

# **BUSH DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES**

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Date: 23/07/2009

**DECLARATION**

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**Bush Doctrine: Implications and Challenges**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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**CERTIFICATE**

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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*Vidya Prakash Maurya*  
**Vidya Prakash Maurya**

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*To My*

*Dada Ji*

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## **Abbreviations**

ABM	: Anti-Ballistic Missile
ANZU	: Australia, New Zealand and United States
BBC	: British Broadcasting Corporation
CBRN	: Chemical, Biological and Radiological or Nuclear
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	: Cable News Network
CJTFHOA	: Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
CTBT	: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EU	: European Union
FBI	: Federal Bureau of Investigation
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GCC	: Gulf Cooperation Council
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	: International Criminal Court
ICJ	: International Court of Justice
ILA	: International Law Association
ISAF	: International Security Assistance Force
LGNS	: Leading Group on National Security
NDS	: National Defense Strategy
NIC	: National Intelligence Council
NMD	: National Missile Defence
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization

NAM	: Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	: Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSS	: National Security Strategy
NWFT	: North-West Frontier Territory
OIC	: Organization of Islamic Conference
PRC	: People's Republic of China
PNAC	: Project for New American Century
RMA	: Revolution in Military Affairs
SARS	: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SC Res.	: Security Council Resolution
SDF	: Self Defence Forces
UK	: United Kingdom
UN	: United Nations
UNMOVIC	: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSCOM	: United Nations Special Commission
UNITA	: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
US	: United States
WMD	: Weapons of Mass Destruction



## *Chapter 1: Introduction*

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 2.1 Background

Presidential Doctrines have played a very important role in the determination of the American foreign policy. United States' Presidential doctrines reflect the stances of the United States when it deals with its very own political goals and attitudes against foreign national economic and military policies. Many doctrines are related to the Cold War while other reflects the emerging problem of their time.

The circumstances surrounding the national security issues and times have changed, but presidents have continued to play a key role in forging the US foreign national security policy. Events such as - the erosion of the British colonial system and the empires of the old Europe, World War II, the rise of the Soviet Union and the bi-polar system of the Cold War, the advent of the nuclear weapons and international terrorism have influenced the making of the national security doctrines and enhanced their importance in the international affairs.

The US President is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and charged with the protecting the security of the nation through war and other means. The enhancing status of the United States in the international affairs increased of power of the Presidents in the international affairs. Two of the early turning points, which put the US and its Presidents on this path, were Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary. These two marked two of the earliest doctrines in national security. Presidents approach the task of protecting US national security from a variety of perspectives. These collective approaches are deemed as *doctrines*, which are general and overarching strategies and objectives that define a president's approach to national security and typically carry the name of the president.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the international relations. There started a big debate among the US policy makers and the analysts to define the role of the US in new developments

of the international relations, and set the United States' foreign policy goals for the twenty first century. President Bill Clinton issued seven National Security Strategies in his eight years tenure in order to complete this search, but his efforts could not bear satisfactory results because of the heated debate and disagreements among the various schools of scholars such as *Idealists, Realists and Neo-conservatives*.

Almost all agreed that the new century should be driven by the US and its culture and values, but there existed sharp differences among the scholars regarding the means to achieve this end. Some advocated for exemplary means that is to be an example of development, prosperity, and champion of great human values. Thus, putting moral pressure on the other nations to follow the United States' model of development and accept the leadership of US. On the other hand, a second group of scholars, particularly the Neo-conservatives, advocated that the United States' victory over Soviet Union in the Cold War was the triumph of the its culture and values. They emphasized that it was the moral duty of the US to promote these values in other nations so that they could also get the benefit of these. It is important to note that these scholars supported even pursuit of hard power to get their objective fulfilled. It was the later, which found the opportunity to implement its agenda during the Bush Presidency (2001-2008).

The terrorist attacks on the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 (later referred as 9/11) reshaped the US perception of global security environment and in a way, changed the global security landscape. This proved to be a fine opportunity for the Neo-conservative wing of President Bush' administration to assert themselves and popularize their agenda. The 9/11 attack shocked the policy makers and the analysts within and outside the US so much that they wanted the perpetrators to be punished at any rate. The international opinion against the terrorists and solidarity with people and the government of the United States provided confidence to the Bush administration, particularly to the Neo-conservative wing.

Thus, in the background of the terrorist attacks on the US, the Neo-conservatives started developing a grand strategy for the US. In this task, they were guided by the Project for

the New American Century's document namely "*Rebuilding America's Defenses Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*", which has been discussed at length in chapter 2. The efforts of the policy makers in Bush administration culminated in a new *National Security Strategy* (NSS 2000) of the US that was referred to as '*Bush Doctrine*'. At its core, the Bush Doctrine was based on use of preemptive military force against actors who could threaten the US with terror tactics or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The aim of pre-emption, as defined by the Bush Administration, was to negate national security threats anywhere in the world before they were formed.

Despite US status as sole global superpower, the horrific 9/11 attacks on America and President Bush's proclamation of a 'Global War on Terrorism' demonstrated more than ever the need for the US to take a very different view of the global security environment. The Bush Doctrine was developed from a realist selective engagement strategy toward a strategy of American primacy with a willingness to use preemptive military force to engage threats vital to the US national security.

However, Bush Doctrine was seen as the new strategy of the US in the twenty first century. President Bush and his Administration, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, recognized more than ever before, the need for the US to take a very different look in the security environment they faced. The Bush administration opted to move toward a NSS of primacy, employ preemptive military action to protect vital national interests, and use a "*coalition of the willing*" when UN support was less than expected. Much controversy and discussion emerged at home and abroad after the Bush administration released their NSS in September 2002.

The 2002 NSS framed preemptive military action as a legitimate action to counter dangerous technological threats "before they are formed." Proponents viewed this position as a necessity because there was nothing more chilling than allowing terrorists to gain control of technologies that allowed them to threaten or use WMD, and "no longer can America take a wait and see approach to derailing terrorism." The supporters of the Bush Doctrine said, "It is precisely his willingness to go it alone and take preemptive

action that has encouraged other nations to seek diplomatic solution before the US launches a preemptive strike.” Moreover, supporters of the Bush Doctrine contended that Iran’s increased willingness to participate in dialogue and Libya’s WMD concessions show the peripheral benefits of preemption.

The idea that the exercise of American power went hand in hand with the promotion of democratic principles was not new and was articulated in policy pronouncements of Presidents from Wilson, to Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton. However, the Clinton NSSs did not use the word “preemptive”. Instead, the Clinton administration issued seven NSSs during his two-term presidency that pronounced the right and willingness “to do whatever it takes” to include the use “unilateral and decisive military action” to protect “vital national interest” and the “vitality of our national entity” (Clinton 1994).

That the Bush Doctrine is the legacy of President George W. Bush is a well-established fact. However, there were many faces behind President Bush, who were instrumental in the formulation of the National Security Strategy (2002) known as the Bush Doctrine. Among these hidden faces the makers of the *Project for the New American Century* (PNAC) were most important. The makers of this new programme of action were committed to spread the supremacy of the United States in every walk of life of the people all over the world. They emphatically advocated for preventive actions to safeguard against the future threats and pre-emptive action to prevent and defy the immediate and possible threats. These scholars emphasized on pre-emptive action even against those states, which were or expected to be against the interests of the United States. That ten of the 25 original signatories of the *Project for the New American Century*’s Statement of the Principals, and four of a further seven names appended to an open letter sent to President Clinton in January 1998 about Iraq, were serving in the administration of the President Bush, is illustrative of the influence of this group on the foreign policy of George W Bush.

Under the ideological umbrella of neo-conservatism these scholars continued to propagate their ideas through influential journals like- ‘*Commentary*’, ‘*Public Interest*’,

*'National Interest*, and more recently *'Weekly Standard'* and the aforementioned PNAC; and key think tanks groups like *American Enterprise Institute*, *Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs*, *Hudson Institute*, *Heritage Foundation*, and *Center for Security Policy*.

Besides the neo-conservative group of thinkers, President Bush himself talked about the key points of his Doctrine even before the formulation of the NSS (2002). Before and during his election campaign, guided by so-called *'American Exceptionalism'*, Bush talked about the promotion of 'universal American values' i.e. democracy, equality, liberty, religious freedom, human rights, open economy and freedom of trade etc. He also promised to make all efforts including preventive and pre-emptive actions to achieve his goals. Almost the same points were reiterated times and again by his National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice who was latter on promoted to the post of Secretary of State of the US.

In fact, Bush Doctrine did not revolutionize the ends of the US foreign policy. It was all about the means. With some caution, it can be said that Bush Doctrine was the implementation of the plans of the previous governments with revolutionary and radical means. In the history of the United States, preventive actions (some-times even pre-emptive action) were taken many times but at no time, so much of the arrogance was seen. Actually, arrogance of the Bush Administration made it enemy of the world.

Existing research on the Bush Doctrine is mostly limited to the criticism of the Bush Administration's policy regarding Iraq war while the purpose of the present study is to analyse even other major issues associated with the Bush Doctrine along with the Iraq war. It seeks to find out the role of the Neo-conservative in the development of the Bush Doctrine and the extent of their success in influencing the decisions of the Bush Administration. An effort has been made to situate the Bush doctrine in the major ideological framework of the American society i.e. the concept of 'Exceptionalism' and 'Benign Hegemon'. It also attempts to make a searching enquiry into the responses to

Bush Doctrine by the other important players in the world community. Afghanistan war in general and the Iraq war in particular have been chosen for the case study.

Bush Doctrine makes for a very interesting study because of many reasons. It was formulated as the United States grand strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century for which a need was being felt since the end of the Cold War. Though its immediate cause was the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US, it was seen as an effort to replace the traditional security strategy by the newly developed 'Revolution in Military Affairs. It is also an important topic of study because it challenged the UN, though not directly, and badly affected the United Nations' credibility as a guarantor of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the small and the weaker states. Its relevance as a research topic is an implication so increased because of the fact that it intensified the race for the acquisition of WMD, at least among the 'Axis of Evil', amidst the great efforts for non-proliferation by many countries and the UN. This study will focus on the various aspects of the above issues and assess the implication of the Bush Doctrine for the non-proliferation regime, UN System and democracy promotion in Middle East; and challenges posed by it to the international peace and security.

## **2.2 Survey of literature:**

Norman Padhoretz (2006) believes that there were three pillars of the Bush Doctrine. Firstly, a categorical rejection of the kind of relativism, that had previously prevailed in the discussion of terrorism. Secondly, a new conception of terrorism that would along with the "mission" emerging out of the rubble of the 9/11, serve as a further justification going first in Afghanistan and then into Iraq, and finally, the determination of the Bush Administration to take pre-emptive action against an anticipated attack. While comparing the Bush Doctrine with Truman Doctrine, Norman predicts that like the Truman Doctrine in 1952, the Bush Doctrine would prove irreversible by the time its author had left the White House in 2008. Encouraged by the precedent of Ronald Reagan, Bush felt almost as confident in predicting that three or four decades into the future, and after the inevitable misstep and reversals, there would come a President who like Reagan in

relation to Truman in the World War Third, would bring the “World War Four” to a victorious end by building on the noble doctrine that George W. Bush promulgated when that war first had begun.

Sergei Rogov (2003) writes that the Bush Doctrine can be considered as an extension of Ronald Reagan’s ideological course rather than the more pragmatic policy of George Bush Senior. Like Reagan, George Bush Junior was counting on tax reduction in his domestic policy, on revision of the US obligation to International Law in foreign policy and on a missile defence in military sphere. He is of the view that the war on international terrorism had become the top priority of US policy during Bush Administration and it would determine the economic, domestic foreign and military policy for near future.

Andrew J. Bacevich (2005) has falsified the claim that 9/11 has ‘changed everything’. He is of the view that ‘what did change as a result of that awful day was basic US policy regarding the use of force’. He predicts that the practice of the Bush Doctrine had showed that it was ‘defective and die very soon’. According to Bacevich efforts to implement the Bush Doctrine had cost the nation specially the US military dearly without appreciably enhancing the American security. He further contemplates the wreckage caused by its preventive war in Iraq, the White House might well come to see the wisdom of allowing the Bush Doctrine to die a quiet death.

Zhiyuan Cui (2005) says that the Bush Doctrine was not a new phenomenon. The principle of pre-emption as articulated in the doctrine was not a recent creation instead it had ancient roots reaching as far back as the Roman Imperial tactic that Cicero forcefully advocated. He says that the Chinese scholars were of the view that contrary to the views of the Western scholars, Bush Doctrine was in continuity with the Clinton’s foreign policy and it was the culmination and maturation of the United States post Cold War grand strategy. According to Cui, China had taken four steps to counterbalance the Bush Doctrine:

- a) Using its power in the UN Security Council to seek peaceful solution;
- b) Supporting the Euro by diversifying China’s foreign currency holdings;



- c) Developing Asian trade and monetary cooperation; and
- d) Developing trade and security cooperation with Russia and neighbouring countries of Central Asia.

Petry Dombrowsky and Rodger A. Payne (2006) are of the view that many member states of The UN were in favour of the principle of pre-emption and pre-emptive strikes and every day more and more states were joining this group. These states held the view that the risk of calamitous surprise attack especially with the chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, might well justify pre-emptive strikes against terrorists or preventive wars against their state sponsors. Nevertheless, all the states agreed that such kind of military action must be carried out under the guidelines of the UN Security Council resolutions. They even emphasized that the UN Charter proposing military intervention in a state must be revised, reformed and updated, keeping in view the present problem of terrorism. They have even described and analyzed the precautions and compulsions of those states that were against the military intervention in Iraq. They have also described the 'current of change' in their strategy and outlook, which was going through the International Organizations like NATO and the European Union.

Fareed Zakaria (2003) maintains that the unprecedented power of the US always terrified the world and the policies of President Bush made it more terrible. He recommends that in order to maintain its position, the US should lead through consensus, and make diplomatic efforts that demonstrate its interest and engagement in the world's problems. He notes that legitimacy of the US power depended on the faith of the world.

Shashi Tharoor (2003) opines that there were three reasons why the US should act while taking the UN in confidence. Firstly, the by acting in accordance with the UN Charter the US could minimize its burden. Secondly, the Company of the UN provided legitimacy to the US's actions. Thirdly, involvement of the UN made the operations more cost effective. Therefore, he suggests that the US should strengthen the UN system and act along with it instead of taking unilateral actions.

Kaufman (2007) notes that Bush doctrine rested mainly on two pillars i.e. pre-emption and democracy promotion. He says that it could facilitate expanding the democratic zone of peace, minimizing the number and gravity of threats the United States faced. He opines that it could facilitate the defeat of such threats at the lowest possible cost and risk, when inevitably; even the most robust deterrent failed.

Brendon O'Connor (2006) provides an historical examination of anti-Americanism from its beginnings. He argues that anti-Americanism was not a comprehensive or coherent belief system or ideology, but rather a series of criticisms and prejudices regarding the United States that had haphazardly been labeled as anti-Americanism.

Sanjay Gupta (2008) suggests that the Security Council needs to be strengthened to respond to contemporary terrorists' challenges. He is of the view that the Bush doctrine needs to be robustly challenged from within the UN, and a strong alternative to unilateral pre-emption developed.

John J. Mearsheimer (2005) is of the view that Bush Administration's action against Saddam Husain was not a realist approach. He says that a realist would have searched for a diplomatic solution of the Iraq problem instead of resorting to direct action.

Brian C. Schmidt (2007) has described the differences between the realists and the neo-conservatives on the question of Iraq war. Based on the debate between the realists and the neoconservatives he has tried to assess the implications of the Iraq war for the future of the US foreign policy. He is of the opinion that Bush Doctrine has damaged the image of the neo-conservative.

Mark A. Dungan (2004) is of the opinion that the Pre-emptive war resorted by the Bush Doctrine has been recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter. He says that Bush Doctrine was both pre-emptive as well as preventive. He contends that until the United Nations makes a significant reformation on how it discharges its duties especially in the Security Council about emerging threats, such as Saddam Hussein, the United States should continue to support the Bush Doctrine of preemption.

Michael Schmid (2004) maintains that the fact that the United States has to dedicate itself to the issues of the world community does not give it carte-blanche for pre-emptive measures. He wants that the strategy should be balanced and well-conceived for different situations requires different solutions. He is of the view that the need for a new strategy is justified and has to involve aggressive enforcement of international law. The fight against terrorism must include more options than military power alone, and all nations must cooperate for the achievement of this cause.

Douglas J. Miller (2006) notes that the 9/11 attacks brought to the forefront a very different kind of threat to US interests- non-state terrorists and rogue nations with the capacity to inflict massive casualties with little or no warning. He says that it is entirely reasonable to believe that the U.S. may find it necessary to move preemptively against a dangerous and shadowy threat, but it is a viable option long available to any nation and hardly worthy of a desk-thumping policy centerpiece. Similarly, unilateral action on the part of the U.S. may be necessary if faced with a sufficient threat and lacking timely support of the international community.

David Bowman (2005) writes that in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the United States national military and security strategy has been shaped to address its vulnerabilities to asymmetric attacks posed by international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. He argues that to control and synchronize the use of preemptive warfare, the United Nations must assert its leadership in providing the legal framework and legitimating authority for preemption. He profess that unless and until it does so, the United States will have no choice but to act unilaterally when its homeland is threatened, thereby giving other nations the impetus to also act preemptively. Therefore, he recommends that the United Nations must work towards redefining "imminent threat" in the post-September 11 world as globalization forces a convergence between all nations and the capabilities and intent of current day adversaries must be taken into account.

Mark Beeson (2004) has presented a historical background of the rise of neocons in the US. He is of the opinion that what the rise of the neocons demonstrates a latent potential that can be bent to ideological ends that may profoundly undermine the existing international system and the complex relationships, political structures and normative values that have underpinned it for some fifty years. So, for him, one of the great ironies of the rise of the neocons is that they have proved to be anything but conservative, and may yet have a more destructive impact on the old order than Osama Bin Laden could ever hope to have.

Michel Chossudovsky (2005) holds that “America’s New War” consists in extending the global market system while opening up new “economic frontiers” for US corporate capital. He says that the US-led military invasion in close liaison with Britain responds to the interests of the Anglo- American oil giants, in alliance with America’s “Big Five” weapons producers: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Boeing and General Dynamics. He is of the opinion that the militarization of the Eurasian corridor is an integral part of Washington’s foreign policy agenda. He argues that America’s quest to control the Eurasian pipeline corridors on behalf of the Anglo-American oil giants is not only directed against Russia, it is also intended to weaken competing European oil interests in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

Robert G. Kaufman (2007) has named the war against terrorism as the World War IV. His analysis holds that the Bush Doctrine rests on two main pillars. First, the events of September 11 rudely demonstrate the inadequacy of deterrence, containment, or ex post facto responses when dealing with terrorists and rogue regimes bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD); hence, the United States cannot rule out the option of using force preemptively rather than reactively. Second, the root cause of 9/11 and similarly inspired aggression is the culture of tyranny in the Middle East, which spawns fanatical, aggressive, secular, and religious despotisms; hence, the United States must promote democratic regime change in that region.

### **2.3 Research Question**

In the light of the existing literature, the present study attempts to address the following questions:

- what is the meaning and scope of the Bush Doctrine?
- what is the impact of the neo-conservative school of thought in the US in the formulation of the Bush Doctrine?
- has it promoted the national interests of the United States of America?
- what is the impact of the implementation of this doctrine on the developing countries, particularly in the Middle East?
- what is the response of the World community to the Bush Doctrine?

### **2.4 Hypothesis**

The study attempts to tests for the hypotheses :

- (a) Bush Doctrine is largely responsible for spread of anti-Americanism around the globe and
- (b) Bush Doctrine has strengthened religious fundamentalism and resolve of the terrorist organizations to strike at US and its allies.

### **2.5 Tentative Chapterization**

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The study is divided into five chapters. A brief introductory chapter introduces and discusses the significance of the 'Bush Doctrine' in international politics and lay out the structure and scope of the study. Chapter 2 deals with historical background of the Bush Doctrine. It examines the impact of several other doctrines named after earlier US Presidents and the influence of the neo-conservative school of thought in the United States, on this doctrine. It also attempts to situate the doctrine in the domestic politics, especially the foreign policy making process. Chapter 3 makes an effort to find out to what extent the Bush Doctrine has been implemented. An examination of its implication

over Afghanistan and Iraq is also attempted. Chapter 4 examines the reaction of the major powers and developing countries to the exponents of the Bush Doctrine. The last chapter makes an effort to analyse and find out the impact of the Bush Doctrine on the world politics, particularly in West and South West Asia. It also examines whether the United States power has declined or strengthened after the proclamation and implementation of the Bush Doctrine.

## **2.6 Research Methodology**

The proposed study is a descriptive and analytical research effort to understand the complex and multifaceted aspects of the Bush Doctrine. The speeches, articles and remarks by President Bush, autobiographies and memoirs of various key policy makers and the official records of the US Government has been used as the primary sources. The study relies upon working papers of projects, seminars and symposia along with the available source material such as books, journals, articles think tank reports and news sources. The case-study method has been employed to analyze the larger theoretical issues in the Bush Doctrine.

*Chapter 2: Evolution of the Bush Doctrine*

## Chapter- 2

### Evolution of the Bush Doctrine

#### 3.1 Introduction

The terrorist attack on the US on September 11, 2001 is generally regarded as the watershed event in the history of international relations. The significance of this event, commonly referred to as 9/11 incident, is reflected in the fact that a group of terrorists could make the single superpower in the world a vulnerable target of violent attacks. While this incident shook the world, the US President George W Bush took prompt action against those responsible for this 'crime'. As part of the strategy to prevent such attacks in the future, senior officers of the Bush Administration brought out the need for preemptive strike ,if necessary, to forestall the design of the America's enemies.

While mentioning the nature of the threat to US national security, the Bush Administration declared that instead of a single political regime, person, religion, or ideology, the enemy is terrorism premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against the innocents. It articulated the need of a collective and comprehensive strategy. It made "no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them". The US National Security Strategy Report issued in 2002 stated that:

While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to **act alone**, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by **acting preemptively** against such terrorists, to **prevent** them from doing harm against our people and our country.

This has come to be widely known as the Bush Doctrine.

There are two different opinions regarding the originality of the Bush Doctrine. According to the first opinion, Bush Doctrine provides a quietly new and different approach to the United States' international engagements and there are many evidences to prove this contention. The *National Security Strategy* (2002) of the United States itself is the basis of their argument. While the second group of thinkers is of the view that Bush



Doctrine is not a new foreign policy principle in the history of United States' foreign relations. They claim that President Bush had followed more or less the same principles as followed by the previous Presidents of the United States.

The scholars of the first group are of the view that America's recent *NSS*, released in September 2002, represents a radical departure from previous policy in two ways<sup>1</sup>. First, being strongly influenced by events on 9/11, it is significantly 'threat-based' and provides a clear vision of the primary threats facing America in the new millennium like transnational terrorist organizations, rogue regimes, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Secondly, it provides a policy of 'use-of-force' including a willingness of unilateral action, use of preemptive strikes, and hints of preventive war<sup>2</sup>. While the new threats facing America were also of unquestionable global concern, a stated use-of-force policy that advertises preemptive and unilateral action was a target of criticism from political leaders both at home and abroad (McMullen 2004).

