

**RISE AND GROWTH OF SOCIALISM IN AFRICA :
A CASE STUDY OF ETHIOPIA AND TANZANIA**

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Certificate

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "Rise and Growth of Socialism in Africa : A Case Study of Ethiopia & Tanzania" submitted by Mr. Bibhu Kalyan Mohanty in fulfilment of six credits out of total requirements of twenty-four credits for the Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) of this University is his original work according to the best of my knowledge and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or of any other University.

Vijay Gupta

(Prof. Vijay Gupta)
Supervisor

**"Salute the dead
because they died
salute the dead
for they made living possible
salute the ones who have given life to the future
by becoming the part"**

**In the loving memory
of those revolutionaries
who have sacrificed their lives
for Tanzania and Ethiopia**

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Dated:

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INTRODUCTION

Study of any social phenomena in the context of its ideological perspective requires that the general laws governing motion of history should be examined in the context of historicity of specific societies, and the general and the specific should be integrated to understand the whole and its relationship with parts and the ideological debate between different parts. This method will lead us to have an empirical study on African socialism with the principal objective of undertaking a dispassionate enquiry into the different ideological postulations between Marxist and non-Marxist socialist path of development.

Before going to study the socialism in the context of Africa, we have to first understand that what is socialism? Socialism is a social system that replaces capitalism and is marked by the social ownership of the means of production, absence of exploitation of man by man, social production planned on a country-wide scale, the first stage of the communist socio-economic formation. Under socialism, abolition of private ownership of the means of production and establishment of socialist property transform the society economically, socially and politically.

But socialism in the context of Africa has two connotations i.e. (1) 'scientific socialism' based on the

theories of Marxism and Leninism as defined above, and (2) 'African socialism' based on the theory that the predominant mode of production is communal and that there is absence of class conflicts.

The leaders of the newly emerging countries in Africa regarded that socialism is a method of faster economic growth from backward to modernised economy. In this context two schools of thought dominated the African scene. On the one hand, some African leadership wanted to adopt socialist path of development but they believed that their ideology should be free from other foreign ideologies and have its roots within the country itself. They propounded their own theory of 'African socialism'. On the other hand there were some who believed in 'scientific socialism' as based on Marxism-Leninism and adopted the same for the development process.

Our main task in this work is to examine whether the end results of both the theories are same or different from each other and whether these two theories have been applied in Africa for bringing socialist society on the basic tenants i.e. faster economic growth, equality, self-reliance, centralised planned development, of delinking of the economy from colonial powers, of building up industry and mechanizing agriculture or a different kind of society whose appearance is socialist society but in reality which is

largely peasant communal society based on traditional egalitarian principles.

Then there will be an attempt also to study the validity of both the approaches in the context of the class-struggle in Africa i.e. which approach is able to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor i.e. the haves and the have-nots.

Then we would like to study that was emergence of socialism in Africa a necessary social condition rather than an economic compulsion as they demanded to increase the production to raise the level of per capita income and to overcome the inequality in the society and exploitation of man by man? But in this context there would be an attempt to examine what type of socialism i.e. African and scientific was introduced to restructure this economy and to bring the qualitative changes in the society?

In case of 'scientific socialism' in Ethiopia, we will apply basic theories of Marxist-Leninism to examine various declarations and documents which the leadership of Ethiopia has issued to bring about socio-economic changes. We will see whether these changes are leading to qualitative changes or still preserving old feudo-bourgeois order. We want to discuss Ethiopian case study with a historical background of its feudo-bourgeois order and the revolution of 1974. Then we want to pose the socialist

policies and programmes of new government in post-revolution period. Then various aspects like land reforms, agricultural sector, industrial sector, education, etc. will be dealt to understand the success or failure of socialism in Ethiopia.

In the analysis of 'African socialism', we have taken Tanzania as the case-study. Here we would like to deal that Tanzanian socialism is understood in terms of traditional society with the values of primitive communism. It seeks to achieve its own brand of socialism what is called 'Ujamaa'. Here the goals of 'Ujamaa' thesis (socialism) will be studied keeping in view the principles of egalitarianism, self-reliance, popular participation as propounded in various declarations i.e. Arusha declaration, leadership code and their less significant documents, and we have to see whether the actions of these theories are leading to any kind of qualitative changes or quantitative changes to destroy the colonial economy. Here also we would like to analyse the causes of success or failure for achieving economic goals in agriculture, industry, etc. The political participation of the people within one-party state would be discussed. Socialist attitude of mind (i.e. education and mass-media), a participatory democracy, self-reliance, rural development programmes will be dealt in a greater detail to understand the achievement or failure of socialism in Tanzania.

Then in the concluding chapter a comparative viewpoint will enable us to draw the conclusion that which path of development is better and fitting for African society. In this context, we would like to compare the political economy of the both i.e. planning for agriculture, industrial development and general welfare of the masses. The methodology of the dissertation will be historical and comparative. An analysis of the two theories of the socialist development will make us methodologically strong enough to find out the conclusions for the hypothesis that we have raised here.

CHAPTER I




**SOCIALISM IN AFRICA - ITS EMERGENCE &
DIFFERENT IDEOLOGICAL POSTULATIONS**

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Africa political - African Socialist Countries



1. Madagascar
2. Tanzania
3. Guinea
4. Algeria
5. Zambia
6. Somalia
7. Senegal

kilometres

Emergence of Socialism in Africa:

Socialism in Africa has been introduced in that historical context where traditional agricultural economic structure of the African society had been super-imposed by monetised and mechanical modern economy leading to the rise of plural economy which has created a kind of economic malaise in the old pattern of economic structure and introduced a colonial economy where dependence on the metropole was a basic requisite. The concrete historical conditions of the emergence of socialist ideas and orientations in Africa pre-determined its principal essence from which stem the following main tasks:

1. The liberation of economy from the domination of metropolitan monopolies thereby achievement of economic independence and its integration to one economy and ending of dual economy.
2. The liquidation of the exploitation of man by man, creation of public property, provision of conditions excluding the seizure of dominating positions in the economic and social spheres by capitalist elements and the strengthening and expansion of public sector in the economy.
3. The creation of a vanguard party of the working people (both workers and peasants) committed to scientific socialism.
4. The implementation of reforms in agriculture in the interests of the broad peasant masses and the development along the democratic lines.

- 5. The democratisation of the state apparatus of power, the inclusion in it of representatives of all people, the granting of genuine democratic rights and freedoms to all people.
- 6. The implementation of a cultural revolution, eradication of illiteracy, upsurge of public education.
- 7. The full development of ethnic culture but total elimination of tribal devicive trends.

The emergence of socialism in Africa had become a necessary social condition rather an economic compulsion as there was a compelling demand even in those societies where socialism had not been introduced to increase the production, to raise the level of per capita income and to overcome the inequality in the society and to end the exploitation of man by man.

These demands arose because winning of the flag independence did not resolve all problems of the Africans, especially the problems of meeting their peoples' hopes for improved standard of living has remained the same. Due to their inheritance of the colonial structure of economy that is dependance on metropolitan power, they remain still now subjects to exploitation in the hands of the western industrialised nations. So the search of the independent African people gave a powerful impetus to contemporary socio-political thought in Africa whose mainspring is the anti-colonial and

anti-imperialist movement.¹ This manifested itself in the emergence of the various ideological trends reflecting the growing significance of the social aspects of the national liberation movement.² Thus the choice of paths of development has become the central issue in the political life of the newly free countries of Africa.

In the post-independence era, the development process in the newly emerging countries had been thwarted due to the economic exploitation by the metropole. Naturally some of the leaders of Africa wanted to have faster economic growth. They had noticed faster economic growth in Soviet Union and China which have followed the scientific socialist path of development. This category is known as the scientific socialist path of development. Here the leadership comes from the petty-bourgeoisie, the peasantry, working class and progressive intelligentsia. They supported the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggle. Whenever they wanted to delink their societies from the metropolies, there they opted for scientific socialism. They were not at all hesitant in total onslaught on imperialism and its remnants and its tentacles and to wage the class

1 Kosukhin, N., 'Introduction' in "The Ideology of African Revolutionary Democracy" by African Studies (Soviet scholars), Moscow, 1984, p.5.

2. Ibid., p.5.

struggle against the exploitation of man by man. Thus for exploitation in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea, etc., the leadership has chosen this path of scientific socialist development. The political parties of the countries under the leadership of this group stand on the Marxist-Leninist positions in order to bring profound range of revolutionary transformations embracing all or almost all spheres of social life. They claim that they represent the working people and peasantry. According to Brutents, these people are not Marxists-Leninists but revolutionary democrats.³ In their pronouncement, they are rejecting capitalism in all forms and asserting themselves as revolutionary democrats. They express the progressive socio-political trends and are claiming that they are the advanced detachment of the people fighting against imperialism, colonialism, racism and reaction. For socio-economic emancipation, Lenin wrote, "By revolutionary democracy we meant the consistent and firm democratic programme of social democracy, do not hold back from any revolutionary measures, but lack the clear social-democratic class consciousness."⁴ The following

3 Brutents, K.N., National Liberation Revolution Today (Theoretical Aspect), Moscow, 1974, pp.400-2.

4 Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, vol.32, Moscow, p.482.

characteristics are one of the revolutionary-democratic ideology,⁵ i.e.

- anti-imperialism,
- defence of the interests of popular masses by revolutionary methods to bring the qualitative changes.
- impact of scientific socialism and Marxism-Leninism,
- renunciation of capitalism as a system and proclamation of socialism as the ultimate goal of social development.
- gradual recognition of class-struggle, which, however, is accompanied sometimes by substituting political evaluation ("revolution-counter-revolution", "class-people", "class-anti-people", "progressive minded forces-reactionary forces", etc.) for a class analysis of the alignment of the forces in a country.
- permitting in the transition period the elements of petty-bourgeois and populist ideology.
- Pronounced nationalist and religious features (idealisation of their original mode of life, the African personality, religious ideas about social justice),
- rejection by some detachments of revolutionary democrats of philosophical materialism mainly by tactical considerations (unwillingness to enter into conflict with religion).

5 Ibid., vol.9, p.197.

This ideology has been eventually committed to Marxist-Leninist principles. Here the top priority is given to qualitative changes in economy leading to total restructuring through land reforms, nationalisation, total science control, etc. to abolish former feudo-bourgeois structure.

Coming to the second category, socialism in Africa is understood and applied in non-Marxist socialist path of development in Tanzania i.e. organising present peasant communal society on traditional egalitarian basis. Here Tanzania confronts with enormous economic and other difficulties and believes in surmounting these problems "by bringing in foreign capital, soliciting help from the former colonial country and other industrialised capitalist states and joining common market". The nationalization or Africanisation of the enterprises owned by foreign capital is regarded by this country as a socialist process.

Here we are marking a trend which we can term as 'social-democracy'. It adheres to reformist socialism in the international working class movement today. Characteristics of 'social democracy' are recognition of the exceptionally peaceful and gradual i.e. reformist methods of social action, a striving to replace class-struggle by class collaboration, the notion of the 'supra-class' nature of state and democracy, the conception of socialism

as a moral ethical category (ethical socialism).⁶ So, here we call these kinds of leaders as social democrats. Their ideological and political principles are opposed to revolutionary, proletarian socialism, to the theory of Marxism-Leninism.⁷ They reckon the growing national liberation movement, intensified struggle of nations for economic independence, against imperialist interference, neo-colonialism, racism and fascism, to declare its solidarity with this struggle and to support the just demands of the peoples of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Today in Africa about seventeen countries adhere by socialism and now and then one or two countries are added to the community of socialist-oriented countries and more and more of them are expressing their faith and allegiance to scientific socialism. It has been marked as a kind of progressive change in the alignment of the main social forces in favour of the world socialism. But examining the social structure of the independent African countries are seen rather clearly the deepest type of social differentiation exemplified by mass popular movements in countries where there exist many classes such as ruling

6 "A Dictionary of Scientific Communism", Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p.220.

7 Ibid., p.220.

elite, commercial elite, peasantry and working class.⁸
 The national democratic anti-exploiter revolution in these countries is led by the progressive political groups of which are gravitating to scientific socialist strategy of social revolution. According to the Marxists scientific socialist path of development, without the radical changes in the internal socio-economic structure, there cannot be fight against the domination and exploitation made by the forms of neo-colonialism. So in this kind of ideology the top priority is given to economic reforms with a view to carrying out the vital task of building up the apparatus of people's power, of establishing a new political super-structure.

Firstly, we should come to those countries which have adopted Marxist-Leninist socialist path of development. Here we have Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Congo, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde islands, () Benin and Zimbabwe

Coming to Angola, firstly, we see that in Angolan revolution in the first half of the seventies, its ideology, practices and essential multi-ethnic support to MPLA could justify a claim to be the essential core and dynamic nucleus of nationalism in which all sections of the population could find common ground and stand together. No doubt, ENLA and

8 Gupta, Vijay, "Socialism in Africa" in Socialist
Panorama, vol.14, 1980, p.20.

UNITA being supported by the western bloc opposed the MPLA and its movement. But MPLA won the mass support, emerged as a vanguard party of the working people (both workers and peasants) who are being committed to scientific socialism and was pledged to the radical transformation of the Angolan society. It was also being influenced by the Cuban techniques of mass mobilisation and organisation.

On 11 November 1975, it got its independence from Portuguese colonial rulers. In the post-independent period, MPLA has taken the task of liberating the economy from the domination of the metropolitan monopolies. The government plans to control its national resources while it allows room for private interests if it is deemed to be in the national interest. Three sectors are being considered: state, co-operative and private. State enterprise is to be concentrated in key sectors of the economy and in large-scale agriculture which require higher level of technology; cooperatives to be established in the agricultural and fishing sectors and private ownership to be maintained in small-scale activities. In January 1982 Angola's biggest cooperation agreement since independence was signed, with the USSR. It provides for the second oil refinery and several dams in Angola. The USSR will also assist with the training of Angolans, and an increase in bilateral trade is planned. Now Angola is facing serious economic difficulties like in production, marketing and distribution.

Though committed to the creation of a 'revolutionary democracy', the MPLA has been pragmatic in pursuit of its socialist goals.⁹ It has not nationalised peasants' land or confiscated peasant property and has only taken over foreign-owned estates which have been abandoned by their owners. Angola's trade is still overwhelming with the West. But, two factors helped the country's economic recovery - the assistance provided by the socialist countries and internal measures adopted by the government, such as a law on state intervention, the formation of a National Bank in 1976, and the institution of a national currency, the Kwanzas, in 1977. The nationalisation law solved the pressing problem of the paralysis of the production facilities which had been abandoned by their owners.

Then coming to Benin we observe that the political history of Benin since independence in August 1960 (as Dehokey^M) can be divided into two quite distinct periods - the first from 1960 to 1970 ridden with political instability as different groups within the ruling elite were chasing for power, and the second from 1972 to the present dominated by the uninterrupted rule of President Mathieu Kerekou and the adoption of a socialist orientation. It

⁹ Tordoff, William, Government and Politics in Africa, Macmillan, London, 1984, p.197.

was during the second period that the country changed its name from the Republic of Dahomey to the People of Republic of Benin.¹⁰ When PRPB came to power in 1972, PRPB had taken attempts to liberate Benin from the various kinds of the economic problems. It envisaged an agrarian reform in the course of which relations of production based on exploitation in the countryside are to be liquidated and the land held by feudals expropriated. Under the guidance of People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB), production cooperatives and state agricultural and cattle farms have been set up. Benin's economy is based on agriculture which is pursued on 1,546,000 hectares of the total area of 11,261,000 hectares of arable land by 52.3 per cent of the economically active population. As for industry, the state sector is seen as dominant form in it and the PRPB has been given priority to its development. Almost all the important industrial enterprises have already been nationalised and wherever there is mixed ownership, they are controlled by the state.¹¹ The PRPB has emerged as the vanguard party of the workers and the peasantry being committed to scientific socialism. It has taken up

10. Synge, Richard, "Recent History on Angola" in Africa's South of Sahara, 1983-84, Europa Publication, London, p.208.

11. Gupta, Vijay, "Socialism in Africa", in op.cit., p.21.

above tasks to liberating Benin's economy from the octopus hands of the metropolitan bourgeoisie.

Then thirdly in Congo, the mass social movements launched since 1975 involve stepping up the efforts to rescue the vital sectors of the national economy from neo-colonialist control. Agriculture and mining are the mainstays of the Congolese economy, which employ an economically active population of some of which 70 per cent are engaged in farming. Here revenues from offshore oil deposits (discovered 1969) have enabled the government to propitiate the left-wing opposition of workers and students by investing in state-controlled enterprises in agriculture and manufacturing.¹² No doubt, that these units are facing lot of difficulties and not having optimum production. In key sectors, no local manpower is available. So the private MNCs are not intentionally allowed, rather, they are permitted because of the absence of the skill. Moreover, the key sectors of the economy are still in the hands of the foreign capital, and Congo retains - it would seem by choice - many of the features of a neo-colonial state. Heavy foreign indebtedness reduces the manoeuvrability of her government in the economic spheres in spite of its adoption of socialist path of development in terms of 'scientific socialism'.

