

**THE U.S. — SOVIET NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY :
A Case Study of Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington Summits.**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of
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21 July 1988



TO WHOMSOEVER IT MAY CONCERN

Certified that the dissertation entitled
"The U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Diplomacy: A Case Study
of Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington Summits" submitted
by Ms Kalpana Mishra is in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy
of this University. This dissertation has not been
submitted for any other degree of this University
or any other University, This is her own work .

We recommend that this dissertation be placed
before the examiners for evaluation.

PROF M.L. SONDHI
CHAIRMAN

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Buried was the bloody hatchet;
Buried was the dreadful war-club;
Buried were all warlike weapons,
And the war-cry was forgotten.
There was peace among the nations.

- Long Fellow, Hiawatha, XIII

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Kalpna Mishra.
(Kalpena Mishra)

ACRONYMS USED

| | | |
|---------|---|--|
| ABM | - | Anti-ballistic Missile |
| ALCM | - | Air-launched Cruise Missile |
| ASM | - | Air to Surface Missile |
| GLCM | - | Ground-launched Cruise Missile |
| ICBM | - | Intercontinental Ballistic Missile |
| INF | - | Intermediate-range Nuclear Force |
| IRMM | - | Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile |
| MAD | - | Mutual Assured Destruction |
| MASS | - | Mutual Assured Survival Strategy |
| MBFR | - | Mutual Balance Force Reduction |
| MIRV | - | Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle |
| NATO | - | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NST | - | Nuclear and Space Talks |
| RDT & E | - | Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation |
| SALT | - | Strategic Arms Limitation Talks |
| START | - | Strategic Arms Reduction Talks |
| SICMB | - | Small ICBM |
| SLBM | - | Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile. |

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

This study being a contemporary current issue, which has continued for last four decades and may continue for many more years to come, may highlight new facts and come with new analysis in due course which may, substantially disprove this research work. This is an area of study which most likely will be undergoing chronic changes every now and then.

Since Hiroshima, both formal and informal arrangements that govern the world's nuclear weapons have assumed a settled shape. The threat of nuclear catastrophe has been enhanced by the unabated arms race which not only consumes scarce natural and human resources but has also resulted in stockpiles of nuclear weapons which can destroy all life on this planet many times over. The danger became all the more menacing with the beginning of the decade of the eighties when nuclear disarmament began to be propounded and serious efforts were started to take the nuclear arms race to outer space. "No peace today, no life tomorrow". Besides, drastic reductions in nuclear weaponry and especially the complete abolition of offensive armaments needs much of mutual political accommodation between them i.e., the U.S. and Soviet Union. Against this backdrop, the main focus of this study is to examine the basic features of the three summits - Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington - in both their structural and procedural aspects.

Chapter I traces a brief history of summitry incorporating the aspects of super power Nuclear Diplomacy, rationale behind the arms race, motives and mutual understanding in limiting, controlling of nuclear weapons and the various proposals, initiatives taken by both the U.S. and Soviet Union.

Chapter II examines issues before Geneva Summit and how the two Super Powers with diametrically opposed ideological and geo-political interests intended to come to an agreement to control/reduce the nuclear weapons from this planet.

Chapter III illustrates what happened at Reykjavik Summit and world public opinion regarding success and failure of the Summit.

Chapter IV attempts an indepth analysis of Washington Summit. It discusses the issues relating to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, the study of Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington Summits bring out three issues; strategic, political and diplomatic.

The theoretical literature pertaining to this research work is based on primary sources including the Communist Party of Soviet Union, Department of Defence, Staff Committee Documents, Press Reports, Speeches and Secondary Source such as Books, articles, journals, press clippings from various newspapers.

CHAPTER - I

BACKGROUND: THE U.S. - SOVIET NUCLEAR
DIPLOMACY

Since Second World War, the global involvement of all states has been determined by the tidal waves of relations between the two Super Powers - the United States and the Soviet Union. The history of Super Powers' antagonism has been interrupted by seeking of accommodation in the act of balancing each other, running from an uneasy wartime alliance through an almost immediately following sharply hostile cold war. For a long time, as the cold war escalated, the hostility between the two and their allies was motivated by a need for defence of the "free world" against "the communist conspiracy for world revolution", for determining common global positions on the western side; on the eastern side, the motive was to stand up against "monopoly capitalism", "neocolonialism" and "imperialism".¹ Thereby, the arms race was pursued by both sides under the assumption of an imminent risk of a military show down between the two systems or at least, of a constant danger of encroachment from the other ideological camp.

In line with this the central element in the development of the relations between the two has been the arms race

1. Alva Myrdal, Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race, Manchester, 1977, p.23.

which has time and again halted the process of detente and disarmament. The detente of recent years has led to a search for greater harmony in Super Power relations through some limited approaches to freer economic, scientific and cultural relations and, generally widened communications. The Helsinki Conference held in 1975 represented a kind of codification of the ideas of detente but without any firm commitments regarding implementation. However, detente has not led to a reversal or even a cessation of the arms race. The main new phenomena has rather been the institutionalisation of the continuous character of the arms race. The result is the two Super Powers now stand more armed than even before with gigantic arsenals which continue to be increased.

From the beginning, both have excelled in high rhetoric about the goal of disarmament, often employing acrimonious polemics against each other's positions. But beneath the surface they have increasingly acted as if there were between them a conspiracy not to permit a halt, still less a reversal of the arms race. To this development belongs the tying up of other nations in alliances.

Although, the Soviet bloc had already been established and solidified, Europe was more firmly structured by the formation of NATO in 1949, and Warsaw Pact in 1955. In other parts of the world, various regional or bilateral accords usually created less tightly regulated arrangements. Despite all pronouncements of mutuality and partnership, within these alliances, the power has remained firmly in the hands of the two Super Powers. Spurred on by the Super Powers' arms race most other countries have militarized unprecedently, not least the underdeveloped countries. The Super Powers have actively contributed to this militarization by military aid and by the politicization of development aid. To the corollary, they have not acted in concert to prevent or stop wars in various parts of the world, as the Charter of the U.N. prescribes that the great powers should do. It is noticed that they have often taken sides in Indo-China, Afghanistan, Middle East war etc. Although, they have not got themselves involved in active warfare, still, their military build up and ideological competition contribute to instability. Taking disarmament while relentlessly building up their own armaments to dazzling levels, producing and aiding allied

countries to do the same, making the world more dangerous, compelling even non-aligned countries to keep their defences high - this is how peoples and their respective Governments of the lesser powers have experienced Super Power politics after the war. Again, while these repercussions are played out all over the world, the two Super Powers in their competitive antagonism are fixated on each other.

Primarily, the motivating force for the Super Powers' arms race has been that - (a) each must be second to none; and secondly (b) whenever the will of the U.S. Congress falters regarding military expenditures, the Pentagon propaganda machine releases news about an approaching bomber gap or missile gap or some other alleged advance, in the Soviet armory. The Soviet Government is not dependent on a scrutinising Congress and the internal debate there is muted. But it can be safely assumed that those responsible for the budget are egged on by their military establishments which deliver correct or incorrect informations about threatening changes in American capabilities. (c) Thirdly, another main motivation of the arms race between the Super Powers is for each to match the other in destructive capacity is continuously revealed in official statements on

both sides.²

Initially the Soviet Union started from a position of inferiority, but it has gradually advanced towards equality in the gross kills, effect of nuclear weapons deployed or in production. In regard to technology, the U.S. has always been and is for all foreseeable time far ahead. But in practical terms especially from the beginning of SALT negotiations in 1969, the two Super Powers have acknowledged that what they possibly can agree upon is the establishment of essential parity which each of them then attempts to surpass in order to reach superiority. Each side still has exaggerated conceptions about the other's military-technological thrust and this drives the arms race onward. As long as the arms race is permitted to go on, more than momentary stability can never be secured.

Apart from identifying the most dynamic elements in the arms race, one should ask how much is enough? Is there any rationale for continuing the quest to match the

2. Ibid., p. 25

other side at ever higher levels and for trying to surpass it ? These are some questions left unformulated by the Super Powers themselves in bilateral negotiations.

Experts have often approached the problems and effectively pointed out how vast is the over kill capacity of both Super Powers. The immediate aim of such observations has been to demonstrate the need to reach an agreement between them to scale down their nuclear ambitions. However, the question is raised whether one of the Super Powers could unilaterally and safely cease the competition and even decrease its nuclear arsenal without risking its deterrent effect.

Furthermore, independent analysts, all agree upon one thing - the overkill capacity of each of the Super Powers is far beyond 'enough'. Even if the ambition should be to kill all of mankind, the magnitude of expected damage is the question of most vital concern to the people living under what they believe is the protection of the terror balance. They must find that the physical, biological and social consequences of ever using what the two sides have in their nuclear arsenals are completely out of line with

any reasonable view of what could be the national objectives of the United States or the Soviet Union.

As observed by Jerone B. Wiesner and Herbert, "in the event of an exchange of blows by strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union most of the urban populations of the two countries could be killed, and most of the industry and commerce could be destroyed by the direct and immediate effects of the nuclear explosions. The towns and rural areas of the two countries would at the same time be subjected to varying amounts of radioactive fallout. The details of what would happen to the people living in such areas depend importantly on the weather conditions prevailing at the time and on the details of the attack pattern, but well over one half of the town and country populations could be killed by the fall out. In addition, the living standards and the life expectancy of the survivors would be substantially reduced by secondary effects including both the effect of less than lethal levels of fallout and the general breakdown of civilized services".³ This estimate

3. Jerone B. Wiesner and Herbert F. York, "National Security and the Nuclear Test Ban", Scientific American, October, 1964, p. 35.

of destruction was stated succinctly by Jerone B. Wiesner in the year 1964.

Even since shortly after World War II, the military power of the U.S. has been steadily increasing. Throughout this same period the national security of U.S. has been rapidly and inexorably diminishing. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union, on the basis of its own unilateral decision and determination to accept the inevitable retaliation could have launched an attack against the United States with bombers carrying fission bombs. Some of these bombs would have penetrated American defences. In the late 1950s, again in its own sole decision and determination to accept the inevitable massive retaliation, the Soviet Union could have launched an attack against the U.S. using more and better bombers, this time carrying thermonuclear bombs. Some of these bombers would have penetrated American defences and the casualties could have numbered in the tens of millions.

From the Soviet point of view the picture is similar but much worse. The Soviet military power has been steadily

increasing since it became an atomic power in 1949. Thus, both sides in the arms race are confronted by the dilemma of increasing military power and decreasing national security. The clearly predictable course of the arms race is a steadily open spiral downward into oblivion. Although, it is very difficult to make precise estimates, but it seems that a "fuel nuclear exchange between the two would result in the order of 10,000 casualties from cancer and Leukemia in countries situated well away from the two main protagonists. In addition, genetic problems that are even more difficult to calculate would affect many *millions* of others to come. Civilizations would survive somewhere, but probably not in the U.S. or the Soviet Union and perhaps not elsewhere in North America or Europe".⁴

With Sputnik in 1957, the Russians demonstrated the possibility of Russian missiles with nuclear warheads reaching the U.S. and the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella was shaken. The shock of the Soviet testing of

4. Ibid., p. 35

a ballistic missile that could cross the Atlantic led the U.S. in 1957 to negotiate, as a token of increased defence preparedness installation of intermediate range missiles (IRBM) in Britain, Italy, and Turkey. However, the IRBMs were never a real threat to the Soviet Union because of its strategic retaliatory force and thus were not effective protection for the western countries either.

Again, the limited war concept was part of the U.S. official strategic doctrine of flexible response and is endorsed by its allies in Western Europe. As such it makes the Russians suspicious that the U.S. might pretend to engage in a limited war, and then use the occasion to escalate it. Reflection on policy statements from Soviet Union raises the question of whether these statements may be merely propaganda or whether they are a warning to the U.S. that it will not be allowed to wage war in Europe without inviting a nuclear onslaught at home. The Soviet Union must equally with the U.S., fear annihilation of its own country in case of a direct international confrontation. Thus, underlying both of strategies is a definite, joint interest in preserving their own territories respectively. As David Packard, Secretary of Defence put it: " U.S.S.R.

as well as the U.S. are going to use their nuclear potential against each other only when an unavoidable threat appears against their own existence".⁵

From the U.S. stand point, it has a double scenario, one for deterrence and one for war. (a) Deterrence for avoiding a Super Power war chiefly through strategic nuclear weapons up to the level of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). (b) If war occurs, it is to be fought as a limited war in Europe, possibly using tactical nuclear attack, but not allowing that war to escalate to intercontinental warfare involving the territories of the Super Powers themselves.

Thus, keeping the above facts in one's mind, it appears that their chief purpose was to maintain a stalemate rather than truly working for elimination of nuclear weapons from this planet.

A phase of stalemate in strategic domain between the two powers came into being in late 1940s' only. The second

5. Ibid., p. 37

world war ended with the U.S. being the world's only undamaged nuclear weapons power. From 1946 onward, the Soviets' principal military aim was to blunt the perilous edge of nuclear supremacy of United States. Then, very soon the wide gap was narrowed rapidly with a supreme effort. By the mid 1950s, the Soviet Union had become a thermonuclear power, equipped with strategic missiles that could devastate large parts of the U.S. Yet, in the 1960s it was maintained that the Soviets lacked the western and specifically U.S. sophistication in dealing with military strategy and in coming up with strategic concepts. Such alleged sluggishness is ascribed to Stalinism, force of tradition and lastly inertia of established institutions. More particularly, this is alleged in the context of Khrushchev's confidence in the wake of Soviet acquisition of space-borne capacity. But only after Cuban missile crisis in 1962, it has been proved that U.S.S.R was as vulnerable as U.S. in strategic nuclear capability and implementation. The fact of 'equal security' created a movement towards mutual restraint which was established later in the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), in Sea-Bed Treaty (1967) and in Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968).

At the time of 24th Congress of the CPSU, V.M. Kulish noted that any one country trying to gain military superiority will alter international relations. He said, "the appearance of the new types of weapons could seriously affect the balance of military forces between the two world systems".⁶ The developments in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s show the U.S. commitment to achieve unilateral military superiority on behalf of the United States.

In continuation to this fact, the Soviet position on strategy virtually is the basis of their position on military superiority. Their view of national security seemed to be undergoing a change since 1970s - a period in which they achieved strategic parity with the West and the U.S. Particularly SALT agreements are the ample recognition of strategic parity or mutual vulnerability. This will mean that the unilateral defence of national security is to operate within the framework of the capacity of each side to cause unacceptable damage on the other.

6. V.M. Kulish, " Conclusion" from selected writings on Soviet Military Strategy, as quoted in Rakesh Gupta, Soviet Policies in the Eighties, New Delhi, 1987, p. 83.

Thus, the SALT significance lay in the political-military strategic field. Raymond L. Grathoff, a member of the US SALT-I delegation has observed: " in a politico-military context these agreements reflected and bore witness to American recognition of the fact that there exists a military parity in the broad sense of inability of either side to prevail military over the other and hence an inability to coerce the other side".⁷ According to Harold Brown, it is the common interest of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to avoid a nuclear war and that the attempt on the part of the U.S. to achieve military superiority of the kind that it had in the 1950 "would be dangerous and unlikely to succeed".⁸ Subscribing to common security for both Super Powers is security from nuclear war and visualised that the management of this security rests on cooperation and not competition. He said the common security " ... cannot in the final analysis be dominated by competition. Their security must be based

7. Raymond L. Grathoff, "The Soviet Military and Salt", in Tiri Valenta and William Potter, ed., Soviet Decision Making for National Security George Allen and Unwin, London, 1984, p. 141.

8. Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security, Defence and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World, Westview, Colorado, 1983, p. 17.

on unparalleled degree of cooperation. It must be common security".⁹ This has elements of cooperation and competition on the basis of mutual essential equivalence. Thus, both on their part have subscribed to the idea of common security. In the early 1980s, the U.S. Administration without consulting the European Allies responded to the criticism and announced the strategic defence initiative (SDI) in March 1983. It signified a paradigm shift from Mutual Assured Destruction(MAD) to Mutual Assured Survival Strategy(MASS). The MASS therefore was offered the vision of a nuclear-free world and hiding the continued relevance of nuclear weapons.

