

**United States and the Camp David Agreement, 1978:
Its Impact on West Asia**

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
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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled
"United States and the Camp David Agreement,
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FARAH NAAZ, in partial fulfilment of the
Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) in
Jawaharlal Nehru University, has not been
previously submitted for any other degree of
this or any other University. To the best
of our knowledge this is an original work.

We recommend that this dissertation be
placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Prof. R.P. Kaushik
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PREFACE

The Middle East, has been and continues to be an important region in international politics. Its importance has been due to the oil wealth, which makes the western powers dependent on it. Upto the First World War, the Middle East was the forward post for the defence of the British Empire. After the Second World War, there was a considerable decline in the powers of the British Empire. The United States' position in the international sphere increased considerably. The US began giving support to the British policy. With the result it gave its assurance to the "Balfour Declaration", which had supported the national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. After the creation of the Israeli State in 1948, the United States' Middle East policy decisions were taken in favour of Israel. American decisions relating to the Middle East, were taken to end the conflicts of the Middle East.

An attempt is made in this study to analyse the US sponsored Camp David Agreement of 1978 with its main focus on the reactions of the West Asian countries. The extent to which the Camp David Agreement succeeded or failed has been elaborately discussed.

The dissertation consists of five chapters. The First chapter deals with the early history of the Middle East and the decline of the British and the increase in the American involvement in the region. American economic and strategic interests and the creation of the state of Israel and the United States' support for it has been discussed. Role of US in the first two West Asian wars of 1948 and 1956 have also been analysed in this chapter.

The United States' real involvement in the Middle East started through its oil companies. This aspect has been dealt with in the second chapter. Other aspects discussed are - the Soviet interests in the region, and the resulting influence of the two super powers, and their stances in the 1967 and the 1973 wars.

The Third chapter has analysed the United States' role in sponsoring the Camp David Agreement and the signing of the Camp David Accords. The implications and the interpretations of the Accords have also been evaluated. How the Palestinian question suffered a total neglect has been highlighted in this chapter.

The Fourth chapter deals with the universal condemnation of the Accords by Arab world. How the Arab countries rejected the Camp David Accords and suspended

Egypt's membership from the Arab League have been the facets discussed at some length. The reactions of the Arab press have also been assessed in details. The changes in the outlook with the change in power in the Middle Eastern countries as well as its impact on the whole has been analysed accordingly.

In the concluding chapter, the overall evaluation of the US sponsored Camp David Agreement and its impact on West Asian countries has been the main facet.

In pursuing this study, I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to my supervisor Professor R.P. Kaushik for the invaluable and timely help, encouragement and inspiration rendered during the course of this dissertation. His suggestions went a long way in the completion of this work.

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I also thank Mr. Chahar for typing my manuscript with great patience and efficiency.

I am indebted to my parents and sister who bore with my long absence from home and whose silent encouragement and moral and financial support helped me complete this work.

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Farah Naaz
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New Delhi.

July 19, 1991.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Between Cairo and Kabul lies a part of the world which came to be known as termed by the modern western geographers, the "Near East". Before the Second World War, the major American interests in the Middle East had been cultural. It acquired thereafter economic and strategic interests on the part of the other powers. By and large, the British and the French who had colonial links in this region and were also exercising power under the League of Nations' mandated territories, had a major say on the politics of the region. Hence the US in the pre-war year was largely dependent upon the French and the British and their analysis of this area for formulating its own policy.

The States of the Middle East felt that they were militarily weak. Despite their oil wealth, they felt powerless and frustrated due to the American, Soviet and Israeli military power reigning supreme in the region.

The Early Phase:

Since the very inception of the problem of the "Jews vs. the Arabs" the people in the United States were divided on the Middle East problems relating to its inhabitants and its disputes. Many Americans were influenced

in the earlier years by the biblical history and the feeling for the return of the Jewish people to the Palestine: "I really wish the Jews again in Judea an independent nation",¹ wrote President John Quincy Adams in 1818. Later in 1891, (three years before Theodore Herzl, founder of the Modern Zionist movement, began his campaign to establish a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine), William Blackstone of Chicago presented President Benjamin Harrison and Secretary of State, James Blaine, a memorial, signed by 413 prominent Americans proposing that the Jews be restored to Palestine. In response, the American council in Jerusalem reported to the State Department that, "(1) Palestine is not ready for the Jews; and (2) The Jews are not ready for Palestine".²

During the nineteenth Century, the penetration of European powers in the Middle East started. The Ottoman authorities granted concessions to foreign governments and companies to promote trade between the empire and Europe. Britain promised the 'Sherif' of Mecca that it would recognize Arab independence after the war, if only the Arabs "would engage in revolt against the Ottoman".³ But the Arabs could not fulfil their aspirations as the areas that Britain had promised to recognize as independent, were occupied by the British and the French forces.

1 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.1.

2 Ibid, p.1.

3 Michael, E. Jansen, The United States and the Palestinian People, (Beirut: Inst. for Palestine Studies, 1970), p.5.

The beginning of the United States Governments' involvement in Palestinian affairs had come in 1914, when war broke out between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire, and the Palestinian Jewish community appealed to American consular agents for protection.

During the war, neutral America was asked to represent British and French interests in the obscure Turkish province of Palestine. "Authur James Balfour, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in England had been hesitant to suggest a British protectorate to his American contacts fully knowing that Washington would not like to get sucked into the imperial rivalries of the European belligerents".⁴ Indeed the President of the United States was opposed to any US responsibility for Palestine or Armenia or any of the other Turkish territories.

During the months just before the Balfour Declaration (in 1917), "President Woodrow Wilson of the United States was under great pressure to join with Britain in enunciating the policy of a Jewish national home in Palestine".⁵

On 4 September 1917, Lord Robert Cecil, the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had cabled to

4 Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p.64.

5 Michael E. Jansen, The United States and the Palestinian People (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970), p.7.

Washington officials, "We are being pressed here for a Declaration of sympathy with the Zionist movement, and I should be very grateful if you felt able to ascertain unofficially if the President favours such a Declaration".⁶

The American government gave its assurance. The British policy makers turned to the next step - a public declaration of support for the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine. The "Balfour Declaration" which was the British response to the International Zionism was a letter approved by the British Cabinet, signed by the Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour, and sent to Lionel Walter Rothschild, President of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland, who was asked to convey it to the World Zionist Organization. The Declaration made in November 1917 stated:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavour to facilitate the achievement of this subject, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by jews in any other country. (7)

On 12 April 1922, at the urging of the Zionists, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican, Massachusetts), the Chairman

6 M.E. Jansen, The Three Basic American Decisions on Palestine (PLO Research Centre, 1971), pp.7-17.

7 Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinboz in ed., Israel in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p.12.

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a resolution into the Senate reaffirming the Balfour Declaration.

Subsequently on 11 September 1922, both the houses worked out a joint declaration in support of the "Balfour Declaration". The joint resolution went to the President, and after receiving the sanction of the State Department, the President signed it. The final resolution read as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the United States of America favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine and that the holy places and religious buildings and site in Palestine shall be adequately protected. (8)

The intent of the Congress clearly was to avoid any specific political commitment. It was an expression of sympathy with the Zionist movement and support for the Balfour Declaration. Congress had clearly entrusted its implementation to its architects, the British. But the resolution had also been interpreted as committing the United States not only to the protection of the holy places, but also to the national home (of Jews) itself, should the British move out for any reason.

8 Mohammad Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians
(London: Croom Helm, 1981), p.27.

The political developments during the 1930s, caused a great deal of concern for the Zionists. The Palestinian rebellion of 1936 prompted the British government to issue the 1939 white paper, which limited the Jewish immigration into Palestine to 75,000 in the following five years and forbade Jewish immigration after that time. The Zionists reacted to the White Paper in three ways:

1. They strengthened their military force in Palestine;
2. They switched their base of political operations from London^{to} Washington; and
3. They intensified their efforts to obtain a firm political commitment from the United States.

American Zionists gathered in 1942 and repudiated the British White Paper to reaffirm their commitment to a national Jewish home in Palestine. Later the American-Zionist movement emerged more united and sought the sympathy of US Congress against the background of Hitler's policy of exterminating Jews. They sought the US Congress' good offices to support a policy of free entry of Jews into Palestine.

During the Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt the humanitarian claims of the Zionists was never solved. Beset by the overriding consideration of winning the war, neither the State Department nor the White House was able to formulate a realistic policy on the Middle East as a whole.

However when time came for Congress to consider the pro-Zionists resolutions, there were protests all over the Middle East. In 1943, President Roosevelt urged the British government, then the authority in Palestine, to permit the entry of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. President Roosevelt validated the Zionist claim that Palestine must be reserved as the ultimate refuge of the world's Jews. But it was his successor President Harry S. Truman who had to make the most crucial decisions.

President Truman was fully aware of Arab hostility to Jewish settlement. Like many other Americans, he was "troubled by the plight of the Jewish people in Europe". Truman's basic outlook on the situation was coloured by his own deep sympathy for the survivors of Hitler's racism and his very legalistic approach to the Balfour Declaration. He assumed that its existence involved a "solemn promise....which should be kept, just as all promises made by responsible, civilized governments should be kept".⁹

President Truman saw no collision between American interests and Jewish interests in Palestine when he said:

It was my feeling that it would be possible for us to watch out for the long range interests of our country while, at the same time, helping these unfortunate victims of persecution to find a home.(10)

9 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952 (New American Library, 1961), vol.1, p.132.

10 Ibid, p.69.

Therefore from the outset of his administration, Truman made it clear that he intended to continue the same policy as did previous American Presidents towards Palestine.

The Partition of Palestine and creation of the Israeli State:

On 2 April, 1947, the British delegation to the United Nations requested the Secretary General to place the Palestine question on the agenda of the General Assembly. Subsequently, an eleven-nation United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed. The majority of UNSCOP favoured the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states with an internationalized Jerusalem. The United States strongly backed partition. The partition was approved by the United Nations on 29 November 1947. It was followed by a lot of confusion and bloodshed which made clear that partition could be effective only through the use of force. Therefore the United States shifted its position from partition to trusteeship in Palestine. It proposed that temporary trusteeship under the Trusteeship Council be established. It was in this context that the US representative to the United Nations, Warren R. Austin, proposed on March 19, 1948, a UN trusteeship as a temporary and emergency measure to restore public order. The plan had little support in UN and was soon overshadowed by the unilateral action by Jews living in Palestine.

Recognition:

Israel declared its independence on 14 May, 1948 and United States was the first to accord it recognition. Truman's decisions were taken against the advice of some of his advisers and the overwhelmingly negative view of the professionals of the Department of State and Department of War, who were concerned that a decision in support of a Jewish state would be harmful to American strategic and political interests in the Arab world, particularly with respect to access to Arab oil. Indeed the establishment of Israel had alienated most of the Arab world from the West. The Arabs see Israel as a Western creation, and blame mainly the US and to a lesser extent, Britain, for assisting the Zionist movement to establish the Jewish state:

The image that emerged is of an Israel that is at once an American outpost on a distant frontier and a staunch independent ally; an Israel, to use the Guardian's words, which is 'America's Sheriff in the Middle East (manning) the frontiers of the free world against the encroachment of Soviet imperialism'. In this framework the United States would presumably be committed to Israel's safety as France had been to French Algeria's - America as Israel's 'Metropole'. (11)

The United States actively participated in helping to create the State of Israel. Unlike some countries of the Middle East, Israel was a stable democracy. These qualities inspired

11 Hisham Bashir Sharabi, Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma (New York, Pegasus, 1969), p.33.

the respect of many Americans, who felt something like a sense of personal involvement in the destiny of Israel. According to an expert, "Today Israel is serving as the frontline of Western defense in the Middle East".¹² By 15 May, 1948, it was absolutely clear that the continued resistance of Palestinians in Palestine depended upon prompt and effective intervention in the civil war by the Arab states. On 15 May, 1948, five Arab states declared war on the newly established state of Israel. In view of a writer, "The Arab governments were divided and suspicious of each other: there was no unified command, no common plan of attack and no cooperation".¹³

The Israelis held the centre, the Arabs attacked on the periphery. The Arab armies were unable to prevent further Jewish expulsion of the people of Palestine or to undo the establishment of the state of Israel. Thus, the Arabs faced the setback in the first Arab-Israel war of 1948. Between 15 May and 11 June, when the United Nations mediator proclaimed the First Truce in the battle, another 300,000-350,000 Palestinians left their homes and villages.

"On July 9, the First Truce expired and hostilities were resumed in the period Zionist sources refer to as the

12 Henry M. Jackson, "The Middle East and American Security policy", Report to the Committee on Armed Services, US Congress, Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, December 1970, (US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1970), p.2.

13 Michael E. Jansen, The United States and the Palestinian People (Beirut: Inst. for Palestine Studies, 1970), p.35.

"Ten Days War", and as a result a flood of 60,000 panicky Palestinians were compelled to take the road to the nearby Arab lines".¹⁴ The second Truce came into effect on July 18. In the ten days of fighting "1000 square kilometres of Arab held territory" had been occupied by the Israeli armed forces. This left Israel in occupation of 1300 square kilometres of territory included in the Palestinian state by the United Nations, and the Arab states holding the "negev" and 330 square kilometre of territory allotted to the Jewish state.

Neither side was content with the situation obtaining when the Second Truce came into effect on July 18. The Arab States would not accept the Jewish state as a "fait accompli" and the Israelis "were determined to tie up the loose ends. (15)

Between December 23, 1948 and January 7, 1949, the Israelis attacked Egyptian positions in the South. On February 24, the Egyptian Israeli Armistice Agreement was signed and on February 28, the Jordanian delegation arrived on the Ireland to negotiate an armistice with Israel. The Jordanian Israeli Armistice Agreement was concluded on April 3, 1949, and Iraq declared that she would be bound by

14 Jon and Kimches, A Clash of Destinies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1960), p.228.

15 Michael E. Jansen, The United States and the Palestinian People (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1979), p.170.

Jordan's signature on the document. Agreements with Lebanon and Syria were concluded by Israel in March and July 1949. "The war in Palestine was officially over, but between July 1949 and June 4, 1967, an additional 12000-15000 Palestinians were driven into exile across the demarcation lines".¹⁶

Washington's Gesture:

During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the official American policy in the area was to keep aloof. Washington sponsored a mediator appointed by the UN and adhered to a UN call for an arms embargo to the area. "Behind the scenes, however, American representatives were actively engaged with both sides to achieve some way to stop the fighting - with the British, with UN mediator Count Folk Bernadotte, and at the UN itself."¹⁷

The armistice agreement did not end the belligerency between Israel and its Arab neighbours, they ended the first Arab-Israeli war, fought over eight months between May 1949 and January 1949 with alternating periods of combat and UN arranged ceasefires.

For the remainder of the Truman administration, Palestine was a minor issue, especially after the onset of

16 Ibid, p.39.

17 Steven L. Speigel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.39.

the Korean War in June 1950. But Truman approved a loan to Israel despite the reluctance of the Chief of the Economic Assistance Programme, approved de jure recognition of Israel after its first elections, supported American sponsorship of Israeli membership in the United Nations. "In February 1952, the President instructed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to increase economic aid to Israel for fiscal year 1953 from \$ 25 to \$ 80 million".¹⁸

In the global arena, growing concern about Soviet objectives took Truman's attention away from the Middle East. One major aim of American policy was to ensure that, however the Palestine question was resolved, the Soviet Union would not benefit. It was felt by the American Administration that "Regionally, the Palestine question was a nuisance, for it threatened to ruin American relations with the Arab world and disrupt oil supplies to the West".¹⁹

Beyond the political dimensions, domestic pressures were divided with rough equality between two powerful coalitions favouring and opposing a Jewish state. To the Israelis and their supporters, a democratic, pro-Western enclave in a politically unstable, but crucial region would secure future American interests there. Opponents demanded that a

18 Ibid, p.45.

19 Ibid, p.47.

Jewish state be prevented or at least limited in area. They argued that American interests in the region (relations with the Arab world, communications links, oil and its consequences for the success of the Marshall Plan) would be adversely affected by Israel's existence. It resulted in the weak and inconsistent policy, which neither side could totally influence.

