

**OPPOSITION AND FOREIGN POLICY  
DURING SHASTRI'S PRIME MINISTERSHIP**

( JUNE 1964 to JANUARY 1966 )

**DISSERTATION  
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By

**RENUKA MEHTA**

( *Post M. A. Diploma in International Affairs* )

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,  
UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN  
JAIPUR.**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

L.S.D.	Loka Sabha Debate
B.J.S.	Bharatiya Jana Sangh
S.S.P.	Samyukta Socialist Party
P.S.P.	Praja Socialist Party
C.P.I.	Communist Party of India
D.M.K.	Dravid Munetra Kazgham
P.M.	Prime Minister
I.P.G.	Independent Parliamentary Group.
U.P.P.G.	United Progressive Parliamentary Group.

## P R E F A C E

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I am also thankful to the Secretary of Rajasthan Legislative Assembly who allowed me to go through the Parliamentary Debates and Journals available in the Assembly Library.

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Renuka Mehta

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

In June 1964, when Lal Bahadur Shastri was chosen to succeed Jawaharlal Nehru as India's Prime Minister, a whisper went around the country. People wondered how this man of unprepossessing physique could fit the complex bill demanded by the Prime Ministership of the most popular democracy in the world.

The question 'After Nehru who?' in itself, was a measure of Lal Bahadur Shastri's achievement as the first Prime Minister of post Nehru India. Shastri's Prime Ministership was at first dismissed as an interlude after the grand Nehru era. India may not be able to produce another Gandhi or Nehru. But the emergence of someone like Shastri - a man of the people achieving all India leadership might not be beyond his political capacity. He had the capacity for clear thinking, and to voice the essential aspirations of the people. His career looked like the Indian version of an ascent.<sup>1</sup> "From the log cabin to the white house", and his experience of the privation that poverty brought gave him a real understanding of human problems.

The 'Guardian' was prompted to say that here was a man who had the characteristics that would make him the

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1. R.C.Gupta - Shastri- The man and his Ideas, P.127  
(New Delhi, 1966).

"most effective Prime Minister of India"<sup>1</sup>. On becoming Prime Minister two important things were uppermost in his thought; the establishment of a new social order in the country and the consolidation of Indian freedom and through it.

Lal Bahadur Shashtri's election as leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party and hence the Prime Minister of India was generally welcomed all over the country. Not only the choice of the man but also the way he was chosen was praised by many leaders. "Unanimous election is demonstration of unity and solidarity which was a tribute to the democratic ideals"<sup>2</sup>.

The election was widely welcomed from different political parties and leaders of the country hoped that he would carry out successfully the mission initiated by Mr. Nehru.<sup>3</sup>

The leaders of Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) party welcomed Mr. Shashtri's election. Its general secretary, the late Mr. Deen Dayal Upadhyaya said, " Mr. Lal Bahadur Shashtri is a man of moderate views"<sup>4</sup>. He added, " I hope we will be able to seek co-operation from all the quarters to save the country from foreign invasion and internal disruption".

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1. R.C. Gupta- Shashtri - The man and his Ideas, P.127 (New Delhi, 1966).
  2. Statesman- June 3, 1964, p.1.
  3. Indian Express- June 3, 1964, p.1.
  4. Ibid. p.5.

The Communist Party said "that Communist Party will support all those policies which will strengthen independence, national defence and the interest of the toilers of the country".<sup>1</sup>

Communist member Mr. Prem Sagar Gupta while "welcoming Mr. Shashtri's election hoped that under his leadership the Government would continue to pursue the basic policies of non-alignment peace democracy and secularism".<sup>2</sup>

Swatantra Party leader Mr. Homi Modi said that the Congress Party had made an "excellent choice", he described "Mr. Shashtri as a man of integrity and quiet competence".<sup>3</sup>

But Mr. C.Rajagopalachari said that "it is the concern of Congress Party". He added that "Mr. Shahstri would be a good premier only to the extent that he develops and maintains respect for opposition parties, as well as his own forms independent opinions and controls his Congress brethren guiding them so as not to allow their oligarchic mentality to grow".<sup>4</sup>

Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) also welcomed Shashtri's election and praised him. This soft spoken Shahstri of diminutive dimensions and retiring disposition was hailed as a man of peace and a man of principle.<sup>5</sup> He is adept at reconciling differences and bringing together divergent personalities by his personal charm and sweet reasonableness.

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1. Indian Express- 3rd June, 1964, p.1.
  2. Statesman- 3rd June, 1964, p.1.
  3. Statesman- 18th June, 1964, p.7.
  4. Statesman- 3rd June, 1964, p.1
  5. Janta (Bombay) Vol. XIX (14th June 1964 No. 71) p. 2



Shashtri's policy statement was welcomed by the Communist Party of India. "Party would support all progressive and democratic policies and measures. But the party would oppose all policies and measures which sought to reverse the policy of non-alignment and peace or which were anti democratic and harmed the people's interests".<sup>1</sup>

About the Shastri's Government Communist member Hiren Mukerjee's main charges were the failure to root out corruption and dangerous signs of a shift away from Nehru's policies.<sup>2</sup>

Left Communist member A.K. Gopalan described his Government "as the Government of Big brothers".

In the early phases of Shashtri's regime Swatantra Party gave full support to the Shastri's Government. In the first session of Parliament after he took over, when no confidence motion was moved by opposition parties, the Swatantra Party did not join it. Minoo Masani explained that Shashtri Government coming after the difficult Jawahar Lal Nehru regime was showing signs of realism and should, therefore, be given a chance. The leader of Swatantra party Rajaji welcomed some of Shastri's realistic moves. First point of realism was that if the present land reforms were quickly implemented, there would be no need for further reforms. Another point of realism was shift in emphasis on priorities in planning.<sup>3</sup> Thus Swatantra

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1. Statesman: 18th June, 1964, p.7.

2. Link (Weekly Journal) (New Delhi) 20th Sep.1964, p.9.

3. Link, (Weekly Journal)(New Delhi) 13th Sept.1964, p.8.

Party gave fair support to Shastri's Government.

J.B.Kripalani, independent member also gave fair support and refused to support the no confidence motion.

Thus to begin with, Shastri secured substantial support from most political parties. By and large the reaction of opposition parties on the election of Shastri and on his policies was favourable and optimistic.

## II

During Shastri's Prime Ministership (June 1964- January 1966) in Lok Sabha the number of opposition parties was 13. But Major parties were only 5 or 6, others were small and local parties. Opposition parties took great interest in foreign policy issues and debates. In fact strong opposition is the sign of healthy parliamentary democracy. The biggest opposition party was the 'Communist Party of India', the member of Communist Party (R) in the house of 485 members, was 33. On the whole the opposition strength was very thin in comparison to present parliament. The opposition parties of Shastri's time were as follows:

1. Communist Party of India
2. Swatantra Party
3. Bharatiya Jana Sangh
4. Praja Socialist Party) Samyunkta Socialist
5. Socialist Party ) Party- 1
6. Independent Parliamentary Group
7. Muslim League
8. United Progressive Parliamentary Group
9. Republican Party

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1. Both PSP and SP merged into one party called SSP (Samyunkta Socialist Party).

10. D.M.K.
11. Ram Rajya Parishad
12. Independent Members
13. Akali Dal

Shastri's was the time of crisis and aggression and two attacks were launched on India by her neighbour, Pakistan. Hence the main foreign policy issue of this time was India's relations with Pakistan. Other issues were comparatively less important. They all may briefly be mentioned here.

In March/April 1965, Pakistani forces attacked the Kutch Border. After a few days' fighting Britain's Prime Minister Wilson offered mediation. The two countries agreed on June 30 to mediate on the Kutch border between India and Pakistan. This agreement was a very controversial issue of foreign policy during Shastri's time. In the agreement we agreed to give our 3800 sq. miles territory to an international Tribunal for its determination.

In this series major issue was Pakistani's armed attack on Kashmir. Firstly from 5th of August Pakistan sent thousands of infiltrators in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to sabotage and paralyse the administration. When their expectations of an internal uprising did not materialise, Pakistan made an open military invasion across the international boundary. After about 3 weeks' war, ceasefire was accepted according to U.N. resolution of 23rd September 1965.

After this conflict Tashkant agreement was argued on 10th January, 1966, between Pakistan's President Ayub and India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri with the good offices of Soviet Premier Kosigin.

The other foreign policy issue was Indo Ceylon Agreement for the people of Indian origin in Ceylon. It was argued by Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Bhandarkar, the two Prime Ministers on October 29, 1964 in New Delhi. It was Prime Minister Shastri's effort towards peaceful relation with neighbouring countries.

The explosion of Chinese Atomic bomb had great impact on India-China relations and its effect on India's nuclear policy. This explosion had opened great controversy throughout the country whether India should make an Atom bomb or not?

Apart from these issues, some minor issues just as India's policy towards Vietnam, non-alignment and about nuclear umbrella were also important.

CHAPTER TWOSHASTRI'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

In June 1964 a new era began when Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri was chosen to succeed Jawaharlal Nehru as India's Prime Minister. He was no theoretician with vast international themes, and he could not have thought in the Nehru style - of his nation having a 'Tryst with Destiny'. But he believed in peace and peaceful development not only of the Indian people, but of the people of the world at large.

Shastri's Prime Ministership broadly falls into two phases - "an initial phase of apparent fumbling and wobbling, followed by a period of firmness - vigour and sureness of touch".<sup>1</sup>

The initial months of his Prime Ministership were far from trouble free. The new leadership seemed to be primarily concerned with consolidation, and with avoiding conflicts.

Decision-making in the Shastri's regime had become a shared process. It had come to be based on collective thinking, in which the Congress President as well as the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues of the Cabinet were partners. Shastri mostly consulted the leaders of

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1. N.C.B. Roy Chaudhary, "Shastri's India", The Political Quarterly (London) Vol.37 (1966) p.281.

opposition parties before taking a major decision. This was the reason why during the crisis all parties and people supported him.

He gave new confidence to India during Indo-Pak conflict. He struck a chord in every Indian's heart. "Eighteen months of his leadership had restored to the nation a badly needed sense of confidence in her destiny".<sup>1</sup>

On every occasion Shastri declared that he would not deviate from Nehru's basic policies and his Government would work for a new social order. In an interview he once said that "our foreign policy will be same on the point of non-alignment, disarmament and anticolonialism and anti racialism".<sup>2</sup>

About the policy of non-alignment he said that "policy of non-alignment initiated by Nehru is beneficial and will be beneficial for the country".<sup>3</sup> India could not afford to join any of the power blocks. He added that India had good relations with most of the countries and he would like to develop the friendly ties with all countries without involving India in power politics. He reaffirmed that non-alignment would continue to be the fundamental basis of India's approach to world problems and her relations with other countries. He also pledged

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1. R.C. Gupta - Shastri - the man and his Ideas, p.121.
  2. Link- (Weekly Magazine) 15th August, 1964, p.10.
  3. Indian Express - 4th June, 1965, p.1.

India's unflinching support to the U.N.O. in maintaining world peace, to the freedom struggles in certain posts of the world, to peace and disarmament and to Afro-Asian solidarity.

At Cairo Conference he declared, "Though Jawaharlalji is no longer with us, the Government and people of India stand dedicated to freedom and peace, to the principle of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, and to the eradication of racialism and colonialism"<sup>1</sup>.

He said that the "policy of peaceful co-existence underlines our broad approach to international relations and we have proclaimed admirable principles which should govern the conduct of states in order to promote and to ensure world peace and security. We want a world where peace prevails and where there is freedom from fear of nuclear annihilations"<sup>2</sup>.

"Peaceful co-existence", Shastri said, "has great importance for India, because we are indulging in economic development. If the whole human race think about peace, the importance of peace will increase. We do not want to conquer even an inch of anybody's territory. We want to live in peace and good neighbourliness, but if we are attacked we will defend ourselves with all our resources"<sup>3</sup>.

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1. From the speech at the Non-aligned Nations Conference, Cairo, 7th October, 1964.
  2. From the speech at the closing session of the non-aligned Nations Conference, Cairo, 10th October, 1964.
  3. From speech at World Conference for peace and International Co-operation, New Delhi, November 16, 1964.

On Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak disputes he said, "while he would pursue a policy of persuasion in dealing with Pakistan and China, he would not do anything inconsistent with national interest and dignity"<sup>1</sup>. So far as China was concerned, India had gone to the utmost length to seek a peaceful solution through the Colombo proposals. Mr. Shastri affirmed that "the Government of India would be prepared to consider any proposals that China might make to break the dead lock"<sup>2</sup>. Thus Shastri believed in the policy of persuasion and peaceful negotiations which could avoid armed conflict between these countries.

Shastri once said that "the policy of China to threaten India by the explosion of Atom Bomb was childish try." But he said that the explosion of atom bomb by China has created a stir which is undoubtedly a matter of concern for all of us. However we have always held the view that the use of nuclear weapons should be banned by agreement and all nations in the world should unite to some humanity from destruction."<sup>3</sup>

Shastri declared that from the threat of Chinese bomb India will never make atom bomb. India does not want to go with China in the field of destructive weapons. He said that "there is no need for rethinking on our nuclear policy. He said that there is no link between

1. Indian Express, 7th June, 1964, p.1.

2. Ibid.

3. Speech at a dinner given in honour of Mrs. Bhandarkar, New Delhi, Rastrapati Bhawan, October 22, 1964.



China policy and our nuclear policy. We in India stand committed to the use of nuclear power only for peaceful purposes and even though in a purely technical and scientific sense, we have the capability of developing nuclear weapons, our scientists and technicians are under firm orders not to make a single experiment, not to perfect a single device which is not needed for peaceful uses of atomic energy<sup>1</sup>.

On the other hand he stressed the need for disarmament and said "the Government of India believe that general and complete disarmament is the most urgent and the most vital problem facing mankind today. A treaty on general and complete disarmament be agreed upon as speedily as possible, and have lent their full support to all measures, comprehensive or partial, preliminary or otherwise, to that end. We believe in the ultimate victory of the spirit of humanity over the glorification of war and violence to the detriment of the human race."<sup>2</sup>

About the question of nuclear umbrella, Shastri said that "no country had offered India a nuclear umbrella, nor had India sought such an umbrella. All he said was that the matter had been taken up at the diplomatic level with both the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. He said that nuclear powers collectively had to do something to reassure the new nuclear countries until such time as nuclear disarmament was reached"<sup>3</sup>.

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1. Statesman- 11th May, 1965, p.1.

2. From letter to Chon Eu Lai, 27th November, 1964.

3. Statesman- 18th June, 1965, p.1.

About Vietnam war he had made an appeal that "the hostilities should come to an end. That the two parties concerned should stop fighting, and there should be another Geneva conference. For this it is necessary that U.S. bombings must stop to create such an atmosphere. It is a very difficult problem and there seems to be no immediate solution in sight. We will do our level best to move in this matter and see that something positive is done".<sup>1</sup>

On India-Russia friendship he said, the development of friendly relations between our two countries was necessary not only in the interest of our two people but also in the larger interests of peace throughout the world. "The close co-operation and understanding which so happily exists in the approach of our two countries to various international problems flows from our common quest for peace and our common desire to eliminate war. It is for this reason that both our countries are totally opposed to the use of force for the settlement of international disputes. We share the view that general and complete disarmament must be achieved as early as possible if mankind is to be saved from the threat of complete annihilation".<sup>2</sup>

Addressing Soviet leaders, he once said: "The Soviet Union has given us many precious gifts; the most precious gift of these is friendship. If the leaders of the world could join and discuss things in a friendly and peaceful

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1. From Reply to debate on President's address, Rajyasabha, 9th March, 1965.
  2. Reply to the toast at the banquet given by the Soviet P.M., Moscow, 12th May, 1965.

~~atmosphere such as you have here, most international~~ 1  
 problems could be solved without any difficulty whatever".

"Our mutual relations are based not upon any temporary expedients but upon the sincere realisation that the larger interest of humanity can be served best by promoting and enlarging the area of peace. Our close relationship is not directed against the interests of any other country or any other people."<sup>2</sup>

India and Pakistan are two great countries linked together by common history and tradition. Hence Shastri believed that it is essential for both India and Pakistan to bring about a real change in the condition of their people. "I consider it most important that there should be peace in the two countries so that economic development becomes possible. It is their natural destiny to be friends with one another and to enter into close co-operation in many fields"<sup>3</sup>. "He said and added that "I know that there are many unresolved differences between our two countries. Even between countries with the best of relations, there are differences and even disputes. The question which we have both to face is whether we should think force as a method solving disputes or whether we should decide and declare that force will never be used. Our assurances to each other not to use force would mean, therefore, that each agrees to respect the territorial integrity of the other"<sup>4</sup>.

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1. Address at Friendship University, Moscow, 14th May, 1965.
  2. Reply to Mr. Kosygin's address of Welcome at a reception held at the Kreundiu, Moscow, 15th May, 1965.
  3. From speech at a dinner given in honour of Lord Mountbatten, New Delhi, 6th May, 1965.
  4. Broadcast to the Nation, 23rd September, 1965.

Shastri further stated that "we must reverse the tide of unfortunate relations between India and Pakistan that the two countries had been at odds with each other for too long"<sup>1</sup>.

He believed that 'no war pact' would be of great benefit to both countries. Unfortunately our neighbours, both China and Pakistan, have chosen to adopt an attitude of aggressive hostility towards India. So we have to be careful about this fact. In these circumstances, the duty of the Government is quite clear and this duty will be discharged fully and effectively.

When Pakistani forces attacked on Kutch border - Shastri said that territorial integrity will be preserved at any cost. "We would prefer to live in poverty for as long as necessary but we shall not allow our freedom to be subverted. The supreme need of the hour is national unity"<sup>2</sup>.

He affirmed the Government's determination to vacate Pakistani's aggression from the Rann of Kutch under the agreement.

About the conditions of ceasefire he said "we will have no objection to ordering a ceasefire on the basis of a simultaneous agreement for the restoration of the status quo ante"<sup>3</sup>. He made it clear that the Government of India

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1. Indian Express, 13th June, 1964, p.1
  2. Speech in Lok Sabha, 28th April, 1965.
  3. Statement in Rajya Sabha, 3rd May, 1965.

~~do not recognise that there is any territorial dispute~~  
about the Rann of Kutch.

Welcoming the Kutch Agreement Mr. Shastri said that "this had eventually prevented a situation full of the gravest consequences"<sup>1</sup>.

About the Tashkant talk, Mr. Shastri said "I am always prepared to meet Mr. Chon-Eu-Lai. But where is a Kosygin to sponsor such a meeting".

I am convinced that the people of India and Pakistan are at one with the other people of the world will meet with satisfaction the results of Taskant meeting. We want to settle border issues between ourselves by peaceful means.

In Tashkant he said - we fought a war, now we have to fight for peace also. He said we must no longer quarrel amongst ourselves over communal and linguistic issues because such activities only sap a nation's strength.

In so far as Ceylon was concerned he entered into an agreement with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Bhandarnaike on the persons of Indian origin in Ceylon and thus removed a major cause. With Burma also, he tried to improve his relations.

In Malaysia Indonesia conflict Shastri told that "he agreed with the suggestion for India to take the initiative

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1. Statesman, 1st May, 1965, p.1.

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for setting up a good offices committee of non-alignment countries to mark for better understanding between Malaysia and Indonesia".<sup>1</sup>

Thus during his Prime Ministership he gave great importance to improve relations with neighbouring countries.

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1. Link- (Weekly Magazine), 4th October, 1964, p.7.

CHAPTER THREENON ALIGNMENT

India's foreign policy is based on the principle of non-alignment. After independence India decided not to join any power bloc. Jawahar Lal Nehru was the father of the concept of non-alignment.

As Mr. Gupta says: "Nehru was not an isolationist".  
"The neutrality upon which his policy is based also springs from a genuine inability at this stage to see world politics in terms of pure black and white and this leads to the decision to attempt to avoid non-alignment".<sup>1</sup>

Addressing the 59th session of the Indian National Congress on January 23, 1954, Nehru said "Our policy has been one of non-alignment and one of friendly relations with all countries. We have declared that India will be no participant in a war, and we have hoped that other countries in Asia would likewise keep away from it, thus building up an area of peace. The larger<sup>2</sup> that area is the more the danger of that war recedes".

