ROLE OF NON STATE ACTORS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
A CASE STUDY OF ISRAEL-PALESTINE PEACE PROCESS

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the present dissertation on *"Role of Non State Actors in Conflict Resolution : A Case Study of Israel-Palestine Peace Process"* being submitted by *Ms. Jyoti Mankotia* is worthy of consideration for the award of M.Phil. Degree of Jawaharlal Nehru University. This is her own work and has not been published or presented for the award or any other degree of this University or any other University in India.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

One of the most prominent features of the global political system in the second half of the 20th century is the surge in the number and importance of Non-state entities. With increased interdependence and communication between societies, a great variety of new organizational structures, operating on regional and global levels, have been established. The rise of these transnationally organized Non State Actors(NSAs) and their growing involvement in world politics challenges the assumptions of the traditional approaches to international relations which assume that states are the only important units of the international system.

While some authors recognize that these non sovereign entities and their activities have led to fundamental changes in world politics. Others maintain that the international system can still be understood on the basis of inter-state relations alone. Though even the states and International Organisations have not been able to resolve many conflicts. The increasing complexity of international conflicts has made it imperative to include NSAs as dialogue partners in conflict resolution.

Given the development of increasing economic interdependence and the inability of states to provide adequately for the security of their own people, the limits of state action in finding solutions to many problems is becoming increasingly obvious. The enhancement of activity on the part of non-state actors is a prominent feature in the recent past. Thus the ranks of modern day diplomacy have expanded necessarily to include NSA beyond

and above the traditional state centric model. Though they lack the leverage of using military and economic muscle to achieve conflict resolution, they do posses certain enabling characteristics which are peculiar to their non-governmental nature.

Some of the characteristics highlighted in this paper are :

* Capacity to conduct negotiations outside of official channels ;

* to make long term commitments to a conciliation process;

* to build peace constituencies;

* to formulate long term plans;

* and to undertake a wide range of activities in humanitarian assistance;

* mediation, human rights, research, informational and professional exchanges, all of which are crucial to achieving lasting peace.

Experience shows that neither the United Nations nor governments alone can bring about peace in the holistic sense of the term. Hence NSAs deserve to be studied and analyzed. But as one absorbs oneself more into the realm of NSAs one is perplexed, Scholars themselves are debating the typology of NSAs. In fact the debate is centered around whether non state entities should be treated as distinct and autonomous actors or merely as instruments of state. The recent theoretical development in this field seems to be moving towards a *Mixed Actor Paradigm*, a view of the international system based on the coexistence of states and NSAs.

According to Jessica T. Mathews[1], the end of the cold war brought no mere adjustment of power among the states, but a novel redistribution of

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[1]   Jessica T. Mathews is a senior fellow at the council on Foreign relations.

power, markets, and civil society[2]. National governments are not simply losing autonomy in a globalising economy. They are sharing powers including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty with business organisations, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, which come under the garb of NSAs. The steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the peace of Westphalia is over, atleast for a while, the absolutes of Westphalian system-territorially fixed states where everything of value lies within some states borders, a single, secular authority governing each territory and representing it outside its borders, and no standing authority above states, are all dissolving. Increasingly, resources and threats that matter, including money, information, pollution, and popular culture, circulate and shape lives and economics with little regard for political boundaries. International standards are beginning to override claims of national or regional singularity. Even the most powerful states find the market place and international public opinion compelling them more often to follow a particular course.

Today's powerful NSAs are not without precedent. The British East India Company ran a subcontinent, and a few influential Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, and the International Labor Organization go back many decades. But these are exceptions. Both in numbers and in impact, NSAs have never before approached their current strength. And a still larger role for them lies ahead.

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[2]   Jessica T. Mathews - "Power Shift" in *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb., 1997, Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 51-52.

While working on this paper innumerable questions crossed my mind. For some I have tried to find answers, but some remain unanswered. To begin, with why is it that NSAs have suddenly arisen to heights of popularity in the 80s and the 90s even though they were in existence before? Is it because of a post cold war syndrome as has been explained by Jessica Mathews[3], perhaps it is because of dawning realization in the international system that for an enduring resolution to conflicts, be it intra-state or inter state, the deep rooted hatred and inherent prejudices, superstitions, and stereotypes of the conflictual parties have to be done away with, hence the role of NSAs.

But, one can further question why overcoming hatred and prejudice require NSAs, perhaps because NSAs go deep down into the conflict area and try to resolve the issue by getting into the roots of the problem, or perhaps their pragmatic rather than messianic, moderate rather than extreme, calculated rather than capricious preferences help them to build peace constituencies within the state which further on help in creating a long lasting enduring, and sustainable peace.

Experience shows that states by themselves have so far not been able to do so, and hence the never ending persistent conflicts. For example, conflicts in former Yugoslavia, former Soviet Union, Northern Ireland, Kashmir, Georgia, Rwanda, Zaire, Israel-Palestine (this conflict I would discuss below) have proven resistant to all conventional state centric

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[3]   Jessica Mathews- The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the rise of nonstate actors is the computer and telecommunications revolution, whose deep political and social consequence have almost been completely ignored.

solutions. So now one can inquire as to what is it in NSAs that makes their involvement in conflict situations achieve a breakthrough? Or why is it that at times, at least, by bringing the conflicting sides on the negotiating table, a good beginning is launched in the resolution of the conflict. To answer this, I will try to identify the distinct, unique characteristics which make their involvement in conflict resolution imperative, especially in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict. For the sake of better understanding I have divided my work into four distinct parts. The first one deals with the *functional aspects of NSAs*, followed by *Track II Diplomacy*, *Confidence Building Measures* and *Negotiation process* and finally I end my dissertation with conclusion. But before dealing with them it is pertinent for us to understand the historical background of the Israel-Palestine conflict as mentioned.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

Though it is difficult to lay down hard and fast rules about the exact origins of Jews and Palestinian [4] Arab - but one can suggest a framework of origins, based on evidence of migrations, religious beliefs, language and archeological findings.

"*Separation*" a single word can be used if the story of Jewish-Arab/Israel-Palestine is to be summarized during the last 100 years. At the centre of the dispute is the status of the territory which now consists of Israel, the West Bank of the river Jordon and the Gaza strip. This territory (Palestine) was a part of the ottoman empire from the 16th century to the first World War and a policy of separation was imposed by the administrative

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[4]   Arab : This word has been taken from the world Abir, plural Arab, meaning nomad, literally, is a native of the Arabian Peninsula.

system of the ottoman empire to which Palestine belonged before World War I. Though this territory became a league of Nations mandate under British mandate after allied powers severed it from Ottoman empire but the policy of separation was continued and the Arabs and Jewish communities maintained social and cultural exclusiveness by running separate economies and segregated systems of education.

The Arab-Jewish conflict heightened and assumed a political character with the *Balfour Declaration in 1917*, from then on both the Arabs and the Jews were determined to struggle for the future of the territory, for which both had laid a claim. The 1948 war and the establishment of the State of Israel brought a tremendous change to both the Jews and the Arab of the newly born state.

The Jews gained the minority status, whereas the Arabs, who previously had been the influential majority under the British mandate became a defeated minority under a Jewish government.

The declaration of Independence of the new state of Israel in May 1948 pledged to uphold full social and political equality for all of its citizens, without distinction of race, creed or sex; and to guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship, education and culture. Though the full integration of Israel's Arab citizens into the main stream of societal life has not occurred. The social, cultural, religious and geographic separation of the Arab population and their economic educational lag behind the Jewish sector have been perpetuated.

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⁵   Arab : - This word has been taken from the word *Abir*, plural *Arab*, meaning nomad, literally, kis a native of the Arabian Peninsula.

The Palestinians were perceived as a cut-off limb of the Arab world and as security risks by the Jewish leadership and public. The mere existence of the military administration, alongwith other legislative and regulative acts enacted out of security considerations constituted institutional legitimization for the perpetuation of fears and suspicions regarding the Arab's loyalty to the state and its Jewish inhabitants.

Besides security, another fundamental separating factor in Israeli-Palestinian relationship is the predominant Israeli ideology. Israel was conceived as a Zionist-Jewish state a homeland into which Jewish people from the many lands of its dispersion were to be gathered and melted into a unified nation-with the Israel's' Arab Citizens who were destined to remain a permanent unassimilated minority.

According to[6] Lustick (1930) and Smooha (1980) policy towards the Arab minority was institutionalizing efficient control over the Arab citizens and their resources to ensure their loyalty, to maintain their vulnerability as a minority group, and shape their identity as an ethnic, religious and cultural minority rather than as a national one.

The duel over Palestine is between *Arab nationalism* and *Jewish nationalism*. Both nationalism were liberation movements; seeking new identities for their people through territorial independence. They clashed in Palestine following the break-up of the ottoman empire of the World War 1 it

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[6] Bargal, David - "Contact is not enough - The contribution of Lewinian Theory to Intergroup Workshops Involving Arab Palestinians and Jewish Youth in Israel *International Journal of Group Tension*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1990, pp. 179-191.

was the desire to revive the cultural ties and expression that inspired the birth of *Pan-Arabism* - the awareness of a corporate Arab identity.

It was towards the end of the 19th century, following the first *pogroms*[7] in Eastern Europe, groups of Jews started to leave for Palestine, the land most closely associated with their religion, for centuries Jews have repeated the words *Le Shana haba be Yerushalay* in (next year in Jerusalem) during pass over.

World War 1 - Britain recognized the historic and religious links the Jews had with Palestine and saw the potential economic and political value in encouraging Jewish settlement and 1917 issues [8] Balfour declaration - When Arabs learnt of this, they were seized with consternation and protested to British government, whereas the Jews greeted the declaration joyfully.[9] Since for many it meant the green light for immigration *(aliya)*[10] on large, organized scale to Palestine. The Jewish immigration created bitter problems for Palestine. Not only was there little in common with local pockets of sephardic and oriental Jews, but there was barely any personal communication between the communities, resulting in discord and violence tensions, demonstrations and armed clashes between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine which were common place throughout the British mandatory period

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[7]   Pogroms - organized massacres of Jewish ghettos.

