

COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC : IMPERATIVES AND CONSTRAINTS

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
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Master of Philosophy

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "**COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC : IMPERATIVES AND CONSTRAINTS**" submitted by **Satyajit Mohanty** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university.

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We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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To
Bapa and Mama
for all they have been to me

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INTRODUCTION

Ever since the early modern era, countries along the North Atlantic shores have dominated international relations. Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, England and the United States have succeeded each other as the premier economic, and military power in the past five centuries. Now the entire international system is at the dawn of a new era. The unprecedented rise of the Asia-Pacific region marks the process of a shift of the global political and economic centre of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific area, prompting many observers to describe the approaching twenty-first century as the *Pacific Century*.¹

In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed: "the Atlantic Era is now at the height of its development and must (sic) soon exhaust the resources at its command. The Pacific Era destined to be the greatest of all, is just at its dawn."² After nearly a century, President Roosevelt's prognostication is due to see the light of the day.

¹ Steve Chan, East Asian Dynamism: Growth, Order and Security in the Pacific Region (Boulder: West View Press, 1993), p.1.

² Quoted in Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, (London: Routledge; 1997), p. 1.

The Asia-Pacific region may be defined in a broad fashion so as to include the littoral states of the Pacific of North, Central and South America, the island states of the South Pacific, Australasia, Northeast and Southeast Asia. But in order to achieve rigour and parsimony the study has defined the Asia-Pacific somewhat narrowly to include the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union (and its more circumscribed successor, Russia); the two regional great powers, China and Japan; and the local countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia. Other parts of what may legitimately be regarded as the Asia-Pacific are referred to the extent that they help in explaining the international politics of the core area identified above.

The region is being given so much of emphasis due to the economic dynamism it has displayed. According to the World Bank, the region's share of the world's economic output has soared from about 4% in 1960 to 27% in 1994 when measured on an exchange rate basis. When measured on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, the region accounts for one-third of the total output.³ The world's second and third largest economies are in the Asia-Pacific, with Japan ranking second and

³ World Bank Atlas, 1996 (Washington, D.C. : World Bank Publication, 1995), pp. 5-7.

China third on an exchange rate basis and China placed second and Japan third in terms of Purchasing Power Parity(PPP).

Before the Southeast Asian currency crisis, the value of exports from the region grew 14% annually since 1985. The success story of the *Newly Industrialised Countries* (NIC's) or the *Asian Tigers* was phenomenal. The Southeast Asian currency crisis is seen as an aberration and with strict control mechanisms and domestic economic reforms the countries are expected to bounce back into the economic arena with renewed vigour. Two way trade between the US and the Asia-Pacific region reached \$600 billion in 1991, which was about one-third higher than the value of cross-Atlantic commerce.⁴ North America, mainly the US, takes 20% of China's exports compared to 6% in 1980. In 1993 Chinese exports (as a share of its Gross Domestic Product[GDP]) is stated to be 24% vis-a-vis 3% in 1970. Further, intra-regional trade has tripled in the past few decades. These trends reflect the growing integration of the Asia-Pacific in the global economy and the increasing regional interdependence. This has led to increasing optimism within the region that the economic dividends of peace will make the likelihood of war remote.

⁴ In this context the Asia - Pacific has been defined more broadly.

This optimism is bolstered by the event of December 25, 1991 when the Communist hammer and sickle flag was lowered for the last time from the Kremlin in Moscow. This event marked "*three ends*" namely the end of the Cold War, the end of geographical divides and spheres of influence and the end of ideological confrontation which is about to usher in a new beginning.⁵ After 150 years of war and military tension the Asia-Pacific region is at peace today. The current lull in more than a century of conflict has led some to believe that the *Pacific Century will be pacific*. In other words, the end of the Cold War and growing economic interdependence, according to David Shambaugh, "will anchor relationships, contain competition from stimulating conflict, maintain balance of power and ensure regional security."⁶

However, despite this optimism the assumption of a pacific Asia is by no means a foregone conclusion. The world was pushed into throes of crisis only years after Norman Angell in his book '*Great Illusion*' (1910) had propounded that wars would become anachronistic because of

⁵ The famous 'End of History' thesis has been avoided here because it has proved to be false by the turn of events. It is criticised by Asian scholars as reflecting an ethno-centric bias. For the end of history thesis refer to Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" National Interest, vol. 16 (Summer, 1989), pp. 3-16.

⁶ David Shambaugh, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century" Current History (December, 1994) p.423.

economic interdependence. Within a span of 30 years of the publication of the book,⁷ the world witnessed two devastating wars unparalleled in human history. Wars didn't become an illusion but Angell's dreams certainly did.

The Asia-Pacific is in an unprecedentedly peaceful state. But it is by no means certain that this state is sustainable. The region is a dynamic one but such dynamism can be a source of instability also.

Thus, amidst this paradoxical situation the Asia-Pacific region can either witness a zone of peace or a zone of conflict in future. On one hand the region can see the emergence of what Karl Deutsch has called a '*pluralistic security community*', defined as an "international region in which one can identify the development of "institutions and practices" strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population."⁸

However, on the other hand the Asia-Pacific region can also be pushed into a zone of turmoil, chaos and anarchy. Lingering historical

⁷ Norman Angell, The Great Illusion : A Study of the Relationship of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage. (London : Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1910).

⁸ Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.2

rivalries and national divisions remain and new asymmetries are taking shape that may cause a fundamental realignment in the balance of power. The threat of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, conflicting claims in the South China Sea, the low boil in Cambodia and possibilities of full blown wars during a period of hegemonic transition loom large over the Asia-Pacific region. This has given rise to a situation where countries of the region feel apprehensive about the uneasy peace that has beset the region as beneath this may lie a simmering conflictual situation.

The logic that the end of the Cold War and growing economic interdependence will lead to a peaceful era cannot be taken to be axiomatic. The Cold War bipolar era may have provided greater stability to the region than can be expected of the emerging structure of the Asia-Pacific region. The region may be 'ripe for rivalry'⁹ with fierce multipolar balance of power competition in the offing. A strong China with irredentist claims or a militaristic Japan reminding the region of the 1930's or a North Korea with a nuclear bomb could upset the process of regionalism.

⁹ Aaron L. Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia.' International Security, vol.18, no.3 (Winter, 1993/94), pp.5-33.

The liberal logic that interdependence creates economic incentives to avoid war is increasingly being questioned with reference to the Asia-Pacific region. The region may be witnessing an '*economic-security dilemma*' where increased wealth derived from market-oriented development policies may foster security-enhancing democratic institutions and interdependence. On the contrary, it can also provide the resources to enhance military power in possibly destabilising ways¹⁰. Continued growth in regional economic-military capabilities will have major long term implications for the global, as well as the regional, military balance. Military capabilities are increasing as a result of increased economic growth. But uneven growth between regional states, can change intra-regional power balances.

These trends and the changed position of interactional capacities of individual countries within the region calls for a new approach to security.

During the Cold War era the independence of the regional countries to determine their respective foreign policies was constrained by balance of power politics. Thus, the bipolar power configuration and the dynamics

¹⁰ Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, 'Security and Economics in East Asia', in Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack (eds.) Asia - Pacific Security : The Economic - Politics Nexus. (Canberra : Allen and Unwin, 1988), p. 17.

of the strategic triangle helped shape the politics of the Asia-Pacific. But in the post-Cold War era the regional security parameters are marginally affected by global concerns. The states have to define for themselves their security interest. The widening of the security agenda to include factors like environment and economics, has changed the geo-strategic dimensions of security from the realm of state to that of the region. Thus, cooperation to enhance one's security has become indispensable in the modern era.

Addressing the manifold problems is the new concept of Cooperative Security which seeks to reassure rather than deter. The chief merits of Cooperative Security lie in the flexibility of the concept. It takes the regional security notions and cultures into account and hence, is an indigenous way to promote regional security. It is not based on the realist logic, but unlike other alternative approaches to security, is not anathema to some of Realism's principles like alliances. Cooperative Security can be ensured with and not inspite of certain traditional security concerns. The approach is particularly relevant to the Asia-Pacific region as it does not emphasize formal institutions to enhance security. This is more in consonance with the '*ASEAN Way*' of informality and personalised

relations. It however welcomes the formation of '*sui generis*' regional multilateral organisations like ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF).

Cooperative Security lays stress both on military and non-military dimensions of conflict and uses both governmental and non-governmental initiatives at conflict resolution. However, realising the need to highlight a particular aspect, the focus of the study is on the application of the Cooperative Security framework to the military and territorial dimensions of regional security in the Asia-Pacific region. But, this in no way undermines the role of Cooperative Security in the non-military arena. That cooperation in '*low politics*' will enhance confidence to apply Cooperative Security in the area of '*high politics*' is a well recognised fact.

Thus, the study begins with a conceptual framework of Cooperative Security in Chapter I. Chapter II traces the Asia-Pacific Security in the Cold War era and Chapter III delineates the post-Cold War power equations in the region. Finally, Chapter IV expounds upon the application of Cooperative Security in the region and the prospects for furthering it in future to enhance regional peace and stability.

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY

In the wake of the Cold War the nature and domain of security concerns have undergone a paradigmatic shift. The dominant security architecture based on the realities of the Cold War era are changing. However, the turn of events during the first decade of the post-Cold War era shows that the initial euphoria expressed at the end of the Cold War and the images of a dramatic shift in the way 'politics among nations is conducted has, by and large died down. The dream of the neo-idealists of a return to a Kantian state of "*perpetual peace*"¹ has met the same fate as that of the idealistic visions earlier in this century.

However, the concerns of the *Traditional Security Studies School* (TSS), dominated by the realists and the neo-realists bred in the Hobbesian 'power politics' tradition is no longer a good analytical framework for the post-Cold War era. Realism, the dominant paradigm in international relations is based on certain tenets whose logic worked well within the Cold War framework. Realism paints a pessimistic picture of

¹ Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", American Political Science Review, vol.80, no.4, (December 1986), p.1151.

world politics. The international system is perceived as a "state of relentless security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background."² The ordering principle in the international system is anarchy, defined as the absence of any central authority above the sovereign nation states. The global pecking order, based on a self-help system is determined by the power differential measured primarily in military terms.³ The state possesses certain offensive military capabilities as it is not sure of other states intentions and military preparedness. Hence, states always have to operate under a *security dilemma*.⁴ As survival is the main aim of the states and there is no global central authority to protect them they have to find means for their own security. The offensive realists⁵ hold the view that security is scarce and cooperation still scarcer making international competition intense and war

² John P. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", International Security, vol.19, no.3, (Winter 1994/95), p.45.

³ For a seminal exposition of structural realism see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Mass Addison Wesley, 1979).

⁴ Stephen Van Evera, "The Hard Realities of International Politics", Boston Review, vol.17, no.6, (November/December 1992), pp.19-21. The inability to pursue one's own security without threatening others, is defined as a security dilemma. This inevitably leads to an arms race.

⁵ These terms 'offensive' and 'defensive realists' are used by Jack Snyder in Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp.11-12. John Mearsheimer belongs to the former group whereas Stephen Walt and Joseph Grieco belong to the later category.

a likely option. The defensive realists argue that states are interested in maintaining the existing balance of power and not maximising relative power. Therefore, security is plentiful and that defensive strategies are the best route to security. However, even for the defensive realists like Joseph Grieco and Stephen Walt, the cooperation to ensure a transition from minimalistic notions of security, as absence of war, to a relatively enduring peace is practically impossible. Alliances are marriages of convenience frequently shifting and inherently unstable.⁶ The Realists hold that cooperation is not possible primarily because of (a) the inhibiting nature of the *relative gains* considerations and (b) fears of being cheated. The issue of relative gains holds that states not only focus on their gains but more importantly on what others gain. This is because they are concerned about the implications it has on the balance of power between them. Cooperation in the non-military low politics area is also difficult because of the linkages of higher economic growth and increased defence expenditure and the impact of the military upon the non-military domain. The fear that the other side will cheat on an agreement to gain a relative advantage negates the cooperative aspect.

⁶ Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987)., p. 10.

The realist notions of security were a perfect fit during the Cold War era where superpowers pursued a strategy of massive military confrontation. The Cold War zero-sum game was premised upon the principles of nuclear deterrence, containment and balance of power. The security of regional subsystems was determined an *overlay* where one or more external powers move directly into the local complex with the effect of suppressing the indigenous security dynamic.⁷ The manner in which this 'overlay' operated during the Cold War to escalate or deescalate conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region is examined in the subsequent chapter.

The realist paradigm also accepts the virtues of bipolarity over multipolarity for three main reasons. Firstly, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Secondly, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Thirdly, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponent's resolve are fewer and less likely.⁸

⁷ Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), p.106.

⁸ John P. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", International Security, vol.15, no.1, (Summer 1996), pp.14-16. Other key works on the bipolarity/multipolarity debate include Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bioplar World", Daedalus, vol.93, no.3, (Summer 1964), pp.881-909 and Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", World Politics, vol.16, no.3 (April 1964), pp.390-406.

The winding down of the Cold War has transformed the fundamental tenets of international security and hence the appropriateness of the realist notions of explaining the security concerns of the system. The three major transformations that have occurred over time but more dramatically since 1989 are (a) the broadening of the security agenda (b) the rise of multilateralism and interdependence and (c) the collapse of the global strategic overlay and rise of regional security systems.

The widening of the security agenda, a focus of the *Widening Security Studies School* (WSS) of Barry Buzan and others puts emphasis on what Buzan calls the growing '*securitization*' of a host of issues starting from environment to economics.⁹ The post-Cold War era has seen the growing incidence of sub-state violence like civil wars, ethnic conflicts etc. The two recent crises in Southeast Asia, the currency crisis and the haze problem showed that when a country catches a cold, not only the region but the entire globe has to sneeze along with it. Realism with an emphasis on military violence doesn't take into account such new developments affecting the security of states. The growing integration

⁹ Barry Buzan, "Security after the Cold War", Cooperation and Conflict, vol.32, no.1 (1997), pp.7-9.

and interdependence in the international system and the linkage across issue areas has changed the nature of security perceptions. This point has been emphasized in detail by the neo-liberals who view that states interested in progress believe in absolute gains and hence, can make cooperation possible.¹⁰

These concerns of security as a result of the transformation of the international system have been encompassed in an approach known as '*Cooperative Security*'.

The genesis of Cooperative Security, in its contemporary formulation is traced to a proposal made by Joe Clark at the September, 1990 session of the United Nations General Assembly. The ideas

¹⁰ Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 5. A rich literature on liberal institutionalism includes Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", World Politics, vol.38, no.1 (October 1985), pp.226-254 and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

contained in this proposal were later developed by several Canadian scholars as well as Gareth Evans in his book *Cooperating for Peace*.¹¹

The best description of Cooperative Security is provided by Canadian academic, David Dewitt. He describes the objective of Cooperative Security in the following terms :

(It means to) replace the Cold War security structure (an essentially bipolar balance of power framework underpinned by bilateral military alliances, with the primary aim of nuclear deterrence) with a multilateral framework geared towards reassurance, rather than deterrence; to replace or at least coexist with bilateral alliances; to promote both military and non-military security is the target of Cooperative Security system. It is not Eurocentric in origin or focus; it is not based on assumptions of strategic global relations in a zero-sum world; it is not "a priori", restrictive in membership; it does not require leadership by dominant military powers or acknowledge that hegemony alone is able to define the agenda or the rules; it does not privilege the military as the repository of all wisdom related to security issues; it does not assume that military conflict or violence is the only challenge to security ; it does presume that states are principal actors but it does not preclude by definition or by intent, that non-state actors ... have critical roles to play in managing and enhancing security-relevant dynamics; and it neither requires nor indeed explicitly calls for the creation of formal institutions or mechanisms, though welcomes both if they emerge from the decisions of the parties. It is noteworthy that the term

¹¹ Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990's and Beyond, (St Leonard: Allen and Unwin, 1993). For the notions of Cooperative Security developed by the Canadian initiated North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) in Asia-Pacific see Stewart Henderson, "Canada and Asia Pacific Security: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue", Recent Trends, Working Paper 1 (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, January 1992) David Dewitt and Paul Evans, "The Changing Dynamics of Asia-Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective. Working Paper 3 (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, January 1992) etc.

'cooperative' indicates a greater diversity of security policies and predicaments or challenges than the term 'common', similarly, "cooperative both acknowledges the necessity to think 'comprehensively' in regards to state and transboundary issues and provides a process to engage issues and actors in a more comprehensive fashion".¹²

These factors will ensure that regional multipolar processes are likely to become an important feature of international politics. Robert Keohane commenting on Europe says that "avoiding military conflict after the Cold War depends greatly on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized cooperation."¹³ He defines multilateralism as "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states through *ad hoc* arrangements by means of institutions."¹⁴ John Ruggie defines multilateralism as "an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized principles of conduct. It specifies principles of appropriate conduct for a class of actions without regard to the

¹² David B. Dewitt, "Concepts of Security for the Asia-Pacific Region", in Bunn Nagara and K.S. Balakrishnan (ed.) The Making of a Security Community in Asia-Pacific (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p.31.

¹³ Robert O. Keohane, "The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies" in Helga H. Afterdorn and Christian Tuschhoff (eds.), America and Europe in an Era of Change (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p.53.

¹⁴ Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research", International Journal, vol.XLV, no.4, (Autumn 1990), p.731.

particularistic or the strategic interests of the parties, or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence".¹⁵ He argues that "there seems little doubt that multilateral norms and institutions appear to be playing a significant role in the management of a broad array of regional and global changes in the world system today."¹⁶

Therefore, the principles of state conduct are conditioned on notions of non-discrimination, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity. Non-discrimination is generally used to denote a situation where state behaviour is not conditioned or qualified by specific reference to the state involved or the nature of the national interest at stake. In security terms, this can be described as a system designed against an unknown enemy for the benefit of an unknown victim. The nature of such collectivity implies an indivisibility among the members. In terms of a multilateral Cooperative Security framework, the member states need to consider peace to be indivisible. This is a socially constructed phenomenon, in that state action based on the belief that peace is indivisible, makes cooperation possible. Finally, multilateralism needs to operate in an atmosphere of *diffuse reciprocity* where members expect cooperation to

¹⁵ John G. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution" International Organisation, vol.46, no.3, (Summer 1992), p.571.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.561.

yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and overtime. Such reciprocity rests on two aspects, contingency and equivalence. 'Contingency' is the principle of rewarding positive and deterring negative action through the threat of punishment, sanctions etc. 'Equivalence' refers to a rough equality in the level of reward to be exchanged between states.¹⁷

Brian Job argues that the *structure of attitudes* among the regional actors determines the prospects for multilateral institutions. While the relative distribution of power among the major states sets the parameters and constraints for the security structures of a particular region, it is the attitudes of governments towards one another that determine the specific form of security institutions that may be created. Job draws four conclusions about the implications of multilateralism in a regional context. First, where the security interests of major powers are perceived to be incompatible, the prevailing mode of multilateral security structure will be through sub-regional common defence agreements or alliances. Second, where there are no immediate threats to the security of major powers, more inclusive forms of multilateral security structures designed to

¹⁷ For implications of Ruggie's definition see Craig A. Snyder, "Multilateral Security in the South China Sea", Asian Perspective, vol.21, no.1 (Spring, 1997), p.9.

promote common attitudinal bases for security architectures may be developed. In these situations however, some states may still be reluctant to enter into multilateral security structures that limit their autonomy. Third, where there are no ideological differences among the major regional powers, multilateral security structures may be created that promote the development of common norms of state behaviour. Finally, the governing authorities of small states tend to be the strongest supporters of multilateral structures, since they are perceived to offer a kind of security guarantee of territorial integrity and protection of internal sovereignty. These multilateral institutions can be beneficial in community building, but are unlikely to engage in initiatives that might reduce conflicts involving their members.¹⁸ While scholars like Keohane and Ruggie equate the intensity of multilateralism with institutionalisation the advocates of Cooperative Security approach believe that regional multilateral processes can be carried forward by a gradual process of institutionalisation or even without it if the actors so want to with a view to avoid rigidity and strict agenda setting in their dialogues.