He also said that this in itself was not a policy. The totality of India's policy was- "The pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or groups of powers but through an independent approach to

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1. Karunakar Gupta- "Indian Foreign Policy" (Calcutta, 1956) p.vi.

2. India News, January 30, 1959, p.452.

each controversial or disputed issue, the liberation of subject peoples, the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual the elimination of racial discrimination elimination of want disease and ignorance which affect the greater part of the world's population".<sup>1</sup> The policy of non-alignment was the best means for the achievement of these objectives.

Prime Minister Shastri agreed with Nehru's policy. He said that "policy of non-alignment initiated by Nehru is beneficial and will be beneficial for the country. India could not afford to join any of the power blocs, He added India had good relations with most of the countries and she would like to develop the friendly ties with all countries without involving ourselves in blocks".<sup>2</sup>

Opposition parties had different views on the policy of non-alignment. Some parties supported it but others criticised it.

(1) Swatantra Party:

A resolution adopted by the Swatantra party at its third national convention at Bangalore cogently expressed the party's view on foreign affairs. Reiterating the general line adopted by some opposition parties of the country, that the military reverses

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1. C.S. Jha: "Non-alignment in a changing world", Indian and foreign Review, (New Delhi) Vol.4(1967 No.23), p.3.
  2. Indian Express, 4th June, 1964, p.1.



sustained by India and the consequent national humiliation were the results of years of wrong policies in the realm of international relations and defence. The most tragic and disastrous of these mistaken policy was the concept of non-alignment and the double standard of judgment to which it led.

The Swatantra Party declared that "the disastrous fundamental policies of non-alignment and appeasement still continue, with the result that India has lost considerable prestige amongst its neighbours and in the world and that instead of the Chinese communist, regime being isolated. It is India that is in danger of finding herself in that situation".<sup>1</sup>

"The Swatantra Party is convinced that so long as this Government with the dead had past policies lying heavily on it, continues in office, there can be no hope of a solution of the problem of recovering our lost territory or ensuring the countries future security".<sup>2</sup>

The leader of Swatantra Party in the Lok Sabha, Mr. Ranga said that "we should not pursue this policy of non-alignment. India's relations between U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. are improving. Both of them are coming together. He said that we are not going to provide a platform for all those countries which would try to be non-aligned as

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1. "Political parties in foreign policy", India Quarterly (New Delhi), Vol.XXIII (1967 No.1) p.73.

2. Ibid.

as against India, which would ~~try to help~~ China. This is the danger"<sup>1</sup>.

Mr. Ranga stated that most of the African countries in Cairo Conference were under the influence of China, He said that "my fear is that India has no positive role to play at all in the present circumstances".


Rajaji's advise was that it would be better for us to have a firm alliance a firm friendship with all democratic nations which are willing to beat down this imperialism. He said, "Mr. Ranga pleaded for renunciation of the out dated policy of non-alignment in favour of friendship with democratic countries so that India could strengthen itself sufficiently to meet the Chinese challenge. China was the biggest enemy to world peace. It was meaningless to remain non-aligned between the Soviet Union and U.S.A. because the two countries were coming closure"<sup>2</sup>. He said that we should give up non-alignment and become part of a grand South East Asian alliance against communism with United States assistance. Similarly Mr. P.S. Narayan said, "we may have to bid goodbye to some of our very dear ideals. If non-alignment needed some revision there should be no hesitation in doing that"<sup>3</sup>. He criticised Government's policy and said we are afraid of offending our real enemies or our indifferent friends

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1. Lok Sabha Debate, 28th Sept. 1964, 9th Session, p.3809, Vol. XXXIV No.16.
  2. Hindustan Times, 26th September, 1964, p.1.
  3. Swarajya (Weekly magazine of Swatantra party) (Madras) Vol. IX (1965, No.47), p.11.

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but we go all out in criticising the western democracies and take their friendship for granted. There is a complacency feeling that the western powers will come to our rescue when our security is threatened again, even if we go on rubbing them on the wrong side. He asked the question, if we are really non-aligned, why we should refuse to recognise Israel on the contrary we antagonize it?

What have we gained by our so called 'non-alignment'? Narayan asked that "during the past decade apart from our estrangement with Pakistan, we have lost our friendship with China and Indonesia, our settlers in Burma have been driven out. We have been forced to agree to Ceylon sending away over five lakhs of Indian citizens from that Island to India where they now have no roots at all. Malaysia's friendship with India is strained because of our like warm support to her resistance to Indonesia's confrontation. We have lost the friendship of both South & North Vietnam. In the middle East almost every country is either turning itself against us or is being successfully goaded to turn against us by communist China. In Zanzibar and Kenya Indian businessmen are being harassed; their future is in great jeopardy<sup>1</sup>". Thus according to these views all difficulties are due to the policy of non-alignment.

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1. Swarajya, Vol.IX (1965, No.47), p.12.

When China attacked us, he argued that not a single non-aligned friend questioned China's aggression against us. But they protested to Prime Minister Macmillan against sending arms to India. At the recent Cairo Conference of non-aligned nations, although Red China was not a member the Chinese lobby was so strong that India could not raise her border issue with China in the Conference. We are fast becoming completely friendless. With regard to our dispute with Pakistan on Kashmir, is there any country which actively support us?

Mr. Narayan concluded that "this is the policy of afraidness. We have refused to exchange diplomatic relations with Israel, because that would offend the Arab world. Why are we not giving East Germany the same diplomatic status that we have given to West Germany? Are we non-aligned in treating these two German entities differently?"<sup>1</sup>

In the Rajya Sabha a member of Swatantra party Mr. Retanaswamy opposed the policy. He felt that "India could not avoid military alliances. India's non-alignment policy has brought her more enemies than friends"<sup>2</sup>.

Finally, the leader of the Swatantra Party Rajaji stated that "a grossly erroneous foreign policy has, step by step, reduced our strength and prestige and brought about it security in place of confident

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1. Swarajya- Vol.IX (1965, No.47) p.12.
  2. Statesman- 24th November, 1965, p.8.

~~leadership in Asia.~~ He suggested that a sound foreign policy has to be followed in place of neutrality which has proved as barren as it has failed to convince any party of its sincerity or coherence". He further said that "we shout about non-alignment but do not permit it to others who have reasons to be non-aligned on some issued." Rajaji said that we have arrived at a serious juncture when our entire outlook calls, for anxious and close re-examination in order to strengthen the defence of the country.

Thus Swatantra Party is against the policy of non-alignment. All difficulties are due to this wrong policy, so we should leave this policy and join power bloc. This is better for our security purposes.

(2) SAMYUKTA SOCIALIST PARTY:

The leader of S.S.P. in Lok Sabha Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia wanted non-alignment to acquire a new content. The way to do it was to arrange a summit meeting between the two power blocks. We should be aligned with those countries which are prepared to come with us in the way of peaceful world.

He further stated "India should give up this parrot like foreign policy and added 'Peaceful co-existence' " is one of the phrases this Government always

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1. Svarajya- Vol.IX (1965, No.47), p.3.

2. L.S.D., 28th September, 1964, 9th Session, p.2118  
Vol.XXXIV. No.16.

has on its lips. Where is the peaceful co-existence? Everywhere it is quarrelsome co-existence. America and U.S.S.R. have not yet resorted to ICBM and to that extent it is ICBM co-existence, but certainly it is not peaceful co-existence. The latter could come if India's foreign policy had a firm base of principle".<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Lohia said in strong words that in present circumstances we should be aligned with those who desire to unite India and Pakistan and pave the way for a world union. As for America and USSR, our effort should be to bring or at least one in complete consonance with our objectives.

He also suggested that "the other direction to which we should turn our attention is the countries in our neighbourhood, particularly Thailand Laos, Nepal, Afganistan".<sup>2</sup> He said that the fact that no delegation has been sent to these countries is enough proof of the thoughtlessness of the foreign policy.

S.S.P. wanted that there should be strength in our foreign policy and also theoretical change in it. In Lohia's view when Dalailama is in India, the Government of Dalailama should be organised and Government of India should recognise.it. He said that Israel and East Germany

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1. L.S.D. 28th September, 1964, 9th Session, p.2119, Vol.XXXIV.No.16.
  2. L.S.D. 24th September, 1965, 12th Session, p.7519 Vol.XLVI, No.29.

should be recognised. Our Prime Minister should have no fear of any country, he suggested.

S.S.P.'s main criticism against the policy of non-alignment is that "due to this policy India had not occupied the same position of prestige today in the international community of nations as she used to once in the past. In this connection Mr. Hem Barua said that "this process of the decline of India's international prestige started with the declining years of Shri Nehru after the Chinese attack of 1962 and what has happened today is that this process has reached its climax".<sup>1</sup> He complained that the Government suffers from a big power psychology: that is why she is neglecting the smaller countries of South East Asia. South East Asia must occupy an important place in our strategic thinking. Our neglecting of South East Asia has cost us dearly. Our position is declining in this sphere when General DeGulla plans a high level Conference for South East Asia, he does not think India as a participant. Even very recently when Mr. Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, formulated a plan for a political solution of the Vietnamese problem, he did not think it would be necessary to consult India. He would consult France, China and Russia.

Mr. Hem Barua said that "our Government's policy of non-alignment is really not non-aligned. Our foreign

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1. Janata: (Weekly Journal of Praja Socialist Party)  
(Bombay) Vol. XIX (1965, No. 13) p.3.

policy is not free from East or West bias or towards this nation or that nation. Our policy towards Israel is based on false bias. We know in that complication called 'Tributes of Homage' on Mr. Nehru's death, the message sent by the President of Israel does not find a place. Government of India calls this a policy of non-alignment.<sup>1</sup> Today India is not a major factor in middle East or anywhere. There should be some firmness in our foreign policy so as to preserve and promote our national interest.

Mr. Barua bitterly criticised India's policy towards South East Asia. What steps our Government have taken to rehabilitate the Indian image and create a pro-Indian climate in these strategic areas? He asked our attitude towards Malaysia is also not so sound. This attitude is very helpless to Malaysia in her critical hour of destiny and history.<sup>2</sup> He also stated our policy of non-alignment is quite a failure. We have seen that in the crisis period we found no friend except Malaysia. So there is a great need of rethinking in our foreign policy.

In Rajya Sabha Mr.M.Govinda Reddy of the SSP said "it was unfortunate that while India stood for democracy and secularism and fought to contain China, America supplied arms to Pakistan to throttle democracy

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1. L.S.D. 28th September, 1964, 9th Session, p.4072  
Vol. XXXIV, No.16.

2. Ibid, p.4073.



in Asia in collusion with China. He wanted reconsideration of India's position in the commonwealth and said it did not serve any useful purpose to India."<sup>1</sup>

(3) COMMUNIST PARTY:

Communist Party of India gave full support to the policy of non-alignment. It thanked the Government for its firm stand on the policy of non-alignment.

Members of the Communist Party Shri Umanath and Shri Indrajit Gupta criticised Swatantra Party's view about non-alignment policy. They argued that the real test of non-alignment is what impact our policy has made among the Afro Asian nations which cover millions of people in the world.

A member of Communist Party in Rajya Sabha, Mr.M.N.Govindan Nair said "the Indo Pakistan conflict had proved the correctness of the policy. If India had been aligned to the western powers, as some people wanted it, she would not have got any help from these powers and Kashmir would have been occupied by Pakistan. He asked the Government not to be swayed by pressures from certain quarters to give up her policies both regard to non-proliferation of Atomic Weapons and non-interference in matter concerning Tibet".<sup>2</sup>

On the whole Communist Party supported non-alignment. But they pointed out that in some places this

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1. Statesman, 24th November, 1965, p.8.

2. Ibid.

policy failed there are marked failures in taking a consistent and firm stand against neo-colonialism conspiracies and aggressive actions of imperialists, For example on Congo, South Vietnam, Malaysia. This shows India's anti imperialist, anti-colonialist image in the eyes of the African and the Asian nation. In this connection we may like to support Malaysia.

About the recognition policy of India, the Communist Party criticised the non-alignment policy. Communist members asked: "Why the Government of India discriminate between West Germany and East Germany. We recognise the West Germany Government and we refuse to recognise the German Democratic Republic to this day. Yet we have built quite good trading and commercial relations with East Germany, but it is not recognised by us. The same case is with Israel. We have not established diplomatic relations with Israel<sup>1</sup>". They also said that the policy of non-alignment failed in Vietnam and in our opposition to foreign bases. These are the crucial tests of a policy of non-alignment.

In April 1965, the national council of the party took serious objection to India's policy towards Vietnam and demanded that "this weak and vacillating attitude of the Government of India, which has done great damage to India's reputation in the world be abandoned"<sup>2</sup>.

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, 28th September, 1964, 9th Session Vol. XXXIV, No. 16, p. 4056.
  2. "Political parties on foreign policy", India quarterly, Vol. XXIII (1967, No. 1), p. 54.

On the whole Communist Party supported the policy of non-alignment, and appreciated it.

(4) INDIAN PARLIAMENTARY GROUP AND INDEPENDENT MEMBERS:

Some Independent Members and the members of I.P.G. held different views on the policy of non-alignment.

Member of I.P.G. in Lok Sabha Dr. L.M.Singhvi said that "we should not extol or place on a pedestal our policy of non-alignment as if it were a veritable deity. It is not a permanent principle in International affairs. It was the positive content, that was given to the policy of non-alignment. It is a great deal of good to this country's national interests in the international context".<sup>1</sup>

The concept of non-alignment which combines these motley nations together to a common approach to foreign policy and this association is very useful for all nations and also to progressive growth of international society on sound principles of human rights and anti-colonialism. The policy of non-alignment should be dynamic. Another member of this party Mr.Swell said that "this policy has earned for us rich dividends".<sup>2</sup>

Another member of I.P.G., Shri Tridib Kumar Chaudhari said that "it is well known that in relation to Kashmir U.S.A. is using economic aid in order to put

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1. L.S.D. 28th September, 1964, 9th Session, p.4098  
Vol.XXXIV. No.16.

2. Ibid, p.4099

pressure on India to get its own views accepted by this country".

He said that any economic aid that we get from any country and which jeopardises the freedom of country must never be taken.

Shri J.B.Kripalani said that "non-alignment has no significance today except that we are not in a military alliance with any country. When we were in trouble, at that time if help had not come from western powers, especially from America it would have not been possible for us to resist aggression. How can we be non-aligned, when we are at hot war and cold war with China and Pakistan. He said non-alignment is now an old slogan. In fact the real principle of foreign policy is that we shall safeguard our legitimate interests". He further said: "Our foreign policy's first principle is that we shall continue to seek friendship and develop our relations with countries irrespective of their ideology or their political systems. He said that the policy of non-alignment has placed us in such an unfavourable position today that we have very few friends left in the world. We should align ourselves with western bloc. We can not make this non-alignment as if it were a moral principle from which we cannot deviate. He requested that Government of India should say at least that if there is any attack upon us we will get help from any

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1. L.S.D. 28th September, 1964, 9th Session, p.4041  
Vol.XXXIV. No.16.

attack upon us we will get help from any quarter, alignment or non-alignment". Thus Kripalani particularly pleaded for an alliance with the Western powers adding that the claim about accepting foreign aid without strings was false<sup>1</sup>.

To cultivate friendly relations with Israel, he said that "we can learn very much from Israel. Why in order to cultivate friendship with Arab countries we should refrain from friendship with Israel, he asked Israel is very anxious to have friendship with us. If we are afraid of the Arab countries then we have no independent non-aligned foreign policy. Foreign policy is not based upon fear but based upon independence and sovereignty. We should have diplomatic relations with Israel without any hesitation"<sup>2</sup>.

Speaking in favour of no confidence motion against Shastri Government, Mr. Kripalani said that "we have always declared that we are non-aligned, but we have said nothing about our strategy and tactics. Non-alignment has come to be only a Mantrani, by which everything will be solved. Today China can quite truly claim itself to be a non-aligned". Kripalani further said: "Non-alignment is a negative conception. It is useless to say that we can stand alone. If we are non-aligned then we must also have some restraint upon ourselves.

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1. L.S.D. 28th September, 1964, 9th Session, P.4041.  
Vol.XXXIV. No.16.

2. Ibid.

Peace and goodwill can be established by nations that are strong not that are weak".<sup>1</sup> He criticised India's foreign policy and said there is a great need of rethinking in foreign policy.

He said to the Government "keep yourself as non-aligned as even China is. But for God's sake, keep your diplomacy, strategy and tactics in a fluid condition. We should have no permanent enemy, no permanent friends. We must have friends but these friends must be such who are bound to us and help us in all emergencies and are not friends of convenience who take a neutral attitude when a critical situation arises in India".<sup>2</sup>

Thus according to Independent members non-alignment was an out dated policy. We should leave it and join any power bloc. In any way national interests should be preserved.

(5) MUSLIM LEAGUE AND D.M.K.:

Member of Muslim league in Lok Sabha, Shri Mohammad Ismail said that "our case was not placed properly before the world by our diplomates. Our policy of non-alignment has failed. Our friends, whose number was fairly large in the past, were not with us during the crisis. A small country, Singapore had the boldness to speak out the truth in the security council and to say that their

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1. L.S.D. 24th August, 1965, 12th Session, p.1600.

2. Ibid., p.7539, Vol.XLVI, No.29.

Government was in favour of our country. So when we think of revising our foreign policy we must give thought to our diplomatic front also, how to improve it so that our case might be put very clearly before the world. Even though we have got a strong case in this matter, the world has been kept in doubt about it. We must always pay our attention to the strength and in maintaining that strength".<sup>1</sup>

The D.M.K. suggested that there is need of re-appraisal of our foreign policy. Shri Sezhiyan said, "We have all along been preaching sermon chanting certain mantras, time and again, about Panchsheel, peaceful co-existence, non-alignment anti nuclear policy and other things. But a foreign policy cannot surely be a string of phrases repeated over and over again. It should be a policy of meaningful, purposeful and practical taking into consideration all the criss-cross currents and attitude of other countries, especially those who are our neighbours. Our policy has not paid any dividends and no country has been able to support us openly in the General Assembly. A decade ago we were having a premier position in the Afro Asian world but now the thunder has been stolen by China and Pindi-Peking axis. What is the reason for the de-<sup>2</sup>ing of position". Non-alignment has left us in, he said, an isolated world. He also pointed out that in 1962 when China committed aggression against India the only African

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1. L.S.D. 24th September, 1965, 12th Session, p.2538  
Vol.XLVI. No.29.

2. Ibid.

country Ethiopia shrewd sympathy to India. When in 1965 there was aggression on us by Pakistan, no country from Africa came out openly to sympathise with us or to condemn the aggression of Pakistan. On the other hand, certain countries are hostile against the Indian stand.

The D.M.K. member stated that we should have an eye on the growing influence by the Pindi-Peking axis on the Afro-Asian countries. The difference between Pindi-Peking and ourselves is ideological. If we want to preserve freedom and democracy we should look around and see the other countries which are of a similar structure just as Malaysia, Singapore, Japan etc. we should have clear contacts with these countries.

The D.M.K. suggested that we should not think in terms of hundred percent friendship or hundred percent enemy. In a mature world when we practise diplomacy we should be somewhat sober. There is no quick love or hatred in international diplomacy. Our policy should be based on practical considerations.

D.M.K. leader Shri C.M. Annadurai said that "while India has proud of the glorious deeds of its soldiers, it should not be mistaken as a direct outcome of the Government foreign policy. The policy of non-alignment should not be a negative one. While he was opposed to the country joining any military bloc or alliances the object of our foreign policy should be always "peace with honour". The country should be made strong enough



to stand on its own feet".<sup>1</sup>

Thus except Communist Party and D.M.K. all parties are of the view that India should give up this old and unsuccessful policy of non-alignment. If our nation security or freedom is in danger then we should give up the policy. Swatantra party was strongly in favour of joining the Western power bloc. S.S.P. also wanted that India should give up this parrot like foreign policy. In their views all difficulties had come due to non-alignment.

On the whole they said that our Government never attempted a proper assessment of the situation about China, Tibet and Pakistan. They said that the non-alignment policy was not free from blemishes and fear.

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1. Statesman- 24th November, 1965, p.8.

