GENERATING SOCIAL CAPITAL: DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION AMONG THE MUSLIMS OF KERALA

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MUHAMMED HANEEFA A.P.

CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI-110067

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CERTIFICATE

This dissertation entitled "**Generating Social Capital: Development of Education among the Muslims of Kerala**" is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, of Jawaharlal Nehru University. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University and is my original work.

MuhammedHaneefa A.P.

We recommend that this Dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation

Prof. Surinder S. JodhkaProf. EhsanulHaq

(Chairperson) (Supervisor)

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

About a year ago, in March, in between *Isha-Maghrib*, Nafeesatha, a mother of seven, carries a *Sabeena*[1], and elocutes beautifully a *malappattu*[2]. She sits beside her grandchildren, who listen to her rendition while doing their school homework. Though they do not comprehend the complete meaning of the *malappattu* that their grandmother sings, they sit around her as devoted listeners. This *malappattu* is nothing but *Moideen Mala*, the most recited devotional classic in Arabi-Malayalam[3]. Along with many *malappattukal* she can also recite the Quran beautifully and accurately without any difficulty. May be, within Kerala Muslims, especially among the Mappila[4] households, one of the most recited and respected work after the Holy Quran is the *Moideen Mala*. It was written exactly four hundred and five years back (1907) by Qadi Muhammad and it praises the life and miracles of Shaikh Muhyi'din 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani in Baghdad, eponym of the Qadiri order[5]. Before the recitation is completed, her son, a schoolteacher and a person who is among the two and a half million census enumerators in India, comes to her home to collect details for the 2011 Indian Census, one of the largest peacetime operations in the world. While marking the column regarding literacy, they ask Nafeestha whether she could write and read Malayalam or any other language. Before she could give an answer, her son marked her as illiterate. Hence, Nafeesatha, who is quite literally the treasure house of Arabi-Malayalam literature in

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[1] A book comprising *dhikrs* and the devotional songs such as *mawluds* and *malappattukal,* mainly known on the basis of the number of songs and *dhikrs* it contains, like 33 *vaka edukal,* 313 *vaka edukal,* 999 *vaka edukal* (the number denotes the total number of different mawluds, *dikrs* and *Malas).* The word has its origin in the Persian language (Kareem and Maulavi 1978: 35).

[2] *Mala* (literally "garland" "necklace") *malappattu* is a genre of songs that describe the life history of pious Muslims and Sufi saints, pl. *malappattuka.* more details see (Abu O 1970: 61-77)

[3] This will be discussed further in the second chapter.

[4] Mappila Muslims constitute more than ninety percent of Muslim population in Kerala. Majority of these Muslims live in the Northern part of Kerala, called as Malabar region. Scholarly woks have variously spelled it as Mappila, Mappilla, Mopla, Maplah and Moplaymar. For more on the name "Mappila" see Miller R. (1992: 30-33).

[5] Abd al-Qadir al-Jılanı(1077-1166/ Hijra 561), famous Sufi preacher and the founder of Quadiri *tariqa* (order), considered the first formal Sufi order. He was born in the Iranian district of Giilaan , and Jilani in his name indicates the place of birth. He adhered quite strictly to the school of Imaam Ahmad ibn Hanbal. In *Moideen Mala* the author says that the Sufi-saint has another name which is *Sultaan al-Awliyaa'* - "The Sultan of the Saints."

my village, ended up being listed as one among the 272,950,015 illiterates in the 2011 Census Report[6]. The irony is that, her son who marked her as an illiterate, cannot read or write Arabi-Malayalam or any *malappattukal,* was marked as literate, because he possesses a 'desired literacy' that the "official" system demands. Nafeesatha is not even a semi-literate, but a complete literate, albeit in Arabi-Malayalam. The existing system however is not ready to accept it or the "educated" enumerators are "unaware" about such a literary tradition[7].

After one year, in another March, scholarly articles reported that Delhi Muslims face a clear discrimination in getting admission in "top rated" schools[8]. One study, based on field work in some selected areas in Delhi, reported that most of the schools in the Capital had some sort of a "prefixed quota of just this much and no more Muslims" (Borker H. 2012). These are not isolated incident; even in Kerala, a state that has achieved "exceptional" development in education in comparison with other states, Muslims face discrimination in schools. For instance, girls are forbidden in some private schools from wearing headscarfs (Lakshmi 2012: 162). Still, as a matter of choice, many educated Muslims in both Delhi and Kerala prefer private schools, especially Christian convent schools[9]. The reason behind such a preference is mainly the "quality" and "tradition" that convent schools vouch to ensure. Parents have the opinion that these schools ensure that the students "have a better command over the English language, and have a strong emphasis on discipline" (Borker H 2012).

Is there any connection between the above mentioned incidents? Yes, both stories do share one common characteristic, which is "social exclusion", or to put it simply, exclusion of a community on the basis of their identity and their knowledge. In the first case, Nafeesatha, even though 'functionally literate', gets "excluded" from being identified as one. In the second case, mostly, the same authorities in alliance with other dominant groups in

[6] As per the provisional population totals of Census 2011, out of the provisional total population of 1,210,193,422, the number of persons aged seven years and above is 1,051,404,135. Out of this 778,454,120 (74.04 per cent) are literate and 272,950,015 (25.06) are illiterate. See Provisional Population Totals, State of Literacy (Chapter 6) Pp-98-101

[7] This story was narrated by Nafeestha's son Ashraf, during the inaugural lecture on Nabidinam program in Sirajul Uloom Madrasa, Cherukulam. See *Sirajul Uloom Silvery Souvenir* July 2011.

[8] It informed that although Muslims constitute around 15 per cent of the population in Delhi, less than 0.5 per cent of Muslim children have been admitted to schools, See Zaman and Perrapadan 2012

[9] For more details on school selection and the role of education on identity formation among the Muslims of Kerala, See Banu Sareena (2007)

society "excluded" the Muslims students from getting admission to the 'mainstream schools'. This admission would supposedly have helped them to achieve a 'desired literacy' and modern education. When in the first instance the state and dominant authorities seem to remind Muslims that their literacy is not "modern" enough, in the second instance they seem to remind them that they are not "desirable". The paradox, irony and contradiction of the situation is that it is the same forces that deny them these "modern", "mainstream" and "desirable" qualifications. Such stories of the exclusion of Indian Muslims are not new. In many parts of India, Muslims have historically been excluded from participating in formal education. Such reports and incidents provoked me to think about the formation of an educational system that favors some groups and communities over others, and facilitates certain groups to generate more social, cultural and economic capital that acts as a catalyst for their domination in society. In addition, I wanted to explore how it further created a dichotomy between 'us' versus 'them' and categorized the 'us' as always 'genuine', 'normal', 'modern' and 'progressive' contrary to the classification of 'them' as 'primitive', 'outdated', 'fanatic' and, colloquially, in Malayalam as *randam number* ((Number two) and *munnam number* (Number three)[10].

Most of the discussions and reports on Muslim education in India often embrace the sketchy phrase "*Pakshe Kerala Muslims*" (But Muslims in Kerala) to emphasize the 'exceptional' character of Kerala Muslims' achievements in education[11]. Such studies highlight that Kerala Muslims have higher educational achievement and literacy rate than most other Muslim communities in the country. However, discussions and reports on Muslim education in Kerala embrace another sketchy phrase "*Pakshe Keralathil Muslims*" (But Muslims within Kerala) to emphasize the low status that Muslims hold in education when

[10] A local type of classification of communities, groups within communities and their doings, we can see the usage of such words in the everyday interaction of individuals, for more details on *onnam number* (number one) Muslims, *randam number* (number two) Muslims and *munnam namber* (number three) Muslims See Osella and Osella 2008: 330.

[11] Such a sketchy phrase is not only used to describe Muslim educational development in Kerala, but it is a common topic of discussion in both academic and policy level to emphasize the 'exceptional' character of Kerala's achievements, especially in literacy, education, health and standard of living. But many recent works have criticized the scholarly pontification of the "Kerala Model Development" and what used to be seen as its cornerstone is now perceived as having silenced the voices of marginal communities, particularly the tribals (Luisa Steur 2009: 26). For more on the critique of Kerala's educational development see Raman K. Ravi (2012), Kumar Ratheesh (2010)

compared to other communities in the state. Those who have tried to find out the reason behind the first *pakshe* (But), generally start their discussion by mainly focusing on the formation of the *Kerala Muslim Aikya Sankam* and end their discussion by giving their views on the programs and policies taken by the Muslim Educational Society (MES)[12]. Those who have tried to answer the reason behind the second *paskhe* (But), limit their discussion by repeating the antique cliché that, Kerala Muslims, mainly Mappila's and their *ulamas*, consciously rejected and boycotted English and modern education, and that it was their attitude towards modern education that caused the historical backwardness of Muslims in education.

However, such scholarly works often neglect the reasons behind such a radical rejection of colonial education and culture by Mappila Muslims. Every education system, as noted by Foucault, "is a political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them" (Foucault, 1972: 227). The colonizers brought with them not only their culture, and political and economic policies but also their religion and a *new* education. They tried to legitimize their rule through this *new* educational system, with the master's language, culture and religion as its locus, upon the colonized. To establish their "superiority" over native culture and education, colonial masters legally branded the native culture and education "backward and childish", "repugnant to justice and morality" or as "opposed to natural morality and humanity" (Asad 2003: 110-11). Colonial rulers even projected that "education on English lines was a necessary passport to success" and "Muslim education was out of keeping with the requirements of the age - perhaps that Islamic belief itself was an anachronism" (Hardy P. 1972: 92). As a response to such colonial cultural imperialism, traditional *ulamas* in Kerala, constructed and taught the Muslims that English is the 'language of hell' and modern education 'is a passport to hell'. But after the independence, colonial education became the dominant form of education wherein education was narrowly and exclusively defined on the basis of colonially given 'modern', 'secular' and English education. Later, colonial educational discourses and cultural domination turned our consciousness to what Spivak calls "worlding of the West as world" in which Western colonial interests are projected as the World's interests and become naturalized in the rest of

[12] The role of these two organizations in Muslim secular education is unavoidable, and will be discussed in detail in the last chapter.

world (Spivak, quoted in Andreotti Vanessa 2007). In fact, current scholarship is incomplete about why Muslims in Kerala rejected modern education for so long- indeed, it is a problem that seems not to have been seriously studied. My own thinking, however, is that we need much more objective studies to discuss the origin of the negative Muslim response to secular education and their educational backwardness when compared with other communities within the state.

Broadly, the present endeavor tries to find the reason behind these two *pakshe* (But), and in addition tries to figure out why during the colonial period Muslims 'have shown very little desire for education'[13], although not entirely in chronological sequence. This work is not just about the 'success story' or 'exceptional' development of education among the Kerala Muslims. But it is also about the *devaluation* of their traditional education and networks, and the suppression of their genuine rebellions by the colonial rulers and what Guha (1982) calls their *eleves*- the dominant group in native society- and elite urban Muslims. This work will further elaborate, how in such a dominant form of education Muslims have been historically "othered", cast as "lagging behind" and called as "backward" in contrast to the 'educated', 'progressive' 'modern' communities. Later, the study will also dwell on how, with the help of social capital, as a source, store and credit that produces 'positive results' and 'benefits' for individual and communities, Kerala Muslims achieved a 'respectable' and 'exceptional' higher educational development when compared with Muslims in other states in India.

Research Objectives

This study explores the development of a *new* system of education in Kerala during the colonial period and the response of the 'natives' to colonial education. It further examines why colonial rulers were forced to implement new educational policies in rebellion-affected regions and how local elites helped them to achieve the colonial 'civilizing mission'. This study aims to examine the traditional educational system among the Kerala Muslims and its fine-tuned functionality with the help of community social capital. The objective is further extended to analyze the pre-colonial social and educational conditions in Kerala and the monopoly over various "capitals" exercised by dominant communities and how this was later

[13] [13] The 1871 census report said that Muslims, especially the Mappilas, have shown very little desire for education. See, Census Report, Madras Presidency, 1871 Vol.1 p.192

reflected in their educational development. The study also examines the relevance of social capital in achieving higher educational credentials and the role played by various organizations, religious institutions and bulk printing in generating social capital for the betterment of the education of Kerala Muslims. Further, the study will analyze the way in which the improvement of local economic conditions and representation in politics has had an impact on the educational condition of Kerala Muslims. In general, this study aims to find out the relevance of social capital in the educational development of marginalized communities.

Overview of Chapters

Chapter 1 introduces the issues relevant to theorizing social capital and education. It summarizes some of the dominant theories- mainly, those of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam- and debates in relation to conceptualizing 'social capital' across the disciplines of sociology, political science and education. This chapter tries to find out answers to the following questions. Firstly, what is social capital? Moreover, why does social capital matter in education? Following Bourdieu, if societies produce and reproduce inequalities through the institutionalization of education and distribution of unequal cultural capital, how does the attainment of more social capital help pupils, especially from the 'lower class', 'lower caste' and minority background to achieve more desirable results in education? Following Coleman, how does generating social capital 'reduce inequalities' in stratified societies? In a stratified society like India, birth into a specific field 'buys' prestige, honor and cultural capital, and in future it helps communities and individuals to attain higher social and educational achievements. If this is the case, can we consider birth as a source of social capital? This chapter further discusses five important sources that generate social capital, which includes voluntary organizations, religion and religious institutions, government and political parties, improvement in local economic conditions and print capitalism, and family relations.

Chapter 2 discusses the colonial construction of education in Kerala and the educational dualism in Muslim societies. What is the educational condition of the Kerala Muslims at the beginning of the twentieth century? How much educational conditions changed over a period of hundred years. This section discusses the historical account of Muslim education in Kerala

and the role of religious institutions such as *dars*, *othupallis* and *madrasas* in educating Muslims in Kerala. It further discusses the fine-tuned functionality of these institutions with the help of community social capital. This chapter also discusses the social, political and economic conditions that predate the colonial invasion, and how it has had an important effect on the present educational backwardness of Kerala Muslims. This chapter will argue that colonialism did not introduce education in Kerala, but they introduced a *new* educational system and educational institutions that partly supplemented and partly replaced and later marginalized, those institutions which were prevalent before. It will further discuss the colonial ruler's 'maneuver' of the use of modern English education as an important weapon to suppress the genuine rebellions raised by oppressed Muslims, and why colonial documents called them as 'fanatic Muslims'.

Chapter 3 draws upon quantitative data from mainly Census reports, the Sachar Committee report and many other official statistics to examine the educational development of Kerala Muslims. Statistical modeling is used to explore the 'conventional' educational indicators such as literacy, mean years of schooling and school enrolment rate. These data are further used to examine the 'exceptional' educational development of Kerala Muslims in comparison with Muslims in other selected states. This chapter also makes use of the literature documents on the participation of Muslims in politics in order to understand how it increases their 'critical consciousness' and 'bargaining power' and its reflection in their educational development. One section in this chapter will discuss the role of voluntary organizations, religious institutions and cluster organizations and the "spread of print capitalism" in order to explain the reasons behind the educational development of Muslims in the state. The last section of this chapter will discuss as to how the family and improvement in local economic conditions and government and political parties generated more networks and facilities for the improvement in the educational status of Kerala Muslims.

Conclusions and recommendations are made in chapter 4. It asks, why are Kerala Muslims underrepresented in government jobs even after having a 'preferable' educational record? This section will challenge Putnam's theory of the decline of social capital and its universality by discussing the formation of more and more parochial organizations among the Muslims of Kerala through the process of dissolution of old collectivities.

Chapter Two

GENERATING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND EDUCATION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Bonds and contacts between individuals and groups serve indeed as central building block of a larger community edifice. This debate in sociology is old as the development of sociology as a subject in Western societies. Emile Durkheim, one of the founding fathers of sociology, was deeply interested "in the way that people's social ties served as the thread from which a wider society wove itself together" (Field 2003: 11). Such bonds, based on mutual trust, cooperation and norms of reciprocity, are essential for community cohesion in any society that fosters collective action for mutual benefits, and this was the very idea behind the concept of social capital. In the later debate, trust, co-operation and networks are considered as the *core features* of social capital definition. Social capital research is a new trend in social sciences, but "social capital is not a new phenomenon" (Ross 1988: 147); a strong network of trustworthiness and cooperation of people who come together for the mutual benefit of the production of goods, charitable works and social services is an inevitable feature of all societies, 'traditional' or 'modern'. It is not only essential for human development, but also for social, economic, political, educational and cultural development of any societies. There are a great number of ways to conceptualize, theorize and measure social capital, there is now overwhelming evidences that support this claim. The 'flexibility' of the concept of social capital and its importance in human development and progress attracted many social scientists, including sociologist, economists, political scientists, policy makers and furthermore, it has "entered public debates" (Adam and Roncevic 2003).

Many of these scholars conceptualize social capital according to their affiliation with subjects and 'institutional' or 'ideological' framework. To solve this 'definitional problem' of social capital in sociology, American sociologist Jonathan H Turner gave a 'broad' and 'all encompassing' definition for social capital. However, the 'broad' sociological definition of social capital by Turner was severely limited in the field of the so-called 'new economic sociology' paradigm. He defined social capital as "those forces that increase the potential for economic development in a society by creating and sustaining social relations and patterns of

social organization" (Turner: 2000). But here, I wonder whether it is the 'basic' or it is the 'popular' definition that he included in his 'broad' definition of social capital. On the other hand, can we limit the definition of social capital *only* in the domain of the forces that increase potential for economic development? Definitely not, but like Turner, many sociologist and economists stressed the 'capital' part of social capital than the 'social'. Even Bourdieu, one of the 'founding fathers' of social capital, argued that economic capital is at the root of all other types of capital (Bourdieu 1986: 252). But to see 'capital' solely in economic terms is insufficient to explain social capital. Interestingly, most of the research on social capital has taken place outside the discipline of economics, among sociologists, political scientists, educationalists and policy makers. Most of these researches never undermined the role of economic capital in the production social capital, but they highlighted the role of trust, 'embeddedness', 'weak ties' and networks in economic growth and development (Woolcock 1998, Granovettor 1973, 1985, Knack and Keefer 1997).

In this chapter, before going to discuss the role of many agencies that activate the dormant social capital for the development of secular education among the Muslims in Kerala, I will elaborate the concept of social capital itself first, then, how the theoretical and empirical studies explained social capital within the context of educational attainment. While analyzing social capital, the 'over abundance of resources' and the 'multi-definitions' on the concept, is an important problem. Similarly, the theoretical discussion of social capital will be further complicated while discussing the 'positive' or 'negative' aspect of social capital, likely, the debate on 'decline' or 'increase', of social capital. To tackle the problem of 'multi-definitions' on social capital, here I will concentrate the theoretical aspects of social capital in the works of 'three modern father of social capital', namely, Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam, and how they debated the concept within the context of education. This will help to avoid a lengthy excursus into social capitals other forms of application. The aim is to set theories of social capital research from a number of different social settings.

This work will take a balanced view over the debate on whether social capital is 'negative' or 'positive', similarly, as to whether it is on the 'decline' or 'increase'. The next two chapters will highlight the 'positive' aspects of social capital, like, how does it help for the formation of educational and development? How does it help the marginalized

communities to acquire a privileged position in societies? But at the end, I will discuss some of the 'dark sides', mainly discussing negative consequences, of social capital by looking at state's failure in public education and how the communalization of education happed through the 'dark sides' of social capital. The 'dark sides' of social capital was mainly a product of social exclusion. If someone faces the question of 'whom I choose' or to 'whom do I trust', the same time he/she is excluding someone by doing 'I am not going to choose you' or 'I won't trust you or your community'. Therefore, the 'selection' of a person or a group is intentional and purposeful, and the 'exclusion' of some groups and communities from joining 'our group' or 'our community' will definitely invite the 'dark sides' of social capital. More will be said the third chapter on about this.

Many theoretical studies on the sociology of education argue that there is a close connection between the possession and amount of parental and/or community social capital with the educational development. However, in empirical studies, social capital did not travel far in its journey to education (Dika and Sing 2002). While we discuss social capital in the India context, rarely we can find literatures that deal directly with the issues of social capital and education. Further, when we look at the Kerala context, there are no studies examining neither the relationship between social capital and educational attainment, nor the role played by social capital in the formation of secular education among the Muslims. However, before going to do such a micro detail study on social capital and education, with special focus on Kerala Muslims, I will deal with the basic question, what is social capital?

Instead of *Two Meanings of Social Capital* (Portes 2000, Essar 2008), today it is not impossible to write an article or book that deals solely with the multiple definitions and meanings of social capital. Because of diverse application of social capital and specific definition given by each authors "now we have a substantial stock of definitions at our disposal" (Adam and Roncevic 2003: 158). Today, "we 'encounter' social capital in every corner of the social sciences" (Ostrom and Ahn 2009: 17), and no discipline has a complete monopoly on the concept. In such a milieu, Svendsen and Svendsen's 'the troika' of social capital has more relevance. They find that 'troika' is an appropriate metaphor for the three disciplines that have mostly 'pulled' social capital research, namely sociology, political science and economics (Svendsen 2009: 1). It would be impossible to define social capital,

specifically within the context of education, without an interdisciplinary theoretical understanding. So, I will move to examine some of the theories of social capital that break the strict traditional sense of disciplinary boundaries, but relevant to all disciplines.

To begin with, all most all debates on the theory of social capital start with the contributions of three thinkers. However, discussing the historical roots of the concept, I will focus more on L J Hanifan's works than Alexis de Tocqueville "the patron saint of contemporary social capitalists" (Putnam 2000: 292). This is because, unlike Tocqueville, Hanifan discussed social capital in relation to education and community development. Apart from discussing the 'general theories' on social capital, here I will focus on the theories of social capital that took education as an important topic of discussion. Interestingly, "these three thinkers have written about education in the context of social capital", or the other way around, and "their interest was largely confined to schools or university education" (Field 2005: 35). This aspect, theoretical explanation of social capital in the context of education, of their work has rarely discussed in the theories of social capital by the later theorists.

Social capital has a wide verity of meanings, it "as a genotype with many phenotype application" (Adam and Roncevic 2003: 158). As Mondak's noticed, "That the meaning of social capital will become muddled" amongst the "staggering flood of discourse**"** (Modedak: 1998). Woolcock argues that due to "indiscriminate applications of social and other *capitals*" in social science, as a result emerged, "several theoretical and empirical weaknesses" (Woolcock 1998: 155). Referring these situations, James Farr observes, "This concerns empirical theorists who seek stable referents and clear definitions" (Farr 2004: 7). In this situation, the researcher who deals with social capital should clearly state what they mean by social capital. Here solving the definitional 'problem', I would like to concentrate the 'core definitions' of the concept and its empirical application in education, that have endeavored to formulate a working definition that helps me to work throughout my research. More ambitiously, it attempts to distill a consistent framework for incorporating 'core theories' of social capital into secular educational formation and development among the Muslims in Kerala by examining studies conducted at the sociological and policy level that have explored the conditions of Muslim education in India and how various social capital mechanisms help educational formation and development.

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The term "social capital" first appeared in the writings of L J Hanifan in 1916. L J Hanifan, according to Robert Putnam, considered as the first person use the concept of social capital[14]. Hanifan conceptualized, social capital as 'something different' or 'addition' to economic capital. His study shows that, the first discussion of social capital was related to the community cohesion and the importance of contact with neighbors' in particular social settings. Hanifan, explained the emergence of social capital by saying that if an individual or his/her family fails to satisfy his/her needs "he/*she* may come into contact with his/*her* neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital" (Hanifan: 1916, emphasis added). What this accumulation of social capital would do, according to Hanifan, "which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community" (Ibid, 1916). His argument is summarized in the following words; social capital is functional, it helps community cohesion and solidarity and the role of community is crucial in the development of an individual. This is very similar to Durkheimian solidarity theory, where solidarity "constitutes the defining characteristic of group life". It is, by extension, "the *sine qua non* of collective action" (Traugott 1984: 325). Hanifan's "the social center idea" basically, "was a rural educator's civic dream: an idea and a movement that placed education in general, and the school in particular, at the center of public life" (Farr 2004: 12). Then it will not be ludicrous to argue that, the history of the concept of social capital first emerged in relation to educational literature, and it highlighted that social capital has a great role to perform in educational development and community cohesion.

From Hanifan to Putnam, the concept of social capital traveled to different disciplines and effectively used the concept to describe the function of democracy, children's school performance, educational attainment, health progress, team sports achievement, and

[14] In his "The Rural School Community Center" (1916), Hanifan began the work by saying that, In the use of the phrase social capital, I do not refer to the usual acceptation of the term capital, except in a figurative sense. I do not refer to real estate or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of a people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit, the rural community, whose logical center is the school. In community building as in business organization and expansion there must be an accumulation of capital before constructive work can be done" (Hanifan 1916: 130).

economic development etc. in different societies. Rather than go into the detail of such studies here, I will move to a discussion of how the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defined the concept of social capital and how he has discussed it within the context of education. Why does Bourdieu represent the theory first? Firstly, I agree with many that Robert Putnam claims much of the credit for popularizing what had previously been a rather obscure terminology for the masses; but the publication of Bourdieu's work "the Forms of Capital" (1986) popularized the concept in academics especially for sociologists. Secondly, I want to elaborate the theories of social capital in chronological order that is explaining the development of social capital as an academic and then a popular concept. This will help to understand the influence of one theorist over another, and it shows that they were never completely isolated from the thought of their predecessors**.**

Bourdieu: *The forms of Capital*

In a recent work, Turner and Simon Susen (2011) identify five aspects that characterize the complexity of Bourdieusian thought. They are, Bourdieu work is "multithematic", "multidisciplinary", "intellectually eclectic", both "empirically grounded and theoretically informed" and "politically committed" (Susen and Turner 2011: xix-xxii). These complexities and aspects of his work are visible in his discussion of 'capitals' in general and the social capital in particular. In addition, the writings of Marx, Weber and Durkheim and their theoretical writings influenced him. Such a broad theoretical and disciplinary background helped Bourdieu to write one of the influential works in Sociology, *The Forms of Capital*[15].

Bourdieu has defined capital broadly as "accumulated human labor" (Bourdieu: 1986, p. 241), which potentially produce different forms of profit. In his interpretation, unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms, i.e. social, cultural and symbolic and not solely in the one form recognized by economic theory, it is impossible to account for the structure and

[15] Bourdieu's work "The Forms of Capital" (1986) mainly answering two questions, one is, what is 'capital'? and the second is, what forms of capital exist?. It was an extension of Marx's concept of capital, where he expanded the term 'capital' to include both material and non-material phenomena. His approach, unlike Adam Smith and other social scientists, who heavily focused on the role of material capitals such as physical and financial capital, to an certain extend tried to answer the puzzle existed in social science that why some individuals, communities and nations are richer than others

function of social world. His definition of 'capital' thus becomes possible to outline the practice of the social world as directed not only towards the possession of economic capital but of all forms of capital. Bourdieu, in contrast to Marxian capital analysis, which is exclusively macroeconomic, historical and one-dimensional the Bourdieusian analysis is micro-sociological and investigates individual relations (Svendsen: 2009). Bourdieu's usage of capital theory, which theoretically, operates with visible, material forms of capital and invisible non-material forms of capital.

Bourdieu's usage is designed to address the way in which social capital is part of a wider set of structural relations and subjective beliefs that are bound up with inequalities of resources, and hence with inequalities of power (Field 2005: 19). Thus, Bourdieu's concept of capital helps us to understand different power politics in different societies. The inclusion of both material and non-material features in the definition of capital also helps us to understand how different forms of capital are unevenly distributed among actors, who possess different habituses and different positions within specific fields. An actor's behavior and life styles is a product of fields, habitus and different forms of 'capitals'. Different forms of capitals are essential to articulate the power structure, stratification and domination in societies. The forms of capital, according to Bourdieu,

> can present itself in three fundamental guises, as economic capital, cultural capital and social capital depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are preconditions for its efficacy in the field in question (Bourdieu: 1986, p 242).

He explains that, economic capital is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights. Cultural capital, which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital made up of social obligations (connections), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of title of nobility (Ibid, P 242-43). In his landmark article on "Education as a Form of Social Reproduction"[16], he defines social capital as a

[16] originally published in French in 1970, translated into English in 1977

> Capital of social relationships which will provide, if necessary, useful 'supports': a capital of honorability and respectability which is often indispensable if one desires to attract clients in socially important positions, and which may serve as currency, for instance in a political career (Bourdieu 1977: p 503)

He further elaborated the concept as

> "The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition, or in other words, to membership in a group, which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital" (Bourdieu 1986)

The above definition shows that, Bourdieu never treats social capital as independent entity and for him other forms of capital like economic and cultural, can mobilize the social capital. He argues that one can 'measure' the amount or volume of social capital by looking at the size of network of connections one can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he/she is connected. Analyzing Bourdieu's definition of social capital, Alejandro Portes has the opinion that Bourdieu's social capital is decomposable into two elements: first, the social relationship itself that allows individuals to claim access to resources possessed by their associates, and second, the amount and quality of those resources (Portes: 1998). Bourdieu insists that all forms of capitals are interconnected and the acquisition of social capital requires deliberate investment of both material and cultural capital. It was further evident in his discussion on the symbolic possession of both cultural and material capital in the maintenance of a bourgeois life-style. He argues that such a bourgeois life style provide a social capital, which according to Bourdieu

> A capital of social connections, honorability and respectability that is often essential in winning and keeping the confidence of high society, and with it a clientele, and may be drawn on, for example, in making a political career (Bourdieu 1984 (1979): 122)

In all this definitions the concept of social capital is defined in a "Bourdieuconomics" (Svendsen: 2009) perspective, in that perspective, Bourdieu suggests that the outcomes of

possession of social or cultural capital are reducible or/and convertible to economic capital (Portes 1998). However, it is not only economic capital, but all forms of capital are subject to conversion, material capital to cultural capital, cultural capital to social capital, and so on**.** In his definitions, interestingly, the phrases like 'connections', 'durable network' and 'membership in a group', are important to link 'the first known definition' of social capital that was given, decades before, by Hanifan. L J Hanifan discussed how an individuals or groups contact with neighbors (connections), and they with other neighbors (durable network) help a community (membership in a group) to accumulate social capital. More interestingly, Bourdieu and later theorists like Coleman and Putnam and many other social capital theorists emphasized the 'connections' and 'networks' as some important features of social capital. However, before going to discuss Coleman and Putnam I will move to Bourdieu's reflection on social capital and education.