In this context, as a continuous process in the global rivalry, the arms race has conceptually offered mutual perceptions. In the place of the concept of arms control, arms reduction came into existence. Earlier, in June, 1946, Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. representative to U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, proposed international authority to conduct

9. Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices, Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*, New York, 1983,
p. 418.

all atomic energy research and development, control all atomic activities, eventually destroy all nuclear weapons. If the plan was adopted, U.S. the only nuclear power at that time, would give up its arsenal. Authority would be empowered to inspect for violations of treaty provisions. Although, plan endorsed by large majority of U.N. members, Soviet objectives to ownership, staging and enforcement provisions and counter proposals that nuclear activities remain under control of National Governments with authority, empowered only to conduct periodic inspection of declared nuclear facilities. Along with U.S. many countries considered Soviet verification provisions altogether inadequate and as a result negotiations were deadlocked.

In corollary to this fact, a fear of what the opposite side may be aiming for then act on both as a force, to drive the arms race onward. They both realised the truth that as long as the arms race was permitted to go on, more than momentary stability could never be secured. Henry Kissinger, the then Secretary of State of U.S.A said, "what in the name of God is strategic superiority? what is the significance of it politically, militarily,

operationally at these levels of numbers ? what do you do with it" ? ¹⁰ Having all these thoughts in their mind, they want to come and focus on one common point of development of a new regime that would outlaw nuclear weapons and reduce danger posed by chemical, conventional and other weapons of mass destruction. But the more important Soviet suggestion in this regard is as soon as policy-makers achieved it should decrease its level while maintaining equal security of both sides.¹¹ In short, this has reference to the Kennedy-McNamara strategy of nuclear deterrence and flexible response which accompanied arms race in ICBMs. It was John F. Kennedy who cried the "missile gap" in the wake of Soviet success in 1957 which had inaugurated the space age. But later it was found baseless.

The Soviet Union accepted the challenge once again. It had been forced into cold war logic earlier. Senator

10. Paul H. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism", Foreign Policy, no. 17, Winter 1974-75, p. 136.

11. E.Primakov, 'Philosophy of Security' in K.Subramaniam and Air Commander Jasjit Singh, ed., Security Without Nuclear Weapons Indo-Soviet Dialogue, New Delhi, 1986, p. 5.

Vandenberg wanted U.S.-Soviet relations to be broken off in 1939. Further, he wanted the US "to win the war first" so that Russia's frontiers could be rolled back¹² in the name of justice. Followed by the atomic bomb and accompanying strategy of massive retaliation the cold war imposed a logic on the USSR which almost in an autarchic fashion produced its own bomb while stressing the peaceful use of atomic energy, which was emphasised in the Soviet proposals in June 1946. But it was rejected by the western powers and the U.S. came up with the Baruch Plan that wanted to preserve U.S. monopoly over the bomb and deny it to the USSR. The cold war logic resulted in an A-bomb for an A-bomb, H-bomb for an H-bomb, MRV for MRV, MIRV for a MIRV till the time a strategic parity was reached between the US and the USSR. In the 1970s, the process of detente, sanity against the goldrush of arms race and militarism¹³ was present.

After this, both Super Powers were engaged in various

12. D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, London, 1961, p. 273.

13. Rakesh Gupta, Soviet Politics in the Eighties, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 86-87.

arms control initiatives. In April, 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed nations to limit production of strategic materials devoted to the military and suggested savings be used for worldwide assistance. In the same year, in December, President Eisenhower called for creation of international atomic energy agency to receive nuclear materials from individual states and use them for peaceful purposes. In July 1955, U.S. President proposed exchange of blueprints of military bases and aerial reconnaissance to protect nations against threatening military buildups and surprise attacks. This was a first step towards comprehensive disarmament. On January 14, 1957, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said, "the U.S. proposed that the first step toward the objective of assuring that the future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes would be to bring the testing of such objects under international inspection and participation".¹⁴ On October 31, 1958, the U.S. unilaterally suspended nuclear weapons testing for a period of one years.

14. Ibid.

On 25 September, 1961, President John F. Kennedy offered plan for general and complete disarmament to U.N, calling for immediate test ban to halt nuclear weapons production, ban on nuclear weapons in outer space, gradual elimination of nuclear stockpiles and improvements in U.N. peace keeping forces. On April 18, 1962, U.S. presented three stage - disarmament proposal: (1) reduction and ceiling on nuclear and conventional forces, test ban etc., (2) further fifty per cent cut in delivery systems and other arms; (3) reduction of arms and forces to levels necessary for internal order, elimination of nuclear weapons and strengthening of U.N. peace keeping forces.¹⁵ On January 21, 1964 at disarmament talks in Geneva, U.S. proposed "verified freeze" on nuclear materials for weapons. Other provisions and safeguards against accidental or surprise attack were prohibited transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. In 1966, signatories agreed to ban nuclear weaponry from outer space in peaceful uses of outer space treaty. President Richard Nixon signed ratification of treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear

15. Ibid.

weapons, and stated that, " this nation, through the administrations of all Presidents of this century, is devoted to the cause of peace".¹⁶ Soviet Union also ratified this treaty in November, 1969. In the same year, Nixon stated that U.S. unilaterally renounced first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons and all methods of biological warfare.



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On February 11, 1971, the sea-bed treaty was signed to prohibit employment of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on ocean floors or their subsoil. In the same year, there was the Nuclear Accidents Agreement which initiated measures to "reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war" between U.S. and the Soviet Union, including pledge to improve safeguards, immediate notification in case of accident and advance notice of missile launchers towards other's territory. On May 29, 1972, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev negotiated and signed basic principles of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Moscow. Regarding disarmament they declared that they both regarded as the ultimate objective of their efforts

16. Ibid.



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to achieve complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accord with the purposes and the principles of the U.N. In the same year, a biological weapons convention was held prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of toxin and other biological weapons and requiring destruction of existing inventories.

In November 1981, Reagan offered "zero zero" proposal for INF under which U.S. and NATO would cancel deployment of Pershing-II and ground launched cruise missiles if Soviets dismantled triple-warhead SS-20 missiles and older, single warhead SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. In March, 1983, given Soviet refusal of zero zero proposal, United States offered interim proposal under which U.S. would reduce planned deployment of Pershing-II and ground launched cruise missiles in case Soviet reduction of number of warheads in their long-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis. In the month of June, U.S. announced changes in START proposal to increase flexibility; relaxation in limit of 850 ballistic missiles on each side; and equal ceiling in number of heavy bombers and cruise missiles carried by bombers. In October, again U.S.

incorporated 'build down' concept into START proposal which linked reductions to rates of modernisation or to an approximately five per cent annual reduction, whichever was greater. The U.S. also was willing to discuss "build down" plan for bombers. In 1985, after the Geneva Summit Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev recognised - (a) that in the present world there can be no military superiority and (b) that in a nuclear war it is hard to imagine a scenario in which there will be victors and vanquished. This is pre^eminently an acceptance by the U.S. of the Soviet position on military equivalence and the West European reluctance in accepting the paradigm of limited nuclear war perhaps hypocritically though. ¹⁷

On the Soviet side, in September 1961, Soviet Union broke a two and half year moratorium on atmospheric nuclear testing. In October, Soviets exploded fifty megaton thermonuclear device, largest ever detonated. In the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty(1963) there was prohibition on

17. Ibid., p. 84.

nuclear weapon tests in atmosphere and outer space and also the Moon. In ^{nuclear} non-proliferation treaty (1968) signatories agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to nations that do not possess such weapons and states without nuclear weapons programmes. SALT-I Interim Agreement on offensive strategic arms Launchers had permitted an increase in sea-launched ballistic missiles up to an agreed level. In 1972, ABM Treaty (SALT-I) limited anti-ballistic missile systems in USSR and US. It was updated in 1974 to provide one anti-ballistic missile site for each country. In November, 1981, in Madrid Conference a review was made with Helsinki Accords. In December 1983, Moscow announced suspensions of talks on intermediate range nuclear forces in Geneva and did not set date for resumption of START talks, also being held in Geneva.

After going through all these above proposals made by Soviet Union and United States respectively one can come to certain specific steps which was taken by them at the same time, more particularly in the domain of "arms control".

At the outset the very term 'arms control' is used here in a broad sense to denote measures intended to freeze, limit or abolish specific categories of weapons; to prevent certain military important items; to reduce the risk of wars to constraint or prohibit the use of certain arms in wars or to build up confidence among States through greater openness in the military field. It thus includes measures of both arms limitation and disarmament. Mainly it includes:

1. restrictions on nuclear weapon testing,
2. the prohibition of non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction,
3. the demilitarization, denuclearisation areas,
4. strategic arms limitations,
5. the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
6. the prevention of war,
7. the humanitarian laws of war. ¹⁸

In this context one can discuss the most important steps in the field of arms control, where the two Super Powers are in the lead.

18. J. Goldblat, "Agreements for Arms Control: A Critical Survey", quoted from Taylor and Francis, 1982, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Year Book 1982.

In the first place, Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow on 5th August, 1963, came into force on 10th October in the same year. The underlying objective was to ban nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, and both in outer space and under water. It prohibited the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosions:

- a) in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or under water including territorial waters or high sea;
- b) or, in any other environment if explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted.¹⁹

Next, there was threshold Test Ban Treaty signed at Moscow between U.S. and the Soviet Union on 3rd July, 1974, which prohibited the carrying out of any underground nuclear weapons test having a yield exceeding one hundred fifty k t.

19. Ibid.

From

31st March 1976 onwards, each party undertook to limit the number of its underground nuclear weapons tests to a minimum. The provisions of the treaty did not extend to underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which were to be governed by a separate agreement. National technical means of verification were to be used to provide assurance of compliance and a protocol to the treaty, which specified the data that have to be exchanged between the parties to ensure such verification. Since the treaty was not in force by 31st March, 1976, they agreed to cut off date for explosions above the established threshold. The parties stated that they would observe the limitation during the pre-ratification period.

In peaceful nuclear explosion treaty, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It was signed at Moscow and Washington respectively on 28th May, 1976; but came in to force only on 31st December, 1981. It prohibited the carrying out of any individual underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, having a yield exceeding 150 kt., or any group explosion (for peaceful purposes, having a yield exceed) with an aggregate yield exceeding 1500 kt. The treaty

governed all nuclear explosions carried out outside the weapon test sites after 31st March, 1976. The question of carrying out individual explosions with a yield exceeding 150 kt. was to be considered at an appropriate time to be agreed. In addition to the use of national technical means of verification, the treaty provided for access to sites of explosion. In certain specified cases, the treaty provided operational arrangements for ensuring that no weapon related benefits precluded by the threshold Test Ban Treaty are derived from peaceful nuclear explosions.

After this understanding, they came to sign SALT-I (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) at Moscow on 26th May, 1972, but came into force on 3 October, 1972. It prohibited the deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems for the defence of the whole territory of both the countries, or of an individual region, except as expressly permitted.²⁰

In addition to the agreement on ABM, there was a

20. Arms Control, Department of State Bulletin, June 1987, pp. 42-47.

protocol signed at Moscow on 3rd July, 1974; which entered into force on 25th May, 1976. It mainly provided that each party should be limited to a single area for deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems or their components instead of two such areas as allowed by the ABM treaty. Each party would like to have the right to dismantle or destroyed at the time of the signing of the protocol and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by the system itself. It further provided that, before starting construction, notification is given during the year which commenced at 5 years interval, therefore, those being the years for periodic review of the ABM treaty. This right was to be exercised only once. The deployment of an ABM system within the area selected should be regained, limited by the levels and other requirements established by the ABM treaty.

An Interim Agreement between the countries had been signed on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, at Moscow on 26th July, 1972, entered into force on 3 October, 1972. It provided a freeze for a period of five years of the aggregate number of fixed land based ICBMs launchers and ballistic missile launchers

on modern submarines. The parties were free to choose the mix, except that conversion of land-based launchers for light ICBMs or for ICBMs of older types, into land based launchers for modern heavy ICBMs was prohibited. National technical means of verifications are to be used to provide assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Agreement.

In September, 1977 the US and the USSR formally stated that although the Interim Agreement was to expire on 3 October, 1977, they intended to refrain from any actions incompatible with its provisions or with the goals of the ongoing talks on a new agreement.

Besides, a memorandum of understanding between the US and the U.S.S.R regarding the establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission on arms limitation was signed at Geneva on 21st December 1972, and came into force on the same date. It established a Standing Consultative Commission to promote the objective and implementation of the provision of the ABM treaty and Interim Agreement of 26th May, 1972 and of the Nuclear Accidents Agreement of 30 September, 1971.

SALT-II was signed at Vienna on 18 June, 1979 on the limitation of strategic offensive arms between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It set for both parties an initial ceiling of 2400 on ICBM Launchers, submarines Launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) capable of a range in excess of 600 km. This ceiling was to be further lowered to 2250 and the lowering must begin in January, 1981, while the dismantling or destruction of systems which exceeded that number must be completed by 31st December, 1981. A sub limit of 1320 was imposed upon each party for the combined number of launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVS and aeroplanes equipped for long range (over 600 km.) cruise missiles. Moreover, each party was limited to a total of 1200 launchers of MIRVED ICBM and SLBMs and MIRVED ICBMs. There were ban on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs, with one exception for each side i.e on building fixed ICBM launchers, on converting fixed light ABM launchers into heavy ICBM launchers, on heavy mobile ICBMs, heavy SLBMs, ASBMs, on surfaced ship ballistic missile Launchers, on systems to launch missiles from earth orbit including fractional orbital missiles. National technical means was to be used to verify compliance. Any interferences with such means of verification or any

deliberate concealment measures which impeded verification were prohibited. The treaty was to remain in force until 31st December, 1985. Prior to signing of the treaty, on 16 January 1979, the U.S.S.R informed the U.S. that the Soviet TU-22M aircraft called 'Backfire' was a medium range bomber and that the Soviet Union did not intend to give this bomber an intercontinental capacity and would not increase its radius of action to enable it to strike targets on US territory. The U.S.S.R also pledged to limit the production of 'backfire' aircraft to the 1979 rate.

A protocol to the SALT-II treaty was signed at Vienna on 18 June, 1979 but came into force on December 31, 1981. It banned the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers or the flight testing of ICBMs from such launchers; the deployment of long range cruise missiles on sea-based or Land based launchers; the flight testing of long range based launchers; the flight testing of Long-range cruise missiles with multiple warheads from sea-based or land-based Launchers and the flight testing or deployment of ASBMS. The protocol is an integral part of the treaty. The SALT-II treaty and the protocol are accompanied by agreed statements and common

understanding clarifying the obligations under particular articles. In short, over the years till SALT talks the U.S. and the Soviet Union had concentrated on that kind of disarmament which consisted in preventing others from manufacturing nuclear weapons; their entrance to the SALT would serve, in part, to support that enterprise in arms control. In retrospect, it had been the Nth power problem, as it was then called the question of non-proliferation rather than arms control in the more conventional sense that had dominated over the past years of U.S. - Soviet nuclear diplomacy.²¹

After a six years of lapse again Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev and American President Ronald Reagan met at Geneva on 19 November, 1985. Although, major break through was not made during this Summit, yet, the most important fact was that the leaders met after a long span of six years, a period in which a step by step confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States was mounting. Hence it was in itself a significant

21. William, R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltgraff, SALT Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s, Pittsburg, 1973, p. 1.

step forward. The positive outcome of the Summit was that both the leaders of two great nations agreed on a basic formulation that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought". This laid the foundation for forward motion towards the objective of nuclear disarmament.

At their second Summit of Reykjavik in October, 10-11, 1986, the two sides agreed to eliminate 100 warheads each on land based intermediate-range nuclear forces. They also agreed that, within the five years, they would reduce by fifty per cent of all the strategic nuclear weapons. However, the Summit failed on the question of 'star wars' or strategic defence initiative (SDI). Later the Soviet Union gave clear indications that it would be willing to delink the INF issue from that of the strategic defence initiative (SDI). After this, it was Soviet initiative that started a zero solution for the intermediate nuclear force in Europe which later became a double zero and later as global zero.

