

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITIES IN PAKISTAN :
A CASE STUDY OF BALUCHISTAN

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
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J. Symon 1971

	Centrally Administered Tribal Areas
	Major Baluch Area
	Major Pashtun (Pathan) Area
	Mixed Brahui-Baluch Area

0 50 100 150 200 Miles

Abbreviations

- BPLF - Baluch People's Liberation Front
- BSO - Baluch Students' Organization
- CENTO - Centzal Treaty Organization
- IDBP - Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan
- JUI - Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam
- NAP - National Awami Party
- PICIC - Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation
- POT - Public Opinion Trends Analysis and News Service
- SEATO - South East Asian Treaty Organization

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ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITY

The question of 'nation', 'nationalities' and 'nationalism' has acquired an increased significance today especially so in most third world countries. As concepts, they defy any rigorous definitions in terms of form and content. Various attempts have been made at arriving at precise and scientific definitions for each. But these terms and definitions have more often than not run into difficulties. The difficulty lies in the fact that there exists a thin layer of difference that separates them from each other. Moreover, many scholars have tended to use these terms interchangeably thus adding to the confusion. The fact however remains that the three, 'nation', 'nationalities' and 'nationalism' are closely interlinked and that in order to study one, one must necessarily encroach into the ambit of the other. Of the existing definitions of a nation, the one by Stalin for instance, defines a nation as "a historically evolved stable community of people, based upon the common possession of four principle attributes, namely: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common

psychological make-up manifesting itself in common specific features of national culture".¹

But this definition too is not fully satisfactory. His emphasis on one language cannot for instance be applicable where easy market communication is made possible by historically evolved bilingualism or multi-lingualism. The Swiss nation is multi-lingual. Moreover, Jewish nationalism again had no actual territorial foothold to start with, while all other nationalism had.²

Moreover by defining nation in such a manner, he unfortunately attributes to a nation all the characteristics which should apply only to the nationality. Engels for instance, makes it clear that a nationality is not a precapitalist structure³ but a product of early capitalist relations; it is a less developed form of a developing nation.⁴

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1. Joseph Stalin: The National Question and Leninism, Mass Publications 1976, p. 5.
 2. The fact remains that the crucial factors contributing to the formation of a nation or nationality have always differed in different circumstances.
 3. Later day thinkers on the national question (especially in India) as E.M.S. Namboodiripad and others are of the view that nations and national cultures emerged in the late feudal phase, that is before the advent of capitalism with the extensive growth of money commodity relations and the rapid growth in the social use of regional languages during and after the Bhakti and other religious reform movements in India. But this view is highly controversial. See EMS Namboodiripad The National Question in Kerala (Peoples Publishing House 1972).
 4. Engels makes this distinction when he refuses to
- contd..../-

The distinction between the two is not merely one of stage of development, but also one of perspective related to the relevant stage. A.R. Kamat for instance, defines a nationality as "a people having some characteristic which go towards the making of a nation and who are striving for a measure of political economic and cultural autonomy."⁵ It may or may not manifest itself in the form of its own distinct nation state. Similarly Irfan Habib argues that a nation has to have a sovereign state or else it needs to be classified as a 'nationality'. A 'nationality' to him is one where "the urge for a separate sovereign state is either (a) not fulfilled or (b) is moderated".⁶ Moreover the nationality itself to him is a bourgeois phenomenon. Speculating on the national question in India, for instance, he writes that there was no basis for the emergence of nationalities before the British conquests, because there was no trace of any emerging bourgeoisie.⁷

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put the label of a nation on the entire German people so long as the low level of industry commerce and agriculture ruled out any centralization of these people. Cited in Partha Chatterjee "Bengal: Rise and Growth of a Nationality, Social Scientist No. 37 August 1975 from P. Engels: Decay of Feudalism and the rise of National States as appended in the Peasant War in Germany Moscow 1974.

5. A.R. Kamat 'Ethno-Linguistic Issues in Indian Federal Context, Economic and Political Weekly June 14-21, 1980.
6. Irfan Habib - "Emergence of Nationalities" Social Scientist No. 37 August 1975.
7. Ibid.

As an event, therefore, nation, nationalities and nationalism, relate sufficiently to the modern world. A nation, for instance "is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism....⁸ and its market formation process."⁹

Thus the manifestations of national consciousness was first seen in the consolidated feudal monarchies of Western Europe when these countries were involved in the process of eliminating feudalism and developing capitalism. The task, then, for this rising capitalist class was to get rid of its own country's restrictive feudal regime so that a free market, co-extensive with a definite-culturally-politically unified territory could be brought into existence with popular support. Consequently, language as a means of communication emerged as a crucial factor for realising such a market. Conditions of unification were created through collective will and conscious effort to make the people aware of their distinct cultural-political identity. This rising bourgeois class managed

8. J.V. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, Mass Publications Calcutta, 1975, pp. 18, 26.

9. "The market is the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism", J.V. Stalin, Selected Works, Vol. 2, pp. 316.

to invent suitable myths and symbols to transform this identity consciousness into a powerful spiritual sentiment called 'nationalism'. It helped them to mobilise the people for conquest of state power.

The national movement, which this emergent class launched, pulled down feudal barriers that led to the establishment of a nation-state and a free national market co-extensive with it. So ^{to} that extent, the establishment of the 'nation' by that particular 'nationality' was progressive and justifiable.

Thus, "Developing Capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression and the creation of national states".¹⁰

This is one way by which nations may be formed, that is from states. The French State, the English State, the Dutch, the Spanish and other European states that were in existence at the dawn of modern era were all absolutist states, consisting of single ethnic groups, that matured into nationalities.

10. Lenin "Critical Remarks on the National Question", Selections from V.I. Lenin & J.V. Stalin On National and Colonial Question, Calcutta Book House pp. 6. The second tendency is the internationalization of capital and economic life and politics.

A second way in which nations are formed is by first attaining cultural solidarity and then political expression of that solidarity. The succession States of the Dual Empire rose to national consciousness while still in subjection to Austria and Hungary. However, the most classical example of such nations is that of Italy and Germany whose cultural unification preceded the political.

Thirdly, nations are formed in struggle against foreign oppression. The experience of shaking off European domination has made nations out of very many colonies that previously had little or no national consciousness. The Poles are an interesting case because they had a State and were in the process of becoming a nation precisely at the time of the Third Partition in 1792. Thereafter, the Polish nation was solidified in conflict, punctuated by repeated uprisings and finally emerged as a recognised State in 1919.¹¹

The most glaring example of this however, remains the experiences of most Third World countries who formed themselves into multi-national States. The differences in the levels of national crystallisation of people with

11. Horace, B. Davis: Towards a Marxist Theory of Nationalism, Monthly Review Press 1978 pp. 8-9.

different expressions of ethnic identity have also been conditioned as mentioned above, by the nature and varying consequences of the capitalist transformation. In this respect the Third World share the historical experience of Europe. Hence the social and political consequences of capitalist development become important in deciphering the specific national problems which confront the various multi-national States of the third world today.

Unlike in Europe where capitalism in its period of genesis and consolidation of nation-states could break feudal barriers, capitalism in the third world is no longer capable of totally destroying the pre-capitalist forms. It is in fact forced to compromise with the pre-capitalist social forces and economic relations for its political survival. The pervasiveness of the bourgeois revolution as in the phase of growing capitalism in Western Europe is thus lost and therefore the bourgeoisie in multi-national states of the third world is no longer capable of establishing a new social unity on modern secular grounds. Such a capitalism, just as it feels compelled to compromise and collaborate with the remnants of feudalism for its political survival, also finds the necessity to collaborate with imperialism as is in the case of Pakistan. This fall back on precapitalist classes

as the landlords and obscurantist ideologies, more than anything explains the prevalence of caste based movements and narrow divisive agitations.¹²

Moreover, although capitalist growth everywhere is always uneven, this creates serious problems in multi-national states when it coincides with nationally demarcated regions or contiguous areas within such regions where population composition is different as for example the tribal belts, that is where people are at different stages of national identity formation. This gives rise to a tendency towards differentiation of such groups from larger nationalities.¹³ "The overall tendency of a divisive capitalism is more towards differentiation and separate crystallisation than towards assimilation as was in the case in Western Europe."¹⁴

Given the bourgeoisie's incapacity to fight and overcome regional unevenness, it looks at the democratic struggles of such groups for equality and the movements

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12. Javed Alam: 'Class, Political and National Dimension to the State Autonomy Movements in India' Social Scientist Vol. 10 No. 8, August 1982.
13. Javed Alam: "Dialectics of Capitalist Transformation and National Crystallisation: The Past and Present of National Question in India" Economic and Political Weekly Vol. XVIII, No. 5, Jan 29 1983.
14. Ibid.

for state autonomy as a struggle waged against its political domination. To disrupt such movements, it willingly or unwillingly converts its structural infirmities and economic weaknesses to political advantage by using the hold of pre-capitalist values to whip up narrow sectarian movements.

Therefore a retarded and crisis-ridden capitalism is said to be always divisive, especially so in multi-national and socially diverse context, and for such a capitalism, the instinct for political survival always takes precedence over national unity and people's welfare.

In such a perspective, the national question is extremely important and relevant. This is because, unlike the historical model of development, as in Western Europe 'nationality' or a well developed cultural-linguistic community is no longer a necessary ground of transition to the emergence of national awareness and movements and their crystallisation in the form of demarcated boundaries. What is important is the specific conditions which make possible the rise of national awakening even before nationality formation has reached maturity and the demands such movements may generate including the one for statehood.

It is precisely for this that it becomes extremely necessary for us to delve into the colonial structure in India and its consequent impact on the various national groups that existed therein.

Impact of British Colonialism in the Development of Nationalities in India :

At the level of economy, the nature of capitalist development during the colonial period has had its inevitable implications for the national question in both India and Pakistan. Modern industries that grew largely around the port cities of Calcutta and Bombay were in the nature of an "enclave economy".¹⁵ Railways and other means of communications integrated the heterogeneity of different types of production units and economic regions (including agriculture). Linked to this was an increase in parasitical pressure on expropriation of agricultural surplus through trade finance, money lending capital facilitated the accumulation of money in the hands of traders and money-lenders. Agriculture got encapsulated by capitalism without any profound transformation in the forces of production. According to Bagchi, the

15. Amiya Kumar Bagchi, "Private Investment in India, 1900-1939" Cambridge 1972 pp. 424.

colonial economy imposed a "dual disjunction" between the growth of agriculture and growth of industry inhibiting the possibilities of growth of sub-economies in which the two could stimulate each other.¹⁶ Industry in colonial India grew area wise (Delhi, Kanpur, Madras, Madurai, Coimbatore, Ahmedabad etc.). There were certain areas which remained completely untouched by modern industry. These were Punjab, Baluchistan, North-West-Frontier-Province, Sind and East Bengal. Most of these areas were overwhelmingly Muslim or Muslim majority areas. Development was also very uneven in terms of commodities and ethnic groups in the developed areas also. Muslim tribals and lower castes were much less affected by these developments. All this had a deep impact in complicating the movements of people in different nationalities as well as in splitting it up in India and Pakistan both before and after independence.

Politically, there was no nationalism or subjectively conscious nationality in precolonial India. What came out of medieval regionalisation process in India were clusters of objective identity marks (language,

16. Quoted in Javed Alam, fn. 135. From Bagchi-
 "Reflections on the Pattern of Regional Growth
 in India During the Period of British Rule",
Bengal Past and Present Vol XCV Part No 180
 Jan-June 1976.

script, etc) that was used to distinguish regional cultural communities from one another. It was only in the nineteenth century that the emergent bourgeoisie picked these identity marks to symbolise their people's territorial unity in order to forge solidarity on this basis.

The British rule, in its own interest unified India's remote and disparate parts through a network of railways and communications, a centralised administration and a wide market. The port-orientation and colonial alignment of market network somewhat weakened and distorted the nationality formation process (as mentioned above). Much more than this, anti-imperialism and the struggle for political independence provided the basis for the common struggles and active cooperation of the masses and the ruling classes that cut across nationality barriers. There appeared however, two streams of national consciousness, one pan-Indian and the other regional.¹⁷ The first was based on pan-Indian homogeneities of culture such as common all-India

17. Anandendu Guha: "The Indian National Question: A Conceptual Framework" Economic and Political Weekly, July 31, 1982.

tradition, history, economic life and psychological make-up, and an all-India market. The latter was based on the relevant region's distinctive homogeneities and demands for substantial or exclusive control by the inhabitants over its resources and markets. The two represented by the big bourgeoisie and the regional bourgeoisie more or less complimented each other. Hence the need arose for an ideology that could uphold a unitary nation-state that was reflected in the attitudes of the Indian National Congress during the period.¹⁸

However, deeper below, at the regional level, there were not only forces of regional linguistic nationalism but also a parallel trend of pan-Hindu and pan-Muslim revivalism.¹⁹ The utter lack of concern for a federal scheme, universal adult suffrage and regional autonomy in the projected vision of 'one India'soon ran into difficulties. The aspirations of the regional bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and peasantry

18. This is reflected in the fact that since 1885 till about the turn of the century, the Indian National Congress continued to deliberate exclusively on subjects of all-India importance.

19. Muslim nationalism will be dealt with at the end of the chapter.

could not be incorporated in their respective regions. "The form of polity that was conceived of by the early nationalists" thrived only on the "...market aspirations of the embryonic big bourgeoisie of India, not of the regional and small bourgeoisie."²⁰

The challenge from regional nationalism together with Islamic revivalism spearheaded by the Muslim League led the dominant platform of the Indian bourgeoisie, the Congress, to realise the Indian realities in its many languages and regional bourgeoisie. From around 1917, therefore, comes up an appreciation amongst them towards having autonomous linguistic units within a federal structure.

The Soviet Example :

Before one goes on to the specifics of the Pakistani case, it becomes imperative to cite the nationality problem as existed in Russia and draw a comparison with the case in most multi-national societies in the third world including Pakistan.

The Russian national process could be traced as far back as the seventeenth century when its bourgeois

20. Amalendu Guha, fn. 17.

formations began to appear. It attained maturity by late nineteenth century and was continually associated not only with a pan-Slavonic movement but also with a colonising thrust West, South and East of the Russian homeland. As a result of this, many subjugated peoples attained their respective national consciousness. The Tsarist empire came to oppress various nationalities, with the Russian nationality dominating them politically, economically and culturally.

Lenin, for instance gives a precise picture of the specific features of the Russian national state. According to him, Russia is a state with a single national centre - Great Russia in which "first that 'subject peoples' (which, on the whole comprise the majority of the entire population - 57 per cent) inhabit the border regions; secondly the oppression of these subject peoples is much stronger here than in the neighbouring states....; thirdly, in a number of cases, the oppressed nationalities inhabiting the border regions have compatriots across the border who enjoy greater national independence (...the Finns, Swedes, the Poles, the Ukraines and the Rumanians along the Western and Southern frontiers of the state); fourthly, the development of capitalism and the general level of culture are often higher in the

non-Russian border regions than in the centre. Lastly, it is in the neighbouring Asian states that we see the beginning of a phase of bourgeois revolutions and national movements which are spreading to some of the kindred nationalities within the border of Russia."

"Thus, it is precisely the special concrete, historical features of the national question in Russia that make the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination in the present period a matter of special urgency in our country."²¹

However, in the case of most multi-national states of the third world (with the exception of post-independent Pakistan), no single nationality as such dominated either in the economic or political front. The bourgeoisie of most nationalities in India, for instance, was united in its common struggle against the colonial rule. They strengthened this unity by invoking from their common past, economic symbols of emotional integration and shared cultural values. The basis was to achieve a free united India.

Similarly, the Muslim League did not represent any single national group. The bourgeoisie or the

211 Lenin : "Right of Nations to self-Determination", Selections, fn. 10, p. 18.

controllers of large business and industrial houses in Pakistan later as well, came from the Memons, Bohras, etc. - the traditional Muslim trading community, who migrated to West Pakistan after partition. These mobile groups did not treat any demarcated national region for favoured treatment and were a pan-Indian bourgeoisie.²²

It was only after their migration to Pakistan and settlement in the Punjab region that Punjab as such and Punjabis began to flourish.²³

Secondly, colonial India was a large mass comprising of many nascent ethnic groups with no significant ethnic relations beyond its parametres. Where there could be as in North West India, British Forward Policy incorporated within its border most of the Baluch and Pathan tribal groups. This problem only came up after the departure of the British who left behind indiscriminately drawn boundary lines (as the Durand line) that cut through the Pathan and Baluch tribal groups, thus landing them in Afghanistan and Iran apart from Pakistan.

22. G.F. Papanek : Pakistan's Development : Social Goals and Private Investments (Cambridge, 1967), Chap. II.

23. See Lawrence Litschultz : "Festering Dillema for Bhutto", Far Eastern Economic Review May 28, 1976.

Moreover, the border regions were negligibly developed according to the convenience of the British and still existed in a pre-capitalist structure and relations. Lastly, there was no significant nationalist movement in the neighbourhood that could percolate inside and lead to any nationalist awakening. Some of these pre-requisites may seem valid today especially so in the case of Baluchistan. However, before we deal with this, a short account on the origins of Pakistan and Pakistani state structure is essential to assess the validity of the national question in Pakistan.

Relevant Factors to the Origin of Pakistan :

It is not in the purview of this dissertation to deal in detail on the factors behind the demand for a separate state of Pakistan. However, for the sake of convenience and clarity on the national question, a short citation of these factors is essential.

The roots of the secessionist movement leading to the partition of India are diverse. There were basic differences in world outlook between believing Hindus and believing Muslims, there were the social differences aggravated by the obsessively hierarchical practices of the Hindu caste system; there were the deliberate policy of 'divide and rule' practised by British administrators

who felt their position in India altered by the massive nationalist movement which had grown up since the beginning of the twentieth century. There were also the divisive tendency inherent in the anti-Muslim attitudes (generated partly as a reaction to the British policy of encouraging Muslim leaders to carry on loyalist propaganda) of many early nationalist leaders. The divisive tactics and the secessionist ideology thrived on the underlying movement tending to aggravate the economic disparity a) between the more backward districts, many of which (particularly in East Bengal and Punjab) had a majority of Muslims, and the less backward districts, and b) between the Hindu entrepreneurial and professional groups which dominated commerce industry and the professions, and the Muslim upper classes. The latter naturally tried to find an independent base from which to attack the barriers set up by the more established Hindu upper and middle classes.

The East Bengal, the majority of the cultivators were Muslims and the majority of landlords were Hindus. Hence there were potent seeds of conflict along communal lines. In the Punjab and north-west of India, a large majority of the traders were Hindus, although the majority of the people were Muslims. This again created communal tensions between the Hindu traders and money-lenders and

the Muslim cultivators. Hence, mass discontent was added to the discontent of the tiny Muslim middle class in Bengal, who felt themselves debarred from any offices of importance by the predominant position of the Hindus. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the pace of industrial development was so slow that it was only the middle classes whether Hindus or Muslims who prospered.

