

MADRASA AND MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN

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fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of
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It is certified that this Dissertation titled “**Madrasa and Militancy in Pakistan**”, submitted by **Vivek Kumar Mishra**, in partial fulfilment of six-credit out of total requirement of twenty four credits for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of this university. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of an M.Phil degree in this university or any other university. This is his own work.

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Dedicated
to my grandparents

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VIVEK KUMAR MISHRA

PREFACE

The proposed study intends to analyse the role of madrasa in the promotion of militancy in Pakistan. The issue has assumed increased importance after the World Trade Centre attacks on September 11, 2001. As has been reported Osama bin Laden, the prime accused supported, and funded Pakistani madrasas. Taliban, (which literally means “Student”) were also the product of Pakistani madrasas. The study, first of its nature, analyses the concept of madrasa in theory and its operation in the present context.

The first chapter deals with the concept of madrasa as understood traditionally, and present day curriculum of madrasas in Pakistan. It looks into the concept of “Jihad”, basic rules of Jihad and how Jihad is being misinterpreted by Pakistani madrasas. The chapter also focuses on the development of sect-wise madrasas like Deobandi and Ahle-e-Hadith. The role of religious parties in brief has also been discussed in the chapter.

The second chapter deals with the Islamisation policies of General Zia and their role in the rise of madrasa culture in Pakistan. It throws the light on the role of Islam and constitutional process in Pakistan and how the Islamization of education under General Zia affected the madrasas and various levels of society. It also looks into the impact of Afghan war and its linkages with Pakistan. The Taliban phenomenon and its nexus with the Pakistani religious parties as well as the major

reasons of Pakistan's support to Taliban have been discussed. The roles of United States and Saudi Arabia have also been analysed.

The third chapter throws light on the role of madrasa in promotion of Islamic militancy. It defines Islamic militancy and the objectives of Pakistan's support and encouragement to terrorism. It also covers how the Islamic fundamentalist organisations use the name of Islam to achieve their political objectives. It also analyses the nexus between the madrasas and militant groups supported by Pakistan. The recruiting methods of Jihadis and the training patterns under the aegis of Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) have also been discussed in this chapter.

The fourth chapter examines the involvement of madrasa in sectarian violence, the theoretical aspects of the Shia-Sunni conflict and the rising militancy in the conflict. It examines the basic outlook of all militant sectarian organisations and their linkages with religious parties and nexus with the drug mafias. The external support of militant sectarian organisation and state's responses have also been discussed.

In the last chapter an assessment of the madrasas role in militancy has been made and concluding observations and suggestions made.

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Chapter-I

CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION

Madrassa: According to the Encyclopedia of Islam, Madrassa is the name of an institution where Islamic sciences are studied.¹ So, a madrassa traditionally is a place of religious learning, which has a long-standing history and has produced many great scholars and reformists of their time who preached and struggled against the lofty humanitarian values and virtues even before Pakistan came into existence. These elementary schools, known as madaris (plural of madrassa) or makatib (plural of maktab), thus came to be located in the most convenient central place, namely, the mosque premises, where memorising and proper understanding of the Quran and the tradition formed the starting point in the earliest Islamic educational system.²

While the curriculum of traditional madrasas centered upon the Quran, writing exercises were taken from secular poetry and subjects like grammar, stories about prophets etc were also taught. In larger towns and cities where, naturally, subjects of study gradually became varied, the larger or congregational (Jami) mosques became the venue

¹ H.A.R. Gibbs, J.H. Kramer's & E.J. Brill, *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, (Leiden, Netherlands, 1974) pp. 300-309.

² "Closures of Dini Madaris," *POT-Pakistan* (New Delhi), February 12, 2000, p. 600.

of instruction. A teacher frequently holds classes in different parts of the same mosque. In the mosque, he would sit by a pillar or in a side room or in the colonnade, with a circle of eager aspirants for knowledge kneeling or squatting in front.³ Madrasa, whether public or private were open to everybody, the only qualification for admission being desire or keenness for learning, with the result that knowledge did not remain confined to the upper classes only. Learning was widespread among all types of people and groups irrespective of professions. The prevalent method of imparting instruction was the lecture system. There would also be seminars, assemblies and debates where topics pertaining to a particular branch of knowledge or a problem were discussed. This would consolidate the pupil's knowledge acquired through lectures and also develop in him perspicacity and discernment and faculties of reasoning and argument.⁴ The "Quran" was considered the source and fountainhead of Islamic learning-Arabic not only formed one of the important subjects of study but in the higher classes even the prescribed textbooks in Quranic commentary, tradition, theology and Islamic law (*Fiqh*) as well as logic (*Mantiq*), philosophy and similar subjects were in Arabic. Tradition and other branches of Islamic learning were almost the same practically throughout the entire Islamic world.

³ Ziyaud - Din - A. Desai, *Centers of Islamic Learning's in India*, (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1978), pp. 10-15.

⁴ M.L. Kotru, "Minding Madrasas", *National Herald*, (New Delhi), April 18, 2001.

Due to the uniformity of the curriculum a number of Pakistani madrasas students also received instructions in other Islamic cities, including Mecca and Madina. "Classes for reading and writing Quran which was the most sacred book of every believer without exception were held in every village or locality in the premises or adjuncts of the mosque in the beginning. The main subject taught was the Quran, as also the basic tenets of religion and important religious precepts and usages. With the passage of time, however, new branches of study were added and the syllabus became more varied as a result of contact with other cultures and religions, but the venue, the mosque remained almost unchanged".⁵ The distinction between madrasa and ordinary mosque was very slight. When a particular room was set apart for teaching purposes in a mosque, this was often called a madrasa; though as already explained, in the earliest period the principal subject studied in the madrasas were "Quran" and "Hadith" to which was added the study of the Arabic language. In brief, the traditional curriculum of madrasas comprised all branches of knowledge, which trace their origin to Islam. The Quran and allied sciences like *TAFSIR* (commentaries on the Quran), *TAJWID* (art of Quranic pronunciation), *QIRAT* (art of recitation of Quran), *HADITH* (statements and decisions of Prophet Mohammed) etc. The rational sciences included logic, philosophy, astrology and natural sciences, etc. Theoretically, even music was supposed to be part of the

⁵ Ziyaud - Din - A. Desai, n.3, pp. 13-15.

curriculum, but it does not appear to have been followed.⁶

Historically, the madrasa was prestigious seat of learning. They were "citadels of knowledge" and "beacon of light" for the world. When Islam was at its zenith, every discipline of learning e.g. mathematics, science, medicine, and jurisprudence were taught at these institutions. Great Muslim luminaries such as Al-Beruni, Ibn-e-Sina (Avesina) and Ibn Khuldoon, were the products of these madrasas.⁷

In Pakistan education has been in the government domain. But private citizens and organisations have been free to set up schools and colleges. Thus we have had schools run entirely by the government and also schools largely funded and run by the private associations and groups. In Pakistan as in many developing countries education is not mandatory. "The World Bank estimates that 40 per cent of Pakistanis are literate, and many rural areas lack public schools".⁸ The quality of education is very poor in these public schools. So the majority of the people do not consider it useful to send their children to schools. On the one hand, there is the elite system of education represented through the mushrooming of private school system in the urban areas, and on the other, there are government run schools in rural areas not geared to produce stuff that could enable them qualify

6 Gibbs, Kramer's and E.J. Brill, n. 1, p. 304

7 "Every one is sick of Kalashnikov Culture," *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), January 13, 2002.

8 *World Bank Report*, (Washington DC), 2001, p. 167.

to enter colleges or universities. It is a fact that the product of the private sector English medium schools are better poised to compete for the limited number of positions at the higher levels of learning, or in the job market.

Pakistan, unfortunately, is an underdeveloped society where education is not the state's most important priority and remains neglected. Its inability to provide education to the masses contributed to the proliferation of madrasas. This has social implications and the state has to share responsibility in this regard. It spends more than 75-80 per cent on defence and debt repayment, ignoring social services. The result is that education is only a state symbol. Pakistan today has three education systems. One, state controlled or state administered state run schools. The others are those only accessible to the elite class with little or no state control, and the last being madrasas that only offer religious insights. These madrasas have no direct state influence and remain impervious to the state directed curriculum. The state is thus unable to monitor the type of education these institutions provide to students, which makes it difficult for the state to monitor them.⁹ They are either run by individuals or by groups having strong sectarian linkages.

In 1947, there were 137 madrasas in the entire country. By 1971 this number had grown to 900. With General Zia-ul-Haq's policy of generously funding madrasa of all sectarian persuasions the

⁹ Tayyaba Tanvir, "Madrasa and Education in Pakistan", www.ipcs.org

numbers rose to 8000 registered madrasas and 25000 unregistered madrasas, educating over half a million students during the Zia's time.¹⁰ By the end of the Zia-ul-Haq regime in 1988, these madrasas became the principal source of education among the poor. By the middle of the year 2000, the number of the madrasas had grown to nearly 9,500 and unregistered madrasas at between 40,000 to 50,000.¹¹ Pakistan's Federal Minister for Education, Ms.Zubeda Jalal, told reporters in Quetta, on October 22, 2001, that about 11,000 madrasas had agreed to get registered with the government and receive official assistance.¹² The madrasas adhere to different faith such as Deobandi, Brelvi, Ahl-e-Hadith, Ahle tashi, Shia etc. for example.

Table 1.1: Break-up of Punjab Seminaries and the number of students according to religious sects.

Division	No. of Semi-naries	Deobandi		Barelvi		Ahl-e-Hadith		Shia	
		M	S	M	S	M	S	M	S
Lahore	356	157	19781	149	20169	45	7074	5	610
Gujranwala	154	40	3995	95	10140	14	2883	5	419
Rawalpindi	186	31	9203	70	9137	7	459	18	559
Faisalabad	124	52	3578	43	7527	20	3445	9	770
Sargodha	164	75	6973	70	9277	10	2548	9	475
Multan	363	140	6076	175	12878	30	3880	13	476
D.G Khan	397	146	10897	191	13565	27	4109	33	940
Bahawlpur	971	368	38404	540	35238	39	5549	21	841
Total	2715	1069	99907	1333	117931	192	29917	113	5340

(M- Madrasa, S- Student)

Source: *The Herald*, (Karachi) November, 2001 p. 51

¹⁰ O.N.Mehrotra, "Madrasa in Pakistan: The Chief Promoter of Islamic Militancy and Terrorism", *Strategic Analysis*, (IDSA, New Delhi), VOL XXIII.No.11, February 2000, p. 1883.

¹¹ *The Herald* (Karachi), September 1992, p. 34.

¹² *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), October 24, 2001.

The Deobandi sect is one of the major subgroups of the Sunni Islam in the Indian subcontinent. They are so called on account of their association with the reformist principles and practices typified by a madrasa (established in 1867) of Deoband in United Provinces.¹³

The Deobandis aimed to train a new generation of learned Muslims who would revive Islamic values based on intellectual learning, spiritual experience, Sharia Law and *Tariqah* (the path). By teaching their students how to interpret sharia, they aimed to harmonize the classical Sharia texts with current realities. The Deobandi's took a restrictive view of the role of women, opposed all forms of hierarchy in Muslim community and rejected the Shia's system. Deobandi madrasas developed much faster in Pakistan after its creation in 1947. The Deobandis set up the Jamiat-ulemma-e-Islam (JUI) a purely religious movement to propagate their beliefs and mobilize the community of believers.¹⁴

The other major groups of Sunni Muslims in India and Pakistan are that of Barelvi and the Ahl-e-Hadith. There were rival Islamic reformist schools in the quest for true Islamic practice, one group, the Ahl-i-Hadith, for example, in their extreme opposition to such practices as visiting the Prophet's grave, rivaled that of the Arabia's

¹³ Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India, Deoband 1860-1900* (London: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 170-190.

¹⁴ Barbara D. Metcalf, "Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs" www.ssrc.com

typically labeled "Wahabi". The Wahabis were followers of an iconoclastic 18th century reform movement initiated by an Arabic scholar Abdul Wahab, associated with tribal unification who were to find renewed vigor in the internal political competition, within Saudi-Arabia in 1920s. From colonial times until today, it is worth noting, the label "Wahabi" is often used to discredit any reformist or politically active Islamic group in Pakistan.¹⁵

Another group that emerged around the same time was popularly known as "Barelvi" and although engaged in the same process of measuring current practice against Hadith, was more open to many customary practices, and they called the others "Wahabi". These orientations: "Deobandi" "Barelvi" or "Ahle-i-Hadith" - would come to define sectarian divisions among Sunni Muslims of the South Asian background to the present. Thus "ulema" Mosques and a wide range of political, educational and missionary movements were known by these labels at the end of the twentieth century, both within the South Asian countries, as well as in places like Britain where South Asian population settled.¹⁶

The Shariah is a difficult concept to define. In its broadest sense, the Shariah is the accepted custom of the Muslim community covering indoctrinal belief, ritual action, commercial transaction and

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 89.

¹⁶ Ahmad Riza Khan, *Barelvi and his Movement: 1870-1920* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 18-30.

criminal punishment. The Sharia is a wide umbrella of moral sanctions covering other theoretical possibilities as well as practical exigencies. The Shariah embraces contradictory juridical decisions and a multiplicity of juridical methods, insisting only that they be based on certain authentic sources and reasoned deduction.¹⁷ This crucial element of flexibility and multiplicity is often lost when the term Shariah is translated as "the law of Islam" or even Islamic law. Rather Shariah is a broad set of customs authenticated and sanctified by legal decisions. The principle and institutions of legal specialists, who make such decisions generally known as fiqh, should be understood as "Islamic Law".¹⁸ The rise of madrasa and religious militancy in Pakistan presents a stark contrast to the decline in the political fortunes of the religious parties.

According to the Report of the Human Right Commission of Pakistan 2001, "about one-third of these schools are providing military training to their students and some madrasas send their students for training and participation in Afghan civil war, without the knowledge of their parents".¹⁹ The students of madrasas are usually children of those parents, who cannot afford their upbringing and in

17 Abbas Rashid, Pakistan: "The politics of fundamentalism" in Kumaar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz (ed) *Internal Conflict in South Asia* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 60.

18 Scott Alan Kugle, "Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic jurisprudence-in Colonial South Asia " *Modern Asian Studies*, (U.K.), vol. 35, no. 2, 2000, p. 258.

19 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan: (Report 2001). p. 122,
<http://www.hrcp.com>

turn, send them to the madrasas for the service of Allah, where they are housed, clothed, and educated. It is apparent that the bulk of the people who enter such madrasas later on take to "Jihad". Madrasa and Jihad have become synonymous in Pakistan.²⁰ In the last twenty years Pakistan has been nurturing militancy in the name of Islam and has used it to promote its strategic goals in the region, particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir in India. Pakistan has called it Jihad, which means "holy-war".

The word Jihad is derived from "Juhd" which signifies exertion, striving and endeavour and ceaseless efforts to one's utmost capacity bestowed by Allah. It is also used in the sense of exerting one's power and ability without implying any sense of war.²¹ In Shariah, this word is also used for war (Jihad-bis-saif), with the object of bringing to end oppression and aggression against Islam. Its object is not to propagate Islam, but to remove those tyrannical forces, which are inimical to Islam and are not prepared to give it a fair deal.²² Classical jurists have classified many forms of Jihad, but broadly it has been divided into two. First, Al-Jihad-ul-Akbar (greater Jihad), which means exerting oneself against temptations and evil. Second, Al-Jihad-ul-Asghar (lesser Jihad), which means fighting in the path of God. The interpretation that some preachers of modern madrasas

20 O.N. Mehrotra, no.10, p. 1884.

21 Sumita Kumar, "Pakistan's Jehadi Apparatus: Goals and Method", *Strategic Analysis*, (IDSA, New Delhi), vol. XXIV, No. 12, p. 2179.

22 *Dawn* (Karachi) January 19, 2001, <http://www.dawn.com>.

have given in the recent times is at complete variance with the Quranic text.²³ It is claimed that the lesser Jihad is simplified to cover holy war against infidels (and infidel countries). This kind of Jihad is described in both the Holy Quran and in the Hadiths. It is also stated that the Muslim law has divided the world into two entities, Dar-ul-Islam, (the abode of Islam), and Dar-ul-harb, (the abode of war). Battling against the abode of war was a duty for every Muslim, as this is the only way Islam could replace the warlike conditions of the infidel's society with peace. Jihad can be used either to defend against or attack an enemy.²⁴

Jihad is the exertion of one's utmost effort in order to attain a goal or to repel something detestable. In the Shariah, Jihad comprises exertion of one's utmost effort to fight in order to raise the word of Allah, and aiding in this fighting. "Perform Jihad against the pagans with your wealth, your selves and your tongues." The aim of Jihad is removing oppression and injustice, removing barriers to the spread of truth.²⁵

23 Rafiq Zakaria, "This Blood Won't Wash", *The Hindustan Times*, August 23, 2001.

24 Kalim Bahadur, "Political Dimention of Jihad", *Aakrosh (New Delhi)*, October 2001, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 58.

25 *The Jihad Fixation: Agenda; Strategy Portents: A Wordsmiths Compilation*, (Wordsmiths: New Delhi, 2001), p. 30.

Six Rules of Jihad

- (1) Intention of the Jihad is for the sake of Allah, not for the sake of wealth, goods, fame, glory or power. Whoever fights in order that the word of Allah should be highest, he is in the path of Allah.
- (2) Obedience to the Imam.
- (3) Avoiding misappropriation of the booty.
- (4) Respecting pledges of protection.
- (5) Endurance under attack: Do not wish for an encounter with the enemy, and ask Allah for well-being, but when you encounter them be steadfast.
- (6) Avoidance of corruption.²⁶

The Jihad that is fought when the Muslims are under their own Islamic state is intended to facilitate the spread of Islam, and so it is not permissible to kill anyone who is not impeding the spread of the religion. It is not permissible to intentionally kill non-combatants (including women, children, old men and monks) unless they are conspirators. And fight, in the path of Allah, those who fight you, and do not transgress limits.²⁷

There are differences among the Islamic scholars about the meaning and understanding of Jihad. Jihad is usually construed as

²⁶ <http://www.members.tripod.com/suhayb.htm>.

