

**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN
GEORGIA AND UKRAINE (1991-2008)**

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "A comparative Study of Democratization in Georgia and Ukraine (1991-2008)" submitted by me for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.


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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Prof. Anuradha M. Chenoy
(Chairperson)


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(Supervisor)

Dedicated

To

My Parents Rev. Khai khan thang & Mrs Don khan ngai

*Pu-leh-Pate lamtual kaihna mun ah
Jesun mun sang pen tang den ta hen
Rev. Khai khan thang (1997) M. Tanglian*

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PREFACE

The declaration of independence with the collapse of Soviet Union and the subsequent Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine was a landmark in the transformation of these countries from a authoritarian rule to a western type of democracy. However, the new governments failed to consolidate democracy. If corruption, crime, election riggings and authoritarian rule were the undemocratic symbol of the old regime, the new regimes too were unable to get rid of these obstacles. Therefore, the future of democracy in Georgia and Ukraine remain unclear and uncertain.

Rationale and Scope of Study

Color Revolutions which is often regarded as a factor that ended authoritarian regimes and established western type of liberal democratic regime constitute an important feature in the study of democratization in Georgia and Ukraine. In this research the causes and impact of Color Revolutions will be critically analyzed. This research will give a major focus on the role of external actor during Color Revolutions in particular and in the democratization process in general.

No research has been done on the comparative study of democratization in Georgia and Ukraine by examining the internal and external factors that impact the democratization process. A comparison would be made on how the impacts of these elements differ in Georgia and Ukraine. This work gives due importance to the role of Non-Government Organizations in mobilizing the people to bring about regime change both in Georgia and Ukraine. These NGOs adopted the mobilizing methods which were relevant to the people. It is important to analyze the re-emergence of semi-authoritarian regime in both Georgia and Ukraine after the Color Revolutions. There are plenty of literatures on Color revolutions which laud the role of international backed NGOs in promoting democracy. Therefore, this study attempts to fill the existing gap by analyzing the process of regime change in the name of democracy and how such attempts imperil the chances of real democracy.

Geographically, this study is confined to Georgia and Ukraine. The proposed research will study the various similarities and dissimilarities of democratization in Georgia and Ukraine. The study covers the period from 1991-2008.

Research Methodology

Being a comparative study, it follows the Mill's 'most similar design' and the 'most different design'. In the most similar design, the similar elements in Georgia and Ukraine are compared while in the 'most different design', the dissimilar elements of the two states are compared. Comparing the civil society and the state institutions of these two countries will throw useful lights on the process of democratization, especially their successes and failures.

The proposed study is primarily descriptive in nature. Examining and comparing the detailed data of democratization of the two countries constitute the prime task of this research. In this sense this study becomes empirical. The study makes no theoretical contribution. Being chiefly a comparative case study, this study attempts an in-depth analysis of the case. This will definitely generate a good amount of empirical data which can be used to test theories related to this study. In this study the trends of democratization in Georgia and Ukraine will be analyzed and then a comparison will be made in order to find the difference of democratization in these two countries.

One of the primary hypotheses to be examined here is that civil society and independent media play crucial role in social awareness and strengthening democracy but when these institutions are embedded to specific interest, they lead to chaos and instability. This is followed by an auxiliary hypothesis which evaluates how external actors' attempt to promote democracy in a newly independent state in the absence of developed state institution proves futile. These two hypotheses are tested in the first two chapters.

The first chapter constitutes the introduction of the dissertation. This chapter highlights the historical background of democratization in Georgia and Ukraine. It also discusses the various theories of democracy which help in better understanding of democracy in both the countries.

The second chapter explains the political system that evolved in these countries since 1991 and compares the state institutions of the two countries. The new constitution of Georgia and Ukraine was established in 1995 and 1996 respectively. This chapter points out that despite the people's quest for liberal democracy the nature of the new constitution is semi-authoritarian. The seven decades experience of communist domination had an unending impact and even in the post Soviet era Georgia and Ukraine are unable to get rid of the Soviet style authoritarian rule.

Georgia has a unitary and semi-presidential political system and in Ukraine, the political system is unitary and parliamentary-presidential system. In both the countries multi-party system prevail permitting opposition parties to compete for power. The presidents of both the countries have a strong power in the centre and at the regional level as well. At the centre the power to dissolve the parliament, the power to appoint and dismiss judges of the courts made the president extraordinarily powerful. The president ensured his/her control over the regional levels through the appointment of the governors. Different political parties operate in both the countries competing for power through election.

Chapter three discusses the color revolutions that occurred in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively. It is called Rose Revolution in Georgia while it is called Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Throughout the late 1990's and early 2000's elections in these two countries were far from free and fair. Corruption was rampant and poverty was widespread. The governments were increasingly unpopular in the country. In order to sustain their rule the government continuously rigged the elections. Despite of their anger and dissatisfaction towards the government on the political and economics failures, the public failed to resist the unconstitutional behavior of the government. Finally in 2003 and 2004 in Georgia and Ukraine respectively, when it was revealed to the people that the elections were rigged, thousands of people protest against the election result on the street braving the cold wind and the semi-authoritarian regime's response.

A focus is given to the international backed NGOs which played a significant role in the color revolutions. As such the role of Kmara in Georgia and Pora in Ukraine was widely mentioned in this chapter. These organizations were composed of new and young generations with new thoughts. In addition to the financial aid received from the west particularly the US, they also got training from Optor which has successfully launched a peaceful revolution in Serbia in 2000. The adoption of non-violent strategy such as concert, cartoon advertisement and live media telecast of important incidents like the protest itself that brought about successful color revolution are also well discuss in this chapter.

The fourth chapter points out the challenges of democratization in Georgia and Ukraine. Soon after a new government was formed in Georgia under Mikhail Saakashvili and in Ukraine under Victor Yushchenko, many reforms have been introduced, turning the country towards democratization and westernization. The most significant achievement was the successful holding of free and fair elections in the post revolution era.


The government in both the countries, however, could not fulfill the promise to reform the country politically and economically. Corruption which was one of the main reasons that flock the people in the street during the color revolutions is still extensive and disruptive. The presidents vested with huge power became more and more authoritative as their predecessors. Many of the problems of the old government prior to the color revolution still prevail in both the new governments. This chapter extensively explains how the constitutional structure such as strong executive, absence of clear cut division of powers, and the widespread corruption and the governments' returned towards authoritarianism pose an obstacles to democratic development in the country.

Chapter five- the concluding chapter, constitutes the main findings of the whole work. The inherent of Soviet style authoritarian rule, corruption and election riggings by the new governments of Georgia and Ukraine in the post independence period posed a threat to the development of democracy in the country. The color revolutions ended the semi-authoritarian regime and set up new pro-western democratic governments. Though some reforms have been taken by the new governments, democratic

consolidation could not be brought about in both the countries. Corruption and crime problems remained unsolved and the regimes became more and more authoritative. The institutional setup that gives vast power to the executive encroaches upon the power of the other two branches of the government and thus became an obstacle on the process of democratization in both the countries. The strong presidential power paved the way for authoritarianism and the democracy formed during the color revolution failed in both Georgia and Ukraine.

The study will be based on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include official document, policies, projects and reports of international agencies like United Nations. The data from Freedom House, Transparency International, World Bank are crucial for examining the crucial indicators. Secondary sources are books, journals, published articles, research paper and internet sources related to the proposed topic.

Dated 28-07-09


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List of Abbreviations

BTC-	Baku-Tblissi-Ceyhan
Canvas-	Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies
CIS-	Commonwealth of Independent States
CUG-	Citizen Union of Georgia
CVU-	Committee of Ukraine Voters
GDP-	Gross Domestic Product
IFES-	International Foundation for Electoral Studies
ISFED-	International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy
KPSS-	Communist Party of Soviet Union
KPU-	Communist Party of Ukraine
NATO-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP-	National Democratic Party
NED-	National Endowment for Democracy
NGOs-	Non Governmental Organizations
NMD-	National Movement-Democrats
NSDC-	National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine
OSCE-	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI-	Open Society Institute
PDVU-	Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine
PR-	Party of Regions
PSPU-	Progressive Social Party
PVT-	Parallel Voting Tabulation
SeIPU-	Peasant Party of Ukraine
SPU-	Socialist Party of Ukraine

TraCCC- Transnational Crime and Corruption Center Caucasus Office
UMN- United National Movement
UNM- United National Movement
USAID- United States Agency for International Development
USSR- Union Soviet Socialist Republic

Chapter 1

Introduction

Historical Background and the Theories of Democracy

Georgia and Ukraine are two of the fifteen newly independent states that emerged as a result of the breakup of Soviet Union in 1991, who were confronted with a problem of determining their countries' an uncertain political future. The road to democracy in these countries can be traced from 1985 when Gorbachev began his reformation policy of Perestroika in the then Soviet Union. The experience of more than seven decades of communist rule signaled that communist system proved a failure in these countries. Liberal democracy and market economy was gradually introduced with the assistance of the west particularly the US, however, there have been many problems and difficulties that made democratization process slow in these two countries. The process of democratization has been marked by crucial development.

Immediately after independence in 1991, Georgia was confronted with several severe internal conflicts concerning foremost the two secession conflicts, in Abkhazia (1990-1992) and South Ossetia (1992-1993) that severely obstruct the process of democracy. Gamsakhurdia was unable to consolidate his position and was succeeded by Eduard Shevardnadze in 1992 in a military coup. On 25 March 1993 the Georgian Parliament formed a State Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution which was approved on 24 August 1995. As a democratic state, multi-party system was permitted in Georgia and elections were held at regular intervals. Parliamentary elections were held in the 1990, 1992, 1995, 2003, 2004 and 2008. The presidential elections held so far were in the year 1991, 1995, 2000, 2004 and 2008. Referendums were also held in 1991, 2003 and 2008. Although Georgia succeeded in holding successful elections, Georgia's government did not rest on a strong set of democratic institutions; it mainly relied on Shevardnadze's paternalistic relationship with different sectors of society. As a result, the administration became increasingly authoritarian. Though oppositions were allowed and different political parties participated in the elections, the ruling elites often monopolized

it and the elections were neither free nor fair. Corruptions were rampant and the people were confronted with economic hardships.

President Eduard Shevardnadze became very unpopular because of the widespread corruption, rigged election, rising crime and deepening poverty. When in 2003, the parliamentary election was again ballot-rigging by the government; tens of thousands of people came out in protest demanding Shevardnadze's resignation and re-election. The NGOs and media played a crucial role in mobilizing and braving the people in this protest which compelled the government to accept the election result as void and called for a new election. Mikhail Saakashvili was elected in the re-run election presidential election held after the resignation of Shevardnadze. This peaceful revolution came to be popularly known as Rose Revolution.

In the Period immediately following the Rose Revolution, many encouraging signs pointed to progress in both Georgian state and society. The Saakashvili administration aggressively moved forward in an anticorruption effort to root out some of the most troubling problems of the government. Most importantly the government could successfully conduct successive free and fair elections. Despite of these advances, power in Georgian political system has been increasingly centralized in the executive branch and Saakashvili himself. Under the new rules the president can easily dissolve the parliament while it is nearly impossible to impeach him. Corruption and organized crime could not be routed out, and the judicial system was still incompetence. Saakashvili gradually became authoritarian like his predecessor that brought him unpopular among the people. This was evident in October 2007, in which a mass protest was held in front of the parliament (similar to Rose Revolution exactly four years ago) demanding that election should be held at the time set by the constitution (Areshidze and Lanskoj 2008). The protest was responded with the declaration of state emergency by the president followed by a brutal police crack down.

In Ukraine, the growing nationalist sentiment and opposition to Soviet rule during 1990-91 political and social turmoil was instrumental in ensuring a peaceful transition from

communist system. Shortly after becoming independent in 1991, Ukraine name a parliamentary commission to prepare a new constitution, adopted a multi-party system, and adopted legislative guarantees of civil and political rights for national minorities. A new, democratic constitution was adopted on June 28, 1996, which mandates a pluralistic political system with protection of basic human rights and liberties. The abolition of communist system was followed by political and economic reforms. Like in Georgia, multi-party system exists in Ukraine, political opposition is permitted and media operates within limited independence. Four presidential elections were held in 1991, 1994, 1999 and 2004. Parliamentary elections too were held in 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2007. Referendums were held in 1991 and 2001. Though crucial issues of public concerned were determined by the people in the form of elections and referendums, the elections were neither free nor fair as in the case of Georgia. Therefore, the government was undemocratic in many aspects.

The people lost faith in the government due to successive elections riggings. The election in 2004 brought a political crisis in the country. The international monitor declared the November 2004 presidential election, neither free nor fair, in which Victor Yanukovich was declared victory. Thousands of people came out in the street protesting the election result and demanding the holding of new election. After a prolong debate in an atmosphere of growing national crises, the Supreme court finally agreed to re-run the election. Yushchenko won the re-run election which is considered to be the end of authoritarian regime and the emergence of democracy. This incident of non violent regime came to be known as "Orange Revolution".

In the post Orange Revolution in Ukraine, freedom was suddenly taken for granted. Everybody freely spoke their mind. The media were unrestricted and voiced diverse opinions. Street demonstrations and minor popular protests became everyday events. The problem was rather how to make and implement democratic decisions. The political situation proved exceedingly unstable. There were different political parties or blocs that differ in ideology and interest. The dominant political leaders could not form a lasting or operative compromise due to ideological conflicts and dysfunctional constitutional order.

In the ensuing four years, Ukraine had at least four governments, led in turn by Tymoshenko, Yuriy Yekhanurov, Yanukovych, and Tymoshenko again. Parliamentary elections were held in March 2006 and again in September 2007 due to coalition break up or dissolution of the parliament.

Theories of Democracy

For a better understanding of the democratization in Georgia and Ukraine let us first look into the meaning and theories of democracy.

The term 'democracy' is derived from the Greek word 'demos' which means 'the many' or 'the people; and 'kratos' which stand for 'rule' or 'government' (Hey Wood 2005). Thus, literally, democracy signifies 'the rule of the people'. The city-states of ancient Greece are considered to be the origin of democratic ideals which passed on and grew into the present day modern democracy. However, there have been a wide range of difference in theory and practice of democracy of the ancient and the present day. The Greeks had a little or no idea about individual, an idea that is tied up with the modern concept of democracy. Greek practice granted the right of political participation to only a small minority of the adult inhabitants of the city. The Greek philosophers and historians whose writing have survived till the present day including Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides depicted democracy as government by ignorant or government by the poor (Birch 2007). It was subsequently held in general dispute for over two thousand years. The term 'democracy', in its modern sense, came into use during the course of the nineteenth century to describe a system of representative government in which the representatives are chosen by free competitive elections and most male citizens are entitled to vote. However franchise was extended to female citizens, country after another beginning with the United States, followed by France and Britain.

The millennium old concept, 'Democracy' is a contested idea. Its concept varied from period to period and from country to country. Scholars failed to reach general consensus on the concept of democracy and various scholars propounded different theories of democracy, the major of them are:-

1. Classical Theory of Democracy

The classical conception of democracy was firmly rooted in the idea of popular participation and drew heavily from Athenian democracy. The cornerstone of Athenian democracy was the direct and continuous participation of all free citizens in the life of their polis or city-state. This amounted to the form of government by mass meeting, and each citizen was qualified to hold public office if selected to do so by lot. Athenian democracy was therefore a system of 'direct democracy' or what is sometimes referred to as 'participatory democracy' (Heywood 2005). By removing the need for a separate class of professional politicians, the citizen themselves were able to rule directly, obligating the distinction between government and the governed and between the state and civil society. Athenian democracy developed a very particular kind of direct popular rule, one that has a very limited application in the modern world. All major decisions are made by the Assembly, or ecclesia, to which all citizens belong (Heywood 2007).

The remarkable features of Athenian democracy were the level of political activity of its citizens. Not only did they participate in regular meetings of the Assembly but they were, in large numbers prepared to shoulder the responsibility of public office and decision making. The town meeting is, however, not the only means through which direct democracy can operate. The most obvious of this is the plebiscite or referendum, a popular vote on a specific issue which enables electors to make decisions directly, instead of selecting politicians to do soon their behalf.

The silent features of classical theory of democracy were;

1. Equal participation by all freemen in the common affairs of the polis (city-state) which was regarded as an essential instrument of good life.
2. Arriving at public decisions in an atmosphere of free discussion
3. General respect for law and for the established procedures of the community. The Greeks took pride in their customary law and admiringly distinguished it from the 'arbitrary rule' prevalent among the 'barbarians'
4. Practice of referendum (Gaubu 2003).

The form of democracy prevalent in ancient Greek city-states was by no means regarded as ideal rule. Plato attacked the principle of political equality on the ground that the masses of the people possess neither the wisdom nor the experience to rule wisely on their behalf. Participation was restricted to Athenian-born males who were over 20 years of age. Slaves who were the majority of the population, and women and foreigners had no political rights (Heywood 2007).

2. Liberal Theory of Democracy

Today, Liberalism is generally thought to be inseparable from democracy so much so that the term 'democracy' is applied to denote 'liberal democracy' unless otherwise specified. Even dictators pay lip service to democracy and communist countries called themselves people's democracies. It represents a combination of free-market economy with universal adult franchise. It is an attempt to resolve the conflicting claims of the capitalists and the masses by making gradual concessions under the grab of a 'welfare state'. Liberal democracy is distinguished from other forms of political system by certain principles and characteristics, that is, its institutional arrangements. Institutions are necessary for the realization of principles; without which principles, the institution might be reduced to a mere formality.

a. Government by discussion

Liberal theory viewed democracy as a government not only by consent, but by individual and rational consent of a representatively large number of citizens. Discussion is usually held at two levels: (a) among the representatives of the people in the legislative assemblies where members of the opposition have their full say; and (b) at the public level where there is direct communication between the leadership and the people. There is election held at a regular interval. As such, remains an indispensable hallmark of democratic leadership that the government does not lose touch with the popular sentiment on the major outlines of policy, and the people are given appropriate opportunities to make effective choices between alternative set of leaders and policies (Merk 1975).

b. Majority Rule

Liberal theory propounded that in every democratic government, important decisions have to be made at one or more levels which involves both the masses and the various bodies of representatives- legislatures, committees and collegial executive. In all these decisions making bodies, from the electorate to the last committee, the issues are to be resolved by majority voice. Majority rule assumes that the units to be counted are equal. The principle of "one man one vote," constitutes one of the outstanding characteristic of democracy, which secure political equality among the citizens (Merk 1975).

c. Recognition of minority rights

Although the important decisions on the policy of the whole community should be made according to the will of the majority, there must a limit to what this majority can do to various minorities in the country. The principle of majority rule by no means implies the suppression of minorities. In modern nation-states, there may be several racial, religious, linguistic or cultural minorities. The majority group can discriminate or impose their will over the minority groups by ordinance or law. The liberal theory, therefore maintained that measures should be taken to protect the minority against the majority by judicial or legislative fiat. Legal safeguard are considered essential for the realization of the democratic principle because their presence helps to raise the level of awareness of both the majority and the minority and thus promote a favorable climate for democratic politics (Merk 1975).

d. More than One Political Party Freely Competing for Political Power

Liberal democracy seeks reconciliation between varying interests and ideologies of different groups. There is no fixed method of securing this reconciliation. When there is a free competition between more than one political parties for power, the people get an opportunity to consider various alternatives policies, program and personalities to exercise their choice. According to this test single-party systems do not qualify as

democracies. Liberal democracy requires open competition for power between different political parties on the basis of established and accepted form of procedure.

e. Periodic Elections Based on Universal Adult Franchise

The principle of universal adult franchise is regarded as a necessary condition for modern democracy. To bring successful democracy each citizens should be granted with the right to vote on attaining the prescribed age. Voting should be secret so that each citizen can exercise his or her right without fear or favor. Periodic elections require that the people's representatives should be chosen for a limited period (Gaubu 2003).

f. Protection of Civil Liberties

The protection of civil liberties, such as freedom of thought and expression, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly and association, and personal freedom, i.e., freedom from arbitrary arrest, is an essential characteristic of liberal democracy. On the one hand, these freedoms enable the citizens to form interest groups and other organizations to influence government decisions. On the other hand, they ensure independence of the mass media, particularly the press, from government control. Without civil liberties, the will of the people cannot be translated into public policy and decision. Civil liberties, therefore, constitute the core of democracy.

g. Separation of Power/Independent Judiciary

The doctrine of the separation of powers proposes that each of the three functions of government- legislative, executive and judiciary should be entrusted to a separate branch of government (Heywood 2007). The doctrine of separation of powers is an important pillar of modern liberal democratic theory. The writings of the separation of powers as a crucial factor in the organization of government has began since the ancient times by Plato. The modern doctrine of separation of powers originates from the writings of John Locke, who advocated the separation between the legislature and the executive. Montesquieu introduced judiciary as the third branch of government. The American founding fathers, particularly Madison and Hamilton, contributed to the introduction of

checks and balances, and the horizontal separation of powers between central and local. (Voigt, Salzberger 2009). The separation of power is applied most strictly in the USA, it is also applied in all the liberal democracies notably in the principle of judicial independence.

h. Rule of Law

The rule of law is a core liberal democratic principle, embodying ideas such as constitutionalism and limited government. It means that law should rule in the sense that it establishes a framework of which all conduct and behavior conform, applying equally to all the members of society, be they private citizens or governments (Heywood 2007). The rule of law implies equal subjugation of all classes to the law of the land. In simple term it means equality before the law, meaning all men are equal before the law and the same law will be applicable to all (Khan 2009).

