

**PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN
POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

NALIN KUMAR MOHAPATRA

**CENTRE FOR SOVIET & EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110 067.
INDIA**

1997




जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110 067


CERTIFICATE

21st July 1997

This is to certify that the dissertation titled "**PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN**", which is being submitted by **Mr. NALIN KUMAR MOHAPATRA** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of degree of **Master of Philosophy**, carried out by him under my guidance and supervision, is his original work and to the best of my knowledge this dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


PROF. NIRMALA JOSHI
(Chairperson)


PROF. DEVENDRA KAUSHIK
(Supervisor)

Dedictaed to
My Late Grand Mother

CONTENTS

PREFACE	PAGES
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION	1-15
CHAPTER II	
GLASNOST AND GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN UZBEKISTAN	16-43
CHAPTER III	
KARIMOV'S APPROACH TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-SOVIET PHASE	44-70
CHAPTER IV	
CHALLENGES TO UZBEKISTAN'S DEMOCRACY	71-95
CHAPTER V	
CONCLUSION	96-98
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	99-106

PREFACE

Uzbekistan which is known as hub of Central Asia, is witnessing a quest for democratization since its emergence as an independent nation, after the collapse of Soviet Union. This dissertation has tried to analyse in detail the objective of its president, Islam Karimov in launching a carefully doctored and well monitored democratisation process resembling the experiment of guided democracy in some other Central Asian Republics.

The conditions under which the post-Soviet regime of Islam Karimov has been functioning are also taken into account while discussing the various measures taken by the Uzbek regime which are violative of human rights. The study also tries to focus on how "Democratization" movement in Uzbekistan is facing challenges from Islamic fundamentalism and emerging Uzbek nationalism.

In the first chapter, the meaning of democracy and various factors, which facilitate the development of democracy, and an historical analysis of the type of political rule that existed has been discussed. In the second chapter, Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost and the rise of democratic movement in Uzbekistan has been analysed.

In the Third Chapter Islam Karimov's approach to democratization in Uzbekistan has been critically examined.

The Fourth Chapter has explored the challenges to democratization process in Uzbekistan.

The last chapter has concluding observations.

Many people offered me consistence support while writing the dissertation and I am indebted to all of them.

First of all my deep acknowledgement goes to prof, Devendra Kaushik under whose supervision I have been able to complete my dissertation. His deep insight on the subject and this sustained guidance throughout the course of research with his constructive and useful remarks enabled me to complete the work successfully. I am also thankful to Dr. Ajay Patnaik for his encouragement and advise. I would like to thank, Prof. Nirmala Joshi, Chairperson for her encouragement and moral support. I would also like to thank all my friends who helped me a lot in completion of this work. My special thanks to the staff and members of Jawaharlal Nehru University Library. Institute of Defence studies and Analysis, Indian Council of Social Science Research, who gave me their valuable co-operation which made my research persuit a lot enjoyable.

I must also thank the staff of "Arpan Photostat" without whose support this dissertation would not have acquired the neat professional shape it possesses.

NEW DELHI
21 July 97

Nalin Kumar Mohapatra
NALIN KUMAR MOHAPATRA

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

The concept 'Democracy' is familiar to everyone but there is no unanimity about its precise definition because democracy is a multi faceted concept and a compound of several elements viz, political ideals, economic and social forces, ethical principles, a form of government, and a way of life.

Despite, many confusions with regards to the definition of democracy, it has significant impact on society, state, and individuals who live in a democratic setup.

MAIN FEATURES OF DEMOCRACY ;

Political and economic doctrine: To some, democracy has meaning in the political field only, and it stands for the rule of the majority, whereas to others, democracy goes beyond the frontiers of politics and enters the realm of economy too. Here the emphasis is on adequate economic opportunities.

Society with no distinction and as a form of government : Democracy, it is claimed stands for an egalitarian society in which the individual has equal status with others.

Government of the people : The term democracy essentially refers to government of the people. In the days

of the great champion of democracy, Pericles of Athenes, all citizens took an active part in the governance of the city state. Hence, it was direct democracy. Direct democracy is not possible in modern states having large territory and population. All people in a modern democratic state do not take an active part in the affairs of the government. The people elect their representatives who are supposed to think, speak, and act on behalf of the people. Hence in modern times, there is indirect or representative democracy, which means government by elected representatives of the people.

Political parties and rule of the majority: An examination of the actual working of parliamentary democracy in states like, England and India reveals that democracy stands for a rule of the majority with adequate safeguards for the minorities. There are political parties; one of which comes to power by virtue of the fact that it has through elections won a majority of seats in the legislature. This means democracy is a system of government based on the principle of majority rule. In modern states, political parties have come to stay and have become indispensable. In all the democracies of the world there are political parties. The party which is the most popular or, most powerful or that which can command very vast

resources is able to form the government. In a cabinet system of government, the real executive, that is, the the council of ministers consists of members drawn from the majority party in the legislature. A partyless democracy through desirable, is not a feasible proposition.

VARYING INTERPRETATION TO THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY:

The concept of democracy does not have specific meaning, and it is subjected to varying interpretations.

CLASSICAL THEORY OF DEMOCRACY:

The classical theory of democracy is mainly associated with western European countries and America. According to this view, democracy is government of the people, by the people, and for the people. The government is run by the representatives of the people, and the government aims at promoting peoples welfare. It exists for their sake and meets their needs, representatives are elected by the people, and are responsible to them. Ministers are the servants of the people and not their mentor.

COMMUNIST VIEW OF DEMOCRACY :

Communists speak in terms of a democratic state as against a democratic government. To them, a democratic state is a socialist state, in which there is no

exploitation, and there is the dictatorship of the proletariat. Giovanni Sartori says: 'Marx declared and thought himself a democrat. He used the name democracy and ended by stating clearly enough what he meant by it. In the Communist Manifesto of 1848 Marx had asserted that it was the task of the proletariat as a dominating class to arrive victoriously at democracy—a democracy referred to an "association" in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.'¹

In Soviet Russia, Lenin and later Stalin developed a unique form of democracy, which is known as democratic centralism. In communist China, Mao-Tse-Tung and others claim that they have succeeded in establishing "New Democracy".

DEMOCRACY IN UNDER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES :

Underdeveloped countries who have emerged after the end of the second World War saw two conflicting ideologies that were prevailing during that period. One ideology put emphasis on democracy while the other talked of communism. As almost all newly independent countries where

1. G.A. Almond: The appeals of Communism (New, Jersey: Princeton University Press) 1965, Page 36.

underdeveloped countries, and almost all of them had the same colonial experience, they tried to imitate from their colonial master the form of government which the colonial master practised. As almost all the colonial master having democratic government, the newly independent countries also tried to adopt democracy. But a successful democracy thrives on attitude, orientation, value, and belief of the people.² Besides, the people should have a genuine desire for liberty, and equality. The feeling that the government functions according to their wishes, and not as desired by a coterie of persons at the top will prepare a ground for democracy. As David Apter says "It is well to remember that democracy has worked fairly successfully only in those countries (some in western Europe, and some others in North America) where there has been a tradition of ethical liberalism, a strong middle class, widespread education, where civil liberties have been cherished and where sustained regards for political dissent exists".³ Since the Third World countries did not have this basic requirement, it rendered democracy susceptible there.

2. L.Pye and S.Verba: Political Culture and Political development (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,) 1969, P.32.

3. David E. Apter: The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago), 1967, P.22.

Another important factor which is absent in these countries, is the eternal vigilance of people. Only when people realise the value of democracy, they are prepared to protect it from internal and external dangers.⁴ If people are indifferent autocracy may rise or a foreign power may be an aggression and impose imperialism. Similarly, democracy can thrive in an atmosphere of peace. People should eschew violent methods, and settle their controversies peacefully. Democracy can be successful if people have sympathy for one another and try to understand one another, there should be free public consent and criticism, and existence of political parties who can articulate the demands of people. But most of the under developing countries are in the grip of ethnic violence, and there are few political parties who can articulate the demands of the people.

Besides, there are some institutional requirements which make democracy successful, like having a written constitution, a legislature that reflects the wishes of the people, and a fearless and independent judiciary, where people can get justice, in an impartial manner.⁵

As most of the underdeveloped countries, have neither a written constitution, nor a legislature representing the

4. Ibid, P.26.

5. Ibid, P.28.

need and aspiration of all sections of population nor a well established impartial Judiciary, democracy is weak, and, the whole political system is under threat.⁶

A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA :

Central Asia, became part of Russia in eighteenth century. Russia's expansion into the steppe region may be said to have begun in 1730 with the acceptance of Russian control by Abdulkhair, the Khan of the Lesser Horde. But real Russian advance towards the Central Asian Khanates began chiefly in the first half of the nineteenth century.⁷ A scientific expedition was sent in 1824 to conduct a barometric study of the Caspian and Aral sea areas, with the support of half a battalion of Cossack infantry and six canons. In 1834, a military base was established at Fort Novo -Alexandravsk on the north-eastern coast of the caspian with the object of improving trade with khiva.

The defeat of Tsarist Russia in the Crimean War resulted in transfer of Russian interest from the Balkans and the near East to the far East and Central Asia. The

6. Ibid.

7. Devendra Kaushik, Central Asia in Modern times, A History From Early 19th Centry (Moscow: 1970), P.40.

main objective of Russia was to strengthen its economic interests.

In June 1865, Chernayev, captured Tashkent, which according to Khalfin, "fully corresponded with the ideas both of the government and the military-feudal aristocracy of the Russian empire, and of commercial and industrial circles."⁸ At first, the ministry of foreign affairs, denied the intention of incorporating Tashkent into the Russian Empire. It wanted Tashkent to act as a buffer state between the Russian Empire and Bukhara. For some time the civil government of Tashkent remained in the hand of Chernayev, with the religious and judicial administration vested in the 'Kazi Kalam', or supreme judge of canon law, subject to confirmation by Chernayev. Ultimately in August 1866, Tashkent was declared a part of Russia.

In the spring of 1866 military operation was started against the Bukhara Emirates, and by May 1866 Khodzhent, Dzhizak, and other towns and districts were taken, which opened up the direct road to Samarkand, and Bukhara.⁹ In 1867 the newly acquired territory was formed into the Govern Generalship of Turkestan, with General K.P. Kaufman at its

8. W.P. and Zelda K.Coates, Soviets in Central Asia, (London: 1951) P. 44.

9. Ibid, PP.44-46

helm. In March 1868 the Emir of Bukhara declared a holy war against the Russian troops and disturbances occurred in Tashkent and other conquered towns. Kaufman acted swiftly, and in April 1868 moved to Samarkand, defeated the troops of the Emir of Bukhara and entered the town on May 2.

Five year later came the turn of Khiva. In the Spring of 1873 it was overrun by Russians and forced to accept terms dictated by Russia. In August 1873 a peace treaty was signed between General Kaufman and Syed Mohammad Rahim Khan, the ruler of Khiva. This treaty forced the Khan to acknowledge that he was "the humble servant of the emperor of all the Russian" and to renounce "all friendly relations existing with neighbouring rulers and Khans".¹⁰ The whole of Amu-Darya and the surrounding lands belonging to Khiva were transferred to Russia. Which also obtained free navigation on Amu-Darya. On the whole this treaty assured Russia an economic hold over these three Khanates.

By the end of 1881, Russians conquered Turkoman territory. Thus the Russian conquest in Central Asia rounded off by 1885.

10. D. Kaushik, Central Asia in Modern times - A History From The Early 19th Century, (Moscow: 1970), P.46.

The Soviet Nationality Question :

With few exceptions, there had been no uniformity in the Russian policies towards her newly acquired colonies. The Tsarist nationality policy towards the majority of non-Russians continued mainly in the suppression of their language and cultures with a view to forcing Russification. However after October revolution, the Soviet Russia under the leadership of Lenin, ~~tried~~ to provide some short of genuine autonomy, to all the nationalities to protect their national culture, religion, language, which was ~~the~~ Soviet nationality policy after 1917. ^{This} ~~policy~~ was subsequently confirmed by a series of Decree on peace such as the Declaration of the Rights of the People's of Russia, the Declaration of the Rights' of the Working and Exploited people; the Appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to the Toiling Muslims of Russia and the East etc. The central problem in Soviet nationality Policy has been to maintain a delicate balance between two conflicting interests: to assure the continued dominance of the Russian majority and at the same time to reduce the alienation of non-Russian nationalities; and to guarantee that they will be equally respected as members of a Soviet multinational

community. In practice, soviet policy fluctuated between these impulses.¹¹

The 1924 National Delimitation and Birth of Uzbekistan:

The national territorial delimitation of Central Asia which brought into existence several national republics in place of former multinational political entities of Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorem. The necessity of undertaking such an extensive territorial reorganization of Central Asian areas from the desire to remedy the complex nationality tangle which considerably hindered the development of a socialist order within the region. This led to the establishment of "The peoples commissariat for Nationality Affairs," which was established in 1918. In February 1924, the question of national delimitation was discussed in a conference of party activist of Bukhara. The conference fully supported the ideal of national self-determination.