### **3.2 How new is the Bush doctrine?**

While the supporters of the second group of scholars believe that the Bush Doctrine was not a new creation; instead it had ancient roots reaching as far back as the Roman Imperial tactic that Cicero forcefully advocated<sup>3</sup>. The policies that form the Bush Doctrine were old and many time practiced by many Presidents of the United States in

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<sup>1</sup> Norman Padhoretz (2006) believe that there are three pillars of the Bush Doctrine: firstly, a categorical rejection of the kind of relativism that had previously prevailed in the discussion of terrorism; secondly, a new conception of terrorism that would along with the "mission" emerging out of the rubble of the 9\ 11, serve as a further justification going first in Afghanistan and then into Iraq; and thirdly, the determination to take pre-emptive action against an anticipated attack.

<sup>2</sup> Many have argued that preemption is unprecedented and against all principles that the United States has articulated as its core value system. Yet, as far back as biblical times, the concept of preemption can be found. The Old Testament of The Bible articulates violence as a means to enforce justice and this is not substantively different from current day use in the international arena (David Bowman 2005).

<sup>3</sup> Cicero said, "How can you believe that the man who has lived so licencelessly up to the present time will not proceed to every extreme of insolence, if shall also secure the authority given by arms? Do not then wait until you have suffered some such treatment and then rue it, but be then be on your guard before you suffer; for it is rash to allow the dangerous to come upon you and then to repent of it, when you might have anticipated them.(Richard Tuck the Rights of War and Peace:1999)"Quoted in Cui, Zhiyuan, ( 2005) "Bush Doctrine and Neo-Conservatism: A Chinese Perspective", *Harvard International Law Journal*, 46( 2): 403-10.

history of the democratic development of the US<sup>4</sup>. But the most significant feature of the Bush Doctrine was that it consisted of the policies of the many presidents at one place and strived to implement them altogether. However, at the same time it is worth mentioning that President George W Bush carried out his policies not like a liberal but as a revolutionary which has been well termed as Neo-conservatism.<sup>5</sup>

It would be wise to first go through the previous presidential doctrines of the United States to see their impact on the Bush Doctrine and then, analyze the rise of the neo-conservative ideology and their influence on it. At last, we shall look into the policies and programmes of President Bush.

As regard the previous Presidential doctrines of the United States, it was a defining moment in the US foreign policy when President James Monroe, in 18 23, proclaimed that “the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . . We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety”. This policy of President Monroe is known as ‘*Monroe Doctrine*’, which was preventive in nature and aimed at securing the US frontiers from any possible threat.

On 6 December 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt delivered his annual message to Congress, which is known as the ‘*Roosevelt Corollary*’ to Monroe Doctrine. It was the reformed version of the Monroe Doctrine that aimed to establish economic and military supremacy of the United States in Latin America. Indirectly, it was asserted that external powers should not dare to interfere in Americas but the US could intervene in the region wherever and whenever necessary. In this message, President Roosevelt assumed the role of international policeman in the region.

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<sup>4</sup> Andrew J. Bacevich (2005) has falsified the claim that 9/11 has ‘changed everything’. He is of the view that ‘what did change as a result of that awful day was basic US policy regarding the use of force.’

<sup>5</sup> It is a blend of liberal democracy and hawkish foreign policy. Today the term refers to idealistic hawkishness.

Next important foreign policy principle in the line of Bush Doctrine was the *Truman Doctrine* which was propounded by President Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947 in an address to the US Congress, in the backdrop of the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). He wanted to give economic and military support to the nations that were vulnerable to communist movement particularly to Greece, Turkey and the nations of the Eastern Europe<sup>6</sup>. In the same way, the administration of the George W. Bush forwarded a huge amount of money to Pakistan and Afghanistan to be partner in the war against terrorism. This amount was also expected to be spent on the modernization of these societies.

On 5 January 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered a message to the United States Congress, which came to be known as the *Eisenhower Doctrine*. In this message, President Eisenhower disclosed that the US could use armed forces upon request in response to “imminent or actual” aggression to the Middle East and furthermore countries that were against Communism were to receive aid in various forms. This strategy was devised mainly to fill the power vacuum left by the departing imperial powers as Great Britain and France. This doctrine was implemented during Suez Crisis and Lebanon Crisis.

President John F. Kennedy, on 20 January 1961, in his inaugural address cautioned that every nation knew whether it wished well or ill, the United States was ‘to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, and oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty’<sup>7</sup>. This was in response to Cuban Missile crisis. President Kennedy was fully prepared to conduct offensive military operations in order to destroy Soviet missiles located in Cuba; he implemented a “defensive quarantine” in advance of actual Soviet or Cuban use of force. This is also known as the policy of *Containment of Communism* and reversal of the same in the Western

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<sup>6</sup> According to President Truman this move was to “...support free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities<sup>6</sup>”. Thus on the basis of his observations United States provided \$400 million worth of military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey to save them from the influence of the erstwhile USSR.

<sup>7</sup> In fact this has been an overt or covert guiding force behind the foreign policies of all the presidents of the United States of America. This view is the foundation of the *American Exceptionalism*.

Hemisphere<sup>8</sup>. In essence, this policy could be termed as the expansion of the foreign policies of Truman and Eisenhower. During the tenure of George W Bush, there were several occasions when these views were reiterated by the President himself and his key officers.

President Lyndon B. Johnson seemed reiterating the policies of his preceding administrations when in 1965 he said that the domestic revolutions in the western Hemisphere would no longer be a local matter when “the object is the establishment of a communist dictatorship.” The *Johnson Doctrine* was applied to justify the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. President Bush, in fact, broadened the Johnson Doctrine when in one of his speeches he said that tyranny in any part of the world affected the security of the United States and that the US would use resources at its hand to see the overthrow of tyranny and establishment of democracy in every part of the world.

There are many similarities between the Vietnam War waged by President Nixon and the Iraq war waged by George W. Bush. At the time of Vietnamization of the Vietnam War on 25 July 1969 President Richard Nixon said that the United States expected its allies to take care of their own military defense. This so called *Nixon Doctrine* was implemented in the Persian Gulf to provide military aid to Iran and Saudi Arabia. This, in fact, paved the way for the direct military involvement of the United States in the First Gulf War and Iraq War. Even President Bush’s intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq was ultimately aimed at securing energy security and ensure freedom of trade.

In his State of the Union address on 23 January 1980, US President Jimmy Carter promulgated the *Carter Doctrine*. This was, in a way, the continuation of the *Nixon Doctrine*. In response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter asserted that the United States could use military force in the Persian Gulf when required

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<sup>8</sup> Notable to the United States is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. President Kennedy was fully prepared to conduct offensive military operations in order to destroy Soviet missiles located in Cuba; he implemented a “defensive quarantine” in advance of actual Soviet or Cuban use of force. Although The UN Security Council debated the issue; there was no clear consensus on whether the United States had operated in opposition to The UN Charter. David Bowma, (2005) “Preemptive Warfare - A Viable Strategic Option.”

to safeguard its national interests. He said that an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault was to be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. This was the period when neo-conservatives were gathering strength and after some time the demand for the preventive and pre-emptive strike was raised with full strength by the neo-conservatives thinkers.

In 1985, in his State of the Union address President Ronald Reagan told that the United States must not break faith with those who were risking their lives on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which had been with the US from its birth and that the support for freedom fighters was self-defense. This strategy was used to support the anti-communist Mujahedeens in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement in Angola. The *Reagan Doctrine* meant to back the anti-communist and anti-Soviet states continued in operation till the end of the Cold War.<sup>9</sup> President Bush Junior was very much influenced by Ronald Reagan and his policies.<sup>10</sup>

President Bill Clinton, on 26 February 1999 said, "We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so". In another speech he stated that if somebody came after innocent civilians and tried to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it was within the US power to stop it, it would stop it. This policy of Clinton administration is known as the *Clinton Doctrine*. This doctrine was used to justify the US intervention at many places in

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<sup>9</sup>The Bush Doctrine can be considered as an extension of Ronald Reagan's ideological course rather than the more pragmatic policy of George Bush Sr. Like Reagan, George Bush Jr., was counting on tax reduction in his domestic policy, on revision of the US obligation to International Law in foreign policy and on an missile defence in military sphere (Sergei Rogov 2003).

<sup>10</sup> "Ronald Reagan's achievements grow larger with the passing of time. He had a profound vision of America's role in the world as one of peace through strength. And because of Ronald Reagan, the world saw America as a strong and peaceful nation.... Ronald Reagan's optimism defined his character and it defined his presidency. More than a habit of mind, this optimism sprang from deep confidence in the power and future of American ideals" (GW Bush: 4 March 2001).

world (including the war in Yugoslavia) in the name of promoting peace and human rights. That is why this doctrine is also known as the *Doctrine of intervention*.

On 1 June 2002, while speaking at the West Point, President Bush said,

“Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities” (Bush 2002c).

However, in a varying degree, the important principles of the Bush Doctrine can be seen in the preceding ten years of his first tenure. These principles do not seem to be new at least in terms of the US public policy pronouncements. Some of these policies were in operation even during the tenure of President Clinton. The National Security Advisor of the Clinton Administration, Anthony Lake said in 1994 that Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Cuba were ‘*backlash state*’ and declared that the US as a sole super power had a *special responsibility* to deal with them. Three, out of this list of the *Backless States* appeared in President Bush’s list of the ‘*Axis of Evil*’.<sup>11</sup>

The National Security Strategy (1996) of President Clinton mentioned about the dangers of terrorism, rogue states and WMD. At the same time, there was reference to the promotion of democracy globally and the global leadership of the US. It also talked about the insurmountable military power of the United States, which would be used if the US national security interests were endangered, ‘with others when we can, but alone when we must’ (NSS 1996). The National Security Strategy of 1998 proclaimed, “...the United States will do what we must to defend our vital interests including- when necessary- using our military unilaterally and decisively” (NSS 1998). Madeleine Albright<sup>12</sup> emphasized the need to develop relationships with states and act as the coalition builder. However, she also said that the US would also act unilaterally if it must to keep new

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<sup>11</sup> The term “Axis of Evil” was devised by the President of the United States, George W Bush on 29 January 2002, in his State of the Union address to highlight some states for their alleged effort to gain Weapons of Mass Destruction and support to the terrorists.

<sup>12</sup> President Clinton nominated Madeleine Korbil Albright on December 5, 1996 as Secretary of State. She was the first female Secretary of State and the highest-ranking woman in the history of the US government until that time.

threats from arising in the struggle against terror and in the pursuit of freedom, “we will behave multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must.”

The National Security Strategy (2002) provided overall Guidelines for the foreign policy of the United States of America, which is known as the Bush Doctrine in the international relations. This document contained the points, which had been demanded by the neo-conservatives for a long time.

Patrick Tyler (1992) of *New York Times* published an article based on the leaked draft of the Pentagon defense planning guidance on 8 March 1992:

In a broad new policy statement that is in its final drafting phase, the Defense Department asserts that America’s political and military mission in the post-cold-war era will be to ensure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territories of the former Soviet Union. A 46-page document that has been circulating at the highest levels of the Pentagon for weeks, and which Defense Secretary Dick Cheney expects to release later this month, states that part of the American mission will be “convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.

The purpose of the draft was to prepare a defense budget while keeping in view the future plans and objectives of the United States for the next decade. After the end of the cold war this was the first foreign policy initiative which signaled a radical foreign policy doctrine for the sole super power. Even President Bush (Senior) was concerned over the arrogance of the draft (Zakaria 2003). It was a very sensitive phenomenon at that critical time because it expressed the desire to be ‘the greatest of the great powers, far greater than any other of the powers’ (Gaddis in Porter 2003).

The most dominating agenda of this document was the prevention of any powerful competitor to replace the USSR and to maintain the dominance of the US in the international affairs. Tyler again quoted, ‘...our strategy now must refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential global competitor’. This objective was to be gained in a new world order shaped and led by the US. The competitors were to be deterred from assuming a bigger role and the advanced industrial states were to be prevented from making any desire to change the existing economic and political system. In this way this

document talked about how the US would make its global policy vision and not only interact but also with the events but also shape them.

It advocated the use of preventive action to stop the use and spread of the WMD and desired the preparedness of the US to act either independently or with ad hoc coalitions. It is worth mentioning that this draft was prepared under the supervision of Paul Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense and support of Vice President Dick Cheney- both of whom occupied key positions in President George W Bush's administration. Before that, both were the founding members of the *Project for the New American Century*.

### **3.3 The 'Project for the New American Century':**

The Project for the New American Century marked the beginning of a new radical ideology in the political and diplomatic history of the United States. This was led by a group of neo-conservatives in 1997. This project was devised to create a universal acceptance of the American values and tradition. The makers of this new programme of action were desirous to spread the supremacy of the United States in every walk of life of the people in every corner of the world. They proposed to take preventive actions to safeguard US interests against the future threats and advocated pre-emptive action to prevent and defy the immediate and possible threats. They were in favor of taking actions against those states, which were or expected to be against the interests of the United States. That ten of the 25 original signatories<sup>13</sup> of the Project for the New American Century's Statement of the Principals, and four of a further seven names appended to an open letter sent to President Clinton in January 1998 about Iraq, were serving in the administration of the President Bush, is illustrative of the influence of this group on the

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<sup>13</sup> See PNAC *Statement of Principles* for the 25 original signatories. Those signatories served in the Bush Jr. administration are: Elliot Abrams, Middle East desk of the National Security Council; Dick Cheney, Vice-President; Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Aaron Friedberg, deputy national security adviser and director of policy planning for VP Cheney; Zalmay Khalilzed, Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan and Iraq; I Lewis Libby, VP Cheney's Chief of Staff; Peter W Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Henry S Rowen, a member of the Defense Policy Board of the US Department of Defense; Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; and Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense. Another was President G W Bush's brother, Jeb Bush.



foreign policy of President George W Bush.<sup>14</sup> Under the leadership of its Chairman, William Kristol<sup>15</sup>, the Project for the New American Century formulated a number of concepts in support of their Principles of statement and the policy prescriptions therein. In support of this open letter, Kristol and Kagan<sup>16</sup> made the case for regime change in Iraq (Kristol and Kagan1998). After the formation of this group, Robert Kagan and Gary Schmitt advocated renewed effort for establishment of the strategic defense missile system and unilateral withdrawal by the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (from which US withdrew on 13 June 2002).

Later in 1998, the *Weekly Standard*, a neo-conservative political magazine founded by William Kristol, identified the key pillars of the Republican foreign policy as ‘military strength, morality and mastery’ (Weekly Standard 1998). The argument had three important points. First, the US military must be rebuilt to regain the country’s position as ‘the world’s pre-eminent power’, an inheritance allegedly ‘squandered’ by President Clinton. Second American principles and support for democracy were important globally. Third, America must lead aggressive effort to shape the international environment. A rise in US power would equal the decline in world chaos said the Weekly Standard. In view of the 2000 US Presidential election, Kagan and Kristol argued for the further augmentation of the US power to allow it to ‘lead the world for a better future, one built around the American principle of freedom and justice’(Kristol and Kagan 1999). They also asserted for the negligence of the international conventions and put emphasis on a greater unilateralist approach in international affairs. This “unilateral approach” idea became an important element of George W. Bush policy on Iraq.

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<sup>14</sup> Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State; John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and Disarmament; William Schneider, Chairman of the Defense Science Board of the US Department of Defense; and Robert Zoellick, US Trade Representative. See PNAC, *Letter to the Honourable William J. Clinton*, (Online: Web) Accessed on 15 February 2009, URL:<http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintoletter.htm>.

<sup>15</sup> William Kristol ‘is one of the most influential neo-conservative thinkers in Washington.’ He edits *The Weekly Standard*, having formerly been Chief of Staff to Vice President Quayle in President George H W Bush’s administration.

<sup>16</sup> Robert Kagan (born September 26, 1958 in Athens, Greece) is an American historian and foreign policy commentator and widely regarded as a leading intellectual of the neo-conservative school of foreign policy.

Robert Kagan noted that President G W Bush's pronouncements on the promotion of democracy echoed those of Truman, Kennedy and Reagan and that military pre-eminence had been an American intent since the start of the Cold War. President Truman sent US forces to Korea without a UN mandate and President Reagan ignored the international institution of the World Court when refusing to accept its judgment over the mining of Nicaragua's harbours (Nichols 2002).

Charles Krauthammer has been one of the key influences on contemporary neocons, and a powerful advocate of a more assertive American foreign policy. The pivotal events for Krauthammer were the Presidency of Ronald Regan during the 1980s, the 'defeat' of the Soviet Union during this period, and the emergence of the US as the sole-superpower as a consequence at the beginning of the 1990s (Winik in Beeson 1996). Krauthammer (1990-91) was amongst the first to recognize that the end of the Cold War had created a new era of unipolarity, in which the old multilateral order was being replaced by a form of 'pseudo-multilateralism', in which America would pay lip service to collective security while acting 'essentially alone'. In a world of new emerging threats to stability, there was only one answer:

Our best hope for safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in American strength and will - the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them (Krauthammer 1990-1991: 33).

Neocons continue to promote their ideas through influential journals like *Commentary*, *Public Interest*, *National Interest*, and more recently *Weekly Standard* and the aforementioned (*PNAC*), and key think tanks like *American Enterprise Institute*, *Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs*, the *Hudson Institute*, *Heritage Foundation*, and *Center for Security Policy* and. In addition to Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Elliott Abrams, other key Neocon figures to obtain powerful positions included: Michael Ledeen (principal advisor to Karl Rove – Bush's key advisor); Lewis 'Scooter' Libby, Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney; and John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and former Vice

President of the American Enterprise Institute. The critical international factor that allowed the Neocons to consolidate their influence on American foreign policy was, paradoxically, enough, September 11, 2001.<sup>17</sup>

### **3.4 Governor G. W. Bush's Election Campaign:**

Similar views to those set out by the Project for the New American Century were expressed in the speeches of the Governor G W Bush (who was yet to receive the Republican nomination for Presidency) in September and November 1999. In these speeches Bush talked about a realist foreign policy and transformed and strengthened military to deter the wars or to fight them if the deterrence failed. He emphasized the opportunity to project America's peaceful influence across the world. At the same time he talked about the homeland security with the strategic missile defense system and adjustments to the ABM Treaty (Bush 1999a).

Two months later, there was a new theme namely the *Distinct American Internationalism*. Bush had four key points on the topic: One, the concept of clear-eyed realism:

In the defense of our nation, a president must be a clear-eyed realist. There are limits to the smiles and scowls of diplomacy. Armies and missiles are not stopped by stiff notes of condemnation. They are held in check by strength and purpose and the promise of swift punishment. (Bush 1999b)

Second, the world depended on America to prevent chaos but to accomplish it the US foreign policy must be in control, not reacting to crisis. To quote him again:

.... military power is not the final measure of might. Our realism must make a place for the human spirit. This spirit, in our time, has caused dictators to fear and empires to fall. And it has left an honor roll of courage and idealism.... The most powerful force in the world is not a weapon or a nation but a truth: that we are spiritual beings and that freedom is "the soul's right to breathe.

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<sup>17</sup> It is important to recognise that in the immediate aftermath of the original attacks, September 11 was seen by key Bush administration figures like Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as an opportunity to more aggressively expand American hegemony and pursue long-term goals that might have been difficult to justify otherwise.

Third, missile defense was the key. He said that was essential halting proliferation as that CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) was not the answer yet. Far more important was to constrict the supply of nuclear materials and the means to deliver them – by making this a priority with Russia and China. He emphasized that the United States must diminish the evil attraction of these weapons for rogue states – by rendering them useless with missile defense. The CTBT did nothing to gain these goals. It did not stop proliferation, especially to renegade regimes. It was not verifiable and not enforceable. He was of the opinion that it would stop the United States from ensuring the safety and reliability of the US's deterrent, should the need had arisen (Bush 1999b).

Fourth, American principles of human freedom and dignity were universal. He further added that America cherished that freedom, but did not own it. It valued the elegant structures of its own democracy – but realized that, in other societies, the architecture would vary. He was of the view that the US proposed its principles, but it must not impose its culture, because the basic principles of human freedom and dignity were universal (Bush 1999b).

In early 2000, as a foreign policy adviser to the presidential candidate Bush, Condoleezza Rice<sup>18</sup> also trailed some concepts, which prepared the background of the Bush Doctrine. In her article in *Foreign Affairs*, she regarded the American values as universal values i.e. political openness, economic growth, free trade, freedom of speech and worship and the right to elect leaders. She emphasized that the American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all nations committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of US national interests (Rice 2000).

According to her, those states that shared these values and worked alongside the US to make the world 'more prosperous, democratic and peaceful' would benefit. Those states that did not share these values and were not ready to cooperate with the US were to get less benefit and were put under the category of the rogue states. Rice advocated to renew

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<sup>18</sup> In 2005, she was appointed as the US Secretary of State after the resignation of Colin Powell, who served from 2001 to 2005.

strong and intimate relationships with allies who shared American values and could thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom and to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which was increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of WMD. To deal with the later, Rice advocated for rescuing the US military from ‘the extraordinary negligence’ under the Clinton administration<sup>19</sup>. There were also reference to prevention and pre-emption in case there was any attack on the American values. She was of the opinion that the next American president should be in a position to intervene when he believed, and could make the case, that the United States was duty-bound to do so. ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ could not be ruled out as a priority (Rice 2000).

Here, the main aim was to keep the US military prepared to intervene at any moment in any part of the world, if necessary, even against the wishes of the UN,<sup>20</sup> if anything come on the way of the US interests. Rice was of the view that Clinton administration’s anxiety for multilateral solutions<sup>21</sup> led to the signing of such agreements, which were against the US interests, i.e. Kyoto Protocol and the CTBT. She claimed that America’s military power must be secured because the United States was the only guarantor of global peace and stability; and that the neglect of America’s armed forces threatened its ability to maintain peace (Rice 2000).

### **3.5 Foreign Policy Vision: Before 9/11**

After the election of George W. Bush as the President of the US his inaugural address in 2001, reflected that his foreign policy would be in consistence with the leaked draft

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<sup>19</sup> After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, the US military budget had decreased. The article recognised that President Clinton had recently increased defence spending, but asserted that it was insufficient to halt the downward spiral of the armed forces during his tenure. As a result, during the Bush administration it was considerably increased especially after the 9/11 incident.

<sup>20</sup> It is noteworthy that the US resolution to attack Iraq rejected by The UN (UN) and ultimately United States had to implement its mission *Desert Storm* without a mandate from the UN.

<sup>21</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997) also noted that, “Unfortunately, to date, efforts to spell out a new central and worldwide objective for the United States, in the wake of the termination of the Cold War, have been one-dimensional. They have failed to link the need to improve the human condition with the imperative of preserving the centrality of American power in world affairs. Several such recent attempts can be identified. During the first two years of the Clinton administration, the advocacy of “assertive multilateralism” did not sufficiently take into account the basic realities of contemporary power.”

policy guidance of 1992<sup>22</sup>, the Project for the New American Century, his election campaign speeches and the concerns and principles expressed by Condoleezza Rice before the elections. In his inaugural address, President Bush desired to make the US military beyond challenge, prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), expand freedom everywhere in the world and spread the American values to all nations:

“We will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest weakness invite challenge. We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new horrors. The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will defend our allies and our interests. We will show purpose without arrogance. We will meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength. And to all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth.”

(Bush 2001a)

In February, he desired to make a military, which was “second to none” (Bush 2001b). Two months later, President Bush expressed the similar view in the National Defense University, Washington. He was concerned at the possible proliferation of the WMD and appeared determined to prevent the spread of WMD particularly in the hands of the ‘least responsible states’. He stated:

....Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at incredible speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world. Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the *world’s least-responsible states* (Bush 2001c).

