

**UNITED STATES — SOMALIA
RELATIONS, 1974—84**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

ABDISALAM MOHAMED

AMERICAN STUDIES DIVISION
CENTRE FOR AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI — 110067

1986

PRE FACE

PREFACE

The developments that revolutionized the politics in the Horn of Africa also compelled the United States to change its priorities and preferences. Pushed out from Ethiopia by a government which was ushered in by a military coup that swore in the name of Karl Marx, the United States crash-landed in Somalia in the arms of another government which it had given up as an ally of the Soviet Union. It marked the beginning of a shift in US policy towards the Soviet Union. What did Somalia get from the US? Nothing, except disappointment, dejection and frustration. Its dream of uniting all Somalis in one country remained a dream. Its economic crisis deepened and political system weakened. This is my thesis in this modest piece of research which is presented here.

I have no words to express my gratitude to Dr. B.K. Shrivastava, Professor of American Studies, for his critical supervision, moral support and valuable guidance to complete this dissertation. I am also grateful to Prof. R. Narayanan of Latin American Studies without whom it would have been impossible for me to take up the study. I owe a debt of gratitude to Prof. H.S. Chopra, Chairman of the Centre for American and West European Studies, J.N.U., for


his assistance. I am also thankful to the Professors of the Centre namely, Prof. M.S. Venkataramani, Dr. R.P. Kaushik and Dr. Christopher Raj.

I am similarly indebted to numerous individuals for their advice, kindness and encouragement. Among them I must mention my parents, Ashok Das, Taranjit Singh, Riswan, Shefali, Mun Mun, Meenakshi, M.J., Abdullahi, Abdi A., Said A., Dr. Ongodia, Hussain, Mahad, Yassir, Mohamad F. and all my close friends.

I also owe a special debt to the staff of the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, American Centre and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

My thanks are also due to Shri S.P. Sharma for having devoted his valuable time in providing the secretarial assistance.

New Delhi,
August 1986


(ABDISALAM M.)

C O N T E N T S

	Pages
PREFACE	i - ii
CHAPTERS	
I INTRODUCTION	1
American Interest in Africa	
Emergence of Somalia as an Independent Country and American Interest in the Horn of Africa	
Fragmenting Relationship between US and Somalia - 1960-1976	
II THE WAR BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA	37
Background: Objectives of the Two Parties	
The Course of War and American Policy	
Disappointment with American Policy	
III GROWING RELATIONS	77
Strategic Relations in view of the Changed Circumstances in Africa	
Economic and Political Relations	
IV CONCLUSION	105
BIBLIOGRAPHY	112

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, the relationship with the Soviet Union has continuously been among the central consideration of US foreign policy.¹ Few American moves in the world arena can be understood in total isolation from super power rivalry. This rivalry is more explicitly shown in their attempts to advance their respective interests in the developing nations. Naturally, Africa is part of the prize of this geopolitical context.

As a consequence of the superpower competition, the policy of the United States towards sub-Saharan Africa is motivated by the desire to face the challenge posed by the Soviet Union to the Americans, a threat which was voiced by the then Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko when he insisted more than a decade ago that "today there is no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition".² In this context then the Soviet Union has a big stake in making its weight felt in the sub-Saharan Africa. Here it is to be noted that the sub-Saharan Africa policy of the United States is not a reactive policy. But to understand, it is nece-

1. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Making of America's Soviet Policy (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1984), p.vii.

2. Pravda (Moscow), 4 April 1971.

ssary to examine the evolution of US interest in the sub-Saharan Africa.

American Interest in Africa

Soon after the end of the Second World War, the United States assumed the responsibility of protecting the "free world" from the menace of communism. And it was at that time, that the cold war scenario unfolded itself, prompting the declaration of "Truman Doctrine".

In it President Harry Truman declared:

It must be the policy of the U.S. to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure - to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through³ economic stability and orderly political process.

Since then, cold war considerations and global containment of communism became the prime occupation of the framers of United States policy.

The Truman Administration viewed Africa as an appendage of Europe, in as much as Europe was allied with America. Hence there was very little African policy free from European consideration. Moreover, at that time, Europe was in the process of recovery from the ravages of war. And the exploitation of Africa's resources was considered

3. Harry Truman, message to Congress, 12 March, 1947. Quoted in Ralph. E. Magnus (ed), Documents on the Middle East (Washington D.C.: 1969), p.66.

essential for that recovery.

Discovering of American role in Africa

It was only after hearing the rising voice of nationalism from the sub-continent that the Americans felt the need to formulate their role in Africa's decolonization. While discussing America's role in African decolonization, Chester Bowles noted as early as 1956 that its "wealth and power have inescapably committed the United States to world politics and world responsibility".⁴ Further, G. Mennon Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in the Kennedy Administration, wrote in 1962 that "our self-interest in Africa stem from acceptance of the idea that there can be no peace for our children or our children's children unless there is stability and satisfaction around the world."⁵ Similarly, Prof. Vernon McKay who served in the State Department argued in 1963 that by the early 1960's American interests in Africa had become "an integral part of a broader interest in American security, prosperity and freedom."⁶ Thus, these were the earlier indications of US interest in forging links with the sub-Sahara.

4. Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America (Berkeley, Cal. 1956), p.3.

5. G. Mennon Williams, "American Foreign Policy and the emerging nations of Africa" in State Department Press Release (Washington D.C.) 241, 4 November 1962.

6. Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York, 1963) p.273.

US attempts to draw Africa in its own sphere

The fulfilment of US objective of bringing the sub-Saharan Africa within the fold of its own alliance system was to some extent frustrated by the emergence of the non-aligned movement. The United States was disappointed by the post independence non-aligned India and others, and wanted Africa not to move away further from the West. Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955, heightened American fears that the newly independent nations, although operating under the guise of "non-alignment", were, in fact inching towards the communist camp.⁷ President John F. Kennedy re-affirmed, few months after assuming the presidency that Africa was the objective of "gigantic communist offensive".⁸

The United States was determined to stave off the spread of communism in the sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so, it intervened in Congo's (now Zaire) civil war in the 1960s to prevent the nationalist leaders from gaining the upper hand. It wanted to have leaders who will be subservient to the interest of the West.

7. For an analysis of the Bandung conference see George McTurman Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, New York, 1956). For more on Dulles' reaction to a non-aligned movement, see Michael A. Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times (New York, 1972), pp. 252-64.

8. See Steven Metz, "American Attitudes towards Decolonization in Africa", Political Science Quarterly (New York), Vol.99, no.3, Fall 1984, p.518.

US Strategy for the Control of African resources

President Kennedy's own evaluation of their involvement in Congo has been described by his biographer and former aide Theodoro c. Sorensen in these words:

The unification of the Congo was consistent with overall American policy in Africa. U.N. pacification of Katanga was preferable to a bloody civil war that could drag in other African states on both sides - the black nationalists against the white supremacists - ultimately (could) drag in the great power as well. He was concerned, however, that the U.N. did not have the means to achieve this goal, and he wanted no undertaking launched which would shift the burden of achieving it to direct American action. He recognized the unpopularity in this country (America) of supporting with funds and planes a U.N. peace keeping operation that was neither peaceful nor aimed at communist. He disliked disagreeing with the British, French and other allies who were more inclined to protect Katanga - although Belgium's Paul Spaak, he felt, had shown great courage and restraint in reversing that nation's encouragement of Tshombe's secession. But backed by his able Ambassador, Edmund Gullion, he believed that the world peace, the effort to keep communism out of Africa and our relations with other African nations were all best served by opposing all tribal secessions in the Congo, and by supporting instead the UN's precedent - setting role as a nation builder.⁹

One can deduce from Kennedy's assessment of US role in Congo's civil war as that of opposing tribal secession in the Congo, which will ultimately serve in keeping communism out of Africa.¹⁰ But the fact of slaying Prime Minister Lumumba under suspicious manner refutes his contention.

9. Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965), p. 637.

10. For the same view but different version see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, Mass, 1965), p. 575.

What was evident from their (the U.S. and its western allies) involvement in Congo crisis was to secure the mineral rich province of Katanga in Congo for themselves, since Lumumba espoused nationalist ideas which they saw as a threat to their national interest. It is futile for us to waste words on the Congo crisis. The man whom the Americans had chosen to rule, still holds power in the Congo, what is now Zaire. His regime has gained the reputation of being the most corrupt administration in the entire sub-Saharan Africa.

The risk of communists take over in Africa advanced by the United States and its allies, was "like Humpty Dumpty's use of words". The real motive behind countering Soviet advances in the sub-Saharan Africa is the "resource control strategy".¹¹ As early as 1943, Henry Villard, Assistant Chief of the State Department in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, declared United States' determination to ensure for itself and other nations equal accesses on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of Africa.¹²

11. For analysis which argue that there is a strategic threat to the United States if the Soviets gain access to mineral resources in Africa, see: Council on Economics on National Security, Strategic Minerals: A Resource Crisis (New Brunswick, N.J., 1980); Walter f. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrel, Soviet Shadow over Africa (Coral Gables, Fla. 1976); and also Daniel S. Mariasch, "Soviet Union is on the Move: It fight's Western Control of Strategic Raw Materials", Los Angeles Times, 13 February 1981.

12. Waldemar A. Nielson, The Great Powers and Africa (London, 1969), p.248.

The struggle for resource, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union as well their respective allies are engaged is an important fact of international politics. Their industrial programme is dependent on these resources and stoppage of their flow would certainly cause unprecedented disorder within their societies.

U.S. Policy of Preserving its interest in Africa

In order to preserve its interest in the sub-Saharan Africa and protect the flow of mineral resource from the regions, the United States pursued a policy of empathizing with the white minority regimes in the Southern Africa. President Richard M. Nixon's "Tar baby" policy towards the sub-Saharan Africa is an apt illustration of this empathy. The policy had been nicknamed "Tar baby" by its State Department opponents to express their considered view that it was a sticky policy which the United States would find difficult to abandon if it did not work. In the famous Uncle Remus story by Joel Chandler Harris, Brer Fox makes a tar baby and sets it by the side of the road to trick Brer Rabbit. Brer Rabbit falls into the trap and gets completely stuck. The "Tar baby" policy had been based on the assumption that Whites are here to stay and the only way constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain

the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. The option argued was that increased US economic aid would provide an opportunity to the sub-Saharan states "to focus their attention on their internal development and to give them a motive to co-operate in reducing tensions". The Republic of South Africa was also to be encouraged to provide economic assistance to the sub-Saharan African States.

The Angolan Civil War of 1975-76, jolted those advocating the "Tar baby" policy. The civil war erupted six months after the Portuguese announced in September 1974 their intention to withdraw from Angola, between the rightist and leftist groups. In the civil war in Angola,¹³ the United States covertly aided UNITA and FNLA, led by Jonas Sivimbi and Holden Roberto, the opponents of Agustino Neto and his popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). It wanted to punish Neto by supporting his rivals because of his reliance on the Soviets and the Cubans for both military hardwares and advisors. The question as to what extent the United States should involve itself in the civil war in Angola generated a debate in the U.S. Congress, resulting in the Clark Amendment in December 1975, which prohibited covert aid to forces opposing Neto's MPLA.¹⁴

13. Angola is only second to South Africa in mineral resources.
 14. For Congressional restrictions on American military and economic aid, see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (Washington, D.C.), 3 June 1978, pp. 1410-12.

U.S. Interest in Africa Suffers set back

The Clark Amendment was a blow to United States' "National interest" in Africa as asserted by Kissinger on 29 January 1976, while appearing before the sub-committee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The blame for their failure he insisted, lay not with the Ford Administration but with Congress for failing to provide the wherewithall for standing up to the Soviets in the crunch. His testimony was a strongly critical of the Congressional majority for its naivete and lack of spine. He said:

Military aggression, direct or indirect, has frequently been successfully dealt with but never in the absence of the local balance of force. U.S. policy in Angola has sought to help friends achieve this balance. Angola represents the first time since the aftermath of World War II that the Soviets moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the U.S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has halted the executive action when it was in the process of meeting this kind of a threat....

If the United States is seen to emasculate itself in the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban intervention, what will be the perception of leaders around the world as they make decisions concerning their future security?.....

I must note with some sadness that by its action the Congress has deprived the President of indispensable flexibility in formulating a foreign policy which we believe to be in our national interest. And Congress has ignored the crucial truth that a stable relationship with the Soviet Union based on mutual restraint will be achieved only if Soviet lack of restraint carries the risk of counteraction....

Our diplomacy was effective so long as we maintained the leverage of a possible military balance. African determination to oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention was becoming more and more evident. ...

By mid-December we were hopeful that the (organisation of African Unity) would provide a framework for eliminating the interference of outside powers by calling for an end to their intervention. At that point, the impact of our domestic debate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. After the Senate vote to block any further aid to Angola, the Cubans aid was resumed on an even larger scale. The scope of Soviet Cuban intervention increased drastically: the co-operation of Soviet diplomacy declined.¹⁵

This unsuccessful attempt of the Ford administration to get the support of the Congress in order to offset the Soviet-Cuban ^{help} to Neto of MPLA, generated a feeling of impotence in the American society. American concern was rising. The US increasingly felt that the Soviet Union was exploiting the conflict and turmoil to its advantage. The mood of people changed. They wanted to be tough with the Russians. That compelled the incumbent President Ford to scrap the word "detente" from his vocabulary.

Naturally, then Jimmy Carter, in line with Kissinger, carried his electoral campaign in 1976 taking the line that the United States will not be passive if the happenings in Angola are repeated elsewhere in the world by the Soviets.

15. See Kissinger's statement before the Sub-Committee on African Affairs of the U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on US Involvement in Civil War in Angola, 94th Congress, 2nd session, (Washington D.C. 1976), pp. 14-23.

Once elected President Carter hoped to fulfill the pledge he had made. And in carrying out the promise of matching the Soviets which in turn serve America's interest in the world, he expressed his view on U.S. foreign policy. In his inaugural address, President Jimmy Carter spoke of his "Absolute commitment" to human rights and promised that under him US foreign policy would be guided by a sense of moral values. "Because we are free", he declared, "we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere". This hinted the use of American power to disseminate American values. The propagation of these values as he believed, was possible. He said, "it is a new world, but America should not fear it. It is a new world and we should help shape it. It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy".¹⁶ Carter made the concern for human rights as the cornerstone of his new foreign policy.¹⁷ He viewed the world conflicts as resulting from regional problems not as a consequence of East-West rivalry. But he was unable to cope with the events that swept the world, that of the Ogaden War of 1977-78 (in which the Soviet

16. Jimmy Carter, "A Foreign Policy Based on America's Essential Character" "Notre Dame University, South Bend, Ind. 22 May 1977 Published in the Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), Vol. 77, no.2003, June 1977, p.622.

17. John Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists. Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy (New York, 1977), p.262.

Union and the Cubans intervened on the side of Ethiopia to recapture the liberated territories from Somalia), the fall of the Shah of Iran (whom the Americans regarded as their policeman in the Gulf region without bothering about his human rights record), the Afgan invasion by the Soviets, both events occurring in 1979.

President Carter, who earlier had stressed on morals in his policies to win Africa and serve American interest disguised under the cloak of human rights,¹⁸ side-tracked moral issues when chips were down and opted for globalism. He warned that: "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf ... will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force".¹⁹

This statement in his State of the Union address to Congress on 23 January 1980, which was called as "Carter Doctrine", was meant to arrest the growing expansion of the Soviet Union. As the President observed earlier:

To the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence in a variety of ways. The Soviet Union apparently sees military assistance as the best means of expanding its

18. Carter as evidence of his commitment to the moral policy cut the American aid to Ethiopia citing violation of human rights as the reason. Also he called back his Ambassador to Uganda, giving the same reason, see for the details of this policy "what price Morality", News Week (New York), 7 March 1977, p.6.

19. U.S. State Department Current Policy No.132. (Washington D.C.), 23 January 1980, p.2.

influence abroad. Obviously areas of instability in the world produce a tempting target for this effort and all too often they seem ready to exploit any such opportunities.²⁰

Carter also responded to the situation by creating in the autumn of 1979 the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) intended to protect its vital interest in the unstable states in the third world²¹ particularly in the Gulf region, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean and embarked on a programme of negotiating access agreement with Kenya, Oman and Somalia for the use of naval and air facilities in these countries, "whenever the need arose". By August 1980, an agreement in that regard was concluded with Kenya, Oman and Somalia.