12 West Africa (London), 24 May 1982, pp.1379-80.

19

Coming to Mozambique we see that FRELIMO had conducted a protracted liberation struggle and its leadership, guided by a Marxist-Leninist ideology, knew well that 'the taking of state power is not the end but the beginning of the revolution'.¹³ It was a party committed to transforming the existing relations of production and to creating a workers' and peasants' state.¹⁴ In the post-independence era, the leadership of FRELIMO insisted scientific socialist path of development in Mozambique. The fight is against 90 per cent illiteracy and for taking over of most fertile land from big plantation owners, stopping outflow of Mozambique labour to South Africa, harnessing hydro-electric resources and extracting mineral for national purpose.

Coming to the second category of non-Marxist or 'African socialist' path of development, Madagascar, Senegal, Tanzania, Sudan, Guinea Ivory Coast, Zambia etc. are the examples. They are led by the petty-bourgeois elements believing in self-reliance, anti-neo-colonialism

13 Munslow, B., "The Liberation Struggle in Mozambique and Origins of Post-Independence Political and Economic Policy" in Mozambique (University of Edinburgh : Seminar Proceedings, Centre of African Studies, 1979), pp.86-99.

14 Munslow, B., "Mozambique : The Revolution and Its Origins", Edinburg University, Edinburg, 1984, p.64.

and against the concentration of economic and political power in a few hands. They use the attractive platform of socialism to win over the masses. They had hazy and wrong notions of socialism. But most of them gradually understood socialism as a definite system to remove disparities and bring about political and economic equality. Though they preach socialism, non-alignment, anti-colonialism, anti-neo-colonialism but in fact they stand for self-reliance and a new economic order with mixed economy in the country. They do not support the one-party system. They also declare that they want to liberate their economy from monopolies but they never go for complete nationalisation. They always claim that their party represents the whole mass from the workers and peasants to the higher strata of the society. But it is only the ruling elite which dictates the norms inside the party and rule over the whole mass by forming the government. The means of production is really owned by them not by the whole mass. The surplus is being appropriated by this ruling elite.

In the first place, we should come to Madagascar. Changes in the social structure of Madagascar came with the dawn of socialist revolution in mid-seventies. More than four million people, that is, 90 per cent of the total

population went to the polls to vote for the constitution, for Ratsiraka as President of Republic, and for a charter of the Malagasy socialist revolution, which embodied a broad programme of socio-economic and political changes. The constitution provided for the formation of a National Front for Defence of the Revolution. The Front includes the VAREMA (Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution) which has more than 30,000 local cells throughout the island and whose Executive Bureau is headed by Didiet Ratsiraka as General Secretary and has as its members other prominent Malagasy personalities. Other members of the Front are the AKEN, the V.S. HONIMA, the UDEOMA, and the Vany.

The bulwarks of neo-colonial domination - the banks and insurance companies - were nationalised, while the large French corporations - la Marseillaise, Corol, Mahevavy, Nemskis, Cotona and Sotema - and a score of other enterprises were either completely nationalised or had to accept major state participation (67 per cent of their capital). The Government took control of four-fifths of all imports and two-third of exports as well as 30 per cent of industry. It has also diversified external economic links, although the former colonial master, France, remains the chief trading partner. Over the next twenty years three quarters of investment is expected to be generated internally. There is also an all-out attempt to change the rural co-operatives into modern production units which can make up for country's

rice deficiency. The cooperatives are the basic units of the social revolution combining economical and political roles.¹⁵ Extensive nationalisation has led to state control of basic economic leverage such as home and foreign, commerce, finance and banking, transport, utilities and insurance, and the bulk of the industrial facilities and part of farming facilities.

Secondly we have Guinea which got independence on October 2, 1958 after a long nationalist struggle led by Sekou Toure, a trade union leader and founder of FDG. Just after independence, it cut out all kinds of relationship (political, economic, etc.) with France. So, there was the withdrawal of the French experts from Guinea. Thus Guinea was badly needing some kind of aid. USSR filled the vacuum. Thus it strained the relationship with Western blocs. This new government accelerated the implementation of its national policy of independent development with a socialist trend. But for Sekou Toure, there is no relevance of class struggle in Africa, since instruments of production belonged to society and traditional Africa had no class antagonism. He claimed ^{that} the scientific socialism based on the principles of Marxism and Leninism has no relevance in Guinean social structure.

15 Gupta, Vijay, "Socialism in Africa", op.cit., p.22.

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Rather he accepted the existence of the privileged class of chiefs and wrote that the chiefs lived on the exploitation of the peasant masses and they justified the colonialist practices with which their own interests were ultimately linked. According to him, this class should be eliminated. In fact, Guinea has involved itself in African anti-imperialist solidarity and has strengthened its ties with the progressive governments inside and outside the continent. The country is quite distinct in francophone group in West Africa in having espoused, from independence, the setting up of a socialist economy, with direct state control of production and consumption in every sector except mining. Thus PDG has taken up the task of an overt, practical renunciation of the capitalist way of life for Guinea and a gradual shift of the country on to a socialist road of development which is idiosyncratic in nature because it rejects the principles of Marxism and Leninism but accepts the traditional African values and principles of rapid modernisation theory.

Though there had been marked by a trend of shifting towards 'socialism', but the surplus capital has been accumulated by few in the ruling elite not by the whole mass. PDG has claimed that it has emerged as the main spokesman of the workers and peasants where the top party leaders are getting the benefits, neither the working masses nor the peasantry.

Thirdly, we can come over to the Republic of Zambia which came into existence on 24 October 1964, when independence was granted to British Protectorate of north Rhodesia. Under the philosophy of 'humanism', the President Kaunda has brought major changes in the economic structure and control of the economy. In April 1968, he invited 26 major companies to accept 51 per cent share-holding interest by the government. In August 1969, he announced 51 per cent government participation in mining industries. Similar measures have been taken in case of Banks in 1971. Government control over the very large parastatal sector is mainly through ZIMCO (Zambian Industrial and Mining Company).¹⁶ He also gave guidelines for institutional changes. These include the intensification of rural development, the channelling of investment to rural areas, the reduction subsidies especially to parastatal organisations, and a firmer application of the leadership code restricting in principle the rights of the party and government officials to engage in commercial activities.

In fact, political parties were disbanded in 1972 and only a single party is officially recognized - the United Party for National Independence (UPNI) - whose Secretary General is named by the President of the Republic. Actually,

¹⁶ Jolly, Richard, "Economy of Zambia" in Africa South of Sahara, op.cit., p.929.

this party represents not the whole mass, rather the few ruling elite. AS Kaunda has rejected the Marxist-Leninist principle and in its place he gave an idea of 'African Humanism', UNFVI can never be a mass party nor a vanguard party of peasantry and working people. Thus this ruling elite is appropriating the surplus and has failed to rescue Zambia from the neo-colonial actors as lot of MNCs have been operating in Zambia and controlling its economic structure.

Socialism in Africa - Different Academic Works and Criticisms

In fact, some African countries have failed to develop true Marxist-Leninist socialism because of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influences. According to Soviet view, socialism is only a stepping stone to communism but Soviet writers side-stepped this point when praising the purported trend towards scientific socialism ^{as} manifested in all the African countries. Most African socialists seek to establish a socialist society but do not advocate building communism. In fact, there is the struggle between the socialist and bourgeois ideologies and this struggle is complicated in Africa by the influences of nationalism and tribalism.¹⁷ In regard to this subject, "Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism" stated:

17 Potekhin, Evan, "Pan-Africanism and the Struggle of the Two Ideologies", International Affairs, no.4, 1964, pp.48-54.

"The liberation of the non-proletarian masses - the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia from the influence of bourgeois ideas and winning them over to socialist ideas, is therefore yet another important task in the workers' ideological struggle.¹⁸

Ivan Potekhin has described the impact of bourgeois ideas upon Africa.¹⁹ He claimed that the bourgeois ideology because it contained petty-commodity producers, owners of private property, a petty-bourgeois and in many countries a capitalist class which exploits others. As a result bourgeois ideas are more widespread in Africa today than socialist ideas which have only recently begun to filter through, although they are today spreading quickly.²⁰ Potekhin was trying to find a rational explanation for the fact that the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are not predominant on the African continent but his argument on the subject contradicted many points he made in relation to similar issues. According to Potekhin's view in this instance, bourgeois ideology was brought to Africa from outside and was not a result of domestic historical development. This contradicted the official Soviet position, which was even expounded on many occasions by Potekhin that ideology can be neither imported nor exported. It must grow out of the

18 Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, p.168 (1960 ed.), p.207.

19 Potekhin, op.cit., p.53.

20 Ibid., p.53.

environment in which it is to be applied. Potekhin thus de-emphasised the capitalistic aspects of African society and even claimed that the weak development of capitalism in Africa was the prime reason that Africa was capable of taking a non-capitalist path, bypassing the capitalist stage of development. Potekhin, therefore, tried to have it two ways: he cited the existence of capitalist elements in Africa as a cause for Africa's acceptance of many aspects of bourgeois ideology but then cited the lack of capitalist development as a feature contributing to Africa's capability to take a non-capitalist path.

African socialism was considered to be just one of many special theories of socialism which, according to Soviet theorists, are really socialism. In his book, Potekhin included a section on the false theories of socialism which were criticised by Marx and Engels in 'The Communist Manifesto'. He pointed out that the supposed theories of socialism only used the guise of socialism in order to deceive the masses and keep them in a position of servitude. He outlined types of socialism attacked by Marx and Engels, which they labelled "feudal socialism", "petty-bourgeois socialism", "conservative socialism" and "critical-utopian socialism".

African socialism was not a monolithic doctrine, and it has many different strands. Various theories of

African socialism get confused and at other times, because the African national bourgeoisie used certain socialist methods, such as economic planning and the creation of a state economic sector, but makes sure that its own class interests are preserved intact. Although there are many interpretations of African socialism, the African popular masses see it as a rejection of capitalism and as a counter to imperialist exploitation.

Guzvaty claimed that the ideas of the national-type socialism such as those in Africa are disseminated by the petty-bourgeoisie. This class has a great ideological influence on the masses and most intellectuals and army officers are members of it.²¹ He asserted that the petty-bourgeoisie joins with the patriotic forces to fight imperialism but the reforms which it brings about are bourgeois-democratic not socialist.

But Crawford Young in his book "Ideology and Development in Africa" (1982) divides the African countries on three major streams;²² (1) Afro-Marxism, (2) populist socialism, and (3) African capitalism. The first category

21 Guzevaty, "Third Way or Genuine Freedom", International Affairs, no.4, April 1963, p.47.

22 Young, C., Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

comprises states such as Mozambique and Ethiopia which have officially espoused Marxism-Leninism; the second is made up of states like Algeria and Tanzania which embrace their own brand of socialism, and the third type of regime, of which the Ivory Coast, Kenya and Nigeria are leading examples, rests upon an ideological base which has often to be inferred from the market economy policies pursued. The most serious fault in Young's classification is his placing of Guinea-Bissau in the populist-socialist bracket rather than in the category of Marxist states to which (both before and after the coup of 1980) it rightfully belongs; the PAIGC has always been closer to its sister movements in Angola and Mozambique than to African populist-socialism and has recently declared itself to be a vanguard party with a Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Class Struggle in Africa

Most of the "African socialists" have contended that the African countries are devoid of social class and that the Marxian theory of class struggle is irrelevant to Africa. But "outside the class struggle, socialism is either a hollow phrase or a naive dream (Benin)."²³ That is why scientific socialists believe that class struggle is the major driving force of social transformation and the role played by classes in it is determined primarily by

23 Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, vol.9, p.443.

their position in the process of production rather than by the size of their incomes. They agree with Marxism-Leninism and define classes as "large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation²⁴ ... to the means of production, by their role in social organisation of labour, and consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are large groups of people, one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy."²⁵

One of the basic claims of the African socialists is that African society was socialist prior to the arrival of the colonialists. But ^{We are} disputing this contention and asserting that although many Africans lived in primitive-communal societies at that time, some of which were not touched by class conflict, class society was evolving and feudalism existed in some places. Ivan Potekhin, a Soviet Africanist, questioned the feasibility of the African socialist view that the African countries could return to the pre-colonialist socialist structure.²⁶

24 Ibid., vol.29, p.421.

25 Ibid., vol.29, p.422.

26 Potekhin, Ivan, Africa: Ways of Development (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1964), p.62.

He admitted that there were primitive-communal societies before the colonialists came to Africa but averred that these societies greatly differed from modern socialist societies and returning to them would not be advantageous. Potekhin wrote: "Many African peoples lived in primitive communal society before the colonialists came, and knew neither exploitation nor the class division of society. If there was equality among these peoples, it was the equality of poverty, socialist society, on the other hand, is a society of abundance."²⁷

In fact, feudalism was in the process of developing when the colonial period started and that there were feudal states in some parts of Africa in which nationalities were already formed. At this time, nations had not yet been formed.²⁸

Now ^{we are} ~~we~~ going to outline a definite sequence of historical development which was pertinent to the African continent, as well as to other parts of the world. Under the primitive-communal system, clans and tribes are the primary social groupings. These clans and tribes have common languages and cultures, have no classes, and are based on ties of kinship. When several tribes amalgamate, a nationality is created. A nationality has a common language,

27 Ibid., p.63.

28 Avetkov, R. and G. Mirekii, "Class Structure in Under-developed Countries" in Thomas Thornson, ed., The Third World Soviet Perspective (Princeton, 1964), p.292.

territory, and culture but not a common economy. It may have a system of slavery but is usually primarily feudal. Communal landholding is replaced by a system of feudal exploitation and class differentiation proceeds rapidly. As feudalism develops into capitalism, the nationality changes into a nation. Private landholding becomes prominent and a landless capitalist class forms in the towns. Nations are composed of antagonistic classes and a nation may contain people of many races. There is no relationship between race and nationhood. According to Ivan Potekhin, there were no nations in Africa until the end of 19th century.

Potekhin stressed that there was no nation before capitalism developed and that there were no African nations until the turn of this century because there was no capitalism in Africa. He wrote: "If one thus understands the word 'nation', it must be evident that a 'nation' is able to come into being only under capitalism and that nations are the product of the capitalist development". Potekhin claimed that nations were now in the process of formation and that this process was accompanied by a rise in national consciousness. The Soviet analysis was marked by a recognition of three basic stages of African development: tribalism, nationality, and nation. The corresponding forms of economic relationships are communal, feudal and capitalist. Therefore, as far as the Soviet critics were

concerned, Africa is certainly not classless and most of it has not been ^{communal} since long before the arrival of the colonialists.

Again another fact is that colonialists helped to develop feudal relations in some parts of Africa. They strengthened the position of the ruling class as they collaborated with the leaders of the territories they conquered. In fact, the colonialists exploited the Africans. They all realized the power of a possible unification of the class struggle of the proletariat with the national liberation movement.²⁹ Most of the workers were migratory peasants and the colonialists held back the growth of the national bourgeoisie. They prevented the Africans from accumulating large reserves of capital. Potekhin stated: "Colonialism acted as an obstacle to the capitalist development of Africa and the emergence of the classes associated with capitalist society".³⁰

Role of Classes in National Liberation Movements:

The national liberation movements in the African countries are aimed at gaining independence from the imperialists and also at ending the exploitation practised by traditional elites. Many segments of the population join

29 Ivan Potekhin, "Some Aspects of the National Question in Africa", World Marxist Review, vol.4, no.11, November 1961, p.44.

30 Ibid., p.44.

in the struggle including the embryonic bourgeoisie, and the national liberation movements therefore have a mass character. Actually all social strata take part except for some tribal leaders and members of the traditional elite. Each social group brings its own goals, demands and prejudices into this movement.

According to E. Dolgopolov, "The colonialists have never in the whole course of history voluntarily granted independence to the colonial peoples, and they will never do so; they are compelled to grant it only when the national liberation movement has become so strong that they are unable to deal with it."³¹

In regard to liberation, the freeing of the masses from colonial rule should be emphasized. Once this was achieved, the economy could begin to develop along socialist principles and the class struggle would become intensified. During the struggle for independence, most of the classes united in opposition to the imperialists under the leadership of petty-bourgeoisie (or rising middle-class). So at the time of independence, the colonial powers handed over power to the petty-bourgeois class in order to get their purpose fulfilled.

³¹ Dolgopolov, E., "National Liberation Wars in the Present Epoch", in International Affairs (Moscow), no.2, February 1962, p.17.