The demographic changes in the twentieth century further increased the weight of the Muslim majority-districts.²⁴ The proportion of Muslims to the total population of India had gone up steadily since 1881. Bengal and Assam were the only provinces which had experienced uninterrupted growth in population from 1901 to 1941. In Assam, this growth could be accounted for by the immigration of peasants, mainly Muslims - from East Bengal. During the twenties, Punjab and Sind also experienced a high rate of growth of population.


Thus the economic, social and demographic basis for a separatist movement along communal lines among the Muslims continued to grow. Nor that the leaders of the national movement were ignorant of this developing movement. Many leaders including Nehru and C.R. Das felt

24. A.K. Bagchi - fn 15, pp. 430.

that any solution would have to incorporate a drastic alteration of the political and social relations between Hindus and Muslims. It was this that led C.R. Das to declare that if and when the Congress came to power in Bengal, it would reserve 60 per cent of all new appointments for the Muslims until they achieved parity of representation with the Hindus according to the population.²⁵ Nehru in most of his writings showed an awareness on the differences in industrial growth between regions and also on the domination of Muslim cultivators by Hindu landlords, money-lenders and traders. He went as far as recognising the emergence of a nascent Muslim bourgeoisie that faced difficulties in the face of the better entrenched Hindu middle class. He recognised the existence of exploitation of the Muslim weaver or tenant in Bengal and in India in general by the banias and landlords and that this was "the root cause of the tension between Hindu and Muslim".²⁶ He also noted that the Hindu Mahasabha had consistently opposed measures for reducing the burden of rural debt in the provinces since the bankers and banias were almost always Hindus.

25. Ibid. pp. 431.

26. Nehru : Glimpses of World History. Kitabistan, Allahabad 1934, p. 452.



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However, neither C.R. Das nor Nehru could move beyond voicing concerns. As Bagchi points out that these differences, between religious communities, between regions or economic classes could not be eliminated by mere reservations. "The provinces or regions" or classes "which are economically backward would have to receive more than their 'fair' share of public investment in a free enterprise economy because there is a tendency for private investment to flow into the more developed regions."²⁷

However, the willingness to make the drastic sacrifices necessary to ameliorate the social and economic position of the Muslim or of the more backward provinces was totally absent from the programmes of the more advantageously placed business or professional classes which formulated the policies of the party. Hence the feudal elements, the lawyer and the nascent Muslim bourgeoisie leading the Muslim League were provided with ample feed for their struggle to create a separate state of Pakistan. The real issue involved in their struggle was not the uniform betterment, of the Muslims or the Muslim National Question as the Communist Party saw it. It was in the real sense, the hedging off of a part of

27. Bagchi - fn 15, p. 432.

India from competition by the established Hindu business groups or professional classes so that the nascent Muslim business class could thrive and the emergent Muslim intelligentsia could find employment.

While the factors behind the move for Pakistan was clear, there were some like the Communist Party of India that began to see that the so-called communal problem was really a problem of growing nationalities. A resolution 'Pakistan and National Unity' was passed by the Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee in September 1942, took as its starting point Stalin's definition of the 'nation' and concluded that the Muslims constituted a national minority which should be granted the right of self-determination.²⁸

We have concluded from our discussion earlier that neither a common language nor a common culture alone could establish the bourgeois nation, let alone the multi-national state. Moreover, religion merely expressed the separation of an individual from the community as a whole and could not constitute the basis for a community. Nor could it be argued that the British colonial state as a dominant

28. G. Adhikari - Pakistan and National Unity. Peoples Publishing House, Bombay 1944.

oppressor nationality oppressed Sindhis and Bengalis more or less than Punjabis or Pathans. In fact, a common subjection to British rule had unified India economically and politically. "The native bourgeoisie was a shining example of cosmopolitanism".²⁹ It was not dominated by any particular religious or caste grouping.

To think of the notion that Pakistan was contained in the assumption that Muslims were a distinct community can be considered, therefore, as simply rewriting history. The overwhelming majority of Muslims in India were poor peasants. The languages they spoke were Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi and Pashtu. They had nothing in common with the Muslim aristocracy of the United Provinces who spoke Urdu. Nehru noted that a Bengali Muslim was far nearer to a Bengali Hindu than he was to a Punjabi Muslim.³⁰ Moreover, peasant struggles tended not to distinguish between Hindu and Muslim landlords.

In addition to linguistic and social differences, there were also rival interpretations of Islam. Apart

29. Tarig Ali - Can Pakistan Survive ? Penguin Books. 1983. pp. 38.

30. J. Nehru - The Discovery of India. Oxford University Press. 1981. pp. 386.

from the Shia-Sunni divide, there were numerous other currents which defined themselves as reformers or defenders of orthodoxy. There were some theologians who were pro-British and wrote sermons on command. Others favoured the Congress and 'composite nationalism'. Still others argued for a universal Islamic republic and refused to consider the notion of Islam in one country.

There, therefore, existed no uniform language, economic situation or religiosity among the Muslims, that could categorise them as a nationality. This fact was even realised by the Communist Party which took great pains in self-criticising their own stand, later on. They realised that the "anti-democratic disruptive" idea of Muslims forming a state was not a technical concession to nationality on the basis of religion but the disruption of the struggle of the nationalities and the common struggle of the Indian people. The demand of the Muslims to have the right to form an autonomous state where they were in a majority was asking too much because the support for Muslim separatism came strongest from where Muslims were in minority (as in Uttar Pradesh) and where competition for jobs between the Hindu and Muslim middle classes was most severe. In those areas where Muslims constituted a majority, the traditional governing elites were till the

very last, either openly hostile or luke-warm to the idea of Pakistan.³¹

The Communist Party of India in their report³² realised their failure to attack the League leaders and their cry for Pakistan as a weapon of compromise with imperialism; of their refusal to analyse the class character of the League leaders in the light of the stage in which capitalism was developing and bourgeois formations taking place in India; of failing to see the communalism which the Muslim League was preaching; of justifying separate electorates and giving slogans that "we have to make the League capable of fulfilling its role as a National Muslim organization.... Pakistan is as much the inalienable right of the Muslims as swaraj is the right of all of us".³³

Pakistan, thus, emerged not as the achievement of freedom for the Muslim nationality. There were 40 million Muslims left behind in India. ^{It} emerged in fact as

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31. Iftikar Ahmed, 'Pakistan: Classes and State Formation', Race and Class, London, 1981.
32. Report on Reformist Deviation (presented by B.T. Ranadive to the second Congress, 28 February to 6 March 1948) in M.B. Rao (ed) Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India, Vol. VII, 1948-50, PPH. January 1976.
33. Quoted in Ibid, pp. 170-172.

an imperialist conspiracy to keep the Hindu and Muslim masses divided. The League was, in fact, demanding a junior partnership with the landlord bourgeois clique in power and state. For this, it was willing to sell the Muslim masses in bondage to the imperialists.

Class Structure in Pakistan :

A brief sketch of the class structure of Pakistan is a necessary precondition for understanding the pattern of economic development, in terms of regions, since partition. The vast rural expanse of West Pakistan is dominated by large landlords who form a traditional aristocracy and gentry owning over 30 per cent of the privately cultivated land. Capitalism in Pakistan (as in most third world) did not develop through an antagonism between the class of Kulak farmers and the old feudal order. In fact, capitalist and feudal modes of production coexist and compliment each other in the sense that capitalism fused into a social formation which reinforced rather than weakened the social power of the landlords.

In the urban areas, we have the budding of a small bourgeois class. When partition occurred, there was practically no industry in the provinces of Sind, Baluchistan, Punjab and North-West-Frontier-Province. The Muslim bourgeoisie, in fact, had played a negligible role

in development of capitalism. Those minority communities of Muslims who traditionally specialised in trading as the Memons Dawoodi Bohras, the Adamjee, Habib, Rahimtoola, Chinoy, Jalibhai, H.D. Dada, M.M. Isphanani, H. Ibrahim, Bashir, Idris, Rashidi, etc. with whatever capital and skill, they formed the initial nucleus of the entrepreneurial class in Western provinces. Later, they were joined by a small and influential group of Muslim businessmen from West Punjab as Sardar Mumtaz Ali Khan, Sheikh Mohammed Allah Baksh, Sheikh Ismail, the Chinotis, etc. These were new-comers and therefore, became overwhelmingly dependent on the patronage of the state bureaucracy for finance and import licences.

Therefore, in the absence of any native capitalist class, the nascent Pakistani government had to fall back largely on these trading communities as agents of industrialization.³⁴ Thereafter, they grew steadily together with their Punjabi counterparts, in a client relationship to the Pakistani civil service which provided them with the privileges and protection necessary for

34. Y.V. Gankovsky and L.R. Polonskaya - A History of Pakistan. Nauka Publishing House, 1964. p. 115.

accumulation. Thus, the direct political power of the Pakistani businessmen was always truncated. "For, rather than an independent capitalist class, government patronage produced a bourgeoisie tied to the pre-existent, structures of military brass and bureaucracy. The key personnel of both these latter apparatuses were, in their turn, recruited from the landed gentry and aristocracy which had always traditionally provided the indigenous staff of the upper echelons of the British colonial state in India.³⁵ The bourgeois class as such remained weak throughout. But it was compensated by an enormous economic power within the country.³⁶

In contrast to the weak indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan bourgeoisie, especially, American capital, is the most powerful of the economically dominant classes operating in Pakistan. It not only has vast

35. Richard Nations : "The Economic Structure of Pakistan and Bangladesh in R. Blackburn - Explosion in the Sub-Continent. Penguin Books. 1975. p. 255.

36. By 1968, 22 families controlled 66 per cent of the country's total industrial capital, 87 per cent of insurance and 80 per cent of banking. Furthermore, 82 per cent of the total advances made by Pakistan's commercial banks came to be concentrated in only 3 per cent of total accounts. Whereas 85 per cent of the country's population lived in rural areas, 70 per cent of commercial bank loans are being utilized in three urban centres. Tariq Ali : Military Rule or People's Power, Vikas Publishing House, 1970, p. 120.

economic power, its political power is also greatly enhanced by virtue of its double representation in the state of Pakistan, both directly through its own agencies and also, indirectly through its own metropolitan state of Pakistan. The principal form in which foreign capital has come into the country is not through direct investments but in the form of tied credits dispensed through the state created investment banks such as PICIC and IDBP to private industries and state development projects.

Economically, Pakistan is heavily dependent on the metropolitan states, especially, the United States. The tied credits, loans and 'aid' has had the effect of allowing foreign capital to establish a grip over its economy. It has made lending countries to regulate its basic policies governing taxation, prices, distribution of income and national and international political commitments. In return, Pakistan has accumulated a vast burden of foreign debt amounting to \$ 8.00 billion or one-third of Pakistan's gross national product. In 1979-80, debt servicing absorbed 38 per cent of Pakistan's export earnings.³⁷

37. Hamza Alavi - "Class and state in Pakistan".
Unpublished Document

Apart from these classes, Pakistan inherited an "over-developed" state apparatus and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of the indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled.³⁸ It inherited a powerful bureaucratic-military structure that had an effective command of state power from Pakistan's very inception. Pakistan's history is complete with how this bureaucratic-military oligarchy has acted as instruments of the three important classes in Pakistan, the indigenous and metropolitan bourgeoisie and the landed classes. Needless to say, however, that the military and the bureaucracy necessarily draws from the same ruling classes. For instances, there are those "conservative right wing" generals that come from the wealthier landed families or have made substantial fortunes in business. Others make money in collusion with foreign power. "Big business in Pakistan have adopted the practice of awarding profitable directorships to retiring generals and therefore, attempted to establish relationships with factions in the army".³⁹

38. 'Overdeveloped' superstructure in relation to the structure of the post-colonial society. Hamza Alavi : State in Post-Colonial Societies" in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma : Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia. Monthly Review Press. 1973. p. 147.

39. Hamza Alavi - "State in Post-Colonial Societies". Ibid. p. 155.

Similarly, the bureaucracy recruit their senior officers largely from rich rural families, thus, affording the land-owning classes, a built-in position within the oligarchy. This link was greatly re-inforced by the grant of land to civilian and military officers who thereby became substantial land-owners in their own right.

The bureaucratic-military oligarchy, which represents the state mediates and arbitrates between the competing demands of the three propertied classes. This goes to explain the repeated intervention by either of the two in the political affairs of the state.

Therefore, we see in Pakistan, not only a unique coterie of ruling classes but also a top-sided economic policy. The territorial magnates and the bourgeoisie of West Pakistan used their monopoly of power to infringe upon the economic interest of the smaller regional bourgeoisie of the various provinces, East Pakistan, Sind, Baluchistan and North-West-Frontier-Province. The ruling circles gave priority to the development of West Pakistan and that too in regions of economic interest of the Punjabi landed interests and the 'big' bourgeoisie. A greater portion of state allocation for economic development were spent on these regions and favourable

conditions for the utilisation of loans were created.⁴⁰
 In two years alone, Punjab was given loans amounting to 100 million rupees. East Pakistan with double the population received 82.1 million rupees; Sind 25 million, North-West-Frontier-Province, 14.2 million and Baluchistan, nil.⁴¹

The bulk of the foreign currency derived from the export of jute from East Pakistan was also used for developmental projects in the Punjab and Karachi regions. The other units were even deprived of the revenue collected by taxing the people of these units. This kind of preferential treatment to Punjab had the obvious results of the increased economic disparity and perpetuation of uneven economic development in the country. Direct support from the Pakistani state helped this big bourgeoisie in collusion with the British monopolies to suppress the development of the bourgeoisie of the

40. For example, out of the Central Government loans to finance development projects in 1948-49, West Punjab received 41.6 per cent or 50 million rupees out of a total of 120 million rupees. In 1949-50, its share rose to 49.5 per cent. W. Godfrey. Pakistan : Economic and Commercial Conditions in Pakistan. London, 1951, p. 65.

41. Ibid.

separate national regions in Pakistan. There was, therefore, a resentment by the small regional bourgeoisie against the obstacles placed in their route to success. Because of the particular manner in which Pakistan came into existence and developed, the contradictions between higher forms of capital (represented by big capital and foreign monopolities) and the lower forms of capital (of the national regions) took the form of clashes between the lower and medium strata of the national bourgeoisie consisting of Bengalis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis and Baluchis, and the big bourgeoisie supported by the big landlords of West Pakistan, primarily of the Punjab region.

The discrimination which the petty and medium national bourgeoisie of East Pakistan and the smaller units of West Pakistan encountered in the economic and political spheres, and the neglect displayed by the ruling circles towards the language and culture of the individual nationalities made the national question one of the most complex and acute political problems of the country. They saw in the national movements a threat to their own interests. Hence, the use of 'two nation theory' and ideologies as pan-Islamism to paralyse them; hence, the bid to 'unite' the whole population into a 'nation'; and hence, the attempt to impose a single 'national language' (Urdu) on the whole populace.

However, the attempt to impose Urdu as the sole state language on a country beset with various nationalities who were politically conscious and where written languages with a rich literature existed, was bound to be resisted by these nationalities. The result was a bitter flare-up in the country soon after independence over this issue.

As has been noted earlier Urdu was not the national language of any of the peoples of Pakistan except for a small number. Thus, the differences regarding the state language assumed sharp forms, especially, in East Pakistan, where the demand for Bengali as state language in addition to Urdu and English arose. It resulted in clashes and mass demonstrations in East Pakistan in defence of the Bengali language. The situation became so tense that M.A. Jinnah himself had to intervene and towards the end of March 1948, he visited Dacca. In one of the public meetings, he addressed, he stressed that "there could be only one lingua franca for Pakistan and that language should be Urdu".... "Ultimately, it is for you, the people of this province to decide what shall be the language of your province. But let me make it very clear to you that the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language".⁴²

42. Quoted in Gankovsky et al. fn. no. 34, p. 153 from H. Feldman ; A Constitution for Pakistan; Oxford. 1956. pp. 16-17.

Many others tried to establish that the defence of Bengali was both un-Islamic and opposed to the interests of national unity.⁴³

The national feelings of the Bengalis was also offended by the dominant position of West Pakistanis, mainly Punjabis in the civil, administration and armed forces. Figures for the year 1950-51, for instance, reveal that although 55 per cent of Pakistan's population lived in the Eastern wing, only 4.3 per cent were represented in the armed forces.⁴⁴ Even as far as budget allocation was concerned, East Pakistan was discriminated against. Most of their protests were suppressed in the name of growing 'provincialism' in the country.⁴⁵

The Bengalis, therefore, were compelled to struggle against such discrimination. They demanded Bengali to be included as one of the state languages and establishment of political autonomy in East Pakistan, which called for severe repressions.

43. Keith Callard - Pakistan: A Political Study, London, 1957, p. 181.

44. Quoted in Gankovsky etc. fn. no. 34, p. 154 from The Pakistan Times, Feb. 7 and 8, 1956.

45. Keith Callard - Pakistan - A Political Study, London, 1957, p. 174.

The inhabitants of West Pakistan, however, too faced similar discrimination and fought alongside the Bengalis in resisting the forcible introduction of Urdu. This resistance was strongest in Sind where the level of national consciousness was high. Prose, poetry, journalism, newspapers in the Sindhi script was widely prevalent. In fact, Sindhis were five times more literate and developed than their Pakhtun, Punjabi or Baluchi counterparts.

The national feelings of the Sindhis were further, injured with the forceful separation of Karachi from the province. As such, Karachi, in fact, was considered by the Sindhis as their national capital. It not only meant an injury in terms of nationalist feelings but also a considerable financial loss to the province since it was one of the highest productive areas. The result of this separation was a chronic budgetary deficit to the province.

Just as the Bengali faction of the Muslim League was opposed to the imposition of Urdu in East Pakistan, similarly, its Sind faction too protested against these practices, both inside and outside the Legislative Assembly, however, to no avail. Mr. Bhutto's assurances of making Sindhi as the official language did not make much of a difference as Urdu too was proclaimed as the official language.

The sense of grievance however was aggravated with the allotment of newly irrigated lands to Punjabi farmers in Sind. Moreover Sind has not benefitted from the remittances from Gulf to the extent Punjabis have. As of today, the grievances have increasingly, shown a tendency towards 'Sindhi nationalism' especially so since forces of autonomy existing mostly in student organizations as the left oriented Sind Awami Tehriq are quite strong. The recent entry of the wadheras (landlords) in the movement in Sind is a manifestation of the discriminating attitudes of the Pakistan state towards Sind.

The case with North-West Frontier Province was only slightly different. Although, apparently, it may seem that the province was not subjected to the policy of discrimination against national regions by the mere fact that the representation in the army, civil service, etc., from this province is higher, yet, the Pakhtuns felt politically, culturally and economically alienated from Pakistani affairs. In fact, the fight for national self-determination of the Pashtu-speaking regions and for the creation of Pakhtunistan had already begun before the partition of India. The People's Party, later renamed People's Organization of Pakistan, founded by the leaders of the Pakhtun national movement, led the struggle for granting autonomy to various nationalities in Pakistan.

