The Portuguese Seaborne Empire” (1969) and “the Dutch Seaborne Empire” (1965) give a descriptive picture of what did the “Seaborne Empire” mean to the two trading organization. Besides these, one of his articles draws our immediate attention – “Portuguese and Dutch colonial rivalry, 1641-1661” – which was published in *Studia* no. 2. (July, 1958). Boxer also wrote a number of articles on various themes which have been collected in his two *Varorium* series and bear indirectly to the theme.

In 1985, K.N. Chaudhuri wrote about the cultural and economic role of long-distance trade and the unity of the Indian Ocean in his “Trade and Civilization in the Indian

Ocean". This work would enable us to understand the theme, in a wider perspective. Same is the case with Kenneth McPherson's, "The Indian Ocean" (1993). Sanjay Subrahmanyam's widely acclaimed work – "The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700" (1993) – deals with locating the Portuguese on 'two intersecting planes'. On the one hand, the Portuguese are discussed in the Asian and African contexts and on the other they are located in the Iberian context. Subrahmanyam notices the Luso-Dutch conflict as a multi-dimensional affair as it involved the indigenous polities also.

Thus, as noticed above, the secondary sources, provide a thematic bearing to our topic. They have their limitation. But, a scope for further study can be built up. This dissertation is thus an effort to examine the intricacies of the Portuguese-Dutch conflict in the seventeenth century by using various sources like the contemporary and later travelogues, the correspondences made by the Governor General of the English East India Company to its various factors and vice versa; and a couple of Portuguese sources like Assentos do Conselho do Estado i.e., the proceedings or minutes of the state council at Goa.

The theme can be understood with the help of four concerns. In order to understand the conflict, it is imperative to know the theatre where the conflict took place. This would consist of the background of the region i.e., its location and geography, polity, society and culture. Thus this would be our first concern. The second concern would be an insight on the dimensions of expansion of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. In it the focus would be on the various theories and myths, which the Portuguese had in their mind prior to the discovery of the Cape route. The development of cartography was another handy tool, in Portuguese expansion. Also role of the trading diasporas cannot be ignored specially in the case of Southeast Asia. It was one of the diasporas who introduced the Portuguese to Coromandel, the unofficial realm of the Estado. Hence in sixteenth century, the Portuguese had monopolized the spice trade of the insular Southeast Asia and they also tried to adopt measures in Coromandel to control the textile trade, which a great value as an exchange item for spices.

The third concern would pertain to the Dutch challenge to the century-old Portuguese hegemony. There will be two phases discussed in it. The first one can be delineated from

the beginning of the century till 1641, when the Dutch captured Melaka. The basic concern in this phase was Southeast Asia, especially the insular part. Most of the region came under the Dutch control. The second phase can be said to have begun after Portugal became independent from Spain. The Luso-Dutch conflict got over on paper, but practically the hostilities remained. It was in this phase (1642-1660) that most of the Portuguese settlements in Coromandel were conquered. The last concern would deal with the commercial hegemony that the Dutch built in the early years of the seventeenth century. The Dutch and the English East India Company has started their ventures in the east around the same time. Since their motives were same they were bound to clash with each other. Till the first half of century, the Dutch dominated all the major niches of Southeast Asia and in fact chased the English from region. But after 1650s, there was a gradual rise of the English as a rival power of the Dutch in Coromandel.

CHAPTER -1

THE SETTING

1.1 The Colamandalam

1.2 The Archipelago

The Indian Ocean region has always had an interesting arena of human interaction with the sea. From time immemorial, its bays and the seas have been criss-crossed leading to the development of several maritime links. Of the many, one such lingering link was between the Coromandel coast in peninsular south-east India and Southeast Asia. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea mentions the presence of the Indonesian outriggers on the eastern coast of India for the exchange of gold, tin, spices, Chinese silk and ceramics. The impact of the commodities traded from Southeast Asia was so profound in the Tamil coast that regular commercial contacts can be noticed through ports such as Arikamedu, Kayal and Kamara, by the second and third centuries A.D. The cotton from Coromandel gradually became the major commodity for exchange in the markets of Southeast Asia. It was this contact which the Europeans explored at the beginning of

the sixteenth century in their quest to monopolize the spice trade.

1.1 The Colamandalam

The narratives of the contemporaries of the 16th and the 17th centuries are either devoted entirely or at large on Coromandel or as a section while describing their travels in Asia. Deriving its name from Coloamandalam¹ the Coromandel coast has been described by the itinerants as the region between Point Calimere in the south and the mouths of Godavari in the north. The different accounts conferred its boundaries according to the knowledge and observations of their perceivers, which were mostly similar. One of the most well-defined description was given by Thomas Bowrey. The coast,

"begineth at Nagapatam...(and)... Extendth it Selfe to point Godaware, on the South Side of the bay Corango, which by computation is in length 400 miles."²

¹ The circle of the Cholas or more precisely the politics - cultural region of the Cholas.

² Thomas Bowrey, A Geographical Account of the Countries Round the Bay of Bengal, 1669 to 1679, ed. R.C. Temple, New Delhi, 1997, pp. 2-3.

To meet the prospect of the proposed theme of the dissertation, the initial focus in the Coromandal coast would be on the Portuguese settlements of Nagapattinam, St. Thomas and Pulicat followed by Masulipatnam & Madras.

Most of the travellers describe it as a land of open plains.³ Travelling during the time of Vijaynagara rulers, Domingo Paes (1520-22) described the region as:

“It is a country sparsely wooded except along this serra on the east, but in places you walk, for two or three leagues under groves of trees; and behind cities and towns and villages they have plantations of mangoes, and jack-fruit trees, which form resting-places where merchants halt with their merchandise. I saw in the city of Recalem a tree under which we lodged three hundred and twenty horses, standing in order as in their stables, and all over the country you may see many small trees. These dominions are very well cultivated and very fertile, and are provided with quantities of cattle, such as cows, buffaloes, and sheep; also of birds, both those belonging to the hills and those reared at home, and this in greater abundance than in our tracts. The land has plenty of rice, and Indian corn, grains, beans, and other kind of crops which are now sown in our parts; also an infinity of cotton”.⁴

³ Dames, M.L. (ed.), *The Book of Duarte Barbosa, II*, Asian Educational Service, 1989, pp.125.

⁴ Filiozat, Vasundhara (ed.), *Vijaynagar as seen beg Domingos Paes and Fernao Nuniz*, National Book Trust, Delhi, 1999, p.60.

Though the testimony given by the contemporaries is true, but still as one progressed towards the north of Madras, the coast was better suited for maritime settlement as Delcohe has pointed out.⁷ That is why Pulicat and Masulipatnam (which was even better than others provided good shelter to the ships) developed as important European enclaves.

The absence of good harbours led to the development of two types of small sailing vessels – masula and catamaran. They had been in use for a long time and were widespread on the Coromandal coast. Both the vessels were used for loading and unloading the goods Thomas Bowrey gave a detailed description of the way these vessels were built by Macoas and how useful they were to combat the bad seas –

“The boats they doe lade and Unlade Ships or Vessels with are built very slight, haveinge noe timbers in them, Save thafts [thawarts] to hold their Sides together. Their planks are very broad and thinne, sowed together with

⁷ Deloche, Jean, *Transport and Communications in India Prior to Steam locomotion*, vol., 2, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp.101. He states that – the coast, extending to the north of the colonial capital, is better suited for maritime settlement; firstly, because there are several deeper lagoons forming good shelter; then because the access to the estuaries is easier. The amplitude of the tide progressively increases as one advances towards Bangal, the mouths and the outlets are not obstructed by sandy bars during the dry seasons and are open throughout the year with a not inconsiderable water depth.

Cayre [Cair], beings flats bottomed and every way much deformed, as on the other side demonstrated.

They are Soe Sleightly built for conveniencies sake, and early are most proper for this coast; for, all long the share, the sea runneth high and breaketh, to which they doe buckle and alsoe to the ground, when they Strike. They are called Massoolase, are for little use save carryinge of light goods [as bailes of callicaes or silkes, not exceedinge 6 or 8 at one time].

When any great Ordinance, Anchors, butts of water or like ponderous ladeninge is carried off or an, they seize 4, 5, or 6 large pieces of boyant, timer together, and this they cale a Cattamaran. Upon which they can lade 3 or 4 tunns weight".⁸

The polities of the region also took interest in developing the overseas trade despite of bad sea and harbours. The state relied on this commerce to enhance their agricultural income due to dispersed and limited cultivated tract. The Pallava rulers had contacts with South East Asia which is reflected in many Hindu remains in the region. Mamallapuram (Mahabalipuram) was an important and embelished port of the Pallavas which was designed as a smaller scale

⁸ Thomas Bowrey, A Geographical Account, 1997, pp.42-43.

Kanchipuram to encourage a "cultural dialogue" with Southeast Asia. It was their successors, the Cholas who were more successful in their overseas endeavours. Thus they built and expanded on the network developed by the Pallavas.

The Cholas were able to establish as a state with distinctive political - cultural features. In their different layers of administration, one was nagaram, the regional marketing center administered by a merchant body called Nagarattar. Though the foreign traders visited the ports during the Pallava times, it was only in the Chola period that they became regular visitors. The commodities acquired by them at these ports i.e. pearls, arecanuts, spices, and textiles required a regular ongoing relationship with the hinterland to allow locally produced goods to reach the coastal centres of international exchange⁹ as Kenneth Hall has pointed. Thus the market centres grew during the Chola period. Besides, the keenness of the Cholas to develop external trade was evident from its commercially oriented port of Nagapattinam which was intended to form external commercial relationships

⁹ Hall, K.R., The "Nagaram" as a marketing center in early medieval South Asia, Diss. Ph.d., Univ. of Michigan, 1975, pg. 1,

alone.¹⁰ The Chola kings also sent maritime expeditions to Sri Lanka, Sri Vijaya (Sumatra) and the trade missions to China in order to secure trade.

The active participation of merchant guilds in the commercial network is yet another interesting aspect of the period. The two most important guilds were the *Aiññūruvar* and the *Mañigrāmmam*. The *Aiññūruvar* or the five Hundred Swamis of Ayyavalepura (Aihole) were the more celebrated ones who had not only developed inland trade network but had also traveled overseas. Their contact with Southeast Asia can be noted through a fragmentary Tamil inscription from Sumatra (1088 A.D.) and a temple of Vishnu which they erected at Pagan. The settlements of this guild in the Chola kingdom were called Vira-pattanas where they enjoyed special privileges in the matters of trade owing to the sanctions given to them by the local and central authorities.

The *Mañigrāmmam* established long distance trade links early in their history. Appearing first in Kerala, their contact

¹⁰ Hall. K.R. Trade and statecraft in the age of Colas, New Delhi, 1980, pg. 168-169. < Ludovico di Varthema (Jones, Winter John (ed.), The itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema. of Bologna from 1502 to 1508, the Argonaut Press, London, 1928, pp.72), gave a description of commerce at Nagapattinam which is as follows – "... it is the route to very large countries. There are many Moorish merchants were who go and come for their merchandise".

with Ainnūruvar enabled them to improve their inter-regional activity. R. Champakalakshmi noted that “the Maṇigrām̄m, like the nagaram, retained its unified composition and character, as it was also a part of the local agricultural communities which branched out into the trading profession by controlling the local exchange nexus throughout the period”.¹¹ Thus this guild’s relations with the hinterland was more deeply entrenched which can also be a reason for its more efficient overseas network. They being mentioned in a 9th century Tamil inscription at Takua-pa (Malaya Peninsula) is just an example which pointed the interaction between Coromandel coast and Malay Peninsula. K.A. Nilakanta Sastri pointed that – “The fact that this merchant guild has established itself on the opposite coast of the Bay of Bengal with sufficient permanence for it to be put in charge of a Vishnu temple and a tank gives clue to a yet little-known chapter in the annals of our ancient polities and commerce.”¹²

¹¹ Champakalakshmi, R., Trade, Ideology and Urbanization South India 300 B.C. to A.D. 13000, Delhi, 1996, pg. 49, Abraham, Mira, Two Medieval Merchant Guilds of South India, Manohar, Delhi, 1988.

¹² Sastri, K.A. Nilankata, A History of South India Madras, 1975, pg. 331; also Christie, J.W., The Medieval Tamil-Language Inscriptions in Southeast Asia and China, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, Singapore, September 1998, pp.242-243.

The Vijayanagar empire which rose in the second quarter of the 14th century had a flourishing trading network. During this period the mercantile activities were dominated by the Muslim merchants. The Illappai or labbai of the Coromandal coast followed the Shafi'ite legal tradition. (which points to an Arab origin and was also carried by the Arabs to Southeast Asia). Like the Mappillas of the Malabar, they often became prosperous maritime traders and shipping magnates from gem and pearl dealings in the Palk Strait and then they moved further to Java, Sumatra and the Malay peninsula for trade. In the later times, as Andre Wink observes, "they assumed the appellations of Maraikkayar of Kayalar, by which they distinguished themselves as a 'maritime' people from the rural hanafi Muslims who sank roots in the Tamil hinterland and who were cultivators, weavers, petty traders and the like."¹³

TH-10651

Besides, Muslim merchants, the chettis were also involved in mercantile activities as informed by Barbosa.¹⁴

DISS
380.109548
N23 Co

TH10651

¹³ Wink, Andre, The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, vol. I, Delhi, 1990, pp.78.

¹⁴ Dames, II, 1989; pp.125-126. Duarte Barbosa pointed that "the more part or all of the Heathens merchants or Chatis who live throughout India are natives of this country, and are very cunning in every kind of traffic in goods. At the seaports also are many Moors, natives of the land; who are great merchants and own many ships." Richard Temple also takes note of a remark made by the court of Directors of the English East India Company. In 1669 from Bantam to Masulipatnam that - "in all the Cargo of Cloth,



Thus the polities of the region supported the trading activities. The cargo from the coast mainly comprised of textiles though rice and copper were also known in the trading circuit. Masulipatnam and Pulicat majored as the ports for exporting textiles which was made and processed in the adjoining hinterland. In many of the references from the period, 'calico' is the generic term used for cotton cloth. This includes muslin, long cloth and chintz. As it has been perceived, the oldest client of the cloth was the insular Southeast Asia. The printed cloth which had a ceremonial connotation was much in demand. An early 16th century traveler, Duarte Barbosa took note of the importance of the textile trade from Pulicat:

"Here are made great abundance of printed cotton cloths which are worth much money is Malacca, Peeguu, Camatra and in the kingdom of Gujerate and Malabar for clothing."¹⁵

which come in Madras, there was not one piece of pintadoe, or any other painting which Mr. Jearsey knew well, were the most required goods for that place".

¹⁵ Dames, II, 1989, pp.132.

1.2 The Archipelago

Southeast Asia had come into the limelight of the world commerce much earlier than Coromandal. The region was known for its aromatic spices. Since Southeast Asia is a large region, it would be more feasible to study it in two parts, following the pattern adopted by Nicholas Tarling in his edited work, "The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia," volume one. The two parts comprise of the mainland and the archipelago. While the mainland includes China, South of the Yangtze, Burma, Thailand, Indo-China and peninsular Malaysia, the archipelago provokes more interest. The more wanted produce –pepper, cloves, nutmeg of the region came from East Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines. Tome Pires, an early 16th century Portuguese traveler noted that,

"The Malay merchants say that God made Timor for sandalwood and Banda for mace and Maluku for cloves, and that thus merchandise is not known anywhere in the world except in these place."¹⁶

¹⁶ Cortesão, A. The Suma oriental of Tomé Pires and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues, II, The Hakluyt Society, London 1944, pp.204 Françoise Pyrard observed in 1619 that the group of islands which formed the insular part 'are fertile in peculiar fruits and merchandise, such as spices and other drugs that are found nowhere else... So this product where with they bound must furnish them with everything else; this is why all kind of food are very duer, save their own product, which is cheap, and why these people are constrained to keep up continual intercourse with one another the one supplying what the other wants" <Pyrard, 1619 II, 169, as cited in Reid,

The clove “nail” as traded was the dried flowerbud of the tropical evergreen tree, *Syzygium aromaticum* or *Caryophyllus aromaticus*. These trees, one of which could produce up to 34 kg of cloves in a good harvest, grew only in Maluku (the Moluccas). The earliest reports around 1500, cite that cloves were cultivated, only on the small islands of Ternate, Tidore, Makian and Motir off the west coast of Halmahera and had just begun to be worked on the somewhat larger island of Bacan.¹⁷ The clove production spread to Ambon and Seram in the sixteenth century and in the next century, they became the major centres of production on. Another spice which was much in demand in Europe was nutmeg, the seed and mace,

Anthony Southeast Asia in age of commerce, vol. II, Yale University Press, 1993, pp.31>.

¹⁷ Tomé Pires < Suma Oriental, vol. I, 1944, pp.213-214> while giving a description of the Moluccas noted the clove production: “The Molucca islands which produce cloves are five, to wit, the chief one is called Ternate and another Tidore and another Motir (Motes) and another Makyan (Maqujem) and another Bachian (Pacham). And there is also a great deal of wild cloves in the part of the Gillolo (Jeilolo) in the land of the island of Gillolo (Batochina)... There five islands must produce about six thousand bahars of cloves a year – sometimes a thousands more, or a thousand less. It is true that merchandise brought in Malacca for five hundred reis will buy a bahar of clove in the Molluccas. The bahar is by Malacca weight, because they weigh it in accordance with that, and the merchants take the scales, as it is sometimes worth more, sometimes less, just a little. There are six crops of cloves every year... cloves were always worth nine or ten cruzados a bahar in Malacca when they were plentiful, and twelve cruzados a bahar when they were scarce.”

its outer covering. This grew in the cluster of tiny islands collectively known as Banda.¹⁸

Though it is doubtful that Varthema ever visited the Moluccas, but his clear description of the clove production is noteworthy –

“The tree of the cloves is exactly like the box tree, that is thick, and the leaf is like that of Cinnamon, but it is a little more round, and is of that colour which I have already mentioned to you... when these cloves are ripe, the said men beat them down with canes , and place some mats under the said tree to catch them. The place where these trees are is like sand... We found that they [Cloves] were sold for twice as much as the nutmegs, but by measure, because these people do not understand weights.”¹⁹

The commercial records of Cairo and Alexandria, which are dated as early as the tenth century mention cloves and occasionally nutmeg and mace. Until the late fourteenth century, they remained extremely rare and expensive

¹⁸ Barbosa <Dames, vol. II, 1989, pp.197> reported the nutmeg and mace production as : “And in three of them grows abundance of nutmeg and mace on certain trees like unto bay trees, whereof the fruits is the nut; over it spreads the mace like a flower, and above that again another thick rind. One quintal of mace is worth here as much as seven of nutmeg. The abundance is such that they burn it, and it may be had almost for the asking.”

¹⁹ Jones, J.W. The itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna from 1502 to 1508, the Argonaut Press, 1928, pp.89.

commodities in Europe. The Chinese also knew of clove and nutmeg as early as the Tang dynasty but used them sparingly before the fifteenth century.²⁰ In fact the people of Ternate and Tidore (which are in the Moluccas) had first learned the value of the cloves from the Chinese. A sixteenth century Spanish traveller, Antonio Pigafetta who visited Tidore pointed that the Moluccans “did not care for the cloves” until Muslims began visiting Tidore and Ternate in 1470.²¹

Another spice of importance was pepper. This was not produced in the archipelago, but in Sumatra. Ludovico di Varthema acknowledged that a large quantity of pepper grew in Pedir. His description is as follows:

“In this country of Pider [Pedir] there grows a very great quantity of pepper, and of long pepper which is called, mologa. The said kind of pepper is larger than that which comes here to us, and is very much whiter, and within it is hollow, and is not so biting as that of ours, and weighs very little, and is sold here in the same manner as cereals are sold with us. And you must know that in this port there are laden with it every year eighteen or twenty ships, all of which go to Cathai, because they say that the extreme cold begins there. The tree which produces this pepper produces it long, but its

²⁰ Reid, Anthony , vol. II, 1993, pp.4.

²¹ cited in Reid, II, 1993, p.6.

vine is larger, and the leaf broader and softer, than that which grows in Calicut.”²²

Thus the pepper which grew on Sumatra was better than one which was produced in the Malabar coast. It flourished so well in Sumatra in no time that Pires estimated the produce at Pasai to be half of that produced in Malabar.²³

The insular part was known for its tropical climate and vegetation. To traverse in such a tropical area, required a skill and technique. A distinct type of vessel sometimes called, Austronesian or Malayo – Polynesian or simply prohu, has been well delineated in the nautical literature. Its most abiding features were – a keel, a hull built by joining planks to the keel and then to each other by means of wooden dowels. Iron nails were not used. This was a practical small freight vessel which had been in use for many years in many parts of Indonesia. In the age of sail, these vessels carried cargoes from anything between 4 to 40 tonnes across the seas of Southeast Asia. However in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it was not this vessel which dominated the trading routes. Much larger vessels with two or three masts and with

²² Jones, J.W., 1928, p.85.

