

**SEPARATIST CONFLICT IN INDONESIA: A CASE STUDY
OF WEST PAPUA**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: A Case Study of West Papua" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

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**Southeast Asian Studies
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Abbreviation

- ABRI : Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
- AMP : Association of College and University Students of the Papuan Central Highlands
- BPKI : Body for Researching Indonesian Independence
- CIA : Central Intelligence Agency
- DAU : Dana Alokasi Umum
- DPR : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council)
- DPRD : Regional People's Representative Council
- DPRP : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua
- EEC : European Economic Community
- EU : European Union
- FI : Freeport Indonesia
- GOI : Government of Indonesia
- HDI : Human Development Index
- Komnas HAM : A branch of Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission
- MRP : Majelis Rakyat Papua
- OPM : Organisasi Papua Merdeka
- PKI : Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia)
- PNG : Papua New Guinea
- PNI : Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)
- PTC : Papuan Traditional Council
- SEATO : Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
- TNI : Tentara Nasional Indonesia
- UN : United Nations
- UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
- UNTEA : United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

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Map of Papua



Source: International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2012

Map of Papua



Source: International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2012

Chapter I

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

The Indonesian nationalism was born out of a long history of struggle against the colonial rule launched by the various ethnic groups in the archipelago. The concept was political as well as to resist the Dutch colonial oppressor. On 20 May 1908, a handful of reformist Javanese intellectuals had founded an organization called Budi Utomo or 'Noble Endeavour', which is considered as the first organization that has inspired and drives Indonesian nationalism.

Right from the beginning, Indonesian nationalism was clearly manifested in self-defined collectivity and the unified power derived from specific solidarity; a sense of unity of all Indonesian people beyond religious affiliation, ethnic, race and fixed island boundaries (Elson 2008: p. 8-21). Indeed, there was a consciousness at that time that the particular local cultures signified feudalism and primitiveness, had to be abandoned in the quest for modernity. Obviously, nationalist leadership were more concerned, to avoid alienating any significant ethnic group within the archipelago. Moreover, the essential of cultural diversity and religious tolerance was also articulated in the five principles known as Panca Sila expressed by President Sukarno in June 1945 and consequently adopted as the philosophy of the Indonesian state.

State formation in Indonesia began under the Japanese, who ended Dutch colonial rule in 1942. After Japan's surrender, Indonesian nationalists proclaimed independence in 17 August 1945 who initially refused to recognize the claim and a brutal, futile effort to maintain control. However on 27 December 1947, the Netherlands surrendered sovereignty to the newly formed Republic of Indonesia except for the province of West Papua.

This study is premised on investigating the pluralities that takes the form of multiple political articulations mainly in the context of a post-colonial state like Indonesia. The specific focus to conduct such a research can be done through a deeper

engagement with the process of a national imagining and its consequent dissenting companion spaces. It is this contested entry of post-colonial 'nation' in Indonesia that has produced resisting identities, ethnicities, territories and nationalities. A thorough investigation into such a contested terrain of post-colonial nation in Indonesia can explicate important dimensions of present day concerns over national identity, citizenship, ethnic identity, representation, development, resources, territoriality, autonomy, independence, secession etc. In this context Papuan nationalism emerged, in response to Dutch during colonial period and later direct activities of the Indonesian state.

This research will argue that a number of political and socioeconomic factors compelled the West Papuans to launch their armed struggles for self-determination and strengthened their ethnic nationalist sentiment. Lack of basic and social services, exploitation of their natural resources, weakening of local institutions, erosion of traditional culture and norms, uneven distribution of wealth, military atrocities, and discrimination, among others, have compelled the West Papuans to conduct anti-Indonesia, separatist activities and have reinforced their ethnic nationalist claims (Trajano 2010).

The notion that a unified Indonesia, having a territory that was congruent with its present boundary, existed during the pre-colonial times is a powerful tool for Indonesian nationalist leaders in uniting all ethnic communities into one single nation-state and in establishing Indonesia's peculiar identity and place in the world (Ibid). The present territory and boundaries of Indonesia were actually demarcated by the Dutch. Undeniably, the Dutch colonialists had given Indonesia, formerly known as the Dutch East Indies, the territorial shape it has today. Yet, ethnic loyalties and relationships were not taken into account when the Dutch were defining and delimiting the territory of the Dutch East Indies colony. Moreover, colonialists did not make any effort to promote the national unification of all Indonesian ethnic communities. Not only did the Dutch maintain the sharp divisions among diverse ethno national entities but through harsh colonial policies they aggravated existing ethnic conflicts and created deeper cleavages.

Hence, the present social and ethnic conflicts in Indonesia are the outcome and can be traced back to the Dutch colonial rule.

The Indonesian unitary state relied considerably on the postcolonial nationalist project. The project had included resistance to Dutch colonialism and the adoption of a politically 'neutral' national language, Bahasa Indonesia, both of which have been used to unite all ethno-linguistic groups in Indonesia (Leifer 2000). During President Sukarno period, nationalism was incorporated within an emotive symbolism, described in contraction as NASAKOM that was apparently projected to legitimize religious and communist as well as nationalist participation in the political process. That symbolism served as a tool for mobilizing function within a competitive domestic politics with President Sukarno fending off the rival attentions of the armed forces and the Communist Party (Ibid).

Since nationalism is an inborn part of Indonesia's political practice and after the end of the Pacific War, it was visible in a combative manner against real or imagined external adversaries. For instance, against the Dutch, to win over West New Guinea (West Papua), when the Dutch granted independence to Indonesia in 1949, they retained sovereignty over West Papua.

Unfortunately, in some episodes in Indonesia's history nationalism was defined against their domestic sympathizers of external enemies, which included some indigenous ethnic groups within the archipelago, such as the Christian Ambonese and also to the small but economically powerful ethnic-Chinese community of migrant origin.

In order to strengthen national unity and to construct a national ideology from the beginning of nationalist movement and after independence, the Indonesian nation-states provided their people with an 'organizational culture' or 'political institution'-the meaningful ways of life in all aspects of human activities, for example, education, politics, economics, ideology, social, religion, entertainment etc.

More precisely the government with its power and authority creates, recreates and invents history by connecting meaning to concrete-sacred artifacts, monuments, sites and landscapes-and indescribable-national history, language, religious celebration, national days commemoration and collective memory-cultural heritage. As part of the nationalist project Indonesia's mainstream new historians designed the history of the nation based on their own suitable past basically the history of Java. For instance, a single harmony nation imagination was clearly seen in their works and the Indonesian state effort to reinvent Sriwijaya and Majapahit Kingdom. However, the perceived weakness of this nationalist project is its presumption on the dominance of and on the importance of the Javanese people/civilization in the history of Indonesia.

The idea of Javanese predominance could also be interpreted as an attempt of the Javanese to assert their superiority as well as to civilize the 'less culturally developed' non- Javanese ethnic groups. Some have concluded that the establishment of an Indonesian unitary state was in response to the attempts of the Dutch to destabilize the newly proclaimed republic. However, it also mirrored the hegemonic thinking of the Javanese that they must lead Indonesia since they represent a little more than half of the total population of the country (Leifer 2000). The Javanese-controlled Indonesian politics, as many scholars have pointed out, could not tolerate genuine dissent, non-conformity, and regional alternatives. The unwillingness of Jakarta to grant political and economic rights to ethnic minorities has led to ethnic tensions and violence since the proclamation of country's independence in 1945.

The coup of the 1965 marked an abrupt shift from the rhetoric of nation and movement to that of the state and control. Nationalism, under Suharto's New Order, became an ideological ornamentation of the state, an 'official nationalism' whose purpose was to endorse the status quo (Anderson 1983: 80-103). But its uses were limited, because the new regime was also determined to achieve modernity by engaging fully in the global capitalist economy. Whereas Sukarno had styled himself Great Leader of the Revolution, Suharto became the Father of Development. The nation's realization of itself was now to take place through the conquest of material prosperity and through the

acknowledgment by other nation-states of Indonesia's power. First came the Task of state-building, the construction of institutions for administration and control; with these in place one could address the matter of nation-building, the creation of a community centred on the state (Mc Vey 2005:21).

During New Order regime, the temper and role of Indonesian nationalism began to change in a managed way. The Indonesian politics was deeply relied on military, in order to maintain law and order. Furthermore, stability and economic development were placed the highest priority for justifying the authoritarian rule.

The Netherlands Indies brought together under one-administration peoples of great cultural, ethnic and religious diversity. Mainstream nationalists did not seek to construct a common cultural and ethnic heritage out of this diversity, but rather looked to the shared struggle against the Dutch as the common bonds that were the building blocks of the nation(Mc Vey 2005:18). They recognized ethnic plurality and sought to create a common Indonesian identity that transcended the local, ethnic and cultural affinities. Indonesian nationalism was political and secular, rather than cultural and ethnic (Chauvel 2003:114).

The collapsed of the Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 has brought deep political change across Indonesia and raised popular expectations of political reform that is confident to mean greater political competition among Indonesia's cultural diversity. Indonesia has become more democratic and the first years of reform that followed and allowed People and the civil society, especially the students to express their long-suppressed feelings and aspirations through public protests. In order to bring resolution for various grievances and demands broad regional autonomy or decentralization was introduced in 1 January 2001.

Against this background of political transformation within the Indonesia Republic, it was possible to hold an act of self-determination in East Timor that finally led to its political independence. The Acehnese demanded a referendum that paved the

way for a peace process that concluded successfully in August 2005 and more importantly, the Papuans openly and peacefully expressed their demand for the right to self-determination. Of course, the circumstances surrounding East Timor's separation from Indonesia injured national pride but they did not give rise to a popular cause, which had been the case when the Dutch had retained the western half of the island of New Guinea (now West Papua or Papua) from the transfer of sovereignty.

As mentioned above regional autonomy programme was initially introduced as a means to calm regional disappointments against the central government. By giving more autonomy to the regions in managing its affairs, the central government also expects that the programme would soon boost the economic performance of the regions. Thus, the logic behind the autonomy programme clearly revolves a belief among Indonesian policy-makers that the fundamental cause for conflict, be it ethnic or religious, is the lack of economic development. Furthermore, they also assumed that armed separatist movements in the country have also been driven by similar economic factor.

In this context, decentralization should be suitably seen as an embedded strategy in strengthening nation-state building. Nevertheless, there are clear tendencies that decentralization does not impressively contribute to the formation of firm nation-state building in Indonesia. Throughout the decade, ethnocentrism and primordialism increases along the democratic processes at the local level. The political powers are still concentrated around specific groups. In the case of Indonesia and the West Papua relationship, decentralization is very complex effort and remains ineffective; the vulnerability of Reformasi is reflected in Province where the abusive military still causes disorder to indigenous ethnic minority Papuan communities.

Indonesia consists of thirty-three provinces and one of which is West Papua or Papua. The province was name as Irian Jaya by the Jakarta after its official integration into the Republic of Indonesia in 1969, but in 2001, the name was change to Papua. To differentiate the province from the neighboring country of Papua New Guinea, this study will refer to the province as West Papua because it is known internationally.

Yet when the Dutch granted independence to Indonesia in 1949, they retained sovereignty over Papua. For more than a decade, the newly independent government of Indonesia struggled diplomatically and militarily to win control over Papua. In the early 1960s, the Dutch agreed to cede control to the United Nations, which would transfer Papua to Indonesia after ascertaining Papuan support for union with Indonesia. In 1969, the Indonesian government, dominated by the military, conducted an “Act of Free Choice” in which government-selected Papuans “chose” to join Indonesia. This process gave rise to a group of unsatisfied Papuans, and their dissatisfaction was then transformed into a secessionist movement led by the Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM).

In order to suppress the small-armed movement the Indonesian government’s military counter-insurgency operation against the Papua Independence Movement (OPM) and has seen widespread disorder to the civilian population, including a high number of human rights’ abuses. Papua’s natural resources have been aggressively exploited, yet the revenues and profits from the extraction have in general, not benefited the Papuan people. This has given rise to charges of “colonialism” by Papuan activists, who argue that Jakarta has merely replaced the Dutch colonial rule.

During the authoritarian New Order regime (1968–1997), a security approach dominated the Jakarta’s policies in West Papua. After the downfall of the New Order regime and the start of the so-called Reform Era in 2001, the Indonesian government finally launched a Special Autonomy Law for West Papua, the well-known Law No. 21/2001. Actually, the Law was a response to demands from West Papuans, other Indonesians, and the international community for a solution to the problems in the province. As a result, the autonomy law gives a broad autonomy for the region to manage their own affairs, except in the fields of foreign policy, defence, fiscal and monetary policies, religious affairs, and judiciary. Indeed, it is still within the framework of a unitary state in which the region to some extent and in some area will have a much greater autonomy.

Literature Review

The literature review has been broadly divided into three themes- first theme focuses on the writings and concepts of various schools on nationalism. Second theme mainly focuses on disintegration and the separatism. Third theme is on a number of political and socio-economic issues of West Papua in relationship with Indonesian State.

1. The literature on nationalism is very wide ranging, Elie Kedourie (1993), He argues that nations are late eighteenth/early nineteenth century ideology that grew as a response to “the predicament of modern man” - a variety of ideologies which caused widespread alienation. Nationalism and socialism developed as opposing solutions to this alienation.

Hans Kohn (1944), work is a classic work which quite convincingly dealing with the current questions on nationalisms. He also looks nations as modern, dating back no further than the mid-eighteenth century having its roots in the distant past as Anthony D. Smith also argues.

Anderson Benedict (1991), to him, nations developed as a necessary component of industrial society, though neither “economic interest, Liberalism, nor Enlightenment could, or did, create in themselves the kind, or shape, or imagined community”. Nations replaced this religious culture with their own uniquely constructed national cultures.

Benner, Erica (1995) Erica’s work is significant as it deals exclusively with the contribution of Marx and Engels’ take on nationalism. She theorizes that the Marx and Engels did theorize the question of nationalism by examining their political commentaries from the revolutionary years 1848-9 and the years after 1860.

Billig Michael (1995) to Billig nationalism exists at all times in less visible forms, which he defines as “banal nationalism”. Far from an ideology of the peripheries, nationalism is always present--even in the “developed” West, as people do not forget their nationalism. There are numerous literatures on Nationalism, which cannot be mentioned here, all. Chatterjee, Partha (1993) in his book “Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse” calls a ‘derivative discourse’, whereby the

nationalisms in the non-Western (Third World) societies work more as a copy of European post-Enlightenment discourse which is well seen in the non-western society's duplication.

2. According to Ernst Haas's definition, political integration is "the process whereby political actors in several distinct political systems are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectation, and political activities toward a new center, the institutions of which possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing sub-system " (Haas 1968:16). On the one hand, the decision to secede represents an instance of political disintegration, wherein political actors in one or more sub-systems withdraw their loyalties from the jurisdictional center to focus them on a center of their own.

This process of disintegration however can ultimately result in numerous different outcomes due to "the fickleness and elasticity" of separatists' demands (Donald Horowitz, 1981). The demands of a disgruntled community fluctuate. Although separatist movements vary widely in terms of intensity, degree and duration of violence, their demands are for greater regional autonomy and outright secession. At any particular time, a movement may include those who push for secession, and others who press for domestic change. Leaders may blur their demands due to their own uncertainty or due to strategic considerations. Thus, the definition of secession used here emphasizes the formal withdrawal of a constituent unit from an established, internationally recognized state and the creation of a new sovereign state.

State building produced a basic discontinuity with earlier forms of social organization (Tilly 1975, P. Anderson 1974, Poggi 1992, Rokkan 1975). At the same time, capitalist economic development knit together large-scale markets and transformed the units of economic activity and interest (Wallerstein 1974, Balibar & Wallerstein 1991, Hechter 1975, Naim 1977, Worsley 1964/1986). Tilly shifts emphasis away from culture but does not break sharply with the developmental narrative of older modernization theory (eg. Gellner 1964, Bendix 1964, Apter 1965, Eisenstadt 1966, 1973, Smelser 1968). Older modernization theory operated with a tension between its

assumption of nation-states as basic units of modern political economy and its treatment of all “undesirable” forms of nationalism as merely inherited from previous eras, a sort of survival that could be expected to wane or moderate into acceptable patriotism in the long run, even if it contributed to short-term eruptions every now and again (Talmon 1952, 1960, Parsons 1960). Modernization theory thus predicted that when outlying regions were incorporated into a social system they would gradually be “homogenized” into cultural similarity with the rest of the system, nationalism centered on the encompassing state would grow and contrary ethnic mobilization would be transitory. “Researchers emphasizing capitalist economics more than state development often broke more sharply with modernization theory” (Wallerstein 1974-1988).

Gellner, analyzes nationalism as a cultural phenomenon dependent not only on state formation and industrial society, but also on certain transformations of culture, such as the creation of “high cultures” and their changing relations with popular or folk cultures, and the imbrications of all particular cultures within a putatively context-free space of cross-cultural communication. At the same time, he is clear in arguing that nationalism is distinctively modern and that it is not strictly the result of prior ethnicity: nationalism is not the awakening and assertion of these mythical, supposedly natural and given units. It is, on the contrary, the crystallization of new units, suitable for the conditions now prevailing, though admittedly using as their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world (Gellner 1983: 49).

Gellner holds that “nationalism . . . engenders nations, and not the other way round” (Gellner 1983: 55). Similarly, Hroch argues that nationalism arose from activities of cultural elites seeking histories and constituted the identities of nations without necessarily giving those identities any immediate political purpose; once established, such nationalist claims were available for politicization by cross-class groups (Hroch 1985).

The state-centered approach, in total, clarifies one aspect of nationalism but obscures others. In fact, it (i) makes it difficult to understand why national identity can

stir the passions it does, and (ii) encourages analysts either to ignore ethnic and other identities that do not coincide with states or to treat them as somehow naturally given.

Gietze, Dale (1989:201-221), to him even before the Republic of Indonesia gained control over the territory of West New Guinea (with the controversial U.N.-supervised Act of Free Choice of 1969), the government had systematically tried to forge new identities for the indigenous peoples, as Indonesians rather than Melanesians. He further argues that the process, of 'Indonesianization' was adopted through the education system, the media, economic development and transmigration. On the other hand West Papuans are developing a sense of their own racial and cultural distinctiveness and asserting their rights to greater participation in decision-making and self-determination.

According to Webster, David (2001-2002), West Papuan nationalism has rested on the promise of a better future; like other nationalisms. Born in 1961 as a nation-of-intent, West Papuans are, in their own minds, "already sovereign." In fact, West Papua was never independent, but the decolonization of the mind begun in 1961 is complete. He argues in a way Papuan sovereignty may yet be expressed in a "fourth-world fashion that does not require all the trappings of an independent state, but it can no longer be denied. Moreover, he describes that the perception of dichotomy between Indonesian and Papuan is the legacy of colonial (Dutch, then Indonesian) rule, but has been adopted enthusiastically by many Papuans as a mobilizing focus. Certainly, the Indonesian presence has made West Papuans far more conscious of themselves as Melanesian.

West Papuan nationalists see their resistance to outside intrusion as predating European colonialism. Very often use the term *amberi*, which originally referred to slave raiding parties from the Sultanate of Tidore in the Moluccas, to refer to Indonesians in general (Bell *et al.*, 1986). There is a gap between the OPM's symbolic importance as a focus for West Papuan nationalism and its weakness as an effective military and political organization. This needs to be understood in relation to the difficulties the OPM faces in relation to world opinion (Ibid, 1986).

Trajano (2010), work is significant as it deals with the political and socioeconomic causes of ethnic secessionism and conflicts in West Papua. He pointed out that due to lack of basic and social services, exploitation of their natural resources, weakening of local institutions, erosion of traditional culture and norms, uneven distribution of wealth, military atrocities, and discrimination, among others, have forced the West Papuans to conduct anti-Indonesia, separatist activities and have reinforced their ethnic nationalist claims.

King, (2004) takes on a particular importance issues as it goes in proposing international military, diplomatic, economic and political intervention, especially from Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and eventually the United Nations, to resolve the problem of the Papuans, namely to free them from “Indonesian occupation”. King also argues that the central government, especially President Abdurrahman Wahid’s endorsement of the Congress and its follow-up, marked a defining moment in Papuan politics. He point out five important issues base on the Indonesia-Papuan relations. First, according to King, the issue of racial discrimination. Second, Papuans perceive themselves as being “colonized” by other Indonesians and the aggressive exploitation of natural resources (copper, gold, timber) irrespective of local interests and traditions has been a major source of grievance. Third, the growing demographic imbalance between “transmigrates” and the locals, with the former being given all the privileges and access, very often at the expense of the latter. The Papuans fear becoming minorities in their own land. Fourth, the growing unhappiness in the manner Papua became part of Indonesia with the Act of Free Choice has being described as nothing more than the “Act of No Choice”, thereby challenging the legal basis of Papua’s integration or restoration into Indonesia. Fifth, the gross violations of human rights by the security apparatus especially the military while conducting operations against the OPM and other groups opposing Indonesia's political and economic presence in the province. King also views in his West Papua as the “Next East Timor”.

He also describes the idea of autonomy in Indonesia emerged in 1998 in the wake of the Reformation Era. Since then, there has been strong debate within Indonesia about

finding alternative solutions, to reduce the power of the central government, as it existed during the New Order Era. Three alternative ideas – autonomy, federalism, and independence – circulated among politicians and scholars. However, independence and federalism were soon ruled out because of previous bad experiences, particularly the case of East Timor. This left autonomy as the only politically acceptable choice. As a result, autonomy, either regional or special was implemented throughout Indonesia, including in West Papua and Aceh. Special autonomy in West Papua, however, as King describes, was far from the original draft composed by West Papuan’s intellectuals (Peter King 2004: 68–84). Therefore, according to King, while it embraced most of the West Papuan’s demands, the Indonesian government managed to eliminate any reference to the people’s implicit desire for “independence,” as mentioned in the bill’s first draft (Ibid).

According to Chauvel, and Bhakti, (2004: 31–33) perceive special autonomy as a “controversial” policy that originated during Wahid’s presidency. The notion of special autonomy for West Papua resulted in overwhelming objections from some elements of the Indonesian government, especially considering the fact that the bill, which already gave greater concessions to West Papuans, also strongly expressed West Papuans’ nationalist sentiments and aspirations. Indeed, as Chauvel and Bhakti describes, the decision to give West Papuans the opportunity to draft their own version of the special autonomy bill actually came from the lack of “clarity and substance” in the government of Indonesia’s commitment to this matter which, since 1999, has been only rhetorical. The contribution of West Papuan elements to the bill gave it more legitimacy. Unfortunately, in Jakarta’s opinion, the West Papuans were also skeptical in their perception of special autonomy: “Why should we believe Jakarta now?” (Ibid).

To McGibbon, (2003: 1–4) special autonomy is meant to accommodate a demand of the people in West Papua that they have a broader opportunity to rule their own region. McGibbon however, also notes that special autonomy in West Papua, like the idea of autonomy in other countries, emerged from the central government’s fear of the growing demand for independence. In the context of Indonesia, in the wave of demands for democratization, autonomy was seen as a reasonable and acceptable choice, which

significantly weakened the power of the central government. Furthermore, McGibbon argues, despite a number of controversies following the implementation of special autonomy, the law also imposed some articles that were seen as a great economic incentive for West Papuans. They required the central government to return to the province eighty percent of the national tax revenue collected from general mining in the province, and seventy percent of the revenue from oil and natural gas produced in the province. Nonetheless, implementation of the law remains a big question (Jacques Bertrand, 2004:185-210).

To Bertrand, a Canadian expert on politics and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, if the special autonomy law could be applied sincerely in West Papua, the problem that the government of Indonesia faces would gradually solve itself (Jacques Bertrand 2004: 185-210). Unfortunately, this has not happened. As many West Papuans argue, the implementation of special autonomy is not as they expected. Violence still occurs, as was evidenced by the assassination of Theys Eluay, chairman of the peaceful opposition group Presidium of West Papua, in November 2001, by the Indonesian military. Moreover, a lack of economic and fiscal transparency continues, and there is no sign that it will end soon. The allocation of revenue is still not as stated in the law, and the continuing security approach by the central government causes more frustration among West Papuans and results in more discontent (Ibid).

Rationale and Scope of the Study

This research will attempt to unfold the critical questions related to historical processes of nation-making, subsequent contestations over citizenship like in terms of autonomy, rights, decentralization and share of resources. The study is extensively intended at critically examining the nature of narratives that readdresses Papua's nationalist ideology, which is found on history and nationalist historiography of decolonization, specifically Papua's incorporation into Indonesia. The decolonization of the Netherlands Indies bequeathed the nation state of Indonesia but the delayed activities of the Netherlands government despite, failed to produce a nation state in West Papua. Even though its

failure to provide a state for the Papuans, the decolonization process has fostered and shaped the development of Papuan nationalism, while the United Nations (UN) system of nation states has provided a language in terms of which they have articulated a call for self-determination and human rights. It is this aspect of the research that suitably corresponds to the historiography that reflected the choices Papuans were making between the contending Indonesian, Dutch, and Papuan visions of a future. Consequently, where possible, this research draws on Papuan sources for expressions of Papuan identity and the articulation of Papuan national ideals. This study will also look into the two elements, the modern and non-modern, are both prominent in the Papuan nationalist story.