CHAPTER FOURINDO - CEYLON AGREEMENT OF 1964

The question of the persons of Indian origin in Ceylon is a very important problem in the relations of India and Ceylon for many years now. The repercussions of Ceylonese policy, says Dr. Kodikara, "have been felt largely in the state of Madras, from where, for over a century, Ceylon's plantations have drawn their labour supply".<sup>1</sup>

For Indian public opinion, the treatment of overseas Indians had become a particularly sore point in view of the position of such Indians in South Africa and in the context of India's international action branding South African policies as discriminatory and tantamount to denial of fundamental human rights.

There are about 11,400,000 persons of Indian origin in Ceylon. About 1,40,000 have been given Ceylonese citizenship. About 29,000 hold Indian passport, the status of the remaining 9,71,000 has been a matter of dispute. The Ceylonese Government contended that they are Indian nationals. India had rejected this claim.

Many attempts were made during Nehru's Prime Ministership, to solve this problem. Of all the efforts

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1. S.U.Kodikara- Indo Ceylon Relations since Independence  
p.219.

the agreement of 1954 is important. The Prime Ministers of the two countries Mr. Nehru and Kotelawala met on January 18, 1954, and considered the problems of people of Indian origin in Ceylon.

Under Nehru-Kotewala Agreement of 1954 a guarantee was given to those having Indian passports that they would be allowed to continue to be in employment in Ceylon till they reached the age of 55. But subsequently the guarantee was applied only to those who had applied for Ceylonese citizenship and been rejected and then applied for Indian citizenship which was granted. Most of these people are plantation workers who have contributed immensely to Ceylonese prosperity over the decades.

When Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister of India to succeed Nehru in June 1964, many efforts were made to create friendly relations with immediate neighbours. Mr. Shastri gave full attention for improving the good neighbourly relations. Many talks and visits were held in New Delhi and Colombo.

On October 29, 1964, the Prime Ministers of India and Ceylon reached Agreement, on the future of the stateless people of Indian origin in Ceylon, in New Delhi. Accordingly the number of stateless persons have been estimated at 9.75 Lakhs. Of this the Government of India have agreed

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1. S.U. Kodikara- Indo-Ceylon Relations since Independence, p.245.

to the repatriation to India of 5.25 lakhs persons, together with the natural increase in that number. The Government of Ceylon have agreed to grant Ceylon citizenship to 3 lakhs persons together with the natural increase. It was agreed that this process should be spread over a period of 15 years and that the two processes should keep pace with each other. The status of the remaining 1.50 lakhs persons has been left for determination at a subsequent meeting between the two Prime Ministers.<sup>1</sup>

The joint communique mentioned the cordial atmosphere and the spirit of give and take in which the discussions were conducted. Indian opinion would be inclined to feel that much of the giving has been on the Indian side.<sup>2</sup>

It was also stated that the Government of Ceylon will grant to the persons repatriated the same facilities as are enjoyed by citizens of other states.

Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri declared that "the Agreement was a major step in the country's efforts to solve problems with her neighbours peacefully and amicably".<sup>3</sup>

The October 1964 Agreement had provided for the phased repatriation of 5,25,000 persons of Indian origin from the island, but the term compulsory repatriation did

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1. The Statesman and Hindustan Times- 30th October, 1964, p.1
  2. The 'Hindu', 31st October, 1964, Quoted by S.U.Kodikara, p.239.
  3. Ibid.

~~not occur in its text.~~

Defending the Agreement Prime Minister Shastri said that "it was the only way of solving the Indo-Ceylon problem peacefully and the alternative was to let the people of Indian origin in Ceylon suffer economic hardships and discrimination".

Political circles in New Delhi hailed the agreement as the first significant achievement of the Shastri Government in international relations.

Unofficial opinion in India, however, were inclined to be critical of the agreement. The view was expressed that much would depend on the spirit in which the agreement was implemented.

On the 1964 Agreement different opposition Indian political parties took different attitude. The D.M.K. and Swatantra party unreservedly condemned the agreement. Some others took it as a great success of Shastriji in improving good neighbourly relations with Ceylon.

#### I. COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA:

A member of Communist Party in the Lok Sabha Mr. M.K.Kumaran said that "those people who are going to be repatriated to India, are not Indians". He added that they are in Ceylon since a very long time. They worked there and they were earning their livelihood from the soil

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1. The Hindu - 9th November, 1964, Quoted by S.U.Kodikara p.237.
  2. Lok Sabha Debate, 24th November, 1964, 10th Session, p-1296 Vol. XXXII.

of that country. But they were not accepted as citizens of that country. This Agreement is unsatisfactory and is very wrong because some Indian people in Ceylon are going to be treated as second class citizens.

Mr. Kumaran further said that more than 5 lakhs of persons of Indian origin in Ceylon were going to be repatriated to India within the next fifteen years. They were from Kerala and Tamilnad. They were poor labourers. Would the Government settle them in this country? Then the problem of over burdenness will arise. This matter should be taken up by the Government with all its seriousness and it should see to it that these repatriates were properly settled in places where they can earn their livelihood and have a better life.

Elucidating his party's views, he pointed out that we cannot forget persons who were settled in Africa and other Afro-Asian countries. Their problem also has become a very live issue. Our Government must advise those people to learn to live with the local people peacefully and take up the citizenship of those states and be loyal.

Another Communist member of the Lok Sabha Shri Kola Vanakiah reminded that these overseas Indians were in great difficulty. But the Government of India was unprepared to solve this problem. There is no mechanism or machinery to keep in touch with people of Indian origin in different countries. Their number runs to several lakhs. There was no close contact with them. India did

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1. Lok Sabha Debate: 24th November, 1964, 10th Session, p.1518, Vol. XXXIII.

not know the feeling of these persons. He said that his party was not against the Agreement, it welcomed the Agreement. But the question was, did our Government take care to be in contact with the people to understand their sentiments and difficulties and did they try to evolve the necessary machinery to tackle those problems? He said that this is a wrong beginning. Tomorrow we may face a similar problem with regard to East Africa Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and any other country. He appealed to Government that this matter should be taken seriously.

In a resolution adopted on November 30, the National Council of the Communist Party of India welcomed the Agreement. The resolution said that "despite its unsatisfactory features, the agreement should be welcomed by all persons standing for Indo-Ceylonese friendship and solidarity".

Thus the reaction of the Communist Party on the Agreement was favourable but it wanted that the Government should be vigilant about the fact that our people in other neighbouring countries should live peacefully. They should not be in an embarrassing situation.

## II- SWATANTRA PARTY:

After the conclusion of the Agreement Mr. Minoo Masani the leader of Swatantra Party said that "I am very glad that there have been signs that the present Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are inclined to turn their attention to their immediate neighbourhood, to try

and mend the fences and create better neighbourly relations between ourselves and our immediate neighbours. I hope these efforts will continue.<sup>1</sup>

But he did not support the Agreement as such after knowing the feelings of people and said we cannot accept the Agreement. He said that we think "it is unsound in principle and that it is a violation of basic human rights. The Ceylon Agreement may take path it likes but it is a very sad day when our own Government makes itself a party to an attack on basic human rights and freedom, which should have been maintained by us and in the destruction of which we should had no part or lot".<sup>2</sup>

During his speech in Lok Sabha on International Situation he quoted a passage from an enlightened journal of Indian opinion of November 17, named 'opinion' which has this to say, on this subject.

"To eat dog and not fill even one's ribs is the sad lot of the Government of India today. The disgraceful arrangement about the Indian descended Ceylonese with Mr. Shastri entered into with Mrs. Bhandarkar is less than a month old and already that formidable female is proposing to whittle it down by putting even those whose Ceylonese citizenship she accepts on a separate electoral Register.

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1. Lok Sabha Debate: 23rd November, 1964, 10th Session, p.1238, Vol. XXXIII.

2. Ibid.



Briefly they are to be second class citizens and Mr. Shastri is not to concern himself about this."<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Masani said that it is not the spirit in which we want good neighbourliness to be settled. He said that I invite our Government to consider whether this Agreement should not be abrogated and we should not free ourselves from this commitment. Thus Swatantra Party was against the spirit of Agreement. Although the party wanted that neighbourly relations should improve it stated that this agreement may create many difficulties in future with Indians living in many other nations from a very long time. So Government should not accept this Agreement.

### III- SAMYUKTA SOCIALIST PARTY:

The members of SSP condemned the Indo-Ceylon Agreement as harming the interests of the Ceylonese, Indians generally and Tamilians particularly. Janata wrote editorially, "that the feelings and opinion of the Ceylon Indians were totally ignored in the talks, is regrettable. That the opinion of those, who are virtually affected, was not taken into consideration is very unjust".<sup>2</sup>

It thought that already the Indian population is suffering in Burma and other countries due to denial of

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1. Lok Sabha Debate: 23rd November, 1964, 10th Session, p.1238, Vol.XXXIII.

2. Janata, Vol.XIX(1964, Vol.44) p.9

rights in the respective countries. This Agreement will add much hardship to them in safeguarding their rights.

Mr. Hem Barua, the member of SSP party in the Lok Sabha said, "that the so called stateless million in Ceylon are morally and legally Ceylonese citizens and the Ceylonese Prime Minister is simply trying to beguile India into Ceylon's imbroglio".<sup>1</sup> He asked Swarn Singh not to talk to her the problem of the stateless million is Ceylon's problem, Ceylon must solve it and Ceylon must not try to draw India into it. The problem of national minority is a different type of colonialism. Our Government should not be indifference when the people of Indian origin are humiliated and oppressed in countries like Burma and Ceylon. Government should send strong notes of protest against these countries. India should make efforts towards organising the U.N. as a supreme tribunal in the interest of national minorities. He said that when fundamental human rights are so blatantly violated as we see in this Agreement, the question of interference and non-interference by a civilized forum like the U.N. cannot arise.<sup>2</sup>

Another member of SSP in Lok Sabha, Shri Nathi Rai said that the new Agreement with Ceylon is not a landmark in the realm of international affairs as Mr. Swaran Singh boasted about it. He praised Shastri's policy and said that the problem solving effort with the neighbours was a

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1. Lok Sabha Debate: 23rd November, 1964, 10th Session, p.4965 Vol. XXXIII.

2. Ibid.

good thing. But it should be done keeping in view our prestige. This Agreement would reduce the status of Indians to second class citizenship. He also said, "You cannot treat lakhs of people as chattles which can be used to suit the convenience of mighty nations. You should consult them. We should say in all humility to Ceylon and all our neighbouring nations that joined in Cairo and in Algiers in condemning the Western colour bars and this Agreement is not different from that"<sup>1</sup>. He argued that India cannot barter away these basic principles. This condition may arise even in case of other countries also. The Indian people who are settled abroad never felt their security and this was a dangerous thing. So India should take a line.

Thus SSP also criticised the Indo-Ceylon Agreement as other parties did.

D.M.K.:

Shri Manoharan a member of D.M.K. in Lok Sabha said that this was a very important issue. He said the arguments advanced and the points raised by the Government and Shri Swaran Singh did not satisfy me, because they simply advocated the case of Ceylon and of the Ceylonese Government. In fact the Agreement was not acceptable to the people of this country. "This Agreement can never be final, and should not be final"<sup>2</sup>. In the past we have

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1. Lok Sabha Debate: 23rd November, 1964, 10th Session, p.4985, Vol. XXXIII.
  2. Lok Sabha Debate: 24rd November, 1964, 10th Session, p.1521, Vol. XXXIII.

~~had several negotiations and Agreements, but Ceylon~~  
 Government broke them. He said that Mr. Swaran Singh was not clear about the stateless persons. This is the clear departure from the stand which was taken by Prime Minister Nehru. We have accepted this Agreement because Ceylon had been threatening us, because the Ceylon Government knew that the Government of India could be easily threatened. It was a very shameful thing. In the streets of Colombo it was common talk that the Government of India understood only one language, that was the language of the fist. Shri Manoharan said that, "the Government of Ceylon is committed openly to sending away all the Indians from the soil of Ceylon. What is meaning of this 5.25 lakhs and 3 lakhs? Ceylon Government had put them in separate registers. We are completely fooled to go into this Agreement and we have proved ourselves to be little children in diplomacy". He further said that "Mrs. Bhandarnaike is the victor and Shri Shastri is the vanquished. It is very shameful thing for the prestige of India". He asked: did the Government of India do anything to ascertain the wishes of hundreds of innocent people who had known no other place except their tea estate? Then he requested the Government to scrap the document. If the Government of India could not do it then leave the matter to the people of Indian origin in Ceylon. The people of Indian origin in Ceylon are not cowards as these people here are. Government should try

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1. Lok Sabha Debate: 24th November, 1964, 10th Session p.1522, Vol.XXXIII.

2. Ibid

~~to give life to the Nehru-Kotelawala Pact reached in~~  
1954. Government of India should do justice for these people. Thus D.M.K. had strongly opposed this Agreement and bitterly criticised the attitude of the Government of India.

Some Independent members had also different views on the Agreement.

INDEPENDENT MEMBERS:

Dr. M.S. Aney, Independent Member in Lok Sabha asked a question to the Government, a question similar to that which the D.M.K. had asked: "Whether when the question as regards the position of the Indians in Ceylon is concerned, the Government of India really takes care to know as to what is the opinion of the Indians who are in Ceylon, whether they want to remain there or not".<sup>1</sup> This was very important question for this Agreement.

He said that economic prosperity of Ceylon is due to the Indian labourers and businessmen which are settled in Ceylon since a long period of time and this fact is admitted by the Ceylonese Government also.

This he also pointed out that "all these persons who have been sent as labourers were not sent without any understanding between the Government of India and the Government of Ceylon. This is the main point. In the Agreement or Correspondence there was clearly stated

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1. Lok Sabha Debate: 23rd November, 1964, 10th Session, p.1266, Vol.XXXIII.

that they could live there. And if they want to come back it will be according to their option, but if they remained there the understanding was that they should be what the Ceylonese would be in their own country".<sup>1</sup> This was the position and there was not a single point of doubt. The successor Governments in both countries should honour those commitments. But the view of the Government of Ceylon was different.

He charged the Indian Government that in the Agreement the Government of India "did not consult the Ceylon Indians and the members of Ceylon Indian Congress".<sup>2</sup> Ceylon Government dismissed almost 90% of the applications and only 10% were accepted as naturalised citizens of Ceylon. In this way the problem of stateless persons of Indian origin has come into existence. He said that "it was unfortunate for us that we have reconciled ourselves to the position of stateless persons of Indian origin and we do not know what will be the fate of two lakhs persons who are now left out and who do not come into account at all."<sup>3</sup>

Even the three lakhs Ceylonese have accepted are being dealt with by them in a discriminatory manner. He asked Mr. Swaran Singh and Shri Shastri that they should

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1. Lok Sabha Debate: 23rd November, 1964, 10th Session, p.1267, Vol. XXIII.
  2. Ibid. 24th November, 1964, 10th Session, p.1268, Vol. XXIII.
  3. Ibid.

see to it that those who remain in Ceylon were not considered second class citizens.

Another Independent Member Shri J.B.Kriplani was also critical of the Agreement. He said that "our Government gives the dog a good name and puts it in the nations lap. This is very strange. This agreement is absolutely against India. It has also violated the interest of the people who are settled there for centuries".<sup>1</sup> He also pleaded that the Government should consult the representatives of the people who are to be brought to India back again after centuries. The Government had done a very great wrong to the people there. Those who have been living for 50 to 100 years in Ceylon are not our citizens. It is something which is unheard of in the history of the whole world.

Mr.Kriplani posed a question whether in the opinion of the Government of India these people were naturalised citizens of Ceylon or did this Government consider them to be citizens of India yet? The persons who had settled in Ceylon are naturalised citizens of Ceylon. Then why should we call them stateless at all? If these people had not been given Ceylonese citizenship this was unjustified and unwise. He said if some American citizens are made stateless, are we going to take them?

All major opposition political parties criticised the Agreement in one way or the other. But the editorial

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1. Lok Sabha Debate: 24th November, 1964, 10th Session  
p.1490, Vol.XXXIII.

of Hindustan Times stated that "by reaching Agreement on the future of people of Indian origin in Ceylon who at present are neither Indian nor Ceylonese citizens, Mr. Shastri and Mrs. Bhandarnaike have solved a problem which had repeatedly baffled their predecessors and had been an element of discard in relation between their two countries for over a decade".<sup>1</sup>

Though the Agreement was signed in 1964, it has not been implemented yet. Implementation of this Agreement is really very difficult, because the people of Indian origin in Ceylon do not want to come India. They are engaged in their work and they are prosperous. This cannot be done just by force.

In conclusion we may say that in the Agreement the divergence was on which part of the people of Indian origin should be repatriated? Should repatriation be carried out under compulsion? But in Agreement it had no mention of compulsory repatriation. It was the general opinion that the implementation of the Agreement should not be spread out over 15 years but completed over a shorter period.

The Hindu took the view that to repatriate to India even a single person born and bred in Ceylon though

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1. The Hindustan Times: 31st November, 1964, p.6.  
Editorial: Indo-Ceylon Agreement "accord on the stateless".



of remote Indian origin against his or her will, will be a gross violation of human rights to which India should not be a party.

On the whole it is evident that Indo-Ceylon Agreement had a mixed reaction among opposition parties and individuals. There were some who were critical of the concessions which Shastri had made but others thought of concluding the Agreement he had shown courage and statesmanship and removed a major cause of friction in Indo-Ceylon relations.

CHAPTER FIVESINO-INDIA RELATIONS

Sino-Indian relations have in the last two decades witnesses more ups and down than India's relations with any other country. India's relations with China are very important not only because they are the two biggest Asian nations, but they are the biggest states of the world in size and population economic growth and unlimited potentialities.

The India-China boundary question took a grave turn during 1962. After the Chinese aggression India-China relations have not improved. Many conciliatory suggestions were made by Nehru. During Shastri's Prime Ministership India's relations with China continued to be an important foreign policy problem. Prime Minister Shastri also reiterated India's offer to begin talks with China if she agreed not to have posts in the demilitarised zone in Ladakh. In August 1964 Shastri said that Government would be prepared to have discussions with China for a just and honourable settlement. Shastri affirmed that the Government would be prepared to consider any proposal that China might make to break the dead lock.

Peking's response to India's concilitaory gestures was negative and uncompromising, on October 8, 1964, at the time of the non-aligned nations' conference at Cairo, the Chinese Government issued an official statement rejecting Mrs. Bhandarnaike's suggestions. Thus China obstructed the

possibility of a peaceful settlement of the border problem and also continued to build up her military strength along the Indian border.

On October 16, 1964 China carried out her first nuclear explosion, flouting world public opinion and increasing the danger of proliferation of Nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Shastri called the test "an aggression against peace and security". He said the policy of China to threaten India by the explosion of Atom Bomb is childish. He also declared India's Atomic policy that from the threat of Chinese bomb India will never make Atom Bomb. India did not want to make destructive weapons.

But it is a fact that due to the Chinese nuclear test a great discussion among various politics parties and leaders begun on this subject. The problem was whether India should make Atomic weapons or not?

During 1965 the Chinese Government maintained, in an intensified form, her hostilities towards India. China kept alive the tension on the borders and often made it dangerously active. Her propaganda organs hurled threats and abuse and sought to ridicule India. In the domestic field China's opposition was directed to India's development through peaceful democratic methods; in the international field our policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence was a major target of their criticism. In the Afro-Asian world, the Chinese endeavoured to damage the image of India and isolate her.

In May China susported Pakistani aggression in Kutch and blamed India for having "provoked armed conflict in the Rann of Kutch".

In September 1965, during the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the Chinese Government gave all out support to Pakistan and threatened to create a second front against India. The threats were accompanied by intrusions and armed, provocations all along the border. India's reaction was dignified and restrained. Prime Minister Shastri offered joint inspection of Sikkam border installations and said Indians would fight with "grim determination" if attacked.

With the acceptance of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan, the Chinese resiled and their ultimatum collapsed. Later, however, they resumed intrusions in November and staged another series of provocations in the Sikkim area in December.

In a note of January 6, 1966, the Chinese Government sought to justify their actions with insincere arguments about self defence but in the process virtually admitted their military intrusions on the borders. In our reply of February 8, it was pointed out that India has scrupulously observed the Colombo proposals and that China's activities on the border were unprovoked and naked acts of aggression.

China was the only country in the world to have been displeased with the Tashkant Agreement.