Bush also talked about using both offensive and defensive measures to deny WMD to those who wanted to acquire it. The offensive measures included the preventive actions, while the defensive measures included the missile defence, marking that the ABM Treaty had become irrelevant. In this way, he made it clear that the US will do every think to

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<sup>22</sup> This draft had appeared in an article by PE Tyler, ‘US strategy plans calls for insuring no rivals develop: a one-superpower world’ in *New York Times* on 8 March 199 2.

achieve its national interest to which he conjoined with the 'world peace': a clear message on the spread of the US values worldwide. According to Bush:

We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces...We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace (Bush 2001c).

Even before the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, there were several emerging trends, which indicated the *Bush Doctrine in making*. First, there was repeated demand for maintaining the superiority of the US military and prevent the emergence of any *peer competitor*. Secondly, a new world order was to be made when US values such as democracy, open market, human dignity and freedom would prevail. Thirdly, the US was not just to react but shape the world events and act against the possible threats to its interests before they became a reality. The military dominance would enable as the preventive or pre-emptive actions whereas the Missile Defense would tackle threats from rogue regimes. Fourthly, the US was willing to act unilaterally or with the ad-hoc coalitions or The UN depending upon the ground realities. Fifthly, ABM Treaty, Kyoto Protocol, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were put on low. Finally Iraq, North Korea and Iran were told that they were 'rouge regimes' and that they should opt for democracy.

### **3.6 Trends after 9/11**

The terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 proved to be a fertile ground for the Bush administration to implement its grand strategy articulated by the neo-conservatives writers. The US Presidents statements and remarks since that fateful event reflected neo-conservative views and convictions. He expressed his determination to promote the American values of freedom<sup>23</sup> and democracy and told that terrorists hated the United States because of its 'great values'. He said:

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<sup>23</sup> Freedom always did not have the same meaning for President Bush. Sometimes it promoted values and sometimes, the national interest, which became clear from his another speech while appreciating the US

These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong. A great people have been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining (Bush 2001d).

In the same speech, he prepared the background for attacking the so-called 'evil regimes', particularly Iraq when he said, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them". Three days after the attack on 14 September 2001, the President's foreign policy theme was to '*get the world rid of the evils*'. He said, "... Our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing" (Bush 2001e).

On 20 September 2001, while addressing the Joint Session of the US Congress, George Bush told that his war against Iraq would be different from the First Gulf war and the American initiatives in Kosovo, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Instead, he stressed that this war would involve ground troops and the US might face military causality involved far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes (Bush 2001f). He asked the American to be ready for a lengthy battle, which might include all types of war tactics and media coverage:

We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. *Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists*. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. (Emphasis added)

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Arm forces: "In our sleep we don't think about the enemies that the men and women who wear the uniform deter, the friends they reassure, and *the freedom in trade they guarantee*. Yet, we rest at night protected by the security they provide." (GW Bush: 2001d)



In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush reiterating his prior commitments. He was of the opinion that the *global war against terrorism* had spread democracy and freedom across Afghanistan, particularly for women. He told that the war in Afghanistan was spreading the universal values of the United States to the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan who were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school were free, and were part of Afghanistan's new government established after the overthrow of the Taliban. By emphasizing on initial small success in Afghanistan, he wanted to strengthen the domestic public opinion, which was, fortunately, in favour of Bush's policies until then.

In the same speech he called for preventive<sup>24</sup> actions against the irresponsible states and terrorists who were threat to the world peace. His concern regarding the WMD was also reflected in his argument that so long as training camps operated; so long as nations harboured terrorists, freedom was at risk and the United States must prevent the terrorists and regimes who sought chemical, biological or nuclear weapons for threatening the United States and the world.

President Bush's readiness for unilateral war was clear in his declaration: "...Some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will." There was special mention of Iraq, Iran and North Korea and their desire to acquire nuclear weapons. He vowed to work closely with the allies to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction.

These, states and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil<sup>25</sup>, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to

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<sup>24</sup> The United States has been involved in several other preemptive actions. These include the United States sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the invasion of Panama in 1989, the intervention in Haiti in 1994, and the combined NATO and United States actions against Yugoslavia in 1999. This list is not all-inclusive; it could include other humanitarian and covert operations that are much less visible.

<sup>25</sup> According to Sergei Rogov (2003), the fight against the "axis of evil" - Iraq, Iran and North Korea- was declared the second priority of US policy. Unlike the faceless terrorists, the "rogue states" are enemies with a specific address. These countries have become the new version of the historical enemies of the United States: the axis of "Germany, Italy and Japan" in World War II and the "evil empire"-that is the USSR during the "cold war".

terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States (Bush 2002).

The State of the Union Address was an opportunity for the President (G W Bush) to disclose his grand strategy for Home Land Security i.e. transformation of the military and development of the National Missile Defense system to make response pre-emptive-. “...We need to replace aging aircraft and make our military more agile, to put our troops anywhere in the world quickly and safely”. He once again reiterated the views expressed by Condoleezza Rice before the election that America would always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity- the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.

### **3.7 National Security Strategy and the Bush Doctrine**

The National Security Strategy Report issued in 2002 reflected some of the views of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). It starts with the arrogance of the PNAC, declaring that the United States possessed ‘unprecedented’ and ‘unequaled’ strength and influence in the world. The impact of the 9/11 incident was clear when it declared that the US was threatened less by the ‘*conquering states*’ than by the ‘*failing ones*’. It called for a united action of the United States along with its allies and friends to defeat the ‘*embittered few*’ having catastrophic technologies. Thus, it outlined that the US was to fear from those failing ones that were among the *embittered few*. This had been the guiding principle of the US policy of selective engagement. It is a well-established fact that the United States has intervened only in those cases where its national interests were involved.

The report mentioned that the future US strategy would be based on a distinctly ‘American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests’ (NSS 2002). It outlined that in order to achieve these goals United States would strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism, defuse regional conflicts, prevent weapons of mass destruction; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building

the infrastructure of democracy; and promote human dignity, free market and free trade. The NSS (2002) also speaks out that the United States would foreign aid and its influence in the international organizations to assist those who believe in democracy, freedom, rights and human dignity and oppose those who resist these values.

The report also expressed concern regarding the rogue states. The National Security Strategy defined the qualities of the rogue states as- disregard for international laws and treaties, threatening their neighbours, determined to acquire WMD, promoting terrorism around the globe, brutalizing their own people, rejecting basic human values and hating the United States and the values for which it stands. It, then, proposed that the US must be prepared to stop *rogue states* and their *terrorist clients* before they were able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and its allies and friends. At the same time the traditional concept of '*deterrence*' were not to work against the terrorists. Therefore, it called for the preventive action, "We cannot let our enemies strike first."

Along with the prescription about the course of action, the NSS (2002) also contained the justifications for these actions. It referred that for centuries international law recognized that nations did not need to suffer an attack before they could lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. And that the legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat- most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

It pointed out that the United States had long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to national security. Since the uncertainty remains at the time and place of enemy's attack the United States would, if necessary, act '*preemptively*' to forestall or '*prevent*' such hostile acts by the adversaries, said the report. Such *anticipatory action* was to be accompanied by "...proactive counter-proliferation efforts, strengthened nonproliferation efforts, and effective consequence

management to respond to the effects of WMD use". These were in addition to the effective missile defense system and military modernization.

There was a striking similarity of views in the NSS (2002) and Bush's first inaugural address. Washington would take all the actions necessary to ensure that the efforts to meet global security commitments of the United States and protection of the Americans was not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction was not extend to Americans and which was not acceptable to the US. In nutshell, the NSS (2002) of the United States was the mouthpiece of the Bush Doctrine.

On 1 June 2002, while delivering his Graduation Speech at West Point, President Bush said that:

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long .... Our security will require transforming the military you will lead — a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.

Further, in his State of the Union Address in 2003, President Bush stated that the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, was the outlaw regimes that sought and possessed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. He was also concerned that such regimes could give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation. He emphasized that the war against terror was the contest of will in which perseverance was power. He pointed that-

Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world; it is God's gift to humanity<sup>26</sup> (Bush 2003).

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<sup>26</sup> In the same speech, President Bush also mentioned, "Across the Earth, America is feeding the hungry - more than 60 percent of international food aid comes as a gift from the people of the United States. As our nation moves troops and builds alliances to make our world safer, we must also remember our calling as a blessed country is to make this world better."

### 3.8 Bush Doctrine and American Exceptionalism:

America's unique historical development, especially the distinctive social traditions and the conditions, that emerged from its revolutionary origins, have underpinned the idea of 'American exceptionalism' (Beeson 2004). Mark Beeson is of the view that outsiders may regard the American attachment to liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez faire - which Lipset claims embody the 'American creed'<sup>27</sup> - with varying degrees of admiration, incredulity or bafflement, but one should not underestimate how powerful a force such ideas have been in defining a sense of national identity and, by extension, American foreign policy. Indeed, unless we recognize how important the moral dimension of both America's domestic life and its foreign policy remain, we shall not be able to understand why the characterization of the Bush regime's post-September 11 policy stance as a 'war against evil' resonated so powerfully with so many Americans. As Lipset (in Beeson 2004) points out:

To endorse a war and call on people to kill others and die for the country, Americans must define their role in a conflict as being on God's side against Satan-for morality against evil, not, in its self-perception, to defend national interests.

There may be many ground to criticize the discourse which legitimized the 'global war on terrorism' but in a country where well over 90 per cent of the population profess a belief in God, it is difficult to overestimate the continuing importance of religion generally and Christianity in particular as a source of identity, belief and political mobilization. Therefore, this sense of exceptionalism, and the belief that the US is a unique country with a possibly God-given historical mission, has shaped US foreign policy and given rise to the idea that America and American values must provide a beacon for the world (McDougall 1997). Distinct from traditional great powers, US political identity has been organized around a particular conception of the national

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<sup>27</sup> The term "American Creed" was introduced by Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944).

purpose, expressed in foreign policy as the belief that Americans are “a chosen people,” an elect nation guided by a “special providence” to demonstrate the viability and spread of the democratic institutions and values that inform the American experiment.

The NSS (2002) claimed, “America is not just a stronger, but is a freer and more just society” and called for standing firmly for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity, rule of law, limits on the absolute power of the state, free speech, freedom of worship, equal justice, respect for women, religious and ethnic tolerance and respect for private property. As Beeson (2004) noted, it was a vision that needed to be actively exported: assumptions about the presumed superiority, universality and desirability of American values, in combination with a growing economic, political and strategic power to impose such a morally informed model on other countries, meant that America’s increasing engagement with the world would be overlaid with distinctive American norms on the one hand, and inescapable structural dominance on the other. Historically, this doctrine has referred to “the perception that the United States differs qualitatively from other developed nations, because of its unique origins, national credo, historical evolution, and distinctive political and religious institutions” (Monten 2005).

Although grounded in the same nationalist premise of liberal exceptionalism, two contending schools have developed with respect to the long-term promotion of democratic change. One perspective-which, following historian H.W. Brands, termed as “exemplarism”- conceives of the United States as founded in separation from Cold World politics and the balance of power system. It suggests that US institutions and values should be perfected and preserved, often but not exclusively through isolation. The United States exerts influence on the world through the force of its example; an activist foreign policy may even corrupt liberal practices at home, undermining the potency of the US model. A second perspective- “vindicationism”-shares this “city on a hill” identity, but argues that the United States must move beyond example and undertake active

measures to spread its universal political values and institutions<sup>28</sup>. Bush Doctrine comes in the latter category.

Students of U.S history generally agree on the direction of change: whereas the first few generations of US political leaders believed that the United States was exceptional for the example it set, vindicationism largely prevailed in the twentieth century, culminating in a Bush Doctrine in which the active- and even coercive- promotion of democracy is a central component of US grand strategy. Writing in *US News & World Report*, Michael Barone accurately captured the logic of US exceptionalism- “Every nation is unique, but America is the most unique” (Barone 2004).

There is anonymity among the Americans that they are chosen people with special responsibility but there are differences regarding the methods and plans of actions to fulfill this responsibility. Making the world a better place by defending and, where possible, exporting democratic ideals and liberal capitalism have been the recurring leitmotifs of American foreign policy. However, the current generations of neocon thinkers differ from earlier Wilsonian idealists because ‘their promotion of democracy is not for the sake of democracy and human rights in the world’ (Kagan 2002). Rather, democracy promotion is meant to bolster America’s security and to further world preeminence’ (Wolfson in Beeson 2004). However, for some Americans democracy, promotion is not just another foreign policy instrument or idealist diversion; it is central to US political identity and sense of national purpose (Monten 2005).

Many have argued that preemption is unprecedented and against all principles that the United States has articulated as its core value system. In other words, opponents viewed the Bush Doctrine as arrogant, overaggressive, and bullish (Kagan 2004). Yet there are even some spiritual justifications to the preventive actions. The book of Exodus, (Chapter

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<sup>28</sup> Anthony Smith, a British historian of nationalism, recognizes this same dichotomy in more general terms, drawing a distinction between “covenanted peoples” who “turn inward away from the profane world” and “missionary peoples” who “seek to expand into and transform the world.” Quoted in Monten, Jonathan, (2005) “Roots of the Bush doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in US Strategy.”

2, Verse 2), allows that “if a thief is caught breaking in and is struck so that he dies, the defender is not guilty of bloodshed.” Broadly interpreted, this biblical judgment authorizes striking before being struck. The act of breaking in can be perceived as an immediate threat, therefore, the defender is justified to respond preemptively. Likewise, WMD capabilities greatly expand the space over which a threat can extend and the extent to which preemption may apply. As far back as biblical times, the concept of preemption can be found. The Old Testament of The Bible articulates violence as a means to enforce justice and this is not substantively different from current day use in the international arena (Bowma 2005).

This aspect of the American foreign policy has created tension and controversy among its citizens. The erosion in the ideal and moral aspect of the superiority of the American domestic values and political practices is being greatly mourned. It has proved divisive in case of the Iraq War and has undermined the United States claim as the leader of the Post-Cold War world.

To conclude, the evolution of the Bush Doctrine does not mark any change in the direction of United States’ foreign policy in true sense of the term. It contains the “threatening” voice of the *Monroe Doctrine*, temptation of the *Roosevelt Corollary*, world view of President Truman and love for the Middle East<sup>29</sup> like the Eisenhower. It also contains the arrogance of the Kennedy Doctrine, belief in military action like the Nixon Doctrine, and is extension of the policies of President Carter and President Reagan. At last, Bill Clinton had prepared the ground for the development of the Bush doctrine by issuing the NSS 1996 and NSS 1998. At the same time it cannot be completely realist or completely neo-conservative ideology. Rather it has the impact of both. Its contents are realist but justifications are neo-conservative. It is realist as far as it tries to maintain the American hegemony and intends to act on the threat perception. It is

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<sup>29</sup> This love, in case of either Eisenhower or G W Bush, was not for the well-being of the people of the Middle East but because of the strategic importance of the region and control over the petroleum resources and also the belief of the Americans that the promotion and strengthening of democracy was useful for the American interests.



neo-conservative as far as it overemphasizes on the military solution of the problems and gives unrealistic justification for military actions.

It can be said that, the Bush Doctrine was essentially idealist policy of past with an aggressive means. It had an idealist strand and a power strand: Wilsonianism provided the idealism; an emphasis on military power provided the teeth. It developed due to the over-optimism of the neo-conservatives in the *Revolution in the Military Affairs* and the notion of the 'benign hegemon'. The most plausible objection to the Bush Doctrine is that it established a dangerous precedent. It emphasised on unilateralism, militarism, deposition of tyrants, elimination of terrorism, promotion of democracy, human rights and so-called 'American values'. But it had only one inherent motive- to maintain and strengthen the supremacy of the United States in the international affairs.

*Chapter 3: Application of Bush Doctrine in  
Afghanistan and Iraq*

## **Chapter-3**

### **Application of Bush Doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Bush Doctrine, which was an immediate response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, was first implemented in Afghanistan, which was a Taliban controlled territory and then in Iraq which was also ruled by a tyrant. However, the attack on Afghanistan was different from that in Iraq in many ways. It had tremendous public opinion behind it in the US as well as in the whole world. It also enjoyed the legitimacy of the UN general Assembly and Security Council. Then the US intervened in Iraq, even some NATO members were dead opposed to it.

The principle of just cause was perhaps the most important component of the justification, since it defined the moral goals and ethical reasons that led nations into war. Throughout the 1990s, US civilian and military personnel were targeted several times in and outside the US by the al Qaida terrorists. Among these were terror attacks in Somalia, the World Trade Centre in 1993, Oklahoma City in 1995, the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, American Embassies in East Africa in 1998, and the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. However, the devastating terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 on the United States were unlike any other attack in recent memory.

Unilateral action, democracy promotion, and pre-emptive action against the perceived enemy state were integral part of the Bush Doctrine. So, Afghanistan war presented the partial implementation of the Bush Doctrine.

#### **4.2 Bush Doctrine and the Afghanistan war**

As regards the implementation of the Bush Doctrine in Afghanistan, it was partially implemented there because the full-fledged Bush Doctrine came into light after the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, there is no doubt that it proved to be testing ground for the Bush Administration to further its agenda in Iraq. The following

paragraphs attempt to analyze the extent of the application of the Bush Doctrine in Afghanistan.

**a). Unilateralism:**

The NSS (2002) advocates unilateral action to bring the terrorists to justice. But the post 9/11 actions of the United States were supported by the world community with almost one voice. Major differences were there, regarding the means but on the question of the ends, everyone agreed. It was supported by The UN' resolutions and the subsequent resolutions passed by the various nations' Parliaments. In this way, the war in Afghanistan was not unilateral but multilateral participated by many countries directly or indirectly under the leadership of NATO and ISAF. Some countries like China, which did not participate in the attacks, latter joined the reconstruction programmes.

It is noteworthy that as a reaction to the 9/11, President Bush promised before the American citizens to use all the resources at his disposal to punish the perpetrators of this crime. At the same time, he also warned the neutral nations by saying that they were either with the terrorists or against them and that there was no third way. Such a strong commitment showed that the US was ready to take unilateral action but could also entertain multilateral support.

**b). Democracy Promotion**

As seen in the previous chapter, the concern for the promotion of democracy was repeatedly occurred in the speeches of President Bush. Besides other issues, "democratic deficit" in many Muslim countries was the leading concern, which gathered the global support for the 'Operation Enduring freedom'. According to George W. Bush, democracy was an integral part of the American value system and it needed to be promoted by overthrowing the theocratic regime of the Taliban and providing economic and political support to the new government of Afghanistan.

After the overthrow of the Taliban, a democratic government was established in Afghanistan. At first, the allied forces were welcomed by the natives but with the passage of time when it became clear that the US-led NATO forces had some hidden agenda

behind the 'Operation Enduring Freedom' and that the US was planning to stay in Afghanistan for an indefinite period, all the enthusiasm and support of the Afghan citizens disappeared. In this way, the Bush Administration got success in establishing democracy in Afghanistan but there persist a permanent question mark on its future and success amidst growing insurgency and suicide attacks. But one thing is clear that religious fundamentalism and anti-Americanism are rising day by day which was never expected by the neo-conservatives at the time of the attack.

**c). Pre-emption:**

In order to punish the terrorists, it became reasonable for the Bush Administration to correct the injustice through the prevention of the future injustices via a forward-looking approach that combined both defensive responses and offensive measures to obviate the future threats. The administration's immediate shift toward interpreting the attacks as acts of war rather than international crime carried several implications. In doing so, the Administration reserved for itself judgments over the legitimacy of the cause for using military force. More importantly, the administration could now heighten America's grievances beyond 9/11 to include offensive military force within the realm of "responding aggression".

But attacks on Afghanistan was not a preemptive instead it was preventive and responsive. It was responsive because it was in retaliation of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It may also be called preventive because it aimed to stop the future attacks on the US and its allies by the al Qaida and other terrorist groups. At the same time it also presented a lesson for those states, which intended to attack the US directly or were supporting the hostile groups against the US.

**4.3 War in Iraq:**

Iraq War is said to be a good example of the implementation of the Bush Doctrine. It was for the overthrow of tyranny, promotion of democracy, elimination of terrorism; it was both preemptive and preventive. Whether this initiative was a realist or neo-conservative

approved or something else there is an unending debate on the issue. But one thing is clear that Iraq war has demonstrated the weakness of the so-called “Revolution in the Military Affairs” (RMA). The RMA failed to produce quick results for the US in Iraq. The long drawn-out US military intervention, on the one hand, has generated anti-Americanism not only in Iraq but also in various parts of the world.

The application of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq sparked a big debate among the academics and commentators on international affairs. The debate between the realist school and the neo-conservative analysts is quite illuminating. In this chapter, we will first examine the Realist vs. Neo-conservative debate and would try to find out whether it was a realist or neo-conservative decision. After that, an effort would be made to see the resolutions of The UN and response of Iraq to the various resolutions of the Security Council. At last, there will be an effort to see the extent of the implementations of Bush Doctrine in Iraq.

**a). Realist and Neo-conservative debate over Iraq war:**

There is lack of unanimity among the scholars regarding the nature of the decision to go to war with Iraq. For some scholars it was influenced by realist ideology while for others it was a neo-conservative decision. The realists have criticized it for being neo-conservative and unrealistic on the other hand neo-conservatives have praised it for being neo-conservative and better option than that of the realists’. There are still some others, who have criticized the Bush Doctrine not for being neo-conservative or realist but for being immoral, inhumane, illegal, radical, and against the international norms and traditions.

As regards the realist stand, many realist scholars never accepted the arguments advanced by the neoconservatives and had vehemently criticized the Bush Doctrine. In response to the Bush Administration’s growing moves toward invasion, a number of American realists like Walt and Mearsheimer attempted to enter the public debate and make the case that it was unwise for the United States to choose war with Iraq. Not only did they foresee a host of problems that would likely accompany the United States’ occupation of the country, but they also found it unnecessary and counterproductive to invade Iraq

(Starobin 2006). Realists argued that the invasion of Iraq would divert attention away from dealing with the real task that is terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda, including the search for Osama bin Laden and the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

To the extent that neoconservatism embraces a liberal theory of international relations, it is not surprising that many realists view the Bush Doctrine as a 'recipe for disaster'. Since at least the time of Hans J. Morgenthau, realists have been fierce critics of the tendency of the United States to engage in moralistic foreign policy crusades to remake the world in its own image. In this view, the grand project of spreading democracy to the Middle East on the basis of alleged universal liberal principles is simply the latest example of a moralistic and crusading spirit in American foreign policy. While neoconservatives want to imbue the key concept of the American national interest with universal moral principles and values, classical realists such as Morgenthau and George Kennan argued that this is precisely what led to so many of the United States' foreign policy blunders (Morgenthau 1951). The national interest, according to Morgenthau, must be derived from the specific interests of the United States, which at a minimum are to protect its "physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations," (Morgenthau 1952). While never denying that realism had to embrace political values, he stressed that the national interest must also be commensurate with the power available to the United States. In 1947, he wrote "a foreign policy based upon a moral principle, which by definition relegates the national interest to the background (if it does not neglect it altogether) is of necessity a policy of national suicide, actual or potential" (Morgenthau 1949).

Although Bush and the neoconservatives wholeheartedly embrace the liberal premise that democracies have distinctive foreign policies and exercise peaceful restraint in their relations with other democracies, realists have been fierce critics of the so-called democratic peace thesis (Layne 1994). As Mearsheimer (2005) observes, "the neo-conservatives' theory of international politics focuses on promoting democracy, which they believe is the most powerful ideology on the face of the earth." He adds, they also "believe that the world divides into good states and bad states, and that the democracies

are the white hats.” In contrast to theorists of the democratic peace, structural realists argued that systemic pressures force all states, democracies and non-democracies alike, to act in a similar manner.