One of the principal reasons for policy vacillations was the low priority assigned to the problem by the administration. Only when international events or domestic pressures forced his direct engagements did Truman deal with the matter. He had no overall goal; any solution that answered the needs of the Jewish refugees in Europe and brought peace to the region would have been acceptable. (20)

In January 1953, President Eisenhower took office and John Foster Dulles became the Secretary of State. In March 1953, Joseph Stalin died. Soviet policy became more flexible and the situation in the Middle East rapidly became more nationalistic and independent of Western tutelage.

In early 1953 Dulles personally visited the Middle East. His analysis emphasized the basic purpose of strengthening the area against Soviet aggression. The Baghdad Pact was initiated by a bilateral treaty between Turkey and Iraq, which was later joined by Iran, Pakistan and Britain. The

United States, the originator of the concept did not formally join the pact. The Baghdad Pact aroused the hostility of Egypt and of Arab popular opinion. On the other side, Nasser's arms deal with the Soviet Union caused a great shock in Washington. The United States was naturally unhappy about the turn of events.

The next event took place over Aswan Dam. Egypt said it would seek Soviet aid if United States' aid was refused. Dulles abruptly withdrew the American offer of aid for the Aswan Dam. Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal company. The initial US reaction came only a day after the event, when the Department of State announced that it would affect the maritime countries using the Canal and the owners of the Universal Suez Canal company, (the major owners being British and French). According to Gulshan Dietl,

The United States was not affected in either respect, it showed its resentment at the intemperate, inaccurate and misleading statements, that Nasser had made about the United States in the speech in which he announced the nationalisation.²¹

21 Gulshan Dietl, Dulles Era: America Enters West Asia
(New Delhi, Lancer International, 1986), p.98.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal aroused violent reactions from the US allies who threatened to go to war to restore their rights. The second Arab-Israeli war started on October 29, 1956, when the French-Israeli-British forces attacked Egypt and the Canal.

Although the US was consulted throughout the crisis, President Eisenhower was not informed of military action before the actual attack. Both, Prime Minister Eden of Britain and Prime Minister Mollet of France feared that Washington would not approve of their actions and that their planned schedule for military operations would be thwarted. The Israeli-Anglo-French attack against Egypt was condemned by the United States.

The United States and the Soviet Union joined in the United Nations to call for the ending of aggression and withdrawal of the Suez invaders. To Professor Hisham B. Sharabi, the American position during the whole episode was a crucial one:

The US once committed to action through the United Nations, had to pursue this line of policy to its logical conclusion. Dulles had little choice. The Hungarian uprising and strong US opposition to Soviet intervention there made it impossible for the United States to support or even take a neutral position toward the tripartite attack on Egypt.

It must be remembered that US policy had supported decolonization in Africa and Asia and could not now risk being identified with

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British and French imperialism. From the point of view of the former colonies and dependent countries, the invasion of Egypt represented a resurgence of European imperialism, which confirmed the theories of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. Facing the Russian intervention in Hungary, and to preserve its position vis-a-vis the Afro-Asian bloc, the United States had no choice but to back the call for an immediate ceasefire, to condemn aggression, and to demand the unconditional withdrawal of the British, French and Israeli troops.(22)

The strong US opposition to the British-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt was primarily factual. It should not be allowed to obscure the shared objective: to isolate and if necessary to diminate Nasser, and consequently Egypt, as a political force in the Middle East, (an objective which American policy makers achieved later during the Sadat era with the Camp David Agreement).

Soon after the crisis, America's real objectives came to light in the "Eisenhower Doctrine", which constitutes a milestone in United States involvement in the Arab world.

The USA felt another threat to tis interest. This was the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia bloc which was formed in opposition to the Baghdad Pact. It was felt in the US that

22 Hisham Bashir Sharabi, Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma (New York:Pegasus, 1969), pp.60-61.

a new policy was required to meet these new exigencies. It was with this idea in mind that President Eisenhower went before the joint session of the US Senate and the US House of Representatives on 5 January 1957, with some special proposals. In his address he declared that "the National integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own security".²³

The Eisenhower Doctrine would have the following features:

It would authorize the US to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would authorize the executive to undertake in the same region programmes of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desired such aid.

Thirdly, it would authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the US - to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism. (24)

The US Congress authorized the implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Doctrine gave the USA, complete freedom for full and open interference in West Asian affairs.

23 President asks for Authorization of US Economic Program and for Resolution on Communist Aggression in Middle East, Department of State Bulletin, vol.36, no.917, 21 January, 1957, p.86.

24 Department of State Bulletin, vol.36, no.917, 21 January, 1957, p.86.

From that time onward, American policy in the Middle East during the Eisenhower Administration became a continued effort to implement the Eisenhower Doctrine and to convince the Arab world that the United States was indispensable for the security of the Middle East. .

However, of the Arab states, only Lebanon formally adhered to the Eisenhower Doctrine. President J.F. Kennedy remarked:

The Arabs know that their lands had never been occupied by Soviet troops - but that they had been occupied by Western troops - and they were not ready to submerge either nationalism or their neutrality in an alliance with the Western nations....(25)

25 John F. Kennedy, The Strategy for Power (New York; Harper and Row, 1960), p.107.

CHAPTER II

US INTERESTS IN THE REGION

The centrality of the United States Middle East role and the special relationship with Israel were complemented in the post October War period by the new developments between the United States and some of the key Arab states. Besides the traditional aspect of the "Arab-Israeli Conflict", the United States - Arab relationship ^{emerged} on a new economic dimension - revolving around oil.

Since the area has more than half of the world's proven oil reserves and there exists a potential for further discoveries, its oil has been seen as strategically and politically important to the United States. This was one of the arguments advanced for determining the policies regarding the Palestinian and the Israel's problem. It was recognised that the oil had a far greater value for the United States as well as its allies in Western Europe and Japan.

US and the Oil Companies:

The United States oil industry came on to the scene in 1859 when "colonel" Edwin Drake drilled the nation's first oil well near Titusville, pa. "Although oil was produced and sold commercially in Canada, Russia, Burma

and Rumania before 1859, Drake's well was the one that was destined to have the greatest impact on the world".¹

The success of that well was due to a number of factors. First, Drake introduced a new technique of drilling for production. It reduced significantly the cost of extracting oil, thus making oil competitive with other fuels.

Secondly, the technological advances provided a ready market for this oil. Among them were lamps designed to burn oil distilled for coal. "Furthermore, the coal-oil industry, which was the fastest - growing illumination industry in the US during the 1850s, had developed the techniques for refining, which the oil industry adopted".²

Thirdly, the US was growing at a rapid pace. The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 greatly accelerated this pace. Furthermore, this industrialisation was not confined merely to the United States. It was also taking place in Western Europe, which provided an important market for the US oil industry. At that time, Canada was its closest rival.

1 H.O' Connor, World Crisis in Oil (New York; Monthly Review Press, 1962), p.27.

2 H.F. Williamson and A.R. Dawn, The American Petroleum Industry, the Age of Illumination (Evanston III; Northwestern University Press, 1959), p.40.

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"In 1862, all the world's oil was produced in the United States and Canada. The US share was 97 per cent, the Canadian, 3 per cent".³

The Organization of the Industry:

With the growth of this new industry, there also emerged a new group of entrepreneurs who were eager to control it and propel it further. These entrepreneurs were engaged in both interproduct and intraproduct rivalry. This process of intense competition followed by monopolisation became evident in the early years of the oil industry. It can be presumed that most entrepreneurs desired to achieve a monopoly position.

As one writer has put it: There were three factors present in the early development of the oil industry which made monopolization possible. They were:

- (i) the presence of scale economies in refining;
- (ii) the geographical distance between the major markets and the producing centres; and
- (iii) the limited supplies of crude oil available.

3 E. Gray, Impact of Oil, the Development of Canada's Oil Resources (Toronto; The Ryerson Press, 1969), pp.5-6.

But these conditions were not sufficient. What needed was the existence of entrepreneurs who could recognize those conditions and utilize them for their own ends. Such an entrepreneur was John D. Rockefeller. Rockefeller had a better understanding than anyone else of the objective conditions in the oil industry, he was able in a relatively short time to create a new form of industrial organization by transforming the industry from a competitive one to a monopoly. He used methods which included such practices as manipulation of freight rates, industrial espionage and the threats against distributors, who bought from his competitors. In 1872, within three months, 21 of the 26 refineries were sold out to Rockefeller. "By 1872, Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company, which was incorporated only two years earlier, owned more than one-fifth of the nation's refining capacity".⁴

Rockefeller's tactics not only enraged the small inefficient units but some members of the elite as well. "The Wall Street banker, John P. Morgan, of Standard Oil Company, made no secret of his dislike of Rockefeller".⁵ Morgan's own tactics did not differ significantly from those of Rockefeller's. They resented this newcomer who

4 Ida Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1933), vol.1, p.67-8.

5 Ed Shaffer, The United States and the Control of World Oil (London; Croom Helm, 1983), p.26.

was threatening their dominant position in society. It was this conjecture of forces that led the US government to launch its famous anti-trust action against Standard Oil. When it finally ended in 1911, the supreme court upheld the decision of the lower court ordering the dissolution of the company.

The US oil picture changed dramatically as a result of the Spindletop discovery in Texas in 1901, one of the great discoveries of all time. It increased the supply of oil and also provided the opportunity for new companies to enter. The new entrants whose power was based on the ownership of crude rather than refining capacity, were able to breach Rockefeller's domestic monopoly. New entrants abroad, posed an additional threat to Rockefeller's dominance of foreign markets. In the later part of the 19th Century, two important new oil centres arose in Russia and in Indonesia. They competed vigorously among themselves and with Rockefeller for the control over world's supplies and markets. The US government while ostensibly punishing Rockefeller for his actions at home, gave considerable support to his activities abroad.

The first major foreign investment by Standard oil was the establishment in 1888 of the Anglo-American Oil Company to market US refined products in England.⁶

6 M. Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914 (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1970), p.64.

Standard Oil Company at various times either purchased or built refineries in Cuba, Puerto Rico, when it was still under Spanish rule, Germany, Autro-Hungary, Japan and Canada. (7)

The First World War demonstrated the importance of oil in modern warfare. From that time on, control of oil became one of the cornerstones of United States foreign economic policy. It became the essential ingredient in the expansion and consolidation of the American Empire.

Oil thus began to be a matter of special concern to US policy makers.

By the end of the war US policy shifted from one of encouraging foreign operations of US oil companies as part of a general policy of aiding the overseas expansion of all US firms to one of giving top priority to oil. The US had formally entered the era of oil imperialism. (8)

In pursuing its objectives the US adopted the policy of "open door". This doctrine was suitable for an area from which US interests were being excluded. The US first used the "open door" doctrine as a means of forcing the British to give US oil companies the right to participate in the exploitation of Iraq's oil resources. The area of Middle East became the key oil area in the post World War II era.

7 Ed Shaffer, The United States and the Control of World Oil (London, Croom Helm, 1983), p.34.

8 Ibid, p.45.

"The first entry of US firms into the Middle East was in the TPC(Turkish Petroleum Company), which changed its name in 1929 to IPC(Iraq Petroleum Company)".⁹

Around the same time as the US was negotiating to allow American companies in Iraq, the Gulf Oil Company obtained an option to purchase concessions in Bahrein and Kuwait from Eastern and General Syndicate, a British company. When GOC was ready to exercise its options it had already joined IPC and was bound by its "Red Line" agreement which prohibited IPC owners from bidding on their own for concession in most of the territory of the old Ottoman Empire. "Bahrein was within the "Red Line" but Kuwait was on the outside".¹⁰ The GOC did not need the approval from IPC to exercise its options there, as it was blocked by the British government from doing so.

After much haggling in 1933, Britain and American formed the Kuwait Oil Company, in which each held an equal share, to operate their Kuwait concession.

Saudi Arabia was the next important area of American penetration in the Middle East. The Standard Oil Company, in 1933, signed an agreement with the government of Saudia

9 Ibid, p.63.

10 Ibid,

Arabia, though it did not have the protection from the US government. This Saudi oil was to be considered as American oil.

In 1936, SOC brought in a partner, the Texas Company, they created ARAMCO (Arabian-American Oil Company), in which each held a fifty per cent share.

With the entry of American companies into Saudi Arabia, the US had an interest in every important Middle East producing area "with the exception of Iran". That country was completely controlled by the British. This monopoly lasted through out the 1920s. During the 1930s, the British share of Middle East production fell and the American's rose. Between the years 1919 and 1935, oil investment of America grew at a faster pace than total investment.

Except for Saudi Arabia, the US was still very much the outsider in the Arab world at the beginning of World War II. In North Africa and the Levant, France held a colonial empire. In Egypt and Iraq, Britain held a special position through its treaty arrangements. There was, however, much interest in expanding America's post-war trade in the Arab world. While Washington's interest in the Arab world was primarily on the commercial level, this could not be neatly separated from political considerations.

The British position was to accept the fact that the US role in the region would increase in the post-war years. In discussing America's policy options, the Economist warned, on March 11, 1944:

It is perfectly possible that the United States will revert to the old dispensation, under which Great Britain shouldered the political and military responsibility in this region and the commercial interests looked after the oil....(11)

As it developed, America's post-war planning for the Arab world, at least in the economic sphere, remained quite unilateral.

In the post-1945 era, oil came to play a basic role in peace-time economic activity. Although American strategists realised early on the importance of oil resources in general, they were particularly interested in the control of the Middle East oil by the American oil companies. By the end of the Second World War, United States oil companies had acquired a dominant strategic position in the balance of the world oil industry. Middle Eastern oil became a tool which the United States used to better its position in Western Europe vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and 'international Communism'. In the post-war period, more than the access to oil supplies,

11 Economist, 11 March, 1944.

containment of international communism was the major political issue for United States foreign policy.

In Europe, in the Middle East, in Korea, in the Third World, the United States strove endlessly for the containment of what was thought to be an aggressive and subverting force controlled from Moscow. Through two decades, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, military assistance pacts with 42 countries, and open and secret warfare from Iceland and Vietnam were all varying manifestations of this one dominating doctrine. (12)

As one writer has put it, "both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plans were linked to the Middle Eastern Oil".¹³ Similarly, James A. Forrestal, the leading business voice in the Truman Administration, declared in a memorandum to the President: "Without Middle East oil, the European Recovery Programme has a very slim chance of success. The US simply cannot supply that continent and meet the increasing demands here".¹⁴

Thus from a relatively late and modest beginning in 1901, the Middle East had become, by the end of the Second World War the largest pool of oil in the world.

12 Carl Salbery, Oil Power, (New York, Moson Publishers 1976), p.197.

13 Ibid, p.176.

14 Memorandum to the President, in Forrestal Papers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), p.179.

Soviet Interests in the Region:

By the time of the First World War, the Persian Gulf was under the British control. "The United Kingdom had signed treaties with many of the Gulf rulers, including those of Bahrain (1892), Kuwait (1899), Qatar (1892, 1916), Muscat and Oman (1939)".¹⁵

By the end of the Second World War, both the value of the Persian Gulf and the power of the Soviet Union had changed. As one writer has put it; "Oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Iran 1908, and by the 1960s the Persian Gulf was known to hold a very major portion of the world's oil reserves".¹⁶

By the mid 1970s, virtually the entire industrialized world was dependent upon Middle East oil, most of it produced in the Persian Gulf, for much of its energy requirements. The Persian Gulf was suddenly an area of critical strategic importance.