²³ Pires, vol. I, pp.139-140.

many features of the prahu like dowelled hulls, double rudders, keels, carried most of the longer – distance tonnage for their Southeast Asian owners. These have been unanimously described as 'junks'.²⁴

In the archipelago the water, forests and the winds blended perfectly with the human activity.²⁵ Their staple diet consisted of fermented fish paste and rice, since ages. It ensued a lasting relationship between land and sea resources and an enduring dependence upon maritime skills. Besides fishing, casual seaborne barter or exchange for survival also gave the earliest expression to it. This part had developed its complex cultural and economic systems based upon interactions between hunter gatherers, shifting cultivators and rice farmers, long before the arrival of the South Asians and Chinese, as Kenneth Mc Pherson has pointed out. The Orang Laut of the Strait of Melaka and the Bugis of Southwest Sulawesi were the itinerant trading groups who collected and distributed the merchandise within the region as well as in South Asia and China. The development of long distance maritime trade, linking the insular Southeast Asia to the

²⁴ Reid, vol. II, 1993, p.36.

²⁵ For this reason, Anthony Reid has connoted Southeast Asia specially the insular part as "The Land below the winds".

markets of Mediterranean and China promoted the evolution of the coastal trading centres. The trade in cloves, for example, transformed the Maluccan society from scattered kin-based communities of hunter gatherers and shifting cultivators to coastal trading state.

The intimacy of the culture with nature helped in the development of a poly-centered polity. Such polities have been perceived as 'Kingdom' by Barbara Watson Andaya, who understood it to be a "coalescence of localized power centres, ideally bound together not by force but through complex interweaving of links engendered by blood connections and obligations."²⁶ For example, in *Sejarah Melayu*, which is collection of anecdotes about Melaka, one of the stories pertains to the King of Kedah viz., "Here now is a story of the Raja of Kedah, who in his turn went to Malaka to do homage and ask for the drum of Sovereignty,"²⁷ and thereafter the anecdote continues about how and why he was granted the drum of sovereignty. But, at the same time, the rulers were always in tension with the tenuousness of their power base,²⁸

²⁶ Andaya, Barbara Watson in Tarling, Nicolas (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.202.

²⁷ Brown, C.C., (trans.), *Sejarah Melayu*, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, p.163.

²⁸ Reid, A., *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680*, vol. II, *Expansion and Crisis*, Yale University Press, 1993. p.

as Anthony Reid has pointed. The legal and bureaucratic basis of the polities were still fragile. A Melakan noble expressed his opinion, as noted in *Sējarah Mēlayu*:

“As far as we who administer territory, what concern is that of yours? For territory is territory even if it is only the size of a coconut shell. What we think should be done we do, for the ruler is not concerned with the difficulties we administrators encounter, he only takes account of the good results we achieve.”²⁹

In a context where the nature of the polities was fragile as noticed above, the advantages derived from trade were critical. Hence a cursory glance of the attitude of the polities towards trade cannot be missed. In the mainland, it is Ayutthaya which evokes interest. Located on an island in the Chao-Phraya river, it offered the prospect of an entrepot to those with commercial skills and resources. The initiative for establishing a new kingdom at Ayutthaya is attributed to U Thang who belonged to a Chinese merchant family. He founded Ayutthaya as a united kingdom of Lopburi and Suphanburi which has generally been understood by the historians as “a bringing together of the Angkor-style administrative skills of the Mons and Khmers of Lopburi, the

²⁹ Brown, 1976, p.66.

manpower and the material skills of the Tais of Suphanburi, and the wealth and commercial skills of the local Chinese merchant communities.³⁰

The Srivijaya kingdom was centered in southeastern Sumatra between the seventh and the fourteenth centuries. In a correspondence to the Sung Emperor one of the kings proudly referred to himself as the king of ocean lands.' Such an impressive claims cannot be missed when the success of Srivijaya empire in the maritime history is considered. A good location on a major international trade route, fine harbour, navigable river and the political and economic talents of the rulers made it bustle with activity. It was in this part that the profit earning exchange between the items of archipelago and those coming from other parts took place. Thus O.W. Wolters rightly pointed that the Maharajas of Srivijaya-Palembang sought to impose a permanent blockade on ports of the archipelago which were outside their dependencies.³¹ To maximize profits and also to control the regime.

The Majapahit rulers reigned in east Java between 1293 and 1528. A.D. They made every possible effort to provide

³⁰ Taylor, K.W., in Tarling (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.170.

³¹ Wolters, O.W., *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History*, London, 1970, p.19.

internal peace and security to smoothen commercial activities. Kenneth Hall pointed that “the relationship between Majapahit’s kings and its merchants grew so close that some sources, both local and foreign, considered Java’s spice merchants to be little more than monarch’s trade agents,”³² although this seems to be an exaggeration. The Mataram state based in Central Java was established by coastal communities that defeated Majapahit.

Thus all these polities gave impetus to economic activities in some way or the other. The trade provided the essential resource base which led to the formation of states along with the development of maritime cities. This is exemplified by Laos, Aceh, Bantam, Banjarmasin, Makassar, Ternate which formed themselves into states for the first time in the “age of commerce”, i.e., the period between fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The geographical location of the places of the region described till now was such that each was important in its own way. The growing nature of trade could not ignore them. But the most strategic location was of the Straits of Melaka. It was an area through which the vessels passed towards the east and also from where goods from its

³² Hall, K.R., *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. I, 1992, p.218.

east or west could be procured. The power which could dominate it stood to benefit it enormously from the commerce that passed through it.

The Srivijaya empire held it till the tenth century and it was during this time that the importance of the strait came to be known with the other powers in a position to challenge it, the hegemony of the said empire was gradually reduced by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The mainland polities like Sukothai and Ayutthaya while eyeing on the Strait expanded Siamese military activities down the Malay peninsula ultimately reaching the Straits. From the insular region, a new expansionary momentum arose from Java in the thirteenth century and under the aegis of Majapahit Empire reached its utmost. Thus the Siamese and Javanese expeditions vied with each other for the Strait and squeezed away the authority from Srivijaya. The situations also changed rapidly when the Ming fleets (of China) started patrolling Southeast Asia at the beginning of the fifteenth century. They sponsored the rise of Melaka and provided a new focus for Malay political activity.³³

³³ Taylor, K.W., in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. I, 1992, p.172.

The Chinese have always been an influencing factor in the region. In the eleventh century, the power of Srivijaya empire was waning. One of the challenges posed to it was by the Chinese. The Ming who ruled China (1368-1644) abandoned the trading activities for sometime. But the activities soon picked pace slowly. With Zheng He's naval voyages. Zheng He was a Muslim admiral who voyaged to Southeast Asia between 1402 and 1433, when the contact of China with the outside world was limited. His expeditions paved way for a wave of Chinese migration to Southeast Asia and increased the commercial intercourse with the region according to Haraprasad Ray.³⁴ The Chinese traders also visited the Vijayanagar kingdom during the mid-fifteenth century. Hence in the region of our theme, the Chinese had played an important role in inter-weaving the region, though in a limited way.

Thus one can note from the above discussion that the conditions were suitable for the trade to prosper. On the Coromandel coast it was Nagapattinam and to a more greater

³⁴ Ray, Haraprasad, "An enquiry into the presence of the Chinese in South and Southeast Asia, after the voyages of Zheng He in early fifteen century" in Mathew, K.S. (ed.), *Mariners, Merchants and Oceans*, Manohar, 1985, p.103.

extent, Pulicat, which had emerged as a trading centre. In Southeast Asia the polities had understood the importance of the Straits of Melaka. The rise of Melaka around 1402, made the trading activities of the strait concentrate on this port. This made Melaka, the greatest entrepot of Southeast Asia within no time. Hence, this was the setting on the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century.

CHAPTER – 2

DIMENSIONS OF EXPANSION OF THE ESTADO DA INDIA IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

2.1 Theories and Myths

2.2 Cartography

2.3 The Estado in Southeast Asia

2.4 Coromandel, the Unofficial Realm

In the 'Age of Discovery', there were two impulses at work – one was the spread of the greater glory, God and the other was making profit. The Portuguese also drew inspiration from these purposes which led to a dramatic process of expansion in Asia and the Americas. But along with it, there were other factors like the strategic and political ones which were also responsible for the expeditions. C.R. Boxer classified the motives behind the Portuguese expansion in his "Seaborne Empire" as: the crusading zeal against the Muslims; the desire for Guinea gold; the quest for Prestor John; and the search for oriental spices.¹ Sanjay Subrahmanyam added another important motive and reasoned that the Portuguese

¹ Boxer, C.R., The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, Hutchison, 1963, p.18.

turning towards the sea was due to its strategic location and relatively limited agrarian resources. Further he pointed that “it also involved both conscious choices and a measure of serendipity, and was cast in terms of a nationalism determined in a matrix: on the one hand, the opposition Christian versus Moor, on the other hand Portuguese vs. Castilian”.²

2.1 Theories and Myths

Behind these there was a background of the Renaissance along with the centuries old traditions of seafaring at various times. The exponents of the seafaring traditions were the philosophers of ancient Greece, geographers of Alexandria, the Roman seafarers, the Arab traders and the Venetians and the Genoese. The treaties about the ‘East’ like the *Periplus of Erythraean Sea* and the indirect references which crossed the frontiers about the ‘East’ also led to the encouragement of explorations. Moreover, before the voyage of Vasco da Gama, the image of the ‘East’ was shrouded with mystery which gave room to the myths and theories about it.

² Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*, Longman, London, 1993, p.53.

The theories which developed about the world since time immemorial were a part of the man's quest to know his surroundings and unfold the mysteries of the earth. The earliest people to do so were the Greeks. As evidenced by their epic, '*Odyssey*', - no one's geographical knowledge matched theirs. By the 5th century B.C., the Pythagorean school had evolved the theory of a spherical earth - a theory which was deduced on philosophical rather than empirical grounds and had been followed by the liberal-minded ever since. The Greek also gave birth to the concept of *oikoumene* or the area inhabited by Greeks or by men of a like nature. Though its limits were not known but it was felt that the land of the *oikoumene* was bounded by Ocean, which covered the rest of the globe. It was Plato who advanced the possibility of the land outside it, which he thought was towards the west. Aristotle believed in a great southward as well as in an eastward extension.

With these developments side by side another interesting development was taking place in the world of learning, that was of "Geography and Cartography, especially in the city of Alexandria which had become a great centre of learning after the decline of the Roman empire. Figures like Ptolemy,

Eratosthenes, Hipparchus, and Posidonis contributed greatly to the existing notions in geography. Ptolemy's Geography was a great addition as well as a transformation from the existing notion because for the first time the world was sketched. Along with the continents of Europe, Africa and Asia, the Indian Ocean was also marked, which was assumed to be the Greater Mediterranean. It was thought to be enclosed by a land bridge which ran from East Africa to Southeastern Asia. A truncated Indian peninsula and the Golden Chersonese (the Malay Peninsula), were featured in it. Beyond this was the Sinus Magnus or Great Gulf, and beyond again the region where the African land bridge terminated. According to Penrose, "this latter feature gave rise to the portrayal of two Malay Peninsulas in the early 16th century cartography, while the concept of the closed Indian Ocean puzzled the Portuguese and other Europeans before the arrival of Vasco da Gamas."³

The long-known tradition of Arab Geography also contributed to the European knowledge. Its introduction was epitomized in the career of Edrisi (1100-1166), a Muslim from Ceuta. Albert Magress and Roger Bacon in the 13th Century also contributed to the development of Geography. Further the

³ Penrose, Boies, Travel and Discovery in the Renaissance 1420-1620, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1955, p.6.

translation of Ptolemy's *Geography* by Jacobus Angelus (1406-1410) was a step forward. Thus rich traditions of knowledge and learning provided a basic ground or more appropriately helped in the development of the background on which the Portuguese worked as a part of their endeavours of maritime expansion.

Besides the theories, there also developed myths about the undiscovered lands. The myths were the embodiments of the popular ideas and images which had long existed. There were Biblical prophecies which from the beginning of the Faith had continued to be an important influence in the formation of the image of the unknown. Having felt the impulse of Renaissance, the curious brains got involved in revealing the undiscovered parts of the globe in this, they were propelled by two motives. The spices,⁴ an old item in the exchange between Europe and Asia, were the main attraction. Christianity being the other. When Vasco do Gama's ships arrived in Calicut, they were asked – *'what the devil has brought you were? To*

⁴ As early as first century A.D., the Roman Statesman, Pliny complained the drain of gold currency to pay for spices and other luxury imports from the Indian Ocean.

which he replied: *'We have come to seek Christian and species.'*⁵

It is evident from the sources that the most common myths pertained to the Christian religion. Not a single contemporary traveller to South India fails to mention about St. Thomas. The apostle, who had a shadowy but glorious career as a missionary and martyr had founded an opulent Christian colony in Southern India around the first century A.D. The saga of St. Thomas⁶ was so inherently built among the Portuguese that the official chronicler of the Portuguese Joao de Barros wrote:

“One of the things that King Dom Manuel used to press on the Governors of India, was that they would be particularly interested in getting information about group of Christians in the East and regarding the life of the Apostle St. Thomas and if it was true that his body was buried in these areas; the same sort of interest was prevalent in the instructions given by his son Dom Joao.”⁷

⁵ As cited in Boxer, 1963, p.37

⁶ The legend of St Thomas had existed since the early days of the Catholic Church. With its creation as an organized body having religious and administrative structures, of the twelve, two apostles moved away from Palestine – Santiago towards Spain and St. Thomas towards India. Even after the headquarters of the Church shifted to Rome, the preoccupation of the Pope, who was the Bishop of Rome and the head of the new faith, was to establish contact with them and thus with these two centres of the faith.

⁷ Da Asia de Joao de Barros, Decada III, Livro VIII, Edicao Liveraria Sam Carlos, Lisboa, 1973, pp.222.

Moreover, the increasing interest of relocating the Apostle and his Christian community was due to the Crusades. In these Christians of South India, the Portuguese support for their cause.

Another interesting aspect one notes while consulting the sources is that the legend of St. Thomas became localized. Duarate Barbosa, a contemporary Portuguese traveller reveals a fantastic account. According to him, afraid of being slayed for preaching and converting people to Christianity, the saint stayed apart from the people. Further as the story progresses, Barbosa divulges the indigenized myth – Wandering in the Wilderness:

“On a certain day a hunter while walking through the hills, bow in hand, saw a great number of peacocks near to the ground, and in the midst of them one exceedingly great and fair which had alighted on a flat rock. The hunter shot at this and pierced it through the middle with an arrow; both it and the others rose, and flying of through the air it turned into the body of a man. The hunter on beholding this stood astonished until he saw it fall, whereupon he went straightaway to the city to declare so great a miracle and in what wise it had taken place. The Governor of the city with other great men went then to see the place which the hunter

showed to them, and they found that it was the body of Blessed St. Thomas...”⁸

Besides the myth becoming more indigenously legendized, there were parables which added sanctity to ‘Mylapore’ – the seat of St. Thomas martyrdom.⁹ Before the arrival of the Portuguese on the coast of Coromandel, Ludovico di Varthema had visited the coast. Thereupon, a native Christian narrated a story to him which was passed on by his earlier generations. The story proceeds on as –

“... forty five years ago the Moors had a dispute with the Christians, and there were wounded on both sides; but one Christian, among the rest, was much wounded in the arms and he went to the tombs of St. Thomas and touched the tomb St. Thomas with that wounded arm, and immediately he was cured. And that from that time henceforward, the king of Narsinga has always wished well to the Christians.”¹⁰

⁸ Dames, M.L. The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol. II, 1989 pp.127-128. Friar Domingo Navaratte also took note of this Indianized legend in 1670 though to found it difficult to believe – “They recount for a certain truth and a received tradition, that when the Infidels came to kill him, the Saint would transform himself into a Peacock, and get out of that way.” (Cummins, J.S. The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navarrate (1618-86), vol. II, CUP, 1962, pp.299). It is also discussed by H.D. Love who speaks of the place of St. Thomas’s relic as ‘*Peacock-city*’ (Love H.D. Vestiges of Old Madras, vol. I, Asian Educational Services, 1996, pp.286-7, also vol. II, pp.96-102.

⁹ The area where the relics of St. Thomas were found.

¹⁰ Jones, J.W., The Itinerary of Ludovico di Vathema of Bologna from 1502 to 1508, London, 1928, p.72. Varthema also took note about, some Nestorian Christian of Kayankullam: “On this city we found same

The myth of St. Thomas as well as the and its indigenized version as well as the anecdote heard by Varthema can be related to the fact that the early Portuguese settlement on Coromandel were unofficial. It was thought to be an abode of renegades and pirates. From here was conducted the private trade. Nonetheless it faced hostility from Goa. Sanjay Subrahmanyam points that this disapproval was given another twist with the discovery of St. Thomas's tomb in 1518. He observed that - "it enabled Goa to rationalize the extension of its administrative network to extend loosely over Coromandel as well."¹¹

The appointment of Manual de Frias in the early 1520's, as the first Portuguese captain of Coromandel and Fisheries coasts shows that the Estado was trying to rein the area in its control. Resident at Pulicat, this captain was to have jurisdiction over all Portuguese residents on the coast. With the aid of a small fleet, at least initially he was to enforce the issuing of cartazes (passes of navigation) to shipping that operated and around Coromandel. In addition to this, the

(Nestorian), Christian of those of Saint Thomas, some of whom are merchants, and believe in Christ, as we do. They say that every three years a priest comes here to baptise them and that he comes to them from Babylon", p.71.

¹¹ Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *The Political Economy of Commerce Southern India 1500-1650*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p.103.

implication of the indigenization of the legend of Saint Thomas can be understood as an attempt by the Portuguese to gain a position in the local system as well. Thus the loosely governed Coromandel would have a better presence of the Estado which in turn, would enable it to earn profit in the Coromandel-Southeast Asia nexus.

Apart from the legend of St. Thomas, another tradition which gained grounds in the Portuguese mindset was that of Prestor John. In an era when the Islamic invasion of Europe had left it wounded, it was not difficult to hope for and to ultimately, believe in the existence of a great 'Christian' kingdom in Asia.

The contemporaries needed a potential ally to fight against Islam which they contemplated in Prestor John. Before the unraveling of the sea route by Bartholomew Diaz till Cape of Boa Esperenca (Cape of Good Hope) followed by Vasco de Gama to India, the adventurous had traveled to Asia by land. Whether it was the thirteenth century Venetian traveller, Marco Polo or Odoric of Pordenone in the early years of the fourteenth century, all of them tried their hands to search for Prestor John, besides accomplishing their basic motives.

Along with these myths there also developed an image of the undiscovered people. This was not of so great a consequence in Asia as in Brazil because the Europeans were indirectly acquainted with the former while the latter was newly discovered. In an age when the reality was not known, and the awareness of other cultures was negligible, it is perplexing to define the contemporary views as ethnocentric. Michel de Certeau while discussing Montaigne's "*Of Cannibals*" provides an excellent example of how the image of the 'other' is created in a narrative. He says that "the discourse about the other is a means of constructing a discourse authorized by the other"¹² The three stages discussed by him in this essay are – the outbound journey, where there is the search for the strange, which is presumed to be different from the place assigned to it in the beginning by the discourse of culture; the depiction of savage society, as seen by a "true" witness; and lastly the return voyage, the home coming of the traveler – narrator.¹³

Michel de Certeau provides a deeper insight which can be used as a reference point in our area of concern, but in a

¹² de Certeau, Michel, *Heterologies, Discourses on the Other*, Minneapolis, 1986, p.68.

¹³ Certeau, 1986, pp.69-70.

limited way. It is quite obvious that the different culture on the shores of the Indian Ocean invited comments on the ways of living and the customs and traditions of the people. Our sources are copious about them and the descriptions are similar. But the image of the 'other' which some of them have portrayed about a few niches of Southeast Asia holds attention.

In the contemporary texts, the usage of the terms like Moor, Heathen, pagan, gentues, barbarian is often noticed. Most of the places which were under the consideration of our narrators pertained to the insular part. Either these places were invited by our eloquent orator or it was a method employed to justify the exploitation of the indigenous lot. The Moluccas which was the spice producing zone caught attention. Varthema commented on the people that – “they are very weak of understanding, and in strength they have no vigour, but live like beasts.”¹⁴ Such a remark suggests that it was a pre-conceived notion and it is doubtful that Varthema ever visited the region. Barbosa opined about the people of Celebes as ‘*flesh-eater’s*’ which he justified by saying that “*if the king of Maluco wishes to put to death any person condoned*

¹⁴ Jones, J.W., 1928, p.88.

by law they beg for him to be delivered to them to eat as if they were asking for a pig."¹⁵ This note makes our contention strong about the sort of conception the travelers had.