After surveying the literature on Indonesia's relation with its unit West Papua, certain gaps are being evident which required to be addressed. They are as follows:

1. The concept of "internal colonialism" can be used to analyze ethnic separatism for example in Jakarta; the core of the Indonesian State, political dominates and economically exploits the periphery, which includes West Papua. The necessary condition for the development of ethnic separatist sentiment is that there must be substantial economic inequalities between the core and the periphery. Most of the literature does not use the concept of "internal colonialism" which is relevant.
2. Most of the literature does not take into account the problem of identifying self-determination exclusively with secession, as it is not only its limited scope but also that it is essentially a state-centered rather than a people-centered approach. There is a contradiction here, because one can see self-determination as a right of peoples, but secession as a process relating to states. There should be distinct levels of analysis, "separatism" and "secession," as well as related concepts such as "autonomy" and "sovereignty" relate to the political organization of states.
3. Available literature does not address the role of the Indonesian Communist Party, which attempted to bridge the divide between nation-state and province by appealing both when it was active.

Objective of the Study

The objective of the Research is to investigate:

1. The character of Indonesia nation-state building project and 'national transformation' in relations with West Papua.
2. How West Papua Nationalism and Ethnic Separatism emerged? and what is the relationship between this nationalism and the OPM?
3. To investigate into how the idea of 'Nation' is produced as an instrument of governance?
4. How post-colonial state Indonesia respond to the Ethnic Separatism of West Papua with effective methods.

Research Methodology

The proposed study is both qualitative and quantitative in nature. The proposed study is conducted through an analysis of primary sources like official documents, government reports and other relevant data and secondary sources like texts, journals, articles, periodicals, seminars, newspapers etc. This research largely employs descriptive and historical tools to understand the problems. The study has relied mostly on the secondary and primary sources available as a field visit to the proposed area was lacking. However sufficient efforts has been made to understand the issues from all possible sources available till date.

Hypotheses

1. West Papuans desire for secession is an offshoot of the very process of Indonesian Nation-State formation, and is rooted in Dutch Colonial practices.
2. Special Autonomy for West Papua has been implemented by state to quell the demand for separation.

Chapterization

Chapter I: Introduction

The first chapter of the study discusses a brief background of the entire research. It provides a brief summary of the problems and introduces the area. The chapter presents

the framework and scope of the research.

Chapter II: Background to the Conflict between Indonesia and Dutch West Papua

Second chapter of the study focuses on the rise of Indonesian nationalism and Indonesia nation-state formation project and national transformation in relations with West Papua. It attempts to highlight the critical questions related to historical processes of nation-making, contestations over territory, ethnicities, resisting identities and citizenship and the Dutch approach to ethnic minorities.

Chapter III: Indonesia Nation-Building Project versus Papuan's Ethnic Separatism

The third chapter looks at the contestation between Indonesia and West Papua. This contested entry of post-colonial nation in Indonesia can spell out important dimensions of present day concerns over sovereignty, national identity, citizenship, ethnic identity, representation, development, resources etc. Largely, the chapter provides a holistic understanding of the ongoing conflict encompassing various issues.

Chapter IV: State Response: A Policy of "Special Autonomy" and West Papuan Responses

The fourth chapter deals with the application of Special Autonomy Law in West Papua. It highlights the evolution, background, features, implementation and the failure of Special Autonomy in West Papua. Generally, the Indonesian government to address the Papuans demand for independence and to address their grievances comprehensively introduced Special Autonomy Law.

Chapter V: Conclusion

The last chapter concludes the study with a brief summary of the above chapters. Above all, the chapter presents the findings and observations in the light of research questions and hypotheses on which the proposed study is based. In addition, a brief recommendation has also been made with enough efforts.

Chapter II

Background to the Conflict between Indonesia and Dutch West Papua

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN INDONESIA AND DUTCH WEST PAPUA

Indonesia Nation-Building Project

The concept of the sovereign state that emerged in Europe by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was married to the concept of the nation that emerged in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This led to increase in power and efficiency of states-partly in order to compete with one another. However, those states that enjoyed historical interruption did not enjoy 'national' homogeneity: they were to construct through social and political involvement, and often by raising a myth of homogeneity, though some at least had a core ethnies (Smith 1994: 375-99). Anthony Smith also refers nationalism to the whole process of the growth of nations and nation states, responses of affection to and pride in the nation, discourse praising the nation and a movement with national desires and goals (Smith 1994: 375-99).

Until the twentieth century, various types of political organization existed along with nation-states, empires, colonies, dependencies and stateless societies. By twentieth century the world polity interaction has magnified hence, the nation-state model has become significant (David 1988:103). Initially, European powers attempted to impose this model on stateless regions. Later on, local elites demanded it for themselves and by the end of World War II, the dismantling of colonial empires was at the top of the political agenda (Robert 1974). "National self-determination" became an "inalienable right" of all "peoples" (Isaac 1983). This doctrine and the model of national polity and the sovereign state has been expressed and strengthened in their purest form in UN debates and Constitution.

According to Klein, every territorial unit is to be organized by a sovereign state officially equal to all others (Klein 1974). Thus, sovereignty plays a central role in the world model of the nation-state. This chapter looks at Indonesia nation-state formation

and the changing dynamic of Indonesian nationalism in relation with the process of a national imagining and its consequent dissenting companion spaces. This chapter will also try to seek and explore the Dutch approach to ethnic minorities specifically West Papuans. It will also seek to analyze how the question of Papua nation building emerged from the Dutch period and how it evolved in postcolonial Indonesia.

State Formation in Indonesia, 1945-1949

'The Indonesian nation is the totality of all the human beings who, according to geopolitics ordained by God Almighty, live throughout the unity of the entire archipelago of Indonesia from the northern tip of Sumatra to Irian' (Feith and Smith 1974 : 176).

State formation may expand over centuries as in Western Europe (till 1990). In twentieth century, large number of states emerged in the international system due to a series of rapid events triggered by the sudden collapses of colonial empires. In this context, state formation in Japan-occupied Pacific Asia at the end of World War II belonged to this pattern and Indonesia was one of the classic examples.

Like many other colonized countries, the idea of nationalism was the first and most popular idea to influence the local population of the Netherland's East Indies. The Indonesian nationalism was born out of a long history of struggle against the colonial rule launched periodically but continuously by the various ethnic groups in the archipelago. The concept was political and as well as to resist the Dutch colonial oppressor.

Against this backdrop, a small group of Indonesian elites started Indonesian nationalism movement around 1908. On 20 May 1908, a handful of reformist Javanese intellectuals had founded an organisation that they called *Budi Utomo* or 'Noble Endeavour' (Leifer 2000). They were mostly, the sons of the middle and high classes of Javanese noblemen (priyayi), sons of entrepreneurial rich merchants of West Sumatera, Indonesian pilgrims to Mekka, some young elite Indonesian people who were the product of limited Dutch colonial education and few people of pure Dutch descent who thought

Indonesia as their real home (Elson 2008: 8-21). They shaped an Indonesian nationalism that was manifested in self-defined collectivity and the unified power derived from specific solidarity; a sense of unity of all Indonesian people beyond religious affiliation, ethnic, race and fixed island boundaries (Elson 2008: 8-21). Of course, Budi Utomo made a minimal impact on the Dutch colonial regime but it has been accepted as the first inspiring of Indonesian nationalism.

Furthermore, Ruth McVey also argued that the quest for modernity was desired among the educated Indonesians. There was a consciousness at that time that the particular local cultures signified feudalism and primitiveness, had to be abandoned in the quest for modernity (McVey 1996:12). In this light, the first half of the twentieth century has been regarded as the Indonesian National Awakening. In this period, people from many parts of the archipelago first began to develop a national consciousness as "Indonesians" (Ricklefs 2008:163-164). Moreover, new organizations and leadership were developed. They were actually supported by political activism (Ibid). Therefore, during the Dutch colonial rule, Indonesians began to consider themselves as a nation.

According to Vickers, several factors gave rise to a nationalist consciousness: the indigenous print media, urbanization, communism, Islam, education, mass entertainment (such as film, stambul theater, and Kroncong music), and suffering under Dutch apartheid. Intellectual leaders such as Kartini, Tirta, and Semaun gave voice and sentiment to the *notion* of a unified archipelago. These leaders, along with many others, sought to hold "modernity" and nation, "freedom" (*merdeka*) and independence. But only a small number raised their voices against colonialism (Vickers 2005:83).

In fact, Vickers notes that "The modern movement against colonial rule was because of the passion and commitment of a few remarkable men and women" (Vickers 2005:83). The movement had started in the late 19th century. Kartini was one such individual who provided the momentum and ideology which inspired successive patriotic nationalists to pursue their beliefs regardless of the difficulty. An enlightened and

intellectually capable family and solid foreign friends in Europe and Indonesia supported her. Kartini maintained her curiousness and integrated much of what she witnessed as ideology e.g., feminist principles, community welfare and education, in her pursuit of the national Indonesian identity and her quest to modernize her traditional society, advocating changes in gender status and principles of individual and national self-determination to realize the Indonesian universal dream of independence and self-rule (Steinberg 1971: 281–287).

During this period the first Indonesian political parties began to emerge; the youth group, Budi Utomo or 'Noble Endeavour' was established in 1908 (Leifer 2000:156) and the Indische Partij in 1912. The same year, Sarekat Islam was founded. It brought Indonesians together, using the banner of Islam in opposition to Dutch rule, however, it had not nationalist agenda, and was often more anti-Chinese than anti-Dutch. In contrast, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), formed in 1920, was a fully-fledged independence party inspired by European politics. In 1926, it attempted a revolution throughout Indonesia through isolated insurrections across Java that panicked the Dutch. Thousands of communists were arrested and exiled by the Dutch colonial government.

In 1918 a proto-parliament, the Volksraad, met for the first time, after being established two years before. It consisted of 39 members, where 15 were native Indonesians. During this year, the Dutch government agreed that at some, unspecified point in the future, Indonesians would be granted self-rule, but in subsequent years did nothing to follow up this aim (Steinberg 1971:281). Around 1920 that the word "Indonesia" came into being. It was created by an English naturalist to classify the ethnic and geographic area, "Indonesia" and this term so called Indonesia was seized upon by nationalist leaders as a word to imagine a unity of peoples. "Previously the Youth Alliances had talked about a separate Balinese nation, Javanese nation, Sumatran nation, and so on, now 'Indonesia' spoke of a single people" (Steinberg 1971: 281).

In 1927, Sukarno founded the Indonesian National Party (PNI) in Bandung. It was the first all-Indonesia secular party committed mainly to independence (Vickers 2005: 79). On 28 October 1928, the All Indonesian Youth Congress proclaimed the Youth Pledge (Indonesian: *Sumpah Pemuda*), establishing the nationalist goals of: "one country — Indonesia, one people — Indonesian, and one language - Indonesian." Indeed, the Dutch colonial government repressed many nationalist organisations and jailed a variety of political leaders. Even though the Dutch were unable to completely suppress local voices for change, they did successfully prevent widespread agitation. Although nationalist sentiment remained high in the 1930s, real moves towards independence remained silent.

With the arrival of World War II, the political fate of the Indies was drastically changed and suddenly unclear. In early 1942, Imperial Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies. The Netherlands had little ability to defend its colony against the Japanese army and Dutch forces were defeated just in little more than a month and ended 300 years of Dutch colonial presence in Indonesia. Thus, State formation in Indonesia began under the Japanese, who ended Dutch colonial rule in 1942. The nationalist movement became most strongly organized by the Indonesian Nationalist Party. Sukarno gained ascendancy as the leader of the nationalist movement and was particularly skilful at bridging various streams of nationalist groups, including Islamists and Communists who shared in the struggle against colonial rule but who also fought for states based on alternative ideologies. The Japanese occupation gave support to the Nationalist Party by preparing it to lead an independent government. Furthermore, by training an Indonesian militia, the Japanese laid the basis for the formation of the Indonesian army, which would fight the returning Dutch after Japan's surrender in 1945. Meanwhile, Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta, the two leaders of Indonesia first worked together as a team under the Japanese proclaimed independence in 1945 after three years of revolution against Dutch (Anderson 1972).

Indonesian National Project and Multicultural Politics

Like many other third world countries, the idea that a unified Indonesia, having a territory that was congruent with its present, existed during the pre-colonial times is a powerful tool for Indonesian nationalist leaders in uniting all ethnic communities into one single nation-state and in establishing Indonesia's peculiar identity and place in the world. The present territory and physical boundaries of Indonesia were actually established by the Dutch (Trajano 2010). Ironically, ethnic loyalties and relationships were ignored when the Dutch were defining and delimiting the territory of the Dutch East Indies colony.

When Indonesia independence was declared on 17 August 1945, and independence from Dutch colonial rule was acknowledged internationally from 27 December 1949, the notion and the reality of the Indonesian nation had been shaped by geography, a territorial experience, a shared history, and a discourse, language and a consciousness of belonging (Watson 2000: 6-8). Probably the most important reason for this has been the success of the mainstream nationalist movement. Moreover, the Indonesian state continues to rely significantly on the postcolonial nationalist project. The movement had included resistance to Dutch colonialism and the use of a politically 'neutral' national language, Bahasa Indonesia. Both tools have been used to unite all ethno-linguistic groups in Indonesia. (Kingsbury 2004).

Since nationalism is an inherent part of Indonesia's political tradition, and that Indonesian nationalism was manifested in a combative manner against real or imagined external enemies after the end of the Second World War. It was first, against the Dutch, the former colonial power, here according to Djiwandono the Indonesian-Dutch conflict in West Irian was framed, not as purely bilateral conflict, but as universal of the worldwide revolution against colonial forces:

"The struggle to liberate West Irian is also part of the struggle to abolish imperialism-colonialism all over the world...the struggle of Algiers...Congo...Angola...Tunisia...the struggle of all nations against imperialism everywhere!" (Djiwandono 2004 43-44).

Then against the British-inspired neighbouring Federation of Malaysia, which was condemned as a neo-colonial enterprise.

In this light, Jakarta during the Konfrontasi episode claims that the Malaysia concept was a “threat” to Indonesia. This perceived Malaysian threat was mainly described in ideological and geopolitical terms, of course, these two sets of charges are by no means mutually exclusive, and cannot be easily separated. For example, neocolonialism was considered an ideological threat in the abstract, but the agents of the geopolitical were viewed as posing a material threat to Indonesian. Therefore, this “encirclement” does not describe a conventional security threat of foreign invasion or conquest, but the less conventional threat of rebellion and intervention in internal affairs. A brief and representative statement of the threat facing Indonesia, which justified the Confrontation, was issued by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry in 1964:

“[The Confrontation] is not a dispute between two sovereign and independent states. It is a struggle against the domination and exploitation which British neo-colonialism exercise against the peoples of Malaya, Singapore and North Kalimantan. It is a struggle against the interference, intervention, sabotage and subversion which British neo-colonialism exerts against the Indonesian State and Revolution” (Mackie 1974: 20-30).

Furthermore, nationalism during this period was integrated by the late President Sukarno within a responsive symbolism *that* was seemingly projected to legitimize religious and communist as well as nationalist participation in the political process. Indeed, that symbolism had served a mobilizing function within a competitive domestic politics with President Sukarno fending off the rival attentions of the armed forces and the Communist Party. Both nationalism and allied symbolism were employed to strengthen Sukarno’s political centrality within the system of Guided Democracy that he imposed by July 1959 to translate himself from a constitutional to an executive president (Leifer 2000: 155).

Since national unity has been a central theme of Indonesian nationalist discourse. Indonesian secular nationalists were concerned, above all, to avoid alienating any significant ethnic group within the archipelago. The essential of cultural diversity and

religious tolerance was at the centre of five principles known as *Panca Sila*, a doctrine laid down by President Sukarno in a speech on June 1, 1945. *Pancasila* contains five principles' specifically:

- 1 *Kebangsaan* (Nationalism),
2. *Kemanusiaan* (International humanism),
3. *Kerakyatan* (Representative government or democracy),
4. *Keadilan Sosial* (Social justice) and
5. *Ketuhanan* (Belief in one God).

And it has been subsequently adopted as the philosophy of the Indonesian state (Leifer, Michael 2000: 159). And it was inscribed in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution and was constantly reiterated by both the Sukarno and Soeharto regimes (Bourchier, Vedi R. Hadiz 2003: 255).

Today, Indonesian nation-state in a geographical sense is an archipelago which is deployed between continental Asia and Australia, stretches from Sumatera Island to Papua Island. This nation state has also consists of more than 17, 000 islands, 931 distinct ethnic groups, different religion, language and culture (Sammeng 1997: 76). Hence, Indonesian nationalism lacked a readily identifiable or easily homogenized ethnic core. Therefore, Indonesian's identity is not rooted in a dominant ethnicity, even though the culturally distinctive Javanese comprise more than 60 per cent of a national population (Leifer 2000: 159). More importantly, the nationalist secular leadership comprised modern men who had shared national identity was based on a confrontation to the colonial order and not on a sense of being part of a distinct ethnic community (kingbury: 2004).

Therefore, the Indonesian national project from the beginning was premised on multiculturalism, at most in the sense of a 'celebration of ethnic diversity and, the commitment to inter-ethnic equality' (Brown 2000: 128). State symbols like the national slogan *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* ('unity in diversity') emphasized ethnic diversity. Since the

first decades of twentieth century, Indonesian nationalists had offered the citizen-participants in the national project both a nationalist history, including a history of glory stretching back to an immemorial past, and an even more bright vision of future prosperity and modernity. That is why the British historian Tom Nair calls the Janus-faced nature of Indonesian nationalism because it faces 'both backward to a mythical past and forward to a future of development in freedom' (Smith 1998:50).

In constructing a nationalist vision of the past, the early Indonesian nationalists' needs were not the same as exclusive ethnic nationalism in parts of Eastern Europe or elsewhere, whose aims were the glorification and purification of distinct ethnic and the associated demonization of often demographically diverse ethnic others. Revival or creation of memories of ancient battles, imperial glories and tribal migrations were suitable for such purposes. On the other hand, in constructing an ancient heritage for the Indonesian nation, it has certain drawbacks. In this context, what (Anderson 1999:7) calls 'splendid ancestors' in the pre-colonial past, had at least the possible to strike a blow at the heart of Indonesian nationalism, because of its multi-cultural nature.

This was recognized by some early nationalists, classic example such as Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana. He argued against glorifying all that had 'ever been found or ever occurred' in the archipelago. Referring to the habit of celebrating early leaders of resistance to Dutch expansion as Indonesian heroes. In that background, he argued in a way that:

...when Diponegoro [the early nineteenth-century leader of the 'Java War' against the Dutch], Tuanku Imam Bonjol [leader of the early nineteenth-century Paderi war in the Minangkabau region of West Sumatra], Teungku Umar [a local ruler who at times led opposition to Dutch expansion into Aceh] and the others fought in those days, there did not yet exist, there was not yet any hint of, any feeling of Indonesian-ness (perasaan keindonesiaan). Diponegoro fought for the Land of Java, even then we cannot really say for the Minangkabau, Teungku Umar for Aceh. Who could guarantee now that Diponegoro, Tuanku Imam Bonjol, or Teungku Umar would not have attacked other parts of this archipelago if they had had the chance to do so? Takdir knew that history could be a servant of 'cultural', and that writing a national history primarily aimed to construct a unified cultural identity upon which to base claims for independent statehood. In creating cultural basis for the new Indonesia, he argued that Indonesian nationalist idea was derived from the twentieth century, modernity and the West (Alisjahbana 1977: 14).

The Post-colonial Indonesian Nation State Project of 'Imagined Community'

In order to strengthen national unity and to construct a national ideology, the Indonesian nation-states provided their people with an 'organizational culture' or 'political institution'-the meaningful ways of life in all aspects of human activities, for example, education, politics, economics, ideology, social, religion, entertainment etc. In this backdrop, according to Herb, it is very important for the nation being able to maintain its political institutions, since it can lead to show that this nation is capable to develop institutionally integrated societies (Herb 1999).

In building national identity in such geography and ethnic diversity, Indonesian nationalists has had to create itself in the face of colonialism on the basis of myths of racial or cultural origin. Such national myths continue to be central to contemporary ideas about identity, which were first defined in the process of strengthening resistance against the imperialists. It is precisely dependent upon the construction of nationalist cultures. For this task, Indonesian state focuses on a glorious past with territory imagination, particular victory and sacred heroes. This national identity is tend to be produced from the perspective of a minor dominant group (Bhabha 1999:6). It is the leaders of a nation who construct a national culture that position, defines its people in the world, and promotes pride and position in the shaped national identity.

More precisely the government with its power and authority creates, recreates and invents history by attaching meaning to concrete-sacred artifacts, monuments, sites and landscapes-and intangible-national history, language, religious celebration, national days commemoration and collective memory-cultural heritage (Herb 1999:17-24). In this light, the national slogan of Indonesia, which propagated "unity in diversity" has certain problems regarding the construction of national history. Indonesia's mainstream new historians designed the history of the nation based on their own suitable past, the history of Java. For instance, a single harmony nation imagination was clearly seen in their works and the Indonesian state effort to reinvent Sriwijaya and Majapahit Kingdom. The ancient Kingdom of Srivijaya located in Palembang, Sumatera was founded in 700 AD.

This Kingdom was an example of the first Indonesian nation origin, since its territory was stretched from Sumatera to Malay Peninsula, ruled by a Malay race-a majority of Indonesian race today and became the transshipment centre in Southeast Asia. However, the most prominent model of Indonesian ancestor greatness was Majapahit Kingdom. This Kingdom was emerged around 12AD, in Trowulan, East Java and was founded by Raden Wljaya a Javanese ethnic. From east Java region, Majapahit expanded its boundaries by regularly conducting expedition to conquer other region. As a result, this kingdom controlled territory as wide as Indonesian region today (Sumadio, 1992).

As continues process of nationalist project during the period of the New Order regime, the civic myths of the nationalist struggle had come to be fundamental to official representations of nation. The key state ceremonies and national holydays, as well as the main school history classes, were centre on the events and figures associated with the 'national awakening' (kebangkitan nasional) in the first two or so decades of the twentieth century and on the 1944-1949 independence struggle (Foulcher 2000).

This civic vision of nationalism was made to incorporate regional diversity into the nationalist historical narrative. Therefore, civic symbols of the modern nation-state were bent to the will of the ruling state elite. Pancasila (the 'five principles': in essence monotheism, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy and social justice), for example, was designed by Sukarno to unite diverse ideological, ethnic and religious groups in the national collective. Of course, to large extent, it was transformed into a weapon under the new order regime, which could be used against dissenters of all kinds.

Furthermore, the Javanese domination in the nation's political elite, the centralization of political power, sometime appeared that the official construction of national culture and history was blurring into the glorification of a Javanese past and court culture, redefined to suit the purposes of the contemporary elite (Foulcher 1990:303). This tendency was particularly marked during the early to mid Suharto years, and was reflected in phenomena like the utilization of Sanskrit in bureaucratic language,

the emphasis on political events in Java in standard histories, and the continuing emphasis on Majapahit. Such processes have had the potential to create dissatisfaction beyond Java and to challenge the unifying basis of national historical narratives (Malley 1999:71), for example, the streets surrounding the chief monument to Riau's national heroes in the province's capital, Pekanbaru, were named after Gadjah Mada and prince Diponegoro, who might well have been understood by locals as examples of Javanese 'expansionism'.

The idea of Javanese predominance could also be seen as an attempt of the Javanese to assert their superiority as well as to civilize the 'less culturally developed' non-Javanese ethnic groups, in particular those with 'curly hair' (Kingsbury 2004: 111). Nonetheless, it also mirrored the hegemonic thinking of the Javanese that they must lead Indonesia since they represent a little more than 60% of the total population of the country. (Ibid). It could be one of the factors that Jakarta's vision of national unity, has always been contested. In the mid-1950s autonomist movements sprang up in several of the resource-rich islands outside Java. They were backed by local military commands, and in some cases the CIA, these movements posed a significant challenge to the central government and to the unity of the newly independent state. For instance, in Aceh, South Sulawesi and some other strongly Islamic regions, the Darul Islam, which had brought the military prestige as the 'guardian of national unity' at the same time it also injected a deep political Islam and regionalist sentiment (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003: 255).

In shaping Indonesia's national policies during the New Order (1966 – 1998), President Suharto created a new 'culture' by reaffirming the importance of the ideology of Pancasila. This national ideology was promoted as the single basic principle for all 'mass organizations' and 'social-political forces' under the Suharto regime (Morfit 1986: 42). It had also tightened the grip of central control over the military apparatus, bureaucracy and over the country as a whole. Thousands of active military officers were appointed to strategic 'civilian' positions, and a parallel military and intelligence

structure reporting to the central command shadowed every layer of civilian government in the regions. Law no. 5/1974 laid the foundations for a quarter of a century of central domination of the administrative apparatus. Central control was further institutionalized with Law no. 5/1979, which standardized village heads would no longer be elected (Kahin 1994:209-10).