In recent past on 7-8 December, 1987, the two leaders met in Washington D.C., and signed an historic treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear missiles. The INF

treaty bans missiles with ranges of 300 to 3400 miles. It includes an agreement on verification under which the two sides will be able to verify implementation of their accord. Its importance lies in the fact that it is an earnest of their intention to advance towards the next and more important goal of reaching agreement to reduce by half strategic offensive arms in the context of a firm guarantee of strategic stability. Very aptly did the Soviet leader Gorbachev say "Today is the first stepping stone towards signs of a constructive super power relations, progress and improvements and move towards a nuclear disarmament". Furthermore, this was the first agreement of its kind in the history of the world's march towards the complete elimination of the nuclear weapons.²²

22. Patriot(New Delhi), 9 December, 1988

CHAPTER - II

GENEVA SUMMIT

Six years after the SALT-II agreement, on 19-20 November, 1985, the U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva. Relations between the two had altered drastically since the last Vienna Summit.¹ Assessing the historical importance, Gorbachev said, the "first and foremost" question was what could be done to halt the unprecedented arms race and its extension to new spheres". The Associated Press reported Gorbachev's thought in this context : "I think when that is explained to him, he will find it will help us to end the arms race, we both must have the same intentions. If he feels as strongly that way as I do, then we will end the arms race".² Before the Summit, observers of both sides respectively had very fragile expectations about the event. A case in point was Carter's decision to go ahead within the production and deployment of the controversial cruise missiles. The Soviets interpreted the decision as an indication of U.S. refusal to allow Moscow to have strategic parity with

1. Daily Telegraph, London, 19 November, 1985.

2. International Herald Tribune, Paris, November 19, 1985.

Washington. Truly, SALT-II was negotiated and signed in June 1979, but thereafter the decline in Super Power relations was swift.³ In a joint appearance both of them agreed in the first ever Super Power Summit of its kind to accelerate negotiations between the two nations "to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth". They were further in agreement that "the nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought". They therefore pledged that "they will not seek to achieve military superiority".⁴ Thus, Reagan claimed that he had moved arms control forward at his Summit meeting with Soviet leader Gorbachev and tried to convince him that missile defences could help the Super Powers "escape the prison of mutual terror".⁵

Background:

As this was the first ever U.S. - Soviet Summit in six years after the SALT-II agreement in 1979, it can only be understood against the background of the U.S. - Soviet relationship during those years. In the post-war era,

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 22 November, 1985

5. Washington Post, Washington, 23 November, 1985

American nuclear superiority was indispensable in deterring Soviet probes that might have led to World War III. But fortunately that era is over, and we live in the age of nuclear parity, when each Super Power has the means to destroy the other and the rest of the world.

In these strategic circumstances, Summit meetings have become inevitable for preservation and maintenance of world peace. No doubt, both the Super Powers have diametrically opposed ideological and geopolitical interests. There are lots of differences between them which can not be resolved. Yet, both have one major goal in common-survival. Each has the key to the other's very survival. Here an essential element of a new relationship is not sentimental expressions of friendship but hardheaded mutual respect. In this context, a question hinges to one's mind that can two Super Powers with diametrically opposed geopolitical interests, avoid war and develop a peaceful relationship? Before answering it is important to recognise first the major dangers which could lead to nuclear war.⁶ These can be :

- i) War by accident: where one side launches a nuclear attack because a mechanical malfunction creates

6. Richard Nixon, "Super Power Summitry", Foreign Affairs, Fall 1985, pp. 1-11.

the mistaken impression that the other side has launched an attack;

- ii) Nuclear proliferation: which could put nuclear weapons in the hands of a leader of a minor revolutionary or terrorist power who would be less restrained from using nuclear weapons than the major powers have been;
- iii) Escalation of small wars: in areas where the interests of the Super Powers are both involved, such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf;
- iv) War by miscalculation: where a leader of one Super Power underestimates the will of the leader of the other to take ultimate risks to defend his interests.

In all four of these scenarios, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in reducing the danger and risks which could lead to a nuclear war. Therefore, they are prepared to come to a Summit where they could play a constructive role.

In the previous Summit, it was clearly indicated that the climate of the Super Powers' relations was steadily

deteriorating. There are many reasons for this development. Soviet expansionist policies in many regions of the world is a pointer to this. Six months after the Vienna Summit there was Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and that made arms control and other forms of cooperation at first difficult and lastly impossible. Relations were further exacerbated by a continuing Soviet military build up.⁷

Under these conditions the basis for a productive U.S. - Soviet dialogue did not exist. Before such a dialogue could take place, several changes had to occur. The trends of the 1970s had to be reversed. Thus, the foundation for November's Summit was five years' rebuilding of American strength in the economic, political as well as in the military spheres. Besides, the Summit was a testimonial to Alliance solidarity and cohesion also.

Before the meeting a number of meetings were held at the Foreign Secretary level. The nuclear arms reduction talk, which the Soviets had broken off in December 1983,

7. Rozanne Z. Ridgway, "The Geneva Summit - A Testimonial to Alliance Solidarity", NATO Review, no.6, December 1985, pp. 1-4.

resumed in March, 1985; also series of regional experts' meetings, dealing with the Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan, Asia and Latin America respectively. Last but not the least, the end of a transitional period of leadership in the Soviet Union and the accession of a new and vigorous leader made such a meeting more than an abstract possibility.⁸ Having all these in mind, the US has been seeking a more constructive long-term relationship with the Soviet Union. In January, 1984, Ronald Reagan said, "we must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms and build a constructive working relationship". The U.S. had agreed to enter new negotiations, "on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms", and the U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed these questions in Geneva on 7-8 January, 1985⁹ before the Geneva Summit.

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8. Victor B. Olason, "The Geneva Talks on Nuclear and Outer Space Weapons", NATO Review, no.1, 1985 pp. 10-11.
 9. Text of Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R Statement on new nuclear and Space arms talks, Geneva, 8 January, NATO Review.

January Communique

As the joint statement issued by them at Geneva in 1985, January communique, they discussed the subject and objectives of the proposed U.S. - Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms at the next meeting. Both of them agreed that the subject of negotiations would be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and INF, with all the questions considered and resolved in their inter-relationship. It was agreed that the objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. Shultz expressed the hope that the negotiations would ultimately "lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms every where".

Later, a delegation from each side, divided into three groups, entered into a negotiation on 12 March, 1985. The groups were to address: (1) strategic offensive nuclear arms, INF, space and other defensive arms. In the START group US sought radical reductions in the numbers and destructive power of strategic forces and was prepared to explore trade offer that would accommodate differences in the force and

structure of the two countries. (2) The US sought the elimination of or radical reductions in US and Soviet INF, and expressed its readiness to pursue the lowest possible equal, global limits, (3) The U.S. intended to raise ground as well as space-based systems in the third forum.¹⁰

In short, the U.S. wanted to reverse the erosion in the stability of the strategic relationship that has resulted from Soviet actions inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the ABM treaty, and from the continuing growth in Soviet offensive nuclear forces. Looking to the long term, the U.S. would discuss the possibility of moving away from a situation in which security rests on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation towards increased reliance on defence as a basis for deterrence.

Geneva Summit

The agreement reached at Geneva on 7-8 January, was a useful first step in what would be a long completed

10. Ibid.

negotiating process. (1) The US expanded the dialogue with Soviet Union and opened a forum where the arms control issues dividing the two sides could be discussed. With regard to Reagan's strategic defence initiative, it was emphasised that this was a research programme, consistent with the ABM Treaty which held out the possibility of enhancing the ability to deter aggression against the U.S. or its allies. In this connection, the U.S. wished to discuss with the Soviet Union, the issue of space arms and the broader question of strategic defence, including existing Soviet defences.

Lastly, the U.S. hoped that through this U.S. - Soviet dialogue, it could achieve deep reductions of nuclear forces and strengthen strategic stability. Equally important, the U.S. would continue to press in diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union for progress in the three other key areas of U.S. - Soviet dialogue: regional problems, human rights and bilateral issues.

Issues Discussed in Geneva 19 November, 1985

During the meeting a comprehensive discussion covered the basic questions of U.S. - Soviet relation and the current

international situation. In their meeting, agreement was reached on a number of specific issues;¹¹

- 1) Both leaders having discussed key security issues and aware of their responsibility for maintaining peace agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and must not be fought. Recognising that conflict between the two could have only catastrophic consequences, they emphasised the importance of preventing any war between them, whether it is nuclear or conventional. They would not seek to achieve military superiority.
- 2) They discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms and they agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to accomplishing the task set down in the joint U.S. - Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985, namely, to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability. During the negotiation of these agreements

11. Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Joint Statement, NATO Review, no.6, December, 1985, pp. 25-27.

effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed would be agreed upon.

- 3) They agreed to study the question of risk taking into account the issues and developments in the Geneva negotiations. They took satisfaction in such recent steps in this direction as the modernisation of the Soviet - U.S. hotline.
- 4) They reaffirmed the commitment of the U.S.S.R. and U.S. to the Treaty of Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their interest in strengthening together with other countries, the non-proliferation regime, and in further enhancing of the treaty, inter alia by enlarging its membership.
- 5) They asserted their commitment, assumed by them under the treaty on the non-proliferation of world to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the treaty.
- 6) They planned to continue to promote the strengthening of the international atomic energy agency and to

support the activities of the agency in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

- 7) In the context of discussing security problems, they reaffirmed that they were in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.
- 8) They agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such as chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Lastly, they also emphasized the importance they attached to the Vienna Mutual balanced force reduction, (MBFR) negotiations and expressed their willingness to work for positive results.

Attaching great importance to the Stockholm conference

on confidence
and security building measures and disarmament in Europe, and noting the progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate, together with participation of other States, an early and successful completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force.

In addition to these, they emphasized the need for continuing dialogue. Both agreed on the need to place on a regular basis and intensify dialogue at various levels. Along with meetings between the leaders of the two countries, they envisaged regular meetings between the U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State as well as between the Heads of other Ministers and agencies. They agreed that the past visit of the Heads of Ministers and departments in such fields of protection of the environment had been useful.

Apart from discussing strategic arms and its ban, they had recognised the importance of views on regional issues at the expert level, they intended to expand the programmes of bilateral exchanges, and also to develop trade and economic

ties. Besides this they also agreed on contracts and exchanges on scientific, educational and cultural fields. They moreover, believed that there should be greater understanding among the peoples to this end. They showed their willingness to encourage greater travel and people to people contact.

In short, the joint statement concluded with agreements on a number of bilateral issues, including nuclear power air safety measures, civil aviation, the opening of consulate General in New York and Kiev; environment protection measures, exchanges and contacts in the field of science, education, medicine and sports; and on the importance of developing international cooperation in obtaining energy from thermo-nuclear fusion.

Overall Assessment

Measured against the hopes and expectations from the US perspective it was a success. Neither a 'breakthrough' nor a 'non-event', it was rather an important step forward in a continuing process, a milestone on the long, uphill road which jointly U.S. and Soviet Union were destined to travel together.

The pertinent question is that Summits, like other important events, do not take place in a vacuum. They must be understood in terms of the past and are judged by their impact on the future. In themselves, they are not decisive events, but must be seen as part of a process.

Above all, the agenda of the 19-20 November meeting was as the President had said, "shaped by the facts of this century."¹¹ Discussions covered the full range of issues that affect the U.S. - Soviet relationship in one way or another, the most crucial was arms control.

Most importantly, the work of the U.S. and Soviet negotiations in Geneva and the impetus given by new Soviet and U.S. proposals put forward in October and November. These proposals moved negotiations forward, and enabled U.S. to find areas of agreement. But the discussions showed that profound differences remained in all the major areas of the Geneva negotiations. These were:¹²

- 1) In the field of strategic arms, the President underscored their commitment to deep mobilising

12. A Report to the USSR Supreme Soviet session on the results of the Geneva Summit and the International situation NATO Review, November 27, 1985, pp.163-89

reductions. Gorbachev asserted that the Soviet Union shared this objective. As a consequence, the joint statement issued at the close of the Summit records U.S. agreement on the goal of a fifty per cent reduction through not on the categories of weapons this reduction should encompass. Similarly it also holds out the possibility of that an interim agreement limiting the INF missiles can be concluded without reference to progress in the other two negotiations. The crucial need of verification in arms control agreements was also reaffirmed, an issue to which the U.S. attached particular importance.

- 2) On Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) the substantial conceptual differences remained. The Summit discussions had value because each leader had a chance to express his views first hand. Reagan expounded his vision of moving deterrence towards a more defensive mode and away from reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation. He stressed particularly that the U.S. did not seek superiority an affirmation that found expressions in the joint statement nor a first strike capability. The Soviet

leader for his part sought to lay out the Soviet concern raised by SDI. Moreover, President Reagan has stressed that the SDI research programme is designed to enhance allied as well as American security.

- 3) The nuclear and space talks were the main focus of arms control discussions. The US reiterated to process in the mutual and balanced (i) force reduction talks in the conference on disarmament in Europe. The joint statement underline the need for concrete confidence building measures. U.S. agreed on the importance of a ban on chemical weapons and would look jointly at the ways to halt their proliferation. They expressed their support for enhanced cooperation in support of the non-proliferation treaty. (ii) They agreed to explore the concept of risk reduction centres first put forward by the two U.S. Senators, John Warner and Sam Nun. ¹³

13. Rozanne L. Ridgway, " The Geneva Summit - A Testimonial to Alliance Solidarity", NATO Review, n. 6, December, 1985, pp. 1-4.

The second major item on the agenda was regional issues. The wide ranging discussions were on Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Central America, Southern Africa and the Middle East. From U.S. stand point of view these discussions are important for the overall relationship. They are important as regional conflicts have affected the Super Powers relationship adversely in other areas of mutual concern such as arms control etc.

Thirdly, human rights was an essential agenda item in U.S. - Soviet Summit discussions at Geneva.

World Reaction

Here process won over substance. It was seen widely by officials on both sides as a victory for Reagan who wanted to emphasise process and play down substance and a setback for Gorbachev who had staked so much personal prestige on an arms control breakthrough at the two days encounter. He was disappointed, when he failed to elicit concessions from Reagan on space based defences. By all accounts it did not work. The Soviet officials were of the opinion that he would revert to a long-term strategy of trying to turn U.S. allied opinion against Reagan's SDI. Moreover, the two

leaders took the meetings into their own hands in a remarkable display of personal diplomacy. On substance, the two leaders developed a realistic understanding of the hard realities of their conflicts and made progress on nuclear control and regional disputes.

After the first ever Summit they took a positive view of the practice of regular Soviet - U.S. consultations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which had been constructive and expressing their intent to continue this practice in the future. Furthermore, an important result of Geneva was the mutual agreement that the dialogue should continue not only at the Summit, but at other levels as well.

Moreover, the most significant fact is that a fresh start has been made. The question is will it lead to a more stable constructive relationship that can be stabilised without the fluctuations that have so often characterised U.S. - Soviet Union relations in the past? Will it prove the basis for meaningful arms agreements embodying substantial reductions of offensive arms? Much depends on the both of them. They have differences based in values and philosophy and they are expressed across a broad range of interests.

Nonetheless, recognising these constraints, the U.S. believes there is the potential for a more constructive relationship, particularly in this field.

Out of this a new approach of mutual accommodation in Soviet - American negotiations emerges the role of trust in moderating their global rivalry crucial in their conflict behaviour. Clearly, if each side does not feel it is gaining, at least as much as it concedes, there will be no agreement at all. Here, the pertinent question is what is the world reaction to such an agreement between two leading powers of this planet? The dilemma in which both the Soviet Union and the U.S. find themselves is in a very real sense, the creation of their military hardliners. The Russians and some other Warsaw Governments have harped on the danger of war. The Western countries also need to use a mounting rhetoric of military options for their own domestic purposes. Henry Grunwald quoted Salvador de Maderiage as saying, " Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other". And therefore to want-disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is an absurd as to want people to go undressed in Winter".¹⁴

14. The New York Times, quoted in International Herald Tribune, Paris, 11 December, 1984.

West European Countries

Officials and specialists in Western Europe have reacted cautiously to Gorbachev's proposal to rid the globe of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. Interviews with disarmament and foreign affairs specialists in several West European capitals indicated a considerable degree of confusion and skepticism about the intent of the Soviet leader's plan. But interest in *clarifying* details of the proposal is strong. ¹⁵

Gonker Roelants, a spokesman for the Dutch foreign ministry said, "we welcome his plan and we will study it within the alliance, but it can be evaluated only after details are presented in a more definite form by the Soviets in Geneva". Further referring to the latest round of U.S. - Soviet arms talks, he said, "Gorbachev wants to convince he is a peacemaker, always at the forefront with new proposals, but I think we are sophisticated enough to see behind his smile". ¹⁶

15. "West Europeans cautions on Soviet Nuclear Plan," Los Angeles Times Services, International Herald Tribune, Paris 22nd January, 1986

16. International Herald Tribune, Paris, January 22, 1986, quoted from Los Angeles Times Service by Tyler Marshall.

Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich of West Germany labelled the plan "very important" and called for consultations on it among the western allies. But he added that the plan appeared ambiguous on the security of nuclear countries in Western Europe.¹⁷

In his opinion the Gorbachev plan calls for eliminating nuclear missiles in three steps. In the initial phase of five to eight years, the U.S. and Soviet Union would cut their strategic arsenals in half and agree to halt all nuclear testing. The two countries would also remove all intermediate range missiles aimed at based in Europe.

