

**Naval Disarmament : A Study of the
Washington Conference on Limitation
of Armaments, 1921 - 22. 2**

DISSERTATION

**Submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirement
for the
Degree of Master of Philosophy**

By

SUBHASHREE MISRA

**Centre For International Politics
and Organization**

**School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University**

New Delhi-110067

1983

PREFACE

In this work I have endeavoured to study the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, 1921-22 in the context of naval disarmament. As this would not be possible without reference to the background of the Conference, I have traced the events from the last decade of the nineteenth century onwards, as it was during this period that the navy suddenly seemed to be an essential instrument of a country's domestic and foreign policy. The Washington Conference stands out as one of the most successful essays in disarmament negotiations; this was partly due to the emphasis at the Conference in tackling the basic political issues along with the narrow questions of naval arms race. Yet this Conference obtained a limited period of naval stability in the Far East which gave way^{to} a renewed naval arms race leading to the Second World War.

I would like to express my gratitude to my Supervisor, Professor M. Zuberi, under whose guidance and encouragement this work could be completed. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my parents whose financial support and assistance made this work possible.

New Delhi,
January 1983.

SUBHASHREE MISRA

CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
PREFACE	
I. INTRODUCTION - BACKGROUND TO THE CONFERENCE, 1890-1914	1 - 31
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFERENCE, 1914-1922	32 - 60
III. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE	61 - 99
IV. CONCLUSION	100 - 116
APPENDICES	117 - 136
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	137 - 139



LIST OF APPENDICES

	<u>Pages</u>
APPENDIX I - Tables Showing the Comparative Strength of the Greater Naval Powers in various classes of Ships between 1907 and 1914	117 - 119
APPENDIX II - Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan limiting Naval Armament	120 - 128
APPENDIX III - Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan relating to their Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific Ocean	129 - 131
APPENDIX IV - Treaty Between All Nine Powers relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China	132 - 136

Chapter I

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFERENCE - 1890-1914

INTRODUCTION

This study seeks to examine the Washington naval conference on the limitation of armaments - 1921-1922. The conference was convened to deal with the limitation of armaments in connection with which the Pacific and the Far Eastern questions were also to be discussed. It resulted in the signature of three treaties. The first treaty was between the United States, Britain, France and Japan to respect each others' right in relation to their possessions in the Pacific and to consult together in case of any threat through the aggressive action of any other power. The second treaty contained extensive measures of naval disarmament. The third treaty contained pledges by all powers at the conference to respect the independence and integrity of China.

In order to assess the success of the conference in restoring the balance of naval power in the Pacific, it is essential to study the technological, strategic and political factors, each of which influenced the conference.

Naval Technology and Strategy

The Machine Age affected the navies of the world at a

late period. By the end of the nineteenth century, "the sail dissolved into mere legend" and was replaced by "a monster of steel carrying huge ordnance, propelling itself by steam and capable of hurling destruction upon antagonists miles away".¹ Each change in the character of the warship and mode of naval attack had an effect on tactics and strategy and 'influenced the relative capacities of nations to wage maritime war'.²

In examining the technological revolution in navies, the important inventions are to be evaluated. They comprise all the important changes in naval armaments and are steam warship, the iron-hulled warship, armor and great ordnance, submarine modes of warfare and naval aircraft.

The adoption of the steam engine enhanced the potential military power of industrialized states. The factor of fuel affected the range of fleets and the importance of stations abroad. The introduction of armor and the development of great ordnance, the evolution of submarines and growth of military aircraft in sea power had far reaching results. They brought into sea power the factor of greater dependence of the battle fleet upon its base and narrowed its range of action. It was

1. Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, p.3

2. Ibid., p.3.

conducive to strengthening the defence of powers separated by wide oceans from their rivals. It, therefore, favoured the 'aspirations of the United States and Japan to military hegemony in their own and adjacent waters'.³

Though naval rivalry stimulated invention in the technology of naval material, it also made a corresponding development in the military arts. The only manner in which Great Britain could continue her supremacy on the sea was to continue building and remain vigilant in case improvements abroad outdistanced her own, and seeking to always build more units on each level of development than any two of her rivals. Similarly other nations had to ensure that their own positions in relation to Great Britain and each other were not worsened. Building went on steadily subjected only to self-imposed restraints. Continued building was the only way of preventing a sudden overthrow of naval position.

Compared to the Anglo-German naval rivalry of the years preceding the world war when naval material had acquired a degree of stability, the political atmosphere of the nineteenth century as seen in naval competition can be termed placid. Rapid developments in armor and ordnance resulted in changes

3. Ibid., p.257.

of great importance in existing power relationships. In 1905 Britain built the Dreadnought. This affected the balance of power despite the technical advance. It was so much more powerful than other battleships that all pre-Dreadnought battleships at once deteriorated in fighting value. Until other powers built Dreadnoughts British superiority increased as Britain still had the largest fleet of pre-Dreadnought ships. The advance in naval technology was also important in that four states, which had never previously been influential maritime powers were able to reach a position of naval eminence by essentially moderate efforts, namely, the United States, Germany, Japan and Italy.

The Growth of American Naval Power

The United States which until 1883 did not possess a single warship worthy of representing a great power found itself a great naval power at the close of the 1890's. From the Spanish-American War of 1898 the United States acquired distant overseas possessions and assumed a new role in international affairs. Expansion into the Caribbean and the Pacific, the Open Door policy in China, Theodore Roosevelt's amplification of the Monroe Doctrine, a mediating role during the Russo-Japanese War and at the Algeiras Conference, the dispatch of the battleship fleet around the world - these

events made the United States a conspicuous actor on the global stage.⁴

The Influence of sea power upon History - 1660-1783 by Alfred Thayer Mahan had a profound influence on an energetic foreign policy and ultimate overseas expansion. "Whether they will or not," Mahan wrote, "Americans must now begin to look outward". Mahan directly influenced the political and naval policies of the contemporary administrations in Washington.

To secure its rightful place in the world, Mahan argued, the United States should develop its trade and enlarge its merchant marine, establish a navy that could protect this new commerce wherever it might be threatened and acquire the overseas bases that would enable the fleet to operate effectively beyond its home waters. The report of the Naval Policy Board in 1890 directly reflected his views.

According to Mahan, the American isthmus was the key position. A canal across the isthmus would 'enable the Atlantic coast to compare with Europe, on equal terms as to distance, for the markets of Eastern Asia'. The distance between the European and the Pacific seaboard would be considerably shortened and the strategic security of the

4. Foster Rhea Dulles, The Imperial Years, p.viii.

Western continental frontier would be weakened. Its security would become a major object of national policy. This could be realized through establishing indisputable naval supremacy over the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific and the acquisition and development of naval bases at strategic points, especially in the Caribbean and the Hawaiian islands. While Mahan was propagating the 'doctrines of sea power and manifest destiny,'⁵ Congress and the Navy Department were struggling to grasp and to apply the new strategy of naval defence. National pride was a powerful motive among them.

"We stand among the great powers of the world", one Congressman declared, "and we should make ourselves respected". To remain helpless before the Navies of Europe asserted another was 'not a fit position for this great republic to occupy'. It was realised that the United States had to have a strong navy - not to attack other nations - but to establish itself on the international scene. 'No one more skillfully blended the dictates of national interest and the broader goals of a world mission - realism and idealism - than Alfred Thayer Mahan'.⁶

5. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power (1776-1918), p.217.

6. Dulles, n.4, p.43.

The growing rivalry for trade and commerce and the need for overseas colonies, had a new meaning for America in the 1890's. From every side powers were converging to divide Africa. Protectorates in the North were established - Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Libya. The British were creating a new empire southward, Bechuana land, Nyasaland and the Rhodesias. Germany was setting up protectorates over East and Southwest Africa. France was consolidating her control over Equatorial Africa and occupying Madagascar.

The imperialistic drive was now set for Eastern Asia. Competition for control of the islands of the Pacific was stretching out to China. The French, installed in Indo-China were moving up from the South. Great Britain, from the Yangtze Valley was seeking new concessions in Central China. Germany, though a new entrant, was making demands upon the 'crumbling dynasty that controlled the fortunes of the once Great Chinese Empire'.⁷ Russia was penetrating into Manchuria. In 1894, China fought a disastrous war with Japan. Though the European powers called upon the victorious Japanese to give up their conquests, except Formosa, Imperial Russia was soon taking over Port Arthur, Darien and control of the Manchurian railways which Japan had to surrender. "The various powers", said the

7. Ibid., p.65.

last of the great Manchu rulers, Empress Dowager Tzu Hoi, "cast upon us looks of tiger-like voracity, hustling each other in their endeavours to seize upon our innermost territories".⁸

If the United States had no part in these moves in Africa and China, it had interests in the Pacific. There were Hawaii and Samoa. The war with Spain was significant in the rise of American naval power. The acquisitions of 1898 and 1899 extended the strategic frontier of the United States several 100 miles eastward into the Atlantic and several 1000 miles westward across the Pacific. The annexation of Puerto Rico and the occupation of Cuba did not materially enlarge or alter the defense problem.

Regarding the Pacific, Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had long regarded the annexation of the Hawaiian islands as a strategic necessity. In a letter to Mahan, dated May 3, 1897, Roosevelt wrote: "I need not say that this letter be strictly private. I speak to you with the greatest freedom, for I sympathize with your views, and I have the same idea of patriotism, and of belief in and love for our country. But to no one else excepting Lodge do I

8. Ibid., p.45.

talk like this".⁹ Mere naval privileges acquired by the Hawaiian American treaty of 1884 were not enough as some power, namely Japan, might secure a foothold there. The conquest of the Philippines added another argument for annexing Hawaii and was perhaps important in bringing this about.

In 1901, strategically speaking, the United States consisted of two sea boards with a great distance between them. There were two solutions to this situation. One was to station in each ocean an independent naval force strong enough to cope with any situation likely to arise there. The other was to build an inter-oceanic isthmian canal which would halve the distance between the Pacific and Atlantic seaboards. Roosevelt committed himself to the second solution and said that the canal would 'greatly increase the efficiency of our Navy if the Navy is of sufficient size...' As Mahan had earlier pointed out - the isthmian canal would be a strategic asset only if the United States Navy held indisputable command over the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific.

After the turn of the century, the position of the United States in the Caribbean and throughout the Western

9. Ibid., p.101.

Atlantic, north of the Equator, became stronger, as a result of the rapid increase of the United States Navy, the growing complexity of naval technology and paradoxically the rise of German naval power. Earlier, Great Britain was the only non-American power with a considerable naval establishment in the Western Atlantic. Germany's threat to Great Britain's naval superiority in European waters forced Great Britain to cut its overseas squadrons and soon eliminated Great Britain as a possible military aggressor. The prospect of German aggression was equally remote. The naval situation in the Eastern Pacific was even more favourable as European aggression was too remote a possibility. The only conceivable source of attack was the rising Japanese Empire. And the Pacific Ocean plus the United States Navy constituted an impregnable barrier against aggression from that quarter.

The United States thus acquired Hawaii, Guam and Puerto Rico as colonies. Hawaii became an incorporated territory through the Organic Act of 1900. Guam remained a naval station administered directly by the Navy Department. Puerto Rico was made an unincorporated territory. In comparison to those, Cuba and the Philippines Islands involved important issues. The Cuban-American treaty of 1903 finally included right of intervention as well as maintenance of a naval base. The Philippine Organic Act adopted in July 1902, provided

for a bicameral legislature and established the status of the islands as an unincorporated territory of the United States. Negotiations regarding the Samoan Islands were reached in 1899 with the United States obtaining the island of Tutuila with the harbour of Pago Pago.

The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Scramble for Concessions in China

In 1899 the question at issue before Secretary of state, Hay, was the policy in regard to China. Though by the close of the 1890's trade with China amounted to no more than something like 2 percent of the total of United States foreign commerce, the division of the Chinese Empire into spheres of influence and the scramble of European powers for special concessions caused alarm in the United States. The influence exercised by Great Britain in the Yangtso Valley, the position occupied by Germany in Shantung and Russian encroachments in Manchuria threatened American trade interests.

The original agitation for specific action to maintain the Open Door, however, came from Britain which wanted to block any further extension of German and Russian influence. The McKinley administration, observed in the problems of war and peace with Spain did not feel that this was a serious matter. However, as the prospects for trade with China increased, pressure was put on the administration for

some sort of action.

Meanwhile in 1900 the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in China for a time disturbed the peace of the world. It was a violent protest by the Chinese people against Western imperialism. The situation worsened when in June 1900 the Boxers overran Peking and began to riot throughout the city. Thousands were massacred and the German Minister and the Chancellor of the Japanese legation were assassinated. Finally, the Boxers attacked the foreign legations. All communications with the outside were cut off from Peking. However, when abandoned by the government, the Boxer leaders called off the siege.

To prevent further partition of China at this crucial juncture, Hay sent a circular message to the several powers. He stated that if the Open Door were to be maintained in China, her political independence had to be safeguarded. As Hay put it, "we want no territory and should regret to see China dispoiled. Above all we want the Open Door".¹⁰ In the end, the view of the United States generally prevailed in the settlements between the powers and China. Though the indemnity was outrageously high, it is important to

80. Ibid., p.219.

note that the powers did not receive any territorial concessions. Under these circumstances the Open Door policy 'for all the retreats and concessions that might be made when it came under direct attack, gradually gathered a tremendous momentum and force in itself'.¹¹

Theodore Roosevelt became the President of the United States in 1901. He realised the importance of building up naval strength. We sought this power not only for national security but for promoting peace. In his campaign for more and larger battleships he often came into conflict with those who believed that America's role was to provide an example in disarmament. "The American people must either build and maintain an adequate navy", he told Congress, "or else make up their minds to definitely accept a secondary position in international affairs".¹²

The peace movement with its emphasis on disarmament was a powerful force in the beginning of the twentieth century. Many peace societies were organised and a large number of peace conferences were held throughout the country. It received ~~for~~ an early impetus from the Disarmament Conference

11. Ibid., p.219.

12. Ibid., p.231.

held at the Hague in 1899 on the initiative of the Tsar of Russia. Though this conference provided a public platform for the discussion of international affairs, it did not achieve the desired results. Its one accomplishment was the establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitration, comprising of a panel of jurists to decide international disputes. However no nation was willing to accept arbitration as a means of settling disputes that might lead to war. The American naval delegate, Mahan, stated that the United States would in fact have to increase its fleet.

Roosevelt lost no time in proceeding with his naval programme. The results were impressive. Within four years naval appropriations had risen from \$85,000,000 to \$118,000,000 per year.¹³ Meanwhile in 1906 the United States got embroiled in a political crisis with Japan which arose from the anti-Japanese sentiments. This culminated in 1906 in the segregation of Japanese school children in San Francisco. Fortunately it subsided. Along with this came the advent of the Dreadnought. In 1907 Roosevelt warned the House Naval Committee that either the United States must build Dreadnoughts or relinquish political power in both the oceans. The outcome of this was one of the bitterest legislative struggles in American

13. Sprent, n.5, pp.259-62.

Naval history. In December 1907, he sent a naval fleet of 16 battleships to the Pacific Coast where they arrived in 1908 to popularize the Navy and his latest naval program and to overawe Japan. It would impress upon Japan, he hoped, the futility of challenging the United States, and thereby strengthen the bases for peace.

