

# FOREIGN POLICY OF TANZANIA, JULIUS NYERERE'S PERIOD

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for  
the award of the Degree of  
**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**SUKHWANT SINGH NANNAN**

CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI—110067

1989



TO MY  
REVERED PARENTS



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI-110067

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES

PROFESSOR VIJAY GUPTA

4th January 1989

CERTIFICATE

*Certified that the dissertation entitled,  
"FOREIGN POLICY OF TANZANIA, JULIUS NYERERE'S PERIOD"  
Submitted by SUKHWANT SINGH NANNAN in partial fulfilment of  
the award of the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M.Phil)  
in Jawaharlal Nehru University, is a product of the student's  
own work, carried out by him under my supervision and guidance.*

*It is hereby certified that this work has  
not been presented for the award of any other degree or diploma  
by any university in or outside India and may be forwarded to  
the examiners for evaluation.*

*Vijay Gupta*  
(VIJAY GUPTA)  
Supervisor

## C O N T E N T S

		<u>Page No(s).</u>
	Preface	i - iii
	Abbreviations	iv
Chapter I	Introduction: Historical Background and Evolution of Tanzania's Foreign Policy	1 - 22
Chapter II	Tanzania and Africa	23 - 61
Chapter III	Tanzania's Bilateral and Multilateral Relations	62 - 88
Chapter IV	Tanzania's Policy of Non-Alignment and Its Policy Towards and Role in United Nations	89 - 110
Chapter V	Conclusion	111 - 119
	Bibliography	120 - 131

\*\*\*\*

## PREFACE

The objective of the present study is to examine Tanzania's foreign policy during President Julius K. Nyerere's period. The study is based on a discussion of the foreign policy of Tanzania in a wider context. In historical perspective, attempts have been made to discuss the evolution of Tanzania's foreign policy and its determinants. Tanzania's foreign policy options as regards the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist forces particularly within Africa and at the UN have also been dealt with. Efforts have also been directed to examine its bilateral and multi-lateral relation, and policy of non-alignment and various antecedent factors to such a policy orientation.

The study has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter deals with the evolution of Tanzania's foreign policy where historical, domestic and external conditions as well as the role of Julius K. Nyerere are seen as important factors in shaping the foreign policy of Tanzania.

In the second chapter, emphasis is on Tanzania's policy towards Africa in which we have dealt its policy towards African Unity, relations with Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) and the liberation movements in

Africa. There has also been a discussion on Tanzania's stand on Biafra issue and war with Uganda in this chapter.

In the third chapter, a critical analysis of Tanzania's bilateral and multilateral relations has been made where we have discussed Tanzania's attitude towards and relations with external world based on independent foreign policy formulations.

The fourth chapter deals with Tanzania's policy of non-alignment, and its policy towards and role in the UN. Here we have sought to discuss Tanzania's non-aligned policy in detail and its policy stand on various issues at the United Nations.

In the fifth and the last chapter an overall concluding derivation of all the chapters has been made.

During the course of my research work I received guidance from my supervisor, Professor Vijay Gupta who encouraged and helped me in completing my dissertation. I owe a deep sense of gratitude to him.

I am grateful to Professor K.R. Singh for his encouragement during my research work.


I am indebted to the staff of Jawaharlal Nehru University library, Delhi University library and Indian

Council of World Affairs library, who provided adequate research materials for my work.

I owe a great deal to my parents, without whose support and encouragement I would not have been able to undertake this work. I take this opportunity to thank my sisters, Balvinder, Sukhvinder and Surjit Bhaji for their best wishes in the completion of this work.

I am extremely thankful to my friend Ananta Vijay Patnaik (Munna) for his encouragement and help throughout this work. I am also thankful to my friends Satya Pradhan, Jitendra Nath, Bijay, Rajat, Ripu, Anand, Amitabh, Amar Manas, Qumrul, Manjunath, Soni, Sanjay, Vivek, Randhir, Harmeet, Ajay and Mukesh for their good wishes and co-operation.

Finally, I express my thanks to Mr. H.K. Taneja for neatly typing my dissertation.

  
(SUKHWANT SINGH NANNAN)

Date: 5-1-1989

Abbreviations Used in this Dissertation

A.S.P.	-	Afro Shirazi Party
C.C.M.	-	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
F.N.L.A.	-	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO	-	The Mozambiquan Liberation Movement
I.M.F.	-	International Monetary Fund
K.A.N.U.	-	Kenya African National Union
M.P.L.A.	-	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
O.A.U.	-	Organisation of African Unity
P.A.F.M.E.C.A.	-	Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa
SWAPO	-	South West African People's Organisation
TAA	-	Tanganyika African Association
T.A.N.U.	-	Tanganyika African National Union
U.D.I.	-	United Declaration of Independence
UNITA	-	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNLF	-	Ugandan National Liberation Front.



## Chapter I

### Introduction: Historical Background and Evolution of Tanzania's Foreign Policy

Foreign policy refers to those policies which have been formulated by a country in the conduct of its relation with other countries of the world. The necessity of having a foreign policy lies in the interests and objectives which a State pursues in conducting its relations with other independent sovereign nations. The aim of a sound foreign policy is to maintain friendly and co-operative relations with other countries. The task of formulating a foreign policy is very complex because of the unevenness and multiformity of the world. Besides, there are also other difficulties, usually encountered while framing the foreign policy like the absence of any clear and direct means of controlling the behaviour of other countries and the changeproneness of the international and national environment with new events of considerable importance. Therefore, the formulation of foreign policy is not an easy task as it sounds rather lot of caution and calculations have to be made before it is implemented.

The problem of determining the foreign policies of the African States revolves round one fundamental factor - their 'newness' - since most of them emerged as sovereign independent nations only in 1960s and later. Considering their 'newness', Professor Dennis Austin remarked that the study of the foreign policies of the African States must be a 'doubtful exercise' since most

of them 'were born yesterday'.<sup>1</sup> Although, the remark carries an extreme expression yet it has some truth in it. We find the occurrences of many irregular phenomena which make it quite difficult to distinguish between the declaratory and operational aspects of the foreign policies of newly liberated African countries because of the variations in their content and style. However, despite the above difficulty as pointed out by Dennis Austin, we can not altogether reject that the foreign policies of these countries can not be studied.

The environmental factors provide the necessary insight and direction to the foreign policy-makers. The foreign policy of a country is generally shaped by the domestic and international environment. According to F.S. Northedge, the foreign policy of any country is the product of environmental factors - both internal and external to it.<sup>2</sup> Accepting this assumption one can say that the foreign policies of the African countries have also been shaped by their respective internal and external environment and the same is true in case of Tanzania. Since the environmental factors are limitless, Professor

---

1 Dennis Austin, "Ex Africa Semper Eadem", in Roger Morgan, ed., The Study of International Affairs, London, 1972, p. 167.

2 F.S. Northedge, The Foreign Policies of the Powers, London, 1968, p. 15.

Joseph Frankel is of the opinion that 'in practice the environment is circumscribed ... by the range of interests and the limitations of power of every single state'.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to the external environment, Tanzania's foreign policy has also been influenced by two important domestic factors - first, ideas and commitment of Tanzanian leader Julius K. Nyerere and second, the impact of colonial rule. Thus the evolution of Tanzania's foreign policies found stimulus in three sources, namely; (1) Nyerere's own values and philosophical orientation; (2) the objective conditions inherited from the colonial rule; and (3) external factors.<sup>4</sup>

#### Historical Background of Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania was formed in 1964 by the Union of the Republic of Tanganyika with the Sultanate of Zanzibar. During late 19th century and the early 20th century the mainland of Tanganyika was under the Germans whereas Zanzibar was under the British. After the defeat of Germany in the First World War and with the formation of the League of Nations Tanganyika

---

3 Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, London, 1963, p. 3.

4 K. Mathews and S.S. Munshi, ed., Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-1981: A Reader, Dar Es Salaam, p. 35.

became a mandate territory of the League and the British were allocated the responsibility of administration of Tanganyika. Under the mandate system there was an early development of territorial political consciousness among the African civil servants who had been educated in English. Their practical experience of political unity led them to form Tanganyika African Association (TAA) in 1929. After the Second World War the League of Nations was not revived and instead the United Nations Organization was established. The mandate system was replaced by that of Trusteeship System of the United Nations. Here, again, the British were conferred with the responsibility to bring political consciousness among the people of Tanganyika thus leading them to such a position whereby they could govern themselves. However, the British administration instead of carrying out its responsibility tried to integrate Tanganyika into its east African Empire. The Asians and European settlers were encouraged to take up profitable economic activities. The Africans were discriminated as became evident in 1951 when the land policy of the British evicted about 3,000 African peasants to make way for the White farmers. These policies were protested by TAA which was later renamed as Tanganyika African National Union, TANU in 1954 by Julius K. Nyerere. TANU led the nationalist struggle against the British. Consequently Tanganyika

became independent on 9 December 1961.

Zanzibar, on the other hand, was a British protectorate since 1890. Under the terms of the 1890 protectorate agreement, Britain was supposed to manage only Zanzibar's foreign affairs while domestic affairs were left to Sultan's Government. Zanzibar's protectorate status was changed in 1913 when the responsibility for the protectorate was transferred from British Foreign Office to the colonial office. Compared to Tanganyika's political unity in the post-war periods, Zanzibar politics mostly consisted of recurrent ethnic and racial confrontations. The British responded to this confusion by seeking to channel this burst of political activism into electoral competitions thereby providing an orderly transition to Zanzibar's independence under a popular government representing the Sultan. Evidently, the British arranged for Zanzibar to receive internal self-government in June 1963 and finally independence was granted on December 10, 1963.

Role of Julius K. Nyerere in Shaping  
An Independent Foreign Policy of Tanzania

Tanzania was formed in 1964 as a result of the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Tanganyika attained its independence on 10 December 1961. During the struggle for independence Nyerere emerged as an undisputed leader.

Since early 1960's or even before that Nyerere played an important role in Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) where he served as the President since its founding in 1954. He also served as Prime Minister when Tanzania became independent and as President in 1962, 1965 and 1970. The Tanzanian foreign policy is quite reflective of Nyerere's personality as the national leader. Nyerere's personality dominated Tanzanian internal and external policy formations. As the national leader, Rudolf Carter maintains, Nyerere's "departure from the leading position in Tanzania would not only drastically change the internal political direction and solidarity of Tanzania but also the reactions and pressures of both the Western and the Eastern Powers towards the future of Tanzania .... Nyerere, therefore, is the key to the continued success and future independence, both domestically and internationally of the United Republic".<sup>5</sup>

Prior to Tanganyika's independence Nyerere took some unequivocal stand that explains his independent orientation towards foreign policy matters. He made it clear in March 1961 that Tanganyika would not apply for the Commonwealth membership if South Africa would

---

5 Rudolf Carter, "The Domestic and Foreign Policy of Tanzania", Pan African Journal, vol. 2, no. 4, (Fall, 1969), pp. 339-61.

remain as a member.<sup>6</sup> Nyerere had also condemned French atomic tests in the Sahara and proposed that the African States should break their links with France.<sup>7</sup>

His announcements expressed his commitments to anti-racialism and anti-colonialism. By opposing French atomic test he protested against colonialism which exploited Africans and their land and used it for dangerous purposes. These were some of the instances of his independent approach. Another symbolic gesture of an independent attitude indicated Tanganyika's plan to forge new friendship when Nyerere paid a visit to Yugoslavia in 1961. The above events helped in the shaping of policy of non-alignment.

The stability in Tanzania's foreign policy could be viewed in terms of its commitment to anti-racialism, anti-colonialism, and to socialism and self-reliance. Here there was an attempt on Nyerere's part to keep the country's socialistic outlook apart from the ideological disputes of the ongoing Cold War between the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc. The proposal of adopting a Socialist way of life was made in 1962 when Nyerere publicized his

---

6 Timothy C. Niblock, "Tanzanian Foreign Policy: An Analysis", The African Review, vol. 1, no. 2, 1972.

7 New York Herald Tribune, 21 April 1961.



views in a pamphlet entitled 'Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism'.<sup>8</sup> In this document he proposed that Ujamaa was an attitude of mind which distinguishes the socialist from the non-socialist. In his view the institution of extended family provided the foundation and the objective of African socialism, the entire society had to be treated as a family. Nyerere stated, 'our socialism ... is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of Man by Man; and it is equally opposed to the doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between Man and Man'.<sup>9</sup> This socialistic orientation was thoroughly debated in next five years. At the TANU Executive Committee Meeting at Arusha in 1967, these ideas emerged in a concretized form known as 'Arusha Declaration' where the terms 'socialism' and 'self-reliance' found full expression. The declaration was an effort to apply principles to the realities of instituting socialism and self-reliance in an African State.<sup>10</sup> Here the emphasis was on rural and agricultural development through

---

8 Aluko Olajide, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States, London, 1977, p. 200.

9 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 162-71.

10 n. 8.

co-operative and communal villages and a deemphasis on industrialisation and on external aid and technical assistance as the bases for development. In terms of foreign policy Arusha declaration provided the direction of economic-foreign policy. Tanzania's policy of 'self-reliance' was meant to reduce the levels of dependency on foreign resources by making optimum utilization of its internal resources. However, the policy of self-reliance does not mean that Tanzania no more requires any foreign aid rather it emphasizes that such aid should be so designed as to enable Tanzania to achieve self-reliance. Thus, the policy of self-reliance has reinforced Tanzania's foreign policy particularly in the context of hard economic bargaining. The policy has entailed a diversification of Tanzania's external relationship as well as domestic restructuring. Tanzania's choice of the policy of self-reliance was a logical outcome of certain facts. The facts are that although many of the third world countries have their political independence they are still very much dependent on the developed countries for economic aid for their developmental processes and subsequent dominance of the developed countries over the underdeveloped ones. Nyerere outlined this fact when he said that Tanzania's efforts towards a self-reliant economy was not because it was the best among Third World

countries to do so but because of the sharing of past experiences. Thus, the implication of self-reliance was the maximum utilization of Tanzania's own resources, hence it is a declared war against exploitation of any kind by an outside power. Therefore, Tanzania's Arusha declaration was designed to bring about structural changes in society and eliminate class contradictions by making use of both the government and the party and by extending State control over the means of production.<sup>11</sup> The Ujamaa programme was, thus, an attempt to transform Tanzanian society and to organise it on the basis of a socialist development. The programme was the outcome of Nyerere's profound faith in humanism which sought to revive pre-colonial African forms of communitarian living that were characterized by equality, freedom and co-operative action.<sup>12</sup> The new Ujamaa programme envisaged by Arusha Declaration placed the emphasis on rural development through participatory leadership, development with self-reliance, and the village resettlement scheme.<sup>13</sup> Regarding this socialism transition Nyerere said,

---

11 Vijay Gupta, "Ujamaa Development Programme and Participatory Leadership", in Alfred De Souza's book, ed., Politics of Change and Leadership Development, New Delhi, 1978, p. 191.

12 Ibid., p. 198.

13 Ibid., pp. 198-99.

"In the modern world there are two basic systems of economic and social organisations - capitalism and socialism .... Thus, the choice for new Nations lies effectively between socialism and capitalism. It is not a completely free choice, for all of us inherited certain patterns of trade and have been to a greater or lesser extent indoctrinated by the value systems of our colonial masters ... There is no real choice. In practice Third World nations can not become developed capitalist societies without surrendering the reality of their freedom and without accepting a degree of inequality between their citizens which would deny the moral validity of our independence struggle. I will argue that our present poverty and national weakness make socialism the only national choice for us".<sup>14</sup>

So, in terms of foreign policy Arusha declaration provided the direction to economic-foreign policy of Tanzania.