The conclusion of these agreements was useful to the United States for two purposes. First it gave the Soviets an indication of the American determination to call a spade a spade, unless Moscow stopped its tendency to exploit the troubled areas of the world. And Second, it boosted the moral of the United States which was suffering from the "Vietnam Syndrome".

20. Jimmy Carter, "The United States and the Soviet Union" address delivered at the US Naval Academy's Commencement exercises, 7 July 1978, Published in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No.2016, July 1978, pp. 14-16.

21. Michael Klare, Beyond the Vietnam Syndrome: US intervention in 1980's (Washington D.C. 1981), p.69.

Yet this action of the United States could not lead to the realization of its intended purpose - that of promoting US interest in the developing nations.

America's interest soars as Reagan came to Power

Ronald Reagan's ascendancy to power ushered a new era for the United States. Reagan and his team believed that the world balance had tilted in favour of "the evil empire",²² that the United States has failed to safeguard its global interest; and the problem in the sub-Saharan Africa was a Russian weapon aimed at the United States.²³

By shifting the focus of the African problem from the United States to the Soviets, the "Reagan administration claimed that it pursues a foreign policy towards Africa that concentrates more than those of its predecessors on United States national interests".²⁴

The Reagan administration's Spokesman on Africa, Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, has noted that the United States' interests in Africa are

-
22. David Shears, "Communism Focus of Evil in the World", says Reagan, the Daily Telegraph (London), 9 March 1983.
23. Reagan made that statement soon after Carter's election in 1976.
24. John P. Lewis & others, United States Foreign Policy and the Third World Agenda, 1983 (New York, 1983), p.69.

broad and varied and they span the spectrum of investments trade, human liberties, political security and strategic concerns. He has called attention to Africa as a source of oil and other vital minerals and has noted that sub-Saharan Africa represents a potentially growing market for U.S. exports.²⁵

The reason why they give Africa's market such prominence is to keep them rich. As President Reagan pointed out: "What I wanted to see above all else is that this country (America), remains a country where someone can always get rich. That is the thing we have that must be preserved."²⁶

To work for that goal "the Reagan team takes it for granted that ... the U.S. must first and foremost be perceived as militarily powerful". "Much of the Reagan administration's understanding of U.S. strategic political and economic interests in Africa depends on its having determined that Western access to Africa's chromium, diamond, cobalt ... and other minerals is crucial and essential for U.S. military strength".²⁷ For this reason the US defined its

25. See "U.S. interests in Africa", address by Assistant Secretary Charter A Crocker to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 5 October 1981, published in The Department of State Bulletin, Vol.82, No.2058, January 1982, pp.23-26.

26. Robert Chesshyre, "White House Peddler an ageless dream", The Observer (London), 29 January 1984. (Emphasis added).

27. Lewis, n.24, p.70.

interests in the Southern Africa as "vital",²⁸ because much of the above mentioned mineral deposits are found in this region. Thus, making Africa "an integral and increasingly important part of the global competitive system."²⁹

These efforts of the United States to win the African market is not only confined to her show of force in the region but also includes her attempts to influence their economy.

The Reagan administration has avowedly taken the stand that it is not the responsibility of the US to help the third world in meeting their development needs. As a consequence, it set a new formula for dispensing its aid. That is aid through bilateralism which will help the US to advance its political and economic objectives. As Crocker said:

Washington needs to stop thinking of African policy as a philanthropic venture and start defining U.S. interests in the economic relationship with Africa. Instead of trying to run rural welfare programs that bypass sovereign governments, the United States should lay aside such echoes of the white man's burden and press ahead with more mundane tasks:

28. *ibid.*

29. See Assistant Secretary Crocker's address before the African-American Institute Conference, Wichita, Kansas, 20 June 1981 published in The Department of State Bulletin Vol. 81, No.2053, 1981, August 1981, pp. 57-58.

export promotion programs , investment incentives for business in African mining development targetting aid toward regional infrastructure projects, and exploring the concept of industrial free zones with African Leaders.³⁰

Crocker's argument is in line with what Reagan and his foreign policy advisers have argued that US policy towards any region should be strategic in its conception and understood in terms of its inter-relatedness with US world policy.³¹

The administration firmly believes that 'economic freedom', meaning capitalism, is the root of "political freedom", meaning democracy. President Reagan gave expression to this view in his speech before the Board of Governors of the World Bank in September 1981. He said, "Every day life confirms the fundamentally human and democratic ideal that individual effort deserves economic rewardWe cannot have prosperity and successful development without economic freedom. Nor can we preserve over personal and political freedom". Although the President did not himself elaborate on a casual relationship between market let development and political freedom. Administration

30. Chester A. Crocker "African Policy in the 1980s", Washington Quarterly (Cambridge, US), no.3, Summer 1980, p.80.

31. For this argument in its African context see W. Scott Thompson, "US Policy Towards Africa: At America's Service?" Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.), vol.25, No.4 Winter 1982, pp. 1022-23.

spokesmen have since suggested both that economic freedom leads to political ^{freedom} and that political freedom leads to economic freedom".³²

Ultimately, this will bring the ascendancy of capitalism over other systems. As a result, US business will foster globally.

In that regard, President Reagan has done the ground work for such an eventuality. He lays emphasis on the acceptance of private enterprise and open market as the condition of helping the African countries. He also attributes the ills of Africa's development as a result of bad policies - particularly the absence of market forces. So he recommends that their development "will depend on the commitment of developing countries (in which Africa is included) to market economic principles and their actions in moving away from Government management of the economy."³³

32. Then US Ambassador to the United Nations, Jean Kirk Patrick, argued that economic freedom under authoritarian regimes can lead to democracy. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig said in Berlin in September 1981: "The ability of free men to work together whether in political parties, press associations, free enterprises, or labor unions is essential to ... a free society. It is also the best for sustained economic growth", Quoted from Lewis & others, n.24, p.133.

33. Development co-ordination Committee, Development Issues: United States Action Affecting Developing Countries: 1985 (Washington D.C., 1985), p.97.

And for the implementation of this programme, the U.S. has embarked on a grand scheme intended to inculcate in the African people the meaning of the "Values of democracy". The scheme is termed in the United States as "Project of Democracy". The project is questionable. Since the administration does not hesitate in supporting Governments which do not enjoy popular support from their people. It aims only to uphold their interest. As Krikpatrick put it: "The central goal of our foreign policy should be not the moral elevation of other nations, but the preservation of a civilized conception of our national self-interest."³⁴

Thus, the proposition in the United States is to create condition suitable for her to maintain its interest in the sub-Saharan Africa. Of course, then, it has to have allies in the region. The Administration concentrates on South Africa. This is because "whenever the Americans talked about their country's stakes in Africa, the Union of South Africa was never far from their minds".³⁵ The reason why the Americans have chosen South Africa to be their ally in Africa is that "Strategic, economic and political interest in Africa could be well served if South Africa had a friendly

34. U.S. News and World Report (Washington D.C.), Vol.90, 2 March 1981.

35. Ram Singh Saini, "United States Relations with South Africa with special reference to the issue of Apartheid, 1953-63, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, School of International Studies, New Delhi, 1976), p.27.

and compatible government",³⁶ It should come as no surprise if the Reagan administration chooses in dealing with South Africa, a policy based on "constructive engagement". The policy advocates, if there is to be change in South Africa, it should come gradually within South Africa, and is against any outside imposition to combat the ugly system of apartheid.

**Emergence of Somalia as an Independent Country
and American interest in the Horn of Africa**

The above analysis of US interest in the sub-Saharan Africa suggests that the United States had persistently pursued a policy of maintaining its interest in the region. It is not surprising therefore that Somalia's independence on 1 July 1960 did not awaken interest of the United States in the Horn of Africa. This was because America's interest in the Horn was well served by its Kagnew base in Asmare, Ethiopia. The base was as a result of the Defence Agreement of 1953 between the US and Ethiopia.³⁷ And consequently, the

36. Ibid.

37. Before the signing of the agreement, U.S. military Planners collaborated with the British and French in an effort to identify and prepare bases in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Somalia and Iraq after the outbreak of general war see for that matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, No.1887/42, March, 1952 (top secret), U.S. National Archives Modern Military Section, Box CCA 381 as quoted in Claudia Wright, "Reagan Arms Policy, the Arabs and Israel - Protectorate or Protection Racket?" Third Quarterly (London), Vol.6 No.3, July 1984, p.643.

the posture adopted by the American administration towards Somalia, at least, proves the consistency in the United States in carrying on a policy which only cared her interest.

Evolution of US policy in the Horn

It was the strategic significance of the region that brought the United States to the Horn. The Horn derives this significance by its location. It lies at one end of the transit route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Whoever desires to control the flow of oil from Persian Gulf and Middle East would like to command the Horn of Africa as the bulk of oil tankers pass through this route.

As a result of her emergence as a world power after World War II, the United States assumed the role of the protector of the "free world" to contain the spread of communism. Since the struggle for global influence went on between the East and the West, the United States recognised the strategic value of the Horn. So it indicated, before the UN resolution of 1950 concerning the destiny of the Eritrean people, that it will take over the large British military mission in Eritrea. This was the sole reason why America supported this "unholy" federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia endorsed by the UN resolution of 1950.

The resolution made Eritrea an autonomous unit "under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown",³⁸ thereby ignoring the demand of the Eritreans for self-determination. John Foster Dulless, who became the U.S. Secretary of States, in the Eisenhower Administration, referring to the American support of Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea, explained this attitude a short time before the implementation of UN decision to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia in September 1952 by saying:

From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless the strategic interests of the United States in the Red Sea basin and considerations of security and world peace makes it necessary that the country has to be linked with our ally Ethiopia.³⁹

Soon after Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia, the United States signed two agreements with the latter, linking it more closely than the 1942 Agreement which allowed the United States during the war to establish her radio Marino there.⁴⁰ This radio was used as all weather communication centre by the United States Government.

The first agreement embodied a Mutual Defence Agreement under which the United States agreed to train

38. Bereket Habte Selassie, "The American Dilemma on the Horn", The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge, UK), Vol.22, no.2, 1984, p.257.

39. Market International (New York), Ethiopia Summary, 1952 as quoted in *ibid*.

40. For more information regarding the importance of radio Marino, see John Gunther, Inside Africa (London, 1955), pp.275-6.



and equip the Ethiopian armed forces. The Agreement also provided for US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Ethiopia. Under the arrangement, American officers were sent to Ethiopia to train the Ethiopian forces. By the mid-1960s MAAG had trained four divisions of the Ethiopian army numbering about 40,000 men. In 1971, the number of Americans serving in Ethiopia reached 3,000.⁴¹

The second agreement with Ethiopia was on the "utilization of Defence installations with the empire of Ethiopia". The agreement provided for the expansion of the small communication station in Asmara. It was renamed Kagnev communication base to commemorate the Ethiopian contingent which took part in the Korean war.

The significance of this base was underlined by *John Spencer*, Chief Adviser to the Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his testimony in the Senate Sub-committee on African Affairs in 1976:

The United States wanted the communications base in Asmara... because it was located in the tropics far from the north and south magnetic poles... and magnetic storms, in a zone where the limited degree of seasonal variations between sunrise and sunset reduced the need for numerous frequency changes. It was, therefore, important to the world wide network of US communications through the Philippines, Ethiopia, Morocco and Arlington, Virginia, and important as well for NATO communications within Western Europe itself when electrical and magnetic disturbance upset communications in those higher altitudes.⁴²

41. See Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (London, 1981), pp.215-6.

42. Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, Hearings before the sub-committee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 4, 5 and 6 August 1976, p.26.

Apart from the base, another factor which linked Ethiopia more to the U.S. was Ethiopia's relation with Israel. Israel was against Eritrea's gaining independence as the Arabs supported the Eritrean cause. And their success would have brought Eritrea into the Arab fold. This could lead to a possible closure of Babel Mandeb straits for the use of Israeli ships. Because of the Israel factor, the State Department favoured Ethiopia much.

The base turned Ethiopia into the hub round which US policies in the Horn rotated. In return America rewarded Ethiopia with military and economic aid. By 1977 Ethiopia received from the United States "over \$350 million in economic aid since 1952 and over \$275 million in military assistance".⁴³

As a result of this interlock between the United States and Ethiopia, United States projected Ethiopia as forming "Southern tier or a secondary line of defence against communism in the Middle East".⁴⁴ And subsequent years saw her status of containing communism in the region raising due to Somalia's independence of 1st July 1960. This trend went on till the overthrow of their man, Haile Selassie, in September 1974.

Somalia's independence raised frowns in the West, because of her determination to get back her "lost territories". The European colonial powers hatched conspiracies and divided Somalia's land into five parts. Somalia never recognised this division. Its emergence as an independent

43. *ibid.*

44. *ibid.*

state definitely posed a problem to the colonial powers, since their stand always advocates a status quo which provides them an opportunity to exploit.

As a result of this division a portion of Somali land was given to Ethiopia resulting in a border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. It was Britain which ceded this portion to Ethiopia under so-called Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897, under which the British were to later hand over the Somali territories of the Ogaden and the Haud in 1948 and 1954, respectively, against the known wishes of the Somali inhabitants of these regions.⁴⁵ It is because of this "robbery" which is the cause of the present border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia.⁴⁶ And when Somalia got its independence it demanded that all territories of SomaliLand be united in the present state of Somalia.

This was strongly opposed by all those who had vested interest in the region. The rejection of the Americans to honour Somalia's request to arm and train her army⁴⁷ was not something unexpected, since they had a base in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. As a prize of this base, the United States co-operated with Haile

45. See M. Lewis, "Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism", in the Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.1, No.2, 1963, pp. 129-31.

46. An account of the border dispute, see J. Drysdale, the Somali dispute (London, 1964), p. 88-89.

47. The Times (London), 13 November, 1963.

on two issues that of Eritrea and Somalia,⁴⁸ both of which were concerned with Ethiopia's occupation of their land.

When the US rejected Somalia's requests, the latter turned to the willing Soviets to arm and train more than 10,000 Somali soldiers. The Soviets accepted. Their acceptance was not without reason. The Soviets had their eyes on the Horn long before Somalia's independence.

Before Somalia gained her independence, the Soviets alongwith the Americans rejected a British plan to unite all Somalis and place them under British UN trusteeship, instead they supported Italy.⁴⁹ Both wanted to use Somalis in furthering their respective interest in Italy but with different goals.

In 1948, general elections were taking place in Italy. The Communist Party and the Christians Democratic Party were wrestling for power. The Soviet presumed that the communist will win the election, since they were the strongest communist movement in Europe. The success of this party would have given the Soviets an outpost to penetrate into Africa. The Americans supported Italy to impose trusteeship over Somalia because of

48. Halliday, n.41, p.216.

49. Arthur Gavshan, Crisis in Africa: Battle ground of East and West (England, 1981), p.79.

their concern with communism. Their support was aimed to appeal to the Italian sentiments of having their empire intact even after their defeat in the World War II. The Christian Democratic Party won the election. As a result, the Soviets failed to get a foothold in Somalia.

The Soviets, therefore, could not miss this new opportunity to come to the Horn. Their coming also boosted the Khrushchev policies towards the third world - that of expanding Soviet interests in this region. Till 1976, Somalia was the centre of the Soviet activities in the sub-Saharan Africa. Only after it switched to Ethiopia in 1977 that their relations turned bitter.

Fragmenting Relationship between the United States and Somalia, 1960-1976

The character of the relation Somalians had with the United States was hate and love in the years between 1960 and 1976.

In the early sixties, the United States did participate in the development of Somalia's economy, despite her refusal to help Somalia militarily. The reason behind this economic assistance was that the United States assumed that the then Somali regime was Western oriented, since Somalia relied for her economic growth on the European Western countries - mainly the members of the European Economic Community (EEC). This brought her generous help

from the United States.