In the next phase, other nuclear powers including Britain, France, and China would begin to cut back their nuclear weapons over a five year period.

While arms control specialists on both sides of the Atlantic remain uncertain about exactly what new ground the Soviet proposals contain, Gorbachev seems to have softened Moscow's position on intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

17. Ibid.

But there are also clear indications that Moscow has tied that softening and indeed the whole proposal to a commitment by the U.S. to give up development and testing, although not research of its strategic defence initiative, which is popularly known as "Star Wars".

Moreover, by calling for the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons from Europe without demanding immediate compensation for French and British nuclear missiles, the Soviet proposal holds evident attraction to the U.S. allies.¹⁸

Lawrence Freedman, professor of disarmament studies at Kings College at the University of London, said, "the apparent move on European missiles is more than I would have expected. The package is certainly not negative. It conveys a sense that something more than positive is going on".¹⁹

Proposal, according to British foreign official,

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

"contains some quite attractive new ideas with some tricky conditions".²⁰ Britain repeatedly has rejected Soviet attempts to negotiate a reduction with the Russians of the British nuclear force until such time as Moscow cuts its own missile force substantially. British official said that: the disparity between Britain's 192 warheads and Moscow's 10,000 would make any such exercise absurd.

But they said the current Soviet offer to reduce its warheads by half would at least raise the prospect of a review of negotiations.²¹

Besides, the other West European nuclear powers were more skeptical. The imbalance between U.S. is so great that a fifty per cent cut makes no sense, said Stephane Chemelewsky, a spokesman on Soviet affairs in the French Ministry of External Relations. "We are not impressed by it is much more a propaganda exercise", he opined further.²²

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

In a communique the leaders of Commonwealth countries welcomed the Super Powers' Summit in Geneva and stressed the importance of a "constructive and positive outcome".²³ To them, the Summit voiced special concern that some countries might be the actual or potential manufacturers of chemical weapons and called for global and verifiable agreements to ban the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.

In his address to the U.N. General Assembly at its 40th anniversary, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi pleaded that constructive disarmament proposals must be earnestly examined and hoped that the "Big Two" talks would mark "the start of a purposeful dialogue and of a process of pulling back from the brink".²⁴ He commended to the world leaders "the practical programme of disarmament" put forwarded by six nations in the Delhi Declaration earlier.²⁵

23. Ibid.

24. D.R.Goyal, ed., Nuclear Disarmament: The Six Nation Initiative and the Big Power Response, New Delhi, 1987, p. ix - xiv.

25. Ibid.

The members of the non-aligned movement are also of the opinion that co-existence should be there but international order and nuclear weapons race cannot go hand in hand. As the peace of the world is threatened by nuclear war, so is the prosperity of an economic crisis of unprecedented gravity. The developing countries perceive the ^{bed}rock of their security only in a disarmed and nuclear-free world.

In this context, the initiative of the six nations from four continents - Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, Greece, Yugoslavia and India represented humanity's response to the dreadful prospect of annihilation of mankind. First expression of this initiative was a statement issued on May 22, 1984, which asserted that nuclear disarmament could not be treated as a concern of nuclear powers alone and appealed to two Super Powers. To resume the deadlocked process of negotiations for arms limitations leading to disarmament.²⁶ In January 1985 in their first conference in New Delhi they attributed the findings about the impact of nuclear warfare in recent atmospheric and biological

26. D.R.Goyal, ed., Nuclear Disarmament: The Six Nation Initiative and the Big Powers Response, New Delhi, 1987, pp. x-xiv.

studies which had made the prevention of nuclear war and dismantling of nuclear weapons a categorical imperative for human survival. In short, the Declaration called upon the nuclear power states to put a "halt to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems", and insisted that it "must be immediately followed by substantial reduction in nuclear forces, leading to complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the final goal of general and complete disarmament".²⁷ On the eve of the Geneva Summit on October 24, 1985, the six sent a message to the two leaders urging suspension of nuclear tests for a year. To remove the obstacles regarding verification they proposed to help by establishing "verification mechanisms on our theories" which could provide a high degree of certainty that testing programmes have ceased".²⁸ They added further: "The world's highest expectations are focussed on our meeting at Geneva. All peoples and governments hope that you will be able to stop the deepening of tensions,

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

opening an era of peace and security for humanity.

Thus one can conclude that the Summit was not a total failure, but rather a positive step towards attainment of the most important goal viz. nuclear disarmament. Undoubtedly, it expressed their intention to continue the practice in future.

The overall balancesheet of the Geneva negotiations was positive. The experience suggests that both sides should first and foremost refrain from actions, subverting what was achieved in Geneva, and refrain from actions which could block talks and depart from the existing constraints on the arms race. This calls inter alia for straight and honest compliance with the treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and also the further mutual respect by the sides for the relevant provisions of the SALT-II Treaty.

In fact, necessity to prevent an arms race in space, coupled with resolve to reduce nuclear arms motivated the two leaders - Reagan and Gorbachev to meet at Reykjavik later.

Chapter III

Reykjavik Summit

The Summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which took place at Reykjavik, the capital city of Iceland (October 11-12, 1986), was marked by the presentation of the unprecedented Soviet programme for elimination of all nuclear arms by the year 2000. On the U.S. side, this was matched by President Reagan's insistence on going ahead with his frightening strategic defence initiative (SDI) programme.¹ It was a major political event in international affairs, in the drive against the arms race, for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and for the removal of war threat hanging over entire humanity. The Soviet Union put nuclear disarmament and the ending of the arms race as top issues of world politics on the negotiating table at Reykjavik. It was a whole package of major proposals, which, if accepted, would have ushered in a new epoch in the life of humanity, that is one-without nuclear arms. Before leaving Washington, Reagan said: "we go to Reykjavik for peace. We go to this meeting for freedom. And we go in hope."²

For the first time, the official Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda talked of a drastic change for the

1 Gorbachev's Television Address to Soviet Public, Mainstream, 1 November, 1986, Vol. XXV, No. 7, p. 27-33.

2 The Hindu (Madras), 11 October, 1986.

better in Soviet-American relations and in the world as a whole. It stressed the realism and constructive approach displayed by both sides. Moreover, in Reagan's words, it was "the last base camp"³ on the way to a future Summit, a preparatory phase to the Washington Summit.⁴

Still there were plenty of stumbling blocks, including the fate of the shorter range missiles which the Russians deployed in Eastern Europe after walking out of the INF and START talks in Geneva at the end of 1983. A deal on intermediate range weapons would not be of much military significance on the NATO side; at least, the cruise and Pershing-IIS had always been seen as a political rather than a military weapon, but it would be shown that the two men were capable of agreeing on something concrete.

The President and his advisers believed that agreeing to a mutual ban on testing would merely freeze a situation in which the Soviet Union would have an advantage. But it is just possible that the U.S. might agree to some deal by which there were fewer tests, or might agree to move towards ratification of the threshold test ban treaty, which limits the size of tests to yield of 150 kilotons. There might even be a move to reduce the threshold down to 100 or 150 kilotons though that would depend on some Soviet move on

3 Michael Mandelbaum, ²Strobe Talbott, "Reykjavik and Beyond", Foreign Affairs, Washington, pp. 216-35.

4 Ibid.

no. 3, 1987

verification.⁵ Besides, Reagan believed in his personal charisma which would give him greater power of persuasion and conviction in a face to face encounter. It is the reason why he was pleased with the Geneva Summit and wanted to have the second in the series at Reykjavik. Further, the timing of the meeting just three weeks before the mid-term elections he viewed as a great advantage to himself. He hoped for progress in arms control, in reducing Soviet offensive weapons. Also, he calculated that as long as nuclear weapons were there something or some kind of testing was inevitable.

Similarly, the Soviet objective at Reykjavik was to persuade Reagan to prolong the SALT-II agreement which was otherwise due to be breached in the following few weeks by the further installation of cruise missiles on American B-52 bombers.

Apart from this, the pressure on Gorbachev personally to reach an arms control agreement with Reagan was greater than many in West appreciated. His economic reform programme laid at the 27th Party Congress, simply could not be announced without a major reduction in arms spending, stopping the drain of the best skills, materials and other resources to the military section and applying them to the civil sector. Furthermore, hope for progress on strategic arms control meant restraining the development of the American defensive system. Gorbachev moved into a decisive phase by

5 Ibid.

a new Soviet approach to the problem by combining reductions in offensive strategic forces with constraints on strategic defences.

Against this background, there were some barriers arising out of it. Firstly, there were Soviet and the U.S. different perspectives on strategic defences.⁶ In the end, however, that may be irrelevant, what counts much for arms control is the ability of both sides to come to an agreement for achieving international security at a lower level of armaments.

Another obstacle maximalist or deliberately utopian approach to arms control which not only the U.S. but also the Soviet Union displayed. Rather than exploring the possible, both Super Powers perhaps, motivated by the outburst of anti-nuclear public sentiments in western societies during the early 1980s, demanded the unattainable. Whereas Reagan insisted on a shield against missile attack which would render nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete".⁷ Gorbachev pleaded for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

Both notions contained an element of real politik in their instrumental effect, as the U.S. President felt he had

6 "U.S.-Soviet Nuclear arms control", SIPRI year book, World Armament and Disarmament, 1987, p. 325-26.

7 George Shultz, "Progress at Reykjavik: U.S. View," Mainstream, 1 November, 1986, Vol. XXV, No. 7, pp. 33-35.

devised a good method both to strengthen the U.S. and to extract concessions from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet leader desired to profit from anti-nuclear feelings in Western Europe by promoting, on the guise of a universal plan, the old Soviet objective of a nuclear free Europe. But as contributions to arms control, these initiatives, if they were intended as such, were counterproductive.

The third obstacle in the path of reaching an agreement was the division within the U.S. Government and the unwillingness or inability of the President to overcome it.⁸ Perhaps, some similar divisions might have existed within the Soviet leadership and government, and they might have emerged if there had been a series of negotiations. As it was, the Soviet Union was able to display an increasingly coherent position vis-a-vis the U.S. administration.

Reagan had come to the Summit and gone home without yielding even the slightest concession on SDI. By appearing to insist on progress in arms control as a condition for holding the Summit conference the Soviets were trying to exert political and psychological pressure on Reagan, whose interest in another meeting and in arms control accord was evident from his statements during the Spring and Summer. In a Czech newspaper Rude Provo, Gorbachev complained, "we have not moved an inch closer to an arms reduction agree-

8 Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, "Reykjavik and Beyond", Foreign Affairs, Washington, no. 3, 1987, pp. 216-35.

ment, despite all the offers made by the USSR".⁹ Even as they seemed to be stalling on a second Summit, the Soviets stepped up their propaganda on behalf of a moratorium on all nuclear testing and a phased reduction of nuclear weapons that would lead to the elimination of both sides' arsenals.

In January 1985, in Geneva, Gromyko and Shultz had insisted that the issues of INF, strategic arms, and space and defensive systems had to be resolved "in their inter-relationship".¹⁰ Yet starting with the Reagan and Gorbachev Summit of November, 1985, Soviet officials began saying they would be willing to settle for an interim INF agreement, progress towards a nuclear test ban or perhaps even so called confidence building measures such as strengthened procedures for avoiding the accidental start of a war in Europe. In short, the Soviets seemed ambivalent about a future Summit. In fact, they did not want to allow Reagan's supporters to claim, as they had after the Geneva meeting, that standing tall and holding firm had paid off and that Gorbachev had knuckled under to the President. At the same they were worried about the consequences of yet another breakdown in Soviet-American diplomacy. The men in the Kremlin are extremely conservative and deeply uncomfortable with discontinuity, uncertainty, unpredictability. The failure

9 Ibid., pp. 218-19

10 Ibid., p. 219.

to hold a follow up Summit would represent all three. This apart they were genuinely worried about the future of the nuclear competition. A respite from or perhaps a long-term arrangement for the regulation of that competition was important if Gorbachev were to have the per edyshka, or breathing space, that he seemed to need in order to carry out his domestic programme.¹¹

Furthermore, the difficulties that the Soviets had experienced with Reagan gave the President a certain political advantage in managing the domestic politics of an agreement if one were achieved.¹² In other words, an attempt was made by the two to identify their common areas and issues in arms control, on which progress could be made at the earlier Geneva negotiations.

Daniloff issue:

But before the Reykjavik Summit, it received a setback with the arrest of American journalist Nicholas Daniloff by KGB officials in Moscow on charges of espionage, in return for the seizure of a Soviet physicist Gennadi Zakharov, for allegation of similar offence, as attempting to purchase

11 Arnold Horlick, "U.S. -Soviet Relations: The Return of Arms Control", Foreign Affairs, America and the World, 1984. Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "The Genesis of Gorbachev's World", Foreign Affairs, 1985.

12 Ibid., p. 220.

intelligence secrets from an agent who had been working for the FBI.¹³ There was a widespread resentment against the arrest. The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. then called on his Soviet counterpart and delivered an oral message demanding the reduction of the staff strength of the Soviet permanent mission at the U.N. by twentyfive. The Soviet permanent representative, Alexander Belongov, branded the U.S. action illegal and issued a warning at a press conference in New York. This kind of behaviour cannot but evoke condemnation. Nor can it remain without consequences. Shevardnadze, Soviet Foreign Minister said, "we will not use other sharper words, but will say frankly that if the U.S. side believes that it can act arbitrarily with impunity, it is mistaken that action will not be left unanswered".¹⁴ Moreover, Daniloff's imprisonment poisoned the atmosphere and complicated the agenda of the meeting.

Moscow had prolonged the tension in Washington and among vulnerable Americans by adding that the retaliatory step would not be taken in haste without regard for the hope and possibility of a coordinated move by the two Super Powers to make the world a safer place to live in by reducing their overflowing nuclear arsenals. The Soviets have been keen on a meeting between Gorbachev and President Reagan at Reykjavik and it seemed confidently that the event could come off in-

13 Ibid.

14 Deccan Herald, 7 October, 1986.

spite of the Zakharov-Daniloff affair.

A problem arose out of this because the U.S. resented to a mass expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the U.N. apparently in retaliation to the arrest of Daniloff in Moscow that if the U.S. Government was allowed to get away with this, one of the essential aspects of the 1947 agreement between U.S. and the U.N. would have been defaced.

All these activities could be called game of one-upmanship between two intelligence agencies - the CIA and the KGB. Neither Reagan nor any of his top advisors was aware of the arrest of Zakharov and therefore its possible consequences could not be foreseen and guarded against. Similarly, the KGB, for its own reasons did not consult Gorbachev before taking Daniloff into custody.

From the above fact it is clear that the Soviet leadership was not interested in the speculation about the state of Reagan's foresight and knowledge of the chain of events that started with the arrest of Zakharov. Further, the whole affair was a concerned plot to create favourable conditions for another explosion of anti-Sovietism in the U.S. and was "aimed at thwarting Soviet-American dialogue and a possible Summit".¹⁵

In short, Daniloff's imprisonment poisoned the atmosphere and complicated the agenda of the meeting. The depth

15 "Disarmament meet: U.S. Thwarts Consensus", Mainstream, 2 July, 1988, pp. 5, 30.

of hostility and mistrust between the Soviet-American relations often appear to exemplify Murphy's Law. What can go wrong, does go wrong and at the worst possible time over the years much has gone wrong, often scuttling the best laid plans of statesmen on both sides. The U-2 incident of May, 1960 led Khrushchev to storm out of the Paris Summit. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968 delayed agreement to be held in the SALT. The invasion of Afghanistan virtually guaranteed that the U.S. Senate would not ratify the SALT II treaty, and the downing of a Korean Airliner in September, 1983 impeded Shultz's effort to reengage the Soviet Union in quiet diplomacy on a variety of bilateral and regional issues.

In sum, for all the prevailing differences among them these incidents had three major important features in common which they shared with the Daniloff affair:

- (1) the Kremlin's concern with security,
- (2) if what the Soviets do leads to a crisis in their relations with the U.S. they are quick to blame Washington,
- (3) the disruption in relations has always proved temporary.¹⁶

In a series of communications with the White House before Daniloff was allowed to leave the U.S.S.R., Gorbachev

16 Ibid.

expressed irritation over the uproar in the U.S. that the journalist's detention had provoked, but also frustration and impatience that the U.S.-Soviet relationship should so often seem to delay deliberate, coherent management from the top. In a letter to Ronald Reagan on September 19, 1986 Gorbachev wrote of the need for the two leaders to involve themselves personally, so as to impart an 'impulse' to the stalled diplomatic process.¹⁷ He proposed a Reykjavik Summit as a preparation for Washington Summit. Reagan was immediately inclined to accept.