3. Elitist Theory of Democracy

According to this theory, the political system is divided into two groups:- a) the elite or 'political entrepreneurs' or minority who possess ideological commitments and manipulative skills and b) the citizens at large, or the masses or the majority or the political clay of the system, a much larger class of passive, inert followers who have little knowledge of public affairs and even less interest. This theory view that, democratic system must rely on the wisdom, loyalty and skill of their political leaders, and not on the population at large (Walker 2009). The elites hold power due to the outstanding skill, talent and experience they acquired, which are necessary for ruling, which the common masses do not have. There is continuous struggle for power among the elites which ousted the incapable rulers and allow new elites/rulers to enter. This is called circulation of elites. Election which is an important aspect of the theory prevents democratic ruler to become absolute or authoritarian.

Mosca in 'The Ruling Class' observed that all societies known to historian have been divided into a minority who controlled the reins of government and the majority who were rule by the minority. It must always be so, he maintained, for two reasons. One is

that a minority can organize itself in a fashion that is beyond the reach of a large multitude (Birch 2007). The second reason is that 'members of a ruling minority regularly have some attribute, real or apparent, which is highly esteemed and very influential in the society in which they live'. For Mosca, the ruling class meant not only the holders of high office but a wider class of people from whom the office holder were drawn. Societies have been dominated by various groups or classes. There had been, or were still, societies dominated by hereditary aristocracy, others dominated by priesthood, others by class of warriors, other by large land owners, others by financiers, others again by the ruling group to which entry was gained by education.

Each ruling class develops a 'political formula' by which it justifies its rule to the rest of the population. The Chinese mandarins claimed to be 'interpreters of the will of the Son of Heaven'. Muslim rulers talked of the will of Allah; French aristocrats of the divine right of kings; English politician of the sovereign of parliament; American rulers of the will of the people. The use of propaganda to propagate and sustain this legitimizing formula is one of the main weapons at the disposal of the ruling class in any period.

Pareto held that every field of endeavour has its own elite, consisting of those persons who happen to be best at the activity in question. The condition of entry into elite is skill, not virtue; in every field some participants are bound to be more talented than others and thus rise to the top. There is elite of lawyers, of scientist, of poet, of thieves. Among these various elite there will be governing elite, composed of the people who have proved themselves most talented in the art of politics. History shows, according to Pareto, that there is a recurrent circulation of elites- both a circulation of individuals between the upper and lower strata in the same field of activity and a circulation between governing and non-governing elite, with different groups of men moving into position of political power in turn. Some governing elites were progressive while others were conservative.

Robert Michels in his 'Iron Law of Oligarch' maintained that the masses are inexperience, poorly educated, apathetic, intellectually inferior to their leaders, and deferential. Leaders take advantage of this situation to perpetuate themselves in power.

They employ all kinds of methods- oratory, persuasion, and playing upon sentiments in order to fool them. Thus, whatever form of government is adopted, in practice it is inevitably reduced to oligarchy, that is, the rule of the chosen few. The most important contribution of Michel was in the field of political parties. Michel pointed out that political parties need leaders, that the leaders acquire more knowledge and experience of politics than their followers, and that they may acquire the ability to reshape the party's policy objectives in the course of their struggle for support among the electorate. Every sizeable political organization chooses leaders such as an executive committee and a president, to direct its affairs. These leaders through experience acquire a deeper understanding of the organization's problems and that this understanding enables them to guide and perhaps to dominate the masses of its members (Birch 2007).

Joseph A. Schumpeter in his 'Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942)' pointed out that "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Walker 2009). He regards democracy as a procedure in which leaders compete at elections to govern. In democracy, there is free competition among the leaders for winning people's vote and the role of the people is reduced to choosing their rulers from the competing elites. Political decisions are taken by the leaders rather than the people themselves.

The redeeming feature of democracy in elitist view is that, unlike other forms of government, it does not allow political leadership to wield absolute power. The factor that prevents democratic system from emerging as absolutism or authoritarian system is the provisions for limited, peaceful competition among members of the elite for the formal positions of leadership within the system (Walker 2009). Though the political leaders or elites initiated policy, the average citizens still had some measure of effective political power because their rights to vote which ultimately prevent democracy to emerge as absolute.

From the study of the views of major theorists of elitist democracy, the main features of the theory can be highlighted as:

- a) Society is divided into two groups- the ruler who are minority and the ruled who constituted the majority.
- b) Political power is concentrated in the hands of the few or minority who are also called the elite.
- c) The elites hold power due to the outstanding skill, talent and experience they acquired, which are necessary for ruling, which the common masses do not have.
- d) There is continuous struggle for power among the elites which ousted the incapable rulers and allow new elites/rulers to enter. This is called circulation of elites.
- e) Election which is an important aspect of the theory prevent democratic ruler to become absolute or authoritarian

4. Pluralist Theory

The first systematic development of Pluralist theory of democracy was found in the contribution of James Madison in The Federalist Papers. According to this theory, society consists of diverse interest groups and the elites who lead them. These diverse groups raise their demands directly or through the mediating agency of political parties on the political system. No group or elite is so powerful as to dominate the government to such an extent that it may implement all its demands completely. No social class can really control the machinery of government to the total exclusion of all other competing classes or groups. The policy making process, however, centralized it may appear in form, is, in reality, a highly decentralized process of bargaining among relatively autonomous groups. Public policy is not a product of the will of the elite or the chosen few, as the elitist theories of democracy hold; on the contrary, it is an outcome of the interaction of all groups who claims upon or express interest in particular issue. The extent, to which different groups will get their way, is a function of the strength of the groups and the intensity of their participation.

The pluralist theorists call for a revision of the democratic theory itself and the elitist theory as well. This theory view that policy-making is actually done neither by the

representatives of a coherent majority, nor by an autonomous and unresponsive elite, but is a product of the interaction among the groups. This theory goes to the extent of claiming that since public policy is largely an outcome of the bargaining among groups interested in a given policy issue, the form of government becomes almost insignificant. Whether democratic form of government or any other form is adopted, the result is not likely to vary significantly. In any case, public policy will reflect the interests of the more organized and vocal groups in society.

James Madison in 'The Federal Papers' argued that unchecked democratic rule might simply lead to majoritarianism, to the crushing of individual rights and to the expropriation of property in the name of the people. Madison propagated that unless each of the multiplicity of interest and groups in society possessed a political voice, stability and order would be impossible. He therefore proposed a system of divided government based on the separation of powers, bicameralism and federalism, that offer a variety of access points to competing groups and interests.

Robert Dahl in 'Who Governs' carried out an empirical study of the distribution of power in New Haven, Connecticut, USA. He concluded that, although the politically privileged and economically powerful exerted greater power than ordinary citizens, no ruling or permanent elite was able to dominate the political process. His conclusion was that 'New Haven is an example of a democratic system, warts and all'. Dahl recognized that modern democratic systems differ markedly from the classical democracies of Ancient Greece (Heywood 2007). In his 'A Preface to Democracy(1956)' Dahl developed a model of the democratic process which he describe as polyarchy to mean rule by the many, as distinct from rule by all citizens. The key feature of such pluralist democracy is that competition between parties at election time, and the ability of interest or pressure groups to articulate their views freely, establishes a reliable link between the government and the governed, and create a channel of communication between the two. Dahl emphasized the "slackness of resources"; there are widely diffused and unused political resources which might be mobilized by the dissatisfied (Burtenshaw 1968). Groups which are economically and

socially disadvantaged, such as Negroes, employ their political equality to improve their lot.

The theorists of pluralist democracy rejected the classical model, but believe that a fair substitute has evolved. Apparently the cause of this advance was industrialization. It has produced “a pattern of dispersed rather than cumulative inequalities” in which every group “has access to some resources that can exploit to gain influence.” In *Who Governs?* Dahl asserts that the social structure gave New Haven an oligarchical government throughout the nineteenth century, but in the twentieth century ethnic politics broke the oligarchy. In the 1950’s ethnic politics yielded to the politics of “shared benefits” and collective “benefits”; power became decentralized and pluralist democracy resulted. Dahl emphasized the “slackness of resources”; there are widely diffused and unused political resources which might be mobilized by the dissatisfied (Burtenshaw 1968). Groups which are economically and socially disadvantaged, such as Negroes, employ their political equality to improve their lot.

Summarizing the various positions of pluralist democracy, it stands for four propositions.

- a) There is no concentration of power in a society; “at bottom, nobody dominates.”
- b) There are slack resources everywhere, which means that no one is necessarily disadvantaged: positions of leadership are accessible to everyone.
- c) Leaders have an incentive to meet the wishes of their constituents, and this may cause them to reflect popular will.
- d) There is a floor under oppression, for a persecuted group to be self-correcting, at least in a limited fashion.

5. Marxist Theory of Democracy

The Marxist theory of democracy is rooted in class analysis. According to this theory political power cannot be understood narrowly in terms of electoral rights, or in terms of the ability of groups to articulate their interests by lobbying and campaigning. Political structure is determined by the nature of its base, that is, the economic relations shaped by

its mode of production. Whether a political system qualifies for democracy or not should be judged by the pattern of its economic relations, not by the forms and structures of its politics. Marxist propagated that genuine democracy can only be achieved if it is extended beyond the political system, to both the social and economic spheres (Heywood 2007).

Marxism is more of a radical critique of capitalism than it is an attempt to describe socialist or communist society or socialist model of democracy. The exponents of Marxist democracy are convinced that democracy and capitalism cannot go together. Marxists believed that liberal democracy or capitalism should first be destroyed to establish socialist democracy which according to its theory is a genuine democracy. Marxists highlighted the defects of the capitalist system in serving as democracy. This theory first criticized 'bourgeoisie individualism' which is seen as central to the concept of liberal democracy and move on to attack the concept of liberal democracy itself (Marco 2000). Marxist term liberal democracy as 'bourgeoisie democracy' as it fosters the capitalist economic system which exclusively serves the interest of the bourgeoisie. In spite of its vast representative institutions, liberal democracy hardly serves the interest of the people on whose behalf power is exercised. Marx himself claimed, 'the executive of the modern state is but the committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'.

According to the Marxian standpoint, since the capitalist system of production is designed to serve the economic interests of the bourgeoisie, its political superstructure cannot be made to serve the people. In the economic sphere, society is divided into 'dominant' and 'dependent' classes, the 'haves' and 'have-not', the 'bourgeoisie' and the 'proletariat'; their interests are diametrically opposed to each other. Political power is only a handmaid of economic power; it is, therefore, quite natural that the political institutions of such a system-whatever their outer form-are bound to serve the interest of the bourgeoisie. Liberal democracy, in spite of providing universal suffrage, periodic elections, freedom of thought and expression, does not embody an effective mechanism for transforming the economic relations of society in order to serve the common interest.

Instead, it tends to perpetuate the economic division of society into 'haves' and 'have-nots' and the values of bourgeoisie society which support and legitimize the division. The liberal democracy, in the Marxist view, is incapable of averting class exploitation; it is a device for keeping the exploitation class or its nominees constantly in power for the purpose of serving its own interests (Gaubas 2003). Dictatorship of the proletariat: A Concrete Democracy. Marxist propounded the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', 'proletariat democracy' or 'socialist democracy' that denotes a state characterized by the domination of the proletariat. It will be established by the proletariat after overthrowing the capitalist order by a violent revolution called 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat'.

6. The Third Wave of Democracy

The first "long" wave of democratization began in the 1820s, with the widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and continued for almost a century until 1926, bringing democratic countries into 29. In 1922, however, the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy marked the beginning of a first "reverse wave" that by 1942 had reduced the number of democratic states in the world to 12. The triumph of the Allies in World War II initiated a second wave of democratization that reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically. This democratization was again followed by a second reverse wave (1960–1975) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30. The third wave of democratization in the history of the modern world constitutes a period between 1974 and 1990. During these years at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, almost doubling the number of democratic governments in the world (Huntington 2003).

Five major factors have contributed significantly to the occurrence of the third-wave transitions to democracy:

(a) The deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were widely accepted, the consequent dependence of these regimes on successful performance, and their inability to maintain "performance legitimacy" due to economic (and sometimes military) failure.

- (b) The unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many countries.
- (c) A striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church, manifested in the Second Vatican Council of 1963–65 and the transformation of national Catholic churches from defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism.
- (d) Changes in the policies of external actors, most notably the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union.
- (e) “Snowballing,” or the demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization.

By 1990 at least two third-wave democracies, Sudan and Nigeria, had reverted to authoritarian rule; the difficulties of consolidation could lead to further reversions in countries with unfavorable conditions for sustaining democracy. The first and second democratic waves were followed not merely by some backsliding but also by major reverse waves during which most regime changes throughout the world were from democracy to authoritarianism. The third wave of democratization may slow down or come to a halt and reverse.

The factors contributing to transitions away from democracy during the first and second reverse waves still constitutes a factor that may lead to third wave reverse. These were:-

- (a) The weakness of democratic values among key elite groups and the general public;
- (b) Severe economic setbacks, which intensified social conflict and enhanced the popularity of remedies that could be imposed only by authoritarian governments;
- (c) Social and political polarization, often produced by leftist governments seeking the rapid introduction of major social and economic reforms;
- (d) The determination of conservative middleclass and upper-class groups to exclude populist and leftist movements and lower-class groups from political power;
- (e) The breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism or insurgency;
- (f) Intervention or conquest by a non democratic foreign power;

(g) “reverse snowballing” triggered by the collapse or overthrow of democratic systems in other countries (Huntington 1991).

Other possible factors that may cause reverse to third wave democracy are:-

First, systemic failures of democratic regimes to operate effectively could undermine their legitimacy.

Second, a shift to authoritarianism by any democratic or democratizing great power could trigger reverse snowballing. If a non democratic state greatly increased its power and began to expand beyond its borders, this too could stimulate authoritarian movements in other countries.

There are obstacles to democratization among the third wave democratic countries such as politics, culture, economic and the absence or weakness of real commitment to democratic values among political leaders. The third wave, the “global democratic revolution” of the late twentieth century, will not last forever. It may be followed by a new surge of authoritarianism sustained enough to constitute a third reverse wave. The two most decisive factors affecting the future consolidation and expansion of democracy will be economic development and political leadership (Huntington 2003).

This dissertation deals with the comparative study of democratization in Georgia and Ukraine by examining the internal and external factors that impact the democratization process. There were many similar cases. The study will find out that, though the two countries shared many similar elements - corruption, election fraud, semi authoritarian regime, political opposition, limited independent media, and civic nationalism and external intervention, and the successful democratic revolution, democracy evolved in different ways. A comparison would be made on how the impacts of these elements differ in Georgia and Ukraine. It is important to make this comparison as it will help us in understanding the reality of democratization process in both the countries.

Chapter 2

Political System of Georgia and Ukraine

After independence in 1991, the two newly independent states of Georgia and Ukraine were faced with the problem of drafting a new constitution based on democracy. The drafting of the new constitution was completed in 1995 and 1996 respectively. The drafting process in Georgia was delayed by the civil war that accompanied the declaration of independence, (Areshidze and Lanskoj 2008) while in Ukraine, the decision of the Soviet era actors who inherited power in the new government to retain Soviet institutional forms and to limit reforms for personal interest was responsible for the untimely completion of the constitution (Anieri 2007). Though the constitutions contain the features of liberal democracy, it was authoritative in certain aspect as the presidents have the right to unilaterally dissolve the parliament.

Semi-Presidential System in Georgia

Georgia has a unitary and semi presidential political system (Gritzner Pavlovic 2005, Gabedava .2006). Under this arrangement, the central government holds nearly all power. Local governments have little influence or importance. Nearly all political decisions are made by the government's executive branch (the president and his advisers) located in the national capital. In the Georgian political system a dominant role is played by a powerful head of the state- the president. The president is the head of government and chief of the state. He is also the supreme commander of the armed forces and presides over the National Security Council. The person holding this office is, by all measures, the most powerful person in the country.

During the Soviet era, Georgia's government and other political activities were under the firm grip of the Communist government. Even after emerging as an independent state from the Soviet Union, Georgian is unable to get rid of the Soviet style authoritarian rule. The new constitution and the subsequent amendments vested more and more power with the president. Soon after the declaration of independence, there was a civil war and ethnic cleansing in Georgia which disrupted the drafting of the constitution. After the bloody coup of 1991 the Soviet Georgian constitution of 1921 was reinstated (Khokrishvili and Kim 2008). In 1995, a national referendum was held

that brought further changes in the form of a new constitution. The new constitution for independent Georgia was accomplished in 1995. This new constitution proclaimed Georgia as a presidential republic (Holmes and Dryzek 2002). It maintained the autonomous status of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adzharia under Georgian sovereignty, although this provision has been rejected by Abkhazia. In 2001, Shevardnadze proposed to reform the government system with the introduction of a full Council of Ministers under the prime minister as the head of government. However, due to renewed tensions between Georgia and Abkhazia the president's proposal could not be put into law (Thomas, Postgate, Jagger and East 2007).

2004 Constitutional Amendment

The constitution of Georgia was amended after Rose Revolution in 2004. The political structure of Georgia was transformed from presidential to semi-presidential or super presidential system, similar to Russian Federation and Central Asian states. The draft of this amendment had been prepared since the time of president Shevardnadze which was presented for discussion in 1998. The proposed draft could not however be passed due to the opposition by the young reformist- a break away faction from Citizen's Union party on the ground that it was an attempt to turn Georgia into an authoritarian state (Gabadava 2006). Until 2004, the design of the central government generally followed the model of the US Constitution. The president could not dissolve the parliament and needed to secure parliamentary approval when appointing minister and adopting the budget (Nodia 2007). Traditionally, the parliamentary model in Georgia is associated with a high degree of democracy, whereas the presidential model is linked with the danger of dictatorship. However, in January 2004, while debating the best desirable model for Georgia, expert rejected the Parliamentary model, labeling it as desirable but unattainable in the given reality. Also, quite unexpectedly, the "non-governmental sector" deemed the mixed system unacceptable. Therefore, a few alternative proposals emerged (Muskhelishvili 2006).

A) Maintaining the existing presidential system and, within its framework, the delegation of executive power by the president, to prime minister and cabinet.

B) Introducing the post of Vice President within the existing system, matching the reforms of the central government within the settlement of the state's territorial arrangement and the territorial distribution of power.

C) Launching large-scale constitutional reforms, stretching over two years and the holding of new parliamentary elections following the enforcement of model on the result of this reform.

Opponents saw signs of dictatorship in such a concentration of power and fear that it could be used against them in the future. However supporters of the proposed amendment justified it by stating that the concentration of power is to overcome the post-revolutionary crises in Georgia. The draft law was markedly aimed at overcoming the difficulties of the transition period as well as the rapid reforms that the government needs to implement. President Mikheil Saakashvili said "We need changes that would enable us to govern the country effectively. He further states that "There will be a strong presidential rule". Though he quoted "I am not interested in personalities" both in public speech and political actions he attached great importance to personalities. When he criticizes the previous political order, he blames Eduard Shevardnadze personally for everything. Opponents in contrast speak about institutions and structures rather persons.