Soviet Union was one of the few industrialized countries not dependent on Middle East oil. Emerging from the

15 R.D. Melaurin, Soviet Policy in the Persian Gulf, ed., Mohammad Mughisuddin, Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p.117.

16 Ibid, p.118.

Second World War it improved its strategic position over the years and slowly closed the great military gap between itself and the United States. By the 1970s the Soviet Union was an experienced and aggressive international actor with increasing political, economic, and military resources to pursue its policies in newly important areas such as the Gulf.

According to an eminent scholar, R.D. McLaurin;

Security interests in the Persian Gulf area are related to the presence of potentially hostile powers posing a land based threat along the Southern Soviet border and the sea-based offensive threat posed by the United States. (17)

America's sea-based deterrent, however, was a strategic threat.

The new significance of the Indian Ocean to Moscow stemmed not so much from the military development of littoral states as from the introduction of new weapons system into the US fleet. By 1968, Soviet media were accusing Washington and London of developing plans for putting together a military bloc aimed at threatening the security of the southern borders of the USSR. (18)

17 Ibid, p.119.

18 Ibid, p.120.

Thus, "the role of the USSR in the Middle East was the result of a three factor equation: (1) Soviet aims and decisions. (2) The policies of rival powers (notably the United States and China), and (3) Political, economic and social forces present in the Middle East itself. Each factor is necessarily affected by the other two".¹⁹ Soviet policies towards any region of the world inevitably had an ideological content grounding in Marxist-Leninist theory".²⁰ But it could not be analysed apart from the global political military strategy of the Soviet Union as a great power.

At one end of the spectrum of interpretation is the view that the USSR is an imperialist and expansionist power; that it is committed to the victory of communism in the world, that it will seek to extend dominant influence to the Middle East as part of a plan to alter the world balance to its own advantage. At the other end of the spectrum is the view that the Soviet Union is seeking a situation of relative stabilization and balance in the Middle East that would protect Soviet security and other interests and prevent domination by any rival power.²¹

19 John C. Campbell, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East", in The Political Economy of the Middle East:1973-78, A Compendium of Papers, submitted to the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, 96th Congress, 2nd session, April 21, 1980 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980), p.345.

20 Ibid, p.347.

21 Ibid, p.348.

The geographic location of the Middle East gives it a particular place in Soviet strategy. As an official statement said, "it is on the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union that can harbour dangers to Soviet security".²²

Soviet economic interests in the Middle East were "less important than the strategic ones, but not negligible".²³ One need was the freedom to use lines of commercial communication to and through the area, as befited a world power active in trade, shipping, fishing and oceanic exploration. Moreover the water routes from European Russia to the Soviet Far-East were seen as lines of internal shipment within the Soviet economy, supplementing the land and air routes across Soviet territory.

A second factor was trade and aid. Trade satisfied some Soviet import requirements but more important were the credits and capital projects which helped to tie the economies of the Middle East states to that of the USSR and created political bonds, as well as offered opportunities for penetration and pressure.

Another economic factor was energy. Upto now the Soviet Union had no pressing need for Middle East oil and gas. Now it had found it convenient to import both, mainly to

22 Ibid, p.349.

23 Ibid,

supply certain areas of the USSR and to ease the strain on exports of Soviet oil and gas to Eastern and Western Europe.

Aside from these positive Soviet interests in expanding economic relations with the Middle East, there had been a negative interest in disrupting relations between that region and the West.

Influence of the Two Super Powers:

To think of the Middle East as a field of play in the context of the super powers was quite justified, indeed necessary, but not if it was seen only as strategic geography. What success the Soviet Union (or the United States) had there depended largely on whether conditions were favourable or not. The various types of situations invited the interference of the super powers.

In the estimate of an expert:

Continuing conflicts in which rival parties look for support from outside the region:

Such a conflict is the one between the Arab states and Israel. As one writer has put it: As long as United States can not win over most of the Arab states to the process of negotiation with Israel, some will inevitably turn to the other super power either to find a different approach to peace as to prepare for war. (24)

Nationalist Movements seeking International Recognition and independence on a National Territory:

"This description fits the PLO".²⁵ Its enemy is Israel. It had the nominal backing of the Arab states but distrusted them. It could get recognition from the United States as long as it did not accept the existence of Israel. Its supporter is, therefore, the Soviet Union which provided arms and political approval. Anywhere there was a dissatisfied nationalist movement - it could be in Iranian Azerbaijan, in Kurdistan, in Dhofar, in Yemen, in Hijaz, in Djibouti or elsewhere - the Soviets were in a position to try to extend their influence by exploiting it, or by asking a price for not exploiting it.

Events leading to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War;

The Syrian Israeli frontier remained the most serious trouble spot. "On April 7, 1967, one of the most serious military clashes between Israel and the Arabs took place on the Syria-Israel border as a result of cultivation dispute".²⁶ The Israeli air strike led the Arab governments quickly to pledge their support to Syria, but it also caused increased bickering among some of the Arab states. "The April 7 air attack multiplied the pressures on Egyptian leaders to take a more direct and active role in supporting their Syrian ally the next time she was attacked".²⁷ On May 16, 1967,

25 Ibid.

26 Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, (New York Syracuse University Press, 1968), p.243.

27 New York Times, April 10, 1967.

President Nasser began to move large number of troops to the Sinai area",²⁸ and asked the UN to remove the forces that had patrolled the border between Israel and Egypt since 1957. The United Nations Secretary General responded at once:

The UN Emergency force was suddenly removed, not only from the border but from the Gaza Strip and Sharm-al-Sheikh as well. Egyptian troops promptly replaced them, and President Nasser announced that the Strait of Tiran would be closed to Israeli shipping.(29)

The situation became one of full crisis. Sharm-al-Sheikh controls access through the Strait of Tiran to the Israeli port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba.

Since Egypt has kept the Suez Canal closed to Israeli shipping in the teeth of the two Security Council Resolutions, the Strait of Tiran was Israel's only direct opening to Africa and Asia and its most important source of oil. Closing the Strait was in effect an act of blockade.(30)

The goal of US policy was to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and to help deal with the underlying cause of tension in the Middle East.

28 New York Times, May 18, 1967.

29 Department of State Bulletin, vol.58, January 8, 1968, p.45.

30 Ibid, p.45.

The United States first pressed for action through the UN. In the Security Council she took the lead in sharply criticising UThant for withdrawing UNEF so hastily and in denying the legality of Egypt's blockade of the Strait of Tiran. On May 31, it introduced an "interim draft resolution which called upon the parties concerned, to comply with the UN Secretary General's appeal to "exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension". "The United States interpreted this to mean that Egypt would have to reopen the Gulf of Agaba to Israel, at least for the time being".³¹

The situation in the area changed radically. Mobilization and counter mobilization had replaced the closing of the Strait as a threat to the peace. Jordan had put her forces under Egyptian command, and troops from Iraq, Algeria and Kuwait joined the Egyptians and Syrians. "President Nasser openly proclaimed the day of the holy war. The explosion occurred on the morning of June 5, 1967".³²

Israel's Reaction:

Israel felt reasonably confident that the US would come to her aid if her security and survival were seriously

31 Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, (New York; Syracuse University Press, 1968), p.253.

32 Department of State Bulletin, vol.58, January 8, 1968, p.46.

endangered. "Firm American support and the presence of the powerful US Sixth Fleet in the eastern meditaranean also reduced the likelihood that the Soviet Union would intervene militarily on the side of the Arabs".³³

"Israel was able, within three days, to conquer the Gaza Strip, Sharm-al-Sheikh, and nearly the entire Sinai Peninsula to the east bank of the Suez Canal, old city of Jerusalem and all Jordanian territory on the West Bank of the Jordan river".³⁴ Hostilities had generally ceased by the evening of June 11 when both sides agreed to and abided by the fourth cease-fire resolution passed by the Security Council.

The third military confrontation of the Arabs with the Israelis revealed that though Arab armed forces had improved, they suffered from many of the earlier deficiencies. "They still lacked able political and military leaders and well trained dedicated officers. Their soldiers were not adequately trained to use the sophisticated weapons supplied by the USSR".³⁵

33 Fred J. Khouri, The Arab Israeli Dilemma (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p.259.

34 Ibid, p.260.

35 Ibid, p.261.

When war broke out on June 5, most of the world governments were extremely anxious to bring the conflict to a halt as quickly as possible, not only because they wished to prevent bloodshed, but especially because they greatly feared that American and Soviet commitments to come to the aid of the disputants might draw them into the military struggle. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were so fearful of finding themselves, through some miscalculation at war, that they quickly made use of the "Hot Line" between Moscow and Washington to assure each other that they would make every effort to end the fighting in the Middle East and to avoid actions which might cause an escalation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Soviet Union's Reaction:

The Soviet Union too made all efforts to stop the war.

As quoted in the New York Times:

"The Soviet Union (1) broke diplomatic relations with Israel on June 10; (2) introduced a draft resolution which among other things vigorously condemned Israel's aggressive activities and violations of Security Council resolutions and demanded that Israel halt her military operations, withdraw her forces behind the 1949 armistic lines, and respect the status of the demilitarised zones; (3) held a meeting of communist bloc leaders in Moscow who issued a statement promising to aid the Arabs if "aggression" did not stop and to make every effort to bring about the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the

.....

occupied areas. (4) warned that she would rearm the Arabs if Israel did not withdraw from occupied Arab areas; (5) threatened to demand the application of sanctions if Israel failed to abide by UN decisions.(36)

The increasing vehemence of the Russian threats caused the United States and other Security Council members to press Israel to halt her advances before the Russians felt it necessary to intervene. Because of these pressures and the passage, on June 9 and June 10, 1967 of resolution 235 and 236 which ordered "a cessation of hostilities forthwith and a prompt return of forces to the original cease-fire positions"-- and because Israel had already achieved most of her immediate military objectives in Syria, "Israel agreed to stop all hostilities at 6.30 P.M., GMT, on June 11".(37)

Aftermath:

Once the cease-fire had gone into effect on all fronts, Russia again concentrated her efforts in the Security Council on bringing about a condemnation of Israel and a withdrawal of her forces to behind the armistice lines. Soviet Union insisted that the Council vote on her resolution. On June 14, the resolution was defeated. According to a writer:

The United States led the opposition within the Council to the Soviet proposal and was largely responsible for its defeat. The Arabs accused of the US of being anti-Arab and pro-Israel....and voting in the Security Council to defeat any resolution opposed by Israel.(38)

36 New York Times, June 8,9,10,11, 1967.

37 Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York Syrian University Press, 1968), p.265.

38 Ibid, p.266.

As quoted in the New York Times on June 8, 1967,

Most Arabs felt that since they could not expect any assistance from the United States despite their desperate economic and military situation, they had no choice but to look to the Russians for aid.(39)

"Israel denounced Soviet Union for being pro-Arab and anti-Israel and accused the Russians for aiding and abetting the Arabs in their endeavours to destroy Israel".⁴⁰

As soon as the hostilities ended, Russia began to rush military and economic aid to the Arabs for the reasons being:

1. to restore some of the military balance of power between the Arab countries and Israel so as to discourage Israel from trying to seize more Arab territories;
2. to strengthen the political bargaining position of the Arabs in case efforts were made to force upon them a political settlement with Israel; and
3. to make the Arabs more dependent upon her and thus to increase her power in the area.

39 New York Times, June 8, 1967.

40 Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, (New York; Syracuse University Press, 1968), p.267.

The Palestinian issue from the June 1967 war to the October 1973 war:

Among the most decisive and far-reaching consequences of the June 1967 war were the spreading and intensifying of Palestinian nationalism; the rise of new activist leadership within the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO); and the emergence of the Palestinian resistance movement as a major force in Arab politics and in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Yasser Arafat became the Chairman of the PLO in 1967. The goal of the PLO being the dismantling of the "Zionist state of Israel" and its replacement with a secular, democratic state of Palestine in which all Palestine Arabs and Jews were to live in peace and equality. "The Palestinian Commando Organizations formed resistance groups within the occupied territories and launched a campaign of guerrilla attacks on Israel both from within the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas and from neighbouring Arab countries, especially Jordan".⁴¹

Significant progress on behalf of the Palestinians was made at the United Nations. In December 1969, the UN General Assembly not only reiterated the provisions of earlier resolutions dealing with the Arab refugees from

41 Ibid, p.358.

the 1948 and 1967 wars, but also passed Resolution which mentioned for the first time, the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. The General Assembly Resolution passed in the fall of 1970 and in subsequent years recognized that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self determination in accordance with the UN Charter and stated that respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace.⁴² The UN General Secretary U Thant urged the big powers to become more directly and actively involved.

Anwar Sadat became the President of Egypt in 1970. He was considered better in giving priority to the Arab-Israeli problem to Egyptian interests. Russia's failure to provide Egypt with the most advanced weapons disappointed it and felt that only US was able to help Arabs regain their lost lands.

A resolution for Palestinian rights was introduced by eight members of the Security Council on July 26, 1973. Thirteen of the fifteen Security Council Members voted for it. US vetoed it on the grounds that it was unbalanced and that it would have undermined Resolution 242.

42 Ibid, p.361.

In the lengthy communique issued at the conclusion of talks between President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev in the latter part of June 1973, there was hardly any mention of the Middle East and no reference of any kind to Resolution 242. Convinced that Americans and Soviets were unwilling to act, the leaders of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia concluded that "they were left with no alternative to war, which erupted on October 6, 1973".⁴³ The United States and the USSR were able to terminate the war before Israel could win a smashing victory and inflict on the Arabs another humiliating defeat.

The war, however, did not end before the super powers had rushed vast amounts of military supplies to their respective clients and had come close to a military confrontation on October 25-26, 1973. After two weeks of hostilities a cease-fire formula was developed (by Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Secretary of State of US Henry Kissinger during the latter's visit to Moscow) and was later adopted by the UN Security Council as Resolution 338.

43 Bernard Reich, "The United States and the Middle East", in The Political Economy of the Middle East: 1973-78: A Compendium of Papers, submitted to the Joint Economic Committees Congress of the United States, 96th Congress, 2nd session, April 21, 1980, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980), p. 376.

UN Resolution 338, October 22, 1973:

The Security Council

1. calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the position they now occupy;
2. calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; and
3. decides that, immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.(44)

Neither Israel nor Arabs could claim decisive military victory although each side claimed it had won the war. Security Council quickly despatched a UN Emergency Force to supervise the Egyptian Israeli Ceasefire and the United States applied determined pressures on Israel, major combat was ended and the dangerous tension between the super power was relieved.

Angered by the massive American arms aid sent to Israel during the conflict, the Arabs applied an Oil Embargo against the United States and cut down an oil shipments to Western Europe.

44 William, B, Quandt, Camp David: Peace Making and Politics (Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution, 1986), p.342.

The major effects of the 1973 October war could be cited as follows:

(a) Israel suffered a major political and diplomatic defeat leaving her more dependent on the United States and more isolated in the world than ever before.

Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel held fast to her strategy which was: "to hold on the every inch of occupied territory until the Arab states were ready to negotiate an Israel's terms".⁴⁵ The next Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1974) followed the same policy.

(b) The October war intensified Palestinian nationalism. By the end of October 1973, 26 out of 33 African states had broken diplomatic relations with Israel.