Education: Reproduction of Inequalities in a Hierarchical Society

Bourdieu had written in detail about education and he envisioned knowledge as a source of power that reproduces inequalities in stratified societies. It is not imperative to argue that Bourdieu explored the concept of cultural capital and educational reproduction than he did with social capital and education[17]. For Bourdieu, educational system is not only, what Durkheim and other functionalists defined, a mechanism by means of which is operated the conservation of a culture inherited from the past, i.e. the transmission from one generation to another, but also, he discussed, how societies and groups within societies produced and reproduced the inequalities through the institutionalization of education. Bourdieu elaborates how by traditionally or the classical theories tend to dissociate the function of cultural reproduction of proper to all educational system from their function of social reproduction (Bourdieu 1977: 488). According to Bourdieu educational system reproduces all the more perfectly the structure of distribution of cultural capital among classes (and a sections of classes) in that the culture which it transmits is closer to the dominant culture (Ibid: 493). In his article on *The Forms of Capital*, he argued that those who hold a 'strong' or 'high'

[17] Sociologists like Michael Grenfell and David James argued, "It is education, to which Bourdieu's attention has repeatedly turned, and it is probably in education that his ideas have had the greatest impact", see Grenfell and James: 1998

cultural capital could attain higher educational credential in society[18]. Nevertheless, it does not mean that only cultural capital can produce educational credentials. Social capital, as a source of 'resource', 'network' and 'connections', in a Bourdieusian perspective, could be mobilized for certain purposes like educational attainment. Because, Bourdieu clearly recognized social capital is as a distinctive 'resource' together with financial and cultural capital.

With social or cultural capital framework, Bourdieu is exploring the cultural and 'hegemonic educational' transmission as a family based inter generational reproduction. Instead of focusing the popular conception of school as an institution of social reform and equality, he discussed how school as an institution formed for the creation and re-creation of differences and inequalities. He treated education and school as a means of perpetuating the existing social pattern as it both provides apparent justification for social inequalities and gives recognition to the cultural heritage, that is, to a social gift treated as a 'natural' one (Bourdieu 1974: 32). His explanation of the ideology of education and school will help us to examine why some communities, groups within communities and individuals become successful in attaining higher education while others are not afford the package of education and able to climb the ladder. It is because certain groups not only possess cultural capital, that but also they possess a large amount of social capital. For instance, Brahmins in India enjoyed higher educational status compare with 'Dalits' and minorities, it is because, in a Bourdieusian understanding, historically the Brahmins controlled the 'monopoly' over cultural capital in Indian subcontinent. Their ascribed social status, as a cultural capital, helped them to generate high amount of social capital through literacy and contacts. Literacy is one tool that connects people together and it makes easy interaction between individuals. Literacy estimates from the Census of 1911 to last Census (2001) highlight the stark inequality between groups, particularly higher castes versus lower castes, tribes and minorities, almost 30 percent of Brahmans were able to read and write in 1911 as compared to less than 2 percent of 'lower castes' and tribes.

[18] Cultural capital, according to Bourdieu can exist in three forms, embodied as a disposition of the mind and body, objectified as cultural goods, and in its institutionalized state as, more suitably, educational credentials (Bourdieu 1986)

The unequal distribution of educational capital has continued into post independence India where literacy rates for the Scheduled Castes (former lower castes), Scheduled tribes and Muslims are substantially below the national average. According to the census of 2001, the average literacy rate in India was 64.84 percent as compared to 54.69 percent and 47.10 percent for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively. The literacy rate of Muslim community was also below the national average, it was 59.1 in the 2001 Census. Literacy, as noted by Gough, "is for the most part an enabling rather than a causal factor, making possible the development of complex political structure" (Gough K 1975: 153) and it provided differences of social prestige and privilege. This high literacy, as a form of cultural capital, enabled 'high caste' Brahmins and Christians in India to organize for different purposes and easy communication with their fellow members, and that helped them to form networks of relationships and 'monopoly' on the education. This monopoly on literacy and education by the Brahmins and other upper castes further excluded and denied the 'low caste' groups and Muslims to achieve the modern literacy and the 'mainstream' modern education. So the educational system, not only in industrialized societies, but also in a feudal and semi feudal societies like India, function in such a way as to legitimate class, caste and even community inequalities. Alice Sullivan work on Bourdieu will further strengthen this argument; he summarizes Bourdieu's works on cultural capital and education by saying that cultural capital is inculcated in higher class home, and enable higher class students to gain higher educational credentials than lower class students. This enables higher-class individuals to maintain their class position, and legitimates the dominant position that higher-class individuals typically goes on to hold. Of course, some lower-class individuals will succeed in the education system, but, rather than challenging the system, this will strengthen it by contributing to the appearance of meritocracy (Sullivan: 2002). In Indian scenario, it is equally true that, education credentials are an important mechanism through which status, wealth and power transmitted[19]. Bourdieu's empirically grounded and theoretically informed

[19] There is not only a class combination in Indian educational system, along with class; there is a caste and community background, which enable students to gain higher educational credentials. In understanding Bourdieu's theories on education and its empirical application, Sullivan's work fails to understand the educational inequalities of nonindustrial and feudal societies. He started his article with the notion that Bourdieu's work must be seen in the context both of the debate on class inequalities in educational attainment and of broader questions of class reproduction in advanced capitalist societies (Sullivan: 2002). His work completely neglected the possibility of Bourdieu's

works has more universal applicability and wider social relevance than Sullivan imagined. For instance, Bourdieu's work argued that Parents' cultural capital helps students to attain educational credentials, like that; the income and profession of parents are also important in attaining higher educational credentials. This phenomenon is true in across different cultures and in societies. He also showed that the three forms of capitals are connected to each other. Some strategies like education that converts one form of capital into another. Going back to the previous example, the Brahmin enjoyed 'monopoly' over literacy and education, here the birth based possession of cultural capital and the strategic or hegemonic use of different 'capitals' generated a 'positive' social capital for Brahmins. In such a system, according to Bourdieu's educational theory, knowledge is a capital, because, as a symbolic product of social field, it has consequences which are more than simply symbolic, it 'buys' prestige, power and economic positioning (Grenfell and James 1998). However, in India, we can take birth as source of social and cultural capital, because, it has a 'privilege', a privilege that 'buys' prestige, chances of success and social positioning.

However, such sources of 'capital' are always criticized and rejected by the educational consciousness and struggle of the hitherto exploited masses. When the 'Dalits' and the minorities in India received chances for educational attainment and representation in politics, they have realized the power of their 'hidden' capitals. We do not know we have capital until we enter a field where it is valued, where it buys something (Ibid: 25). It gives the possibility that social capital is generative and it has specific usage according to the contexts. In Bourdieu's educational theory, cultural capital has a negative impact, especially cultural capital in its third form as an educational credential, because it reproduces inequalities in societies. However, at the same time, he recognizes the relevance of social capital in generating educational credentials, or somehow, solving the problems in unequal educational attainment. He acknowledge that the cultural capital and ethos combine to determine behavior in school and the attitude to schools which make up the differential principle of elimination operating for children of different social classes (Bourdieu 1974: 35). Here the lack of cultural capital is the one reason behind the excessive elimination of working class or the 'lower caste' children from the school or other educational institutions.

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works application in studying non-industrial or the so-called 'pre-modern' societies, and how in such societies education has been used for the production and reproduction of inequalities.

As a solution, the deliberate construction of social capital by the 'low classes', 'backward castes' and minority communities is the important means to settle the problems in education[20].

In short, even though Bourdieu's approach on social capital is micro sociological in nature, he placed his discussion in a wider context of structural inequalities in societies, especially how 'capitals'[21] produced and reproduced inequalities in diverse societies and groups within societies. However, Bourdieu's emphasis on the importance of social capital has two meaning, one "social capital as a source of power", and, secondly it as a "means for people to advance their interests and secure their relative advantage over the longer term" (Field 2005: 22-23). Many scholars have discussed the second point, especially sociologist James S Coleman, to understand the 'positive' power of social capital to 'reduce inequalities' in diverse societies. To discuss the formation of educational credential through community capital, the role played by social capital in it, and to place this debate in a wider intellectual context, Bourdieu needs to be set along side of other influential theorists Coleman and Putnam. Considering the sociological relation of Coleman with Bourdieu and his works influence on Putnam, next I will move to discuss on Coleman's notion of social capital and education.

James Coleman: Social Capital in the creation of Human Capital

American sociologist James Coleman's work on social capital has had a tremendous influence over the educational research in sociology[22]. Especially his work *Social capital in the creation of Human Capital* (1988) is the most frequently cited in the educational literature and social capital. Whereas a part of a wider attempt to explain social systems

[20] In analyzing education, the part of Bourdieu's theory that has been most influential and most fruitful for empirical researchers is the concept of social capital. Many of the works on social capital and education focused not in macro but in micro sociological understanding of the educational attainment. But as Nash Roy noted, Bourdieu's work on education and his account of socially differentiated educational attainment in terms of habitus, cultural capital and field is finally inadequate (Nash Roy 1990), to explain the complex processes in education. But such a criticism was rejected by many scholars by using the concepts in different social and historical contexts.

[21] 'Capitals' Includes all forms of capitals such as "economic capital", "cultural capital", "social capital" and "human capital".

[22] In a time, whereas Bourdieu's works has a limited access and reach to the English-speaking world, Coleman has found a strong response in the mainstream of educational studies.

proper, including but not limited to economic systems, Coleman uses social capital as a tool to explain social order. He examines the usefulness of the concept of social capital in a particular context that of educational attainment. He was 'an unapologetic rational choice theorist' (Frank 1992) and was influenced by the work of Gary Becker on rational choice theory and human capital (Field 2005)[23]. He uses social capital as a tool in building a bridge between the concept of 'over socialized' notion of humankind and the rational choice action (Coleman 1988)[24].

From the light of rational choice theory, Coleman conceptualizes social capital as a particular resource available to an actor. Self-interest is the first and foremost interest in rational action[25]. If self-interest is the only motivation behind every action, why people cooperate with one another? As question rose by John Field, when Cooperation is rarely in the individual's interest, except in those rare circumstances where they are constrained into altruism (Field 2005: 23). For James Coleman, an answer to this problem, the attraction of social capital as a concept was that it offered a means of explaining how people nonetheless manage to cooperate with one another, across a wide range of situations (Field 2005). From such a theoretical background, Coleman defined social capital according to its function. "My aim" Coleman says, "is to import the economists' principle of rational action for use in the analysis of social systems proper, including but not limited to economic systems, and to do so without discarding social organization in the process" (Coleman 1988: S98). Social capital, according to Coleman,

> Is defined by its function not a single entity but a verity of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors, whether personal or corporate actor, within the

[23] Becker, the father of the concept of "human capital" attempted to incorporate 'social' into his economic analysis (Becker 1964). He demonstrates that "rational choice theory is not inconsistent with the importance of social structure, but rather is crucial in understanding how this structure gets determined" (Becker and Murphy 2000: 23)

[24] During the final years of his life, he came with a major project that is to the building of a bridge between sociology and economics. For Coleman social capital is a tool that he used to bridge the disciplinary boundaries of sociology and economics.

[25] Rational choice sociology presupposes a highly individualistic model of human behavior, with an individual acting in ways that serve their own interests and wellbeing, apart from of the fate of others.. In economics, many took Edgeworth's (1881) dictum that 'the first principle of economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest

> structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain goals that in its absence would not be possible. Like physical and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others (Coleman 1988: S98).

The way Coleman connecting social capital to other forms of capital gives the idea that, like Bourdieu, Coleman also classifies capital mainly into three forms. However, unlike Bourdieu, he names physical and human capital instead of economic and cultural capital in addition to social capital. By arguing 'social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible', Coleman treats social capital as a resource, store and credit that produces 'positive results' and 'benefits' for the individuals and group of individuals in societies. There is no doubt that in his analysis social capital, for its owners, is a positive resource or outcome[26]. Even he discussed the negative aspects of social capital, that discussion was not enough to permit Andrew Greeley that "Coleman's social capital is "neutral" (Greeley 2001)[27]. Greeley summarized Coleman's article on social capital (1988) by giving many aspects of social structure that can generate social capital. These include obligations, expectations and trustworthiness of structures, information channels, norms and effective sanctions, closure of social networks. All these aspects Coleman discussed more in relation with a positive outcome of social capital i.e. the New York wholesale diamond market, South Korean students 'clandestine study circle' based on school, support networks of children in Detroit and Jerusalem and the Kahn El Khalili market in Cairo. Therefore, it is better to say that Coleman discussed social capital

[26] Even though he considered it as a 'positive' resource, he is not that worried about the declining of social capital, that did by Putnam. It may be because, pragmatically, he was aware about the negative outcomes and consequences of social capital. Because of that, he said in the above definition that, "social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions might be useless or even harmful for others". Therefore, there is not only a 'positive' and 'useful' social capital but there is a 'negative' and 'harmful' one

[27] To support his argument that Coleman's social capital is neutral, he severely criticizes Putnamian analysis. Taking a strong position in favor of Coleman's social capital, Greely argues that social capital "facilitates the goals of actors, whether that goals be morally and socially desirable or not". He further says that "It is therefore not always a 'good thing' as much of the currency fuzzy minded discussion about the decline of social capital would seem to suggest" (Greeley 2001 :238). Greeley made this argument to criticize Putnam and those who argued for the decline of social capital in American societies.

not as a 'neutral concept', but as a source that may produce both positive and negative outcomes, but his theory predicts a more positive response or outcomes of social capital. Regarding the decline of social capital, Greeley has the opinion that there is a 'zero' chance for such a process. But, Coleman discussed social capital in relation with terms like 'created' and 'destroyed', and 'arises' or 'disappears'[28], such a discussion shows that like the development of social capital, Coleman was well aware about the chance for the decline of social capital. So it is futile to argue that the issue of the decline of social capital is not discussed by Coleman and there is a 'zero' chance for such a process.

While discussing Coleman's social capital and family influence on academic outcomes, Denise B Kandel argued that "Diminution of social capital creates diminished possibilities for the formation of human capital and greater possibilities for the development of antisocial behavior in the children" (Kandel 1996: 44). This study highlights the process of the decline of social capital and its relation to anti-social activities. However, it would not be wrong to argue that in a functionalist point of view, Coleman theorized the possession of social capital as a collective property that can help an individual and group to claim the collective goods that in its absence would not be possible. From such a functionalistic theoretical backdrop, Coleman discussed the educational system in America and the relevance of social capital in its functioning.

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The very introduction of the concept of social capital by James Coleman to American readers as a way to understand distinctions in family, school and community relations through to influence school performances and individual academic attainments (Coleman 1988, 1994). But he rarely discussed social capital as a separate or autonomous capital. He discussed the

[28] Coleman says that, "the Public good quality of most social capital means that it is in a fundamentally different position with respect to purposive action than are most other forms of capital. It is an important resource for individuals and may affect greatly their ability to act and their perceived quality of life. They have the capability of bringing it into being. Yet, because the benefits of action that bring social capital into being are largely experienced by persons other than the actor, it is often not in his interest to bring it into being. The result is that most forms of social capital created or destroyed as by-products of other activities. This social capital arises or disappears without anyone's willing it into or out of being and is thus even less recognized and taken account of in social action than its already intangible character would warrant" (Coleman 1988: S118)

relevance of social capital in relation with the human and physical capital. Like Bourdieu, Coleman has perceived that the social capital has a strong value and effect when it connects with other forms of capital, i.e. human capital and physical capital. While discussing Bourdieu, Portes also makes the same argument that social capital of any significance can seldom be acquired, for example, without the investment of some material resources and the possession of some cultural knowledge, enabling the individual to establish relations with others (Portes 2000: 2). I find it more relevant that, to show the significance of social capital in the production of human capital both Bourdieu and Coleman's conception of social capital take the analogy with financial capital seriously. Both of them find social capital as instrumental in the flow of goods and services to individual and groups. Apart for individual and group, Coleman has also noted that voluntary social organizations and community norms can generate social capital. He argues that social organizations, even they organized for specific purposes like South Korean Students radical groups, once brought into existence for one set of purposes, can also aid others, thus constituting social capital available for use (Coleman 1988). This beneficiary transaction of social capital he conceptualized what in today's literature on social capital might be called as "within group" and "between group" social capital[29]. Analyzing such binaries of "within group" and "between group" social capital, "bonding" and "bridging" social capital "integration" and "linkage" social capital, Foley and Edwards connects the value of social capital into larger social context. They argue that "all such efforts should be seen as extensions of the insight that the value of social capital at any given level depends on the larger context, including the insertion of the individual or group in question into networks of relations at higher levels of social organization" (Foley and Edwards 2001: 13). Therefore, it is not individual and group alone benefit from social capital, but also organizations and communities benefit from social capital. Mostly, it is communities and organization provides useful links and connections for individuals. Sometimes, an individual's charismatic leadership and capacity to mobilize bridging social capital help historically excluded communities to claim their rights in

[29] To explain how closure and social organizational provide social capital within and between group, Coleman quotes Max Gluckman's distinction between simplex and multiplex relations. In multiplex relation, persons linked by more than one context like neighborhood, fellow worker, fellow parent and coreligionist. But, in simplex relations, persons are linked through only one of these relations (Coleman 1988: S109)

hierarchical societies. That is one of the main strengths of Coleman's theoretical understanding of social capital, he recognized that social capital could be an asset for the disadvantaged social groups and not solely an instrument of privilege (Filed 2005: 24). Such an understanding helped Coleman to discuss the advancement and development of education in Catholic and other religious schools than the public school. Within the functionalist sociology tradition, Coleman analyses the educational development in American society, in Chicago region, with special focus on community and parental social capital. The relationship between schools and society, and, the social capital's role in reduce inequalities of educational opportunities prompted Coleman to carried out extensive empirical research on education. As I did with Bourdieu, now I will move to discuss Coleman's discussion on social capital with special focus on education.

Social Capital: 'Reduces Inequalities' of Educational Opportunity

Unlike Bourdieu, Coleman theorized social capital with special focus on educational attainment. Coleman's first major work in the area of education was *The Adolescent Society*, published in 1961. Influenced by Durkheimian functionalist interpretation of education, Coleman in this work discusses the role of education through socialization in maintaining the specific functions in society. As noted by Heckman and Neal, Coleman began this work because of his interest in the structure and functioning of social systems. He thought that high schools could be a research site for the study of sources of status in social systems (Heckman and Neal 1996: 89-90). Coleman said, "Once organized, if a society to maintain itself, the young must be so shaped as to fit into the roles on which the society's survival depends" (Coleman 1961: 1). He finds school and other educational institutions as the source of socialization and as vehicles for the transmission of norms and values from one generation to another in a rationalized society. These more formalized institutions, schools and other educational institutions, have replaced families' role in education. Still families' and parents role in education is important for a successful academic life of an individual. How do the different families, groups and communities influence the performances in education? Coleman uses his theory of social capital to answer this complex process of educational attainment in societies. Here, Coleman has used schools as a laboratory for a study of society at large (Heckman and Neal 1996: 88).

In his celebrated work, *Equality and Achievement in Education* (1990), Coleman treated education as a means to an end, not an end in itself. Like Bourdieu, Coleman also noted that educational system produces unequal opportunities in stratified societies. Bourdieu, looked education as a tool to reproduce inequality in society, thus, Coleman considered it as mechanism for 'reduction of inequality' in society. Such a perspective helped Coleman to theorize the role of education in any society as a "means to an end, not an end in itself, and equal opportunity refers to later life rather than the educational process itself" (Coleman 1975: 28). This theoretical understanding on education by Coleman came mainly from his detailed study on the educational development in American society and his project on the Equality of Educational Opportunity Study in 1966, known as *The Coleman Report*.

The Coleman Report was published in 1966, which is considered as a turning point in social science and educational research. The Equality of Educational Opportunity Study (EEOS)" also known as "The Coleman Study", was commissioned by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1966 to assess the availability of equal educational opportunities to children of different race, color, religion, and national origin (Coleman: 1966). For this study, a wide array of 4000 schools representing over 645,000 pupils was interviewed in 1956[30]. Summarizing the Report, Harold Howe II, US Commissioner of Education, said that the majority of American children attend schools that are largely segregated, that is where almost all of their fellow students are of the same racial background as they are (Howe Harold: 1968). In such a backdrop, in the Report, Coleman emphasized the importance of 'peer effect' in education. The report says that blacks who attended integrated schools appeared to benefit in terms of their test scores, while whites who attended those schools did not appear to lose, anything on their test scores (Coleman 1966). Coleman believed the relevance of inter racial interaction and in schools, who sits next to you, 'peer effect' as an important factors that influence the positive educational outcomes and progress for minorities and disadvantaged groups in American society.

The report noticed that socio-economic factor play a considerable role in educational achievement. But it is ludicrous to argue that, The Coleman Report underestimates the role of

[30] Heckman and Neal have the opinion that no study of this type had ever been undertaken in the US or elsewhere (Heckman and Neal: 1996)

teacher and school in pupil's educational development. The Report analyzed the importance of a school, and its impact on students because of different familial and social backgrounds, and the effects it had on their educational achievement. After analyzing from the large quantity of data, the Report concludes the role of school by saying that,

> the school of a minority pupil will increase his achievement more than will improving the school of a white child increase his. Similarly, the average minority pupil's achievement will suffer more in a school of low quality than will the average white pupil's. In short, whites, and to a lesser extent Oriental Americans, are less affected one way or the other by the quality of their schools than are minority pupils. This indicates that it is for the most disadvantaged children that improvements in school quality will make the most difference in achievement.

On the basis of the Coleman Report, we can assume that for the whites in America, 'high castes' in India, and those who posses bundle of social and cultural capital like parental education, parent's connection with teacher and contacts with libraries, school is just another supplementary tool to their development[31]. But for those pupils, like Blacks in America, 'Dalits' and Minorities in India and elsewhere, their parents does not hold adequate amount of social and cultural capital in societies, school and educational institutional attendance are must for their higher education, which provide them more chances for improved academic achievement. Through such a finding, Coleman emphasized the pre- schooling factors or out of school features such as family, religion, race and community to discrepancy in the performance of children in schools. Heckman and Neal argues that by emphasizing the role of families, and general social environments, in shaping learning, Coleman instructed 'Great Society' planners that much of what influenced academic achievement was beyond their control because schools operate in contexts that strongly influence academic success (Heckman and Neal: 1996). Nevertheless, it does not mean that school has nothing do with the different educational outcomes. Coleman wants to show that, along with schooling inputs such as funds allotted per school, school size, library facilities, teachers ratio and their behavior, qualification of the teacher, some of the pre-school facts profoundly influence pupils academic achievement.

[31] However, in 1967 another article was published in *The Public Interest*, where he clarified that "school inputs did not contribute much to the formation of cognitive achievement" (Coleman 1967)

It will not be ludicrous to argue that, in Coleman's perspective, unequal distribution of resources across families and communities were the main reasons behind the educational backwardness or educational progress of pupils in societies. Similarly, he saw that a lack of social capital within the family differ from different educational outcomes (Coleman 1988). To understand familial social capital in educational outcome, he uses the school dropout rates in different families in American society. His finding shows that, there is a more dropout rate in single parent families (19.1) than the two parents' families (13.1). His study also reveals that number of children in family matters. If the school dropout rate is 10.8 in one sibling families, it is 17. 2 in four sibling families. It shows that children in large families have less adult attention, which produces weaker educational outcomes (Ibid). To sum up, the educational outcome is directly influenced by the families and communities social capital, and the possession of higher social capital can produce higher educational development and outcomes. But in the policy level, it is not very easy to control the community and family social capital. Therefore, most of the educational policies in America, after The Coleman Report, mainly concentrated on the other findings and suggestions of The Coleman report, like the implementation of the forced integration.

As noted above, The Report highlighted the importance of peers in schools and their influence in educational performances of pupil in different societies. For Coleman, who sits next to you in a classroom does matters. This result ought to contribute to the question of whether schools should be integrated, and to the decision of how much effort should be put into school integration (Coleman 1972). The above result of his report indicates that a child has a greater educational prospect in a school with children from milieus that are educationally stronger. This finding results for a forced integration of schools in many areas of the United States. But, commenting on the forced integration, that was clearly an after effect of Coleman Report, many argued that since home environments are less easily influenced and controlled by policy, "Coleman's evidence was cited as evidence that forced integration was the most expeditious policy for raising black achievement" (Heckman and Neal 1996: 93). However, when analyzing the other works of Coleman, it is very clear that by educational development and equal educational opportunity he has not only meant the output of schooling results, but also input school resources.

This input school resources is not easily achieved though forced integration. He observes that if equality of outputs is taken as the definition for equal educational opportunity, "then it appears incapable of being achieved, because of the massive unequal influence in the achievements of different children, particularly families which differ sharply in what they are able to give to their children, educationally" (Coleman 1975: 1)[32]. He has a very strong sociological point on the equality of education and educational opportunities. He believes that the concept of 'equality of educational opportunity' is itself a mistaken and misleading concept. He considered, "it is mistaken because it locates 'equality of opportunity' within the educational institutions, and thus focuses attention on education as an end in itself rather than as properly it is, a means to ends achieved in adulthood" (Coleman 1975: 28). Such view on education makes it clear that, those who fail to achieve the benefits from the educational institutions in the adulthood; he/she will face problems to cope up with the social system in the future. According to Coleman, it is misleading because "it suggests that equal educational opportunity, defined in something other than a purely formal (input) way, is achievable, while it is not" (Ibid). This is an important sociological finding in equality of educational achievement; this finding suggests that equal educational opportunity is a myth. When, students are coming from different unequal family and heterogeneous community backgrounds; they possess different and unequal kinds of social, cultural and economic capital. Unless and until one can make quality in such capital possessions, it is futile to argue that quality of educational opportunity is achievable, but is not.

If equal educational opportunity is a myth, how do we address the question of 'equal educational opportunity'? How does one solve the issue of inequality in educational attainment? Before answering this question, primarily, we should acknowledge the fact that educational institutions are embedded in an unequal social system. The existing systemic inequality in any society reproduces the unequal educational outcomes. In such scenario, the very concept of 'equality of educational opportunity' is mistaken and misleading. This theoretical understanding forced Coleman to find an alternative to unequal achievement and

[32] As a functionalist, he strongly supported the role of family and community in maintaining educational quality and outcomes in any societies. For Coleman, only an advocate of state omnipotence with full power can extract a child from unequalizing family environment. Only he/she can consistently maintain a definition of equality of educational opportunity in terms of results or school outputs (Coleman 1975)

opportunities in education. He uses the term ‘reduction in inequality’ rather than equality. According to him, “such a formulation would properly connote the fact that the initial state in which schools find children, and the continuing environments outside the school that compete for the child's time, are unequal” (Coleman 1975: 29). In such a situation, “the school's task is, besides increasing opportunity for all, through what it imparts, to reduce the unequalizing impact on adult life of these differential environments.

From the above discussion, it is clear that, both Bourdieu and Coleman see education and educational institutions linked to the unequal social structure. Nevertheless, both discussed the role of education in various contexts and in different theoretical milieus. Bourdieu finds, the educational institutions, like school, reproduces the unequal social structure, and works as a mechanism to maintain status quo in societies. Whereas, Coleman discusses the educational institutions as a mechanism, that helps to reduce the inequality in societies. They agree in a common point that, those possesses ‘higher amount’ of social and cultural capital in a stratified society enjoys higher school outcomes and educational achievements, when compare with those had lesser amount of social capital. It generate a reasonable question that, if there exists a ‘higher’ or ‘lesser’ social capital, is there any chance of increase it through any mechanism. They found that, educating adults in a society will increase the possession of social capital. This raises another important question that, if an individual, family and community can ‘increase’ social capital, is there any possibility to a decline of social capital? While commenting on Andrew Greeley discussion on Coleman, earlier I pointed out that, even Coleman saw the diminution of social capital creates diminished possibilities for the formation of human capital, and he acknowledged the possibilities for a declining of social capital. Before moving into the question of how to generate social capital for positive educational outcomes, next section of this chapter will look into the question of decline of social capital. Robert Putman has discussed in detail the declining of social capital. The next section will explain Robert Putnam’s concept of social capital and the connection of the same with education.

Bowling Alone: Putnam on Social Capital

After the publication of his celebrated work, *Bowling Alone* (2000) Robert Putnam has considered as the most widely read and recognized advocate of social capital[33]. Unlike Bourdieu and Coleman, Putnam gives much attention to explore the concept 'social capital' itself and he finds its origin and development mainly through the works of 'progressive educator and social reformer' L Judson Hanifan (Putnam 2002). As I pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, it was L J Hanifan, who influenced the thoughts and writings of Robert Putnam on social capital. That is too, the positive functional aspects of social capital, discussed by Hanifan in 'The Rural School Community Center' (1916), heavily influenced the social capital discussion of Rober Putnam.

Subsequent to his work on rural educational system in America, Hanifan concluded that "the grave social, economic and political problems of the communities in which he worked could be solved only by strengthening the networks of solidarity among their citizens" (Quoted in Putnam 2002: 4). The positive outcome of these 'networks of solidarity' attracted Putman and that led him to worry about the decline of the social capital in American societies. Putnam's first involvement with the question on social capital came towards the end of a study of regional government in Italy (Putnam 1993). Analyzing the regional administrations in north and south of Italy, he concluded that the comparatively successful institutional performance of the northern regions in Italy was due to the reciprocal interrelationship between government and civil society. He has used the concept of social capital to explain this differential civic engagement in the northern and southern regions of Italy. He saw the cooperation and networks in the region make benefits for the collectivity of group and individuals. He sees that "if actors are unable to make credible commitments to one another, they must forgo many opportunities for mutual gain, ruefully, but rationally" (Ibid: 164). This view of Putnam illustrates noticeable resemblances to Durkheimian notions of cooperation and solidarity. The extensive stress on the words like 'voluntary cooperation' 'mutual gain' 'collective action' shows it clear that his definitions on social capital is

[33] In a period, where Bourdieu and Coleman's works are mainly discussed among the sociologists and educational research, Putnam's contribution has transformed the boundaries of his professional field of political science, and reached a far wider public. It will not be an embellishment to say that Putnam has dedicated his entire academic career to explore the concept of social capital.

functional, that too is evident in his selection and suggestion on the readings for social capital. To form a functional definition for social capital he quotes Coleman, who profoundly influenced by functionalist tradition of Durkheim and Parsons, and seldom cites Bourdieu, an 'unorthodox Marxist' (Flower Bridget: 2011), in his writings. While writing the introduction with Kristin A Goss for *Democracies in Flux* (2002), Putnam quotes Bourdieu's definition of social capital to give an overall picture of the historical origin of social capital, apart from that Putnam rarely acknowledges Bourdieu in his writings.

In his work on Italy (1993), he defined social capital as the "features social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam 1993a: 167, 1993b). Like Bourdieu and Coleman, Putnam also sees Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital (Putnam 1993b). Even though he, as did by Bourdieu, did not spend much time on elaborating the difference and connection between social capital from other forms of capitals. But somewhere he explained the connections and differences between social capital from other two types of capital (Putnam 2000). The connection between social capital and other forms of capital can be seen like this "Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a college education (human capital) can increase productivity (both individual and collective), so too social contacts *(social capital*) affect the productivity of individual and groups" (Putnam 2000: 16 emphasis added). He makes the difference between social capital and other forms of capital by arguing that "Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals" (Ibid).