The Pakhtun national-democratic organizations demanded the abolition of administrative barriers as legacy of British colonialism, fusion of all Pashtu speaking areas into a united Pakhtunistan; restriction of landlord property rights, democratisation of the country's political system; liquidation of Pakhtun states and equality for the Pakhtuns in all spheres, economic, cultural and political in Pakistan.

The repression unleashed consequently dealt a heavy blow to the movement and its leaders arrested and imprisoned. Even as late as the 1972, the National Awami Party under pressure from the Centre had to resign in the face of repression. The result is that till this day, the demand for autonomy exists and is fast moving towards a final break with Pakistan.

However, the classic case of outright neglect and exploitation after East Bengal is Baluchistan.⁴⁶ Similar demand arose; similar national movement arose that progressively moved and is moving from autonomy to a final break with Pakistan. The extent of neglect and discrimination can be seen from the statement issued in a Pakistani paper which said that "the Central Secretariat

46. Baluch case will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

at Karachi, the local police force, the army and the militia - the doors of all these are almost shut to Baluchistanis.⁴⁷ The saga of resource exploitation from Baluchistan (as will be dealt later) is only too well-known. Repression is rampant consequently strengthening and uniting the Baluchis against the Punjabi dominated structure.

Thus, we have national movements and nationalities whether in a nascent form or well developed existing in Pakistan. Apart from the Punjabi nationality, no other group could effectively form strong organizations in the form of political parties. It was only later that for instance, the National Awami Party becomes a formidable force for the Pakistani politico-military structure. Moreover, the fear among the landlords and privileged sections against their own population whom they dominated in the various regions and their desire to enlist the aid of the Central Government at the slightest provocation, against their own peasants, strongly influenced the national movement in these regions. Lastly, the working people primarily the peasant to begin with, had little conscious^{ness} and consequently, no solid organisation in

47. The Pakistan Times. Aug. 9, 1950.

order to unite with their counterparts in other provinces and together fight the centralising measures of the Centre. Feudal and religious values prevented them from doing so. A classic case of this is, in fact, the Baluch case, whose population was deeply entrenched in tribal values and loyalties inimical to any unity or development in the region.

NATIONALITIES AND NATIONAL GROUPS IN PAKISTAN

There exists numerous difficulties in determining the various ethnic groups, languages and cultural diversities in Pakistan. The difficulty lies primarily in the way the censuses were taken both in independent Pakistan as well as during colonial India. Only part, or even none, of the population of some of the regions and districts, incorporated into Pakistan in 1947, was registered in the colonial period. In other cases as the censuses of 1931 and 1941 the statistics are known to have been distorted deliberately. Moreover, the statistics of both present Pakistan and colonial India are more often than not inaccurate as that have been based not on scientifically evolved objective criteria, but on the subjective estimation of those who compiled them. This inaccuracy lies for instance, in that, that some of the smaller dialects were included in major dialects.¹ Secondly records pertaining to tribal belts is highly inadequate and incomplete.

1. In 1951 Census of Pakistan for instance, Dogri as a whole was included in the Punjabi dialect. Census of Pakistan, 1951 Vol. I, Table 7.

To take the census data first, in the three censuses of 1951, 1961 and 1972, no exhaustive enumeration of the frontier tribal areas was attempted. Rough estimates based on information from tribal chiefs were made available. The 1972 Census report in fact referred to this lacuna by stating that though 'importance of individual enumeration for all tribal areas was well appreciated, it was not practical to do so because of the peculiar characteristics of the tribal areas and its population, namely, mountainous terrain of tribal areas, inadequate transport system, sparsely populated nature of population, nomadic and socio-cultural pattern of tribal life, non-availability of suitable personnel for enumeration etc.'²

Furthermore, it has been found essential to verify available linguistical data while determining the ethnical make-up since these ethnic communities are in constant flux. Political independence resulted in the continued consolidation of major communities, during which smaller ethnic groups came to be assimilated into the former.

2. Urmila Phadnis: Ethnic Movements in Pakistan (Unpublished) from Pakistan Census Organization, Ministry of Interior, States and Frontier Regions, Census Report of Federally Administered 1972 (Islamabad 1972), p. 111.

The Pakistan Censuses of 1951 and 1961 show that about twentyfour languages were prevalent. Most of the population of Pakistan (including the erstwhile East Pakistan) speak Indo-Aryan languages of the Indo-European family. These are Bengali Sindhi Urdu, Gujrati and Rajasthani. In West Pakistan Indian languages (Pashto and Baluchi) are used widely. There is also a fairly large use of the Dardic languages of the Indo-European family as well as the Dravidian languages (as Brahui).

However, distribution pattern of languages in Pakistan differ widely. Six major languages cover 98 per cent of the country's population Bengali (50 million people), Punjabi (26.2 million), Pashto (6.8 million), Sindhi (5 million), Urdu (3.3 million) and Baluchi (1 million).³ Most of these languages are distributed over distinct, large geographical and historical regions which indicate the linguistical territorial and cultural unity of the population that has historically developed in these regions.

The migration of population from India to Pakistan brought no significant change in the ethnical pattern

3. See appendix. Census of Pakistan, Population, 1961, Vol. I, Table 38, pp. IV, 114.

except in the southern part of Sind. The reason is that the overwhelming majority of the emigrants were Muslim Punjabis from East Punjab who diffused among the Punjabi population of West Pakistan. Urdu speaking emigrants settled in Karachi due to employment opportunities.

According to the 1951 Census, 98.4 per cent of East Bengal's population speak Bengali as their mother tongue; 94.6 per cent of the population in Punjab speak Punjabi as their mother tongue; Pashtu is spoken by 90 per cent and in Baluchistan Baluchi is the prevailing speech. In the southern part of Sind, Urdu is the native language for 51.7 per cent of the population. The initial Urdu-speaking Sindhi after their migration to India were replaced by Urdu speaking Muslims. Sindhi population thereby declined to 11 per cent of the population in the region of Karachi. however, in the regions of Hyderabad and Khairpur, Sindhi remains the native language for the bulk of the population.

Thus, erstwhile East Pakistan, as shown in the figures was much more ethnically uniform than the West.⁴ West Pakistan is not as ethnically uniform as the

4. Bengalis in East Pakistan accounted for 98 per cent of the population and were numerically pre-dominant in 19 districts of the province.

erstwhile East Pakistan. Its population consists of five major ethnic groups (as mentioned before). Punjabis 61 per cent of the population, Pashtus 15.8 per cent, Sindhis 11.7 per cent and Baluchis 2.3 per cent. Urdu as such spoken mostly by emigrants from northern India is spoken by 6.9 per cent of West Pakistan's population.⁵

However, Urdu was never spoken on a national scale. The 1951 Census quotes Urdu as the mother tongue of 2.4 million inhabitants or 3.3 per cent of the entire country's population (East and West). In East Pakistan, it was the mother tongue of only 268,000 inhabitants or 0.63 per cent of the population in the province. There was a slightly larger population who could speak or understand Urdu (not mother tongue). In the whole of Pakistan 5.4 million inhabitants or 7.3 per cent spoke the language.

Therefore, Urdu was never the national language of any of the peoples of Pakistan excluding an insignificant number. It was the Muslim nobility, the big Muslim businessmen, a section of the Punjabi Muslim intelligentsia educated in the tradition of the Aligarh colleges and the Muslim immigrants from the United and Central Provinces of British India whose mother tongue was Urdu. There were

5. As per 1961 Census.

no social strata or groups in Pakistan who came forward in support of Urdu as the sole state language of the country.

Most of the Punjabis, that is about 25,000,000 people or about 95 per cent of them, are dispersed over the territory of Punjab, and two districts of North-West-Frontier Province: Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan. In those areas they predominate numerically. They also reside in Peshawar, Mardan, Northern Sind, Quetta, Loralai and Karachi where they constitute a minority (that is about 7 - 9 per cent). However, in Quetta and Loralai districts the percentage rises to 30.

About 6,500,000 or 95 per cent of the Pashtuns live in the Bannu, Kohat, Mardan and Peshawar districts of the North-West-Frontier-Province, the Zhob district of Baluchistan, the former Dir and Swat states and the tribal belt. In all these regions they constitute an absolute majority (about 90 - 99 per cent of the population). They constitute a majority (about 60 per cent) also in Quetta - Pishin and Loralai of Baluchistan Province. There is also a considerable Pashtun population in Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara (about 20 per cent). Some insignificant numbers also reside in Campbellpur and Rawalpindi and in Sind. Moreover, post 1947 Karachi saw

an increase in the Pashtun population on account of seasonal workers.⁶

Some remnants of clan organization have survived to the present day among the Pashtuns of West Pakistan. The largest Pashtun tribal groups, for instance are Yusufzais, Mohmands Afridis, Orakzais, Bannuchis, Marwat, Wazir, Kakar and Tarin. There are also some tribes that are nomadic in nature and migrate to Afghanistan and back during the summer and winter months respectively.⁷

The Sindhis inhabit the territory of the Sind Province, the former Khairpur and Las-Bela states and the district of Karachi. More than 96 per cent, or about 4,800,000 of Sindhis live in these regions. 80,000 Sindhis (or 29 per cent) live in the Kalat and a few thousands live in Rahimyar Khan, a district of the former Bhawalpur state.

The Baluchis :

The tribal groups collectively known as the Baluchis reside in one of the most remote and rugged parts

6. The 1961 Census shows that there are 122,000 Pashtuns in Karachi.

7. J.W. Spain: *The Way of the Pathans* pp. 48-49. Cited in V. Gankovski: *The Peoples of Pakistan : An Ethnic History* (Nauka Publishing House 1973) p. 11.

of Asia. From the sparsely populated desert in south and south-west of the massive Hindu Kush Mountains the Baluch homeland stretches down to the Arabian Sea across vast tracts of formidable mountains and landscapes. They spread over three countries : Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The Afghan portion contains numerically the fewest Baluchis. The largest in number and most political Baluch tribes reside in Pakistan. To the West lies the Iranian Baluchistan and Seistan. Pakistani Baluchistan containing about 40 per cent of the country's territory and consisting administratively of two divisions Quetta and Kalat is further divided into ten districts (Changai, Kachhi, Kalat, Kharan, Las Bela, Loralai, Makran, Quetta-Pishin, Sibi and Zhob).

Origin and History :

Historically, the origin of the Baluchis goes back to 2,000 years. Most of them claim that their ancestors came from Aleppo in modern Syria at the time of the ninth century Arab conquests. However, western investigations reveal that the Baluchis are first identifiable in history inhabiting area in north-western Iran, adjacent to the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Virtually all, judge them as a rare amalgam of many peoples and consequently class their language together with Persian Pashtu and Kurdish, in the Iranian group of Indo-European language family.

While evidence exists that they existed as far back as the seventh century, it was only during the second millenium that they came to inhabit what is now modern Baluchistan. It was, therefore, the thirteenth and fourteenth century in which the Baluch people, having settled here, came into contact with the Pashtuns, Punjabis, Sindhis and some Dravidian groups (Brahuis). It was during this period of settlement that they were faced with repeated attempts at subjugation by the Persian, Sindhi, Afghan, Sikh and other conquering armies who could only succeed in establishing limited suzerainty over them.

Within themselves attempts were made at consolidation and unification mainly by three Baluch monarchs who ruled during the three centuries preceeding the British Raj. The first of these nation builders' was Mir Chakar Rind who in the fifteenth century established a short-lived tribal confederacy reaching from the Makran coast to the present day Marri tribal area, south of Quetta.⁸ He ruled from his capital at Sibi from 1487 to 1511, but his kingdom was destroyed by a civil war between the two

8. Baluch Nationalist writer extol Mir Chakar Rind for making the first serious effort to unify the Baluch politically.

leading Baluch tribal federations, the Rinds and the Lasharis. Whatever may be the circumstances of his ultimate departure from Sibi, it is clear from records, that he led a sizeable army into Punjab, achieving 'complete possession' of Multan and other areas of South Punjab during early sixteenth century. The British historian M. Longworth Dames writes that Mir Chakar's military successes "seem to have led to something like a national migration."⁹ Evidences of this lies in the fact that a sizeable number of Baluchis have come to dwell in the Punjab region. Popular blads sung by wandering minstrels glorify Mir Chakar and his feats.

After Mir Chakar's death in 1511 the Moghul Empire made several unsuccessful attempts to incorporate the Baluch who were able to cooperate militarily to preserve their independence. However, they were unable to restore political unity until the Ahmadzai tribe established the Kalat Confederacy in 1666. It was the most significant accomplishment of the dynamic Nasir Khan, sixth in line

9. Cited in Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Washington D.C. 1981), p. 15 from 'M.L. Dames: The Baluch Race: A Historical and Ethnological Sketch (London, Royal Asiatic Society 1904), p. 43'.

of Khan of Kalat, who ruled for more than half a century (beginning in 1741) and who in the eighteenth century drove the frontiers of the Khanate of Kalat northward into Afghanistan, southward into Makran, westward into the Persian territory and eastward into Punjab and Sind as far as Karachi.

Administratively, Nasir Khan came closer to establishing a centralized bureaucratic apparatus covering all of Baluchistan than any Baluch ruler before. This was manifested in a Wazir or Prime Minister, a Baluch Parliament with a lower and an upper chamber, and a network of roads. He even renewed Kalat's claims of sovereignty over the Iranian Baluch tribes and sent occasional expeditionary forces to the western borderlands.

For Baluch nationalists today Nasir Khan's achievements remain an all-important symbol, providing some semblance of historical precedent for the concept of a unified Baluch political identity.

However, the Baluch unity was not to remain for long and broke down after his death in 1805. An important reason for this could be the fact that it became a crucial region determining Russian and British Empires when the British concluded that Afghanistan should

become a buffer state to shield their Indian empire from Russia, Baluchistan as a key area immediately acquired a new strategic significance. In their effort to establish direct control over the access routes to Afghanistan, the British fought bloody battles for over a period of forty years. By 1876, they could subdue Kalat and secure direct control over a broad belt of territory in north-eastern Baluchistan including Quetta and thereby through formal treaty rights, manage to reduce Kalat to a status of utter dependency. After the 1890's Baluchistan was never a serious challenge to British authority.¹⁰

Culturally, the Baluchi ethnolinguistic group is far from homogeneous. Diversity, in terms of historical origins, geographic isolation of individual tribes, intermingling and wider integration and the result of the recent partitioning of their homeland into separate states has made variations in their lifestyles and social patterns.¹¹ Some have adopted regional vernaculars depending upon where they have settled. Iranian Baluchis for instance have assimilated to a certain extent into Persian culture. Similarly the Afghan Baluchis have begun to speak Pashtu in addition to their own dialect.

10. The British policies would be dealt with later in the dissertation.

11. Robert G. Wirsing The Baluchis and the Pathans Minority Rights Group, Report No. 48, p. 3.

However, the greatest difficulty in ascertaining Baluch cultural boundaries in Pakistan lies in its relation with the Brahuys. This is a small group also residing in West Pakistan. According to the 1961 Census there are about 350,800 Brahuys.¹² The bulk of them inhabit the central regions of East Baluchistan or the Kalat state. Their language cannot be classified under the Baluch language. It is in fact closely related to the Dravidian languages of South India. The two, however, show a great similarity in culture and tradition. The Brahuys language has a heavy Baluchi admixture and male bilingualism is common in both. There is also changes in tribal allegiance whereby Brahuys integrated into and became Baluchis and vice versa.¹³

Politically, the Baluchi movement is stronger and no independent Brahui movement as such exists. However, a number of prominent Brahui political leaders are closely associated with the Baluch nationalist movement. Of late because of the well developed language, an independent political outlook grounded in Brahui linguistic nationalism has started developing.

12. Census of Pakistan. Population, 1961, Vol. I, pp. IV-39.

13. Nina Swidler "Brahuys Political Organization and the National State" in Ainslie T. Embree (ed), Pakistan's Western Borderlands (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1977), p. 112.

Language :

The Baluchi language has descended from a lost language linked with the Parthian or Median civilizations, which flourished in the Caspian and adjacent areas in the pre-Christian era.¹⁴ It is one of the oldest living languages classified as a member of the Iranian group of the Indo-European language family amongst which it is closest to the Kurdish. Recently there has been borrowings from Persian, Sindhi, Arabic and other languages. Until a century and a half the Baluch did not have any recorded literature and Baluch savants wrote Baluchi in Persian or Urdu scripts. Of late, again, Baluch nationalists have evolved a Baluchi script known as Nastaliq, a variant of the Arabic script.

Although the script may have been borrowed to a certain extent and the Baluch culture as such faced with continual pressure from strong well-developed neighbouring cultures yet the Baluchis have been remarkably successful in preserving a distinct identity of their own. The Baluchi language and a relatively uniform folklore and value system have provided a common platform for the various scattered tribes.

14. Richard N. Frye "Remarks on Baluchi History"
Central Asiatic Journal, No. 1, 1961.

Demography :

The total population of Baluchi speakers in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan is around 5 million.¹⁵ Out of this, Pakistan accounts for at least 75 per cent. There are about 983,000 persons or 2.5 per cent of the total population of West Pakistan¹⁶ whose mother tongue is Baluchi. In the same Census there were an additional 366,000 who spoke Brahvi as their mother tongue. Together, the Baluch-Brahvi speaking constituted approximately 3.5 per cent of West Pakistan's population. The 1979 population figures quotes the same population at 2.8 million.

The distribution pattern of the Baluchis is varied. About 57 per cent (1961) dwell as minorities in Sind and Punjab then in Baluchistan. In Baluchistan itself, large numbers of Pashtu, Sindhi and Punjabis reside and Baluchis themselves are in a minority, that is about 31 per cent (45 per cent including Brahvis, (see Appendix, Table 2). Baluchis are barely represented in three heavily Pashtu-speaking northern districts of the Province-Zhob (0.3 per cent), Quetta-Pishin (2.2 per cent) and Loralai (8.1 per cent) (see Appendix, Table 3).

15. Selig Harrison: "Nightmare in Baluchistan"
Foreign Policy, No. 32 (Fall 1978).

16. 1961 Population Census.

In identifying the spatial dimension, the migration data becomes equally important. Given the nature of data available only very tentative generalizations can be made.¹⁷ The tables (see appendix table 4 and 5) indicate that social mobility is more in North-West-Frontier Province than Baluchistan, if the two are compared. Secondly, there is a significant increase in the areas during the 1961-73 period than in the earlier decade. Thirdly, there seems to be a historical continuity in migration movements towards urban areas in case of Baluchistan (and North-West-Frontier Province). And, lastly a large number of Punjabis have migrated into these regions.

The impetus for migration have been many. In most cases migrants from Baluchistan have gone as labour force. Amongst them, a very few number, in view of their technical capabilities have occupied positions in engineering works or in military bureaucratic complex.