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On February 6, 2004, the parliament passed an amendment which unraveled the republican balance in favor of the president. The post of prime minister and the cabinet ministers were established (Nodia 2007). The president should secure the approval from the parliament to appoint the prime minister but can dismiss him at will. Most importantly, the president acquired powers to dismiss the parliament in specific circumstances, such as in the event of three consecutive no-confidence votes delivered to the cabinet by the parliament. The creation of the cabinet ministers in the government altered the existing constitutional framework and drove it away from presidential to semi-presidential system. Although the semi-presidentialism in theory implies limited authority of the president, empowers government and strengthens parliament, the Georgian experiment produces a very different situation. In Georgia the government is responsible and accountable to the president, but not to the parliament. The parliament is at the mercy of the president- it can be quite easily dismissed, while the cabinet remains largely immune from parliament no-confidence,

if the president chooses so. The parliament's confidence/non-confidence vote becomes irrelevant in Georgia since the president can dismiss the parliament. In cases where the parliament does not approve presidential candidate(s) for the prime minister or his/her cabinet, the president is authorized to appoint them and sack the parliament. The president may nominate the same cabinet three times – even if the parliament objects. If the parliament fails to approve the nomination after the third times, the parliament may be disbanded and a new government may be appointed by presidential decree. The cabinet is rendered to be a presidential body, rather than a branch of its own. President is given extensive legislative powers, especially regarding the budget.

The president can initiate laws in the parliament and at the same time he is given the power to veto, which is extremely hard to override. Extensive budgetary powers are yet another angle of Georgian presidential authority. The budget needs the president's approval to be introduced to the parliament, if the parliament fails to approve, it is in danger of being disbanded (Gabadava 2006). In the judicial system, the president may halt or abolish the acts of the government or individual ministries if they conflict with the constitution, ordinary laws or the president's own acts. These constitutional amendments strengthen presidency and in practice, parliamentary independence decreased as a result of these changes

Unitary System

As a unitary state the president of Georgia enjoys enormous power not only in the centre but also in the regions. The president has the legal power to appoint the highest representatives for all levels of regional and local government with special status to Abkhazia, Ajaria and South Ossetia (Gritzner and Pavlovic 2005). The President appointed the governors of Georgia who govern the eight regions of the country. The governor has a twofold function: he represents the central government at the regional level and vice versa. Due to the dependency of the governor on presidential approval and appointment, the political scope might be limited and therefore the political autonomy of the regions could be restricted. This power put the regional governments at the mercy of the central government.

Abkhazia and Ajaria, however, are largely self-governed and can select their own leaders. Within the State of Georgia the Autonomous Republic of Adjara maintained a special status, while the status of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia⁵ is still undefined. Due to the autonomous status of Adjara, the institutions differ within that region to some extent. The head of the Adjara government is appointed by the president of Georgia, but with regard to other regions, his competences are guaranteed by law (backed by Law of the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara). The power of the Government of Adjara is greater compared to those of the regional governors, but still limited. Even in Adjara, the Parliament of Adjara could be suspended by the President of Georgia and acts of the Adzharian Parliament could be set off.

The administration of the government of Georgia was divided into four tiers:-

(a) State level or Central. (b) Regional. (c) Rayons or District and (d) Villages. (Jackson 2004) Tbilisi, as the capital city, holds a special status equal to that of the region. The remaining of the country is divided into 10 regions (9 established regions and Tskhinvali, a region the status which remains undetermined). The 10 regional governments are further divided into 65 districts, and approximately 60 district towns, 50 small towns, and 4,500 villages. Even the smallest units, the villages, are further divided into nearly 950 village councils. Local governments have some voice in local affairs such as taxes, economic development, education, medical care of citizens, and a number of other local services and concerns (Gritzner and Pavlovic 2005). The first nation wide elections for local-self governance councils were held on October 5, 2005. The elections were monitored by seven local watchdog organizations and other international observers including OSCE and the Council of Europe. Both the local and international observers declared the elections free and fair (Government of Georgia 2007).

Party System in Georgia

For much of the 1990s, Georgian politics was dominated by one party, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), Shevardnadze's power base. In an attempt to reinforce his authority, Shevardnadze formed the CUG, a political medley composed of various elements of the intelligentsia, regional ex-Communist leaders and Leftist political

groups, including Zurab Zhvania's Green Party (Areshidze 2003). The opposition that existed was weak and failed to mount a challenge to Shevardnadze's political dominance. During the civil war that broke out after Gamsakhurdia's ouster, the principal opposition to Shevardnadze's authority came from Gamsakhurdia's loyalist known as Zviadist. Most other political forces – the intelligentsia, political parties and former Communist elite supported the new president. However, when Georgia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, Shevardnadze lost the backing of many pro-independence politicians, who felt the CIS represented an attempt by Russia to reassert its influence across the former Soviet Union.

In 1995 Georgia adopted its first democratic, multi-party constitution. As Shevardnadze's government enacted major legislative changes in 1995 and 1996, a number of individuals closely associated with the president, including Zhvania, Mikhail Saakashvili, and Lado Chanturia, gained prominence as reformers eager to establish Western-style laws and institutions. Meanwhile, the center-right National Democratic Party (NDP) led a marginalized opposition. The Revival Party emerged in 1995 elections in the autonomous republic of Abkhazeti. The real intention of its emergence on the national political scene has always been to preserve Abkhazeti Abkhazian fiefdom rather than to lay a claim to national political role.

Before 2000, Shevardnadze faced little in the way of opposition, with the exception of the rebellious Zviadist. The CUG again performed well in the October 1999 parliamentary elections, although reports of voting irregularities marred the party's victory. In all likelihood, at least two groups – the Labor Party and the Third Way alliance- surpassed the 7% barrier necessary to enter parliament. In addition to the CUG, two other parties entered parliament in 1999: second-place finisher Revival and the Industrialist Party (Areshidze 2003).

After parliamentary elections in 1999, however, various splits developed within the CUG, and Shevardnadze's formerly dominated party rapidly lost influence. The weakening of the CUG gave birth to three distinct political forces: a group of Shevardnadze loyalists, a more radical opposition loosely classified as the Reformers Team and the New Right Party, a more moderate opposition that views Shevardnadze

as a guarantor of international stability, but which is also critical of the government's domestic policy.

Political parties in Georgia have not grown out of social cleavages, do not represent large segment of society and are difficult to identify on the left-right spectrum of classical political ideologies. While political polarization, primarily around the pro-regime fault line tends to be quite high in Georgia, ideological polarization is not. Ostensibly, differences between parties in Georgia do not hinge on different ideological positions, and, to the extent that differences in ideological positions are discernable they are of secondary value in informing voter's choices (Bader 2008). During most of the first 15 years of independence, the power balance within the party system was that of one dominant force and a great number of parties mostly opposition parties. Parties of powers have dominated legislatures both under the Shevardnadze (CUG) and Saakashvili presidencies (United National Movement)

Around the turn of the 21st century, the Citizen's Union of Georgia lost its ability to unite the political elite, when influential young politicians such as Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze defected and started creating their own opposition parties. The political forces of these politicians subsequently were at the forefront of the Rose Revolution. Saakashvili and other Georgian opposition leaders formed a "United People's Alliance" in November 2003 to bring together the United National Movement, the United Democrats, the Union of National Solidarity and the youth movement "Kmara" in a loose alliance against the government of President Eduard Shevardnadze. After successfully electing Saakashvili in the presidential re-election held on 4 January, 2004, the United National Movement and the United Democrats amalgamated on February 5, 2004; the UNM retained its name but its parliamentary faction is called the National Movement-Democrats.

Since the Rose Revolution, the party system is dominated by the National Movement-Democrats. In the fresh parliamentary elections held on March 28, 2004, the United National Movement's parliamentary faction, the NMD, secured the vast majority of the seats (with ca. 75% of the votes). Only one other party reached the 7% threshold; the Rightist Opposition with ca. 7.5%.

After the Rose Revolution, presidential powers were further increased simultaneously with the introduction of formal semi-presidentialism through the creation of the post of prime minister. Strong presidential power in combination with weak parliamentarianism has the following negative consequences for party development and party system institutionalization in Georgia (Bader 2008).

1) The relative weakness of the legislature means that the main prize of political competition is for control over the executive, which take away much of the incentive for creating strong and durable parties.

2)The fact that cabinet in Georgia are formed not on the basis of a majority parliamentary coalition, but directly by the president, further decreases the importance of parties.

3)Presidents in strong presidential regimes often prefer to present themselves as standing above party politics and similarly tend to appoint non-partisan politicians to government posts. This circumstance leads aspiring high-rank politician to refrain from seeking party affiliation as a party affiliation could hamper their careers.

Ethnicity in the Politics of Georgia

The ethnic composition of Georgia has greatly impact the political system and political nature of the country. The multi-ethnic composition often led to the rise of the demand for autonomy and secession from the country. Georgia was ethnically diverse state, with relatively small but geographically concentrated minorities: Abkhazians in Abkhazia, Ossetians in South Ossetia, Armenians in the South, and Azeris in the Southeast (Holmes, Dryzek 2002). About 70 of the population were ethnically Georgian. In the past, the growth of nationalism among the various ethnic groups has been balanced by different rulers who ruled over Georgia. The collapse of Soviet Union and the birth of newly independent Georgia allowed the unchecked growth of nationalism among the different ethnic groups in Georgia. The rise of Georgian nationalism let ethnic conflict with other minor groups, who were also the experiencing the same wave of nationalism. The attempt to impose Georgian identity on the state and suppression of national minorities took the country into a serious ethnic and civil strife for the following three years.

The newly elected president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia- a strident Georgian nationalist, sought to quell the Ossetians' aspiration for greater sovereignty, first unilaterally abolished the autonomy of the region and then used force against it (Areshidze, Lansky 2008). This was strongly opposed by South Ossetians who seek reunification with North Ossetia in Russian Federation. Secession war broke out between Georgia and South Ossetia which lasted for two years from 1991-92 in which most of the ethnic-Georgians were driven out from the region. In the mid 1992 a ceasefire was reached between the two parties, authorizing the stationing of Russia forces as peacekeepers.

After the civil war in January 1992, accused of dictatorial tendencies, Gamsakhurdia's regime was confronted by armed opposition. He was soon deposed and was succeeded by Eduard Shevardnadze. In the same year, the second separatist conflict broke out in Abkhazia. In the clash between Abkhaz forces and Georgian National Troops, more than 8,000 people lost their lives. The conflict led to the ethnic cleansing and displacement of 300,000 people mostly the Georgians. The Abkhazians who aspire for independence won the war and declared independence in 1994 which is unrecognized by the international community till today (Thomas, Postgate, Jagger and East 2007). Though the declaration of independence by Abkhazia remained unrecognized, the anti-Georgian sentiments and the struggle to break away continued. The 1995 constitution of Georgia which recognized the autonomous status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was rejected by Abkhazia. In 2001 tension between the two broke out again. On May 2004, Saakashvili threatened and diplomat Abashidze to leave his position, ultimately Abashidze resigned and was exiled in Russia.

During the Soviet era the region of Abkhazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia had the status of "Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic" within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the Autonomous region of Adjara the political situation remained stable during these years of conflict due to the authoritarian rule by Abashidze. Unlike South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Adjara did not claim full independence since they consider themselves Georgian, ethnically (CrisisGroup 2004). The civil war remains one of the most dramatic and divisive events in the history of modern Georgia. A once prosperous Georgia was completely divested during the three years of conflict, with the economy and industry shattered. The civil

war strengthens separatist movement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The collapse of central authority led to the rise of criminal gangs in different parts of the country. Further more, Georgian society split into two irreconcilable sides which engaged in a vicious struggle in the next decades (Mikaberidze 2007). Ethnic diversity remains a destructive threat towards the process of democratization and territorial integrity of Georgia. Georgia still lacks jurisdiction control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Halmiton 2004). Shevardnadze attempt to integrate Abkhazia to Georgia in 1992 resulted more bloodshed leaving his dream unfulfilled. Neither Shikashvilli could bring territorial unity of the country. His mission to bring back South Ossetia in 2008 completely failed (Bhadrakumar 2008). However territorial integrity encompassing the multi ethnicity of the country continues to occupy to priority in the policy of the government.

Presidential System in Ukraine

Though Ukraine emerged as an independent state in 1991, the Soviet Ukraine constitution of 1978 remained effective until 1996, when the new constitution was adopted. The old constitution was repeatedly amended from 1991-1996 and the new constitution too had further undergone several amendments. As a result the Ukrainian political system keeps changing from one form to another, revolving around different form of presidential system. The political system of Ukraine from 1991-1996 was Semi-presidential, while from 1996-2006 there was presidential form and from 2006-2008 the Ukrainian political system turned to be Parliamentarized Semi-presidentialism (Anieri 2007).

In a true semi-presidential system, the prime minister reliant on the parliament for his or her position. This gives parliament considerable influence over the operation of the executive branch. Independent Ukraine inherited from Soviet Ukraine what appeared to be a pure model of parliamentary government. With no formally identified prime minister, the speaker of the parliament emerged as the de facto head of government, and there was no head of the state. Following the declaration of independence, there was a rush to create all the formal institution of a state, to show domestically or internationally that this was truly sovereign state that would have state-to-state relations with other states, including Russia. Therefore, the office of president was

created as an official symbol of an independent state. In creating the presidency, the parliament could maintain control over the government. These included the parliamentary right to veto executive decrees, the right to override a presidential veto with only a simple majority vote (which effectively means no presidential veto), the right to reject the appointment of key ministers, and the right to dismiss the entire cabinet. The president had no right to dissolve the parliament or call new elections.

Also in the fall of 1991, the office of prime minister was created to divide executive power even further. While the president would be head of the state, the prime minister would be the head of the government i.e. the day-to day workings of the executive branch would be controlled by the prime minister, who would be responsible to both the president and the parliament. Thus, within a matter of months Ukraine went from having no separate head of the state executive branch to having two. In creating two powerful new offices, no workable constitutional provisions were made for either of the new offices or for the existing organ that were presumably giving up some responsibility to them.

From 1991 until the establishment of the 1996 constitution, Ukraine had four-headed government, with executive authority unclearly divided among the president, prime minister, parliament and parliamentary speaker. There was no new constitution still, the prerogatives of the separate offices were not clearly delineated, and because there was, moreover, no functioning court system to sort things out, there ensued a pitched battle for control over the prime minister and the cabinet, with the prime minister trying to carve out some space for independence while the president and the parliament each sought greater control at the other's expense. The period from 1991-1996 might be defined as semi-presidential, for the parliament had more influence over the cabinet minister than the president. Even in that era, the prime minister was selected by the president (Anieri 2007).

The 1996 constitution of Ukraine gave immense power to the presidency. It created a strong presidential system. At the same time, parliament has been relatively weak both in paper and in reality. This new constitution gave the president the powers to appoint the holders of most government, judicial, and military offices, to appoint the prime minister and the cabinet, to issue decrees with equal status to parliament

legislation, to initiate legislation, to name the head of oblast and radion state administrations, and, most crucially, to dissolve the parliament if it failed to approved the government's program twice in sixty days. The powers over appointments of various officers as well as local and regional administrations would give the president massive patronage power reaching down into the government and into local government. This made very difficult to raise challenges against the resident. Power to issue legislation by degree meant that there is no need for the president to comprise with the parliament. There was no mechanism to resolve contradictions between presidential decrees and parliamentary legislation. However, it was clear what would happen when the president and parliament fundamentally disagreed: parliament would be dissolved. In such conditions, the president would have no reason to compromise, and the parliament would have no ground on which to stand when it disagreed with the president.

The political system of Ukraine from 1996-2006 did not require the prime minister to have a majority in the parliament, and the parliament's control over the prime minister was weak, and it therefore makes sense to classify the Ukrainian system as fully presidential. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skatch define a "pure presidential regime" as one of mutual independence in which "the legislature has affixed electoral mandate which is its own source of legitimacy" and the executive also "has a fixed electorate mandate that is its own sources of legitimacy". This characterization fits Ukraine from 1996 to 2006. The new constitution which operates from 1996-2006 the prime minister was dependent almost entirely on the president for his or her position. The prime minister as well as the other minister were chosen by the president and could be fired by the president. The parliament had only the power to confirm the prime minister and some other ministers, and to vote no confidence in the prime minister. But it had no authority to name the prime minister or other ministers and no control over the executive branch. Hence using Linz's definition of presidential system as one in which the president possess "full control of the composition of the composition of the cabinet". We can safely define Ukraine from 1996-2006 as a presidential system (Anieri 2007).

In Ukraine the president is elected by the people for a fixed term, which means that the president is not dependent on parliament confidence to retain office. He or she

needs to maintain the confidence of the people to be reelected, and cannot be dismissed, except through impeachment, which is extremely difficult to practice. Besides making the president completely independent of the parliament, the popular election of the president allows him or her to claim that the parliament is impeding the will of the people when it opposes him. The parliaments of course, are also directly elected but they rarely speak with a single clear voice, and do not possess the symbolic voice of the people that the president does.

The deal that led to the rerunning of the second round of the 2004 presidential election included substantial changes to the constitution, which took effect in early 2006. The balance of power between the president, the prime minister, and parliament has been substantially modified. The new arrangement strikes a compromise between those who sought to maintain a very strong presidency, and those who advocate a shift to a fully parliamentary system.

The amendments shift power away from the president, and toward the prime minister and parliament. According to the new provisions, the prime minister has the power to name most of the ministers. Several key posts will continue to be appointed by the president: these include the minister of defense and foreign affairs, the heads of the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Security and Defense Council, the National Bank, and the procurator general. Parliament will also be able to dismiss ministers individually, increasing the parliament's ability to influence policy in individual ministers. Thus the ministers will serve at the pleasure of both the president and the parliament. The term of office of the cabinet of ministers has been changed to coincide with parliamentary, rather than presidential elections. When a new parliament is elected a new cabinet will be named based on the majority in the new parliament (Anieri 2007).

Unitary Model

Soon after attaining independence, there was a debate over what system of government should be adopted in Ukraine. Political parties and elites across the country were divided into two groups with one group propagating federalism and the other supporting unitarilism. Federalist ideas enjoy the support of the regional elites

and parties rooted in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The national-democrats, the Lefts and the president Leonid Kuchma opposed federalism and support for unitary establishment in Ukraine. The supporter of federalism argued that economic autonomy of region would provide better and more efficient economic potential to counteract regional disparities and deal with the economic grievances of the country. Since the regional parties won only few seats in the 1994 parliamentary election, the called for territorial autonomy of national minorities fell on the deaf ears both with the national-democrats and the Left because such autonomy interfered with the conception of nationhood. While the regional, pro-federal elites lacked representation in the parliament, they looked to president as a champion of their interest. Although Leonid Kuchma skillfully propagated federalism during the election campaign, once elected he not only never openly supported federalism but advocate the centralized model of state. He argued that regions had to concede their autonomy for the shake of economic reforms. The national-democrats which took the lead in opposing federalism rejected federalism on the ground that Ukraine needed to become single organism and integrate its regions into one political entity. The party insisted that first of all there had to be a strong state to tighten the unity of the country from the existing regional, cultural and linguistic cleavages. In Ukraine federalism is regarded as one that harms the integrity of the state and even hostile to the very idea of Ukrainian statehood. The June 1996 constitution defines Ukraine as a Unitary state with the sole exception of the Crimea as its only autonomous region (Kuzio 1998).

Ukraine is subdivided into twenty-four oblasts (provinces), one autonomous republic- Crimea, and two cities- Kiev, the capital city and Sevastopol having a legal special status. The 24 oblasts and Crimea are subdivided into 490 districts, or second-level administrative units. The territorial administrative division of Ukraine reflects the country's model of unitary political system. This division is based on the combination of centralization and decentralization (Article 132). The centre government has a strong power over the administration of the local governments- 24 oblast, Crimea, the two cities Kiev and Sevastopol and districts. The executive power in oblasts, districts, and in the Cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol is exercised by local state administrations. Particular aspects of the exercise of executive power in the Cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol are determined by special laws of Ukraine. The heads of local state administrations are appointed to office and dismissed from office by the President of

Ukraine upon the submission of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. In the exercise of their duties, the heads of local state administrations are responsible to the President of Ukraine and to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Decisions of the heads of local state administrations that contravene the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, other acts of legislation of Ukraine, may be revoked by the President of Ukraine or by the head of the local state administration of a higher level, in accordance with the law. He can issue decrees and can appoint presidential representatives to oversee policy implementation by local authorities.

Multi-Party System

During the soviet period Ukraine had a unilateral party system with Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) as the only party of the state. On 16 July, 1990 the Ukrainian parliament proclaimed a declaration of sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR. In October 1990, Article 6 of the Ukrainian constitution which prohibits the existence of parties other than KPU was abolished as a result of which political parties were officially recognized and multiparty system began to emerged (Haran, Kerstin 2008). Though multi-party system developed at the central and region in the post March 1990 elections, it was underdeveloped and nearly all political parties still lacked organizational or social roots, and had only regional based. Most parties were in fact little more than personality-based factions. The new government banned KPU from 1991-1993, however it may be noted that when the KPU was banned in August 1991, most of the capable leaders had already left the party. They formed party-like associations or informal political groupings called “party of power”-which continue to control the politics of the country. In the 1994 parliamentary election the “party of power” fielded candidates as independents and they predominated in parliament and the second largest group was the re-legalized KPU (Kuzio 2000).