The events of these years thus made it clear that

for China the conflict with India was not merely a border issue but was an integral part of China's foreign policy and an instrument to apply protracted military pressure on India.

On Sino-India relations and Chinese atomic explosion <sup>opposition</sup> parties in India had different attitudes. For the study of opposition's view and commitments on India-China relations it is necessary to know, what suggestions they made and what was their policy regarding Chinese hostility towards India during Shastri's Prime Ministership.

#### 1. COMMUNIST PARTY:

A resolution passed by the Communist Party of India urged the Government "to take the initiative to contact the Government of China to break the present deadlock over the border dispute and to arrive at an acceptable basis on which negotiations can start".<sup>1</sup> Party resolution said that continuance of the deadlock between the two biggest countries of Asia would only harm the cause of Afro-Asian and Anti-imperialistic solidarity which has become all the more urgent in view of the "brajenners with which U.S. imperialism had extended the operation of 7th Fleet into the Indian Ocean Area".

A Communist member Shri Umanath said in the Lok Sabha that "there can never be a military solution to the border disputes with China. Solution is possible only on a political basis".<sup>2</sup> In so far as the Government of India

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1. Statesman: 10th December, 1964, p.7.

2. L.S.D. 28th September, 1964, p.4059, 9th Session, Vol. XXXIV, No.16.

considered the proposal for the withdrawal of the seven Chinese posts without waiting for the proposal to come from the Chinese side meant that India was taking some initiative for the purpose of breaking the stalemate. He suggested that this initiative must be taken through diplomatic channels.

It expressed the hope that the Chinese Government would also "take initiative to bring about a settlement of the border dispute in the interest of both countries and the entire people of Asia.

It expressed the hope that the Chinese Government would also take initiative to bring about a settlement of the border dispute in the interest of both countries and the entire people of Asia.

Another member Shri M.Basevapunniah also stated that it was no use going into the question of Colombo proposals, and India should not wait for the Chinese to take the initiative. Asked what should be the next step if China did not respond favourably to Indian suggestions for negotiations, he replied that China would have to reckon with world reaction if it did not accept a reasonable proposal. He suggested, "Nothing that the Government of India was prepared to favourably consider the suggestion that it should start negotiations with China without prejudice to its claims if no civilian posts remained in the demilitarised zone of Ladakh. Indian and Chinese representatives should meet to explore the possibility of

5 opening negotiations on this basis or any other basis".

Significantly resolution passed by the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India in New Delhi, described Mr. Mao Tse-tung's recent statement claiming large parts of Asia as Chinese territory, as an attempt to justify "great Chinese expansionism"<sup>1</sup>. It also drew the attention of all Indians to the dangerous views of Mr. Mao. Mr. Danga<sup>2</sup> dubbed Mr. Mao, a well developed war monger". The Party condemned China for the "shameless support it has given to Pakistani aggression"<sup>3</sup>.

It further expressed the view that "the growing anti-Indian collusion between Pakistan and China and the continued refusal of Chinese leadership to settle the Sino-Indian border dispute is used by the imperialists and reactionaries to step up their efforts for the abandonment of non-alignments and acceptance of U.S. Nuclear umbrella"<sup>4</sup>.

The party later criticised the Chinese atomic test and said that "it had damaged the prospects of the march towards complete stoppage of nuclear tests and destruction of all nuclear weapons. It had encouraged the reactionary forces in India to demand the manufacture of the Bomb. But they assured the Indian people that this explosion was only a deterrent against the U.S. imperialism"<sup>5</sup>.

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1. Statesman: 16th October, 1964, p.1.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Janata: (Bombay) Vol. XIX (1965, No.1), p.3.

The Party emphatically rejected the plea for the manufacture of the Atom Bomb in India. The 7th Congress of the Communist Party said "the making of Atomic weapons would not only place further crippling burdens on our national economy but would also weaken India's role in the preservation and consolidation of world peace". The so called 'nuclear umbrella' would mean the virtual handing over of the defence of our country to the imperialists.

Communist Members Shri M.K.Kumaran and Kolla Venkaiah strongly criticised the idea of nuclear umbrella and said that "American Atomic umbrella is very dangerous. We should not depend on American Imperialism. America used this weapon against Asia and terrorise the C.P.I. notes with satisfaction the declaration of the Government of India that it would not change its policy in this regard and would not go in for either the making of Atomic bombs or any nuclear shield". It welcomed the policy statement on this issue made by Prime Minister Shastri at the World Conference for peace and international co-operation held at New Delhi.

This stand added to India's stature and won the acclaim of peace lovers throughout the world, according to communists.

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1. Janata:(Bombay) Vol.XIX(1965, No.1), p.3.
  2. L.S.D.: 24th November,1964, p.1501, 10th Session, Vol.XXXV.



The 7th Congress regretted that "in his speeches in the Lok Sabha and his statements in London Prime Minister Shastri had shown a certain weakness and made certain proposals which would bring in the imperialist 'nuclear shield' through the backdoor". C.P.I. demanded that the Prime Minister should clearly categorically repudiate the so-called nuclear shield proposal without further delay. C.P.I. urged the Government of India to take initiative to prevent further proliferation of atomic bombs, to bring about nuclear free zones in Asia, Africa and Europe to move rapidly towards the destruction of all nuclear stockpiles and the complete banning of nuclear weapons.

It thought that such an active policy for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and for complete and general dis-armament alone can be an effective defence of our country against nuclear threats from which ever quarter they may emanate.

Thus the C.P.I. wanted India to take initiative in both solving the India-China border problem and in preventing the race for Atomic weapons. C.P.I. condemned the Chinese atomic explosion, and appreciated the Government of India's policy of 'not making the Atom Bomb'. It wanted that we should be far away from Imperialistic Nuclear umbrella for our security purposes.

## 2. SWATANTRA PARTY:

Swatantra Party was of the opinion that India should adopt a very hard line towards China, including cessation of all trade and of all support for U.N. membership, the breaking of all diplomatic ties with China, recognition of the Taiwan regime and recognition of the Tibetan Government, in exile. However because of Swatantra's perception of the international system, virtually every issue in Indian foreign affairs is related with China.

Swatantra's first premise and its over-whelming concern is that "China is the sole enemy and genuine menace to India. Massani made this quite explicit when in a major policy statement, he said, that international 'reality' is that the biggest threat to our independence, our way of life and our survival is that which comes from communist China and while adverting to the malice of Pakistan, he termed, it a minor threat<sup>1</sup>"doubting Pakistan's capability to do (India) much harm".

Insisting that China does provide a clear and present danger, Swatantra Party further held that India is incapable of checking China's aggressive intent alone and that continued non-alignment will not guarantee the support needed. Thus according to Rajaji "never have we been more abandoned by friends and menaced of foes, thanks to our airy foreign policy inaugurated and sanctified by the late Prime Minister Nehru".<sup>2</sup>

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1. L.S.D.: 1st November, 1965, Vol. XLVIII. No. 18.

2. Swarajya: (Madras) Vol. IX (1965, No. 42), 17th April, p. 1.

In the view of Swatantra Party, India is not strong enough to face China single handed. Moreover as its founding father, Rajaji, stated, "If South Vietnam is abandoned by the United States and a communist take over takes place, the remaining neutral countries, Laos and Cambodia, will go over, and then Thailand will not be able to resist communist aggression. So will Burma disappear into the Communist Empire with the speed of lightening and this will take the communist Empire to the gates of India"<sup>1</sup>. Its logic leads to the conclusion that India should have a China oriented foreign policy.

About China's nuclear explosion it was said that it is a clear threat and any attempt on our part to regain our lost territory will invite nuclear retaliation. Mr. Massani said "China will use it politically and diplomati- cally against us. It will be used as a powerful support to Chinese communist diplomacy to erode and undermine the freedom of India and the other free countries of Asia"<sup>2</sup>.

To face this situation, Massani gave three alter- natives. The first is that we should appeal to the U.N. and world opinion and thus force the Chinese communists to abandon their nuclear weapons. He warned the Prime Minister not to depend solely on world public opinion. It cannot save our country from being destroyed. Our nuclear policy should not be of retaliation but deterrence. Mr. Massani

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1. Swarajya: Vol.IX (3rd April, 1965, No.40) p.1.

2. L.S.D. 23rd Nov. 1964, P.1239, 10th Session Vol.XXXV.

added that "I am not along with Government on this issue that we neither need to make the bomb nor, do we need take somebody else's bomb to defend us"<sup>1</sup>.

Second alternative is that we should make the bomb. According to Massani it is in our national interest to make the bomb.

But Shri C.Rajagopalachari has categorically rejected the plea for the manufacture of the atom bomb as a deterrent in India's defence strategy against China. The only deterrent that the leader of the Swatantra party envisages is a "clear treaty alliance against China with those powers of the world who are firmly ranged against the communist aggression"<sup>2</sup>.

This was also Massani's third alternative. "To-day the U.S.A. is the only deterrent which can protect our sovereignty. This was not the surrender of sovereignty in any way. He was strongly in favour of accepting nuclear protection from the U.S.A."<sup>3</sup> Both Rajaji and Massani held that it was not against the policy of non-alignment.

Thus China being the real danger, the Swatantra party wanted alignment with the West and also nuclear protection from the West. According to this party this will keep China away from India and also South Asia.

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1. L.S.D. 23rd November, 1964, p.1239, 10th Session, Vol. XXXV.
  2. Janata: Vol. XIX (1965, No.1), p.1.
  3. L.S.D. 23rd November, 1964, p.1242, 10th Session, Vol. XXXV.

### 3. BHARATIYA JANA SANGH:

Censuring the Government of India's policy because "its policy towards China has been right from the beginning unrealistic and based on appeasement and vacillation in dealing with the territorial violations of China".<sup>1</sup> The Bharatiya Jana Sangh demanded a broad programme of military preparedness including universal military training.

B.J.S. member Shri Bade, speaking in the Lok Sabha said that our Government should take benefit from Sino-Soviet rift. China is spreading her legs in South East Asia. We should try to stop her in that important strategic area. In this connection the B.J.S. wanted the re-evaluation and reorientation of our foreign policy. It advocated a hard line with China. Shri Bade said, "Unless and until the aggressor is thrown out from every inch of our sacred soil, it is impossible to think and talk of a negotiated table".<sup>2</sup>

On the Chinese explosion of Atom Bomb, B.J.S. stated was that "now we should follow the policy of 'weapon for weapon'.<sup>3</sup> We should not depend on any country. We should not be afraid of making a nuclear weapon, not for the purpose of destruction, but for the purpose of terror meeting terror. Money is no consideration, because it is the question of country's national defence.

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1. Organiser: Vol.XVIII (1965, No.15), p.2.

2. L.S.D.: 28th September, 1964, p.4114, 9th Session, Vol.XXXIV.

3. L.S.D.: 24th November, 1964, p.1811, 10th Session, Vol.XXXV.

The B.J.S. had always been of the view that "the nations determination to build up military strength adequate enough to frustrate the gravest challenge to its independence and integrity"<sup>1</sup>.

Calling for the development of nuclear artillery and the bomb, the B.J.S. argued that "India should work on the bomb to deter Chinese aggression". Thus India would be able to give them a fighting reply and blast their aggressive designs"<sup>2</sup>.

They are not willing to go merely as far as Swatantra in depending on the West for India's own defence against China. It wanted that India should develop her military strength and should build up its own Atom Bomb. No price can be considered too high where the country's defence is involved.

#### 4. PRAJA SOCIALIST PARTY:

According to the P.S.P. the Chinese expansionist ambitions are a source of danger for India. In a resolution, it stated that no talks should be held with the aggressor unless and until there is complete vacation of aggression by the Chinese and all necessary measures should be taken to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, however, long and hard the struggle may be.

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1. Janata: Vol.XIX (1965, No.1) p.20.

2. Organiser: Vol.XIX(1965, No.25) P.3.

Speaking in the Lok Sabha, Hem Barua said, "Why our Government should go on making concessions to China. We should leave the policy of negotiations towards China".<sup>1</sup> China has grabbed our territory and there the matter ends. He said "Whether China will further attack on us or not is secondary, what is primary is whether our Government is prepared to recover the 14,500 sq.miles of Indian territory under China's occupation".<sup>2</sup> That is the main point.

The National Executive of the P.S.P. passed a resolution on the Chinese nuclear threat. It was constrained to observe that the fact that "China could produce an Atom Bomb on her own has created a feeling of awe if not always of admiration in many of the newly independent countries in Afro-Asia and Latin America. In the Afro Asian region except Malaysia, none has shown courage to condemn the Chinese explosion".<sup>3</sup>

Nath Pai regretted the lack of a proper assessment of the Chinese atomic blast and its impact on India's foreign policy.<sup>4</sup>

While some have righteously declared that India committed as she is to be loyalty ideal of Ahimsa and to the terms of Moscow Treaty could never think of producing nuclear

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1. L.S.D.: 28th September, 1964, p.4069, 9th Session Vol.XXXIV.
  2. Janata: Vol.XIX (1965, No.13) p.4.
  3. Janata: Vol.XIX(1965, No.3) p.15.
  4. Ibid.

weapons, others have hinted at the possibility and desirability of a nuclear umbrella to be provided by either the U.S.A. and the U.K. or better still jointly by the U.S.A., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R.

About these suggestions the P.S.P. was of the opinion that preserving of the sovereign and independence of the country whatever the means and whatever the cost was of the greatest importance. Secondly, it suggested it should be enough to point out that history is full of instances where such protective umbrella failed to open at right moments. It is therefore necessary to take the lesson to heart that the best defence is one that any nation can device, develop and deploy on her own.

##### 5. SAMYUKTA SOCIALIST PARTY:

S.S.P. was of the view that the policy of Government of India towards China was wrong and contradictory. In this connection S.S.P. leader late Shri Lohia said that our Government's prestige is decreasing day by day. Its main reason is that our declaration has no value. Many times Government gives contradictory statements. In relation to China our Government declared that we will gain our full territory which is under China's occupation. On the other hand we say that for achieving peace sacrifice is necessary from both the sides.<sup>1</sup> He said this is a shameful thing for a country. From these contradictory statements we had lost

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1. L.S.D.: 23rd November, 1964, p.1321, 10th Session, Vol. XXXV.



15. our prestige and faith in world opinion. He suggested that we should cut off all relations with China and should not make effort for China's entry in the United Nations, because in Lohia's words "China is the 'Rakshas' of the modern age".<sup>1</sup>

According to the S.S.P., Congress Government had shown a very poor performance in matters of defence planning. With unending pacifist platitude the Congress Government palpably neglected the defence of our northern borders. In playing down the dangers of the Chinese invasion, it betrayed the country's confidence.<sup>2</sup>

The party also condemned the Chinese nuclear explosion and said, "this was a clear ~~threat~~ cut threat for India and South East Asia. It stated that Government should take timely steps to protect India and South East Asia from Chinese aggressive expansionism. India should take the initiative in coming to some understanding with Japan, Australia and other Western countries in stemming the Chinese designs which might ultimately pose a serious danger to India's hard won freedom."<sup>3</sup>

We should make Atom Bomb or not, this was a secondary question, according to Dr.Lohia. Firstly we should industrialise ourselves rapidly. He said we are

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1. L.S.D.: 23rd November, 1964, p.1321, 10th Session, Vol.XXXV.
  2. L.S.D.: 23rd November, 1964, p.1323, 10th Session, Vol.XXXV.
  3. Janata, Vol.XIX (1964, no.43) p.10.
  4. Hindustan Times: 16th Sep.1964, p.8.

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on the parth of non-violence then why we talk about making Atom Bomb. Thus S.S.P. was not in favour of making Atom Bomb by India but its view was that the whole foreign policy should be re-organised in the context of the Chinese.

6. OTHER PARTIES AND INDEPENDENT MEMBERS:

On China's atomic explosion an Independent member J.B.Kripalani said that people should not be surprised, because "We knew that China was trying to make this experiment, and one day it would succeed"<sup>1</sup>. We also knew that China believed in cunning diplomacy and war. So we should not claim or blame China because she wants to terrorise us. He said, "our Government must not bind future Government in this matter of Atom Bomb. The new generations will have as much right to decide for themselves as the present generation has. We must think in practical terms, can we make the bomb in near future?"<sup>2</sup>

A member of Independent Parliamentary Group, Shri L.M.Singhi stated in the Lok Sabha that "We should not take initiative for the admission of China in the U.N. At a time when we were asking for the expulsion of South Africa from the U.N. for violating certain dictates of the Charter, it is entirely in comprehensive why we should be sponsoring the cause of communist China's admission in U.N."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Janata: Vol.XIX (1964, No.46) p.5.

2. L.S.D.: 24th November, 1964, p.1844, 10th Session, Vol.XXXV.

3. L.S.D.: 28th September, 1964, p.4102, 9th Session, Vol.XXXIV.

Thus all political parties concentrated on the Chinese nuclear explosion. All of them said that it was a danger and threat for India. Swatantra party was of the view that China was our real enemy. All its policy was China oriented. B.J.S. argued that both China and Pakistan were menaces, comparing them to tuberculosis and the plague respectively. Both parties were in the view that we should make Atom Bomb. But Swatantra party wanted to accept nuclear umbrella from Western countries. On the other hand P.S.P. and S.S.P. was against these nuclear shields. They said that best thing was that we should depend on our own feet instead of others. Communist party of India was of the view that India should take initiative for the settlement of border dispute and to break the present dead lock. It also criticised the Chinese atomic explosion but it was against the manufacturing of Atom Bomb by India.

Thus according to all opposition parties China is the real danger for India's security. All opposition parties appreciated Shastri's strong action towards China during Indo Pak war, ~~xxxx~~ when China gave ultimatum to India. They suggested that India should take initiative for the settlement of border dispute with China. But it should not be against India's national prestige and dignity. With some exception all parties' views were in conformity with the views of Shastri Government.

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CHAPTER SIXINDO-PAK RELATIONS(A) ATTACK ON KUTCH:

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 brought into being the two sovereign successor states out of the previous India. Relations between India and Pakistan began in a very unfriendly and unsatisfactory circumstances. The two countries are neighbours and yet are so unfriendly that a good part of the foreign policies of two countries is based on considerations of each other. Kashmir is the main issue between their relations.

From the point of view of Indo-Pak relations the year 1964-65 is very important. The year 1965 witnessed the India-Pakistan relations descending to the lowest ebb. During Shastri's Prime Ministership three main incidents occurred which are important in the context of Indo-Pak relations. These are: the Pakistani attack on Kutch border and Kutch pact, major armed conflict of 1965 and Tashkent Declaration.

In the study of Indian foreign policy relations with Pakistan have great importance. There is a great need of friendly relations between these two neighbours. Indian opposition parties have different attitudes towards Indo-Pak relations. For the purpose of this study we may divide it into three separate parts.

(A) KUTCH CONFLICT AND AGREEMENT:

Following a series of minor violations of the Indian border in Kutch, from February 1965 onwards, Pakistan made a serious violation in March the same year in Kanjarkot, 1300 yards within India territory and made exaggerated and unfounded claims regarding their patrolling right in Rann of Kutch. On April 19, Pakistan launched a planned attack on our border post at Sardar followed by further attacks South of the Indo-Pak border in the Rann of Kutch and occupation of certain posts which on Pakistan's own admission had never been in her possession. Pakistan's foreign Minister admitted that "this is a over territory which lies roughly north of 24th parallel. All opposition political parties condemned the Government for its negligence on border.

Jansangh member in the Lok Sabha, Shri U.M.Trivedi said that, "the policy of drift adopted by the Government in its relations with Pakistan has brought the country to the brink of ruin and disgrace and that steps should be taken to replace the present policy with a strong, cogent and logical policy to meet the challenge of Pakistan".<sup>1</sup>

Jansangh thought that the aggression was naked and rackless; there was no border dispute. The border was divided by nature.

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1. L.S.D.: 11th Session, 28th April, 1965, p.11591, Vol.XLII.

Swatantra Party was of the opinion that the Government was very weak. We have lost all our friends. N.G. Ranga said in the Lok Sabha, "I cannot feel confident that this Government has got that moral strength or this ruling party would be able to exercise such a moral strength as to be able to provide that kind of a broad minded, far sighted, courageous leadership that is necessary today, ~~tomorrow~~<sup>1</sup> tomorrow and day after, as long as this threat of Chinese aggression and the present aggression from Pakistan continues".