²⁷ Ibid.

war, with all its connotations of violence and bloodshed. Many western scholars also use the term war for Jihad.²⁸ Many contemporary scholars have written extensively on the concept and meaning of Jihad. The founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) produced a voluminous work titled “al Jihad fil Islam”, which was published in 1930. It covered a wide field, which included an analysis of the Islamic concept of Jihad, defensive war, tactical war, the spread of Islam by sword and the Islamic laws of war and peace. The most significant element of Jihad is the use of violence as an element of general strategy.²⁹ However, in the Islamic context, and in the literal sense, the word Jihad simply means a struggle - doing one's utmost to further a worthy cause. The actual Arabic equivalent of war is qital, and even this is used in a defensive sense. Many people think that it is synonymous with war undertaken for spreading Islam. Even some ulema cannot discern the distinction between qital and Jihad as laid down in the “Quran”.

Kalma or the recital of creed, Salat or five daily prayers, Roza or fasting during Ramzan, Zakat or alms giving and lastly Haj, pilgrimage to Mecca. It has been asserted that the importance of Jihad ranks next only to Namaz (ritual prayers), Roza and Haj.³⁰ However, only

28 Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan: 1961*, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 153.

29 Sayyid Ali Naqi, *Sayyid Maududi Ka Ahd*, (Lahore: Al Badr Publication, 1980), pp. 19-20.

30 Aziz Ahmed, *Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 214.

one Islamic sect has declared Jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam, namely, the Kharijites who were responsible for the killing of Hazrat Ali, the fourth caliph, cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad.³¹ According to Muhammad Iqbal, Jihad was not an offensive attack of the Muslim community for self-aggrandisement. All war waged under the leadership of Prophet Muhammad were defensive. He claimed that while defensive wars are permitted aggressive warfare is contrary to the Quran. Iqbal believed that any attempt at social change through employment of violence is impossible.³² Some contemporary Jihadis, for example those who are now fighting in Jammu and Kashmir claim that the people on their own can wage Jihad.³³

One of the Pakistan's major Jehadi Institution, the Markaz-e-Dawa-wal-Irshad changed new name (Jamaat-ud-Daawa Pakistan), was set up in 1987, to combine two primary missions of preaching Islam and Jihad. Their concept of Jihad is that it can be declared even if there is no Islamic state. They believe that if an Islamic state exists it would be its responsibility to wage Jihad but if there is no Islamic state then they have to do it on their own. They claim that Muslims are backward not because they have lagged behind in

31 Jamal Ahmed Khan, "War is not the Aim of Jihad", *The Times of India*, September 22, 2001.

32 John Esposito, "Muhammad Iqbal and the Islamic State", in John Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 1983, pp. 181-82.

33 Zaigham Khan, "Allah's Army", *The Herald*, (Karachi,) January 1998, pp. 123-133

education, science and technology but because they have given up Jihad and therefore, science and technology have passed into the hands of non-Muslims. Democracy according to Jihadis was inherited from alien governments. To them democratic practices are useless and part of the system against which they are fighting. It is not possible for them to work under democracy and establish an Islamic system.³⁴

The modern Islamists have gone to the extent where standing armies of Jehadi's are being trained and have also misinterpreted the concept of Jihad. The general perception today is that these madrasas have Jehadi literature in their curriculum and thus teach and preach Jihad with the main objective of producing " holy warriors".³⁵ In Pakistani madrasas often the student learn only the Quran. They are nor taught much Mathematics and probably no science or literature neither any other secular subject regarded in the west as important for functioning in modern society. Many of these schools preach Jihad with varying degrees of militancy. Pakistani officials estimate that 10 to 15 per cent of the country's madrasa promotes extremist ideologies. Mujeebur Rehman Inqalabi, a leader of Pakistanis Sunni sectarian party, Sipah-e-Sahaba, claims that the United States had finally figured out that madrasas comprise the base for Jihad and

³⁴ Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), vol. 79, n. 6, p. 22.

³⁵ Suba Chandran, "Madrasas: A Brief Overview", [htt://www.ipcs.org](http://www.ipcs.org).

war, therefore, is pressurising Pakistan to shut them down. He asserts that this is not possible since the "madrasas are the supply line for Jihad. Whereas the state controls madrasas, as in Egypt and Jordan, the voices for Jihad have been silenced".³⁶

Pakistan and Afghanistan are now the only countries where it is possible to preach Jihad in the madrasas. The terrorist activities in America, like the World Trade Center bombing some years ago and the terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 and Mir Aimal Kansi's attack at the CIA, are a reaction to the US attempt to impose a new world order on the rest of the world.³⁷ Whatever might have been the justification for Jihad in its original conception in the Quranic revelation; it had a different meaning and significance in the middle ages and has a different one in modern times. The theory of Jihad may well exploit for military and political expansion and there may be economic motivation behind it.³⁸

Islamic militants in the middle East and Afghanistan are well known but very little is known about those in Kashmir perhaps because they operate mainly in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and do not pose a terrorist threat outside South Asia. The Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf has called them

36 Ibid. p. 21.

37 Op. cit. n. 26, p. 60

38 Aziz Ahmed, *Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 78.

“freedom fighters” and admonishes the west not to confuse Jihad with terrorism. Musharraf is right so far as distinction is concerned. The Jihad doctrine delineates between acceptable war behaviour and terrorism which it explicitly outlaws, - but he is wrong about the militant group's activities.

It may be remembered that the summit meeting between the President of Pakistan, General Musharraf and the Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee held at Agra in July 2001 had collapsed on the issue of the cross-border terrorism, whom General Musharraf insisted on calling terrorist as “freedom fighters.”

Kashmir has been the focus of India-Pakistan tensions and conflicts ever since independence in 1947. They have fought four wars and during the rest of the period their relations have been tense, often degenerating into virtual war. Pakistani leaders have been calling the Kashmir issue as an unfinished agenda of the partition. It was as early as, October 1947 that Pakistan, which had refused to recognise the accession of the Kashmir state into the Indian Union, had sponsored the first invasion of the state by the Pathans from the tribal areas of the North-west Frontier Province of the country. The Pakistani leaders termed it Jihad, and soon sent in Pakistan's regular forces. A Jehadi culture has already evolved in Pakistan, the roots of which are entangled in the Afghan civil war of the 1980s, when the United States set up camps in Pakistan to train terrorists to fight

Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq during his rule sought to put down political activity where necessary with brute force by banning political parties, he also paved the way for the emergence of non-political groupings and forces. By trying to impose Islamization, which was based on Hanafi Fiqh (Jurisprudence) with strong overtones of Deobandi school of thought, he alienated the Shi'ite population of Pakistan.³⁹

An important role in the propagation of Jehadi culture in Pakistan has been played by the madrasas during the eighties when General Zia-ul-Haq supported them to secure the support of the religious parties for his regime. They also provided the recruiting ground for troops during the war against the Soviet army in Afghanistan. In the early period, these madrasas were financed from the Zakat funds, but later financial assistance came from the rich Pakistanis from within the country and from the Gulf. Without government supervision, these madrasas were free to preach a narrow and violent version of Islam.⁴⁰

Jehadi madrasas and terrorist organisations have promoted sectarian violence within Pakistan, because of the two movements - Jihad against the Indians in Kashmir and Jihad against the Shia in Pakistan - are inextricably linked. As a matter of fact, Jehadi

³⁹ *The Friday Times*, (Lahore), August 18, 2001.

⁴⁰ Jessica Stern, n. 39, pp. 120-21.

organisations in Pakistan are much more powerful today than they were during the days of the Afghan war. They have learnt to be self-sufficient and are now able to generate most of the funds required for their operations through private sources. Lashkar-e-Taiba, for example, generates crores of rupees every year by selling the hides of sacrificial animals.⁴¹ Its trained cadres, while waiting for their turn to go to Kashmir, set up and run offices all over the country and collect funds for the organisation. Also, all Jehadi organisations have rich supporters and individual backers who provide generous help.

Pakistani religious parties did not lag far behind in providing volunteers for the Afghan civil war. In the process, close ties were forged between Afghan and Pakistani Sunni extremists. The Afghan conflict gave religious rivals in Pakistan access to arms and military training. As a result, sectarian conflict in Pakistan acquired a far more violent hue than it had ever before in the country's history.⁴² According to Mujeeb-ur-Rehman Inqalabi, one of the party's leaders, "Deobandi madrasas are providing mental training to a significant fraction of the terrorists in Kashmir".⁴³ Most of the Pakistani madrasas are situated in the rural areas of the Pakistan. With neither centralized hierarchy nor the ability of any locally renowned or learned

41 Zaigham Khan, "Inside the Mind of the Holy Warrior", *The Herald* (Karachi) July 1999, p. 42.

42 Samina Ahmed, "The Unholy Nexus?" *Newsline* (Karachi), September 1998, p. 33.

43 Kalim Bahadur, "Political Dimensions of Jihad", *Aakrosh*, (New Delhi), October 2001, vol. 4, no. 13, p. 67.

mullah to start a madrasa, the Deobandi tradition has resulted in dozen's of breakaway, extremist factions emerging out of the mainstream JUI. Samiul Haq, a religious and political leader who has been a member of national assembly and a senator whose madrasa became a major training ground for the Taliban leadership, leads the most important breakaway faction of the JUI.⁴⁴

Haqqania madrasa is in Akhora Khatak, in the NWFP, is a sprawling collection of buildings on the main Islamabad-Peshawar highway. This is the biggest madrasa in Pakistan. Its mosques and classrooms and dormitories are spread over eight-weed-covered acres and the madrasa has currently enrolled more than 2,800 resident students.⁴⁵ The student, range in age from 8 to 30 sometimes to 35 years. The youngest boys spend much of their days squatting cross-legged on the floors of air less classrooms, memorizing of Quran. This is the process that takes between six months and three years, Haqqania is notable not only because of its size, but also because it has graduated more leaders of the Taliban.⁴⁶ At Haqqania, indoctrination seems total and effective. Asked whether nuclear weapons should be deployed in Jihad or not, all the students in a

44 S.V.R. Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics", *Modern Asian Review*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000,) vol. 34, pp. 156-57.

45 Massoud Ansari, "The Jihad Factories", *Frontline* (Chennai) August 17, 2001, p. 66.

46 Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Education of Holy Warrior", *The New York Times*, June 25, 2000.

classroom raised their hands in approval.

It may be noted that the Binori Town mosque in Karachi is a veritable Mecca of Islamic learning. The mosque has been spreading Deobandi Sunni ideology all over the world. It claims to have students as well as donations from as many as countries, including Britain, France, Germany, and Philippines etc. The Binori Town mosque is the second largest seminary in Pakistan.⁴⁷ The mosque imparts comprehensive Islamic education to some 8,000 students at a time.⁴⁸

The Musharraf government, however, announced plans to regulate the seminaries curriculum soon after coming to power. The actual move came more than a year later, when the government promulgated an ordinance imposing a ban on receiving foreign funds without state approval. The statute promulgated on August 18, 2001 called as the Pakistan Madrasa Education (Establishment and Application of Model Deeni Madaris) Board ordinance 2001 - provided for the integration of the seminaries with the country's general education system.⁴⁹

The issue of madrasa, of course, has assumed greater relevance since September 11, 2001, in the aftermath of which the U.S led the

47 Op. cit. no. 23 p. 1884.

48 Owais Tohid, "The Jihad at Home", *The Herald* (Karachi), December 1997, p. 65.

49 Azmat Abbas, "The Real Battle Front", *The Herald* (Karachi), November 2001, pp. 50-51.

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campaign against the Taliban, which was bombed out of Pakistan's 27 years old Afghan policy.⁵⁰ President Musharraf and the military dispensation he heads will now have to rethink the entire Jehadi regime that was created inside Pakistan to sustain the Afghan policy and its most critical spin-off the Jihad in Kashmir. Their immediate task to seek a viable formula for dismantling the Jehadi regime before the US runs out of patience and takes the task upon itself. In this regard President Musharraf's address to the Nation on January 12, 2002 stated many important measures to control the Jehadi outfits and regulation of madrasa's curriculum. In his speech Gen. Musharraf criticized madrasas that impart "only religious education". He announced new rules for madrasas.⁵¹

- A. Rules for schools and colleges will apply to madrasas.
- B. Madrasas involved in militancy to be shut down.
- C. All mosques to be registered.
- D. Loudspeakers allowed only for Ramzans and Juma prayers.
- E. Ban on political activities in mosques.

He formulated a new strategy for madrasas, and stated, "We have developed a new Syllabus for madrasas providing for teaching of Pakistan studies, Mathematics, Science and English along with religious subjects.⁵² To me the student of religious schools should be

50 Aamer, Ahmed Khan: "The End of Jihad", *The Herald* (Karachi) December 2001, p. 19.

51 *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) January 13, 2002.

52 "President's Address to the Nation", January 12, 2002 <http://www.ipcs.org>

brought in to the mainstream of society. If any one of them opts to join college in university, he would have the option of being equipped with the modern education. It would mean that the student of madrasas should be brought to the mainstream through a better system of education.” This is the crux of the madrasa strategy.⁵³ He also stated that these madrasas would be governed by same rules and regulations applicable to other schools, colleges and universities. All Madrasa were to be registered by March 23, 2002 and no new madrasa would be opened without permission of the Government. If any madrasa is found indulging in extremism, subversion, militant activity it would be closed. All madrasas would have to adopt the new syllabus by the end of this year (2002).

Gen. Musharraf expounded on the concept of Jihad, saying militancy is the “lesser Jihad”. The greater Jihad, he said, was curbing social evils. He said the smaller Jihad now over and the greater Jihad against backwardness and literacy had started. He banned two sectarian parties, the Sipah-i-Sahaba (SSP) and the Tehreek-i-Jaferia and the extremist group Tehrik-i-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammedi. He also announced ban on the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. But these were long overdue and proceeded by enough warning to enable the two outfits to change their names and continue operating.⁵⁴ Banning terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ *The Hindustan Times*, (New Delhi) January 13, 2001.

e-Taiba and Jais-e-Mohammad, measures to register and permit establishment of mosques and madrasas, prohibiting their indulging in extremism, subversion, militant activity or possessing any type of weapons, insistence on foreign students possessing proper (entry) documents and reforming the police organization are all welcome steps. Theoretically these policy initiative are truly revolutionary, their impact can, however, be judged only over a period of time.

Chapter-II

CHAPTER - II

Islamization Under Zia and the Taliban Phenomenon

The state of Pakistan came into existence as a result of the two-nation theory propounded by the Muslim League. The Muslims of India wanted a separate state for themselves, as it would not be possible for them to co-exist in a free India dominated by Hindus. However, the leadership of the Muslim League and the Pakistan movement did not envisage Pakistan as a theocratic state or an Islamic country.¹ As Binder observed, "Islamic government, Islamic state and Islamic constitution were the slogans of the last years of empire and the first of independence, but no one was quite sure what they meant."² However, it was clear that religion was used as a means to achieve political power, which the Muslim League found difficult, if not impossible, to share with the Indian National Congress within the parameters of united and undivided India. The Father of Pakistan Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was personally secular and believed in the ideals of liberalism and democracy. Mr. Jinnah in his inaugural address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on

¹ While a 'religious' state refers to the creation of a state along religious lines, "theocracy" refers to the promotion of religion by state. In a Muslim theoretic state the final authority lies not in the state, but on 'Allah'.

² Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 4.

August 11, 1947 stated that religion was a private affair of the individual and highlighted the equality of religion. To quote:

“In course of time all these angularities of the majority and the minority community - will vanish ... you are free, you are free to go to your temples, and you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in the state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the state ... we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslim would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense a citizen of the state”.³

Yet the contradiction lay in the fact that on the one hand, there was a demand for the creation of a state along religious lines, while the leaders of that state were secular in outlook. This laid the foundation of the ideological debate, which ensued immediately after creation of the state and continues to this day. The Muslim League resorted to the use of religion to give credence to the two-nation theory.

³ Jamil-ud-din Ahmad (ed.), *Speeches and Writings of M.A. Jinnah* (Lahore, 1976), vol.2, p.401-4.

The independence of Pakistan came at a time when neither the "Ulema" nor the politicians had a clear-cut perception of the nature of the new state. The religious groups on the one hand, and the secularists on the other, kept the question of ideology alive. The gap between the two groups was very wide.⁴ The "Ulema" represented the traditional view, as they claimed themselves to be the upholders of tradition and said that establishment of Islamic state was possible only if their own institutions were recognized. The secularists on the other hand were exposed to western, liberal education and came from the top brass of the military and civil services.

That Pakistan was created to fulfil the religious aspirations of Indian Muslims cannot be accepted because the principal Islamic groups in India were against the Pakistan Movement. In fact, religion and ideology became matter of controversy only in independent Pakistan, Islam was not at the centre of Muslim nationalism in India, but was brought into the political debate in Pakistan after the nation was created.

⁴ Binder, no. 3, p. 6: He argues that in any Muslim state, the controversy between traditionalist and modernists is inherent but in Pakistan it was manifest because the gap between the two groups was wide.

Islam and the Constitutional Process in Pakistan

In Pakistan, religion was invoked ritualistically in the early years. Initially, the secular leadership and later the military - bureaucratic oligarchy, dominated largely by the Punjabis, did not want the fundamentalists to encroach upon their monopoly of power.⁵ On the other hand, it became necessary for this very class to use Islam to counter the ethnic problems.⁶ The process of constitution making in Pakistan can be traced to the Basic Objectives Resolution, which was clearly a victory for Pakistan's liberal leadership. It sought to recognize the people as center of power. The next attempt at framing a constitution was done under the Ayub regime. The 1956 constitution was given a religious facade - it commenced in the name of Allah and declared that the country would be based on "Islamic Principles of Social Justice". But no attempt was made to declare Islam as state religion. Even with regard to other religious provisions, very few steps were taken to enforce them in true spirit. There was a tendency to evade these provisions, which were included basically to appease the ulema.⁷

⁵ Ibid. p. 27.

⁶ Hamza Alavi, "The State in Crisis" in Hassan Gardeze and Jamil Rashid, (ed.), *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), 1983, pp. 57-58.

⁷ Afzal Iqbal, *Islamization of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Idarah-I-Adabiyat-I, 1984), p. 68.

The 1962 constitution differed from the 1956 constitution in many ways but with regard to Islamic provisions, there was no major change. Islam was still retained formally. Significantly, however, the constitution recognized the various sects within Islam and stated that the laws would be in conformity with Holy "Quran" and "Sunnah" but the various sects in accordance with their personal law could interpret them. And, as for the laws violating the Islamic principles, it was provided that they could not be examined in the court of law. In the 1956 constitution, the court had been given power to examine such a law. The 1973 constitution was framed in the aftermath of the creation of Bangladesh and the general elections. It was, therefore, necessary to draft a constitution wherein an agreeable consensus could be derived and controversies avoided. The constitution, like the others, began in the name of Allah and, for the first time, Islam became the state religion of Pakistan.