As a result of her qualifying for U.S. aid, the United States assisted the construction of teachers training institute at Afgoi; it built the Kismayo port; it operated various assistance programmes mainly in the field of agriculture, such as the organization of an agricultural extension service, livestock improvement, soil and water resources, it also granted more than hundred scholarships to Somali students; and it sent American teachers to Somalia under Peace Corps Programmes.

Their relation could have turned better if fate did not rule otherwise. It was during Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal's visit to the United States that the Somali President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated at Las Anood by policeman brought from the capital to enhance his security while he was at tour to see the grievance of the people about a recent concluded general election. Five days after the assassination of the President, a coup took place in Somalia.

This coup of October, 1969 which brought the fall of the duly elected regime put more hurdles in the way of their rapprochement. Soon after seizing power, the junta added democratic to the name of the Republic.

Henceforth, the name of Somali Republic was Somali Democratic Republic. The additional word - democratic has wide coinage in the socialist countries. That might have been the first mark of Somalia's tilt to the socialist bloc. And her subsequent action confirmed this tilt indicated by the inclusion of democratic in her name.

Somalia showed her sympathy with the socialist countries by allowing ships registered under Somali flag to carry freight to Hanoi. That time United States was at war with North Vietnam. This led the United States to cancel its substantial aid to Somalia in 1970.

In the same year, Somalia embraced socialism as the state ideology. Socialist ideology is against the capitalist ideology in which America upholds.

As often happens with a newly adopted socialist state to define its relations with the outside world by using rhetoric, Somalia was not an exception. After her adoption of socialism, words like anti-imperialism, imperialists, anti-revolutionary gained common usage in Somalia. Then no wonder if the Somali officials depicted the United States as the leading "imperialist state" in their official statements. The use of these words became the framework within which Somalia assessed

her relation with the United States.

In return, the United States identified Somalia as one of the havens of terrorism,⁵⁰ a term Americans use for those whom they consider out of their norms.

Although, the year 1974, marked a change in the region (because of Ethiopia's revolution), it also pointed to the deteriorating relationship between Somalia and the United States. It was that year when Somalia allowed the Soviets to use its port of Berbera as a base.

Before acquiring Berbera, the Soviets were badly in need to have a base in the Indian Ocean. Their want was not without reason. They desired to remove the stigma which they got after Egypt expelled them from Mersa Matruh in the year 1972.

The Soviet decision makers tried very hard to obtain a base to compensate for Soviet loss. For this reason Soviet became deeply involved in the politics of the countries of Horn. They encouraged the Somalia President. They invited him to Moscow in 1971 and promised him incredible economic aid to build for Somalia dams, canals and hydro-electric station on

50. New York Times, 19 May 1977.

on the Juba River near Fanole. To some "the Fanole project was thought as instrumental of the Soviet - Somali Co-operation".⁵¹ The success of the project could have turned Somalia into an industrialised state but it never took off.

The year after, the then Soviet Defence Minister Grechko visited Somalia. He signed an agreement that had implications far beyond the Fanole-Juba project. "This time the Soviets received something specific in return for their investment for Grechko had agreed to improve the air-strip and the port of Berbera in return for the future access to the new facilities".⁵² In 1972 itself, the Soviets began the construction of the base. And by the end of 1973, the work was complete.

President Podgorny visited Somalia in July 1974 for the inauguration. The outcome of his visit was the signing of Friendship and Co-operation treaty with Somalia. After the signing of this treaty, the door was open for "the Soviet navy ... to have a home in the Indian Ocean ...".⁵³ The base thus enabled them to stage periodic naval reconnaissance over the

51. See, J. Bowyer Bell "Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Somalia," Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.) Vol.19, no.2, Summer 1975, p.406.

52. Ibid., p.404.

53. Ibid.

Indian Ocean.

To the world public, the news of the Russian base at Berbera came through a photograph taken in March 1975 by United States U-2 plane. The Somali ambassador in Washington Abdullah Addou, reacted to this revelation by holding a press conference on 26 June during which he denied the existence of such a base.⁵⁴

But the Americans did not buy this denial. They unleashed propaganda aimed to secure more funds from the Congress in order to upgrade its communication facilities in the Indian Ocean island, Diego Garcia, which would enable them to counter the growing Soviet influence in the region. The American presence at Diego Garcia began when they got a lease for fifty years from the British in 1967. The island is one of the four islands carved away by the British from Mauritius and the Seychelles before granting them independence to create the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) in 1966.

The importance that the Americans attach to the plan for expansion of their facilities at Diego Garcia

⁵⁴. Ibid. 409.

could be seen when in 1974 they rejected an offer from Somalia to have a base at Kismaya, in the south of Somalia.⁵⁵ The reason why the Somali government offered this base to America was to offset the American allegations against their regime. That is the Soviet base in Somalia.

The Americans based their rejection of this offer on the events that were happening in the region, adjoining the Persian Gulf. Before embarking to change its communication facilities at Diego Garcia into a fulfilled naval base, the United States mainly relied for its security needs in the region on its Kagnew base, in Ethiopia. Emperor Haile Salessie of Ethiopia, a close ally of the United States, created problems for it by declining to resupply arms to Israel during the October 1973 war by cutting diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, Eritrean freedom fighters were gaining upper hand in their struggle to liberate their occupied land from Ethiopia. And they were succeeding to cut Asmara, the site of the American Kagnew base, from the rest of Ethiopia. In addition, the Arabs, at the same time, announced their oil boycott adding injury to an insult, since major western

55. Halliday, n.41, p.224.

allies of the United States depended on the Arab oil as a source of energy.

It is not surprising, therefore, if the United States for her own security reasons concentrated on her base at Diego Garcia, where at least, it was sure that the island was insulated from local instability.

The US rejection of Somalian offer of a base shocked the Saudis who had persuaded the Somalis to oust the Soviets from their country and also offer a base to the United States'.⁵⁶

For the Saudis the acceptance of this offer by the Americans was meant to remove the Soviet presence on the Horn as the Saudis themselves wanted to establish authority over the Red Sea.⁵⁷

56. Multinational Corporation and United States Foreign Policy', Hearings before the sub-committee on Multinational Corporations, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, May 1976, pp.417-52 as cited in Samuel Makinde, "United States Policy in the Horn of Africa since 1974", The Australian Journal of Politics and History (St. Lucia), vol.30, no.3, 1984, p.376.

57. Peter Schwab, "Cold War on the Horn of Africa", African Affairs (London), vol.77, no.306, January 1978, p.19.

After the Americans ignored the Saudi initiative to remove the Soviets from the Horn, the Somali President, took up the task of stopping the propaganda storm created by the American allegations against his government that it had enabled the Russians to entrench themselves in Berbera. He extended an invitation to some members of US Senate to come to Somalia in order to verify if there is any truth in the American allegation of the Soviet base in Somalia. The subsequent visit of the Senate confirmed the reports of the existence of the base. Senator Dewey F. Bartlett (R-Okla) who led Senate inspection of the Berbera facilities said that the Soviet Union was developing a "significant" naval and air station that 'exceeds any other facility' outside the nation's border.⁵⁸ As a result their relations cooled off, since Somali government expected from their visit to bring the two countries closer.⁵⁹

Only after political cloud of uncertainty hovered around which induced the Americans to change their

58. See Visit to the Democratic Republic of Somalia, report to the Committee on appropriations, US Senate, by Members of the Fact-Finding Team Sent to Somalia at the invitation of the President of Somalia, 4 July 1975, (Washington D.C., 1976).

59. See Bell, n.51, p.409.

earlier attitude towards the region and showed some interest in Somalia. First indications of such change appeared (which in the end caused realignment) when the Soviet lost their trust in the Somalis. Somalia, an ally of the Soviets invited some members of the American Senate to come and inspect Berbera, a Somali port given to the Soviets for base. So this gave the Soviets a hint that they might be expelled from Somalia and they started looking for an alternative in the region. Another factor which caused political uncertainty in the region was Ethiopia. By being an empire, Ethiopia was impregnated with internal disorder. Liberation fronts like the Eritrean Liberation fronts and the Western Somali Liberation front were waging war against Ethiopia to get their self-determination. Also Ethiopia faced power struggle within the Dergue, the ruling junta who took power after the overthrow of Haile Salasse in 1974. The Dergue for their own survival then asked Soviet help to stop the wars waged by those liberation fronts which they were supporting. Thus, tilting themselves towards the Left.

As a result American policy in the region faced a dilemma. And soon after the interaction of these

new developments in the region coupled with the war of 1977 between Somalia and Ethiopia set the change that brought the redrawing of the political map in the area.

CHAPTER II

THE WAR BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA

CHAPTER II

THE WAR BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA

The Ethiopian revolution of 1974, in which Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by military junta, known in Amharic as the Dergue, heralded a change in the Horn of Africa.¹

Soon after seizing power, the Dergue faced the long outstanding question of the right of self-determination posed by the Eritrean and the Western Somali Liberation Fronts against the Ethiopian empire. They were divided on the right approach to get the required solution for the independence struggle waged by these groups against Ethiopia.² Some of them were of the view that the solution lies through negotiations while others like Mengistu Haile, who eventually rose to become the chairman of the Dergue favoured suppression. As a result of these two different approaches in dealing

-
1. For details of the Ethiopian Revolution, see Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (London, 1981), pp.82-95.
 2. A full account of the struggle waged by the Eritreans in pursuit of their right of self-determination, see Richard Sherman, Eritrea the Unfinished Revolution (New York, 1981), pp.72-93. And for the border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia out of which was born by the Western Somali Liberation Front, see J. Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London, 1964), pp.88-89.

with the demands of independence brought to the surface a power struggle within the Dergue. The Label of the method of struggle employed by the former was known as "white terror", in which they chose their opponents. While the later used "red terror" in which they indiscriminately killed their antagonists. The result of this internal power struggle was the killing of the Chairman of the junta, Lt. Gen Aman Andom on 22 November 1974 and also his successor Tafari in February 1977.³

The indiscriminate killing that was prevailing in Ethiopia at that time, had attracted the world's attention,⁴ particularly of the United States, because of her old ties with Ethiopia. The United States harshly criticized the "red terror" carried out by the Dergue against those who differed on how the revolution should evolve. And when President Jimmy Carter of the United States pronounced his policy of human rights in which

3. See "Shootout in Dergue" in News Week (New York), 14 February 1977, p.22.

4. On 27 November 1974, Salim who was then, Tanzania's representative in the United Nations and current chairman of the African group, asked the General Assembly to send messages in the name of the UN asking that the lives of the emperor and other persons should be spared. While underlying the urgency of the matter, he said that it was "of great concern to Africans who had heard with tremendous concern and pain of the repeated executions of numerous ex-officials in Ethiopia. See Colin Legum ed., Africa Contemporary Record Annual Survey and Documents: 1974-75 (London, 1975), p.B-136 (Hereafter cited as AGR).

Ethiopia was listed among the countries that had abused human rights in February 1977,⁵ their relations took a turn downwards.

Indeed, the process of cooling of relations between the two had started earlier than that. It was in 1975 when the Ford Administration decided to limit its aid programme to Ethiopia. This reevaluation of policy resulted in the rejection of Ethiopia's \$ 25 million military aid request by the United States.

Hence, Carter's inclusion of Ethiopia among the countries where human rights were being violated only accentuated what Ethiopia perceived as a plan to weaken her existence as a state. Moreover, it was a threat to the survival of the junta which needed arms in order to remain in the saddle and suppress the demands of the Liberation fronts.⁶

The only option for the Dergue to procure weapons to oppress the different nationalities within the

5. The other countries were Argentina and Uruguay. And because of their consistent violations of human right, the Carter administration announced further reductions of its foreign aid to Ethiopia as well well as to Argentina and Uruguay.

6. See, John Dorntan's series of articles on the Eritrean war in the New York Times, 11, 12 and 13 July 1977.

empire was to announce that in future Ethiopia would seek its military aid from the "Socialist countries."⁷

This signal offered the Soviet Union a much needed hope to frustrate the American design in the region vital to the latter's interest. V. Sofinisky, a Soviet official, pointed out that the Soviets regarded the Horn of Africa as of great military, political and economic significance as the area lies at the conjunction of the two continents of Asia and Africa.⁸

Accordingly, it was not a surprise if the Soviet Union, an ally of Somalia (Ethiopia's arch-enemy), was moved by this overture of Ethiopia to arm her. And once they became Ethiopia's supplier of arms in the early months of 1977, they started proclaiming Ethiopian revolution as a "genuine Marxist revolution". A proclamation which generally aims to pave the way for the Soviets to move in. Thus, this newly found role of being the supplier of arms to both Ethiopia

7. This announcement was made by col. Mengistu Haile on February 4, a day after his triumph to the Chairmanship, in a broadcast.

8. This statement was made by V. Sofinisky, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Department in Television speech in Moscow on February 3, 1978, reported by the New China News Agency, 14 March 1978.

and Somalia has given the Soviet Union the ability needed to eliminate American influence in a region vital to it. In its first attempts aimed in that direction, it arranged a meeting to negotiate a federal state between Somalia and Ethiopia in Aden, the capital of South Yemen, in March 1977. Somalian President, Mohamed Siyad Barre and Chairman Mengistu Haile of Ethiopia attended the meeting in which Fidel Castro, President of Cuba, acting on behalf of the Soviet Union, presided. The aim of this meeting was to put to an end the long outstanding border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. So that the whole Red Sea could turn to be a Soviet Lake.⁹ Somalia rejected the plan. Of course, America too undermined the plan. It tried her best to frustrate the Soviet strategy in the region through Saudi Arabia. The Saudis enticed Somalia away from the Soviet influence by offering her substantial economic aid.¹⁰

9. For an excellent exposition of the Russia's historic interest in the area, see Edward Wilson, Russia and Black Africa before the World War II (New York, 1974).

10. For an account of Soviet Ventures in Africa and Saudis' counter moves see, "Africa Venture" in NewsWeek, 4 April 1977, p-15.

It was after this unsuccessful effort to federate Somalia and Ethiopia that the mistrust between the Somali government and and the Soviet Union grew. What further aggravated the already tense relations existing between the two was the Soviet commitment to arm Ethiopia to the teeth and then ignoring Somalia's appeals for Soviet arms.

Hence, this only contributed more to Somalia's pledge to help her brethren in Ethiopia across the border, resulting in an outbreak of full scale war between Somalia and Ethiopia in July 1977.

Background: Objectives of the two parties

The war brought to the fore Somalia's demand to get back her lost territory and Ethiopia's determination to keep what she gained as being part of the African scramble.

The present hate relation that exists between Somalia and Ethiopia started when the European colonial masters arrived in Somalia and signed a Protectorate treaty with the Somali clans in the late nineteenth century. The colonial powers took into confidence the Abyssinian empire in partitioning the Somali territory. Prior to that, the disputed area

known as Ogaden was not part of Ethiopia. As late Margery Perham, an eminent writer, observed:

While the fluctuating power and ward of the Shoan outpost of Ethiopia make it impossible for a clear line to be drawn upon a map, it would be roughly true, up to about 1880, to regard the country for about a hundred miles round the modern capital as the southern most projection of the power of Ethiopia. East and West, as well as South of this were people who lay outside the Government of the Kingdom.¹¹

But then how did Ethiopia manage to be part in the carving up of Somali territory? This was because Ethiopia was considered as "Christian island in a sea of pagans." That gave her a special status - letting her to enjoy some of the powers of colonial rulers. And it also made possible her inclusion in the Brussels Act of 1890.¹² Thus, giving her the much needed impetus to change the tiny kingdom into an empire. It was not surprising therefore to see her challenging the limit of her expansion only after a few years of her signing of the Brussels Act.

11. Louis Fitzgibbon, The Betrayal of the Somalia (London, 1982), p.12.

12. On 16 December 1890 Abyssinia acceded to the Brussels Act, the ostensible purpose of which was to counter the slave trade, but which also provided for the prevention of firearms falling into the hands of most Africans.

