

**ADAPTATION AND CHANGE IN THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION: A STUDY
OF POST-COLD WAR ERA**

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DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation entitled “**Adaptation and Change in North Atlantic Treaty Organization: A Study of post-Cold War Era**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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In Memory of My Loving

Father

Late Sebanidhi Meher

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List of Abbreviations

ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACO	Allied Command Operations
AOR	Operation Area of Responsibility
Art	Article
ARW	Advance Research Workshop
ATA	Atlantic Treaty Association
AU	African Union
AWACS	Airborne Early Warning and Control Force
BC	Budget Committee
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CAC	Conventional Arms Control
CBRN	Chemical Biological Radiological or Nuclear
CEEC	Central and East European Countries
CMBC	Civil and Military Budget Committee
CMC	Collective Measures Committee
CME	Crisis Management Exercise
CNAD	Conference of National Armaments Directors
COE	Centre of Excellence
COEC	Council Operations and Exercise Committee
CPG	Comprehensive Political Guidance
CPM	Conflict Prevention and Management
CS	Civil Structure
CTTC	Counter Terrorism Technology Coordinator
CTTU	Counter Terrorism Technology Unit
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DF	Deployable Forces
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
ENVSEC	Environment and Security
ESI	Environment Security Initiative
EST	Evolving Security Task
EU	European Union
EULEX	EU's Rule of Law Mission
EWG	Executive Working Group
FEST	Forum on Energy Security Technology
FLR	Forces at Lower Readiness
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavi
HLG	High Level Group

HLTF	High Level Task Force
HQ	Headquarters
HQSACT	Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
HRF	High Readiness Forces
IC	Infrastructure Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR	NATO-led Implementation Force
IPF	In-Place Forces
IPTF	International Police Task Force
IS	International Staff
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JFC	Joint Force Commands
KFOR	NATO-led Kosovo Force
LTBT	Term Build-up Forces
MC	Military Committee
MS	Military Structure
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAT	North Atlantic Treaty
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCCCA	NATO's Consultation Control and Command Agency
NCIRC	NATO's Computer Incident Response Capability
NCRS	NATO Crisis Response System
NCRS	NATO Crisis Response System
NCTTDP	NATO Counter Terrorism Technology Development Programme
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIWS	NATO Intelligence and Warning System
NIWS	NATO's Operational Planning System
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPT	Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC	NATO Russia Council
NRF	NATO Response Force
NRFA	NATO-Russia Founding Act
NSCFES	NATO Security Science Forum on Environmental Security
NTM-I	NATO Training Mission-Iraq
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
OAF	Operation Amber Fox
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PC	Political Committee
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
SACE	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

SC	Strategic Commanders
SCEPC	Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
SFOR	NATO-led Stabilization Force
SG	Secretary General
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Europe
SLWPG	Senior Level Weapons Protection Group
SPC	Senior Political Committee
SPS	Science for Peace and Security
SSF	Science Security Forum
TFE	Task Force Endeavour
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WDC	Western Defence Committee
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WUDO	Western Union Defence Organization

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4th April, 1949. It provides a forum in which the US, Canada and European countries can consult together on security issues of common concern and take joint action in addressing them. During the Cold War period, NATO's role was essentially static: preventing an attack against the territory of its member countries. Given the specific conditions of the East-West conflict, NATO could accomplish this objective by deterrence alone. NATO has added new members six times since its founding and comprises twenty eight members. NATO's purpose is enlarging the community of democratic states throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, while providing its growing number of members with the military foundation to undertake joint military action in defense of their common territory, values and interests.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, at NATO's London summit in July 1990, the alliance offered the Central and Eastern-European transition countries to formally put an end to confrontation, to establish permanent diplomatic relations with NATO and the base the future relationship on the principles of common security. In its strategic concept adopted in Rome in November 1991, NATO established a new and cooperative relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern-Europe as an integral part of the alliance strategy. In this way NATO has been transformed into an instrument of collective security and adopts multi-functions and issues in the Post Cold war era.

This study intent to seek answers to the following questions:

- Why is the need of NATO to enlarge its membership?
- How does NATO's role and functions expand in the Post-Cold war period?
- What useful role the NATO till playing in the present period?

It attempts to test following hypotheses:

- Due to the collapse of the military and political threat to its Alliance partners,

after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO was emphasizing crisis management rather than on deterrence

- To spread and strengthen democratic values throughout the Europe is the major propelling force behind the enlargement of its membership.
- NATO's increasing involvement in crisis management through its military contributions to the United Nations is the most significant role to maintain international peace and security.

The study will use both primary (official records and documents of the NATO) and secondary (books, journals and research papers etc.) sources of data and adopt inductive method in analyses the subject. The study will also employ historical, descriptive and analytical approaches. The study attempts to use Ernest B Hass' three models of change (Incremental Growth Model, Turbulent Non-Growth Model and Managed Interdependence Model) to understand the adaptation and change in the NATO.

Chapterization

This research work has been divided in five chapters. The chapter first provides the historical background of the NATO, its origin and development, structural understanding with its purposes. It also analyses the NATO's functions during the Cold War era.

The chapter second explores the detail about the process of NATO enlargement of the past and present. It highlights NATO's enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries in the post-Cold War era. Then it analyses the impact of enlargement on the structure and functions of NATO and on Russia.

The chapter third provides the ideas about the changing role of the NATO from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period and how it spillover to one function to multi-functions in post-Cold War period. How NATO is playing more significant role to spread and strengthen democracy in the Europe (especially in the Eastern Europe), and also how it brings stability in the Europe through the cooperation of other international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and non-member states etc. are the important focus in this chapter.

Chapter fourth identifies the challenges and problems relating to membership enlargement and the measures undertaken by NATO to address them. Then, it analyses the new threats emanating from transnational terrorism, climate change and energy security, weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks and highlight some of the actions taken by NATO to address them.

The chapter five summarises findings of the preceding chapters by discussing the NATO's changes and adaptations in the context of Ernest B Hass's three models of change. It ends with highlighting the need of reforms in certain areas and holds of sensitivity towards international community.

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) both emerged within the context of the Post-World War II international order. The UN was set up to focus on collective security mechanisms whereas NATO arose as a collective defence alliance in response to the emerging threat emanating from the Soviet Union (Schmidt 2001: 32). NATO and UN subsist in an ambivalent coexistence according to the UN Charter. The Security Council is the sole authority with the ability to legitimize the use of force in international relations. However, the “inherent right” to self-defence remains unaffected ‘if an armed attack occurs’ and until the Security Council takes the ‘necessary measures to maintain international peace and security’ (Art. 51 UN Charter). Referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty constitutes the legal basis for military action of the collective defence alliance (Schmidt 2001: 42).

NATO was created for defensive purposes because in 1949 the UN had already demonstrated that it would be unable to provide the collective security that the Western democracies so desperately wanted (Hartley 1963: 645-646). Moreover, it had no capacity whatsoever to offer collective defence against what seemed to be and was a genuine threat from the Soviet Union. Collective defence, to state the obvious, was the coming together of like-minded states to protect the group against an outsider. To be sure, the move of the NATO founding members toward collective defence was for all practical purposes recognition that collective security was an idea that had failed. As Canadian diplomat John Holmes puts it that the creation of NATO “really marked the end of Canadian dedication to the principle of collective security except confusingly in speeches” (Holmes 1996: 60-61). That was true of countries other than Canada too. Its collective enemy ‘the Soviet bloc’ has vanished in 1989 and therefore NATO’s “life expectancy” has, by many, been expected to be limited as well. However, the Atlantic partnership has proven to be more adaptable to the changing international environment than anticipated. Its anachronistic appeal puts NATO on the spot in justifying its

continual existence. NATO experienced a transition towards a global security agency with worldwide reach and influence. The mandating or sub-contracting NATO within the framework of the UN peace operations as recently the case in the Balkans and currently in Afghanistan clearly shows NATO's evolution beyond its original alliance character towards a "security manager" in Europe and beyond. NATO's global reach and its global definition of threats to its member states' security on the other hand disqualifies it as a regional organization in the traditional sense leaving it at a hybrid stage (Yost 2007).

The present chapter provides the historical background of the NATO, its origin and development, structural understanding with its purposes. It also analyzes the NATO's functioning during the Cold War era.

Origin and Development

At the end of the Second World War, there was considerable concern over the security of Western Europe especially in light of the growing power of the Soviet Union over Central and Eastern Europe (Holden 1989: 25). Very soon after the creation of the United Nations, the effects of the US-Soviet rivalry began to take hold. With both countries holding a veto in the Security Council the likelihood of the Security Council agreeing to significant action diminished considerably. At the same time, Soviet activities in Eastern Europe generated considerable concerns in the West. These two trends came together to prompt discussions and negotiations of a defensive alliance including Western European countries, Canada and the United States. The impetus for the development of the North Atlantic Treaty had, therefore, as much to do about concern about the inability of the UN to carry out its assigned tasks, as it was a response to fears about Soviet activities in Europe (Henderson 1982). In the pressing need for economic reconstruction, Western European countries and their North American allies viewed with concern the expansionist policies and methods of the USSR. During this period, they thought that the new international organization would be the primary and universal tool for dealing with international peace and security issues. Having fulfilled their own wartime undertakings to reduce their defence establishments and to demobilise forces, Western governments became increasingly alarmed as it became clear that the Soviet leadership intended to

maintain its own military forces at full strength (Lawrence 2004: 3). Moreover, in view of the declared ideological aims of the Soviet Communist party, it was evident that appeals for respect for the United Nations Charter and for respect for the international settlements reached at the end of the war would not guarantee the national sovereignty or independence of democratic states faced with the threat of outside aggression or internal subversion (English 2001: 305).

The imposition of undemocratic forms of government and the repression of effective opposition and of basic human and civic rights and freedoms in many Central and Eastern European countries as well as elsewhere in the world, added to these fears. On 7th March 1948, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK signed the Brussels treaty to develop a common defence system and to strengthen the ties between them in a manner, which would enable them to resist ideological, political and military threats to their security (Brussels Treaty 1948). These countries pledged themselves to build up a common defence system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties. Article IV of the Brussels Treaty states that should any of the contracting parties be the object of an “armed aggression in Europe”, the other signatories to the treaty would afford the attacked party “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”. The Treaty, with duration of 50 years, provided for the creation of a supreme body in Western Union, known as the Consultative Council consisting of the five Foreign Ministers. Under it, there was a ‘Western Defence Committee’ consisting of the Defence Ministers (Henderson 1982: 75).

The Brussels Treaty was scarcely signed when the Russians started the blockade of West Berlin. It was to last for 323 days and was only countered by the organization of an air-lift by the Western Powers. The Berlin blockade hastened the setting up of Western defence. On April 30, 1948, the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff of the five Brussels Treaty signatory powers met in London to discuss their countries’ military equipment needs, to see how far they could be met from their own production resources, and how much additional aid would have to be requested from the United States. From July, 1948 onwards, United States and Canadian experts attended these meetings as observers. In September, 1948, a military body was created with the Brussels Treaty

known as the 'Western Union Defence Organization'. Field Marshal Montgomery was appointed chairman of the Commanders in Chief Committee and set up his Headquarters at Fontainebleau, France. Commanders in Chief were appointed : General de Lattre de Tassigny (France) for the Land Forces; Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb (United Kingdom) for the Air Forces; Vice-admiral Jaujard (France) for Naval Forces. The creation of a defence organization by the member countries of Brussels treaty in Europe could not fail to awaken a response from the United States.

On April 11, 1948, the United States Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall and the Under Secretary, Mr. Robert M. Lovett opened preliminary talks with Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally on the problems of security in the North Atlantic area. On April 28, 1948, the idea of single mutual defence system superseding the Brussels Treaty was publicly put forward by Mr. St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons. But it was essential that the United States should be able constitutionally to join the Atlantic Alliance (Schmidt 2001: 306). To this end, in consultation with the State Department, Senator Vandenberg drew up a resolution which recommended in particular "the association of the United States by constitutional process with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" and its "contribution to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter should any armed attack occur affecting its national security". Gradually it was realised that the Brussels treaty powers could not possibly pose an adequate counterweight to the Soviets without the aid and assistance of the US and within a month the Brussels powers had commenced negotiations with the US and Canada for an enlarged collective defensive arrangement (Hanreider 1974).

The North Atlantic Treaty was subsequently signed in Washington D.C in 4th April 1949 by the representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US forming the Atlantic alliance (North Atlantic Treaty 1949). The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 turned out to be one of the most important political events of the early post-War years,

restoring confidence to the Western world with the long-term commitment of the United States to the security of Western Europe. The treaty entered into force on August 24, 1949 (Lawrence 2007). It was to create a collective defence against a potential threat resulting from the policies and growing military capacity of former Soviet Union. The NATO was established in September 1949 to implement the North Atlantic Treaty. The establishment of NATO was rested upon a European and in particular a British initiative. It is the principal defence alliance linking North America and Europe since World War II. Brought into existence by the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the original intention behind NATO was to ensure Western Europe's security against the Soviet Union, in other words, to keep the US in, Russia out, and Germany down (Faringdon 1989). The NATO is the most successful military alliance in the contemporary world history.

Purpose

NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe (North Atlantic Treaty 1949). NATO also embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and cooperation among sovereign states based on the indivisibility of the security of its members (Cook 1989). Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in political, military and other spheres, ensures that no member country is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges (Hastings 1954). Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them to realise their essential national security objectives through collective effort.

NATO was designed to provide strong military forces to balance the threat from the Soviet Union. Article 5 reads that (which is unchanged till today): *“the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the party or parties, so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action, as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”*(North Atlantic Treaty 1949).

Structure

Like any other alliance NATO is ultimately governed by its member states. However, the North Atlantic Treaty and other agreements outline how decisions are to be made within NATO. Each of the members sends a delegation or mission to NATO's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The senior permanent member of each delegation is known as the Permanent Representative and is generally a senior civil servant or an experienced ambassador (and holding that diplomatic rank). NATO's structure comprises separate civil and military structures and various organizations and agencies (NATO 1989). Both civil and military structures are dealing with different functions. The details about them are as following below:

Civil Structure

Within the Civil Structure, the main bodies are: the NATO Headquarters (HQ), the Secretary General and the International Staff. There are three important policy and decision-making institutions of the Alliance, namely the North Atlantic Council, the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. Each of these plays a vital role in the consultative and decision-making processes that are the bedrock of the cooperation, joint planning and shared security between member countries that NATO represents. The decisions taken by each of these bodies have the same status and represent the agreed policy of the member countries irrespective of the level at which they are taken. This committee structure provides the basic mechanism that gives the

Alliance its consultation and decision-making capability, ensuring that each member country can be represented at every level and in all fields of NATO activity.

North Atlantic Council: It is the most senior political governing body of NATO established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty (Cook 1989). It has effective political authority and powers of decision, and consists of Permanent Representatives of all member countries meeting together at least once a week. The Council also meets at higher levels involving Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers or Heads of Government, but it has the same authority and powers of decision-making and its decisions have the same status and validity at whatever level it meets. The Council has an important public profile and issues declarations and communiqués explaining the Alliance's policies and decisions to the public and to the governments of countries which are not members of NATO. The Council is the only body within the Alliance, which derives its authority explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty (Hastings 1954). The Council itself was given responsibility under the Treaty for setting up subsidiary bodies. Many committees and planning groups since their have been created to support the work of the Council or to assume responsibility in specific fields such as defence planning, nuclear planning and military matters.

The Council thus provides a unique forum for wideranging consultations between member governments on all issues affecting their security and is the most important decision-making body in NATO. All member countries of NATO have an equal right to express their views round the Council table. The Decisions are the expression of the collective will of member governments arrived at by common consent (Huston 1984:332). All member governments are party to the policies formulated in the Council or under its authority and share in the consensus on which decisions are based. When the Council meets in this format, it is often referred to as the "Permanent Council". Twice each year and sometimes more frequently the Council meets at Ministerial level when Ministers of Foreign Affairs represent each nation. The Meetings of the Council also take place in Defence Ministers Sessions. The Summit Meetings, attended by Heads of State or Government, are held whenever particularly important issues have to be addressed or at seminal moments in the evolution of Allied security policy.

NATO decisions are taken on the basis of consensus after discussions and consultations among member countries. A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent and supported by each member country. This implies that when a NATO decision is taken, it is the expression of the collective will of the sovereign states that are members of the alliance. It is this decision-making process that gives NATO both its strength and its credibility. When there is disagreement, discussions take place until a decision is reached, and in some circumstances this may be to recognize that agreement is not possible. In general, however, mutually acceptable solutions are normally found. The process is rapid since member consult on a continuous basis and therefore frequently knows and understands each other's positions in advance. Consultation is a vital part of the decision-making process. It facilitates communication between members whose prime goal is to ensure that decisions taken collectively are consistent with their national interests (Lawson 1958: 163-179).

While the Council normally meets at least once a week, it can be convened at short notice whenever necessary. Its meetings are chaired by the Secretary General of NATO in his absence by his Deputy. The longest serving Ambassador or Permanent Representative on the Council assumes the title of Dean of the Council. Primarily as ceremonial function, the Dean may be called upon to play a more specific presiding role, for example, in convening meetings and chairing discussions at the time of the selection of a new Secretary General. At Ministerial Meetings of Foreign Ministers, one country's Foreign Minister assumes the role of Honorary President. An Order of Precedence in the Permanent Council is established based on length of service, but at meetings of the Council at any level, Permanent Representatives sit round the table in order of nationality, following the English alphabetical order (Munk 1964: 199). The same procedure is followed throughout the NATO committee structure. Items discussed and decisions taken at meetings of the Council cover all aspects of the Organization's activities and are frequently based on reports and recommendations prepared by subordinate committees at the Council's request. Equally, subjects may be raised by any one of the national representatives or by the Secretary General. Permanent Representatives act on instructions from their capitals, informing and explaining the views and policy decisions of their governments to their colleagues round the table.

Conversely, they report to their national authorities on the views expressed and positions taken by other governments, informing them of new developments and keeping them abreast of movement towards consensus on important issues or areas where national positions diverge (Nicholas and Weidenfeld 1982: 149). Subordinate Committees prepare the work of the Council with responsibility for specific areas of policy. Much of this work involves the Senior Political Committee (SPC) consisting of Deputy Permanent Representatives, sometimes reinforced by appropriate national experts depending on the subject. The Senior Political Committee has particular responsibility for preparing most statements or communiqués to be issued by the Council and meets in advance of ministerial meetings to draft such texts for Council approval. Other aspects of political work may be handled by the regular Political Committee, which consists of Political Counselors or Advisers from national delegations (Lawson 1958: 163-179).

When the Council meets at the level of Defence Ministers or is dealing with defence matters and questions relating to defence strategy, other senior committees, such as the Executive Working Group, may be involved as the principal advisory bodies. If financial matters are on the Council's agenda, the Senior Resource Board or the Civil or Military Budget Committees or the Infrastructure Committee depending on which body is appropriate, will be responsible to the Council for preparing its work. Depending on the topic under discussion, the respective senior committee with responsibility for the subject area assumes the leading role in preparing Council meetings and following up on Council decisions.

Defence Planning Committee (DPC): It is the senior decision making body on matters relating to the integrated military structure of the Alliance. It was established in 1960s, and has same functions and authority as the Council (NATO 1989). In ministerial sessions- Defence Ministers or Secretary of Defence are participating. It is normally composed of Permanent Representatives but meets at the level of Defence Ministers at least twice a year and deals with most defence matters and subjects related to collective defence planning. With the exception of France, all member countries are represented in this forum. The Defence Planning Committee provides guidance to NATO's military authorities and within the area of its responsibilities, and it have the same functions and

attributes and the same authority as the NAC on matters within its competence (Lawrence 2007).

A number of subordinate committees with specific responsibilities prepare the work of the Defence Planning Committee and in particular, by the Defence Review Committee, which oversees the Force Planning Process within NATO and examines other issues relating to the Integrated Military Structure. Like the Council, the Defence Planning Committee looks to the senior committee with the relevant specific responsibility for the preparatory and follow-up work arising from its decisions.