The Ahmadiyas (also known as Qadianis) follow the teaching of Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) of Qadian in Indian Punjab. They shifted from Indian Punjab following partition and set up, their township and named it Rabwah located near Chiniot in Pakistani Punjab. The problem arises because the orthodox Muslims believe that Mohammed was the last prophet while the Ahmadiyas disagree on this score: however, this

Islamic tenet was challenged much to the displeasure of the orthodox Muslim clergy. The Ahmadiya controversy, which raged from 1948 to 1953, was the first sectarian conflict to take place in Pakistan.⁸ The Ahmadiyas were declared non-Muslim minorities and the constitution further laid down that the state of Pakistan recognized Prophet Mohammad as the last of the Prophets. These were the compromises made by the Bhutto regime to appease the "ulema".⁹ This constitution deleted the clause relating to Article 227 of the previous constitution which provided that "Quran" and "Sunnah" could be interpreted in accordance with the personal law of various sects.

Riaz Hassan argues that Islamization emerged as a state policy under Bhutto's government, though the steps were taken primarily to appease certain section of people.¹⁰ The process of Islamization was perpetuated by the General Zia-ul-Haq regime but was marked by the attempts to restore fundamentalism and the use of military to achieve the same. The bureaucracy had been Ayub's constituency, which helped him to rule for well over a decade. General Zia, however, came to power with the promise of

⁸ M.V. Lakhi, "Constitutional Development in Pakistan: The First Phase 1947-56" in V. Grover and Ranjana Arora (eds.) *Political System in Pakistan* (Vol. 2) (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication, 1995), pp. 10-11.

⁹ B.M. Chengappa, "Pakistan: The Role of Religion in Political Evolution", *Strategic Analysis* (IDSA, New Delhi, 2001), Vol. XXIV, No. 12, p. 57.

¹⁰ Riaz Hassan, "Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Changes in Pakistan", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1983, pp. 263-80.

restoring democracy within ninety days. But it was soon clear that he had no intention of relinquishing power. General Zia had no mass base or even the support of politicians and bureaucracy. He used Islam, therefore, to legitimise his rule. It was a major base on which he attempted to build a structure of support.¹¹ He declared that his army would defend both the "territorial" and "ideological" boundaries of Pakistan.¹² His measures in Islamization included pre-medieval Islamic laws like death sentence for adultery, exemplary public punishment for petty crimes etc. With the introduction of these and other measures, General Zia gained the support of the fundamentalists.

On August 12, 1983, General Zia gave a blueprint of the perceived Islamic political system. In effect, it was not a system based on political competition and party politics. The Islamic system was to be governed by the "best men". In an Islamic political system "sovereignty" belongs to Allah and people exercise only delegated authority. Hence, the leader or the ruler is described as god's vicegerent on earth. Without inhibitions, General Zia justified his induction into the political system of Pakistan as a "god-sent opportunity". He often called himself as

¹¹ Eric Gustafson and William Richter, "Pakistan in 1980 - Weathering Storm", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXI, No. 2, February, 1981, pp. 162-71.

¹² Hassan Gardezi, and Jamil Rashid, (ed) *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship* (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983) p.p.57-8.

"god's appointee".¹³ Extending Maulana Maudoodi's theory of an Islamic political order, General Zia justified his role as an Amir (ruler), or the President, and claimed to purify the ideological basis of Pakistani state, upholding the revealed will of Allah. He insisted that a legislative council (Majlis-i-Shoora) composed of men with requisite educational qualifications, was an essential feature of an Islamic state. Furthermore, unlike the western notion of competition-based democracy, Islamic ethos had no scope for political parties. The Islamic state gave priority to the principle of consensus (ijma) and did not believe in arbitrary or personalised rule.¹⁴

Methodical Islamization in General Zia's regime included Islamization at various levels of society. Religious institutions were brought under the direct patronage of the state. It became the state's responsibility to propagate religion and its teaching and the enforcement of strict observance of religious codes. Educational institutions were also Islamized and education was oriented to infuse "Islamic mentality". The major focus of Islamization was regulative, punitive and extractive. Very little attempt was made to project other aspect of Islam, i.e. social and economic egalitarianism and accountability of those in power, and

¹³ Ibid. pp. 218-19.

¹⁴ Veena Kukreja, "The Zia Regime: Legitimation through Islamisation", *Strategic Analysis* (IDSA, New Delhi), Vol. XXI, No. IV, June 1992, p. 188.

thus the socio-economic structural bases of the existing power arrangements remained unaltered. The following steps were taken by the military regime to promote Islamization:

The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was reconstituted to provide more representation to conservative and orthodox elements (Islamic scholars and Priests) for advising the government on Islamization of polity, including the review of the existing laws with the objective of bringing these into conformity with the Quran and the Sunnah.¹⁵

The constitution was amended to set-up a shariat bench in each of the four provincial High Courts and an Appellate Bench in the Supreme Court in early 1979. One year later, a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) replaced the Shariat benches. During the next five years (1980-85), several presidential orders were issued to modify the working of the FSC, and it was incorporated in the constitution as a separate chapter 3A. The FSC could hear cases pertaining to the Islamic laws enforced by the military government, dealing with Shariah-related petitions, and adjudicated, if a law of administrative action was disputed as being in violation of Islamic injunctions. An appeal against its judgement could be filed with the Appellate Bench of Supreme

¹⁵ Jamal Malik, *Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan*, (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1996), pp. 33-54.

Court. The FSC was, however, debarred from questioning the constitution, Muslim Personal Laws and fiscal matters, including taxation, banking and insurance. The President exercised wide discretion in the appointment, tenure and transfer of Judges of FSC, which adversely affected its independence.¹⁶

Four laws were issued in February 1979 to enforce Islamic punishments for a number of crimes, collectively called the Hudood Ordinances. This was the most prominent and, at times, controversial reforms carried out in Pakistan Penal Code. These prescribed penalties for various sex-related crimes, wrongful imputation of illicit sexual relations, theft of property and possession of alcohol and prohibited drugs. The punishment ranged from imprisonment, financial penalties, lashing, amputation of the right hand, and stoning to death for adultery and rape. In October 1984, a new Law of Evidence (Qanoon-i-Shahadat) replaced the existing law, which dated back to the British period. However, the new law was little different from the earlier law except that it rearranged and reworded the clauses and provided that, in the event of financial or future obligations, the

¹⁶ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 171.

evidence of two females was equal to one male; for other matters the courts could treat the evidence of both sexes at par.¹⁷

In the economic sphere, it was sought to provide for equitable distribution of wealth, taxation system in accordance with Islam, abolition of monopoly etc. A compulsory tax, Zakat, was introduced in 1980, which applied to saving accounts and other investments at the rate of 2.5 per cent per annum. Another tax, Ushr, made operative in 1983, applied to agricultural produce at the rate of 10 per cent of the value of the crop/produce.¹⁸

A Zakat fund was established with the initial amount of 2,250 million rupees for the help of widows, orphans and other needy persons. The major contribution for this fund came from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. A network of Zakat councils was set up from the federal level to provinces, districts and below for management and distribution of Zakat. General Zia's introduction of Islamic measures like Zakat, Ushr and Hudood punishments accentuated sectarian tension between the Sunnis and Shias. The Shias, who constitute nearly 15-20 per cent of the population, claim that their school of traditional legal thought, namely, *Jafari fiqh*, is different in its prescription from the Hanafi-based *Sunni*

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 171.

¹⁸ Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (ed.) *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), pp 356-57

fiqh.¹⁹ Shia demonstrations in 1980 against Zakat had led to violence and bloodshed. Islamic resurgence under Zia brought to the surface the differences among various Sunni sects, Deobandi, Barelvi, Wahabi, Alhe Hadith and so forth.²⁰ A Shariah faculty was established in the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, in September 1979. Later, a separate Islamic University was set up in Islamabad with the financial cooperation of a number of the Gulf States.²¹

Islamization of Education under General Zia:

Education provided another area of General Zia's Islamization programme. In this field, Islamization included redefining of the educational objectives in order to ensure that the education is "relevant" and inculcates Islamic mentality.²² The bureaucratic restructuring, necessary to implement the new educational objectives was to involve the development of a national school system, the abolition of the distinction between the madrasas and the modern scientific educational institutions, the determination of the policies relating to teachers training and

¹⁹ Satish Kumar, "Militant Islam: The Nemesis of Pakistan", *Aakrosh* (New Delhi) January 2000, Vol. 3, No. 6, p. 21.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 21.

²¹ Hasan Askari Rizvi, n. 16, p. 172.

²² David Taylor, "The Politics of Islam and Islamization in Pakistan", in James P. Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 181-88.

teaching standards and finally, the distribution of sources equally among all schools in order to reduce and eliminate the prestige hierarchy which characterized the then existing educational system.²³ Radical changes in Pakistan's educational system can be traced to 1972-1977 during the regime of Bhutto itself. Under Bhutto's nationalisation policy, educational system was also nationalized. Most of the changes introduced during that period were left intact by the General Zia's government also. Under General Zia, attempt was made to bring education into closer conformity with Islam to a greater extent. Under General Zia's regime, education was affected in five ways. The first is in the area of curriculum. There were now courses in religion (Islamiyat) from primary level through college and university and other curricula were revised to bring them in conformity with Islam.²⁴

The important area of Islamization was the expansion of formal instruction in the history and principle of Islam. Islamiyat (Islamic studies courses) as a 'subject' was made compulsory for every student throughout the academic career. Non-Muslims would have to offer a course on Pakistan culture and ideology as a substitute. The aim of the education policy was to create an

²³ Hassan, Riaz, "Islamization: An Analysis of Religious Political and Social Change in Pakistan", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, July 1985, p. 169.

²⁴ Louis D. Hayes, "Islamization and Education in Pakistan", *Asia Pacific Community*, No. 23, Winter 1984, p. 99.

integrated system of education bridging the long-standing bifurcation between the traditional, religious and modern scientific streams.²⁵

The courses and syllabi of schools and colleges were revised to place greater emphasis on Islamic principles and teachings and ideology of Pakistan.²⁶ A new provision was made that students enrolled in traditional Islamic educational institutions like *Maktabs*, *Madrasas* and *Darul- uloom* were to be offered financial assistance, which was available to students, enrolled in other schools and colleges and integrated curriculum was to facilitate horizontal and vertical mobility between traditional and modern educational institutions. Urdu replaced English as the medium of instruction in schools and colleges and assumed a prominent place in public life as Pakistan's national language. In Mosques classes, heretofore, teaching of the Quran (usually by rote) was expanded through the addition of the primary school curriculum and primary school teachers and was to be integrated into a massive anti-illiteracy campaign aimed at both children and adults.²⁷

²⁵ Ibid. p. 100.

²⁶ H.A. Rizvi, n. 16, p. 172.

²⁷ Louis D. Hayes, n.24, pp. 74-75.

General Zia's government issued instructions to the federal and provincial government employees that they must perform their religious duties and could avail a break for prayers. Simultaneously, the media, particularly Radio and Television (which were under the control of the government), were ordered to redesign their programmes, according to the Islamic teachings.²⁸ General Zia called upon all Pakistanis to wear national attire during working hours. Civil servants, university professors, and businessmen were asked to trade their suits for traditional-national attire. Increased emphasis on Pakistani - Islamic identity and fraternal ties with Arab Muslim countries resulted in increased use of Arabic in education and the renaming of cities, streets and public facilities. The city of Lyallpur became Faisalabad, and Islamic University became Quaid-i-Azam University.²⁹

Under the educational Islamization, all books, curriculum, methods, and indeed the entire corpus of the educational enterprise were brought in conformity with the teaching of Islam. To this end various boards and agencies were assigned the task of Islamizing the system also but it had problems of its own:

²⁸ R. Mazumdar, *Pakistan Jinnah to the Present Day, Vol.2* (New Delhi: Anmol Publication, 1998), p. 553.

²⁹ John L. Esposito, "Islam: Ideology and Politics in Pakistan" in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, *The State Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard Publication, 1987), pp. 356-7.

(a) There was problem of determining who was qualified to decide what was and what was not Islamic, and (b) what to do in the event of disagreement over basic principles.³⁰

The Islamization of education was widely criticised for being redundant, as the quality of instruction had diminished due to the lack of teaching materials especially books and shortage of teachers. Opposition within the educational establishment had made the implementation of Islamic education uneven; for example, the federal government mandated the teaching of Islamiyat but the Sind government announced it could not raise the resources to hire teachers.³¹ While the goal of creating a society based on Islamic values was often stated, it was not clear what the content of the curriculum or how this content was to be determined. Some educators described Islamization of curriculum as “propaganda”; others saw it as a device to keep the religious community happy.³²

In spite of General Zia's claim of cementing national bonds through Islamization during his eleven-year tenure, Pakistan was plagued by deep-seated sectarian, ethnic and linguistic tensions and antagonisms. The Shia Muslims strongly protested against

³⁰ Louis D. Hayes, "Islamization and Education in Pakistan", *Asia Pacific Community*, No. 23, Winter 1984, p. 102.

³¹ Ibid. p. 99.

³² Ibid. p. 100.

General Zia's Islamization measures which were ultimately concerned with imposition of Sunni hegemony in Pakistan.³³

The entire society remained marred by “culture of violence” and the lure of the Kalashnikovs. The youth got increasingly addicted to various drugs. Huge funds collected from the Islamic taxation system in the form of Zakat and Ushr, filled the pockets of corrupt officials, Zia loyalists and student wings of Jamaat-i-Islami, namely Islamic-Jammat-Tulba (IJT). The government gave priority to stockpiling of weapons rather than to health, education, housing and neglected areas in social service sector.³⁴

Islamization policy also affected the standard of textbooks. There was no positive extension of literacy. One out of three adults continued to remain illiterate, the rate of literacy fluctuated between 26 to 30 per cent during General Zia's years of reign. All these factors of General Zia's Islamization policy led to the mushrooming of madrasas in Pakistan.³⁵

Taliban Phenomenon:

In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan; ten of thousands of young men joined the Jihad (holy war) against the occupying force, with backing from

³³ S.N. Kaushik, n. 7, p. 223.

³⁴ H.A. Rizvi, op. n. 16. p. 172.

³⁵ Satish Kumar, n. 19, pp. 22-23.

Pakistan, Iran, Arab countries and the United States. Pakistan provided safe sanctuaries to the Afghan refugees and fielded the Mujahideen fighters who were waging war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan assumed a key role, acting as the conduit of arms and assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen.

Before the Soviet invasion in 1979, Pakistan's eastern and western borders were both in dispute.³⁶ The disagreement over the Durand line (the International border between Pakistan and Afghanistan) had frequently resulted in tensions. At the core of this tension was Kabul's claim to all the Pushtun-speaking people who straddled the Durand line. The Soviet invasion altered the strategic context of all these disputed boundaries.

First, displacement of millions from Afghanistan into neighbouring countries blurred the regional borders. Second, massive amounts of American arms and economic aid buttressed the Pakistan military in relation to other states in the region. At its peak, between the US and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan had received more than one billion in arms and money annually to fight the Afghan war. The US had forged a powerful strategic alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan was declared not only a frontline state as General Zia- ul- Haq was fond of pointing out,

³⁶ Maya, Chadda, " Talibanisation of Pakistan's Transitional Democracy" *World Affairs* (New York) July-September, 1999, Vol.3, No. 3, p. 101.

but also “a safe haven” to more than three million Afghan refugees. The fleeing refugees were both a danger and an opportunity. They strained Pakistan’s fragile social fabric and burdened its economy, but their presence offered General Zia an opportunity to recast the regional map in Pakistan’s favour.³⁷

General Zia’s first objective was strategic ;to make the Durand line a firm and mutually recognised boundary between the two states. This meant Afghan leaders had to be persuaded to abandon their traditional claim to the Pushtun’s speaking territories of the Northwestern and Western part of Pakistan. The flight of huge numbers of Pushtun speaking Afghan across the border into Peshawar was then a godsent chance for General Zia. To pre-empt future Afghan demands, he sought to bring all Pushtuns on both sides of the border under Pakistan’s control. General Zia hoped to use the trans-border Pushtun enclave to not only end the Afghan claims across the Durand line but also to create a formidable buffer, buttressed by the Hindukush mountain, between it and the Soviet imperial domain to the North. This was now possible since the fight for Afghanistan was being waged from the refugee camps in Peshawar, and Zia controlled the money and the weapons to the Afghan Mujahideens.

³⁷ Ibid.p.102.

The Pushtun strategy was also meant to give Pakistan leverage over the course of the struggle for Afghanistan both during and after Soviet occupation had ended. There were other advantages to Zia's strategy, American arms and economic assistance pouring into Pakistan gave it the wherewithal to strengthen and modernise its military, and provided it with a "strategic depth" (as General Aslam Baig described it) against its traditional enemy, India.³⁸

Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq allowed the establishment of a chain of madrasas (religious schools) along the Pak-Afghan border. Lieutenant General (Retd.) Kamal Matinuddin, an observer of the Afghan scenario, writes that Zia did so in order to create a belt of religion-oriented students, who would reinforce the Afghan *Mujahideen* to evict Russia from Afghanistan. At the same time, it was an effort to obtain the support base from the Pakistani *mullahs*, among whom he was building as his own political constituency³⁹. Very soon, madrasas began to sprout in almost all the major cities of the NWFP and Balochistan. Later on, they spread to Punjab, Sindh, and the Northern Areas. The madrasas, which were functioning in Afghanistan before the Soviet occupation of the country, also

³⁸ General Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 20.

³⁹ H.A.Rizvi, n. 16, pp. 22-23.

moved into Pakistan and established themselves in different parts of the country.⁴⁰In addition to receiving donations from local philanthropists, these madrasas were reportedly massively funded by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and some friendly conservative Muslim countries as well. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq had also authorised the district *Zakat* Committees to give them money from the official *Zakat* funds.⁴¹ Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia sub-contracted much of the dealing with the Afghan *Mujahideen* groups to the *Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)*. In 1981, Pakistani authorities in consultation with *Jamaat-e-Islami*, and the Saudi Arabia, reorganized dozens of *Mujahideen* parties, which had been clamouring for aid, into seven groups for the purpose of receiving aid. Since there was a close collaboration between the *Ji* and *Hizb-e-Islami* of Hikmatyar, a big share of the arms and aid went to the latter. The Arab donors, who paid for the transportation of weapons and other related functions, gave such sub-contracts almost exclusively to their favourites, i.e. Hikmatyar and Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf.⁴² Saudi Arabia was extremely active in developing Islam-oriented institutions, madrasa and mosques in Afghanistan and the Afghan

⁴⁰ General Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon*,(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 14-15.

