"NATION" IN AFRICA:

A CASE STUDY OF NATION-BUILDING IN SUDAN

Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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JULY 2011

25th July, 2011.

DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "'Nation" in Africa: A Case Study of Nation-Building in Sudan", submitted by me is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree **of Master of Philosophy** is my original work and has not been previously submitted for any other Degree of this or any other University.

Hala Hassan Mohamed

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this dissertation entitled, '"Nation" in Africa: A Case Study of Nation-Building in Sudan", submitted by Miss. Hala Hassan Mohamed, in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is an original work.

We recommend this dissertation to be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Susan Visvanathan

(Chairperson)

Dr. G. Srinivas

(Supervisor)

"NATION" IN AFRICA:

A CASE STUDY OF NATION-BUILDING IN

SUDAN

Dedicated to
My mother Suaad and to the soul of my father, Hassan

CONTENTS

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Chapter One

Introduction

Introduction

'Nation' refers to a community of people who share a common territory and government; and who often share a common language, race, descent, and/or history. But the nature of nation differs from one place to another across world. Nation in Europe is different from that of Asia, that of Africa, that of America and so on. In Europe the concept of nation emerged which emphasized the community image with similar language, religion, race and so on. In Asia or in Africa, the situation is entirely different. Language, race, ethnicity, religion and culture are not one in the case of these continents, but diverse. So what is 'nation' in the case of these continents and especially in case of Africa were the diversity of ethnicity, race and religion play a major role in political life of the people. The present study aims to address this puzzling question of nation especially in relation to the African countries.

In Africa, nation is strongly related to nation-building. The very moment the concept of nation invoked, the question of nation-building comes in. The nation has to be built up in these countries, as it is a concept, which is very different from where it was originated. Benedict Anderson's work becomes important here, to compare the historical emergence of Nation and the contemporary conflicts over the question of nations. The term Nation-building' is a multi-dimensional term that has widely been used to mean the process of constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state. While nation is an imagined political community, nation-building refers to a process of constructing the national identity by state. The difference of African nations with Europeans nations is in the way of imagining the community.

Benedict Anderson defined a nation as an imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. He says that an imagined community is different from an actual community because it is not based on everyday face-to face interaction between its members. Instead, members hold in their minds a mental image of

their affinity[1]. The nation was defined as a mental image – a feeling of being one community. In the case of European countries where the concept of nation emerged for first time, had a political environment that made the people over there to unite as a community. In case of majority of non-West countries, they were under colonial rule for a long time. For these countries, nation was the product of imagination of colonizers.

E.K Francis looks at nation in a slightly different way. For him, nation building is a process of social change culminating in a historical type of politically organized society, viz., the modern nation. He finds the process of nation-building as movement towards an ideal goal, set and rationalized by an ideology (or rather, political myth) called "nationalism" of which several varieties can be distinguished. The basic meaning of "nation" can best be explicated by describing the genesis of the nation-state, he adds[2] Here, it is not about the imagination of nation but about the social changes and movements that lead to nation-state. But in many cases, the social changes and movements may not result in a successful nation state but in destruction of it, as Walker Connor argues. He mentions about the gap between the literatures on nation-building and the actual situations in nation-building process in countries were the ethnic, religious and cultural differences matters much. He says that the scholars associated with the nation-building are tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as merely one of a number of minor impediments to effective state-integration.

Therefore, the study tries to understand the concept of nation and nation-building within a context of these debates. This is a study that seeks to understand the concept of nation in Africa. The understanding of nation in Africa is carried out by taking the case of Sudanese nation-building process. In this chapter, the historical background about the nation-building project in Sudan and the various problems that were thrown open as part

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[1] Anderson, Benedict, 1991 (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New York: Verso

[2] Francis, E.K. (1968) "The Ethnic Factor in Nation-Building", *Social Forces*. Vol. 46, No. 3 , pp. 338-346. P-338.

of this project have been discussed. A number of issues and factors that have contributed to the ambit of the nation-building project in Sudan were also raised. Basically, those issues that are directly related to the question of identity, as Sudan is a country that embraces both Arab-Islamic identity and African identity were focused up on. This duality, among other factors, poses a principal hindrance to the nation-building project. It then, stated the research problem and the most important features that characterized the nation-building project and the national state in the Sudan during the rule of the Islamic Movement. This chapter also included the literature review of the previous studies, which dealt with different perspectives, and it also discusses some of the basic hypotheses of the study, and shows the structure of the study.

Nation in African Context

The intensive use of this term in particular, came about at the end of the colonial power in the African continent. It denotes the effort of the newly independent states of engineering social, political and economic heritage of the colonialism with the main objective to reform these fields to match the national context relevant to independent state. It was believed that the colonial territories that had been carved out by colonial powers, without regard to ethnic or other boundaries may need to be re-addressed, should these new nations become viable and coherent national entities[3]. Many dimensions are implicitly, seen within the nation-building mission. Creation of superficial national paraphernalia such as flags, anthems, national days, national stadia, national languages, and national myths are considered to be among the corner-stone of nation-building. In a nutshell, a national identity needs to be deliberately constructed via modeling different groups into a nation.

The term 'Nation-building' is a multi-dimensional term that has widely been used to mean the process of constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state. This process aims at the unification of the people or peoples within a nation state

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[3] Opio, Peter John, 2000, Economic Development & Nation-building in Africa: In Search of a New Paradigm, Paper presented at African Nation- Builders Workshop- Minnesota 25, 2000. http://www.fiuc.org/iaup/esap/publications/umu/detecgrowth.php.

so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run. Nation-building could involve the use of propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster social harmony and economic growth.

The idea of nation-building in Sudan is a difficult task. Since it cannot be isolated from the crisis of identity, and the slippery politics it has had inherited from its colonial legacy[4]. The identity crisis in Sudan has been an inborn symptom since independence; and many political and social problems owe their existence to it. Alongside the process of Sudanese politics, identity has been the Trojan horse of the politics. Many political slogans of nation-building have been carried out in the name of identity. Debates about Sudan's identity started during the early stage of independence focusing primarily on two different views; whether Sudan should unite with Egypt and then become part of the league of the Arab, or should the country be part of Africa and then join the African World. Many scholars believe that, the task of nation-building in Sudan has remained a dream that may not be achievable in the near future, mainly due to the crisis of identity, which has been revolving around the Arab-African dichotomy.

The way the question of identity was tackled by both elites and academics left too many issues that were swept under the rug of Arabism and Africanism[5]. However, what fostered, the crisis of nation-building in Sudan to the extent of an endemic disease, according to Assal (2009) the absent dimension of some outstanding questions, that were not given sufficient attention: how identity is played out at the bottom; how the Sudanese play out their identity at micro levels and how the deterioration in economic and political conditions in the country contribute to divisive identification exemplified by what was witnessed during the civil war in the south and in Darfur at the present time[6]. The way of engineering a national identity in the process of nation-building in Sudan, was purely confined to the elite sections of society specifically the political class, without

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[4] Assal, Manzoul, 2009. The Question of Identity in The Sudan: New Dimensions For an Old Problem, The Maghreb Review. Vol 342-3.pp 1.

[5] Assal, Manzoul (2006) 'Sudan: Identity and Conflict over Natural Resources', *Development,* Vol. 43.

[6] Ibid, P-101-5

considering what really matters at the grass roots level. Assal believes that, it is the disregard to what matters to the grass roots that underlies the current crisis[7]. The fluid identity of the country has led some scholars, quite often and rightly, to look at it as a microcosm of Africa. The country is characterized by rich diversities in ethnicities, religious affiliations, cultural outlook, climate, and modes of livelihoods. Although, such wide rainbow of diversities, ostensibly, constitutes a sign of strength for the Sudan particularly, however, the country suffers what Mazrui (1985) called *multiple marginalities* and is seen as the *sick man of Africa*[8].

In spite of "the multiple marginalities" the country has been bogged down through out the second half of the last century; it has clearly and severely been reflected in the internal politics of Sudan, soon after the National Islamic Front (NIF) took over power in 1989 through a military coup. It has been obvious since then that, the country has been locked up within two different views; where it's dominant northern elite desires it to be Muslim and Arab and its southern elite desires it to be African and de-Arabized[9].

These two contradictory, even exclusivist, desires have been at the very heart of the political conflict that lies at the centre of the decay of the Sudanese state. In the continuous and relentless pursuit of making Sudan an appendage to 'something' Arab, African or Islamic, both elites have failed to build 'something' Sudanese as its uniqueness, expressed in being Arab and African at the same time, required[10].

Surprisingly enough, Sudan is marginal to both the Arabs and Africa. The marginality of Sudan comes from the fact that Sudanese are Arab mostly because of their culture and

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[7] Harir, Sharif (1994) 'Recycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay," in Sharif Harrir and Terje Tvedt (eds), *Short-cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan,* (pp. 10-68), Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. P-11

[8] Mazrui, Ali (1985) 'The Multiple Marginality of the Sudan', in Yusuf Fadl Hassan (ed.) *Sudan in Africa*, Khartoum University Press. , pp. 240-255 and Assal, Munzoul (2009) 'The Question of Identity in the Sudan: New Dimensions for an Old Problem', *The Maghreb Review*, Vol 34.

[9] Harir, Sharif (1994) 'Recycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay," in Sharif Harrir and Terje Tvedt (eds), *Short-cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan,* (pp. 10-68), Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. P-10

[10] Ibid, p-11

tradition, while they are African more than Arab, according to their biological and racial features[11]. At the very heart of this marginality lies the enigma of the contested identity, which wraps the task of the nation-building with thick ambiguity.

Statement of the Problem

On 30th of June 1989, Sudan had fallen under a military regime for the third time as a result of the democratic government proved to be incapable once again. From the very beginning, as the slogan of the new government indicated, different political factions of the National Islamic Front (NIF) were behind the coup, which named itself *Hkom at al Ingaz Salvation* government. It was clear that, the orientation of the new government would be the reformation of a nation and the state along the lines of the NIF programme; in the direction of the Islamic-Arabic world, with no regard to any other cultural components. With the clear emergence of the NIF as the first party to support the coup, a new dimension of identity politics of nation-building was in the making in Sudan, under the guise of rescuing the country from being under the secular *Africanism* slogan that was being raised by Sudanese People's Libration Movement/Sudanese People's Libration Army (SPLM/SPLA). The new government declared its Islamic-Arabic manifesto under the so-called *'al-mashro al-hadari'* (civilizational project). Under the new manifesto the project of the nation-building has been much undermined[12]. In terms of divisive identity politics under the *Ingaz* government, Sudan had experienced unprecedented problems. The onus of escalating the Sudanese nation-building project does not rest with a single regime, a great deal of it rests with the *Ingaz* government though[13]. Drawing on Assal's view, we can understand that, at the very heart of this nation-building project was a

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[11]Mazrui belives that our 'sense of marginality' has things in common with the sociological sense. But it is not our intention to imply any kind of deviance in the status of the Sudan, or lack of acceptance of the Sudan by this or that group... in the ultimate analysis we use the term marginality to denote specific traits in the Sudan which place it significantly in an intermediate category between two distinct sectors of Africa. Some times the intermediacy gives the Sudan a double identity as in her capacity as both an African country in a racial sense and an Arab country in a cultural sense (Pp. 241-42).

[12] Assal, Munzoul (2009) 'The Question of Identity in the Sudan: New Dimensions for an Old Problem', *The Maghreb Review*, Vol 34. p.86-87.

[13]The manifesto of *'al-mashro al-hadari'* introduced by the government in 1990 sharpened the boundaries across religious lines (Assal, op. cit; 2006).

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policy of conquest and re-Islamization. Accordingly, the civil war[14] has reached unprecedented stages and the repression had affected all parts of the country[15].

The National Islamic Front under the veil of *Ingaz* government has shifted the old slogan of '*unity in diversity*'[16] under which the nation-building of Sudan was supposed to be structured; into an extremist slogan which is '*unity in conformity*'[17] Ingaz government has tried, vehemently but in vain, to enforce *unity in conformity* over Sudan. The new ruling elite members under Ingaz regime would have the Sudanese conform to what they deem an appropriate identity, e.g. adopting the Arabic culture as the culture of the whole of Sudan and the consequences of decisions like Arabization of higher education institutions and enforcing Sharia (Islamic laws) laws.

Extending Ahmed's[18] view about the Sudanese crisis, we can consider that, controversy of nation-building in Sudan reveals a dominant discourse: the prevalence of insurmountable differences between the North and the South. The conflict has for a long time been portrayed as an ideological struggle between two different cultures. Ahmed[19] reiterates this view 'at the ideological level, the conflict is construed as a struggle between Arabs and Africans, between Muslims and Christians'. Identification with Arabism is congruent with Islam, while identification with Africa is congruent with Christianity and a concomitant cultural proximity with African reality. The failure of the project that had been adopted by the NIF as a national project to fuse the diverse component of the Sudanese society without considering the dangers of religious, racial,

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[14] The salivation government shifted war in south Sudan from a political conflict to religious conflict by announcing the Islamic Jihad (sacred war).

[15] The binaries of Arab/Africans, Muslims/Christians, and North/South have been accentuated. The policy of "either you are with us or against us" adopted by the regime during early 1990s shifted the conflict to almost all parts of the country (Ibid, 186).

[16] Deng, Francis Mading (1999) *Dynamyat Al Hweah Asas Lltkamul Al Watnee Fi Al Sudan, (Dynamics of Identification A Basis for National Integration in the Sudan)*, Khartoum: Sudanese Studies Center. P-41

[17] Assal, Munzoul (2009) 'The Question of Identity in the Sudan: New Dimensions for an Old Problem', *The Maghreb Review*, Vol 34. p.187.

[18] Ahmad, Muhammad Abd Al-Gafar (1987) *As Sudan Wa-L-Lwhda Fi-L- Tanawwu (Sudan and Unity in Diversity)*, Das Araische Buche. P.16-24.

[19] Ibid

cultural, and political polarization that can emerge as a result of this policy. The project adopted by the NIF has over time proven to be an obstacle that has ever faced the national project of the Sudanese nation-building since independence in 1956. The final outcome of the NIF project of nation-building may end up with whole country to fall apart[20]. The intention of utilizing religion to maneuver the reformation of the nation has resulted in disarray – the promise offered by the nation-building project has been turned into an obscure 'de-building of nation'.

Research Questions

The study tries to find answers for many questions related to nation-building as a political objective of the NIF. Some of these questions are in order:

1. Did plurality of religious, ethnic identities pose hindrance to the national project of the nation-building in Sudan?

2. How different is the NIF project of nation-building in comparison with the programmes of other Islamic-based parties?

3. Whether religion and religiosity hindered or enriched the process of nation-building under the NIF project?

4. Is religious diversity a synonym of de-building of nation?

5. Whether the outcome of the nation-building would have been any different, had the NIF not imposed the civilization project?

Focus of the Research

Since this study aims to understand the role in civilization project of NIF in nation-building in Sudan, various socio, economic and political developments during the ascendance and rule of NIF, i.e., the period between June 1983 to January 2005 has been chosen as a time frame of this study. The reasons behind that are:

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[20]Assal, Munzoul (2006) 'Sudan: Identity and Conflict over Natural Resources', *Development*, Vol. 43 and Ibraheem, Haidar (2004) *Segoot Almshrooa Alhadaree (The Failure Of The Civilizational Project)*, Khartoum: Sudanese Studies Center.

- The turning point of the NIF was in the year 1983, when NIF succeeded to introduce the famous Islamic Sharia laws in the public life of country. That step paved the way for them to take over the rule later in 1989.

- Since June 1989, the NIF has monopolized the entire political arena for two decades conductively, where a full Islamization project, over the whole aspects of life has been implemented.

- In January 2005 the NIF project of the nation-building proved to be a failure, and then resulted in the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement

Tools and Techniques of Research

The present study employs historical method specifically causal explanation and concerns itself with understanding various factors and outcomes of nation-building project in Sudan with the help of case study as a strategy[21]. It tries to analyze the antecedents of nation-building project in Sudan's diversity in terms of civilization, religious plurality, colonial past and political history by reviewing the relevant literature and juxtaposes it with the contrary outcome viz., division of Sudan into two nation states.

Prepositions

Since the process of nation-building is a multi-dimensional process, many prepositions can be identified to frame the focus of the study:

- Religious diversity has not been an obstacle of nation-building, especially in the recent history of Sudan.

- The utilization of religion to manipulate political agenda, has posed serious challenges to the nation-building project after 1983.

- Plurality of identification is not a synonym of conflict in the process of the

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[21] G. Thomas (2011) clarifies that Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. The case that is the *subject* of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame - an *object* - within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates." G. Thomas (2011) A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of Definition, Discourse and Structure. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 17, 6, 511-521.

Sudanese nation-building.

- The Sudanese nation-building project cannot hold together under the NIF perspective of the civilizational project.

Chapter Schema

Chapter two deals with the basic information about Sudan, including: its geographical location, boundaries and the neighbouring countries, information on the population (before and after secession), and natural resources of Sudan. A special focus is given to natural resources, as a major factor in conflicts, i.e. failure in power and wealth division, the lack of balanced development, and the control of a particular Sudanese elite group over resources were some of the main causes of the failure of the nation-building project in Sudan. This failure ultimately led to the split of Sudan into two different countries (Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan), with the predictions of the split of more parts of the country, which used to be the largest country in all Africa. The chapter also explains the basic roots of various conflicts in different parts of Sudan: between the north and the south, the conflict in the Nuba Hills region, and Darfur region, in addition to other conflicts, which did not turn into armed conflicts like in the Blue Nile and the rest of the Eastern Sudan regions.

Third chapter deals with the emergence of the national movements and the birth of Sudanese political parties during the rule of the British colonial rule. A large section in this chapter is dedicated to the National Islamic Front Party of Sudan: its emergence, its approach and dealing with the southern Sudan issue. It also throws light on the ways in which historically various governments dealt with this particular issue: since independence, three short-term democratic governments, three military governments and one-year interim government that have ruled Sudan alternately. It also outlines how the issue of separation of the south from the north is not an outcome of the policies adopted by the NIF government in the last twenty years only, but was the result of policies that have accumulated since the pre-independence period during the period of colonial rule. The problems aggravated during the periods of democratic

governments and military governments alike, and then came the policies of the National Islamic Front as a real catastrophe to nation-building project in Sudan is also dealt with.

Chapter four delineates the experiences of the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Sudan, its project for the nation-building and national state building in Sudan. Specifically, the pros and cons of this project, to what extent it had contributed to the secession of the south from the north and the escalation of conflict and the worsening of crisis in Darfur, and the fate of the other areas under conflict after the secession of the south. Then, various theoretical frameworks that addressed the issue of nation-building are outlined in an attempt to reach for a deeper understanding of the case of Sudan, and to come out with generalizations about the problems which led to the failure of the project.

Many researchers have observed that the policies of the NIF alone are the main cause of this failure; contrarily the reality confirms that there are other international and regional dimensions to the failure of the nation-building project and national state-building in Sudan.

Chapter five is conclusion; it mainly consists of summary analysis of all chapters. Further it also attempts to outline some plausible generalizations.

Chapter Two

Historical Background of Conflict in Sudan

Historical Background of Conflict in Sudan

In this chapter, background information about Sudan that includes its geographic location and the neighboring countries, population, and natural resources as one of the main causes of conflict among others. The conflicts that were going on in different regions of Sudan, which resulted in problems that can be considered as a hindrance to the nation-building project in Sudan were discussed in a chronological order.

Sudan, literally means the lands of the black (Belad Al Sood) [1] was the name given by the Arabs in the medieval ages to all countries along the Savanna belt from the Atlantic Ocean till the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The name is now used only for the Republic of Sudan (Jumhūrīyat al Sūdān), which is bordered by Egypt to the north, the Red Sea to the northeast, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya and Uganda to the southeast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic to the southwest, Chad to the west and Libya to the northwest. In terms of size, and geographic and ethnic variety, the country is like a miniature Africa. Just like North Africa, the northern part of Sudan (before secession), is mostly populated by Muslim Arabs, while the southern part is mostly populated by Christians and animist black Africans. Majority of the population live in the rural areas, belong to around 50 ethnic groups, and speak 142 languages, some of which are only spoken, while others are spoken and written languages. The total area of the country is about 2, 5 sq kms; after demarcating the borders between the two countries Northern Sudan is expected to have 2/3rds of this area and the newborn country of Southern Sudan the other one third [2].

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[1] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p, 312.
[2] Ibid, p.113.

People who have pure African origins inhabit the areas of rich savannah in the Southern states, which are characterized by high rainfall rates, whereas those of Arab origins inhabit the Saharan and sub-Saharan regions in the arid north. Some hybrid tribes, a mixture of Arabised blacks (Afro-Arabs), live in the middle savannah region, which has a low rainfall rate. In the bushy forests of the far south, there are some pure African black tribes, which have never been influenced by Islam and Arabic language. This region is immediately followed by the long grass region and flooded savannah plains, which is inhabited by groups of African blacks, who are partially influenced by Islam and Arabic language, which is mixed with their mother languages. In the poor savannah plains, there are different degrees of mixture, between the ethnic groups on the one hand, and the different cultures and languages on the other hand. Most of these groups embraced Islam and adopted Arabic to the extent that their own languages have drastically dwindled. This region is followed by a region inhabited by groups of Arabs who have intermingled with the indigenous inhabitants, and preserved their Islamic and Arab culture, and even their livelihoods, to a large extent. Therefore, the degrees of fusion differ from one region to another, till we find in the far arid deserts of the north some pure nomadic Arab tribes that did not mix with indigenous inhabitants and their cultural features and their accent cannot be differentiated from those of the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula[3].

Sudan, as a whole, is located in the tropical region, and occupies the middle and largest part of the Nile valley. Due to the absence of mountain barriers, which could obstruct the course of the winds, the climate gradually changes in alignment with the latitudes. The annual rainfall rate decreases from 1200 mms in the rich savannah regions in the south, to the non-rainy regions in the Nubian Desert. The Nile and its main tributaries cross 2258 kms in the Sudanese lands, and the Blue Nile which originates from Lake Tana in Ethiopia confluences with the White Nile which originates from Lake Victoria at the

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[3] Ahmad, Muhammad Abd Al-Gafar (1987) *As Sudan Wa-L-Lwhda Fi-L- Tanawwu (Sudan and Unity in Diversity)*, p.8.

national capital (Khartoum)[4].

Population

In the year 1904, Sudan had a population of 2.87 million people only, and this number had tripled since independence till the last census in 2008. Sudan had a population of 11 million in 1956 census, 21 million in 1983 census, 24 million and 940 million people according to the fourth census in April 1992, and the most recent census conducted in 2008 has shown a figure somewhere around 39 million people. According to the official United Nations population estimates and projections, the population of Sudan will be around 60 million in 2025. Statistics indicate that about 40% of the population can be classified as Arabs culturally more than ethnically, as the Sudanese people of Arab origin are composed of a mixture of Arabs on the one hand and Nubians and other Hamitic groups on the other hand.

Sudanese Arab tribes in the middle of the Nile Valley, like Shaigiya, Rubatab and Ja'aliyeen are mainly farmers who cultivate the lands on the banks of the Nile, other Arab tribes live away from the banks of the Nile and depend for their livelihood on pasture and rain-fed farming, in the tropical poor savannah regions in northern and western Sudan live the nomadic camel herders such as Shukriya, Kababeesh and Kawahla, and towards the south-west of the country live a number of Arab tribes, including the Baggara, whose livelihood is cattle herding. The non-Arab population of Northern Sudan are around 30% of the total population, and include the Nubians in the far north on the border with Egypt, the Beja in the Red Sea Hills areas (7%), the Nuba in the Nuba Hills areas in Southern Kurdufan State, a number of tribes in the southern part of Blue Nile State and Angasna, and a number of non-Arab tribes in Darfur like Zaghawa, Masaleet, Fur and so on. Moreover, there are a number of immigrant groups like Copts from Egypt, some tribes from West Africa generally known as Fallata (7% of the population), and they occupy an area of more than 1000 kms in different parts of the country. Most of the population in

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[4] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.114.

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Northern Sudan had embraced Islam as their religion[5].

The people of Southern Sudan, who also constitute about 30% of the population are composed of two main groups: the first is the Nilotic group whose livelihood depends on cattle breeding, and it includes the tribes of Dinka (12% of the population), Shilluk, Noer who inhabit the middle thick grass areas; the other group, which includes, among others, the tribes of Zande, Bariya, Anwak, Latuka, Morle, Taposa, depend on the cultivation of vegetables, fruits, and grains in the forest areas. The influence of Islam and Christianity on the second group is more than that on the first group.

Natural Resources

The area of arable land in Sudan is 88 million hectares (200 million acres) due to difficulties like lack of financial investment, adequate means of irrigation, or poor soil in some regions only one third of this land is actually being utilized for production. About 100 hectares are used for grazing, and 18 million hectares (22 million acres) are natural forests.

Causes of Conflict and its Historical Roots

Sudan is a country like a continent inflicted by bloody conflicts over resources and identity. Historically, Sudan's resources were exploited and robbed extensively; identities (cultural, religious identities and ethnic affiliations) are suppressed and forcibly fused into the Arab-Islamic identity[6].

Since the beginning of the last century, a commercial, authoritarian elite group of Arab origins migrated to Sudan from various Arab countries, and intermarried with the Nubians. With the passage of time, they placed themselves in a position of controlling the reins of political, economic and religious power in Sudan[7]. This elite group exploited the

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[5] Ahmad, Muhammad Abd Al-Gafar (1987) *As Sudan Wa-L-Lwhda Fi-L- Tanawwu (Sudan and Unity in Diversity)*, p.30.
[6] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.117.
[7] Ibid, p.118.

natural resources of the country to their own benefit, and assaulted the spiritual and cultural heritage of the people of non-Arab or non-Muslim affiliations. Therefore, one might strongly claim that the conflict in Sudan is triggered by a number of factors grouped in two dimensions: first, the dimension of natural resources, instantiated by the assault on natural resources by power-holders, the desperate natural conditions and the consequent pressure on resources, the influences of the international economic decline and its impact on Sudan as one of the developing countries; second, the dimension of identity, which is inseparable from the first dimension, as the hegemony of a certain elite group and their control of resources necessarily need to use a cover, which is in this case, in the form of an intellectual and moral ideology adopted by the ruling system. Consequently, this allows for the attack on the identity and rights of the repressed groups[8].

Attack on Resources

World Bank's first loan for initiating mechanized farming in 1968 concurred with the beginning of the long drought on the coast of Africa (1967). These two events left unfortunate profound impacts on natural resources in the Sudanese countryside. The forests have been cleared, and the vegetation deteriorated, due to the unjust expansion in the mechanized rain-fed farming (18 million acres of mechanized farming owned by about 8000 families only, compared to 9 million acres of traditional farming owned by four million small farmers), added to this is that the decline in the annual rainfall average rate to almost the half. By the year 2003: all extended forests in all of northern Sudan have been cleared, except for a few in dispersed areas; Sudan has lost 17 million hectares (40 million acres) as a result of soil erosion, caused by rain-fed mechanized farming; more than 6 million people are living below the poverty line, according to the Sudanese government statistics, which are significantly outnumbered by the statistics provided by the world organizations working in the Sudan[9].

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[8] Suleiman, Mohamed, 2006:112-23 and Ahmad, Muhammad Abd Al-Gafar, p. 9-19.
[9] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*, p.12.

While around 4 million people immigrated from their provinces to the middle, where food security is relatively better, and 3 million died because of civil wars and famines; the successive governments have given millions of hectares to the Sudanese elite and its regional and international partners at the expense of the inhabitants of rural areas. The most affected areas are the conflict-stricken regions at the present time, which include: Eastern Sudan, the southern part of Blue Nile State, Darfur region, and Nuba Hills, in addition to Upper Nile State (which is now in the newborn country of Southern Sudan). All these regions are located in the Savannah belt between 6□ N and 15□ N[10].

Attack on Identity

Most of the power holders in the northern elite group are men who come from the Arab (and Arabized) Muslim groups mostly settled in the central part of Sudan on the banks of the River Nile. This elite group strived to impose its Arab Islamic identity on the other inhabitants of Sudan so as to strengthen the economic and political control. Most writers and researchers view what they call (Islamo-Arabism), as an ideology based on the ruling elite, and hence its propagation is an inseparable part of the process of hegemony over the country – its resources and people. This ideology justifies the treatment of non-Arab and non- Muslim groups as second-class citizens and allows for the elite of the ruling regime to control over their lands and resources along with their contents, and justifies the elite's exploiting them in labour at low wages.

The ruling elite have always ignored the fact that the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity which characterizes Sudan enriches all Sudanese ethnicities, and that mutual intermingling gives Sudan a distinguished cultural flavor. Let's take the example of the Nuba and Baggara tribes in the Nuba Hills region around the middle of Sudan. After more than 200 years of intermingling and rivalry, it is no more possible to talk about them as two mono-cultural groups. Likewise, it is not possible to describe the society of the region as a whole as a multi-cultural society. Identity is a term used to describe a network of social relationships agreed upon by all, and formed through unfrozen social

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[10] Ibid, p.13.

processes. Therefore, there is no Nubian or Baggari identity which is stable in a certain time and place, but rather, the reality of the region invites the talk about a hetero-cultural identity. The two-way relationships, either commercial, marital, religious or ideological etc, has two sides: cooperation and rivalry and both sides work together to enrich the process of cultural intermingling. However, the fight which is instigated between the Nuba and Baggara tribes leave a profound wound whereby both ethnic groups are affected[11].

Battlefronts

The first issue that the British colonial government felt concern for after the defeat of the Sudanese Mahdi state (which terminated the Egyptian-Turkish rule) in the last battle between the two sides "Kerrari battle 1898" was to fix the country border especially in the southern parts of Sudan which was disputed between Britain and other European countries (for instance, there was the fighting between Britain and Belgium in Jebel Lado area). The second issue was to consolidate the basis of the colonial administration in the southern region. The key task was to extend of the security back-up and subject the southern tribes to the British colonial authority. On the other hand, the administration turned to the assimilation of the influential leaders of the southern tribes and absorbing them in the new administrative apparatus[12].

It was a difficult task for the British colonizers to subject the southern tribes to their power, and they had to make their surrender forceful, necessitated by continuous confrontation especially with the Nilotic tribes, and this continued till the end of the 1920's.

The British policy during that period tended to isolate the southern tribes from the neighboring Arab tribes in northern Sudan by using all administrative, cultural and economic means to restrict the expansion of the authority of northern Sudanese Arab Muslims among the southern tribes. To achieve this, the British government offered

[11] Suleiman, Mohamed, 2006:112-23 and Ahmad, Muhammad Abd Al-Gafar, p.111.
[12] Shigir, Naom (1981) *Tarekh Al Sudan* (*The History of The Sudan*), p.417.

ample financial help to the Christian missionaries, entrusted them with the educational and health care issues, and allowed them to ask for financial support from the ecclesiastic organizations in Europe. The Verona Fathers Roman Catholic group was the most active missionary in the 'Bahr Al Ghazal' province, which is mostly affected by the Arab – Islamic influence, and at the same time it strived to strengthen the ties between the southern provinces and Uganda and Kenya[13].

Moreover, the Southern Defense Force was established, as a southern military brigade, apart from the Sudanese defense force in the north which later became the nucleus of the Sudanese army, was formed. The justifications provided for its establishment were that the army as an institution has cultural influences on societies. The Southern Defense Force consisted of southern Sudanese only, and English was the official language of communication, issuing of orders, performing religious rites, the language of communication and official dealings in southern Sudan. Extensive administrative measures were applied to restrict the trade movement between the north and the south. The then administrative secretary, Harold Mc Michael, took all measures necessary to ensure the encouragement of the Greeks, Syrians and Christian traders to replace the northern traders. These measures were known as 'the policy of closed areas'.

Thinkers from both northern and southern Sudan have never agreed upon something more like their almost unanimous agreement upon the gravity of the detriments which have been done to the nation building project in Sudan, and the crack that took place between the northern and southern Sudan was a result of these policies[14]. These policies came back as a curse on the economic growth in the south, leading to shrinking of the local market caused by the restrictions imposed on the economic exchange in the south. The final outcome in the fields of education, health care, and other services and development in general was disappointing, and did not worth the capital and efforts wasted on them. The measures of 'the policy of closed areas' can be summarized as

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[13] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.82.
[14] Deng, Francis Mading (1999) *Dynamyat Al Hweah Asas Lltkamul Al Watnee Fi Al Sudan, (Dynamics of Identification A Basis for National Integration in The Sudan)*, p.18.