Nuclear Planning Group (NPG): It is the principal forum for consultation on all matters relating to the role of nuclear forces in NATO's security and defence policies. It is the ultimate authority within NATO with regard to nuclear policy issues as is the North Atlantic Council or the Defence Planning Committee on matters within their competence. Its discussions cover a broad range of nuclear policy matters including the safety, security and survivability of nuclear weapons, communications and information systems as well as deployment issues (Brand 1991: 258). It also covers wider questions of common concern such as nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation. The role of the Nuclear Planning Group is to review the Alliance's nuclear policy in the light of the ever changing security challenges of the international environment and to adopt it if necessary. It provides a forum in which member countries of the Alliance can participate in the development of the Alliance's nuclear policy and in decisions on NATO's nuclear posture irrespective of whether or not they themselves maintain nuclear weapons. The policies that are agreed upon therefore represent the common position of all the participating countries. Decisions are taken by consensus within the NPG as is the case for all NATO committees.

Members participating in NATO's integrated military structure (all member countries except France) are part of the NPG. The Secretary General of NATO chairs it. The work of the Nuclear Planning Group is prepared by an NPG Staff Group composed of members of the national delegations of all participating member countries. The Staff Group prepares meetings of the NPG Permanent Representatives and carries out detailed

work on their behalf. It meets once a week and at other times as necessary. The senior advisory body to the NPG on nuclear policy and planning issues is the NPG High Level Group (HLG). In 1998-99, the HLG also took over the functions and responsibilities of the former Senior Level Weapons Protection Group (SLWPG) which was charged with overseeing nuclear weapons safety, security and survivability matters. The HLG is chaired by the United States and is composed of national policy makers and experts from capitals (English 2001). It meets several times a year to discuss aspects of NATO's nuclear policy, planning and force posture, and matters concerning the safety, security and survivability of nuclear weapons. The NPG itself meets when necessary at the level of Ambassadors and twice a year at the level of Ministers of Defence.

NATO Headquarters: The NATO Headquarters in Brussels is the political headquarters of the Alliance and the permanent home of the North Atlantic Council (Jordan 1967). It houses Permanent Representatives and national delegations, the Secretary General and the International Staff, national Military Representatives, the Chairman of the Military Committee and the International Military Staff, and a number of NATO agencies.

The Secretary General: The Secretary General is nominated by member governments for an initial period of four years. There is no formal process for selecting the Secretary General. Instead, the members of NATO traditionally reach a consensus on who should serve next. This procedure often takes place through informal diplomatic channels. Usually, an international statesman with ministerial experience in the government of one of the member countries is appointed who acts as a decision facilitator, leading and guiding the process of consensus-building and decision making throughout the alliance (Jordan 1967: 307). He may propose items for discussion and has the authority to use his good offices in cases of dispute between member countries.

The Secretary General has three main roles: first and foremost, he is the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, Defence Planning Committee, Nuclear Planning Group as well as the chairman of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Mediterranean Cooperation Group. Secondly, he is the principal spokesman of the Alliance and represents the Alliance in public on behalf

of the member countries, reflections their common positions on political issues. Thirdly, he is the senior executive officer of the NATO international staff, responsible for making appointments to the staff and overseeing its work (Jordan 1967).

The Deputy Secretary General assists the Secretary General in the exercise of his functions and replaces him in his absence. As the organisation's senior representative, the Secretary General speaks on its behalf not only in public but also in its external relations with other organizations, with non-member country governments and with the international media. He is also the Chairman of the High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control, the Executive Working Group, the NATO Air Defence Committee on Proliferation and a number of other Ad Hoc and Working Group (NATO 1989). His role allows him to exert considerable influence on the decision making process while respecting the fundamental principle that the authority for taking decisions is invested only in the member governments themselves. His influence is, therefore, exercised principally by encouraging and stimulation the member governments to take initiatives and where necessary to reconcile their positions in the interests of the alliance as a whole.

Permanent Representatives and National Delegations: Each NATO member country has a delegation at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The delegation has the status similar to an embassy and is headed by an Ambassador or Permanent Representative, who acts on instructions from his or her capital and reports back to the national authorities (NATO 1989). With all the delegations in the same building, they are able to maintain formal and informal contacts with each other as well as with NATO's international staff and representatives of partner countries, each of which are entitled to have a mission at NATO Headquarters. The responsibility and task of each delegation is to represent its member country at NATO. The authority of each delegation comes from its home country's government to which it reports back on NATO decisions and projects. Each member country is represented on the North Atlantic Council, the most important political decision-making body within NATO by an Ambassador (or Permanent Representative). The length of the Ambassador's appointment depends on his or her home country. It generally ranges from one to eight years. The Ambassadors are

supported by their national delegation composed of advisers and officials who represent their country on different NATO committees, subordinate to the North Atlantic Council.

Each member country is represented on every NATO committee at every level and therefore, the delegations are sometimes also supported by experts from capitals on certain matters. An important function of the delegations at NATO Headquarters is the consultation process (Munk 1964: 199). Consultation among the delegations can take place in many forms, from the exchange of information and opinions; to the communication of actions or decisions which governments have already taken or may be about to take and which have a direct or indirect bearing on the interests of their allies. Consultation is ultimately designed to enable member countries to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements on collective decisions or on action by the Alliance as a whole.

The International Staff: The International Staff is an advisory and administrative body that supports the work of the national delegations at NATO headquarters at different committee levels. It follows up on the decisions of NATO committees and supports the process of consensus-building and decision-making (Jordan 1967: 201). The primary role of the international staff is to provide advice, guidance and administrative support to the national delegations at NATO headquarters. Secondly, from a purely organisational point of view, it must be noted that all divisions are headed by an Assistant Secretary General, who is supported by one or two Deputy Assistant Secretary Generals and independent offices are headed by Directors. The Secretary General, who is a member and also head of the international staff (IS). In addition, there are a number of civil agencies and organisations located in different member countries working in specific fields such as communications and logistic support.

Budget and financial control: All the operating expenditures for the International Staff, the Headquarters and the agencies are paid for by means of contributions requested from member countries. These expenditures are covered by budgets adopted by the Council on the basis of a report by a Budget Committee consisting of representatives of the various countries (Lawrence 2004). There are two Budget Committee, one examines the requests for funds made by the various departments of the International Staff; the other examines

the budget estimate of SHAPE, the subordinate headquarters and related organizations and the budget estimates of the independent commands, channel command and SACLANT (NATO 1989).

The financial departments come under the authority of a Financial Controller. It is his business to obtain the contributions due from member countries which are payable in three stages throughout the year and which in principal are equivalent to the funds voted. Each nation's share is worked out on the basis of a cost-sharing formula. The expenditures are undertaken by the various departments under the supervision of the Financial Controller who is responsible for ensuring compliance with the budgetary regulations and the provisions of the financial rules and procedures drawn up by the council. The annual accounts drawn up by the Financial Controller with a single account for SHAPE and the subordinate headquarters are submitted for audit to a Board of Auditors, which plays the same part as the audit offices or similar bodies in the various countries. The Board of Auditors is completely independent of NATO administration as its members are selected from among senior civil servants in the financial control organizations of the various countries and are placed at the disposal of NATO through their emoluments are paid by their home country. The Board of Auditors' reports are examined in the presence of the financial controllers concerned by the budget committees, which forward them to the Council with their view on the comments contained therein (Brady and Kaufman 1985: 56-60).

The economic challenge was there and would remain paramount even though the formation of NATO was based *a priori* on the military and ideological threat from the Soviet Union. NATO's European members have always shown greater concern over salient economic issues whether domestic or international and have continually balked at placing such investments in defence. Although their perceptions of the U.S. defence umbrella may have contributed to their belief that they could allocate resources in this way, European disdain for any further destruction and economic disruption as that experienced in World War II was contributory to their belief that solid, dynamically, functioning economies would help them keep from war's doorstep (Brady 1985: 59).

Economically, within the alliance the one issue continually addressed has been burden sharing. The ultimate goal of this has been to overcome defence force imbalances in conventional forces. Performance among alliance members in achieving the determined 3 percent per year real increase in defence funding since 1978 has been missed, with greatest positive efforts made through 1981 and fall off since then. The United States has constantly increased its funding, rising from 1.5 percent in 1977-78 to 5.4 percent in 1981-82 whereas non-US increases have averaged a little over 2 percent each fiscal year (Braddy 1985: 87-88). The major NATO powers and France have managed so far to meet the 3 percent goal on average. The European allies perceive that they been carrying close to fair share of the Alliance defence burden and resent US criticisms or suggestions they are not doing so. On matters of equitable burden sharing in NATO, the Europeans in particular are not sympathetic or responsive to U.S. pressure to increase their contributions (Braddy 1985: 114).

NATO'S Military Structure

NATO's has good military structure where the main bodies of the military structure are the Military Committee, Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). There are two types of forces within the NATO structure, first is Deployable Forces (DF), other is In-Place Forces (IPF). The details about all these sub structures are following below:

The Military Committee (MC): It is the highest military authority within the Alliance. The Military Committee is made up of senior military officers from the NATO member countries who serve as their country's Military Representatives to NATO or representing their Chiefs of Defence. The Committee's principal role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy or it provides military advice to the NAC and develops military plans at the request of NAC. The role of NATO's military structure is to defend the territory of member countries (North Atlantic Treaty 1949). It is responsible for recommending to NATO's political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area and for the implementation of decisions regarding NATO's operations and missions.

Like the political decision-making bodies, it also meets regularly at a higher level, namely at the level of Chiefs of Defence. Meetings at this level are normally held three times a year. Two of these meetings occur in Brussels and one is hosted by NATO countries on a rotational basis. In the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace, the Military Committee meets regularly with partner countries at the level of national Military Representatives (once a month) and at the level of Chiefs of Defence (twice a year) to deal with military cooperation issues. The Military Committee also meets in different formats in the framework of the NATO- Russia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and with the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) of the seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries (David and Charles 1985: 13-14). The Chairman of the Military Committee (MC) directs the day-to-day business of the Committee, and the MC is NATO's highest military authority who acts on its behalf. The Chairman is also the Committee's spokesman and representative making him the senior military spokesman for the Alliance. The Chairman of the Military Committee is nominated by the NATO Chiefs of Defence and appointed for a three year term of office. The Chairman's authority stems from the Military Committee to which he is responsible in the performance of his duties. He chairs all meetings of the Military Committee and acts in an international capacity (Bland 1991). In his absence, the Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee takes the chair.

Allied Command Operations (ACO): It is one of NATO's important strategic military commands like Allied Command Transformation. Located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium, it is responsible for all Alliance operations wherever it may be required (Dawson and Nicholas 1967: 370-375). The command structure is based on functionality rather than geography. There are three tiers of command: strategic, operational, and the tactical or component level. At the strategic level, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) commands Allied Command Operations. SACEUR is dual-hatted as the commander of the US European Command, which shares many of the same geographical responsibilities. The operational level consists of two standing joint force commands (JFCs): one in Brunssum, the Netherlands and one in Naples, Italy, both of which can conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters. There is also a

robust but more limited standing joint headquarters in Lisbon, Portugal, from which a deployable sea-based CJTF headquarters capability can be drawn. The component or tactical level consists of six Joint Force Component Commands (JFCCs), which provide service-specific land, maritime or air expertise and support to the operational level (Boland 1999).

The Supreme Allied Headquarters (SHAPE) was established on 2 April, 1951 in Rocquencourt, France as part of an effort to establish an integrated and effective NATO military force. In 1967, after France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure, SHAPE was relocated to Casteau, Mons, Belgium. The London Declaration of July 1990 was a decisive turning point in the history of the Alliance and led to the adoption of the new Alliance Strategic Concept in November 1991, reflecting a broader approach to security. This in turn led to NATO's Long Term Study to examine the Integrated Military Structure and put forward proposals for change to the Alliance's Force Structures, Command Structures and Common Infrastructure (Dawdon and Nicholson 1967: 585). In essence, the Cold War command structure was reduced from 78 headquarters to 20 with two overarching Strategic Commanders (SC), one for the Atlantic, and one for Europe, with three Regional Commanders under the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) and two under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). During the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO's military command structure was again reorganized with a focus on becoming leaner and more efficient. The former Allied Command Europe (ACE) became the Allied Command for Operations (ACO). The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and his staff at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) situated in Mons, Belgium, were henceforth responsible for all Alliance operations, including those previously undertaken by SACLANT. The command structure beneath SHAPE was also significantly streamlined, with a reduction in the number of headquarters from 32 Command Centres down to 9.

Allied Command Transformation (ACT): It is leading at the strategic command level the transformation of NATO's military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. It is enhancing training, particularly of commanders and staffs, conducting experiments to

assess new concepts, and promoting interoperability throughout the Alliance (NATO 1989). Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT) is located in Norfolk, Virginia, is the physical headquarters of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) and houses the command structure of ACT. HQ SACT directs ACT's various subordinate commands including the Joint Warfare Centre in Norway), the Joint Forces Training Centre in Poland, the NATO Undersea Research Centre in Italy, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Greece, various NATO schools and Centres of Excellence. There are direct linkages between ACT, NATO schools and agencies as well as the US Joint Forces Command, with which ACT Headquarters is co-located and with which it shares its double-hatted commander. This gives it a link into US transformation initiatives and fosters a two-way street between the United States and Europe (Jordan 1985: 229).

Allied Command Transformation was initially formed as Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) at Norfolk, Virginia, in 1952. During the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO's military command structure was reorganized with a focus on becoming leaner and more efficient. One Strategic Command was focused on NATO's operations Allied Command Operations (ACO/SHAPE) and the other on transforming NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT). HQ SACT is the only NATO command in North America and the only permanent NATO headquarters outside of Europe.

Types of Forces: There are two types of forces within the NATO structure, first is Deployable Forces (DF), available for the full range NATO missions, deployed everywhere and other is In-Place Forces (IPF), defence forces within or near the territory of the nations providing them. Deployable Forces are those forces available for the full range of NATO missions. They can be fully deployed throughout Alliance territory and beyond (Boland 1999: 26-28). They can provide the capability for rapid reaction and reinforcement of In-Place Forces in the case of any Article 5 operation, as well as rapid reaction and rotation of such forces in the case of non-Article 5 crisis response operations. In-Place Forces are predominantly those required for collective defence within or near the territory of the nation providing them. Such forces need not be fully deployable but will be held at appropriate readiness levels. The majority of such forces

are provided by individual nations (Moss 2002). The readiness levels affecting both types of forces, to which reference is made above are: High Readiness Forces (HRF) consists of a limited but military significant proportion of land, air and maritime forces, capable of deploying rapidly or immediately, either for Article 5 collective defence or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations. Forces at Lower Readiness (FLR) are forces that would provide the bulk of the forces required for collective defence for further reinforcement of a particular region and for the rotation of forces needed to sustain non-Article 5 operations whether within or beyond Alliance territory (Barry 1996). Long Term Build-up Forces (LTBF) is provided a long-term build-up and augmentation capability for the worst case scenario of large-scale Article 5 operations. They would enable the Alliance to build up larger forces needed to undertake specific tasks and to respond to any fundamental changes in the international security environment. Individual nations are responsible for establishing the reinforcement plans needed to provide this long-term capability in accordance with their constitutional procedures (Norton 1978: 172). The forces available to NATO are further delineated between those which come under the operational command or operational control of a NATO Strategic Commander when required, in accordance with specified procedures or at prescribed times; and those which member states have agreed to assign to the operational command of a Strategic Commander at a future date, if required. In assigning forces to NATO, member nations assign operational command or operational control as distinct from full command over all aspects of the operations and administration of those forces (Sean 1995). These latter aspects continue to be a national responsibility and remain under national control. In general, most NATO forces remain under full national command until they are assigned to the Alliance for a specific operation decided upon at the political level. Exceptions to this rule are the integrated staffs in the various NATO military headquarters; parts of the integrated air defence structure, including the Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (AWACS); some communications units; and the Standing Naval Forces as well as other elements of the Alliance's High Readiness Forces (Lawrence 2007).

Functions

Since the establishment of NATO, the fundamental role of Allied forces has been to

guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states. The task of providing security through deterrence and collective defence remains a fundamental responsibility. During the Cold War, NATO's defence planning was primarily concerned with maintaining the capabilities needed to defend against possible aggression by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. During Cold War, NATO was only concerned on "functions of collective defence" and providing security to its member-states in Europe and North-America.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO's military role was essentially static: to prevent an attack against the territory of its member countries. NATO could accomplish this objective by deterrence alone. The possibility that NATO might be used in support of the UN arose, albeit fleetingly, on two occasions during the Cold War. The first occurred in the context of the various efforts that arose from the Korean War experience and the Uniting for Peace resolution (Cook: 1989). One of the products of the Uniting for Peace Resolution was the creation of the Collective Measures Committee. The Committee was charged with developing ways of strengthening the UN's ability to deal with international peace and security issues. Within the Committee, the United States argued that NATO should be given a role in aiding the UN in carrying out its enforcement measures. The proposal did not result in any action on the issue, at least in part due to a lack of enthusiasm from other NATO members (Smith 1995: 56-73). The second instance occurred during the early stages of the Cyprus crisis in 1964. In response to the deteriorating situation on the island, Britain proposed that a NATO force be used as a peacekeeping force to ensure peace while political efforts to resolve the dispute could occur. The US supported the proposal as did Greece and Turkey. The Greek Cypriot leader refused to agree, however, even after a revised plan was created. The proposal was dropped and the issue went to the Security Council. It is not evident that the force would have been used even had agreement been achieved. The Soviet Union was very against the idea and other NATO states were not particularly enthusiastic (Higgins 1981: 92-92).

The Alliance carries out its security policies including the maintenance of a sufficient military capability to prevent war and to provide for effective defence, and active promotion of dialogue with other nations and of a cooperative approach to further

progress in the field of arms control and disarmament (Brady 1985: 19). To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security task: it provides an indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. It seeks to create an environment in which no country would be able to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. It provides deterrence and defence against any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state. In accordance with article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it serves as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues affecting the vital interests of its members, including developments, which might pose risks to their security. It facilitates coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. It preserves a strategic balance within Europe.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was crucial for NATO as it raised the apparent threat level greatly (all communist countries were suspected of working together) and forced the Alliance to develop concrete military plans (Isby and Charles 1985:13-14). The 1952 Lisbon Conference seeking to provide the forces necessary for NATO's long-term defence plan called for an expansion to 96 divisions. However this requirement was dropped the following year to roughly 35 divisions with heavier use to be made of nuclear weapons. At this time, NATO could call on about fifteen ready divisions in Central Europe and another ten in Italy and Scandinavia (Osgood 1986: 28). Also at Lisbon, the post of Secretary General of NATO as the organization's chief civilian was also created and Baron Hastings Ismay eventually appointed to the post. Later, in September 1952, the first major NATO maritime exercises began; operation Main brace brought together 200 ships and over 50,000 personnel to practice the defence of Denmark and Norway. Greece and Turkey joined the alliance the same year, forcing a series of controversial negotiations, in which the United States and Britain were the primary disputants over how to bring the two countries in to the military command structure. In 1954, the Soviet Union suggested that it should join NATO to preserve peace in Europe. The NATO countries fearing that the Soviet Union's motive was to weaken the alliance ultimately rejected this proposal.

The incorporation of West Germany into the organization on May 1955 was described as “a decisive turning point in the history of our continent” by Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway at that time. A major reason for Germany's entry into the alliance was that without German manpower, it would have been impossible to field enough conventional forces to resist a Soviet invasion. Indeed, one of its immediate results was the creation of the Warsaw Pact, signed on 14 May 1955 by the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and East Germany, as a formal response to this event, thereby delineating the two opposing sides of the Cold War.

On 11 March 1959, France withdrew its Mediterranean fleet from NATO command; three months later, in June 1959, De Gaulle (President of France) banned the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on France's soil (Lawrence 2004: 30-31). This caused the United States to transfer two hundred military aircraft out of France and return control of the ten major air force bases that had operated in France since 1950 to 1967. Though France showed solidarity with the rest of NATO during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, De Gaulle continued his pursuit of an independent defence by removing France's Atlantic and channel fleets from NATO command. In 1966, all French armed forces were removed from NATO's integrated military command and all non-French NATO troops were asked to leave France. This withdrawal forced the relocation to the supreme headquarters allied powers Europe (SHAPE) from Rocquencourt near Paris to Casteau, north of Mons, Belgium, by 16 October 1967. France remained a member of the Alliance, and committed to the defence of Europe from possible communist attack with own forces stationed in the federal republic of Germany throughout the Cold War. France is a member of the Alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure and does not participate in collective force planning (Lawrence 2004: 33).