On 29th September, Daniloff was finally released and Zakharov returned home. The complexity of events were characteristic of both the Soviet Union's conceptual framework and Gorbachev's challenge to American policy.

The Soviets had led American officials to expect that INF would be the focal point of the meeting. Since the Geneva Summit in 1985, the Soviets had been hinting, and flatly stating sometimes that Gorbachev was prepared to sign a separate INF agreement delinked from other arms control issues. As it was vitally important in the politics of NATO, the so-called Euro missiles symbolised America's commitment to use its own nuclear weapons to protect Western Europe. Conversely, the Soviet campaign to block the American deployments was part of a broader effort to encourage the "decoupling

17 International Herald Tribune, Paris, 11 October, 1986.

of the U.S. from Europe".¹⁸

When the time was ripe to make a deal that would be the centre piece of a Summit, Shultz and Shevardnadze were drawn toward INF. The negotiations were crafted to the immediate diplomatic need to achieve a concrete agreement to focus on the important military questions at stake whether the U.S. should spend billions on developing exotic anti-ballistic missile systems and whether the Soviet Union would have to spend comparable sums on counter measures or not?

Strangely enough, when Reagan arrived at the Summit meeting he found INF was not the main item nor did it have priority over other strategic issues.

Before the Summit, the world speculation was "a grand compromise", in which the U.S. would accept significant constraints on SDI in exchange for equally significant reductions in Soviet offensive forces. The Soviet incentive for such a compromise was clear as an American defensive system, even if it were not particularly effective, would force the Kremlin into an expensive and potentially disruptive round of the arms race. Moreover, SDI represented a new kind of competition in exotic technology, where the advantage, at least, initially would be with the U.S. The most important fact was that those who pondered over the

¹⁸ Rakesh Gupta, Soviet Policies in the Eighties, Patriot Publisher, New Delhi, 1987, p. 89.

possibilities for such a compromise had never been certain about how far the Soviets would go in offering to reduce their most threatened offensive weapons in order to obtain restraints on American defences.

Issues discussed:

A whole set of important measures was put forward at the Reykjavik Summit. The discussion was no longer about limiting nuclear arms race, as was the case with the SALT-I, SALT-II and other previous treaties, but about the elimination of nuclear weapons within a comparatively short-period of time as evident from the following:¹⁹

(1) The first Soviet proposal was with regard to strategic offensive weapons. Gorbachev expressed Soviet desire to reduce them by fifty per cent within the next five years. The strategic weapons on land, water and the air would be halved. He agreed to a major concessions by revoking the previous demand that the strategic equation include American medium range missiles reaching Soviet territory and American forward based systems.

(2) Secondly, in dealing with medium range missiles, Gorbachev suggested to Reagan that the Soviet and American missiles of this class in Europe be completely eliminated.

19 Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on Soviet Television on 14 October, 1986.

(3) Thirdly, the question raised by Gorbachev was regarding the existing ABM and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet approach was: since both the Super Powers were entering a totally new situation which would witness the beginning of substantial reductions in nuclear weapons and their complete elimination in the foreseeable future it was necessary to protect oneself from any unexpected developments.

(4) Both pledged to seek cuts in their strategic nuclear forces by fifty per cent, to try to negotiate an interim agreement on INF and, in addition, to prevent an arms race in space, and end it on earth.²⁰

(5) Both sides favoured modernisation restraints but with a different bias: the Soviet Union having completed a major missile modernisation programme wanted to prohibit all new, untested strategic weapons; the U.S. which was just beginning its own force of modernisation insisted that only new heavy and mobile ICBMs should be so prohibited.

(6) With regard to INF, the Soviet Union, while prepared to accept a force up to 120 cruise missiles in Western Europe, insisted that it needed a similar SS-20 force plus sufficient INF to compensate for the British and French strategic forces.

Apart from these differences existing between the two, on 15th January, 1986, Soviet leader Gorbachev launched a major, ambitious proposal, suggesting a detailed schedule to

20 U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control - SIPRI Yearbook 1987: World Armaments and Disarmament, pp. 325-26.

achieve the total abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The main initial step of halving the strategic arsenals of both Super Powers was still tied to restrictions on SDI. However, such a reduction was possible only if both the USSR and the U.S. renounced the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons. Yet the proposal also contained important new moves, which, though still far from meeting Western demands, indicated a Soviet readiness to get negotiations moving.²¹

In particular, this applied to an area which the General Secretary had signed on previous occasions for treatment separated from the SDI impasse: INFs. What NATO's military experts had feared and advocated and what Reagan had made the official position in the INF negotiations since 1981 was now being proposed from Moscow a zero solution for all INF in Europe.

Even then the initiatives still did not quite bridge the gap between the former Soviet and U.S. positions: Gorbachev showed no readiness to reduce Soviet INF right to build up their own INF forces to compensate for British and French strategic forces to be frozen at their present level. At the same time, however, this was the first Soviet proposal suggesting the total disappearance of the Soviet SS-20 missile in the European zone - a decisive departure from all previous statements.

²¹ Reprinted in, Neues Deutschland, 16th January, 1986.

One of the most important elements was the issue of verification. Whereas Soviet leaders before Gorbachev had shown some readiness in individual cases to accept a degree of on-site inspection, he was the first to formulate Soviet readiness for comprehensive verification. All the steps in his disarmament plan were to be subject to verification by national means as well as through on site inspection. And Gorbachev even stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to agree to any additional means of verification.

Overall Outcome:

Soon after the Reykjavik meeting was over, its results, consequences were in the centre of world public attention. Everybody wanted to know: what happened? What results did it yield? What would the world be like after it? Would it lead to further successful Summit meetings in the future and serve the actual purpose in the truer sense? To answer all the above questions one can clearly examine the issues discussed at Reykjavik and the ultimate conclusion to which both could have come.

In the first place, Gorbachev had proposed totally different kinds of restrictions at different times, from what Americans wanted as regards to reductions of offensive forces. Their chief goal was restraints on defensive systems, more categorically the American SDI.

Secondly, earlier in 1985, Gorbachev wanted a complete ban on "space strike arms"²² including all laboratory research etc. Later he stated that "fundamental"²³ research might be allowed in respect of strategic defence. He proposed an extension of the ABM treaty, signed in 1972, for a period of 15-20 years, then for "up to 15 years".²⁴ In a letter to Gorbachev in July, 1986, Reagan proposed continuing the ABM treaty for seven and a half years and neither side would be able to withdraw during that period. The question of duration was obviously amenable to compromise. The two could split the differences and arrive at a figure of 10 years and they did so at Reykjavik. But that did not resolve the different question of what the ABM treaty actually permitted in the way of research, development and testing of high-technology space based defensive systems. It was over this issue that the Reykjavik meeting collapsed.

Thirdly, on the crucial issue of SDI, from the Soviet view, Reagan's position meant that the U.S. was not willing to pay any appreciable price in defensive-restraints to get offensive reductions. Reagan's agreement to delay SDI deployment for ten years and adhere to the ABM treaty depended on the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles within that 10 years period. Moreover, Reagan's understanding of

22 Ibid., p. 227.

23 Time, September, 1985.

24 Ibid.

the ABM Treaty differed sharply not only from that of the Soviets but also from the interpretation of a number of key members of Congress and even of the Americans who negotiated the treaty in the early 1970s.

After the meeting, U.S. administration spokesman maintained that the Treaty gave the U.S. the right to conduct research and develop, test the SDI system and its components. So when the 10 years moratorium ended, the U.S. might have some sort of defensive system really to put in place. Faced with that prospect, the Soviets would have no incentive to reduce their offensive forces. Quite the contrary, they would have every reason to increase their arsenal of offensive weapons; for in order to deter the U.S., the Soviets believed, they must be able to penetrate and overwhelm whatever defences the U.S. would eventually deploy. Thus, Reagan's position on the defensive half of the grand compromise at Reykjavik came down to a refusal to accept any of the restraints and SDI that the Soviets wanted. Furthermore, his main concerns seemed to be protecting SDI from Soviet efforts to "kill" it. In an interview published in Time, Gerard Smith, Chief American negotiator, said, "there could be testing, outside the laboratory of some new technology and devices, as long as they were not components of a deployable system. Defining components may be a key element in the ongoing negotiation, but between the Soviets current laboratory definition of permissible research and the administration's claim that anything goes, there should be a way of

accommodating Gorbachev's fear and Reagan's dream."

In contrast to the Geneva Summit, the item, arms control in agenda was relegated to secondary importance. Gorbachev's concessions on medium range missiles was perhaps the most important one. But in fact, by trying these concessions to a package deal on the SDI, he put the onus of failure on Reagan and made the President's commitment to missile defence appear to be the greatest stumbling block to any final agreement.

For Gorbachev, the preparations for the Summit helped to formulate a platform which led to the ultimate success. Moreover, the infamous SDI became more conspicuous as a symbol of obstruction in the way of peace, as a concentrated expression of militaristic designs and the unwillingness to avert the nuclear threat looming large over mankind.

For the U.S. it was an extraordinary event, it could set the stage for a major advance in U.S. and Soviet Union relations. So far Reagan had refused to compromise and vowed not to use the SDI as a bargaining chip, yet a combination of factors viz. the sobering experience, mounting budgetary constraints, West European pressure and a desire to secure Reagan's place in history as a "peace President" might have even caused him to reconsider at Reykjavik. In addition, a more assertive Congress and his status as a lame duck President could increasingly erode his bargaining

leverage. Further, his vision of making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" as opposed to building an imperfect defence for missile silos involved technology that would not be available until the end of the century. And consequently if he could afford to accept a 10 year moratorium on testing and developing missile defences, as discussed at Reykjavik, without sacrificing his longterm dream, laboratory research would continue and deployment could be left for future negotiation. In sum, it was a historic opportunity which was not lost at Reykjavik. It was still "within the grasp"²⁵ said Reagan. To him what was needed then were not mutual recriminations but renewed commitments on both sides to build on the substance of progress made at Reykjavik. The possibilities for significant progress in stabilising relations had increased but so also the cost of overconfidence and amateurism.

George Shultz elaborated on Reagan's proposal about postponing deployment of a strategic defence system for 10 years in conjunction with fifty per cent reductions of strategic forces over the first five years, and the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles over the second five years. He also agreed to continue to abide by ABM Treaty on the SDI. A question was raised in the minds of Americans, in walking away from a quick deal on Reykjavik

25 Jyotsna Saksena, "Reykjavik, Euromissiles and West European Security," Strategic Analysis, January, 1987, Vol. XI, No. 10, pp. 1183-98.

whether the Americans reached the end of the road or not? The reply was in near negation. As the Americans said, they were prepared to build on the work done there and during the months preceeding the meeting, the real significance of Reykjavik was that both the Super Powers got so close.²⁶

In his Press Conference at the conclusion of Summit and later on at his 14th October's televised speech, Gorbachev made clear that he was not closing the door, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, he could not rule out the possibility of coming to an understanding with the U.S. without fundamentally altering the assumptions undergaurding his overall foreign and domestic policies. Secondly, were he to secure Reagan's assent to an important arms control accord, arms control's validity and need would no longer be major American issues, as they had been since the early 1970s.

The impasse at Reykjavik had been greatly exaggerated. Rather it would be more correct to say that Reykjavik was not a failure. On the contrary, the meeting showed how much could be achieved given enough political will on both sides. Both the Super Powers had significantly narrowed their differences on INFS, testing and deep cuts in offensive nuclear missile accord. Question was: whether Reagan was using the SDI as a leverage? Was the President's commitment to the SDI absolute? The alternative before Reagan was deep

26 "Progress at Reykjavik: U.S. View", Mainstream, November appeared in the New York Times, by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

cuts in offensive weapons and some constraints on the SDI or no accord on strategic arms during his administration.

World Reaction:

German Democratic Republic considered the meeting at Reykjavik between the two Super Powers as a major political event of extraordinary importance in the struggle to end the arms race and to prohibit and abolish nuclear weapons. They commended the constructive and bold Soviet approach to resolving the vital questions affecting mankind and declared that the Western democratic attitude on the part of the Soviet Union.²⁷

The Warsaw Treaty States supported the position taken at the meeting by the Soviet Union for a radical reduction in strategic offensive weapons. They supported the Soviet demand that "reliable verification be guaranteed of the package of measures proposed".²⁸

West Germany viewed Reykjavik already a turning point in history in East-West relations and in alliance policy. A Government security policy formulator said: "The healthy thing in Reykjavik was that we saw clearly what the Euro-

27 Statement by the Politburo of the SRD Central Committee, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of the GDR of 22 October, 1986, Neues Deutschland, 14 October, 1986.

28 The communique issued by the meeting of the Foreign Ministers' committee of the Warsaw Treaty States held on 14 and 15 October in Bucharest, News Deutschland, 16 October, 1986.

peans must do. We saw that the Super Powers are ready to negotiate over the heads of the Europeans, ready to call in- to questions the entire strategy we have been operated on." To Bangladesh Times it appeared as "a preparatory step to the full blown Summit". West European and NATO countries were more cautious and did not expect any positive outcome from the Summit.

According to Korea Herald²⁹ Reykjavik was a break-through regardless of what it will be called a hurry up meeting, a one-on-one meeting or a preparatory Summit. "The question of disarmament is so urgent that" Time said "it is better to start somewhere". According to New York Times, perhaps the main lesson of Reykjavik was that the concessions there were more substantial than those in any other East-West arms conference since World War II, and that they still held the promise not of a "world without nuclear weapons" or "a shield for the human race".

For Los Angeles Times³⁰ "Reykjavik however was merely the beginning of the most promising phase in the long and discouraging history of nuclear diplomacy and at least it offered some lessons".

India was glad to see that the two giant powers had resumed their efforts to make progress towards disarmament

29 Korea Herald, Seoul, 2 October 1986.

30 Quoted from Los Angeles Times Service, 30 September, 1986. International Herald Tribune, Paris, 1, October, 1986.

at Reykjavik. She also hoped that at their next meeting, both of them would reach "important and meaningful agreements".

Following the world reaction to the major events, question crops up in one's mind what would be the future prospect after Reykjavik, which had occupied greater importance. Eminent American specialists on international affairs, McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard C. Smith told New York Times that "to them, the Iceland Summit meeting offered an opportunity for progress in the reduction of nuclear dangers more promising than any since the imperfect effort for international control of atomic energy broke down under Stalin's rejection 40 years ago".

On the surface, the meeting produced first a picture of disappointing impasse and then a busy public relations campaign on both sides. But still, it had marked real progress and continued hope.

Earlier, Americans viewed that there was a radical incompatibility between Reagan's initial dream of a leak proof strategic defence. They asserted that "it is possible to reach good agreements or possible to insist on the Star Wars programme as it stands but wholly impossible to do both". This proposition seems amply confirmed by Iceland. He was clear that the Soviet Government had no intention of reaching major arms control agreement that

reduced its strategic forces unless and until it could get acceptable constraints on strategic defence.

But it was not a total failure. The encounter had more hopeful lessons. The SDI had proved to be a powerful bargaining lever. If indeed the Soviet government could have satisfactory constraints on strategic defence, it would be ready to conclude agreements greatly reducing offensive forces. From what had been revealed, there was little possibility of reaching an agreement. There was reason to doubt American reports that extraordinary progress was made, and much of it by positive changes in Soviet positions.

On SDI, the question whether the Iceland impasse on strategic defence was as much an obstacle as it seemed, the Americans pointed out that Gorbachev's fear was baseless. The Reykjavik Summit made it clear that Moscow's primary goal was to protect the Soviet Union against deployment of offensive and defensive systems that might create a U.S. first strike capability.

In sum, both sides were willing to agree that there was no need of early strategic defence deployment. The proposals made in Iceland suggested that the next decade should be used to make great reductions of ballistic missiles.

There was moreover another confusion about what the SDI was designed to do. Reagan first spoke of a defence

so strong that the American people would be truly safe from Soviet missile forces.

Indeed, there was hard work ahead. It is much easier to cut the number of offensive missiles in half than to go all the way to zero, and both sides in the end may need small offensive forces as general assurance against secret deployments by anyone. It is also easier to call for agreed long-term control of strategic defence than to state its proper terms.

Thus, it was necessary for both to look again at their opportunities and their fears. The Americans in particular should take a hard look at the real record and prospects of the SDI. The President Reagan recognised the limits as well as the strategy of this bargaining lever.

Moreover, the challenge of the Iceland meeting was to rise above its frustration and begin a determined search for ways to fulfil its hope and lead to a full-fledged future summit with the same objective and success.