There were other instances which seem to show that the local population tried to instill fear in the minds of our narrators so that they kept away. Describing Sumatra, Barbosa speaks of the Kingdom of Aru which comprised of Heathens who were flesh eaters. Continuing further, he mentioned that "*every foreigner when they can take they eat without any pity whatsoever*".¹⁶ This could however be an exaggeration, for another contemporary Pires acknowledges that:

¹⁵ Dames, M-L, II, 1989, p. 205. It was not only the eastern most part of the archipelago about which the Voyagers wrote in such a way. The people of Java were also described as *flesh eaters* and Varthema goes on as – "when their fathers become so old that they can no longer do any work, their children or relations set them up in the market-place for sale, and those who purchase them kill them and eat them cooked. And if any young man should be attacked by any great sickness, and that it should appear to the skillful that he might die of it, the father or brother of the sick man kills him, and they do not wait for him to die. And when they have killed him they sell him to others to be eaten." <Jones, 1928, p.91>. It is surprising to note that Mandeville, travelling in the early 17th century when the entire insular region had been explored also took note about the Sumatrans that "they have an evil custom among them, for they will gladly eat men's flesh than any other" (Letts, Malcolm (trans), Mandeville's Travels vol. 1, The Hakluyt Society', London, 1953, p.127. This might be a an interpolation or the European concept of showing the other as inferior.

¹⁶ Dames, II, 1989, p.188; Barros (Decada III, Livro V, Capitulo I, p.119) says about Aru as: "the Heathen who dwell in that part of the Island which is over against Malacca, and that tribe thereof which they call Battas, who eat human flesh, the wildest and Fiercest people in the whole world.

“the people of Aru are presumptuous and Warlike and no one trusts them. If they do not steal they do not live, and therefore no one is friendly with them.”¹⁷

There is a sharp difference in the perception of Barbosa and Pires. Probably Barbosa did not like the nature of the people of Aru which made him simply regard them as ‘flesh-eaters’. The later writings contest such views. John Crawford, a high authority on the themes pertaining to Southeast Asia condemned them and termed it to be false and worthless. Writing in the late 19th century, Alfred Russel Wallace with a refined bend of mind observed that:

“Men of a superior race freely trade with men of a lower race. It extends trade no doubts for a time, but it demoralizes the native, checks true civilization, and does not lead to any permanent increase in the wealth of the country.”¹⁸

Thus the accounts we have come across above are mild when compared with those of the ‘New World’. Those pertaining to Americas are obsessed with Cannibalism and savagery.¹⁹ First of all, either it was the discourse of Varthema or

¹⁷ Cortesão, A. vol. I., 1990, pp.148.

¹⁸ Wallace, Alfred Russel, *The Malay Archipelago*, London, 1894, p.73.

¹⁹ For further reference, see, Michael Palencia Roth, *Cannibalism and the new man of Latin America in the 15th and 16th century European imagination*, *Comparative civilizations review*, Carlisle, PA, 1979.

Barbosa or Barros, the construct of the other was authorized by the other. Secondly, the three stages identified by Certeau can be liberally applied for most of the itinerants proceeded with the idea of visiting east which was acclaimed for spices. The claims made by the early travelers are not entirely true. They either never visited the concerned area and just gave an hypothetical account or even if they ventured, they revealed a similar picture so as to subjugate the 'other'.

The myths and theories discussed above were a part of the mindset. Though they did not have any immediate consequences but they had always been present latently in the thought. Hence it was necessary to discern them to understand the Portuguese conquest and expansion in Asia. Most of the monarchs of Portugal were preoccupied with the maritime expansion. Bailey W. Diffie observed that the growing wealth and the increasing importance of the Portuguese merchant class and those of foreign merchants who were using Portugal as a base, was exclusively confined due to trade in goods for which the Portuguese had hold in northern Europe, Spain, Granada & North Africa. This

experience helped Portugal in preparing for an overseas expansion that was to come in the 15th century.²⁰

Among the authors who wrote about the European expansion, the early ones followed the traditional view by allocating the chief role to the Portuguese rulers. They described the works of the kings and specially accoladed Prince Henry for his efforts. They also ascribed the establishment of the 'school' of Sagres which was taken note by Samuel Purchas in the 17th century. Ever since then it had caught the attention of the writers. Donald F. Lach, an exponent on the theme remarked about the development of the port of Laiges as harbour by Prince Henry at Sagres from where "he regularly sent out small expeditions into the Atlantic and down the African coast."²¹ Diffie argued the theory of the existence of 'school' at Sagres and said that it was just a legend which grew in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and moreover Barros (who in acclaimed to have written about this 'school') noted nothing about it.

²⁰ Diffie, Bailey W. and Winius, George D., Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1977, pg.41.

²¹ Lach, Donald F., Asia in the making of Europe, Vol. I, Book one, Chicago, 1965, p..52.

Amused with the concept, Diffie remarked - "*it is the kind of legend that is too romantic to be relinquished.*"²²


2.2 Cartography

The progress made by the Portuguese in the field of cartography showed their anxiousness to discover the east. The maps which came into being in the sixteenth century had a long-drawn tradition. The conception of the world which the Europeans had, was derived from the Bible, classical antiquity and the Middle Ages. Of the five known zones of the world, the two polar zones and the equatorial, were thought to be inhabitable till the fourteenth century. Even with the ever increasing geographical knowledge, fable still vied with it to form the conception of the world. Besides, the understanding of geography was based on Ptolemy's concept of the world.

The Portolan charts which were practical mariners maps were different from Ptolemy's delineation of the World. The earliest one, dated around 1300 A.D., was not simply a graphic representation of the World, but also had comments by the seamen. The Catalan atlas prepared for Charles V, the King of France in 1375 gave a comprehensive picture of Asia and was the most celebrated one till the sixteenth

²² Diffie and Winius, 1977, p. 116.

MAP-1




SOURCE : THOMAZ , L.F., F.R. , "THE IMAGE OF THE ARCHIPELAGO IN PORTUGUESE CARTOGRAPHY OF THE 16th AND EARLY 17th CENTURIES" IN KRATOSKA, P.H. (ed.), SOUTHEAST ASIA COLONIAL HISTORY, Vol.I, ROUTLEDGE, 2001

century. With this background, along with the unleashing of the cape route to India and as a response to the growing needs of trade and sea faring, Portuguese cartography developed quickly. But it is interesting to note as Luis Filipe F.R. Thomaz points that there were no maps known immediately after the voyages of Vasco da Gama (1497-1499) and Pedro Alvares Cabral (1500-1501).²³ Also the traces of Ptolemaic influences or of Marco Polo are scarce in them, according to him


Most of the Portuguese maps were nautical which meant that they were intended for sailing and not for providing an image of land or depicting the shape of the World. Thus they gave all practical details to the sailors like the mouths of rivers, capes, reefs, islets so that they could change their course in case of danger or simply note it as a milestone in their voyage. A Portuguese chart of 1502, Cantino Planisphere (see Map-1), for the first time since the Catalan Atlas, gave the Indian peninsula its true shape. It also depicted the Malay peninsula, although it was too wide and extended too far in the South. Nevertheless this map gave

²³ Thomaz, Luio Filipe, F.R., "The image of the archipelago in Portuguese Cartography of the 16th and early 17th centuries" in Kratoska, Paul H. (edt). South East Asia Colonial History, Vol. I, Routledge, London, 2001, p.47.



SOURCE: THOMAZ, L.F.F.R., "THE IMAGE OF THE ARCHIPELAGO IN PORTUGUESE CARTOGRAPHY OF 16th AND EARLY 17th CENTURIES" IN KRATOSKA, P.H. (ed.), SOUTHEAST ASIA COLONIAL HISTORY, VOL. I, ROUTLEDGE, 2001.

MAP-2



SOURCE : THOMAZ, L.F.F.R., "THE IMAGE OF THE ARCHIPELAGO IN PORTUGUESE CARTOGRAPHY OF 16th AND EARLY 17th CENTURIES" IN KRATOCKA, P.H. (ed), "SOUTHEAST ASIA COLONIAL HISTORY VIII", ROUTLEDGE, 2001

an idea of the topography of the region. Infact this map was the first Portuguese representation of the East.

It was only in 1510 AD that the next Portuguese map came into being. Produced by Jorge Reinel, (see Map 2), it marked the chief ports of Asia from where intra- Asian trade was conducted. Moreover a short description about the worth of the port was also given in it. Thus when Afonso de Albuquerque set to conquer Goa and beyond, he had a picture of the East which in a way simplified his conquests. It was only after the conquest of Melaka that the archipelago appeared in the map. Francisco Rodrigues, a pilot cartographer was a part of the Portuguese expeditions sent by Albuquerque to discover the Movuccas, the fabled spice-producing area. On his return in 1512 A.D., he made an atlas (see Map 3), which is regarded as the oldest known cartographical representation of the *Insulinda*. His sketch of the insular Southeast Asia was followed by a number of other representations which finally produced its real image. Hence during the first half of the sixteenth century, Portuguese cartography had reached its zenith, only to be surpassed by the Dutch in the later half.

The development of Portuguese cartography was an important step in its overseas expansion & exploration. In fact the two were related, as noted above. On the one hand, while cartography encouraged and helped in the exploration, on the other hand the exploration made maps more accurate. Furthermore the help secured in navigation from the indigenous pilots led to more effective- exploration. This was followed from the very beginning of their endeavours of maritime expansion. For example, Vasco da Gama took help of an Arab pilot at Malindi in East Africa for further exploring in the Ocean. Not only this, till then eastern limits of their enterprise which was Ceylon, the main informants were again the Arab pilots. It is interesting to note a contradiction here, that the people from whom the Portuguese secured assistance were their religions and commercial rivals. Furthermore, during their expedition in insular southeast Asia they sort the help of the Malays, who were known for their seafaring tradition.

2.3 The Estado in Southeast Asia

The first Portuguese who arrived in the Straits of Melaka in 1509 AD saw a flourishing trade at the entrepot of

Melaka. The Arabs, had a notable presence as a trading community in Southeast Asia. So much so that Varthema who travelled in this region just before the arrival of the Portuguese, had to dupe his identity and call himself a Persian²⁴ Besides the Arabs, there were many other communities which were involved in trade.

While describing the role of Xabamdar in Melaka, Pires took note of the trading communities there: the Bunauqujim (kelings), Bengalees, Pegus, Pase, Javanese, Maluccans, Banda, Palembang, Tamjompura, Lucoes, Chinese, Lequeos, Chancheo and Champa.²⁵ The amalgamation of so many different communities at Malaka is significant from the view of cross – cultural interaction. According to Philip Curtin, “cross -trade has almost always been carried out through special institutional arrangements to help guarantee the

²⁴ The narrative by Varthema (Jones 1928, p.82) concerns with Pegu. When the King of Pegu questioned the identity of Varthema and his companions, they revealed themselves as Persians. Thus the King agree to their request of selling their produce. The dialogue which follows provokes interest. The King began to say: “That he had been at war with the King of Ava for two years, and on that account he had no money; but that if were willing to barter for so many rubies, he would amply satisfy us.” We caused him to be told by these Christians (i.e. the other groupmates) that we desired nothing further from him than his friendship – that we should take the commodities and do whatever he pleased to develop ties. On a number of other occasions, the Portuguese adopted similar tactics to expand safely in the region so as to monopolise the trade.

²⁵ Cortesão Vol.II, 1990, p.265.

mutual security of the two side.”²⁶ As far as Melaka is concerned, there existed a structure before the arrival of the Portuguese which had provided an incentive to the growth of cross-cultural trade.

The structure of administration in Melaka was oriented in such a way so as to ease commerce. The significance of this port-state is best asserted by Tome Pires-

“Malacca is a city that was made for merchandise, fitter than any other in the world; the end of the monsoons and the beginning of others. Malacca is surrounded and lies in the middle, and the trade and commerce between the different nations for a thousand leagues on every hand must come to Malacca.”²⁷

Due to such a strategic position and lack of a productive hinterland, the Melakan sultanate was bent towards developing trade. Thus trade was the only resource base & so a well-knitted administration was the utmost priority of the Sultans. In the hierarchy of the office, there was the Paduca Raja or Captain - general who was a Viceroy and was next to the king. The next in the line was the Bemdara who assumed the highest position when there was no aforesaid official.

²⁶ Curtin, Philip, Cross -Cultural trade in World History, Cambridge, 1984, p.1.

²⁷ Cortesão II, 1990, p.286.

Besides being a sort of chief justice in civil and criminal matters, he was also in charge of the King's revenues. He had the authority to order a death sentence to anyone irrespective of rank, race condition or status (i.e. whether nobleman or a foreigner) though he had to inform the king and decide it with Lasamana and Tumunguo.

The Lasamana or admiral was the chief of the fleets at sea. As he was the King's guard, his position rose at the time of the war. The chief magistrate was called Tumungo who also received the dues on merchandise. There were also municipal offices which were called Xabamdares and were four in number. These men dealt directly with the expatriate mercantile communities. They received the Captains of the ships. But a Xabandar could only receive a Captain, whose nationality was under his jurisdiction.²⁸ Further they presented the merchants to the Bemdara and who provided them with all requisites like-allotting them warehouses, dispatching their merchandise, providing them with lodging

²⁸ In the list given by Pires (Cortésão II 1990, p. 265) there are such communities mentioned. As he narrated - "There is a Xabandar for the Gujaratees, the most important of all; there is a Xabandar for the Bunuaqjlim, Bengalees, Pegus, Pase; there is a Xabandar for the Javanese, Moluccans, Banda, Palembang, Tamjompura and Lucaes; there is a Xabandar for the Chinese, Lequeos, Chancho and Champa."

and if merchants required they were provided with the elephants for transportation.

The administrative structure of Melaka hence, provided every opportunity for trade. The much known indigenous source for Melaka, *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu*, also reasoned a well-structured administration for the prosperity of Melaka.²⁹ That is why Varthema was bound to believe that - "*more ships arrive here than in any other place in the world.*"³⁰

Such a place could but, hold any ones attention. In the age of pre-modern commerce, the role played by the polity and the trading communities at Melaka is immense importance. One can actually put these expatriate mercantile communities under the nomenclature of 'Trade diaspora.' Introduced by Abner Cohen in 1971, the concept described

²⁹ *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu* (Brown, C.C. (Trans.) *Sejarah Melayu*, OUP, 1970 p.181), is a compilation of stories about the Sultanate of Melaka. One of the related anecdote goes on as - "when Sri Maharaja had become Bendahara, the city of Malaka steadily increased in prosperity and in population, for Bendahara Sri Maharaja was exceedingly just and humane, clever in his handling of foreigners and skilled in conciliating the good will of the populace. So much so that in ships bound for Melaka from above the wind it was the custom, as the anchor was being weighed, for the master of the ship, after receiving the usual prayer to say :May we reach Malaka safely and see Pisang Jeram, the stream of Bukit China and Benadahara Sri Maharaja!" And the crew would answers, "Ay, ay, Sir!"

³⁰ Jones, 1928, p.82.

*“the interrelated commercial network of a nation of socially interdependent but spatially dispersed communities”.*³¹

Philip Curtin admitted that the organization of the trade diasporas varied widely. Besides the informal ties based on, for example, a shared culture, religion, language, kinship, there were also formal ones with centralized arrangements.³² In the former category, we can put the Keling merchants from the Tamil coast who, it can be assumed, became an important factor in the Coromandel - Southeast Asia trade. It is difficult to compartmentalized them in a particular section because there were a number of factors which made this diaspora to settle in Southeast Asia, trade being the primary one. The Dutch and the English East India Companies fit in the second part along with the Portuguese Estado da India. The role played by the Asian diasporas in the region particular to our theme, was much more than has been assumed. In fact they were the ones who introduced the Europeans in Coromandel- Southeast Asia network, though the Europeans themselves understood the profit incurred in this network once they reached Melaka Although the

³¹ Cited in Wink, Andre, *Al Hind: The making of the Indo-Islamic World*, OUP, 1990, pp.65-66.

³² Curtin, 1984, pp. 2-12.

European stimulus had resulted in the growth of trade on this route, but at the same time we cannot understate the role played by say the Kelings. They had been a part of this network for a long time, so their impact was not felt as profoundly as that of Europeans. Moreover the European enterprise was larger in scale & organized on different lines.

The most distinct example of one diaspora helping the other can be seen in the case of the capture of Melaka. From the days of the arrival of Diogo Lopes Sequeira at the entrepot of Melaka, it was believed by the various group of merchants like Gujaratis, Parsis, Arabs, Bengalis and the Kelings that

“the Portuguese had reached the port, and consequently were bound to come there anytime, and that, besides robbing by sea and by land, they were spying in order to come back and capture it [i.e. *Melaka*] just as all India was already in the power of the Portuguese.”³³

Their apprehension was correct. However, in the capture of Melaka by ‘*Franks*’,³⁴ it were the Keling merchants who played a crucial role by siding with the Portuguese. This was because they saw a potential ally in the Portuguese who were also against their rivals-the Arab and Gujarati

³³ Cortesão, II, 1990, p. 255.

³⁴ A Term used for the Portuguese in many sources like *Sējarah Mēlayu*, *Suma Oriental*.

merchants. So significant was their role that when the Bemdara of Melaka, Nina Chatu (who was a Keling) died, the Portuguese remarked "*May it please our Lord that we do not miss Nina Chatnu, as we all fear.*"³⁵ It was thought by them to have two hundred more Portuguese to uphold Melaka!

The conquest of Melaka by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1511 AD became a significant saga in the writing of the later Europeans. John Crawford, while writing about the history of the archipelago reproduced it as –

"Albuquerque saw Malacca as useless and dreary solitude, and resolve it to repeople it with strangers. He, for this purpose, pursued the wise and solutary conduct of leaving the natives to their domestic laws and usages. He intrusted Raja Utimutis, a Javanese chief, with the administration of the Mahamedan part of the population, and Ninachetnan over the Pagan portion, the former an ambitions chief, who long aimed at the sovereignty of Malacca, and the latter, one who befriended the Portuguese from his hatred to the Mahomedan religion."³⁶

In this passage though there was a bit of digression but the flavour of the event remains. Besides the ones on history, the authors writing about their contemporary times, could also not afford to miss Melaka and its historicity. For example,

³⁵ Cortesão II, 1990, p.288.

³⁶ Crawford, John, 1820, pp. 402-403.

Peter James Begbie, a Captain with the English East India Company in the 1830's, related the seizure of Melaka by the Portuguese in the context of the ongoing Nanning War (1831-32). While giving a vivid description of the prosperity of Melaka and the military encounters of the Portuguese, he gave a detailed account like that of Barbosa or Pires. Having some discrepancies like noting Nina Chatnu as a '*pagan Malay*',³⁷ it is clear that since he was interested in the conflict side of the history, he did not bother to give other details.

Once Melaka was conquered, Afonso de Albuquerque sent men in all those directions from where goods came to Melaka. He sent Antonio de Miranda d' Azevedo to Siam and Pegu, Ruy d' Acunha to Java and Antonio d' Abreu to Maluku. With such embassies he also wanted to assure that the people trading with Melaka should not have fear of the Portuguese for they would preserve rights and given all protection to the dealings,³⁸ as Barros noted. Before Antonio

³⁷ Begbie P.J., *Malayan Peninsula*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967, p.38.

³⁸ Barros, *Decada III, Parte Primeira Livro II, Chapter VI*, 1973, pg 583; It is interesting to note here that the Portuguese inverted the rates paid at the custom house of Melaka. The Christians, that now paid 6% and the Muslims and the Hindus 10% as Thomaz argues (Thomaz, Luis Filipe F.R., "The Indian Merchant Communities in Malacca under the Portuguese

d' Abreu left, Albuquerque sent a Muslim, a native of Melaka called Nehoda Ismail, who regularly traded with the ports of the archipelago in order to facilitate d' Abreu's venture. Thus this merchant was used by the Portuguese to introduce them in a good light in the insular Southeast Asia. Further as Barros said that

“the purpose that had been spread was that this Nehoda was going to fetch clove in Maluku and cinnamon in Banda and in this way would give testimony how peaceful was Melaka and how great protection was given by the Captain to all foreign merchants without the harrassments the used to suffer at the time of the King of Melaka.”³⁹

Thus this was an act of publicity by the Portuguese so as to pave cordial relations in order to monopolise the trade of the archipelago.

Francisco Serrao who was with Antonio de Abreu, as a commander of another vessel in the expedition to the Moluccas became ship wrecked on the reefs of an island, probably Giliang. Fortunately the Portuguese wreckage was spied by a band of Malaysian pirates, who specialized in exploiting such distress. Serrao and his sailors saw them

³⁹ Rule.” in de Souza, Teotonio R. (ed.), *Indo-Portuguese History Old Issues, New Questions*, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1985, p.63).
ibid.

coming and merely lay low, waiting for the cutthroats to come ashore. They then sprang up behind them and commandeered their vessel to the Moluccas, where they were stranded for three years. The King of Ternate on hearing that Francisco Serrao was in Amboina, set for him and received him well in his domain. As Pires noted, "the said King wrote letters to Malacca saying how he and his land were the slaves of the King our lord."⁴⁰ It was only in 1514 AD, when an expedition arrived from Melaka under Antonio de Miranda de Azevedo⁴¹ Thus this contact was the beginning of future Portuguese endeavours in the region. It finally resulted in

⁴⁰ Cortesao, Vol. I, 1990, p. 215.