Furthermore, during the New Order regime Indonesian nationalism was defined with reference to external enemies and their domestic sympathisers, which included some indigenous ethnic groups within the archipelago, such as the Christian Ambonese who had been beneficiaries of colonial rule (Leifer: 2000). The same internal definition applied also to the small but economically powerful ethnic-Chinese community that had serviced the Dutch state in a comprador role to considerable advantage. In Suharto's Indonesia (and to some extent even now), 'national identity' required more than proof of birth in the country. Among citizens, there were official categories of pribumi (native) and non-pribumi (non-native)—based on 'race' and indigeneity— with the former being regarded as the 'authentic' (asli) inhabitants of the land. Hence, the Chinese who had acquired Indonesian citizenship were still seen as 'foreigners' and categorized as non-pribumi. Because they were originated from a land 'outside' the boundaries of the Indonesian nation (Aguilar 2001).

The pribumi have also discontent over the Chinese because of their dominant economic role and close links to Suharto's regime and family circle. In extreme form that view was met of acute social discontent and unrest during May 1998. That was the consequence of the economic hardship which Indonesia had experienced from the latter part of 1997. Hence, Chinese property was a main object of mob violence and the rape of Chinese women were occurred during the closing moments to Suharto's resignation. The local Chinese were the scapegoat for Indonesia's economic misfortunes rather than as the focus of a unifying neo-nationalism. The position adopted towards the local Chinese by the successor government of President Habibie was uncertain. However, the attacks on Chinese and their property ceased under his rule (Leifer 2000:pp.157-158). According to

Ien Ang (Ang 2001b), 'while the Indonesian nation was from its inception imagined as a multiethnic entity, the place of those marked as "Chinese" in this "unity-in-diversity" has always been resolutely ambiguous and uncertain' (Ang 2001: 28).

The exit of President Suharto raised popular expectations of political reform that is confident to mean greater political competition among Indonesia's cultural diversity, which includes an important Islamic dimension (Leifer 2000). More recently, there have been attempts to engage the state much more deeply and consistently in religious matters, and especially to give practical effect to the fact that by far the greatest proportion of Indonesians is Muslim. In fact, Hefner rightly notes: 'as Islamization brings more and more people to piety, it is inevitable and, in fact, important that Muslims and non-Muslims reconsider the role of religion in public life' (Hefner 1995: 38). Moreover, the state has a tricky role to play (Bowen 2001: 12).

In broader discourses about the political implications of developing religiosity, there has been much discussion of the authentic-contextual specificity, meaning and (lack of) philosophical grounding of the notion of the secular state, and its founding assumption that religious belief and behavior are a purely private matter (Hunter 2009: 28-30). For example, 'some critics talk of the collapse or bankruptcy of secularism and the need to replace it with religiously based states. Others wish to trim its sails, to modify modern secular states' (Esposito 2002: 1).

Nonetheless, there are other groups which must also be accommodated, their rights protected, their beliefs respected, in so heterogeneous and a complex society. Even though they call to resolve this tension between the political assertion of a particular religion and the need for individual freedom and social tolerance and pluralism (Effendy 2003: 224), it is uncertain whether that can be achieved with any finality. In the words of Mujani and Liddle, it is far-fetched to think that Indonesia might move, even surreptitiously, to adopt the architecture of a formal Islamic state (Mujani and Liddle 2009: 590). Similarly not viable is Djihadono's idea that 'the preamble to the

Constitution should be changed so as to make the Republic of Indonesia a secular state (Djiwandono 2004). Otherwise this nation would continuously be subject to conflicts and threatened by disintegration.’ Thus, the place of religion, and specifically the influence exerted by Islamic organisation and Islamic ideas, in Indonesian politics and statecraft will continue to be a matter of contention, tension and even chronic bitterness.

The Indonesian nationalism on East Timor had unique nature. It could be because of the controversial issues regarding East Timor became part of Indonesia in 1975 as 27 province of the Indonesia, which was not recognized by international community. However, East Timor successfully attained independence following a referendum in 1999 (Milbank 2001). Of course, the circumstances surrounding East Timor’s separation from Indonesia injured national pride but they did not give rise to a popular irredentist cause, which had been the case when the Dutch had withheld the western half of the island of New Guinea (now West Papua or Papua) from the transfer of sovereignty. East Timor had never been a subject of a nationalist claim or a symbol of national fulfillment. In Jakarta and other major cities, although a resentment of having an Australian-led multinational force imposed on Indonesia by the UN, public protest over East Timor was limited to small-scale and not nation-wide demonstrations (Leifer 2000:154).

After the downfall of Suharto in 1998, the Indonesian military may no longer be the leading actor in national politics, but has reasonably play important role “behind the scenes” (Sebastian, 2007). After abolishing the “dual-function” doctrine that legitimated military engagement in socio-political affairs, the armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) leadership has placed more emphasis on transforming its institutional profile and improving its human rights record. Ironically, the reform efforts to control military businesses and to place the TNI under the authority of a civilian-led Ministry of Defense remain difficult due to sensitive and practical reasons. Of course, the military may no longer dictate policy to civilians, but it retains its privileged position of influence by virtue of its historical legacy and the fact that no civilian president can govern the country without their assistance. This practical alliance necessary either to secure a

presidential election or to prevent the military acting as a “spoiler” in national policymaking has worked to preserve the TNI’s institutional autonomy (Rinakit 2005: 39). Therefore, the Civilian politicians have compromised the process of reform. For instance, during Megawati’s presidency, the counterinsurgency operation in Aceh had given new momentum for TNI to take on a greater role in internal security in the pretext of “military operations other than war” (Sebastian 2007). Thus, the attempts by post-Suharto military reformers to limit their function purely to external defense has been sideline.

Decentralization and Nation-State Building

The basic foundation of decentralizing state powers is mixed, be in political grounds, economic motives, to administrative objectives. Actually decentralization should be suitably seen as an embedded strategy in strengthening nation-state building. Matsui (Matsui 2003) suggests that decentralization as the —opportunity to learning by doing□ for the central and local governments in the process of the nation state building.

There are clear tendencies that decentralization does not impressively contribute to the formation of firm nation-state building in Indonesia. Throughout the decade, ethnocentrism and primordialism increases along the democratic processes at the local level. Instead of spreading powers and empowering people, decentralization produces current of power among particular groups. According to Zulkieflimansyah, the most current political system in Indonesia is characterized by politics of dynasty, a widespread phenomenon of nominating a figure from the incumbents’family and the old political elites as Member of Parliament or candidate of head of local government (Zulkieflimansyah 2009.) In the words of Taslim (2007), the rise of primordialism spirit could be seen as a sign of declining nationalism spirit. Once again, Indonesia is facing serious challenges with its decentralization framework. The following table on kinship system (i.e. dynasty) among local elites in various regions may explain such phenomena.

Kinship System (—Dynasty) in Decentralized Indonesia, by Level of Local Government:

Table 1

Province Level	District Level
<p>Banten: Atut Ratu Chosiyah (Governor); Hikmat Tomet (husband, serves as Member Of Parliament rummy (Atut's firstborn, serves as Member of Senate 2009-2014); Adde Khairunnisa (Atut's daughter-in-law, serves as Vice Chairman of Local Parliament/DPRD, City of Serang, previously served as Vice Chairman of DPRD, Banten Province, and now she serves as Vice Bupati, District of Serang, Banten Province, 2010-2015); Aden Abdul Khaliq (Atut's brother-in-law, serves as Member City, Banten Province, 2011-2016); and Heryani (Atut's step-mother, serves as Vice Bupati, District of Pande-glang, Banten Province, 2011-2016). 17 South Sulawesi: Syahrul Yasin Limpo (Governor, 2008-2013); Ichsan Yasin Limpo (Syahrul's brother, serves as Bupati of Gowa, 2010-2015); Nur-hayati (Syahrul's mother, serves as Member of Parliament 2004-2009); Tenri Olle (Syahrul's brother, serves as Member of DPRD, District of Gowa).. Central Kalimantan: Agustin</p>	<p>Tabanan District, Bali Province: Nyoman Adi Wiryatama (Bupati, 2000-2010); Ni Putu Eka Wiryastuti (Nyoman's daughter, serves as Bupati, 2010-2015). Kutai Kartanegara District, East Kalimantan Province: Syauckani (Bupati, 1999-2006); Rita Widayarsi (Syauckani's daughter, serves as Bupati, 2010-2015). Bantul District, Yogyakarta Province: Idham Samawi (Bupati, 2000-2010); Sri Suryawidati (Samawi's wife, serves as Bupati, 2010-2015). Kediri District, East Java Province: Sutrisno (Bupati, 2000-2010); Haryanti (Sutrisno's wife, serves as Bupati 2010-2015). Kendal District, Central Java Province: Hendy Boedoro (Bupati, 2000-2006); Widya Kandi Susanti (Hendy's wife, serves as Bupati, 2010-2015). Indramayu District, West Java Province: Irianto MS. Syaifuddin (Bupati, 2000-2010); Anna Sopannah (Irianto's wife, serves as Bupati, 2010-2015). Bandung District, West Java Province: Obar Sobarna (Bupati, 2000-2010); Dadang Mohamad Naser (Obar's</p>

<p>Teras Narang (Governor, 2005-2015); Atu Narang (Agustin's brother, serves Chairman of DPRD, Central Kalimantan Province, 2005 Syahrul's father, Yasin Limpo, was Bupati in three different districts, i.e. Luwuk, Majene, dan Gowa - 2015); Aris Narang (Agustin's firstborn, serves as Member of DPRD, Central Kalimantan Province); Asdy Narang (Agustin's nephew, serves as Member of Parliament, 2009-2014). Lampung: Sjachroedin Zainal Pagaralam (Governor, 2004-2014); Rycko Menoza (Sjachroedin's son, serves as Bupati of South Lampung, 2010-2015); Aryodhia Febriansa (Sjachroedin's daughter, serves as Member of Senate, 2009-2014). Sjachroedin's father, Zainal Abidin Pagar Alam, was Governor of Lampung, 1967- 1973. Jambi: Zulkifli Nurdin (Governor, 2000-2010), Ratu Munawaroh (Zulkifli's wife, serves as Member of Parliament, 2009-2014); Zumi Zola (Zulkifli's son, serves as Bupati of Tanjung Jabung Timur, Jambi Province, 2011-2016).</p>	<p>son-in-law, previously served as Member of DPRD, West Java Province, now serves as Bupati, 2010-2015). Central Lombok District, West Nusa Tenggara Province: Lalu Wiratmaja (Bupati, 2005- 2010); Lalu Suprayatno (Lalu's son-in- law, serves as Vice Bupati, 2005-2010). Bontang City, East Kalimantan Province: Sofyan Hasdam (Mayor, 2001-2011); Neni Murniaeni (Sofyan's wife, serves as Chairman of DPRD, City of Bontang, 2009-2014). Sragen, Central Java Province: Untung Wiyono (Bupati, 2001- 2011); Kusdinar Untung Yuni Sukowati (Untung's daughter, serves as Chairman of DPRD, District of Sragen, 2009- 2014).</p>
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The above description indicates that political powers in grass-root level are still concentrated around small groups. Distributing powers and designing checks and balances among political actors and other stakeholders are difficult to maintain. Therefore, Decentralization in Indonesia is very complex effort and remains ineffective.

In the context of Indonesia and the West Papua (Papua) relation, it is necessary and interesting to have an analysis on the Indonesian democratization. The vulnerability of *Reformasi* is reflected in West Papua where the abusive military still causes disorder to Papuans. According to Political scientists, democratization can be viewed as the movement from authoritarianism to a stable democracy, which preferably should transform diverse aspects of national life for the better. *Reformasi* was relatively successful in many parts of the archipelago. Unfortunately, it failed to remove the remnants of authoritarian rule in West Papua. In this backdrop, Political scientist (Omotola 2008) notes that the effective functioning and strength of a democratic society primarily depends on the institutionalization of important elements such as an unrestricted democratic political space, where no interest group would be barred from participating in the democratic process, as well as the availability of multiple avenues for citizens, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, to express and represent their views and interests. He further says there should be an open, free, and independent press that serves as an alternative source of information while holding the Indonesian government accountable for its actions and excesses. There should be rule of law, which includes political equality of all citizens and the protection of their human rights as well as those of ethnic minorities (Omotola 2008).

Dutch Policy of Papuan Nation-Building

Historical and Political Contexts

West Papua is the western half of Papua New Guinea. The island is divided into two parts, West Papua, which Indonesia has incorporated as a province, and Papua New Guinea. The physical area of Papua is 421,981 square kilometers and lies between 130° – 141° East Longitude and 2°25' South Longitude – 9° North Longitude. The regency of Merauke has the largest area with 119,749 square kilometers while the City of Jayapura has the smallest area with 940 square kilometers. The province of West Papua consists of 27 regencies and 2 municipalities (Mollet and Julius' 2007:156).

The name of West Papua has changed many times. During Dutch colonial times the island was called Netherlands New Guinea. When the Indonesian government assumed control the island was renamed Irian Jaya (Garnaut and Manning 1974). When Irian Jaya was decentralized in 2001, the name Irian Jaya changed to Papua. Recently West Papua was divided into two provinces namely Papua and West Irian Jaya.

The West Papua topography consists of three areas namely the Bird Head, Central highland including the Northern and the Southern Jayawijaya highlands. According to Koentjoroningrat the Bird Head area includes Manokwari, Fak-Fak, Teminabuan, Stenkool, Kaimana, Kokas, Ayamaru and Windesi (Koentjoroningrat 1994). The Central Highland and the Northern areas include Jayawijaya, Mambramo, Cenderawasih Bay and Jayapura. The area south of Mount Jayawijaya is Merauke.

Indigenous West Papuan consisted primarily of three groups—Negritos, Papuans, and Melanesians—today they are categorized as a single race, Melanesians. Historically, the people living in West Papua categorized along clan and linguistic lines. In 1963, when the Netherlands handed West New Guinea over to Indonesia, it included 200 languages among 500,000 Papuans in an estimated population of 700,000 (Osborne 1985).

Historically, the Dutch from 1828 to 1961 colonized West Papua. During the Dutch period, Papuan infrastructure dominated by the mining sector after crude oil was discovered in Sorong. The Dutch used the territory regularly for its natural resources. The oil company Royal Dutch Shell began to tap into the region's oil reserves in 1907. Over the next few decades, the wealth of resources available became increasingly apparent and was being actively exploited by both British and American companies. Garnaut and Manning (reported that during 1951 to 1952 Papua exported 259 tons of oil equal to a value of US\$2.460 thousands (Garnaut and Manning 1974). The agricultural sector provided the second largest export commodity. Products such as copra, nutmeg, mace,

crocodile skins and copal were exported to Singapore and the Netherlands, about 3,986 tons in total with a value of US\$788 thousand.

As a response to the widespread Indonesian rebellion against colonial rule in 1926, the Dutch instituted a policy of internal exile. They created a new settlement in West New Guinea, known as Tanah Merah (“red earth”) to house exiled Indonesians. The settlement served to establish an Indonesian presence in New Guinea. When the Netherlands surrendered its colonies to Japan in 1942, the Dutch forced Indonesians from Tanah Merah onto steamers headed to Australia, where they were imprisoned by the Australian government (Osborne 1985: 9-10).

When the Dutch fled West New Guinea, they did not leave behind much of an administrative infrastructure. The majority of the island’s inland areas were in contact only with churches and missionary projects, which were scattered throughout the region. Japan saw itself as the liberator of the region from the control of white imperialists, yet sought to impose its own sovereignty over the West Papuans. The Japanese were faced with voices of West Papuan dissent left over from Dutch rule, including the Koreri movement that had developed in Biak. (Biak is a small island off the north coast of West Papua. It is considered a region of West Papua.)

The movement was based on a belief that a powerful spiritual figure would come and liberate the Papuans from oppression. (Carmel 1988). In response to the Koreri movement and the small, armed resistance to Japanese domination, Japanese officials arrested, tortured, and killed suspected members of the movement and ordered entire villages to be relocated. West Papuan resistance and Japanese retaliation continued until the liberation of the region by American-led forces in August 1944.

Wind of Change

After Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the Dutch administration gradually returned to West New Guinea. In the meantime, a separate independence movement had been

brewing in neighboring Indonesia. The Body for Researching Indonesian Independence (BPKI), an organization formed under the Japanese and held two meetings in July 1945 to discuss the possibility and the implications of Indonesian independence, including the question of which territories would be part of the new state. The majority of the delegates supported an independent Indonesia that would include all of the Dutch Indies and West New Guinea. When Indonesian nationalists declared independence on August 17, 1945, their account of Indonesia included the territory of West New Guinea (Chauvel 2004).

On their return to their colonial possessions the Dutch were faced with a political task, that of preventing West Papua from being incorporated into Indonesia. This was a battle that was fought at an international level in the United Nations General Assembly and at the local by engaging in a program of nation building, by Dutch missionaries. It was also as fear of the Indonesian communist threat grew among the Western countries, the Dutch promised to bring West New Guinea into the modern world by educating and training the indigenous Papuans to govern the country.

In this context, the Dutch subsequently attempt to carve off Papua from the emergent Indonesian state, could be first, the Netherlands hopes to retain its presence in the region. Second, Papua's population, the Netherlands felt, had little or nothing in common with the Malay-related peoples of Indonesia. Third, Papua's predominantly Christian population tugged at the heartstrings of a powerful domestic constituency back in the Netherlands. Fourth, the Netherlands, having failed in Indonesia with '300 years of whip and club', was eager to revive its reputation through a more enlightened decolonization of Papua (Hastings 1996:211). Fifth, the Netherlands thought that Papua would be a good home for Dutch and Eurasian settlers. And sixth, there was a general perception that Indonesia could not manage this difficult territory.

From 1949 onwards, the Dutch attempted to achieve some sort of Papuan unity in the territory through administration, Schools, and churches. The process of creating a Papuan nation was cast into the mould of Western-Christian institutions and ideologies.

Christianity came, consequently, to be assumed as a distinctive, 'nationalist' marker of 'Papuan-ness' against an Islamic Indonesia. By the 1950s, the Dutch began the process of Papuan nation building. In this context, it will be interesting to see the religious dichotomy between Christians and Muslims regarding the Papuan nationalism by drawing into the 'ethnic dimension'. The pro-Dutch group in 1950 founded the Gerakam Persatuan Nieuw Guinea, or New Guinea Unity Movement in opposition to the pro-Indonesia party Partai Kemerdekaan, or Indonesian Freedom Party for Irian, founded in 1946. The party's program was the creation of an Independent Papua with the help of the Dutch (Lagerberg and Jaren, 1975: 85). Therefore, it is clear that political consciousness came to be clearly articulated in the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. On the other side, the Dutch policies towards West Papua also changed.

Van der veur precisely notes this changed attitudes of the Dutch by dividing Dutch colonial policy of the post-war period 1950-1962 into two distinct phases: the first phase, between 1950 and 1960, is represented by what he defines as 'neo-colonialism' and a second shorter phase from 1959 to 1962 of "terminal colonial democracy" (Veur 1972: 60). According to Van der veur the processes of nation-building were guided by Dutch neo-colonial interests and that the Papuan nation that emerged was a mere artificial construction of neo-colonial policies. Colonial administration and mission activity tended to complement each other in the enterprise of nation building re-creating that indissoluble 'connubial bliss' between the flag and the cross that has always accompanied the construction of colonial societies (Ibid).

As part of the policy, the Dutch missionaries returned to West Papua with the task of preparing the Papuan Church for independence. The key word was not restauratie, but reconstructive, not 'restoration' but 'reconstruction' (Hoekendijk and Zending 1946: 7). In order to reconstruct it was necessary to destruct or de-construct what was existed, until then during the colonial period. The post-war paradigm shift of Dutch policy towards West Papua involved the destruction of the colonial society of the pre-war years in order to create a new society in tune with the demands and needs of neo-colonialism. This

position called for the 'erasure' of Papuan ethnic identity forged during the colonial era and the formation of a new 'national' identity in which the constitutive trait of 'ethnicity' could have functioned as an anti-Indonesian value. This process of reconstruction could only be attained through the implementation of an ad hoc education system (Rizzo and Susanna 2004:317).

Education was the main focus of mission activity in post-war Papua since it was believed that through education it was possible to create an elite capable of governing the country. Van baal, who was governor in West Papua from 1953 to 1958, argued, that 'education is the most important tool for the advancement of acculturation' (Van 1960:119). The education system was managed by Christian missions, so that, as the Australian missionary Roscoe, who was touring West Papua in the late 1950s, reports: "every school in Netherlands New Guinea is Mission school" (Roscoe 1959:39).

Furthermore, the Report on Netherlands New Guinea of 1961 indicates that there were 496 unsubsidized mission schools with 20,000 pupils where the content of teaching was almost exclusively religious. The missions also ran the 776 subsidized primary schools with 45,000 pupils in which religious contents did not figure prominently (Garnaut and Manning C 1974: 16-17). More over many students who were also attending secondary schools were offered technical and vocational subjects for example, farming, fishing and motor mechanics. According to McGibbon the Dutch educated Papuan basically aimed to establish pan-Papuan leadership in order to combat the nationalist propaganda of President Sukarno in the early 1960s (McGibbon 2004).

Literacy programs were mainly focus on the reading of the Bible, the textbook, moreover the schools often shared with the Church building. Therefore, it was difficult to differentiate between the religious and secular spheres of modernity and hard to explain, the character of nationalist ideologies and movement in decolonizing realities. In addition, administratively the school system depended on the government. Each of the major mission denominations appointed a General School Manager whose salary Dutch

government paid. In this backdrop, Roscoe observed that the Dutch recognized the different educational needs of the children living in urban areas and those who lived in rural settings. Since the ethnic make-up of urban areas was rather composite the primary schools were divided into two distinct categories, a Primary A for children who spoke Dutch at home and a Primary B for those who spoke either Malay or Chinese (Roscoe 1959:40). Following the completion of primary schooling, they attended the Intermediate School or MULO in which denominational divisions tended to disappear.

Secondary education was meant for a very small group of Papuans selected and properly trained to be the future political elite of an independent West Papua. Papuans were attending the single secondary school in the territory and 95 Papuans were studying abroad¹. In almost all the schools, but in particular in rural or village settings, teaching was initially in Malay since it was carried out by a native guru, who was either Papuan or Indonesian. It appeared that the spread of Western and Christian values was the fundamental aim of the Dutch educational system, and the issue regarding the 'creation' or 'choice' of a national language was poorly addressed in the nation-building process (Rizzo and Susanna 2004:321).

Conflicting Goals for West Papua.

Implementation of programs and educational institutions were an important problem faced by the Dutch. In sum, the international climate, once again, affected this specific sector of Papuan development. Van Baal effectively illustrated the risks involved in implementing an educational program unmatched by socio-economic development:

When education is far ahead of economic development, young people leaving school will not succeed in finding work where they can apply the knowledge they have gathered. They have to be content with poorly paid jobs. Socially the disappointment experienced by these young people is a serious drawback, eventually big enough to create a class of unemployed or underemployed semi-intellectuals (Van Baal 1960:119).

¹ Report on Netherlands New Guinea 1961:101-103

As part of nation- building process immediately preceding and following years of the Second World War a series of socio-economic changes had begun to take place. Literacy programs were incorporated with programs aiming at socio-economic development and at the improvement in the quality of life of Papuan communities as 'mobile' health system and hygiene programs the Dutch set up to fight endemic diseases. Doctors and nurses travelled every two to three weeks to visit remote villages, although in some villages there were local nurses who had received basic training, as did also the district officers (controleurs), agricultural extension officers (landbouw ambtenaren) and police commanders (Rudy de Jongh, Private Communication, 28 September 2003.) The administration believed, in fact, the improvement of socio-economic condition and literacy programs should have been simultaneously implemented in order to warn off the risk of a spread of communist ideologies which were developed in the pro-Indonesian movements and the emerging political parties (Ricklefs 2008: 270-271).

The motivation behind the formation of political parties after the World War Two had a social motivation more than being dictated by genuine nationalist aspirations. The social and racial discrimination experienced by the Papuans vis a vis the Indo-Europeans colonists to in Manokwari and the land settlement disputes in Merauke, force the Papuans to address socio-economic issues (Rizzo and Susanna 2004:325) Social tensions seem to have characterized the post-war situation in West Papuan (Lagerberg 1979:68-69).