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follows:

- To establish self-sufficient entities on tribal and racial bases in order to preserve the inherited habits, customs and traditions, in accordance with the goals of the righteous governance in the south.

- To speed up the expansion of the scope of using English language instead of Arabic language in the fields of education, administration and official dealing, if not possible then indigenous languages and dialects shall be used.

- To gradually remove the northern administrative, technical and clerical employees from their posts and replace them by people of the southern provinces.

- To take immediate measures to stop migration of northern traders to the south and to encourage the activities of Syrian and Greek traders.

The citizens of northern Sudan expressed their concern towards the policies of the British administration in the southern provinces. This nightmare took a further turn and became a plain refusal, i.e. when the Graduates Congress protested against the educational policy and demanded the set up of a standardized educational policy to all parts of Sudan. The Graduates Congress also opposed the measures that restrict the movement of the northern traders and their activities in the south. Historian L. Sanderson[15] criticized the outcomes of "the policy of closed areas" and warned against the inability of the administration during the last 20 years from fulfilling its declared obligations in the field of education. One of the goals of the policy of closed areas was to meet the aspirations of the layman southern citizen, so that s/he can occupy a self-satisfying position in his/her own environment. However, this was not fulfilled, and that weak policy deserved all the criticism directed to it, as it reflected a disdainful view, depicting the prevailing realty no more than as a zoo.

Another historian Holt[16] adopted a similar view concerning the policy of closed areas. He clarified that it is narrow- mindedness to consider all northern traders as a barbarian

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[15] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.73.

[16] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.74.

incited by a strong desire to gain profits, whereas the south citizen lacks the sound cleverness to confront this situation.

By 1944, the frequent demands to review the policies towards the south began to reverberate among high officials in the British administration. At the beginning of August 1945, the following options concerning the future of the south were crystallized [17]:

(1) Unity with the north.

(2) Annexation of the south with the union of East African countries.

(3) Division of the south, so that the Northern provinces were to be combined with provinces of northern Sudan and the southern provinces annexed to East African countries.

In August 1945, the then governor-general of Sudan, James Robertson, issued an important memorandum concerning the future relationship between the south and the north, in which he stated that the policy of the government of Sudan towards the south was based on considering fact that the geographical and economic factors helped in linking the Southerners, in spite of their Black African origins, to the course of development in the Middle East and Northern Sudan which has Arabian inclinations and adopts the civilization of the Middle East region. Therefore, we must ensure the provision of the people of the south with means of advancement in the economy and progress in the field of education by necessary means, so as to be in an equal footing in social and economic aspects with the people of the north who would be their partners in the near future. The Administrative Secretary's conviction with the changes undertaken by the British administration was reinforced after noticing by himself the reaction of officials in the east African countries and their unwillingness to annex southern Sudan to their union.

Although the people of southern Sudan have their own reticent views towards these policies they finally accepted them. They sent representatives to participate in the first

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[17] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.22.

proposed legislative assembly. It was decided that 13 representatives from the south should be sent to participate in the legislative assembly proposed by the colonial regime to govern the Sudanese affairs after the departure of the British colonizers. The southern historian Lazarus Lech Madut[18] later, severely criticized the southerners' participation, which was, according to him, imposed by the British regime and the northerners. From his point of view, the policy of the closed areas was dictated by the interests of Great Britain in the first place, and not, as claimed by the colonizers, to protect the south from the northerners. He feels that the northerners and southerners have always, throughout their common history, known each other's capabilities and intentions. This fact prompted them to establish good neighborhood relations maintain peaceful co-existence, before the advent of colonizing power.

The southern writer, Oliver Albino[19], clarified the reasons behind the British administration's abandonment of the policy of closed areas and to side with the option for unity between the north and the south, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Difficulty in demarcating border separating the southern provinces from the northern provinces of Sudan, which might result in creating a spot of confrontation and hostility between them.

2. Fear that division of the southern provinces might urge northern Sudan to fall in the arms of Egypt and to be united to it.

3. It is difficult to overlook the fact that almost all northern citizens have African bloods.

4. Regarding the economy of southern Sudan, it is preferable to integrate the economy of the south with that of the north since the markets of Uganda and Kenya do not give way for competition of goods from southern Sudan.

So, Juba Conference was held on 12-13 January, 1947 to discuss the future concerning the relationship between the north and the south. Later, historians from southern Sudan

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[18] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.143.
[19] Albino, O (1970) The *Southern Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint*, p.22.

criticized it, accusing the British Administrative Secretary of selecting the majority of representatives from the sultans and tribal chiefs whom they considered as employees working for the colonial government[20].

After the Juba Conference, the people of the south passed through a phase of profound constitutional and economic changes: a number of economic projects were finalized; a network of roads was extended, linking the main southern cities; restrictions on northern traders desirous to work in the south were reduced; trade license was given to a number of southern traders; the first secondary school was inaugurated in Rumbek; southern students started travelling to Khartoum to pursue their education at Gordon Memorial College instead of being sent to McCrery University in Uganda. However, most of the southern historians' assessment was that effort was still insufficient to create the necessary fusing process among the people of the north and the south and to remove obstacles and differences which developed as a result of 'the policy of closed areas'. It was too late.

By the time 13 Southerners became members of the Legislative Assembly, it has become clear that Britain intended to give the Sudanese people more responsibility in ruling their own country by themselves, in preparation for its withdrawal. The Southern representatives demanded that the British government should stay for a longer time and not to be hasty in its withdrawal from the country, arguing that self-governance would never be in favor of the Sudanese, because they were not yet capable of managing the affairs of their country at that time. A group of southerners, leaded by the Legislative Assembly Both Diu, handed over some suggestions concerning the fate of the South; one of these was to have a federal government. Since Sudan was dually colonized by Britain and Egypt; the outbreak of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 directly influenced the process of constitutional transformation in Sudan. Naguib's Regime which took over after the Revolution gave the Sudanese the self-determination right - to choose between complete independence and unity with Egypt. This paved the way for independence

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[20] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan: The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.57.

negotiations which took place on 12th February 1953[21].

The Northern political parties participated in those decisive negotiations alone, without involving the southerners; their argument was that there were no political parties in the south to represent the southerners, in spite of the importance of the talks and specialty of the situation in the south. This was considered the first crisis of trust between the Southerners and the Northerners. Disregarding the importance of the participation of the Southerners in debates of independence, decisive as they were in their present and future, has been engraved in the memories of the Southerners. This incident precipitated the establishment of political parties in the south.

Widespread protests prevailed Southern Sudan and a number of memos were handed over to the government, some of which demanding a provision granting the south a federal government, and others called for putting the south under the tutelage of the United Nations until its people are capable of governing it. Independence Agreements were strongly opposed by the southerners, and their representatives in the Legislative Assembly held a meeting on December 23, 1952 and issued a strong note of condemnation of the Northern parties, and refused to recognize the Agreements. The state of anger and protest among the citizens of the Southern districts precipitated the establishment of the first political party in the south: at the end of 1952, the establishment of the first southern party was officially announced – ("the South Party" whose name was changed a year later to "South Sudan Liberal Party"). This party extorted the right to represent the southern states in the Parliamentary session, because there was a wide consensus on it, and continued to represent the southern districts until the Parliament was dissolved by the first military regime after the 1958 coup d'état led by General Ibrahim Abboud. The most important achievements of the South Liberal Party include: after a number of other political parties were established in the South, it unified the southern representatives in the Legislative Assembly belonging to different parties under what became known as the Southern bloc, which entered the arena of political and

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[21] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan: The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.62.

constitutional discourse to address of the expectations of the vast majority of citizens in the South, and it became difficult for the Northern parties to waive the opinion. Its prominent achievements also include the protests during the Parliamentary proceedings on the way in which the governmental and military posts were Sudanized after the withdrawal of the colonizers. They argued that the Sudanization Committee followed technical standards that gave preference to experience, seniority and qualifications, and did not take into account: the special conditions and different circumstances in Southern Sudan, the political necessity demanded by the sensitivity of the situation, and the north-south relation marked by caution and distrust. Of 800 Sudanized posts, only 4 intermediate level posts were given to southerners, so Sudan's Independence for the Southerners was nothing but one master gone, another came[22].

The resolutions of the Sudanization Committee prompted the resignation of a number of southerners who belonged to the then ruling party, the National Unionist Party, which was led by the first Prime Minister of Sudan after independence, Mr. Ismail Al-Azhari. In reaction to these resolutions also, a conference was held in Juba from 18 _ October 21, 1954, attended by 227 southern citizens representing all colours of the political and tribal spectra in the south, and copies of its decisions were sent to the then Governor-General of the Sudan (Sir Alexander Knox Helm) and Ismail Al-Azhari as of December 2, 1954. Conference proposals focused on:

(1) Establishment of federal system of government in the south and north, and if not agreed upon then:

(2) Division of the country into two independent entities, as in the case of India and Pakistan in 1947.

The idea of calling for federal governance in the Sudan could be attributed to an initiative made by a number of British administrators who had worked in the Southern districts. In spite of that the proposal was not approved by the then Administrative Secretary Mr.

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[22] Abd Algader, Al Tejanee (2010) *Nizaa Alislameen Fee Al Sudan Mgalat Fee Al Ngd Wa Al Islah (The Conflict of Islamism in Sudan: Essays in Reforms and Critique), p.76.*

James Robertson and decision-makers in Khartoum and Cairo, the Southern parties adopted the proposal and sought to obtain the support for it through the Legislative Assembly and the Sudanese Parliament at a later stage.[23]

The proposal was deliberately neglected by the parliamentary Bloc of Southern Sudan and South Liberal Party at certain stages of time, because their interests were linked with the interests of the Northern parties. However, the Northern parties' indifference and their failure to address the substantial wishes of the South and their disregard of the Southerners' right of representation in determining the fate of their country in decisive political turns incited a number of representatives in the Bloc of Southern Sudan to take the responsibility towards the South by their hands (such as Ezbuni Mandiri and father Sternino Lohiri who established the South Federalist Party). Thus, the demands for a federal government transformed from the context of constitutional and political debates to political action at the public level[24].

Right from the beginning, the South Federalist Party was distinguished by its courage and clarity in defining its objectives without hesitation as was the case of the Liberal Party. Its programme implied a strong condemnation of the discriminating nature of the policies of the Northern parties. First, it condemned the insertion of the Islamic Shari'a Law in the political conflicts, and opposed its use as the basis of legislation in Sudan, and called for considering Christianity as state religion and the basis for legislation by way of equality with Islam at the time the Constitution of Sudan was being drafted. It also called for the adoption of English as a second state language along with Arabic. Furthermore, and for the first time in the history of the dialogue concerning the relationship between the North and South, the program included a demand for the establishment of an independent army, as well as the application of an independent educational system in the districts of the South. The programme of the Federalist Party (SFP) did not only discuss the power-sharing between the centre and the southern districts, but also put forward a program

[23] Abd Algader, Al Tejanee (2010) *Nizaa Alislameen Fee Al Sudan Mgalat Fee Al Ngd Wa Al Islah (The Conflict of Islamism in Sudan: Essays in Reforms and Critique), pp. 76.*

[24] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969),* p.156.

leading to secession at the end. Thenceforth, the crisis of governance began to enter into a path threatened by foretold confrontation in the near future. On the other hand, the attitudes of the Northern parties that continued to rule whether individually or in alliance were marked by neglect, indifference and malpractice towards Southern Sudan issues, and the Federalist Party was banned and Ezbuni Mandiri, a founding member of the party, was prosecuted. [25]

In the middle of August 1955, and Sudan was moving apace towards self-determination, insurgency led by a group of soldiers from the Equatorial Brigade in Toreet's Garrison, broke out, and created a state of insecurity and panic among the northern citizens in the south, especially those who were living in the Equatorial districts, it, however, overwhelmed all of the southern districts with varying degrees. As a result of these insurgency works: 260 northern citizens were killed by southerners; 75 southerners were killed by the government army and cameleers forces which used violence to curb the insurgents; and a large number of soldiers and civilians fled to the nearby forests.

This incident left another deep wound and increased the tension in the already-tense relations between the north and the south. These unfortunate events[26] which took place in Toreet and other cities in the south, exposed the inability of the government and the northern parties represented in the parliament to confront the political and national responsibility of investigating to find out the mistakes that led to this rebellion. Therefore, government officials could not take the political steps to recover the constructive trust and ease tensions, and Sudan was then within a few steps from full independence. The pre-independence government relied on military action to deter and track down the rebels, without trying to find out the real causes of the outbreak of violence and try to find solutions to them. Military actions have prompted large numbers of troops in the Equatorial Garrison of Toreet to resort to the nearby forest, and later became the nucleus of the "Anyanya Movement" that led the civil war in Sudan from the

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[25] Ibid, p.157.
[26] They are generally known as Toreet incidents because most of them were in Toreet city.

southern side.[27]

Despite these bitter sufferings, the Southern representatives did not hesitate to put their hands in the hands of their Northern counterparts to declare independence in the Parliament (declared by Ismail Azhari), in a rare manifestation of unity and giving priority to higher goals and interests of the country. The Northern parties later reneged on their promises which they had promised to apply Federal governance in Southern Sudan. Southern members resigned from the committee that had been formed for the drafting of the constitution, when they the realized that the draft included clauses providing for the establishment of a central government based on the principles of the Islamic Shari'a law.

Conflict in the Nuba Hills Region

Since 1984, flames of civil war broke out in the Nuba Hills Region in the central parts of Southern Kurdufan State between the Nuba tribes under what is known as the Sudan's Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) on the one hand, and the government forces backed by the militias of the Baqqara Arab tribes on the other hand. The civil war afterwards extended to the north. The bloody conflict caused serious damages and left terrible impacts on the relations that used to be based on peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the different ethnic groups in the region. In spite of the intermingling between the different ethnicities in the Nuba Hills region, a long history of peace and stability - which was not arrived at easily but required a long time and multiple social processes - has been destroyed.

The government convinced the Baqqara tribes to join the armed forces in their war against the Nuba tribes by supplying them with armaments, and promised to give them ownership of the fertile Nuba lands if they win a swift victory; however, the war went on nonstop for many years. As a result of this civil war: security has been undermined; some

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[27] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*, p.158.

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of the Baggara tribes have lost their lands, souls and cattle; and their trade with the Nuba tribes has deteriorated. The grave losses forced some of the Baggara tribes in many areas to resort to direct negotiations with the Nuba groups to achieve peace without paying attention to the views of the government authorities.

The Nuba Hills region is located between longitudes 29□-31□ and latitudes10□-12□, and covers an area of about 82 km, lies within 400 km from Khartoum - the national capital, and geographically acts as the centre of a circle to Sudan. The region is a territory of contact between the tribes of the south and those of the north, and is bordered by five states: to the south the oil-rich Wahda (Unity) State (which has now become part of Southern Sudan after its secession); to the west Southern Darfur State, which is rich in animal resources; to the east, the western borders of White Nile State and Upper Nile State (which is now part of Southern Sudan), and both embrace the main agricultural projects for the production of grains; and to the north, Northern Kurdufan State, the principal centre for the production and marketing of gum Arabic, and across its plains, extend oil pipelines from Hijleej fields in Wahda State to Bashaier oil port on the Red Sea[28].

The term 'Nuba' is often used to refer to the inhabitants of a region occupied by more than 24 tribes, overlapping and intermingling - both geographically and socially 90% of the population belong to the Nuba tribes, while 10% belong to the Baqqara tribes (mostly Hawazma, Misairiya, and Awlad Hamar), in addition to some immigrant tribes from the Western Sudan (now West Africa) like Fallata and Daju, and a small portion of traders of Arab origins[29].

The term 'Nuba' is used to refer to intermingling ethnic groups, which are classified differently by different researchers and scholars. However, the British linguist Ronald Stevenson, after a longitudinal study on the region that had lasted for three decades,

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[28]Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.205

[29] They are usually called 'Jallaba' which literally means 'travelling salesmen' in colloquial Sudanese Arabic - it should not be confused with 'peddler', which has a negative meaning.

identified more than 50 related languages and dialects, which belong to 10 main groups - each group includes a number of tribes which are similar in their languages and inherited traditions[30].

Many researches and studies relate the origins of Nuba to Kush dynasty in the far north of Sudan and the Nilotic civilization which reigned during the 9th century BC. On the contrary, the Southern Sudanese researcher Walter Kunijwok, who belongs to Shilluk tribe, claimed that the whole region of Southern Kurdufan used to be under the rule of the spiritual and political dominion 'Ruth' of the Shilluk tribe, and considered it an ethnic and cultural extension of it, and hence, he argues, it is part of Southern Sudan. The Nuba themselves prefer the first opinion, arguing that there are a lot of common vocabulary items and similar linguistic features between their languages and those of the 'Nuba' tribes (Mahas, Danagla, and Halfawiyeen) in the far north[31].

The British researcher and administrator Harold McMichael stated the following: "In the ancient times and for thousands of years afterwards, most probably the Nuba ancestors dominated over large parts of the lands now called Kurdufan, except for the northern parts which are mostly deserts. The Nuba were attacked by the other tribes dominating on the banks of the Nile, and other interior tribes, and lastly by the nomadic Arabs, forcing them to seek protection in the mountainous region in Southern Kurdufan."[32]

The Nuba tribes, in fact, belong to different ethnic groups which differ considerably in languages and cultures, but what prompted researchers and scholars interested in the region to propose a single 'Nubian' ethnicity is that the successive calamities imposed a common fate for the inhabitants of the region and this, in turn, created some kind of unity and developed a sense of common identity [33]. The common historical experiences helped in developing this sense of oneness include: confronting campaigns of slavery; being

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[30] Ibid, p.206.
[31] Shigir, Naom (1981) *Tarekh Al Sudan* (*The History of The Sudan*), p.107.
[32] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah* (*The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity*), p.215.
[33] Ibid, p.216.

under the Turkish Egyptian rule; resistance against the British colonization; and rejection of the hegemony and exploitation of the 'Jallaba' traders. This generalization is further consolidated by the existence of common cultural features among the different groups. Thus, it can be safely presumed that a general common identity prevailed among these groups of distinct inhabitants by means of acts and definitions imposed upon them by the other dominant groups. Therefore, the Nubian identity can be self-defined as a group which can be distinguished from the Baqqara Arabs in Kurdufan and Darfur regions (as non-Nubians), and which can be objectively defined by a common geographical space, and characterized by similar cultural values and similar economic activities.

Because the Nuba languages do not have written scripts, the Nuba's ancient history, which basically depends on oral resources, has been erased and forgotten. This has been noticed by the researcher Nadel, who says: "the traditions and memoirs of the people themselves provide scattered information about their history, and it often seems that these historical traditions were cut down under the influence of the Mahdist rule during the period from 1881 to 1898."[34]

The Nuba practice many productive activities, these include: animal husbandry, hunting, looking for new pastures, and traditional farming is their main productive unit, whose main goals are to achieve self-sufficiency in food for its members, and use part of the surplus income in their trade with the Jallaba groups in the region.

The Baqqara tribes, which used to roam the plains of Northern Kurdufan and Western Darfur States in 1800 BC, began to proceed towards the Valleys in the Nuba Hills looking for water sources and pastures for their increasing animals, and their migration concurred with the slavery campaigns waged by the Egyptian-Turkish invaders. By the passage of time, the Baqqara occupied a large portion of land in the region. The Baqqara of Kurdufan region belong to the tribe of Hawazma, which has three main clans (Rawawga, Abdul-Aal, and Halfa), and they represent the principal Arab presence in the

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[34] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.217.

region. Gradually, trade transactions started to take place between the two ethnic groups (Nuba and Baqqara), but were not entirely consistent. These trade relations were further consolidated by what was known as 'Blood Alliances', which were mutual agreements between a number of Nuba tribes and Arab tribes in which they would promise not to target each other, and mutually defend each other in case of any outside threat which requires defense, in addition to the trade exchanges, etc. In some areas the relations even went beyond mutual defense and trade exchanges; many documents refer to many cases of intermarriage between the two groups. However, the extent and boundaries of these social, economic, and political relations between the two groups vary from one place to another.

The existence of such intermittent good relations should not obscure the fact that the dominant character in the Nuba-Baqqara relations were the slavery campaigns waged on the Nuba tribes during the Ottoman Turkish rule, which began by the conquering of Sudan by the Khedivate of Egypt in 1921. Kurdufan governors from the part of the colonial authorities waged many military campaigns on the Nuba Hills region in search of gold in Shaiboon Hills and enslavement of natives. They, nevertheless, did not have any serious attempts to directly govern the region, a thing which could have played a key role in bringing the different ethnic groups together. On the contrary, they adopted a 'divide-and-rule' policy to set the two groups at each other. Stevenson mentioned that the enslavement of Nuba people by the Turkish government aimed at recruiting them as strong troops in the Ottoman army. During and after the Ottoman (Turkish) rule, the Nuba found themselves fighting in many lands far away from their homelands, such as the Arabian Peninsula, Eastern Europe, Palestine, and even Mexico. Influenced by this, the Nuba, since that time and till now, has always represented a significant part of the military forces in Sudan, whether in the government forces or opposition forces. [35]

During the Mahdist rule, some of the Nuba supported the new state, while others opposed

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[35] Karmel, Gasm Allseed (2003) *Al Engaz Takol Abaha: Sera Alsoltah Fee Alsudan Baen Al Harakah Al Islameah Wa Al Tajmoa Al Watanee Aldemogratee (The Salvation Eats It's Father: Authority Conflict Between Islamic Movement And The Democratic Nationalist Union)*, p.77.

it. This duality prompted the successive governments to classify the Nuba into two groups based on stereotypes: one group is rebellious against the government; the other is friendly or sympathetic with it. The Mahdi's successor (Khalifa Abdullahi Al Ta'aishi) sent a number of military campaigns to subjugate the region inhabitants {Hamdan Abu Anja and Noor Anqara Campaigns (1886-1887), Abdul-Baqi Alwakeel Campaign (1890), and Ibrahim Khaleel Campaign (1891). The unfortunate policies and deeds of the Generals of the Mahdist State against the inhabitants of the region had severe impacts on them. To make matters worse, a century later - at the time of the late democracy in Sudan - the region inhabitants found themselves again suffering from the unjust policies of the grandchildren of first Mahdist rulers.[36]

In spite of their bitter experience under the Mahdist rule, the Nubian people did not welcome the new colonial administration after the collapse of the Mahdist State, and their subjugation required 30 years of fighting against the colonial forces. After the complete dominion of the central colonial government over the region, the scope of disputes between the local groups has diminished to a large extent, and the position and status of the local chiefs has improved as they were adopted by the government, and employed in what was called (Al-Idara Al-Ahliya "Native Administration system"). The colonizers applied the same (old-new) strategy of recruiting the friendly Nubians to constantly curb the uprises of the rebellious Nubians. The colonial administration tried to follow the same policy of closed areas which it had implemented earlier in Southern Sudan in the Nuba Hills region: it stopped the Arab tribes' migration to the region under the pressure of the missionary organizations, pretending to preserve public security, and protect local societies from forced labour and exploitation. However, these policies, which began in the 1930's, were dropped in 1949.[37]

The impacts of the colonial rule on the Nuba Hills region included: making some changes in the Nubians' way of life, especially after the establishment of the Nuba Hills

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[36] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*, p.319.
[37] Ibid, p.320.

Agricultural Project, and the introduction of cotton as a cash crop in 1925 in order to revive the economy, increase the region's inputs to cover the expenditures of the colonial administration during the disciplinary campaigns, and to reduce the Nubians migration.

Another variant also had a great impact on the people: the introduction of a governmental education system, which began with the introduction of elementary education in 1940, a thing which played a vital role in changing the course of the region's history later. Education was one the significant factors which assisted in: raising political awareness, unifying the Nubians' visions, and the emergence of what was known as "the Nuba Nation". At the same time the region witnessed intensive Islamic missionary campaigns by government officials and Sufi religious men, in addition to evangelization, especially by the Roman Catholic missionary and Saint Daniel Comboni. As a result, religious distribution in the region became as follows: 75% of the population are Muslims, and inhabit, among others, large parts of the northern and western areas (Taloudi, Kalougi, Almiri); 12% are Christians, and most of them inhabit the Attoro Hills area, Liri, and Moro; other groups, scattered in different parts of the region, still stick to their indigenous African traditions and beliefs.[38]

After Sudan's Independence in 1956, the Nuba Hills region opened up, and many of its people migrated to the urban areas like Khartoum State, Red Sea State, and Gezira, and this is followed by migration to the neighboring countries like Egypt, Libya and the Gulf countries. Hence, The Nuba Hills region has been subjected to economic exploitation and political investment by agents from Sudan and abroad, but has also become an area of cultural exchange and interaction. This openness made the region's inhabitants realize the amount of economic, social, and political backwardness of their region, compared to other regions in Sudan, in spite of the enormous natural and human resources of their own region. They began to pay attention for the development and improvement of the way of life in their region like others do. This interaction and migration to other regions of Sudan and other countries helped in raising the people's awareness of their identity,

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[38] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.275.

cultural peculiarity. In the long term, this led to the conglomeration of the different Nuba tribes in one nation, which has, not only a common identity, but also a common fate. The increasing migration of the Arab tribes and the Nigerian groups (Fallata) to the region has increased the pressure on resources, which is why many researchers prophesy the breakout of even fiercer disputes in the region in the near future.[39]

Baqqara-Nuba relations, whether peaceful and cooperative or aggressive and disharmonious, became an efficient instrument in formulating their societies, which are characterized by cultural variety. The Nuba and Baqqara became two dynamic identities which can never be frozen in mono-ethnicities or put in frozen cultural templates. Civil war in such societies opens up deep wounds between the two groups, which have already intermingled and enriched one another. The said circumstances of intermingling imposed establishing mutual alliances between different clans (for instance, the alliances between: Kawaleeb and Hawazma, Kenana and Taala, Awlad Hameed and Kawnaro). These alliances helped in preserving the existence of the allied entities and supporting their co-existence with regard to the common interests in farming, and the nomadic Baqqara tribes which mainly depend on cattle grazing as an economic and cultural feature.

In the past, the conflicts and disputes resulting from the competion over sources of water and land were resolved on annual tribal conferences where the Nuba and Arab chief leader were present. This annual conference is normally held in neutral grounds and generally the resolution terms were acceptable to both parties because they were based on the disputing tribes' norms and customs.

Henceforth this coherent system of peaceful co-existence among the tribes has been greatly affected by the interference of the central government and international organizations. We can broadly summarize the main reasons that resulted in the regions

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[39] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.277.

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armed conflicts in the following[40]

- Fertile lands were granted to the migrant Arabs (*Jalabaa*) although some of them were not from the region habitants

- Drought that resulted in settlement of seasonal Cattle Pastorals in the mountains region and hence they become sedentary pastorals

- Development and mechanical agricultural projects that were established in the natural pastures area

- The necessity of securing the petroleum pipelines that cross the region towards the port of export

The neglect of the tribal customs and laws for property and land ownership was an integral reason for the dispute in the Nuba Mountains region. This resulted in great turmoil in the social and economical lives of the Nuba and finally led to demolishing the bases of the peaceful co-existence between the Nuba and Cattle Pastorals tribes.

In 1968 the government granted the Corporation of Mechanical Agriculture 650 projects as a start, with an approximate area of 422 hectare per a project. Those areas were taken by force from their owners and were not fairly distributed afterwards; in addition to that all the revenue was transferred out of the region and thus not contributing to the development of the region or even providing basic food security to the area. Even the Corporation for Development of the Nuba Mountains Region that was established in 1970 for the development of the region and its mechanisms of agriculture provided only 37% of its land to the Nuba people and approximately 45% to the Arab tribes and even 19% to the Falata tribe which are migrants from West Africa. Those who objected any of these reforms were suppressed by the government.[41]

The scarcity of rain, below the half of the annual levels increased the pattern of seasonal Cattle Pastorals and their settlement in the region. This added pressure over the land,

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[40] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.200.
[41] Ibid, p.215.

aggravated the dispute between the Cattle Pastorals and the Nuba Tribe; the incidence accelerated when the Arab Migrant tribes (*Jalabaa*) owning agriculture schemes formed a temporary coalition with the migrant Cattle Pastorals based on the power of arms which was been represented in a militia of both the Arab warriors (*Forsan*) and the Migrant warriors (*Maraheel*).

The circumstances speeded up when the Jallabah group (The owners of the fertile agricultural land) and Baggara Tribe made a temporary alliance based on the weaponry power and represented by the cavaliers and nomadic militias later on, they Merged Together and formed the local people defense troops (established by the national front to be in the same line with the rout with lesser expenditure than what goes to the armed forces and that because the peoples martyrs troops fundamentally build and based on the ideology of Islamic Jihad (holy war) and based eventually on volunteering without immediate pay back, the substance of Islamic holy war philosophy is the reward on the hereafter (Down day). The most dangerous consequences of the civil war in area of NOBA HILLS was the dominance (control) of the militias field commandos on the local city councils and administrative sector and put their hand on the political election institutions whether local regional or national further more one of the most dangerous outcome of civil war in the NOBA HILLS area is the beneficiary marriage between Jallabah and Baggara Tribes who have Arab roots. This marriage has paralyzed the balance of power between NOBA Tribes and Baggara Tribes .This dramatic changes occurred on the influence of the local people's governance act 1971. That time the administrative bodies were redemption in the area and communist union units established during the regime at the time of general Numari (1969-1985) and this was the turning point in the history of Arab Tribes in the area that for the first time they relocated their existence into administrative units approved by the central Authorities, and managed to organize themselves politically in every formal manner.

Such kind of marriage has appeared first in 1992 when the central government declared that there were been unfair play and dangerous Excesses in the Ratification at the agricultural land belong to the mechanize farming institution in the area, the government

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has snatched away 712 Agro-project (farms) from many places in the hills area, claiming that some of these land was given to children (not adult) and the other were sold and rented from within, which means an offence against the low. But some political analysts seen what happened as an attempt and the main purpose behind it is the redistribution of the farms to the militias leaders and sheiks and leaders of Baggara Tribes as a reward for them because of their participation in the operations against the rebels and send them out of the area, and also an attempt by the government to create allied bases in the area, and the days never lied this prophecy. Many reasons has been accumulated to become the core reasons behind the initiating of the conflict in NOBA HILLS, first reason was the history of the slavery attempts that was been practiced during the Turku -Egyptian condominium.

Secondly the area never gets any portfolio when the center distributes the administration portfolios, when nationalism of Job initiated on the time of the independence. Another Reason that this area never witnessed any kind of secondary education, it happened only in the beginning of the seventies of the 20th century when eight secondary schools were established in the area. The area has been completely isolated from national political life in a fabulous manner, and the northern civilian societies (political parties-unions) made any efforts to accommodate the ambitions of Noba Hills area in their agenda, not even a single representative of hills area were to be found in their head centers, ALUMA party has given only moral support to the Baggara tribes while the Democratic-union party depended on the Jallabah Tribe (the arrivals to the area).

The peoples of the area start building and constructing secret organizations to represent them and take care of some issues of great concern to them like backwardness in the area example for that black organization which established in 1939, but it surrendered later by the colonial authorities. Another organization formed in the name of *Liberal Negros* in 1969, from which came out the secret KOMOLO organization in 1972, this organization has played an important role in the political and social life of the Nubian societies which

later on became the core base which launched the jacquard which Joined the SPLA. The fate of this organization was rigorous pursuit and non recognition from the Authorities[42]

The popular revolution in October 1964 which removed general Abood regime was an important turn in the political live in the area and whole Sudan as well, this period witnessed the open construction of the political organization to represent the people of the area, in that year Noba Boys Association was build which later on turn to be the National Sudanese party under the leadership of father Philip Abbass Gaboosh many societies represented mainly by the general union of Noba Hills in the second multi-party system Abu-1969, later it turn to be the main stream organ in the Sudanese national party in the third multi party period, the thing which distinguished the S.N.P is that it tried to bring out the issues of the area and attempted to solve these issues separately and in Isolation from the affairs at the nation as whole to a comprehensive solution in the national frame and this reflected in organism of national sprit which empowered the founders of S.P.L.A to bring out the South Sudan and other marginalized area issues and the attempt to solve it within the national frame. despite of national orientation still the central and regional governments accused the peoples of the party with racism whenever they try to demand their rights and when the second civil war launched in 1983, The Noba were somehow sympathetic with the goals adopted by S.P.S.A, and thousand at them has moved the area captured by S.P.L.A or to Ethiopia to join military training camps there, and the main turning point was in 1984 when some politicians and intellectuals from Noba area joined the training camps and confabulate political and military leadership headed by Yousif Kowa Maki and Danial Kodi and Ismail Khamis Jallab, and in that period may of Noba people has been recruited and sent to Ethiopia for military training in the area of Jambila, later they came back in the name of Kosh pauillion and then started the establishment of network organizational structures and configurate a head base in Morro Hill area and in retaliation for this step by the SPLA, the central Government start arming the Baggara Tribe openly for the first time and considered them as friendly militia to the armed forces, the democratic government of

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[42] Ibid, p.315.