Of even greater significance is the fact that demographic developments create further odds against

17. The 1951 and 1961 Census provided a breakdown of the enumerated district by the district of birth proving an opportunity to compute the number of life-time migrants. However, the 1972 Census did not deal with migration. In 1973 a nation-wide Housing, Economic and Demographic Survey was conducted but this too did not provide the total number of migrants. See Usmila Phadnis, fn. 2.

Baluchistan. Apart from the steady exodus of Baluchis out of their homeland, there is a continuing dilution of their population within the Province. This is due to the steady migration of outsiders (Afghans, Punjabis, Sindhis, Hazaras) into the region since independence and even before. There is also the recent massive migration of Pashtu speaking Afghan refugees into parts of Baluchistan in search of labour. As industry spreads into the area it brings Punjabi skilled and Pathan unskilled labour so much so that the Pathans now claim to be in a majority in the province.

Religion :

The Baluchi tribal groups are almost entirely Muslims and adhere to the Hanafi School of the Sunni sect of Islam which is in harmony with the state of Pakistan which is predominately Sunni. This may seem to place them in unison with Pakistan state and its Islamic ideology. However, religious uniformity is not complete and to overstate the strength of Islamic bond between the two can be deceptive. Their devotion may be considerable but is typically simple and ridden with superstitious. Moreover, the powerful loyalty to clan and tribe continues to claim the highest allegiance.¹⁸ This has acted as

18. Stephen L. Pastner "Lords of the Desert Borderlands: Frontier Feudalism in Southern Baluchistan and Eastern Ethiopia" International Journal of Middle-East Studies, 10(1979).

a brake on the utility of Islam as an integrative force.¹⁹ Moreover, Islam has been exploited to the maximum by the Pakistani State to suppress any form of protest. Despite the fact that Pakistan as such was created as a Muslim state, was declared an Islami Republic in 1964 and steps towards greater 'Islamization' taken in February 1978, these developments have met with greatest hostility by these tribesmen whose leaders tend to view them as politically inspired efforts to strengthen the central government.

The Baluch Social Organization :

The Baluchis are segmented into tribes, clans and sub-clans. The tribal organizations are centrally organized and hierarchical and submission to the authority of the chief is the basis of tribal affiliation.²⁰ However, the Baluchis could not escape the transformative impact of modern society. The Sardari system came to represent a pale substitute for the power of modern bureaucracy. A comparative study of the sardari system as before and after successive political changes in Baluchistan will be dealt later in the dissertation.

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19. Robert Wirsing, fn. 11, p. 7.

20. Philip Salzman: "Continuity and Change in Baluchi Tribal Leadership" International Journal of Middle-East Studies, 4 No. 4 Oct. 1973.

THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM

British Policies in the Borderlands :

Some of Pakistan's basic problems concerned with the borderlands are, in fact, historical legacies of the nineteenth century imperial experience, which had far-reaching consequences. This is reflected not only as far as the definition of frontiers and the demarcation of linear boundaries but also in the general thrust of the foreign policy of independent Pakistan.

To take the first, it is well-known that in the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the rulers' interests in the borderland were essentially two: the warriors it could provide for the royal armies, and the need to ensure passage through it. With the deterioration of Muslim power in Asia in the eighteenth century, the right to passage became less important politically, though, it continued to have some commercial value. The expansion of the British Indian Empire to the North-West corner of the Sub-continent in 1849 changed this. It was an attempt to centralise administration, to establish trade with Central Asia and revenue associated with it,

good prospects of agriculture in the fertile valleys lying West of Indus and most of all, the key defense against expansionisms French, German and Russian at different stages which was becoming almost a national paranoia in England.

In order, therefore, that safe communication be established, the British not only formed the Punjab Irregular Force (later named Punjab Frontier Force) but also evolved a system of subsidies for protection to travellers, mainly, British. Various tribal chieftains were given this responsibility. The Adam Khels, Orakzai, Bangash were utilised by which the British did their best to play one clan against another. However, more often than not this policy proved unsuccessful and rather expensive.

This inspired new examination of just, where the frontier should be and it was decided that what they had taken, they could hold and that British territory should run atleast as far West as the border hills. A combination of factors led to the giving way of the Close Border Policy in favour of a Forward Policy under which the British undertook to administer some of the tribal areas to move strong garrisons forward into other parts and to dictate a boundary settlement (the Durand Line) with the Afghan Amir Abdur Rehman, which pushed further the border.

That it was possible to push administration out into the tribal area was proven by Colonel Sandeman in Baluchistan. The Sandeman system, a corollary of the Forward Policy meant a "peaceful penetration of their homeland based on knowledge and sympathy."¹ Behind this was assumption that given the chance to improve their economic lot, the impoverished hillmen would abandon their violent methods. The immediate instrument for such improvement was their employment in levies, road-making and other services. The tendency therefore of the Sandeman system was to increase dependence but basically freeze the already existing social system. Unlike in Bengal and Punjab, the British did not ultimately use Baluchistan for the creation of surpluses; nor did they collect revenues from areas which came to be called British Baluchistan. Instead, they paid salaries to the Khans and the numerous Sardars. Again, unlike Sind and Gujrat regions, Baluchistan was never used for export facilities and that explains why no ports nor fisheries were developed along the long coastline.

In agrarian relations the British strengthened consolidated and froze the social structure that existed

1. James W. Spain : "Political Problems of a Borderland", in Ainslie T. Embree (ed.) : Pakistan's Western Borderlands. The Transformation of a Political Order (Vikas Pub. House, 1977), p. 13.

previously in Baluchistan,² as a result of which oppression exploitation of the masses increased; Stagnation of the economy resulted in political degeneration, increased power of the Sardars, increased exploitation of the semi-nomadic and peasant masses in a framework of total dependence upon the British who now actively financed the repressive Sardari system and received abject loyalty in return. The masses - serfs, slaves and rural wage earners as well as the semi-nomadic cattle breeders were burdened now with a double oppression - practiced directly by the Sardars who in turn were assisted in doing the same by the new law and order apparatus paid for by the British.

By 1854, the Khan of Kalat had sold his loyalty to the British for an annual salary of Rs. 50,000. Free passage guarantees were given in the course of the First Afghan War. But by 1876, the Khan and all the Sardars had accepted the British as the final arbiter of their internal disputes and a treaty was signed to that effect (Treaty Between the British Government and the Khelat State 1876). The new Sandeman system of administration retained the autonomy of the chiefs vis-a-vis their subjects, but were themselves subject to British

2. A detailed analysis of this agrarian structure will be dealt with in the Conclusion.

supervision. Very soon, Quetta, Pishin-Sibi (1879) and Zhob valley (1891) were annexed and the new administration administered there. On the whole, the Sandeman system of administration was found to be so satisfactory that following the advice of the Simon Commission, Baluchistan was left out of the new settlement which gave India its first constitution before II World War.³

The Sandeman system worked well in Baluchistan almost from the beginning. Administration was extended upto the limits of the area of British interest. However, the Baluch border tribes were less well-armed and less intractable than the Pathans. Their tribal culture, too, was less developed and the British did initially face resistance in their move from Zhob in Baluchistan to Gomal in Waziristan.

The concept of Afghanistan as a buffer state now being firmly established in Calcutta and London, they turned their attention to getting a permanent pattern of administration for the Frontier area itself. The "Three-Fold Frontier" was the solution to the problem of defining

3. Aijaz Ahmed ; "The National Question in Baluchistan" in Feroz Ahmed (ed) Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon Question (Peoples Publishing House, 1975), p. 22.

the forms of power to be exercised by the Government of India in the Sub-Continent and its environs. The first frontier was the outer edge of directly administered territory; the second was that of indirect administration; and the third, the outer edge of the area of influence. The first, defined as "British India", the territory, where the Government of India exercised full authority, imposing its legal and political system. Beyond this was a zone regarded as under the territorial control of the Government but where the law and administrative forms, especially, the system of taxation was not applied. This was the "Frontier of Separation", where tribal chieftains continued customary forms of Government with general control exercised over them by the Government of India through subsidies and the army. However, the princely states in the interior of the Sub-Continent were integrated into the mainstream of Indian life and were not included in this second zone.

On the outer edge of this "unadministered" territory was one of the "truly crucial innovations of the British in the Sub-Continent - the demarcated linear boundary"⁴ or the Durand Line. Beyond this delimited and

4. Ainslie T. Embree : "Pakistan's Imperial Legacy" in Ainslie T. Embree, fn. 1, p. 27.

demarcated boundary was the third frontier region, the protectorate or buffer state, independent but tied by treaties or other forms of obligations to the Government of India. Afghanistan was the region.⁵

In short, there were three basic territorial components : (1) the semi-autonomous princely States; (2) the centrally administered territories (the tribal agencies of the North-West Frontier; and the Chief Commissioner's province of Baluchistan); and (3) the locally administered settled districts (the Governor's province of North-West Frontier).

Concerned largely with frontier security, the British ruled the tribal agencies and most of the province of Baluchistan through political agents entrusted mainly with security and peace-keeping functions. Customary tribal law was maintained, enforced by tribal councils (jirgas) under the somewhat disorganized sets of regulations later consolidated by Curzon into the Frontier Crimes Regulations III of 1901. To reiterate, the Frontier Crimes Regulations provided for the referral of criminal and civil cases in accordance with tribal customs.

5. Nepal, too, was one such region.

As far as Baluchistan specifically is concerned, the stabilization of Baluchi tribes was a slow process beginning in 1843 and not really completed by 1890's. The solution for the British lay not in annexing the whole area but only of a narrow strip of territory on the North and North-West that isolated the Baluchis from contacts with outsiders. The military expedition that followed determined the frontier between Sind and the territories of the Khan of Kalat by treaty in 1854 and demarcated in 1862. Quetta too which was considered as key to control of Baluchis was finally acquired in 1876 by treaty from the Khan. Over the next two decades more territory was acquired from Afghanistan, the Khan and the tribal chiefs in the Zhob river area. This created the required narrow stretch of territory under the Government of India that cut off Baluchistan from direct contact with both Afghanistan and the tribal peoples of North-West Frontier Province.

Baluchistan thus became part of a peculiar frontier structure - the second frontier or the unadministered territory between the boundary of administration that defined Sind and the Durand Line. Change in terms of amelioration of social conditions rather than any social or structural, was conducted. This imperial legacy

brought undue strains on the new Government of Pakistan later, not only in its internal policies but also in foreign policy towards Afghanistan. However what concerns us is the changes brought about by successive Governments to this administrative structure established by the British.

The Post-Independence Phenomenon :

The British policy clearly left an imprint on contemporary Pakistan. In reality little seems to have changed. Yet some structural changes did occur. Since independence all of the princely states⁶ have been abolished and by 1970 were brought fully under provincial administration. The centrally administered territories of Baluchistan are now formally under provincial administration - those of the North-West frontier remain under central administration. By 1972 there were a total of fourteen specially designated tribal areas ; ten in North-West frontier, three in Baluchistan (Bugti, Marri and Kachhi) and in the district of Punjab.

The frontier crimes regulation practically continues though in an abridged form. Central and provincial laws

6. Four each in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province.

generally do not apply in any of the tribal areas. Administratively too there has been a great deal of structural carry over in Government tribal policy from the British period into independent Pakistan.

However as far as tribal areas, the new Government followed a slightly different path. It viewed the borderlands as integral components of the new state and not as buffers. The basic drive has been towards the acceleration and intensification of pressures for integrating the tribal areas more completely into the political, social and economic mainstream of Pakistan. From this practice, what was striking was the manner in which Baluchistan came under Pakistan's suzerainty. And this requires some elaboration.

struggle against Accession to Pakistan :

The incorporation of the Baluch into Pakistan came as a traumatic blow to the Baluch nationalists who had campaigned clandestinely for an independent Baluchistan towards the end of the British Raj. In the forties limited exposure to education together with the stimulus from the October Revolution in Soviet Union as well as the Independence movement led by Gandhi and Nehru in India had produced an upsurge of political consciousness. It led to the emergence of an organized nationalist movement. There was also a corresponding rise in Baluch

literature, political pamphlets and newspapers. Under ground political groups were organized, most notably, the Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Baluchistan (Organization for the Unity of Baluchistan).⁷

By 1935 the Kalat National Party dedicated to the same cause was established but was soon outlawed by the British for the reason that it sought independence with the Khan Mir Ahmed Yar Khan as the heir.⁸ In their memorandum to the Cabinet Mission Plan they stated that Kalat would retain its independence once the British withdrew and the Baluch principalities which were leased to the British would revert to Kalat. The Cabinet Mission Plan however left the issue of principalities in the sub-continent undecided so that the Baluch issue remained unresolved when Pakistan was formally established on August 14, 1947. The Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah, in his statement to the press on June 18, 1947 specifically noted that "I am of the firm opinion, that the Memorandum of the Cabinet Mission of 12th May, 1946, clearly lays down the policy of

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7. Its aim was the creation of a united independent Greater Baluchistan embracing areas in Iran, Kalat, British, Baluchistan, Dera Ghazi Khan and the Province of Sind.
 8. They were working under the assumption that the 1876 treaty which permitted Britain to occupy Baluchistan pledged that the British would respect the sovereignty and independence of Kalat. Treaty given in Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch Inside Baluchistan (Royal Book Co., Karachi 1975), p. 230.

His Majesty's Government in respect of the position of the Indian States. It nowhere makes it obligatory upon them to merge themselves with any Legislative Assembly be it Indian or Pakistani.... In case a state desiring to retain its independence by co-operating with Pakistan in trade and economic affairs. Only we welcome to have political talks on the same to arrive at any solution agreed upon for mutual good".

The Round Table Conference held on 4th August, 1947 with Lord Mountbatten and the agreement between Kalat and Pakistan reiterated the point that Kalat is an independent state and on matters of Defence Foreign Relations and communications, deliberations would be held.⁹

Soon after Pakistan came into existence, the Khan of Kalat declared Kalat's independence, (15th August 1947) but offered to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan in the spheres of defence, foreign affairs and communications. The members of the Kalat Assembly chosen just after the declaration of independence, were willing to form an alliance with Pakistan with independence as

9. Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch: Inside Baluchistan, fn. 8, p. 146.

a pre-condition.¹⁰ They argued that Pakistan had shown malice towards the Baluch by perpetuating the separate status of the three 'leased' Baluch principalities,¹¹ thereby dividing a unified Baluch identity, in which case, it was difficult to even consider accession. The dominant sentiments in the Kalat Assembly was therefore for a sovereign Baluch state.

The matter reached its climax on April 1, 1948 with the Pakistani army marching into Kalat. The Khan was arrested and forced to sign an agreement of accession. His brother Abdul Karim with the tacit approval of the Khan fled to Afghanistan along with 700 followers and declared a revolt against Pakistan. With Afghan help, he launched guerilla operations against the Pakistani army in the Jhalawan district. However he too was forced to surrender by the Pakistani forces and made to sign a safe conduct agreement, which the Pakistan authorities themselves dishonoured by arresting him soon after.

The first decade of Pakistan's independent existence was therefore characterised by the use of force to

10. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. 9, Chapter II, p. 24.

11. British Baluchistan, Dera Ghazi Khan and the Province of Sind.

establish its authority over Baluchistan. This was compensated by the establishment of Baluchistan States Union (1952-1955) which provided the princes substantial autonomy. There was no doubt of an almost complete neglect of Baluchistan as far as development of the region was concerned.

1958-1969 :

The Ayub Khan era on the contrary, was characterised by a powerful assertion of central authority in almost all aspects of its relationship with tribal areas. The one-unit scheme, the collapse of parliamentary institutions and the establishment of marshall law in 1958 by Ayub pointed towards a centralising trend with a renewed drive towards garrisoning the tribal areas.

The one unit plan of the 1950s for consolidating the ethnic groups of West Pakistan into a single province was basically meant to break the constitutional deadlock threatening the unity of the two wings. The move would balance Bengali strength in a projected national governmental structure based on the concept of parity between the two wings. However the plan only resulted in legitimising the grievances of the minority ethno-linguistic groups as the Sindhis, Pashtus, Baluchis, against the majority Punjabis. It, therefore, became

"a convenient focus for minority grievances of all kinds stemming from alleged Punjabi domination of the government."¹²

Ayub's regime was accused of adopting a partial attitude towards Punjabis as far as economic opportunities was concerned. Punjab cornered a major share of public funds for education health and other development projects.

The opposition therefore to the one unit was sure to come from these minority communities who felt themselves deprived of their rightful share. The agitation against the plan took especially violent forms in Baluchistan where for more than a year (late 1960s) open rebellion between the government and the Bugti tribe of Sibi district persisted.¹³ Armed forces were sure to step in to curb 'lawlessness'.

The Baluch leaders reacted to the one unit plan by organizing open opposition in defiance of a ban on political activity. In 1955 Abdul Karim, formed the Ustman Gal (People's Party), which opposed the plan and

12. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. 9, Chapter II, p. 27.

13. Bugti antagonism had been aroused by what they felt as politically motivated move of distributing scarce and extremely valuable barrage land in the area.

demanded the formation of a unified Baluchistan province. The Khan of Kalat supported this demand for a unified Baluchistan and further demanded the restoration to Kalat of other Baluch areas taken by the British.

Against this growing restlessness in Baluchistan, the Pakistani army moved into Kalat on October 6, 1958, a day before martial law was declared, setting the stage of Ayub's military regime. The Khan was arrested and his ancestral wealth confiscated. He and his brother Abdul Karim were charged of secretly negotiating with Afghanistan for support of a full scale Baluch rebellion.

The Khan's arrest sparked off a chain of violence and counter-violence. Tribal resistance grew along with the guerilla bands. The army blockade of Jhalawan led to virtual battle between Nauroz Khan¹⁴ and the Pakistan army. The former however was forced by the army to surrender and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In this period, that is the 1960s we also have a strong organised guerilla movement developing under Sher Mohammed Marri. The Pararis as they were called¹⁵

14. A Chief of the Zehri Tribe.

15. The Parari Movement would be dealt later.

operated mainly over a large stretch, from the Mengal tribal areas of Jhalawan in the South to Marri Bugti areas in the North. As such, they attempted to avoid large-scale encounters with the Pakistan army and concentrated more in ambushing convoys, bombing trains, raiding military encampments and the like. The most serious of such clashes occurred in the Gharur area during December 1965 in which General Tikka Khan was castigated as the Butcher of Baluchistan by anti-Government leaders.¹⁶ The fighting in Baluchistan continued sporadically until 1969 when Yahya Khan induced the Paraxis to agree to a cease-fire by ordering the withdrawal of the one ^{unit} plan.

1971-1977 :

The withdrawal of the one unit plan obviously raised hopes for a more democratic option for many of the nationalities in Pakistan. However, these hopes were dashed by the events that followed which contributed greatly to the growing disillusionment especially among the Baluch leaders. The first such event was concerned with Bangladesh and the background to its creation. The elections in 1970 which would have placed Sheikh Mujibur-Rehman as the country's Prime Minister, was seen by

16. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 33.

the more conservative elements in Pakistan army as a threat to the entrenched position of Punjab within the existing State. The rejection of the election results as such ripened the 'national question' in East Bengal leading to the establishment of Bangladesh.