On May, 10, 1924, the recommendation of national commission were scrutinised and on October 27, 1924 the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. adopted a resolution recognizing the national delimitation of the

11. Gali W.Lapidus "The Soviet Nationality Question" in Alexander Dallina dn.c. Rice ed. The Gorbachev Era, (California : Stanford, 1987) P.77.

Soviet republics of Central Asia and the formation of Uzbekistan. Another important development which took place in political sphere in Uzbekistan was the joining of Jadid group with Communist party of Uzbekistan. Jadid group had fought along with the Bolshevik party against the Tsartst regime. After the October Revolution, Uzbekistan got a special republic status, and Jadid groups dominated the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. During the period of Lenin, there was no power struggle within the communist party of Uzbekistan. But Stalin after coming to power put his favorites in the power structure of Uzbekistan.¹² This led to power conflict among the major leaders of Uzbekistan. Three most prominent leaders who emerged in the power struggle were Usman Yusupov, Abduzabar Abdurakhmanov, and Amin Niyazov. Following Stalin's death in march 1953, there was tussle for power at the highest level of the C.P.S.U. involving Nikita Khrushchev, Vice-Premier Vyacheslav Molotov, and the head of the K.G.B., Lavrenti Beria. However, in this fight for power, Khrushchev emerged as the unbeatable front runners and began to intititate his de-

12. Donalds, Carlisle: "The Uzbek power elite, Politburo and secretariate [1938-83]", Central Asian Survey, Vol.5 No.314, 1986, page - 105.

stalinization process. This power struggle affected all the republics, including Uzbekistan. As a result, Usman yusupov, the chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, a die-hard Stalinist lost his Job. It went to Nuritdin Mukhitinov. Similarly.

Following the promotion of Mukhitinov to a central party job at the C.P.S.U. secretariat in Moscow in December 1957, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sabir Kamalov became the first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (C.P.U.Z) in January 1959.¹³ He was replaced by Sharaf Rashidov, a journalist. Under Rashidov de-Stalinization process continued Uuzbekistan.

Khrushchev's fall from power in October 1964 slowed but not stopped the destalinisation process- tried to consolidate his own position in republic affairs and appointed his nominees to higher posts so that no one would disturb his position, However, after continuous rule for over 20 years, Rashidov faced serious allegation of corruption. After his death Inamjan Usman Khozayev, who succeeded Rashidov as the C.P.U.Z's First secretary pursued anti-corruption drive vigorously while replacing Rashidov's

13. Ibid. P- 111.

appointees mostly from his native Jizak region.¹⁴ After sometimes, wide spread allegation of corruption was made against Usman Khozayev. Similarly in C.P.S.U. committees, the Uzbeks were not able to get adequate nomination.

All these factors indicate that since Tsarist period Uzbekistan was merely used as a supplier of raw material without any adequate basis of political participation. Similarly, the republican leaders were merely chosen from Moscow giving little opportunity to the people of Uzbekistan. A traditional society and subsequent development since the 19th century prevented Uzbekistan from building democracy because of its incorporation into the Tsarist Empire, and later on to the Soviet Union and the existence of various competing centres of power. Moreover, a country where people's loyalty is more towards their ethnic origin and the people's attitude and value is yet to develop towards the modern political system usually flounders in its quest for a democratic political system. However, after coming^{to} power Gorbachev introduced some reform in Soviet system through policy of Glasnost and Peristorika which put tremendous impact on Uzbekistan and this led to

14. Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammed, The Changing Face of Central Asia, (Harper Collins publishers, London,) 1994, P.162.

rise of democratic movement in Uzbekistan. But in the post independent phase, the process of Democratization, ^{is} yet to ~~get~~ completed. Uzbekistan's quest for democratisation is further complicated, due to emergence of various ethnic, religious, groups and the authoriterian rule of Islam Karomov, all ^{there} ~~make~~ the democratization more complicated.

CHAPTER II

GLASNOST AND GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN UZBEKISTAN

The selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 showed a new trend in the Soviet politics. Soon after assuming office, Mikhail Gorbachev adopted a new policy, which was completely different from the policy followed during the last 70 years in Soviet Union under communist rule. Under his leadership, the 27th Party Congress in 1986 adopted and initiated new policies to suit the new environment.

Reason for adoption of Glasnost and Perestroika In Soviet Union

It is necessary to analyse the factors that led to the adoption and initiation of new policies under the leadership of President Gorbachev.

The first reason was economic stagnation which was the root cause of 'reform'. The Soviet Economy continuously lost its ability to compete economically with the West. By then Soviet Union's economy was in dire strait. Gorbachev while, disclosing the real economic situation, had made it clear that no matter who headed the Soviet regime, there should be no going back to a centralized economic system and

said that Perestroika is the only means to restructure the stagant Soviet economy" and he added that the glasnost and perestroik were the only means for its survival.¹

The economic performance of the Soviet system slowed down, particularly at the end of 1970s. In accordance with Soviet figures, the average annual growth rate of national income during the decade (1961-70) was 7.1 per cent and it declined to 4.9 per cent during 1971-80 and to 4.5 percent during 1981-86.² Similarly according to Western estimates, the G.N.P. Growth Rate was just 3.4 per cent during 1961-85. The industrial production of Soviet Union also declined to a considerable extent.

The moral corruption in USSR had reached its zenith during Brezhnev era; and highly placed bureaucrats became involved in common crimes, along with bureaucratic corruption. The third reason for reform, we can say, was the decline of Soviet model of Socialism among third world countries. The thrid world countries increasingly realized the futility of Soviet socialism and looked more and more towards western countries led by U.S.A.

1. Andres Asulund, "Gorbachev, Perestroika and Economic Crisis", Washington D.C, Problem of Communism, January-April 1991, PP.18-41.

2. Ibid.

Another factor that was responsible for the adoption of this policy was the notion that "In the modern technological age, the scientific and technological intelligentsia, and not the working class should manage the state."³ The Soviet leader aimed to create a union between scientific and technological intelligentsia together with their cultural milieu and party leadership on the other. This is the notion of party technocracy which was to supersede the old purely party bureaucracies. By this way, the Soviet leader tried to bring progress in Soviet Union.

Finally, the Soviet Union which is composed of numerous nationalities, race, religions, and languages was observing different customs and traditions. The 70 years of the centralised Communist regime could not bridge the gulf among various Soviet nationalities. All these factors compelled Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev to look into these issues and he revitalized the country by the policy of Perestroika and Glasnost.

Given the meanings of Glasnost and Perestroika, the latter refers to restructuring of economic system. On the otherhand, Glasnost refers to, as given in the Soviet Political dictionary, "one of the most important democratic

3. Ibid.

principles, guaranteeing the openness of the works of the organs of the government and access it to the society that can inform itself about the activities of the organs. Glassnost, is the most developed form, in the control by the masses of the population over the organs of the government, especially the local ones and it is the struggle against bureaucratisation. The most important channel of glassnost is the means of mass information, oral propaganda and visual aid such as display of informations, about certains states and military secretes, industrial production, crime investigation etc. Glasnost can also be termed as democratization of society, the attempt being to combine mode of government with a certain degree of cultural freedom, which is accountable to transparency."⁴ The imperative of glassnost lies in the fact that it is also a means to restructuring the economic system.

Impact of Glasnost on Soviet society. Since with the advent, of free press and end of press censorship, people were able to get true information which were being denied to them before Glasnost. Due to Glasnost most of the news, articles, journals, at became available for publication. In the academic world also, there was a lot of impact of

4. Walter Laqueur, "Glasnost and its limit Commentary". P.13. July 1988.

glasnost. In the past, the picture of nationality relations in the Soviet periodicals, press and other magazines depicted the friendship among various nationalities. But after Glasnost, the real picture came into open. This was manifest in a series of violent clashes between various nationalities, in Central Asia, and other parts of the union. People got freedom to express their views on national culture and cross national relations. A good example of this was the Baltic republics namely, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia such, under the growing impact of Glasnost and Perestroika, declared their independence. Similar trends were seen in other parts of the country.

Central Asia, being the part of socio-political economic system of Soviet Union since Tsarist period paired could not escape from the impact of Glasnost and Perestroika. The impact of Glasnost and Perestroika led to growing consciousness among the people of Central Asia about their language, culture and religion who were under Russian control since Tsarist period. During the Tsarist period, the policy of Tsarists towards muslim religion was complete liquidation of the governing class, the campaign against Muslim religion, and the policy of Russification. The native governing class was considered as the most dangerous

enemy. Hence, it was physically destroyed and deprived of its feudal rights. The policy towards Islam since Tsarist period was hostile. Restrictions were imposed on property meant for religious and educational purposes. A number of Russian schools whose primary objective was to convert and educate Muslim children, were started by Russian missionaries. However, after 1917 the communists led by Lenin adopted a number of constitutional and political measures to enable the Muslims to participate in the Communist Party and the Soviet government. Thus the first phase starting from 1917 to 1958 was a period during which the Soviet pursued a relatively liberal policy towards religion. The second phase starting from 1959 to 1964 again saw the re-emergence of anti-religions propaganda, campaigns, directed towards complete liquidation of the remnants of religion, it's history and culture. The third phase began in 1965 and since then, the Soviet have largely desisted from pursuing open-anti-religious, policies, despite the continuous efforts that were made to suppress the religious and culture identity of central Asians. Thus the growing manifestation of the nationality question in Central Asia republics was largely the product of Gorbachev's policies of Perestroika and Glasnost. In fact, some of the nationalistic outbreak like, Alma-Ata riot and

DISS

320.9587

M7256 Pr



TH6591

Nogorno Karobakh, are good examples of the impact of glasnost.⁵

Its impact on Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan, being a part of Soviet Union and having a common historical and cultural legacies like other Central Asian Republics could not escape from the policy of Glasnost and Perestroika, which provided an opportunity to people to raise their popular urges in an atmosphere of freedom where they could be able to put forth their grievances without any hindrances.

The major impact of Glasnost in Uzbekistan was in the field of Uzbek culture, rehabilitation of Soviet Uzbek writers, importance to native language which provided a means to growth of Uzbek nationalism.

Uzbekistan, being an ancient country was having its own culture but like other Central Asian Republics. It was also a part of Tsarist empire as well as of Soviet Union that became detrimental to Uzbek cultures. Although, since the period of Khrushchev some efforts were made to revive the ancient cultures and glory of Uzbekistan, it was not sufficient. Officials of Uzbekistan have begun to celebrate the traditional Islamic practices and many Uzbek words of

5. Ibid.

Arabic and Persian origin have begun to reappear. However, this development being a part of the overall developments that were taking place in other parts of U.S.S.R., some people from Uzbek literary community were unsatisfied with the development but could not be able to express their problems due to tight control and lack of freedom of speech. After coming of glasnost, these problems were highlighted more directly. Similarly many of the Soviet historians interpreted Islam as a largely reactionary forces but after glasnost, many of the Uzbek writers demanded more balanced assessment of Islam and Islamic culture.⁶

Another impact of Glasnost on Uzbek culture was related to script. More and more people demanded that Arabic should be their alphabet but not cyrillic which they had to adopt after 1920. It would be noted that despite a number of differences between Uzbek history, and history of other republic of central Asia, the cultural concern of Uzbek writers, discussed above, are similar to those realized by the other central Asian Republics and Baltic states.

Rehabilitation of Uzbek writer: Another important impact of glasnost of Uzbekistan was rehabilitation of

6. William Fireman, "Glasnost : the Uzbek experience", Central Asian Survey, Vol.3., No.2., 1989, P.8.

writers. The rehabilitation of dissident writers and the re-evaluation of past literary heritage in Uzbekistan is parallel to the trend elsewhere in the USSR. Ukrainian writers sought complete rehabilitation of a number of fellow countrymen similarly the writers in Russia, Baltic Republics and other Central Asian republic also demanded their rehabilitation. Most of the Uzbek writers lay their blames on "Moscow", the Russians and partly at the centralized political system for their condition. Although some important steps were taken in the past during the period of Brezhnev, but those not sufficient.