(c) The Arabs gained greater political support at the UN and throughout the Arab world. Thus the October war strengthened their bargaining position. According to a writer, "It also demonstrated that Israel remained considerably more powerful than the Arabs and that the United States would do everything possible, including risk a conflict with Russia, to insure Israel's survival and security".⁴⁶

45 New York Times, July 13, 1975.

46 Fred J. Khours, The Arab Israeli Dilemma (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 373.

The war and Egypt's respectable military performance strengthened the credibility, prestige, and influence of President Sadat in the Arab world, and this enabled him to take the lead in pressing for peace negotiations. Since Sadat had been convinced that US was seriously trying to promote a fair peace, and "since he had little faith in the USSR, Sadat decided to place almost complete faith in American willingness and determination to move Israel to make all the concessions required for peace".⁴⁷

(d) The positions of the PLO and Yasser Arafat were significantly enhanced politically and diplomatically when, the UN General Assembly on October 14, 1974, invited the PLO to participate in the approaching deliberations on the Palestine Question and on November 23, gave UN observer status to the PLO.

(e) Russia's position with Syria and the Palestinians remained firm after the war, her relations with Egypt deteriorated as Egypt moved closer to the United States. Russia insisted that negotiations on the overall problem be held at Geneva, where she was a co-sponsor with the United States, and she continued to give substantial political and diplomatic support to the Arab and Palestinian causes.

The Geneva Conference was called for by Resolution 338 and met on December 21-22, 1973, American Officials decided to adopt a step by step approach in the hope of cutting down the size of the Arab-Israeli problem and creating a favourable atmosphere for a complete settlement.

Secretary of State of the United States Henry Kissinger was able to arrange disengagements between Egypt and Israel on January 17, 1974, and Syria and Israel on May 29, 1974. Those provided for Israeli forces to withdraw to positions some 15 to 20 miles east of the Suez Canal and to evacuate all new territories seized in Syria in October 1973 and a sliver of land captured on the Golan Heights in 1967. Buffer zones manned by UNEF were established.

Syria and Egypt obtained the return of some of their lost lands and American promises of economic aid. The US obtained an end of the Oil Embargo, the renewal of diplomatic relations with Egypt and Syria.

The process of achieving an agreement took a substantial step forward with the June 1975 meetings of

Ford with Sadat in Europe and later with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in Washington. A complex of agreements was initiated on September 1, 1975, in Jerusalem and Alexandria and was signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975.

CHAPTER III

THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTU.S. Role:

The Carter Administration, adopted as its primary objective in the Middle East the termination of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Underlying Carter's approach to peace was the view that the time had never been more propitious to work for a settlement (because of Israel's confident military strength, the moderation of Arab leaders, the receding civil war in Lebanon, and the willingness of all parties to participate in a new round of Geneva talks), and that to lose this opportunity could be disastrous for the region and for the international political and economic order. A just and lasting peace was seen as essential for a peaceful world and for the United States. Vice President of US Walter Mondale noted that "the conflict there carries the threat of a global confrontation and runs the risk of a nuclear war". The lasting peace in the Middle East would help to maintain American influence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the area. The US role has also been assumed because of its special relationship with Israel and its rapidly developing links with the Arab states. As Vice President Mondale said,

It is precisely because of our close ties with both Israel and her Arab neighbours that we are uniquely placed to promote the search for peace, to work for an improved

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understanding of each side's legitimate concerns, and to help them work out what we hope will be a basis for negotiation leading to a final peace in the Middle East.

The Administration believed that a new approach was called for, although the goals remained constant. At its base was United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. It was decided to work with the parties to develop an overall framework for an enduring peace.

The United States sought to bring about negotiations between the parties and to establish a set of principles that might serve as a basis for a settlement. Direct negotiations were obviously necessary, for as Vice President Walter Mondale noted: "We can not conceive of genuine peace existing between countries who will not talk to one another. If they are preparing for peace, the first proof is willingness to negotiate their differences". Carter defined peace as

A termination of belligerence towards Israel by her neighbours, a recognition of Israel's right to exist, the right to exist in peace, the opening up of borders with free trade, tourist travel, cultural exchange between Israel and her neighbours.(1)

1 Bernard Reich, "The United States and the Middle East", The Political Economy of the Middle East: 1973-78, A Compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, 96th Congress, 2nd session, April 21, 1980, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980), p.382.

The second central element was that of territory and borders. The crucial problem was to provide borders that were secure and acceptable to all the parties and would be permanent and recognised. The principles involved were clear. There would be substantial Israeli withdrawals from the occupied territories and minor adjustments in the pre-1967 lines. The final lines would have to be negotiated and agreed between Israel and the Arabs.

The Palestinian element emerged as the most controversial. President Carter's earliest views were that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people had to be incorporated in the settlement (this was later changed to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people). Carter believed that there should be a Palestinian homeland or entity, whose political status would have to be negotiated.

Carter Administration viewed the problem as both sufficiently important and intractable for Washington. In an interview in May 1977 Carter foreshadowed future activity when he noted:

I would not hesitate if I saw clearly a fair and equitable solution to use the full strength of our own country and its perspective powers to bring those nations to agreement I recognize, though, that we can not impose our will on others and unless the countries involve agree, there is no way for us to make progress.(2)

William Quandt, one of the architects of the Camp David strategy said: "Carter was convinced that the struggle in this region might develop to the point of dire threat of a vast international confrontation as had happened in 1973".³ Carter tried to lay down a number of principles which would be suitable as the basis for achieving a comprehensive peace in the region. These principles were:

The term "peace" involve to include the necessity of changing the nature of relations between the nations of the area after the ratification of the peace agreement if there was to be a true peace and not merely a document.

Second, Carter affirmed that, in order to achieve peace, it was necessary that there be an Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in 1967. Israel would have to withdraw to the 1967 boundaries, with some minor adjustments.

Third, Carter believed that in order to carry this out it was necessary to pay attention to the problem of security. He realized that the security procedures had to become a part of the final agreement. He thought of the possibility of demilitarization in the area and of expanding the role of emergency forces and the like.

Carter incorporated the Palestinian problem, and its treatment in a new manner. "In the beginning and from the early stages of his presidency, Carter had spoken of the necessity of recognizing the rights of Palestinians including their right to establish a homeland".⁴

/Middle East

3 William Quandt, "On the Shaping of United States/Policy", Middle East Review, Spring 1980, p.31.

4 Ibid, p.32.

In mid February 1977, Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance travelled to six Middle Eastern countries (Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jerusalem, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) to lay the ground work for a new attempt at a settlement and the White House emphasized the importance of making progress towards peace in the Middle East. A second round of explanatory conversation between Carter and the Middle East leaders (including Rabin, Sadat, Hussein, Assad, Fahd, and Begin) began in March 1977, was slowed by the Israeli elections in May, but continued until the Middle of July. In August 1977, Secretary of State set off on a second Middle East trip (on which he visited Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jerusalem, Saudi Arabia and Israel) to try to narrow the differences between the parties and move closer to the necessary framework for convening a Geneva Conference.

In the spring of 1978 the Carter Administration announced its intention to sell military aircraft to Egypt and to Saudi Arabia as well as to Israel. The Administration's intention became the policy of the United States as the Congress was unable to approve resolutions to prevent the sales. By the summer of 1978 it was possible for the United States to get the process moving once again. In August 1978, Vance visited the region and extended invitations to Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt to meet President Carter in September in United States.

Both accepted. Carter's decision to convene the summit at Camp David marked the onset of direct and substantial presidential involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Both President Carter and Secretary of State Vance made statements to encourage the PLO to accept Resolution 242. In an interview with "Time" in early August, Carter declared that his administration "would immediately commence plans" to talk with the PLO if it accepted other Israel's right to exist on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for negotiations. President Carter declared, "If the Palestinians should say, "we recognize Resolution 242 in its entirety but we think the Palestinians have additional status other than just refugees", that would suit us okay".⁵

Meanwhile, Vance said that "PLO acceptance of Resolution 242 would mean that they were recognizing "the right of Israel to exist in a state of peace within secure and recognized boundaries", and that they would thereby be revoking their covenant which called for an end to the existence of Israel".⁶

Thus Carter and Vance made it clear that they would deal directly with the PLO if it accepted Resolution 242.

5 Time, 8 August 1977, p.25.

6 Department of State Bulletin, 12 September 1977, p.340.

The US sponsored Middle East Summit at Camp David concluded on September 17 with Israeli premier Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat agreeing to a framework for a peace treaty between their two countries for the settlement of the broader Arab-Israeli issue of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Under the Egyptian-Israeli Accord, both nations were to conclude a peace treaty within 3 months. Israel would withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula and turn it back to Egypt. The area would be demilitarized. The Israeli pullout would occur in phases, with the first one taking place within 3 to 9 months after the signing of the peace treaty. Normal diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt would then be established. The final Israeli withdrawal would be carried out within 2 to 3 years after the peace pact was signed. (7)

The Camp David Summit lasted for 13 days, from 5 September to 17 September 1978. In the opinion of William Quandt, "after 10 days of intense discussion and negotiations at Camp David, almost everyone believed the talks had reached an impasse".⁸ Faced with the real prospect of failure, Carter was obliged to reconsider his initial strategy. The political costs of leaving the Summit empty handed must have been apparent not only to Carter and Sadat but also to Begin.

7 Facts on File, vol.38, no.1976, September 22, 1978, p.709.

8 William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peace Making and Policies, (Washington D.C.; Brookings Institution, 1986), p.234.

If agreement was now to be reached, some one was going to have to make major concessions. On September 5 the gap between Egypt and Israel was still large. Sadat continued to demand that Israel withdraw from the settlements and airfields in Sinai, and Begin still refused. "Sadat also resisted on some language that would commit Israel to eventual withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and to some form of Palestinian self determination. Here Begin showed no give.

Finally the two agreements were signed on September 17, 1978, by Sadat and Begin, and witnessed by Carter. The first stated general principles and set forth an outline for dealing with the West Bank and Gaza. The second, loosely tied to the principles stated in the first, was a detailed formula for reaching an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. (See Appendix A).

Details of the Agreement:

The Issues -

The Camp David Accords demanded enormous skill on the part of all those involved in the negotiations. The talks would have achieved nothing had the participants not demonstrated the will and ability to move away from extreme opening positions and sought compromise on the issues that sharply divided them.

Sadat began the conference on September 6, 1978 by presenting the text of a proposal entitled "Framework for the Comprehensive Peace Settlement of the Middle East Problem". It contained an eight-clause preamble and two major articles. Moshe Dayan, stated the major provisions of the plan. These were:

- Withdrawal of Israel to international boundaries and armistice line -- the pre-1967 borders -- in the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Jerusalem with only minor modifications;
- removal of Israeli settlements from the occupied territories;
- supervision of the administration of the West Bank by Jordan and of the Gaza Strip by Egypt "with the collaboration of the elected representatives of the Palestinian people..." at the end of a period not to exceed five years;
- establishment of a national entity for the Palestinian people -- linked to Jordan if the inhabitants so choose -- after they have exercised their right of self-determination six months prior to the end of the interim period;
- Recognition of the right of the Palestinian refugees to return or to receive compensation in accordance with UN resolutions;
- formation of a committee composed of equal numbers of Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem to administer the city;
- implementation of these points within a framework of peace recognising the principles of "non-acquisition of territory by war";
- finally, payment by Israel of full compensation for all damages caused by the operations of its armed forces and the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territories.

Carter's role in helping to broker the agreements was central. If, left to themselves, Sadat and Begin would probably not have overcome that suspicions and would be broken off the talks over any number of issues. Carter's positions on substance influenced the outcome. According to a writer, "He wanted an Egyptian-Israeli agreement on Sinai, and he was prepared to press Begin hard on withdrawal and on settlements to get it. He was less concerned with the details of West Bank-Gaza agreement and did not think that any explicit linkage with the Palestinian question was desirable or necessary".⁹

Quandt Observes, "In the end it was Carter who made the final judgements on what to accept and what not to accept, and it was Carter who used his influence with Sadat to get him to stay and to sign an agreement that both man knew was imperfect".¹⁰

Carter was thus very much the architect of the Camp David Accords. He had played the role of craftsman, strategist, therapist, friend, adversary, and mediator. He deserved much of the credit for the success, and he bore the blame for some of the shortcomings. He had acted both as a statesman, in pressing for the historic agreement, and as a Palestinian, in settling for the attainable and thinking at times of short-term gains rather than long-term consequences. (11)

According to Quandt "The thirteenth days at Camp David showed Carter at his best. He was sincere in his desire for peace in the Middle East".¹²

⁹ William Quandt, n.8, p.257.

¹⁰ Ibid, p.257.

¹¹ Ibid, p.258

¹² Ibid.

Egyptian Gains and Losses:

Egypt's most tangible gain from Camp David was an Israeli commitment to full withdrawal from Sinai, including from the oil fields settlement and airbases. To get this commitment, Sadat had offered a period of three years to complete the withdrawal, concrete security arrangements that would be monitored by the United States and the United Nations, and a promise to "normalize relations" with Israel once the first phase of withdrawal had been reached". According to Quandt, "In Egyptian terms, the agreement was a good one, meeting virtually all Sadat's demands".¹³

The document containing general principles referred to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the right of the Palestinians to choose their own form of government, but all the details dealt with the procedures and arrangements for the transitional period, not for the final status of the occupied territories. Quandt said, "Israel had made no commitment to eventual withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza; nothing was said about Jerusalem; and settlements in the West Bank and Gaza were nowhere mentioned, though the Americans were telling everyone that Begin had in fact agreed to a freeze for the duration of the negotiations on autonomy".¹⁴

13 Ibid, pp.254-55.

14 Ibid, p.255.

Sadat and his chief aides...were thus keenly disappointed by the results of Camp David. Their pride was hurt, even though Egypt's vital national interests had been well defended.

Israel's Gains and Losses:

Begin was no doubt the most able negotiator at Camp David. Begin had to concede the earlier Sinai to Sadat, thus giving up something tangible and very valuable. But in return, Begin had won not only peace with Egypt, which by its nature might not prove durable, but also a comparatively free hand for Israel in dealing with the West Bank and Gaza.

Begin protected himself against considerable U.S. and Egyptian pressure on the key issues of the future of the West Bank and Gaza, and on any form of linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the Palestinian question. According to a writer:

While promising full autonomy to the West Bank and Gaza, Begin refused to spell out what that might mean in practice. He did not agree to abolish the military government, only to withdraw it. (It later emerged from discussions that he meant that the military government would be physically moved from the West Bank during the interim period, but it would continue to exist and would have ultimate control over the "self governing authority" that the Palestinians were to elect). (15)

Central to Begin's sense of success was the fact that he had not been forced to accept language on the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war", the applicability of the principles of 242 UN Resolution "to all fronts of the conflict" and the need for eventual Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Nor had any dilution of Israel's claim to sovereignty over all of Jerusalem been insinuated into the agreement". Finally, Begin had gone no further than to promise a three month freeze on settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

Within 9 months of signing a peace treaty with Egypt, and even with Israeli troops still in Sinai, diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel were established and the ambassadors were exchanged.

The Implications:

The Camp David Accords, initiated and released at White House ceremonies during the evening of September 17, 1978 were remarkable documents. The first accord, entitled,

The framework for Peace in the Middle East", contained a preamble and three major sections setting guidelines for a settlement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip involving Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian people. The second accord, called "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between

.....

Israel and Egypt", described detailed procedures for a step-by-step transfer of the Sinai Peninsula from Israel to Egypt within specified time periods.(16)

The preamble to "The Framework for Peace in the Middle East" confirmed that the basis for any future dealings between Israel and its neighbours would remain UN Resolutions 242 and 338, as the Israeli delegation insisted it should. It called on the parties to seek peace founded on "respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area (including Israel) and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. It stated that "Israeli insecurity should be relived by adopting special measures such as "demilitarised zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements".¹⁷ And it noted that the framework could serve as basis for peace between Egypt and Israel and each of the latter's neighbours prepared to negotiate an end to hostilities. The preamble did not condemn the acquisition of territory through war.