Referring to the previous studies on social capital, trust and credit association by Coleman, Gambetta and Geertz respectively, he argues that spontaneous cooperation is facilitated by social capital. He believes, most forms of social capital, like trust, networks and social norms, increases rather than decreases through use, which become depleted if not used (ibid: 167-170). Like Coleman, who argued, "as an attribute of the social structure in which a person is embedded, social capital is not the private property of any of the persons who benefit from it" (Coleman 1998: 315), Putnam also considered the public utility of social capital as one important feature. He sees social capital as a public good, unlike conventional

capital, which is ordinarily a private good (Putnam 1993). He sees trust and cooperation are an essential component of social capital[34]. Further, he sees the dense networks of social exchange are connected with an effective norm of generalized reciprocity. Networks of civil engagement, like the neighborhood associations, choral societies, cooperation and sports clubs etc. as an essential form of social capital. Overall, Putnam sees that, in a society or community, or within the group or between the groups, the horizontal, bringing agents of equivalent status and power, and vertical, liking unequal agents in asymmetric relation of hierarchy, dense networks and cooperation will help the individuals, communities and even nations to cooperate for mutual benefit.

Putnam elaborated the definition of social capital in his later works and added more features and components of social capital in addition to his early writings. His widely read and discussed article on social capital was published in 1995 titled as "Bowling Alone: Americas Declining of Social Capital". Since the publication of the article in *Journal of Democracy*, Putnam's social capital and his concern over the decline of social capital in American received wide publicity both in the academic realm and in the public realm. In this work, the definition of social capital was not changed or altered and it was same that he gave in his 1993 studies. However, Putnam's definition of social capital changed little over the 1990s (Field: 2005). For instance, in his article *Who Killed Civic America?* In 1996, Putnam defined that by 'social capital' I mean features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (Putnam 1996: 56). The three primary elements, networks norms and trust, here had not changed since 1993; what was new was the identification of 'participants' in particular rather than 'society' as the beneficiaries of social capital (Baron *et al*. 2000: 9). Replacing 'society' for 'participants', I think that Putnam tries to show that social capital has both an individual and collective aspect. Therefore, the participants may be an individual or group or community, not as always a society, can benefit from social capital. That is more evident in

[34] He elaborates the connection between trust and cooperation as follows "Trust lubricates cooperation. The greater the level of trust within a community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation. And cooperation itself breeds trust. The steady accumulation of social capital is a crucial part of the story behind the virtuous circles of civil society… Social trust in complex modern settings can arise from two related sources, norms of reciprocity and networks of reciprocity and networks of civic engagements. For more details, see Putnam 1993: 171

his *Bowling Alone*, where he argues, "social capital has an individual and collective aspect, a private face and a public face" (Putnam 2000: 20). Through such an effort, Putnam breaks the long dilemma on the question of whether social capital is an individual or collective asset.

The terms such as 'asset', 'shared objective' and 'collective aspect' etc. in the definition of social capital led many researchers to conclude that social capital is always 'positive' or the outcome of social capital is always 'positive'. It is true that the outcome is positive, but not always, and it is positive for those inside the network, and may be 'negative' and 'harmful' for those who live outside the network. This dual nature of social capital forced Putnam to argue, "Social capital… can be directed toward malevolent, antisocial purposes, just like any other form of capital" (Ibid: 20). Similarly, another dual nature of social capital is its bridging and bonding features. Similar to his discussion on vertical and horizontal social capital (Putnam 1995), in his landmark work *Bowling Alone* (2000) Putnam introduced two different kinds of social capital; bridging and bonding. Bonding (or inclusive) social capital, for instance ethnic fraternal organizations, church based women's reading groups, tends to reinforce exclusive identities and maintain homogeneity; whereas bridging (or exclusive)social capital, for instance civil rights movement, many youth service groups, tends to bring together people across diverse social divisions. Bonding social capital is good for mobilizing solidarity within the group. Whereas bridging social capital are better for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion. Moreover, bridging networks can generate broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital strengthens the narrow selves of individuals (Putnam 2000: 21-23). Relatively, Putnam sees bonding social capital has more chance to produce negative outcomes. He says,

> Bonding social capital, by creating strong in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-group antagonism…and for that reason we might expect negative external effects to be more common with this form of social capital (Ibid: 23)

This argument does not mean that bridging social capital is free from negative outcomes. Both bridging and bonding social capital can have powerful social outcomes. But relatively, I think bridging social capital can produce more positive and desirable social outcomes, and it can reduce inequalities in education. For instance, while analyzing 'peer effects' Coleman emphasized the relevance of intercommunity interaction between students, or cultural

mingling of students from different racial groups and the positive correlation of it with their test scores. This finding strengthens the importance of birding social capital or linking factor in positive educational outcome. The bridging networks between black students and whites, and their parental interactions can create, according to The Coleman Report, more desirable educational outcome. Because, such networks and connections help students to make connection and interaction with diverse classes, communities and families, and that will help them to understand the cultural and social diversities in their societies.

The benefit of bridging social capital may not be available in societies that posses 'strong' ties of social capital like kinship and family, and achievable through 'weak' ties that connects diverse communities (Granovetter 1973). Nevertheless, economic sociologist Mark Granovetter has preferred the relevance of 'weak' ties to 'strong' ties for seeking jobs and political allies. He has pointed out that the "weak" ties that link me to distant acquaintances who move in different circles from mine are actually more valuable that the "strong" ties that link me to relatives and intimate friends whose sociology niche is very like my own (Qouted in Putnam 2001: 23). To summaries these two types of social capital, I would like to say that bridging social capital connects participants to different identities, while bonding social capital links participants to relative and intimate friends, family and same communities. However, this does not overlook the importance of bonding social capital, family relation, intimate connection with relatives and friends in attaining social benefits, like higher educational credentials.

Nevertheless, he is skeptical about the generation of social capital. He believes that government, public policy, widening 'horizontal' ties than 'vertical' ties and electronic networks etc. can effectively generate social capital. All this variations, like bridging and bonding in social capital theory, and its wide nature and scope helps Putnam to proposes that social capital can be viewed as attribute of an individual, an asset for community, a property of cities and nations. To sum up, it will not be wrong to say that Putnam's social capital is macro-sociological in nature and it is an all-encompassing package. Such a board theoretical understanding of Putnam on social capital will help us to discuss the role of education in a macro-sociological setting, like the role of state and civil society in education, and the role of religion etc. By keeping in mind the broad scope macro sociological applicability of social

capital, next I will move to discuss the relevance of education in Robert D Putnam's social capital theory and his views on the role of education in generating social capital.

Like other theorists on social capital, Putnam also considered social capital as an asset for higher educational outcomes. He sees parental involvement in the educational process represents a particularly productive form of social capital (Putnam: 1995). Putnam and Helliwell's study focuses on the effects of education on measures of social trust, and social engagement, two key variables often used as measures of social capital. Their study finds that large and permeative positive effects of general education on levels of trust and participation. They also explained that the social engagement increases with average levels of education. Therefore, they conclude their study by arguing that education should be considered as an increasing rather than merely redistributing social capital (Putnam and Helliwell 1999: 7-15). It will be right to argue that, in Putnamian perspective, education is both an individual and social asset. An average education in any society can increase social capital; this increase in trust, cooperation and networks helps both individual, groups, communities and even nations to function properly in stratified societies.

Like Coleman, Putnam also sees the role of government and public policies as very important in generating social capital. The government and state machineries can destroy highly effective and functional social networks and norms. For instance, the states destruction of social capital, Putnam gives an example of American slum-clearance policy of the 1950s and 1960s. He argues that the "policy of the government renovated physical capital, but it destroyed a high amount of existing social capital" (Putnam 1995). Contrary to this, finding a positive response of the county agricultural-agent system, community colleges, and tax deductions for charitable contributions by governments, Putnam argues, "Government can encourage social-capital formation" (Ibid). Like government, many agencies and institutions can generate social capital. Next, I will move to discuss the mechanisms, forces and sources that generate social capital effectively for the formation of higher education, and desirable educational outcome.

The Sources that Generate Social Capital

Why does social capital matter in education? The existing theoretical and empirical literature on social capital has given some convincing answers. They argue that social capital is an asset or a resource, "making possible the achievement of certain goals that in its absence would not be possible" (Coleman: 1988). As a resource, social capital not only promises to resolve some of the crucial issues in education, but also a wide verity of social, economic and political problems. However, if societies are to prosper, citizens not only need physical and human capital, but also social capital (Ostrom 2001). It helps individual actors, communities, governments and nations to access resources, which in its absence would not be possible. As "a special case of *capital*", (Essar H 2008), it helps students, teachers, parents and even communities to achieve development and progress in education. Even studies argue that "the more social capital a society has, the more efficient its transactions and the more productive it is" (Bothwell 1997: 249). Bourdieu considered social capital as an individual or family asset, Coleman sees it as a family and community resource while Putnam discussed it with more macro level like the role of state and governments and civil organizations in generating social capital.

Such broad theoretical literature on social capital will help us to denote that all those possessions and benefits that an actor or participant, including family, community and state can mobilize and/or profit from because of his/her/their embeddedness in a *network* of *relations,* to make *contacts* and *cooperation* with other actors, communities and states. To certain extent such a 'broad' definition of social capital solve the question that whether social capital is an individual or a collective property. I would like to examine that, if social capital matters in development, if it is an asset, if it makes positive outcomes in education, how does an individual, society or group within societies generate/accumulate social capital? If Putnam's worry regarding the decline of social capital as a 'problem' for American democracy or a 'negative' factor for the poor function of civil society in southern Italy, is there any way to solve these 'problems'? If once social capital is depleted, is there any chance to rebuild social capital?

I will propose that, if social capital is declining in societies, there is a way to reconstruct social capital, and there are mechanisms and institutions that can generate and

construct social capital. If this is the case, then what are these sources or mechanisms and institutions that can generate social capital? It is not easy to find an answer to this question, because in social capital studies "the attention has been focused almost exclusively on trying to measure social capital or trying to ascertain its consequences" (Hooghe and Stole 2003:7). Moreover, we know little about how this resource is created (Herreros 2004: 19). Hooghe and Stole have the opinion that 'how social capital might be generated' should be the most important and relevant question in social sciences. Because, this question has the most important relevance in a policy point of view, but has been neglected in most of the research in social sciences (Hooghe and Stole 2003). Contrary to their understanding, many recent studies argue that many institutions like religion, family and civil society organizations like sports cubs and social moments can generate social capital. Nevertheless, such a discussion, generating social capital, is mainly depending on a critical question raised by scholars like Dekker (2004: 90-1), van Deth (2008: 157) that "whose capital is at issue: that of the individual or the community?'

I will argue that, any answer to the above question will be based mainly on the purpose or intention of the researcher; if a researcher wants to prove that the consequences of the social capital is an effort of on individual actor, he/she can do it by using existing theories of social capital. By using the same theories, another researcher can argue that social capital is a collective property, not an individual property. Therefore, in using social capital theories in social science research, the intention and purpose of the researcher matters. In such a scenario, along with Deth Jan and Essar, I will argue that social capital can be viewed as an aspect of relationships among individuals, that is, as a property or/and resource of individuals and to be found in networks of individual participants. In addition, it can be conceived as a collective good, the benefit available to all or most participants (van Deth 2008, Essar 2008). In this study, my aim will be to discuss social capital within the context of education, that too the formation of education among the Muslims, there for I will concentrate more on the aspect of 'community social capital', means social capital as a collective property than individual. I believe that the formation of education, in a positive way, that I am going to discuss in the third chapter will be an outcome or property of collective resources, a resource that generated by not an individual alone, but, altogether, largely communities or groups within communities. In doing so, I would not ignore the initiatives taken by some of the

charismatic leaders for the educational development of Muslims in Kerala, rather than I would like to excogitate more on the community social capital that worked as a 'collective resource' in the formation of education among the Muslims in Kerala.

This section would argue that both society and institutions play an important role in the creation of social capital. To substantiate this argument, in this section I will discuss five mechanisms and resources that effectively generate social capital. This includes the voluntary organizations (1), religion and religiously motivated organizations (2), state and political institutions (3), role of the family (4) and the local economic conditions (5). These are not the *exclusive* or *only* mechanisms and resources, which generate social capital. The role of social reformers, traditional leaders, and charismatic leadership and bulk printing etc. act as agencies to generate social capital for the development of education among the Muslims in Kerala. Five of these *ideal types* closely interconnected to reach other but work independently. However, there can be no doubt that these agencies do have differences and specific features in generating social capital. Considering this uniqueness, next, I will discuss the presents of these five institutions in social capital literature and their importance in generating social capital, not strictly within the educational context but in general.

Voluntary organizations play an importance role in generating social capital. Voluntary organizations presume an instrumental feature: "they are intentional participatory organizations that facilitate social connections, co-operation and *mutual benefits*, and by virtue of repeated interactions engender trust among members" (Anheier, H.K. and J. Kendall 2000, Italics added). Robert Putnam (1993) advocates that dense networks of voluntary associations are the main explanation for Northern Italy's economic progress over the country's Southern parts[35]. He considered cooperation and trust as the core ethos and social objectives of many voluntary organizations. Likely, Tonkiss and Passey (1999) arguing that *trust* forms the basis for voluntary association itself. Trust facilitates an easy formation of networks and connections between 'like minded' individuals for specific purposes. Such

[35] More precisely, in Northern Italy, he points to a high density of associations and a successful political and economic situation; whereas in the South, the density of associations is far lower, and the political and economic achievements are relatively limited

networks along with good trust, a major aspect of social capital, are an important element in achieving economic and social development[36].

Discussing the puzzle of high social capital in Nordic countries Bo Rothstein argues that in this region "social capital in the form of social networks and voluntary associations or, with another term, civil society organizations, has been seen as an alternative to the state (and the market and the family) for 'getting things done'" (Rothstein Bo 1999: 199)[37]. The active participation of members' in voluntary association and active civil society participation by the member in different organization forced scholars to believe that this region has high social capital than other regions in the world. This situation in Nordic countries forced people to believe that in this region 'most other people can be trusted' (You 2006, Rothstein 1999).

Trust forms network, and it helps cooperation. Here I do agree to Richard Rose opinion that "networks are a consequence of people trusting each other rather than trust emerging as a byproduct of association" (Rose 1988). Such trust forms voluntary organizations like cultural organizations, sport clubs, social movements, self-help organizations, relief associations and charity groups. It is not *always* but *mostly* money, authority, religion, politics, family, kinship, class background and other similar identities that are driving these organizations, but cooperation for mutual benefit and trust between members are essential for these organizations. But many a times, voluntary organizations break the barriers of 'exclusive identities', and build a bridging social capital than the bonding social capital. For instance, sport clubs, as a voluntary organization, bridges the barriers of religious, economic and other born identities. Sports clubs can be used as a mechanism to generate bridging social capital in heterogeneous societies. This is clearly noted by Putnam when he argued that "to build bridging social capital requires that we transcend our social and political and professional identities to connect with people unlike ourselves. This is why team sports provide good venues for social capital creation" (Putnam 2000: 411). Like that, many scholars have long-noted the important role of sport as a social and socializing institution, and they argued, "the

[36] For instance, Fukuyama (1995), uses 'trust' as a kind of social capital that underpin economic cohesion and growth in the US, Germany and Japan.

[37] Many other researches on the high social capital and the high levels of development indicators in Scandinavian countries show that people in these countries are members in many organizations and active in voluntary associations to a comparatively large extent See Vogel et al., 2003; van Oorschot et al., 2006

central role sport plays in facilitating social integration and civic participation" (Nicholson and Hoye 2008, Rosentraub and Ijla 2008). Such forms of voluntary organizations play an inevitable role in generating social capital in any form of societies such as both 'modern' and 'pre-modern'.

Religion and its role in nurturing trust, fosters group cohesion, constructing norms, values and moral ethics and impose its ideology on the masses became an important topic of debate for sociologists. Max Weber pointed to the importance of religion not simply in creating the work ethic, but in building trust networks that were contributing to the entrepreneurship and economic exchange. Scholars like Putnam (2000), Rothstein Bo (1999) and other have treated religion primarily as one form, among the many forms, of voluntary association that generate social capital. Here I would like to discuss religion as a separately from other forms of voluntary association, mainly because of the unique role that religion plays in generating social capital[38]. In addition, it needs a separate discussion, because this work is all about the role of social capital in the development of education among the Kerala Muslims. Therefore, the work will not be complete without discussing the role played by religion and religious associations and organizations in building social capital. No one can deny the relevance of religion in social movements and in building "capitals" in general and generating social capital in particular in many 'modern' societies. So like in the 'pre-modern' societies, in 'modern' society also, the role of religion on nurturing trust and enhances the possibility for the successful cooperation among its members is notable one.

Fukuyama identifies religion as historically the main source of social capital in the form of the imposition of moral codes of conduct (Fukuyama 1997). While analyzing the way in which religion promotes the formation of social capital among African Americans, Frederick Harris argues that a unique feature of religion's contribution to the formation of social capital is 'its ability to nurture and sustain reciprocity among actors' (Harris 2003). Harris also found that religiously formed social capital could provide stronger bonds of cooperation than the forms of social capital generated from secular sources. This is mainly

[38] The role of religion in modern society is clearly articulated by Asad by saying that "the contemporary salience of religious movements around the globe, and the torrent of commentary on them by scholars and journalists, made it plain that religion is by no means disappearing in the modern world" (Asad 2003: 1)

because of the nature of religion and its non-material incentives like, desire to do good works and charity etc. that are often rooted in the beliefs of religious societies (Ibid 2003: 120-123). Similarly, in *Religion as Social capital* (2003) Corwin Smidt argues that

> religious behavior may contribute to social capital formation in that volunteering, charitable contributions, and other distinct acts of mercy can, at least in the short run, help to provide a "safety net" for members of society who are "at risk" (Smidt 2003: 2).

His study shows that the religiously motivated voluntary associations can effectively generate social capital for the good of its members. Religiously constituted charitable organizations, welfare associations can mobilize not only money, but also the credibility and trust of the people. Religious prayers, church or mosque or temple attendance, religious festivals create a sense of 'we' feeling and close ties between the members. For good or bad, this sense of 'we' feeling further develops trust and then it leads to the formation of networks. Nevertheless, this networks do not cross or go beyond certain specified boundaries. In such a context, the social capital that generated through religious 'we' feeling would be mainly limited *within* the groups and communities. Many a times, it fails to produce bridging social capital. This is mainly because; the religion has a common character that it produces an exclusionary social world marked by cultural and symbolic boundaries. Another way, religion is depend primarily on separating one's group from surrounding groups and then asserting various forms of differences, many times *superiority*, to these "others", based on one's identity. Such 'exclusionary' nature of religion fails to create intercommunity ties between different religions and it inevitably invites the unequal possession of social capital by different religious communities. Concluding religion as source for generating social capital, I will argue that religion has more potential to contribute for the formation of social capital, but the 'exclusionary nature' of religion primarily builds bonding social capital.

Today, government and political institutions have overwhelmingly concerned with the construction of social capital. Many of the government policies, local governing bodies and even political parties have an essential role as the sources of social capital and progress in civic communities. Earlier while discussing Putnam's criticism on slum policy, I have pointed out that, the government and state policies have a role in the construction and

destruction of social capital. The destruction of social capital is not always a byproduct of the 'repressive' or 'authoritarian' government. Generally, repression and authoritarianism are found to have a strong, negative influence on social capital (Booth and Bayer 1998). Repressive governments disturb civic developments and building of social capital in two major ways: First, they discourage 'spontaneous' group activity, and second, they discourage trust (Ibid: 43). Similarly, state policies are notorious in destructing social and small-scale economic capital. But overwhelming literature on the importance of state and government policies shows that state and political institutions are more effective and responsible in generating 'inclusive' social capital than any other agencies of social capital. The inclusiveness is important especially in multicultural societies. In such societies, the ideal role of government is to generate a generalized trust or bridging social capital. Here generalized trust 'is the perception that *most* people are part of your moral community' and it refers 'faith in both your own kind and people who are different from you' (Uslaner 2007). However, it is not always easy to construct generalized trust. Because we are predisposed to trust our own kind more than out-groups (Brewer 1979). In such a situation, than the religion, voluntary organizations, the government can bridge the barriers of many exclusive identities. Thus, discriminatory policies, bias and prejudice of government and favorable engagement with various communities make the barriers in the achievement of bridging social capital. For instance, as Putnam pointed out, minority groups, as African Americans in USA, have long suffered discrimination will quite naturally have lower levels of generalized trust (Putnam 1995). Only through an inclusive, unbiased and nondiscriminatory policy, the government can make the generalized trust of the people and inculcate the trust of the minorities.

Local government bodies, like panchayat, municipality and corporations, etc. have to play a greater role in building social capital. These state institutions, with various purposes help local people to unite and make contact with each other in a number of matters across various communities. For instance, M S John and Chathukulam argue that the phenomenal rise of micro-level institutions in Kerala increased the potential for strengthening social capital and through it also civil society. This improvement in social capital, according to them, had a crowding effect on the rural scenario (John and Chathukulam 2002). They further argue, "The rise of these new institutions is not spontaneous. They are either created as necessary elements of the planning process or are formed at the initiative of the panchayat

members" (Ibid: p1964). This study can be taken as an example for the governments' deliberate initiative in the building social capital in rural areas[39]. To sum up, I will propose that, the inability of the government to implement more inclusive and nondiscriminatory policies will quite naturally lead to the erosion of trust in government and political institutions, which will force the minorities and marginalized groups to search for an alternative mechanism to "get their things done".

Family is considered as another important institution that embodies an important form of social capital**.** The families into which we are born are a major determinant of the 'capitals' to which we first will have access; families have unequal 'capitals', and those variations determine the extent to which parents invest in their children, as well as which investments they choose (Parcel Toby and al. 2010). From childhood onwards, family functions as a "learning school" for children (Stolle 2003: 30) and sociologists considered it as the most important agent of primary socialization. The amount of social capital that a family possesses is directly linked to the educational achievement of children[40]. Even in relation to children and education as a primary phase of life, "it is hard to disentangle the effects of education from those of family background or local context" (Schuller 2004:18). Like that, many other studies (Parcel and al. 2010) on the child's educational achievement in schools and colleges, and researches on lifelong learning (Field 2005) show that family background and social context do have an unavoidable role in producing desirable educational outcomes. To build family social capital, effective economic development and mobilization is important, only a family with reasonable economic capital can enable to connect with wider social settings. Another way, improvement in economic condition will automatically lead to the formation of larger networks. This last point leads to my next theme, namely the role of economy or the improvement in local economic condition as a source of social capital.

[39] A similar kind of discussion can be seen in Sudha Pai's analysis of 'Dalits' and backward classes, to challenge the dominance of upper castes and classes in Meerut and Azamgarh districts (Pai Sudha: 2004).

[40] To understand other families' role in a child's educational progress, see the Coleman Report. It highlights that a student's educational outcome was not only related to that student's own family background; it was related, less strongly, to the family backgrounds of other students in the school. For more on essential feature of family household and its function as a kind of social capital, see Weber 1922: 359. More on family social capital and educational outcome of children, also see Israel 2001.

Economic condition also matters greatly in the building of social capital. Many studies argue that trust, 'weak ties' and social capital in general bring economic growth and prosperity, (Knack Stephen and Keefer: 1997, Uslaner 2003, Granovetter: 1973, Woolcock: 1998), we can argue either way around that, economic equality brings more generalized trust and improvement in social capital. Because, the features of social capital, such as trust, network and cooperation is does not depend upon socio-cultural factors alone. Apart from socio-culture factors, many a times, it is largely depends on the economic condition of societies. Uslaner argues that the level of economic equality in a society has powerful effect on the level of generalized trust, and here, the government policies that foster a more equal and inclusive distribution of resources can have a powerful effect on trust (Uslaner 2003: 172). In democratic nations, according to Uslaner, the single biggest barrier to generalized trust is economic inequality. He shows that, both over time in the United States and across thirty-three democracies, economic well-being in and of itself does not explain variations in trust, but trust goes down as inequality goes up, and he has found that there is a direct linkage between trust and economic inequality (Uslaner 2002: 186). His study shows that economic wellbeing of a society is not an indicator for the higher trust, contrary to that, the equality in a society will facilitate more generalized trust and social capital in societies. Considering the relevance of more equality in economic sphere as an important indicator for generalized trust, by concluding this section, I propose that the improvement in local economic condition of individuals and families is an essential requirement for generating social capital and educational development.

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Social capital, summarizing the definitions of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam, generally defined as the information, trusting, cooperating and norms of reciprocity inhering in one's social networks that facilitates collective action for mutual benefits. The concept of social capital was introduced by Hanifan and was later elaborated by the theorists like Bourdieu, Coleman, Putnam and Woolcock to study western societies. Since the late 1980s, scholars have used the concept critically to study different non-western societies, including various aspects of Indian societies (Bhattacharyya and *al* 2004 Pal Mahi 2005, Blomkvist Hans and Swain Ashok 2001, Fine Ben 2001, John and Chathukulam 2002, Andrist 2008). The

polymorphous nature of the concept helped them to work effectively in different contexts, and such studies emphasis the contextual understanding of social capital in its application. The applicability of social capital theories in non-Western societies is made possible because 'there are different types, levels, or dimensions of social capital' (Woolcock1998: 159). This work, rather than concentrating on the individual aspects of social capital, examines the collective or community dimension of cooperation, trust, networks and resource mobilization, and its relevance in the formation of education among the Kerala Muslim.

The three major theorists of social capital elaborated the concept of social capital, not exclusively, but within the context of education. In educational research, social capital is considered as an 'asset' and 'resource' for the development of community education and students performances in schools and colleges. In a stratified society, education produces and reproduces educational inequalities, but social capital as a resource of individuals and communities has the power to 'reduction in inequality' in such societies. This theoretical background argues that the high levels of social capital is 'positive' for the development of education, it gives societies and groups within communities access to privilege, resources and lowering the risks of economic malfeasance and liabilities. It further helps communities that have suffered and continue to suffer discrimination and humiliation from an unjustifiable social stratification to get a descent and privileged status. Similarly, the monopoly on access to social capital by certain communities and groups may have negative consequences; especially on the educational development of historically marginalized communities.

Lastly, I have discussed five important (re)sources or mechanisms that have been important in generating social capital in different societies. Before further discussing the role of these five (re)sources in the development of education among the Muslims in Kerala, another important question that must be addressed is whether the development of education among the Kerala Muslims was an outcome social capital; does Muslims have a higher social capital in Kerala compare with other communities? If so, why is it that when compared to the other religious communities, 'Muslims 'lag behind' in education while the former enjoy a higher educational status not just in Kerala but more generally in Indian subcontinent? To find answers to this question, another question that needs to be settled is as to how do the secular educational institutions and state educational apparatuses systematically 'excluded'

the Muslims from attaining higher education? Moreover, is there any evidence for the absence of social capital among the Muslims before they achieve comparatively better education? Studies argue that Islam has placed greater emphasis on social capital like mutual trust, cooperation for collective good, that is particularly evident on one's economic liability to the larger community, as reflected in the prohibition on charging interests on loans (Uslaner 2003: 181). If Islam has placed such a great importance on social capital, how do we explain the educational backwardness of Muslims in India and relatively higher educational development of Kerala Muslims by highlighting the importance of social capital on educational development?

The answer to all these questions is not possible without a proper understanding of the history of the educational system in Kerala. The current Muslim educational backwardness lies not just at roots of the colonial construction of secular education, but the unequal social, political and economic structures that predates the British colonial invasion. Therefore, the next chapter will discuss the 'secularization' of education in Kerala, which will, in turn, lead us to a discussion of historically 'unsolved problem' of the dual nature of Muslim education in India. Apart from that, it will also discuss the reasons for begging of the reposition of the forms of 'capitals' from the realm of 'tradition' or '*dini*' or 'religious' education to the realm of the 'modern' or '*dunyawi*' or 'worldly' or 'secular' education.

Chapter Three

COLONIALISM, EDUCATIONAL DUALISM AND COMMUNITY SOCIAL CAPITAL

> A common language of communication within a country, a common language of communication for the world: that is the ideal, and we have to struggle for it. But that language, whichever it would be, should not be planted in the graveyard of other languages within one country or in the world' (Ngûgî, wa Thiong'o 1993:39).

The nature and meaning of education varies according to the context in which it is studied. The major theorists of social capital such as Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam says a great deal about the education of children and the role that family and culture plays in reproducing values and norms. But very little is told about the role of religion in knowledge production and religious education in their societies. The education that they discussed is mainly considered as 'universal', 'modern', 'liberal' and 'secular'. Bourdieu, according to Turner, did not make a major contribution to the field of sociology of religion. Although his actual production of essays in the sociology of religion was slight, some of his central conceptual tools, "such as embodiment, habitus, practice and field, offer a fruitful way of thinking about religion" (Turner 2011: 228-241), and it will give us an opportunity to understand the functioning of religion in modern societies. Both Coleman and Putnam wrote on the role of religion in societies in general but very little about the religious education and the engagement of religion in schools and other 'public' educational institutions.

I propose that, even though these theorists seldom discuss a society where the meaning of education has dual character, their theoretical concepts on social capital is important in understanding educational development in multi-cultural societies. Those who have studied the educational system of Muslims in modern societies and their problems and prospects in a multi-cultural setup, have always had to confront the question of educational dualism within the Muslims. The colonial educational system is the one which created the dichotomy between 'religious'—'secular', '*dini'* — '*dunyawi*', 'traditional' — 'modern', 'Islamic' — 'non-Islamic', 'Eastern' — 'Western' education and privileges the latter to the former that were, and are, and will always remain at the forefront of educational policies, reports and discussions. It is because of this that the spread of secular modern education is taken to be

'neutral', 'beneficial', 'progressive' and 'essential to survive' in a modern society.

In India, the overwhelming discussion and debate over the modernization of madrasas is a clear indication of the existence of dual system of education among the Muslims. The educational dualism in India is a colonial construction. However, this educational system, the traditional - religious and the modern - liberal, exists not only in India but also in many parts of the Muslim world. Rosnani Hashim, by focusing on Malaysia, which is predominantly a Muslim majority country, conducted one of the major researches in the field of educational dualism in Muslim societies. She is of the view that the traditional religious education was introduced with the coming of Islam, while secular, liberal education came about through the process of colonization and modernization (Hashim R 1996: ix-3). In a similar vein, Ali Ashraf argues that "two systems of education are prevalent in Muslim countries; the modern secular system and the older religious system…hence the conflict between the two systems is prevalent at the theoretical and at the practical levels" (Ashraf 1996: xiii). Here, however, we cannot limit the discussion on educational dualism to the Muslim societies, but we can see this dualism in most societies where religion still plays an important role in the everyday life of the people.