⁴¹ Barros (Decada III, Parte Primeira, Livro II, Chapter VI, 1973, p. 598), gives an account of Ternate and Tidore which is interest stimulating and on different lines. "In the same year (1513) after the visit of John Lopo Alvin Antonio de Miranda d' Azevedo went with one armada to the islands of Maluku and Banda to load clove, and in the said voyage he lost a junk; And both the Kings there one of Ternate and the other of Tidore competed among themsleves regarding the supply of cloves and the jealousy that always existed between them although the King of Ternate was the son-in- law of the other, married to the daughter of the King of Tidore. In order to establish the peace between the two, Antonio de Miranda d' Azevedo interefered and being afraid that the one in which the Portuguese would settle would become more powerful than the other, each one of them has written to the King Dom Manuel requesting him to build a fortress and giving the reasons for the services that they would give to the King. And as the request of both has created a deep confusion in the mind about where to put up the fortress and as they have an island that was owned by both of them which was known by the name of maqueium it was decided that the fortress would be built there without creating any feeling between them."

building up of the fort of Sao Joao at Ternate in 1522, the first real foothold of the Portuguese in the Moluccas

The becoming of Melaka a Portuguese beachhead, led to the dispersion of trade to a number of other centres as Athony Reid has pointed.⁴² The immediate beneficiaries were Patani, Johore, Pahang, Aceh and Banten - which emerged from obscurity to become substantial states in the sixteenth century. Most of the Gujarati merchants followed the ousted Melakan Sultan to his exile at Pagah, and later on to Bantam the Sultan harassed the Portuguese from there and later on when he finally settled in Johore, he passed the hostility towards the Portuguese, to his successors, who made several attacks and suffered great losses too. In the troubled straits of Melaka was the emergence of Johor, where a part of Melaka's trade shifted with the sovereigns. Pasai in north Sumatra was another part where Muslim merchants moved and from there to Aceh around 1520. The Gujarati Muslims who had moved away from Melaka took refuge in Aceh. It was this place which was to become a chief Islamic centre of the region in the coming years. Not only did the Muslim merchants moved to the places near Melaka but as far as

⁴² Reid, A. 1993, p.209.

Brunei in north Borneo. Besides the Portuguese also in the faced rivalry from the rulers of Britain.⁴³ In the meanwhile, the Malay traders had also transferred their activities to Macassar in South Celebes.

Between 1511 and 1515, a series of overseas ventures were organized by the Portuguese Crown in cooperation with the Keling merchants. The destination from Melaka were either the ports of the mainland Southeast Asia like Martaban or Pulicat on the Caromandel Coast or to the Moluccas in the archipelago besides others. Such ventures led to the emergence of the system of *carreira* (i.e. Crown trade routes) to the east of Cape Comorin too. From the 1520s as Sanjay

⁴³ The conflict between Bintan & the Portuguese Melaka has been noted in detail by Barros. (*Decada Tercira, Livro II, CHapter IV, 1973, pp. 146-151*). "Dom Aleixo de Menezes was sent to Melaka with galleons and ammunition. As a part of the measures to make Melaka secure, Dom Aleixo sent Duarte Coelho to the King of Siam with a letter and gift from Dom Manuel the King of Portugal. This was actually the answer to the gift which the King of Siam had given to the King of Portugal. But this also seems to be an opportunity taken by the Portuguese to strengthen and uphold their ties. Further they requested the King of Siam to send some of his natives to come and settle in Melaka. This was because the Portuguese intended to send away all the Malays, who were Muslims and settle the subject of the King of Siam. It was a way of improving relations on the part of the Portuguese. As the Portuguese felt more secure with the Siamese, they wanted the latter to be a part of the trade at Melaka and that is why the Muslims were as planned, to be thrown out. Further more, when Duarte Coelho while returning from Siam accidentally landed on the coast of Pam, which was ruled by the King of Bintin, he was well-received with the testimonials of friendship rather than getting punished. Since he had bad relations with his father in law, he made himself a vassal of King Dom Manuel promising him to give every year a vase of gold weighing four cates."

Subrahmanyam observed that “the carreira system represented a compromise between Crown and private interests.”⁴⁴ Like the nakhoda (captain of the ship) in the traditional Indian shipping, who had the right to have a cargo space, the captain and the officials of the Estado da India were also allowed the free use of a certain proportion of the cargo-hold, in addition to the salary he secured.

By 1521, the Portuguese had constructed forts in the major niches of the Asian trading network. The extant ones were Sofala (1505), Mozambique (1508), Hurmuz (1515), Chaul (1521), Goa (1510), Cannanore (1505), Calicut (1513), Cochin (15036) Kollam (1519), Colombo (1518), Pasai (1521) and Melaka (1511) - from west to east. On the east African coast, Kilwa (1505-12) Socotra (1507-11) and Anjedive (1505-07) had already been abandoned.⁴⁵

From the above list, it can be discerned that the Portuguese enterprise to the east of Cape Comorin followed the ‘*Guinea model*’,⁴⁶ as postulated by Luis Filipe F.R.

⁴⁴ Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500 -1700: A Political and Economic History*, Longman, 1993; p. 71.

⁴⁵ In Southeast Asia, as Barros (Decada II, Livro VIII, Chapter I, p.241), observed that “fortress of Pacem was the first one upto this date that we have been compelled to abandon due to the fight with those of the land”.

⁴⁶ Cited in Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *The Political Economy of Commerce 1500-1650*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 92.

Thomaz. According to his model, firstly, the fortresses became less frequent and the factories were also placed at distant intervals. Secondly the dominant type of trade was a seasonal one along the coasts. This is noticeable even when the Portuguese enterprise was at its fullest.

The fortresses, east of the Cape Comorin were mainly in Southeast Asia. The western part of the Bay of Bengal was left unfortified. As for this region, it remained for the most part a more *incognitum* as Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Thomaz have pointed.⁴⁷ The reason they cite is that the greater part of the Bay remained a domain of Portuguese deserter and disreputable private trader in the pre-1530 period. Thus there were no fortresses built in Coromandel but the unofficial Portuguese settlements were the theatres for the activities of the Estado. Not only this, as mentioned earlier in the chapter while dealing with the myth of Saint Thomas, the Estado tried to provide religious legitimacy to the region to assure its trade as well as the Gospel.

⁴⁷ Subrahmanyam, Sanjay and Thomaz, Luis Filipe F.R., "Evolution of Empire: The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean During the Sixteenth Century," in Tracy, James D. (ed.) *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 302.

2.4 Coromandel, the Unofficial Realm

The early Portuguese interaction with Coromandel happened as early as 1506, which was purely by accident. They landed in the vicinity of Nagapattinam where they received a hostile reception from the local Muslim traders as a letter from Gaspar da India to the King of Portugal dated 16th November, 1506 suggests.⁴⁸ According to Barros, it was in relation to discover the land of the martyrdom of Saint Thomas that the Portuguese reached Coromandel around 1518. They were in the company of an Armenian called Khwaja Sikander who had already been to Pulicat and had the knowledge of the place where saint Thomas was buried. Barros gave detailed description the venture which is as follows:

“The first news that the Portuguese had about the place where was buried, Saint Thomas is dated of 1517 and is due to Diogo Fernandes and Bastiao Fernandes who in the company of their Portuguese were returning from Melaka in the company of an Armenian named Khwaja Sikander, who was also accompanied by other Armenians. The said Armenians had already been in the city of Pulicat on the coast of Coromandel belonging to the Kingdom of Vijaynagar in the extreme of Cape

⁴⁸ as cited by Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 1990, p.98.

Comorin on his way to Bengal and had knowledge of the place where according to the tradition was buried the body of Saint Thomas. Arriving at the port of Pulicat at a moment in which weather conditions did not allow him to proceed in his voyage, he landed, having this Armenian told ours [i.e. *the Portuguese*] if they were wishing to accompany him to the place where the body of Saint Thomas was buried according to tradition. If they were wishing to go there, what the Portuguese accepted with great pleasure.”⁴⁹

Thus Coromandel which was considered to be peripheral zone by the Portuguese administrators came into limelight. There also developed a clarity about the resources and the strength of the pre-existing commercial network with Southeast Asia. It was only by the late 1520's that the custom of sending a ship annually, on account of the Portuguese Crown crystallized. The development of the *carreira* (navigational line) moved from an initial Melaka-Pulicat-Melaka route to Goa-Pulicat-Melaka-Goa route. The one between Melaka and Pegu now included Pulicat and thus the pattern was Goa-Pulicat-Pegu-Goa route. The inclusion of Pulicat in the *carreira* as well as its beginning and terminal point being Goa shows the increasing confidence of the

⁴⁹ Barros, *Decada III, Livro VII, Capitulo XI*, 1973, pp. 223-224.

Portuguese officialdom on the Coromandel coast. Pulicat, hence, rose to importance & became a tiny, unofficial '*empire within an empire*.'⁵⁰

Though the Portuguese establishment was at Saint Thomas but all the trading was done from Pulicat due to better harbour.⁵¹ A far inferior port to Pulicat was Nagapattinam. Atleast from the Chola times, if not before, it participated in trade in the Bay of Bengal and across to Southeast Asia. Varthema observed it as a large city bustling with trading activities. It was famous for its rice trade and was '*the route to very large countries*,'⁵² as Varthema stated. The port was extensively dominated by Indo-Portuguese and Muslim merchants. The Portuguese probably settled in this port in the mid - 1520's. And it was only after the decline of Pulicat that Nagapattinam rose to prominence in the latter half of the sixteenth century.

⁵⁰ Subrahmanyam 1990, p.102.

⁵¹ Many of the contemporary writers point that the coast had bad harbours. About São Tomé or Mylapur, Cesare Federici also noted it. The authors do not miss Pulicat too which had a relatively good harbour. The famous Pulicat lake in which the ships anchored is mentioned by Streynsham Master in 1679. (Master, Streynsham, Diaries of , vol.II p. 131) as "a great lake of salt water, which communicates with the sea at Pollicat" by which a great deal of trade is carried out.

⁵² Jones, 1928, p. 72.

The Portuguese settlements of Coromandel – Pulicat, Sao Thome and Nagapattinam – had men of influence and prestige resident there by the late 1530's . Around 1542, as Subrahmanyam pointed, the governor and his clansmen were turning away from the traditional focus of the government i.e. the western Indian Ocean to the eastern side. The concern as he say was clearly expressed in two ways. Firstly there was a heavy deployment of Crown vessels in Southeast Asia.. Secondly an elaborate expedition which was eventually unsuccessful, was sent under Jeronimo de Figueiredo to discover the '*Island of Gold*' rumoured to exist near, Sumatra.⁵³ Again from the mid 1540s to the mid 1550s the Portuguese officialdom retained its western Indian Ocean focus. Thus the focus dwindled and it seemed that the only motive of the Portuguese was to maintain such ports which bore them profits. There were factors which were responsible for this like the coming of Basra under the control of the Ottomans, which had made the Portuguese apprehensive about the western Indian Ocean and thus resulted their dwindling policies.

⁵³ Subrahmanyam 1993, pp.90-91.

Thus there was a sort of crisis in the mid-sixteenth century as pointed by Subrahmanyam. The upshot in the rethinking of the high officials seeing the crisis in the Coromandel Carreira led them to introduce two changes. The first one was to withdraw shipping from such lines and secondly to monopolise the Coromandel-Melaka network to prevent the independent Asian shipping. These changes were promptly visible in the 1570s with the full flowering of the concession system. Under this system, those people were granted the concession or right by the King of Portugal to make a voyage between two point in the Indian Ocean in their own shipping, who had rendered services to the Crown. It was also granted in lieu of a salary payment or to enable a Fidalgo to arrange the marriage of his daughter. Hence in part, these concessions replaced old Crown shipping routes (carreiras). With the system of concessions, for the first time, there was established a system of monopoly over commercial routes of the Bay of Bengal by the Portuguese.

Luis Filipe Thomaz has posited the existence of a '*second wind*'⁵⁴ as a consequence of the concession system, in

⁵⁴ Cited in Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *Improvising Empire Portuguese Trade and Settlement in the Bay of Bengal 1500-1700*. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1990, p. 35.

a closely argued article on the Portuguese in the sixteenth century Indonesia. From his study, it emerges that it is demonstrably false to treat Portuguese official policy with respect to their own participation in Asian trade as a unity during the sixteenth century. He rather shows that there were significant differences between policies followed in the course of century, and that for form being random, these changes evolved in a particular direction. The concession system was an important result of these changes. These changes appear to have arisen due to the Counter - Reformation, the attention diverted to Atlantic trade and Brazil and the successive financial crisis of the Estado da India.

Under this system of concessions, direct trade between Nagapattinam and Melaka was forbidden in theory. This was because, such a voyage would infringe upon the monopoly right of the concessionary who navigated from Sao Thome to Melaka. But the documentation testifies that these monopolies were in fact rarely effective. Subrahmanyam has pointed out.⁵⁵ The Italian ceasare Federici, who passed through Coromondel in around 1570, speaks of two '*greate ships*' that leave Sao Thome each year, the one bound for

⁵⁵ Subraymanyam, Sanjay, 1990 (b), p. 191.

Melaka & the other for Pegu; these were apparently the concession vessels.⁵⁶

By the end of the century, when Pulicat was on its decline. It was Nagapattinam and Masulipatnam which had gained importance. Such was the state of Pulicat that Jan Huygen van Linschoten did not mention it among the principal ports of Coromandel in the 1580s.

Thus, the late sixteenth century was a period of profound change in the Portuguese Estado da India. We have already noticed this in the case of Coromandel. The insular Southeast Asia and especially Melaka were no exception. Melaka witnessed an increasingly hostile environment. The Sumatran Sultanate of Aceh which was one of the rivals of Portuguese Melaka. The Acehnese attacked Melaka and laid sieges on it on numerous occasions of which the most celebrated ones were of the late 1560s and early 1570s. Despite their defeat, there remained an unfriendly atmosphere in the region. Moreover Islam was spreading in Java, Borneo or Maluku and the Catholic missionary pressure increased the propensity of Portuguese for religious

⁵⁶ The Voyage of Master Caesar Frederick into East India and beyond the Indies, Anno 1563 in Hakluyt, Richard (ed.), *The Principal Navigations, Voyage, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, Vol. III London, pp. 229-31, 251-5.

intolerance. Moreover the Portuguese lost direct control of the niches in Maluku and Banda in the 1570s which fell increasingly into the Javanese hands.

In the sixteenth century hence the Coromandel coast and Southeast Asia underwent changes. These changes were brought about by the Portuguese as a state as well as private traders. Their presence by end of the century was felt everywhere in Asia. Most of the lines of trade, in theory, were under their control, but there were loopholes. In the first four decades of the sixteenth century, their main concentration was on Southeast Asia with Coromandel also gaining attention along with. They were introduced by the expatriate trading communities at Melaka to the trade of the archipelago as well as that of coromandel. In the second half of the 16th century, there were changes which have been termed as the 'second wind'. An important element of this process was the concession system through which the Portuguese tried to monopolise the network of trade across the Bay of Bengal. Thus in the sixteenth century, the Portuguese had establishments mainly at Pulicat, Sao Thome and Nagapattinam, on the Coromandel coast and in Southeast Asia, they had fortresses at Melaka, Amboina,

Ternate, and also strongholds at Tidore, Solor, Amber and Timor. Most of these ports were to face the brunt's of Luso-Dutch conflict in the coming seventeenth century when purse and sword became even more important.

CHAPTER 3

THE DUTCH CHALLENGE TO THE PORTUGUESE HEGEMONY, 1600-1662

- 3.1 Portugal, Holland and Spain, their relations before 1600.**
- 3.2 The Dutch East India Company as a trading organization.**
- 3.3 The first phase : 1600-1641**
- 3.4 The second phase : 1642-1662**

The year 1600 marks the coming into being of a novel element in the European overseas activities. This was the founding of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, the United Dutch East India Company or VOC and the English East India Company. Their predecessors, Spain and Portugal respectively had expanded on entirely different lines as regards to the maritime expansion. The Portuguese overseas endeavors were driven by the initiatives taken by the Crown under the name of Estado da India. In Spain on the other hand it was important to channelize the surplus of soldiers. So the crown initiated the soldiers in the maritime

expansion. Due to the different motives but expansionary zeal led the companies to dominate the commercial world of Asia.


The Portuguese had monopolized of the trading networks of the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century. The entry of the Dutch in this theatre was bound to have repercussions. As the Dutch also concentrated on the spice trade, it resulted in their establishing contacts with Coromandel. This is evident as early 1612 when the Coromandel textiles were noticed as the trading item in the Moluccas. Hendrick Brouwer, a Governor General of the VOC noted that the Coromandel coast was the *"left arm of the Moluccas and the surrounding islands because without textiles that came from there [the Coromandel coast, the trade in the Moluccas will be dead."*¹ It would thus be interesting to study the challenge posed by the VOC on the century-old Portuguese hegemony.

3.1 Portugal, Holland And Spain Their Relations Before 1600

The Iberians - the Portuguese and the Spaniards had always had antagonistic relations between them. On the



¹ Cited in Prakash, Om, the Dutch Factories in India 1617-1623, Munshiram Manoharlal publishers Private Ltd. Delhi, 1984 p 2.

MAP - 5



SOURCE : THOMAZ, L.F.F.R. , "THE IMAGE OF THE ARCHIPELAGO IN PORTUGUESE CARTOGRAPHY OF 16th AND EARLY 17th CENTURIES" IN KRATOSKA, P.H. (ed), SOUTHEAST ASIA COLONIAL HISTORY, VOL. I, ROUTLEDGE, 2001

MAP-4



Two sketch-maps to illustrate the *demarcación* of the Treaty of Tordesillas, based alternatively on the league of 3 and the league of 4 Roman miles, with the Atlantic *demarcación* laid down 370 leagues W of San Antonio, the most westerly of the Cape Verde Islands.

Key

Demarcación A, based on the league of 3 Roman miles.

370 leagues = 1110 Roman miles = 888 nautical miles.

888 miles in the latitude of San Antonio (17°4'N) = 928.9' or 15°24'.

San Antonio (W Point) is 25°22'W of Greenwich.

The *demarcación* is 25°22'W + 15°24'W = 40°46'W of Greenwich.

Demarcación B, based on the league of 4 Roman miles.

370 leagues = 1480 Roman miles = 1184 nautical miles.

1184 miles in the latitude of San Antonio = 1238' or 20°36'.

The *demarcación* is 25°22'W + 20°36'W = 45°58'W of Greenwich.

whole it was the mutual dislike between the two which had bedeviled their relations more frequently from around the fourteenth century. Since both of them had intentions for overseas expansion, the hatred became more obvious with time. With the Roman Catholic church favouring Spain, it was obvious for the Portuguese to react. In 1494, as a measure to mediate peace, the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed between the two. Its outcome was that it drew a notional line of demarcation through the Atlantic Ocean and continental South America separating the world, including the Oceans into an exclusive Portuguese zone to the east and a Castilian one to the west of the line. (See Map 4)

The Voyage of Magellan, however, opened the chapter again as he emphasized that the Moluccas (which was the Portuguese stronghold) lay in the extreme east of the Portuguese territory, (according to the Treaty of Tordesillas) and so should be a part of Spain. The problem was further aggravated due to vague and inaccurate maps based on Ptolemy's concept of geography which placed the Malay Peninsula too far in the east. So important was this notion that the cartographic representation of Diogo Ribera's map of 1525 gave this impression. (See map 5) The places marked

were: the southern part of the Malay peninsula, the east of Sumatra, the north coast of Java & Timor, some neighbouring islands, the Bay of Brunei with a small portion of the north coast of Borneo , and the Moluccus group with the west coast of Geilolo or Malmahera and the southern extremity of Philippines. Thomaz while analysing it observed that "Diogo Riberio was at the service of the Emperor Charles V, King of Spain. Therefore he is inclined to exaggerate the breadth of the Bay of Bengal and of the Archipelago in longitude, so that Moluccas might fall within the Spanish hemisphere."²

A second division of the world was done in 1529 by the Treaty of Zaragoza. It divided the Asia Pacific region into two mutually exclusive Spanish and Portuguese spheres of interest. With the exception of the Philippines, most of the Southeast Asia fell within the Portuguese sphere. However the Spaniards were still stubborn about the question of Moluccas. Their claims were based on their own interpretation of where the Tordesillas line fell, on the other side of the world. George Winus points out that the issue over the latitude of Moluccas had not been resolved moreover it became all the more difficult when longitude was almost

² Thomaz, in Kratoska (ed.) 2001, Pg. 53

impossible to determine with any certainty.³ This long dispute was finally settled in 1529. The Spanish monarch pledged his claims to the King of Portugal in return for the loan of a large sum of money. Though this Luso-Spanish rivalry in the Indonesian archipelago was short lived, but during its tenure, it was quite disturbing for the Portuguese. Moluccas, as we know, were their prized possession. Besides the Spanish had an upper hand in the overseas expansion. Thus this conflict though short lived was important for the Portuguese.