Nyerere as a statesman was realistic and pragmatic in his attitude towards foreign policy goals and objectives. This was quite evident from his statement where he said, 'The first responsibility of the Govern-

---

14 Julius K. Nyerere, Man and Development, OUP, Nairobi, 1974, pp. 113-14.

ment - its first principle is the protection of Tanzania's independence and its freedom to determine its own policies, both internal and external. This is really nothing more than a continuation of the freedom struggle under new circumstances'.<sup>15</sup> This very statement of Nyerere explains his realistic approach to life, issues and problems. His realistic orientation becomes more emphatic while considering his views on ideology. He says, 'in the end, ideology bows before reality; the State acts in its own interests with ... ideological policies ... giving way before policies with a more direct relation to the interest of the State'.<sup>16</sup>

#### Colonial Impact on Tanzania's Foreign Policy

The term 'colonialism' suggests political imposition and economic exploitation of one country by another. Such was the case with Tanzania. Tanzania was the victim of colonial exploitation during the British rule. Thus, the obvious outcome was the economic stagnation of Tanzania. The word 'dependency', in fact, describes the situation. The manifestation of Tanzania's dependence

---

15 Julius K. Nyerere, "The Costs of Non-alignment", Africa Report, vol. 11, no. 7, October 1966, pp. 61-67.

16 Vernon Mackay, ed., African Diplomacy, New York, 1966, pp. 25-54.

was quite clear during 1961-66 period. During this period Tanzania was mainly dependent upon the export of few commodities, importation of consumer and capital goods, foreign aid and technical assistance, foreign technology and multinational corporations.<sup>17</sup> This dependence during 1961-66 period reflects very shallow impact of Nyerere's early treatise on 'Ujamaa' (1962) as it was not given any programmatic content before 1967. In 1967 the 'Arusha Declaration',<sup>18</sup> clearly outlined the basic framework for a self-reliant developmental programme. In addition to this emphasis on self-reliance, there was a gradual shift in Tanzania's relationship with the countries of the world. In other words, there was a shift from former colonial power and Western bloc countries to Eastern bloc nations. Some call it a tilt and others an economic expediency. This diversification in Tanzania's relationships with the countries became essential because of its policy of self-reliance and need for wider sources of assistance, other agricultural and industrial inputs for its developmental programmes and wider markets for its products. As Nyerere pointed out, 'Tanzania's objectives, therefore, mean that she

---

17 G. Ruhumbika, ed., Towards Ujamaa: Twenty Years of TANU Leadership, Nairobi, 1974, p. 68.

18 n. 9, p. 7.

wants to adapt her own needs some of the institutions from each side of the divided world. Indeed, it is impossible to carry out our economic policy unless we do have relation with both East and West, and unless we attract some economic investment from both. For it is as unrealistic to expect the private enterprise systems of the West to understand the needs of publicly owned industries here as it is to expect the public ownership systems of the East to establish private firms here'.<sup>19</sup>

#### External Factors

The external environment has also a positive role to play in moulding the foreign policy of Tanzania. The immediate need for Tanzania after its formation in 1964 was to explore the means whereby its limits of power could be ascertained in the international sphere where the role of Super Powers and the influence of former colonial powers were an existing reality. This realisation led the Tanzanian leadership to admit, 'we small powers can have no ... illusions. Only in an organisation such as the United Nations can we hope to make our voice heard on international issues, and only through the implementation of the principles upon which it is based

---

19 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 192-93.

can we hope to survive and grow in peace'.<sup>20</sup> The above statement conveyed Tanzania's foreign policy differences with some Western countries during 1964 and 1965. Tanzania had to lose a substantial amount of developmental aid for taking this principled position. The most important of these was the quarrel with West Germany over the issue of Tanzania's recognition of East Germany following the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. Other disputes were with USA over an alleged plot against Tanzania; and with UK over the question of Rhodesia's independence which compelled Tanzania to break diplomatic relations with Britain. In all its policies of disagreements with the Western nations Tanzania expressed its firm faith in the United Nations and its principles.

Tanzania has shown a degree of consistency in reaffirming its commitment to anti-racialism and anti-colonialism. Thus, the obvious assumption, here, is that Tanzania's external relations as well as its foreign policies are to some extent conditioned by the events in the neighbouring countries. The geographical contiguity of Tanzania to South Africa and the continuing racism in Southern Africa and hence efforts to eliminate it

---

20 Ibid., pp. 367-84.



fit in to Tanzania's strategic importance in the continent and the justification of its commitment to anti-racialism and anti-colonialism. This awareness confronting the situation in South Africa was a logical factor in influencing the foreign policy of Tanzania.

The above internal as well as the external factors had profound impact on the evolution of Tanzania's foreign policy. So, the period between 1961-66 was marked with Tanzania's effort for political unity and economic development domestically and politics of non-alignment externally. The policy of non-alignment was the ultimate choice for Tanzania during this period when the world was clearly divided into two blocs, the West and the East. In addition, the choice of non-alignment was also for several other reasons. Tanzania's total dependence on the West could only be reduced by following an independent foreign policy which could best be possible by adhering to the principles of non-alignment, since non-alignment was considered as a mechanism to reduce the impact of neo-colonialism. Nyerere was quite explicit about the ideological and economic basis of non-alignment in his statement.<sup>21</sup> On the ideological

---

21 op. cit., p. 11.

line there was no exclusive adherence to the socio-economic system of either bloc. Here the emphasis was on adopting the best of both the blocs. At the economic level highest priority was given to self-reliance and independence of policy stand. This independent policy signifies acceptance of foreign aid and assistance without any political compulsion attached to it. This independent stand has been reflected in Nyerere's statement where he said, 'we persist in our attempt to follow a policy of non-alignment in the ideological and power quarrels of the world, committing ourselves to no great power alliances .... We shall not allow any of our friends to be exclusive; we shall not allow anyone to choose any of our friends or enemies for us'.<sup>22</sup> Following from the statement was the very purpose to avoid ideological and military alliances with the major powers which might give them a pretext to intervene in the country's internal policy matters or to expect automatic support from the country in the international forums. The major test as to Tanzania's commitment to non-alignment arose in 1965 on the issue of diplomatic relationship with East Germany. The issue cropped up when Tanzania gave recognition to East Germany along with the permission

---

22 n. 15, pp. 368-69.

to its consulates to have jurisdiction throughout the Tanzanian Republic which meant giving it an equal status with that of West Germany. The West German Government refused to accept the decision and demanded that East German consulate should have limited jurisdiction. As a consequence there was immediate withdrawal of military assistance to Tanzania by the West-German Government and it also threatened that unless the Tanzanian Government adopted the position advocated, economic assistance would be cut. Nyerere's response to West Germany was equally firm. In his statement Nyerere countered the threat given by West Germany by declaring that Tanzania would not accept West German economic aid and all West German aid projects must be terminated immediately.<sup>23</sup> A modus vivendi was subsequently worked out, more or less along Tanzania's terms. A final solution was possible only when West Germany and East Germany normalised their relations with each other. Then other States could follow their lead without placing themselves in jeopardy.<sup>24</sup> In the light of above development in the attitude of Tanzania, it would appear that

---

23 Niblock Timothy C., "Foreign Policy of Tanzania; An Analysis", African Review, vol. 2, no. 2, September 1971, pp. 94-98.

24 New York Times, 22 December 1972.

independence of foreign policy of Tanzania constitutes the very essence of non-alignment. Conversely, non-alignment should be looked upon as an attribute of sovereignty for no state can be regarded sovereign if it fails to pursue an independent foreign policy. Non-alignment, therefore, has imparted to sovereignty a new purpose which is much wider a concept to include liquidation of colonialism, attainment of economic self-sufficiency and political stability. In fact, non-alignment was evolved to strengthen the socio-economic and politico-strategic basis of the new countries of Asia and Africa. It was through non-alignment that Tanzania was trying to give meaning and content to its political independence.

Tanzania's policies may also be examined in the context of its commitment to anti-racialism. After the independence of Tanganyika a conscious attempt to compare the developments in Tanganyika with the white minority regime in South Africa was made. In March 1961 Nyerere spoke out against South Africa's apartheid policy and indicated that independent Tanganyika could not join Commonwealth if South Africa continued its membership in it.<sup>25</sup> Subsequently, being aware of the new divided

---

25 op. cit., p. 5.

opinion, South Africa decided to drop her application for readmission as a Republic. In the 1960's and 1970's Tanzania enacted policies against racism, both at home and over seas. Such enactment was keeping in view Tanzania's commitment to anti-racialism not as a vehicle to colonialism and the so called multi-racial society in Tanganyika, but also as a commitment to the principles of non-racialism in independent Tanganyika as well as non-alignment. When the Tanganyika legislative council was debating on the citizenship bill for independent Tanganyika, Nyerere had stated that discrimination against human beings because of their colour, was exactly what they have been fighting against. He said, "This was what we have formed TANU for".<sup>26</sup> There was continued persistence in the policies of anti-racialism by Tanganyika after its independence in 1961. By 1963 Tanganyika's delegation to UN had been identified more or less with the radical African view which focussed attention over the wrongs of Southern Africa and vehemently criticised the Western governments (especially Britain and the USA) that gave them support and sustenance.<sup>27</sup> By the end of the year 1963 Tanganyika imposed a boycott on all trade with South Africa. In



TH-2762

---

26 n. 9, pp. 143-56.

27 n. 19, pp. 91-101.

DISS

DISS

327.678

N155 Fo



TH2762

December 1965, Tanzania became the first Commonwealth country to break diplomatic ties with the Britain because of the latter's refusal to take strong measures to end White rule over Zimbabwe.

Tanzania has all through been against the involvement in the Cold War and has categorically insisted that the major world problems are violation of peace and the increasing gap between the rich and the poor nations. The realization of these sad truths provided the essential guidance to Tanzania in its quest for principles. This has been emphasized through an analysis of her commitments to racial equality, self-reliance and non-alignment which can be seen as the requisites for independence and freedom.

**Chapter 11**

**Tanzania And Africa**

One of the major aspects of Tanzania's foreign policy has been the need for African unity. Tanzania's policy of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism can be seen in the context of her belief in and support for African unity. Since the days of her anti-colonial struggle Tanzania has been well aware of the fact that internal unity as well as unity and co-operation with other African countries was necessary as a strategy to defeat colonialism and imperialism in Africa. Thus Tanzania's quest for African unity began as a principle as well as a strategy in her struggle against colonialism, racialism and imperialism both internally and externally. The basis of Tanzania's policy on African unity was clearly spelt out by President Nyerere in his maiden address to the United Nations where he said,

"The basis of our action, internal and external, will be an attempt, an honest attempt, to honour the dignity of man. We must accept without question as a basis, a basic article of faith, that every individual has an equal right to inherit the earth and to partake of its joys and sorrows .... In saying this, we have committed our country to a grand endeavour .... There can be no question of colonialism continuing any longer .... Our opposition to colonialism is total and not confined by space or time; but it is natural and inevitable



that we should have a particular concern for Africa .... For that implementation of our third policy, the attainment of African unity, depends the complete freedom of our continent".<sup>1</sup>

In the statement Nyerere has outlined Tanzania's basic faith on human dignity and its opposition to exploitation whether it be in the form of colonialism, or neo-colonialism. So, it is in the interest of all the people of Africa that Tanzania has pledged to fight colonialism and imperialism. By analysing the validity of the very fact that "united we stand, divided we fall", Tanzania has sought to bring African unity in her struggle to liberate the African continent from the colonial and imperialist domination. Thus while discussing the foreign policy of Tanzania it is quite imperative to mention its policy towards African unity and relationship with the OAU as well as the liberation movements in Africa. Besides, another major focus of attention in this chapter would be on Tanzania's policy towards certain issues like Biafra issue and Tanzania-Uganda war. The need to discuss these two issues under different subsection of the chapter arose because of their special significance to the foreign policy stand of Tanzania. Many have

---

1 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Dar es Salaam, 1968, p. 291.

interpreted Tanzania's policy stand on these issues as controversial. Here the purpose is to show that Tanzania's stand on these issues was not controversial rather it was very much in conformity with those principles on which its foreign policy is based.

Tanzania's effort in the direction of African unity dates back to its struggle for independence in a wider Pan-African context. The aspirations of the black peoples in their struggle for self-determination were very much connected with the anti-imperialist struggle during the colonial phase in Africa. The common bond of race, exploitation and oppression forged unity to embody Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism represented a nationalism against foreign domination and exploitation, against imperialism and for national independence. It was in this context that Tanzania found Pan-Africanism or African unity as a strategy to fight colonialism and imperialism. The first manifestation of the desire for unity in the East and Central Asia made its appearance in 1958 at a meeting at Mwanza in Tanganyika. It was here that Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) was formed by delegates from Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and Nyasaland. Thus it was through the formation of PAFMECA in 1958, Tanzania endeavoured to present a broad

united front of East and the Central African countries to confront colonialism and imperialism.

As regards the African unity, President Nyerere supported the gradualist approach to it and held that regional federations were a good basis that would forward an All African Government.<sup>2</sup> Tanzania's attempt to bring about the East African Federation was made in January 1961 when President Nyerere announced at the PAFMECA conference at Dar es Salaam that TANU was willing to delay the date of Tanganyika's independence if it could enable her to join Kenya and Uganda in an independent East African Federation.<sup>3</sup> Tanzania has thus associated the success of her nationalist struggles with the ultimate realization of African unity particularly because its leadership held the view that any kind of unity would strengthen the economies of the young independent states of Africa.<sup>4</sup>

---

2 This approach of President Nyerere was quite contrary to that of President Nkrumah of Ghana who called for an immediate continental Government.

3 This attempt of Tanzania failed. Later on in 1963 Uganda and in 1964 Kenya refused to join East African Federation.

4 The Pan African Movement which emerged in East and Central Africa in the late 1950's reflected the weakness of the first stage. The struggle for political independence without the reality of economic independence meant neo-colonialism. This reflected the economic weakness of the national bourgeoisie to assert and advance their economic interests over that of international finance capital. Having no

As President Nyerere has argued -

"Many of us in East Africa believe that our best path to unity may be through a regional association. This would bring us some immediate strengthening of our economies at the same time showing to our people the benefits of unity .... We must use the African National States as an instrument for the reunification of Africa, and not allow our enemies to use them as tools for dividing Africa. African Nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic and is dangerous, if it is not at the same time Pan-African". (5)

In the post independence period, an important feature of Tanzania's foreign policy had been to seek co-operation with like minded regimes to co-ordinate their foreign policy positions on key issues in order to boost their bargaining power. Thus, from mid sixties, Nyerere, President Milton Obote of Uganda and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia coordinated their efforts and put forward a common strategy particularly with regard to Southern Africa. This group - unofficially known as 'Mulungushi Club' - was able to take strong position including against Britain's proposed arms sales to South Africa at the

---

Footnote 4 cont'd ...

such control over the production they could not achieve the Pan African grand dream in which United Africa could become an economic giant with a large market to withstand the competition of other continents. This became the very aim of regional co-operation or federation.

5 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, Dar es Salaam, 1968, pp. 193-94.

1971 Commonwealth Conference in Singapore.<sup>6</sup> The fall of Obote in Uganda in 1971 weakened Mulungushi Club. Nevertheless determined to pursue Tanzanian policy for liberation of Africa and eradication of colonialism and racialism from Southern Africa, Nyerere looked to the South for new alignments to strengthen liberation front. This resulted in the formation of the 'Frontline States',<sup>7</sup> who have been able to co-ordinate their policies for the liberation of Southern Africa reasonably well.<sup>8</sup> Thus emerging in the mid-1970s as a spokesman for the Frontline States group Tanzania has become increasingly involved in the regional politics of Africa. Issues of political principle, in particular the assertion of meaningful national and continental independence, have been central to Tanzania's foreign relations. In its effort to bring African unity, Tanzania has sought to generate and act

---

6 K. Mathews, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy in Liberation of South Africa", African Quarterly, vol. XXI, no. 2-4, 1982, p. 43.

7 Initially the Frontline States comprised of five Southern African States, namely, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Botswana. Today Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe also comprise this group.

8 Tanzania's role as the spokesman of the Frontline States as well as its policy and role towards the liberation struggles in Southern Africa have been discussed in the following subsection of this chapter under the subtitle 'Tanzania and the Liberation Movements in Africa'.

upon, a set of Pan-African principles that could serve as a model to other African States.

Tanzania and the Organisation  
of African Unity (O.A.U.)

With the decolonisation process there emerged many new States in Africa. They attempted to free themselves from colonial exploitation which was being continued through neo-colonial designs. The decolonised countries came together to put up a united front against various types of odds. They proposed greater political and economic co-operation among them. With this basic aim in view they formed the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) in 1963. The aims and objectives of the O.A.U. were stipulated in its Charter which was adopted by the Heads of States and Governments in the meeting at Addis Ababa in May 1963. The aims were as follows -

1. To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States.
2. To co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa.
3. To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence.
4. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.

5. To promote international co-operation, have due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>9</sup>

The aims and objectives outlined in the Charter clearly reflect the desire of the African States for African unity to safeguard independence, to improve living standard and to ensure end of colonialism from Africa. It was in the context of these aims and objectives of O.A.U. that it is quite essential to examine Tanzania's relationship with O.A.U. in order to give a definitive picture of its foreign policy stand on different issues of significance.