But in case of the countries of scientific socialist group, a grass-root level of mass consciousness emerged, and the revolution against the colonialism^{& neo-colonialism} took place. So the party of the whole mass of workers and peasantry was constituted as the vanguard party, and took charge of the state affair from the metropolitan capitalists. So in case of the countries which have followed the African socialism, there was a negotiated transfer of power to the elite. In case of this category, it was the party of the few which ruled over the mass unlike in case of scientific socialism.

Development of Class Struggle in Post-Independence Era

In the early years after African countries won political independence, the African socialists continued to be in the grip of nationalist ideas and failed to observe the formation of classes and the development of class struggle at home. Moreover, they denied the possibility of a class differentiation of society in future as well, explaining this by the specifics in the social structure of African society. They conceived the building of a new society on the basis of national unity in which there would be no class struggle. In 1950s and early 1960s, Kwame Nkrumah, for example, admitted the presence of class struggle in the advanced countries of Europe, Asia and America, but denied its existence in Africa and, particularly

in Ghana.³² A. Sekou Toure wrote in 1959 that the Democratic Party of Guinea cannot expound any class struggle, for the differentiation of social strata in Black Africa does not feature for the most part a differentiation of interests, the more so, contradictory interests.³³

J.K. Nyerere also spoke about the desire to avoid the growth of different social and economic classes in Tanzania. He idealised the African peasant community and regarded communal and patriarchal ties as the embryo of socialist relations. Nyerere contraposed the traditional social structure, with its principle of equal distribution of the products of labour among all labourers, to a class society. He associated the formation of classes with an even distribution of social revenues.³⁴

But the new group of African revolutionary democracy takes into account the experience of development of the socialist-oriented countries as well as those which knew the price of formal independence and neo-colonialist relations with the imperialist states. The revolutions in these countries and the radical socio-economic transformations which they brought in their wake laid bare the

32 Ikromah, Kwame, Consciencism (London, 1964), p.69.

33 Toure, A. Sekou, Strategy and Tactics of the Revolution (Paris, 1962), p.394.

34 Nyerere, J.K., Freedom and Unity (London, 1967), p. 134.

social contradictions in society, and spawned the exacerbation of class struggle, frantic resistance on the part of the internal and external reactionary elements and the disassociation and regrouping of class forces. As the leaders of revolutionary democracy unlike that of social democracy, declare the working people (working masses, toiling people, broad popular masses, working strata of population) are the major revolutionary forces opposed both to international imperialism and its allies inside the country, namely the exploiter classes (feudals, the comprador and burocratic bourgeoisie). They realize that the depth of revolutionary transformation is contingent on the degree of the working masses' involvement in their implementation.

The revolutionary democrats usually assign a special place to the peasantry and workers. They considered them to be nucleus of the working masses. Nkrumah drew the conclusion that "it is upon the workers and poor farmers that the construction of our country depends." The Arusha Declaration proclaimed Tanzania a state of peasants and workers. The worker-peasant alliance is also crucial for the development of the Ethiopian revolution. The constitution of the People's Republic of Benin regards the alliance of workers and peasants as the foothold of revolutionary power. Mozambique's leaders consider this alliance as the foundation of people's democratic power

and an indispensable condition for building socialism. It is clear that in the course of this struggle we are witnessing the regrouping of forces on the political arena and the revolutionary democrats are compelled to reconsider again and again their attitude to all the classes of African society, and to assess their revolutionary potential from a new vantage point.

Classes	Divisions within classes	Elites
Peasants:		
1. Proletariat (wage-earning)	- rural, labourers, etc. - industrial (mainly employed in major industries, mining transport, etc.)	
2. Petty-bourgeoisie		
a) Farmers (rural petty-bourgeoisie, owning land and employing labour)	- social status determined by size of land-holding and amount of labour employed.	
b) Urban petty-bourgeoisie (small traders, merchants, craftsmen, etc.)	- Status according to size of business and property.	
3. Bourgeoisie (including national bourgeoisie and representing capitalism)	- upper - middle	- intellectuals - top bureaucrats - officer class - Professionals - technocrats
- traders, tradesmen		
- top civil servants		
- Compradors		
- Entrepreneurs		
- Professional and managerial 'class', etc.		

Sources: Kwame Nkrumah, 'Class in Africa' (London, Panaf, 1970)

CHAPTER II

**CASE STUDY OF ETHIOPIA : A
SCIENTIFIC SOCIALIST PATH OF DEVELOPMENT**

In 1974, the basic changes occurred in Ethiopia. Old feudal order was overthrown by a group of people who declared their dedication to destroy feudo-bourgeois regime and established ^{socialist} society. Mass-participation in the overthrow of Haile Selassie, the head of the feudal order came from students, teachers, workers and men in uniform. The provisional military government which was established to carry out the changes brought about far-reaching land reforms, nationalisation of urban properties, industries, shopping complexes, education, etc. The PMAC (DERG) called these above changes as a revolution to establish a socialist society. In this chapter we shall discuss how Ethiopian revolution was a socialist revolution and how far Ethiopia is successful in laying the foundations of the socialism.

Before Revolution:

Feudal Foundation:

Before the changes in 1974, Ethiopia's dominant class was its hereditary nobility, with the Emperor at the peak of hierarchy. Under ^{Selassie,} the great provincial lords and the lesser nobles within the hierarchy extracted, with the aid of religiously sanctioned custom, most of the production of the ordinary farmers.¹ The poor peasants, of course, had no role in this part from providing the crops that sustained the upper levels of society.

¹ Cartwright, J., 'Political Leadership in Africa' (London, Croomhelm, 1983) P. 257

In Ethiopia, the value of land as an instrument of production² has always ranked very highly, and possession of it has always been a factor of paramount socio-economic significance. The aristocracy and the ecclesiastical hierarchy comprised the traditional ruling classes. They engaged in no productive activity and were maintained through the medium of the gutt. The 'gutt' conveyed rights over land, the cultivators who worked on it and their produce. Gutt rights were acquired through a formal grant from the monarch or from provincial rulers who were empowered to make such grants. Temporary 'gutt' rights were attached to state office, and served to compensate officials who did not begin to receive salaries until well into this century.³ Permanent gutt was granted to the members of the aristocracy and high clergy for their maintenance, to churches and monasteries for the living of their members, and to retired officials as a reward for service. This is all about the traditional feudal Ethiopian society.

But the Ethiopian regime in the post-war period represents a mutation from the earlier feudal structure. The observers of the Ethiopian scene were struck by the co-existence of a world tied to tradition and feudalism and

2 Markakis, John and Azale, Hega, Class and Revolution in Ethiopia (Nottingham, 1978), p.21.

3 Hoben, Allen, Land Tenure Among the Amhara of Ethiopia (Chicago, 1973), p.32.

a so-called modern and bourgeois micro-society, economy and set of institutions.⁴ Still then, the advent of capitalist mode of production, the appearance of elements of a new social order incompatible with feudalism, and the futile attempt to graft them on to the latter; the conversion of feudal privilege into modern rights of property; the centralization of state power and bureaucratization of its processes within the orbit of monarchical absolutism; all resemble the interregnum between declining feudalism and the rise of bourgeois capitalism, a period known as the 'ancien regime'. Like that prototype, the Ethiopian regime was flawed by the dissociation of its ruling classes from the productive processes i.e. the economic base of society. In feudal mode the aristocracy possessed a sound economic base in the gutt, a device that gave it control over the surplus; as well as political control over the peasantry. Both these elements of control were seriously weakened during the post-war period and the position of the traditional ruling class was similarly affected. Formally this class managed to cross the initial stage of transition from feudalism without grave damage to its economic position. It exchanged feudal rights to tribute for modern legal rights of property over vast areas of land.

4 Letort, Rene, Ethiopia : An Heretical Revolution (London, 1983), p.13.

But the Ethiopian aristocracy had no experience on the affairs of production or commerce. They lacked the aptitude for an active entrepreneurial role in agriculture and the capacity to forge a link with the emerging capitalist enterprise in the urban sector. They continued to regard government as their metier. Even though it continued to appropriate a major share of the peasant surplus, the landlord class in the traditional sector was devoid of economic dynamism. Land could not be turned into profitable enterprise and did not contribute to capital accumulation. Absentee ownership and tenancy were two basic obstacles. Market, transport and storage limitations were additional hindrances to more intensive exploitation of land. Basically, however, the parasitic nature of landlordism itself were opposed to the transformation of the process of production, because such transformation inevitably would have affected the relationships of production as well, thereby undermining the position of this class. So the introduction of the capitalist mode of production in agriculture had a highly pernicious impact on the position of landlordism by exposing its parasitic nature and condemning it as a fetter on the productive forces in the rural sector. So landlordism came under attack by all other social classes among whom the expectations of progress and development had been aroused by the commencement of modernization. These included not only the nascent

working class and the rapidly expanding petty-bourgeoisie but the bureaucratic-military bourgeoisie and its foreign patrons as well. The economic position of the land-owning aristocracy was becoming untenable. The political position of this class was reduced. So they were forced to enter into an alliance with the bureaucratic and military officialdom. But the relationship between the both was not free of conflict. Thus the regime's reliance— moreover, Haile Selassie's reliance on the political strength of the land-owning aristocracy proved quite misplaced.

The Revolution of 1974:

Beside the above class-contradictions, other causes brought down the edifice with surprising rapidity and initial ease, provoking a countrywide revolt in the process.

1. 'Structural crisis of the regime' : It lies in the failure of the regime to resolve the agrarian crisis, to develop the country's productive forces in such a way as to improve the population's living standard and even, in the provinces ravaged by famine, to maintain previous subsistence levels.
2. The Eritrean and Bale revolts had stretched the resources and were engendering a broader conscience amongst other Ethiopian nationalities. They placed a considerable strain upon the armed forces and thereby on the state's finances.

3. The famine in Welo served both to expose the incapacity of the state at home and abroad and to raise the political temperature in Addis Ababa itself, where it led to student protest and considerable inflation. This certainly weakened the regime's remaining credibility.

Stages of Revolution:

The Ethiopian revolution went through four stages⁵:

1. It saw that demands become increasingly sweeping and radical, as the limits imposed by the old regime collapsed.
2. It went through a struggle for power among different groups, particularly the army officers against the students and other civilian groups, with the differences between them being not so much over the future shape of Ethiopian society as over who should hold power.
3. In the course of their struggle for power, the different groups tried to outbid each other for popular support, with the culmination of this escalation being the sweeping land reform of 1975.
4. As the eventual winners of the struggle for control of the central government, the military radicals, consolidated their power, the Mengistu eliminated his personal rivals; he found himself forced to live with the new structure, created in the heat of the struggle. Specifically, the land reform

5 See Halliday, Fred and Molyneux, Maxine, The Ethiopian Revolution (London, 1981), pp.82-83.

and the creation of an armed peasantry created a barrier to the regime backsliding towards any large-scale rural land-holding, whether by a revived nobility or by state collective farms.

Measures for the Alternation of Old Production Relations

For centuries, the predominant social order prevailed in Ethiopia was feudalism. On the other hand, since the development of the newly emerging capitalism was fettered by imperialism, conditions in the country were far from conducive to socio-economic development.

By 1974, the feudo-capitalist regime of Haile Selassie had led Ethiopia to the worst social, economic and political crisis. Although Ethiopia continued to maintain one of the most affluent ruling classes in the world, the people of Ethiopia had been reduced to a most affluent ruling class in the world, the people of Ethiopia had been reduced to a most impoverished, illiterate and diseased status. While 90 per cent of the people tilled the land and produced virtually all the wealth of the country, all the benefits went to maintain members of small feudal aristocracy. The broad masses had no schools, hospitals and other facilities necessary for a minimally decent living. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, there were frequent peasant uprisings which were suppressed by brutal use of military power. Although they were often gunned down on the streets, students staged

peaceful demonstrations demanding agrarian reform and the democratisation of the political life of the country. Workers at the cost of their lives struggled for their rights and welfare.

During the feudo-capitalist regime of Haile Selassie, the land tenure system was such that the peasant had to hand over upto 75 per cent of his produce to the landlord. Under these conditions, the peasant had neither the capacity nor the security to employment of improved farming implements and techniques in order to increase his productivity. Again, the surplus generated from agriculture was being accumulated by the landlord class on the consumption of luxury goods.

The industrial sector was based on the production of simple consumer goods for the comparatively small urban population. It did not lay any foundation for the development of heavy industry which is crucial for building a strong technical base for the national economy. These consumption-based industries were highly dependent on not only imported machinery but also on imports of spare parts and raw materials so much so that they made hardly any contribution to an integrated development of the various sectors of the economy. In the same way, due to the high proportion of foreign-owned capital in the construction and transport sectors as well as in the trade sector which is particularly important as a source of capital accumulation,

the surplus originating in these sectors contributed little, if any, by way of accelerating the socio-economic development of the nation.

Before 1974, the illiteracy rate in the country was 93 per cent. The elementary school participation rate stood at no more than 19 per cent. Basic health services were accessible only to 15 per cent of the total population. Of the total population barely 2 per cent received potable water. Unemployment and other socio-economic problems were rampant.

The rebellion of 1974 broke out against a background of such dire socio-economic conditions. Prior emphasis was placed on changing the archaic production relations which gave rise to these adverse conditions by constraining the development of the productive forces and by bringing about qualitative changes in the socio-economic order. Hence the measures which not only promoted the uninterrupted development of the productive forces but also laid down the foundation for the building of an economic system free from all forms of exploitation and oppression were boldly taken. The nationalisation of key production, distribution and service enterprises and organizations has, by covering the exploitative relations with imperialism, created the necessary preconditions for building of socialism. These radical transformations in production relations, numerous directives, which helped to promote socio-economic development

along the socialist lines, were formulated and put into practice. The radical land reform proclamation, which wiped out the exploitation and oppression from rural Ethiopia once and for all, occupies a prominent chapter in the history of this Ethiopian revolution.

Socialist Objectives and Strategies:

In the period of socialist transformation, the objective conditions in Ethiopia have dictated them to have a mixed economy. But they have a strong desire to replace the continued development of productive forces by a socialist production relations. So they have adopted measures to expand and strengthen socialist production relations. They have speeded up the socialization of the existing broad petty commodity production and the small capitalist sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture on the basis of scientific socialism. In relation to the Ethiopian present level of development, everything depends upon the development of agriculture. So, the planning has been made by creating appropriate conditions for the organization of large scale farms in order to bringing about the speedy agricultural development.

The laying of foundation of socialist society requires the conscious participation of the masses in the country's economic, political and social activities. So developing the cultural level of population is a strategic goal of the

Government deserving high priority. Thus the major objectives of the leadership are to:

1. enhance the productive capacity of the economy by developing and improving the productive forces,
2. build a strong national economy with adequate inter-sectoral linkages,
3. conserve, explore, develop and rationally utilize the country's natural resources,
4. expand and strengthen socialist production,
5. raise the material and cultural well-being of the people,
6. ensure balanced development of all the regions of the country.

So in this context, it is possible to see the course of the Ethiopian revolution as the following a definite political and social logic: a process of radicalization and post-revolutionary consolidation, through which the EPRC established a stable new order on the ruins of the old.⁶

Following upon the proclamation of Ethiopian socialism on December 20, 1974, the EPRC moved with unexpected rapidity and concreteness to give effect of this socialism in a set of a major reform that established control of the main areas of the urban economy and destroyed the bases of the old regimes in the countryside.⁷ The programme of the National

6 Ibid., p.96.

7 Ibid., p.99.

Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia is the comprehensive guideline of the revolution. It firmly places Ethiopia on the socialist course of development. With the victory over the forces of feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism, it envisages a democratic and socialist republic of Ethiopia led by a working class party.

The Ten-Point Programme:

The proclamation of the ten-point programme (20th December 1974), the charter of the revolution until the appearance of the Programme of the National Democratic Revolution in April 1976, was welcomed by the civilian left. The ten-point programme set out:

1. Ethiopia shall remain a united country without ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural differences.
2. Ethiopia wishes to see the setting up of an economic, cultural and social community with Kenya, Sudan and Somalia.
3. The slogan 'Ethiopia Tikedem' of the Ethiopian revolution is to be based on a specifically Ethiopian socialism.
4. Every regional administration and every village shall manage its own resources and be self-sufficient.
5. A great political party based on the revolutionary philosophy, Ethiopia Tikedem, shall be constituted on a nationalist and socialist base.

6. The entire economy shall be in the hands of the state. All assets existing in Ethiopia are by rights the property of the Ethiopian people. Only a limited number of businesses will remain private if they are deemed to be of public utility.
7. The right to own land shall be restricted to those who work in the land.
8. Industry will be managed by the state.
9. The family, which will be the fundamental basis of Ethiopian society, will be protected against all foreign influences, vices and defects.
10. Ethiopia's existing foreign policy will be essentially maintained. The new regime will, however, endeavour to strengthen good-neighbourly relations with all neighbouring countries.