[8]   Balfour Declaration 1917 - Pledged the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine   in accordance with the concept of Zionism.

[9]   Highly orthodox Jews opposed Zionism as a political solution to the Jewish problem, because they considered Jewish nationalism a sacrilege. They considered the true Mersiah would lead them back when God wished it.

[10]   Aliya - means Rebirth, uplift.

(1922-48). This problem was further complicated by the buying, selling and settlement of land. The areas chosen for Jewish settlement often cut cross Arab villages and furthermore the Jewish labour was preferred to Arab. The Arabs accused the Jews of *Racial discrimination.* Waves of immigration (*immigration+settlement= Riots*)the numbers of Jews in Palestine bringing resentment and unease, serious riots and disturbances, almost continuously from 1936-39. Though various concepts for the ultimate disposition of the territory were put forward during the period between the world wars, the final decision awaited the United Nation in 1947. The British turned the matter of the future of the Palestine mandate over to the United Nation and in November 1947, its General Assembly adopted the majority plan of the United Nations Special Community on Palestine (UNSCOP), which called for the partition of Palestine and the creation of Jewish State and on Arab state with Jerusalem under an international regime. The Zionists responded in affirmative (with reluctance); the Arabs rejected in the plan.

The break up of the Mandate created an enormous *Refugee Problem* which became the major stumbling - block to peace settlement. An Arab exodus suited Zionist interest : an Israeli state could not be realized without a Jewish majority[11] Christopher sykes writes : `But if the exodus was by and large an accident of war in the first stage, in the later stages it was consciously and mercilessly helped on by Jewish threats and aggression towards Arab populations[12].

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[11] Resolution 194(iii) of Dec 1948 called for the repatriation of the refugees, restitution of property, and compensation for loss of or damage to property.

[12] Ferguson, Pamela - The Palestine problem, Latimer trend Ltd., London 1973, pp.9-46.

Another impasse was created when Israel refused to allow the refugees back, after the cease-fire. Not even the U.N. could break this impasse. In its Resolution of 11 December 1948, the U.N. tried to persuade the Israelis to open this borders to refugees - before a peace settlement, but the Israelis refused in May 1948, when Britain terminated its mandatory government and withdrew its forces from Palestine, *Palestine Liberation Organization* came into being, was formally created on May 26, 1969, becoming the umbrella organization of nearly all the Palestine.

Six major Wars have been fought since then *Israel War of independence* (1948-49), *Sinai Suez War* (1956), June 1967. *Six day War*, *War of Attrition* 1969. *the October (You Kippur)* 1973 war which ended by giving way to peace conferences in Geneva on December 1973; The Camp David Accord of 1978 were though thought of elevating the peace process to a new level but neither the accord refered to the Palestinians nor other Arab states joined the process. The sixth War Arab-Israel War of 1982 which was followed by US brokered, Lebanese-Israel negotiations leading to May Accord 1983. But failure of this and other regional and extra regional developments precluded further moues towards peace.

RECENT PAST:

A major change in Arab-Israel relations developed from regionally initiated moues, and also from extra-regional moues especially the United States. The Palestinian uprising (Intifada) which began in December 1987 and Yassir Arafats acceptance of the three[13] '*Yesses*' of Geneva, in

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[13] "Three Yeses" - Recognition of Israels right to exist; Renunciation of Terrorism; Acceptnce of United Nations Security Council Resolution. 242.

December 1988 generated international attention and brought forth new efforts in the direction of Arab-Israel Peace.

The United States, too tried to play its role in continuation of the peace process. Particularly after Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War at its own hands, with the end of Cold War and Collapse of the former USSR, and United States came under mounting pressures especially from its Arab allies to work towards Arab-Israeli peace The result was the *Madrid Peace Conference* 30 October 1991.

The basic issues though continues to remain the ultimate division of the territory, Palestine and sovereignty over it, the borders of the state of Israel and its right to exist in peace and security, the states of Jerusalem and the right of the Palestinians, as well as a whole set of technical problems, are components that have to be addressed substantially.

It is here that the NSAs by launching various new efforts in the form of intergroup workshops, co-authorship, inter-personal contacts, addressing public opinion between the Israelis and Palestinians, have sought to stress on reducing the cultural enemity and the inherent deep rooted hatred towards each other. All these have given a new dimension to the peace process.

QUESTIONS RAISED :

1. Are non-official professionals replacing or supplementing official professionals?

2. Are NSAs efficient starters for the resolution of conflict?

3. Would NSAs replace sovereign states as a major unit of analysis in foreign policy or the broader study of international relations?

4. Are NSAs essential ingredient in the sociology of peace building?

5. Do NSAs have some special characteristics that make them efficient resolvers of conflict?

HYPOTHESIS:

1. For resolution of a conflict in a democratic society it is necessary to build peace constituencies in support of conflict resolution.

2. In resolution of a conflict NSAs substitute for and supplement the state.

3. In certain conflict situations third party mediation works best through NSAs.

CHAPTER I

FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF NON STATE ACTORS :

* Multi-Dimensional channels of contact among societies:-

NSAs establish multiple links amongst the parties involved in a conflict, the most important being the establishment of interpersonal acquaintances and contact among the societies where they work. According to Ben Ari and Amir[1] (1986) the state of art regarding the contact between the Arab and Jewish youth can be gauged by their growing readiness to change the status quo and to improve intergroup relations. But the question that arises is how to change, and by what means.

Ben Ari and Amir, herein talk about the work of NSAs that work on the micro level of contact between young people of the two ethnic groups which are in conflict. The most prominent and successful contacts took place at the intergroup workshop, whereby educational induced are provided towards co-operation amongst the young people from two diverses culture, who will come into contact at various levels as adults later in life. The objectives are to reduce the alienation aloneness between the two groups; to try to minimize stereotypes and prejudices; to evolve 늘 글 an empathic attitude towards the other group; and to increase the level and number of contacts between the two

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[1] Ben Ari, R.Amir (1986) "Contact between Arab and Jewish youth in Israel-Palestine in Newstone , M. Brown, R. *Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters*, Oxford, Bssil Blackwell, pp.45-58

conflicting groups : Hence, the main goals of these encounters lie in the realm of interpersonal acquaintance.

For example, in *the Neve Shalom Intergroup Conflict management workshop*, the youths contributed new skills and knowledge for dealing with the Israel-Palestine conflict. Herein certain conduct and sentiments of the minority group were altered as part of pre-intergroup workshops, whereby each ethnic group had enough time to study its own identity, examine its stereotyped images of the other group, and prepare to encounter the other group. To put it in [2] *Bargals Bar* terminology, these sessions were designed to encourage *anticipatory socialization* which later enhances the impact of the actual workshop.

The NSAs, in particular the various NGOs involved in the Israel-Palestine peace process such as *B.Tselem*[3], *Israeli Peace movement, Jerusalem link*[4], *Jerusalem Foundation*[5] also act as using transmission belts, broadcasting government policies in various countries and making them more sensitive to one another. Hence they act as catalysts in defusing dangerous situations and thereby

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[2] Bargal, David - Contact is not enoguh - The contribution of Lewinian Theory of intergroup workshops involving Arab - Palestinians and Jewish Youth in Israel, *International Journal of Group Tension*, Volume 20, NO. 12. 1990, pp. 179-191.

[3] B. Tselem- published report on the Israeli govt. Discrimination against Palestinians in the area of land expropriation planning and building in Jerusalem.

[4] Jerusalem Link- run by women and trees to build greater cooperation bet women on both sides.

[5] Jerusalem Foundation- is responsible for community building projects.

establish themselves as advocates of positive change. They do so by carrying out various *Problem solving workshops.* These workshops bring together leaders of conflicting groups or nations to :

* analyze the root causes of the conflicts and to examine the interests and needs that underline the rigid positions of the conflicting parties;

* develop cooperative and friendly workable personal relationships;

* understand dimensions of conflict from the perspective of an adversary;

* develop joint strategies for dealing with the conflict or sharing problems;

* help the participants arrive at a shared understanding of roots of conflict

* define their separate goals and work together to discover options that satisfy them.

Problem Solving Workshop:

This is the most complex and the most sensitive activity, and it played a very very important role at times when Israeli citizens were prohibited from meeting with representatives or members of the PLO, peace groups and the other NGO organizations.

At times, workshops made a direct input the into arena of the formal *(Track one)* peace negotiations, for example in 1991, 5 Palestinians and 6 Israelis spent 5 days in dialogue under the sponsorship of Stanford University Center on Conflict and negotiation.

*   *Co-authoring:* Mark A. Heller's and Sari Nusseibeh's book *"No Trumpets, No Drums : A Two- State Settlement Of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict"* according to Edy Kaufman provided an excellent opportunity to place the joint venture of two scholars working on both sides of the green line within the wider context of an historical introspection on *coauthorship* in a situation of existential conflict.

In addition co-authoring, one could see the process also covered the evolution of other, less difficult, forms of cooperation such as workshops, joint statements, writing in newspapers, teaching, researching and co-editing.

Until the mid-1980's, cases of co-authoring in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been very rare; during the three decades of the British mandate, it was mainly within small marginal circles of Jewish and the Arab peace oriented personalities and the Marxists groups where are interaction took place. Gradually Jewish-Arab co-existence within the boundaries of the state created the dynamics for politically inspired joint ventures, particularly on the left, but after 1948 such acts did not spread across the boundaries of Israel.