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Elasdig Elmahdi in that time (1987) start arming the Baggara Tribe specifically AL Meseria Tribe. Surprisely enough The Baggara Tribe was not different from the other Tribe in the area in regard of Marginalization and backward economic situation. The African right organization has commented on these events after 10 years in 1995 by saying that one of the most tragically thing is that even the Arab of Baggara who executed and implemented may at the government policies on Noba Tribes that they themselves an small marginalized community in Sudan.

Darfur

The state of Darfur lies between the meridians 22 and 27 east and latitudes 15 and 16 north. The total area of the state covers 549 square kilometers in the far west of Sudan and sharing political boundaries with Libya, Chad, Central Africa, with an estimated population of four million people.[43]

In the northern part of the region a hot dry desert climate prevails while on the southern part there is a hot, dry climate. The dry season in the north ranges from 15 to 12 months and in the south from 7 to 9 months to stabilize often at 29 degrees Celsius. The high temperature significantly affects the degree of availability of water in the region, and so is the shortage of water in North Darfur which constitutes a growing ecological problem. land use and utilization of resources has been adapted to the levels of rainfall and available water in the past, but after a huge increase in population and numbers of livestock in recent decades, in addition to the expansion of unfair mechanized farming at the expense of traditional agriculture, each region has become vulnerable to a widespread ecosystem degradation which is associated with high frequency of armed clashes and bloody conflicts. What has increased the severity of these conflicts that the region's population is divided generally into two ethnic groups, one of Semitic Arab origin and the other of Garrison African origin. This division, which increased in prominence and severity later on, reflects the structure of economic geography of the region and the geographical boundaries of the racial and tribal distribution.

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[43] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.301.

Also of the reasons for the increased intensity of the conflict that livelihoods in Darfur are fully compatible with the distribution of racial and ethnic groups. The Arab tribes are nomads who are working in either grazing cattle or camels, while the populations of non-Arab origins except for the Zaghawa tribe have stable life that depends to a limited extent on traditional agriculture.

A Sudanese researcher Dr. Mohammed Suleiman[44] argued that the attempt to investigate the effect of ecological change in northern Darfur on the conditions of war and peace during the contemporary history of the area seems clear. The most dramatic observation is a phenomenon that farmers and herders are linked with each other in bonds of cross and sustained solidarity and rivalry, cooperation and collision. According to his point of view understanding of solidarity in times of difficulty passing in bad times, but when their lives and property itself is in danger, they struggle for in a deadly fighting.

According to his point, then, the bloody conflict that has been raging since the mid-eighties of the twentieth century in Jebel Marra area in Darfur, is considered as an ecological traditional conflict being along particular ecological borders that represent areas of contact between Arab nomads who have grazing, roaming in search of pasture and water for their animals, and the tribes of the Negro character, which take the lives of stability in the fertile areas and depend on agriculture as a mode of living and productive life. The impact they can have is due to the long droughts that hit the region in 1967, and the consequences of unprecedented large movements of population groups in the region. Many studies have been conducted on the social and economic impacts of drought on the population of these areas but no attention was given to them due to their impact on the bloody conflicts in the region. Thus, the disregard and neglect of these studies has led to many misconceptions, on one hand, attributed to environmental degradation and to economic and social reasons, and on the other hand interpreted the conflicts resulting from this environmental degradation from ethnic and political perspectives.

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[44] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.317.

The state of North Darfur is one of the most volatile regions in the country which witnesses, unstable security conditions, in addition to that it is regarded as the most vulnerable spot emerged from the interrelated problems of environmental degradation and long-standing bloody conflict. The region has witnessed the outbreak of skirmishes and sporadic armed clashes; the worst of them took place in the mid-eighties and took the form of a high pace armed conflict[45].

The conflict was in the eighties is worse than in the seventies, a number of reasons, including that of food production in the Sudan during the seventies was directed towards the needs of local markets but in the eighties, it tended to export, in addition to the traditional leaders during the seventies, who were working efficiently and have the ability to support the local communities. But in the eighties the civil administration has been terminated by General Nimeiri. In addition to that the seventh decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a relative peace in Sudan and neighboring countries. But the eighties witnessed the explosion of the second civil war in Sudan, and the outbreak of the Libyan-Chad war and widening scope of its impact on the state of war and peace in western Sudan, especially the state of North Darfur, bordering Chad and Libya. With the advent of drought, the rural economy began to collapse. And large numbers of animals dead which forced the pastoralists to get rid of the remaining animals at low prices, and traders turned their backs on and left the rural battered economy, thus, the security collapsed and the rural community became oriented towards disintegration and unrest and armed clashes and finally war.

It was expected in the case of Darfur, a peace strategy to be available where the process of environmental rehabilitation going side by side with the settlement of the disputes and find answers to it. This will serve as an unprecedented example that can be followed when handling conflicts with similar nature in other regions similar to Darfur. But this did not happen and ignored at the regional and central government level.

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[45] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.319.

The Political History of Darfur

Darfur was an independent sovereign State in the period from 1650 to 1917, and was then the Sultanate of Darfur as state was able to abort many attempts aimed at assuming foreign domination until 1917, when the British colonialism succeeded in the annexing it to the Sudanese state. Since 1917 and until after Sudan's independence from Britain 1956, Darfur had only a very little chance for economic development, and this neglect by the central authority has contributed in the isolation of Darfur from the rest of the other parts of the country not only at the economic, but also at the political, cultural   level, and the system of regional governments which has been applied since 1982 has led in practice to devote economic underdevelopment in the region and strengthen the political isolation and cultural relativism in this sprawling country.[46]

Since February 1991 darfur has been divided into three states: North Darfur state, capital El Fasher. South Darfur state, capital Nyala, West Darfur state, capital Alginaina. The organizational structure of the regional government consists of several states; each state is divided into several provinces and every province to urban councils and rural Councils. Despite the gradual complex administrative structure, Darfur continued to be as one of the least integrated parts of the Sudan and most difficult of governance and that is due to the distance from the center and weak linkages with access to its good transport links and active network connections .In spite of the administrative division of the area which we have mentioned previously, there are traditional divisions such as the so called **Al Dar** (i.e., the land of the designated tribe and its homeland) and every house or Dar constitute a social identity, political and cultural life of the selected group as it sees in this "Dar" the embodiment of social status, collective life and cultural domain . We find that these traditional divisions are the most important parts of ethnic groups, and by this way, Darfur is divided into three homes (Dars) primarily in the north (**Dar Zaghawa**), ascribed or attributed to Zaghawa tribe, which inhabited by camel herders (Abbala), and (**Darfur**)

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[46] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.217.

in which **Fur** of African descent live, and rely on agriculture, and **(Dar Rezegat)** are cattle herders in the southern and eastern parts, in addition to the homes of other small groups. This extremely sensitive ethnic ecological division has helped in increasing the possibility of igniting the conflict between these different groups in times of scarcity and frictions.[47]

Population in Darfur

The racial and ethnic distinctions in the states of Darfur and in Sudan in general is not very clear as it is not severe, and if we take the two important sub- distinctions, Darfur states residents can be divided of, as we mentioned earlier to the people of Arab descent, and to garrison groups of African descent. Although some Arab groups in Sudan, claiming Arab ethnic purity, but it must be noted that Arabism is based on the cultural heritage only, not on ethnicity and affiliation of the blood. Thus, the name of the Arabs means only those speakers in Arabic and those who mingled through a long historical process with African non-Arab groups.

The Fur tribe is of African descent and is the largest ethnic group in the region, made up of sedentary farmers using traditional methods as they are the founders of the Fur Sultanate (1650-1916) and they are the historic rulers of the region. The other non-Arab groups in the region are Meidob, Zaghawa, Masalit, Albrko, Berti, Tama, Birgit Agamar, Aldajo and Altinger in addition to the clans groups of Fallata (Brno, Hawsa) migrating from West Africa. These non-Arab groups are the founders of Darfur Renaissance Front in the mid-sixties of the twentieth century to face the campaigns of exclusion experienced by these non-Arabs ethnic groups by the central government and those who assumed political authority. The main objective of the front is to protect the interests of the people of Darfur, especially during the periods of conflict and political competition that was going through the central government in Khartoum. Arab tribes in Darfur, mostly nomadic tribes consists of Habbaniya , Beni Hussein, Ziyadiyah, Bani helba, Jawamaa, Rizeiqat and Almhiria in addition to the Arab traders, urban residents and government

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[47] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.209.

officials who are the sons of Jellaba. These communities have formed the so-called Arab alliance during the mid-eighth decade of the last century. The objective of that alliance is to obtain official and financial support from the central government and Sudanese political parties to support the Arab cause in the region. As noted by the two researchers Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmed and Sheriff Hareer in 1982, the population of Darfur are also can be divided using other classification, into four sections: Baggara (Cowboys) and Abbala (camel herders) and Alzurga (the local name given to the farmers of non-Arabs origins and means in Sudanese slang the blacks, and for Sudanese blue color azrag means black) and the population of urban areas.

Another Division based on cultural dimension more than others, has been used by a researcher Fuad Ibrahim, where he distinguished among the four groups based on their relationship with blood and Arab culture, and these divisions are: the Arabs, and absolute Arabists, and partial Arabists, and non-Arabs. The Arabs of Darfur poulation are those who speak Arabic such as Alersiqat and Ziyadiyah and Beni Hussein and Jawama and all of them are shepherds. The Arabists group of people relinquished their local languages and fully understanding and adopting Arabic, such as Alberti and Tunjur. The third category is the Arabists in part who consists of those who maintained their native languages in addition to speaking Arabic dialects, which has been particularly included within the Fur, Zaghawa, Meidob, Albrgid, Mima, Tama and Kenana.[48]

On the other hand, Sian Aovahe adopted different division, he pointed out that, Darfur from ethnological   aspect, is one of the lowest systematical areas in the distribution of ethnicity in Sudan, that makes the classification to Arabs and non Arabs rated at a random one, which it could not be used as a reference based on ethnic backgrounds as it is not valid for classification in practice. Aovahe proposed a different division based on the migration and linguistic factors and ways to earn a living (occupation) as elements of knowledge of the ethnicity structure of Darfur population.

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[48] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.211.

In this study I shall apply more extensive and comprehensive approach that combines the elements of language and livelihoods and regional cultural components for classifying the population of Darfur. For my faith that these different components, each and every one of them plays an important role in the conflict and structure of different identities within one nation, which is constitute an obstacle in the case of building the nation-state. According to this trend it is possible to distinguish between 3 groups of people, each of them involved in the lineage tree and the type of productive activity in addition to living in the same space of similar cultural elements.[49]

First of these groups are the camel herders and cattle herders who consider themselves Arabs, and by reference to common perception, they have the status of Arabs with a self sense of a nomad Bedouin supported by a sense of superiority and the tendency towards violence. This group considers the settled farmers and other rural groups as of inferior status and in lower class, not only at the ethnic level, but also at the cultural level, based on what they see as a decline in the kinds of professions practiced by these groups, viewing them as tenants of (Altkl) which means the kitchen referring to the contempt of their stable lifestyle .This group glorifies the concept of home as it embodies the status of its people and distinguishes them from others. To protect the home (Dar) from intruders, each branch in the ethnic group has specific military unit led by a colonel (Ageed) or warrier commander. This configuration is typical to the military organization as it is known - for example - between the primitive Germanic tribes, which repressed the Roman Empire. And like their European counterparts, these military – pastoral groups do not hesitate or qualms about the invasion and looting of despised farmers, as their point of view, especially in times of rareness and scarcity of resources. The armed raid against other groups, especially those living in agricultural areas is considered as a vital strategy to stave off destitution and poverty, and for these groups these invasions are permitted by their culture, and they consider them as the type of the equestrian and courage. As noted, a British writer Alexander de Waal indicated that the hunger and famine are not the most

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[49] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, pp. 212.

influential on these groups, but the social and psychological consequences of displacement away from the house is of concern to the members of these groups. De Waal [50], finds that the rural population of western Sudan are usually susceptible to carrying the largest amount of hunger, they find that the most threatening factor while facing the risk of starvation and destitution is the collapse of the social fabric of the house.

Group II consists of farmers engaged in varying seasonal cultivations, in addition to a limited number of settled farmers. And these citizens are rural, descended mainly from non-Arab, mostly from the Fur tribe, who traditionally do not need to configure the military formations, unlike pastoralist groups that exist in the previous group. This group, considered Darfur its home while everyone else is an outsider to the region. In spite of that the Fur farmers are usually characterized by their tendency to a life of peace, but they sometimes find themselves in sporadic clashes with cattle and camels herders due to the entry of them into their farms. As a result of these conflicts and their consequences, the two groups have a great deal of hostility and mistrust towards each other.[51]

The third group with the same cultural, regional and occupational aspects consists of traders, government officials and absentees landowners and professionals residing in urban areas, and unlike the two previous groups with a limited political influence, this third group plays an important role in the political and economic life of the region.

Darfur states are a region of distress and underdevelopment as it is affected by unfair and unbalanced development in the country. This situation got escalated as a result of the ruling elite's biased attention to the Sudan of the Nile Valley (cities triangle of Sennar, Kosti and Khartoum), relatively rich and which has for many years enjoyed the lion's share of the sources of public and private investment at the expense of the rest of the country. Therefore, the local economy of Darfur is emblematic of all the features of the economy of the areas that suffer from exploitation, more than any other region in the

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[50] Ibraheem, Haidar (2004) *Segoot Almshrooa Alhadaree (The Failure of the Civilizational Project)*, p. 217.
[51] Ibid, p.218.

Sudan, areas that also suffer from the double impasse as a least developed in the most backward country. That such regional disparity is one of the more evident features in the economy of Sudan, reflecting a steadily and constantly widening gap between the rich and poor, between wealthy urban centers, and disadvantaged rural areas. While the gap has been widening between the rich and the poor countries in the world, it is also clear that the gap between poor and rich within developing countries is also widening but at a higher rate.

Armed Conflicts

Armed conflicts between ethnic groups in Darfur, experienced two main stages in their development:

Simple limited tribal conflicts and clashes between now and then, which characterized the differences since the fifties and even the seventies of the twentieth century. The second type is exacerbated, long term and large scale conflicts, cropped up since the mid-eighties of the twentieth century. In the past, previous conflicts were easily contained and have found an appropriate solution but the later conflicts proved to be more complex and intractable by traditional methods which have had a role in the past.

In the mid-eighties sporadic clashes began expanding and growing and the degree of intensity began increasing until it turned into a real quasi-civil war which killed thousands by using unprecedented modern weapons, and whole villages were removed and wiped out and fired and the property was looted of its people. The successive governments at the regional and central levels adopted various strategies to address the different conflicts, but their efforts proved ineffective, and in many occasions the central government accused of being biased towards one of the conflict parties against the other party.

The conflicts before the mid-eighties usually erupt between two groups, such as conflicts that took place between the Zaghawa and Almhiria in 1968 and between Alma'lea and

Rizeigat 1968, also between Rizeigat and Misseriya in the period 1972-1974 and Beni Halba and Almhiria 1975-1977 and Ta'aisha and Salamat, 1978 - 1981.

The conflicts began widening since 1985. These conflicts were in two groups; the first one was among Zaghawa and Almhiria who are camel herders, who inhabit the upper northern parts of the desert belt, against the settled farmers of the Fur.[52]

The second was a war entered into by the non-Arab group farmers of the population of the Jebel Marra area against a broad coalition consisting of all the tribes herders of Arab origin, and since then, despite several attempts made by various governments, including both military and civilian, the conflicts continued and remained inflamed and from time to time its scope expanded significantly. Unlike the local clashes in the past over water and pasture, the recent conflicts that erupted after 1985, showed a regular tendency of herders to occupy land in the central region in Jebel Marra using the latest weapons. While the previous conflicts are spontaneous and unintentional, this new type is severe and continued. Many researchers regard it as an attempt of those who have suffered from drought and desertification to take control of green oases, and thus the problem of Darfur emerged that surpassed the scope of the local context, hence the Government of the National Congress Party failed to control the situation which led to internationalization of Sudanese issues and foreign interference in Sudan's internal affairs, which reached its peak by accusing President of the National Congress, the Prime Minister, General al-Bashir who became at the top of the most wanted war criminals in the International Court of Justice.

East Sudan

East Sudan, geographically is the area which is located between latitudes 15-22 N and longitudes 23-35 east, and is divided into three areas: the Red Sea hills and rugged, barren plains that stretches to the River Atbara and finally, the natural fertile plains region of natural fertile, which lies south of the River Atbara, which are areas located

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[52] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, pp. 405.

within the belt of savannah-rich region with the average rate of rainfall between 700 and 500mm and many seasonal streams.

East Sudan includes five states. Demographically, the northern region of these states includes different ethnic and multicultural, groups mostly from the Beja tribes of Hamitic origin which is considered as one of the largest population groups in the region, and their clans spread to the central region of the East. Beja link to the region extends to thousands of years. The word Beja does not mean specific ethnic group, but all those who speak Beja language in the region and those who live in their region and consider themselves part of them. Some of them are nomadic tribes which cross the barrier of political borders of the country and extend their presence to the area of Qus in Egypt, while part of them is stable in the agricultural projects in Gash and Tokar. The largest group of the Beja tribe is Hdandwa, whose paths/roots (mrahil) extend/go beyond the Ethiopian and Eritrean territories.

There is still disagreement about the origin of these populations and groups of people, because some scholars[53] refer to the similarity between the Beja and some tribes of the southern Arabian Peninsula, but it is not known whether they are of African or Asian origin. There are conflicting stories about their Semitism and *hamitism* but what is certain is the existence of the Beja in the region before five thousand years at least, and even their political influence in some periods extended to the River Nile, but their pastoral traditions prevented them from settlement in the rainy and river areas in the south and west which also had an impact later on their access to education and their role in political life.

The fundamental link between groups of the Beja is the continuation of their languages affiliation to bedawin group of Hamitic origin. In spite of the differences between Beja tribes, the linguistic, cultural and morphological characteristics allow to bring them together under one name. They are pastoral tribes that spread on every area of the East

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[53] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.211.

and all of them are Muslims, do not speak Arabic, except to the extent imposed by the conditions of interaction with the rest of the groups of the region.

There are also Shukriya tribes of Arab descent, and they are located in the southwestern part, all Muslims, and there are also Rashaida, the latest pastoral Arab tribes coming from the Arabian Peninsula in the early nineteenth century and are still living in isolation from other tribes.[54]

In the eastern part of the Blue Nile State, "one of the states of eastern Sudan," there are Refaa Alhoy and Kenan tribes who are mainly Arab pastoral tribes that adopt nomadism as pattern of pastoral economic life. They move south and east, and in the southern part of the Blue Nile State. There are many tribes of Arab and African origins living in this State, on the ruins of borders, customs and traditions of the Blue Sultanate (Alsaltana alzrgaa). In spite of that the region and its oral history indicate that this area lies between two cultures, but historically considered as a crossing of a number of population and cultural groups. Origins of population groups have been studied for the first time in 1926 by a British researcher Edward Evans Pritchard, who showed that the region had been located within the rules of the closed areas in 1922, like others along the contact areas in central Sudan. The colonial authorities insisted to create illegal barrier to stop the movement of Arabization, and spread of Islam in the region, especially among the Bail boron and Inqasna and Maban, but after the abolition of this policy in the late fourth decade of the twentieth century, it had made a moral barrier and isolation of the area that led to a gap, especially in the educational systems either in the N. Sudan, or in the South, also disrupted its Economic and Social integration with other parts of the country. The colonial policies has intensified the effects of marginalization of the region with continued exploitation by Jellaba traders, and opened also to Fallata clans who trade in agricultural products of the region "sesame, gum Arabic," and local handicrafts, in exchange for their basic needs.

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[54] Ibid, p.212.

In fact, the colonial authorities did not complete sovereignty over the region until the end of the twenties. The existence of the region on the Ethiopian borders constituted additional factor in increasing isolation. Due to the security conditions at that time, the clans groups of Inqasna, boron, Maban took an interest in expansion in agriculture, but these developments also opened opportunities for the emergence of conflicts between Refaa Alhoy pastoral tribe of Arab origin and African clans in the region, similar to what had ocurred between Nuba and Baggara in South Kordofan. Since the fifth decade of the twentieth century conflicts intensified due to increasing competition on water resources and pasture, especially with the increasing demand for land for mechanized projects and mining quarries.

The Inqasna people and Alodok exposed to intensified missionary activity since the third decade of the last century, as they are socially suffer with other groups such as Mabana and Boron from political and economic marginalization, and exclusion from participation in political life at all levels, whether local, regional or national. In the mid-nineties these tribes exposed to the risk of genocide, that they were in the area of fighting between the Sudanese army from the north and militias of Sudan Liberation Movement, the Nuer armed tribe, so, they are compelled to migrate to the south since 1987, but they could not stay in the south after militia attacks of Nuer, and there were also forced to leave the area of Nasser in the south and resort to Ethiopia.

There are also all over the East, ethnic groups from all over the Sudan, such as Aljaliyn, Rikabiya, Nuba, Shilluk and Fur who fled to the region long ago and settled in this region. These groups brought with them their languages, customs and religions and have worked in various activities, although they often do not include grazing. Of the most important groups are Fallata clans (Brno, Hawsa, Ambrro) who came from West Africa, settled in the East and their numbers continued to increase, with the beginnings of agricultural projects during the period of British colonialism. Some of them worked in grazing, in addition to a group of Nubians, the tribe that forcibly resettled in the New Halfa for nearly 50 years after Old Halfa city been flooded with waters of the High Dam

and Lake Nasser (Lake Dam) at the Egyptian-Sudanese border. Fallata and Nubians are Muslim groups but do not speak Arabic, except in transactions with other groups.

In general we can say that the vast majority of the population of eastern Sudan, are Muslims, but are not of Arab descent, most of whom are still pastoralists, with nomadic pride of working in grazing especially the Beja tribe to the level that formed a barrier between them and adjacent stable communities by scorning all other activities. The dominant character of this region is marginalization and underdevelopment and less share of development projects, minimum levels of basic needs i.e. Food, health and education as well as ignorance, poverty, and spread of disease in all parts of the region.

East Sudan lagged behind other regions and ignored by the central authorities since independence, where education started only in the mid-twentieth century by opening the first elementary school in the city of Pau and by the end of eighties only 6 primary schools were opened for boys and one for girls. There is no electricity in the area, although it is not far more than 40 miles from Roseires Dam the main source of hydroelectric power in the Sudan before the construction of Merowe Dam latter. The central government experts gave a priority to harness the power supply to serve the urban areas in the north and ignoring the development of the region.

The culture and self perceptions of these African communities that live in the South Funj are formed in a historical pattern that resemble to a large extent the experience of Nubian tribes. The source of this similarity is due to interacting dynamic relations between African culture and Arab and Islamic culture and their representatives in the region of Arab origins, and in the State relationship with the communities of African heritage.

East Sudan has witnessed periods of prosperity and was also exposed to interferences of different civilizations since the days of the Pharaohs and ancient civilizations of Axum, Ethiopian and Kush, Nile. The tribes of the East established good commercial relations with the cities of the Hijaz, Yemen and India. The coast of the region has been a target for the ambitions of Ottoman, Turkish, Portuguese and Egyptian empires, giving the

region a historic important dimension. Despite the waves of social relations experienced by the region, the identity of its people still retains its own distinctiveness and uniqueness, indicating the privacy of their cultural heritage.[55]

Omara Donkos was the first Sultan of Fung who began his reign in 1485 from his capital Sennar on the Blue Nile. He is the founder of the Blue Sultanate (blue means black) for incarnating and embodying this dialectical relationship between the Arab and Islamic heritage and African and local traditions. In the early sixteenth century the Sultanate extended its powers to the regions of west Kordofan and Dongola as far north, until it collapsed by the forces of Egyptian khdeve in 1821. The external factors and interventions associated with political conditions and economic and social development during the rule of the Sultanate of Funj "blue Sultanate " and the subsequent era of Turkish rule, "Ottoman" and Anglo-Egyptian conquest after the year 1899 till the mid of the last century are factors imposed on these local communities, including areas of Ingasana mountains to rely on the characteristics of their own community and social institutions in their search for peace to maintain their survival in the region. This region exposed to campaigns of continuous activities of slavery which their impact and consequences of their practices extend to the mid - twentieth century, even to the post-independence period of Sudan. The communities of African descent has faced continued oppression, but urged to resist against all forms of tyranny.

The importance of the eastern region for the Sudan appeared from the fact that, the main port and the port of Bashair for exporting oil, and Damazin and Roseires Dam which generate 80% of the country's power supply before the opening of the Merowe Dam in 2010 are all located in the eastern region. There are also 90% of the total mining projects, beside the largest reserves of mineral wealth in the country.

East Sudan also exposed to the problems of mechanized projects, as happened in the Nuba Mountains area, where the projects have started mechanized farming in eastern

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[55] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.401.

Sudan during the Second World War, i.e. since the Sudan was a British colony, where the investment began in the region of Gadmbalia in order to provide the needs of the British armies and its allies. Hence, the right to use the land was granted to specific capable social groups, neglecting the consequences of depriving the majority of the local indigenous population. The nature of these decisions was based on political and economic motives that contradict the pastoral lifestyle, and separate the animal husbandry from farming. The nomadic paths were affected and their grazing lands were reduced, and forced to march south to areas that do not fit with their herds which are exposed to total loss then forced to shift to seasonal agricultural workers, so as to provide money to compensate for their herds to resume their nomadic life again.

E. Sudan entered to the equation of the civil war at the end of the eighth decade of the last century. The Sudan Liberation Movement was able to extend its alliances to attract the tribes of the north-eastern Upper Nile and South Fung. Kurmuk occupation led by Selvakir, the current president of the new South Sudan State, on 11 October 1987 is a major turning point in the path of the second civil war, where the movement has been able for the first time to threat the major power plants, water dams, agricultural projects and mines, so E. Sudan joined the hotbeds of conflict.

The political variables in Khartoum, which began interacting since mid eighties i.e. 1986 when Sadiq al-Mahdi came to power without any clear strategies in dealing with the civil war, in addition to the insistence of the Sudan Liberation Movement to strengthen its presence north of latitude 12,all these factors have led to the escalation of war and open the door to foreign intervention and increasing violence and counter-violence, but the balance of events has not been changed except after the military coup in June 1989, and adoption of a military solution as a strategy to achieve peace. The military government has taken a number of decisions that served as the framework to enter into negotiations with the Sudan Liberation Movement, but interest in the eastern Sudan, by the central government came after the start of the first military operations carried out by the Sudan Alliance Forces on April 20, 1996, which were followed by several military attacks on eastern Sudan. In January 1997, the coalition forces agreed with the Sudan Liberation

Movement to go joint attacks over E. Sudan and attained a number of victories. Many observers, considered this shift as a radical change in the nature of the civil war in Sudan, where it is no longer a civil war is a war of southern Sudan alone, but included parts of northern Sudan, involving North and therefore no longer bear the description of the war between the South and the north, or between Christians African and Muslim Arabs.[56]

Resettlement of Nubians

East Sudan has faced – beside the consequences of mechanized farming- the challenges that accompanied the changes in Butana area relating to irrigated and mechanized projects. Butana region is plains of approximately 120.000 square kilometers bounded by Atbara River and Blue Nile area. The plains are muddy in which the pastoral tribes of Arab origins are roaming, especially Alshukria, Kenana and Rashaida tribes. Since 1960, this area witnessed many changes such as the extension of agricultural projects and the continued expansion by estblishing Khshm al Girba and Rahad agricultural projects in particular, in addition to the forced displacement suffered by the citizens of the area of Wadi Halfa ie the Nubians of the far north Sudan. They are people of African origin with cultural, social and environmental legacy different from Butana area, where khashm Al Girba agricultural project is found as the people drawing closer to agriculture and settled in it. These circumstances have formed the combined factors that increased tension and conflict over resources in the region. The Nubians, after more than five decades still think that their precariousness and compulsory deportation to the area alien to them climatically and socially imposed on them to change their lifestyle they are accustomed to. All these unfair policies are only for the interest of the projects of the northern neighbor Egypt, where the nubians found nothing to link them to this land, and they are still looking forward to returning to Halfa area and contribute in its reconstruction.[57]

Although the project management has exerted many efforts to alleviate the conflict by trying to convince and encourage the pastoral tribes to live in stability in the project by

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[56] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.405.
[57] Ibid, p.407

benefiting from the agricultural, health and educational services of the project, but the pastoral tribes have also been dealing with the Nubian as outsiders on their land. Moreover they confirmed their protests by assuming that, the basic services provided for their pastoral communities or for those who settled in khshm al Girba project do not justify the settlement of about 8000 Nubian family, housed in 25 model villages in the town of New Halfa and with a better services than those delivered to them, which are at the expense of their resources and pasture of their cattle. Although the level of conflict in this area of eastern Sudan has not exceeded the seasonal skirmishes and clashes and entry of pastoralists in the farms, and sporadic tribal clashes but the pastoral tribes continue to defy all obstacles facing their north and south tracks. Since 1973 the dispute escalated to the level that necessitates the permanent existence of armed forces in Butana plains for protection of agricultural projects throughout the year.

Eastern Sudan Joins the Armed Opposition

Historically, the northern parts of the Beja region are classified as pro- the Democratic Unionist Party, for their loyalty to the *Khatmiyya Sect*, while the majority of Hdandwa are associated with the legacy of the Ansar sect. In general the advancement of regional organizations, in the east of Sudan, expressed by groups such as the Union of South Funj and Beja Congress and the Blue Nile Youth Movement (Thana) is considered as a prominent milestone in the intensity of polarization and renewed political allegiances as well as the principle on which the Sudanese opposition relied upon for the legality of using the arms before signing the peace agreement in 2005. Beja Congress was established since 1958 as a regional organization by a number of prominent activists. The Congress since that time aimed at addressing and confronting the problem of underdevelopment and grievances of the region, as well as driving the people of the East out of this gap through the decentralization of government. The new leadership of the Beja Congress was based on the legacy of this historic organization in striving against colonialism by Egyptian khedive and Turkish rule. The Beja Congress played a vital role in the revolution of 1924, in addition to their sacrifice against the British colonialist's policies. The Beja Congress reaches the top of its influence by participating in the general

election in 1965, in which he had 10 members in the Constituent Assembly (parliament). In the context of alliance of political forces represented with the Nuba Mountains and Southern Sudan a new situation merged in the wake of October Revolution 1964, but its representation has declined in 1968 to three members, and the slogans of the Beja Congress became the minimum agenda of political action in the region.

The opportunity for growth of the Beja Congress may be identified by the growing disputes between the Beja tribes especially Bani Amer and Hdandwa and increasing competition on the official government positions in the states of the East i.e. Kassala and Red Sea , in addition to the attempts made by some intellectuals of the region to exploit the clan contradictions for their interests by political recruitment and increase in severe military confrontation in Eastern Sudan, deepening the intensity of these differences. Those responsible for shaping the public opinion often they employ tribalism and harnessed it to achieve political objectives. In eastern Sudan, for example, there is a solid understanding to hadndwa tribe which claims that it is the original tribe and owners of the land in East Sudan, therefore they are anti- Bani Amer tribe which is originally descended from Altigrai tribes, and represents the social depth and religious and cultural outreach of Bani Amer tribes to stand in the face of the firm alliance of the Christian tigrai nationality in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and this is the main reason for the adoption of the current system of the Islamic National Front to rely on in the Eastern region. Therefore, Bani Amer believes that Hdandwa tribe seeks to fragment them and weaken their strength, although Hdandwa have found the attention of successive Sudanese governments by giving them a broad access to education and other services as well as political participation and the rule of the Eastern Province, because the successive Sudanese governments became beware of Bani Amer tribes due to their strong extensions in Eritrea. However, the Government of the National Front was of the view that Bani Amer are the best support to the North in power as they maintain safety and security in the Eastern region, unlike Hdandwa who are of contrary roots and affiliation to the Arab trends. Moreover they are dealing with the Northern peoples as aliens and outsiders as well as they accusing them of sequestering the rights of other nationalities , minimizing their role and stature and depriving them of economic development, as they show strong

enthusiasm for Dinka insurgency in Southern Sudan and fight against the central government.