Religion has played an important role in the educational history of the Indian subcontinent. In India, there are madrasas and other Muslim educational institutions like *maktabs, othupallis, dars* and mosques that impart basic religious education to Muslims. The diversities and multidimensional character of Islamic education influenced scholars like Jamal Malik, who begins his work by saying that, contributors to his work won't resort to the view that "Islamic" education is a "monolithic" form; and goes on to argue that, it is indeed not 'one-dimensional' as defined by the United States' ongoing "war on terror" (Malik Jamal 2007: 2). Today in India, there is an overwhelming concern by the governments and policy makers regarding how to make it as "monolithic" and "modern" as possible. I will come back to this discussion at the end of the last chapter. Here, to understand the development, diversity and legacy of Muslim education in Kerala, I will deal with the pre-colonial educational structure among the Muslims in Kerala and as to how the Islamic learning centers proliferated, produced scholars and functioned with the help of community social capital.

This study has the view that Muslims in India, characterized by poor economic background, dumped with "unfavorable academic environment" and forced to live in an "inconvenient location" (Rahmatullah 1989), has been historically 'othered' and cast as 'backward' and called as 'lagging behind' in contrast to the 'educated' and 'progressive' communities. The history of minority education in India and the question related to educational backwardness are mainly directed to the case of Muslims, for the educational development of other minorities have always kept pace with the development of the society as a whole. The other numerical minorities like Christians, Sikhs, Jews and Parsees, with a lot of exceptions, achieve similar or even better academic results when compared with the majority (Chauhan: 2004). In the case of Jews, Parsees and Christians, their educational status may be even higher than that of the society as a whole (Chauhan: 1990).

The problem with all the "backwardness" or "lagging behind" theories and theorists are that, such works completely ignore the legacy of Islamic education and the multifarious aspects of Muslim education in India and the well-organized traditional educational systems among them. Many critics and modern reformists even argue that the Muslim conservatism and their firm stand against colonial, missionary and English education is responsible for the unsatisfactory and 'pathetic' status of Muslims in education. Many such studies sound like the 'civilizing mission' of colonists, and they give the impression that 'education', which according to them is 'rational', 'progressive', 'neutral' and 'universal', had been unknown to Muslims in Kerala and that they lack a 'genuine' spirit for education. Doing so, most of such works neglect the uncompromising struggles fought by the Muslims against the exploitative colonial interests and their cultural imperialism. Such works also neglect the immense traditional educational networks that once existed within the Muslims. The anti-English agitation and other resistance of Muslims in Kerala against 'modern' education have been taken out of its context and theorized within the modern discourse on education, and I find such studies incomplete and problematic. Considering Bourdieu's concept of field, and the theories on social capital as important tools in explaining education, in this chapter, I will argue that no such thing as a "monolithic" form of education exists or ever existed, among the Muslims. The chapter will further argue that Muslims are not educationally backward, but they are seen educationally backward when education is defined as "monolithic" or "one-dimensional", where education is narrowly and exclusively defined on the basis of colonially

given ‘modern’, ‘secular’ and English education. So here, I will give an overview of the traditional education among the Muslims in Kerala, where they have a great remarkable history and advancement. I wish to make the point that Muslims possess a considerable amount of social capital *within* the community but their social and cultural capital was *devalued* by the dominant upper caste Hindus and later by the British in the period of colonial administration. More ambitiously, this chapter will discuss the formation of the sociology of secular education among the Muslims in Kerala, and how colonialism and unequal and unjustifiable land policies or *jenmi* monopoly over “capitals” caused the present backwardness of Muslims in secular education. By sociology of secular education, I mean as to how secular education was molded and shaped by the social factors such as colonialism, especially British cultural imperialism, religion and religious reformism and community conditions; such areas still remain relatively unexplored by social science literature.

Historical Account of Muslim Education in Kerala

In this section, I am not going to deal with the genesis of Islam in Kerala, about which historians have diverse views. Instead, I select certain aspects of Muslim education in Kerala, and some critical historical junctures that are germane to a discussion of the Muslim education in Kerala in pre-colonial period. The cultural system of Muslims in Kerala was extremely antiquated, at least as far as formal education was concerned (Lemercinier 1984: 273). In “traditional Kerala” most of the Muslims, both girls and boys, are literate in Arabi-Malayalam. To avoid further confusion on ‘traditional Kerala’, I will here give the definition of given ‘traditional Kerala’ by Kathreen Gough. According to Gough, “traditional Kerala refers to the feudal kingdoms from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-eighteenth century” (Gough 1968: 133).

Gough points out that, in this period, Malayalam became an increasingly popular literacy medium with a widening public and the modifications of the ancient Tamil script *vattezhuttu* were used for records of the places. Like Izhavas and other low-caste Hindus, Mappila Muslim merchants continued to use *vattezhuttu* until the early twentieth century. Gough’s detailed study rejects the criticism made by many ‘reformists’ and scholars that during the colonial period and before, Muslims discouraged the study of Malayalam language and religious scholars declared that even the learning of the local dialect was

prohibited by religion (Ali 1990:77-78). Contrary to these findings, Gough argues that Mappilas may have formed 10 percent of Kerala's population until the mid-eighteenth century and "it is probable that most of them were literate in Malayalam, while many had a smattering of Arabic, and a few religious leaders where Arabic scholars" (Gough 1968: 137). She has the view that most of the Mappila men appear to have been educated in simple Malayalam, arithmetic and rudiments of religious knowledge. However, many studies show that it was not only Muslim men but also Muslim women who received basic education in Arabic-Malayalam. Many sources show that all the Muslims scholars in 'traditional Kerala' were not well versed in Arabic, many scholars used the local language Malayalam to communicate with the locals and "Arabi-Malayalam" became the major language through which major teachings happened.

Like in any other Muslim societies, here also the general aim and objective of the formal education was mainly to teach the students the basics of the Quran and Hadith and about the spread of Islamic ideal and culture. The basis of this type of education was to produce religious minded persons and to prepare the future generation to transmit Islamic morals and values. Hence with the support of local rulers many kinds of educational institutions were setup in different villages. While tracing the history of Muslim education in Kerala through the ages, we can see that education was different things to different people (Mohammed 2007: 31). Scholars have the opinion that, Muslim educational institutions might have started from the early days of Islam in Kerala (Pasha1995: 133). Islam, like other missionary religions such as Buddhism and Christianity (Arnold 1913: 10), adopted various methods and teaching techniques to impart its faith, rules, morals, customs and everyday rituals and practices to its adherents and the people from 'other faiths' in different societies. Islamic education in Kerala was mainly centered on four institutional forms, namely *Othupalli*, *Daras*, madrasas and Islamic colleges. In addition to this, systematic and well-organized *Wa'az* programme served as the universal education of Islam to the masses. Presently, the role of the *othupallis* are taken by much developed and well organized madrasa system of education, however, three institutions such as *dars*, madrasa and Islamic colleges still carry the message of Islam to the people.

The mosque, as a social institution has played a central role in the cultural and social life of Muslims in many societies. In India, to impart the basics of religious education every

mosque had a *muktab* and madrasa attached to it, they "were mostly establishing the body of belief and ensuring that the code of conduct confronted to these beliefs" (Kabir 1961: 189). Likewise, during the early decades of Islam in Kerala, mosques formed the nerve centre of political, religious and educational activities. Even during the present time, it continues to serve as an important institution for Islamic learning. In Kerala, the educational system attached with Mosques are known as *palli Dars*. Palli denotes the local name for Muslim mosques, whereas *dars* comes from the Arabic word *dars* (دَرْسْ) which means a lesson or a class. In *dars* the religious teachers known as *musaliars* or *khatib* (a preacher) taught the students Arabic and Islamic ideals and culture. The pupils first learned the Arabic alphabet, with accents and marks of pronunciation. In many mosques, *agathepalli* and the big hall in front of the *agathepalli* served as classrooms. The upper-story of the mosque served as hostel. In some cases *darses* are held on the first floor of the mosques, the ground floor being left free for prayer (Mohammed 2007: 32). Special quarters and separate dining halls were attached to the mosques for the residence of teachers, *mukris* and students.

However, most of the times, the villagers fed students from their homes and the residents of respective *mahals* divided students and teachers among themselves (Ahmad and Kareem 1978). One of the peculiar features of this system is that the responsibility to feed the students, *musaliars* and *mukris* and to give them other facilities such as educational materials, dress and other miscellaneous expenses were all a responsibility of *mahal* inhabitants. These expenses were financed by the small contributions given by the villagers, and sometimes from the *waqf* income. Villagers used to contribute their amount especially after the Friday prayer. The collection of money in this form was called as *bakkattu pirivu*.

Pasha notes that the food for all students and teachers were given by the villagers. He further says, "Each family adopted a student. Poor families offered either breakfast, dinner or supper. So the food and accommodation was not a problem" (Pasha 1995 134). *Dars* was not the only form which attached with mosque to give education to the Muslims, but Mosques also provided many other pedagogical activities. At mosques, as noted by Roland E Miller, during the month of Ramadan, "the nights are alive with special, open-air services. These take the form of extended pedagogical addresses by maulavis, often guest speakers, combined with antiphonal responses by those assembled" (Miller 1992: 234). However, this was not limited to the month of Ramadan, but after every Friday prayer, this pedagogical

address by the *khatib* was a routine. Unlike *dars,* where only male members could participate in the classes, in these types of pedagogical activities, women were also allowed to enter. Like that, most of the *Mahal* committees have organized *wa'az* programme as a part of universal education of Islam in the villages and urban areas. Well organized *wa'az* programs, which lasted sometimes to days and weeks based on different religious topics facilitated detailed oral teaching of various aspects of Islam on a host of subjects, served as an effective setup for universal education. Eminent religious scholars from different places came to given the pedagogical lectures. They were paid for their services, and they mobilized money and other materials for the construction of mosques and other religious centers.

The most prestigious and prominent of all the *darses* for the production of *musaliars* or *maulavis* in Kerala in early times was that of the big Juma Masjid situated at Ponnani in Malabar. In Ponnani, what Miller would have called, "the Mappila center" or Engseng Ho would have called the "Mecca of Malabr" (Ho 2009:403) was "the residence of the spiritual head of the majority of the Muhammadans of Malabar" (Arnold 1913: 213). Is where most of the new converts to Islam receive their first lessons regarding the Islamic rituals and practices, and even today, this place is considered as the 'welcome centre' of Islamic learning for the new converts. As a matter of fact, it was the advent of the Makhdum family and their activities, especially the efforts made by Shaikh Zein-ud-Din ibn Shaik Ali (1467-1521), known as "the senior Makhdum", and Shaikh Ahmad Zein-ud-Din ibn Shaikh Muhammed al-Ghazali (d.1581) called "the junior Makhdum", centering round the big Juma Masjid, that made Ponnani a centre of Islamic learning. This main centre of educational learning and its legacy gave the place the prestigious name as 'little Mecca' of Malabar.

One of the important features of this educational institution is that the education through this institution was, and still is, imparted completely free of cost, and like other *darses*, it provided students food, accommodation and other facilities free of cost. Commenting on Ponnani *dars*, William Logan in his *Malabar Manual* noted that "the students at the college are supported by the Ponnani towns people, the custom being to quarter two students in each home" (Logan 2009 [1887]: 108). He also note that, in this *dars* there is no examination, however, the most able of the students are sought out by the teacher and invited by him to join in the public reading with him at the "big lamp" in the Jammath Mosque. This invitation, according to Logan, "is considered as a sign of their fitness for the degree, which they

assume without further preliminaries" (Ibid). This method of teaching and effective educational system, historians noted that, appealed students not only from different places of Kerala and from other parts of India but also from other countries like Indonesia, Malaya and Java (Syed 1960: 305).

Many critics argue that *dars* was an "unscientific" and "defective" system of religious education and it students lack knowledge of the present day world (Ali Mohammed 1990: 40, Mohammed 2007: 32-33). These critics presented education as a "monolithic" form that should serve the "modern needs" of individuals and they believed that *dars* itself was/is an anachronism. Saying, they reduced the role of education to serve the "modern" needs of the individuals, and to achieve or 'to act like a modern men/women' they proposed the 'rationalization' of Islamic learning. They held the view that "rational" education was a necessary passport to success and an urgent requirement to the achievement of "true" Islam. However, by adding the concept of "modern", a questionable idea in itself, they project this system of education completely as "traditional" "irrational" and "unscientific". In the context of Kerala also, Arshad Alam's critique of existing literature on madrasa education or Muslim education is very important. While discussing the previous works on Islamic education, especially madrasa education in India, he pointed out that an important but unfortunate aspect of Indian madrasa literature has been that it has mostly concerned itself with what Francis Robinson would have called "the rationalist" traditions within Islam (Alam 2012: 17). The same is true in the case of works and comments on the traditional educational systems in Kerala, critics have tried to look at it either through the prism of "rationalist" Islam or "modern" secular rationalism. Critic's argument that "the *dars* system deteriorated beyond redemption" is also baseless, because, even today in many parts of Kerala *dars* serves as an important source of "Islamic" learning for many students. A recent study by Garoof Qasimi argues that in 2000, there were 1074 *darsses* in Kerala with the strength of 31721 students and 1109 teachers. This study clearly shows the role of *dars* system of education in producing scholars, and the charitable contribution given by the Muslims and their 'helping hand' for the maintenance and proper functioning of this 'traditional' institution in modern Kerala.

Dars as an institution in society also helps us to understand the amount of social capital possessed by Muslims in "traditional" Kerala. As noted above, in *darses*, food and other

miscellaneous expenses were provided by villagers. This was done by allotting or adopting one or two students by each house. Similarly, the practice of house visiting by the *musliars* was an important feature of Muslim life in Kerala. Both *dars* students and *musliars* conducted special prayers in families on important occasions, "such as the anniversary of the departure of a loved one or before the start of a special undertaking" (Miller 1992: 241). Sometimes families provided feasts for many students at a time. These feats often give during some special occasion such as *nerchas* or *mawlud.* These feasts were followed by *duas* (prayer) were an important ritual that strengthened the bond between the family members and students. In many cases, "since students were given food from houses the students were considered to be members of the house" (Pasha 1995: 135). Such membership in the family was not based on any kinship relation, but it was entirely based on the mutual trust and respect between family members and students. These bonds what Granovettor would have called the "weak ties" helped many students to achieve a respectable position in societies. It also helped students, especially those who belonged to economically poor families, to acquire social and cultural capital by giving them an opportunity to interact with various people within the community and by providing them with an education at a lower cost. Like *darses*, madrasas and *othupallis* have been playing an important role in imparting education among the Muslims.

Scholars have given different and sometimes contradictory definitions for *othupallis.* However, they have not discussed how *othupallis* as an educational institution differs from other traditional educational centers such as *dars* and madrasa. Ali has the view that, the religious classes conducted outside and adjacent to mosques known as *othupallis.* He elaborates his definition by saying that "*othupalli* is a sort of primary school for religious and Arabic education for Muslim boys and girls" (Ali Mohammed 1990:37). Pasha has the opinion that *othupalli* is influenced by traditional Hindu method of teaching. He argues, "along with certain temples there were *othanmar* madam in which Hindu students were taught to recite Sanskrit *slokas* (hymens). Probably the same method was adopted by early Muslims. That was why the "othupalli" got the name" (Pasha 1995: 136).

Mohammed defined *othupalli* as "single teacher institutions where a single person would handle the class as a single unit irrespective of the age and standard of pupils" (Mohammed 2007:32). Like Mohammed, Pasha has the opinion that "there were single

teacher schools known as *othupallis* or *maktabs*". Nevertheless, he noted that teachers of *maktabs* or *othupallis* were the senior students of *dars* i.e. the secondary or collegiate section of Juma Masjid. However, analyzing the different *ulama* groups among the Mappila community Hussain has divided *thangals*, *musliars*, *mullahs* and *mu'allims* according to their function. In which, "mullahs serve as teachers in the primary religious institutions called *othupallis"* (Randathani 2007: 115). But his classification of *ulamas* according to their function works only in the case of *thangals*, because their status is an ascribed one, which they considered as static and believed that those born outside such group can never achieve such a status. Nevertheless, the status of other three categories such as *musliars*, *mullahs* and *mu'allims* are achieved one. Moreover, such distinctions and classification of *ulamas* that he has made are merely local and contextual and it varies according to places and contexts. In such a case, not only *mullahs* but also *musliars* and *ma'ullims* taught in *othupallis*.

However, scholars have unanimously agreed that *othupalli,* is an important center of Islamic learning, that imparted religious education free of cost. At any period, these institutions did not receive any help or monetary funds from the government or any other secular authorities. It was the effort of the local people and their contributions that helped these institutions to sustain in societies. Unlike *dars,* in *othupallis* both boys and girls participated in religious learning. In *othupallis* and later in madrasas, Arabi-Malayalam, a kind of linguistic pidgin with Arab script and Malayalam and Arab words, was widely used to impart religious education. This script was an "invention" and great contribution by Kerala Muslims to Malayalam literature.

Even though, Malayalam was, and is, the main language of Muslims in Kerala, "their religious usage is heavily arabicised" (Miller 1992: 6). The influence of their religion in their everyday life furnished them with a new literacy form, called as Arabi-Malayalam. Arabi-Malayalam is a script, in which Malayalam, the local language, is written in sophisticated Arabic script (Shamsuddin 1978, Abu 1970). A number of sounds in the Arabic tongue do not have corresponding phonic items in Malayalam. However, by adding lines and dots to consonants and vowels, the script is thus modified so that it can represent all the sounds of the Malayalam language (Karassery 1995: 161-169). The script is not limited to northern Kerala Mappila Muslims, but it also had a wide currency among the South Kerala Muslims.

Many have limited its scope by saying that Arabi-Malayalam 'was a script' used by 'traditional' Muslims to impart religious education. However, many scholars pointed out that the script was not confined to religious instruction, it entered into the daily life of the people and it was their great literary achievement (Abu 1970, Miller 1992: 289, Menon 2008: 113, Shamsuddin 1978). Qadi Muhammed's popular devotional classic *Moideen Mala*, written in 1607, is considered as the first know work in Arabi-Malayalam. He was also the author of many Arabic books, one of them was a political lament titled 'The Zamorins who loved the Muslims'. The *Moideen Mala* eulogizes the life history, miraculous events and struggles of great Sufi saint Sheik Abdul Khader Jilani of Baghdad. Even though this work was considered as the first known work in Arabi-Malayalam, it does not mean that the language was originated in 1607. Many scholars have the view that, the developed nature and style of the poem and the use of complex varieties of sentences indicates that there must have been considerable literature in Arabic-Malayalam before *Moideen Mala* was composed.

Arabi-Malayalam language was widely used by Muslims in Kerala for various purposes such as religious education, trade and commerce. Scholars have various opinion regarding the origin and development of this language. Many like T Ubaid, Ahmad Maulavi hold the view that the script could be as old as 1500 years. Like *Moideen Mala*, there were many other great pieces of literature in this language, like *Badar Mala*, *Nool Mala*, *Rifai Mala*, *Kondotti Mala*, *Nafeezath Mala*, *Manjakkulam Mala* and *Mamburam Mala* (Abu 1970: 61-120). This large number of works by Muslims in Arabi-Malayalam and their contribution to Arabic literature was greatly neglected by many scholars. For instance, Kathleen Gough argued,

> As a community the Mappilas did not, however, produce any significant literature in either Arabic or Malayalam. Their literacy was apparently geared to storing and retrieving religious, legal, magical and folk knowledge and to keeping records and accounts of revenues, taxes and trade (Gough1968: 138).

Here Gough simply ignores a large number of literatures produced by Muslims, especially Mappila Muslims, both in Arabic and Arabi-Malayalam. Similarly, while discussing the literature and other cultural forms such as music, dance and architecture from 15th to 18th century Kerala, even eminent historians like K N Panikkar was completely silent about the

rich cultural tradition of Muslims in Kerala. He found, only the upper caste literatures and their art forms such as Kathakali, a temple centered upper caste elite art form (Kusuman 1996: 134), and the glory of Sanskrit literature from 15th to 18th century Kerala as the "Kerala culture" (Panikkar 1960: 426-34). Such of his arguments influenced many scholars and they argued that, "most of the Kerala's literature was written by Nambudiri Brahmans before sixteenth century, and much of it thereafter" (Gough: 1968: 134). Contrary to these studies, scholars like Syed Muhammad has the opinion that after the classic works in Arabic-Malayalam such as Kunhayin Musaliyar's *Nool Mala* and Qadi Muhammad's *Muhiyyuddin Mala* there were a number of literary materials produced in Arabi-Malayalam. In this treasure of Arabi-Malayalam literature, thus, more than 1600 items either complete or incomplete or unknown today (Syed, quoted in Ali 1900: 60).

Scholars have the opinion that, there are many numbers of martial songs in Arabic-Malayalam. In this the most famous ones being *Badar Padappattu*, *Uhdu Padappattu* and *Makkam Fathahu* (Abu 1970). Like that, Moyinkutty Vaidyar's *Malappuram Patappattu* was one of the prominent works in this language; most of his works were an inspiration for Muslims to fight against the colonialists and the oppressed landlords. Ibrahim Bevinje argues that there are more than five thousands literatures were in Arabi-Malayalam (Bevinje 1995:45). Such studies make it plain that, the knowledge of Muslims in Arabic, and Arabi-Malayalam was enormous in character. For instance, Makhdoom-II compiled so many books in different subjects, the most famous among them being *Thuhfathul Mujahideen* which is considered as one of the classical works on Kerala history of that age. Another book of equal importance is *Fathul Mueen*, which is a prescribed text for Islamic jurisprudence in different universities of the world including Al Azhar in Egypt. However, for Muslims in Kerala, Arabi-Malayalam was not just a medium to impart religious education, but it was their life, culture, and one of the main mediums through which they imparted their culture from generation to generation. Moreover, the literatures in this language were an important inspiration for local people to fight against the very oppressors. Even today, the language is very much alive in Kerala. Presently, more than 8000 madrasas in Kerala use this language as their medium of instruction. The intellectual horizon and pedagogical activities of the Muslim community expanded largely in this "golden age" up to the foreign invasion of Malabar. The above-mentioned discussion shows that Muslims had their own curriculum,

pedagogical activities, a rich literary tradition and even the script called Arabi-Malayalam.

As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the meaning of education and literacy varies according to context and communities. We cannot use the modern "monolithic" form or the "universal" concept of education or literacy to explain the traditional societies. In a Weberian sociological view, the people have given different meanings towards their actions and education and we can understand the meanings of such actions and education only through the historical context in which it was taking place, and through the meaning given by the people. This contextual historical understanding and meaning given by the actors to their action is considerably absent in the modern critical understanding of educational system by "reformists" scholars. I propose that, there is a purpose and agenda behind such studies. Such critics want to show that the 'education' that they received and the knowledge that they reproduce is the only kind of education or knowledge, and that, they believe is the 'true', 'pure' or 'superior' knowledge. Similarly, they preached that the culture that they posses is 'superior', in order to establish this 'superiority', they constructed a kind of knowledge in which those who teaching the 'traditional' knowledge, was seen as lacking the 'rational' view or 'genuine' spirit for knowledge, and therefore they were/are, ridiculed as being 'superstitions' or 'naturally backward'. Like the colonialists, they deliberately and purposefully labeled the pre-colonial and colonial system of Muslim education as 'superstitious', and 'outdated'. This outlook was an outcome of their impression that only through 'rationalization' of education, especially through the "rationalization" of Islamic education, can society achieve progress and development. Like the colonial missionaries, they took this view as important and out on their 'civilizing mission'. In doing so, the reformists have largely ignored the field in which the educational institutions were situated and the role-played by Muslims against the colonial invasion. I will propose that, the traditional educational institutions such as madrasas, *othupallis* and *dars* "can be considered as institutionalized cultural capital which has value *only* in relation to the demarcated field" (Alam 2012:25 emphasis added). Thus, the field is important in understanding the educational structure of Muslims in Kerala. In such a case, it was not the lack of social capital but the monopoly over "capitals" by the upper castes before, during, and even after the colonial invasion that greatly caused the present educational conditions of Kerala Muslims. The backwardness in education, I will argue, has a historical and

sociological dimension and that was largely ignored by the hitherto 'reformists' and 'modernists'. But before going to deal with the pre-colonial social condition, it would be worth to discuss the other institutions of Islamic learning in Kerala, and the relevance of community social capital in maintaining the enormous networks of madrasas.

'Modern' but 'Traditional'

As I pointed out earlier, Islamic education in Kerala is mainly centered on four major institutions. And we have seen how *othupallies* and *dars* systems of education functioned with the help of community social capital. Now I will move on to the other two important institutions that are considered as the major centers of Islamic learning. In Kerala, madrasa system and Islamic colleges played an unavoidable role in imparting both secular and religious education for Muslims. Kerala madrasas are vary from the north Indian system, but scholars have erroneously defined it in the context of north Indian madrasa system (Sikand 2004, Jaireth 2010). Madrasas, that this section discusses, is strictly classified as "part-time" madrasa system, and I consider it as an ideal type of Muslim educational system in multicultural societies. This system of education allows the Muslim boys and girls to have their regular schooling as well along with religious studies. Moreover, the Islamic colleges, that many scholars classified as madrasa in Kerala (Jaireth 2010, Sikand 2004), need a separates discussion, because unlike madrasa system of education, Islamic colleges function as full-time boarding colleges and not supplementary. Many of these colleges provide religious education to Muslim boys and girls along with secular education. These Islamic or Arabic colleges contributed heavily for the development of secular education among the Muslims. Because of its peculiar nature, I will discuss the Islamic colleges that produce secular knowledge in the next chapter. In this section, I will only discuss the madrasa educational system in Kerala. My intention here is not to discuss the syllabus, pedagogy or teaching method in the madrasa institutions, nor am I going to focus on the much-debated topics such as the modernization of madrasa education. However, my focus will be on the proliferation of madrasas along with the proliferation of sectarian religious organizations and how the community participation and their charitable behavior contributed for the maintenance and proper functioning of these institutions.

Discussion on madrasa education will help us to understand two important features of

Kerala Muslims. Firstly, it is clearly impossible to include all the Muslims in Kerala in the same category and the diversity in terms of religious ideology and practice is enormous and sometimes confronting each other. To classify Kerala Muslims as one category such as 'Sunni Muslims' or the 'followers of the *Shafi School*' would be to forget the important differences that existed, and still exist, between the various groups within the section of Muslims in Kerala. We must not only distinguish the "Sunnis" or "traditionalists" from the "*Salafis*" or "*Mujahids*" but also remember that in each of these major groupings there were also important differences between sub-groups. Secondly, the proliferation of madrasas and its functioning in a multicultural society is an important indicator to understand the amount of social capital, such as networks, trust, and cooperation, possessed by the various Muslim organizations and communities in Kerala. The first point is very easy to establish, because the number of madrasas under different ideological organizations are numerous, and that has always attracted sociologists and historians alike in understanding the diversity of Muslim culture in the region.

It is noted that madrasas and Arabic colleges function outside the traditional setting of mosques, but many a times most of the madrasas are situated near any mosques or *srambis* (small Muslim prayer- Houses). Presently there are more than 14000 such madrasas in Kerala and they are imparting the basic religious education for Muslims boys and girls. This number clearly negates the findings of some studies, which says that "although some Madrasas of the 'traditional' type do exist in Kerala, they have been overtaken by a large and expanding network of reformed Madrasas that have incorporated 'modern' subjects and teaching methods of varying degrees" (Sikand 2004, Jaireth and all. 2010). These studies are incomplete and misleading and their "North Indian definition" of madrasa is not sufficient to understand the peculiarities and complexities of Kerala madrasas. By saying "reformed madrasas," these scholars mean the religious plus secular incorporated educational institutions, or the full-time Islamic colleges in the region. But in Kerala, such institutions have been called as Arabic colleges or Islamic colleges and universities. Madras here strictly called for part time religious educational institutions which impart mainly religious education such as *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), the recitation of Quran, the language of Arabic and its grammar, *thaskiyat* (the morality) and *thariq* (the history). Kerala's part-time madrasa education, function between 7.30 am and 9.30am in the morning and between 7 pm and 9 pm

in the evening, is the most well organized Islamic religious educational system in the country today. The primary aim of these madrasas are to educate the younger generation and to make them aware of Islam and its culture. All of the fourteen thousand madrasas in Kerala are working outside of normal school hours and because of this madrasa system, school education is not affected by religious instruction.

Hitherto existing studies on madrasa education in Kerala had highlighted the role played by the reformist scholars such as Chaliyakath Kunhamad Haji, KM Moulavi, EK Maulavi, Vakkam Moulavi in the formation of madrasas in Kerala (Ali 1992, Pasha 1995, Mohammad 1995, 2007, Sikand 2004). These scholars advocated many reforms in educational system and introduced many novel ideas. Among these scholars, Chalilakath Kunhamed Haji was responsible for starting a movement for the reformed madrasas. It is true that the *Mujahid* movement and reformists' scholars had brought changes in the field of religious reform and education. However, as noted by Hussain Randathani, it is not the *Mujahid* organizations that reaped the fruits, and in the field of Madrasa education the traditional *ulama* that now belonged to two factions brought the desired results (Randathani 2005). Presently, *Samastha Kerala Islam Matha Vidhyabhyasa Board* (All Kerala Islamic Educational Board) known as SKIMVB, and *Samastha Kerala Sunni Vidhyabhyasa Board* (All Kerala Sunni Sunni Education Board) work expeditiously to monitor the Madrasa network system in Kerala. Both of these boards has their centers at Calicut. Currently, they control more than ten thousand madrasas in Kerala, and all these are working as part-time educational centers.

The birth of the sectarian religious organizations in Kerala would have been considered as one of the main reasons for the proliferation of madrasas. Form the organizational point of view, the madrasa system reached its highest point in Kerala after 1950s were madrasas where systematically instituted, endowed and maintained under various religious associations with diverse syllabi and pedagogical activities. Generally, a local community having a specific religious ideology such as Sunnis and *Salafis,* decide to set up a madrasa and approach the concerned education board for permission. If the educational board approves their request, they tend to provide other facilities such as to send a *Mufathish* (inspector) to test the standard of madrasas, and the board conducts annual examination. Currently, SKIMVB and their parent organization, *Samastha Kerala Jamiyyattul Ulama*, administrate most of the madrasas in the state. This organization was formed in 1926 to serve the various

religious, educational, and social needs of Muslims. In March 1952, SKIMVB called for application for Madrasa recognition, and the board working committee held on August 26, 1952 recognized first ten Madrasas. The number of recognized Madrasas has been increased since then and now it has reached more than 8491. More than 1004650 students are learning in these madrasas. The board directly holds centralized Public Examinations in the fifth, 7th, and 10th classes. It has so far issued 2,039,021 fifth class certificates, while the number is 603,524 in 7th and 45,994 in 10th. The following figures will give us a clear picture of the proliferation of the madrasas under the board from its inception to the present. In 1956, the total number of madrasas under the board was 149, in 1961, it reached to 746, and after ten years in 1971, the board recognized 2694 madrasas. After that in each year, many more madrasas added to the list. In 1991, the total number of madrasas under the board was 6440, and in 2001, the number of madrasas under the board was rose to 7865. The board was published the latest list of the madrasa on 11th September 2006, and this list shows that 8491 madrasas are working under the board, and some these madrasas are working outside Kerala and some of them are in abroad.