In politics, political party's ideologies in West Papua (Papua) had different origins and aims. Some focused on local issues and concerns and others reflected missionary influences by endorsing, for instance, ideas regarding 'God's sovereignty' or 'peace against violence'. Few presented themselves as anti-communist who believed that independence could have been achieved through an alliance with the Dutch even going as far as adopting the Dutch language as their 'national' idiom (Lagerberg and Jaren 1979:228-232). Van der Kroef notes:

Despite such seemingly opposing emphasis, a Papuan self-perception in terms of what perhaps may simply be called 'development minded' clearly emerges as a common suggestion in these party programs, along with a search for a Papuan national identity, not just anti-Indonesian, but also reaching out beyond the cocoon of Dutch colonialism. (Van der 1979:111.)

Meanwhile anti-Indonesian sentiments implanted by colonial propaganda were growing and spreading social consciousness. Further, dissatisfaction generated by that social phenomenon (Stouffer 1949) was increasing proportionately. In 1950, a strike of waterfront workers in Hollandia brought to a standstill the Dutch oil company operating in the area. Ten years later, in Hollandia caused the outbreak of violent street manifestations and strikes (Lagerberg 1979:69). The episodes reported by Lagerberg show not only that the situation of socio-economic tension persisted during all the 1950s but also that was aggravated by the anti-Indonesian policies implemented and that inevitably affected the process of Papuan nation building. Van Baal tried to address the widespread socio-economic dissatisfaction generated by the failure of the project by establishing the Blitung-farms, a system based on the cultivation of cash crops in which the Papuans able to make a personal profit (Lagerberg and Jaren, 1979:124-128).

Furthermore, the Dutch designed a national economic system by cutting off all previously established commercial ties with the territorial that had become part of Indonesia and reoriented Papuan trade towards other areas, such as The Netherlands and Singapore. The ties with Maluku were also severed (Rizzo and Susanna 2004:327). Van Eechoud, from the very beginning, had declared the necessity to abandon the treatment of West Papua as extension of Maluku. The detailed plan that he presented in 1947 to the Batavian Government was formulated on this important premise (Klein 1947:178-187). This, of course, caused anger among the southern Moluccans who had always considered West Papua as their 'backyard' or private reserve. In their own program of national independence West Papua was to be part of either a Moluccan Commonwealth, comprising North and South Moluccas and New Guinea, or of the Republic Maluku Selatan or Republic of South Moluccas. The Muslim raja Sialana of Morella (Ambon) is said to have declared in 1947:

Concerning the economic problem, I feel it is very necessary that New Guinea become part of our area here, because previously it was included in our residency. With New Guinea I am convinced that we here need not in the future be scared of rich European countries or Indonesia, even though we withdraw from East Indonesia and become a nation ourselves, because in New Guinea there is a great deal of gold, silver, oil, coal and also fertile land for an expanding economy (Chauvel 2003:239-240).

The Dutch poured millions of guilders into the economic development of West Papua and in the establishment of Western institutions such as schools, hospitals, administrative offices. And the Dutch expenditure particularly affected, the urban and industrial centres of Hollandia, Manokwari, Merauke Biak and Sorong.² In 1962 Lagerberg reports that the government budget amounted to 142 million guilders and the Dutch grant in aid 101 million. The European Economic Community (EEC) granted 133 million guilders for the development program over the whole period of Dutch rule, while West Papua's own share of the budget was, in 1961, 37 million guilders (Lagerberg 1979:106).

Furthermore, the government was trying to regulate the influx of migrants to the region. By 1959 it was estimated that 21,965 Papuans were living in the major urban centres of Hollandia, Manokwari, Biak, Sorong and Fak-FaK along with 15,190 Europeans and 9,806 Asians. Foreign presence appears to have increased eight fold if one compares these same estimates with those of 1930 in the same areas (Lagerberg and Jaren, 1979:55-58). As a result, xenophobic attitudes among the Papuans had begun to emerge, as the newcomers were perceived to be 'economic competitors'. In this context, Van Eechoud had clearly expressed his reservations and concerns regarding the immigration of Dutch settlers to West Papua in a letter to de Bruyn:

I must admit that I am not very enthusiastic in New Guinea of Europeans from Holland. In the first place I doubt it will be successful. Further it seems to me that the import of Europeans will sow the seed of future conflict. (Derix 1987: 165-166.)

² Report on Netherlands New Guinea' years 1950-1961. Department Perdagangan Jayapura.

Among the Muyu of the Merauke region, for instance, Christianity and western capitalism came to be integrated into the traditional expectations of wealth and prosperity. (Schoorl and Kultuur 1957:270). The Kuram movement that took place in the 1950s displayed xenophobic and pro-nationalist sentiments.

Xenophobic attitudes were directed in particular against the Indonesians and the Chinese who were resented because they were believed to be destroying and obstructing Muyu's social mobility and economic growth with their presence (Power 1955:252-253). Among the Muju and anti-Indonesian feeling which reached its peak in the aftermath of World War Two when the United States increased the pressure on the Dutch to hand the territory to Indonesia. De Jongh noticed that the Muju's attitude towards the Indonesians was in stark contrast to that of the nearby Asmat where he was stationed in 1962: the Muju were, in fact, more educated and had greater access to means of information, such as transistor radios, than the Asmat who appeared to be more indifferent to the takeover (De Jongh 2003).

It seemed clear that the Dutch policy of Papuan nation-building aimed at antagonizing Indonesia's claims over the territory. There was a widespread conviction among Dutch policy makers that this goal could be achieved only stressing Papuan distinctiveness. The Bot plan set up at the end of 1950s aimed, consequently, at the 'Papuanisation' of the public administration and at the political development for the attainment of self-determination and independence of West Papua as part of a wider Melanesian entity (Chauvel 2003:29-31).

Furthermore, the nation-building project tended to introduce cultural elements and values opposing to the Indonesian ones. 'Papuaness' and Papuanisation, which figured prominently in van Eechoud's program of nation-building, in reality meant christianisation and westernization, a method that was clearly marked during Van Baal's governorship and expressed in his statement that "education must bring them at least something of the elementary fundamentals of Western secular success" (Van Baa

1960:119). In case the nation-building program served the neo-colonial interests of the Dutch, it is also served international ones. Ironically, it would be the fear of communism that would decide the fate of West Papua in 1962. (Lagerberg 1979: 87).

Conclusion

The Indonesian nationalism was born out of a long history of struggle against the colonial rule. It was clearly manifested in self-defined collectivity and the unified power derived from specific solidarity; a sense of unity of all Indonesian people beyond religious affiliation, ethnic, race and fixed island boundaries (Elson 2008:8-21). Indeed, local cultures which signified feudalism and primitiveness, had been abandoned in the quest for modernity. The essentials of cultural diversity and religious tolerance were also articulated in the five principles known as Panca Sila. The Indonesian nation-state provided their people with an 'organizational culture' and 'political institution', which tried to enriched meaningful ways of life in all aspects of human activities. Thus more precisely the government with its power and authority creates, recreates and invents history by connecting meaning to concrete monuments, sites, landscapes and intangible-national history, language, etc. Thus as a single harmonious nation imagination was clearly seen in the mainstream nationalist works and the Indonesian state's effort to reinvent Sriwijaya and Majapahit Kingdom.

The relationship between Indonesia and West Papua province political condition has been subject to debate when the Dutch retained West Papua the rest of the East Indies gained independence as the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, West Papuan nationalism is a product of colonial rule, first by the Netherlands and then by Indonesia. It developed within a colony with boundaries drawn by colonial interest. West Papua provides a good example for the argument that nations are imagined and constructed in modern times. Moreover, the Indonesian presence has made West Papuans far more conscious of themselves as Melanesian.

Chapter III

Indonesia Nation-Building Project Versus Papuan's Ethnic Separatism

INDONESIA NATION-BUILDING PROJECT VERSUS PAPUAN'S ETHNIC SEPARATISM

'A world of nations cannot exist, only a world where some potentially national groups, in claiming this status, exclude others from making similar claims, which, as it happens, not many of them do' (Hobsbawme 1990: 78). The qualification Hobsbawm added to his generalization is still applicable', in the context of Indonesia' perhaps, even though the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, then at hand, has come about. A world of states exists, banally seen as nation-states, but many of them contain more than one potential nation. The 'forcible marginalization of many who were supposed to have shared in the fruits of liberation' was a 'standard outcome' of anti-colonial nationalism in 'artificial state frameworks'. Partha Chatterjee suggests '[O]ne nation's independence may be the beginning of another nation's oppression', as Wiebe describes it (Wiebe1993:167).

1. The Period 1945–1949

The Dutch occupied Indonesia for almost three hundred and fifty years, starting with its presence in 1600 and lasting until 1942. Japanese ended Dutch rule and occupied Indonesia for three years. After Japan surrendered in 1945, the Dutch tried to reoccupy Indonesia. However, on August 17, 1945, Indonesia proclaimed an independent republic. Dutch objectives clashed with Indonesia's passions to be independent, resulting in three years of war throughout the country. Indonesia's independence was recognized after Netherland surrendered their sovereignty over Indonesia and at the same time, recognized by international community in the Round Table agreement in December 1949 in Den Haag, Netherlands.

2. The Period 1950–1960

Papua was the first region of the Netherlands Indies, liberated from Japanese in 1944 by the Americans led Allies forces and the territory remained under the Netherlands military control throughout Indonesia's struggle for independence. Even though, in 1949, the

Dutch agreed to Indonesian independence but held on to West Papua. Nevertheless, there were a number of revolts against the Dutch authorities in Hollandia (later Jayapura) in 1945-7 and in Biak in 1948. They hoped to build what one parliamentarian called "a model state in Southeast Asia which would stand out like a lighthouse above the decayed area around it" (Lijpardt 1966:167).

Therefore, the years after 1949 left three main legacies. First, they were dominated by an escalating international struggle between Indonesia and the Netherlands over who had the right to sovereignty over West New Guinea. Certainly, Papuan nationalists were forced increasingly to choose one side or the other. Both streams of Papuan nationalism faced rejection by their patrons in 1956. The *kaum kanan*, working for increased local control under Dutch tutelage, protested bitterly when the Dutch Reformed Church suggested talks with Indonesia over the future of West Papua (Kaisiepo 1956). Indonesia, meanwhile, rejected the declaration of an autonomous province of West Irian (West Papua) by Silas Papare, who like most of the *kaum kiri* had fled into Indonesian exile, in favour of an "autonomous province" headed by the Sultan of Tidore. Second, the leading voices of Papuan nationalism were highly offshoot, taking on the language and style of their respective groups. Third, the discourse of race began to play an increasingly important role. Challenged to justify continued colonial rule over one part of their old empire when the rest was now an independent country, the Dutch optioned to the argument of racial difference, insisting that Indonesians were Asian and the people of New Guinea were dark-skinned, curly-haired Melanesians. On the other hand, Indonesian leaders protested that Indonesia contained a spectrum of ethnic groups and was not a racially defined state. In this context, Gouda notes that the Dutch discourse of race had a long history and was pushed into tune-up in an international political battle to justify their arguments (Gouda 1995:118-56).

Several bilateral meetings between the two countries in order to settle problems peacefully marked the period between 1950-1960. Notably, there were at least three official conferences which focused on solving the dispute over West Papua. The first

conference in April 1950 followed by a second conference in December 1950, and a third a year later, in December 1951¹.

However, all the official efforts and all the conferences failed, because the Dutch wanted to maintain their presence in West Papua, something that the Indonesian government saw as more or less a continuation of Dutch colonial rule over Indonesian territory. To settle the dispute peacefully the Indonesian government decided to bring the problem to the United Nations, where the UN General Assembly formally addressed it in its ninth session, in 1954². Unfortunately, no resolution was issued regarding this matter. In the meanwhile, the domestic political situation in Indonesia was highlighted overwhelmingly by anti-Dutch sentiment, which was fueled by a Dutch decision in 1960 to send an aircraft carrier into West Papuan waters.

In 1960 the Dutch announced a ten-year plan for local control and the ground of the debate on West Papua shifted from colonialism versus liberation to a question of whether West Papua would gain independence as part of Indonesia or as an independent state. This included a "Papuanization" programme that saw locals holding three-quarters of administrative posts by 1962, slated to hit 95 percent by 1970 (Savage 198:22). A new nationalist movement free of pro-Dutch or pro-Indonesian sentiments emerged in this period in the context of Indonesian-Dutch struggle. The Papuan elite, promised progress towards independence began to force the pace of decolonization.

As part of decolonization, in February 1961, the Dutch held elections for the West New Guinea Council, a representative body planned to encourage the establishment of a Papuan political elite that would eventually govern the region after Dutch withdrawal (Saltford:2003). In this election Papuans won 22 of the 28 seats and Nicolaas Jouwe and Markus Kaisiepo of the kaum kanan shared vice-presidential duties (Papuan membership Council 1960). With this governing body in place, the Dutch government formally proposed the "Luns Plan" to the U.N. General Assembly. The plan called for a

¹ [http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJAbok/Irja RightFrame.htm](http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJAbok/Irja%20RightFrame.htm)

² [http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJAbok/Irja RightFrame.htm](http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJAbok/Irja%20RightFrame.htm)

termination of Dutch sovereignty followed by a U.N. administration and the establishment of an international study commission that would supervise the administration and organize a plebiscite to determine the territory's status (Osborne 1985:14-15). On December 1, 1961, the Council agreed on the name of West Papua for their new nation, created a national anthem, and adopted the Morning Star Flag. On that day, the *Bintang Kejora* (Morning Star) flag was raised at the Imbi Square in Jayapura, West Papua's capital, and the 'Hai Tanahku Papua' sung for the first time as West Papua's national anthem. This historic ceremony took place outside the New Guinea Council, which had been established earlier that year as the first West Papua-wide representative institution and as an initial step in the complicated process of decolonization that visualized the establishment of an independent West Papuan nation-state.

Nonetheless, the basis of the nation was unclear. If it had been defined as "not Indonesian," that suggested moves to federation with other Melanesian areas (the path that was indeed preferred by some of the most pro-Dutch leaders, such as Jouwe, and indeed by the Dutch themselves) (Jouwe 1978). The idea of a Melanesian Federation, however was eventually fixed by Australia, which had previously advanced the idea. There were extensive efforts to use "race" as part of identity formation and this was also asserted internationally. Papuan leaders reached out to African states and black organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) as part of a global anti-colonial quest based on skin colour and the assertion "Dutch New Guinea is New Africa" (Justus and Kroef 1979: 107-108).

In this backdrop, the Indonesian government responded critically to these developments and eventually launched the Mandala military operation, with its famous rhetoric of the so-called People's Three Commands:

- To prevent the formation of a puppet state of West Papua by a colonial power;
- To raise the Indonesian red and white flag in West Papua; and
- To prepare a general mobilization to defend national independence and unity³.

³ <http://www.indonesiamissionny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJAbok/IrjaRightFrame.htm>

As resulted, the relations between the two countries sharply deteriorated, especially after limited armed conflicts occurred both in West Papuan waters and on land. It seemed that, at this point of time, military confrontation between the two countries was unavoidable.

At the same time, the international community, particularly the United Nations, the United States, Australia, and some of the non-aligned countries, urged both countries to settle the dispute diplomatically and peacefully. Equally important was the Cold War situation, which triggered fear in Washington regarding the future of Indonesia, especially considering the existence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the largest communist party outside the USSR and China. During this period, Indonesia had very close relations with the USSR, something the United States was not comfortable and tried to disrupt. Thus, it was important for the United States to approach West Papua's problem diplomatically, instead of causing a military confrontation between the Dutch and Indonesia, which had the Soviet Union as its back-up (Elmslie 2002: 12). As a result, U.S. President John F. Kennedy took on the role of negotiating a peace accord between the Dutch and the Indonesians (the Bunker Plan Negotiations).

In the processes, the two parties under the auspices of the United Nations signed the Bunker negotiation culminated in the New York Agreement on August 15, 1962. However, it is important to note that no West Papuan representatives participated in the agreement. By New York Agreement terms, the two countries agreed to transfer the administration of West Papua from the Netherlands to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). The period for the UNTEA would be from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, followed by Indonesian control, with the agreement that an 'Act of Free Choice' would be held within five years (Elmslie 2002:12). According to the plan, UNTEA took control of West Papua in October 1962.

Bunker Plan and the New York Agreement

No doubt, the Papuans' exclusion from the decisions on West Papua's future was not for lack of effort. For their part on February 16, 1962, the New Guinea Council held a debate on the issue of self-determination. Two of the leading speakers, Tanggahma and Bonay, both asserted Papuan's right of self-determination, but they differed on the means. Tanggahma argued in favor of leaving Indonesia out, while Bonay said that Indonesia should be included in the discussions. Tanggahma advocated a continued Dutch administration leading to self-determination. Integration with Indonesia was undesirable, an association with Australian New Guinea would be possible only when both halves of the island were independent, and a long-term association with the Netherlands was not possible because the world considered it colonialism. Therefore, the only option was continued Dutch administration leading to self-determination. For his part, Bonay argued for a tripartite conference involving the Papuans, the Netherlands, and Indonesia. He felt that Papua would never be able to exercise its right to self-determination as long as there was still a dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Therefore, it was only possible to resolve the conflict if Indonesia were included in the discussions⁴.

More precisely the Papuans continued to be left out of the high-level discussions, taking place among the governments of the United States, Indonesia, and the Netherlands, that were leading to the resolution of the West New Guinea dispute. However, without any decision making power the Papuans could only observe from a distance and send protest telegrams, petitions, and resolutions to those in Washington, Jakarta, and Hague who were determining their fate. Papuan nationalists were particularly critical of the American intervention, especially the role of US Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who was sent to Jakarta and Hague to encourage the parties to the negotiation table⁵.

⁴ Telegram 3131, February 16, 1962

⁵ Monthly Reports, April 1962

Papuan Responses to the New York Agreement:

Papuans reactions to the New York Agreement had two major differences- one who supported and others who rejected. Some expressed a willingness to accommodate at least temporarily to an Indonesian prospect others articulated rejection and feelings of betrayal. There was also discussion of possible assertion of independence. The New Guinea Council building became a focus for large and well-organized demonstrations against the agreement. First, on such demonstration, Markus Kaisiepo condemned the agreement by saying, "We were traded as goats by the Americans." He agreed with the PARNA leader, Bonay, that the time had passed for Papuans to support Dutch policy. Now the Dutch must support the Papuans⁶. In a later memoir, Bonay recalled two of the chants at the demonstration: "How many dollars for Papua, Yankee," and "We Papuans want freedom, not Soekarno (Sukarno)" (Bonay 1980: 5).

Furthermore, in responses to the New York Agreement, a National Congress was held in mid-September 1962 to discuss how to secure the Papuan national aspirations while reaching some accommodation with the incoming Indonesian administration⁷. Zacharias Sawor, a Dutch educated Papuan agricultural official recalled that the majority of the Congress wanted the plebiscite to be held, while the UNTEA troops were present in order to ensure a proper vote (Sawor 1969: 83–84).

On the other hand, others seemed to realize that this was no longer possible, and that the 1969 plebiscite would have to be the next objective of the national struggle. Such was the argument of Tanggahma, who said:

We must give Indonesia no chance to destroy our aspirations. Jakarta would get the opportunity if Papuans were disruptive. Therefore, I will urge people to maintain law and order. Papuans must strengthen themselves in order to sustain and preserve their nationalist sentiments until the plebiscite. To this end, Papuans must organize themselves in large parties with the same objective: Independence in 1969 (Nieuw Guinea Koerier, 24-8-62).

⁶ Nieuw Guinea Koerier, August 11, 1962.

⁷ Nieuw Guinea Koerier, September 21, 1962

The Exiles' Campaign for Self-Determination

Several of the most senior Papuan politicians left Papua with the Dutch at the end of 1962. Two of the most significant were Nicholaas Jouwe and Markus Kaisiepo, who established the "Freedom Committee of West Papua/West New Guinea" while in exile (Chauvel 2005:33). From their base in the Netherlands, Jouwe and Kaisiepo attempted to mobilize support for the Papuan cause and sustained a lobbying campaign with governments and at the UN for the just and proper implementation of the "Act of Free Choice" (Ibid). They also maintained some communication with supporters in West Papua and accepted them as the movement's leaders. In November 1962, for example, Jouwe wrote to President Kennedy to express Papuans' opposition to the New York Agreement because not only Papuans were excluded from the negotiations, but also because Indonesia had shown that it was ignoring its international obligations (Ibid). According to Jouwe, Papuans were concerned about their future, fearing that Indonesia's increasing military power meant that Papua's chances of independence were threatened (Jouwe 21 Nov. 1962:84).

Jouwe sought Kennedy's support for realization of Papua's right of self-determination before 1969 and, if Papua should proclaim its independence, the US's recognition and protection. In return, Jouwe promised that an independent Papua would join SEATO. As a "free nation" and as a Christian people, he said, Papuans could not be "neutral between good and evil or between the free and communist world" (Jouwe 21 Nov. 1962:84).

Jouwe was also aware of the 1963–64 campaign of Indonesia's Information Minister, Ruslan Abdulgani, to undermine the "Act of Free Choice." The campaign concluded in the Proclamation of May 16, 1964, read to the province's representative council by West Irian's (West Papua's) first Governor, the Papuan E. J. Bonay, which summarized the second of the above propositions. Jouwe states that, this proclamation not only expressed pro-Indonesian sentiment but was drafted by the Indonesian government itself. Jouwe argued that this Proclamation and the earlier statements by Papuan leaders reflected the Indonesian government's view that Papua's right of self-

determination and the entire New York Agreement no longer existed. The abolition in 1963 of the elected New Guinea Council, and its replacement by another council whose members were all appointed by the government, and the termination of seven Papuan political parties in December 1963 were all actions contrary to the spirit of the New York Agreement (Jouwe 20 Nov. 1964).

Jouwe also asserted that Indonesia had no intention of permitting Papuans to exercise their right of self-determination freely, citing Acting President Suharto's 1967 Independence Day speech, in which Suharto stated that the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969 would be an opportunity for the people of West Irian (West Papua) to affirm their decision to remain part of the Indonesian nation. In his letter, Jouwe appealed to the Secretary General to guarantee Papuans' rights as provided for in the New York Agreement, as therein lies "our only chance of being liberated from the unbearable mismanagement of Indonesia (Jouwe 1967).

Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)

By the onset of Indonesian rule over the province, small pockets of armed resistance emerged under the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) (Djopari 1993). Founded by Arfak leader Johan Ariks, a veteran nationalist associated with the kaum kanan, the OPM spread quickly under independent local leaders drawn mostly from the old elite and the Dutch-trained Papuan Volunteer Corps. In fact, the name may have been invented by Indonesian army intelligence to describe distinct bands (Djopari 1995). The OPM is the central vehicle of inspiring West Papuan nationalism. All the leaders of local guerrilla actions have claimed to be part of it. Such as, all who have been politically active and in exiles in Western Europe, Africa and the Pacific. Rebellions have been waged under its banner in a way that has involved people of every major ethnic group. Moreover, in the opinion of General Surodiraja, it continues to attract able, educated members of the younger generation as its leaders, as well as wide support in the general population (Surodiraja 1985: 34-44). Its members' have skill with bows and arrows, it has disputed logging, oil, and copper mining operations, attacked transmigration settlements, and

forced administrators and police to flee from many isolated posts. Its units have mounted ambushes on numerous occasions, sometimes forcing Indonesian authorities to negotiate with them to have hostages released⁸.

On the other hand, its military activities have remained small scale. Its stock of modern weapons is very tiny. It has evidently had little success in seizing arms from its enemy. No doubt, its importance is less military than symbolic, "We are all OPM," remains a common saying. A Papuan joins the OPM not by signing a membership card, but simply by taking up arms and calling himself OPM. The OPM (Free Papua Movement) staged anti-Indonesia guerrilla warfare and continues to be the main armed resistance organization in West Papua. OPM was and is still seeking an absolute separation of West Papua from the Republic of Indonesia. For many decades, the Indonesian military has undertaken successive military operations to quell the West Papuan rebellion, resulting in widespread abuses of human rights, such as arbitrary killings, rape, torture, and intimidation (Sukma 2005:7).

One of the classic examples, in 1981, the Indonesian military launched Operation Clean Sweep, which sought to undermine support for the Papuan resistance by persecuting relatives of OPM members. In this operation Indonesian Soldiers raped, assaulted, and killed the wives of known rebels and sacked villages suspected of lending support to the OPM. Papuan survivors reported that brutal murders had happened in the Jayapura district, claiming that whole families had been pierced to death and their bodies left to rot (Osborne 1985). Operation Clean Sweep actually aimed both to intimidate those suspected of supporting the OPM and to cleanse the border regions of Papuans to make room for Javanese migrants. This objective was suggested by the army's slogan: "Let the rats run into the jungle so that the chickens can breed in the coop" (Osborne 1985:87).

⁸ Kompas Jakarta, November 22, 1977

Lands which were emptied by Operation Clean Sweep, then converted into transmigration areas and soon populated by settlers from Java or elsewhere in Indonesia (Budiardjo & Liong 1986:81).