The PSP and the SSP took this aggression with more seriousness than the Chinese aggression of 1962. The PSP held the view that if even after the reverses of 1962, if it is said that we are unprepared or that we are unaware, then this Government was incapable of defending the country. A PSP member Shri Diwedi said that "we have several times raised this question about the threat of China and Pakistan, but we had been accused as war-mongers. We should be really serious about the territorial integrity of our country"<sup>2</sup>. It suggested that if militarily it was not possible to take action, atleast we should have taken steps to populate these areas, build roads and communication etc. So this area was connected with the other regions of our land. The Government totally

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1. L.S.D.: 11th Session, 28th April, 1965, p.11601, Vol. XLII.
  2. L.S.D.: 14th Session, 28th April, 1965, p.11650, Vol. XLII.

neglected this aspect, although we had been told several times that we consider Pakistan as our enemy. No one.

The SSP was also of the view that there was a great need of strong action. According to Dr.Lohia,"this Government has lost a lot of territory- Langju, Barahoti, Ladhakh, Aksi-chiu and what not and nero Kutch. The people of Pakistan think that any time Indian territory can be taken. So we should take strong action. He said, "I do not like war and arms but there is no other alternative. Between India and Pakistan there is no permanent solution except federation between them. And we should prepare for any sacrifice for this cause".<sup>1</sup>

The Communist Party of India condemned ~~the Kutch Agreement~~, America more for this attack than Pakistan. In its view all this was because of the imperialistic attitude of the U.S.A. In this situation what requires is that we should be determined unitedly to defend our country's integrity; we would not allow the rulers of Pakistan to secure their unjust claims to Indian territory by military pressure and blackmail. A Communist Member Shri H.H.Mukerjee said, "we do not want to fight with Pakistan, but the American authorities are behaving in this most egregious fashion. The U.S.A. has consistently armed Pakistan with modern weapons, while refusing to supply them to India."<sup>2</sup>

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1. L.S.D.: 11th Session, 28th April, 1965, p.11706, Vol.XLII

2. Ibid: p.11603.

According to the D.M.K. this border was well established. The border and ground rules laid down were accepted by Ayub Khan himself in 1960. But Pakistan did not believe in peaceful negotiation and has resorted to this dangerous experiment of nibbling at our border. Shri Sezhiyan said that we should tell the Pakistani Government and the whole world that our conciliatory attitude should not be mistaken for weakness and if the only answer to aggression was to vacate it, we should be prepared for taking such action. He said that, "our Government should prepare to defend not only the Kutch Sind border, but to defend India. He suggested that our communication facility should extend to this area. Now we are told that the Kutch area is soundy and marshy. It is very strange that we expect from our aggressors that they should move their troops in a place where we can move without much difficulty".<sup>1</sup>

Some Independent members also criticised Government's policy. J.B.Kripalani said that, "this carelessness of the Government of India was a matter of shame, it is a culpable negligence of our Government. Once Gandhiji said that those in whose hands the lives of millions of people lay, if they make a mistake, it is not a mistake but it is a sin, it is immoral".<sup>2</sup>

Independent member Shri P.V.Shastri said, "before taking any decision about Kashmir, we should be careful that after this Kutch episode there should not be such

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1. L.S.D.: 11th Session, 28th April, 1965, p.11710, Vol.XLII.

2. Ibid: p.11738.



incident again".<sup>1</sup>

Thus all opposition parties criticised the Government for her negligence on border conflict. After many days of war, India and Pakistan agreed on May 4, 1965 to a de-facto cease fire on the Kutch border pending further negotiations.

In the course of a detailed statement in Parliament on April 12 the Indian Home Minister Mr. G.L. Nanda disclosed that India had informed the U.N. security Council and the Governments of friendly countries about the unprovoked Pakistani aggression and its dangerous repercussions if Pakistan persisted in it.

After he had announced India's willingness to enter into negotiations with Pakistan for a peaceful settlement of the disputed border, Prime Minister Shastri intervened to assure Parliament that the Government would insist on a Pakistani assurance that it would vacate the Kanjarkot area before the commencement of the proposed talks. He warned Pakistan that if it failed to give such an undertaking, India would not only not enter into any negotiations with her but also take suitable measures to push back the Pakistani forces from the military posts they had illegally set up on Indian territory.

On April 28, the Lok Sabha affirmed the nations resolve to drive out the Pakistani aggression from Indian soil after Mr. Shastri's repeated assurances that the

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1. L.S.D.: 28th April, 1965, 11th Session, p.11723, Vol. XLII.

Government would defend the borders "with firm and courageous determination".

In the Rajya Sabha on May 3, Mr. Shastri reiterated that there could be no ceasefire in the Rann of Kutch without a simultaneous agreement on the restoration of status-quo-ante. He said, "the threat of total war will not deter the Government of India from doing its rightful duty. No Government would be worth its name if it allowed its territories to be annexed by force by an aggressive neighbour".

In her desire for good neighbourly relations and also in response to the mediatory efforts of the British Prime Minister, India entered into an agreement on June 30 with Pakistan which provided for : (i) ceasefire from July 1, 1965; (ii) restoration of the status-quo as it prevailed on January 1, 1965; and (iii) resort to agreed processes for determining the Sind-Kutch border.

According to the Agreement troops of both countries would withdraw from Kutch within a week.

Indian police re-occupied the post as Chhad-Bet and the police of both countries patrolled the tracks which they were patrolling prior to January 1.

The preamble to the Agreement said that "both had agreed to the restoration of the status quo as on January 1, 1965 in the confidence that this will also

contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo-Pakistani border".

A Tribunal was then constituted under this Agreement with Judge Lagergren of Sweden as Chairman and two nominated members by India and Pakistan. The decisions of the Tribunal was to be final and binding.

The Agreement had mixed reactions in the political circles of India.

#### 1. COMMUNIST PARTY:

The executive of the Communist Party also welcoming the Agreement stated that, "it shares the deep concern of our people at certain dangerous and dishonourable terms in the ceasefire Agreement". The party stated, "while supporting the ceasefire the central executive committee of the Communist Party of India calls upon the people, upon all democratic and patriotic parties, groups and individuals to unite and activate their forces throughout the country into an all out mobilisation for defeating the imperialistic manoeuvres behind the arbitration proposals and for compelling the Shastri's Government to give up its weak and vacillating policy in the matter of defending Indian sovereignty over Indian territory under pressure of the Anglo-American patrons of Pakistan".

The resolution pointed out that India however has has to pay dearly for the Government's utter incompleteness

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1. Statesman: 9th July, 1965, p.7.

in handling defence matters and for the deliberate policy of keeping the people in the dark. A victim of aggression, India had to withdraw its military forces from its own territory, because prior to January 1, "it was not the Indian army but only the Gujarat State Police who were<sup>1</sup> defending the Rann of Kutch".

In the Lok Sabha, a communist member Shri Indrajit Gupta said, "at first this news gave great relief that a ceasefire Agreement had been reached in Kutch, that was quite natural because the status-quo-ante, which the Government announced had been achieved, that means that all the posts and areas which had been forcibly occupied by Pakistani armed aggression would have to be vacated, and a general threat and danger has averted, this was a general feeling of relief"<sup>2</sup>. He also pointed out that the "nature of that withdrawal was such that it was not a withdrawal on an equitable basis. It seemed that our army had to vacate the entire area which before January 1, 1965 was being patrolled only by our state police and not by the regular army. But on the other side of the border, the regular Pakistan army forces having withdrawn from Kanjarkot, Chhad-Bet, Biar-Bet and Sardarpost, can remain absolutely<sup>3</sup> on their side of the border right upto the frontiers".

He asked if the Government of India was aware of the Dingsurai track which Pakistan had built? In the Agreement

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1. Statesman: 9th July, 1965, p.7.

2. L.S.D.: 16th August, 1965, 12th Session, p.1190, No. XLIV.

3. L.S.D.: 16th August, 1965, 12th Session, p.1191, No. XLIV.

Pakistan has been given police patrolling rights ~~in~~ along with the Indian police in the strip between Ding and Surai in the Indian side, because it has proved that it was patrolling a track constructed by it unknown to the Indian Government. He asked, "what our intelligence services were doing all this time? Why was the house not told about it formerly? Either the Government was ignorant about it, or she knew about it and these facts were being suppressed". He said 'I want the Government to examine whether or not there had been any blatant flagrant violation by Pakistan of these ground rules as far as the patrolling of that track was concerned and if so whether it was not a "good ground for us to get out of some of the provisions of the Agreement?"<sup>1</sup>

He further said that, "the provision of tribunal in Agreement is quite objectionable. We were told that there was no dispute except regarding the question of demarcation on the ground; there could be no question of entertaining Pakistan's fantastic claims of 3,500 sq.miles which would push the whole line down several miles south of the 24th parallel which would mean that the demarcation pillars which are already there will have to be uprooted. But it is surprising that now we have signed an Agreement in which we have clearly agreed that the terms of reference of this tribunal will not be confined to ground by existing international border between Kutch and Sind".<sup>2</sup>

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1. L.S.D.: 16th August, 1965, p.1191, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.

2. Ibid: p.1191.

"The terms of reference of the proposed tribunal  
are no longer limited to the question of demarcation of the  
existing border, but have been extended to cover Pakistan's  
fantastic claims over Indian territory. Thus India's  
sovereignty over the Mann of Kutch has been made a subject  
of arbitration"<sup>1</sup>.

In brief, the Communist Party's stand was that,  
"it (Agreement) contains some very, very upalatable things  
which are the creation of this Government's own previous  
policy. Mr. Indrajit Gupta said it is one thing to get  
a ceasefire Agreement but it does not laying down a  
procedure for the future settlement. The Agreement is  
against our national dignity and self respect"<sup>2</sup>.

All disputes should be settled through direct  
bilateral talks between India and Pakistan without the  
mediation of any third party or tribunal. Communist party  
demanded that this Government should, if it wanted to consis-  
tently uphold our sovereign rights and territorial integrity,  
revoke this clause which gives this power to the tribunal  
arbitrate over our own territory"<sup>3</sup>.

Thus Communist Party of India supported the  
ceasefire Agreement. But it strongly criticised some of  
its provisions which were described as dangerous and  
dishonourable. C.P.I. called upon the people to carry on

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1. Statesman: 9th July, 1965, p.7.

2. Ibid:

3. L.S.D.: 16th August, 1965, p.1192, 12th Session  
Vol. XLIV.

a country wide campaign to ensure that India's nominee in the tribunal was from a friendly socialist country. It strongly stated that there was no extension of the arbitration procedure to cover the Kashmir dispute on the analogy of the Kutch.

2. SWATANTRA PARTY:

In its resolution of 17th May, 1964. the Parliamentary Board of the Swatantra Party dealt at length with the problem of Pakistan. It stated, "measures for ensuring the country's security and defence should include the settlement of outstanding issues with Pakistan and serious consideration of the offer made by Pakistan for the joint defence of the sub-continent"<sup>1</sup>.

The Swatantra Party alone gave the Agreement its unqualified approval. But a Swatantra Party member Shri Patel described India's attitude towards Pakistan "as unrealistic. India was perturbed by the little skirmishes on the Kutch border, which were just like those hit and run", incidents that had been occurring on the Indo-Pakistan border for over 16 years. India had in the past made many concessions to Pakistan - the canal water treaty and the exchange of lockers were two examples. This had been done for the express purpose of living in peace with Pakistan. Yet, India had failed to join hands with Pakistan on the most important issue, he said, by rejecting President Ayub Khan's joint defence offer"<sup>2</sup>.

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1. Statesman: 2nd July, 1965, p.1.

2. Ibid: 1st May, 1965, p.3.

Shri N.G. Ranga, leader of Swatantra Party in Lok Sabha, suggested that "India should try her best to keep the doors open for friendly relations".

Another Swatantra Party member Shri Himmat Singh said, "It is not correct to say that the Agreement is a compromise". He said that Congress members called it a peaceful approach. "In fact our country should have a balance between political thinking and military action. It was the same peaceful approach that brought about the trouble on the Tibetan border; it was the same peaceful approach which has landed us in this Kashmir problem. So we should not talk such things and be prepared for all eventualities"<sup>1</sup>.

Thus Swatantra Party criticized the Government's negligence on our borders but it accepted the Kutch Agreement for the sake of friendly and peaceful relations between the two countries. It was the only party which welcomed the Agreement.

### 8. BHARATIYA JANASANGH:

The Kutch Agreement was severely criticised by the BJS. Shri U.M.Trivedi said<sup>2</sup>"This Agreement is very shameful for the country". Shri Deen Dayal Upadhyaya said<sup>3</sup>that "the ceasefire Agreement between India and Pakistan is misnomer". The real operative part of the Agreement related to the settlement of the future boundary

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1. L.S.D.: 17th August, 1965, p.501, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.

2. Ibidi p.420.

3. Organiser (Weekly journal of Bhartiya Janasangh) (New Delhi) Vol.XVIII(1965, No.48)p.2.



of the Kutch-Sind area. "All this was being done to lessen the shock of this dishonourable Agreement to the people, to make them feel that we got something by hard bargaining and that the Government of India had been successful in carrying their point".<sup>1</sup>

In a resolution adopted by the general council of BJS on 11th May, 1965, the Agreement was described as "a case of shameful capitulation before Pakistani wanten aggression".<sup>2</sup>

On August 16 the Anti Kutch Pact Rally was organised by the BJS. Shri A.V. Vajpayee, Janasangh leader in Rajya Sabha warned that "if the Government refused to heed voice of the people so unambiguously expressed and adamantly went ahead with the pact the BJS would be constrained to take the next step".<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Upadhyaya stated that the Prime Minister Shastri had informed the Lok Sabha on May 11 that Pak had accepted U.K. proposals and had agreed to restore the status-quo-ante and even to vacate Kanjarkot which was not in her possession on January 1, 1965. Now it seems that the intervening period has been utilizing not by us but by Pakistan, to gain some points. He asked why this particular date January 1 was chosen in the Agreement? This date <sup>was</sup> leads the people: Shri Trivedi complained that

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1. Organiser: Vol. XVIII (1965, No.48) p.2.
  2. Organiser: Vol. XVIII (1965, No.40) p.3.
  3. Organiser: Vol. XVIII (1965, No.54) p.4.

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"this is very shameful thing that we do not believe in our facts and believe in enemies facts. Did we know that Pakistan is using our territory for patrolling the Ding-Surai track? If not then why we agreed to take this in an Agreement". He also pointed out that from the Agreement it appeared that the condition of restoration of status-quo-ante was applied to both India and Pakistan. We have agreed to quit Vigokot and sardar post because these posts are alleged to have been created after January 1,1965. We have submitted many restrictions in our own territory. Why? Does it show that we have gained anything? Pakistan's troops will withdraw from the Rann of Kutch to the international border. They can sit there comfortably poised for any action against India. On the contrary Indian troops will completely evacuate the Rann of Kutch (their own territory) any night be stationed somewhere in Kutch far away from the international border. "By this ignorable Agreement we have recognised Pakistan's thief activities and legal rights to send police patrols in our own territory".

Shri U.M.Trivedi suggested that, "It is the demand of time that Government should leave the policy of fear and pressure. We want peace but not at the cost of our nations respect. "In the Agreement Government has

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1. L.S.D. :17th August,1965, p.421, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.
  2. Organiser: Vol.XVIII (1965, No.48) p.2.

Thus BJS party was of the view that we should take strong steps in this matter and should not talk to such a nation which has no faith in Agreements and peaceful talks. Briefly the BJS strongly opposed the Kutch Agreement as it was against the wishes of our people.

#### 4. THE PRAJA SOCIALIST PARTY:

Shri Prem Bhasin, General Secretary of the PSP said that in the views of PSP, "the Indo-Pakistan Agreement on the Rann of Kuch primarily as a vindication of the resolution of international disputes by peaceful negotiations without recourse to war"<sup>1</sup>. The PSP was however constrained to observe that the Government of India had exceeded its mandate by implicitly conceding to the tribunal the right to determine the whole area of the Rann of Kutch as a disputed territory.

Another PSP leader, Hari Vishnu Kamath stated that, "here was, in Kutch, a golden opportunity to retrieve the lost prestige of October 1962. If the Prime Minister is to be believed that Pakistani patrolling had been going on even before 1st January, 1965, but there was not any statement from Government's side so it is the fault of Government"<sup>2</sup>.

According to PSP "it was not an Agreement of peace or truce either; it was not an Agreement of peace with honour and justice, it was a pact for object appeasement of the aggressor, where the aggressor and the aggressed, the

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1. Janata: Vol.XX (11th July, 1965, No.25), p.7.

2. L.S.D.: 12th Session, 17th August, 1965, p.477, Vol.XLIV.

victim are equated, ~~put on a par with each other.~~ There is a lost of difference between demarcation and determination. We have no objection about demarcation. But determination is brought with grave danger, because it gives power to the tribunal to draw an entirely new boundary, while we have all the time said that the Rann of Kutch was part of Kutch and not of the province of Sind<sup>1</sup>".

Shri Kamnath and Shri Hem Barua said in the Lok Sabha that "Agreement had violated certain provisions of the Indian constitution, has over ridden the Authority of Parliament and by-passed certain assurances given by Government on the floor of this house"<sup>2</sup>.

The PSP charged that the Gujarat Government and Union Law Minister were never consulted before the Agreement was signed, because of the pathetic faith in the British Prime Minister and white hall experts. According to the PSP the Government had committed a great blunder, but who is to pay the price for these blunders? It is too high a price to pay for peace.

Shri Barua draw the attention to the most dangerous aspect of the Agreement: the decision of the tribunal shall be binding on both Governments and shall not be questioned on any ground whatever. In this agreement the supremacy of Parliament is challenged.

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1. L.S.D.: 16th Aug.1965, p.163, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.

2. Janata: Vol.XX(25th July,1965, No.21) p.8.

Shri Jashvant Mehta of the PSP said in Lok Sabha that "after the Kutch Agreement Pakistan started another move on the Kashmir ceasefire line. So there is a need of re-thinking. We should take bold steps against Pakistan and reconsider it".<sup>1</sup>

Thus on the whole the PSP was of the view that the agreement was a dishonourable document and a humiliation to India.

5. THE SAMYUKTA SOCIALIST PARTY:

In a resolution on the Kutch Agreement the national committee of the SSP criticised the Agreement on 3 grounds: (1) It led to India's withdrawal from her own territory; (2) It permitted Pakistan to patrol Indian territory; and (3) the introduction of the arbitration clause which, was tantamount to violation of India's sovereignty.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Lohia poured scorn on the Agreement saying that "it was west damning" and one "which only a senile Government could reach".<sup>3</sup> He said that the Kutch agreement was a three-fold surrender by India - as was stated in the party resolution.

Shri Ram Sewak Yadav charged that "our Government had never cared for the map of India. In 1962 China attacked and we had to loose our territory. Again in

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1. L.S.D.: 17th August, 1965, p.476, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.

2. Statesmen: 2nd July, 1965, p.1.

3. Ibid.

Kutch Pakistan did the same thing . In 1962, we agreed on Colombo proposals and now we have agreed Kutch Agreement. He said that this was the process of disintegrating India".<sup>1</sup> He also pointed out that after Kuch Agreement Pakistan was sending infiltrators in Kashmir. He expressed his party's pleasure at putting 3500 sq.miles territory of India before a tribunal. He stated that we do not want war, but when war is imposed on us then we should not sit silently and should not adopt the path of surrender. We have to be determined that we would not give an inch of our territory to any other nation - then only we can save ourselves from war and defend our boundary.

SSP wanted to scrap the Agreement. Pakistan's adventure in Kashmir was the direct result of the dishonourable Kutch pact, it thought if Pakistan had been taught a salutaory lesson in Kutch it would not have dared to do mischief in Kashmir.

Thus PSPS criticised the Agreement as bitterly as other opposition parties had done. Arbitration clause in the Agreement was the most objectionable thing according to SSP.

6. OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES AND INDEPENDENT MEMBERS:

According to Mr. Maurya, the leader of Republican Party, "Kuch agreement was against democratic values. This agreement was against the wishes of people and against

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1. L.S.D.: 17th August, 1965, p.443, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.

assurances given to the Parliament".<sup>1</sup> Like many others, he thought that the objectionable thing in the Agreement was the clause of tribunal. Maurya said that we should have the power to solve our problems ourselves. Without it we could not safeguard our national boundaries. Republican Party's objection was that Pakistan's claim on our 3500 sq. miles of territory was recognised by the Government of India.