Until the second post independent elections in 1998, Ukraine suffered from unfavorable conditions for the formation of the competitive party system. The negative attitude and policies of the ruling Ukrainian Communist elites in the late 1980s and early 1990s toward emerging alternative political organizations discredited the very institution of the political party in the eyes of the public. The informal party of power which controlled the executive and managerial positions across the nation

and held the majority of Rada seat after the 1994 elections was not interested in the development of organized parties. A combination of strong nonparty president, weak discipline of the parliamentary parties, and electoral legislation that was clearly biased against political organizations further undermined the institutionalization of the Ukrainian party system. Since the 1998 elections, the Ukrainian party system has shown signs of movement toward greater political institutionalization (Meleshevich 2007).

The Ukrainian parliamentary elections in 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2007 were held under three different electoral systems. The 1994 parliamentary elections took place under the same rule of 1990. In 1997, a new electoral law was introduced according to which half of the deputies were elected from national party list in proportional election with a four percent threshold and the remaining half of deputies elected in majoritarian districts. The 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections were held under this new law. In the 2006 parliamentary elections and the 2007 pre-term elections were held under full proportional system with a three percent threshold with deputies elected on party lists (Haran , Kerstin 2008).

The Ukrainian party system is fragmented along regional and ethnical lines. A significant divide between the South-East and that of the west-Center of Ukraine has persisted in every election held since 1990 and regionalized voting was discernible in the 2006 and 2007 elections. The elections in 1990 showed that regional differences rather than sociological cleavages accounted for voting patterns. The east continued to be the strongest recruitment base for the KPU as well as bureaucrats and economic managers, whereas the Democratic Bloc received most of its support in the western regions.

The Ukrainian political parties may broadly be divided into- the leftist, the centrist, the center-right parties and far right. Though Ukrainian political parties emerged with these new names, the ruling elites remained the same people of the soviet era. The bulk of the former Communist elite remained in power after independence. They formed informal networks and constituted the party of power, which was later formalized into various versions of centrist parties which mostly lacked a clear ideology (Kuzio 2000).

The Ukrainian left parties are historically and, to a great extent, ideologically connected to the KPU which was an organic part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (KPSS). The main left parties after 1991 were Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) re-legalized in 1993, the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) established in the fall 1991, the Peasant Party of Ukraine (SelPU) established in 1992 and the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU) that broke away from SPU in 1996. The centrist parties emerged only in the 1998 elections after the emergence of powerful economic actors during the 1990s. The centrists are not successor parties to the KPU in ideological terms. But they inherited much of the political culture of the KPU, such as a very centralized power structure, political and economic conservatism and command-administrative methods. There was continuity of personnel from the banned KPU. The main parties of the centrist are- People's Democratic Party (NDP)- a party formed by Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDVU) and Labor Congress of Ukraine United, Our Ukraine, Donetsk Party of Power, the Party of Regions, Party for a Beautiful Ukraine and the Ukraine Party of Pensioners.

Social and Regional Division in the Politics of Ukraine

The political nature of Ukrainian is largely determined by ethnic, region and ideology of the people. From the early days of its history until today Ukraine has been sharply divided by diverging political, ethnic influences and deep geographical divisions- between the west and the east (Morlino and Magen 2009). The most developed and influential, industrial East and South of Ukraine, which dominated the republic's political and economic life during the Soviet era, belong to the Russian Empire for centuries and were to a large extent Russified. The people in these two regions did not assigned great importance to Ukrainian language, ethnicity, anti-Russian sentiments or national independence. The Autonomous Republic of Crimea maintains strong political and cultural ties with the Russian Federation (which was until 1963 Crimea part of the Russian Federation). On the other hand, the western areas of Ukraine experienced strong political and cultural influences from Poland and the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As such, nationalism is strong in this region and they are pro-west in their outlook. They continue to be a fertile breeding ground for the national and pro-independence movement (Yitzhak, Finkel 2008). Consequently, the political life of modern Ukraine

was divided into two contradict groups- the pro-west and the pro-east. In Ukraine, ethnicity, language and religion do not coincide but rather overlap in different directions and become destructive for nation building and democratization (Snyder, Rubin 1998).

Parties of Ukraine have been affiliated to certain region and ideology. Accordingly the most prominent leftist party (the communist) derives its support disproportionately from Russian speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine, while rightist parties are weakest in those regions and strongest in the west, where use of Ukrainian language and self-identification are highest (Anier 2007). The Communist Party gained 20 percent of the popular vote in the 1994 parliamentary elections and 25 percent in 1998 in the industrial Russian-speaking east of Ukraine. The pro-nationalistic party 'Rukh' received a significant share of the electorate in the rural Ukrainian-speaking west, 5 percent of the 1994 parliamentary election votes and 10 percent of those in 1998.

Parties tend to be identified largely with particular region, but on difficult issues, even parties from the same regions do not vote together. So, despite the strong regional flavor of Ukraine's party system, parties in the parliament are driven by left-right rather than linguistic or ethnic issues. There were enmity and power struggle between the left and right and that they could not come together for several years. Ideological enmity was deep rooted in the politics of Ukraine. In the 1996 constitution, the reason why the Right forces were willing to transfer power from parliament to executive was not because of any principle or belief about good constitutional design, but just because the parliament was control by the Left. This enables president Kuchma to adopt the policy of divide and rule between these two groups and became authoritarian. However, occasional alliances between left and right became increasingly frequent after 2000. When the stakes were high enough, as Kuchma became more authoritarian and the 2004 election approached, various parties made necessary compromises which led to the emergence of coalition-building in Ukraine politics. In Ukrainian politics different cleavages seem predominant at different levels. At the level of elections- both presidential and parliamentary elections, regional effects have a strong influence. Within the parliament, however, left-right cleavages have deeper influence than regional factors (Anier 2007).

Comparison of Georgian and Ukraine Political System

Georgia and Ukraine have unitary and semi-presidential political system. The parliament and the prime minister are weak in both the countries and are largely depending on the mercy of the president. Despite of the concentration and centralization of power, and the authoritarian nature of the political system, the nature of power sharing at the centre and the centre's power over the regional administration differ in certain areas. Before color revolutions – Rose revolution in Georgia and Orange Revolution in Ukraine, presidential system prevailed in both the countries. During this period Ukraine has both the posts of prime minister and cabinet minister, whereas in Georgia neither the post of cabinet minister nor prime minister had been existed. The post of prime minister and cabinet ministers was introduced in Georgia only after the rose revolution. Whereas Ukraine president was vested with the power to dissolve parliament, Georgian president had no such power to dissolve parliament, instead the president is to secure the approval of the parliament at the time of appointing ministers and adopting budget. There had been constitutional amendments that altered the political system of Georgia and Ukraine. After the overthrow of the semi authoritarian regimes, the new governments in Georgia and Ukraine enacted constitutional amendment in 2004. In Georgia the political system was shifted from presidential to semi or super presidential system and in Ukraine the shift was from presidential to parliamentarized semi presidential system. Both the presidents were given the power to dismiss the parliament, the power which can undermine the powers of parliament and prime minister. Under the new system, the prime minister and the parliament of Ukraine are more powerful that their counterparts in Georgia.

As a strong centralized state both the president of Georgia and Ukraine appoint and dismiss the head of administrators (governors) of the regional/provincial governments. The head of regional administration act as an agent of the president. The president ensures his control over the regional provinces through these agents who are in turn responsible to him. In the territorial administrative division, certain provinces both in Georgia and Ukraine have special status- Crimea in Ukraine and, Abkhazia, Adjara and South Ossetia in Georgia. The autonomous region of Crimea and Adjara are administered within the constitution of Ukraine and Georgia respectively. However, Abkhazia and Ajara are administered independent of Georgia.

Though the declaration of independence by these two provinces had not been recognized, these two regions remained outside the control of Georgian government. This shows that Ukraine has a better or stronger political system than that of Georgia.

Multi-party system exists in Georgia and Ukraine. A number of political parties based on region and ideology operate and oppositions are allowed in both the countries. However, the election law – the threshold on election which largely determine the party's entry to the parliament have a wide gap between the two countries. The Ukrainian elections were held under different laws. The latest law on election adopted on 2005 replacing the 2001 law on election reduced the threshold from 4% to 3%. (ECFD Venice Commission at its 78th Plenary Session) Whereas in Georgia a party or an electoral bloc running in parliamentary elections must garner at least 7% of the votes in order to gain a seat in the country's legislative body. The Council of Europe has been calling on the Georgian authorities to reduce the current threshold to at least 5% (Crisis Group 2004).

Chapter 3

Color Revolution, Regime Change and Super Imposed Democracy

The post-Cold War period has witnessed the emergence of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes in the post-Communist newly formed democratic countries. A number of such regimes have experienced democratic revolutions in the form of civil society upheavals frequently referred to as color revolutions. The exposure of electoral fraud that sparked popular uprisings has led to the demise of authoritarian rulers (Calingaert Daniel 2006). In the color revolutions that broke out in Georgia and Ukraine, most significant contribution was made by the internationally sponsored NGOs which played a major role in overthrowing the semi-authoritarian, pro-Russian regimes and replaced with new pro-democratic and pro-west governments.

Georgia on the eve of Rose Revolution

After gaining independence, Georgia like the other post-Soviet countries was faced with many obstacles- civil war and ethnic conflicts, which were followed by economic instability (Esadze 2004). The economic, social and political crises devolved Georgia to a little more than a failed state, enduring a decade of “chaos, poverty and fragmentation”. Nearly 20 percent of its territory was beyond the central government’s control. Abkhazia and South Ossetia had seceded under Russian protection. Adjara was controlled by its local potentate, Aslan Abashidze, who ignored central institutions and laws. To the South, the Armenian region of Jayakheti was more closely integrated into neighboring Armenia than Georgia.

Georgia’s high level of corruption and organized crime is a direct legacy of Georgian history and its Soviet past. After centuries of domination by foreign rulers and most recently by the Russian empire and the Soviet state, Georgians became alienated from the central state. Their ethnic identity, family and immediate community became central, a tradition that fostered nepotism. The state was never seen as constituted by or for the

people but was instead a force imposed from the outside. In Georgia, where personal relationships and family often carry more importance than loyalty to the central state, it appears that personal relationships and interests routinely prevail to the detriment of the state. Georgia's economic hardship in the post independence has further deepened the population's reliance on and attachment to personal networks rather than official institutions (Latta, Scott and Shelley 2007). The Soviet-era system had not collapse with the collapse of Soviet Union and the political changes since 1989 had not seriously damaged the networks because most officials at the lower and middle levels of the state were not changed (Esadze 2004).

Corruption in Georgia encompassed all forms of illegal exchanges, including large-scale embezzlement by high officials, small-scale extortion of bribes by traffic policemen, and nepotism at all levels of the state structure. Corruption is very well structured from the top down and between various state agencies. Horizontal and vertical structures of corruption seriously undermine the impact of formal institutions of democratic control.

When in 1992 Shevardnadze succeeded Gamsakhurdia as the second president, the people had high reputation that he would redress the country's problems of corruption and crime, but the expectation took a negative turn. His publicized efforts to fight crime and corruption often promoted personal and political objectives rather than addressing the core problem. Under Shevardnadze, Georgia devolved into a weak country (Mitchell 2004) enduring a decade of "chaos, poverty and fragmentation" (Jones 2006). He blatantly filled the pockets of oligarchs and officials who helped him to come to power instead of feeding the people. Corruption was rampant and government officials misappropriated international aid and sold off state industries to their associates. Bribery became the main force in politics. Unprofessionals were appointed to key post in the government and oligarchy became stronger. The state could not deliver basic services, repair the crumbling infrastructure, enforce the law, or collect taxes (Mitchell 2004). The socio-economic condition under this situation was disastrous. The people lived in poverty and social problems became severe. Even in the capital electricity or running water shortage was frequent. In the countryside, the situation was even more precarious.

Georgia's per capita income was reduced to lower than that of Swaziland and more than half of the population lived below the poverty line (Tudoroiu 2007).

The Georgian education system which was once known for its high quality slipped down speedily. Funds granted for infrastructure were embezzled. Bribery was wide spread in the top universities. As such medical graduates did not know medicine; lawyers did not know the law and engineers had not learned the fundamentals of construction. The condition of road deteriorated. Research conducted by TraCCC researchers revealed that funds for road repair were embezzled, and new road construction funded by World Bank loans and support from the Kuwait Development Foundation resulted in roads that deteriorated within days of construction. The chief administrator of the railroads, one of the most corrupt officials of the Shevardnadze era, stole so much from the railway system, tracks could not be maintained. Both passengers and flight transport were severely undermined. The government failed to enforce Laws on basic sanitation standard. Dead fish were smoked and sold in the market. Tainted wine was bottled and sold commercially. Even the elderly pensions, seven dollars a month were embezzled by the Georgian postal bank that distributes it (Latta, Scott and Shelley 2007).

The Georgian state, crippled by corruption, was extremely weak. The organized criminals, who emerged due to the institutionalized corruption of the Shevardnadze era, further weakened the Georgian state. These organized criminals and corruptors jeopardize both the politics and economy of the state. The criminals controlled the most important sectors of the Georgian economy - hotels, restaurants, retail trade and they drove out potential investors who cannot compete against those who use criminal tactics to protect their financial investment. They contributed to political campaigns or run candidates for office. Members of parliament and high-level state bureaucrats protected them. Criminal like Ioselani served as a political advisor in the Shevardnadze's government. The criminals and crooked officials did not worry about the possible penalties of breaking the law because of the weakness of the state (Esadze 2004).

Shevardnadze employed the method of election rigged in order to cover his unpopularity and to sustain his presidential position. In both the 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections, Shevardnadze's party Citizen's Union of Georgia took the first place and he was elected president. Though these elections were rigged, the US was silent because they were in good terms with the president. The US was still silent in the 1999 parliamentary election which was again rigged. Shevardnadze won the 2000 presidential election by approximately 80 percent of the vote, but the poll was marred by myriad incidents of serious electoral fraud, including group voting, ballot-box stuffing, police presence in polling stations, and a lack of transparency in vote-counting and tabulation. These events, coupled with discontent over ailing economic reforms and a dwindling standard of living, contributed to a significant drop in support for the regime. Because of the rising crime, widespread corruption and deepening poverty Eduard Shevardnadze became unpopular and lost the support of his people (Bowker 2007). Even his close ally Zurab Zhvania and Mikhail Saakashvili now distanced from Shevardnadze and became the main force of opposition. Zhvania was the Chairman of Parliament who had resigned and Saakashvili was Shevardnadze's former supporter. Saakashvili formed a new political party called the "National Movement", and quickly became Shevardnadze's number one enemy. He became the leader of Rose Revolution, against Shevardnadze regime's corruption and election rigged.

The Rose Revolution

The parliamentary election of Georgia was held on 2nd November, 2003. Even worse than the previous elections this time, it was reported that voting was marked by rampant ballot stuffing, multiple voting, late poll openings, and ballots not being delivered to some polling places, and voter lists that included dead people but excluded thousands of live voters. The scale of the fraud was even higher during the counting of the votes. The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) conducted a parallel vote and turnout tabulation (Tudoroiu 2007). An exit poll funded by the west was also conducted by Rustavi-2. Rustavi2 contracted the Global Strategic Group USA to take the exit polls result. The government was against the use of exit polls by any organization and tried to break it down but was in vain. The government called the Austrian

sociological group Sora to take exit polls results. By the evening of the election, the exit poll results were different from one another. Global Strategic Group showed that Saakashvili's National Movement was the election's clear winner while Sora claimed government bloc had won the election. The counting of votes took two weeks after which the Central Election Commission published the result of the elections. The result placed the government's bloc - For a New Georgia in the first place followed by the Union of Democratic Revival, the National Movement, the labor Party, the Burdjanadze Democrats, and the New Rightists. This contradicts the result of parallel counting conducted by ISFED (Fair Election) which claimed the National Movement the winner followed by For a New Georgia, the Labor party, the United Democrats, the Union of Democratic Revival. Consequently, the opposition refused to accept the election's official outcome and warned the government Shevardnadze to change the official result and recognized the result of Fair Elections and the victory of the National Movement.

A mass protest against the election result and a demand for the president Shevardnadze's resignation was launched for twenty days from 3rd to 23rd November 2003 (Kandelaki 2006). It began a vigil in front of the Parliament building. As long as the number of the protester remained small the government ignored their demands but scene soon changed dramatically. Each day showed the rapid increase in the number of protesters. On 9th November when the election commission stopped counting the votes because of the ongoing court challenges, opposition leaders Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze, and Zurab Zhvania met Shevardnadze but the president refused to resign. Saakashvili soon called for civil disobedience which spread to state institutions such as schools throughout the country. Groups of well-known artists, writers and poets too joined the demonstration. The president intended to use force to suppress the protesters, but could not, due to internal split among the army, police and the presidential guards, Assuming as an alternative means to crush the demonstrators, the president appealed to Adjara's strong man - the secessionist Aslan Abashidze, who sent his supporters to organize a counter-demonstration in front of the Parliament. This action backfired, since Shevardnadze was seen as relying on Georgia's very enemy. The government was unmoved by the protesters and went ahead with the official election result. Tensions were

exacerbated on November 20 after the final official results were released and the composition of the new Parliament was announced. On November 22, as Shevardnadze was formally opening the new legislative session, Saakashvili led a peaceful protest of 30,000 people with roses in their hands against the opening of the new parliament. The mob proceeded to the chamber to disrupt the session, the government troops refused to stop the invaders, the protesters placed roses in their barrels, Shevardnadze was hustled out of the chamber by his supporters. The president immediately declared state emergency, he however resigned on the next day. Fresh presidential elections were held on 4 January 2004 which resulted in the victory of Saakashvili with 66% of the vote, against the other five candidates (Thomas, Postgate, Jagger and Roger 2007).

Corruption in Ukraine before Orange Revolution

As a young independent state, Ukraine was badly weakened by the practice of corruption in the country. The fight against corruption date backs to early 1990's. The main pre-Orange Revolution legislative acts containing anti-corruption regulations are: the Law of Ukraine "On Civil Service" of December 16, 1993; the Law of Ukraine "On Combating Corruption" of April 3, 1997; the Criminal Code of Ukraine of September 1, 2001 (Karatnycky, Neutze 2007). Despite various anti-corruption measures initiated by the government, the spread of corruption in the country could not be checked. Bribery and illegal practices prevailed at all levels of the government. There was a strong inter-linkage between business and politics. The Kuchma regime maintained a system in which political power ensured economic advancement and vice versa. People loyal to the regime were rewarded with huge state wealth. The support base of Kuchma was built on practices such as overt corruption, clientelism, and patronage, rather than on a solid political base. By the early 21st century corruption was wide spread in Ukraine. During Kuchma's second term in office, Ukraine witnessed record of economic growth, reaching a 12% increase in GDP between 2003 and 2004 (McFaul 2006). However, high levels of corruption in Ukraine denied Kuchma the popular support that twelve percent growth should have generated for him. Kuchma's unwillingness to fight corruption became one of the central factors driving his unpopularity. In 2003, Transparency International ranked Ukraine 106th out of 133 countries in the world, indicating high level of

corruption, while Nations in Transit gave corruption in the country a score of 5.75 out of 7 possible. The World Bank Good Governance project scored Ukraine among the lowest quartile in the ranking of corrupt countries and gave it a score of -90, barely better than Georgia. The revelations of corruption and political violence reduced the popularity of the regime and public support decline drastically. Because of the high level of corruption Kuchma regime was seen as undemocratic and people's expectation that a new democratic government would eliminate corruption became the major reason of their support for the opposition against the corrupt regime (Spirova 2008).

Organized Crime in Ukraine

There has been a close inter-relationship between organized crime and corruption. The rapid growth of organized crime in Ukraine was largely due to the destabilization of state power as a result of the collapse of the USSR. In the first decade of independence, economic reforms in Ukraine did not serve to deter economic crime, but rather get encouraged the conditions under which it could thrive (Kalman 2004). The unsuccessful political, economic and legal reforms by the newly democratic government of Ukraine, has led to social instability, and the criminally-minded part of the population took advantage of this situation (Aromaa and Nevala 2003).