Native language: Another important area where the policy of glasnost put a profound impact was local language. Uzbek writer union president Adil Yagubov put that until recently it was difficult to talk about native language which around hostility and was called national egoism.⁷ Taking advantage of the situation Uzbek writers complained that the low status of their language prevented their people from enjoying the same opportunity, which was available to the people of other Soviet nationalities. Among the major complaints one was that their language was treated as third grade.

7. Ibid.

As glasnost and perestroika. Opened up new opportunities for the people of Soviet Union like multi-candidates election and modified political structure, it also provided opportunity for the growth different social-cultural, political, organisations.

In part because of Gorbachev's innovations, for the first time since the 1920-, the C.P.S.U. had to contend with at least locally powerful rival political organisations. In some cases like Baltic republics and Georgia opposing nationalist political organisations came to power despite republican communist parties adopting locally popular causes. Uzbekistan also Under the growing socio-cultural consciousness, one such movement that emerged in Uzbekistan was Birlik. Birlik was founded in November 1988, by a handful of intellectuals primarily writers. Birlik's stand for name the preservation of Uzbekistan's natural, material, and spiritual riches. The movement was mainly inspired by the national Sajudi of Lithuania. Birlik grew rapidly, within a short period of time with its policy on democracy, nationalism, and economic liberalization. The new organisations draft programme contained many policies which contradicted the policies of the republic's Communist party, led by by first secretary Rafiq. Nishanov, including its call for Uzbekistan to become sovereign.

According to one of its founder the unity mentioned in its name refers to unity of all people Uzbekistan and growth of popular urges through nationalist movement.

Glasnost which put profound impact on uzbebekistan's language, culture, and writers, gave an impetues to the growth of this movement. Many of the uzbek writer who are members of Birlik movement, freely articulate their demanding through Birlik platform. The group has also close link with the literary circle of uzbekistan, Brilik has acquired especially close ties among other member of the intelligentsia, and youth mainly among students. It was devoted primarily to the question at declaring uzbek as the official language of and reportedly attracted 12,000 people.⁸ A part from raising the language question, another question that was raised by Birlik was recognition for Birlik and called for serious attention to problems such as environmental protection.

In the early days of Birlik's existence its founders such as Ahmad Azam, Zahir, Allam and Muhammed Salih recognised a need to broaden the organisational base among the masses so that it can claim legitimacy. Therefore they invited a popular physicians Polatov to Join the party. This

8. Ibid, P.16.

helped the organisation to grow quickly in Uzbekistan within a short period of time and providing a forum for articulating the grievances of the people who are adversely affected by communist rule.

When Gorbachev's policy of glasnost was practiced in the Uzbekistan, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (CPUZ) changed its programme and policies, to suit new conditions in Uzbekistan. Considerable attention was given to many of the issues advocated by the Birlik leader. Among the areas in which the leadership has shown greater attention is national culture and language. There were clear differences between CPSU and CPUZ leadership in 1986 on many issues.

Since its foundation, Birlik had called for study of the cultural heritage of the Uzbeks and other people of the republics. It also called for the replacement of recent place names with their historical equivalents, publicizing the activities and programmes of several organizations which were banned in the 1930s and the introduction of Arabic script into Uzbek school curriculum.⁹ However, the demand concerning language issues has been a persistent feature. Birlik's draft programme specifically called for an end to policies which discriminate against Uzbek language.

9. Ibid, P.16.

Although the focus of Birliks draft programme was clearly Uzbekistan and not the broader Turkestan. Many of the leaders favoured much stronger links with other republics of central Asia and they have started cultural and linguistic links with other Turkish peoples. Another complex issue on Birlik agenda is concerned with the economy, especially the cotton economy, and agricultural organisation. The draft programme called for a sharp reduction in Uzbekistan's cotton - quota, and long term leases on land. Birlik leader had also demanded that Uzbekistan should be entitled to some of the profits which was added to the price of such natural products as oil, natural gas and precious minerals when they are refined or processed outside the republics.

Birlik also called for health problems causes by the damage to the environment, from the beginning Birlik's concern about ecology was closely linked to those of health care and social welfare. Other important demand of Birlik related to personal freedoms. The draft programme called for gurantees of privacy of correspondence and telephone, as well as guarantee of religious and political belief. Birliks demanded especially for an end to the practice of

bringing outsiders for local jobs which created unemployment problem in Uzbekistan.¹⁰

It should be noted that the demand raised by the Birlik was not of its own, but it was merely articulating people's grievances in an atmosphere of freedom and liberty, which was possible due to the free environment created in Uzbekistan by the policy of glasnost.

However, from the very beginning conflict among the Birlik members developed. The radicals led by Abdurahim Polatov favoured more direct confrontation with the Uzbek authority, in particular at unsanctioned meetings. In contrast to Polatov's practices, the moderates shied away from the Uzbek Writer's Union and also brought into question the benefit of training many people through Russian medium. Similarly they claimed that language discrimination is also practiced in work places. Another question they raised is the need to translate texts into Uzbek language.¹¹

Another major demand of Uzbek writers is that too much foreign language was used in their dialects, and they also felt that poor translation of text books that violates the rules of Uzbek language ^{is} also responsible for destruction

10. William Fierman : "The Communist Party, "Erk" and the Changing Uzbek Political Environment". Central Asian Survey, Vol.10. 1991, P.57.

11. Ibid, P.67.

of native language. This trend is not confined to Uzbekistan alone, even Turkmenistan and Kirgijstan writer's under the growing impact of glanost demanded that their native language to be restored to its original language and asked for their own language to be started in schools instead of Russian language.

With so much change in every sphere, like social, cultural, language, religions, the political sphere did not escape from the impact of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost and Perestroika. In fact the growth of popular urges in Uzbekistan can be attributed to the glasnost and policy of perestorika initiated by Gorbachev.

As most of the leaders of Central Asia were corrupt so the first step Gorbachev took towards Central Asian leadership was that to remove the high public officials who were involved in corrupt practices. However, it should be noted that the policy started from the Andropov era although it was a union wide initiative. One of the first region on which it was focussed was the Uzbek Republic. It was precipitated by embezzlement on a vast scale in Uzbekistan. As Pravada observed "The cotton affairs in Uzbekinton exploded loudly and unexpectedly like a thunder from a blue

sky."¹² The first sign of changes in the administration which had grown independent and corrupt under the years of Brezhnev rule came with the transfer of second secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (CPUZ) in May 1983.¹³ In the next two month, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Republic KGB was removed with the assumption of power by Usman Khodzhaev. The drive against corruption gained further momentum. Which swept through the educational, financial, and agricultural bureaucracies and specially hard hit was the cotton growing industries.

However it should be noted that the, wide spread corruption was not confined to Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan and other republics of Central Asia were also affected by the corrupt practices. Similar type of corruption was wide spread in Tajikistan. However, after coming into power, Gorbachev effected administrative changes. His policy affected almost all republics of Central Asia, and Uzbekistan did not escape from this phenomenon. Due to freedom of press and other freedoms grated by the policy of glosnost the people got conscious about their rights and

12. Gregory Gleason: "Independent Muslim Republics in Central Asia", legacy of the part, shape of the future", Journal Institute of Muslim Minority affairs, Vol.12 No:4, July 1991, page-257.

13. Ibid.

complained about the growing corruption. The first political change Gorbachev made after coming to power was removal of Sharif Rashidov by late 1986, who as Uzbek Party Secretary, had managed to win a longer tenure than any other republican secretary the was being publicly ridiculed and denounced for his link with corruption. He was charged with bribery, the result of a full scale investigation into corrupt practices published in 1987, showed that during his twenty four year tenure as party boss, Rashidov was instrumental in looting public treasuries, of the equivalent of 2 billion US dollar by getting payment for inflated, cotton, production figures. More than 2,600 officials in Moscow and in Uzbekistan were arrested for their participation in the long-running fraud.¹⁴

However, soon after Usman Khojayev who replaced Rashidov found himself arrested on corruption charges and found guilty in several cases relating to corruption. He was replaced, by Rafiq Nishanov as first secretary in January 1988. The relentless, publicity in the media about the misdeeds of erstwhile respected figures, and conviction of many party and government official on corruption charges, resulted not only in long term prison sentence but also in

14. Dilip Hiro, Between marx and muhammed, The Changing face of central Asia, (London; Harper Collins Publishers, 1994,) page-161.

execution which a devastating impact on the C.P.U.Z. It created an environment conducive to the rise of opposition groups, nationalists, and Islamic, both formally and informally. However, Nishanov could not last long due to bloody violence in Fargana valley and in the wake of continued economic and other scandals, Gorbachev replaced Nishanov with Islam Karimov.¹⁵

Another important aspect of Gorbachev's policy towards leaders of republics especially Uzbekistan was the increase use of KGB activities to monitor their performance. This gained added importance as Uzbekistan shared border with Afghanistan, and tension in the Persian Gulf and the Iran-Iraq conflict have also contributed to this. The chief aim of KGB was to monitor the performance of their leaders in an era of restructuring and broadening democracy in Uzbekistan. The main task of KGB was to check the corruption and monitor all the border regions.¹⁶

An important policy towards leadership of Central Asia particularly Uzbekistan initiated by Gorbachev, was to ideologically control these regims and reconcile the principles of Islam with the principles of Communism.

15. Ibid, P.69.

16. Ibid, P.72.

Despite, religious freedom granted to the, people under the policy of glasnost, Gorbachov was to minimize the influence of Islam over the leadership of Central Asia. The Communist party of Uzbekistan (CPUZ), with the growing Consciousness of people, writers and intellectual, taking the advantage at new policy at liberalisation, freedom, under glasnost adopted a flexible attitude. towards the Birlik movement. Even before the founding of Birlik there was a great dissatisfaction among many of the Uzbek literary community towards the C.P.U.Z and its first secretary Rafiq Nishanov. However Nishanov did not think that this movement will create potential trouble in future. This provided opportunity to these groups to consolidate and virtually spread into all parts of the Uzbeklation. However in the wake of first public demonstration in spring 1989¹⁷ the Republic leadership adopted more differentiated policy which sought to convince the republic, and informal organisations to limit their use of public meeting. The party leaders of C.P.U.Z. after seeing the growing movement tried to adopt a more rigid attitude toward this movement which incensed the people and prompted them participate in mass demonstration against. party authorities. However due to the Fargana

17. Ibid. Page -162.

valley violence, and replacement of Nishanov with Islam Karimov as secretary General of C.P.U.Z., the party adopted more and more Lenient policy, even co-operation, with the Birlik and their leaders. In general the CPUZ seemed to have demonstrated great flexibility, on those issues, which have not required large financial investment. Moreover, greater freedom for religious worship and cultural expression in Central Asia was relatively easy to reconcile with parallel development in Russia and other areas of Soviet union. With regard to language, there was tremendous progress following Nishanov's removal. Birlik leaders believed that Nishanov was attempting to limit or even reverse the rehabilitation of such early 20th, century writers, but with assuming of office by Karimov as First secretary, the trend changed and he made certain efforts to renebilate the writers. Similarly, with regard to environmental issue, Karimov, shared many of the concern raised by the Birlik's leaders, with regard to cotton and other explosive issue, Karimov spoke much more favourably for Uzbekistan. Karimov's leadership also made some progress on social issues which was rooted in Moscow's treatment of Uzbekiuan as a raw material supplier. Karimov also took some favourable step with regards to migration.

Earlier the Uzbek workers used to work outside Uzbekistan, but Karimov banned it.

ATTITUDE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF UZBEKISTAN TOWARDS "ERK" AND BIRLIK MOVEMENTS:

What are the factors that encouraged more conciliatory stance from the CPUZ towards growing public demand for various issues which was raised by Birilk and Erk? Among the factors, most important was the Gorbachov's policy of glasnost and perestroika which admittedly, manifested themselves in Uzbekiston in a much paler fashion than in the Baltics, Transcaucasia, and other Republic of U.S.S.R. So this change produced profound impact, and the leadership also took a lenient attitude towards the movements which was not possible ten years ago and began to grow now.

Another factor that facilitated this compromise attitude was, when Karimov was selected as first secretary, the communist govt. was already discredited among the masses due to the hard measures adopted by Nishanov. So communist party at that time wanted to achieve legitimacy among the masses, by adopting some populist measures, which would satisfy the need and aspirations of people. Similarly C.P.U.Z. led by Karimov felt that failure to achieve legitimacy, and failure to achieve result on the issues which Birlik had raised would probably lead to an explosive

situation, and this will give rise to extremist movements. Moreover, it should be noted that many CPUZ members, some in prominent positions also shared the same concerns in cultural, social, economic institutions also supported the policy of change.