According to the United Progressive Parliamentary Group (U.P.P.G) the Government had completely failed to solve the boundary problems. The Government knew in 1960, that Pakistan was quarelling with us about the 3500 sq.miles of Kutch territory. But our Government had done nothing for the security of Kutch boundary and for providing military facilities there.

The member of the group Shri Yajnik stated in the Lok Sabha that "wrong facts were presented before us about Ding-Surai track. We agreed to give this track by seeing a photograph. The Government's fault was that it did not consult the Gujarat Government before accepting this Agreement. It was very strange that P.M.Wilson made Shastriji agree on that".<sup>2</sup>

In the Agreement the objectionable thing was the provision for a tribunal. It was very shameful thing for us to accept.

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1. L.S.D.: 17th August, 1965, p.511, 12th Session, Vol. XLIV.

2. L.S.D.: 16th August, 1965, p.216, 12th Session, Vol. XLIV.

He demanded that "before signing this Agreement Government should consult and secure the acceptance of Parliament. It should be made clear to Pakistan that the sword shall perish by the sword"<sup>1</sup>.

Thus both Republican Party and U.P.P.G. opposed the Agreement.

Some independent members in the Lok Sabha also opposed the Agreement. J.B.Kripalani asked "Why the word 'determination' was used in the Agreement?"<sup>2</sup> because History shows that there is no dispute about Kutch except the demarcation of boundary.

He said that it was a strange thing that the Government did not know that there was a portion of our territory that was being patrolled by Pakistan. According to M.S. Aney and Kripalani "the Government was legally and morally wrong. Due to its negligence it had converted this question into an international question"<sup>3</sup>.

Shri Prakash Vir Shastri said that "Government of India and Prime Minister Shastri had done an insulting and weak agreement for the nation"<sup>4</sup>. It was a very wrong tradition that at first Government took these important decisions and then on the basis of majority passed these

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1. L.S.D.: 16th August, 1965, p.217, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.
  2. L.S.D.: 17th August, 1965, p.503, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.
  3. L.S.D.: 16th August, 1965, p.235, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.
  4. L.S.D.: 17th August, 1965, p.467, 12th Session, Vol.XLIV.



~~Agreements. We should change this process.~~ He said that we should be careful about the tactics of Britain. About the clause of tribunal he said the strange thing was that we could not challenge the verdict of the tribunal. He said that it was not only the responsibility of opposition members to oppose the Agreement. It was a national issue and national prestige should be saved.

In sum, all political parties criticised the Kutch Agreement as against the national interest and national prestige. All parties criticised the point that the Agreement was to give the Kutch case to a tribunal. It was a breach of India's sovereignty. All of them held the view that Pakistan did not believe in agreements and pacts so we should not enter into pacts and agreements with her. It is all right that we want to live in peaceful atmosphere with Pakistan but it depends on Pakistan to reciprocate. They were all the more critical because after the Agreement Pakistan had sent infiltrators in Kashmir. All demanded that the Agreement should be abrogated.

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(B) INDO-PAK CRISIS & KASHMIR ISSUE

The year 1965 was very important in the history of Indo-Pak relation. On the one hand Kutch Agreement was signed and on the other Pakistan was using this Agreement as a gap for her military preparations. After the Kutch Agreement Pakistan launched another invasion, this time in Kashmir. Kashmir is the real problem in the relations of the two countries. Pakistan launched an invasion in 1948 for the first time in Kashmir. In 1965 she made her second attempt. Thousands of Pakistani armed infiltrators were sent across the ceasefire line into Jammu and Kashmir to sabotage and paralyse the administration. When their expectations of an internal uprising did not materialise, Pakistan made an open military invasion across the international boundary in the Chhamb area. India was forced to take counter-measures. Shastri declared that we would defend India's frontiers with full strength. India adopted the *fit for tat* policy. It was decided that those "who live by the sword shall perish by the sword". And thus to relieve the pressure on our forces in the Chhamb sector and to forestall further aggression by Pakistan, Indian forces had to move across the frontier into West Pakistan.

When conflict broke out, discussion arose throughout the country about Indo-Pak relations and Kashmir. The U.N. Secretary-General visited India and Pakistan in the second week of September in an attempt to bring about peace. The security council passed a resolution on September 20, 1965, calling upon both countries

to ceasefire. India made positive response while Pakistan's response was not clear. Eventually the cease-fire came into force at 3.30 A.M. on September 23. Pakistan, however, attempted to occupy Indian territory even after the cease-fire but our forces frustrated her attempts. Thus hot war ended but cold war was still continuing. Kashmir question, opposition parties had different views. Many opposition parties criticised the U.N. resolution as one sided. Prime Minister Shastri took many decisions about the Indo-Pak war and ceasefire.

Representatives of all parties and sections of the people at a meeting convened by Prime Minister Shastri pledged full support<sup>1</sup> to the Government in its conflict against Pakistan. On the eve of Parliament's winter session (after aggression this was the first session) Shastri received powerful support for his policy towards Pakistan, both from his own party and from the opposition.<sup>2</sup> He expressed his gratitude to the leaders of the opposition parties whose demonstration of solidarity with the Government at the crucial hour, had made the other countries recognise that in meeting any serious threat to her integrity India could not only show resoluteness and strength but also remain united.<sup>3</sup> Shastri was keen to mobilise the support of the opposition to meet the crisis.

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1. Organiser: Vol.XIX (1965, No.5)p.2.
  2. Statesman: 3rd November, 1965, p.1.
  3. Swarajya: Vol.X (1965, No.29) p.6.

This was obviously an enviable position for any Prime Minister. But there were indications that within the frame work of over all support the Prime Minister should expect at least some principles, if not, an occasional attack on the flanks.

On behalf of BSP, Communist and Janasangh groups, it was made known, however, that while they agreed with the Government's general policy they would have some faults to find with it. The BJS gave a notice through a resolution, of its intention to demand a complete change in the country's foreign policy.

Professor N.G. Ranga, Swatantra Party's leader, who was present at the meeting with Prime Minister was in broad agreement with Mr. Shastri. But his party's resolution, by contrast, appeared to be an exercise in tight-rope walking. <sup>1</sup> It endorsed a tough-line but also advocated that the door for discussion on Kashmir should be kept open.

The Prime Minister confirmed at the meeting of the Congress party and during discussions with the opposition leaders that the ceasefire situation had slightly improved but added that Pakistan was continuing its attempts to occupy Indian territory presumably to be able to show its face to the world that, it took had occupied some area in India.

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1. Statesman: 3rd November, 1965, p.1.

2. Ibid:

India's withdrawal from the U.N. Security Council debate, Mr. Shastri said, was no boycott. It was interdict to demonstrate that she could not tolerate any interference in her domestic affairs; a policy she was determined to pursue. Most of the members of the security council, Mr. Shastri said, agreed with India's stand and appreciated the view that political question could not be mixed up with the ceasefire and withdrawal of troops.

With this background let us now take into account the attitude of each political party in relation to the Indo-Pak problem including Kashmir.

#### 1. COMMUNIST PARTY:

The Communist Party was of the opinion that Indo-Pakistan problem was the creation of the imperialistic and that all problems, including Kashmir could be solved through direct negotiations without any outside interference.

On Kashmir it was of the view that it was wrong to say that Kashmir was like any other state in India. In fact the Government of India had talked with Pakistan many times on this problem. It wanted the special status of Kashmir to remain as it were.

The national council of Communist Party met from August 19 to 24, 1965 and vehemently condemned the infiltration of thousands of Pakistani trained armed personnel across the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Its resolution

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1. Statesman: 3rd November, 1965, p.1 .

regretted that the Government of India has placed an undue faith in the U.N. observers, and wanted the Government to take firm steps to halt Pakistani aggression through all possible means.

From the very beginning of the Indo-Pak war the Communist Party favoured settlement of the disputes through direct negotiations. It was of the opinion that these problems could never be solved in the battle field but around a conference table only. In reply to Nanda's Lok Sabha statement, G.S.P. Sundaraya said that his party "advocated a peaceful settlement of India's disputes with China and Pakistan not because it is afraid of war but because the party feels that it is the only way by which the interests of our people and our country can be safeguarded".

The resolution of national council of Communist Party stated that "a non-war pact between the two countries will benefit both"<sup>1</sup>.

Mr. Namboodripad was of the view that the "accession of Kashmir to India was final and that if there was any issue it was an internal matter between the Government of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir"<sup>2</sup>. Pakistan, he said, has no business to interfere in the internal affairs

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1. New Age: Vol.13, No.35, p.3.

2. Statesman: 1st November, 1965, p.7.

of India. He told in a press conference, "I am now opposed to the demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir by Pakistan".<sup>1</sup>

In a statement the Communist Party stated, "The Pakistani aggression backed by U.S. and British imperialism has created a situation in which the utmost vigilance and the United exertions of our entire people are called for to meet the challenge. The C.P.I. is firmly of the view that the aggressors must be driven out to the last man and necessary conditions, both military and otherwise, must be created so that it is no longer possible for the Pakistani forces, whether openly or in disguise, violate Indian territory and commit aggression".<sup>2</sup>

The Communist Party in another resolution on 4th September, 1965, also took a serious view of the opportunist support given by the Chinese Government to the Pakistani Government in its anti India actions. It said that, "by this support the Chinese Government was impeding a peaceful settlement between India and Pakistan and thus weakening the cause of anti imperialism, peace and Asian solidarity. The communist paper, New Age, called this intervention by China as "the pouring of fuel on already raging flames".<sup>3</sup>

Notwithstanding the role of the Chinese Government in this matter the C.P.I. thought that it was ultimately the U.S. and the British Imperialists who would

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1. Statesman: 1st November, 1965, p.7.

2. New Age: Vol.13, No.37, p.2.

3. Ibid:

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exercise pressures on the Indian Government to enter into a dishonourable "settlement" with Pakistan. The C.P.I. appreciated the Soviet Union's firm stand in the security council and elsewhere to the effect that Kashmir is an integral part of India.

Commenting editorially upon the mission of Secretary General of the U.N. to end hostilities New Age referred to a statement issued on the 6th September, 1965 which said "an unconditional ceasefire which ignores the fact of Pakistani aggression, which enables Pakistan to maintain its infiltrators inside Indian territory and send in war of them at all". It stated that "any ceasefire to be effective must guarantee (1) vacation of Pakistani aggression, (2) removal of all infiltrators from the Indian soil of Kashmir; (3) provision to ensure that no further infiltration or aggression is possible".<sup>1</sup> The paper also welcomed the security council's resolution for a ceasefire ~~in~~ its acceptance by India. But it was of the opinion that the imperialists will try to interpret the Security Council's resolution in such a way as to allow Pakistan a breathing time for renewed aggression at a later date. It urged the Government not to allow any peace keeping forces into Kashmir. It felt that India should not be dependent upon the umbrella and other loaded gifts of the imperialists.<sup>2</sup>

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1. New Age: Vol.13, No.37, p.2.

2. New Age: Vol.13, No.39, p.1.



On October 31, 1965, writing in New Age under the title 'Indo-Pak Conflict which way to peaceful solution', G. Adhikari said "the national council and central executive of the Communist party of India have always taken a serious view of the disastrous effects of Indo-Pak conflict. The provisions fruit of the imperialist imposed partition of the country and have sought to work out peaceful solution of the same in the interest of the common people ~~in the~~ <sup>1</sup> ~~interest of the common people~~ of the sub-continent".

In short, the C.P.I. stated: (1) that the measures to throw out the aggressors should not in any way lead to the harrasment of the people; (2) Efforts should be made to settle the Indo-Pakistan problems in general and Kashmir problem in particular through peaceful means.

The Communist Party paper People's Democracy (editorially) welcomed the Prime Minister's statement that the Government was prepared to have talks with Pakistan on relations between the two countries. <sup>2</sup> In a letter written on November 24, 1965, E.M.S. Namboodripad welcomed the announcement by the Prime Minister that he had already agreed to meet the President of Pakistan in Tashkent to discuss all matters of dispute between the two countries.

On the whole, the party's attitude towards the dispute was one of anti imperialist. It refused to believe that our real enemy was China. It was of the view that

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1. New Age: Vol.13, No.39, p.1.

2. People's Democracy: Vol.1 No.23, p.1.

American imperialism was our real enemy. Just as Swatantra Party always tried to view the Indo-Pak dispute as a part of China's grand design; the Communist Party always tried to show the people that this dispute was the result of Anglo-American imperialism.

## 2. SWATANTRA PARTY:

The Swatantra Party is a prowestern party. It is not so outspoken about the danger from Pakistan, as it is with regard to China. It views the conflict as an unfortunate event in the world history. Swatantra party was always soft towards Pakistan and considered "collaboration with her to be in the interest of the sub-continent for security against Chinese communist imperialism"<sup>1</sup>. Surprisingly enough, the party did not come out with a statement at the national level immediately after the aggression as it had done during China's aggression.

Writing the Swarajya Rajaji had stated that "full freedom should be given to the people of Kashmir to decide whether to join Pakistan or India or to remain independent with the pledged protection of India, Pakistan and the U.N."<sup>2</sup> At another place he stated, "there is a simple and fairly certain way out of this eternal conflict with Pakistan. It is to honour Nehru's much repeated promise to hold a plebiscide in Kashmir"<sup>3</sup>. In short, if

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1. Swarajya: Vol.X (1965, No.29), p.3.
  2. Swarajya: Vol.10, No.13, p.1.
  3. Swarajya: Vol.X, (1965, No.29), p.3.

there has not yet been an understanding with Pakistan "the fault is as much (India's) as Pakistan's."<sup>1</sup>

The Swatantra Party's view was that the root cause of the Indo-Pakistan conflict was not Pakistan's pretended anxiety to safeguard the democratic right of Kashmiris to self determination, but her plan hatched in collaboration with China to destroy the bastion of secular democracy and peaceful progress in this part of the world.

The national executive of the Swatantra Party passed a resolution urging the Government to take the initiative at the proper time in working out a solution of the Kashmir problem, which would be in the interests of the two countries. It recognised the need for taking steps to combat aggression and guard against further infiltration in Kashmir. But at the same time it wanted the door kept open for normal and friendly relations which could be restored when Pakistan ~~was~~ made amends and showed a desire to co-operate and when this could not be misconstrued as having been brought about by Pakistan's military adventures of democracy and peace.<sup>2</sup>

At the Conference all party leaders meeting with the Prime Minister held on September 6, 1965 N.G. Ranga advocated that India must be clear in its mind and also must make it clear to the world what is wanted to achieve through

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1. Swaraiya: Vol.IX (1965, No.57) p.4.

2. Swaraiya: December 2, 1965.

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the present conflict. He termed the Pakistani aggression as "pro-arranged". He was of the view that the aim of India should be limited, to teach Pakistan a lesson to live like a good neighbour. He desired India to hasten to take advantage of any move towards peace as soon as it was offered itself to reduce the sufferings of war.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the conflict the party proclaimed its whole hearted support to the Government of India. Mr. Massani called upon members to co-operate actively with the authorities in civil defence measures and in all other ways connected with the defence efforts.

Rajaji welcomed India's acceptance of security Council's resolution on ceasefire and withdrawal to 5th August line. He termed it "as victors gesture and matter of pride. He felt that in accepting this, India had incidently helped to add to the prestige, and importance of the U.N. to him and to Swatantra Party, China was the real enemy. Rajaji felt that it was important "to achieve a settlement with Pakistan to mean it away from China".<sup>2</sup>

During the Pakistan attack on Kashmir, Ranga said, "the developments in Kashmir in the last few days have taught us that we should be prepared to face the combined hostility of communist China and Pakistan".<sup>3</sup>

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1. Swarajya: Vol.10, No.13. p.33.
  2. Swarajya: Vol.10, No.4, p.25.
  3. L.S.D.: 23rd August,1965, p.1258.

Swatantra Party in general and Rajaji in particular felt that the excitement of three weeks war should not blind us in the long term view. He was of the opinion that in the long run China was the real enemy and Pakistan and India must ~~be~~ re-establish friendly and close relations to face the common enemy if they both want to exist as non-communist countries.

Thus on the whole in view of the Swatantra Party China was our real enemy and not Pakistan. So it adopted soft line towards Pakistan. It wanted a policy of conciliation in Kashmir, and gave full support to the Government of India during conflict.

### 3. BHARATIYA JANASANGH:

The Bharatiya Janasangh, a product of militant Hindu nationalistic ideology, adopted an aggressive, communal, retaliatory and not a conciliatory policy towards Pakistan. It believed that Pakistan was and will continue to be India's enemy. Its very existence depended upon maintaining hostility and aggressiveness towards India and it was wrong to presume that the settlement of the Kashmir issue would suffice to end the tension between the two countries.

The Janasangh thought that "China and Pakistan were equally dangerous. It is true that Pakistan is the

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1. Swarajya: Vol.10, No.15, p.1.

2. Organiser: 21st September, 1964.

weaker of the two but in the case of China, India could rely on the west whereas in the case of Pakistan she would have to be self reliant so these two became equally dangerous"<sup>1</sup>. It held that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of Bharat and to bring it in line with other states the Jana Sangh would take steps to delete Art.370<sup>2</sup> and thus apply the whole of Indian constitution to that state.

The BJS argued that "the Hyderabad and Junagadh issues died the day we decided to solve them. Let us solve the Kashmir issue the same way, there is no other way"<sup>3</sup>. Thus according to the BJS our firm objective should be the complete integration of Kashmir with the rest of the India and the liberation of 2/5th of Kashmir under the occupation of Pakistani aggressors.<sup>4</sup>

Unlike Swatantra, which considers Kashmir as the outstanding issue between India and Pakistan, the BJS thinks in terms of prolonged conflict with Pakistan. Unlike Swatantra which is willing to yield on Kashmir to help establish fuller ties with the West, the BJS rejected any such suggestion.

The Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha of the Janasangh at its session held on August 17-18, 1965, declared that "Pakistan action had annulled the ceasefire agreement. It urged that the territory of Kashmir must be cleared of Pak aggression right upto the international frontier".<sup>5</sup>

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1. Organiser: 20th July, 1964.
  2. Organiser: Vol. XIX. (1965, No.2) p.3.
  3. Organiser: Vol. XVIII (1965, No.28)
  4. Organiser: Vol.: XIX(1965, No.25)
  5. Organiser: 22th August, Vol. XIX (1965, No.2)

It described the infiltration of armed men as an invasion and their failure to accomplish their task as a Pakistani's bay of pigs", it suggested that all along the border the army should be in control to stop infiltration.

The BJS extended active and full co-operation to Government in its war efforts. It suspended its anti-Kutch pact agitation and congratulated the Government of India for its decision to talk to Pakistan in the only language it understood. Shri Upadhyaya welcomed the Prime Minister's statement that "we cannot go from one ceasefire to another ceasefire, and wait till Pakistan chooses to start hostilities against"<sup>1</sup>.

In the Prime Minister's Conference with all party leaders, the Jana Sangh's president expressed his party's support to the Government and said that the fight with Pakistan was no longer the responsibility of Government.<sup>2</sup> He wanted India to continue war till Pakistani aggression was completely vacated.

The BJS weekly Organiser wrote that "we must not agree to a ceasefire until and unless Pakistani unconditionally ceases fire and when that is done- we must make liberation and integration of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir with India a condition of peace"<sup>3</sup>. Speaking

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1. Organiser: 19th September, Vol.XIX(1965. No.6).
  2. Organiser: 12th September Vol.19 (1965, No.5), p.1-3
  3. Organiser: Ibid

in the Rajya Sabha on 24th September, Mr. A. B. Bajpayee warned the Government that the "victory in the battle field should not be lost in the diplomatic field".<sup>1</sup>

Again, speaking in the Lok Sabha on the ceasefire and U.N. Resolution, Shri U. M. Trivedi stated that "after all the sacrifices that our army and people had made, and the promises that our Government has made, are we going to fall back to the old so called ceasefire line of the 5th August by adopting the UN Resolution?"<sup>2</sup>

On the whole the Jana Sangh took a militant stand with regard to Pakistani aggression. It was the opinion that unless we create a fear in the hearts of Pakistan, India cannot live in peace. Jana Sangh attitude was that peace with Pakistan should and can only be possible on Indian terms.