Realists also called into question the neoconservative’s pristine account of the history of American foreign policy behavior and the notion of “American exceptionalism.” While often portrayed as standing for good over evil, the history of American foreign policy, including its relationship to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, provided plenty of examples of ruthless and less than moral behavior. Not only did the realists dispute the notion that the internal character of a regime determines its external behavior, but they were also extremely dubious that the United States has the capabilities, know-how, and perseverance to bring about democracy in Iraq or any other state in the world. As many have noted, the United States does not have a strong track record of successful nation building (Schmidt and Williams 2007).

In contrast to neo-conservatism’s claim that democracy was the most powerful ideology in the world, realists stressed the power of nationalism. Despite the fact that nationalism was strongly visible during the Vietnam War, and is clearly visible today in the lethal insurgency underway in Iraq, the neoconservatives who planned the attack on Iraq simply discounted its potential impact, choosing instead to believe that the United States’ armed forces would be greeted as liberators<sup>30</sup>. Realists who emphasized nationalism warned of the dangers of invading a multi-ethnic Middle Eastern state and they had largely been vindicated. With the hindsight of the Cold War, Mearsheimer (2005) notes, “realists thought from the start that it was foolish in the age of nationalism to think that the United States could invade and occupy Iraq and other countries in the Middle East for the purpose of altering their political systems in ways that would make them friendly to America.”

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<sup>30</sup> Mearsheimer (2005) says, “There are other cases which demonstrate that nationalism quickly turns liberators into occupiers, who then face a major insurrection. The Israelis, for example, invaded Lebanon in 1982 and were at first welcomed as liberators. But they overstayed their welcome and generated an insurgency which drove them out of Lebanon eighteen years later.” This happens when the cherished goal of liberty is denied to the people by the liberators themselves, which arouse their nationalist sentiments.



Realists strongly disagreed with the neoconservative's assertion that, following the invasion of Iraq, other countries would seek to either align themselves with the United States or reform their domestic political system to suit America's liking. Stephen Walt, for example, holds that by employing bandwagoning logic, neoconservatives incorrectly argued "that displays of power and resolve by the United States will discourage further resistance and lead more and more states to conclude that it is time to get on our side" (Walt 2005). Contrary to this, realists, according to Mearsheimer (2005), "...tend to believe that we live in a balancing world, in which, when one state puts its fist in another state's face, the target usually does not throw its hands in the air and surrender. Instead, it looks for ways to defend itself; it balances against the threatening state." Thus, the neo-conservative policy will decrease the influence of the US instead of increasing it.

In direct contrast with the neoconservatives, Mearsheimer (2002) argues, "...instead of building an empire - which will increase anti-American hatred and put US forces on the front lines around the world - the United States should seek to reduce its military footprint and use force sparingly." Neoconservatives and others, however, argued that, given the superior power advantage that the United States currently possessed, balance of power politics was hardly relevant. They saw no evidence that other states were even attempting to balance what they perceived to be the overwhelming, yet benevolent, power of the United States. Balance of threat theory, according to Walt, "argues that states form alliances to balance against threats. Threats, in turn, are a function of power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions" (Walt 2002). Thus, the overwhelming emphasis on the so-called benevolent power of the US, advocated by the neo-conservatives, would create enemy alliances with aggressive intentions, which might work against the national interest of the United States.

The preventive use of force under the Bush Doctrine made clear before the world that not only did the United States have abundance of power but also aggressive intentions. As Walt (2005) observed, "the war in Iraq reinforced global concerns about the unchecked nature of US power." By using "force against Iraq- in defiance of the Security Council and widespread global opposition." Walt (2005) argued that more and more states began to view the problem of US primacy in the following manner: "how can other states be

comfortable and secure when US decisions affected all of their interests, and when the United States is strong enough to act pretty much as it wishes?" In this view, one of the ironies of the militaristic, aggressive, and unilateral nature of the Bush administration's foreign policy was that it was actually encouraging other states to engage in balancing behavior against the United States. As Pape (2005) argues, "the Bush strategy of aggressive unilateralism is changing the United States' long-enjoyed reputation for benign intent and giving other major powers reason to fear its power." It would ultimately lead to an incredibly sharp decline in the favorable opinion that others around the world have of the United States and greatly jeopardise the ability of the United States to engage in successful diplomacy, which realists since Morgenthau have recognized to be a crucial component of state power. Thus, leading to the inefficient foreign policy and endangered national interest of the United States.

According to the realists, the United States could contain Iraq indefinitely and that the preventive use of military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power was harmful to the American national interest.<sup>31</sup> During the thirty years that Saddam was in power, Iraq started two wars with its neighbors: with Iran in 1980 and in 1990 with Kuwait. Mearsheimer and Walt (2003a) observe, "Saddam's record in this regard is no worse than that of neighboring states such as Egypt or Israel, each of which played a role in starting several wars since 1948." In their opinion, even if Iraq did possess WMD, including nuclear weapons, the United States could have deterred Saddam Hussein from using them against any country, thus making preventive war unnecessary. According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2003a), "the historical record shows that the United States can contain Iraq effectively even if Saddam has nuclear weapons just as it contained the Soviet Union during the Cold War." Thus, while Iraq could use chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iranians because they could not retaliate in kind, this would not have been the case with the United States, since it could retaliate with overwhelming force, including weapons of mass destruction. Mearsheimer and Walt (2003b) add, "...this is why Mr. Hussein did not use chemical or biological weapons against American forces or Israel during the 1991 Persian Gulf War." Walt also dismissed the notion that Saddam Hussein

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<sup>31</sup> "War with Iraq is Not in America's National Interest," *New York Times*, 26 September, 2002.

would hand-off his WMD to groups such as al Qaeda who could use them against the United States because the policies of Saddam in the recent history of Iraq had showed that he wanted to survive and remain in power.

However, the neo-conservatives have their own set of arguments against the realist stand on foreign policy. According to Brian and Michael (2007), neo-conservatives' criticism of realism is based mainly on three points. First, realism is not clear as to what is national interest, and severs values from foreign policy and thus, suffers the fate of modern rationalism as a whole. It is a symptom of the decline of both intellectual and political life: a mark of decadence masquerading as objectivity that contributes to processes of social erosion, fragmentation, and 'decadence', and that undermines the maintenance of a viable conception of the public interest and - by extension - the national interest. Realism paradoxically encourages a division between morality and foreign policy that reflects the liberal divide between interests and ethics and in the process undermines both. Second, neo-conservatives viewed the realist policy guided by traditional *realpolitik* alone as profoundly unrealistic. They said that unable to connect adequately to the values and identity of the American people, a realist foreign policy would fail to generate either the commitment or the resources necessary to ensure its success. Finally, instead of providing security for American society, a realist foreign policy actually contributes to its decay. It is lacking a clear vision of the national interest that can be explained to citizens and connected to their values. Thus, realist foreign policy is of necessity often duplicitous.

In an early call for a "neo-Reaganite foreign policy", Kristol and Kagan (1996) drew upon this theme to insist, "It is already clear that, on the present course, Washington will find it increasingly impossible to fulfill even the less ambitious foreign policies of the realists, including the defense of so-called 'vital' national interests in Europe and Asia. Without a broad, sustaining foreign policy vision, the American people will be inclined to withdraw from the world and will lose sight of their abiding interest in vigorous world leadership. Without a sense of mission, they will seek deeper and deeper cuts in the defense and foreign affairs budgets and gradually decimate the tools of US hegemony".

Thus, according to Brian and Michael, neo-conservatives thought that far from protecting the state, realist theories of the national interest actually endangered it. Disconnected from values, realism could not give any content to the national interest beyond a minimal and ultimately ineffective and debilitating pragmatism, or a corrosive cynicism. A manipulative 'realism' would only lead to decline – incapable of pulling people with it and thereby gaining the necessary resources and support, it would either fail, or would have to resort to secrecy and manipulation, thus furthering in practice the social cynicism about values that it advocated in theory. Corrosive of support abroad and eroding virtue at home, it was ultimately ineffective internationally and destructive domestically. What was even worse, in this process realism actually deprives modern societies of one of the most effective means of mobilizing virtue and combating decadence – the idea of the national interest itself. In the neoconservative vision, the national interest could be used to counter modernity's worst dynamics. A "moral" foreign policy reinforced virtues and values in the citizenry of the US, and it would receive their support by pursuing a national interest that was an expression of their values, and which they could identify with. By contrast, realism removed the potential for the idea of the national interest, and national values, to be used as an effective form of political mobilization and reformation in support of a virtuous polity. The national interest thus needed to be recaptured from traditional realists in both theory and practice so that it could become a substantive guide and mobilizing symbol in foreign policy, and contributed to political reconstruction at home. (Kristol and Brooks 1997)

The critics of the war were less uniform. Most held that the objectives of Bush's policies were justifiable, but that ignorance, miscalculations, or ideology had blocked their realization. Such would seem to be the cases with Fareed Zakaria, Fouad Ajami, Eliot A. Cohen, and David Brooks, among others. The editors of *National Review* (3 May 2004), who fell into this category, put their objections bluntly: "There probably weren't enough troops. The administration probably was not determined enough to get international help, even on its own terms.... The administration clearly wasn't ready for the magnitude of the task that rebuilding and occupying Iraq would present." Having said this, the *National Review* editors, like most that saw similar shortcomings; cautioned that, "allowing

radicals to prevail there would be a sharp setback in the War on Terror.” They pinned their hopes on an orderly withdrawal from a stable, but not necessarily democratic, Iraq. Yet others who acknowledged mistakes in the execution of the war contended that they were obliged to stay the course and achieve the original goals. Sullivan (2002), for instance, took the editors of National Review to task, arguing that their “skepticism and realism” should have led them to oppose the “intervention in the first place as the Buchanan brigades averred.”

#### **b). UN Charter and Legality of Pre-emptive Strike**

The UN (UN) does not allow pre-emptive strikes by an individual nation or groups of nations without the authorization of the Security Council. The preamble of the UN Charter states that the UN was established “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. The substantive provisions of the charter obligate its members to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means” (Article 2[3]) and to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of The UN” (Article 2[4]). In place of the traditional right of states to use force against another member, the charter creates a system of collective security in which the Security Council is authorized to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to “decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain international peace and security” (Article 39). Under Article 42, it has the authority to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Although the UN Charter denies the use of force by states against their adversaries, it does recognize the right of nations to use force for the purpose of self-defense (Article 51).

However, the above right to self-defense comes into effect only when an armed attack has already occurred and the Security Council has not been able to take the necessary measures to thwart the attack. Thus, Article 51 precludes the pre-emptive use of force by individual states or groupings of states and reserves such use of force exclusively to the

Security Council. Measures in self-defense, in this context, are legitimate only after an armed attack has already occurred.

However, the exact scope of the right to self-defense has been the subject of controversy and ongoing debate. Some scholars argue that Article 51 should not be construed so narrowly, because to do so have the unintended consequence of protecting an aggressor's right to strike first (Waldock cited in Roberts 1999). To avoid this result, some assert that Article 51 recognizes and preserves the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" as developed in customary international law. The reference to that right not being impaired "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN," it is said, merely emphasizes one important situation in which that right may be exercised, but does not exclude or exhaust other possibilities (Gupta 2008).

But the main debate that arose during the Iraq war was whether the phrase "if an armed attack occurs" rules out self-defense before an attack occur. To be more precise, does international law allow anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense? The US position on this issue was stated in *The National Security Strategy* (2002):

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat - most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush's National Security Adviser, further elaborated this stand in an address. :

Extremists who seem to view suicide as a sacrament are unlikely to ever be deterred. And new technology requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes "imminent." So as a matter of common sense, the United States must be prepared to take action, when necessary, before threats have fully materialized (Rice 2002).

Officers of the Bush administration argued that while a literal reading of Article 51 of the UN Charter suggested that self-defense was only lawful after an attack occurred, this would be absurd if it meant that a state must let itself be harmed, perhaps fatally, before it

could respond with force. In *Nicaragua v. United States* (ICJ 1986), the ICJ did not dismiss out of hand the possibility of some limited form of anticipatory self-defense. It merely stated, "...expresses no view on the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of an armed attack" as the issue was not raised in this instance (ICJ 1986). But the fact that the USA and its coalition did not approach the ICJ for its advisory opinion on the legality of its strike was in itself an admission that its aggression against Iraq was not legal and that international law would not have authorized such military intervention if it had gone to the world court. After the USA's experience before the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, it was highly unlikely that it would have submitted such a matter to the world court (Gupta 2008).

**c). UN Resolutions and Iraq War:**

Iraq thwarted the Security Council's disarmament demands for over twelve years following the first Persian Gulf War, frustrating repeated UN attempts at site inspections and withholding any full and accurate declaration of its inventories of weapons of mass destruction. In November 2002, Council Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one "final opportunity" to comply with the terms of the Council's disarmament mandate. Saddam deliberately lost this opportunity. In the event, an allied military coalition then acted to remove him from power. The military "coalition of the willing" was broad-based, composed of forty-nine allies led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.<sup>32</sup> By necessity, the military campaign was mounted without any additional Security Council resolution explicitly calling for the employment of force. The Security Council does not take straw polls, of course, but one veteran American diplomat has confided that a resolution reaffirming the use of force could have gained eleven votes. France made it clear that it would veto any such resolution, which made the exercise point-less and created a stark dilemma-whether to accept the procedural blockage of the Security Council, or to seek an alternative route to legitimacy and the recognition of

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<sup>32</sup> White House Information Sheet, Coalition Members (Online: Web) Accessed on 10 May, 2009 URL:[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303\\_27-10.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303_27-10.html).

legality. Procedural dynamism was an underlying feature of the Charter - a willingness, sometimes after lamentation and sometimes quietly, to allow alternative methods of decision-making.

Resolution 687 (1991) of the Security Council required, as a central condition of the cease-fire, that Iraq eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, and give a full and verifiable accounting of their disposal. This was unique legal condition, because the customary law did not forbid per se the simple possession of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. But Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, prior use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iranians, and front-line deployment of chemical and biological weapons in the first Gulf war forced the Security Council to impose a more rigorous bar.<sup>33</sup> Due to Iraq's record of misuse of such weapons, the cease-fire was founded on a solemn promise to give up all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and weapons stockpiles, precursors, and missiles with a range over 150 kilometers. The security guarantee was a prerequisite to the allied cease-fire in 1991, and incorporated by the Security Council as an operative requirement in Resolution 687.

In this way, flagrant and repetitive violation of the resolutions of the Security Council by Saddam resulted in the suspension of the cease-fire and permitted the allies to resume the forcible effort to gain Iraqi compliance. In addition, the companion terms of Resolution 678 (1990) explicitly authorized UN member states to use "all necessary means" for two stated purposes: to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to enforce all "subsequent relevant resolutions". Cease-fire Resolution 687 qualifies within that set of subsequent relevant resolutions.

Wedgwood (2003) is of the opinion that under such circumstances, the Security Council often substituted rhetoric for resolve. An antiquated resolution neglected for many years should not, perhaps, be easily revivable. But efforts to complete Iraq's disarmament held center stage in a decade of work. The inspection efforts by the UN Special Commission

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<sup>33</sup> US Government White Paper: Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (Online: Web) Accessed on 15 May 2009 URL: [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq\\_white\\_paper.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html).



on Iraq (UNSCOM) led by diplomats Rolf Ekeus and Richard Butler were supplemented by an independent review of Iraq's unexplained material balances by the Security Council's designee, Brazilian diplomat Celso Amorim, in 1998. The baton was then handed to the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) led by Hans Blix. The attempt to gain a credible accounting by Iraq of its weapons programs was ongoing and continuous, and frequently involved de facto warnings to Baghdad that noncompliance would entail forcible consequences. Economic sanctions were kept in place against Iraq despite the humanitarian hardships engineered by Saddam and the limited amelioration under the "Oil for Food" programme so as to induce Iraqi compliance with the disarmament terms. There was no desuetude.

In addition to the above, military action was used or threatened on several occasions by Council allies in order to carry out the mandate of Resolution 687. This was done without any additional Security Council enforcement resolution including in 1993, when French, British, and American forces engaged in a limited air campaign to regain access for inspectors to necessary Iraqi air facilities; and in March 1998, when the threat of allied force gained access to the presidential palaces. At the time of the crisis in March 1998, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan sidestepped any suggestion that a new Council resolution was needed for the use of force, instead noting only that "some sort of consultations with the other members would be required". Again, in December 1998, the United Kingdom and the United States responded to the de facto exclusion of inspectors by launching "Operation Desert Fox", a limited air campaign against Iraqi military sites, without any additional Security Council resolution (Wedgwood 2003).

Thus, the interval of twelve years did not lessen the authority of Resolutions 678 and 687. The passage of time rather testified to Saddam's obstinacy. There were occasions, the Security Council declared Iraq to be in "material breach" or "flagrant violation" of the conditions imposed by Resolution 687, and warned of "serious consequences" (SC Res. 1134: 1997). It is noteworthy that The UN never abandoned or suspended the effort to gain compliance, and it would be the height of irony to attempt to construct a claim of desuetude from the failure of the United States to threaten earlier to use the wholesale

force of which critics now complain. Resolution 687 was not an artifact from forgotten files. Rather, The UN was engaged throughout the interval, attempting to obtain Iraqi compliance by diplomatic means, multilateral economic sanctions, and the graduated threat of force. In addition, the efforts of the UN weapons inspectors gained credibility from the “no fly zones” and allied air presence in the North and South of Iraq. These were designed to protect the Kurds and the Shia from genocidal violence by Baghdad, after Saddam ruthlessly quelled revolts in the wake of the first Gulf war. Any open debate about the provenance of the air zones was limited by the certainty that without them Saddam would renew his attacks against Kurdish and Shia civilians.

It was seen that return to the Security Council in November 2002 in no way undermined the authority of Resolutions 678 and 687. In the final text of Resolution 1441, which was cosponsored by Britain and the United States, the Security Council reaffirmed that Iraq was in continuing “material breach” of Resolution 687. On the basis of the same resolution, Russia and France resisted a finding of material breach in the 1998 crisis because of a perceived linkage to the use of force. The new resolution also quietly acknowledged the conditional nature of the Gulf war cease-fire-invoking the Council’s 1991 declaration that a “ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of Resolution 687, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein” (SC Res.1441). The new resolution further “recalled” the past warnings of “serious consequences” if Iraq should fail to account for its inventory or fail to cooperate with the inspectors (SC Res.1441). The urgency of Iraqi performance was pronounced in the warning that this was “a final opportunity to comply” (SC Res.1441).

To be sure, the French permanent representative said that Resolution 1441 contained no stipulation of “automaticity” for the use of force<sup>34</sup>. Nevertheless, the United States permanent representative countered that the resolution also did not “constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.”<sup>35</sup> According to

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<sup>34</sup> UN Doc. S/PV.4644 (2002).

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

Wedgwood (2006), the debate over Resolution 1441 as a draw, and did not purport to revoke or amend the prior authority of Resolutions 678 and 687. At last, any exploration of further modalities became impossible by the French foreign minister's announcement in March 2003 that France would veto any new resolution that explicitly endorsed the use of force.

Baghdad yielded to the reentry of UN inspectors in December 2002 only after ninety thousand allied troops deployed to Gulf battle stations, and began to make grudging concessions to UN inspectors only as troop numbers grew to two hundred thousand. But the Bathist regime still refused to give any credible accounting of the missing Iraqi inventory that included 31,000 chemical warfare munitions, 600 tons of VX nerve gas precursors, and 17 tons of biological growth media<sup>36</sup> that could satisfy the US administration. It still refused to permit the interview of Iraqi weapons scientists outside the country. The last minute suggestion by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister that the regime had simply poured the deadly reagents into the desert soil was understandably not believed by the Bush administration that was determined to overthrow Saddam once and for all. The coalition's military action in March 2003 was, thus grounded not on a "smoking gun," but on "smoking documents" the irrefragable failure of Iraq to give a credible accounting of its weapons programs.

According to Wedgwood, legality may deserve to be seen as a question of degree, rather than an all or nothing choice. In addition, the age-old distinction between an objective account of legality and the matter of public acknowledgment may come into play. Interestingly, some states that disfavoured the allied action in Iraq did so with deliberate equivocation. Germany, for example, carefully refrained from labeling the allied action as "aggression"; for fear that, the German constitution would forbid the government from contributing air facilities to the campaign. Indeed, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer initially took the view that no "second" Council resolution was required at all, until the politics of the European Union pulled Berlin back to Paris's side.

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<sup>36</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Commission Established by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 9(b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), UN Doc. S/1997/774.

It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the allied victory over Saddam, no member of the Security Council or General Assembly has thought to propose that his regime should be restored as an expression of Iraqi political will. Indeed, the Security Council has returned to the fray with Resolution 1483 (2003), acknowledging the cooperative role of the allied occupation authority and The UN in contributing to the construction of a newly democratic Iraq through “the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future”. Resolution 1483 gives a political umbrella to countries that declined to join the prewar coalition, allowing them to participate in Iraq’s transformation hardly the usual denouement of an “illegal” use of force. Thus, the mandates of Resolutions 678 and 687 suffice to ground the allied action against Saddam’s regime. Requiring a second or (as some would have it) an “eighteenth” resolution was a *‘reductio ad absurdum’* for multilateralists who wish the Council’s substantive mandates to be treated seriously.

#### **4.4 Bush Doctrine in Iraq:**

##### **a). Pre-emptive/ Preventive Action:**

The preemptive “defensive war” doctrine and the “war on terrorism” against al Qaeda constituted essential building blocks of the Pentagon’s propaganda campaign. To justify preemptive military actions, the National Security Strategy (NSS) requires the fabrication of a terrorist threat<sup>37</sup> i.e., “an Outside Enemy”. It also needed to link these terrorist threats to “State sponsorship” by so-called “rogue states.” The objective was to present “preemptive military action”- meaning war as an act of “self-defense” against two categories of enemies, “rogue States” and “Islamic terrorists”, both of which are said to possess weapons of mass destruction:

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<sup>37</sup> To prepare a strong public opinion for extraordinary exertion and potential sacrifice there is a long and old tradition of overstatement in United States. In 1947 Senator Arthur Vandenberg explained to President Henry Truman that if he wanted the American People to take on international communism and re-engage war prone Europe he had to ‘scare the hell’ out of them. The adversary must be painted as black as possible, without any shades of gray let alone glimmers of white. Since then it has been understood in Washington that high-risk foreign policy requires selling of threat (Lawrence Freedman 2004).

The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. ... America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.... Rogue States and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction...

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,.... To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively (National Security Strategy 2002).

This “anticipatory action”, according to Michel Chossudovsky, under the NSS included the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which are now classified as “in theater weapons” to be used in conventional war theaters alongside conventional weapons. The propaganda emanating from the CIA and the Pentagon consisted in presenting Al Qaeda as capable of developing a nuclear device, which could be used in an attack on the United States.

According to a report of the CIA’s Intelligence Directorate:

Al Qaeda’s goal is the use of (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons) to cause mass casualties.... (Islamist extremists) have a wide variety of potential agents and delivery means to choose from for chemical, biological and radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attacks. (Washington Times 3 June 2003)

The National Security Strategy (2002) justified the preemptive use of nuclear weapons to defend America against Al Qaeda on the basis of the alleged nuclear threats from Al Qaeda.