The development described above, provided hope for the CPUZ leadership that by adopting a genuine popular policy would provide a relatively peaceful political solution in Uzbekiston as the republic enter into 1990s.

GLASNOST AND THE GROWTH OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS:

Another important development that took place in Uzbekistan after the implementation of glasnost, was growth of religious consciousness among the people there. Containing two third of 230 functioning mosques in central Asia¹⁸. Uzbekiston was the single most important Soviet republics in terms of Islam. However, during Tsarist rule and after that Communist rule in Soviet Union, the Soviet authority continuously discouraged the practice of religion. However, after the policy of glasnost, there was slow but steady rise of Islamic influence, many Islamic practices and rituals, which were not practised since the days of

18. Ibid, Page -161.

Tsar. In the past, religious sentiment was strong only among older, people in rural areas, but under the new circumstances, the general level of education of the new believer was high and some of them were sophisticated thinkers. Besides, the young in general, a particular social group that has come under the rising Islamic influence is the old trading class of the traditional bazar. Having been dormant for many decades in the after math of Bolshevic revolution, several marchent classes showed a sign of revivals as the state opened up opportunity in the co-operative sector. Given the link between bazar and mosques, it was not long before religious charities, supported by traders sprang up following the passing of all union law that permitted social and cultural organisations, including those engaged in repairing and constructing place of worship. Despite the policy of glasnost, Soviet leadership under Gorbachov wanted to tighten its grip over local communist party unit with regards to religious matter. In the first six-months of 1987, C.P.U.Z. leaders expelled fifty three members from the party for organizing and participating in religious rituals often concerned with birth, marriages, funeral. The authorities also begun responding to the Islamic revival by spreading the message of atthesis, Hal Muhammed, the secretary to the C.P.U.Z's,

central committee, pointed out that the observance of Islamic rituals and tradition had risen among young, citizen and even among party members. The challenges he observed, was how to bring about the emancipation of their consciousness from the narcotic of religion forced upon the people by the clergy under the cover of national tradition.¹⁹ It should be noted that despite, best effort the official policy of atheism, could not able to counter the spread of religion. Even it was found that some important office holder of Communist Party of Uzbekistan, also helped in rising of Islam. However, to re build a popular base for the C.P.U.Z, and its leader, Karimov after becoming, party secretary forged a close link with Islam. There were signs of rapproachment between the state and the mosques. The media campaign initiated in Central Asia in early 1989 to repair some of the damages done by the biased presentation of Islam in the past gathered momentum as the year progressed. The Communist Party of Uzbekitan's manifesto, for the Uzbek Supreme Soviet election scheduled for March 1990 summed up the governing party's stand on religion thus" the republican party organization is actively in favour of freedom of religion and the legal

19. Ibid, P.173.

rights of believers, and for co-operation with religious organisations... Believers are entitled to all opportunities for participation in the public, political, and cultural life of the Republic.²⁰

GLASNOST AND ITS IMPACT ON UZBEK POLITICS:

Glasnost which produced so much impact on the socio, cultural process also put profound impact upon the political process, glasnost itself being not a process of democratization but means to democratizaties to the entire political system. With bureaucrats from Moscow no longer serving as scapegoalts the Uzbek leaders found themselves as the focus of anger. Further Gorbachov's political reform encouraged the hopes among formely excluded political groups that they might not only partipate in politics but they might even take power themselves.

At last the development described above provided hope that the CPUZ leadership in adopting genuines popular policies might permit a relatively peaceful political evolution in Uzbekiston as the republic entered the 1990s However. It should be noted that the problem's like, economic, social, ecological which had accumulated over the years, in combination with the rising expectation and a

20. Ibid. page 164.

breakdown of discipline provided the primary basis for pessimism in Uzbekistan.

However, Islam Karimov, the first secretary of Uzbekistan, has consolidated his hold on the republic, while else where in Soviet union, both government and party structure one facing serious problem. The month of February -April 1990 was designated for parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan. The Communist administration ordered that a list of candidates for oblasts be submitted well beforehand. After the lists of candidates were scrutinised by the central committee, than the list was turned to K-G-B, administration and examined once again. After this the list was scrutinized at the Central Committee Bureau.²¹

The name of the candidates were divided into three categories. A red category candidate meant that he will be a candidate under any circumstances. I blue category candidate on an opposition basis could be permissible. The possibility of black category could be permitted on the basis of his age, nationality and profession. The red category candidates were backed by the members of Central Committee. Blue category candidates, on the list made them

21. F.B.I.S. 11 May 1994, Central Eurasia, U.S.A., Page.41.

responsible to oblast's leadership. Black categories of candidates were responsible to the rayon leaders. Appearance in the press, propaganda and publicity, for meetings were permitted on the basis of

Because of lack of experiencing in voting people showed no interest in election, as a result of which nearly 30 % . People did not vote at all in the election, and most of the representative who got elected were leading, communist members. Infact, they got elected without any competition and opposition. At the third session of Uzbekistan's "New Parliament," Karimov transformed his council of ministers into a presidential cabinet. Unexpectedly, Karimov even included some members of Birlik in the state council in his presidential cabinet. This was done to check the growing opposition that was growing against president Karimov's authority.²²

Thus, glasnost, provided opportunities to democratise the society. However the greatest obstacles to glosnast and democracy in Uzbekistan, as one leading Birlik leader pointed out was that of local psychology. As he said "we still are not used to dissenting opinion. People feel obliged to support the man in power. We have to educate

22. Ibid.

the people, so that they demand their rights, we have to publish the Helsinki document which take all angles of human rights, and we have to educate our president in the spirit of democracy of developed countries."²³

23. F.B.I.S., 11 May 1994 Central Eurasia, U.S.A.,
Page.43.

CHAPTER III

KARIMOV'S APPROCH TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-SOVIET PHASE

The collapse of Soviet empire is one of the most important events of the century which can be compared only to the collapse of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires during the First World War and has put significant economic and political impact across the world. Ideologically the Soviet Union with its Marxist ideology had offered many third world countries an alternative path to development. Politically it supported third world liberation movements against colonialism, imperialism neo-colonialism, To sum up briefly the Soviet Union acted as a counter to the USA and its capitalist ideology. The immediate impact of the collapse of the Soviet union was the emergence of independent nation states in eastern Europe as well as in Central Asia, creating a geo political confusion which changed the map of Asia and Europe.

The new character of the international politics in Asia after the demise of Soviet Union, described by some as "Back to Future" of the Nineteenth century politics, is rendered

particularly complex by the presence of many new players on the scene.¹ The emergence of newly independent and sovereign Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgystan has drastically changed the balance of power of the region.

These countries had never before existed as independent modern nation states. The long subordination of these States-first under the Tsarist and later under Soviet Russia denied the scope of genuine autonomy. The demise of Soviet Union and sudden independence in 1991 created psychological, social, political and economic problems for the Central Asia states and left the region with uncertainty.

It should be noted that all the newly independent countries of the Twentieth century, have faced same problems as the Central Asian countries are facing now. Infact no major empire has dissolved in the century without their successor states undergoing civil war or, regional conflicts. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by the Balkan wars and the conflict among

1. Graham - E Fuller; The "New-Geo Political Order", Ali Banuazizi Myron Weiner (ed) London, New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its borderland, I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1994), page. 20.

successive Arab states. The withdrawal of the British from India, led to deep conflict and emergence of two states - India and Pakistan. Another area of problem in those states is they are often weak. Under colonial rule, the major institutions - the civil administration, the police, the military and the financial institutions were dominated by imperial powers. The successor states often lacked the experienced manpower to manage these institutions. In some instances, the institutions themselves have become discredited and their legitimacy eroded by their nationalist opponents; in still other instances, these institutions are dominated by the same individuals who controlled them during the imperial era. The emerging elite in these countries also use these institutions for their personal gain, the result is loss of people's confidence in them. Another feature of successor states is that violent conflict within and quarrel among them readily become institutionalised. Minorities within states often turn to the neighbouring countries for support with whom they are having ethnic bond. This leads to ethnic conflicts which make the situation more fragile. The five Central Asian

Republics, more or less can fit into the above model and infact all of them are in a process of transition and facing the above problems.

The main problem of the Central Asia republics is the substantial presence of Russian Minorities.

Russian Minorities

The ethnic composition of Central Asian Republics was transformed by settlement from Russia and other Slavic republics of former Soviet Union, as well as movement of people and settlements across their own boundaries. Today among 55 million inhabitants, there are estimated to be 10 million Russians, many of whom play an important part in state apparatus. The proportion of the Russians in these republics range from 6 to 9% in Azerbaijan. Tajikistan,, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to 22% in Kyrgyzstan and 38% in Kazakhstan.² The large socio-economic disparities between the Russian and local population, difference in their cultural values and modes of behaviour led to a volatile situation in all Central Asian Republics, and which inturn,

2. Ibid, page 24.

leads to the growth of aggressive nationalism in all Central Asian Republics.

NEW CHALLENGES :

The most urgent internal problem confronting the new states is to survive the sudden shock of total independence and to establish fundamentals of a new nation state. Almost all the Central Asian republics, apart from its titular nationalities, contain literally dozens of other nationalities including Russian. In the communist phase, the independent character of each Central Asian Republic had little practical meaning since all key policies were determined by Moscow. But today the process of nationalistic assertion is well under way in each Republic as it seeks fulfil aspirations which are largely formulated by a small group of elite, as it usually the case of the development of the Third-World nationalism. In the post Soviet phase, each regime and movement that are encountering pressures from growing nationalist fronts and movements which were formerly under ground have now come to the bront. Their main grievance was that during the

soviet period the local culture and language were denied opportunities for flourishing in a true manner.

Economic Pressure:

The most immediate problem the Central Asia Republics are facing after the disintegration of Soviet Union is economic. The central planing from Moscow had created gigantic production units which supplied products to all part of Soviet Union. But each production unit specialised in the production of one commodity only. For example, large size boilers were manufactured in Russia while smaller boilers were produced in Ukraine.³ in agriculture also, different geographical entities spcialised in different products and they catered to the need of other regions.⁴

As Lenin once said "we can't do without petroleum of Azerbaijan or the cotton of Turkmenistan, we take these production which are necessary for us, not as the Tsarist Russian exploiter but as old-brother bearing the torch of civilization."⁵ Under Soviet rule, this region became

3. Nazif Shahrani, "Cental Asia and challenge of Soviet legacy", C.A. Survey, Vol.12(2), 1993, page - 124.

4. Ibid, page, 125.

5. Ibid.

totally integrated into the Soviet union. The collapse of Soviet Union and the emergence of independent states in the Central Asian region left the region in a state of uncertainty. They face problem of economic underdevelopment narrow market, grave problem of capital formation, unemployment, poverty, and high inflation rate.

Another problem they are facing is the lack of expertise in various areas which is necessary for the development of industries. During the Soviet period, most of the workforce employed in industries were Russians, and the local population was engaged mainly in agriculture. The dis-integration and current growth of ultra nationalism forced these industrial workers to flee to Russia which made the problem more acute. The dependent character of economy particularly, after the dissolution of Soviet Union has brutally surfaced now. As President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan mentioned; "they are forced to beg for consumer goods, technological equipments and budget resources."⁶

6. Igor, P. Lipovsky, "Central Asia, in search of a new political identity" Middle east Journal, Spring, 32(3), July 1996, page 213.

Most of the Central Asian economic problems are tied in one way or other to relation with Russia. Russia continues to be the major trading partner of these republics. However, the Central Asian states had little success either individually or collectively in influencing terms of trade with Russia. This compels the Central Asian leaders to forge a close economic ties with Russia and C.I.S. Infact president Karimov at Uzbekistan had gone to the extent of signing a treaty with President Yeltsin with regards to formation of a 'single Roublezone, co-ordinating fiscal and custom facilities, and joint use of military and industrial complex of two countries.

Islamic Politics:

Another important issue which confronts all the Central Asian states is Islamic politics. Islam is a key feature of the Central Asian civilization from the 8th century. The advent of communism in these republics, however, was not ablve to destroy the unofficial. Islam and private practices of religion. After dis-integration of the Soviet Union, the unofficial Islam is emerging in all Central Asian republics. Many fundamentalist leaders are also emerging. Their

presence pose a serious challenge to the state since they tend to question the legitimacy of existing government and call for Islamisation of politics. The political regimes of Uzbekistan and other republics of Central Asia are in dilemma whether to suppress islamic activism or to integrate it into the state.

The above internal factors like the absence of a stable dynamic economy, uncertain national identity, internal ethnic rivalries and conflict, the problem of legitimacy of the new government and growth of Islamic factors, complicated the painful transition of the Central Asian states as indepent and prosperous nation states in the present context of globalisation.