The aims and objectives of O.A.U. bear some similarity with Tanzania's own effort for African unity. Since independence Tanzania has associated herself with the ultimate aim of realization of African unity because it held that only unity and regional co-operation could create conditions to strengthen the economies of the young independent States of Africa. This approach was very explicit in President Nyerere's statement itself, where he said -

---

9 See O.A.U. Charter, O.A.U., Addis Ababa, 1963.

"Many of us in East Africa believe that our best path to unity may be through a regional association. This would bring us some immediate strengthening of our economies at the same time showing to our people the benefits of unity". (10)

Before the formation of O.A.U., two contending groups existed in Africa (with the exception of PAFMECA) and differed in their approach to African unity. They were Casablanca group led by the radical (ideology) Ghana and the Monrovia group led by the moderate (ideology) Nigeria.<sup>11</sup> These groups were based on ideological considerations, the former being radical and following more or less Nkrumah's one step move to unity through a political decision by heads of States, while the latter emphasised the barriers to unity and was for gradual methods such as economic co-operation.<sup>12</sup> Tanzania, however, did not join any of the group. Tanzania's non-involvement in these groups enabled her to play a neutralizing role at

---

10 n. 4, pp. 193-94.

11 The Casablanca Group was comprised of five African States - U.A.R., Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco. Monrovia group, on the other hand, consisted of all of the States of the former French community except Guinea, Mali and Mauritania, plus Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia. With the formation of O.A.U. both the groups were taken as dissolved.

12 K. Mathews and S.S. Mushi, ed., Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-81; A Reader, Dar es Salaam, 1984, p. 98.



the founding conference of the O.A.U. where it brought both sides - the Casablanca group and the Monrovia group - to final agreement.<sup>13</sup> This integrative role by Tanzania was indicative of its genuine effort towards African unity. In this context, the statement of Nyerere is worth mentioning -

"We must use the African National States as an instrument for the reunification of Africa, and not allow our enemies to use them as tools for dividing Africa. African nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic and is dangerous if it is not at the same time Pan-African". (14)

During the formative years of O.A.U. there were disagreements between Tanzania and Ghana over the question of strategy for African unity. President Nkrumah of Ghana was advocating the setting up of United States of Africa as opposed to President Nyerere's 'step by step' approach through regional economic groupings and political mergers on Tanganyika and Zanzibar lines. President Nyerere made his position very clear in 1964 O.A.U. Summit held at Cairo. He argued that the step by step approach was the only realistic measure towards African unity and said -

---

13 Tanzania was the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Charter of the O.A.U.

14 op. cit., p.28.

"We are committed to the achievement of a United Africa under a single continental Government. We have already surrendered our sovereignty, in the name of greater unity. We shall surrender it again for a bigger unity. We do not believe that there is a choice between achieving African unity step by step and achieving it in one act. The one act choice is not available to us except in some curious imagination .... It has not given to us human mortals to simply wish things into existence. Between our willing an end and achievement of that end there is a process. This process is sometimes long and sometimes short, and indeed, the greater the objective the longer may be the process. But whether short or long it is a process by definition is progress step by step. To rule out a step by step progress in a march to unity is to rule out our unity itself". (15)

Here, Nyerere has developed his argument logically. According to him African unity meant, in a broader sense, nationalism against foreign domination and exploitation by imperialism and international monopoly capital. Therefore, mere political independence was meaningless without economic independence. The necessity of economic independence, Tanzania asserted should be viewed in the context of achieving genuine national independence under which people would have full control of their resources for their own advancement. Tanzania submitted to other members that the need was to form regional economic groupings was imperative, for, imperialism, which had

dominated and exploited Africa under disunity, would not freely leave Africa to let it form a united continent. The Cairo Summit of the O.A.U. saw increasing support to Nyerere's step by step approach and eventually, the problems involved in whatever strategy to be followed for African unity were resolved.

Apart from helping in the resolution of these initial problems during the formative years of O.A.U., Tanzania did in fact play a positive role at various O.A.U. Summit conferences. This positive role can be seen in the context of Congo crisis, Rhodesian crisis, Mercenary problem in Africa and the Lusaka manifesto. The need to discuss these issues arose out of the basic fact that Tanzania's stand on these issues has got a direct relationship with its foreign policy orientation. Thus, the citation of these issues is essential in order to give a comprehensive study as to the operational aspect of Tanzania's foreign policy.

The first crisis that O.A.U. had to confront immediately after it was formed was the Congo crisis.<sup>16</sup>

---

16 Immediately after her independence on June 30, 1960 Congo faced the problem of disintegration. On July 11, Moise Tshombe, the President of Katanga, announced Katangese secession.

Tanzania took an active role in exposing the activities of Moise Tshombe and imperialist manoeuvres in Congo.<sup>17</sup> Tanzania, as a result, was instrumental in withholding O.A.U.'s recognition of Tshombe's puppet regime which was formed in July 1964.

Another role played by Tanzania in the O.A.U. was in the context of the Rhodesia crisis.<sup>18</sup> Tanzania opposed granting of independence by United Kingdom to the White minority Government in Rhodesia. Thus in 1965, with the threat of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the settler minorities in Rhodesia, it was mainly Tanzania's pressure through the Liberation Committee of O.A.U. that made possible for the extraordinary Council of Minister's Conference to pass a resolution on 3rd December 1965 calling the member countries to break diplomatic relation with Britain by 15 December 1965, if Britain fails to bring an end to White minority leader Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia. This resolution, however, had little impact as only nine countries adhered to the resolution while the rest did not. As part of the political action over

---

17 The Katangese in Congo in their attempt for secession, were helped by hundreds of foreign mercenaries mostly from America and Belgium.

18 Rhodesia crisis has also been dealt in the following subsection of this chapter under the sub-caption 'Tanzania and the Liberation Movements in Africa'.

the Rhodesian issue, Tanzania, on 15 December 1965 went as far as to sever diplomatic relations with Britain in order to bring effective pressure to bear on UK and make her government to wake up to its democratic commitment to majority rule.

The problem of mercenary involvement in the African political scene can be traced back to the history of the Congo crisis where Katangese were supported by hundreds of foreign mercenaries. Realizing the seriousness of this problem, the O.A.U. at the initiative of Tanzania, adopted a declaration on mercenaries at its Eighth Summit which reaffirmed : "the determination of the African peoples and States to take all the necessary measures to eradicate from the African continent the scourge that the mercenary system represents". In this conference Tanzania was mostly concerned with the definition of a mercenary and suggested a delay in drafting a convention on mercenaries to allow further studies on mercenaries. Such a delay was conceived in the context of an erroneous belief that mercenaries were the nationals of non-African States and that Africans were not mercenaries. It was later found out that in the case of invasion of the Republic of Guinea, the invaders included mercenaries who were the nationals of the Guinea itself. This was seen in the light of how imperialists in Asia have been using Asian

mercenaries to fight Asians and this imperialist doctrine will in due course if not already initiated be used in Africa as well.<sup>19</sup> Thus Tanzania's initiative against the mercenaries can be viewed in the line of its commitment to anti-imperialism.

President Nyerere has all along expressed his preference for a peaceful settlement of the Southern African problem. This preference has been clearly spelt out in the 'Lusaka Manifesto' which was drawn up in April 1969 through the 'Good Neighbours' conference in East and Central African countries, which offered Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa a chance for peaceful negotiation as an alternative to violent conflict. This manifesto was later adopted by O.A.U. The manifesto clearly told the minority regimes in Southern Africa -

"We would prefer to negotiate rather than to destroy, to talk rather than to kill". But added, "Africa can not acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent". (20)

It appeared that President Nyerere was concerned with mobilization of all the forces that could assist in achieving political independence of the colonised countries

---

19 See The Nationalist, Tanzania, 31 July 1971.

20 See the "Lusaka Manifesto", The African Review, vol. 1, no. 1, 1971.

than with ideological issues of that independence. Thus he did not consider the armed struggle negotiation dichotomy in ideological term i.e., whether one or the other would tend to produce a socialist or capitalist society rather in terms of how to minimize the sufferings of the people. He, therefore, saw negotiation and armed struggle as two sides of the same coin, and encouraged liberation movements to negotiate whenever and wherever possible and to fight when all else had failed.

From the above analysis, we may conclude that Tanzania's position in the O.A.U. has been mostly in terms of her effort to build African unity. Despite the fact of lack of sympathy on the part of O.A.U. towards Tanzania on certain issues<sup>21</sup>, Tanzania never failed to ensure that the O.A.U. survived. Although Tanzania lamented that the Organisation had betrayed the people of Africa behind the curtain of legalistic principles of the Charter and thus, sacrificing the fundamental principles of morality and human dignity<sup>22</sup> yet Tanzania did never

---

21 During the Uganda-Tanzania war, O.A.U. condemned Tanzania's intervention but failed to condemn Uganda's aggression of Tanzania. Besides, Tanzania also failed in persuading O.A.U. to recognise the genuine concern of the people of Biafra. Both the issues have been discussed in subsequent subsections of this chapter.

22 Uganda under Iddi Amin's regime was known for indiscriminate killings of the innocent people whoever tried to oppose Amin's Government. When O.A.U. accepted an offer of Amin to host the 1975 O.A.U. Summit, Tanzania strongly protested the decision of the O.A.U. See Vijay Gupta, 'Obote: Second Liberation' Vikas, New Delhi, 1983.

work towards the demise of the Organisation. The O.A.U. has still been viewed by Tanzania as the principal instrument for regional integration and ultimately for African unity.

Tanzania and the Liberation  
Movements in Africa

There has been a positive linkage between Tanzania and the liberation struggle in Africa. Historically speaking, Tanzania's relationship with the liberation movements in Africa can be explained in terms of the practical experience of the country itself. Tanzania's anti-colonial struggle could be traced back to 1880's when her people put up serious resistances against German colonialism culminating in the famous Maji-Maji rebellion involving an armed struggle against Germans during 1905 and 1906.<sup>23</sup> German rule did not last long. Following the defeat of the Germans in the First World War, Britain became Tanzania's new colonial master. It was during the British colonial period that the Tanganyikans launched their nationalist struggle eventually to achieve independence in 1961. The struggle for independence in Tanzania was mainly led by the Tanganyika African

---

23 n. 6, p. 41.



Association (TAA) which later came to be known as Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). During the nationalist struggle TANU had a record of co-operation with other nationalist parties in Africa.<sup>24</sup> Thus, for Tanzania, the history of working together with other liberation movements is as old as the country's struggle for independence.

One of the principal aims and objectives of TANU which still remains the aim of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (a party which was named after the merger of TANU and Afro Shirazi party of Zanzibar) is to see to it that the Government co-operates with other states in ensuring African unity. Tanzania's crusade against colonialism and racialism was evidenced just before Tanganyika's independence when President Nyerere declared that Tanganyika would remain outside the Commonwealth if South Africa's racist regime remained a member. Thus, with independence, Tanzania was identified as a militant and anti-imperialist country, particularly in relation to the liberation of Africa. This position was further strengthened when the Arusha Declaration was made in 1967. The part 1 of the

---

24 Tanganyika had strong links with Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar, and was instrumental in the formation of Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA).

Declaration stipulates the foreign policy objectives of the party and the government. The policy objectives were -

- (a) to co-operate with all political parties in Africa,
- (b) to see to it that the government co-operates with other States to bring about African unity.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, the centrepiece in Tanzania's foreign policy principles and priorities is its policy on liberation. Its policy on liberation is closely related to her domestic policy of socialism and self-reliance which is based on the principles of human equality and human dignity. Internally, Tanzania is committed to the building of an egalitarian society devoid of exploitation, oppression and discrimination. Born out of this policy of socialism are the principles of anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and anti-imperialism, and ultimately its policy direction towards the liberation of Africa.

Considering the foreign policy stand of Tanzania as well as its role in the direction of African unity, the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) decided to have the Head Quarters of its Liberation Committee at

---

25 n. 12, p. 108.

the Tanzanian capital, Dar-es-Salaam.<sup>26</sup> The choice of Dar-es-Salaam was also partly due to Tanzania's proximity to the unliberated territories of Southern Africa, namely the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, the settler regimes of Rhodesia, and South Africa. Addressing the first emergency session of the Council of Ministers of O.A.U. on 12 February 1964, Nyerere said -

"For Africa, Tanganyika is a border state. By virtue of that fact, the headquarters of the Liberation Committee is situated in our capital". (27)

Conceived in the context of Tanzania's relationship with the freedom movements in Africa, it is found that since 1961 when Tanganyika became independent, Dar es Salaam had been the headquarters of most of the liberation movements operating in Southern Africa, particularly FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO, ZANU and many others. Despite the risks involved, Tanzania had also contacts with the liberation movements recognised by the O.A.U.<sup>28</sup> The formation of

---

26 Nine member states formed the Committee at its inception, and Tanzania as the host country, had continued to provide Executive Secretary for the Committee.

27 n. 5, p. 288.

28 During the Portuguese colonial rule of Mozambique, a number of attacks were made on various parts of Southern Tanzania under the pretext that the colonial regime was attacking the FRELIMO camps in Tanzania.

Frontline States as an informal alliance of states with sub-regional interests, and their deep involvement in the Zimbabwe crisis till the latter's independence in April 1980, was consequent upon the collapse of the Portuguese power in Mozambique and Angola in 1975. After the independence of Portuguese colonies, Tanzania supported the liberation struggle in further South. She recognised the existence of two forces in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa namely imperialist domination and an internal oppressor, that is, the settler racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and accepted the necessity to use force to bring down these forces if peaceful settlement failed. So, it is in the context of liberation struggles in Southern Africa, we will here discuss Tanzania's role with regard to Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa.

When we examine Tanzania's role and policy on the liberation of Southern Africa we find that in Mozambique, Tanzania supported FRELIMO (the Mozambiquan Liberation Movement)<sup>29</sup> from its inception in Dar es Salaam in 1962 and supported Samora Machel before and after his confirmation as FRELIMO's President in 1970. Tanzania regarded FRELIMO and its leadership as an example of genuine

---

29 In addition to FRELIMO, there was another liberation movement in Mozambique known as COREMO which was formed after the assassination of FRELIMO leader Edward Mondlane in 1969.

liberation movement in the African liberation struggle. Between the year 1970 and 1974 there was increased intensification of armed struggle between FRELIMO and the Portuguese colonial regime which ultimately led to establishment of large liberated zones within Mozambique. TANU declared the year 1974 as 'Year of Liberation' and this was followed by the mobilization of all sections of the population in Tanzania to support the liberation struggle. At the end of the year of liberation, Samora Machel was presented with Shs. 4 million as Tanzania's contribution to the liberation process. Thus Tanzania's recognition as well as moral and material support to FRELIMO and its leadership over the years was no less important in the achievement of Mozambique's independence in 1975 from the Portuguese colonial rule.

On the Angolan front Tanzania supported late President Augustinho Netto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which was formed in 1956. As Angola approached independence, there was increased intensification of rivalry, between the liberation movements of MPLA, Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). By 1975, all these movements were seeking African support to form an independent government after the withdrawal of

Portuguese colonial rule. By November 1975, MPLA was in a position to rally support from all over the country. The FNLA and UNLTA whose activities remained restricted to eastern and southern borders respectively sought aid from the West and South Africa. These two formed an alliance to counter the force of MPLA which received Soviet arms, and thus there were two rival governments on the eve of the independence in 1975. This led to disagreements in the O.A.U. as to which government should be recognised and supported in Angola after the departure of the Portuguese. In such an atmosphere, Tanzania laid the argument in support of MPLA. President Nyerere clarified MPLA's position by explaining that MPLA had received arms from the countries largely because the Western countries refused to supply them and moreover, communist support to MPLA was not a fight for communism but continuation of struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism which South Africa was trying to perpetuate by taking advantage of Angola's internal divisions.