In the aftermath of the shock of 1967 war, some exceptional West Bankers, such as Aziz Shehaded, expressed willingness to move toward shared visions with Israelis, but these isolated moves were soon stifled by the Palestinian leadership outside the territories and the Labor Party's traditional preference for the Jordanian option[6]. Few dialogues

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[6]   Jordanian option :- The Allon Plan, which envisaged handing over Jericho to Jordonian rule while keeping the Jordan valley in Israeli hands.

became sustained efforts, and some took place either behind closed doors in often secretive ventures, or in occasional conferences sponsored by organizations such as *New Outlook,* an Israeli Journal. **The New York** conference initiated jointly by the Israeli *magazine New Outlook* and a Palestinian daily *"Al Fajr"* along with the Friends of Peace Now and the American Council for Palestine Affairs, was on co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians and was aptly called "The Road to Peace". The discussions were characterized by an absence of mutual recrimination and a growing sense of shared commitment to the elimination of the obstacles on the uneven and difficult road to peace. These encounters were ground breaking experiences insofar as they opened the minds of the participants to the idea of working together. And it is from these timid beginnings that there gradually sprang up joint speaking tours, better planned and intensive workshops, and also the Heller-Nusseibeh book.

There were programs conducted by the academies and policy that evolved from the experimentation of scholars interested in conflict resolution. The most prominent were programs conducted by the Harvard university for more than a decade by Prof. Herbert Kelman, Jay Rothman and others. Sometimes these programs ended in significant statements of agreements. In 1990, for example, the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation issued a document entitled *"Principles and Provisions of a Palestinian- Israeli Agreement"* calling for the implementation in stages of a two-state solution. Another joint

undertaking was a statement advocating a phased two-stage solution of settlement issued in Jerusalem in August 1990 by 15 Israeli Knesset members and 12 Palestinian intellectual and political leaders from the West Bank, the *"Israel-Palestinian Joint Declaration on Peace"*.

But apart from these political statements, there were more emotional and personal encounters which took various forms. For example, the correspondence that grew between *New Outlook* editor Chain shur and the young Palestinian journalist Mona Hamza. Another one was a joint teaching exercise. A pioneering effort in real time in the locus of conflict itself was undertaken by Sari Nusseibeh as far back as the early 1980s when he taught a course on Islamic philosophy at the Herbew University. In 1988 Dr. Eyad al-Sarraj from Gaza and Dr. Raphel Moses of the Herbew university taught a seminar on the psychological aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the University.

A Joint anthology was realased in print in 1988 when two doctoral candidates at the American University in Washington, DC, Yehuda Luckas and Abdalla M. Battah, published in the contributions to a conference covering the post- 1967 period, in the book entitled *"The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change"*.

The launching of Intifada in late 1987 provided an impetus for joint research, dialogue, and other peace-seeking ventures among Palestinian and Israeli intellectuals and artists. One of the most comprehensive interactions has been the *"Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project"* (IPPRP) , undertaken by the Turban Institute of

Hebrew University and the Arab Studies Society of Jerusalem. *Coauthorship* is perhaps the highest stage of joint intellectual discourse and requires a particular commitment, which was done while writing this book. Formidable barriers in such interventions arose, mainly arising from perceptions of inequality. The blatant disparity of one side having a state while the other is under occupation, created objective and subjective reasons that delayed the process of co-authoring. With the negotiating process underway, though now it is again in shambles, one wonders why many more joint expressions across national lines are not emerging.

Academic cooperation can be seen as constituting basic and critical aspects of a comprehensive peace settlement, according to Edy Kaufman. All these initiatives give cause to hope that the scattered and slow process of reconciliation led by the academics of both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian protracted confrontation may bear fruit, if sustained efforts continue to prevail over adverse circumstances.

The encounters between Israelis and Palestine's were made by using a variety of interventions; the methods ranged from the provisions of opportunities for brief contact between Arabs and Jews through joint participation in social or cultural activities to planned, systematic, encounters at which participants engage in meaningful dialogues which may potentially continue beyond the context of the encounter, often for sustained periods of time and concomitant diplomatic process in interbloc diplomacy-refers to the ability to avert mutually unfavourable

outcomes in a relationship as a result of misunderstandings or poor communications.

This systematic efforts helps in improving the political climate between strategic adversaries by pointing to a lack of hostile intentions and a general reassurance that the other side has no built-in animosity incompatible with your own interests, notwithstanding the basic competitive or conflictual nature of the relationship. They are measure intended to reassure the adversary about the basically peaceful nature of one's own intentions.

Change at the political level is for the most part the domain of *Track one* - Conflict Resolution, however is not sustainable through single track effort why? because for resolving deep rooted conflicts one requires change in attitudes, change in structures and change in political and local relationship for which Tract II is an necessity : Track II Diplomacy is a growing field, and with each new Track II initiative there's an opportunity for cooperation and colleboration with Track one efforts. Because Track II practitioners must recognize that if their initiative is successful, they will probably have to coordinate their activities with *Track one*. It is governments after all, that are responsible for negotiating, signing and ratifying treaties and other formal documents that are needed to seal the unofficial, successful initiatives. Hence, in the end it is only through a collaborative effort among all societal sectors and power structures that a real change is possible.

*Commitment And Long Term Capability To Conflict :

Formal Diplomacy suffers from the inability to address the psychological obstacles in negotiation, further on a professional diplomat rarely has sufficient time to develop close and intimate relationships with the disputants. The high diplomatic turn inhibits the development of a close rapport which enhances mutual confidence and respect between the conflicting parties. Lastly, formal diplomacy is more often used as a means of crises intervention in a conflict. Since the officials feel pressured or unduly constrained by the politicians, they are not very relaxed when they negotiate, emotions too are kept from bursting out by the practice of formal diplomacy. Hence this shows a certain rigidity about formal diplomacy.

Whereas unofficial diplomats have sufficient time and ability to invest in establising credibility with the disputing parties and in gaining familiarity with the issues involved . The "*psychological task*, which the unofficial diplomats cater to consists of reducing the sense of vicitimhood of the parties and dehumanizing the image of the adversary, if successful it gradually brings about a climate of opinion within the community, making it safe for political leaders to take positive steps in working towards resolving conflicts. NSA commitment to mediation of conflict may span many years and may continue, despite the frustration of all attempts to reach peace. For example the *Quaker* involvement in the Middle east dates back to 1948 and continues till today.

The consistent attitude endows the NSAs with S^3 (By S^3 I mean stability, sturdiness, and swift movers) an reliability that the government mediators lack since they are vulnerable to changes in governmental leadership and policy. Since the NSAs work at the level of effecting behavioral changes, their impact on the conflicting parties is reliable and stable, but one might question as to how do they do it?

According to [7]Lewin for a person to change his values or accept new ones, requires that he/she undergoes a psychological process termed by him *"Re-education"*, which involves a number of cognitive, interpersonal and group processes. *Re-education*, which the intergroup workshop practiced in the Israel-Palestine conflict, involved changes of knowledge and beliefs, changes of values and standards, changes of emotional attachments and needs, and changes of everyday conduct, which occurred not piecemeal and independently of each other, but within the framework of an individual's total life in the group. This group acts as a major means to change the attitude and behaviour of the individual because only by anchoring his/her conduct in something as large, substantial and super-individual as the culture of a group, can the individual stabilize his beliefs sufficiently to keep them immune from the day-by-day fluctuations of moods and influences to which he as an individual, is subject.

Bergal, David : op.cit., pp. 187-189.

Lewin argues from the experience of this workshop that *reeducation* consists of three components: the *cognitive*, the *affective*, and the *motoric*. In the former component they tried to modify social stereotypes, though it was very difficult, and infact interpersonal contact even though it was on an interpersonal basis did not by itself achieve the desired results until and unless the participants of the group were actively involved in the effort, without this involvement, no objective fact is likely to influence his or her social conduct. The workshop creates an atmosphere of freedom and spontaneity, freedom of expression, voluntary attendance, the voicing of grievances, emotional security and avoidance of pressure. And this is what government mediators lack.

Furthermore, official actors are vulnerable to change in the government and policy making. After the election of Benjamin Netanyau the peace process at the official level was almost halted. But these joint workshops are still continuing, and this lends stability and reliability towards the peace process or towards resolution of the conflict.

By swift mover, I mean that the NSAs especially the NGOs are quicker to respond to new demands and opportunities. Internationally, in both the poorest and richest countries. NGOs, when adequately funded, can outperform government in delivery of many public services. Their growth along with that of the other elements of civil society, can strengthen the fabric of the many still fragile democracies.

* IMPARTIAL AMBASSADORS OF GOODWILL :

Lack of coercive power frees the NSAs from being perceived as "arm twisters". The military or political weakness of NSAs paradoxically translates into their mediatory strength. For example, in 1989 Archbishop Desmond Tutu spent Christmas in the occupied territories in Palestine criticizing Israeli government policies. This caused considerable embarrassment to the Israeli government but did wonders for Palestinian morale. Such activity inspires trust and confidence among parties to the conflict. But on the contrary, lack of monetary resources and the reputation of being a weak NSAs can lead the way for a powerful state actor to take charge of the conflict. Infact,· at times when the conflict is grave it becomes imperative for the powerful state "arm twister" to take charge of the conflict. The current situation of the Israel-Palestine conflict proves this point, the Israeli-Palestine conflict is in shambles, and it has almost been taken over by the state actors, namely the Prime-ministers of both sides.

* SOFT APPROACH:

NSAs are better than governments at dealing with problems that grow slowly and affect society through their cumulative effect on individuals, - the soft threats of environmental degradation, denial of human rights, population growth, poverty, and lack of development that may already be causing more deaths in conflict than the traditional acts of aggression .This slow, gradual, and consistent approach of NSAs

further on helps them to bring the conflict at the manageable level. This approach helps these actors to bring the conflict at the manageable level.

CULTURAL PROXIMITY :

Catering to cultural sensitivity is of pertinence in resolution of a conflict especially when the differences between the two national groups like Arabs and Jews are formidable. They are reflected in many aspects of life, ritual, emotional, religious and social behaviour.

Arab society is traditional in its orientation and family relations are close and tight. Like any other traditional society, spontaneous expression of feelings is not approved and this affects the Arab participants ability to use avenues of emotional expression for communication purposes. During the workshops, it was seen that Arab society, be it Christian or Muslim, was strange to Jewish participants. Likewise, to the Arab participants who meets Jewish youth on close terms for the first time , the open interpersonal relations especially between boys and girs and the spontaneous expression of feelings, often seems strange and threatening. This very unequal status of the two national groups also manifests itself in the relative absence of communication skills and the ability for introspection among the Arab participants.