During most of the duration of the Cold War, NATO maintained a holding pattern with no actual military engagement as an organization (Coker 1980: 78-79). On 1 July 1968, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty opened for signature: NATO argued that its nuclear weapons sharing arrangements did not breach the treaty as U.S forces controlled the weapons until a decision was made to go to war, at which point the Treaty would no longer be controlling. Few states knew of the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements at that

time and they were not challenged. On 30 May 1978, NATO countries officially defined two complementary aims of the Alliance, to maintain security and pursue détente. This was supposed to mean matching defences at the level rendered necessary by the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities without spurring a further arms race. On 30 December 1979, in light of a build-up of Warsaw Pact nuclear capacities in Europe, ministers approved the deployment of US-GLCM cruise missiles and Pershing II theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. The new warheads were also meant to strengthen the Western negotiating position in regard to nuclear disarmament (Holden 1989). This policy was called the dual track policy. Similarly, in 1983-84, responding to the stationing of Warsaw Pact SS-20 medium-range missiles in Europe, NATO deployed modern Pershing II missiles tasked to hit military targets such as tank formations in the event of war (Brady 1985: 25-32). This action led to peace movement protests throughout Western Europe.

With the background of the buildup of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, NATO decided under the impetus of the Reagan presidency to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, primarily West Germany. These missiles were theatre nuclear weapons intended to strike targets on the battlefield if the Soviets invaded West Germany. Yet support for the deployment was wavering and many doubted whether the push for deployment could be sustained. On 1 September 1983, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean passenger airliner when it crossed into Soviet airspace an act which Reagan characterized as a "massacre" (Lawrence 2004: 88-89). The barbarity of this act, as the U.S. and indeed the world understood it, galvanized support for the deployment which stood in place until the later accords between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. The membership of the organization at this time remained largely static. In 1974, as a consequence of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece withdrew its forces from NATO's military command structure but, with Turkish cooperation, was readmitted in 1980. On May 30, 1982, NATO gained a new member when, following a referendum, the newly democratic Spain joined the alliance. In November 1983, NATO manoeuvres simulating a nuclear launch caused panic in the Kremlin (Krieger 2001: 102). The Soviet leadership led by ailing General Secretary Yuri Andropov became concerned that the manoeuvres, codenamed Able Archer 83, were the beginnings of a

genuine first strike. In response, Soviet nuclear forces were readied and air units in East Germany and Poland were placed on alert (Krieger 2001: 104).

Conclusion

NATO is an inter-governmental organization formed by the Western Europe, USA and Canada. It provides an Alliance of collective defence till the end of the Cold War. It has both Civil and Military structures, which are playing very significant role to maintain security and stability in Europe. The Civil Structure is dealing with political matters or non-military functions. It deals all political activities with the help of its sub-structures like North Atlantic Council and NATO Headquarters. Here political representatives and international staffs are the most important elements in the Civil Structure. It also operates all the financial activities of the NATO. Military Structure provides the military activities to maintain peace and security in Europe. All the forces including Land, Sea and Air forces are coming under the 'Military Structure', where the member states are contributing their military troops. Though 'Civil Structure' is dealing to all the political or non-military functions, still it plays a very crucial role during the decision making over the military operations. Because North Atlantic Council is the highest and most powerful decision making body within the NATO framework. All the civilian and military sub-structures are authorizing under direction and supervision of the NAC, which is coming under the 'Civil Structure'.

During the Cold War period the role and functions of the NATO was essentially static: preventing an attack against the territory of its member countries. NATO's primary objective was to unify and strengthen the military response of the Western allies in case the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies invaded to Western Europe in an attempt to extend communism there. In the early period of 1945s, the Western countries found themselves faced with a new danger: the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union. Faced with Soviet expansion, the free countries of Europe were gravely threatened and understandably recognized the need to seek the means of guaranteeing their freedom and security. It is an international organization served to provide a high level US and European military resources for the collective deterrence and defence while making it

hard for the US to defect in case of a Soviet attack. In the Cold War period, its functions were remained within certain limited democratic countries in Europe. But after the end of Cold War, its territorial expansionist policy towards East Europe was emerged or it extended to the former members of the Soviet Union, which is discussed in the next chapter. So its proper organizational structure and functions are making it as an effective collective defence organization for the 'North Atlantic Alliance' during the Cold War.

CHAPTER - II

ENLARGEMENT OF MEMBER STATES AND ITS IMPACT

In the 59 years, since the Alliance was created, its membership has grown from the 12 founders to today's 28 members. NATO plays an essential role within the developing European security architecture. Stability and security in Europe is strengthened through an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole Europe. NATO enlargement is part of that process, which threatens no-one and contribute to a developing broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe, enhancing stability and security for all (Asmus 2002: 48). NATO's enlargement evolved as one element of the broader evolution of European cooperation in its security.

The present chapter provides the detail about the process of NATO enlargement of the past and present. It highlights NATO's enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries in the post-Cold War Era. The chapter further analyses the impact of enlargement on the structure and functions of NATO and on Russia.

Enlargement process

In every international organization, there are certain processes or procedures for getting their membership. NATO's door remains open to any European country, which is in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Before becoming a member of the NATO, a country has to come through certain processes, which are given below:

Traditional enlargement process

The process of joining the alliance is governed by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is the basis of the open door policy adopted by NATO regarding the accession of new member countries. Those Countries are wishing to join have to meet certain requirements and complete a multi-step process involving political dialogue and military integration (North Atlantic Treaty 1949). The accession process is overseen by the North

Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body. Enlargement is occurring through a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process of the NATO. Enlargement will be decided on a case by case basis and some nations may attain membership before other (Duignan 2000: 70). A new member is to be admitted or excluded on the basis of belonging to some group or category. Ultimately, Allies will decide by consensus whether to invite each new member to join, according to their judgment that should contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area at the time such a decision is to be made. According to the Article-10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, before the membership of NATO, one country has to meet with a NATO team at its headquarters in Brussels and bring together teams of NATO experts and representatives of the individual invitees (Kay 1998: 100). Their aim is to obtain formal confirmation from the invitees of their willingness and ability to meet the political, legal and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership, as laid out in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The talks take place in two sessions with each invitee. In the first session, political and defense or military issues are discussed, essentially providing the opportunity to establish that the preconditions for membership have been met. The second session is more technical and includes discussion of resources, security, and legal issues as well as the contribution of each new member country to NATO's common budget. This is determined on a proportional basis, according to the size of their economies in relation to those of other Alliance member countries. Invitees are also required to implement measures to ensure the protection of NATO classified information, and prepare their security and intelligence services to work with the NATO Office of Security. The end product of these discussions is a timetable to be submitted by each invitee for the completion of necessary reforms, which may continue even after these countries have become NATO members (Rauchhaus 2001: 107). The second step of the accession process requires each invitee country to provide confirmation of its acceptance of the obligations and commitments of membership in the form of a letter of intent from their foreign minister addressed to the NATO Secretary General. Together with this letter they also formally submit their individual reform timetables. NATO then prepares Accession Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty for each invitee. These protocols are in effect amendments or additions to the Treaty, which once signed and ratified by Allies, become

an integral part of the Treaty itself and permit the invited countries to become parties to the Treaty. The governments of NATO member states ratify the protocols, according to their national requirements and procedures (Asmus 2002: 125). The ratification procedure varies from country to country. Invitees accede to the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with their national procedures. Upon depositing their instruments of accession with the US State Department, invitees formally become NATO members.

Additional Enlargement process

After the end of Cold War, some plans and programmes were added for the membership of the NATO. Those important old processes have changed and some new additional accession processes are added for the membership like Partnership for Peace, Membership Action Plans and Individual Partnership Action Plans.

Partnership for Peace (PfP): The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO. It was launched in January 1994, which allows Partner countries to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation (Sloan 2005: 152). Based on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the PfP is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner countries and NATO, as well as among Partner countries (Asmus 2002: 49). The essence of the PfP programme is a partnership formed individually between each Partner country and NATO, tailored to individual needs and jointly implemented at the level and pace chosen by each participating government (Schmidt 2001: 270). The formal basis for the PfP is the Framework Document, which sets out specific undertakings for each Partner country. Each Partner country makes a number of far-reaching political commitments to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfil obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully. Specific commitments are also made to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting to establish democratic

control over armed forces, and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (Smith 2006: 57).

The Framework Document also enshrines a commitment by the Allies to consult with any partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security a mechanism. For example, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia made use of threat during the Kosovo crisis. Partner countries choose individual activities based on their ambitions and abilities, which are put forward to NATO in what is called a Presentation Document. An Individual Partnership Programme is then jointly developed and agreed between NATO and each Partner country (Mankoff 2009: 165). These two-year programmes are drawn up from an extensive menu of activities, according to each country's specific interests and needs. Cooperation focuses in particular on defense-related work, defense reform and managing the consequences of defense reform, but touches on virtually every field of NATO activity, including defense policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, air defense, communications and information systems, crisis management, and civil emergency planning (Braun 2007: 98). There are currently 22 countries in the Partnership for Peace programme. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) provides the overall political framework for NATO's cooperation with partners (Sloan 2005: 152).

Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP): It was launched at the November 2002 Prague Summit and open to countries that have the political will and ability to deepen their relationship with NATO (Barany 2003: 115). Developed on a two-year basis, such plans are designed to bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which a partner country interacts with the Alliance, sharpening the focus of activities to better support their domestic reform efforts (Moore 2007: 138). An IPAP should clearly set out the cooperation objectives and priorities of the individual partner country, and ensure that the various mechanisms in use correspond directly to these priorities. Intensified political dialogue on relevant issues may be an integral part of an IPAP process. IPAP makes it easier to coordinate bilateral assistance provided by individual Allies and partner countries, as well as to coordinate efforts with other relevant

international institutions (Gladman 2003: 677). Objectives covered fall into the general categories of political and security issues; defence, security and military issues; public information; science and environment; civil emergency planning; and administrative, protective security and resource issues. On 29 October 2004, Georgia became the first country to agree an IPAP with NATO. Azerbaijan agreed one on 27 May 2005, Armenia on 16 December 2005, Kazakhstan on 31 January 2006, and Moldova on 19 May 2006. In early 2008, two Balkan countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro started working with NATO on developing IPAPs (Moore 2007: 139). Montenegro presented its IPAP to NATO in June 2008.

After coming through this process, the applicant state has to meet “Intensified Dialogue” for the membership of the NATO. Intensified dialogue with NATO is viewed as a stage before being invited to enter the alliance Membership Action Plan (MAP), while the latter should eventually lead to NATO membership (Robertson 2007: 306). Countries currently engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO are: Ukraine (21 April 2005), Georgia (21 September 2006), Bosnia and Herzegovina (3 April 2008), Montenegro (3 April 2008) and Serbia (3 April 2008).

The Membership Action Plan (MAP): NATO instituted the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in April 1999 to formalize the assessment and the accession process for future rounds of enlargement following the addition of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic to the Alliance (Barany 2003: 25). The Membership Action Plan (MAP), building on the Intensified, Individual Dialogue on membership questions, is designed to reinforce that firm commitment to further enlargement by putting into place a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership. It must be understood that decisions made by aspirants on the basis of advice received will remain national decisions undertaken and implemented at the sole responsibility of the country concerned. The programme offers the aspirants a list of activities from which they may select those they consider of most value to help them in their preparations (Moore 2007: 210). Active participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) mechanisms remains essential for aspiring countries who wish to further deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the

Alliance. Any decision to invite an aspirant to begin accession talks with the Alliance will be made on a case-by-case basis by Allies in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration, and the Washington Summit Declaration. Participation in the Membership Action Plan, which would be on the basis of self-differentiation, does not imply any timeframe for any such decision nor any guarantee of eventual membership (Papacosma 2001: 134). The programme cannot be considered as a list of criteria for membership.

NATO also has an interest in ensuring each MAP country participates in NATO sponsored peace operations in order to encourage the country's cooperative international behavior, instill a mindset conducive to collective security and transfer military skills and expertise (Duignan 2000: 115). The Membership Action Plan, which is a practical manifestation of the Open Door, is focusing on five issues. These issues are related to areas of politics, economy, defence, military, resource and security. Within each issue-area the MAP identifies issues that might be discussed (non-exhaustive) and highlights mechanisms through which preparation for possible eventual membership can be carried forward. Aspirants would be offered the opportunity to discuss and substantiate their willingness and ability to assume the obligations and commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty and the relevant provisions of the NATO Enlargement (Krupnick 2003: 67). Future members must conform to basic principles embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty such as democracy, individual liberty and other relevant provisions set out in its Preamble.

The ability of aspiring countries to contribute militarily to collective defense and to the Alliance's new missions and their willingness to commit to gradual improvements in their military capabilities will be factors to be considered in determining their suitability for NATO membership. Full participation in operational PFP is an essential component, as it will further deepen aspirants' political and military ties with the Alliance, helping them prepare for participation in the full range of new missions. New members of the Alliance must be prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits and burdens of common security and collective defense. They should be expected to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out in the strategic concept and as laid

out in other ministerial statements. New Alliance members would be expected to commit sufficient budget resources to allow them to meet the commitments entailed by possible membership (Krupnick 2003: 68). National programmes of aspirants must put in place the necessary structures to plan and implement defense budgets that meet established defense priorities and make provision for training schemes to familiarize staff with NATO practices and procedures in order to prepare for possible future participation in Alliance structures. Aspirants would be expected after accession to have in place sufficient safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of the most sensitive information as laid down in NATO security policy. In order to be able to undertake the commitments of membership, aspirants should examine and become acquainted with the appropriate legal arrangements and agreements which govern cooperation within NATO (Mattox and Rachwald 2001: 26). This should enable aspirants to scrutinize domestic law for compatibility with those NATO rules and regulations. In addition, aspirants should be properly informed about the formal legal process leading to membership.

The list of issues identified for discussion does not constitute criteria for membership and is intended to encompass those issues which the aspiring countries themselves have identified as matters which they wish to address. Each aspiring country will be requested to draw up an annual national programme on preparations for possible future membership, setting objectives and targets for its preparations and containing specific information on steps being taken, the responsible authorities and, where appropriate a schedule of work on specific aspects of those preparations (Barany 2003: 26). It would be open to aspirants to update the programme when they chose. The programme would form a basis for the Alliance to keep track of aspirants' progress and to provide feedback. Each year the Alliance will draw up for individual aspirants a report providing feedback focused on progress made in the areas covered in their annual national programmes. This document would form the basis of discussion at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council with the aspirant country. The report would help identify areas for further action, but it would remain at the aspirant's discretion to commit itself to taking further action.

Enlargement of the Member Countries

Enlargement is in fact an on-going and dynamic process, based upon Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that membership is open to any "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" (North Atlantic Treaty 1949). During the Cold War period NATO was not emphasizing to its enlargement of the member states which done later in the post-Cold War period.

Cold War period

The first three rounds of enlargement which brought in Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain (1982) in NATO took place during the Cold War, when strategic considerations were at the forefront of decision-making. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact after the end of the Cold War opened up the possibility of further NATO enlargement. Some of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to become integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Post-Cold War period

At the NATO Summit in Brussels (10 January 1994), the 16 Allied leaders said they expected and would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to the East. There was a growing support in the United States for the idea that NATO should extend European stability eastwards by taking in Eastern and Central European states (Zsigmond 2004: 40). They reaffirmed that the Alliance, as provided in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, was open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to security in the North Atlantic area. In 1995, the Alliance carried out and published the results of a 'Study on NATO Enlargement' that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in (NATO 1995: 28). It concludes that the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to improve security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all. During 1996, 'an intensified individual dialogue' was undertaken with 12 interested partner countries. These sessions improved their understanding of how the Alliance

works and gave the Alliance a better understanding of where these countries stood in terms of their internal development as well as the resolution of any disputes with neighboring countries. The Study identified this as an important precondition for membership. The NATO Allies began drawing up recommendations (10th Dec, 1996) regarding which country or countries should be invited to start accession talks, in preparation for a decision to be made at the Madrid Summit of July 1997. In the early 1997, intensified individual dialogue meetings took place with 11 partner countries, at their request. In parallel, NATO military authorities undertook an analysis of relevant military factors concerning countries interested in NATO membership. At the meeting of Allied leaders in Madrid (8 July 1997) the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to start accession talks with the Alliance (Schmidt 2001: 153). They also reaffirmed that NATO would remain open to new members. At the end of the process, the three countries sent letters of intent confirming commitments undertaken during the talks. On 16th December, 1997, NATO Foreign Ministers signed Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the three countries. During 1998, Allied countries ratified the Protocols of Accession according to their national procedures. On 12th March of 1999, after completion of their own national legislative procedures, the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland deposited instruments of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in a ceremony in Independence, Missouri in the United States.

This marked their formal entry into the Alliance but at the same time Russia and some other countries which are not taking part in accession negotiations for various reasons were a significant problem for NATO enlargement. Russia has historically surrounded itself with a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. NATO's expansion beyond central Europe, particularly to former Soviet Republics was a source of anxiety for the Russians (Schmidt 2001: 224). This is due to a deep lack of trust between the US and Russia, which emanates from the Cold-War NATO structure which was considered by Russians as an aggressive military block under the US sphere of influence on Central and Eastern European countries.

Barring some unforeseen event of major magnitude, leaders of the 19 NATO members were assembled at a summit in Prague in November 2002 and invited more countries for membership. The decision to enlarge NATO further in 2002 was made at the alliance's June 2001 summit, when the "zero option" of not inviting any country was taken off the table. If the 1997-99 round of enlargement offers any lessons, the six months before the Prague summit witnessed intense scrutiny of the candidate countries and extensive political maneuvering by them (as well as by their supporters and detractors in current NATO countries) in order to secure a membership invitation at the summit (Szayna 2002: 2). Seven countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia) were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance's Prague Summit in 2002. Romania and Slovenia were regarded for a long time as ranked outsiders in the race to join NATO but in the final lap emerged as possible members. Romania was the first country to sign up for partnership for peace (Zsigmond 2004: 47). Geographically Romania is situated at the border of Europe at the place where central Europe meets the Balkans. It is considered to be particularly important because of its direct access to the Black Sea. This can help the alliance to protect Europe from military and non-military threats from the east (Zsigmond 2004: 48). On 29 March 2004, they officially became members of the Alliance, making this the largest wave of enlargement in NATO history. All seven countries joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme soon after its creation in 1994 and have subsequently forged ever closer and deeper relations with the Alliance with a view to becoming NATO members (Mattox and Rachwald 2001: 204). Since 1999, all of these countries have benefited from intensified cooperation under the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a programme of advice, assistance and practical support designed to help the countries wishing to join the Alliance to meet NATO standards (Moore 2007: 211). In the process, the seven new members have undergone comprehensive and demanding reforms covering a wide variety of areas extending well beyond defense and security issues and military structures. While undertaking these reforms, these countries have also become involved alongside other NATO partner countries in many of the Alliance's operations, including the Balkans and Afghanistan. Participating in these operations has enabled these new member countries to

demonstrate that they can contribute to security and to help increase stability in and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area (Sloan 2005: 153).

NATO-Albania relations dates back to 1992, when Albania joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (renamed as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997). Relations further expanded when Albania joined the PfP in 1994. Albania played an important role in supporting Allied efforts to end the humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo and secure the peace after the air campaign. Bilateral cooperation has developed progressively in light of the country's membership aspirations and its participation in the MAP since April 1999. Political and public support for accession to NATO has always been very high (supported by over 95 per cent of the population). In April 2008, Albania was invited to start accession talks with the Alliance. NATO Allies signed protocols on Albania's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on 9 July 2008 (Christoff 2009:).

NATO-Croatia relations date back to 1994, when senior Croatian diplomats publicly declared Croatia's interest in joining the (PfP). Relations continued to expand and Croatia joined the PfP and the EAPC in May 2000 (Gaiills 2008:). Bilateral cooperation has developed progressively in light of the country's membership aspirations and its participation in the MAP since 2002. NATO Allies signed both protocols on Albania and Croatia's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on 9 July 2008. Both achieved full membership of the Alliance on 1 April 2009 (Morelli 2009: 05). NATO and Croatia actively cooperates in a range of areas, including on defence and security reforms, as well as wider democratic and institutional reform. NATO had been involving Croatia in Alliance activities to the greatest extent possible, and continued to provide support and assistance, through the MAP. Beyond the key focus on reform, another important area of cooperation is the country's support for NATO-led operations. Croatia has contributed to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) both directly and indirectly. It has also been contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2003 (Asmus 2008).