An important step in the evolution of Japanese-American relations was taken shortly after the fleet left Yokohama through the Root-Takahara Agreement to maintain the existing status quo in the Pacific, to respect each other's possessions and to preserve the common interests of the powers in China by following the Open Door policy.

Roosevelt's retirement was followed by William H. Taft assuming the Presidency. Roosevelt in a letter at the close of 1908 outlined his important achievements. In addition to his diplomacy in Eastern Asia and at Algiers, he cited the doubling of the Navy; the start of construction on the Panama canal; settlement of the affair of Santo Domingo, a policy of good faith towards Cuba and establishment of more friendly relations with Latin America and also with Japan.

The presidency of Taft spanned a critical period in history. During that period the United States, although taking a more aggressive part in the Far Eastern struggle,

once more sought security for America in the 'ancient tradition of political isolation'. Woodrow Wilson upon becoming President in 1913 spoke with high confidence of the growing cordiality and sense of community interest among the nations. Over the horizon was the first World War which was to change the entire course of history.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance

In the Far East, Japan's successful war with China in 1894-95 brought her to the front as a naval power to be reckoned with. The signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 recognized the importance of the Far East in international affairs. It placed Japan on an equal footing with a world power.

Since 1868 Japan had mistrusted Britain as they felt that since their country was vulnerable to attack from the sea it was likely to be from Britain, the strongest naval power in the Far East. The relationship was better in the industrial sector. In 1870 and 1873 the Japanese government concluded railway loans in Britain as the leading financial centre. Britain assisted Japan and from 1870 to 1900 most Japanese battleships were built in British yards. Thus it is safe to conclude that "the creation of a modern navy in Japan by 1894 was due largely to the efforts and technical

cooperation of Britain".¹⁴

Until 1894, Britain's policy was largely concerned with the maintenance of her treaty rights while Japan wanted the revision of what it considered unequal treaties. Britain was also trying to gain Japanese co-operation in keeping Russia out of Korea. Thus the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty was signed in 1894 which postponed ending of extra-territorial rights until 1899 but prepared the way for immediately introducing an 'ad valorem' tariff. This was a precedent for Japan's later treaties with the United States, Russia, Germany and other European countries.

Why an alliance was necessary can be realised after analysing the international situation in the Far East in 1894. In China since 1644, the Manchu dynasty had been ruling, steeped in traditions. There was no serious response to the challenge of modernization. After the Taiping Rebellion they saw the need for modernization and took steps accordingly. However, they were no match for the Japanese as the war of 1894-95 proved. The situation was ominous because of the expansionist policies in this area. Britain's supremacy in the Far East was soon being challenged when the French acquired control over Indo-China in 1885.

14. Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p.8.

The eastward expansion of Russia had begun under Nikolai Nikolaevich Muraviev, Governor-General of East Siberia between 1857 and 1861. The survey for a trans-Siberian railway in 1867 shifted Russian interest in East Asia. For this project Russia needed French capital which resulted in first an entente (1891) and later an alliance (1894). Other powers were less active in China prior to 1894. Much attention was placed on Korea, China's tributary territory. Japan had acquired trade rights by the treaty of 1876. Meanwhile the Korean King turned towards Russia, which shared a frontier with Korea and in 1884, signed a commercial treaty with her. This turn of events alarmed the British Government, which sent a naval squadron to occupy Port Hamilton on an islet off South Korea in 1885. On receiving an undertaking from China, not to occupy any Korean territory she withdrew from Port Hamilton in 1887.

Till 1894 there had been no hostility nor any warmth between Britain and Japan. The war with China brought a new dimension to their relations. It has been alleged that the British government was anti-Japanese at the outbreak of the war. At the beginning of the war, 'British sympathy was clearly on the side of the Celestial Empire'.¹⁵ Seen against

15. Chang Chung Fu, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p.14.

the recent commercial treaty it was not so, for if it had been pro-Chinese it could have withdrawn from the treaty. The action which Britain took was not so much 'pro-Chinese or anti-Japanese as pro-British'.¹⁶ The Japanese historian Kajima has written that 'it was not as though Britain had hostile feelings towards our country or treated it as an enemy; she only thought that the war would strategically and commercially have an adverse effect on herself and sincerely wished that peace in East Asia should not be broken'.¹⁷

Japanese victory over China and the consequent territorial demands made by Japan made the Western Powers suddenly aware of the innumerable problems posed by the impending break-up of the Chinese Empire. Russia, France and Germany intervened on behalf of China and sent a threatening note to Japan to desist from territorial conquests. The Japanese Government was stunned by this extraordinary turn of events but had no option but to yield to Western pressure. Japan had to abandon the whole of the Liaotung peninsula and had to be satisfied with an indemnity. The three-power intervention not only delayed Japan's entry into international affairs but forced her to concentrate on building up her national strength.

16. Nish, n.14, p.25.

17. Kajima Morinosuke, History of Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy, p.154.

In 1893 the government decided to double the size of her army and increase her naval strength. In the years that followed, most of the shipbuilding was carried out in British yards. By 1900 Japan came to hold the naval balance between 'the Russo-French and British fleets in the Far East' and by the time this phase of her programme was finished in 1902-03, her fleet was 'capable of dominating naval policies there'.¹⁸

While Japan was consolidating her position, the powers in the Far East roughly divided themselves into two groups - France and Russia, Japan and Britain. Though on political issues Germany usually sided with France and Russia, on financial issues she was more or less on Britain's side. Meanwhile the powers busied themselves with compensatory acquisitions after the Sino-Japanese war. Germany occupied Tsingtao in 1897, France demanded the lease of Kwangchow in 1898. The Russians took advantage of this situation by sending a squadron to Port Arthur. Within three months they acquired the lease of Port Arthur, Dalny and the tip of the Liautung peninsula. This was a sore point for the Japanese as it was the territory they had been compelled to vacate three years ago as a result of the intervention

18. Nish, n.14, p.36.

of Russia, Germany and France.

Failing to prevent Russia from acquiring these concessions Britain began making demands on China and secured the non-alienation of the Yangtze Valley to any other power, the lease of the New Territories opposite Hongkong and the lease of Weihaiwei. Japan's temporary occupation of Weihaiwei was to end as soon as the indemnity had been paid. China raised the sum by foreign loans and the Japanese withdrew their garrison.

was

Meanwhile Japan/negotiating with Russia over Korea. By the 'Nishi-Rosen agreement' Russia admitted only Japan's special industrial and commercial rights in the peninsula. No concessions were made on the main issues. Japanese and Russian interests were put on an equal footing within an independent Korea. Between the cession of Weihaiwei and the Boxer Rebellion there was no international crisis in the Far East. After the Boxer rebellion Japan's stature as a great power could not be denied. It is within this context of power rivalries in north China that the Anglo-Japanese rapprochement had its origins.

Between 1900 and 1901 Anglo-Japanese relations greatly improved. They realised their mutual interest in challenging Russian concentration in Manchuria and Korea. The Manchurian

DISS

327.174309797042

M6911 Na



TH1076



TH-1076

crisis turned both Japan and Britain against Russia. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was finally signed in 1902. The diplomatic notes containing the naval agreement were concluded simultaneously. Each government recognised that its naval forces:

"should, as far as it is possible, act in concert with those of (its ally) in time of peace, and agrees that mutual facilities shall be given for the docking and coaling of vessels of war of one country in the ports of the other, as well as other advantages conducive to the welfare and efficiency of the respective navies of the two powers. At the present moment Japan and Great Britain are each of them maintaining in the extreme East a naval force superior in strength to that of any other power. (Each ally) has no intention of relaxing her efforts to maintain, so far as may be possible, available for concentration in the waters of the Extreme East a naval force superior to that of any third power".¹⁹

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was limited to the Far East and was due to run for five years. It was, however, continued in revised form in 1905 and 1911. It affected sea power in the Pacific and altered Japan's status in Korea and Manchuria.

19. Ibid., p.217.

It managed to reduce the importance of the naval power that Russia was trying to build up in Asia with French cooperation. Japan's improved position led to tension between her and Russia which eventually led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. Japan's victories were spectacular. The crushing defeat of the supposedly superior Russian Navy successfully established Japan as a Great Power. It also showed how limited the Alliance of 1902 was and how it was required to be adjusted. Although the 1902 treaty was not due to expire till 1907 it was revised and bound the two powers for ten years.

In the first alliance the Japanese had entered a clause whereby each power was to keep its naval force superior in strength to that of any third power. Immediately afterwards the Russian squadron was destroyed and Britain's battleships were withdrawn from the Far East. This left the United States as the third naval power next to Japan in the Pacific. Thus the war affected the naval balance throughout the world.

The military naval talks at the time of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance exposed its shortcomings. Britain was unwilling to offer the naval co-operation that Japan expected. Similarly Japan was reluctant to help in the defense of India. One month after, Britain and Japan signed separate agreements with the earlier main enemy,

Russia which further lessened the value of the Alliance. The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war eliminated a major power from the Far East. The power alignments in Europe leading to the Anglo-French Entente in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 focussed attention on the growing menace of Germany. This resulted in the withdrawal of a major portion of the British fleet from the Far East and the consequent placidity in that area. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance lost its significance to the British. American anxieties about Japanese naval strength and the territorial acquisitions in Korea and Manchuria, however, increased. In that context the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was an important factor in Far Eastern diplomacy until its abrogation - a major result of the Washington Conference.

THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL ARMS RACE

Because of the great industrial growth after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, Germany was able to challenge the naval supremacy of Great Britain. In 1894 the Oberkommando²⁰ of the German Navy issued a memorandum on the importance of sea power, written by Captain Alfred von Tirpitz. It contained a statement to the effect that there should be a powerful German fleet strong enough to meet an enemy at sea and to

20. Executive Command - Oberkommando.

meet an enemy at sea and not merely cruiser raid. Its power was to be felt beyond its own territorial waters the first navy Law of 1898 reflected these views. The German fleet was to consist of 19 battleships, 12 large and 30 small cruisers, 8 armoured coast-defense ships. The total non-recurrent expenditure to cover the years of 1898 to 1903 was to be over £20,000,000.²¹ Its coincidence with the occupation of Kiaochow as a naval base in the Far East was significant. The programme under the Navy Law extended to the financial year 1903-04. Propaganda among the German people was carried out by Tirpitz mainly through the Navy League (founded in 1898) with funds largely provided by the firm of Krüpp.

The proposals for the New Navy Law was laid down in 1900. Under the new plan the battlefleet in 1920 was to consist of 2 flagships, 4 squadrons of 6 battleships. Moreover, 3 large cruisers and 3 small cruisers would form a fleet reserve. However the Government was forced by the Centre Party to reduce the cruiser reserve to 1 large and 2 small cruisers.²² The theoretical justification for this very expensive plan was provided by Tirpitz in the security of its economic development and world trade, needed 'peace on land

21. E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, p.25.

22. *Ibid.*, p.29.

and sea'. The only effective means of protecting German overseas trade and colonies lay in the construction of a powerful battle-fleet so that even the strongest naval power could not attack it without risking its own position. No mention was made of Great Britain but everybody knew that Great Britain was the strongest Naval Power.

Britain responded to this challenge at the diplomatic level by sorting out her colonial quarrels with France and Russia. The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 relieved her of anxieties in the colonial field and thus enabled her to deal with the German threat. Britain also embarked upon her own naval build up. The Anglo-German naval arms race had begun in earnest.

A supplementary law was announced by Germany in 1905 providing for a large increase in tonnage and cost of battleships still to be built under the laws of 1900. An annual appropriation of £ 250,000 was made for submarine experiments. Britain responded within three weeks with a memorandum stating that her naval programme would depend upon the German programme and in 1905 was built the Dreadnought. Mr. Lloyd George in 1908 put the matter very simply by saying that the Dreadnought policy embodied the views of naval officials giving them the kind of ship they wanted for the tactics they thought most desirable.

The Balance of Power was affected despite the technical advance in the building of the Dreadnought. It was so much more powerful than other battleships, that all pre-Dreadnought battleships at once deteriorated in fighting value. Until other powers built Dreadnoughts for themselves British superiority increased as Britain still had the largest fleet of pre-Dreadnought ships.

In the midst of this naval arms race the second Hague Conference was convened in 1907. In spite of a renewed attempt to strengthen the cause of arbitration and to bring about some limitation of armaments, it proved no more a success than the First Conference. The main contribution of the Hague Conference was in the elaboration of the laws of warfare and the rights of combatants.

The Anglo-German naval arms race was in no way interrupted by the deliberations of the Hague Conference. The acceleration in German ship-building alarmed Britain. If Germany built her ships in advance of her published time-table, Britain was afraid that Germany might overtake her in ships of the Dreadnought class. The British government therefore brought forward a programme of 8 Dreadnoughts. There was no doubt that Britain meant to retain her naval supremacy.

Sea power was of tremendous importance to an island state and a scattered Empire. Winston Churchill's description

of the British fleet as a necessity and the German fleet as a luxury was not well received in Germany. The term was not entirely wrong because till the passing of the 1st Navy Bill Germany was the most powerful of the military states of Europe.

By March 1902 Great Britain still held her supremacy of 13 percent in battleships and cruisers over the combined fleets of Germany and the United States. This superiority would have diminished by a quarter in 1909. Great Britain, therefore, needed to lay down 7 large ships to secure a 10 percent and 4 large to secure a 5 percent superiority.²³

The British naval estimates were published in 1912-13. If there was no increase in the German programme of 2 ships a year for the next 6 years, a programme of 4 and 3 ships for 6 years would give Great Britain slightly over 60 percent superiority. If Germany added two ships for the next 6 years, Great Britain would lay down 4 additional ships during the same period. If Germany added 3, Great Britain would add 6 ships.

Before these estimates were finally voted, the new German programme, consisted of a reorganisation which meant an increase of 3 battleships, 3 large cruisers and 3 small

23. Ibid., pp.368-9; See Appendix-1 for tables of comparative strength of greater naval powers between 1898 and 1914.

cruisers in full commission. One battleship was to be laid down in 1913 and a second in 1916. The British programme meant an added expenditure of £ 10,250,000 between 1912 and 1917. Winston Churchill's suggestion of a naval holiday was not well received in Germany. The Emperor sent a message that the German programme was based upon German needs and 'it does not matter what counter-measures' England takes.

France and Great Britain felt that the situation would be more favourable if the Russian naval plans were put into effect. In 1912 the long controversy as to whether Russia should build a battlefleet or be content with 'torpedo attack' was settled in favour of battleships. A 5-year programme was laid down, costing £ 50,000,000. A new naval base was to be constructed at the Reval.

The 'strategy of position', the dominant phase of naval rivalry of the powers in European waters was affected by the announcement by the French government in 1912 that they intended to concentrate the greater part of their navy in the Mediterranean. Six pre-Dreadnought ships would have been of little use against Germany but were a match for Austria and Italy. The new French Dreadnoughts would also be stationed in the Mediterranean. This is one of the clearest examples of the intense naval competition. The fact that France was leaving her northern and western ports without adequate naval

defense and that Great Britain was welcoming the reinforcement of the French fleet caused Germany a good deal of alarm.