A 1984 report by Amnesty International noted that the Indonesian army and police often arrested and detained anyone suspected of OPM involvement, especially after nationalist incidents such as the raising of the West Papuan flag (Budiardjo & Liong 1986). Military personnel arrested and detained people without warrant and for indefinite periods of time (Budiardjo & Liong 1986: 46). While most detained West Papuans were never formally charged or tried, those who were brought to court were unlikely to receive a fair trial. Amnesty noted, however, that information about extrajudicial killings “is often scanty and difficult to verify, given the limited access to West Papua by independent observers and the restrictions on press freedom in Indonesia more generally” (Budiardjo & Liong 21Jan. 1987). Such restrictions by the Indonesian government served to block international scrutiny.

Politics of Indonesianization, Centralizing Nationalism and Civilizing Mission

Mainstream nationalism in late twentieth century Indonesia was not free from confrontations. There were ‘sub-nationalisms’ and unsuccessful’ nationalisms, some of which were and still seeking independent statehood, for example, West Papua. Thus, Independent Indonesia faced regional opposition in the early postwar decades, and still continue to face. Therefore, as an essential components of Indonesian’s government process of nation building. The New Order regime of Suharto claimed that national development could only be attained through the strengthening of unity and consistency that required a strong and centralized state, strengthen by the military and politics of support. Modernization theory has been widely applied in research on the links between ethnicity, development and democracy (Lipset 1959). Modernization theorists argue that developing countries need an authoritarian political system where power is concentrated to ensure rapid economic growth and the creation of conditions that will eventually help promote the consolidation of democracy (Huntington, 1991). This strong state would face

little resistance from social groups within society and in the political arena, like trade unions, opposition parties and non-governmental organizations, allowing the government to implement economic policies that would facilitate rapid development. Economic progress would contribute to the rise of a new, economically independent middle class whose doorstep for autocratic rule would diminish. This new middle class, highly educated, well informed and independent economically, would ultimately come to value democratic principles that would serve to force them to act as the forerunner to dismantle the strong state. The democratic value that they would seek to include the right to free media, within the limitations of the law, against government policies they identify to be unjust (Huntington 1991).

In this light, policies were formulated in the centre and imposed on the periphery, which meant that all political and economic aspects were tightly controlled by the centre. However, the centralized system of government predominantly served the political and economic interests of the centre, particularly the few members of the power elite. Centralization, which became the politics of uniformity rather than unity, soon undermined local institutions and local identity (Trajano 2010: 17-18).

Since Indonesia took possession of West Papua, a bonfire of Papuan flags was one of the new regime's first acts (Anti-Slavery Society 1990:31). Of course, UNTEA was the first to ban the papua flag. Before the arrival of the UNTEA forces, various Indonesian commanders who claimed that they had liberated West Papua (or West Irian) asserted their rule over the locals through military force. Even after the arrival of UNTEA's security force, about 1500 Indonesian commandos remained in West Papua, actually to assist the local police. Instead, they engaged in harsh tactics to curb Papuan nationalist sentiment, including mass arrests and sometimes torture. At the same time, the Indonesians exploited the local economy, ordered the use of the Indonesian language as the mode of instruction in schools, and formulated plans for the emigration and settlement of 400,000 Javanese in West Papua (Osborne 1985:33-35).

UNTEA pulled out in May 1963, even though repeated requests by West Papuans for them to stay and protect Papuan rights. After UNTEA's departure, an armed struggle began between the Indonesian military and a pro-independence Papuan resistance movement known as the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM). Indonesian government responded by targeting civilians as well as OPM fighters. Killings, disappearances, torture, and rape of Papuans by government forces became common. In addition, the Indonesian government organized mass migrations from Java to West Papua, resettling hundreds of Indonesian families in the midst of the Papuan population.

Due to the increasing Javanized 'Guided Democracy' framework and rooted Indonesian discrimination against Papuans. Papuans had limited ability to actually make any inroads in the wider Indonesian setting. West Papuan elites realized that Indonesia would not be able to deliver a better life; in fact, it could hardly protect the newest province from the economic chaos surrounding Indonesia and was certainly not going to allow any form of local control (Osborne 1985:136).

Indonesian government tried something that the Dutch had never bothered about the actual administration of the interior West Papua. As resulted, the first foreign rule imposed on many Papuans was Indonesian. The Indonesian nationalists assumed that Papuans were seen as Indonesians still living in a more primitive time, and they are in need of development and modernization. They were liberated from Dutch colonialism, the next step was to liberate them from backwardness. In this light, Foreign Minister Subandrio once said that it was their task to "get them down out of the trees, even if we have to pull them down" (Osborne 1985:136).

It was this attitude that was reflected in the highlands during Operasi Koteka, the sarcastic Indonesian name for the penis-gourd worn by Dani men and many other highlanders, and its less-publicized counterpart Operasi Busana (Operation Wear Clothes). Wearing clothes was associated with being educated and progressive (berpakaian = berpendidikan dan maju). President Suharto symbolically handed 800,000 garments (roughly the indigenous population) to the provincial government. The

campaign to dress up the Dani was conducted in a notably brutal fashion by "civic action" teams from the army⁹.

The Indonesian government has sought to "civilize" Papuans to make them think, act, and look like Indonesians. Attempts at "Indonesianization," by banning traditional Papuan apparel, hampering traditional governance, as well as restricting cultural practices and symbols, have undermined the identity and dignity of the West Papuans (Bonay and McGrory 2004: 442).

In this background, Gietzelt highlighted that rather than being divided by such policy, tribes were being increasingly drawn together in a common defensive reaction to Jakarta rule. Even the school system designed to create a homogenized Indonesian identity had the effect of bringing West Papuans together across tribal divisions (Gietzelt 1989: 201-21).

Moreover, it is the hatred of the Papuans towards the Indonesians, whom they call a number of negative names. Amongst these are the Biak term *amberi*: people who 'speak sweetly but have evil intentions' (Osborne 1985b:5); and so *fuk*: 'circumcised ones' (Osborne 1985: 29). To the West Papuan, the average Javanese farmer is equated with both Indonesia's military rulers and local officials since they share an ethnic and religious identity (Caufield 1984: 27).

West Papuan nationalists believe that "Indonesianization" or "depapuanization" is what the Indonesian government has trying to do since 1963. Depapuanization is being implemented through the spreading of Pancasila, the history of the Indonesian revolution, Islam, and the Javanese culture. Several West Papuan scholars have cited the building of mosques in Christian dominated Papuan villages in which the Indonesian military, through its civic missions, provided material support to Papuan Muslims (Chauvel 2004: 53).

⁹ Australian Quarterly 1965:16

In order to protect themselves against Jakarta policy of Indonesianization, the Papuans had also constructed the symbols of Papuan nationalism and ready to be adopted more effectively. Jakarta, seeing the failure of its project in West Papua and the reality of a nationalism it had rejected as the work of Dutch stooges, announced in 1965 that it was cancelling the act of self-determination it had promised to the United Nations, in fact, for that reason Indonesia was leaving membership of the UN. Therefore, Papuans were forced to take up arms and waged war against Indonesian government since the international avenues cut off. The first rebellion against Indonesia was tribally based, the 1965 Arfak rising, which declared a free state of West Papua centred in Manokwari, which was a rebellion with echoes in all districts of West Papua (Ortiz Sanz 1969: 49-52).

On the other side, Indonesia saw it all as a Dutch "time bomb"¹⁰ and responded harshly. Such kind of military repression, resulted more converts to the nationalist cause. Gradually the members of the Papuan elite deserted from their acceptance of Indonesian rule, which had been conditioned on ultimate self-determination, to an oppositional position that still looked to 1969 as the year of deliverance.

As part of Indonesianization processes, Eliezer J. Bonay, the first governor of West Irian (West Papua) province, was fired after two years for being "unreliable" and then jailed for distributing pro-independence leaflets. In this episode, even one Member of Parliament sought UN mediation. In addition, Herman Woyoi's described the post-1963 Indonesian government as a racial state in which Papuans did not enjoy the same rights as other Indonesians. He further characterizes post-1963 West Papua as a "colonial territory" of Indonesia (Alua 2002a:63).

Moreover, Papuans were never given the opportunity to be integrated into the administration either at provincial or national levels. Herman Woyoi further argued that no Papuans were appointed as Ministers or as senior officials in central government departments (Woyoi 1999) nor were Papuans ever appointed to positions as governor or

¹⁰ Indonesia, Department of Information, Jakarta, 1976

other senior officials in provinces elsewhere in Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesians from Aceh to Maluku flooded into Papua to assume positions that had previously been held by Papuans. From the lowest to the most senior levels of the bureaucracy, Papuan officials were excluded from the administration and “became observers and foreigners in their own country” (Wayoi 1999).

The 1969 Act of Free Choice

After Sukarno was overthrown, however, the new regime, under General Suharto, rejoined the United Nations. However, Suharto's government was no more democratic, but it was far dedicated on close ties to the United States and was also more concerned on attracting foreign investment. In 1967, after consolidated its hold on power, it agreed to hold the act of free choice. However, Indonesian government never accepted that the Papuan people had the right to self-determination. Some observers believed that the act of free choice would be held, in order to demonstrate that Indonesia could be trusted to abide by international treaties¹¹.

The controversial Act of Free Choice, which was held in August 1969, marked the official integration of West Papua into the Republic of Indonesia. This Act, as was noted above, was the continuation of the 1962 New York Agreement, which was basically meant to fulfill the genuine aspiration of the people of West Papua¹². However, because of the way the referendum was conducted, the Act of Free Choice was widely criticized. In 1969, to carry out the Act of Free Choice, Indonesia carefully selected 1025 pro-Indonesia Papuan leaders who voted unanimously in favor of integration with Indonesia. Military coercion also silenced those denouncing the way Indonesia government conducted the referendum. Indeed, the 1969 plebiscite was widely regarded as fraudulent and unrepresentative (Bonay and McGrory 2004:439). Hence, Indonesia turned the referendum into “act of no choice.” The Indonesia’s invasion of their homeland has been regarded by majority of the West Papuans as illegitimate. They

¹¹ New York Times 1 Oct 1966

¹² [http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJABook/Irja RightFrame.htm](http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJABook/Irja%20RightFrame.htm)

continuously resist the Indonesian rule over their communities and disapprove of the denial of their right to self-determination (Ibid).

The UN monitor Fernando Ortiz Sanz had observed the "election" of only a small portion of the eight regional assemblies that eventually agreed unanimously by musyawarah to remain with Indonesia. After the election, Ortiz Sanz reported that a number of high Indonesian officials including the minister of home affairs who even "asked the members of the assembly to determine their future with courage and full responsibility, bearing in mind that they had one ideology, Pantja Sila, one flag, one Government and one country stretching from Sabang to Merauke (Ortiz Sanz 1969:60).

In this backdrop, one of the Indonesian government officer told villagers "I will shoot dead anyone who is against us." This was in line with Suharto's order that the act "must not betray or harm the Indonesian people and the Government"¹³. General Ali Murtopo, army head of special operations and the man in charge of the act, told to one group that Jakarta was not interested in us as Papuans but in West Papua as a territory. If we want to be independent, he said, laughing scornfully, we had better ask God if He could find us an island in the Pacific where we could emigrate. We could also write to the Americans. They had already set foot on the moon and perhaps they would be good enough to find us a place there (Budiardjoa nd Liem Soei Liong 1988:25).

In this context, many people believe that the Act of Free Choice with all its controversies was the main source of the problem in West Papua. Many elements, both domestic and international, used the very critical momentum of the West Papua problem as the basis of their arguments to determine the next step in solving the problem. The Indonesian government, unfortunately, reacted temperamentally in facing the challenges of its policies in West Papua. A heavy-handed security approach, with an emphasis on a military anti-guerilla operation, was the Indonesian government's main choice for addressing the problem in West Papua. As a result, instead of cooling things down, the problem were worsened and exacerbated.

¹³ New York Times 3 May 1969

Transmigration, Economic Exploitation, Oppression and Marginalization

Transmigration Policy

In aftermath of the Act of Free Choice, the transmigration policy, which did the Indonesian government implement until 2000 involved the migration of typically poor Indonesian families from overpopulated islands such as Java, Bali, and Madura to less densely populated regions such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, and West Papua. The military evicted man native Papuans from their land by trickery or at gunpoint in order to allow settlers from other parts of Indonesia, often ex-military men and their families, to move onto the land (Osborne 1985:58). The transmigration of people had been used by the Indonesian government to quell the Papuan independence movement and to effectively exploit the “potential” of West Papua. These settlers are economically dependent - at least for the first year or two - on government subsidies, in the form of a few hectares of land, a house, seed, fertilizer, tools and food for the first year. This process of consolidating and extending state power and legitimacy is the rationale behind the concept of 'Indonesianization', which was taking place throughout Indonesia. Because the indigenous people are of Melanesian descent, Indonesianization in West Papua takes on a somewhat different flavour from most other parts of Indonesia, and the fact that the resistance movement has been organized well enough to attract international attention gives it a particular interest.

Indonesianization in West Papua has been defined as a process that: encompasses a complex system of programs which are aimed at adjusting the population of Irian Jaya to the cultural, economic and political life of the Indonesians through assimilation with other ethnic groups, and participation in the cultural, economic and political life in Indonesia in Indonesia (Roosman 1975:165). Transmigration can be considered the most potentially devastating vehicle of the Indonesianization process. The official view of transmigration (*transmigrasi*) is: the removal and/or transfer of population from one area to settle in another area determined upon within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, in the interests of the country's development, or for other reasons considered

necessary by the government (Clause 1 of the Basic Transmigration Act of 1972) (Hardjono, 1977).

Transmigration has been heavily centred around Sorong and Manokwari, the sites of major oilfields in West Papua, thereby guaranteeing the oil companies a safe and steady labour force. Merauke too is becoming a focus for resettlement, because the area is suitable for agriculture (Wanandi 1984:35) other negative aspects of transmigration, such as the corruption of officials, the misappropriation of funds (Osborne 1985b:7), the isolation from marketing centres, and the infertility of soils (Hardjono 1986:46) have filtered back to the source areas, and challenge the image of transmigration projected by the government (Caufield 1984:27). OPM representative (Rumakiek 1985b:26) claims that one community near Merauke, the scene of present and future expansion of transmigration sites, has had its entire traditional land resumed for resettlement, with the result that the whole 8000 in the group fled across the PNG border in 1984. There are reports, however, that these people cross the border at the instigation of the resistance movement who have sought to focus international attention on their plight (Hastings 1988.) Since Javanese have tended to predominate in the middle and higher echelons of the territorial bureaucracy, West Papuans held only 20% of administrative positions in the mid-seventies (Kroef 1976a: 10).

Furthermore, because many transmigrants have equal or superior technical or non-technical training to the West Papuans, even those locals who possess competitive diplomas or other qualifications find difficulty in competing for jobs against them. For every three non-Papuans holding technical positions, only one West Papuan is employed in a similar capacity (Carter 1984: 214).

'Homogenization' is seen as the solution to the problem of conflict in the outer islands. According to Meyer and MacAndrews, (Meyer and Macandrews 1978) the initial aims of transmigration emphasized, at least on paper, National unification by an assimilation of the Javanese migrants into the local societies'. This is related to the goal of transmigration, namely, to act as a Vehicle to promote national stability and

integration (Awanohara 1985:50). As part of its nation-building operation, the Indonesian Government has given priority to consolidating its strength along its borders. Through transmigration, the government acquires a focal point for infrastructural services and the people it needs to perform certain development tasks (as in the oilfields). Equally important, transmigration is the medium through which the state maintains control of outlying areas, since the transmigrants themselves become agents of the Indonesianization process. As former Army Chief, General Murdani said:

Overall, the movement of people in the framework of the transmigration programme has helped to disseminate knowledge and understanding of state ideology, political attitudes and cultural values to the relatively "naive" local residents (Otten 1986:188).

The government took large tracts of land coercively from traditional owners to support the Indonesian settlers. For instance, the "Operation Clean Sweep", implemented in June 1981, was reportedly used to coerce West Papuans to vacate their lands for incoming transmigrants. Indonesian state laws have legitimized the confiscation of Papuan ancestral lands for allocating those lands to transnational corporations and transmigrants. For instance, Basic Forestry Act of 1967 states that "[t]he rights of traditional law communities may not be allowed to stand in the way of transmigration sites." Consequently, the entire Papuan communities were being displaced and there was an increase feeling of marginalization by the indigenous population, especially in the mining towns where immigrants vastly outnumbered the Papuans¹⁴.

In many cases, local people were threatened by the Indonesian security troops and were told that those not releasing their lands would be considered OPM guerrillas and be prosecuted. West Papuan tribes were forcibly relocated into the malaria-infested lowlands. Those who fled back to their ancestral lands were arrested and then the military transported them back to the lowlands. Many women and children died because of malaria and starvation¹⁵. The Indonesian government, moreover, was unwilling to give compensation to traditional Papuan landowners. Due to discriminatory laws along with all kind of corruption in the Indonesian administration, Papuans did not receive

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch, July 2007: 9

¹⁵ The Working Group on Indigenous Populations 1987

compensation for the loss of their ancestral domains (Ibid). Other West Papuans were also being required to 'translocate' or to move into the transmigration compounds. It was a new form of pacification and a scheme that clearly aimed at dispersing the West Papuans and submerging them into alien communities. The government ordered that within the compounds, the Papuans should be thinly spread out— one Papuan family to every nine Javanese families. The Indonesian regime forced the indigenous people to become 'translocals', separating them from their natural means of production and sources of livelihood. The new strategy was a way of assimilating the semi nomadic tribes people and of ensuring that they would become the minority in each locality dominated by the Javanese¹⁶.

Indonesian transmigrants dominate the economic activities of West Papua. The ethnic division of the economy of the province finds a symbolic representation in the night market of Jayapura, the provincial capital. The shops are Indonesian-Chinese migrant-owned; settler traders run the market stalls in front of the shops. In front of the stalls sit Papuan traders, mainly highlanders selling small quantities of fruits and vegetables (Chauvel 2004:124-25).

The share of immigrants in the total population of West Papua was only 4 percent in 1971, but it gradually rose to about 21 percent in 1990. By 2000, when the government-supported transmigration programs ended, non-Papuans made up around 35 percent of the population. It was estimated in 2005 that transmigrants comprised 41 percent of the population of West Papua. the Papuan population has diminished as a proportion of the population from 96 percent in 1971 to just 59 percent in 2005. Jim Elsie predicts that by 2011 out of a total population of 3.7 million, there would be 1.7 million Papuans, or 47.5 percent, and 1.98 million non-Papuans, or 53.5%. This non-Papuan majority will increase to 70.8% by 2020 out of a population of 6.7 million¹⁷.

¹⁶ http://www.swsahs.nsw.gov.au/areaser/startts/volunteers/transitions/Issue%2010_An%20Unnoticed%20War.htm

¹⁷ <http://papuapost.multiply.com/journal/item/13>

The loss of their land and disruption of their lifestyles placed the West Papuans at severe risk of malnutrition and disease by the mid-1980s. In 1984, an Indonesian doctor suggested that Indonesian intrusions into West Papuan lifestyles led to a high incidence of disease among the West Papuan population. A Dutch doctor interviewed by a Dutch TV company called the health situation of the West Papuans “alarming.” He described high rates of yaws, measles, whooping cough, small- and large-scale epidemics, and sexually transmitted diseases that impaired the fertility of the Dani people who resided in the fertile Baliem Valley, a major transmigration site (Budiardjo & Liong 1982:58).

A Dutch missionary working in the mountain regions told the Dutch TV journalists that infant mortality among the West Papuans in that region was above 60 percent, and the average life expectancy only 30 or 31 years (Budiardjo & Liong 1982:58). Mortality and morbidity rates among Papuans increased in the later 1990s as rates of HIV infection rose dramatically. In 2002, 20.4 people per 100,000 were infected by HIV in Papua, compared to only 0.42 cases per 100,000 in the rest of Indonesia (Butt et al., 2002) Approximately 40 percent of Indonesia’s HIV and AIDS cases were located in Papua, a province that is home to less than one percent of Indonesia’s population (Ibid). Papuans also appear to contract HIV at rates significantly higher than the Indonesian migrant community residing in Papua (Ibid).

Several recent studies suggest that this stark discrepancy in infection rates is due to government-sponsored AIDS educational interventions that systematically discriminate against ethnic Papuans. AIDS prevention efforts by the Papuan Department of Health, which is staffed almost exclusively by ethnic Indonesians, have targeted the professional brothel and bar worker industries that employ Indonesian migrants. Papuan sex workers, who generally work for low pay in unregulated and high-risk environments outside of formal brothels and bars are rarely provided with any information about HIV/AIDS prevention or condom use (Ibid). Generally, AIDS awareness and safe sex campaigns in Papua are sporadic and focused on urban areas. However, they do not reach the majority of Papuans, who live in rural and semi-urban regions (Ibid).

Meanwhile, local health care systems are inadequate and frequently discriminate against Papuans. For example, in the Baliem Valley, administrators at family planning and maternal and child health clinics hold separate sessions for Papuan members of the Dani tribe and Indonesian migrants because “the Dani are dirty and women won’t want to use the same examining table as a Dani ” (Butt 2001). The same clinics have refused to provide oral contraceptives to Dani women, on the grounds that they will misuse them or feed the pills to their pigs (Butt 2001:70-71). Indonesian officials often point to Papuan culture and sexually abnormal behavior as reasons for the spread of HIV, other STDs, a view that has annoyed inequalities in AIDS prevention, and education programs in the region (Butt et al., 2002: 2). Without a more equitable and comprehensive response by the Indonesian government to the public health crisis in Papua, HIV/AIDS is likely to become an epidemic that threatens the very survival of the Papuan people.

The influx of immigrants and the marginalization of the indigenous population resulted to violent and bloody ethnic clashes that claimed West Papuan and immigrant lives in the 1980s and 1990s. The OPM has maintained a low-level, armed guerrilla war targeting mainly members of the Indonesian security forces, but has also occasionally targeted Indonesian transmigrants and foreign workers¹⁸. The current Indonesian government is now establishing food estates in West Papua. In doing so, the government is planning to take control vast tracts of Papuan ancestral lands.

The planned Merauke food estate will comprise a 1.6 million hectare integrated food production zone where companies will grow, process and package their products in one location. The plan entails the revival of state-supported inflow of non-Papuan farm workers along the lines of decades of "transmigration policies" that have sown ethnic conflict in West Papua¹⁹. Hence, the food estate plan will definitely worsen the separatist problem in this troubled province.

¹⁸ Human Rights Watch 11 Nov. 2007

¹⁹ West Papua Action Team, *February 2010*

The transmigration programs of the Indonesian government in West Papua have indeed caused the deprivation and marginalization of the indigenous Papuans. Many of them are now considered “squatters” in their homeland. Thus, it is not surprising that West Papuans have demanded the separation of their homeland from the unitary state of Indonesia and the expulsion of soldiers and non-ethnic Papuans from their communities.

Exploitation of Natural Resources

Indonesian authorities have been exploiting West Papua’s rich timber resources. Its forests are spread over 41.5 million hectares or 23% of Indonesia’s total forested area of 180 million hectares. Some 22 million hectares are classed as “production forest” as opposed to conservation areas²⁰. The Director of Greenpeace in South East Asia, Emmy Hafild states that more than 25 per cent of the natural forest in West Papua has been sold in concessions to timber firms exporting to Japan, the United States, the European Union and China²¹.

In 1982, three articles published in a Jakarta daily described the exploitation of the Asmat tribe, which lived near the south coast of West Papua, by Jakarta-based timber companies. The companies relocated the Asmat people and subjected them to a regime of compulsory labor, by which local officials forced villagers to cut down their own forests at below-subsistence wages. Officials warned that those who refused to accept the logging jobs and conditions could be arrested (Budiardjo & Liong 1982).

“The compulsory log-felling scheme exploited forests that were the property of the tribes. It threatened their sago supplies, the staple food of the Asmat people. It disrupted village life, forcing villagers to stay in the forest for as long as six weeks” (Ibib). An Indonesian environmental group warned that the Asmat people were “on the brink of cultural starvation after a decade of enforced ironwood logging.” (Kampanye Oct. 1982). In 1988, a Jakarta weekly newspaper warned that the Asmat area, rapidly

²⁰ www.bps.go.id/profile/irja2000

²¹ The Jakarta Post, 15 April 2006

succumbing to soil erosion, might soon be submerged by nearby rivers²². Oil, copper, and timber were not the only West Papuan resources exploited by outsiders. In 1987, Transpeche, a French company, began to operate West Papua's first canning business with an on-stream canning facility. Local West Papuan fishermen, who still relied on poles and lines, had no hope of surviving against the deep nets and modern equipment of Transpeche (Ibid 41-42).

A similar instance of forced labor occurred in the Paniai region of West Papua from 1982 onward. There, the Indonesian military, having established a post around Tiga Danau, imposed a system of forced labor on the indigenous population²³. All men with the exception of teachers were required to work around the guard post every Wednesday, performing night patrol, and the youth were forced to deliver rations to the guard post without compensation (Ibid). If one man from the village was absent for any of these duties, the whole village was punished (Ibid). These punishments included monetary fines as well as physical punishment or torture (Ibid).