New membership in the alliance has been largely from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, including former members of the Warsaw Pact. At the 2008 summit in

Bucharest, three countries were promised future invitations: the Republic of Macedonia, Georgia and Ukraine. Other potential candidate countries include Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sweden, Armenia and Serbia. Expansion to Central and Eastern European countries is ongoing effort of the NATO, though there is an objection from the Russia.

Impacts

Post-Cold War NATO's enlargement is ongoing process, which is not remaining static for making stability of the European security architecture. Growing member states of the NATO has been enlarging to its structure and functions and at the same time its enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries has a great significant impact on Russia.

Impact on Russia

NATO reached out to Russia as it moved toward including the Soviet Union's former Central and East European allies in the Western security system. Russia was offered participation in NATO's partnership program. Then in the context of the first round of NATO enlargement, was given a special relationship to the Alliance with the negotiation of "the founding act" on mutual relations cooperation and security between NATO and Russia federation, establishing a Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which as a framework for continuing consultations between NATO nations plus Russia (Braun 2008: 74). When the idea of NATO enlargement was debated for the first time at the highest political level in 1993, the Russian reaction was rather relaxed. It seemed that Russia would not object to the expansion of NATO towards the East (Zsigmond 2004: 42), but after the NATO's enlargement in 2004, Russia has been opposing to the further enlargement to the East Europe (Bugajski 2007:3). NATO's expanding beyond Central Europe, particularly to former Soviet Republics, is a source of anxiety for the Russians. Although Russia has several times tried to prevent NATO's expansion toward Eastern and Central Europe, these attempts have categorically rebutted by NATO authorities. One of the most long-standing Russian objections to NATO enlargement has been the loss of arms markets in central and eastern European countries (Hursoy: 2005: 68). The glory of the Soviet era

has gone and Russia stands alone weak with a ruined economy. Russia, forced by these factors, acknowledged that Central-Europe is no longer its sphere of influence, but made it very clear that the former Soviet republics and the Black sea region is of particular importance for Russia's security. If enlargement will go further Russia, then it may remain single power. As a matter of fact, the Former Russian President Vladimir Putin began more constructively focusing on developing a new institutional relationship with NATO through deeper co-operation. Moreover, since the beginning of 2002, Putin's leadership was surprisingly dropped its opposition to NATO's enlargement and focused on replacing NATO's PJC with a new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) (Hursoy 2005: 68). Enlargement may also increase Russian hostility towards the alliance and this will cause considerable change within Russian domestic policies, having the effect of bringing extreme forces to power. Today, Russia does not look like an expansionist state and does not seem to be an immediate threat for its near abroad. But if Russia does state to gain power it may act aggressively towards the neighboring countries. If the countries threatened are NATO members, protection is offered to them which can deter the aggressiveness of Russia (Zsigmond 2004: 43).

A new round of enlargement pushing NATO up to Russia's borders may damage Russia-Western relations more than did the first round of enlargement. For example, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a law in 2000 standing that the expansion of military alliances poses a threat to Russia's borders. The risk may not be in sparking a complete renewal of the Cold War, but rather in pushing Russian leaders away from the belief that, the West is a trustworthy partner in cooperation. Already, NATO's strategic concept and its 1999 operation in Kosovo have reversed a trend in Moscow's doctrinal development away from the assumption that there are no external military threats to Russia (Wallander 2000: 07-12).

Though the Permanent Joint Council is intended as a forum of consultation, its terms of references is wide. It may discuss issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Russia may attempt to manipulate the PJC and to play great power politics with NATO over the heads of non-NATO eastern European

states. A key Russian aim here is to prevent NATO from enlarging to include the Baltic States (Eyal 1997:716-717).

Impacts on NATO's Structure

NATO headquarters are required on the territory of new members to cover the revised tasks. The rapid enlargement of the organization influences existing command, control and communications equipment and infrastructure which are unlikely to meet minimum NATO standards. The building of new headquarters and the upgrading of existing headquarters to NATO standards would involve significant costs although progress on the development of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept may have a bearing on alliance headquarters requirements. Enlargement will lead to new activities and a need for increased resources. Additional office space is to be needed at NATO HQ to accommodate new members and possible increases to the staffs of the International Staff (IS) and International Military Staff (IMS). Operating and Capital cost in the Civil Budget will grow. New members shall be expected to contribute, which depends in large part on the members' level of participation. It is important to ensure that potential new members are fully aware that they face considerable financial obligations when joining the alliance (Hartley and Sandler 1999: 668).

Enlargement may therefore require a review of the size of staffs at most NATO headquarters and national representation. This process would be complicated, if new members join consecutively. In the case of NATO's command structure, the enlargement will lead to establishment of new areas of responsibility and the related command structure. A broad plan will therefore be needed to ensure the maximum effectiveness and flexibility of the command structure. The alliance's military strength and cohesion depends on its multinational forces and structures, and the fair sharing of risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits. To ensure military effectiveness, current and prospective members must be committed to developing, managing and supporting NATO's new force structures. New members' forces would be expected to take part in the of alliance missions to the extent appropriate to their capabilities. Thus the increasing need for mobility, flexibility and inter-service and multinational interoperability in

undertaking both defense and new missions means that current alliance policy on multi nationality should apply when new members' forces join NATO force structure, consistent with the need to maintain military effectiveness (MaCalla 1996: 448).

Impacts on its Functions

The admission of new members requires the economic and military contribution for maintaining peace and security in Europe. And the same time the burden sharing activities are easily carryout by the alliance instead facing various difficulties (Lawrence 2004: 109). But, if member states are remaining few then it may burden for them to carryout functions of NATO. Indeed if members are large, than it is not difficult for them to carryout those burden sharing activities. So, enhancing security and strengthening stability is occurring in the structure by coming new members to the NATO. Interest in burden sharing arose when member nations perceived major differences in defense burdens and a widening of the gap between defense costs and benefits (Kennedy 1979). NATO burden sharing activities are about the actual contribution of each nation to collective defense alliance and the fairness of each state's contribution (Szayna 2002: 3-4). Equity issues are inevitably controversial and NATO requires international collective agreement on whether member-states should contribute to the alliance on the basis of the benefits received or on the basis of ability to pay on a proportional of progressive basis. NATO common funding comprises the NATO security investment programme which funds its infrastructure projects, the military budget, its staff and committees, and the civil budget which support headquarters, and planning groups (Sandler and Hartley 1999: 674).

NATO is providing collective defense output in the form of peace, protection, and security. Defense expenditure is an input which purchases air, land and sea forces designed to provide final outputs in the form of peace and protection (Hartley and Sandler 1999: 672). Seven countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) formally became NATO members on 29 March 2004 with all the benefits and responsibilities that Alliance membership entails. The enlargement of the Alliance extends the zone of security and stability in Europe and brings European citizens

under NATO's protective umbrella (Kramer 2009: 47-50). The fifth round of NATO enlargement, the second since the end of the Cold War is by far the largest, involving as many countries as in all four previous rounds. In the words of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: "it will be a major step towards a long-standing NATO objective: a Europe free, united and secure in peace, democracy and common values". The first post-Cold War accession of new countries in 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the alliance, have helped to strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability in Europe (Kydd 2001: 803).

New members contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being; roles, risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits of assuring common security goals and objectives. NATO's reliance on collective defense has ensured that no single ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Sharing these benefits with new members can help extend security and stability in Europe (Dodd 1998: 14). So the enlargement will occur as one element of the broader evolution of European cooperation and security currently underway. Enlargement will have implications for all European nations including states which do not join NATO early or at all. It will be important to maintain active, cooperation with countries which do not join the alliance to avoid divisions or uncertainties in Europe and to ensure broad, inclusive approaches to the cooperative security. The alliance should underline that there can be no question of "*spheres of influence*" in the contemporary Europe. NATO's relations with other European states, whether cooperation partners or not, are important factors to consider in taking any decision to proceed with the enlargement process as is building security for states which may not be prospective members.

NATO's commitments to support, on a case by case basis and in accordance with alliance procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, will remain valid after enlargement. An enlarged alliance would have greater capacity to support such

peacekeeping activities and operations (Dodd 1998: 25). An OSCE discussion of a European security model in the 21st century reflects the process of NATO enlargement. A strengthened OSCE, an enlarged NATO, an active NACC and PfP would, together with other fora, form complementary parts of broad, inclusive European security architecture, supporting the objective of an undivided Europe. Multilateral training and exercises on the territory of new members will contribute significantly to maintaining alliance military capability and effectiveness and enhance the ability of the alliance to fulfill its full range of mission. Sharing of intelligence among allies contributes to the effectiveness of the alliance. There is a disagreement among the NATO members on which states are ready to join the Alliance. More particularly, France and Italy have on several occasions expressed the fact that they were strongly supported Romania and Slovenia to be included in the group of future and possible NATO members. If one looks at the debate on NATO enlargement in the US Senate, there appears little chance for a future candidate.

Members of the alliance are also concerned with the institutional reform of the organization and some of them argue that first and foremost the institutional reform should be carried out (Brady 1985: 40). The fundamental constraint on the ability of the MAP states to achieve the military objectives is the lack of resources available to them in relation to most of the current NATO members (Brady 1985: 166). This is due to the small size and relative lack of affluence of the candidate states. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia inherited a large military establishment from the Communist era. The other MAP states basically had to start from scratch, having little in terms of equipment and organization. As such, their problems have been different. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia have faced problems of military reform before admission to NATO. The problem here has been how to narrow and adapt the legacy forces. The other MAP countries have had the opposite problem of how to build up a NATO-compatible military establishment (Yost 1998:139). Different levels of resource availability and varying degrees of effectiveness in defense planning have led to different levels of success in this group. The willingness of the candidates to invest resources in defense has varied, although all the MAP states have plans in place to increase their defense spending to close to 2.0 percent of the GDP (with some of them at that level already). Whether the

candidates will stick to those plans once they are members is debatable. The defense burden-sharing issues aside, there remains the fundamental point of less resources. The combined current level of annual defense expenditures by all nine MAP states is approximately \$2 billion (which is two-thirds of what current less affluent or small NATO allies like Poland or Denmark, respectively, spend annually) (Hartley and Sandler 1999: 672).

Conclusion

NATO expansion involves both benefits and costs. Benefits include improved collective defense capabilities and security, improved burden-sharing in NATO. The enlargement of the alliance extends the zone PFP security and stability in Europe and brings European citizens under NATO's protective umbrella. The costs of expansion embrace infrastructure in the new member-states, modernization of forces for the new members, enhanced reinforcement capabilities, the thinning of forces to defend longer borders and larger areas, and the increasing problems of decision making in a larger NATO. Expansion is worthwhile so long as expected benefits exceed expected costs for existing members and for the new entrants. Further expansion requires a careful evaluation of benefits and costs for existing members and new entrants (including an evaluation of past and current expansions). The impact of expansion on force thinning cannot be ignored. The alliance has emphasis an "open door" to further enlargement, general rationales such as promoting democratization, and the prospect of including almost every state in the Euro-Atlantic region in NATO-sponsored institutions.

Opposition to NATO enlargement is also important issue in that the Putin and post-Putin administration may need to maintain a sense of threat to Russia among the public and among military and security structures in order to rebuild central control and instill loyalty to an assertive Russian state. NATO may have outlived one of its core purposes if there comes a time when Moscow genuinely welcomes its further enlargement. To conclude, NATO since the dissolution of the Warsaw-Pact has undertaken a number of initiatives designed to both adapt itself to an alternative and relevant role, and to incorporate the former members of the pact.

CHAPTER - III

CHANGING ROLE AND EXPANSION OF FUNCTIONS

In the new world arising after the Cold War NATO's main task has shifted from deterring a great war between East and West to crisis management, peacekeeping and support for collective security. The Alliance's primary purpose had been to address the threats posed by the Soviet Union to Western Europe. Even after the disintegration of Soviet Union the NATO has not only survived but has even added to its elaborate organizational bodies and undertaken new activities. The allies have updated their common strategic concept, maintained NATO's integrated military structure and continue to engage in joint military planning, training, and exercises (Schmidt 2001). They have developed new policies and fora for promoting dialogue and security cooperation with the former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. In December 1992, for the first time in its history the Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement operations. NATO has changed from the Collective Defence to Collective Security through new initiatives and functions in the post-Cold War period (Schmidt 2001: 59).

The chapter provides the ideas about the changing role of the NATO from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period and how it spillover to one function to multi-functions in the post-Cold War period. How NATO is playing more significant role to spread and strengthen democracy in the Europe (especially in the East Europe) and also how it brings stability in the Europe through the cooperation of other international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and non-member states are the important focus in this chapter.

Changing role

During the Cold War period, NATO was maintaining its static role of collective defense, but with the end of the Cold War it has changed its role of collective defense due to collapse of the Soviet Union, and jumped to other areas like conflict prevention, crisis management. The greatest and most visible change in NATO's role since the end of the Cold War is its involvement in ending conflict, restoring peace and building stability in

crisis regions. NATO's Conflict Prevention and Management (CPM) and its role on collective security are important issues in the discussion of the post- Cold War security framework.

Crisis management

Crisis management is one of NATO's fundamental security tasks in the post-Cold War period (Ghecia 2005). It can involve military and non-military measures to respond to a threat, be it in a national or an international situation. A crisis can be political, military or humanitarian and can be caused by politic of armed conflict, technological incidents or natural disasters. Crisis management consists of the different means of dealing with these different forms of crises. NATO's role in crisis management goes beyond military operations to include issues such as the protection of populations against natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations. Indeed the Alliance is currently involved in a variety of capacities in complex, peace-support operations on three continents: in the Former Yugoslavia in Europe; in Afghanistan and Iraq in Asia; and in Darfur, Sudan in Africa. There are different types of crisis management operations and all have specific objectives and mandates, which are important to know in order to understand the impact and limitations of an operation (Giovanna 2003).

Decisions are taken by the governments of each NATO member country collectively and may include political or military measures, as well as measures to deal with civil emergencies depending on the nature of the crisis (Foster 1995). In this field North Atlantic Council is the principal political decision making body, supported by a number of specialized committees. The NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS), NATO's Operational Planning System and NATO Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management arrangements are designed to underpin the Alliance's crisis management role and response capability in a complementary and synergistic fashion, as part of an overall NATO crisis management process (Katharina: 2007).

In reaching and implementing its decisions, the Council may be supported by specialized committees such as the Political Committee (PC), the Policy Coordination

Group (PCG), the Military Committee (MC) and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC). It also makes full use of and draws on the communications and information systems available to it, including the NATO Situation Center which collects and disseminates political, economic and military intelligence and information on a permanent and continuous basis every single day of the year. In any crisis, NATO may take the lead or play a supporting role in the context of a crisis management activity undertaken under the responsibility of the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union, or by one or more NATO member countries (Clement 1997). In either case, the focus of NATO's involvement is on making a significant and distinct contribution to successful conflict management and resolution. The Alliance must be prepared to conduct the full range of Article 5 missions in circumstances that in many cases will be difficult to predict since, to some extent, every crisis is unique. Nonetheless, the process by which the Alliance addresses and seeks to manage and resolve a crisis can be planned with reasonable confidence.

The crisis management process is designed to facilitate political consultation and decision making at a sufficiently early stage in an emerging crisis to give the appropriate NATO committees time to coordinate their work and submit timely advice to the Council. It also allows the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACE) as the Strategic Commander responsible for Allied Command Operations (ACO) to undertake preparatory planning measures in a reasonable time frame. These activities may in turn contribute early on to the advice provided to the Council by NATO's military authorities. From very early in its history, NATO has played an important role in smoothing relations among its members for burden sharing activities in crisis management (Joseph 1988). And in early 1994, they approved the development of a mechanism termed Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that would enable groups of members "coalitions of the willing" to draw upon common Alliance assets for specific operations outside of the treaty area. NATO has remained the institution to which its members and some non-members primarily look to ensure their security (Hattne 1991). NATO also has a Science Programme that supports collaboration in civil science between scientists from NATO member and Partner countries. Some 10,000 scientists a year participate in various ways in events and projects supported through the programme, including initiatives to improve

computer networking and expand Internet access among the research community of the Caucasus and Central Asia (Wörner 2005). Moreover, in line with the shift in NATO priorities since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the programme is moving increasingly towards supporting collaboration on research projects related to the defense against terrorism and countering other threats to modern society. In an emerging crisis calling for possible crisis response operations, the crisis management process consists of five successive phases ranging from initial indications and warning of an impending crisis, assessment of the situation and its actual or potential implications for Alliance security, development of recommended response options, and planning and execution of the Council's decisions.

The effectiveness of the crisis response system and of NATO's overall crisis management process may be determined to a great extent by the effectiveness and efficiency of the structures and procedures of the NATO Headquarters Crisis Management Organisation, which have to be responsive, flexible and adaptable (Clement 1997). They must also facilitate the seamless and smooth inter-operation of the other main elements of the crisis management process, namely the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS), NATO's operational planning system, and NATO Civil Emergency Planning crisis management arrangements. The NATO Situation Centre supports the process with communications and other essential facilities. In the light of decisions taken at the Washington Summit meeting in 1999 to transform NATO structures and capabilities, the crisis management tools in place were considered to be no longer sufficiently well adapted to the risks and challenges that the Alliance might face (Frederking 2003). In August 2001, the North Atlantic Council approved policy guidelines with a view to developing a single, fully integrated NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS). The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 brought new urgency to this task and a new dimension to the NATO's crisis management framework, which had hitherto focused primarily on requirements for collective defense (Deni 2007). In June 2002, the Council also provided political guidance for the development of a Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism. An important result of this decision has been the introduction of measures to strengthen civil emergency planning for Article 5 and non-Article 5 contingencies, as

well as the management of the consequences of civil emergencies or disasters resulting from the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) agents.

In view of new risks as well as the need for the Alliance to be able to address more complex and demanding crisis management requirements, including the possibility of NATO support for non-NATO operations involving one or more member countries, further far-reaching decisions have been taken with regard to NATO's overall defense posture. These have resulted in a new force posture and a new command structure, transformation of staff structures, new measures relating to defense against terrorism, the establishment of the NATO Response Force, improvements in capabilities, the development of the strategic partnership with the European Union, enhanced cooperation with Partner countries and reinforcement of the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue (Zyla 2005). The NATO Crisis Response System under development takes full account of and complements for these new NATO concepts, capabilities and arrangements. It aims to provide the Alliance with a comprehensive set of options and measures to manage and respond to crises appropriately, taking full advantage of the tools and capabilities being introduced as a result of decisions taken by NATO heads of state and government at successive summit meetings. Exercises to test and develop crisis management procedures are held at regular intervals in conjunction with national capitals and NATO Strategic Commanders. Such exercises and the arrangements, procedures and facilities on which the crisis management process depends are coordinated by the Council Operations and Exercise Committee (COEC). Crisis management activities involving NATO's Partner countries are also coordinated by the COEC and are among the agreed fields of activity in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan and in Individual Partnership Programmes. They include briefings and consultations, expert visits, crisis management courses, Partner country participation in an annual NATO-wide crisis management exercise and the provision of generic crisis management documents to interested partner countries (Tarcisio 2003). The coordination of crisis management responses to disasters or emergencies in the Euro-Atlantic area takes place in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). The Centre's role is to facilitate the coordination of responses to civil emergencies or disasters including the management of

consequences resulting from terrorist attacks. The Centre, which can be augmented if necessary, is able to operate on a 24/7 basis if circumstances require (Duffield 1995).

Collective Security

There are several ongoing processes in the development of NATO's role in collective security missions, these are the importance of humanitarian missions, new military formations and structures accommodating not only NATO states but non NATO states and other international organizations, protection of human rights, peace keeping and peace enforcement actions, promoting democracy, fight against terrorism, arms control and nuclear disarmament, conflict prevention and crisis management and enforcement of international laws etc.

Created to protect post-War Western Europe from the Soviet Union, the Alliance is now seeking to bring stability to other parts of the world. In the process it has been extending both its geographic reach and the range of its operations. In the 1990, NATO successfully halted two genocides in the Balkans (Gulnur 1999). NATO's military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) supports the political aims of the international community, which reaffirmed a peaceful, multi ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis (Yost 1998). In recent years, it has played peace keepers in Afghanistan, trained security forces in Iraq and given logistical support to the African Union's mission in Darfur (Tarcisio 2003). It assisted the tsunami relief effort in Indonesia and ferried supplies to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and to those of a massive earthquake in Pakistan. NATO's main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. Its role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan Government in exercising and establish good governance, rule of law and to promote human rights (Worner 2005). It does this predominately through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force. Currently NATO and many partners in the international community are helping the people of Afghanistan in their effort to achieve peace, stability and the opportunity for a

brighter and more prosperous future. The stability in Iraq is in the best interest of the international community (Pansard 2007). At the request of the government of Iraq, NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) has been involved since 2004 in helping Iraq develop security forces that are professional, operate in accordance with international standards and the rule of law and have respect for human rights. NTM-I's sole purpose is to help equip train and mentor Iraq's fledgling military and police forces. NMT-I will continue to work at the direction of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and in partnership with the government of Iraq to enhance the stability of Iraq (Worner 2005).