16 M. A. Friedlander, Sadat and Begin: The domestic politics of peace making (Westview Press, Colorado, 1983), p.228.

17 Ibid, p.229.

The "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" addressed the issues surrounding the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and representatives of the Palestinian people would participate in three-stage negotiations to determine the area's future. ✓ First, Cairo and Jerusalem would negotiate and then supervise transitional arrangements for a maximum of five years. The current Israeli military and civilian administration would withdraw when the inhabitants of the areas had elected a self-governing authority in free elections. Jordan would assist in the details of the change but Egypt and Israel would possess the right to review any adjustments.

Second, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan would determine the powers and responsibilities of an elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel would redeploy its withdrawn IDF forces into specified locations. Local constabulary forces consisting of Israeli and Jordanian forces would patrol and thereby ensure proper border control.

Third, after the establishment of the self-governing authority a transition period of five years would begin. No later than the third year negotiations to determine the final status of the territories would begin. The discussions would include Egypt, Israel, Jordan and elected representatives of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The talks

would be based on the provisions of UN Resolution 242 and involve discussion of boundaries and future security arrangements. "And the solution would recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements".¹⁸ In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future.

Finally, Egyptian, Israeli, Jordanian, and representatives of the self-governing authority would form a committee to monitor and restrict the resettlement of refugees into the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

A smaller section of the Framework established principles for resolving peacefully disputes arising from the settlement and fixed a goal of three months to negotiate a final peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.

The concluding portion of the first accord asserted the parties' intention to enter into full recognition, abolish economic boycotts, and guarantee that each country's citizens enjoyed equal protection of the law in the other's jurisdiction. The United States was invited to participate in treaty talks, and the United Nations would be asked to endorse the resulting treaty and ensure full compliance.(19)

18 Ibid, p.229.

19 Ibid, p.230.

The terms of the Egyptian-Israeli bilateral agreement on the Sinai would be implemented within a two-to three year period. Israel would withdraw its armed forces, including those based at the airfields, to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine. Jerusalem would possess the right of free passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Specified limitations on the stationing of Egyptian, Israeli, and UN forces in the Sinai during and after the implementation of the agreement concluded the substantive portion of the document.

Following the signature of a peace treaty and upon completion of the interim withdrawal, the two countries would -

establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations, terminate commercial boycotts, and apply legal due process to each other's citizens. The interim withdrawal itself would occur between three and nine months after the signature of the peace treaty. All Israeli forces would retreat east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Mohammad, to an exact location to be determined by mutual consent. (20)

US-Israel discord over settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip marred the generally festive mood that enveloped the White House signing ceremony. A sharp exchange among Carter, Begin, and aides preceded the signing. An Israeli agreement to refrain from building new settlements

anywhere in the administered territories during the period of negotiations relived the dispute temporarily. The issue would soon cause a rift between the United States and Israel, which interpreted the pre-signing agreement differently. "Begin claimed the prohibition covered only the three months of negotiations over the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Carter asserted the freeze applied to the entire five-year transition period."²¹

Camp David was a milestone toward achieving peace in the Middle East. The parties reached agreement because Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin chose to place pragmatism ahead of principle and statesmanship over self-interest.

Situation Between September 1978 and March 1979:

Talks between Egypt and Israel to complete negotiations begun at Camp David opened at Blair House in Washington on October 12, 1978. Defence Minister Kamal Hasan led the Egyptian delegation. Moshe Dayan, Weizman, and others represented Israel. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance led the American delegation. Tension continued at the talks. President Carter told Dayan that "Sadat wanted to link resolution of the Palestinian question with the implementation of the bilateral treaty between Egypt and Israel, which the

21 Ibid, p.231.

two sides would negotiate at Blair House".²² Dayan rejected any linkage between Palestinian issues and the talks at Blair House, reminding Carter that the meetings in Washington were intended to conclude a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel as specified in the Camp David accords, not a solution to the Palestinian problem. The Israeli foreign minister admitted that "Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would regard continued meddling by the United States, Egypt and Israel in their affairs as patronizing and might stiffen their rejection of the Camp David accords as a result."²³ But he continued to "regret over Sadat's difficulties and repeated his refusal to consider any linkage between the Palestinian problem and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Vance established a format for the negotiations at the initial session of the Blair House talks on October 12. The US delegation presented a draft peace treaty to Egypt and Israel individually. "Both approved the general outlines of the draft although each sought modifications".²⁴

22 Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (London; Weidenfeld & Nicolson Limited, 1981), pp.191-2.

23 Ibid, p.206.

24 Ibid, p.207.

Linkage of the Palestinian issue to the peace treaty remained the most divisive issue, and Carter attempted to break the impasse by suggesting compromise positions. For example, although the president regarded linkage as essential he considered a political rather than legal link as perfectly acceptable. He recognized the validity of Dayan's view that it would be ridiculous for ... "the maintenance of the Israel-Egypt treaty to be dependent upon the Palestinians or Jordan".²⁵

Carter proposed the following trade offs:

Israel would agree to a provision in the preamble establishing linkage between the two issues and would commit itself to end military government in the territories in an exchange of letters between Begin and Sadat. Egypt would agree to exchange ambassadors immediately upon completion of the first phase of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the United States would itself put together a multilateral force with Canadian or Australian troops should the UN Security Council fail to agree on the composition of a peace keeping force for the Sinai.(26)

As quoted in the New York Times, March 14, 1979, "Sadat approved the peace terms at Cairo's International Airport on the afternoon of March 13, 1978".²⁷

25 Ibid, p.216.

26 Ibid, pp.216-17.

27 New York Times, March 14, 1979.

Delegations headed by Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and the Secretary of State of United States, Vance, met at Camp David, on February 21-25, 1979. Following is a statement President Carter made on February 25.

In the light of the developments in the talks at Camp David this past week, we are discussing with the two governments the possibility of moving these negotiations to the head of government level...., I am prepared to spare no effort in achieving the peace settlement foreseen in the Camp David accords reached last year (September 17, 1978). The other two partners in these negotiations share this determination.(28)

As quoted in the New York Times,

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed on March 26, 1979, on the White House lawn by Anwar Sadat and Menachein Begin, with Jimmy Carter as witness.(29) (see appendix B)

The treaty contained a preamble, nine main articles, three annexes, an agreed record of the negotiations, several letters of understandings--some from President Carter to Sadat and Begin and others from each of the Principles to the American President.(30)

28 Department of State Bulletin, April 1979, p.39.

29 New York Times, March 27, 1979.

30 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Department of State Bulletin, April 1979, pp.1-23.

Implications of the Treaty:

The preamble stressed the continuity of the peace treaty with the framework agreement signed at Camp David and with UN Resolutions 242 and 338. It also stated that the treaty would constitute an important step in the search for comprehensive peace....settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects. According to a writer, Friedlander, "it invited other Arab parties to the dispute to join in the peace process".³¹

The nine articles in the main portion of the document dealt with the general principles governing the termination of war and establishing peace; withdrawal by Israel from the Sinai to an international boundary; normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel under the provision of the UN Charter; security arrangements, including limited force zones, paralleled by UN observers, transit rights in international waterways such as the Suez Canal, Strait of Tiran, and Gulf of Aqaba; priority of obligations; and procedures to settle disputes arising from the treaty peacefully.

The annexes contained the details of the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai, established the timing for the exchange of ambassadors, and defined the

31 Melvin, A, Friedlander, n.16, p.287.

nature of relations in the fields of economics, trade, culture, travel, transportation, and telecommunications. The agreed record covered issues that had remained in dispute for many months of hard bargaining, such as treaty review procedufes, priority of obligations provisions, the composition of observer forces, and the Israeli right to purchase Egyptian oil from the Sinai fields. The letters dealt with sensitive bilateral issues, including the implementation of autonomy and US responsibilities in the event of treaty violations.

The peace treaty was a reasoned effort to balance return of the Sinai with a complex web of measures that would adequately protect Israeli security. But both parties were determined that the pact would be more simply an agreement on territorial rights. They considered it a solemn undertaking, the first step toward healing the wounds of over thirty years of war and hatred.(32)

Cairo requested and received an agreement that,

initiated a process that in time could lead to settlement of the Palestinian problem, the key to a comprehensive peace and to the restoration of an Egyptian role in the Arab world. Israel had dreamt for thirty years of gaining acceptance among Middle Eastern nations. The Treaty achieved recognitions and relationship with at least Egypt - the most populous and powerful Arab states. Finally, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty placed America squarely at the Centre of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.(33)

32 Ibid, p.288.

33 Ibid,

The American Guarantee:

Within hours of the White House ceremony marking signature of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Vance and Dayan initiated for that respective governments a memorandum of agreement listing the diplomatic, economic, and military measures the two would take to remedy any violation of the treaty. Specifically Washington committed itself to:

...consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the violation.(34)

The United States also pledged its continuing military and economic assistance to Israel and promised to use its veto in the UN against measures deemed contrary to spirit and letter of the peace treaty. Finally, "America promised not to transfer weapons that might be used in an attack against Israel to any country in the area".³⁵

President Carter declared, "whether it produces a lasting peace or results in renewed turmoil, the Israeli-Egyptian treaty signed at the White House on March 26, 1979, drew the United States further than ever before into the politics and conflicts of the Middle East."³⁶

34 Moshe Dayan, n.22, pp.356-7.

35 Ibid, p.279.

36 President Carter, 1979 (Washington D.C.; Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980), p.34.

As stated by the President, "the narrow purpose of the treaty was to end the 30-year state of war between Israel and its largest Arab neighbor. But the broader implication of an American negotiated separate peace was that the United States would become the protector and benefactor of both nations".³⁷

In addition to pushing the treaty negotiations to a successful conclusion, President Carter agreed to expand American security, economic and political commitments to Egypt and Israel. All sides admitted the treaty was only beginning, rather than an end, to Middle East peace efforts.

"Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin pledged that their nations will fully honour the provisions of the treaty they signed and Carter witnessed on the White House lawn".³⁸ The treaty was also the culmination of talks and peace initiatives under way ever since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and especially since the 1975 Sinai agreement worked out by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Among the obstacles left unresolved by the treaty were the future of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

37 Ibid, p.34.

38 Ibid.

The President said, "Negotiations on the Palestinian problem were to begin in one month, and under the treaty Egypt and Israel were to agree within a year on a plan for Palestinian self rule".³⁹

Interpretations:

The two agreements reached at Camp David marked an important watershed in the peace negotiations, but a long road remained to be travelled before peace would actually be achieved. Egypt and Israel would finally reach their goal of a formal peace treaty, but the broader objective of finding a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian question remained elusive. As one writer put it: "Camp David represented a possibility of peace, but did not guarantee its achievement".⁴⁰

Carter's clear priority after Camp David was to conclude the treaty negotiations as quickly as possible, literally within few days. In the opinion of William Quandt, "For Begin, there could be no formal link between the Egyptian-Israel peace treaty and the negotiations to establish a Palestinian self-governing authority. He had fought hard at Camp David to resist linkage and had essentially succeeded but the battle was likely to go on".⁴¹

39 Ibid.

40 William B. Quandt, n.8, p.239.

41 Ibid, p.251.

Begin returned to Israel to find some strong criticism for his having agreed to abandon the settlements in Sinai. He had of course done so to secure an agreement with Egypt, and in the process had protected Israel's claim to the West Bank and Gaza, which was of primary importance to him. But there was still opposition, including attacks on the Camp David Accords from those who saw in "full autonomy" for the Palestinians, the embryo of a future Palestinian state.

Sadat was not criticised for recovering Egyptian territory, but he was accused of having sold out the Palestinians. Anyone with the patience to read through the Camp David Accords might have found few passages that looked promising for the Palestinians, but the magic words "withdrawal from occupied territory" and "self determination" were not there, and nothing in the agreement precluded indefinite Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza.

Sadat had the most difficult political task of the three leaders in trying to build broad support for the Camp David Accords. His foreign Minister, Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil resigned. Elsewhere in the Arab world Sadat was abused for making a separate peace with Israel.

The PLO was making queries to Washington about the meaning of the agreements. "Arafat was also skeptical, but he showed a serious interest in finding out if there

might be more to Camp David than met the eye".⁴² The Americans hoped they might succeed in giving a more open-ended interpretation to the framework dealing with the Palestinians and thus prevent a strongly negative Arab reaction.

The United States went on record as favouring the inclusion of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem in the election for the self governing authority.

On September 29, 1978, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance spoke before the U.N. General Assembly:

As the President said our historic position on settlements in occupied territory has remained constant. As he further said no peace agreement will be either just or secure if it does not resolve the problem of the Palestinians in the broadest sense. We believe that the Palestinian people must be assured that they and their descendents can live with dignity and freedom and have the opportunity for economic fulfilment and for political expression. The Camp David accords state that the negotiated solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.(43)

There was also the contention on priority of obligations. Israel wanted the treaty to contain a clear statement that it superseded other Egyptian commitments, such as Egypt's many mutual defense pacts with Arab countries.

42 Ibid, p.265.

43 Department of State Bulletin, vol.78, March 1978, p.49.

Sadat found it intolerable to say in public that commitments to Israel counted for more than commitments to Arab States. For example, if Israel carried out aggression against an Arab state allied to Egypt, Sadat did not feel it would be a violation of the treaty if he went to the aid of that State. In reality, of course, whatever was written on paper would not guarantee what would happen in some future conflict.

Sadat had made it clear that he was willing to accommodate Carter on several points, including "the exchange of ambassadors.

Egypt could not agree to permanent force limits in Sinai. Upto twenty-five years would be acceptable. Second, article 6 of the treaty, the priority of obligations issue, made it seem as if Egypt's commitments to Israel were greater than those to the Arab League. The language of the treaty should not downgrade Egypt's obligations under previous agreements. Third, the treaty must clearly say that Egypt has sovereignty over Sinai. Carter agreed to all this.(44)

Regarding the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it was agreed upon: Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West

Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an Agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza.

Thus, Israel was to withdraw its troops to security positions. After an administrative council had been elected by the people of the occupied territories, a five year period would begin at the end of which the definitive status of the West Bank and Gaza would be decided.

The cost of peace were borne by the United States, which paid Israel \$ 3,000 million for withdrawal from Sinai and the transfer of Israeli air bases to the Negev desert. Furthermore, Israel was to receive \$ 1,800 million annually in financial aid and 75 F-16 fighter jets. Egypt would receive \$ 2,000 million per year from the World Bank, towards which the United States would contribute \$ 1,000 million. The New York Times estimated the value of US arms deliveries to Egypt at \$ 2,000 million.

There were good reasons why the United States was prepared to pay so high a price for its "pax americana". Camp David considerably increased American influence in the region. The USA saw Egypt as the new bastion of American influence thereafter the fall of the Shah. Moreover, the USA now has several military bases in the Middle East.

On 25 February 1979, the US Defense Secretary publicly stated: "Protection of our oil supplies from the Middle East is clearly one of our vital interests. We will take any appropriate measure, including the use of military force, to guarantee these vital interests."⁴⁵

What the PLO and the Arab states had repeatedly warned since 1978 was now a reality. The treaty between Egypt and Israel remained a separate treaty. It remained a separate treaty because Sadat achieved nothing for the Palestinians. Israel and the USA dictated the course of the talks in accordance with their own wishes. The Camp David autonomy plan was extremely vague and susceptible to wide interpretations. It was precise only in what it excluded. The plan did not implement Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 which demanded complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied areas. It conflicted with all the UN resolutions to date on the Palestinian problem and simply denied the existence of the Palestinian people, its right to self determination in accordance with the United Nations Charter and its right to return to its home country. It rejected the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and expressly excluded it from negotiations. It

45 Abdallah Franqi, The PLO and the Palestine (London: Zed Books Limited, 1982), p.166.

denied the rights of more than two million Palestinians forced to live in exile in refugee camps.