The politics of the New Order's exploitation of resources in the name of development gravely affected the lives of ethnic minorities. There are considerable pieces of evidence to support West Papuan claims that the region's natural resources—petroleum, minerals, and timber—are being exploited by American, Japanese, and South African firms for the benefit primarily of the Indonesian central government in Jakarta, the military, foreign investors, and local (non-Papuan) officials. Only few benefits add to the indigenous population. The exploitation of natural resources has frequently caused disaster in the lives of the West Papuans by destroying their subsistence economy (Drake 1989: 57).

The struggle for the control of West Papuan natural wealth has significantly contributed to the conflict. Concessions given to foreign-owned oil and mining corporations without any consideration for the rights of the indigenous people, the

²² Indonesia News Service July 25, 1988

²³ Office for Justice and Peace, Nov. 2000: 17-18

involvement of the Indonesian security troops in guarding mining sites and resource extraction, and the huge amount of taxes and revenues which flow to the Indonesian government provide powerful motives for the OPM and the rest of the West Papuans to continue the struggle for independence. Civilians protesting against the impact of these activities upon their environment, livelihoods, and communities are often repressed by security force members, who have frequently responded to community protest with violent force²⁴. The 1970s and early 1980s saw a rush of large investments in extractive industries in West Papua such as *oil*, mining, fisheries, and forestry. These industries account for almost all the increase in the value of provincial exports (Ibid).

In 1972, Petromer Trend, an oil company controlled by Oppenheimer of South Africa, resumed drilling on the former exploration site of the Standard Oil. Rich oil deposits were discovered again, sulphur-free and of a light quality that was highly desirable to minimize refinery costs. Trend is said to be producing 170,000 barrels per day (b/d) from the Sorong oil well. Other transnational oil companies are also involved in the drilling of West Papuan oil. Membrano Shell controls an area of 14,657 square kilometers in Block G, also known as the Nauka Block, and produces an estimated output of 150,000 b/d. The "Consortium," which consists of Conoco, Total Oil, Chevron, and Texaco, has a concession in Block G covering an area of 43,755 square kilometers; the estimated output of the "Consortium" is 200,000 b/d. The estimated revenue of an oil company in West Papua is at least \$1 billion (Tapol, 2001: 35).

Even though of this huge revenue, the oil drilling activities have had no significant impact on regional employment and indigenous income generation. In the words of Tapol, West Papuan employees have been discriminated by the Indonesian and Western bosses. Most of the native workers have been replaced by Indonesian migrants (Tapol 2001).

American-owned Freeport Inc. is Indonesia's first large-scale mining corporation, which has been operating for more than 30 years in West Papua. Freeport's Mt. Ertsberg

²⁴ Human Rights Watch, July 2007: 12-13

mine is the second largest copper mine in the world and also has the largest proven gold deposit in existence. The company has already earned not less than \$100 billion from the extraction of West Papua's mineral resources. At least 1,448 tons of gold, have been scraped out of Ertzberg Mountain. The region around the mine is a military zone and blocked off to outsiders as well as to the Papuan land owners who were evicted by the Indonesian security forces and company officials. Prior to the establishment of the mining company, Ertzberg Mountain was communally owned by a West Papuan tribes and a traditional hunting ground as well. Freeport is now simply turning an entire mountain of gold and copper into an open pit²⁵.

In addition to extracting the wealth of West Papua, Freeport has done irreversible destruction to the surrounding environment. West Papua's unique rainforest has been destroyed due to mining activities. About 1.3 billion tons of tailing waste and 3.6 billion tons of waste rock have been dumped into the environment without proper treatment. The wastes have polluted Ajkwa River and caused Lake Wanagon to collapse. Freeport has already contaminated hundreds of hectares of land long way down to the Arafura Sea. It also has a long history of troubled relations with ethnic Papuans who, despite the mine's development programs, feel excluded from the economic benefits of the mine yet bear the burden of its environmental impact. The company is allegedly rewarding the Indonesian military for violating the human rights of West Papuan activists and separatists²⁶.

Investment in resource-based industries has been viewed as a major potential to economic development. This expectation has been realized only to a limited extent. The hope that these industries might rouse employment and generate indigenous incomes in West Papua has not been realized so far. The impact of these extractive activities on regional economic activities is small. Almost all government revenues accrue to the central government. To some extent only in the Sorong region these foreign investments appear to have had significant impact on regional employment and income generation. The amount of the indigenous population who have benefited from the growth of West

²⁵ Jakarta: Jatam 13 January 2006

²⁶ Human Rights Watch 2006:13

Papua's GDP and increasing revenues from extractive industries is extremely small. Furthermore, only a small section, approximately 4 to 5 percent, of West Papua's provincial budget is allocated to basic and social services every year. In this context, Human rights organizations have noted that the amount which the Jakarta spends on education, health, and other services for the Papuans is smaller than the huge amount of revenues earned from the extraction of Papua's natural wealth²⁷.

Although West Papua earns the third highest Gross Domestic Product, its Human Development Index (HDI), which reflects mortality rates of pregnant mothers as well as babies, has been falling to the bottom²⁸. West Papua has the largest number of poor people with HDI index in the 29th rank among Indonesia's 30 provinces in the year 2006. The number of people living below the poverty line has increased to more than 35 percent of the total population, a clear suggestion that income from West Papua's resources has not benefited the indigenous population. For the year 2007, Indonesia's national poverty rate was 16.6 percent. The poverty rate in Jakarta in the same year was only 4.6 percent, the lowest among Indonesian provinces²⁹.

Since its establishment, the OPM has been conducting attacks on Freeport's mining areas. This means that West Papuans' socioeconomic grievances have been suggesting OPM's separatist sentiment and legitimacy. In addition, the socioeconomic impact of Indonesian rule over West Papua has forced the indigenous Papuans to continue the struggle for the liberation of their homeland. The exploitation of their natural resources and the destruction of their communities and subsistence economy have inspired the West Papuans were forced to increase their resistance in order to defend their socioeconomic rights.

In this light, Michael Hechter an influential contribution to the growing literature on nationalism from the Neo-Marxist camp provides theory on ethnic nationalism. Hechter discusses the concept of "internal colonialism" and its impact on ethnic

²⁷ Human Rights Watch 2006:17

²⁸ Human Rights Watch 1995:14

²⁹ http://www.faithbasednetworkonwestpapua.org/millennium_development_goals

nationalism. He argues that in the process of internal colonialism, the core (Jakarta) dominates the periphery (West Papua) politically and exploits it economically. Resources and power were distributed unequally between the core (dominant ethnic group) and the periphery (ethnic minorities). This situation leads the Papuans to identify themselves with their group and contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic Papuan identity. Furthermore, Hechter identifies two important conditions for the emergence of group solidarity and ethnic nationalism. First, there must be wide economic inequalities between individuals, which are seen as part of a model of collective oppression. Second, he notes that economic inequalities are not adequate for the development of collective solidarity since there must be an accompanying social awareness and explanation of the situation as unjust and unlawful. He concludes that the greater the economic inequality between groups, the greater the chance that the disadvantaged group will resist political integration and seek independence (Hechter 1977).

In sum, Tom Nair also examines the emergence of ethnic nationalism and he perceived that ethnic nationalism is the response of ethnic groups to the existing situations of ethnic-structural inequality and uneven development. He further describes that the dominant ethnic group redefines the moving frontier of development to suit themselves at the expense of minority ethnic groups. The uneven wave of development over state territories widens the gap between the dominant and minority ethnic groups and thus creates social conflicts. The dominant group economically exploits the minority groups and tries to continue the unequal distribution of resources through policies aiming at the institutionalization of the socioeconomic inequality. Therefore, in the words of Nair, it was the ethnically biased process of modernization and development that were some of the important factors that created West Papuan nationalism (Nair 1997).

Conclusion

The genesis of separatist conflict in Indonesia can be traced back to the processes in which West Papua became a part of Indonesia Republic. Papuan ethnic-separatist conflict is related to the historical processes of Indonesian nation-state formation. Conflict

emerged out of the creation of political and social structures that deprived the rights of indigenous people of West Papua in term of identity, culture, security, political participation and economy, which are consider as the base for the existing conflict.

West Papuan nationalism is an invention of colonial rule, first by the Netherlands and then by Indonesia. Thus, the West Papuan nationalist movement emerged in the backdrop of an international trial of strength between the Dutch colonial power and recently independent Indonesia Republic, which then successfully affirmed a claim to replace the old borders of the Dutch East Indies.

Because of the presence of exploitative mining corporations, best symbolized by Freeport Indonesia and abusive Indonesian security forces provided a driving force for West Papuan separatists. The irregular pattern of economic development over the state territories has widened the gap between the dominant and minority ethnic groups, which has engendered the social conflicts. The Javanese, dominant ethnic group generally redefines the so-called development to suit themselves at the expense of the West Papuans. The dominant role of the Indonesians in economy as well as in political affairs has profoundly strengthened ethnic nationalisms of the West Papuans. The concept of "internal colonialism" can be applied to examine ethnic separatism. In this light, Jakarta, the core of the Indonesian state, politically dominates and economically exploits the periphery- West Papua.

Therefore, we can conclude that in West Papua there is no doubt that assumed ethnic difference and economic underdevelopment are two major factors that play an important role in alienating the Papuans from the state of Indonesia. However, we cannot deny the root cause of the conflict which is political in nature (the process in which the territory was acquired) while economic and social factors have served to keep alive demands for autonomy or complete independence.

Chapter IV

State Response: Policy of “Special Autonomy” and West Papuan Responses

STATE RESPONSE: POLICY OF “SPECIAL AUTONOMY” AND WEST PAPUAN RESPONSES

The fall of Suharto’s regime in Indonesia in mid-1998 led to greater democracy in Indonesia. The new incoming President, Habibies, government was facing multiple crises and central authority was under significant pressure from pro-independence supporters who perceived the change of administration as an opportunity to process their cause. The Papuans used the new democratic space to express their grievances and openly demand for the right to self-determination. Since their integration to Indonesia in 1963, Papuans have been mobilizing to obtain self-determination. Responding to Papuan demands and to address their grievances, the Indonesia government ultimately, offered Special Autonomy law in 2001, which included significant compromises for Papua.

The Special Autonomy Law No. 21/2001 for Papua focused on giving greater political and economic power to Papuans. The law went further than other decentralization processes in Indonesia by recognizing specific grievances, such as the exploitation of natural resources and threats to Papuans’ identity, while still ensuring that Papua remained within the territory of Indonesia. Several provisions had explicit, positive implications for transitional justice. Against the backdrop of the significant changes in relations between the central government and its region, the Special Autonomy Law No. 21/2001 for Papua can be interpreted as one of many symbols that the Indonesian government has taken a turn toward accommodationist rather than integrationist strategies toward this province.

I. Theoretical Background

A. Theory of Autonomy and Autonomous Regions

The significant notion, of declaring the “special autonomy” of a region, or declaring it an “autonomous region,” is one way to solve the problems of regional ethnic conflict, threatened secession, and rebellion. In this light, Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich has states that, territorial autonomy, is generally accepted as a region’s right to

independence in dealing with its internal domestic affairs. While acknowledging that foreign affairs and defense are usually under the central or national government domain, they further point out that autonomy could imply the power to make international agreements in limited matters, such as those pertaining to the region's cultural or economic interests (Hannum and Lillich 1980: 860).

As part of their arguments, they discuss five important variables in an autonomous region regarding its executive power that must be discussed before the region can be even "minimally" categorized as an autonomous region. The variables are:

1. The political status of the local executive: Does he or she represent the central government or the local government? How and by whom are the executives selected?
2. The responsibility of the executive: Does the local executive administer the laws of the central government? Does the central government retain concurrent or separate powers to enforce national laws?
3. The authority of the executive within the legislative process: Does the local executive have a veto or other power over local legislation?
4. The extent of local authority over normally national executive branch matters such as foreign relation and defense matters.
5. The extent of local police powers and the relation between the local and national security forces (Ibid).

More precisely Hannum and Lillich, further talks about three important matters. First, the existence of an elected legislative institution; second, the establishment of a free and independent judiciary system, even though this system is not totally separate from the national judiciary system; and, third, the greater right to control natural resources and a complete control over particular resources, such as water, forests, and non-mining resources (Ibid).

Furthermore, concept of autonomy, has greater control over social and cultural issues such as the health system, education, public assistance, social security, cultural

affairs, public housing, and labor affairs. Finance and economic matters, are not necessarily have to be under local control; instead, they can be divided into several units which are ruled either by the central government or the local authority (Ibid). In sum, Hannum and Lillich stress that in order to be fully recognized as an autonomous territory there should be:

First . . . a locally elected body with some independent legislative power . . .

Second, a locally chosen chief executive, who has general responsibility for the administration and execution of local laws or decrees . . .

Third, an independent local judiciary . . .

Fourth, the status of autonomy and at least limited self-government is not inconsistent with the denial of any local authority over specific areas of special concern to the principal/sovereign government, as opposed to the reservation by the sovereign of general discretionary powers. . .

Fifth, full autonomy and self-government are also consistent with power-sharing arrangements between the central and autonomous government (Ibid).

Moreover, Svante E. Cornell, Cornell has argues that, in international law, autonomy is taken to mean that “parts of the state’s territory are authorized to govern themselves in certain matters by enacting laws and bills, but without constituting a state of their own (Cornel 2002 :24). In this context, however, Cornell recognizes that the central government of any autonomous region is universally facing the same problem, which may trigger secessionism. He gives three arguable reasons:

...first, they [central governments] fear that granting territorial autonomy to a minority group would be merely the first step toward the eventual secession of the region; second, giving way autonomy to one region may be assumed as discrimination against other inhabitants or groups; and third, autonomy increases the risk of intervention by a foreign state associated with the particular minority population (Ibid.246-7).

On the other hand, Andrew D. Mason perceives autonomy within a more substantial understanding and divides it into three respective perceptions with regard to its relation to the state. These perceptions are:

...first, respect for autonomy requires the state never to prevent the exercise of autonomy, except perhaps to avoid amoral catastrophe; second, respect for autonomy entails that the state always has a reason for not preventing its exercise, which it must take into account in its decision, but which may nevertheless be overridden; third, respect for autonomy requires that state to treat the exercise of autonomy as a goal to be promoted (Mason 1990: 440).

Therefore, the above theories clearly define the role of regional autonomy in conflict resolution. Some scholars believe that autonomy is reliable in solving the problem of secessionism or ethnic-based conflict, while others identify autonomy only as one element of a more comprehensive approach.

B. Autonomy and Conflict Resolution

To bring into negotiation many scholars agree that conflict regulations, which eventually can be transformed into conflict resolutions, are divided into three categories: territorial solutions, institutional solutions, and policy choices (Schneckener and Wolff 2004: 1–17). Territorial solutions are divided into two choices: partition and federalism. Institutional solutions are divided into two, options: constitutional/structural options and electoral/institutional device (Ibid).

Nonetheless, there are strong debates among scholars regarding the best proposal for solving the problem comprehensively. In the case of West Papua, a territorial approach which talks about partition and federalism as its main concepts has strong support from the main actors in West Papua, especially the OPM and some of the supporters of West Papua independence. In contrast, the Indonesian government, prefers a status of special autonomy as the practical solution.

In this light, Katherine Adeney notes that, federalism can bridge the tension between the center and the provinces by giving a possible political or economic autonomy to discuss many things, including broader political and economic rights to the provinces. However, she also admits that many scholars and politicians fear that this debate will be ultimately relating to a secessionism (Adeney 2004:126). Furthermore, Adeney points out that, in order to be successful federalism. It has necessary to have the

existence of more homogeneous provinces (Ibid). Adeney says there are four things that should follow the assumption:

First, homogenous units should, wherever possible, be subdivided into two or more units . . . ; second, smaller units are likely to perceive advantages in secession or be viable units to do so . . . ; third, there should be no great disparities between the units in terms of size, population, or resources . . . ; and fourth, the optimal number of units should be more than three (Ibid).

Unfortunately, many Indonesians associate federalism with Dutch efforts to maintain control over its former colony, and tried to stop the establishment independent Indonesia republic. Moreover, a unitary form of government was also proclaimed by Indonesia's founding fathers in the 1945 constitution, which gave more reason to Indonesian nationalists' who saw Dutch-imposed federalism as, "an artificial legacy of their old colonial master" (Ferrazi 2000: 66). In Indonesia, most political parties prefer broader regional autonomy than pure decentralization, which could lead to federalism (Ibid). In their opinion, separatists will use federalism as an instrument and foundation to discuss secessionism. Therefore, the ongoing contesting concepts on this matter remain unsolved.

C. The Partition Theory and Its Implication

Partition is considered as one of the most practicable solution for ethnic conflict according to a territorial-based approach. One of the proponent of this approach, Kaufman argues that whatever the resolutions are, a solution is only possible if the opposing groups are demographically separate (Kaufman 1996: 137). He further argues that, "Separation reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat, and largely eliminates both reasons and chances for ethnic cleansing of civilians (Ibid). However, he admits, that partition — although it can reduce ethnic hostilities, and in the long run might reduce "inter-ethnic antagonism" — does not necessarily resolve ethnic hatred (Ibid). This theory has been a favorite of the OPM and other secessionist elements in West Papua. They are arguing that West Papua is an entity which is different from the other parts of Indonesia for instances, in religion they are mostly Christians where as Indonesian are mostly Muslims. Racially, historically and even geographically they are different from Indonesian. The OPM and West Papuans who favor independence want to

emphasize that separation is the only possible solution for all the problems and conflicts in West Papua.

In contrast, the Indonesian government assumed that special autonomy is more practical way to address the problems in West Papua, while keeping this province as a part of Indonesia. For strengthening their arguments and legitimacy, the government also highlighted that many countries, including the United States and the member-states of the United Nations, officially recognize Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua. Furthermore, the Indonesian government has always argued that what West Papua needs is not separatism, because that might only trigger bigger problems, namely the possibility of a disintegrating Indonesia, or a chaotic West Papua (Hadi 2004: 3–4).

In relating with that argument, Nicholas Sambanis argues that partition might trigger a different kind of problem, such as what has occurred recently in East Timor. In addition, Sambanis argues, “Partition, does not help reduce the risk of war recurrence. Partitions are in fact positively (though not significantly) associated with the recurrence of ethnic war” (Sambanis 2000:480). However, Sambanis agrees that, Partitions are more likely after costly ethnic/religious wars, after a rebel victory or treaty, and in countries with better-than-average socioeconomic conditions. Partitions are more likely where ethnic groups are large; they are less likely to occur as the degree of ethnic heterogeneity increases (Ibid). He elaborates further, only in the most extreme cases may partition be necessary, indeed unavoidable. Those cases must be handpicked on the basis of political analysis of regional and global constraints, the history of the preceding war, and the special traits of the society in question . . . on average, partition may be an impossible solution to ethnic civil war (Ibid). Therefore, in the case of Indonesia, the Jakarta would prefer, special autonomy for viable solution to secession problems, ethnic conflict, or separatism.

II. Socio-Economic and Political Background before the Introduction of Special Autonomy in West Papua

1. New Order Politics: National Identity and Strengthening Boundaries

Indonesia has been relatively stable since the emergence of Suharto as its second president, following the downfall of Sukarno. The policies of the New Order government (1966-1998) were to turn Indonesia into a developing industrialized country with an established national identity, a nation that was economically integrated into the global economy, as well as being internationally recognized for its unique culture. In this backdrop, the International Group for Assistance was installed and Suharto changed the programme with the aim of attracting foreign investment (Lagerberg 1979: 119). In order to achieve this goal the Foreign Investment Review Law which was passed in 1967 contained generous provisions on the questions of local control and sending profits abroad (Cribb 1945 and Brown 1997:116). Throughout the New Order period, President Suharto was focusing upon economic and cultural development policies that enforced his national control through emphasis on prosperity, tradition, national integration and stability (Drake 1989:225).

In this background, during the period of early 1980s, before the emergence of democracy in industrialized Asia, some scholars began to argue that the key reason the middle class in this region was not supporting the need to liberalize their political system was because of their culture (Asian culture). Therefore, Lucien W. Pye, argues that Asian political culture was said to emphasize on collective, not individual, freedom and favored order over conflict (Pye 1985 and Clark Neher 1994). By using a Weberian point of view, many scholars such as Richard Robinson, Kevin Hewison and Gary Rodan argues that in the Protestant tradition, the principle of compromise and equality were actively allowed the societies that supported to Protestantism that interested the promotion of democracy. On the other hand, Islam and Confucianism, in fact, believed the ideas that legitimized, even sanctioned, hierarchical structure in society that is one of the important factor that hindered the rise of democracy (Robison *et al.*, 1990).

In fact, from late 1980s onward, democracy began to flourish throughout East and Southeast Asia beginning in the economically underdeveloped Philippines before encompassing industrialized Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand. As part of democratization in this region, democracy began to spread through East and Southeast Asia, and the authoritarian government increasingly came under question for refusing to liberalize their political system. On the other side in newly industrialized Singapore and Malaysia and Indonesia, authoritarian leaders continued to retain their dominance over these states (Vatikiotis 1996). Apart from that, the government leaders of these countries also believed on to the concepts of “Asian Values” and “Asian democracy” to legitimize and to build the argument that their cultural traditions supported an authoritarian form of governance.

Hence, the very foundations of the argument about Asian Values were based on the notion of “cultural difference” that served as a suitable explanation for the need to maintain authoritarian rule since ethnic harmony and political stability were then helping to draw large foreign investments that would help to progress economic modernization and industrial development.

2. Security Approach

Although Suharto’s Indonesia enjoy high economic growth was also filled with tensions and conflicts. Especially the secessionist movements in the provinces of East Timor, Aceh and West Papua were regarded as major security challenges. However, threat to stability, were met with an uncompromising response, in particular, with the use of force by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, or ABRI). The security approach with all its side effects, including human rights abuses, still dominated government policies in West Papua. From the early 1960s through the present, Papua has been the site of numerous human rights abuses by Indonesian security forces in the context of both military operations against a small armed separatist movement and the suppression of nonviolent independence activists¹.

¹ <http://www.komnasperempuan>

3. 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Indonesia

The Asian Financial crisis that began in 1997 had a devastating effect on Indonesia, the hardest-hit country. In Indonesia, it evolved into a multidimensional crisis, socio-political as well as economic. During the period 1997–1999, Indonesia experienced political turmoil, which led to political reform movement emerged, led by the urban middle class and students. These movement, popularly known as the reformasi, eventually led to remove the New Order's legitimation of Development and ousting of Suharto as President of Indonesia. The rise of reformasi in Indonesia discredited the argument that culture defined and conditioned identity and political systems, undermining also the idea of an "Asian" form of democracy (Huntington: 1996).

During this period negative economic growth, by a double-digit rate of inflation; an explosion of communal violence, the worst occurring in Moluccas, where it took more than 5,000 lives; and riots in some cities, most notably in Jakarta, where hundreds of people died. These are the circumstances that incidents marked the rise of the new regime under President Habibie. During Habibie's administration, the separation of East Timor took place, following a referendum in August 1999. This event is one of the milestones in Indonesian history, and, more important, in the history of Indonesia's territorial integrity. The separation of East Timor also raised theory and predictions about the case of West Papua and served as a source of reference for the OPM and its supporters. The election in 1999 marked the end of Habibie's regime and the beginning Abdurrahman Wahid's as the fourth Indonesian president. During Wahid's period, there were a number of political developments that changed the course of politics in Indonesia. A number of developments have also taken place with regard to West Papua issue and ultimately resulted in the introduction of a policy of special autonomy.

III. LAW NO. 21/2001: Special Autonomy for West Papua

The resignation of Suharto in May 1998 led to greater democracy in Indonesia. It became possible to hold an act of self-determination in East Timor which ultimately led to its political independence. The Acehnese demanded a referendum which paved the way for a peace process that concluded successfully in August 2005. It could be argued that West Papua remains the last major conflict in the Indonesian archipelago yet to be resolved. The Papuans, used the new democratic situation openly and express peacefully their demand for the right to self-determination. Peaceful demonstrations with thousands of participants were held in all major West Papuan towns, such as Biak (2-6 July 1998), Wamena (7 July 1998), Jayapura (1 July 1999), Sorong (5 July 1999) and Timika (10 November - 2 December 1999).

On 1 December 1999, Papuans jointly raised the Morning Star flag in towns all over West Papua (Broek 2001). This flag is a powerful symbol of Papuan nationalism and resistance against Indonesian oppression (Broek and Szalay 2001: 77-92). Peaceful demonstrations calling for the right to self-determination continue up to the present day (The Jakarta Post 2004). The third Indonesian president, B. J. Habibie, initiated a meeting with 100 Papuan representatives led by Tom Beanal in order to hear from them personally about their reasons for demanding the right to self-determination. This meeting, held on 26 February 1999 in the prestigious presidential palace, Istana Merdeka, in Jakarta, and was attended by all the cabinet ministers as well as the military commander and the national police chief. At the meeting the Papuans openly expressed the president their desire that they wished to secede from Indonesia and establish a new independent state of West Papua.