Intergroup relations cannot be solved without altering certain conduct and sentiments of the group and herein is the role on NSAs. For example, the *Neve Shalom Research Project* made pre-workshop preparations for each ethnic group. This enabled them to examine their

stereotypes towards the other group, in terms of its own identity, to prepare for the encounter with the other group, thereby reaching a much more balanced and equal position. Hence these intergroup workshops try to alter the conduct and sentiments of the other group. This ensures a better and more effective intergroup encounter. This *anticipatory socialization*[8] enhances the impact of the actual workshop. The contents of these discussions are technically known as "*anticipatory inputs*". These basically are of three types. The first being of informative nature, the second focuses on cognitive change by providing knowledge and exposing future participants to values which enhance greater awareness to basic issues, the third type aims to affect a deeper level of experience by dealing with emotional aspects of attitudes and behavioral reactions.

Sometimes, as an extension of the indigenous society, local NGOs or broadly speaking NSAs can better evaluate the cultural factors in conflict resolution. These provide internal stimulus to the conflict.

For example *The Time For Peace Rally* was based on the idea of détente from below. *The Time Peace Rally* took place in Jerusalem at the end of December 1989. Palestinian nationalist organizations and Israeli peace organizations co-operated in a joint demonstration in support for Palestinian rights and the cause for a just peace. This movement was seen as important in forging vital links in the chain of non-violence reaching from the ground upto the heart of Israeli policy making. The rally complemented the projects of the doves on both sides

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[8]   Ibid., p.14.

of the conflict and was able to attract considerable support from both

constituencies. This rally demonstrated that Palestinians and Israelis

were able to demonstrate for peace alongside each other. In this process

they inhaled the same tear gas, felt the force of the same water-cannons

and fled from the same threats of rifle-butts and clubs. [9]Andrew Rigby

says "I participated in the rally and there was a sense of community, a

common togetherness of people from diverse backgrounds inpursuit of a

common purpose-ending of occupation and conflict. This experience had

a powerful impact on the morale and perspective of those who

participated".

CONSCIENCE TOUCHERS :

Sometimes NSAs might touch the conscience of one or more

parties to the conflict, acting as a catalyst to effect changes in the

outlook and stance of the others, so that eventually the impact of the

original action might reverberate along the links in a chain leading to

political elites and key policy makers (Galtung)[10].

For example. *Al Awda Boat Of Return/Peace Ship Feb 1989:*

The PLO planned to sail a boat from the occupied territories to Israel.

This powerful symbolism of a boat loaded with Palestinian deportees

non-violently seeking to return to their homeland was intended to

capture the sympathy and touch the conscience of previously

unconcerned public opinion around the world. However, the project had

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[9]   Rigby, Andrew - Unofficial Non-violent Intervention - Examples from Israeli-Palestine Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research,* Volume 32, No. 4, November, 1995.

[10]   Ibid.

to be aborted since the Israelis blew up the ship. As a result, many Jews publicly renounced their right to return to Israel in solidarity with the Palestinians who had been expelled from their homeland. Such public declarations earned the activists the censure of fellow Jews within their communities who viewed such actions as a dangerous precedent, if sufficient numbers of Jews of the world renounced their right to return it would undermine the very basis of Israel as a state and homeland for all Jews. The impact upon the morale of Palestinians in the occupied territories and elsewhere was felt, Israeli sabotage lent credibility to Palestinian claims about the lengths to which the occupiers would go to suppress the legitimate human rights and aspirations of the Palestinians.

PEACE CONSTITUENTS:

NSA help in building Peace Constituencies in the area of conflict situations. They create a favorable environment between the disputing parties and hence they soothen the atmosphere for the dialogue to be sit in. Peace constituencies range from a small workshop to a heavily funded conflict management workshop. These constituencies act at the grass root level and built up peace potential from below, which later helps in building a strong public opinion and in creating an ambience of normally and peace in the conflictual area. They provide a means for influencing people that increases good-will. They emphasize compassion as the motivation for action rather than fear, guilt or shame.

CHAPTER II

TRACK II DIPLOMACY

"When Track I simply will not do,

We have to travel on Track II,

but for results to be abiding,

the track must meet upon siding."

(Kenneth Bolding, Amsterdam, Jan 6, 1986)

Non state actors operate through the medium of *Track II,* [1]which is the unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion and organize human and material resources in ways that help to resolve the conflict. *Track II* is not a substitute for official, formal *Track I,* rather it is designed to assist official leaders by compensating for constraints imposed on them by the psychologically understandable need for leaders to be seen as strong and indomitable in the face of the enemy. If there is tension in political conflict, the leader who takes risks for peace without his constituents being prepared for it loses his political base, and as it happened in the Israel - Palestine case, of Yitzak Rabin, who lost his life. The assassination of Yitzak Rabin is a good example supporting the above argument.

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[1] Track II Diplomacy : was coined in 1981 by *Joseph Montiville,* U.S. Diplomat in constrast to Track I Diplomacy.

According to *James Notter and John Mc Donald* [2]- *Track II Diplomacy* is a growing field that not only can support *Track I* (government) efforts but can also play an important role in its own right. They contend it is only through a collaborative effort among all societal sectors and power structures that real change is possible.

Track II is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in first instance, to manage conflicts, by exploring possible solutions out of public view and without the requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage. *Track II* seeks political formulas or scenarios which might satisfy the basic security and esteem needs of parties to a particular dispute. On a more general level, it seeks to promote a environment in a political community, through the education of public opinion, that would make it safer for political leaders to take risks for peace.

To use a cliché; as they say you can't clap with one hand, similarly we can't talk about conflict resolution unless we utilize both *Track I and Track II Diplomacy.*

Track II Diplomacy involves three interdependent processes:-

(a)   *Problem Solving Workshops;*

(b)   *Influencing Public Opinion;*

(c)   *Cooperative Economic Development.*

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²   Notter, James and Mc Donald, James - arc working at the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) in Washington, D.C.; Notter is the Institute's Programme Director and McDonald is the Chairman and Co-founder of theInstitute.

The first process consists of *problem solving workshops* or seminars

that bring together the leaders of conflicting groups or nations for the

following purposes:

* to develop workable personal relationships in a   microcosm.

* to understand the dimensions of the conflict from the

perspective of the adversary

* To develop joint strategies for dealing with conflict as a shared

problem, the solution of which requires reciprocal and cooperative efforts.

Problem Solving Workshops:

This is the most complex and   sensitive activity in *Track II*

Diplomacy. Several good examples of *Track II*   consulation projects have

been implemented with Israelis and Palestinians some for example are as

follows:

(1)   The most prominent work done unofficially by the Israeli and

Palestinian academicians, was the success of the Oslo Accord. In Oslo was a

crucial component of the process that led to the historic agreement between

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and the PLO leader Yasser Arafat.

Behind the scene academicians were an Israeli professor, Dr. Yair Hirschfeld,

Professor Ron Pundik, Palestinian economist and Abu Ala. Not to forget the

third party which made the accord a living example of today. Terje Larsen[3]

head of the an Oslo-based research institute, FAFO was uniquely qualified

to bring the two enemies together.

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[3]   Terje Larsen - was highly regarded by the Israelis, who knew that his country had
been an enthusiastic supporter of the Jewish homeland ever since the holocaust, and was
also a sympathetic expert on the bleak life of occupied Palestine, he was trusted by the
Palestinians.

(2)   A group of psychiatrists affiliated with the American psychiatric association organised six workshops from 1980 through 1984 that brought together Israelis and Palestinian.

(3)   The greater the status of the sponsoring institution, the greater the political influence of the participants who are prepared to accept the invitation to take part in the workshops. An excellent example to prove this point is the July 91 meeting that took place between five Palestinians and six Israelis who spent five days in dialogue under the sponsorship of the *Stanford University Centre on Conflict and Negotiation.*

On another front, *Herbert Kelman* of Harvard University has also been running a series of problem solving workshops with the Israelis and the Palestinians since 1971.

These problem solving workshops also encourage creative thinking.[4] For example in one of the workshops, an Israeli participant gave recognition to the fact that Palestinians like Jews, have been victimized by history. This recognition of historic grievances and hurts becomes a critically necessary early step in any psychologically sensitive conflict resolution process.

The second process is influencing *public opinion*. This task is a psychological one since the image of the enemy/adversary has to be rehumanized and the sense of victimhood of parties also has to be reduced. This process later builds up a favorable climate of opinion within a community or nation, making it safe for the respective political leaders to take positive steps towards resolving the conflict.

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[4]   Neve Shalom (The Oasis of Peace) Conflict Management Workshop.

The advantage of addressing public opinion being that the leaders develop a wide expansive understanding of the conflict themselves. Sometimes the leaders also undergo metamorphosis in which the approach to the enemy becomes humanized. The disadvantage of this approach comes to the forefront when the overall political environment fails to reflect the enhanced and new knowledge gained by the political leaders and they (i.e. the political leaders) have to confront strong resistance when they try to take action based on their new insights. For example, in Israel the participants in workshops have symbolized their stance vis-à-vis the conflict through wearing label badges, displaying bumper stickers, wearing a Kiffiyah, talking with friends about the issue, raising the Palestinian question in different organizations such as peace groups, political parties trade unions and voluntary association, organizing debates, film screening, street politics, lobbying national politicians. Though participants in such activities are unlikely to incur any unforeseen sanctions but these activities are aimed invariably at affecting in one way or another the activities of government, organization and agencies which are directly involved in the conflict. These all constitute the conventional needs of off-site interventionary action.

At times a particular citizen initiative shows enormous potential for helping to build an environment for eventual Israel-Palestine Peace.