Samastha Kerala Sunni Vidhyabhyasa Board, another Sunni educational board in Kerala was setup in early 1990s and started its office in 1991 at Darya Ganj, New Delhi and its branch office is in Calicut Markaz Complex. This board has more than two thousand madrasas in Kerala. *Dekshina Kerala Jam-iyathul Ulama* is another important organization that mainly concentrates the social and educational development of Muslims in south Kerala. It was formed in 1955, and the educational board under this organization is called as *Dekshina Kerala Islamatha Vidhyabhyasa Board*. Under this board, more than 2967 madrasas are working today. Presently, *Kerala Nadvathul Mujahidn* has more than 600 madrasas under its management. It was formed on 20th of April 1950, under the leadership of K M Moulavi, and he was nominated as its first president. During the early 1950s, *Jamaat-e-Islami Hind Kerala* also started their madrasas in Kerala. The *Majlis*, the educational agency of the *Jamaat-e-Islami Kerala*, has 233 madrasas in Kerala and in which 15898 students are learning.

In Kerala, one can see that the proliferation of madrasas as a byproduct of the proliferation of Islamic religious organizations. However, most of these madrasas are functioning with the help and the contribution given by the local people. The villages, where

the madrasas are situated, meet the salary of the madrasa teachers and their accommodation and food, the construction of new buildings and classrooms, and all other expenses of the madrasas. The money is collected mainly through the system called as *varisankya*. In this system, each family in a locality gives a certain amount of money to the madrasa committee and the administrative body will spend the money for various purposes. In addition, some times the *waqf* property, which supported the madrasas upkeep. The different educational Boards take care of the pension of the teachers when they retire, and the Boards deposits money in their welfare funds. If this is the case, it completely negates the arguments made by many like Prem Chopra, that most of the madrasas in Kerala are foreign funded, particularly from Gulf countries (Chopra 2005: 40). In contrary to such studies, we can see this system of education as a finest example of the community effort, mutual trust, and cooperation of Muslims for their educational development. Nevertheless, it also shows the distrust and competition within the community, and among the different faction of religious groups. Today, some areas we can see more than one madrasas, where the competition and distrust is high among the Muslims. Even though, they claim this as to impart "true" knowledge of Islam, but the main intention of many of these madrasas are to establish the "strength" and "superior" position over another groups. The Madrasa educational system shows that, there exist 'strong ties' between the members within the Muslim communities in Kerala. Moreover, many a time the *ulama* and even the local people fail to make a bonding social capital across different ideologies of people. This failure was the one of the main reasons behind the proliferation of madrasas in Kerala.

Thus, it makes clear that there was, and still is, a considerable amount of social capital among the Muslims in Kerala. However, when it comes to the arena of modern secular education they fail to make an impressive contribution. This backwardness of Muslims in secular education in Kerala was a construction of many socio-historical factors. And these earlier socio-historical enterprises are worth mentioning because the present emerges out of the past and the resistance towards English education was an important landmark in the fight against the colonial cultural imperialism, a resistance which had a deep and far reaching effect. Before moving into that section, it is important to understand the sociological forces that historically controlled the public educational systems in Kerala and how it effected the educational development of Kerala Muslims.

Educational Backwardness: a Construction of Social and historical Conditions

It was not only the British colonial invasion but also the social, political and economic conditions, which predate the colonial invasion that played a role in bringing about the present educational backwardness of Kerala Muslims. Further discussion will infringe some of the "modernists" and "reformists" undermining of historical reasons behind the educational backwardness of Muslims in Kerala. For instance, while analyzing the educational backwardness of Kerala Muslims, Abdul Ghafoor, the chairman of MES, attacks the claim that the past historical events played an important role in the present educational conditions of Muslims in Kerala. He has the view that "the lack of co-ordinate action on the part of Muslims for the betterment of the community was mainly responsible for the sorry state of the community" (Gafoor 1970 Quted in Miller 1992). Here, he undermines many social and political factors that were responsible for the present educational condition of Muslims. However, I will discuss some of such important issues, which I considered as important in understanding Kerala Muslims social and educational conditions. One such important factor was traditional caste system and the domination of upper castes.

The unequal caste structure played an important role in the present domination or advancement of many communities in the field of education. Kerala, especially Malabar region where a large number of Muslims settled, was a "priest-ridden county even from its origin" (Panikkar 2006 [1900]: 11). It was caste hierarchy, which determined the social, economic, political and educational status of individuals and communities. The upper castes such as Nambudiris and Nayars were in total control of the society's income, wealth and land and enjoyed all social privileges. These communities observed the evil social custom of untouchability and maltreatment of people of the oppressed castes took savage forms. A Nambudiri who happened to be seen by a Nayadi or Pulaya considered himself have been polluted (Menon 1967: 268). Apart from untouchability, unseeability and distance pollution ('unapproachability') also existed in a dreadful form (Menon 1967: 268, Ramachandran 2000: 100). The Nambudiris, Kshatriyas and Nayars mainly observed these triple social evil customs. The hierarchical order in Kerala society always helped higher caste Nambudiri Brahmins and Nayars to get an easy access of better education.

Nambudiris monopoly over education was clearly stated by Logan by arguing that they "were, of and are still it may be added, the last persons in the world to approve of educating the commonality, for that would have tended to take from themselves the monopoly of learning they so long possessed" (Logan 2009 [1887]: 92). They did not allow any other communities, like Muslims and 'untouchables', to live decent life. In addition to the monopoly over educational institutions, they owned landed estates, managed temples, occupied honored positions and controlled the law courts and public sphere. The landlords (*janmis*) and upper castes enjoyed all the facilities to lead a life of ease and indolence and the law of the land gave them all the protection that they needed (Menon 1967: 268), at the same time, they humiliated the other communities by imposing various social customs. This is not to imply that all Nayars and Nambudiris were wealthy in this period, but majority of the economic, social, and cultural capitals controlled by these communities. However, how did this domination by the upper castes influence the educational backwardness of the Muslims? Mainly, there are two reasons that directly connect the domination of the upper castes and the backwardness of the Muslims. Firstly, this rests on a monopoly to the access or control of "capitals" by upper castes, secondly, the conversion of the "low castes" to Islam.

Most of the "capitals" such economic capital, social capital and cultural capital were controlled by upper caste Hindus. Without a traditional economic capital analysis, we cannot understand the backwardness of any communities in Kerala. The traditional economic condition in Kerala, as noted by Mencher and Raman Unni, was "very exploitative of those at the bottom but which provided those at the top with tremendous economic, political and social power" (Mencher and Unni 1976: 123). Ownership on the land is an important indicator for economic capital. Historians have been noted that the Muslims and "untouchables" were prevented from becoming landowners by the system of land tenure that uniquely prevailed in Kerala. It has also been remarked that no other parts of India and few other places in the world presented such a bewildering variety of land tenures as Kerala (Oommen, 1971: 10). The land system in Kerala was based on a principle of unceasing land ownership reserved for those who held the birthright. That hereditary proprietorship or birthright in land was called *jenmum* or *janmam*, those who held the privilege were called *jenmis*.

The *jenmi* has been defined in the Malabar Tenancy Act of 1930 as "a person entitled to

the absolute proprietorship of the land" (Quoted in Menon 1979: 76). In Malabar where a large number of Muslim populations settled, here the Nayars and Nambudiris constituted the majority of the *jenmis*. More specifically, in south Malabar these *jenmis* were mainly Nambudiri Brahmans, while in the north they were Nayars. Muslims had little place in this arrangement of land ownership which had been set up by some unknown process when the Brahmins assumed power (Miller 1992: 98). This traditional caste based *jenmi* system had maintained the most abominably tyrannical effect on the Muslims. However, Malabar came under the rule of Sultans of Mysore during 1766-1792. Their rule had made certain social, political and economic changes in Malabar. The main result of the Mysore occupation was the disappearance of the feudal or *jenmi* system of administration and its replacement by a centralized system of government (Menon1967: 304). Under this centralized system, "land was parceled out among petty princes each exercising sovereignty and each contributing to the anarchy of the whole suddenly collapsed" (Panikkar 1960: 424). The Mysorean invasion and their rule was a "shock treatment" to the traditional Kerala society (Menon: 1967: 305). Because, it deracinated many upper castes from Malabar the Mysorean rule sounded the death bell of the old social order and partially put an end to the birth based economic status enjoyed by the upper castes such as Nambudiris and Nayars. Even though north Malabar Muslims enjoyed comparatively higher economic status, the bulk of the Muslim population form South Malabar suffered a lot, majority of them were Muslims converts. They were principally converted from the 'lower' Thiyya, Cheruman, and Mukkuvan castes, for whom 'the honor of Islam' brought freedom from the disabilities of ritual pollution (Hardgrave L Robert 1977: 59)

Somehow, the Mysorean invasion challenged things that hitherto went unchallenged. It is true that their invasion and their land and taxation policies partially helped Muslims. Nevertheless, again, under the oppressive taxation and corruption during the period of Hyder Ali and later Tipu Sultan, Muslims along with other "untouchables" suffered a lot. The situation of Mappila Muslims in 18th century was clearly articulated by Miller; he says, (Miller 1992: 100)

> Apart from the slaves, the traditional land tenure system had maintained the most oppressive effect on the Mappilas. Blocked by the perpetual land

> possession of the Brahmans and Nayars the vast majority of the community, some of whom in any event were converts from the landless classes, found place only in the ranks of the lowest tenants and laborers. In that position they have suffered the full weight of the injustice that were part and parcel of the system.

As I pointed out earlier, the upper castes not only controlled economic capital, but also they controlled the social and cultural capital. In the first chapter, I made the point that, in India, birth can be taken as a form of social or cultural capital, because, it grants a 'privilege', which buys 'prestige', 'honor', 'status' and more importantly chances of success and social positioning. In traditional Kerala, especially before the British occupation (1792 A.D) the institutional structure of education, law, economy and polity were mainly based on evil social "customs". The learned Brahman castes had set these "custom", in which they have been enjoying higher positions and authorities. This authoritative power rests not alone on force but on legitimacy, which means that the normative belief on the part of an actor or one community that a command, rule, or custom ought to be obeyed. Thus, through such a dominant legitimacy they controlled the everyday life and practices of the "untouchables" and other communities. Thus, it will not be a preposterous attempt to sum up the law of the country in traditional Kerala in a single word, that word says Logan would undoubtedly be the word "custom" (Logan 2009 [1887]). The word "custom," in Malayalam would be "*Marayada*" "*Margam*" all signifying oppressive established rule and custom, and all of them Sanskrit words (ibid). Here the language and the words itself shows the domination of one community over another.

Most of the kingdoms in Kerala considered the Brahman and Nayar castes as "clean", "high", "superior", "good" or "pure" communities. All these knowledge production depend primarily on separating one's group from surrounding groups and then claiming various forms of superiority to these "others", based on one's caste identity. In this case, these involve belonging to "the pure religion" and "pure caste", being the "true owners" of knowledge, and being culturally, economically and politically more advanced than the "other" communities, and thus able to "legitimately" claim superiority over their land and other belongings. This dominant ideology and the language of "pure", "superior" or "clean" was transmitted from

generation to generation through educational institutions, which were completely closed in front of other castes and communities. Only Nambudiris and Nayars were permitted to attend the colleges and any other educational institutions, for instance, the Vedic college at Trichur or Tirunnavaya, *sankedams* respectively located in the kingdoms of Cochin and Kozhikode (Gough 1968: 144). This monopoly on educational institutions and sacerdotal mastery helped them to acquire better literacy in Malayalam and Sanskrit language. Thus, this "traditional cultural capital" helped the Nayars to acclaim, what Ayyar would have called as, the "famous grammarians, philosophers and poets" (Ayyar 1938: 310). They used this literacy "to conserve their custom, to organize and sanction the feudal kingdom, and to provide artistic entertainment and religious and philosophical enlightenment to the ruling castes" (Ibid 1968: 141). This literacy and "superior" status also helped them to serve as ministers or as ambassadors between kingdoms, scriveners in the royal palaces, ménages of lesser princes, and throughout Kerala history, these communities established a close connection with the ruling elites in the region.

Forgoing discussion makes it plain that, in the old feudal days, social and political powers rested in the hands of upper castes, and this certainly ended up being both social and economic barrier in the development of "untouchables" and other communities. However, the Mysorean invasion shook the powers of oppression and domination and because of their new land policy, the old feudal system had completely broken down. Later with the assumption of authority by the British government in 1792, all the political powers passed to that body leaving the social counterparts in the hands of old *janmis*. Thus, the old feudal chieftains and lords stripped of their political powers, which at one time they possessed, became, as at the present day, an obsolete and defunct body with no power to enforce their social commandments (Panikkar 2006 [1900]: 116). However, during the colonial period, both in Kerala and elsewhere in India, the social, political, economic and educational status of Muslims changed for the worse. During colonial period, as noted by Peter Hardy, Muslims had been asked then to submit to a new syllabus of study for success in life, which appeared to ask them to deny Islam as the one true religion (Hardy 1973: 92). The discussion of British education and policies are important not for their achievement in secular education though that was too considerable, but for the formation of a dual system of education among the Muslims in India and the construction of a backward community in Indian subcontinent.

Colonizers "desire to impose of what they considered civilized standards of justice and humanity on the subject population-that is the desire to create new human subjects" (Asad 2003:111) vehemently opposed by Kerala Muslims. Various historical and sociological factors were responsible for such a rejection of the colonial culture and education. As noted by Nathan there was a "special social and historical conditions have induced among the Mohammedan population an antipathy with regard to Western education, and even a feeling of hostility towards it, which have proved to very difficult to overcome" (Nathan 1904: 367). Therefore next section is going to discuss the social and historical conditions that contributed to the development of a *new* educational system in Kerala and as to how through various forms of struggle the traditional ulamas and Sufi saints 'demonized' the colonial culture and education.

Secular Education: A Colonial Construction

Colonialism did not introduce education in India, but they introduced a *new* educational system and *new* educational institutions that partly supplemented and partly replaced those, which were there before (Similar discussion by Mangan 1993, Walter Rodney, Vincent Harding: 1981, in Colonial Afirca). This system of education made the classification of education in India as "modern and traditional," "religious and secular", "rational and superstitious" and "Western and non-western." These binary oppositions were a part of colonial cultural project and colonialism, as noted by Nicholas Dirk, "was itself a cultural project of control". In his Forward to Bernad S Cohen's *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge* (1996),Nicholas Dirks argued that "colonialism was made possible, and then sustained and strengthened, as much by cultural technologies of rule as it was by the more obvious and brutal modes of conquest that first established power on foreign shores" (Dirks 1966: ix). The 'civilizing mission' of the colonizers was justified in creating superiority over the 'native' culture and education. To build up this superiority the setting up of administrative structures, creating ideological structures and transforming cultural practices approached with reforming zeal (Mann and all 2004: 1-26). The creation of powerful knowledge structure and creation of dichotomy between 'natives' and 'colonizers' was clearly articulated by Nicholas Dirk, he argues that (Dirks 1966: ix)

> Colonial knowledge both enabled conquest and was produced by it, in certain

> important ways, knowledge was what colonialism was all about. Cultural forms in societies newly classified as “traditional” were reconstructed and transformed by and through this knowledge, which created new categories and oppositions between colonizers and colonized, European and Asian, modern and traditional, West and East.

Considering colonialism as a cultural project, I will propose that the ‘universal’, ‘secular’, and ‘modern’ system of education in India was a construction of colonial imperialism. Colonization has profound implications for educational system, as educational sites are centrally involved in the production and reproduction, “in the propagation”, “selective dissemination” and "social appropriation" of discourses (Ball 1990: 3). The colonizers believed that their education and culture was “superior” over the native “ignorance”. To establish this “superiority” over native culture and education colonial masters legally branded the native culture and education as “backward and childish”, “repugnant to justice and morality”, or as “opposed to natural morality and humanity” (Asad 2003-110-11). This was evident in colonial masters language, for instance, in his The Macaulay Minutes, where Macaulay made the disparaging description that “a single shelf of a good European library worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia” (Macaulay 1995, 1935). Their education mission, to quote Macaulay’s much quoted words, “We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” (Macaulay 1995, 1935: 430). Thus, their educating mission aside, the real purpose of their education was, to prepare a class of natives for the ‘service’ of colonial administration, and, not to prepare Indians for self-rule. This was not only in India, but the colonial system of education in everywhere, or what British colonial officials referred to as “Education for adaptation” was geared to training “natives” to be good service providers and to keep them contented with their lot in the colonial system (Buchert 1994: 17).

The British colonial powers constructed the colonial state, colonial economy and colonial education to serve the interests of British imperialism. Every educational system, as Foucault states, "is a means of maintaining or modifying the appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them” (Foucault 1972: 227). Once they organized, the imperialist powers must necessarily control the means of the production of

knowledge in order to ensure the future of their domination. This type of education, whether state or missionary, primary or secondary, editors of *Post Colonial Studies Reader* noted that, "was a massive cannon in the artillery of empire… unlike outright territorial aggression, education effects, in Gramsci's terms, a 'domination by consent" (Ashcroft and al. 1995: 425). Although Gramsci does not employ domination in a colonial discourse, for him, domination finds its synonym in relationship that involves with the relations between the leader and those led (Gramsci 1971). In British India, we can see the leader and the led in a dominant and subordinate relationship in which the notion of hegemony become essential. This, domination can be achieved, according to Gramsci, by coercion and consent. In the colonial context "consent can be understood as a mode of intelligibility structuring the relations between the colonizers and the colonized" (Dorothy 2000: 43). The consent in British colonial India was done through the colonizer's imposition of an educational system with the master's language, culture and religion as its locus, upon the colonized. This education and colonial knowledge production legitimizes the colonizers' usurpation. Here the colonizers bring with them not only their education, and political and economic policies but also their culture and religion. Their educational discourses and cultural domination turned our consciousness in to what Spivak calls "worlding of the West as world" in which Western interests are projected as the World's interests and become naturalized in the rest of world (Spivak, quoted in Andreotti 2007).

As I pointed out earlier, the colonial educational system was constructed and maintained through the ideological structure of colonial empire. This ideological structures of the colonial empire and their civilizing missions "where conservative" and they "helped to sustain bonds of allegiance and unite them in what they perceived to be a great spiritual and moral enterprise" (Carey 2011: xiv). This spiritual and moral 'civilizing mission' was not only carried through, what Althusser called as Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA), but also through Christian missionaries, they played a crucial role in this 'civilizing mission'. For missionaries and Christian churches, the colonial imperialism was "a mission field" (Ibid 2011: 3). In India, missionary educationists, Anglicizing evangelical preachers and company officials were already championing English education "during the 1820s and 1830s at the 'age of reform' " and "this continued up through the 1940s and 1950s" (Bellenoit 2007: 3). Today we can find many studies on missionary activities in India; some highlights the

positive aspects of missionaries. For instance, Lata Mani has focused on missionary diatribes over *sati*, discussing how they riled against such 'barbaric' practices (Mani: 1998). Scholars like, Avril Powell has studied the more hardened interactions between missionaries and other communities, especially with the Muslims. He argued that there was "no coherent and continuous anti-missionary movement in existence either before or after 1987" (Powell 1993: 291). However, in India, there was a constant confrontation between Christians and other communities regarding the missionary education.

There is no doubt that the Christian missionaries had undertaken the pioneer work in the matter of western education in Kerala. The chief missionary groups which took the lead were the Landon Missionary Society (L.M.S) in the erstwhile south Travancore, the Church Mission Society (C.M.S) in the erstwhile Central Travancore and Cochin areas and the Basel German Evangelical Mission in the Malabar area (Menon 1979: 297). As I noted earlier, nearly fifty thousand people from the 'lower caste' group converted to Islam during 1871-1881, and this tremendous growth of conversion to Islam caused apprehension to Christian missionaries and authorities as well. A Christian Mission conference held at Calcutta in 1882 discussed this issue and reported that the Muslims were increasing so rapidly in Malabar, and they afraid that "as to render it possible that in a few years the whole of the lower race of the west coast may become Muhammadamn" (Arnold 1963: 272). For the missionaries education was the main mechanism through which they can control the conversion of 'low caste' groups to other faiths. With this intension to propagate the religion, the missionaries started various educational institutions in many parts of Kerala.

The followers of a missionary religion, Muslims believed that Christian missionary education and English education would have weaken the faith of the young Muslim students' religious beliefs, and they afraid that this education will open up the way for the propagation of Christian religion among them. There are many 'genuine' reasons for Muslims to be suspicious of British education and the role played by Christian missionaries in education. In an Islamic educational system, Muslims believed that, knowledge derived from the Qur'an and Sunna must be the heart of all education, "acting as the glue which holds together the entire curriculum into an integrated whole" (Mark Halstead 2004: 525). The one reason was that, as noted by Fazlur Rahman, "Islam, ever since its inception, has faced and met spiritual and intellectual challenges and indeed, the Qur'anic Revelation itself is partly an emergent

from the challenges flung to it by the older and developed Jewish and Christian religions" (Rahman 1996: 212). Therefore, it was 'natural' for their side to resist the missionary education. Secondly, it was considered that "theology was crucial to the field of missionary education" (Bellenoit 2007: 7), this theology was often imparted, with help of colonial administrates, through 'general' or 'public' educational institutions. However, Muslims found that colonialism as a powerful force uses missionaries as a means to impose the "other" faith, theology and knowledge over them. Therefore, many parts of India, especially in Kerala, Muslims vehemently resisted the British education. However, these resistances were not always against the Christian religion but it was against the British exploitation and their cultural imperialism.

The articulation of resistance against colonialism was a complex phenomenon (Panikkar 2007: 1). According to Panikkar, "the resistance to colonialism in India manifested in armed revolts, social protests, cultural assertion, and intellectual dissent" (Ibid). The religious ideology was crucial in analyzing Muslim resistance against colonialism. Most of the scholars who did research on the Muslim uprising in Kerala have various explanations on the role of religion in the Muslim uprising. Thus, most of them agree that, religion, religious institutions, *ulams* and Sufi saints and Arabi-Malayalam literatures such as *malas* and *mawlids* played an important role in fighting against the landlords and colonial oppressors (Panikkar 1989, 2007: 6-8, Randathani 2007: 89-137, Menon 1989, Dale 1990, Guha Ranjit 1983: 171, Conrad Wood 1974: 5-33). In order to resist the colonial cultural, in Kerala, ulamas and Sufis alike used their religion as a source of inspiration. But many a times religion and religious ideologies come only as a 'supporting force' in fighting against colonial and *jenmi* oppressors. The social situations, denial of basic religious rights such as providing burial grounds and prayer halls, the denial of the basic human rights like a descent life, threatening social security, notion of instability, economic exploitation, encroachment of land etc. are the sole reasons that are 'compelled' and 'forced' Muslims in Kerala to fight against the colonizers. Colonial oppression and exploitation was a 'common phenomenon' in any colonized countries, but what are the forces that motivate people to act against the oppressor, is also important. For Muslims in Kerala the motivation to act against the oppressor come largely from their religious ideologies. The religious *ulamas* and Sufis constructed the dictum that the English is the language of hell and British education was

considered as passport to hell. Such sever traditional opposition to English education had placed the Mappilas in an impossible situation, Miller argues that, "it had blocked their progress, retarded the community economically, and created a public image and private mentality of backwardness" (Miller 1976: 206). However, such a 'demonization' of western education was an important resistance against the British cultural imperialism, and such an anti-colonial spirit helped Muslims to lead many serious revolution against the very colonial oppressors, may be "an armed rebellion which was one of the most serious outbreaks of violence in the modern Indian history" (Dale1980: vii).

Muslims were not all satisfied within the colonial rule. Many parts of Kerala, especially Malabar region, Muslims continued to feel intense hatred toward the British, and they lead many organized attacks against the colonists. Why the colonial authorities were unable to bring Muslim violence more effectively under control? Stephen F Dale has given two important reasons. Firstly, after the colonial authorities secured the loyalty of *janmis* by guaranteeing their control of land and recognizing these landholders traditional social authority as *adhikaris*, they simultaneously mortgaged the loyalty of much of the large Muslim tenant population (Dale 1980: 176). Even after the British took over the political power, the traditional land tenure system remained essentially unchallenged. As I mentioned earlier, this traditional land system was always exploitative for Muslims. By their religious conviction, they were not ready to accept any such exploitation. Secondly, the rebellions that Muslims organized were a genuine revolt, "that of a beleaguered Muslim community reacting against its subordination to a European government and a non-Islamic society" (ibid: 177). Colonial authorities used many techniques to suppress the revolutionary zeal of Muslims. As part of such policy, Sayyid Fazal, the son of Mambar Sayyid Alavi, was banished from the state. This was because he wrote revolutionary books and "issued religious *fatwas* to make the people conscious of the consequences of the colonial rule or the rule of *kuffar* as he often referred (Randathani 2007: 118). Another important tool or technique used by the colonists to suppress the revolution was to 'civilize' or 'educate' the native 'fanatic' Muslims.

The colonial authorities, their reports and their *eleves* had constructed the category of 'fanatic' Muslims. The fanatic, aptly put by Ansari, "is commonly defined, 'normed' as a person excessively or abnormally religious, s/he needs to be controlled". Ansari elaborates that "the fanatic looks backward to the 'heathen', or to the 'pagan' one who believes in a

different and 'primitive' religion, with the implication that s/he out to have been better educated" (Ansari 2005: 38). The colonial authorities had found English secular education as an important weapon to suppress the revolutionary zeal of 'fanatic' Muslims. In addition, they also want to control the religious education that they thought as the catalyst of revolts in many parts of Malabar. However, the authorities had realized that "any real attempt to control religious teaching and preaching would be viewed as persecution" (Winterbotham 1896: 64, Quoted in Dale 1980: 153). It was indubitably apparent that colonial authorities found the answer to what they called the 'Mappila Problem' lay in secular education on the western pattern (Miller 1976: 204), and they believed that only through 'civilizing' Muslims they can solve the problem of 'Mappila fanaticism'. Peter Hardy noted that the colonial authorities offer, slowly at first, "educational boons to Muslims in the hope that more Muslims would then become qualified to compete successfully for the official and professional employment created by British rule" (Hardy Peter 1992:80). However, in Kerala, the formation of secular education and the spread of western ideas should be viewed in the light of colonial authorities' policy or their primary tool to suppress the genuine rebellions. The British scholars suggested that, "in the long run the best safeguarded against a recurrence of Mappila outbreaks will be the spread of education in the caste" (Innes 1908: 300). But Logan disagree with Innes and others advocate education as the primary strategy or an equally certain means to end the flourishing 'fanaticism'. He advisably proposed that, "starving people are not easily taught, and, if taught, it would only lead to their adopting more effectual measures to obtain for themselves that secularity and comfort in their homesteads which it would be much wiser to grant at once". According to him, increasing comfort at home was more important. Without comfort, and with education, he said Mappilas' "discontent would only increased" (Logan 2009 [1887]: 594).

Even though colonial authorities spend meagerly for education, they took Innes and others suggestion at most serious and to decide further program to educate 'fanatic' Mappila Muslims, with that intention they formed a committee in 1871. To setup this committee Muslims educationist such as Sulaiman Sahib, Bava Moopen and Saithalikkutti Master and Kader Kutti helped the authorities (Quoted in Malayamma and Mahmood Kodur AK : 31). Under the supervision of District collector, Malabar District Board established four middle schools in Eranad, Walluvanad and Ponnani *taluks* (ibid: 36), and these places were

considered as the 'fanatic zone' or heartland of Malabar rebellion. It was because; from 1836 to 1921, there were thirty-two rebellions in Malabar. Ansari's points out that, between 1836 to 1919 "apart from the 29 actual rebellions, there were also 12 putative outbreaks" in Malabar (Ansari 2005: 37), and a major one in 1921, all these uprisings except two were concentrated in Ernad and Walluvanad taluks in South Malabar. The educational policies implement by the colonial authorities in these areas should be viewed in the light of this context.

However, all the educational efforts initiated by British with the help of local elites failed because of Mappila cultural opposition to the educational program, and their "indifferences and lack of training" (Miller 1976: 205). In such a situation, many vernacular journals and papers controlled by educated Muslims advised the locals to get secular education, and they have advised the colonial authorities to diffuse secular education among Muslims. For instance, *Kasim-ul-Akbar*, an Urdu daily published from Madras, found the cause of the Mappila distrust and rebellion to the 'illiteracy' and poverty of the people. It suggested the colonial government to education and measures to improve Mappila's life status (Lakshmi 2012:113). However, even after many initiatives taken by the colonial government to educate Muslims, their indifference to secular education continued, and Muslims were organized many other rebellions against colonists, and in the many cases, their 'outrages' were directed against the oppressive caste Hindus.

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We have seen that the colonial authorities found it hard to control the religious education and fast spreading revolutionary spirit of the Muslims, and it was that that forced the colonial authorities to open up educational institutions in Muslim populated regions of Kerala. Nevertheless, Muslims were firmly convinced about the "truth" of their religion, culture and institutions, and they were satisfied with the education and culture that they hitherto enjoyed. It will not be ludicrous to quote Adolfo Gilly, who wrote the introduction to Frantz Fanon's *A Dying Colonialism*, to explain the revolutionary spirit and thought of Muslims in 'traditional Kerala'. They believed "Liberation does not come as a gift from anybody; it is seized by the masses with their own hands" (Gilly Adolfo 1965: 2). However, fortunately or unfortunately, after the colonial invasion and even after the freedom of the country from its colonial masters, the colonially

constructed “new education” became the dominant form of education in India. And according to this dominant form of education, the State and governments, policy makers and academic scholars setup the parameters of backwardness in education, or/and they have conceptualized the “lagging behind” theories. As far as this secular education is concerned, Muslims are backward in education in comparison to other religious communities in India. Studies show that when compared with other states in India, Muslims in Kerala are comparatively fortunate in education; but on considering the conditions within the State, they come way below the other religious communities in terms of educational achievement. This chapter made the argument that it was not only the British colonialism but also the system of education and social customs that predates the colonial invasion that is considerably responsible for the Muslim educational backwardness.

The traditional Muslim educational institutions and its fine tuned functionality show that, traditionally, Muslims in Kerala had greater information, contact, trust and cooperation with fellow community members, which facilitated for their mutual benefits. Therefore, the reason for the current educational backwardness is not the lack of social capital within the communities, but the *devolution* and *destruction* of their social and cultural capital by the dominant authorities and ideological powers. In addition, the under representation of Muslims in higher educational posts and authorities happened due to the monopoly of the caste elites over the economic capital. We have also seen that because of various reasons, Muslim ulama and Sufi saints in Kerala ‘demonized’ the teaching and preaching of English language. Later the reformists and their policy of rationalization of Islam set up the graveyard for the rich Arabi-Malayalam language. The situation of Kerala, tells us that the dreadful invasion of Portuguese, exploitation by the landlords and *janims* and deceitful attitude of the colonial powers sabotaged all the economic, social and political powers enjoyed by the Muslims. During this period they were also victimized by the vindictive colonial powers and the oppressive landlords.