¹⁸ Brian Job, Multilateralism: The Relevance of the Concept to Regional Conflict Management, Working Paper No.5, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1994), pp.4-5.


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Common Security as a concept originated in Europe as a specific response to East-West rivalry overall, and particularly to strategic nuclear deterrence. The first major exposition of Common Security was by the *Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI)*, popularly known as *the Palme Commission*. The report, entitled *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* defined Common Security in the following terms:

"The avoidance of war, particularly nuclear war... even for existence of the nations of the world is interdependent. For both East and West, the avoidance of nuclear catastrophe depends on mutual recognition of the need for peaceful relations, national restraint and amelioration of the armaments competition. A more effective way to ensure security is to create positive processes that can lead to peace and disarmament. Acceptance of Common Security as the organising principle for efforts to reduce the risk of war, limit arms, and move towards disarmament means, in principle that cooperation will replace confrontation in resolving conflicts of interests."¹⁹

The Commission which made recommendations such as establishment of nuclear and chemical weapons free zones was primarily concerned to achieve 'security with' as opposed to 'security against' the adversary and ameliorate the security dilemma and arms races. Common Security suggests that the consideration of the *shadow of the future* in security decisions is, ultimately, in everybody's interest. Although, the

¹⁹ Olaf Palme, *et.al.*, *Common Security: A Blue Print for Survival*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp.7-11.



report had a chapter on economics its focus remained on military aspects. Subsequently, the *World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission)* and the *Commission on Global Governance* co-chaired by Ingvar Carlsson and Shridath Ramphal expanded the notions of Common Security.²⁰

David Dewitt is of the opinion that Cooperative Security differs from Common Security to the extent that the former envisages a gradual approach to developing multilateral institutions. It is also a more flexible concept, as it recognises the value of existing balance of power arrangements in contributing to regional security. Working with and through them allows multilateralism to become more successful.²¹ It thus has the potential to develop into a broadly accepted "homegrown" security doctrine. Operationalisation of Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific region will reflect the unique features and problems of the regional security environment.

Thus, Cooperative Security is not what a number of scholars of the Brookings Institution have written using the same label. Ashton B.

²⁰ Raimo Vayrynen, "Multilateral Security: Common, Cooperative or Collective", in Michael G. Schechter (ed), Future Multilateralism: The Political and Social Framework, (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp.55-57.

²¹ David B. Dewitt, op.cit., n.12, p.30.

Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbruner in '*A New Concept of Cooperative Security*' build on the idea of security cooperation and focus solely on the challenges facing the post-Cold War world where horizontal proliferation along with other military security dynamics, "have created some new problems of managing international security dynamics in the longer term. For the U.S. security policy in particular, the crisis is acute."²² They argue for a new approach to security dialogue between the US, Russia and Europe, aimed at developing a framework to regulate the levels and types of military deployments according to the principle of cooperative engagement - described as a 'commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit.'²³

While the above construction does pay lip service to the non-military dimension as 'unconventional security problems',²⁴ it is clearly

²² Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p.4. For other works on Cooperative Security emerging from the Brookings Institution see Janne E. Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).

²³ *Ibid.*, p.6.

²⁴ Harry Harding, "Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific in Janne E. Nolan (ed), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p.420.

oriented to the specific strategic circumstances which apply to the post - Cold War Europe, and designed to help guide the massive demobilization and demilitarization of European, Russian and the US military personnel, industry and facilities, limitations on the diffusion of nuclear weapons and other dual-use technologies in the 1990's. Nor does this version of Cooperative Security address sub-state violence, or other internal threats to state sovereignty.²⁵

Cooperative Security is partly a pragmatic response to those who might too quickly think of a restructured security architecture for the Asia-Pacific or other regions in the shadow of the Cold War demise, in terms either of classic *Collective Security* or more specifically the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Cooperative security in its gradualist approach would seek to establish "habits of dialogue" including "track two" diplomacy, whereby experts from the academic, governmental, official, non-governmental and private communities can meet in their individual capacities to converse about issues of common concern. While track two process is not unique to Cooperative Security, track two activities are facilitated by the lack of any requirement that

²⁵Alan Dupont, "Concepts of Security" in Jim Rolpe (ed) Unresolved Futures: Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1995), p.10.

formal institutional arrangements are a necessary precursor to progress on security question. In other words we should be thinking less about multilateral institutions which "focus on the formal organisational elements of international life and more about the institution of multilateralism which is grounded in appeals to be less formal, less codified habits, practices, ideas, and norms of international society."²⁶

Cooperative Security stands out from other approaches of security because of its emphasis on the principle of '*inclusivity*'. Regardless of government defining characteristics, its place in the international hierarchy of states, its allegiance to other multilateral fora or processes, its network of bilateral relationships, or its position on any one of a host of international issues, it can participate in the Cooperative Security process. By providing for built-in constraints against rigidification of process, structure or agenda Cooperative Security reassures states that enhancement of security particularly in the diffuse international order must not be viewed through the zero-sum, security dilemma prism. However, this is not to argue that Cooperative Security doesn't acknowledge the primacy of state interests, the realities of territorial

²⁶ James A. Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations", International Organization, vol.46, no.3 (Summer, 1992), p.602.

defence, the inevitability of competing and at times conflicting interests, and the increasing inter-penetrability of states and other actors. It views multilateral activity not as a challenge but a complement to enhanced bilateral activity. Coalition building in pursuit of consensus need not be an enemy to great power interests, but rather a means through which such states seek support in pursuit of goals at a time that they are either no longer able or willing to go it alone. Further, within distinct regions and sub-regions multilateral Cooperative Security processes afford non-regional or marginally regional actors opportunities for responsible participation, without the attributes of great power style intervention.

Thus, in the final analysis Cooperative Security provides for some loose signposts. and guidelines to ensure inclusiveness, promote means other than military ones to resolve differences, acknowledge divergences of interests, practices and capabilities and facilitate the modalities of a more secure and creative potential in the midst of the uncertain transition from bipolar dominant Cold War politics of containment and competition towards the regionalisation of security politics.²⁷

²⁷ David B. Dewitt, *op.cit.*, n. 12, pp.31-39.

CHAPTER II

ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY : THE COLD WAR YEARS

The international system has been shaped, and its structure determined, primarily by the rise and fall of great powers.¹ In spite of the fact that international politics has always been in a state of flux, the one constant thing that can be deciphered is the great power rivalry for supremacy in the hierarchy of states. The post-World War II period proved to be unparalleled in scope as far as the study of the great power behaviour is concerned. The single dominant reality of the Cold War has been the pre-eminent status of two great powers - the United States and the Soviet Union at the top of the international hierarchy of states whose combined power and resources far surpassed the rest of the countries to give them the status of '*superpowers*'. The theatre of rivalry was no longer confined to Europe as the superpowers had a *global reach*. The advent of nuclear weapons changed the nature of conflicts by maintaining a '*balance of terror*' by conjuring an image of '*Mutually Assured*

¹ Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York : Random House, 1987), p.3.

Destruction' (MAD) in case of a nuclear holocaust². Hence, the hostile superpower relations which stopped short of a hot war due to operation of deterrence, brought about a change in the rules of international politics. The Cold War was viewed as a zero - sum game where *relative gains* mattered a lot. Instead of hot wars each superpower tried to extend and consolidate its own sphere of influence. Hence, the policies of *containment* and *domino effect* loomed large in the minds of the decision makers. The wars were more often fought by proxy without, however, escalating it to a direct superpower confrontation. Thus, the global reach, the spheres of influence, the policies of containment and proxy wars created a *strategic overlay* which, to a large extent shaped and determined the regional security structure.³

The significant difference between the Cold War situation in the European theatre and that of Asia was that in the former the dominant spheres of influence of seized an superpowers was clearly demarcated with an unwritten code of non-interference in each other's zones of hegemony. The US with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO)

² For details of the nature of nuclear deterrence see James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Contenting Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pp.368-371.

³ Charles W Kegley, Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics : Trend and Transformation (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997) p.80.

was at the helm of affairs in Western Europe, while the Soviet Union with the WARSAW Pact maintained its hegemonic influence in Eastern Europe. However, in the Asia-Pacific the situation was much more fluid. The superpowers tried to extend their zones of influence and countries like China changed sides giving rise to a *strategic triangle*. The non-aligned dimension also added to the prevailing uncertainty during the Cold War. It was in the Asia-Pacific that the Korean and the Vietnam wars were fought. But the fact that they were 'limited' and did not become general wars is indicative of the of the greater flexibility that applied to the region. It was possible to insulate conflicts and prevent them from engulfing the region as a whole.

The countries of the region did not on the whole join multiple or regional alliance systems. Rather bilateral alliances typically between a super power and a regional partner were forged. This allowed for significant variations within the region as to how the links between the global, the regional and the local levels could apply at any given time. The ineffectiveness of multilateral alliance systems like the SEATO on one hand and the strong US - Japan alliance on the other aptly illustrates the above point. Thus, the Asia-Pacific can claim to be located at an important geographical junction of post World War II politics where the

competing Cold War interests of the two superpowers intersected with each other with those of the two major regional powers, China and Japan and with the smaller resident states to give the region its distinctive identity.⁴ However, before delving deep into the Cold War dynamics of the region, a brief picture of the evolution of a distinct regional identity needs to be laid down as an introductory passage to the Cold War Story.

The Asia-Pacific region is still in a state of becoming, of forging a new and distinct identity. Right from the very beginning the 'construction' of an Asia-Pacific identity has been attributed more to exogenous rather than to endogenous forces. The region bears the indelible marks of the colonial legacy. Rather than any considerations of homogeneity, shared cultural norms and common political values, a regional identity was forged once the great powers treated the diverse countries of the area as a distinct arena of international politics and economics.

The spread of international politics beyond Europe after the first World War gave the Asia-Pacific some sort of regional coherence. The *Washington Naval Conference* of 1921-22 treated the Asia-Pacific region

⁴ Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London : Routledge, 1997), p. 2.

as a distinct geographical region for the first time. The great powers of the day formally agreed to fix the ratio of the warships to be deployed in the Pacific. This was a move to limit the rising power of Japan - the first state in the region to challenge the Western powers. By the 1930's the Japanese not only repudiated the agreement but sought to keep the Western powers out of the region by proposing an '*East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere*' in 1938. However, the brutality and domineering behaviour of the Japanese undermined their image as liberators. The fear psyche which the Japanese hammered into the people of the region has cast a shadow well into the post Cold War era. The Second World War which saw several agreements among wartime allies like the Quebec Conference of 1943, which set up the Southeast Asian Command, the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of 1945 helped to give parts of the region greater geo-political coherence.⁵

THE INITIAL YEARS OF THE COLD WAR (1945-71)

Following the end of World War II and the defeat of Japan the evolution of the region may be seen as beginning with great power arrangements to accommodate the distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific to the global balance of power. A new balance of power emerged

⁵ Ibid., pp.21-22.

under the impact of the Cold War as the US sought to contain the challenge of two major Communist powers. This was linked to struggles for independence from colonial rule and subsequent attempts to consolidate independence and build new nations. Local elites tended to seek external support and patronage. Thus, linkages were formed between external balance of power considerations and regional and local conflicts that were defined primarily in terms of the Cold War.

Although the Pacific war provided strategic rationale for treating the region as a whole the Western allies came to treat Northeast and Southeast Asia separately. As the US concentrated its forces on the assault of Japan itself, Britain was entrusted with winning the war in the Southeast Asian countries of Burma, Thailand, Singapore and Sumatra. In July 1945, the Dutch East Indies, excluding the island of East Timor as well as Indo-China South of the sixteenth degree parallel was transferred to the Southeast Asian Command under Admiral Mountbatten. Indo-China, north of the sixteenth parallel was allocated to the China command of Chiang Kai-shek and the remaining areas were designated as the South West Pacific command. This "division of labour was to accentuate the differences between the two sub-regions of Northeast and Southeast Asia in the early years after the war since the immediate agenda for the north

centered on relations between the US and the Soviet Union and the domestic evolutions of China and Japan; that of the south turned on the struggles for independence with the returned colonial powers.”⁶ These struggles for independence had implications for global distribution of power and influence.

In Northeast Asia the understandings of the post-Yalta Conference reflected the realities of American maritime hegemony in the Pacific and Soviet dominance of the landmass.⁷ Following the Communist Victory in the Chinese Civil War, Mao Tse-tung stepped up his pro-USSR and anti-US speeches and signed an alliance treaty with the USSR in February 1950.⁸ The anti-communist sentiment and McCarthyism in the USA led to a changed perception towards Japan as an ally to be counted rather than a vanquished opponent to be clipped. However, American stake in Northeast Asia were limited before the Korean war. The US *Perimeter Defence Strategy* ran from Aleutians through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines. Despite American aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan

⁶ Michael Yahuda provides a detailed account of the initial impact of Cold War upon the Asia-Pacific region. *Ibid.*, pp.22-23.

⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States (New York : Mc Graw Hill, 1990), pp.165-167.

⁸ Suisheng Zhao, Power Competition in East Asia : From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity (London : Macmillan, 1997), pp.91-92.

and Syngman Rhee regime in South Korea, commitment to them was more qualified. American priorities were in Europe and it didn't want to get overcommitted elsewhere.⁹ On the contrary the Soviet Union had a major influence in establishing and arming of Kim Il Sung regime.

However, the outbreak of the Korean War resulted in underlining the sharp differences between the Communist side on one hand and the free world on the other. The North Korean attack on the South across the thirty-eighth degree parallel on 25 June 1950 was, according to the communists, an attempt to reunite the two Koreas. But from the Western perspective this event, following the 1949 Berlin Blockade by the Soviets, was viewed as an act of aggression. The NSC 68 (National Security Council Resolution 68) of 1949 was applied to Northeast Asia and that became the first case of the extension of Cold War strategic thinking to Asia. An economic embargo on China and positioning of the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits resulted from the Korean crisis. This was done to preempt chances of Chinese attack upon Taiwan on one hand and deny Taiwan as a potential Soviet Union base in the Western Pacific on the other. This heightened Mao's fear that US was supporting Chiang Kai-shek regime with the hope of invading the Chinese mainland to reverse

⁹ Ibid., p.101.

the result of the Chinese Civil War.¹⁰ However, it was only after the US dominated UN forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, inspite of Chinese warnings to exercise restraint, that China got involved in the Korean crisis and the UN forces retreated beyond the thirty-eighth parallel. The Korean War was beneficial to Moscow in the sense that for a long time it put an end to the possibilities of an accomodation between Beijing and Washington.¹¹ Although Eisenhower had threatened to use nuclear weapons, so as to put an end to the armistic negotiations, the Korean War was in effect, the first limited war of the Cold War era.¹² The US, in the post Korean crisis period sought to make its presence felt in Northeast Asia. Inspite of the fact that the idea of a Pacific Pact was not successful due to the distrust of other US allies about the role of Japan, the US through a series of bilateral agreements like the *Mutual Defence Treaty* with the Phillipines (1951) and the US-Japan Treaty (1952) strengthened its position in Asia-Pacific. It formed the Australia, New Zealand and the US alliance (ANZUS) in 1951. However, the Soviet side

¹⁰ John Lewis Gaddis, "Korea in American Politics, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1949-50" in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (eds). The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo : University of Tokyo Press), pp.227-280.

¹¹ B. Borisov and B.T Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1973 : A Brief History (Moscow: Mysl Publishers, 1980) p.117.

¹² Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York : Harper Collins, 1957), p.140.

could not dominate Northeast Asia as it did in Eastern Europe. It exercised influence not control over North Korea. People's Republic of China (PRC) was too big, independent and proud to be dominated in that way especially as it proved itself to be a major power on the battle fields of Korea.¹³

The end of the Pacific war also had a significant impact on the Southeast Asian politics - both domestic and international. According to Michael Leifer three levels of foreign relations may be identified in the early evolution of the foreign relations of the states in Southeast Asia. Firstly, the process of acquiring independence and the character of the post-colonial settlement involved relations with former rulers. In some cases these endured in relative harmony well beyond the transfer of sovereignty. The second level involved local reactions to great power participation in the region. The third involved intra-regional relations among the resident states.¹⁴

The Americans pressed for early independence of the Southeast Asian countries as they feared that the appeal of Communism to the

¹³ Michael Yahuda, *op.cit.*, n.4, p.28.

¹⁴ Michael Leifer, The Foreign Relations of New States (Melbourne : Longman Australia, 1974), p.2.

peoples of Asia would grow if the nationalists were to be continually frustrated in their rightful quest for independence. The Americans helped local elites in crushing the insurgency of communist rebels in many countries like the Philippines which became a close associate of the US. The US not only extended economic aid but also included the Philippines in its *Strategic Defence Perimeter* in the Pacific. Malaya and Thailand were the two other pro-Western states of the region which incidentally had formed the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) along with the Philippines in 1963. The Organisation became a non-starter because of the rigid stand of the Philippines over the Sabah Islands.

Among the Southeast Asian countries Indonesia earned the unique distinction of practising a policy of non-alignment. This was partly because of the impact of a complex struggle for independence and partly because of a high self-esteem, and self-perception as it had as the major power in Southeast Asia. Burma, faced with the towering presence of China and a callous attitude by the West opted for a policy of what Michael Leifer has called 'non-offence'. By early 1950's Burma became active in voicing the concerns of Asian neutralism and played a key role in convening the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955.¹⁵

¹⁵ Ibid., p.14.

Indo-China was to Southeast Asia what Korea was to Northeast Asia. It may not be far off from truth to describe Vietnam as the cockpit of Asia. Since 1946 the Communist led Vietminh had carried out an armed struggle against France for independence. While the Americans backed popular struggles for independence elsewhere in the region they were silent in Vietnam as the popular struggle led by Vietminh had the backing of the victorious Chinese Communists. The Americans after the Elysee Agreements of March 1949 backed a Vietnamese nationalistic alternative to Communist Vietminh. However, the Chinese support tilted the balance in favour of Vietminh and the French finally conceded defeat after the Dien Bien Phu incident in May 1954.¹⁶ The protracted wars culminated in the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China in July 1954. The agreements resulted in the recognition of the independence of Laos and Cambodia and of a Communist North Vietnam and a non-Communist South Vietnam. The Geneva Agreement pleased the Chinese as they perceived that the agreements prevented an immediate US attack on China using Indo-China as a gateway. It also seemed to justify the Chinese diplomatic stance of 'peaceful co-existence' as a means to

¹⁶ Martin Borthwick, Pacific Century (Boulder:Westview Press, 1992), pp.235-239.

concentrate on economic development at home. The Americans however, were not pleased with the Geneva Accord and didn't recognise China's claim for a great power status. But during negotiations it went alongside with its allies, the British and the French .¹⁷

As the Korean war helped in redefining American strategy in the Northeast, the aftermath of the Vietnam war resulted in the signing of *Collective Defence Treaty* for Southeast Asia at Manila. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established in the following year at Bangkok with the US, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines as its signatories. A protocol attached to the treaty extended the provisions of the agreement to South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. While Cambodia rejected the treaty in 1955 stating that it is inconsistent with its neutrality, Laos was eventually excluded from the treaty's scope by the outcome of the Geneva Conference of 1962.¹⁸

The result of these developments was the limited Soviet presence, both in terms of political alliances and military might and economic clout. In contrast the US provided a hegemonic stability to the region by

¹⁷ Suisheng Zhao, *opcit*, n.4, p.125.