⁴¹ Barnet R. Rubin, *In Search of Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer to Failed State*, (Yale University Press, 1995), p. 37.

⁴² Ibid.

refugee camps in Pakistan.⁴³ In the refugee camps almost every *Mujahideen* group had established its respective madrasas according to its own religious affiliations.

The Taliban ("student" in Pashto) first emerged as a force in 1993 out of religious schools (madrasas) in Pakistan. At these madrasas thousands of Afghan students were indoctrinated into a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. They were also given military training and armed by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency with support from the CIA and funding from Saudi Arabia.⁴⁴ Since massive funding was being done by different Muslim sources in the name of Islam, Jihad, and refugees, they found that by opening madrasas, it was an easy means to muster support and strength. Thus, a mushroom growth of madrasas began, both in and outside the refugee camps. So the Taliban were, essentially, products of Pakistani madrasas, says Islamic scholar Asghar Ali Engineer.⁴⁵

Throughout the 1980s, while Pakistan's Afghan policy was conducted with the help of the *Jamaat-e-Islami* and *Hizb-e-Islami* of Hikmatyar, *Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)* quietly built up a support base in Balochistan and NWFP, by opening up numerous

⁴³ Peter Marden, *Taliban War, Religion and New Order in Afghanistan*, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1998), p. 84.

⁴⁴ *Frontline*, (Chennai), October 26, 2001, p. 132.

⁴⁵ *The Times of India*, New Delhi, November 4, 2001.

madrasas to carry out relief work in the various refugee camps. Indirectly it created its influence over the *Durrani Pukhtoos* living in Balochistan and around Kandahar, who had a great deal in common with the Afghan Taliban.⁴⁶ Virtually all of the Afghan Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pakistan and have studied in the madrasas run by one or the other faction of the JUI. The main faction was headed by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, while the other by Mualana Sami-ul-Haq—hence the JUI (F) and JUI (S), respectively.

During the more than two decades of stay of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the notional difference between Pakistanis and Afghans had diminished, particularly in the areas where there was an Afghan concentration. One entire Afghan generation was born in and grew up on Pakistani soil. They feel more at home in Pakistan than in Afghanistan; rather they have no experience of having lived in Afghanistan. They also got married into Pakistani families. Many carry Pakistani national identity cards, and form an important electoral vote bank, which was evident in the 1997 general elections when they voted in large numbers for the JUI. The Taliban recruited hundreds of Pakistani students, who belong to JUI, to fight for their cause in Afghanistan.⁴⁷ Since the

⁴⁶ William Maley, *Fundamentalism Reborn, Afghan and Taliban*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1998), p. 74

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p.75.

Sami-ul-Haq faction of JUI reportedly ran more than one thousand madrasas with *Darul Uloom Haqqania*, with Akora Khattak, as its headquarters, a number of the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban leaders use *Haqqani* with their names. They, in fact, are not related to each other, but such links are helpful to the Taliban in providing them recruits, both Pakistani and Afghan. For example, Maulana Sami-ul-Haq claimed that most of his students joined the Taliban after the latter's defeat in Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997. In his words: "Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban movement, personally rang me and requested me to send my students to Afghanistan and fight for the Taliban".⁴⁸

Ahmed Rashid, a political reporter on Afghanistan, opines that JUI (F) became more effective both in internal politics, as well as for the Taliban when it joined Benazir Bhutto's coalition government in 1993. For the first time, it gained an access to the corridors of power and established close links with the ISI and the Pakistan's Interior Ministry. In 1996, the Taliban handed over the control of training camps in Afghanistan to the JUI factions, and thus enhanced their image and influence within Pakistani and Arab Taliban.⁴⁹ According to Ahmad Rashid, "The Taliban derived

⁴⁸ Barnet R. Rubin, "Afghanistan Under the Taliban", *Current History*, Vol. 625, 1999, p. 85.

⁴⁹ Ahmed Rashid, "Taliban Exporting Terrorism", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), November/December 1999, p. 25.

much of their religious inspiration from *Deobandis*, a Sunni movement that arose in India in the late 19th century. It was aimed at regenerating the real Muslim Society. The *Deobandis* actually sought to harmonise classical Islamic texts with the current realities - which the Afghan Taliban have ignored to do. They are interpreting a stricter version of Islam, which is primitive and extreme in nature. Saudi Arabian funds and scholarships have brought the Taliban's version closer to the *Wahabism*, currently prevalent in Saudi Arabia."⁵⁰

It is common knowledge that the Jamat-e-Islami with whom Nasirullah Babar, the Interior Minister in Benazir Bhutto's government was closely associated, had an important role to play in the emergence of the Taliban. The ISI was directly involved in the creation and evolution of the Taliban. Pakistan was not only provided moral and diplomatic support to the Taliban, but was also extending financial and technical assistance. Pakistan's friendly attitude towards the Taliban became more evident when General Babar welcomed and publicized the action taken by the religious students against the local warlords who had ambushed the Pakistani convoy near Kandahar. General Babar continued his efforts to bring about reconciliation between the Taliban and anti-Taliban alliances, to persuade them to agree to a cease-fire,

⁵⁰ Kamal Matinuddin. n. 40 pp. 164-66

and that Babar made efforts towards making the three-power groups accept a formula for ending the conflict. However, the President dismissed the second Benazir government on the night of November 5, 1996, and General Babar no longer wielded his baton.

Reasons for Pakistan's Support to Taliban

The Taliban were predominantly Pushtun and therefore had the sympathy of the Pushtuns living especially in NWFP and Balochistan Province in Pakistan. The Taliban were strongest in areas adjacent to Pakistan and hence needed to be supported in the interest of better relations with Afghanistan in the future.

Turkmenistan's Karakorum desert is believed to hold third largest gas reserves in the world, some three trillion cubic meters, and has estimated oil reserves of six billion barrels. The shortest route to the open sea from Turkmenistan is through Afghanistan and Pakistan; therefore Pakistan supported the Taliban, who had total control over the route to Central Asia.⁵¹ Support for the Taliban was appreciated by Saudi Arabia, with whom Pakistan has always had the best of relations.

⁵¹ Maya Chadda. n. 36, p. 103.

Role of United States and Saudi Arabia

The Mujahideen received enormous financial, military and intelligence support from the United States, channeled through Pakistan and funded largely by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states. With the Soviet defeat, US interest in the region diminished and the large CIA presence in Pakistan was withdrawn. The ISI continued to train and channel Saudi funds to the Mujahideen and Arabs. After three years of civil war, they defeated the Najibullah government got involved in bitter factional fighting, leaving the country in chaos.

In 1979, President Carter issued a classified directive to initiate covert operations in Afghanistan.⁵² The CIA established close working relations with Pakistan's ISI, which ran the daily operations in Afghanistan. Between 1980-85 the CIA funded the recruitment and training of thousands of volunteers from three-dozen Muslim countries to fight in Afghanistan.⁵³

In 1985 the Regan administration sharply escalated covert action in Afghanistan. Through the 1980s the US channeled \$ 2-3 billion in weapons and supplies through the CIA and ISI as part of the largest US covert action programme since World War II.⁵⁴ By 1987, the US was sending more than 65,000 tons of arms

⁵² *Frontline* (Chennai), October 26, 2001, p. 132.

⁵³ *Ibid.* pp. 132-33

⁵⁴ Coll and Mary Anne Weaver, "The Real Bin Laden", *New York Times*, January 24, 2000.

annually to the Mujahideen, especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the most ruthless and puritanical faction.⁵⁵ The CIA and Pentagon operatives helped the ISI establish a network of schools in Pakistan and bases in Afghanistan to train the Mujahideen in secure communications, covert financial transactions, guerrilla warfare, urban sabotage and heavy weapons,⁵⁶ Mujahideen's use of stinger anti aircraft missiles helped turn the tide of war against the Soviets.

As stated earlier, US had forged an alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. General Zia's objectives happily converged with the anti-Soviet containment objectives of the other partners in the strategic alliance, the United States and Saudi Arabia. In its desire to be seen as the defender of Islam, Saudi Arabia provided funds to support the Afghan struggle. The Saudi interest was to promote Sunni Wahabi Islam in Afghanistan and weaken Shia groups that were sympathetic to Iran.

Ms. Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia during the Clinton Administration in 1996, visited Kandahar and met the Taliban leaders to address their real intention, and to try and convince them of the need to broaden their base in

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Mohammed Yusuf, *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story*, (London: L. Cooper, 1992). pp. 189-90.

Kandahar. Mullah Muttaqi, the leader of the Taliban delegation, told Raphel that the United States should use its influence in the United Nations to impose economic and military sanctions to force the Afghan president to step down as a precondition for an extra-Afghan peace dialogue.⁵⁷ Since the US was interested in an end to the strife in Afghanistan, Raphel did try to persuade the Taliban to participate in an intra-Afghanistan peace moot in Jalalabad. Raphel insisted that the US did not intend to get directly involve in Afghanistan. Raphel's formula for peace in Afghanistan included: a ceasefire, a neutral security force, demilitarisation of Kabul etc., all of these proposals had been made before and were acceptable to all the Afghan factions including the Taliban. The major hurdle in the implementation of these ideas was that each group wanted to secure its own interest in the final deal and was not willing to compromise on any of its demands. The US soon realised that the Taliban were becoming too big for their boots and were creating more problems. Their extreme religious views were also a matter of concern as this according their views could lead to Taliban involvement in international terrorism against the United States and their allies in the Arab world.

⁵⁷ Kamal, Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997*(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.165-7,

Another factor that influenced the decision of the US to take a more direct interest in bringing about peace in Afghanistan was the involvement of the US firm Unocal in the construction of two pipe lines from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Arabian Sea. Unocal had put in a bid to construct the pipeline, but the \$2 billion project could only come online if a broad-based government was established in Afghanistan, this naturally increased US interest in Afghanistan.⁵⁸

Washington was interested in verifying the presence of training camps in Taliban-controlled areas as, according to US intelligence agencies, some of the Islamists who tried to blow up the World Trade Centre had been trained on Afghan soil. The religious attitudes of the Taliban were unacceptable to the US administration, it could not just wish them away. The Mullah's did control two-thirds of Afghanistan and seemed set to do so for quite a while.

The religious schools (madrasas) produced Afghan trained warriors who turned up in all parts of the world from Morocco to China, from Bosnia to the Philippines and not to mention in Kashmir. Even if Osama Bin Laden is the terrorist that

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 167

Washington claims, he is just part of the problem.⁵⁹ In late 1980s, according to intelligence sources, bin Laden and some Egyptians formed Al Qaeda (The Base) for a global crusade. He spent some time in Sudan, lost his Saudi citizenship for objecting to US bases there during the Gulf War, and eventually returned to Afghanistan in 1996. Two years later bin-Laden and several other militants announced publicly that they had founded the international Islamic front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, an umbrella entity that included Al Qaeda. Their mission was, "to kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, as an individual duty of every Muslim who is able in any country where this is possible".⁶⁰

In mid-2000 Taliban became a sub-army of Osama Bin Laden who began to pay the leaders of the Taliban and directly influenced the Taliban movement.⁶¹ On 11, September 2001, the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were attacked resulting in over 6,000 civilian deaths. The US named bin-Laden as a prime suspect and threatened to attack Afghanistan for harbouring him. President Bush states, "From this day onwards, any nation that continues to harbour or supports terrorism will be regarded by the

⁵⁹ *Asiaweek*, September 21, 2001, p. 39.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 39-40

⁶¹ <http://www.afghanland.com>

United States as a hostile, regime".⁶² On October 8, 2001, US launched its military campaign against Afghanistan, and finally Taliban surrendered their stronghold of Kandahar on first week of December.

⁶² *The Times of India*, (New Delhi) September 20, 2001.

Chapter-III

CHAPTER III

The Role of Madrasa in Promotion of Islamic Militancy

In the post cold war period, Islamic militancy and terrorism have emerged as the most dangerous phenomena in international affairs. 'Islamic fundamentalism' has spread for the last two decades in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Radical Islamic groups of several hues have sprung up in both these countries, by a belief that Islamic tenets as interpreted by them, must prevail. Most radical Islamic organisations justify use of force against those societies and Muslim states, which do not follow their interpretation of "Shariah" and the "Quran".¹ They believe that Muslims who follow the western secular and cultural norms are in fact non-believers who should either conform or be eliminated. The missionary zeal of Islamic fundamentalist movements and their efforts to impose rigid Wahabi traditions on the Muslims of the South and Central Asian regions has disturbed peace.

The activities of Islamic fundamentalist organisations reveal that they are not really reformists, but are using the name of Islam to achieve their political objectives. They usually take up arms against those who do not cooperate. Being extremely narrow-minded and bigoted, fundamentalist groups have generated ethnic, sectarian and

¹ Satish Kumar, "Militant Islam: The Nemesis of Pakistan", *Aakarosh* (New Delhi, January 2000), vol. 3, no. 6, p.17

cultural violence in many countries in South Asia.² Since the 1980s, Pakistan has emerged as the gateway for the organised projection of militant Islam into the region. Strategic considerations and religious affinities have enabled Pakistan to exploit the situations of internal conflict in the South Asia region. "Islamic militancy is a political and military strategy, which seeks to Islamize domestic political arrangements as well as external strategic relationship, i.e. within and between countries."³ The changes sought are revolutionary because they require system change and radical alteration of relationships, institutions and principles of social, political, military and economic organisations.

Islamic militancy has the qualities of ideological and religious fanaticism. In Pakistan's case, Islamic militancy demonstrates the existence of durable connection in sub-national elements, which are politically and militarily organised and are aligned to influential segments of the state/government (which has an Islamicized military strategy in Pakistan)⁴. A transnational dimension exists in as much as the sub-national and the statistic forces in the neighborhood outside Pakistan seek to form a mini-international Islamic society. Islamic Pakistani society and government links go back to at least 1977.⁵

² Ibid.

³ Donohue, J.L. and J.L. Esposito, *Islam in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 99.

⁴ G.H. Jansen, *Militant Islam* (London: Pan Books, 1979) p. 99.

⁵ Ibid. p. 139.

Secondly, the agenda of the Islamic players is trans-nationalism as is clear by the association of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies with the Taliban forces in the west, by their association with various militant movements and insurgencies in Kashmir and Indian Punjab in the east, and by the links with Islamic forces in Central Asia.⁶ At the same time, Islamic forces have been engaged in the transformation of Pakistan into an Islamic state and society. The battlefield is, therefore, both external and internal. The growth of Sunni-Shi'ite violence and strife is a sign that Pakistan itself is an ideological and a military battlefield, and militant Islam is not only actively involved with conflict in Kashmir, Punjab and other parts of world but also engaged with internal conflict within Pakistan as well.

Islamic militancy and extremism have emerged as potentially the most threatening form of international terrorism since the closing years of 1980s. This form of terrorism has little to do with Islam as such. Islam provides a convenient religious cover for its perpetrators to achieve political objectives through the means of violence and coercion. A violent and terrorist movement, launched in the name of Islam, touches the sentiments of the followers of Islam, which makes of a more lethal and dangerous destabilizing phenomena for Muslims as well as non-Muslim countries. Pakistan emerges as the chief patron and

⁶ Jeff Haynes, *Religion in Global Politics*, (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1998), pp. 65-70.

promoter of Islamic militancy and terrorism with the aim of utilising it to serve its policy interests.⁷

Pakistan's open and official association with Islamic politics began with the seizure of power by General Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977. In order to gain legitimacy for his rule and to develop close relations with Muslim countries, especially oil rich Saudi Arabia, General Zia projected himself as a champion and his country the "citadel" of Islam. The Soviet military intervention in neighboring Afghanistan came as an Islamic cause and defender of the faith.⁸

Pakistan declared that Islam was in danger in Kabul and gave a call for Jihad to throw the infidel Soviet army out of Afghanistan. Overnight Afghan refugees were converted into Mujahideen (holy warrior), Pakistan, obviously assumed the role of the "frontline state" and under its supervision and control, a chain of training camps were set up along the Pak-Afghan border to impart religious indoctrination and military training to Afghan Mujahideen and thousands of enthusiastic Muslim youth from other countries who had been rushing in to participate in the Jihad. Organisation like the fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-ulema-e-Islam and Markaz Dawa-wal Irshad were in the forefront of the whole venture.⁹ Militant Islam was

⁷ P.B. Sinha, "Pakistan - The Chief Patron-Promoter of Islamic Militancy and Terrorism," *Strategic Analysis* (IDSA, New Delhi), vol. XX, no. 3, p. 1015.

⁸ Ibid. p. 1015.

⁹ Ahmad Mumtaz, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia", in Martin E.Harty

raised to a very high pitch and it was strengthened manifold, witnessed the birth of a new breed of militarily trained religious fanatics ready to take and give life for the cause of Islam.¹⁰

Three immediate objectives can be discerned in Pakistan's support and encouragement to Islamic militancy and terrorism as a means to attain primacy among Muslim countries. First, and the foremost, targeted India. It was planned that well-trained Islamic militant Pakistani, Arab, Afghan and of Kashmiri origin-on their own, as well as in collaboration with locally drafted elements, would unleash a sustained campaign of sabotage, subversion, assassinations and other kinds of terrorist activities in as many parts of India as feasible and thus create chaos and strife in the country. In Kashmir, trained Islamic extremists would incite the religious sentiments and susceptibilities of Kashmiri Muslims and channelise their feelings aroused towards anti-Hindu, anti-India direction. Having thus created a favourable atmosphere, those Islamists and pro-Pakistan Muslim elements would then resort to a bloody campaign of terrorism as an "Islamic war" that would ultimately lead to secession of Kashmir from India, which would facilitate the fulfillment of their long-cherished dream of incorporating Kashmir into Pakistan.¹¹

and R.Scott Appleby (eds.) *Fundamentalism Observed*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 458.

¹⁰ Donohue and Esposito, no.3, pp. 122-3.

¹¹ P.B. Sinha, no.7. p. 1016.

The second objective related to Afghanistan by exporting Islamic militancy and terror through a subservient Islamic dispensation in Kabul as well as independent of it. Pakistan would be able to exercise a commanding ideological and politico-economic influence over preponderantly Muslim areas of erstwhile Soviet Union and Xinjiang, the Muslim-majority regions in northwest China.¹² Thirdly, the Islamic militant force would be useful in promoting the cause of Islam by violent and terrorist means in other parts of the world. The stages in which a Jehadi eventually indulges in militancy have been summarized as:¹³

The Making of a Jehadi: - A snapshot of how the Madrasas recruit and train terrorists.