The political opposition in northern Sudan has taken the East as an area of the first armed confrontations with the National Front Government. A National Democratic Assembly (NDA) was formed as a gathering of all Sudanese political forces, except the National congress party (NCP), which originated from the organization of the National Islamic Front. NDA held a famous conference in Asmara in July 1995 in which he announced his intention to overthrow the ruling regime in Sudan by all means, including military force, thereby opened a second new front in E. Sudan, and in this time political parties and military forces from N. Sudan participated in fighting. Hence, the war is not limited to the north and south only.

All the data issued by the coalition forces that the ultimate goal of the coalition forces is to establish a civil unified democratic state. The Conference of Asmara (Eritrea) was the first opportunity to provide a public leadership. The Alliance elected a political bureau including five civilians and two military officers and Brigadier Abdul Aziz Khalid Osman presided that Bureau, who also occupied the post of Commander in Chief of the coalition forces, but the Assembly parties were not recognizing that military establishment as each party intended to establish his military presence away from the legitimate leadership of the Assembly forces, so the National Umma Party established (Umma Liberation Army) and the Democratic Unionist Party (Alfath forces) and the Communist Party (democratic front forces) and the Sudanese National Party has founded (Mountain Tigers), followed by Beja Congress and the Federal Democratic Alliance. Therefore, many people considered this step as non-recognition of the Assembly joint leadership, and this is one of the weaknesses that led to the failure of its military mission later.

The opposition front in E. Sudan has identified the primary goals of the military crossing towards the center of power in Khartoum and change the system of government in three axis: the **first** is to disable Roseires dam as a main source of electricity, and the **second** is

to cut off the only road that connects the East Sudan and the only port in Port Sudan ie. "Khartoum-Port Sudan road," which means the control of the country supplies and halt its exports, while the **third** axis was to disable the effectiveness of the oil pipeline.

The armed arrangements in the Eastern Front of the Sudan has been facilitated by the success of the Sudan Liberation Movement during a period of ten years prior to the Alliance , when it was able, to recruit supporters in the South Funj along the Sudanese-Ethiopian borders, area of about 70 thousand square kilometers, with a population of about 200.000 citizen. The first military event in the E. Sudan beyond this barrier was in the early 1991 when the Beja groups declared that they are striving to achieve the meaning of national unity by the equitable distribution of wealth and national income and participation in the national and regional authorities, followed by the declaration of the unknown organization, calling itself the Resistance Movement, which bear the responsibility for trying to blow up some bridges on Port Sudan – Khartoum road in July 1992, but the real start of the organized military activity against the Sudanese government from E. Sudan was the attack of Madeasesa garrison in April, 1996. The military action entered a new stage by attackig Hemshkourib in January 1996, and in March of the same year the coalition forces took control over other areas in E. Sudan.

The competition for resources and land has increased very rapidly since the mid-sixth decade of the twentieth century. The number of people and livestock on the rise, especially after the exodus of large groups of refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea in the seventies, and accelerated process of displacement of Ambrro "Fallata" clans from West Africa, which differ in their Tracks (Marahil) and breeding of the animals compared to the other tribes of the region, add to that the massive expansion in the area of mechanized farming projects, and the arrival of a large number of agricultural workers from all over Sudan, especially Darfur states which were hit by successive droughts.

The social organization of the pastoral tribes in the southern part of E. Sudan, like all other regions based on a cultural, political and economic legacy associated with the environment. The region exposed to imbalance between the pastoral activity and the

growing automated agricultural sector. This expansion is at the expense of the pastoral nomadisim as many projects were established such as Akaddmpelia then the projects supported by the State and the international institutions which began in 1954 on the land exploited by Rerfaa and kenana nomadic tribes. These projects had immense impact on all aspects of life in the region. Mrahil or paths of these tribes are vital to them as herdsmen on the banks of the White Nile as a base and then to the Blue Nile at the time of drought. Their seasonal tracks are always long, where Refaa Alhoy migrating tribes move south until they reach and sometimes enter the Ethiopian borders.

Chapter 3

National Movement, Political Parties and Islamic Revival

National Movement, Political Parties and Islamic Revival

In this chapter the research dealt with the effect of Turku-Egyptian rule in Sudan under Mohammad Ali Basha of Egypt, in the Sudanese society and in spreading Islamic education among Sudanese. Before the Turku–Egyptian rule Sudan was a country that ruled by different small political units, kingdoms and sultanates, e.g. the Islamic sultanate of Funj in central Sudan which took over sixteenth century, the Musbaat kingdom in Kordufan, and four kingdoms of Darfur. Musbaat and Funj kingdoms were beaten by Mohammad Ali's army in the beginnings of eighteenth-century and came under the Turku- Egyptian rule, while four kingdoms continued till its fall under the British rule in 1916, under the Turku-Egyptian rule, Sudan had been made a united state for the first time. Thus, nationalism as a concept that includes all the Sudanese with their different ethnic groups, religions and cultures, started with the Turkish state in Sudan[1].

The chapter also deals with the Mahdist period that defeated the Turku-Egyptian rule, and presented the first Islamic state in Sudan, to demonstrate that how it united all the Sudanese people using Islamic religion as a unified factor, and building an Islamic state that depended on Islamic militant ideas like Jihad, which had tremendous effect on the Sudanese national spirit at that time.

At that time, Sudan occupied an almost unique position in the Muslim world. The forces working to limit the political role of Islam were weaker than in most other regions, while the level of Islamic awareness was probably the highest in Sudan. In the heyday of nineteenth-century colonialism, the closest Sudan came to Westernizing influences was to experience the impact of Mohammad Ali's modernizing policies, which were not

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[1] Shigir, Naom (1981) *Tarekh Al Sudan* (*The History of The Sudan*), pp. 130-55.

exactly radical secularism. In fact, Mohammad Ali's 'infidel Turks' contributed significantly to the expansion of Islamic education in Sudan. They-set up schools, sent students to al-Azhar, established Islamic courts, and brought in some prominent *ulama* as advisers, teachers and judges[2].

This situation did not, however, save the Turku-Egyptian administration from succumbing to a militant Islamic revolt, which voiced specifically Islamic grievances and claimed the ultimate divine sanction of appointment by divine ordainment, *Mahdism*. Even within the context of Sudan's self-reinforcing progressive Islamization, the *Mahdist* uprising represented a quantum leap, transporting the community on to a new, intense and explosive level of Islamization. This outbreak was by far the most militant Islamic activism for centuries, and the last apocalyptic revivalist movement until Khomeini returned to Iran[3].

In the context of Sudanese Islam, Mahdism evoked mixed and equally intense responses, both in approval and rejection. For one thing, Mahdism emerged from within Sudanese Sufi Islam[4] and spoke its language. The Sammaniyya *tariqa*, in which Mohammad Ahmad ibn Abdullah (the Mahdi) was initiated, arrived in Sudan as part of the neo-Sufi wave of Islamic revival, which swept the whole Muslim World that began in the eighteenth century. In this sense the *Mahdist* and Sufi-orthodox synthesis appeared a natural development consistent with the historical progress of Islam in Sudan. As far as Sudan was concerned, neo-Sufism fitted perfectly with the dynamics that already characterized the spread of Islam there: a gradual and spontaneous process, mainly mediated through the immigration of Muslims and their interaction and intermarriage with local people. Few of these immigrants were well versed in Islamic doctrine, being mainly Bedouins and nomads who were only marginally more than 'nominal' Muslims[5]. Therefore, even though Islam started to spread into Sudan in the seventh century, Dayf

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[2] Shigir, Naom (1981) *Tarekh Al Sudan* (*The History of The Sudan*), pp.193-220.

[3] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (1991) *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, pp.:23-24.

[4] The Sudanese sufi Islam is a branch of the Sufism movement in the middle East and Africa. Sufi Islam is different from Shiaa and Sunni in the sense of its strong spirituals dimensions.

[5] Most of the immigrant Arabs came to Sudan as traders, not as religious teachers or thinkers; the same is with Abd al Gafar. Ahmed (1987:18-19) has the same point of view Ahmad.

Allah mentioned in his *Tabaqat* that when the Muslim Funj Kingdom took over in central Sudan early in the sixteenth century, there was no record of any schools for the Qur'an nor religious learning. Disregard for elementary Islamic rules was the norm until Shaikh Mahmud al-Araki came from Egypt and taught people about these rules.

The process started by Shaikh al-Araki gave Sudanese Islam its distinctive features, for al-Araki was also a Sufi sheikh. From then on, Sufis and ulama reinforced each other, in contrast to other areas in the Muslim world where reformers had constantly risen against the excesses of Sufi heterodoxy, such as Wahabism in Arabia[6].

Sufi groups also became the nucleus of the emerging Muslim society in Sudan. The residences of Sufi shaikhs became new centres around which the Sudanese society was reconstituted. Post-harvest pilgrimages to abodes of holy men by tribes in surrounding areas (to pay homage and fulfill vows) also attracted many disadvantaged groups who hoped to benefit from the tributes paid to the Shaikh. The tribes came to holy men for arbitration and for intercession with the authorities. The Sufi centers used the influx of wealth (in addition to welfare) for the establishment of learning centers. A Sufi centre thus became the focus of religious, cultural, economic and political life of the community. In catering for almost all the needs of the community, these centers gave Sudanese society its present-day form. The absence of conflict between economic, political and social demands in the life shaped by these institutions gave them enduring strength, and they managed to adapt themselves remarkably to changing circumstances. Sufism was far from other-worldly because the charisma of a Sufi leader had essentially to be manifested in his worldly achievements. The absence of a strong centralizing state in the predominantly tribal society and the fusion of tribal and *tariqa*[7] identification in most cases enhanced the role of Sufi leaders even further[8].

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[6] Shigir, Naom (1981) *Tarekh Al Sudan* (*The History of The Sudan*), pp. 150-151.
[7] Because sufism is dependent on the tribal authority to spread, for example the influence of khatmia is among the northern and eastern Sudan tribes, while the influence of Ansar is among the western Sudan tribes.
[8] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (1991) *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, p.125.

The fusion of the role of alim[9] and Sufi sheikh again strengthened these institutions, this fusion being further reinforced by the impact of neo-Sufism in the eighteenth century, with its similar emphasis on ulama-Sufi synthesis. The eighteenth-century revivalism affected Sudan through the agency of several men, most of them disciples or associates of Sayyid Ahmad Ibn-Idris al-Fasi (1760-1835), a Sufi reformer and an alim who originally came from North Africa and taught at Mecca before being forced by rival ulama to take refuge in Asir valley in southwest Arabia. Among the men who spread the new message in Sudan was Muhammad al-Majdhoub al-Suahavvir (1796-1833), a member of an established Sufi family residing in the vicinity of El-Damar in the territory of the Jaaliyyin tribe in northern Sudan. AI-Majdhoub went to Arabia in 1819 and stayed there for nine years, before returning to infuse a new dynamism in the Majdhoubiyya order, which followed the Qadiriyya and Shadhiliyya Sufi traditions. On his return, al-Majdhoub set up a new centre for the tariqa near Suakin. His teachings emphasized the need to adhere to Shariah, and he was viscerally opposed to traditional latitudinarianism of Sudanese Sufis, which caused friction with other tariqas, especially the Khatmiyya, the dominant tariqa in the vicinity of Suakin.

The Khatmiyya was itself part of the new wave introduced in 1818 to Sudan by another disciple of Ibn-Idris, Muhammad Othman al-Mirghani (1793-1853), who gained a wide following in northern and eastern Sudan. His tariqa had fewer activists, supporting the Egyptian authorities after the 1821 invasion and later opposing the Mahdist uprising. The Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of 1896-9 had restored the tariqa as a reward for its loyalty (El-Affendi, Abdelwahab, 1991:25).

The Sammaniyya also arrived as a part of the neo-Sufi influence, albeit at a much earlier date. Ahmad al-Bashir al-Tayyib (1739-1825) accepted the tariqa in Medina and introduced it in 1774 to Sudan where it gained a wide following in the Gezira area. Later, the Sanusiyya and Tijaniyya tariqas entered Sudan mainly through Darfur, which meant that almost the whole of Muslim Sudan had come under the influence of neo-Sufism in some form or other by the nineteenth century.

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[9] While Alim is appointed by state, the sheikh is the teacher of Quran and Prophetic literature, and he is also the thinker for his followers.

Mahdism thus emerged within this process of almost continuous revivalist tradition. There is, however, an important sense in which Mahdism was a radical departure from traditional Sufism. Although couched in a language all Sufis (and even ulama) could understand, the Mahdist claim was extreme, and the spontaneous reaction to it from most Muslims was flat rejection. In its very universalism Mahdism was therefore alien and divisive, in contrast to the traditional tolerance of Sufism. On the other hand, the Sufi groups which responded more readily to the Mahdi's call were the more orthodox and strict tariqas, such as the Majdhoubiyya and Ismacliyya, which was not surprising in view of the Mahdi's tendency since his youth to condemn Sufi latitudinarianism and to call for strict adherence to the original undiluted Islamic message. The ulama, however, were not particularly impressed, and in the face of this hostility Mahdism was in no mood to preach tolerance. Mahdism appears to have enhanced existing divisions within society and endowed them with new bitterness. The age-old difficulty of attaining unity with tolerance, which plagued the Muslim community from its early years, received no solution from Mahdism in its ecstatic, uncompromising self-righteous eruption. As a result, the Muslim society, which faced the British invasion of 1896-99 was a divided society, of which sizeable sections welcomed the invaders as saviors (Shigir, 1981:325).

For the outside world the Mahdist eruption was, like its Iranian counterpart a century later, evocative of strong feelings of alarm or vehement enthusiasm, depending on where one stood. Like similar messianic movements, Mahdism shook the world but never bothered to examine it. It was not of this world, and its universalism was potentially sectarian. Once rejected by the outside world, it could only respond with equally steadfast rejection and turn inwards. A sect, in this sense, represents a temporary acceptance of defeat, but not an abandonment of original goals. The movement closes the doors of its world on itself and awaits the inevitable moment of eventual triumph.

Nevertheless, once a movement becomes a sect, it becomes tolerant of diversity, a tolerance, which is implicit in the acceptance of defeat. In the early years of the Condominium the Mahdists were too demoralized to emerge as effective actors on the

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political scene. They reverted to seclusion and quietism, while a few of the most zealous embarked on desperate and suicidal acts of protest. However, the movement started to emerge slowly after the Mahdi's posthumous son, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, assumed leadership. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, because of his education, belonged more to the ulama class than to the Sufis, with whom his father more or less identified. He also associated with and enjoyed the protection of leading ulama, Egyptian and Sudanese, and the attraction appeared to have been mutual. Revived Mahdism, in the absence of the apocalyptic claims of its founder, resorted to a more stable formula of Islamic revivalism, becoming more inward-looking and concerned with the welfare of the faithful and their worldly interests, which represented a considerable scaling down of aspirations. The new formula, however, was more sustainable.

The British Policy

Regarding Islam, British policy was mainly informed by the fear of a recurrence of Mahdism and by Lord Cromer's experience in Egypt where he was on friendly terms with Mohammad Abduh and sympathized with his Islamic modernism. The central premise of this policy was the erroneous assumption that Mahdism was a direct product of popular Sufi Islam and that the influence of ulama, especially reformist ones, was the proper antidote. However, it is clear that the Mahdi, in so far as he was a revolutionary, was more under the influence of the orthodox component of his education. The condemnation of most Sufi Shaikhs of the Mahdi emphasized his deviation from traditional Sufi modes of operation. The British policy therefore has the curious effect of encouraging the infusion into Sudanese Islam of the very explosive elements the British dreaded; it was fortunate for them that their policy was ineffective. The Board of Ulemas established in 1901 to advise the government on Muslim affairs lacked influence precisely because it fronted for a non-Muslim administration, and also because it had to give concessions to popular leaders of Islam if it was to retain any credibility[10].

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[10] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan,1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*, p.50

British policy depended only secondarily on the good offices of ulama and other local leaders to assert control. Its ultimate weapons were military might and economic sanctions and inducements. Military power was used effectively to crush the Mahdist state and any semblance of an uprising after that. Force was used at its most effective also in creating a *cordon* in the south, from which Arab and Islamic influences were barred in a move that still stands out as one of the rare successes in stemming the tide of Islamic expansion. With the establishment of undisputed hegemony the administration moved to create a modern state, with its characteristic effective control over wide aspects of economic and social life. The government thus gained wide powers to withhold or grant benefits and to apply punishments. And although one could not say that the life of every individual was in its hands, it was certain that no large-scale economic, political or social activities could take place without its approval[11].

Armed with sweeping powers, the government acted in a manner it calculated would suppress undesirable forms of Islamic self-expression and would foster desirable alternatives. Restrictions were put on Mahdist and Sufi leaders. Official recognition was withheld from all Sufi tariqas, including such friendly ones as the Khatmiyya (which was nevertheless tolerated and even subsidized). Reformist ulama, on the other hand, were supported, and orthodox education was encouraged.

Later the government also institutionalized 'Native Administration' to co-opt tribal leaders into the government machinery. The influence of tribal leaders and the establishment of Shariah courts were also calculated to limit the influence of traditional figures of popular Islam who were accustomed to perform the functions of local arbitrators[12].

The limitations of these feats of social engineering-soon became apparent. As soon as crises hit the government, it was forced to deal with the existing reality, which meant acknowledging the influence of leaders of popular Islam and relying on them. This

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[11] Ibid. p.55.
[12] Ahmad, Muhammad Abd Al-Gafar (1987) *As Sudan Wa-L-Lwhda Fi-L- Tanawwu (Sudan and Unity in Diversity)*, p.57.

happened during World War I and again after the nationalist stirrings in Egypt and the Sudan just after the war. This policy of accommodation with traditional religious forces was also facilitated by the willingness of the traditional leaders to co-operate, which must have indicated to the British administrators that they had been mistaken about popular Islam[13].

The modern state as introduced by the colonial administration represented (as in most other Muslim countries), both an exile and a prison for the traditionally constituted Muslim society. It created a new unsettling environment and a novel field of action, imposing novel demands of interaction with unfamiliar forces and groups, while at the same time cutting the Muslims off from the wider Muslim community and locking them within the boundaries of the new polity[14].

The resulting disorientation helped to magnify local, ethnic and sectarian differences, and consequently made the traditional leaders easier to manipulate. After the government abandoned its early futile attempts to suppress popular Islam in favor of orthodoxy, local actors were left with a freedom comparable to what they enjoyed under traditional Islamic rule. But this also meant that the threat to the position of each actor came from his rivals rather than from the state, which could now affect to act as a neutral arbiter, wooed by all parties. At the same time, the parochialism of traditional actors, which justified the collaborationist stance came under threat, because the social developments brought about under the auspices of the modern state were eroding the standing of the traditional leaders[15].

Education was probably the area in which government policy had the most significant long-term impact. The government's educational policy, unfortunately, was impeded by short-term economic and security considerations from becoming an effective tool in the battle with Islam for the hearts and minds of the people. The central objective of the educational policy (which started to take shape with the establishment of the Gordon

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[13] Ibid, p.60.
[14] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (1991) *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, p.27.
[15] Ibid.

Memorial College in 1902), was to create a class that would have the rudiments of a common language with the new rulers, and help with junior tasks in the administration. However, the resources deployed for this enterprise were meager and the government had to allow traditional education to continue, since it cost nothing and was thought to be conducive, if correctly administered, to the immunization of the population at large against fanatical calls to rebellion. But there were worries that too much of the vaccine of religious education could itself generate fanaticism, so it had to be tempered with such secular subjects as arithmetic[16].

The concept of limited or controlled education was problematic, because incorporating ignorance deliberately into education proved a contradiction and a difficulty to implement it in practice. It involved an almost impossible requirement of delimiting the borders of forbidden knowledge, and was thus counterproductive in the long term, as was the naive dream of creating a sort of quarantine against contagious Egyptian nationalist sentiments, Islamic militancy, local popular Islamic influences and useful modern education, all at the same time. Even when such endeavors achieved partial success (e.g., in the south), this proved negative in character. Undesirable social developments were arrested, but so was all development.

In the mid-1930s the government appeared to accept their mistake, and tried to turn education into a positive tool of indoctrination with Western values and ideas, instead of the crude manipulation it had been. Caning was abolished, and a semblance of dialogue was begun, which aimed at promoting Western civilization and some current Western theories and modes of thinking, such as Darwin's theory of evolution. But this effort was rather half-hearted and came too late to influence the re-emerging nationalist movement[17].

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[16] *Tatoor Al- Altalem Al –Tagreer Al- Watnee (Development of Education –The National Report)*, 2008, Pp. 3-4.

[17] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*, Pp.144-52.

The Sudanese intelligentsia which started to emerge in the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century was still dominated by the traditionally educated, in whose ranks could be included teachers and Shariah judges who studied traditional Arabic and Islamic studies (with a curriculum influenced by modern Islamic reformism) at Gordon Memorial College. In their education and cultural outlook, these early intellectuals were an extension of the Egyptian intelligentsia. Mostly Egyptian teachers taught them more or less the same curricula and they were weaned on Egyptian newspapers and books. The influence of Abduh's Islamic modernism was equally felt among them, through their readings, their teachers and the reformed education, which was offered. Consequently, pan-Islamic sentiments were strong among them[18] .

The neo-classical literary renaissance, which swept Egypt towards the end of the nineteenth century, had its impact on the Sudanese intelligentsia, and poetry became an important vehicle for self-expression. Before 1913 the main forums of cultural exchange were, besides the mosques, the annual celebrations of religious festivals, such as the Muslim New Year *(Hijra)* and the Prophet's birthday celebrations *(Mawlid)*. In 1913, a new forum emerged in the shape of Raid al-Sudan (more widely known as al-Raid), a newspaper set up by a Greek merchant. Under the editorship of Abd al-Rahim Mustafa Qulaylat, a Lebanese poet who worked for Sudan Railways, the paper became the cherished medium of the intelligentsia at the time. On its pages, two generations of intellectuals met to air their views. The paper stimulated cultural activity by sponsoring poetry competitions and its editor put the Sudanese in touch with the happenings in the Muslim world in a deliberate attempt to foster pan-Islamic sentiments. When World War I broke out, the editor made no secret of his sympathies with Turkey, and was expelled from Sudan in 1917 when his criticisms became too trenchant.

By that time a definite polarization was starting to take place between the nascent pan-Islamic radicalism of the rising generation and the quietism of the traditional leaders. The collaborationism of the latter came under attack from the younger militants who did not

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[18] Ibid, p.147.

share the parochialism or the defeatist pessimism of their elders, and could not therefore accept their justifications for co-operating with 'infidel usurpers'[19]. The army and the new educational institutions transformed the worldview of the new generation, endowing it with a camaraderie that became the nucleus of Sudanese nationalism. Their limited education was just enough to make them catch a glimpse of the vast opportunities denied to them, and made them acutely aware of the logical inconsistency and moral depravity of the collaborationism of the Islamic leaders. The recurrent themes in their interventions were the remembrance of past Islamic glory and the censure of traditional Muslim leaders who did not live up to the ideals, which in the first place made that glory possible [20].

The differentiation between the two trends occurred gradually. At first the two currents combined and intersected, but the divergence of the two attitudes was clear enough, and it did not take long for them to polarize into two antagonistic schools of thought. The struggle between these two currents culminated in the revolution of 1924, which was led by an assortment of radicals who included junior clerical staff, ulama, merchants and army officers[21].

What united these groups was a common outlook, shared frustrations and shared hopes generated by the ferment Egypt, which promised imminent liberation. The small merchants and junior ulama shared much by way of education, culture and social background with the budding intelligentsia and junior army officers.[22] These groups were literate enough to be exposed to the influence of Egyptian newspapers, and had also sufficiently ascended the social scale and acquired sufficient knowledge of the workings of the state and the economy to discover the tantalizing rewards which were just beyond their grasp, denied them by the monopoly of power and foreign trade by aliens. The educated also acquired a grasp of Western culture and world affairs to discover that

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[19] Makkee, Hassan (1990) *Tareekh Harakat Alikhwan Almoslemeen Fee Al Sudan 1946- 1969 (The History of Muslim Brother's Movement in Sudan)*, p.54.

[20] Ibid, p.55.

[21] Ibid, p.57.

[22]The shared social origin of the majority of activists was the object of scathing criticism in a pro-government newspaper, which derided the hooliganism of these 'commoners', Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan,1900-1969 (The History Of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*, p.163.

British rule stood condemned by its own Western standards. At the same time they were sufficiently steeped in Islamic culture to find it difficult to submit to foreign subjugation by non-Muslims[23].

The central demand put by the agitators was for a united Nile Valley, free from British influence. This attitude was dictated by the cultural affinity felt by most activists with Egypt and the inspiration of the Egyptian nationalist movement. The Sudanese radicals also naively believed that the Egyptian army units stationed in Sudan could easily be used as an instrument of liberation from British rule. As it turned out, Egyptian succour was not forthcoming, and Sudanese army units that wanted to join the expelled Egyptian units in November 1924 were annihilated. The revolution was ruthlessly crushed, and peace was restored. The militants were brutally awakened to the limitations of their power, and they, like the Mahdist militants some two decades earlier, were forced to engage in a bitter rethinking of their position.

Neo-Mahdism

The transformation of Mahdism was a most interesting development in its own right: like the rise of Islam before, Mahdism was in a sense the 'creation of a world'. New groups emerged united by new principles and relations with the destruction of the Mahdist state the political basis of the Mahdist order was removed. Its economic and spiritual foundations were undermined, but as the spiritual bond was the primary basis of the Mahdist community it managed to survive and even witness a revival. The Ansar (the Mahdi followers) were weakened, demoralized and impoverished, but they were still there, defined by their faith and their traditional social and economic links. The government, however, took as many precautions as it could to prevent an effective revival of the Mahdist movement. The painful reconstruction and redefinition of the movement in the changing circumstances testifies to the resourcefulness of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, who charted its new course and managed to maintain the initiative vis-à-vis

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[23] Ibid, p.163.

other Sudanese actors for most of the period of the latter half of the Condominium[24]. From the start he consistently stuck to a policy of appeasement of the British authorities. He justified this course, which so flagrantly contradicted the dictates of original Mahdism, by pointing to the limited choices available to the movement as it emerged from the ruins of shattered Mahdist dreams. He was aware that most Mahdists either chose what he regarded as a suicidal confrontation or opted for withdrawal from the world altogether, awaiting the 'second coming of Christ', popularly believed to follow shortly on the footsteps of the Mahdi. Sayyid Abel al-Rahman, by contrast, was neither suicidal nor a recluse. He wanted to adapt the movement to the new environment and was aware that he needed British tolerance, if not co-operation, to achieve his goals. He decided that he was prepared to give whatever it took to get this co-operation[25].

His was not a unique dilemma in the Muslim world at the time. The British had found pliable allies elsewhere in such militants as the Wahhabis of Arabia and the heirs of Dan Folio in Nigeria. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman belonged to this club, a factor of which he was aware when he later developed monarchical ambitions. For most of these men, the alliance with the British was dictated by a realization of their powerlessness and by the desire to forestall local rivals, but the line between tactical retreat and abject collaborationism is a thin one, especially when one believes that he will never, transcend his state of weakness. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman and most of the monarchs mentioned earlier ended by giving too much, to the extent that what they set out to protect appeared to have already been ceded to the enemy. Indeed, as his movement emerged to full political recognition in the mid-forties, it became an umbrella for the 'real' collaborationists: secularist top civil servants who had served the Condominium faithfully and ended-up sharing more with their British seniors than with their more militant compatriots[26].

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[24] The British-Egyptian rule.

[25] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement in Sudan, 1900-1969)*, Pp. 70-71.

[26] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan,1900-1969 (The History Of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*, p. 74.

It is simplistic, however, to argue from this, as many of the Sayyid's opponents and even some observers have done, that his movement was not more than a British creation. It is true that Sayyid Abd al-Rahman benefited a great deal from government support. His economic power and the establishment of Ansar colonies as a socio-economic basis for the resurgence of the Mahdist movement depended on government support (active one at times). He would also have been unable to publish newspapers if he did not appear to serve the policy of the government against nationalist militants. But the government had given more support, and more consistently, to his main rival, Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, without comparable results. The authorities also continued to mistrust Sayyid Abd al-Rahman until the very end, his untiring protestations of loyalty notwithstanding. It was Sayyid Abd al-Rahman's entrepreneurship, and even more importantly, his firm grip on the Ansar movement and the consistency of his policies that gave the movement its shape. The Mahdist movement was potentially explosive and, under lesser leaders, would probably have disintegrated under the intense internal pressures generated by such a compromise. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman avoided such a course in spite of numerous provocations and temptations[27].

The Ansar movement, however, retained its own objective existence, complete with its latent Mahdist ideology. Again Sayyid Abd al-Rahman managed to adapt this ideology. The most important (and controversial) addendum he made to Mahdism was to project the Mahdi as the forerunner of the Sudanese nationalist movement, a problematic assertion to say the least, but one that has since become an integral part of modern Sudanese 'orthodoxy'. No less significant was his conversion of the movement to pacifism by reinstating the old Sufi formula, which interpreted jihad as 'inner struggle against the self.' He also justified his economic activities and quest for prosperity (anathema to his father) by arguing that economic might was an essential tool for jihad in the new age. The amassing of wealth approached in the right way, he maintained, had now become a necessity to achieve the objectives of religion. Jihad could be waged by new peaceful means in political', economic and other fields.

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[27] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969).*

The organization Sayyid Abd al-Rahman set up initially comprised mainly primitive zealous immigrants from West Africa and from local tribes in western Sudan, who worked the Sayyid's plantations on the White Nile. But even in the early period some staunch Mahdist families rallied to Sayyid Abd al-Rahman and were helping him secretly in his years of need and poverty before World War I. By the time he had emerged as the dominant national figure in the early 1930s, his support spanned a wide spectrum of tribal and urban notables who supplemented the core of his support among the Ansar masses. He was also successful in winning over a sizeable section of the intelligentsia, whom he started to court as early as the post-World War I period. His own person was the pivot of the whole structure, because he controlled the wealth and was the object of loyalty. The bulk of his followers would never ask him for an explanation for his decisions, while the small group of modern-educated followers depended on his good will for access to the masses, either through him or through the publishing house he controlled. The Sayyid, however, was a shrewd politician who took great care to take the views of the more prominent among his followers into account[28].

The neo-Mahdist synthesis of militant Islamic revivalism and sober pragmatism effected by Sayyid Abd al-Rahman was more apparent than real, however, and therefore precarious. It was practically a momentary secularization justified by the external pressures of a superior military power. Religious and political beliefs were compartmentalized, so that neither impinged effectively on the other. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman remained the link between the two. He was the locus of allegiance of the militant Ansar masses who took the Mahdist message literally, and used his influence to keep them in check while he dexterously maneuvered to achieve his political objectives, mostly in complete disregard for, if not in contradiction with, the dictates of his avowed ideology. The Umma party, when it emerged in 1945, mirrored this schism. The party had a clearly secular programme hinging on securing independence. It was maintained mostly by secular-minded activists, but its support and local machinery remained largely

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[28] Abd Algader, Al Tejanee (2010) *Nizaa Alislameen Fee Al Sudan Mgalat Fee Al Ngd Wa Al Islah (The Conflict of Islamism in Sudan: Essays in Reforms and Critique)*, p.42.

Ansar. There was a great deal of latent tension in this position that was bound to erupt at any time, and it did.

The Re-Emergence of the Nationalist Movement

The post-1924 crackdown mainly targeted modern-educated people who were seen by the government as incorrigible troublemakers. By extension, education was severely restricted and employment outlets for graduates similarly hit. Fewer schools meant fewer jobs for teachers, while job openings in the bureaucracy for Sudanese were deliberately reduced through the extension of native administration in accordance with the philosophy of indirect rule[29].