¹⁸ Michael Yahuda, *opcit*, n.4, pp.50-51.

offering favourable public goods so that the countries enjoyed, what is called a *free rider effect*. This policy reflected the economic aspect of containment. Most of the pro-Western states were dictatorial regimes. Hence, to prevent communist insurgency, massive economic aid and favourable trade policies were extended to these states. This, the Americans believed would be an effective measure to prevent a domino effect.

The application of American doctrine of containment, as duly modified by the Eisenhower *New Look* strategy and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' concept of '*nuclear brinkmanship*' and '*massive retaliation*' was partially tested in the 1954 and 1958 crises over the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

The first Taiwanese Crisis of 1954 can be traced to the panic reactions of China which perceived a mutual defence treaty between Washington and Taipei in the offing. By shelling the islands China was, firstly, declaring its intention to lay claim upon Taiwan; secondly, warning off America's allies from a putative alliance; thirdly, complicating the American position by compelling it to include the protection of these islands in its treaty commitment so as to make more difficult the establishment of Taiwan as a separate entity; and finally, it was hoping to

begin a dialogue with the US so as to break the economic embargo and isolation imposed upon it by the US. The Taipei leaders sought an American commitment that not only would ensure its relative equality with America's other Asian allies but also uphold its occupation of the off-shore islands in the hope of an eventual return to mainland China. The American interest was to link, Taiwan in the emerging security system of the Asia-Pacific and complete the cordon of Containment. Hence, it signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China(Taiwan) on 2 December 1954. The Congress Formosa Resolution gave Eisenhower discretion to defend the off-shore islands, should he judge that necessary for the security of Taiwan itself. Chiang Kai-shek got separate assurances about the Quemoy and Matsu Islands but not about the more northerly Dazhen (Tachen) islands which were taken over by the People's Republic of China. This assured Beijing as it confirmed the statements emanating from Washington that Eisenhower opposed any plans of invading the mainland China.

The second off-shore islands crisis 1958, followed from the failure to solve the deeper problems inherent in the first. The Sino-American Geneva Talks of August 1955 failed as the price that the US and China, each demanded of the other for improving relations was concession

regarding Taiwan, that neither was in a position to make. The Americans wanted Beijing to agree to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan area and the PRC wanted the Americans to agree to withdraw from the region. By 1958 having failed to get from China what it wanted and having succeeded in maintaining Taiwan's participation in numerous international fora, the US suspended talks with China. China angered by such a development started bombardment of Quemoy in the summer of 1958 which stopped after public warnings by Eisenhower and Dulles including the possible use of nuclear weapons. Soviet Union wholeheartedly supported China and Khrushchev warned the USA that an attack on the PRC would be considered as an attack on the Soviet Union. Emboldened by this assurance Beijing resumed intensive shelling and then announced a ceasefire. The second Taiwanese crisis left Taiwan firmly embedded within the American scheme of containment and it was not until the Sino-US *rapprochement* that the Taiwan issue took a different turn.¹⁹

However, the Sino-Soviet camaraderie was gradually collapsing as the Chinese leaders were not prepared to toe the Soviet leaders line of thought and the Soviet leaders could not allow an independent China to

¹⁹ For a brilliant analysis of the Taiwan straits crisis see Zun Zhan, Ending the Chinese Civil War : Power, Commerce and Conciliation between Beijing and Taipei (New York : St Martins Press, 1995), pp. 10-28.

place the Soviet Union's global strategic interests in jeopardy. While Khrushchev was successful in diffusing some tension with the US, Mao faced an obdurate Eisenhower administration. While the Soviet Union could concentrate on domestic reforms and declared an interest in preventing domestic conflicts within nations, China facing domestic economic crisis, had no alternative but support the wars of national liberation. Thus, the Eisenhower strategy of following different strategies towards the two Communist giants helped the US to a large extent in fomenting a division within the Communist bloc. Chinese and Soviet leaders accused each other of betraying the cause of Communism.

Another turning point came with the refusal of the Soviet Union in 1959 to supply China with a sample atomic bomb as per the terms of the Nuclear Sharing Act of 1958. The Sino-US collusion to prevent China from developing its own nuclear weapons as seen in the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 also drove a wedge between the Soviet Union and China. However, China successfully developed and tested the nuclear bomb at Lop Nor in 1964.²⁰ The Soviet stand which varied from neutrality to support for India during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 led to an

²⁰ Jonathan D. Pollack, 'China and the Global Strategic Balance,' in Harry Harding, (ed) China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1982), p.150.

acrimonious relationship between the two Communist Countries.²¹ The Sino-Soviet tensions had an impact upon Asia-Pacific. A case in point was Sukarno's Indonesia. Sukarno became more militant and began to lean more to the Chinese side as the Sino-Soviet conflict unfolded. The result was a Djakarta - Phnom Penh -Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis against the British and the Commonwealth troops. The 1965 coup in Indonesia, which brought Major General Suharto to power, offset the alliance.²²

However, the major impact of the change of Sino-Soviet relations was upon the second Indo-China War. The importance of Indo-China in the US policy circles stemmed from the popularity of the domino theory. The Americans believed that the fall of South Vietnam due to a communist victory would trigger a chain reaction in Indo-China and Southeast Asia and the entire region would go red. The lack of social base of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South-Vietnam vis-a-vis the popular support of Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam coupled with the establishment of National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) caused alarm in Washington. The newly formed Kennedy Administration viewed that

²¹ Steven M. Goldstein, "Nationalism and Internationalism : Sino-Soviet Relations," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Sambaugh (eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) pp.235-240.

²² Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London : George Allen and Unwin 1983), p.105.

South Vietnam should not be allowed to 'go red' and Chinese support for such movements had to be dealt strongly. Such an action in the US perception would reassure the third world allies and friends of the US. Lyndon B. Johnson, who became the US president after John F. Kennedy's assassination, ordered the US armed forces to replace the South Vietnamese army as the main combat troops. But the attempt to compel the North Vietnamese to negotiate by stepping up the bombing backfired as the US had underestimated the commitment of the Communists to the nationalist cause. The Chinese were more than willing to come to North Vietnam's rescue. By 1968 around 525,000 US troops were in Vietnam.²³ The Second Indo-China war was an unmitigated disaster for the US and the ghost of Vietnam continues to haunt the US foreign policy to date. The war drained the US, killed many of its army men during action in a foreign land leading to sharp domestic protests and resulted in its hegemonic decline. The SEATO proved to be of little help and by 1966 tacit understandings were reached with the Chinese to prevent escalation of war to a direct military confrontation between China and the USA. The Soviet Union on its part found time to bridge the

²³ William Head, "Vietnam and Its Wars : A Historical Overview of US Involvement" in William Head and Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.). Looking Back on The Vietnam War. (Westport : Praeger, 1993), p.27.

technological gap. It also seized an opportunity to augment its naval capabilities and its Pacific Fleet. This fleet which became the largest in the Soviet navy gave them a significant capacity to project force in the region.²⁴ Although both the Soviet Union and China supported North Vietnam, there was no Sino-Soviet cooperation on the issue reflecting the fracture within the Communist bloc.

The larger strategic purpose of the war was altogether lost as the international balance of power underwent a dramatic change about which reference will presently appear. Washington aligned with Beijing and pursued *detente* with Moscow. This helped the US to beat a dignified retreat from Vietnam after the 1973 agreement with North Vietnam. But the final humiliation of the US took place when in 1975 the North Vietnam army reunified entire Vietnam by force. It was during the courses of the war (July, 1969) that Nixon announced a new security doctrine for the US in Asia. The '*Nixon Doctrine*' stated that, henceforth, the allies would be expected to do the bulk of ground fighting and the Americans would contribute with their navy and airforce from off-shore and provide for military training. The Vietnam debacle marked the growing

²⁴ Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia" in Donald Zagoria (ed) Soviet Policy in East Asia (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1982) pp.255-262.

uncertainties about the durability of American capabilities and will to deploy countervailing power when needed.

THE '*STRATEGIC TRIANGLE*' AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Before the impact of the changed scenario in the Asia-Pacific region could be felt the structure of the international system underwent a dramatic change. Kissinger's Beijing coup in 1971 and the Sino-US 'rapprochement'²⁵ changed the post-1971 international system and brought into play what has often been described as the dynamics of a 'strategic triangle.'²⁶ The strategic parity which the USSR achieved by bridging the 'technological gap' gave the '*China factor*' a new significance. While certain scholars viewed China as a global power with regional significance others like Michael Yahuda hold the view that "even within the Asia-Pacific the effect of tripolarity was not to change the fundamental pattern of alliances involving the US and the Soviet Union, but rather to change the position and relations of China."²⁷ The one American international alliance that ended was with Taiwan. But it was

²⁵ Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston : Little Brown and Company, 1979), p.755.

²⁶ Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle : An Elementary Game Theoretical Analysis" World Politics, vol.33, no 4 (July,1981) pp.488-516.

²⁷ Michael Yahuda, op.cit, n.4, p.78.

soon renewed through domestic American legislation in form of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1978. China's relations in the region changed rapidly particularly in Southeast Asia where relations were soon established with former adversaries like Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. The admission of China into the UN not only ended its ostracization from the international system but also provided the legal channels to lay stake to a great power status. However, in reality it was China's relative weakness that brought it closer to the US against the perceived threat from the USSR.²⁸ The USSR was on its part assured that as long as the US sought detente and stability it would resist Chinese efforts to turn the Sino-US rapprochement explicitly against the USSR. It was only when the US abandoned detente in 1979 that the Soviet Union feared of such a possibility. The Reagan Administration, which came into power in 1980, engaged in a massive military buildup (the *Strategic Defence Initiative* [SDI]) popularly known as Star Wars. This had the twin effect of comparatively weakening Soviet Union, which was wound up in the Afghan conflict, and making China's pivotal role redundant. It was then that China, in 1982, announced an independent foreign policy and

²⁸ Robert S. Ross, "Conclusion : Tripolarity and Policy Making , " in Robert S Ross (ed) China, the United States and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War World (New York : M.C. Sharpe, 1993), p.179.

the Soviet leaders responded positively to Chinese initiatives to improve their bilateral relations. Hence, during the first phase of tripolarity that lasted until 1979 the Chinese were regarded as the main source of anti-Soviet hostility seeking to push the US from the path of detente towards confrontation; in the second phase from 1980 until about 1988 the role was reversed as Washington was cast in the role of seeking to restrain Beijing from reaching an accomodation with Moscow.

The dynamics of the strategic triangle, as indicated above, had an impact on the Asia-Pacific region. The immediate impact was upon Taiwan. The famous *Shanghai Communique* of February 1972 signed by Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai allowed the US alone, of all Western nations to maintain full diplomatic relations and a security treaty with Taiwan while simultaneously maintaining a quasi-embassy in Beijing. Even when relations were normalized between Washington and Beijing in January 1979, Washington was able to insist on its interest in a peaceful resolution of Beijing -Taipei dispute and on its intention to continue to sell arms to the island. Although the US had to abrogate its defence treaty with Taiwan, the Taiwan Relation Act(TRA) of 1978 enabled the US to

maintain a capacity to "resist any resort to force that would jeopardize the security of the people of Taiwan".²⁹

The Sino-US rapprochement came as an initial shock to Japan, as it had not been taken into confidence. However, Japan under Kakuei Tanaka as Prime Minister moved in to establish diplomatic relations with China in September 1972.³⁰ In spite of simmering tensions between China and Japan in the early 1970's, the former never sought to play off Japan and the US against each other as the US-Japan alliance was seen in Chinese circles as a constraint upon the Soviet Union and as the bedrock of strategic stability in East Asia.³¹

The Soviet moves to sign a peace and friendship treaty with Japan failed on account of the Soviet refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of Japanese right even to dispute ownership of the Kurile islands to the north of Japan. The Soviet diplomacy was judged to be overbearing and this was one of the major push factors for the August 1978 *Treaty of Peace and Friendship* between China and Japan that inter alia, expressed

²⁹ Michael Yahuda, *op.cit.*, n.4, p.83.

³⁰ John K. Emmerson and Harrison M. Lolland, *The Eagle and the Rising Sun : America and Japan in the Twentieth Century* (Reading : Addison-Wesley, 1988), p.180.

³¹ Henry Kissinger, *op.cit.*, n.25, p.1090.

opposition to 'hegemony', widely regarded as a Chinese code for the Soviet Union. The Sino-Japanese treaty also contributed to emboldening the Chinese to mount an attack on Vietnam in early 1979. The Soviets were now confronted in East Asia by an alignment of the most populous, the most successful economically and the most powerful state that is China, Japan and the US respectively. This may well have played a part in the Soviet decision to support Vietnam in its conquest of Cambodia in 1978 and its own invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Although the era of tripolarity did not have much of an effect on the Korean Peninsula where the Cold War logic of bipolarity reigned supreme, the new divisions and realignments cast its shadow on Indo-China resulting in a third war in the sub-region. China feared that the US withdrawal from Indo-China after the Paris Agreements of 1973 would lead to a vacuum which could be filled up by the Soviets. The opportunistic seizure of the Paracel Islands by China added to growing tensions between Hanoi and Beijing. However the real snap of ties between Vietnam and China centered on the Cambodian issue. The virulent anti-Vietnamese nationalism of Khmer Rouge served Chinese interests by denying Vietnam the opportunity of dominating the whole of Indo-China. Backed by membership of COMECON in June 1978 and by a

formal friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in November the same year, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and captured Phnom Penh in January 1979. It imposed a regime of its choice. The Khmer Rouge forces retreated to the Cambodian-Thailand border and started guerilla warfare. Deng Xiaoping vowed to "teach Vietnam a lesson" and launched an attack on 17 February 1979 into North Vietnam ostensibly because of border violations.³² This resulted in a stalemate that lasted ten years in which an internationally isolated Vietnam was dependent upon the Soviet Union to sustain its dominant position in Cambodia, while being confronted on the margins by resistance forces that enjoyed international legitimacy and support from China, the US and the ASEAN countries. China which had criticised the ASEAN as a 'proto-imperialist organisation' when it was formed in 1967, had by 1978 wholeheartedly supported it. The crisis in Indo-China also reflected the failure of the *Fukuda Doctrine*, named after the Japanese Prime Minister. The Fukuda Doctrine of 1977 meant to bring an accomodation between Vietnam and the ASEAN by using Japan's economic strength and thereby weaning Vietnam away from the Soviet Union.

³² Suisheng Zhao, *opcit*, n.8, pp.145-150.

An external threat in the form of Vietnam helped the ASEAN to emerge as a more cohesive diplomatic body. The recharged Southeast Asian nations got together to declare Southeast Asia as a '*Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)*' that would be free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers. In 1974 Malaysia became the first ASEAN country to recognize the PRC. Thailand and the Philippines followed suit in 1975 probably due to the pressure arising out of victories by revolutionaries in Vietnam and Cambodia. The limits of the US in the Asia-Pacific got exposed during the Vietnam war and the Nixon Doctrine forced the, ASEAN members to reorient their foreign policies to the changed environment. The ASEAN summit meeting of 1976 reaffirmed the purpose of the association as a body primarily concerned with the internal security and of the vision for the attainment of a regional order that emphasized the peaceful settlement of disputes. It held out the prospect of the socialist Indo-Chinese states becoming associated with the ASEAN through a *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)*. Keeping in tune with its stated regional security policy the ASEAN refused to accept the legitimacy of the Vietnam imposed government, while granting Khmer Rouge that status irrespective of the latter's gruesome record. The ASEAN also played an important diplomatic role in keeping Vietnam

isolated at various international fora like the UN. The ASEAN response was shaped by Thailand, which as a frontline state, helped China in supplying assistance to Khmer Rouge and also provided a safe sanctuary to the latter to indulge in guerilla warfare³³.

By the end of the decade of 70's *detente* gave way to a *New Cold War* and American Star Wars made China's pivotal role redundant. The Soviet position in the Asia-Pacific had worsened considerably due to the drain in Afghanistan.³⁴ China following the changed focus towards domestic economic growth due to the launching of the *Four Modernizations* in 1978 under Deng modified its foreign policy. Realising that it has been downgraded in the US need-hierarchy, the Chinese leaders declared in 1982 that China would pursue an independent foreign policy. It sought to reestablish relationship with the Soviets but not before the Soviets had made the concession of removing the three famous obstacles-(i)ending Soviet support for Vietnam in Cambodia,

³³ Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South East Asia (London : Routledge, 1989), pp.147-150.

³⁴ Robert S. Ross, 'US Policy Towards China : The Strategic Context and the Policy Making Process in Robert Ross (ed) op.cit., n.28, pp.169-171.

(ii) withdrawing the Soviet occupation forces from Afghanistan and (iii) reducing Soviet military threat on the Chinese border.³⁵

Significant changes in the era of tripolarity occurred only after Gorbachev came into power. Gorbachev's Perestroika was designed to reinvigorate the Soviet economy through modest domestic economic reforms and further integration into the world economy. The need to reverse the excessive reliance that had been put upon military force and place emphasis upon economic dimension can be seen in the July 1985 five-year trade agreement (1986-90) between the Soviet Union and China. It was worth \$14 billion and had an impact of nearly doubling the level of bilateral trade.³⁶ The Soviet policy now seemed to be oriented towards disentanglement from costly regional conflicts of the Third World and focused on building a *New Detente* with the US. The signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) agreement of December 1987 between the US and the Soviet Union and the international agreement of 1988 by which the Soviets pledged to withdraw all their armed forces from Afghanistan brought the Cold War hostilities to an end. The Chinese demands were amicably met by the Soviet Union and this resulted in the

³⁵ Michael Yahuda, op.cit., n.4, p.94.

³⁶ Suisheng Zhao, op.cit., n.8, p.156.

'normalization' of Sino-Soviet relations through a visit to Beijing by Gorbachev in May 1989.

It was Gorbachev who at Vladivostok in 1986 and Krasnodar in 1988 proposed the idea of an '*Asian Security System*'. Although the idea had a lukewarm response it was not viewed with scepticism as the 1969 Brezhnev idea of the '*Asian Collective Security System*' which had the underlying motive to encircle China. However, the Gorbachev idea is being given a serious consideration in the post-Cold War era by many policy makers and scholars.

The other countries of the region also responded positively to the warm international environment. South Korea, for example established successful diplomatic relations with both China and the Soviet Union under the aegis of its new 'Northern Policy'. The significance of military high politics declined and the economic issues gained salience. The powerful growth of the 'Newly Industrialized Countries'(NICs) or the '*Asian Tigers*' demanded a peaceful environment. Not only Japan but countries like China, averaging an 8.4% growth rate largely welcomed the beginning of the end of Cold War. Vietnam, committed to replace the conventional socialistic economic model with a programme of 'Renovation' (*Doi Moi*) in 1986, announced that it would withdraw from

Cambodia.³⁷ Thus, as the curtains on the Cold War were drawn, the Asia-Pacific region was delicately poised to enter into the post-Cold War era.

³⁷ Michael Yahuda, *op.cit.*, n.4, p.100.

CHAPTER III

ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY : THE POST COLD WAR ERA

For the Asia - Pacific region, the end of the Cold War has merely meant, the disappearance of just one dimension of its security problem. With the end of the Cold War, the countries of the region will no longer face the danger of getting embroiled in an East - West confrontation or the threat of great power interference in the context of East-West competition. From that perspective, the end of the Cold War has created an opportunity for a more peaceful international climate in the Asia-Pacific region with prospects for promoting greater economic and trade relations among states without the political constraints brought about by Cold War bipolarisation.