The Barter of Ogaden

England's attempt to get the approval of Ethiopia to the partition of Africa in order to control Hergasia, with the strategic Western Somalian coastline and its hinterland, within its protectorate, resulted in compromising its commitment to protect the Somali people and their territory. As a result, Britain abandoned its claim to some 67,000 square miles of land in the Haud and Ogaden. So, the arrangement placed "the Somali clansmen concerned in a position in which they would not be able to maintain their independence from Ethiopia. It was merely a matter of time before Ethiopia followed up her spasmodic thrusts and transformed her infiltration among the Somalis into a definite occupation.... Thus 1897 saw the definition of the British sphere in relation to Ethiopia."¹³

It should be noted that the Ogaden area, covering about 25,000 square miles, was given to Ethiopia to induce her to agree to the colonial arrangements made by Europeans during the period 1885-1905.¹⁴ With the

13. Red Sea Foreign (secret E), p-73 progs Nos.62-71, December 1892, National Archives of India, hereafter cited as NAI, New Delhi.

14. Refer to the Red Sea and Somaliland, confidential prints, Foreign Ext 1, part - B, proceedings during the period 1892 - 1900 NAI, New Delhi.

acceptance of Ethiopia, the Italians and French began constructing railway lines in the Asmara - Massawa and Addis Ababa - Djibuti sections respectively, and Britain got the assurance that the upper Nile arrangement was not to be interfered with. The defeat of Italy at Adua in 1896 made Ethiopia more prominent in the area. The British and Italians then considered it prudent to reach a compromise with Ethiopia.

The exigency of the situation demanded that the Europeans part with Ogaden and other areas to Ethiopia, so that it could help both of them to acquire a hold in the Horn and maintain their empires.

The fact is that the European powers divided the area amongst themselves with the acquiescence of Ethiopia. "For the time being atleast, France, Britain and Italy had pruned their Somali possessions to dimensions acceptable to Ethiopia, and the stage was set for the march of local events."¹⁵ The next 21 years were dominated by the religious war against Christian infidels led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdulla Hassan in

15. For details see, Red Sea and Somaliland Confdl. prints, Foreign Ext. 1, part-B, Progs. Nos.119-121, October 1898, NAI, New Delhi.

which the Somalis fiercely strove to regain their lost independence."¹⁶

Somali Nationalism at War

The foreign intrusions into Somaliland caused Somalis to resist the intruders. In March 1899, Sayyid Mohamed Abdulla Hassan started his famous rebellion against foreign intrusion. The main planks of the rebellion were opposition to foreign rule,¹⁷ partition of grazingland, vindication of the Somali code of law, common Somaliness, Somali culture and Islam. The same urges and responses of the Somalis got crystallised later in the Somalian National League formed in 1935 and in the demand for greater Somalia in 1951.¹⁸ (It is interesting that the British Foreign Office itself advocated the idea of Greater Somalia in the early 1940s. The idea was incorporated in the Somali constitution when Somalia became independent in 1960). The Somalis stiffly resisted the penetration of the British and the Italians into their country. But they were defeated because of superior

16. I.M. Lewis, the Modern History of Somaliland: From nation to state (New York, 1965), p.62.

17. For details see, Red Sea and Somaliland confdl. prints, Foreign Ext 1. Part-B, Progs. Nos.13-64, January 1900, NAI, New Delhi.

18. Raman G. Bhardwaj: The Dilemma of the Horn of Africa (New Delhi, 1979), p.31.

firearms of the invaders. Yet, they continued to fight in order to retrieve back their lost territories and regain their independence from the foreign occupation.

There were uprisings against the Ethiopians, British and Italians, At the same time, when they (Somalis) saw further infringement of their independence by Ethiopia, the Somalis started to remind the British their obligation to defend them. To demonstrate that Somalia was indeed British protectorate, Somali sultan of Ogaden pressed for a British protectorate flag as a proof of the British occupation, and by implication of Ogaden.¹⁹ Despite these efforts on the part of the Somalis, to maintain their independence, the British were unconcerned. This was clear when the Abyssinia and British signed their questionable treaty of 1897 which still plagues the relation between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Ogaden: Bone of Contention

After the defeat of Italy in world war II, the British Military Administration took over the whole

19. Letter written by Harding to Salisbury, 30 September 1898, F.O. 107/96 Confd 1, proceedings of the Foreign Department for the year 1898, NAI, New Delhi.

of Somalia, including Ogaden. Nevertheless, the Angolo - Ethiopia treaties of 1942 and 1944 recognised the sovereignty of Ethiopia over Ogaden. But despite these and the earlier 1897 - 1906 treaties, "the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin sensibly proposed in the spring of 1946 that the interests of the Somali people will be best served if the existing union of Somali territories were continued. A trusteeship preferably under Britain... was suggested." The move was hotly contested by the Ethiopians. But a campaign was in the offing in Ogaden against the surrender of the trust territory to Ethiopia. "As early as 1942, there were disturbances in the Harar - Jiggiga region concerned with Ethiopian attempt to impose direct taxation. Two years later, the leaders of Ogaden clans petitioned the British Military Administration urging Britain not to relinquish their territory to Ethiopian rule."²⁰ Ethiopia was again given Ogaden on 23 April 1948 to the complete disappointment and dismay of the Somalis.

Soon after the liberation of the Horn by the Allied Forces in 1946-47, Haile Selassie claimed all

20. Lewis, n. 16, p. 124.

the adjacent colonies of Italy. Ethiopia became an independent state in 1942 but Britain continued to be the caretaker Government of Eritrea, of the Italian and the British Somaliland, and of Haud and Ogaden Reserved Areas. This arrangement evoked intense bickerings among the big powers and the Ethiopian Emperor took full advantage of this.²¹

Haile Selassie was partly appeased by the cession of Ogaden on the basis of the old questionable treaty of 1897.²² But the Somalis resented and just started their uprising against the heinous acts of the imperialists.

It was the Somali League which spearheaded a big movement - aimed for the unification of the Somaliland, "The centuries old cultural nationalism of the Somalis had at least found a powerful modern political expression. Somali nationalism in fact had gained an impetus and momentum which was to carry it increasingly forward."²³ The League continued its

21. Ibid., p.138.

22. For details regarding the Agreements of 1949 and 1954, as also the merger of the British and Italian Somalilands in a new Somali Republic on July 1, 1960, see Lewis, n.16, pp.129-131.

23. Lewis, n.16, p.138.

struggle till Somalia had gained its independence.

Since then, the task of liberating the "lost - land" has fallen on the new republic. Soon after Somalia's independence, Ethiopia abrogated the grazing rights of Somali nomads which they enjoyed under the British and expropriated their live stocks in several incidents. It also declared emergency in Ogaden. These oppressive tactics of the Ethiopian empire led to the uprising of Somali Ogaden which culminated into a war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964.

Ethiopia, which takes advantage of the privileges it has been given by the colonial masters, refuses to relinquish the Somali territory it occupies, thereby denying the right of the self - determination to the people under her domain. Its refusal to resolve border dispute with Somalia by peaceful means resulted in an animus between Somalia and Ethiopia. This precipitated the 1977 - 78 War between the two.

The Ogaden War in 1977-78

The first reports of the war that broke between Somalia and Ethiopia came on 21 February 1977 from independent sources in Nairobi, Kenya.²⁴ Somalia denied them, saying that it had "always advocated the peaceful settlement of problems of any nature." By early June, Ethiopia was blaming Somali trained "infiltrators" for the attacks on the Addis Ababa - Djibouti railway.²⁵ Somalia's response to this allegation was that Ethiopia was trying to draw attention away from its own "liberation wars". It added that it will never desist from supporting those liberation struggles in general and that of Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in particular.

In mid-June Mogadishu began to broadcast the communique of the WSLF, which at the time was thought to have 6000 armed men²⁶ operating in the Ogaden and other parts of Harar province. The first report, on 16 June, claimed 352 Ethiopia soldiers killed and 176 captured in a skirmish at Bable in the mountains

24. Washington Post, 22 February 1977.

25. London Times, 2 June 1977.

26. Washington Post, 24 May 1977.

near Harar. On 19 June, the WSLF claimed it had captured the Ogaden towns of Sagug and Fig. It was at this time that Ethiopia began to accuse Somalia of having sent its regular forces in the Ogaden.

Ethiopia claimed that an all-out Somali attack was launched against its territory on 23 July. It spoke of full scale air and tank battles in which Egyptian and Iraqi pilots were allegedly engaged. Somali response was to accuse Ethiopia of massing troops along the frontier; the Somali ambassador in Rome, Abdullahi Egal Nour, told a press conference on 28 July that regular Somali forces had been involved in the fighting for the first time when Ethiopian planes violated Somali airspace. But the official position Somalis maintained was that their regular forces were in no way involved in the fighting.²⁷

August and September were the months of heaviest fighting. By mid-September the Somali forces had control, even by Ethiopian admission of 90 percent of the disputed area²⁸ and were advancing on Dire Dawa Harar and Jigjiga. The WSLF claimed to have

27. New York Times, 11 August 1977.

28. London Times, 5 August 1977.

inflicted heavy casualties in a mortar and rocket attack on Dire Dawa on 16 August, but Ethiopia insisted that the attack had been repulsed.

The greatest Somali victory of the war occurred on 13 September, with the capture of Jigjiga, a market town and Ethiopian forward tank base to the east of Harar.²⁹ The Somalis claimed that they have killed 3,000 Ethiopians and shot down seven Ethiopian F-5 Jets.

Ethiopia and Somalia were now fully engaged in an open war, diplomatic relations were cut, and Ethiopia mobilized its civilian reserves. Official Somali statements of the war still clung to the version that Somali regular forces were not involved in the war.

To show their success of the war with Ethiopia, the WSLF took western correspondents and television crews to Jigjiga and beyond it. In late September John Darnton of the New York Times wrote:

Despite vigorous claims by Addis Ababa that the strategic gateway is still in Ethiopian hands and that a critical battle is raging the only signs of an Ethiopian presence are the million

29. Washington post, 18 September 1977.

of dollars worth of American supplied tanks, military vehicles and ammunitions the Ethiopians left behind apparently in a panicky retreat into the mountains.³⁰

The battle for Harar

The WSLF concentrated its attacks throughout October on Harar, the capital of Ogaden region. It was at this time that the first trickle of Soviet arms was now reaching Ethiopia. The Soviet ambassador in Addis Ababa Anatoly Ratanav, declared on 19 October that the USSR had "officially and formally" stopped the supply of arms to Somalia. The USSR he said, was now providing Ethiopia with "defensive weapons to protect her revolution."

It was at the time of the battle of Harar that the Soviets threw their weight behind the Ethiopians. Soon after declaring that they have stopped arming Somalis, they despatched the Cuban mercenary soldiers to fight at the Ethiopian side.³¹ More than 11,000 Cuban soldiers were sent to halt Somalia's success in liberating her lost territory, but they could not succeed in opening any front in order to defeat the Somali forces. It was only after the Soviets intervened on the side of Ethiopia to take full charge of

30. New York Times, 29 September 1977.

31. An account of the Soviet - Cuban involvement in the War, see "the battle for the Horn", News Weeks, 13 February 1978, p.14.

the war that the tide of the war changed in favour of Ethiopia.

To show its military capabilities,³² the Soviets launched one of the largest military support operations in recent history in November 1977. It transported by air and sea, an estimated \$ 1 billion worth of equipment.³³

By February 1978, the Soviets were ready to attack the Ogaden liberators and on 28 February they airlifted tanks and Cuban soldier behind the Somali defence line in Jigjiga by using MI-6 helicopters, each capable of carrying two light tanks. During the battle, the Soviet unveiled a weapon never before used in combat - the BMP - one, a highly mobile armoured vehicle with a 75 mm gun, anti-tank missiles and heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles.³⁴ By March Jigjiga fell to the Ethiopians.

On 9 March, Somalia announced the withdrawal of Somali forces from the Ogaden region. The withdrawal of Somali forces came after Somalia received

32. Africa Research Bulletin (London), 15 February 1978, p.14.

33. For the details of the operation see "Airlift to Ethiopia" in News Weeks, 23 January 1978, p.12.

34. Africa Research Bulletin. (London), 15 April 1978, p.4774.

a guarantee from the "big powers" that Ethiopian forces would not cross the Somali frontiers and that other foreign forces would be withdrawn from the area.³⁵ The acting Information Minister, Abdisalam Sheikh Hussien, said Somalia had been "advised by big powers to solve the problem in a peaceful manner". He added that these powers guaranteed the safeguarding of the rights of the people of "Western Somalia", and demanded that they urgently "initiate the process for bringing about a just and lasting settlement of the conflict in the Horn of Africa". The withdrawal was announced simultaneously by President Carter. A State Department official said that his Administration had made "considerable effort to bring it about".³⁶

The Course of the War and American Foreign Policy

The war that had erupted in the Horn of Africa opened opportunities for exploitation by the super-powers. And it was not surprising that the commencement of the war brought a realignment that changed the political contours of the region. Somalia, which

35. "The Ogaden Debacle", News Week, 20 March 1978, p.15.

36. See ACR: 1977-78, p.B379.

was an old ally of the Soviet Union disembarked from the Soviet plane and boarded an American flight. While Ethiopia did just the opposite.

The President of the U.S. Jimmy Carter who was worried about his administration's lack of effective policy in the region after Ethiopia's revolution and saw a growing discomfiture between the United States and Ethiopia, thought that the war was a blessing.³⁷ He ordered his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski "to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our friend."³⁸ The man selected to act as an inter-mediatory in that effort was Dr. Kevin Cahill, Somalia's President Siyaad Barre's long time personal physician and close American friend, who flew to Mogadishu in mid-June after conferring with Mathew Nimitz, a trouble shooter for Vance. Cahill told Barre that he had a message from "the very top", that Washington was

37. This despair of Carter was reflected in a statement which he made while addressing his news conference of June 13, 1977. In the conference he said: "... as I have already indicated and named several countries - Somalia, Ethiopia, Iraq and even more controversial Vietnams, Cuba - I want to move as best as I can to re-establish normal, friendly relationships with those countries." In detail see "President Carter's conference of 13 June in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 77, no. 1984, July 1977, p.3.

38. News Week, 26 September 1977, p.15.

"not averse to further guerrilla pressure in the Ogaden."³⁹ [This of course, was just two months after Ethiopia had pre-empted the U.S. by closing down its military aid programme Carter had made but not yet implemented a similar decision as a result of President Review Memorandum (PRM) 21. This rift between the US and Ethiopia developed after the arrival of Cuban advisers in Ethiopia in May 1977.⁴⁰ Washington saw this arrival of the Cubans in Ethiopia as part of Ethiopia's recent shift towards the Soviet Union, more pronounced since Lt. col. Mengistu Haile emerged as strongman following a shootout among military leaders in February 1977.

Since then, Ethiopia once totally dependent on the U.S. for weapons has signed a military assistance pact with Moscow. The Carter Administration, citing human rights violations cancelled military aid to Addis Abba in February 1977 but continued to sell arms.

In April, Ethiopia ordered the shutting down of five U.S. installations - the consulate in Eritrean capital of Asmara and four military and

39. Ibid., p.15.

40. Washington Post, 26 April 1977.

cultural facilities including the kagnew communication base at Asmara - and expelled 350 Americans working at the installations]. Cahill also apparently told Barre that the United States was willing to consider Somalia's defence needs.⁴¹ Abdullahi Addou, the Somali Ambassador in Washington, conferred with Carter twice and assured Barre that the Cahill message was correct. On 1 July, Cyrus Vance declared: "we will consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from states which are threatened by a build-up of foreign military equipment and advisers on their border in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa".⁴² Prior to this declaration, Somalia was not even in the list of those countries in Africa which received U.S. arms.

On 13 July, Saudis called Somali President, Barre to meet them secretly in Saudi Arabia.⁴³ The aim of the meeting was to woo away Somalia from Soviet influence, which, in turn, would help them to stop the Soviet attempts to turn the Red Sea into Soviet Lake, - an area vital to the security of Saudi

41. News Week, 26 September 1977, p.15

42. See Vance's statement in ^{The} Department of State Bulletin, vol.77, No.1989, August 8, 1977, p.170.

43. This newly found role of the Saudis was confirmed through an interview televised on 13 January 1978 by Henry Kissinger. In the interview, Kissinger said that Saudis had become involved in Somalia "partly at our arguing" in ACR:1977-78 p.A73.