In 1972, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs of Israeli citizenship founded the village of Neve Shalom, meaning Oasis of Peace, on a hill situated halfway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. This village offers concrete expression to its founders determination to prove that Arabs and

Jews can live together on the basis of mutual aspect. Since 1980, well over 8000 people including adults from Arab and Jewish communities have attended the villages programs. (But like almost all *Tract II* initiatives, *Neve Shalom* is constantly scratching for funds). Even the *American Psychiatric Associations.* Conflict Resolution Workshop - which teaches Jewish school children Arab history and culture, to promote the growth of mutually respectful Arab-Jewish relations as a response to the alarming rise in Israel youth support for extremist Anti-Arab-Ideologies, also help in reducing social stereotypes and prejudices.

Alouh Harevan runs the *Van Leer Jerusalem Institute* developed *"To live together"*, a curriculum in Civic Education on Arab-Jewish relations. This *citizen diplomacy* at times best intervenes to affect the process and outcome of conflicts. Citizens have at hand a range of legitimate and conventional means of exercising pressure for change.

Another example of citizen action is the *TIME FOR PEACE* rally that took place in Jerusalem at the end of December, 1989. The idea behind this action was to mobilize Palestinian nationalist organizations and Israeli peace organizations along with a sizable international contingent, in a joint non-violent demonstration in support for Palestinian rights and the cause of a just peace. The themes of rally were *"PEACE YES"*, *"OCCUPATION NO"*, *"TWO STATES FOR TWO PEOPLE"*. This rally served to convince the buck of Israeli participants that the need to change Israeli government Policy was more urgent than ever.

This rally complemented the projects of the 'doves' on both sides of the conflict and attracted considerable support from both constituencies. In this rally observes felt there was a sense of community - a common togetherness of people from diverse backgrounds in pursuit of a common purpose - being ending of occupation and conflict. This experience had a powerful impact on the morale and perspective of those who participated.

Another protest action was named the Al-Awda 'Boat of Return/Peaceship' : February 1988 : Two months after intifada, the PLO planned to sail a boat from Athens across the Mediterranean to Israel with more than 200 Palestinians deportees and refugees. The aim of this voyage was to highlight Israel's violation of international law and human rights especially with regard to deporting people from the occupied territories.

This powerful symbolism of boat load of Palestinian [5]deportees non-violently seeking to return to this homeland was intended to capture the sympathy and touch the conscience of the previously unconcerned publics around the world. The resultant effect of this effort was that a number of Jews publicly renounced their "right of return" to Israel in solidarity with the Palestinians who had been expelled from their homeland.

The third process which Joseph V. Montville talks about is *Cooperative Economic Development.* Though this process is not compulsory for conflict resolution, but it does provide incentives, institutional support and continuity to the political and psychological

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[5]   The original initiative came from *Associazione per la Pace* (Italian Peace Association).

processes. And such cooperative economic activities offer prospects of growth, enhancement of individual well being and a measure of stability for families and communities who suffered considerable losses and chronic instability.

Economics have been so central to the Israeli-Palestinian accommodation effort that there sometimes appears to be a descrete attempt to submerge political issues.

As an example, S. Elmusa and Mahmud Jaafari [6] argue accommodation has been marked as the road to regional prosperity; whereas prosperity coupled with creation of economic interdependencies is the guarantee for accommodations durability. These premises were exemplified in the "Casablanca Declaration" issued on November 1994 at the Middle East North America Economic Summit.

In the case of the Israel-Palestine economic relationship, the web of economic links is woven by Israel to serve its own economic and strategic interests and this has kept the Palestinian economy in a state of underdevelopment and subordination to the Israeli economy. The Palestinians tried unsuccessfully during the intifada to unravel this web by boycotting Israeli goods, encouraging local production, resisting tax payments. Renegotiations between the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) and Israel-Palestine about the economic relationship resulted in two agreements. The first one consists of economic provisions (a statement of

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[6]   Sharif S. Elmusa and Mahmud El-Jaafri - "Power and Trade" : The Israeli Palistinian, Economic Protocol", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol XXIV, no. 2, 1995, pp. 14-20.

general principles and an outline of areas of cooperation) of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed by Israel-Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on 13 Sept., 1993 (Article XI, Annexure I and II).

The second agreement was the[7] *"Paris Protocol on Economic Relations"* between the Government of Israel-Palestine and the PLO representing the Palestinian People, signed in Paris on 29 April 1994. The details of the protocol have been analysed in the statistical diagrams are given in Annexures.

The Economic Annex of the Goza-Jericho agreement was incorporated into the interim agreement. The articles and appendices, including the establishment of a single economic unit for the purpose of customs and import policy, also applies to the whole of the West Bank and Gaza strip. An entire annex of the agreement also deals with co-operation between Israel-Palestine and the Palestinian Council. The parties committed to cooperation programs involving officials, institutions and the private sector in various fields, such as economics, science, culture and society. Cooperation is to focus on five principal areas :

*	Economics (comprising industry, agriculture, energy, transport and tourism);

*	Environmental Protection;

*	Technology and Science;

Paris Protocol - Consists of a preamble and a dozen articles and annexes covering banking, trade, taxes, labor, insurance tourism etc, also delineates the spheres of Palestinian autonomous decision making.

*   Culture and Education (comprising culture, media, communication, education, sports and youth); and

*   The fostering of dialogue and relations between the two peoples through a people to people program.

In this context the parties are to work to develop contacts between the economic, agricultural, scientific and educational sectors; and to also find common solutions for environmental protection, such as waste removal and clean energy sources. World would also be done to advance tourism through investment in infrastructure and joint initiatives, to advance education by the development of curricula, the training of sports instructors, youth exchange programs, drug prevention etc.

Analysing these provision for economic cooperation, one can argue that the Palestinians were unable to obtain concessions, by contrast they lacked detailed information failed to take full advantage of the available expertise because of the preference for organizational and personal loyalties over expertise that marred the conduct of negotiations and also due to the paralyzing centralism. Unless change is forthcoming, rebuilding the devastated economy and unraveling the web of dependence on the Israeli economy are a long way ahead. Furthermore, one can say that a *technocratic*[8] *approach* may not satisfy the quest for "peace" propounded by most intellectuals. But economic cooperation acts as a viable alternative to pragmatism, which atleast promises some hope in great dispair.

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[8]   Technocratic approach - Rather than fighting over national symbols, historic promises, holy places, one must design development projects concerning trade, electricity transportation and banking facilities.

4. Women's Role:

Track II Diplomacy works like the invisible hand. It was behind the door negotiations that led to the famous Oslo accords which was, to use a cliche, the "mother" of all peace accords. But if one goes deep down into the story behind these accords one can also see how women too played their role in a special capacity and showed keen interest in the peace process.

Infact one has to read between the lines of the New York Times and the Israeli press to find out that two prominent Norwegian women played a pivotal role in the pre-negotiation stage that led to the signing of the [9]accord. One was *Marianne Heiberg,* a research scholar at the Institute for Applied Social Science [9](FAFO). What remains largely unknown is that she introduced both foreign ministers and Terse Rod Larsen, Executive Director of FAFO, to key people on the Israeli side, and used her personal and professional connections in Israel-Palestine and in West Bank and Gaza strip, especially her close working relationship with Prof. Yair Hirschfeld who later became part of the Israeli team to secret negotiations. The second prominent woman, whose role is even lesser known was *Mona Juul,* adviser to the Norwegian Foreign Minister and Mideast expert, wife of Terje Larsen whose role in orchestrating the accord was not widely known. She played on the backstage of secret negotiations in Oslo, she was instrumental in setting up the preliminary meetings leading to the direct secret negotiations and she was present in most of the meetings.

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[9]   FAFO - Think Tank. The Norwegian acroynm far Institute for Applied Social Science.

From the Palestinian side it was *Hannan Mikhail Ashrawi -* spokeswoman of the Palestinian delegation, now a minister, who played a prominent role, but her rising to this level was due to the massive political mobilization of Palestinian women and their explicit demands to take part in the decisions that effect their lives which forced the Palestinian leadership to include women in social and political institutions, nevertheless women's access to decision making remained limited.

The active role of these ladies in the pre-negotiation stages remains one of the best kept secrets in the history of secret backstage negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords.

CHAPTER III

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS):

Non State Actors also help in building confidence on both sides of the dispute. Infact, CBMs are designed to enhance the assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states and the new situations they create. CBMs[1] by definition, must promote confidence on both sides of any dispute. Non-Symmetrical or unilateral measures are not acceptable to the other side since they tend to increase rather than decrease tensions, in the language of William Durch, Alan Platt and Amy Smithson. For resolving the conflict between Israel and Palestine certain actions; gestures; which were to be associated with trustworthiness and peace-making were created, a wide range of CBMs were employed to lessen tensions, quieten borders, or introduce degree of transparency that did not impinge on the security of any participating state.

A significant number of these measures, some recognized and some not have already been employed in various parts of the Middle East to mitigate the Israel-Palestine dispute and tensions in other parts of the region as well. In this dispute, the NSAs build up the conditions, objective and subjective, for initiating the peace process as they did in Israel-Palestine conflict, and this involved a genuine commitment on the part of the major protagonists. This kind of commitment came about only in the wake of the

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[1]   Krepon. M, McCoy.M. Dominique and Rudolph C.J. Mathew (ed) : A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security, *The Henry L. Stimson Centre*, Handbook No. 1, September 1993.

1973 war, after which the difficulties in proceeding stemmed not so much from the lack of will to make progress, as from the difficult and complicated circumstances. Some of these difficulties were eventually alleviated by the set of steps and devices that we refer to under the generic name of CBMs. This term was born during the late stages of the cold war in Europe and concomitant diplomatic processes in interbloc diplomacy. It refers to the ability to avert mutually unfavourable outcome in a relationship as a result of misunderstandings or poor communications. At best, it refers to systematic efforts at improving the political climate between strategic adversaries by pointing to a lack of hostile intentions and a general reassurance that the other side has no built-in animosity incompatible with your own interests, notwithstanding the basic competitive or conflictual nature of the relationship

Scholars point out that confidence building measures are understood differently in various contexts. In some cases, the term refers merely to a process of verification or monitoring. This seems to be somewhat technical, since the agreements would be concluded with a reasonable certainty that they will be adhered to because there are means of monitoring and verifying compliances. This has profound connotations in the political process since it facilities agreements for regulating conflict and reduces armed confrontations arising from a conviction that there is no alternative to war.