Realistically, organized crime cannot exist without the cooperation of government entities. The criminal-political nexus permeates the highest reaches of power in the administrative branches of government. Industries, backed by their own private security forces, have close ties to the security apparatus, the police, and the military, and often to the criminal world. The largest are attached to the banking and oil and gas industries. Officials in Ukraine aid their long-term associates from the shadow economy with whom they are inextricably linked in complex financial relationships. Sometimes this assistance is not financial but protects them from the application of the criminal law (Shelley1998).

The criminal-political nexus in Ukraine has a major impact on the electoral and legislative process by sponsoring candidates for parliament and pressuring individuals in the legislatures to develop policies that serve their interests. This became a problem at

both the national and regional levels. According to the Ukrainian security service, forty-four people in various degrees of criminal activity have already been elected to local political bodies. Penetration also existed at the ministerial level and was reported as early as 1993. Hryhory Omelchenko, a member of the Rada Committee on Fighting Organized Crime and Corruption, asserts that more than twenty members of the new parliament cannot be brought to trial.

A large group of criminals or criminal link individuals who were elected as a representative, were reluctant to implement a criminal laws against the criminals and many organized crime groups were left free hand. The negligence of criminal activities led to the increasing number of criminals in the country. In 1973–1981, the total number of registered crimes was 1,447,045; in 1982–1990 2,350,442 crimes; and in 1991–2000 their number was 5,520,506. Compared to 1973, the growth in the crime rate was 184% in 1983; 500% in 1995, and 431% in the year 2000. During 9 months of 2002, the gangs and criminal organizations throughout Ukraine committed 5,298 crimes, of which 4,340 belonged to the category of common criminal offences (Aromaa and Nevala 2003).

Rigged Elections

After relatively free and fair elections in 1994 and 1998, some election infringements were registered in the 1999 presidential elections. There was little doubt though, the incumbent Leonid Kuchma would defeat Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko. During Kuchma's second term in office the enormity and brazenness of election fraud has grown. The 1999 campaign was much dirtier than its 1994 predecessor, perhaps because since Kuchma shored up its institutional power, the presidency has become more important, although this was not fully reflected in the 1996 Constitution.

In the 2002 parliamentary elections, 219 candidates were de-registered, of whom only ten were re-instated. A general election results in Yushchenko's Our Ukraine coalition having a plurality of seats in the parliament, but not a majority. The opposition parties alleged electoral fraud and Yushchenko became the leader of the anti-president opposition in parliament. The opposition staged mass protests demanding the resignation of President

Kuchma. The U.S. officials authenticate audio recordings made in 2000 on which Kuchma was apparently heard to order an official to "deal with" journalist Georgiy Gongadze. In addition to his unwillingness to fight corruption, Kuchma involvement in the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze, the founder of the internet publication, *Ukrainskaya Prava* became another important factor of his low public rating and unpopularity. Tapes of conversations between Kuchma and subordinates leaked to the press strongly suggested that the Ukrainian president played a role in ordering Gongadze's execution. More than any other single event, Gongadze's murder exposed the illegitimacy of Kuchma and his allies (McFaul 2006).

Electoral falsification under Kuchma was remarkably extensive, thoroughly planned, and well organized. During election, the government institutions such as hospitals, schools and military bases became key instruments in the regime's vote-stealing efforts. Those people in charge of such institutions helped mobilize votes and ensured high vote shares in support of the incumbent regime. Kuchma adopted the policy of reward and punishment in regards to his election policy. The officials who complied with his directions were heavily rewarded and those who disobeyed him were dealt with a cruel punishment. He used tax administration, the police and other government agencies to coerce businesspeople, politicians and state officials into backing the regime during elections (Way 2005).

The Orange Revolution

The third presidential election of Ukraine was held on 31st October 2004. Unsurprisingly the election was rigged again by the ruling regime as expected by the opposition. Due to the unacceptance of the result by the opposition on the ground that the result was neither free nor fair, re-election was subsequently held on 21st November and 26th December 2004 (Moehre 2005). According to Ukrainian officials over 3500 election observers registered to monitor the 31 October presidential election. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODHR) with 600 observers played a prominent role in monitoring the voting process. Freedom House, National Democratic Institute, International Republican

Institute and Commonwealth of Independent States were also represented as a monitoring agent. Most of the international observers complained that the Ukrainian authorities violated the standards for free and fair elections during the campaign and election. The OSCE observers reported that government employees, factory workers and students were threatened with dismissal unless they supported Yanukovich. These observers criticized media bias and the use of government resources in favor of the government backed candidate Yanukovich during the campaign. They also criticized the missing of a large number of names from the voting rolls and the last-minute barring of some members of local electoral commissions from their posts. On 10 November, after substantial delay, the Ukrainian Central Election Commission announced the final result of the first round election in which Yushchenko won 39.87% of the vote, while Yanukovich won 39.32% the remaining votes split among the remaining candidates. Since no candidate received 50% which the Ukrainian constitution required, the top two winners - Yushchenko and Yanukovich moved on to a runoff election to be held on 21 November (Wilson 2006).

The runoff of election was held on 21 November 2004. A similar large number of international observers were present again in this second round of election as in the first election on 31 October. The non-partisan exit polls during this election predicted a commanding victory to Yushchenko with 52% vote and 43% vote to Victor Yanukovich. However, the official preliminary election result on the next day declared Yushchenko with 49.5% of the vote as compared with Yushchenko's 46.6% of the vote. The electoral commission said Yanukovich held three-percentile lead over Yushchenko with almost all ballots counted. The commission, in this hotly contested election did not immediately proclaim Yanukovich as the victor. This preliminary result was immediately challenged. On the next day of the election on 22 November, Ukrainians took to the street in protest of this election result that lasted for the following three weeks. Cars, trucks, and buses adorned with orange banners drove down the street, also hundreds of thousands of people, most of them wearing orange walked down the street towards Independence Square (Karatnycky 2005). On this very first day of the nationwide protest, Yushchenko declared himself president and took the oath of office in a short parliament session, claiming that he won the runoff election and called for international community to

recognize him (Global Security 2004). As many as 200,000 of his supporters demonstrated outside the chamber to show solidarity with his claim. Tens of thousand of people also protested in other cities of the country, mainly in the western regions. Yushchenko accused the authorities in Ukraine of rigging the official election result and urged militia and the military to stand with the people, and called on local government to transfer their allegiance to him and his council. The government of the capital, Kiev, the cities of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Vynntsia, and Ternopil in western Ukraine announced that they would recognize only Yushchenko as a president. With the election result highly contested and the president still occupying the office, three presidents suddenly emerged in Ukraine: the outgoing but still incumbent Kuchma, the official winner of the runoff, Yanukovich; and Yushchenko; whose swearing in had been covered by the increasingly open national media. This created confusion among the people including the security forces. Though the president and other hardliners wanted to use force to disperse the protesters, the idea could not be put into action since the military and security services fragmented among them as in the case of Georgia (Moehre 2005).

After days of mass protest, on 27 November, the Supreme Court blocked official publication of the election result, the last step before the winning candidate can be inaugurated, until it had review Yushchenko's complained that the vote was manipulated. On the same day, the parliament by a clear majority voted to declare the election result invalid. Six days later, on 3 December Ukrainian's Supreme Court declared the 21 November runoff election illegal and cancelled the result. The court also accepted Yushchenko's complains of massive fraud and official high-level conspiracy. The court called for fresh election on 26 December 2004 (USAID 2006). Kuchma accepted the Supreme Court decision, changed the central electoral commissions and signed legislation modifying the electoral law to disallow absentees' ballots (Tudoroiu 2007).

The third and the final pool of 2004 Ukrainian presidential election were held on 26 December. More than 12000 international observers from Europe, North America, Russia and Asia, the largest in the history took part in it. The freedom of media was widened and more coverage of the election had been broadcasted throughout the election. However,

media in the eastern Ukraine continued to be biased and only pro-Yanukovich perspective was broadcast. On 28 December, the Ukrainian Central Election Commission announced the result, declaring the victory of Yushchenko. Yushchenko received 52 percent of the votes while Yanukovich got 44 percent vote, with a winning margin of 2.2 million votes out of 28 million cast. As in the two rounds, support to the candidates was divided sharply on regional lines. Yushchenko won decisively in western and central Ukraine, while Yanukovich won in southern and eastern Ukraine. International Observers said that although some problems remained, the conduct of the repeated election marked a great improvement over the conduct of the first two rounds, moving closer to OSCE standards (Karatnycky 2005).

The Role of NGOs in Rose and Orange Revolutions

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NGOs had a profound impact on political, economic and social processes in the region. One of the major impacts of these NGOs was its contribution towards the overthrow of authoritarian regimes (Silova 2008). The economic and political stability of the west in the post Cold War era creates powerful incentives for promoting democracy in the world. As such the global democratization process largely depends on the intervention of the west, particularly the US (Way, Levitsky 2005). In the first decade following independence, Georgia and Ukraine witnessed a continuous development of civil organizations in the country. Soon these Non-Government Organizations multiplied, funded mostly by International actors and became an important source of promoting democracy in the country. In fact, the NGOs became major actors in the color revolutions that broke out in both the countries.

Formulating Non-Violent Strategy for the Rose Revolution

In the post-communist countries where color revolution broke out, the techniques of non-violent revolutionary had been transported from one country to another with the coordination of the western countries. Georgia was the second of the three dominos-Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine where non-violent revolutions swept aside Soviet-style authoritarian or semi-authoritarian leaders. Both in Georgia and Ukraine, one of the

secrets of the success of the Color Revolutions was the adoption of Non-Violent method as a means to fight against the corrupted ruling regime.

In Georgia Soros, USAID, NRI, Freedom House and the US State Department were involved in various ways in establishing democracy in the country. Georgia civil society directly benefited from Serbian NGOs' anti-Milosevic experience. The Rose Revolution succeeded to a great extent due to the instruction of non-violent method to the Georgian NGOs by Serbian NGOs like Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) and Center for Non-Violent Resistance. The three days seminars to more than 1000 Georgian students by the former Serbian Otpor activists sponsored by the west proved extremely helpful during the revolution (Sussman 2006). In Ukraine the past experience like "Ukraine Without Kuchma" and "Arise Ukraine" in which the Civil Organizations failed to overthrow the government, and the lesson learned from Serbia's Otpor and Georgia's Kmara - which successfully overthrew the ruling regime, influenced the NGOs particularly the Pora to opt for non-violent method. The Pora developed a campaigned strategy for the revolution under four themes, which includes- "Its Time to Stand", "Its Time to Think", "Its Time to Vote" and "Its Time to Keep Watch" (McFaul, Aslund 2006). The first sought to attract and train a large number of volunteers to serve as communicators, the second focus on electoral process, candidate programs and voter rights, the third called voters to take part in the election and the fourth called the people to fight in case election is manipulated or rigged.

The color revolutions represent new non-violent revolution that differs from the classical revolution. These non-violent revolutions open a new gate giving people a new stage of history while closing the undemocratic past. There was a believed that Georgia and Ukraine will never go back, the return to authoritarianism is considered impossible (Fairbanks 2007).

Monitoring 2003 Georgian and 2004 Ukrainian Elections

Georgian NGOs and survey firms flooded with international funding carried out the country's first-ever exit polls and parallel vote count in 2004 presidential election. About

8,000 foreign and domestic monitors observed the voting. The results from the exit polling and parallel count were remarkably similar and strikingly contrary with the official tallies. These monitors' results were crucial for the success of Rose Revolution. Based on the monitors' results, the masses challenged the official result of the election and came out in the street in protest for twenty days that resulted in the overthrowing of the Shevardnadze's regime. Had no independent exit poll and parallel count been conducted, the governing regime would have successfully rigged the election result again and the re-election would have been avoided (McFaul 2005).

The international agents of election monitor in Ukraine too crush the illegal practice of the government consistent election riggings to remain in power. In the pre 2004 election, the people had been the victim of this non-transparency of the electoral process. While several NGOs, including international groups, monitor the vote count, the Committee of Ukraine Voters (CVU) played the central role in monitoring all rounds of the 2004 presidential vote. CVU conducted parallel vote tabulation during all the three rounds. Both the first and second rounds of the election were declared fraud by the monitoring agents. The second poll on 21 November was followed by mass protest. The court deliberating amid the grand peaceful protest of late November and December 2004, then used the evidence of the fraud that the CVU and other NGOs had gathered as grounds for overturning the official results and ordering a rerun of the second round (McFaul 2005). International assistance in the form of ideas and financial resources was crucial in exposing election fraud (McFaul 2007).

Awakening the People by Exposing the Unconstitutional Acts of the Government

The independent media played a significant role in the peaceful overthrowing of regime in Georgia and Ukraine by exposing the unconstitutional act of the governing regime to the people. Though both the states were semi-authoritarian, independent media were allowed to operate to certain degree. In Georgia media was quite independent while in Ukraine, though most of the main channels were owned by Oligarchs loyal to Kuchma,

there were other independent media channels available to the opposition to air their views.

The television channel Rustavi-2 founded in 1994 by Eroisi Kitsmarishvili with the help and advice of the US media assistance non-profit, Internews played a major role in spread information in Georgia. This channel served as the main source of information to the people about the weakness of the state like corruption and particularly election fraud, and highlighted a proper strategy to be adopted during the course of the revolution. It was Rustavi-2, which built a revolutionary link between Serbia and Georgia. The non-violent techniques used by Opatov and the opposition in Serbia were broadcasted in Georgia by Rustavi-2, using a documentary about the Serbian revolutionary production by the American Steve York and Peter Akerman (McFaul, Aslund 2006). On the eve of the 2nd November parliamentary election Rustavi-2 station broadcasted several documentary films like "Bringing Down a Dictator," made by director and producer Steve York that portrayed in detail how the Serb carried the non-violent revolution against Slobodan Milosevic. This made the people understand non-violent conflict who designed their own strategies for liberation and freedom.

During the 2003 electoral campaign, Rustavi-2 provided an important forum for the opposition parties and NGOs critical of the government. The channel with the British Council, the Open Society Georgia Foundation sponsored an exit poll by the Global Strategy Group. The exit poll that shown a sharp contradiction of the result declared by the government and the NGO Parallel Voting Tabulation (PVT) was televised immediately by Rustavi-2, Imedi and Mze after the polling station was closed. These channels mainly the Rustavi-2 regularly transmitted a good coverage of the demonstration following the exit poll which attracted more and more people for demonstration each day (Welt 2005). With the active efforts put up by the independent media the election fraud was widely known to the people. In this critical situation, it was Rustavi-2 the main channel, and others that exposed the election fraud to the people.

In Ukraine, internet became an important machinery of the opposition in their fight against the ruling regime. The NGOs run internet brought wide range of awareness among the people about the ruling elite's corruption and other illegal practices. Out of the 48 million populations, some 6 million boasted accessing the internet. The student organizations used its internet to stage a highly effective campaign. Cell phones too played a useful role in detecting the government's agents fault. The students in Ukraine had a good collection of evidence of election fraud that film professors illegally ordering them to vote. These films were posted in the internet and were made downloadable. It served as evidence in court prosecutions during which the authorities were accused of rigging the election results. Ukraine has been described as the world's first "internet revolution". The internet opened up possibilities for private chat rooms to discuss tactics and strategy, e-mail, bloggers, and hosting NGOs web sites. With the NGOs and the opposition dominating the internet, these forums became a major link to criticize the ruling regime. A series of cartoon pictures symbolizing the weakness of the government were posted in the on-line internet, which created awareness among the people about the secret of the government (Kuzio 2006).

Old media, too, played a modest role. Most nationwide media are privately owned in Ukraine, but before the Orange Revolution all were under the strong control of oligarchs close to the Kuchma regime. Despite the government's nearly total control of political content on national television and significant pressure on independent media, a significant array of objective newspapers and local radio stations continue to function. Independent media played a positive and critical role in communicating news about the falsified vote and helped in turn to mobilize popular opposition to the regime after the voting. Channel-5 played the central role, first in communicating the results of the exit polls and in reporting on the hundreds of cases of electoral fraud. Also Channel-5 then served an especially vital function of providing live, 24 hours coverage of the events on Maiden, broadcast that helped to encourage others to join the protests, especially when viewers saw peaceful, festive nature of crowd (McFaul 2006).

Uniting the Opposition Parties of Georgia

The unity of the two opposition parties the- National Movement and Democrats is an important factor in toppling down the ruling regime in Georgia. These two opposition parties, competing for the same votes were in rivals for a long time. Even in the 2003 election, the two parties could not come together against the ruling semi-authoritarian regime. However, with the exposition of fraudulent election by NGO monitoring agents, strong anti-regime feeling was rapidly growing among the oppositions. This anti-feeling against the regime brought a sense of oneness before common enemy that quickly bind these two parties under a common platform. Two days after the election, the National Movement and Democrats pledge unity to resist fraudulent electoral results. Their joint efforts bore fruit and the ruling regime was successfully overthrown (Welt 2005).

In Ukraine too, the NGOs particularly the Pora played a significant role in uniting the opposition parties in the face of common threat. In the first decade of independence, the oppositions remained divided and disorganized which allowed the ruling regime to divide and rule over them. The elders continue to fail to unite into a unified opposition party, thereby; a single candidate could not be field in the elections for many years. However, the new generation successfully united the opposition parties and bloc in 2004. The triangular opposition consisting of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko bloc, and Socialist that has existed since 2001, reemerged and were united in 2004, supporting Yushchenko's candidacy with only the Communist party refusing to join the bloc (Kuzio 2008). The NGOs too aligned with the united oppositions in the fight against election fraud. The unity displayed by the coalition was crucial especially because it overcame severed ideological differences in their fight against the common enemy- the ruling regime (Kuzio 2006).

Mobilizing the Masses in the Rose Revolution

The foreign sponsored student movement - Kmara meaning 'Enough' was founded at Tbilisi State University in 2000. Kmara played a crucial role in mobilizing the people against the government before, during and after the Rose Revolution. Kmara avoided the use of violent and adopted the methods of humor, mass entertainment and art appeared in

wooing the people to join their fight against the government. The group made a humble began by campaigning against corruption in higher education but the scope was quickly broadened when the group criticized the Georgian political system as a whole. Kmara and Georgian Student Movement were at the forefront in opposing the government's attempt to exert control over the largest and most important and pro-opposition television station, Rustavi-2 in 2001 (Lavery 2008). On 14 April 2003, 500 young people of Kmara group marched to the state chancellery on the anniversary of the 1978 Georgian student demonstration when the then Georgian Communist Party Secretary Shevardnadze supported the courageous young people protesting the planned abolition of Georgian language's favored status. The secret of this protest was to mobilize the people for the coming November 2003 parliamentary election. The student protesters exposed the regime's connection with the country's Soviet past, highlighting and criticizing the government's alleged intention to rig the November 2 parliamentary election (Kandelaki 2006).

Few months later Kmara activists travelled to Serbia to learn from the activist of foreign sponsored NGO student movement - Optor of Serbia, the methods to be adopted in the parliamentary election of their country. In the summer of the same year, Optor activist visited Georgia, organized courses that trained 1,000 students all over the country in the tactics of Serbian-style 'revolution' (Volkov and Grey 2003). In June 2003, Kmara and other groups articulated the demand that the Georgian Central Election Commission be changed to include more independent oversight. When it became clear the authorities would not concede to such a demand, groups turned their attention to organizing independent exit polls and observers to unmask fraud once it occurred. In this difficult task Kmara was assisted by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy who sent thousands of volunteer observers and set up parallel vote tabulation (PVT) operation, which Kmara publicized on distributed flyers after the fraud was committed. Foreign NGOs such as the British Council, the Open Society Georgia Foundation, and the Eurasia Foundation also conducted exit polls, which helped to legitimize the opposition's claims (Lavery 2008).

Though not a dominant actor, Kmara's role was vital during the Rose Revolution. The opposition parties and medias' claim of the election rigged be revealed to the people which only the parties could not do. This job was carried out by Kmara activist who not only unmasked the election rigged to the people but also convinced the people to participate in the revolution. Kmara use of humor, mass entertainment, and art contributed to the group's successful mobilization of the people. The Soviet experience left the citizens weary and distrustful of political participation, which made it difficult for groups to mobilize support and easy for the government to suppress the opponents. Kmara took direct action to overcome this apathy. The group mobilized the uninterested people by engaging in fun activities like rock concerts or getting cultural figures such as musician, poets and authors to campaign on behalf of the group. The group also performed important community functions such as book drive for school, performing trash collection, to highlight the group's sincerity. Humors such as daily circulated jokes or amusement graffiti further lightened the mood and also caused the citizens to begin viewing their government in an absurd light, which was conducive to activism. These strategies were derived from Optor. Georgia was a typical post-Soviet society where the public participation in the politics was low. The people did not believe to achieve a change of government peacefully through elections. This was common among the youths. Kmara took direct action to overcome this apathy. In the mist of the protest, a group of well know people mostly young artists, poets and musicians started campaigning throughout the country, mainly in the universities, calling the student to join the protest. Kmara activist played important roles in most of these, since they already possessed vulnerable experience in organizational structure and discipline (Kandelaki 2006).