In 1913 Churchill again proposed a naval holiday, this time extending it to include France, Russia, Italy and Austria as well. It had no impact on Germany. The cost, size and destructive power of naval armaments had increased and was continuing to increase. The Dreadnought had been superseded by the 'Super Dreadnought'. The range of the torpedo had increased since the Russo-Japanese war. The speed of torpedoes had doubled. The submarine had now been provided with an effective weapon. A new factor appeared with the development of airships. The German airprogramme of 1913 included 5 army airship battalions, 5 aeroplane battalions, 2 squadrons of naval airships, six groups of water planes, 30 army airships and 10 naval airships.

The Anglo-German naval arms race was one of the major contributory factors in the intense power rivalries preceding the First World War. The effect of this naval competition on the naval strength of other European powers evoked a sense of anxiety and led to a major realignment of force in Europe. The interlocking relationships between Great Britain, France and Russia through the Anglo-French Entente and the Anglo-Russian Convention set in motion a chain of events which

led to the division of Europe into two hostile and heavily armed camps. Military preparations were based on the assumption of a preemptive strike and quick victory. Mobilisation plans were prepared with rigid time-tables. This meant that in a crisis, political control over military strategy would be difficult to maintain; governments would become victims of their rigid mobilization schedule. As was unfolded in quick succession in the fateful war of 1914, leaders in European capitals realized with horror their inability to control their military machines.

Chapter II

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFERENCE - 1914-1922

August 1914 witnessed the outbreak of the First World War. Originating as a purely European war it was not long before America intervened and participated on a full scale. This war foreshadowed an upward rise of navalism within the United States. It compelled the Administration towards a program of warlike preparation and the passage of the great naval bill of 1916, which 'marked another milestone in the rise of American naval power'.¹

This Act projected an intensive naval building program. The origin and evolution of this program is summarized in the following table.

Categories of Ships	General Boards Program (5 Yrs)	Adminic- tration Program (5 Yrs)	Compro- mise Bill (1 Yr)	Senato Program (3 Yrs)	Final Act (3 Yrs)
Battleships	10	10	-	10	10
Battle Cruisers	6	6	5	6	6
Scout Cruisers	10	10	4	10	10
Destroyers	50	50	10	50	50
Fleet Submarines	9	15	-	9	9
Coast Submarines	58	85	50	58	58
Miscellaneous	63	10	3	14	14

1. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power (1776-1918), p.317.

This law concluded with a section renouncing armed aggression and supporting disarmament in principle. It stated that the United States Government looked with disfavour upon "a general increase of armaments through the world" but took the view "that no single nation could alone disarm".

In the meantime the war in Europe was moving towards a crisis which carried the Allied Powers to disaster in the spring of 1917. It resulted mainly from the development of new instruments and techniques of naval warfare. It was precipitated by the German submarine offensive against merchant shipping and this ultimately led to the entry of the United States into the war. American naval resources were put to a critical test. But the navy rose to the emergency and played an important part in saving the allies.

Theoretically and mathematically the Allies in 1914 possessed a preponderance of naval power. The British Navy alone exceeded the combined forces of the Central Powers. Germany had a slight advantage in submarines. The fate of the Allies depended upon the ability of Britain to retain her command of the sea. The Allies could and repeatedly did suffer reverses on land but these reverses could not be decisive. 'But one naval decisive defeat shattering the

naval power of Britain would have been almost certainly have made them lose the war'.

Sea plans were less important to the Central Powers who counted on a swift land campaign to win the war within a few days or weeks. They largely ignored the superior naval power of the allies and neglected the potentialities of their own navy. The German navy was "second only to Britain in size and second to none in mechanical excellence and technical efficiency".²

In February 1915, the German Government countered the Allied Blockade with a submarine offensive against merchant shipping in a 'war zone'. Surrounding the British Isles they revealed the commerce-destroying potentialities of the submarine. Meanwhile an Allied attempt to open the Dardanelles and thereby reestablish military communications with Russia had proved abortive. Early in 1916 in the Battle of Jutland, the only major naval action of the war, the weaker German Fleet inflicted serious injury and then escaped though not without casualties.

This naval encounter marked another turning point in the naval war. Though hailed as a great victory in Germany

2. Ibid., p.349.

it had conclusively shown the inability of the Central Powers to snatch the command of the sea from the Allies. This strengthened the demand for more aggressive use of submarines, which alone, it was contended, could save the Central Powers from defeat. Accordingly U-boat³ construction was speeded up.

The war now moved to a crisis. The Allies controlled the surface of every ocean and all of the strategically important narrow seas except the Dardanelles and the South-East tip of the Baltic. The Russian Revolution of 1917 foreshadowed an early collapse of the Allied Eastern Front.

The German Submarine offensive was the final link in the chain of events that 'transformed the United States from a neutral partisan into a belligerent partner of the Allies.'⁴

The entry of the United States into the war changed the situation. The American navy played an important part in devising and putting into operation an effective system of anti-submarine defence. The logical answer to the submarine offensive was to escort merchant vessels in groups through the danger zone under protection of destroyers or other craft

3. German Submarines were popularly called U-boats from the German word 'Unterseeboot'.

4. Sprout, n.1, p.354.

equipped to fight submarines. The next problem was to assemble enough anti-submarine craft particularly destroyers to operate a commercial convoy system on a large scale. Initially, all appeals to the United States Navy Department by Admiral Sims were received with hesitation. Gradually after realising that the German fleet posed no threat to the United States, anti-submarine forces were sent overseas. By the beginning of 1918 the Navy was at last becoming an efficient smooth-running war machine. American and British navies were co-operating in the unprecedented task of safely ferrying a great American Army to Europe through submarine infested areas.

An important American contribution was the development of effective underwater detectors. They warned anti-submarine craft of the presence and approximate location of submerged U-boats ⁴ thus removing the obstacle of hunting submarines at sea. The Navy Department's perfection of a new type of mine was another great contribution. The new mine had a float and an anchor connected with a container of explosive by an antenna-contact between the iron hull of a vessel and this antenna actuated an electric current which exploded the mine. The concussion of this explosion would destroy or damage a vessel within a considerable vertical as well as horizontal distance from that mine".⁵ It was organized and undertaken by the Navy

5. Ibid., p.367.

Department in 1917 with some British assistance and was well on the way to completion when the Ministries terminated hostilities in November 1918. When the terms of surrender were being discussed it appeared that the German fleet would be turned over to the British for safe-keeping. British naval command demanded the entire German battle fleet and many auxiliary ships as well. The United States approved the surrender of the German fleet but opposed any attempt to make these vessels part of the naval tonnage.⁶

Even as late as January 1917, President Wilson was still arguing against total victory. A "peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished", he said, "would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest... as upon quicksand".⁷ However, one in the war the US had to fight the war to its better end.

The damage had been done and the peace of Europe had been shattered. Austria-Hungary was gone. Germany was in a state of breakdown. Russia was caught up in the Revolution. The new states of eastern and central Europe were lacking in

6. G.T. Davis, Navy Second to None, p.242.

7. G.F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, pp.66-67.

domestic stability and the traditions of statesmanship. On the other side of Germany were France and England, reeling from the vicissitudes of the war.⁸

Especially sinister were the conditions in the Pacific. The European belligerents all held territories in the Far East. Great Britain was joined in an alliance with Japan. Thus any move to exclude the European struggle from the Pacific and the Far East would have caused great difficulties. England no longer had the military power required to defend its empire in the Pacific and its economic stake in China against the encroaching advance of Japanese. Germany at the outbreak of the war had a strong cruiser squadron in the Far East. Since Japan possessed enough naval resources, immediately available, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was accordingly invoked and Japan was invited to clear German naval forces from the Pacific.

It was no part of British war strategy to substitute Japan for Germany in Shantung or Pacific Islands. Britain was fully aware that the United States would be hostile to this considering their interests in the Pacific.

Though Japanese naval forces took possession of the Marshall, Caroline and Marianas archipelagoes early in

8. Ibid., pp.68-69.

October 1914, Japan stated that their occupation was temporary. The destruction of German power in the Pacific and the Far East, along with the practical withdrawal of Russian, French and British forces left only the United States to guard 'occidental interests' in that area. Lack of modern naval bases in the Pacific, however, made it difficult for her to make a very strong stand in the Far East.

Japan presented the notorious 'twenty-one demands' to China in 1915 which if carried out would have gravely affected the integrity of China. It was presented to China on 18 January, 1915 and accepted in part on 7 May, 1915. They included China's assent to 'the direct disposition between Japan and Germany of the German rights, interests, and concessions in Shantung and to the building by Japan of a railway from Chefoo to join the Kiaochow-Tainan Railway'.⁹

In 1917, anticipating China's participation in the war, Japan entered into secret diplomatic agreements with Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia for gaining support to her claim at the peace conference. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Japanese forces moved into the 'Russian Sphere of influence' in Manchuria.

9. Go-Zay Wood, Shantung Question: A Study in Diplomacy and World Politics, p. 16.

The United States reluctantly gave in to the transfer of Germany's rights in China to Japan. But they hoped the Post War Conference would restore Shantung to China. However, Japan came to Versailles not only with "secret Allied pledges of support for her claim but also a treaty with the corrupt militarist regime in Peking signed in September 1918"¹⁰ for the purpose of developing the Shantung Railway as a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise. In spite of American appeals, President Wilson responded to the pressure of the Allies, the fear that Japan would withdraw from the conference and his own rationalization that the League of Nations would right the matter in the end.¹¹

The Treaty of Versailles handed Japan all former German rights and preferences in Shantung, including the Railway in return for a promise to restore the leasehold of Kiaochow to China under certain conditions. This had serious consequences. The stunned Chinese delegation refused to sign the peace treaty. Chinese resentment and nationalism exploded in the May Fourth Movement. Japan's attempts at pressing the Chinese Government to enter into bilateral negotiations were futile.

10. Noel H. Pugh, "American Friendship for China and the Shantung Question at the Washington Conference", Journal of American History, vol. 62, June 1977, p. 69.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

The 'Japanese Menace' was stated as one of the reasons for expansion of the American Naval Program. However, a temporary improvement in Japanese-American relations was brought about by the famous diplomatic understanding, the Lansing-Tschi Agreement of 1917, which secured some recognition of Japan's claims in Asia.

China's declaration of war upon Germany on 14 August, 1917 caused further complications in the Pacific. It abrogated the convention of 1898 under which Germany had obtained her lease to her territory in Shantung. Upon the abrogation of the lease, German rights and concessions reverted to China.

In 1918, Japan entered into secret understandings with the Chinese Minister at Tokyo by which she was given the right to construct two railway lines between Toinan and Shunteh and between Kcomi and Hsiachow.¹²

As a means of breaking the stranglehold which Japanese finance was frightening on China, the Wilson Administration in 1918 revived a scheme, inaugurated under President Taft for international subscription and control of loans to that country. American troops were sent for the real, though unstated, purpose of blocking Japan's advance into

12. Ge-Zay Kood, n.9, p.17.

Eastern Siberia.

Thus the struggle in the Pacific continued, with Japan opposing American efforts to establish a 'new financial consortium'. The United States sought "to free China from dependence upon Japanese financial assistance and the sacrifices China would have to make for such assistances".¹³

The defeat of Germany, therefore, set the stage for momentous events in the Pacific. In the eyes of Japan, her long-sought primacy in the Far East depended largely on permanent occupation of the Monnai, Caroline and Marshall archipelagoes, seized from Germany in the early weeks of the war. The strategic consequences of leaving Japan in possession of the German islands were felt in the United States. They formed a 'Screen separating the Philippines from the Hawaiian Group and from the United States'.¹⁴ Japanese control over the island was also perceived as a constant menace to naval ships passing through the Pacific and between the Philippines and the United States. Various alternatives to dislodge the Japanese from these islands were discussed. One extraordinary suggestion made was to return these islands to Germany as

13. Davis, n.6, pp.246-47.

14. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power, p.91.

Germany would command no naval force sufficient 'to disturb the peace of the Pacific'. Besides, there would be a slim chance of the United States acquiring these islands from Germany at a later period.

When the peace conference at Versailles began its session, Japan arrived to demand her 'portion of flesh'. Her diplomatic bargains with the principal European Allies, concluded earlier, stood her in good stead and confirmed her succession to German possessions in the Pacific and the Far East. The Big Three, namely, Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau agreed to Japan's demands, "the question had now become one that threatened the integrity of China as a whole".¹⁵

China could not of course accept the situation and refused to sign the Versailles treaty. The United States, having signed it did not ratify it. But the treaty came into force upon ratification by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Though legally it could never be binding upon China or the United States, the fact that it was binding upon Japan, Great Britain, Italy, France and other Allied Powers made its revision or reconsideration difficult.

15. Ge-Zay Wood, n.9, p.17.

In theory, however, the settlement at Paris did safeguard the American military road across the Pacific. Japan retained possession of the former German islands 'north of the Equator not as full and unlimited sovereign, but as the administrator of a mandate from the Allied and Associated Powers'.¹⁶

Hector C. Bywater, in his book published in 1921, describes in detail the strategic consequences of American acquiescence in Japanese occupation of the islands. The effect, he said, was 'to surround Guam with a cordon of potential Japanese strongholds and naval bases'. The Island of Yap, a few hundred miles to the South-West, was 'admirably adapted for use as a base for submarines or other vessels operative against the Guam-Manila line of communication and so long as it remained in enemy occupation this route would never be safe. Even if... driven out of Yap, Japan would still have the Pelew Islands. As long as these positions remained in the hands of Japan, an American fleet based on Guam would operate under difficulties comparable to those that would have confronted Britain's Grand Fleet in the world war if Germany had possessed a submarine base in the Shetland Islands at the threshold of Scapa flow.'¹⁷

16. Sprout, n.14, p.92.

17. H.C. Bywater, Sea power in the Pacific, pp.266-68.

The Shantung controversy brought to surface the anti-Japanese current in America. By secret agreements, France and Great Britain were pledged to support Japan's claim to all German rights in the Pacific Islands as well as in Shantung. All President Wilson could do was to acquiesce in Japan's succession in return for a verbal pledge that the political control of the province would be handed back to China by Japan at some future date.

The Peking Government did intend to bring the Shantung question before the Council of the League of Nations, but China could not expect much from the Council in view of the fact that the Powers represented on it were, with the exception of China, signatories to the Versailles Treaty. The United States was not a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles. At the Washington Conference (1921-22), it was the intention of the Chinese delegates to present the Shantung Question in one of its plenary sessions.¹⁸ But this could not be done because of the fact that out of the nine powers attending the Conference, six had signed the Versailles Treaty. However, at the Conference, after thirty-six laborious meetings, the Chinese and Japanese delegates reached an agreement relative to the Shantung question, the

18. Go-Zay Wood, n.9, p.23.

terms of which were nothing short of a negation of the Versailles settlement¹⁹.

In addition to Shantung and Japanese difficulties the Japanese-American racial question rose again. The people of California passed a legislation in 1920, under the system of popular initiative in connection with the ownership or leasing of land by aliens not eligible to citizenship.¹⁹ Japan's strong demand for racial equality at the Peace Conference is a clear indication of how intense were her national convictions on this subject.

In the Atlantic, the defeat of Germany was followed by surrender and subsequent self-destruction of the German fleet and the sea power of Austria. The struggle on land had consumed the energies of France and Italy with consequent deterioration in their naval forces. Revolutionary upheaval in Russia had temporarily disorganised the naval power of Russia.