Thus they have propounded the same type of Marxist-Leninist path of socialist development as was in Russia and China. But the corner-stone of the revolution was laid down upon three principles: land to the tiller, a self-reliant and self-managing people.

Nationalisation:

On 1 January 1975, three banks, three financial institutions and fourteen insurance companies were nationalised. On 3 February it was the turn of the seventy-two industrial and commercial companies that owned major share-holdings. On 16 May, finally, private airlines and super-markets were nationalised. By

late 1976, two-thirds of all manufacturing was under the control of the Ministry of Industry. On 4 March 1975, the most important reform of all, a land reform, was announced: all rural land was nationalized, tenancy was prohibited, and the peasantry was to have the right to till the plots of only ten hectares maximum.

The Declaration on Economic Policy of socialist Ethiopia, published on 7 February 1975, for the first time, laid out its views in this area:

The major and immediate economic goal of Ethiopia is to eliminate poverty and exploitation.... This goal can be achieved only when the government, as the representative of the people and the interest of the mass of Ethiopian workers and peasants, directly owns and controls the natural resources and key industrial, commercial and financial sectors of the country.

Five reasons are there for this policy:⁸

1. overcoming underdevelopment required co-ordinated action and effective planning;
- (2) the government could direct production towards goods that were really necessary for the people and not towards luxury goods;
- (3) government control would protect the economy from the ups and downs of capitalism;
- (4) private ownership of the means of production was the basis of exploitation of man

⁸ Lofort, R. op.cit., London, 1981, p.133.

by men⁹ (5) and those who worked in the nationalised industries would have their say in running them. Private capital, both foreign and national, was not banned. The immediate goal was to increase production.

Land Reforms:

Proclamation No. 31 (published on 4 March 1975) established the public ownership of land⁹; all rural land shall be the collective property of the Ethiopian people and private rights to cultivation. No peasant shall by sale, exchange, succession, mortgage, entichresis, lease or otherwise transfer his holding, but the right to cultivate the land shall, on his death, pass on to his wife or his children. The measure eliminated the old private ownership which allowed for the sale, exchange and inheritance of land and proclaimed a system of use-right only. Thus, the land-peasant relations under which the peasant was deprived of as much as 75 per cent of his produce came to an end. The proclamation also provides for the formation of peasant associations. The powers and functions of these associations were further consolidated through the proclamation of December 1975. Agrarian reform was a central achievement of the revolution because it affected the life and welfare of 90 per cent of the Ethiopian people. The urban

⁹ Basic Documents of the Ethiopian Revolution (Provisional Office for Mass Organisational Affairs: Addis Ababa), no. 77, p.18.

land and Extra Houses Proclamation of July 1975 nationalised urban land and extra houses. This step eliminated speculation in urban land and real estate business and brought under control the problems of high rent and housing.

The proclamation also provided for the formation of urban dwellers associations which would enhance the economic and social interest of communities. The powers and functions of these associations were expanded in 1976.

The other basic document is the Labour Proclamation of December 1975. During the reign of the feudal-bourgeois government, one of the most exploited and oppressed segments of Ethiopian society was the working class. The labour proclamation restores to the working class all its democratic and organisational rights. It affirms the dignity of labour; it provides job security and assures all the necessary facilities to maintain the well-being of the workman.¹⁰ In clear terms, it defines the rights and duties of workers. It confirms the rights of workers to organise and be organised. It provides opportunities for the development of socialist consciousness so that working class can establish its proletarian vanguard and assume the leadership of the revolution as soon as possible.¹¹ It is also a fact that they have

10 Lefort Reno, op.cit., p.101.

11 Ibid., p.101.

admitted that they are not successful in keeping promises. One of the major reasons is the famine in the country.

Attempts for Building of a Strong National Economy:

Since in the process of replacing the old system by the new social order, a great deal of time was sacrificed in effecting organisational changes compatible with the new requirements, it was not possible to concentrate fully on the development of the productive forces right from the beginning of the revolution. Through a protracted and bitter class struggle the whole mass of Ethiopia were on the march of achieving the conducive socio-economic conditions for economic development.

Through the launching of the development campaign in 1978¹² the broad masses tried their best to restore war-damaged physical assets and infrastructures, to alleviate urgent economic problems prevailing at the time, to lay down social and economic infrastructure necessary for accelerated development, to find ways and means of solving the prevailing social problems, to create the necessary institutional framework and gain the requisite expertise and experience for the preparation and implementation of long-term plans. The development campaign programmes contributed to the restoration and recovery of the national economy through the alleviation of the shortage of basic

12 Workers' Party of Ethiopia, Guideline on the Economic and Social Development of Ethiopia, 1984/85-1993/94, Draft, p.5.

consumer goods and services, repair and reactivation of several war-damaged production units and transport facilities and the implementation, to the extent the availability of resources permitted, of new development projects. This programme provided the opportunity for the broad masses to enhance their diligence, to understand and appreciate the principles and advantages of planning and to work together in an atmosphere of mutual co-operation in order to solve common problems.

If we analyse the GDP under this development programme, we see that GDP has shown an annual decline of 0.9 per cent in 1977-78 Ethiopian fiscal year. But it grew by 5.2 per cent in 1978-79 and 5.5 per cent in 1979-80. These overall output increases were attributable mainly to measures taken to boost production in the agricultural and industrial sectors and to improve distribution facilities and trade flows. During the 1980-81 and 1981-82 fiscal year GDP grew by 3.0 per cent and 1.1 per cent, respectively; thus exhibiting recessionary tendencies.¹³ The major factor responsible for these unfavourable trends was drought prevailing in some parts of the country. Overall growth resumed its buoyancy in 1982-83 when, largely as a result of increased agricultural production, the GDP grew by 5.1 per cent. In 1983-84 the

13 'The Non-Aligned Countries', Orbis (Prague, 1982), p.231.

situation was again reversed, with a reduced overall output growth rate of 2.5 per cent. Drought was again the major cause of the decline in the rate of growth. The average annual rate of growth of the national economy during the period from 1973-74 to 1977-78 was 0.7 per cent while during the period from 1978-79 to 1982-83 this growth rate increased to 3.9 per cent. Similarly, the average annual rate of investment, which was 8.8 per cent during the period from 1973-74 to 1977-78 rose to 10.5 per cent for the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period. Thus it is well known to everybody that inflation was brought under control.

Problems of the Present Ethiopian Economy:

Ethiopia's low-level of economic development is reflected in the structure of the economy where agriculture contributes 48 per cent of the GDP and industry contributes only 16 per cent. But the construction of a socialist economy heavily relies on strengthening the share of industry. So the transformation of the present state of the economy needs tremendous sacrifices.¹⁴

1. The country's gross investment to GDP ratio is currently about 12 per cent - a figure too low compared to those countries in the same stage of economic development. The main reason for the small investment ratio

14 Guideline on the Economic and Social Development of Ethiopia (1984/85-1993/94), Draft, by Workers' Party of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, September 1984, p.12.

is the low level of labour productivity. The low level of national savings, caused by the smallness of the populations' per capita income, and the low absorptive capacity for foreign loans and assistance, resulting from the country's limited trained manpower, managerial and administrative capability, contribute to the low level of investment. Thus investment plays a determining role in economic development.

2. Next problem is the capacity to generate enough foreign exchange. The total dependence on imported capital goods like machinery and transport equipment, petroleum, industrial inputs and semi-finished products and basic consumption items, which are not produced domestically, have made the country require a lot of money in foreign exchange.

3. Thirdly, the national economy being heavily dependent on one export commodity i.e. coffee is another acute problem. Though subject to fluctuation due to the quota of coffee exports and world market prices, the share of coffee in total export earnings is quite high. In 1981-82 alone, the trade deficit amounted to 867.9 million birr as total imports rose to 1641.3 million birr, while earnings from exports were only 773.4 million birr. This has forced the country to draw its foreign exchange reserves to a precariously low position.

4. The low level of institutional development, the limited supply of trained and skilled manpower, and the inadequate administrative and managerial capabilities and the lack in the systematization and coordination of work have all contributed to the retardation of the pace of socio-economic development.

5. The rate of inflation is other facet of the country's economic problem. Although from 1976-77 to 1980-81 the inflation rate has shown a declining trend, it is still a problem which merits special attention. Among the factors which contribute to inflationary price rises are the inadequate supply of essential industrial and agricultural commodities compared to the demand for such commodities, the inefficiency of the country's distribution system, transportation problems and the rise in world market prices of imported goods.*

These were the basic problems that Ethiopia was facing in its current stage of economic development. So it adopted socialist path of economic development for overcoming those problems and for faster economic growth.

Agricultural Sector:

Agriculture is the mainstay of the Ethiopian economy. It provides employment to most of the population and

* Here I mean imported goods as petroleum, chemicals, medicines, etc.

accounts over 48 per cent of the GDP. Since 1975 revolution far-reaching measures have been taken in order to create conditions that will help in accelerating the growth of agriculture. The implementation of the February 1975 proclamation of the nationalization of all rural lands; the formation of peasant associations, service and producer co-operatives; state farms as well as settlements have all assisted in strengthening the socialist production relations in the country.

In agricultural sector the fundamental problem which has been inherited from a predominantly feudal system is its low level of productivity which is caused by fragmented farm holdings, scattered settlement, shortage of skilled-men, illiteracy, technological backwardness and limited infrastructure.

The major development objectives of the agriculture sector in the ten-year perspective plan include the following:

1. Increasing agricultural production to a level that meets the population's food requirement and securing reserve food for at least a three-month period.
2. Producing adequate raw material for the major industries in the country.
3. Ensuring the supremacy of a socialist ownership through a strengthened and well-established production relation in the rural sector.

4. Increasing the production of export commodities both in quantity and variety so as to generate adequate foreign exchange required for the development of the economy at large.¹⁵

According to FAO figures, some 13 million hectares of land were under cultivation at the beginning of the 1970s.¹⁶ The current campaign of agricultural development, pursued by the revolutionary government, is based on a planned expansion of cultivated areas. Before the revolutionary victory 1974, agriculture accounted for 48 per cent of the gross national product and in 1977 it rose to 52 per cent.¹⁷

In 1977 the most important crops as reported by the FAO were teff and other cereals (1,270,000 tons) barley (830,000 tons), wheat (529,000 tons), maize (1,150,000 tons), sugar-cane (1,240,000 tons), vegetables (414,000 tons) and coffee (175,000 tons).¹⁸ In the same year Ethiopia had 26,119,000 head of cattle, 23,149,000 sheep and some 966,000 camels. It is estimated that more than ten million people work in agriculture i.e. 88 per cent of the economically active population, but there are no exact figures in this respect.¹⁹

15 Workers' Party of Ethiopia, op.cit., p.35.

16 FAO Report, October 1975.

17 FAO Report, November 1976.

18 The Non-Aligned Countries, op.cit., p.231.

19 Ibid., p.231.

Since the nationalisation of the land in 1975, more than nine million peasants have associated in some 27,000 agricultural associations which are getting state subsidies for their development. These associations, in turn, form producer cooperatives which together, with state farms, form the base of the agricultural development plans. There are some 2,500 of the latter institutions throughout Ethiopia. According to the latest figures on the National Revolutionary Campaign of Economic Development, which began its first stage in 1976, in 1980 agriculture had raised its share of Ethiopia's GDP by 5.6 per cent.²⁰ In the first year of the campaign, 84,000 hectares of previously unproductive land were added to the agricultural capacity. In 1979, 136,000 hectares of such land were put under cultivation, and in 1980 it was hoped yet another 250,000 hectares of land would be similarly improved. All in all, over the next ten years, more than a million hectares of new land is expected to be made productive. At the same time, the use of fertilizers is being increased and special emphasis is being laid on the production of coffee as the country's main export item. Coffee accounts for approximately 70 per cent of Ethiopia's income from foreign trade. The volume of coffee exports was 77,000 tons in 1978, it rose to 100,000 tons in 1979, and according to official data it amounted

20 Ibid., p.232.

to 127,825 tons in 1980. In 1978, a Ministry of Development of Coffee and Tea Production was established to control the production of these crops of vital importance for the Ethiopian economy. It is estimated that between 1979 and 1980 the total production of coffee exceeded 200,000 tons.

Under the ten-year perspective plan, it is now planned to promote the development of the agricultural sector at an annual growth rate of 4.3 per cent. To achieve the above growth target, it is estimated that the production of annual and perennial crops will increase at an annual average rate of 6.1 per cent. The growth targets set for the output of fish and meat products are also high enough to bring about a substantial change in the sub-sector. With regard to the change in the production relations in the agriculture sector, it is expected that at the end of (10-year) plan period 53 per cent of the total peasant population will have been organized under producers' co-operatives. A reforestation campaign is currently underway to cope with the chaos which was inherited from the feudal regime in the exploitation of the country's timber resources. Ethiopia has some 3.5 million hectares of forests, although vast tracts of forests have disappeared due to indiscriminate exploitation. In 1979 alone, 45 million new trees were planted, which is 24 times more than in the pre-revolutionary period. In 1980, 55,000 hectares of land was reforested. Timber production was 24,290,000 cum. in 1975.

Thus in agriculture, priority under the development programmes have been accorded to increasing productivity, cooperativization, conservation and development. Attempts have been made to increase agricultural productivity through the provision of fertilizer, improved seeds, pesticides, improved farming implements and other technical assistance both to agricultural cooperative and private farmers.

Industrial Sector:

Employing only about three per cent of the national work-force, the current share of industry in the gross domestic product does not exceed eleven per cent. Of the total gross value of production, food, beverages, textiles and other consumer goods industries account for about 81 per cent, while the share of chemical, metal, and non-metallic mineral product industries is only about 19 per cent. While the industrial sector includes state, co-operative and private holdings, the state sector accounts for about 95 per cent of the gross value of production of the manufacturing industry.²¹ In this respect, it has been made possible in the past few years to reach capacity in existing factories through increased productivity. Now much more emphasis has been put on the organization of producers' cooperatives in order to enhancing the

21 Ibid., p.232.

socialisation and development of handicrafts. In fact, industry plays a pivotal role in laying the technical base for overcoming backwardness and building of socialism.

Manufacturing industry accounted for 15 per cent of Ethiopia's GNP in 1977. The industrial sector includes mainly the manufacture of cotton fabrics and other products from cotton, but also some food products, processing tobacco and sugar cane, bottling of mineral water and production of beer. 7,600 tons of paper were produced in 1979. Industrial development plans calling for a 37 per cent increase in production by the manufacturing industry between 1979 and 1981 have been successfully implemented.

180,000 tons of cement were produced in 1981 in cement mills in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Massawa, but by 1984 this quantity should rise to 300,000 tons as a new mill is put into operation at Mughor, which is being built with the technical assistance of the GDR and with Cuban aid. In 1976, 480 million KW of electric power was produced, while the petroleum refining capacity was approximately 700,000 tons annually. The following are the major long-term industrial development objectives charted:

1. Increase the quality and quantity of basic consumer goods with a view to improve the living standards of the working people.

2. Expand and/or establish capital and intermediate goods industries that would support agriculture and other sectors of the economy while at the same time laying the basis for heavy industry.
3. Establish and strengthen handicrafts producer co-operatives.
4. Increase the capacity to save and earn foreign exchange.

Special attention has been given to the training of workers, the introduction of improved organisation and management systems and increasing the productivity and efficiency of existing plants.

Participatory Democracy:

In the political sphere, too, having abolished the feudal monarchy and demolished the reactionary feudal-bourgeois system, and having adopted socialism as a guiding principle, the Ethiopian people are actively participating in the affairs of the country and ensuring their class interests by raising the level of their consciousness, by being armed and organized under the various mass organisations and professional associations. There is no doubt that the organisation of the masses from the district to the national level under the All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU), the All-Ethiopia Peasants' Association (AOPA), the Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association (REYA), the All-Ethiopia Women's Association (AEMA), etc. and under urban dwellers' associations in cities and towns from the

district to the level of city councils is a reliable beginning for the practical realization of people's democracy. The establishment of COPWE in 1979 as a result of arduous struggle that is being carried out for the formation of a Marxist-Leninist Party, whose leadership is an indispensable factor for the success of the Ethiopian revolution and the fact is that COPWE is at present intensifying its endeavour in the various spheres are a reliable basis for the construction of a socialist society. Thus fully aware of the impossibility of accomplishing the process of transition and embarked upon socialist construction in the absence of Marxist-Leninist party leadership, Ethiopian revolutionaries have established COPWE. As the successful accomplishment of COPWE's mission is a decisive factor in the unequivocal triumph of socialism in Ethiopia, it is here worthwhile to briefly survey the major activities of this organisation. The major purposes of COPWE are two-pronged:²²

1. To cause the dissemination and propagation of the science of Marxism-Leninism among government and mass organisations, cooperatives and the broad masses generally.
2. To organise a solid, strong party of the working people based on the teachings of Marxism and Leninism, whose

22 Proclamation No. 174 of 1979, Proclamation providing for the establishment of COPWE. Addis Ababa, 1979.

historical mission shall be to liquidate from the land of Ethiopia feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism and to establish the new People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and to guide the people to achieve socialism and consequently communism.