The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (NDS) released in March 2005, by the Pentagon, broadly sketched Washington’s agenda for global military domination. While the NDS followed in the footsteps of the Administration’s “pre-

emptive” war doctrine as outlined in the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), it went much further in setting the contours of Washington’s global military agenda. Whereas the pre-emptive war doctrine envisaged military action as a means of “self defense” against countries categorized as “hostile” to the US, the 2005 NSD went one-step further. It envisaged the possibility of military intervention against countries, which did not visibly constitute a threat to the security of the American homeland. It called for a more “proactive” approach to warfare, beyond the weaker notion of “preemptive” and “defensive” actions, where military operations were launched against a “declared enemy” with a view to “preserving the peace” and “defending America”. The 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) aimed at “enhancing US influence around the world”, through increased troop deployments and a massive buildup of America’s advanced weapons systems. The new National Security doctrine outlined “four major threats to the United States”:

1. “Traditional challenges” are posed by well-known and recognized military powers using “well-understood” forms of war.
2. “Irregular threats” come from forces using so-called “unconventional” methods to counter stronger power.
3. “The catastrophic challenge” pertains to the “use of weapons of mass destruction by an enemy.
4. “Disruptive challenges” pertains to “potential adversaries utilizing new technologies to counter US advantages.”

(Bush 2005)

The NDS document explicitly acknowledged America’s global military mandate, beyond regional war theaters. This mandate, like NSS (2002), also includes military operations directed against so-called “failed states” or “unstable nations.”

Shortly after the release of the Pentagon’s March 2005 NDS document, the newly formed Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization under the National Intelligence Council (NIC) of the State Department confirmed that “US intelligence experts are preparing a list of 25

countries deemed unstable and, thus, candidates for [military] intervention”. The exercise aimed at identifying countries of “greatest instability and risk”, distinct from declared enemies or “Rogue States. America’s security was said to be threatened less by “conquering states than by the failed and failing ones”:

Conflict prevention and postwar reconstruction of failed and failing states had become a “mainstream foreign policy challenge” because of the dangers of terrorist groups and the availability of weapons of mass destruction....

The mandate of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization under the NIC is to prevent conflict, but also to prepare to react quickly when the US military had to intervene. Post-conflict work would focus on creating laws and institutions of a “market democracy”. ... Planning would include forming a “reserve corps” of specialist civilian teams and devising reconstruction contracts in advance with private companies and NGOs. (Financial Times 30 March 2005)

The justification for intervening militarily in these countries was based on America’s mandate to “help them stabilize” and put them on “a sustainable path”. One could expect that any national project, which went against Washington’s conception of a “free market democracy”, would be a candidate for possible military intervention (Chossudovsky 2005).

**b). Regime Change/ Democratization:**

According to Robbins (2006), Iraq had been at the center of US national security policy since the end of the Cold War. No other single country had consumed more American attention, wealth, and political capital since 1990. Furthermore, given the magnitude of the US investment in Iraq, coupled with its strategic location, the country was likely to remain one of the most significant US policy interests for years to come.

The location of Iraq at the center of the energy producing Near East was one factor making it essential to the US interests. Iraq has the world’s fourth greatest proven oil reserves, and borders on three other countries in the top five (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait). As long as the global economy remains dependent on fossil fuels, Iraq and the Near East generally would be vital for the United States.

Iraq was also important to the United States because it had become a testing ground for the spread of democracy in the region. The Near East, with the exception of Israel, had not been fruitful ground for democratic development. Twentieth-century democratic experiments in many Middle Eastern countries (including Iraq in the period 1932-1958) fell victim to either traditionalist or socialist forms of authoritarianism or institutional democracy gave way to civil war, as in the case of Lebanon. Political development in the region was being threatened by several strains of radicalized political Islam, which was generally hostile to Western conceptions of democracy and desired to establish a transnational Caliphate based on Sharia law. The United States had committed itself to seeing that the democratic experiment succeeded in Iraq and hoped that other countries in the region might follow suit. This critical ideological conflict would also keep Iraq at the center of American policy for many years; the failure to support democracy in Iraq would be a lost opportunity of historical proportions.

Iraq was also related to several regional and global issues of concern to the United States. According to Robbins, such issues were preventing proliferation of advanced weapons such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and long-range missiles; the protection of US allies in the region, particularly Israel; and the desire to check the power of states such as Iran that might seek regional hegemony and thus obtain disproportionate influence over the global petroleum-dependent economy. It was also believed that a stable, prosperous, and democratic Iraq would be an important US ally in the region for all of these reasons.

Saddam was not overthrown during Operation Desert Storm, because many hoped that the damage to the regime would be sufficient to destabilize it to the point where either ethnically based insurgent forces or Baathist competitors for power within the regime would remove Saddam from power. However, the failure of Coalition troops to advance to Baghdad allowed Saddam to portray the war as a victory, the expected coup did not materialize, and the few uprisings inside Iraq were quickly crushed.



Regime change did not become the explicit policy of the United States until 1998. The Iraq Liberation Act, which was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on October 31 of that year (coincidentally, the same day international weapons inspectors were expelled), stated that “it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government” (ILA 1998). The law provided for assistance to Iraqi opposition groups, and in subsequent years, around \$8 million was funneled annually to the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella organization under the leadership of Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi. However, these efforts had little impact, and the INC in particular was criticized for being unable to account for the millions in assistance it was receiving.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Iraq became the central point of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy. The 2002 *National Security Strategy* noted, “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends.” The case for implementing by force the standing regime change policy grew steadily over the next 18 months, and centered on four issues: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international aggression, and human rights. Some policymakers, such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, saw regime change as an opportunity for a geopolitical reordering of the Middle East, placing a free, democratic pro-Western state in the middle of this critical region.

Other decision makers in the White House and the Pentagon began to focus on a threat they referred to as “the Nexus.”<sup>38</sup> The Nexus was the intersection of three component parts: international terrorism, rouge states, and weapons of mass destruction. It was thought that a WMD-armed country might strike at the United States through a global terrorist network. Because the act would not be traceable back to the country of origin, the rogue state could not be deterred by the certainty of a counterattack. After 9/11, potential threats of this nature were no longer acceptable. Because of its refusal to allow

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<sup>38</sup>“Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, *Vanity Fair*,” 9 May 2003. (Online: Web) Accessed on 26 May 2009, URL: <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594>.

arms inspections, historic ties to international terrorist groups, and ongoing conflict with the United States, Iraq was seen as the most threatening potential Nexus state.

According to Robbins (2006), there were many stated reasons for going to war with Iraq i.e. violation of human right, promotion of democracy, terrorism, energy security etc. but a decision was made to make the WMD issue the central rationale. This was done in order to have the firmest legal basis on which to act, based on prior Security Council resolutions, and also to find common ground within the US bureaucracy.<sup>39</sup> It was also believed that this would be the best way to assemble both a domestic and international coalition against Saddam Hussein and in favor of regime change.

Time and again, Iraq was warned that “it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations,” language that many interpreted as a threat of war. From the American point of view, military operations in Iraq were already authorized under existing Council resolutions, including resolution 678 (1990) and resolution 687 (1991) and were already being carried out through the no-fly zones. The United States noted, “Iraq repeatedly has refused, over a protracted period of time, to respond to diplomatic overtures, economic sanctions, and other peaceful means designed to help bring about Iraqi compliance with its obligations to disarm Iraq and permit full inspection of its WMD and related programs.”<sup>40</sup> On October 2, 2002, the US Congress passed Joint Resolution 114 authorizing the use of the United States Armed Forces to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq”.

While denying the allegations Saddam always left some signs which created doubts in the minds of the international community regarding presence of WMD in Iraq. Since 1998 Inspectors were not allowed to inspect and the fact the earlier round of inspection had showed that Iraq’ programmes were more advanced than expected. This fact, along with

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<sup>39</sup> John D. Negroponte, US Permanent Representative to The UN, Statement Before the UN Security Council, New York, March 27, 2003.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

the reports of British and American Intelligence Agencies (which proved to be wrong) supported the earlier doubts in favour of action.

Once again, the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspectors began arriving back in Iraq on November 27, 2002, though they found the regime “on the whole cooperated rather well” compared to its behavior prior to 1998. On December 7, Iraq submitted a 12,000-page report claiming it had no weapons of mass destruction or other types of weapons banned by the UN. But over the next several months, inspectors discovered some discrepancies. The January 27, 2003, report from chief UNMOVIC inspector Hans Blix concluded, “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance- not even today- of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.”<sup>41</sup> The following day, President Bush announced in his 2003 State of the Union message, that Saddam’s regime “has shown utter contempt for the UN and the opinion of the world,” and that the “Coalition is prepared to take action even without a UN mandate.”

An UNMOVIC interim report in February 2003 was ambiguous, though Mohamed El Baradei, reporting for the IAEA (as its chief), said his agency had found no evidence of prohibited nuclear programs. In March, the United States and Britain attempted to push a UN ultimatum, which was blocked by a veto threat from France and Russia. Nevertheless, on March 17, President Bush announced, “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict commenced at a time of our choosing.”

**c). Unilateralism:**

Attack on Iraq was the result of unilateral initiative of the United States. In this war the US not only provided the leadership but also material, ideological, and military support. It was started, sponsored and conducted by the US. It was unilateral because other

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<sup>41</sup> Hans Blix, “An Update on Inspection,” remarks delivered to The UN Security Council in New York, 27 January 2003.

countries supported it only after the determination of the United States to attack and oust Saddam at any cost.

The success of a substantial US led coalition against Iraq in 1991, exemplary of President H. W. Bush's "New World Order," was followed by a series of US engagements of uneven success that moved the country away from global entanglements. This process accelerated in the mid-1990s when the Republican Party took control of both houses of Congress and began restricting funding to reduce money allocated to international organizations. The Senate's refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 was soon followed by President G.W. Bush's renunciation of the Kyoto Protocol, refusal to participate in the International Criminal Court, and abrogation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty, all alarming developments when contrasted with typical US foreign policy in the latter half of the 20th century (Hook 2005).

There appeared to be diminishing belief on the part of the US government that the requisite international will to act was either necessary or sufficient to protect and promote US interests. Historically, Americans did not trust international rules and institutions to be either honest or helpful. From this perspective, US policy makers after 9/11 had increasingly believed it more advantageous to dictate international norms rather than retreat to isolationism. "If the stakes are rising and the margins of error are shrinking in the war on terrorism, multilateral norms and agreements that sanction and limit the use of force are just annoying distractions" (Ikenberry 2002).

### **3.5 Post War Situation:**

In his 2004 State of the Union Address, Bush himself admitted, "The work of building a new Iraq is hard, and it is right" (Bush 2004b). The gravity of the situation can be understood by the fact that the Bush administration aimed to create a UN facade for what would remain a US mission. The Bush team hoped that by creating at least the illusion of a powerful UN role, other countries would contribute troops and treasure. It became clear that the 140,000 US troops in Iraq were insufficient to maintain a stable security

environment and the Iraq mission was getting very expensive. Military operations alone were running at a nearly \$4-billion-per-month pace (Carpenter 2008).

According to an estimate, 4326<sup>42</sup> US soldiers lost their lives and 30182 were wounded in Iraq by June 2009.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, 737 soldiers lost their lives while 3022 were wounded in Afghanistan by June 2009.<sup>44</sup>

Moreover, between 2000 and 2004, the US budget moved from a surplus estimated at \$5.5 trillion to a \$412 billion deficit<sup>45</sup>, deterioration equivalent to nearly 6 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). According to an estimate of the Congressional Committee, reported by CNN on 14 November 2007, the economic cost of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq would reach \$1.6 trillion by 2009, and \$3.5 trillion by 2017.<sup>46</sup>

Fiscal year 2005-06 saw a record \$105 billion being devoted to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, followed in early 2005 by yet another supplemental budget request for fiscal year 2006, this time of \$82 billion, pushing the total for both conflicts to nearly \$300 billion. Other budgetary figures have reflected similar trends: in the 2005 budget, spending on armed forces and homeland defense increased by 7 and 10 per cent respectively, for fiscal year 2006. Bush requested another 4.8 per cent increase for the Defense Department (bringing the total increase since 2001 to 41 per cent), nearly 7 per

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<sup>42</sup> US Defense Department, "Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) US Casualty Status", (Online: Web) Accessed on 30 June 2009, URL: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf>.

<sup>43</sup> 'US Casualties in Iraq', (Online: Web) Accessed on 30 June 2009, URL: [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq\\_casualties.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm).

<sup>44</sup> 'Coalition Military Fatalities By Year', (Online: Web) Accessed on 30 June 2009, URL: <http://icasualties.org/oef/>.

<sup>45</sup> Using Congressional Budget Office figures, Nouriel Roubini calculates a 2009 budget deficit of about \$600 billion, or 4 per cent of GDP, excluding social security reform. Roubini, Nouriel (2005), "Will the Bretton Woods 2 Regime Unravel Soon? The Risk of a Hard Landing in 2005- 2006", (Online: Web) Accessed on 30 June 2009, URL: <http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/0502/Roubini.pdf>.

<sup>46</sup> 'War costs could total \$1.6 trillion by 2009, panel estimates', *CNN*, 14 November 2007, (Online: Web) Accessed on 30 May 2009, URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/13/hidden.war.costs/>.

cent more for the Department of Homeland Security and nearly 16 per cent more for State Department spending on foreign operations (Daphne 2006).

According to a Report submitted to the UN Secretary-General in 2005, by a group of Iraqi human rights activists, “Children are suffering negative psychological effects since the beginning of occupation and military operations. Children suffer from fear and exhibit aggressive behavior. A further indicator of their suffering is their worsening performance at school” (Al-Darraji 2005). Medical practitioners were not allowed to enter the war-affected areas. The scientists, researchers including the retired Generals and officers of the Saddam regime were assassinated and assaulted. The Report noted that ‘Iraqi police sources revealed that till the end of March 2004, more than 1000 Iraqi scientists were shot.’

The American administration would have to be defensive for generations to come for the treatment meted to the prisoners by the US military officers. As the above Report revealed, “The number of Iraqi prisoners in US prison camps is estimated to exceed 280,000 prisoners of both sexes and all ages.... US military medical cadres remove organs and body parts from wounded prisoners before killing them, as well as from prisoners sentenced to death. These body parts are, then sold, via a well-organized network, in the US. Many bodies of the victims killed by US forces were lacking organs. Oddly, the medical reports testified natural causes of death” (Al-Darraji 2005). Besides these the cases of racism, violation of religious and civil freedoms and arbitrary punishment were also common.

In this way, Bush administration did an irreversible damage to the Iraqis. The atrocities resulting from the implementation of the Bush Doctrine created a sense of anger and hatred among the Iraqis and Afghans. This sense of anti-Americanism would continue to affect the US interests in the Muslim world particularly in the Middle East.

In 2006, the administration's National Intelligence Agency conceded that the Iraq War had become the cause attraction for jihadists ... and was shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives.

Bergen and Cruickshank (2007) estimated that there was sevenfold increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks globally after the US invasion on Iraq. Their study found that there was a 607 percent rise, globally, in the average yearly incidence of attacks (28.3 attacks per year before and 199.8 after) and a 237 percent rise in the average fatality rate (from 501 to 1,689 deaths per year). Eeven when attacks in both Afghanistan and Iraq (the two countries that together account for 80 percent of attacks and 67 percent of deaths since the invasion of Iraq) were excluded, there was still a significant rise in jihadist terrorism elsewhere - a 35 percent increase in the number of jihadist terrorist attacks outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, from 27.6 to 37 a year, with a 12 percent rise in fatalities from 496 to 554 per year. (Bergen and Cruickshank 2007)

The post Iraq war opinion was best described by the Democratic candidates, while campaigning against the Bush administration's foreign policy and promising a return to normal. In a *Foreign Affairs* essay, Barack Obama<sup>47</sup> called for a renewal of American leadership: "American cannot meet the threats of this century alone, and the world cannot meet them without America. We can neither retreat from the world nor try to bully it into submission. We must lead the world by deed and by example." Not to be outdone, Obama's Democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton<sup>48</sup>, also wrote in *Foreign Affairs*, "The tragedy of the last six years is that the Bush Administration has squandered the respect, trust, and confidence of even our closest allies and friends... At a moment in history when the world's most pressing problems require unprecedented cooperation, this administration has unilaterally pursued policies that are widely disliked and distrusted... Yet, it does not have to be this way... as President, I will seize the opportunity to reintroduce America to the world."

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<sup>47</sup> Barack Obama was the Presidential candidate from Democratic Party who won the election and became the President of the United States in 2009.

<sup>48</sup> Hillary Clinton was wife of former US President Bill Clinton and opponent of Obama in Presidential election. After the victory of Obama Hillary was appointed as the Secretary of State of the United States.

The critics of the Iraq war are of the view that Iraq is going to be the second Vietnam for the US. Now the US is searching for a face saving solution of the problem. The obstinacy of Saddam Husain gave success to the obstinacy and temptation of the neo-conservatives led by President Bush, which ultimately led the Iraqi citizens to doom and gloom. As a result, of the experiment of the Bush Doctrine President Bush lost his popularity, his party lost majority in Congress and the Republican candidate lost the presidential election. The citizens of Iraq are mourning the loss of peace and prosperity, which prevailed during the tyrannical days of Saddam and trying to cope with the chaos caused by the failure of the grand strategy of the so-called “exceptional” and “benign” hegemon. The ultimate result of this failure is anti-Americanism, religious fundamentalism and confusion regarding the future of Afghanistan and Iraq.



*Chapter-4: External Responses to Bush Doctrine*

## Chapter-4

### External Responses to Bush Doctrine

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US shook the world. Its impact was so strong that almost whole world stood beside the US with a determination to destroy the terrorists and eliminate their network from every corner of the world forever. Bush Doctrine, which was yet to come in a concrete form, was tested in Afghanistan. The international support to the US in Afghanistan against the Taliban gave confidence to the Bush administration and encouraged it go ahead in Iraq with its agenda but President Bush could not get expected support from the international community for the Iraq war. The UN refused to sanction the military action against Saddam Husain. Even some of the its important traditional allies vehemently opposed the US on the question of Iraq war. At the same time, it received only minor support from some of its allies. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to find out and analyse the reasons for the behavior of some of the important countries, including the UN, on the question of Iraq war.

#### **5.1 United Nations Response to Bush Doctrine**

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, on 4 November 2002, announced the creation of a 16 member '*High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change*' to explore the United Nations' role in promoting international security, given the new vulnerabilities of the twenty first century. The Panel's report embraced the prospects of pre-emptive actions and contained specific recommendations on preventive action in a multilateral context that in many ways reflected American thinking.

However, on 23 September 2003, Annan condemned the use of preemptive force as witnessed in Iraq. He said that this act would set a bad precedent for the future. In 1999, however, the Europeans initiating a NATO air attack over Kosovo alongside US forces without a direct and explicit mandate from the Security Council had already set the precedent. Annan emphasized that Article 33 of the UN Charter clearly stipulates that international disputes should be handled through peaceful means. However, in July 2000,

Annan justified the United Nations' "preemptive strike" against Sierra Leon's Militia, known as the "Westside Boys", and warned that anyone who attempted to attack peacekeepers would pay a price (Annan 2000). The adoption of UN Resolution 1368, the day after the September 11 attacks (at the initiative of the French), and the Security Council's interpretation of Article 51 officially and for the first time made UN responsive to threats from non-state actors.

When the UN headquarters in Baghdad was attacked leading to death of United Nations' Special Envoy Sergio Demillo, the UN observed the problem through a different lens. Perhaps it took the death of one of their own staffers for The UN to admit the need for reform. As former American Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger stated in response to the chances of the required changes, "I stand a better chance of eating an ice cream cone in hell."<sup>49</sup> The U.N came to a fork in the road and it has to decide which route it would take in order to bring about the changes necessary to make it a collective body of security, as it was earlier designed to be. The UN Security Council remained unchanged since its inception. Discussions about changing the UN was probably to end up like the old saying, "when all is said and done, more will be said than done."

## **5.2 European Responses:**

Notwithstanding the solidarity shown after the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, much of the friction in transatlantic relationships began at the first practical application of the Bush Doctrine: US plans for and action against Iraq (Gubert 2003). Views diverged and 'somewhere between Kabul and Baghdad, the United States and Europe (in fact some European states) lost each other' (Asmus 2003). While public opinion in many European states was against the US war plans for Iraq, some leaders opted to align themselves with the US. Some acted because of a deeply held belief that the US plans were appropriate, others because of an enduring faith in the Euro-Atlantic alliance and still others because of a cost-benefit analysis that suggested that alignment

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<sup>49</sup> CNN interview of 23 September 2003 concerning President Bush's speech to the UN.

with the US was the better long-term approach. Overall, however, 'in the court of European intellectual and public opinion, President Bush lost his case', leading to the 'largest wave of anti-Americanism in Europe in decades' (Asmus 2003).

The diplomatic disagreement over Iraq produced the worst transatlantic crisis in nearly 50 years. By the time the war began, relations between the United States and some leading European governments were so strained that the very future of the alliance was open to question (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). The US and European states did not sit at the same point within the spectrum of international relations theory and practice. Kagan argued that the US and Europe had parted company, pointing to an enlarging and semi-integrating Europe adopting a Kantian approach centred on laws, rules, institutions and multilateralism (Kagan 2002), while the US looked to the essential nature and use of military power in an anarchic Hobbesian world (Kupchan 2002). These theoretical differences had practical effects on the Bush Doctrine.

The increasing might of the US emphasised a capability gap, driving home European states' collective status as a 'military pygmy' (Robertson 2001) and its hard power irrelevance in the eyes of the US. Zakaria noted that in 2004 the US would spend as much on defence as the rest of the world put together. Such asymmetry of power, along with different approaches towards global issues, served to make 'strategic cooperation across the Atlantic increasingly tenuous' (Asmus 2003). Such difficulty played into the hands of those US policy makers pushing the unilateral line, who saw no benefit in listening to divided institutions that apparently brought little to the table. In their mind, this drove the wedge between the US and European states even deeper. Poor diplomacy compounded the problem.

#### **a). France- the Leading European Opponent**

France was the leader of the group that along with some European and some non-European states challenged the US plans over Iraq. This move of France was guided by the intention to oppose the perceived US hegemony and enhance the French leadership in Europe. According to Paul Howard (2003), its Gaullist-inspired stand was not only about

Iraq, but was also 'about the new world order' and a rejection of unipolarity. Hubert Védrine, the then French Foreign Minister, had set the scene during President Clinton's Democratic administration, noting in the late 1990s that 'France cannot accept a politically unipolar world ... nor the unilateralism of a single hyperpower'.<sup>50</sup>

He also led the criticism of President Bush's January 2002 'Axis of Evil' speech, labelling it as 'simplistic' and criticising vociferously that it was conceived 'unilaterally, without consulting others'.<sup>51</sup> Dominique de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister, returned to this theme in March 2003: 'to be truly stable, this new world must be based on a number of regional poles'.<sup>52</sup> While de Villepin was claiming in the UN Security Council that France was 'the guardians of an ideal, the guardians of a conscience', it was also engaged in a struggle for power. The French wished to maintain the primacy of the UN Security Council, which they saw as an essential forum in which France could exercise influence in international affairs. They also sought to retain what they saw as their role in charting the direction for Europe (Kagan 2003).

The French resistance to US hegemony and its desire to play a leading role in Europe and in international affairs found an opportunity in the opposition to the application of the Bush Doctrine. This gave France a clear target to reiterate their call for a return to multipolarity. The French approach was consistent with contemporary French foreign policy trends, which had roots stretching back to Charles de Gaulle.

President Chirac drew his present view of US foreign policy from his Gaullist heritage. In 1978, Jacques Chirac, by then in Parliament and having been the prodigy of Georges Pompidou, Charles de Gaulle's Chief of Staff, published a book that set out his vision for France. He held that it was not to be a small power, nor without influence on the destiny of the world. France was to lead resistance against the US. Twenty-five years later, Chirac's motivation rested on three key assumptions- that France was a pivotal great

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<sup>50</sup> Quoted in Blinken, A. J. (2001), "The false crisis over the Atlantic", *Foreign Affairs*, 80(3), p. 41.