TYPES OF POLITICAL MODELS FOR CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS :-

Like any newly independent countries, the Central Asian states are also in a confusion, as to the type of political model they should adopt for their over all development and which can move them away from current problems in which they are embroiled. Like the countries that were liberated after the second World War, the Central Asian states also suffer from the confusion of models. So the local communist leader

face a dilemma, they either had to quit the scene or, if they choose to remain in power, they had to adopt new economic policies, a new political ideology, developing new allies, and had to seek new sources of financial assistance. But one of the most important problems for the former central Asian communist elite is to what type of political ideologies to adopt after Marxism and Leninism has been discredited. The main political models available to the Central Asian republics are :

TURKISH MODEL :- Upon achieving independence, the central Asian republics turned towards Turkey as model of modern state. They were inspired by state model of Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of Turkish Republic.⁷ The main principle of Turkish model was its emphasis on the fundamental principles of nationalism, national character and revolutionary change. The Kemalist economic system which includes principles of mixed economy, and means to attract foreign capital to accelerate the development of a

7. Igor, P. Lipovasky, "Central Asia, in Search of a new political identity" Middle east Journal, Spring, 32(3), July 1996, Page.216.

capitalist economy also provided the model for transition to capitalism of the Socialist economies of the Central Asian States.⁸ From the political point of view the Central Asian states had a natural affinity to the Kemalist form of democracy, which will provide a balance between the traditional Central Asian society and the deep rooted norms of old Soviet Union.

The Turkish model evoked many emotional response among central Asian leaders. Turkey on its part made effort to assist the Central Asian states in their development programme. Effort are also made to institutionalise its relations with these states by calling summit of Turkish speaking nations.

THE SULTAN GALIEV MODEL :-

The new Central Asian leader in addition to Turkish model, wanted to adopt another well known model, that of Tatar Muslim Marxist Sultan Galiev of 1920.⁹ The importance of this model lies in the fact that it combines three ideological movements, which has significant influence in

8. Ibid, Page.216.

9. ~~Ibid~~

central Asia, namely pan-Islamic, pan-Turkie, and Marxism. Sultan Galiev saw in Islam the spiritual and ethnical ideals that he considered important for society. Like other religion, he considers Islam not merely a religion but also an integral system that governs the way people lead their lives, a system moreover which could be destroyed only at the risk of provoking a popular uprising. He believed in systematic and planned elimination of fundamentalist elements in Islam and not destroying Islam itself.

Another element in Sultan Galieve's thinking is that of uniting all the Turkieh people and in which their ideal national aspiration could be realized. At the sametime, he believed that Marxism is the mean by which social equality and justice could be achieved. But he viewed the present system of communism as a product of western industrial capitalist system which will not suit the Asian countries. So he advocated a new format of communism, which will suit to the socio-economic development of Asian countries, and their spiritual values and way of life. 9

Islamic Model :- A third model that has been developed after the emergence of central Asian republics is that an

Islamic model with a theocratic state. Infact, this view has been shared by both Islamic and western worlds. This view is foreseen primarily because of the region's geographical closeness to Iran and the possibility of Iran's interest in pushing its own brand of radical Islam. This assumption got further strengthened by the victory of the fundamentalist forces in Afghanistan recently.

Despite the pros and cons of each model, the political system developed by the ex-communist elites in Central Asia included combination of all three models at present.

Firstly, setting up of an economic system that is half way between the 1980's economic liberalism of Turgut Ozal and the mixed economy developed by Ismet Inane during 1960s.

Second, a type of controlled democracy that had the characteristics of Turkish Republic peoples party in 1946-50 and Thirdly, at ideological level which includes some of the Galiev's idea of building consensus through compromise, between nationalism, Islam and state politics. Fourthly, developing a state based religion which will halt the growth of religious fundamentalism. The Central Asian leaders, by means of these methods made smooth transition from old

communist regimes to a moderate, secular political system with a mixed economy.¹⁰

Democratization process in other Central Asian republics

All the countries, who are having the experience of colonialism, faces one basic problem, that is the crisis of governability, and political chaos because the colonial masters developed their own political institution that will satisfy their own interest. The ruling elite in colonial countries after independence, tried to adopt the same method for governance, but that led to political instability, as it is not in consonance with that culture.

Central Asian states also face the same problem of formidable impediments in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. During Soviet times, Soviet policy encouraged large native administration which to a great extent were staffed by members of the old traditional elites.

The central Asian republic's regional and provincial governments simply mirror the political hierarchy that

10. Martha, Brill Olcott, 'Central Asia's Post-empire Politics' Orbis, spring, 1992, p.255.

commanded the local communist party. During the soviet period towards the end of 1989 -90, there was some form of political participation by masses on various issues like rule and status of native languages, rewriting the histories of central Asian Republic and also ecological issues.

In Tajikistan the period of 1989 - 91 was also a period of mass peoples participation on the issues related to regional, ethnic language, culture etc.¹¹ Major parties competed with each other to take up the regional aspirations. While the Democratic Party, is secular party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, is more religiously oriented.

In Kazakhstan, the first political movement was an ecological issue. Kazakh poet Alzhus Suleimenov organised the Nevada movement to press for the end of testing of nuclear weapons in the republic which has devastating impact on population and environment. The period from 1989 to 91 also witnessed the emergence of several Kazakh movements

11. Martha Brill Olcott; "Central Asia's Post-empire Politics". Orbis spring 1992. P 256.

which include Azat (freedom), the Republican Party, the Civil Movement.¹²

In Kyrgyzstan, democratic parties appear within communist party. In October 1990, the democratic movement succeeded in blocking the presidential candidate of Moscow and elected Askar Akyev, thus making Kyrgyzstan, the first soviet republic to select its own president.

In Turkmenistan, the same development took place and Niyazov successfully manipulated the political system.

The Minsk agreement, which dissolved U.S.S.R. ultimately, made the central Asian states to become free. This further complicated the complex struggle for power in Central Asian republics. The power of the communists was challenged by the new political forces, mainly composed of intellectuals, and Islamic clerics who were trained outside.

In the post independence period, some parties were allowed to function, albeit with various restrictions. The first party that emerged was the socialist party, which was composed of many ex-communist members. The congress Party was founded in 1992 by poet Suleimonov, who is a pro-

12. Ibid.

Nazarbayev.¹³ Another party that emerged in Kazakhstan is National Unity for Kazakhstan. However, by President Nazarbayev succeeded to manipulate the election of March 1994 despite the growth of the above mentioned parties in March 1994 election.¹⁴

In Kirgызstan Askar Akayev who was elected as first president of Kirgызstan in October 1990,¹⁵ before continued to hold the post of president even after Kyrgyzstan attained independence. Initially, he allowed some formal press freedom, allowing opposition parties, but soon after in face of a deteriorating economy and growing evidence of favoritism and nepotism have soured the relation between the parliament? and the government led by Akayev. In, January 1994, Akayev conducted a plebiscite for the post of president and he secured 99% vote.¹⁶ Since then the government has taken many anti-democratic measures which

13. Martha Brill Olcott: "Emerging Political elites, in Central Asian", Ali Banuazizi and Myron weiner (Ed.) The New Geo-politics of Central Asia and its Borderland, (London 1-B; Tauris and co. ltd. 1994,) pp-44-48.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

includ curtailng of press, freedom, dissolution of parliament etc. Later in 1994, in violations of the constitution, a referendum was held for modification of the constitution which made him largely an authoritarian ruler.

The hostility to broader political participation in Central Asia was indicated by the fact that president Nabiev of Tajikistan was ousted by opposition in May 1992. Nabiev was elected as the president in November 1991 securing nearly 60% of votes in an international supervised election. After a brief take over by Islamic fundamentalists, speaker of parliament, Rakhamanov took over power. The anarchy and civil war in Tajikistan has led to the set-up of two rival-governments. Rakhamanov has the support of the pro-communist party, who after his selection as the president jailed or killed opposition members.

In Turkmenisatan, Niyazov, the head of Turkmernistan has been elected president for life and installed his own personality cult and curbed all democratic opposition.

Process of Democratization in Uzbekistan under Islam Karimov

Soon after the dissolution of Soviet Union. Uzbekistan, like other Central Asian republics, faced the

same situation of economic stagnation, political instability, and growth of religious and ethno-nationalistic elements, which all made the situation in Uzbekistan very volatile.

Uzbekistan under president Karimov adopted a more balanced approach towards these developments. Soon after dissolution the first step president Karimov did was to visit Turkey, where he proclaimed "my country will go forwards by the Turkish routes."¹⁷ The Turkish model attracted him as it adheres to the Principles of democracy, free market and free election. Another factor which president compelled Karimov to adopt the Turkish model was dependence on the U.S.A. Soon, after dissolution, U.S.A. listed the following four conditions for establishing diplomatic link with republics of former Soviet Union.

- Acceptance of all U.S.A. - U.S.S.R. agreement.
- A free market.
- A free and fair democratic election
- A functioning multi-party political system.

17. Dilip Hiro; Between Marx and Muhammad: the changing face of Central Asia, (London, Harper Collins Publication, 1994) p-176.

The US insists that all the republics must show some progress towards these guidelines to get the recognition of the U.S.¹⁸

The third factor that compelled Uzbekistan to adopt a Turkish model of Democracy is to keep the opposition at bay, and legitimize the rule of Islam Karimov who is threatened by the newly emerging political elites of Uzbekistan.

The fourth factor which made Islam Karimov's regime adopt a Turkish model is that both the U.S.A. and Russia, backed Turkish model. So by adopting the Turkish model, Uzbekistan will get help from them, in various forms, like admitting itself into the I.M.F. and World bank and technical and financial assistance which will help Uzbekistan's economy to stabilize.

Like competing power centres in other republics, in Uzbekistan also three centres of political power exist. The south with Samarkand and Bukhara, the Fargana valley in the west and capital Tashkent. Since the time of Khrushchev Samarkand and Bukhara have tended to dominate political scene. Islam Karimov belongs to this region. Another

18. Ibid, 178.

centre for political power is Fargana valley. This area is a fertile ground for the growth of religious based party. The Uzbek based Islamic Renaissance Party has strong presence in this region and a number of religious parties are emerging in the this area. These groups are given the title of Adalat [Justice) and acted as a form of local religious group protecting local neighbourhood from crime, and ensuring that Islamic code of moral conduct be practised. Tashkent is the major political centre in Uzbekistan. Its power is connected to its dominance in trade sector, and economy. Although it is weaker in comparison to other centres of power, it play's balancing role between the other two power centre.

Keeping this complex problem of Uzbekiston, in view, Islam karimov initiated the process of democratization. The first step in this direction was by holding presidential election on 29.12.1991. He made a novel method of nomination of candidate for post of president. According to this method, individual backed by parties which had

collected 60,000 signatures could become candidate in the election.¹⁹

Using his power, Islam Karimov deliberately blocked the candidature of Abdurahaman Polatov, the Birlik chief, because Karimov shuns all opposition. But in order to legitimize his election in the eyes of people and western world, particularly U.S.A., he allowed a politically insignificant candidate, Muhammed Salhi. The election campaign was not free and fair. Islam Karmiov used many tactics like spreading rvmours by linking Muhammed Sahhi's name with Muhammed Saudi, an Islamic fundamentalist. All newspapers and magazines, were censored and voters were prevented from gathering at pre-election meetings. Ballot was stolen in some place, and also voters were turned away in some cases.²⁰

19. F.B.I.S. - SOV - 94-050 May 1994, page 106

20. Ibid, Page No. 176.

This way president Islam Karimov and his progressive Democratic party got 60% of total vote and Muhammed Salih got 13%.²¹

Soon after his election to the post of president Karimov continued with his presidential form of government. In order to suppress his opponents, all major institutions were brought under his control. The parliament was reduced to a mere rubber stamp and a new constitution came into existence in October 1992.²² Which provided for unlimited presidential power. Soon after the new constitution was dissolved. The regional soviets are replaced by system based on regional hakim [governor]. These hakims (governor) who are selected by president Karimov are loyal to him and any sign of regional independence is suppressed by the immediate sacking of the hakim and changing the administration of that area completely.

21. Dilip Hiro; Between Marx and Muhammed: The changing Face of central Asia, (London; Harper collins Publication 1994), page 177.

22. Dilip Hiro, (Between Marx and Muhammed, The Changing Face of Central Asia, London Harper Collins publication 1994), page 177.