Great Britain, on the other hand, emerged from the war stronger on the sea than before. With no formidable European 'enemy' in sight, Great Britain was free once again to take a large view in relation to 'empire defence, national policy and world politics'.

19. Davis, n.6, p.250.

In principle the situation was still as defined by the Committee of Imperial Defence before the War. "The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial Defence against attack from over the sea. This is the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire, and is fully recognised by the Admiralty who have accepted the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad against organised invasion from the sea".²⁰

However, in practice the position was difficult. Though the German High Seas Fleet was at the bottom of Scapa Flow and no other likely 'enemy' existed in Europe, the United States seemed set on building at least to parity with the British navy for much the same reasons as Germany had before the war - for the necessary purposes of her greatness.²¹

The United States naval building program had begun before she entered the war. The Act of 1916 provided for an intensive naval program. The impact of the European balance of power in American Security was pointed out by some perceptive ^{Americans even} before the war. Lewis Einstein, an American

20. Lt. Col. E.A. Altham in "Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France or Russia" (August 12, 1901), quoted in Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment, p.86.

21. Ibid., p.26.

diplomatist of the time, had written as early as 1913:
 "Unperceived by many Americans, the European balance of power is a potential necessity which can alone sanction on the Western Hemisphere the continuance of an economic development unhandicapped by the burden of extensive armament. ...It is no affair of the United States even though England were defeated, so long as the general balance is preserved. But if even decisive results are about to be registered of a nature calculated to upset what has for centuries been the recognized political fabric of Europe, America can remain indifferent thereto only at its own eventual cost. If it then reflects to observe that the interests of the nations crushed are likewise its own, America will be guilty of political blindness which it will later rue..."²²

The problem in 1918 was that British Navy's war-induced inflation and its strategic emancipation provided arguments for continuing the American program of naval expansion originally directed against Germany. Further emphasis was laid on the fact that Britain was still joined in a formal military alliance with Japan, America's potential enemy in the Pacific.

22. Kennan, n.7, pp.70-71.

The destruction of German seapower, the advance of Japan in the Pacific and Far East, the wartime surge of navalism in Britain, United States and Japan, the astounding development of military and industrial technology - all these developments set the stage for the next act in the drama of sea power and world politics.²³

Great Britain's dominance in European waters was reaffirmed by the defeat of Germany. The American navy wielded 'overwhelming force' throughout the Western Atlantic and the Eastern Pacific. The strategic position of Japan in the Western Pacific was considerably strengthened by the war. But none could transmit its regional command of the sea into a world dominance as Britain had done before the war.²⁴

Any attempt on the part of these powers to reach a purely military solution could result only in armament competition. These considerations impelled men towards internationalism, as embodied in President Wilson's prospectus of a League of Nations. Only by a pooling of weapons, military and economic could the nations establish a foundation upon which to build a new world order.

23. Sprout, n.14, pp.44-46.

24. Ibid., p.47. According to Harold and Margaret Sprout the reason for this failure was primarily geographical.

Sea power figured prominently in the plans for a new world order to be set up after the war. It was inevitable that the British navy would play a large part in any system of collective sanctions. It was felt that the 'naval police power' of the proposed League of Nations must be headed by two national components of approximately equal strength. Only the United States possessed the financial and industrial resources to match the dominant sea power of Great Britain. Thus it was contended that the United States had to attain naval parity with Great Britain as soon as possible.

While the American naval authorities in 1918 favoured progressive naval expansion as a post war policy, the Wilson administration felt that there must be "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants".²⁵ This was absolutely abhorrent to the British.

Wilson stated that the United States was "pledged to fight not only Prussian militarism but militarism everywhere".²⁶ If the European Allies could not accept all of the "fourteen points" there would be a possibility of the United States

25. Ibid., p.60.

26. Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol.4, p.168.

making a separate peace with Germany. If Great Britain would not at least discuss freedom of the seas, the United States would have no alternative but to "build up its navy to a point where it could enforce American interpretations of neutral rights in future wars".²⁷

The reaction in Great Britain was one of alarm for the British had taken for granted their primacy upon the seas. Sea power was the 'ultimate sanction of British diplomacy'. But they wanted to avoid a naval building contest with the United States - not only for financial reasons - but also because they wanted to analyse the technical lessons of the war before charting a course of future development.

The Anglo-American impasse dissolved on President Wilson's broadening conception of a League of nations in which there would be no neutral powers, and therefore, no controversy over neutral rights. But the strife continued and developed into a 'frontal assault' on the American position also referred to as the naval battle of Paris. It threatened, momentarily, to disrupt the peace conference.

Admiral Wemyss justified Britain's case for maintaining the 'largest navy afloat' by the fact that his was an

27. Ibid., pp. 164-65.

'island nation, with colonies all over the globe'. "The United States", replied Admiral Benson, "would never agree to any nation having the supremacy of the seas. The responsibilities of the American Navy extended from the Philippines to Virgin Islands, from Alaska to the... farthest portion of south America, because the Monroe Doctrine imposed a duty upon us we must always be ready to perform". For these reasons 'equality with the British Navy'²⁸ was the minimum standard acceptable to the United States.

There seemed little room for compromise. The United States felt that equality was necessary to secure the ends of world peace and international justice. Britain wanted to remain 'mistress of the seas'. Secret bargaining between the two Powers, however, resulted in an agreement.

The agreement was reached on 10 April 1919, between Colonel House and Lord Robert Cecil acting on behalf of Wilson and Lloyd George. In a highly confidential memorandum it was understood that Britain would support Wilson's plan for a League of Nations. In return the President would consider postponing work on ships authorized but not yet laid down, as well as suspending the second three-year program

28. Sprout, n.14, p.64.

not yet enacted.²⁹ This maritime truce was to continue until the two governments could after the Peace Conference work out a permanent agreement. This was upset, however, by the 'tragic physical collapse of Wilson and for the bitter political struggle ending in the rejection of the League of Nations by the Senate of the United States.

Having used the threat of unlimited naval expansion to advance his league of nations project, President Wilson used the same threat against anti-League forces in America. From May 1919 until March 1921, the President and his Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, told the American people that they faced a fundamental choice. Either they must accept the League or embrace militarism. As far as coercing the anti-League forces was concerned, these threats proved unavailing.

As early as January 1919, 'British-American discord' and 'British-American naval rivalry' were becoming popular newspaper topics.³⁰ The truce with Great Britain was not well-received by the anti-League of Nations forces that were rapidly gaining momentum. The same trend could be seen in the naval debacle of 1919-1920. Members of the Congress

29. Seymour, n.26, pp.417-23.

30. Sprout, n.16, p.77.

continued to picture Great Britain as a possible enemy. Thus the annual drive for larger naval appropriations got under way once more in 1920. The General Board contended that 'the large increase in our merchant marine and our rapidly extending commercial interests' left it in no doubt as to the need of a navy 'equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world'. Thus, the American Administration evolved a two-pronged strategy - to coerce Great Britain into an acceptance of naval parity with the United States and to coerce the American people into joining the League of Nations.

Other rationalisations for an aggressive programme were soon forthcoming. It was stated soon after his inauguration that President Harding himself favoured building the most powerful navy in the world as a guarantee not only to the world, but to American citizens of the sincerity of the Administration when it proposed changed international relations and reduction of armaments.³¹

It was, therefore, impossible to ignore the disturbing trends in Anglo-American relations. Frequent charges that the American government was actively preparing for war with England, together with the big navy propaganda, in turn gave rise to the assertion that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance originally

31. Ibid., pp.78-86.

directed against Russia and later on Germany, was now a symbol of the hostility of Great Britain against the United States.

Although both British and American statesmen were stating that their naval plans were not competitive, the developing Japanese-American crisis in the Pacific was not conducive to Anglo-American solidarity.

American^{op}position to Japan's Asiatic and Pacific programme tended to accelerate the pace of Japanese naval expansion.³² In 1920, the Japanese Parliament accepted a building program designed to give Japan by 1927 a fleet of eight super dreadnought battleships and eight giant battle cruisers all less than eight years old in addition to five older dreadnoughts and four battle cruisers - a total of twenty-five capital ships completed since 1914. In addition to capital ships the Japanese navy in 1921 concluded a long list of auxiliary combatant craft, built, building and authorized. The quick pace of Japanese naval construction coinciding with the political impasse in the Far East completed the vicious circle of armament competition.

The United States decided to establish a separate battlefleet in the Pacific, a radical departure from the

32. Bywater, n.17, p.50.

concentration of all battle ships in the Atlantic fleet. The trend of power politics in the Pacific was further reflected in the growing concern of the United States Navy's share facilities in the Ocean and recommendations for expanding the naval base at Pearl Harbour.

The accelerating tempo of naval development resulted in a widespread conviction in the winter of 1920-21 that only restoration of a Far Eastern Balance of Power, redefinition of national interests and policies in that region and limitation of naval armaments could avert an expensive and destructive war in the Pacific.

The shadow of Anglo-American discord and the gathering storm in the Pacific forced the question of naval disarmament into international politics. Though peace was desirable and the need for fiscal relief was compelling, the great Naval Powers approached the question of disarmament cautiously. Navies were not merely agencies of defense but also instruments of policies.³³

The post-war reaction against naval expansion in 1920-21 evolved rapidly into a 'positive, well-directed popular movement for internationalization to check the competitive

33. Sprout, n.14, pp.98-105.

struggle for naval primacy,³⁴ which it was felt was driving the great naval powers towards bankruptcy or war.

Meanwhile, in December 1920, the United States Navy Department brought forward another naval building program. This stimulated in Britain the demand in 1921 of a building program to keep pace with American naval expansion. This also aggravated the situation in the Pacific which was rapidly approaching a crisis.

In December 1920, Senator Boorah assumed parliamentary leadership of the arms limitation movement by a congressional joint resolution requesting the Parliament to open negotiations on the subject of naval limitations with the other two powers which entered the naval calculations of the United States, namely, Great Britain and Japan. This movement was gathering momentum. On January 11, 1921, the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives held detailed hearings. Distinguished experts gave testimony before the Committee. One of these was General Tasker H. Bliss, who had been a delegate at the Paris Peace Conference. His proposal was that the United States should hold an international arms conference at Washington where representative of other nations would better realize what confronts them if they

34. Ibid., p.114.

force the United States into a real competition with them in the matter of armaments. "The United States", said Bliss, "should open the Conference with a reasonable proposition tending to remove mutual fear".³⁵

President Harding entered the White House on March 1921 with commitments, which were interpreted as a pledge to take early steps towards limitation of armaments. He felt an Arms Conference would be the most effective step in that direction.

Meanwhile in a parliamentary struggle, the Administration appeared publicly as the ally of groups favouring naval expansion, they defended their position by stating that the naval bill that had been passed in the previous session would give the United States naval parity with Great Britain. Only then could they safely agree to a proportionate reduction of armaments.

External pressure for arms limitations came from Great Britain which viewed with alarm the proposed naval programme of the United States. Maintenance of naval equality would have become a heavy and unacceptable financial burden for Britain. Accelerated naval development would also aggravate

35. United States 66th Congress, 3rd Session, "Hearings on Disarmament", Reprinted in Hearings of Sundry Naval Legislation 1920-1922, pp. 554-60.

the Japanese-American Crisis which would also gravely affect Britain. Thus naval limitation became an important ^{objective} for Britain.

Shortly after President Harding's inauguration, Lord Lee, head of the British Admiralty, took the first public bid for American initiative. Speaking before the British Institute of Naval Architects he said that 'if an invitation comes from Washington, I am prepared personally to put aside all other business... in order to take part in a business than which there can be nothing more pressing in the affairs of the world'.³⁶

A complicating factor was the 'Anglo-Irish War' which brought about an anti-British agitation among a section of the American press and Anglo-Irish groups in America. In June 1921, the Secretary of State himself utilized the threat of Congressional demonstration on behalf of Ireland in his efforts to force Britain to terminate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In Japan, the business depression and large revenue spent on armaments in addition to the threatening international outlook stimulated a move for international arm limitation.

36. Sprout, n.14, p.129.

It was proposed that the United States sponsor a conference of the powers 'directly concerned' (Britain, Japan, United States and China) to consider all essential matters bearing upon the Far East and the Pacific Ocean.

On 8 July 1921, the State Department sent a tentative proposal for an arms conference to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. On 11 July, it was officially stated that the United States Government had extended the long-awaited invitation to the main naval powers and to China to participate in a Conference at Washington for the 'limitation of armament' and for 'reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East'.

Chapter III

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

'The day was Saturday, November 12, 1921. The hour was approaching 10.30 O'Clock in the morning, the place was the city of Washington. The occasion was the formal opening of Conference on Limitation of Armament, called to halt the incipient struggle for naval primacy in the Atlantic, to check the ominous drift toward armed conflict in the Pacific, and to fashion, if possible, a stable balance of power upon the Sea'.¹

As was proper, the American Government had not sent its final invitation until it had obtained assurance from the powers to be addressed that they would give it a favourable reply. All the Powers, except Japan, gave full and prompt approval to the American proposal. Though Japan finally did accept the invitation it did so with misgivings. According to Westel W. Willoughby, it was evident that it felt that as the Pacific and Far Eastern questions were concerned it might be called to give justification of certain acts which it would find difficult to give.²

-
1. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power, 1918-1922, p.149.
 2. W.W. Willoughby, China at the Conference, p.7.

An invitation was also sent to China but she was invited to participate only in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions. In view of their several interests in the Far East Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal were also invited to participate in the Conference so far as it might relate to the Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

Thus the Conference became one of five Powers so far as the limitation of armaments was concerned and one of nine Powers so far as Pacific and Far Eastern questions were concerned.

Hughes was the Chief of the American delegation. With him were Senator Lodge, Senator Underwood and Elihu Root. The nominal head of the British delegation was Arthur Balfour, Lord President of the Council. The French delegation was headed by Premier Aristide Briand. Prince Tokugawa was the nominal head of the Japanese delegation but the actual direction was given ^{to} Admiral Baron Tomosaburo Kato. Italy was represented by Senator Carlo Schanzer. China's representative was Mr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, Envoy and Minister to the United States. Baron de Cartier, Belgian Ambassador to the United States came on behalf of Belgium. The Portuguese Minister to the United States, Viscount d'Alte represented Portugal and representing the Netherlands was Jonkheer

H.A. Van Karneboek, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Hughes was unanimously elected the permanent Chairman of the Conference.

Welcoming the delegated President Harding hoped the Conference would bring an 'understanding which will emphasize the guarantees of peace, and for commitment to less burdens and a better order which will tranquilize the world'.³

Hughes then took the floor. He launched into a resume of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and described the failure of these efforts. More suggestions, he noted, had no practical effect. The audience were suddenly taken off guard when he declared, "the time has come and this Conference has been called not for general resolutions or mutual advice, but for action". He stated that it was apparent that huge sacrifices had to be made to gain this objective but it was also clear that no naval power should be expected to make these sacrifices alone. The only hope of limitation of armaments was by agreement. "It would also seem to be a vital part of a plan for the limitation of naval armament that there should be a naval holiday".