Tanzania's support was justifiable on the basis of MPLA's opposition to US policy which made it clear that its support to FNLA-UNLTA was motivated by its pursuit of anti-communist policies, largely based on Cold War rivalry for sphere of influence in Africa rather than by support for liberation. Thus, largely because of

Tanzania's elaboration of correct policy considerations for supporting MPLA, the O.A.U. eventually recognised MPLA's ruler over the People's Republic of Angola by admitting it to full O.A.U. membership in February 1976.<sup>30</sup>

Tanzania's role and activities in the liberation of Rhodesia and South Africa can be viewed in a wider context. Tanzania, along with Zambia, had been attempting to solve Rhodesian crisis ever since the UDI of 11 November 1965. Tanzanian and Zambian aims in Rhodesia were to contribute and assist in the achievement of democratic independence in Africa. Earlier attempts were made for a peaceful settlement of Rhodesia and South Africa problem through negotiation as outlined in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969. But Rhodesia and South Africa declined the offer. Thus, in April 1975 the Extraordinary meeting of O.A.U. Ministerial Council which was held at Dar es Salaam, came out with the famous "Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on the Liberation of Southern Africa".<sup>31</sup> The Declaration indicated O.A.U.'s objectives in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

The objectives of O.A.U. in Zimbabwe and South Africa have been emphasised in the Declaration. The

---

30 n. 6, p. 47.

31 Nyerere addressed the opening session of the meeting and his views were endorsed later on in the form of "Dar-es-Salaam Declaration".

Declaration indicated the possibilities of changing the strategies and tactics of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The following is a part of the Declaration which runs as follows -

" ... These objectives flow from Africa's commitment to achieve total independence on the basis of majority rule with respect to the two colonial territories. Concerning South Africa, the objective has been, and still is, the ending of apartheid and the total elimination of racial discrimination. While the strategies and tactics in the attainment of this objective may change from one situation to another and from time to time, the objective itself is constant and non-negotiable". (32)

In the South African situation the declaration stressed the continued strategy of isolating South Africa internationally, while in the case of Zimbabwe it left open the possibilities of the dispute being solved by a constitutional conference. But if the constitutional arrangement failed then O.A.U. would guarantee material and diplomatic support in intensifying the armed struggle.<sup>33</sup> On the question of Namibia, the declaration made it clear that, "in the absence of South Africa's willingness to terminate its illegal occupation of Namibia, O.A.U.

---

32 See Declaration of Dar-es-Salaam on Southern Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar-es-Salaam, 1978, p. 3.

33 Ibid., p. 6.



must assist the national liberation movement of Namibia, SWAPO, to intensify the armed struggle in Namibia".<sup>34</sup>

At the Dar-es-Salaam meeting of 1975, Tanzania viewed armed struggle as an incentive for negotiation rather than a process of radicalization that would lead to a structural revolution after the attainment of political independence. In his address to the meeting, President Nyerere made it clear that Tanzania's assistance to the liberation of Southern Africa was limited to the achievement of political independence and an end to apartheid. He said -

"Our only international justification for supporting the nationalists either diplomatically, financially or militarily - is opposition to colonialism or racism". (35)

Thus, it was mostly through the efforts of Tanzania and other Frontline States that Zimbabwe could attain its independence on the basis of majority rule in April 1980. Having achieved their objective of majority rule in Zimbabwe, the Frontline States, now joined by Zimbabwe as their sixth alliance partner, have now directed their

---

34 Ibid., p. 7.

35 See Nathan M. Shamuyarira, Documents and Speeches on the O.A.U. Strategy for Liberation of Southern Africa, Dar-es-Salaam, 1976.

attention to the problems of South Africa, namely, the liberation of Namibia and an end of apartheid system in South Africa.

In the light of Southern African Liberation Movement, the five major components of contemporary Tanzanian approach are the following -

1. Continued moral and material support for the military and para-military liberation movements.
2. Diplomatic recognition of these movements, in the hope of increasing their international respectability.
3. Reconciliation of internal differences within and among the liberation groups, to increase their effectiveness and reduce the likelihood of post independence political violence in their countries.
4. Diplomatic and propaganda pressures aimed at isolating the minority regimes in Southern Africa, combined with an effort to promote the enforcement and extension of international sanctions.
5. Provision of opportunities for close communication among the liberation movements, and between them and similar organisations in other parts of the world, to strengthen their members'

resolve and solidarity.<sup>36</sup>

From the above discussion we may conclude that the crusade for African Liberation continues, and Tanzania remains pledged to advance the struggle until all the countries in the region have achieved independence and majority rule. There has been greater clarification by Tanzania as regards the basic purpose of liberation movements. The purpose of liberation movement, according to the view of Tanzania, is not the fight to have any particular system whether it be capitalism or communism, rather it is a fight against colonialism and other forms of exploitations. It is for freedom, equality, justice and human dignity. Tanzania's continued support to the liberation movements in Africa have, thus, carried a moral justification as to her support to the liberation movements in Africa. While supporting these liberation struggles, Tanzania did never compromise or sacrifice the fundamental principles of her foreign policy, that is, the policy of anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and anti-imperialism.

#### Tanzania and the Biafra Issue

Tanzania's role in the Biafra issue has been interpreted by many as a controversial one. Tanzania's

---

36 Nnoli Okwudiba, Self Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania, New York, 1978, p. 255.

stand on Biafra was viewed to be in contradiction to its foreign policy stand, and her general statements on African unity. The recognition of Biafra by Tanzania was seemingly at odds with Nyerere's 1967 speech on African unity.<sup>37</sup> So, in the light of this controversy, here, the need is to examine whether Tanzania did actually deviate from the adhered principles of its foreign policy or otherwise.

Biafra issue in the African political scene referred to the secessionist aspirations of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. The basic cause for secession from the Nigerian Federation was the denial of human rights to Ibos particularly right of equality in terms of jobs and economic activities. There had emerged situations when the people from the eastern region could no longer feel safe in other parts of the Nigerian Federation.<sup>38</sup> The Ibos felt that they were not accepted as citizens of Nigeria by the other citizens of Nigeria. Such a situation made it difficult for these people to move freely even with an assurance of personal safety. This fear of Ibo people was quite genuine and it became stronger in 1966 when about 30,000

---

37 n. 1, pp. 291-300.

38 The eastern region of Nigeria is dominated by Ibo and the people of related ethnic groups.

Ibos were massacred.<sup>39</sup> Tanzanian Government expressing concern for the Ibos stated, "The only way to remove the Easterners' fear is for the Nigerian authorities to accept its existence, to acknowledge the reason for it, and then to talk on terms of equality with those involved about the way forward".<sup>40</sup> The Tanzanian Government spokesman further said,

"When the people have reason to be afraid you can not assure them through the barrel of a gun; your only hope is to talk as one man to another, or as one group to another. It is no use the Federal authorities that the persecuted should come as supplicant for mercy, by first renouncing their secession from the political unit. For the secession was declared because the Ibo people felt it to be their only defence against extermination. In their mind, therefore, a demand that they should renounce secession before talks are begun, is equivalent to a demand that they should announce their willingness to be exterminated".<sup>41</sup> This statement of Tanzanian Government

---

39 Between January and July of the year 1966, two military coups took place in Nigeria which resulted in two major pogroms against the Ibos. Apart from the massacre, it made two million Ibos to flee from their homes in other parts of Nigeria to their tribal home land in Eastern Nigeria.

40 n. 12, p. 276.

41 Ibid.

was not an arbitrary explanation rather it was in conformity with as to what had been happening in Nigeria.

The ultimate culmination of this crisis was the declaration of an independent state, in the Eastern Nigeria by the Ibos, the 'Republic of Biafra'. Tanzania was the first African country to recognize Biafra on 13 April 1968. In the 1969 Addis Ababa Conference of O.A.U., Tanzania circulated a paper titled "The Nigeria-Biafra Crisis", attempting to justify why she had recognised Biafra. The paper argued -

"We should learn that where in any African state there is a dominant group, whether that group is ethnic, religious or otherwise, it must wield its power and influence on behalf of all elements which go to form that country. In particular, it should be very solicitous of the interests of the minorities, because they are the ones which need the protection of the State. If a dominant group does not act in this protective manner, then civil strife and consequent Biafras become inevitable. That is the lesson Africa should learn from the Nigerian tragedy". (42)

This paper, however, had little impact on O.A.U. and its members. Tanzania, thus, compromised with the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the 1970 O.A.U. Summit after Ibos were defeated and an end came to the 'Republic of Biafra'.

---

42 The Standard, Tanzania, September 4, 1969.

Tanzania's conciliatory approach at the end should not be viewed, again, as contrary to its basic foreign policy principle. Rather it was the due cognizance of the changing situation that it had to cope with. Moreover, its earlier recognition of Biafra was also not a deviation from its foreign policy stand on African unity. Exploitation and discrimination, whether be it through internal forces or external forces have the similar consequence, that is, a revolt against those forces. Thus, Biafra issue was the genuine concern of the genuine people. The Nigerian Federal Authorities through their discriminatory activities did, in fact, force the Ibo people to alienate themselves from the Nigerian mainstream and ultimately towards disintegration. So, it was the Nigerian Federal Authority who worked towards disunity rather than towards unity. Thus, Tanzania's recognition of Biafra, although it appeared to be a deviation from its commitment to African unity, in a broader perspective it was truly towards unity through the conceived ideal of peaceful co-existence and equality of all human beings.

#### Tanzania-Uganda War

The crisis of Uganda-Tanzania war in 1978 can be traced back to 1971 when President Milton Obote of Uganda was overthrown through a coup d' etat by Iddi Amin.

From the very outset Tanzania refused to recognise Amin's Government on the grounds that it was anti-revolutionary, particularly in the field of Africa's liberation struggle.<sup>43</sup> Another reason of Tanzania's opposition to Amin was his mass killings inside Uganda. Large numbers of anti-Amin fled to Tanzania as political refugees when Amin's regime became more and more oppressive. These political refugees started organizing themselves with the ultimate objective of overthrowing Amin's regime. This increased the tension between Uganda and Tanzania with frequent accusations by Amin that Tanzania was preparing to invade Uganda, overthrow his regime and reinstate Obote. Amin further warned that if Uganda were forced to invade Tanzania in order to repulse such an invasion, it would retain any territories captured and would not entertain any mediation attempt by any third country.<sup>44</sup>

Amin's accusations of Tanzania for its support to an invasion of Uganda by ex-President Obote's supporters

---

43 Iddi Amin came to power by a coup d'etat in January 1971 while his President was in Singapore playing a leading role in the opposition to the then British Government's proposed resumption of arms sales to South Africa. Amin after seizing power in Uganda withdrew Uganda's opposition to that proposal. See Vijay Gupta, *Obote Second Liberation*, op. cit.

44 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 6-12, 1975.



were repeated over the years culminating in 1978 invasion of Tanzania.<sup>45</sup> Amin's provocative statements against Tanzania had no bounds. Whenever Amin was in internal difficulties through the people's attempts to resist his murderous regime, he accused Tanzania of subversion.<sup>46</sup> There were also occasions where Amin's allegations received international attention. For an instance, the allegations that Tanzania was preparing to invade Uganda were reported in British newspapers in February 1971, March 1973, August 1975 and February 1977. Allegations that Tanzania had actually invaded Uganda were reported in the World Press in July 1971, July 1974, September 1975 and early in October 1978.<sup>47</sup>

Tanzania's strained relations with Uganda further worsened in late 1978. Renewed border fighting was reported in October 1978, and the following month Uganda announced the annexation of the Kagera Salient<sup>48</sup>, comprising some 1,840 sq. km. of Tanzanian territory.<sup>49</sup>

---

45 For details see David Martin, General Amin, London, 1978, pp. 235-36.

46 n. 12, p. 306.

47 Ibid.

48 Iddi Amin laid claim to the territory of Kagera Salient a number of times starting in October 1971.

49 Africa South of Sahara, Europa Publication Ltd., London, 1988, p. 989.

At the diplomatic level Tanzania condemned the Ugandan action and called upon the member states of O.A.U. and the World to do the same. Nyerere, while condemning the action, said -

"Amin has used his army to commit aggression against Tanzania. Africa must recognise this for what it is; aggression. All African countries must condemn the aggression" (50)

Despite repeated appeals by Tanzania, O.A.U. failed to condemn the invasion except for pressurizing Uganda to withdraw its troops.<sup>51</sup> Regretting the inability of O.A.U. in condemning Uganda, Nyerere said -

"The O.A.U. was established by the Heads of African States. The O.A.U. is not a trade union of Africa's heads of states. Therefore, if it is to retain the respect and support of the people of Africa, it must be concerned about the lives of the people of Africa. We must not just concern ourselves with our own survival as heads of states; we must be even more concerned about peace and justice in Africa than we are about the sanctity of the boundaries we inherited .... The O.A.U. must sometimes raise a voice against those regimes in Africa ... who opposes the peoples of Africa". (52)

---

50 See Daily News, Tanzania, 26 November 1978.

51 Only few members of O.A.U. condemned the aggression, namely, Mozambique, Zambia, Algeria and Ethiopia.

52 n. 5, p. 40.

Although the Ugandan troops withdrew as a result of the pressure from O.A.U., border fighting still continued. Having realized that nothing was going to solve the problem, Tanzania decided to take unilateral decision to meet Amin's challenge. Thus, in January 1979 a Tanzanian-based invasion force entered Uganda. They gained control over the southern region. Amin's army capitulated and an interim Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF) government was subsequently proclaimed in April 1979 in Uganda. Tanzania's intervention became a controversy at the O.A.U. Summit Conference in July 1979 where the violation of Ugandan territorial integrity by Tanzania was condemned as a dangerous precedent despite Nyerere's claim to have acted in response of Ugandan aggression.

In this chapter we have sought to examine Tanzania's policy towards Africa, particularly towards African unity, O.A.U. and the Liberation struggles in Africa. We have also discussed Tanzania's relations with O.A.U. and other African Liberation Movements, and its policy stand on Biafra issue and Tanzania-Uganda war. On careful examination of various issues and problems discussed in this chapter, we may infer that Tanzania's policy towards Africa has been mostly in terms of anti-racialism and bringing an end to the colonial and neo-colonial

domination of the African continent. It has remained an ardent supporter of the genuine liberation movements in Africa and exposed those liberation movements and regimes which sought to perpetuate the neo-colonial domination irrespective of the fact whether it was direct or indirect. As regards the liberation of Africa Tanzania tried to neutralize the power bloc influence in the continent through the argument that the liberation struggles in Africa were nationalist struggle and they were not for or against any particular bloc. In her policy applications in the inter-African politics Tanzania has remained mostly consistent. Its role in the Biafra crisis and war with Uganda, it should not be regarded that her policy on these issues was unrealistic or inconsistent. Such a view would undermine an objective definition of realism and consistency. The term 'realism' necessitates an objective assessment of the situation and then act accordingly. Similarly, consistency should not be viewed as adhering to any particular position throughout, rather it should be looked in dynamic terms. Thus, viewed in these terms, Tanzania's role in Biafra and Uganda issues was very much in consistency with her foreign policy principles and objectives. The realities of Tanzania's position inside Africa suggest that there has been hardly any disparity between her domestic and

foreign policies. Despite her differences with O.A.U. on many occasions, it has not isolated itself from the O.A.U. system and has continued to remain an active member in her pursuit to liberate South Africa from the clutches of the racist regime.

**Chapter III**

**Tanzania's Bilateral and Multilateral  
Relations**

Tanzania's foreign policy has from the beginning been professedly non-aligned. The architect of the policy President Julius K. Nyerere has always sought to base Tanzania's attitudes towards and relations with external world on the paradigm of autonomous decision making. Although many interpretations of Tanzanian foreign policy elements have either sought to highlight a definitive inclination towards either bloc (Western and Socialist) or a phasal shift from one major power to another. In either case the emphasis are misplaced. A pertinent analysis would rather highlight the fact that in essence ever since independence and upto present time<sup>1</sup>, Dar es Salaam has of necessity persued a policy which by Nyerere's own conviction is the appropriate policy for a comparatively weak, underdeveloped third world nations like Tanzania. In a word, Tanzania has never really compromised its genuine pursuit of an independent minded foreign policy based on the tenets of non-alignment.

The Paradigm of Autonomy ...  
Tanzanian Perspective

Ever since independence, in fact, even before that Julius Nyerere had insisted in unequivocal terms that it

---

1 T.C. Niblock's analysis has been in such a spirit. In his article, "Tanzanian Foreign Policy: An Analysis", The African Review, vol. 1, no. 2, 1972, p. 91.

is in the interest of Tanzania, with the burden of its colonial legacies as also of its internal socio, economic and political changes of the future, to opt for a policy that is geared towards the resolution of these tasks and yet is uncompromising as regards Tanzania's external autonomy. It is a tribute to the vision of Julius K. Nyerere (the parallels of which are striking in the case of Nehru and India's foreign policy) that he saw in non-alignment, the ideal policy orientation that takes into account all the above issues.