Arabia. As a bargaining chip, they assured Barre not to worry about "the supply of armament" from the West. Since Somalia relied mainly on the Soviets for arms supply. They also encouraged the Somali Government to expel the Soviets from its territory. Somali president was led to believe that even if the Soviets stopped providing arms to Somalia, the latter will be able to procure weapons from the West.

An announcement on 27 July by the State Department was a pointer to that. While referring to this announcement, Richard Moose, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said: "We had told the Somalis ... that with other countries, we are willing to meet their legitimate defensive requirement."⁴⁴ After the Tanzanian president Julius K. Nyerere's departure from Washington in the early August of 1977, a Somali delegation visiting Washington was told that no U.S. arms would be supplied while the Ogaden fighting persisted. Presumably, the President Nyerere was acting at the

⁴⁴. News Week, 26 September 1977, P. 15

behest of the Kenyans.⁴⁵ Since Somalia had a border dispute with Kenya, he might have told Carter not to provide any arms to Somalia, as well, he might have reminded the United States to respect the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) stand on the inviolability of the borders in Africa. The cause of the present border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia was the result of treaties signed among Britain, Italy and Ethiopia. Ironically, Nyerere has his own reservation about treaties entered by parties other than a Sovereign Tanzania. This is clearly written in a statement which he made on 30 November 1961, in reference to an agreement reached between the U.K. and Belgium about port facilities in Kigoma and Dares Saleam. He said :

We would not object to the enjoyment by foreign States of special facilities in our territory if such facilities had been granted in a manner fully compatible with our sovereign rights and our new status on complete independence. But such was not the case with facilities which were granted to Belgium under

45. President Nyerere paid official visit to Washington in August 1977. During his visit, he met Carter and reviewed the political and economic developments in Africa and their relationship to global issues. They must have discussed the Ogaden War which was at that time the crisis of the day. For Nyerere's visit to U.S. see The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 77, no.1988, August 1977, P. 275.

the 1921 and 1951 agreements. A lease in perpetuity of land in the territory of Tanganyika is not something which is compatible with the sovereignty of Tanganyika (Tanganyika is the former name of Tanzania before the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar island) when made by an authority whose own right in Tanganyika were for a limited duration. No one give away something which is not his to give.⁴⁶

By following Nyerere's advice, the Statement Department spokesman Hodding Carter publicly said on 1 September 1977 that "we have decided that providing arms at this time would add fuel to a fire we are more interested in putting out."⁴⁷ Moreover, the United States also declared that it would not allow the transfers of U.S. military equipment to Somalia from third countries.⁴⁸

Though, this volte face of the United States came as a shock to the Somalis, they however, stood firm in the face of the Soviet pressures. And expelled them when they found that the Soviets were only interested in building their own empire on 13 November 1977.

46. See The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, "Problems of State Succession in Africa: Statement of Prime Minister of Tanganyika", International and Comparative Law Quarterly (London), Vol. II, (1962), P. 1212.

47. News Week, 26 September 1977, P. 16.

48. During his visit to Washington in November 1977, Shah of Iran urged the U.S. administration to lift its embargo on American munitions for Somalia. See News Week, 28 November 1977, P. 41.

The false promises given to the Somalis by the United States was the cause of the failure of its ill-fated policy to deal with the Soviet Union and in particular to recover the ground lost in Ethiopia.

Somalia - Soviet Relations

The marriage of convenience between Somalia and the Soviet Union began in 1962 at a time when Somalia was preoccupied with the preservation of newly found republic. (The Somali Republic was formed by the merger of the British and Italian Somali lands in July 1960). It appealed to the West to train and equip its army. The response which she got from the West, particularly from the United States was that the latter was willing to train and equip an army of about 5,000 on condition that the Somali government would not accept any assistance from any country.⁴⁹ The Government of Somalia rejected the offer because of its condition. Then an offer from the Soviet Union hard on the heels of the American response came to train and equip an army of about 10,000. By its offer the Soviet aimed to secure a

⁴⁹. See Africa Digest (London), August 1962

foothold in sub Saharan Africa, which it did; Somalia accepted military assistance from the Soviet Union.

During this period, Somalia had persistently urged the West to help Somalia in her drive for the unification of the divided Somalis. The United States was against that demand. Since their interest in the region was well served by their base in Asmara. Like wise, the U.K. was opposed to the idea of the unification of Somaliland. Even though Britain was responsible for much of the suffering of the Somali people. The intention of the British were to add more of it. And this was manifested when the British ceded Somali NED (Northern Frontier District) to Kenya in March 1963. This act of parting a portion of Somaliland was meant to buy the safety of the British settlers in Kenya from the wrath of the Kenyans. NED was incorporated into Kenya despite the finding of the commission appointed by the British in 1962. The task of the commission was to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of NED. The report of the commission was that more than 62 percent of the inhabitants of NFD favoured independence.⁵⁰ As a consequence, Somalia broke

50. See Report of the Northern Frontier District Commission (London, 1962), Cmnd. 1900.

her relations with the British in March 1963. Seven years later the United States cut its aid to Somalia. The reason was that Somali registered ships had carried freight to Hanoi, North Vietnam. (This itself was to show solidarity with the Soviet Union). This led Somalia to lean heavily on the Soviet for both military and as well as non-military aid.

Coup in Somalia

A coup took place in Somalia in October 1969. The coup gave an impetus to the government to consolidate further country's relations with the Soviet Union. The officials who staged the coup, if not ardent believers in Soviet ideology were sympathetically inclined towards it. Within a year the "coup" had retrospectively become "a revolution", and the regime declared that the country would henceforth be guided by "Scientific Socialism".

In 1973, on the fourth anniversary of the "revolution", Somalia's President Siyaad Barre announced plans for the formation of a new party based on the principles of scientific socialism. It was in July 1976 that the party was formed.⁵¹

51. Anthony J. Hughes, "Somalia's Socialists Road" > Africa Report (New Burnswick N.J.), Vol.22. no.2, March - April, 1977, P. 41.

The party consisted of a Supreme Council of seventy-three members, and a Central Committee, an enlarged version of the Supreme Revolutionary Council. At the apex of the pyramid was the political Bureau consisting of Present, the three Vice-Presidents and the head of National Security Service. Ministers were also appointed to act in coordination with the political Bureau.

Thus Somalia acquired a system of government which bore at least a superficial resemblance to the Soviet model, and much of the rhetoric of the regime was couched in Marxist - Leninist terms. These so-called revolutionary changes in Somalia distanced further the relations between Somalia and the United States. As a result their dislike of each other grew more. Americans showed their dislike of the Somali government by listing Somalia as one of the four Arab nations giving support to terrorist groups.⁵² The other three were Libya, Iraq and Southern Yemen. The common grudge against them seems to be that they all had somewhat maintained a strong relation with the Soviet Union.

52. New York Times, 19 May 1977

The period of honeymoon between Somalia and the Soviet Union witnessed the signing of Friendship Treaty in 1974 on the occasion of President Podgorny's visit to Somalia. The treaty made Somalia the first black African state with which the Soviets signed such a treaty.

The Soviets portrayed Somalia as the success of their model in the sub-Sahara Africa. While Somalia consistently sided with the Soviet Union in the world forums on East-West issues.

The make believe relations went on smoothly till May 1976. The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 brought discord and ultimately resulted in a divorce between the two in November 1977. At that time the ruling junta of the Ethiopian revolution published its Nine-point peace plan for Eritrea; it rejected independence for the province and proposed a federal solution instead. Kremlin immediately backed the plan for Eritrea as a Policy worth the support of progressives. ¹⁸This endorsement marked the beginning of the USSR's rift with Somalia and Eritrea!

Deteriorating Relations between the U.S. and Ethiopia

The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 set into motion a chain reaction in the region. First it brought

to an end a quarter century of relation of Ethiopia with the United States. Second, it effected the realignment in the region.

A cloud of political instability surrounded the ruling military junta, Dergue, throughout the year of 1976. There were claims of coups and counter coups in Ethiopia leading to the massacre of quite a number of Ethiopians.⁵³

The Ethiopian empire showed cracks and needed outside support if it was to be held together. And this was evident when colonel Mengistu who emerged after a series of purges in the Dergue as the dominant leader announced in a radio broadcast on 4 February 1977, the day after his triumph that Ethiopia in future would seek its military aid from the "socialist countries". This appeal to the "Socialist bloc" came only after Americans rejected the request of the Dergue to supply arms.⁵⁴

Americans were unwilling to provide the weapons needed to silence the uprising against the Dergue.

53. Africa (London), May 1977.

54. New York Times, 7 March 1976.

Plus the Dergue faced the threat of disintegration. Both Eritrea and Ogaden provinces intensified their fight to end the illegal rule of the Ethiopians in their province and gain their own independence. And Carter, being the President, whose declared policy objective was to link arms deals with the improvement of the "human rights", announced on 25 February 1977 that his administration was reducing foreign aid - including military grants worth \$6 million - to Ethiopia because of its consistent violations of human rights.⁵⁵ The Dergue reacted sharply on 23 April by ordering the closure of the facilities United States enjoyed in Ethiopia.- including the Kagnev base in Asmara.

When the Soviet Union decided to respond favourably to Ethiopian overtures, the Soviet publicly began to refer to the fighting in the Ogaden as an armed invasion of Ethiopian territory "by regular units of the Somali army."⁵⁶ The Somalia President secretly flew to Moscow in the hope to persuade them not to supply arms to the Ethiopians.

55. "The Limits of Morality", News Week, 7 March 1977, p.7.

56. Izvestiya (Moscow), 16 August 1977.

His appeals were ignored. Somalia did not have any option but to abrogate the Friendship and cooperation Treaty with the Soviets on 13 November 1977. The Soviets responded by saying that "we will teach the Somalis a lesson they will never forget. We will bring them to their knees".⁵⁷ They succeeded in doing so. To fulfil their promise, the Soviets started to airlift arms worth millions to Ethiopia. It was this airlifting of arms which woke Americans from their slumber.⁵⁸ But before this massive airlift, the Americans as well as the Western countries visualised a Vietnam - like quandary for the Soviets in the Horn: "The Russians", wrote the Observer reflecting Western thinking "are caught in a trap by supporting both sides and they should be left to extricate themselves as best they can". And even more Western diplomats in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu congratulated themselves that their countries were not involved.⁵⁹ With this belief, they washed their hands of the Horn soon after the start of the war.

57. "The Battle of the Horn", Newsweek, 13 February 1978, p.14.

58. "Airlift to Ethiopia", News Week, 23 January 1978, p.12.

59. "War on the Horn", ibid., 29 August 1977, pp.11-12.

Disappointment with American Policy

As the war took its course the United States officials held different views about the war between Somalia and Ethiopia.

To Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, the situation between Somalia and Ethiopia was more than a border conflict. He contended that by their involvement in the conflict, the Soviets aimed to expand their influence and pose a threat to U.S. position in the Middle East. This intensification of the Soviet effort was intended to improve their position by taking advantage of the tension and turbulence in the third world. Brzezinski fiercely argued that the United States should not be indifferent to the conflict in the Horn. Since the Soviets succeeded in sustaining Angola through their preferred solution - use of Cuban "surrogate" and now embarked on a repetition in the region that was in close proximity to the area of most vital interest to the U.S.

Brzezinski's arguments got support from the expression of concern expressed by Giscard and Sadat (respectively, they were the French and Egyptian Presidents). "Both warned Carter on several occasions not to be passive or to under-

estimate the gravity of an entrenched Soviet military presence so close to weak, vulnerable, yet vitally needed Saudi Arabia."⁶⁰

Brezzezinski recorded in his memoirs of the Carter years: "Yet inspite of such expressions of concern, throughout the late fall of 1977 and much of 1978 I (Brzezinski) was very much alone in the U.S. government in advocating a stronger response. (Secretary of State) Cyrus Vance insisted that this purely a local one, while Brown (secretary of Defense) was skeptical of the feasibility of any U.S. counter moves."⁶¹ The mounting evidence of growing Soviet - sponsored involvement in the Horn made Carter react to the situation in the late Summer of 1977. "As a result ... he approved, to accelerate our (U.S.) efforts to provide support to the Sudan, to take steps to reassure and strengthen Kenya and to explore means of getting as many African leaders as possible to react adversely to the Soviet - sponsored Cuban military presence,"⁶²

60. Brzezinski Zbigniew, Power and Principle : Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977 - 80 (New York, 1983), p.179.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

but no support to Somalia.

Worried by the U.S. lack of activity in the region, Brzezinski wrote a memo to the President describing the consequence of Soviet adventures in Africa and recommended as well the need on the part of the U.S. to react directly. He wrote:

Soviet leaders may be acting merely in response to an apparent opportunity, or the Soviet action may be part of a wider strategic design. In either case, the Soviet probably calculated, as previously in Angola, they can later adopt a more conciliatory attitude and the U.S. will simply again adjust to the consolidation of Soviet presence in yet another African country.⁶³

"... failure to pursue such a course (not responding assertively to Soviet menace in the region) could prove to be damaging and will be exploited by your political opponents with considerable effect. Indeed, the Soviet - Cuban offensive could coincide with the signing of SALT."⁶⁴ He suggested the deployment of an American aircraft carrier task force near Ethiopia. That would send a strong message to the Soviet and too show to the outside world America's concern in the region.

However, Harold Brown and Cyrus Vance were against that proposal. Vance preferred political

63. Ibid. p.181.

64. Ibid. p.182.

settlement that will make easier for the Somalis to withdraw and keep their forces out, even if the East bloc supported Ethiopians invaded Somalia. He argued that "we are getting sucked in. The Somalis brought this to themselves. They are not great friends of ours, and they are reaping the fruits of their actions. For US to put our prestige on the line and to military steps is a risk we should not take."⁶⁵ It is indeed true that the Somalis brought this to themselves, because they expelled the Soviet Union. And that they did so with American prodding.

U.S. Mistrusts

During the war, the Americans betrayed Somalis for fear that they might become part of the crisis, which, indeed, they instigated. Their tendency was to down-play the crisis.⁶⁶ But if they could take the credit for the outcome of the war, they were ready to send their aircraft carrier to the Somali waters, as Brown said:"... if we know the situation will come out all right in Somalia... then we might deploy the carrier and take credit for success in preventing an invasion. On the other hand, if we do not know how the situation will come out, then

65. Ibid., p.182.

66. Ibid., p.181.

we should not put it in."⁶⁷

Since they were not sure about the fate of the Somali government, their preferred policy was to "restrain"⁶⁸ other countries ready to help Somalia in her just war against the "demon" - The Soviet Union. And, in addition, the Carter administration repeatedly ignored Brzezinski's contention that more was at stake than a disputed piece of desert. Moreover, his administration disregarded the plight of the Somalis. This is clearly seen from the words of Brzezinski, as he noted in his memoirs:

Everyone otherwise was against me (they were against Somalia). The Defense Department speaking through Harold, The JCS speaking through General Jones, and State speaking through Cy - all of them seem to me badly bitten by the Vietnam bug and as a consequence are fearful of taking kind of action which is necessary to convey our determination and to reassure the concerned countries in the region..."⁶⁹

And yet Carter pretended that he salvaged Somalis from the mouth of the "bear" when he announced Somalia's agreement to withdraw its regular forces from the Ogaden on 9 March 1978. It was this illusion of identifying Somalia's interest with that

67. Ibid., p.183.

68. Ibid., p.180.

69. Ibid., pp.183-84.

of the United States, which enabled her coming back into the region. Prior to this time, particularly after the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, American whistle in the region was out of tune. This pretense of being a Somali friend gave her the opportunity to take stock of the events that raked the world after the Soviet invasion of Afganistan and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Both the events threatened her interest in the region. The United States' influence in Iran came to an end after the overthrow of Shah, thereby knocking out one of the two pillars of United States policy in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, Western fears of the Soviet designs to reach the warm waters were nearly being achieved after the Soviet invasion of Afganistan in the late December of 1979. Combination of these events pressed hard the Americans to reassess their strategy in a region vital to her.