Indirect rule was a reflection of a philosophy that, under the guise of respect for indigenous culture actually meant keeping people backward so as to make their subjugation that much easier. The British administrators brought with them to Sudan their experience with the rebelliousness of the educated classes in Egypt and India, which made some wary of extending education in Sudan beyond the bare minimum necessary for a smooth and economic running of the country. Later, under the influence of Lugard, the prophet of Indirect Rule, this attitude became more refined. Kitchener's hostility to attempts to force upon a semi-oriental half-civilized people an elaborate system of education suited only to a highly civilized Western nation, later became pessimism, about the civilizing value of Western European ways, and concern that modernization did not seem to bring happiness to colonized people. But the practical results were the same for the objective was not to disturb the existing order of things and to minimize the inevitable disturbance likely to follow from the installment of the colonial order. The reaction to the events of 1924 removed any such philosophical niceties and led the administration to embark on an unashamed vendetta against the educated[30].

In the end, salvation for the frustrated intelligentsia came from within the self-contradictions of the government policies, which made these policies unsustainable. A

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[29] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement in Sudan, 1900-1969)*, p.109.
[30] Ibid, p.111.

policy that depended on the arrest of growth and development was essentially self-defeating. Also the blanket onslaught on just one section of the agitators of 1924 showed the limitations of government power. The government reduced the only area in which it could exercise maximum control by cutting back on education and military training for officers, but it could not control the growth of other social groups such as traders, ulama or Sufis. Thus, the very measures taken widened the area, which lay outside government control, as well as restrained economic growth, another factor which weakened the government.

Education became the hottest political issue in the 1920s and 1930s, the theme of patriotic songs, the driving force behind the establishment of study circles and the incentive for daring and desperate escapes to Egypt. In an atmosphere where education was wrested against the will of the government, the usual question about the impact of Western culture in a Muslim society became largely irrelevant. There was no loyal Westernized class to be pitted against the more traditional elements. Here, the educated were forced to be more radical and anti-Western than their uneducated or modestly-educated compatriots, and they were able to condemn their elders not in the name of the new civilization, but in the name of Islamic values. The original Arab-Islamic culture thus had no rival from a vigorously promoted Western culture, but in fact was reinforced by the link-up with Egypt into which the educated were pushed and/or attracted[31].

The modest level of education attainable, however, meant that the educated did not have much of a command of their indigenous culture either, and were in no position to repel a serious challenge from Western culture, had this challenge been mounted.

In the ranks of the resuscitated nationalist movement, which emerged in the study circles and journals of the 1920s and 1930s (culminating in the founding of the Graduates Congress[32] in February 1938), there were, therefore, only a handful of activists who

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[31] Ahmad, Muhammad Abd Al-Gafar (1987) *As Sudan Wa-L-Lwhda Fi-L- Tanawwu (Sudan and Unity in Diversity)*, p.57.
[32] Ahmed Kheir, a famous Sudanese lawyer, graduated from GMC, wrote a series of essays in the journal Dawn mobilizing the graduates of GMC to establish the Graduates Congress.

exhibited a semblance of pro-Western sentiments (Bashir, Mohamed Omer, 1980: 128). Apart from the members of the al-Fajr group (who were a small but vocal minority) almost all activists maintained a radical anti-Western, pro-Arab sentiment, and were jealous about their Arab-Islamic identity. Even the members of al-Fajr could not be considered secularist in any positive sense of the term. For them, Islam continued to be the basis of the ethical system, and they did not propose any alter-native ethical foundation at any time. The thrust of their argument was to advocate a more rational and flexible interpretation of Islam. Like all Islamic reformists, they insisted that this was the essence of orthodox Islam and lashed at the traditional Sufi leaders for deviating from it. In this, they joined with the Egyptian intellectual movement as it was swinging back from its secularist adolescence, and avidly read al-Aggad, Taha Hussein and Haikal in their Islamic phase[33].

The nationalist movement which thus emerged had some continuity with the movement of the 1920s. Some of the activists of the twenties figured prominently in the ranks of the new movement, which also reaffirmed the pan-Islamist and Arabist aspirations of the earlier generation. When the Graduates Congress was formed, the first memorandum it submitted to the government (in April 1939) called for reforms in al-Mahad al-Ilmi, the main institution of religious learning. The second memorandum, submitted three months later, also on education insisted that education in Sudan must be oriented towards giving the country an Arab-Islamic character. In the famous memorandum of 1942, the demands for ending subsidies to missionary schools figured prominently reflecting the persistent hostility to the institutions, which figured frequently in the Congress propaganda. Another memorandum submitted to Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Maher on his visit to Sudan in 1940 asked for support for Islamic education in the north and South. Congress had also made a point of according special attention to the Qur'anic schools as part of its efforts to expand education. Many new Qur'anic schools were established, old ones were revived and subsidized, and the Congress leaders rekindled the symbolic 'Qur'anic Fire'

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[33] Despite the fact that the Islamist movements and parties in Sudan use in their conflict with Marxist in Sudan the idea that Marxist include the denial of god, significantly a lot of Marxist in Sudan practice the Islamic rituals just like other Sudanese, and adopting Islam in the sense of Sufism e.g., most of the Marxists in Sudan are supporters of Mahmud Mohammad Taha – the leader of Gamhoreen ideology.

that used to mark some great Qur'anic teaching centres in the past. In addition, the hostility to the sectarian leaders and what was seen as their subservience to the colonial administration continued unabated in the same radical vein of the 1920s. Egypt also maintained for a section of the new movement its romantic, almost mystical value as the symbol of nationalist aspirations.

However, even those who represented the generation of 1924 had mellowed a little in their attitude towards the Sudan government, and their attachment to Egypt and enthusiasm for unity had dampened somewhat. Nevertheless, an undercurrent of sympathy for Egypt remained strong. Although almost all those who had experienced Egypt first hand came back disappointed, Egypt was still an idealized concept: that far-away place where university education was for the taking. It was the citadel of Islamic culture that stood as a guarantee against the submersion of Sudan in the jungles of heathen Africa, the source of magazines and books that were the intelligentsia's link with the world beyond, the cradle of the nationalist movement and its heroes. And since 1937 Egypt no longer became so distant, once it opened its doors to scores of students who for the first time were availing themselves of that most precious of commodities for the educated, higher education. This powerful-latent pro-Egyptianism was brought to the fore in the early 1940s when the hard-line attitude of the Sudan government dashed early hopes for fruitful co-operation with the British[34].

The Emergence of Political Parties

The rebuff by the British government, symbolized by the rejection of the 1942 Graduates Congress memorandum, also did away with the last chance that the nationalist movement could be enticed into a radically secularist stance. The leaders of the graduates' movement were intensely aware of their Islamic identity, but they were not Islamic militants. In fact, most of them had abandoned the traditional practice of religion as reflected in daily prayers and other rituals. The more senior among them were imbued with the secularist outlook from their long association with their British masters. British

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[34] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement in Sudan, 1900-1969)*, p.135.

encouragement could probably have made it possible for them to strengthen their influence vis-a-vis the radicals. The rebuff did the opposite[35].

Without the support of the British, the graduates movement was forced to resort to the masses, and the masses, the graduates were aware from very early on, understood only the language of Islam. In a self-confession of weakness the educated elite did not choose to construct their own Islamic movement, but were content to use the existing religious structures, controlled by traditional leaders. The idealism of the early years was dropped, and the graduates were forced into co-operation with the Sayyids whom they were sure stood condemned by the criteria of true Islam as well as by those of modernity. By the conversion of the radical graduates to the idea of 'tactical collaborationism', this type of maneuvering became from then on a national ethic. Sudanese politics would become an endless web of tactical alliances for decades to come. This at first reflected two important facts of Sudanese life, the nature of the social fabric and the ethics governing it (which favored compromise and rejected sharp divisions), and the fact that all political actors were fighting for survival. The first element reflected the tribal basis of Sudanese society. A tribe, as a voluntary association of sovereign individuals, cannot survive if individual members become too assertive of their claims. The second element reflected the nature of the political field of action, in which all competing groups were mainly concerned simply to establish their rights to-be there[36].

At first, the graduates were attracted to Sayyid Abd al-Rahman who was aggressively promoting himself for national leadership. By contrast, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman's main rival, Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani - the leader of khatmiyya-was habitually withdrawn from politics and not as generous nor as active as his opponent. The Khatmiyya, as the collaborationist movement par excellence, had never openly defied authority in Sudan. Its only act of defiance (against Mahdism) reflected less of an exception that it seemed, since it was an act of support for the authority against rebels and was largely negative. The leadership and style of Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani reinforced this orientation, and the

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[35] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (1991:32) *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan.*
[36] Ibid, p.34.

movement was conspicuous by its absence from the national political scene, leaving the initiative, even in the demonstration of loyalty to the regime, to others. Only one thing was capable of galvanizing the recluse Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani into action, and that was jealousy of the phenomenal advance of his bitter rival, the Ansar leader. He was prepared to give his 'always tacit' support to any move that could thwart this advance. And since Sayyid Abd al-Rahman had effectively hijacked the call of 'the Sudan for the Sudanese' (discredited though it was by its use of government supporters against the radicals of the 1920s), Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani was forced to search for a winning cause to put him back into the race. He later found it in radical nationalism and its calls for unity with Egypt. For the first time the Khatmiyya discovered that there was capital to be made out of opposition. The inclination to Egypt was also favoured by the ulama cosmopolitan component in the neo-Sufi origins of Khatmiyya, which also lay at the basis of Khatmiyya opposition to Mahdism[37].

The younger radicals, who at first shunned the two Sayyids and their supporters, had earlier backed the pro-Khatmiyya faction of senior bureaucrats in the early thirties in the battle to control the Omdurman Graduates Club[38], but the outcome of the attempt was a disappointing failure. The association with Sayyid Abd al-Rahman in the late 1930's and early 1940's also proved difficult, and the Sayyid distanced himself from the radicals when they proved too difficult to control, thus sending them back to Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani.

Two main blocs were created by this polarization towards the mid-forties: the Mahdist-supported Umma party and its allies on the one hand, and an assortment of rival political groups united by support for some form of unity with Egypt, on the other. The latter groups were backed by the Khatmiyya, and the main party among them was the Ashiqqa party, led by Ismael al-Azhari, who was president of the Graduates Congress from 1942. In the early stages the unionists had the edge because the battle was fought mainly in an

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[37] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (1991) *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, p.37

[38] At that time the movement of the new Mahdism became very active that the British administration can not avoid confront its leader, thus the Saied Abd Alrhman tried to find the support among the graduates, and the Said Ahmed Al Mergani was very aware about the danger of this step, that's why he tried to do the same thing.

urban setting. Sizeable sections of the urban population were under the influence of Khatmiyya, while the educated and the workers swung behind the unionist cause and opposed the pro-British stance espoused by the Umma. The Umma, by contrast, enjoyed support from tribal leaders and senior bureaucrats, such as most of those who controlled the government machinery in the bureaucracy and Native Administration. Its position was further enhanced by the founding of the Advisory Council in 1943 and the Legislative Assembly in 1948. Both were boycotted by the unionists, but were packed with Umma supporters, and several Umma supporters were elevated to ministerial rank after 1948, thus enhancing their prestige and that of the party[39]

The Umma party lost in the first election held in 1953, but won its struggle for Sudan's independence. Changes in the political situation in Egypt (with the 1952 coup and subsequent power struggles), and the receding of the threat of Britain imposing its allies as rulers against radical nationalist wishes, caused the victorious National Unionist Party (NUP)[40] to opt for independence. This was followed by a rapprochement between the two traditional blocs (Ansar and Khatmiyya), which led to the ousting of NUP leader Ismael al-Azhari from the premiership in June 1956, just six months after he led the country to independence. The demise of Azhari ended the bid of the educated class to take an independent stance and starkly demonstrated its paradoxical position. The educated manned the vital posts in each party's machinery, articulated its demands and ideology, and ran the state apparatus for the victorious side. Their support for the unionist cause and the Khatmiyya was decisive and appeared to show their ability to shape opinion in the country as a whole[41].

It was clear, however, that in spite of its ability to lead public opinion, the intelligentsia had not been able to form an independent power base, nor forge direct links with the

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[39] Ahmad, Muhammad Abd Al-Gafar (1987) *As Sudan Wa-L-Lwhda Fi-L- Tanawwu (Sudan and Unity in Diversity)*, p.59.

[40] The leader of NUP was Ismaiel Al Azhari, the hero of Sudan independence. Ismail Al Azhari strived for unity between Sudan and Egypt after independence. However, in a very historical moment, he surprised the whole Sudanese, Egyptian, and the British, and announced Sudan's independence and hoisted the flag of Sudan. He is like Mahatma Gandhi of Sudan.

[41] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*, Pp.292-32.

masses independent of the mediation of religious leaders. The weakness of the educated class was an objective reality. They were numerically, economically, and even educationally weak. However, in the end it was the acceptance of this class of its limitations that was the decisive factor. It was unable to produce leaders such as Saad Zaghloul[42] or Gandhi, who could appeal to the masses across the cultural divide. This could not be ascribed to the specific circumstances of Sudan, nor to its backwardness. In 1924, a much smaller and weaker group had managed to mobilize the masses not only without the help of traditional religious leaders, but against the express directives of those leaders. The activists of the 1930s and 1940s, on the other hand, always sought the easy way out, eager to achieve quick results by the shortest and easiest routes (Ibid, p.33).

However, speaking of the modern-educated people as a class, or even as a group, may be misleading. This group of people, sometimes described as the new middle class, is characterized by its technocratic ability: the mastery of those skills, which are essential for the running of the modern state and society. Its special significance in such countries as Sudan stems from the scarcity of these skills at a certain juncture in time. Their status is of necessity eroded with the advance and spread of learning. This group shares a broad outlook, which in the case of Sudan was strongly influenced by the emergence of the graduates movement primarily as an interest group, but one that nevertheless shared a vague self-image as the 'enlightened class', the class which alone knew what was good for the country and was also the guardian of its interests.

The testing of these common perceptions by circumstances soon led to a divergence in outlook, and once this class ceased to act in unison, its significance was by necessity eroded; if not eliminated. Once the skills possessed by the technocrats ceased to be the monopoly of a certain group, these skills could no longer be the source of undisputed power. In Sudan, the educated class was much closer to the people, because the process of differentiation that created it was neither deep nor of long standing. This made it even less significant as an independent force. As the graduates' movement emerged slowly

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[42] One of the greatest national movement leaders in Egypt.

from the squabbles of the 1930s and 1940s, its agenda was dictated by its weaknesses. The questions asked were not what to do, for what reasons and how? But who to turn to for help: Egypt or Britain, Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani or Sayyid Abd al-Rahman? When the situation changed and the real questions of what to do and how to do it had to be faced, these leaders were short of answers.

Yet the triumph of liberal nationalism as the guiding principle for Sudanese politics was in itself a triumph for the educated class, which formulated these alien ideas into local language. This stance was potentially secularist, and the alliance with the traditional religious leaders did not by itself negate the secularist content of liberal nationalism. The political discourse of the traditional leaders was not couched in religious form any more than was that of the educated class. In fact, the educated resorted to religious language more than their traditional opponents, especially when they criticized the latter. This very reticence of the traditional religious leaders, nevertheless, spoke of their vulnerability on this front. Their legitimation was at bottom religious, but the evocation of religion would have demanded from them a stance they were not prepared to take. As long as their opponents did not use religion as a weapon, and as long the masses continued to believe that what is religious is by definition what, the traditional leaders said, then they were safe. However, if it was possible, successfully, to challenge the leaders' delimitation of what is religious, then the system would be seriously threatened. Again this was negative and precarious secularism, it is secularism by default. This peculiar situation owed its existence, in part to a feature of the political field of action mentioned earlier, political groups were fighting for survival in an environment dominated by an alien secularizing power. As long as this situation held, the action of political actors centered on attempting to shelter their existence from possible threats by the dominant power, and for this, religious language was of little use.

The Left

An attempt to transcend this whole set-up in the direction of a more positively secularist stance was made when Marxist groups emerged in the mid-1940s and began to play an influential role in national politics. The Marxist movement, which initially was strongest among the Sudanese students in Egypt, achieved a remarkable success by controlling Sudanese student unions in Cairo and at Gordon Memorial College in 1947. For the Sudanese students, the most attractive feature of Marxism at that time (apart from being the next logical step in the radicalization of a nationalist movement molded on Western models) was its formula for resolving the paradoxical commitment of the radicals to unity with Egypt. Outside the particular historical context, which has made unionism synonymous with patriotism, the call for replacing one foreign crown with another looked an embarrassing self-contradiction for people campaigning to win their freedom. The appeal of a pro-independence movement that was free from the suspect link with the British was thus understandably powerful[43].

In addition, Marxist theory appeared to the young Sudanese radicals, as it did to many others in the Third World, as a powerful tool for understanding and relating to the new world, in which they found themselves. Its discovery must have been an exciting and reassuring experience, especially when advanced by men such as the Egyptian Jewish millionaire Henri Curial and the British conscript Herbert Storey, who created the Sudanese communist organizations in Cairo and Sudan, respectively. These men came from the heart of the establishment that had previously appeared alien; formidable, oppressive and inaccessible to the young students. Now the establishment's Achilles' heel seemed finally to have been found [44].

At first the Marxist groups were largely informal associations, and their ideology reflected a similar fluidity. Early leaders saw no clear demarcation lines separating them from the unionists and actually resisted calls to set up an independent party. By 1949 the Egyptian-educated radicals, led by Abd al-Khaliq Mahjoub who had been groomed for

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[43] Makkee, Hassan (1990) *Tareekh Harakat Alikhwan Almoslemeen Fee Al Sudan 1946- 1969 (The History of Muslim Brother's Movement in Sudan)*, p.141.

[44] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (1991) *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, p.41.

years by Curial, managed to take control of the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation (SMNL), after a series of purges. Under Abd al-Khaliq SMNL pursued the radical and aggressive line that would characterize it from then on. The cornerstone of the new strategy was the 'national front,' which was thought to be a tool to pool the support of the workers, peasants, students and the professionals for the aims of the movement. The new leadership set up a series of fronts, starting with the National Front, followed shortly by the United Front for the Liberation of Sudan, then the Anti-Imperialist Front, but none of these groupings appeared much more than another name for the communist party. In fact, the ideological hard-line adopted by Abd al-Khaliq, which insisted on taking pride in unadulterated commitment to Marxism-Leninism, militated against the success of the front tactic, since the communists were not prepared to tolerate any ideological deviation, let alone pluralism, within their ranks[45].

Abd al-Khaliq's[46] style of leadership was a unique blend of ideological purism and political pragmatism, internal democracy and stern discipline. Like the British before him, he felt more sympathy for the traditional and rural groups than for urban groups or the educated classes, of whose shallowness and ideological muddle he was utterly contemptuous. This style, however, was condemned as autocratic and continued to be challenged from both radicals and pragmatists, sometimes simultaneously[47].

Even without the endemic factionalism to which this led, the communists in Sudan faced a potentially hostile environment. The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) remained for most of its history a tiny group, with membership restricted to students, educated middle-class elements and a few workers. Like similar parties in the Arab world, it was handicapped by the Muslim environment in which it emerged, and by the cosmopolitanism that put it at odds with the Arab nationalist feelings in their heyday. The ideological rigor of SCP was an additional handicap. In their early years the communists provoked a head-on clash with Islamic beliefs and institutions before the 1965 rude shock of dissolution, which

[45] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (1991) *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, p.42.
[46] The leader of the Sudanese Communist Party.
[47] Abd Algader, Al Tejanee (2010) *Nizaa Alislameen Fee Al Sudan Mgalat Fee Al Ngd Wa Al Islah (The Conflict of Islamism In Sudan: Essays In Reforms And Critique)*, Pp.12-13

forced them to rethink their stance. These very attacks provoked a defiant reaction among their more religious colleagues who later responded by forming the modern Islamist movement, which became the communists' most formidable opponent[48].

With the exception of the communists, no group explicitly rejected Islam as a basis of the political system and none lost any opportunity in affirming commitment to Islam. But the group that could have given a positive content to this commitment, the Ulama, was even weaker in Sudan than in other Muslim countries.[49] The fact that an independent Ulama class did not emerge early in Sudan was due to a peculiarity of Sudanese Islam: the unity of Ulama-Sufi tradition in the Sudanese Islamic experience. In Sudan most early institutions of learning were set up by men or families of Sufi-Ulama, and state patronage during the Funj Sultanate was directed to this class. Under the Egyptian administration an opportunity presented itself for the emergence of an independent Ulama class on traditional lines, when the government set up state-run schools and encouraged students to go to al-Azhar. Muhammad Ali and his successors were, however, not keen on promoting a powerful independent Ulama class. Some independent-minded Ulama were actually harassed by the authorities. But the opening up, to Egypt had a significant impact on Sudanese society, as shown by the divergent reactions to Mahdism, even within the same family of religious notables, depending on the strength of Azhar links. It could generally be said that Azhar-influenced Ulama were more consistently hostile to Mahdism than traditional Sufi leaders, although the Sufi establishment as a whole was not very sympathetic either. The Mahdi himself was hard to classify in this Sufi-Ulama dichotomy. The central role he accorded to prophetic visions in his doctrine made him more of a Sufi than a traditional alim-reformer, although in another sense he embodied the peculiar Sudanese Sufi-Ulama amalgam. He opposed popular Sufi practices and advocated a return to the early sources of Islam, just as Ulama reformers had always done.

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[48] Abd Algader, Al Tejanee (2010) *Nizaa Alislameen Fee Al Sudan Mgalat Fee Al Ngd Wa Al Islah (The Conflict of Islamism In Sudan: Essays In Reforms And Critique)*, p.213.

[49] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan: The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.139.

British policies aimed to promote an official Ulama class. During the Secularism period, the reproduction of the Ulama class, which used to take place by means of transmission of learning between individuals in private settings, was made more formal and centralized. Ulama were encouraged to teach at the Omdurman mosque instead of in their private homes, leading eventually to the emergence of a property regulated institute, Mahad al-Mashiakha al-Ilamiyya (later known as al-Mahad al-Ilmi), (the scientific institute) - and by scientific they mean the Islamic knowledge - to cater to religious education nationally. Most graduates of the Mahad ended up as teachers in Qur'anic schools or mosque preachers, while a few were employed in junior posts in the Shariah courts. The number of regular students in the Mahad rose from 138 in 1917 to 787 in 1935, and in the thirties the Mahad became a symbol of the nationalist struggle. A sizeable section of Gordon Memorial College graduates also belonged to the Ulama class, but a schism developed between this group, influenced as it was by reforming modernism, and the Mahad graduates, who were more traditionally inclined.

In the 1940s and 1950s, the ranks of the Ulama were swelled by graduates of Azhar, where the majority of students who subsequently went to Cairo were educated. The potential influence of this class was great since they, unlike the bulk of the educated class, were in direct contact countrywide with the masses on a daily basis. Their actual influence was minimal, however, because they were economically weak, dependent as they were on government subsidies and donations from the community. Neither were they organized, their dispersal in rural communities thus turning into a point of weakness rather than strength, due to lack of effective communications and of a unified leadership. In addition, most Ulama were not independent from the dominant Sufi Islamic establishment, adhering to one sect or another. Even after the Mahad became the Omdurman Islamic University in 1966, and hundreds of graduates arrived from al-Azliar and Dar al-Uloum in Cairo, the traditionally educated proto-Ulama class remained weak and disadvantaged in employment opportunities and social influence.

The Ulama group, nevertheless, had a potential ally in the small Sufi groups and established Ulama families around the country. The small Sufi groups, such as the

Sammaniyya, various Qadiriyya factions and the Majdhoubiyya, were influenced by neo-Sufism and continued to move along the route charted by its pioneers. Sons of Sufi shaikhs went to al-Azhar or the Mahad, leading to the eventual emergence of a new influential Sufi-Ulama class. This was reflected in the developments within the Tijaniyya order, which started mainly as a rural based order in western Sudan, but ended under the control of urban-based merchant-Ulama groups. The Tijaniyya, which seeped into western Sudan from North Africa with the neo-Sufi wave of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, became the dominant order in Darfur prior to the destruction of the Fur Sultanate in 1916, but was displaced by neo-Mahdism by the 1930s. Mahdism made inroads into the rural strongholds of the order, and an influx of West African immigrants tipped the balance in favour of Mahdism. In the 1940s the centre of the tariqa shifted mainly to urban centres and spread all over the country. Attempts to create a unified leadership failed due to jealousies and lack of endorsement from the key traditional centers in the West. In 1952 a semblance of unity was momentarily created with the convention of the first annual conference for the tariqa and the election of a leadership body of twenty-five people headed by Shaikh Majdhoub Mudathir al-Hajjaz. Unfortunately, this unity move was short-lived, failing to obtain universal approval. Politically the Tijaniyya were split in the 1940s along rural-urban lines; between Ashiqqa (for the urban groups) and the Umma (mainly from rural groups in the west). But the dominance of Ulama-Sufi elements in major centers of the order, especially in urban areas, was firmly established[50].

Other ulama and Sufi groups took different sides in the political polarization in the 1940s and 1950s, according to traditional family ties or other factors. The Majdhoubiyya and Ismaeliyya sided with the Mahdists, following their tradition. The majority of the rest sided with the unionists, since enmity to Mahdism was one of the few unifying bonds within Sudanese Sufi Islam. But the Khatmiyya were not dear to them either; which is why they were easily wooed by Azhari (himself a descendent of the Sufi-ulama leaders of the small Ismaeliyya tariga in Kordofan) in his attempt to counter the influence of the two national tariqas.

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[50] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (1991) *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, Pp. 44-5.

The Islamic Revival

It is ironic that the early stirrings of the Islamic revival in Sudan were conditioned by the British policy, which favored Ulama and the expansion of Islamic education and combated the excesses of Sufism, because this was precisely the policy advocated by Islamic reformists led by Mohammad Abduh. When Abduh visited Sudan in 1904, one year before his death, he was well received there, but the real impact he had was through one of his main disciples, Shaikh Mustafa al-Maraghi, who was appointed Qadi al-Qudat (Chief Justice in the Shariah courts) in 1908 and served there until 1919. Shaikh Maraghi later became an important figure in the Islamic revival movement in Egypt, twice serving as Shaikh al-Azhar, but more importantly he became a tutor to King Farouq and wielded considerable influence in the country in the early 1940s together with the then prime minister Ali Maher. He was also close to the Muslim Brotherhood, and active in the pan-Islamic *Khilafa* movement of the 1920s[51].

During his stay in Sudan, Shaikh Maraghi contributed significantly to the revival of Islam. He supported Sayyid Abd al-Rahman and apparently admired the Mahdi, because on his advice the *ratib* (prayer book) of the Mahdi was legalized again. His Mahdist sympathies must owe their origin to another curious bent of British policy: the Board of Ulemas established in 1902 was made up primarily of former Mahdist officials, and its head, Shaikh Muhammad al-Badawi, was another patron of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman. Shaikh Maraghi must have been influenced by his contacts with his fellow-ulama. It was no surprise then that the nationalist movement of the 1920s was informed by a revisionist view of Mahdism, recasting it into more orthodox light. The main motivating force behind the early rumblings of the revival was another product of British policy, the Shariah section of the Gordon Memorial College, which taught potential judges religious subjects along reformist lines, together with some secular subjects taught in English. This was the explosive formula that produced the new generation of Islamic activists everywhere, and it was natural that the fiery poets of the second and third decades of this century, with their Islamic revivalist rhetoric, hailed from this group. A section of the

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[51] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969), Pp. 241-59.

traditionally educated groups also appears to have had independent links with the Islamic reform movement in Egypt[52].

The regrouping of Ansar under Sayyid Abd al-Rahman's leadership, and the revival of Sufi tariqas under the umbrella of the pax Britannica established by the Condominium, also represented - a significant development because they created well-organized groups with Islam as the main bond uniting them. In the early 1940s the two major tariqas established their own youth groups to promote themselves among the young, before being stopped by the government. However, these groups were only potentially Islamic, since in the prevailing political conditions it was deemed unwise to engage in overt political action. Also, longer the `exceptional situation' persisted, the more their political quietism tended to take the form of an accepted tradition, difficult later to disturb. Sporadic overtly activist Islamic movements did emerge, nevertheless, but they remained isolated and limited in their impact.

To make up for the increasing irrelevance of the Mahdist uprisings, new forms of specifically Islamic activism soon sprang up which were at first connected to Syrian and Egyptian teachers and officials. The editor of al-Raid who preached Syrian had been expelled in 1917, and the contributions of Maraghi and other Egyptian Ulama were rather low key. The teachings of Mohammad Madi Abul-Azaim, an Egyptian who came to Sudan in 1902 and eventually became a lecturer at the GMC, were another matter. He was considered to have been influenced by Wahabi ideas, since his followers manifested violent opposition to some popular customs that they deemed un-Islamic. He seemed, however, more keen to promote a kind of neo-Sufi organization. His followers came mainly from the rural areas of eastern Sudan, but he was expelled in 1915 when he apparently moved into higher gear, and engaged in what was termed 'sedition' in Khartoum.

Abul-Azaim's impact was minimal, and the Azmiyya tariqa he established did not amount to much, but his activities played some role in linking a long tradition of Islamic

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[52] El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (1991) *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sud*an, Pp.50-59.

militancy in eastern Sudan. The same area which witnessed the growth of the militant Majdhoubiyya, and later its Mahdist transformation, remained receptive to similar ideas. The influx of Wahabism proper in the late 1930s and early 1940s came through this route, when the first Ansar at-Sunna groups were established in Port Sudan, before spreading to the rest of the country. Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, the movement of Ali Betai also flourished among the Beja tribesmen. Betai, who made his base in Hamash-korib, led a campaign to purify Islam from popular Sufi practices, establishing schools for the Quran connected to agricultural colonies. He taught an ethic of cleanliness, hard work and learning, and was admired, even by secular elements among the educated Beja, for his opposition to the obscurantism of the Sufis [53].

After a lull in the 1930s, the 1940s witnessed again some feverish activities in the Islamic field. Groups such as the Islamic Missionary Society, the Reform Society and other Ulama groups were springing up everywhere. An 'alim named Hassan Tanon established a party called the Party of God in that period, but did not seem to have been taken seriously. This was also the period with Ikhwan (Muslims Brothers) propaganda started to have an impact in Sudan. The mid-1940s also witnessed the emergence of Mahmoud Mohammad Taha's Republican Party, a militant Sufi-fundamentalist group. Taha advocated restructuring Islam along genuine Sufi lines, by imitating the Prophet and accommodating modernity creatively within an Islamic framework. His ideas increased in sophistication later, but in those early years he was admired by young Islamists for his combative style, while arousing the hostility of Sufi leaders by touching the same raw nerve the Mahdi touched a century earlier in claiming a direct divine mandate to reshape Sufism, (and the totality of Islam). However, these specifically Islamic orientations did not receive sufficient attention, mainly because the main leaders of Islam, the men who set the agenda for political discourse, did not consider it a priority. It remains significant, though, that such discourse could not be dismissed completely by these leaders, for they simply succeeded in delaying the time when they would have to face a widespread return to fundamental Islamic principles.

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[53] Makkee, Hassan (1990) *Tareekh Harakat Alikhwan Almoslemeen Fee Al Sudan 1946- 1969 (The History of Muslim Brother's Movement in Sudan)*, p.279.

The general trend of political, social and cultural developments in Sudan up to the first half of the twentieth century strengthened potentially Islamic actors. Mahdism had put Islam firmly on the agenda, and forced both opponents and supporters to express themselves in terms of Islamic symbols. The British were forced to deal with this reality, and their perception of modernization as a threat allowed the traditional forces (which were predominantly religious) to develop without serious competition from Western-influenced secularizing forces. Sudanese society was thus relatively shielded from the disruptive impact of aggressive modernization and Westernization. The attempted Christianization of the south did not change the general picture, since it was seen by the nationalists as a treacherous and insidious war on Islam, and thus contributed to the strengthening of the Islamic sentiments of the northerners. Within the south itself the exclusion of Islam was only achieved at the cost of considerable underdevelopment, and thus the southerners were not in a position to play the influential role played by Christians in such predominantly Muslim polities as Nigeria, Senegal or Lebanon. The paradoxical result is that the stronger the south grows, the more the Muslim northerners feel challenged, and the stronger becomes their attachment to their religious identity.

When the delayed process of modernization was finally allowed to get under way, it occurred in a national and international context that was not hostile to Islamization. In fact, it favored it. There is a correlation between the centralization of religious authority and the spread of education on the one hand, and the strengthening of rigorous orthodoxy ('fundamentalism') on the other. As better communications and educational facilities ended the isolation of local communities, the influence of local religious leaders was eroded in favor of more orthodox and learned actors.