The unification of Spain & Portugal took place in 1580. Between 1580 and 1600, some ambitious projects for territorial expansion were adumbrated at Manila, Malacca and Goa in the name of the Cross or the Crowns, which did not have any result⁴. It was the indigenous polities who rivaled the Portuguese presence that became the prey of these projects. Aceh was one of them. Of the many attacks this Sumatran polity had laid on the Portuguese Melaka, the latter never succeeded in fighting an offensive war against Aceh.

³ Diffie & Winius, 1978, Pg. 282

⁴ Boxer, C.R., "Portuguese & Spanish Projects for the conquest of South east Asia, 1580-1600, from his own collection, Portuguese conquest & commerce in South Asia 1500-1750, Variorum, Great Britain, 1990 Pg. 119

One detailed plan for an attack on Aceh was put forward by Dom Joao Ribeiro Gaio, Bishop of Melaka in 1584. Based on the intelligence report of certain Diago Gil, who had been a prisoner at Aceh for many years and had enjoyed a considerable freedom of movement. It described all the places from where the army could lay attack and even suggested tactics to be adopted.

The Bishop, presumably echoing his informants view stated the expeditionary force from Goa should comprise of at least four thousand Portuguese, exclusive of mariners, auxiliaries and camp followers. Moreover the said Bishop also advocated the capture of another enemy of Portugal, Johore and the recapture of Ternate. He further recommended that after these ventures; Siam, Cambodia, Cochinchina (Vietnam) and China should be conquered. Though Proposals for the invasion of occupation of Aceh were discussed in Lisbon, Goa & Melaka throughout the 1580's, but all went in vain. During his stay at Goa between 1584 & 1588, the Dutch traveler, Jan Huygen Van Linschoten noted

"It was long since concluded and determined by the king of Portugal and his Viceroy, that the isle of Sumatra should be conquered, and at this present there are certain captains, that to the same end have

the Kings's pay, with the title of generals & chief captains, or Alelantado of this conquest, but as yet there is nothing done therein, although they do still talk there of but do it not.⁵

Again, in the 1580's, the Spaniards at Manila sent two expeditions to the Portuguese to help them to retake Ternate from Sultan Kechil Babullah, but it was a failure. Patani was also given a thought by the Iberians, however, it merely remained a thought. Thus there projects just remained ambitious.

The Dutch and the Portuguese enjoyed amiable relations in the sixteenth century. In Europe, the Dutch ships transported the spices and other Asian products between Lisbon and Northern Europe from the reign of Dom Joao III. Besides this, the accounts of the Dutch travellers like Dirk Gerritsen Pomp & Jan Huyghen Van Linschoten are full of appreciation for the Portuguese. They travelled to India in the Portuguese employment and this illustrates that the relations between the two powers were easy and cordial. The relations remained the same after the implication of Spain & Portugal.

⁵ Tiele, P. A. and Burnell, A.C. (edt.). *The Voyage of John Huyghen Van Linschoten to the East Indies*, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1885, PP 32-33.

In the first Dutch passage to Asia in 1595 there seems very little anti Portuguese motivation. The situation could have become sensitive between the Dutch and the Portuguese if the latter acted on the orders of the Spanish King.

It was only in 1601, that the trouble started. There had been many independent voyages to the Moluccas till 1601 and a highly successful one was by captain Jacob Van Neck, of the Amsterdam Code Compagnie. When the said captain reached Ternate, he learned that the crew of a Dutch Ship has recently been massacred by the Portuguese visiting the nearby Tidore. To exact revenge Van Neck attacked Tidore, but was beaten off by the Portuguese. He tried to make contacts with the Portuguese later in his journey, but failed to do so.

Such an encounter was to have explosive results and it had, as is seen in the attack of the homeward-bound Portuguese ship, Santa Catarina in June 1603, captioned by Jacob Van Heemskerck. The matter was again revived when a Dutch factor, Apius, who returned to Europe via Goa, revealed that except him and two other, the crew had been executed by the Portuguese. From this time onwards, the Portuguese were identified in the Dutch documents as 'the enemy' and were lumped together with the Spaniards as if undifferentiable.

Thereafter as Blusse & Winius point, the Dutch applied to their East India dealing exactly the same formula applied to the Spaniards: "*do the enemy as much damage as possible*"⁶

3.2 The VOC as a Trading Company

In order to understand the conflict it is must to know the inception of the Dutch East India Company and its proforma for the east. The constitution of the company was embodied in the charter adopted by the States General on 20th March 1602, by virtue of which the company came into existence. The previously existing companies at Amsterdam, Hoorn Enkhuizen, Rotterdam, Delft and Middelburg became chambers in it. Its central management was assigned to the court of Directors - Heeren XVII-consisting of seventeen delegates from the chambers. Of these, the majority consisted of those from Amsterdam (who were eight) and Zeeland (who were four)

The meetings of Heeren XVII were held twice a year and if further negotiations were urgent, they took place in a subcommittee, Kleine Zeventien. The directors of the chamber

⁶ Blusse, Leonard and Winius, George, the Origin and Rhythm of Dutch Aggression against the Estado da India 1601-1661 in de Souza, Tentonio R (ed.), Indo-Portuguese history. Old Issues, new Questions, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi-1985- pp-77

(the so-called bewindhebbers) were brought in on some of the decisions, but final power vested with the seventeen Gentlemen . With the passage of time, Heeren XVII started appointing committees for treatments of various spheres. Thus four department were distinguished : for receipts, for equipment of ships, for accountancy and for commerce.⁷

It is interesting to take note that around 1600, Amsterdam rose as a centre for trade in Europe. Thus the very foundation of the company and its motives are clear. It was structured to be a pure mercantile organization. From the charter, through which the company was secured, it was pointed that the basic motive behind its formation was to get monopoly of eastern trade. Throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, it sought zealously to maintain and safeguard this monopoly against interlopers and against any attempts at private trade by its officers.

With its expansion and establishment in the east the company extended this concept of monopoly to acquire as much Asian-trade it could. In its early years, it developed the policy of acquiring a monopoly of certain key commodities of

⁷ Glamann, Kristoff Dutch Asiatic Trade 1620-1740, Martimes Nighoff S-Gravenhage, 1981 pp-3-5

the network by controlling the areas of production and supply. This is best evident from Southeast Asia. The spices which had been pivotal items of trade in the world commerce drew their immediate attention.

3.3 The First Phase : 1600-1641

The main aim of the Dutch was to secure a monopoly of spices in Southeast Asia⁸. Besides in the early years, the pattern of their maritime expansion was such as to avoid the area where Portuguese were still strong. This was because when the Dutch attempted to make contact with Gujarat they were intercepted by the Portuguese and executed. In the insular Southeast Asia as early as 1599, a fleet under Wijbrand van Warwijk and Jacob van Heemskerck visited Amboina and the Bandas and concluded treaties with the natives (subject to ratification by the King of Ternate) and left

⁸ John Crawford (Vol. II, 1820, pp 411-413) reasoned the advent of the Dutch in Asia which is as follows - "the inhabitants of the Low Countries, driven from the parts of Portugal and deprived, by the Union of those Kingdoms, of the beneficial commerce which they carried on in distributing throughout Europe the production of the East, obtain at the mart of Lisbon, resolved to proceed direct to the Indies in search of those productions and on. The 2nd of April 1595, a fleet of four ships sailed from the telex for this purpose. The adventures in their intercourse with the natives, behaved without judgement or moderation". This was the prelude to the future Dutch enterprises after the setting up of the VOC.

factories in two of the Banda Islands. Van Warwijk then proceeded to Ternate, where the King, in hope of assistance against the Portuguese and their ally, the King of Tidore, agreed to the establishment of a Dutch factory in his capital. In the following year another fleet arrived under van Neck, and the Portuguese fort at Tidore was bombarded. Around the same time, Steven Van der Hagen besieged a Portuguese stronghold on the Ambonia, though much success⁹.

In 1602, the position of the Dutch was further strengthened when Wolphert Harmenszoon visited Ternate and the Bandas, and concluded an alliance with the chiefs of the latter islands, who agreed to sell their cloves only to the Dutch. Later they were joined by a Spanish squadron from Manila. The allied forces, besieged the King of Ternate, said Berkat in his capital but had to abandon the enterprise due to finishing of ammunition. Thus the king of Ternate and Tidore continued their war banking on the support of the Dutch and the Portuguese respectively. Thus in the opening years of the seventeenth century the nascent VOC had not yet developed any strategic plan or even any fixed pattern of operation. It

⁹ Foster William, *The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas 1604-1606*, Hakluyt Society London 1943 pp-XX-XXI.

'was more in the nature of an impromptu trading presence'¹⁰ as Vink and Winius observe. Moluccas from the previous experiences (as noted above) was preferred due to spice trade besides, the great distance from the real centres of Portuguese power. It was only in 1605 when Fort Victoria at Amboyna was captured from the Portuguese which led to the establishment of an effective base of operation of the VOC. They built a fortress afterwards called " *Nieuw Victoria*" (i.e New Victory) Frederik de Hontman, the celebrated navigator and compiler became the first Dutch governor of Ambon. As an early nineteenth century British Resident at the court of Java John Crawfurd noticed that

"the hatred of the people of the Moluccas towards the Portuguese, made them readily join the Dutch in driving them from the Moluccas but the rapacity of the latter was too open for their artifices, and the natives were scarcely acquainted with them, when they were as desirous of being rid of these new quests as of the former".¹¹

The relevance of this statement is seen as early as 1606. The King of Ternate attempted to league the princes of the

¹⁰ Winius, George D & Vink, Marcus P.M., *The Merchant-Warrior Pacified*, OUP, Delhi, 1991, pp-12

¹¹ Crawfurd, Vol.II 1820, pp-436

Moluccas against the Dutch for their expulsion. Infact by the second decade of the century, the indigenous polities had realised that the Dutch were not less dangerous than their first visitors, the Portuguese.

In 1609, the post of the '*gouverneur generaal*' was created by the company directors in Holland as a means of coordinating activities within Asia. Though the Dutch concentrated in Southeast Asia, the age-old trading link to Coromandel, could not be avoided. The VOC obtained the first of its firman for establishing a factory at Masulipatam from the Qutb Shahi Sultans. But it was still an open question to the company directors what future role would the coast play in their Asian design apart from the fact that its cloth was the only item to barter in the Moluccas ¹². In the following year, a settlement was reached with the local authorities after which a factory was established at Petapuli (i.e Nizampatnam). The firman for establishing a factory at Pulicat was received in 1607. This was detrimental for the Portuguese, who had their settlement at nearby Sao Thome, and had been using Pulicat harbour though now less in use. While describing Pulicat, an

¹² Winius & Vink, pp-12-13

English observer, William Methwold observed the hostile Dutch presence there and it presented "*a badde neihbour to the Portugall*".¹³

In the early seventeenth century the whole of the Southern most India was in theory under suzerainty to what was left of the once mighty Vijayanagara empire. But in actuality, it was the semi autonomous nayaks who were the real local powers. In 1640, Vijayanagara had ceased to exist when it was conquered by Golkanda. Out of the five Islamic dynasties who ruled Deccan, the Qutb Shahis gradually extended their influence on the Andhra coast. The Adil Shahis in the meantime absorbed Gingee with Vijayanagara's decline. To the south of the Coleroon river there remained only three smaller Hindu Kingdoms, all claiming to be heirs apparent to the Vijayanagara's legacy - the nayak of Tanjore, the Thevar of Ramnad and the nayak of Madura¹⁴

Perhaps both the Europeans and the rulers were aware of the relative insecurity of the region and that the establishment of fortified presence was the best guarantee that

¹³ Moreland WH, (edt), Relations of Golanda in the early Seventeenth Century, The Hakluyt Society London 1931, pp-3

¹⁴ Arasratnam, S., Merchants, companies and commerce OUP, 1986 Chapter I - II Raychoudhuri Tapan, Jan Company at work, 1962, Chapter 1.

the Dutch would be willing to remain in it ¹⁵. For example the Nayak of Gingee, Krishnappa gave permission to build a fort at Devanampatnam (modern Fort St. David) in 1608. This concession was given to the Dutch, so as to check the Portuguese and to increase the trade thus the Nayak's Olla (or farman) was stated as

"We promise to protect the Dutchmen who will settle in Tegnapatam to allow them to build a town, to refuse entrance to the Portuguese to whom we shall remain hostile. On the other hand we, the Dutchmen, promise to bring all kinds of goods, to traffic with all traders on the condition that they will pay us for every merchandise excepting rice. We shall also pay 4 for every 100 of our merchandise we carry away from their. Those who have paid once will not pay again. We promise to take the oath and to keep all conditions faithfully".¹⁶

The Portuguese on hearing the news of the farman being granted to the Dutch, their bitter rivals, started exercising much influence at the court of Venkata I the King of Vellore. The said king sent an envoy to the Nayak of Gingee ordering the expulsion of the Dutch from his territory. The disobedience of Krishnappa made Venkata issue another letter

¹⁵ Vink and Winius, 1990, pp - 13

¹⁶ Bahadur, Rao and Srinivasachari, C.S, A History of Gingee and its Rulers Annamalai University, Annamalianagar, 1943, pp-109

reprimanding him of his act and ordering him to act according to the demands of the Jesuit father, i.e. to expel the Dutch. To the king the Portuguese were better friends than the Dutch. Such instances were common. Of all the places it was Pulicat which really witnessed the Portuguese - Dutch conflict for nearly three decades. Though the Dutch had received a farman to establish a factory there, but it was not before 1612 that they could make a settlement. Pulicat became the headquarters on the coast for all other settlements. The Dutch still had to make serious inroads here, which they did around 1612.

The attitude of the Dutch towards the overseas expansion, in comparison to the Portuguese, was an enterprising one. As early as 1608, the States of Holland passed a secret resolution that they would never '*in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, withdraw, surrender or renounce the freedom of the seas, everywhere and in all regions of the world*'. With such a consideration the Dutch vigorously started assaulting whoever they thought was capable to be challenged their authority. Eventually, the States of Holland persuaded the States-General to adopt the same standpoint as passed in the resolution. This was later affirmed by it (i.e. the

States-General) in 1645 that '*the existence, welfare and reputation of the State consists in navigation and maritime trade.*'¹⁷

In Europe the long-drawn war between Spain and Holland was suspended in 1609 which resulted in signing of a truce of twelve years (1609-1621)¹⁸ between them. Among other things it was said in it that the Dutch and the Portuguese should not interfere with each other's trade in the East. But this did not happen so. Instead the conflict between the two picked up pace. It seemed that now the events in Europe hardly mattered for the powers. Rather in Asia it was the quest for monopoly which mattered the most. During the truce what happened in Asia was a series of actions between Spanish naval forces operating out of the Philippines and the VOC fleets in the Moluccas. The Spanish might have pressed the Dutch sorely for a time, but the Portuguese did not take much part in the operations.¹⁹ As a matter of the fact, the

¹⁷ Cited in Boxer, C.R. *the Dutch Seaborne Empire*, Hutchinson, London, 1965, pp 90

¹⁸ Peter Floris, (Moreland, W.H.(edt.), *Peter Floris, this Voyage to the East Indies in the Globe, 1611-15*, The Hakluyt Society, London 1934 pp 21) talks about the truce between Holland and Spain which came into force in the East in October 1610. He pointed that it had little or no effect in the affairs of east.

¹⁹ Blusse & Winius, 1985, pp-77

Spanish and Portuguese do not seem to collaborate with each other against the Dutch during the time.²⁰ The attitude of the Dutch can be seen from the following statement with which, Jan Pietersz Coen, who assured the Heeren XVII in 1614:

“Your Honours should know by experience that trade in Asia is must be driven and maintained under the protection and favour of Your Honour's own weapons, and that the weapons must be paid for by the profits from the trade, so that we cannot carry on trade without war nor war without trade.”²¹

The Portuguese, as has been noted in the previous chapter had enjoyed a monopoly of nearly hundred years in the Asian trade. It can be said that the rulers who had made peace with them had benefited at least in terms of the stability of the trade Siam, for example had been an ally of the Portuguese for many years. So it was obvious that its trading operations were quite stable. But the entry of the Dutch had resulted in a

²⁰ Navaratte wrote - "When Dom John de Sylva was Governor of the Philippine Islands (1609-1616) His Majesty order'd all the Force of Manila and Goa should rendezvous at Malacca, and that the Governor and Viceroy Should go aboard in Person, in order to fall upon Jacatra, and drive the Dutch quite out of India (1616). Governor de Sylva came with five mighty Ships [to Malacca] where he awaited the Viceroy, of Goa two Years, but he is not come yet!..... All that ever spoke of this Subject say, that if his Majesty's Orders had been obey, the Dutch had infallibly been ruin'd and expell'd India". (Cummins, II 1962, p. 264)

²¹ Boxer, 1965, 96

dislocation of trade as observed by Peter Floris²² in 1612. This could as well be applied to the other regions, specially the Moluccas, where during this time the Dutch presence was strong. But at the same time, one cannot be so harsh on the Dutch as if their entry caused the dislocation. The Portuguese, as is known, were a declining power and so a partial blame can be put on the functioning of the Portuguese system. Moreover, it can be reasoned out that when any new power tried to monopolise an existing market or a production area, there were disturbances till the time, the system got adjusted with them. If not, they continued on with other methods.

The Dutch within a small span of time became literally known all over Southeast Asia as well as Coromandel. As early as 1612, the governor - general of the Dutch company came to reside in and around the Malaya Archipelago. His very presence showed the increasing hold of the company in the region. Moreover with the seat of the governor being

²² The comment made by Floris [Moreland, W.H. (edt.) Peter Floris, his Voyage to the East Indies in the Globe, 1611-1615, The Hakluyt society, 1934, pp XXV,] who was a Dutch and travelling in an English ship, *The Globe*, in 1612, is: The recent entry of the Dutch into markets previously monopolised by the Portuguese inevitably resulted in temporary dislocation of trade.

within the region, the discrepancies and the malpractices if done by the company officials, would come in to light. Thus the governor general would be able to solve the matter before it reached its crux.

In 1616, a new southern route (the 'Brouwer Route') was developed directly to Indonesia from the Cape of Good Hope. The Dutch vessels made their way along the Indian coast and often touched Ceylon en route. It seems that the acquisition of cotton cloth for trading in the Moluccas spice market now occupied the minds of the Directors. Initially as has been noticed, the company directors were not sure of the worth of the Coromandel cloth. They realized it when they obtained mace, cloves and nutmeg in silver since money economy was not yet fully developed. Thus this new route also made the Dutch quite known in the region.

The strong Dutch presence could not be avoided by the Portuguese. Several possible solutions were suggested by the men of various ranks in the Portuguese Asia, to counter the ever increasing Dutch presence. One such example is that of Andre Coelho²³, a soldier and a ship's captain with some

²³ Subrahmanyam Sanjay, 1993 pg. 159

knowledge of Asia. He wrote a detailed Relacao in 1621 describing the Dutch possessions and trade in Asia and the means to 'extinguish' them (as he put it). One of the means he suggest was to put paid to Dutch trade on Coromandel is - to state it mildly -somewhat far fetched, involving the monopoly of a dye-wood (Xaia) produced in Mannar. This proposal does not sound as interesting as the other.

His other proposal, which was a more direct one, involved the creation of a fleet of eight galliots. While four of them would wait at the bar of Tenasserim, the other four would attack shipping in lower Burma till 10th of October by this time, most of the ships from Bengal and Coromandel would have arrived. The two sub-fleets would then proceed to Melaka to get supplies only to return in December and January to attack ship along the whole coast from Tenasserim to Arakan. In the month of February, they would make a lighting raid on Masulipatam harbour, *'and will burn in that bay (sic) all the vessels, carracks, sampans of the years and the Dutch, which may be in that port'*. The same would be followed at the Dutch factory of Pulicat, after which the said fleet would proceed on to Galle in Sri Lanka.

It was not so easy to get rid of the Dutch as Coelho had thought. As is well known, the Portuguese were frailing in these parts during the period. The Portuguese could only protect some of their bases of which Melaka was one of them (their stronghold). Their whole energy and resources were involved in this direction. The Dutch could not miss such a bustling entrepot where one could procure whatever one required. Their eyes were set on Melaka as early as the first decade of the seventeenth century. According to F.C. Danvers in 1606, the Dutch had entered into an alliance with the indigenous polities with an view of expelling Portuguese from Melaka. After a serious encounter, which lasted for months the Dutch retreated. Both the side suffered serious losses.²⁴

Ever since then, Dutch had conducted a series of blockades to capture it.

The Portuguese on feeling the Dutch presence, also thought of following the model of the Dutch company. But there was only a limited extent to which they could follow it. Firstly the basis of the organization of the Estado da India was different from VOC. Secondly the Portuguese already had on

²⁴ Danvers, F.C. The Portuguese in India, Vol.-II, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. London, 1966 Pg. 135-139

elaborate local apparatus, which included designated cities with municipal chambers and all sorts of sovereign claims. This could not be simply handed over to the Company. The state in Portuguese Asia already existed ; one could not create a company that would also be a quasi-state, as was the case with the VOC.²⁵ Anthony Disney has pointed out that the Portuguese had an idea of forming a company like the VOC as early as 1618. In the early 1620's the New Christian Merchant and arbitrista, Duarte Gomes Solis actually published a proposal for the formation of a company.²⁶

It was pointed by Frederick Charles Danvers that "the internal affairs of the Portuguese in India that appear about this time (i.e.1615) to have been in a very disordered and unsatisfactory condition."²⁷ Further he mentioned that "the want of funds in India was evidently very great" and at the time when the sinews of war were most urgently required in the struggle of the Portuguese with the English and Dutch, their pecuniary resources here at the lowest ebb." ²⁸ Thus this

²⁵ Subrahmanyam, 1993 Pg 160

²⁶ Disney, Anthony R, *Twilight of the pepper empire: Portuguese trade in Southwest India in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century*, Harvard university press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1978.