The second event (which would be dealt later) was the dismissal and arrest in 1973 of the first elected provincial Ministry in Baluchistan - which fueled to the growing nationalist sentiments of the Baluch.

Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, therefore, the centralising tendency mentioned before, grew more apparent. In spite of the fact that the provinces had been reconstituted in 1970 and their continued autonomy explicitly guaranteed under the 1970 Constitution, Bhutto utilised the States' resources more than his predecessors to subjugate the provinces to central authority. Consequently it was the tribal areas that had to bear the brunt of his repressive measures. In Pakistan, a new situation had arisen - the post-Bangladesh phase which seemingly gave a semblance of cohesiveness to the Pakistani State.

Administratively, the 1973 Constitution endorsed the federal administrative structure restored in 1969.

It contained amongst other principles, numerous guarantees of the rights of ethnic minorities to preserve and promote a distinct language script or culture;¹⁷ Parochialism Racialism Tribalism Sectarianism was discouraged;¹⁸ commitment of State to eradicate economic and social inequality amongst regions;¹⁹ recruitment to armed forces from all regions²⁰ and an acknowledgement of the right of provincial assemblies to adopt measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to Urdu, the national language²¹ was conceded. Lastly the Constitution reaffirmed the separate legal status of the tribal areas under the Frontier Crimes Regulations.²²

The Constitution, analysed on its own, may seem the champion of the ethnic and national groups in Pakistan. Retrospectively speaking, it was meant more as a safety valve against similar occurrences (as in East Bengal) in the lesser developed regions of West Pakistan. In reality it strengthened the power of the Prime Minister more than it protected rights of the ethnic minorities. Provincial

17. See Article 28 of the 1973 Constitution.

18. Article 33.

19. Article 37.

20. Article 39.

21. Article 251.

22. Article 247.

autonomy was granted in principle but there was no devolution of power.²³ Moreover, the Constitution's initial authoritarian tendencies were gradually increased by legislative enactments that curtailed fundamental rights and strengthened the power of the Central Government.²⁴

Years of Insurrection :

This centralising tendency was sure to call for widespread protests which took special violent forms in Baluchistan. Between 1973 and 1977 Eastern Baluchistan was swept by a major tribal rebellion against the Pakistani State. They fought against a force of about 70,000 troops well-equipped with modern weaponry. Prominent amongst the tribes were the Baluch tribes of Mengals and Marris as well as the Brahuis groups. The Government maintained that the conflict had been provoked by a small clique of tribal sardars who were determined to resist socio-economic changes meant to erode their feudal authority. Moreover, the Government White Paper on Baluchistan accused the then Ministry headed by the

23. S.J. Burki : Pakistan under Bhutto 1971-1977, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 93.

24. The fifth amendment of the Constitution Act of 1976 drastically curtailed whatever remained of judicial restraint upon the Government's use of preventive detention to pursue political opposition.

National Awami Party of further dismembering Pakistan.²⁵ On the other hand it is a well-known fact, as it also acknowledged by the Baluch leaders, that the insurrection originated in Bhutto's utter intolerance of the limits to his authority symbolized by the autonomy-minded Chiefs.

In the General Elections of 1970 although the Peoples Party of Pakistan could control most of the other provinces, in North-West Frontier Province it could only secure about 2 per cent of votes. It fared worse in Baluchistan where not one of the twenty seats could be captured by the Party. In both these provinces it was the National Awami Party in coalition with the Conservative Jamiat-Ul-Ulema-e-Islam which formed the Government.²⁶ Consequently, Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo and Sardar Attaullah Mengal, both powerful and respected leaders of the Brahui tribes became Governor and Chief Minister respectively.²⁷

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25. Government of Pakistan : White Paper on Baluchistan (Rawalpindi, 19 October 1974), p. 39.
26. The National Awami Party emerged in the strongest position having won three seats in the National Assembly from each of the two provinces and eight and thirteen, respectively in the provincial Legislatures of Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province.
27. Earlier Bhutto had sought to override the results of the elections by appointing one of his own supporters Ghaus Baksh Raisani as the Governor. However under pressure he had to relent and a Tripartite Agreement of 6 March 1972 was signed by which the coalition was eventually permitted to hold the Ministry.

The experiment however was made to last for not more than ten months, until February 1973 when Bhutto replaced the Governor of Baluchistan (and North-West Frontier Province), dismissed the Government of Baluchistan arrested the three Baluch leaders, Ghans Baksh Bizengo, Ataulah Mengal and Khair Baksh Marri. The North-West Frontier Ministry resigned in protest. Bhutto justified this dismissal on the grounds that the National Awami Party with foreign anti-Pakistan forces, patronized and encouraged lawlessness and violence throughout the province. He accused the NAP as never reconciling to the 'Two Nation Theory', of propagating the notion that there were four or five nations within Pakistan and that the Baluch leaders were in league with India, Soviet Union and Afghanistan in a complex conspiracy designed to merge the Frontier Province with Afghanistan and thereby make Baluchistan independent.²⁸

The Government White Paper on Baluchistan stated that the domination of the NAP over the Ministry caused serious misgivings about the survival of Pakistan as an integrated state.

The 'coup' in Baluchistan, however, came after several incidents of tribal violence and after the most

28. Lawrence Lifchultz, fn. 23, Chapter I.

peculiar and perplexing discovery in February 10, 1972 of a huge cache of Soviet arms in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad. The NAP was accused of being the recipient and organiser of an international arm smuggling operation for Baluchistan via Iraqi Embassy diplomatic bag.²⁹ The Baluch leaders on the contrary reiterate that political violence in Baluchistan was the direct result of the political instability brought about by the Central Government's efforts to bring that province under the control of Bhutto's People's Party of Pakistan, which was rejected at the polls.³⁰ Also, Bhutto himself was encouraging extensive arms smuggling into Baluchistan.³¹ According to Bizenjo the dismissal of the Mengal ministry was part of a multipurpose scheme to keep the Punjab quiet by raising the bogey of secession, to bring the Shah of Iran into the affairs, to engage the army preclude the chances of any coup and finally to crush a formidable political opposition in the country led by the NAP.³²

29. Even to those present the charges seemed exaggerated. Arms for Baluchistan could easily have been smuggled if necessary through Pakistan's extended Makran Baluchi coast or border of Afghanistan. But to bring guns through Karachi by diplomatic bags to Islamabad, at the opposite end of the country seemed an extremely circuitous route.

30. Satish Kumar : "Political Moves in Baluchistan", The Hindustan Times, January 24, 1974.

31. Robert Wirsing : The Baluch and the Pathan, fn. 11, Chapter II, p. 11.

32. "Measures suggested to solve the Baluchistan

The fact however remains that the Baluch leaders by gaining a major foothold for provincial autonomy, had wrung a significant concession from Bhutto who was unwilling to sit quiet over it. In February 15, 1973, five days after the dismissal, he appointed the Chief Sardar of the Bugti tribe and an arch rival of the Baluch leaders, Nawab Akbar Bugti as the Governor. However unable to control the situation the way Bhutto wanted he was forced to resign giving way to massive tribal repression.³³

After the dismissal of the NAP Ministry, the military authorities adopted a Forward Policy of sending patrols into the interior to deal with rebellion. Iranian Army Aviation's help was sought by Bhutto and the evidence to this lay in the use of Iranian helicopters believed to be American Chinooks. Khair Baksh Marri, the leader of the Baluch also cited the use of two French Mirages.³⁴

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question", Public Opinion Trends Analysis and News Service, Vol. IV, Part 38, February 28, 1978.

33. Bugti in fact became very critical of the way in which the Pakistani army had gone about suppressing tribesmen as well as of the murder of the head of the National Awami Party in Baluchistan, Abdul Samad Achakzai. He accused the Central Government of trying to divide Baluch tribesmen. He also feared Iranian intervention in Baluchistan. "Bugti Tenders Resignation", Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 1973.

34. This was confirmed later by the French Embassy sources in Islamabad who admitted that on Pakistan's request, Squadrons of F-86 Jets were stationed at Quetta. Also, UH-7 helicopters supplied to

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In 1974 May, the Government launched its major offensive of Civil War called the 'Chamaland Campaign' which proved very expensive in terms of money and time. It left between 3,000-5,000 Pakistan army men dead.

During this period again, the Baluch sources claim that the Government began a policy of economic blockade and the widespread taking of civilians as hostages.³⁵ This policy was an attempt to lure fighters out of the hills by bringing their families down to the plains and settling them in developmental projects officially called "people's colonies". These were situated in the main administrative centres as Kahan, Mawand, Kholu in the East and Wad in the South where side by side, permanent army garrisons were also being constructed.³⁶ The people's colonies was therefore a major pillar of the Government's long range strategy for "pacification" of Baluchistan - a term widely used in Government correspondence on the problem.

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Pakistan by the United States in 1973 for use during floods were utilised. "Full-Fledged Revolt in Baluchistan-I", National Herald, January 30, 1975.

35. No Foodgrains were allowed into the province. Wheat was sold at Rs. 200/- per bag (of 2½ mands), "Repression in Baluchistan, Patriot, January 14, 1974.
36. Renamed as 'concentration camps' (by the insurgents) where people must work on public works as building roads since their flocks had been confiscated and auctioned.

The insurgents were themselves organized into four of five main groups operating in specific areas. The Marri tribal area East of Quetta was controlled by one of the most politically conscious of all the fighting groups, their units led by Mir Hazar Khan Ramkhani. His group headed the then newly formed Baluch Awami Azadi Mahaiz (Baluch Peoples' Liberation Front) which regarded itself as a Marxist-Leninist Organisation.³⁷

The other main area of rebellion was in the Jhalawan hills South of Kalat. The main rebel groups in this area were associated with Aslam Gichki whose headquarters were in the Mashkai region and Mehrulla Mengal, a younger brother of the then imprisoned Chief Minister of Baluchistan. Both these leaders were regarded as Leftists. The Chief Minister's youngest son Munir too was in the hills until about January 1976 when in a major army operation, the two together with a unit of twenty-five fighters were surrounded and compelled to surrender after having run out of ammunitions. A month later, a third son of Mengal, Asadulah was machinegunned in full view of witnesses in a Karachi suburb and while barely alive, kidnapped by his attackers. Intensive police investigations obviously gave no results.

37. The Baluch National Organizations would be dealt in detail in the next chapter.

The third principal region of insurgency was the mountain range known as Sarawan, North-East of Jhalawan and directly East of Kalat. Two main figures associated here were Agha Salaman and Zafar Khan Zarakzai both regarded as Baluch nationalists with less of an ideological orientation than the rest. They stood for the restoration of the full democratic rights of Baluch people. Agha Salaman came down from the hills in anticipation of a bargain sought to be struck with Bhutto but which was popularised by Bhutto as the surrender of a major insurgent leader. The basis for the 'surrender' was that Bhutto should agree to withdraw the army from the interior; that all Baluch political prisoners including Khair Baksh Marri, Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo and Atullah Mengal be released and criminal cases against them be withdrawn; that guarantee for full provincial autonomy for all four provinces be given; and lastly that the pre-February situation regarding the NAP ministries be restored. These were the demands also of most other nationalist leaders and groups in Baluchistan.

The repressive campaign took a heavy toll in terms of men and money. Baluchi sources indicate that altogether 1,00,000 Pakistani troops were involved and about 55,000 Baluchis participated in the 1973-1977 fighting.³⁸

38. Lawrence Lifschultz, fn. 23, Chapter I.

Casualty estimates vary. They run as high as 3,300 Pakistani men and 5,300 Baluchis killed, as well as hundreds of women and children caught in the crossfire.³⁹ Moreover, Outlook reports that over Rs. 200 crores was spent by the Pakistani authorities to suppress the revolt in Baluchistan.⁴⁰

The federal strategy of 'pacification' in Baluchistan was however much more than a military effort. It had important social and economic dimensions. In 1970 for instance, the total budget allocation for development in the province was US \$ 7 million. At the time, double the amount was being spent on salaries of Government officials. In 1976, the total development budget was US \$ 30 million a year which represented a real increase of 50 per cent.⁴¹

The province had clearly been neglected for 25 years by the Centre and with the outbreak of the rebellion in 1973 federal authorities obviously realised that large

39. Selig Harrison : "Tribal Separatist Movements Grow in Pakistan, Iran". International Herald Tribune, October 16, 1978.

40. Patriot, July 28, 1974.

41. Lawrence Lifschultz : "The Strategic Equation", Far Eastern Economic Review, May 28, 1976.

and new investments had to be made if the situation were to be diffused in the long run. Iranian assistance was very substantial in this regard. In 1975, Iran committed US \$ 76 million in aid for Baluchistan alone. Although to be spent over two textile mills, a cement plant and a new Medical College, the amount still represented double of what Pakistan herself was contributing annually despite increased allocation from the Central Budget.

Besides this the Pakistani Government claims to have increased federal financial assistance to the province. The total non-development assistance given in 1975-1976 constituted an increase of 283.04 per cent over the allocation in 1971-1972. Development assistance constituted an increase in 753.03 per cent in the year 1976-1977, progress according to them was also made in education which claimed one-third of the annual budget, medical and engineering colleges were opened and several land reforms enacted.⁴²

However, the most dramatic attack on what the federal authorities regarded as the social basis of rebellion was the announcement by Bhutto on April 8, 1976, in a speech at the provincial Baluchi Capital of

42. Baluchistan : Achievements of the People's Government, 1972-1976.

Quetta, that the Sardari system had been abolished. He denounced the Sardars as 'cruel and oppressive and declared that the authority of the tribal Heads would be broken once and for all. For the tribesmen, the concepts of nation States and obedience to the Central Government under which they lived carried no meaning at all. The ordinance abolishing the sardari system describes it as "the worst remnant of oppressive feudal and tribal system.... derogatory to human dignity and freedom... repugnant to the spirit of democracy and equality as enunciated by Islam and enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and opposed to the economic advancement of the people." The Sardars (according to the ordinance) "will no longer exercise judicial powers, maintain private jails, arrest any person, take free labour and receive tribute".⁴³

However Bhutto's repudiation of the Sardari system was not merely intended at abolishing a 'cruel and oppressive' social structure; or any meaningful land distribution it was basically designed to reduce the power of the various tribal Chiefs and thereby pave the way for

43. "Sardari system Abolished by Ordinance", Public Opinion Trends Analysis and News Service (POT), Vol. IV, Part 42, April 12, 1976.

a forced incorporation of the tribesmen into the mainstream of Pakistan's political, economic and social life.⁴⁴

The main cause of the rebellion, according to the Government's White Paper on Baluchistan "has been the resistance of the sardars of these (Marri-Mengal) and some other tribal areas to the introduction of civil administration and the launching of socio-economic reforms which inevitably erode the absolute authority of the tribal Chieftains". Al Fatah, spokesman of the ruling Pakistan People's Party noted, that "one thing is clear that the interests of the sardars of Baluchistan whether they are in power or out of it are common. As a result of this and their personal feuds the situation in the province has deteriorated."⁴⁵ On the other hand, according to the Baluchi sources, it is not that the leaders opposed the abolition of the traditional privileges they enjoyed. Their own Government they say, had moved a Bill in the Provincial Assembly to abolish Sardari system, but the bill was awaiting the President's assent. Besides,

44. Nader Entessar : "Baluchi Nationalism", Asian Affairs : An American Review, November-December 1979.

45. "Factors Behind the Turmoil in Baluchistan", Public Opinion Trends Analysis and News Service Vol. IV, Part 29, March 12 1976, p. 190.

the erstwhile Governor of the Province Ghaus Beksh Bizenjo was a non-Sardar.⁴⁶ Moreover, they point out that if Mengal, Marri and others were Sardars, so also were the leading figures in the then newly constituted People's Party of Pakistan, such as Raisani Las Bela and Dodha Khan. Also the fact that Bhutto himself came from one of the longest landowning families in Sind and was widely referred to as Wadera (great feudal lord) has generated great cynicism in Baluchistan about the 'revolutionary act of Sardari abolition'.⁴⁷

However, the fact remains that the recommendation to abolish the Sardari system by the Sardar was no benevolent gesture. It is seen by some as a move by the Sardars to clear-cut proprietorship of the communally owned tribal lands. Significantly, Ghaus Bakshsh Bizenjo and Attaullah Mengal asserted that 'shashik' (one sixth of the produce that is paid to the Sardar, for instance in Jhaljhal) is not a Sardari tax at all, but the legitimate right of the proprietor whose lands are being actually shave-cropped.⁴⁸

46. Satish Kumar, fn. no. 30.

47. Lawrence Lifschultz : The Strategic Equation, fn. no. 41.

48. It is said that during the 1960's the Sardars managed to bribe the bureaucracy into entering their names into the revenue records as proprietors; when jagirdaris were abolished and their holdings came up for sale they saw to it that no buyer came in sight and bought back their jagirdaris at nominal rates.

The recommendation to abolish the system however, said nothing about altering this pattern of land-holding. It merely envisaged (1) the abolition of privy purses, compensations, grants etc. for the ex-Chiefs and Khans (2) abolition of the jirga system and its replacement by judicial committees to dispense according to the regular laws of the land. Thus there existed a realisation for the Sardars, that "it is more profitable to be a feudal lord than to be a tribal chief merely. As such they are keen to forego the tribal connection and secure their positions as feudal lords with personal claims to what used to be tribal lands".⁴⁹

Yet, Bhutto had his own political reasons for political moves in the province and in which he failed considerably. The imposition of President's rule by him is seen as an utter failure to solve the problem. An article in Urdu Digest of February 1976 notes that "Mr. Bhutto tried to solve the Baluchistan problem five times but each time the problem became more serious and complicated.... Under the Marshall Law, Mr. Raisani was made the governor of Baluchistan. In 1973 Akbar Bugti was brought in, in the year 1974 responsibility was given to

49. Aijaz Ahmed; "The National Question in Baluchistan, fn. no. 3, p. 38.

Khan of Kalat and Jam Saheb was again removed from political power in 1975. These events have proved that no government without having people's sanction can play an effective role."⁵⁰

1977 and After :

The martial law regime of General Zia-ul-Haq "applied a brake to many aspects of the centralising trend."⁵¹ He appeared at least for the first three years to maintain an uneasy truce with the tribal areas, by releasing an estimated 6,000 prisoners held in the controversial prisons at Kohlu and Loralai where numerous instances of torture said to have occurred. He dissolved the Hyderabad Tribunal and released all the political prisoners (mainly NAP activists) on the grounds that Bhutto had political motives in setting up the Tribunal. He also declared an amnesty for guerillas who had fled to Afghanistan during the 1971-1977 repression attempting thereby to divide the nationalist movement like his predecessors. Similarly he proved unresponsive on the main issue of autonomy to Baluchistan in a restructured Pakistan.