<sup>51</sup> Quoted in Peterson, 'Europe, America and 11 September'.

<sup>52</sup> Quoted in H Grabbe, 'Shaken to the core', *Prospect*, No 85, May 2003.

power; that it needed a multipolar world in which to play this pivotal role; and that multipolarity was best assured through a world where multilateral actions were the norm. French authorities were concerned that if these assumptions were not sustained, then France's international status would continue to decline (Herpen 2003).

Notwithstanding the ideological roots of President's Chirac's opposition to US actions over Iraq, domestic, economic and historical factors also played important role. There was strong public opinion in France against use of force in Iraq. But the opinion was against the Bush administration and not Americans *per se*. France's large Muslim minority,<sup>53</sup> with a strong voice in domestic politics were against the US willingness to use force against Iraq with relative US position over Israel and Palestine. Fareed Zakaria (2003) noted that France had often tried to reduce the containment of Iraq for trading reasons. There was an historical pessimism and wariness about war that was not present in the US (Vaisse 2003). France's range of perspective over the use of force was evidenced by the extent of its military commitment. On the one hand, France viewed US-led operations in Afghanistan as justified and offered full support, diplomatically and militarily. Contrarily, to France Iraq did not represent a clear and present danger to the world. The risks outweighed the benefits, thus diplomatic support was not offered (Tertrais 2003). It also gave France an opportunity to push the multipolar line, another issue over which European states took sides. Such divisions adversely affected the major institutions in Europe, weakening their collective voice.

With French policy enshrined in Gaullists precepts and domestic factors at play, modern battle lines were drawn with the US. Inelegant diplomacy was apparent on both sides. Dominique de Villepin humiliated US Secretary of State Colin Powell in the UN Security Council and Jacques Chirac lambasted Eastern European states for supporting the US. France, acting as if they believed they were still a great power, offended Americans. The US noted that 'France will suffer consequences' for its opposition over the war with Iraq

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<sup>53</sup> Muslims in France make up some 15% of the population. Half are French citizens. There are 10 million Muslims in France and Germany, compared with some 700,000 Jews. The 15 million Muslims in the EU are some three times the number in the US. The former are better politically organised than the latter (Boyer, "Confronting transatlantic discord: major policy differences between the United States and Europe" 2003).

and considered 'industrial, military penalties' against it. The UK's *Daily Telegraph* commented that Condoleezza Rice had suggested that a US reaction to the opposition to its policies towards Iraq was to 'punish France, ignore Germany, and forgive Russia.' French and US business leaders warned of 'dire economic consequences- including recession- if the two nations' differences spill over into trade' (Porter 2003).

The difference of opinion between the US and France was evident even during the G8 meeting held in France in 2003. As an indication of their main thrust at the meeting, the UK and the US had put together a statement on counter terrorist actions for the G8 to adopt. But the French priorities focused on a vision for a multipolar world. Apparently, the tension between President Bush and Chirac was palpable (Brogan and Harnden 2003). As a precursor to the event, for example, President Chirac organised an 'enlarged dialogue meeting', inviting leaders from 22 states from a cross-section of developing countries to discuss under the headings of 'responsibility, solidarity and security.' The *Financial Times* saw it as no surprise that all 22 of those states opposed the US action against Iraq and that Chirac was using the meeting to entrench that opposition. Six weeks later the Prime Minister of Malaysia, an arch opponent of the US action in Iraq, presented President Chirac with the Kuala Lumpur World Peace Award. Chirac proclaimed that the world could no longer live by the law of the jungle; an international organization to eliminate unilateralism was essential (Vinocur 2003). In addition to such policy pronouncements, there were many other examples of continuing ill feelings between the US and France.

Though perhaps individually minor, taken together examples of differences between the US and France sustained animosity, with negative downstream implications. Although the US ruled out official sanctions against French goods, many individual Americans turned away from them. French cheese and wine exporters reported a drop in business, especially from countryside American. American tourist visits to France in 2003, especially in the mass-market area, dropped by about 30 per cent, though SARS and terrorism would have contributed to that figure (Lichfield 2003). The French Tourist Board employed Woody Allen and Robert de Niro to lead its advertising campaign in the

US, with a film entitled 'Let's Fall in Love Again' (Buncombe 2003). The sponsors of French exchange student programs reported difficulty in finding host families in the US (Cowan 2003). The US officials were barred by the US Government from attending the June 2003 Paris Air Show, the world's largest, in a move that was interpreted as punishment for French opposition to the US. The decision to increase the US presence at the Moscow air show two months later was also seen as a snub to France (Vereshchagin 2003). The French Defence Minister complained of deliberate acts of retribution by the US, including the waging of 'economic war' and the exclusion of French armed forces from a major exercise in the US in 2004.

As an indication of the strength of feeling, the French Ambassador to the US wrote to senior government officials and members of Congress in Washington, complaining about an orchestrated campaign by the Bush administration to discredit France. The White House denied the claim (Harnden 2003a). It is clear that antagonism existed. Its extrapolation, in the form of an antagonised and truculent France vigorously opposing any line but its own, could lead to corrosive second order consequences where the enlargement, integration and future effectiveness of NATO and the EU are hampered because of intra-institutional animosity. Beyond this, failure by NATO and the EU to achieve their potential led to wider consequences related to the global distribution of power.

**b). German perspective:**

Germany, filling one of the ten rotational seats on the UN Security Council from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2003 until 31 December 2004, also vehemently opposed US policy towards Iraq. Closely aligned with France as the 'axis on which the EU is built', it adopted a similar stance in an attempt to offset the US hegemony (Kupchan 2002). Germany's Chancellor Schroeder also took a strong anti-war and anti-American stand in 2002 Federal elections in order to 'woo back disaffected left-wing voters'. He was re-elected because of it (Naumann 2003). Firm opposition to US foreign policy, 'was a new departure for the German government.' It was taken forward jointly with France, when President Chirac



and Chancellor Schroeder used the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty to emphasise the preeminence and authority of the UN in deliberations over Iraq. Actually, the German position later appeared more opposed to military action than that of France. While the latter accepted that military force might be appropriate 'once a full new weapons inspections process had been exhausted', the former, reflecting a pacifist and anti-militarist line, took a stance against any military action, even with a UN Security Council resolution (Menon and Lipkin 2003). In this way, Germany also attracted US anger.

Although France's position as a permanent veto-holding member of the UN Security Council gave it a louder, more influential voice than Germany, thus making it the subject of more intense US pressure, Germany also found itself out of favour with the US. It is noteworthy that relationships between the two states 'fell to a post-World War II low in bitter exchanges of rhetoric over the invasion of Iraq'. A vengeful US snubbed its German allies for opposing the war against Iraq (Rosecrance 2003). There was suspicion in Berlin that decision to move a number of US military facilities from Germany to further east in Europe had been taken to punish German opposition to the war. Pentagon estimates suggested that US bases contributed as much as US\$ 4.5 billion per year to the local economy (Anderson 2003), the withdrawal of which was seen as having a significant economic impact on Germany. As the ground war in Iraq drew to a close, there were also reports of the Pentagon reviewing a US\$ 4.3 million contract with a German paint manufacturer. A small contract but, perhaps, indicative of US anger against Germany. This became a cause for concern in Germany as the transatlantic rift continued.

Early 2003 saw the dilemma emerging in German foreign policy. According to Simon Porter, on the one hand, German left-wing politicians urged Chancellor Schroeder to maintain his opposition against US foreign policy. On the other, some of its politicians feared that Germany stood to lose more than it gained from the impression in the US that Europe was 'seized by a frenzy of anti-Americanism.' In this vein, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer 'began to edge Germany back into the good graces of the Bush Administration.' He made clear that Germany had its own views on international politics, which did not entirely accord with those of France. Visits to Germany by Secretary of

State Powell and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Trade Representative Robert Zoellick were interpreted as attempts to indicate that relationships could be brought back to a more normal footing.

When President Bush praised Germany for its role in Afghanistan, it was interpreted by German officials as a signal that the bilateral ice age brought on by the war in Iraq may be over. Now, it appeared that while German foreign policy would remain underpinned by a belief in multilateralism, unlike France, Germany would not be so ardent to balance the US through EU. Rather, it believed that an alliance between the US and Europe, working in one pole was key for success. Such adjustment by Germany isolated France in Europe: it was France against the rest, or more precisely, the rest against France.

### **c). Supporters of the Bush Doctrine:**

While France and Germany, supported by a couple of other European states, chose to oppose US policy towards Iraq, some other European states opted to support the US-led action, witness the separate declarations of support by eight European NATO nations and the ten strong Vilnius Group<sup>54</sup> of Eastern and Central European EU and NATO candidate or aspirant nations. The latter, by signing the joint letter of support for US-led action against Iraq, were putting down a marker that they accepted the unipolar nature of global order, rather than France's call for multipolarity. They also maintained before accession to the EU, that they did not wish to sit in the shadow of France and Germany, following their lead (Joffe 2003). They wished to record their own voices. These letters cemented the clear divisions in Europe. Downstream consequences menaced the successful enlargement and integration of NATO and the EU.

#### **1. US-UK 'Special Relationship' on a Tightrope:**

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<sup>54</sup>BBC, 'Chirac blasts EU candidates', 18 February 2003, (Online: Web) Accessed on 31 May 2009, URL:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2774139.stm> The eight NATO states were the Czech Republic\*, Denmark, Hungary\*, Italy, Poland\*, Portugal, Spain and the UK. All are in the EU, less those marked \*, which are formal EU candidate states. The Vilnius Group states are Albania, Bulgaria\*\*, Croatia, Estonia\*\*, Latvia\*\*, Lithuania\*\*, Latvia\*\*, Macedonia, Romania\*\*, Slovakia\*\* and Slovenia\*\*. Those marked \*\* are formal EU and NATO candidate states. The others are aspirants for both.

Contrary to France and Germany, the UK along with some other European states decided to support the US, though this was not without its problems, especially domestic ones. From his election in 1997, Tony Blair sought to maintain, if not strengthen, the 'special relationship' between the UK and the US, develop a more central role for the UK in Europe and to act as a bridge between the US and its European allies (Kramer 2003). The disruption of relationships across the Atlantic, brought to a head by the US policy towards Iraq, forced the UK to take sides. Blair often justified his decision by stressing his belief in the cause, reprising this at his political party conference in the UK in September 2003. Others hold that it was in the UK's paramount national interest to be the United States' principal ally, for economic and political reasons. That said, firm UK alignment with the US was not without political cost, as the UK Prime Minister put 'principle before expediency'. In so doing, Blair confronted significant 'European-style anti-Americanism and anti-Bushism' in Britain and negative public opinion votes (Simon Porter 2003).

Prime Minister Blair's leadership was under considerable pressure, primarily because of his policies towards Iraq, unquestioning support to US foreign policy agenda, specially his decisions over Iraq. Apparently, the UK's position showed itself to be the majority view amongst several heads of government in Europe, thus, placing the UK in a relatively influential position. It also placed the UK opposite to France, the state that sought to lead the enlargement of the EU (Kramer 2003). All this was happening at a time when the UK was looking to define a more influential role for itself in Europe. Indeed, Steven Kramer noted that the UK 'must fully affirm its identity as part of Europe' if Blair was to have the opportunity to progress his foreign policy objectives. The UK walked something of a tightrope.

## **2. Poland's Response**

Poland firmly aligned itself with the US including making a small military contribution to the US-led operation in Iraq, one of only three other nations to provide ground combat troops (Australia and the UK were the other two). It also agreed to command one of the post-war sectors in Iraq, even under pressure from France and Germany not to do so

(Bernstein 2003a). It was seen as one of the closest European ally of the US after the UK, and firmly opposed to the Franco–German line. Polish motivation fell into a number of baskets. Due to the presence of the large Polish *émigré* community in the US, there had been close political alignment with America since the end of the Cold War. This was because of the fact that Poland regarded the US as the ultimate guarantor of its security. It held that to assure this relationship, it was right for Poland to support the US over Iraq, and make a contribution on the ground (Bernstein 2003b).

The question arises, why did Poland support the US? This was well answered by a Polish official, “The ally (the US) came asking us for help ... we had no alternative. We could not say no. The decision was seen as ‘hugely beneficial in prestige terms’, with the potential for commercial benefits through reconstruction contracts in Iraq and the movement of US military bases and personnel from Germany to Poland” (Harnden 2003b). Moreover, Poland believed that alignment with, and commitment to, the US over Iraq would provide access to Iraqi oil, which Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz acknowledged as his country’s ‘ultimate objective’ (BBC 3 July 2003). It was also believed that the decision was motivated in part to show that Poland, preparing for accession to the EU, should have its own voice taken into account. Cimoszewicz noted that Poland was the biggest state among those joining the EU. Its population (of nearly 40 million) and GDP were, respectively, more than half of those of the other nine aspirant states combined. Poland wanted to define its role in Europe, rather than have its role defined for it (Wyborcza 2003). This was not lost on neighbouring states, with the German press talking about Poland as a ‘Trojan Donkey’<sup>55</sup> of the US in Europe (Bernstein 2003).

#### **d). Bandwagoning and Battle Lines:**

In addition to the UK and Poland, many other European states supported the US line over Iraq, though none committed combat forces to the war. European states in the ‘coalition

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<sup>55</sup> Talk of a ‘Trojan Donkey’ is probably a parody on Charles de Gaulle’s labelling of the UK as a US ‘Trojan Horse’ when he engineered the prevention of the UK’s admission to the European Common Market in 1963 and 1967.

of the willing' perhaps looked to receive a dividend under what 'realists call bandwagoning. Smaller states supported the US in hopes of getting favour in other areas' (Howard 2003). The decision by the US Senate to approve seven of the Vilnius Group for membership of NATO was but one example. Another was the decision by the US to include Batasuna, a radical Basque Nationalist Party, on its list of international terrorist groups, was seen as a reward to Spain by President Bush for 'one of his most loyal supporters in the Iraq war' (Bumiller 2003).

The European states of NATO, the EU, and candidate nations to join those groupings, split into two foreign policy camps. It is difficult to be precise about numbers, as it depended on the metrics used. Josef Joffe (2003), for example, makes it two against the US versus 18 for. Yet this discounted Belgium and Luxembourg, who supported France and Germany, especially in NATO. It also did not take account of recent moves by Germany, to some extent reciprocated by the US, to rebuild bridges. Nevertheless, alignment with the US and the practical application of the Bush Doctrine led to internal divisions within Europe, where some European states were subject to US opprobrium and others a dividend. Such consequences menaced the successful development of these bodies and the wider roles they had to play with the US for the maintenance of global order (Porter 2003).

### **5.3 Russian Response**

The Bush Doctrine remained almost unnoticed in Russia until the US attack on Iraq. After the war was unleashed, the concept became the object of heated discussions, proving the emergence of a new kind of political correctness in Russia, motivated mainly by the drastic turn in President Putin's foreign policy toward the United States and the West after the 9/11 terrorist acts. The Russian strategic community and public opinion were divided on questions concerning the United States' true motives, as well as on how Russia should respond to a drastically changed international situation (Zhebin 2006)

Although Russia did not issue a detailed response to the US announcement of its National Security Strategy (NSS) on 17 September 2002, Russian leaders' reactions to its content can be inferred by their actions on its key points. In the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the Bush Doctrine, Putin was especially preoccupied with three issues: the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, weapons inspectors in Iraq and NATO expansion.

In September, Putin was embroiled in disagreement with Georgia and argued that Eduard Shevardnadze was failing to prevent terrorist attacks from the Pankisi Gorge into Russia. Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov went so far as to tell journalists in Washington that Russia would launch a preemptive strike against Georgia, if 'bandits' were seen within 10-15 kilometres of the border. Russia insisted that terrorists from Chechnya, as well as from some Muslim states, gathered here, some with alleged links to al-Qaeda. In response, US leaders urged patience and negotiation with Georgia. Later in the month, Ivanov stressed that the issues of Iraq and the Pankisi Gorge had to be kept separate and that the latter was of much greater interest to Russia.

Along with his Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, Putin advocated the return of weapon inspectors to Iraq in order to establish whether or not weapons of mass destruction (WMD) existed. Higher officials of Russia held that, if there were no weapons, then there was no justification for war. They said that the Iraq war was against the UN Charter because the Security Council did not authorise it or backed the overthrow of a leader of a sovereign state. Thus, Bush's insistence on the use of 'hard power' was rejected by Russia, although it had been acceptable in Afghanistan (Buckley 2006). As a result, a clear difference prevailed between Putin and Bush. However, Putin and Ivanov insisted that disagreement with the US over Iraq would not mean an end to the strategic partnership that existed between them. Putin emphasised that the issue of Iraq should be solved by political and diplomatic means. Sergei Karaganov, Chair of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, however, clarified that the US did not need Russia's backing to act against Iraq and could do it alone. Nonetheless, he said that differences on Iraq would not culminate in a significant worsening of relations. There would be business as usual.

Putin warned the US against its unilateral action in Iraq and, together with France and Germany, urged 'positive results' by working through UN and by staying within the remit of Security Council Resolution 1441 in an attempt to get Iraq to disarm. The main concern for Putin was not regarding the US justification for its pre-emptive or preventive actions. Rather, it was about the lack of evidence concerning WMD together with a deeply rooted Russian resistance to American interference in the domestic affairs of other states, dating back to the Soviet past and, more recently, to intervention in Kosovo.

The issue of NATO expansion had been smouldering in 2001. Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov was especially preoccupied with what it meant for Russia's role in NATO and for US withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. Initially, both Moscow and Beijing had reacted negatively to the latter and to the US intent to build a National Missile Defence (NMD) system (Buckley 2003). After 9/11, however, Putin commented that Russian opposition to NATO expansion could be reassessed in view of the need for a global anti-terrorism coalition. He attempted to link the issue of tackling terrorism in Afghanistan with Russian priority to deal with it in Chechnya. Sergei Ivanov maintained his more openly critical stand when in February 2002, he openly criticized Bush's notion of an 'axis of evil' embracing North Korea, Iran and Iraq.

According to Mary Buckley in this wider context of reduced regional power, lost superpower status and overwhelming US military might, Russian leaders pragmatically did not condemn the Bush Doctrine outrightly. Rather, they agreed with many of its points where they suited Russian interests. While the doctrine's application to Iraq was opposed, it did not follow that Russia would necessarily oppose another war or incursion against another state, depending upon its location and the wider context. Leaders would most probably argue against hostilities against Iran and North Korea without proof of serious terrorist activities there, but might threaten attacks on Georgia on the grounds that terrorists who were a threat to Russia were being harboured.

## **5.4 Asian Response**

### **a). Chinese perspective:**

Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese leaders and policy elites have been suspicious of US intentions to shape the structure of the international system according to American values and interests. Despite talk of a 'strategic partnership' during the Clinton Administration, US-China relations remained rather unstable throughout the 1990s (Li 1999). When George W. Bush was elected president in 2000, Chinese leaders seemed to be convinced that China would become a 'strategic competitor' of the US.

The event of 9/11, however, provided an opportunity for the two countries to improve their relations through anti-terrorist cooperation. Chinese leaders, nonetheless, were alarmed by the rapid expansion of American influence across the world. They were mainly concerned about the US entry into the oil-rich area of Central Asia, which was perceived as a serious challenge to China's energy and military security. The Chinese leaders were increasingly worried that the Bush administration would exploit the post-9/11 security situation to enhance America's global position. That was why former Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan warned at the UN in September 2002 that 'efforts should be made to prevent the arbitrary expansion' of the war on terror.

The Chinese leaders thought that the publication of the US National Security Strategy (NSS) confirmed their doubts that the Americans were actively seeking to utilize their formidable power to achieve absolute security and global dominance. The emphasis on preventing potential adversaries from challenging American power was seen as a clear indication of US hegemonic ambitions. Unsurprisingly, America's intention of leading the cause of promoting democracy, development, free markets and free trade throughout the world was viewed with great suspicion (Su and Guo 2003).

What worried Chinese leaders most was the inclusion of the Bush administration's new strategic doctrine in an official document, which signified a fundamental shift from the Cold War strategy of deterrence to a new doctrine supporting pre-emptive strikes against terrorist groups and any states sheltering them or possessing weapons of mass destruction



(WMD). The Bush Doctrine, they feared, could be used to justify any military action in the name of self-defence and anti-terrorism.

The Chinese leaders continuously advocated that Iraq crisis should be handled through the UN. China voted along with other permanent Security Council members on resolution 1441 in November 2002 in the hope that the US could be dissuaded from tackling the crisis unilaterally. As Zhang Qiyue, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman of the People's Republic of China (PRC) put it: 'I think our position is extremely close to that of France' (CNN 23 Jan. 2003). In a telephone conversation with President Jacques Chirac, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin reportedly said that 'the Iraq issue should be resolved through political and diplomatic means within the framework of the UN (CNN 27 Jan. 2003).

Contrary to the Chinese scholars and commentators, the official media by and large refrained from publishing reports that expressed strong anti-American sentiments. However, from January 2003 onwards, Chinese analysts became much more outspoken, and there were noticeably more articles criticizing US policy. When two UN arms inspectors, Hans Blix and Mohamed Baradei, informed the Security Council that they were unable to find evidence of WMD in Iraq (Blix 2004), Tang Jiaxuan joined his French and Russian colleagues in pressing for continued UN inspection. He argued that 'to intensify inspections for the purpose of seeking a peaceful solution to the Iraqi issue, we are obliged to try our best and use all possible means to avert war' (CNN 14 Feb. 2003).

Due to the possibility of war, the Chinese Communist Party's Leading Group on National Security (LGNS) met regularly to discuss how China should respond to the situation. The LGNS was worried about the tendency of 'US unilateralism' and America's global ambitions and their implications for Chinese security interests. When President Bush asserted that Saddam Hussein could not be disarmed peacefully, Chinese officials, including Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, continued to express their opposition to military attack on Iraq without UN approval but did not wish to

confront Washington directly. When the US and Britain decided to withdraw their application for a second resolution, China was relieved that it did not have to vote on it.

When the US-led military actions in Iraq began, Chinese officials called for an end to the war, emphasizing the consequences of civilian casualties and humanitarian catastrophe. Li Zhaoxing said that the invasion trampled upon the UN Constitution and international law. China's National People's Congress and the People's Political Consultative Conference also condemned the war. The advisors of the Chinese leaders warned that America could become more assertive in Asia in pursuing its interests following a successful operation in Iraq. A group of Chinese intellectuals was permitted to organize a conference that condemned US 'hegemonism'. Meanwhile, the state media that vehemently criticized the US invasion. Most Chinese writers asserted that the war had seriously damaged the world order and that the philosophy of 'might make right' could now prevail in international affairs (Li 2003).

This intellectuals, academics and students all shared the anti-war sentiments and tried to organize demonstrations in Beijing. China's official news agency Xinhua claimed that cadres and masses in different parts of the country expressed their support for the government's stand on the Iraqi issue and they appealed for an end to the war. However, the Chinese authorities closely monitored and curtailed the activities of anti-war supporters. Chinese leaders feared that widespread anti-American demonstrations could put pressure on the government to take tougher stand against Washington, thus destabilizing Sino-US relations. It is noteworthy that a small number of intellectuals were able to issue public statements on the internet showing their support for the US operations in removing Saddam's regime (Rex Li 2006).

Some Chinese analysts argued that the Iraq war was the beginning of a process whereby the US would seek to reshape the world order based on its new security strategy. The doctrine of pre-emption, they predicted, might well be applied to other countries, making certain states vulnerable. The Chinese leaders said that America's 'pre-emptive strike' on Iraq reflected its unilateral position, which was in total disregard of world opinion and contempt for the UN. According to Chinese analysis, Iraq posed no imminent threat to

America nor did it possess any WMD. The real motive behind the invasion, it was argued, was to further strengthen US economic, political and military dominance in the world (Wang 2003).