The second meaning of confidence-building is more psychological than technical. The psychological task consists of measures to reassure the adversary about the basically peaceful nature of the other partiy's intentions. A number of gestures can be made to open the minds to the adversary and

share various kinds of information so as to minimize the danger of misunderstanding and inadvertent breakdowns due to lack of knowledge and the resulting uncertainty. At times this form of CBM takes the form of trying to expose the society and not just the government to each others scrutiny by exchanging diplomats, students, artists, scientists, and tourists; by opening boundaries for trade and the like. The idea is of relatively free interaction and movement to stress the willingness of each to learn about the other. In addition, gestures of a humanitarian nature and verbal behaviour reflecting a sensitivity to the other side's concerns are also made in order to show sufficient concern with issues higher on the agenda. This turns out to be a relatively inexpensive way of handling conflict and transforming it into a less vehement type of competition.

A third meaning of confidence building refers to a gradual strategy of progress in negotiations, to make all the gestures and moves neccessary to reassure the adversary that the previous stage of negotiations has been fairly implemented, and that by observing it scrupulously it is now possible and desirable to proceed to the next stage, where greater risks have to be taken. This approach facilities the complex, lengthy process of conflict regulation when a single agreement will not resolve the range of difficult issues.

A fourth type of confidence building has to do with mediation but in a broad sense of the term. It may merely be that reliance on a mutually acceptable, trustworthy mediator is all that is needed, but at other times we refer to mediating concepts (such as national sovereignty) or structures (such as membership in United Nations) or even cultures (such as being part of a

world wide elite educated in a major English speaking university, reading the New York time and watching the CNN or sky cable network).

Though a strong commitment to a set of values, concepts and ideological slogans may be seen as contributing to fanaticism rather than to conflict resolution, when the norms of commitment are shared, there is some common language which allows a dialogue with some meaning to take place.

Critics would say that confidence building is not very useful, because it refers to matters of process rather than substance. Proponents of this argument say that the best way to build confidence and make progress is to see that success follows one stage of negotiations; this inevitably breeds confidence leading toward the following stage.

Though progress on substantive issues is the best way to proceed, and such progress is indeed a superb confidence building measure, there are many conflictual situations in which such progress is simply not possible , and the question arises as to how to bring about a breakthrough or keep the negotiating process alive when the resolution of basic issues is not yet in sight. Confidence building measures may help to bring about the kind of progress that will generate momentum of its own. Though in many ways, process is substance, this is not always true and sometimes the greatest confidence cannot help when the basic divisions are too deep. As the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Still, good intentions may just prevent the need to go to hell. Lack of trust and worst case assumptions about the adversary in and of themselves are central ingredients of a conflict situation,

so that lack of confidence is as important as in the empirical sense of the term.

Conflict breeds lack of confidence and lack of confidence breeds conflict. So confidence building measures can help break this escalatory, self perpetuating cycle, and initially without touching on the basic issues too much, at a time when dealing with these issues is very difficult precisely because of harsh psychological conditions surrounding the parties and their grievances. The realities created by the Yom Kippur war of 1973 led to an almost classic demonstration of a confidence-building process. What was special about this war was that it made the conflicting parties wish for more peace than they had before the war, argues[2] Gabriel Ben-Dor. The reasons as described by him are the following :

(a)   First there was the devastation of the war. The scale of destruction, unprecedented in the Middle east, made the leaders think twice about the next war.

(b)   Second, there were the special circumstances of the outbreak of the war, such that it could be regarded as a defeat for everyone. Israel considered itself to be on top of the world after the 1967 war, when its enemies were in humiliating disarray. Yet the lines were breached, and the causalties were so heavy that Israel-Palestine could not bear them, and all this even without looking at the economic costs of the war.

On the Arab side, after the initial joy of winning, a second, more sober thought led to similarly sober conclusions. The Arabs started the war

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[2]   Ben-Dor, Gabriel : State and Conflict in the Middle-East, Praeger, New York, 1983.

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under optimal conditions, in a situation of total surprise, reinforced by a devastatingly effective oil embargo which caught everyone unprepared. All in all, the kind of situation that can be expected to occur perhaps once in a lifetime, but should not be expected to reoccur with any kind of regularity. Yet even these optimal conditions did not lead to an Arab victory. In fact, when the war ended, in 18 short days, Israel-Palestine had managed to recapture everything lost in the north, taking an extra salient that put Damascus within its artillery range.

(c)   Third, there was a question of dependence on the outside powers. This is not only a matter of psychology, although it is that, too. There is more to it, there is the problem that the dependence factor takes away whatever fruits you may have gained in victory, and it subjects you to the kind of political constraints that you were fighting to avoid in the first place. Moreover, while local problems, no matter how serious, may be temporary, subjection to the whims of foreign powers is much more difficult to reverse or overcome.

Further more, the uncertainty that the outside powers may not give support makes the local powers think twice about continuing the conflict, and especially one in which there is no chance of winning without such support, because of the developments in technology. No amount of national pride and willingness to make sacrifice can make up for the inability to produce or even maintain advanced weapons systems in the electronic age.

(d)   Fourth, there was the fear of the nuclear factor. This is one of the great enigmas of Middle East politics. But the assumption has long existed

that the Israelis have a nuclear capacity. When such rumors started to loom large, in early October 1973, there were rumors that Israel-Palestine was getting ready to arm its missiles with nuclear war heads. For the Israelis the very possibility of needing to use their nuclear option was very frightening, and of course, the fact that the superpowers reached the brink of a nuclear confrontation led the Israelis leaders to think about the future of American commitment to Israel-Palestine. All this added to the hesitations of the U.S. administration in resupplying Israel-Palestine at a time when the Soviet Union as already had for its Arab clients.

From the Arab point of view things did not look good either, infact, victory in the end eluded the Arabs, notwithstanding their huge early momentum, so there was no need for Israel-Palestine to use a nuclear option. But to many thinking Arabs it was obvious that the near disaster of the war's opening stage would push the Israelis to accelerate their nuclear program. Everyday brought Israel-Palestine closer to a nuclear option.

An important conclusion can perhaps be drawn from the fact that the 1973 war did become the basis for all later political activity in the Middle East. Until 1967 war the Arab-Israeli conflict was difficult to grasp, because it involved heavily ideological themes taken from the glory of radical nationalism, and involving, the right of Israel-Palestine to exist. In any case the conflict changed drastically in 1967 and from then on involved concrete territories in terms that nation-states traditionally understand and are well equipped to deal with. In the period between 1967 and 1973 the concrete territorial issues were hopelessly tangled and confused with lingering

ideological themes and this became one of the reasons for the difficulties in peace-making in the intervening period. The 1973 war changed that.

According to Gabriel Ben Dor the realities created by the 1973 Yom Kippur war led to an almost classic demonstration of a confidence - building process. The objective conditions surrounding the war's end left a residue of uncertainty and high risk which simply had to be reduced 'And the deployment of forces and their proximity made it imperative to undertake some confidence-building that would then allow the parties to withdraw and disengage, thereby reducing the risk of future outbreaks of war undesirable for all concerned. To do that required trusting the adversary to have the same interest in averting mutually destructive outcomes, which is the very basis of the original minimalist approach to confidence-building. This is what happened in this conflict, when there was recognition that there is resemblance between oneself and the adversary which is much more striking than preciously assumed, and hence brought forth practical negotiations about the implementing of arrangements for mutual benefit.

Gabriel continues to stress that immediately after the Yom-Kippur war and even before it came to complete halt, the need for such measures began to sink in and that attitude really helped to launch the confidence building measures.

CHAPTER IV

NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Negotiations process creates a momentum of its own, it generates a dynamic that keeps it going and accelerating until an agreement is forged. This momentum usually has its origin in the prenegotiation process, when the parties begin to explore some of the substantive issues that are to be negotiated and develop a commitment to the negotiations they are about to enter. The fact that conflicting parties come to table creates a sense of commitment and opportunity. In this chapter I will discuss the two stage formula of the Israeli-Palestine negotiations, that began in the 90s. These are the first negotiations since the short-lived Geneva Conference in the 1970s.

In negotiations we see that it is the governments afterall who are responsible for negotiating, signing and ratifying treaties and other formal documents that are needed to seal the successful unofficial initiatives. Henceforth, one can argue that the state takes an upper hand in the negotiations tasks compared to the Non-State Actors (NSAs).

The negotiations between Israeli and the Palestinians were based on a two- stage formula

* 5 year interim self government arrangement,

* to be followed by negotiations on the permanent status issues.

The 1990s have witnessed a series of landmarks in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians - from the historic handshake between

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at the signing of the declaration of Principles in Washington on Sep. 13, 1993 through the agreements reached within the framework of the interim self-government in 1993. Arrangements for the Palestinians in May and August 1994, and finally the signing of the Interim agreement on Sep.28, 1995 Summit meetings between the leaders of both sides are held periodically in order to iron out differences and move forward with the implementation of the interim agreement.

Background :- Following intense behind the scenes contacts between Israel and Palestinian negotiators in Oslo an agreement was achieved between Israel Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. On Sep.9, 1993, Arafat sent a letter to Prime Minister Rabin, unequivocally stating that the PLO: -

* Recognizes the right of Israel-Palestine to exist in peace and security;

* Accepts UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338;

* Commits itself to a peaceful resolution of the conflict;

* Renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence;

* Assumes responsibility over all PLO elements to ensure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators;

* Affirms that those articles of the PLO covenant which deny Israel's right to exist are now inoperative and no longer valid;

* Undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes to the Covenant.

In reply, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians in peace negotiations.