Motivation: - Rhetoric from the popular leaders like, Osama bin-Laden supporters at local mosques about worldwide persecution of Muslims piques interest in defending Islam militarily.

Audition: - Network leader meets possible recruit in Peshawar, and many places in Pakistan, for a screening.

Training: - Once approved, recruit attends training camp in Afghanistan, POK and other places in Pakistan to learn: basic military skills and strategy.

¹² P.B. Sinha, Op. cit. no. 7, p. 1022.

¹³ *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), October 12, 2001

Education: - Gets advanced training at another camp, learns how to blend into a foreign community

Graduation: - Returns to his basic camps for instruction on destination and objectives.

Sowing the seed: - Joins a cell of four or five other militants to provide support, develop ideas for an attack.

Implementation: - A coordinator is called in once a plan is well developed to pull various cells together and implement the attack.

Most madrasas in Pakistan, imparting the teaching of Jihad, in the militant sense, is included in their curriculum. Teaching and preaching Jihad, and producing holy warriors is considered as their supreme objective. In some madrasas, military training such as the use of weapons, learning the art of guerilla warfare, and so forth, are also imparted.¹⁴ The emergence of purely Jehadi organisations is important feature of the Pakistani madrasas. They vow to fight for the cause of Islam and for Muslims the world over. They have association with political religious forces.¹⁵ Together, the Islamic political parties and the militant outfits have given rise to what may be called a "Jehadi culture", with Jehadi movements and Jehadi strategies which are deployed inside and outside the country by the vested interests.

¹⁴ Suba Chandran, "Madrasas in Pakistan: A Brief Overview", 25 January 2000, <http://www.ipcs.com>

¹⁵ Babarshah, "The Myth of Talibanisation of Pakistan", <http://www.jang-group.com>

The recruits are taken to training camps, most of them located in the northern parts of Pakistan and POK. The Al-Akhwan Academy located in the mountainous region of Chakwal about 110 km from Islamabad, can train a batch of 750 recruits at a time. Markaz-e-Taiba, which can train 400 recruits at a time, meets the needs of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Al Badar-I and Al Badar-II in Muzaffarabad specialise in commando operations.¹⁶

The basic training lasts six to eight weeks. It starts with a process of indoctrination, in which the recruits are made to read Islamic literature and be psychologically prepared for Jihad. They are asked to climb mountains in the dark, carrying on their shoulder bags weighing 20-30 kg. During this session, the trainees are constantly watched, and only those who are found committed and psychologically fit are selected for the next stage of training. The selected ones are sent for the Special Task Force (STF), after a short break of two to three weeks. During this session the recruits are trained in handling guns, firing methods, dismantling and assembling weapons etc. They handle all kinds of weapons-from pistols to Kalashnikovs to rocket launchers to rocket propelled grenades. A winding up session during which tests are conducted to assess the trainees follows the STF course. Certificates are sent to the heads of the organisations to which the youth belong. The best candidates are sometimes recalled for commando training, which lasts about three

¹⁶ Masood Ansari, "Jihad Factories" *Frontline* (Chennai), October 2001, p. 67


months. Such activity is buttressed by the madrasa culture that is prevalent in Pakistan. Karachi alone had 43 centers in universities and colleges.¹⁷ One example cited is of the jihad-training center at Muridke, which was founded by three nationals of a Muslim brotherly country. The Markaz-Dawa-wal Irshad (Jamat-ul-Dawa Pakistan), was founded by three university teachers, Zafar Iqbal and Hafiz Mohammad Saeed from the university of Engineering and Technology in Lahore, and Abdullah Azam of the International Islamic University in 1987. From its relatively humble beginning, it grew into a formidable force. In 1997, the organisation was running 30 schools where nearly 5,000 students were enrolled. While these schools followed the official syllabus for the teaching of secular subjects, additional study of Arabic, the "Quran" and "Sunnah" were compulsory from the primary level. These schools were clearly geared towards producing Mujahideen or holy warriors, ready to wage Jihad.¹⁸ "We will continue to work in the twin fields of education and Jihad", said Professor Zafar Iqbal, one of the founders of the Markaz. "Jihad is being carried out to establish the system of Allah in the world. But this system cannot be established without education", Professor explained.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ibid. pp. 67-68.

¹⁸ Zaigham Khan, "From Strength to Strength" *The Herald*, January 1998, p. 125.

¹⁹ Zaigham Khan, "Allah's Army", *The Herald* (Karachi), January 1998, p. 125.

Parties, Militant groups and Splinter groups: -



Source: *The Herald*, (Karachi) May 2000, p.54.

Jamaat-I-Islami: -At the dawn of independence, Maudoodi's Jamaat-i-Islami, established in 1941, symbolised the aspirations of the religious groups to control power in the country established in the name of Islam. The Jamaat-i-Islami runs the Syed Maudoodi International Institute at its headquarter in Lahore, which trains and financially helps, Islamists. For the Jamaat-i-Islami, the dispatching of zealots to

fight against oppression of Muslims in any part of the world, or the bombing of an enemy installation, was justified if it was for the larger Islamic cause. The Jamaat-I-Islami has well-disciplined cadres, through which it vociferously advocates fundamentalism.²⁰

Hizbul Mujahideen: - commonly known as a pro-Pakistan group, the Hizb is a militant outfit of the Jamaat-i-Islami in Indian held Kashmir. Syed Salahuddin heads this group, which has been operating in Kashmir since its inception in 1989 in Shrinagar. Most of its militants are Kashmiri, both from the P.O.K. and Kashmir.²¹

Al Badar: -is the third largest militant group operating in Jammu & Kashmir. In its present form, the organization surfaced in September 1998, after splitting away from the Hizbul Mujahideen and Bakht Zameen is the current chief of Al Badar. An organization by the name first emerged in 1971 when it persecuted the Bengalis of East Pakistan. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Al Badr operated as a function of Hekmatyar's Hizb-e- Islami. The organization begins training the first Kashmiri insurgents in 1989, and in 1990 became actively involved in Kashmir as a regiment in the Hizbul Mujahideen.²²

Tehrik-e-Jafaria: - A major Shia organization in Pakistan, the party was born following the major success of the Shia's protest movement

²⁰ Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Afsir Karim, "A profile of Islamic Resurgence in South Asia". *Aakrosh* (New Delhi) April 1999 vol. 2 no. 3 pp. 12-15

²¹ Zaffar Abbas, "A Who's Who of Kashmir Militancy?" *The Herald* (Karachi) August 2000 p. 29

²² Sumita Kumar, "Pakistan's Jehadi Apparatus: Goals and Methods". *Strategic Analysis* (IDSA, New Delhi) March 2001, vol. XXIV no. 12 p. 2186

against certain aspects of Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation Laws. It splintered into many groups including Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan, a violent anti-Sunni faction.

Harkatul Mujahideen: -It is one of the most active militant groups, which has often been accused by western countries of involve in terrorism. When the United States declared Harkatul Ansar a terrorist organization in 1995, following the kidnapping of five western tourists in Kashmir, the group immediately changed its name to Harkatul Mujahideen. But the name also has a history of its own. Harkatul Ansar itself was formed in 1993 when two Deobandi militant groups, Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami and Harkatul Mujahideen merged with each other. Farooq Kashmiri, with Fazlur Rehman Khalil as a secretary-general, presently heads it. In terms of political and material support, it is linked to both the factions of Jamiat-ul-Ualma-e-Islam (JUI) of Samiul Haq and Fazlur Rehman.²³

The most typical of these organizations, and the one with the largest manpower and resources, is Lashkar-e-Taiba (army of the pure) is the militant wing of Jamaat-ul-Dawa Pakistan, an Ahle Hadith Wahabi organisation based in Muridke, near Lahore founded in 1986. There are many Pakistani Jehadi organisations operating on the Indian

²³ Ibid p. 29

side in Kashmir, but Lashkar is the largest of them. Eighty per cent of the Lashkar's soldiers belong to Pakistan.²⁴

Compared to other similar organisations, the Lashkar-e-Taiba has proved to be more powerful. Since its inception, it has managed to attract thousands of committed young madrasa students to its fold. The Lashkar prefers not to reveal the exact number of men, it deploys in Kashmir at a given time. “The Amir decides how many Mujahideen (holy warrior) should be sent to the valley”, is all that the spokesman reveals, “The decision depends on the number of deaths that have taken place. It also depends on the recruitment and capacity of the organisation inside Kashmir to absorb new fighters”.²⁵

A Decade of Conflict in the Valley

Year	No. Of L-e-T Militants killed	Year	No. Of L -e-T Militants killed
1990	1	1996	84
1991	03	1997	112
1992	01	1998	91
1993	20	1999	253
1994	31	2000	289
1995	36	2001	312

Source: *The Herald* (Karachi), January 2001, p. 125.

An interview with the Amir of the Lashkar-e-Taiba reveals the specific motivations and goals of this organisation interview conducted

²⁴ Zaigham Khan, “In God We Trust”, *The Herald* (Karachi), January 2002, p. 47.

²⁵ Azmat Abbas, “Lashkar’s Big Split”, *The Herald* (Karachi) August 2000, p.58.

by a Pakistani Journalist, Zaigham Khan, with Hafiz Mohammed Khan; "Our Jihad is confined strictly to non-Muslims, and particularly Hindus and Jews, the two main enemies of the Muslims".²⁶

The Lashkar operates four training camps-Maoskar-e-Taiba, Moaskar-e-Aqsa, Omal Qura and Abdullah Bin Masood-in the mountainous terrain of Jammu -Kashmir. The organisation has also set up a Baitul Mujahideen (house of Mujahideen) in Muzaffarabad, which serves as a reception office for all those aspiring to join the struggle in Kashmir. There are two different modes of training imparted at these camps. The first is a 21-day standard or general course called the Daura-e-Aama, while the second is a more intensive three-month course called Daura-e-Khasa. It is during the latter that the recruits learn the techniques of guerrilla warfare, use of small arms and the art of ambushing. As a matter of policy, a volunteer must stop shaving and grow bread as soon as he has formally been recruited by the organization.²⁷

Pakistan, on December 25, 2001, froze the bank accounts of L-e-T and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, which were blacklisted by US president George Bush. Lashkar-e-Taiba chief, Hafiz Muhammad said on December 25, 2001-"We have no offices or assets in Pakistan-our

²⁶ Zaigham Khan, 'Allah's army', *The Herald* (Karachi), January 1998, p. 125.

²⁷ Azmat Abbas, no.25, pp. 47-8

assets are our Mujahideen and who can freeze them?"²⁸ Lashkar was said to be involved in the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament. President Musharraf banned this organization on January 12, 2002.

Jaish-e-Mohammad: -(Army of Mohammad) Differs from other Jehadi outfits in the scope of its agenda, which extended beyond the battle against Indian forces in occupied Kashmir. Following its creation in the last week of January 2000, the group quickly became involved in sectarian warfare within Pakistan and its approach towards Jihad proved to be a source of conflict with other Jehadi organisations.²⁹ The Jaish-e-Mohammad, which was banned on January 12, 2002, grew at an astonishing rate during its two-year existence. Its chief Maulana Masood Azhar expounded the concept of muqqalid or follower, a doctrine, which has its roots in Deobandi teachings. Azhar preached that Jihad could not be waged in the absence of a spiritual leader to whom all holy warriors owe allegiance and condemned those who did not subscribe to the idea. Jehadi groups saw this as a direct attack on the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other Jehadi organisations following the Ahle Hadith school of thought.³⁰ Jaish's formation splintered the Harkatul mujahideen, formerly known as the Harkatul Ansar, and a large number of Harkat activists opted for Azhar's organisation. They not

²⁸ *The Times of India*, (New Delhi), December 25, 2001.

²⁹ *The Hindustan Times*, (New Delhi), February 22, 2002.

³⁰ Azmat Abbas, "Tightening the Noose", *The Herald* (Karachi), February 2002, p. 34.

only offered their services, but also almost overnight, converted Harkat offices across the country into Jaish outlets. Some hard-line Lashkar-e-Taiba activists also crossed over to the Jaish-e-Mohammad.³¹ General Musharraf also banned it on January 12, 2002.

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan: - is a hard line Sunni political-cum-militant organisation. It is vigorously opposed to Iran and to the Shia community in Pakistan. It has links with Harkatul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad. It assumed the role of patron and its chief Azam Tariq became Masood Azhar's muqquadid.³² Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is a separate militant wing of the SSP. It is one of the most dreaded militant sectarian organisations operating in Pakistan.³³ The SSP came to be the umbrella political group while the Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi represented the organisation's Jehadi and domestic militant wings respectively.³⁴ Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf banned both organizations on August 14, 2001.

In Pakistan, there is close relationship between Islamic political parties and various militant outfits. For instance, the Jamiat-ul-ulema-e-Islam (JUI) had a fundamental connection with the Taliban, since Afghans educated at JUI-run madrasas, originally formed the rank and file of the student's militia. The Jamaat-i-Islami is said to have spawned

³¹ Ibid. p. 35.

³² P.B. Sinha, no. 7, p. 1887.

³³ Ibid, p. 1888.

³⁴ Azmat Abbas, no. 30, p. 35.

a guerrilla offshoot of the Hizb-ul-mujahideen, while most Ahle Hadith political groups in the country are affiliated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba.³⁵ Similarly, Shia political parties in Pakistan are associated with the Hizb-e-Wahadat. After cutting their teeth in battle in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the young Islamist militant have proved to be a key human resource for hard-line religious parties in their activities on the streets of Pakistan.³⁶

Pakistan can blame no one else other than itself for the backlash of its Afghanistan policy in terms of increased militancy and terrorism at home and outside. Thousands of volunteers affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulema (Fazlur-Rehman), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Samiul Haq) JUI (S), Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-i-Jhangvi, and Kashmiri fighters from the Harkat-ul-mujahideen, Hizb-ul-mujahideen, Al-badr mujahideen, and Arab nationals from the different countries have been trained in guerrilla and defense warfare in Afghanistan during the last two decades, and hundreds more continue to report at the military camp in PoK. What is noticeable about this activity is that no minimum age is set for the recruitment, and boys in their early teens are often seen heading for the frontline.³⁷

³⁵ Satish Kumar, "Militant Islam: The Nemesis of Pakistan", *Aakrosh*, (New Delhi, January 2000), Vol. 3, NO. 6, p. 35.

³⁶ Ibid. p. 35.

³⁷ Behroz Khan, "Sectarian Spillover", *Newsline* (Karachi), October 1999, p. 76.

There is popular misconception that young Pakistani men who volunteer for Jihad invariably do so out of a lack of viable economic options. This is particularly untrue in Karachi where most budding Jihadis hail from middle/upper-middle and even upper class families.³⁸ A similar trend prevails in other large cities-which in turn explode another myth, that Pakistan's holy warriors are largely confined to the country's tribal and northern areas. As example, twenty five year old Moazim Shaikh was involved in an encounter on April 7, 2001 with the Indian troops near Dodu Baniyal district in the Jammu sector. He is one of the hundreds of young militants who have died in Kashmir, one of the world's hottest spots of Islamic Jihad (holy war). He was motivated to join the "holy warriors" in Kashmir when he was studying in Chandka Medical College, Larkana. He became a member of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Hafeez Shaikh, an engineer, believed that Moazim, his son, is a Shaheed (martyr). Shaheeds never die, they pass from one world to another.³⁹

Role of ISI

Maj. General Cawthorne created ISI in 1948. It is the paramount intelligence agency in Pakistan and controls most of the levers of power in the undercover fraternity. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

³⁸ Hussain Askari, "*The Herald*", (Karachi), December 2001, p. 23.

³⁹ Massoud Ansari, "The Jihad Factories", *Frontline* (Chennai), August 17, 2001, p. 65.

supports all the Jehadi organisations.⁴⁰ Pakistan has been using intelligence as an instrument of policy execution, not just for policy formulation. As a result, ISI had donned the role of an army. Stealth, covert action and surprise are the hallmarks of a professional intelligence outfit.⁴¹ ISI's tentacles spread to all over the Arab world while promoting Jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan and it came in close contact with various Muslim fundamentalist and terrorist organisations.

The ISI had initially worked with the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan in conducting its terrorist operations in Kashmir. The rise of Taliban and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema's offspring, Harkat-ul-Ansar, led the ISI to get round these forces as well as become their guiding patron. For the Pak agency, it was quite easy to join hands with the Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad, the umbrella organisation behind the Lashkar-e-Taiba, because of the strong axis forged by Pakistan with Saudi Arabia during the anti Soviet armed campaign in Afghanistan.⁴²

The covert operational activities of Pakistan's ISI, included motivating and enticing the youth into joining the movement; arranging infiltration and exfiltration, transit and other support facilities:

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 70.

⁴¹ Rajeev Sharma (ed.) *Pakistan Trap*, (New Delhi, UPS Publication, 2001), p. 16.

⁴² D.C. Pathak, "Pak Proxy War: Fermenting Religious Militantism", in Rajeev Sharma, (ed.), *Pakistan Trap*, (USB Publication, New Delhi, 2001), p. 73.

organising training camps in Pakistan, PoK and Afghanistan, providing arms and ammunitions, explosives, communication equipment etc. Channeling funds for the Jehadi outfits, coordinating the efforts of fundamentalist parties in all aspects, including indoctrination and induction of foreign mercenaries; and controlling, coordinating the operations inside the valley.⁴³

Presently, ISI and other agencies are operating around 50 training centers of which around 40 are in PoK, 10 in Pakistan. Significantly, most of these training camps, as well as, transit, holding and launching camps are known to be in close proximity to identified army units. The ISI-run training programme is fairly intensive and includes lessons in handling of weapons and explosive devices.⁴⁴

According to an estimate, ISI has been spending nearly Rs. 40 million per month in support of militancy in J&K. With the involvement of Jehadi parties and other including expatriates in these efforts, it is now estimated that the financial support to militancy has increased to around Rs. 50 million per month. The expenditure includes payments to militant organisations, maintenance, payment to cadres, running of clandestine radio stations etc. ISI directly contributes 15 to 20 per cent of funds while it channalises 40 per cent from contributions coming

⁴³ Sultan Shahin, "ISI Activities in South and Central Asia: Jihad or Terrorism", in Rajeev Sharma (ed.), *Pakistan Trap*, (USB Publication, New Delhi, 2001), p. 188.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 190.

from Islamic groups. Some funds are locally collected through extortion and contribution.⁴⁵

Many senior army and police officers attribute sectarian attacks inside Pakistan to the militants trained by the ISI. But these appear to be minor issues given the scale of the ISI's alleged operations. Despite the army high command's visible displeasure at the Indian hijack crisis in December 1999, Maulana Masood Azhar, an ISI-trained militant, was allowed to roam free in Pakistan after being released by the Indian authorities in exchange for the release of hostage abroad the hijacked Jetliner.⁴⁶ Even after September 11, the ISI continued to pursue its pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan—a development which analysts believe led to the unceremonious ouster of the then DG ISI General Mahmood Ahmed.⁴⁷

Under the patronage of the ISI, Pakistan's religious organisations had established close contacts with clandestine Islamic movements in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.⁴⁸ Several of Pakistani Islamic fighters crossed over to these predominantly Muslim republics, which were part of the erstwhile USSR, to promote the cause of Islam against infidel communists. The Soviet officials had protested strongly to

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 191.