It does not follow however, that peace and stability will thus be created, for the problem of security in the Asia-Pacific region has been complex and multidimensional in nature, more, for instance, than in Europe, the birthplace as well as deathbed of the Cold War. Aside from the fluidity of the Cold War dynamics the region has always contained within itself various seeds of potential conflicts, both domestic and

regional or interstate. East-West competition of the Cold War had indeed tended to exacerbate existing conflict situations of both types because of the support given by the two blocs of the Cold War for their respective protagonists in the conflicts to serve their interests. However, more often than not they were not the primary sources of conflict themselves.¹

Hence, the various security problems have survived the end of the Cold War and have got a new colour and dimension in the post-Cold War era. Certain conflict situations which were buried under the Cold War dynamics have suddenly burst open alongside new issues and agendas in the Asia-Pacific region and deserve serious attention.

The conflict dynamics which earlier were operating under the global strategic dynamic now are operating under a regional security framework. Hence, a preliminary understanding of the emerging power dynamics is a necessary prelude to understanding the security issues and concerns of the region.

There are three major images of the emerging regional security architecture. Suffice it to say that the new power configuration has not taken its final shape, in strategic terms. This is because "never before

¹ J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Cooperative Security in the Asia - Pacific Region: An ASEAN Perspective" The Indonesia Quarterly, vol. XXII, no.3, pp. 206-207.

have the components of world order, their capacity to interact, and their goals all changed quite so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally. Both Bush and Clinton spoke of the New World Order as if it were just around the corner. In fact it is still in a period of gestation, and its final form will not be visible until well into the next century".² These three major models would be examined keeping into consideration the contentions of some analysts, that there exists a power or security 'vacuum' in the Asia-Pacific region.³

² Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p.806. Kissinger sees the last several centuries as having three long definable systems: the order that grew out of the Peace of Westphalia that lasted for 150 years, the 100 years of the system created by the Congress of Vienna and (after the twenty years long Versailles 'Armistice') forty plus years long Cold War.

³ Although the presence of a power vacuum is intrinsically accepted in the chapter the theory is not without challenge. David Sambaugh writes that many Chinese strategists do not believe that the presence of US forces in the Asia-Pacific prevents a power vacuum from developing. See David Sambaugh, "Growing Strong". China's Challenges to Asian Security", Survival, vol.36, no.2, Summer 1994, p.51. Also see Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of the Security Environment in Southeast Asia in the Post- Cold War Era", Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.47, no.2 (October 1993), p.268.

The proponents of the power vacuum theory are William J. Crower, Jr. and Alan D. Romberg, "Rethinking Security in the Pacific", Foreign Affairs, vol.70, no.2 (Spring 1991), p.124.

J. Mohan Malik, "Conflict Patterns and Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific: Post Cold War Era", China Report, vol.28, no.4, (October-December, 1992), pp.305-328.

Denny Roy, "Assessing the Asia-Pacific 'Power Vacuum'", Survival, vol.37, no.3 (Autumn 1995), pp.45-60.

Images of the Coming Regional Order

The first image of the future of the Asia-Pacific region is premised upon the overwhelming American presence in the Asia-Pacific region. It echoes the views of Charles Krauthammer who argues that the end of Cold War has left the US as the sole superpower.

Rejecting the views of the declinist theories, the Krauthammer thesis echoed by others, is summed up in the following excerpt:

"The most striking feature of the post - Cold War world is its unipolarity. No doubt multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the US, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre - World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will be for decades. Now is the *unipolar moment*."⁴

Samuel Huntington arguing in the same vein says that:

"in contrast to other countries the United States ranks extraordinarily high in almost all the major sources of national power: population size and education, natural resources, economic development, social cohesion, political stability, military strength, ideological appeal, diplomatic alliances and technological achievement. It is consequently, able to sustain reverses in any one area which maintaining its overall influence stemming from other sources."⁵

⁴ Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', Foreign Affairs, vol.70, no.1(1990-1991), pp.23-33.

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "The US-Dilemma or Renewal?" Foreign Affairs (Winter 1988-89), pp.76-96.

The long cycle theory advanced by George Modelski also predicts American hegemony atleast till the first quarter of the next century.⁶

Given the fact that the US has been a major power in the Asia-Pacific since the Cold War era, and China's rise is still premised upon many preconditions; analysts believe that the US will still be able to play the role of a hegemon. It would help provide strategic stability and thereby maintain peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, another competing image is that of an *incipient bipolarity*. This thesis is based on China's rise as a great power. China with a tremendous economic growth touching double digits and massive military modernization will be ready to challenge US hegemony by the end of the first decade of the next century. The thesis has been popularized of late by Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro in their book, '*The Coming Conflict with China*.'⁷ Kenneth Waltz writes that great powers are defined by capabilities. Their rank in the international hierarchy of states depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory; resource endowment; military strength; political stability; and

⁶ See Richard Rosecrance, "Long Cycle Theory and International Relations," *International Organisation*; (Spring 1987), pp.283-301.

⁷ Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Knopf; 1997).

competence.⁸ China has proved to be performing relatively better than most of the countries on all the indicators except political stability. Their high level of military capability, an emphasis on science and technology, and keenness to benefit from the *Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)* will soon make them self-sufficient strategically and capable of projecting power beyond borders. A greater assertiveness in defining and defending their interests and a broad concept of security that embraces a concern with regional and/or global balances will make China a force to contend with.⁹ Such an analysis is also bolstered by the fact that China was relatively unaffected by the recent Southeast Asian crisis. The differential growth in the power of various states causes a fundamental redistribution of power in the system.¹⁰ The Chinese economy has quadrupled in the last two decades and those of Japan and US have remained more or less stagnant. Paul Kennedy observes "relative economic shifts heralded the rise of new Great Powers which one day would have a decisive impact on

⁸ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass Addison-Wesley, 1971), p.131.

⁹ The above analysis is based upon the indicators as identified by Jack Levy in War and the Modern Great Power System 1495-1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp.11-19.

¹⁰ Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.13.

the military/territorial order.”¹¹ Thus, China’s rise might just be around the corner.

By enhancing its relative capabilities a state, in this case China, would fetch for itself greater security and have a wide range of strategic options.¹² Thus, even if this is a ‘unipolar moment’ where relative power is extremely unbalanced, “the structural pressures on eligible states (say, for example China) to increase their relative capabilities and become great powers is overwhelming. If they do not acquire great power capabilities they may be exploited by the hegemon.”¹³ On the basis of the above observations many American scholars predict a new Cold War. If Europe was the centre stage for the Cold War, then the Asia-Pacific would be the main theatre for the coming Cold War. They urge America to prepare for a ‘*new NSC 68.*’

The final image is based upon the contention that an emergence of a new triad composed of China, Japan, and the US is in the offing. There are two contrasting views about the *emerging triangular relationship*.

¹¹ Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), p.XXII.

¹² Robert Gilpin, op.cit.,n.10, pp.86-87.

¹³ Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise” International Security, vol.17, no.4 (Spring 1993), p.11.

Some scholars have predicted that such a triad could be a dangerous one as "triangular relationships, by their very nature, reduce international relations to a zero-sum game where any of the three powers is apt to suspect the other two of colluding to augment their bargaining power. Hence, a triangle made up of China, Japan and the US... could be a dangerous one..."¹⁴ Similarly, Theodore Caplow, who has described eight types of triads based on the distribution of power, states that the "most significant property of the triad is its tendency to divide into a coalition of two members against the third."¹⁵

However, Caplow's contention of 'two against one' in a triangular relationship has been challenged by other studies. Anatol Rapoport argues that "the interests of participants partially conflict and partially coincide" in n-person games and emphasizes that players "may be able to get jointly more if they coordinate their strategies."¹⁶ In other words states are not in a constant power struggle. Based on this and other assumptions, the empirical study of the Sino-Soviet-US triangle by Josua

¹⁴ Yoichi Funabasi, "The Asianization of Asia", Foreign Affairs, vol.72, no.5 (1993), p.83. Also see Lam Lai Sing, 'A Short Note on ASEAN - 'Great Power Interaction'', Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.15, no.4, (1994), pp.454-563.

¹⁵ Theodore Caplow, Two Against One: Coalitions in Triads (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), p.6.

¹⁶ Anatol Rapoport, 'Introduction' in Anatol Rapoport (ed) Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution (Dordrecht: Dordrecht, 1974), p.2,4

Goldstein and John Freeman offers us an important alternative approach to triadic behaviour. Goldstein and Freeman state that "these results - specifically the norm of bilateral reciprocity we find - imply in general, strategies using cooperative initiatives elicit like responses in the real world of great power politics... Hostile initiatives, however... tend to fail, eliciting hostile responses."¹⁷

Ming Zhang after studying the consecutive and seemingly related events where one actor affects the interaction between the other two actors in the US-Japan-China triad arrives at a '*reciprocation hypothesis*.' To this extent he differs from the realist two-against-one alignment approach of Funabasi and Lam Lai Sing. Reciprocal behaviour pattern will mean that "each country reacts to the other country's previous behaviour in kind and despite frictions the players of the game do not hesitate to initiate cooperative actions. The chief merit of a reciprocal model is that it considers both hostile and cooperative actions and therefore leaves an opportunity open for an improved relationship. A two-against-one model

¹⁷ Josua Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p.4.

presumes a negative cycle of a trilateral relationship and excludes positive evidence and development.¹⁸

The three major models analysed above are by no means exhaustive. Alternative models like a strategic quadrangle involving possibly a rising Russia or even ASEAN as a unified bloc; a multipolar concert of powers with all above mentioned powers, and an emerging India have been put forward but have not gained as much credibility in the academic circles as the three models discussed above. At another end of the spectrum exists alternative images which discount the importance of traditional means of power and base their models completely on economic sources of power.

To examine the post-Cold War balance in the Asia-Pacific, the policies and strategies of the three major players of the region deserve a detailed examination.

¹⁸ Ming Zhang, "The Emerging Asia-Pacific Triangle" Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.52, no.1 (1998), pp.47-61. Ming Zhang considers three issues to prove his point

- (a) The Taiwan crisis of March 1996 (b) The Clinton-Hashimoto Summit of April 1996 and (c) Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute between China and Japan of September- October 1996. He argues that the norm of reciprocity may help in not giving rise to a confrontational balance of power relationship in the Asia-Pacific region. In case such a situation arises then it would be conducive in promoting Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific.

The 'China threat' factor and chances of '*Pax Nipponica*' have subsequently been analysed. The chances that the emergence of either would be a threat to regional security cannot be discounted. A competition between Japan and China - two historical rivals could also have a debilitating influence on the Asia-Pacific security system. The various reasons have been traced in detail. The stability of the Asia-Pacific hinges upon the nature of bilateral relationships between them. The present era of strategic uncertainty coupled with the completing sovereignty, territorial and legitimacy claims are the two main factors responsible for the growing arms buildup that the region as a whole is witnessing. Hence, the presence of the US is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition to avoid a regional geo-political cauldron and further the chances of regional multilateral Cooperative Security. The above points are analysed in detail below :

THE 'CHINA THREAT' THEORY : IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

Pivotal to the post-Cold War security calculations in the Asia-Pacific region is the People's Republic of China. Despite recent public statements of high Chinese Communist Party officials that 'China will never seek hegemony', many informed China watchers have concluded

that regional hegemony is exactly what China wants. David Shambaugh writes that China has 'aspirations to become the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region.'¹⁹ Harlan W. Jencks says 'The Chinese assume that they should be the dominant regional power', meaning they should have freedom of action in the region without constraint by any countervailing power, while no Asia government should take any action contrary to Chinese interests."²⁰ Larry Wortzel observes that China seems "locked in pre-Cold War, almost turn-of-the-century modes of quasi-imperial competition for regional hegemony".²¹ Samuel S. Kim argues that in Beijing's view, "the rise of power vacuums is not a danger to be avoided or managed through regional or global conflict management mechanisms but an opportunity to be unilaterally exploited."²²

Many observers have compared the rise of China to that of Germany before the First World War. For Arthur Waldron, "sooner or later, if present trends continue, war is probable in Asia...China today is

¹⁹ David Shambaugh, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," Current History, vol. 93, no. 587 (December 1994), p. 425.

²⁰ Harlan W. Jencks, "The PRC's Military and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era", Issues and Studies, vol. 30, no. 11, (November 1994), p. 103.

²¹ Larry Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status", Orbis, vol. 38, no.2 (Spring 1994), p. 157.

²² Samuel S. Kim, "Mainland China in a Changing Asia-Pacific Regional Order", Issues and Studies, vol. 30, no. 10 (October, 1994), p. 9.

actively seeking to scare the US away from East Asia as Germany sought to frighten Britain before World War I by building its 'risk fleet'."²³

Those scholars who subscribe to the 'China threat thesis' base their assumption on three main points : (a) shifts in strategic outlook (b) territorial claims (c) differences in world view between China and many of its neighbours.

The principal features that characterize China's emerging strategic view are as follows:-

(1) Since the economic modernization is the number one priority of China's grand strategy, an increased concern with the stability and protection of coastal offshore and sea based material resources, communication routes and trade access is found to be necessary. (2) Further, a shift from continental '*People's War*' concept to embrace a more flexible, modernized capability to respond to limited conflicts along China's periphery is seen as a strategic imperative. (3) There is a growing recognition that likely threats and security concerns to China, will emanate from China's Southeast and East like the Korean Peninsula, Japan, Taiwan, South China Sea, Vietnam and the US presence in the

²³ Arthur Waldron, "How not to deal with China", Commentary, vol. 103, no. 3 (March 1997), pp. 44-49.

Pacific. (4) A shift of procurement and logistics priorities to reflect these new concepts, with a focus on maritime assets is being thought as necessary by the Chinese strategists.²⁴

These shifting security concerns and the resolution of the territorial and ethnic issues with Russia and the Central Asian Republics amicably, has resulted in China's increasing political and military presence to the East and Southeast Asia.²⁵

JAPAN'S REACTION TO THE 'CHINA THREAT' -IS 'PAXNIPPONICA' ON THE HORIZON?

The major reaction to the 'China threat' comes from Japan. With the future of American presence in the Asia-Pacific in doubt, Japan could well be on its way to a radical reorientation of its foreign policy. Some scholars argue that at present the incentives for Japan's expansion are not very visible. Japan in spite of its economic might is a "fragile (economic) super power" as it is dependent on foreign supplies for its raw

²⁴ Bates Gill, "Chinese Military Modernization and Arms Proliferation in Asia-Pacific" in Jonathan. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (eds.) In China's Shadow : Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development (Santa Monica : RAND Centre for Asia-Pacific Policy, 1997), p. 18

²⁵ Satyajit Mohanty, "China and the Central Asian Republics : Towards Mutual Cooperation", Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (March-April, 1999), pp. 42-50.

materials.²⁶ An unfavourable capital-to-debt ratio, recessionary trends, increasing unemployment political instability and a 'peace constitution are constraining factors upon Japan's militarism. Further, the Japanese realise that the memory of the Pacific war haunts the states of the Asia-Pacific and any change in their policy might result in an anti-Tokyo alliance.²⁷

However, the above arguments of a pacific Japan are premised upon three major assumptions : (a) Japan will be a status-quo power as long as it finds a conducive international order from which it would continue to benefit. (b) It receives the security guarantees and the nuclear umbrella of the United States. This should be demonstrated by American presence and willingness to come to Japan's rescue even in case of a "*coming confrontation between China and Japan.*"²⁸ During the Cold War this sense of psychological security was responsible for the pacifism in Japan and finally (c) China doesn't pose a threat to Japan's security interests.

²⁶ Frank Gibney, Japan : The Fragile Superpower (Tokyo : Charles & Tuttle, 1987).

²⁷ Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 17.

²⁸ The phrase has been taken from Gerald Segal, "The Coming Confrontation Between China and Japan," World Policy Journal, vol. 10, no.2 (Summer 1993), p.18.

All the three preconditions which were responsible for a peaceful Japan have undergone a dramatic change in the post-Cold War era. With the end of the Cold War Japan perceives that the American strategic logic has undergone a radical change. It has either reduced its global commitments and/or is perceived to be doing the same in future due to domestic pressures and public opinion against overstretching itself. Japan enjoyed the economic benefits of America's policy of containment. America provided favourable public goods and Japan was a *'free rider'*. However, the growing American reluctance to sponsor *'free riders'* and the call for *'burden-sharing'* has meant that Japan has to chart an independent course of action. Further, the growing trade wars with America reflect a new phase of uncertainty in US-Japan relations. America's turn from active to passive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region has meant a decreasing confidence in Japan, about the intention of US to abide by its security commitments. Such a perception has been bolstered by the American reverses in Somalia, its inability to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts in European countries like former Yugoslavia and its unwillingness to send ground troops to Kosovo. Thus, Japan's perception of the Asia-Pacific is based upon an image of a declining military and diplomatic presence of the United States coupled with that of a rising

China. Heightened political tensions between China and Japan has been depicted aptly by Allen S. Whiting, in his seminal work "*China eyes Japan*."²⁹ Further, deep historical mistrusts and the Japanese war time atrocities still make a significant emotional impact on China. That China would try to undo the historic wrongs and expand, might lead Japan to rethink its post-Cold War agenda.

If history is any guide then '*Pax Nipponica*' or at least attempts at it is just round the corner. Akira Iriye, who has produced some of the best scholarships on the international history of modern Asia, argues that Japan embarked on its aggressive policy of the 1930's and early 1940's after Tokyo perceived a breakdown in the international and regional order. Until then, the Japanese had accepted the premises and institutions crafted by the US and the UK, including free trade, Washington Naval Conference treaties and the League of Nations. After 1929, confidence in Wilsonian liberalism and the regime based upon it had weakened and many concluded that economic protectionism and increased central government powers and even military adventurism were the best means for ensuring national survival. Equally important, with Britain's power

²⁹ Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1989)

declining and the US unwilling to take up the mantle, there was no dominant power in the world or in Asia. The British maintained colonial territories in the Western Pacific, but their ability to defend them was questionable. From Japan's standpoint, the Anglo-US regime had given way to 'uncertainty' and Japanese policy during the 1930's was intended to overcome this.³⁰ This high vulnerability and the perception of a vacuum in Asia shaped Japan's policy during the 1920's and 1930's.

Thus, high vulnerability of the 1920's and the 1930's might be replicated in the 1990's and Japan is determined to prevent the opportunistic expansion of potential countries for filling roles and gaining capabilities that might increase their relative power.³¹ A new confidence to 'just say no' and take a tougher stance in disputes, a growing assertiveness and an emerging consensus for conducting a more activist foreign policy, maintaining a strong defence and increasing Japan's international stature like bidding for permanent membership in the UN Security Council and participating in Peacekeeping coupled with a rising nationalism and declining pacifism are viewed with caution and even alarm

³⁰ Akira Iriye, Power and Culture : The Japanese - American War, 1941-1945 (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 2-3.

³¹ Denny Roy, "Assessing the Asia-Pacific 'Power Vacuum'", Survival, vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 47-48.

in the Asia-Pacific circles.³² The increasingly independent and assertive foreign policy backed up by defence modernization and domestic shift in perceived Japanese role in future might justify the '*rising sun*' thesis.

Hence, an increasing need to improve bilateral relations is seen as being the bedrock of Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific.³³ The then Japanese Prime Minister Takasi Kaifu in 1991 stressed that "solid friendly, and cooperative relationship between Japan and China provides one of the extremely important preconditions for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region."³⁴ Thus, the interaction of the '*Emerging Dragon*' and the '*Rising Sun*' would determine the shape of the Asia-Pacific security to a large extent. Sino-Japanese relations "take on an importance in Asian affairs at least comparable to that of Franco-German relations in determining European affairs."³⁵ The first signs after the Cold War era are very encouraging Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China

³² Works that support the view of Japanese dominance in Asia are Chalmers Johnson, "Where Does Mainland China Fit in a World Organised into Pacific, North American and European Regions?" Issues and Studies, vol. 27, no. 8 (August 1991), p. 12; Walden Bello, "Trouble in Paradise", World Policy Journal, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 1993); Steven Sclosstein, The End of American Century (New York : Congdon and Weed, 1989).