At the Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO Heads of States and Government approved the alliance's new strategic concept to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Washington Summit 1999). At the Riga Summit in 2006 NATO declared that terrorism together with the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years. By contributing to the international community's efforts to combat terrorism, NATO helps ensure that citizens can go about their daily lives safely, free from the threat of indiscriminate acts of terror (Riga Summit 2006). NATO has made great progress in transforming the Alliance's capabilities and can best response to the new security environment by building on its strength. It has mostly streamlined its command structures, made progress toward the development of a rapid response force and led the way in efforts to promote international consensus on the nature of the threat (Gulnur 1999).

Active policies in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation have been an inseparable part of NATO's contribution to security and stability. In May 1989, NATO adopted a Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament which allowed the Alliance to move forward in the sphere of arms control (Yost 1998). It addressed the role of arms control in East-West relations, the principles of Alliance security and a number of guiding principles and objectives governing Allied policy in the nuclear, conventional and chemical fields of arms control. This commitment was reiterated by Allied leaders in declarations made at the summit meetings held in Washington (1999), Istanbul (2004),

Riga (2006) and Bucharest (2008). The subject of arms control is also embedded in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and in the declaration made by Allied and Russian leaders at the 2002 Rome Summit, which set up the NATO-Russia Council (Ponsard 2007).

In the post-Cold War period conflict prevention is also an important role of the NATO, though it has been taking the help of United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). It has played a very significant role in the case of Kosovo and Bosnia. NATO has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area.

In the Cold War period, there was no such type of conflict prevention activities by the NATO, which have been emerging in the post-Cold War period. Therefore, having intervened in Kosovo to protect ethnic Albanians from ethnic cleansing, NATO has been equally committed to protecting the province's ethnic Serbs from a similar fate since the deployment of KFOR in the province in June 1999. NATO's military intervention in Bosnia of Kosovo was its very crucial role on conflict prevention to stop the systematic ethnic cleansing of the civilian population. NATO remains the single most effective organization for combining the political-military assets of the major Western powers and its effectiveness must be preserved for to enable it to conduct selected operations in support of collective security. Above all those factors are closely related with the functions and objectives of the United Nations by which one can observe that- NATO has been working like a collective security organization in the Europe as well as out of Europe.

Expansion of Functions

In the post-Cold War period the NATO has been working on various functions instead to give importance to a single function, as it did during the Cold War era. Its most important functions are: spreading and strengthening democracy in the Europe and especially to the East-European countries' growing relations with international organizations (like United Nations, European Union and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe),

cooperation with non-member states and improving its relations with the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Supporting Democracy and Stability in the Eastern-Europe

Democracies are essentially peaceful in their external behavior, in particular vis-à-vis other democracies. NATO's explicit goal of protecting its member countries against totalitarian threats from inside, as well as outside further serves to maintain the peaceful character of internal relations among member states (Hassner 1990). In Western Europe, democracy is firmly established. But that is not the case in Eastern Europe. There, governments still struggle to different degrees with potentially destabilizing challenges (Thomas 1995). The success of democratization in Central and East European countries would significantly advance security in Europe and in Russia also, in a larger geographic contest (Kaiser 1996). Contributing to democratization wherever possible is therefore a new functions of NATO after inclusion of member of East-European countries as its members. After 1990 the Western decision makers regarded the liberal democratic values of the transatlantic community as universally valid, the concept of promotion of "good" institutions of domestic governance came to be synonymous with the projection of liberal democracy into the former communist countries of Europe (Lebonic 2004). Some philosophers argued, the early 1990s witnessed the process of a collective writing of Europe's "new constitution", which established democratic pluralism, human right, and the rule of law as the key pillars of legitimate domestic governance (Flynn and Farrell 1999). At the Vienna summit in 1993, the members of the Council of Europe stated: "All our countries are committed to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. Europe can thus become a vast area of democratic security. We intend to render the Council of Europe fully capable of contributing to democratic security" (Lebonic 2004). Therefore the western decision makers argued that if NATO was to survive and remain relevant in the new security environment, it has to develop its ability to promote democratic stability within the former Communist states of Europe. As part of its new mission, NATO should "build political and economic ties with the East, promote respect for human rights and help to build democratic institutions" (Baker 1989). Since

1990, NATO has established a wide array of programs and institutions for dialogue and cooperation on security issues, most notably the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) through which it can assist the fledgling regimes in reshaping their defense policies, structures and planning processes (Flanagan 1992). To enhance stability in the East, NATO members must work for the spread of democracy. It is the best long-term step that can be taken to shore up the continent's security because it provides the most effective framework for resolving conflicts between regions or among ethnic groups within states. A democratic form of government is also the most reliable guarantee that a state will adopt prudent and peaceful behavior in its external policies (Rebecca 2007).

Growing Relations with other International Organizations

During the Cold War the Alliance had no significant interactions with the other international organizations and only they focused on collective defense and deterrence as the basis for diplomacy with their adversaries to the East. But at the end of the Cold War in 1990-91, the Allies were farsighted enough to recognize that in the new circumstances NATO would need to work more closely with other major international security organizations (North Atlantic Council 1991). The Balkan conflicts since 1991 and NATO's engagement in Afghanistan since 2002-03 have been the main drivers of the alliance's increasingly extensive cooperation with other international organizations (Brenner 1998). Practical needs in specific tasks in operations as well as assistance for security sector reform and other partnership activities have led NATO to work with many bodies, including national and non-governmental organizations as well as intergovernmental organizations (Cristina: 2002). In fact, the relationship between NATO and other international organizations intensified due to the explanation of its role and functions in the post-Cold War era.

Relations with the United Nations: UN Security Council resolutions have provided the mandate for NATO's major peace-support operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan and also provide the framework for NATO's training mission in Iraq. More recently NATO has provided logistical assistance to the African Union's UN endorsed

peacekeeping operation in the Darfur region of Sudan. In recent years, cooperation between NATO and the United Nations has developed well beyond their common engagement in the Western Balkans and in Afghanistan (Duffield 1995: 772-75). An important motivation behind NATO's decision to expand activities into the field of peacekeeping was the perceived need for the alliance to demonstrate its relevance after the Cold War by developing those concepts that had only been vaguely outlined in the new strategic concept of 1991 (Laugen 1999: 24-25). The relationship between the two organizations has been steadily growing at all levels conceptually and politically as well as institutionally. Cooperation and consultations with UN specialized bodies go beyond crisis management and cover a wide range of issues, including civil emergency planning, civil-military cooperation, combating human trafficking, action against mines, and the fight against terrorism (Deffield 1995: 772-775). The acknowledgment of a direct relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations is a fundamental principle of the Alliance. The Charter, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by fifty countries provides the legal basis for the creation of NATO and establishes the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security. These two fundamental principles are enshrined in NATO's North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. Although the formal link between the United Nations and the North Atlantic Alliance has remained solidly anchored in the connection between their respective founding documents since the foundation of the Alliance in 1949, working relations between the institutions of the United Nations and those of the Alliance remained limited for most of this period. The situation changed in 1992, against the backdrop of growing conflict in the Western Balkans, where their respective roles in crisis management led to an intensification of practical cooperation between the two organizations (Barth 2001: 6-7).

Peacekeeping operation is the major propelling force behind UN's interest in establishing closer ties with NATO (Annan 1993: 6). In July 1992, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft, began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of a UN arms embargo against all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. A few months later in November, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) began enforcement

operations in support of UN Security Council resolutions aimed at preventing an escalation of the conflict. The readiness of the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council was formally stated by NATO foreign ministers in December 1992 (Tarcisio 2003).

Measures already being taken by NATO countries individually and as an Alliance, were reviewed and the Alliance indicated that it was ready to respond positively to further initiatives that the UN Secretary General might take in seeking Alliance assistance in this field. A number of measures were subsequently taken including joint maritime operations under the authority of the NATO and WEU Councils, NATO air operations, close air support for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), air strikes to protect UN “Safe Areas” and contingency planning for other options which the United Nations might take. Following the signature of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) on 14 December 1995, NATO was given a mandate by the United Nations, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1031, to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement (Smith 1996). This was NATO’s first peacekeeping operation. A NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) began operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfill this mandate on 16 December 1995 (Schmidt 2001: 72). One year later, it was replaced by a NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). Throughout their mandates both multinational forces worked closely with other international organizations and humanitarian agencies on the ground, including UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF). From the onset of the conflict in Kosovo in 1998 and throughout the crisis, close contacts were maintained between the UN Secretary General and NATO’s Secretary General. Actions were taken by the Alliance in support of UN Security Council resolutions both during and after the conflict (Ochmartek 2000). The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 12 June 1999 to provide an international security presence as the prerequisite for peace and reconstruction of Kosovo (Schmidt 2001: 66). In 2000 and 2001, NATO and the United Nations also cooperated successfully in containing major ethnic discord in southern Serbia and preventing a full-blown civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

More recently, cooperation between NATO and the UN has played a key role in Afghanistan. On 11 August 2003, the Alliance formally took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UN-mandated force originally tasked with helping provide security in and around Kabul. NATO and ISAF work closely with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other international actors that are supporting governance, reconstruction and development (Lindley-French 2007: 101). It includes co-membership of the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) overseeing the implementation of the internationally endorsed Afghanistan Compact, co-chairmanship together with the Afghan Government of the Executive Steering Committee for Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other joint Afghan-International Community bodies. The practical close work also covers cooperation between UNAMA, ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul on civil-military issues such as operational planning. Beyond Kabul city, close civil-military cooperation between UNAMA and ISAF is also being pursued in those provinces, where both ISAF and UNAMA are present (Tarcisio 2003). This practical work is now being developed comprehensively in the context of UNAMA's Integrated Approach to selected prioritized Afghan districts. ISAF has subsequently been authorized by a series of UN Security Council resolutions to expand its presence into other regions of the country to extend the authority of the central government and to facilitate development and reconstruction (Lawrence 2004: 137). The Alliance also temporarily deployed extra forces to Afghanistan to increase ISAF's support for the Afghan authorities' efforts to provide a secure environment for presidential elections in October 2004 and for the parliamentary and municipal elections in September 2005. In Iraq under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 and at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government, NATO has provided assistance in training and equipping Iraqi security forces (Lindley-French 2007 202). In June 2005, following a request from the African Union and in close coordination with the United Nations and the European Union, NATO agreed to support the African Union in the expansion of its mission to end the continuing violence in the Darfur region of Sudan (Deni 2007). NATO assisted by airlifting peace keepers from African troop-contributing countries to the region over the summer months and also

helped train African Union officers in running a multinational military headquarters and managing intelligence.

The two organizations have been cooperating in this area since the early 1990s and share a commitment to maintaining international peace and security. Over the years, cooperation has broadened to include consultations between both organizations on issues such as crisis management, civil-military cooperation, combating human trafficking, mine action, civil emergency planning, arms control and non-proliferation, and the fight against terrorism. UN Security Council resolutions have provided the mandate for NATO's operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan and the framework for NATO's training mission in Iraq. In the twenty first century world order it is necessary for both organizations to take the help of each other to handle various global as well as regional problems in the world.

The Partnership with European Union (EU): Since the end of the Cold War, both NATO and the EU have evolved along with Europe's changed strategic landscape. While NATO's collective defense guarantee remains at the core of the alliance, members have also sought to redefine its mission as new security challenges have emerged in Europe's periphery and beyond. At the same time, EU members have taken steps toward political integration with decisions to develop a common foreign policy and a defense arm to improve EU member states' abilities to manage security crises such as those that engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s (Sophia 1997). The March 2003 agreement on the "Berlin plus" package made possible the first EU-led peacekeeping mission, operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, from March to December 2003 (Zyla 2005). In July 2003, the EU and the Alliance agreed on "a common vision" for Western Balkan region: stability, democracy, prosperity and closer cooperation with (and possible eventual membership in) European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. In the framework of this vision the alliance decided at the June 2004 Istanbul summit to conclude its Stabilization Force operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of 2004 and to work with the EU in the Berlin Plus framework to organize the transition to an EU led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina named Althea (NATO 2003). The "Berlin Plus" arrangements provide for assured EU access to NATO operational planning capabilities

and for the availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as headquarters and communications units, for EU- led operations (Rebecca 2007).

The Berlin Plus arrangements are based on the recognition that member countries of both organizations only have one set of forces and limited defense resources on which they can draw (Gardner 2004). Under these circumstances and to avoid an unnecessary duplication of resources, it was agreed that operations led by the European Union would be able to benefit from NATO assets and capabilities. In effect, these arrangements enable NATO to support EU-led operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. They have facilitated the transfer of responsibility from NATO to the European Union of military operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Agreed in March 2003, these arrangements are referred to as Berlin Plus because they build on decisions taken in Berlin in 1996 in the context of NATO-WEU cooperation (Zyla 2005).

The crisis in Southern Serbia and the unstable political situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia became a focus of international concern in 2001. A series of joint visits to the region by NATO's Secretary General and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy underscore the unity of purpose and commitment shared by NATO and the European Union with regard to the security of the region. On 30 May 2001, at the first formal NATO-EU Foreign Ministers' meeting in Budapest, the NATO Secretary General and the EU presidency issued a joint statement on the Western Balkans. Later they met in Brussels in December 2001 and in Reykjavik in May 2002 to review their cooperation across the board. They underlined their continuing commitment to strengthening the peace process in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as elsewhere in the Western Balkans and reaffirmed their commitment to a close and transparent relationship between the two organizations (Tarcisio 2003). Cooperation on the ground contributed positively to the improved situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. From August 2001 to the end of March 2003, NATO provided security for EU and OSCE monitors of the peace plan brokered with the support of the international community in the city of Ohrid. On 31 March 2003, the NATO-led peacekeeping mission (Operation Amber Fox) was

terminated and responsibility for this task was formally handed over to the European Union, with the agreement of the government in Skopje. Renamed Operation Concordia, this was the first EU-led military crisis management operation (Zyla 2005). Undertaken on the basis of the Berlin Plus arrangements, it marked the real starting point for cooperation between NATO and the European Union in addressing an operational crisis-management task. On 29 July 2003, NATO and the European Union formally agreed on a “concerted approach to security and stability in the Western Balkans” and outlined their strategic approach to the problems of the region (Lindley-French 2007: 116). Both organizations expressed determination to continue to build on their achievements in working together to bring an end to conflict and to help stabilize the region as a whole (Carpenter 2001).

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, in view of the positive evolution of the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alliance leaders confirmed their decision to terminate NATO’s peacekeeping mission there, which it had led since 1996 and welcomed the readiness of the European Union to assume responsibility for a new mission, Operation Althea, based on the Berlin Plus arrangements (Worner 2005). Close cooperation and coordination with regard to the planning and implementation of the EU mission was facilitated by the appointment of the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) as the EU Operation Commander. NATO leaders stressed that NATO would nevertheless remain committed to the stabilization of the country and would maintain a residual military presence through a NATO headquarters in Sarajevo. This headquarters is responsible primarily for providing assistance in the defense reform process and other tasks including counter-terrorism and support for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. A ceremony marking the handover of the primary responsibility for security in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO to the European Union took place in Sarajevo on 2 December 2004. The new NATO military headquarters was formally established on the same day (Pursley 2008). The strategic partnership also covers other issues of common interest. This included concerted efforts with regard to the planning and development of military capabilities. NATO experts have provided military and technical advice for both the initial preparation and the subsequent implementation of the European Union’s European Capabilities

Action Plan (ECAP), which was created in November 2001. ECAP aims to provide the forces and capabilities required to meet the EU Headline Goal set at Helsinki in 1999. A NATO-EU Capability Group was established in May 2003 which ensures that the Alliance's capabilities initiatives and the ECAP are mutually reinforcing, and also examining the relationship between the NATO Response Force and newly created EU Battle Groups as part of the NATO-EU agenda under the Berlin Plus arrangements (Lawrence 2004: 125).

Through information exchanges on their respective activities, consultations and contacts at expert and staff level, joint meetings, NATO and the European Union also undertake joint work on issues such as the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the situation in Moldova, Mediterranean issues and cooperation in Afghanistan (Carpenter 2001). Additional spheres of information exchange and cooperation include protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks and other civil emergency planning and WMD related issues. Cooperation can sometimes involve reciprocal participation in exercises. In November 2003 for instance, the first joint NATO-EU Crisis Management Exercise (CME/CMX03) was held. It was based on a range of standing Berlin Plus arrangements and concentrated on how the EU plans for an envisaged EU-led operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, where NATO as a whole is not engaged (Ghecia 2005).

Therefore, both NATO and the European Union are working together to prevent and resolve crises and armed conflicts in Europe and beyond. The two organizations share common strategic interests and cooperate in a spirit of complementarities and partnership. Close cooperation between NATO and the European Union is an important element in the development of an international "Comprehensive Approach" to crisis management and operations, which requires the effective application of both military and civilian means.

Relations with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: In 1994, the allies agreed to make NATO resources available to support peacekeeping operations

mandated by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN). NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have complementary roles and functions in promoting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region in areas such as conflict prevention and crisis management. The NATO-OSCE relationship is manifested at both the political and the operational level (Scherwen 1990). The two organizations have cooperated actively in the field in the Western Balkans since the 1990s, and regularly exchange views and seek to complement each other's activities on issues of common interest such as crisis management, border security, disarmament, terrorism and initiatives towards specific regions (Sophia 1997). Practical NATO-OSCE cooperation is best exemplified by the complementary missions undertaken by the two organizations in the Western Balkans. In 1996, after the signing of the "Dayton Peace Accord", they developed a joint action programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) established to implement the military aspects of the peace agreements and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) which succeeded it, provided vital support for implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreements. By ensuring the security of OSCE personnel and humanitarian assistance NATO contributed among others, to the smooth organization of elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina under OSCE auspices (Deni 2007).

In October 1998, the OSCE in Europe established a Kosovo Verification Mission to monitor compliance on the ground with cease-fire agreements concluded after the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo and the efforts of the international community to avert further conflict. NATO conducted a parallel aerial surveillance mission (Giovanna 2003). Following a further deterioration in security conditions, the OSCE Verification Mission was forced to withdraw in March 1999.

NATO air campaign in Kosovo on July 1999, a new OSCE Mission to Kosovo was established as part of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. The role of the OSCE Mission among other things is to oversee the progress of democratization, the creation of institutions and the protection of human rights. The Mission maintains close relations with the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which has a mandate from the United Nations to guarantee a safe environment for the work of the

inter-national community. NATO has also cooperated closely with the OSCE in Europe in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Miller and Kagan 1997). A NATO Task Force was set up in September 2001 to provide additional security for EU and OSCE observers monitoring the implementation of a framework peace agreement, which had been reached in the summer after a period of internal ethnic unrest in the spring. The European Union officially took over this operation, renamed Concordia, from March 2003 until its conclusion in December 2003. NATO-OSCE cooperation has also contributed to promoting better management and securing of borders in the Western Balkans.

At a high-level conference held in Ohrid in May 2003, five Balkan countries endorsed a Common Platform developed by the European Union, NATO, the OSCE in Europe and the Stability Pact aimed at enhancing border security in the region (Ghecia 2005). Each organization supports the countries involved in the areas within its jurisdiction. NATO and the OSCE in Europe also seek to coordinate their efforts in other areas. Initiatives taken by NATO in areas such as arms control, mine clearance, elimination of ammunition stocks and efforts to control the spread of small arms and light weapons dovetail with OSCE efforts aimed at preventing conflict and restoring stability after a conflict (Lansford 2002). Moreover, in the regional context both organizations place special emphasis on Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Each has also developed parallel initiatives directed towards the countries of the Mediterranean region (Deni 2007).

NATO and the OSCE are working together to build security and promote stability in the Euro-Atlantic area at both the political and the operational level in areas such as conflict prevention, crisis management and addressing new security threats. Close cooperation between NATO and the OSCE is an important element in the development of an international “Comprehensive Approach” to crisis management, which requires the effective application of both military and civilian means

Cooperation with non-member states

After involving in global issues and problems, NATO needs support and cooperation of

its members as well as non-member states to handle effectively those global problems like terrorism, nuclear disarmament and arms control. Specially after the event of terrorist attack of 11th September, 2001 on world trade center of U.S, NATO has been working with its non-member states like Russia and Cooperation with other countries in the Mediterranean region and Middle East.