Strictly in order to project the necessity of independence in decision-making Julius Nyerere had already made important statements and taken significant steps. For example, in an article in the Observer of 12th March 1961, he made it clear that Tanganyika would not feel able to apply for Commonwealth, if South Africa remained a member. In such a commitment at this stage Nyerere was one and only Commonwealth leader. Nyerere condemned atomic tests by France in the Sahara.<sup>2</sup> He refused to accept Britain's treaty obligations (made on behalf of Tanganyika) before independence and also Nyerere visited Yugoslavia and expressed Tanganyika's desire to forge new friendships.

---

2 New York Herald Tribune, 21 April 1961.



Following independence the Tanganyika government's attitude on crucial questions of foreign policy were decisively stated, whether it was on issues relating to Southern Africa or to its relationship with former colonizing country Great Britain, there was one clear common denominator ... an assertion of independence in foreign policy decisions. Tanzania was typically non-aligned in its refusal to be drawn into any Cold War based policy formulations. As a consequence of this its relations with either bloc, the capitalist and the socialist was not one that could be characterised as exclusive to one bloc at the expense of the other. With its dedication to national self-reliance and commitment to national self-determination it was but natural that its foreign policy should seek to promote and preserve political and economic non-alignment. So if on the one hand Dar es Salaam had sought and created openings towards the East, it has nonetheless not been averse to promoting politically and economically advantageous ties with the countries of the West. In fact it was quite evident immediately after independence that Tanzania was finding it important and relevant to its internal situation to have close and cordial ties with ex-colonizer Great Britain. This period has been called the period of innocence on the part of Tanzanian foreign policy. Tanzania had in these

initial years found an advantageous congruence of foreign and domestic policies that rested on continuing dependence upon Britain. Britain was taken along with United States of America as a nation that had reasonable sympathies for Tanzanian aspirations. Hence both development strategy and foreign policy in these years came to depend to a large degree on assumption that Britain would understand and encourage policies based on self determination, economically, politically and socially. In the event as we shall see subsequently such a faith was discovered to be not very well founded.

A narration of the development of Tanzania's relations with the two bloc's shows the spirit of adjustments in Tanzania's foreign policy orientations over the years. It also makes it clear that decisive yet effective changes could be possible only on the basis of a singular continuous factor that is belief in the autonomy of foreign policy. It will be seen that Tanzania has demonstrated a foreign policy flexibility that can not be regarded possible of a country that prescribe to bloc alignment. From the above analysis we arrive at some fundamental postulates regarding Tanzanian foreign policy which together serve to give us a wholesome framework for analysing developments in Tanzania's relations with the external world -

1. Tanzania has like many other third world countries opted for non-alignment as the only suitable and pragmatic foreign policy orientation.
2. It sees a necessary complementarity between non-alignment and the policy issues the Tanzania's domestic situation warrant.
3. Its closeness to or distance from any bloc is only an expression of the fact that its national interests are thereby adequately served.

#### Historical Perspective

It has been often said that year 1964 and 1965 mark a turning point in Tanzania's foreign policy. While some interpretations see this change as one from traditional dependence to genuinely independent foreign policy<sup>3</sup>, there are other interpretations which see the break as one from pro-West policies to pro-East policies. In both the cases there is greater emphasis on one aspect at the expense of the other.

A proper historical analysis of developments concerning Tanzanian foreign policy over these so called contrasting periods reveals that whether it was before

---

3 This view, broadly, is taken by Catherine Hoskyns in her article, "Africa's Foreign Relations", International Affairs, July 1968.

1964-65 or after, the insistence on Tanzania's sovereignty and non-alignment was a constant factor. For example, in both the periods it has never diluted the intensity of its campaign for self-determination in Southern Africa or the need for regional development or the imperative of a New International Economic Order etc.

Following independence in December 1961 Tanganyika nurtured close relationship with Great Britain - relationship that tantamounted to dependence upon the latter. British presence in Tanzania was even till the closing years of the 60's quite formidable. Report by the Tanzanian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning in 1969 reveals that in the year 1961 of a total of 4452 middle and senior posts in the Tanganyika Civil Service 3282 were held by expatriates, almost all of which were British.

Other aspects of dependence on Great Britain were the foreign capital assistance received by Tanzania during the early 60's. Great Britain contributed nearly 70% of the external development revenues received by the Tanzanian treasury between 1961 and 1965 (10 million pounds out of the total of 15 million pounds).<sup>4</sup>

---

4 Comprehensive aid figures are very hard to come by. These figures are the totals of developmental revenues received as these are recorded in the official budget survey, 1965-66 and the background

During this period again Britain and Tanzania had close cultural and trade ties. The same period also saw cordiality of relations between Washington and Dar es Salaam. The Tanzania's perception of international politics during this period was described by Nyerere in August 1964.

"The world is divided into various conflicting groups, and each one of these groups is anxious for allies in Africa and even more anxious that opponents shall not find friends. In this field also we have, therefore, to think carefully and objectively about the implications of every move we make .... The desire to help the United Republic in our economic struggle - even the desire for friendship with us - these things come second to what the other nation believes to be in its own interests. It is no use complaining about that; basically we ourselves adopt the same attitude. We have to recognize that some overseas nations will help us if they can, and if they do not believe that they will harm themselves while doing so; other nations will help us solely in the hope of some kind of return to themselves - whether this be diplomatic, political or economic".<sup>5</sup>

---

Footnote 4 cont'd ...

to the budget, 1966-67. They do not include military aid, assistance in kind, or aid given directly to public corporations. They also do not include aid that was promised but which never materialised.

5 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, Dar es Salaam, 1966, pp. 314-15.

The above statement "makes it clear that at that time Nyerere regarded Britain and the United States not as nations who would help Tanzania only if they could see a direct return of themselves, but rather as sympathetic countries who could be expected to help Tanzania as long as they did not thereby harm themselves. This assumption was an important ingredient of Tanzania's foreign policy and of its development strategy. These policies were thus at that time in total harmony one with the other".<sup>6</sup>

This period of innocence however was bound to give way to the two important trends;

1. Tanzanian optimism about British and American attitudes towards Tanzania was replaced by a more pragmatic perspective of international politics on the part of its leaders. Following a series of crises in Tanzania's relations with Great Britain and other Western bloc countries the leaders "reassessed the foreign policy ... (and) saw the world of international in a harsher and more sober light".<sup>7</sup>

---

6 Cranford Pratt, "Foreign Policy Issues and the Emergence of Socialism in Tanzania: 1961-8", International Journal, vol. 30, nos. 3-4, 1975, pp. 447.

7 Ibid., p. 448.

2. On an internal level a profound commitment arose towards seeking a socialist transformation of Tanzanian society. The famous Arusha Declaration of February 1967 was not only the sign post of internal political and economic changes in Tanzania but was also significant of the new importance attached to relations with the socialist bloc by President Julius Nyerere and other Tanzanian leaders.

Cranford Pratt lists four important issues which caused "loss of innocence" in foreign affairs and "move to the left" in Tanzania. These are -

1. Failure of Western powers to concern themselves with the liberation of southern Africa.
2. American and Belgian intervention in the Congo.
3. Direct intrusion of Cold War politics following the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
4. The break of diplomatic relations with Britain over the British policy towards Rhodesia.<sup>8</sup>

The above crises have often been labelled as radicalizing experiences for Tanzanian decision-makers.

---

8 For details see Cranford Pratt, *ibid.*

However, it would be an over statement to say that there were any really radical departures in foreign policy considerations from the early 60's to the late 60's. A distinguished scholar has emphasised the over all continuity and coherence of Tanzania's foreign relations by showing that issues like shaking off dependence on Great Britain, assertion of support for liberation movements in Southern Africa were highlights of the different periods one of the early 60's and the other of the late 60's, however in both the cases the policy was response to circumstances, in a "continued attempt to evolve a locally derived over all strategy for development and see foreign relations from the perspective of what helps or hinders the furtherance of this policy".<sup>9</sup>

Similarly Cranford Pratt sees a direct link between Tanzania's foreign relations and its development strategy. He underlines "the leader of a country which accepts a dependent relationship with a major capitalist state or a socialist state are unlikely to engage in independent thinking about its social, economic and political objectives. Instead the policies of dependent states are likely to be immitative of those of the major powers which is its international protector ... the

---

9 Catherine Hoskyns, "Africa's Foreign Policy: The Case of Tanzania", International Affairs, July 1968, p. 103.



tendency towards non-alignment and the tendency towards socialism were mutually reinforcing".<sup>10</sup>

The aspect of non-alignment became even more strong towards late 60's and continues till the present. If anything, issues of political principles, in particular the assertion of meaningful national and continental independence in a more equitable global community started taking a central place in Tanzania's foreign relations. Indeed its most important implications became evident in Tanzania's regional diplomacy, details of which are given elsewhere in this work. In view of greater super power involvement in African affairs Tanzania saw a greater need for non-alignment than ever before. Rodger Yeager points out that Tanzania's greatest foreign policy accomplishment in the post 1967 period lies, perhaps in the preservation of its political and economic non-alignment.<sup>11</sup> Politically if not economically Tanzania had been able and especially after 1967 was manifestly capable to further Nyerere's personal commitment to national self-determination. The principles which led Nyerere to support Southern African liberation movements

---

10 n. 6, pp. 469-70.

11 Rodger Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment, Westview Press, Colorado, 1982, p. 105.

were also the same that Tanzania proclaimed in recognizing the provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam, in acknowledging the legitimacy of the Prince Sihanouk's Cambodian exile government and in condemning the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, in the bargain it offended both super powers.

From the above, it is obvious that Tanzanian foreign policy never divested itself of a constant moral premise. Consequently it asserted its autonomy in its economic and political relations with the various countries of the world, be they of the Socialist bloc or the capitalist bloc or the non-aligned. It was with the same spirit of independence in decision making as regards its own affairs that Tanzania had in the early 70's forged close relationship with the Peoples Republic of China. The laying down of the TANZAM railway was one of the principle outcomes of this closeness. In the early 70's also one third of all foreign aid came from Peoples Republic of China. Similarly Tanzania also entered into a equally cordial relations with Cuba in mid-70's leading to educational, scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries. Tanzania's relations with Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies cannot be said to be as cordial in the late 60's and early 70's.

In particular the Soviet association with Uganda and its arms supplies to the dictatorial regime of Idi Amin was not appreciated by Dar es Salaam. On the other side the Soviets and the East Germans offered very little developmental assistance probably because of Tanzania's opening to China. Nevertheless, it has to be considered that Tanzania, even in the period of low key relations with Soviet Union, received 60 per cent of its military aid from the latter (more than what Soviets sold to Uganda, and was appreciative of Soviet and Cuban military support for Southern African liberation. The period starting from late 70's upto the present has seen certain changes in policy trends in Tanzania, one of the most remarkable developments was of Tanzania's shift towards smaller European nations like Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands and important developing nations of the Third World, in place of a policy that operated on the principle of maintaining relations of mutual interaction with either Socialist bloc and capitalist bloc nations, this is not to say that Tanzania did not continue its national interest based policy which sought to extend and maintain multilateral and bilateral relations with countries of either blocs, this is only to point out that Tanzania has realized in the last decade the value of promoting economic and political ties with non bloc actors. This

is typical of the continuing spirit of Nyerere's policy which refuses to see "events in the world through the lens of East-West conflict exclusively without regard to the actual causes or the aspirations of the peoples involved".<sup>12</sup>

Even in the 80's Tanzania has only limited ties with either the Soviet Union or the United States, unlike many other nations of Africa which have chosen to side with one super power or the other on the issues of the day. Tanzania has never failed to criticise either the United States or the Soviet Union for actions which Tanzania considers interventionary and arbitrary. Thus while on the one hand Nyerere criticised the Soviet Union for supporting Idi Amin or intervening in Afghanistan, he had also condemned Washington for intimidating and threatening Indian Ocean countries in its efforts to obtain military bases following events in Iran and Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup>

In a speech in 1980 Nyerere reiterated views that are an explanation of the above mentioned foreign

---

12 David F. Gordon, "Foreign Relations; Dilemmas of Independence and Development", in Joel D. Barkan's book, ed., Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, New York, 1984, p. 331.

13 Ibid.

policy actions of Tanzania. He said, "Non-alignment is the only basis on which a small and weak state like ours can maintain its political independence".<sup>14</sup> Therefore even if in recent years Tanzania-Soviet relations having improved and even if Tanzania continues to receive lot of developmental assistance from the Western powers, yet it has managed to keep both the blocs at an arms length. Indeed in a more positive assertion of its foreign policy independence it has steadily become intimate in recent years with smaller and less powerful states such as Canada, the Netherlands and the scandinavian countries and also with the multilateral developmental agencies. With its emphasis on a self-reliant development strategy it is unlikely that in the future Tanzanian relations will abandon this posture of non-alignment.

#### The Economic Dimension

The search for self-reliance has always been one of the mainstay of Tanzania's foreign policy, especially after a policy declaration made at Arusha in 1967 the concept of self-reliance became the singular rationale for every foreign policy decision. The ideal was further affirmed in 1971, that is the year of TANU party guidelines

---

14 Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record 1980, London, 1981, p. B327.

(MWUNGOZO, both Arusha and MWONGCZO attempted to define a strategy to deal with internal and external problems. Both sought to promote the policy of self-reliance and socialism. In October 1967 President Nyerere clarifying the meaning of self-reliance said, "it means that we must make maximum use of resources which we have, we want citizens to be given priority in every field as soon as they are capable of doing the job efficiently .... Tanzanians must control our country, second the policy does not say that Tanzania refuses outside aid or that there is something in receiving it .... What the Arusha Declaration says is that the only group of people will rely upon is ourself; we will not organise our country and our life in such a way that there will be no development unless we get foreign money".<sup>15</sup> Similarly the policy of socialism did not mean any closer alignment with the East than with the West. Nyerere in fact stresses that there are enough socialists in the West and that Tanzania "should be ready and happy to welcome socialists from other countries who are ready to help us achieve our objectives .... Thus we welcome the Chinese decision to help the TANZAM railway. Thus we shall

---

15 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Dar es Salaam, 1968, pp. 386-89.

welcome an American decision to help build our road from Dar es Salaam to Tunduma".<sup>16</sup>

From the position that the Tanzanians have taken it appears that they believe not only in national self-reliance but also in collective self-reliance amongst Third World nations. Thus Tanzania on the one hand has promoted national self-reliance by promoting interdependence with both Eastern and Western bloc countries and on the other hand, it has been a very active and effective participant in the various international bargaining fora for a New International Economic Order.

In order to further its policies of self-reliance and non-dependence either East or West Tanzania has made considerable efforts especially since the beginning of 70's to diversify on its external economic relations that is in the aspects of foreign trade, foreign aid, foreign investment etc. The Western countries take markedly dominant position in foreign trade of Tanzania, it is especially dominated by seven traditional Western markets that is U.K., U.S.A., West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France, Belgium. Nevertheless the diversification policy has reduced the share of the seven Western

---

16      *ibid.*, p. 388.

countries in Tanzania's imports. Thus in 1965 they had captured a 62% share of Tanzania imports, while in 1977 it had come down to 48%. On the export side also these Western countries had been the dominating markets for Tanzania's goods, from 1965-1977 the Tanzania export to these countries increased from 55% to 60%.<sup>17</sup> In fact over all trade pictures for Tanzania in 1977 show a remarkable dominance of Western capitalist countries (including Japan). They accounted for 69% of Tanzania's imports and 78% of Tanzania's exports. In 1982 the situation had not changed much and Western industrialised countries accounted for 56% of export and 68% of the imports of Tanzania, while the socialist countries accounted for 7% and 3% respectively.<sup>18</sup> So we can conclude that despite the post Arusha efforts to increase trade with the socialist countries there has been not much impact on western dominance in Tanzania's trade. The period between 1970-75 is only an exception as a result of heavy imports from China in relation to TAZARA. What may be the reasons for the slow rate in the growth of trade with

---

17 S.S. Mushi, "Tanzania Foreign Relations and the Policies of Non-Alignment, Socialism and Self-Reliance", in K. Mathews and S.S. Mushi, ed., Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-81; A Reader, Dar es Salaam, 1984, p. 51.