Negotiations were conducted which compelled the Baluch leaders to either remain silent or operate from

50. "Mr. Bhutto has Failed in Baluchistan", Public Opinion Trends Analysis and News Service, Vol. IV, Part 21 and 22, February 25, 1976.

51. Robert Wirsing : The Baluch and the Pathan, fn. 11, Chapter II, p. 11.

underground. However, arrests of nationalists now from students continued which further convinced the Baluch of Punjabis being prejudiced against them. They accused him and regarded his plan to replace martial law with an electoral system based on proportional representation as an attempt to virtually disenfranchise them as well as other ethnic minorities.

Of late repression on Baluchis has increased tremendously especially after their full-fledged participation in the movement for the Restoration of Democracy. The Baluchis along with the Sindhis and the Pashtuns have a sense of deprivation which have brought them together to jointly fight for a more equitable order. Many arrests have been made including the arrest of Bizenjo who is increasingly made to move rapidly towards breaking from Pakistan.

In a recent interview with Lifschultz, Mengal has reiterated that there has been no basic change as far as the attitude and motives of the present Government from the previous regimes "whether a regime enters into a series of military operations or whether it does it through peaceful means, as far as our interest as a nationality is concerned it has come to one and the same" -

to extract and plunder to the maximum.⁵² For them, "the methods have been changed but the object has been the same.... whether it has been through bullets or through the gallows, the policy has remained. Death has been offered to us by every regime which came to power Bhutto offered death through bullets. Ayub Khan offered bullets and gallows. Jinnah gave us bullets. Zia's regime so far has offered us gallows."⁵³

In fact, Zia had different motives at different times. On the one hand he projects not to adopt a policy of highhandedness towards the Baluch. On the other hand, he has tried to impress upon the Americans of his capacity to be harsh and ruthless. The hanging of the Baluch student Hamid. Baluch in fact reiterates this policy.⁵⁴

Thus we see, that the problem that Baluchistan faces today, stems from the policies followed by the British. No significant changes were made administratively and there was a heightened indifference towards any sort

52. Interview with Mengal, Lawrence Lifschultz: "Independent Baluchistan? Ataulah Mengal's Declaration of Independence", in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XVIII, Annual No. 1983, pp. 742.

53. Ibid.

54. Mengal in fact sees this as a deliberate policy to please the Americans as the execution was conducted on the day when American Under-Secretary of State, James Buckley arrived, to negotiate the Military aid agreement. Ibid.

of development in the region. Whatever development projects were started were either in the interest of Punjab or Sind, or else were hurriedly put up to dispense any doubts from the minds of the nationalists of neglect of the region. The outcome therefore was more than obvious. It aggravated not only the elite of Baluchistan, the Sardars but also the masses who revolted against this indifference as well as the attempts to stifle their political rights. So that extent their revolt seemed justified. It led them to organize themselves politically and put forth their demands in a united fashion.

The question however remains of the demands posed by the various Baluch organizations and leaders. Of late, there has been an increase of repression as also an increase in protests. The logical culmination has been a fast advance in their demand from autonomy to independence. What remains to be seen is whether there exists any unity in the attitudes and demands raised by most of the Baluch Organizations.

VEHICLES OF BALUCH NATIONALISM

The Baluch Nationalist Movement had until the 1970's been a disorganized and a little more than a tenuous coalition of a dozen or so tribal groups, that inevitably fought with each other when there existed no direct Pakistani repression. As in most such groupings, a crisis compels them to consolidate and become strong. The crisis situation perpetuated by the Pakistani authorities, . . . compelled the feuding tribal groups to establish closer links between themselves, became more organized, more politically conscious to the extent of adopting various ideological commitments, to justify their activities. On the whole, the situation has led most of these groupings to increasingly adopt more progressive ideas - a result of force of circumstances.

Spearheading the Baluch Nationalist Movement are three loosely allied leaders who emerged as martyrs during the war years and around whom the Movement has come to be associated. They are Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Ataulah Mengal. All of them started with the notion of an autonomous Baluch majority state within

Pakistan. But as repression grew, so did their demand, and as of today most of them with the exception of Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo have given up speaking of any federation of Pakistan. Instead they have increasingly moved towards an independent Baluchistan.

Among the various groups and organizations fighting for the Baluch cause, only some have emerged organizationally cohesive and politically mature from the insurgency years of 1973 onwards. Several separate guerilla groups operated independently in the hills. But most of these broke up after the 1977 ceasefire. Most of them differ not only in terms of tribal loyalties but also over issues of ideology, strategy and tactics. Of late, there has also been a strong differentiation between rural and urban guerillas.

However the three principal vehicles of organized Baluch activity in Pakistan are : the Baluch People's Liberation Front, the Baluch Students' Organization (which later split into two) and the Pakistan National Party.

The Baluch People's Liberation Front :

The Baluch People's Liberation Front although formally took shape in 1976, it is more a direct outgrowth of the Parari Movement of the decades of the 1960s, headed

by Mir Hazar Ramkhani. The Pararis and close ties with both Sher Mohammed Marri as well as Sardar Khair Baksh Marri.

The Parari, Movement (as mentioned before) came up as a guerilla movement to fight against the repressive measures unleashed by Ayub Khan, primary amongst which was the One Unit Plan. Its political programme was in a nascent form and quite disorderly. Despite its inchoate political foresight, it did win a series of successes against the Pakistani authorities and was successful in pinning them down in a number of places. Amongst themselves there existed no unified strategy as well as thinking which was the main weakness of the organization itself. There was a realisation amongst some in the organization as Sher Mohammed Marri that only by achieving autonomy within a loosely federated Socialist Pakistan, or by seceding from Pakistan altogether can the three minority provinces escape from the economic oppression inflicted by the Punjabi dominated political and economic hierarchy. Others questioned these nationality demands, charging that leftist elements could and have been used as tools of the bourgeoisie. There were yet other groups especially among the Pakistani students abroad who believed these should be armed national liberation struggle in Baluchistan. Most of these latter groups were non-Baluchi leftist intellectuals.¹ who rallied behind Khair Baksh

1. The London Group as it was called comprised mostly of sons of prosperous business men and civil servants in Pakistan.

Marri and who were influenced by the Marxist-Leninist guerilla activity of China and Vietnam. These young militants adopted a Baluch way of life, Baluchi names and were quite successful in leading several Parari operation in the State. Their leader Mohammed Bhabha, son of a Karachi import-export magnate, who adopted the name of Murad Khan played a key role in these operations.²

The differences in the Parari organization especially in terms of its long-term strategy came up again in 1975-1976 with much of the dust settling in Baluchistan. Most of them could not look beyond entering into some kind of truce with the Pakistan authorities. Others like Mir Hazar Ramkhani along with the London Group thought of consolidating the gains of insurgency into a well-organized and disciplined force committed to armed struggle. In 1976 therefore the Pararis were reconstituted into Baluch Awami Azadi Mahaiz or the Baluch people's Liberation Front which later absorbed several militant followers of Sher Mohammed Marri and Khair Bakhsh Marri such as Khair Jan Baluch,³ Aslam Gichki and others,

2. Some of them as Baluch led several operations against an Amoco oil drilling venture thereby suspending oil exploration for nearly two years. Selig Harrison - In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9. Chapter II, p. 74.

3. He later broke with the Liberation Front on the ground that the Front was ridden with Marri Chauvinism.

besides several students. Given the nature of the tribal society it took the leadership quite some time to try and eliminate tribal loyalties and make the Front truly 'national' in nature.

As of today there are about 7,500 men in their combat units out of which around 2,700 are based in Afghan camps while about 1,700 are scattered in different parts of Pakistani Baluchistan. Another 3,000 are "active reservists" working in Karachi and parts of Sind. However, according to Mir Bazar Ramkhani "the Front's organized units constitute a skeleton command structure capable of mobilising thousands of additional troops in a future insurgency".⁴

Organizationally, the Baluch People's Liberation Front is loosely structured and does not incorporate formal party units at the local level. The Guerilla combat units serve as the party organization, functioning cooperatively without an internal chain of command. The Front developed a network of armed militants that cut across tribal bonds and rivalries. It established several mobile camps based on military units which were self-sufficient. A campaign was launched to eradicate illiteracy and disease together with an attempt to create political awareness. For this

4. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow. fn. 9, Chapter II, p. 75.

they had to bear the brunt of unlimited torture which took grotesque forms as severe beatings; eyes gouged out; electrical shocks; beard and hair torn off; finger nails ripped; all these in order to handicap and disable the militants.⁵

Ideologically, the Baluch People's Liberation Front espouses Marxism-Leninism. However, it is more a mixture of traditionalism characteristic of a tribal society and modern progressive ideas. In their effort to 'modernize the tribal society', they wish to retain 'what is healthy' in its ethos. This is evident from their efforts at retaining a predated economic structure as nomadism along with "gradually industrialising the region".⁶ Such an attitude may have arisen in their opposition to the 'modernization programmes' initiated by the Centre especially under Bhutto, which was seen more as means by which to exploit rather than develop the region in any meaningful way. The Baluch leaders themselves have time and again pointed out that industries developed within the region either catered to the United States or to interest of Punjabis. 80 per cent of the sui Gas, for instance is channeled out of Baluchistan "to make others rich".

5. Tariq Ali, fn. 29, Chapter I, pp. 120-121. ?

6. Ibid, p. 77.

Similarly most of the roads built in Baluchistan were "not for our benefit but to make it easier for the military to control us and for the Punjabis to rob us. The issue is not whether to develop, but whether to develop with or without autonomy. Exploitation has now adopted the name of development".⁷

Their belief in Marxism, however, is vindicated by their fairly accurate analysis of the Pakistani social formation. The BPLF define the Pakistani State as a reactionary construct governed by a military-bureaucratic dictatorship which defended the interests of the propertied classes and was in turn backed by the United States and its leading allies Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Bhutto regime was designated as "the most advanced political representative" of 'feudal, bourgeois, bureaucratic and military interests'. The national question and the agrarian problem were characterised as the central contradiction of the State and the Baluch struggle as the starting point for a more generalised assault on the Islamabad regime.⁸

What however is praiseworthy is the much needed realisation amongst the Liberation Front leaders on their

7. ^{Harrison} Ibid, p. 47.

8. Tariq Ali, Ibid, p. 122.

attitudes towards women and a concerted attempt at involving them politically in their movement. This in itself puts them miles ahead of most radicals, who have yet to reconcile to this new progressive development. The organ of the Liberation Front 'Jabal' in fact hoped that "progressively the liberation of women will appear as a necessity and that it will be undertaken by the women themselves."⁹

On the question of autonomy or independence, until recently the Baluch Liberation Front had wished to work within Pakistan rather than exercise the right to self-determination. In an interview with Raymond Noat, Murad Khan had clearly stated, that "we in the Baluch Liberation Front have voluntarily decided to merge our national struggle with the class struggle in Baluchistan on the one hand, and also to merge our national struggle with the struggle of other oppressed nationalities in Pakistan". "Our struggle is principally against the Pakistani State" and wish to form "a broad United Front bringing together oppressed nationalities and oppressed classes within a common revolutionary framework."¹⁰ In 'concretely

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9. Jabal, 1976, Quoted in Tariq Ali, fn. no. 29 Chapter I, p. 222.
10. He however insisted that this in no way meant that they do not have the option of exercising their right to self-determination, and that it is only a temporary abdication. Interview with Murad Khan. Pakistan Progressive, Vol. 3, No.s. 3 and 4, 1980. Quoted in Tariq Ali, Ibid, p. 200.

analysing the concrete condition' that prevails, the people according to them, are commonly faced with the twin evils of the Pakistani State as well as American Imperialism. Therefore for the Liberation Front, the objective is not independence but rather the complete transformation of the existing social and economic order, which is inconceivable until and unless the military institutions of Pakistan are totally destroyed.¹¹

Such an understanding may seem a correct Marxist understanding, applicable to most third world multi-national States. For, it is definitely better to have cohesive large States rather than small weaker ones which can be easily susceptible to Imperialist pressures and influence.¹² This realisation existed in their understanding and therefore they found it ridiculous to bring about any change "independently of a number of tools and instruments which are favourable to bringing about that change - such as the other oppressed nationalities and classes in Pakistan".¹³ The struggle therefore aimed at a "confederation" of nationalities in Pakistan.

In their first manifesto as well as in the first few issues of Jabal their publication, they wished to align

11. Ibid, p. 201.

12. Bangladesh is, for instance, a standing example.

13. Interview with Murad Khan. Cited in Tariq Ali, fn. no. 29, Chapter I, p. 202.

themselves with other leftist forces in Pakistan, describing Baluchistan as a reliable base for the liberation struggles of other oppressed nationalities classes and democratic forces in Pakistan. There was also an awareness of Iran's growing military power which ruled out any struggle for a 'Greater Baluchistan'.

However this view was not held by all within the Liberation Front. With Zia relying heavily on repression there seems to have arisen a simmering controversy over whether to work for independence or to cooperate with other anti-Government groups in Pakistan. This led to the defection of several non-Baluchi members in March 1981, most of them from the London Group as Asad Rehman (Chakkar Khan) who still believed in a United Front. Others like Mir Hazar Ramkhani and the Marri hard core have moved to a position of striving towards independent Baluchistan.

Murad Khan, in an interview in Paris in March 1980 stated that "we are giving up our old idea of a federation of Socialist Republics in an all-Pakistan revolutionary structure with Baluchistan in the Vanguard".¹⁴ New developments in the region according to him have pointed towards the desirability of an independent 'Greater

14. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow. fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 79.

Baluchistan' that would unify the Baluch in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The overthrow of Shah leading to a more decentralised structure under Khomeini has made the goal more realistic. Moreover in the face of Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the Baluch in all three countries are acutely sensitive of getting involved in great power politics.

In October 1980, the liberation front announced plans to reactivate itself militarily in its struggle against Iranian and Pakistani occupation forces on both sides of Baluchistan. It has increased its efforts, for instance, to contact ethnic minorities inside Iran for co-ordinating their activities.¹⁵

On the whole the Liberation Front has tried to adopt a position of neutrality. "We do not want to get involved in global blocs if we can avoid it and we do not want to become dependent on anyone.... We would welcome help from any side from any Government."¹⁶ However the fact remains that they still are hopeful of Soviet support rather than any aid from Western sources. This hope stems from the strategic importance of Baluchistan. It can be viewed as

15. Ahmed Malik, "Ideal Scenario For Baluch Struggle", Patriot, 9 October 1980.

16. Chakkar Khan, Ibid, p. 80.

a direct opposition to the policies of the United States and China in their support of the Pakistani State.¹⁷

"Therefore it is obvious that Soviet Union constitutes a potential ally for the Baluch liberation movement... but not necessarily for revolution in Baluchistan itself."¹⁸

From Afghanistan since about 1975 Mir Hazar and his refugees were receiving something like \$ 875,000 per year.¹⁹ Daud in fact, under pressure from Iran only very reluctantly conceded and had it not been for his overthrow, he would have signed an agreement with Bhutto on the return of all refugees to Pakistan.²⁰ In 1978 when the Khalq Government took over power it promptly granted political asylum to these guerillas.²¹ Murad Khan strongly hoped that the Soviet Union would become their strong ally. They were however soon distressed with Soviet military presence although they refrained from openly criticising and even seemed ready to accept Soviet help. As such the Parcham

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17. However, amongst the Liberation Front's Soviet leaning critics as Khari Jar Baluch, there is this feeling that the Front is basically Maoist in its ideology given the Chinese aid in terms of literature that the Front has received. However this view can be doubted.
18. Interview with Murad Khan. Tariq Ali, fn. 29, Chapter I, p. 208.
19. This support was in keeping with the tradition of Baluch-Pashtun Kinship dating back to Nasir Khan's and his tributary ties with the first Afghan Kingdom in Kandahar.
20. Selig Harrison - In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 81.
21. At the annual Pushtunistan and Baluchistan day, Mir Hazar Khan was even invited to speak on Baluch liberation Movement.

regime seemed indifferent to the guerillas who found themselves awkwardly placed between the two factions Parcham and Khalq of the Communist Party of Afghanistan. This along with their clash with the anti-Communists in whose area their camp is placed has led to divisions within their own ranks. However, with the presence in Kabul of Khair Baksh Marri, who until the regular channel between Baluchistan and Kabul, manned by workers of the Liberation Front has been formed for despatching arms and ammunitions to the students in the turbulent border province.²²

Closely associated to the Parari Movement and later to the Baluch People's Liberation Front though not openly in the case of the latter, was the Baluch Sardar and Head of the Marri tribe Khair Baksh Marri. The Marri tribe as such have a history of struggle against the Britishers, as well as the successive Pakistani Governments. His grandfather Khair Baksh the Great in fact was in forefront of the struggle against the Britishers, followed by his father Mehrullah Khan Marri who spearheaded the underground anti-British political activity in the pre-1947 decades. Even as far as the 1973-1977 insurgency was concerned, the Maris exercised a pivotal role.²³

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22. B.K. Joshi, "Stepped up Baluch Activities Worry Pakistan", Times of India, 1 February 1982.

23. Their active participation and lead in most of the struggles has led them to think themselves as the Vanguard of Baluch liberation, so much so that within the Liberation Front, many a revolts have occurred in protest of this feeling of superiority. Selig Harrison, IN Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. 9, Chapter-II, p. 42.

Khair Baksh Marri, the seventh in the line of the leaders of the ruling Bahawalpur dynasty, was a late starter in politics. Impelled and induced by the repression unleashed during the 1950s especially the One Unit Plan, he soon became the most influential theoretician of the Baluch nationalist movement in Pakistan. He was considered as a hardliner in Baluch Councils. Amongst the three, Ataulloh Mengal, Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo and Marri, it has been Marri who has been most consistent as far as his commitment to the Baluch cause is concerned. In 1968 when Bizenjo and Mengal nearly compromised with Ayub, it was Mengal who put a halt to it. Even though he agreed to a settlement with Yahya by virtue of which the elections in Baluchistan was held and he became the Chairman of the governing National Awami Party, he continued to be wary of Islamabad and quietly aided the Parari guerilla movement. In 1973 Marri questioned the 1973 Constitution and its autonomy provisions even though Bizenjo himself signed it. His suspicion was vindicated a little later when Awami Party Ministry in Baluchistan was dismissed and most of its leaders were arrested. In 1977 although reluctant to negotiate with Zia, he insisted on major Pakistani concessions as the basis of any settlement.²⁴ Zia's rejection of these terms once

24. These included the complete withdrawal of the Pakistani army from Baluchistan and compensation to be paid to victims of military atrocities. Selig Harrison : "Nightmare in Baluchistan", Foreign Policy, No. 32, Fall, 1978.

again established Khair Bakhsh Marri as the staunchist guardian of Baluch interests.