The Chinese leaders predicted that the Bush administration would become more conservative and hawkish in its foreign policy after the success of US military occupation of Iraq. The establishment of a 'democratic' Iraqi regime was seen as the first step towards their goal of 'democratization of the Middle East', closely linked to America's anti-terrorist strategy. This would help to enhance US economic and strategic interests in the region, which, combined, with America's growing influence in other areas, would ensure its global dominance in the post-9/11 world.

**b). Indian Perspective:**

The Indian responses to the Bush Doctrine had been shaped by a combination of idealist and realist streams in its foreign policy community (Yasmeen 2006). As a prescription of the shape of the international order, the Bush Doctrine came into conflict with the views of the idealist school in India. 'The Doctrine', Nihal Singh (2003) maintained, 'seems to be to free (the US) of alliances of any kind in order to retain all options in picking allies for specific operations.' The Doctrine's weaknesses were recognized and criticized as a invitation for disaster. The emerging strategic relationship between India and the US also played a role in determining Indian responses to the Bush Doctrine. A combination of the Indian policy of economic liberalization and American interest in forging a strategic partnership with India had created a momentum for continuing expansion of Indo-US ties.

From the very beginning, the US intentions of toppling the Saddam regime on the basis of alleged Iraqi possession of WMD had received little support from Indian analysts and the people. This was apparent in the manner in which strategic analysts shied away from explaining the American government's policy in terms of WMD. When it became apparent that despite international criticism, Washington was determined to invade Iraq,

concerns emerged in India about the repercussions of US military intervention for Indian security.

Some argued that the US had embarked upon an agenda of restructuring the Middle East that included both costs and benefits for India. The invasion was seen as causing problems for the large Indian Diaspora employed in the Gulf States. The potential rise in oil prices was seen as another cost for India at a stage when its energy requirements were increasing at a fast pace. At the same time, a restructured Middle East was viewed as opening avenues for a greater Indian role in the region including its participation in the reconstruction of Iraq (Mohan 2003).

According to Samina Yasmeen, the Indian government's response was tailored to mollify the critics at home without compromising the progress in its relations with the US. For the success of this policy, it adopted an ambiguous policy that could indicate its opposition to the US moves against Iraq without costing it a role in the post-invasion Middle East. Such a pragmatic approach was reflected in a number of statements given by Indian leaders prior to the US invasion of Iraq. In January 2003, for instance, the Indian Minister for External Affairs, Yashwant Sinha, stressed the significance of multilateralism in dealing with the Iraqi situation. He said, "...military action was not a solution and that India did not favour external interventions in the internal affairs of any country... It is not the responsibility of any country, however high or mighty, to interfere in another country's affairs." However, he refrained from criticizing the US military build-up on the pretext that the US fleet was either in international waters or being allowed by the respective Gulf States (Hindu, 20 Jan. 2003).

A few weeks later, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee adopted a similar stand on the US policies towards Iraq. Speaking at the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003, he identified both the US and the UN as being engaged in Iraq. While acknowledging the limited role of NAM in averting the war, India also became party to a resolution that asked Iraq to destroy its WMD. By

implication, it clearly extended the blame for the invasion to Iraq (Indian Express 26 Feb. 2003).

The policy of refraining from making open criticism of the Bush Doctrine continued as the US launched its attack on Iraq on 20 March 2003. The statement issued by the Indian government did not blame instead it acknowledged the full force and validity of the objective of the international community to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. The statement also expressed Indian intention of playing its part in providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people (Times of India 22 March 2003). This reluctance to criticize the US reflected in the resolution passed by the Indian Parliament 20 days after the invasion. The resolution had used the Hindi word 'ninda' while referring to the US invasion. The Indian government emphasised that it should be translated as 'deplore' and not 'condemn'.<sup>56</sup>

The careful response to the invasion made by India reflected its interest in not impeding the process of improving relations with US. It was also interested in using a less than critical stand for securing contracts in the reconstruction of Iraq. Such motivations were evident in the refusal by the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes to let the invasion affect India's military relationship with Washington. A number of senior Indian officials and leaders also visited the US during and after the Iraq invasion. The list included the Indian Secretary of External Affairs Kanwal Sibal, the National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra (May 2003) and the Indian Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani (June 2003). New Delhi also tried to ensure that Indian companies would be given a share in the reconstruction of Iraq.

However, Indian willingness to participate in activities in Iraq was not extended to sending Indian troops as part of an international stabilization force. Despite requests by the US government, New Delhi was careful not to accede to such a request. After discussion in the Cabinet Committee on Security, the Indian Prime Minister announced on 14 July 2003 the decision not to send Indian troops to Iraq except under UN

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<sup>56</sup> Interestingly, the opposition chose to translate the word as 'deplore'. "Deplore or Condemn; What is the Difference?" *Statesman*, 12 April 2003.

supervision.<sup>57</sup> Two months later, the Indian Permanent Representative to the UN repeated his government's commitment to send troops to Iraq only within the framework of multilateralism. The invitation to send troops, he specified, could only come from the Iraqi leadership, and New Delhi would respond favourably only if the command and control of the troops were under a UN mandate (Mohan 2003).

The Indian government's response to the Iraq situation in 2003 indicated the limits of Indian ability to question the Bush Doctrine. The logic of its strategic partnership with Washington limited New Delhi's ability to voice criticism of the invasion. At the same time, however, the Indian approach in 2003 indicated the government's reluctance completely to identify with the US position on unilateralism and pre-emption. This mixed approach, one could argue, provided a framework in which New Delhi tried to shape its relationship with Washington despite the concerns among some Indian foreign policy experts and political leaders about the assumption underpinning the Bush Doctrine.

### **c). Japan's response to the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq war**

Following 9/11, the Japanese government offered firm support to America in its global 'war on terrorism'. On 19 September, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced a seven-point assistance plan, which was followed by the passage of counter-terrorism legislation in the Diet in October. Although the legislation had a two-year limit, it allowed the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to provide logistical, rear-echelon support to the American and British forces in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the government approved the dispatch of Japanese C-130 transport planes to provide relief supplies to Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Rex Li 2006). In November, Tokyo decided to send two destroyers and a supply ship to the Indian Ocean. A year later, the Koizumi administration decided to offer further surveillance and logistical support to American and British naval forces by sending an AEGIS-equipped destroyer to the area (Strategic Survey 2001/ 2002).

Mindful of the accusation of lack of alliance commitment to the US operations in the 1991 Iraq war, the Japanese government responded to 9/11 decisively. It also expressed

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<sup>57</sup> "India rejects US plea, says troops to Iraq only under UN", *Sentinel*, 15 July 2003.

its willingness to back America politically if it were to attack Iraq. However, Japan was constrained by Article 9 of its constitution, which would prevent the SDF from taking part in US military operations. Initially, the Japanese government was in favour of finding a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis. After America, Britain and Spain set a deadline for disarming Iraq through diplomatic channels Koizumi announced Japan's support. He expressed his regret for the United Nations' failure to deal with the crisis peacefully, but noted that military operations could be legitimized by previous UN Security Council resolutions (Berkofsky 2003).

Nevertheless, Koizumi did not hide the fact that his government backed the US invasion because of the necessity of maintaining the US-Japan security alliance. 'To lose trust in the Japan- US security relationships', as he explained in March 2003, 'would be against Japan's national interests' (CNN 18March 2003). This was particularly true when nuclear development in North Korea was considered as a serious threat to Japan. Japan stood shoulder to shoulder with the Bush administration in its decision to attack Iraq (Rex Li 2006).

Public opinion in Japan, however, was against the Bush Doctrine. By supporting the US, Prime Minister Koizumi acted against public opinion in his country. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Japanese broadcasting station NHK on 7-9 March 2003, 70 per cent of respondents did not support a US military attack on Iraq even with UN approval, and 80 per cent of them opposed the war without a UN resolution. The results of other opinion polls were remarkably similar. For example, a poll conducted by the Japanese newspaper *Mainichi Shimbun* on 1-2 March showed that 84 per cent of the Japanese people were against an attack on Iraq. Another poll conducted on 23-24 February by *Asahi Shimbun* also revealed that 78 per cent of the respondents opposed the war. Apart from negative public opinion, the Koizumi government also faced opposition from the leaders of its coalition partners, the new Conservative Party and the new Komei Party, as well as from members of its own party, the Liberal Democratic Party (Rex Li 2006).

Koizumi, however, made it clear that Japanese forces would not take part in the US-led invasion of Iraq. Instead, they would contribute to the rebuilding of post-war Iraq. It was made possible by the passage of a law by the Diet in July 2003. In December, the Koizumi government approved a plan to dispatch several hundred non-combat troops to Iraq for a period of one year. Even though the main task of the troops was to provide humanitarian assistance, it aroused intense debate as the move was widely viewed as a violation of Japan's pacifist constitution. Only 9 per cent of the population showed their support for the plan (CNN 9 Dec. 2003).

While Japanese troops did not suffer any casualties in Iraq in 2004, Japanese civilians became the targets of Iraqi militants who demanded the withdrawal of the 550-strong Japanese troops in southern Iraq. A number of Japanese nationals were abducted and one of them was killed. Two Japanese freelance journalists were also shot dead. One Japanese tourist was abducted and beheaded after Japan refused to concede to the demands of Iraqi insurgents.

Despite these shocking incidents, Tokyo decided in December 2004 to extend the SDF mission for another year. Not surprisingly, Japanese public opinion was divided. An opinion poll conducted by *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* showed that 54 per cent of the Japanese were against the extension of the dispatch and only 32 per cent were in favour. Some newspapers offered strong support for the government's plan. *Sankei Shimbun* argued that the troop extension was a 'necessary course of action'. *Yomiuri Shimbun* believed that Japan needed to play its part in the international community. Withdrawing the SDF was therefore 'not an option'. Others, however, called for an exit strategy. *Asahi Shimbun* suggested that the troops should be withdrawn after Iraq's elections in March 2005 to coincide with the withdrawal of the Dutch military, which provided security and protection to the Japanese mission. The paper questioned the argument that withdrawal of the troops would harm the US-Japan alliance and urged the government seriously to consider alternative ways of assisting Iraq. Still others, such as *Ryukyu Shimpo*, raised their concern at Japan's 'lack of independence' in its decision to back America. *Tokyo*



*Shimbun* urged the government to pay more attention to the safety of the troops in Iraq and to be prepared to withdraw the mission if the situation required (Rex Li 2006).

Koizumi was fully aware of public divisions and debate and stressed that the troops were deployed in a 'non-combat' zone. He also highlighted the importance of the mission to US–Japan security relations. He said at a news conference in December 2004 that “Japan’s support activities in Iraq are the implementation of policies for the Japan-US alliance and international cooperation . . . such implementation is a national interest of Japan” (Asahi Shimbun 10 Dec.2004). To Koizumi’s delight, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard agreed in February 2005 to send 450 more troops to Samawah where the SDF were based. It was believed that it would provide security for the Japanese troops to perform humanitarian and reconstruction work in the ‘relatively benign’ area (Japan Times 23 Feb 2005).

#### **d). Pakistani Perspective:**

The Bush Doctrine was enunciated within a year of Pakistan undertaking a major foreign policy shift when instead of supporting the Taliban regime; it joined the US war on terrorism and provided considerable support to American operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Due to the resentment against American unreliability, as witnessed in the 1990s, the shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy provided the backdrop against which various groups interpreted the significance of the Bush Doctrine. In this way, there were two opposite approaches to Bush Doctrine in Pakistan.

To some scholars, the doctrine was an encouragement to India to undertake similar action in South Asia. The logic of equating freedom fighting with terrorism, in their opinion, enabled the Indian government to employ a similar language in its relations with Pakistan. Coupled with the idea of preemption, Bush Doctrine could open the possibilities for the Indian government to “thwart the struggle for freedom” by Kashmiris. Statements by Indian leaders and their reluctance to negotiate on issues

critical for Pakistan were presented an example of the impact of the Bush Doctrine on India (Mazari 2004).

Most of the criticism of the Bush Doctrine, however, was linked to its perceived implications for Pakistan as a Muslim state. Critics argued that the US presence in Afghanistan and the Middle East formed part of a grand strategy that aimed to neutralize 'strong' Muslim states. Pakistan, with its nuclear capability and the large Muslim population, it was argued, was a natural target. The process of targeting Pakistan was seen as being 'gradual' in nature. According to this perspective, Washington had secured Pakistan's participation in the war on terrorism. But the logic of confusing the freedom struggle with terrorism, which lied at the heart of the Bush Doctrine, enabled the US also to side with New Delhi against Pakistan. By building a strategic partnership with India, it was slowly reducing the options for Pakistan to continue cross border terrorism in Kashmir. This was not to the liking of the Pakistani government. This process was viewed as occurring in tandem with American moves against other major Muslim states: the US invasion of Iraq and its declared opposition to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapons capability were presented as the evidence of anti-Muslim bias in the Bush Doctrine (Mazari 2004).

Critics also pointed out that the Bush Doctrine would provide a basis for the US to put pressure upon Pakistan to relinquish its nuclear capability. They argued that Washington had already started pushing Pakistan into signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state in the NPT Review Conference of 2005. Moreover, top US officials had been asking Islamabad 'not to conduct nuclear tests, to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and to tighten the export controls'. There was also a suspicion that the Pakistan government might already have allowed the US to 'acquire partial control of its nuclear weapons and mark them down' (Irshad 2004).

The process had been paralleled by the allegation that the architect of Pakistan's nuclear programme, A.Q. Khan, had shared nuclear technology with Iran, Libya and North Korea. These allegations were seen as part of the process of putting extra pressure on

Pakistan to roll back its nuclear programme. Interestingly, the critical discourse surrounding the revelations of Khan's role in nuclear proliferation portrayed him as a hero who had willingly shouldered the blame to avert negative US reaction within the framework of the Bush Doctrine. The Pakistan government, in contrast, was presented as an accomplice unwilling to take a stand against US pressure on the nuclear issue. This weakness, they argued, was also apparent in Islamabad's policy of appeasing the US and acting as a pawn in the latter's moves in the regions bordering Pakistan. The campaign by the Pakistan military against al-Qaeda remnants in South Waziristan was presented as a case in point. The policy of cooperating with the Bush administration, however, it was argued, would not avert the danger of US retribution in future: Islamabad would come under additional pressure from Washington to give up its nuclear capability and drastically alter its stand on Kashmir. Failure to comply with this demand would attract US retribution along lines similar to the ones experienced by Iraq. Effectively, therefore, critics expected the Bush Doctrine to pave the way for America targeting Pakistan as well (Yasmeen 2006).

Some scholars criticized the Bush Doctrine for its inherent contradiction- that is the promise to promote democracy across the world but supporting the dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. However, another group of scholars who presented a more positive assessment of Bush Doctrine addressed these concerns. They differentiated between the assumptions of 'instant' and 'gradual' democratization of Muslim states (Rais 2002). They suggested that Washington had embarked upon a process of gradual democratization of Pakistan. They believed that economic assistance extended to Pakistan because of its participation in the war on terrorism was part of creating conditions that would make this transition possible.

A small minority of supporters of the Bush Doctrine also identified the indirect benefits to Pakistan: the doctrine's opposition to WMD was seen as introducing an element of realism in Pakistan's defence and foreign policy. Having invested in the nuclear capability at the expense of improving economic conditions, they argued, Pakistan was forced to reassess its relationship with India and the relevance of nuclear capability in

'countering' the Indian threat. The long-term implications of such a reassessment were considered to be beneficial for Pakistan as well as the whole of South Asia (Yasmeen 2006).

Against the background of these differing strands of opinion, the Pakistan government had adopted a mixed attitude towards the manifestations of the Bush Doctrine. At one level, guided by the need to retain US support in the economic and military arena (including the supply of additional F-16s), Islamabad was reticent in unequivocally condemning the doctrine. On the contrary, it highlighted its credentials as a state that was playing a major role in the war on terrorism. Active cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Pakistani authorities as well as the patrolling of the Pakistan-Afghan border to prevent infiltration by al-Qaeda members were often presented as evidence of Pakistan's acceptance of one element of the Bush Doctrine. That the Pakistani authorities had also managed to catch a number of al-Qaeda operatives within Pakistan was presented as part of this activism and acceptance.

The dual approach to the Bush Doctrine was apparent in Islamabad's response to the US invasion of Iraq. Prior to the invasion, it was keen to emphasize the helplessness of weaker states in conflicts involving unequal adversaries. However, as the invasion became imminent, mindful of the negative reaction among the general public, the Pakistan government stressed its preference for multilateralism over unilateralism. Being a member of the Security Council, it came under pressure from Washington to support the second resolution. Senior US officials also visited Pakistan to secure its support. Instead of caving in, Islamabad adopted a mixed approach: it stated that war was not a good option but did not categorically condemn the impending invasion. It suggested that inspectors be given more time to establish the presence of WMD in Iraq. At the same time, it insisted that all UN resolutions be respected, thus diluting the criticism.

The Pakistan government's response to the US request for troops in Iraq also demonstrated its dual approach. In June 2003, Musharraf stated after a meeting with Bush at Camp David that 'in principle' Pakistan could send troops to Iraq if some 'conditions'

could be met (Daily Times 13 July 2004). This was followed by a formal request from the US Chairman Joint Chief of Staff, General Myers, in July 2003. Initially, some sections of the Pakistan government responded favourably as a means of securing US goodwill. However, the concerns of domestic backlash changed the preference. Prime Minister Jamali refused to commit troops without taking parliament into his confidence. At the same time, however, Islamabad left the option open for such a commitment in future. During his trip to the US, for instance, Prime Minister Jamali said that Pakistan might send troops if the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) became active in Iraq. That Pakistan did not wish totally to alienate the US became apparent as it agreed to its ambassador in Washington, Jehangir Qazi, taking up the position of the UN envoy in Iraq. (Acorn, 13 July 2004)

Effectively, Pakistan was keen to show that, while declaring its opposition to unilateralism, it was prepared to accept American presence in and policies toward South Asia. It was also prepared to accept the limits of multilateralism provided the US continued to support Pakistan within the context of the Bush Doctrine.

### **5.5 Australian Perspective:**

At the grand strategic level, the Australian government was in agreement with America's plans to maintain its position as the pre-eminent global power. The US was not only seen as Australia's most important military ally but also as its best protection against possible outside threats, with many Australians believing that America saved Australia from Japanese occupation during World War II and that America would come to their country's aid again, if necessary. The notion that Australia existed in a hostile region has been an ongoing motif throughout Australian history (Burke 2001), although, apart from the Japanese during World War II, Australia had faced very few foreign threats. The intelligence community was most concerned about China (White 2002), whereas the general public saw Indonesia as the greatest threat to Australian security (McAllister *et al.* 2004).

The Australian government promptly sent troops to assist US troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, it took its own steps towards pre-emption, asserting that Australia was also willing to use pre-emptive force against terrorists in its own region. This position was widely condemned as provocative and an action that could be interpreted as a declaration of war.

The Australian Prime Minister John Howard twice stated that Australia reserves this right: first in December 2003 (Broinowski 2003; Garran 2004) and then again during the election campaign in 2004. Australia's countenancing of the use of pre-emptive force would seem to confirm one of the immediate criticisms of the Bush administration's pre-emptive doctrine; namely, that it would create a precedent or excuse for other nations who want to act outside the boundaries of international law (Connor 2006).

The level of support the Australian government gave to the US since 9/11 was quite extraordinary. In addition to sending combat troops into war with the US in Iraq, Australia signed the US missile defence shield and generally strengthened its military, political and economic ties with the US whenever the opportunity arose. These decisions and actions made Australia part of a small group of nations that largely supported the Bush Doctrine and moved closer to the Bush Administration.

The Howard government's support to the Bush administration occurred in the face of considerable opposition from Australia's main opposition party, the Labor Party, and at best lukewarm support from the public, who remained supportive of the Australia, New Zealand United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)<sup>58</sup> alliance, but were considerably less taken with the Bush administration (McAllister *et al.* 2004). Thus, the Australian government's support of the Bush Doctrine was more ambivalent than the tag 'loyal Aussies' suggested. This was particularly reflected in opinion polls, which showed little support for President Bush (Hartcher 2004).

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<sup>58</sup> It is a security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States that was signed in San Francisco, on Sept. 1, 1951, for the purpose of providing mutual aid in the event of aggression and for settling disputes by peaceful means. It came into force in 1952.

Howard took every opportunity to strengthen what he saw as Australia's special relationship with the US. Elsewhere, Howard commented that Americans 'have a lot of the values and attitudes that we share' and that he is 'a great believer that you should have close relations with the countries whose way of life is closest to your own' (Harries 2004). There was also personal chemistry between Howard and Bush. Reflecting this chumminess, Bush described Howard as 'a man of steel' during Howard's visit to Crawford, Texas. In his address to the Australian parliament in October 2003, Bush proffered that 'Prime Minister John Howard is a leader of exceptional courage who exemplifies the finest qualities of one of the world's greatest democracies. I am proud to call him friend' (Bush 2003b).

Some scholars have noted that, Howard strengthened this relationship at a terrible cost to the nation. When comparing Howard's and Blair's reasons for supporting the US position on Iraq, the former Australian intelligence officer, Andrew Wilkie (2004), wrote that they 'found themselves driven mostly by their obsession with fostering their countries' relationships with the US at any cost; in practice, what this amounted to was ingratiating themselves with Bush by supporting a war which they both had known for a long time was inevitable'. Both Howard and Blair rejected the regular mocking of them as Bush's 'poodles', believing instead that they have actively engaged with the Bush administration to achieve short- and long-term benefits for their respective nations.

Public support for Australia to go to war with the US in Iraq was never strong. In the early months of 2003, a sizeable majority of Australians opposed Australian troops being sent to war without UN endorsement.<sup>59</sup> The government did enjoy a swing towards its position in opinion polls on the war's eve. However, at the same time, anti-war sentiment was quite high and vocal. On the weekend of 14-16 February 2003, over 500,000 people took part in rallies against the Iraq war across Australia, including Australia's largest ever demonstration of around 250,000 people in Sydney (Lawson 2003).

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<sup>59</sup> Newspoll, 2003, [http://www.newspoll.com.au/cgi-bin/display\\_poll\\_data.pl](http://www.newspoll.com.au/cgi-bin/display_poll_data.pl).

The official engagement of Australian troops covered a 21-day period in March/April 2003 in which Saddam's regime was comprehensively defeated without a single Australian soldier being killed. Howard's shrewd commitment of Australian troops for the duration of the war with a limited post-war role did not totally alleviate public scepticism about the war, but this more limited role, coupled with a lack of casualties, reduced the political fallout. At the same time, the role Australia played strengthened its alliance with the US. In some circles, this was seen as a masterstroke. However, the general public seemed decidedly ambivalent about these closer ties; as reflected in Howard not making Australia's strengthened relations with the US a major election issue in the October 2004 federal election (Connor 2006).

In the lead-up to the Iraq conflict, the Howard government's line on why war was necessary mirrored the American position. Although Iraq posed no direct threat to Australia (Wilkie 2004), the government gave the public a list of reasons for grave concern. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated that the 'issue about Iraq' was 'whether the world has any choice but other than to live in the constant fear of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons left in the hands of vicious dictators'. Following the US lead, the prime minister argued that these weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could 'fall into the hands of terrorists', which he said would be the 'ultimate nightmare not only for us but other peoples in other nations. That, more than anything else is the reason why we have taken the stance we have (John Howard 2003).' However, a less circuitous and more honest reason why Australia went to war was because America did.