18 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Annual, Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 1961-70, 1977 and 1983.



the socialist countries? S.S. Mushi, gives the three possible reasons -

Tanzania's domestic and foreign policy (socialism, self-reliance and non-alignment) has guarded against 'disengaging' from one bloc and 'engaging' in another. If a country is non-aligned in a situation already tilted towards one (Western) direction, any move to correct the imbalance is naturally interpreted by the vested (Western) interests as a move to align with the other side. Second, however, the West, which has wider markets and selection of manufactured goods, has more aggressive and more sophisticated trading organizations (in particular, the multinational corporations). Third, partly for the above and other historical reasons, the bureaucrats have preferred to transact with Western marketing agents who have scrambled for the Tanzanian market with greater sophistication since the Arusha Declaration than they did prior to its promulgation.<sup>19</sup>

One outstanding factor that should not be overlooked is that Tanzania has also tried, and to an extent successfully, to promote trade with small but developed nordic countries. Thus we see that Denmark, Norway and

---

19 n. 17, p. 52.

Sweden in combination share about 7% of Tanzania's imports and 3% of its exports, which compares quite favourably with the socialist bloc itself. However, it has to be remembered that over and above the trade in goods and services, the socialist bloc has to be seen as an important source of arms and training in Tanzania. Thus between 1967-76 arms imports from China have been estimated to be worth Shs 600 million and from Soviet Union Shs 2400 million. This contrasts with much lower arms purchases, from the major Western trading partners. Canada Shs 40 million and U.S.A., U.K. and West Germany Shs 8 million each.<sup>20</sup> This is perhaps understandable from the perspective that Tanzania has been the front post in the fight against remaining packets of western colonialism in the post Arusha period.

In the final analysis it needs to be said that while Tanzania has tried in principle to diversify as regards its partners in trade, practical difficulties like market feasibility, product availability and pricing have made it difficult for Tanzania to avoid Western dominance of its trade. Nevertheless, its external trade policy has been to the extent of decision-making quite autonomous. Secondly, it needs to be

---

20 Ibid., p. 54.

observed that overall Tanzanian trade has not been able to shake off its dependent relationship. Balance of trade deficit has been chronic and there has been continued dependence on the export of primary products, especially agricultural products. The question as to whether Tanzania can diversify its relations, besides its partners in the East and the West, and also whether it can have a less dependent equation in its external trade relations in the future, quite depend upon factors like the future mode of exploitation of countries vast natural resources and the emerging attitude of the non-capitalist bloc countries as well as nordic countries with which Tanzania has in recent years intensified its trade relations.

#### Foreign Aid and Investment

Tanzania is one of the leading foreign assistance recipient in the world and among the African countries it receives the largest amount of per capita assistance, in keeping with its policy of self-reliance and non-alignment it has successfully managed to diversify her sources of foreign assistance. In the initial period after independence there was total dependence for foreign assistance on ex-colonizer Great Britain. In the early 1970s the Tanzanians received large scale assistance from China, however, both these periods of dependence (that is on Britain and China respectively) were, due to

certain incidental reasons. The dependence on the Great Britain in the early post independence years was basically a continuum of colonial links, the large scale aid from China in early 70's was specifically geared to the TANZAM rail project and thereafter dwindled to almost zero. In general therefore Tanzania has had a very diverse source of foreign loans and assistance, some of the important lenders at present are Sweden, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, West Germany. On the other hand Soviet bloc countries have played a minor role in providing assistance to Tanzania. Only Yugoslavia had some major share in donorship in 1970s. The U.S. which was never the major donor stopped any assistance to Tanzania in 1982, because of defaults in repayment of loans by Tanzania. It is important to observe here that neither the Soviet Union nor the U.S. figure as major donors to Tanzania. For example, in period 1970-81 only countries like West Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, U.K., Canada, Denmark have been major donors. West Germany, Sweden, Netherlands contributed 15%, 12% and 12% respectively, while in the same period, U.S. contributed only 4% and Soviet Union just 1%.<sup>21</sup> On the

---

21 Susan Gitelson, "Policy Options for Small States: Kenya and Tanzania Reconsidered", Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 12, no. 2, 1977, p. 48.

whole therefore one has to agree with David F. Gordon that "while Tanzania's growing dependence on loans further calls into question President Nyerere's self-reliance approach, its successful diversification of aid has both vastly reduced the role of Great Britain and limited the influence of any of the major global powers, thus underlining Tanzania's continued commitment to strict non-alignment. Moreover the rapid decline in Chinese presence in Tanzania since the completion of TANZAM railroad indicates that those observers who, in the early 1970s, saw Tanzania becoming dependent upon and aligned with China were wide of the mark".<sup>22</sup>

Tanzania had tried in the early years of independence especially upto 1967, to attract foreign private capital for investment, however, due to lack of adequate infrastructure, the good banking system and an extensive domestic market, it was difficult for Tanzania to successfully attract any satisfactory amount of foreign investment, after 1967 Tanzania on its own discarded foreign private investment while Kenya welcomed all foreign investments. The Tanzania went to the extent of decrying the role of tourism as antithetical to socialism. Its only recently

---

22 n. 12, p. 306.

(in 1980s) that Tanzania has tried to attract some foreign private investment. On the whole, however, Tanzania has been insular to any large scale foreign private investment in the same way as it has been reluctant to have any single dominant source of aid or a single dominant trade partner. How to explain this behaviour of Tanzania whereby it has been willing to pay economic costs to preserve its political ideals? Perhaps it lies in Nyerere's and other Tanzanian leaders conviction that in long run autonomous conscious choices can be justified in terms of Tanzania's over all development and progress political, social and economic. It is perhaps this conviction that has been at the back of Tanzania's long drawn struggle with the I.M.F. Tanzania has consistently refused to accept I.M.F. dictates on its policy making in exchange of aid.<sup>23</sup> Nyerere has condemned I.M.F. tactics as an attempt of exploitation, he has also criticised IMF as been no more than a stooge of western powers especially USA. Despite serious economic crises in late 1970s Tanzania refused to adhere to the IMF condition of devaluation of Tanzanian currency, while IMF saw the devaluation as a key to successful adjustment, Tanzania has always seen such a step as catastrophic for

---

23 Vijay Gupta, "World Bank Plot Against Africa", The Daily, Bombay, September 29, 1981.

the country in general and its poorest section in particular.

In addition to its emphasis on independence and progress through economic development, Tanzania has also been the champion of disarmament and world peace. In the context of peace and disarmament Tanzania has been one of the signatories of the six Nation Peace Initiative whose first Summit was held in New Delhi in 1985. The other five members are India, Argentina, Greece, Sweden and Mexico. The objective of this initiative is to bring nuclear disarmament in the world.

On careful examination of the issues discussed in this chapter we may conclude that Tanzanian foreign policy is characterised by a largely principled yet consistent stand of non-alignment and self-reliance. Tanzania seems to be willing to sacrifice short term economic and political advantages in order to live up to its basic, social, political and economic ideals, like democracy, socialism, autonomy in decision-making, fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism, campaigning for NIBO and South-South cooperation. It has also continually tried to play a decisive regional role and has in the process not tried to seek direct help from any of the blocs. Though Tanzania today remains relatively poor, powerless and a

largely dependent state, its dependence is not exclusively to any country or any bloc. Indeed it has tried to transcend the disadvantages of dependence by trying to diversify its political and economic relations. One of the principal indicators of this is perhaps its growing ties with the small but developed industrialised states like Norway, Sweden, Netherlands and also in recent decades its championing of the cause of South-South co-operation by promoting Tanzania's relations with African countries as well as other third world countries. It is not important to answer the question as to the success of Tanzania's foreign policy. What is important is to see that the criticism, that Tanzania has not achieved in very concrete terms its ideals of genuine non-alignment is misplaced because the very fact that Tanzanian trade and aid received is dominated by a certain number of countries does not in itself imply that this dependence in material terms is also equivalent to dependence in terms of policy. In a word therefore one may conclude that while Tanzania has been facing and continues to face daunting economic and political challenges, its foreign policy stand as conceived by its architect President Julius Nyerere in terms of non-commitment to either bloc and real autonomy in decision-making cannot be said to have been really compromised.



## Chapter IV

Tanzania's Policy of Non-Alignment  
And Its Policy Towards and Role  
in United Nations

The horrors of the two World Wars and its disastrous consequences had compelled the entire mankind to become prudent and sensible to devise some institutional framework whereby they could sort out various problems and conflicting issues in a rational way. The proclivity of having such institutional set up was, thus, not out of any arbitrary inclinations rather it was the question of saving the mankind from getting annihilated in the process of blind struggle for power. Although, it has remained a fact that there is no essential unity in the world yet efforts have been directed in bringing about certain reconciliation among various groups each having a different style and content of its operation. Such an approach explains the formation of League of Nations at the end of the First World War and that of United Nations (UN) after the Second World War. UN is a world forum with the objective to maintain international peace and security. However, the irony is that despite its formation it has failed to alleviate the grievances and the drudgery of the poor nations of the world at the initial stage as it was mainly in the hands of the rich and the developed countries. As a result these poor nations thought it wise to launch a global movement and adopt those policies by which they could make themselves heard and mobilise public opinion in support of their

struggle against the injustices that is being done to them by the rich and the developed countries. This had led them to launch the non-aligned movement.

However, it would be wrong to say that the UN has become a defunct body. It still holds its importance as an international body devised to preserve peace and stability in the world. With the increasing membership of these decolonised and newly independent poor nations in the UN, it has really become active in solving various international issues and problems. So, while discussing Tanzania's foreign policy it is quite unavoidable to mention its policy of non-alignment as well as policy towards the UN and its role in it.

Non-alignment as a movement emerged from the struggle against those forces that were opposed to the national interest of the newly independent countries and engaged in threatening world peace through arms build-up. 'It was the product of new political and economic relations and changing material conditions of the developing and developed world which have necessitated the adoption of non-aligned policy'.<sup>1</sup> The essence of non-alignment lies in its struggle against colonialism,

---

1 Vijay Gupta, ed., India and Non-Alignment, New Delhi, 1983, p. 116.

racial discrimination and the imperialist thrust through neo-colonialism. 'It is an acceptance of the principles of peaceful coexistence, a national assertion of independence based on efforts for self-reliance, and international approach to achieve just and equal economic relation for stable peace. It was a response to the aspirations of the vast masses of people who emerged from the foreign domination and were eager to attain the status of respect and equality with other nations of the world'.<sup>2</sup>

The development of non-aligned movement can be seen through its struggle against racialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Thus the principles of non-alignment have provided areas of agreement amongst the newly independent countries as a result of which these principles have turned this movement into 'Unity Forum' for anti-colonialism, new economic order and against continued exploitation of the developing countries by the developed capitalist world.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the foreign policies of the newly independent and decolonised countries are generally manifested through the policy of non-alignment since non-alignment is viewed by them as the objective

---

2 Vijay Gupta, 'Indian and African Non-Alignment Role; A Theoretical Framework', Indian Philosophical Quarterly, vol. VIII, no. 1, Pune, 1980, p. 1.

3 n. 1, p. 5.

necessity for restructuring their backward economy, freeing their countries from imperialist hold and for faster socio-economic development.

For African countries, non-alignment was seen as an important instrument to protect their independence. In order to protect their freedom these African countries considered unity with other newly independent countries as essential for a unified attack on colonialism, racialism and neo-colonialism. Thus, it was quite imperative for them to join non-aligned movement as it was genuinely opposed to racialism and colonialism.<sup>4</sup>

Historically speaking Tanzania's policy of non-alignment can be traced back to its nationalist struggle. The principal actors of Tanzania's national struggle were the petty bourgeoisie and the peasants. They carried out the national struggle of Tanzania. So, when Tanzania attained independence, it was the petty bourgeoisie which acquired the leadership of Tanzania. At the time of independence Tanganyika's economy was largely dominated by the commercial bourgeoisie, which was non-indigenous and comprador in character.<sup>5</sup> Here we find a sort of

---

4 n. 2, pp. 4.

5 Issa G. Shivaji, Class Struggle in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 1975, p. 64.

contradiction in the Tanzanian political and economic system, i.e., when the leadership was fighting colonialism, the commercial bourgeoisies was trying to maintain its link with the colonial powers. Hence, "the political leaders who were mainly Africans, in order to maintain their position, began to undermine the economic base of the settlers by Africanization, nationalization, and formation of co-operatives".<sup>6</sup> Thus, notwithstanding any possible adverse repercussion on its economy, the Tanzanian leadership directed these actions in order to gain control over the economy.

During the Tanzanian nationalist struggle one major focus of attention of the leadership was the creation of general awareness of the people against colonial exploitation and racial discrimination. This, they could do so through slogans of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. This fact persisted even after the independence of Tanzania because of the fear of imperialist re-entry into the country and moreover, many of the African countries were not free from the colonial bondage. Apart from its political and social aspect the ideology of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism was supposed to

---

6 Vijay Gupta, "Ujamaa Development Programme and Participatory Leadership", in Alfred De Souza, ed., The Politics of Change and Leadership and Development, New Delhi, 1978, p. 185.

have an economic dimension - economic independence and self-reliance. For Tanzania it meant Africanization of the jobs held by the settlers and nationalization of all trading and manufacturing units, stress on national culture, and greater utilization of economic resources for the benefit of Tanzanians.<sup>7</sup> 'The net result was the emergence of a powerful bureaucratic bourgeoisie wedded with the concept of egalitarian distribution of income and resources'.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, at the time of independence the immediate objective of Tanzania was to develop economically and survive politically. Its political survival could be viewed in the context of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. In order to survive politically Tanzania had to fight against colonialism and racialism. During the colonial rule of Tanzania, Europeans were being treated as superior to Africans. Such an experience compelled the Tanzanian leadership not to give way to any such colonial or neo-colonial force for further exploitation and discrimination of their fellow countrymen. The basic implication of such an attitude was the desire to be recognised as equal.

---

7 Vijay Gupta, "Nature and Content of Tanzanian Non-Alignment", in K.P. Mishra, ed., Non-Alignment: Frontiers and Dynamics, New Delhi, 1982, p. 383.

8 Ibid.

So, these factors were responsible for Tanzania's opting for and joining non-aligned movement. Non-alignment was viewed by Nyerere as 'a world movement now against being pushed around and against pushing others around .... This movement will succeed. Eventually, imperialism and racialism will become a chapter in the history of man'.<sup>9</sup> This statement of Nyerere was quite explicit enough as to the clarity of Tanzania's policy stand on colonialism and racialism. No doubt it was very much anti-colonial, anti-racial and against imperialism.

Tanzania has also been quite vocal as to the preservation of its national independence. This hard won gain of the nationalist struggle, Tanzania was not prepared to sacrifice it at any cost. In this context, Tanzania's leadership found the policy of non-alignment as an essential pre-condition to pursue an independent foreign policy in the international sphere. Thus, on attaining independence Tanzania never thought of joining either of the power blocs of the divided world. Considering this fact of the divided world, Nyerere wrote -

---

9 Julius K. Nyerere, Man and Development, Dar es Salaam, 1974, p. 106.



"The world was divided into two fairly clear and opposing power blocs and the membership of the non-aligned movement at that time meant that the member States were asserting their independence of either bloc ... taking an important political action". (10)

So, Nyerere regarded non-aligned countries as those which were not "going to be the willing participants in the Cold War struggle".<sup>11</sup> Nyerere thus made it explicit that Tanzania would not come under the influence of any power bloc and it would chose its own path by judging each issue on its merits. The policy of non-alignment was, therefore, considered by Nyerere to be the best policy.

Nyerere has explained non-alignment as the assertion of "the right of the small or militarily weaker nations to determine their own policies in their own interests or to have influence on world affairs .... And we are asserting the right of all peoples to freedom and self-determination and therefore expressing outright opposition and international domination of one people by another".<sup>12</sup> So Tanzania has viewed non-alignment as an important instrument of enhancing its position as well as its bargaining power in the world of affairs.

---

10 Ibid., p. 65.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p. 67.

It was in the line of the policies of non-alignment that Tanzania demanded complete independence, with "freedom to determine its own policies, both internal and external".<sup>13</sup>

Tanzania's unconditional faith in the policies of non-alignment through the assertion of its national independence can also be examined from the economic point of view. At the time of independence economically Tanzania remained within the Western orbit. In other words, it was a client state on the periphery of the Western economic system.<sup>14</sup> Thus in the process of nation-building Tanzania had to face certain economic constraints on its independence. Conversely, it had to take anti-Western positions on various occasions while building up a self-reliant economy. "It interpreted self-reliance as economic independence and not total self-reliance or rupture of relationship with the Western capitalist system. Since Tanzania was not dependent upon, or integrated with, the East, this meant delinking from the West without necessarily linking up with the East."<sup>15</sup> Although Tanzania found the Socialist East to be more

---

13 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Dar es Salaam, 1968, p. 189.