3. John Chalmers Vinson, The Parchment Peace, p. 136.

With these ends in view he then submitted a concrete proposal for an agreement on the limitation of naval armament on behalf of the American delegation.⁴ Discussion of the limitation of naval armament should be in conjunction with the Pacific and Far Eastern problems as these were related to armament limitation. Hughes spoke on the need of and the reason why the naval armament limitation question was to be given first priority.⁵

The proposal initially dealt with the United States, Britain and Japan, the chief naval powers. Four general principles were laid down (1) that all capital ship building programmes either actual or projected should be abandoned, (2) that further reduction should be made through the scrapping of some of the older ships, (3) that regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned, and (4) that the capital ship tonnage should be used as a measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft should be prescribed.

Under this plan the United States was to scrap 30 (old and new) ships with a total tonnage of 845,740 tons. According to Harold and Margaret Sprout it should be noted that most

4. Sprout, n.1, pp.152-54.

5. Dr. Morinosuke Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan 1894-1922.

of the older ships to be scrapped had ceased to have any fighting value in the battleline and could have eventually been scrapped.⁶ Britain was to scrap 19 older battleships and abandon the 4 new Hoodes with a total tonnage of 583,375 tons. Japan was to scrap 17 ships with an aggregate of 448,928 tons. Neither Italy nor France were required to scrap any capital ships. There was silence at this proposal as Hughes sank more battleships 'than all the admirals of the world had destroyed in a cycle of centuries'.⁷

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF 5 NAVIES IN TERMS OF
CAPITAL SHIPS - ORIGINAL AMERICAN PLAN

Country	No. of Ships	Tonnage
United States	18	500,650
Great Britain	22	606,650
Japan	10	299,700
France	10	221,170
Italy	10	182,800

Differences in age and in technical details was the reason for the larger tonnage allotted to Great Britain which was substantially equal to that of the United States.

6. Sprout, n.1, p.154.

7. Col. A. C. Repington, After the War, p.433.

Replacements were to stay within an agreed maximum of capital ship tonnage of 500,000 for the United States and Britain, 300,000 tons for Japan and 175,000 tons for France and Italy. No new ship was to be built during the naval holiday for ten years. The maximum size of new individual capital ships was to be built was not to exceed 35,000 tons.⁸ Thus Hughes wanted to establish a ratio of 5:5:3 regarding United States, Britain and Japan. Such determination to limit armament at a Conference called specifically for that purpose was so unexpected that it literally startled the world.⁹

At the second plenary session on November 15, Arthur Balfour presented the British viewpoint and emphasized the importance of sea power for the British Empire which was scattered all over the world. He, however, hastened to add that this would not prevent the British government from approving the American proposal. But he felt that as the proposal dealt only with the 3 principal naval powers British would require a larger allowance of cruisers and destroyers especially if no step was taken to limit or abolish

8. Yamoto Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After, pp. 36-37.

9. Mark Sullivan, The Great Adventure at Washington, pp. 35-41.

submarines, 'a class of vessel most easily abused in their use'.¹⁰ Baron Kato then declared Japan's readiness to reduce her naval armament. But he felt that the ratio accorded to Japan was not enough for her security.

The resulting struggle for a higher naval ratio lasted a month. The naval limitation problem could not be resolved without taking into consideration its political setting. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had a direct bearing on the naval strength of the major powers. The way to compromise was further opened by the conclusion of the Four Power Treaty which superseded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The Japanese Case was that Japan could not accept a lesser ratio as it would jeopardize her national security and defense. Regarding aircraft carriers, she was entitled to equality with Britain and the United States because of her geographical position. The battleship 'Mutsu' should be retained, as it had already been built.

The most important task before the Washington Conference was to effect an agreement on the ratio of capital ships - the backbone of the fleet. Thus on November 19, the 'Big Three'

10. Sprout, n.1, pp.162-63.

namely Hughes, Balfour and Kato met and began the task of achieving this agreement.

Japan realized that if she persisted it would risk breaking up the Conference. On the other hand to surrender unconditionally would weaken her position in the Pacific. The only solution lay in finding a middle path. On receiving instructions from Tokyo a new proposal was put forward stating that it might be possible for Japan to accept the 5:5:3 ratio in return for certain concessions. The first was the retention of the 'Matsu'. The second was the maintenance of status quo regarding fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. The development of modern naval bases in Guam was a threat to Japan's communications in the Western Pacific and under such conditions she could not reduce her armaments, unless the US 'could agree not to increase the fortifications ~~of~~ naval bases at Guam, the Philippines Islands and Hawaii'.¹¹

Hughes made it clear that he could not consider the case of Hawaii but agreed to the maintenance of the status quo on the Philippines and Guam. Kato also agreed to follow suit regarding Japan's outlying islands. Mr. Balfour included Hongkong in this agreement as he felt that as for

11. Ichihashi, n.8, pp.48-49.

as Britain was concerned, it was the only place which might be considered in Japan's neighbourhood.¹²

Hughes stated his inability to make any commitment except as part of the acceptance by Baron Kato of a general agreement which would also embrace the proposed quadruple entente in the Pacific, as well as the proposals of the American delegation on limitation of armaments.

This proposed quadruple entente was to negotiate an arrangement to supersede the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. One current of American opinion strongly opposed the United States entering into any naval limitation scheme as long as Britain and Japan remained even nominally joined in their 20-year old alliance. It was assumed that in case of an American-Japanese conflict, the Alliance would swing Britain in favour of Japan. Moreover, Canada was worried about the possibility of a conflict between Japan and the United States, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would, in such an eventuality, put her in the most uncomfortable position of choosing between Britain and the United States. Britain's desire to avoid a naval building contest with the United States and the trend of opinion in Canada where renewal of the alliance

12. Ibid., p.53.

would not be accepted favourably, especially on the part of Prime Minister, Arthur Meighon, of Canada, made Britain consider ways of 'gracefully' terminating the Alliance.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance became a contentious issue between the Dominions and Great Britain as well. Canada believed that the Alliance if renewed would result in indirect support of Japanese aggression in the Far East.

'Canada could not help opposing the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance not only because it was considered a threat to friendly relations between Britain and the United States and between Canada and the United States, but also because the security of Canada solely depended on her friendship with the United States.¹³

Australia on the other hand strongly favoured the renewal of the Alliance. After the war Australia did not want to depend on favours from Japan and had welcomed Wilson's naval plan for a new balance in the Pacific. Britain could not help her because of economic depression in Britain. The naval base in Singapore would also not be as large in scale as Australia had expected. These calculations led to the conclusion that Australia could not depend on Britain's promise

13. Kajima, n.5, p.439.

of military support in the context of naval competition in the Pacific. She was faced with the problem of choosing Japan or Britain as an ally and resolved to choose Japan. It was, however, the American attitude and pressure on Canada which had a decisive influence on the question of the renewal of the Alliance.¹⁴

Japan wanted to renew the Alliance. Japan also recognised the fact that the United States would not consider limitation of naval armaments until the Alliance had been modified or abrogated. Neither Japan nor Britain could afford to antagonize the United States and, therefore, reluctantly came to the conclusion that the Alliance should be modified and that a tripartite Pact would be the most reasonable modification.¹⁵ The British and Japanese proposals were submitted to Hughes. Both dealt with rights and interests in Eastern Asia as well as in the Pacific Ocean. Both contained mutual guarantees of non-aggression as to the other contracting powers.

The United States made two changes. A fourth power, France was included and the scope was narrowed to the island possessions of the contracting parties in the Pacific Ocean. It was finally announced on December 10 that the four powers

14. Ibid., pp.437-40.

15. Vinson, n.3, p.149.

had accepted a treaty to be made public shortly. The Root-Takahira Agreement was suggested as a model to make clear, once more, the harmonious relation between Japan and the United States.

The inclusion of France by the United States rose out of the realisation that it would be possible for Britain and Japan to form a military alliance if threatened by the United States. So Hughes suggested that the provision for a military alliance be removed and broadened to include France. He insisted that it must be an agreement rather than an alliance.¹⁶

The Treaty pledged the four Powers to respect each other's rights in their 'insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean'.¹⁷ A conference of the signatories was to be held in case of disputes in this region. The question of whether Japan's home islands were to be considered in the same category as other island possessions was raised by Shidehara. The delegates finally decided to consider a proposal to 'exclude the Islands of Japan from the treaty and also to exempt from the action of the treaty any matter which under the terms of

16. Ibid., pp.153-54.

17. Sprout, n.1, p.174.

international law was a part of the domestic policy of the nation concerned'.¹⁸ However, at the beginning of the last session Shiōchara announced that his government had decided to abandon the demand for excluding the main islands of Japan from the scope of the treaty.

Meanwhile, the American delegation had come to a decision on the Japanese proposal on the maintenance of status quo as to the insular fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. On December 12 with the Four Power treaty agreed upon and ready for signature the Big Three met again.

The maintenance of the status quo in the Philippines and Guam was a part of a general agreement among the Four Powers included in the 'Quadruple Treaty'. The Japanese Government's insistence on keeping the new battleship 'Mutsu' turned into a 'knotty technical problem' with which the Conference had to deal. To maintain the 5:5:3 ratio under these altered conditions, the United States would have to complete and Great Britain would have to build additional capital ships which according to Hughes violated the principle of the original proposal. Japan being adamant, Hughes and Balfour met on December 12 to discuss the

18. Vinson, n.3, p.157.

possibility of rearranging the tonnage allowances and scrapping schedules to preserve the 5:5:3 ratio.¹⁹

Another difficulty arose over Britain's desire to build 2 'Super Hood' whose tonnage far exceeded the provision of 35,000 tons. The 'Big Three' spent nearly a month before they could settle the problem. This was finally solved by a provisional agreement, an agreement to the maintenance of status quo with respect to Pacific fortifications and naval bases. This was to include the British colony of Hongkong excluding Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand, the islands along the coasts of the United States and Canada and those composing Japan proper. Japan was allowed to retain the 'Mutsu' battleship and to substitute the 'Settsu' for it.

The United States was to complete the 'Colorado' and the 'Washington',²⁰ and to scrap the 'North Dakota' and the 'Delaware'. This would bring American tonnage allotment to 525,000 tons thus restoring the ratio. Great Britain was to construct 2 new ships of 35,000 legend tons²¹ and to scrap 4 ships of 'King George V type'. Maximum tonnage of individual capital ships to be built was fixed at 35,000

19. Sprout, n.1, pp.176-78.

20. The West Virginia, another ship of the same class was later substituted for the 'Washington'.

21. This was equivalent to about 37,000 American tons.

legend tons and the total replacement tonnage of capital ships allowed was 525,000 for the United States and Britain and 315,000 for Japan. The ten year holiday was to be observed with the exceptions just stated.

This agreement was released to the press on December 15. It was also mentioned that this agreement would depend on the outcome of negotiations with Italy and France. An extension of this agreement to these two powers presented difficulties. Italy presented no serious problem as the Italian government then in power was willing to reduce Italian naval force to almost any level as long as they remained in parity with the French.

Regarding France, though she had brought no positive naval programme to the Conference her stand seemed to Britain unreasonable and designed to bend British policy to the will of France.²² France was historically one of the greatest naval powers. After the war, France was second only to Britain in European waters. But in 1921 France had no defensive naval policy. It was natural for her to view the conference from her own special European position. Premier Aristide Briand had already stated that as an outcome of

22. Sprout, n.1, p.181.

the war his navy was inadequate for the defence of France. In fact, the French delegates favoured an increase rather than a reduction of their navy. Plans were already approved for adding cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines and the need for resuming capital ship building at a date not later than 1927.

The American delegation felt that a 'good basis' would be to allow France and Italy 'to keep their existing tonnage' but eventually through replacement 'to come to 175,000 tons of capital ships with a proportionate allotment for auxiliaries'. Such a basis was understood to be 'satisfactory to Italy' and was known to be 'satisfactory to England'. But it was feared that this would not 'be at all satisfactory to France'. This figure, however, was 'not only fair but...generous'.²³ The quota of 175,000 tons to which each power might build after the ten year naval holiday would give them greater naval strength than either country possessed at that moment.

But France felt that Hughes proposal was an 'affront' to the security and prestige of France. Admiral de Bon stated with indignation that France had been a great nation and fought for liberty and that she had been one of the

23. Colonel Roosevelt's diary, quoted in Sprout, n.1, pp. 185-86.

greatest naval powers in the world. The American and British delegates were not convinced by these arguments. Finally, after numerous appeals to Briand the French Government accepted the 175,000 tonnage quota.

The submarine problem was also brought up at the Conference. It has been correctly stated that it was through discussions on submarines auxiliary surface craft and air power that 'the Conference came to grips with the potentialities and limitations of sea power and hence with its future role and importance as an instrument of defence and of national policy'.²⁴

The outlook for abolishing the submarine was not very bright. France found the submarines to be an inexpensive way to strengthen the defence of their country. Japan and Italy also found in it solutions for their problems. The United States had in quantity if not in quality the greatest submarine force in the world. Britain because of her narrow escape from disaster in the war²⁵ was the only power insisting on the abolition of submarines. When the Conference assembled in November 1921 all the principal naval powers, excluding

24. Sprout, n.1, p.191.

25. The German Submarine Blockade.

Great Britain had plans for building more submarines. Lord Lee stated that Great Britain was ready to scrap all its submarines, 100 ships aggregating 80,000 tons, provided the other powers could do likewise. He stressed on the destructive nature of the submarines. This proposal threw the Conference into turmoil. Throughout the Christmas session the value of the submarine was discussed with every power opposed to Great Britain.

It was argued that the submarine was invaluable as regards a country's coast and harbour defenses. Admiral de Bon stressed on its necessity as a safeguard. Mr. Hanihara insisted that it was a 'relatively inexpensive and yet effective' weapon for a country like Japan. Senator Schenzer said that it was an 'indispensable weapon for the defense of the Italian coasts'. Similar was the attitude of the American delegation. "It was also defended as a valuable adjunct to larger operations".²⁶

A proposal made by Hughes that British and American quotas were to be reduced to 60,000 tons and other powers were to keep what they had was unacceptable to Japan and France. Another proposal of a common upper limit of 60,000 tons

26. Sprout, n.1, pp.195-201.

for all the five powers was not accepted by Britain.

Elihu Root and his colleagues prepared a set of resolutions on the use of submarines as commerce destroyers. This was to gain some agreement which would bind the powers to use their submarines in a lawful manner. Submarines were not to be used as commerce destroyers as this practice went against the universal requirements by nations for the protection of neutrals and non-combatants. It was further resolved that any person who violated these rules 'should be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy'.²⁷

The Root Resolutions were opposed by France. The question was raised whether a commerce ship remained a merchant ship if it armed at war time. French opposition was countered by Lord Leo quoting from an article by Captain Castex, a French naval officer from which it was inferred that Castex justified the unrestricted use of the submarine as a 'ruthless commerce destroyer'. In such a case, Lord Leo contended, British anxieties were justified. France was, however, forced to acquiesce in a proposal favourable to Great Britain, as she was the country most vulnerable to submarine war on commerce. It was agreed that the armament

27. Ibid., p.203.

of merchantmen should be held to the limits set for surface cruisers and that the Resolution left the rights of merchant vessels where they were under previously accepted international law. The five delegates were in accord with a prohibition of the sort of submarine warfare employed by Germany in the world war.