To rectify the imbalance created by those events, the United States felt the need to form a force capable of safeguarding U.S. interest in the Middle East as well as the Persian Gulf. Somalia was, then, among the countries spotted by the Pentagon to shift the balance of power in favour of the the United States. Then, the American cloak of friendship was put on once again.

CHAPTER III

GROWING RELATIONS

STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC & POLITICAL RELATIONS
IN THE CHANGED CONTEXT

The United States' strategic interest in Africa and particularly the Horn of Africa is related to its own security concerns in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Chester A Crocker, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, probably best defined this correlations in his address before the World Affairs Council on 13 November 1985. He said:

...the Horn of Africa... demonstrates some of the basic principles of American diplomacy in Third World....The Horn... a region of great strategic importance and therefore, inevitably an area of World power involvement. The Horn of Africa is the northeast corner of Africa composed of the nations of Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia....It has considerable strategic importance for the United States as it is relevant to both the security of the Middle East and to Africa. Physically, it is a key crossroads of air and sea routes. The Horn guard access to the Red Sea. It protects the South West approaches of Arabia....

America's interest in this area include safeguarding shipping lanes, particularly for oil tankers which fuel the economy of Western Europe.¹

The United States strategic interest in Somalia is linked with its strategic interest in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. To understand this link, it is necessary to examine the changes that were occurring in the region in 1970s, which ultimately culminated the inclusion of the Somalia into the American strategic calculations.

1. See Chester A. Crocker, "U.S. and Soviet interests in the Horn", Department of State Bulletin (Washington D.C.), vol.86, no.2106, p.29.

Prior to the Somalia's inclusion into this strategic network, American defence of its interest in this sphere depended on the projection of its power to deter the Soviet adventures in the region. But that "...military containment was based on confidence that the United States could prevail in any major US-Soviet war - a belief that was eroding by late 1960s."² Because of the Soviet success in attaining strategically parity with the United States.

This success led the Soviet Union to use the newly acquired power in expanding its empire. And the first opportunity that offered the Soviets to test their show of force came when the British announced in January 1968 that they will withdraw their force from the "East of Suez" by the end of 1971. Three months after the British announcement of their withdrawal from the East of Suez, five of the Soviet naval ships arrived in the Indian ocean.³ This action of the Soviet Union endangered the region, vital to the American interest. The area threatened by the Soviet move

2. Seyom Brown, The Crises of Power on Interpretation of US Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years (New York, 1979), p.19.

3. These ships stayed four months in this region. During this period, these ships appeared in Bombay and Madras in India; Karachi, Pakistan; Basrah and Umm-Qasr in Iraq; Bandar Abbas, Iran; Aden, South Yemen, and Mogadishu in Somalia.

into the Indian ocean embraced large number of states. Besides the ocean proper and its islands, the area comprised of all the littoral states and regions surrounding the ocean, including the states of the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and other African littoral states (Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa), Australia, South-East Asia and South Asia.⁴ Thus, setting the course of Superpower rivalry in the region.

From 1948 till 1968, the British maintained the stability in the area of the East of Suez. An area, significance of which to United States was underlined by James Forrestal, the first US Secretary of defence in the post World War II era, when he said that "it is doubtful if there is any segment of our foreign relations of greater importance or of greater danger in its broad implications to the security of the United States than our relations in the Middle East"⁵. Also the importance of the region *derives* more weight from the fact that "the

4. U.S. Congress Senate, U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service, 96th Congress, 1st Session April 1979 (Washington, D.C., 1979), p.84. For information regarding states considered as littoral and hinterland states of the Indian ocean see UN Gen. Ass., Official Records, Twenty-Eight Session Suppl. 29 (A/9029), Annex 1.

5. Walter Mills, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, V 1951), p.35.

countries bordering the Persian Gulf contained three-fourths of the world's oil reserves".⁶

A substance which is the source of energy to her Western allies. This is confirmed by President Nixon's remark when he said: "The Mideast is important. We all know that 80 percent of Europe's oil and 90 percent of Japan's oil comes from the Mideast".⁷ As a consequence of the importance of the region, the major objective of United States' policy in the area was mainly concerned with the unhindered flow of oil from the region to Western countries. But the Soviet naval presence in the Indian ocean raised questions about the stability of the region. And it also succeeded in breaking "a cardinal tenet of U.S. foreign policy (which) has been to keep the Middle east and more recently the Persian Gulf free from Soviet control either by proxy or directly"⁸ by the mere presence of her naval forces in the zone. Moreover, the Soviet Union entrenched itself in the region.

6. Cecil v. Crabb, Jr., The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy, Their Meaning, Roles and Future (Baton Rouge, 1982), p.330

7. See Public Papers of the President's of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, D.C. 1974), p.291.

8. Emile A. Nakhleh, The Persian Gulf and American Policy (New York, 1982), p.96.

Thus, the induction of the Soviet naval forces into the Indian ocean and the subsequent expansion of her influence in the region had been perceived by the United States as a threat to its national interest.

What made it easier for the Soviets to entrench themselves in the region was the then prevailing political climate. The Soviet took advantage of the African liberation movements against the White colonial regimes by supporting them. Since America was committed to assist the White minority regimes in Southern Africa. Thus, this frustrated more the United States' interest in the African region.

U.S. Loosing its grip in this region

Prior to the Soviet appearance in the Indian ocean, the American bases in Asmara, Ethiopia and Tripoli, in Libya had contributed to the smooth flow of oil from the region. But both these bases were under fire from the demand for change that clouded the area. The American base in Asmara was constantly endangered by the Eritrean Liberation Fronts which were fighting for the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia, in which Asmara is the capital. Their war against Ethiopia was on since 1962 when Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia. This led the United States to shift gradually its communication base in Asmara

to Diego Garcia, an Indian ocean island which it rented from Britain in 1967. And as for its base in Libya, it was closed after the overthrow of king Idris by Captain Moamer Gadhafi, who later appointed himself a colonel in 1969. Soon after capturing the power, he ordered the expulsion of the American from the Wheelus Air Force Base in Tripoli. And he claimed to profess Pan-Arabism.⁹ (Pan-Arabism as a policy is against the West's interests in the Middle East). Much worse, he befriended the Soviet Union.

The independence of Aden in 1967 and the Ba'ath Party's success in capturing power in Iraq in 1968 were other factors that raised America's fears of the Soviet moves in the region. Soon after its independence, Aden turned out to be a Marxist state; while the Ba'ath party advocated revolutionary change in the middle east. Both these states allowed the Soviet naval ships to visit their waters. And particularly Aden served the Soviet designs of the destabilisation of the region when it supported the Dhofari rebels of Oman in their struggle from

9. Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan Arabism", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.57, no.2, Winter 1978-79 pp. 363 ff.

1965 until the mid - 1970s to unseat the Sultan Said bin Taimur and then his son, Sultan Qaboos, who overthrew his father in 1970. The success of the rebels in Oman would have given the Soviets an access to the Musandan Peninsula which dominates the crucial straits of Hormus, through which passes the bulk of Arabian Gulf petroleum bound for the rest of the world. Thus, this successful expansion of the Soviet influence in a region vital to American interest underscored the vulnerable security of the region.

What gave credence to United States suspicions of the Soviet moves was the latter's link with Somalia. Their influence in Somalia rapidly grew after the military coup of 1969 in Somalia which brought military junta to power. The junta led the country to conclude Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1974. That gave the Soviet an access to build naval base at the port of Berbera, a north-western town in Somalia. The United States voiced its concern with the implication of the base facilities offered to the Soviets.¹⁰ In a major statement delivered to the Senate Committee on Armed Services on 10 June 1975, the United States

10. See Soviet Military capability in Berbera, Somalia, Report of Senator Bartlet to the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, July 1975, 94th Cong. 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1976).

Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, pointed to the important location of Berbera, lying as it did, on the Gulf of Aden, in the Horn of Africa, and thus facilitating control over approaches to the Red Sea. In an attempt to obtain from the US Congress additional funds for the construction of increased naval facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, Schlesinger stated:

The Soviet Union has become a major sea power only in the last decade It is worth remembering that the entire Soviet build up in the Indian Ocean ... has occurred during the period since the Suez Canal closed in 1967.... The level of US presence in the Indian Ocean has been prudent. Since an effective military balance is essential to the preservation of regional security and stability in this area of great importance to the economic well-being of the industrialised world, we feel we should have logistical facilities which will permit us to maintain a credible presence. In period of historical transition toward a new set of power relations, only the United States among the Western nations has the stature to ensure that the balance is maintained.¹¹

Apart from the Soviet threat following the growth of its influence in the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, the Arab-Isreali war of 1973 heightened the precariousness of the United States security in the realm. The Arabs used oil embargo

11. See the statement of James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defence, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, Washington D.C. 10 June 1975, 94th Cong., 1st Session (Washington D.C., 1976).

as a weapon in their fight against Israel to settle scores with the western nations that supported Israel, in which America was listed first. The United States response to this embargo was the threat to use force in sustaining the smooth flow of oil from the Middle East.¹²

This happening necessitated the United States to enhance its security arrangements in the region. The first measure it took in that regard was the enlarging its communication facilities in Diego Garcia to that of a fullfledged base. The then U.S. administration used Somalia because of her close ties with the Soviet Union, as the lever to get the necessary approval from the Congress, since the conversion of Diego Garcia will entail the spending of millions of dollars.

Another step taken by the United States to stop the Soviet advance in the region was to promote regional force. Iran and Saudi Arabia were picked up for that purpose. This step was known as "Twin-pillar" policy. It presumed the cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran and convergence of

12. The best known such warnings of military action was undoubted by the interview with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. See "Kissinger on Oil, Food and Trade," Business Week (Washington, D.C.), 13 January 1975, pp 66-76.

their interests with those of the United States.¹³
The twin-policy was an off-shoot of Nixon Doctrine.
The Nixon Doctrine announced on Guam in November
1969 provided that the United States would meet its
treaty commitments and furnish arms economic
assistance to nations threatened by aggression but
could look for such nations to provide the manpower.¹⁴

This doctrine, at least, served US interest in
the region till its premises were shattered. That
occurred with the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979
by the surge of Khomeini wave.

But even before the fall of Shah, the events
that were taking place in the surrounding area had
an adverse effect on the United States' interest in
the region. One of them was the collapse of the
Portuguese empire. The demise of the Portuguese
empire deprived the United States of the use of
Mozambique which is essential to security of the
sea lanes.¹⁵ In addition, the Ethiopian revolution

-
13. US Congress, Senate, US Military Sales to Iran, A Staff Report to the Sub-committee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2nd Session (Washington D.C. 1976), p.5.
 14. See The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 65, No.1667 March 1971, pp. 344-5.
 15. Anthony Harrigan, "Security interests in the Persian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean", Strategic Review (Cambridge Mass.), Fall 1973, p.3.

of 1974 ended the privileges it enjoyed at the time of Haile Selassie's reign by ordering the closure of its base in Asmara in the early months of 1977.

Before the order of the closure of the base, the United States had given a clean chit to the Dergue, despite the fact that the regime in Addis Ababa had been moving towards the left, because she needed to increase the life span of her Kagnev base. In this regard, when in August 1976 the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, William Schaufele, was asked at a Congressional hearing whether he would consider the Dergue anti-America he said:

No sir, I would not. Certainly in the press there are attacks on the United States but by and large the government, although it is attempting to set up some kind of leftist or socialist system in Ethiopia, however unfocused and disorganised it may be, is not systematically or instinctively anti-United States... I don't find that the government, despite its sometimes inconsistent attitudes, is basically anti-United States.¹⁶

And also the war that had erupted between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden area in 1977, in which

16. For the importance of its Kagnev base in Asmara to the United States policy in the region, see Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, hearings before the Sub-committee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Washington, D.C. 1976, p. 123.

the Soviet's intervened in favour of Ethiopia, had further exposed the weakness of the United States strategy assumptions in the region. In this war the Soviets demonstrated their military prowess by airlifting millions of tons of armament to Ethiopia.

Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afganistan in 1979 had telling effect on US security arrangement in the region. Since this action of the Soviets has nearly brought to home their effort to reach the "Warm Waters".¹⁷ And now the assumption after Afganistan is the Soviets has such a capability in this region.¹⁸

U.S. Coping with the Soviet Threat

Combination of these developments forced the U.S. to reorder its security plans in the region. And the "Carter Doctrine"¹⁹ marked the first step to thwart the Soviet moves in the region. It signalled to the Soviet Union the willingness of the United States to use force in the Gulf to protect

17. See J.C. Hurowitz ed., The Middle East and North African World Politics: A Documentary Record, 2nd Rev. Ed. ii (New Haven, 1979), pp. 559-61. Also see the "Text of will" in Sir Persey Sykes, 2nd Ed. ii (London, 1921), pp.241-6.

18. See the statement by General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on "Good Morning America", 30 January 1980.

19. For the text, See, New York Times, 24 January 1980

its vital interests. And it took into consideration the fact that if the Soviets instigated threat to the security of the Persian Gulf areas occurred, it could turn into a long conventional war for which the United States must be prepared.²⁰

To give teeth to this Doctrine the formation of Rapid Deployment Force became necessary.²¹ The aim of this force was to counter any threats to regional security "whether they come from disputes among nations in the region, such as the current war between Iraq-Iran, or from internal instability". But the success of this force depended on access to air bases and port facilities in order to save the Persian Gulf from the Soviet hand, since her navy is to cover 12,000 miles in reaching the Gulf. Accordingly, the United States actively sought facilities agreements with states bordering the Indian Ocean. And by August 1980, it reached agreements with Kenya, Oman and Somalia to enforce the Carter Doctrine.²²

20. See the view of Defence Department officials as summarized in dispatch by Richard Halloram, New York Times, 19 April 1981.

21. See Kennath N. Waltz, "A strategy for Rapid Deployment Force", International Security (Washington D.C.) V.5 no. 4, Spring 1980, pp.49-73.

22. The attitude of Somalia, Kenya and Oman towards the Carter Doctrine are discussed more fully in New York Times, 22 April 1980.

Thus, Somalia's importance to United States, lies in the fact that it enhances US military capability in the Persian Gulf.²³ Besides the United States presence in Somalia serves her to "assist and encourage the countries in the region to recycle their surplus revenues into the world economy in orderly and indisruptive manner."²⁴ And it rectified its loss of Kagnew base in Ethiopia. Moreover, the success of the United States in signing a treaty with Somalia:

... reflects an awareness of the significance of the Gulf as a source of oil for the Western world, as an enormous source of capital, as a vast market for western products and expertise, and as an area possibly coveted by the Soviet Union and other potentially anti-Western political movements. Therefore, U.S. policy makers have consistently attempted to tie the Persian Gulf to the United States and to the West in general, both economically and militarily, as the best guarantee of regional stability.²⁵

ECONOMIC *and* POLITICAL RELATIONS

As the events of 1979 and the United States reaction to these events suggest, what brought Somalia into the American horizon, was the United States need to have base facilities around the countries bordering the Gulf.

-
23. See US interests in and policies towards the Persian Gulf 1980, Hearings before the sub-committee on Europe and Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 96th Cong., 2nd Session, (Washington D.C.; 1980), p.413.
24. The Persian Gulf, 1974: Money, Politics, Arms and Power, Hearings before the Sub-committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 2nd Session (Washington D.C., 1975), p.73.
25. Nakhleh, n.8, p.107.

Growing Political Relations

Soon after the start of Iranian agitation against Shah, the Carter administration felt that they were wrong in adopting a low profile in 1977-78 (the war between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden) conflict²⁶ by not helping Somalia. That could have compensated the likelihood of losing Iran. Since it had already suffered a loss of a lamp-post which it had in Ethiopia, as a result of Ethiopia's anti-American rhetoric in 1977. Her loss of Ethiopia gave a chance to the Soviet Union, her arch-enemy, to venture and turn Ethiopia into her ally.

Moreover, its belated attempt to rescue the American hostages taken by Iran, underlined the need to have an access for bases around the Gulf states to bolster its deflated standing in the area. And Somalia was picked up for that purpose.