14 Vijay Gupta, "Non-Alignment to Collective Self-Reliance", in R.R. Ramchandani, ed., India and Africa, New Delhi, 1980, p. 36.

15 n. 7, pp. 383-84.

in agreement with her policy of anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and anti-imperialism yet Tanzania never intended to join the socialist camp of the East because of the realization that a complete switch over to them could mean upsetting to Tanzanian economy even though temporarily. As a matter of fact "many economic measures taken immediately after independence objectively resulted in a further integration of the economy in the world capitalist system .... Foreign investment was to be encouraged for it did not appear to conflict with commitment to African socialism". Tanzania's African socialism was a kind of mixed economy or state capitalism.<sup>16</sup> Thus, at the time of independence, the most suitable policy choice for Tanzania was those of the policy of non-alignment.

The development aspirations of Tanzania, therefore, had no other option but to move away from the Western camp by following the path of non-alignment. Justifying this shift to the path of non-alignment, Nyerere wrote -

"For all of us inherited certain patterns of trade, and have been to a greater or lesser extent indoctrinated by the value system of our colonial master. Further, the Great Powers continue to regard us as being within the sphere of influence of one or the other of them ... which usually demonstrates its displeasure if we refuse

---

16 n. 5, pp. 65 and 122.

to conform to the expected pattern of behaviour. But ultimately, if we so determine, and if we are prepared to overcome our recent past and the difficulties which others may place in our way, one can move toward the growth of one system or the other within our society". (17)

Tanzania's greatest foreign policy accomplishment in the post-1967 period perhaps lies in the preservation of its political and economic non-alignment.<sup>18</sup> In 1970's and 1980's Tanzania had diversified its source of foreign aid. The source of foreign aid no more remained confined to the major Western countries. Tanzania started seeking aid from China, World Bank and other small European nations like Sweden, Norway and Netherlands. Tanzania's ultimate policy objective was to achieve national economic independence. Its more immediate goal was to interact as wide as possible and thereby minimize the influence of those nations upon whose help it must indefinitely depend.<sup>19</sup> The fact of detente between the two Super Powers in the 1970's along with the political maturity of the non-aligned countries led the non-aligned movement from its initial pre-occupation with political non-interference (by the Super Powers)

---

17 n. 9, p. 112.

18 Roger Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment, Westview Press, Colorado, USA, 1982, p. 105.

19 Ibid.

to a positive pre-occupation with economic development. Accordingly, Tanzania had reoriented its foreign policy where it viewed aid as a right rather than a charity. This attitude of Tanzania towards aid was partly responsible for Tanzania's great effort in procuring foreign aid from various sources in the 1970's and 1980's. Tanzania's development policy was focussed on national and collective self-reliance. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 and Mwongozo of 1971 provided the very dynamics as to the purpose of effecting a restructuring of the basic relationships and structures of underdevelopment. As a corollary, the rejection of a world order based on a division between the poor and the rich, and the advocacy of egalitarian morality and justice explicitly characterized Tanzania's foreign policy; a policy for a NIEO. As President Nyerere has said -

" ... there are two aspects to the fight against poverty in the Third World. The first is the responsibility of the under-developed countries to work and organize their own development and to build up self-reliant economies. The second is the world responsibility to restructure the international economic order so that it facilitates rather than hinders the efforts made by the poor". (20)

---

20 Julius K. Nyerere, The Plea of the Poor; Address at Howard University, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1977.

The continued interference by the West thus forced Tanzania to disengage itself from the Western capitalist system by following the path of non-alignment and emphasising the need for self-reliance based on equality, self-determination and mutual interest. Non-alignment, therefore, to Tanzania means opposition to colonialism, racialism, neo-colonialism and assertion of national independence through economic self-determination.

#### Tanzania's Policy Towards United Nations

Tanzania's relationship with UN can be traced back to its pre-independence period. Before independence Tanganyika was a trust territory of the UN. Under the Tanganyika Trusteeship Agreement, the Administering Authority was to promote the development of free and suitable political institution in the territory. Thus, Britain<sup>21</sup> was required to develop the participation of the people of Tanganyika in advisory and legislative bodies and in the government of the territory. The UN Charter also specifically proclaimed "self government or independence" as the aim of the trust territories.<sup>22</sup> Both procedurally and functionally the UN Trusteeship

---

21 Under the Tanganyika Trusteeship Agreement Britain was the Administering Authority.

22 See Article 76(B) of the UN Charter.

Council was more directly concerned with the problems of the trust territories.<sup>23</sup> The Council dispatched visiting mission to Tanganyika every three years to study the developments and the political awareness of the people. The Second UN Visiting Mission to Tanganyika in 1954 recommended independence for Tanganyika in twenty to twentyfive years. This recommendation of the visiting mission was rejected by Britain, the Administering Authority. As a consequence, the newly formed party Tanganyika Africa National Union, TANU, decided to send its President, Julius K. Nyerere, to the UN to give further evidence with regard to its demand for independence. This continued persistence gave publicity to the views of TANU through various media of the UN. This added to the self-confidence and strength of TANU in particular and that of Tanganyika's struggle for independence in general which it could have been able to achieve in December 1961. Acknowledging the special role of the UN Trusteeship System Nyerere, in his first speech to the UN General Assembly said -

"We feel a special gratitude and loyalty to the UN because we are conscious of the debt we owe to the Trusteeship Council and of course to the General Assembly .... I would not be honest if I did not admit openly and graciously that the fact that

---

23 For details see B.G. Chidzera, Tanganyika and the International Trusteeship, Oxford University Press, London, 1961.

we have been a Trust Territory under the British Administration had greatly helped us to achieve our independence in the way in which we achieved it". (24)

So, considering the positive role played by the UN for Tanganyika's independence, Tanzania has consistently been regarding UN as an important instrument of her foreign policy. Being a Third World, non-aligned country, Tanzania feels that it can hope to make her voice heard on international issues mainly through the UN. It has also no hesitation in admitting that it can grow in peace only by implementing the principles of the UN. Tanzania's policy towards UN has its broader manifestation in Julius Nyerere's address to the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1961 where he said -

"The first principle of a government's policy is, therefore, a recognition of the fundamental importance of the United Nations .... This international organisation has great purpose and still greater potentiality .... Within this Assembly every nation is equal, and we believe that in this lies the unique character of the United Nations and its greatest asset .... The importance of the United Nations can and will grow, dependent only upon the determination of all of us to make it work .... Tanganyika will look at everyone of its policy decisions in the light of its recognition of the fundamental importance of the United Nations". (25)

---

24 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, Oxford University Press, London, 1966, pp. 144-45.

25 Ibid.



Tanzania's active support to the UN springs mainly from President Nyerere's commitment to human equality, democracy and anti-colonialism which are basic to his political philosophy. He stressed the need for world peace, safeguarding of human rights and the need for African unity. He also recognised the crucial role played by the UN in the above-mentioned areas. Nyerere has accorded utmost gratitude to UN for its effort in alleviating the plight of the developing countries. In the words of Nyerere -

"We believe that the importance of the UN can and will grow depending only upon the determination of all of us to make it work. We can only say for our own part, we will do what little we can to enhance the status of this organisation and assist in the execution of its policies. We believe that because action through it avoids any fear of domination by another State, it can do much to contribute to the peace that we all desire". (26)

For Nyerere, support to the UN was an essential concomitant of Tanzania's policy of non-alignment. Thus, the policy of non-alignment is not exclusive of its objectives from that of United Nations. The policy of non-alignment glorifies national independence, justice and world peace. Thus, as a matter of fact its aspirations

and assumptions have come closer to the principles on which the United Nations is based.

Tanzania's Role in the  
United Nations

Tanzania's role in the United Nations is worth mentioning. In the political sphere, Tanzania played an important role in the United Nations. Though remained unsuccessful, Tanzania sought to mediate the Sino-Indian border conflict, the disputes between Indonesia and Holland on the question of the future of New-Guinea and the Kenya-Somali dispute. With regard to People's Republic of China, Tanzania was an ardent advocate of its admission to the United Nations, a position that it maintained until the objective was finally achieved in October 1971.

One of the objectives of Tanzanian diplomacy at the United Nations has been strengthening of African representation in its principal organs, particularly in the Security Council, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Secretariat. This was conceived in the context of a meaningful and effective participation of African countries in shaping the world order. The essential outcome of such an effort was the amendment of Articles 23 and 61 of the UN Charter in 1963 whereby

the membership of the Security Council and that of ECOSOC was raised from 10 to 15 and from 17 to 27 respectively.<sup>27</sup>

Keeping in view the increasing threat from the nuclear arms build up, Tanzania has been extending its support to all the disarmament efforts by the United Nations. Such a gesture can be observed from its continued support to the Conference of Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva in its effort to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control; to urge the UN to declare Africa as a denuclearized zone, which was, in fact, what the General Assembly did in Resolution 1652 (XVI); and to recognize the special responsibility of the Super Powers in the field of disarmament.

Another significant role played by Tanzania has been in the context of evolving international law through UN. Thus, since 1973 Tanzania has been actively participating in the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences and has championed the cause of the African and Third World countries.<sup>28</sup>

---

27 See UN General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII) of 17 September 1963. A later amendment to Article 61 in 1971 raised the membership of ECOSOC from 27 to 54.

28 K. Mathews and S.S. Mushi, Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-81: A Reader, Dar es Salaam, 1984 p. 210.

In line with its anti-racialism and anti-colonialism Tanzania has always taken positions in international politics which have provided strength to anti-Western character of its non-alignment.<sup>29</sup> Tanzania's relentless attack on the apartheid situation in Southern Africa led to its identification since 1963 with radical African views, in the United Nations. Its delegation has focussed attention on the undesirable role of the British and the Americans and other Western powers in supporting anti-humanist regimes.<sup>30</sup> There has been a two-rponged strategy adopted by Tanzania at the UN in order to achieve its goal of liberation and decolonisation for Africa. These comprise first, the intense diplomatic pressure to isolate the colonialist and racist regimes and second, to mobilise world public opinion against these regimes.<sup>31</sup>

Tanzania's role in the UN can also be viewed from the fact of its holding some key positions in the UN system. Tanzania was the non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1975 and 1976, member of ECOSOC

---

29 n. 7, p. 387.

30 n.13, pp. 50-54.

31 n.28, p. 211.

from 1964 to 1969 and again from 1978 to 1980. Holding of these positions by Tanzania in the UN System reflects the recognition of Tanzania as an important international actor.

Thus, it can be concluded from the above explanations that Tanzania's policy towards UN has remained consistent over the years. It has viewed the UN as an instrument of her foreign policy. It was, in fact, through UN that Tanzania could project itself as an important international actor as the spokesman of Africa and Third World countries.

From the overall analysis of the policies and issues discussed in this chapter it can be derived that Tanzania's foreign policy is an extension of the policies of non-alignment. In other words, Tanzania has opted for the principles of non-alignment as its foreign policy options. The choice of non-alignment for Tanzania was quite natural because of the force of the circumstances. Starting from the colonial experience to the present day exploitative world order, Tanzania had no better option than to follow this policy. In non-aligned movement Tanzania found a forum of unity for the newly liberated countries who did not wish to remain with their former colonial powers and were interested in preserving their independence and asserting their right to self-reliance.

The non-aligned provided the possibility of collective bargaining for a new international economic order. Its due faith in the UN reflects another policy facet of non-alignment. Non-alignment has no more remained a narrow concept. It has encompassed almost all aspects of human life - socio-economic, political, military and cultural. Its unending struggle against the injustices meted out to the poor nations by the rich ones indicates the very essence of its existence. Tanzania being a poor and developing nation, thus, had to take itself to the course of non-alignment rather than taking itself to the worse by joining the course of power rivalry between the two contending power blocs led by USA and the USSR.

**Chapter V**

**Conclusion**

In the foregoing chapters we have discussed the foreign policy of Tanzania taking into consideration several factors as it is to the common sense that the foreign policy does not emerge out of a given factor. We began with the assumption that foreign policies are usually evolved in the process of safeguarding national independence and developing independent and self-reliant economy. They are given proper shape during the course of their application to the objective reality. This shaping is effected in an atmosphere where various interacting forces - both internal and external - are said to be influencing the political system of the country. Here a comprehensive study of the foreign policy of Tanzania requires an analysis of various factors which have a direct or indirect bearing on the political system of Tanzania thus causing it to be oriented towards a kind of foreign policy stand. Keeping this fact in our mind we have sought to examine the foreign policy of Tanzania from different angles. This, essentially, explains the very purpose of dividing the dissertation into different chapters. As we have already discussed Tanzania's foreign policy from various angles, hence the emphasis will be on giving along with a thematic briefing a concluding derivation as to what have been discussed in different chapters.



An analysis of Tanzania's foreign policy posits a decisive policy orientation which is quite characteristic of many of the decolonised Third World countries. The quest for principles which characterizes Tanzania's foreign policy has emphasized through an examination of her commitments to racial equality, non-alignment and the fact of its decrying colonialism, neo-colonialism, racial discrimination and economic exploitation. These are seen as the requisites for independence and freedom. In the application of the principles of racial equality and non-alignment, Tanzania had to cope with either blocs of the divided world. Tanzania's foreign policy objectives, therefore, means her intentions to have friendly relations with each side of the divided world. Another facet of her quest for principles has been the drive for normalization of her relation with independent states of Africa and elsewhere in the world. Tanzania has rejected her involvement in the Cold War and has althrough stressed that the major world problems are peace and seemingly the wider gap between the rich and the poor. Thus, Tanzania has been bold enough to pursue those policies in its foreign relations which not only provide the necessary justification to its stand on various international issues and problems, but also suggest essential remedies to them by exposing the inherent flaws and follies in them.

Some of the important principles involved in Tanzania's foreign policy have been the principle of anti-colonialism, African Unity and the principle of unhesitant support to it. So, a related aspect of Tanzania's foreign policy is its policy of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism which Tanzania considers to be in support of African Unity. Even before independence, Tanzania realized during her nationalist struggle that the co-operation with other African countries was essential as a strategy to defeat colonialism and imperialism in Africa. Thus, in the post-independence period Tanzania's foreign policy has been oriented in such a spirit that its quest for African Unity began as a principle as well as a strategy in her struggle against colonialism and imperialism both internally and externally. Tanzania's policy on liberation, therefore, is the centrepiece in her foreign policy principles and priorities. It is also closely related to her domestic policy of socialism and self-reliance based on the belief in human equality and independent judgement. Tanzania's attempt to transition to socialism took place when the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) reaffirmed its commitment to socialism in 1967 in the Arusha Declaration. Tanzania's strategy for the transition to socialism was a product of interaction of two important ideas - the vision of a

socialist society free from colonial and neo-colonial exploitations and the perception of economic, political and administrative constraints in the domestic sphere. This transition, therefore, was viewed in terms of greater equality and the enhancement of democratic participation. It is the commitment to build an egalitarian society devoid of exploitation, oppression and discrimination. This socialist ideology has been the guiding principle as far as societal transformation is concerned. Born out of this policy of socialism are the principles of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

The implications of Tanzania's fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism is quite manifest in various speeches and writings of Julius K. Nyerere. For Nyerere, fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism is nothing but national struggles which can unify the vast majority of the people. Thus, unity simplifies and strengthens the national cause in both the cases. Achieving internal liberation means enabling all the citizens of a State to live in conditions of human dignity, personal freedom and justice. It necessarily involves the acceptance of human equality as the basis of social attitudes and structures. This view of Nyerere explains Nyerere's interpretation of the values of mankind and thus, justifies Tanzania's crusade against

racialism.

Freedom from exploitation is, thus, an essential part of Tanzania adopting socialist principles. But mere political equality and freedom is meaningless without economic equality. Here comes the concept of 'self reliance' which is another major aspect of Arusha Declaration. For Tanzania, fighting neo-colonialism requires greater realism. It involves hard economic choices which have serious political implications. In the view of Tanzania, self-reliance means getting greater control over one's own economic affairs by giving due emphasis on the use of one's own productive and human resources and adopting appropriate technologies. It is, in fact, a deliberate orientation to development in order to build up a self-generating internal economy instead of the one directed outwards. Thus, the obvious implication of the fight against neo-colonialism is the development of a planned and self-reliant economy free from all sorts of external dictates.