Mobilizing the Masses in the Orange Revolution

The NGOs mainly the Pora played a central role in mobilizing the people toward achieving democracy in the country. The NGOs were crucial in three inter related areas. First, they assisted in the mobilization of protestors. Second, they provided logistical support to the protests. Third, they were often the first wave of protestors.

The NGO group - Pora a radical student organization similar to Kmara played a major role in mobilizing the people in Ukraine. Many of this member emerged at the forefront of the Orange Revolution. Pora is composed of two groups - black Pora and Yellow Pora groups. Black Pora's members were generally younger student activists who were veteran of "Ukraine Without Kuchma" campaigned of 2001 and refused to openly associated with the opposition coalition. Whereas, Yellow Pora was much more organized and media savvy and coordinated with the opposition, particularly after electoral fraud was committed. Like Kmara in Georgia, Pora's overall strategy emphasis on non-violence and humor, making difficult for the regime to crack down. Central to its campaign was nationwide information and mobilization campaign.

Black Pora, in March 2004, posted leaflets throughout Ukraine calling upon Ukrainian to remove "Kuyhmaizm" from Ukraine. Immediately after round two of the election on 21 November 2004, Pora activists erected a tent in Kyiv for the protesters. Since the governing regime control over most state and commercial media, alternative sources of information were conceivable only in the realm of civil society. Alternative sources of information were needed to give accurate information to the Ukrainian public about electoral process, rights of citizens and the importance of voting etc. The Pora volunteers delivered election-related information from hand to hand and door to door directly to the people thereby providing an alternative media, to the areas beyond the reached of the media (Skrynka 2007).

Ukraine's Orange Revolution was a symbiosis of "political meeting and rock festival". As in the case of Georgia, Pora used humor and mass entertainment to attract the people indifference to politics. Many people lost faith in the government and the level of mass participation in the politics was significantly low. To draw these people to the fold of politics, Pora organized concert where best-known and modern band performed for Yushchenko. The song "We are many, we cannot be defeated" written by a well-known Ivano-Frankivsk hip-hop band Grandzioly became a rallying cry in Orange revolution which inspired people to face the government. Ukrainian well known sport personalities such as Vitali and Vladimir Klichko brother boxers, who were icon of the young people,

often appeared on the Maidan. Orange Revolution music, which was continuously played on the Maidan either by live band or through music CDs, also touched upon Ukraine's national identity and the choice they were making at that moment in the history. Songs such as "Ukrayina" by the well-known band Mandry called upon Ukrainians to look at their ancestors who were looking down upon them at this critical time (Kuzio 2006).

NGOs Funded by International Actors

The dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 opened an opportunity for the west to extend their influence over Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Western Allies, particularly the United States actively intervened in these regions in the name of promoting democracy, encouraged political mobilization that subsequently deposed the ruling regime in non-violent revolution one after another first in Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 (Sascha and Sussman 2008). In these revolutions, the same technique was successfully transmitted subsequently which was well coordinated and supervised by the transnational NGOs sponsored by the west. The Optor a student movement of Serbia, trained youth movements Kmara of Georgia and Pora of Ukraine and repeated the marketing tactics in their own countries.

It is obvious that the development of Georgian NGOs would have been much less spectacular without generous foreign funding. Between 1995 and 2000, Georgia received over 700 million US\$ of American direct aid. In 2002 to 2003, it was the fourth-largest per capita recipient of US Agency for International Development (USAID) aid (in 2000, USAID spent US\$200 per person in Georgia compared with US\$1.25 in Russia). The European Union also contributed 420 million Euros between 1992 and 2004, an amount that does not include contributions from separate member states. Most of the aid targeted democracy and governance, including election reform, local government, judicial reform and development of the NGOs. Many of the programs promoted citizen mobilization and advocacy networks among NGOs. George Soros' Open Society Institute (OSI) played a major role in financing not only the general development of Georgian NGOs but also civic actions, which directly contributed to Shevardnadze's fall (Tudoroiu 2007). In fact, it was Soros who promoted the "Serbian model" of peaceful regime change. Soros gave

Kmara \$ 350,000 as 'start-up' cash and also Rustavi-2 and the newspaper, 24 Hours were the major benefactors of Soros (Sacha, Gerald 2008). Funding from OSI enabled the creation of Kmara and the training of its activists in techniques of non-violent protest by Serbian Otpor activists. Due to OSI financing, a number of politicians including Saakashvili and student activists could go to Serbia and confer with activists who had defeated Milosevic's regime. Open Society Georgia Foundation was a major funder of the critical exit poll that helped reveal the extent of electoral fraud. Pointing the huge contribution of NGOs, Levan Ramishvili of the Liberty Institute, an NGO that received US funds since 1996 said, "The success in Georgia is a result of the people's commitment to democracy, but without foreign assistance I'm not sure we would have been able to achieve what we did without bloodshed." In 2004 alone the United States alone spent about \$34 million in Ukraine regime change initiatives while Soros pitched in about \$1.6 million in support of a local 'Freedom of Choice' NGO coalition and Ukraine's 'New Choice 2004'. Pora received \$5000,000 from Freedom House, while a Ukrainian opposition group, Znayu, was given \$50,000 from Freedom House and \$ 1 million from the US-Ukraine Foundation to start a teaser-type advertising campaign in seventeen Ukrainian cities (Krader and Sussman 2008). In addition to foreign aid Ukraine business oligarchs provided major financial backing to Yushchenko in 2004 presidential election estimated at US\$ 100 million for campaigning, banners, logos and transport poll observers (Way 2008).

US Geopolitical Interest in Georgia and Ukraine

The sponsoring of democratization in Georgia and Ukraine were heavily drawn by the geopolitical interest of the US over these two countries. In fact, democracy promotion has been a long standing element of US foreign policy since the past decades. The World War I and World War II are considered in the US as a fight against dictatorship to make the world safe for democracy. The US administrations have been interested in promoting democracy to varying degrees and Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Clinton viewed democracy promotion as an important component of their foreign policy (Miko, Serafino, Epstein). With the collapse of Soviet Union the policy of global democracy was adopted by the US administration and regime change has been used as a machinery to

meet this end. Under Bush administration democracy promotion came to be viewed as machinery for promoting peace and combating terrorism. However, despite the significant importance given to democracy especially in the post cold war era, the policy of global democracy promotion was selectively supported by the US in the countries only where its national interest could be further or accomplished. In this sense, democracy promotion in the post Soviet countries in the form of color revolutions was very much a part of the geopolitical ambitions of the US in these regions. The US's zeal for promoting and imposing democracy in these regions has three underlying objectives: energy supply, security concerned and the attempt to check the possible hegemony/influence of resurgence Russian over these regions.

Energy security remained a major facet of US policy in the South Caucasus or Georgia in particular. In geo-political terms Georgia is crucial for east-west transport corridor and is the key bridge between the east and the west. Oil and gas are supplied to Europe and the West through Georgia from the resource rich countries like Central Asia and Russia (Cornell 2007). The US oil consumption constituted around 25 percent of the global consumption; the rising demand from China, India and the other fast growing economies reduced/ affect the US demand for consumption over the past decade (Carothers 2007). Soaring oil price in the international market, decreasing stockpiles, the strengthening of hardliner power in Iran, unrest in Iraq and instability in Saudi Arabia made the Caspian region increasingly attractive for peaceful and stable supplier of oil to the US (Cornell 2007). The US wanted to ensure a regular supply of oil and gas from the rich countries without serious disruption, and promoting democracy in Georgia was conceived as an important measure to safeguard the energy security of the US. The US has long been engaged in the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines from Caspian basin that would bypass Russia, especially via Georgia. The Nabucco pipeline project was intended to reduce the west's dependence on Russia and the opening of Baku-Tblissi-Ceyhan pipeline in 2006 was one of the biggest achievements of Washington in back rolling Russia's influence on these regions.

The terrorist attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, and the subsequent war on Iraq and Afghanistan enhanced the importance of Georgia to the US in its attempt to bring global peace and security by fighting global terrorism. Georgia's proximity to Russia, Iran and Middle East increased its geopolitical importance to the US. The South Caucasus and the Central Asia became indispensable for the successful prosecution of war in Afghanistan in the heart of Asia. The US easily secured basing rights in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for its Air Force. However, transiting US military forces still faced "Caspian bottleneck". Though Russia willingly cooperated by providing airspace for humanitarian and logistical flight, it refused to grant airspace for US combat aircraft, and Iran was not an option to transit US forces to Afghanistan. This left only the South Caucasian states - most notably Georgia and Azerbaijan in the top priority to the US for support in its fight against Global War on Terrorism. The "Operation Iraqi Freedom" in the Spring of 2003 and the boiling confrontation between the US and Iran further illustrated the importance of Georgia of the South Caucasus, bordering the Middle East for US forces to operate on Iraq. The refusal of Turkey to open a second front in northern Iraq made Georgia a region of additional significance for US security interests (Cornell 2007).

Geo-politics to a large extent motivated the democracy promotion in Ukraine too. Ukraine is historically tied to Russia, geographically and culturally. It is Slavic, and home of the first Russian state, Kiev Rus. Its 52 million people are the second largest in Eastern Europe, and it is regarded as the strategic buffer between Russia and a string of new US NATO bases from Poland to Bulgaria to Kosovo, all of which have carefully grown up since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US policy is to Balkanize Eurasia and ensure that no possible link between Russia and the EU and China emerges in the future that might challenge US global hegemony. This is the idea of the Bush Doctrine of 'pre-emptive wars.' In taking control of Ukraine, Washington would take a giant step to encircle Russia for the future. Russian moves to use its vast energy reserves to play for room in rebuilding its political role would be over. Chinese efforts to link with Russia to secure some independence from US energy control would also be over. Iran's attempts to secure support from Russia against the Washington pressure would end (Engdahl).

Brzezinski in his book *The Grand Chessboard* argued 'Ukraine, a new important space on the Eurasian chessboard is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be supported by their fellow Islamic states in the south' " However, if Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia". To him the US would preserve its supremacy position under all circumstances. To this end NATO, acting as a "bridgehead" of the US, should expand into Eurasia and take control of geo-strategically important regions so as to prevent Russia's resurgence as a powerful political force (Hantke 2009).

Oil pipeline politics are also directly involved in the US sponsored for democracy in Ukraine. Ukraine is the transit land for most major Russian Siberian gas pipelines to Germany, the rest of Europe and the west. Washington policy is also to control directly the oil and gas flow from the Caspian including Turkmenistan, and to counter Russian regional influence from Georgia to Ukraine to Azerbaijan and Iran (Hamtke 2009).

The Russian Federation under the presidency of Putin introduced serious changes in its foreign policy strategy towards the post-Soviet space called the Near Abroad. In this new policy, the post Soviet countries unlike the Balkans and Central Europe were recognized as the sphere of Russian real national interest. This shift in the foreign policy was the product of the processes which took place in the post-Soviet countries in the first decade of the collapse of USSR. The negligence of Russian interest by the policy of Europe and the US displayed in their policies towards the Balkans and Central Europe taught Russia a lesson that the west would not hesitate to intervene even in its bordering countries - the Near Abroad. The decision of NATO to expand to Central Europe in the early 90s that continued in the Balkans from 1995 until 2000 resulted in Russia's hostility towards the west. The subsequent incidents like crisis in Kosovo and the EU enlargement into the

Baltic States marked the turning point in the Russian perception of the Euro-Atlantic structure (Samokhvalov 2005). These incidents produced irritant against western policy even for the most moderate groups of the Russian elite - economist and diplomats. While Moscow could hardly do anything in these cases, apart from expressing diplomatic protests, in the case of the Near Abroad, Russia tried to respond by deepening economic integration in the CIS and supporting pro-Russian political elites. Therefore, the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine took place in the time when Russia was ready to do all it can to maintain its interest over the Near Abroad. Unlike the Soviet Union in 1989 which did nothing to stop the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, in the period before and after color revolutions Putin actively sought to halt the spread of democracy in the post Soviet countries in order to preserve its autocratic political system and to re-establish its hegemony over these regions. Russia supported authoritarian regimes throughout the former USSR. Putin's policy of re-establishing Russian influence frequently conflicts with the US policy of promoting democracy aimed at furthering the US influence. This was clearly evident in the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Therefore, democratization process in reality in the post-Soviet countries in general and in Georgia and Ukraine in particular is a geopolitical game between the US and Russia.

In Ukraine Kuchma regime was actively supported by Russia despite of all its unpopularity and irresponsibility to the people. Kremlin continued to support Kuchma's political heir, Viktor Yanukovich who was seen as pro-Russian and oriented toward continuity with Kuchma's policies and governing style (Ambrosio 2007). The then president of Russia paid a visit to Kiev during 2004 parliamentary election and accompanied Yanukovich in the election campaign. Also Kremlin donated \$ 300 million for its preferred candidate Yanukovich for the election. Russia was deeply disappointed by the result of the re-run election which claimed the western backed candidate Yushchenko victory. Victor Chernomyrdin, Russian Ambassador to Kiev, blamed western interference for reversing the result of the election (Bowker 2007).

Moscow perceived the US enthusiasm for democracy in the post-Soviet countries as a response to check Russia's growing economic power and international independence. To

the Russians, democracy promotion proclaimed by the US is nothing more than a pursue of its own national interest at Moscow's expense. In contrast, the US consistently justified its involvement in promoting democracy during the color revolutions by pointing out the undemocratic behaviors of the overthrown regimes in Georgia and Ukraine. To some extent the US claimed may be valid, but the geopolitical importance of Georgia and Ukraine to the US cannot be undermined. The US has been more concerned with the oil security and to sideline the influence of resurging Russia in these regions. Therefore, the imposition of democracy with a mere objective to achieved geopolitical interest failed to bring real democracy in both the countries which will be discussed in detailed in the next chapter.

Comparisons between Rose and Orange Revolutions

Georgia and Ukraine had similar problems such as corruption, election fraud and authoritarian rule which led to the outbreak of color revolution in the two countries. Media, NGOs and opposition parties in both the countries played a significant role in the revolutions. However, the different causes had relatively different level of impact in Georgia and Ukraine. In Georgia, the focus of the revolution was prominent on corruption, while in Ukraine the focus was more on the blatant fraud committed by Kuchma and how much it affect democracy. In Georgia the state was weak and the civil society was strong while in Ukraine the state was strong and the civil society was weak.

The problems including poverty, corruption, the weakness of the Georgian state, and an increase in non-democratic practices in the late 1990s and early in the first decade of the twenty-first century were interrelated and collectively responsible for the outbreak of Rose Revolution in 2003. However, of these problems, corruption that directly caused poverty was major, and from it was the other problems sprang out. The state budget and public financing in the early 1990s, laid the groundwork for the 1998-2003 budget crisis. The budget crisis produced economic stagnation-disastrous for a nation that was already poor following the collapse of the USSR. The poverty rate hovered at around 50 percent, which led to social unrest (Nicklaus 2008). In addition to Georgia's fiscal problems, it also suffered from endemic administrative corruption, which further exacerbated social

unrest. The officials enriched themselves at the public's expense and the state failed to provide basic public goods. Unable to provide public services or enforce its will, the Eduard Shevardnadze regime increasingly came to rely on electoral fraud and violations to remain in power.

In Ukraine the causes of the revolution was more of political problems, such as non-democratic practices, rather than economic problems and corruption. Although economic problems and corruption were present, Ukraine experienced corruption through the influence of clan-linked oligarchs and local political machines-these were less important causes of the Orange Revolution. Post-Soviet Ukraine's political problems largely concern the use of political violence (especially during the Leonid Kuchma regime), and blatant electoral fraud and manipulation. The most shocking instance of these tactics was demonstrated when dissident journalist Hryhoriy Gongadze was savagely murdered in 2000 after launching a Website that took Ukrainian politics into bitterness. The regime's complicity in this brutal act came to light when Mykola Melnychenko released transcripts of secret tapes recorded in the presidential office, which also revealed Kuchma's role behind fraud in the 1999 presidential elections (Wilson 2005). The release of the tapes sparked a protest movement in west-central Ukraine which later became the epicenter of the Orange Revolution called "Ukraine without Kuchma". Although it did not succeed in its objective, the protest signaled the popular mood, which was darkened further when the regime effectively stole the 2002 parliamentary election by using administrative resources to dominate the single member district portion of the ballot even after it suffered a stunning defeat in the Party of the Regions (PR).

Ethnic conflicts following the independence and the continuous territorial secessions movement in parts of the country weaken the Georgian state. The weakness of the state offered an opportunity for the emergence of strong civil society, unlike in many other post-Soviet societies where stronger states managed to assert some control. Civil society in Georgia is rooted in the informal networks of the late Soviet period, which later became NGOs that dealt with more explicitly political issues. As the state reconstituted itself in the mid 1990s, its conscious identification with democracy and Europe preserved

the NGOs' autonomy, allowing them to grow. Although the regime eventually recognized civil society's importance and attempted to suppress it, these attempts were usually limited to passing laws that the state could not enforce which merely defame the laws, and disseminating propaganda to discredit the groups, usually by painting them as foreign agents (Broers 2005).

In contrast to Georgia, NGOs and civil society groups faced a very different general atmosphere in Ukraine. The Ukrainian regime did not have to contend with problems of weakness in the same way the Shevardnadze regime did, partly because Ukraine did not have to deal with significant territorial separatism, although regional and linguistic divides play a large role in Ukrainian politics, and partly because Moscow exerted more control over Kyiv before the USSR's collapse. Consequently, civil society did not enjoy the same sort of autonomy in Ukraine, it was relatively shallow and weak. The problem of this strong state and weak civil society was that, the Ukrainian regime was able to vigorously response to civil society's activities, including raiding NGO offices prior to the election and arresting movement activists. The regime was so concerned about Pora that it actually planted explosives in the group's office so that it could claim the group was planning to engage in anti regime violence. These harsh policy and strong actions of the Ukraine state against the civil society and NGOs only resulted in turning more people against the regime, demonstrating how much undemocratic the regime was (Kuzio 2005).

Chapter 4

Challenges to Democratization in Georgia and Ukraine

The new governments of Georgia and Ukraine that were formed after the color revolutions were looked upon with high expectations to bring changes both in the field of politics and economy. However, the pro-democratic reforms of the post revolutions in both the countries encountered various obstacles to smooth democratization. The existence of corruption and strong executive power and the governments' gradual return towards authoritarianism pose challenges to the democratic developments in these countries. The reforms implemented were too limited to fulfill the needs and expectations of the people, thereby a strong discontentment has developed among the people and the popularity of the new governments had declined (J Kalandadze 2007).

Challenges to Georgian Democracy

Georgia's history since independence has seen war, severe economic and political stagnation, and a new period of reform and change in the post revolution. After the Rose Revolution a sense of euphoria filled Georgia. Many people sincerely believed that corruption in all its manifestations would soon become a thing of the past and Georgia's economic problems would be solved. After assuming office Saakashvili declared to combat corruption and organized crime, and to raise living standard and to promote economic growth as the primary priorities of the new government. Governmental reform, particularly of the law enforcement system, was central to achieving these goals. While there have been many meaningful successes, many Georgians felt that they replaced a corrupt government with a government that cannot fulfill its campaigned promises. (Latta, Scott and Shelley 2007) The Rose Revolution resulted in only partial reform of state structures. Corruption is far from elimination even though many post revolution officials assert otherwise. In the 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 159 states, Georgia was in the 130th position, placing it on the same level as Kyrgyzstan, Venezuela, and Cambodia, and nearly unchanged from its ranking at the 139th position in 2004 (Latta, Scott and Shelley 2007). The Transparency International ranked Georgia on the 2006 Corruption Perception Index on the 79th place out of 170 countries (EFDS

2009). The media, once a major catalyst for change, has increasingly come under the control of the central government. The annual global survey by the New York-based Freedom House found that Georgia slid backwards in a few key democratic indices in 2008, such as independent media and electoral process (The Christian Science Monitor 2009). Judicial framework and independence, and governance too got worse in the aftermath of Orange Revolution.