It was for good reasons therefore that Khair Bakhsh Marri was considered as the most politically dangerous of all the Baluch by most of the Pakistani rulers and was labelled as a 'disgruntled feudal baron' who strongly resisted the modernization programmes of the successive Pakistani regimes. Marri however strongly doubted any such programmes from the very beginning. He was accused of trying to retain his privileges by opposing the One Unit which challenged the Sardari system as a whole even by some Baluch themselves. According to Munir Khan²⁵ "Marri has betrayed a sentimental desire to preserve tribal mores as well as a thinly veiled fear that development programmes would undermine his authority."²⁶ Marri himself had no valid answer to this, apart from the fact that they themselves while in Office had introduced land reforms and that he even abolished many of the oppressive taxes imposed on his tribe by previous Chiefs. He viewed the modernization of the Marri areas by Bhutto and others as politically and economically exploitative in character.

25. A former Chief Secretary of Baluchistan.

26. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 46.

His support to the Parari movement had been continuous and for this his orchards were either confiscated or bulldozed.

Ideologically, he seems to be a self-educated Marxist yet very close to the Baluch culture, tradition and way of life. He seeks to adapt Marxist-Leninist ideas to Baluch conditions in what he calls national Communism. "If any one thinks the Baluch is going to get his cake Baluchistan - through parliamentary democracy - well, I doubt it.... Capitalist nationalism is obsolete.... Today's poor man will not follow his landlord to fight for his freedom. You have to convince him that in a new State he will get his economic rights and that means some adaptation of what Marx and Lenin have taught."²⁷

From his interview with Selig Harrison one can deduce his support for an independent 'Greater Baluchistan'. "It is taken for granted that the Baluch must be with somebody.... But what is the harm of the Baluch wanting to put themselves together? It will develop, it ought to develop".²⁸ He rejected outright any future for the Baluch population within Pakistan on the grounds that even when Berg alis

27. Interview with Marri. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 49.

28. Ibid, p. 48.

outnumbered the Punjabis, they were not given a just representation, leave alone the Baluch minority. "There has been a certain escalation in each stage of our struggle, and this has produced a clearer recognition that what we confront is nothing less than slow death as a people. There are scars that remind from the things that have happened in the past, the guns, the killings, the rape, and they cannot erase them with a smile."²⁹

On the question of support Marri is equally wary like the Liberation Front of getting involved in Super Power conflicts especially so after recent events in Afghanistan. Yet, "if the Americans pump weapons into the Punjabis, obviously we have to stretch our hand to another Super Power". However the question for him still remains as "whose aid can we get, whose aid can we accept, without selling out completely."³⁰

Marri therefore seems quite close to the ideology and understanding of the Baluch Liberation Front. He accepts the Front's strategy of armed struggle for the achievement of their rights. Although he may not have openly accepted so, clear evidence shows his closeness to the activities of the Front.³¹

29. Ibid, p. 49.

30. Ibid, p. 51.

31. This is seen by the fact that in January, 1981, he visited Kabul apparently to solve minor differences between their guerillas and the Karmal regime in Kabul.

As of today, the Front represents the most advanced core of Socialists in the country. It is rather striking that a backward region could produce such an advanced cadre. It is for this reason therefore, that the Front although close to the National Awami Party especially during the insurgency years, regarded it revisionist by nature. A concerted attempt was made to supercede the NAP politically if the fight became prolonged.³² Their creative approach and self-education of their cadres are indeed praiseworthy.

The Baluch Students' Organization :

The expansion of political activity especially of the Baluch cause, among the students has greatly been accelerated by the developmental efforts of the Pakistani Government. This was especially so during Bhutto's regime when in order to rebut Baluch charges of neglect in the educational field there was a sudden expansion of educational facilities in the province.³³ This effort to neutralise the insurgency, resulted in inadequate housing facilities, inadequate basic amenities and a restive collegiate population that protested overwhelmingly not only against Campus issues but also against the political events in the province.

32. Lawrence Lifschultz : "Festering Dillema for Bhutto", fn. 23 Chapter I.

33. Twenty-seven new Colleges as well as Junior Colleges were opened within a six-year period.

The Baluch Students' Organization played a particularly important role in filling the vacuum left by the absence of a significant middle class.³⁴ It has in fact provided a steady stream of recruits to most of the Baluch Organizations especially to the Baluch People's Liberation Front and is next only in importance to it in terms of its organization and political activities. It came up in 1967 to counter the One Unit Plan and has since then steadily grown especially during the 1973-1977 period.³⁵ However, it has been noted, that the Baluch Students' Organization was more a creation of the National Awami Party in 1967 and some of the first student leaders were the sympathisers of the latter. Differences within their ranks in terms of the degree of resistance that should be unleashed, together with a rejection especially of Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo's attempt to negotiate a political settlement with Zia led to a break in their ranks. In 1978 therefore at their biennial Convention, the rebels in the Baluch Students' Organisation took over headed by Razik Bukti and Habib Jalib. Bukti is closely connected to the Leftist circles in Karachi and Lahore especially with leaders of the Communist-sponsored National Progressive Party. It is no wonder that the new

34. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. 9, Chapter II, p. 83.

35. According to Selig Harrison, more than 25,000 young Baluch have been politically involved as 7,850 Members between 1967 and 1981.

students' group he formed, the Pakistan Federal Union of Students should echo the National Progressive Party line on several issues.

However, ideologically, just like others, Bukti too is reticent in aligning with either Moscow or Peking and in general advocates devising programmes according to the conditions of Pakistan. Yet, again, they consider the Soviet Union as "very progressive and we support progressive movements". The realisation of Soviet Union as a Super Power exists yet, while one super power (United States) "supports the minority and most reactionary regimes" the other "supports the majority" (Soviet Union).³⁶ The implication is more than clear; that Soviet Union, is seen more as a friend and an ally and a force on whom they can fall back on.

As far as their attitude to the Liberation Front is concerned there exists no uniform view within the leadership. There are some like Razik Bukti who deny completely any connection between the Baluch Students' Organization and the Front and who scoff at the strategy of armed struggle of the Front. However, there are others like Habib Jalib who are mere equivocal and in fact admire the commitment of the Marxists in the Front. Referring to Khair Baksh Marri, he said, "he is an honest man who stands for the Baluch nation".

36. Selig Harrison, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 85.

Most of the views of the Baluch Students' Organization are reflected in their monthly newsletter, 'Girukh' (Lightening), a doctrinal monthly 'Sangat' (Truth) and a monthly literary journal 'Bam' (Morning star).

The Baluch Students' Organisation was however not devoid of any factionalism. Differences within its ranks developed as early as in 1969 over the terms of the 1969 ceasefire. A militant dissident group dissatisfied with Sher Mohammed Marri and the Parari's willingness to lay down their arms formed from amongst the students an 'anti-Sardar' group in protest against this soft attitude of the Baluch leaders. Their differences crystallised in December 1972 with the formation of the Baluch Students' Organization (Awami).

The Baluch Students' Organisation (Awami) makes no secret of its leanings towards the Liberation Front. They in fact appreciate the role of Sher Mohammed Marri and the Pararis for reshaping the armed struggle on more scientific lines; and criticise Bizenjo and Mengals 'sham negotiation' with Zia. Their monthly newsletter 'Pajjar' (Awakening) as well as their monthly literary journal Labzank (Treasure of Language) has time and again praised Sher Mohammed Marri who in fact addressed their Annual National Council Meeting in 1978. A former Baluch Students' Organisation (Awami) President Abdul Nabi has served as a link between the Front and the Baluch Students' Organization.

Ideologically, they too wish to remain independent of any great influence. Back home, they feel a lack in progressivism in any of the existing parties of Pakistan, as far as the attitudes of these parties towards the Baluch cause is concerned. They are especially critical of the Communist Party in their outlook towards them, although within their ranks there also appear many pro-Communist elements. Others who are pro-Liberation Front favour immediate active participation and preparation for an insurgency. All stress the need for independence. The difference lies only in degree and the method by which to obtain it.

The students' movement as such has contributed largely to the guerilla activities as recruits. Khair Jan Baluch the B.S.O. President during the 1973-1977 insurgency in fact organized a guerilla group which contributed immensely to the protest movements that were launched then.

The BSO and the BSO (Awami) after the coming into existence in 1978 of the Communist regime in Afghanistan enthusiastically eulogised the regime as progressive and truly national and wished that Pakistanis would emulate the Afghan revolutionary model. They see hardly any implications of the Soviet presence except the fear that

Afghan situation can be exploited by Zia in Baluchistan and that the Baluch would have to take up arms against him. Hamid Baluch the students' leader executed by Zia was in fact sure of Russian aid and support to the Baluch cause. In fact the student activists regard the Soviet Union as the 'Standard bearer of Revolution' and therefore could assist the Baluch in their struggle³⁷ Indian Express reports, that the Baluch students' Organisation is also being supported by the Palestinian guerillas.³⁸

Organisationally the BSO is greater than their Awami faction. As in 1980 they claimed 4,300 students, with a National Council of 200 members. ^{BSO}(Awami) had a membership slightly less than 2,000 with a National Council of 110 members. However the latter is increasingly gaining popularity, primarily because of its militant nature. As of today both the Organisations work from underground after the imposition of a ban in political activity (1979). The students' movement as such does not pose a direct threat to the Central Government as there is a continual turnover in its membership and Government-controlled educational institutions exercise considerable leverage over independent students.

37. "Baluchistan May Be Next Soviet Target" Indian Express (New Delhi) 2 March 1980. Pamphlets urging the Baluch to bester themselves and toss out the Punjabis, bear the words 'Printed by Novosti Press, Moscow', B.K. Tiwari "Soviet Influence on Baluchis increasing", Indian Express, 2 February 1982.

38. B.K. Tiwari, Ibid.

The Pakistan National Party :

The Pakistan National Party formed in 1979 is considered as the single and strongest electoral force in the Baluch areas as is a successor to the National Awami Party which was banned, during the insurgency. It split from the National Democratic Party which had been formed after the NAP was banned. 'National' only in name, the Pakistan National Party, exists primarily in Baluchistan, "but was launched as a Pakistan-wide group in order to circumvent Martial Law Regulations banning the formation of regional Parties."³⁹

The National Awami Party was an extremely popular force in Pakistan in the decades of the 1960s and early 1970s. It was in fact the first national attempt to organise the country's fledging opposition. It was the most radical Party in Pakistan although not Socialist by nature. "Its political development was a consequence of the triune influence of provincial Autonomists, populism and mass hostility to the pro-American foreign policy of successive Government."⁴⁰ Its regional units in Baluch, Pashtun, Sindhi and Bengali areas attempted to wrest political power from Punjabis. It was the National Awami Party which worked

39. Selig Harrison: In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 89.

40. Tariq Ali, fn. no. 29, Chapter I, p. 59.

closely with the Awami League that led the agitation that overthrew Ayub Khan in 1969.

Its main bases were in Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province and East-Pakistan. Some of its leaders mostly non-Communists, were Wali Khan, (NWFP) Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo, Ataulah Mengal, Khair Baksh Marri, Mozaffer Ahmed and Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani (East Pakistan). Its United Front strategy had significant results, the most important being the violence and consequent secession of Bangladesh. The latter event gave a disastrous blow to the Baluch, Pashtuns and Sindhis who were reduced even collectively as a minority.

At the regional level the National Awami Party championed the cause of Baluch autonomy. In fact Bizenjo, Mengal and Marri the Governor, Chief Minister and Party Chairman, respectively, united behind the National Awami Party during their short-lived provincial rule in 1972-73. However with the overthrow of the Governor as well as an increase in repression, the NAP's moderate parliamentary methods were made obsolete. Moreover the NAP was soon banned. The choice now lay between parliamentary politics or armed struggle and between Baluch participation in countrywide politics or an independent movement for achieving independence.

A split was therefore inevitable, now between the Pashtun and the Baluchi factions of the newly formed National Democratic Party. The Pashtun faction seemed accommodating towards the Zia regime, much to the chagrin of the more embittered Baluch leaders of the NAP. Differences also developed in terms of the characterisation of the minorities in Pakistan. Bizenjo called them nationalities and in doing so was pitted against Abdul Wali Khan who favoured using terminology less objectionable to the Punjabis. The two also differed on how hard to push their autonomy demands as well as on the question of Afghanistan. Bizenjo was openly critical of Zia's support for anti-Communist rebels in Afghanistan while Wali Khan was milder and more moderate.

1979 therefore saw a failure in any efforts at reconciliation, and a split leading to the creation of the Pakistan National Party (Baluch) and the National Democratic Party (Pathan). What however is significant is that neither Marri nor Mengal⁴¹ joined the Pakistan National Party. Bizenjo was in fact the only leader who closely aligned himself with its affairs.

41. Mengal actually did join the Party but soon withdrew at the eve of his departure abroad.

As heir to the National Awami Party, the Pakistan National Party came to acquire considerable prestige in the eyes of the Baluch. Its first manifesto stressed on the constitutional and practical guarantees of equal internal autonomy to all federating units in Pakistan, a positive non-aligned foreign policy and a national democratic revolution designed to achieve economic independence and an end to remnants of feudalism and monopoly capitalism. It represented the "detrribalized Baluch middle class", not only in Quetta but also among the Baluch migrants in Karachi and other parts of Sind.⁴² Basically the Party advocated a moderate non-violent parliamentary course of action, though they were not critical of the 1973-1977 insurgency.

It is Bizenjo in fact who thrived on the conventional parliamentary political game so well represented by the Pakistan National Party with which he has close links.⁴³ Educated at Aligarh, the hot-bed of Congress politics, and 'nationalist' muslims, he was attracted more towards the anti-colonialism of the Congress than the anti-Hindu ideology of the Muslim League. It was therefore natural for him to reject the pro-Pakistani stance. He ridiculed at the time of partition as he even does today, at the

42. Selig Harrison ; In Afghanistan's Shadow. fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 88.

43. Bizejno is the only one amongst the three Baluch leader who is not exactly a Sardar.

official position, that Pakistanis of all ethnic backgrounds constitute a single nationality on the basis of being Muslims. Rejecting also therefore the stand of the Communists in 1942, he wrote that "there is no such thing as a Muslim nation.... The Almighty recognized tribes clans and nationalities as he did a universal brotherhood of all believers."⁴⁴

Back home, Bizenjo formed the Kalat National Party and vigorously campaigned for an independent Baluchistan which obviously earned him the name of Father of Baluchistan. On December 14, 1947, Bizenjo declared that, "we have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran should also be amalgamated with Pakistan.... They say we Baluch cannot defend ourselves in the atomic age. Well, are Afghanistan, Iran and even Pakistan capable of defending themselves against the superpowers ?.... They say we must join Pakistan for economic reasons. Yet we have minerals, we have petroleum and we have ports. The question is what would Pakistan be without us?"⁴⁵

44. Salamat Ali ; "Shaking the Foundations", Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 September 1978.

45. Cited in Selig Harrison ; In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 25.

Bizenjo made it clear that he was prepared for close ties between a sovereign Kalat and Pakistan. "I do not propose to create hurdles for the newly created state in matters of defence, external affairs and communications. But we want an honourable relationship.... We do not want to amalgamate with Pakistan", and if Pakistan forces the Baluch to do so, "...every Baluch will fight for his freedom".⁴⁶

However with the forceful accession of Baluchistan to Pakistan, Bizenjo soon came to adopt the stand taken by the Communists in Pakistan over the Baluch question. Till late, he reiterated time and again that "the Baluch problem was part of a larger, "interlocking set of problems confronting the artificially created multi-national states of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and India".⁴⁷ The answer lay in regional confederations and as a first step, the recognition of the separate nationalities and the adoption of a new Pakistani Constitution guaranteeing wider powers to each national unit. At another time he envisaged a loose federation where only defence, foreign affairs, currency and communications would lie with the Centre. Bizenjo also wanted for the provinces, complete control over the means of production,

46. Ibid, p. 25.

47. Interview with Bizenjo, Selig Harrison, Ibid, p. 55.

which will mean, in the case of Baluchistan, the natural gas resources, meeting almost ninety per cent of Pakistan's total consumption. "The four national units would have full control and sovereignty over their natural resources."⁴⁸

In a statement published in Viewpoint, Bizenjo spelled out his theory of federatism and four nationalities residing in Punjab, Sind, North-West-Frontier Province and Baluchistan. "Pakistan's integrity and the well-being of its people are synonymous with the protection and preservation of the political and economic rights of the people belonging to the federating units by guaranteeing them the fullest autonomy. The federation of Pakistan must provide iron - cast guarantees against violation and usurpation of the rights of the federating units, with the exception of the rights over subjects which the federating ^{units} would voluntarily transfer to the centre in order to make the federal government viable and self-sufficient."⁴⁹

According to Bizenjo, there is no such thing as the 'ideology of Pakistan'. Even though Jinnah had evolved the two nation theory for the partitioning of India, he never maintained that Muslims as such were a nation. What Jinnah

48. In this context Bizenjo admired the Soviet approach to the national question, "Socialism and Communism, if practised properly have the capacity to solve the national question". Ibid, pp. 56-57.

49. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, "The Basis of our Politics" Viewpoint (Lahore), 28 August 1978.

actually meant, according to Bizenjo, was that the Muslims of India had attained all the essential features and characteristics to differentiate them from the Hindus, on the basis of culture, history, specific social and economic interests. And hence, the Muslims were qualified to live in a separate territory of their own to safeguard their common interests.⁵⁰

By this logic therefore, Bizenjo claimed that the different components forming the Federation of Pakistan have the right to exercise full-autonomy within the Federal framework and could lay claim to their own separate languages, cultures, histories, customs and traditions. They also have political and economic rights which are inviolable and must be protected by the Federation of which they are equal constituents. Thus the formation of a national government in the prevailing conditions would be unwise and an "irretrievable folly."⁵¹

Until recently, Bizenjo had omitted the ultimate right of secession from his demand for a Pakistani

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50. Salamat Ali : "Shaking the Foundations", Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 September 1978.
51. Rajendra Sareen, "Bizenjo Attacks 'Muslim Nationhood' Concept", Time of India, 31 August 1978.

Constitution based on the recognition of nationalities.⁵² However, with the change in circumstances, he could no longer hold this view. "There are today (serious) misgivings about the efficacy, viability (and justification) of the State itself and about whether the people can any longer live together."⁵³ In April 1980 he included this demand too in his response to a proposal for an anti-Government alliance between his Party and Air Marshal Asghar Khan's Tehrik Istiqlal. The resultant joint manifesto suggested a strict limitation of Central Government's sphere of activity to defence, foreign affairs currency and communications together with the right of nationalities to secede.⁵⁴ Of late Bizenjo is still willing to strike a bargain with Zia for an autonomous Baluchistan but he no longer believes that such a bargain is possible since it is unconceivable that Zia is going to grant autonomy to province so close to Afghanistan. Before the Hyderabad Tribunal infact he stated "we do not want an

52. This coincided with the Soviet view of the goal of a 'united' 'Socialist' 'federal' Pakistan. Bizenjo : "The Basis of our Politics", Viewpoint (Lahore) 28 August 1978.