⁴⁶ Amer Ahmed Khan, "The end of Jihad", *The Herald*, (Karachi), December 2001, p. 21.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 21.

⁴⁸ Zahid Hussain "Islamic Warriors", *Newsline* (Karachi), February 1995, p.26

Pakistan against the infiltration of Pakistani Islamists into those states.⁴⁹

Another area in the region, which has been recipient of Pakistan's Islamic "benevolence", is Chechnya, a small Muslim majority part of Southern Russia. Engaged in a war of total secession from Moscow, Chechens have been extended various kinds of help and assistance by Pakistan.⁵⁰ Leaders of Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami confirmed that their volunteers have been fighting alongside Dudayev's forces.⁵¹ Apart from providing ideological and military training to Islamic militants from Xingiang, Pakistan is reported to have been arranging for extension of various kind of assistance to Uighur Muslims of the northwestern Chinese province.⁵² The list of ISI's subversive activities in South and Central Asia is long and almost unending.

It is an irony of history that the US, which gave all assistance to the growth of Islamic militancy and extremism to promote its interests in Afghanistan, has now been paying a high price for its misadventure. For instance, the stinger missile, which the US supplied to rebels, has become a major security threat to western interests.⁵³ Now the same Islamic militants, it once funded have turned against the US. On the

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ *The Indian Express*, (New Delhi) May22, 1996

⁵¹ Zahid Hussain, n.48, p.26

⁵² P.B.Sinha, "Islamic Militancy And Separatism in Xinjiang," *Strategic Analysis*, June1997, Vol. XX, No.3, pp.452-56

⁵³ *India Today*, (New Delhi), May 15, 1984, p. 61.

one hand the US now calls them terrorists, they, on the other say that the US is the greatest terrorist in the world. The menace of Islamic extremism and terrorism has been a serious threat to various Islamic and secular countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and the United States.

Chapter-IV

CHAPTER IV

Madrasa and Sectarian Violence in Pakistan:

Sectarian violence has risen phenomenally in Pakistan over the past two decades. It has extended beyond sporadic clashes over doctrinal issues between Sunnis, who constitute 90 percent of the world's Muslims and 75-85 percent of Pakistanis, and Shias, who constitute 15-25 percent of Pakistanis, and metamorphosed into political conflict around mobilization of group identity.¹ Militant organizations that champion its cause operate for the most part in the political rather than religious arena.

“Sectarian violence is not new phenomenon in Islam- In a devotee sense, sectarian merely refers to the existence of different sects or denominations within the larger ambit of Islam. Its real dynamics neither relates merely to semantics nor are they benign.”² Sectarianism is the creation of historical and political processes, often bloody, over 1500 year march of Islam. Interestingly, while sectarianism was almost never a product of religious thought, being mostly political, the differences between the heterodoxies and the orthodoxy have always played out in the backdrop of religion. The explosion of sectarian violence stems from “The state’s own

¹ Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 28.

² *Friday Times*, (Lahore) August 17, 2001. <http://eurasianews.com>

acceptance of sectarianism and sectarian violence as a way of life as a reasonable means of expressing dissatisfaction. The problem lies in the kind of thinking that hold religious sentiment to be sacred than the right to an orderly civic life.” This mentality is reinforced with every new step that government takes to control the sectarian rivalries.³

As stated earlier, the institution of Madrasa needs to be studied seriously especially because of the impact it has had on the strength and salience of sectarian organisations and politico-religious parties in Pakistan. The role of Madrasas is important in terms of providing manpower to sustain the sectarian conflict and as an institution for, reproducing the ideology. Often these institutions themselves have a sectarian orientation, which they impart to train students. Some of these institutions go further and impart military training.⁴

The mushroom growth of foreign-funded madrasas teaching highly provocative sectarian courses serving as recruitment and training centres for sectarian militants, has created a vast support base for violent terrorism in Pakistan. Sectarian violence has taken centre-stage as militant view to assert the pre-eminence of their religious communities, gain control of the Islamic discourse and define

³ Zaigham Khan, “The Tragedy of Mominpura,” *The Herald* (Karachi) February 1998, vol. 29. no. 2, p. 50.

⁴ Abbas Rashid, “The Politics and Dynamics of Violent Sectarianism”, <http://www.tripods.com>

the nature of state-society relation. Probing the reasons for the rise of sectarian violence can shed much light on changes on the ideology and practice of Islamism in Pakistan. It can elucidate the manner in which changes in the intellectual and social function of traditional education and the ulema that they produce, have interacted with regional and domestic politics to create a new style of Islamic activism with a different approach to the question of the role of Islam in politics. This chapter will examine the link of Madrasas with the key sectarian militant groups operating in Pakistan and will provide information on their structure, activities, history, ideology, funding and leadership.

There are numerous sectarian divisions in Pakistan. One source puts on the total number of Muslim sects and sub sects at 72.⁵ The Sunni population subdivides into four major streams- Deobandis, Barelvis, Aahl-Hadith and Wahabis, within these there are dozens of subgroups.⁶ Despite these divisions, the majority of Sunnis follow the Hanafi School of Islamic Jurisprudence.

The three Shia streams in Pakistan are the Ismail, the Ithna Ashariya and the Bohras.⁷ Although small in numbers, the Shias are

5. *Time* (New York) September 1998, p. 72.

6. Rizwan Qureshi, "The Second Coming", *The Herald* (Karachi) February 1999, vol.30, no. 2, p. 59.

7. None of the sources consulted differentiate between the three Shia streams, and for the purpose of this chapter, they are treated as one group.

an influential minority.⁸ The Shia-Sunni differences over certain issues of political theory and interpretation of early Muslim History (especially from the Prophet's death in the 632 A.D. to the assassination of Ali in 661 A.D.) constitute the most potent reason for their tension and conflict. The Sunnis regard the first four rulers, following the Prophet's death (Abu Bakr, Omar bin Khattab, Osmab bin Attan, and Ali Ibne Abu Talib), as not only legitimate but also as 'pious' and 'righteous' caliphs worthy of great reverence. The Shia considers Ali Ibne Abu Talib alone to have been a legitimate ruler and treat his three predecessors as usurpers. They also believe that the first three caliphs were not really true to the prophet and his mission. Allegedly they speak ill of them in various other ways in their own gatherings and some of them use insulting vocabulary in referring to them. The Sunnis find these Shia attitudes and interpretations to be intolerably offensive.⁹ Next to the God and Prophet, Ali Ibne Abu Talib occupies a central place in the Shia belief system. This might pose a problem to the Sunnis. They regard Ali as one of the four "righteous" caliphs. So one of the major issues of conflict between the two sects is the acceptance of the legitimacy of the caliphate.

8. Muhammed Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalisation of Shia and Sunni Identities", *Modern Asian Studies* (Cambridge, UK), July 1998, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 689- 707.

9. Anwar H. Syed, "The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Pakistan", in Hafeez Malik (ed.) *Pakistan: Founder's Aspiration and Today's Realities* (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 289.

Shia-Sunni conflicts were mostly unknown before partition in the areas, which form now Pakistan because of the influence of Pirs and Sufis. After partition and despite the migration to Pakistan of Muhajirs belonging to areas with a strong tradition of sectarian conflicts, relations between Sunnis and Shias remained normal except occasional riots and minor clashes during Muharram ceremonies. The state was neutral and had no sectarian agenda. General Zia-ul-Haq attempted to implement the Sunni "Hanafi fiqh" this became the starting point of Shia resistance.¹⁰

He began to say that the obligation for the creation of Pakistan could not be fulfilled unless it became an Islamic state, that is, a state in which Islamic law and instructions (the Shariah) were implemented. In February 1979 he declared that the Hanafi fiqh would be enforced in the country. Then he issued an ordinance for enforcing the Islamic penalties for certain violations (theft, adultery, fornication). Then he went on to establish a Shariat court and authorised it to annul any law of Pakistan, which it deemed to be repugnant to the Shariah.¹¹

These developments alarmed the Shia. They subscribed their own fiqh-e-Jafaria, not to the fiqh of Abu Hanafa, and had their own

¹⁰. Samina Ahmad, "The Unholy Nexus?" *Newsline* (Karachi, September 1998), p. 249.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 253.

interpretations of Islamic taxes and penalties. They established an organisation called the Tehrike-e-Nafaz-e-fiqh-e-Jafariya (Movement of the Enforcement of the Jafariya fiqh) to demand that the Shias in Pakistan be allowed to follow their own fiqh. In 1980, the TNFJ (which is now called TJP) sponsored an agitation to get exemption from the payment of the Islamic taxes (Zakat and Ushr). Gen.Zia-ul-Haq eventually relented, exempted the Shia community from paying Zakat and Ushr and also declared that they would not be governed by any fiqh other than their own. This gave TJP a sense of efficacy.¹² So Gen. Zia's policies served to radicalise the Shia population and led to the formation of militant Shia organisations.

The other important contributing factors were the Iranian revolution in 1979, the war between Shia Iran and Sunni Iraq from 1980 to 1988, and the fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, which flooded Pakistan with weapons, spawned dozens of Islamic groups and led to a militarization of religious groups.¹³ Saudi Arabia and Iran funded many of the Sunni and Shia madrasas respectively in Pakistan. These madrasas have spread even to small towns and they enrol more students than the public elementary and middle schools. They teach theology, but many

¹² Afak Hayder, "The Politicisation of Shias: The Development of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Fiqh-e-Jafaria in Pakistan", in Charles H. Kennedy (ed.) *Pakistan 1997*, (Boulder Co: Westview Press, 1993), p. 127.

¹³ Muhammed, Qasim Zaman, no. 8, p. 687.

of them also teach their students to disapprove of sects other than their own, and give them military training.¹⁴

A major development that served to raise the level of sectarian tensions was the rapid spread of Madrasa movement during the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁵ These Islamic seminaries (madrasas), often run inside mosques or in adjoining rooms, provide religious instruction to boys age 6 to 16 who generally come from economically deprived backgrounds. Sponsored by politico-religious parties and often funded by donors from the Middle East, madrasas instruct their students in accordance with the sectarian beliefs of the schools sponsor.¹⁶

The Afghan war in the 1980s was important in this regard as it raised the prospects of communism reaching the shores of the Arabian Sea. The response of the Persian Gulf states was very much the same. Providing generous support for all manner of Islamic activities to strengthen Islamic identity in Pakistan, and this time also to help train activists who would be willing to fight in the war.¹⁷ These funds found their way to madrasas and helped create a whole new

¹⁴. Anwar, H.Sayed, no. 9, p. 290.

¹⁵ Owais Tohid, "The Jihad at Home", *The Herald* (Karachi), December 1997, vol. 28, no. 12, p. 64.

¹⁶. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 1997, pp. 88-89,
<http://www.hrcp.com>

¹⁷. Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 196-7.

genre of madrasas- once that were equally if not more concerned with Jihad (holy war) than with vigorous sectarianism.

General Zia's reform of curricula changed the character of many madrasas and hence their graduates. The quality of madrasas education declined, the concern for excellence in mastering traditional subjects was no longer important, and instead ideological outlook took over. Although this is not true of the far fewer older and prestigious madrasas, such as the Deobandi Korangi Darul- ulum of Karachi, it is generally true of most of the newer madrasas that cropped up in the 1980s and 1990s, and were instituted and managed by low ranking preachers or ulema. Training "Islamic Bureaucrats" and activists was more central to their mission than providing veritable ulema, they began to modernise and politicise.¹⁸

In North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, owing to the proximity of the Afghan war, madrasas also began to militarise, in many cases combining traditional religious education with a modern military one. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, democratisation changed the political climate of the Pakistan and slowed the pace of Islamisation, and economic recession reduced employment opportunities. As a result, the promised jobs for the

¹⁸. S.V.R. Nasr, "Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulema in Society and Politics", *Modern Asian Studies*, (Cambridge), 2000, vol. 34, p. 150.

graduates of madrasas did not materialise, leading most to join the ranks of the frustrated unemployed. Sectarianism began to shape around what the Mumtaz Ahmad has termed, “the revolt of petty-ulema”.¹⁹ Using the rural mosques, madrasas and Islamic institutions under their control, and using sectarianism as an Islamic ideology of mobilisation, autonomous from the control of the higher-ranking ulema and their institutions, and parties, the lower-ranking ulema began to stake out their own claim to power and wealth-satiating appetites for power, status and wealth that Islamisation had whetted but left unsatiated.

Since the lower-ranking ulema, and especially those among them who were recent graduates of madrasas were less steeped in knowledge and were more political, and many had got their education at new madrasas that did not offer high standards in traditional education, many would not be able to follow the career path of the traditional ulema, nor were most trained to desire such a career path, if and when they became preachers or ulema, they used the *Minbar* (pulpit) to pursue political agendas. The new breed of ulema and preachers often refused to follow the path of the established ulema parties or traditional madrasas, preferring to join smaller militant

¹⁹. Mumtaz Ahmad, “Revivalism, Islamization, Sectarianism and Violence in Pakistan”, in Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy (eds.), *Pakistan 1997* (Boulder Co. Westview Press, 1998), pp. 101-21.

organisations. For instance, many of the graduates of the Bareilvi Ziau'l-Quran madrasa did not join the main Bareilvi party, Jamiat-e-ulema-e-Pakistan, preferring the militant Sunni Tehrik instead.²⁰

The new breed of madrasas graduates were nominally of the ulema, but had a claim to politics and were jihadis in outlook- they had bought into the rhetoric of the Afghan war, and many viewed the Taliban's conquest of Afghanistan as the model to follow- pushed them in the direction of militant activism. In a state with ongoing ethnic, civil, and socio-ethnic conflicts, with a preponderance of guns and a "Kalashnikov culture", this militancy soon turned violent.²¹ A prime example here is the escalation of violence in sectarian conflict in the Kurram valley in NWFP; where in the summer of 1996 in Pachinar in a five-day armed conflict some 200 peoples lost their lives. There had existed socio-economic grievances between Shia and Sunnis regarding control of fertile land and proceeds from the fecund tomato crop. The manner in which such grievances translated into an outright sectarian war, however, had to do with the fact that the older Shia and Sunni ulema and preachers had been replaced with recent graduates of militant madrasas, whose activism had served to harden sectarian identities and promote militancy. Sermons became more vitriolic and mosques came to be used as arms depots. The proximity

²⁰. Ibid. p. 151.

²¹. *Newsline* (Karachi), October 1996, p. 75.

of the region to the Afghan conflict had also helped with both the arms build-up by the two sides, and the propensity to use violence.²²

The increase in the number of madrasas since the mid 1970s has been evident among all schools of Sunnism, and in some cases more among the Barelvīs than others. The Deobandi madararas have not been the only groups to engage in sectarianism, other sects also spread sectarianism. For example, the JUP leader, Maulana Shah Ahmad Nuri was one of the most notable anti-Shia voices in Sind in the 1970s, and the militant Sunni movement (Sunni Tehrik) Barelavi, and the Ahl-e-Hadith as a whole have lent support to anti-Shia activism.²³ Still the rise in the number of Sunni madaras and especially their role in militant sectarianism have become enmeshed with an ongoing and much older struggle for power within Sunnism, and is tied to the larger phenomenon of Deobandi ascendancy in Pakistan and beyond.

Jane's Intelligence Review has described madararas in Pakistan as "less centres for spiritual developments and more breeding ground for sectarian intolerance and hatred."²⁴ The discipline inside the madrasas is very harsh, and the students are indoctrinated in the

²². Ibid. p. 76.

²³. Charles H. Kennedy, "Jami'iyatul-ulama-e-Islam," in John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Islamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 364-65.

²⁴. Anthony Davis, "Pakistan: State of Unrest", *Jane's Intelligence Review* (Surrey, UK), January 1999, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 34.

spirit of Jihad.²⁵ The Human Right Commission of Pakistan, citing a Punjab government report, states that about 1/3rd of 2500 registered madrasas in Punjab are known to impart military training to their students, and directly involved in sectarian attacks.²⁶ Sources indicate that these religious schools churn out a huge numbers of graduates each year, most of them have few skills that will allow them to fit into mainstream Pakistani society. According to the Karachi based monthly *The Herald*, madarasa graduates “comprise a crucial component of the extremist religious parties, forming the bulk of their street power.”²⁷ Most of the founders and leaders of these sectarian groups obtained their early religious education in the madrasas, particularly those in Punjab province.

Much of the support for sectarian organisations, both Shia and Sunni, come from the urban middle class, often from people recently arrived from rural areas.²⁸ Sectarian organisations offer support and anchorage to the upwardly mobile middle class, or those who aspire to join it, and are especially appealing when mainstream political institutions appear bankrupt.²⁹ These organisations produce vast amounts of sectarian literature. The estimated cost which is running

²⁵ Owais Tohid, no. 15, p. 64.

²⁶ Human Right Commissson of Pakistan, 1998, p. 222, (<http://www.hrcp.com>)

²⁷ Zaigham Khan, “Playing with Fire”, *The Herald* (Karachi), vol. 29, no. 9, p. 30

²⁸ Muhammed Qasim Zaman, no. 8, pp. 705-7.