COPWE set out to practically accomplish these tasks by classifying them into three intertwined phases: Phase one - the period of preparation; phase two - the period of activity initiated by the First Congress of the organization; and phase three - the period of party formation.

During the phase of the party formation, the major class-contradiction has been marked by the revolutionaries. The major contradiction in Ethiopian society at present is one between those who stand for the capitalist path of development and their own selfish interests (ranging from bureaucratic saboteurs to the imperialist-assisted opportunistic bandits), on the one hand, and those who genuinely and resolutely stand for the formation of a truly Marxist-Leninist party and for the supremacy of the socialism, namely, the working class, the peasantry and the revolutionary intelligentsia.

Thus it is quite clear from the above that the COPWE represents the whole mass, not the few people only. And it is quite obvious that in the effective accomplishment of the process of transition and the stepping upto socialist

construction, the leadership role of the Marxist-Leninist Party imbued with proletarian internationalism is an inevitable law of social development which is again not only endorsed by the theory of socialist orientation but has also been proven in practice.

Education:

Before the revolution, a UNESCO study showed that between 95 and 98 per cent of Ethiopia's population were illiterate; this was a figure unparalleled anywhere else in the world. Only some 500,000 children, out of the total of 9,000,000 children of school age attended the class with some regularity. At the secondary-school level (boys and girls older than fifteen) only 0.3 per cent of children in the respective age category attended school, most of them sons of the feudal and bourgeois class and of government officials.²³

One of the first steps taken by the Government of Socialist Ethiopia, after the Revolution of 1974, was to restructure and re-orient the educational system. These measures were aimed at raising the political consciousness of the masses, making education relevant for research and enhancing the productive capability of the country by providing the manpower requirement of the country.²⁴

23 Ibid., p.232.

24 Workers' Party of Ethiopia, op.cit., p.82.

Accordingly, the curriculum was restructured to include ideological education, technical and vocational education, arts and physical education.

A national literacy campaign officially began in 1979 as the most ambitious project of its kind in the history of the African continent. It was estimated at that time that some 28 million in Ethiopia were illiterate. According to plans, the campaign was to be concluded in urban areas by June 1980 and in rural areas, where most of the country's population live by 1984. It was initially estimated that in September 1979, some 1,300,000 individuals should have been learning to read and write, but actually, on that date, 4,600,000 individuals were attending regular literacy courses as a result of the enormous enthusiasm evoked among the population by the education crusade waged in Ethiopia's five principal languages - Amharic, Oromi, Somali, Tigri and wollo. By October 1980 when the fourth stage of the campaign was initiated, eight million individuals had learned to read and write, and already some 60,000 teachers were involved in the project.²⁵ The University of Addis Ababa had more than 29,000 students in 1980, attending both day and evening courses, and a thorough university reform was carried out, under which higher education is accessible to students in 1980, attending both day and

25 'The Non-Aligned Countries! op.cit., p.233.

evening courses, and a thorough university reform was carried out, under which higher education is accessible to students from the poorest strata of the population.

Despite all these changes, Ethiopia is not able to keep up the promises. Because the party has not been built up fully. It has not been able to call itself the vanguard. Political organisations are not available to allow the people in process of decision-making. Ethiopian government has not been able to achieve the functioning of democratic centralism fully. Rather they are accused to be the preponderance of the men in uniform. Social evils like corruption, nepotism, etc. have not been fully eradicated.

Still then the changes in the Ethiopian societal structure, that have been brought up by socialist government are necessary to build a socialist system where the exploitation of man by man will, once and for all, be done away with. As now, Ethiopia is in transitional phase from feudo-bourgeois to socialism, so it is on the march of implementing the foundation of socialism which will yield a socialist structure of society though some of the remnants of the old feudo-bourgeois structure are still found.

ETHIOPIA:
BALANCE OF TRADE

Year	Imports (cif)	Exports (fob)	Deficit
1975	613.1	478.3	-134.8
1976	736.7	590.6	-156.1
1977	810.9	687.7	-128.2
1978	1,069.9	615.7	-454.2
1979	1,174.6	864.3	-310.3
1980	1,497.7	879.3	-618.4
1981	1,528.3	774.5	-753.8

Source: African Research Bulletin, 1982.

CHAPTER III

**CASE STUDY OF TANZANIA - 'AFRICAN
SOCIALIST' PATH OF DEVELOPMENT**

After two decades of independence, there are few of the optimists so numerous in the 1960s, who regarded Tanzania as the prototype of the brave new African world, the egalitarian, self-reliant society whose citizens would eschew the temptations of an individualist, materialist consumer society in favour of sharing with and supporting each other. Before giving the explanations of where Tanzania took wrong turnings, let us summarize the goals that Nyerere set out to pursue.

1. First, building a non-racial society (i.e. society without any discrimination based on racial attitudes) in which an individual's race (or other fixed attributes such as ethnicity or religion) would be irrelevant to his role in Tanzania;
2. Second, broadening popular participation in all decision-making processes, in order to increase people's control over their own fate;
3. Third, creating an egalitarian and co-operative economic order aiming at satisfying basic needs for all collectively, rather than satisfying individual's desire for personal luxuries.

These goals, however, were not only hard to achieve but to some extent they were ⁱⁿ conflict with each other. Thus allowing people to participate in determining the shape of the community implies that there must be a significant scope for local initiatives and a concomitant

restraint upon central direction. It also implies that these initiatives may run in different directions; and that some communities may in consequence deviate from Nyerere's concept of socialism, or oppose the non-racial attitude. Similarly, Nyerere's concept of socialism or oppose his non-racial attitude. Similarly Nyerere's goal of non-racial society can contrary to the deeply felt emotions of the most Africans.

Political Economy of Tanzania at the time of Independence

Basically Tanzania was a British colony. The colonial rule transformed this area from the stage of being a primitive reserve virtually outside the world market into that of a true underdeveloped economy dominated by and integrated into the world market and with a dualistic appearance, characterised by an increasing inequality in the distribution of growth between the various sectors. It perpetuated underdevelopment in Tanzania at the cost of the development in the colonial master's country. On December 9, 1961, Tanganyika was granted independence and Julius K. Nyerere became the country's first Prime Minister. Actually power was being transferred to a section of people in Tanzanian society, who were considered to be the intelligentsia, by the metropolitan bourgeoisie in tacit understanding serving the latter's interests. Thus after the independence Tanzania's economic structure was like

most other colonized territories, export-oriented. She not only supplied the raw materials to the metropolis but also provided a market for their manufactured products. The internal transport system was also made in such a way that it could only help the metropolitan powers. Tanzania had virtually no industrial base at the time of independence. Tanzania was being ruled over by the bureaucratic-cum-political class to whom the power was being transferred. Nyerere being a social democrat wanted to adopt socialism which is typically fitting to the Tanzanian societal structure. Now we should switch over to the analysis of class in the context of Tanzanian societal structure.

Class Character of Tanzanian State

The goal of cooperative grassroots socialism might have been feasible, at least if it had relied upon an explicit class appeal to the less privileged sectors of rural society, but it was sabotaged by a section of people in the society, who had concentrated their efforts only upon those parts of Nyerere's programme that enhanced their own power. In the post-independence era, these sections of the society wanted to adopt socialism in Tanzania because they saw the inherent defects in other social systems. So they have adopted socialist path which is totally different from scientific socialism and fit for the African social context. As socialism in Tanzania was not a natural product of TANU as a whole, but of some intellectuals in the party,

So TANU, the ruling party, failed to give the ideology its necessary mass support. And also in the post-colonial Tanzania, the Party grew into an organisation that provided for some unity between different groups of civil servants and white-collar employees. Before Arusha declaration and after independence, the classes in the societal structure were the bureaucratic-cum-political bourgeoisie which emerged during colonial period, commercial bourgeoisie which mostly dominated by the Asian traders, peasantry and working class. During this period, according to I.G. Shivji, the main contradiction was between the newly emerging bureaucratic-cum-political bourgeoisie who became the governing class and the commercial bourgeoisie which was dominated by the Asian traders.¹ The former was in a dominant position, because they became the governing class having the political power after independence and commercial bourgeoisie which remained essentially an Asian class was unable to transcend its racial differentiation to promote alliance with other classes. Most of the policies of TANU were the attempts of the governing class to use the state power to displace the commercial bourgeoisie and also to establish an economic base for itself.² But

1 Shivji, I.G., Tanzania's Class Struggle Continues (Dar-es-Salaam: University of Dar-es-Salaam, Institute of Development Studies, mimeo, 1973), p.52.

2 Ibid., p.53.

after the Arusha Declaration, the bureaucratic-political bourgeoisie became a more powerful section of the middle class. It also led to the disintegration of the commercial bourgeoisie. They gradually began to restrict their business activities and instead of saving, accumulating, and investing, they began to export capital.³ Within the territorial economy they started selling off business, running down of stocks, etc. But the accumulation of capital is done by the state on behalf of the class as a whole.⁴ The 'leadership code' shows that there must be restraint on the part of the individuals of bureaucratic-bourgeoisie in terms of consumption or engaging in luxury life so that the state may be left enough for accumulation.⁵

Tenets of 'Ujamaa':

The literal meaning of 'Ujamaa' is familiness or brotherhood. The significance of adopting Ujamaa is that it is an African word (Swahili) and thus it emphasizes the 'Africanness' of the policies supposed to be followed.⁶ Its literal meaning is familiness. It brings to the mind of the people the idea of mutual involvement in the family as they

3 Ibid., p.81.

4 Ibid., p.95.

5 Ibid., p.95.

6 Nyerere, J.K., Nyerere on Socialism (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford, 1979), p.28.

know it.⁷ In Julius Nyerere's view socialism is an attitude of mind.⁸ Such an attitude of mind inclines men towards the sense of mutual cooperation and obligation for the welfare of their fellowmen. Ujamaa's role is not confined to the revival of the traditional attitudes but it extends to all mankind. The major institution for this task is the party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).⁹ 'Ujamaa' is based on indigenous traditional social organisation, but not on Marxism-Leninism, rather it is opposed to both capitalism and doctrinaire socialism. It is because the former seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of men by men and the latter seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between men and men.¹⁰

Nyerere's main stress is; first, to see the country's position and its needs, and then to consider other countries' experiences in the light of their requirements.¹¹

7 Ibid., p.28.

8 Nyerere, J.K., Ujamaa, The Basis of African Socialism in his Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford, 1968), p.7.

9 TANU and Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) were merged within 1977 and now there is only one party in the country, namely, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Revolutionary Party.

10 Nyerere, J.K., Ujamaa Essays on Socialism, op.cit., p.12.

11 Nyerere, J.K., Freedom and Socialism (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford, 1968), p.12.

He rejects the concept of uniformity in socialism both in practice and theory. According to him, Ujamaa's basic tenet of traditional attitude of mind does not mean going backward. It means rather building socialism on the foundation of the country's past and building according to its design.¹²

Since Ujamaa is an extended family (or *familiness*), there is no place for tribalism, religious intolerance and racial discrimination. Thus its basic principles of Ujamaa is 'human equality'. So under the guidance of 'Ujamaa' based on equality Tanzania's path is towards the building of a classless society.¹³ In the context of social change according to Ujamaa's approach, gradualism and non-violence are the two key-factors.¹⁴ Violence does not create a congenial atmosphere for the formation of socialist attitude of mind. That is why Nyerere opposes the claim of the Marxism-Leninism that 'class-war' is necessary for achieving socialism. He considers class-war as the violent activities. Rather the purpose is to enlarge the real freedom of man and to increase his opportunity of living, welfare and dignity in

12 Nyerere, J.K., "Freedom and Development" in A. Goulson, ed., African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979), pp.27-35.

13 Nyerere, J.K., Freedom and Unity (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford, 1966), p.207.

14 Nyerere, J.K., Freedom and Socialism, op.cit., p.24.

order to end the exploitation and injustice. Socialism, according to Nyerere is for freedom and development where freedom refers to national freedom, freedom from hunger, disease and poverty and personal freedom, and the latter refers to development of the whole mass.¹⁵

Goals of Tanzania Socialism:

1. Self-Reliance:

It has been enunciated in part three of the Arusha Declaration. It is for the maximum utilization of the country's resources and national control over the course of development. According to Nyerere, self-reliance means that Tanzania shall depend upon itself through the effective utilization of its own resources.¹⁶ S.S. Kushi who writes on the interconnection between self-reliance and socialism said: "Both the ethical and instrumental justification with socialism (ujamaa) defining a socio-economic organization which is in consonance with the maximum development of the human resources and self-reliance defining the methods and development inputs to be used, namely, local materials and the efforts of the people."¹⁷ In fact, it is a policy which challenges the colonial and neo-colonial tendencies and their nefarious activities.

15 Nyerere, n.12, p.27.

16 Nyerere, J.K., After the Arusha Declaration, Presidential Address to the National Conference of TANU, Nwanza, October 1967 (Dar-es-Salaam; Ministry of Information and Tourism), p.3.

17 Kushi, S.S., "Tanzania" in Adebayo Adedeji, ed., Indigenization of African Economics (London: Hutchinson, 1981), p.220.

In the post-independence period of Tanzania, there was the continuation of the same economic structure which is so dependent on the metropole that it continues the transfer of potential savings to the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Tanzania always supplies raw materials, and in turn gets finished products. In this process, lots of private local and foreign enterprises took the initiative on direct investment for the industrial development.¹⁸ The early post-independence period proved the utter failure of the earlier expectation particularly on foreign private investment in Tanzania. The government could not realize the expected foreign aid for implementing the economic planning. In order to tackle some of the economic contradictions which prevail upon the relation between the external and domestic economy in favour of the latter, the policy of nationalisation was adopted.

2. Socialist Attitude of Mind

Another important aspect of Tanzanian socialism is insistence on the theory that socialism is an attitude of mind not a dogma. According to Nyerere in his book "Ujamaa : Essays on Socialism", socialism is an attitude of mind. According to him, a socialist society can only be built by those who believe in socialism and who themselves

¹⁸ Nnoli, O., Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania : The Dynamics of the Diplomacy of a new State, 1961 to 1971 (New York; London, Lagos: Nok Publishers, 1978), p.206.

practise the principles of socialism. What he explains is that socialist structures will arise further out of the socialist ideals and attitudes. To elucidate Nyerere's point the Arusha Declaration states that 'socialism is a belief', 'socialism is a way of life, and a socialist society can only be built by those who believe in, and who themselves practice the principles of socialism'. Julius Nyerere affirms that the Arusha Declaration is also a commitment to a particular quality of life. It is based on the assumption of human equality on the belief that it is wrong for one man to dominate or exploit another, and on the knowledge that every individual hopes to live in society as a freeman able to lead a decent life in conditions of peace and with his neighbours. The idea is, in other words, man-centred.¹⁹ Acculturation or internationalisation of socialist culture or values are required for the transformation of a society towards a socialist system. It appears from the above postulates that for Nyerere party is not the vehicle for creating a socialist attitude of mind. Instead of regarding socialism as a scientific philosophy Nyerere regards this an attitude of mind which could be inculcated through education, mass media and information.

19 Nyerere, J.K., "The Purpose is Man" in Freedom and Socialism, op.cit., p.316.

PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS

<u>Imports</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
Belgium	294.7	342.2
China	155.6	322.0
Denmark	183.9	343.0
France	174.0	193.5
Germany	697.6	939.5
India	352.5	360.9
Italy	259.0	529.0
Japan	691.0	969.9
Netherlands	273.9	590.2
Sweden	146.7	259.0
UK	951.6	1,604.0
USA	288.5	304.9
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Total	6,199	8,798
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Source: Africa Contemporary Record, 1983-84.

<u>Exports</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
China	145.1	102.9
Germany	803.6	559.9
Hong Kong	159.9	154.0
India	163.9	141.7
Italy	351.6	184.1
Japan	109.4	93.3
Mozambique	n.a.	86.5
Netherlands	106.4	196.7
Singapore	259.0	56.1
UK	636.6	737.9
USA	597.6	404.7
Yugoslavia	n.a.	89.3
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Total (including others)	4,536	3,071
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Source: ACI, 1982-83.

For him it is not an ideological issue rather a moral issue, where man is to be prepared through education, information and mass media. For a scientific socialist, socialism is related to mode of production and production-relations. For them it is not an attitude of mind but a reflection of objective reality.