³³ Yong Deng, "Chinese Relations with Japan : Implications for Asia-Pacific Regionalism", Pacific Affairs, vol. 70, no. 3 (Fall, 1997), p. 373.

³⁴ Takasi Kaifu, quoted in *Ibid.* pp. 381-382.

³⁵ Yong Deng, *op.cit.*, n.33,p. 377.

in 1992 reached \$3.5 billion which was 6.5% of Chinese FDI, making Japan the fourth largest investor in China. Its technology exports to China surged to account for 28% of China's total technology imports. China is the leading recipient of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA). China was Japan's fifth largest trade partner in 1992 but in 1993 it ranked just behind the USA. In 1995 Japan was China's largest trading partner. The restrained criticism of Tiananmen Square incident by the Japanese in the light of global condemnation, the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Takashi Kaifu to Beijing in 1991 and not imposing sanctions or suspending loans were important reasons for the peaceful bilateral relations between China and Japan. Jiang Zemin returned a visit to Japan to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties.³⁶

The fact that Sino Japan trade relations are on the up and both Sino-US and Japan-US trade relations are patchy, increasing economic interdependence between Japan and China might help in promoting regional integration and peace. This roughly equal distribution of power between Japan and China would lead to a "*regional bihegemony*". Apparently an equal distribution of power among several countries as

³⁶ For details of Sino-Japanese bilateral relations refer to *Ibid*, pp. 378-384.

opposed to a preponderance of power enjoyed by a hegemon, has at times, changed towards great power parity and a fluid power hierarchy was associated with less wars during the nineteenth century. Within such a power hierarchy the nations would have an interest in creating norms and rules that will lead to stable expectations and joint gains.³⁷

However, this contention of the optimists is rejected by those who see certain deep seated historical rivalries, bilateral disputes and competition for regional hegemony as strong currents to offset the process of economic cooperation. They point out that the long and dark shadow of history will be the most powerful disincentive to the prospects for long term cooperation. Further a regional bihegemony is ruled out because both the countries can tolerate the presence of an outside power rather than each other. Neither China has forgotten the Japanese war atrocities and the non-recognition of PRC till 1972 nor has Japan digested the fact of playing second fiddle to China in the region. Hence, China's perceives the renewed US-Japan security alliance as a restraint upon Japanese militarism.

³⁷J. David Singer, S. Bremer and J. Stuckey, "Capability Distribution , Uncertainty and Major Power War 1820-1965" in Bruce Russett (ed.) Peace War and Numbers (California : Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 19-48.

Thus, rhetorics apart the crucial factor in the Sino-Japanese relations in particular and the Asia-Pacific in general will be the presence of the United States.

SOVEREIGNTY, LEGITIMACY AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC:

In addition to the strategic uncertainty the lingering disputes also have a major role in adding to the heightened tensions in the area. Some of the potential dispute areas within the Asia-Pacific region are illustrated below.

The Taiwanese crisis was precipitated by many historical and ongoing events. But the massive and intensive military exercises by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in March 1996 was an attempt to threaten pro-independence elements before Taiwan's general election on 23 March 1996.³⁸ The targets of the Chinese were 30 miles off Taiwan's port cities of Jilong and Gaoxiong, respectively. The US Congress House Leadership adopted a non binding resolution calling for the US forces to be sent into battle if China attacked Taiwan. The US military denounced the exercises which included M-9 missiles carrying dummy war heads.

³⁸ Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang, "Crisis, What Crisis? - Lessons of the 1996 Tension and the ROC View of Security in the Taiwan Strait", in Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard Yang (eds.) op.cit., n.24, p. 143.

The military directed aircraft carriers *USS Independence* and *USS Nimitz* to move closer to the straits. The PLA announced that it would conduct live-ammunition naval and air force manoeuvres in the South China Sea and East China till 25 March, 1996. This led to an acrimonious exchange between the US and China and the US negotiated with Taiwan on arms sales and agreed to sell *Stinger Surface-to-Air Missiles* to Taiwan. However, China's military exercises were called off on 20 March, three days before Taiwan's election and at this point the crisis started to cool down.³⁹ The crisis demonstrated the adverse impact that '*greater China*' can have on the Asia-Pacific security. China might seek to promote its '*one China policy*' through military means thereby creating problems for regional security. Japan has been worried the foremost by this development.⁴⁰

The South China Sea conflict is in fact the single most important conflict which could destabilise the entire region and push it to a major war. Earlier the Russian Navy with facilities in Vietnam, and US navy based in the Philippines, provided a stabilizing balance of power in the

³⁹ For details of the third Taiwanese Straits Crisis see Ming Zhang, *op.cit.*, n.18, pp. 50-53.

⁴⁰ Gary Klintworth, "Greater China and Regional Security", in Gary Klintworth (ed.) *Asia-Pacific Security : Less Uncertainty, More Opportunities* (Melbourne : Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pvt. Limited, 1996, p. 36.

region.⁴¹ But in the post Cold War era, Beijing intends to establish the South China Sea as a '*Chinese lake*'. Within the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands is probably the only case in the world which is claimed by more than two countries.

The Spratly Islands is claimed by PRC, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.⁴² The Chinese claim that Spratlys was '*terra nullius*' prior to their discovery. The Chinese occupied Itu Aba in Spratlys and the 1958 the Chinese territorial law renamed Spratlys as Nansha. In 1987 China conducted naval manoeuvres in Spratlys and occupied Fiery Cross Reef and five more Spratly islands. In 1992, a new Chinese Territorial Sea Law Reaffirmed its claims to the South China Sea Islands. While China ratified the *United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS)* on May 15, 1996 it reiterated its claims that both Paracels and Spratly Islands are a part of Chinese territory. It has awarded exploration rights in the area to Creston Energy in 1992.⁴³

⁴¹ Eric Hyer, "The South China Sea Disputes : Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements", *Pacific Affairs*, vol.68, no.1 (Spring, 1995), p. 36.

⁴² Codner Lee, "The Spratly Islands Disputes and the Law of the Seas", *Ocean Development and International Law*, vol. 25, pp.73-74.

⁴³ Mark Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes, *Adelphi Paper 298* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 9-11.

Taiwan also claims Spratlys on the basis of history and the Japan-Taiwan Treaty of 1952 which transferred ownership of Spratlys to Taiwan. It adopted the '*South China Sea Policy Guideline*' in 1993 which called for safeguarding ROC's sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea. A patrol force of Taiwan ran into rough weather when it met strong protests from Vietnam and the Philippines.⁴⁴

The Philippines has also put forth the '*terra nullius*' argument and proclaimed a new state of *Kalayaan* in 1956 which included the Spratlys. In 1968 Philippines occupied three islands and in 1978, attached Spratlys to Palawan province. In May 1998 the Philippines government carried out a scientific mission to survey the economic resources. In an intense diplomatic show it seized four Taiwanese fishing boats, which they said entered into their territorial waters near Spratlys. It has invited Alcorn to explore the islands.

Malaysia's claim makes greatest reference to modern international law. It is based on the Geneva Law of the Seas Convention, 1958. Malaysia has, off and on, arrested fishermen from other countries which it claims has entered its islands. It invited Sabah Shell to explore the area

⁴⁴ Cheng-Yi Lin, "Taiwan's South China Sea Policy", *Asian's Survey*, vol. XXXVII, no.4, p. 325

for potential petroleum resources. Both Brunei and Malaysia claim Lousa Reef. The reef is well south of the main Spratly archipelago.

Vietnam and Chinese military have already gone to war twice over the South China Sea. The issue at hand was Paracel Islands. Now the occupation of twenty one islets in Spratlys by Vietnam has led China to warn the Vietnamese not to pursue the activities of "military provocation".⁴⁵

Given the strategic and economic importance of the region, the nations would be very reluctant to give up their claims. The South China Seas not only contains the Major Sea Lanes of Communications (SCOC's) but also has enormous energy potential.⁴⁶ In economic terms the Spratlys could contain upto six billion barrels of oil equivalent, out of which 70% could be natural gas. The need for increased energy resources by countries of the Asia-Pacific would further heighten the crisis.

The growing assertiveness of China to claim, what it calls the islands rightfully belonging to it, has been backed by naval buildup. This has sent alarm signals in Japan, as both countries claim sovereignty over

⁴⁵ Mark Valencia provides a detailed account of the claims and activities of various countries. Mark Valencia, *op.cit*, no.43, pp. 8-23.

⁴⁶ Chaing Pao Min, "A New Scramble for South China Sea Islands", Contemporary South-East Asia, vol. 12, no.1 (June,1990), p. 21.

the islands called Diaoyu by the Chinese and Senkaku by the Japanese.⁴⁷ Beijing claims the islands on the basis of historical evidence while Tokyo insists that its rights derive from takeover of Okinawa in 1879 and the formal incorporation of Senkaku islands after the defeat of China's naval fleet in 1895. At present, the islands which are rich in geological sources are in Japanese occupation. The PLA has set up a Diaoyu Island's Operational Group for emergency plans and has dispatched naval ships near Diaoyu Island in 1996 as a protest against the light house built by Japanese rightists on the islands. Although the light house was not recognised by Japanese government, China on 30 September 1996 sent more than ten war planes and naval vessels to cruise past and fly over Diaoyu islands. The September 1996 crisis erupted again in May 1997 when Chinese civilians sailed towards the island and Japan sent patrol ships and helicopters to expel Chinese boats. The PLA sent fighters including SU-27, near the disputed area. The US non-action in the dispute, even at a verbal level made neither Japan nor China happy.⁴⁸

The competing Soviet and now Russian and Japanese claims to the Southern Kurile islands referred to by the Japanese as Northern

⁴⁷ Lamp Peng Er, "Japan and the Spratlys Dispute: Aspirations and Limitations", *Asian Survey*, vol.XXXVI, no.10 (October 1996), p.996.

⁴⁸ Ming Zhang, *opcit.*, n.18, pp.53-55.

Territories, namely, Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan islands is also an irritating issue between Japan and Russia.⁴⁹ The unresolved dispute between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima or Tak-do) in the Southern part of the Sea of Japan might offset the Japan-South Korea camaraderie. The continuing claim of the Philippines to the Malaysian island of Sabah was one of the reasons for the derailment of Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in the 1960's. The dispute persists and if it escalates it can affect the ASEAN solidarity and peace in Southeast Asia. The strong separatist movement in Sabah further complicates this issue. The dispute between Vietnam and Indonesia on the demarcation line on the continental shelf near Natuna Island; between Vietnam and Malaysia on their off-shore demarcation line; between Malaysia and Singapore over ownership of the island of Pulau Batu Putih (Petra Branca), some 55 kilometers east of Singapore in the straits of Johore; between Malaysia and Indonesia to the islands of Sipadan, Sebatik and Ligitan in Celebes Sea, some 35 km from Semporna in Sabah might hamper Southeast Asian regionalism. Further, boundary disputes between Vietnam and Malaysia and border disputes between Vietnam

⁴⁹ Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "Russia's Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia", Pacific Affairs, vol.64, no.4 (Winter 1994/95), p.496.

and Cambodia and Thailand and Burma can be a setback to ASEAN particularly during the period of downward turn in their economies. The insurgency movements in Southeast Asia, the guerrilla movements along the Laos-Thai border, residual conflict in Cambodia, the independence movements in East Timor, and Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) resistance in Irian Jaya, Indonesia, Aceh independence movement in Northern Sumatra would cause increasing problems of governance in Southeast Asia.⁵⁰

The Korean Peninsula may not be facing legitimacy territorial or sovereignty claims in a strict manner but definitely the deployment of nearly 1.4 million ground troops against each other along the *Demilitarized Zone* (DMZ) is a source of tension. The growing fears of an unstable or even an imploding North Korea with nuclear capabilities creates problems for sub-regional and regional security.⁵¹

The uncertainty over the future strategic architecture and the sovereignty, legitimacy and territorial conflicts in the Asia-Pacific has

⁵⁰ Demond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region", *International Security*, vol.18, no.3 (Winter 1993/94), pp.88-89.

⁵¹ William T. Tow, "Military Dimensions of the Korean Confrontation" in Seldon W. Simon (ed.) *East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p.75.

resulted in a major arms modernization initiative in the region.

THE ARMS MODERNIZATION AND THE NUCLEAR PERILS

The states of the Asia-Pacific region have witnessed a sustained buildup of conventional weapons and have displayed a keen interest in the *Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)*. James Elad and Patric Marshall argue that "a new Asian arms race is underway which bodes ill for a region already racked by ancient animosities and border disputes".⁵²

Through the mid and late 1980's, regional defence expenditure increased at an unprecedented rate. The decline in defence spending in the US, Europe, and the former Soviet Union since 1989, has resulted in a doubling of Asian share of the world military expenditure (in relative terms) over the past decade. Although gross figures should be treated carefully, the defence expenditures in East Asia and Australasia in 1992 amounted to some \$105 billion, and by 1995 shot up to \$130 billion- equal to all Europe.

In case of arms imports to the region, Asia's share of world expenditure on arms transfers rose from 15.5% in 1982 to 34% in 1991. In 1991 three countries in the Asia-Pacific region-South Korea, China and

⁵² James Clad and Patric Marshall", Southeast Asia's Quiet Arms Race," Chicago Tribune, (May 23, 1992), p.21.

Thailand ranked within the top ten arms importers in terms of contracts concluded; two others-Taiwan and Burma-ranked in the top ten, in terms of the value of arms actually delivered.⁵³

In Northeast Asia the defence budgets are generally in an order of magnitude greater than in Southeast Asia. In China, throughout the first half of 1990's the defence budget grew by a double digit percentage vis-à-vis the previous year. But in Southeast Asia, defence forces have been restructured with increased emphasis on high-technology and maritime forces. According to Desmond Ball the more particular enhancements include :

- a) national command, control, and communication (C³) systems
- b) national strategic and tactical intelligence systems;
- c) Multi-role fighter aircraft with marine attack capabilities as well as air-superiority capabilities.
- d) maritime surveillance aircraft (e.g. P-3s)
- e) anti-ship missiles (e.g. Harpoon and Exocet)
- f) modern surface combatants - destroyers, frigates, ocean patrol vessels;

⁵³ Graeme Cheeseman and Richard Leaver, "Trends in Arms Spending and Conventional Arms Trade in the Asia-Pacific Region" in Gary Klintworth (ed.), *opcit*, n.40, pp.200-205.

- g) submarines
- h) Electronic Warfare (EW) systems
- i) rapid deployment forces⁵⁴

He goes on to identify certain factors accounting for the regional acquisition programmes among which the important ones are :-⁵⁵

1) Economic Growth and Increasing Resources for Defence :-

A positive correlation between the two factors can be noticed particularly in ASEAN. Countries like Singapore and Malaysia have had the highest rates of increase of both Gross National Product (GNP) and defence spending, while those with slower economic growth such as Indonesia and the Philippines have had the slowest increases in defence spending.

2) The requirements for enhanced self reliance :-

Due to the collapse of the Cold War security architecture, the countries of the Asia-Pacific feel the need for increased '*resilience*'. The increasing self-reliance against regional contingencies involves a primary emphasis on defence of the maritime assets. Greater self-reliance requires

⁵⁴ Desmond Ball, *opcit*, n.50, p.81.

⁵⁵ Desmond Ball has provided an indepth analysis of the regional arms acquisition trends. *Ibid.*, pp.78-112.

independent surveillance, warning, and intelligence capabilities to monitor regional developments. The centrality of independent national intelligence capabilities to a policy of self-reliance is even more pronounced where such a policy is pursued through a defensive or non-offensive posture.

3) The perceived drawdown of US presence and capabilities :-

This factor is seen as a major imperative for arms modernization in the region. Desmond Ball had rightly pointed out that reductions in US defence capabilities in the Pacific are proportionally much less than those which have befallen European deployments. There is little real prospect of any more extensive reductions in US capabilities in the Pacific through the rest of the 1990's. However, the arms build up demonstrates panic reactions within the Asia-Pacific.

4) Fear of "the dragons" :-

The increasing power projection capabilities of Japan and China, and to a lesser extent India coupled with the propensity of medium-size political powers to compete for power has triggered an arms modernization. Japan is already involved in maritime operations out to 1000 nautical miles, which takes it almost as far south as the Philippines. It already has a substantial and very modern naval force, including some

100 marine combat aircraft, 64 surface combatants (6 destroyers and 58 frigates) and 14 submarines. It is in the process of building several *Yukikaze* class destroyers equipped with the *Aegis System*; and modernizing its submarine fleet. It is planning to acquire tanker aircraft to extend the range of its air coverage; and also considering the acquisition of 'defensive' aircraft carriers.

The Chinese Navy-PLAN is trying to become a blue water fleet. It is acquiring a new class of destroyer (*Luhu, or Type 052*), upgraded versions of the *Luda-class* destroyers a new class (*Jiangwei*) of missile frigates, and a new class of resupply and amphibious assault ships for sustaining operations farther from shore and for longer periods. China's power projection capabilities in the South China Sea have been enhanced with the construction of an airbase and anchorages on Woody Island in the Parcel Islands, and acquisition of an air-to-air refueling capability for its naval forces. China is acquiring several types of modern aircraft from Russia including *Su-Flanker* strike fighters; *MIG-31 Foxhound* interceptor fighters and even *Tu-22M Backfire* supersonic bombers. China is also actively interested in the acquisition of aircraft carrier capability by 2010.

These trends and the fear of an arms race between Japan and China affects the arms acquisition of the Asia-Pacific. The Indian naval

developments on Andaman and Nicobar Islands which are only 80 nautical miles from the North Coast of Sumatra, and the Chinese access to a Naval base on Hanggyi Island in the Bassein River at the mouth of Irrawaddy and acquisition of a site for a monitoring station on Burma's Coco Island just north of India's Andaman Islands are ominous developments particularly for Southeast Asia.

5) The increasing salience of regional conflicts and the requirements for EEZ surveillance and protection of the critical Sea Line of Communication (SLOC's) :-

These factors have proved to be very significant in defence modernization programmes. They drive the requirements for greater marine surveillance capabilities including ground based *signals intelligence (SIGINT)* systems and sophisticated marine reconnaissance aircraft. The need for long-endurance surface combatants, platforms to launch anti-ship missiles and long-range aircrafts is increasingly being felt by the countries of the Asia-Pacific.

Throughout the Asia-Pacific there has been a significant expansion in SIGINT capabilities and operations for maritime surveillance, information and the need to collect Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)

information on the communications and electronic systems of neighbours and potential adversaries for electronic warfare purposes. The *Japan Marine Self Defence Force (JMSDF)* is equipped with SIGINT to monitor Japanese SLOCS. China has several *EY-8 SIGINT* aircraft's equipped with *BM/K2-8608 electronic intelligence (ELINT)* system designed to monitor stubborn radar emissions. The countries are acquiring significant numbers of advance multi-role fighter aircrafts. Around 1500 new fighters will be deployed by four Northeast Asia air forces-China (about 550), Taiwan (466), Japan (400) and South Korea (160). Southeast Asian countries are likely to acquire 300 new fighters and strike aircrafts. Japan is planning to acquire *74 P-3C Long Range Marine Patrol (LRMP)* aircraft, while South Korea is acquiring eight to ten *P-3C's*. The *P-3s* are equipped to carry *Harpoon* anti-ship missiles. Singapore and Thailand have acquired *Fokker F-50 Maritime Enforcers*. Similar maritime patrol aircraft has been ordered by Indonesia and Malaysia. East Asian navies, particularly China has submarines although many of the *Romeo class* submarines possessed by China and North Korea are no longer operational. South Korea is in the process of acquiring 9 Type 209's and Australia is building six *Collins class* submarines. This has made countries

like Malaysia and Singapore to seriously reconsider acquisition of some submarines.

The present arms acquisition doesn't however, amount to an arms race as states haven't stretched their resources for arms acquisition. Secondly, increased defence budgets of most countries in real terms is either non-existent or is very minimal. But the future strategic uncertainty does leave enough room for a spiralling arms race in the region.