Parochialism, in this respect, favored secularism, as the conduct of traditional leaders in the national context has shown. But unlike secularism, which rests on deeper philosophical assumptions about the indeterminability of truth, parochialism simply refers to actual limitations on access to truth. For the village faki, the faki in the next village is his equal, and neither possesses the whole truth. For the 'alim conversant with

the Qur'an, this logic is unacceptable. Also within the context of the wider community, a unity around the minimum requirements of the faith has to be achieved if it is to function as a community. The negative secularism of the parochial community is therefore precarious, and collapses as soon as the possibility of access to the truth presents itself.

In a similar fashion, the indifference of the traditional religious leaders to the strict demands of orthodoxy could be challenged. One could deduce the precariousness of Sudanese secularism from its very dependence on ignorance and parochialism to survive. It was not an attitude that transcended Islam towards a post-Islamic way of thinking, but one that has not yet confronted it. Its dependence on Islam for legitimation meant that it was moving head-on towards this confrontation.

In conclusion, then, the question of legitimacy in Sudan remained unresolved, since the whole system appealed to Islamic sentiments while avoiding giving itself an Islamic content. The parochialism of local and tribal leaders gave way easily to the religious claims of the national religious leaders, but the challenge to the latter from the perspective of the educated elite was not equally forthcoming.

As result, precarious compromises that did not address the real issues have dominated. The elite did not offer an alternative basis for social values, while the religious leaders insisted that they accepted modern values only in so far as they did not contradict Islam. No party bothered at first to elaborate the basis of its position or define its boundaries. The tension between two tentatively coexisting systems remained latent simply because all parties took refuge in vagueness and were trapped into their inadequacies.

History of the Islamic Movement in Sudan: The Emergence of Ikhwan (Muslim Brothers)

To start probing about the Sudanese political movements and structures of organizations, objectives and tools of achieving their goals, it is noteworthy to mention that communist activism emerged in Cairo paving way for the modern Islamist movement that can be traced back to Egypt of which one was the early Nubian members of the Emption

Movement for National Liberation (EMNL) in addition to other leftist groups and the Ikhwan recognized as members in these groups for their right rather than representatives of Sudan. Historically, the Sudanese section of the EMNL was set up only in 1943, whereas the first Sudanese member, Abduh Dhahab, was already central committee member at that time with a role comparable to that of Dhabab for the Islamists was Jamal-al-din al-Snhouri of Dongola who visited Cairo as a student in the late 1930s and stayed to join the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in the early 40s and which becomes the nucleus of an Ikhwan movement among Sudanese students in Egypt. Further and more significantly, he occupied a key position in the parent movement itself, taking charge of the Africa section in the Muslim world liaison office.

Like Dhahab, he acted as an emissary to Sudan from the early 1940s as many students were in contact with Ikhwan allowing some of them access to Ikhwan general headquarters for participating in Hassan-al-banna's popular Tuesday lecture as per their normal day-to-day Sudanese practices at home. It is true to state that, religious speeches by popular preachers were an important attraction; Ikhwan feted unionist delegations visiting Cairo as part of their support for the unionist cause and in line with their general practice of establishing contacts with visiting Muslims dignitaries. This helped to avail constant contacts between Ikhwan and the visiting resident supporters of the unionist cause without abandoning their allegiance to the Ashiqqa party, to which most of them belonged.

However, with the polarization within the unionist movement in the course of 1946 and the subsequent rise of the left , it became clear that the old stance was no longer tenable, those who were strongly anti-Marxist started to explore avenues beyond their traditional unionist allegiances grouped together within the league of Sudanese (LSS) which split from the communist-dominated Sudanese student's union (SSU) in 1947, these students started to fall back on their old contacts as they groped about for support with a leading figure in LSS, Sadiq Abdullah Aabd al-majid, who came to Egypt in 1940 to became LSS president in 1943. By the time, he contacted Sayyid Qutb (Halwan) long before the later joined Ikhwan, met Banna and some members of Ikhwan. Saddiq applied to Ikhwan and

Al-Azhar during his anti-communist campaign of 1946-7 and joined the movement himself along with a few other colleagues.

The Movement's membership increased during the 1947-8 events in Egypt, which brought Ikhwan to prominence in Egyptian political life and highlighted their heroism during the Palestine campaign, despite the fact that their members remained small and LSS maintained its status of a mainly unionist anti-communist coalition as students conveyed the Movement's message to those with whom they came in contact during their holidays and vacation and warn them of the threat and hazards of communism in an attempt to recruit them to Ikhwan in the final setting. An example of such practices could be referred to by a group of such characters such as al-Sami Muhammad Ibrahim, a former teacher at Madani intermediate school who had gone to Cairo for further study, visited Hantoub in 1948 to see some of his former students and friends, and most prominent among whom were Babikir karrar and Mohammad Yusuf Mohammad.

On track with such groups' activities, as the Hantoub group admitted to the Gordon memorial college (GMC) the following years, they were shocked to find it completely controlled by communists and that other parties or groups had no voice with unionists were almost non-existent. In 1948, the first elections to be contested on party lines, the communists won control of the union, displacing the unionists who had traditionally dominated the college for the communists dominating the theatre, the trade unions led the opposition to the legislative assembly, instigating strikes and demonstrations with the only option left for communists to follow an aggressive approach of alienating many in the process. In this context and to deal with the matter, karrar suggested to Muhammad Yusuf that they revive the idea relayed to them earlier by al-Saim. A group of six people came together to draft a constitution for the movement, which was called harakat al-tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Movement- ILM).

The consequences were that the movement set its goals the revival of Islam and the establishment of a new world order transcending the prevalent east-west dichotomy and Mohammad Yusuf wrote the communiqué launching the movement expressing that the

world was divided into two big warring blocs and that the third force which should have stood up to these two giants and a part from them was ineffective with its energies dissipated and wasted; an imperative to set up a new order based on Islam, because Islam was the only force capable of standing up to world powers. The starting point would be to set up an Islamic state based on Islamic socialism and to liberate Sudan from colonialism as a major move to pave the way for an Islamic state in the country. All activities were still secret however; their existence and orientation soon become known to the communists who dominated the campus as propaganda against the ILM started, branding the terrorist Muslim brotherhood group. The identification of the new movement with Ikhwan was based on the experiences of the young Marxist in Egypt where as members of EMNL, they came into conflict with the Ikhwan and were made aware of the grave danger such movement posed to their cause. The campaign was apparently so effective that ILM had to deny any affiliation with khwan, directing the attention of potential recruits to its own official name and its programme, nature and objectives without any mention of Ikhwan. On the other hand, the main attraction of Marxism for the young radicals of Sudanese society was its status as liberating theory that seemed to link them to a whole new world. The Islamists reaction was not directed at this particular feature, but at another major feature in Marxism, its western-oriented aspects.

The rejection of the old patterns in the name of a new all-encompassing theory that promised to show the way to the future was a different experience, vindicating the person and endowing him with a mission in the very process of succumbing to the temptation. Former western theories, although widely accepted by the intelligentsia before, did not have this same quality of linking the ideals of anti-colonial struggle and self-assertion with the acceptance of western norms and values. It seems contradicting to note that communism in Sudan grew mainly among the westernized and western-educated middle class, and has itself become an important agent of westernization. At universities and others, communists became the direct medium of western forms of art and western norms of behavior, and in turn used this as a tool of propaganda and political action encouraging visual arts along western traditions, western music and dance, and such celebrations as western-style birthday, Christmas and New Year's Eve parties. Left forces played a major

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role as transmitters of western norms, values and the dissemination of western culture and values. But, a strong reaction prevailed, especially among students of rural origin for such a reaction to become the focus of the counter-movement which used Islam as a point of departure. Students who formed the core of the counter-movement were normally those who still had strong moorings in the local culture, especially those coming from traditional religions families or from the countryside. The rest of Sudan remained largely dominated by a rural-based culture, which was strongly felt even in the capital. In this respect, the urban-rural divide was an important aspect of school life in those transformative years, where students of rural origins were ridiculed by their sophisticated fellow-students and as a defense sought consolation in striving for academic excellence a situation graphically described by the well-kwon writer and novelist al-tayyib salih, a founder-member of ILM who later quit the movement. A fact to be recognized is that, the early Ikhwan recruits came mainly from unionist backgrounds because Ansar strongholds were not exposed enough to modern education in that period. Nevertheless, Ansar appears to have been the closer of the two groups to Ikhwan, in view of its rural bias and its being more in tune with the militant message preached by Ikhwan. Another factor may have been that students with Ansar backgrounds seemed to reflect more the influence of their upbringing than the relatively urbanized and secularized Khatmiyya.

As the ILS emerged in the Sudan of the early 1950's, it was not only dominated by the traditional forces but also accommodated many other small groups professing to work for Islam who claimed affiliation to that modern Islamic movement par excellence, the Ikhwan. The way the influence of the Egyptian Ikhwan movement started to seep into Sudanese society is itself indicative of the nature of the Sudanese society and the kind of problem it posses for modern Islamic activists. The early Ikhwan propagandists, whether delegates sent expressly from Egypt or Egyptian members assigned to civil or military service in Sudan, were received enthusiastically wherever they went, since people did not distinguish them from traditional itinerant preachers who always received a warm welcome. The political dimension of the Ikhwan call does not seem to have been appreciated by those who accepted them, since most of those who pledged allegiance to

the movement maintained their earlier political affiliations where the idea of Ikhwan appeared to have spread gradually through numerous channels.

The first moment of conscious and organized action took place in November 1945, when an Egyptian lawyer named salah abd al-sid visited Sudan in the company of jamal al-snhouri presenting speeches at the graduates club in Omdurman and turned the country to promote the organization. Several loosely structured groups emerged which declared their affiliation to the Ikhwan, but members retained their membership in the Ashiqqaa party. Shortly after that an Egyptian army offer managed to form another group by making the circuit of mosque in Omdurman, its members also retaining their allegiance to the Ashiqqaa.

In 1946 an official Ikhwan delegation was sent to Sudan to meet with the above-mentioned group, toured the country to found new branches in the north and east as the influence of these visits was well-felt, and the real work for the propagation of the movement continued to be performed by Egyptian Ikhwan members resident in Sudan, who recruited and organized members, sometimes with the help of Sudanese student on vacation from Egypt. The nature of this enterprise was such that there was no unified organization that grouped all those who claimed to belong to the Ikhwan. Further, with the passage of time, ILM members started to get in touch with the various Ikhwan affiliated groups outside the university. By the early fifties, the dominant figure in these circles was Ali Talb- Allah, who acted as liaison with the Egyptians. Later, Talb- Allah was arrested in November 1947 and given a ten month jail sentence for possessing an unlicensed pistol. While in prison, he received a letter from Hassan al-banna, appointing him general supervisor of the Ikhwan in Sudan and member of the constituent assembly. In 1953, Ali talb-Allah set up his headquarters in Omdurman, a rudimentary organization was started and the literature of the parent organization becomes the basis of education and indoctrination.

At first only karrar was in contact with talb- Allah. But in 1951 changes were taking place in Egypt, the effects of which were being felt in Sudan. The wafdist government

that replaced Ibrahim abd alhadi's anti Ikhwan cabinet rehabilitated Ikhwan somewhat, and even the trails of Ikhwan cast them in a heroic light, revealing their contributions in the war in Palestine and their anti-British guerrilla activities in the Canal Zone. Affiliation to Ikhwan thus became a source of bride, so that the ILM group no longer had to deny its relationship to Ikhwan. Banna's *rasail* (messages) became an important part of members' education in the Sudanese movement. Many students spend long nights making copies by hand, until some were learned by heart. But, many of those who joined ILM in this phase did not even hear about its original name, but considered themselves to be part of Ikhwan. This brought the group closer to other currents of Ikhwan, and ILM members acted in co-ordination with the wide Ikhwan current, especially since the college students were in a better position to carry out the task of the education and indoctrination of ordinary members. The college itself was a centre of Ikhwan cultural activities (lectures, debates, etc.), and in addition the majority of adherents remained students since the movement had not by that time made much headway outside student circles.

The identity of the emerging movement came to be defined in conflict. First, the ongoing battle with the communists forced the movement into solidarity with Ikhwan grouping outside and eventually with the Egyptian parent group. Secondly, there was also internal conflict about the character of the movement, its goals and its methods. The first internal problem arose towards the end of 1952, when Karrar temporarily deserted the movement in protest against too close an identification with the Egyptian Ikhwan. Then in august 1953, Karrar came back and engineered a coup calling for a meeting of about forty of his followers and managed to get a resolution passed reasserting the original name of the movement (ILM) and its objectives. The name of Ikhwan was rejected and the original Islamic socialist line was reaffirmed. The movement was said to be on the side of workers and peasants and in favor of drastic land reform and nationalization. The members of the earlier leadership who were not like-minded were dismissed and a new leadership under Karrar installed. Apparently Karrar managed to gain substantial support for his measures; since a counter-meeting called a few days later did not resolve the issue. The leader of the opposing faction, Yusuf Hassan said, resigned during the second

meeting. However, in the end a compromise was reached a general conference to be called to resolve the issue. It was a rich experience for many members, leading a great number to resign. The movement fell into disarray as opposing factions vied with each other for the loyalty of rank-and- file members in anticipation of the congress. Several factions emerged in the course of the struggle, two ILM factions just mentioned, the loose grouping centered around Ali Talb- Allah and the Omdurman cultural club group. Talb-Allah was kept in the dark about the proposed conference, leading him to challenge its legitimacy and boycott it, since he considered himself the sole, legitimate leader of the movement, in view of his investiture by Banna himself.

The First Congress

On 21 August 1954, a conference was finally convened at the Omdurman Cultural Club adopting resolutions which would give the mainstream modern Islamist movement its shape. First, it was decided to adopt officially the name *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoon*, (Muslims brothers) which represented the triumph of those who identified strongly with the parent Ikhwan movement and felt pride in its history and achievements. This same group also argued that the link with a movement with international dimensions satisfied pan-Islamist aspirations and caused the young Sudanese movement to profit from the experiences and support of a more established organization. In a clear concession to the Karrar group, it was resolved that the movement was to be 'a Sudan-based' movement (i.e. not directly connected with the Egyptian group) and that it should maintain its independence from all other political parties. Another move which should have pleased the dissidents was the official removal of Talb-Allah as figurehead of the movement. In addition, the movement decided to campaign for an Islamic constitution. A new body was set up to head the movement in the form of an executive whose leader (designated as 'secretary') was Muhammad Khair Abd al-Gadir.

An immediate and clear reflection of this meeting, known as *The Eid Congress* (religious festival) holiday was to create splits in the movement in two directions. The radicals led by Karrar rejected the resolutions and left to form their own organization, al-Jama'a al-

Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) which adopted a radical programme with strong socialist overtones. The conservative pro-Egyptian group also rejected the conference resolutions, questioning its very legitimacy. Such a move re-opened a chapter that the Eid Congress was meant to close Egyptian Ikhwan had claimed jurisdiction over the Ikhwan groupings from the mid-forties. The first converts who welcomed this new breed of itinerant preacher were made to swear allegiance to Banna, and it was Banna who later appointed Talb-Allah to head the Sudan branch of his movement. Talb-Allah derived this status and his legitimacy from being the liaison with Egyptian Ikhwan members resident in Sudan, who were playing a central role in directing the movement in its early years.

Consequently, in 1952, an Egyptian Ikhwan delegation came to Khartoum and held lengthy talks with the ILM, which was even then - emerging as a major faction among the Islamist groupings, and urged them to merge with the parent organization following the example of other Ikhwan offshoots in Syria, Jordan and Iraq. But the call was rejected on the grounds that the move was unnecessary and could alienate members with Ansar backgrounds. When Talb-Allah contested the resolutions of the Eid Congress and appealed to Ikhwan leadership to arbitrate, the issue of affiliation was brought up again. Two successive missions were sent to mediate in early 1955, as result of which and alongside the resignation of Abd al-Gadir that same year, tensions were reduced. The new executive comprised some of Talb-Allah's supporters; its leader, al-Rashid al-Tahir, was known for his strong sympathies for and close ties with the Egyptian parent organization. Al-Muragib al-'am (the general supervisor) was designated as the new leader, the first time such a title was given locally to an elected leader of Sudanese Ikhwan, signifying a major step in the development of the movement. For the first time Ikhwan represented a united movement under one recognized leader for the movement to be more effective and influential in the community looking forward for achieving political objective in the final setting.

The Search for a Political Role

It is true to state that ILM achieved a significant success within three years of its establishment by wresting control of GMC students' union in a landslide victory in February 1953. Nine out of the ten seats on the executive were taken by ILM candidates, with the tenth going to an independent, a significant blow for the communists who had dominated the GMC students' union since 1947. They have since been organizing unions in the secondary schools in preparation for, the setting up of a national students' union. Al-Rashid al-Tahir became the first Ikhwan member to head the union, and he set out to exploit this platform zealously. In that year and the following one the union played an influential role in national politics, pressuring all political parties to accept the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1953, and isolating the communists who opposed the agreement. The control of the union at this particular time brought Ikhwan close to centre-stage during a crucial period not only in Sudan's history, but also in that of Egypt and the region as a whole. The July revolution in Egypt was taking shape and the Sudanese Islamists, taking their cue from their Egyptian counterparts, supported it with enthusiasm. The energetic al-Rashid al-Tahir emerged as a leading political tactician for the movement as he applied himself to the task of attempting to influence events. He quickly managed to establish close working relationships with the men of the revolution starting with Salah Salem. Al-Rashid at-Tahir led a delegation to Egypt in 1953 where he met with the revolutionary leaders and made the customary pilgrimage to Ikhwan headquarters. AI-Tahir was impressed with the work of the young Ikhwan officers, and he and his colleagues became ardent supporters of adopting Ikhwan style and methods. Subsequently, al-Rashid al-Tahir and his colleagues held frequent meetings with Salem during his many visits to Khartoum; Salem was aware of al-Tahir's Ikhwan sympathies, for a demonstration led by Ikhwan greeted him when he visited Khartoum during the early 1954 crackdown on Ikhwan in Egypt. AI-Tahir delivered a strong protest which Salem promised 'to relay to his colleagues'.

During this period, relations between Ikhwan and other political groups were, apart from hostility to communists (and probably because of it), either cordial or indifferent. As the

movement arose mainly within the modern educated sector, it tended to go along with unionist views, a trend enhanced by the connection with Egypt through the parent Ikhwan. In the 1953 elections most Ikhwan voted for the National Unionist Party (NUP), although no directive was issued to this effect and many Ikhwan of Ansar backgrounds remained unenthusiastic about unionism, especially after communist slogans pointed out that unionism was not the only patriotic option. The events of 1954 removed any trace of equivocation on this point. The executions of Ikhwan profoundly shocked the Sudanese, a sentiment on which the Umma party did not hesitate to capitalize. Demonstrations and marches were organized to protest the crackdown, giving Ikhwan a major opportunity to get acquainted with the tactics of popular mobilization for a cause which was essentially their own. Even unionists participated in the marches and the religious services organized to mark the occasion, but the episode brought Ikhwan especially closer to the Umma. Siddiq al-Mahdi, president of the Umma party, issued a communiqué warning pro-Egyptian parties in the Sudan of the fate of 'their brothers' there if they persisted in supporting unity with Egypt, while the Umma joined Ikhwan in forming the Front against Military Dictatorship. The Umma newspaper opened its pages for Ikhwan to vent their anti-Nasser feelings, and from then on Ikhwan became vehement champions of independence. In January 1955, the students' union, which was headed by Ikhwan member Dafa'allah al-Haj Yousuf, issued a communiqué in support of independence.

Ikhwan support for the independence cause was, however, more deep-rooted, and it is ironic that this group which was supposed to be pan-Islamist and to lean towards Egypt never seemed to have put its heart into the unionist cause. Apart from the impact of the developments in Egypt, Ansar as a specifically Islamic and militant group appealed to young activists, many of whom had Ansar backgrounds anyway. However, the crucial factor appears to have been the rural bias in both groups. The relations between the two parties passed through many paradoxical shifts. After the 1954 crackdown on Ikhwan in Egypt a rift developed with the unionists, most of whom supported Nasser. Although the communists joined Ikhwan in condemning Nasser and the persecutions, this did not put Ikhwan in any mood for co-operation with them or tolerance for those who did.

In addition, the Umma led the opposition to the Islamic constitution inside the constitution commission. Their spokesman described those agitating for an Islamic constitution as 'rabble' and was subjected to a bitter campaign by Ikhwan. By contrast, the unionists, led by Azhari, unequivocally supported the Islamic constitution and Azhari himself led a strong anti-communist campaign. In addition, Azhari was subjected to a bitter campaign from Egypt when it became clear that he had shifted his stance on unity, which led all NUP'S propaganda machinery to turn its fire on Nasser, and occasioned a rapprochement with Ikhwan. However, NUP support for the Islamic constitution did not mean full agreement with Ikhwan on this issue. Some unionists tried to give a secular interpretation for their stance, which prompted a reaction from Ikhwan, the two sides came closer to each other after Azhari's ousting in 1956.

The Ikhwan shift to the independence camp coincided with a general change of mood in the country and the Ikhwan contributed significantly to the overall change by deepening the awareness of the events in Cairo for serving their own goals despite the fact that they remained an obscure group far removed from the centre of action. The visits and tours of prominent Egyptians were well received, but in the context of the existing tradition of itinerant preaching, rather than as a call to a new movement. Even the agitation which Ikhwan organized on behalf of their Egyptian colleagues, and which had a strong impact on public consciousness, was received in the context of tradition that was revolted by the persecution of 'Muslim brothers'. The popular response to the crackdown was also, influenced by the reaction to the removal of the popular Neguib, who was much, loved in Sudan and came to symbolize the revolution to most Sudanese. Apart from this only the activities of the Omdurman Cultural Club (OCC) presented the Islamists to society at large furnishing lectures, educational or sports programmes to attract the youth were met with little success vis-à-vis its limited objectives.

By late 1955, with the movement's house finally put in order and under the leadership of al-Tahir, Ikhwan moved to put some of programmes into practice affected by three major factors that shaped the movement's perspective: its anti-communism, its opposition to Nasser and its ultimate goal of setting up an Islamic order. After it became clear by late

1955 that independence was coming, Ikhwan hastened to form the Islamic Front for the Constitution (IFC) in December 1955. Many groups united by the ideal of an Islamic constitution represented a pressure group in a loose organization with Ikhwan at its centre, set up their headquarters in the building of the Islamic Missionary Society in Omdurman. The idea of IFC draws to some extent on the experience of the 1954 agitation against Nasser: it is an attempt to mobilize independent forces for a limited cause. The idea was then to set up a broad coalition to support the cause of independence. The main parties were quick to take it over with the Khatmiyya setting up the National Front in 1949 and the Umma organizing the Independence Front in the 1950s. Within the Islamist circles, the Syrian Ikhwan was the first to come up with such an idea, when they set up the Socialist Front 1949. But the most direct influence must have been the communists, whom Ikhwan were monitoring closely and striving to emulate. The IFC also produced a 'model constitution', which envisaged a parliamentary system with regional devolution in a unitary state paying particular attention to economic organization, reflecting the influence of the socialist phase of the movement. Land reform, public ownership of mineral resources and nationalization of banks, Islamic reforms.

What is known about Ikhwan was far from well-organized group at the time, and in no position to set up and control a nationwide organization with members mostly students or recent graduates, the oldest being in their mid-twenties, with little membership in general and limited resources. IFC, being a single-issue pressure group, was pushing an idea that had powerful emotional appeal, an idea, which few could dare resist, in a political system where the legitimation of the two major parties was decidedly religious. The activism of IFC posed to the Sudanese Muslims in an acute fashion the problem facing Muslims in general in modern times, what does it entail to be a Muslim? And the issue had explosive potential within a system that has never actually posed to itself the question of transcending Islam. Nevertheless, the endeavors of IFC ended in initial failure when the Constitution Commission (CC), set up by the government to draw up a permanent constitution, rejected the proposal of an Islamic constitution by a decisive margin in February 1957. Such provoked an angry reaction from IFC and its supporters. Al-Ikhwan

al-Muslimoon brought out a special issue condemning the vote and engineered a fierce campaign, supported by NUP, who were in opposition.

A success was witnessed regarding the campaign appears to have worked where the two sayyids (masters) issued a joint communiqué on 20 February, 1957 declaring that, 'It is our opinion that the state in Sudan should be an Islamic Parliamentary Republic, and That the holy Shariah should be the source of legislation in the country's constitution'. They were followed quickly by Prime Minister Khalil and other leaders. Earlier private communications with the two sayyids could not produce any clear-cut commitment for the idea of an Islamic constitution. Hassan Mahjoub, invited to address an IFC rally, told those gathered that nobody really cared about what they were saying since most people were actually ignorant of the basics of Islam. Apparently, politicians did not then think that this movement had any potential, but as the campaign gained momentum everybody began to take the matter differently.

Ikhwan itself remained on the fringes of national politics focusing on putting the Islamic constitution on the agenda and forcing all the major political groups to commit themselves to it did not translate into practical results. No Islamic constitution, or any other replacement for the 1956 Provisional Constitution, was agreed upon by the time the squabbles between rival politicians brought in the army in 1958. In the 1958 elections, Ikhwan decided not to field candidates and were content to pledge support for candidates who declared their commitment to art Islamic constitution. A split developed within the ranks of IFC over the issue, leading eventually to its demise. The leaders of IFC wanted to field candidates, but the internal Ikhwan leader ship met and decided against it, arguing that IFC was a non-partisan group and any involvement in electoral politics would reduce its appeal. The concern of failure was more likely, could be construed as a referendum on the Islamic constitution and thus deal the cause a decisive blow. A mid such fears and concerns, IFC fielded at least two candidates, which led to a crisis that was compounded by squabbles between Omar Bakheit al-Awad, the ITC Secretary and al-Rashid al-Tahir, the Ikhwan leader. Al-Tahir complained that the IFC threatened to submerge the original organization and criticized al-Awad for acting as if IFC represented the whole of Ikhwan

with and immediate result was the breakup of IFC, since al-Awad resigned from Ikhwan and dedicated himself completely to 1FC, the two groups drifted apart, and IFC lapsed after it lost the full support of Ikhwan directly at their rear position.

The political atmosphere in which Ikhwan started functioning was dominated by endemic instability as factionalism tore NUP apart and a precarious coalition ruled after Azhari was toppled in July 1956 for Azhari to lose the support of Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani pushing the Khatmiyya to set up their own party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) that came to power in coalition with-the Umma. Once independence was achieved, he acquiesced and formed a national unity government in February, but by that time he had already alienated the Khatmiyya leader, insisting to teach him a lesson.

The Umma-Khatmiyya coalition ended a period which started in 1935, when the educated class began to present itself as the voice of the Sudanese people and the repository of 'enlightened opinion' a section of which managed to manipulate events successfully and actually to use the dominant forces, including Egypt and Britain, to achieve its objectives. But this game had its limitations. In 1946 Congress lost its national pretensions when the Mahdists boycotted it. From then on, the Ashiqqa party became just another party competing with others for mass support, and could no longer claim monopoly over 'enlightened opinion.' The bulk of the educated class rallied to the Ashiqqa and other unionist groups, and thus remained largely united and influential in public opinion, as was proved by the results of the 1953 elections. It is worthy to mention that, the coalition partners were united only in opposition to Azhari otherwise; they were divided by old sectarian animosities as well as by deep differences on internal and foreign policy issues. The divide was obvious, PDP was pro-Nasser and a touch radical, while the Umma remained conservative and pro-Western.

Furthering political maneuvers, in February 1958, another election was held. The coalition partners abolished the graduates' constituencies, increasing geographical constituencies from 97 to 173, with a heavy bias towards their rural strongholds. The aim was clearly to cut at the heart of NUP support in urban areas and among the educated, but

the election results were still not decisive, with the two parties having again to form a coalition government. The result was that, Azhari's NUP appeared to have done well, maintaining solid support within the broad coalition he had forged from the educated class, town notables, merchants and small religious groups are among his major supporters.

The disparity between the two coalition partners persisted, compounded by rapid deterioration in the economy and intensive pressures from their respective foreign friends. Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil found his hold on power threatened from two sides. On one side rumors were rife about a possible re-merger between NUP and PDP, which would have meant a certain collapse for Khalil's government. On the other, Sayyid al-Siddiq al-Mahdi was pushing for the dissolution of the coalition and the formation of another with NUP, which he believed would have been more stable and compatible. Upon deliberations and consultations with some of his friends abroad, and with the approval of the two sayyids, Khalil, who was also defense minister, ordered General Ibrahim Abboud, the Commander-in-Chief to take power by 17 November in order to-forestall the new parliamentary session scheduled for that day and thus foil the attempt to topple his government.

Under First Military Rule

Al lkhwan al-Muslimoon of 17 November 1958 labeled carried an editorial signed by al-Rashid al-Tahir titled On the Edge of the Precipice, calling for Sudanese democracy. Al-Tahir lamented the endemic political instability which had plagued the country since its independence and described the frustration of the hopes people had pinned on the democratic system and on its ability to solve their problems. Mentioning that there is no question that the democratic system is the best humanity had succeeded to devise after a long struggle. But disaster comes always at the hands of those who abuse the system and cause it to degenerate into mere vacuous forms ... As a result, all the advantages of the system disappear and only its defects remain visible. The ruled then rush all over the place in search of an alternative. He mentioned that this happened in Egypt, in Iraq and

in Pakistan, and will happen in every country which misunderstands and abuses the democratic system.

An initial endorsement of the regime by Ikhwan reflected the stance of most major parties and public opinion at large at that time where a part from the communists, every group either welcomed the coup or maintained guarded silence. Abdallah Khalil had skillfully managed to sway the two sayyids behind the coup to the extent that both issued a statement endorsing the takeover, which was all the soldiers needed. During the course of 1959, however, disillusionment with the junta was setting in among all its former supporters, primarily because the military derided to rule alone and thus, disappointing all who had hoped the coup was in their favor. In addition, the junta appeared in no hurry to return the country to civilian rule.

For the Ikhwan opposition, it remained muted at first but, on 10 September 1959, the Ikhwan-dominated Khartoum University Students Union (KUSU) handed a memorandum to the junta calling for a return to civilian rule. The memorandum does not appear to have been imposed, although it reflected the general mood in Ikhwan and the country. It called for the formation of a civilian government representing all the political forces in the country to draw up a new constitution, which should aim to remedy the defects that caused instability under the older one setting-off all restrictions on the freedom of speech and association. The immediate reaction of the junta was briefly to arrest the union leaders and ignore this and other likely demands.

On the other extreme, the Ikhwan leadership, on the other hand, was contemplating more drastic action. Al-Tahir had been conspiring with some officers in the army of different persuasions to topple the regime by force. The coup, which was eventually unsuccessfully attempted on 9 November 1959, generated a bitter internal controversy, hinging on the idea of the coup itself, the participation of communist elements in it, and the fact that al-Tahir's colleagues were not kept adequately informed. AI-Tahir was caught red-handed and he was pleaded guilty at his trial and sentenced to five years in prison, while five officers among the coup leaders were executed. The coup and its

failure delivered a heavy blow to the movement. In addition to the shock felt all over the country at the executions representing the first ever political executions in independent Sudan, the movement was left in disarray by the loss of its leader and the controversy that arose around it. It could not be avoided that, the coup attempt reflected to a great extent al-Tahir's own radical outlook and the gulf that separated him from most of his colleagues. Differences between al-Tahir and other colleagues started to emerge in 1956. Friction between him and IFC secretary al-Awad alienated some IFC supporters. Later, in early 1958, al-Tahir came up with a suggestion of running on an Umma ticket for the February parliamentary elections, an idea supported by Turabi but rejected by the majority of al-Tahir's colleagues. AI-Tahir became progressively alienated as his stance drifted to the left, and his views became more in tune with those of the communists and the Karrar group than with his more immediate colleagues who were mostly on the conservative side.

The coup was planned in co-operation with nationalist and even communist officers; it was modeled on Nasser's coup and was not meant to engineer a speedy return to civilian rule. Rather, the aim was to set up a radial regime aimed at achieving 'social and economic transformation,' and to end subservience to colonialism. In this, al-Tahir did not reflect specifically Ikhwan thinking, but the mood among the radical intelligentsia at large, who had grown impatient with traditional political leadership and were impatient to break away from the old forms and ways. Where in the coup's aftermath and its failure, and upon protests in the university at the executions, the whole movement lapsed into a phase of inaction.