For Nyerere the major objectives of education policy that had been declared in 1967 were (1) orientation of schooling to the rural areas and specifically to agriculture, (2) the development of cooperative attitudes, (3) the creativity of critical thinking and self-confidence, (4) the unity of manual and mental work, (5) loyalty to the party and the government and to the masses, the peasants and workers, (6) the fostering of egalitarian values.²⁰ Nyerere, no doubt, criticised the colonial type of education, for he thought that it was motivated by a desire to inculcate the values of colonial society and to train the individual for the service of the colonial state.

Coming to the shortcomings of the educational system, one of the objectives was to redefine primary schooling to be an end in itself, terminal, but not a means to higher education and employment in the white collar jobs. Therefore, the emphasis was on a relevant rural-oriented curriculum. But it has not been realised because the masses think that steady monthly incomes employed as factory workers and

²⁰ Nyerere, *ibid.*, pp.266-290.

swampers, if not managers or teachers, are better off than being a poor peasant. Even now peasants do not have any access to the higher education. Still now masses think formal education as the means for individual advancement in terms of financial rewards and social prestige. The teaching methods and organisation in primary and secondary schools are not towards the objectives of developing creativity, critical thinking, self-confidence and cooperation,²¹ rather classroom practice is authoritarian and bureaucratic. Students are feeling alienated because there is no co-operation or good relation between the teachers and the students. The object of uniting mental and manual work in education as a part of socialist programme is not achieved.

The children of the privileged group that means the children of the bureaucrats, exports and ruling elite are getting more facilities in Tanzania such as to go abroad, to go for higher studies, etc.

So the Nyerere's plan to change the colonial type of education to create this new attitude is a failure. Chamungwaha aptly remarked that instead of the radical transformation of old values and attitudes what really has taken place in the schools is largely cultural expansion but not cultural change.²² The issue of mass education has

21 Mbilinyi, M., Contradiction in Tanzanian Education Reform in A. Coulson, ed., African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience (London: Spokesman, 1979), p.222.

22 Chamungwaha, H.M.S., "Socialization Problem in Tanzania: An Appraisal of Self-Reliance as a Strategy of Cultural Transformation", Tazuli: A Political Science Forum, vol.5, No.1, 1975, p.10.

become a myth as the privileged group of the country is only able to send their children abroad for higher studies. Thus the educational system of Tanzania is not able to establish the socialist pattern in true to the sense.

Role of mass-media can also be considered as the means for the propagation of socialist ideals and values according to Arusha Declaration. In this connection we can have three things at our disposal for the propagation. These are radio, television and newspaper. Though mass-media in Tanzania is in the hands of the government and controlled by the party, it fails to spread the belief in socialism which Nyerere desires it to do, because in Tanzania majority of people cannot afford radio or television. Again they are not so literate that they could even read the newspaper. Thus everything is for urban dwellers, for well-to-do families and for the ruling elite. Thus Nyerere's attempt in changing the attitude of mind through formal education, mass media and political mobilization has become a failure.

3. Participatory Democracy:

A democratic society is defined as one in which the spirit of the equality and fraternity prevails. Democracy as a form of state was developed in four bases - the doctrine of natural rights (in the late middle-ages); the utilitarian principle - the happiness of the many; and the idealist basis - that democracy makes possible the full

realization of the most characteristic potentiality of human personality, the scientific socialist basis, i.e. mass participation, democratic centralism, ideological commitment, etc. But according to Nyerere, the essence of democracy is discussion, equality and freedom.²³ Here the essence of the participatory democracy is discussed on the basis of the interaction between urban based leadership and the rural poor in the framework of the implementation of the 'ujamaa' scheme for the promotion of social and economic development.

When Tanzania achieved independence, there was a transfer of power from the British colonial government to the leaders of TANU. In this period, to improve the socio-economic conditions of the people, Julius Nyerere, the TANU leader, introduced a new concept of participatory democracy which he claimed was based on ujamaa and African socialism. No doubt, over the years, the concept of ujamaa underwent changes which were incorporated in the Arusha Declaration (1967) and projected in the themes of socialism and self-reliance through participatory socio-economic development based on the decentralisation of planning and implementation.

23 Nyerere, J.K., 'Freedom & Unity', op.cit., p.103.

After independence, Tanzania has adopted single-party system operating on the basis of socialist ideology of 'ujamaa'. Nyerere defended Tanzanian political structure by stating that because of the nature of the social formations in African society, one-party system is justified and democratic. But after independence, the mobilisation of the people could not be achieved by the bureaucrats or TANU leaders even at the district level. It required a new style of participatory democratic leadership functioning in a decentralised system of administration in which the village would be the lowest level of unit of organisation. The new political leaders who emerged in this process of decentralised administration and who shared both power and privilege with the bureaucrats were more interested in retaining their position than in serving the people.

Nyerere also tried to dissociate Tanzanian one party system from one-party communist system. He criticised communist one-party system in this context that their policies are creeds. He also said that dogmatism and freedom of discussion do not easily go together. Rather he argues that in Tanzania, within the framework of TANU's programme one can find the grass-root level participation which brings political stability in the country. Even all the party programmes, manifestations and government resolutions have been discussed freely within the party, according to Nyerere, where such kind of participation and freedom is not possible in the communist party system.

But although the TANU is the party of the social democrat, it does not follow the principle of democratic centralism. Nyerere's 'ujamaa' thesis on which TANU stood, neither makes an appraisal of the institutions that were responsible for the traditional African socialist-orientation nor does it examine the possibility of creating comparable social, economic and political institutions in modern Tanzania.²⁴ He does not suggest any kind of institutional forms that are needed to provide an operational basis for ujamaa transformation of society. When in this context the question arises that who will organise the rural population for ujamaa, Nyerere relies on TANU for leadership, but what is TANU, who constitutes this organisation and what is its class character? In the post-independence era, TANU, being led by lower middle class of Africans (because of their education and socio-economic status) emerged as a political power rather than a mass party. During the period of ujamaa experimentation, the benefits of Africanisation and economic development were monopolised by lower middle class Africans - not only political leaders, civil servants, small businessmen and traders but also officials associated with cooperatives, foreign companies, banks and insurance.²⁵

24 Gupta, Vijay, "Ujamaa Development Programme and Participatory Leadership" in Alfred de Souza's, The Politics of Change and Leadership Development (New Delhi: Manohar, 1978), p.184.

25 Wages, Income, Rural Development, Investment and Price Policy (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printers, 1967), Tanzania Government Paper No.4, 1967.

In 1965, TANU emerged as the sole political party in Tanzania. During this time, it was decided to introduce TANU party cells. The main purpose of establishing these cells was to associate TANU with the lowest level of administrative system and to enhance the effectiveness of TANU's control and communication. Each cell, which was composed of ten members was expected to: (1) assess the strength of the party and ensure that the membership records were accurate and reliable, (2) facilitate the efficient collection of party dues and subscriptions; and (3) develop harmonious relations between the cells and development committees at all levels. But upto now nothing has been done in enabling TANU to exercise effective control over the units at the lowest level.

But Nyerere devised that the party leaders were expected to see that the administrative bureaucracy functioned in consultation with the lowest cell level cadres and also to keep the area and national leaders informed of the people's reactions to the development programmes. The participatory leaders were to be the local functionaries who would work with the people and be competent to deal with both ideological issues and organisational problems. The leadership code of conduct laid down in the Arusha Declaration was applicable only to national and district leaders, yet it had important implications both for recruitment to TANU and for its work.

By the leadership code, TANU and government leaders had to be peasants or workers, and they were debarred from owning property, running private business or receiving more than one salary. But since the new leaders enjoyed high status in politico-administrative circles as well as privileges which were denied to the masses of the people, the leadership became increasingly isolated from the masses. These leaders have acquired the elite status.

Under decentralisation scheme, village assemblies whose membership was constituted by all the residents of the village were set up. Each Assembly was empowered to elect a village council to manage its affairs and the implementation of development programmes. But in the actual sense there was no basic change in the participation of the people. This was due not only to the lack of ideological clarity among the leaders but also because in spite of the administrative changes, TANU members continued to be unprogressive, old and largely illiterate, though enjoying wealth and local prestige. The basic mistake of TANU was not to promote ujamaa and its development programmes but to propagate villagisation to which the rural population did not respond favourably.

In fact, the new leaders were unable to cope with the new demands of ujamaa as a system of decentralised participatory development. Thus participatory democracy within the established goals of socialism is far off in Tanzania.

Economic Growth:

Tanzania's GDP amounted to 3,800,000,000 dollars in 1970, with the annual growth of 2.1 per cent between 1970 and 1977. Gross industrial product rose to 3,000,000,000 dollars in 1979 and grew at the annual rate of 4.5 per cent between 1970 and 1977. The national income in constant prices, has increased only 4.2 per cent in average, per year, between 1967 and 1975. It was 5.1 per cent during the period 1976 and 1980.²⁶ The target rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP) was 6.7 per cent in 1964-69, the first Five-Year Plan; whereas the actual increase was in the range of 4.8 to 5.2 per cent.²⁷ In the second Five-Year Plan (1969-69 to 1973-74), the target was 6.5 per cent and it was 6.0 per cent in third Five-Year Plan.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Gross Domestic Products</u>
1967	6,777 T.sh.
1969	7,259 "
1974	9,020 "
1976	9,905 "
1977	10,587 "
1980	12,516 "

26 Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania and Mozambique Annual supplement, 1982, p.6 (The real increase in percentage at 1966 constant prices for the year 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 are respectively 4.6 per cent, 6.6 per cent, 5.7 per cent, 5.5 per cent and 3.6 per cent. The period 1967 to 1980 covers three five-year plans).

27 Bignon, H., "Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development". (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1967)
p. 43

Considering the above table it has been seen that GDP has almost doubled.

Agriculture:

Tanzania is basically an agricultural country. Nearly 90 per cent of the total population depends on agriculture. About 60 per cent of Tanzania's export values come from the agricultural products. The performance in agricultural production in annual growth rate, at constant prices, was 6.9 per cent during first Five-Year Plan, 1.9 per cent in second and during the period 1974-77 it was 5.1 per cent per annum. Agricultural products include coffee, cotton, sisal, spices (sanzibar) and other crops, and agricultural production employs 86 per cent of the total labour force (only 6 per cent work in industry). During 1970-1980 food crop sector did better than export crop sector (or cash crop sector). Export crops output of sisal, cloves and pyrethrum fell by between 45.50 per cent during the period 1970-1980 while the output of cashew, nuts fell by 50 per cent and of cotton by 25 per cent.²⁸ The ILO report highlights two problems - the use of the price control (too much control) and the response of the peasants to the government policy.

28 ILO - Basic needs in Danger : A Basic Needs-Oriented Development Strategy for Tanzania (Addis Ababa, ILO, 1982), p.22.

Land:

Out of the total land area of 89.6 million hectares in mainland Tanzania, only 6.2 million hectares were cultivated in 1979-80. Now only 15.7 per cent of the total available land area is cultivated at present.²⁹ The productivity of land and labour was low due to poor technology and organization.

Mainly the problems in the agricultural production growth are dependence on nature for water, partly inadequate price policy of the government and inadequate utilization of land and the conservative attitude of farmers against using modern techniques.³⁰

Industry:

Industrial sector in Tanzania occupied 7 per cent of total GDP in 1965 and 10 per cent in 1977. The increase in the rate of industrial production was about 10 per cent per annum during first Five-Year Plan, 6.8 per cent in second Five-Year Plan and 4.2 per cent during 1974-77.³¹ The third Five-Year Plan emphasized on developing manufacturing industry. The main objectives were to

29 Ministry of Agriculture, 'Tanzania Food Strategy' (Dar es Salaam 1981) p.5.

30 For detailed study of the last aspect, see Hyden, G., 'Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania' (London: Heinemann, 1990), pp.18-19.

31 Africa South of Sahara, 1979, p.1031.

process all agricultural commodities, to provide all basic consumer needs, and to launch new industries to process and use other Tanzanian resources - coal, iron ore, phosphate, pulp and paper. About the summary trends in Tanzanian manufacturing (see *next page*), we see certain increases in the industrial sector. Still then the performance in many sectors were not satisfactory. The main factors of less satisfactory industrial performance were - frequent interruptions of electricity and water supply, high import prices, low capacity utilization, no satisfactory performance of the parastatals, shortage of raw materials, inadequate infrastructure, particularly transport, lack of skilled manpower and the high cost of management and low productivity of labour.

Whether Tanzania has achieved the Ujamaa Principle of Self-Reliance or not?

The first Five-Year Plan asserted that "notable changes in policy are the much greater emphasis given to the irrigation and settlement sub-division of agriculture, and to industry in the new plan in order to diminish the effects of the previous patterns of the dual 'economy'. The country could not produce all the consumer needs, still policies were adopted to limit the amount of consumer goods imported.³² Policies were framed to close the gap between the devised standards of consumption for

32 Seidman, A, "Tanzania's Industrial Strategy" in Cliffe and Soule, ed., Socialism in Tanzania, vol.2, p.199.

the mass of the population and the limited range of domestic production by developing labour-intensive, small-scale industries and crafts.

SUMMARY TRENDS IN TANZANIAN MANUFACTURING

	1970-72 (1)	1976-78 (2)	Ratio (2) to (1)
1. Value added in constant (1966) prices (T.Sh.n.)	536.9	874.3	1.63
2. Employment (000)	51.560	84.819	1.65
3. Capital (T.sh.m.) constant 1966 prices	1,049.3	1,833.0	1.75
4. Capital-output ratio (3:1)	1.95	2.10	1.08
5. Capital-labour ratio (3:2)	20.35	21.61	1.06
6. Output per worker (1:2)	10,413	10,308	0.99
7. Labour cost as share of value added (%)	61.3	36.2	0.63
8. Real Product wage (T.sh. per worker)	4,065.3	3,579.	0.88
9. Actual real rate of return on capital (%)	21.1	21.1	-

Source: ILO, *op.cit.*, p.213 (based on National Accounts of Tanzania, 1980 and 1981-82 budget speech by the Minister of Industry.

In the second Five-Year Plan the need for an integrated economy was demonstrated. But those policies, however, were not consistently designed to achieve a self-reliant economy. These policies never speak of the item of production (what to produce). Even in 1970s and 1980s the import of foodgrains (see next page:) are still continuing.

As Mayer has pointed out that the strategies in the second plan are based on the notion of improvement rather than transformation of the economy.³³ There is no emphasis on applied research, increased inputs of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, expansion of extension services or a credit system linked to technological improvements. A self-reliant, integrated economy where there is the close relation between domestic production, domestic consumption is not able to realize. Because, the strategy of the plans was to produce the consumer goods not luxury goods. But nearly one-third of the investment undertaken by the National Development Corporation (NDC) was concentrated on luxury items: cigarette production, breweries, hotels and tourism.³⁴

33 Mayer, M.P., "Planning for Self-Reliance", Tamul: A Political Science Forum, vol.4, no.2, July 1974, p.27.

34 Ibid., p.27.

IMPORT OF FOODGRAINS TO TANZANIA, 1970-1981

(In tons and US \$ million)

Year	Maize	Wheat	Rice	Total	Total value
1970	25,623	1,733	7,271	32,627	7.9
1971	20,803	19,010	9,950	57,763	-
1972	116,021	21,124	8,142	142,207	-
1973	3,495	-	8,058	11,553	6.7
1974	253,545	160,021	71,199	334,755	99.4
1975	299,511	157,156	63,931	520,640	117.8
1976	155,647	3,076	0,792	167,515	24.5
1977	-	-	-	120,000	40.9
1978	-	-	-	90,000	34.7
1979	-	-	-	65,000	19.3
1980	-	-	-	310,000	93.9
1981	-	-	-	9,400,000	-

Source: Kjell J. Havnevik and Rune Skarstein, "Agricultural Backwardness and Foreign Aid", quoted by T.F. Shoo, "Self-Reliance : Theory and Models - The Case of Tanzania", Paper presented to a seminar at the Arab Planning Institute, Kuwait, 13.2.1982.

Another reason for the failure to achieve self-reliance, is the failure to disengage Tanzanian economic structure from the international capitalist system. Even during the first Five-Year Plan period the development strategy was based on capital from external sources. Nearly 78 per cent of the public sector expenditure during the period was expected from foreign sources.³⁵ But after the Arusha Declaration (1967), Government took a majority share in each important area - mining, export crops, hotels, trading, enterprises, banking, etc. But it does not mean an end to dependency. Three-fourths of the NDC's investments are expected to come from foreign companies and subsidiaries.³⁶ Thus Tanzanian Government has failed to integrate economic structure (mainly production and consumption) through the allocation of resources for production to meet domestic demand. One of the probable sources of resource mobilisation for industrialisation is parastatal bodies which generally increase dependence upon the external sources. It has been visualised in the Plans that they will increase the production of the essential commodities within the country and decrease the dependency on foreign capital. But the economic structure of Tanzania is continuing to exist in that situation where it exports its primary goods and imports finished products.