No amount of persuasion could bring about a change in the French demand for 90,000 tons of submarines and consequently the limitation of submarine tonnage had to be abandoned.²⁸ The real problem, the denial of merchantship privileges and immunities to armed vessels, was evaded. The submarine treaty was ratified by the United States, Britain, Italy and Japan. But the French Government had not ratified it when it was finally superseded by a milder agreement concluded at the London Naval Conference of 1930.

The failure to limit submarine tonnage was accompanied by the failure of the Conference to agree on tonnage quotas for auxiliary combatant surface craft. This category included cruisers, except battle cruisers (capital ships), destroyers and smaller combatant craft of various types. Cruisers could be divided into several sub-types of various ranges. Destroyers

28. Ichihashi, n.8, p.94.

were also similarly divided into sub-types of varying ranges (armed in addition to guns with torpedo tubes and anti-submarine depth bombs).

Every power viewed its cruiser and destroyer needs in relation to its fighting fleet, the volume and importance of its overseas commerce as well as the location and length of its sea communications. This naturally resulted in a conflict of interests and hence different requirements for each power.

In 1921, Britain's cruiser and destroyer policy depended to a great extent on the cruiser and submarine policy of France and to a lesser extent of Italy. Italy claimed full parity with France. France refused to accept a submarine quota less than 90,000 tons. Thus the British Government felt that in these circumstances she reserved the full right to build any auxiliary craft which she considered necessary to deal with the possibility of a great fleet to be built on the shores nearest to her.

The impasse reached seemed to have no room for compromise. Hughes came up with a suggestion that as 'quantitative limitation' was not practicable under the circumstances, it would be possible to limit at least the size and armament of individual ships of this class. He proposed a quantitative limitation

of 10,000 tons and 8 inch guns. France was for no tonnage restrictions. But it was generally recognized that gun and tonnage limits were necessary to stop the light cruiser from turning into an expensive warship, a capital ship in all but name. The proposal made by Hughes was finally adopted by the Conference.

'The delegates of France never seemed to share the spirit of the conference... When the whole world was starry-eyed in the pursuit of the great adventure, the delegates of France were thinking of their place at the table'.²⁹

No serious attempt was made at the Conference to impose a direct limitation on the air components of navies. Any attempt to limit naval aeronautics it was maintained, would check the advance of commercial aviation. There was also no compelling demand for the limitation of air power.

Indirectly the Conference did place restrictions on the future use of airpower over the sea through limitation of naval aircraft carriers. These were on each power's total tonnage and the size and armament of each carrier and curtailed the use of aircraft beyond the reach of land.

29. Sullivan, n.9, pp.200-01.

Air power made the defence of outlying possessions much easier. The use of bombing planes, mines and submarines made possible a close blockade of enemy ports. The rapid development of the bombing plane following that of the submarine threatened the 'classical doctrine' of battle-fleet supremacy upon which had rested the theory and practice of command at sea.³⁰

The American plan presented to the Washington Conference had no plan for limiting aircraft. There were certain compelling reasons for this significant omission. As the New York Times put it: "The nation that commands the air will be the greatest military power, first on sea as well as on land..."³¹

Regarding limitation of naval aircraft carriers the American plan provided for a moderate tonnage allowance to the three largest navies in the ratio of 5:5:3. Each power could retain its existing aircraft carriers and those under construction. But new construction including replacement was to be kept within the maximum tonnage allowance which was about 80,000 tons for the United States and Britain and

30. *Ibid.*, p.219.

31. January 11, 1922, p.20, quoted in Sprout, n.1, p.231.

about 48,000 tons for Japan. Replacements could not be made until the ships to be replaced were 17 years old. No replacement could mount guns larger than 8 inches, the rule for all auxiliary combatant ships. Japan's delegates claimed a larger carrier allowance as they deemed it necessary for coastal defense. Under this proposal the allowances of France and Italy worked to 28,000 tons each.

This agreement did not suit anyone. After further bargaining an agreement was reached whereby British and American quotas were raised to 135,000 tons, Japan's to 80,000 and those of France and Italy to 60,000. It was also agreed that existing aircraft being experimental replacement would be without reference to age. The 8 inch gun limit and limitation of individual ships to 27,000 tons displacement were confirmed.

American experts felt it advantageous to convert two of their partially built battle cruisers into aircraft but this required the consent of other naval powers as it would exceed the proposed maximum tonnage of 27,000 tons. Matters were simplified as other powers had special claims of their own. There was no desire however to increase the tonnage limits beyond 27,000 tons. The United States would build smaller carriers in future to make up 'the slack'. Britain also desired permission to build equivalent ships

if needed. An understanding was reached to this effect.

The moderate limitations on aircraft carriers, the failure to limit aircraft had significant results. Air menace weakened the strategic position of Great Britain and posed a further threat to the crowded shipping lanes in the English Channel, North Sea, Mediterranean Sea and East Atlantic Ocean. The United States was worried about the future of airpower in the Pacific. It would not be possible for her to maintain her fighting fleet in 'Asiatic waters' as the status quo ^{would have} ~~being~~ to be maintained. It was argued that the future balance of sea power in the Pacific would depend more on the relative strength of Japan and the United States in the newer weapons adopted than on capital ships.

At the meeting on January 7, there were a few issues unsettled. Of these the most important was the article limiting the development of fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific Region. Japan put forward a claim to exclude certain islands, especially the Bonin islands from the agreement. These islands were an integral part of Japan proper though several 100 miles from the main Japanese coast. Britain claimed exemption for all island outside a parallelogram bounded on the east by the 180th meridian, on the north by 30th degree of latitude, on the west by the 110th meridian

and on the south by the Equator - an area including practically all of the Japanese, most of the American and very few of the British islands. These two claims caused a turmoil in the meeting.

On January 9, Mr. Balfour called upon Kato to elicit support for his parallelogram scheme. Kato had no objection to exempting the British islands in the region of Australia, especially the Papuan Bay in British New Guinea which Balfour had included in his scheme in order to satisfy Australia. Australia wanted to reserve the right to fortify Papuan Bay, though this 'fortification might not be undertaken'.³² Kato had serious reservations regarding the parallelogram scheme as it exempted all British possessions in the Pacific. Balfour said it would withdraw his parallelogram scheme in return for Kato's support for the Papuan Bay claim.

Balfour went back on his commitment to Kato the next day when he brought up the parallelogram scheme again. Meanwhile Japan was aware that the United States would never have agreed to the status quo in Philippines and Guam if Japan was free to build in the islands lying in between. It was understood that the announcement of December 15

32. Ichihashi, n.s., p.86.

included these islands. Few weeks later the Japanese delegation received instructions from Tokyo that Okhima and Bonins being 'islands composing Japan proper were exempt from limitations.'. Baron Kato regarded this to be a personal attack on himself by his political enemies to embarrass him in his dealings in Washington.³³

The December 15 agreement was not clear about the status of the Aleutian islands. It was silent as to Singapore. Balfour excepted Australia and New Zealand but included Hongkong and other British islands in the Pacific. In compliance with the Dominions wishes the British delegation stated that they had made no commitment respecting any British possession other than Hongkong. Thus their claim was supported on many grounds. Australia and New Zealand were never in the agreement.

Meanwhile, after sending proposals and counter-proposals to the Japanese government finally a solution was accepted. The parallelogram scheme was dropped as was the claim to exclude all islands South of the Equator by the British delegation. Specific exemptions were claimed for islands adjacent to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Singapore

33. Ibid., p.86.

was excluded. The Japanese Government were willing to extend their agreement to their Kurile islands in return for inclusion of the Aleutian islands of the United States.

Colonel Roosevelt recorded in his diary, 'The fortifications agreement' "leaves us in my opinion, in a slightly better position than Japan. We trade certain fortifications which we would never have completed, for fortifications which they (Japanese) would have unquestionably completed".³⁴

An agreement on naval limitations had also been reached. It was one of the main achievements of the Washington Conference. The naval treaty consisted of 3 chapters.³⁵ The first contained general principles or provisions relating to limitation of naval armaments. The second contained rules for execution of the agreement. The third contained certain miscellaneous details.

NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF CAPITAL SHIPS RETAINED UNDER AND THE MAXIMUM REPLACEMENT TONNAGE FIXED BY THE TREATY

Country	No. of Ships	Existing Tonnage	Maximum Replacement Tonnage
United States	18	525,850	525,000
Great Britain	20	558,950	525,000
Japan	10	303,320	315,000
France	10	221,170	175,000
Italy	10	182,800	175,000

34. Sprout, n.1, p.251.

35. See Appendix-2 for details.

The total tonnage of aircraft carriers was limited by the treaty. It fixed maximum size of 3 types of vessels. At the time of replacement no capital ships of more than 35,000 tons, no aircraft carriers of more than 27,000 tons and no light cruisers of more than 10,000 tons were to be built. It contained provisions in the nature of limitation namely as regards the number and the caliber of guns to be carried by various types of vessels.³⁶ Provision for Pacific fortifications was included. The term of the treaty was to be for 15 years to continue for 5 years after the expiration of the 10 year holiday. The provisions could be amended or reconsidered during the life of the treaty if necessary.

The Far Eastern Crisis had a bearing on the later stages of naval negotiations. From 1918 to 1921, the United States was pressing Japan to withdraw her troops from Siberia, to restore Shantung to China, to release its grip on Manchuria, to renounce its ambitions in China which were not in keeping with the Open Door and to recognize American claims as to cable privileges in the Island of Yap. Until the Conference, the attempts had been a failure. The dispute over Yap was settled in December by an agreement in which the United States recognized Japan's mandate over former German islands north

36. Ichihashi, n.G., p.109.

of the Equator in return for commercial rights in those islands and for special cable-landing rights in Yap.

It was rumoured that the American delegation intended to 'withhold their final promise not to build the world's largest fleet',³⁷ until Japan came to terms on Shantung, Siberia and Manchuria. Similarly it was rumoured that the Japanese Government was prolonging the fortifications agreement until it was assured of no encroachment, in her interests in Eastern Asia by the Western powers. Realisation that the Conference might break-up provided the necessary stimulus to persuade Japan and the United States to reach a series of compromises regarding the Far East. Japan's declaration regarding an early withdrawal of her troops from Siberia helped matters.

Negotiations on the Shantung question began during the Conference but ^{was} not part of it and ^{was} ~~not~~ assisted by the official 'observers' of the American and British governments. This was a compromise between the Japanese viewpoint that the question was to be settled between China and Japan and the Chinese insistence that it was an international problem. Go Zay Wood feels that China's consent

37. Sprout, n.1, p.252.

to negotiate with Japan was not entirely due to the offer of good offices by Hughes and Balfour. It was also due to a realization by China that failure to settle the Shantung question at Washington would make it necessary to fall back on 'direct negotiation between Peking and Tokyo'. The Chinese had refused 'direct negotiations three times'.³⁸

These conversations began on December 1, 1921. At the first few meetings, the minor issues such as the transfer of public properties was resolved. The crux of the matter lay in the administration of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway. As a concession to China, Japan proposed to sell the Railway, regarding it as Japanese property, to China. But the proposal consisted of a long-term loan to China while China wanted to conclude the deal at the end of ninety days. Another bone of contention was that Japan insisted that the Chief Engineer, Chief Accountant and Chief Traffic Manager of the railway should be Japanese this was not acceptable to China.

China finally was willing to consider spreading the payments to a period as was usually provided in the long-term railway loan agreements. But this was to be done 'without the form of a loan' and simultaneously 'keeping the railway

38. Ge-Zay Wood, The Shantung Question, p.239.

under full Chinese control, operation and management'.³⁹
 But the Japanese were insistent.

Meanwhile, Japan did not agree to the proposal by China that Hughes and Balfour be present at the next meeting. Thus the Shantung question was once more brought to an impasse. At this turn of events Hughes and Balfour offered a 'compromise formula' for the settlement of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway dispute which would, on the one hand satisfy Japan in the matter of appointing Japanese nationals in the responsible positions of its administration and on the other satisfy China in regard to the mode of payment. China and Japan resumed 'conversations' on the 'collateral' issues such as withdrawal of Japanese troops in Shantung, extension of the Shantung railways, control and operation of the mines, salt fields and German cables, and the opening of the leased territory to international trade.⁴⁰

At the thirty-fourth meeting the discussion of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway was resumed, both governments having studied the 'compromise formula'. An agreement was finally reached at the thirty-fifth meeting held on January 31. This included the transfer of the railway

39. Ibid., p.257.

40. Ibid., p.262.

within nine months after the day the agreement came into force, the reimbursement by China of about 53,406,141 gold marks (with allowances for improvements and depreciation), the appointment of a Japanese traffic manager and a Japanese chief accountant to be 'under the direction, control and supervision of the Chinese Managing Director' of the railway. Reimbursement was to be made by Chinese government Treasury Notes obtained from revenue from the railway, good for 15 years but redeemable at the end of five years upon 6 months' notice. The Japanese officials were to be retained for so long a period as any part of the said treasury Notes remained unredeemed.

The Shantung agreement was signed on February 4, by the Chinese and Japanese delegations at the Washington Conference. These terms were embodied in the treaty. The agreement was announced by Hughes at the fifth plenary session of the Conference on February 1. This was made part of the Conference record.

Mr. Balfour at this session proposed to surrender the British rights ^{to} of Weihaiwei which was located in Shantung on the same terms as Japan had agreed to give up her holdings. Progress was also made at the Conference in redefining foreign interests in China and freeing her from extra-territoriality and a fixed customs tariff.

The treaty on Chinese customs tariff was reported at the 6th plenary session of the Washington Conference on February 4. Chairman Underwood presented the draft treaty. He stated that the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1902 laid the basis for the customs administration. Employment of British and other foreigners had improved the administration. In view of China's disturbed conditions this was not to be changed. This was accepted by China.

Underwood then stated that there was a need for an agreement between China and other nations regarding the customs tariff in view of China's disturbed state and depressed economic condition. After reading the full text of the treaty he concluded, "the adoption of this treaty and putting it into effect would in all probability double the existing revenues of China received from maritime and inland customs... The Chinese government are badly in need of this revenue and it would be a great relief to existing conditions there if the treaty were ratified at an early date".⁴¹ All delegates agreed with this statement.

At the third meeting of the Pacific and Far Eastern Committee on November 21, Elihu Root presented a resolution

41. Kajima, n.5, p.666.

stating that the powers at the Conference were to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial and administrative integrity of China. All countries^{who} enjoyed equal opportunities in China were to commit themselves not to demand from China any privileges or special rights for their own benefit at the cost of rights belonging to other countries, and to use their influence to establish and maintain an effective and stable government in China. This resolution was assented to on December 10.⁴² Root proposed on January 21 that all powers should mutually engage to prevent creation of spheres of influence in China or causing exclusive interests through contracts. This was later embodied in the Nine Power Treaty.

On January 16, it was decided that since the Open Door question was connected with the privileges and special rights enjoyed by various powers in China, one general resolution should be adopted. Accordingly, a resolution was later presented by Hughes embodying the principles of the Open Door of equality for the trade and industry of all nations in China. The Conference approved it with a few modifications. The definition of the Open Door which the United States had adopted as a policy towards China in 1899, was altered at the Washing Conference. Spheres of influence

42. Ibid., pp. 506-09.

and special interests ^{were} now considered to be incompatible with the Open Door. By signing this treaty in 1922, the Powers for the first time found themselves bound by an official document with the force of international law. Moreover, China was now obliged to submit to the principles of the Open Door Treaty.