#### 4. PRAJA SOCIALIST PARTY:

PSP's national executive at its meeting held from 13th to 15th August, 1965, considered the Kashmir problem. It stated that the incidents in Kashmir and other places have exploded the myth that the Indo-Pakistani conflict can be resolved through peaceful negotiations. Pakistan never believed in peaceful co-existence with India and expressed the hope that in view of recent developments the platitudes about peaceful settlement with Pakistan and Indo-Pakistan confederation would now cease.

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1. Organiser: 25th September, Vol. 19 (1965, No. 7) p. 4.
  2. L.S.D.: 24th September, 1965, p. 7490, 12th Session, Vol.



It warned the Government against reopening the Kashmir issue. The resolution further said, "the PSP was convinced that once India's firm decision on Kashmir was made known to the world, the Big power, which has so far failed to understand the basic issues involved in the Indo-Pakistan conflict would re-discover in India a true defender of democracy and peace".<sup>1</sup>

A PSP leader, Shri S.N.Divedi, criticised India's intelligence service. Now we have four intelligence offices working in Kashmir. Every Kashmiri asks, her, inspite of all these intelligence offices these infiltrators come for the purpose of capturing Srinagar itself. "If this is the quality of intelligence service then we should not spent so much money on them",<sup>2</sup> He asked. He also said this Pakistani action was not an isolated raid into Kashmir. It was a challenge to India's democracy and secularism.<sup>3</sup> "The PSP is convinced that the root cause of the Indo-Pakistan conflict is not Pakistan's pretended anxiety to safeguard the democratic rights of the Kashmiris to self determination but it is her plan in collaboration ~~xxx~~ with China to destroy the bastion of secular democracy and peaceful progress in this part of the world".<sup>4</sup> Shri Divedi declared that Kashmir was a part of India and that we must not permit anybody to encroach upon it. The Government should liberate those areas of Kashmir which were in the enemy's hand.

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1. Statesman: 15th Nov. ,1965, p.8.

2. Janata: September 12.

3. Ibid.

4. L.S.D: 24th August,1965, p.181, 12th Session, Vol.

In an emergency session (11 to 12th September, 1965)

the PSP made it known that, "the party has no doubt ~~that~~ whatever that in this conflict India is not actuated by a desire to seize Pakistani territory. Here is a limited objective, to take all such measures as are necessary to prevent Pakistan from sending her infiltrators across the border to convince the Government of Pakistan that its policy of unending harassment and aggression does not pay and that Kashmir must be retained as part of Indian territory"<sup>1</sup>.

The PSP gave the Government unconditional support in the conflict. It felt that "the issue of Kashmir could never be reopened. It warned the Government against yielding to pressures on this issue on against being stamped into a ceasefire which can only be precluded to further Pakistani aggression"<sup>2</sup>.

At all Party meeting, Shri N.G.Goray, Chairman of the PSP expressed appreciation of the Government's response to Pakistan's challenge and pledged his party's support to it.<sup>3</sup>

In a broadcast over all India Radio on September 13, 1965, Shri S.N.Divedi expressed the hope that "out of the present conflict India would emerge as a new nation". He called Pakistani behaviour an open aggression. He said the PSP was opposed to the congress Government but at this

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1. Janata: Vol.20, No.38, p.3.

2. Ibid.

3. Organiser: 12th Sept.Vol.XIX(1965,No.5),p.5.

hour of trial we all stand together as loyal citizens to defend our country". He described the aggression a 'Sino-Pak design' made after a great deliberation to destroy Indian democracy. He felt that the best reply to Pakistan was to maintain communal harmony and an atmosphere of peace and amity in the country.

The standing committee of the PSP national executive met on 21st September, 1965 to consider the security council's resolution demanding a ceasefire. In a resolution it said, "the brief and bitterly fought conflict with Pakistan has ended with an uneasy ceasefire extending from Karagil in the north to Gahra in the south". It stated "so long as Pakistani's collusion with China continues and so long as the totalitarian regime president Ayub lasts, the compulsions to launch an offensive against India would persist".<sup>2</sup> In the opinion of PSP by making such admissions and by linking up the proposal for cessation of hostilities with the withdrawal to August 5 position the Council has rendered it unacceptable to India. The committee believed that India would not be bullied or blackmailed into submission. The resolution took note of the moves by some Governments to bring both the countries to conference table to negotiate to fate Kashmir and warned the Government not to slide back from the position that Kashmir was an integral part of India. It cautioned the

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1. Janata: 21st Nov.1965, p.3.

2. Ibid.

Government in regard to the role of some of the Big powers who were persistently pressuring India to give up what they call a rigid attitude. It did not approve of the idea of annexating or confederation with Pakistan and wanted India to remain firm on Kashmir issue because once a concession was made to Pakistan over Kashmir it would open flood gates to further demands from within and without. The national conference of PSP warned the Government that any softening of the Kashmir issue at Tashkent will not be tolerated by the people.

In short, the PSP advocated a firm position towards Pakistan and wanted the liberation of occupied Kashmir also. It held the view that peace and co-existence with Pakistan was possible only on Indian terms and there could never be a compromise in this regard.

##### 5. SAMYUKTA SOCIALIST PARTY:

A distinctive aspect of the SSP's to Indo-Pak relations was its emphasis on the need for a confederation in the sub-continent.

The idea of confederation was put forward cogently in a resolution passed at the United India-Pak. Conference. The resolution said: "This is the firm and considered opinion of this Conference that our leaders committed a big mistake in accepting the division of the country".

"The partition of the country and the prevailing concomitant hatred between Hindus and Muslims is due to the machinations of the British imperialism and mistake of some top leaders".

"The conference demanded of Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri to tell Shri Ayub Khan that the big problem was not Kashmir but the development of India and Pakistan in the present world which depends on their realisation of the mistake that was partition. "We must forget differences and come closer, so that people of both the states may live in peace and prosperity", the resolution added.

The PSP national committee in a resolution (26th August) welcomed the crossing of the ceasefire line in Kashmir by the Indian security forces provided their action. It urged the Government to explore avenues of an overall settlement with Pakistan and strive to liquidate the more disastrous consequences of partition, make the two states one in international personality with common defence and foreign policies, common citizenship and market.

In the Prime Minister's conference with all party leaders, SSP Chairman Shri S.M. Joshi thanked the Prime Minister for inviting party leaders for consultations and seeking their help for the country's defence. Patriotism is our Dharma, he said, but we must know what are the objectives of the battle, or the war, India should not just react to what Pakistan does?

The U.N. resolution on the conflict was bitterly criticised by Party leaders. Dr. Lohia said that the security council was demongated by power politics of big nations. It could not pass resolution against America in Vietnam and

Russia in Hungary. It could pass resolutions against weak and small nations which had no military strength. He said, "resolutions which were passed by Security council, said that we should go to the old ceasefire line of 5th August and that there should be talk on Kashmīr. Both are infact<sup>1</sup> dangerous for us".

The national committee of the SSP met at Hyderabad on 23rd October and passed a resolution congratulating the Armed forces on their performances in the fighting. The resolution stated that the events of September made it quite evident that the ceasefire might not last long as autocrats of Pakistan might plunge the sub-continent into another flare up. It was therefore, necessary for India to remain alert.

Thus the SSP was of the opinion that confederation was the only solution of Indo-Pakistani conflict. It was of the opinion that we should not accept an adhoc to the ceasefire on Kashmir again and again.

#### 6. OTHER PARTIES AND INDEPENDENT MEMBERS:

In the conference of Prime Minister with all party leaders, Shri B.P.Maurya of the Republican party, while assuring his party's support to the Government, asked the Congress to set its own house in order. He also emphasised the need to ensure that all officials<sup>2</sup> treated this matter as one above party consideration.

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1. L.S.D.: 24th September, 1965, p.7515, 12th Session, Vol.XXXIV.

2. Organiser: 12th September, Vol.XIX(1965, No.5).

Hindu Mahasabha leader, Shri Bishan Chandra Seth stressed that greater vigilance was necessary on the border. The infiltrators in Kashmir, he said, must be completely wiped out.

Shri Frank Anthony, nominated Anglo Indian Representative in Parliament, said that "with India, Kashmir was a point of honour. He added, "we must teach Pakistan that aggression will never pay".

J.M.K. leader Shri Annadurai pledged unreserved support to the Government and said "India wants peace but aggression must be met". He also pleaded for a moratorium on all controversial issues.

Shri Mohammad Ismail, President of the Muslim League, "congratulated the Government for taking a bold stand and said that the people were prepared to make all sacrifices in fighting the enemy".

Independent member of Parliament, Shri A.D.Mani, wanted all controversial issues to be shelved. He pointed out that "in the national Defence Council as presently constituted all parties were not represented. He urged that the Council should be suitably reconstituted or expanded. He also demanded that the Pak Embassy be ordered to close down.

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1. Organiser: 12th September, Vol.XIX (1965, No.5).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

Thus at the time of Pakistani aggression on Kashmir, all parties gave full support to the Government.

Speaking on the Kashmir problem in Lok Sabha, Shri P.V. Shastri said that "reacting to situations as they arose was no way of tackling the problem. Simply by throwing out the raiders or quelling them, as and when they did mischief was no solution. The permanent solution, he said lay in merging <sup>1</sup>Jammu and Kashmir State with Punjab or Himachal Pradesh". He said that "it is Sadiq's indulgent attitude to the anti-national elements in Kashmir valley, adopted in the name of liberalisation, which has been <sup>2</sup>mainly responsible for the explosive situation there". He demanded abrogation of Article 370 and also imposition of President's rule in the state. He urged that vigorous steps should be taken to beat back the raiders. He said that Kashmir is not the main issue but it is part <sup>3</sup>of conflict between India and Pakistan.

A member of Independent Parliamentary Group, Dr. L.M.Singhvi said in the Lok Sabha that "U.N. resolution is a source of great distress and disillusionment. It shows a complete lack of appreciation of the facts of the situation. Our propoganda machine is very weak. All the chanceries of the world, and the foreign offices have shown a complete lack of understanding on this vital issue affecting Kashmir. We have a marvelous case on Kashmir,

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1. Organiser: 22nd August, Vol.XIX(1965, No.2) p.4.

2. Ibid.

3. L.S.D.: 16th Nov.1965, p.2259, 13th Session, Vol.XIVIII.



but that case has been not properly explained and publicized before the bar of world public opinion".<sup>1</sup> He said that it was all right that we accepted ceasefire in the interest of peace, but first of all, we must analyse what the U.N. resolution sought to do. It did not say as to who was the aggressor? Another objectionable feature was that it linked a simple cessation of hostilities with a withdrawal of armed personnel to the positions occupied on the 5th of August. In fact Pakistan in both times attacked us against international law but because it suited the great powers has again shelved.<sup>2</sup> So we should not accept this ceasefire resolution it is away from real facts.

Thus all parties wanted that there should be permanent solution of Kashmir. All appreciated the decision taken by Shastri Government to fight with Pakistan and congratulated the Indian fighting forces. BJS bitterly criticised the Pakistani attitude. It was not ready to make any concessions to Pakistan. Swatantra Party wanted a policy of conciliation with Pakistan. Some parties accepted the ceasefire resolution of U.N. but most of parties were of the view that ceasefire had no meaning. PSP and SSP were of the view that Pakistan was trying to harrass us and want to abolish the bastion of secularism and democracy. All parties except communists demanded that special status of Kashmir should be ended by our Government because it mislead the words public opinion. They demanded the deletion

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1. L.S.D.: 24th September, 1965, p.7474, 12th Session, Vol.XXXIV.

2. Ibid.

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of Art.370. All parties gave full support to the Government of India in the period of trial.

SSP was of the view that federation was the only solution and BJS also held that Akhand Bharat should be the slogan. Swatantra party was of the opinion that our real enemy was China. There should be alliance between India and Pakistan to meet the challenge of China. Communist party never accepted the view that there was no Kashmir problem. It wanted peaceful relations with Pakistan as a first step in Delhi - Pindi - Peking axis against American imperialism.

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(C) TASHKENT AGREEMENT

Prior to the ceasefire, on September 17, 1965, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers had offered his good offices and proposed meeting of the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan in Tashkent in order to bring about amity.

Tashkent Summit had begun with a bang; it must not end with a whimper. This was the general opinion. Prime Minister Shastri also said, "that the eyes of the whole world are on Tashkent and that therefore they could not afford to disappoint the hopes which has been roused".<sup>1</sup>

When the Tashkent <sup>meeting</sup> ~~necessity~~ was proposed, the opposition parties expressed their views in the Lok Sabha about its significance and prospects.

A Swatantra Party member Shri P.K. Deo while fully appreciating the effort of the Soviet Premier to bring about the talk said: "We sincerely hope that the talk in Tashkent will be crowned with success and that it will open the gate for a permanent solution of this problem and would bring about permanent peace between these two neighbours".<sup>2</sup> Swatantra leader Shri N.G. Ranga said that "the country would not like Tashkent to be used by Pakistan only as a smoke screen behind which it could carry on its military preparations as it did in the case of the Kutch

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1. New Age: 4th January, 1966, p.2.

2. L.S.D.: 10th Dec. 1965, p.6959, 13th Session, Vol. XLIX.

51 Agreement." But he demanded that under no circumstances must Government agree to withdraw troops from the commanding posts of Haji Pir, Kargil and Tithwal.<sup>1</sup>

A Communist member H.N.Mukerjee said "I wish we can get a stabilisation of the ceasefire line and peace to follow".<sup>2</sup> When Shastri said that we will discuss the totality of Indo-Pak relations, he thought it to be rather odd, because it included Kashmir also.

A Jana Sangh member Shri U.M.Trivedi said "it is very wise on his part to have set at rest doubts that existed in the minds of some that opportunity might be available for the question of Kashmir and our hold on Kashmir being discussed. Nothing can be desirable than the avoidance of the horrors of war. None of us want war and every effort in that direction would be a welcome effort".<sup>3</sup> But M.S. Golwalkar, the <sup>4</sup> ~~leader~~ of RSS said, India's search for peace is humiliating.

Shri S.N.Divedi of the PSP said, "The Prime Minister has taken the most unusual steps in agreeing to a meeting at Tashkent inspite of the fact that Pakistan still continues to violate the ceasefire and still occupies a large territory of our country".<sup>5</sup> He also wanted to know whether this totality excludes Kashmir.

1. Organiser: 9th January, 1965, p2.
2. L.S.D.: 10th December, 1965, p.6960, 13th Session, Vol.XLIX.
3. Ibid: p.6961.
4. New Age: 4th January, 1966, p.5.
5. L.S.D.: 10th Dec. 1966, p.6962, 13th Session, Vol.XLIX.

In short the Tashkent meeting was welcomed by most political parties though there were certain misgivings about its scope.

The meeting started on January 4, 1966 and a Declaration was agreed upon on January 10, 1966. The Declaration said: "The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that: (i) both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations in accordance with the United Nations Charter and reaffirm their obligation under the charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means; (ii) all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than February 25, 1966, to positions they held prior to August 5, 1965, and shall observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire lines". Other points related to the normalization of relations in economic, diplomatic and other fields.

Subsequently, the Army chiefs of the two countries entered into an agreement on January 22, 1966, on disengagement and withdrawal of forces and lessening of border tension. On February 10, Army Commanders of eastern region of both the countries agreed on further measures aimed at eliminating tension in that sector.

When this agreement was signed, different political parties took at it from different angles. Some opposition parties criticised it and some appreciated it. The Tashkent Declaration and the subsequent steps



taken by India and Pakistan to restore normally in their relations have been welcomed by a large majority of opinion in both the countries. The war of 1965 has in many ways demonstrated the risk of allowing these relations to deteriorate beyond a certain limit and the need to maintain a measure of stability in Indo-Pakistani relations.

1. COMMUNIST PARTY:

The CPI expressed its happiness at the Tashkent Declaration. It is important to note that while the Chinese Government by no means welcomed the Tashkent Declaration, the communist party did so unequivocally; in fact they regarded Tashkent as a vindication of their position because the dispute between India and Pakistan could not be settled in the battle field, it could be settled only around the negotiating table. Party felt that the withdrawal of troops and the restoration of diplomatic, economic, cultural relations, trade and communication as constituting a firm basis to the next step to the solution of all outstanding problems between the two countries.

The CPI thought that "The Tashkent Declaration paves the way for lessening tension and normalizing relations between India and Pakistan and for settling all disputes between the two countries by peaceful means".<sup>1</sup> It held that Shastriji went to Tashkent in quest of peace and friendship between India and Pakistan. His efforts

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1. New Age: 10th January 1966, Vol.XIV, No.3. p.1.

then brought him and the nation a crowning victory.

The Communist Party also said that 4th January would be a "red letter day in the world's peace calendar. The declaration was a harbinger of peace. We have pledged to live as good neighbours. The impact of the Tashkent Declaration on the friendship would be good indeed".<sup>1</sup>

The national council of the communist party in its resolution described Tashkent as "an event of great historic significance not only for the people of two countries but for all peace loving mankind".<sup>2</sup> It was of the view that the Tashkent Declaration corresponds to the deepest urges of the people of India and Pakistan for peaceful and friendly relations. The people of India and Pakistan are not merely neighbours, they are brother people tied to each other by common bonds of history, tradition culture and struggle for their independence. It further declared that "the Tashkent Declaration which makes a firm commitment for the renunciation of the use of force and for the solving of all disputes through peaceful means, opens broad vistas for constructive efforts for the ending of all outstanding problems and for building up friendship ~~and~~ between India and Pakistan on solid and indestructible foundations".<sup>3</sup> It also thought that in the context of the Tashkent Declarations commitment ~~for~~

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1. New Age: 4th January, 1966, p.2.

2. New Age: 16th January, 1966, Vol. XIV, No.3, p.9

for renunciation of use of force, the agreement for mutual withdrawal of military personnel to the August 5th line is the logic corollary conforming also the India's earlier acceptance of September and is therefore to be welcomed in the interests. The C.P.I. held the view that for 18 years the U.S. and other imperialists have been kept alive the Indo-Pakistani conflict and have spared no efforts to thwart any progress towards a peaceful solution of differences. The Tashkent Declaration has now come as a blow to the imperialist designs and conspiracies.<sup>1</sup>

The central committee ~~of~~ also stressed the need for a similar approach to our relations with China. Thus according to communist party of India, Tashkent Declaration opened the door to peace. The optimists have won and the cynics and chauvinists defeated. The subsequent tasks was to carry forward the Tashkent spirit, to give flesh and blood to it through concrete measures to heal the wounds of the Indo-Pak conflict, and build on Tashkent's foundations a real and lasting Indo-Pakistan settlement".<sup>2</sup>

## 2. SWATANTRA PARTY:

The Swatantra party also welcomed the Tashkent Declaration. Writing in Swarajya Rajaji expressed the hope that Tashkent would be a success and added, " I wish the meeting all success which will mean an in estimable deal for both India and Pakistan".<sup>3</sup> He further said "Kosygin of

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1. India Quarterly: "Political parties on foreign policy".  
Vol. XXXIII No.1, p.64.

2. Ibid.

3. Swarajya: 22nd January, 1966, p.1.



Russia has pulled the two nations back from the brink and it is upto the leaders of Pakistan and India not only to be grateful to the Soviet Union's leaders but to engage themselves in what is necessary to be done in order to save their respective nations from gloriously ruining themselves".<sup>1</sup>

The Swatantra Party welcomed the Tashkent Declaration as the beginning of new chapter in Indo-Pak relations and advocated its implementation with good faith. The agreement relieved the party from the awkward position in which it found itself during the 1965 war because of its basic pro-western stand.

### 3. BHARATIYA JANA SANGH:

Jana Sangh was of the view that nothing would come out of Tashkent, or if something did come out it would be against the interests of India. The Jana Sangh was <sup>one</sup> of the opposition parties which vehemently opposed the Tashkent Declaration. The Organiser editorially wrote: "this declaration goes counter to the pledged word of the Prime Minister to the Parliament and the people. The care of the agreement....about the withdrawal is objectionable and wholly unacceptable".<sup>2</sup> It expressed the hope that the Parliament would not accept the declaration.