35 Ibid., p.30.

36 Seidman, A., "Some Comments on Planning in East Africa", in Cliff and Saul, eds., op.cit., vol.2, p.89.

Economic Malaise in Tanzanian Socialist
Structure and Failure of 'African Socialism'

Basically Tanzania is an agricultural country. Bureaucratic bourgeoisie of Tanzania have their economic social base on the peasants and the political base on the party (TANU). Nyerere has a wrong perspective of historical development of society. While recognising the existence of classes and consequently the clashing vested class interests in Tanzania, he wants to revert the course of history to classless traditional communal society where because of the absence of private property the class contradictions do not exist. But as a matter of empirical evidence the wheel of history cannot be reversed. Once the classes with conflicting vested interests emerge the holders of economic power will not give away their privileged position without putting up a struggle.

Nyerere seems to believe that by just presenting an idea he will bring the change and the owners of the private property will relinquish their privileged position in society. Moreover, Nyerere neither makes in Ujamaa thesis an appraisal of the institutions which were responsible for the traditional African socialist attitude of mind nor examines the possibility of creating similar institutions in modern Tanzania. He makes no effort to put down economic plan to introduce 'ujamaa' as a socialist step.

In order to enhance their own power, the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' encouraged the nationalisation of industries because this increased the number of lucrative jobs open to them, and supported the villagisation programme and other changes in the rural areas only so far as those allowed the central government to extract more wealth from the peasants to support a growing bureaucracy. On the other hand, they opposed schemes in which the peasants decided for themselves how to run their own affairs, such as the Ruvuma Development Association.

It was very clear by 1973 that attempts to transform the rural areas by persuasion would take a very long time. One official estimated that in early 1974 only some 2.5 million people were living in villages and that figures included some who had always been village-dwellers.³⁷ It also included some who had already been forced in villages such as the people of Dodoma region, who had been compulsorily uprooted in 1971 in the first of a number of military style operations.³⁸ In 1973, Nyerere openly abandoned the

37 Mwapochu, J.V., "Operation Planned Villages in Rural Tanzania: A Revolutionary Strategy for Development", in African Review, 6(1), 1973, p.3.

38 Hill, Frances, "Operation Dodoma, 1969-71" in Andrew Coulson, ed., African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1979), pp.106-13.

reliance on persuasion for rural transformation, announcing to the TANU conference that it was the time to force people to move in order to save them from a continuing "life of death". To meet the deadline of moving all Tansanians by 1976 district administrators set up a series of district 'operations' involving lorry loads of people being dumped into new sites on which minimal preparation had been done, and that too entirely by government officials rather than the people who would have to live with the results. In total, some 11 million people were incorporated into new villages from 1973 to 1977, although perhaps less than half this number were physically uprooted. Whatever the numbers, it was the largest mass movement in Africa's history as has been pointed out by Nyerere in his book "Arusha Declaration".

The forced villagisation programme brought to the fore the question of what goals Nyerere and TANU were really pursuing. Then the question arises "Was the motive for villagisation, as Nyerere claimed, to provide services such as schooling and health-care which it could not manage while people were widely scattered? Was the real motive, as critics insisted, to bring the peasants under government control so that the dominant 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' could extract a larger share of their surplus? The government's arguments did sound somewhat implausible to be sure, although Nyerere claimed villagisation had made universal

primary education attainable by the end of 1977, it did have to accept that the government really wanted to have to cope with the increased expectations stirred by villagisation when it could barely afford existing levels of school services.

Villagisation programmes and ujamaa village programmes were introduced at the instance of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie not at the instance of the peasantry. Villagisation has served to stifle enterprise in agriculture and to strengthen the tendency for the rural petty-bourgeoisie to switch out farming into transporting or some other ventures. Peasants face the problem of poor producer prices and forced cultivation measures on the one hand, and worst services and help from the government on the other.³⁹

Two other actions Nyerere took in the rural areas at this time were responses to the failure of TANU to live up to his expectations as a grassroots vehicle for disseminating cooperative socialism. Nyerere seems to have assumed that popular opinion in TANU was favourable to socialism, and that the job of central authorities was simply to guide people towards the best ways of achieving this agreed-upon goal. In fact, however, at the lowest

³⁹ Hyden, G., Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1980), p.17.

levels of the party, the town-house cell and the branch, where all party workers were volunteers, there was a widespread tendency for shopkeepers, well-to-do farmers and other comparatively privileged individuals to emerge as the party's local leaders.⁴⁰ Such local notables frequently opposed activities such as cooperative shops that ran contrary to their interests, and made sure that agricultural and marketing cooperatives were run so as to channel most benefits to themselves. The higher echelons of the party thus faced a dilemma. If they tried to impose more egalitarian values from above, they undercut local participation. However, to wait for the local cells to embrace socialism voluntarily would be like waiting for bankers to forswear usury. Even in districts which were too poor to have many notables whose economic interests ran against TANU policy, those individuals chosen to lead cells or branches were simply too little ahead of their neighbours in political consciousness to be able to inculcate TANU's values.

The central government's response to this dominance of local party branches by a privileged stratum was to reduce the opportunities for local participation. The major step was the 'decentralisation' of major government

40 Joel and Rachel Gormoff, "The Local Politics of Under-development", African Review, 6(1), 1976, pp.80-96.

departments begun in 1972.⁴¹ Number of most able and committed civil servants went out into the field to oversee district and regional development, taking direct control of developmental budgets with them rather than leaving it in Dar-es-Salaam. However, in this process elected district councils have had their operating responsibilities substantially reduced.⁴² In both the district councils and the cooperatives, rich farmers had been disproportionately influential, and curtailing the powers of these bodies could thus be seen as a step toward preventing the growth of greater economic disparities. However, it also served to tighten central government and party control over the rural areas, and to reduce opportunities for any grassroots participation.

The great failure of Tanzania so far has been the failure of self-reliance. The fact that foreign aid, totalling some \$500 million in 1980, has become the main source of the development budget, marked an abandonment of the major tenet of Arusha Declaration.

41 Julius Nyerere, Decentralization (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printers, 1972).

42 Joel Genoff, "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie: Decentralization and Class Structure in Tanzania", Cooperative Studies in Society and History, 25 January 1979, p.313.

Tanzania provides textbook examples of economic dependency and periphery capitalism. Political independence and social transformation mean little in the context of colonial economic relationship that still prevails and determines the quality of Tanzanian life. African peasants continue to produce primary agricultural products, which are exported to industrial countries in return for imported commodities, which are mostly consumed by the governing elite and by an emergent class of wage earners and relatively prosperous cash-crop farmers. In spite of a successful campaign to curtail luxury imports, the only qualitative change acknowledged to have occurred since independence involves a shift in the major beneficiaries of the international dependency relationship. The British and their Asian retainers are said to have been replaced by a privileged group of government officials. The elitism and class-formation are reinforced by the party government's recent encouragement of small-scale capitalism, which not only increases the country's addiction to imported factors of production but also further widens the income gap between urban workers and subsistence farmers. Although foreign investment has been limited in the interests of maximizing national self-reliance, foreign aid has grown in importance and is argued to have systematically biased the political and decision-making processes. Observing that many aspects of the 1972 decentralisation campaign

were recommended by a US consulting firm, one can point out that the decentralisation has created regional cadres of self-seeking elites. The decentralisation policy is also accused of having turned the central government ministries into operationally meaningless organisations whose essential function is merely to attract the donor funds. Foreign aid is often accompanied by formally and informally mandated guidelines on how it should be used.⁴³ Lofchie was referring to the international pressures exerted on Tanzania to reemphasise agricultural production in the aftermath of the villagisation programme. The US Agency for International Development (AID) has provided a more recent, albeit tentative, example of these attempted interventions in the Tanzanian policy process. If such influences are sufficiently strong and pervasive, then the question arises on the reality of Tanzanian independence.

Still then Tanzanians are more equal than are their counterparts in countries like Zambia and Kenya, but not so equal as the socialist countries should be. Governmental stability is no doubt greater in Tanzania than in such ethnically competitive societies as Zaire and Uganda.

43 Michael P. Lofchie, "Agrarian Crisis & Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania" in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 16(3), 1978. P. 451-75.

Political repression is felt less here than in dictatorships like Malawi's.⁴⁴

But the fact is that the above countries have not adopted the socialist path of development as Tanzania claims to be. Socialism is a science, the science of social change and of necessary steps to build class society where appropriation of surplus is not done by a group of people against the working mass. But in Tanzania the growing inequality among the people gives rise to the class-contradiction. Thus it is disrupting the basic tenets of scientific socialism.

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
Agriculture	4,354	4,023
Mining & quarrying	71	64
Manufacturing	903	648
Electricity and water	212	216
Construction	459	401
	1,045	1,042
Trade	1,205	1,316
Transport	1,111	1,140
Finance	2,319	2,409
Public Administration	11,561	11,145

Source: ACR, 1982-83

44 Rodger, Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment (New York: Westview Press, 1982), p.110.

ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing	2,549,688	2,666,805	5,216,493
2. Mining and quarrying	4,918	99	5,017
3. Manufacture	85,659	13,205	98,864
4. Construction	32,755	318	33,073
5. Electricity, gas, water and sanitary services	5,704	153	5,857
6. Commerce	71,098	7,716	78,814
7. Transport and communication	46,171	711	46,882
8. Other Services	169,693	39,803	209,496
9. Other activities (not adequately described)	35,574	10,091	45,665
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Total	3,001,200	2,745,596	5,746,796
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Source: ACS, 1932-33.

CONCLUSION : A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Here we look into the various aspects that emerged during our study of the two countries and their operation ~~and~~ of the socialist measures. We ^{have} attempted to see which country has brought qualitative changes and which country has brought only quantitative changes, and whether these countries have achieved the socialist path of development in the true sense to their pronouncement of manifestoes or not.

Having studied both of the countries we find that both belong to different historical backgrounds. So looking at the historicity of these two societal structures we find lot of differences which have lot of repercussions on their economic structures.

Tanzania became independent on 9th December 1961 and J.K. Nyerere became the country's first Prime Minister. It achieved its independence without a revolution or a mass movement for liberation, rather power was transferred to the petty-bourgeoisie which took the character of bureaucratic-cum-political bourgeoisie and with the result in the post-independence era, the same colonial economic structure has been continuing with dependency linkage with the metropole. So like the colonial era, Tanzania continued to supply raw materials at lower cost and getting finished products at a higher price. In this process lot of foreign enterprises (both public and private) directly

or indirectly invested their capital in Tanzania. Due to the emergence and existence of this kind of transnationalized capitalism or otherwise known as monopoly capitalism in Tanzania it has failed to become self-reliant, and become more and more underdeveloped at the cost of the development of the core i.e. the metropole.

But in Ethiopia, the case is totally different. The social revolution of 1974 brought to an end a regime with its semi-feudal and semi-capitalist mode of production. The fall of Haile Selassie regime came to an end with the emergence of peoples' consciousness of being exploited under the feudal regime. It was a follow-up of a numerous popular rebellions. After the revolution, there were basic structural changes i.e. from semi-feudalism and semi-capitalism to non-capitalist or socialist path of development. The new leadership took steps to uproot the feudal structure and to build a new system aimed at ending for ever exploitation of man by man. All sorts of radical or progressive changes necessary to build a socialist system were introduced. Scientific socialism was adopted in order to restructure the economy, to bring the qualitative changes, to increase the production, to raise the level of per capita income, to overcome the inequality in the society, to socialise the means of production and to eventually end the private appropriation. Ethiopian

leadership took steps to sever relations of exploitation with imperialism and to increase co-operation with socialist bloc countries. These above changes created necessary conditions for laying foundation of socialism.

But we find some similarities in these two types of societal structures representing scientific socialism and African socialism. Both, no doubt, vehemently oppose capitalism as it seeks to build a society on the basis of exploitation of man by man. Both of them assert that capitalism has no place in African society. Both have attempted to achieve the public ownership of the means of production and state control of all vital sectors of the economy. With the spirit of implementing the principles like broadening of popular participation, egalitarianism, self-reliance, socialism, etc. both have adopted one-party rule. Both have attempted to bring land reforms in the societal structures in order to achieving abolition of private properties. They have adopted socialism in order to increase production and to raise the standard of living of the people.

But there are lot of dissimilarities in terms of 'ideologies' and implementation of the socialist principles.

In the planning system of both countries we found that in case of Tanzania, voice of the dominant socio-economic forces of the society, i.e. bureaucratic-cum-political

bourgeoisie counted much, though its basic motive remained bringing egalitarianism and self-reliance. In Ethiopia, the interests of the people were defended by the anti-feudal and anti-capitalist forces and there was a continuous involvement of the people in the guidance of the planning commission and other lower organs in the state, districts and villages. In Ethiopia, the emphasis was not only on egalitarianism, self-reliance and participation but also on the system of managing economic process involving production, distribution, investment and consumption. Its essence consisted in determining economic targets and methods for their implementation, in particular the allocation of the means of production and labour to different uses.¹ In Ethiopia, the principles pertaining to the formulation of a central economic plan being derived from the economic laws of socialism are the utmost satisfaction of the ever growing needs of the society, which calls for proportional growth in social production, and raising of the overall productivity within the national economy. Nevertheless, both Tanzania and Ethiopia have followed the mobilisation of resources through saving and investment, structural change, institutional transformation, maintenance of desirable pattern

1 Wilczynski, J., The Economics of Socialism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), p.33.

of economic distribution, national control over the non-African and neo-colonial agencies. African economic integration, maintenance of a reasonable balance of regional development for national cohesion and sustained economic development. Our study reveals that in Tanzania these aspects are more in theory than in practice. In Tanzania, generally the metropolitan bourgeoisie with the help of these local bureaucratic-cum-political bourgeoisie mobilise the resources through saving and investment. The Tanzanian planning system is not fully directed to uplift the working class and peasantry but the privileged class of bureaucratic-cum-political bourgeoisie. Various measures of the Ethiopian leadership convince us that the planning is an instrument of economic strategy to achieve the optimum growth of national income for the maximum satisfaction of social needs. The Ethiopians have also been able to involve, to some extent, the broad masses to achieve the above goals for reaching near the targets of the plans. In the process of plan execution, the Tanzanian party's national executive could not involve the people.² The planning process in Tanzania failed to interconnect economic and political objectives. The plan was heavily based on foreign aid (around 80 per cent of the government expenditure). Basically in Tanzania, the

2 Leys, Colin, "The Analysis of Planning" in C. Leys, ed., Politics and Change in Developing Countries (Cambridge, 1969), p.269.

planning process failed to sustain the country's economy in the event of external economic threats in the form of price fluctuations in imports and exports, to mobilise the resources internally since foreign private investments was unreliable, to communicate and coordinate between the planners who produced the plan document and the officials who were charged with implementing the plan and mass of the people who were supposed to participate in it. But in Ethiopia, the radical measures taken to place the major means of production under state and public ownership, the revolutionary proclamations and directives issued in the course of the revolution to mould the country's economic policies and organizational setup along socialist lines and better meet of the economic needs and interests of the masses of the people have created conditions suited to the guidance and regulation of the country's economic growth through a harmonious and coordinated central plan.

Public ownership of means of production is one of the goals of socialism both in Tanzania and Ethiopia. Public ownership in Ethiopia is represented by two principal forms: State property i.e. 'the property of the whole people' and co-operative property. State property initially emerged after the victory of the '1974 revolution' as a result of the expropriation or nationalisation of large-scale private property (large industrial and agricultural enterprises,

banks, mines and so on), created by the labour of the workers who were exploited by the capitalists. The socialisation of the small-scale property of peasants and artisans, created or acquired through their personal labour, was effected by establishing cooperatives on a voluntary basis. Thus collective farm and cooperative property emerged. Both forms of property ensure the exclusion of the exploitation of man by man and provide for state planning of the entire national economy in the interest of the fullest possible satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural needs of working people and the distribution of material goods according to the work done, i.e. according to the quantity and quality of labour contributed by each person to society. In Uganda/Tanzania, there has been large-scale nationalisation but the major beneficiary from the nationalisation are the bureaucratic-cum-political bourgeoisie, which is the ruling class. So the nationalisation process which started after Arusha Declaration in 1967 has failed to sub-serve the interests of the broad masses. But in Ethiopia, in 1975, the leadership launched a programme of nationalisation of the country's financial, commercial and industrial establishments which not only affected more than a hundred foreign companies but the feudo-bourgeois elements as well. In Ethiopia, state property which is

the leading form of public property, constitutes more than 90 per cent of the basic productive assets of the national economy. State enterprises and their products are the property of the whole people, while cooperatives and collective farms and their produce are the property of these collective enterprises.