### **5.6 African Perspective:**

Since the Cold War's end, the African continent was seen by successive US administrations neither as a significant source of threats nor as an arena of great opportunities (Hentz 2004). The 9/11 attacks, the Bush Doctrine and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq altered these calculations to some degree. American security, to a greater degree, began to be tied to Africa (Mills 2004). Nevertheless, despite some increased attention, the continent remained peripheral to America's war on terrorism. The



increased attention was symbolized by Bush's brief visit to Africa in July 2003.<sup>60</sup> While they expressed a new concern with terrorism, emphasis remained on long-standing priorities in Africa. However, efforts were made at preventing potential terrorists from using African countries as places in which to hide or bases from which to strike elsewhere. America responded to such threats- real or merely perceived- with both diplomatic efforts and military cooperation. American diplomats also sought African support for US policies elsewhere in the world.

Libya and Sudan were identified as supporters of international terrorism by the US. Their leaders knew that they were likely targets of American attacks and that they could expect no assistance from other powers and that, there was some likelihood - however low - of their country being invaded. This awareness provided strong incentives greatly to improve their relationship with America. A small number of African countries embraced the Bush Doctrine with eagerness. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea joined the 'coalition of the willing', supporting, albeit in very limited ways, the US invasion of Iraq. Rwanda later indicated its strong support for American policies. While most leaders on the continent were horrified by 9/11, shared the American sense of heightened danger from terrorism and passively supported the invasion of Afghanistan, they found the American turning of attention to Iraq both a diversion and a wrong-headed strategy. Both in the UN and elsewhere, some members of this group tried to prevent the attack on Iraq and distanced themselves from any participation once it occurred (Grey 2006).

Despite an African Union resolution opposing a unilateral decision of the 'coalition of the willing' to go to war without UN authorization, Ethiopia and Eritrea became part of the State Department's initial list of members of the coalition. Each seemed to think that its declaration of support might make America more sympathetic to its claim in their mutual border conflict. Eritrea, especially, tried to add a significant military component to its expression of support, offering America use of its Red Sea naval facilities. A second State Department list later added Rwanda and Uganda as coalition members.

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<sup>60</sup>George W. Bush was only the fourth US president to visit the continent while in office, and the first Republican president to do so.

Other African states, while having no role as promoting terrorism, were viewed as likely targets of terrorist attacks or arenas where terrorists could operate with impunity. Many of the states of North Africa, the Sahel and the East African coast have overwhelmingly Muslim populations. Their governments tended to be either secular or a very moderate Islamic cast. Some, such as the governments of Algeria and Egypt, had been under attack by domestic fundamentalist insurgents, and others were viewed as possible targets. Both the US and African governments felt that there was a potential security threat. Even where governments were unlikely to be targets, groups such as al-Qaeda, deprived of its base in Afghanistan, were likely to seek other countries in which to operate. From that perspective, the notoriously weak governments in much of Africa might be unable either to detect or to do anything about terrorist activity. The collapsed state of Somalia (Dange and Menkhaus 2002) was seen as particularly vulnerable.

Moreover, the Bush administration- and particularly Pentagon officials and energy analysts -had begun to realize that US dependence on imported oil from the Middle East left America vulnerable both to attacks on the region's oilfields and supply lines and to long-term political instability. The presence of substantial reserves of oil in Nigeria and Angola, and the discovery of additional oilfields from Equatorial Guinea in the Gulf of Guinea through Chad and into the Sudan, offered an alternative to Middle East oil supplies.

According to Grey, the conjunction of these two security priorities raised relationships with Africa to a higher priority than they had been since the Cold War. Africa, however, was not central to US foreign policy. Afghanistan and Iraq absorbed most US military capabilities, and the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran captured diplomatic attention. Economic links with Europe, Japan, China and elsewhere were far more important than those with Africa. But a continent that had been largely marginalized since 1989 became somewhat less so after 9/11.

### **5.7 The military component of the 'Bush Doctrine' in Africa**

The State and Defense Departments considered Africa an important secondary arena in the conflict with terrorism. Muammar al Qadhafi in Libya and Omar al-Bashir in Sudan espoused a more fundamentalist role for Islam in their states, and both had previously been identified by the State Department as states sponsoring terrorism. Each, moreover, had been a previous target of limited US pre-emptive strikes. Thus, they became possible targets of future US preventive invasions. At this point, little was known about the dynamics of US-Sudanese or US- Libyan relations. However, relations between each of those days improved dramatically at the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004. First, Libya assumed responsibility for, and paid compensation for, an earlier plane bombing. More importantly, it announced that it had had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development programme, renounced that programme and opened its facilities to international inspection. In return, both the US and various European countries signaled their acceptance of a Libyan return to international respectability.

In addition to promoting a fundamentalist state and sponsoring terrorism, Sudanese President Bashir had long been waging a war against Christian and animist insurgents in the south. In 2004, Khartoum also seemed to be responsible for militias waging war against the people of Darfur Province, in western Sudan. Despite this horrendous record, relations between Washington and Khartoum improved radically during 2004. On Washington's side, this may well had been the result of Bashir seriously negotiating to end the conflict in the south and implementing anti-terrorist activities and, perhaps, of growing American interest in Sudanese oil. The increased willingness of the Sudanese and Libyan governments to cooperate with Washington might have reflected their awareness that, as identified sponsors of terrorism, they fell just below Iran and North Korea as possible US targets and that they were essentially helpless to avoid such a fate, with no powerful international friends.

The Bush Administration adopted a number of different programmes to deal with vulnerability to terrorist attack or sites of terrorist operation as well as several states that were actual or potential sources of oil. It established a small group of reasonably

powerful African states with which it proposed to work closely in its anti-terrorist campaign. South Africa and Nigeria were the most significant regional powers in sub-Saharan Africa with military and intelligence capabilities surpassing others. Both were willing to work closely with the US in combating terrorism, yet each had certain domestic constraints in doing so. Islam was the dominant religion in northern Nigeria and, at least in parts of the north, becoming more fundamentalist. The national government in Abuja was confronted with significant domestic battles with such forces. An alliance with the US complicated an already complex situation. The South African government has confronted a number of terrorist incidents within its own borders, although not related to Muslim fundamentalism. That strengthened its willingness to be part of an international anti-terrorist effort. But human rights groups within the country were sensitive to possible trade-offs between aggressive anti-terrorist activities and restrictions on civil and political liberties (Goredem 2003). For these very different reasons, neither state could cooperate as much as Bush wished.

The other two 'core states' in Washington's planning were Ethiopia and Kenya. Although lacking the resources like Nigeria and South Africa, these were more conveniently located, adjacent to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and thus across from the Arabian Peninsula, a centre of terrorist activities. As indicated above, Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, enthusiastically joined the coalition of the willing. In 1998, Kenya suffered a large death toll when the US embassy there was car bombed and then, in 2002, endured a second attack on a resort largely patronized by Israelis, as well as an attempted shooting down of an Israeli chartered flight. As a victim itself of terrorism, and as a country heavily dependent on tourism, the Kenyans have been close ally of the US in the counter-terrorism effort. Nevertheless, given the limited resources of these two states, their efforts could hardly contribute significantly to the American-led campaign.

The US military was stretched very thin. Despite its concentrations elsewhere, it sought ways in which it could, with minimum personnel and minimum expense, provide a military response to the perceived threats in Africa. As part of the Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA) programme, the US created a military base in

Djibouti, which it embedded in a diplomatic/military initiative to work with the militaries of the Horn of Africa and East Africa. It initiated comparable arrangements with the militaries of West Africa, North Africa and the Sahel. Finally, it strengthened a long-standing programme for US to bring additional training military personnel from across the continent.

Significantly, almost all the African leaders found it useful to cooperate with the US. In addition to whatever innate benefits these military links provided - and presumably, they were seen as at least marginally enhancing the security of African leaders or their countries - they merely constituted part of a whole complex of programmes linking the US to African countries. African leaders perhaps perceived participation in these military programmes as the price they must pay for continued American assistance to other non-military programmes (Leonard and Straus 2003).

To Conclude, on the basis of the above discussion, it can be said that implementation of the Bush Doctrine Iraq changed the equations of international relations. With the start of the Iraq war in 2003, the US lost the leadership role in Europe that it enjoyed since the end of the Second World War. At the strategic level, Bush Doctrine provided an opportunity to France and Germany to assert them as an independent and global power. The use of preemptive action in Iraq by the US provided a justification, although illegal, to Russia for taking preemptive action in Georgia. Though china did not take any stiff position against the US, it tried to strengthen its relation with those countries, which opposed the implementation of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq. In this way, besides heavy economic and military loses Iraq war badly affected the credibility of the US as a responsible nation and spread anti-Americanism across the world. Most importantly, it weakened the 'global war against terrorism' and resulted in the intensified efforts of the rogue states' to develop WMD as a guarantee to their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

## *Chapter 5: Conclusion*

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### Conclusion

Bush Doctrine was a response to the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 on the United States of America. It took a concrete shape when President George W. Bush issued his 'National Security Strategy' in September 2002. It emphasized on pre-emptive or preventive actions against the 'terrorist or the rouge states', that assisted and encouraged the terrorists against the US and its allies. Promotion of democracy by replacing the tyrannical regimes by democratic ones, promotion of human rights along with propagation of the 'universal American values' were its idealist agenda. Finally, it asked for taking unilateral actions when multilateral forums fail to safeguard and promote the national interest of the United States.

The neo-conservative scholars were the guiding star of the Bush Doctrine. "*Project for the New American Century*", a leading American think tank was instrumental in the formulation of the Bush Doctrine. As discussed in chapter two, the extent of the influence of neo-conservatives can be judged by the fact that many prominent personalities of the PNAC occupied important positions in the Bush Administration. Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were a few of them. The PNAC document '*Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*', issued in September 2000, can be considered as the precursor of the Bush Doctrine. This document had formulated the guidelines and strategy to maintain the post-Cold War super power position of the US, and prevent rival powers from emerging as a threat to the national interests of the US.

However, close examination shows that instead of promoting the national interest of the country, Bush Doctrine acted against it. It did not get enough success in proportion to the investment of resources by the Bush Presidency. There was a dire possibility that Iraq could turn it into a second Vietnam. American military intervention in Iraq, removal of Saddam regime, and engagement of US led coalition forces in combating terrorism and insurgency took a heavy toll of lives. The Iraq war exposed the weakness of the

*Revolution in Military Affairs*, which was an important part of President Bush's grand strategy in Iraq.

Even on the economic front, success of the US policy in Iraq was un-satisfactory. Rising inflation and budgetary deficit due to heavy flow of American funds in Afghanistan and Iraq worried the American leaders. The taxpayers were considerably concerned and accused the politicians of misusing their money, specially in Iraq. What was more worrying for the Americans was the shrinking domestic expenditure on social security for the poor.

Thus, Bush Doctrine's implementation proved dear for the US. Taking unilateral action, while ignoring international opinion, was the main reason behind the minimum economic and military participation of members of the '*Coalition of the Willing*' in Iraq war, which resulted in the rising US casualties. On the other hand, tremendous international support to the US and the participation of many countries in Afghanistan war lessened the US casualty there. However, being the leading member of the coalition forces, US had to pay heavier price in comparison to other members.

As far as Bush Doctrine's impact on human rights in Iraq is concerned, it would be remembered for 'serious' violation of human rights and not promotion of human rights in that country. The Bush Presidency can be faulted for shocking treatment meted to the prisoners in the Abu Ghraib jail, and violation of the rights of women, children and common masses in Iraq. Iraq represented a living example of the weakness of the 'universal values of America' and the 'democratization mission' of the Bush Administration.

As discussed in chapter 2, the American administration would have to be defensive for generations to come for the treatment meted to the prisoners by the US military officers, cases of racialism and violations of civil and religious rights in Afghanistan and Iraq. Arbitrary punishment was common and trade of human organs was also reported, which added to the discredit of the US sponsored 'global war against terrorism.'



The Bush administration can be accused of causing irreversible damage to the Iraqis. The atrocities resulting from the implementation of the Bush Doctrine created a sense of anger and hatred among the Iraqis and Afghans as well. This sense of anti-Americanism would continue to affect the US interests in the Muslim World, particularly in the Middle East.

Very few will contend the view that Bush Doctrine provided fewer solutions, rather posed more challenges, to be tackled by his successor President Barak Obama. It is, perhaps true to say that America's unprecedented power scared the world, and the Bush Administration had only made it worse. Because of the Bush Doctrine, the United States lost the trust of the international community. Unilateral approach of the Bush Administration undermined the importance of international laws and international institutions. However, at the same time, it encouraged a new movement to strengthen and restructure the international organizations and reform in international laws.

The impact of the Bush Doctrine was also felt on the relationship of the US with the major powers of the world. Though United Kingdom, Japan and Australia got the certificates hailing them as 'all weather friends' of the US; France and Germany were seen as 'fair weather friends', trying to challenge the US position on Iraq on every possible occasion. On the other hand, Russia seemed to be a mute spectator without making any sharp reaction, but tried to implement the Bush Doctrine against Georgia without accusing the US for doing the same in Iraq.

In Asia, China was worried about the presence of large number of US troops in its neighbourhood and condemned the US for violation of the international laws and undermining United Nations. However, there was no visible impact on the Sino-US relations. India tried to increase proximity with the US and wanted the later to take actions against Pakistan for promoting cross-border terrorism in India. The Rightist scholars supported the Bush Doctrine and advocated to implement the same in Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan advocated for the implementation of the Bush Doctrine in

India for alleged violation of human rights in Kashmir. Considering the gravity of situation, it declared itself and was accepted by the US as the 'natural ally' in the *Global War against Terrorism*. This phenomenon frustrated the Indian leaders.

As regards the impact of Bush doctrine on the 'Axis of Evil' (North Korea, Iraq and Iran), they were the centre point of the American foreign policy during the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, Bush failed, largely, in this regard. Iran showed little concern to the international opinion against its nuclear programme and had maintained its earlier policies, though sometimes with a lowering of tone. North Korea conducted its nuclear test successfully, ignoring all sanctions and pressures of the international community including the UN Security Council. It even threatened to use nuclear weapons, if attacked. The decision of President Bush to organize and participate in the 'six party' talks was ridiculed by some but the failure of this initiative was more humiliating because Bush failed to solve this problem by either unilaterally or multilaterally.

Afghanistan and Iraq were groaning and screaming due to the atrocities of the terrorists on the one hand, and allied forces on the other. The mission of democratization appeared to have turned Iraq into a second Vietnam. Bush was so much embroiled in Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea that he could not find time to implement his doctrine on Syria. There was a possibility that it might also follow the steps of Iran and North Korea to avoid the US pressures and future attacks on its countries.

Thus, too much hard-line approach toward these 'rouge states' by President Bush had only instigated these states to pursue their weaponization programmes with new zeal and intensity. This trend, perhaps, start a new race for the acquisition of WMD as a guarantee of national security and territorial integrity among many potential nuclear aspirants.

However, the US relation with Libya and Sudan showed dramatic improvements at the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004. They had been previously target of limited US pre-emptive strikes. The Bush doctrine made them possible targets of future US

preventive invasions. Under pressure, Libya assumed responsibility for, and paid compensation for, an earlier plane bombing. More importantly, it announced that it had had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) development programme, renounced that programme and opened its facilities to international inspection. In return, both the US and various European countries signaled their acceptance of a Libyan return to international respectability. Sudan also followed the Libyan line and showed its willingness to increase its cooperation with the US, which was interested in the Sudanese oil fields. This might have given some relief to the 'war-fatigued' Bush administration.

As far as the impact of Bush Doctrine on the UN is concerned, violation of the UN Charter by the US started a new debate for strengthening and empowering the UN. Reform in the UN Charter and its institutions, in order to enable it to deal with Iraq like situation, became the main debating point among leader and analysts. Moreover, Bush Doctrine also highlighted the weakness of the UN to enforce its decisions. After the beginning of the Iraq war, urgent need was felt to strengthen the enforcement mechanism of the UN.

In this way, the study finds that -

First, American foreign policy has rarely won the universal, sincere or lasting admiration abroad. However, few American Presidents have attracted as much elite and mass opprobrium outside the United States as President George W. Bush for his approach to foreign affairs. President Bush was charged for spreading anti-Americanism in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Such was the antipathy against Bush, that he was compared unfavourably with Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. The frequent threat of use of American military force was a key factor in the unpopularity of these three Presidents' foreign policy.

The spread of anti-Americanism was, partly, the result of misuse of the worldwide sympathy and support to the US against the *Taliban*. This international legitimacy began to evaporate after the publication of the *National Security Strategy* (2002) of the US. Bush rejected the peace keeping as a 'humanitarian adventure' and nation-building

missions of the Clinton's foreign policy as a 'social work', favouring instead on recalibrating great power relations with Russia and China agreeing that the route to respect for America in the world was to exercise and exhibit humility in its foreign affairs. In this way, Bush allegedly wasted the advantage it enjoyed in the aftermath of 9/11 and "left America weaker and less respected" than all his recent predecessors. Anti-Americanism can be said to be the natural outcome of the Bush Doctrine.

Secondly, even before Bush ordered military intervention in Iraq, some observers had professed that war in Iraq would not stop the spread of religious fundamentalism, but would in fact; perpetuate it. These concerns became reality as the war led to an unprecedented rise in Islamic fundamentalism, sectarian violence, and jihadist attacks in and outside Iraq. In 2006, the administration's National Intelligence Agency (2006) conceded that the Iraq War had become the cause attraction for jihadists ... and was shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives. This was further supported by a report of Bergen and Cruickshank (2007), which claimed that there was sevenfold increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks globally after the US invasion on Iraq.

The Bush Doctrine increased the hatred toward the USA in the Muslim World, encouraging thousands of Muslims to get ready for jihadist terrorism. There was a possibility that terrorist groups in Iraq, which raised several millions of dollars through kidnapping and oil theft, would also be in a position to help and fund their jihadist brethren operating outside of Iraq. There was a sharp fall in the popularity of the US in many of its friendly Muslim countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Egypt as well.

In view of Bush Doctrine's devastating impact on Iraq and the Middle East region, the continued use of the doctrine weakened the US standing in the world, instead of strengthening it. The Bush administration was embroiled in Iraq so deeply, that it was less responsive to other geopolitical challenges, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the re-emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

To sum up, the Bush Doctrine was not a new phenomenon as far as ends are concerned. However, in the choice of means, it made a difference from similar approaches of his predecessors. Some analysts describe the Doctrine as the 'Wilson's idealism with teeth'. The means of the Bush Doctrine may be held responsible, to a large extent, for altering the track of the US foreign policy, which ultimately led to the change in the equations of international relations. It redefined the US relationship with its traditional allies, which went against the US interests, at least for a short term. Iraq War diverted the US attention away from dealing with the real task that was terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda, including the search for Osama bin Laden and the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Finally, it can be inferred that Bush Doctrine affected the credibility of the UN negatively. It intensified the desires of the nations for armament, increased religious fundamentalism and contributed to the rise of anti-Americanism around the world. Nevertheless, there was an option for the US to regain its popularity by matching its military buildup with diplomatic efforts that would demonstrate its interest and peaceful engagement in resolving the world's problems. The Bush Doctrine reminded the members of the international community the importance of multilateralism and taught the US policy makers the pitfalls of unilateralism. It also sparked the efforts for the reforms of the UN system to tackle future problems similar to Iraq war. At the same time, it highlighted the importance of the international laws and international institutions. It shook, at least to some extent, the 'conservative Muslim society' and forced them to reconsider their age-old social structure and institutions. At last it can be said that the Bush Doctrine made the US more insecure than it was before the 9/11 attacks.

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*Appendix: Relevant Part of the Charter of UN and  
National Security Strategy (2002) of the United  
States of America*

## **Appendix**

### **Relevant parts of the UN Charter**

#### **Preamble To The Charter Of The UN**

*WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UN DETERMINED* to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

*AND FOR THESE ENDS* to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

*HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS*

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of The UN and do hereby establish an international organisation to be known as The UN.

#### **Article 2**

The Organisation and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of The UN.
5. All Members shall give The UN every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which The UN is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organisation shall ensure that states which are not Members of The UN act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize The UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

### **Article 33**

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

### **Article 39**

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

#### **Article 41**

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of The UN to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

#### **Article 42**

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of The UN.

#### **Article 51**

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of The UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

## **Relevant parts of National Security Strategy (2002) of the United States of America**

### **I. Overview of America's International Strategy**

*“Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace- a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”*

President Bush  
West Point, New York  
June 1, 2002

The United States possesses unprecedented- and unequaled- strength and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.

For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality. That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends.

This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty. The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. And this path is not America’s alone. It is open to all.

To achieve these goals, the United States will:

- champion aspirations for human dignity;
- strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
- ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and
- transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

## **II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity**

*"Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities."*

President Bush  
West Point, New York  
June 1, 2002

In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.



No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.

America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.

These demands can be met in many ways. America's constitution has served us well. Many other nations, with different histories and cultures, facing different circumstances, have successfully incorporated these core principles into their own systems of governance. History has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people. America's experience as a great multi-ethnic democracy affirms our conviction that people of many heritages and faiths can live and prosper in peace. Our own history is a long struggle to live up to our ideals. But even in our worst moments, the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence were there to guide us. As a result, America is not just a stronger, but is a freer and more just society.

Today, these ideals are a lifeline to lonely defenders of liberty. And when openings arrive, we can encourage change—as we did in central and eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, or in Belgrade in 2000. When we see democratic processes take hold among our friends in Taiwan or in the Republic of Korea, and see elected leaders replace generals in Latin America and Africa, we see examples of how authoritarian systems can evolve, marrying local history and traditions with the principles we all cherish. Embodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have today, the national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty.

Our principles will guide our government's decisions about international cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the allocation of resources. They will guide our actions and our words in international bodies. We will:

- speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to advance freedom;
- use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take;
- make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future; and
- take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments. We will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it.

### **III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends**

*“Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.”*

President Bush  
Washington, D.C. (The National Cathedral)  
September 14, 2001

The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism- premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.

In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror. The United States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.

The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes- some seen, some unseen.

Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can, and will, do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to achieve their political goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia.

Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists' ability to plan and operate.

We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. Once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task.

The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism. We will identify and block the sources of funding for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support them, deny terrorists access to the international

financial system, protect legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the movement of terrorists' assets through alternative financial networks.

However, this campaign need not be sequential to be effective, the cumulative effect across all regions will help achieve the results we seek. We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:

- direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;
- defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of selfdefense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and
- denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities. We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. This includes:
  - using the full influence of the United States, and working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose;
  - supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation;

- diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on areas most at risk; and
- using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.

While we recognize that our best defense is a good offense, we are also strengthening America's homeland security to protect against and deter attack. This Administration has proposed the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Centered on a new Department of Homeland Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public and the private sector.

This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For example, emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with terrorism but with all hazards. Our medical system will be strengthened to manage not just bioterror, but all infectious diseases and mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic.

While our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism in today's globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our allies can provide.

As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations such as The UN, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other

countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists.

In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life. Freedom and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy end to this conflict. In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

#### **V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction**

*“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.”*

President Bush  
West Point, New York  
June 1, 2002

The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States— with our allies and friends— to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation.

Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were inconceivable.

But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous.

In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different

in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:

- brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;
- display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
- are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
- sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
- reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable

missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.

Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:

- *Proactive counterproliferation efforts.* We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities- detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities- are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.
- *Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction.* We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to \$20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward.



- *Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.* Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

- In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.

- In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.

- Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called

soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat- most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction- weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction. The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.

We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:

- build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
- coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and
- continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.