Other than inside the university, all was quiet so far as Ikhwan were concerned. They were not among the components of the Front of Opposition Parties (FOP), set up as an opposition grouping under Sayyid al-Siddiq al-Mahdi in 1960. Ikhwan suffered an acute embarrassment when not one of their numbers figured among the twelve politicians imprisoned in July 1961. They were not invited to the meeting which decided to send a strongly worded memorandum to the regime, protesting the alleged torture of a communist activist in El-Obeid in western Sudan and urging return to civil rule. A

delegation went to see FOP leader Sayyid al-Siddiq al-Mahdi the following day and he apologized for the 'unintended omission, but this reflected the low regard which the various political forces reserved for Ikhwan. Ikhwan had not by then managed to make its pretence felt strongly enough on the political scene, and was still subsisting on the fringes of Sudanese politics.

The year 1962, witnessed the appearance of Hassan Turabi at the time when Ikhwan's political presence was minor and reappeared briefly on the scene. He had not figured prominently in the movement's history before then and did not join ILM in Hantoub where he witnessed its early beginnings, deciding that it had little to offer for someone like him who had received an advanced home education in religious sciences and teachings. But once in college he decided to join to become in 1954 even the leader of the university branch. Not only that, but his name was heard again in 1955 in connection with a document redefining the movement's ideology in contrast to the radical pronouncements of the Karrar group. But, during the same year, Turabi left for London to study for an MA degree to join on his return in 1957 the Executive Bureau (EB), and in 1958 he supported al-Tahir's bid to run for parliament on an Umma ticket. Turabi then disappeared again to go Paris in 1959 to complete his Ph.D. at the Sorbonne University. Despite this long absence abroad, he was removed from direct influence in the organization until he returned in 1962 on an extended vacation and was said to have participated then in the affairs of the movement and represented it at FOP meetings.

Turabi's actual impact was to stimulate discussion on the future of the organization and its ultimate objectives by asking direct questions and then offering bold unorthodox answers. Up to 1958, Ikhwan had functioned as a modestly successful pressure group, but its subsequent development and the bid for power by al-Rashid al-Tahir posed new questions. Did the movement want to continue as a pressure group or become a political party? If the latter, did they want to be an elitist party as they had remained hitherto or did they want to become a mass movement? Did they want to achieve their aims by force or did they want to stick to the democratic process? In a memorandum sub mitted to the Fifth Congress of the Constituent Assembly held in May 1962 at al-Ailafoun village,

Turabi proposed that the movement be transformed into an intellectual pressure group on the lines of the Fabian Society, and not work as an independent party. Instead it should act through all political parties and on all of them. The suggestion was rejected due to certain justification and reasoning.

Consequently Turabi submitted another memorandum which gained acceptance calling for shaping the movement's strategy for the next two years in a manner that describes Turabi's approach, the document started by laying down the first ideological principles relevant to the case. On the basis of this ideological grounding, Turabi then moved to outline a strategy to fight the junta through forging a united front which southerners and Khatmiyya - PDP would be encouraged to join. Such a front should not just unite against the regime but must also formulate a positive programme for the future. Ikhwan must continue to support the existing FOP while the new front was being formed. For this purpose they must continue to formulate and propose programmes of action to be adopted by FOP and send the best qualified elements they have to its meetings.

In pursuit of resistance tactics to be followed, Turabi discounted the resort to a counter coup, because it consequences cannot be foreseen and because popular resistance on its own is sufficient for the task. This does not mean rejecting any help that might come from military sources, or desisting from active campaigning to win the army over to the cause of democracy and to undermine its support for the regime: a violent popular uprising was also discounted, in view of the regime's monopoly over the media and modern arms. The course left was therefore peaceful and protracted popular resistance. It should be embarked upon by forming committees all over the country that should keep the people mobilized and reminded of the ultimate goals of the resistance. Negotiations and petitions should not be ruled out as modes of resistance, together with strikes, demonstrations and propaganda outside and inside the country. In so doing, the movement was goaded into a relentless fight with the regime, which would intensify again on Turabi's final return in 1964.

In the shade of this strategy, the Fifth Congress attempted to resolve the leadership problem by formalizing the post-al-Tahir practice of collegial leadership. The Executive Bureau was now formally empowered to choose the leader front among its members, which meant that the leadership was vested in the body as a whole. Al-Rashid al-Tahir was officially removed and his unauthorized coup attempt formally repudiated and censured.

These measures unfortunately did not bring a definitive solution to most of the problems. The congress was silent on crucial issues, such as whether to adopt the military option or reject it definitively. Turabi and his supporters were opposed when they wanted to push through some organizational reforms that were designed to do away with the excessive preoccupation with secrecy and the concentration on the methods inherited from Egypt (which insisted on individual recruitment and the rigorous formation of individual members). This almost led to a split and the reformists were forced to back down. The suggested reforms aimed to make the movement more open and to lift restrictions which required members to be subjected to long periods of indoctrination before they could have full rights, including aspiring for leadership positions. The corollary of this would have been to make the organizational structures more open. Those opposed to the suggestions said they would dilute the movement and arrow infiltration by uncommitted and even hostile elements, but in the end, some, sweeping constitutional reforms were nevertheless passed.

Leadership and Organization

On the issue of Movement's leadership and Organization, the demise of al-Tahir reversed what had earlier seemed to be progress towards stability in the movement, for unification of the movement under al-Tahir had heralded a new era for a previously faction-ridden group. But with his imprisonment all that seemed to have been lost. That said al-Tahir had never won the hearts of the rank-and-file, his elevation to the leadership was due to his prominence in the ranks of the movement as a gifted political tactician who managed, through his contacts and dexterous moves, to project the movement favorably to the

world. He was also a brilliant lawyer who, after a high profile career as a student leader, moved to establish himself in society. This was a double advantage in a movement that remained mainly student-based, where few others had al-Tahir's opportunity to be in the limelight in a crucial moment in history. Another important factor was that there were few challengers at the time.

In the course of the Movement and it early development process, in spite of endemic factionalism, there was no scramble for the leadership apart from that of Talb-Allah who was in an important sense an outsider. When ILM was set up in 1949, it did not apparently have a well-defined hierarchy and Karrar's status as de facto leader did not receive formal ratification. In the early 1950s ILM members, who were all students, did not seem to be confident enough to lead an Islamic movement, and kept looking around for someone who would guide them. In 1951 Muhammad Yousuf travelled to Rufa'a to meet Mahmoud Muhammad Taha who was in retreat there, after a lengthy discussion he decided that Taha's views were too unorthodox for him to lead the movement. Later, Yousuf travelled with Shaikh Ali Abd al-Rahman (the future PDP leader) for several days on a journey to the south, hoping again to find a leader in Abd al-Rahman, but once more he emerged unconvinced. During the 1953 dispute, Yousuf Hassan Said was quick to relinquish his post and resign rather than fight Karrar and his group. The same was done by his successor, Abd al-Gadir, when faced by harassment from challenger Talb-Allah. Al-Tahir was not keen on holding to the post either. Later when al-Tahir was imprisoned, no one was keen to bid for his place, and even when he was sacked in 1962, no immediate replacement was thought necessary, a collegial leadership being installed instead. There seemed to be a lack of attachment or serious commitment to the movement per se.

A great number deserted during the dispute of 1953 rather than stick it out and fight, and this happened again in 1962. For many, Islamic morality made internal squabbles distasteful, which is why Abd al-Gadir deserted the movement after resigning the leadership, maintaining that he would rather work for Islam in his individual capacity. Many other leading members, including al-Tahir and Turabi, started from 1958 to

question the wisdom of having an Islamist group acting as an independent political entity, recommending instead the pressure group tactic (perfected under the IFC), which attempted to enlist the support of all parties for the Islamic cause. This was actually the dominant view in 1958, on the basis of which the movement refused to field candidates for the election that year. This attitude was based on a certain reading of the structure of Sudanese society. Political leadership was in the hands of religiously-based groups, which made them open to pressure on this score as the experiences of the agitation in support of Egyptian Ikhwan and for the Islamic constitution had shown. On the other hand, challenging the religious leaders publicly from an independent platform appeared counter-productive. In addition, Ikhwan, like the rest of the Sudanese intelligentsia, were impatient for results.

During such acceleration of actions, al-Rashid al-Tahir was described to be in tune with his generation where he had achieved many successes for himself and for the movement within the system to feel that nothing could prevent him from being another Azhari or Abdallah Khalil if he took the right path. Unfortunately, this attitude created a gap between him and most of his followers. Al-Tahir may have been adept when it came to moving in high circles and conducting political maneuvers, but he was not the man when it came to the day-to-day running of an organization. The aloofness of al-Tahir drove a wedge between him and the rank-and-file while giving his challengers an advantage over him. It was Omar Bakheit al-Awad who shouldered most of the day-to-day running of the organization although al-Tahir defeated him during the 1958 confrontation, this factor kept working against al-Tahir in the long run.

The leadership issue reflected the general fluidity of organizational structures, which in turn reflected the lack of clarity about purpose to avail conflict that hampered the movement for decades as the one between pragmatists and those who piously adhered to the Egyptian model and opposed reforms that contradicted the ethos inherited from Banna and his movement. This latter group was re-admitted to the leader ship in the compromises worked out in 1955, and led the opposition to the reforms proposed by Turabi in 1962. Another conflict was that between the demands of a mass organization,

represented by IFC, and the core group represented by Ikhwan. The conflict between al-Tahir and Al-Awad was not just a clash of personalities, but reflected the tension between two different modes of action. The concept of a parallel organization reflected the influence of the communist concept of 'national front', and responded to the particular Sudanese situation, where the calls to introduce Islam into politics were well received. But the friction between the two styles led to failure.

It is vital to mention that even the classical organizational form inherited from Egypt comprised the constituent assembly, which elected the executive organs. It included the *usrah or family* (cell, usually of five members), which acted as a unit for indoctrination. Above the *usrah* came the shu'ba (branch), in the town or neighbourhood. There were very few branches outside Khartoum in those early years, and the university branch exerted disproportionate influence, in view of the concentration of a great number of militant members, while members who graduated tended to drift away and lose touch. Secondary schools remained the most important area of recruitment, and branches were controlled from the university.

Organization-wise, as of 1954, the highest body of the Movement remained the constituent assembly, comprising members who completed four years membership and were over twenty years of age. But unlike its Egyptian counterpart, the membership of which was restricted the constituent assembly was allowed to replace a third of its members annually. The 1962 amendments replaced the constituent assembly with an elected *shura (the concept of democracy in Islam)* council, which in turn elected the Executive Bureau. The Executive Bureau was allowed to elect its own secretary, which contributed even more to weakening the position of the secretary. The job was apparently not coveted, and the names of those occupying it were not prominent.

During this period, the movement's membership remained predominantly student-based, to the extent that the few branches scattered around Khartoum were referred to as 'external branches' during the 1950s. The typical member was a student or recent graduate, in his twenties, from rural background and a family with modest means. The

establishment of the IFC in late 1955 did not seem to signal a shift in membership, because it was a loose grouping, and the gathering of senior ulama and Sufi leaders who backed IFC could not be persuaded to join and work under the leadership of the students and young graduates who dominated the movement. The trickle of graduates and a few army officers affiliated to the movement started to make inroads into the wider society, but during the Abboud years the membership seemed to have all but evaporated except in the university. This again gave the movement a decidedly student character, and contributed to the lack of attention paid to it as a serious political movement. The Abboud regime did not even think it worthwhile to harass its members. It is to state that, the financial status of the Movement being weak enough as finance coming mainly from membership dues and donations which affected the movement greatly and limited the scope of the movement's activities to a greater extent.

Chapter 4
Trajectory of Nation-Building Project

Trajectory of Nation-Building Project

In this chapter, the role of nation-building project in conflict and peace negotiations under various political regimes has been analyzed. It also delineates the developments that led to failure of democratic government and repeated military coups that have aggravated the conflict between north and south Sudan, Christian and Muslim populations and different ethnic groups.

The Period of First Democratic Government since Independence to 1958

Different civil and military governments have ruled Sudan since independence, which was announced in 1956. These governments adopted various programs that failed to achieve development or the solution of the South Sudan problem. The Government remained limited in its interpretation of the problems facing South Sudan, as rebellions which related to political or religious foreign conspiracies. The only solutions provided by the Government were in form of increased stress on Arabization and Islamization.

When England began thinking about withdrawal from its colonies as a consequence of national resistance movements and the circumstances of World War, it began to take series of preparatory measures for transfer of political power to the people of the colonial countries and their new political parties. In this context, numerous political parties emerged in northern Sudan. The political parties in the Northern part of Sudan are historically older, more established and developed than the southern parties. The establishment of parties in northern Sudan has been associated with the national political movement and the struggle against the colonizers.

The first blow in the relations between South and North as pointed out before took place in context of the negotiations of independence held on February 12, 1953, between the

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colonizers and Sudanese. The north did not allow the south to take part in the negotiations, citing the reason as absence of political parties in South. This encouraged the people of South Sudan to accelerate the establishment of their political parties, so that they may take part in future political events. The establishment of the 'South Party' was announced at the end of 1953. The establishment happened in the context of the te weakening of the colonial rule, the transitional rule of the Legislative Assembly and acceleration of the efforts towards self-rule in Sudan. One year later the name of the party was changed to the Liberal Party or the South Liberal Party, which represented the southern districts after it won 16 seats in the parliament of Sudan in 1953, until the dissolution of the parliament by the first military rule in 1958[1]. Lack of trust has increased between southern and northern politicians and deepened again after the so called initiative called 'Sudanization of the Jobs' in Sudan after the departure of the colonizers. The Sudanization Job Committee had to find suitable Sudanese to occupy the ranks left vacant after the departure of British employees. It followed technical standards that gave priority to experience, seniority and qualifications, without taking into account the historical conditions of the South, and the effects of the policy of closed areas which reflected negatively on the education and development in the South, and did not concern the distrustful relationship between South and North. Moreover, the south was given only four medium level jobs out of the 800 jobs. The history of South was neglected and no affirmative action was ensured for south, thus, deepening the divisions and distrust between north and south. Although the prime minister of the first democratic government in Sudan who was at the same time the President of the National Unionist Democratic Party, Ismail Al-Azhari had promised the citizens of the South in the bulletin circulated widely in the south, that the issue of Sudanization will always be fair and democratic, and precedence will be given to the South, even in jobs in north, especially in high positions in the service of the central government. Unfortunately it was not applied. Furthermore, the policy of Sudanization and the decisions of its committees

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[1] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan: The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.34.

have enhanced the impression of southerners that independence only meant replacement of one master by another[2].

Numbers of southerners were joined some Northern parties, particularly National unionist party led by Al Zhari. However, because of the stance of the party on the Sudanization issues many of the Southern people resigned from it, as some southerners in the party lost their district in elections.[3]

The South Liberal Party considered the results of Sudanization as an additional reason to demand the federal governing of South Sudan. They included the demand for federal government as a political agenda in its general conference held in October 1954. However, the request for federal government was conceptualized differently by different political parties. For some the term meant greater degree of autonomy, and other parties misunderstood it as a constitutional step that could lead to total separation of the north from south Sudan. Northern citizens believed that the federal government implicitly meant secession.[4]

The Prime Minister Ismail Al-Azhari tried to prevent a number of Southern employees in the government from participating in the second Conference of the Southern Liberal Party in 1955 on the pretext that the government is a transitional government must not allow government employees to participate in such a political conference. In open defiance to Prime Minister Ismail Al-Azhari the second conference was held in Juba from October 18 to 21, 1954, in the city of Juba, and was attended by about 217 members who represented the tribes of the south and southerners living in the North in addition to the Southern members of National Democratic Party in the Parliament. The Conference requested for the Federal Governing of South Sudan, and many threatened separation if

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[2] Deng, Francis Mading (1999) *Dynamyat Al Hweah Asas Lltkamul Al Watnee Fi Al Sudan, (Dynamics Of Identification: A Basis for National Integration in The Sudan)* p.32.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) *Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan The Controversial (Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, p.35.

their demands are not met with an immediate response. The member of the conference expressed their anger at the Northern parties that blocked their right to participate in the independence negotiations in 1953. The government of the National Unionist Party has received a lot of criticism for the unjust application of the Sudanization policy. Finally, the conference delegates unanimously adopted the demand of federal government for the South[5].

In August 1955, four-month before the declaration of the independence of Sudan, rebellion of tropical band in garrison of Torit begun in which Southerners killed about 2600 Northern people. Most of them were officers, women, children and traders in the street and their houses.75 people from the South were killed by the army force. The army used the highest degree of deterrence. After these events the relationship between the people of the North and the South has reached the highest level of tension and mistrust, and even mutual hatred.[6]

The events of the rebellion in Torit and other southern cities revealed the failure of the new North parties which represented in the first parliament, to be held responsible for political and national affairs. Their lack of accountability reflects in the series of mistakes and the causes that led to the outbreak of the rebellion, as well as the act of racial violence in the South. The northern parties failed to draw lessons and to take constructive steps to ensure political confidence and calm, especially when Sudan was about to be independent. Torit rebellion also indicates the southern Sudanese emotion of hate towards the northern that resulted from the political and racial polarization been practiced by the southern leaders and the religious political polarization been practiced by missionaries.

Government authorities did not try to reveal the truth and the real reasons for the outbreak of violence and murder. But merely made promises it will let repetition of what happened and compensate those affected. Moreover, the threat of using the power to target the rebels has pushed large numbers of southern troops and citizens who

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[5] Ibid, p.41.
[6] Ibid, p.43.

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participated in the violence to flee to the nearby forest, and later that became the nucleus of the Anya Nya movement, which became later the military wing of the political movement in the South against the North. The leader Al-Azhari was more likely to follow the example of Indian leaders, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru and their wisdom in resolving the conflict in a peaceful manner as in Pakistan question. [7]

Southern leaders also have disappointed hopes by using of ethnic and racial polarization to convince the Southern people, as this increased the feeling of hatred in the southerners against their brothers in the North. Eventually, their policy led to the massacre of Torit. The colonizer used the policy of closed area under the pretext of protecting the Negro tribes from the slave trade practiced by the Arabs from Northern Sudan. Many Sudanese writers and historians in addition to Europeans have ignored the significant role that the Europeans themselves and the leaders of the Southern tribes played in the slave trade. Southern people have chosen from the beginning the option federal government looking forward to separation in the long term, without giving a chance to the opportunity of uniting in one nation, enriched by cultural diversity and differences in religion and ethnicity of the North and the South. Furthermore, the associations of missionaries were given the task of education in the south by the colonizers. This has played a significant role in the increase of the spirit of separation as a particular image of north was constructed in the minds of people of south. The missionaries interpreted for the world that the war between the South and the North is a war between the Arab Muslims, that is the north and African Christians that is the south.

The Southerners depended on the committee responsible for drafting a permanent constitution for Sudan, where they hope the South to be represented according to its political and demographic weight, but out of 46 members in the Committee, only three were representatives from South Sudan. The formation of the Committee in this way raised doubts about the Northern parties' desire to grant the South fair representation. The request of federalism for the South was the main constitutional obstacle that faced the

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[7] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.112.

constitution committee drafting, but the Committee did not concern much to the commitment made by the Northern parties on the issue of the federal rule for the South, which was a political commitment by all political parties in the North at that time. Consequently, the problem deepened when draft constitution included establishment of a central government based on the principles of Islamic law, which led the southern members in the constitutional Committee to submit their resignations. The disappointment increased when Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub announced draft constitution to parliament, saying that the Committee has paid a very serious consideration to the request of southerners for the Federal rule, but it concluded that it would not be feasible in a country like Sudan. Southern people were angry because they supported the Umma Party - after they left the National Unionist Party-and its stand of preventing the establishment of a united state with Egypt. Their hopes of federal government were on the Umma Party. [8]

Sudanese parliament experience before Independence has made it clear that the Southern Liberal Party has suffered much in its struggle for the federal government. The high language and maneuvers followed in parliament alienated the southern members more. In addition to the spread of political corruption through bribery and inducements by providing ministerial positions, rush of south party leaders to join the Northern parties in order to or support them during the voting to pass the specific policies. Booth Dew and Vlmon Majok joined the Umma Party, and Benjamin Luckey supported the People's Democratic Party. But Sricio Aero joined the National Unionist Party.

The demand for the federation for the southern Sudan emerged for the first time by the British Administrator. Although the proposal was not approved by the Administrative Secretary at the time - James Robertson - and decision makers in Khartoum and Cairo, but the intellectuals of the South and the Southern parties adopted it later and attempted to get the support of the Legislative Assembly and the Sudanese Parliament at a later stage. The Liberal Party did not request the federal rule strongly enough - because of their

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[8] Olish, Abd Almajid (2005) Hadath Fee Alsudan: Yomyat Aldolah Aleslamyah (It Happened in Sudan: The Dairies of the Islamic State), p.57.

mutual interests with the Northern parties - However, the negligence of the North parties to touch the true wishes of the South, and taking into account the right of representation in determining the future of their country in a crucial political situation, that encouraged number of southern members to take responsibility for the South. Azibwni Mendiri and Fr Strnino Ohra had announced the establishment of the Southern Federal Party. Thus, the requirement of the federal rule transformed from Minutes of the constitutional and political discussions to wide political action at the popular level. [9]

The name of Federal Party itself explains the desire to face the ignorance of the political parties in the North. This party since its inception, was identified its objectives without hesitation, as is the case with the Liberal Party. The program of the federal party included a condemnation of the Northern parties which entered Islamic law in the political conflicts. Furthermore, it opposed the declaration of Islamic law as the basis law for legislation in Sudan. It also called for the Christian religion as state religion and a source of legislation, on equal level with the Islamic religion in the development of Sudan's Permanent Constitution. The Party called for the adoption of the language as a second language beside the Arabic language. For the first time as part of the debate about the relationship between the North and South, the program included a requirement for the establishment of an independent army, as well as the applying of an independent educational system in the South. The program of the Party also did not include only the power sharing between the center and the South, but also put forward a program leading eventually to separation which entered the crisis of the rule in the path of confrontation.

In contrast, the positions of the successive governments of the Northern parties were adopted misconduct with the legitimate demands of the South, Those parties did not accept the opposing opinion of the opposition parties, which reflected in the ban of the Federal party and submitted of Azibwna Mendira the founder of the Party to the trial[10]

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[9] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969).
[10] Ibid, p.57.

The first years after independence was characterized by political instability and the growing of popular resentment against the rule of successive governments, both individually and combined. In addition to, prevailing of phenomenon of the bad practices of the political parties whether, Northern or Southern parties. The Northern political parties used to buy loyalty of Southern members, given their compromising nature and lack of popular control on their performance. As well as, the weakness of their political experience and parliament work. Moreover, the political parties in the North and number of people from the South bear the responsibility for the corruption in the political democratic practice. At the same time the general situation was aggravated because of economic recession and low rates of production in the cotton projects and decrease of cotton prices after a period of recovery in the war years. The economic expectations pointed to a budget deficit. The high voices that attempted to extend Islamic culture were increased the political tension - the Arab identity of Sudan as a determiner for the Sudan of multi cultures.

On the other hand the government accused the Southern representatives and their supporters who requested the Federal rule of treason to Sudan and collusion with the remnants of colonialism and church organizations, this excessive reaction did not help to repair bridges, did not calm the emotions of Southern citizens, but pushed them to hold on to their demand for a federal government, and in this context Staslaus Pisama who characterized by moderation was sacked from the Presidency of the Southern mass in parliament and was replaced by Strnino Lo Ohri. It was clear that the political crisis has reached a range that the pluralistic democratic regime no longer able to maintain its survival and continuity. The emergence of El Beja Front in eastern Sudan which its leaders met with leaders of the southern mass to coordinate and take their demands from the central government has increased the troubles of the regime. The first reactions that reflect the uncertainty and confusion the government used violence to silence the legitimate demands of the tribal groupings in the South and East, the Nuba Mountains and Darfur. It was not the demands of the Federal party and El Beja Front are the only reason that led to weakening the alliance of Al Umma party and the People's Democratic Party which were on the power of democratic alliance government, the loud demands by

trade unions, staff associations and professionals in mid-1958 and peaked in October 1958, in addition to the increase of differences between the coalition government. The Egyptian pressure to break up the coalition was increased the crisis. In this atmosphere, the Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil Ali delivered the power to the generals of the army which ended the first troubled experience of democratic civilian rule in Sudan. [11]

The Period of the First Military Rule after Independence

Takeover of the armed forces to power in November 17, 1958 disappointing to the expectations of Southern politicians who realized that their demands for federalism and separation will turn into a military confrontation under the military regimes, however, they did not loss hope officers of the armed forces as the army have national roles to protect the unity of homeland, prevent the regional conflicts and the maintaining of regulations. Especially since most members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces who were at the head of the revolution were aware of and know the truth about what is going on in South Sudan during the period of their work in the south. In his first speech General Ibrahim Abboud, president of the Supreme Council of the armed forces who seized the legislature and executive power in the country said that they took the power because of the bad situation of the country, chaos and instability in the security conditions. He meant the growing popular fury in several parts of the Sudan; therefore his analysis was not contrary to that fact.

But military rule since the starting point did not announce an alternative policy to the Northern political parties that preceded it on the power, which include the definition identity of Sudan in the framework of Arab – Muslim, and attempt to corner the rest of the groups under this umbrella without consideration of the variance cultures and religions. Military government maintained the existing policy towards the South. Therefore, the visions of the Northern parties that ruled the country corresponded with the visions of the Council which took the reins of power on the policy to be followed

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[11] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan, 1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*, Khartoum: Al Dar Al Soudania for Books.Benedict, Anderson (1991) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso. P.201.

towards the problem of the South, while the means were different, where the military government began using the military machine in dealing with the problem.

In the area of legislation, economics, international relations, military rule has attempted to use a pragmatic policy that it failed to meet its full obligations, in general the cornerstones of the policy pursued by the political parties have remained as they are.

The position of the military government were characterized by duplicity and confusion, while it participated in the foundation of the Organization of African Unity (AU), where Sudan was one of the initiative countries, and also participated in the Non-Aligned Movement calling for national liberation and economic independence and positive neutrality between the two poles of world politics (the former Soviet Union and the U.S. United States), the regime inside the country has prevented freedoms and demands of national groups, in that era the Nubians northern Sudan was forced to abandon their lands which were flooded by the water of the High Dam without regard to their views, but for the South , the military leaders were announced that their government is not interested in the agreements with the Sudanese parties on the eve of independence to grant the south the Federal government. [12]

Although the military government announced that it is not interested in the discussions in parliament to amend the existing constitution in accordance with Islamic law. As recommended by the Committee to amend the constitution. This has led to reassure the Southern politicians but the military government did not abide by the announcement, where as the South has witnessed active work to spread Islam and Arab culture as it is the only guarantee to create a national of Sudan and the common identity that must be agreed to ensure the preservation of united Sudan.[13]

The first years of military rule have witnessed significant activity in building of mosques and the creation of Khalawi in the Southern districts. Therefore, decided that Friday is

[12] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan: The Controversial *(Dialectical) of Unity and Separation)*, Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, p.101.
[13] Ibid, p.104.

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weekend instead of Sunday. Moreover, the government established several primary schools, in several Southern cities and Islamic high schools in Juba.

The southern writer and researcher Abel Alier has documented for that era, where he analyzed most the important features of that period, he stated that the military government in the push to build a united country, has attempted the Islamization and Arabization of the South. The local and English languages have excluded as means of education in the schools and replaced by the Arabic language and applied the same steps in the government offices. He stated that legislation has been issued to limit the activity of the Catholic missionary bodies, except by using private permission in accordance with the law of bodies of the missionary activity for the year 1962. The military leaders at that time believed this is the only way to remove the effect of the policy of closed areas which was applicable in Southern Sudan during the colonial period. However, the Catholic Church protested against these policies and their protests found a wide response in Western newspapers and the State of the Vatican. [14]

Establishment of Sano Party

After the dissolution of parliament by the military government in 1958, the Southern representatives led by Father Strnino Lo Ohri, Joseph Idohou and Agheri Jadain have left to Uganda in 1960 and later on established Sudanese Christian Union in 1962. This party built a political struggle against the government of General Abboud in Khartoum, in order to show the conflict between the South and the North as a religious conflict. This institution did not continue for a long time after the founders have decided to move in the direction of an armed conflict. William Deng has joined the early founders. He was a senior administrator in the central government. His joining was as a qualitative shift in the leadership of political and military action of the South given his capabilities and vast experience in addition to the great influence he had over Dinka tribe, the largest tribe of Sudan as a whole. Another important development took place around this time was the formation of The Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) in March

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[14] Alier, A bel (1990) The Suthern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonored, p.26.

1962. After one year it changed its name to the Sudan African National Union (SANU).[15]

There are some old and some new names have emerged the identity of South African resistance. The leaders of Sano Party avoided referring to the so called closed districts to avoid the anger and opposition of the new African Unity Organization which committed to face any regional moves to change the existing borders of the newly independent African countries. The headquarters of Christian African Union in Nairobi had expressed sympathy with Sano Party and has provided a generous financial aid.

Anya Nya movement had emerged beside the political leadership of Sano Party as the armed wing of it. The name of Anya Nya was chosen by a group of the members of the Movement, it means poison of a deadly snake in the language of Amady tribe. The Southern tribes used to launch different names for Anya Nya, according to their local dialects, but in the North of Sudan they were considered as mutineers and rebels.

The Southern scholar Elias Waxon Nyamlell[16] stated that Anya Nya movement was not like the rest of the national liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere in the world. Unlike other movements that have adopted revolutionary theories and/or Marxist orientation to a certain degree, the movement of Anya Nya and Sano Party do not have fixed ideology or a clear theory. Furthermore the individuals who lead Sano Party - despite the fact that most of them were former parliamentarians - lack experience and did not find the opportunity to meet the African leaders, the most influential in the Organization of African Unity. They were not familiar with the complexity of international and regional relations to the extent that ought to have reflected in the strategies of their movement. However, they have strived to accommodate the views of foreign missionaries and international church organizations in many situations. The Anya Nya has identified its objective, since its inception, as a total separation from Northern Sudan and the establishment of an African country.

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[15] Alier, A bel (1990) The Suthern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonored, p.27.
[16] Niamlell, E (1969) The Anta Nya Movement: Essay on Religion, Politics and Education, p.169.

Anya Nya movement has reached a degree of rigidness and widely spread by 1964 so that it forced the Sudanese government forces to retreat and only control the cities and a number of main roads. At that time, the traders and troops were not able to move without the protection of rafts armed (rafts are military and civilian convoys moving slowly, for the sake of caution and under the protection of soldiers, especially since the embers of South armed movement used to plant land mines to hunt teams of Sudanese army). Despite all the precautions and excellence that characterizes the government forces, many times they have become an easy target for sudden attacks, ambushes by fighters of Anya Nya. In addition, the people in Southern Sudan used to supply the fighters of Anya Nya information about the movement of the troops. The fighters of Anya Nya usually stayed around their tribes, being more willing to adapt to the life of the bush as most of them lived there throughout the conflict period after the first rebellion of the garrison of Torit in 1955., And they were more familiar with the place, than the government army which consisted of soldiers recruited from regions afar and very different from the jungle areas of Southern Sudan. Sudanese forces that fought in the South were Northern forces. In addition, conventional armies all over the world have little experience and feasibility in unconventional wars - or guerilla wars.[17]

As expected, the war in the South reflected in the continuous political discussions between the military government and the opposition political parties in the North. As well as, the protest of intellectuals and some citizens against the policy of government and the use of violence against the armed movement of Southern. Therefore, the pressure from citizens, soldiers and also some officers of the armed forces, the head of the military Ibrahim Abboud announced the formation of a national committee to make proposals on the future of the situations in Southern Sudan. Indeed, the Committee has been composed of 27 members, half of them from the Sultans of the South and senior staff of the South that were loyal to the government. It was more like a Committee of intellectuals, politicians and military personnel who were aware of the dangers of civil war, and the

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[17] Ibid, Pp.49-52.

need to radically change the structures of governance and return to the practice of parliamentary democracy in Sudan.[18]

But the case of political foresight and the pursuit of partial solutions to extend the life of the military government prevented access to the real reasons that led to the outbreak of civil war. The formation of the Committee had a limited mission, with several restraints, without prejudice to the constitutional structure and the principle of united government, it was expected to find the true reasons that hinder the process of harmony between the north and south Sudan and recommend solutions that promote confidence and achieve internal stability. This decision has revealed the narrow-mindedness of government policies that do not keep pace with changes in the political and constitutional arenas, which led to the deepening of the rift between the North and the South. Since the armed rebellion was started, the Committee was not provided power to review the existing constitutional structures and the principle of central government, which rejected by all the parties of the Southern political movement. With so many constraints the committee could play only a limited role and propose some marginal reforms. Therefore, the military government missed the last chance available to them to stop the war.