Israel and Egypt had been negotiating on this autonomy plan since 1978 and after all these years there was still not the faintest glimmer of an agreement in sight. "There have been more than enough negotiations in this period and time and again, the Palestinians have been discussed. But these were negotiations about the Palestinians. The Palestinians themselves were excluded from negotiations".⁴⁶

The Israeli self government plan - officially approved by the Israeli Council - confirmed Palestinian fears that self-government would be not more than a legalized form of Israeli occupation.

Israel's major and publicly stated goal was to use this autonomy plan as a means of preventing the establishing of a Palestinian state and extending its domination and control of the occupied territories.

Less than 4 months after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem 30,000 Israeli troops attacked the PLO in Lebanon. South Lebanon was occupied and evacuated only after United Nations intervention. The Camp David 'peace' had a truly terrifying face for the Palestinian.

46 Ibid, p.168.

Under the Camp David Peace Umbrella, Begin annexed Jerusalem in July 1980, ordered the bombing of a nuclear reactor in Baghdad and, in July 1981, ordered the bombing of the Fakhani district of Beirut. The 14 days war in July 1981 resulted in 2000 deaths among the Palestinian and Lebanese civilian population. In 1981 the Knesset annexed the Golan Heights. It was even threatening to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. According to a writer -

even the most prejudiced observers must find it difficult to see this as a policy of peace or even as a single step towards peace. The Camp David Agreement has simply provided Israel with convenient cover to continue its intransigent policy, launch new military operations in Lebanon, consolidate its annexations and continue its expansionism.(47)

Only two days after the evacuation of Sinai, Menachen Begin again stressed that Israel would never abandon its claims to sovereignty over the occupied areas and that Israel's right and claim to 'Eretz Israel' was valid in perpetuity.

On 25 April 1982, the anniversary of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon said, "Israel had reached the red limit of concessions. From then on there would be no more withdrawal from Israeli settlements".

The existing Israeli settlements on the West Bank were not mentioned in the Camp David agreements. These settlements, in the unanimous view of the UN Security Council and according to repeated statements by President Carter himself and members of his administration are illegal under the terms of international law.(48)

There was the legal objection to the outcome of the Camp David meeting. The practical objection was that the plan outlined at the meeting had no hope of achieving its objective - assuming that the objective was a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

What emerged at the end of the summit meeting was the embryo of a separate peace between Egypt and Israel and, on the larger question of devising a comprehensive settlement, only another formula characterised by the same ambiguity that has bedevilled less spectacular attempts in the past.

48 Editorial, "Middle East International", no.88, October 1978, p.3.

CHAPTER IV

CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT AND WEST ASIAThe Arab Reaction:

Whatever came out of Camp David Agreement needed to have an acceptance from moderates on both the sides. The basic weakness of the Camp David Agreement ^{was} the nature of its reception in Israel and in the Arab world. What was remarkable in Israel was not so much the fact that the moderates welcomed the Agreement but the extremists were equally delighted. As quoted in the Middle East International in October 1978, "In the Arab world, while their dismissal by the rejectionists was inevitable, the Agreements failed to win the approval of even the outstanding moderate and pro-American governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Over that it is right to call the failure at Camp David".¹

The Camp David Accords (1978) and the ensuing Egyptian-Israeli treaty (1979) were met by almost universal Arab rejection. The Arab summit was convened in Baghdad to condemn Egypt. The Arab states decided to break off diplomatic relations with Cairo, suspend Egypt's membership in the League of Arab States, transfer the headquarters of the League from Cairo to Tunis, and boycott any Egyptian company that would do business with Israel.

1 "Editorial", Middle East International, no.88, October 1978, p.3.

A number of Arab countries had special relations with Egypt. Chief among them was Saudi Arabia. Egypt needed Saudi Arabian financial help, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia needed Sadat to sustain stability in the Arab East. As observed by the scholar, "Relations between the two countries were not affected by the visit to Israel"². Later Saudi Arabia went along with other Arab countries breaking off diplomatic relations with Egypt and refusing to pay for the 50 US made F-5E fighter jets ordered earlier by Egypt.

Camp David was strategic settlement arranged by one great power, as opposed to the concert of powers, to avoid the dangers of war in a sensitive part of the world. Sadat had in effect made a separate peace with Israel, thereby presenting himself to Egyptians as a more effective leader than his predecessor. As put by a writer -

Nasser lost a war and a province, Sadat (almost) won a war and has regained the province, he himself is the sole guarantor that the fruits of victory will be kept, since the Israelis had made it clear that if any replacement for Sadat tried to reverse his policy they would reoccupy - and presumably recolonise - Sinai.(3)

2 Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Mark Bruzonsky, ed., Security in the Middle East (London; West View Press, 1987), p.81.

3 Middle East International, no.89, November 1978, p.5.

In the opinion of an eminent scholar, the Palestinian view can be summarised as follows:

Today there are two kinds of opposition to the Camp David agreements. The first is benign and comprises those moderates and compromisers who feel that by going it alone and giving up so much for so little Sadat has drastically weakened their position and spoiled the chances of reaching a minimum viable peace. The second kind of opposition is much more serious and far reaching and comprises people who believe, ...that Zionism is an aggressive colonial racist movement singularly averse to compromise by the nature of its exclusivity, whose very existence entails the absolute negation of Palestinian rights and whose raison d'etat from the point of view of the Western imperialists powers that supported it all along is the disruption of Arab progress towards freedom and unity. For us, Zionism (and therefore Israel) is a cancer in the Arab body and there can be no co-existence between the two.(4)

Baghdad was an impressive display of the depth and breadth of Arab perplexity about the consequences of Camp David. But it was not clear that it achieved anything positive. As put by a writer, "Certainly neither its earnestly proffered blandishments nor its discreetly muffled theatre were likely to deflect President Sadat from his chosen course".⁵

4 A. Said, "A Palestinian View", Middle East International, no.89, November 1978.

5 Edward Mortimer, "Sadat's Arab Critics: an Agreed Minimums", Middle East International, no.90, December 1978, p.4.

After the signing of the peace treaty in March 1979, the Arabs renewed their opposition with greater vigour. The International Herald Tribune editorial on 8 March, 1979 pointed that "Egypt is not all that strong now and that the Middle East has changed since Camp David". It stated that -

The Begin government fears that concession to Egypt may imperil its security in the face of this increased Islamic vigor. Egypt fears the loss of allies, the pressure of its wealthier Arab friends from without and of anti government Moslem forces from within. And both remember that the many differences among the Arab states could usually be put aside when an Arab-Israel crisis occurred.(6)

The repercussions of success or failure could be enormous, as the London Economist pointed out on 10 March, 1979:

Even if the treaty is signed, the next problem will be to keep it signed. A great many Arabs will undoubtedly say that the treaty does not give the Palestinians what they would like, but that it half removes Egypt from the struggle on behalf of the Palestinians; and they not be manifestly wrong. These Arabs will therefore turn to the only Arab government which might be able to pose Egypt out of its new relationship with Israel - the Saudi government and ask it to start prising.(7)

London Daily Express of 14 March, 1979 observed:

President Sadat has gone as far as any Egyptian leader could have gone to make peace with Israel. He has risked isolation in the Arab world. The

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6 International Herald Tribune, 8 March 1979.

7 London Economist, March 10, 1979.

new Islamic militancy is growing stronger and is uncompromisingly hostile to Israel. If Sadat's peace policy fails, his prestige will be shattered. He may even be overthrown. Then Israel, having failed to make peace with Sadat, would face the prospect of war with somebody else.(8)

The London Guardian of 14 March 1978 printed an article by Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan. Observing that seldom had peace efforts -

been viewed with so much apprehension by so many. The broad framework, resulting from Camp David full of ambiguity as it is, did not address the main issues which, inevitably, should serve as the cornerstones of any peace effort. The fact that three out of the four front line states facing Israel did not at any stage participate in the peace effort, is in itself an eloquent comment on the inadequacy and fragility of the Camp David arrangements.(9)

"Ma'ariv" reflected the widespread concern in Israel over the possible consequences of the Carter peace formula in its editorial of 14 March 1978:

We do not yet know the amended text of the agreement, the way in which what only yesterday seemed irresolvable differences have today been solved, the scale of the new concessions Israel agreed to make. Looking at it realistically we are about to buy something without examining it first. Moreover, the price of this Merchandise has kept going and may not yet have been finalised. It may be good or bad one, but it would not be fair to condemn it before its nature and price have become clear.(10)

8 Middle East International, no.95, March 16, 1979, p.12.

9 Ibid.

10 'Editorial', Middle East International, March 14, 1979.

Arab Perspective:

The Arab media tended to see conspiracy everywhere.

On March 7, 1979, Egyptian Radio declared:

The peace which is being sought today will permit the realisation of all the interests of the Arab nation. This peace will lead to the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories and allow the Palestinians to prove their existence. It is the peace for which we have been fighting for thirty years, and no surrender... We invite our Arab brethren to stop trying to outbid us and to raise themselves to a level of responsibility.

In Damascus, the official daily "Tishrin" of 7 March, 1979 warned the Arab people of the dangers attendant upon Carter's visit: "President Carter is now undertaking a foolhardy exercise in Middle East". And another paper, "Al Baath" stated:

The American conspiracies that Carter has come to express will not succeed in setting up an alliance like the one formed at Baghdad. The failure will be harmful indeed to American interests.(12)

In Amman on March 7, the Jordanian newspaper Al Dastour called on Sadat to hold a national referendum on the proposed peace treaty with Israel:

President Sadat can avert the impasse he is up against by going back to the Egyptian people and consulting them on the treaty. The entire Arab nation would support Sadat and indeed bless him, if he decided to return to the Arab fold.(13)

11 Middle East International, no.95, 16 March 1979, p.14.

12 Ibid,

13 Ibid.

Saudi Arabia's English language press gave Carter his marks for perseverance, although low marks for timing. The Arab News of 7 March said that despite Carter's "undoubted goodwill and determination", he simply ignored "most of the basic ingredients for a permanent and meaningful settlement". The Saudi Gazette had this to say: even if Carter brought about an Egyptian-Israeli settlement,

...the region will remain tense as long as Israel occupied Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The only recourse Carter fails again would be to reactivate steps for having the whole case reviewed by the Geneva Conference seems the only reasonable and legal way to solve the problem.(14)

The Arabic press was predictably full of angry reaction against the Egyptian Israeli treaty. There were fresh calls for economic and other operations against American and other Western interest. The Saudi Al Jazira showed some sympathy for Egypt's position as unofficial "leader" of the Arab League at a time when the League was roundly condemning President Sadat and threatening to carry out the decisions made at Baghdad. On 25 March, 1978 the paper commented:

While diplomatic circles in Cairo have been deliberating over the withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab League, the Egyptian government has decided to freeze its membership of the League and suspend its participation in all its affiliated bodies.

The Cairo weekly magazine "October", which is a mouth piece for the President, said, this weekened that the move was in preparation for total withdrawal from the League. Observers in Cairo expect that now a number of Egyptian diplomats working in the League's offices will tender their resignation.

Meanwhile, sources in Beirut report that the PLO has decided to close its office in Cairo.(15)

The French-language Beirut daily newspaper L'Orient-Le Sour reflected PLO attitudes towards the signing of the peace agreement. On 25 March the paper reported:

On Saturday the PLO rejected Jimmy Carter's announcement that the United States was ready to negotiate with the PLO, provided the PLO would recognise Security Council Resolution 242. In a declaration put out by the Palestinian Information Agency, Wafa, PLO political bureau Chief Farouq Kaddoumi recalled that his organisation had often repeated its rejection of that same resolution. "We have also demanded on various occasions", he said, "that the Security Council adopt a new resolution proclaiming the national rights of the Palestinian people, because Resolution 242 defined the Palestinian question as a refugee problem.(16)

The UN made a move in this direction in January 1977, but the US used its right of Veto. This shows clearly that the United States is continuing along the wrong path where the Middle East is concerned, and that it has misunderstood the national rights of the Palestinian people. The PLO has not given any Arab party the right to speak in its name. All Palestinians, inside and outside Palestine, recognise the PLO as their sole representative. What is happening now is an attempt on behalf of the American imperialists to consecrate the occupation of Arab territory by acceptance of the autonomy proposals. However, this will not lead to peace but instead to tensions and incidents all over the region. President Sadat is a prisoners of American imperialism which is

trying to embroil other Arab states as well as the PLO, in making concessions.(17)

On 22 March, the Damascus daily "Tishrin" asserted:

The Arab answer to American challenges will be firm and strong, and will be directed against United States interests in the area.(18)

The Iraqi government newspaper Al Thawra, on 22 March, published in Baghdad, invited the Arabs to prepare to plunge themselves into what it called "a long-drawn-out war".

The United States must stand accused of giving the enemy the go-ahead to initiate a new aggression to prevent the establishment of unity between Iraq and Syria. There must be an immediate implementation of the Baghdad summit resolutions, to make President Sadat realise that what has been decided will be carried out, and is not just an empty threat. We also urge the rapid conclusion of the unification of Iran and Syria, as a tangible realisation of the final, decisive reply to the policies of betrayal and negligence.(19)

On 22 March the English-language Amman newspaper the Jordan Times published an interview with Crown Prince Hassan, following the abortive visit to the Jordanian capital by President Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. In reply to questions the Prince said:

The Camp David approach to solving the Palestinian question appears to Jordan to contain the seeds of regional instability and possible upheaval...(20)

17 Ibid.
 18 Ibid.
 19 Ibid., p.12.
 20 Ibid., p.12.

On 20 March, the Saudi daily Al Riyadh announced:

Without total self-assurance, or indeed without the assurance given by the US and Egypt, Israel would never have defied Arabs and Muslims in this way by the annexation of the whole of Jerusalem, and by moves designed to make it permanently into an Israeli capital city. (21)

Western Media:

Following the signing of the Egypt-Israel treaty in Washington, the London Guardian on 27 March, 1979 was full of praise for the leaders who had been brave enough, as the paper put it, to secure "peace in the teeth of the evidence".

Is President Sadat vainly trying to resist the tide of events in the Middle East, or will he, at last, give event a new and more constructive direction than they have had for more than a generation,..... Will the rest of the Arab world do business on these terms? The immediate answer is obviously no: but Sadat believes it will change over the years. States which cannot see the benefit of peace.... The fact of Israel's permanent presence will be accepted.

That may be. In the meantime, though, the Middle East is in for a very rough time. The PLO will not accept anything less than a state and Israel will not grant anything approaching it. (22)

Ihsan Hijazi, an eminent scholar, writing from Beirut in the Financial Times on 27 March, pointed out that the signing of the treaty has presented a "major challenge"

21 Ibid, p.12.

22 Ibid, p.12.

to the Palestinian resistance movement, which was now going through its "most serious phase since 1948":

The Palestinian political, social, economic and military structure has all the makings of an independent state. What it needs, of course, is what it does not have: the territory on which to stall the state.

This is why the Egyptian-Israeli treaty presents the PLO with a double jeopardy, against which they are bound to react strongly. From a Palestinian point of view President Sadat has dropped even the minimum of linkage between the treaty and the Palestinian question: he gave up his insistence on a target date for the establishment of an autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. (23)

New York Times on 22 March from Riyadh published a statement summing up Saudi reactions to the treaty:

Saudi officials say they will try to hold back the most radical Arab countries after signing, but will go along with some sanctions against Egypt. We do not want to punish the Egyptian people because our relationship with Egypt is a historical one and must continue despite individual policy decisions. (24)

A news item unique in the 30 years of Israel's history appeared in all sections of the Hebrew Press this week. This was how the Labour Party daily Davar presented it on 27 March:

In a special order of the Day issued by the Chief of Staff, to be read this morning to all army units, General Rafael Eytan told the Israel forces that they were now at peace with Egypt. However, he added, they

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23 Ibid, p.12.