Chapter IV

WASHINGTON SUMMIT

After Reykjavik Summit, the U.S.-Soviet leaders met at Washington for an arms reduction agreement culminating into signing of the INF treaty. It was the nuclear arms and came almost eight years after SALT-II. For the first time instead of 'arms control', the concept 'arms reduction' became the main theme for the summit. More important thing was the theme for President Reagan had reiterated his keen desire for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in the Summit. Accordingly, on December 8, 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed INF treaty eliminating medium range and shorter range nuclear missiles. Under the terms of the accord the U.S. agreed to scrap 396 Pershing-2 and land-based cruise missiles deployed on West Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium. Similarly, the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate 683 missiles, about 50 of which are deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.¹

The INF Treaty became possible for the two leaders realised the imperatives of political self-interest and the burden of the arms race on their nations respectively. Moreover, Reagan was himself conscious of his term of Presidency

1. O.N.Mehrotra, "The INF Treaty: A Step Toward Nuclear Arms Reduction", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol.XI, No.12 March 1988, pp.1368-77.

and in case of Gorbachev he was interested in Glassnost² (openness) and Perestroika³ (economic reconstruction) to establish the spectacular achievements in their socio-economic structure.

The Summit symbolises the supremacy gained by the "disarmament" approach in ending the nuclear arms race. Till now, the dominant philosophy on the nuclear arms limitation has been the "arms control" approach which sought to manage arms race rather than eliminate it. Instead of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, the arms control stimulated the nuclear arms race.

Background

It was in 1982 that an attempt was made to negotiate INF Treaty. But it failed for American embargo on the supply of critical materials for the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline. Again, the 1983 proved a crucial year as it was in doubt to decide whether and how to implement its 1979 commitment based on "double track" approach envisaging deployment of new American nuclear missiles only if negotiations on INF failed. The two super powers failed to reach an

2. Glassnost: openness in existing system, viz., political, cultural, introduced by Gorbachev in 1988.
3. Perestroika: restructuring of economic system in particular. As such individual Soviet enterprises must aim at being self-supporting and self-financing, state subsidies are to be cut as units learn to make their own profits, melt their financial commitments to the state and use their own profits for expansion and social programmes.

agreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the stipulated period and therefore the West Germany Parliament approved the deployment of new American nuclear missiles on November 22, 1983. The very next day the Soviet announced its decision to boycott the Geneva talks. Here, in this context one can estimate the importance of the Euro-strategic Missile debate known as "Euromissile Crisis".⁴

The Euromissile issue was first raised by Helmut Schmidt, the then Chancellor of West Germany in October 1977. He advocated for inclusion of Soviet INF (SS-20s) in the SALT-II, but they could not qualify to be included in the Strategic Arms Limitation talks because of their range. It was widely felt in the West that its nuclear superiority of the U.S. and its linkage in NATO's triad of deterrence, forward defence and flexible response were neutralised by the Soviet Union through deployment of SS-20 missiles. It was also felt that detente and arms limitation negotiations were given more emphasis. There was a serious debate on the possibility of adopting a new strategy to deter the Soviet Union. The Soviet argument on the contrary was that Pershing-2 missiles with their accuracy and range posed a decapitation threat to Soviet command and control system.

The West European fear was that the Pershing-2 missile with its range into the Soviet Union would be used

4. Ibid., p.1364.

to signal to the USSR that there was no intention to target Soviet territory and thereby to decouple the nuclear weapons on Europe from the US strategic system. This could enable both super powers to fight a devastating nuclear war limited to Europe. Secondly, the very deployment of Pershing-2 missiles in West Germany invited a preemptive strike on them making it inevitable a war in Europe to escalate to nuclear level. Thus, Western specialists, who discussed the implication of deployment of new missiles, failed to arrive at a conclusion as to how deterrence and reassurance could be reconciled.

While President Reagan kept on repeating his 'zero option' offer of November 1981, the Soviet leadership put forward many proposals to maintain superiority in INF in Europe over that of NATO, in rejecting the 'zero option' proposals, the Soviet Union alleged that the motive behind the proposal was to defuse protests in Western Europe and thus clear the path for deployment of a new generation of US missiles that would give Washington a "first strike capability"⁵ against Moscow's command and control centres.

Moreover, the Reagan administration wanted to follow a policy of 'build up, build down', under this policy, the US would begin to field its new nuclear missiles in Western

5. First strike capability: Theoretical capability to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack which would destroy all of an adversary's retaliatory nuclear forces.

Europe and the Soviet Union was expected to dismantle its missiles until they were roughly equal. Then only both sides would agree to reduce their forces. In short, the Soviet Union did not wish to surrender its superiority over the NATO because it knew that there was resistance against deployment of new American missiles in many West European countries. The peace movement had already gained momentum in Western countries.

The two super powers conducted negotiations on the question of intermediate range nuclear force in Europe for two years beginning from November 1981. They tried to outsmart each other by proposing their arms control proposals. The US reportedly offered the interim solution, in March 1983 envisaging limit to 100 missile launchers and 300 missile warheads or some variation of this for each side, with no restrictions on the types of missiles involved. The U.S. would be allowed to deploy some Pershing-2 and cruise missiles while the Soviet Union would have to reduce their current force of mobile SS-20 missiles.

Apart from the new proposals on resolving the Euro-missile crisis offered by the leaders of the two super powers, Paul Nitze, who led the US negotiations at Geneva and his Soviet counterpart Yuli Kvitsinsky, in July 1982, worked out a package in their famous 'walk in the woods' which involved

equal ceilings for both sides' medium range nuclear weapons in the European theatre. But this package was rejected both by the Kremlin and by Defence Department and Joint Chiefs of staff of the US. However, the US kept on its pressure for an agreement on 'zero option'.⁶

There was a widely shared feeling that the breakdown of the Geneva talks further deteriorated the East-West relations. The second cold war intensified and it appeared that the arms race between the two super powers would be more vigorous, as Reagan was interested only in his 'zero option'.

Despite growing tension in East-West relations, the Soviet and US leaders realised that there was no option but to negotiate feasible agreements on arms control/reduction. The bilateral negotiations on arms restarted in March 1985 after an agreement reached between the Secretary of State, George Shultz, and the then Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, in January 1985. Later the Soviet Union tried to link INF with SDI. On the other hand, the Reagan administration had rejected the Soviet demand of linkage between an agreement on INF and the SDI. In fact, Reagan's commitment to build a space based missile defence system was made as a non-negotiable issue.

6. Ibid.

As explained earlier the Geneva talks could not make much progress because both the super powers had not decided to change their earlier policies. But the change in Soviet leadership had given a new impetus to the arms control negotiations. And Gorbachev announced a self-imposed unilateral moratorium on underground nuclear tests for five months, beginning on August 6, 1985 on the eve of 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Again, Reagan administration rejected the moratorium saying that tests were needed to perfect American weapons. In reality, the US was not willing to impose moratorium on underground nuclear tests.

As the reduction of nuclear missiles of both the super powers in Europe was the major issue of negotiation related to East-West relations, on October 1985, during his visit to France, Gorbachev proposed 50 per cent reduction in Soviet and the US strategic nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory. A total ban on the 'development, production and deployment' of offensive space weapons of both countries and the uncoupling of British and French nuclear weapons from US-Soviet negotiations and called for direct Soviet talks with Britain and France on medium range nuclear missiles in Europe. The underlying objective of Gorbachev proposal was to probe the American stand on some issues at the forthcoming Summit of Geneva.

The Summit at Reykjavik that followed was a clear indication of that the two leaders were interested in negotiating seriously on arms control/reduction agreement. But on some important issues they remained indifferent. The question of SDI apparently made the Summit a failure. But one common thing in their mind was their faith in "nuclear disarmament" that led to Washington Summit.

Preparation

In February 1987, Gorbachev took the initiative to resolve the contentious issue relating to linkage between INF and SDI and expressed his willingness to delink the INF from that of SDI. In April that year during Shultz-Shevardnadze parley Gorbachev's proposal for global elimination of US and Soviet intermediate range and short range nuclear missiles was discussed. It was here that Shevardnadze communicated to his American counterpart that Gorbachev accepted Reagan's 'zero option' and offered his global double zero plan.

Another major hurdle was the question of how to verify an arms control agreement. The US had earlier demanded strict verification procedures, which included a system of 'challenge' inspections of factories and missile sites on 24 hours notice. Later Washington reportedly

diluted its demand for strict verification and agreed that the surprise inspections would be limited to certain missile facilities. The reason for this concessions was that Moscow dropped its plan to retain 100 medium range warheads outside Europe. But American manufacturer and security officials were worried about Americans relaxing the rules for strict verification. However, some American experts criticised the Reagan administration for revising its position because the US failed to seize the chance to set a precedent for strict verification that could serve for other treaties.

Issues

It was against this backdrop that on December 8, 1987, President Reagan and the Soviet leader Gorbachev signed the historic treaty to eliminate their land-based intermediate range (1,000 to 5,000 km) and shorter range (500 to 1,000 km) nuclear missiles. The 169-page treaty with 17 articles and three annexures contains detailed provisions regarding elimination and verification of nuclear missiles.⁷

In this context, here is an attempt to analyse and review the important issues discussed at the Summit.⁸

7. USSR-US Summit, Washington, December 7-10, 1987, Documents and Materials.

8. C.Raja Mohan, "Peace and Security: The Changing World Scenario", Mainstream, 5 December, 1987, Vol.XXVI, No.8, pp.4-9.

(1) INF Accord

An "agreement in principle" was announced in September, 1987 by both the US-Soviet Union to eliminate all land based intermediate range short range nuclear missiles. The agreement led to the scrapping of about 1550 Soviet nuclear warheads and about 400 American ones. Since February 1987 various proposals initiated by Gorbachev had converted the original Reagan's 'zero option' for INF in Europe "into a double zero" including short range missiles. And it made the ban a global one.

Although the INF accord affected only about 4 per cent of the combined nuclear arsenals of the US and the Soviet Union, yet, the significance ought to be noted here:

(i) It is the world's first nuclear "reduction agreement" not like the past nuclear arms control agreements, which set even higher ceilings for nuclear arsenals.

(ii) In fact, it is the first time both super powers agreed to eliminate in toto entire class of nuclear weapons. Previously, only aged, old and obsolescent nuclear weapons were retired. The accord led to the removal of some most modern nuclear weapon systems i.e., the Soviet (SS-20) and the US Pershing-II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM);

(iii) The most important point to be taken note of was that the accord symbolising the feasibility of the 'disarmament

approach" in the place of arms control one.

(iv) Finally, it had broken new ground on the crucial question of verification. Under the leadership of Gorbachev, the shedding of long standing Soviet inhibitions on intrusive on site inspection, facilitates movement across the board in all arms limitation talks.

(v) Besides, the attributed importance of the signing the treaty, the long term political significance of the 4 per cent cut in Soviet and American arsenal's could far outweigh its military significance. Particularly, the confrontation in Europe.

(2) Strategic Arms Reduction

Limiting strategic nuclear arsenals has been the central theme of the Soviet-American arms control process, until INF issue has dominated the spectrum. In fact, the SALT-I and II were unable to restraint the nuclear arms race. As we have seen, the joint strength of both strategic nuclear warheads multiplied from about 5,500 in 1968 to 20,000 in 1980 when the SALT process got derailed. Although SALT put a ceiling on delivery systems, yet, it was easily circumvented by increasing the number of warheads on each delivery system. Again, the SALT-II treaty signed in 1979, could not be ratified in the US as political support for detente and arms

control quickly vanished on the late 1970s from the scene.

Although, the two resumed talks on the limitation of strategic Arms Reduction (START) in 1981, it did not prove much progress. The reason for this was that the Soviets placed most of their weapons on the land based missiles, giving less emphasis on the air-delivery and sea-based weapons. On the other hand, the US has a more balanced distribution of its weapons among the triad as evident from the table below:

Table

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS

| | USA | USSR |
|------------------|--------|--------|
| Land based ICBMs | 2,204 | 6,420 |
| SLBMs | 5,632 | 3,344 |
| On bombers | 3,538 | 940 |
| | 11,374 | 10,704 |

Both sides had agreed on a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 strategic delivery vehicle ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers earlier. In Washington they agreed to a sub-ceiling of 4,900 warheads on ballistic missiles, ICBMs and SLBMs. Within that the Soviets have agreed to cut their heavy missiles, the SS-18s by half to 154 launchers.

Counting rules were also agreed upon for missiles. In short, agreement in principle was reached on a counting rule for bombers carrying air-launched cruise missile regardless of the number of ALCMs they carried. But the Soviets were resisting US proposal to count the B-52 and B-1 at considerably fewer than the 12 ALCM warheads they actually carry or the 22 the B-1 is capable of carrying.

As regards the above fact, pertinent question was: should either side have a sizable proportion of its weapons basing models or believes what the other side does? It is correct to say that the treaty did it by eliminating Pershing-II missiles, a threat to Soviet command and control system practically.

In sum, this epoch-making arms reduction agreement is the result of following Soviet concessions:

- i) Substantive cuts in Soviet land based forces;
- ii) Agreement to abide by US counting rules on air-delivered weapons in fact;
- iii) Willingness to take the rapidly growing US sea-launched cruise missiles out of the ambit of strategic arsenals.⁹

Moreover, START could help coping with the vulnerability of ICBMs, symbolically the most prominent threat to crisis stability. Modernisation, testing constraints

9. Ibid.

that would inhibit or slow improvements in missile accuracy could reduce the possibility of destroying ICBMs S110s. Reducing MIRVs, especially on highly accurate missiles, could reduce the advantages of shooting first Any or all of these steps would not only add to stability but also lead to the way to deeper cuts in the future. One more point here to be noted as mobile missiles pose a problem for verification, that have to be counted in verifiable way. On 15 December 1987 Ambassador Paul Nize said Nuclear Power Commission: "We wanted to be sure that everything we'd worked out in the INF Treaty would be carried over to the START agreement".

(3) Strategic Defence Initiative

The idea of building defence against missiles by Reagan administration, in March 1983 was one of the most significant strategic development. The essence of the Soviet-American strategic bargain during detente was mainly two fold: (i) a ceiling on offensive nuclear weapons codified in the SALT treaties and severe restrictions on the defence building formulated by the ABM treaty. Basically, this bargaining was based on the understanding that peace could be preserved only by ending nuclear threat. The Soviets

10. Lean V.Sigal, "START Nears the Finish Line", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.44, No.3, April 1988.

justified by SDI Reagan tried to attain strategic superiority and break out of the strategic stalemate imposed by the balance in offensive nuclear forces.

During the last one year there have been certain development on the issue of SDI and in the attitude of both super powers as well. The new position allowed to certain types of defences until now the US had ruled out all compromises because of Reagan's vision of SDI. But recent developments indicated the stigma of retreat from this dangerous approach of the Reagan administration: (i) the assertion of the US Senate of its constitutional right to disallow re-interpretation of already ratified treaties; (ii) the Senate's refusal to permit SDI testing which would violate restrictive interpretation of ABM treaty; (iii) the shooting down of the technological vision of SDI by important sections of the scientific community; (iv) the controversy among the supporters of SDI regarding scientific fraud; (v) the impossibility of sustaining an expensive SDI programme at a time when US defence allocations could only stay put on decline; (vi) the departure of the champions of SDI; (vii) the willingness of new Defence Secretary Frank Carlucci to work more in tune with the Senate's position or the restrictive interpretation of ABM Treaty. Further what Gerlod Yonas said, "the purpose of the SDI is to provide the hard data as well as the indepth insight to

allow truly informed decisions" is partially true but not devoid of that SDI is symbolic of all the worst apprehensions of the current nuclear era.

4. Nuclear Testing

There was also agreement between the two on nuclear issue viz. testing at the Summit. The approach had changed now. It is a phased approach leading to a lowering of the ceiling on the yield of underground nuclear tests from 150 Kt. and perhaps a slow reduction in the frequency of nuclear testing. Another notable development over the past year in the Soviet-American agreement to set up nuclear risk reduction centres to reduce the dangers of accidental nuclear war.

5. Chemical Disarmament

There has been a substantive movement on the issue of eliminating chemical weapons over the year. It was earlier raised as an issue at Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It was agreed on a halt to chemical weapons production: a system for destroying existing societies; and a system for overseeing the commercial chemical industry etc. But in fact inspection and verification has eluded there. It was agreed there on a halt to chemical weapon production; a system for overseeing the commercial chemical industry as

a check against clandestine production. But inspection and verification has been an issue that eluding consensus at chemical disarmament conference. Over the years, the Soviets have virtually reversed their past position on chemical weapon inspection, thereby narrowing the differences on drafting a ban on chemical weapons.