They sophisticated three reasons for their demand: (1) West Papua was annexed illegally by Indonesia; (2) Papuans have been the victims of crimes against humanity committed by the Indonesian military; and (3) the Indonesian government ignores the Papuans' rights to social, economic and cultural development (Alua 1999). Their demands were strengthened by the Papuan Convention held from 26 to 29 February 2000 and the Second Papuan Congress from 29 May to 4 June 2000 in Jayapura (Alua 2000).

Responding to the call for the right to self-determination raised by the Papuans, the Indonesian government led by the fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid, offered them special autonomy status. Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province was passed by the Indonesian House of Representatives and subsequently approved by the fifth Indonesian president, Megawati Soekarno Putri, in October 2001.

The law allows West Papua to:

- express Papuan cultural identity through the Papuan flag and anthem;
- establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for historical rectification of past events in West Papua and a branch office of the National Commission on Human Rights (KOMNAS HAM);
- assume all governmental powers except for international affairs, defence, monetary policy and the Supreme Court;
- receive 80 percent of the revenues from forestry and fisheries plus 70 percent of the revenues from oil and gas exploitation;
- form a Papuan People’s Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua/MRP) as a representative body of all indigenous Papuans, membership of which should represent ethnic groups, religions and women².

The law was welcomed by the provincial government of Papua, the Papuan Provincial Legislative Council, Papuan religious leaders and Papuan scholars and students. The international community (European Union, the Pacific Island Forum and the United States of America) documented its support by providing experts and financial aid to ensure successful implementation of the autonomy law. They were all agreed that proper and effective implementation of the autonomy law holds out the prospect of realistic and viable solutions to various problems in West Papua.

² <http://www.WestPapuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>

1. Drafting Process for Special Autonomy

According to Peter King, the drafting of a special autonomy law for West Papua was heavily influenced by events in East Timor and Aceh. In addition, the process started in the course of high tension and suspicion between Jakarta and West Papua regarding the real intention of the central government, especially given the situation in Aceh and its future status as a special autonomous region (King 2004: 81). The situation was exacerbated by the introduction of Law No. 45, which divided West Papua into three new provinces, something the West Papuans perceived as an attempt to divide-and-rule the region (Ibid). The process for drafting of Special Autonomy Law began in November 2000, when Jaap Salossa became governor of West Papua. Having previously convinced the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) that West Papua, like Aceh, needed a policy of special autonomy, Salossa began the process of drafting a special autonomy bill by inviting local scholars, academics, activists, tribal elites, young people and students, ex-political prisoners, businessmen and customary figures, including some of the NGO representatives and religious organizations in this region.

After drafting the law, the provincial government consulted to the public in 12 districts and two municipalities in Papua Province. After public consultation process in Papua the provincial government proposed the draft to DPR. However, DPR discussed the draft based on its own initiatives, not one from the provincial government. The discussion was done through Special Committee Meeting (Pansus), Working Committee (Panja) and Formulator Team (Timus) of DPR, and DPR finally discussed it with central government. DPR always involved the delegation from Papua Province Government as "assistance team". Early in the process, there was strong debate among the participants whether the word "independence" should appear in the draft. After several exhaustive meetings, the forum agreed to a final draft abolishing the word "independence," using instead the word "autonomy" (Ibid). As King emphasizes,

"The West Papuan bill became the main reference for the special committee, set up by the DPR (People's Representative Council) to develop a special autonomy law" (King 2004: 83).

Finally, after extensive consultation with all parties concerned, mostly elements from West Papua, Law No.21/2001 was passed by the DPR in November 2001 and went into effect on January 1, 2002 (Hidayat.S 2001: 43).

2. Content of the Special Autonomy Law

The Papua Special Autonomy Law has material sources from two elements; (1) the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia and the other laws and regulation and (2) aspiration from the people in Papua Province and priority needs for the Papuan society.

The Special Autonomy Law consists of twenty-seven chapters and seventy-nine articles, which start with the preamble and end with general explanation and explanation of each article. The analysis toward the content material contained in this law shows that its construct comprises of the 'symbolic' content material and 'substance' content material. The 'symbolic' content is basically the acknowledgement of the great true identity of the Papuan native people, while the 'substance content' is acknowledgement of the needs and the effort to fulfill rights and obligations of the people of West Papua Province, especially West Papua native people as citizens. Among them, as Mohammad Hidayat points out, the law spells out explicitly several basic principles for conflict resolution: First, among those principles is greater authority granted to the Province to implement its governance and manage its natural resources in the best interest of the local people. Second, the Law recognizes and respects the basic rights of indigenous West Papuans, and their strategic and basic empowerment. Third, it provides for good governance characterized by broader participation, development for the maximum benefit of the people, transparency, and accountability. Fourth, it provides a clear division of authority, labour, and responsibility between local institutions (Hidayat.S 2001: 45).

Additionally, the Law also provides broad opportunities for West Papuans to participate and contribute in shaping and directing local development strategies and regional policies. More important, the Special Autonomy Law also recognizes the existence of traditional rights and customary law: In its effort to implement the law, the

government was required to form a West Papuan People's Assembly, the Majelis Rakyat West Papua, or MRP, a legislative institution. This was unique to West Papua and made the province the first in Indonesia to have a bicameral legislature: the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) and the MRP (King 2004: 83). MRP is a legislature body comprised of natives West Papuans who represent customary, religion, and women which elected for a five years term. The law went even further by recognizing the traditional symbols of West Papua, the flag and the anthem. It stipulated, however, that, on formal occasions, the Indonesian national flag, the Red and White, and the national anthem, Indonesia Raya, should be performed before the West Papuan (Hidayat. S 2001: 45).

A. Political Affairs

In the Special Autonomy Law, political affairs comprise thirty-two articles which include rules governing the executive, the legislatures, political parties, and the identity of the region. The significant article is article nineteen, which directed the existence of the West Papuan People's Assembly, the MRP. As was noted above, West Papua is the only province in Indonesia to have such a legislative body. The MRP consists of elected native West Papuan customary and religious representatives who serve for five years. As a uniquely West Papuan legislature body, the MRP has significant authorities, rights, tasks, and obligations. The most important are three provisions that authorize the assembly to consider and approve candidates for governor, candidates for the national People's Consultative Assembly, and additions or changes to the Bill of Regional Laws³.

B. Economic Affairs

The law contains ten articles that governs and to deal the financial matters such as taxes, revenues, trade, and industry. Among these, the most important issue is how to divide the revenues from all the natural resources in the region. The Special Autonomy Law stipulates that one third of all natural-resource revenues be given to the region. More specifically, it states that eighty percent of the forestry, fishery, and general mining revenues be allocated to the region. It also says that seventy percent of the natural oil-mining and natural-gas-mining revenues be given to the region. Moreover, the law's also

³ <http://www.WestPapuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>

talks about the sharing of taxes with the West Papuan authorities: ninety percent of the land and building taxes are allocated to the region, twenty percent of the individual income taxes are allocated to the region, and eighty percent of the taxes from the exercise of land- and building-acquisition⁴.

C. Human Rights and Justice Affairs

Human rights and justice are ruled on in eight articles, including articles about the regional police force and the existence of a customary judiciary and customary laws. Article fifty-one addresses the conduct of the customary court, which dominates the life of West Papuans, especially in customary and religious matters. Human rights are ruled on in articles forty-five, forty-six, and forty-seven, all of which specify the government's obligation to protect, respect, improve, and enforce human rights in the entire region and for the entire population. Article forty-five also notes the need to establish a representative for a Commission on Human Rights, a Human Rights Court, and a Commission on Righteousness and Reconciliation (Ibid).

D. Socio-Cultural and Customary Rights

West Papua's socio-cultural and customary rights are ruled on in twelve articles. The protection of customary rights is mentioned specifically in two articles, numbers forty-three and forty-four. Religion is acknowledged in three articles, numbers fifty-three, fifty-four, and fifty-five, which state explicitly the freedom and right of religion for West Papuans. Education and culture are ruled on in articles fifty-six, fifty seven, and fifty-eight. And, finally, social matters are explained in articles sixty-five and sixty-six⁵.

E. Additional Articles

The Special Autonomy Law has several additional articles, which address various subjects, including the environment, certain kinds of disputes, population and manpower issues, and supervision matters. The articles are clearly meant to enhance people's overall comprehension of the policy of Special Autonomy. The additional articles provide a

⁴ <http://www.WestPapuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>

⁵ <http://www.WestPapuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>

sense of popular participation to Indonesia's Special Autonomy ruling as a final government policy for West Papua.

In addition, the policy of special autonomy in West Papua consists of significant and comprehensive laws and regulations that are applicable to every aspect of the people's lives. It is important to note that the Special Autonomy Law leaves four basic aspects under the central government's regulation: the defense system; the financial system, including the currency; the national police institution; and foreign policy. Nonetheless, it is generally believed that, if the law is implemented consistently, the central problems in West Papua will eventually be solved and the West Papuans will live peacefully as part of Indonesia.

IV. Implementation of Special Autonomy Law

The special autonomy law is quite comprehensive in the areas of politics, the economy, socio-cultural aspects, human rights, and justice. It addresses many prospective problems and provides excellent solutions to the grievances of West Papuans. The law, which was carefully formulated mostly by West Papuan scholars, has precise rules governing important issues concerning to West Papuans: political rights, economic opportunities, cultural differences, and human rights protection. If implemented properly, these regulations could provide a basis for better development in all aspects of West Papuan life. Sadly, the reality is far different than what was expected. Since its introduction in 2001, little of the special autonomy law has been implemented. Thus, the same problems continue in West Papua.

Implementation Problems

1. Political Affairs

There are three important problems regarding the implementation of special autonomy Law effectively and consistently. They are 1) the Jakarta government's tried to divide West Papua into three provinces, 2) the Jakarta government's efforts to block the establishment of a well-functioning West Papuan People's Assembly (Majelis Rakyat

Papua, or MRP), and 3) West Papuans' use of a certain flag as a symbol of their province. These three problems are clearly described and enclosed by the law: chapter two addresses the flag symbol; chapter three, the regional divisions; and chapter five, part fourth, the MRP.

A. Division of West Papua into Three Provinces

The Indonesian government perceived that implementation of the autonomy law would only strengthen the separatist movement and accelerate the creation of an independent state of West Papua because it has received local, national and international support (Ladjar 2007: 87).

In this context, Bishop Leo Laba Ladjar of the diocese of Jayapura has noted out, "There was growing suspicion that the central government viewed the special autonomy law as a dangerous weapon that Papuans could use to make the transition to independence" (Ladjar 2007: 87).

In order to weaken the separatist movement in West Papua the Indonesian government adopted for a different solution, which was to divide West Papua province into three separate provinces. Thus, the controversy over the division of West Papua into three provinces began on September 16, 1999, when the Indonesian parliament passed Law No. 45 mandating the division of Irian Jaya—the previous name of the province—into three provinces: West Irian Jaya, Central Irian Jaya, and the rump of Irian Jaya. The law also required the creation of four new districts: Paniai, Puncak Jaya, Mimika, and the city of Sorong⁶. The regulatory came in the form of Presidential Instruction No.1/2003 issued by President Megawati. Central government without any prior consultation with the Papuans or the provincial government made this controversial move⁷.

The creation of new provinces was a problem because it undermined the 2001 special autonomy Law No. 21, which defines the region as a single entity. Indigenous Papuans strongly rejected this step, which was designed to undermine their cultural unity

⁶ International Crisis Group 9 April, 2003

⁷ Cenderawasih Pos, 7 February 2003

by means of a divide-and-rule strategy⁸. They also received full support from the Provincial Legislative Council⁹, Papuan religious leaders, Papuan tribal leaders, Papuan students¹⁰ and Jayapura-based non-governmental¹¹. The European Parliament was also deeply disturbed by the policy of dividing West Papua into three new provinces and called on Indonesian government to revoke the presidential decree since, it undermined the Special Autonomy Law for West Papua and the EU's commitments.

Meanwhile, proponents of the division presented several factors behind the division. One of the significant rationales for autonomy concerned to administrative efficiency, which takes into consideration the factor that West Papua is three and a half times the size of Java, which consists of six provinces¹². There is one thing, however, that caused the division to become even more controversial: it did not have the approval of the two West Papuan legislative bodies, the DPRD (provincial parliament) and the MRP, as is required by the special autonomy law (Sullivan 2003: 5-6).

B. Establishment of the West Papuan People's Assembly (MRP)

The West Papuan People's Assembly, or MRP, is clearly specified in article five of the law and consists of six articles, which define it and describe its membership, rights, and obligations¹³. The formation of the MRP is what makes the special autonomy law in West Papua unique, since it is the only province in Indonesia that has a bi-cameral legislature. President Megawati's leaders were able to delay the issuing of the government regulation on the establishment of the Papuan People's Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua/MRP), which is essential for the implementation of the Papuan autonomy law. They argued that creation of this institution is a starting point toward West Papuan independent, for example, Hari Sabarno, the minister of internal affairs during President Megawati's government suggested, that the MRP has such extensive powers that it may be a danger for the administration and stabilization of West Papua (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004: 37–

⁸ The Jakarta Post, 11 March 2003

⁹ The Jakarta Post, March 15, 2003

¹⁰ The Jakarta Post, 25 October 2003

¹¹ Cenderawasih Pos, 10 February 2003

¹² International Crisis Group 2003: 10

¹³ <http://www.at.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>

38). However, the sixth Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, finally issued the government regulation on the formation of the MRP in December 2004 (Government Regulation No. 54/2004 on the Papuan People's Assembly). The members of the MRP were selected and inaugurated in November 2005.

Another serious challenge faced by the MRP was its membership formulation which, according to the law, had to represent various elements of the impartial West Papuan society, who had also to be indigenous West Papuans. The central government's involvement in the process of the MRP's membership formulation created considerable doubt among the West Papuans. They assumed the MRP – which was hastily formed following the governor's election in 2005 – as merely a lip-service strategy from the central government merely to ease the demand for independence but were not appropriately based on the principles of the special autonomy law (King 2004:12–13).

Furthermore, President Susilo has not resolved the controversy surrounding the province of West Irian Jaya. The Papuan People's Assembly and the Papuan Provincial Legislative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua/DPRP) have rejected the government's decision to establish the province of West Irian Jaya. It is clearly laid down in the Papuan autonomy law, a new province should not be created without the approval of the MRP and DPRP. Despite this rejection, the central government allowed West Irian Jaya province to conduct its own gubernatorial election on 11 March 2006. Papua province conducted its gubernatorial election on 10 March 2006.

C. Controversy over the Symbols of West Papua

Chapter two of the law regulates the symbols of the province of West Papua, which consist of a province symbol, a flag, anthem, logo, and motto. This draft already submitted by MRP to governor and local parliament at the beginning of March 2007 in order to start legalized process). These are not uniquely West Papuan, however. Most of the provinces in Indonesia have their own symbols, but in West Papua's case, the symbols are also used and manipulated by some of the pro-independence figures to

express their pro independence aspirations and identity. As a result, despite the legality of the symbols, based on the special autonomy law, in practice, the national government, police and military associate all activities involving West Papuans who use these symbols – most notably the flag – with the independence movement and therefore attempt to ban them. However, some of the independence activists with the OPM flag also commonly associate the West Papuan flag. The Indonesian authority, represented by the police, treats harshly events where the West Papuan flag is raised. And the allegation of treason may then be made against persons involved in such events, with a possibility of spending twenty years in prison¹⁴. Moreover, especially the military argued that the immediate need for Papuan people today is prosperity, therefore the provincial development program start from prosperity of people, but not from symbol of Papua province. On the other hand, MRP said that we have a long history of suffering and human right violations from 1961 until now. Therefore the first start of Papua development program start from “saving Papuan people through legalized Papuan’s symbol and then let’s start development program”. This issue started at April 18, 2007 in two provinces officials meeting in Biak (Alua 2007).

2. Economic Affairs

Economic development is basically one of the most significant factors triggering the West Papuans’ grievances, especially a number of multinational companies with assets worth billions of dollars are operating in West Papua. The most prominent and controversial company is Freeport McMoRan. Freeport Indonesia (FI) is Indonesia’s single largest taxpayer, the largest employer in West Papua and the source of over 50% of West Papua’s income (Leith D 2004) Freeport’s status is controversial because of its entanglement with elitist groups and the military during the Suharto era. Since 1992 it has paid more than U.S.

During the 1990s Freeport sold shares in the mine and other assets, ranging from a power plant to housing and catering services, to business allies of Suharto (Leith 2003). Freeport’s presence has been a central cause of resentment for some elements in West

¹⁴ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1014962.stm>

Papua, as was evident in the bloody riot, in March 2006.¹⁵ The mine has long been accused of dispossessing locals and colluding in human rights abuses by its military guards (Abrash and Carolyn, 2004).

According to Elmslie, West Papua's economic exploitation is one of the factors fueling West Papuans' resentment against the Indonesian government. The main beneficiary from the harvesting of Irian Jaya's resources was the rest of Indonesian and especially Jakarta (Elmslie 2002: 113).

Furthermore, in relations with economic concerns three central issues can be used to point out the "failure" of special autonomy. First, the fairness of the revenue contribution from all the natural-resources extraction in West Papua. Second, the budget allocation by the central government to West Papua. And third, the problem of economic disparities between indigenous West Papuans and other Indonesians who migrate to this region.

A. Contribution of Natural Resources

The special autonomy has provided large new revenues for the province from taxes on natural resources produced in West Papua, particularly mining. Papua was to receive eighty percent from mining, forestry and fisheries, and seventy percent from oil and gas exploitation. In addition, a greater proportion of tax revenues were to accumulate to the province (Bertrand 2004: 206-207). Unfortunately, this regulation, is hardly applied by the government. Among all the natural resources exploration in West Papua, mining is still on the top of the list, followed by forestry, and fishery. According to West Papua government data, there were thirty mining companies in 2000,¹⁶ including the most prominent one, Freeport McMoran, which in accordance to 1991 work contract, possessed a 2,6 million square hectare area of exploration¹⁷. Most of these companies are exploring copper, nickel, and gold which are extremely expensive in international market

¹⁵ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20060321.F0>

¹⁶ <http://www.papua.go.id/content.php/en/16>

¹⁷ <http://www.ptfi.com/Content.asp?id=1&cid=71>

and trade. Financially, Freeport has been giving a lot of contribution to Indonesian economy. In 2005 alone, the company has paid US\$1, 17 million as part of tax, royalty and its dividend. During the period of 1992-2004 the company paid US\$ 33 million— 2.73 percent of Indonesia GDP--to the Indonesian government¹⁸.

Based on this calculation, fifty-five percent of West Papua GDP had come from Freeport contribution (Ibid). However, in reality, only a small number of Indonesians and West Papuans have benefited the impact of this contribution¹⁹. Furthermore, one side effect of the continued existence of all these companies in the province is that West Papuans' resentment shows no sign of decreasing. Indeed, the situation is getting worse. There were number of incidents in which the companies clashed with local communities.

Furthermore, another resource industry with the greatest geographical impact is logging, the concessions for which cover nearly a third of the territory of West Papua. Its forests are spread over 41.5 million hectares or 23% of Indonesia's total forested area of 180 million hectares. Some 22 million hectares are classed as "production forest" as opposed to conservation areas²⁰. Emmy Hafild the Director of Greenpeace in South East Asia, states that more than 25 per cent of the natural forest in West Papua has been sold in concessions to timber firms exporting to Japan, the United States, the European Union and China²¹.

In 2001, some 40 logging companies were active in West Papua. The beneficiaries are mostly business cronies, the military or senior officials and their families, who are non-Papuans²². The illegal logging business is thriving in West Papua too (Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak 2005). The destruction of West Papuan forests continues and they are fast disappearing (Laksamana 28 October 2003). The companies rely on the military and the police to protect their logging interests. Indigenous Papuans

¹⁸ <http://www.ptfi.com/Content.asp?id=1&cid=71>

¹⁹ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20050211.L03>

²⁰ www.bps.go.id/profile/irja

²¹ The Jakarta Post, 15 April 2006

²² International Crisis Group 2002: 14-16

insisting on the right to their ancestral land are accused of being separatist rebels and intimidated by the Indonesian security forces (Ibid).

B. Budget Allocation

According to the special autonomy regulations, the budget allocation for West Papua must be “special,” which means bigger than the allocation of an average Indonesian province. The allocation comes, essentially, from two sources: the central government budget and West Papua’s regional revenues. More specifically, the budget allowance from the central government comes from a general allocation grant (DAU/Dana Alokasi Umum) and special autonomy funds (Dana Otsus). As specified by the special autonomy rules, the budget must include a certain percentage taken from regional revenues. The budget, however, is not free of problems: there are issues of corruption and transparency²³. For instance, in fiscal year 2005, the region received a budget allocation of US\$183 million from the central government for special autonomy implementation²⁴.

Nonetheless, as a Jakarta Post article points out, “forty percent of West Papuans are living below the poverty line – more than double the national average. One third of West Papuans’ children do not go to school, and nine out of ten villages do not have basic health service, with a health center, doctor or midwife²⁵.”

C. Economic Disparities

Another important issue with regard to West Papua’s economic situation is the level of economic disparity between the indigenous West Papuans and other Indonesians who live in West Papua. As Elmslie argues in his book, *Irian Jaya under the Gun*, an increasing number of Indonesians in West Papua is inevitable, thanks to the Indonesian government’s transmigration program. It not only changes the composition of the population, but also presents new challenges for West Papuans in terms of economic opportunity and competition (Elmslie 2002: 73-75). Although the government halted its transmigration program in 2000, Indonesians, especially from Java and South Sulawesi,

²³ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20030328.C04>

²⁴ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20050401.C05>

²⁵ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20051116.F05>

still flow spontaneously to this region, which they perceive as a region of hope and entrepreneurship (Ibid).

Unfortunately, the economic disparity between the local people and the Indonesian immigrants not only fuels regional tension, but also creates a wider gap between the indigenous people and the other Indonesians. Indonesian migrants play a dominant role in society (Ibid). They excel in trade, services, construction and contracting in West Papua. Indigenous Papuans, by contrast, face immense economic problems. The religious leaders in West Papua have stated that “a people-centred economy has not been developed and the majority of the poor community have been economically disempowered²⁶. It has been very difficult for indigenous Papuans to compete against migrants who are better skilled and have better business networks, longer experience in marketing and the modern economy and more capital to draw on. Having conducted an economic survey in Timika, Agus Sumule, the leading sociologist in West Papua, came to the conclusion that “given the heavy influx of migrants, it was almost inevitable that Papuans would lose out in competition (Sumule 2001: 107).

Migrants dominate almost all government offices and private companies. The religious leaders in West Papua recognize that indigenous Papuans are marginalized and neglected, especially those living in remote and isolated villages²⁷. The domination of the migrants has engendered feelings of bitterness among indigenous Papuans. They feel “robbed of their belongings such as land, deprived of the right to a job, powerless to compete, jealous of the progress made by others and looked down upon as inferior – to say nothing of the stigmatization they meet (stupid, poor, lazy, etc) (Broek and Rathgeber 2005: 141).

Economic disparity is not an independent problem. It is related to other problems, such as the level of education, the socio-cultural background, and the availability of opportunity. Jaap Timmer argues that poor governance then aggravated the problem.

²⁶ September Declaration, No. 4

²⁷ Religious leaders in West Papua, issued on 20 December 2003

Poverty levels in the highlands are the highest in Indonesia and economic disparities lead to regional tensions. Poor governance is widening the gap between local people and the government. On top of that, decades of poorly controlled military action have generated a widespread collective memory of violence and humiliation. These accumulated factors conjure up the demon of independence that so easily mobilizes Papuans and paralyzes Jakarta (Timmer, 2006).

3. Socio-Cultural Affairs

The twelve articles of the special autonomy law cover a number of socio-cultural issues. Implementation of these articles, however, as with the political and economic issues, is far from what was expected, even many years after the law's circulation. Problems exist in every sector, social and cultural, and at every level of West Papuan society: whether villages, suburbs, or cities. Some indicators – such as the level of education, the level of poverty, the level of illiteracy, and so forth – show just how far the implementation of the law has or has not worked throughout all levels of society. Observers of the law's implementation in West Papuan society find that those indicators reveal the “failures” of special autonomy.

A. Education

Article fifty-six of the law determines that education is part of the area of the provincial government, which must regulate all aspects related to education, from the curriculum to the overall system. In article forty-seven, the law requires that the educational system be used to promote and preserve the West Papuan identity, culture, and customs²⁸. The law also specifically says that education is meant to elevate the living standard of mainly the indigenous people, who, intentionally or not, have been marginalized, especially during the new-order era.

Controversy occurred when the Indonesian parliament passed an education law that introduced a new educational system for all of Indonesia. During the debates and process of developing this law, neither the central government nor the parliament

²⁸ <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>

considered the necessity to exclude special regions, like West Papua, from being subject to the new law (Sullivan 2003: 10–11). As a result, the West Papuans became increasingly skeptical of the government's intentions.