The first attempt by the United States in this direction came in December 1979, when it sent a team of State and Defence Department officials to visit Somalia as part of a tour to look for bases from which, according to the New York Times, American forces might be able to project military power.²⁷ Somalia

26. See New York Times, 27 November 1978 and 1, 11 January 1979.

27. Ibid., 23 December 1979.

agreed on 22 August to give the United States access to military facilities, successfully completing a series of three pacts sought by President Carter in 1980 to increase America's military presence in the Persian Gulf region. The agreement with Somalia ended months of negotiations that began after the declaration of the Carter Doctrine. These facilities were intended to provide landing and staging areas close to Persian Gulf for the US Rapid Deployment forces.

Under a separate pact signed on 21 August, the United States agreed to give Somalia \$ 20 million in low-interest in fiscal 1980 for the purchase of arms in the United States and another \$ 20 million in arms credits for fiscal 1981, plus \$ 5 million in related security assistance for each of the two years. Moreover, they agreed to exchange defence attaches and the United States began a programme of military training for Somalia. The signing of the agreement thus paved the way for Somalia's inclusion in the Western defence system. Since 1981, it has been participating in the United States annual maneuvers in the region, known as Bright Star exercise.

American Misgivings

Even though the signing of agreement between the United States and Somalia marked the growing

political relations between the two, the United States officials were doubtful of the wisdom of arming Somalia. At a committee hearing on 26 August 1980, House Foreign Affairs Africa sub-committee member told Pentagon and State Department officials that they questioned the wisdom of signing base facilities with Somalia.²⁸ They also expressed their fear that the agreement might lead to the enmeshing of the United States in Somalia's border dispute with Ethiopia. Because Somalis under Ethiopia had been waging war of liberation for years against the Ethiopian empire in an effort to regain their lost territory.

Because of Somali commitment to support their brethren, the Americans feared that the base agreement might lead them to be part of the border conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. This might damage the credibility of the Americans to help a friend in case of outbreak of war between Somalia and Ethiopia.

In this regard, Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, assured the sub-committee that he had received assurances "orally and in writing that the Somalis will not

28. See "Somalia Bases Agreement" in Congressional Quarterly Almanac 96th Congress, 2nd Session... 1980, Vol. 31 (Washington D.C., 1980), p.361.

introduce regular forces into the Ogaden" in the future. But his assurances could not convince the Chairman of the sub-committee, Stephen J. Solarz who doubted whether Somalia could respect her promises. He posed this question to Mr. Moose: "Are you telling us that the Somalis are abandoning one of their major national objectives in exchange for \$ 40 million in foreign military sales (credit)?"

Leslie H. Gelb, former director of politico-military affairs for the State Department, in his testimony to Congressional Committee appreciated the importance of the base to the Pentagon, but he categorically said that "We should make clear to the Somalis that we're not coming to their aid if they are mucking around in the Ogaden"²⁹.

Moose's response to all these doubts was that he was willing to rely on Somali assurances that it would avoid military action in the Ogaden. He also hoped that the promise of further U.S. military and economic aid would induce them to abide by their pledge.

This negative attitude of the United States towards Somalia is reinforced by the fact that the first shipment of US arms to Somalia materialised

29. Ibid., p.362.

in mid-July 1982. Its base agreement stipulated, among other things, the supply of American weapons to Somalia for self-defence. This apathy of the US towards Somalia led to encourage Ethiopia to invade two of Somalia's border towns in July 1982.³⁰

American reaction to this Ethiopian invasion was to airlift few anti aircraft weapons drawn from part of the \$ 40 million agreed in the base agreement. To the Americans this was an appropriate response to help a friend whose territorial integrity was threatened.³¹ If that is so, then why the Americans are rejecting till now Somalia's request for getting US warplanes, at least the F-5, the type which they have agreed to supply to her neighbour, Kenya.

The reason behind this over cautiousness of the US to implement its new relationship with Somalia is as "many in the African bureau of the State Department view Ethiopia as the prize to be ultimately regained in the Horn."³²

30. In order to understand how this apathy of the United States led Ethiopia to capture two Somali towns, see footnotes 33 and 34.

31. The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 83, no.2074 May 1983, p.24.

32. Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre "US Strategic Policy in Northwest and the Indian Ocean" Africa Report (New Burnswick, N.J.), Vol.23, no.6, November-December 1983, p.6.

Hence as prerequisite of gaining Ethiopia's confidence by the US, Somalia is to be made weak. This is evident from the statement of Chester A Crocker, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, when he said: "Our assistance to Somalia poses no offensive threat to Ethiopia, and Ethiopia knows it",³³ despite Ethiopia's incursion into Somaliland. He further made it clear that they are "demonstrably not arming Somalia to (a) degree that need arouse legitimate concerns on the part of Ethiopia or any other state in the region...."³⁴ And he persistently argued on behalf of Ethiopia that Somalia should renounce her territory under Ethiopia. In this respect he said, "we have never wavered from our support for Ethiopia's territorial integrity".³⁵

To win Ethiopia's favour the US encourages Somalis to enter into a dialogue with Ethiopia. They have already tested this process of dialogue in their attempt to negotiate the border dispute between Somalia and Kenya. It gave the requisite result when Somalia's President Mohamed Siad Barre declared his renunciation of Somaliland under Kenya. This served American interest in the region very well.³⁶

33. Department of State Bulletin, vol.86, no.2106, January 1986, p.29

34. *Ibid.*, vol.83, no.2074, May 1983, p.24.

35. *Ibid.*, n.33, p.30.

36. *Ibid.*, p.32.

One wonders if the growing political relations between the US and Somalia is not intended to undermine the existence of Somalia as a state. Since the political relation that exists between Somalia and the US could be interpreted as person who claims to be friend, yet trades your property in order to enhance his status. This is precisely where the US fits in the Somali affairs.

Economic Aid

What gives this leverage to the US to dictate terms to Somalia is the latter's dependency on US economic aid. A cursory look of the growing economic link between the two will reveal the truth of this statement.

Somalia is one among the few states which receives a large share of US aid. The US aid policy in Africa intends to promote private enterprise and economic reforms. The adoption of these reforms according to the US will promote the economic growth in Africa. And as a condition, the United States economic aid will be extended to such countries as are willing to adopt these reforms. These reforms are the encouragement of free enterprise, and doing away the price control and state subsidies.

Since most of the African countries are facing problems of food shortages, and production of food is under the control of governments (because of state farming regulations), the US regards these food shortages as problems of market which hinders their economic growth. So it encourages the decontrolling of food production in Africa. Thus resulting in the process of policy reforms.

The Somali and the US governments signed an agreement in October 1982 whereby the US was to provide 45 million tons of rice, wheat flour and oil, valued at \$ 15 million for state trading agencies which would sell the food to the business community, the proceeds being used to finance agricultural development and rural health programmes. The aid gained its aim by 1984 when the Somali government declared that it would no more regulate the price of food. The US claimed that it was due to her encouragement that such bold acts were taken by the Somali government.³⁷

Thus, the success of the introduction of these reforms in Somalia has helped the US to route the

37. Ibid., vol.85, no.2098, June 1985, p.49.

so-called Socialist system which Somalia claimed to adhere to before forging links with the US.³⁸

Devaluation: The Price Somalis pay for this reform

Somalia's adoption of the package of reforms proposed by the US caused the present economic crisis in Somalia. A case in point is the devaluation of Somalia's currency. The United States alongwith the International Monetary Fund and World Bank had persistently argued the Somali government should devalue her currency in order to qualify for loans from the IMF.³⁹

The acceptance of the condition resulted in devaluation of Somalia's currency by 150 percent. This trend of devaluation started only after Somalia forged a close relation with the United States. The result which we are seeing is economic destabilization alongwith soaring prices. The West blames the inefficiency, corruption and bad management which is prevalent in Somalia for the economic crisis.

To ease Somalia's economic difficulties, the US injects a heavy dose of economic aid and also

38. Ibid., vol.84, no.2086, May 1984, p.47.

39. Ibid., n.34, p.24.

urges her western allies to do the same. Hence, Somalia receives \$ 400 million aid annually. This dependence on aid is explicitly shown in her five year plans. "Somalia's 1982-86 development plan is based upon the expectation of attracting 80 per-cent of its investment from outside." ⁴⁰

Thus, Somalia's economic growth depends on foreign aid. This aid policy will make Somalis dependent to take on grants for their economic growth without internal support. Hence making Somalia a prisoner of Western system.

Despite her pleas to introduce reforms in Somalia, the US encourages Somalia and Kenya to collaborate in undertaking some common projects. The site of these projects will be in Kenya. This will definitely make Somalia's economy subservient to the Kenyan economy. The aim of America's encouragement of such project could be the doing away of any possibility of Somalia's becoming either militarily or economically a power in the region, as long as the Persian Gulf attracts her eye. Since strong Somalia could feel free to pursue her

40. Guy Arnold, "Somalia: America's Ally in the Horn" Africa Report, Vol.28, no.6, November-December 1983, p.53.

irredentist policy in the region this could undermine the stability of the Persian Gulf, which Americans will dislike much. Naturally, then, a weak Somalia which is dependent on the western aid is preferable.

Refugees : Factor of the growing US-Somalia Relations

Yet another factor which draws Somalia close to the US is the presence of some 800,000 refugees in Somalia which have been displaced by Ethiopia. As far as the figures of 1983 it provided food aid for the refugees at the rate of 25,000 tons annually and contributed about 48 percent of the total \$ 16 million UNHCR budgets. As year passes, the American aid continued to rise. This American assistance is appreciable. But what negates her humanitarian help to the refugees in Somalia is her encouragement to the Somali government to rehabilitate them.

The resettlement of refugees in Somalia will definitely sow the seeds of political crisis in Somalia. As it is well known the present political crisis in Lebanon was the cause of influx of Palestinian refugees.

Despite her close relations with Israel, the United States never supported any plan for a separate

Palestinian homeland. The result is the ongoing killing of the Palestinian refugees by the Israelis and the Arabs alike.

Did the US learn a lesson from her earlier commitments to aid refugees without ever going to find solution to their real problem - that of their homeland?⁴¹ Sure it did! The US quite well knows that aiding refugees to resettle in other country than their own does not solve their right to have their homeland where they could steer their destiny. But then what purpose the rehabilitation of refugees in Somalia will serve? ~~It will~~ in two ways: (1) the resettlement of refugees will constrain Somalia's economy since Somalia is among the 25 poorest nations. As a result the need of the American aid will always be greater and (2) their rehabilitation in Somalia would help the US to win Ethiopia. Since this will change the demography of the Somali occupied territory under Ethiopia.

Surprisingly the string of the US aid also helps her to solve her perennial problem of disposing of

41. The reason why the United States is responsible for finding solution to the problem of refugees is that if it could encourage other countries to allow refugees to settle in their own countries, then what bars her to encourage their return to their original place.

nuclear wastage.

For quite some time, the US was facing the problem of finding a suitable site for the burial of nuclear radioactive wastage inside the United States. Almost all the Governors and Legislators of States have a common attitude to the disposal of nuclear waste. That is "Do not put it here".

As a result of this stiff resistance to burying the nuclear wastage within the US, the US has been compelled to find out ways to dispose the nuclear radioactive wastes. President Reagan addressing the urgency of the need to find a way out of this problem directed the Secretary of Energy James B. Edwards "to proceed swiftly toward deployment of means of storing and disposing of commercial high level radioactive waste."

This direction of President Reagan confirms the reports that the US will dump her nuclear waste in Central Somalia.⁴²

Thus it would appear that the growing political and economic relations between Somalia and the US is heavily tilted in favour of the U.S. It is simply

42. See Antony Shaw, "Somalia : Barre's Balancing Act" Africa Report, vol. 30, no.6, November-December 1985, p.26.

because the US pursues a policy of furthering her own interest in Somalia without either caring for the interest of its friend or goes to the extent of trading of Somalia's territory in order to please its neighbours.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

US-Somalia relations grew out of their respective interests. Somalia, an old ally of the Soviet Union, was without patron after it expelled it in 1977. The Soviets caused this rupture by siding with Ethiopia when Somalia was at war with her. While the United States' influence in the region was substantially reduced when their man Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was overthrown by Dergue in 1974. A rift developed between the two, due to the latter's violations of human rights, in which the United States showed her concern by accusing Ethiopia as violator of human rights though it remained silent about even more serious violations of human rights in the neighbouring areas of Ethiopia. This left the impression that the sudden awareness of human rights violations in Ethiopia was because a leftist government has assumed power. This led Ethiopian government to close American base, thus depriving the United States a home in the Red Sea.

The years that followed saw an increased Soviet threat to both Somalia and the U.S. security. On the Somali side, the Soviet threat emanated from her support to Ethiopia. The Soviets armed Ethiopia upto its teeth. That made her feel secure to raid Somali towns.

As for the menace to the American security, it came in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afganistan. After that, Americans felt that the Soviet aim is to conquer the Persian Gulf and Middle East, a region vital to United States' interest, because of its oil reserves. And undoubtedly its success would have unfavourably tilted the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union. As a precaution, the United States took measures to deal such an eventuality by creating Rapid Development Force (RDF).

The RDF was aimed to defend the interest of the United States in the third world particularly the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The strength of this force lies in its access to ports in the adjoining region. As a result, Somalia was seen as particularly important for the effectiveness of the RDF because of its strategic location. The United States therefore sought an agreement with Somalia in this regard. As a consequence, Somalia signed an agreement in August 1980 permitting the United States to use Somali ports for its own military purposes. In return, the United States agreed to supply arms to Somalia.

This agreement thus linked Somalia politically and economically with the West. It also made it possible for her to qualify for substantial economic

aid from the United States. This also marked her drift towards the West and in the process burying behind the remains of her claims that it adheres to socialism.

The economic links with the West were not without conditions which range from the implementation of democratic values of the West to the encouragement of economic reforms, essentially dictated by the World Bank and its agencies.

The result of the reform is that the structure of Somalia's economy has changed completely. Its survival now depends on the economic aid granted by the West. While a few years ago, especially in the mid-seventies, Somalia was self-sufficient in food, it is facing severe shortage of food now. It is neither self-sufficient in food nor can it regulate the prices of essential things.

It may not be wrong to suggest then that the attributes of the Somalia's present economic ills started with the coming of the United States to Somalia. To explain this, one does not need to go for statistics. An example is enough to illustrate this point.

The present Reagan administration which is determined not to see the developing nations tilt towards the Soviet Union, placed much emphasis on

the manner of dispensing US aid. Aid has become an instrument for the coercion of the developing nations . The United States asked the Somalia government to open its markets as a condition for qualifying for US aid. To open markets is not bad. But what did Somalia get in return for opening of its markets. They have got nothing at the moment, except banana as cash-crop. The quota as well as the price of banana is governed by international commodity agreement. The opening of Somalian markets then will act as detriment to the growth of the Somalia's economy. Either the Americans do not understand this or if they do, they do not care. Both ways this shows how hollow is their claim that they want to help Somalia.

Another sign of the deterioration of Somalian economy which has emerged after their economic link, is constant devaluation of Somali currency, suggested by the World Bank and its agencies as a pre-condition for loan. This made the Somali shilling of no value.

Thus such a trend will eventually mortgage the country to the World Bank - which is mainly an American Bank. As a result, Somalis will have the same experience as Brazil or for that matter the

whole of Latin America. Brazilians are suspecting and want to prove that no less than 65 per cent of the US \$ 105 - billion debt did not even enter Brazil but stayed with the foreign banks as interest payments.¹ It is clear then that the loss a country like Somalia suffers from borrowing from the U.S. is much worse.

What could be then the prospect of such relationship? It could act to bring the two countries at loggerhead whereby the Somali government might feel obliged to reevaluate her economic relation with the United States. Since the economic hardship the Somali government is facing will cause political upheaval against her regime. Though such revaluation looks dim at present from the Somali government because its survival now depends on the American aid. But the possibility of reassessment is not ruled out if another government succeeds the present regime.

The economic relations between Somalia and the United States do not show very bright prospects. And political relations also appear to be moving in the direction of doubt and uncertainty. With one Super power it has broken off relations and with the other relationship is running into all sorts of difficulties. The lot of Somalia is unenviable.