Enhancement of NATO-Russia relations: NATO-Russia relations formally began in 1991 at the inaugural session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), which was created following the end of Cold War as a forum for consultation to foster a new cooperative relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Fedyashin 2009). A few years later in 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace programme a major programme of practical security and defence cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries (Braun 2008: 125). In 1997, NATO-Russia relations took another big step forward with the signature of the Founding Act which expressed the common goal of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, providing a true basis for the development of a strong and durable partnership. It set up the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a forum for regular consultation on security issues of common concern aimed at helping build mutual confidence through dialogue. In this body, NATO and Russia started developing a programme of consultation and cooperation. From 1999 onwards, NATO-Russia relations started to improve significantly (Fedyashin 2009). When Lord Robertson became NATO Secretary General in October of that year, he committed himself to breaking the stalemate in NATO-Russia relations. Similarly, in 2000, upon his election as President of Russia, Vladimir Putin announced that “he would work to rebuild relations with NATO in a spirit of pragmatism and we have come a long way from opposition to dialogue, and from confrontation to cooperation” (Braun 2008: 124). In 2000, the NATO Information Bureau was opened in Moscow and in 2002 the Liaison Mission arrived. The same year in Rome heads of Russia and NATO member states signed a document, which declared a new quality of relations that reflected the improvement of ties in the aftermath of 9/11 (Braun 2008: 125). The Permanent Joint Council was replaced with a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the creation of NRC on 28 May 2002 was a key milestone in NATO history and a decisive turning-point in NATO-Russia relations. It built on the

gradual development of NATO-Russia relations (Braun 2008: 98). Since 1991, It was formalized and broadened with the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security in 1997. Practical cooperation in the Balkans , where allied and Russian soldiers had been serving alongside each other in NATO led peacekeeping operations since 1996, had also helped foster mutual trust and confidence between the Russian and allied militarizes, essentially predating the political rapprochement that was to follow (Fedyshin 2009). The Council does not discuss domestic affairs or political values of its members. This undoubtedly makes it more attractive to Russia, relative to other institutional mechanisms such as the OSCE through which it interacts with the West. In relative terms, if compared with PJC the activity of the NRC and the development of Russia-NATO relations since the moment they were established can be assessed fairly positively, although it never lived up to the optimism expressed by many analysts in the early stages. The Council withstood the controversies caused by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the second wave of NATO's Eastern enlargement in 2004 leading, among other things to the patrolling of the airspace of the Baltic States by other NATO countries air crews, which was (unofficially) interpreted in Russia as non-compliance with the Founding Act (Braun 2008: 130). It indeed served as a forum to deal with the collision between Russia and the West during the Orange revolution in Ukraine whereas the OSCE Summit in Sofia in December 2004 failed to produce any kind of a declaration, NRC came up with a joint statement.

Furthermore, NRC was successful in promoting practical co-operation in several areas. In February 2003 Russia and NATO signed an agreement on cooperation in sea search and rescue, which enabled Russia to receive assistance from the British military, who rescued a Russian mini-submarine in the Far East in August 2005. A major part of the practical work has been in the field of combating terrorism (Fedyashin 2009). In December 2004 in Brussels, the parties adopted a "Comprehensive Action Plan" of activities in this field. Russia agreed to participate in joint naval patrols set up by NATO's operation Active Endeavor Maritime Cooperation to protect against terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. A series of exercises on dealing with emergency situations were held near Moscow in the Kaliningrad area as well as in the Murmansk area. In April 2005, the NATO Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement was concluded at the

NRC ministerial, which regulates the legal status of the armed forces on each other's territory (Ponsard 2007). Russia and NATO had in-depth discussions on an issue as sensitive as Theatre Missile Defence.

There were three major driving factors behind Russia's turn towards more cooperation with NATO in the beginning of the current decade. The first one was Russian realignment with the West (sometimes also called "Russia's European Choice"), which President Vladimir Putin is believed to have been following in his first years in office, for as long as his administration considered the West to be the major potential source of Russia's economic growth and overall modernization (Braun 2008: 45). This kind of general understanding of Russia's future warranted cooperation rather than tension with the leading institutions of the West. Second, directly threatened and attacked by terrorists, Russian leadership tended to view the security interests of the country as being close to or even the same as those of the West. It saw clear benefits in being a partner of the West in the war against terrorism and for this reason acquiesced to the US military presence in Central Asia. Thirdly, Russia had no possibility in practice to stop the second wave of NATO enlargement (Braun 2008). Practical cooperation "in the field", which could lead to the erosion of negative stereotypes, remains insufficient, especially after Russia in 2003 decided to withdraw its troops from the Balkans (Sharyl 2002). The NATO-Russia Council failed to become and in most likelihood could not have become, a gathering of countries in their national capacity as it is only logical that NATO states adhere to the same position. It can be added that from the psychological point of view, Russia would be reluctant to discuss important security issues with countries with which it has difficult bilateral relations, especially from Central Europe. It is easier, in fact, for Moscow to interact bilaterally with Washington. At the same time, many NATO members are not willing to give Russia a real say on issues that matter to them. The NRC, therefore, even institutionally looks like a discussion club not a decision-making body. Finally, the more NATO's role as a European and global security provider finds itself in jeopardy, the less relevant it will look for Russia and the more stagnant and bureaucratic the whole relationship will be (Sharyl 2002).

In September 18, 2009, at the press conference in Brussels the NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen says that- “NATO officials realize that without Russia, NATO (and the United States) will not make any progress on any of its goals, including in Afghanistan or in connection with the common efforts against terrorism, piracy, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons” (Fedyashin 2009). The Alliance has an open door policy and indeed, promotes the membership aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine, whose eventual accession to NATO is possible. Russian reaction to such developments is difficult to predict at the moment as it will depend on Russia’s domestic evolution in the meanwhile, but acquiescence, as in the case with Baltic States is not likely (Braun 2008). On the contrary, certain military build-up in the Black Sea region, in general, and the strengthening Russian military presence in Crimea in particular, should not be ruled out (Ponsard 2007). Such a build-up is to be expected in any case. The significance of potential Russian actions in the region should therefore not be overemphasized.

Even US is taking the help of Russia not because of fearing to Russia but due to growing terrorist activities and developing Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD). To sum up, today’s NATO-Russia relations are controversial. On the one hand, partnership has been declared. On the other hand, confidence is absent and the respective policies are often not accepted. In the short term, a trend towards maintaining *ad hoc* selective collaboration is likely to prevail over the existing controversies, but in the longer run, in view of the widening value gap between Russia and the West and differing security perceptions producing meaningful results will be increasingly difficult.

Cooperation with countries in the Mediterranean region and Middle East: NATO is developing closer security partnerships with countries in the Mediterranean region and the broader Middle East. This marks a shift in Alliance priorities towards greater involvement in these strategically important regions of the world, whose security and stability is closely linked to Euro-Atlantic security (Carpenter 2001). There are several reasons, why it is important for NATO to promote dialogue and foster stability and security in North Africa and the broader Middle East. One key reason is that a number of today’s security challenges like terrorism, the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), failed states and transnational organized crime etc. are common to

both NATO member states and to countries in these regions (Schmidt 2001: 169). As a consequence, they require common responses. Moreover, in addressing these challenges, NATO is becoming more engaged in areas beyond Europe including a security assistance operation in Afghanistan, a maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean and a training mission in Iraq (Tarcisio 2003). Energy security is another concern since as much as 65 percent of Europe's imports of oil and natural gas passes through the Mediterranean. A secure and stable environment in the Mediterranean region is important not only to Western importing countries but the region's energy producers and to the countries through which oil and gas transit (Ghecia 2005).

NATO's Mediterranean dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council in order to contribute to regional security and stability, achieve better mutual understanding and dispel misconceptions about NATO's policies and objectives among dialogue countries (Taugen 1999). Over the years, the number of participating countries has increased: Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia joined in 1994, followed by Jordan in 1995 and Algeria in 2000. The dialogue reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It has formed an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment and has been an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. Measures to strengthen cooperation with Mediterranean dialogue countries were introduced at NATO summit meetings in Washington (1999) and Prague (2002) (Worner 2005). At the Istanbul summit in 2004 the dialogue was taken one step further with the aim of elevating it to a genuine partnership. The overriding objectives of the Mediterranean dialogue remain the same, but the future focus is on developing more practical cooperation. Specific objectives are to enhance political dialogue, to achieve interoperability (that is, to improve the ability of the militaries of dialogue countries to work with NATO forces) to contribute to the fight against terrorism and to cooperate in the area of defence reform (Rebecca 2007). At the June 2004 Summit meeting, the Alliance launched an Istanbul cooperation initiative and invited interested countries in the broader Middle East region to take part, beginning with the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Of these, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had already

accepted the invitation by mid-2005; the alliance hopes that the others will also do so. The objective is to foster mutually beneficial bilateral relations with the countries of the region as a means of enhancing regional security and stability with a particular focus on practical cooperation in the defense and security fields (Zyla 2005).

By the above discussion, it is clear that in the post-Cold War period NATO is working with not only with European countries but also out of European countries. Key priorities are the fight against terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Mediterranean dialogue is based on the principle of joint ownership, which means fully respecting the mutual interests of NATO and of the participating countries, taking into account their diversity and specific needs.

Improving relations with NGOs in crisis response operations: After the end of Cold War, NATO has been developing its relations with the various Non-Governmental Organizations in most of the crisis response operations. Indeed NGOs are important actors in the prevention and resolution of crises due to their effective participation (Borgomano 2007: 15). NGOs and NATO come in to contact in the theater of operations in emergency relief operations and in complex crisis, including armed conflicts. Experience in stabilization and reconstruction operations has shown the importance of the relationship between military forces and civilian actors including NGOs. In the NATO's Riga summit declaration of November 2006 emphasized on the practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant international organizations, Non-Governmental Organization and local actors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations wherever appropriate (NATO's Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November). NGOs have been invited to visit NATO HQ and to attend NATO conferences and seminars (Pursley 2008: 5-8). Improving the relationship between NGOs and military forces is therefore difficult, but necessary (Borgomano 2007: 38). Even the UN Security Council (UNSC) has invited NGOs to discuss the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. NGOs are an integral part of civil society that had few opportunities for contact with NATO before the alliance engaged in crisis management and disaster relief operations. In order to withstand competition more effectively and continue to be recognized as partners, NGOs are grouping themselves into large networks, professionalizing themselves and becoming increasingly transparent and accountable.

Numerous NGOs work in areas where they have to interact with the military: protection of populations, refugee camp management, mine clearance, DDR (Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration) and enforcement of international laws. They have also set up networks that can rapidly deploy personnel specialized in these areas. Consequently NGOs and NATO share common fields of action, making dialogue essential.

One of the most significant Non-Governmental Organizations with which NATO cooperates is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is an impartial neutral and independent organization exclusively concerned with humanitarian action to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and international violence and to provide them with necessary assistance. This NGO basically directs and coordinates international relief activities conducted in situations of conflict. Relations between the two organizations have focused on *ad hoc* cooperation, with occasional informal exchanges of views between staff and high level meetings when required (Borgomano 2007: 48). Cooperation has taken place in the context of a number of issues in different countries and regions, for example in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in Iraq. It has provided support for training courses on peacekeeping and civil emergency planning at the NATO School in Oberammergau, organized in the framework of the partnership for peace programme. Another important NGO is the Atlantic Treaty Association, who supports the activities of NATO and promotes the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty. Its objectives are to conduct research into the various purposes and activities of NATO and their extension to countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the furtherance of NATO's Mediterranean dialogue, to promote democracy and to develop the solidarity of the people of the North Atlantic area and of those whose countries participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme.

Due to emerging global problems, NATO needs the cooperation of both the inter-governmental organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations to work efficiently in the world affair. Especially in the situations like crisis management, disaster relief operations, protection of human rights and enforcement of international laws and democratic principles etc. are most important factors, where NATO and NGOs are

working in a very cooperative way to maintain better international peace, security and development in the world.

Conclusion

Due to disintegration of the Soviet Union, the role and functions of the NATO has undergone transformation and expansion. NATO has been spillover to multi issues and functions with the cooperation of its member states as well as non-member states. Emerging various global and regional problems are the important reasons behind the mutual dependence of NATO and the UN to enhance their respective capabilities in the post-Cold War era. NATO continues to enhance the security of its members in Europe and also trying to make stability in the out of European countries like in Afghanistan and Iraq with the cooperation of EU, OSCE and UN. NATO has transformed itself from a collective defense alliance-states drawn together to defend against an external threat to an organization that embraced the much broader and more demanding functions of a collective security organization. With the vision of strong international organization NATO has been building global partnership and cooperation with other inter-governmental as well as non-governmental organizations.

Thus, NATO has taken a series of initiatives to strengthen European security architecture by making dialogue, confidence building and cooperation with former adversaries (like Russia and Eastern European countries) as well as other European states and neighboring countries in the wider Mediterranean region. It is necessary for NATO to that need new forms of political and military cooperation which required preserving peace and stability in Europe and preventing the escalation of regional tensions after the end of the Cold War. In response to the new security challenges, NATO has transformed with its new role to in the wider field of security in the post Cold War era. Due to active role of the NATO in the peacekeeping and crisis management in Europe as well as outside Europe with the help of other international organizations, many things that it deserves a status as an important international organization to maintain international peace and security in the world. Whereas, many others become apprehensive of expanding role and functions beyond its border.

CHAPTER - IV

CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

NATO in the post-Cold War period has evolved considerably from the security alliance created in 1949. In the course of more than a half century of existence, both the Alliance and the wider world have developed in ways that NATO's founders could not have envisaged. With the integration of new member countries, a process of continuing adaptation is inevitable in order to accommodate the interests of the larger membership without adversely affecting the ability of the Alliance to take decisions in a timely fashion. Indeed, as the strategic environment continues to change, the pace of NATO's evolution will need to increase in order to meet new threats. NATO's on-going transformation is part of a process designed to enhance the security of Alliance member countries and the future stability and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. NATO encounters two varieties of challenges and problems. Firstly, it faces the challenges and problems emanating from the expansion of its membership. Secondly, it has to address the challenges and problems arising from new threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, climate change and energy security and cyber attacks.

This chapter identifies the challenges and problems relating to membership enlargement and the measures undertaken by NATO to address them. Then, it analyzes the new threats emanating from transnational terrorism, climate change and energy security, weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks and highlight some of the actions taken by NATO to address them.

Challenges from membership expansion

Some challenges have been emerging towards the NATO due to its expansion of member states, which is weakening to its security and stability. Challenges like: evolving security tasks, decision making problems, economic cost and strengthening democracy into the new member states etc, are emerging especially in the post-Cold War period for NATO.

Evolving Security Tasks

Since 1990, NATO members have assumed that instability in Central and Eastern Europe is inseparably linked to their own security (Brown 1997: 35). With the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO members now believed that security threats were less likely to come from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies than from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bebler 1999: 55). According to the strategic concept, such tensions could threaten European stability and peace and thus involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries having a direct effect on the security of the alliance.

In part, the incentive to redefine NATO's security mandate more broadly was being driven by such real world events as the disintegration of Yugoslavia and instabilities in various parts of the former Warsaw Pact. The old strategic distinction between in-area and out-of-area interests and conflicts was becoming increasingly blurred as developments beyond NATO's borders become the top security concerns for many of its members (Asmus 2002: 37). Accordingly, the Strategic Concept stipulates that peace in Europe now rests on NATO's ability to manage crises successfully (NATO: 1999). In general, peace operations require many more special forces including those qualified to perform civil-affairs operations, personnel who speak multiple languages and those trained in psychological operations than traditional combat operations (Burbach 1997: 10-19). For this reason, the numbers, types of forces, and their effective operational capacity on the ground matter decisively for peace operations. Recruiting, training, and equipping enough troops with the correct expertise and discipline for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks are not easy (Roberts 1996: 37), especially as military spending has dropped significantly in most states as a percentage of gross domestic product. Moreover, very few of the extent peacekeeping training programs worldwide incorporate instruction in the kinds of specific contact skills that peace operations typically require (Singer and Cott 1997: 168-169).

From the beginning, U.S. President George Bush disclaimed U.S interest in intervening despite a clear humanitarian need, arguing that the conflict was Europe's responsibility. And because the Europeans did not have the military capabilities to intervene decisively on their own, Washington saw itself as the main contributor of forces should it become involved. For their part, the Europeans were wary of being trapped by American unpredictability. They worried that if they went in with the United States, Washington would offer air power but no ground troops to do the dirty work (Goodby 1996: 238). The result was three years of collective buck-passing until NATO intervened in 1994 by threatening and then carrying out air strikes. Even this did not put an end to burden sharing conflicts. Congress's insistence that the Europeans assume full responsibility for the Bosnian operation after U.S troops eventually leave is inconsistent with Europeans determination that they will not again stand alone military in Bosnia (Daalder 1998: 05-09). NATO has come a long way since 1990 in redefining itself both as the core of an enlarged security community in Europe and as a versatile conflict-management tool. This is no small achievement for an organization that seemed to verge of redundancy just a few years ago in the Cold War period. NATO member states should provide enough of the right kinds of forces to carryout peace operations effectively or whether they will assume the costs and risks of intervening at decisive moments in situations that are likely to be dangerous. These difficulties, moreover, are likely to grow as NATO expands, because a larger group is likely to be less militarily cohesive and politically decisive than a smaller one.

Decision Making

It is important that NATO continues to enlarge, and as its geographical reach expands, it must become more flexible in its decision making. NATO enlargement may weaken its military power and complicate decision-making within the alliance (Reiter 2001: 42). NATO boasts that one of its greatest strengths is its consensus voting model, whereby no official votes are taken and all decisions can be interpreted as the alliance speaking with one voice. NATO's invocation by consensus, of Article V on September 12, 2001, was indeed an extremely powerful political signal. Coalitions of members within the alliance should be able to pursue missions under a NATO banner in which not all members

participate. It is anathema to assume that all members should have a de facto veto over the planning and management of a NATO operation in which they are not participating. Equally, as an intergovernmental alliance of sovereign nation-states, the differing national rules of each NATO member make coalitions within the alliance, essential in a security environment in which speed and efficiency are often essential to operational success. Further enlargement weakens NATO because the more members it has, the more difficult it will be to reach decisions (Gheciu 2005: 23). As NATO includes more states, it will become increasingly difficult to reach consensus, especially on the conduct of peacekeeping and out of area operations (Lepgold 1998: 91). At present, consensus decision making reigns throughout NATO bodies from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to the Military Committee and from the Defense Planning Committee to the working groups. NATO's undertaking to stop Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999 exposed the shortcomings and limitations of NATO's decision-making process.

Operation Allied Force employed a three-phase air campaign, with each phase representing an escalation of the previous. However, each phase had to be separately authorized by the NAC on a consensus basis. Several alliance members objected to giving Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Wesley Clark responsibility for choosing the targets of the air campaign; therefore, NAC took operational control of the campaign, utilizing the protracted consensus decision-making procedure in what became labeled "war by committee". With seven more members than in 1999 and two accessions were pending, NATO didn't hope to pursue such a strategy in future. It is also unlikely that all NATO members will see national value undertaking every single mission. To avoid a pitfall of the EU system specifically, that foreign policy tends to reflect the lowest common denominator of action NATO must embrace a "coalitions of the willing and capable" mentality while at the same time preserving the alliance as a whole (Gheciu 2005: 25).

NATO should adopt a new principle on decision making that only those countries that substantially contribute to a mission with troops, assets, or civilians will be involved in the planning and execution of the mission. As defense analyst Leo Michel argues, a

model that allows for contributing coalitions within the alliance ensures that the contributors have “a significant role in decision making, commensurate with their contributions”. Matching decision-making responsibilities with members’ level of contribution to a mission is a model substantially endorsed in a key 2007 report on NATO by former senior officers in the alliance, including General John Shalikashvili, a former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report argues: only those nations that contribute to a mission that is military forces in a military operation should have the right to a say in the process of the operation. This structure would highlight the need and the opportunity for commitment and commitment would be rewarded at the table. Nor would a coalition need to be static. Countries could choose to join the contributing coalition at a later stage, subject to the approval of existing contributors. The contributing coalition should be responsible for military planning and determine the level of SACEUR’s operational control (Brady 1985: 41).