²⁷ Danvers, F.C. Report to the secretary of state for India in Council on the Portuguese Records related to the East Indies London 1982.

²⁸ *Ibid*, Pg. 26-27

was the situation of the Portuguese and still some of them like Coelho and Duarte Gomes Solis desired great designs against the Dutch or making the Estado like the VOC. As early as 1608 Diogo do Conto complained that the Indians, no longer termed the Portuguese as Ferenghis (Franks) but Frangoes (Chickens).

The Dutch hence were not an easy power to reckon with and moreover with the Portuguese as a fading power, they had just the right theatre ready for them. This is one of the reasons how the Dutch established themselves in a very short span of time in Asia. The founding of Batavia on the ruins of Jakarta in 1619, as the headquarters of the VOC marked the beginning of true centralization and *modus operandi*. It were the policies of Coen which had created an environment to fill the Dutch coffers. But from 1619 onwards the Dutch had several, formidable problems to face. Perhaps the most important of these was in Java. It is true that the Dutch were already conducting the blockade of Melaka which took most of their navy, but in Java proper they just had a small foothold in Batavia. The two great power in Java were Bantam on the west and Mataram on the east of Batavia . Bantam resented

the loss of Jakarta and also that the Dutch had removed their factory from Bantam which diminished its revenue.

Bantam attacked the Dutch in 1622, but did not succeed. The Dutch retaliated by blockading it for six years i.e. from 1622 to 1628. This was an important contest because Batavia was the headquarters of the Dutch. If the attacks of Bantam had succeeded then it was almost sure that Dutch hopes for supremacy in Southeast Asia would have been seriously jeopardized, if not put to an end altogether. A similar threat came from Mataram when the Sultan, Agung, who was determined to spread his rule all over Java including Bantam. By 1625 he had extended his territories to Madura and Surabaya and declared himself to be the '*Susuhunan*' i.e. he to whom everyone is a subject. For the sake of his prestige, he was anxious that the Dutch should acknowledge his authority. The Dutch however refused to acknowledge. The VOC and Bantam realising the increasing power of Mataram signed a treaty with Bantam in 1628. As per its clauses, the Dutch removed their blockades from Bantam and agreed to

reopen the factory again. The serious attack launched by Mataram in 1628 and 29 was repulsed by the Dutch.²⁹

In the meantime, the Dutch were also occupied with Melaka, besides the insular Southeast Asia. Melaka was an important entrepot which the Dutch had been trying to seize from the Portuguese. On the other hand, it was the port of Pulicat on the Coromandel coast which occupied their attention. The 1630's were crucial in many ways for both the Portuguese and the Dutch. The Portuguese had just tasted a major victory against a besieging Achenese force off Melaka. The dispatch of Nuno Alvares Botelho to the Governor of India from Malacca, dated 8th December 1629 showed the mood of the Portuguese -

"I raised the siege of Malacca; I kept in that the fleet in which I serve; and I completely destroyed that of the enemy; for which infinite thanks be given to God for evermore.³⁰

This success came due to the support of Johore. Its ruler, Sultan Abdul Jamil had arrived with a substantial war-fleet to

²⁹ Moorhead, F.J. A History of Malaya, Vol. II, Longmans, 1963 pp-12-14
³⁰ Boxer, C.R. (trans), "The Achinese attack on Malacca in 1629, as described in contemporary Portuguese sources in his collection, Varorium, p. 19

help the Portuguese and so the tide turned against the Achenese forces.

The defeat of the Achenese at Melaka provided a fillip to trade between Coromandel and Melaka. During this time, central and southern Coromandel were controlled by three rulers from north to south, the last Vijayanagara dynasty at Chandragiri, the Nayak of Senji and the Nayak of Tanjavur.. By the late 1620's the activity of the Dutch was concentrated at Pulicat as they had abandoned their factories in the Seinji Nayak's lands. One of the most celebrated Viceroy's of Portuguese Asia, Dom Miguel de Noronha, Count of Linhares, who was in Pulicat for almost six year in the past - speeded the '*Pulicat enterprise*'.³¹ There was an unusual level of activity. He put forward an idea to throw the Dutch from there. According to his plan, the Portuguese should persuade the ruler of Chandragiri, Venkata III to attack Pulicat by land

³¹ Subrahmanyam Sanjay, *The Pulicat Enterprises; Luso-Dutch conflict in South-Eastern India 1610-1640* in his collection, *Improvising Empire*, OUP, Delhi, 1990 pp 188-215. In the council meeting which took place on 19th April, 1631, a letter of Diogo de Mello was read. In that it was read out : "And that (Diogo de Mello) had sent an envoy to Vijayanagar whose name is Salvador de Rezende, close friend of the royal of that king who was done his utmost regarding the instructions that he had carried with him. The said king of Vijayanagar had swear to us solemnly that he would take the fortress of Pulicat and would give it to us being us on its possession in the same way the Dutch have it and would deliver it with all the artillery and ammunition (Pissurlencar, S.S (e.d.) *Assentos do Conselho do Estado*, Vol. 1 Tipografia Rangel, Bastora-Goa 1953, Doc. 113).

while they themselves would do so by water. Linhares offered 30,000 xerafins in coin, twelve horses, six elephants, and on its capture - the entire contents of the Dutch warehouse. But Linhares proved less than successful largely due to the superior connections of the Dutch with the local polity networks of commerce in and around Chandragiri.

Though Pulicat was the main preoccupation of the Portuguese Tegnapatam and Wagapattinam also occupied considerable attention. It was stated in a letter sent by the King of Portugal to the Viceroy at Goa on 28th January 1634. The said letter appreciated the ways in which the Viceroy dealt with the Naik of Gingee. The document proceeds on as follow

....it seems to me that your diligencies are correct in what concerns the dealing with the Naik of Gingi in order that he would expel the Dutch that have overcome Tegnapatam and would destroy the fortress that they had built. I advice you to try to maintain with the said Naik the best of the relations and with the purpose of friendly good relations and the exchange of gifts if so would be necessary with the aim to maintain him as a friend and confident of the Estado da India and disassociating him from the Dutch and other European enemies. That with the settlers of Nagapattinam must be established cordial relations and granting them all necessary favours in order to get their support. In what concerns the success of

Nagapattinam and what in this place was the Naik of Tanjore performed. It seems to me advisable that the Portuguese would remain there for a longer period considering the acts of vandalism performed against the whole images and the bad treatment of the Naik without having means of self defence".³²

Thus the Portuguese were looking forward to secure the support of the indigenous polities to expel the Dutch. The Portuguese, it seems were too hopeful in making such alliances. Actually the situation they were facing i.e. the continued hostility by the Dutch had made them enter into these understandings. Since the Portuguese saw only the immediate benefits from such acts, without realizing their position in Asia, they favoured the Naiks without any apprehension.

One of the documents related to the council meeting of April 1638, requested the Governor of Manila to join the Portuguese in resisting the Dutch. If the Spaniards were not willing, they should at least send some galleons to the city of Macao to collect the copper, artillery and ammunitions. In the 1630's as we know, it is clear that Spain had neither the

³² Pissurlencar, S.S (e.d.) Assentos do Conselho. do Estado, Vol. II Tipografia Rangel, Bastora-Goa 1953, pp-503

resources nor the will to resist Dutch incursions overseas. The events in Brazil give this impression. As Dutch force took Pernambuco in 1637 and then turned their attention towards the crucial sugar producing area of Bahia in the next year, the Portuguese resentment at what they saw as a Spanish neglect of their overseas possessions grew.³³ The Portuguese in Asia were understanding this approach as in the above mentioned document of 1638. It was said that -

"and that His Majesty would be kept informed of all these dealings of so great importance for His Majesty as well as for the losses that would occur both the ground if it was forbidden the trade the Portuguese with Manila and of the same Manila with that of Portuguese and would show at the same time how great was the benefit handed to the Dutch if this trade was maintained".³⁴

In the meantime the Portuguese were also pre-occupied at in Southeast Asia specially at Melaka. After a number of blockades in the first four decades of the seventeenth century, the Dutch finally took Melaka from the Portuguese on the 14th of January, 1641. They took the help of the King of Johore in capturing Melaka. The understanding with Johore was that

³³ Subrahmanyam 1993 pp-175

³⁴ Pissurlencar, S.S (e.d..) Assentos do Conselho. do Estado, Vol. II Tipografia Rangel, Bastora-Goa 1953, pp Doc. 63, pp-206

the VOC after the capture of Melaka would enable Johore to build its trading network at the cost of Aceh. The Dutch after the seizure kept their promise which transpired in the year from 1641 to 1680.³⁵ Just before the capture of Melaka, the event which the Portuguese underwent also played an important role in their defeat. It has already been noticed that Spain and Portugal were were already drifting apart in the early 1630's. There was a growing resentment among the Portuguese regarding the disconcern of Spain towards it.

The revolt in Catalonia thus presented the Portuguese with a marvelous opening. The Duke of Braganca, Dom Joao IV seized the opportunity in December 1640, declaring himself the King of Portugal. As a ruler Dom Joao IV's first act's were to more for a peace with Holland and ratifying the one with English. Though the peace between Holland and Portugal was signed, but the Dutch refused to accept it in Asia until the points of the truce were officially delivered to them. It was in this period, after the peace had already ;been signed that the Dutch captured Melaka.

³⁵ Andaya Leonard Y. The Kingdom of Johore, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur 1975 pp-35

In two of the correspondences, between the Viceroy at Goa and the King of Portugal (29th December 1637 and 3rd August 1638), the King was informed about the letters, which the Viceroy had received from the President of the Danish factory. The letter from the Danes announced the project of the Dutch against Goa, Melaka and Ceylon. It also mentioned the help the Dutch had received from Holland and the power they enjoyed. Though the Portuguese knew what was going to happen, but due to their declining position they could not do much about it.

The capture of Pulicat by the Dutch in 1640 and that of Melaka in 1641 can be seen to be related. It was the trade in spices which the Portuguese and the Dutch had vied for. The struggle between the two came into light because the Portuguese had dominated the trade for century. Their monopoly was threatened with the arrival of the Dutch. For the Dutch, it was not an open field. But the difference lay in the fact that the Dutch were mentally prepared for this kind of conflict while the Portuguese in many ways were not.

The capture of Melaka by the Dutch has been viewed by the contemporaries as a catastrophe. It was a major blow to the Portuguese body politics. Travelling in 1670, the

Dominican missionary, Friar Domingo Navarrete very aptly commented-

"I shed tears as I walked through those streets to see that country [has been] possess'd by Enemies of the Church, for it is Garden and Paradise in Worldly things, in Spirituals it was once a great colony, and the Church has many children there still, but they are set among bloody Wolves. The women wish they could get away from thence, but are so poor and without help that they cannot, Those who have some wealth are pleased and satisfied."³⁶

This passage by Navarrete gives a feeling that the Dutch had made their presence felt, by violence at the Portuguese stronghold of Melaka.

In order to make their presence felt, the Dutch adopted certain methods. Of the ships sent from Holland, the purpose of most of them was first to unload the goods at the destined port and then sail on as directed earlier or on the orders of the administrative Authorities. This pertained to cruising in the sea. Whenever their services were required either for trade or to face the challenge of the enemy, they were called upon An

³⁶ Cummins, J.S (edt.), The Travels and controversies as of Friar Domingo Navarrete, 1618-1686, Vol-II. The Hakluyt Society, London, 1962, pp-283

example of this is an order of 1617 by the Directors at Amsterdam. It states that --

"..... after unloading the cargo at Pulicat, [they] would cruise against the Portuguese in Ceylon, San Thome, the straits of Malacca or elsewhere at the discretion of the factors at Pulicat."³⁷

This example shows the kind of fear psychosis the Dutch were trying to inflict in the Asian waters. Besides instructions were given specifically to cause damage to the Spanish and the Portuguese vessels as well as to the Indians living under their jurisdiction. The policy of inculcating fear in the indigenous lot would help the Dutch to pace up their ambition to attain monopoly as it would cause a distress among them. In the process they would snap the ties with the Portuguese and abide by the Dutch assuming them to be "*the power*".

3.4 The Second Phase : 1642-1662

The second of the Portuguese and Dutch colonial rivalry can be said to have begun with the proclamation of the ten-

³⁷ Prakash, Om The Dutch Factories in India 1617-1623 A collection of Dutch East India Company documents pertaining to India. Munshiram Manoharlal. Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1984, pp-45

year truce in 1642.³⁸ Though both the sides were to maintain peace for the next ten year, but the hostilities continued. When the Portuguese in a council meeting held at Goa, on the 3rd of October 1642, decided to send a ship to Batavia to make the truce known to them, they meant with a hostile reception -

"Father Frei Goncalo Sao Jose in order to make known to the Dutch superior authority that had its headquarters there, to inform him that his Majesty was wishing to observe it. And that due to the bad weather

³⁸ As Philip Baldaeus (Baldaeus, Philip, A description of the East India, coast of Malabar and Coromandel and also of the isle of Ceylon with their adjacent kingdoms and provinces Asian Educational Series 2000, pp-615-616) noted it was : " a firm Alliance and Truce has been concluded for 10 years betwixt the most Potent Dom John IV, King of Portugal, Algerve, and Lord of Guinea, and of the conquests made on the shores of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India, on one side, and their High and Mightinesses the States General of the United Provinces on the other side, including all the before mentioned Kingdoms, Countries, Provinces, Islands, and other places on both sides of the Equinoctial Line (without exception) all such as now actually are, or for the future may be under the Jurisdiction of the said king and the States-General ; during which space of ten years successively all Hostilities betwixt their respective Subjects shall cease both by sea and Land, cease both by Sea and Land, without limitation or exception of any Places, Persons or Circumstances, as by the Articles of the said Truce, does more amply and fully appear. It is therefore that we are commanded to surcease all manner of Hostilities from this day for next succeeding ten years, according to which all our subject shall regulate themselves, and to take effectual care that nothing may be transacted any wise contrary to the true intent of the Articles of the said alliance and Truce, but to maintain the fame inviolably. And that nobody may plead ignorance in this case, but have ordered these Presents to be published enjoying everybody under severe Penalties, not to infringe any of the before mentioned Articles, as they will answer, the same at their peril."

conditions the ship was not able to leave upto 26th September; when having arrived at the entrance of this port seven Dutch ships were there; They with the purpose to conduct military operations against us and, as in the previous year, to harm us as much as possible. And are not disposed to accept the suspension of hostilities and having declared that they had in mind to conduct acts of war and plunder as it has taken place in the previous years"³⁹

After the conquest of Melaka, there was a desire on the part of the Dutch to normalise the trade which had been disrupted by the long seige. Passes were freely issued from Indian factories to Malacca and orders were placed to stock the place with goods that would be desired by the merchants. The other policy followed by the VOC areas from the monopolistic aims of their commercial policy. In the context of Melaka, it implied Dutch control of the main articles of import and export with a view to dictate prices.⁴⁰ The Dutch were also trying to force the traders to call only at Melaka to transact their business. They also decided on a policy of exclusive contracts with Malay rules to monopolies trade

³⁹ Pissurlencar, Vol-II, Doc. 132, pp-374, 1953

⁴⁰ Arasratnam, S. "Some notes on the Dutch in Malacca and the Indo-Malayan trade 1641-70' in his collection Varorium 1990 pp-481

In Southeast Asia, the Dutch signed treaties with the indigenous rulers. With Sultan of Kedah, it was signed on 18th June 1642 whereby half of the tin produced or imported in Kedah was to be sold to the Dutch at a fixed price. An year later, a similar treaty was signed with the overlord of Junk Ceylon (Phuket). In this one, the ruler promised not to allow any traders from Kedah, Perak, Java Coromandel, Bengal and other neighbouring places unless they had the Dutch passes and had sojourned Melaka besides paying tolls there. With the Governor of Bangery, a treaty was signed in 1645 which implied that all the tin found in the state was to be delivered to the Dutch.

The Sultan of Johore who had helped the Dutch to capture Melaka, had fallen out with them around 1645. He was trying to establish a port to rival Melaka. The Raja of Kedah made several requests to the Governor of Melaka for pass to sail to Coromandel but was repeatedly refused. The cargoes from Coromandel which comprised of cloth were effected by the Dutch policies. The merchants who traded in them had to pay a heavy toll of 10% on cloth. Though there was some relief granted in it, but the merchants always complained of the tariff policy.

Though the Dutch tried to adopt restrictionists policies in case of indigenous rulers and also at the same time were hostile to the other European powers. The Portuguese still bore their brunt. In a council meeting of the Estado which took place in Goa on 6th of February 1642, the Viceroy informed the members who were present that -

'he has been informed through different sources, that the Dutch enemy was preparing itself to attack some of the pracas (military installations) of Colombo, Jaffna, Manar and Saint Thomas and for this purpose have left from Batavia. Six naus and from those that are outside this port have left for to join them and an their way they were in a position to create some damage to the fortress of Canara, Cannanor or Cragnaore, if the opportunity raised they would not miss it. Thus the need of the anticipated the necessary help."⁴¹

The places mentioned in the document actually became the scenes of conflicts in the second phase.

Although the VOC's sphere of activity extended across the Indian ocean but it was only in certain regions that they were able to exercise effective monopoly. In Sir George Downing's words, who was an English envoy at the Hague at the outbreak of the send Anglo Dutch conflict, it was *mare*

⁴¹ Pissurlencar, Vol-II, Doc. - 113, pp-331-332, 1953

clausum in the eastern waters. This meant that the Dutch took measures in the east to carve out sections of the sea and the traffic therein for themselves to the exclusion of other European and Asian traders.⁴² We have already noticed in the previous section that the Dutch had vigorously assaulted Portuguese monopoly in Southeast Asia as well as Coromandel. They disposed off the Portuguese claims & set about to enunciate the principles on which restrictions of various kinds were put.

A good review of their position can be visualized by the General Instructions compiled by Heeren XVII. This was meant to be the guide-line for the Governor General and his council at Batavia and was issued in 1650. The Heeren, XVII explicitly recognized that the Company's trade in Asia could be divided into three categories: Firstly, trade in regions where the VOC exercised unchallenged territorial control by right of cession or of conquest. In 1650 these places were limited to a few islands in the Moluccas and some of the fortified trading settlements like Batavia, Malacca and Pulicat. Secondly, regions where the VOC enjoyed exclusive trading rights due to monopoly contracts negotiated with the indigenous politics

⁴² As cited in Boxer, C.R., 1965 pp-92

such as the Sultan of Ternate and the village headman of Amboyna. Thirdly, trade conducted by virtue of treaties with the rulers *'both on the basis of freely negotiated agreements as well as on the basis of free trade alongside merchants of all other nations.'*⁴³

The years between 1641 and about 1680 represent the height of Dutch maritime influence in the Asian Waters. As far as our region is concerned, by 1662, the Dutch had conquered most of the important niches. The last one Nagapattinam and Tuticorin were captured in 1659 and Sao Thome in 1662. Their other concern in the Bay of Bengal, Ceylon had met a similar fate. Soon after the Dutch take over of Melaka, they seized the Portuguese strongholds of Galle (1641), Negombo (1642), Colombo (1656) and Jaffna (1658). This cinnamon producing island was wholly in the Dutch sway. Thus the seizure of so many Portuguese settlements shows that the VOC was not an easy rival for the Estado do India to combat.