²⁹ John Bray, “Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline?” *International Affairs* (London), 1997, vol. 73, no. 2, pp. 329-30.

to millions of rupees each month much of it available free of charge.³⁰ Almost, all of the monthly and fortnightly journals published by madrasas, religious associations and sectarian organisations carry numerous advertisements from shopkeepers, small merchants and some large businessmen. In addition to the support, they receive funds from their parent organisation. The armed militant groups sponsored by these organisations receive funding from “invisible ...Patrons”, often-extremist groups in the Middle East or Iran. Some groups are also involved fund raising activities such as gunrunning, armed robberies, kidnapping for ransom activities etc.³¹ Journalist Azhar Abbas stated in “The Herald” that many of the gunmen in the sectarian groups are essentially professional hitmen, available for hire either for sectarian or criminal purposes.³²

Violent sectarian conflict began in Punjab in the mid 1980s as a vendetta between leaders of the militant Sunni-Deobandi political party Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), (Guardian of the friends of Prophet) and the Shia political party, Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP, Movement for Shia Law) but soon spreaded to other provinces.³³ According to sources, the extremist factions of both parties, the

30. Aamer, Ahmad Khan, “The Rise of Sectarian Mafias,” *The Herald* (Karachi), June 1994, vol.25, no. 6, p.31.

31. Ibid. p. 30.

32. Azmat Abbas, “Last Encounter,” *The Herald* (Karachi), May 1999, vol. 30, no. 5, p. 36.

33. Zaffar Abbas, “The Enemy Within,” *The Herald* (Karachi), April 1998, vol. 29, no. 4, p. 41.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Sipah-e-Mohammedi Pakistan, almost always carry out sectarian killings directed by members of the rival branch.³⁴ Violent clashes between members of the Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-e-Hadith Sunni sub- sects are not unknown. In the beginning both groups primarily targeted the others hitman, but then changed tactics and begin targeting high-profile members of the two communities – doctors, lawyers, businessmen, intellectuals and government officials.³⁵ Then they switched to indiscriminate reprisal killings, such as attacks on mosques, in which any one even remotely connected to the other branch is a potential target.³⁶ Sectarian violence in one part of the country can lead to reprisals in another. Far example the killing of Shias in Multan, Punjab on arch30, 1998, was linked to a major sectarian clash in Hangu, NWFP, several days earlier that resulted in many deaths and injuries.³⁷

Sources have often commented on the ambiguous relationship that has evolved between the armed sectarian groups and their parent organisations.³⁸ While the mainstream religious parties often downplay their involvement in sectarian conflict, police officials and other observers are convinced that these parties have “deep links” to

34. HRCF, 1997, p. 85 (<http://www.hrcf.com>)

35. Aamer Ahmad Khan, “Moving Targets,” *The Herald* (Karachi), August 1997, vol.28, no. 8, p. 37.

36. Ibid.

37. *Pakistan Press International*. March30,1998, “Three killed in Multan”, <http://www.stategovt.com>

38. Zaigham Khan, “Blood on the Streets”, *The Herald* (Karachi), June 1997, vol. 28, no. 6, pp.55-6.

and are able to influence their respective sub-organisations or splinter groups.³⁹ The leaders of the major religious parties have rarely condemned the violent activities of their armed factions or pressured them to stop their activities.⁴⁰ In addition to the tacit approval, they enjoy from mainstream religious parties. Sectarian militant groups can draw on “wide spread and deeply entrenched” support networks in Pakistani society, a large number of people collect information about the target before the hitmen arrive in the area at madrasas is arranged in advance, and they are given weapons and logistical support from a place near the target area.⁴¹ This “for reaching network of accomplices and sympathisers constitutes the real strength of sectarian mafias. It is impossible to break because ” each hit man has his own contacts and no one member of the group knows all of the others.⁴²

MAJOR SUNNI GROUPS: -

Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam: (JUI, conference of Ulema of Islam): is a rightwing religious party founded in 1945, it was associated with the conservative Deobandi reform movement, started in the mid of the Nineteenth century. JUI advocates an Islamic state based on Sunni teachings and has called for Islamic revolution led by Maulana Fazlur

39. Adnan Adil, “Sectarian Violence Threat in Bahawalnagar and Bahawalpur”, *The Friday Times* (Lahore), November, 1996, vol. 6, pp. 21-26.

40. Muhammed Qasim Zaman, no. 8, p. 698.

41. Azmat Abbas, “Lahore: Laskar-e-Jhanghvi Involve in Multan Killings”, <http://www.dawn.com>.

42. Zaigham Khan, no. 38, p. 56.

Rahman and with a power base centred in the Pashtun areas of Baluchistan and NWFP⁴³. The JUI had a “fundamental connection to the Taliban of Afghanistan— although considered a mainstream religious party, the JUI, like the Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and other religious parties, has failed to generate much of a presence in parliament”⁴⁴. The JUI is also important for spawned at least 11 factions, one of which the SSP is considered to be the most violent.

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan: (SSP: Guardians of the Friends of the Prophets) launched by the Maulana Jhangvi on September 6, 1985, from his own masque in Jhang (Punjab), it grew into the largest Sunni religious organisation of the country. While the JUI had broader view about how an Islamic state should be run, the SSP advocated a “purely Sunni state in which all other sects will be declared non-Muslim minorities.”⁴⁵

A “virtually anti-Shia party”, the SSP’s formal goals were to combat Shiaism at all fronts; to have Shias declared a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan; to prescribe Muharram (Shiite commemorative ceremony) processions which it says as a leading cause of sectarian riots; and to have Sunni Islam declared the state religion of

43. Barnett R. Rubin, “Afghanistan under the Taliban”, *Current History* (Philadelphia), February 1999, vol. 98, no. 625, pp. 81-85.

44. Ahmad Rashid, “The Great Divide: Shia and Sunni Battle out in Pakistan,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), vol. 158, no. 10, p. 24.

45. *Ibid.* p. 24.

Pakistan.⁴⁶ To that end the SSP initiated a guerrilla war against the Shia organisations fought in the same way.

Much of the support for the SSP comes from urban Sunni businessmen. The party promotes its sectarian views through its official monthly organ, *Khilifat-i-Rashida* (the rightly guided Caliphate), which is published in Faisalabad.⁴⁷ Many SSP militants were known to have obtained their military experience fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, and received the training at camps, which were probably run by the Kashmiri militant group *Harkat-ul-Ansar* in Afghanistan.⁴⁸ According to the *Friday Times*, the SSP located its headquarter in the district's two largest Deobandi madrasas- *Jamiat-ul-Aloom Eidgah* in Bahawalnagar city, and *Dar-ul-Aloom Deoband Faqirwali*, Fort Abbas subdivision in Punjab. The SSP has also spawned numerous splinter groups. Although all are anti-Shia in nature so they are not coherent organisations with well-defined goals and cannot explain what makes them different from each other.⁴⁹ This organisation banned by President Pervez Musharraf, on August 14, 2001.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: - (LJ, Army of Jhangvi)

Named after the assassinated SSP leader Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was formed in 1995, when radical elements within the SSP

46. Azmat Abbas, no. 32, p. 29.

47. Muhammed Qasim Zaman, no. 8, pp. 702-10.

48. *The Friday Times* (Lahore), August 20, 1998. (<http://www.eurasianews.com>)

49. Amer Ahmed Khan, no. 30, p. 29.

split from the party after the leadership opened a dialogue with the leadership of militant Shia organisations. This is the most militant organisation in Pakistan.⁵⁰ Considered by its membership to be 'Jihadi' organisation, the LJ's main battlefield lies within Pakistan, where it has admitted responsibility for numerous massacres of Shias and targeted leaders of Shia religious and community leaders, and in some cases Sunni officials.⁵¹

The Laskar-e-Jhangvi is organised into small cells of five to eight militants that operate independently of the others. Individual militants are reportedly unaware of the exact number of cells similar to their own that might be operating in Punjab, or the nature of upcoming operations.⁵² The main leader of the organisation Riaz Basra and Akram Lahori and others devoted their energies to training new recruits and directing operations, and the training allowed a new group of young men to become militants to replace those who had been arrested. Many of these young militants are between 16 to 20 years of age, and very well trained in their respective madrasas.⁵³ Such young militants generally do not have criminal records and are therefore difficult to identify and arrest, and they tend to be less

50. Zaigham Khan, "Allah's Armies", *The Herald* (Karachi) September 1998, vol. 29, no. 9, p. 29.

51. Amir Mir, "Men Behind Raiwind Blast Linked to Harkatul Ansar", *The News International* (Karachi), March 4, 1999. (<http://www.jang-groups.com>)

52. Zaigham Khan, no.38, p. 56

53. _____, no. 50, p. 18

concerned with how the organisation works that with simply obeying the order of their leaders.⁵⁴ President Pervez Musharraf also banned it, on August 14, 2001.

Sunni Tehrik: -(SUNNI FORCE)

This is the product of a huge network of Barelvi madrasas called Ziaul-Quaran; the Sunni force is believed to be among the most dangerous sectarian organisations to have cropped up over the years. In the past one year alone, its influence has recorded an amazingly steep rise in Faisalabad and Jhang in Punjab. Very little is known about this organisation's aims and objectives because none of its leaders has so far come out in open.⁵⁵

It is quite likely that the Sunni force is just a collection of all those Ziaul Quran madrasa graduates who unlike what happened in the past, refused to join the JUP. Some of its leaders are suspected of complicity in some major decoities in Faisalabad, Gurjanwala, Sargoda and Sialkot.

Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariate-e-Mohammadi (TNSM): - is a militant, tribally based Wahabi party that first came to prominence in 1994 when it led an arm uprising in support of Shariah in Malakand division, NWFP. Led by Sufi Mohammed, this operates primarily in the

⁵⁴. Azmat Abbas, "New Breed," *The Herald* (Karachi) September 1998, vol. 29, no. 9, p.18

⁵⁵. Amer Aahmed Khan, no. 30, p. 37.

tribal belt, such as in Swat and the adjoining districts of NWFP and continues to demand implementation Shariah.⁵⁶

The SSP and Laskar-e-Jhangvi's cadres come from the same madrasas as also a similar social milieu. The SSP leadership has never criticized the LJ because the two organisations share the same sectarian belief system and worldview. They also have a similar charter of demands, which includes training Pakistan into a Sunni state. Both the outfits have consistently resorted to violent and killings to press their demands, though the SSP has also been attempting to adopt a political path.

Many SSP and L-e-J cadres have received arms trainings from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), a Pakistan-based terrorist outfit active in India's Jammu and Kashmir. Militants belonging to the SSP are reported to have arms trainings from the Pakistan's intelligence agencies. Both organisations also have close links to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-based terrorist outfit active in Jammu and Kashmir. Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of JeM, speaking at a jihad conference in October 2000 said, "now we go hand-in-hand, and Sipah-e-Sahaba stands shoulder to shoulder with Jaish-e-Mohammad

⁵⁶. Sajjad Abbas Niazi, "Riaz Basra Killed in Encounter, Claim police" April 6, 1999. <http://www.dawn.com>

in Jihad.”⁶⁸ Most of the foreign-funded Sunni madrasas in Pakistan are reportedly controlled by the SSP.

MAJOR SHIA GROUPS:

Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan: (TJP) traces its origins to the establishment in March 1979 of the Tehrik-e-Nefaz-e-Fiqh-Jafria (TNFJ, movement of the implementation of Shia law), a religious pressure group formed in response to Gen. Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization policies, within favoured Pakistan’s Sunni majority.⁵⁷ The objectives of the TNFJ were to formulate an Islamic constitution based on Shia principles as expounded by Iran’s Ayotollah Khomeini, unite the Shia community and actively involve Shias in Pakistan’s politics.⁵⁸

In 1988 the TNFJ changed its name to the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan and registered as a political party. The TJP movement reportedly gave rise to several splinter groups, including the SMP, a violent anti-Sunni faction. The TJP/TNFJ remained the main political organisation for the Shias throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s, but recently there have been growing divisions within the party since at least 1995.⁵⁹ The Shural Wahdat-e-Islami (Council of Islamic

68. <http://www.schinantribes.com>

57. Stuart Mews, *Religion in Politics: A World Guide* (Chicago: St James Press 1989), p. 207

58. Farzana Shaikh (ed), *Islam and Islamic Groups: A Worldwide Reference Guide* Longman Group, U.K. 1992), p. 189

59. Zaigham Khan, “Divided They Stand” *The Herald* (Karachi) September 1998, vol. 29, no. 9, p. 48a.

Unity), a Shia umbrella organisation claiming to represent all Shia political activism, was created in 1998, thereby uprising a role previously claimed by the TJP.

Sipah-e-Mohammadi Pakistan (SMP): -

A TJP splinter group, the SMP was formed after a TJP affiliate group in 1991, of the Imamia Madrasa Students Organisation (ISO). This “became too violent for its own good” and fragmented into small groups, with many of its most important militant members joining the SMP.⁶⁰ While ISO reportedly advocated a tough line against Sunni extremism, ⁶¹by the late 1980s, many ISO militants had become increasingly critical of their organisation’s close connections to the TJP leadership, blaming the TJP leaders for the rapid growth of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. ⁶²

During the early and mid-1990s, the SMP was considered to be most heavily armed and violent terrorist groups in Punjab. Led by Gulam Raza Naqvi and Murid Abbas Yazdani, fellow scholars from the Hoza Ilmia at Qom, Iran. ⁶³The SMP committed itself to “expunging the SSP from the history books, its gunmen attacked SSP activists, Sunni clerics and offices of many newspapers which deemed

^{60.} Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Faction Replay,” *The Herald* (Karachi) June 1994, vol. 25, no. 6, p. 37.

^{61.} Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan Muslim Violence Spreads,” *The Daily Telegraph* (London), March 8, 1995.

^{62.} Muhammed Qasim Zaman, no.8, p. 48b-c.

^{63.} Anthony Davis, no. 24, p. 45.

unfriendly.” In addition to its anti-Sunni operations, the SMP was also suspected of widespread criminal activities, including large-scale gunrunning to raise money for its activities.⁶⁴ Like Reza Naqvi, most of the SMP leadership shared rural or small-town backgrounds, religious educations at madrasas in Punjab, elsewhere in Pakistan or Iran, and obtained much of their military training in Afghanistan.⁶⁵ Headquartered in Thukar Niaz Beig, a Shia household in the suburb in Lahore, the SMP had claimed its thousands of supporters in Pakistan, and that it had offices in abroad. One source indicates that the group had influential supporters within the police, military and security establishment and particularly, in the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI).⁶⁶ The SMP was the only violent sectarian group operating in Pakistan, and was responsible for all sectarian attacks on Sunnis; President General Pervez Musharraf banned it in August 14, 2001.⁶⁷

According to an *intelligence report*, there are over 2600 madrasas in Punjab with more than 200,000 students actively involve in sectarian and terrorist activities. There were 64 dreaded sectarian terrorists in the Punjab carrying total head money of 18 million rupees, with Laskar-e-Jhangvi chief, Riaz Basra, topping the list, who

^{64.} Ahmed Rashid, no. 61, p. 37.

^{65.} Muhammed Qasim Zaman, no. 8, p. 698.

^{66.} Amer Ahmed Khan, no. 35, p. 38.

^{67.} *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) January 13, 2002.

was probably killed encounter on April 5, 1999. ⁶⁹According to a survey conducted by an agency of Punjab government, about 36 per cent of the madrasas were getting financial aids from the government out of Zakat fund. The rest were being run by their organisations either using foreign fund directly provided to them by foreign organisations or on the basis of regular subscriptions. The survey included an investigation into madrasa involved in sectarian activities. In Sargodha, Faisalabad, and Rawalpindi, the percentage of such madrasas is reported to be particularly high in Sargodha, 105 out of 149, in Faisalabad 87 out of 112, and in Rawalpindi 90 out of 169 madrasas is involved in sectarian violence. In Bahawalpur, D.G.Khan and Multan, it is closer to 25 per cent. In Gurjanwala and Lahore, it is considerably lower, though the number of students is relatively high. Bahawalpur and Lahore, in that order account for almost 50 per cent of students of madrasas in Punjab, with approximately 64,000 and 42,000 respectively.⁷⁰

⁶⁹. Amir Mir, "Sects and Violence," *Newsline* (Karachi) October 1999, p. 70.

⁷⁰. Abbas Rashid, "The Politics and Dynamics of Violent Sectarianism", <http://www.tripods.com>

Sectarian Violence in the Punjab (1989-99): -

Year	Incidents	Killed	Injured
1989	67	18	102
1990	274	32	328
1991	180	47	263
1992	135	58	261
1993	90	39	247
1994	162	73	326
1995	88	59	189
1996	80	86	168
1997	103	193	219
1998	188	157	231
1999	103	86	189
Total	1470	848	2523

Sources: *Newsline* (Karachi), October 1999, p. 68.

Having remained the iron grip of mainstream religious parties for decades, the theatre of political violence has found new actors and audiences. Splinter groups, breakaway factions, some organisations have emerged more dangerous than their parent organisations ever were, mainly due to the ready availability of arms and a steady waning of administrative control. These militant organisations have close links with crime mafias and smugglers and most of these splinter groups have actually criminal network, which use sectarianism as a convenient cover-up for their activities. As example, SSP started off with aggressive and irresponsible mullah who took on board every conceivable criminal in the locality to build up their street power, so these militant splinter groups mostly consisted of people with strong criminals background who are recruiting the mullah to do their bidding.⁷¹

⁷¹ Amer Ahmed Khan, no. 30, pp. 28-29.

The drug cultivation and trafficking is normally viewed as a threat in terms of drug abuse and law and order problem. However the threats posed are manifold, it affects social, economic and political institutions. Drug trafficking results in organised crimes and creates a state within state posing the serious threats to the governments of Pakistan. The militant groups earning money by drug trafficking are able to get the arms and lethal weapons such as, AK-47; those are freely available in Pakistani society. Any snap action against this trade leads to the kidnapping for ransom, decoities in border cities and a general disenchantment in Pakistan.⁷²

State Response:

The government's anti-sectarian measures have tended to be reactive rather than pro-active, and a few legislative measures to control sectarian violence have failed.⁷³ According to the report of the Human Right Commission of Pakistan, successive governments have done little to prevent young people from joining sectarian groups, have taken no action against the thousands of madrasas preaching sectarian hatred, and have had no consistent policies to manage sectarian divisions or improve religious tolerance.⁷⁴ The governments

⁷² M. Ilyas Khan, "Traders Or Smugglers?" *The Herald* (Karachi) May 2000, p. 64.