The treaty provided against future spheres of influence and against the violation of China's rights as a neutral nation. It created an international board to stabilise conditions in the Far East in order to safeguard the rights and interests of China.

On the question of the Twenty-One Demands, Japan offered certain modifications but China wanted a complete renunciation. As most of the participants in the Treaty of Versailles were present at the Conference they could not do more than accept Japan's offers. On this issue, China was defeated once again as in Paris.

The resolutions adopted at the Conference, committed the Powers to discontinue their exercise of special rights and privileges in China. The United States, Britain, France and Japan maintained their post offices in China but these were completely withdrawn by January 1, 1923. The powers agreed to withdraw their armed forces stationed in China

without the authority of any agreement or treaty. Japan withdrew her troops in this category. They also agreed not to conclude any treaty directly affecting China or peace in the Pacific without consulting China.

The Chinese delegates demanded that the Powers relinquished their extra-territorial rights in China 'at the end of a definite period'. An international commission to look into this matter was created and finally convened on January 12, 1926.

The Powers were unable to agree on the demand that leased areas and spheres of influence in China be abrogated and that arms and ammunitions were not ^{to} be imported into China. Thus, aside from the leasehold of Kiaochoo, all the leased areas remained intact. The Powers agreed not to create new spheres of interest but the existing ones were to remain.

The question as to whether Japan would remove her troops from Siberia was settled by a pledge in which Japan agreed to do so.

At the sixth plenary session, or the last session of the Washington Conference on February 4, 1922, the text of Nine Power Treaty⁴³ and other Acts relating to China

43. See Appendix-4 for details.

were read out for approval. The Conference unanimously adopted them. Summing up the achievements of the Conference, Arthur Balfour then spoke about the transformation of the international environment. This was due to three achievements, the charter of non-aggression in the Far East, The Four Power treaty of non-aggression covering island possessions in the Pacific and the reduction of fighting fleets and the cessation of naval arms race among the maritime powers.

Baron Shidehara, on behalf of Japan stated that the naval limitation treaty, the submarine treaty, 'for the suppression of brutal practices of warfare', the agreement 'relating to China' in general and to Shantung in particular, the adjustment of the difficult question of the Pacific and the Four Power Treaty all contributed to relaxing of existing tensions.

Senator Schanzer, on behalf of Italy stated that Italy welcomed "these agreements, and especially the Naval Treaty, with the greatest satisfaction". The French delegation alone voiced doubts regarding the future. But M. Sarraut announced, the French government sincerely joined in the reduction and limitation of naval armaments.

President Harding addressed the Conference at its closing session on February 6. He declared that "the

faith plighted here today, kept national honour, will mark the beginning of a new and better epoch in human affairs... It is all so fine, so gratifying, so full of promise," he concluded, "that above the murmurings of a world sorrow not yet silenced... there is the note of rejoicing which is not alone ours or yours, or all of us, but comes from the hearts of men of all the world".⁴⁴

44. Sprout, n.1, pp.257-58.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSION

The treaties concluded at the Washington Conference in February 1922 inevitably evoked varied responses in the participating countries. In France the conference was generally viewed with disappointment. On the naval side they resented the relegation to the rank of a secondary power, no longer in the forefront as one of the world's greatest naval powers. France possessed a world-wide empire whose security depended upon sea power. With the tonnage for capital ships and aircrafts strictly limited on the basis of parity with Italy, she had no alternative but to seek security through cruisers, destroyers, submarines and other available instruments of power.

In Japan, the reaction was a mixed one. Some Japanese felt that Japan had sacrificed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and tied her hands in the Pacific and the Far East besides accepting an inferior ratio of naval strength thus weakening her status as a naval power. On the other hand, many Japanese rejoiced in the diversion of capital from armaments to educational and more productive purposes. Professor Yamato Ichihashi, after a thorough investigation declared that it

was a 'step towards progress, national and international'¹ promising relief from the fiscal burden of uncontrolled navalism.

The reaction evoked in Great Britain was also two-sided. Some applauded its success and felt it 'to be a great day for all time in the history of the world'. Britain would no longer be forced to bear the financial burden of arms competition. Others were vehemently opposed to it. Admiral Wemyss, a former First Sea-Lord, felt that Britain had lost its 'strongest driving power'. She had won the late war on the sea only to lose it at the conference table - a paradoxical result of the greatest victory in history.²

The response in the United States, in contrast, was enthusiastic. The Americans heralded the success of the Conference as a cornerstone of a new 'international concert' which delivered 'one region of the globe.....from the menace of a major war'.³ When viewed in a wider context, these diverse verdicts on the Washington Conference assume a clear pattern. While there was no unanimity regarding the

-
1. Yamato Ichihashi, Washington Conference and After, p.146.
 2. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power, p.265.
 3. *Ibid.*, p.272.

achievements of the Conference, public opinion in the principal countries showed a tendency to follow the lead of the national official pronouncements on the conference. Thus the popular verdict was more favourable in the United States and least favourable in France.

Public opinion in most countries looked favourably upon the Conference and saw a brighter future ahead. The nationalistic elements in each country tended to deplore the concessions and sacrifices made and tended to minimise the advantages gained. Armed services in every country directly concerned viewed the Conference with distrust. They could not believe that pledges of non-aggression could be an effective substitute for armed force in the international struggle for power. Thus the Conference evoked varied responses from various sections of the participating countries.

China saw it as a great victory when the Powers declared their firm intention 'to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China'. Although the Conference, deliberately in its policies, devoted itself almost exclusively to a consideration of problems of China, it had not been called primarily for this purpose. It was only incidental to this end that the sources of tension in the Far East had to be satisfactorily

dealt with. China was to have an immediate revision of tariff valuations so as to be able to collect an effective five percent upon her imports, thereby being able to increase her revenue by almost \$ 17,000,000 silver. She was to be allowed to levy surtaxes which would yield \$ 29,000,000 silver. With the Likin abolished, the additional revenue secured by maritime customs would amount to \$ 156,000,000 silver. Thus financially China stood to gain from the conference. The abolition of foreign post offices and stationing of foreign troops and radio stations without her consent stood to her advantage. Leased territories were returned to her and she won an almost complete victory in the Shantung controversy.⁴ Moreover, she obtained assurances regarding her territorial integrity and political stability in the Nine Power Treaty.

In order to evaluate the success of the Conference it is necessary to analyse its results and achievements; how far it forwarded the cause of naval disarmament and how successful it was in the restoration of world peace.

The essential feature of the new order established at the Conference was the stabilization of political and naval relations by limitations on the strength and indirectly

4. Westel W. Willoughby, China at the Conference, pp.339-42.

on the use of battlefleets. To this end the total capital ship tonnage of the principal naval powers was reduced and fixed in approximately the ratio of relative existing strength. Limits were placed on the size and armament of individual ships. And there was to be no further development of insular naval bases and fortifications in the Western Pacific.

The practical result was to delimit the areas within which each of the leading naval powers could individually assert an effective command of the seas. For Britain, the narrow seas of Europe, the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean - Suez route to India and Australasia were put beyond the reach of the Japanese and American battlefleets. The United States was assured uninterrupted sway over the sea approaches to North America and the Panama Canal. And Japan was left in virtually indisputable control of the ocean surface in the far western Pacific as far South perhaps as the Equator.⁵

This relative distribution of naval preponderance was the recognition and perpetuation of existing balances. The Americans abandoned the struggle for a 'contested and dubious

5. Sprout, n.2, p.290.

naval primacy in distant seas' in return for the 'cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance' and for 'mutual pledges' covering island possessions in the Pacific as well as the 'American objectives in Asia'.⁶ The treaties placed no building restrictions on submarines and aircraft. War experience and post war experimentation had exposed the immense potentialities of the submarine for local coast defense. The potentialities of commerce raiding were not lost sight of.

The rise of submarine and airpower played havoc with the accepted postulates of British naval policy. British efforts at the Conference to secure abolition of submarines were futile. Renewed naval competition was presently to open a 'deep fissure' in the recently cemented Anglo-American accord. In 1922 the problem of sea power was merging with the larger problem of armaments as a whole, which was one aspect of a 'gigantic problem of world order and reconstruction'. The Washington Conference had taken a step towards a constructive solution of this problem but much still remained to be done.

While the Washington treaties rendered Japanese communications with Eastern Asia secure against an American attack in

6. Ibid., p.291.

force, they did not place America's Far Eastern possessions quite at the mercy of Japan or place Japan's sea-borne commerce entirely beyond the reach of American naval power.

The British Empire's post-Conference position in the Far East was comparable to, though weaker than the position of the United States. At the same time Great Britain possessed in that region a number of commanding sites and one partially developed naval base of immense potentialities. This was the base at Singapore which was excluded from the fortifications article of the Naval treaty.

Though by no means negligible, the naval power which Great Britain and the United States could bring locally to bear in the Far Western Pacific was potentially far less important than the foundation laid for Anglo-American co-operation. A common interest in maintaining peace and the status quo in the Far East provided the basis for parallel action in that region.

For the past three centuries Britain had reigned supreme as 'mistress of the seas'. With the signing of the naval treaty Britain could no longer retain her earlier superiority. Thus the Conference can be seen as a landmark in the history of naval power. As Admiral Sir Rosslyn Woster-Wemyss, former First Sea-Lord, put it, the outstanding result of

the Conference was Britain's voluntary surrender of that naval supremacy which had constituted the cornerstone of British statecraft for, 'more than three hundred years'. England's voice would 'no longer carry the same weight as heretofore' in the 'councils of the nations'.⁷

Britain's proposal for the total abolition of submarines had not been accepted. In turn, the British had declined to 'accept any limitation except in the categories of capital ships and aircraft carriers. This left submarine cruisers and destroyers open to competitive building and free from any restrictions except upon the maximum size of individual units and their armaments. This invalidated one of the main principles of the Conference as the elimination of competitive building through international agreements limiting the total size of navies was one of the essential steps towards the preservation of peace.'⁸

Partial limitation had its effect on the United States. There would be no scrapping of surplus cruisers on the part of other powers to serve as compensation for the destruction of American superiority in capital ships. Insular naval bases in the Western Pacific Ocean were to remain in status

7. Ibid., p.265.

8. Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States' Navy, p.427.

quo. Britain was permitted a naval base at Singapore. Japan excluded her home bases from restriction. The United States by the agreement on restriction upon naval bases in the Orient could not exercise effective naval power in that region.

Unfortunately the partial limitation prescribed by the Washington Conference failed to stop competitive building. Japan set an early and rapid pace in the unrestricted naval auxiliaries - cruisers, destroyers and submarines to be followed by Britain, France and Italy.

In 1925 the Preparatory Commission for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments was created by the League of Nations. The commission met at Geneva in 1926. President Coolidge invited Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to join the United States in a five-power conference for the limitation of naval armaments, to include all categories not limited by the Washington treaty of 1922. France and Italy declined, though their representatives attended as observers. The United States, Britain and Japan attended the Conference in Geneva in 1927. The American proposed tonnage limits for the following categories - cruisers, 250,000 to 300,000 tons; destroyers, 200,000 to 250,000 tons; and submarines, 60,000 to 90,000 tons. It was

mandatory that the ratio established at the Washington Conference was to apply to these categories between America, Britain and Japan. This gave a global limit of 510,000 tons as against the 540,000 tons proposed at the Washington Conference.

The British delegates however would not recede from a limit of about 458,000 tons of cruisers alone. They further insisted on subdividing cruisers into categories; the '10,000 ton cruisers carrying 8 inch guns', they wanted to be restricted. This was the type most suitable for America's geographical position and lack of bases. The British insistence on a minimum of 458,000 tons amounted virtually to no limitation on cruisers. The British, with their great 'network of commercial lanes and strategically placed naval stations in the seven seas did not need large cruisers. What they needed was a large number of smaller vessels with guns no longer than 6 inches. At the same time, they wanted to close the option for the United States to build a large fleet of big cruisers. What they wanted was parity in battle-fleets and those essential auxiliaries and 'in addition' enough light cruisers to guard their commerce, whereas the United States insisted on mathematical parity. Japanese attempts to mediate met without success. The Conference adjourned on August 4, 1927 after six weeks

of futile arguments. Failure at Geneva brought out the fact that the British Government was not really willing to concede full naval parity to the United States.

Following the failure of the Geneva Conference, President Coolidge persuaded Congress to provide for a building programme of cruisers of the class suited for American interests. The Bill was passed in 1929, a few weeks after the United States by ratifying the Kellogg-Briand Pact had 'renounced' war as an instrument of national policy.

A grave defect in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 was the failure to provide limitation including all types of naval craft. This was corrected with reference to the United States, Britain and Japan by the London Conference of 1930 called at the instance of President Hoover after a personal interview with the British Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. Anglo-American harmony was restored. France and Italy were again represented. Japan was insistent in her demand for improved ratios in auxiliary vessels. The proportions of total naval strength for America, Britain and Japan became about 5:5.2:3.25 respectively in consequence of the Washington and London treaties combined. The dispute that had broken up the Geneva Conference was easily disposed of. The United States dropped its demand for twenty-one

10,000 ton cruisers. Britain agreed to the United States having either eighteen of these cruisers and an over-all cruiser tonnage some 15,000 tons below Britain's own, or fifteen of the big cruisers and parity with Great Britain in all cruiser categories. Japan was given a cruiser strength of about 70 percent of that of the United States and Great Britain. The destroyer and submarine tonnage was also limited, Japan receiving a 7:10 ratio in the former and parity with the United States and Great Britain in the latter. Replacement of capital ships, which, according to the Washington treaty was to begin in 1931, was deferred until 1936, thus saving many 'millions of dollars' for all participating countries.

Of the capital ships then in commission it was agreed that Great Britain should destroy five, the United States, three, and Japan, one, leaving capital ship strength at fifteen, fifteen and nine respectively. France and Italy accepted only parts of the treaty, being unable to agree on cruiser ratios.

An 'escalator clause' was provided for whereby the three principal signatories would have the right to exceed the quotas agreed upon if their security should be threatened

by new naval construction by a power not a part to the agreement. The five participants and later all other important naval powers agreed that submarines should in future be used against commerce only in accordance with the rules of international law and humanity. This provision was to be of indefinite duration; other portions of the treaty should expire on December 31, 1936.

The reduction in America's relative strength in ships along with the restrictions upon her naval bases in the Western Pacific rendered her navy inferior to that of Japan for operations in the Pacific. The security of American interests there were dependent upon treaties - mainly the Nine Power Treaty guaranteeing the political and administrative integrity of China, together with the other agreements negotiated at Washington as predicates to the Naval Treaty of Limitation.⁹

The London Conference in 1930 was the last successful attempt to limit the size of navies by international agreement. The period of peace and comparative harmony following World War I was ended in 1931 when Japan renewed her penetration of China. Japanese militarists had resented

9. Ibid., p.431.

the inferior naval ratios accepted by Japan at the Washington and London Conferences. Aggression in Manchuria signalled their ascendancy in government circles. American Secretary of State Stimson protested and declared the Japanese incursion into Manchuria as being a violation of the 1922 Nine Power Treaty. Despite these protests, repeated by Secretary of State Hull in 1935, Japan continued her advance in China from time to time, thus invalidating an important predicate of the naval agreements. In 1934 Japan served notice of her intention to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. As two years were required before the notice could become effective, the expiration of the treaty would have coincided with the automatic termination of the London Naval Treaty of 1930.