Regarding the Dutch, the captain of the English ship, expedition commented that they trust the English company will not be

⁴³ Boxer, 1965, pp. 94

"Again circumvented by that politick nation, who aspire to the sole trade of India, especially that of spice., which the better to compass, they have for these four months invested Columbo on Zealon with a streight seige, by sea and land assaulted it, and entered the citty, but were suddenly beaten back with great loss; also four of their ships [lost] by fowle weather there; which have been recrewed from Paleacatt [with] much provizion, the seige still continuing, and tis thought they [will go] neere to carry it at last by storme, the Portugall having not eq [ual forces] to oppose or strength by sea to releive it. And for Amboyna, tis wholly reduced to obedience; and the Maccassers utterly routed [with] great slaughter of their people."⁴⁴

Most of the insular Southeast Asia had come under the Dutch occupation by the second half of the seventeenth century. Macassar, which was one of the main markets of species was the only one left on the eastern part of the archipelago which was still not seized by the Dutch. As early as 1601, the Dutch had established a factory here, but when their treaty expired in 1619, Macassar, did not renew it. From the time, a certain hostility developed between the two powers. Macassar looked to Portuguese English, Danish and Chinese traders for support, and indeed these traders flocked to Maccassar in ever

⁴⁴ Foster,, William, *The English Factories in India 1655-1660*, Oxford 1921, pp. 45

- increasing numbers to escape the heavy duties levied at either Melaka at Batavia

Macassar had always provided refuge to the migrators or the escapers. When the Portuguese took over Melaka, many Muslim merchants migrated to Macassar. Achinese attacks on Johore and the blockade of Melaka of the Dutch led Javanese and Malay traders to this southern market of Sulawesi. The disruption of the spice trade in the Moluccas by the Dutch made it a more approachable center for spices. Moreover new production centres developed in the small islands of Ambelau and Manipa, where Makassar traders could more easily buy the cloves without being detected by the Dutch.⁴⁵

Fray Sebastien Maurique, travelling between 1629 and 1643 noticed that during Emperor Sumbanco's tenure, the Portuguese had taken shelter in Macassar⁴⁶. Moreover after the said King's death, his successor Prince Carrim Liquio, was to remain with a regent called Carrim Patingoloa who was a

⁴⁵ Reid, Anthony, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680*, Vol. II- Expansion and crisis, Yale University Press, 1993, p. 33

⁴⁶ Luard, C. Eckford (trans), *Travels of Fray Sebastien Manrique, (1629-1643)* Vol. II: China, India etc., Hakluyt Society, London, 1927 pp. 79. In Manrique's words- "he has been a real father to all the Portuguese who reached his shores in a distressed condition, aiding and assisting them all with paternal solicitude.

Portuguese. Born in Macassar and a follower of Islam, this regent, in Maurique's words was *"in actual practice and in zeal for increasing the lustre of the Portuguese name he could hold his own with those most eager and anxious for the common good and the enhancement of our country's glory"*⁴⁷.

Thus Macassar had immense support of the Portuguese. When the Macassar were engaged in conquest of Boni, Sambawa, Xulla Isles and Butung, they came in contact with the Dutch power in 1655 at the latter's establishment at Butung: Macassar had destroyed the establishment in an effort to conquer Butung. The Dutch determined to take revenge sent a powerful force against the Macassars in 1660. The Portuguese⁴⁸ in 1620 assisted Macassar while the Dutch were assisted by Macassar's enemy, Boni. After a long seije, the ruler of Macassar, Hassan Udin, capitulated and accepted the Treaty of Bongaya in 1668. Thus the VOC ultimately secured a monopoly of the trade in Macassar and insisted that all non-Dutch traders should be compelled to leave the city.

As late as 1670's the Portuguese, either the itinerants or those living in Asia, blamed the Dutch for their decline.

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Crawford, Vol.-II pp. 388

Travelling between 1672 and 1674, the French itinerant, Abbe Carre while on his way to Madras, blamed the Portuguese for their own decline. Pretending to be a Portuguese due to circumstances, Carre questioned his fellow traveler as to why did he have a roaring reaction over the Dutch. The thought, an interesting one, goes on as:

"Why do you blame the Dutch for all the calamities and miserly that your nation has suffered in India? Why do you accuse that nation of baseness? God has used them as He always does, to chastise or abase the pride and haughtiness with which he wished to rule and govern everything. No, no", I said, "you must not rage against the Dutch, but against idolatry, against wild passion to amass treasures, against luxury, against illicit delights and voluptuous excesses. You must denounce all these, for they have ruined our fine government and lost all our credit and reputation, as well as all our trade, our towns, and principal places, and finally have reduced us to misery contempt all over the East"⁴⁹

It is interesting to note how Carre explains to the fellow traveler about the Portuguese decline in his conversation. The entire web of decline was created by the Portuguese

⁴⁹ Fawcett, Charles and Burn, Richard (edt.), *The Travels of Abbe Carre in India and the Near East (1672-74)* The Hakhyt Society, London, 1947, pp 365

themselves. The totally hostile attitude of Carre's fellow traveler can be countered by the consideration the Dutch had, though in their early years. A correspondence by General Coen to Andries Soury at Masulipatam in 1621 adjuncts it. Coen wrote; "*It should be realized that the fort and factories in Coromandel were maintained to carry on profitable trade and not simply to trouble the Muslims and the Portuguese*".⁵⁰

Thus the retreat of the Portuguese in the years from 1610 to 1665 was not only the result out of the rivalry between the Dutch and the Portuguese. The Portuguese retreat was the result of their own design. In this retreat, as Sanjay Subrahmanyam has analyzed, the Dutch acted as the catalyst.⁵¹ The taking of the beachheads like Melaka could not have been accomplished had the local polities like Johore not helped the Dutch. So the Dutch East India Company which at its inception was a pure merchant's combine, enforced its quest for monopoly and acquired the major niches of the commercial world of the Indian Ocean. In October 1664, the Company submitted to the States - General the following list of their settlements in Southeast Asia and Coromandel -

⁵⁰ Prakash, Om, 1984, pp. 169.

⁵¹ Subrahmanyam, 1993 pp. 180

Amboyna; the Banda Islands. Pulo Roon; Ternate and other Moluccas. Macassar and Manado in Celebus; Timor; Bima on Sambawa; in Sumatra, Jambi, Palembang and Indragiri, Melaka , Tenasserim; Junk Ceylon; and factories in Tonquin, Arakan Pegu, Ava and Sirian. On the Coromandel coast, they had acquired Pulicat, Sao Thome, Nagapattinam, Masulipatam and Tuticorin. Hence in a short period of time the Dutch were able to build their presence which posited a strong challenge to the century-old Portuguese hegemony in Coromandel and Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER-4

THE DUTCH COMMERCIAL HEGEMONY AND THE RISE OF THE ENGLISH AS A RIVAL POWER

4.1 The Hostile Dutch Presence and the beginning of English Trade

4.2 The Growth of English Company as a Mercantile Power

The opening years of the seventeenth century saw the rapid growth of the two East India Companies - the Dutch and the English on the Asian Water. Both of them pooled in resources to establish overseas enterprises. While the two companies had many similarities, there were some difference also. The Dutch company was more tightly organized and centralized and far better capitalized from its very inception than its English counterpart. Though the English Company, from the very beginning, was financially and organizationally weak, but it proved itself enough to survive with time.

4.1 The Hostile Dutch and The Beginnings of The English Trade

The concentration of both of the Companies was in Southeast Asia, especially in the insular part due to the lucrative spice trade. The English were bound to follow the Dutch where ever they went for their goals were similar. So the competition with the English East India Company implied a far more serious threat to the Jan company's commercial interests. In 1604, the English East India Company sent its second fleet, which was commanded by Henry Middleton to the Malay Archipelago. The Dutch fleet which was also sent during the same time was commanded by Van der Hagen, these two fleets raced with each other, at moments, to insure that they gain more than the other.

Before the beginning of the English Company's endeavours, Francis Drake had already visited the Moluccas in 1579 during his celebrated voyage round the world. While off Motir, the governor of that island, persuaded Drake to visit the Ternate sovereign, Sultan Babu. So Drake accepted the proposal and on anchoring there, sent a message to its ruler inviting him to exchange commodities. Though it was not a

matter of great relevance during that period, but later on this incident acquired a amount of significance.¹

When the competition between the Dutch and the English gained pace in the Moluccas, the above mentioned visit of Drake gathered importance. The English contended that they had a prior, claim to the commerce of the Moluccas, on the ground that Drake had approached the ruler first for the cloves. Prior to Middleton's visit, the Dutch had already tried to tarnish the image of the English in as early as 1596. A memoir written in 1853 by Horace St. John puts forward the situation in Bantam:

".... He Cornellius Houtman, a Dutch merchant had come to threat for alliance and claim the privileges of trade. The natives appeared were pleased with the Dutch, and warned them against the merchants of Portugal. The Hollanders as they assert, defended the people of that nation, praying that they might not be confounded with those pirates, the English, who were already on strength of strange report hated and feared throughout that region."²

The author of the account commented about the above quoted passage that whatever may be true in these accounts, it is

¹ Faster, William (edt) *The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton th the Maluccas, 1604-1606*, The hakluyt society, 1943 pp. XVIII.

² St. John, *The Indian Archipelago : Its History and present state*, Vol. I, Longman., Brown Green, and Longmens, London, 1853, pp. 221

certain that each of the European adventures endeavoured to supplant the other, and to secure the monopoly of traffic.³ It is interesting to note that while writing in the second half of the nineteenth century, the author was not prejudiced but had a keen observation and understanding.

A letter from the King of Tidore to the King of England in the year 1605 pleaded the latter to help them against their old rival - Ternate. Not only this, they also desired that England and Spain should join with them and help them combat Tidore who were supported by the Dutch.⁴ The Dutch had conquered the Portuguese stronghold of Amboyna in 1605. Thus they began to establish their hegemony in the Moluccas. They prohibited the English from trading in Amboyna which was a true outcome of the principles of monopoly. The English took

³ ibid.

⁴ Foster, William, (The Voyage of Henry Middleton... 1943, pp. 63), The letter, was written as : " This writing of the King of Tydor to the King of England is to let Your Highnesse understand that the King of Holland hath sent hither into these partes a fleet of shippes to joyne with our ancient enemy, the King of Tarnate; and they joyntly together have overrunne and spoyled part of our country, and are determined to destroy both us and our subjects. Nowe, understanding by the bearer hereof, Captaine Henry Middleton that your Highnesse is in frien[d]ship with King the of Spaine, Wee desire your Majestie that you would take pittie of us, that wee may not be destroyed by the King(s) of Holland and Tarnata, to whom wee have offered no wrong, but they by forceable meanes seek to bereave us of our Kingdome. And as great Kings upon the earth are ordayned by God to succour all them that be wrongfully oppressed, so I appeale unto your Majeste for succour against my enemies; not doubting but to find reliefe at your Majesties hands".

to the island of Ternate, whose sultan was the successor of the prince with whom Sir Francis Drake had carried on commercial relations.

Unlike the Dutch, the English had no settled plan of action. The East India Company thought only in terms of separate voyages, and for a long time even the accounts of each voyage were kept distinct. Too often the goods of the company and the general interest were sacrificed to the private quarrels of individual captains. This lack of a far sighted and vigorous policy, the meagre resources of the Company and the lack of support by the government of England made the chances of the company's obtaining a share of Southeast Asian trade very slight indeed. The rival Dutch Company had precisely these advantages and their ultimate success against the English was certain.⁵

The attitude of the Dutch became more hostile after 1609. As early as 1611, the English had established their factory at Masulipatnam and a little later, also opened a factory at Petapuli. '*The Globe*', an English ship on its seventh voyage had visited Pulicat in June 1613, in the quest of trade. The Dutch did not allow the vessel to be anchored as they

⁵ Moorhead, F.J. A history of Malaya, Vol.II, Longmans of Malaya, 1963

reminded the local authorities that they had an exclusive right on the port of Pulicat. The *States General of Holland* ordered the VOC to follow a friendly policy and not to obstruct the English trade. This was led to the conflict between state policy and local commercial interest, which can also be observed in a one line sarcasm "*The English would shear the sheep and we, the Dutch Pigs.*"⁶ Thus, the *Globe* was forced by the Dutch strength to look for markets in Southeast Asia. But, they also, they had to make their choice for the second best alternatives like Bantam or Patani.

The *Globe* left for England in 1615. Between 1615 and 1619, the English could do little to improve their position in the eastern archipelago. In 1613, they had already established a factory at Bantam. It was an important factory and a good stronghold for future operations in the archipelago. Bantam had the great export trade with China and the neighbouring islands and its nearness to the Sunda strait made it a more profitable centre for sale and purchase of goods than Aceh. Like the Dutch, the English had also suffered much, from the oppression of the Sultan and when the Dutch moved to Jakarta. the English after some delay

⁶ flaris, pp 10-12

followed their example in 1617. In 1618 they opened a factory in Japara, then of considerable importance as it was the chief port of Mataram. In the meantime, competition with the Portuguese private traders constrained their efforts at Makassar, while Amboyna, Bandas and Moluccas were bone of contention with the VOC.

When in November 1617, the Dutch declared war on English in the Moluccas, Banda and Amboyna, the Company followed a policy of cautious vigilance on the Coromandel coast. There were no actual hostilities here. In fact the Dutch factors on the Coromandel with their hands sufficiently full with the Portuguese would have preferred more friendly relations with the English.⁷

The situation that existed in the early 1618 can be best understood by a correspondence between Sir Thomas Roe at Ahmedabad and the Company:

".... The Dutch have spoyled Moluccoes which they fought for, and spent more then they will yield them. If quiett, in seaven yeares. Syndu you may freely goe too, lade and relade; but it is inhabited by the Portugal; lies noe way well for your stock (except you scatter it); it vents only your teeth [Ivory] and affords good cloth and many toyes. But if the sorts you have seen serve your marketts, you are nearer seated and may

⁷ EFI, 1618-21, p.17.

have what quantities you please; and for your teeth, the marchant will fetch them at Suratt.⁸"

The Dutch eagerness to expel the English at gun point checked by a contrary state policy had given place to a willingness to co-exist at a time, when the two-nations were at war.⁹ There existed a conflict between state policy and local commercial interest of the Dutch though the circumstances had changed radically. The VOC was conscious of the power of its rival. So it was evidently seeking the establishment of a limited dual control on the buyer's market, which would have eminently served their ultimate purpose of reducing the bargaining power of local supplier and eliminated the effects of powerful competition as Tapan Raychandhuri has pointed.¹⁰

The Anglo-Dutch truce came into effect in Asia in April 1620. But there followed a bitter struggle between the two companies mainly in the Indonesian archipelago and particularly around Batavia and the Moluccas. In Coromandel, there was a low key confrontation as the English with factories at Masulipatnam and Nizamapatnam could ill-

⁸ EFI, 1618-1621, pp. 14

⁹ Raychaudhuri, Tapan, Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, p.103

¹⁰ *ibid*, pp. 103

afford to enter into a armed confrontation with the Dutch, who were prosperous and relatively well - supplied. In a correspondence between Matthew Duke at Petapoli to the Company dated 9th December, 1618, the fuming English factor declared that "*theis buterboxes [the Dutch] are groanne soe insolent, that yf they be suffered but a whit longer, they will make claims to the whole Indies*".¹¹

On April 13 1621, an agreement between the English and Dutch presidencies was signed at Batavia for regulating the joint trade at Pulicat. The clauses of the agreement were : Firstly, the Dutch authorities will either provide the English factors with a house. (charging a reasonable rent for the same) or allot a site on which they may build for themselves, and in the meantime will find them convenient lodgings. Secondly, the English merchants would inform the Dutch what sorts and quantities of cloth they desire to buy. If the latter intend to purchase any of the same kind, the goods will be bought jointly at a price agreed upon and afterwards divided.

The third clause said that the English share of the charges and maintenance of the fort and the wages of the

¹¹ EFI, 1618-21, pp. 48

garrison is fixed by the seventh article of the Treaty of Defence. If they cannot furnish the victuals or warlike munition required they will pay for any brought by the Dutch from Batavia at the rate fixed upon for the Moluccas, Amboyna and Banda. Provisions bought in the country will be charged at cost price. Fourthly, damages to the fort, its ordnance, provisions, and C., will be repaired at the joint expense. Fifthly the wages and maintenance of the Dutch merchants 'and other inferior persons' shall not be charged as garrison expenses.

The sixth point of the agreement stated that the servants of both companies are expressly prohibited from private trade in cloth, under penalty of confiscation of the goods and further punishment. Seventhly, although these common charges might strictly be held to commence from the publication of the Treaty, the Dutch have agreed to waive for the present only the claim for expenditure anterior to the arrival of the English at Pulicat. The last clause said that the Dutch will render to the English at Pulicat a monthly account of the charges for the

garrisons, & C., and the latter will thereupon pay their share to the Dutch Governor.¹²

Thus this agreement was an important one, as far as the relations between the English and the Dutch were concerned. But it was foredoomed to failure. The employees of the VOC, whatever the attitude of their masters, were unwilling to give away entirely through a partnership the definite advantages they had over their rivals. General Coen, who seldom minced matters, enquired if their Honours in Amsterdam had been lacking in good counsel. To him, friendship with the English was an impossibility, it would mean that the Dutch "*would have to quit not only the Indies, but the world*".¹³

The English were also apprehensive about this agreement. They felt that such a co-operation with a powerful rival would only mean numerous encumbrances and surrender of legitimate rights. The English Council as early as March 1622 reported to London that the partnership with the Dutch in Coromandel was working very badly and asked the home authorities to "consider whether to be free from them may not be more beneficial for your trade than to live under

¹² EFI, 1618-21, pp. 253-254. All the clause mentioned above are quoted from the agreement.

¹³ Raychaudhuri, 1962, p. 104

their under their subjection and take their leavings."¹⁴ Further more the English were financially weaker than the Dutch and so they found it impossible to trade with the Dutch on a basis of equality.

The Dutch had in reality little reason to be insecure. In the pursuit of their monopoly policy they deliberately destroyed the clove plantations elsewhere in order to make Amboyna the only source for the supply of cloves.¹⁵ By 1623, the English finding nothing but obstruction and repeated slights, decided to close down their factories in the East. But before these orders reached Amboyna, an incident occurred which embittered relations between Dutch and English for many years to come. This was the famous Amboyna incident or the "Massacre of Amboyna" as known in the documents. This was one incident among many of the extremes to which the Dutch went to ensure their monopoly. Ten Englishmen, after being tortured together with nine Japanese and one Portuguese, were executed on a charge of having attempted to seize the fortress of Amboyna.

¹⁴ ibid.

¹⁵ Foster, William, (ed.), Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1930, vol. II, p.141.

From one point of view the "Massacre" was an event of world importance, for it finally convinced the English of the futility of their attempts to compete with the Dutch. Moreover with this outrage all the hopes vanished of future co-operation of the two nations in the Far East. The President of the English Company was determined to quit Batavia where they had established headquarters in 1620 and establish outside Dutch jurisdiction. By the end of the year the factories at Patani, Pulicat, Siam and Hirado (Japan) had been dissolved, and the only ones left under the control of the English President and Council at Batavia were those at Masulipatnam, Achin, Jambi, Japara and Macassar.

On the Coromandel coast, it was not found worthwhile to maintain a factory, at Pulicat. The reasons given were the need of reducing expenses and the fact that Coromandel cloth would not be required in any quantity, as the English factories in the Moluccas were closed. The Dutch at Batavia offered no objection to the proposal, though they intimated that, should the English desire at any time to return to Pulicat, the question would arise as to their paying part of the cost of the garrison during their absence. Thus the '*Ruby*', was dispatched to Pulicat with orders for the dissolution of the

factory and shifting to Masulipatnam. This ended the Anglo-Dutch partnership on the Coromandel coast.¹⁶

Thus the prominent base of the English on the Coromandel coast was Masulipatnam now. Prior to the shifting of the factory of Pulicat to Masulipatnam, the latter had become a port for the centralization and shipment of goods collected from the hinterland as well as along the coast. William Methwold, who was in Masulipatnam between 1618 and 1622 referred to it as "*the chief port of the Kingdome of Golchonda*".¹⁷ Anthony Schorer, around 1616 had called it the '*most famous market on the coast.*' Thus this already prosperous port city¹⁸ was given a new lease of life in the

¹⁶ EFI, 1622-23, pp.246-47: 'The shipp *Rubie* arrived att Pallacatt the 8th June, bringinge order for desoulvinge of this factory [i.e Pulicat], the reasons wherefore you shall understand, by the Presidents letter more large from the said Pallacatt I dispeeded this shipp *Rubie* the prime July and raised that factory and there inbayled 131 baylls cloth, being woven and paintings, which now suppose as, the case stands, will little advance our masters, is regard of the disoulvinge of all the factories in the Mollucas, beinge clothes most parte not vendable in other places, except Bantam when open (whereof there is some hope). The 4th of July wee by Gods providence wee safly arived in this road of Musulapatnam.

¹⁷ Methwold, William, "Relations of the Kingdome of Golchanda, and other neighbouring nations with the Gulfe of Bengala, Arreccan, Pepin, Tannassery, etc. and the English Trade in those Parts in Moreland, W.H. (edt.) Relations of Golconda in Early Seventeenth Century. The Hakluyt Society, London, 1931, p. 6

¹⁸ Schorer, Anthony, "Brief Relation of the Trade of the Coromandel Coast, especially at Masulipatnam, where I resided in the service of the Hon'ble Company in the seventh Year" in Moreland (edt), 1931, p. 55

period following 1624. This was largely on account of the growth of trade involving Macassar.

Makassar, as already seen in the previous chapter, had provided refuge to the various trading diasporas who had fled from Melaka or expelled from elsewhere. The English had settled a factory there in 1613. But it was not until the mid-1620's that Makassar grew in importance largely due to its clove trade. Between 1622 and 1643, when the Dutch effectively snuffed out all sources of '*smuggled*' cloves, the trade continued to grow apace. The English policy was to use their Coromandel factories to supply Batavia (upto 1628) and Banten (thereafter) with textiles, which were then carried to Makassar.¹⁹ Moreover the signing of the Anglo Portuguese Treaty in 1635 also made the Dutch apprehensive that the English were plotting with the Portuguese, against them. The Dutch in their efforts to restrict the clove trade of Macassar met success only after 1643 which lasted up to 1651. In this period, the English trade declined between Coromandel and the insular Southeast Asia. The combined English-Danish

¹⁹ Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, *The Political Economy of Commerce*, Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 176.

export of textiles to Makassar in 1646 was estimated to be only 400 bales.