⁷³ Azmat Abbas, "Law and Disorder," *The Herald* (Karachi) January 1999, vol. 30 no. 1 p. 101

⁷⁴ Human Rights Commission Report of Pakistan, 1997, p. 89,

have been intimidated by the militancies of fundamentalist religious and their violent splinter groups and that, when arrested sectarian militants have often been let off with a small bribe or have received preferential treatment at the hands of police and jail authorities.⁷⁵

For controlling sectarianism, important action was taken by the creation of the Milli Yanjehti Council in 1995 (MYC, National Solidarity Council), in which the government attempted to engage 21 sectarian groups and religious parties in dialogue.⁷⁶ The council was intended to help the Punjab government find a solution to sectarian strife and to restore the positive image of religious parties, after years of escalating violence. The government was quick to claim that it had put an end to sectarian violence in Pakistan, but eventually the MYC proved ineffective. The SMP and SSP were the first to withdraw, claiming the council's proposed code of ethics imposed on the central tenets of their beliefs, and by the fall of 1995, the MYC was falling apart.⁷⁷ Just prior to the formation of council the government had launched a crackdown on sectarian groups, arresting over 200 religious party activists, and reportedly was moving to restrict the growth of madrasas. However the government abandoned its operation

<http://www.hrcp.com>

⁷⁵ Adnan Adil, n. 39 p. 25.

⁷⁶ HRCP (Report) no. 75, p. 88

⁷⁷ Jilani, Hina *Human Rights and Democratic Development in Pakistan* (Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 1998) p. 128

when the MYC was formed, with the result that the council broke up as soon as the perceived threat was over.

In August 1997 the Pakistan Muslim League government led by Nawaz Sharif passed the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) intended to prevent terrorism, sectarian violence and provide for speedy trial.⁷⁸ The ATA was severely criticized by lawyers, politicians, and human rights activists, International Human Rights Organisation and by the public for “its harsh provisions for legalising extra-judicial killing by police and for raising a parallel judicial system.” In December 1998, a special anti-terrorist court in Multan, Punjab, sentenced to death 14 Shia and Sunni militants convicted in 1996 and 1997 attacks on an Iranian cultural centre and the Al-Khair mosque in Multan, it was the largest ever single conviction court for terrorist crimes in Punjab.⁷⁹

On April 28, 1999, the Nawaz Sharif government established new anti-terrorism courts by presidential ordinance.⁸⁰ The new ordinance, the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 1999, retained many of the provision of the ATA, but added a new offence called “creation of civil commotion.” The new provision was widely criticized by opposition parties, human rights groups and the Pakistani press as

⁷⁸ Human Rights Commission Report of Pakistan, 1998, p. 34, <<http://www.hrcp.com>>

⁷⁹ Anthony Davis, “Action Taken Over Punjabi Violence,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (Surrey, U.K.) March 1999, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 6

⁸⁰ *Dawn* (Karachi), April 29, 1999 <<http://www.dawn.com>>

threatening the constitutional rights, to peaceful assembly and to express political dissent.⁸¹ In April 1999, the Prime Minister Sharif met with TJP and SSP leaders in Islamabad. The purpose of the meeting was to bring the two groups close together and find a solution for sectarian violence. The Prime Minister subsequently announced the creation of “high-powered committee of ulema and religious scholars,” to formulate recommendation on the elimination of sectarian violence in Pakistan.⁸² The ten-member committee brought forward a number of recommendation, but one week later the TJP pulled out of the committee, accusing its head, Dr. Israr Ahmad, being a controversial person and disregarding decisions taken by the committee.

In his first speech on October 17, 1999, the President General Pervez Musharraf talked of a campaign to rid the society of extremism, violence and terrorism. On June 5, 2000, on the occasion of the secret conference with ulema belonging to all schools of thoughts, he spoke firmly to them against religious extremism. On the 14th of August 2001, he took an important decision to ban Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan and placed SSP and TJP under observation⁸³ President Musharraf refused to allow large demonstrations since January 12, 2001, when he announced a

⁸¹ *Dawn* (Karachi), May 1, 1999 <<http://www.dawn.com>>

⁸² Ali Ahmed, “The Myth of Good Governance,” *The Herald* (Karachi) vol. 30, no. 5 p. 38

⁸³ *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), January 13, 2002

crackdown on Islamic militants. In his address to the nation on January 12, 2002, General Musharraf asked the people of the country to unite and fight the menace of religious violence and sectarianism in the country. He also formulated a new strategy for the regulation and registration of madrasas for controlling sectarianism in Pakistan.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ <<http://www.forum.worldaffairsboard.com>>

Conclusion

CONCLUSION

The word “Madrasa” is an Arabic word, which means ‘to learn something’. Therefore, the word madrasa implies the place where something is taught (school). The primary aim of the madrasa is to produce individuals imbued with Islamic worldview and outlook of life. They are to be equipped with a competent and authentic knowledge of “Quran” and “Sunnah” (saying of Prophet Mohammad), which finds its expression in all aspects of their practical life. These individuals are expected to be the torchbearers of Islamic knowledge, carrying its light to people from all walks of life, at every opportunity and in all circumstances for the sake of Allah. To impart a sound knowledge of Islam with an understanding of practical implications of its teachings in the contemporary world, the madrasas are supposed to equip students with the availability and invite others to Islam in a peaceful and non-aggressive manner.¹

Pakistan is an Islamic country; about 98 per cent population is Muslim. The system of madrasa education also exists in Pakistan.² The environment of madrasas is very different from the schools and universities in Pakistan. Unlike public schools and universities, madrasas have no concept of co-education. There are separate madrasas for men and women. Some mosques also serve as a madrasas.

¹ Kaship Iqbal Buttar, “Madrasa Schools in Pakistan”, <http://www.ipcs.org>

² Ibid.

The general perception about madrasas as they have evolved in Pakistan today is that they are fundamentalist in orientation. They are the breeding grounds for Islamic terrorists to wage Jihad in Kashmir and other parts of the world. They provide weapons and training to the Jihadis and are independent of Pakistani government's control. Are these assumptions correct?

It is wrong to assume that all these Madrasas preach "Jihad" and convert the students into "Jihadis". There are many Madrasas which teach secular subjects and do not indulge in militancy. According to the report of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, "about one-third of these schools provide military training to their students and some madrasas send their students for training and participation in Afghan civil-war, without the knowledge of their parents."³ The Jihad was the main subject in madrasas set up during General Zia's time by the fundamentalist parties like Jaamat-i-Islami and Jamit-ul-ulema-e-Islam. The students of these madrasas were drawn mainly from Afghan refugee camps.

The main reason for parents sending their children to these madrasas is not that they want their children to become Jehadi or Islamic scholars, but due to their economic inability to send them to

³ O.N. Mehrotra, "Madrasa in Pakistan: The Chief Promoter of Islamic Militancy and Terrorism", *Strategic Analysis* (IDSA, New Delhi), February 2000, p. 1884.

private schools and the government's failure to provide necessary infrastructure, in terms of primary and secondary schools, and competent teachers. The Pakistan government spends around 2 per cent of GNP on education.⁴ Even this amount does not reach the proper destination because of the prevalent corruption and misappropriation. Most of the government schools are running without teachers and the local politicians occupy school buildings. Whereas the upper class parents can afford to send their children to the private schools, the lower class parents have no other option, but to send their children to these madrasas. These madrasas provide accommodation, food and scholarship. When the students finish their studies, quite a few madrasa graduates become professional mosque muezzins, professional pulpit preachers and prayer leaders. Their services are required at weddings and also at funeral. To provide employment to the madrasa graduates, the society would require many mosques every year, but the inadequate growth of mosques in the preceding years, has created severe unemployment problem. Crisis in Pakistan is so acute that many of the madrasa-educated students go on to join Jihad. In fact, unemployment is the most important factor in Pakistan; even young students who have graduated in secular education in government and private institutions join Jihad.

⁴ Suba Chandran, "Madrasas in Pakistan: Breeding Grounds for Islamic Militants", <http://www.ipcs.org>

Important Facts About the Madrasas

- The madrasas cater for the education of people from areas where education is not easily accessible, catering to the poor and deprived.
- All those involved in military training in addition to education, are located in remote areas.
- All entrants are mostly uneducated and poor.
- Religion provides a powerful instrument to convert them into fundamentalists, who view violence as a means to a desirable end.
- Their goals are not confined to recognised territorial boundaries.

So, if poverty is the fertile breeding ground for bigotry (seeking religious justification), then lack of education is the fertilizer for its growth. All those involved in violence as a means to an end, have perceived justification for their acts, and are seeking to “right for a wrong” and that the version of religion imparted to them justifies their untenable acts through the most powerful and unquestionable medium - God. But, it cannot be poverty and lack of education alone since there are many educated people involved in militancy. Education, or the lack of it, coupled with poverty might be the prime reason for bulk recruitment, but there are people like Osama bin Laden, the most wanted of them, is an engineer by profession.

In 1980s General Zia-ul-Haq promoted the madrasas as a way to garner legitimacy for his rule and to recruit youth for the anti-Soviet War in Afghanistan. At that time, many madrasas were financed by the Zakat, (the Islamic tithe collected by the state), giving the government at least a modicum of control. But wealthy Pakistani industrialists at home or abroad fund more and more religious schools some are funded by private and government supported NGOs in the Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia and by Iran.

In 1947, there were 137 madrasas in the entire country, but by the middle of the year 2000, the number of registered madrasas had grown to nearly 11,000. Some commentators in Pakistan have also estimated that the current number of unregistered madrasas would be between 40,000 to 50,000.⁵ Most of these madrasas are free to preach narrow and violent versions of Islam. The mind-boggling curriculum in these madrasas entirely neglects all branches of practical and secular instructions and comprises purely theological education like recitation of Quran, and indoctrination of Jihad. Most of the madrasas offer religious instructions ignoring Mathematics, Sciences and other secular subjects that are important for functioning in modern society. The inevitable consequences for such education have been the chronic inability to produce reality-based theories of change, extraordinarily narrow and

⁵ *The Herald* (Karachi), September 2001, p. 31.

exclusionary perspective and deepening sectarian division that spill over into increasing violence.

Even worse, some extremist madrasas preach “Jihad” without understanding the concept. They equated Jihad, which most Islamic scholars interpret as striving for justice (and principally an inner striving to purify the self) with guerrilla warfare. These madrasas encourage their graduates to fulfil their “spiritual obligation” by fighting against the Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir in India and against the Muslims of other sects in Pakistan.

Every madrasa is fed with an ample supply of pro-Jehadi literature. The walls of these madrasas are plastered with posters glorifying the Afghan Jihad militants and Osama bin Laden etc. Students are generally enrolled at the tender age of six and continue until at least sixteen. “At such an impressionable age, it is fairly easy to inspire students to join the Jihad.”⁶ In reality, the parents of the students of these madrasas do not know anything about the modus operandi of the places of learning. “I had handed over my son to the madrasa so that he learns the Quran, not the handling of the guns”, said a father of a 13-year-old student who visited Afghanistan along with his colleagues from the Jamia Islamia madrasa, Clifton, (Karachi) without his parents knowledge.⁷

⁶ Massoud Ansari, “The Jihad Factories”, *Frontline* (Chennai), August 17, 2001, pp. 65-66.

⁷ O.N. Mehrotra, no.3, p. 1884.

These madrasas are clearly geared towards producing Mujahideen (holy warriors) ready to wage “Jihad”. They believe that Islam is in danger and that it needs their service. The recruits are taken to training camps, most of them located in the northern part of the Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK). As Ahmed Rasid noted, “Over 80,000 Pakistani militants have been trained and fought with the Taliban since 1994. They form hardcore Islamic activists ever ready to carry out a similar Taliban style, Islamic revolution in Pakistan.”⁸ Madrasas are the supply line for Jihad. So, if madrasas supply the labour for Jihad, then wealthy Pakistani and Arabs around the world supply the capital. On Eid-ul Azha, the second most important Muslim holiday for the year, Muslims are required to sacrifice animals and give the hide to charity. Pakistani militants groups solicit such hidden donations, which they describe as a significant source of funding for their activities. Most of the militant groups funding, however, comes in the form of anonymous donations sent directly to their bank accounts. Laskar-e-Taiba, which is banned by President Pervez Musharraf on January 12, 2002, is an Ahl-e-Hadith (Wahabi) group raises their fund on the Internet.

The success of Mujahideen against the Soviet Union gave hope to Islamic Fundamentalist groups and their political mentors in Pakistan. After victory in Afghan War, Jihad became an instrument of gaining

⁸ Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism”, *Foreign Affairs* (New York), vol. 78, no. 6, November-December 1999, p. 27.

political power by exploiting the religious sentiments. Accordingly, several thousands of Kashmiris were trained by Pakistan in the 1980s to open a new front in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Their slogan was, "We have celebrated victory in Kabul - let us go to Kashmir now."⁹ The frontiers of Jihad now extended from Chechnya to Kashmir and across the Indian Sub-continent to Bangladesh, Philippines and Indonesia. Warriors trained in the madrasas in Pakistan have now become a formidable force, which operate successfully in several parts of the world.

The Jehadi guerrilla and insurgent forces were soon armed with high technology weaponry and provided with a sophisticated command and communication network. The Jehadi movement posed a threat to all secular and democratic states. All the neighbouring areas in the Afghan-Pakistan belt were also gradually threatened by the aggressive design of these radical Islamic groups. Even China has to take notice of the support provided to the Uighur Muslims of the Xinjiang by radical Islamic groups operating from the Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is waging a new kind of war against India, using the madrasa product "Jehadi Forces" as a front in Jammu and Kashmir for achieving its own political objective.

⁹ Afsir Karim, "Pakistan's Coercive Strategy in an Islamic Cloak", *Aakrosh* (New Delhi), vol. 4, no. 11, April 2001, p. 3.

The Islamic practice or tradition that is mainly responsible for the growth of the Islamic militancy is the “Jihad”: which is the most abused word of Islamic vocabulary today. No other word describes more accurately the “struggle” or “striving” that the Muslim has to take all his life to better himself/herself than Jihad. But, Muslims today seem to wage Jihad against their own families and their own neighbours. The word “Jihad” is immediately invoked. Only certain designated persons in any Muslim community or country can declare Jihad, but today, every Muslim seems to have bestowed on himself/herself the right to declare Jihad, which is the total misinterpretation of the meaning of Jihad. It has gone to an extent that the Jihadis violate the spirit of Jihad as explained in the Holy Quran: this is possibly the core of the Pakistan’s socio-political problem.

Shia and Sunni madrasas have spawned rival terrorist forces that visit gratuitous slaughter on sectarian rivals. There is also a deep schism between Sunni Deobandi and Barelvi madrasas and a large number of Ahl-e-Hadith madrasas. The spurt in sectarian violence is the direct consequence of the proliferation of madrasas, their prime significance has been the export of international extremist Islamic terrorism and this has created enormous internal concentration of armed, trained and indoctrinated terrorist forces. The mushrooming of madrasas in Pakistan has also led to the weaponisation of society, which is mostly witnessed in the frontier and border regions of Pakistan. Trade in contraband goods is

the lifeline of the thousands in Federal Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and other tribal families in many areas, which are adjacent to Afghanistan. All these factors pose the internal security threat to Pakistan.

Madrasa culture has shattered a vital segment of Pakistan's economy. Foreign Direct Investment will remain an unreliable dream in a country driven by religious sectarian bloodletting. Some fraternal Muslim states are mostly reluctant now to issue even transit visas to Pakistani passport holders because the Pakistani citizen is suspected to be a dubious character unless he/she convinces the world otherwise. These are the gifts of madrasas and those who have exploited them.

It is an irony of the history that the United States, which gave all assistance to the growth of Islamic militancy and madrasa culture in Pakistan to promote its interest in Afghanistan, has now been paying a high price for its misadventure. Now the same Islamic militants have turned against the United States. On the one hand, the United States has been calling them "terrorists", on the other hand, they say, "the United States is the biggest terrorist state in the World."¹⁰

Some measures, which can be taken to reform, these madrasas are: They should be registered. If registered they might, in principle, be eligible for government grants. Those who do register should be given the

¹⁰ *The Herald* (Karachi), November-December 1998, p. 32b.

choice of introducing secular and liberalised subjects, (World History, Political Science, Computer Education, General Sciences etc.) with financial support from the state. If, however, they do not, then no funds should be forthcoming. There should be no restriction of any kind on the madrasas except that they will not receive foreign money without the knowledge of the government; they will not enrol foreign students without the government's permission; they will impart no military training and they will not allow any religious fundamentalist to come there and to deliver a talk in their institutions.¹¹ Effective legal actions should be taken against those delivering objectionable speeches or publishing such literature. The Pakistani Government should introduce a code of conduct on madrasa-related activities, which should be strictly implemented. If these restrictions are imposed, then the traditional form of madrasas can be restored. The reduction of the students will only come from these madrasas when the state opens up many schools even in the remotest corner of the country. Moreover, parents who teach their children should be given pecuniary incentives and the children themselves should be given milk, fruit and clothes to keep them in the schools. This is the only humane and effective way of attracting children away from the madrasas. However, the state schools, themselves teach pro-war, chauvinistic, anti-India lessons. So, if reform of curricula is needed it is also needed in the state schools.

¹¹ Tariq Rahman, "Madrasa Reforms", news cited from <http://www.jang.com/pk> January 29, 2002.

No effective measures for controlling the religious extremism and the mushrooming of madrasas have been taken by the predecessors of President General Musharraf. General Musharraf formulated a new strategy for madrasas; the basic crux of which is that the students of madrasas should be brought into the mainstream of society. On August 14, 2001 he banned two sectarian organisations Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Janghvi. The issue of madrasa has assumed greater relevance since World Trade Centre attack on September 11, 2001. In this regard, President Musharraf's address to the nation on January 12, 2002, stated many important measures to control the Jehadi outfits and regulation of madrasa. He also announced ban on Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad.¹² Finally, the Musharraf government has announced the Madrasa Regulation Ordinance 2002 to register and regulate the thousands of madrasas operating in the country. A key component of this ordinance is the establishment of the Madrasa Education Boards at the federal and provincial levels, which will ensure, among other things, that the syllabus taught at religious schools includes the compulsory subjects such as English, Urdu, Mathematics and Science. This will bring the madrasa education system on a par with the regular public education system and open up opportunities for the madrasa students to join institutions of higher learning after completing religious education. The

¹² *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), January 13, 2002.

policy will thus bridge the existing gap between the two parallel education systems and pave the way for the madrasas students to join the mainstream job market.

Theoretically, these policy initiatives are truly revolutionary but banning certain groups may be symbolically significant in terms of sending out a signal regarding the state's resolution to tackle the issue but it needs to be followed up with an attempt to address the cause of phenomenon. These measures seem to tackle the issue of militancy in right direction but on the part of implementation, it can be fairly inferred that there should be difference between theoretical declaration and practical aspects of these measures.

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