Hence, as Desmond Ball has pointed out "it is necessary to stress the development of **regional Cooperative Security and Confidence Building Measures**(emphasis mine) to the point where they become a significant aspect of regional strategic architecture".⁵⁶

CROSSING THE NUCLEAR RUBICON

Apart from the arms modernization the spreading nuclear capabilities in the Asia-Pacific would have significant ramifications on global stability. The collapse of a non-universal discriminatory and as of now a non-verifiable nuclear regime (although CTBT provides for such verifiable mechanisms) and the fact that a rogue state like North Korea can offset the global nuclear regimes cannot be ruled out. States like

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.108.

China, India and US with nuclear weapons impinge upon the security of the Asia-Pacific Region. Japan, North Korea, South Korea have matured nuclear technology competencies, while Thailand and Indonesia have nascent nuclear technology but have plans to widen their exploitation.

North Korea has constructed nuclear reactors and plutonium processing plants at Yongbyon. According to estimates it might well be having weapons grade plutonium for the manufacture of 2-3 bombs. It threatened to pull out of the NPT in 1993 and failed to provide IAEA necessary access to its nuclear facilities. Although under the terms of the Agreed Framework signed with the US it has halted current operations, the future is still uncertain. Its missile development programme adds to the fears of the Asia-Pacific countries.⁵⁷

China has over 300 nuclear warheads of which 100 are deployed operationally on ballistic missiles. Its land based strategic missiles can strike US. With Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM's) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM's), China is a nuclear threat.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Vladimir Petrovsky, "Non-Proliferation and Export Control Regimes in the APR: Problems and Outlook" Far Eastern Affairs, vol. 1, no.2 (1998), pp.4-5.

⁵⁸Vijai K. Nair, "Spreading Nuclear Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Ramifications on Global Stability", Agni, vol.3, no.2, pp.37-38.

Japan has all the technological and engineering competencies and has appropriate infrastructure and materials needed for its nuclear weapon option like electronic detonation devices, long range nuclear delivery systems etc. The Chairman of US Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn is on record that "Japan would develop nuclear weapons very rapidly".⁵⁹ Japan's holding of plutonium is estimated at 9000 kg and it has already become the '*plutonium giant*' of the world. The Japanese government's failure to legislate three non-nuclear principles [not to possess, not to produce and not to allow introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil and its abstention from voting for 'Neotiations for an early conclusion of a *Treaty for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons* adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1996 has raised doubt about the country's nuclear intentions.⁶⁰

While world attention was focused on North Korea, South Korea was quietly fostering the rapid expansion of nuclear power and sheltering a dormant nuclear weapons programme. There are nine operating nuclear reactors in South Korea, the spent fuel of which contains tons of plutonium. South Korean Electric Power Company plans to have an

⁵⁹ Sam Nunn quoted in *Ibid.*, p.36.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.39-40.

operating plutonium fuelled reactor by 2011. The changing geostrategic environment might force South Korea to think of the nuclear option. Taiwan on its part has made attempts to organise production of plutonium on an experimental basis and the Taiwanese Nuclear Energy Scientific Institute has well developed base and expertise to plan a bomb.⁶¹

Thus, in case of a collapse of the global nuclear regime on one hand and the growing strategic uncertainty and increasing territorial disputes on the other, the nuclear scenario in Asia-Pacific would look very different

AMERICAN PRESENCE AND AVOIDANCE OF STRATEGIC HUBRIS⁶²

Hugh De Santis says that one could envision some form of security syncretism by the beginning of the next century that would encourage the development of an integrated, multilateral and, in the best of, the worlds cooperative framework. However, this modest outcome is predicated upon an important precondition, and that is the maintenance

⁶¹ Ibid., pp.42-43.

⁶² The word "*Strategic Hubris*" has been coined by John Chipman. See John Chipman, "The New Regionalism: Avoiding Strategic Hubris", in Denny Roy (ed.) The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), p.20.

of continued military and diplomatic contacts of the US in the Asia-Pacific.⁶³ American presence in the region would not meet any opposition by most of the countries. Almost all the countries of the region would prefer '*Pax Americana*' to any conceivable alternative. As Charles Krauthammer has pointed : "no country in East Asia....fears the deployment of American forces. What they do fear is American withdrawal.⁶⁴ In the absence of Pax Americana there would be enough nervousness about ultimate Japanese intentions and capabilities, to spark a local arms race and create instability of a kind that has not been seen in Asia for decades.

The fears of the future American intentions in the Asia-Pacific is a result of the contradictory reports that come from the US Department of Defence(DOD). The 1990 and the 1992 *East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI)* outlined the changed US priorities in East Asia. The documents stated in general terms, the need for American presence in East Asia and emphasized the use of promoting democracy and human rights.⁶⁵ The

⁶³ Hugh De Santis, "Europe and Asia without America", World Policy Journal, vol.10, no.3 (Autumn 1993), p.39.

⁶⁴ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment" Foreign Affairs, vol.70, no.1, (Fall, 1990/91), p.35.

⁶⁵ Stanley Chan, "The American Military Capability Gap" Orbis, vol.41, no.3 (Summer, 1997), pp.385-387.

linking up of security and military issues had a direct bearing upon the US-Japan security treaty which formed one of the main pillars of Asian stability in the Cold War era. The EASI documents hinted at the reduction of US forward deployed forces in the East Asian region. However since 1995 the US strategy for Asia-Pacific has seen a sea-change. The 1995 *East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI)* confirmed the American intention to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in the region for the foreseeable future.⁶⁶ This change resulted because in July 1994, Japanese Defence Agency officials presented working drafts to the Prime Minister's advisory commission report on the *National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO)* entitled *'The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan : The Outlook for the 21st Century'*, to their counterparts in the Pentagon. The draft set off alarms in some parts of DOD and caught the attention of the administration's two top Japan watchers, Joseph Nye and Ezra Vogel, at the CIA National Intelligence Council. The report rather than reaffirming the centrality of the US-Japan alliance to Japan's security, made broad and ambiguous recommendations which was read in some quarters as stressing upon

⁶⁶ David L. Asher, "A US-Japan Alliance for the Next Century", *Orbis*, vol.41, no.3 (Summer, 1997), pp.358-359.

unilateralism. The report captured well the growing doubts in Tokyo regarding the reliability of the US as a protector of Japanese interests.⁶⁷

But things are looking brighter since 1995. The American presence in the Asia-Pacific has been reaffirmed ever since the *Nye Initiative*. The Nye report entitled '*Harnessing the Rising Sun*' laid stress upon various elements for a successful US-Japan strategy. The 1995 US security strategy for the East Asia-Pacific region states that "if the American presence in Asia were removed, the security of Asia would be imperiled with consequences for Asia and America alike. Our markets and our interests would be jeopardized. Our security alliance with Japan is the linch pin of the United States security in Asia".⁶⁸

In mid-April 1996, having put trade issues on the sidelines, President Clinton made a state visit to Japan in order to unveil with Prime Minister Hashimoto a new '*US-Japan Declaration on Security*'. In September 1997, the '*Revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation*' enhanced this security alliance. Similarly the security alliance of US with Australia has been enlarged through the 1996 Joint Security Declaration known as the '*Sydney Statement*'. In March 1997,

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp.354-357

⁶⁸ Cited in Ibid., p.358.

US conducted a joint military training exercise, *TANDEM THRUST*, with Australia and *COBRA GOLD* with Thailand. The US signed the *Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)* with the Philippines in January 1998. The dispatch of USS Nimitz and USS Independence during the March 1996 Taiwanese straits crisis, for instance, would reaffirm the Asia-Pacific nations of US commitment to peace and stability in APR. *The US DOD 1997 Report of Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR)* presented three integrated concepts of Shape, Respond, and Prepare : the US will remain globally engaged to shape the international environment; respond to the full spectrum of crises; and prepare now for an uncertain future.

The US, *Comprehensive Engagement : "Presence Plus"* Strategy also aims at constructive participation in regional multilateral security processes. This approach is highly beneficial in promoting Cooperative Security in the region. Forward presence allows the US to continue playing a positive role in broadening regional confidence and thereby manage potential threats.

The US Eighth Army and Seventh Air Force in Korea, III Marine Expeditionary Force and Fifth Air Force in Japan and the US Seventh Fleet, all amount to a formidable force. The Japanese bases maintain the US 5th Air Force, including 18th Wing, 35th Fighter Wing and 374th Airlift

Wing, Navy 7th Fleet, including USS Kitty Hawk Carrier Battle Group and USS Belleau Wood Amphibious Ready Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 9th Theatre Area Army Command (TAACOM) and 1st USA Special Forces Battalion. The US still enjoys a series of access agreements and other arrangements with Southeast Asian partners including port calls, repair facilities, training ranges and logistic support. Further training activities, *US Foreign Military Sales (FMS)* and *Foreign Military Financing (FMF)* programmes also play a key role in maintaining a US presence in the Asia-Pacific. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that embodies new technologies, operational concepts and organizational structures give US forces greater flexibility and mobility to respond rapidly to any conflict. Given the relative lack of RMA in China's PLA, US dominance is likely to continue.⁶⁹

However, inspite of its strategic superiority and military presence in the region, the US does not try to contain China or form a '*Cordon Sanitaire*' around the '*Middle Kingdom*'. Charles Krauthammer's containment strategy has few takers in Washington. Rather the US seeks to '*comprehensively engage China*' so that it can emerge as a stable,

⁶⁹ "The US Security Strategy in the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998" is available on www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98. The above facts about the US presence in the Asia-Pacific is gathered from the above mentioned website.

secure, open, prosperous and peaceful country. Hence, it welcomed China's publication of a *Defence White Paper* in August 1998, although this White Paper sees the enlargement of military alliances as a factor of instability in the region.

The 1998 *East Asia Strategic Assessment (EASA)* reiterates the American commitments and hence, would go a long way in avoiding strategic hubris' in the region.

The presence of the US in the Asia-Pacific is only a necessary condition for the maintenance of regional stability. Given the fluid post-Cold War situation certain concrete regional initiatives need to be taken to promote Cooperative Security. Realising this the states of the region have proceeded to promote regional cooperation although much needs to be done in future. These initiatives and suggestions for furthering Cooperative Security have been analysed in the subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER IV

COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION: APPLICATIONAL ASPECTS

The post-Cold War strategic trends of the Asia-Pacific region presents a strange paradox. What is unfolding in Asia is a race between the accelerating dynamics of multipolarity, which could increase the chances of conflict, and the growth of mitigating factors that should tend to dampen them and to improve the prospects for a continuing peace. The race is in its early stages and it is still too soon to pick a winner. The anticipation of war, like the expectation of peace, can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Virtuous upward spirals can become vicious downward ones.¹ The centrifugal forces operating within the Asia-Pacific are strong enough to prevent the emergence of the area as a cohesive region. Hence, the main agenda before the countries of the Asia-Pacific is to strengthen the centripetal forces of regionalism and promote an interlocking web of bilateral and multilateral relationships.

¹ Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia" International Security, vol.18, no.3 (Winter, 1993) pp.27-28. The ideas on the impediments to peace and security have been taken from Friedberg's article.

CONSTRAINTS FOR COOPERATION

In analysis of regional Cooperative Security mechanisms, the European model of achieving cooperation is taken as a standard. Aaron Friedberg compares Europe to Asia and argues that Asia is missing or has underdeveloped '*conflict restraining factors*'. As a result, Asia, in the long run, is far more likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict than Europe.² Many scholars are of the view that Mearsheimer's picture of an unstable and chaotic Europe will be seen in the Asia-Pacific rather than in Europe.³ The conflict restraining factors found in Europe can be identified as :-

a) A shared memory of a recent, devastating war can help dampen the competitive dynamics to which a multipolar system might otherwise be prone. In Europe' the notion of security that prevailed for decades was that the use of force to achieve political ends between two opposing alliances was an unacceptable risk. The experience of World War II and

² Ibid., pp.5-33.

³ John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, vol.15, no.1 (Summer 1990), pp.5-56. The arguments of Mearsheimer have been repudiated in Stephen Van Evera, "Primed For Peace: Europe After the Cold War" International Security, vol.15, no.5 (Winter 1990/91), pp.7-57; and Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?" International Security, vol.16, no.3 (Winter 1991/92), pp.34-73.

the dangers posed by the presence of large number of nuclear weapons in the European theatre undercut the utility of conflict and deterred war. Diplomatic relations were actively maintained between the adversaries and a basic stalemate in force levels and types of weaponry existed between the two sides for many years.⁴ *The restraining influence of a moral consensus*⁵ which was found in Cold war Europe is more or less absent in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, the changed character of the European states, the nature of linkages among them and the shifting costs and benefits of war⁶ will inhibit, Europe's journey 'back to the future'.

Comparing the present day Europe to the early years of the century, Stephen Van Evera concludes that "the domestic orders of most states have changed in ways that make renewed aggression unlikely."⁷ The internal changes to which Van Evera refers are political, socio-economic and cultural. The nations of Western Europe are more

⁴ Geoffrey Kemp, "Cooperative Security in the Middle East" in Janne E. Nolan (ed.) Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp.404-405.

⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948), p. 214.

⁶ Aaron L. Friedberg, op.cit, n.1, p.11.

⁷ Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security, vol.15, no.3 (Winter 1990/91), p. 9.

democratic and the trend of *democratic diffusion* from east to west is bound to continue. That *democracies do not fight each other* will ensure peace in Europe.⁸

b) A second set of changes which has occurred is that the states of Europe are wealthier than before and that this wealth is more or less equitably distributed. The socio-economic 'levelling' that nations have witnessed has made them less subject to the evils of militarism, hyper-nationalism, social imperialism and to aggressive national policies due to domestic turmoil. The rising levels of economic linkages also diminish the appeal to war by making it a costly proposition.⁹

c) In addition to their economic ties the nations of Western Europe have become enmeshed in a dense *web of institutions* or what Richard Ullman has described as "a thick alphabet soup of international agencies"¹⁰ International institutions help to promote peace by providing

⁸ This is the contention of the **Democratic Peace Theory** which states that the democracies do not fight other democracies. Prominent advocates of the Democratic Peace Theory include Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no.4 (December 1986), pp.1151-1169. For a rebuttal of the theory see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace." International Security, vol.19, no.2 (Fall 1994), pp.5-49.

⁹ Stephen Van Evera, op.cit, no.7, p.25.

¹⁰ Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p.145.

channels for dispute resolution. Robert Keohane says that "insofar as states regularly follow the rules and standards of international institutions, they signal their willingness to continue patterns of cooperation, and therefore reinforce expectations of stability."¹¹

d) The final form of interconnection that links the nations of Europe is cultural. The obverse of the waning of national identification to which Jervis refers to, is the growth of "ties of mutual identification and the development of an altered psychology whereby, individuals identify less deeply with their nations and more with broader entities, values and causes."¹² This feeling of collective identity and to think of oneself, say as a European, is necessary for the formation of what Hedley Bull has described as "*a society of states*".¹³

Thus, the synergetic impact of the movement toward democracy, equality and cosmopolitanism in each of the states of Europe; the increasingly dense and diverse linkages between them and the mounting

¹¹ Robert Keohane "Correspondence: Back to the Future II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe," International Security, vol.15, no.2 (Fall, 1990), p.193.

¹² Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?" International Security, vol.16, no.3 (Winter 1991/92), p.55.

¹³ Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p.33.

costs and declining benefits of war between them are sufficiently overwhelming to offset the impact of multipolarity as a source of instability.¹⁴

The scholars who believe that regionalism in the Asia-Pacific is a distant dream compare it to Europe. The conflict restraining factors missing in the Asia-Pacific, as identified by the Asia-Pacific Regionalism (APR) pessimists are as follows:

a) The region is marked by a diversity of governmental and societal forms than by any obvious unity. Among the countries in the Asian part of the Asia-Pacific only Japan can be said to be securely democratic. Totalitarian regimes exist in Myanmar and North Korea. The countries of Southeast Asia are undergoing a painful transition witnessing varying mixes of democracy and authoritarianism.

b) Secondly, there is wide spread variation among countries in the levels of economic growth . Rapid national economic growth and shared feeling of power and entitlement that tend to go with it, may be a very important cause of expansionism. As Samuel Huntington has suggested "the external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet

¹⁴ Robert Jervis, op.cit, no.12, p.54.

Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development."¹⁵ The aggregate measures of growth and income distribution which China is witnessing and its links with military modernization, the possible reemergence of Japanese militarism, the existence of North Korea as a 'rogue' state all suggest that the Asia-Pacific region will be the next flashpoint in the history of world politics.

c) The concerns about China in the region are particularly noteworthy. The Chinese *Strategic Culture* which can be traced back to classics such as 'The Art of War' by SunTze, is based on a deep rooted *realpolitik*.¹⁶ It reflects the *yang* approach to external relations that emphasizes diversity over uniformity, conflicts over harmony, and economic-military power over moral persuasion. This, Johnston refers to as the '*Parabellum paradigm*'. It states that "the best way of dealing with security threats is to eliminate them through the use of force."¹⁷ The Chinese view conflicts as a zero-sum game. Chinese policy, suggests Samuel S. Kim "in most

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival*, vol.33, no.1 (January/February,1991), p.12.

¹⁶ Sun Tze, *The Art of War*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) (The translated version).

¹⁷ Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1995), p.7.

domains seems to be propelled by unilateralism in bilateral clothing with a little Asian multilateral regionalism."¹⁸ Thus, Chinese approach towards Asia-Pacific security is characterized by what Jing-dong Yuan calls *conditional multilateralism* wherein its support for emerging regional security dialogue is premised upon its freedom of action. Hence, it doesn't overcommit itself to institutional arrangements and remains inherently suspicious of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, even equating it at times with China-bashing.¹⁹

d) Added to the offensive Strategic Culture is the self-perception of China as a victim of aggression which makes it an anti-status quoist power. The image of China being looted, humiliated and exploited has made China a revisionist power. Hence, it's great power status has generated what, Michael Yahuda has called "*a diplomatic culture of entitlement*."²⁰ This would be a growing threat to regional security.

¹⁸ Samuel S. Kim, "China's Pacific Policy: Reconciling the Irreconcilable", International Journal, vol.50, no.3, (Summer 1995), p.469.

¹⁹ Jing-dong Yuan, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament" in Keith Crause (ed) Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1997), p.81.

²⁰ Michael Yahuda, "How Much has China Learned About Interdependence?" in David G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (London: Routledge, 1997), p.15.

e) The indications of an evolution away from national chauvinism are also not very much visible. The day when Japanese and Koreans think of themselves as more similar than different is not yet at hand. Territorial disputes are rampant in the region and involve big as well as small powers. The list of states that have outstanding differences over delineation of their land borders or maritime boundaries is long.

f) History too is subject to disagreement in Asia and, as with territory, controversies over it both reflect and reinforce feelings of national identity and difference.

g) The ties among the Asian states are, by comparison, much less developed; the basis for their establishment is, in some cases, less obvious; and the possible obstacles to their growth more readily apparent. Long separated by politics and by their differing developmental strategies, the economies of most Asian states remains substantially independent of each other. Among Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, the ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand the trade in 1989 amounted to 37% of their total imports and exports vis-a-vis 59% for nations of the then European Community. Further, the countries of the Asia-Pacific, particularly the smaller ones are afraid of the political problems created by

the overdominance of Japanese and Chinese business in some Asian states.²¹

h) Next to Europe, Asia appears strikingly under-institutionalized. The rich 'alphabet soup' of international agencies that has helped to nurture peaceful relations among the European powers is, in Asia, a very thin gruel indeed. The process of institution building will be further complicated by the lack of common culture and 'useable' Asian past. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal offering a pessimistic reading of the Asia-Pacific region say that "there is little that binds states together and much that divides them and the similarities are barely skin deep."²²

i) Buzan and Segal go on to point out that the arms buildup and strategic asymmetries in the region are offsetting regional integration. The fact that South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan may acquire nuclear weapons in case of a collapse of the global nuclear regimes or if North Korea does so implies that the future of the Asia-Pacific will be determined by power politics much more than by interdependence.²³

²¹ For details see 'Unblocking the Yen' The Economist, (November 16, 1991), p.83.

²² Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security", Survival, vol.36, no.2, (Summer 1994), p.7

²³ *Ibid.*, p.10.

IMPERATIVES FOR COOPERATION

However, the optimists on the other side of the fence say that there is enough reason to believe that the signs of Cooperative Security in the post-Cold War era are visible and they will grow stronger with the passage of time. The surprising point is that the optimists, often use the same facts as those of the pessimists but arrive at opposite conclusions. They cite several factors which will help promote cooperation:

a) The initial scepticism towards multilateral security cooperation was because of the fact that it continued to give the image of a military pact with the involvement and backing of a great power. This was due to the great power involvement in the region during the Cold War period. As some of the early proposals for multilateral Collective Security originated in the context of the Cold War (eg. Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security System proposal, 1969) the countries of the Asia-Pacific were slow to react to such proposals during the post-Cold War era. But there has been a decided shift in regional attitudes towards such multilateral security initiatives.

b) Scholars like Jusuf Wanandi view that "since there was no historical burden as in the European case, it may be easier to charter

new ways and strategies of cooperation for the Asia-Pacific."²⁴ The amount of flexibility in the Asia-Pacific demonstrated even during Cold War, is often cited as a positive point to promote regional multilateralism.

c) While regional strategic asymmetries and arms modernization may be seen as a source of instability, many scholars view that this will help accelerate the process of adopting a Cooperative Security framework. The proliferation dilemma affects each country in different ways, yet all have an interest in achieving some semblance of stability.²⁵ The fears of an emerging hegemony is also seen as an important push factor for smaller countries of the region to speed up the process of regional multilateralism. This will help to "draw in and socialise" the hegemon to behave in cooperative ways.

d) The economic dividends of peace are also well recognised by countries of the region. Charles Lipson argues that when economic relations are at stake, "cooperation can be sustained among several self interested states."²⁶ Each country realises that at times they have a

²⁴ Jusuf Wanandi, "Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific", The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. XXII, no.3, p.204.

²⁵ This idea is borrowed from Geoffrey Kemp, op.cit no.4, p.393.

²⁶ Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics, vol.37, no.1 (October 1984), p.2.

collective interest in making short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term benefits. The recent currency crises in Southeast Asia has shown that a greater amount of economic interdependence has resulted in a situation where one country's problems can soon spread to the other countries of a region - a phenomenon known as '*Contagion Effect*'. Hence, cooperation to minimise such threats - both military and non-military has become a strategic imperative.

e) While prospects for cooperation is made difficult by what pessimists like Buzan and Segal call, a great deal of diversity, other scholars particularly from Asia, point out to the emergence of an "Asian Way" in the region. Advocates of an 'Asian way' contend that the political and economic rise of Asian countries, the recent crisis in Southeast Asia notwithstanding , is directly attributable to regionally distinctive Asian cultural traits. Similarly in the strategic realm the states of the region have different predominant strategic preferences from those of the West, that are rooted in their historical and cultural heritages and

formative experiences as states.²⁷ A new breed of cross-fertilised civilisational values is emerging due to the increased interaction of the Indo and Sinic values and, this according to Geng Huichang, has produced a stable region built on "the Asia-Pacific model of peaceful coexistence and national amity, and nurtured by oriental wisdom in contrast to the turbulence in Europe since the end of the Cold War."²⁸ The West should be more sensitive to 'Asia and learn from it, accepting some Asian values in the process. The Asian scholars believe that the Anglo-Saxon tradition in international relations has overlooked the emergence of alternative theoretical perspectives of conflict resolution and dispute management. In Asia both conflict resolution and dispute management take place within a cultural context. Buzan and Segal to their credit,

²⁷ Some prominent exponents of the 'Asian Way' thesis include politicians like Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore and Mahathir Mohammed, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Li Xianglu, former Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang's Secretary for Economic Reform, 1980-84, and senior diplomat Tommy Koh. For details refer to Lee Kuan Yew, 'Culture is Destiny', Foreign Affairs, vol.73, no.2 (March-April 1994), pp.107-17, Kishore Mahbubani, 'The Pacific Impulse' Survival, vol.37, no.1, (Spring 1995), pp.105-120. Mahbubani is the most prolific writer of the Singapore School. Japanese journalist Yoichi Funabashi in a series of articles emphasis on Asian values. Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia", Foreign Affairs, vol.72, no.5 (November-December 1993) pp.77-85.

²⁸ Geng Huichang, "Multinational Coordination. Feasibility in Asia-Pacific" Contemporary International Relations, vol.2, no.11 (November 1992), pp.2-3. He was the President of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, when the article was published.

acknowledge that the US and Europe might "welcome a deterioration in security relations within Asia as the rise in tensions would prolong the west's view of itself as being more civilized than the rest of the world and would give it more leverage over Japan and China."²⁹

f) A successful example of achieving regional multilateral security is the 'ASEAN Way' which can be tried out in the Asia-Pacific region. The 'ASEAN Way', has helped put a lid on potential disputes and develop '*sui generis*' multilateral security forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The approach to eventual multilateral security cooperation is incremental and graduated-informal; without an intervening bureaucracy. It is built on personal and political relationships. Its focus is not on controversy but on areas of common interest from which multilateral cooperation can be developed and expanded. Divisive issues are simply passed over, for later resolution or until they have been made either, irrelevant or innocuous by time and events.³⁰

Amitav Acharya observes "although the ASEAN Way is a multilateral approach, it is also evident in the management of bilateral

²⁹ Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, op.cit, no.22, p.13.

³⁰ Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring Security, the 'ASEAN Way'," Survival, vol.39, no.4, (Winter 1997-98), p.81.

relationships among member states. It reflects the ASEAN members' efforts to manage and overcome intra-mural differences through a process of consultations and compromise without necessarily relying on formal institutional mechanisms."³¹ While the European way lays stress upon liberal institutions, the 'ASEAN Way' views that 'a thick alphabet soup of institutions' is not a necessary prelude to regional multilateral processes - a point which Cooperative Security very well appreciates.

The differences between European and 'ASEAN' approach reflects "cultural differences between linear, deductive Western thinking and inductive intuitive Asian thinking. While Westerners rely primarily on the rule of law to build trust, Asians rely on reciprocity and personal relations. Francis Fukuyama argues that law is ultimately a better basis for building mutual confidence. But personal relations can also give the relatively weaker party a more sympathetic hearing than can the impersonal letter of the law. This approach has led to criticisms that the ARF is all bark and no bite. Such criticism misses the point, for the process is as important as any eventual agreement."³²

³¹ Amitav Acharya, "Culture and Security." *Achieving Regional Security in the "ASEAN Way",* in Keith Krause (ed.) Cross Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1997), p.50.

³² Jose T. Almonte, op.cit no.30, p.81.

The ASEAN Way consists of a code of conduct for interstate behaviour as well as a decision-making process based on consultations and consensus. It involves a high degree of discreteness, informality, pragmatism, expediency, consensus-building, and non-confrontational bargaining styles which are often contrasted with adversarial posturing and legalistic decision-making procedures in western multilateral negotiations. It tends to be process-oriented and implies a commitment to carry on open-ended negotiations. The preference for informality is evident in several areas of the ASEAN'S approach to institution building in the security arena. 'Dialogues' and 'Consultative Mechanisms' are preferred to 'institutions' and 'conflict-resolution' measures. The ASEAN coordinating bodies cover a large number of issue areas and over 200 meetings are held under its auspices. These meetings have become part of an institutional culture that helps avoid and control conflicts.

The ASEAN countries do not equate institutionalisation with effectiveness. Hence, the idea of an Asia-Pacific counterpart to the *Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)*, a proposal which primarily came from scholars like Joe Clark and Gareth Evans, has been rejected in the ASEAN circles. The OSCE is viewed to be too institutionalized, having mechanisms (such as the Conflict Prevention

Centre and the Missions of Long Duration to Yugoslavia) with grand titles which are under-resourced and unworkable. Hence, ARF is seen not primarily as a mechanism for conflict resolution but as a 'dialogue process'. The major consequence of the ASEAN's non-confrontational posture is the reluctance to publicly identify threats. In western circles this is mistaken as an attempt to push conflict situations under the carpet. However, this does not mean that strategic planners do not take into account issues like the growing military power of China. But unlike westerners they never talk about a '*China Threat*' and seek to 'engage' rather than 'contain' China.

The next important element of the 'ASEAN Way' is the concept and practice of "consultations" (*Musyawah*) and "consensus" (*Mufakat*). Thus, consensus-building in the ASEAN Way, is an attempt to create a common understanding of the problem, without necessarily producing a common approach to problem-solving. It is about agreeing to disagree, rather than allowing disagreements to cloud and undermine the spirit of regionalism. The ASEAN has sought, with a measure of initial success, to transplant the 'ASEAN Way', particularly the style of non-confrontational, informal and consensual decision making system, into a wider regional setting and make it the foundation of an '*Asia-Pacific Way*'

of multilateralism. This is particularly remarkable given the fact that the membership of the ARF includes the major powers of the contemporary international system. Thus, the point of the *Constructivist* international relations theory, that social identities of actors help constitute their interests, certainly applies to the ASEAN experience.³³

One of the major factors which gives a fillip to the spread of the 'ASEAN Way' in the Asia-Pacific region is the change in China's attitude towards multilateral security cooperation. While pessimists point at the '*Parabellum Paradigm*' optimists cite the increasing relevance of '*Confucian-Mencian Paradigm*' or the '*Yin*' approach. The later approach views the world as harmonious rather than conflictual. It believes that only on extending benevolence, security would be assured.³⁴ An outstanding example of such benevolence is found in China's behaviour during the recent Southeast Asian currency crisis. China could have devalued its currency to become more export competitive but that would have resulted in further battering of the Southeast Asian economies. China's benevolence during the currency crisis and the flexibility it has shown in diplomatic negotiations are arguments against the 'China Threat

³³ Much of the above analysis on the 'ASEAN Way' is based on the article by Amitav Acharya, op.cit. no.31, pp.50-58.

³⁴ Jing-dong Yuan, op.cit. no.19, pp.73-74.

Theory' advocated by Western scholars.³⁵ The holistic approach to national security in Chinese strategic culture, which places a strong emphasis on overall political, economic and psychological aspects of interstate relations will be sufficient to deter China's aggressive behaviour. The growing interdependence and the peace dividends are highly appreciated by Chinese policy makers. General Secretary Jiang Zemin in a speech in Malaysia on November 11, 1994 said "China needs a long lasting peaceful international environment for its development."³⁶ Repudiating fears of a malign hegemon on the horizon at the Second ARF meeting at Brunei the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen adopted a Cooperative Security language. He recommended that the Asia-Pacific states should "replace resort to force and threat to use force with peaceful negotiations, dialogues and consultations."³⁷

Thus, given these imperative Cooperative Security mechanisms have emerged with a rapid pace in the post-Cold War era. The potential constraints and the points raised by the '*APR pessimists*' have to be

³⁵ Denny Roy, "The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments", Asian Survey, vol. XXXVI, no.8 (August 1996), pp.758-771.

³⁶ Jiang Zemin quoted in *Ibid.*, p.762.

³⁷ Qian Qichen quoted in Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought," Asian Survey, vol. XXXVII, no.5 (May, 1998), p.429.

addressed in near future so that a society of states can emerge in the Asia-Pacific region.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY MEASURES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

The merit of Cooperative Security lies in its elasticity. Cooperative Security aims at multilateral regional security architecture while recognising the need and importance of bilateral processes in enhancing regional stability. The elasticity of Cooperative Security lies in the importance which it lays on both Track One and Track Two diplomacy. 'Track I' refers to the traditional government level talks that are held at bilateral and multilateral levels. 'Track Two' refers to unofficial meetings, normally hosted by NGO's and/or independent research institutes which bring scholars, security specialists and policy-makers acting in their private capacities to discuss the outstanding issues of the region and suggest ways and means to resolve it.

While recognising the fact that Track I and Track II processes complement and supplement each other, for a neat schematisation they have been separated in the chapter. The focus being 'high politics', the emphasis is upon the Cooperative Security mechanisms initiated in areas relating to 'high politics'. This does not diminish the importance of

Cooperative Security measures in other areas given the fact that security is an all encompassing term and there is a strong linkage between the traditional and the widening security areas.

GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES

Within the rubric of governmental initiatives the participation of the countries of the region in global disarmament, and arms control agreements is first examined in detail. Although not qualifying to be called regional Cooperative Security mechanism, these treaties and regimes helped by acting as a necessary pre-condition for regional cooperation.

Impact of Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties and Regimes

Ever since the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) drove nuclear tests underground, contributing to a dramatic decline in atmospheric nuclear fallout, the region has benefitted from such measures. However, proactive initiation of disarmament and arms control measures have rarely been the priority of the countries of the Asia-Pacific. The recent interest in the *Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM's)* may not be of the classic arms control/disarmament variety, they may nonetheless, lead to greater openness and transparency and pave the way for substantial regional arms control measures. The region, till date, largely

has enjoyed the *flow on effects* of the arms control and disarmament negotiations such as lowering of tensions between superpowers.³⁸

The impact of a nuclear arms race being the foremost concern of various countries, nuclear arms control and non-proliferation treaties and regimes merit attention.

The PTBT of 1963 directly benefited the Asia-Pacific region by driving American nuclear tests in South-Pacific underground. China, the only nuclear weapon state in the region, has also done likewise with a few exceptions. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II of 1972 and 1979 respectively) helped stabilise nuclear arms race thereby enhancing security across the globe. Of particular importance was the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement. The Soviet SS 20's which were targeted at certain Asia-Pacific states were detargeted. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I and II (START) has also helped lower the strategic nuclear deployments.³⁹

³⁸ Trevor Findlay, "Disarmament, Arms Control and the Regional Security Dialogue", in Gary Klintworth (ed.), Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities (Melbourne : Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pvt. Ltd., 1996), p.221.

³⁹ Ibid., pp.222-23.

A major achievement in the field of nuclear non-proliferation regime was the revision and confirmation of *nuclear security guarantees* for non-nuclear states on the part of nuclear powers in the NPT context. The Resolution 984, unanimously approved on April 11, 1995 lists what is known as "positive nuclear guarantees." This commits Security Council permanent members to instantly call the Council's attention to nuclear attacks or nuclear threat against any non-nuclear NPT member state; so as to render necessary assistance to the victim in accordance with the UN Charter.

The "negative nuclear guarantees" are contained in the statements by nuclear powers with permanent Security Council membership in connection with Resolution 984. These states shall refrain from using nuclear arms against non-nuclear NPT members. The only exception to the rule concerns the eventuality of a non-nuclear state carrying out an attack in conjunction or alliance with a nuclear state. It is assumed that both types of security guarantees cover the states that are not just part of the NPT, but also those who diligently honour their commitments under the treaty.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Vladimir Petrovsky, "Non-Proliferation and Export Control Regimes in the APR: Problems and Outlook", Far Eastern Affairs, vol.1, no.2, (1998), p.8.

The Security Council resolution has helped to allay certain fears of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region by assuring security counter-guarantees should some states like North Korea decide to launch a nuclear attack.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was specifically discussed at the third ARF session in Jakarta in July 1996. On the whole the forum participants (except India) were in favour of signing the CTBT. China after having carried out its forty-fifth test since 1964, on 29 July, 1996 declared a moratorium on further nuclear tests. It has since signed the CTBT.

For Australia, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand and small states of South Pacific, the CTBT is likely to help in furthering regional security and bolster the credibility of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone as declared by the Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985. China's adherence to the CTBT will help curb vertical proliferation.

The document on the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1994 names the creation of zones free from nuclear arms and other types of *Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)* as an absolute priority. Building upon the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration of Southeast region as a *Zone*

of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the ARF in its 1995 Bangkok Declaration declared to make Southeast Asia a *Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ)*. The SEANWFZ would help ban manufacturing, deploying, using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons against zone member states even by countries outside the NWFZ. The SEANWFZ Treaty of 1995 contains precise definitions of nuclear arms and their delivery means. It also specifies the conditions of their deployment and storage, as well as stipulates the right of member states to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The major area of concern is Northeast Asia. The March 1993 crisis connected with North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT was particularly alarming. However, the 1994 US-North Korean Framework Agreement has largely taken the edge off the crisis. Under the terms of the Framework, Pyongyang agreed to free its plutonium production capability at Yongbyon. Currently, it has halted operations on the 5-Megawatt plutonium production reactor. The US personnel are helping prepare spent fuel for shipment out of North Korea. It is also reported to have ceased construction on two large reactors that would have been sources of plutonium, suspended operations at the reprocessing plant,

and agreed to dismantle nuclear facilities covered by the Agreed Framework, in exchange of two light-water reactors.

An important step toward settling the March 1993 crisis and strengthening the regional non-proliferation regime has been the creation of the *Korea Energy Development Organisation (KEDO)*. The consortium founders, the US, the Republic of Korea and Japan, agreed that the Republic of Korea ought to play a key role in financing and building two light water reactors in North Korea. Although KEDO has run into rough weather over its funding, such agencies can help in making North Korea behave in accordance with international norms.⁴¹

Particularly topical is the aim to create a nuclear free zone in Northeast Asia and to achieve greater Northeast Asian subregional cooperation. The most comprehensive and detailed project of a *Northeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone (NEANFZ)* involving Koreas, Japan and Taiwan would include the following restrictions:

1. Ban on purchasing, testing and manufacturing nuclear weapons by the zone countries.
2. Ban on deploying nuclear weapons within the zone territory.

⁴¹ Vijai K. Nair, "Spreading Nuclear Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Ramifications on Global Stability", *Agni*, vol.3, no.2, p.35.

3. Nuclear power's commitment to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear arms against zone countries.
4. Ban on burying nuclear wastes within the zone.
5. Ban on producing and importing fissionable materials.⁴²

The preliminary step to achieve a NEANFZ is to establish channels of increased bilateral talks and if possible cooperation between the two Koreas. The eight rounds of high level talks which culminated in signing the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation in December 1991, and the Joint South-North Agreement on the Denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula were historical steps in the right direction and need proper follow up actions. Only if bilateral relations between the two Korea's improve, sub-regional concert involving the two Korea's, China, Japan and Russia can be strengthened.

Recently, the Japanese government decided to help Russia in improving the technique of spent nuclear fuel burial in the area of the Sea of Japan and the Western Pacific.⁴³

⁴² Andrew Mack, "A Nuclear Free Zone for Northeast Asia", The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol.IX, no.2 (1995), p.308.

⁴³ Vladimir Petrovsky, op.cit, n.40, p.11.

The strength of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the NPT and the CTBT is likely to be determined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) multilateral inspection mechanism and related agreements such as ban on Chemical Weapons; ban on biological and toxic weapons; restrictions on their delivery means, and monitoring of conventional arms, modern military technologies and dual-purpose technologies.⁴⁴

The states of the Asia-Pacific region like Australia, Indonesia and Japan played an important role in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Australia's *Chemical Weapons Region Initiative (CWRI)* saw the states of the region already declare their non-possession of chemical weapons. Apart from North Korea and South Korea most of the countries have signed the CWC. The states must reveal their defensive programmes to the *Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)*.⁴⁵ The 1972 *Convention on Banning Biological and Toxic Arms (BABC)* also assumes significance in the light of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) belief that before China joined the BABC in 1984 it had gone ahead with an aggressive biological weapons stock

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp.11-12.