1. See "Next on the agenda: Foreign Debt", South (London), No. 69/July, 1986, p.49.

After the United States packed her things from Ethiopia in the early 1977, it felt the need to obtain alternative facilities in a nearby area. While Somalia, itself was without friend after it expelled the Soviets in late 1977, and was interested in reinforcing its position against Ethiopia which was being backed by the Soviets. Due to their mutual needs, they forged close links.

The same sentiments might as well work towards their falling out. This is evident from the United States desire to revive her old close ties with Ethiopia. She is desperately anxious to achieve this at any price in order to frustrate the Soviet success in Ethiopia. But they are hardly likely to succeed as the present regime in Ethiopia knows well that it was the Soviet's help which kept the empire intact in 1977 when it was facing disintegration due to wars of liberation waged by the Eritrean and Western Somali Liberation Fronts despite the American rejections of their pleas for help. "But many in the United States are too easily comforted by myth and nostalgia instead of truth"². They think that it is possible for them to win Ethiopia back, if they could pay the necessary price.

2. See Tom Hayden "One Dove's late Lessons from the Vietnam war", International Herald Tribune (published with the New York Times and the Washington Post), 10 July 1986.

The U.S. considers sacrifice of Somalia's interest as the price. The Americans for this reason told Somalis that they are not going to enhance Somalia's security until they were ready to renounce their territory under Ethiopia.

To tell Somalis to forget their land is like telling the Cubans to forget the Guantanamo island occupied by the Americans. It is unacceptable to the Somalis.

By dictating matters crucial to Somalia's existence is like asking it to give the Americans blank cheque for setting its policies. This will act as a brake in developing amicable relations. Such ill-advised policy of the United States is only going to damage the relationship between the two country; a damage which will be difficult to repair.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

US Congress, Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa,
Hearings before the Sub-committee
on the African Affairs, Committee
on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
94th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington,
D.C., 1976).

_____, Soviet Military Capability in Berbera,
Somalia, Report of Senator Bartlet to
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, July 1975, 94th Cong. 1st sess.
(Washington, D.C., 1976).

_____, Statement of James R. Schtesinger
Secretary of Defence, before the Senate
Armed Service Committee, US Senage,
Washington, D.C. 10th June 1975, 94th
Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.,
1976).

_____, Visit to the Democratic Republic of
Somalia, Report to the Committee on
Appropriation, US, by members of the
Fact-Finding Team at the Invitation
of the President of Somalia, 4 July 1975,
94th Cong. 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.
1976).

Congressional Quarterly, 30th-40th Annual (Congressional
Quarterly inc., Washington, D.C.), 1974-84.

United States, Department of State Bulletin (Department
of State, Washington, D.C.) 1974-86.

Memoirs

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Power and Principle: Memoirs of
the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981
(New York, 1983).

Carter, Jimmy, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President
(London: 1982).

Haig, Alexander M., Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagon and Foreign Policy (London: 1984).

Vance, Cyrus, Hard Choices; Critical years in America's Foreign Policy (New York, 1983).

Secondary Sources

(i) Books

Abernathy, M. Glenn and others, The Carter Years: The President and Policy Making (London, 1984).

Alb Albright, David E., ed., Communism in Africa (Bloomington, Ind., 1980).

Arkhurst, Fredrick S., ed., U.S. Policy toward Africa (New York, 1975).

Aron, Raymond, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945-1973 (New Delhi, 1975).

Bartlett, C.J., The Rise and Fall of the Pax Americana: United States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1974).

Bowles, Chester, Africa: Challenge to America (New York, 1956).

Bowman, W. Larry, and Clark, Ian, ed., The Indian Ocean in Global Politics (Boulder, Colo., 1981).

Brown, Seyom, The Crises of Power an Interpretation of US Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years (New York, 1979).

- Chester, Edward, Clash of Titans: Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 1974).
- Cimbala, Stephen J., ed., National Security and Strategy Choices and Limits, (New York, 1984).
- Collins, Robert C., ed., Partition of Africa: Illusion or Necessity (New York, 1969).
- Crabb, Cecil V., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1972).
- _____, The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Roles and Future (Louisiana, 1982).
- Cranwell, J.P., The Destiny of the Sea Power (New York, 1976).
- Donaldson, Robert H., ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failures (Boulder, Colo., 1981).
- Drysdale, John, The Somali Dispute (London, 1964).
- Emerson, Rupert, Africa and United States Policy (New York, 1967).
- Farer, Tom J., War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm (Washington, D.C., 1979).
- Farid, Abdel Majid, ed., Oil Security in the Arabian Gulf (London, 1983).
- Fitzgibbon, Louis, Betrayal of the Somalis (London, 1982).
- Foitz, William J., and Bieneni Henry S., Arms and the African Military Influences on Africa's International Relations (London, 1985).

- Forsythe, David P., American Foreign Policy in an Uncertain World (Nebraska, 1984).
- Freedman, Robert O., ed., World Politics and the Arab-Israel Conflict (New York, 1979).
- Gavshon, Arthur, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West (London, 1981).
- Gujral, M.L., U.S. Global Involvement : A Study of American Expansionism (New Delhi, 1975).
- Gunthor, John, Inside Africa (London, 1955).
- Gurtov, Melvin, The United States Against the Third World (New York, 1974).
- Halliday, Fred, and Molyneux, Maxime, The Ethiopian Revolution (London, 1981).
- Hammond, Thomas T., Red Star Over Afganistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and their Consequences (Boulder, Colo., 1983).
- Harkavy, Robert E., Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases : The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy (New York, 1982).
- Hess, R.L., Italian Colonialism in Somalia, 1966 (Chicago, 1966).
- Howe, Russel Warren, Along the Africa Shore : An Historic Review of Two Centuries of US - African Relations (New York, 1975).
- _____ and Trott, Sarah Hays, The Power Peddlers: How Lobbyists Mold American Foreign Policy (New York, 1977).

- Hurewitz, J.C. ed., The Middle East and North African World Politics : A Documentary Record (New Haven, 1979).
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., The Reagan Phenomenon - And Other Speeches on Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1983).
- Kitchen, Helen, US Interests in Africa (New York, 1983).
- Klare, Michael T., Beyond the Vietnam Syndrome : US Interventions in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.1981).
- Lake, Anthony, The 'Tar Baby' Option: American Policy Towards Southern Rhodesia (New York, 1973).
- Legum, Colin, and Bill, Lee, The Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London, 1977).
- Lewis, John P. and Kallab, Valerieane, US Foreign Policy and the Third World Agenda 1983 (New York, 1983).
- Lewis, I.M., The Modern History of Somaliland : From Nation to State (London, 1980).
- Louis, William Roger, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York, 1978).
- McMahan, Jeff, Reagan and the World: Imperial Policy in the New Cold War (London, 1984).
- Nakhleh, Emile A. The Persian Gulf and American Policy (New York, 1982).
- Nevins, Allan, and Commager, Henry Steele, A Short History of the United States (New York, 1968).

- Nye, Joseph S., Jr., The Making of America's Soviet Policy (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1984).
- Ottaway, Marino S., Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa (New York, 1982).
- Perham, Margery, The Government of Ethiopia (London, 1969).
- Saini, Ram Sing, United States Relations with South Africa with Special Reference to the Issues of Apartheid, 1953-63 (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, School of International Studies, New Delhi, 1976).
- Samatar, Said S., Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The case of Sayyid Mahammad 'Abille Hassan (New York, 1982).
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., A Thousand Days : John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, Mass., 1965).
- Selassie, Bereket Habte, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (New York, 1980).
- Somali Government, The Somali Peninsula : A New Light on Imperial Motives, (London, 1961).
- Sorenson, Theodore, Kennedy (New York, 1965).
- Stoessinger, John, Crusaders and Pragmatists : Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy (New York, 1977).
- Taylor, William J., Jr., and others Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s (Mass., 1984).
- Touval, Saadia, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge, U.S., 1963).

Ulam, Adem, Expansion and Coexistence : Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973, (New York, 1974).

Williams, W.A., ed., From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1972).

(ii) Articles

Abir, Mordechai, "Red Sea Politics", Adelphi Papers (London), no.93, 1972, pp.25-42.

Ajami, Fouad, "The End of Pan-Arabism", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.57, no.2, Winter 1978/79, pp.355-73.

Arnold, Guy, "Somalia: America's Ally in the Horn", Africa Report (New Burnswick), vol.28, no.6, November-December 1983, pp.51-54.

Ayoob, Mohammed, "The Super-powers and Regional Stability: Parallel responses to the Gulf and the Horn", World Today (London), vol.35, no.5, May 1979, pp.157-205.

Bailer, Seweryn and Afferica, Joan, "Reagan and Russia", Foreign Affairs, vol.61, no.2, Winter 1982/83, pp.249-71.

Bell, J. Bowyer, "Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Somalia", Orbis (Philadelphia, pa.), vol.19, no.2, Summer 1975, pp.402-11.

Bender, Gerald J., "Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), no.31, Summer 1978, pp.3-30.

Bienen, Henry, "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in Africa", Political Science Quarterly (New York), vol.95, no.1, Spring 1980, pp.29-42.

- Bowman, Larry W., and Lefebure, Jeffrey A., "U.S. Strategic Policy in Northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", Africa Report vol. 28 no.6, November-December, 1983, pp.4-9.
- Bowne, Robert S., "Africa and the IMF: Conditionality, a new form of colonialism?" Africa Report vol.29, no.5, September-October, 1984, pp.14-18.
- Castagno, A.A. "The Somali-Kenyan controversy : Implications for the future", The Journal of Modern African Studies (London), vol.2, no.2, 1964, pp.165-88.
- Chalian, Gerard, "Horn of Africa's dilemma", Foreign Policy, Vol.30, Spring 1978, pp.116-31.
- Cheche, Michael, "The Revolution Betrayed : Ethiopia 1974-9", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.17, no.3, 1979, pp.359-80.
- Crocker, Chester A. "African Policy in the 1980s", Washington Quarterly, (Cambridge, U.S.) vol.3 No.3, Summer 1980, pp.72-86.
- Crozier, Brian, "The Soviet Presence in Somalia", Conflict Studies (London) No.54, February 1975, pp.1-17.
- De Stefani, B. and Lucia, A.G. "The Experience of a Foreign Intervention in Somalia Refugee Camps, Italian Teams in the Ogaden refugee camps in Qoryoley," Africa (Roma), vol.38, no.3, September 1983, pp.468-73.
- Friffith, William E, "Soviet Power and Policies in the Third World : The Case of Africa", Adelphi Papers, no.152, Summer 1979, pp.39-46.

- Halliday, Fred, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa :
Abouliya or Proxy Intervention?" Review of
African Political Economy (London) no.10,
September-December 1978, pp.8-32.
- Henze, Paul B., "How Stable is Siad Barre's Regime?"
Africa Report, vol.27, no.2, March-April
1982, pp.54-58.
- Herrick and Anita Warren, "US Role in the Eritrean
Conflict", Africa Report, vol.23, no.2, 1976
pp.39-53.
- Hopkins, Joseph "Countering Soviet Imperialism", US
Naval Institute Proceedings (Menasha,
Wisconsin), vol.105, no.6, June 1979,
pp.59-65.
- Laitin, David D., "The War in the Ogaden : Implications
for Siyaad's Role in Somali History", The
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.17,
no.1, 1979, pp.95-115.
- Lancaster, Carol, "U.S. Aid Diplomacy and African
Development", Africa Report, vol. no.4,
July-August 1984, pp62-66.
- Legum, Colin, "Pan Africanism, The Communists and
the West", African Affairs (London)
Vol.63, no.252, July 1964, pp.186-96.
- Lewis, I.M., "Recent Development in the Somali Dispute",
African Affairs, vol.66, no.263, April, 1967,
pp. 104-12.
- Liebenow, J., "American Policy in Africa : The Reagan
Years", Current History (philadelphia, pa)
vol.82, no.482, March 1983, pp.97-101,
133-36.
- Makinde, Samuel, "United States Policy in the Horn
of Africa since 1974", The Australian
Journal of Politics and History (St. Lucia,
Australia), vol.30, no.3, 1984, pp.363-77.

- Mayal, James, "The National Question in the Horn of Africa", World Today, vol.39, September 1983, pp.336-43.
- Metz, Steven, "American Attitudes toward Decolonization in Africa", Political Science Quarterly, vol.99, no.3, Fall 1984, pp.515-33.
- Natufe, Omajuwa Igho, "Evolution of Soviet African Policy", Problems of Non-alignment (New Delhi), vol.2, No.3, September-November 1984, pp.249-67.
- Ododo, Harry, "Somalia's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations Since the Ogaden War of 1977-78", Middle Eastern Studies (London) vol.21, no.3 July 1985, pp.285-97.
- Olusola, Oja, "U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa", Problems of Non-alignment, vol.2, no.2, June-August 1984, pp.109-24.
- Ottaway, David, "Africa: U.S. Policy Eclipse", Foreign Affairs, vol.58, no.3, pp.637-58.
- Payton, Gary D., "Soviet Military Presence Abroad : The Lessons of Somalia," Military Review (Leavenworth, Kansas), vol.59, No.1, January 1979, pp.67-76.
- Peterson, J.E., "Defending Arabia : Evolution of Responsibility", Orbis, vol.28, no.3, Fall 1984, pp.465-88.
- Rais, Rasul, B., "Appraisal of U.S. Strategy in the Indian Ocean", Asian Survey (California), vol.23, no.9, September 1983, pp.1043-51.
- Ravenhill, John and Rothchild, Donald, "Reagan's African Policy : A New Unilateralism", International Journal (Ontario) vol.38, no.1, Winter 1982/83 pp.107-27.



- Reisman, W. Michael, "The Case of Western Somaliland : An International Legal Perspective", Horn of Africa (New Jersey), July-September 1978. pp.13-27.
- Remnek, Richard B., "Soviet Military Interests in Africa", Orbis, vol.28, no.1, Spring 1984, pp.123-43.
- Rubinstein, Alvin Z. and Donald B. Smith, "Anti-Americanism in the Third World", Orbis, vol.28, no.3, Fall 1984, pp.593-614.
- Samatar, Said S., "The New Imperial Rivalry in Africa : America and Russian in the Recent Crisis of the Horn", Pan-Africanist (Illinois) (8), July 1979, pp.36-48.
- Schwab, Peter "Cold War on the Horn of Africa", African Affairs, vol.77, no.306, January 1978, pp.6-20.
- Selassi, Bereket, "The American Dilemma on the Horn", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.22, no.2, June 1984, pp.249-72.
- Shaw, Antony, "Somalia : Barre's Balancing Act", Africa Report, vol.30, no.6, November-December 1985, pp.26-29.
- Sheik, Abdi, "Somali Nationalism : Its Origins and Future", The Journal of Modern African Studies vol.15, no.4, December 1977, pp.657-66.
- Thompson, W. Scott, "U.S. Policy toward Africa : At America's Service?" Orbis, vol.25, no.4, winter 1982, pp.1011-24.
- Touval, Saadia, "The Somali Republic", Current History, vol. 46, no.271, March 1966, pp.156-62.
- Trofimenko, Henry, "The Third World and U.S. - Soviet Competition", Foreign Affairs vol.59, no.5 Summer 1981, pp.1021-40.

Tucker, Robert W.; "The purpose of American Power,"
Foreign Affairs, vol.59, no.2, Winter
1980/81, pp.241-74.

Volman, David, "Africa's Rising in American Defence
Policy", the Journal of Modern African
Studies, vol.22, no.1, 1984, pp.143-51.

Waltz, Kenneth N., "A Strategy for Rapid Deployment
Force", International Security (Washington
D.C.) vol.5, No.5, Spring, 1980, pp.49-73.

Ward, David, "Terms of Loan are as Follows : ...",
New Statesman (London) vol.108, no.2795,
12 October 1984, pp.20-21.

Woody, J.B., "Hunting Spectre of the Horn of Africa",
Contemporary Review (London), vol.246, no.1428,
January 1985, pp.9-13.

Newspapers and Magazine

Economist (London).

Editorials on File (Washington, D.C.).

Hindustan Times (New Delhi).

International Herald Tribune (New York).

News Week (New York).

New York Times.

South (London).

US News and World Report (Washington D.C.).

Washington Post.