Karimov not only compelled the entire administration but also sponsored loyal opposition groups like National Progress party that distanced itself from Uzbek nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. The leadership of this party is very close to Islam Karimov. Another party that is created by Islam Karimov is the Homeland Party, which is also loyal to government. The rationale behind creating such parties is to show the western world that Uzbekistan possesses true democracy, and to challenge the opposition movement which is

led by Birlik and Erk party.

Islam Karimov has ^{not} not left the Islamic political groups. He fears that such groups have a much wider base. The Islamic movement has been very strong in Fargana valley and is also one of the major contenders for political power in Uzbekistan. Islam Karimov began considerable suppression on Adalat vigilante group, and the Islamic Renaissance Party cells in the Fargana valley. At the same time, Islamic missionaries from other countries were also expelled from Uzbekistan. But, since Karimov knows that Islam is a part and parcel for Uzbek life especially after the collapse of Soviet Union, he tries to promote official

Islam to counteract the Islamic parties, like Islamic Renaissance party. He allowed an official Islam policy under mufti Muhammed Yusuf. In other words, Karimov and the Progressive Democratic party wants to treat Islam as a crucial part of Uzbek culture, so that people will not rally behind political Islam, and, want to separate religion from politic. At the same time karimov to keep himself popular, started recruitment drives for P.D.P. and it became the largest party in Uzbekistan.

Another important milestone towards democratization process was holding of parliamentary election. At the same time Islam karimov replaced large Soviet style parliament of Uzbekistan by a smaller professional 250 member are In the election mainly two parties were in contention Democratic Party of Islam Karimov and Father Land party, basically a creation of Islam Karimov. He wanted to show the world that multiparty democracy is practiced in Uzbekistan. The Father Land party is basically composed of enterpruners, businessmen, and urban youth whose presence is very strong in Tashkent, Samarkand and other Industrial Centres. The main differences between Father Land party and

People Democratic party is that the latter is composed of mostly former communists.

The Erk Democratic Party and Birlik Party did not contest the election, due to repression by authority. In the election to Majlis (parliament) there are 69 deputies elected from the people's democratic party, 14 from Father Land Party and 169 from local authorities.²³ In this election Islam Karimov and his P.D.P. party adopted unfair practices to a large extent. Although the parliamentary election held for the first time in Uzbekistan since outbreak of Soviet Union, the election no way suggests any improvement in situation. There was no opposition to P.D.P. in the election, although in the election, another party was there namely 'Vatan Tarakkiyeti' but it was created by the authorities to counter balance of the radical organizations. All the main P.D.P. leaders got themselves elected in Soviet style election.

In another bid to capture political power and maintaining his authoritarian rule Karimov held a referendum to extend his presidency upto 2,000 from present 1997. The

22. F.B.I.S.- SOV - 95 -020, 31, January 1995, page No.43.

main reason advocated by the supporters of the president is that "Since uzbekistan is in a transitional phase, it is necessary to develop democratic and market mechanism and institutions."²⁴

In the referendum which was held in February 1995. Like erst-while soviet type of referendum 99% of total population in uzbekistan participated, extending the term of Karimov to 2,000.²⁵ After the referendum the president said "The referendum as such was held with only one aim in view, above all to create a base for legislative, executive power including presidential power, to work along the same line and to improve joint work to guarantee and implement the expression of peoples will."²⁶

Despite the tall claim by president Karimov that is free and fair, polls large scale misuse of power and atrocities including spreading terror among people ws practised.

While claiming himself to be democratic, Islam Karimov tries to maintain his authoritarian rule.

24. F.B.I.S. - SOV - 95 - 051, 16 March, 1995.

25. F.B. I.S. - SOV - 905-062, - 031 March 1995, Page No.74.

26. Ibid.

CHAPTER - IV

CHALLENGES TO UZBEKISTAN'S DEMOCRACY

The stability of political system in any country is always determined by the attitude, orientation, belief, value of people towards political system, which constitute the political culture of a system. So democracy, as a form of government, attracted most of the countries who gained independence after the end of second world war from their colonial masters. Many countries of Afro-Asian regions adopted democracy, simply because it is the most attractive form of government during that contemporary period. But experience of democracy in those countries during last forty years shows that it failed miserably and same traditional political forces, who occupied political power before colonial period continued to rule those countries. Politics in those countries shows a sharp distinction between theory and practice, and politics in those countries is largely dominated by various groups, who compete with each other to achieve power, status, and profit.¹ It is on account of these facts, that while a democratic form of government

1. Pye and Verba, Political culture and political development, (New Jersey : Princeton University, Press, 1965), P.36.

developed working well in countries like USA, UK, Sweden, France it has failed in many third world countries. The realisation, therefore, now is that, each state in its own historical context, learned and incorporated a particular form of government.

S.E.Finer has analysed three types of political cultures and its relation to stability of political system.

Mature political culture:

As practised in UK, USA, Australia and Netherlands, where political consensus and its degree of organisation are very high, people accept democracy as a way of life.

Developed political culture:

It refers to a society where the public is highly organised. Though, from time to time, people become sharply polarized on either the legitimacy of its institutions and procedures or the incumbents, who hold office as a consequence.

LOW POLITICAL CULTURE;

It is found in countries with narrow and weak organised public, often self divided on the legitimacy of the government or incumbents in office. In such countries public often self-divided to offer any sustained resistance to

authoritarian rules, e.g. countries, like Iraq, Syria, Indonesia and various African countries like, Kenya, Uganda may be placed in the category.²

One of the essential requirements of democracy is to provide means to resolve group conflicts, and power is shared and distributed through agreements reached between shifting coalition of groups. Cleavages are moderated and there is much consensus on values. A culture of accommodation and moderation, especially among elites and political activists are reached in a democracy.³

The chances of democracy surviving are greatest in those third world countries which have high level of economic development and low level of economic inequality, If this logic of democracy is applied to many newly emerging third world countries who adopted democracy as a form of government, they will not fit into this criteria, which shows that the newly emerging third world countries adopted democracy by default. It means only on paper that they have

2. S.E. Finer, Comparative Government; (London : Allan Lane, 1970), PP.537-40.

3. Ibid.

democracy, but their traditional values make the political system unstable.⁴

These newly independent countries, who have adopted democracy, also have inherited various problems from their old colonial regime and also have to deal with the rising demand from dissatisfied people.

Short of resources, at some point of time, the difficulties of balancing divergent demands from different internal and external constituencies may also compel the government to sacrifice one constituency to pacify others.⁵

Another main problem associated with democracies in third world countries is that it is too difficult to maintain equilibrium in such countries. This is because the demand for particular outcome is too high and because the lack of experience may increase the likelihood of destabilisation in those countries.⁶

As most of the third world countries lack either a culture of democracy or a high level of economic

4. Pye and Verba : Political Culture and Political Development, (New Jersey : Princeton University Press), P.44.

5. Ibid, P.52.

6. Anthony Smith; The Ethnic origin of nations (London : Basill Blackwell 1986), PP.21-46.

development, it shows that democracy is nearly impossible in those countries.

CHALLENGES TO UZBEK DEMOCRACY:

Uzbekistan, which emerged as an independent country after the collapse of Soviet Union, tried to democratise itself under the leadership of Islam Karimov. Remaining under Soviet Union since last seventy years, Uzbekistan had experienced a different form of government in which everything was decided from Moscow and local authorities had no power. They simply carried out the guidelines passed from the centre and the Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was simply appointed from Moscow.

However, the policy of Glasnost and Perestroika, which Gorbachev had introduced in Soviet Union, put a revolutionary changes in Soviet Political System. Some form of openness, democracy, rights and liberties were provided to the people. Also the control of Moscow over the republics had been some-what lessened. This had its impact all over Central Asian republics and Uzbekistan could not remain immune from this process.

Uzbekistan, under the leadership of Karimov, initiated some form of democratic process like conducting election

immediately before the collapse of Soviet Union. However, immediately after the dissolution of Soviet Union, Uzbekistan gained independence and to legitimize his power, Islam Karimov adopted some reforms in political sphere. The main objectives of Islam Karimov in initiating all the reforms is to show the Western World that real democracy is practised in Uzbekistan.

However, the transition is not as smooth as was initially thought. Like other third world countries of Africa and Asia where the democratic movement failed due to many reasons, Uzbekistan also had to meet similar problems. The main challenges before Uzbekistan today is one from Uzbek's nationalism and other from Islamic fundamentalism.

NATIONALISM IN A BROADER OUTLINE:

Nationalism is one of the gravest but least understood term in the international political scenario today. Twice in this century, nationalism provided the impetus for world war. Now the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European Communist States also shows the role nationalism played in building and destroying new state system.

So far, the public discussion on the concept of nationalism has been dominated by two views. The ancient

hatred scheme applied essentially to Nazism. Most scholars of Nationalism condemned the ancient hatred view. They argued that Nationalism was primarily a modern phenomenon and that the intensity of ethnic conflict varied greatly with changing social and political conditions. Many post-Soviet national identities such as Uzbek or Moldovian, scarcely existed in people's consciousness until Soviet Policy arbitrarily made them titular nationality of Republics.

Recent scholars suggest that nationalism reflects a need to establish an effective state to achieve group's economic and security goals. The most aggressive nationalist movement has arisen when states failed to carry out those tasks.⁷ Today, Nationalism is emerging where old states have collapsed and mobilised population are demanding creation of new state. The problem is that many of these new States lack the institutional capacity to fulfil popular demands as their borders and sovereign are in doubt, their armies are in a disarray, their economics are out of control. These short-comings re-double the intensity of

7. Ibid.

nationalistic sentiments, as militants demand the creation of national States to manage social problems.⁸

NATIONALISM AND MODERN STATE:

The process of organising collective actions in modern times gives a strong impetus to the development of the modern state and its offspring, "nationalism."⁹ In contrast to the traditional society, modern states were unable to carry out the burden of organising efficient collective action without political intervention. At first the State activities focussed on regionalising laws and bureaucracy; later the States' equally important task was to create a constitutional framework through which social interests could be represented.

NATIONALISM & POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:

Nationalism typically intensifies the proportion of people, who have a voice in politics. Since its earlier appearance in Britain. Nationalism has been connected with popular rule. Nationalists often claim that old elites are ineffective in meeting foreign threats and that a new

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

popular government needs to pursue national self-interest. This led to breakup of the nationalist movement and to reassess their monopoly over political power. Today, similar developments are unfolding in some of the former Soviet States. Former Communists who had clung to power are trying to outdo the nationalist feeling which is emerging in those countries. The same thing happened in Ukraine. For example, Kravchuk successfully pre-empted the Rukh movement monopolization. The nationalist movement, stood firmly on the issue of Ukrainian independence and Sovereign rights. However, in Azerbaijan, Mulatov was ousted because he wanted to co-operate with the nationalist agenda of popular front.¹⁰

EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA IN POST-SOVIET ERA.

The sudden emergence of newly independent countries after the collapse of Soviet Union, has created all-shorts of conflicts. While some problems are new others are inherited from the Soviet empire, which now poses danger to the establishment of democracy in almost all Central Asian countries. The Central Asian Republics, who have achieved

10. Yaccov Ro'i, "The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia," Problems of Communism, July-August, 1990, PP.49-67.

their present form, under the Soviet rule, pose a unique set of challenges. Unlike other Republics of the former Soviet Union, the Central Asian Republics were carved out of Union republic from the Tsarist Turkestanikykray, territorially demarcated, politically evolved, economically framed and socio-culturally managed. The former Soviet Republics of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were driven to the process of building their independent States. The painful transition from predominantly feudal and properly clan-tribal Khanates at the beginning of the century to build modern states in the twenties and thirties implied nomean success for these pathfinders. Their eye-catching achievements in overcoming their backwardness in short span of two decades further implied a systematic success for socialism. All premises of their conflict were regional in general, and the individual Republics, in particular, were considered not only models of phenomenal success but also representatives of a unique relationship that existed between a developed country and backward periphery for over five decades, even the most ingrained conflicts were so portrayed as to give an impression that they never existed. The achievement of

independence and resultant democratic process in the post Soviet era have clearly revealed the undercurrents of mutual animity among Central Asian Republics.

enmity

VARYING LEVEL OF NATIONALISM AND ITS CHALLENGES TO UZBEKISTAN'S DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

The Uzbekistan, as the dominant country in the region, also faces an apparent identity crisis on a different platform. The proletarian internationalism and its accompanying atheism of the Soviet years have vanished pushing it to travel an independent path and to build a sovereign nation with democracy. But, in this path, the Uzbeks encounter an imminent three-pronged conflict at different levels of their own nationalism.