On Sep. 13, 1993, a joint Israeli-Palestinian Directive of Principles (DOP) was signed by the two in Washington, outlining the proposed interim self government, arrangements, as envisioned and agreed upon by both sides. Although the DOP was signed in Washington, with President Bill Clinton acting as master of ceremonies, it had been negotiated in Oslo. It was a product of secret diplomacy Rabin noted that this was the first agreement between the Palestinians and Israel since the creation of the state of Israel. To quote him "Its an historic moment, which hopefully will bring about an end to 100 years of bloodshed, misery, between the Palestinians and Jews, between Palestinians and Israel. In the words of Avi Shalim - The Oslo accord is "historic" because it reconciles the two principle parties to the Arab-Israeli Conflict[1].

The historic reconciliation was based on a historic compromise : acceptance of the principle of the partition of Palestine - By simultaneously accepting this principle, both sides abandoned the ideological dispute as to who is the rightful owner of Palestine and turned to finding a practical solution to the problem of sharing the cramped living space between the Jordan river and the mediterranean sea. Acceptance of the idea of partition by both sides supports Abba Ebans' observation that men and nations often behave wisely once they have exhausted all the other alternatives.[2]

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[1]   This conflict has two dimensions : one is the interstate conflict but   Israel and the neighboring Arab States; the other is the clash between Jewish and Palestinian nationalism.

[2]   Abba Eban, "Building Bridges, Not Walls", *The Guardian* 10 september 1993.

This agreement ended the two year old deadlock in the American-sponsored Middle East peace talks which began at Madrid conference in Oct 91. Shortly after signing, negotiations commenced between Israeli and Palestinian delegations on the interim agreement, which was accomplished in three stages These are explained by the help of the diagram on page

Altogether 14 sessions of talks were held in Oslo over an 8 - month period, behind a thick veil of secrecy. Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Jorgen Hoist and Terje Rod Larsen[3] acted as generous hosts and general mediatoars. key players being two Israeli academics, Dr. Hisrschfeld and Dr. Ron Pundak, and PLO treasurer Ahmad Qurai [4], Away from the glare of publicity and political pressure, these three men worked imaginatively and indefatigably to establish the conceptual framework of Israel - PLO accord. Though their discussions ran parallel to the bilateral talks in Washington, but they proceeded without the knowledge of the official Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.

DOP was essentially an agenda for negotiations, governed by a tight timetable, rather than a full blown agreement. There were some inherent defects in the accord itself. One is that it is completely silent on vital issues. Second the accord contains so many ambiguities and contradictions that it is open to widely differing interpretations. For the Israeli government, the accord makes provision for an interim arrangement, which carries only the most general implications for permanent transfer of territory or power.

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[3]   Social Scientist discetor of FAFO.

[4]   Also known as Abu Ala.

Whereas for the PLO, the accord is the first step towards full statehood including the right of return[5] of refugees, borders, future of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and status of transiation. Perhaps the reason was that if these issues had been addressed in concrete or well defined terms, , there would have been no accord at all. Both sides took a calculated risk, realizing that a great deal would depend on the way the experiment in Palestinian self-government worked out in practice.

Though it is premature to assess at this stage the impact of negotiations in the Israel - Palestine Peace process, a number of points can be made.

* The negotiations did not result in the creation of a substitute for the PLO, the embodiment of the Palestinian state and Palestinian autonomy of decision making.

* Negotiations have had in mixed results for the unity of the Palestinians. Palestinian internal division has not ended, but it crosses the inside and outside simultaneously along different lines. Opposition to Arafat's concerning his attitude towards negotiations has steadily grown since Madrid the main challenges being from the Islamic groups.

* Israel while presented to value Palestinian - Israeli agreement pursued a policy on the ground that is contrary both to the spirit and letter of terms of reference of negotiations. For example, not only have violations of human rights continued, but also steps towards physical control of land - through accelerated zoning in Palestinian localities, settlement activities

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[5]   Right of return of the 1948 refugees.

53

(including in Jerusalem) and road construction have been pursued during negotiation.

*   At the table itself, the negotiations have not brought Palestinian statehood closer (but they have also not foreclosed it). Slow exhausting steps have been made towards Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian central authority during the interim period. Another step made in the approach to negotiations is discussing the (self-government Model in terms of sets of issues instead of sphere by sphere. If negotiations are weighed against the interim objective set in Madrid - that agreement on arrangements for Palestinian Interim self-government must be reached within one year. The result is deplorable as seen in Israels offer of December, 92, was not consistent with self-government requirement and was well behind the schedule.

The United States, above and beyond its heavy tilt towards Israel in setting the terms of reference of the negotiations, has not played the role it set for itself at the start of the process. Though in the letter of assurances given to the Palestinian side on Oct 1991, the U.S. promised to act as an honest broker to play the role of a driving force in this process to help the parties to move towards comprehensive peace. But it became clear that the U.S. administration for its past did not behave in a way consistent with them in the course of negotiations.

Assessed all in all, the results of negotiations though meager have been progressing slowly and steadily but has been observed by Herbert C.

Kelman[6] that there is a reciprocal relationship between momentum in the

negotiation process and public support for the process. Negotiations that

began with some momentum helped to create an exceptation of success and a

sense of hope, thus generating public support. Such public support, in turn

contributes to maintaining and accelerating the momentum.

[6]   Kelman C. Herbert : Acknowledging the Other's Nationhood : How to create a
Momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.
XXII. No. 1, Autumn 1992. pp. 18-38.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion one can recognize the fact that the Israel-Palestine peace process shows no sign of end, despite the continued tension. An Israeli pollster *Hanoch Smith* conducted polls asking Israelis, "*Are you in favour of continuing the peace processes?*". 75% said "*yes*". When the majority of Israelis want peace, why should Prime-Minister Netanyahu ignore the gains of the peace process?

On the whole, the peace process for Israel has meant wider diplomatic recognition, greater interaction with outside powers, larger exports, firmer hegemenoy, normalisation with Arab states, and also virtual separation between the Palestinian and Arab dimensions of the conflict.

But then one wonders why the Israeli Prime-Minister is taking a hardline approach towards the peace process? The fact is that though he is not opposed to peace per se and has assured the Arab world of his decision to stand behind the Peres government's decision concerning Peace. There were grave misgivings due to his pre and post election statements. He is afraid of linking the Hebron withdrawl with the pull back that the Palestinians want from rural areas of the West Bank. Netanyu is also opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state even though 50% of Israelis have already accepted this idea even before the endorsement by the Labour and Likud parties.

Netanayahu realises how crucial the Oslo accords are to Israels' integration in the region and to breaking out of its alienation globally, hence

he can only stop the peace process at a price most Israelies do not want to pay.

The Arab summit of 22 June 1996 made a commitment to continue the peace process, but at the same time said that any backtracking by Israel would lead the Arab countries to reconsider the steps they had taken towards reconciliation with Israel.

Even though the peace process has been interrupted by events like the Hebron massacre, the assasination of Rabin in Nov. 95, the murder of engineer Yahiya Ayyash and the Hamas bombings, and also the expansion and building of the new Jewish settlements which vitiated the atmosphere, peace talks have continued due to the indomitable support of 70% Palestinians and 75% Israelis who support the continuation of rapproachment process.

In contrast to the Israel opinion, a vast majority of the Palestinians believe that the peace process has had a *"negative"* effect on their economy, but the majority still support the process because of their belief that its success will change conditions for the better. Two years ago for the Palestinians under Israelis Military rule, life used to be oppressive under curfew, demolition of houses and imprisonment being daily affairs, but things have dramatically changed since the handshake between Arafat and Rabin. Not only is Israel gradually withdrawing from more and more West Bank/Gaza lands, but despite hiccups both parties continue to talk. The Palestinians due to the foot dragging attitude of the Israelis, on the issue of withdrawl. would at the end or soon after the 5 year interim period (May

1999) proclaim the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Though major hurdles are still ahead - like Israeli withdrawl from other parts of West Bank and about 35% from Gaza, Jewish settlements, the status of East Jerusalem, the issue of "military areas", question of sovereignty and final border, right of return of Palestinians and lastly the issue of final status. But the most important and significant thing to observe is that for both the Isralis and the Palestinians a firm beginning has been made and the NSAs have added a new dimension to the Peace Process.

One might say that in today's world the gap between the fixed geography of states and the non-territorial nature of problems, which is only likely to increase, strongly suggests that the relative power of states will continue to decline. Nation states may simply no longer be the natural problem solving unit, local governments, Non-Governmental Organisations, academic institutions, parliamentarians, business and professional communities, media and citizens at large all must be involved in the resolution of conflicts.

Not only in the academic realm of international relations, but also in the practical realm states are beginning to realise the importance of NSAs their particular characteristics are their main strength. These include the following: - serving as transmission belts between communities, giving commitment and long term capability to resolving the conflict, providing durability, stability and sturdiness, acting as ambassadors of goodwill touching the conscience of the conflicting parties.

All these add a positive, holistic, dynamic, dimension to the conflict resolution process. The mechanism by which these aspects are transferred to the conflicting parties is through the modum of peace constituencies. These peace constituencies may range from a small workshop to heavily funded *Neve Shalom conflict management workshop*. Acting as grassroots projects, they facilitate the much needed "*bottom-up*" peace potential. This furtheron helps in building on ambience of normalcy and peace in the conflictual area. These constituencies are necessary for building up the groundwork for conflict resolution. This proves the *first hypothesis* that for resolution of conflict, it becomes necessary to build such peace constituencies in support of conflict resolution.

Though NSAs are important facilitators and assets in any negotiating deal, they can never replace sovereign states as main actors. Since it is the governments which are actually responsible for negotiating, signing and ratifying treaties and other formal documents, without states no final decision can be struck.

Coming to the *second hypothesis*, analyzing the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict, one can argue that though the NSAs cannot solely, or completely substitute for the states, they can definitely supplement the states. It has been proved that conflict resolution is not sustainable through a single-track effort. Track two diplomacy like any track in a multi-track system will always be more effective, especially when employed in conjunction and coordination with efforts from NSAs. Hence for supplementing the state it is essential that the non official professionals act in addition to the official

professionals, but it obvious that the non-official professionals contribute towards making the Track one professionals get down to the negotiating table and to begin to formally resolve the existing conflict.