The Jana Sangh felt, as Party Secretary, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya said, that "Tashkent Declaration died with Shastri and that Russia pressurised Shastri to sign that agreement".<sup>3</sup>

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1. Swarajya: 22nd January, 1966, p.1.

2. Organiser: Vol.19, No.22, p.3 (1966 Jan.9)

3. Organiser: 16th Jan.Vol.19(1966, No.23) p.3.

The Central Executive of the Sangh at its two day session held on January 15-16, 1966, strongly assailed the Tashkent Declaration as a betrayal of national interests. Through it the victory won by our defence forces on battle field was lost at the diplomatic table. With the completion of withdrawal of our forces from the strategic areas of Hajipir and Kargil, Pak has once again come back into her true colours. She has further strengthened the alliances with communist China. From this agreement we would be quitting areas which are legally constitutionally an integral part of India liberated from Pakistan's clutches by our brave jawans at a heavy price. The resolution had expressed the hope that the Parliament would reject the Declaration as it was no assurance of a stable peace. The resolution said: "It would be self delusion to think that Tashkent Declaration means the end of Pakistan's aggressive intentions". According to it the agreement goes counter to the pledges given to the Indian people and withdrawal to August 5 line is not only wrong in principle but is fraught with grave dangers to national security because this will leave open again all those old routes of infiltration".

Speaking in Lok Sabha on the 16th Feb. 1966

U.M. Trivedi of the Sangh said that "he could not understand how the territory belonging to us - Kargil, Tithwal, Hajipir, recovered by us by force from Pakistani illegal occupation being given back. He felt that pressures were

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1. Organiser: 22nd January, Vol. XIX (1966 No. 24), p. 3.

put on the Prime Minister to make him believe that Russia is the only friend of ours and so he should not discard the advice given by Russia. He firmly believed that the Prime Minister agreed to this declaration under pressure. He said that the demonstration by BJS party were the means by which the people expressed their feeling against the giving up of Kargil, Tithwal, Hajipir which was not liked by the people at large". He added the Tashkent Declaration "is not approved by the people and shall not be approved for all times to come".<sup>1</sup>

Proposing an amendment to the resolution on Tashkent Declaration, Jana Sangh leaders A.B. Vajpayee wanted the Rajya Sabha to record its disapproval of the declaration and call the Government to halt the withdrawal. In a second amendment he wanted to be added that "having considered the same this house records that the declaration is a gross violation of the solemn assurances given to the Parliament and the people".<sup>2</sup>

Speaking at a public meeting Vajpayee said "while Jana Sangh was second to none in its respects to the late Prime Minister, it would not permit the congress to confuse the basic issues involved in Tashkent agreement by trying to tag it with Shastri's death. He said:"the agreement which asks for a withdrawal from Kargil and other places is wrong on all counts".<sup>3</sup>

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1. L.S.D.: 16th Feb. 1966, p.6959, 14th Session.
  2. Parliamentary Debate: Rajya Sabha, 21st February, 1966.
  3. Organiser: Republic Day Issue, 1966.

Mr. Vajpayee was of the opinion that unless Pakistan agreed to implement the declaration on the infiltrators also we should not withdraw our forces from Tithwal, Kargil and Hajipir. He felt that when Pakistan has murdered the Declaration on the first day itself by saying that this declaration "will not be applicable on <sup>1</sup> infiltrators, we should not also withdraw our forces".

BJS was of the view that the occupation of these areas had become imperative for a two fold strategic reason. The entry of infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir state had to be plugged and China's treat to Ladakh had to be effectively checkened. So we should not accept this clause in the agreement. Mr. Vajpayee expressed his fears in Rajya Sabha that after sometime Pakistan will again start its aggressive acts on India. Jana Sangh called this agreement a 'scrap of paper'.

#### 4. PRAJA SOCIALIST PARTY:

Shri N.G. Goray of the PSP also called upon the people to mobilise the public opinion against the Tashkent Declaration and termed the Agreement "anti national as it revived the Kashmir question". He said that "the victories of battle field were turned into a political defeat and that Tashkent produced a mouse"<sup>2</sup>. Shri S.N.Dwivedi charged Shastriji with showing "extreme weakness in preserving the <sup>3</sup> interests of the nation". The Resolution of national

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1. Parliamentary Debate: Rajya Sabha: 21st Feb. 1966
  2. New Age: 16th January, 1966, p.2. Vol.XIV, No.3.
  3. Ibid.

Executive of PSP on February 18-20, 1966 stated "the PSP would have been extremely happy to welcome the Tashkent Declaration if it were to have the way for a lasting peace without jeopardizing the integrity of India. But the declaration made it obligatory on both to withdraw their troops to August 5, 1965, line. Our withdrawal means a total repudiation of assurances given by the Government to the people. The PSP can never be a party to such agreement, a commitment which seems counter to the fact that Kashmir is an integral part of the India<sup>1</sup>".

Thus PSP was against this agreement only on some points, not on the whole agreement. It was against the agreement as it was not a guarantee of stable peace.

##### 5. SAMYUKTA SOCIALIST PARTY:

Commenting on the Tashkent Agreement, SSP held the view: "the Tashkent Declaration instead of giving a clear and definite lead has added to the confusion in public mind in respect of Indo-Pakistani relations. In spite of the sacrifice of the precious life of India's Prime Minister, the Tashkent agreement is not going to yield more than a temporary respite. This agreement is bound to meet the same fate as the previous Indo-Pak agreements<sup>2</sup>".

Like the PSPS, it also said that in reaching this agreement "the Prime Minister of India had violated the solemn

1. Janata: Vol.21, No.6, p.10.

2. India Quarterly: "Political parties on foreign policy" (New Delhi, 1967) Vol.XXIII, No.1. p.67.

pledge given to the Parliament and the country of not leaving Hajipir and other points. The agreement had failed even to provide firm principle for any lasting solution. Agreements and conflict seem to succeed one other in Indo-Pak relationship. The only lasting and real factor in Indo-Pak relations was tension and friction. The rulers of both the states neither have the will nor the courage to tackle and remove the basic cause of this friction. Even if they resort to armed conflict they can not take it to finish because of their reliance on bigger powers. The solution of the problem would, therefore, be possible when either of the two develop the necessary strength<sup>1</sup>".

The SSP expressed the view that in Tashkent Declaration Mr.Kosygin implemented what Mr.Goldberg had suggested in the security council. It was suggested prior to Tashkent that the ceasefire line may be stabilised as an international border. But even that has not been achieved. The party was convinced that so long as the two countries remained separate no lasting solution could be achieved. A SSP member M.R.Bagri is known to have raised the issue of Indo-Pak confederation and asked Shastri to press for it.

Another member of SSP Shri Madhu Limaye said:

"The Tashkent Declaration was a betrayal and defeat for India".<sup>2</sup>

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1. India Quarterly: "Political parties on foreign policy", Vol.XXIII, No.1, p.67.

2. New Age: 16th January, 1966, p.7, Vol.XLV, No.3.

The SSP leaders seemed to contradict each other on this issue, since S.M. Joshi, Chairman had in his tribute declared that only a few hours before Shastriji's death the nation has turned the corner under his stewardship. Thus he had praised his efforts for peace.

Thus SSP criticised or opposed the Tashkent Declaration but not as BJS did. The common points of opposition in Tashkent Declaration were two. All opposition parties said it as against the solemn pledge given to the people and Parliament, and to vacate the Hajipir, Kargil and other strategic points were also the point of their opposition. They all except communist Party, wanted that we should not vacate these important point which are already the part of Indian territory.

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CHAPTER SEVENSOME OTHER ISSUES OF FOREIGN POLICY

As we have already seen, during Shastri's Prime Ministership major Foreign Policy issues were Indo Pak relations and Indo-Ceylon agreement. Apart from these issues some other issues were comparatively less important. On these issues also the reaction of the opposition is of importance. These issues were India's policy towards Vietnam, her relation with the U.K. in the context of common wealth and Cairo Conference of non-aligned relations.

England's attitude towards India during Indo-Pak war was critical by all opposition parties. BJS said that in the present crisis U.K. had been most unfriendly.<sup>1</sup> As a consequence of this India's relations with the commonwealth once again became a subject of discussion. The BJS member in Lok Sabha, Shri U.M.Trivedi said, "India should not withdraw from the commonwealth in a fit of temper, but after what has happened, we would always remain on our guard against the commonwealth organisation being exploited against India. He suggested that the commonwealth countries should come together and drive out England from the commonwealth".<sup>2</sup> It was asked how Kashmir issue which was an internal affair of India was discussed at the commonwealth conference. On account of this some parties demanded that India should leave the commonwealth

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1. Organiser: Vol. XIX (7 Nov. 1965, No.12) p. 3

2. L.S.D., 24th September, 1965, p.7494, 12th Session, Vol.XLVI, No.29.



Mr. Trivedi pointed out that Britain was the master of the commonwealth.

On the question of India's association with the commonwealth, the executive of Swatantra party disapproved the proposal that, "India should break with the commonwealth. It was of the view that the Government should take the initiative in organising the defence of democracy in Asia in view of the continuing menace of China which posed a major threat to the security and independence of India".<sup>1</sup>

The Communist Party of India regretted that Indo-Pakistani dispute was referred to in the final<sup>2</sup> communique of the Conference.

PSP was also of the opinion that "Kashmir or Indo-Pak crisis should not have been discussed in the commonwealth conference. It gave the suggestion "of quitting commonwealth".<sup>3</sup>

A member of Independent Parliamentary Group, Shri L.M.Singhvi said that, "the attitude of the British compelled us to make a unanimous demand in this country that the whole question of our continued membership of the commonwealth should be reviewed with a view to consider the severance of our link with the commonwealth".<sup>4</sup>

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1. Statesman: 28 Nov. 1965, p.7

2. L.S.D. : 28th September, 1964, p.4046, Vol.XXXIV, 9th session.

3. Janata: Vol.XIX(13th June, 1965, No.21) p.2.

4. L.S.D.: 24th September, 1965, p.7479, Vol.XLVI, 12th session.

He said that we should either mend the commonwealth or we should begin the process which would indeed end it.

About the India's policy towards Vietnam, opposition parties had differing views.

The national executive of the Swatantra Party said that "it deplores the attitude of the Indian Government in taking the short sighted and suicidal attitude of condemning the U.S. and South Vietnamese attacks on North Vietnam, while maintaining silence on North Vietnamese aggression on South Vietnam which has now proceeded for not less than 9 years. This stand of Government of India is entirely contrary to justice and our own national interest<sup>1</sup>". Mr. Massani asked, "is our policy today in regard to South Vietnam and Laos in line with the fact that the defence of South Vietnam, Laos and Malaysia is part and parcel of the defence of this country? Frontiers of India today lie on the river Mekong. The Mekong river and its valley are the eastern frontiers of India today. So we should try that this frontier remain safe"<sup>2</sup>.

A member of Communist Party, Shri Hiren Mukerjee strongly criticised Massani's view on Vietnam. He said, "for us it is clear, we must ask the United States forces in Vietnam to go. Shri Shastri at one point of time did

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1. Swarajya: Vol.IX (10th June,1965, No.51) p.26.

2. L.S.D.: 31st March,1965, p.7068, 11th Session.

say that the United States Army had no business in Vietnam and it should go out of that territory. He said now we do not say that, but even so, let us impress on the 'world that there are certain categorical imperatives which India has always followed, even before we were free"<sup>1</sup>.

About India's policy towards Vietnam, SSP leader, Dr. Lohia said that, "there should be our clear cut policy that we will not do any such work in South Asia from which Chinese strength increases". He said that in the present situation, "it will be better to sit silently. There have been many occasions in international policy where nation's speaking has been dangerous both from the national and international point of view or interest. He said if we cannot speak against China in South Asia, we should remain silent, whenever we speak we will speak against China, this should be our policy"<sup>2</sup>.

A member Shri U.M.Trivedi of the BJS said that "we should not interfere in other's matter. We could not solve our problems, why we should indulge in another's matter. We should see if China takes the whole Vietnam. What will be the impact on our foreign policy? Because in that situation whole East Asia will become communistic, and our position would be very awkward. So we should think

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1. L.S.D.: 31st March, 1963, p.7076, 11th Session.

2. Ibid: P.7098.

~~in terms of our national interest rather than making~~  
<sup>1</sup>  
 comments".

Janata wrote editorially, "that the retaliation by South Vietnam and American bombing will also have direct consequences for the whole world if the more sensible amongst them, especially Indians, did not condemn Communist China for initiating this war"<sup>2</sup>. It thought that, "the reluctance of the Shastri Government to take up a firm stand on the issue will trap many into thinking that because India does not speak up on its mind without reservation, she does not intend to resist the expansionism of communist China in South East Asia"<sup>3</sup>. In fact the most telling indictment of India's policy was that it was confused and indecisive.

Thus some parties criticised the Government of India for lack of initiative in solving the problem but others suggested that we should not interfere in this problem.

On Cairo conference of non-aligned nations, which was held in October, 1964, opposition parties held different attitude.

A member of Communist party Shri Kolla Venkaiah

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1. L.S.D.: 31 March 1965, p. 7103, 117<sup>th</sup> session

2. Janata: Vol. XIX (18th April, 1965, No. 15) p. 10.

3. Ibid.

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said in the Lok Sabha that "our delegation in Cairo was out of tune with the situation. Our delegation did not correctly reflect the sentiments of non-aligned nations. The Tshombe incident did not bring credit to our Government or to the people of India. Not only this but our delegation repeatedly attempted to introduce amendments against the spirit of anti-imperialism reflected in the conference. If that is their understanding and policy of non-alignment then the Government is going far away from the spirit of Cairo conference. Our relations with African countries are weak. We should try to cultivate better relations with Africa".<sup>1</sup>

Shri Nath Pai of the SSP said that "Cairo Conference is not a big achievement as Mr. Shastri had claimed to be. In fact this Government had become obsessed with issuing communiques. The larger the number of communiques it signs, the greater it thinks its achievements in the field of international affairs are. But they did not add to the sum total of India's prestige and influence in the world".<sup>2</sup> He further added that in the communique we do not find any kind of reference to the fact of aggression by China on us. But Mr. Shastri could be persuaded to condemn Israel. If the UAR regarded Israel as her enemy, our enemy was China. He also said that Mr. Shastri went abroad, and forgot the problem of

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1. L.S.D.: 24th November, 1964, P.1557, 10th Session, Vol. XXXV.

2. L.S.D.: 23rd November, 1964, p.1286, 10th Session, Vol. XXXV.

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Chinese threat to India and to the security of the whole of South East Asia. What is the use of joining into issuing platitudes completely ignoring the problems with which this country is faced? he asked. In his view Mr. Shastri bartered the legitimate interests of India.

An independent member, Shri J.B.Kripalani said that "in Cairo Conference our representative discussed abstract principles, nothing to do with the world in which we are living. This is only the waste of money to go to such conferences where only the barest of first principles and abstract principles are enunciated".

Communist Party also criticised the role which Shastri played at Cairo Conference. Thus most parties were of the view that such conferences were not useful for India.

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1. L.S.D.:23rd November,1964, p.1286, 10th Session,Vol.XXXV.
  2. L.S.D.:24th November,1964, p.1489, 10th Session,Vol.XXXV.

CONCLUSION

The 18 month's (from June 1964 to January 1966) Prime Ministership of Lal Bahadur Shastri was marked by importance when two attacks launched on India by Pakistan, once in Kutch and then in Kashmir and three Pacts with neighbouring countries. In 1964 Indo-Ceylon Agreement was signed dealing with the persons of Indian origin in Ceylon. Then Kutch Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan for the determination of Kutch border. Finally, Tashkent Agreement was concluded between India and Pakistan in January 1966. These were very crucial matters and opposition parties took great interest in them.

Decision making in the Shastri regime had become a sort of shared process. Before taking any major decision, Shastri mostly consulted the leaders of opposition parties. During his Prime Ministership more than once he formally consulted the opposition on important foreign policy matters and a National Defence Council was established, in which all parties ~~parties~~ were represented.

Lal Bahadur Shastri's election as leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party and hence the Prime Minister of India was generally welcomed all over the country, not only the choice of the man but also the way he was chosen was praised by many political parties and leaders. But when it came to specific foreign policy issues which the Shastri Government handled, the opposition's reaction was not uniform. For obvious reasons, he was

both criticized and praised by opposition parties which had their own approaches and orientations on matters relating to foreign policy.

On the Policy of Non-alignment all parties except D.M.K. were of the view that India should give up this old and unsuccessful policy. If nation's security or freedom was in danger, India should give up the policy. Swatantra Party was strongly in favour of joining the Western power bloc. SSP also wanted that India should give up this parrot like foreign policy. Their over all view was that the Government of India never attempted a proper assessment of the situation about China, Tibet and Pakistan. They said that the Policy of non-alignment was not free from blemishes.

On India-China relations, all political parties concentrated on the Chinese nuclear explosion. All of them said that it was a danger and threat for India. Swatantra party was of the view that China was our real enemy. All its policy was China oriented. BJS argued that both China and Pakistan were a menaces, comparing them to tuberculosis and the plague respectively. Both parties were of the view that India should make Atom Bomb. But Swatantra Party wanted to accept nuclear umbrella from the Western countries. On the other hand the PSP and the SSP were against nuclear shields. They said that the best thing was that we should depend on our own resources instead of depending upon others. Communist Party



3 of India was of the view that India should take initiative for the settlement of border dispute with China. It also criticised the Chinese atomic explosion but it was against the manufacturing of Atom Bomb by India.

All opposition parties thought that China was the real danger to India's security. All opposition parties appreciated Shastri's strong action towards China during Indo-Pak war, when she gave ultimatum to India. Exceptions apart all parties views were in agreement with the response of the Shastri Government.

On Indo-Ceylon Agreement the divergence was on which part of the people of Indian origin should be repatriated? It was the general opinion among political parties that the implementation of the Agreement should not be spread out over 15 years but completed over a shorter period. On the whole it was evident that Indo-Ceylon Agreement had a mixed reaction among opposition parties and individuals. There were some who were critical of the concessions which Shastri had made but others thought by concluding this Agreement, he had shown courage and statesmanship and removed a major cause of friction in Indo-Ceylon Relations.

All political parties criticised the Kutch Agreement as against India's national interest and prestige. All parties criticised the point that the Agreement was to give the Kutch case to a tribunal. It was a breach of India's sovereignty. All of them held

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the view that Pakistan did not believe in agreements and pacts. So we should not enter into pacts and agreements with her. It was all right that India wanted to live in peace with Pakistan but it depended on Pakistan to reciprocate. They were all the more critical because after the Agreement Pakistan had sent infiltrators in Kashmir. All demanded that the Agreement should be abrogated.

On Indo-Pak crisis and Kashmir issue all parties wanted that there should be permanent solution of Kashmir. All appreciated the decision of the Shastri Government to fight with Pakistan and congratulated the Indian fighting forces. BJS bitterly criticised the Pakistani attitude. It was not ready to make any concessions to Pakistan. Swatantra wanted a policy of conciliation with Pakistan. Some parties welcomed the ceasefire resolution of U.N. but most of the parties were of the view that cease-fire had no meaning. The PSP and the SSP were of the view that Pakistan was trying to harrass us and wanted to abolish the bastion of secularism and democracy. All parties, except communists, demanded that special status of Kashmir should be ended by India because it mislead the world's public opinion. They demanded deletion of Art.370. All parties gave full support to the Government of India in the period of trial.

The SSP was of the view that federation between India and Pakistan was the only solution and BJS also held that Akhand Bharat should be India's slogan. The Swatantra party was of the opinion that our real enemy was China.

There should be alliance between India and Pakistan to meet the challenge of China. Communist party never accepted the view that there was no Kashmir problem. It wanted peaceful relations with Pakistan as a first step in Delhi-Pindi Peking axis against American imperialism.

The PSP and the SSP criticised and opposed the Tashkent Declaration but not as much as BJS did. All opposition parties said that the Declaration as against the solemn pledge given to the people and Parliament, and that India should not vacate Hajipir, Kargil, Tithwal and other strategic points.

In sum, the Government of Shastri received a fair degree of support from the opposition political parties in so far as the conflict with Pakistan was concerned but on other major foreign policy matters the opposition was divided in its support to Shastri. Shastri no doubt consulted the opposition more frequently than Nehru. This established better understanding between the Government and the opposition.

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