The Uzbek nationalism is exists at three levels - Supranational, national, and, sub-national¹¹ During Soviet years, a Uzbek, in a broader circle, such as that in the educational establishments, Olympic team, armed forces and at most other places of union importance was first of all a Soviet person then an Uzbek national. The demise of the Soviet Union has brought to an end the broader super-

11. Dilip Hiro; Between Marx and Muhammad : the Changing Face at Central Asia (London : Harper Callins Publishers, 1994), Pp.154.

national feelings and has most visibly replaced it with an overall Central Asian identity. However, it may seem, supranationalism of the Soviet year could continue to influence Uzbek association with Moscow and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States within the framework of broader Central Asian identity.

The transition from the feeling of supra-nationalism to a dominant feeling of indigenous Uzbek nationalism seems unlikely to be a smooth process in view of two factors, first a complex ethnic regime to assert their national supremacy. Second being the regional Central Asian factor playing its role. The disappearance of the Soviet style of supranationalism has begun to facilitate the emergence of strong Uzbek nationalism in the region. The other two vital components of nationalism and sub-nationalism are playing their subtle role to rally popular support in Uzbekistan that could be dominant and influential, powerful and a determining factor in Central Asian politics. On the one hand, there has been emphasis on "Uzbekistan for Uzbek" and on the other, roads are being forged for a regional cooperation in Central Asia under the Uzbek aegis.

Although it is true that the revival of Uzbek nationalism and its importance in political process become more prominent after the emergence of independent Uzbekistan, but for an historical analysis, it should be mentioned that it can be traced to 1966 when many Russians came to Uzbekistan to rebuild Tashkent, subsequently they settled there and most of the Russians occupied government jobs, which led to resentment of local people against Russian rule. However, no protest was organised there due to Soviet Communist rule.¹² Slowly, but steadily there was growing consciousness among people about their religion, language, culture and growing socio-economic disparity between Russian and native Uzbeks. Lack of employment opportunities for the Uzbek people was also responsible for this. This feeling of isolation and lack of identity led to growing alienation of people from organised political institution. However, this process got a new impetus during Gorbachev period and his policy of Glasnost created opportunities for people to organize and to raise their protest against Government, when a movement was organised

12. William Fireman, "The Erk, Birlik, The Changing Uzbek Political Environment" Central Asia Survey, Vol.10, 1991, PP.55-72.

under Birlk a socio cultural organisation. It came as an offshoot of the policy of Glasnost. However, main feature of nationalism of the eighties was that it spread widely. Unlike the situation in the sixties and seventies, where the issues national identity and national aspiration were confined to intelligentsia, during eighties it spread to other sections of society, notably students and to certain extent, the middle classes also. During the initial period of growth of Uzbek nationalism, the Soviet communist authorities did not take the movement very seriously. However, in the wake of first public demonstration in Uzbekistan in 1989, the republic leadership adopted a different policy and warned the informal organisations to organize public meetings only in consultation with the authorities and cautioned them not to invite public to participate in mass demonstrations. However, two important events which occurred in (June 1989) accelerated the shift of the CPUZ leadership in favour of tolerance and even cooperation with informal organisations and their leaders. One was the Fergana Valley violence. During this crisis, Muhammed Salih, Abdurahim Pulatov, the new Mufti of Central Asia, travelled to the valley to calm things down. The second event was the removal of Rafiq Nishanov on June 23

and his replacement by a figure much more favourable to the platforms advocated by Birlik. It advocated republic sovereignty and locally oriented solutions. President Karimov explicitly rejected the notion that all Uzbeks were corrupt, and he sought to rehabilitate the reputation of Uzbekistan. At the same time, Karimov shared many views advocated by Birlik and the press also recognised the growing role of Birlik. However, the Republic leadership refused to permit large uncontrolled political demonstration.

Gradually, Birlik in its agenda, advocated many issues related to Uzbekistan. Among them the most important one was the replacement of the names of the places with their historical equivalents. Birlik demands were also related to language issue, environmental degradation, particularly in Aral Sea, cotton issue and more importantly, issues like Health Care and Social Welfare and its programme for ending child labour, improvement in Sanitation and working condition for women, as well as jobs. Birlik leaders also demanded improvements in Uzbek education, whose poor quality they linked to the cotton cultivation. Birlik also called for stipend to send talented students abroad to learn

needed specialist courses.¹³ Similarly, it also raised the question of language issue. The CPUZ tried to gain legitimacy among the masses, and its leader Karimov tried to adopt many policies advocated by Birlik, so as to alienate Birlik from masses.

However, Birlik's status as a public movement has not changed to that of a political party. It was not recognised by the government because it could not conduct internal elections, consequently the CPUZ, often offering more than one candidate for a seat, emerged with a clear monopoly in the parliamentary election. However, after sometime, differences arose within Birlik over leadership issue. Among the major contenders for the party post are Salihand Pulatov. For Salih, working for Uzbekistan's independence was most important, leaving Democracy in abeyance; while Pulatov stressed on democracy, and toppling of communist regime of Karimov, leaving independence in abeyance. In April 1990, barely a year after the founding of Birlik, Salih and two other leaders, left Birlik to establish "Erk"

13. Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammed : the Changing Face of Central Asia, (London : Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), Pp.186.

(Freedom) which they claimed as the real representative of the people.

The split in opposition was good news for karimov, as he would not face same danger from the nationalistic front as when Birlik was united. So soon after the collapse of Soviet Union, Islam Karimov tried to hijack the political movement from the Birlik and Erk party, by changing the name of Uzbek communist party to People"s Democratic Party, and at the sametime advocated the issue raised by, Erk and Birlik in order to strengthen his popular base.

In the post-independence phase, these nationalistic forces put continued opposition to Islam Karimov. During first presidential election, Islam karimov faced the opposition leader Mohammed Salih of Erk party. At the sametime, through manipulation, they blocked the candidature of the Birlik chief and a political heavy weight for the presidency and by using State apparatus, Islam Karimov was able to win the presidential election. But the nationalistic opposition now spreads to students also, who participated actively and opposed Karimov's rule.

The subsequent differences between Islam Karimov's P.D.P. and nationalistic group like Erk, led to physical

confrontation between the government and the nationalist group. By now this nationalist ethnic group wanted a change of state language from Russian to Uzbek, which worried the Russian minorities. However, the Nationalistic forces were continuing their opposition to Islam Karimov's regime and his Democratization process, which in turn led to sharp repression on opposition by Islam karimov, like amending constitution, which in turn led to de-registering political parties based on nationalistic and religious sentiment. When Birlik challenged the banning, the Justice Ministry argued that during 1991-92 as many as 168 Birlik members had been charged with breaking the law. In subsequent elections, such as Election to, Olly-Mazhlis. (Parliament)

Karimov used harsh methods to suppress the nationalist group who tried to contest the election. President karimov even created a new party, Homeland Party, which is very loyal to government and at the same time posing challenges to nationalistic parties like, Birlik & Erk. 13

The Nationalistic challenges to Uzbekistan Democratic process, initiated by Islam Karimov continues despite large scale suppression of these movements.

13. i.b.i.d

**CHALLENGES FROM ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM TO DEMOCRATISATION
PROCESS IN UZBEKISTAN :**

Another important challenge to the Democratization process in Uzbekistan is Islamic Fundamentalism, which remained dormant over a long period of time during Soviet rule is now manifesting itself and striving for the establishment of a theocratic state in post independence phase. This challenge is not only faced by Uzbekistan alone but in fact, almost all Central Asian Republics are facing the same. ↵

Islam During Soviet period in Central Asia

There were mainly three streams of Islam which prevailed in Central Asia during Soviet Rule. Official Islam, various forms of unofficial Islam, in particular Sufi brotherhoods and Islamic tradition and Folklore as practised by the population as a whole. ↵

Official Islam - During Stalin period, in order to prevent the growth of Islam in Central Asia, Moscow established spiritual Board or Directorate in Tashkent, Baku, Makhachkala, and Ufa in 1943. other Religions in the USSR, official Islam sought to preserve its own ideological and existentialist desire by compromising with the official

atheistic State to which it owed its creation. So it propagated that Islam is not opposed to, but rather is capable of co-existing with, Marxism and Leninism and has devoted considerable attention for expanding the possibilities of reconciling what would seem to be inherently contradictory. It is also responsible for maintaining those mosques. However, Gorbachev and his policy of Glasnost and Perestroika completely changed the policy towards Islam. Under this policy, new mosques were built.¹⁴

UNOFFICIAL ISLAM : The limitation, traditionally placed by Soviet authorities on the practice of orthodox Islam, and particularly perhaps, the persistent dearth of mosques, on the one hand and strong social, cultural and psychological tendencies prevalent among large section of muslim population that rejects secularization on the other hand have led to the flourishing of a non-establishment, non-orthodox Islam.

A significant portion of non official Islam is a by-product of of Sufism. The traditionalist conservative Sufi

14. Yacov Ro'i, "The task of Creating new Soviet man; Atheist propaganda in Soviet Muslim areas," Soviet Studies, January 1984, Pp.26-44.

brotherhood focussed not on mosque but rather on private prayer in home or, unofficial houses or worship and on pilgrimage or other devotions at holy places. By its very nature Sufism propounded its own system of rites and rules. For spiritual training, empowering the master to help the individual to reach higher level of spiritual knowledge. As a result of which the master comes to command total obedience. Since Tsarist times, brotherhood played an important role in the BASHMACHI movement that defied Bolshevik regime in Central Asia since 1920.

Forced underground for several decades, Suffi brotherhood movements have emerged with a strength, vitality and dynamism that are manifested in their acceptance of large numbers of intellegencia men and women. In some areas of Central Asia, particularly in Central and Southern Tajikistan, there was also a resurgence of Wahhabism, a Sunni Fundamentalist movement that seeks to return to a pristine Islamic purity. Wahhabi Mullah's accused the Soviet regime of pursuing negative policy towards Islam for practices. The third category of Islam that prevail in Central Asia is Folk Practices. As elsewhere in former Soviet Union local citizen committees are formed that are

dedicated to the preservation of historical and cultural monuments.¹⁵

Official propaganda depicts portrays women and youth as being the most closely linked with this folk Islam. The former have been traditionally singled out in this connection, especially since they are brought to exercise considerable influences over the child - the proportion of women employed outside home being much smaller in the Central Asian countryside. The youth also portrayed in the recent year as sources of having particular interest towards religion.¹⁶

ISLAM IN POST-SOVIET PHASE;

Despite growing opposition to Islam, Islam became the part and parcel in the life of the people of Central Asia. So break up Soviet Union and consequently emergence of independent nations provided opportunity for the Islamic fanatics to legitimise themselves in national reconstruction process. Thus Islam emerged as a part of central Asian politics which tries to put effective opposition to national reconstruction and democratic process.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

Uzbekistan despite being part of soviet union till its independence was not able to immune itself from the growing challenges of Islam. Islam as religion has remained there for centuries as traditional faith of people. During the period of Stalin a Muslim spiritual Boards of directorate was set up in Tashkent during 1940 to supervise all Islamic activities.

The initial reaction of the authorities to the emerging Islamism was very sharp. Gorbachev himself was highly critical of growing Islamic influences on the Uzbek political life. He greatly ciriticised participation of communists in the religious affairs. By the end of 1989, The magnitude of religious influence in public life of Uzbekistan became very clear. In first six month of 1989 the number of active mosque in uzbekistan increased to a large extent.¹⁷

When Islam visibly influenced Uzbek public life the authorities apparently decided to co-exist by demonstrating a liberal attitude, by acknowledge the positive role of Islamic values. After independent the Islamic activities grew especially in fergena valley, Namangan. Another

17. Ibid.

important factor that led to the growth of religious fundamentalism is fall of communist government in Afghanistan and inroad of militant Islamic Renaissance Party into Uzbekistan. The religious opposition now consists of the Islamic renaissance party and newly established "ADALAT" (Justice) a socio-religious association of Farganan valley.

Islam Karimov, aware of the problem of Islamic resurgence, adopted two types of strategies to curb the Islamic movement. One through putting pressure on these organisation and secondly the tried to promote official Islam by visiting mosque and using Islamic names. (Bismilla-ul-Raham-al-Rahim).¹⁸

The Karimov government also appointed a Mullah as the head of religious affairs. Presently there are two contradictory views that prevail in Uzbekistan regarding the role of Islam in politics, one advocated by Islamic radicals is that Islam is a socio-political ideology and it can not be separated from polity. They further argue that religion can not be separated from life and government is part of citizen's life. Therefore it is not possible to

18. Dilip Hiro; Between Marx and Muhammed : the Changing Face of Central Asia, (London : Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), P.167.

have mosque and the government apart. On the other hand Karimov and his people's Democratic party argues that Islam is concerned with persons, moral and spiritual well being and it has nothing to do with politics. As a result government is keeping a close watch over the movement of the Islamic groups.