Thus in this section, as has been noticed the Dutch proved to be hostile enemies of the English in Coromandel and Southeast Asia. The success of the English trade was not only limited, but also of short duration in the first half of the seventeenth century. It was during this period that the English initiated the building of Fort St. George at Madras in 1639. This was to become the residence of their President and council, controlling the trade of the Bay of Bengal and the one towards the further east.

4.2 The Growth of English Company as Mercantile Power

In the first half of the seventeenth century, as seen in the above section, the Dutch policies and plans especially of J.P. Coen had made the English Company concentrate its activities in India and on developing the bilateral trade with Europe. From the middle of the seventeenth century this strategy began to pay-off, as the European market for Indian textiles expanded. This slow moving company gradually took lead over the Dutch as participants in trade both within Asia and between Europe and Asia in the eighteenth century.

The Dutch records as well as the correspondences of the English reported an improvement in the state of English trade on the Coromandel coast between 1649 and 1652.²⁰ But their position again deteriorated considerably after. 1652 despite the fact that they enjoyed a certain advantage, over the Dutch due to their friendly relations with Mir Jumla. The situation became so pathetic that in 1653-54, with the exception of Masulipatnam and Fort St. George, all factories were abandoned as they could not incur profits. During the outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1653, there were no actual hostilities as the English ships had practically stopped sailing due to the fear of the Dutch. Once peace was established, the English started sailing again. The English company's troubles with Mir Jumla, in 1657-58 led to attacks on Madras, which helped the Dutch to maintain their ascendancy.

The English trade became a serious threat to the Dutch commercial enterprise from the early 1660's. The investments of the English in the imported varieties of cloth were large enough. By this time their network of acquiring the cloth from the hinterland had solidified in Southeast Asia, while the

²⁰ EFI, 1641-45, p. 154;
EFI, 1651-54 p. 22.

Dutch had their main market in Melaka and adjacent region, the English sold their cloth at Achin which eventually reached Johore. As the English developed more efficient network, it caused a glut in the markets of Southeast Asia. The situation was so severe in 1661 that for many months not a bale of Coromandel cloth could be sold in Melaka. This resulted in reducing the orders for the next year. In the seventies the impact of English Competition was felt in the cloth trade of Java as well.²¹

The outbreak of the second Anglo Dutch war had its repercussions in Asia too. In August, 1665, Batavia instructed the factors at Coromandel to inflict as much damage on the English as they can. Not only this, three yachts were sent from Pulicat under Peter de Lange to capture the English ships anchored off Madras. But they merely succeeded in seizing a small ship belonging to an English private trader near Masulipatnam. This action was accorded by the Golconda authorities as an unlawful violation of the peace of the harbour and temporarily involved the Dutch in serious difficulties.

²¹ Raychaudhuri, 1962, p.108

Meanwhile in the second half of the seventeenth century, the English had grown strong. So much so that during the second Anglo Dutch war, the Dutch factors at Masulipatnam feared an attack on their factory by the numerically stronger English. The administrators at Fort Geldria in Pulicat decided to postpone any decisive action until further orders from Batavia. The Dutch received instructions from Holland in 1668 that the ships of the enemy should be attacked in neutral harbours but by then the peace between England and Holland had been settled.

In 1672, the Dutch at Batavia informed their fellows in Coromandel of the renewal of the war with England. This resulted in a naval engagement to the south of Masulipatnam. A fleet of four Dutch ships & ten English vessels fought which ended with the victory of Hollanders. This was decisive for a fleet of four ships had captured three of the enemy. This success made the Dutch factors in Coromandel approve of Batavias recommendation that in the time of war no heed should be paid to the prohibition by the indigenous polities like Golconda in their waters. The war in Europe terminated

in 1674 and before it no further hostilities with the English took place.²²

Thus the changing situation especially in the late seventies was in favour of the English. The English East India Company had the support of capital from home with which they could make large purchases for Europe. The Dutch on the other hand, were inadequately supplied with the capital from the Netherlands. They had to depend on credit now, for a large part of their business. With the fulcrum of Coromandel trade increasingly going on the English side, the Dutch openly admitted that the ascendancy of trade has passed on to the English. The situation had two implications for the VOC. Firstly they could no longer procure from Coromandel cloth of right quality and inadequate quantity. The Masulipatnam market was fully in English control. Secondly, due to the English ascendancy on the coast, the Dutch were ousted from the market for Coromandel cloth in Europe.²³

The English, at last, had gained grounds on the Coromandel coast, though they were of minor importance in Southeast Asia except in few places like Bencoolen. It was

²² Love, H.D. Vestiges of Old Madras, Vol. I, AES, 1996, 358ff.

²³ Raychaudhuri, 1962, p. 110.

partly due to their private trade and interloping that the English hegemony had been established. The interlopers, for example, were satisfied with even lower rates of profit per unit than the English Company's. They were thus considered the most dangerous competitors of the Dutch. Due to the increased capital of their rivals, the Dutch lost their control over the Coromandel market though they posed as power in the insular Southeast Asia. When the English abandoned Bantam and were involved in a war with Mughals in 1689-90, the Dutch thought that they could still outrival the English. But these were just false hopes. The focus of the English in the second half of the century had been the Indian subcontinent and not Southeast Asia.

Thus in the seventeenth century, there were different scenes simultaneously at work in the theatre beyond Cape Comorin. On the one hand there were the fading Portuguese power whose decline was accentuated by the hostile Dutch presence. While on the other hand, the Dutch rivaled with the English in their quest for monopoly. The primary aim of the Dutch as we know was to monopolise trade. Thus the Portuguese and the English received fatal blows by the Dutch attacks. Moreover though the rivals of the Dutch – the

Portuguese and the English had signed a treaty in 1635, it was hardly of any consequence. The second half of the century, however, saw a rapid growth of the English power. It grew strong in the Coromandel in the 1670's that they came out rival the Dutch who had literally thrown them from the insular Southeast Asia.

CONCLUSION

The commercial world of the Indian Ocean has witnessed various aspects of trade during different times. Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese, among the many networks which existed across the Ocean, one was between Coromandel coast and Malaya Peninsula and insular Southeast Asia. Both of these regions had developed important centers for trade. The role of polities was significant in creating viable conditions for commercial activities. The rise of Pulicat (Palaverkadu) in the fifteenth century was closely linked with the stabilisation of Vijaynagara control over the area and the crystallization of stable links between the port of Pulicat and the imperial city of Vijaynagara.¹ In the same century, Melaka also rose to become an important entrepot on the Malaya Peninsula. In this case also, the politics helped in its growth. Moreover, it was a maritime state which meant that its basic resource was trade. Hence at the beginning of the sixteenth century there existed a flourishing state of trade in the region.

¹ Subrahmanyam, Sanjay 1990 (b), p. 94

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to venture to the East under an organization in the sixteenth century. It was called the Estado da India. The turning towards the sea of Portugal was due to its strategic position and relatively less agrarian sources. Before discovering the east they had some pre-conceived theories and myths. Ptolemy's construct of geography helped the Portuguese to know about the east, but in theory. Along with it, certain myths like that of Prestor John and Saint Thomas developed due to the crussades. Besides there also developed the concept of 'other' about the East. One can identity this concept in various narratives, especially those pertaining to Southeast Asia. The indigenous people are generally referred to as human flesh eaters or barbaric or savage.

The cartography was another skill which helped the Portuguese to know the east. In its development, we can also see, the different stages of Portuguese exploration. In most of the maps, the portrayal of India is not problematic. As far as the insular Southeast Asia is concerned, until the conquest of Melaka, the maps are vague. Afonso de Albuquerque, after the conquest sent an expedition to the Moluccas of which Francisco Rodrigues was a part. With this expedition, an

appropriate sketch of the insular Southeast Asia was produced, which was to be followed by a number of other representations to produce a real image. The development of Portuguese cartography was an important step in its overseas expansion and exploration. On the one hand, while cartography encouraged and helped in the exploration, on the other hand, the exploration made maps more accurate.

The Portuguese in their explorations took help of the indigenous pilots - either at Malindi to further explore the Indian Ocean or at Melaka to go further east in search of spices. Besides they also got support from the trading diasporas. At Melaka, about fifteen such diasporas lived and conducted cross cultural trade. Among these, it were the keling merchants from the Tamil coast who supported the Portuguese in their conquest of Melaka and thus developing good terms with the Iberians. The keling merchants were not only influential at Melaka, but in most of the ports of the archipelago. For example, these 'men of great estates'² held the coveted post of shahbandar at Banten. One of them called Kiayi Wijamanggala remained in that post for more

² Dames II, 1989, p. 172.

than twenty years and played a major role in the important political events which took place then in Banten.³

Another diaspora from the Tamil coast based at Melaka, were the Armenians. They were the ones who introduced the Portuguese in Coromandel. In the official layers of the Estado da India, the Coromandel coast was thought to be an abode of pirates and renegades. It was only after the discovery of tomb of Saint Thomas at Mylapore around 1519 and the realization by the Portuguese of the importance of Coromandel textiles as an exchange item in Moluccas, that the Goa authorities started bring the coast under their control. Among the different measures taken, the most important one was the adoption of the concession system. Thus these were the dimensions of Portuguese expansion in the sixteenth century. On the one hand, the Portuguese had establishment at Sao Thome, Pulicat and Nagapattinam on the Coromandel coast. On the other hand, they had fortresses at Melaka, Amboyna, Ternate and strongholds at Tidore, Solor, Amber and Timor. Most of these ports were to face the brunts of the

³ Guillot, Claude, "Banten and the Bay of Bengal during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" in Prakash, Om and Lombard, Denys (ed), *Commerce and Culture in the Bay of Bengla, 1500-1800*, Manohar, 1999, p. 167.

Portuguese - Dutch conflict in the seventeenth century when the purse and the sword became more important.

The founding of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1602 and its quest for monopoly posed as an important challenge for the Estado da India. It was not the first time that the Estado's monopoly was being challenged. Earlier it had faced problems with the indigenous polities like Aceh. However, in the case of Dutch, things were different. Firstly, the organization of the VOC was much superior to that of the Estado's. Secondly, the Dutch being fellow Europeans made the Portuguese feel more insecure as far as competition in the markets of Europe was concerned. The aggressive nature of the Dutch made the Portuguese say of them as 'rebeldas'⁴ in their official documents. The capture of the Portuguese fortress of Amboyna was the first success the Dutch achieved in the Moluccas. Thereafter within the first half of the century the Dutch swiftly completed their conquest of the insular Southeast Asia as well as Pulicat on the Coromandel coast. With the fall of Sao Thome in

⁴ Danvers, F.C. Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on the Portuguese records related to the East Indies London, 1892, p. 21

1662 the Dutch had conquered most of the region to the east of Cape Comorin.

When the Dutch arrived, the Portuguese were already a declining power. The Dutch assaults only fastened the Portuguese decline. With the capture of Melaka, the Portuguese lost their most important stronghold in Southeast Asia. A Council meeting held at Goa on the 25th of November, 1642 clearly gives an idea of the state of affairs of the Portuguese -

"It was proposed that the Dominican religious that had submitted a request in which they have declared that with the purpose to give assistance to the Christians of Solor, [the Portuguese had their establishment at Solor and was known for the sandalwood trade] that were entrusted to them, having no shipping connection that would be leaving from the fortress of His Majesty having a departure to that port. As it was most convenient that a large loss of time would not take place they request that the Viceroy granted them permission to travel by any Dutch shipping. And have been debated the method by all the councilors they expressed the uniform opinion that any case the Count Viceroy could grant such a permission through a written document as it would be against the interest of his Majesty and of the state of India. And wishing the said religious deal this method of the journey, the method would be

conducted, in a way in which the Count Viceroy would be maintained ignorant of the development and no instruction would be issued on the method."⁵

This document gives a clear idea of the decline of the Portuguese Empire beyond Melaka. It also shows a growing initiative taken by individuals and in this case members of the Dominican order to organize themselves in the dealings with the Dutch as autonomous personalities.

Thus the Dutch established their commercial hegemony soon after their arrival in the region. They not only had to meet the challenge of the Portuguese, but also of the English. The English East India Company also came into existence around the same time as the Dutch East India Company. But the English Company was financially and organizationally weaker than its Dutch counterpart. The English competed side by side with the Dutch in Southeast Asia. So the Dutch had two rivals to tackle side by side - on the one hand were the Portuguese and on the other had the English. In

⁵ Pissurlencar, S S (ed.), Assentos do Conselho do Estado, Tipografia Rangel, Bastora - Goa 1956, document 137 vol. 4. pp-380-381.

this contest the Portuguese posed more threat to the Dutch than the English. This was because the Portuguese had monopolized the region for nearly a century. Nevertheless the Dutch were able to out rival both of them by the middle of the seventeenth century due to the policies and methods they adopted. The English on being ousted from insular Southeast Asia started concentrating on the Coromandel coast. They grew so strong by 1670's that they out rivaled the Dutch. Hence the Dutch were confined to Southeast Asia where they had carved nearly most of the archipelago for themselves.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Baldaeus, Philip, A Description of the East India Coasts of Malabar and Coramandel and also of the isle of Ceylon with their adjacent Kingdom and provinces, Asian Educational Services, 2000.
- Beecknan, Captian Daniel, A voyage to and from the Island of Borneo in the East Indies, Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1973.
- Begbie, P.J., Malayan Peninsula, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967,
- Brown, C.C., (trans.) Sejarah Melayu, Kuala Lumpur, 1976.
- Cortésão, Armando (edt) The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues, 2 volumes, The Hakluyt Society, 1944
- Crawfurd, John Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and the adjacent countries, London, 1856.
- Crawfurd, John, History of the Indian Archipelago, Vol. II. Archibald Constable & co., 1820.
- Cummins, J.S. (edt.), The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navarrete, 1618-1686, the Hakluyt Society, 1962

- Da Asia de João de Barros, Decoda I-IV, Livro III edicoo
Livraria Sam Carlos, Lisboa, 1973.
- Dames. M.L. (edt.), The Book of Duarte Barbosa, Vol. 1 The
Hakluyt Society, 1918
- Dames. M.L. (edt.), The Book of Duarte Barbosa, Vol. 2 The
Hakluyt Society, 1921
- Danvers, F.C., Report to the Secretary of State for India in
Council on the Portuguese Records related to the
East Indies, London 1892.
- Fawcett, Charles and Burn, Richard, The Travels of Abbe
Carre in India and the Near East (1672-74), The
Hakluyt Society, 1947.
- Foster William. (edt), The English Factories in India, (1618-
1669), 13 Volumes, Oxford, 1906-27,
- Foster William, The voyage of Sir-Henry Middleton to the
Moluccas 1604-1606, The Hakluyt Society London
1943.
- Foster, William. (edt.), Early Travels in India (1583-1619),
OUP, 1921,
- Foster, William (edt.), Alexander Hamilton A New Account of
the East Indies, the Hakluyt Society, London, Vol.
II, 1930
- Gray, Albert (edt.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrad of Laval to
the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and
Brazil, 2 Volumes, The Hakluyt Society, 1887-8.

- Hakluyt, Richard, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, London, 1926.
- Love H.D., *Vestiges of old Madras*, Vol. I & II Asian Educational Services 1996.
- Markham, C.R. (edt.), *The Voyage of James Lancaster to the East Indies*, The Hakluyt Society, 1877.
- Moreland, W.H (edt.), *Peter Floris, His Voyage to the East Indies in the Globe, 1611-1615*, The Hakluyt Society, 1934.
- Moreland, W.H (edt.), *Relations of Golconda in the Early Seventeenth Century*, The Hakluyt Society, 1931.
- Pissurlencer, S.S. (ed.), *Assentos do Conselho do Estado, Vol.I-IV*, Tipografia Rangel, Bastora - Goa, 1953-1956.
- Prakash, Om (edt.), *The Dutch Factories in India, 1617-1623*, Munshiram Manoharlal Pvt. Ltd., 1984.
- Purchas, Samuel, *Purchas his Pilgrims*, Glasglow Vol.X
- St. John, *The Indian Archipelago: Its History and present state*, Vol. 1, Longman, Brown Green, and Longman, London, 1853.
- Temple R.C. (edt), *The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna from 1502 to 1508*, the Argonaut Press, 1928.

- Temple, R.C. (edt), Thomas Bowrey, An Account of countries round the Bay of Bengal, The Hakluyt Society, 1997.
- Temple, R.C. (edt.), The Diaries of Streynsham Master 1675-1680 Vol. II, London.
- The Voyage of Master Caesar Frederick into East India and beyond the Indies, Anno 1563 in Hakluyt, Richard (ed.), The Principal Navigations, Voyages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, Vol. III, London, 1926.
- The voyage of Nicholas Downton to the East Indies, 1614-15, The Hakluyt Society, 1939.
- Tiele, P.A. and Burnell, A.C. (edt.), The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies, 2 Volumes, The Hakluyt Society, 1885.
- Travels of Fray Sebastien Manrique, 1629-43, Vol.II China, India etc. The Hakluyt Society, 1927.
- Wallace, Alfred Russel, The Malay Archipelago Macmillian & Co., 1894.
- Willem Ysbrantz Bontekoe, Memorable Description of the East Indian Voyage (1618-1625), George Routledge & Sons, 1929.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Andaya, Leonard Y., The Kingdom of Johore, Oxford University Press, Kualalumpur, 1975.

- Arasratnam, S., Merchants Companies and commerce Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Bahadur, Rao and Srinivasachari, C.S., A history of Gingee and its Rulers Annamalai University, Annamalainagar, 1943.
- Boxer, C.R., Dutch Seaborne Empire, Hutchinson of London, 1965.
- Boxer, C.R., Portuguese Conquest and commerce in South Asia 1500-1750, Varorium Great Britain, 1990.
- Boxer, C.R., Portuguese Seaborne Empire, Hutchinson of London, 1969
- Chaudhuri, K.N., Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, CUP, 1985.
- Coedes, G., The Indianized states of Southeast Asia, East-West Center Press, 1968.
- Curtin, Philip D., cross cultural trade in World History, CUP, 1986.
- Danvers, F.C., The Portuguese in India Vol. II Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. London, 1966.
- de Certeau, Michel, Heterologies, Discourses on the other, Minneapolis, 1986.
- de souza, Tentonio, (edt.), Indo-Portuguese history Old issues, new question, concept publishing company, New Delhi 1985.

- Diffe, Bailey W. & Winius, George D., Foundations of the Portuguese Empire Vol. 1 Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Disney, Anthony, R., Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese trade in Southwest India in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1978
- Glamann, Kristoff, Dutch Asiatic Trade 1620-1740, Martinus Nijhoff S-Gravenhange, 1981.
- Hall, H.R., The Nagaram as a marketing in early medieval South India, Diss-Ph.d., University of Michigan, 1975.
- Israel, Jonathan, I, Dutch Primacy in World Trade 1585-1740, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
- Kratoska, Paul H. (edt)., South East Asia Colonial History, Vol. I, Routledge, London, 2001.
- Lombard, D. and Prakash, Om (ed), Commerce and Culture in the Bay of Bengal, Manohar, 1999.
- Meilink-Roelofsz, M.A.P., Asian Trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630, The Hague, 1962.
- Moorhead, F.J., A History of Malaya Vol. II Longmans, 1963.

- Penrose, Boies, Travel and discovery in the Renaissance, 1420-1620 Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1945.
- Raychaudhari, Tapan, Jan Company in Coromandel, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
- Reid, A., Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, vol. II - Expansion and Crisis, Yale University Press, 1993.
- Reid, A., Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, Vol.1 - The Lands below the winds, Yale University Press, 1988.
- Richards, D.S., Islam and the Trade of Asia. Bruno Cassier Oxford, 1970.
- Sarkar, H.B., Trade and Commercial Activities of South India in the Malay-Indonesia World upto 1511 A.D., Firma K.L.M. Pvt. Ltd., 1986.
- Subrahmanyam, S., (a) Improvising Empire, OUP, 1990.
- Subrahmanyam, S., (b) The Political Economy of Commerce Southern India 1500-1650, CUP, 1990
- Subrahmanyam, S., The Portuguese Empire in Asia, Longman, 1993.
- Tarling, N., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 1. CUP, 1992.

- Thomaz, L.F.F., "The Indian Merchant Communities in Malacca under the Portuguese Rule", in Teotonio R. deSouzais. Indo-Portuguese History, Concept Pub. Co., 1985.
- Tracy, James. D (edt.), The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
- Van Leur, J.C., Indonesian Trade and Society, The Hague, 1954.
- Winius, G.D. and Vink, Marcus P.M. The Merchant – Warrior Pacified, OUP, 1991.
- Wink, Andre, Al Hind: The making of the Indo-Islamic World Oxford University Press, 1990.