Weak Political Structure

The establishment of democracy to a large extent depends on the nature of its political structure. Among the constitutional features of democracy the division of power occupies significantly important, which implies that the power of executive, legislature and judiciary are separated from one another and are supreme within each sphere. In Georgia the division of power is made disproportionately thereby vesting huge power to the executive at the expense of the legislature and judiciary. This institutional arrangement remains untouched in the post revolutionary period and became a big threat to the democratization process of the country.

Strong President

Georgia's democratic development is seriously endangered by the very direction followed by post-revolution reforms. After the peaceful Rose Revolution of November 2003 and the installation of Mikhail Saakashvili in January 2004, the outgoing Parliament adopted on 5 February 2004 far-reaching changes to the Constitution, which increased the power of the Executive. As a result, the President has the power to dissolve the Parliament, while he or she can stay in government even when the Parliament has expressed its lack of confidence (EFDS 2009). Georgia has its most powerful president since independence with no effective parliamentary opposition. The president appoints the Prime Minister and the cabinet, also several mayors and lower ranking officers including university provosts are appointed by the president. The president can disband parliament if it rejects the budget twice. Saakashvili enjoyed more formal power than Shevardnadze (Michael Lincoln A. 2006). Presidential powers were also increased in

other areas, including the judicial system that is subjected to presidential interference and control. Mikheil Saakashvili used the huge power vested in him to achieve his political ends and emerged towards authoritarianism as his predecessor. He violated many democratic principles thereby undermining his promises to reform the country politically and economically. The misuse of power negatively impacted him and his popularity was drastically reduced down (Tudoroiu 2007).

On 2 November 2007, exactly on the fourth anniversary of Rose Revolution in Tbilisi, tens of thousands of people overwhelmingly rallied in front of the parliament. Unlike four years ago, fraudulence in elections was not a trigger for revolt but elections were a part of the political aims. The 10 opposition-party coalition demanded that the parliamentary elections be held at the time set by constitutional frames (i.e. Spring 2008 instead of fall of the same year, as earmarked by constitutional amendments of 27 December 2006) and presented this slogan as a remedy to the diverse concerns of the protesters. The opposition later condemned the decision as an attempt of "power usurpation" and a clearly "undemocratic precedent," devised to serve as nothing more than double-edged election tactics, aiming on the one hand, to use Saakashvili as a locomotive for his rating-loosing party in parliamentary elections and, on the other, to disqualify Saakashvili's opponents under 35, specifically Irakli Okruashvili, from running for the presidency. The agreement of thousands to this call demonstrated the general fatigue from revolutions (Tsikhelashvili 2007).

On 7 November, 2007, the government of Georgia declared the imposition of a 15 days state emergency in the capital Tbilisi, after several days of anti-government protest. The protesters demanded early elections to end corrupt and authoritarian regime. The opposition were of the opinion that Saakashvili grabbed too much power and should step down after calling early elections. But Saakashvili responded by using military force (Mchedlishvili and Antidze 2007). On the next day 8 November 2007, the government took position to enforce the imposed emergency. The police used tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons against the protesters. News channels were also raided and shut down. Not less than 500 people were hospitalized after the riot; the police fired gas and water

cannon on crowds calling for the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili, in a sudden escalation after six days of protests. Twenty-four police officers were among the wounded (Harding 2007).

In the aftermath of state emergency, Saakashvili's administration harshly dealt with the protesters, the police cracked them down, and the two independent media outlets- Imedi TV and the Kavkasia channel had been shut down and public assemblies were banned. One of the stations, Imedi-TV, which carried the country's most popular news program, was occupied by Special Forces officers. The government accused it of inciting unrest after it broadcast a statement from one of its owners, Badri Patarkatsishvili, calling for the end of Mr. Saakashvili's government. Newspapers and foreign news broadcasts were not available in the capital on 8th November and the police filled the streets. To the residents this act meant that the country has backslid into authoritarian rule (The New York Times 2007).

Saakashvili in his address to the country on television justified the use of violence in crushing the protesters. He said, "We cannot let our country become the stage for dirty geopolitical escapades by other countries, our democracy needs the firm hand of the authorities" (Bahrapour 2007). However, the opponents blamed that Saakashvili's government became increasingly authoritarian in ways that echo Soviet days, allowing judicial abuse and political intimidation. The events marked the most serious challenge to Saakashvili since he grabbed power in 2003 with overwhelming support of the public. The public defenders and the NGOs too harshly criticized the action of the government. The international community too criticized the actions of Saakashvili. Saakashvili subsequently stepped down on 25th November, paving the way for parliament to call an extraordinary presidential election for 5 January 2008 (Tatum 2009).

The harsh reaction to the November 2007 protesters in Tbilisi exposed the authoritarian character in Saakashvili's personality. In order to prevent this ominous reversal of fortune, the president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili on 8 November quickly called for a special presidential election on January 5, saying he would test whether he retained a

mandate a day after a police crackdown and clashes with opposition demonstrators. This led the government to declare a state of emergency (The New York Times 2007).

But this was not what the opposition was demanding. The opposition wanted the parliamentary elections to be held in accordance with the constitution in order to be able to legally contest Saakashvili within the proper framework of governance; in essence, to become a more powerful legislative “check” on the executive branch. Saakashvili had wanted to delay these elections until autumn. Although Saakashvili eventually agreed to call the parliamentary elections according to the demands of the opposition, he cleverly manipulated the process in his favor by holding the presidential election first. By winning the presidential race, he regained a renewed amount of power going into the parliamentary plebiscite. In addition, snapped presidential elections meant that the opposition, already suffering from a lack of media outlets, had merely one month to organize a campaign, putting them at a distinct disadvantage (Tatum 2009).

The presidential election that took place on 5 January 2008 in which Saakashvili was elected with 53.4% of the vote, avoiding a second round was assessed moderately positive by the OSCE. The OSCE declared the election “in essence consistent with most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for democratic elections.” However the OSCE also pointed out significant shortcomings including imbalance of news coverage in favor of the ruling party’s candidate and blurring of state activities and Saakashvili’s campaign. In particular, the distribution of vouchers for such things as utilities and medical supplies to vulnerable groups were criticized as an alleged misuse of budgetary funds in support of Mr. Saakashvili, especially since distributors of vouchers sometimes asked recipients whether they would vote for Mr. Saakashvili, and asked them to sign documents confirming their support (EFDS 2009). On 21 May 2008 parliamentary elections were held in Georgia. Saakashvili’s UNM won 59% of the vote and ensured a constitutional majority. More protests were held in the capital by the opposition. Despite a mainly positive response from international observers, the opposition claimed widespread fraud and intimidation, and was concerned about the margin of victory, which gave Saakashvili control over legislation.

One of the main factors that allowed the president to act authoritative was the existence of weak judicial system in the country. The judicial system, a major focus of reform in the Shevardnadze era, has been largely untouched since the Rose Revolution. Just as the judiciary could not be reformed in isolation from other branches of the legal system in the Shevardnadze era, the lack of systematic reform under President Saakashvili is also creating problems. Cases are not resolved fairly because of corruption and political pressure. Certain judges are on the payroll of top business people. The independence of the judiciary was not a focal concern of the government. Perhaps the biggest institutional failure of the new authorities lies in the de facto restrictions on the judiciary's independence. Observers note that judges exercise self-censorship in sensitive cases and lean towards decisions that they think the authorities endorse. In addition to the president's ability to appoint and dismiss judges, Saakashvili has repeatedly made statements that could have been seen as prejudicing the court. As a result, in all of the high-profile corruption cases, courts ordered pre-trial detention of the accused, a measure that should only, according to a strict interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Code, be applied in a very limited number of cases (Latta, Scott and Shelley 2007).

Societal Division

The independence of ethnically diverse state of Georgia was accompanied by three years of ethnic civil wars starting from 1991-1993. The Georgian-South Ossetian war in 1991-92 and Georgian- Abkhazian war in 1992-93 resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and much more displacement, causing law and order problems in the country (Areshidze and Lansky 2008). The country's aspiration for unification vanished and the democratic development was greatly affected as the two regions isolated themselves from the centre. The problem continued in the aftermath of the revolution. In 2008, Georgia again became the center of attention as a war erupted between Georgia and Russia over the break-away region of South Ossetia. The Georgia president Mikhail Saakashvili's attempt to bring back the break away region of South Ossetia resulted in an open arm conflicts between Georgia and Ukraine in early August (Hearn 2008). The war was brief and devastating; resulting in many deaths, displaced persons, and a de facto redrawing of the regional map after Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia - the other break-away region of

Georgia - as independent. A bitter verbal and diplomatic struggle followed, with the international community divided over the related issue that was suddenly brought to the forefront - the question of Georgia's possible accession to the NATO. The conflicts in the separatist regions are facilitating all forms of contraband trade. Smuggling remains both an economic and security challenge for Georgia (EFDS 2009).

Weak Multi Party System

The success of democracy not only requires division of power and check and balance of power among the three branches of the government. The effective function of multiparty system enhanced the prospects of democracy as it helps the check and balance of power. The Georgian multiparty system is still in its infancy. The parties are organizationally weak, too heavily focused on people over party programs, and not sufficiently rooted in the society. Cooperation between the government and the opposition is also almost nonexistent. Georgia lacked an institutionalized party system. Since the very time of independence from Soviet Union, the "party of power" emerged in Georgia that reflects the old Communist Party. From 1993 until its demise in 2001, this party was the Citizens' Union of Georgia. In November 2004, a new "party of power" called the United National Movement (UNM) was formed from a merger of then prime minister Zurab Zhvania's United Democrats and Saakashvili's National Movement. In the aftermath of Rose Revolution a single party dominance continued that paved the way for authoritarian rule. The National Movement Democratic Front in 2004 election captured 135 seats of the total 150 which constituted 67.75 percent of the valid votes. The Rightist Opposition Industrialists and New Rights got 15 seats while the majority of the parties contesting the election failed to a single seat. Again in 2008 parliamentary election the United National Movement captured vast majority seats of 119 out of 150. Four other parties shared the remaining 31 seats which were still below the number capable to check single party dominance in the parliament. The big number in the parliament enabled the government to ignore both the opposition and the people as a whole which is detrimental to the success of democracy. Between 2004 and 2007, the government of Georgia amended the constitution five times, mostly without consultation with either the opposition or the public at large. Some of these amendments involved fundamental institutional change,

such as granting the president the right to dissolve parliament under certain circumstances in the case of the February 2004 amendments (Wheatley 2008).

Table 1.1

2004 Georgian Parliamentary Election Result		
Party	Votes (Percent)	Seats
National Movement Democratic Front	67.75%	135
The Rightist Opposition Industrialist and New Rights	7.74%	15
Labour Party of Georgia	6.14%	0
Tavisupleba- KJonstantite Z Gamsakhurdia	4.49%	0
Democratic Revival Union	3.95%	0
NDP- Traditionalist	2.61%	0
Erto Bloc	2.53%	0
Others	4.79%	0

Source: www.electionguide.org/results.phd?ID=196

Table 1.2		
2008 Georgian Parliamentary Election Result		
Party	Votes (Percent)	Seat
United National Movement	58.53%	119
United Opposition-National Council-New Rights	17.54%	17
Christian-Democratic Party	8.56%	6
Labour Party	7.36%	6
Republican Party	3.74%	2
Traditionalist Party- Our Georgia-Women's Party	44%	0
New Rights Alliance- Topadze Industrialists	92%	0
Christian Democratic Alliance	88%	0
Georgian Politics	46%	0
National Movement of Radical Democrats of Georgia	18%	0
Union of Georgia Sportsment	8%	0
Our Country	12%	0

Source: www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1412

Democratic Challenges in Ukraine

In Ukraine too, the orange revolution cast a sense of relief and threw a new light of hope to the people ridden with poverty and political crises. The people looked forward with high expectation, the promises made during and after the revolution by President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulya Tymoshenko to tackle corruption, ensure media

freedom, reform the economy and bring justice to those guilty of crimes under the Kuchma regime, including those who killed the journalist Hyhoriy Gongadze and those who poisoned Yushchenko. Following the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian government, as well as foreign governments and NGOs, began to address this issue through a range of legislative and administrative initiatives, including ratifying several international conventions against corruption, establishing governmental working groups, and cooperating with international advisory groups. However, the core problems of the people and the country remained unsolved. In the eyes of its supporters, the Orange Revolution has betrayed its own promises to bring justice. Corruption and criminal still prevails, and democracy remains a distant dream.

Weak Political Structure

The crucial problem of Ukraine is that it has been caught in the gray zone between a presidential and parliamentary system. The constitutional compromise of December 2004 transferred substantial power from the president to the government and parliament, but it barely hangs together. It divides the executive power between the president and the prime minister. The prime minister was vested with more power and has the power to appoint most of the ministers which in turn attracted their patronage. The president has substantial power and could oust the prime minister, but he can do little constructive beyond foreign policy and appointments, since detailed executive power rests with the cabinet of ministers. There has been intense conflict between the president and the prime minister within the executive due to institutional, sometimes party politics and personal problems (Elgie 2005). As a consequence, all the three presidents of independent Ukraine have suffered from an interminable temptation to dismiss their prime minister, who has been regularly been sacked once a year regardless of performance (Anieri, 2007).

The constitutions require joint participation of the president and the parliament in cabinet formation. The president nominates a prime minister and the parliament decides whether to confirm a nominee. The constitution also provides both the president and parliament with the unilateral power of cabinet dismissal. Though the president and the parliament have substantial means to influence the behavior of the cabinet, the presidents were more

successful than the parliaments in securing the cabinet loyalty. Cabinets were more likely to follow the preferences of the president rather than parliament because the latter had difficulties both in securing the selection and of its candidates for the post of prime minister and producing credible threats to dismiss the cabinet in case of non-compliance. Thus the presidential dominance over the cabinet has been a major source of conflict between the president and parliament (Protsyk 2003).

Strong Executive Power

Though the executive power was reduced due to divisions of powers between the president and the prime minister, the president retains the power to dissolve the parliament- Rada that supersede the power of other branches i.e. the legislature and the judiciary. The Ukrainian constitution granted the president right to dissolve the parliament under any of the following reasons: 1) If no parliament coalition has been established after one month. 2) If the Rada cannot start work during 30 days of a parliamentary session. 3) If no new government has been formed within 60 days after the resignation of the new government (Katchanovski 2008). Moreover, the president retains the control of the appointment of the heads of local state administrations (Wise, Edward, Robert 2005). Yushchenko made good use of this power to achieve his political ends. At the time of conflicts and power struggles between the president and the prime minister or even with the parliament, Yushchenko cleverly used the power vested in him to dissolve the parliament even to the extent of unconstitutionality. This power enables Yushchenko to go beyond constitutional limits and he slowly became authoritarian. The people's hope to see democracy and development has been overshadowed Yushchenko's popularity gradually decline.

In the post Orange Revolution, the coalition government was engaged in inter-fight activities. Prime Minister Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko head of the National Security fought for the control over key media and industrial assets. In September 2005, president Yushchenko fired the entire cabinet and forged an alliance with his erstwhile rival Yanukovich. A deal was made between Yushchenko and Yanukovich in which

Yushchenko promised not to open criminal cases against those involved in perpetrating electoral fraud in 2004 and to expand parliamentary immunity to local deputies, thereby protecting criminal structures. Yushchenko's firing of the entire cabinet and making alliance with Yanukovich the once top rival in 2004 who was seen as a symbol of undemocratic authoritarianism, place the Orange Revolutionaries in doubt (Beissinger 2006).

In the spring of 2007, Viktor Yushchenko issued several presidential decrees, dissolving the parliament despite initial opposition from the anti-Orange majority in the Rada and Yanukovich government both of which deem the move anti constitutional. The April 2nd parliamentary dissolution was made on the ground it was illegal for individual deputies from "Our Ukraine" bloc and BYuT to join the non-Orange parliament coalition. The second dissolution on April 26 was justified by the president claiming that the parliament coalition had not been formed, even though the condition had been formally announced 10 months earlier. The third dissolution on June 5th was due to the result of the president's agreement with the head of the government and the head of the parliament as stated by Yushchenko. This agreement was based on the fact that "Our Ukraine" and BYuT deputies had renounced their seats and therefore the number of remaining deputies no longer made up the two-third majority. Yushchenko declared that such a majority was constitutionally-mandated for Rada to continue to function between elections even though a relevant article of Ukraine's constitution states that parliament is legally formed if at least two-third of its deputies had been elected (Katchanovski 2008).

During his standoff with the parliament in May 2007, Viktor Yushchenko unilaterally took direct control over the Internal Troops away from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On 24 May he dismissed Ukraine's Prosecutor-General Svyatoslav Piskun barely a month after appointing him to the job. A day later about 2,000 troops were ordered to march on the capital Kiev to wrest control of the Prosecutor-General's office from troops loyal to Prime Minister Yanukovich. The Interior Ministry troops scuffled with the president's security forces at the office (Radyuhin 2007).

Like Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko de facto subjugated the parliament and the judicial system to a certain extent after the spring 2007 crisis. Yushchenko refused to

recognize the legality of session held and laws issued by Rada between April 2007 and September 2007, with the exception of a period of several days during which he had temporarily suspended his second degree dissolving the parliament. When it appeared that the Constitutional Court would rule in May 2007 that the presidential decrees dissolving the parliament were unconstitutional, Viktor Yushchenko blocked the work of the Court by dismissing its chairman and two other judges who were likely to support such a ruling (Katchanovski 2008).

Viktor Yushchenko claimed that the dissolution of parliament as an act of defending democracy. However, his stand lacked legal justifications, the unconstitutional suspension of parliament, the threat to force to implement this decision and hold snap elections, and the partial subjugation of the judicial branch by Yushchenko undermined the legitimacy of democratic institution in Ukraine (Katchanovski 2008).

A KIIS poll conducted in the first half of April 2007 showed that 55 percent of Ukrainians, excluding those who were undecided, opposed the first presidential decree dissolving Rada. A Razumkov Centre poll conducted in April 2008 showed that if the presidential elections were held at that time, Viktor Yushchenko would probably have lost to Viktor Yanukovich and Yulia Tymoshenko in the first round. Only about 15 percent of potential voters, excluding the undecided, would have supported Yushchenko, while 35 percent would have backed Yanukovich (Katchanovski 2008). In 2008, the fourth anniversary of Orange revolution that brought Yushchenko to power, the International Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES) released a new survey in which eighty two percent of Ukrainians express no confidence in Yushchenko, and three-quarters think that he should not stand for a second term. Yushchenko's job approval rating stands at only three percent (Kuzo 2008).

Ukrainians blamed Mr. Yushchenko for four years of political instability that have led to repeated crises and the likelihood that five governments and three elections will come and go before the end of his first term in office. Political stability, economic prosperity and democratic establishment continue to be the dreams of the people.

Political Crisis due to Imbalance of power and Diverse Ideologies

The new law enables the president and the prime minister to check one another. This division of power impedes renewed authoritarianism of the president that Kuchma enjoyed before the orange revolution. Checking the authoritative nature of the state by dividing the power of the executive was a significant achievement of the peaceful revolutionaries in orange. However, this division created continuous conflicts between the president on the one hand and the prime minister and the parliament on the other hand resulting political crisis one after another.

It should be noted that the president did not surrendered all the powers, as he/she still appoints the ministers of defence and foreign affairs, prosecutor-general, and the head of the security service. The ambiguity this created, however, caused its own set of problems. These reforms were criticized as a 'return to the past', meaning that they re-establish a more ambiguous relationship between the president and parliament, which had already existed since the early 1990s, and have proved a source of conflict in Ukrainian politics. Indeed, disputes between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovich in 2007 and then with Prime Minister Tymoshenko in 2008, both of which were over the distribution of powers between the two executives, precipitated serious political crises (Kubicek 2009).

The Orange Coalition was composed of different blocs with varied ideologies and political rivalries. It is unsurprising that the coalition had schisms and uncompromising issues on the policy to be adopted. Entrenched differences between Ms Tymoshenko and another millionaire minister, Petr Poroshenko, the Secretary of the National Security Council, were said to have brought the revolution to a halt and led to internal intrigues that paralyzed the decision-making. Nine months after the so-called "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, its two leading figures have been plunged into disagreement, accused one another of corruption and debilitating infighting. On September 8, President Victor Yushchenko sacked the government of his erstwhile comrade in arms, Julia Timoshenko (Osborn 2005).