An attempt to reach an agreement was made at another Conference in London in 1935-36. Japan's insistence upon parity with the United States and Great Britain in all categories was not accepted and the Japanese delegation withdrew from the Conference. Only matters of minor importance could be decided upon in March, 1936. Agreement was reached on the maximum, permissible, individual sizes of various types of ships and of the guns they might carry. A treaty on 'qualitative' limitation was agreed upon by Great Britain, France and the United States. It placed no

limit on the number of ships in any category but limited the size of battleships to 35,000 tons and the bore of guns to 14 inches instead of the 16 inches allowed by the Washington treaty. The Conference also agreed upon limitation on the size of other vessels, declared a six-year holiday in the building of heavy cruisers and provided for exchange of information regarding any new naval construction. However, there were 'escape clauses' freeing the signatories from restrictions in the event of excessive naval construction by other powers.

The Washington Five-Power Treaty, consequently, came to an end on the last day of 1936. Thereafter there was no treaty limit on the number of naval vessels to be built by any government. Rumours that Japan was building 45,000 ton battleships, and the Japanese government's refusal to confirm or deny such reports led the United States, Great Britain and France in 1938 to invoke the 'escape clause' of the treaty of 1936. Thereafter the 'sky was the limit' in size and armament of the world's navies. Events were moving fast towards the second World War.

Thus the whole experiment in naval limitation proved to be a disappointment. Conceived of at a time when the entire world was recovering from the effects of the First

World War, the Washington Conference was grasped as a ready solution and the right way towards international peace. Though earlier attempts at peace had been made by the Hague Conferences they were just meetings with no definite outcome. The Washington Conference was the first instance of a Conference called for naval disarmament purposes which achieved tangible reality. The Washington Treaty at the time was considered a significant accomplishment in the cause of peace. But later events revealed that 'its very provisions contained the seed that led Japan to try and conquer the Pacific in 1941'.¹⁰ A recent study has made the following assessment of the Washington Conference. "In the twentieth century this proved to be a parchment peace. It was peace conceived in the hope that pledges and public opinion unaided by international organizations and military force could meet the problems of a world order".¹¹

By the Naval Treaty the principal naval powers came to an agreement on the limitation of their existing naval build-up. The revoking of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its replacement by the Four Power Treaty removed the

10. Daniel J. Garrison, *The United States Navy*, p.27.

11. John C. Vinson, *The Parchment Peace*, p.217.

menace of Anglo-Japanese collaboration against a third power, namely, the United States, in that area. Japan's insistence on maintenance of 'status quo' with regard to existing naval bases and fortifications in the Pacific favoured her security in the Pacific. The Nine Power Treaty, though incidental, maintained the integrity of China.

Thus the Conference was no mean achievement. Paramountcy in sea power no longer remained with the British who had maintained this position over the last three hundred years. Its weakness lay in the fact that there were many ~~loopholes~~, 'escape clauses' of which the Powers took full advantage of.

APPENDIX I

TABLES SHOWING THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE GREATER
NAVAL POWERS IN VARIOUS CLASSES OF SHIPS BETWEEN 1907 and 1914¹

1. (a) Battleships not more than 15 years old from date of launch.
- (b) Battleships under construction or projected.
- (c) Battleships of Dreadnought type completed.
- (d) Battleships of ^{Dreadnought}~~Dreadnought~~ type underconstruction or projected.
- (e) Armoured cruisers not more than 15 years old from date of launch.
- (f) ^{Armoured}~~A14~~ cruisers under construction or projected.
- (g) ^{Armoured}~~A14~~ cruisers of Invincible type completed.
- (h) ^{Armoured}~~A14~~ cruisers of Invincible type under construction or projected.

<u>MARCH 1907</u>	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Great Britain	47	5	1	3	30	8	0	3
France	17	10	0	0	17	5	0	0
Russia	6	4	0	0	2	4	0	0
Germany	21	8	0	4	6	4	0	2
Italy	4	5	0	1	6	4	0	0
United States	23	7	0	4	11	3	0	0
Japan	13	2	0	0	10	3	0	0

MARCH 1911

Great Britain	63	10	8	10	38	5	4	5
France	11	8	0	2	17	1	0	0
Russia	5	7	0	4	4	2	0	0

(cont'd on next page)

1. E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, pp. 449-54.

(cont'd)

Germany	24	9	4	9	10	3	2	3
Italy	8	4	0	4	8	-	0	0
United States	26	6	4	6	13	-	0	1
Japan	13	2	0	2	13	1	0	1
Austria-Hungary	9	5	0	4	2	-	0	0

2. (a) Battleships not more than 15 years old from date of launch.
- (b) Battleships of Dreadnought or improved Dreadnought type completed.
- (c) Battleships under construction or projected (all of ~~Dreadnought~~ or improved ~~Dreadnought~~ type).
- (d) Battle-cruisers completed.
- (e) Battle-cruisers under construction or projected.
- (f) Armoured cruisers not more than 15 years old from date of launch (for 1914 only).

<u>MARCH 1912</u>	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Great Britain	43	12	10	4	6	34
France	13	6	7	0	0	18
Russia	7	0	7	0	0	5
Germany	26	7	10	2	4	9
Italy	8	0	6	0	0	7
United States	27	6	6	0	0	13
Japan	12	3	2	0	4	13
Austria-Hungary	9	0	4	0	0	2

<u>JANUARY 1914</u>	1st class protected cruisers included under (f)					
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Great Britain	43	18	14	9	1	34
France	15	8	10	0	0	19
Russia	7	0	7	0	4	11
Germany	31	8	6	4	3	8
Italy	7	1	5	0	0	7
United States	24	8	6	0	0	17
Japan	11	4	2	1	3	13
Austria-Hungary	11	2	2	0	0	1

3. (a) Torpedo-boat destroyers not more than 14 years old from date of launch.
- (b) Torpedo-boat destroyers under construction or projected.
- (c) Submarines not more than 6 years old from date of launch.
- (d) Submarines under construction or projected.

<u>1913</u>	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Great Britain	132	36	39	22
France	73	11	42	8
Russia	93	45	12	19
Germany	123	9	17	14
Italy	22	10	8	8
United States	45	14	16	14
Japan	55	-	13	2
Austria-Hungary	12	6	6	-
 <u>1914</u>				
Great Britain	143	36	37	29
France	77	7	35	26
Russia	86	45	7	18
Germany	127	12	23	14
Italy	28	16	14	2
United States	47	14	19	21
Japan	44	2	6	2
Austria-Hungary	15	3	6	5

APPENDIX II

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN LIMITING NAVAL ARMAMENT¹

Signed at Washington
February 6, 1922.

Ratified by Japan
August 5, 1922

Entered into Force
August 17, 1923

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF
NAVAL ARMAMENT

Article I

The Contracting Powers agree to limit their respective naval armament as provided in the present Treaty.

Article II

The Contracting Powers may retain respectively the capital ships which are specified in Chapter II, Part 1. On the coming into force of the present Treaty, but subject to the following provisions of this Article, all other capital ships, built or building, of the United States, the British Empire and Japan shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

In addition to the capital ships specified in Chapter II, Part 1, the United States may complete and retain two ships of the West Virginia class now under construction. On the

1. Morinosuke Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan 1894-1922, vol.III, pp.498-501.

completion of these two ships the North Dakota and Delaware shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

The British Empire may, in accordance with the replacement table in Chapter II, Part 3, construct two new capital ships not exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement each. On the completion of the said two ships, the Thunderer, King George V, Ajax and Centurion shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

Article III

Subject to the provisions of Article II, the Contracting Powers shall abandon their respective capital ship building programs, and no new capital ships shall be constructed or acquired by any of the Contracting Powers except replacement tonnage which may be constructed or acquired as specified in Chapter II, Part 3.

Ships which are replaced in accordance with Chapter II, Part 3, shall be disposed of as prescribed in Part 2 of that Chapter.

Article IV

The total capital ship replacement tonnage of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard replacement, for the United States 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for the British Empire 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for France 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Italy 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons) for Japan 315,000 tons

(320,040 metric tons).

Article V

No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.

Article VI

No capital ship of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 16 inches (406 millimetres).

Article VII

The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 135,000 tons (137,169 metric tons); for the British Empire 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for France 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Italy 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Japan 81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons).

Article VIII

The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be effected only as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, provided, however, that all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII, without regard to its age.

Article IX

No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,430 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.

However, any of the Contracting Powers may, provided that its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not thereby exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 metric tons) standard displacement, and in order to effect economy any of the Contracting Powers may use for this purpose any two of their ships, whether constructed or in course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped under the provisions of Article II. The armament of any aircraft carriers exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be in accordance with the requirements of Article X, except that the total number of guns to be carried in case any of such guns be of a calibre exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres), except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres), shall not exceed eight.

Article X

No aircraft carrier of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches

(203 millimetres). Without prejudice to the provisions of Article IX, if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres), shall not exceed ten. If alternatively the armament contains no guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited. In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres) is not limited.

Article XI

No vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers. Vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under government control for fighting purposes, which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities otherwise than as fighting ships, shall not be within the limitations of of this Article.

Article XII

No vessel of war of any of the Contracting Powers, hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, shall carry

a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres).

Article XIII

Except as provided in Article IX, no ship designated in the present Treaty to be scrapped may be reconverted into a vessel of war.

Article XIV

No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6 inch (152 millimetres) calibre.

Article XV

No vessel of war constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers for a non-Contracting Power shall exceed the limitations as to displacement and armaments prescribed by the present Treaty for vessels of a similar type which may be constructed by or for any of the Contracting Powers; provided, however, that the displacement for aircraft carriers constructed for a non-Contracting Power shall in no case exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement.

Article XVI

If the construction of any vessel of war for a non-Contracting Power is undertaken within the jurisdiction of

any of the Contracting Powers, such Powers shall promptly inform the other Contracting Powers of the date of the signing of the contract and the date on which the keel of the ship is laid; and shall also communicate to them the particulars relating to the ship prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, Section I(b), (4) and (5).

Article XVII

In the event of a Contracting Power being engaged in war, such Power shall not use as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power, or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

Article XVIII

Each of the Contracting Powers undertakes not to dispose by gift, sale or any mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the Navy of any foreign power.

Article XIX

The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a)

those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;

(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;

(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.

Article II

The rules for determining tonnage displacement prescribed in Chapter II, Part 4, shall apply to the ships of each of the Contracting Powers.

CHAPTER II

Rules Relating to the Execution of the Treaty - Definition of Terms.

(Omitted)

APPENDIX III

A TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE AND JAPAN, SIGNED DECEMBER 13, 1921, RELATING TO THEIR INSULAR POSSESSIONS AND INSULAR DOMINIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN.

I

The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II

If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

III

This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve months' notice.

IV

This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate. The Government of United States will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the precis-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty in French and in English, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the Signatory Powers.

In faith whereof the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the thirteenth day of December, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-One.

A TREATY BETWEEN THE SAME FOUR POWERS, SUPPLEMENTARY TO
THE ABOVE, SIGNED FEBRUARY 6, 1922

The United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan have, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agreed upon the following stipulations supplementary to the Quadruple Treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921:

The term "insular possessions and insular dominions" used in the aforesaid Treaty shall, in its application to Japan, include only Karafuto (or the Southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan.

The present agreement shall have the same force and effect as the said Treaty to which it is supplementary.

APPENDIX IV

A TREATY BETWEEN ALL NINE POWERS RELATING TO PRINCIPLES, AND POLICIES TO BE FOLLOWED IN MATTERS CONCERNING CHINA¹

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal:

Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity;

Have resolved to conclude a treaty for that purpose.

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the

1. W.E. Willoughby, China at the Conference, pp.368-73.

territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing actions inimical to the security of such States.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I.

ARTICLE III

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking

(a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating

with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this Article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial, or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this Article in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present Treaty or not.

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.

ARTICLE V

China agrees that, throughout the whole of the railways in China, she will not exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination

whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or to which they are consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on the Chinese Railways.

The Contracting Powers, other than China, assumed a corresponding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid railway over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or otherwise.

ARTICLE VI

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party; and China declares that when she is a neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality.

ARTICLE VII

The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.

ARTICLE VIII

Powers not signatory to the present Treaty, which have Governments recognized by the Signatory Powers and which have treaty relations with China, shall be invited to adhere to the present Treaty. To this end the Government of the United States will make the necessary communications to nonsignatory Powers and will inform the Contracting Powers of the replies received. Adherence by any Power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States

ARTICLE IX

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other Contracting Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other Contracting Powers.

In faith thereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the Sixth-day of February, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Two.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brodie, Bernard, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941).
- _____, A guide to naval strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944).
- Buckley, Thomas A., The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1970).
- Bywater, Hector C., Sea Power in the Pacific: A study of the American-Japanese naval problem (London: Constable, 1921).
- Callahan, James Morton, American Relations in the Far East, 1784-1900 (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969).
- Carrison, Daniel J., The United States Navy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968).
- Chang, Chung-Fu, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1931).
- Clinard, Outten J., Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947).
- Cohen, Warren I., America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971).
- Davis, George T., A Navy Second to None (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940).
- Dennis, Alfred P., The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (California: University of California Press, 1923).
- Dulles, Foster Rhea, The Imperial Years (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956).
- _____, America's rise to World power, 1898-1954 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).

- Griswold, Whitney A., The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1938).
- Howard, Michael, Continental Commitment: The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two World Wars etc. (London: Temple Smith, 1972).
- Ichihashi, Yamato, The Washington Conference and After (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1928).
- Iriye, Akira, After Imperialism: The Search for a new order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
- _____, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967).
- _____, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American expansion 1879-1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).
- Kajima, Dr. Morinosuke, The Diplomacy of Japan 1894-1922 vol. III (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, 1980).
- Kennan, George F., American diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).
- Kennedy, Malcolm D., A history of Japan (Great Britain: Western Printing Services Ltd., 1963).
- _____, Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan 1917-35 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969).
- Knox, Dudley W., A history of the United States Navy (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1948).
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Sea-Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890).
- _____, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1897).
- Pollard, Robert T., China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933).

- Pugach, Noel H., "American Friendship for China and the Shantung Question at the Washington Conference", Journal of American History, vol. 64, June 1977, pp. 67-86.
- Seymour, Charles, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Chicago: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928 IV).
- Sprout, Harold and Margaret, Toward a New Order of Sea Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940).
- _____, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946).
- Sullivan, Mark, The Great Adventure at Washington (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company 1922).
- Takeuchi, Tatsuji, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935).
- Treat, Payson J., Japan and the United States 1853-1921 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921).
- _____, The Far East (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1928).
- _____, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Japan, 1895-1905 (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1963).
- Vinson, John Chalmers, The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1955).
- Willoughby, Westel W., China at the Conference. A Report (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1922).
- Wood, Ge-Zay, Shantung Question: A study on diplomacy and world politics (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1922).
- Woodward, E.L., Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935).