24 Ibid, p.13.

needed to strengthen their power on the eastern front, which was threatening Israel with war.(25)

In general, the Israeli reaction to the peace treaty was one of relief rather than enthusiasm, with much emphasis on the dangers that still lay ahead for Israel. Ha'aretz on 23 March warned against taking future good relations with both Egypt and the United States for granted:

The signing of the peace treaty in Washington can not solve everything. Our peace with Egypt and the understanding we have reached with the Americans are tender plants, and we had better not expose them to excessively harsh weather conditions. Begin is deluding himself if he thinks he can gain Arab, or at least Egyptian, acceptance for an autonomy plan which does not provide for any territorial concessions in forthcoming negotiations(26)

It is true that the West Bank-Gaza section came first in the text, but there was no indication that this order was intended to be chronological. A time limit of three months was given for the Egypt-Israel treaty, but no time limit for the opening of negotiations on the transitional arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza. The reasonable deduction was that the treaty would come first

25 Ibid, p.13.

26 Ibid, p.14.

and in a separate "Framework" for an Egypt-Israel peace treaty the West Bank and Gaza were simply not mentioned. The reaction of the "steadfastness" countries was a foregoing conclusion, and a chorus of tut-tuts from the Gulf was to be expected.

Changes in Outlook:

Since the signing of the Camp David Accords in September 1978, much had happened to change the prospects for eventual accommodation between Israel and Palestinian. By 1985, all the architects of the Camp David Accords had passed from the scene. Israel was governed by a coalition led by Shimon Peres, a man who had spoken openly of the possibility of a "territorial compromise" that would return at least some of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordanian-Palestinian authority.

Egypt too had changed leaders, and President Husni Mubarak made it clear that he had no desire to negotiate an autonomy agreement for the West Bank and Gaza with Israel. Instead he favoured bringing Jordan and the Palestinians directly into a dialogue with the United States and eventually with Israel. "Egypt was prepared to assume the part of umpresario, but preferred not to be at center stage when the play began".

Somewhat ironically, those who shunned Camp David in 1970 were still in positions of authority in the mid-1980s. King Hussein, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad were all part of the diplomatic scene and remained as opposed as ever to Camp David. Jordan and Palestinians, however, had moved closer to agreement on the idea of a joint role in any future negotiations, and both favoured an eventual confederation of Jordan and a Palestinian state. But any negotiations would have to be based on the principle of "territory for peace", not autonomy.

William B. Quandt, one of the leading observers of the Camp David Agreement, said : "Syria, with a major political victory to its credit in Lebanon in 1983-84, was determined to block any negotiations over the Palestinian issue that did not have the prior approval of Damascus".²⁷ President Asad had declared Arafat "persona non grata" in Syria after 1984, and the PLO seemed deeply split between the factions allied to Syria and the Fatah leadership of Yasser Arafat and his colleagues. For most indications the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were largely behind Arafat in this debate, but above, all were looking for someone who could help bring the Israel occupation to an end.

27 William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peace Making and Politics (Washington D.C.; Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 328.

American Concern:

American policy too, had evolved since 1978. After the trauma of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, President Reagan made a speech on September 1, 1982, that followed the broad lines of Camp David, but with some notable additions. In his initiative Reagan emphasized the "territory for peace" formula and the need to bring Jordan and the Palestinians into the negotiating process. In subsequent clarifications Reagan implied that the transitional period of autonomy could be short, and that negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza could begin immediately. Furthermore, the president undertook to get Israeli agreement to a freeze on settlements if Jordanians and Palestinians would enter into negotiations. American views on autonomy also became more precise. The US position was that during the interim period of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinians should be given substantial control over land and water, and the Palestinians in East Jerusalem should be allowed to vote for the self-governing authority.

None of these developments during the Reagan administration was inconsistent with Camp David, but each had the virtue in Arab eyes of coming with a new label. Unfortunately the creativity shown by Reagan in repackaging Camp David did not extend to figuring out how to press the

peace process forward. By mid-1983, the Reagan initiative seemed to have succumbed, at least for the moment, to the mounting violence in Lebanon. During much of 1985 another round of talks took place involving the Reagan administration and Arab and Israeli leaders; but with little prospect for a breakthrough.

Reagan Administration: Initial Concerns:

The Middle East was accorded high priority by President Carter virtually from his inauguration, and the focal point for much of his term in office was the Arab-Israel conflict. The President had identified the Camp David summit and the resultant accords as his most significant foreign policy achievements. Subsequently, the focus shifted as the Iranian Revolution led to the ouster of the Shah, the installation of the Khomeini regime, and the taking of American hostages.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan generated substantial concern not only about the future of that country, but also about the potential threat to the Gulf. The Carter Doctrine was an important statement of policy as it indicated the nature and extent of United States concern with that sector of the Middle East. The Carter team sought to ensure the implementation of the Camp David Accords.

The Arab-Israel policy did not occupy much importance during the initial years of Reagan administration. As one writer has put it: "The foreign policy orientation of the administration was dictated by the estimate of intense Soviet threat held by senior officials and their closest allies in Congress".²⁸

The main objective of the administration was the implementation of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. "The catalytic factor, which altered the Reagan Administration's approach to peace making in the Arab-Israeli conflict from its episodic dimension to a more comprehensive framework, was the war in Lebanon".²⁹

Continued Israeli complaints of the violation of the cease-fire and the continued presence of the Syrian missiles in Lebanon raised concerns about Israeli military action in response:

Escalation of shelling by the PLO across the border between and Lebanon and the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London were the causes of the Israeli decision to launch, in early June 1982, the war in Lebanon, referred to by Israel as "Operation Peace for Galilee." (30)

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- 28 Paul Marantz and Janice Gross Stein, ed., "Peace-Making in the Middle East", (London:Croom Helm, 1985) p. 134.
- 29 Ibid, p.138.
- 30 Ibid.

The Official position was that the United States did not collide with Israel and did not welcome the invasion but it did not condemn it either. Yet the Reagan Administration clearly identified the dangers. It led President Reagan to develop his "fresh start" initiative and to launch a major effort to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict.

On September 1, 1982, Reagan announced an initiative for peace in the Middle East. President Reagan sought to take advantage of the strategic changes in the region, and specifically the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. Reagan's initiative would also be seen as a continuation of earlier efforts such as Kissinger's shuttles and Carter's involvement at Camp David. Reagan articulated this general conception when he said:

Our involvement in the search for Mideast peace is not a matter of preference, it is a moral imperative..... I recognise that the United States has a special responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability.(31)

Reagan spoke not only of a "fresh start" but also of continuity with the Camp David process when he said:

The right of Israel to exist within secure and recognized borders were reasserted. Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians (but not the PLO) were asked to join the negotiations concerning the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Reagan envisaged a five year transition period during which the future of these territories would be worked out, as had been provided in the Camp David Accords.(32)

31 Ibid, p.139.

32 Ibid.

He further said that these territories should become a self-governing entity in association with Jordan, city of Jerusalem should remain undivided, and finally, urged a halt to the creation of Israeli settlements.

Many of the points made by Reagan were not new, although the articulation of specific policy positions marked a departure from some previous American policy pronouncements. The statement of the President on the future for West Bank and Gaza was more precise than previously discussed:

The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give and take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.(33)

There were three assumptions of President Reagan's initiative. First, the initiative envisaged palestinian self-government in association with Jordan. The second assumption involved the Israeli participation. Prime Minister Begin and the Israeli Cabinet rejected the initiative. Begin preferred the Camp David process, especially within the new context resulting from Israeli action in Lebanon and the decreased capabilities of the PLO.

Begin was also concerned because "the proposals seemed to deviate from the Camp David process, despite the President's assertion to the contrary".³⁴ The Reagan administration indicated that "it was not surprised by the rejection but did not consider it the final and irrevocable word on the matter".³⁵

The third assumption was of a link between the situation in Lebanon and the initiative. The basic goals of the administration were to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, extend and secure the sovereignty of the Lebanese government throughout all its territory, achieve the economic and social reconstruction of that country and to implement the various elements of Reagan peace initiative.

The administration recognised the need for the participation of King Hussein. In this regard, Secretary of State, George Shultz noted, "the absence of Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories from the negotiations has been the crucial missing link in the Camp David process".³⁶

34 Ibid, p.141.

35 New York Times, September 6, 1982.

36 Paul Marantz and Janice Gross Stein, ed., n.28, p.144.

Therefore, he believed that, success in the peace process depended on Arab support for these vital missing partners to join the negotiations and become partners for peace.

The negotiations between Hussein and Arafat were significant as was the decision of the Palestine National Council in February 1983 that the Reagan initiative was not an acceptable basis for solving the Palestinian problem, and that the PLO would not give Jordan a mandate to negotiate on its behalf. King Hussein of Jordan announced in April 1983 that he and Arafat could not reach an agreement:

The efforts of the Reagan Administration both to negotiate a withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and to encourage King Hussein to come forward as a participant in peace negotiations on behalf of the Palestinians had failed.(37)

The Secretary of State George Shultz took personal control of the negotiations and gave them his undivided attention. In the view of the administration, the agreement represented a major step forward in the peace process. The United States declared to Israel that "it recognised Israel's right to self-defence and to retaliate against subsequent aggression by "terrorists" in Lebanon".³⁸

37 Ibid, p.145.

38 New York Times, 18 May, 1983.

The US and Israel agreed that "Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon was contingent on Syria and the PLO agreeing to do likewise".³⁹ The reaction of Syria to the agreement was serious. The government of President Asad of Syria condemned the withdrawal agreement as infringing on Lebanon's sovereignty.

Thus, a key stumbling block to the Reagan Administration's policy in Lebanon remained the unwillingness of Syria to withdraw its troops. On October 27, 1983, Reagan clarified his year-old initiative for peace in the Middle East in the context of the deteriorating military predicament in Lebanon:

A peace initiative for the entire Middle East, consistent with the Camp David Accords and UN Resolutions 242 and 338, still offers the best hope for bringing peace to the region...

By November 1983, there had been little improvement in the situation in Lebanon. The removal of foreign forces from Lebanon remained stymied by a Syrian refusal, backed by the Soviet Union, to enter into negotiations with the government of Lebanon and by the administration's apparent inability to achieve a change in Syria's policy. Reagan reiterated his objective of encouraging more Arab nations

39 Ibid.

to enter into direct negotiations with Israel:

...the idea of US continuing to help, as we did at Camp David, in furthering that process, bringing more nations into the kind of peaceful arrangement that occurred between Egypt and Israel, producing more Egypts, if you will.(40)

Shultz responded to the charge that the Reagan initiative was dead:

They think we will shy away from the sensitive issues of the Middle East during a Presidential election year. Well they are wrong. Ronald Reagan has no intention of letting the search for peace lapse.(41)

The assertions of Secretary Shultz are illustrative of Reagan Administration's determination to keep the "fresh start" initiative alive, even in the absence of substantive progress and the rather unpromising prospects for any significant break-through in the immediate future.(42)

The administration believed that the "fresh start initiative" and the basis upon which it was constructed (that is, UN Resolution 242 and the Camp David Accords) provided the necessary and appropriate procedures for movement towards peace.

40 Washington Post, October 24, 1983.

41 New York Times, November 20, 1983.

42 Paul Morantz and Janice Gross Stein, ed., n.28, p.152.

Impact:

The Camp David agreements placed the Palestinians and the Arab world in a most intractable position. Sadat had done what he swore he would never do. "He has made a separate deal with Israel without obtaining any Israeli commitment to withdraw from Palestinian territory".⁴³ As a result of this, the Arab world was deeply and bitterly divided, the only Arab army capable of exercising direct military pressure on Israel had been materialised and the Palestinians had been left with no effective Arab force to support their struggle for independent statehood.

The flaws in the agreement were discernible. There was the "notorious veto" given to Israel on all important issues such as the right of the refugees to return to their homeland during the five year transitional period of Palestinian self-government. Most important of all, Israel had a veto over the right to self-determination at the end of five years. There was the absence of any mention of East Jerusalem or Golan, or any limitation, still less withdrawal, of Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory. In short, the Camp David agreements offered the Palestinians no more than a slightly modified version of Begin's original terms.

43 Sir Anthony Nutting, "The Palestinians: Foot in the the Door"? Middle East International, no.90, December 1978, p.4.

But merely to rehearse those objections to Camp David was not to answer the question with which the Palestinian and that Arab supporters were faced. The Baghdad summit failed to tackle this question.

According to Sir Anthony Nutting an eminent scholar, "An attempt was made to bribe Sadat to renounce Camp David with offers of financial aid. When no agreement could be reached on punitive sanctions against Egypt, the summit ended with no more than a tame request to Sadat to return to the Arab ranks".⁴⁴

The main aims and achievement of the Americans and the Zionists at Camp David arise from Sadat's acceptance of the imposition of a "pax Americana". Specifically Sadat served to:

- a. Facilitate and back American intervention in Arab affairs from within a framework of assumed trusteeship, as witnessed by Carter's proposal for a Lebanese peace conference;
- b. Bestow - for the first time - legitimacy on the Zionist occupation of Palestine;
- c. Isolate Egypt from the rest of the Arab Nation with disastrous consequences for Egypt and adverse effects on the underlying feeling of Arab nationhood and solidarity among the Arabs;
- d. Contain and gradually liquidate the Palestinian liberation movement by divisive political and forcible military means.

44 Ibid, p.4.

Begin outlined his gains vis-a-vis the Palestinians at some length, no relinquishing of Zionist sovereignty, no withdrawal of Zionist troops and no end to the occupation of Gaza and West Bank, no Palestinian self-determination, no Palestinian state, no PLO, no implementation of large scale return of Palestinian refugees to their country, no cessation of Zionist colonization in the West Bank and Gaza beyond a 3 months moratorium, no linkage between the separate Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and the development of self-rule with West Bank and Gaza; no return of Arab Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty.

The sell-out of Palestinian rights was so flagrant that the London Economist sounded a note of caution after the Camp David euphoria: but a peace that ignores the central injustice done to the Palestinians carries a cancer. (45)

Far from achieving the much promised honourable and comprehensive peace on total Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands occupied in 1967 and on Palestinian self determination, the Camp David agreements provided the grounds for a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and a framework for dealing with the other possible Arab parties to such agreements. Sadat's hand might have been somewhat strengthened had he been able to win Israeli concessions on the

45 A. Said, "A Palestinian View", Middle East International, no.89, November 1978, p.7.

following issues:

1. Admission of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
2. abandonment of Israeli sovereignty over occupied territory other than Sinai at a future date;
3. implementation of UN resolutions regarding Palestinian rights, including the right to self-determination;
4. cessation of Zionist colonization and settlement in Gaza and the West Bank during the five year period of self rule; and
5. firm positive undertakings regarding Arab Jerusalem and the Golan.

The Agreements served to alienate and antagonise many interested parties, beginning with King Hussein of Jordan and extending to the Soviet Union and the United Nations.

By exposing the capitulationists and humiliating nature of "peace" and "compromise" with Zionism, and the completely anti-Arab direction of US policy in the Middle East, the Camp David agreements have embarrassed the Arab "moderates" and made possible a more radical common Arab stance vis-a-vis the new threat to the Arabs' future, national dignity and common interests. (46)

The realistic options open to the Arabs were limited by the Camp David to three:

1. To create a real politico-economic military Arab alliance on the northern and eastern

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fronts that would be formidable enough to prevent collapse and maintain general confrontation with Israel;

2. to dissuade Sadat by seduction or intimidation, or both, and prevent him from proceeding with his plans for a peace treaty with Israel;
3. By demonstrating the reality of Arab solidarity and successful material response to the Zionist challenge on the other fronts, to encourage those in Egypt who are willing and capable of deposing Sadat to act, should he insist on toing the American line.