An essential concomitant of Tanzania's approach to self-reliant economy is its policy of non-alignment. The choice of non-alignment for Tanzania means offering genuine friendship to all countries. Tanzania's foreign policy objective, therefore, means that Tanzania wants

to adapt her own needs some of the institutions from each side of the divided world. Clearly she could do this by having friendly relations with each side of the divided blocs. According to Nyerere, it is quite impossible to carry out Tanzania's economic policies unless it has economic relations with both East and the West. Tanzania thus is not dependent on any bloc exclusively. It has, in fact, tried to overcome the disadvantages of economic dependence by diversifying its political and economic relations, as it is evidenced from its growing economic ties with small but economically developed and industrialized States like Norway, Sweden and Netherlands and that of championing the cause of South-South co-operation by promoting Tanzania's relations with African countries and other Third World countries. Given the fact, the economic grounds has led Tanzania to pursue a policy of non-alignment. For non-alignment provides the necessary guidelines to the freedom of the nation. Nyerere said that it would be very illogical to ally Tanzania with one bloc for its wealth and protection thus surrendering the freedom to determine its own policies. Tanzania's policy of non-alignment, therefore, corresponds to its economic position in the direction of self-reliance. Tanzania has cleared its position in choosing aid-givers on the basis of assessing

the developing role of the aid offered. It has denied those aid offers which had political strings attached to it. It has not at all been hesitant in exposing those countries who attach political conditions while offering aid and has openly opposed IMF and World Bank conditions. It has not hesitated in accusing the US and other Western powers of supporting the racialist regime of South Africa. Such a position of Tanzania should not be interpreted as anti-Western rather it is the undoubted belief in the principle of national independence.

Tanzania has been persistent in pursuing a definitive foreign policy. Throughout, it has given full support to the collective approach to liberate itself economically and to fight the menace of imperialist penetration. One of the main thrusts of Tanzania's foreign relations has been the need to change for a new economic order, a kind of progress based on equality, independence and self-determination. So, Tanzania has pursued those policies which were quite consistent with her ideology and principles, even if it cost her in terms of economic aid or friendship inside or outside the African continent. Tanzania has although been conscious of the very fact of imperialistic move of the West as well as the ideological imposition of the East.

Tanzania never tried to adopt exclusively the socio-economic system of either bloc, rather it tried to develop on those lines which were quite suitable to the regional conditions of the country itself. Tanzania, therefore, sought to pursue a line of African socialism rejecting both Western capitalism and the ideology of the extreme left. Thus, it has been evident that a genuine attempt has been made by Tanzania in pursuing an independent-minded foreign policy based on the tenets of non-alignment.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y



Selected BibliographyPrimary Sources:

- The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance, Dar es Salaam, TANU, 1967.
- CCM Constitution, Tanganyika Standard Newspapers, Dar es Salaam, 1977.
- United Republic of Tanzania: Economic Survey (Annual) (various).
- Background to the Budget, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, various - 1964-1978.
- The Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1973.
- President's Statement on West-German Aid Issue, Press Release, 17 March 1965.
- Government Statement on The Recognition of Biafra, Government Printer, 13 April 1968.
- Tanzania Ten Years After Independence, Report prepared by President J.K. Nyerere to TANU National Conference, Dar es Salaam, September 1971.
- Economic Development through Self-Reliance, Tanzania's Statement at the Sixth African Congress, Dar es Salaam, 1974.
- The Organization of African Unity and the Freedom Struggle, A document presented by the Government of Tanzania at the OAU Summit Conference at Addis Ababa, June 1971.
- Declaration of Dar es Salaam on Southern Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 1978.

Secondary Sources:Books:

- Aluko, O., Foreign Policies of African States, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.
- Barkan, Joel D., (ed.), Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, Praeger Publications, New York, 1984.
- Brett, Anthony, E., Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, London, Heineman, 1973.
- Burke, F.C., Tancanyika Preplanning, Syracuse, 1965.
- Chidzero, Bernard, G., Tancanyika and International Trusteeship, London, Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Clark, Edmund, Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania, 1964-73, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1978.
- Cliffe, Lionel and Saul, John, (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania (in two volumes), Dar es Salaam, East African Publishing House, 1973.
- Desfosses, Hellen and Jacques Levesques (eds.), Socialism in the Third World, New York, Praeger, 1975.
- Frankel, J., The Making of Foreign Policy, London, Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Gupta, Vijay, (ed.), India and Non-alignment, New Literature, New Delhi, 1983.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Obote, Second Liberation, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1983.
- Harlow, V. and Smith, A. (eds.), History of East Africa, vol. 1 and 2, Oxford, 1965.
- Hatch, John, Tanzania; A Profile, New York, Praeger, 1972.

- Hazlewood, A., Economic Integration: The East African Experience, London, Heineman, 1975.
- Hopkins, Raymond F., Political Roles in a New State: Tanzania's First Decade, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971.
- Hughes, A.J., East Africa: The Search for Unity, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1963.
- Ingham, Kenneth, (ed.), Foreign Relations of African States, London, Butterworths, 1974.
- Ingle, Clyde Reid, From Villages to State in Tanzania: The Politics of Rural Development, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1972.
- Illife, J., A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Jones, Roy, E., Analysing Foreign Policy, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
- Kaula, Edna, M., Land and People of Tanzania, New York, J.B. Lippincot Co., 1972.
- Kimambo, I.N. and Temu, A.J., (eds.), A History of Tanzania Nairobi, 1969.
- Knappert Jan, East Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1987.
- Leys C. and Robson, P., (eds.), Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems, London, Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Low, D.A. and Smith Alison, (eds.), History of East Africa, in three volumes, Oxford, 1976.
- Mathews, K. and Mushi, S.S., (eds.), Foreign Policy of Tanzania, 1961-81; A Reader, Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salaam, 1984.
- Modelski, George, A Theory of Foreign Policy, New York, Frederick & Praeger, 1962.

- Mutukwa, Kasuka, S., Politics of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Project; A Study of Tanzania-China-Zambia Relations, Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1972.
- Mwansasu, Biskark and Pratt, Cranford, (eds.), Towards Socialism in Tanzania, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1979.
- Nabudere, Dan, Imperialism and Integration in East Africa, London, Zed Press, 1988.
- Nnoli, Okwudiba, Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania, New York, Lagos, Lok Publishers, 1978.
- Nye, Joseph, Pan Africanism and East African Intecration, Oxford University Press, 1966.
- Nyerere, Julius K., Freedom and Socialism, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Freedom and Unity, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Freedom and Development, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Crusade for Liberation, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Ogunsanwo, Alaba, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71, Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Oliver, R. and Mathew, G., (eds.), History of East Africa, Oxford, 1963.
- Pratt, Cranford, The Crucial Phase in Tanzania 1945-68, Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy, Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Rutman, G., The Economy of Tanzania, New York, Praeger, 1968.
- Ruhumbika, Gabriel, (ed.), Towards Ujamaa; Twenty Years of TANU Leadership, Nairobi, 1974.

- Rweyemamu, Anthony H., Nation-Building in Tanzania: Problems and Issues, Nairobi, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Government and Politics in Tanzania: A Bibliography, 1972.
- Shamuyarira, Nathan, N., (ed.), Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa, Dar es Salaam, 1975.
- Shivji, Issa, The Silent Class Struggle, Dar es Salaam, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Class Struggles in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 1976.
- Smith, William Edget, Nyerere of Tanzania, Nairobi, Transafrica Publishers, 1974.
- Stephens, Hugh W., The Political Transformation of Tanganyika, 1920-67, New York, Praeger, 1968.
- Svendsen, Kund, E. and Teisen, Merete, Self-Reliant Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 1969.
- Thiam, D., The Foreign Policy of African States, London, Phoenix House, 1965.
- Ulynovsky, R., Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974.
- Weinstein, Warren, (ed.), Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa, N.Y., Praeger, 1975.
- Whitaker, Jennifer, Seymour, Africa and the United States: Vital Interests, Washington Square, New York University Press, 1978.
- Yaffey, M.J., Possibilities for Tanzania-Zambia Trade, Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau, University College of Dar es Salaam.
- Yu George, T., China's African Policy - A Study of Tanzania, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975.

Articles:

- Agyeman, Opoku, "The Osagyefo, The Mwalimu and Pan-Africanism: A Study in the Growth of a Dynamic Concept", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 13, no. 4, 1975, pp. 653-75.
- Ake, Claude, "Tanzania: Progress of a Decade", The African Review, vol. 2, no. 1, June 1972, pp. 52-64.
- Ali, Picho, "Theory and Practice of Non-Alignment", East Africa Journal, vol. 6, no. 10, October 1969.
- Amin, Samir, "Self-Reliance and the New International Economic Order", Monthly Review, vol. 29, no. 3, 1978.
- Arrighi, G. and Saul, J., "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, 1968.
- Arnold, G., "Tanzania and Foreign Aid", Africa, London, no. 29, January 1974, pp. 26-29.
- Bailey, Martin, "Tanzania and China", African Affairs, vol. 74, January 1975, pp. 39-50.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Chinese Aid in Action, Building the Tanzania-Zambia Railway", World Development, vol. no. 3, July 1975, pp. 587-93.
- Bienefeld, M., "Special Gains from Trade with Socialist Countries: The Case of Tanzania", World Development, Oxford, vol. 3, no. 4, 1975, pp. 247-72.
- Bienen, Henry, "Foreign Aid Versus National Independence", East African Journal, February, 1965, pp. 19-26.
- Cliffe, L., "Tanzania: Socialist Transformation and Party Development", The African Review, vol. 1, no. 1, 1971, pp. 119-75.

- Davis, William, J., "Politics, Perception and Development Strategy in Tropical Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 1975, pp. 35-53.
- Ehrlich, Cyril, "Some Aspects of Economic Politics in Tanganyika 1945-60", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, 1964, pp. 265-78.
- Gordon, David F., "Foreign Relations; Dilemmas of Independence and Development", in Joel D. Barkan, (ed.), Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, Praeger, New York, 1964.
- Gupta, Vijay, "Indian and African Non-alignment Role; A Theoretical Framework", Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Pune, vol. 8, no. 1, 1980.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Nature and Content of Tanzanian Non-Alignment".
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Non-alignment Movement - India and Africa", in Vijay Gupta, (ed.), India and Non-Alignment, New Literature, New Delhi, 1983.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Super Powers in Africa - Present and Future", in Priya Mulalik Desai, (eds.), Development Issues in Africa, Bombay, 1982.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Ujamaa Development Programme and Participatory Leadership", in Alfred De Souza, (ed.), Politics of Change and Leadership Development, Manohar, New Delhi, 1978.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Non-alignment to Collective Self-Reliance; A Perspective", in R.R. Ramchandani, (ed.) India and Africa, Radiant Pub., New Delhi, 1980.
- Hakes, Jay, E., "Political Stability in East Africa; An Evaluation", Current History, vol. no. 64, no. 379, March 1973.
- Hartman, J., "Economic Dependence and Foreign Policy; Case of Tanzania", The African Review, vol. 7, no. 4, 1977.

- Hoskyns, Catherine, "Africa's Foreign Relations; The Case of Tanzania", International Affairs, vol. 44, no. 3, July 1968, pp. 445-62.
- Hughes, A., "East African Community of Disinterest", Africa Report, New York, vol. 20, no. 2, March-April 1975, pp. 35-43.
- Ismael, Tareq, Y., "The Peoples Republic of China and Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 9, no. 4, 1971, pp. 507-29.
- John David, H., "The Foreign Policy of Tanzania", in Aluko O., (ed.), Foreign Policies of African States, London, 1977, pp. 196-220.
- Kiva, L.V., "Ujamaa in Tanzania", International Journal of Politics, vol. 6, no. 4, Winter 1976-77, pp. 87-106.
- Leys, Collins, "Recent Relations between the States of East Africa", International Journal, vol. 20, no. 4, Winter 1965, pp. 150-73.
- Lonsdale, John, "The Tanzanian Experiment", African Affairs, vol. 67, October 1968, pp. 330-44.
- Malecela, John S., "What Next for the East African Community? ; The Case for Integration", The African Review, vol. 2, no. 1, June 1972.
- Malima, Kichoma Ali, "International Trade and Economic Transformation of Tanzania", The African Review, vol. 1, no. 2, September 1971.
- Mbilinyi, S.M., "East African Export Commodities and the Enlarged European Community", The African Review, vol. 3, no. 1, 1973.
- McHenry, Dean, "The Underdevelopment Theory; A Case Study from Tanzania", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 14, no. 14, 1976, pp. 621-36.
- Mohiddin, Ahmed, "Ujamaa; A Commentary on President Nyerere's Vision of Tanzania Society", African Affairs, vol. 67, 1968, pp. 130-43.



- Mulei, Christopher, "The Predicament of the Left in Tanzania", East African Journal, vol. 9, no. 8, August 1972.
- Mwasakafyuka, "Tanzania's Foreign Policy as a Frontline State in the Liberation of Southern Africa", Journal of International Relations, Univ. of Dar es Salaam, vol. 2, no. 2, 1978, p. 17.
- Neerso, P., "Tanzania's Policies on Private Foreign Investment", The African Review, vol. 4, no. 1, 1974.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Selected Aspects of Tanzanian Policies of Foreign Investment", World Development, Oxford, vol. 1, no. 1, February 1974, pp. 739-44.
- Niblock, Timothy, C., "Tanzanian Foreign Policy : An Analysis", The African Review, vol. 1, no. 2, 1972.
- Nnoli, O., "Diplomacy and the Extraction of External Resources: Tanzania's Experience", University of East Africa Social Sciences Conference, Dar es Salaam, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Political Will and the Margin of Autonomy in Tanzania Foreign Policy", Africa Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1, July 1977, pp. 5-36.
- Nyerere, J.K., "A United States of Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, March 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "A Statement of Policies", Punch (London), 16 July 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Principles and Development", in Freedom and Development, OUP, 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Independence Means Power", Africa Report, December 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Tanzania: Ten Years After Independence", The African Review, vol. 2, no. 1, June 1972.

- Nyerere, J.K., "The Rational Choice", in Freedom and Development, OUP, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Our Independence is Not for Sale", Africa, no. 53, May, 1974, p. 66.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "From Uhuru to Ujamaa", Africa Today, vol. 21, no. 3, Summer 1974, pp. 3-8.
- Othman, H., "The Arusha Declaration and the Triangle Principle of Tanzanian Foreign Policy", East African Journal, vol. 7, no. 5, May 1970, pp. 35-42.
- Pratt, Cranford, "Nyerere on the Transition to Socialism in Tanzania", The African Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Foreign Policy Issues and the Emergence of Socialism in Tanzania, 1961-68", International Journal, Summer, 1975, pp. 445-70.
- Rodney, Walter, "Tanzanian Ujamaa and Scientific Socialism", The African Review, vol. 1, no. 4, 1972.
- Shaw, Timothy, "African States and International Stratification; The Adaptive Foreign Policy of Tanzania", in K. Incham's Foreign Policies of African States, London, 1974.
- Shivji, Issa, "Capitalism Unlimited - Public Corporations in Partnership with Multinational Corporations", The African Review, vol. 3, no. 3, 1973, pp. 359-81.
- Tamu, P.E., "Nationalization in Tanzania", East Africa Journal, June 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Employment of Foreign Consultants in Tanzania; Its Value and Limitations", The African Review, vol. 3, no. 1, 1973, pp. 69-81.
- Thobani, A.H., "Tanzania's Foreign Trade Pattern", Africa Today, vol. 21, no. 3, Summer 1974, pp. 43-48.

- Tordoff, William, "Tanzania: Politics and Development", Africa, London, no. 46, June 1975, pp. 61-62.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Tanzania Unlucky Ujamaa", The Economist London, pp. 12-18, April 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Tanzania: 27 Years of TANU", Africa, London, no. 59, July 1976, pp. 41-80.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Tanzania: A Passage to Pan-Africanism", Africa, London, no. 66, February 1977, pp. 10-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Tanzania: One Year After CCM", Africa, London, no. 78, February 1978, pp. 77-106.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Tanzania/Uganda: Nyerere Warns Amin", Africa, no. 91, March 1979, p. 23.

Periodicals and Newspapers:

Africa Contemporary Record (London).

Africa Diary (New Delhi).

African Recorder (New Delhi).

African World (London).

Africa Report (New York).

Africa Research Bulletin (U.K.).

Africa South of the Sahara (London).

African Contemporary Record.

International Affairs (Moscow).

Observer (London).

The Standard (Tanzania).

The Daily (Bombay).

\*\*\*