Sano party opposed the formation of this committee, and questioned the sincerity of the government's intentions to find a solution to end the civil war. At the same time the political situation in Northern Sudan was also affected as disintegration and weaknesses crept in more quickly than the military government expected. Even before the Committee began its work, the pressure on the military government increased from different directions with the rising of popular resentment in the north of Sudan because of the civil war in the south. Students and teachers of the University of Khartoum (formerly Gordon Memorial College) called for a public symposium and unified the political opposition against military rule. In an unprecedented development the people of Northern Sudan rejected use of violence as a means to end the problem between the North and South, and pressed for a dialogue and listen to the demands of the political movement in

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[18] Bob, Abd Almajed (2009) Jnoob Alsudan Jdl Al Whdaa Wa Al Enfesal (South Sudan: The Controversial *(Dialectical) of Unity and Separation*), p.47.

the south. This step was a huge leap in the direction of exiting from the historical framework that in the first place deepened sense of separation between North and South. Despite the authorities' refusal to these views and its threat to use extreme violence, the historical symposium was held, the military government was in the state of loss of balance and stocktaking of the political situation in the country, can no longer capture the historical moment to stop the war and create the atmosphere of dialogue, which called on citizens to participate but it was too late.

The government has gone too far with the use of violence, and the symposium for peaceful dialogue became an arena of fighting between security forces on the one hand and the students of the university and citizens on the other hand. As result of the collusion between the security personnel and the protesters, a number of university students and a number of citizens have become martyrs after the military entered the campus for the first time in the history of Sudan. October Revolution has started and ended the rule of military government; the first military that ruled the Sudan after independence. The President of the ruling military council has announced the solution for the institutions of governance one after the other. Then the transfer of power to the civilian leadership of the party leaders and representatives of professional organizations has become possible.

The Era of the Second Democratic Government 1964-1969

Prime Minister of the transitional government Sir El Khatim El Khaleefa, after the restoration of democratic rule has announced the determination of the democratic government to adopt a new policy towards the issue of Southern Sudan, and decided to renounce violence and create conditions to reach a peaceful solution to the problem. Moreover, he has appointed two ministers from the South. The first Minister was Clement Amburo (an experienced administrator who later on attended the Juba conference), where he was appointed as an Interior Minister, which showed a significant change and an indication of the sincerity of democratic government and its attempt to

resolve the problem peacefully, while the second was the Southern Father Aziboni Mendiri founder and president of the South Federal Party.[19]

Sano party, has welcomed the step of the democratic government and issued a statement calling on the government to recognize Sano party as a political party and allow it to work inside, issuing a blanket amnesty for all refugees residing in neighboring countries and other active people from the South, and the abolition of the law of the Missionary Societies, issued by the military government in 1962 , and be committed to the view of the proposed dialogue among the proposals for the future of the relationship between the North and South, including the application of Sano's demand associated to Federal rule in the South. William Deng one of the leaders of Sano, the only leader who returned to Sudan after the Revolution of October, while all the leaders of Sano outside Sudan. He suggested holding a round-table conference with the participation of all Sudanese parties and representatives from the Judiciary, which regained its independence after the revolution of October, representatives from the Teachers of University of Khartoum and labor unions. The message included William Deng a proposal to invite observers from some African countries to attend the conference. The democratic transitional government has accepted the suggestion. The government issued a blanket amnesty for fighters of Anya Nya and welcomed the voluntary repatriation of Sudanese refugees living abroad since 1955. The amnesty covered even individuals who have fled to the African countries after the events of the military mutiny in Torit 1955; including persons issued judicial and criminal verdicts against them.   The North Parties responded to the call of the Conference, and participated in the formation of the preparatory committee headed by Professor Mohamed Omar Basher and included a number of top Sudanese intellectuals and thinkers.[20]

South parties requested to hold the conference outside of Sudan and then later agreed to stay in Juba and subsequently, because of security conditions and the lack of logistics components accepted to stay in Khartoum. As well as the parties abandoned the South

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[19] Suleiman, Mohamed (2006) *Al Sudan Heroob Almoared Wa Alhweah (The Sudan: Wars of Resources and Identity)*, p.106.

[20] Ibid, p.33.

claim to lift the state of emergency as a condition for participation in the conference because of the lack of security in parts of Southern districts.

It was agreed that the time of the conference in the period between 15 to 26 March 1965, and was overcome another obstacle related to the observers, the Northern parties rejected the idea of bringing observers from Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia, the proportion of the state of hostility between these countries and Sudan. The participation of delegates from United Nations and the Organization of African Unity has been excluded, because of the rejection of political parties and their fear of the internationalization of the problem of Sudan. In the end they were decided to invite observers from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria and Ghana. Those observers played an active role in preventing conference from slipping to the brink of collapse. After long discussion the presidency of the conference had assigned to professor, El Nather Dafa Allah the Director of the University of Khartoum. [21]

In the meantime, there were many Southern parties in the political arena, where William Deng a leader from Sano party returned to practice of political action inside Sudan using the same name (the party of Sano) and, soon fell out with the rest of the leaders of the party outside the Sudan, and this difference led to an intense struggle within the party ended to be divided into two wings (wing inside and another outside). William Deng led the Party inside Sudan, while Joseph Idohou, led the wing abroad who entered in a serious conflict with Agri Jadain who eventually led Sano party outside Sudan.

The South Front has emerged in the political arena in the South, which was a result of the initiative of a group of staff and Southern students resident in Khartoum. It was established at the end of November 1964 and was led by Clement Amburo, Aziboni Mendiri, Bona Malwal and others. Some of the founders of the South Front have previously worked within the secret cells loyal to Sano party. The South Front was founded as a political party has a clear political program and organizational structure and

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[21] Bashir, Mohamed Omer (1980) *Tareekh Al-Harakah Al-Watanya Fi Al-Sudan,1900-1969 (The History of National Movement In Sudan, 1900-1969)*.

unified leadership to fill the political vacuum existing because of the presence of South leaderships outside Sudan.

The northern parties that Participated in the conference were the Umma Party, the National Unionist Party, El Methag Islamic Front, Sudanese Communist Party and the People's Democratic Party in addition to the national front for bodies (consisting of individuals from various bodies and institutions, trade unions for the role played by these institutions in the October Revolution and the democratic transformation).

The parties from the South that participated in the conference are South front and the two wings of Sano Party at home and abroad. The issue of representation of Sano party was a real obstacle. Where the leaders of Sano abroad refused the participation of William Deng, and William Deng clamed the right to participate on behalf of Sano party, as he was the only leader who preferred to return to work among the party mass at home, while the rest of the leaders rejected to come to Sudan, and were not willing to participate in the conference and sit down to negotiate without the pressure from their African host countries, it has required the concerted and intensified efforts to persuade the two wings of Sano to share the seats allocated to the party, in order to give strength and legitimacy to the decisions of the Conference. In the end, decided to represent the wing at home with four seats, while Sano abroad wing party won five seats. The three Southern parties agreed to participate in the conference among themselves on the lack of representation of the Liberal Party of South after they make sure that the political transformations in the South has exceeded the leaders of this party. The parties also rejected the request of the Unity Party led by Santino Deng to participate in the conference in any capacity as leader of the party associated with military rule that caused the deepening crisis in the South by adopting a military solution.

In a rare moment the representatives of political forces decided to mandate the government to choose nine additional personnel to represent the different views of the South people who did not involved in the participated Parties. But those individuals at the

start of the conference sessions accepted the representation of the South by the Southern parties involved.

The abroad wing of Sano Party opposed to the idea of participating in the conference in the beginning strongly insists in its stance and called for separation, but African countries that host leaders of the Southern opposition did not accept the tough stance led by the State of Uganda. Sano Party changed its position after the interior Minister of Uganda talked in front of the parliament and said that Uganda supports the efforts being made to start peaceful negotiations in the framework of the Round Table Conference. He mentioned in his speech that politicians in Sano party spend large amount of money can not be compare to some members of Ugandan parliament themselves. He added that Uganda in spite of its weak resources has provided the need of the life of refugees from Southern Sudan. Furthermore, he blamed the leaders of the Anya Nya and Sano Party abroad and stated that they do not listen to any advices that help to achieve peace in Sudan. There were hidden signals in his speech about the money that was spent by Israel on the Southern Sudanese opposition, which was abetted them to refuse the participation in the conference.

Negotiations of the Round Table Conference

The Round Table Conference was first showdown open meeting and direct dialogue between the people of the south and the north to put their different views about the causes and roots of the problem and also their views on possible solutions, and therefore in this research we addressed its activities in some detail to get to the causes that led to the outbreak of the longest civil war in the African continent, and most destructive of the lives, the destruction of infrastructure, the displacement and the resort of the citizens of southern to the northern Sudan and neighboring African countries, and all human miseries and social problems resulting from this.

Proposals of the Southern parties participating in the Round Table Conference

Agheri Jaden chairman of Sano party abroad spoke at the conference and summarized the arguments which he addressed in several points, some of the important were that the

decision of the unity of Sudan was taken at the administrative conference in the year 1946 by the English administrators, and the representatives of the South had nothing in front of them but to follow what the Administrative Secretary James Robertson dictated, and therefore it does not reflect the desire of the Southern peoples according to opinion of Jadin. Jadin criticized the closed area policy and made Sudanese governments responsible for deepening the existing reality of underdevelopment, and said that it was done intentionally to dominate the south and keeping it in isolation from global development, to be able to exploit its wealth and its people. He talked about the exclusion practiced by Northern parties against the people of the south and depriving them of important issues related to their future, and he said that this compel the people of the South to belief that there are two Sudan, according to him in the Northern Sudan mix strains of Arab live, and language and Arab culture and Islamic religion unite them, and they look forward for their future with the Arab world. While the South Sudan include ethnic groups comprising of African descent, that differ from the people of northern Sudan. He concluded that there isn't any common basis or common interests between north and south for the unity of which North is talking. He also said that independence did not provide the inhabitants of the south cause for celebration and it was a replacement of British colonization with the Arab barbaric colonization, therefore the South must be given its independence, and then demanded the secession of southern Sudan and its independence from the north.

As far as the south front is concerned so it was represented by the party leader Gordon Murtat and he agreed with Jaden in all the previous opinions, and he blamed the deterioration of relations between North and South to North parties as according to his opinion it rallied to denounce the covenants with the people of the south. But the south front did not demand for secession, but demanded to give southerners the right to self-determination.

As far as the Sano party's internal wing is concerned so it demanded the granting of a federal government, as William Deng spoke about the problems of southern refugees in African countries and the security situation and listed the historical circumstances

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surrounding relationship between North and South and led to the war. His point of view also matched with others with regard to grievances isolating the Northern parties for the people of the South in matters directly related to the future of their situation. He said that Sudan has two choices, first to establish two separate entities and second is the establishment of a federation, considering that full unity is unlikely, as per his point of view, because each party stick with its culture, and cultural differences can be accommodated within the framework of the federal option, so the federal government is the appropriate option.

Unity Party of Sudan led by Santino Deng, although it was not invited to participate in the conference but it did not prevent it from expressing it opposition for giving the non-central situation to the South, and demanded for the application of the central in all districts of Sudan, not only in the south and refused the referendum and as well as demanded from the southern front and also opposed the demand of federal rule.

Proposals of the Northern parties in the Round Table Conference

People's Democratic Party leader, Ali Abdul Rahman, who is known for his tendencies of Arab nationalism of the Islamic militant, spoke about his party and focused his speech on several points, most important of them was that the responsibility for the problem of the south lies on the British colonialism and the Missionary Societies, which fueled a spirit of hostility of south and north and distorted image of Islam in the eyes of the South, he also opposed the demand of Sano Party for separation and demand of the southern front to give South the right of self-determination, saying that it can't be given to the people who govern among themselves, but for the people sitting under the colonization of another people. He denounced the monopoly of Sano party, and the southern front to represent the South Sudan without acknowledging that right to other southern parties, specially the parties which call for the unity of Sudan, such as the Unity Party of Sudan and the Liberal Party. He also said that Islam and Christianity are both minorities religions in southern Sudan, 80% of the citizens there are pagans, and it is the southerners who tried to dye the religious color on conflict and filming it in that form at the instigation of certain parties. He concluded his speech that the Sudan is a single entity, there is no way to

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divide, and these Arab countries despite the existence of other groups differ in terms of traditions, language and belief. The Sudanese have coexisted for decades and the Arabic language is the rope that link between them. He said that his party did not mind in giving south a kind of decentralized governance in the framework of a united Sudan, provided that this is not a way leading to separation.

Ali Abdel Rahman's talk about the causes and roots of the problem in southern Sudan was not liked by the South, dismissing as creatures of the Christian Church, imperialism and Zionism in their dealings towards the issue of the South before the independence. Sheikh Ali Abdul Rahman sees clearly that the problem of the south and effort of its session did not arise because of errors by successive Sudanese governments or because of the necessities of nature, but it resulted due to the greed of British policy in East Africa, and it can be the reason for the beginning of the insurgency before the remnants of English administrators leave Sudan, according to his point of view the people of the South have not given the northern governments an opportunity to do effort for the development of their region, which led insurgencies and rebellion before declaring the independence of Sudan, listening to the opinions of English administrators about the evils of North and what awaits them of the persecution at their hands, in the bloody events more than three thousand citizen of the northern Sudan died in slaughtering and burning by the peoples of the south, where they did not distinguish between old, woman or child . The Islamic Charter Front was represented by Mohammed Yousef Mohammed, and it asked for the granting of South district decentralize power and with defined powers for conducting the local affairs, while the central government maintains all the functions of sovereignty, he also said that the trend in international politics is the tendency to unite and build large entities. He said the civil war, is the policy of the British administration in addition to what he called ill-thought of the brotherhood of South toward the North, which is also in his view is the plot of the British administration and the evangelistic mission of Christianity, which has taken from the slave trade, that occurred in the Egypt-Turkish rule under the leadership of the Ottoman Empire, as a pretext to isolate the south from the north. He said that the slave trade that occurred at that time was a fraction of the practice indulged by the major European countries and

U.S. It is worth mentioning that the slave trade in Sudan was led by the Europeans, Turks and the Egyptians, while some leaders of the southern tribes and some northern traders also took part in it. He also questioned the logic the allows the putting the responsibility on the present generation, and urged the northern politicians to put their demands aside which are based on claims of racial persecution as these are unconvincing and urge them to highlight any views that will lead towards peace and stability in all parts of Sudan. The representative of the Islamic Charter Front also protested on the claims of southern politicians about the exploitation of northern people at the hands of the North and the denying them from the opportunities of advancement, as happened in northern Sudan, and stated that economic and social development which south has achieved since independence, was not achieved at the hands of the British administration, which has dominated Sudan for more than fifty years.

In the meetings of the Conference on the Northern parties, the Federal National Party also participated and it was represented by Ismail Al-Azhari the Federal National Party leader and prime minister of the first civilian government after independence. His speech include several points, the most important of them is that the problems of the Sudan is the origin of colonial rule, which practiced the closed area policy for the areas that had basically suffered isolation from the rest of the population groups in Sudan, in addition to the reality of multi-tribal, ethnic and linguistic diversity that distinguish Sudan. He opposed the demand of Sano Party (internal wing) with federal government, because federal systems, depending on his point of view, often stand for collecting scattered and unifying them behind a single state and not vice versa, as the state does not start one and then divided into different, and refused flatly truncating any part of the country from secession. It was his opinion that the federal government hampers performance in governance and takes enormous financial costs, and extra effort compared to the systems of central government. Besides this the Federal will not achieve any measure of success, if it is not surrounded by guarantees based on the depth of national links that connects the parts of the same country and facilitate the flow of the relations among them. He expressed his fear that this form of government will lead to the confrontation between the different federal entities, there is no successful experience of the State that began single

and then declined and decomposed in federal units, the federal government leads to the fueling of regional feelings, and confrontation between the central government and regional governments and encourages each region to maintain its resources for local development and refused to give for national development, which lead to widen the development of uneven and unequal standards of living between different regions. He also said in his speech that the Organization of African Union had clearly defined all the countries to remain in their geographical borders existing at the time of independence, and said that his party is ready to accept any mode of administration that would lead to peace and love between the north and south.

The Sudanese Communist Party was represented by the party secretary Abdalkhalq Mahgoob. Abdalkhalq in his speech took a different meaning in its essence which is consistent with the principles of his party, which is based on Marxist theory and schools if he blamed the worsening crisis in the south to the policy of uneven development which arose mainly under the colonial administration, and deepened in the era of successive national governments. He also did not exempted southern parties from the responsibility due to lack of clarity in policies and sufficiency of vague slogans about the future of the relationship between North and South, he said the absence of clear programs made these parties a tool in the hands of the Missionary Societies and the promoter of partisanship. And condemned the southern parties also and accused them of abandoning her constituents and converting it into traded goods between the Northern parties.

Abd al-Khaliq Mahgoub said that the form of federal government claimed by some southern parties, is futile, because of the scarcity of resources of the province at the time and it inability to secure accumulated sources to achieve economic and social development, and that the experience of African countries, newly independent, which adopted the federal systems confirmed the development of the regions on the support provided by the centre. He said this is what happens in Sudan.

Sudan witnessed many initiatives since the round table conference but the political instability and the shift from a democratic government to a military one does not leave the scope of any peaceful solutions.

The round table conference present the first chance for the people of the broken nation to meet for the first time and present their different viewpoints about their vision of the project of nation building in Sudan. The decisions of the conference were shifted to be revised and negotiated by committee named as the committee of twelve. After finishing its mission they had to submit a report with recommendations to the prime minster.

The problem of south Sudan since the round table conference tend to take the military confrontation some times, and peaceful negotiation another times. One of most important peaceful solutions was the Addis Ababa agreement 1972 that took place at the time of the military rule of General Numairi. The importance of Addis Ababa agreement is that it succeeded to stop the war for ten years, till the beginning of second civil war in Sudan in 1983. At that time the southern military movement change its leadership and became under the leadership of Johan garang De Mopior. It also changed its name to Sudan people's liberation movement (SPLM). And its military wing was Sudan people's liberation army (SPLA). And for the first time of the history of the southern movement, the movement raises the slogan of the unity of the Sudan.

And the political and military leader of the movement rise announcement that he is seeking of the emerging and born of what he called the new Sudan. In his discourse Johan garang adopted a Marxist approach and that approach appears very clearly in the manifesto of the movement.

The idea of the new Sudan as john garang drawn started to spread among the Sudanese politician, by it Johan garang meant as appear from some of his speeches the destruction of the old social, economic and political structure, cleaning the way of the emergence of a new structures led in the long run to the born of the new Sudan. That's why the NIF accused the SPLM by said it is the handmade of the Sudanese communist party SCP.

The SPLM shifted from civil war with the government army to the peace negotiation many times. So after the collapse of Addis Ababa they hold kokadam announcement, peace agreement between Al Mirgni-Garang 1988, before the cup of NIFin1989.

After the NIF the military solution started to towards the government army for two reasons, the problems and separations of some leaders of SPLM/SPLA. And the beginning of the projects of the Sudanese oil. At the same time the conflicting sides continue their peace negotiations.

In 1989 an initiative led by the previous president of the united state Jimi Karter in 1989. Another American initiative been held in 1990.

In 1991 another initiative led by The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a seven-country regional development organization in East Africa, and two initiatives in Apoja in 1992-93. In 1994 IGAD adopted a new initiative; the new thing in that initiative is that it contains a pre prepared frame and forced the two sides to sign them. Where as the SPLM was in a hurry to sign it, the Sudanese government accused IGAD countries of bias towards the SPLM. The united state takes the initiative that became the base of mechacose, the frame protocol of the comprehensive peace agreement that led to the separation of Sudan, and the failure of nation building project.

Machakos agreement is the frame of reference for the subsequent peace agreements between the SPLM and the government, but what is the frame of reference for Machakos itself? Dr. Tijani Abdel Qadar said that Machakos agreement can be seen as a functional theory-oriented anti-state as the nation-state in the view point of functionalists is the obstacle standing in the face of achieving required interests and common needs with more efficiency. So they are urging to bypass the concept of the sovereign nation-state with the concept of majority rule and the related concepts of the hierarchy of power which in the long-term may lead to substitute the existing state institutions by establishing a network of alternative institutions with the function of basic services to achieve some common interests and concerns.

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The functionalists also concentrate on the efficiency and efficiency alone in the performance of functions that should determine the loyalty of individuals and groups to these institutions. According to this theory we can avoid a conflict groups around the state by moving away from the state itself and inclusion of those groups in the network of other institutions at administrative and security levels for economic planning and implementation, and pushed them towards stability through economic arrangements, based on charters beyond the capacity of the nation- state to force the central government to abandon a number of its responsibilities and national competencies and to be allocated and included in a number of new administrative and political units, which are intended to gradually evolve toward greater complexity and institutional integration. This will pave the way for the emergence of new political elites and bureaucracy with administrative capabilities and tendencies of utilitarian's appropriate for such operations and have a pragmatic mentality contrary to the political and military veterans who participated in the war.

The underlying assumption of Machakos that the more numerous and intertwined state agencies and the power-sharing systems, the smaller the chances of a return to arms, or to the Democratic majority to settle the dispute. The functionalists' claims that once these basic units established the primary institutional integration process will begin and will continue through gradual self-reinforcing and feedback.

So the essence of the Machakos Agreement lies in the commitment to the principles of prior policies and procedures without knowing the outcome, the intention was to leave these results to the known dynamics of the circumstances or the situation, meaning that the political conditions have a momentum of its own and all the circumstances creating a climate for the new circumstance that generates the same theory, which the Americans applied in the Camp David Agreement. Similarities also between the peace agreement and the Camp David the deconstructive policy on which the theory is based, which is quite different from the federal system, where the central government giving up the functions and terms of reference for other separate and independent political departments.

This arrangement is a dangerous functional arrangement not because for only decentralizing the functions of state institutions, but because those institutions shall loose most of their powers and the state and its various organs such as armed forces and the Central Bank and the legislative body, will become of minor importance.

It is worth mentioning that the functional theory itself has defects and subjected to many criticisms and amendments, even some of the functionalists turned to the new functionalism. The first criticism is that the new intensified institutional frameworks could not be alone sufficient to achieve confidence, but will lead when it is placed into effect to new differences crystallized in the direction of the conflict. The second criticism is that the groups that will be upgraded to the leadership of these institutions will seek to acquiring the critical resources on which the rest of society depends and will seek to enact laws that reflects their opinions and interests, and thus raise the anger of other political and social groups who are not covered by the agreements. That would be the beginning of another conflict. The third criticism is to the idea of discriminating one of the conflict parties and creating a new situation for it, as that such discrimination is only possible by withdrawing resources from other sectors in society, which they defend their interests and establish their vision, which means that this idea carries the seeds of conflict within it, as the success in the area is the same as what would be the start of the outbreak of war in the other (so that the resolution of conflict in southern Sudan followed by Darfur dispute which flared up fiercely, and when the dispute parties sat down with the government for negotiations, a civil war broke out in the Nuba mountains.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Conclusion

This study was an attempt to understand the concept of nation in Africa by looking at the history of Sudanese nation-building process. Sudan represents one among many similar cases of nation-building processes in Africa. The political history of Sudan shows that the question on nation-building is one which is frequently raised. To what extend the Sudanese Governments succeeded in building a nation state? This is the question that is asked through out the work and the study seeks to address the problems relating to the nation-building there. Sudanese society is a diverse society that contains different races ethnicities, religions, and cultures. Diversity can be a positive factor and a source of cultural and civilizational enrichment; or it can be a negative factor, a source of backwardness that lead to conflicts, civil wars and other problems that became real hindrance concerning the nation state and nation building projects. In the case of Sudan the question of nation-building remains as an unresolved question because of its diversity in ethnicity, religion and culture. Now, the issue to be raised is on the reason why the diversity operated negatively on the nation-building process. The history of Sudan can answer this question to some extent.

Under colonial rule, British designed a tactic to keep the Sudanese people separated within themselves in-order to prevent a movement from the Sudanese against the British rule. They made it operational through different ways. With the political power, British could operate it easily by using the state power and making policies that are best suitable for it. For instance, the closed area policy or closed district policy was one of the way through which British prevented the free mobility of northern Sudanese in to southern Sudan. British administration prevented the northern Sudanese Arabs from moving towards the south even as a trader using the justification of prevention of slavery trade. But, slavery in Sudan was been practiced by the time of the Turkish rule and the European themselves plays an important role as partners to them. The southern Sudanese tribal leaders themselves have the same role of northern traders. It is clear that the intention of British was not much about the prevention of slavery but about the separation between north and south Sudan. While this was a tactic of British from above, *i.e.,* they

also operated it from below through influencing and favouring the leaders of major religious sect and to maintain the gap between people. Among the two religious sects – *khatmya* and *ansar*– British influenced and used the leaders of *ansars* to stand in opposition to Egypt while Egypt was trying to unite with Sudan, with the slogan of 'the Unity of River valley'. *Khatmya*, at the same time, supported Egyptian move for unity. The conflict between these two sects in Sudan with the influence of British continued through out the history. Later these two sects became the main political parties in Sudan. They continued to be in conflicting situations and fought within themselves. this kind of political polarization and the kind of distorted practice of political party became the discourse of all Sudanese parties.

Apart from that, the British also made the foundation for the inequality between the north and south. British found the central Sudan, a part of North Sudan, more convenient for their trade and business and so they started developing the area through developing infrastructure over there. The northern Sudan started developing under colonial rule which thus, helped the northern people to develop themselves. The south was left untouched. Education is one of the very important factors of integration of different social groups, and the creation of a collective national spirit. However, the mission of education was been left to the Christian missionaries in the south. The missionaries were more interested in spreading the religion than in educating people. They offered all the opportunities for Christians in South creating an inequality within southern Sudan. Except few Christian elites, majority in southern Sudan remained poor and uneducated while the northern people were much better than the South. In Instead of supporting unity, education and religion in the south encouraged separation. In any peace initiative that been hold to solve the problem of south Sudan, religion and language tend to be a real hindrance.

One of the biggest threats to nation building and nation state in Sudan was the issue of differential participation of various ethnic groups in political and economic activity. In Sudan, majority of the populations have been excluded from the political authority and the economic and cultural representation in their country. Sudan was been ruling by very

few elite from the Arab Muslims groups whom settled in the area of central Sudan by the Nile banks, and with them, joined recently the southern Sudanese elites. Together they exploited the natural resources of the country to their own benefit, and assaulted the spiritual and cultural heritage of the people of non-Arab or non-Muslim affiliations. Therefore, one might strongly claim that the conflict in Sudan is triggered by a number of factors grouped in two major dimensions: first, the dimension of natural resources – exploitation of natural resources by power-holders, the desperate natural conditions and the consequent pressure on resources–and the international economic decline and its impact on Sudan; second, the dimension of identity, as the hegemony of a certain elite group and their control of resources necessarily need to use a cover, which is in this case, in the form of an intellectual and moral ideology adopted by the ruling system. Consequently, this allows for the attack on the identity and rights.

In addition to the internal conflicts that Sudan suffers from, Sudan also has its own regional and international special position. On the regional level we noticed that its strategic geographical location in the heart of the African continent in addition to its link between the Arabic and African worlds gives it a very unique importance. The Middle East is a very rich area with oil and other mineral resources; however, the area suffers a serious problem concerning drinking water sources. This problem extends to shape the whole African continent, that's why a lot of scholars warning that the coming war is a war of water, especially in the African corn area. Though Sudan occupied the largest area of the river Nile valley, about two third of the water of the Nile river comes from its brunch blue Nile of Ethiopia. This is why the conflicts of interests historically lays its dark shades on the relation between the two countries. In addition, Sudan was the largest county in the continent before separation and it is very rich in its natural resources. It has the ability to become a strong political and economic state. Keeping in the consideration the tendency of the Sudanese elites towards Arabian nationalism and Islamic religion, especially under the rule of the current regime, can be a real threat to the Israelian state in the Middle East. Sudan is one of the major countries in the African continent and a country surrounded by a host of Arab and none Arab entities enjoys a great deal of consideration by neighboring nations bordering it. The influence of Sudan upon such

countries is well-felt and even considered to be a threat for countries such as USA, UK, Israel and others. The spread of Islam from the Sudan to its neighbors is of great threat to such countries who seek pursuing their own interest by any means and for any cost which made Sudan subject for a host of accusations and conspiracies by the super powers via the UN, the International Court of Justice (ICC) gateways and others. For, some of such countries views Sudanese Islamic system as a model to be followed particularly, upon its stand against colonial countries, refusal of hegemony policies and practices in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the so-called new world order and the becoming of the USA as the sole dominant power of world politics. The Islamic Movement in Sudan therefore, enjoys a great deal of interest worldwide.

Now-a-days, and due to the above hypothesis (accusations), Sudan was subject to divide into North-South states as of the 09th of July, 2011 at the time of pursuing this study. Allegations against the country were reasoned by the conflict and rivalries between the political factions that damaged the country's own unity. The result is that South Sudan split to form another independent state inflicting the country's economy, social structure and unity. The host of political movements that were emerged in Sudan soon after independence could not preserve the country's unity for more than five decades.

The conclusion to be invited in this brief scenario is that, for more than 50 years' of political conflict and social transformation, Sudan as one of the dominant and culture-diversified countries in Africa could not manage to find solutions for its own problems. A few years before independent, the major objective of the Sudanese people was to obtain their independence and to send a way the British. Then, soon after achieving this valuable objective, Sudanese political groups and factions turned their guns against each other. In the history of Sudan there were vital turning points such as the country's independence in 1956, a host of military coups that shredded the country from 1958 – 1983 in search of democracy and the rule of the majority, Sudanese elections recently, a South-North civil war that extended for more than 50 years as the longest in the continent and South-region referendum in 2010 that ended with the secession of the South.

All developments and scenarios stream on this line –Conflicts, rivalries, disagreement, search for leadership and charisma and influence. The final result witnessed by the whole world a few days ago (09th of July, 2011) was the separation of South Sudan as the newest state (no. 193 in the UN records) reflecting the bitter fact of the Sudanese politicians and leadership to preserve the country's unity. The chronology of events, the formulation of political parties in Sudan never regarded the country's interest as a priority. Politician's and faction's selfishness were the most outstanding criterion of those groups. The prominent problem of Sudan is that, harmfulness and problems were caused by the intelligentsia of the majority of its population. A great deal of Sudanese were educated and professors in politics and other sciences. Intellect is a characteristic of many people even the normal one at the street. No one can deny the excellent colonial heritage of the British who left good educational base and a refined system of education like that of India (both countries were once colonized by UK). A by-product of this was that English language is commonly spoken by elderly and youths at the various parks, sshopping centers and the streets of Khartoum and New Delhi.

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SUDAN
Political Map

N

EGYPT

LIBYA

Wadi Halfa •

ASH
SHAMALIYAH

Dunqunab •

AL BAHR
AL AHMAR

Red Sea

Port Sudan □

Dunqulah □

NAHR
AN
NIL

Hayya •   Tawkar •

Kurayamah •

Ad
Damir □

CHAD

SHAMAL
DARFUR

KHARTOUM

KASSALA

Kassala □

ERITREA

Wad Madani □

Al Junaynah □   Al Fashir □

SHAMAL
KURDUFAN

AL JAZIRAH

Al Qadariff

GHARB
DARFUR

GHARB
KURDUFAN

Al Ubayyid □

SINNAR

Rabak
Sinjah

Nyala □

An Nuhud □

JANUB
KURDUFAN

A'N NIL AL
ABYAD

Ad
Damazin □

JANUB
DARFUR

Babanusah •

Kaduqli □

AN NIL AL
AZRAQ

A'ALI AN NIL
(UPPER NILE)

AL
WAHDAH

ETHIOPIA

SHAMAL BAHR
AL GHAZAL

Malakal □

Uwayl □

Bentiu □

CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC

GHARB
BAHR
AL GHAZAL

WARAB

Warab □

Waw □

JUNQALI

Rumbek □

AL BUHAYRAT

Bor □

SHARQ AL
ISTIWAIYAH

GHARB AL
ISTIWAIYAH

Juba □

Kapoeta □

Yambio □

BAHRAL
JABAL

Nimule •

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO

UGANDA

KENYA

0   100   200 Kilometers

Legend	
– – –	International Boundary
- - -	Province Boundary
■	National Capital
□	Province Capital
•	Other City