The fact was that unless the right of the Palestinians to self-determination was not merely recognised but given concrete expression, there was no possibility of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

The London Guardian of 14 March, 1979 pointed an article by Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan:

The broad framework, resulting from Camp David, full of ambiguity as it is, did not address the main issues inevitably should serve as the cornerstones of any peace effort. The fact that three out of the four front-line states facing Israel did not at any stage participate in the peace effort, is in itself an eloquent comment on the inadequacy and fragility of the Camp David arrangements. (47)

The Camp David Agreements would have the following impact in the military balance between Israel and its Arab neighbours:

47 Middle East International, no.95, March 16, 1979, p.12.

- i. Israel would withdraw some of its troops from the occupied portion of Jordan on the West Bank of the Jordan river.
- ii. Those remaining would be withdrawn into "specific security locations" during a five year period for transition to West Bank autonomy.
- iii. A strong local police force - which may include Jordanian citizens, would be established.(48)

Within three years after Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty - which must be within three months of the Camp David agreements - all Israeli forces will have withdrawn from Sinai. As a first step, they would be withdrawn east of El-Arish within nine months from the signing of a treaty.(49)

The most remarkable change in the Middle Eastern conflict in 1978-79 was not so much in the military as it was in the diplomatic field.

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty also meant a change in the nature of the formerly intense Arab-Israeli ideological conflict, which was still going on between Israel, the PLO and the North Eastern bloc, headed by Syria, Iraq and Jordan, and supported by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Although Egypt was removed from the Arab confrontation front and its absence resulted in the weakening of the offensive front coalition^{The Arab coalition}/had been strengthened.

48 Middle East Monitor, vol.VIII, no.18, October 1, 1978, p.1.

49 Ibid.

The Arab rejectionist front (rejecting the Accords and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty) was ameliorated by the October 1978 Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement. The closer cooperation established between the North Eastern members of both the offensive coalitions (Syria, Iraq, the PLO and Jordan) supported by the Southern coalitions of the Arab States, and the moderate Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf States, represented a new type of offensive coalition.

The continuing Soviet supply of political and economic support to Syria and Iraq also strengthened this combination of offensive and "Iraq's goal after the Baghdad Summit have changed as well, so that Arabization of Gulf predominates, followed by war against Israel, those aims take precedence over those of internal stability and economic prosperity".⁵⁰

Egyptian-Israeli treaty had given rise to a new and different perception by some Arab governments of the relationship between their conflict with Israel, and their dealings with the super powers. Now there was an increasing

50 Amos Peremutter, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Strategic concepts and practices", A compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, 96th Congress, 2nd session, April 21, 1980 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980), pp.499-500.

tendency to see Arab-Israel relations in terms of super power confrontation, rather than the super power confrontation in terms of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Within the Arab world some countries had chosen a western alignment, even if this meant finding themselves in the same camp as Israel. Others had drawn the logical conclusion that it was significant at the first meeting of the rejectionists after Camp David, the major decision was for a closer alignment with Soviet Union.⁵¹ "Relations between Egypt and Palestinians were seriously strained and the PLO had called on Arab countries to impose maximum sanctions and complete isolation on Sadat".⁵²

Relations further deteriorated when the PLO joined Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and Iraq at a conference in Tripoli during December 1977 convened to oppose Sadat's initiatives: "Relations between Egypt and Palestinians reached a low point in February 1978 when terrorists assassinated "Yusuf Sebai" an Egyptian Secretary General."⁵³

51 Ibid, p.516.

52 Don Peretz, "The Palestinian issue", The Political Economy of the Middle East, 1973-78; A Compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, 96th Congress, 2nd session, April 21, 1980, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980), p.549.

53 Ibid, p.549.

Thus the uncertainties and ambiguities of Israel's policies in the occupied territories deepened enmities of the Palestinians. The Palestinians supported by the Arab League, by the United Nations, and by many third world countries had determined that the PLO was their "sole political representative". Israel, with qualified support from the United States, had taken a firm stance against any recognition of or dealing with the PLO. Israel's position was in large measure determined by the outmoted dogma of the 1964 Palestine National Covenant calling for elimination of the Jewish state. But political realities had bypassed ideology, both Israel and the PLO had shown that in practical relationship they could accept each other's existence. However, the Camp David meetings yielded something entirely different. A separate peace between Egypt and Israel shaped in the spirit of the Cold war strategy and a realignment of forces in the context of the US-Soviet confrontation. The Palestinians problem was not resolved, the conflict between Israel and its adversaries in the East remained in full force, and the arms race escalated.

Begin's unilateral annexations of the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem, advances on West Bank, suppression of Palestinian rights, invasion of Lebanon, and maintenance of military superiority over the whole Arab world could not but create a deadlock in the Camp David peace process - which if perpetuated, will ultimately abort it. (56)

The Egyptian people and the intellectual political elite have paid the steep price of isolation and ostracism for their signature of separate peace. Though they regained all the territories they lost in 1967, they feel extremely frustrated and angry at Israel's explanation of the peace treaty, for the invasion of Lebanon, for the unilateral annexations, and for the oppression of the Palestinians. (57)

The United States' perceived that Israeli policies had nurtured anti-American sentiment in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. It had called into question U.S. credibility as a disinterested peace broker and the viability of the Camp David agreement.

This complicity - taken together with Washington's failure to curb Begin's passion for building settlements, the lame pursuance of the September 1982 Reagan plan, the continuation of massive American aid to Israel inspite of the settlements in the West Bank, which the United States itself defines as an obstacle to peace, the US refusal to initiate formal talks with the PLO - accounts for the growing disillusionment in the Arab world with the United States and its peace initiatives. The influence that the United States could potentially exercise over Israel's recognition or non-recognition of the Palestinians is deemed considerable, and hence its non-use is all the more frustrating in Arab eyes. (58)

Arafat was able to reunify the PLO and win an endorsement, for the moment, but at a price. "Arafat was obliged to

57 Ibid.

58 Mark Bruzonsky, "The Second Defeat of Palestine", Journal of Palestine Studies, vol.59, no.14, Spring 1986, pp.30-52.

abandon the 1985 agreement he had made with King Hussein of Jordan under which the two leaders would seek a joint approach to negotiations with Israel".⁵⁹

The Palestinians and Arafat in particular were potentially key to the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, to the restarting of a real peace process, and to stability in the Middle East. But they were also a time bomb which whenever it exploded might ignite a new period of turbulence. The solution of this problem would also affect the prospects of democracy, economic development and social progress in all the countries concerned.

59 Ibid, p.182.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Middle East also known as West Asia has constituted an important area for the United States, strategically as well as economically. It has more than half of the world's proven oil reserves. Despite the oil wealth, the States in Middle East have felt powerless before the military strength of the U.S.; the Soviets, and the Israelis. The U.S. involvement in the Middle East started after the First World War, when it chose to represent the interests of the British and the French in the Trans-Jordan area - known as the Palestine.

In 1917, when the British announced the "Balfour Declaration", US gave full support to it. The action of the United States has been interpreted as a commitment on their part for the protection of the holy places as well as that of the Jewish State should the British move out of the region.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt supported the Zionist claim that Palestine must be reserved as the ultimate refuge of the world's Jews. The next President, Harry S. Truman also saw no collision between the American and the Jewish interests. When the Palestinian question

was kept on the agenda of the General Assembly, the United States strongly backed the partition. Again when Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, United States was the first to accord it recognition. Since then US has felt a sense of personal involvement in the destiny of Israel, it is argued that Israel is now serving on the frontline of the Western interest.

During the first Arab-Israeli war 1948, the policy planners in Washington intervened effectively to stop the war. It was assumed that a pro-western enclave in the Middle East would secure future American interests. As a follow up, during the second Arab-Israeli war in 1956 the Israeli-Anglo-French attack against Egypt was condemned by the US.

The US involvement in the Middle East started with its oil industries. The First World War demonstrated the importance of oil in modern warfare. From that time on, control of oil became one of the cornerstones of United States foreign economic policy. By the Second World War, oil became more important and America started controlling the Middle East oil through its oil companies. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan also were linked to the Middle Eastern Oil which followed subsequently with a view to protect American interest.

When the Third Arab-Israeli War broke out in 1967, both the Super Powers tried to bring the war to a halt. They quickly made use of the "Hot Line" between Moscow and Washington to assure each other that they would make every effort to end the fighting in the Middle East.

The most decisive consequences of the June 1967 war, was the spreading of Palestinian nationalism. The goal of the PLO became the dismantling of the "Zionist state of Israel" and its replacement with a secular and democratic Palestine in which all Palestine Arabs and Jews were to live in peace and equality.

The Fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1973, and the super powers rushed vast amounts of military supplies to their respective clients. Although the war ended with a ceasefire resolution, the oil-embargo made Israel suffer a major political and diplomatic defeat leaving her more dependent on the United States.

In 1978, Jimmy Carter became the President. He adopted his primary objective as the termination of the Arab-Israeli conflict sponsored the Middle East Summit at Camp David, concluded on September 17, with Israeli premier Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat

agreeing to a framework for a peace treaty between them for the settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The two agreements were signed on September 17, 1978.

If we interpret the Camp David Accords, they did not yield anything. The Palestinian self governing authority could not be established. Sadat was criticised all over the Arab world for selling out the Palestinians. There was no withdrawal of the territory and no self determination for the Palestinians.

For the solution of the Middle East problem any effort would have to take into consideration the question of Palestinians. The Camp David Accords went completely contrary to this.

The Camp David Agreement (September 1978) and the ensuing Egyptian-Israeli Treaty (March 1979) were met by almost universal Arab rejection. The Arab summit was convened in Baghdad to condemn Egypt. The Arab states decided to break off diplomatic relations with Cairo, suspended Egypt's membership in the League of Arab states, transfer the headquarters of the League from Cairo to Tunis, and boycott any Egyptian company that would do business with Israel. The Arabs renewed their vigour against US and Israel.



The Egyptian Israeli Treaty was regarded as a strategic settlement arranged by one great power to avoid the danger of war in the Middle East region.

However, it has been felt that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was full of ambiguity and did not reckon with the main issues. It presented the PLO with a fait accompli, against which they were bound to react strongly. It seemed that President Sadat had dropped even the minimum of linkage between the treaty and the Palestinian question.

Although West Bank and Gaza section comes first in the text, but there was no indication that this order is intended to be chronological. Moreover, in the separate "framework" for an Egypt-Israel peace treaty the West Bank and Gaza were simply not mentioned. As a result, the Arab world was deeply divided. Among the main results of the Camp David Agreement were:

To facilitate American intervention in the Arab affairs, isolation of Egypt from the rest of the Arab nation with disastrous consequences for Egypt, liquidation of the Palestinian Liberation movement by divisive means.

As the Camp David Agreement was sponsored by US, the text was made in Israel's favour. Among the Israel's gains were, not relinquishing of Zionist sovereignty, no end to the occupation of Gaza and West Bank, no Palestinian self-determination, no Palestinian state, no PLO, no cessation of Zionist colonization in the West Bank and Gaza beyond a 3 months moratorium, no linkage between the separate Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and the development of self rule in West Bank and Gaza, no return of Arab Jerusalem to sovereignty.

The Camp David Agreement considerably increased American influence in the region. Its vital interest was the protection of its oil supplies from the Middle East. Israel and USA dictated the course of the talks in accordance with their own wishes. The plan did not implement security council resolution 242 and 338 which demanded complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied areas. It simply denied the existence of the Palestinian people and did not take into consideration the UN resolution to date on the Palestinian problem. It was clear that neither US nor Israel wanted to establish the Palestinian state.

Even after the signing of the Camp David Agreement, Begin annexed Jerusalem in July 1980, and ordered the bombing in Baghdad and Beirut. In the 14 days war of Lebanon in July 1981 thousands of Palestinians died. Israel kept consolidating its annexations and continued its expansionism.

Camp David did not bring peace and the Palestinian problem remained unsolved. Camp David reduced the chances of achieving a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. It was felt by the Americans that, with Egypt at peace, Israel would have little incentive to make further

territorial concessions, Without return of territory, other Arab leaders would have no incentive to make peace with Israel.

One could also argue that Sadat set a very high standard by which other Arab negotiations would be judged. No other Arab leader was likely to recover all the territory his country lost to Israel in the 1967 war. Moreover, since the signing of the Camp David Accords, Israel had formally annexed East Jerusalem, extended Israeli law to the Golan Heights, and increased its civilian presence in the West Bank and Gaza.

Camp David accords did not provide a model that could be easily copied in future negotiations. It greatly strengthened Israel's bargaining position vis-a-vis Jordan Syria and the Palestinians and so no Arab leader could expect to gain as much from negotiations as Sadat did. Any future negotiations between Israel and an Arab partner would be even more difficult than those that resulted in the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. The balance of power between Israel and the other Arabs indicated that the outcome of negotiations would be heavily to Israel's advantage.

Nonetheless, the Camp David experience holds out some hope. Negotiations do create a new political dynamic, sometimes opening avenues that are not apparent at the beginning, the American role can help to tip the balance towards a 'territory for peace' outcome. If and when those negotiations are attempted, some parts of the Camp David approach will be found to be of value, while others will be irrelevant or in need of revision.

The Camp David Accords, September 17, 1978A Framework for peace in the MiddleEast Agreed at Camp David:

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978 and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following -

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
- After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilisation and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting

Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismaila, the peace proposals, made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and my neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In

addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza:

I. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West

Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. . In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agree-

ment will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and

Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

(i) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

(ii) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

(iii) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

(iv) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in

providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee, to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this Framework a

peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the time-table for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors- Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

- (a) full recognition;
- (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
- (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with

the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreement and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

M. Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter, President of the
United States of America.

Framework for the conclusion of a peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel:

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and

Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them. It is agreed that:

- The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flat at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.
- All of the principles of UN Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
- Unless otherwise mutually agree, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

- (a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty upto the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
- (b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
- (c) the use of the airfields left by the Israelis near E1 Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;
- (d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom and overflight;
- (e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and

Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

(f) the stationing of military force listed below:

Stationing of Forces

- A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km.) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.
- B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. to 40 km.
- C. In the area within 3 km of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.
- D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in the part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the

Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of E1-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

M. Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter,
Jimmy Carter, President of the
United States of America.

APPENDIX - B

Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, March 26, 1979Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt
and the State of Israel: The Government of Arab
Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State
of Israel;Preamble:

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David", dated September 17, 1978;

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbours which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework.

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel".

Article I

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex 1), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.
3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex 1, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III(3).

Article II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza

Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

Article III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries.

c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought

to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

Article IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the

implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

Article V

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through a Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Article VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.
3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification of the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.
4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligations in conflict with this Treaty.
5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

Article VII

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.
2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

Article VIII

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September 1975.
3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Washington, D.C. this 26th day of March, 1979, in triplicate in the English, Arabic, and Hebrew languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

M. Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter, President of the
United States of America.

(For Annexures see, Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, ed., Beyond Camp David, (Syracuse University Press, New York, 1981)), pp. 133-148.

Agreed Minutes of Articles I, IV, V and VI and Annexes I and III of the Treaty of Peace:

Article I

Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in paragraph of Article 2 shall occur with regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from that area.

Article IV

It is agreed between the Parties that the review provided for in Article IV(4) will be undertaken when requested by either Party, commencing within three months of such a request, but that any amendment can be made only with the mutual agreement of both Parties.

Article V

The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows:

"The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba".

Article VI(2)

The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(2) of the treaty, which reads as follows:

"The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other Party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty".

Article VI(5)

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

"Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented".

Annex I

Article VI, Paragraph 8, of Annex I provides as follows:

"The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the

United Nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council".

The Parties have agreed as follows:

"With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of Annex I, if no agreement is reached between the Parties, they will accept or support a U.S. proposal concerning the composition of the United Nations force and observers".

Annex III

The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance therewith it is agreed that such relations, will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption and Egypt and its oil concessionaries will entertain bids made by Israel on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil.

Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

M. Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter, President of the
United States of America.

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