The NAC should not be sidelined in this process, nor should the regular and thorough consultation procedures be abandoned. The contributing coalition should apprise the NAC of its mission in broad terms in advance, and at the stage non contributing members may place any formal objection on the record, if necessary. Since the NAC is not being asked for formal approval of the mission or for a compulsory contribution from non participating members, this should reduce the political pressure for non participating members to object to the mission (Lawrence 2004: 136). If no formal objection is received, the contributing coalition should be allowed access to NATO assets, including AWACS aircraft, NATO’s situation center, and other important resources. Use of NATO response force should also remain an option, where appropriate and authorization for its use could be requested during the contributors briefing to the NAC (Schmidt 2001: 225). Major NATO decisions such as enlargement and Article V of the NAC should continue to remain exclusively within the NAC’s orbit and subject to consensus. NATO’s founding treaty precludes enlargement decisions by anything other than unanimous approval. However the widespread application of consensus decision making has been formed in practice rather than law over the years, so adopting it to today’s strategic environment should not prove too difficult. An all-or-nothing approach to decision making makes little sense in a modern security environment. The NATO

brand should be more readily available to coalitions undertaking missions in which the alliance is not acting as a whole.

Economic Cost

During the debate before NATO's decision to enlarge, the argument about economic or budgetary costs of NATO enlargement played an important role. Referring to NATO's limited common budget and national parliament's general unwillingness to increase defence spending to finance enlargement, opponents of the move used, and still use, the argument regarding the mounting costs of extending NATO's infrastructures to the new member states, and in this field US and Germany are the important financers in this organization (Seidelmann 1997: 135). Buildup of the necessary infrastructure could be done stepwise and the introduction of arms and weapons systems meeting NATO standards could be combined with only the absolutely necessary modernization and structural reforms. NATO members should agree to new burden sharing rules, including commitments to increase defence spending and to reduce national operation. It is understandable that the political and the military establishments in Eastern Europe as well as western armament industries are interested in major modernization and extension program. But as long as who pays for it has not been solved and as long as the objective threat situation is the actual costs of enlargement for NATO, In total its major western member states are and will be marginal. Thus the argument of high or extraordinary budgetary costs does not seem valid.

Democracy for New Members

Supporters of enlargement have argued that it would help to stabilize Eastern Europe in at least three ways. First, a strong western commitment to former communist states in this region would deter any future Russian aggression. Second, enlargement would reduce the likelihood of conflict among NATO members and pursue the peaceful resolution of disputes. Third, it would further democratization in the region, which in turn would help to stabilize the area because democracies are unlikely to fight each other (Kaiser 1996: 135-40). Though it has positive response, we can't escape to its negative impact over its member states. Critics of NATO enlargement are worrying about its risks and costs. The

principal concern is that expansion may jeopardize relations between Russia and the west, pushing Russia away from cooperation on issues such as strategic arms control and peacekeeping in the Balkans, and perhaps turning it back toward belligerence and even ultra nationalism (Reiter 2001: 45.). Its enlargement is weakening NATO's military power. Here, central argument is that the NATO members have been facing lot of problems to strengthen their democratic norms and principles in Europe. It did not contribute much to democratization in the three east European states (Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic) admitted in 1999, and the promise of NATO membership is unlikely to speed democracy within any of the other new members those were joined in 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia)) and in 2009 (Albania and Croatia).

New Threats

Apart from the challenges of NATO through expansion of its member states, some other unavoidable new threats are emerging, like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, climate change and energy security and cyber attacks. NATO has very significant role to eliminate these types of serious threats through its global partnership and cooperation especially in the post-Cold War period.

Terrorism

Terrorism is a universal scourge that knows no border, nationality or religion. It is therefore a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO contributes to the international fight against terrorism in multiple areas and through various means. NATO's contributions to the campaign against terrorism have included sending Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft to the United States, deploying naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and conducting preventive action against terrorist groups acting within or from the Balkans (Gordon 2002: 37). Other measures taken by the Alliance include adoption of a new Military concept for defence against Terrorism and a Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, strengthening the nuclear, biological and chemical defence and civil protection and better cooperation with other international organizations, etc.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the Alliance's principal political decision-making body, decides on NATO's overall role in the fight against terrorism (Faber 2005). The response to terrorism is a standing agenda item at the Council's weekly deliberations. Specific aspects of NATO's involvement are developed through specialized bodies and committees like: Conference of National Armaments Directors, Counter Terrorism Technology Coordinator, Counter-Terrorism Technology Unit and NATO Counter Terrorism Technology Development Programme (Kuzmanov 2006).

Immediately after the terrorist attacks in the evening of 11 September 2001, the North Atlantic Council declared that the United States can rely on its 18 allies in North Atlantic allies in North-America and Europe for assistance and support. Less than 24 hours after the attacks and for the first time in NATO's history the Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's collective defense clause. The terrorist attacks were surprising and shocking, their enormity and barbarism were sobering for all and the success of the attacks against the strongest NATO member revealed the vulnerability of each state and its institutions. The perception of vulnerability, the solidarity with the United States and the anger and indignation at the brutal terrorist acts unified NATO allies and their partners in their resolve to support the United States in the response to the challenge of terrorism. Article 5 of the NAC is referring to article 51 of the charter of the United Nations, foresees the right of individual or collective self-defense in case of an armed attack against one or more allies (Rapporteur 2004). In response to the U.S. request and in fulfillment of the NAC decision of 4 October, the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) deployed seven Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft (AWACS) to the United States from their main base in Geilenkirchen, Germany. Within the operation, in which 830 crew members from 13 NATO nations took part, the NATO AWACS aircraft flew nearly 4300 hours in over 360 operational sorties. In order to provide support to the new government and to create conditions for the post-Taliban recovery of the country, on 20 December 2001 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1386 to launch the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with a peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Despite ISAF was established by UN, it was not an UN force. ISAF was manned by the coalition of the willing, supported by NATO and financed by the troop-contributing nations. On 11

August 2003, NATO took over command of the ISAF with a schedule to continue the operation until 2007 (Tanner 2006). In fact, this was the first Alliance mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area (Lukov 2005).

The NAEW&CF provided airborne surveillance over more than 30 special events, including the funeral of Pope John Paul II in Rome, the Spanish Royal Wedding in Madrid, the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, Greece, and the European football championship in Portugal, as well as the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Turin, Italy. On one hand, sending naval vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean could be considered as a warning and expression of resolve against states sponsoring terrorism. However, at that time it was unclear what kinds of operations these ships would be able to perform against diverse international terrorist organizations. The types of ships comprising Task Force Endeavour (TFE) differ from those designated to destroy land based targets. In March 2003, NATO expanded Operation Active Endeavor by providing escorts to non-military ships from Alliance member states through the Straits of Gibraltar (Faber 2005). In April 2003, the operation scope was further expanded to include systematically boarding suspect ships. These boarding take places with the compliance of the ships' masters and flag states in accordance with international law. In March 2004, the Operation Area of Responsibility (AOR) was expanded to cover the entire Mediterranean (Bruno 2008).

The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism is the main platform for joint efforts by Allies and Partners in the fight against terrorism. It provides a framework for cooperation and expertise sharing in this area through political consultation and practical measures, such as: Intensified consultations and information sharing, Enhanced preparedness for combating terrorism, Impeding support for terrorist groups, Enhanced capabilities to contribute to consequence management and Assistance to partners' efforts against terrorism (Gordon 2002: 36). At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO leaders approved some measures to fight against terrorism like: a Partnership Action Plan on terrorism, cooperation with other international organisations, improved intelligence sharing, enhancement of cyber-defense of NATO and national critical infrastructure assets, including information and communications systems (Rapporteur 2004). In June 2004, additional measures to increase the Alliance contribution to the campaign against

terrorism were approved at the NATO Summit in Istanbul. These measures included: enhanced intelligence sharing, mechanisms for more rapid response to member countries' requests for support in case of terrorist attacks threat, and a research and technology programme of work for better forces' and populations' protection against terrorist acts (Kuzmanov 2006). The fight against terrorism is high on NATO's agenda, in endorsing the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) at the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO's Heads of State and Government recognized that "terrorism, together with the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years" (Steer 2009).

At that Summit, NATO accepted the Russian and Ukrainian offers to support Operation Active Endeavour. Russian ships are expected to join TFE in the middle of 2006. By the end of February 2006, TFE had monitored more than 75,000 vessels and conducted 100 compliant boardings. A total of 488 vessels had been escorted through the Straits of Gibraltar. Operation Active Endeavour provided also assistance to the Greek government to ensure the safe conduct of the 2004 Olympic Games (Schwartz 2009). In practice, the involvement of NATO as a military alliance in the campaign against terrorism has included sending (AWACS) aircraft to the United States, naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate NATO's solidarity and resolve, conducting preventive action by NATO's peacekeeping forces against terrorist groups acting within or from the Balkans, and taking the lead of ISAF in Afghanistan (Lukov 2005: 49). The decision to create the NATO Response Force (NRF) was approved at the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002. It has to achieve full operational capability no later than October 2006. NRF could be used not only for collective defence but also for implementation and enforcement of decisions of the United Nations Security Council directed towards neutralizing threats posed by terrorism. NATO needs a much greater transformation of its structures and procedures if it is to serve the common security interests of the allies and others. Traditional policies should be seriously reconsidered and perhaps drastically reevaluated. The new types of threats to allied security and proposes alternative strategies to reform NATO so as to enhance international security (Bruno 2008).

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government endorsed the implementation of five chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) initiatives to enhance the Alliance's defence capabilities against weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The North Atlantic Council in June 2003, decided to further enhance and take forward these initiatives by forming a Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion. The Battalion is just one part of a far-reaching transformation of NATO to ensure it remains able to deal with new security threats amongst them the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Joyce 2005: 45). The mission of the CBRN Defence Battalion is to provide rapidly a credible Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) capability, primarily to deployed NATO joint forces and commands, in order that Alliance freedom of action is maintained in an NBC threat environment. The CBRN Defence Battalion will be capable of conducting the following tasks: NBC reconnaissance operations; Provide identification of NBC substances; Biological detection and monitoring operations; Provide NBC assessments and advice to NATO commanders and NBC decontamination operations (Schmidt 2001: 105).

The Multinational CBRN Defense Battalion will be under the operational control of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The NATO Multinational CBRN Defense Battalion is a high readiness, multi-national, multi-functional Battalion, able to deploy quickly to participate in the full spectrum of NATO missions wherever NATO requires. The Battalion reached its Initial Operational Capability on 1 December 2003. Full Operational Capacity was achieved on 1 July 2004, and responsibility was transferred into the operational command of Allied Command Operations. From then on, the Battalion was included in the six-month rotation system of the NRF (Joyce 2005).

NATO's Allied Command Transformation provides evaluation standards, supports training and evaluation standards, determines future NBC defense requirements, and develops enhancing capabilities (Gordon 1998). The Battalion level organization is composed of personnel from a number of NATO countries, on standby for a period of six months (termed a 'rotation'). Like the NATO Response Force (NRF), dedicated personnel are based in their countries, coming together for training and deployment. A

voluntary lead country is identified for each rotation. The lead country hosts the Battalion headquarters, responsible for command and control arrangements, maintaining standard operational procedures, sustaining readiness levels and for planning and conducting collective, multi-national training. Contributing countries supply functional capabilities (Tanner 2006: 55). It includes providing requisite troops, equipment and logistical support in accordance with mission requirements. The first rotation, led by the Czech Republic, consisted of personnel from eleven NATO countries.

The realization of the Multinational CBRN Battalion fulfils two of the capability commitments made at the 2002 Prague Summit: a Prototype Deployable Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Analytical Laboratory and a Prototype NBC Event Response team. These capabilities greatly enhance the Alliance's defense against weapons of mass destruction. The Battalion's mission is to provide a rapidly-deployable, credible CBRN defense capability, primarily to deployed NATO joint forces and commands, in order that Alliance freedom of action is maintained and NATO forces can operate effectively in a CBRN threat environment (Howard 2007). The CBRN Battalion may be used to provide military assistance to civil authorities when authorized by the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance's senior decision-making body. For example, they played a key planning role during the 2004 Summer Olympics in Greece, and the 2004 Istanbul Summit, where they were readily available to support any CBRN-related contingency operations.

After the Washington Summit in April 1999, it was believed that the threat of WMDs was extremely serious not only from sovereign states such as North Korea and Iran but also from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups (Schmidt 2001: 105). This strong belief led to the launch of NATO's WMD centre in 2000, which deals with the threats arising from the potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear assets. The Centre includes a number of personnel from the International Secretariat as well as National Experts. The Centre's primary role is to improve coordination of WMD related activities, as well as to strengthen consultations on non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament issues. The other role the centre provides is three-fold, to

improve intelligence and information sharing on proliferation issues, to assist allies their means of delivery (Rapporteru 2004).

The military concept for Defence against Terrorism underlines the alliance's readiness to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against Allied populations, territory, infrastructure and forces by acting against terrorist and those who harbor them; to provide assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks; to support operations by the European Union or other international organisations or coalitions involving Allies; and to deploy forces as and where required to carry out such missions. At the same summit NATO governments endorsed the implementation of five nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defence initiatives designed to improve the Alliance's defence capabilities against WMD. Starting that the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were keen on laying their hands on nuclear weapons, Mr. Obama (U.S President) vowed to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists (Gordon 2002: 37). So to end the terrorist activities and nuclear threat from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, he announced 30, 000 more troops into the Afghanistan (New York 2009). In 4 December 2009, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark told reporters at NATO headquarters that 7,000 allied troops would be sent next year into the Afghanistan (Brussels 2009).

After the Prague summit in 2002, NATO launched three broad initiatives in an effort to modernize and to ensure that the Alliance is able to effectively meet the new challenges of the 21st Century. The first was aimed at addressing the increasing threat of missile proliferation and the threat on Alliance territory. The second initiative is in the area of defense against CBRN weapons. Within this field states also agreed on implementing immediately five initiatives that can be categorized in the area of response in countering the threat of WMD attacks. One was to constitute an event response force to counter different types of threats. The second was to set up deployable laboratories to assess what type of agents one could be dealing with and the third was to look at the creation of a medical surveillance system. The final two initiatives in this response category was to create a stockpile of pharmaceutical and other medical counter-measures to reacts to any attack and finally to improve training within this area as a whole. The Prague summit also called for an implementation of the civil emergency plan of action

for the threat of WMD terrorism. In regards to terrorism arising from WMD, NATO's primary instrument is to support and enforcement of the Non- Proliferation Treaty. As the NATO alliance works to secure its defense and as an agent of order, it may continue to be called on to conduct "out of area" operations. Future "out of area" operations by NATO forces may need to be conducted in WMD threat environment. For such situation, NATO will need to have effective capabilities to deter WMD armed adversaries were feasible and to defend itself. It is in the hands of the alliance to make a significant contribution towards safeguarding the future of the NPT and protecting the treaty against a creeping erosion process.

Climate Change and Energy Security

Climate change is considered as a global problem, which need global effort and cooperation in the contemporary world order. NATO has a very significant role to tackle this problem through the cooperation of its member states and with the help from other international organizations especially after the post-Cold War era. At the same time its energy security is also one of the important concerns to successfully conducting its military security forces in the present contest. Direct links exist between the security of NATO member states and the interruption of their energy supply.

The link between the environment and our security is rapidly becoming a major political issue for governments across the globe (Cornell: 2008). Environmental degradation as a result of depletion of natural resources, trans-boundary issues arising from shared water sources, pollution, etc. can lead ultimately to regional tensions and violence. Through the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, NATO nations are helping Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries deal with the issue of environmental security through scientific cooperation that is delivering concrete results. The SPS Programme fosters collaboration between NATO nations and Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to help address their security issues and provide solutions. At the same time such cooperation enhances trust and confidence and improves capacity building, with the overarching aim of mitigating conflict and contributing to sustainable peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region (Egenhofer 2001).

In Geneva the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has provided the information that- 2009 will be one of the 10 warmest individual years recorded. The provisional figure for warming during the year is 0.44c above the long-term average of 14 c (Vidal 2009). In January 29, 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer addressed a Seminar on Security Prospects in the High North, underscoring that the Arctic ice cap melting causes changes that will affect the whole international community, and suggested that NATO could contribute to addressing this problem through its participation in relief operations and utilizing the opportunities inherent to the NATO-Russia Council (Hanusova 2009). Environmental security has been identified as a key priority for NATO's Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries and in 2008, NATO nations concurred that the Science Security Forum (SSF) has addressed this issue in-depth by bringing together internationally-recognized experts from NATO member, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Mohaghan 2008). At the Strasbourg NATO summit in April, 2009, U.S President Obama, said that "To truly transform our economy, protect our security, and save our planet from the ravages of climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable energy the National Priority" (NATO 2009).

As well as working with a broad network of experts within NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, the SPS programme extends this cooperation through ongoing collaboration with other international bodies such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Environmental Security Initiative (ESI) (Monaghn 2006). The Environment and Security (ENVSEC) Initiative was established in 2003 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). NATO became an associate member in 2004, through its Public Diplomacy Division. Peacefully resolving the overriding political, economic and social concerns of our time requires a multifaceted approach, including mechanisms to address the links between the natural environment and human security. UNDP, UNEP, OSCE, NATO, UNECE and REC have joined forces in the (ENVSEC) Initiative to offer countries their combined pool of expertise and resources towards that aim (Cornell 2008).

In Jan 30, 2009, NATO's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer addressed three principal topics in his speech: navigation, resources and territorial claims. NATO could play a constructive role in each of these areas, working with the eight-nation Arctic Council to develop and enact common organizational frameworks and coordinated mechanisms to respond to the emerging challenges (Hanusova 2009). He has insisted that the alliance must look to a new "strategic horizon" where dwindling water and food supplies, global warming, and mass migration cause international tensions. He was adding that NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) has the equipment, resources and experience to coordinate relief efforts and support search-and-rescue operations. The potential to discover and extract energy and mineral resources has oil and mining companies chomping at the bit, and governments looking to ensure that their respective nations get a share of the pie. Even if temperatures do increase, the Arctic will remain an inhospitable and relatively isolated region, however, he asserted that companies, and governments, would need to invest large sums to discover and bring them to market (Egenhofter and Cornillie: 2001).

NATO's involvement in energy security in the past was limited to ensuring security of energy supplies for the purpose of military operability. In recent years, daunting developments have shaken energy markets and indeed international affairs, causing energy security to become an issue of greater importance to the members of the alliance (NEA 2008). NATO has increasingly recognized the need to debate about where it could add value has focused mainly on a very particular aspect of energy security, namely the assurance of fossil fuel supplies. At the Riga summit in 2006 the heads of state and government made the first move towards defining a coherent approach and a consistent policy on energy security (legendre 2008). In the Riga declaration, the allies affirmed that they "support a coordinated, international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure security. With this in mind, directed the council in permanent session to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security, in order to define those areas where NATO may add value to safeguard the security interests of the allies and , upon request, assist national and international efforts (NATO, Riga summit declaration; 2006). Consequently, numerous discussions, workshops and forums have been initiated to find out what NATO's contribution in

energy security could look like in practice. a brief review of the results of these different initiatives was presented at the Bucharest summit in 2008, where the allies agreed on taking a more active role and outlined several fields for possible action. The proposed actions included: information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure (NATO, Bucharest summit declaration: 2008). The allies further declared that NATO's contribution entrenched within the initiatives of the international community.