The Orange Revolution's claimed to stand for "democracy," "liberty" and "against corruption" has proved nothing more than power struggle within the ruling elite. For the mass of the population, Julia Timoshenko's government meant rising inflation and rapidly sinking living standards. Yushchenko has reconciled himself with his once staunch opponents Victor Yanukovich and the old elites slowly entered into power. In August 2006, Yushchenko appointed his onetime opponent in the presidential race, Viktor Yushchenko, to be the new Prime Minister (Nikiaus, Richter 2005).

Another political crisis erupted again in the following year in 2007. On 2 April president Yushchenko issue a decree dissolving the parliament and ordering pre-term election to be held on 27 May. The president's decree was in response to the governing coalition's attempt to form a constitutional majority in parliament through the incorporation of opposition deputies into the coalition. Both the government and the parliament refused to recognize the president's decree and instead forwarded to the constitutional court to rule on its legality. On 26 April, president Yushchenko issued a further decree superseding his earlier one. The new decree again ordered the dissolution of parliament but extended the date for fresh election to 24 June. Parliament again forwarded the degree to the constitutional court. The political situation remained deadlocked until 27 May when president Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yanukovych and parliamentary speaker Moroz agreed a compromise package of measures to end the crises- including the provision for pre-term parliamentary elections, which were to be held on 30 September 2007.

Another political crisis broke out in September, with the collapse of parliamentary coalition formed by the president's Our Ukraine Self-Defence party and the prime minister Yulia Timoshenko's bloc. The collapse was triggered by differing of approaches towards the Russian-Georgia conflict and in-tandem voting of the bloc Yulia Timoshenko (BYuT) and the pro Russian Party of Regions. Timoshenko and Yushchenko, the two close allies during the Orange revolution exchanged accusation against one another. President Yushchenko called the prime minister a traitor, after her party supported legislation reducing the president's power (EFDS 2008).

On October 8 the president dissolved the Parliament and called for early elections, following the break-up of the ruling 'orange coalition'. He blamed Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko for destroying the Orange coalition, and causing the political crisis. But Tymoshenko's party claims the president's actions are illegal and say they are ready to appeal the decision in court. The judge found in favour of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who argued that Yushchenko's decision was unconstitutional. Ukraine's President Yushchenko has dissolved a local administrative court in Kiev. He took the action following the court's ruling against Yushchenko's decree to hold early parliamentary elections. Since independence in 1991, Ukrainian judiciary has been reformed from time to time but the independence of Judiciary has not been met. The politicians repeatedly interfered in the judicial system, the court and judges were far from independence and the rule of law was severely paralyzed. Both in the 2007 and 2008 political crisis, the ruling and the opposition parties, and the president did not hesitate to interfere in the sphere of the judicial system. Even four years after Orange Revolution, the rule of law could not be brought about in Ukraine which became the main disappointment of the people (Tupchienko 2008).

Weak Multi party System in Ukraine

In the post revolution period, there was competition between various parties for power in the parliament. Unlike Georgia where only few party entered the parliament, in Ukraine there are more parties that could successfully get a share of power in the parliament. This is to a great extent due to the electoral law in Ukraine which require only 3percent threshold as compared to 7% threshold in Georgia (Crisis Group 2004). The big number of parties in the parliament does not, however, enhance the function of the government in the legislation or administration by effectively checking and balancing one another. The clashing of different political parties or blocs due to difference in ideology and interest posed an obstacle in the process of democratization of the country. The dominant political leaders could not form a lasting or operative compromise due to ideological conflicts and dysfunctional constitutional order. As a result from 2005 to 2007, Ukraine had at least four governments, led in turn by Tymoshenko, Yuriy Yekhanurov, Yanukovich, and Tymoshenko again. Parliamentary elections were held in March 2006

and again in September 2007 due to coalition break up or dissolution of the parliament (Aslund 2009).

Table 1.3

<i>Results of election to the Supreme Rada, March 26, 2006a</i>		
<i>Partyt</i>	<i>Votes (Percent)</i>	<i>Seats</i>
<i>Left</i>	<i>13.1</i>	<i>54</i>
<i>Communist</i>	<i>3.7</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>Socialist</i>	<i>5.7</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>Center-Right</i>	<i>82.9</i>	<i>396</i>
<i>Party of Regions</i>	<i>32.1</i>	<i>186</i>
<i>Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc</i>	<i>22.3</i>	<i>129</i>
<i>Our Ukraine</i>	<i>14.0</i>	<i>81</i>
<i>Against all or not valid</i>	<i>4.0</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>450</i>
<i>Voter turnout (percent) 67.1 Pure proportional election.</i>		

Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua (accessed on September 31, 2006)

Table 1.4

<i>Results of election to the Supreme Rada, September 30, 2007</i>		
<i>Party</i>	<i>Votes (percent)</i>	<i>Seats</i>
<i>Left</i>	<i>10.0</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Communist</i>	<i>5.4</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Socialist</i>	<i>2.9</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>Center-Right</i>	<i>87.1</i>	<i>423</i>
<i>Party of Regions</i>	<i>34.4</i>	<i>175</i>
<i>Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko</i>	<i>30.7</i>	<i>156</i>
<i>Our Ukraine—People's Self-Defense</i>	<i>14.2</i>	<i>72</i>
<i>Lytvyn Bloc</i>	<i>4.0</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Against all, or not valid</i>	<i>2.9</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>450</i>
<i>Voter turnout (percent) 62.0</i>		
<i>Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua (accessed on October 16, 2007).</i>		

Conclusion

Real democracy could not be achieved in Georgia and Ukraine due to the problems discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The US backed opposition parties successfully destabilized semi-authoritarian regimes in Georgia and Ukraine but failed in consolidating democracies in both the countries. The newly elected leaders- Saakashvili and Yushchenko quickly found themselves dependent on the same political power brokers, oligarchs or bureaucratic machines as the leaders they replaced. As such could introduce only limited reforms and gradually reversed towards their predecessors' authoritarian nature. Truly election is a necessary condition for democracy; however, election is not sufficient to guarantee democratic stability. Soon after the leaders who were accused of rigging elections were removed, the people expected that democracy will immediately emerged and the country will soon prosper. However, this never happened because the success of democracy does not end only in free and fair election. Equally important to election are the institutional setup and the will and the capacity of the state to carry out the will of the legislature in a fair and effective manner (Kopstein 2006). Both the state and legislature in Georgia and Ukraine neither have the will nor the capacity to carry out the law of the land effectively. This is partly due to institutional arrangement and the Soviet legacy which both the states inherited. Thus obstacle to democracy in Georgia and Ukraine was with the people particularly the leaders who represented the people. Unless and until the domestic institutions for democracy are rooted in the society democracy cannot be sustained. Clearly democracy Georgia and Ukraine failed as it was imposed from above by the US in the absence of democratic institutions rooted in the society.

Comparison

The development of democracy in Georgia and Ukraine since Rose and Orange Revolutions has produced a mixed result. By 2008 democracy was in a better state than five years ago in both the countries, however, many obstacles for democratic governance remain. Fairbanks has argued that, in both countries, there is "a sense...that they can never go back," but an "authoritarian temptation" remains in Georgia, while the return of the old elites to power in Ukraine is providing a problem (Spirova 2008).

The electoral process and the position of civil society have improved in both countries, reflecting a generally free and fair electoral process in Georgia and Ukraine. Media freedom has increased in Ukraine, but deteriorated in Georgia, while judicial independence has deteriorated in Georgia and remained largely unchanged in Ukraine.

The Orange Revolution led to the freeing of the Ukrainian media, and it was very difficult for a leader to force the media back under state control. Attempts to undermine the freedom of media proved a failure. Yushchenko discovered this when he harshly criticized reporters who publicized his son's extravagant spending habits. Media in Ukraine can now play the watchdog role to which they are "assigned" in democratic theory. Though most of the medias in the aftermath revolution are controlled by oligarchs or large firms with their own political agendas to promote and may even act politically biased, media can help limit government's misbehavior by investigating and publicizing it. In contrast to the Kuchma era, a wide variety of views is being expressed. Moreover, outlets that criticized the government have not been harassed. This is a vital check on the government officials which represents a positive sign of democratic development in the country (Anieri 2007).

Since the Rose Revolution, relations between the Georgian government and local media have increasingly caused concern. The media that campaigned so successfully against the corruption of the Shevardnadze era has been muzzled by Mikheil Saakashvili's government. The government has attempted to tame the press by administrative measures under the pretext of establishing the rule of law. Increasingly, the opposition-media has suffered from state-repression and journalists increasingly showed acts of self-censorship. Consequently, some Georgian television stations and newspapers that had enjoyed a relatively unrestricted reporting have significantly toned down their criticism of the government, especially within the context of reports on the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Others were simply closed down. The television show "60 Minutes" and the station Rustavi 2, cited for their crusading work against corruption no longer are permitted to run such cutting exposes of corruption. The ill treatment meted to the

opposition-media in the post revolutionary years has fuelled the fear of one-party politics. Media freedom which is an import feature of democracy has been considerably declining in the aftermath revolution. The Paris-based press freedom watchdog Reporters Sans Frontie`res ranked Georgia 99th among 167 countries for its press freedom record, down from 73rd in 2003 and 94th in 2004 (EFDS 2009).

The efforts to curb corruption in the two countries have achieved very different results. Georgia achieved progressive achievement on this matter while Ukraine continues to reflect a high level of corruption. According to the Corruption Perception Index, Georgia has improved its corruption standing considerably-its score went from 1.8 to 3.9 between 2003 and 2008. Its ranking has also improved drastically-from 124th in the world in 2003 to 67th in 2008-although these trends are not as easy to interpret since the number and nature of countries included in the rankings have changed over time. Ukraine has, in contrast, maintained a more stable score: it has improved slightly since 2004 (2.5 in 2008, compared to 2.2 in 2004), but its trend also reflects some temporary improvement following the 2004 revolution, although there has been deterioration since 2006. The World Bank Good Governance indicators, the most comprehensive of the indices, also report more substantial improvement in Georgia than in the Ukraine from 2003 to 2007. While the NiT and World Bank scores for both countries in 2007 are better than the averages for the former Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic States), Georgia is clearly in a better situation in this comparison as well (Spirova 2008).

All the three indicators mentioned above point to a very clear divergence in the anticorruption efforts and records of the post-revolution executives in Georgia and Ukraine: Georgia has managed to curb the most extensive forms of corruption, while in Ukraine next to nothing has been achieved on that front. Low-level corruption, such as that involving the police, the public registry, and higher education, has seen a “conspicuous decline” since 2004 in Georgia. This improvement is attributed to the dedication of the Saakashvili government to both institutional reforms and punitive measures: legislation has been adopted and implemented, supervisory bodies have been set up, and “myriad arrests of high ranking officials in both the previous government and

the current administration” have been carried out. High level corruption and political patronage, however, still continue to be present in the country. Allegations of nontransparent public procurement processes and executive involvement in personnel appointments in the judiciary are often made. The stress on punitive rather than preventive anticorruption policies by the government is often criticized as well. Overall, however, the progress made in fighting corruption in Georgia has been substantial, and, in 2006, the percentage of people who considered corruption to be widespread among the top governmental officials had dropped from 89 percent to 58 percent, while the share of those who thought there was no corruption had increased from 5 percent to 35 percent (Spirova 2008).

Ukraine, on the other hand, has seen little political will to fight corruption. While some anticorruption legislation has been adopted, little has been done to ensure its application in society. Low-level corruption continues to dominate everyday life, while grand corruption such as “kickbacks, nepotism, and clientelism” takes place in public procurement. There seems to be little concern about the division of state power and business, further contributing to the acceptance of corruption as a way of life at both the political and social levels.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The democratization process in Georgia and Ukraine are widely available in the current literature. The analytical review of this whole process would reflect the features that help in the progress of democracy or the feature that stand as an obstacle to democracy. The inheritance of Soviet style authoritarian rule, corruption and election riggings by new the governments of Georgia and Ukraine in the post independence period pose a threat to the development of democracy in the country. However, the destruction of the authoritarian regime does not meant the establishment of democracy. The creation and nurturing of democracy needs a proper institutional setup and the active participation of the local people. The top-down super imposed democracy in Georgia and Ukraine proved to be a failure.

With the declaration of independence the people of Georgia and Ukraine hoped that the establishment of democracy will bring political freedom and economic development in the country and end the existing economic hardships. The hope and aspiration of the people was marred by the continuation of Soviet type authoritarian rule, the existence of wide spread corruption and organized crime in the post Soviet era.

Corruption was widespread in Georgia and Ukraine. In Georgia corruption was rampant and bribery became the main force of politics. Funds granted for educational infrastructure were embezzled. Funds for repairing roads were corrupted and the condition became more and more deteriorated. Universities were so badly affected by corruption that medical doctors did not know medicine; lawyers did not know the law and engineers had not learned the fundamentals of construction. The government failed to deliver even the basic needs of the people. Civil war and ethnic conflicts have strengthened the practice of corruption and crime. Even in Ukraine which was free from such ethnic civil war, corruption could not be checked despite various anti-corruption measures. There was a strong linkage between business and politics. Bribery prevailed at all levels of the government and people loyal to the regime were rewarded with huge state wealth.

Organized crime too was rampant in Georgia and Ukraine largely due to the destabilization of state power as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was a close tie between politicians and organized crime. In fact organized crime cannot exist without the cooperation of the government officials. The presence of a large number of criminal or criminal link individuals as a representative to the government who were reluctant to implement criminal laws left many criminals with free hand. Also criminals in these two countries directly or indirectly controlled many of the important economic sectors of the country which make them strong and stable.

The authoritarian or at least semi-authoritarian rulers used all government machinery to maintain their status quo. As such elections were successively rigged that sustained the rulers in the office despite their high unpopularity among the common masses. They could not, however, continue for unending period. The election rigging finally led to the outbreak of non-violent revolutions in both of the countries and brought an end to the semi-authoritarian regimes.

The rigging of the November 2003 parliamentary election in Georgia and the October 2004 presidential election had erupted popular upheavals in both the countries. Thousands and thousands of people braved the cold weather and the ruling regime and rallied in the street in protest, demanding the re-election and the resignation of the presidents. Corruption and election rigging was looked upon by people as undemocratic served as a binding force of the revolutionaries. The International NGOs played a crucial role in making the revolution materialized. Millions and millions of dollars had been sent from the west mainly through the NGOs for the purpose of democratization in these countries. The NGOs not only provided the pro-democratic activists with financial assistance but also helped them with the strategy to be adopted during the course of the protest. The media too played a crucial role in mobilizing the people by spreading information to the people across the country. The masses participated in large number.

After days of protest both the governments accepted the election result as void and called for new elections. In the re-run elections the candidates of the old semi-authoritarians pro-Russian regimes lost to the pro-west regime candidates which were projected as

democratic both at home and abroad. The success of the pro-west candidates Mikhial Saakashvili in Georgia and Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine threw a new ray a hope for democracy and development in both the countries. The new governments formed after the color revolutions promised to end corruption, to reform the political system to suit democracy and to bring justice and development in the country. However, in the first term itself, the promises disappeared and the same problems continued to bother the people. Corruption remains extensive and disruptive, organized crime still operates and the people continue to live under the shadow of poverty and misery. The new regimes which the western media regularly declared democratic remained authoritarian and cracked down the democratic opponents, thereby, reversing towards their predecessors' nature of semi-authoritarianism. The democratic future of the country remained vague and uncertain. The people's faith in the government and the hope for democracy has declined drastically. These prevailing unsolved problems show that the governments formed after the destruction of authoritarian regime is not necessarily democratic.

Both the competing parties in the revolution- the ruling and the oppositions regarded the election as the end of everything and give due importance to the result of the elections. While to the ruling regime losing the election meant permanent end of their rule, to the opposition losing in the election meant permanent failure of democracy in the country. So the focus of both the parties was on the candidates or parties contesting for the election. The ruling regimes did everything within their command to ensure the success of their candidates, Edward Shevardnadze and Victor Yanukovych including election rigging and poisoning of opposition candidate in Ukraine. The oppositions on the other side brave themselves to face all dangers to make their candidates Saakashvili and Victor Yushchenko win the elections. The re-elections were held in the presence of large number international observers such as ISFED and OSCE in the early and late 2004. The opposition candidates Saakashvili in Georgia and Victor Yushchenko were elected.

The success of Saakashvili in Georgia and Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine was considered a revival of democracy in the country. Here, democracy was personalized. The victory of the pro-west and pro-democratic candidates was significantly a progress towards democratization, but democracy does not depend completely on the success or failure of

individual leadership in the country. The revolutionaries in Georgia and Ukraine successfully overthrew the semi-authoritarian regime but failed to destroy the nature of the political system. The political institution which is an important ingredient for the establishment of democracy was not effectively reformed to provide a favorable condition for the growth of democracy. After the color revolutions, both the countries underwent a constitutional amendment in 2004. The reformed constitution introduced semi-presidential in Georgia and presidential-parliamentary system in Ukraine. The main weakness of the new constitutions is the lack of clarity of the separation of power between executive, legislature and judiciary which is an important feature of liberal democracy. In Ukraine, the new constitution divides the executive power between the president and the prime minister. The prime minister was vested with more power and has the power to appoint most of the ministers while the president continues to appoint key post like defense and foreign affairs, the heads of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Procurator General etc. In Georgia the division of power was made disproportionately, thereby vesting huge power to the executive at the expense of the legislature and judiciary.

Both the presidents remained strong horizontally and vertically. In the centre the presidents have the power to unilaterally dismiss the parliament. Also the presidents appoint and can dismiss the judges of the high courts. At the regional levels, the presidents ensure his/her dominance through the governors he/she appoints and dismisses. The creation of strong executive/president in both the countries poses the biggest challenge to the democratization process in the country. The institutional arrangement remained untouched in the post color revolutionary period. The successful achievement of the so called 'Color Revolution' was the replacement of pro-Russian presidents with the pro-US presidential candidates. Therefore, the color revolution in reality is an orchestrated regime change- a regime change planned and supervised by the US, rather than a revolution since no sudden or immediate change other than the regime change took place. The subsequent reforms brought some improvement from the previous regimes but were not sufficient for real democracy.

The strong power vested in the president is often misused by the presidents, most frequently for the suppression of the opponents to meet their political ends. The strong presidential power makes the balance of power among the three branches ineffective. It makes the judiciary and executive weak as compared to the president. In the absence of proper check and balance, it is natural that the president turns authoritarian or semi-authoritarian. The authoritarian nature of both the presidents appeared to the people in the political crisis that rocked both the countries in 2007. On November 2 the people of Georgia who live a miserable life due to corruption in the country, rallied on the street of Tbilisi demanding the parliamentary election to be held on time as set by the constitution. The president declared emergency and crushed down the protesters with massive force. In Ukraine, the 2007 political crisis was dealt with by Yushchenko by dissolving the parliament at least three times giving different justification. But a poll conducted in the first half of April by KIIS showed that 55 percent of Ukrainian excluding those who were undecided opposed the first presidential decree.

The lack of progress by the new governments under Saakashvili and Yushchenko reveals the futility of imposed democracy in Georgia and Ukraine. The democratic institutions in these countries were not rooted in the society and the state neither had the capacity nor will to implement the law effectively. As a result democracy could not be sustained. The presidents of both the countries control the legislature and small elite rules the countries. The competitive election is missing and the opposition parties are weak. The separation of judiciary from the executive has not been defined clearly.

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Appendix: 1 GEORGIA

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Electoral Process	4.00	4.50	5.00	5.25	5.25	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.75
Civil Society	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Independent Media	3.75	3.50	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.00	4.25
Governance*	4.50	4.75	5.00	5.50	5.75	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
National Democratic									
Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.75
Local Democratic									
Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.50
Judicial Framework									
and Independence	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.50	4.50	5.00	4.75	4.75	4.75
Corruption	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.75	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.00	5.00
Democracy Score	4.17	4.33	4.58	4.83	4.83	4.96	4.86	4.68	4.79

The social data above was taken from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's *Transition Report 2007: People in Transition*, and the economic data from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators 2008*.

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.

Appendix: 2 UKRAINE

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Electoral Process	3.50	4.00	4.50	4.00	4.25	3.50	3.25	3.00	3.00
Civil Society	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.75	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.75
Independent Media	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.50	4.75	3.75	3.75	3.50
Governance	4.75	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.25	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
National Democratic									
Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	5.00	4.50	4.75	4.75
Local Democratic									
Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.25
Judicial Framework									
and Independence	4.50	4.50	4.75	4.50	4.75	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.75
Corruption	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
Democracy Score	4.63	4.71	4.92	4.71	4.88	4.50	4.21	4.25	4.25

The social data above was taken from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's *Transition Report 2007: People in Transition*, and the economic data from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators 2008*.

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.