With regard to the *third hypothesis*, it is proved in the Israel-Palestine conflict that the mediation exercise has worked best through the NSAs, so much so that none of the respective states can afford to ignore the public opinion.

Whether the rice of NSAs ultimately turns out to be good news or bad will depend on whether humanity can launch itself on a course of rapid social innovation. The adaptations needed for a better functioning of NSAs include a business sector that can should a broader policy role, NGOs that are less parochial and better able to operate on a large scale, international institutions that can efficiently serve the dual masters of state and civil society, and political entities that match the transnational scope of today's challenges, while also meeting the citizens demand for accountable democratic governance.

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NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS

Declaration of Principles
Washington, D.C. - September 13, 1993

STAGE I
Interim Self-Government
Arrangements

STAGE II
Permanent Status

GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT Signed: May 4, 1994	→	TRANSFER OF POWERS Signed: August 29, 1994	→	INTERIM AGREEMENT & ELECTIONS Signed: Sept 28, 1995	·····→	PERMANENT STATUS AGREEMENT

This agreement includes the following :-

This will be in those areas not included in the Gaza - Jericho agreement :-

Transfer of powers and responsibilities in the West Bank from Israel to elected Palestinian Council according to following dates

An agreement to determine the nature of the final settlement between Israel + the Palestinians, as follows ·

- Security arrangements

- Transfer of civil affairs

- Legal framework

- Economic framework

Education & culture

Health

Social welfare

Direct taxation

Tourism

Other spheres as agreed

- *Dec 31, 1995:* End of IDF redeployment from populated areas of West Bank

- *Jan 20, 1996:* Elections to the Palestinian Council

- *March 31, 1996:* IDF redeployment from Hebron

- *Jun 30 & Dec 31, 1996, Jun 30, 1997:* Further IDF redeployments in West Bank

- Talks to begin as soon as possible but not later than 3rd year of interim period (*May 1996*)

- Permanent Status issues to include: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements and borders.

- Permanent Status Agreement to enter into force after 5th year of Self-Government (*May 1999*)

Source :- Information Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs Israel.

69

STAGE III

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP SIGNED ON SEP. 28, 1995 This marks conclusion of stage I & stage II Aim- to broader Palestinian self government by means of Palestinian Council

MAJOR PROVISIONS

Elections for an interim period not exceeding 5 yrs from signing Gaza-Jericho agreement

Establishment of Palestinian Council 82 members with Executive & legislative powers excluding foreign relations

Redeployment of the IOF

Security: Israel will have overriding responsibility for external security & for security of Israelis & settlements

Revocation of the articles in PLO covenant calling for destruction of Israel

Security policy for prevention of terrorism & violence

Transfer of Civil Powers & Responsibilities to the Council

Responsibility over religious sites to be transferred to Palestinian side

| Human rights to be adhered to |
|---|

Release of Prisoners from both sides

Cooperation & Economic relations

Educational systems on both sides for peace

Source :- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Information Division Israel.

TYPOLOGY OF NON STATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

NON STATE ACTORS
NSAs

```
                                    NON STATE ACTORS
                                         NSAs
                                           |
          _____
         |                                                                    |
    Transnational                                                     International
    Organisation                                                      Governmental
    (TNO)                                                             Organisation
         |                                                                IGO's
         |                                                                   |
    _____                        _____
   |                 |                      |                       |                |
 (TNCO)            TCO                    INGO                    Hybrid         Genuine IGO
 Transnational     Transnational           |                     IGO            (GIGO)
 Non-Corporate     Corporate               |
 Organisation      Organization            |
                                   _____
                                  |                |
                            Genuine NGO        Hybrid NGO
                            (HINGO)            (HINGO)
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Notes : - The initial classification of NSA's distinguishes between two major types of International Organisations IGOs and INGOs. These two have been recognised as the main NSAs alongside the traditional state actor.

- A number of additional criterion can be used it aims of organisation (general or specific), level of involvement (continues or sporaelie), wide ranging or concentrated on one issue area, institutionalised or not structures (representative, bureaucratic, industrial..); resources (financial). Adopting further criterion requires extensive conceptual framework.

- The further development of the present typology is suggested as a programme of future research.

- Since the study of transnational relations and NSAs is a relatively new phenomenon, much of the terminology new phenomenon, much of the terminology used is unclear and contradictory.

- Another problem is categorisation of more more complex NSAs that are neither purely governmental nor purely private in nature for example ILO.

- Scholars of International Relations, disagree over how to classify non-state actors in world politics.

Source: Pole Papers 1994 published by Centre for Polemology of Free University of Brussels.

NEGOTIATION PROCESS

*   When two or more parties are emerged in a joint decision making process, designed to bring agreement.
*   This process gave the Palestinian leadership, inside or outside a focus and sense of purpose.

THE MADRID FRAMEWORK
Oct 30, 1991

THE BILATERAL TRACK
* Based on two stage
formulae:-

* 5 year Interim self-govt. agreement

* Permanent Status issues

THE MULTILATERAL TRACK
* Designed to build the
Middle East of the future, &
to build confidence
among regional parties

* opened in Moscow Jan. 1992

* 5 separate forums were
* Water
* Environment
* Arms Control
* Refugees
* Economic development

MADRID CONFERENCE ROUNDS IN DETAIL

*   This Conference was an occasion to ascertain Palestinian identity, thanx to behind the - scenes bargaining.

First Bilateral Round: Madrid, 3 Nov. 1991

*   Negotiations took place "*on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 & 338*".
*   Negotiations were conducted along two tracks:
     a Palestinian-Israeli track;
     a Jordanian-israeli track;

Second Round: Washington, D.C., 4-17 Dec. 1991

*   Issue was status of Palestinian-Israeli track vis-a-vis the Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli plenary body. This created disagreements.
*   Failure to reach a final agreement.

Third Round:- Washington, D.C., B-16 Jan. 1992

*   At the beginning of the round, agreement was reached on the two tracks, due to U.S. mediation, not say pressure.

*   The Israeli side presented a 200 - word draft agenda, for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations but refused by Palestinians.

*   The Palestinian side presented 130 - word draft agenda & two pronged approach outline of the model for the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority (PISGA) based on free elections under international supervision & test major concerns as:-

     a)   its positions on Jerusalem, resolution 242; & self-determination;
     b)   its demands for the immediate halt of settlement activities.

Fourth Round: Washington, D.C., 24 Feb- 4 March 1992

* Two important documents were exchanged here
* Presented by Israeli side- *"Ideas for Peaceful Co-existence in the Territories during the Interim Period"*.
* Presented by Palestinian side- *"Expanded Outline: Palestinian Interims self-Govt. Arrangements: Concepts, Preliminary Measures and Election Modalities"*.
* American attitude was interpreted as a *balancing act* aimed at allaying criticisms against the administration for its tough stance on the loan guarantees to Israel. But in substance it seemed to converge with the negotiating attitude of the Israeli side.
* For Palestinians, this round ended with mixed feelings, on one hand they presented well-thought out model preserving Palestinian principles, while not breaking the Madrid terms of reference, on the hand, the Palestinians felt frustration and doubts concerning the American attitude and the inadequacy of Israel's proposals.

Fifth Round: Washington, D.C., 27-30 April 1992

* Scheduled to be short and expected, and the last before the Israeli elections.
* Each side came with the aim of shoring up its weak point in the previous encounter
* For Israelis, this was issue of the Palestinian elections.
* For Palestinians, it was negotiations on specifics.

Sixth Round: Washington, D.C. 24 Aug- 24 Sep. 1992

This round took place in Two stages:-

Stage One: 24 Aug - 3 Sep.

* Israeli side presented text: *"The Administrative Council of the Interim Self-Govt. arrangements"*:

* This text remained silent on certain important issues like, territorial dimension for the ISGA, change in lows & order etc.

*   Palestinians saw it as a direct filiation from Shamir's guidelines; and presented a document entitled *"Draft Proposal: Framework Agreement on Arrangements for Palestinian Interim Self-Government"*.

Recess: 4-13 Sep.

The recess allowed each party to reasses the latest developments.

Stage Two: 14-24 Sep.

*   First priority was to obtain from the Israeli side acknowledgement of the applicability of resolution 242 to the entire process.
*   Israeli side presented a new document entitled *"Informal Concept of the Interim Self-Govt. Arrangements: Building Blocks for Agreement"*, - This mentioned for the first time 242 Resolution.
*   3 main blocks of issues emerged here:-
*   Terms of reference including 242 & the idea of transitionality
*   Territorial jurisdiction, including question of land, water & Jerusalem
*   The powers of the Palestinian authority.

Seventh Round: Washington, D.C. 21 Oct. - 20 Nov. 1992

*   Israeli side started negotiating the details of arrangements for self-govt.
*   Palestinian side first wanted to obtain Israeli assurances on 242
*   Palestinians described the Israeli model as *"complicated"*, *"impractical"*, *"unworkable"*, and likely to create more problems than it would resolve.

Eighth Round: Washington, D.C., 7-17 Dec. 1992

*   Due to the expression of its frustration at the Israeli attitude, both on ground 7 at the bilaterals, the Palestinian leadership decided to send to this round reduced delegation comprising only four members.
*   Israeli side presented a document entitled *"Informal Compilation of Israeli Ideas on the Concept of the Interim Self-Govt. Arrangements"*.

*   For Palestinians, this document felt short of satisfying them since as to the powers of the palestinian self-govt.
*   First, document states the name of PAC could be made.
*   PAC powers will not apply to the Israeli security forces & related aspects.
*   Not only would the Palestinian powers be restricted to the Palestinians, but these powers will be limited by the requirement to cooperate
*   Coordinate with Israel & by the latters *residual powers*.

This round was last to be held under Bush administration.

Source: Mansour, Camille The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Overview & Assessment Journal of Palestine Studies XXII, no.3 (Spring 1993).