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer admitted in a 2008 speech to the 'Security and Defense Agenda' that the renaissance of civilian nuclear energy poses its very own proliferation problems the debate about NATO's role in energy security has so far remained limited to CEIP and has successfully avoided growing civilian nuclear risk (Scheffer 2008). NATO already has the capacity to add value in this area. The majority of NATO members are experienced nuclear countries with long traditions in designing, operating, securing and decommissioning nuclear power plants. They possess significant knowledge and practice in dealing with spent nuclear fuel, one of the greatest challenges posed by accelerated worldwide plant construction. France is particularly experienced in the field of nuclear fuel reprocessing, providing its services to other countries on a commercial basis (Nuclear Energy Agency 2008: 24). NATO has already initiated several workshops to examine sensitive nuclear technologies and solutions. In 1996, a workshop was held on "Advanced Nuclear Systems Consuming Excess Plutonium" with the objective to explore new possibilities for plutonium disposal (NATO 1996). In 1997, NATO organized an "Advanced Research Workshop in Nuclear Materials Safety Management", to examine nuclear materials handling, safety, disposition and storage (NATO 1997). The high attendance to these events demonstrates that NATO is widely accepted as a vehicle for dialogue in this area. Indeed of several multilateral fuel supply assurance proposals, NATO could assist in ensuring the security of these nuclear fuel centres as well as the security of nuclear fuel transportation. In light of the risks associated with the deepening energy crisis, energy security has become an issue of global responsibility and concern reinforcing the value of a world energy organization (EIBaradei 2008: 01). Energy security is a vivid concept which is much wider than

security of supply and demand of fossil fuels. It is also a concept that, when not properly addressed, can pose a significant threat to international peace and stability. Thus, it is essential to treat energy security as a common concern and welcome any debate seeking measures to improve it. These are only some of the many ways in which NATO could help improve nuclear energy security, and there is still room to deepen the discussion. The Alliance must acknowledge the security challenges of the emerging nuclear renaissance, and recognize its potential to add significant value.

So the member states of the NATO have to cooperate with one another to address these environmental problems to get strong solution. Treaty and diplomatic efforts are clearly the first means for dealing with natural resources problems or environmental security arising from transnational pollutants. These treaties can control pollution through taxes/subsidies, quotas, emission trading or technological transfers. Even these diplomatic solutions must have an effective enforcement mechanism to convince nations to fulfill treaty pledges. When an economic and diplomatic measure fails, strong measures may have to be applied if the environmental consequences of doing are sufficiently dire.

Cyber attacks

The protection of NATO's key information systems in general, and cyber defence in particular, are integral parts of the functions of the Alliance. There have been strong indications of a growing threat to such systems, including through the Internet. NATO has a valuable role to play in complementing members' capabilities in cyber defenses and electronic warfare. The Bucharest summit paved the way for the establishment of the Tallinn-based NATO cooperative cyber defense Centre of Excellence (COE), which concentrates on protecting vital systems and countering cyber attacks similar to the attacks on Estonia in 2007 (North Atlantic Council 2008: 47). Protecting NATO's infrastructure from cyber attacks was initially placed on the agenda at the Prague summit in 2002, and NATO has since concluded that the alliance has a vital role to play in adding capacity and increasing members, cyber defense interoperability (North Atlantic Council 2008).

Cyber attacks on Estonia in the spring of 2007 heightened general awareness of the issue. NATO has therefore developed new measures to enhance the protection of its communication and information systems against attempts at disruption through attacks or illegal access. In January 2008, it approved a policy on cyber defence which aims to ensure that the Alliance can efficiently and effectively deal with cyber aggression. It provides direction to NATO's civil and military bodies in order to ensure a common and coordinated approach and contains recommendations for individual countries on the protection of their national systems. In 2008 NATO also established the Cyber defense Management Authority, which has prior authority to deal with rapidly unfolding cyber defense crises. In addition, NATO is exploring the potential for incremental, practical cooperation on cyber defense with Partner countries. Guidelines for working with partner countries are currently being developed.

At the Strasbourg NATO summit in April 2009, all the allies members declared that- *We remain committed to strengthening communication and information systems that are of critical importance to the Alliance against cyber attacks, as state and non-state actors may try to exploit the Alliance's and Allies' growing reliance on these systems. To prevent and respond to such attacks, in line with our agreed Policy on Cyber Defense, we have established a NATO Cyber Defense Management Authority, improved the existing Computer Incident Response Capability (NATO 2009).* The recently established Centre of Excellence on Cyber defense in Estonia will serve as a valuable conduit and focal point for NATO's efforts in this field. U.S secretary of Defense, Robert Gates announced in November 2008 that the US fully supports the COE initiative, which gained full accreditation in early November 2008. America and European countries should demonstrate their support by contributing a small number of specialists and becoming sponsoring nations of this valuable intergovernmental initiative.

Cyber defense is being made an integral part of NATO exercises. It shall be further strengthened to the linkages between NATO and Partner countries on protection against cyber attacks. In this vein, we have developed a framework for cooperation on cyber defense between NATO and Partner countries, and acknowledge the need to cooperate with international organizations, as appropriate.

Conclusion

NATO has been facing both internal and external challenges since the end of the Cold War. Problems like burden sharing activities, difficult to provide security to its larger alliance, insufficient infrastructure, and consensus decision making process and promoting democracy in the new member countries are unavoidable internal challenges of NATO, which may weaken to its structure and functions. At the same time some new global threats are appearing, like international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, climate change, energy security and cyber attacks, which have been facing by NATO member states as well as non-member states. Due to all these emerging challenges and problems both within and out side of NATO, Alliance must revitalize itself through restructure and reform of its policies and structure. NATO remains essential to transatlantic security and a vital element of America's alliance architecture, but it requires a strong US as well as European leadership to revitalize the flagging Alliance. To face all these evolving set of challenges and new threats NATO has to build greater cooperation with its member states as well as non-member states. Global challenges like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and climate change etc, can be eliminated through the multilateral strategic partnership of NATO with other international organizations.

To ensure effective and efficient implementation of Partnership's existing programmes and new initiatives, Allies should review the size and distribution of NATO's budgetary and human resources devoted to the planning and execution of co-operation programmes and activities in NATO HQ and the military headquarters in the light of partnership objectives. There should be geographical and substantive priorities and other outreach programmes pursued by the Alliance. In this regard, reprioritization and possible reallocation of existing resources are become necessary. Thus, NATO should explore possibilities for PfP co-operation in the field of border security, particularly in connection with the fight against "Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Climate Change". There is a need for a concept of collective effort and multilateral approaches at a level above that at which NATO, the OSCE or the EU now operates. While NATO enlargement is a positive step for both the newly emerging democracies and the Atlantic alliance itself, it is also necessary to reform to its structure

and policies. But the real and necessary transformation of the European security architecture requires a broader framework to include the OSCE, UN, EU/WEU and the many other bilateral and multilateral institutions on the continent. Until all the states in Europe are in some manner a part of the structure and stability has been achieved, the US and Europeans will not truly have constructed a European security framework for the next millennium. Therefore to address all these challenges, NATO needs to extend its structure and functions for the better security and stability in Europe.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

All international organizations try to accommodate changes with their external environment. Change is a complex process in which adjustment and alteration are made according to environmental demands. This study uses Ernst B Hass's three models of organizational change to understand adaptation and change of the NATO in the post-Cold War era. His three models are: incremental growth model, turbulent non-growth model and managed interdependence model to understand and explain the change by adaptation and learning in international organizations. NATO was originated with incremental growth model after the end of World War II, later it turned to turbulent non-growth model during the Cold War period. But after the end of Cold War, it has been moved to manage interdependence model.

NATO is a political and defensive Alliance. It is an organization which serves the Alliance in which member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence. At the formation time of NATO, the incremental growth model of Hass is the best suitable to explore the successive increment of the organization.

Haas gives descriptive codes for incremental growth like liberal, dependency or ecotology ideology. He points the analytic code in this model is not more consensual knowledge, specific-static political goals, eclectic decision-making style and tactical issue linkage etc. In this case, the NATO's initial stage was related with the descriptive codes of the incremental growth model. From 1945 to 1949, Western European countries and their North American allies viewed with concern the expansionist policies and methods of the USSR. Western governments became increasingly alarmed as it became clear that the Soviet leadership intended to maintain its own military forces at full strength. And in view of the declared ideological aims of the Soviet Communist Party, it was evident that appeals for respect for the United Nations Charter, and for respect for the international settlements reached at the end of World War II, would not guarantee the national sovereignty or independence of democratic states faced with the threat of outside aggression or internal subversion. The imposition of undemocratic forms of government,

the repression of effective opposition, and of basic human and civil rights and freedoms in many Central and Eastern European countries as well as elsewhere in the world, added to these fears. Between 1947 and 1949, there were direct threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece, Turkey and other Western European countries, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, and the illegal blockade of Berlin which began in April of the same year. The signature of the Brussels Treaty of March 1948 marked the determination of five Western European countries (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) to develop a common defence system and to strengthen the ties between them in a manner which would enable them to resist ideological, political and military threats to their security. Negotiations with the United States and Canada then followed on the creation of a single North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited by the Brussels Treaty powers to become participants in this process. These negotiations culminated in the signature of the 'North Atlantic Treaty' in April 1949 at Washington which resulted in a common security system based on a partnership among these 12 countries. The Treaty upholds their individual rights as well as their international obligations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It commits each member country to sharing the risks and responsibilities as well as the benefits of collective security and requires of each of them the undertaking not to enter into any other international commitment which might conflict with the Treaty.

NATO constitutes a system of collective defence whereby its member states agree to mutual defence in response to an attack by external party. Created within the framework of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective defence, the Alliance is an association of free states united in their determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries. It is an international organization served to provide a high level of US and European military resources for the collective deterrence and defence while making it hard for the US to defect in case of a Soviet attack and avoiding rivalries among the Alliance members from resurfacing and escalating. NATO's purpose would be limited to continuing to provide political and military entrée for the US to Europe. It facilitates consultation and cooperation between members on political as well as other

areas where policies can co-ordinate in order to fulfill the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Turbulent non-Growth Model is based on non-growth of the international organization and the failure to acquire new tasks, recruit needed personnel and also involving low morale. Haas says that there should be presence of all ideologies and equal representation in the turbulent non-growth model. Here analytical code is not more consensual knowledge among coalitions, here goal is static. In this context Cold War NATO is the good example of turbulent non-growth, where its role and functions were remained static. Its main function was preventing an attack against the territory of its member countries. Given the specific conditions of the East-West conflict with the accomplish objective of deterrence alone. At that time the North Atlantic Alliance had two main functions. First function was to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure, and to defend the territory of the member countries if aggression should occur. The second function was in a climate of security and confidence, is to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable East-West relationship in which the underlying political issues which divide them can be resolved. During the Cold War, NATO did not carried out actual military engagement. Its attempts to improve the East-West relations did not achieve much break through.

Turbulent non-growth model may also prevail during the growing tasks, agreements and new organs within the organization. On the basis of this model the member countries were used the civil and military structures, which they have created within NATO frame work to coordinate their policies in accordance with the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. It involves continuous political consultation and cooperation in economic and other non-military fields as well as the formulation of joint plans for the common defence, the establishment of the infrastructure needed to enable military forces to operate, and arrangement for joint training programmes and exercises. Underpinning these activities is a complex civilian and military structure involving administrative, budgetary and planning staffs, as well as agencies which have been established by the member countries if the alliance to coordinate work in specialist fields such as the

communications needed to facilitate political consultation and command and control of military forces, and the logistics support needed to sustain military forces. Within the Cold War only four countries (Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain) were added into the NATO and its total member states grow to 16 including its twelve founding members. At that time NATO was not emphasized to its enlargement of membership, which done in post-Cold War period. It was an Alliance of collective defence till the end of the Cold War and it would archive this through deterrence.

Managed interdependence model defines about the dissatisfaction with turbulent non-growth model, where a new dominant coalition is formed. NATO adopts managed interdependence model in the post-Cold War period, which played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security. In the managed interdependence model Haas suggests about all types of administration for descriptive code. At the same time the analytical codes are more consensual knowledge, interconnected-expanding political goals and pragmatic or analytic decision-making style etc. So in this context, NATO has been adapted multi issues and functions in the post-Cold War period. At the Summit Meeting in London in July 1990, in the most far-reaching Declaration issued since NATO was founded, the Heads of State and Government announced major steps to transform the Alliance in a manner commensurate with the new security environment and to bring confrontation between East and West to an end. They extended offers to the governments of the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO and to work towards a new relationship based on cooperation.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has changed its role from deterrence to crisis management and collective security. Its role and functions have undergone transformational change. Its functions have extended through political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with non-member states, continuing openness to the accession of new members, collaboration with other international organizations, commitment and exemplified in the Balkans and peace support operations etc, all are reflecting its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance has been at the heart of efforts

to establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and has committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider stability. It has shown the depth of that commitment in its efforts to put an end to the immense human suffering created by conflict in the Balkans (NATO 1999). Through its active pursuit of partnership, cooperation and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive force in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO's cooperation with its Partners. It offers an expanded political dimension for both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, contribute to crisis management and develop practical cooperation activities.

Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a major initiative introduced by NATO at the January 1994 Brussels Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The aim of the Partnership is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe. The PfP programme focuses on defence-related cooperation but goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership between each Partner country and NATO. The programme is helping to increase stability, to diminish threats to peace and to build strengthened security relationships based on the practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles which underpin the Alliance. All members of PfP are also members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) which provides the overall framework for cooperation between NATO and its Partner countries

In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO has been seeking cooperation with other organizations to prevent conflict and crisis, which contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO's Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security

Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Presently, with more than 50,000 troops under NATO command, the Alliance is keeping the peace in Kosovo, assisting defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, patrolling the Mediterranean Sea in a naval anti-terrorist mission, engaged in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and airlifting African Union troops to the Sudanese crisis region of Darfur. In addition, NATO provided humanitarian relief to Pakistan after the October 2005 earthquake. At the same time NATO has been training Iraqi security forces, both inside and outside of the country. In 4 December 2009, NATO Secretary General Anders F Rasmussen of Denmark announced to provide 7,000 allied troops which would be sent next year into the Afghanistan (Brussels 2009).

Managed interdependence model also says about the re-examination of purposes of organization. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been steadily moving in a direction consistent with the purposes of an Alliance of collective security. As early as July 1990, the NATO allies declared that “in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors (NATO 1990). Thus the allies effectively tied their security to that of their East while adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe. The following year, NATO noted that the risks of its members faced were “less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe (NATO 1999). This implied, as the new strategic concept underscored that NATO ought to place a premium on crisis prevention and management rather than on deterrence. During the Cold War years, NATO was a military alliance with a political foundation. It united a community of countries that was committed to upholding the principles of democracy and individual liberty. It sought to deter and if necessary, defend against a possible attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. With the collapse of the military and political threat to Alliance partners, the political principles that united NATO members now remain the element that holds the Alliance together. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental

security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles and other advanced weaponry.

Managed interdependence model is also related with learning that leads to organizational change. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. In July 1997 at the Madrid summit, three former Communist countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland) were invited to join NATO. In this year the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was established, which serves as an umbrella organization for both former (North Atlantic Co-operation Council) NACC and (Partnership for Peace) PfP activities. NATO invited the first Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to join the alliance and in 1999, establish the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for the remaining CEECs interested in becoming full members. The most recent expansion came with the accession of seven Northern European and Eastern European countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. These nations were first invited to start talks of membership during 2002 Prague summit and joined NATO on March 29, 2004. In April 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest of Romania, a principal issue was consideration of the candidates for membership of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. The allies agreed to extend invitations to Albania and Croatia. Although, the alliance determined that Macedonia met the qualifications for NATO membership, Greece blocked the invitation due to an enduring dispute over Macedonia's name. Both countries were joined into NATO in April, 2009. It expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion and enhance overall European security and stability.

Due to the clashes in ideologies and principles in the turbulence non-growth model, new ideas can emerge, which are later turned to managed interdependence. In this field, Cold War NATO grew with the admission of Greece, Turkey, West Germany and Spain, till North Atlantic Alliance didn't emphasized to its enlargement activities. But in the post Cold War period, it has changed to its attitude towards enlargement, and has been giving importance on debate about its continuous expansion to Eastward. In 1999, Poland Hungary and the Czech Republic were becoming new members of the NATO. Another expansion came with the accession of seven Northern European and Eastern European countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. These nations were first invited to start talks of membership during the 2002 Prague summit and joined NATO on March 29, 2004 at the 2004 Istanbul Summit. Most recently, Albania and Croatia joined on April 1, 2009 in the 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl Summit.

New emerging things in the Managed interdependence model is also emphasized to accept emerging new global challenges to NATO in the Post-Cold War period like "Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs) and Climate Change and Cyber Attacks etc. are important focus, which challenges were not emphasised by NATO during the Cold War period. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, all the member countries have shown a strong determination to play their part in the fight against terrorism, because it was a threat to all member states of the NATO (according to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty). At the same time some developing countries are more urge to develop WMDs instead of economic and political development. Terrorist groups such as Aum Shinryko in Japan and Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network have tries to acquire nuclear materials. There are other countries with nuclear power programs whose safeguard systems may be considerably weaker than those in Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs), it means that spent fuel from reactors as well as other radioactive materials, may easier to acquire. Therefore, even US (the most powerful member of the NATO) is now pursuing arms control negotiations with Russia, not because, it suspects that the Russians have ill intent towards the US but to keep Russia's weapons out of the hands of terrorist.

Emerging global and regional challenges and problems made the NATO conscious of the need of collaboration and joint action with other international organizations like UN, EU and OSCE. This realization made NATO to increase its interactions with other international organizations. At the same time at the Riga summit declaration in November 2006, NATO member countries emphasized its relations with the International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in the crisis response regions, due to their effective role for stabilization and reconstruction in the various crisis management operations. Most of the INGOs have been invited to visit NATOHQ and to attend its conferences and seminars, with attending courses and training exercises on humanitarian aid and relief program.

Thus, NATO has taken a series of initiatives to strengthen European security architecture by making dialogue, confidence building and cooperation with former adversaries (like Russia and Eastern European countries) as well as other European states and neighboring countries in the wider Mediterranean region. It is necessary for NATO to that need new forms of political and military cooperation which required preserving peace and stability in Europe and preventing the escalation of regional tensions after the end of the Cold War. In response to the new security challenges, NATO has transformed with its new role to in the wider field of security in the post Cold War era. Due to active role of the NATO in the peacekeeping and crisis management in Europe as well as outside Europe with the help of other international organizations, many things that it deserves a status as an important international organization to maintain international peace and security in the world. Whereas, many others become apprehensive expanding role and functions beyond its border.

Keeping in view the changes in membership and also role and functions, NATO needs reform. Reform is an ongoing process aimed at preserving and improving NATO's ability to conduct its full spectrum of missions. Reform should also enhance performance and optimize the use of resources by creating a lean, more effective organization, while respecting that NATO is a consensus-based organization. NATO's decision-making and consultative machinery was designed for a much smaller Alliance. One major concern of enlargement is that NATO will become too big, too bureaucratic, and lose its ability to

make necessary military decisions. NATO operates on the basis of consensus. What will happen to NATO's cohesion, when the Alliance grows more than 28 members? Simple mathematics indicates that the greater the number of decision makers, the more difficult it will be to reach consensus and the level of difficulty in reaching consensus may get progressively higher. A large membership requires greater coordination for joint interoperability and greater cost for information gathering. There is also more potential for selective participation, freeloading and non-compliance. By promoting greater equity in burden sharing, and by enhancing the visibility of its military requirements to the member nations during and in advance of the political decision-making process, NATO could potentially catalyze the broader process of creating and maintaining political cohesion amongst the nations. Reforming NATO policy is one of ensuring and demonstrating equity in operational burden sharing between the nations.

NATO designed the EAPC to address political co-operation, but this has not yet become nearly as active as the PFP. Its predecessor, the NACC was the earliest attempt by NATO to draw in the former Warsaw Pact members and preceded the PFP by several years but its size and mandate made for difficulties. Its area of consultation with NATO has expanded to include arms control, peace operations, regional matters, and others. But while all these responsibilities are impressive on paper, actual implementation has not matched the expectations of the non-NATO members. Infrastructural reform of the NATO's headquarter is needed to accommodate new member states as well as new staffs of the NATO's Civil and Political structure. Present infrastructure is not enough for the smooth functioning of the NATO due to enlarging its member states. Therefore expansion of its infrastructural buildings and staffs is the necessary need for NATO. The task of reform may be difficult, but it is a tall order and will require innovative and significant political will of the North Atlantic alliance. There is a range of reforms which will be necessary for the enlargement process itself or 'getting it right' from internal reforms of NATO to external relations with states from relations with non-members to relations with the broader international community. The enlargement of NATO was a correct decision both for the Alliance objective of stability and security in Europe and for the candidate countries. The decision was taken only after a long process of debate and discussion. It is not a decision taken lightly by any country; it has been doing by

consensus decision making process. NATO enlargement is also justifiable in the context of broader reform of the alliance and of the European security structure more generally.

The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organizations as well as the United Nations. Its attempts in the area of peacekeeping and crisis management, especially outside Europe, need to be undertaken with much care and caution. It should not take upon itself the role of implementing arm of the United Nations, as the international community would not approve of it. On the whole it's expanding role and functions need to be carried out with sensitivity and caution.

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