Apart from, on the issue of Conventional Force Reduction, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks have symbolised the worst features of detente and arms control, avoid basic issues; emphasise the irrelevant; build up rather than build down; talk for the sake of talking. The opponents of INF accord have argued that it would leave the West vulnerable to the purported Soviet conventional superiority. They have argued that nuclear weapons should not be removed from Europe, so long as the conventional imbalance is not rectified.

Assessment

From the foregoing discussion, one can say that the Washington Summit focused mainly on the INF treaty and prospects for further nuclear disarmament. Indeed it has historical significance being first ever in kind in eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons. It is the major step forward in dismantling the Soviet-American cold war. Gorbachev summarised the conceptual essence of his meeting with American President, as consisting of a transition to a

new phase in their relation, while recognising that the two sides are now emerging out of a long drawn out confrontation. In his TV address to the Soviets, he referred to the dangerous tendencies which could undermine nascent turn in the process of demilitarisation of international relations. He also realised that there was much hard work ahead to nurture the "first sprout of nuclear disarmament that pushed concrete walls to prejudice and stereotype hostility. In view of this, he thinks that the INF treaty and other understandings he arrived at Washington "offer a historic chance to the whole humanity to stand getting rid of the heavy burden of militarisation and war which took not only a horrible toll in human life but rolled back economic development and material, cultural and shackled freedom and spiritual and social creativity of peoples".¹¹

Gorbachev's utterances in Washington are inconsistent with the policy of peace, as it stresses much on the integral and interdependent nature of the world, the mutuality of security, reasonable sufficiency of military power, the primacy of political interaction (in the way of achievement of world security), the pursuit of the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, the idea of a comprehensive global security, the need to democratise international relations, the strengthening of UN system and so on. Further, they had

11. Hindu, Madras, 2 January, 1988.

broadly outlined the nature of cuts to be imposed on the strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides. By all accounts the progress on START at the Summit was impressive.

On the issue of third world conflicts, both the leaders realized that the right of every people to make their own social choice and have the freedom to pursue that path. In short, the emphasis is on global security and on creating international norms against intervention.

Reagan too in his TV address to his people declared that he intended to go for arms reduction rather than just arms control. He said: "We are moving away from the so-called policy of MAD by which nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction!"

Apart from bright prospects of an agreement on reduction of long-range nuclear weapons of the two super powers, some agreement was made on chemical weapons control, conventional weapons and armed forces control, ban on nuclear testing elimination of strategic offensive arms are made at the Summit.

Yet, the strength and range of Western criticisms of the INF accord indicates the persistence of serious obstacles in the path of disarmament. NATO countries fear that the elimination of two categories of nuclear weapons would undermine Western security and cohesion and push NATO down the

"slippery slope of denuclearization". They argue that the endorsement by Reagan of the vision of a nuclear free world put forward by Gorbachev is both unrealistic and dangerous. In its view, nuclear weapons are sine qua non for Western security. As Henry Kissinger put it: "President Reagan cannot keep repeating the goal of denuclearising the world without further eroding the American nuclear commitment to Europe. Moreover, somebody must face the fact that slogans of denuclearization are impossible to fulfil - and hence irresponsible... it cannot be in the interest of democracies to keep arousing objectives more sentimental than realistic - and to stigmatise the weapons on which the defence of the West must for the foreseeable future be based".

It is evident that the nuclear cult is still alive and well. The faith in nuclear weapons as useful instruments of policy and the belief that there is no alternative to nuclear deterrence in maintaining peace are far too strongly entrenched to point an easy movement towards the goal of comprehensive nuclear disarmament. However, the INF treaty is the first major step toward nuclear disarmament. It is the first agreement which calls for elimination of two categories of modern arms. This could be possible because the leaders of the two super powers agreed to circumvent their central disagreement on the issue of testing space

based defensive weapons. In fact much depends on the political will of the two leaders and their allies as regards the future arms control/reduction. At present the prospect of long-range nuclear warheads reduction agreement between the two super powers seems to be quite bright.

World Reactions

As for NATO countries, elimination of the weapons removes a divisive political problem in Europe, particularly in West Germany, which anguished over the deployment, and among the Belgians and Dutch, who were reluctant to accept the missiles in the first place. In short, they think the elimination of two categories of nuclear weapons would undermine western security and cohesion and push NATO down the "slippery slope of denuclearisation".¹³

The West European countries vehemently criticised the INF accord which clearly indicates the pertinence of serious obstacles in the path of disarmament. A number of leading statesmen from US and West Europe like the former US President Richard Nixon; his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, architect of detente and SALT process, Zbigniew Brazezinski, National Security Adviser to Carter; General Bernard Rogers the retired chief of NATO forces have all warned against the dangers of the INF accord.¹⁴

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

Europe's independent nuclear powers welcomed the signing of a super power accord of this kind to scrap Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) but warned against making further nuclear cuts without first reducing an imbalance in other weapon sectors.¹⁵

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl voiced the straight backing to the accord signed earlier in Washington by both the leaders of US and Soviet Union. In his TV address Chancellor Kohl said Washington ceremony was of "historic importance".¹⁶

In London, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told the House of Commons that the INF agreement was "an historic event and good news for us all". She added there should be no further reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe. Until such a time as we are far nearer parity on conventional weapons and chemical weapons have been eliminated.

French Premier Jacques Chirac said, INF accord would only prove "a positive step if it is followed by other agreements to strengthen security in Europe".¹⁷

UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cullar hailing the accord said, "the signing today of the INF Treaty by

15. Patriot, New Delhi, 10 December, 1987.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

Reagan and Gorbachev constitutes a truly remarkable development that I welcome whole-heartedly". He said, "I earnestly hope that the two sides will now make progress towards significantly reducing strategic nuclear weapons, and in dealing with the other most important issues on their agenda".¹⁸

In an official communique the Spanish Government said that "European, allied and international security will be increased by reducing arms levels", the INF treaty opens the way to a less armed and safer world".¹⁹

The Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski sent a telegram congratulating the leaders of the both super powers on the signing of the treaty banning medium range nuclear missiles.

The six nation Summit at Stockholm raised the question of nuclear disarmament by suggesting that the world should think of managing world without nuclear weapons. It posed the issue of multilateral management of the disarmament process by suggesting a role for the UN in verification.

India's Reaction

Among the countries of South Asia, India hailed the agreement between the two leaders. The Prime Minister

18. Ibid.

19. D.R. Goyal (ed.); Nuclear Disarmament the Six Nation Initiative and the Big Power Response, New Delhi, 1987.

Rajiv Gandhi described the agreement as "a truly momentous development". He told the Parliament that the agreement had vividly demonstrated that given the necessary political will, technical, problems such as verification could be overcome. He expressed: "This agreement is not, and should not be considered as more than a beginning, a historic beginning, a vital beginning, but still only a beginning".²⁰ He hoped the world would be really safe only when as the Delhi Declaration puts it, "the balance of terror gives way to comprehensive international security". In separate messages to both the leaders, the prime minister congratulated on the signing of the historic agreement as a "triumph of reason and amity over fear and hostility". In a statement in Parliament, the Minister of State for external affairs, Natwar Singh said that India regards the signing of INF Treaty as "a vindication of own stand on nuclear disarmament". The Indian Press generally reacted favourably and described the agreement as historic step towards strengthening the world peace and lowering tensions.²¹

In sum, a point here to note is that both Reagan and Gorbachev have rejected the strategy of nuclear war fighting.

20. Indian and Foreign Review, "India Hails INF Treaty," 15 February 1988, Vol.25, No.8, pp.10-11.

21. Ibid.

The Geneva communique had emphasised that "Nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". This is quite a step if one looks back a decade when the strategy of counter force, involving entire class destruction of military targets with inevitable colateral destruction of the civilian population and even counter value strategy against industrial and population targets was postulated. Compared to this we now have a situation where it is realised that the requirements of deterrence can be met at much lower levels, Soviet leader Gorbachev has projected the goal of a move towards minimal levels of nuclear and conventional arms. Nuclear deterrence still continues to be the strategy; a strategy to prevent war and there is now a move towards the implementation of this strategy levels by arms reduction. Reagan also speaks of the American and Russians having been too long both masters and captives of the arms race and refers to the objective of cutting strategic missiles by half.²² This is movement in positive trend and temper particularly, after the Summit at Washington.

22. The Hindustan Times, February 10, 1988 (New Delhi).

C O N C L U S I O N S

In the foregoing chapters, an attempt has been made to examine the basic features of the three Summits - Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington - in both their structural and procedural aspects. The overall impact on world politics of nuclear diplomacy between the US and the Soviet Union is the result of the manifold cross-connections created by their respective doctrines of national security. Moreover, the intensification of regional conflicts has been accompanied by the rise of interventionism of the Super Powers: e.g., the increasing US involvement in the Central American crisis and the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The three Summits discussed in the present study have taken together offered a progressively clearer picture of the issues that divide Washington and Moscow. Although the interests of the Super Powers diverge, yet the assumptions and goals of their foreign policies do not point to a complete breakdown of relationship. On the contrary both in terms of generalities and specifics the negotiating machinery can be geared up to generate confidence and coherence of policy interaction. Thus it is clear that the Super Powers have got off to a slow start towards normalisation of relations. At the Geneva summit it was too early to say that the two countries could work out a comprehensive accommodation. All that could be said with confidence was that the two chief negotiators

had focused on the more controversial operational issues in nuclear diplomacy. At the Reykjavik summit the rhetoric and activities of the two leaders pointed to a less hostile relationship with serious exploration of alternative scenarios. The Washington Summit pointed to policy proposals rooted in a wider framework, which could in turn help to forge a consensus. Thus when the Washington parleys ended it ^{was} clear that both the divisive issues and the negotiating machinery had gained a visibility which was unparalleled in their earlier interaction. This imparted a positive sense of achievement in the direction of gaining eventual control over super power conflicts.

In conclusion we can address ourselves to the general question of the plausibility of transformative change in super power relations and point to new challenges under three agendas: (1) Strategic issues, (2) political issues, and (3) diplomatic issues. On several occasions in the past super power relations have run into serious difficulties on account of their different perceptions of reality. A fruitful hypothesis would seem to be that in the modes of diplomatic conduct and attitudes in the three Summits the two super powers have given an absolute priority to the elimination of violent conflict between them to avoid a catastrophe for the entire human species.

Strategic Issues

The long term global strategies of both the super powers are in essence multidimensional arrangements for extending their influence throughout the world. Both are not averse to geo-political expansion and where direct use of military power is counter-productive, they have developed approaches which involve the indirect use of military, naval and air power. The heavy reliance on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons has provided a unique political-military setting to super power understanding of national security issues.

The Geneva Summit witnessed the agreement of Reagan and Gorbachev on the principle of a fifty per cent cut in strategic forces. In addition they agreed on a separate interim agreement on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe together with a common approach to the prevention of proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons.

The Reykjavik Summit was marked by an agreement to eliminate 100 warheads each on land based intermediate range forces. They also discussed the stipulation of the time period. Apparently the Summit failed on the question of "Star Wars" but later the Soviet Union gave indications that it would be willing to delink the INF issue from that of SDI. Clearly the Soviet initiative effected what

started as a "zero" solution to the INF in Europe. It became a double "zero" and later a global "zero". The importance of the Reykjavik Summit pointed to the adaptation of the double zero INF proposals to the global reality, in which the role of both the conventional forces and nuclear forces have to be related to the enhancement of both nuclear and conventional stability.

The Washington Summit provided a logical alternative to the escalation of conflict by developing a major initiative for the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons.

Taking an overview of all the three Summits on the developing agenda of strategic issues, we can discern the descriptive and explanatory features of the process for achieving a more stable strategic equilibrium. The whole process of political linkage and leverage has had a checkered history. What is a remarkable feature of the three summits we have studied is that the two sides show an increasing measure of conceptual clarity and willingness to assess a variety of approaches to reach a consensus on the patterns, sources and types of stability. The images and perceptions about strategic issues have moved in a direction which will prove to be meaningful and comprehensible by both the super powers.

Political Issues

The central dimensions of the agenda of political issues is of course related to the dictum in which both Washington and Moscow apparently still believe that "none should be second to the other". The three Summits have undoubtedly helped to share perceptions about global and regional problems and the political tasks which devolve on both the Super Powers. It is not simply a matter of considering the political issues as academic questions. What Reagan and Gorbachev were able to experience was the co-existence of their competing ideas along with a joint exploration of the political concepts and issues in an integrated manner. The Summit sequence from Geneva to Reykjavik to Washington helped to familiarise the two leaders with the conceptual tools for a political analysis in which political tactics and strategy have to be related to the formulation, evaluation and implementation of stabilising factors in East-West relations. Since both statesmen have to face domestic priorities which cry out for urgent solutions, the political imperatives are not only to project military power, but to eliminate sources of political risk. The agenda of political issues, therefore, clearly focuses on the joint investigation of the ways to manage or resolve regional and global conflict. The

theories of Soviet and American intervention in the post-1945 World thus have become irrelevant to the emerging international milieu.

Diplomatic Issues

With outlooks based on the balance of mutual assured destruction, the diplomatic objectives on both sides have been based on worst-case scenarios. The development of the US policy of containment shows the manner in which a geopolitical contest integrates local, regional and global conflicts to produce a volatile world. The three Summits mark a return to the search for greater harmony in super power relations through diplomatic initiatives. Both sides are in the process of giving up their illusions of omnipotence and have once again started using diplomacy for assessing various alternative future developments. Frustrated by earlier failures of heated controversies over strategic issues, the super powers have scaled down some of their commitments. Diplomacy can make an important contribution to the avoidance of direct challenges and establishing a more general international diplomatic equilibrium. This requires a more perceptive understanding of the other Super Power's political culture and the understanding of national self-interest in the context of the emerging international order. This does not mean that either Washington or Moscow is giving up realpolitik; it only means that diplomatic

interactions will be used more extensively to determine situational characteristics and military and political capabilities in determining both perceptions and policies.

Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington did not solve many of the major problems which were encountered by the US and the Soviet Union. The three Summits helped to lay the intellectual foundations for alternative approaches to thinking about the principal contradictions between the two super powers. It is doubtful if the hardliners on either side will regain their position of dominance in strategy, politics or diplomacy. It would, however, warrant further study whether the following words may one day have greater implications for global stability:



"The most unjust peace is preferred to the justest war that was ever waged."

--- Cicero (Julius Ceaser)

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APPENDIX -I

TABLE LIST

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Table 1.1. US strategic nuclear forces, 1987

| Weapon system | | | | Warheads | | |
|----------------------------|--------------|---------------|------------|-------------------|------|------------------|
| Type | No. deployed | Year deployed | Range (km) | Warhead × yield | Type | No. in stockpile |
| <i>ICBMs^a</i> | | | | | | |
| Minuteman II | 450 | 1966 | 11 300 | 1 × 1.2 Mt | W-56 | 480 |
| Minuteman III (Mk 12) | 240 | 1970 | 13 000 | 3 × 170 kt | W-62 | 750 |
| Minuteman III (Mk 12A) | 300 | 1979 | 13 000 | 3 × 335 kt | W-78 | 950 |
| MX | 10 | 1986 | 11 000 | 10 × 300 kt | W-87 | 110 |
| Total | 1 000 | | | | | 2 290 |
| <i>SLBMs</i> | | | | | | |
| Poseidon | 256 | 1971 | 4 600 | 10 × 50 kt | W-68 | 2 750 |
| Trident I | 384 | 1979 | 7 400 | 8 × 100 kt | W-76 | 3 300 |
| Total | 640 | | | | | 6 050 |
| <i>Bombers</i> | | | | | | |
| B-1B | 18 | 1986 | 9 800 | 8-24 | b | 250 |
| B-52G/H | 263 | 1955 | 16 000 | 8-24 ^b | b | 4 733 |
| FB-111 | 61 | 1969 | 4 700 | 6 ^b | b | 360 |
| Total | 339 | | | | | 5 343 |
| <i>Refuelling aircraft</i> | | | | | | |
| KC-135 | 615 | 1957 | | | | |

^a The four Titan II ICBMs remaining at Dec. 1986 are scheduled to be deactivated by mid-1987.

^b Bomber weapons include six different nuclear bomb designs (B-83, B-61-0, -1, -7, B-57, B-53, B-43, B-28) with yields from sub-kt to 9 Mt. ALCMs with selectable yields from 5 to 150 kt, and SRAMs with a yield of 200 kt. FB-111s do not carry ALCMs or B-53 or B-28 bombs.