Additionally, the data pertaining to education in West Papua, as shown below is clear evidence that, despite the effort and money committed to education in West Papua, much more has to be done in order to achieve what the law requires...

There are 2,378 elementary schools, 238 secondary schools, 105 high schools two state universities and some private colleges in Papua²⁹. Education is regarded as vital for development and welfare, and the provincial government has made it the top priority in its development programme. However, many schools in remote areas, where the pupils are exclusively Papuan, have almost no teaching materials. School buildings are neglected. Most primary schools lack facilities, furniture and material support. More and more schools cannot function properly because of the shortage of teachers. Pay is low, as is the standard of teacher training and skills. Schoolbooks are not properly distributed to villages³⁰.

The majority of indigenous Papuans receive either no schooling or very little. The literacy rate for Papuan women is 44% compared to 78% in the rest of Indonesia, and for Papuan men the figure is 58% compared to 90% nationwide³¹. Only 10% of Papuans have a high school education and only 1% graduate from college (kakisina 2002). The quality of education is not improving. On the contrary, as Bishop Leo has acknowledged, "the education sector is getting worse, especially in the highlands and hinterlands (Ladjar, Interfaith Communion).

West Papua is rich in natural resources, such as gold, copper, petroleum, liquefied natural gas, timber, fish, etc. Nevertheless, indigenous Papuans continue to be afflicted by poverty³². According to local government, 80 per cent of the population of Papua

²⁹ The Jakarta Post, 6 January 2001

³⁰ September Declaration, No. 4

³¹ UNDP, Human Development Report 2002

³² UNDP, Human Development Report, 2002

ranks poor (Kompas, 22 March 2005). The abundance of natural resources does not bring prosperity to the Papuans. Central government leaving Papuans economically marginalized (Largerberg 1979 and Schell 2002) mainly ploughs the profits earned from natural resources back.

Indigenous Papuans, who suffer from a severe lack of training and access to capital, are not economically empowered, living a largely cashless existence of subsistence farming, gathering, and hunting. They are in some ways dependent on forest products for their livelihood (Kakisina S. 2001).

B. Poverty, Health, and Living Standard

West Papuans' living conditions probably are among the most controversial issues, due to the fact that, in terms of its natural resources and budget allocation, the province of West Papua is among the five richest provinces and receives the biggest annual budget allotment in all of Indonesia. Unfortunately, In 2003, Governor Jaap Salossa reported that "74.24 percent of the more than 2.3-million-strong population is living in remote areas such as steep slopes, isolated isles, and deep gorges, without access to proper transportation and other public facilities (Nethy Dharma Somba. 74 percent of Papuans live in isolation and poverty³³. He added, "Poverty was the cause of a low quality of life in West Papua, with the infant mortality rate standing at seventy-nine per one thousand births" (Ibid).

According to statistics from the Ministry of Development and Disadvantaged Regions, nineteen out of twenty-nine regions in West Papua were categorized as "underdeveloped"³⁴. Based on the data, therefore, it is not surprising that 39.2 percent of West Papuans live under the poverty level, 123³⁵. Furthermore, more than 50% of Papuan children under the age of five are undernourished. Only 40.8% of Papuan children have been immunized compared with the national average of 60.3%³⁶ and twenty-five out of

³³ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20030819.D02>

³⁴ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20060726.E01>

³⁵ West Papua Statistics Bureau, www.bpspapua.go.id

³⁶ "West Papua: the Facts," *New Internationalist*, No. 344, April 2002

250 tribes are still living without outside contact (Ibid). This sad picture of West Papuans' social condition is worsened by numerous incidents of such factors as famine,³⁷ death-related diarrhea, and malaria³⁸ and an increasing number of HIV/AIDS cases thirty times the national average³⁹. The provincial office of the Department of Health in West Papua reported in June 2004 that out of a total of 1,579 patients 596 had developed AIDS and 983 HIV⁴⁰.

It has been estimated that as many as 5 percent of the population has already been infected. Infant mortality is expected to remain high over the coming ten years due to the high percentage of people with HIV/AIDS (Green C.W 2002). Having researched into AIDS, reproduction and colonization in West Papua for ten years, Leslie Butt, a Canadian medical anthropologist, presents a number of reasons for giving HIV top priority. She points out that the international community is not aware of the extent of the problem. The local culture is always blamed for the spread of HIV, and bureaucrats play down their own role in the lack of adequate information about safe sex. Only Indonesian sex workers are taught about the use of condoms. Papuans know little about condoms because none are distributed to them. Indigenous Papuans have higher rates of HIV infection than Indonesian migrants in West Papua (Butt 2001).

C. Rhetoric of Culture Protection

Two articles of the special autonomy law cover cultural protection aspects. Article fifty-seven says that "the provincial government shall protect, foster, and develop the culture of West Papuan natives"⁴¹. Article fifty-eight specifies the government's obligation to "maintain and stabilize" the identity of West Papuans (Ibid). Thus, according to those articles, the government must play an active role in protecting aspects of West Papuan culture. The reality, however, is disturbingly opposite. Instead of maintaining and stabilizing the culture, the government is accused not only of being negligent, but also of endangering West Papuan culture by allowing the continuous presence of other

³⁷ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20060425.D02>

³⁸ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20060425.D01>

³⁹ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20060425.D22>

⁴⁰ Kompas, 1 November 2004

⁴¹ <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>

Indonesians in West Papua. Many scholars have addressed this continuation of “Indonesianization” in West Papua. West Papuans are being forced to change their way of life, which, according to the government, is neither civilized nor healthy.

Furthermore, in the name of modernization and development, West Papuans are being encouraged to change their traditions, customs, and even their identity (Tebay 2005:11–12). As Neles Tebay, a priest in Jayapura’s diocese, explains,

A significant example of the undermining of West Papuan culture is the way that West Papuans have been separated from their land. In former days, the West Papuans were the owners of the forest under customary adat (traditional law) . . . under Indonesian rule, West Papuans were no longer considered as the owners of ancestral lands. Their lands were plundered on the pretext of national development, and their forests expropriated and exploited (Ibid).

4. Human Rights and Justice

Human rights and justice encompass one of the most visible areas in which Special autonomy has failed to improve conditions for the indigenous West Papuans. Since 2001, the year the law was launched a number of human-rights- and justice-related incidents have occurred in West Papua. These institutions, including human rights courts and a commission of righteousness and reconciliation are expressed in the special autonomy law as a mean to achieve and maintain a conducive human rights situation in which indigenous people are respected and treated fairly, are equal, and are free from fear and intimidation⁴². Ironically, Human rights violations in Papua were so widespread and almost non-discriminatory. The Papuans perceive human rights violations as something more than a collection of individual cases. It hurt Papuans’ dignity and defamed humanity as well. In addition, Indonesia faces increasingly strong criticism from the world over its human rights records. These were committed mostly by the Indonesian military, especially during the New Order era. Many scholars argue that the continuation of a security approach by the Indonesian government is the main cause of these violations. Even though the law respects human rights, in practice, human rights are put aside in the name of security and stability. Nonetheless, since President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono victory in 2004 election the situation is improving. Regrettably, a number of

⁴² www.papuaweb.org

unexpected incidents have unavoidably occurred, which undermine the government's promise to improve the human rights situation.

A more disturbing picture described by Human Rights Watch relates to the Indonesian military's practices in West Papua, which, according to the 2006 report, are "characterized by undisciplined and unaccountable troops committing widespread abuses against civilians, including extrajudicial executions, torture, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and drastic limits on freedom of movement"⁴³. The report also notes, however, that in September 2005, two police officers were tried in a human rights court in Makassar for the killing of three West Papuan students and the torture of a hundred civilians (Ibid).

It is also important to note that not only Indonesian authorities commit human rights violations but also by some OPM members. Clearly, the continuation of this chain of violence will only intensify the tension between West Papuans and the Indonesian military and police on the one hand, and between the indigenous people and Indonesian immigrants on the other.

In political, the government banned all expressions of a so-called Independent West Papua, including meetings, demonstrations, flag raisings, speeches, and the provision of documents, pictures, and songs. Thus, the West Papuans were alienated.

5. Recent Evaluation of the Special Autonomy Law

After the resignation of Suharto in 1998, Special Autonomy laws were perceived as part of the solution in diverting secessionist demand of West Papua. When the political situation eventually became more stable and the government reorganized central authority, the necessity of Special Autonomy was viewed from a different perspective. This involved a move away from adopting by DPR, s of bills devised by provincial elites in preference to government drafts. Lack of technical capacity to draft legislation which still resided in the bureaucracy was a factor receiving DPR were contrary to the previous

⁴³ Human Rights Watch, January 2006

pattern of legislative/executive relations. Failure of local governments to effectively implement legislation had provided opportunity to reverse or change original initiatives. The central government chose alternative strategies of a less accommodating nature to suppress separatists demands (McGibbon 2004).

In this context, two major groups had emerged in Papuan society with difference views. The views of two major groups of Papuans are as follows- first, for the majority of the inhabitants, only a referendum for independence can deliver freedom for Papua; second, the view of those who are not ethnic Papuans, ...that the best future for Papua is a status quo of full integration with Indonesia (Braitewaite, et.al 2008: 36).

Whilst the Province has received a huge sum of Special Autonomy funds but most people are getting poorer. In this regard many Papuans had believes that the funds were being spent on security services, Freeport mining company and the other foreign investors rather than the needs of ordinary Papuans for education and health in particular. Many of them cannot afford education, health service and medicine. This lack of regulation opened up opportunities for corruption. The present situation places regents in a potentially corrupt position arising from disbursements to people asking for funds which are presently being paid from the Special Autonomy fund (Somba 2010). Economic and social developments that were meant to improve the West Papuans' socio-economic conditions were marginalized many of them from educational, economic and social opportunities.

Papuans were also lost their trust on the Indonesian State or its agents in Papua. Because "the Special Autonomy Law permitted the raising of a Papuan flag, yet the security services prevented raising the Morning Star flag under any conditions. A similar circumstance applied in relation to the singing of *Hai Tanahku Papua* (Oh Papua My Homeland) (Braitewaite, el. Al., 2008: 38).

Currently, "as the Papuan anthropologist, historian and prophet of Papuanisation, Benny Giay, would insist, it is important for Papuans to understand and manage or

overcome the divisions on their own side-particularly over the issue of autonomy versus independence (King 2004: 69). This could help to avoid divisive tactics by Indonesian officials in future negotiations.

Furthermore, to end impunity enjoyed by Indonesian security forces, a draft of the autonomy legislation contained provisions for the establishment of an independent human rights commission for Papua. As a result, a branch of Indonesia Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) was opened in West Papua (Papua) following the implementation of the autonomy legislation after so many years, without any specific mandate or tasks. In fact, the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court of Justice was extremely limited. The new court lacked the ability to prosecute abuses by security forces and government officials. Moreover, impunity for soldiers and their commanders is still the order of the day in Papua.

For comprehensive performance of Special Autonomy Law's Papuan People's Consultative Council (MRP) was established, but its role limited to cultural affairs with no decision-making power and authority whatsoever. Currently the MRP simply provides advice to the administration and the People's Parliamentary Representative Council (DPRP).

In that background, in 2007, an Evaluation Team was formed to study the implementation of the autonomy law. This evaluation Team consists of members of the Papuan People's Consultative Council (MRP), scholars at Cenderawasih University, as well as youth activists from the Association of College and University Students of the Papuan Central Highlands (AMP). Mr. John Djopari, a government official who was formerly the Indonesian ambassador to PNG, served as Chairman of the Papua Special Autonomy Evaluation Team. The result of the evaluation was basically the same as the one carried out by the Papuan Traditional Council (PTC) in 2005. Mr. John Djopari, acknowledged the implementation of the bill as a failure. Mr. Djopari admitted that the GOI used up all the special autonomy funds to expand new regencies and their associated expenditures. These expansions, according to Mr. Djopari are not in line with the

aspirations of the Papuan community members; they only serve the interests of certain elites (Mote 2010).

On the other hand, the republic of Indonesia, concluded Mr. Djopari, has wasted the funds from the autonomy bill to form new, unnecessary, district administrative units. The core issue is that civilian officials have failed to establish meaningful and authoritative control over the uncontrollable forces, which continue to operate with impunity (Ibid).

6. The Alternative Solutions

Third party intervention

1. The Indonesian government is projecting that the Special Autonomy Law as the best solution to deal the political, social and economic problems comprehensively in West Papua. However, in practice the government is not implementing the Special Autonomy Law consistently and comprehensively.

2. In this context, West Papua people today feel that the intention and the policies of Jakarta are threatening for their right to life in their own homeland.

3. Therefore, what Papuan concerned about is the third party participation and Intervention:

a. In order to put pressure on the central government in Jakarta as well as local government for the full implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, especially the Papuan original version (the non-watered down version)

b. A dialogue between GOI and the Papuans (represented by PTC, MRP & DPRP) is necessary to settle the conflict facilitated by an international neutral third party.

Conclusion

The collapsed of the Suharto regime in 1998 has brought drastically political change across Indonesia. The first years of reform allowed Papuans to express their long-suppressed feelings and aspirations through public protests and even openly and peacefully express their demand for the right to self-determination.

The Special Autonomy Law 2001 was the Indonesian government's significant attempt to address grievances of the people of Papua. The Special Autonomy Law focused on giving greater political and economic power to Papuans. The law recognized specific grievances, such as the exploitation of natural resources and threats to Papuans' identity, while still ensuring that Papua remained within the territory of Indonesia. The law includes to establish transitional justice mechanisms, including a Human Rights Court and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Papua. However, the final autonomy bill removed the key provision of independence of a regional human rights body. A branch of Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) was established in West Papua following the implementation of autonomy legislation, without any specific mandate or tasks. The new court lacked the ability to prosecute abuses by security forces and government officials.

Furthermore, Province has received a huge sum of Special Autonomy funds but most people are getting poorer. Many of indigenous Papuan cannot afford education, health service and medicine. The people who benefit from the special autonomy are a group of Papuan elites who hold various positions in various regencies. Papuans were also lost their trust on the Indonesian State or its agents in Papua. Because "the Special Autonomy Law permitted the raising of a Papuan flag, yet the security services prevented raising the Morning Star flag under any conditions. A similar condition applied in relation to the singing of Hai Tanahku Papua. Therefore, the core issue is that Civilian authorities have failed to establish meaningful and authoritative control over the security forces, which continue to operate with impunity.

Therefore, we can conclude that what Papuan people need now is the third party participation and International community intervention to put pressure Indonesian government in Jakarta and local government in order to support effectively and consistently the full implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, especially the Papuan original version (the non-watered down version.) This would be a viable solution to address the problems more effectively since the indigenous scholars drafted this law.

Chapter V

Conclusion

CONCLUSION

West Papua situated at the easternmost edge of Indonesia's archipelago. Papua is one of the country's most resource-rich provinces. Papuan nationalism emerged, in response to Dutch rule during colonial period and later because of the activities of the Indonesian state.

The Indonesian nationalism was born out of a long history of struggle against the colonial rule. With the arrival of World War II, State formation in Indonesia began under the Japanese, who ended Dutch colonial rule in 1942 and after Japan surrendered Indonesia proclaimed independence in 1945. The state of the Republic of Indonesia relied to a considerable extent on the 'nation creation' efforts of the post-1949 period. These have included, most successfully, opposition to Dutch colonialism and the development of a new national language 'Bahasa Indonesia' both of which have acted to bind together the otherwise diverse peoples of the regions. Less successful, however, there have been attempts to recall the greatness of the Majapahit Empire, which relied on a very particular representation of Javanese political hegemony.

In the period of Sukarno's Guided Democracy Indonesian nationalism was manifested in a combative manner against real or imagined external enemies. Against the Dutch- the former colonial power not only in national revolution but also after independence over the demand of West Papua. The Indonesian-Dutch conflict in West Papua was outline not merely as a bilateral conflict but as a revolution against the imperialism.

After the fall of Sukarno in 1965, nationalism under Suharto's New Order became an ideological ornamentation of the state and ruled the country as an authoritarian for thirty-two years. He focused mainly on national economy that would bring material prosperity and sought political reorganization as a sovereign state from other nation-

states. He prioritized on the mission of state building, the construction of institutions for administration and control and the creation of a community centred state.

The relationship between Indonesia and West Papua province political condition has been subject to debate. West Papua first appeared as a part of Netherlands Indies in official documents issued in 1828 and 1848. This situation changed following World War II, when the Dutch retained West Papua after the rest of the East Indies gained independence as the Republic of Indonesia. In the Round Table Agreement of 1949, a clause predetermined that the Papuan's fate would be decided within a year. When the bilateral talks broke down, Indonesia lobbied for integration with West Papua, first through diplomacy then by threatening a war.

Initially, the Netherlands responded by accelerating the process for West Papuans self-rule. However, finally the Netherlands surrendered to American pressure and agreed to a settlement with Indonesia. The New York Agreement of 1962 called for West Papua's transfer to the United Nations, then Indonesia, which was to hold an 'Act of Free Choice' in which the West Papuans would chose between independence and integration into the Indonesia Republic.

Prior to its formal agreement, the Indonesian Government took control of West Papua on 1 May 1963 and in 1969, 1022 carefully supervised individuals voted unanimously in favor of integration. Since then an armed separatist movement started against Indonesian rule by OPM. Indonesian government's military counter-insurgency campaigned against the West Papua Independence Movement (OPM), which resulted into a widespread disruption to the civilian population, including a high number of human rights' abuses. Moreover, trans-national companies and Jakarta Government have exploited Papua's natural resources.

Since the fall of the Suharto's regime in 21 May 1998, the independence movement took on a more inclusive, nonviolent form. The opposition to Jakarta's rule has moved from the periodic attacks of the OPM, to an elite-led movement to assert

Papua's legal rights to autonomy or full independence. The Papuan elite, has largely advocated independence through various forums and political representations to Jakarta. On 26 February 1999 meeting in Jakarta, a Team of 100 provincial leaders presented then President Habibie with a demand for West Papua's independence. Responding to Papuan demands and to address their grievances, the Indonesia government ultimately offered Special Autonomy law in 2001, which contained significant concessions for West Papua. The Special Autonomy Law for West Papua, which was drafted by mostly indigenous West Papuan scholars, states explicitly all the requirements and conditions necessary to accommodate the secessionists' demands, except for independence. However, the law also specifies the Indonesian government's rights in terms of defense, foreign policy, financial issues, the national police force, and judicial affairs.

The Special Autonomy Law No. 21/2001 for Papua focused on giving greater political and economic power to Papuans. The law went further than other decentralization processes in Indonesia by recognizing specific grievances, such as the exploitation of natural resources and threats to Papuans' identity, while still ensuring that Papua remained within the territory of Indonesia.

In this backdrop of the significant changes in relations between the central government and its region, the Special Autonomy Law No. 21/2001 for Papua can be interpreted as one of many signs that the Indonesian government has adopted a policy of accommodation rather than integration toward the West Papua. However, the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law to address the demand for Independence and the grievances remains a big challenge.

The proposed study began with an attempt to understand the following questions: First, the nature of Indonesia 'nation-state building project' and 'national transformation' in relations with West Papua. Second, how did the West Papua nationalism and ethnic separatism emerge? What is the relationship between Papuan nationalism and OPM? Third, to investigate the idea of Nation which is produce as an instrument of governance?

Fourth, how Indonesia responded to ethnic separatism of West Papua with effective methods.

Discussion on such critical questions are very importance in order to understand the historical processes of nation-making, subsequent contestations over citizenship like in terms of rights, decentralization, autonomy, self-determination and share of resources. The prevailing discourses on Separatist conflict in Indonesia in relation with West Papua are critical questions related to historical processes of Indonesia nation-state formation. The genesis of political conflict is trace to the very processes in which West Papua became a part of Indonesia Republic. Conflict emerged out of the creation of political structures and social that deprived the rights of indigenous people of West Papua in term of identity and culture, safety, respect, participation and economy are regarded main factors for the existing conflict. The conflict is marked by:

First, the coercive nature of how West Papua was included in the Republic of Indonesia with the Act of Free Choice which is being described as nothing more than the "Act of No Choice", there by challenging the legal basis of Papua's integration into Indonesia.

Second, the exploitation of natural resources (copper, gold, timber) irrespective of local interests and traditions has been a main source of grievances. The growing demographic imbalance between "transmigrants" and the locals, with the former being given all the privileges and access, at the expense of the latter.

Third, the gross violations of human rights by the security forces, especially the military, when conducting operations against the OPM and other groups opposing Jakarta authority.

Fourth, recently the failure to the full effective and consistent implementation of Special Autonomy Law.

The questions civil, political, economic, Social and cultural situation triggered a new generation fighting for implementation of Special Autonomy Law effectively and consistently and some are demanding complete independence from Indonesia. A through examining the nature of narratives that readdresses Papua's nationalist ideology, which is founded on the history, and nationalist historiography of decolonization, specifically Papua's integration or takeover into Indonesia. The decolonization of the Netherlands Indies leaved the nation state of Indonesia, but, the delayed activities of the Netherlands government despite, failed to produce a nation state in West Papua. Even though its failure to provide a state for the Papuans, the decolonization process has fostered and shaped the development of Papuan nationalism, while the UN system of nation states has provided a language in terms of which they have articulated a call for self-determination and human rights. Lack of basic and social services, exploitation of their natural resources, weakening of local institutions, erosion of traditional culture and norms, uneven distribution of wealth, military atrocities, and discrimination, among others, have forced the West Papuans to conduct anti-Indonesia, separatist activities and have reinforced their ethnic nationalist claims.

Furthermore, Special Autonomy Law was initially introduced as a means to settle West Papuan discontents against the Indonesian State. By giving more autonomy to the region in managing its affairs, the central government also expects that the programme would soon boost the economic performance of the region. The policy of Special Autonomy is understood to be one of the best solutions possible for solving the problems of West Papua. This Law, which had been drafted by mostly indigenous West Papuan scholars, states clearly all the requirements and conditions necessary to accommodate the secessionists' demands, except for independence. However, the law also specifies the Indonesian government's rights in terms of defense, foreign policy, financial issues, the national police force, and justice affairs, while still ensuring that Papua remained within the territory of Indonesia. Indeed, this will bring Indonesia closer to a federal system but it is still within the framework of a unitary state in which the region will have a much greater autonomy.

Several provisions in the law include a positive commitment to establish transitional justice mechanisms, including a Human Rights Court and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Papua. However, the final autonomy bill eliminated the key provision of independence of a regional human rights body. Human rights have not significantly improved in democratic times. In sum, Papua has moved significantly beyond the situation under the Suharto regime. However, ongoing human rights abuses by Indonesian's militaries and government officials mean that charges of "internal colonialism" are still widespread within Papua.

Whilst the Province has received, a huge sum of Special Autonomy funds but most people are getting poorer. Many of them cannot afford education, health service and medicine. Since Indonesian government has failed to handle the cultural, economic, social and political problems facing indigenous Papuans. It is clear that the main cause of this failure is the absence of full, effective and consistent implementation of the Papuan Autonomy Law by the Indonesian government. Therefore, decentralization or Special Autonomy Law should be seen as an embedded strategy in strengthening nation-state building.

Instead of protecting the legitimate rights of the West Papuans both the past and present Indonesian government crafted and implemented policies for West Papuan which were gravely repressive and there is no specific law to protect human rights for West Papuans, including independence supporters, to peacefully express their political position, aspirations, and views. Jakarta officials and even some political analysts have argued that the country has achieved important progress in strengthening its democracy since the collapse of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998. However, the transfer of power from Suharto's authoritarian regime to successive Reformasi democratic governments has not translated into significant changes in so far as the level of socioeconomic development and human rights situation in West Papua are concerned.

Therefore, after a thorough examination we can conclude that any analysis of Indonesia-Papuan relations has centred on a number of key issues such as Papuan ethnic

difference, economic underdevelopment and so on. But the root cause of the problem is political, due to the manner in which the territory was acquired, while economic and cultural factors have served to keep alive demands for autonomy or complete independence. Thus, Papuan observes them as being "colonized" by other Indonesians.

Therefore, the need of the hour of Papuans is the third party participation and intervention to put pressure Indonesian government in Jakarta and local government in order to support effectively and consistently the full implementation of the Special Autonomy Law. The International community also needs to put pressure on Jakarta (GOI) to genuinely and seriously to implement the special autonomy bill, especially the Papuan original version (the non-watered down version). If the law is implemented, there is a hope that human rights violations committed by both state and non-state actors will be reduced dramatically. Moreover, the immediate withdrawal of Indonesian security forces will definitely decrease the number of cases of forced disappearances, extrajudicial killing, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, intimidation, and sweeping military operations against besieged/displaced civilian population.

On the other hand, In fact, there is little hope for Papuans to get complete independence from Indonesia. Since, secessionist movement in West Papua received little international support from members of the United Nations. Therefore, the best way for Papuan is to struggle and fight to achieve right for self- determination within unitary Indonesia.

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