Moreover, the colonizers found in the Muslims a potential danger, ‘fanatic attitude’, revolutionary zeal and power of resistance since they were always against the cultural aggression systematically carried out by the colonial forces. It is somehow true that the pertinacious and uncompromising resistance against the colonizers diverted the attention of the Muslims from their educational activities and it caused the backwardness of Muslims in

secular education. Afterwards, like Peter Ives, many argues that there is a large body of literature critical of the spread of English and colonial education across the globe (Ives Peter 2010: 78, Thiong'o 1993). Far from improving lives by offering greater facilities, prestige, honor, progress and facilities for communication, colonialism and their language and culture "threatens other languages, acts as a gatekeeper to positions of wealth and prestige both within and between nations, and is the language through which much of the unequal distribution of wealth, resources, and knowledge operates" (Pennycook 1995: 55). At the beginning of the twentieth century, in India, 68 males and 7 females in every 10,000 persons of each sex were literate in English. Following table (2.1) shows that Muslims and Buddhists were the least literate community in English.

Number of Persons Literate in English in 1901 (Table 2.1)

	Number in 10,000 who know English.	
Religion	Males	Females
Hindu	64	1
Jain	134	1
Musalman	32	…
Christian	1,289	615
Parsi	4,075	961
Sikh	52	…
Buddhist	24	1
Animist	2	…

(H.H. Risley and E.A. Gait , (1903), *REPORT ON THE CENSUS OF INDIA, 1901* , Calcutta , Superintendent of Government Printing, p. 167)

Among the Mappila Muslims in Madras province, out of 10000 populations, only five men and one woman were literate in English, comparing with 975 men and 11 women and 272 men 77 women among the Brahmins and native Christians respectively. In Cochin state, out of 10000 populations, only four Muslim men were literate in English and there was no Muslim woman was literate in English. But at the same time, 66 Brahmans and 1,171

Kshatriyas and 209 Nayars were literate in English. This educational advancement of 'high castes' benefited from their domination over "capitals". At the same time, the "demonization" of English language as the language of hell by the traditional *ulamas* caused the poor English literacy of Muslims. Post-colonial theorists will argue that, the spread of English is part and parcel of unequal power relationships (Eriksen, 1992, Ashcroft *et al*., 1989). In Kerala, in an early stage, those communities who uncritically accepted English education, and who established secular educational institutions, and those who worked closely with colonial masters, and those who helped the colonialist to suppress the genuine revolts, benefited most in the later period, and they simply achieved wealth and prestige in societies. As noted by Ossella and Ossella "the colonial-driven modernization which were enthusiastically embraced all over Kerala by Christians and Hindus alike" (Ossella and Ossella 2007: 325), within the Muslims it was the Koyas and Keyis of Kozhikode firstly embraced the English education. It was not only the high caste Brahmins but also the high class and high caste Muslims were the former benefiters of secular education. Even today, they criticize and see South Malabar Muslims "as poor (*randam* and *munnum number*)" Muslims by saying that they "refused to engage with modern education; instead, privileging Arabi-Malayalam over both English and written Malayalam, deemed respectively the languages of *shaitan* (the devil) and *kafirs* (non-believers)" (Ossella and Ossella 2007: 325). But such criticse give little or no mention to history and the radical progressive struggle led by South Malabar Muslims against colonial oppression. As a matter of fact, those who resisted the colonial cultural imperialism and their exploitation like Muslims under the leadership of Sayyid Alavi Mambarm, Sayyid Fazal and Veliyangode Umar Qazi, the most vocal and pertinacious of all the critics of colonialism in Kerala, were later marginalized and victimized and neglected in societies.

To resolve the deplorable plight of Muslims in education in Kerala, many committees, policies and actions were taken by Muslim community leaders, religious scholars and state authorities. Many of such studies and reports were 'celebrated' by Muslims themselves by arguing "we are/were backward" and "we need more representation". However, the governments' lackadaisical attitude, neglect and bias in allotting funds and resources to Muslim educational institutions is an important topic for discussion. Therefore, in the next chapter, I will discuss how the five important sources and institutions, which I have discussed

in the first chapter such as voluntary associations, religious authorities and organizations, political institutions, state and government, family and local economic conditions generated social capital for the betterment and development of education among the Kerala Muslims. More ambitiously, next chapter will discuss the efforts made by Muslims through the repositioning of traditional community social capital from the realm of “traditional” education to “modern” secular education.

Chapter Four

DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

Inequality has been the central focus of most sociological research concerned with education. In the first chapter, we saw how both Coleman and Bourdieu defined educational inequality in contrary to the 'commonsensical' understanding. Such researches highlighted that the educational inequalities between children from different groups such as religion, caste and class are not a 'natural' or a given phenomenon, but is constructed through various historical and sociological processes. In the last chapter, I have discussed some of such sociological and historical factors that caused the educational backwardness of Muslims in Kerala and have analyzed as to why they 'have shown very little desire for education'. However, these were not the only reasons for Muslim educational backwardness, but the reasons are many. Broadly, we can classify these reasons into what Coleman have called the "input" and "output" factors or "within" and "outside" problems in acquiring educational credentials.

In Kerala, the domination of "high caste" and Christian communities in education indicates that historical and the socio-economic factors bear a strong relation to academic achievement. In such a context, differences between schools account for only a small faction of differences in pupil's achievement. In a Colemanian theoretical perspective, the average middle class, upper class, 'upper caste' and economically well off student's achievement is less affected by the strength or weakness of his/her school's facilities, curricula and strength of teachers than the average lower class, 'lower caste' and minority pupil's. It does not mean that the number of schools, standard and facilities in schools are not important in pupil's educational development. But I do agree that school facilities, educational methods and teaching will increase the chances of minority or 'low caste' students achievement more than will improving the school facilities of majority or well off child increase. Moreover, for the most disadvantaged children[41], the improvements in school will make the most differences in achievement. But, more than that the factors outside the school such as family background, class position, parental "capitals" possessions are important in deciding educational achievement. In another way, the field in which one born and brought up is the major

[41] Disadvantaged children are a product of unequal social system. The "disadvantage" is granted them by society by classifying them on the basis of their birth to a specific field and social context.

deciding factor in their educational achievement. Taking Coleman's theoretical work as a starting point, this chapter will argue that, not only the school and educational institutions that determine the educational achievement of children, but also the improvement in social and economic conditions and improvement in political consciousness of people are important in achieving educational development.

We have seen that at the end of the nineteenth century, considering secular education, Muslims were considered as 'historyless people', and colonial rulers and their *eleves* tried or forced to 'convince' the native Muslims that their education in a new society will be 'worthless' and 'useless'. In a way to discuss the effects of this intellectual rape of the colonists and their *eleves*, in this chapter, I will discuss the current state of Muslims in secular education in Kerala and the "progressive story" that they achieved through generating social capital. This chapter has been mainly divided into three sections. The first section will analyze the state of Minority education in India in general and Kerala in particular. To discuss the 'comparatively' better educational achievement of Muslims in Kerala, next section will take five indicators that I consider important mechanisms to explain the modern education development. In the last section, I will discuss how the generation of social capital through various institutions and mechanisms helped Kerala Muslims to acquire a better position in education when compared with Muslims in other states.

Minority Education and Muslims

Acquiring knowledge with the aid of social networks plays an important step in the educational development of the minority communities in India. The major question while discussing minority education and any other topic related to minorities in India is as to 'Who is a minority?' In a diverse and heterogeneous country like India 'What does minority mean?' Many scholars define minority groups on the basis of the group's power and numerical size in a particular society, and they argued that those who are demographically minor and do not have power in society is called minority (Schermerhorn 1970, Sharma: 1978). Khan defined minority as a group apart, almost counter posed to the rest of the people (Khan. R: 1978). In India, according to official terminology, 'minority' has a more restrictive range and refers only to the religious minorities. Because of the restriction of minorities on

the basis of religion, the official Minorities Commission of India deals with issues affecting the non-Hindu religious minorities like Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, and Buddhists and so on.

The history of minority education in India and the question related to educational backwardness are directed mainly to the case of Muslims, for the educational development of other minorities have always kept pace with the development of the society as a whole. Muslims are minorities not only in the numerical sense; they are lagging behind the other communities in India socially, educationally and economically as well. In political representation too, it is generally taken that Christians and Sikhs representation in politics is not as issue, as it presumed that they are not underrepresented (Ansari 2006 viii). In general, the other numerical minorities like Christians, Sikhs, Jews and Parsees, with a lot of exceptions, achieve similar or even better academic results when compared with the majority (Chauhan 2004). Similarly, when we take the national education, in the case of Jews, Parsees, and Christians, their educational status may be even higher than that of the society as a whole.

The educational backwardness among the Muslims in India is not uniform in its character and many scholars, I agree, always criticize the generalization. I P Desai has the opinion that "when we say that Muslims are back-ward in education, actually it is the lower class that we are referring to and we generalize from that for the whole Muslim community" (Desai:1981). Nevertheless, the Sachar Committee report shows that educationally, Muslims are the most vulnerable group in the country; even more vulnerable than the lower castes and other minorities (Sachar 2006: 50). Muslim and non-Muslim activists and scholars had, from as early as nineteenth century, organized programmes and formed policies with the aim of improving educational conditions of Muslims in order to alleviate the pathetic condition they are in. Such plans and programmes mainly aimed at giving Muslims a secular education along with their religious one.

The reasons behind the educational backwardness of Muslims are many. Broadly, we can classify these problems as 'within' and 'outside' factors. Inside problem can simply be defined as the problem within the religious community towards secular education. Scholars and many other 'reformists' in Kerala argue the educational backwardness of Muslim community, in Kerala and elsewhere, is generally attributed to their religious orthodoxy and 'negative' or 'outdated' attitude of traditional ulama towards social reforms. These attitudes

were, according to Fahimuddin "coupled with their emphasis on theological education with little effort to change traditional education system and acquire knowledge relevant to the needs of the changing world" (Fahimuddin 2004). From this perspective, Muslim community itself was solely responsible for their educational backwardness. Contrary to this argument, many argue that the main problem for education among Muslims is poverty, not religion or lack of will (Engineer 2001).

Hence, many have given a balanced view to explain the educational backwardness of Muslims (Ahmed 1984, Omar Khalidi 1976). They argues that Muslims *ulamas* failure to respond to secular education, fearing that they would turn atheist or irreligious if they get modern education, vested interest of communities leaders were responsible for Muslim educational backwardness. However, they also accept the fact that, if this is the only explanation, then, this explanation was a one sided story. Therefore, they further argue that Muslim educational backwardness can be explained in terms of discrimination practiced by state and society, the constant fear of communal violence, lack of government jobs for them were also responsible for their educational backwardness. Many scholars are arguing that 'outside' factors and problems are much more significant than the 'inside' ones (Engineer 2001, Habib 1976, Harman 1976). Here the value theory, which says different social classes have different value systems that influence their attitude towards the benefits of education (Hyman 1953), cannot be accepted as an explanation for the low levels of education for Muslims.

To overcome the plight situation of Muslims in education, Muslim elites and educationists have initiated many movements across the country. Before and after the independence, institutionalized movements started in Kerala by elite urban Muslims with a double aim, one was to give Muslims secular education, and another was to teach them the "true Islam". The networks of relations that they constructed through various social capitals, and with the help of colonial authorities and their *eleves*, gave Muslims a way to secular education. The educational movement of minority communities and 'low castes' in Kerala was organizational in character; it questioned the dominant authorities collective control over socio-educational power, it also challenged the 'normality' of power structure in education and finally, it helped Muslims along with 'lower caste' groups to get a remarkable space in the history of 'secular educational'. Government reports and scholarly studies highlight this

"exceptional" educational development of Kerala Muslims.

But Kerala Muslims: From "an Impossible Situation" to Progress

By the end of the 20th century, the traditional opposition to secular education and colonial culture had placed the Muslims "in an impossible situation", it had blocked their progress, retarded the community economically, and created a public image and private mentality of backwardness (Miller 1976: 206). But in the twenty-first, most of the narratives pertaining to the issues of Muslim education often embrace the sketchy phrase "*Pakshe Keralathile Mulims*…"(But Muslims in Kerala) to emphasize the 'exceptional' or remarkable character of Kerala Muslims achievements in education. Recent reports and statistics demonstrate that Kerala Muslims have more educational and literacy achievement than the Muslims in other states in India. Despite their under representation in state government jobs, high unemployment rate and internal conflicts, Kerala Muslims occupy a remarkable educational profile in India. This includes high rate of literacy, better mean years of schooling, high school enrolment, and political mobilization and more importantly a high level of political consciousness.

In this section, to discuss differentials in attainments at various levels of education between Muslims in Kerala and other parts of India, I have been used the following indicators: *Literacy Rate, Mean years of Schooling, School Enrolment Rates, and Participation in Politics-mainly their representation in Lok Sabha and State Assembly Elections.* These data have been analyzed in a comparative perspective, a comparison to Muslims from other demographically dominant states. Comparative approach will help us to understand the differential attainment of education of Muslims in different states. [42]

Literacy and Educational 'Development'

For the purposes of the Census, Indian census report defines literacy as, a person who aged seven and above, who can both read and write with understanding in any language, is treated as literate. A person, who can only read but cannot write, is not literate. The effective literacy rate for

[42] More importantly for sociologists, education and educational development cannot be discuss without making comparisons, for more see Grimshaw, 1973

State wise literacy levels- 2001 (Table 3.1)

State	All (%)	Muslims (%)
India	64.8	59.1
Andhra Pradesh	60.5	68.0
Assam	63.3	48.4
Bihar	47.0	42.0
Chhattisgarh	64.7	82.5
Delhi	81.7	66.6
Gujarat	69.1	73.5
Jammu and Kashmir	55.5	47.3
Jharkand	53.6	55.6
Karnataka	66.6	70.1
Kerala	**90.9**	**89.4**
Madhya Pradesh	63.7	70.3
Maharashtra	76.9	78.1
Haryana	67.9	40.0
Himachal Pradesh	76.5	57.5
Orissa	63.1	71.3
Punjab	69.7	51.2
Rajasthan	60.4	56.6
Tamil Nadu	73.5	82.9
UP	56.3	47.8
Uttaranchal	71.6	51.1
West Bengal	68.6	57.5

Source: Census of India 2001, **(**U.P: Utter Pradesh)

India in Census 2011, works out to 74.04 percent[43]. After the formation of the Kerala state in 1956, the first Census Report was conducted in 1961. In this Census Report, Kerala as a whole, the literacy rate was 46.9 per cent, when in India as a whole it was only 24 per cent. Like previous Census Report in 2001, in 2011 Census Report also, Kerala ranks first in the country with a literacy rate of 93.91 percent, closely followed by Lakshadweep (92.28 per cent) and Mizoram (91.58 per cent)[44]. This achievement in literacy was a continuation of what Menon would have called an 'alarming increase of literacy' early in the British period (Menon1962: 651). There are many reasons behind the higher literacy in Kerala. The most significant reason is the increase in the number of educational institutions, and higher number of the enrollment of students and teachers. Gough has the opinion that the development of bulk printing, role of the political parties and modern ethnic associations, British conquest and education policies, modern power based transport and industries, capitalist economic relations and modern world communication were all responsible for the development of modern literacy in Kerala (Gough 1976: 155-160). All together with other communities, Muslims also benefited in this 'alarming rate of' progress in literacy in Kerala.

The 2011 Census report has not yet published the literacy date on the basis of religious communities. Therefore, most of the data in this section would be depend on 2001 Census report. Before getting into statistical date, it would be worth to discuss the connections between literacy and educational attainment. In another way, I will explain, how could be it is possible to take higher literacy as an important indicator for educational development? Most of the reports, including the Census Report and the Sachar Committee report, considered literacy rate and enrollment in schools as an important indicator for primary educational achievement. The Sachar Committee Report says, "Despite its inadequacies, literacy remains the most easily understood and widely used indicator of educational achievement" (Sachar: 2006: 51). As noted in 2001 Census report, many in academics and in policy level considered that literacy rate and educational development are important key variables affecting demographic indicators like fertility, mortality (especially infant mortality) rate and migration. Literacy also contributes to accumulate various types of "capitals", it also "greatly contributes in improving quality of life, particularly with regard to

[43] Census of India, Provisional Population Totals, Part I, Series I, Chapter 6, State of Literacy 97-136
[44] Ibid: Page 110-114

life expectancy, infant mortality, learning level and nutritional level of children"[45]. So here, I would like to start with an overview of literacy rate in India, and to what extent Kerala Muslims stand differently from other Muslims. In 2001, nearly 65 % of India's population was literate. Nevertheless, in 2001, the literacy rate among Muslims was 59.1 %. When we analyze it community wise, if the SCs/STs, with an even lower literacy level of 52.2 per cent and Muslims, are excluded, the remaining category of 'All Others' show a high literacy level of 70.8 per cent (Sachar 2006 52). Only three states Chhattisgarh, Kerala and Tamil Nadu have above 80 per cent Muslim literacy. However, Comparing with any other states in India, Kerala Muslims had a satisfactory position (89.9 per cent) in literacy achievement.

School Enrolment Rate and Kerala Muslims

The Census does not provide information on enrolment and attendance rates. In this section, I will use data available from Sachar Committee Report and Enrolment Based Indicators issued by NEUPA under District Information System for Education (DISE)**.**

Differences in Enrolment Levels between Muslims and All Others (Table 3.2)



National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCERE) Report
Source: Sachar Committee Report (2006)

[45] 2001 Census Report

During 2006-07 DISE data collection, NEUPA has attempted to collect information on enrolment of Muslim children for the first time[46]. In their latest (2008-09) report on Enrolment Based Indicators, DISE has more critically analyzed the enrolment percentage of SC, ST, OBC and Muslims with respect to total enrolment[47]. In 2008-09, the percentage of Muslim enrolment at primary level is reported to be 11.03 against 9.13 at upper primary level. The percentage of girls' enrolment is as high as 48.93 (GPI, 0.96) and 50.03 (GPI, 1.00) at primary and upper primary levels. Table 2 shows that, enrolment rates are above (90 per cent) in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, and what Schar Report called satisfactory (above 80%) is in Karnataka, Maharashtra and Delhi. The difference in enrolment rates is also small in states like Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra. However, analyzing the enrollment of students in primary education, Kerala is much better than any other states in India. Students enrollment in primary education is nearly 92 per cent and the gap between Hindus and Muslims are very less. In Assam, only 63 per cent of Muslims are enrolling in primary education. But at the same time 88 per cent of the Hindus are enrolling in primary education. In many other states, the gap between Muslim and other communities are very high, but in Kerala there is no such wide gap exists between Muslims and other communities. In many states, except Kerala, Karnadaka and Tamil Nadu, there exists a wide gap between Muslims and other communities in primary and secondary enrollments .But it needs to be noted that in none of the 'satisfactory' states are current attendance rates amongst Muslims higher than that of the remaining population (Sachar 2006: 58).

Mean Years of Schooling and Kerala Muslims

In India, mean years of schooling is defined on the average number of years a person has attended school during the relevant age span. In India, "this has been estimated for the age group 7 to 16 years corresponding to matriculation" (Sachar 2006: 51). The Census of India 2001 for the first time provides data that is somewhat amenable to estimate Mean Years of Schooling according to socio-religious categories.

[46] Analytical report 2008-09,Elementary Education in India by Arun C Mehta, Part III- Enrolment Based indicators 103-156, DISE, See the link for more information- http://www.dise.in/Downloads/Publications/Publications%202008-09/AR%202008-09/Enrolment-Based%20Indicators.pdf

[47] Ibid

Mean Years of Schooling of children aged 7-16 years – 2001 (Table 3.3)

	All (No. of years)		Male (No. of years)		Female (No. of years)	
	All	Muslims	All	Muslims	All	Muslims
India	3.95	3.26	4.18	3.40	3.69	3.11
West Bengal	3.58	2.84	3.72	2.86	3.44	2.83
Kerala	5.75	5.62	5.65	5.50	5.85	5.74
UP	3.43	2.60	3.78	2.85	3.03	2.33
Bihar	2.69	2.07	3.07	2.32	2.24	1.78
Assam	3.64	2.64	3.72	2.67	3.55	2.60
Jammu and Kashmir	3.73	3.41	4.08	3.83	3.36	2.97
Jharkhand	3.24	2.87	3.64	3.16	2.79	2.56
Karnataka	4.46	4.26	4.62	4.25	4.29	4.27
Uttaranchal	4.45	2.86	4.63	3.12	4.26	2.58
Delhi	4.76	3.78	4.74	3.73	4.79	3.83
Maharashtra	4.98	4.66	5.08	4.64	4.86	4.68
Andhra Pradesh	4.38	4.42	4.64	4.48	4.10	4.36
Gujarat	4.35	4.29	4.61	4.48	4.06	4.09
Rajasthan	3.51	2.88	4.07	3.35	2.88	2.36
Madhya Pradesh	3.62	3.79	3.92	3.85	3.27	3.73
Haryana	4.33	2.04	4.46	2.63	4.18	1.33
Tamil Nadu	5.22	5.16	5.26	5.16	5.19	5.16
Orissa	4.00	4.13	4.30	4.21	3.70	4.05
Himachal Pradesh	5.02	3.63	5.06	3.84	4.97	3.40
Chhattisgarh	3.82	4.64	4.08	4.66	3.55	4.63
Punjab	4.48	3.33	4.46	3.38	4.51	3.28

Source: 2001 Census Report

Table 3.3 shows that, in India on an average a child goes to school for only 3.95 years. The MYS of Muslims is 3.26. Sachar Committee made a comparison between the MYS of schooling in Muslims and other communities, and they made the argument that the MYS of Muslims is the lowest (about three years four months). A comparison across socio-religious categories both by gender and by place of residence also reveals consistently lower levels of MYS for the Muslim community (Sachar 2006: 56). However, the case in Kerala is entirely different, considering the MYS, a Kerala model of development do exist. It can be seen that on an average a child in Kerala goes to school for 5.75 years. In all the states, Muslims are below the state average. The MYS of Muslims in Kerala is 5.56, which is far ahead of the national average and it is very high compare with any other states.

There are many reasons behind such a remarkable achievement of MYS among the Kerala Muslims. Most of the development in formal education among the Muslims in Kerala started at the beginning of twentieth century. The role played by government, religious organizations, and community associations is important in the achievement of MYS. The combination and competition of various groups helped improving schooling facilities. More importantly, as said in the second chapter, madrasas in Kerala are working outside of normal school hours and because of this madrasa system, students got chances to attend both secular schools and madrasas. The entry of religious organizations, ethnic groups and caste associations to the field of 'educational industry' is not a recent trend in Kerala. It has been there since the British period. In Kerala, recent reports show that private agencies, mainly religious organizations and caste associations control majority of the schools. In 1962, total schools under private control was 5921 (59.7 per cent), in 1974 it was 6764 (61.0 per cent) and in 1993 there were 7650 (63.5 per cent) schools under different managements, but only 4406 (36.5 per cent) under government control[48]. In 2009-10, there were 12425 total schools in Kerala, out of which only 5098 schools are under government control, rest of the 7327 schools are under different private agencies[49]. Only two states in India, Kerala and Meghalaya[50] outnumbered by private schools than the government schools. Government's

[48] Source: Report of Educational Department, Director of Public Instruction

[49] Source: State Elementary Education Report Card : 2009-10, Published by NUEPA, District information System for Education

[50] In Meghalaya, in 2009-10, out of the 11749 total schools, 8057 schools were under private agencies, only 3692 schools were under government control.

withdrawal from the primary educational sector caused the domination of many religious and other agencies in the field of primary education. For instance, in Kerala in 1993, within the private agencies Hindu religious organizations supporting Nayar, Ezhavas and others control 3076 (25.5 per cent) of the schools. Christians including Latin Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Marthoma, Jacobites, CSI and other Christians control 2816 (23.4 per cent) schools. Muslims including various ideological organizations control 1301 (10.8 per cent) schools[51]. This combination makes it plain that, those communities who owned traditional "capitals" still enjoys higher education and controls the educational institutions. Considering MYS as an important indicator for educational development, I will summarize this section by saying that, comparing with other states in the country Muslims are far better, but their condition is not that satisfactory when compare with other communities in the state.

Education and Political Participation

Participation in politics and education must be closely connected, since education, what Coleman would have called a means to an end, not an end in itself, inducting individuals and groups into a political culture, of socializing them politically and nurturing, what Paulo Freire (1970) would have called, of them critical consciousness. I will take Almond and Verba's definition of political culture for further discussion on political culture. Political culture, they refer to "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the self in the system" (Almond and Verba 1963:13). Participation in politics may become active or passive. Moreover, both educated and little educated person can participate in political system. But the more educated person is more likely to be a member, and an active one, of some organization. Notwithstanding, it does not mean that education is the only factor in encouraging active political participation and the tool in constructing political consciousness, but rather it makes a person 'available for political participation' (Ibid 319). Similarly, Lal Goel argues that among the demographic variables usually investigated in social science research, age, income, sex, occupation, place of residence, education has been found to have the greatest effect on political behavior (Milbrath and Goel 1977). It is widely recognized that, the educated is a different kind of political actor than the person who has only a little education or none at all (Milbrath 1965:122-124).

[51] Source: Report of Educational Department, Director of Public Instruction

To be consciousness on the rights of individuals, to defend exploitation, to demand the 'genuine' rights of communities and groups education and critical consciousness is a must one. At the same time, educated can use political power more easily can exploit the masses, and they can use it as an ideological weapon to suppress the voices of people. This is because the more educated persons possess networks, connections and greater information about government and politics; they are also likely to possess a higher incidence of feelings of political efficacy (Lal M Goel 1970). Kerala Muslims entrance to politics, to the governing body of colonial government and other political authorities was a very late happening. The absence of 'desired literacy', during and even before colonial administration, prevented them to become government scriveners, and as ministers and ambassadors between kingdoms.

Muslim Deprivation in Twelve State Assemblies in descending order of Deprivation (Table 3.4)

States	Muslim Population* Average (%)	Deprivation
Gujarat	8.59	79.27
Karnataka	10.73	70.69
Madhya Pradesh	4.43	68.70
Maharashtra	8.51	62.32
Andhra Pradesh	8.22	60.99
Rajasthan	7.06	55.82
Bihar	13.34	46.48
Utter Pradesh	15.59	45.70
West Bengal	21.09	42.67
Assam	25.20	32.45
Kerala	**19.73**	**17.55**
Delhi	7.81	11.76

Average Muslim Deprivation in State Assemblies: 49.70%
*Average of population percentage based on census data from 1951 to 1991
Source: Ansari A Iqbal 2006: 370

To analyze how their better achievement in political representation possible, I will also look into the nomination of Muslim candidates by political parties for the State Assembly Elections. Ansari's rich and well organized quantitative study shows that, in the first elected

Because, literacy is needed or certainly assisted in collecting tribute and taxes, record-keeping, the development of a complex legal system, scriveners in the government offices and other features of a centralized political system (Gough 1968: 153). Those who lack the 'desired literacy' setup by the *official* authorities prevented them from achieving a better position in political participation.

It is not easy to give the detailed account of Muslim participation in politics in the grassroots level. I will take the representation of Muslims in central and state legislatures in Kerala and will make a comparison with national average and Muslims in some other selected states. Kerala Muslims are the second least deprived group in Assembly representation in the country after Delhi, which according to Ansari "in any case has had no regular assembly" (Ansari A.I 2006: 230). Their average membership has been of the order of 81.50 per cent of what would be expected under a population-based quota (Ibid). Assembly in 1957 in Kerala, there were only 11 Muslim members, whereas their share in population required 20 members, and their deprivation thus was 45 per cent. Miller mistakenly pointed out that Muslim League "captured eight seats in the Kerala Legislature in 1957" (Miller 1976: 196). However, in this election the Muslim League did not put up any candidates. Out of eleven, seven of them were elected as independents and two each on the Congress and CPI tickets. In the second election in 1960, Muslim League bagged 10 seats and the INC five and CPI one. Between 1977 and 1982, Muslim representation significantly increased reaching the peak of 28 members in 1982, which was one more than could be expected on the basis of population. In 1980, the 27 members gave Muslims 100 per cent representation (Ansari 2006: 230). From 1987 to 2001, deprivation has again reached the reasonable level of about 19 per cent (Ibid). To achieve a better number in Kerala Assembly, there is no doubt that, Muslim League has served Muslims secure satisfactory representation in the Assemblies. Because the party bagged 10 (16)[52] seats in 1960, 6 (18) in 1965, 13 (21) in 1967, 9 (15) in 1970, 13 (25) in 1977, 18 (27) (both MUL and IML) in 1980, 17 (28) (both MUL and IML) 1982, 15 (23) in 1987, 18 (27) in 1991, 13 (26) in 1996, 15 (26) in 2001, 7 (26) in 2006 and their highest number of 20 (36) in 2011[53].

[52] In Bracket, the total number of Muslim MLAs.

[53] Source: Ansari 2006: 232, http://keralaassembly.org/index.html, Muslim MLAs in 5 assemblies: They are now 13, Report in two circle. Net, see link http://twocircles.net/2011may14/muslim_mlas_5_assemblies_they_are_now_130.html, A U Asif

In India, after Haryana (27.27 per cent), Muslims in Kerala are the least deprived section in the country based on political representation in Lok Sabha assemblies. Their overall average deprivation was 28.4 per cent. Muslims were most deprived in states like Rajasthan (91.30 per cent), Delhi (87.50 per cent), Gujarat (81.48 per cent) and Maharashtra (70.17 per cent)[54]. Hence, in state where educational outcomes, allotment of educational institutions were, and still are depend on the communities' political and economic leverage and less on the democratic rules and egalitarian principles, Muslims 'satisfactory' representation in politics gave them much bargaining power and authorities.

To sum up, the conventional educational indicates such literacy, mean years of schooling, school enrolment shows that Muslims in Kerala are 'comparatively' better in their education. They also have 'desirable' representation in politics when compare with Muslims in other states. However, within the state they still face discrimination in finding government jobs and accessibility of higher education. How Kerala Muslims achieved these 'exceptional' or 'comparatively' satisfactory achievements? What are the conditions that helped the community to attain a 'remarkable position' in education? Does social capital have any role in attaining higher educational levels of Kerala Muslims? If so, what are sources that generate this social capital? How the other forms of "capitals" do helped the Kerala Muslims? Next section will try to answer these above questions.

Story of an 'Exceptional' Educational Progress: from Voluntary and Religious Organizations to Bulk Printing

There are more than thousands of educational institutions are in Kerala working under different private organizations and charitable. Who controls these organizations and trusts? It is not easy to classify them strictly under any category like religious organizations, voluntary organizations, and community organizations. It may paradoxical that, today, religious organizations have taken the baton of secular education, and the competition between different religious sects made possible the easy access of education for Muslims. However, it

(2006): Muslim Factor In 2006 Assembly Polls, in http://www.iosworld.org , http://electionaffairs.com/Kerala/Results_Kerala_Assembly_Elections_2011.cfm

[54] See Ansari (2006) for a detailed quantitative analysis

was, and still is, the community organizations that have pioneered the cause of education for different communities.