Sources: Cochran, T. B., Arkin, W. M. and Norris, R. S., *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 1: US Forces and Capabilities*, 2nd edn (Ballinger: Cambridge, MA, forthcoming); Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1988*; authors' estimates.

Table 1.2. US theatre nuclear forces, 1987

| Weapon system | | | | Warheads | |
|---------------|--------------|---------------|------------|-----------------|--------|
| Type | No. deployed | Year deployed | Range (km) | Warhead × yield | No. in |

Table 1.2. US theatre nuclear forces, 1987

| Weapon system | | | | Warheads | | |
|----------------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------|
| Type | No. deployed | Year deployed | Range (km) | Warhead × yield | Type | No. in stockpile |
| Land-based systems: | | | | | | |
| <i>Aircraft</i> | | | | | | |
| ^a | 2 000 | .. | 1 060– 2 400 | 1–3 × bombs | ^a | 2 800 |
| <i>Missiles</i> | | | | | | |
| Pershing II | 108 | 1983 | 1 790 | 1 × 0.3–80 kt | W-85 | 125 |
| GLCM | 208 | 1983 | 2 500 | 1 × 0.2–150 kt | W-84 | 250 |
| Pershing 1a | 72 | 1962 | 740 | 1 × 60–400 kt | W-50 | 100 |
| Lance | 100 | 1972 | 125 | 1 × 1–100 kt | W-70 | 1 282 |
| Honest John | 24 | 1954 | 38 | 1 × 1–20 kt | W-31 | 132 |
| Nike Hercules | 27 | 1958 | 160 | 1 × 1–20 kt | W-31 | 75 |
| <i>Other systems</i> | | | | | | |
| Artillery ^b | 4 300 | 1956 | 30 | 1 × 0.1–12 kt | ^b | 2 022 |
| ADM (special) | 150 | 1964 | .. | 1 × 0.01–1 kt | W-54 | 150 |
| Naval systems: | | | | | | |
| <i>Carrier aircraft</i> | | | | | | |
| ^c | 900 | .. | 550– 1 800 | 1–2 × bombs | ^c | 1 000 |
| <i>Land-attack SLCMs</i> | | | | | | |
| Tomahawk | 100 | 1984 | 2 500 | 1 × 5–150 kt | W-80-0 | 110 |
| <i>ASW systems</i> | | | | | | |
| ASROC | .. | 1961 | 10 | 1 × 5–10 kt | W-44 | 574 |
| SUBROC | .. | 1965 | 60 | 1 × 5–10 kt | W-55 | 150 |
| P-3/S-3/SH-3 ^d | 630 | 1964 | 2 500 | 1 × <20 kt | B-57 | 897 |
| <i>Naval SAMs</i> | | | | | | |
| Terrier | .. | 1956 | 35 | 1 × 1 kt | W-45 | 290 |

^a Aircraft include Air Force F-4, F-16 and F-111, and NATO F-16, F-104 and Tornado. Bombs include four types (B-28, B-43, B-57 and B-61) with yields from sub-kt to 1.45 Mt.

^b There are two types of nuclear artillery (155-mm and 203-mm) with four different warheads: a 0.1-kt W-48, 155-mm shell; a 1- to 12-kt W-33, 203-mm shell; a 0.8-kt W-79-1, enhanced-radiation, 203-mm shell; and a variable yield (up to 1.1 kt) W-79-0 fission warhead. The enhanced radiation warheads will be converted to standard fission weapons.

^c Aircraft include Navy A-6, A-7, F/A-18 and Marine Corps A-4, A-6 and AV-8B. Bombs include three types with yields from 20 kt to 1 Mt.

^d Some US B-57 nuclear depth bombs are allocated to British Nimrod, Italian Atlantique and Dutch P-3 aircraft.

Sources: Cochran, T. B., Arkin, W. M. and Norris, R. S., *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 1: US Forces and Capabilities*, 2nd edn (Ballinger: Cambridge, MA, forthcoming); Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1988*; authors' estimates.

Woonsdrecht continued, and construction of the second British base began. The full complement of 108 Pershing II missiles were deployed in FR Germany by the end of 1985.

Overall, the number of US nuclear warheads in Western Europe continued to decline, in response both to the agreement reached by NATO Ministers at Montebello, Canada, in October 1983 to reduce the numbers of nuclear warheads in Europe (see *SIPRI Yearbook 1986*) and political and fiscal decisions resulting in numerous retirement and reduction programmes.³³ By end 1986, about 4600 warheads (see table 1.3) were deployed in Europe.

Table 1.3. US nuclear warheads in Europe, 1965-95

| Type | May 1965 | Dec. 1981 | Dec. 1986 | End modernization* (1992-95) |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------------------|
| <i>Artillery</i> | | | | |
| 8-inch | 975 | 938 | 900 | } ~500 total |
| 155-mm | 0 | 732 | 732 | |
| <i>Tactical SSMs</i> | | | | |
| Lance | 0 | 692 | 692 | 692 |
| Pershing I | 200 | 293 | 100 | 100 |
| Pershing II | 0 | 0 | 108 | 108 |
| Honest John | 1 900 | 198 | 0 | 0 |
| Sergeant | 300 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <i>Nike Hercules SAMs</i> | 990 | 686 | 75 | 0 |
| <i>Bombs</i> | 1 240 | 1 929 | 1 629 | 1 329 |
| B-57 NDB | - | 192 | 192 | 192 |
| <i>ADMs</i> | 340 | 372 | 0 | 0 |
| <i>GLCMs</i> | 0 | 0 | 208 | 464 |
| Total | 5 945 | 6 032 | 4 636 | 3 385 |

* Assuming there are no further reductions of nuclear warheads because of future arms control agreements.

Source: Authors' estimates.

Reductions since the original NATO modernization decision in December 1979 have now included: (a) withdrawal of all atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) from Europe (1985); (b) phased retirement of all Nike Hercules missile warheads (began in 1981, to be completed by 1988-89); (c) retirement of nuclear warheads used to arm Greek and Turkish Honest John tactical missiles (1985); and (d) 'significant reductions in the total of tactical bombs' since 1981 with the deployment of new B-61 bombs replacing older B-28 and B-43 bombs on a less than one-for-one basis.³⁴

After numerous delays, it appears that US nuclear artillery modernization in Europe is moving forward (see *SIPRI Yearbooks 1985* and *1986* for further discussion). In mid-1986, it was reported that non-enhanced radiation versions of the new W-79 8-inch nuclear artillery projectile had been deployed in FR

Table 7.3. US and Soviet supply of major weapons to Third World regions, 1982–86: share of region's total imports and region's share of supplier's total exports

Percentage shares are based on SIPRI trend indicator values, as expressed in US \$m., at constant (1985) prices.

| Importing region | Supplier's share of region's total imports | | Region's share of supplier's total exports to Third World | |
|--------------------|--|------|---|------|
| | USA | USSR | USA | USSR |
| Middle East | 32 | 31 | 62 | 46 |
| South Asia | 12 | 56 | 6 | 23 |
| Far East | 46 | 21 | 19 | 7 |
| South America | 12 | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| North Africa | 13 | 46 | 4 | 10 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 10 | 44 | 2 | 8 |
| Central America | 17 | 66 | 2 | 6 |

Source: SIPRI data base.

Table 7.4. Recipient shares in US exports of major weapons to the Third World, 1977–81 and 1982–86

Percentage shares are based on SIPRI trend indicator values, as expressed in US \$m., at constant (1985) prices.

| Recipient | 1977–81 | Recipient | 1982–86 |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| Iran | 19.0 | Egypt | 25.5 |
| Israel | 16.3 | Saudi Arabia | 17.0 |
| Top 2 | 35.3 | | 42.5 |
| Saudi Arabia | 13.0 | Israel | 9.3 |
| South Korea | 9.0 | Taiwan | 7.4 |
| Taiwan | 5.5 | Pakistan | 5.8 |
| Top 5 | 62.8 | | 65.0 |
| Jordan | 5.2 | South Korea | 4.6 |
| Egypt | 5.1 | Jordan | 2.7 |
| Morocco | 3.4 | Thailand | 2.1 |
| Thailand | 3.1 | Kuwait | 1.9 |
| Singapore | 2.0 | Venezuela | 1.8 |
| Top 10 | 81.6 | | 78.1 |
| Total value | \$32 584 m. | | \$28 157 m. |
| Total no. of Third World recipients | 69 | | 61 |

Source: SIPRI data base.

the USA may supply airborne early-warning (AEW) capabilities to Pakistan while at the same time seeking military co-operation with India.

China views US arms sales to Taiwan as a symbol of US intentions concerning the future of Taiwan. So far, the United States has not endorsed the reunification concept of 'one country, two systems' as proposed by China. From the Chinese point of view, a more rapid reduction of US arms sales to Taiwan—in accordance with the joint Sino-US communiqué of 1982¹³—would signify a neutral US attitude towards the issue of reunification. China argues

Table I.4. Soviet strategic nuclear forces, 1987

| Weapon system | | | | | Warheads | |
|----------------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------|------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Type | NATO code-name | No. deployed | Year deployed | Range (km) | Warhead × yield | No. in stockpile ^a |
| <i>ICBMs</i> | | | | | | |
| SS-11 Mod. 1 | Sego | 28 | 1966 | 11 000 | 1 × 1 Mt | 29 - 56 |
| Mod. 2 | | 360 | 1973 | 13 000 | 1 × 1 Mt | 380 - 720 |
| Mod. 3 | | 60 | 1973 | 10 600 | 3 × 250-350 kt (MRV) | 190 - 360 |
| SS-13 Mod. 2 | Savage | 60 | 1972 | 9 400 | 1 × 600-750 kt | 63 - 120 |
| SS-17 Mod. 2 | Spanker | 150 | 1979 | 10 000 | 4 × 750 kt (MIRV) | 630 - 1 200 |
| SS-18 Mod. 4 | Satan | 308 | 1979 | 11 000 | 10 × 550 kt (MIRV) | 3 200 - 6 200 |
| SS-19 Mod. 3 | Stiletto | 360 | 1979 | 10 000 | 6 × 550 kt (MIRV) | 2 300 - 4 300 |
| SS-X-24 | Scalpel | | 1987? | 10 000 | 7-10 × 100 kt (MIRV) | .. . |
| SS-25 | Sickle | 72 | 1985 | 10 500 | 1 × 550 kt | 76 - 140 |
| Total | | 1 398 | | | | 6 900 - 13 000 |
| <i>SLBMs</i> | | | | | | |
| SS-N-5 | Sark | 39 | 1963 | 1 400 | 1 × 1 Mt | 41 - 47 |
| SS-N-6 Mod. 1/2 | Serb } | 288 ^b | 1967 | 2 400 | 1 × 1 Mt | 450 - 520 |
| Mod. 3 | | | 1973 | 3 000 | 2 × 200-350 kt (MRV) } | |
| SS-N-8 | Sawfly | 292 | 1973 | 7 800 | 1 × 800 kt-1 Mt | 310 - 350 |
| SS-N-17 | Snipe | 12 | 1977 | 3 900 | 1 × 1 Mt | 13 - 14 |
| SS-N-i8 Mod. 1/3 | Stingray } | 224 | 1978 | 6 500 | 3-7 × 200-500 kt } | 710 - 1 900 |
| Mod. 2 | | | 1978 | 8 000 | 1 × 450 kt-1 Mt } | |
| SS-N-20 ^c | Sturgeon | 80 | 1983 | 8 300 | 6-9 × 350-500 kt | 500 - 860 |
| SS-N-23 ^c | Skiff | 32 | 1986 | 7 240 | 10 × 350-500 kt | 340 - 380 |
| Total | | 967 | | | | 2 400 - 4 100 |
| <i>Bombers</i> | | | | | | |
| Tu-95 | Bear A/B/C/G | 100 | 1956 | 8 300 | 2-4 × bombs/ASMs | 280 - 560 |
| Tu-95 | Bear H ^d | 40 | 1984 | 8 300 | 8 × AS-15 ALCMs | 320 - 640 |
| Total^e | | 140 | | | | 600 - 1 200 |
| <i>Refuelling aircraft</i> | | | | | | |
| | | 140-170 | | | | |
| <i>ABMs</i> | | | | | | |
| ABM-1B | Galosh Mod. | 32 | 1986 | 320 | 1 × unknown | 32 - 64 |
| ABM-3 | Gazelle | 68 | 1985 | 70 | 1 × low yield | 68 - 140 |
| Total | | 100 | | | | 100 - 200 |

Table 1.5. Soviet theatre nuclear forces, 1987

| Weapon system | | | | | Warheads | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------|------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| Type | NATO code-name | No. deployed | Year deployed | Range (km) | Warhead × yield | No. in stockpile ^a |
| Land-based systems: | | | | | | |
| <i>Aircraft</i> | | | | | | |
| Tu-26 | Backfire | 144 | 1974 | 3 700 | 2-3 × bombs or ASMs | 288 |
| Tu-16 | Badger | 287 ^b | 1955 | 4 800 | 2 × bombs or ASMs | 480 |
| Tu-22 | Blinder | 136 ^b | 1962 | 2 200 | 1 × bombs or ASMs | 136 |
| Tactical aircraft ^c | | 2 885 | | 700-1 000 | 1-2 × bombs | 2 885 |
| <i>Missiles</i> | | | | | | |
| SS-20 | Saber | 441 | 1977 | 5 000 | 3 × 250 kt | 1 323-2 200 ^d |
| SS-4 | Sandal | 112 | 1959 | 2 000 | 1 × 1 Mt | 112 |
| SS-12 Mod. 1/2 | Scaleboard | ~130 | 1969/78 | 800-900 | 1 × 200 kt-1 Mt | 130 |
| SS-1C | Scud B } | 690 | 1965 | 280 | 1 × 100-500 kt } | 690-1 400 |
| SS-23 | Spider } | | 1985 | 350 | 1 × 100 kt } | |
| | FROG 7 } | 890 | 1965 | 70 | 1 × 10-200 kt } | 890-3 600 |
| SS-21 | Scarab } | | 1978 | 120 | 1 × 20-100 kt } | |
| SS-C-1B ^e | | 100 | 1962 | 450 | 1 × 50-200 kt | 100 |
| SAMs ^f | | n.a. | 1956 | 40-300 | 1 × low kt | n.a. |
| <i>Other systems</i> | | | | | | |
| Artillery ^g | | <7 700 | 1974 | 10-30 | 1 × low kt | n.a. |
| ADMs | | n.a. | n.a. | - | n.a. | n.a. |
| Naval systems: | | | | | | |
| <i>Aircraft</i> | | | | | | |
| Tu-26 | Backfire | 132 | 1974 | 3 700 | 2-3 × bombs or ASMs | 264 |
| Tu-16 | Badger | 220 | 1961 | 4 800 | 1-2 × bombs or ASMs | 480 |
| Tu-22 | Blinder | 35 | 1962 | 2 200 | 1 × bombs | 35 |
| ASW aircraft ^h | | 204 | 1965 | | 1 × depth bombs | 204 |
| <i>Anti-ship cruise missiles</i> | | | | | | |
| SS-N-3 | Shaddock/Sepal | 264 | 1962 | 450 | 1 × 350 kt | 264 |
| SS-N-7 | .. | 96 | 1968 | 56 | 1 × 200 kt | 96 |
| SS-N-9 | Siren | 224 | 1969 | 111 | 1 × 200 kt | 224 |
| SS-N-12 | Sandbox | 120 | 1976 | 500 | 1 × 350 kt | 120 |
| SS-N-19 | .. | 112 | 1980 | 460 | 1 × 500 kt | 112 |
| SS-N-22 | .. | 44 | 1981 | 111 | 1 × 200 kt | 44 |
| <i>Land-attack cruise missiles</i> | | | | | | |
| SS-N-21 | .. | ? | 1986 | 3 000 | 1 × n.a. | n.a. |
| SS-NX-24 | .. | 12? | 1986? | <3 000 | 1 × n.a. | n.a. |
| <i>ASW missiles and torpedoes</i> | | | | | | |
| SS-N-14 | Silex | 314 | 1968 | 50 | 1 × low kt | 314 |
| SS-N-15 | .. | n.a. | 1972 | 40 | 1 × 10 kt | n.a. |
| SUW-N-1/FRAS-1 | .. | 10 | 1967 | 30 | 1 × 5 kt | 10 |
| Torpedoes | | n.a. | 1957 | 16 | 1 × low kt | n.a. |
| <i>Naval SAMsⁱ</i> | | | | | | |
| SA-N-1 | Goa | 65 | 1961 | 22-32 | 1 × 10 kt | 65 |
| SA-N-3 | Goblet | 43 | 1967 | 37-56 | 1 × 10 kt | 43 |