⁴⁵ Trevor Findlay, op.cit., n.38, pp.227-228.

programme and Taiwan and North Korea are developing such potentialities.⁴⁶

The *Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)* was launched in April 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain and the US to control the transfer of equipments capable of carrying nuclear (broadened in 1992 to include chemical or biological warheads) warheads of more than 500kg over a distance of 300 k.m. The transfer of missile technology to other countries by China and North Korea is a major concern for other states of the Asia-Pacific region. China and North Korea's adherence to the MTCR is questioned. The countries should be encouraged to exercise restraint. The deployment of a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) System by US in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea may jeopardise Article 9 of the Anti-Missile Defence Treaty of 1972.

The *Wassenaar Agreement on Export Control over Conventional Arms and Dual Purpose Products and Technologies* wherein member states have agreed to hold regular semi-annual information exchange, consultation and conferences regarding the transfer of arms listed in the UN Conventional Arms Register has excellent chances of development in

⁴⁶ Vladimir Petrovsky, *op.cit.*, n.40, p.14.

the Asia-Pacific Region.⁴⁷ It would help maintain a system of control and restriction which could be monitored by a regional organisation.

Transparency and Trust Building Measures

The various transparency measures, defined as openness on defence matters, encourages trust and reduces suspicions thereby undermining 'security dilemma' situations. These transparency measures were are an integral part of the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM's) at Helsinki in 1975. The promise to use force only for defensive purposes, commitment not to alter borders by force, agreement to provide prior notification on military movements involving more than 25,000 personnel and voluntary exchange of observers at military exercises formed part of the Helsinki baskets. This paved the way for far-reaching agreements at the review Conferences in Stockholm (1986) and Vienna (1990).⁴⁸

The Asia-Pacific region could adopt indigenous methods of transparency measures which would eliminate the danger of small conflicts of the region escalating into major crisis. Given the importance

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp.14-17.

⁴⁸ Barry Huges, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992), p.222.

of 'trust' and personal comfort in the cultural framework of the region and the scepticism about European modes and processes, *Trust Building Measures (TBM's)* and *Mutual Reassurance Measures (MRM's)* can be adopted. Some countries like China have been reluctant to discuss security issues in government forums like the ARF. However, China is not the only country which is worried about 'doing too much too soon' with regard to military transparency issues. Yet, China has taken a number of transparency measures. In November 1995 it published the Government White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament. During November 1997 representatives from NGO's and foreign governments visited Chinese nuclear weapons laboratories in Mianyang, Sichuan Province. The tour by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the Air Defense Command Centre outside Beijing, in January 1998 reflects the fact that countries are slowly but steadily moving to an era of openness and mutual reassurance.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Ralph Cossa, "Asia-Pacific Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security", in Michael Krepon, Khurshid Khoja, Michael Newbill and Jenny S. Drezin (eds.), A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security, (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Centre, March 1998), pp.19-20.

Regional Multilateral Organisations

An important step in promoting multilateral Cooperative Security was the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the first working session of which was convened in July 1994 in Bangkok. ARF is a '*Sui generis*' organisation with its own distinctive political approach to regional security problems. The "emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum was both a symptom of, and a response to, changes in the security context in East Asia following the end of Cold War."⁵⁰

The ASEAN seized the initiative to provide a multilateral forum because it wanted to engage the regional and extra-regional powers in a constructive manner and forestall the emergence of bodies like Council of Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), modelled after European CSCE.⁵¹ With a membership of twenty-one countries the ARF saw three areas for discussion and advancement (a) promotion of CSBM's (b) development of Preventive Diplomacy mechanisms and (c) development of Conflict Resolution mechanisms. Based on the 'ASEAN Way' the ARF

⁵⁰ Michael Leifer, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum', Adelphi Paper, No.302 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.5.

⁵¹ Gary J. Smith, "Multilateralism and Regional Security in Asia: The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC's Geopolitical Value." Seminar on the Future of the ARF (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, 27-28 April, 1998), pp.21-23.

has no permanent Secretariat and the Chair rotates annually through the ASEAN members. There is one Ministerial meeting per year which is preceded by one Senior Official Meeting (SOM). The SOM prepares the agenda for the ARF Summit.

The achievements of the ARF in the Track I arena can be seen from the Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) Meetings. For example the ISG on CBM's recommended a number of concrete measures which included dialogue on security perceptions and information sharing. The ARF members should be encouraged to submit annually, a defence policy statement to the ARF-SOM on a voluntary basis. The *UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA)* should be discussed within the ARF framework and ARF members should be encouraged to circulate on a voluntary basis the data they submit to the UN. The ISM on Peacekeeping Operations encouraged the ARF participants to work together more closely within the ARF context and also in the UN Special Committee on Peace Keeping Operations. It is noteworthy that the ISG on CBM's in early March 1997 was held in Beijing showing the growing importance of the ARF in 'socialising' China according to international norms.

If the ARF is to become a meaningful vehicle to enhance the peace and prosperity of the region it will have to demonstrate its capacity to

solve territorial disputes and gradually move beyond Stage I (CBM's) to Stage II. Stage II would involve Preventive Diplomacy and finally Stage III would aim at Conflict Resolution. Keeping in view the disputes in areas like South China Sea, Korean Peninsula etc. Preventive Diplomacy measures can be explored in consonance with the measures stipulated in Article 33 of the UN Charter.⁵²

The application of Cooperative Security to the resolution of long-standing territorial disputes will be the toughest test for the success and failure of both Cooperative Security mechanisms and the regional multilateral organisations like the ARF. As an illustration of the above point the disputes in the South China Sea particularly those involving the Spratly Islands will be interesting. The ASEAN Manila Declaration, 1992 states that the disputing parties in the South China Sea should be "conscious that any adverse development in the South China Sea directly affects the peace and stability in the region."⁵³

Measures have to be taken in the direction of what Michael Krepon calls *Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAM's)* which involves the freezing of

⁵² Jusuf Wanandi, "The ARF: Objective, Processes and Programmmes", in Thangam Ramnath (ed.), The Emerging Regional Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific, (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia 1996), pp.44-47.

⁵³ Ibid., p.48.

the existing levels of conflicts.⁵⁴ The ground rules for cooperation have been laid down in the *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia*, adopted at the ASEAN summit meeting at Bali in 1976. The discussion of Spratly islands at the ARF may denote the first step in what Rummel calls conflict resolution through '*peace-making principle*' which involves, interalia classifying a conflict-situation; defining a 'yesable' interest and displaying commitment in the dialogue process. Thus, a 'building block' incremental approach to peace is the first step.⁵⁵ The 3rd Annual ARF meeting also stressed upon the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region. The significance of the 1995 Hangzhou Summit was the increased unity of ASEAN members over the Spratlys which send a signal to China that any further action in the South China Sea will lead to a hardening of the ASEAN stand.⁵⁶ In the application of Cooperative Security to the island disputes the ARF could look into possible solutions like -

⁵⁴ Michael Krepon, Confidence Building Measures, (Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Centre, 1993), p.4.

⁵⁵ R.J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War: The Just Peace (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), p.213.

⁵⁶ Craig A. Snyder, "Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea", Asian Perspective, vol.21, no.1 (Spring-Summer 1997), p.27.

- a) evolving mechanisms for the allocation of the South China Sea on the basis of equidistance principle as enshrined in the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (1982).⁵⁷
- b) applying the Antarctic Treaty of 1957 as a model for resolving conflicting claims in the South China Sea. The South China Sea can be declared as a '*regional common*' something, akin to the concept of 'global common'. A temporary freezing of claims can be followed by a *Joint Development Council of the South China Sea (JDCSCS)*.

The Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui has proposed that a multinational South China Sea Development Company with an initial capital of \$10 billion be established and the profits from the exploration of the Sea be devoted to building infrastructure in the region. This idea is similar to the Spratlys Management Authority (SMA) suggested by the American maritime affairs expert Mark Valencia.⁵⁸ The peace in the South

⁵⁷ For details of the various legal aspects of the South China Sea disputes see Codner Lee, "Spratly Island Disputes and the Law of the Seas", Ocean Development and International Law, vol.25, no.1, p.73.

⁵⁸ Mark Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes", Adelphi Paper No. 298 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.47.

China Sea is a necessary precondition for the smooth operation of *Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC's)* linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The formation of the *Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)*, an informal group of the Asia-Pacific 'economies'⁵⁹ will help in further economic integration of the region. While it is unlikely that the APEC will evolve into a multifaceted CSCE-type forum, its survival and growth in the face of widespread scepticism and opposition have proved that an Asia-Pacific dialogue in at least some fields is feasible.⁶⁰ Further, economic development of the countries within an institutional framework will help in preventing the growth of economic and defence synergies. The second important benefit of APEC is the presence of the US in the organisation. According to Winston Lord, the Clinton administration's Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, the APEC helps 'anchor', the United States in Asia; the implication being that this may have a spill over effect in the security field.⁶¹ Thus, the APEC and its non-governmental counterpart the *Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)* form the

⁵⁹ The presence of Hong Kong and Taiwan necessitates the use of 'economies' and not countries.

⁶⁰ Trevor Findlay, *op.cit.*, n.38, p.234.

⁶¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.234.

operational core of the concept of Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Non-Governmental Initiatives

The evolution of 'second track diplomacy' has been critical in stimulating governmental level security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific. Beginning in the late 1980's, the intensive series of informal consultations, research projects and conferences on the Asia-Pacific security, involving a mix of academic and governmental representatives, seems to have been seminal in turning regional opinion around.⁶² It helps in the exploration of new or potentially sensitive options without necessarily locking participants into established, rigid governmental positions. The importance of Track Two activities has been recognised by the ARF which has conducted its own Track Two Meetings.⁶³ For example, a Track Two seminar on the 'Building of Confidence and Trust in the Asia-Pacific' was held under the ARF auspices in Canberra, Australia in November, 1994. Its results were incorporated into the ARF Concept Paper, prepared in advance of the Second ARF meeting and subsequently included as an attachment to the 1995 Chairman's

⁶² Ibid., p.235.

⁶³ Ralph Cossa, *op.cit.*, n.49, p.27.

statement. Annex B of the Concept Paper provided an indicative list of medium to long term proposals which could become the focus, of Track Two efforts. For example, participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms was in Annex A, which was for the ARF participants to explore. But the case for a Regional Arms Register was at the top of the list of potential Confidence-Building Measures (CBM's) in Annex B.⁶⁴

The UN also has become involved in Track Two activities. Each year the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament sponsors an annual 'unofficial' meeting at Kathmandu. The '*Kathmandu Process*' has prospects of bringing, in future the UN and the ASEAN together on various issues - a point highlighted by Boutros-Boutros Ghali in his '*Agenda for Peace*' (1992).

The most prominent of the formalized Track Two dialogue is the annual Asia-Pacific Round Table Meeting, now organised by the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) which involves several hundred participants from some two dozen countries. The prominent formalized sub-regional Track Two dialogue mechanisms are the *Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)* sponsored by the University of California's Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.24.

(IGCC) and the *North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD)*, now renamed as *North Pacific Security Dialogue*, by the York University, Toronto with Canadian Government funding.

The NEACD project has stressed upon a broad and comprehensive scope of *Mutual Reassurance Measures* aimed at eliminating misperception and hostilities by adopting a gradual process.⁶⁵

The formation of the *Council of Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP)* marks the most important development of Track Two Diplomacy. It was established in 1993 by member committees from Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, North and South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the US and Vietman. The CSCAP while predating the ARF, is now focusing its efforts on providing direct support to this inter-governmental forum. Several CSCAP issue-oriented International Working Groups (IWG's) are focusing on specific topics outlined in the ARF Communiqués.⁶⁶ The CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Security Cooperation has engaged in exploring the prospects of Maritime

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp.25-26.

⁶⁶ Paul M. Evans, "Managing Security Relations after the Cold War: Prospects for the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific", The Indonesia Quarterly, vol.XXII, no.1 (1994), pp.62-70.

Confidence and Security Building Measures (MCSBM's) in the light of the South China Sea disputes. It also deals with issues like piracy, drug smuggling marine cooperation etc. It is one of the very few multilateral forums where China and Taiwan, and North and South Korea get to discuss security issues.

The MSCSBM's suggested by the CSCAP will compliment the measures taken by Track I diplomatic initiatives on South China Sea. The informal multilateral workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea shows the utility of Track Two Forums. China is reluctant to discuss the contesting sovereignty claims over the South China Sea at the inter-governmental forums. It however prefers working through such workshops. A quasi-diplomatic Conference on the South China Sea in October 1994 in Bukittinggi, Indonesia, funded by *Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)*, suggested some concrete steps to achieve Cooperative Security in the South China Sea. The Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea have been going on since 1990. Several *Technical Working Groups (TWG's)* have been established by these workshops to deal with specific issues like marine science research, bio-diversity, shipping etc with an aim to

establish sufficient confidence among participants so that they will eventually work together on more politically sensitive projects.⁶⁷

Thus, through a slow, gradual, incremental building-block approach the Asia-Pacific region as a whole and the sub-regions within it is moving from a soft unstructured regionalism to a more structured, regional multilateral Cooperative Security Framework. This is with a view to arrest and push back the forces of war and conflict and help bolster confidence in the security and economic realms needed for a more cohesive regionalism. Although there are impediments in the process of regionalism they are by no means unsurmountable. The imperatives found in the Asia-Pacific region are strong enough to fuel such a process. This would help undermine the historical rivalries and lingering tensions within the region. The formation of several regional multilateral organisations both in the economic and security arena will help in building 'habits of dialogue', thereby promoting greater trust and reassurance within the region.

⁶⁷ Craig A. Snyder, *op.cit.*, n.55, pp.28-21.

CONCLUSIONS

The theoretical developments in the field of international relations can be classified into three broad paradigms. The '*Hobbesian*' or the power politics paradigm remains dominant in international relations. The Realists and the neo-realists operate within this paradigm. While the *Hobbesian* paradigm lies at one end of the spectrum the *Kantian* paradigm lies at the opposite end. The Idealists and the neo-idealists function within the *Kantian* paradigm.

While Realism views man as selfish, egoistic and always with a need for power, Idealism emphasizes the altruistic aspects and cooperative instincts of human behaviour. Thus, for the Realists the state has to operate within an anarchical self-help system where security is scarce. On the other hand, the Idealists visualise a world which will see the eventual disappearance of the state boundaries. The entire world would be a *global federation* with units within it freely cooperating. Hence, peace and security would be plentiful.

In between the two extremes lies the *Grotian* paradigm within which scholars like Hedley Bull and Adam Watson operated. Their thesis

emphasizes that inspite of the competing and at times conflicting interests of the states, a semblence of order can be achieved, if states work out means and mechanisms to prevent a relentless competition for power. Such an outcome is possible by using diplomatic means, international organisations, great power cooperation in the system for regime building etc.

The Kantian view of the international system operates in the realm of utopia. A decade after the collapse of the Cold War structures shows that even in the post-Cold War era territorial and military conflicts are likely to stay. Hence, some of the core assumptions of Realism are still relevant to the present era. However, the conclusions which they draw as a syllogistic logic can be challenged by altering one of the premises. For example, security dilemma giving rise to an arms race, might be a major premise for the realists. The minor premise would affirm that due to an anarchic self-help system, states have to operate under a security dilemma. From these two premises the Realists would conclude the inevitability of an arms race and a war-prone system.

However, by altering the minor premise the Realist conclusion would fall apart. If a situation can be created wherein the states do not have to operate under a security dilemma, say by furthering regional

transparency measures, then the prospects of an arms race and conflictual situations are negated. This is what Cooperative Security precisely aims to achieve. It does not provide any revolutionary alternatives to qualify within the Kantian paradigm in international relations but would definitely come under the Grotian paradigm.

The Cooperative Security approach seeks to proceed with and not in spite of some of the core assumptions of realism. The strong points of this practical approach to promote security lie in its inclusivity and elasticity. The fundamental aim of Cooperative Security is to reassure states in their inter-state behaviour rather than deter them. It is neither Eurocentric in origin or focus nor based on assumptions of strategic global relations in a zero-sum world. The Cooperative Security proponents expand the notions of security to the non-military realm and give due emphasis to the role of non-state actors in security building process.

During the Cold War era the regions of the globe including the Asia-Pacific functioned within a global strategic overlay. The 'high politics' bipolar balance of power framework underpinned by bilateral military alliances, with the primary aim of nuclear deterrence dominated the Cold War era of the Asia-Pacific region. The local, the regional and the global politics interacted with great density to provide the region with

a fluidity in sharp contrast to the rigid division of spheres of influence of the superpowers in Europe.

The winding down of the Cold War has meant that the states are now more independent to shape their bilateral and regional foreign policies. In the absence of a global framework, the region is in a state of strategic uncertainty. The motives and intentions of three major players are not yet clear even after a decade of the post-Cold War. This is in contrast with the Cold War era where the incipient bipolarity was recognised even before the end of the Second World War. This strategic uncertainty coupled with the multifaceted nature of the territorial disputes has found its ramifications in the arms build up in the region. Added to this the cautious approach of states in the conduct of foreign relations is due to a deep seated suspicion about ambitions of other countries. Such scepticism is also a result of historical rivalries within a plural and diversified region. The debilitating consequences of such an arms build up and conflicts over territorial disputes could push the region into chaos comparable to the pre-World War I Europe. The 'China threat' is a worrisome situation for many countries. As China grows stronger and stronger, it would play a determining role in the region. The irredentist claims and the arms modernisation coupled with its ideology of

revisionism may be dangerous for the Asia-Pacific. The chances of *Pax Nipponica* and the history of 1930's repeating itself has also not been discounted in the regional security analysis. So the presence of the US in the region is viewed as a necessary though not a sufficient condition for regional peace. The threats of an imploding Korea, a domestically unstable China, growing independence movements in Southeast Asia and future energy crises to which reference has been made in the passing, will nonetheless play an important role in shaping the regional security architecture.

To avoid the nations of the region from getting embroiled in a spiralling conflict Cooperative Security mechanisms are necessary. The approach stresses upon two important tenets which make it particularly desirable for building a '*regional security community*' in the Asia-Pacific region. The proponents of Cooperative Security lay emphasis upon the cultural context. The differences between European and our Asian approaches reflect the differences of linear deductive western thinking and inductive, intuitive Asian thinking. Therefore, Cooperative Security recognises that the formal legal institutional multilateral processes in Europe or elsewhere cannot be replicated in the Asia-Pacific region. While it is not opposed to multilateral institutions it emphasizes a gradual

building - block approach to the development of such institutions. Hence, it recognises the value of existing balance of power arrangements and the importance of bilateral processes in enhancing regional stability and to that extent promoting the development of regional Cooperative Security. Thus, it has welcomed the homegrown security structures like the ASEAN Regional Forum. The emphasis on informal processes has helped the approach to absorb the Track Two diplomatic initiatives within its fold.

Thus, it is a pragmatic response to those who might think of restructuring the regional security architecture dramatically by transplanting Western concepts and institutions in the Asia-Pacific in utter disregard to the cultural context. The approach provides for built in constraints against the rigidification of the process, structure or agenda of security dialogues.

In the final analysis it can be said that only by building upon the present Cooperative Security measures, can *'durable peace'* be achieved in the region. Otherwise, the vision of Theodore Roosevelt has to be postponed for future generations. The curtain is falling on one of the most significant centuries in the history of world politics. However, the world is in the thick of a transitional phase and mankind does have an important role in ensuring that the forces of peace, security and stability

are promoted and those of war, insecurity and turmoil controlled and thrown into the veritable dustbin of history. The *Japanese Diet* Resolution of June 9, 1995 to commemorate the end of Fifty Years of Pacific War was styled as : "*Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learnt from History.*" Let not the history of the Asia-Pacific repeat itself and let the region and the world move towards realising the ultimate goal of human security.

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