Most of the community organizations in Kerala, directly or indirectly, influenced or controlled by any religious and caste groups. Keeping their economic motive apart, these organizations had founded educational institutions mainly with the purpose of imparting education primarily to their specific communities, weather it is based on caste or religion. These institutions are "the social symbols of their pride, power, prestige and enchasing status" (Mathew George 1989: 104). The portals of such institutions are not only open to one single community per se but also to the students belonging to other religions and castes. But their primary is the educational empowerment of students belonging to the respected community by providing them with structural and institutional facilities. For that to achieve, they work as a pressure group and demand governments to contribute to the development of their communities.

In Kerala, the schools, colleges and other educational institutions formed by Christian missionaries, Nair Service Society (NSS), Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam (SNDPY), and Muslim Educational Society (MES) and in recent times many other organizations clearly fit in to the category of educational institutions under voluntary organizations. The principal task of these organizations is to accumulate "capitals" and use it "to protect the self-interest of communities" (Mathew George 1989: 80). Even though they have helped, Muslims and 'lower caste' people, to liberate themselves from numerous social disabilities from which they had been suffering from centuries, they have created, in Mertonian (1936) terms 'some unanticipated negative consequences' in Kerala society. I will discuss these consequences later.

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At the end of the ninetieth century, as pointed out elsewhere, the colonial authorities believed that the role of religion in Mappila outbreaks was inspirational and philosophical, and religious education provides justification for their actions. For educating or more aptly 'civilizing' the natives, colonialists adopted many policies and programs, during the same period, with the help of colonial authorities, elite Muslim educationists took it as their 'duty' to educate the locals. And some of the wealthier and elite Muslims began to exert pressure on

the rebels (Millar 1992: 114). Even though Pukkoya Thangal was a staunch critic of colonialism, he issued a fatwa that no one should rebel against the British, that the learned should discourage the uneducated from doing so (ibid). Such *fatwas* and what C.K Kareem calls on the "bourgeois deception" (Qouted in Miller 1992: 114) had an adverse affect on the anti-colonial struggles of Mappilas. It shows that, though the revolutionary spirit of the Mappilas was in high and they were rich in anti-colonialist consciousness, the colonial social structure coupled with religious reformation succeeded in creating native bourgeoisies. They were people mainly from native elites who received colonial education and a sense of '(ir)rational' thinking. These Muslim bourgeoisies organized movements to educate the 'uneducated', 'fanatic', 'backward' but the most oppressed and those who lead the boldest and most pertinacious struggles against colonialism in Indian subcontinent. The native elites, living in affluent condition, could do nothing but to educate the most suffered and oppressed Muslims. Otherwise, they afraid, in future, Muslim community will sink into a 'native darkness', where anyone can overexploit the communities. This realization happened mainly because of the unequal development and prosperity enjoyed by the 'historical elite' groups such as Nayars, Namboodiries, and the 'emerging elites' Christians. In this context, Muslims leaders began to look up to 'high castes' and Christians as their reference group. It does not mean that they were ready to accept their religious ideas and values; they did not want to attain membership in such groups, but they *want to become like* or *want to make same* achievement in material prosperities and educational development of such groups.

As argued by many scholars, we can locate the early reformists among urban educated elites, and their participation in reform movements and political organizations from nineteenth century onwards is not at all unusual (Gellner 1981, Robinson 2001: 184, Metcalf 1982, Osella and Osella 2008). In Kerala too, we can locate the reformism among the middle class people mainly educated elite. They formed many organizations to discuss the 'woeful plight' condition of Muslims in education. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the most important of such organizations were the *Himayathul Islam Sabha* and the *Ansarul-Islam-Bitheyle-Mil-Anam*, also known as Mohammedan Educational Society in Kozhikode, and *Hidayathul Muslimeen Sabha* founded at Manjeri in 1897. *Himayathul Islam Sabha* and the Mohammedan Educational Society founded schools for Mappilas with the financial support of rich traders, timber merchants, landholders and the *thangals* of Kozhikode

(Lakshmi 2012:103). *Hidayathul Muslimeen Sabha* also focused the development of Muslim education, the organization work as a pressure group and demanded the government to provide scholarship for the students, exemption of fees, and more schools and highs schools. The *Sabha* constructed a new building in 1919 in Manjeri, which later called as *Sabha Hall*. Even today, the parallel college and other educational institutions under the *Sabha* are popularly known as *Manjeri Sabha Hall*. Muhamadali's study on the *Sabha* clearly states that, the *Sabha* activities and activists were supported the colonial administration and they even celebrated the victory of the British in the first World War by giving tea and sweets to the Students (Muhammadali 2009). At the same time, they opposed the rebellions and 'advised' the locals to respect the king and colonial masters. Under the leadership of Abdulla Maulavi, the *Sabha* organized meetings to plan the stoppage of rebellion (Ibid). Most of these 'reactionary leaders' and the Sabha members were from the elite social background, and they were highly influenced by the ideologues of the later formed *Kerala Muslim Aikya Sangham* (here onwards *Sangham*), a middle class 'reformist' organization formed to 'educate', 'rationalize' and 'civilize' the natives.

In the beginning of the twentieth century, the educated Muslim elites, who mainly coming from 'the more favorable surroundings of Cochin State' (Miller 1976:206), were inclined to educate their male family members. It is beyond doubt that, they were the dominant groups, who first realized the relevance of both religious and secular education for Muslims in modern societies. Most of its exponents had started personal initiatives and many had started organized movements for the formal education for Muslims. The formation of the *Sangham* in 1922 had a tremendous influence on the development of secular education among the Muslims. The *Sangham* had adopted new programs to promote secular education and setup programs for women's education which stood neglected for long (Muhammad 2007:63). To educate Muslims or more importantly to build a 'religious rational society' or to preach 'true Islam' or what they would have called the 'removal of superstitions' and 'evil social' customs that prevailed among the Kerala Muslims, they had initiated many programs and policies. This included opening libraries, establishing religious and secular educational institutions and publishing books and journals. They had started monthlies like *Al-Irshad* and *Al Islahi* in Arabic Malayalam and '*Muslim Aikyum'* in Malayalam to propagate their ideas (Lakshmi 2012: 94, Ali 1992: 155, Miller 1976: 206), and it had a tremendous impact as an

inspirational force upon young Muslims, which gave it a seminal role in Muslim intellectual development (Miller 1976: 206).

As an organization, the *Sangham* lasted only for twelve years and disbanded itself in 1934; it was mainly because of traditional *ulamas* criticism and finical crisis that was followed by the divides within the organization. Nevertheless, their polices, ideologies and programs reverberated throughout on the cultural, religious, educational and everyday social life of Kerala Muslims, and even today it continues. However, it might be argued that, before the *Sangham*, no other Muslim organization had contributed to the development of secular education among the Kerala Muslims, so did by the *Sangham* (Kutty Ahmad 1978: 443). Even though, due to lack of economic resources they failed to establish a Muslim College at Alwaye in 1922 (Miller 1976: 208), their network of relations inspired many personalities to open schools, colleges, Arabic colleges and madrasas in parts of Kerala. This network of relations established through various means such as debate with fellow Muslims, through 'bulk printing' and their local efforts to spread the ideology and knowledge of 'true Islam' among the people, which did mainly through the vernacularisation of Friday *Khutbah* (خطبة) prayers and *wa'az* programs. I will discuss the Arabic colleges that influenced by the ideologies and ideologues of *the Sangham* later in this section, but now I will move to discuss one important college that established by the ideologues of *the Sangham*, known as Farook College, the first college under a Muslim management in Kerala.

The establishment of Farook College in 1948 under the *Rouzathul Uloom Association* was an important landmark in the Muslim secular educational development. The formation of the College was a suitable example to understand the community spirit of Muslims and how do they generate social and economic capital for community educational development. Even though there were no such physical facilities existed in Feroke to approve a College, the vice chancellor of the Madras University granted the affiliation to the College mainly because of the collective enthusiasm of the public and the zeal shown by the locals to collect the urgent economic capital that needed for the construction of buildings for the College. L. Mudaliar, the University Vice-Chancellor, later quoted this community zeal for the opening of College by saying that if the enthusiasm of the people had petered out then there would not have been any Farook College today.

The teaching in the College itself started in a 'gifted building'[55] given by the educationist Maulavi Abussabah Ahmed Ali. The Mappila elites, business men and professionals and planter groups pledged personally held government securities to the value of 1.7 Lakhs of rupees to establish the required endowment (Miller 1976: 208), and in a fast pace they mobilized a sum of one Lakh rupees to provide the initial installment of the endowment demanded by the University (Ali 1990: 171). Later years, the management committee the Rouzathul Uloom Association had received many donations from the elite Muslims and from its alumni members. They have had given the money for setting up new buildings and to give financial aid for students from the poor background.

The college was started with 32 students and five faculty members, in 2009-10 the number of enrolled students reached to 2078, and they were taught by 133 faculty members[56]. The Rouzathul Uloom Association is running about 10 educational institutions like Farook College, Arabic College, Training College, Higher Secondary School, and an English-medium school in the campus. It is reported that, more than 7,000 students are studying in these institutions (Kallada 2004). There is no doubt that, later many people influenced the idea of a college like Farook College, and many initiatives were taken by individual and organizations to set up similar educational institutions. One of such pioneering work in the field of secular education has been carrying by a well-established organization called Muslim Educational Society (here onwards MES).

In 1964 with the aim of educational upliftment of Muslims in Kerala, the MES was formed under the leadership of P.K Abdul Gafoor. Most of the founding members were from higher educational background and they themselves experienced the benefits of secular education, and they realized the general function of secular education in a fast changing social context. Like Farook College, during the initial period and later the financial support for the MES institutions were generated mainly through community and philanthropic activities. It had established many colleges and schools in different parts of Kerala. Mathew had erroneously pointed out that Mampad College was the first college formed the MES in

[55] Maulavi Abussabah gave the Rouzathul Uloom Arabic College building for Farook College in 1948. And he moved the Arabic College to a shed near to the College.

[56] In 2009-10, total number of permanent faculties was 108, number of Guest faculties 25. To more details, see *The Annual Quality Assurance Report*, Farook College 2009-10, *Submitted to* National Assessment and Accreditation Council Bangalore.

1956 (Mathew 1991: 29), But Mampad College was started in 1965 by the Eranad Educational Association and later adopted by the Muslim Educational Society in 1967. Even though, many political parties and traditional *ulamas* menaced MES with various accusations, it had created a favorable climate and 'revolutionary changes' for the progress of the secular education of the community by making it duty conscious (Miller 1976: 212-18). MES is not only providing college level education, but is also running many school and higher secondary institutions in different parts of Kerala and abroad.

In 2009-10, it runs 72 English medium schools, more than half of which are affiliated with Central Board of Secondary Examination (CBSE). It also has 24 colleges, including 14 Arts and Science Colleges, two B.Ed. colleges, two Business management colleges, two engineering colleges, and a nursing and a dental college. They have started the first self-financing Engineering College, MES College of Kuttippuram, in the State having a Muslim minority status[57]. Most of their colleges are located in the Muslim populated areas of Malabar districts. The total number of students enrolled in MES owned institutions is almost 60,000[58]. More than a third of them are non-Muslims. Apart from educational centers, MES was able to establish a number of hospitals, orphanages, hostels and job training centers (Ali: 1990). The role of MES in providing secular education for different communities, especially for Muslims, was discussed by scholars from various perspectives (Miller 1976: 211-21, Lakshmi 2012: 156-57, Mathew 1991: 29, Ali 1992: 176-178, Hassan and Ritu 2005: 134, Mohammad U 2007, Nair and Salim 2002: 237-42). Such overwhelming concern for MES has sidelined the efforts of certain voluntary organizations and trusts to give secular education for Muslims in their respective regions. A review on such institutions would be important to understand the fact that there are not only the dominant forms of networks on secular education, but also other grassroots initiatives, along with government colleges and schools, helped the hitherto marginalized Muslims a chance to acquire secular education.

After independence, many Muslim trust and organizations established schools, colleges and other educational networks that helped Muslims for easy access of education. Thangal Kunju Musaliar, a person born in an affluent middle class family in Kollam, and his thoughts for the educational development of Muslims culminated in the formation of T.K.M

[57] See *MES Bulletin* (October 2009) MES College of Engineering Supplementary, Page 15-16
[58] See www.meskerala.edu\details), also MES Bulletin Vol. 3 NO. 2, Interview with Fasal Gafoor by A Sajeevan page 3-7,

Educational Trust in 1956. The trust has a wider network of institutions such as the Engineering College, Arts and Science College, High school and higher secondary school. Similarly, Peringammala Iqbal College, the first college owned by the Muslim community in Thiruvananthapuram district, has also had an important role in Muslim educational development. This College was established in 1964 under *Iqbal College Trust* to educate the backward community in general the Muslim community in particular. Like that many other educational institutions, such as Milad E Sherief Memorial (MSM) College Kayamkulam[59], the Younus College of Engineering & Technology under the trust of Fathima Memorial Educational Trust in Kollam, Muslim Association College of Engineering (MACE)[60], are some of the major higher educational institutions in South Kerala work under Muslims managements. In south Kerala, these institutions along with many other educational institutions provided, still providing education for Muslims as well as other communities. Like that, in North Kerala, Wayanad Muslim Orphanage (1995), Sullamussalam Arabic College Areacode (1955), Pocker Sahib Memorial Orphanage College (1968), Sir Syed College Taliparamba (1967), Unity Women's College Manjeri (1991) are some of the major colleges under Muslim management. These institutional networks and educational 'hubs' indented to attract Muslim students, but they also provide education for other communities.

To sum up, Muslim management schools increased from 472 (4.8 per cent) in 1962/03 to 919 (8.3 per cent) in 1974/75 and to 1301 (10.8 per cent) in 1993/94[61]. Besides, the community had 26 aided colleges including five Arabic Colleges in 1995/96 and several technical institutions (Nair and Salim 2002: 243). Such an enormous educational network provided the Muslims to acquire primary, secondary and college education. However, many a times the Muslim management institutions like other community managements, charges higher fees for English medium education and other technical education. In such a scenario, for poor Muslims families, government schools, colleges, and religious educational institutions like Arabic colleges and *Dars* are the only affordable means for formal education. Religious organizations have an important role in imparting secular education and formation

[59] founded in 1964 by the late Al Haj P.K.Kunju sahib
[60] founded in 1956 in Venjarammoodu, Thiruvananthapuram is managed by the Muslim Association
[61] Source: Administration Report of Education Department, Director of Public Instruction 1962/34 to 1993/94.

of parochial identities among the Muslims, next I will move to discuss the role played by religious organizations in Muslim educational development.

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There are mainly three important reasons behind the flourishing of secular educational institutions under Muslim religious organizations in Kerala. Firstly, the debates related to the abolition of separate schools for Mappilas during British period, and after independence, the Governments' ban on religious instruction in educational institutions wholly managed by State resources. In the Mappila schools, in everyday religious instruction was imparted to every pupil for three hours, because religious education was considered "as most essential by the parents" (Lakshmi 2012:121). Even though the committee appointed by Madras Government in 1922 recommended not abolishing separate Mappila schools and to retain separate schools[62] (Muhammad 2007:49), the debate over the abolition of separate school created 'insecurities' in the minds Muslims. They thought that the proposed "change would be disastrous" and "it would be difficult to provide for Koran study in mixed schools" (Lakshmi 2012: 118). Such debates forced Muslims to search for alternatives for their education. This thought further strengthened by the provision in Article 28 (Clause 1) of The India Constitution. It forbids totally any religious education being imparted in educational institutions wholly managed by the State funds. But clause two of Article 28 permits religious instruction, if requires, in educational institution which is administered by the State but has been established under any endowment or trust. This helped religious organization to open their own schools and colleges to provide both secular and religious education for Muslims.

Secondly, the improvement in local economic conditions of Muslims and both traditional and modern *ulamas* encouraging speeches in support for charitable behavior toward those of lesser means and to support the rights of the needy and oppressed helped religious organizations to open orphanages, schools and Islamic colleges. I leave this point here and come back to this discussion later, in the next section. Lastly, the exclusionary

[62] The Report was suggested to close some schools, for example Lakshi (2012), quoting from the Report of Public instruction in the Madras Presidency (RDPI) says that "the committee suggested the abolition of the separate training school in Malappuram" (p.111). However, Muhammad U (2007), says that the report suggested "to retain the separate schools for Mappilas at Malappuram and rise its status to the higher elementary grade" (p.49). But both agree that the Committee recommended not to abolish separate Mappila elementary schools.

nature of the hitherto existing 'dominant' and 'common' educational institutions and their teaching methods also induced Muslim religious organizations to support the cause of secular education under an 'Islamic environment'. Before the formation of Muslims managed secular educational institutions, there were many other religious and caste communities hold a major control over the education of Kerala. All of these educational institutions, run by Christians, Ezhava, Nayar and other communities, are not exclusively for its members alone. But, according to George Mathew "in making appointments preferences will, of course, be given to the community running the colleges. But they take their staff members from other communities, at least as a token of communal representation" (Mathew: 1989). He further discusses that the S. B College that they gave preferences to Catholics and other Syrian Christians before NSS got a college in Changanacherry. Only after all applicants of the management's candidates were admitted, a handful of bright Nair or Ezhava or Pulaya candidates were admitted (Ibid). Those Muslims who are studying in such institutions find it problematic to adjust with the 'everyday ritual practices' of these institutions. Some of the issues like Friday prayer, veil and classes in the Islamic fasting month of Ramalan etc. become the issues for many Muslims. Muslim religious leaders and even common people started to think about an educational institution that should 'protect' and respect their specific religious identities. At the same time, most of the Muslim organizations rather than highlighting the importance of knowledge in Islam mainly propagated the 'other communities' development and progress in the field of education and searched the reason behind their educational development. Such a reference group perspective forced many religious organizations to open their door of religious educational institution for secular education. This open door policy of religious institutions paved the way for the further development of "communally centered" secular education for Muslims. Even though these educational institutions are known as Arabic colleges, Islamic college or Islamic Universities, secular education, modern syllabus and an "official environment for modern education" become an important priority here. There are literally hundreds of Muslim religious organizations are working in different parts of Kerala. These 'cluster of organizations' and their ability, in Harris (2003) terms, "to nurture and sustain reciprocity among actors" is an important source for social capital. For want of data and limitation of

space, here I will move to discuss few organizations and their educational institutions that impart religious education on a par with secular education.

While discussing the pre-colonial Muslim education in Kerala, I have pointed out that in educating Muslims, many religious organizations such as *Samasta Kerala Jam'iyyathul Ulama*, *Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen* and their factions[63], and *Jamaa-te Islami Hind* (Kerala) have played an unavoidable role. In Kerala within the factions of religious groups, most noticeable distinction is between "Sunnis" and "Mujahids". Ossella and Ossella notice that "both groups run and have control of mosques, *madrasas*, schools, colleges and orphanages, and both are formally split into two rival factions" (Ossella and Ossella 2008: 320). The traditional *ulamas*, which belong to either of any 'Sunni' factions, permitted secular education in their institutions as a 'defense mechanism' against, what Osella and Osella (2008) calls on the "radical reform movement" of '*Mujahids*'. In another way they "began to adopt the pattern of education of its reformists rivals" (Sikand2008:45), this 'rivals' popularly known as '*Mujahids*', '*Salafis*' or "*Islahis*'. So what is so peculiar about the 'radical reform movement'? What are their characteristics that forced the 'traditionalists' to imitate and rethink about their previous educational system?

Firstly, the reformist movements showed how to accommodate both secular and religious education in a single house that too without conflict. Secondly, they introduced religious education in a new way, in which educational structure and ambiance changed into something 'modern', but the content and syllabus changed into what Miller would have "fundamentally conservative" (Miller 1992: 280), or in Dale's terms, "basically fundamentalist and puritanical rather than modernist and liberal" (Dale 1979:197). The influence of this movement is sum up by Miller by saying that "a new emphasis on the meaning of the Qur'an, improvement in madrasa education, the increased use of Malayalam in religious devotion, and an increased number of Mappilas involved in secular education" (Miller 1992:280).

Secondly, as I pointed earlier, the hitherto existing literatures on Kerala Muslim education, historical narratives and the current rhetoric that Mujahids "struggle for education in the face of traditionalist opposition" (Osella and Osella 2008: 326) got wide currency in

[63] Kerala "Sunnis" are divided mainly between two groups, popularly known as "A.P Sunnis" and "E.K Sunnis", Similarly "Mujahids" also split mainly between two groups, and popularly called as "Madani group" "Madavoor group". For more details, see Osella Osella (2008).

academic and media circles. The Mujahids claim on the complete authority over the Muslim educational 'empowerment', 'upliftment' and 'development' disturbed deeply the 'traditional' Muslim organizations. Such a debate forced "traditional" *ulama's* and their organizations to review their educational policies.

More importantly, the Mujahid movement in Kerala gave a new meaning for Arabic studies. To teach Arabic systematically they open many Arabic colleges. As an alternative to *Dars* system of education, in 1891 the first Arabic College named Dar ul-Uloom Arabic College was established in Valakkad (Ali 1990:51). Later the establishment of Rouzath ul-Uloom Arabic college in Anakkayam in 1942, Madeenathul Uloom Arabic College in Pulikkal in 1947, Al Madrassathul Aliyah Arabic College in Chemmanad in 1943, Sullamussalam Arabic College in Areacode in 1954 (Ibid), was some of the prominent Arabic Colleges formed by Mujahid leaders. Some of these Arabic Colleges are aided by the state government and has recognition and grants of the University Grants Commission. They also offered Afzal ul Ulama certificate courses in their colleges, "Which enables its bearer to teach Arabic in secondary Schools" (Miller 1992: 237). In all these colleges in addition to the teaching of Quran, *Hadith*, *Fiqh* and Islamic history, students are taught English and other modern subjects. Such a new method of Arabic teaching and religious education considerably influenced the other organizations Jamaat –e-Islami and *Samasta Kerala Jam'iyyathul Ulama*.

As noted in the second chapter, *Samasta Kerala Jam'iyyathul Ulama* (SKJM) control most of the Madrasas in the state, like that; they also have nearly fifty-four Arabic and Islamic colleges. Among these, Jamia Nooriyya Arabic College in Pattikkad, Rahmaniya Arabic College in Katameri, Darul Huda Islamic University in Chemmad and Maunat-ul Islam Arabic Collge in Ponnani are some of the premier institutes. In these, except few, most of the institutions educate the students on both secular and religious subjects. Jamia Nooriyya Arabic College was established in 1965, and today among the "Sunni circle", especially in villages, it is considered as one of the premier institutes of Islamic learning. But this institution gives minimal education in modern subjects. Critical thoughts within the groups and influence of Mujahid educational institutions as reference group, some educationists like Baputti Hajji and Basheer Musliyar's policies and programs succeeded in the establishment of Dar ul-Huda Islamic Academy in 1986, and later it upgraded as an Islamic university in

2010. This Academy, now has twenty branches, now enrolling north Indian students and even teaching some sections in Urdu (Metcalf 2007: 98, Sikand 2005), and it gives twelve years course on Islamic education and modern subjects.

Under the leadership of A.P Abubaker Musliar, *Markazus Saqafatis Sunniyya* established in 1978 in Karanthur. In Kerala, among the Muslims this institution is popularly known as *The Markaz*. Under *The Markaz* there are Arabic colleges, Hifzul Qur'an centre, Postgraduate Islamic study centre, L.P. and U.P. schools , secondary madrasa, a residential English-medium school, boys and girls hostels, printing press, computer and typewriting institute and orphanages[64]. Another group, *Jamaat –e- Islami Kerala* has twenty-four colleges, seventy-seven schools, and six orphanages in Kerala. The organization has also administrating one university called *Al-Jamia Al-Islamia* in Santhapuram, was established in 1955, and upgraded as a University in 2003.

The proliferation of these organizations and Arabic colleges would not be possible without the charitable contributions and distinct acts of Muslims in Kerala. Most of the Arabic Colleges, except very few like Raulathul Uloom Arabic College in Feroke, do not receive any grants or funds from state and the government authorities. In addition, none of the students in these institutes pays tuition or any other fees for their education, but they receive free food, boarding and lodging. In the *Dars* system that I discussed in the second chapter, it was the local families took the responsibilities of the pupils, however, in modern Arabic Colleges, the responsibility has been taken by the community as a whole. Even though there exists an alarming rate of distrust, increasing conflict and confrontation between different religious groups among the Muslims, it does not caused the decrease of the social capital among the Muslims, instead it helped them to make more boding social capital within the communities. Here, the decline of the larger collectivity does not cause for the formation of individualism or "bowling alone," which Putnam found in American and Italian societies. But here the distrust and decline of the collectivity as factions does not caused to the formation of individualism, but to the formation of clusters or cloistered groups. Moreover, in modern context, all this clusters, irrespective of their ideology, accepted the modern

[64] The Sunni Cultural Centre In Calicut by K Hamza, The Milli Gazette
See link http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/01-5-2000/the_sunni_cultural_centre.htm
See also http://www.markazonline.com

education as an important part of their prestige and progressive outlook, and they realized the usefulness of modern education as a tool to dominate in modern societies.

The diverse interpretation of religion and religious texts along with the economic improvement of the Muslims was responsible for the further formation of cluster organization and cluster communities. A cluster organization is an organizational structure that has many small groups and squads within the organization, which helps the organization to collect data, easy communication with locals, and to achieve organizational objectives. Each Muslim religious organization in Kerala should be considered as cluster organization, because, they have different students and youth wings, educational bodies, and separate *waqf* committees. But they are interdependent and work in mutual cooperation with another. Such cluster organization helped Muslims to expand their social networks, and to gain data on the availability of opportunity in education in different societies. Similary, cluster community also work as a network among different religious communities. Custer community, "as an increasingly popular *community development* strategy", has some wider meaning, according to Borich, "*Cluster communities* organized as *voluntary alliances* between two or more communities to address common problems, needs and interests" (Borich T and Korsching 2007). Kerala has seen different voluntary alliances between religious communities to act against a "common enemy," mostly state and its apparatus, by arguing that State has scrubbed the basic rights of minorities or State has violated the constitutional rights. Similarly, many cluster communities have formed to defend the 'rights' of the communities, they demand governments to allow more funds, schools and colleges for private sector. To propagate the ideology of cluster organizations, many periodicals and presses started in Kerala. In Kerala, the proliferation of organizations has caused the "spread of print capitalism", and it has an important role in educating Kerala Muslims. Next, I will move to discuss the bulk printing and its role in the development of education among the Kerala Muslims.

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The development of modern newspaper and periodicals in Malayalam commences with the publication of the *Rajyasamacharam* (News of the country) from Illikunnu in Tellicherry in June, 1847 (Menon 1979: 321). However, most of the newspapers, journals and printing presses in Kerala were controlled and owned by the Nayars and Christians (Gough 1968:

156, Lakshmi 2012: 133, Mathew 1989: 60-65). As argued by Robinson most Muslim societies have experienced barely one hundred years of print culture (Robinson 1993: 250). If that is the case, Kerala Muslims, when compare Muslims in other parts of South Asia, entry to print culture was not a late occurrence. Nevertheless, when we compare their entry to the field of print with other communities in Kerala, we can see that it was a late occurrence. Reasons may be, as noted by Francis Robinson in most Muslim societies, Muslims had the notion that printing would attack the very heart of Islamic systems for the transmission of knowledge; it attacks what was understood to make knowledge trustworthy, what gave it value, what gave it authority (ibid: 234). Many other reasons like poor economic background, lack of printing facilities, and lack of knowledge in printing technology further added in the late entrance of Kerala Muslims to the print culture. But later many people thought that spread of print materials would help them to fight effectively and more organizationally against the colonial rulers. With such a motive, at the end of nineteenth century, Theepputhi Kunjahammad started the first Muslim press in Kerala in Thalassery (Kareem and Maulavi 1978: 45-46). Inspiration from the first press, and to fight against the colonialist by producing anti-colonial writings many Muslims started "secret printing presses" in Malabar, especially in areas like Thalassery, Ponnani and Tirur. However, the formation of religious organizations and its clusters caused the development and spread of printing among the Muslims. Such print culture provided, and still provides, information to the parents and pupils in both rural and urban localities regarding the education, educational opportunities and its importance in changing societies. *Salahul Ikhwan*, the four-page periodical edited by C Seythalikutty was published during the 1890s and 1900s from Tirur, "had a very detailed and vibrant foreign news section which informed the readers mainly about the developments in the Ottoman Empire"[65]. Most of the early periodicals informed Muslims in Kerala about the plight of Muslims in other societies and how does they achieved progress in their societies. For instance, the reformist leaders like Vakkom Maulavi, mainly inspired by the thoughts of Muhammad Abdu and Rasheed Rida and writing in *Al-Manar*[66], utilized print media especially paper like *Swadeshabhimani* to propagate the ideology "true Islam" among

[65] K K Abdul Sathar, in Periodical reveals truth on Malabar Muslims by Harikrishnan in ibnlive.in.com Oct 05, 2011

[66] *Al-Manar* meaning The Lighthouse, the magazine Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865) published in Cairo from 1898 until 1935.

the Muslims. In 1906, Vakkom Maulavi published a monthly, the *Muslim* and later another monthly *Al-Islam* in Arabi-Malayalam. The main purpose of the later was to communicate the reformist ideas to the locals in Malabar region, where their main literacy was in Arabic-Malayalam. He also started another Malayalam monthly *Deepika*, in which the translation of the Quran appeared regularly (Menon 1979: 2010). In 1914, he wrote on the Muslim that Muslims should learn lessons from Hindu's around them and "rich people should contribute financially towards the development of education among poor Muslims"[67]. Similarly, under the editorialship of congress leader Mohammad Abdur Rahiman, a news paper, *Al-Amin* started in 1924 to promote national sentiment among the Muslims, and it had the consequence of stimulating Mappila awareness of their of cultural heritage and need.

The establishment of *Chandrika*, as a weekly in 1934 from Thalassery was an important milestone in the development of print culture among the Kerala Muslims. It was started to publish daily newspapers in 1939, and same year shifted its office to Calicut. As a mouthpiece of Muslim League, it published serial articles on education and reported news that helped Muslims in their socio-cultural development. After independence, hundreds of periodicals were published by various Muslim organizations both in Malayalam, Arabic, and even in Arabic-Malayalam. It was a part of the general trend among the Kerala culture, which produced thousands of periodicals by different religious, community and caste organizations. Gough eloquently expressed this phenomenal growth in print culture in Kerala, after she came back to Kerala in 1964, she says "it seemed that the whole state was flooded with newsprint, novels, political pamphlets, advertisements, wall-slogans, shop-sings, bill-boards, posters, letters, printed invitations and announcements" (Gough 1968: 156-57).