Karimov while trying to give a legitimate place to religion in politics also wants to suppress growth of Islamic fundamentalist. For example he incorporated a new article 54 in uzbekistan constitution that banned political parties based on nationalistic or, religious principles. But Islam Karimov's facade democracy has not so far able to suppress these religious fundamentalist groups who try to capture political power using religion as a means.¹⁹

19. Ibid, P.186.

CONCLUSION

In this study, we have tried to analyse the prospect of democracy in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan. This has been done in the light of the existing democratic elements in the country. Years of Russian subjugation and lack of international contacts have created conditions that may be termed as opposing to the goals of democratization. Yet, after getting an independent status with the break-up of Soviet Union, Uzbekistan tried to democratize itself under the newly emerging political elite.

The main problem in the process of democratization is historical legacy, present socio-economic condition and continuing political authoritarianism, which have all been factors impeding the achievement of democracy in the country.

Since its incorporation to the Tsarist empire, this region has largely remained as satellite of Russia, and used for raw material extraction. The Bolshevik revolution led to autonomous status for Uzbekistan, but it proved to be short lived. The Party Secretary of Uzbekistan Communist Party, was appointed from Moscow. To achieve their narrower end, the Republican leadership tried to appease the Central leadership in Moscow without taking into account the needs of the people. All this led to suppression of rights and

liberty of people which are essential condition for achieving democracy.

The policy of Glassnost and pereretroika had profound impact upon Uzbek Society. Through this policy of openness people became conscious about their rights and duties. However, the process of democratization was not possible due to single party communist rule and the traditional habit of the people for blind obedience to their ruler. This penomenon is not unique in the of Uzbekistan alone. All newly independent countries who gained independence from colonial masters after the IInd world war are facing same problems.

Under the leadership of Islam Karimov ^{Uzbekistan} ~~he~~ tries to democratize itself. The main rational behind Islam Karimov's approach to democracy is to legitimise his power through democratic means. To legitimise his power, he adopted some democratic means like conducting election to parliament, and through a referendum extended his term. However, if we analyse it properly, it shows that the elction was not free, and fair.

Karimov's authoritan democracy is not free from challenges. Like other third world countries where democracy faces challenges from various ethnic and religious

groups, the newly independent Uzbekistan faces similar threats.

The traditional religious and ethnic groups who remained dormant over a long period of time are trying to re-asserts themselves. Their main objective is to capture political power, which pose a challenge to democratization process.

All these developments shows that future of democracy is rather bleak in Uzbekistan. This is not only due to the authoritarian rule of Karimov, but absence of adequate democratic institutions, including free press, and independent judiciary.

The only solution to the above problem lies in developing a democratic culture in the psyche of the people, while at the same time effecting overall development in the socio-economic and political conditions.

This study may also provide an analogy for any investigation of this nature in other thrid would countries. In particular C.I.S countries experience an similar socio-political existence, as that of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan also provides a case in point for binding out socio-political variables that may contribute to the process or democratization in a developing country.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES ;

Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, 1991 - 1996 (Ohio, U.S.A.)

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia, U.S.A.

Summary of World Broadcast, B.B.C. London.

Secondary Sources :

Books

Aron, Raymond, Democracy and Totalitarianism, Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press, 1990.

Akiner, Shirin, Islamic People of the Soviet Union. (London : Kegan Paul, International, 1983).

Allworth, Edward, The Modern Uzbeks (Stanford : Hoover Institution Press, 1990).

Allworth, Edward, (ed), Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, (New York : Columbia University Press, 1967).

Almond, G.A. The Appeals of Communism, (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1965).

Almond, G.A. & Coleman, J.S., The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1960).

Apter, David E., The Politics of Modernization (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1967).

Anderson Benedict, Imagined Communities : Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London : Verso Editions and New Left Book, 1983).

- Benningsen, A and Broxup, M., Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (London: Croom Hlem, 1983).
- Benningsen, A. and Wimbush, S.E., Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary strategy for Colonial World, (Chicago : 1980).
- Banuazizi, and Weiner (ed); The New Geo Politics of Central Asia and its Borderlands (London : I.B. Tauris and Co, Ltd, 1994).
- Critchlow, James, Nationalism in Uzbekistan : Soviet Republics Road to Sovereignty (Boulder, Colorado : West View Press, 1992).
- Dani, A.H., New light on Central Asia (Lahor: Sang-e-meel Publication, 1993).
- Finher, S.E., Comparative Government, (London : Allanlane, 1970).
- Gali. W. Lapidus and Victor Zaslusky (ed.), From Soviet Union to Commonwealth : Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics, (Cambridge : 1992).
- Greetz, Clifford, (ed), Old Societies and New States (London : The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
- Hiro, Dilip, Between Marx and Muhammed, The Changing face of Central Asia (London : Harper Collins Publishers, 1994).
- JEDC, Synder, (ed). After Empire, The Emerging Geo-politics of Central Asia (Washington (DC) : Ft, MCNair, National Defence University Press, 1996).
- Kaushik, Devendra, Central Asia in Modern Times : A History from Early 19th Century, (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1970).
- Mandelbaum, Michael, Central Asia and the World : Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan (New York : Foreign Relations Press, 1994).

- Patnaik, Ajay, Central Asia : Between Modernity and Tradition (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996).
- Pierce. R.A., Russian Central Asia (Berkely: California University Press, 1960).
- Pipes, Richard, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, 1964).
- Pye and Verba, (ed), Political Culture and Political Development, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969).
- Rashid, Ahmed, The Resurgence of Central Asia : Islam or Nationalism (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1994).
- Ram Rahul, Modern Central Asia (New Delhi : Bikas Publishers 1979).
- , Politics of Central Asia, (New Delhi : 1973).
- Shams-ud-din, Secularisation of Soviet Central Asia (New Delhi : Vikas Publishers, 1982).
- Simon C., Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities in the Soviet Union (Boulder : Westview Press Inc., 1991).
- Sharma, R.R., A Marxist Model of Social Changes in Soviet Central Asia 1917-1940 (New Delhi : Macmillan, 1979).
- Vaidyanathan, R., Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republic, A Study of Soviet Nationality Policy (1917-1934) (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1967).
- Warikoo, Norbu (ed)., Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers Pvt. Limited, 1992).
- Warikoo, (ed). Central Asia : Emerging New Order (New Delhi : Har-Anand Publisher, 1995).

Wheeler, Geoffery, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia
(New York : Praeger Publications, 1964).

ARTICLES :

Akbarrzades, Shahram, "Nation Building in Uzbekistan"
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No.1, 1996.

Arapov, Aleksai, and Umanskit.t, "Asianism, the External and
Internal Manifestation of Ethno-politics in
Central Asia: A view from Uzbekistan" Russian
Social Science Review, Vol. 35, No. (4),
July, August 1994.

Ahmar, Moonis, "Ethnic Factor in Contemporary Central Asia",
Pakistan's Perspective, Eurasian Studies,
Vol.2, No.3, Winter 1995-96.

----- . "Conflict Resolution and Confidence Building in
Central Asia", Strategic Studies, Vol. 16,
No.3, Spring 1994.

Abdus, Sabir Akim, "Muslims in the Soviet Union Conflict or
Accommodation", Bliss Journal (Dacca), 7 (2),
April 1986.

Andres Asulund., "Gorbachev, Perestroika and Economic
Crisis", Washington DC, Problem of Communism
January-April, 1991.

Aydin, Mustafa, "Turkey and Central Asia : A challenges of
Change" Central Asian Survey 15 (2), June,
1996.

Brown, B, "The Public Role of Perestroika in Central Asia",
Central Asian Survey, Vol.9, No.1, 1989.

Broxup , Marie, "Islam in Central Asia Since Gorbachev",
Asian Affairs, London, Vol.18, Part 3,
October, 1987.

Benningsen, Alexander, "Islam in Retrospect" Central Asian
Survey, Vol.13, No.2, 1989.

Banerjee, D "Central Asian Republics Today", Strategic
Analysis, Vol. 17, No.5, August, 1994.

- Blank, Stephen, "Central Asia, 120 years of Russia Rule", Central Asian Survey, Vol.8, No.4, 1989.
- Chauney, Harris D, "Ethnic Tension in Successor Republics in 1993 and Early 1994, Post-Soviet Geography, Vol.35, No.4, 1994.
- Canfeild, Robert, "Restructuring in Greater Central Asia : Changing Political Configurations", Asian Survey, Vol.32, No.10, October 1992.
- Dannreuther, Roland., "Creating New States in Central Asia", Adelphie Papers-288, March, 1994.
- Madi, Hafizullah, "State, Ideology and Islamic Resurgence in Tajikistan", Central Asian Survey, Vol No. 13, No.4, 1994.
- Fuller Graham. E., "Central Asia : The Quest for Identity", current History, Vol.93, No. 582, April 1994.
- , "The Emergence of Central Asia", Foreign Policy, No.78, Spring, 1996.
- Fireman, William, "The Communist Party, Erk and the Changing Uzbek Political environment", Central Asian Survey, Vol.10, No.3, 1991.
- "Glasnost in Practice, : The Uzbek Experience" Central Asian Survey, Vol.8, No.2, 1989.
- Freij, Hanna Yusuf, "State Interest Vs the Uma", Middle East Journal, Winter, 1996.
- Grant, Jonathan, "De-Colonization by default : Independence in Soviet central Asia", Central Asian Survey, Vol.10, No.3, 1991.
- Gleason, Gregory, "Independent Muslim Republics in Central Asia, Legacy of Past shape of the future", Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 12, No.2, July, 1992.
- Hiro, Dilip, "Islamist Strengths and Weakness in Central Asia" Middle East International, 443 February, 1993.

- Hunter, T. Shireen, "Nationalist Movement in Soviet Asia" Current History, Vol.89, No.549 October 1990.
- Hyman, Anthony, "Moving out of Moscow Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia, international Affairs, Vol. 69 No.(2). 1993.
- Karpat H. Kemal, "The Old and New Central Asia" Central Asian Survey (12) (4) 1993.
- James, Ruppert, "Islam, Democracy West, Foreign Affairs, summer 1992.
- Mirsky, I. George, "Central Asia's Emergence", Current History, Vol.91, No. 567 - October, 1992.
- Olcott Martha, Brill, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence", Foreign Affairs, 71(3), 1992.
- Olcott, Martha, Brill, "Central Asia's Post Empire Politics", Orbis Spring 1993, vol.36 No.2.
- Onaran, Yalman "Economics and Nationalism" : The case of Muslim Central Asia", Central Asian Survey Vol.13, No.7, 1994.
- Panarin, Sergies, "Muslims of the Former USSR, Dynamic of Survival", Central Asian Survey, 12, (2), 1993.
- Shahrani, Nazif, "Central Asia and the Challenge of The Soviet Legacy", Central Asian Survey, Vol.12, No.2, 1993.
- Sahot, Steven, "The Creation of Soviet Central Asia : The 1924 National Delimitation", Central Asian Survey, 12 (2) 1993.
- Sharma, R.R., "Political economy of Central Asia " World Focus, 14, (3-4), March-April, 1993.
- Stobdan, P., "Emergence of Central Asia : Strategic Implication" Strategic Analysis Vol.18, No.3 June 1995.

- Stobdan, P., "Looking towards Central Asia", Strategic Analysis, 16 (8), November 1993.
- , "Uzbekistan's Quest for Central Asian leadership", Middle East International, 19(8), November 1996.
- Sutrazska, Wisla, "Transition to Democracy and the Fragmentation of a City: Four case of Central European Capitals" Political Geography, 15 (5), June, 1996.
- Warikoo, K. "Dynamics of Changes in Soviet Central Asia", World Affairs, Vol.3, New Delhi, 1991.
- Yauuz, M. Kakan, "The Pattern of Political Islamic Identity : Dynamics of National and Transnational Localities and Identity". Central Asian Survey, 14 (3) 1995.
- Lipovsky, Igor P. "Awakening of Central Asian Islam", Middle Eastern Studies, 32 (3) July, 96.
- "Central Asia : In Search of new Political Identity" Middle East Journal, 50 (2), Spring, 1996.

JOURNALS & PERIODICALS :

Adelphi Papers, Oxford (U.K.).

Asian Affairs, London. (U.K.).

Asian Survey, Berkeley (U.S.A.).

Central Asian Survey (U.K.).

Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong).

Foreign Affairs, New York (U.S.A.).

Oribs (USA Moscow News)

Problem of Economic transition New York, (U.S.A.)

The Economist (London)