In the educational system, both Ethiopia and Tanzania having criticised the colonial type of education, proposed the 'education for all'. But in practice we find that a chunk of people in Tanzania (those who belong to rising middle class) are being benefited whereas in Ethiopia the government is trying its best to give education to the whole mass without keeping any kind of special reservation for the bureaucrats or politicians. Even if we review the educational programmes of the two countries we find that in Ethiopia unlike in Tanzania the attempt has been made to increase the political consciousness of the people. Rather in Tanzania, they went to educate the whole mass to keep them loyal to the single party TANU. Here in Tanzania also, the government has mainly stressed on the orientation of the curriculum of the schools and colleges to rural areas especially agriculture, in Ethiopia government has included all kinds of education, technical, vocational, arts, physical etc. If we see table XII we find that the enrolment number in higher education in Tanzania is less than in Ethiopia.

In Tanzania only the people from bureaucratic-cum-political bourgeoisie are getting facilities to continue their higher studies.

In the context of industrial sector also, we see that in Ethiopia it accounted for 15 per cent of its GNP in 1977 whereas in Tanzania it accounted for 10 per cent. In order to become self-reliant, the main objective is to provide all basic consumer needs. But in Tanzania some of the industries are producing luxury goods instead of producing basic goods for consumption. After nationalisation of industries, hundreds of foreign (both private and public) industries were being affected in Ethiopia. But in Tanzania, the nationalisation process could not eliminate the accumulation of capital from Tanzania by the foreign companies.

Thus we have observed that in one case (i.e. in Ethiopia), we have Marxist socialist path of development and in other (i.e. in Tanzania) we have non-Marxist socialist path of development based on mixed economy (foreign and local).

Coming to the party systems of both the countries we find that both have no doubt adopted one-party system (i.e. Tanzania in 1965 and Ethiopia in 1979). Here in this context we have to examine the nature of party systems whether it is a cadre party or mass-party, whether it serves the interests of the few or of the whole mass, etc. In Ethiopia

COPWE emerged as the workers party of Ethiopia in 1979 to disseminate and propagate the science of Marxism-Leninism among the government and mass organisations, cooperatives and the broad masses generally. It is a cadre party which represents the interests of the whole mass. Leadership belongs to the petty-bourgeoisie, working people and peasantry. But the working strata, or peasantry serves the interests of the whole mass.

In Ethiopia the main class contradiction is between those who adhere to the remnants of old feudo-bourgeois order and the capitalistic societal structure and those who support for the formation and functioning of WPE in order to bring communism in ultimate. So WPE has to fight against the former in order to implement socialistic policies and strategies with the aim of bringing the triumph of communism, a scientific expression of the radical interests and objectives involved in the struggle of the working class.

But in Tanzania, the case is different. In TANU which emerged as the sole party in Tanzania since 1965, we find that TANU being led by the lower-middle class of Africans (because of their education and socio-economic status) emerged as political power rather than a mass party. The benefits of Africanisation, nationalisation and economic development (which were the programmes of TANU) were

monopolized by lower middle class of Africans - not only political leaders, civil servants, small businessmen and traders but also officials associated with cooperatives, foreign companies, banks and insurances. The leaders of the party belong to the elite group as they enjoy high status in politico-administrative circles and privileges which are denied to the masses of the people. Thus TANU has become the party of the bureaucratic-cum-political bourgeoisie. In this context, it is quite clear that participatory democracy is far off in Tanzania as the leaders of TANU have not become able to represent the interests of the whole mass including working people and peasantry. Thus Nyerere's theory of egalitarianism and self-reliance based on the principle of popular participation has remained in theory itself.

Thus we find that in Tanzania all attempts to implement 'African socialism' are bringing no progressive transformation from a state of colonial economy where dependence on the metropole is a basic requisite, to a self-reliant economy being freed from metropolitan countries. Rather Tanzanian economic structure has been marked by the continuation of the same kind of plural economy that had been existing during the colonial era, but in a bit different way in the sense that now inside Tanzanian societal structure a group of people - the so-called elite, bureaucratic-cum-political bourgeoisie held the power in the political apparatus



of the state and become the economically powerful group by appropriating the surplus of the working mass. But in Ethiopia after the revolution, the leadership belongs to the petty-bourgeoisie, working class and peasantry, but they serve the interests of the whole mass. Now in the transitional phase, Ethiopia is running through severe economic crisis due to the natural calamities like drought etc. and unnecessary defence expenditure to meet the threats on borders. Despite these crises, the adoption of scientific socialism on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism by EPRC and rise of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia with the principles of democratic centralism and equal opportunity to all have moved Ethiopia from old-feudo-bourgeois order to socialist orientation. As a result, Ethiopian economic structure has been marked by faster economic growth in spite of drought and other calamities, absence of inflation, continuous existence of some exchange order, increasingly foreign exchange earnings and receipt of aid from non-socialist countries. But in Tanzania, they do not have some kind of economic growth. Their economic structure has been marked by growing unemployment, increasing inflation, greater dependency, falling exchange rate, etc.

It is very difficult to compare the achievements of the two countries. Tanzania became independent in 1961. It did not have to face the long-run war with any of the neighbours (There is a short duration war with Uganda).

It has received massive aid from foreign countries (both western and socialist). It had smooth development on political front. Thus, apparently the achievements are greater for example in fields of primary education, village level dispensaries, industries and agriculture. They are leaving one and more projects in private hands.

In case of Ethiopia, there had been five years period of struggle to fight remnants of feudal-bourgeois section and imperialist intrigues. There is a massive diversion of funds of the defense of the borders. There has been internal uprising, for example, in Eritrea, Ogaden. There has been very little foreign aid from the western countries. And, above all, there has been a long drought. Despite these crises, they have educated 93 per cent of the people, improved their health facilities, maintained prices of essential commodities, nationalised entire urban property and provided more houses. In Tanzania, although there is still structural possibility for adopting socialist measures, but this is not being done, because the political leadership is not in the hands of the working class and peasantry.

It appears from the above study, while Ethiopia is moving on the path of socialism based on the basic tenets such as faster economic growth, equality, self-reliance, centralised planned development, of delinking of the economy from the colonial powers of building up industry and mechanising agriculture, Tanzania is moving away from the course of socialism marked by inequality in the societal structure, exploitation of man by man, appropriation of surplus by few, etc.

APPENDICES

TABLE I
EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE RATES, 1992-94

	<u>Monetary Unit</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>
Ethiopia	Birr	2.28	2.17	2.03
Tanzania	Shilling	10.55	13.04	17.75

Sources: International Financial Statistics, vol. XXXVI, no.7 (July 1993), vol. XXXVII, no.7 (July 1994), and vol. XXXVIII, no.2 (February 1995).

TABLE II
BASIC INDICATIONS, 1993

	<u>Population</u> (millions)	<u>GDP per</u> <u>head</u> (dollar)	<u>GDP growth</u> <u>rate</u>	<u>Consumer</u> <u>price</u> <u>index</u>
			(Percentage change over previous year)	
Ethiopia	36.3	141	5.1	-7.1
Tanzania	19.7	221	0.5	27.0

Source: ECA, "Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa, 1993-94", UN, 20th Session of the Commission and eleventh meeting of the conference of Ministers, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27-29 April 1995, p.157.

TABLE III

STRUCTURE OF DEMAND 1983

(Millions of US \$ at current market prices)

	GDP	Private consumption	Public consumption	Gross capital formation	Net Exports
Ethiopia	4,822	3,679	700	743	-300
Tanzania	4,465	3,345	655	954	-398

Source: Ibid., p.158.

TABLE IV

STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION, 1983

(Million of US Dollars at current factor cost)

	GDP	Agri.	Industry	Services
Ethiopia	4,350	1,057	719	1,574
Tanzania	3,925	2,107	498	1,231

Source: Ibid., p.161.

TABLE V

STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY, 1983

	Mining	Manufacture	Electricity & water	Construction
Ethiopia	5	505	31	177
Tanzania	12	202	45	149

Source: Ibid., p.163.

TABLE VI

FOOD SUPPLY 1983

(Thousands of Tonnes)

	CEREAL Production	Production of roots & Tubers	Planta- tion production	Net Cereals Imports
Ethiopia	6,360	1,574	-	325
Tanzania	2,673	6,139	1,000	214

Source: Ibid., p.165.

TABLE VII

AGRICULTURAL INDICATORS, 1983
(Per Capita)

	Arable land (Hectares)	Production of cereals, roots, tubers and plantains (kg. of cereal equivalent)	Net cereal Imports (kilograms)
Ethiopia	0.61	200.4	9.5
Tanzania	0.26	253.2	10.9

Source: Ibid., p.167.

TABLE VIII

LABOUR FORCE

	1960 (Thousands)	1970 (Thousands)	Average Annual Growth rate, 1960-79 (%)
Ethiopia	9,192	13,157	1.9
Tanzania	4,851	7,328	2.2

Source: Ibid., p.177.

TABLE IX
 SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR FORCE, 1960 &
 1980 (%)

	Agriculture		Industry		Services	
	1960	1980	1960	1980	1960	1980
Ethiopia	88	80	5	7	7	13
Tanzania	89	83	4	6	7	11

Source: Ibid., p.179.

TABLE X
TRANSPORT AND TELECOMMUNICATION INDICATORS

	Length of rail (thousand kms)	Road density (km./sq.km.)	Private motor vehicles per 1000	Number of tele- phones per 100
	1984	1982	1982	1982
Ethiopia	0.8	0.0	1	2.8
Tanzania	5.8	0.1	3	5.0

Source: Ibid., p.181.

TABLE XI

HEALTH INDICATORS

	Life expectancy (Years)	Population per doctor	Population per para- medic	Population per hos- pital
	1982	1980	1980	1979
Ethiopia	47	58,490	5,440	3,016
Tanzania	52	17,560	2,980	-

Source: Ibid., p.183.

TABLE XII

EDUCATION ENROLEMENT

(% of relevent age group)

	Primary school	Secondary school	Higher education
Ethiopia	66	12	0.5
Tanzania	102	3	0.4

Source: Ibid., p.185

LITERACY 1980

Ethiopia	47%
Tanzania	79%

Source: Ibid.

TABLE XIII

ESTIMATES OF AREA AND PRODUCTION OF MAJOR CROPS

Crops	1975-76		1978-79		1978-79 over 1975-76	
	Area	Production	Area	Production	Area	Production
Cereals	4488	46186	4738	39663	5.5	-14.1
Pulses	642	4566	646	4679	0.6	2.5
Others	352	1267	209	766	-40.0	-39.5
Total	5484	52019	5594	45108	3.7	-13.3

Source: Ibid., pp.12-14.

TABLE XIV

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION AND AREA UNDER MAJOR CROPS

Crop	Total Production (000 t.)				Percentage Change			
	1975-76	76-77	77-78	78-79	1976-77 over 1975-76	77-78 over 76-77	78-79 over 77-78	79-80 over 78-79
Cereals	46936	43393	39746	41521	-7.6	-8.4	4.5	-11.6
Pulses	4619	6241	5148	4707	35.1	-17.5	-8.6	1.9
Oilseeds	1300	725	867	944	-44.2	19.6	-2.7	-34.7
Industrial & other crops	533	687	728	792	28.9	5.8	8.9	48.6
Total:	53459	51052	46490	47865	-4.5	-9.0	3.0	-10.4
					Area Under Crops (000 ha)			
Cereals	4553	4376	4617	4857	-3.9	5.5	5.2	6.6
Pulses	646	669	629	652	3.6	-6.0	3.6	0.9
Oilseeds	367	231	214	237	-37.1	-7.5	11.0	-35.4
Industrial & others	26	29	30	34	18.0	1.7	15.3	36.0
Total:	5592	5307	5491	5780	-5.1	3.5	5.3	3.4

Source: National Bank of Ethiopia, Annual Report, 1979.

TABLE XV

BASIC NEEDS PROFILE OF TANZANIA

Components	Position in 1970	Latest Position
<u>I. General Indicators</u>		
1. GNP per capita (US \$) 1978	130	270
2. Average annual growth rate (1960-78)		2.7
3. Real GDP growth rate (I) 1960-70		6.00
(II) 1970-80		5.00
4. Agricultural growth rate (1970-80)		4.5
5. Manufacturing growth rate (1970-80)		4.5
6. Services growth rate (1970-80)		6.4
7. Population growth rate	2.9	3.5
Urban	6.3	8.9b
8. Population below 14 years	44.4	45.7 ^b
<u>II. Basic Needs Indicators</u>		
1. Basic needs income (1981)		Sh.600 p.m.
Percentage below:		
a) urban areas		15
b) Rural areas		20-30
2. Minimum wage	Sh.170 p.m.	Sh.600 p.m.
3. Agriculture - wage group (a)	2.5	1.8

Components	Position in 1970	Lowest position
III. Food:		
Per capita supply of calories		2709 ^b
IV. Malnutrition		
(i) Severe PEM ^F	4.8	2.3
(ii) Moderate PEM ^F	22	40-60
V. Health		
i. Life expectancy at birth	44.45	51 g
ii. Total fertility rate	6.4	6.5
iii. Crude Birth rate	47	49
iv. Crude Death rate	19	16
v. Infant mortality rate	145-155	115-130g
vi. Population per hospital bed	650	646
vii. Population per rural health centre	234,000	83,600
viii. Population per dispensary	91,000	6,700
ix. Rural population per staff member of a rural health centre/dispensary	2,300	1,600
x. Population per physician	24,770	18,160
xi. Immunisation per 1000 children		600
VI. Water:		
1. Access to safe water supply	9	42
a) Rural		
b) urban	61	90
c) Rural household distance to water supply		0-6-3.4 km(1)

Componenta	Position in 1970	Lowest position
VII. <u>Education</u>		
a) Illiteracy(2)	67.7	10.0 J
b) Enrolment rate primary education	84.7	70
c) Pupil-teacher in primary schools	47.7	50
VIII. <u>Shelter</u>		
i. Average number of habitable rooms per household	2.6	2.9-3.6
ii. Average number of persons per habitable room		1.4-1.7m
iii. Average number of houses for habitation use by a household	1.33	1.37
iv. Houses with mud and poles walls	43	45
v. Houses with burnt bricks, stone and concrete	5	5
vi. Houses with grass or leaves roof	70	61
vii. Houses with metal sheets roof	17	26
viii. Houses with concrete, cement or stone floor	10	14
IX. <u>Energy:</u>		
i. Rural household distance to fire-wood (km)		0.7-4.2m
ii. Energy consumption per capita kg. of coal equivalent	62	65
X. <u>Transport:</u>		
i. Motor cars per 1000 population	0.25	0.16 _p

Components	Position in 1970	Latest position
ii. Total motor vehicles per 1,000 population	0.8	0.5 ^b
iii. Growth of road traffic per annum (1975-80)		2%-5%

- (b) Position in 1978-79, except as indicated.
- (c) Food balance sheet estimate for 1977-78, see Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre, Data Report on the Food and Nutrition Situation in Tanzania, 1973/74-1977-78, Dar-es-Salaam, 1980, Table 22.1
- (f) PEM - Protein energy malnutrition figures overtime are not strictly comparable severe = Less than 60% of the standard weight forage.
- (g) Estimation for 1981.
- (h) Position in 1980.
- (i) Position in 1977 based on the household budget survey - minimum and maximum distances.
- (j) 1981 expected results of the test.
- (k) Percentage of children in age group 7-13 years in schools.
- (l) Figures relate to 1968-69 and 1976-77 respectively, and are based on the household budget surveys in these years.
- (m) Minimum and maximum distances in 1977.
- (n) Minimum and maximum estimates.

TABLE XVI

PROFITS OF PARASTATAL ENTERPRISES (Shs. Million)

Industry	1970			1974			1977		
	Receipt	Expen- diture	Profit	Receipt	Expen- diture	Profit	Receipt	Expen- diture	Profit
Agriculture	109.5	114.5	05.0	232.2	145.1	87.1	245.7	171.5	74.2
Mining	116.7	69.0	47.7	161.9	92.5	69.4	197.6	115.4	82.2
Manufacturing	793.1	732.9	60.2	2552.8	2480.2	72.6	4764.8	4375.3	389.5
Electricity	80.5	52.3	28.2	140.5	131.9	8.6	246.3	199.1	47.2
Construction	65.4	60.9	4.5	81.1	87.1	6.0	125.8	114.2	11.6
Commerce	1791.9	1784.0	7.9	4793.7	4544.1	249.6	4517.3	4335.6	181.7
Finance	246.8	158.1	88.7	505.3	298.0	207.3	1557.2	1103.5	453.7
Real Estate & Business Service	1.7	1.8	0.2	67.5	45.3	22.2	9.43	41.9	52.6
Fishing	-	-	-	0.2	0.6	0.4	-	-	-
Other Services	12.6	11.2	9.2	18.7	17.9	0.8	243.4	80.4	163.0
Total:	3367.5	3088.3	279.2	8750.4	8020.0	730.4	12273.1	10780.4	1492.7

Source: Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Analysis of Accounts of Parastatal, 1966-1977.

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