More recently, multicultural media including television, newspapers, magazines and other printing materials that target Muslims audience, include people from diverse clusters, and sectarian ideologies. In Kerala, Muslims own five newspapers, namely *Chandriak* (Muslim League, 1934), *Madhyamum* (Jama'te e-Islami Kerala, 1987), *Siraj* (Sunnis [A.P group], 1984), *Varthamanam* (Mujahids, 1956) *Tejas* (Popular Front of India, 2006)[68]. There are hundreds of magazine including weeklies and monthlies also publishing by various

[67] *Samudayodharanam* (Mal) (1914) in *Muslim*, Jan-Feb, part 19

[68] In bracket mouthpiece of the organization name, and established year.

voluntary and religious organizations. Both Sunni 'rival' groups, A.P Sunnis and E.K Sunnis, are targeting Muslim audience from different age groups through their magazines. Under the leadership of SKJM (E.K Sunni) many magazines are publishing, which includes *Sathyadara, Sunni Afkar, Santhushta Kudumbam, Al-Mu'alim* and *Kurunnukal*. In a similar manner, the A.P Sunni's publish magazines like *Risala Weekly*, *Sunni Voice*, *Sunnath Monthly* and *Kusumam*. Under the Intermedia Publishing Ltd[69], a Malayalam fortnight *Thejas Weekly* is publishing. *Jamaat-e-Islami Hind Kerala* has a number of magazines and one of the biggest book publishing houses in South India[70]. Their magazines include, *Prabothanam, Bodhanam, Aramam,* and *Malarvadi*. An Islamic Missionary Organization, *Niche of Truth,* has publishing another magazine called *Sneha Samvadam*, which claims to propagate 'True Islam' among the Muslims and other religious communities. *Vichinthanam* started in 2001, a weekly publication along with the monthly publication of *Al-Manar* are the two important official mouthpiece of KNM (A.P group). Similarly, *Shabab Weekly* and *Pudava Monlthy* are the important organ of the another faction of KNM (Madavoor). There are many other magazines, like *MES Bulletin,* are coming to the crowded media scene of Kerala from various independent but ideological organizations. Among these most of the newspapers, journals and periodicals would subscribe and read mainly by their own adherents and sympathizers. Reactive side is the one main reason behind the flourishing of these Medias. This reaction is not always a minority reaction to media mistreatment and their (mis)treatment, but a reaction to the 'rival' group's ideology and religious, social and political standpoints. A close analysis of the pages of these media shows that, they fight each other; they debate 'trivial' issues for weeks and months; they never accept the opinion of other groups; they uses their magazines pages to humiliate the 'rival' groups; and they further try to strengthen the cluster organizations and sectarian identities. However, at the same time, they provide networks of information regarding education and other social issues, they provide a voice in advancing the welfare of the community; they challenge social unequal distribution of resources by government agencies; they challenge the 'dominant' media culture and their (mis)treatment, and (mis)representation of issues related with Muslims.

[69] This is under the control of political party Popular Front of India (PFI)
[70] This press is known as Islamic Publishing House (IPH) established in 1945 under the leadership of V.P. Muhammad Ali Hajji.

Voluntary and religious organizations along with, in Anderson's (1983) term, "the spread of print-capitalism" helped Muslims to achieve a better position in education when compare with Muslims in other states. Nevertheless, these are not the only forces that helped Muslims to get a respectable position in secular education in Kerala. More importantly, the improvement in local economic condition, and government and participation in politics and political organization is an important factor for the Muslim educational development. Next section will discuss how Muslim economic condition does, and how do political parties and governments contributed for the "exceptional" educational development of Kerala Muslims.

Outside the Syllabus: Conditions of Family, Improvement in Local Economic Condition, Government and Political Authorities

The traditional 'upper caste' domination in government jobs continued even after the independence. Muslims and "low castes" faced serial discrimination in many sectors, and government authorities and dominant caste groups have some sort of "prefixed quota of just this much and no more Muslims" attitude. This is not just an assumption; the recent studies show that only 268733 of the 78, 63342 Muslims in Kerala are working under the government sector. Even though they constitute 26.9 per cent of the state population, their representation in government jobs is 11.4 per cent. However, Nayars who represent only 12.5 percent of the Kerala population occupied 21 per cent of government jobs[71]. The representation of Christians in government jobs is 20.6 percent but they represent 18.3 per cent of total Kerala population. It is clear that the improvement in the economic condition among the Muslims made possible not through the government job participation, but through the gulf migration and "capitalist oriented business community" (Osella and Osella 2010) within the Muslims.

Until 2008, more than 40 percent of the emigrants from Kerala are Muslims. Comparable figures are 37.7 percent for Hindus and 21.2 percent for Christians (Zachariah and Rajan 2008: 4). Many have the assumption that the migration to gulf countries by Kerala Muslims has adverse effects on their education (Muhammad U 2007). But many argue that improvement in economic condition, instead of decreasing educational outcome, made

[71] Source: Kerala Shastra Sahitya Parishath 2006

Muslims more self critical and created a thirst for modern education (Miller 1972: 190, Menon Indu 1981). However, very few works discuss the impact of migration and economic condition of Muslims in detail and its relation to educational outcomes[72]. Indu Menon's work, specially focusing on Muslim populated districts in Kerala, argues that there is a positive correlation between parent's income and educational achievement. While analyzing the data, she makes the argument that "as income of parents' increases, education of respondents also increases" (Menon Indu 1981: 41). She argues that 52 per cent of the Muslim women belonging to the income group below Rs.150 were illiterate and only 1 per cent had high school education and above. But at the same time, she argues, those with income above Rs. 750 account for 16 per cent of illiterates but they account for 51 per cent of the high school and above (Ibid). Even though her study is based on a small sample of population, it highlights the significance of economic capital for education among the Muslims.

I will propose that, the proliferation of voluntary organizations, print media, religious organizations, and increasing number of Schools and Colleges among the Kerala Muslims would not have possible unless there would have been a desired change in the local economic conditions. The improvement in local economic condition made possible mainly through gulf migration. This is because; the remittance the families received through gulf migration is an important indicator to understand this prosperity both in rural and urban areas. The Muslims have the largest (34.7) proportion of households that received remittances, Christians received 15.3 per cent and the Hindus have the lowest (11.3 percent). Muslims received remittances a sum of 18998 (crores) while Hindu's received remittance of 16492 (crores) and total remittance for Christians was 7798[73]. The increasing "gulf money" and outside contact facilitated Muslims for better education, and wide currency for reformists' trends (Osella and Osella 2008, Millar 1992). While discussing gulf migration and Kerala Muslims, Osella and Osella's study rightly pointed out that the economic environment that achieved mainly because of gulf migration, "constitutes the ground against with contemporary reformist religious discourses seeking to transform Muslim selves" (Osella and Osella 2010: 194). The proliferation of most religious and voluntary organizations, educational institutions happened

[72] Some exceptions include Kareem Abdul (1988), Osella and Osella (2010)
[73] See tables in Zachariah, K C, B A Prakash and S Irudaya Rajan (2008)

mainly after 1970s, which marked as the large-scale migration of Muslims to gulf countries due to "the oil states started welcoming semi-skilled and unskilled labour" (Millar 1992: 322). There is no doubt that, the migration of the 'uneducated' people from both rural and urban areas increased the "capitals" of Kerala Muslims. Most of the families benefited from the gulf migration, and especially the second-generation family members received opportunities to complete their education without many difficulties. In many areas, the migration of the father and eldest brother to gulf countries become a 'norm', they wanted their children, brothers and sisters better educated, and their hard work and remittance helped the other family members to live a 'respectable' life style. In the case of Kerala Muslims, migration to the Gulf is mainly limited to males, but the economic capital that they generated helped to improve female literacy among the Muslims. As noted by Robin Jeffry, "literate men have literate sons; literate women have literate children", by such a statement, Jeffry stresses the role of female literacy in achieving mass literacy in Kerala. The mass literacy and increasing literacy among the Muslim women in Kerala gave the Muslim children a favorable educational environment in their families.

In addition, "gulf money" increased flair for "conspicuous consumption" and a leisure class group, the owners of large property claims. It also increased the charitable behavior of Muslims. The elite philanthropic activists like Abdul Wahab, MA Usuf Ali and many others, "have started the fashion of giving large donation to mosques and Muslims organizations" and they are criticized as the "self-advertising stunts of a parvenu" (Osella and Ossella 2010: 199). But more than this corporate philanthropists, "gulf money" created many rural philanthropists, and their donations have increased the philanthropic activities such as supporting poor families; give donations for marriages; donate money for sport clubs; donate dress and other school equipments to poor families. Voluntary organizations like sport clubs and religious organizations worked like as intermediary in this endeavor. In addition, for voluntary and religious organizations, "*gulfukaran*" become an important source of capital for their charity works. The religious organizations used "gulf money" to build up their organizational prosperity and through which all organizations tried to establish their superiorities. There unlike Uslaner's (2002) theory, which argues "economic prosperity" will improve more generalized trust and cooperation, in Kerala among the Muslims, economic prosperity could not facilitate more generalized trust, but it caused the formation cluster

organizations and more and more factions in societies. Which further caused the construction of increasingly private, ethnic centered educational institutions, at all levels, education is turning into a growingly sectarian and communalized affair. Private educational institutions, which established with the help of corporate philanthropists, charged hefty monthly fees from the students, and they admitted only upper and middle class Muslims. It is matter of fact that, only well off families can afford such institutions. For poor Muslims, government educational institutions are the only option that they can afford without any difficulties. Even though the number of educational institutions under government control is decreasing in an alarming rate and privatization of education becomes the policy of changing governments, intervention of the government in Muslim and 'lower caste' education gained strength during the period since independence.

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Even though the British opened schools with the aim of 'civilizing' the 'fanatic Muslims', the amount of money they spend for education in Malabar was meager. Under the colonial rule, Malabar remained a neglected outstation of Madras, on which the government spend little beyond the requirements of maintenance of law and order (Sharp H. 1965: 73). The apathy on the part of government was an important reason for the backwardness of Malabar region when compare with Cochin and Travancore. This negligence of the governments towards Muslim education was not new, but it has its root in colonialism. Only after the 1921 rebellion, the colonial policy towards Muslim education underwent a great change. This change was an outcome of their fear for things, which were 'unknown' to them, and increasing threats that they have had faced from the Muslims. This 'unknowingness' to deal with the native culture and society was discussed differently in the colonial reports. Whether 'civilize' 'them' by providing 'our' education, or should we make change in their social and economic condition was a serious topic discussed by the colonial reports.

As I noted earlier somewhere, the Committee appointed by the government in 1922, recommend compulsory elementary education for Muslims, especially the *taluks* which British authorities classified as "fanatic zones". It also recommended for the appointment of qualified Arabic teachers in higher education to give religious education for Muslim

students[74]. Accepting these recommendations, the government opened schools in Calicut, Tallacherry, Cochin and some selected areas of Ernad, Walluwanad and Ponnanni *taluks*. Such initiatives increased the number of Schools for Muslims in Malabr, the Number of Mappila schools for boys increased from 557 in 1921/22 to 1598 in 1931/32, and in the same period, the total number of students increased from 39096 to 114604 (Ali 1990: 106).

The Hartog committee of 1929, appointed by the government to submit a comprehensive report on Indian education (Gosh 2009: 154), pointed out that the problem concerning Muslim education was not so much of getting the children to schools as of retaining them there. The committee also criticized the tendency for establishing separate and special schools for Muslims and it suggested abolishing such schools (Dwivedi 1994: 262). It shows that some committees recommended abolishing separate schools for Muslims and some support the retaining of separate schools for Muslims. But the reports generally highlights the point that the government should do something to holding back Muslims in schools[75]. With such purpose, government sanctioned special scholarships in higher education for Muslims. As a part of general policy of the government, some arrangements were made to attract the economically weaker section. These 'attractive measures' and suggestions include the supply of books and slates, the provision of free-day meals and milk in elementary schools in selected villages (Ali 1990: 120-21).

Even after independence, the indifference of government towards Muslim education continued. But because of political pressure goverments were opened many schools in Malabar. After the formation of the state of Kerala in 1956, the government gave all encouragement in improving education and mass schooling that helped Muslims and other backward communities. Government has also worked closely with Muslim organizations to restructure their syllabi for the higher levels of education, including English throughout (Metcalf B. 2007: 98). The government expenditure on education was another important reason behind the achievement of high literacy in Kerala. Government expenditure on education that was Rs 16.16 crores in 1960-61 rose to Rs. 130.17 crores in 1975-76. The per capita expenditure on education increased from Rs. 9.56 in 1960-61 to Rs 52.48 in 1975-76

[74]See RPIMP (1926/27) page 24
[75] See Logan (1887), Hartog (1929)

(Menon 1979: 307). The proportion of total government expenditure spend on education in Kerala is much higher, and none of the states in India spends such a high proportion of its resources on education (Ramachandran 2000: 105, Menon: 1979: 307). This high expenditure on education by Government mainly helped Muslims and other backward communities. Because the 'high caste' Hindus and Christians were already enjoying higher hold on educational institutions, and historically they enjoyed the lion's share of the educational benefits. However, the policies that both governments (UDF and LDF)[76] took after 1982 had an adverse effect on the public education. Because, the per capita expenditure spend on education in 1982 was 37.2 per cent, but it decreased to 31.5 per cent in 1986-87. Subsequent years, it decreased to 27.45 per cent in 1987-91, then to 26.67 in 1991-95. During the period of LDF government in 1995-96 to 99-2000 it decreased from 26.67 to 22.56 per cent[77]. This decrease in educational expenditure adversely affected the Muslims, because, this was the time more Muslims became aware of the importance of education, and they started to go for higher education. Due to their higher priority for education, the number of Muslims migrants drastically decreased since the last ten years[78]. In such a scenario, many political parties, mainly from Malabar, challenged government's indifferent attitudes and their lackadaisical attitude in allotting funds for Malabar. They started to demand more educational institutions for Malabar and they ask the State that "when the children of one part of Kerala are getting education under government expenses, why should those in Malabar pay fees to study?" (Lakshmi 2012: 161). In such a context, the role of political parties is unavoidable in the development of education among the Kerala Muslims.

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Political power is the most needed for the development of any communities. The hitherto marginalized and excluded communities and groups can attain social, economic and educational status mainly by achieving political power. It is because; political power and authority gives bargaining power for minorities, through such a power they can demand their

[76] United Democratic Front (UDF) an alliance led by the Indian National Congress, Left Democratic Front (LDF) an alliance led by Communist Party of India (Marxist).
[77] Source: *Reserve Bank of India Bulletin*, cited in Ramachandran (2000) p. 104, Bahavudeen (2007) p.43
[78] See Zachariah, K C, B A Prakash and S Irudaya Rajan (2008)

genuine rights. In India, minorities have three political choices (Khalidi 1993). Firstly, according to Umar Khalidi, Muslims can join one of the parties sympathetic to minorities or secular in orientation. Secondly, they can work through a non-partisan pressure group that would ensure the election of sympathetic individuals regardless of party affiliation (Ibid). The third option is the option, by chance or by selection, chosen by many Kerala Muslims. The option is, Muslims have to form their own political party and try to extract benefits by holding the balance of power in a coalition government (Ibid). The political powers Muslims enjoy in Kerala have had an important impact on their educational development. Even though they have divided and distributed through various political parties, Muslim League is the single largest party that represents the majority Muslims. Until recently, the authority and higher political positions of Muslim League and other Muslim political organizations like Indian National League, Jamaat e Islami Kerala were controlled by the few economically rich and socially 'superior' and educational elites. Discussing the native representation in Municipal Board in Kozhikode, LRS Lakshmi argues, "What is significant is that the Muslim seats in the Municipal Board were being filled by wealthy 'Mappilla' landlords and merchants" (Lakshmi 2012:134). Even before independence and after that, the ultimate leadership and authority of the Muslim League, one of the major political party in the region, has been in the hands of the Thangals. They claim to be the descendants of the Prophet and are therefore granted a superior status in the hierarchal social order. There is no doubt that the 'eminent' political leaders from Kerala were received well formal education and most of them were from rich high class families.

In Kerala, especially before independence, modern education was an important deciding factor in political leaderships. Those who had the opportunity and affordability to go to schools and universities became the leading political leaders. For instance, K.M Seethi Sahib, one of the founders of Muslim League and a person who had been inspired by the *Sangam*, who worked for the improvement of modern education for the Mappila community, himself was a product of modern secular education. He was born in an affluent family in Kodungaloor, and done his schooling at Kodungaloor High school and completed the Inter Mediate Course from Ernakulam Maharajas College in 1917. After that, he obtained his Bachelors of Law degree from the Trivandrum Law College. He fought for the development of Muslims institutions for education, especially at the elementary level (Miller 1976: 207).

Unlike many other reformists, he has a moderate reformist view and he tried his best to accommodate Islamic culture and values in modern education. Commenting on the principle of separate Urdu schools that he had started at an early educational stage, he said, "the Muslim pupil cannot forget that he or she is a Muslim and…should get the opportunity to study the principle of his or her religion, and to imbibe his or her cultural history" (Quoted in Miller 1976: 207). He was the one leader who worked both in All India Muslim League and at the same time with the *Sangham.* Even though the majority of the followers of Muslim league were 'Sunnis' or the 'traditionalists', they never questioned the leadership of Seethi Sahib, who was a supporter of the reformist groups. His education and/or cultural capital in the form of Charismatic leadership and respectable position in society, helped him in keeping the 'traditionalists' and 'reformists' Muslims under Muslim League. His moderate reformist view served the purpose of bridging the fears of traditionalist Mappilas regarding modern education (Ibid).

Similarly, B.Pokkar Sahib, only one Mappila who was associated with Madras Presidency Muslim League founded in 1908, was a formally educated leader and was a advocate in Madras High Court till 1956. Early in Malabar, the ethnic or 'high class' families were dominated and controlled the economic capital. They also enjoyed higher educational status and political authorities. For instance, the first Muslim political organization called the *Malabar Muslim Majlis* (MMM) found in Talasherri in 1930. The founding members include K.M Seethi Sahib, C.P mammu Keyi Sahib, Sattar Sait, Arakkla Sultan Abdurahman Ali Raja and Uppi Sahib, they received their political training under the MMM and latter they became the leaders of the Muslim League in Malabar (Aziz Abdul 1992:25). Like that, by 1933, Kozhikode Municipal Board had seven Muslims, out of which there were five *Koya* merchants, namely, Ahmad Koya Haji, Kunhahmed Koya, P Mohammad Koya Sahib, Thayyil Hassan Koya Mulla and Assankoya. Amongst the other two Mappilas were P.I Kunhahmed Haji and Abdurahiman[79]. All of these leaders were from the affluent and economically rich families. From the beginning Muslim Politics, education and economic capital in erstwhile Malabar were controlled by the traditional ethnic groups like Koyas, Keyis, Baramis and Arakkal Rajas. In Bourdieuian perspective, the above people's

[79] See 1933 *Asylum Press Almanac and Compendium of Intelligence*, Madras (1869-1943)

possession of “capitals” helped them to reproduce all the more perfectly the structure of distribution of education and cultural capital amongst their classes. The culture and education, which transmits among this ethnic groups is closer to the dominant culture, a culture setup by the elite reformists and colonial administrators.

After the independence, Muslim League joined with Congress Party and Communist Party, played a pivotal role in the social and political development of Kerala Muslims. According to Abdul Aziz Muslim League's “record of achievements, mainly in the educational field, was spectacular”. He noted that the most outstanding achievement among this was the establishment of the Calicut University (Aziz 1992). The establishment of this University helped the Muslims, especially in Malabar region to grow in University education. The demand from the Muslim political parties forced government to setup new educational institutions in Muslim localities. Communist Parities success in Kerala and its influence on Muslims was “partly erosive and partly productive” (Miller 1992: 203). Its influence gave Muslims a more critical consciousness, the power to pressurize both State and religious authorities for change, and it increased critical understanding of their religion and social surroundings. Many other political parties and politically and ideologically ridden groups such as Indian National League, Popular Front of India and Solidarity Youth Movement etc. also worked as networks among the Muslims, and they worked as a pressure group that demands more representation of Muslims in government sectors.

To sum up, in Kerala, at the begging of the twentieth century, the formation of religious organizations indicate the growing dissention between the wealthy and educated, city centered Muslims and their allies like colonial *eleves* on the one hand, and the majority poor and oppressed groups on the margins. The later were treated as “superstitious believers” and “fanatic Muslims”, were attacked on grounds of religious life and practice and their uncompromising anti-colonial struggle. The urban elites accepted secular education as a means of increasing their social prestige, and they started to propagate “undiluted Islam” and they claimed as the custodians of “true Islam”. As a response to the elite education and reformist trends, the “traditional” *ulamas* opened the doors of their religious institutions for secular education, where they provided secular education on a par with the religious education. During the same period, the proliferation of organizations generated networks and

strong group ties between middle class people and later it helped the poor Muslims to access social capital, and this change in structure lead the community to progress in secular education. The benefits of social capital within the community are varying from cluster organizations and ethnic communities. Earlier, those who are part of Mujahid or Salafi movement and Jamate-e- Islami, or social dominant groups like *thangals* and economically dominant ethnic groups like Koyas, Keyis, and Baramis did much better in secular education compared to the traditional Sunnis. But today, the increase in cluster organizations and network ties helps the traditional Sunnis to go ahead in the field of secular education.

In the 'exceptional' development of Muslim education in Kerala, apart from voluntary and religious organizations, improvement in local economic condition and spread of bulk printing, and participation in politics is indispensable. Similarly, many of the government initiatives from British period to the present also helped Muslims and other backward communities to come out from the discrimination that they faced in centuries. I admit that, these are not the only forces that generate social capital for the educational progress of Muslims. Many cultural groups, sports clubs, non-governmental organizations have also giving information and guidelines regarding education for Muslims. Sports clubs initiatives to appreciate the rank holders of SSLC, Plus Two and College examination is a growing trend in Malabar. Such honoring and increasing public appreciation programs encouraged many students from backward region to go for schools and colleges. All such networks, cooperation, mutual trust among the Muslims helped them to inform the pupil regarding the changes and trends in the field of education.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

Generating social capitals through various means made possible the 'exceptional' development of education among the Kerala Muslims. I have started the work by discussing the works of three major theorists of social capital-Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam- and the way they elaborated the concept, not exclusively, but within the context of social capital. Discussing some other works on social capital and its application in non-Western context, I have argued that the polymorphous nature of social capital will help us to use the concept in different social and historical contexts. After discussing the major features of social capital, I argued that, Islam has placed greater emphasis on social capital like mutual trust, cooperation for collective goals; such strong bonding social capital within the Muslims was evident while we discuss the traditional educational system among the Kerala Muslims. I have described the traditional educational institutions such as *othupallis*, *dars*, and madrasas in as much detail as possible and its fine tuned functionality show that, traditionally, Muslims in Kerala had greater information mechanisms, contact, mutual trust, charitable behavior and cooperation with fellow community members, which felicitated for their mutual benefits. Hence, I argued that, traditionally, Kerala Muslims possess a great social capital *within* the community. Following Granovetter and Putnam, I argued that Kerala Muslims did not benefit of bridging social capital because of their 'strong' ties of social capital like religious affiliation, parochial thoughts and cluster organizations. But even their bridging social capital and cultural capital was *devalued* and called as *randam number* (number two) and *munnam number* (number three) by the dominant 'upper castes' and colonial rulers and their *eleves* during the British administration, and later by the middleclass intelligentsia and urban elites among the Muslims.

However, colonialism did not introduce education in Kerala, but they introduced a *new* educational system and educational institutions. This *new* system is the one which created the dichotomy between 'religious'-'secular', '*dini*'-'*dunyawi*' , 'traditional' -'modern', 'Islamic'-'non-Islamic', 'the Eastern' -'the Western' education and privileged the latter to the former that were, and are and will always remain at the forefront of educational

policies, reports and discussions. It is because of this that the spread of secular modern education is taken to be 'neutral', 'beneficial', 'progressive' and 'essential to survive' in a modern society. Muslims in India, characterized by poor economic background, poverty and unemployment forced to live in "inconvenient location" and "unfavorable academic environment" has been reported as backward in education compare with other religious communities.

After a detailed discussion of traditional Muslim education, their literary works, and their functional literature in both Malayalam and Arabi-Malayalam, I proposed that colonial education and their educational institutions in Kerala partly supplemented and partly replaced those, which were there before. Further, I argued that colonizers categorized rebellious areas in Malabar as "fanatic zones", because they found in the Muslims a potential danger, 'fanatic attitude' revolutionary zeal and power of resistance since they were always against the cultural aggression systematically carried out by the colonial forces. Unlike many previous studies, here I proposed that, Muslims were not enjoyed complete freedom or equality before the pre-colonial period. Their present educational backwardness lies not just at root of colonial construction of *new* education, but the unequal social, political and economic structures that predates the colonialism. The monopoly over 'capitals' by 'high castes' and the unequal *janmi* system existed in Kerala had an important effect on the present educational backwardness of Muslims. In Kerala, in an early period, those communities, groups within communities and castes, who uncritically accepted English education and colonial culture; and who established secular educational institutions with the help of colonial rulers; those who worked closely with colonial masters; those who helped the colonialists to brutally suppress the genuine revolts, benefited most in the later period, and they simply achieved secular education, wealth and prestige in societies. However, those who continuously resisted the colonial cultural imperialism and their exploitation, and those who, as a way to resist colonialism, 'demonized' the colonial education by articulating English as the "language of hell" and Western education as "passport to hell", in a later period, were marginalized and victimized and neglected in societies.

To resolve the deplorable plight of Muslims in modern education, many initiatives, policies and actions were taken by voluntary organizations, *ulamas* and religious

organizations, government authorities and political parties. Such agencies alone with cluster organizations generated social capital, networks and information, for the mutual benefit of the Muslim community. Such an initiative placed Kerala Muslims in a 'respectable' position in modern education when compare with other states in India. To support my argument of the 'exceptional' educational development of Kerala Muslims, I have used 'conventional' educational indicators like literacy, mean years of schooling and school enrolment rate along with the participation in politics. The comparison of these indicators with Muslims in some selected states shows that Kerala Muslims are much ahead in primary and secondary education, and their participation in state and central assemblies was 'satisfactory'. This achievement is made possible not only though voluntary organizations, religious organizations and government support, but also through various other means. The respect for educated, honoring of higher educational achievement, the spread of print capitalism, widening networks, charitable works, corporate philanthropists, increasing religious organizations and cluster groups have created what Richard Frank calls on "official environments of support for education" among the Kerala Muslims. Such a wider networks, and cooperation enabled Muslims, "to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (Putnam 1996) i.e. education for their children.

However, this higher educational developmental index does not always mean that Muslims in Kerala do not face any sort of discrimination in terms of their religion. Even though, their educational development is much better when compared with Muslims in other states of India, they still face discrimination in the state. Recent study published by KSSP, shows that the Kerala Muslims whose population is very nearly one-fourth of state population, and have been declared backward in their low participation in government jobs by all the official Commissions appointed by the State. Even though their literacy rate is very high and above all the states, their participation in government jobs is very less (only 11.4 per cent, see table 5.1) when compared with other states. In the work participation of Muslims, Karnataka is in a better position, even though the Muslim literacy rate in Karnataka is only 70.3 per cent, 36.4 per cent of them are working in government sector[80].

[80] See, Sachar Committee Report (2006), Pp: 87-106

In Kerala, women's work participation is very low (only 5.9) and it is lower than any other states except Delhi (only 4.8 per cent). Here one thing is very clear, high literacy or educational achievement never contributed Kerala Muslim women to get a job or their social conditions compel them to remain in their home. Many religious organizations, especially traditional *ulamas*, are discouraging women's work participation. Another reason for lower participation rates of Muslim women, according to Sachar Report, "may be higher dependency rates due to relatively higher share of younger population in the community resulting in women staying at home" (Sachar 2006: 90).

The very low participation of Kerala Muslims (11.4 per cent) compared to all other castes and religious communities in government job are one of the important highlights of the Narendran Commission and the KSSP Report[81]. The Reports found that Muslims in public services was in almost all cases below the reservation quota, the difference being between 0.3 per cent and about 6% in the four categories. The Report further says that Ezhavas are the most socially and educationally advanced among the Backward Classes in the State. The commission said that the main reason why Muslims as well as other Backward Communities have not fared well is "nothing but educational backwardness" and that they can emulate the example of Ezhavas "if they pay more attention to the education of their children" (Narendran: 2001). Therefore the educational development of Kerala Muslims is not unique or it cannot claim to have "a development model that should be replicable" in other states. I argue that, Kerala Muslims are educationally developed and progressed only when we compare the statistics with Muslims in other states, but still they are 'lagging behind' and they are 'backward' in modern education while we compare the educational statistics with other communities within the state.

However, a close analysis of the development indicators of Kerala Muslims show the importance of social capital for a community's educational, social, political and economic development. Organized and unorganized movements against discrimination by the government and dominant castes and British colonialism lead to the development of secular

[81] Nayars represent 12.5 of Kerala population, but their representation in government job is 21 per cent. Christians constitute 18.3 per cent of Kerala population and their representation in government job is 20.6 per cent. Ezyavas representation in government job is 22.7 per cent and they represent 22.2 per cent.

education among the Kerala Muslims. According to Sleeter, a movement must have a clear sense of who the opposition is and what the issues are those differentiate "us" from "them" (Sleeter 1996: 241). In Kerala, the opposition in a hostile way, was mainly the colonialists and 'high caste' Hindus. Such a hostile attitude towards colonial cultural imperialism and uncompromising fight against *janims* gave Muslims the 'bad name' of 'fanatics'. Nevertheless, today, the struggle through various means for better education have placed them back in a better position. But all is not rosy when it comes to community education as it has at the same time created some undesirable consequences. These consequences are not always 'intentional' or 'manifest', but most of them are 'unintentional' and 'latent functions' (Merton: 1996). In Kerala, it is a fact that some institutions and parents do not want Muslim children to study with others. While the sociological studies on education argue that, in multicultural, multi-religious societies "who sits next to you in classroom" is an important matter for a multicultural exposure and more satisfactory social outlooks. However, it is to be noted that separate religious and caste based educational institutions for each community might further increase cultural polarization and students will grow up without ever having had the chance to make friends with peers from other communities. This will result in the problem of the formation of 'exclusive friendship circle' on the basis of religion and castes. In such community specific schools, there is also the danger that this would further entrench communal stereotypes and all sorts of obscurantism and feelings of insularity. In such a context, instead of doing more privatization and repressive activities that discourage the general trust of the people, government should take effective measures to ensure quality and inclusive education for all communities. Only government can make education more accessible and socially inclusive, because they are responsible in generating 'inclusive' social capital than any other agencies of social capital. Only through an inclusive, unbiased and nondiscriminatory policy, the government can make the generalized trust of the people and inculcate the trust of the minorities and other 'oppressed' communities.

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