53. Tariq Ali: "Is Baluchistan the Next to Blow", Guardian (London), 26 February 1982.

54. This was seen by many as a possible change in Soviet stand to an independent Baluchistan. Others saw it as another of Bizenjo's 'opportunist' tactics of changing with time and circumstances.

Independent Baluchistan nor we think any other as more patriotic Pakistani than us".⁵⁵

With the Soviet presence in Afghanistan that Soviet interest would be limited in Pakistan suggests that the most promising way to break dominated military grip may be to promote a 'democratic' government with Communist participation will grant autonomy to the provinces including secede.

Referring to Zia-ul-Haq, Bizenjo recalled Pakistan's past experience has shown that when parties forces and individual's assumed the government, without the people's sanction and invariably found some excuse or the other to aspirations of the people and instead sought themselves in power. He recalled that the Constituent Assembly of 1947, dragged its feet and prolo for eight years under the excuse of framing a constitution for the country which it never did. Inevitable political parties which have now joined the government the plea to accelerate the process of holding elections are not likely to behave differently.

55. Formation of a 'Single Nation' is only a matter of time - Crises - Bizenjo, Dawn (Karachi), 27.

parties will obviously prepare the people, not for elections, but for enduring a long spell of their own reign without the people's mandate.⁵⁶ This kind of joint government by Martial Law authorities in association with some political parties would inevitably lead to such conditions in which the people would be compelled to oppose it in order to safeguard their democratic rights and interests.⁵⁷

Again commenting on Zia's efforts at bringing about unity through Islam, Bizenjo said that the attempts to counterpose nations and nationalities against Muslim brotherhood was tantamount to "mutilating the spirit of Islam." He would rather promote the concept of Pakistani Nation instead of what goes under the name of Pakistani ideology.⁵⁸

On the question of assistance, Bizenjo unlike his co-leaders is not as wary of Soviet aid. "If any nationality in any country faces permanent exploitation by majority nationalities, and those majority nationalities are protected and helped by the Western bloc, then in order to fight for their survival the minorities will naturally not hesitate to have help from anywhere". As far as the influence that

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56. Rajendra Sareen, "Bizenjo Attacks 'Muslim Nationhood' Concept", Times of India, 31 August 1978.
57. Cited in "Bizenjo and Nationalities" Pakistan Times (Lahore), 28 Aug. 1978.
58. Cited in Rajendra Sareen, fn. no. 56.

goes hand in hand with aid, "we feel we have the capacity to stand up for our interests".⁵⁹

This along with other of his pro-Soviet stance have led many to conclude that he is more of a Communist than a nationalist. His advocacy, according to his critics, of a Soviet tilted brand of neutralism as well as his strong support to the 1978 Afghan Revolution makes them more than convinced.⁶⁰ However there is little more than truth in their apprehensions. Amongst the three Baluch leaders he seems undoubtedly more pro-Soviet balanced and radical. His policies can be viewed more as a result of the continuous American support to bolster the Punjabi dominated establishment and the consequent repression that it unleashed.⁶¹

Nevertheless, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan has made him increasingly fear the possibility of Baluchistan becoming the focus of a Super Power collision that could immensely damage the Baluch cause. With Afghanistan no longer a buffer state "we would rather become

59. Selig Harrison ; In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 57.

60. Harrison for one feels that Moscow has been seriously cultivating him as their potential ally in Pakistan. Ibid, p. 60.

61. Ibid, p. 59.

this new buffer State with the concurrence of the Super Powers, then achieve our independence through alignment with one or the other".⁶²

One of Bizenjo's close associates and a major finance to the Pakistan National Party is the millionaire Akbar Y. Musti Khan⁶³ who is increasingly turning openly political. What motives do industrialists have in a budding nationalist/independence movement is only too well-known. Nevertheless it points to the gravity of the problem as well as the high level of political maturity the movement has achieved.

Equally vocal on the issue especially on the Punjabi domination has been the third leader of Baluchistan, Atauliah Mengal who has come to acquire the symbol of uncomplicated Baluch patriotism and commands intense respect in all political factions of Baluchistan. He earned a reputation of an incorruptible, progressive Sardar despite his non-Marxist political career, largely due to his benign act of parceling out nearly half of his inherited

62. Ibid, p. 61.

63. The Musti Khan assets include Musti Khan Trans continental, a construction firm operating throughout the Middle East Frigid Fish Limited and other assorted enterprises.

lands among his tenants. Ideologically he is a more moderate reformer who was greatly moved by the army excesses in Baluchistan. He himself collided with the Ayub's establishment in 1962 when he won the Assembly seat from one of the Baluch areas but was soon put behind the bars on false charges.⁶⁴

After his release in 1967 along with his co-leaders, he organized the Baluchistan branch of the National Awami Party and campaigned vigorously for the unification of the Baluch areas in Baluchistan. In 1970 under the National Awami Party, he became the Chief Minister only to be deposed, triggering the insurgency during which his own son Asadullah was shot dead.⁶⁵ Mengal himself braved this tragedy by saying "I have lost so many 'sons' in Baluchistan, and I felt : so another of them is dead...."⁶⁶

On the question of Baluchistan's fate, Mengal has taken time to harden his own attitudes unlike his co-leaders. Nevertheless he is equally bitter with what the Punjabis have done to them. What the Baluch face is a "whole gang of Punjabis" in the bureaucracy and the army, "a network

64. He was accused of murdering a distant cousin whom Ayub appointed in his stead after deposing him.

65. This was part of a special commando operation under Colonel Bashir who was given the authority by Bhutto to capture and kill the Baluch anywhere in Pakistan. Tariq Ali, fn. no. 29 Chapter I, p. 121.

66. Interview with Tariq Ali, Ibid, p. 121.

that has complete control of the civil service machinery in Baluchistan". It means "tens of thousands of them... buying the best land in Quetta, more and more of them crawling all over us, annihilating us".⁶⁷ Again, "Governments, military regimes have come and gone, but they have shared one attitude in common. They have mistreated and oppressed the Baluch".⁶⁸ In an interview with Lifschultz he reiterated that Pakistan is a country which exists only to maintain the privileges of the army and the Punjabis.⁶⁹

This growing hatred towards the Punjabis has led Mengal to change his stand from working within Pakistan to a struggle for independence. According to him, Zia has "reinforced the feeling of our people that they are second-class citizens of this country."⁷⁰ Yet, prior to 1978-1979, he refrained from advising the Baluch militants on taking a guerilla path; he still saw that justice could be achieved in Pakistan through political means. He spoke grimly of the "impossible choices", of choosing between "Punjabi

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67. Selig Harrison; In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, pp. 65 and 67 respectively.
68. Interview with Tariq Ali, fn. no. 29 Chapter I, p. 118.
69. Interview with Lawrence Lifschultz, Independent Baluchistan' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 19, 20 & 21, Annual No. 1983.
70. Selig Harrison ; In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 64.

bullheadedness" and the adventurous course adopted by the militant students. He was not willing to lead them or take responsibility for the "bloodbath that a struggle for independence would involve."⁷¹ The choices for him were so impossible that he along with Marri left the country for medical reasons and decided to continue the struggle as political exiles (1979).

However by 1979-1980, in the face of changed circumstances, he no longer felt it would be 'reckless to pursue guerilla activity and even gave up all hopes of a settlement with Islamabad. He and Marri decided to establish a Baluch Government-in-exile. He spoke more of a 'confederation' rather than a federation, and believed in no compromise with the authorities in Islamabad.⁷²

Speaking favourably of the Russian aid and assistance, "we Baluch must choose between losing our identity at the mercy of the Punjabis or stretching our hands to others". If there is any hope for foreign aid, it is from the Soviets. On the other hand, denouncing American role in Pakistan to bolster the economy he said that "if the Iranians, the Arabs and the United States would stop pumping in money, the Government would not last for two years. It is living

71. Ibid, pp. 65-66.

72. Interview Tariq Ali, fn. no. 29, Chapter I, p. 123.

on blood transfusions and glucose drips".⁷³ Pakistan will be susceptible to military coups, to the politicization of the army and to its ultimate divisions, despite the backing. The election of Reagan as the President in the United States has led to a further hardening of Mengal's position.

Mengal is bitter about Pakistan's decision to allow the use of Baluchistan to the Rapid Deployment Force (at Gwadar) which was even confirmed by the United States itself.⁷⁴ In an interview, Mengal said that, "We know to our cost, that, the People of Baluchistan, Sind and the Frontier will be the first victims of this American Military buildup..." Because of this "...U.S. policy makers are our enemy number one."⁷⁵

He is now openly speaking of an independent Baluchistan "...there is no place in Pakistan for a self-respecting Baluch. We want to see Baluchistan as a sovereign State and the Baluch as an independent nation" and "the only way to gain freedom is through the muzzle of the gun".⁷⁶

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73. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 67.
74. Lawrence Lifschultz : Independent Baluchistan? fn. no. 69.
75. V.D. Chopra, "Baluch Fight for Freedom", Statesman (New Delhi), 10 February 1980.
76. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 68.

Tired of being called traitors, Mengal felt that "if we are called traitors, let it be so. We do not take any exclusive responsibility to either save or break Pakistan."⁷⁷

Referring to the change in his stand he said that this was because first, that the army operations have made it clear, that even if a demand for provincial autonomy is made within democratic structure, it will be met with the same violence from the army. So it is better to ask for independence. Secondly, the Baluch can never realise their rights within the framework of Pakistan. Right from the beginning there was the denial of the rights of nationalities. Thirdly the Baluch cannot accept more Punjabis to exploit them in terms of land and resources.⁷⁸ Thus "Nothing short of an independent Baluchistan can satisfy the people of this region because culturally, linguistically and historically we have nothing in common with the Punjabis who have become dominant in all walks of life. We Baluchis are their serfs and a semi-colonial people."⁷⁹

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77. "Concern Over Reemergence of extremism in Baluchistan" POT, Vol. VI, Part 109, May 20, 1978.
78. Interview with Lawrence Lifschultz, fn. no. 69.
79. V.D. Chopra, "Baluch Fight for Freedom" Statesman (New Delhi), 10 February, 1980.

On the question of 'Greater Baluchistan' Mengal wished for all Baluch "but I can only speak for the Baluch in Pakistan", implying thereby that at present he was not thinking on those lines.⁸⁰

Mengal has always been most concerned of a lack of a clear movement under a stable Constitution which would protect the interests of the Baluch. Pained most by the polarisation between Bizenjo's supporters and the hardliners of Marri, he has found himself most of the time trying to hold the triumverate together and constructing a unified movement.

Communist Policies in Baluchistan :

Till today Soviet policies have stopped short of supporting the independence of Baluchistan or the concept of an independent or Greater Baluchistan.

Yuri Gankovsky, a leading Soviet writer on nationality problems asserted that the dismemberment of India along religious lines did not solve the national problem of Pakistan. "...the slogan of Pakistan albeit in an indirect deformed way, expressed the striving for national autonomy and self determination" of two homogeneous Muslim regions in the sub-continent, Baluchistan and the Pushtun dominated North-West-Frontier Province, as well as the Muslim parts

80. Ibid.

of Bengali, Punjabi and Sindhi peoples. But policies after partition distorted the original intention of its founders who had emphasized that these areas would be autonomous and sovereign - thus implying that Pakistan consisted of five district nationalities whose right to autonomy had yet to be ^{realised} in the Pakistani state as it was then constituted.⁸¹

Thus the realisation of Pakistan as a multi-national state existed among Soviet scholars. But they see no gains in the ethnic minorities exercising their right of secession. For the Soviet Union, the Communists in Pakistan should work for a loose multi-national federation under their (communist) leadership. Separatism according to the Soviets should be a last resort when there exists no possibility of overall Communist victory.⁸²

As far as Baluch nationalism is concerned, Soviet writings, and quite correctly, have treated it as a nascent but growing phenomenon. The Baluch "are the only one of Pakistan's major peoples who had not consolidated into a bourgeois nation by the time the colonialists left the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent". Moreover the economic neglect of

81. Yuri Gankovsky : The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History, Nauka Publishing House, 1971.

82. This is seen by some as a Soviet diplomatic offensive to counter Chinese and American influence in Pakistan. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 130.

The region by the British led to large scale migration from Baluchistan to Sind and other provinces. This made Baluch national consolidation exceedingly difficult.⁸³

Another Soviet writer Beknazar Ibragimov pointed to the changed circumstances that has integrated the Baluch into a nation during 1947-1970. The economic links with the more developed regions of Pakistan has led to the emergence of landless agricultural labour and a working class and with the growth of Baluch intelligentsia, their national movement has become "an indispensable part of the entire democratic movement in the country."⁸⁴ The 1977 review of nationality issues in Asia by Soviet scholars again reiterated that along with centrifugal forces, centripetal forces in Pakistan are also gaining strength. They also failed to see any organised national movement of the Baluch, and instead noted the growing consciousness among the masses, of the need to strengthen all-national unity.⁸⁵

Within Baluchistan, the Communists have remained a weak force for a number of reasons. First the Communist decision in 1941 to support the Pakistan movement had a

83. Y. Gankovsky : The Peoples of Pakistan, fn. no. 81.

84. Beknazar Ibragimov : Beludzhei Pakistan (The Baluch of Pakistan) Moscow, Nauka Publishing House, 1973, p. 4, Cited in Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 131.

85. Cited in Selig Harrison, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 132.

very demoralising effect in Baluchistan. Both the Baluch and the Pushtun areas were homogenous Muslim areas where there was little fear of Hindu domination and consequently little interest in the Pakistan cause. Secondly the Communist Party has been controlled since its inception by urban middle class leaders who migrated from India at the time of partition and lack local roots in any of the ethnic regions of Pakistan. Most of them being Punjabis and allies of the dominant Punjabis in Pakistan, they were looked upon as suspects as Mahajirs in the eyes of the locally rooted Party comrades. According to Nizamani the Communist leader, they had "no understanding of the most acute contradictions in the country" and who considered the basic contradiction between the ruling class and the suppressed minorities as only a secondary one.⁸⁶ Basing their theory on conventional Marxism-Leninism, these 'Mahajirs' came looking for industrial workers and landless peasants but instead found a nomadic tribal society with a growing 'nationalistic' consciousness.

Thirdly, in contrast to the more liberal environment which the Communist Parties face in India, the Communist Party in Pakistan has faced severe repressions from the start. This has resulted in and aggravated built in rivalries and ideologically based factional tensions.

86. Cited in Ibid, p. 134.

Nizamani's own efforts to establish the Baluch Marxist Party dedicated to an independent Baluchistan, along with Abdul Karim failed. The latter formed his own open legal Ustoman Gali (People's Party) which echoed the traditional Communist line that Baluchistan should have autonomy within Pakistan.

Referring to the 1973-1977 insurgency, Aijaz Ahmed, a Communist-oriented intellectual acknowledged the fact that many progressives sided with the Baluch forces, yet the guerillas were unable to "transform or politicize the masses". For him the only significant result of the insurgency had been to "prop up the leading Sardars of the insurrection as the leaders of Baluchistan today". Consequently, the leaders not only regained their feudal power but also gained political legitimacy.⁸⁷

In 1976, the Communist Party leaders declared that the question of national rights had not been solved in Pakistan and asked their party members to participate in the just struggles of the people of Baluchistan, while at the same time uniting the same with the other democratic issues in the country.

87. Aijaz Ahmed : "The National Question in Baluchistan" in Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtun Question (ed.) Feroz Ahmed (Lahore - People's Publishing House 1975), pp. 30-31.

88. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 135.

Among the Communist factions none have a significant following in Baluchistan. The two most important factions, the Mazdoor-Kisan Party and the Awami Tehrik still do not have a base in Baluchistan but are a formidable force in Pushtun and Sind region respectively.

What however is significant is that despite the difference in views between the Communist Party and the Baluchi forces, yet the Soviet Union enjoys a favourable image among the Baluchis.⁸⁹ This, for some is more a reaction against Western attempts at bolstering the Pakistani State as well as the general belief of Soviet Union as a friend of the oppressed of the world. Also, amongst the Baluch themselves there are a number of pro-Soviet progressives who were actively involved in Ustman Gal Party in 1950, and 1960s, the National Awami Party, Baluch Students' Organisation as well as the Pakistan National Party. Most of them support the Russians' views on many issues. Even Nazimani in his monthly newspaper Nadal Baluchistan rarely drifted from the Soviet line. It was only in 1979 that the People's Front (as it was called) openly came out for sovereign independence. Selig Harrison for one considers

89. This is despite strong Soviet support to Bhutto's People's Party during the post-1970 era.

him more an independent Baluch nationalist who takes help from both Communist and non-Communist sources alike and is ideological tilted towards the Soviets.⁹⁰

90. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 140.

INTERNATIONAL COMPLEXITIES

The North-West regions of Pakistan, including the North-West-Frontier-Province and Baluchistan have always played a pivotal role as far as great power politics is concerned. Efforts to pacify the tribesmen was an important preoccupation for the British for many years that involved them in "endless diplomatic wrangling and in a very costly succession of often fruitless military campaigns."¹ They succeeded in subduing most of Baluchistan and had reduced Afghanistan to the status of British dependency. However, by the Third Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 their grip was loosened and from then on these areas have been the hotbed of regional as well as global power game.²

With the departure of the British from India and the creation of Pakistan, the problem of the tribal area was transferred to the three Governments Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan under which the Baluchis (and the Pathans)

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1. Robert Wirsing : The Baluchis and Pathans, fn. no. 11, Chapter II, p. 14.
 2. Zalmay Khalilzad : "The Super Powers and the Northern Tier", International Security, Winter 1979-1980.

lived. Pakistan inherited the bulk of the Baluch (and Pathan) population and consequently inherited the most problematic issue that was to live with it and prove the most frustrating to the ruling Punjabi dominated circles. Religion with which they sought to bind the whole population failed in its function. The policies of the new State accentuated the tribal dissatisfaction of living within Pakistan. It resulted in a restive population which not only continuously tried to assert itself politically or otherwise, but also tried to claim ties with their co-ethnic groups beyond the border. The situation was similar albeit with a difference in Afghanistan and Iran. Official policies of the both these countries seldom coincided with that of Pakistan except when repression had to be unleashed. However Afghanistan had definitely much more to say and this confirms its involvement as far as Pakistan's Baluch population is concerned. Whether they sought an 'Independent Baluchistan' or a 'Greater Baluchistan' or even a 'Greater Afghanistan' is a debatable issue which needs some consideration.

In contrast to the Soviet Union, which has always emphasized achievement of Baluch rights within Pakistan,³

3. See For example Gankovsky : The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History, and Gankovsky and Polanskaya A History of Pakistan.

Afghanistan has traditionally encouraged Baluch ambitions for some form of liberation from Islamabad. Afghanistan's seventeenth century founder Ahmed Shah Durrani ruled over the Baluch State of Kalat as a tributary for about fourteen years. Consequently, Afghanistan has periodically included Baluchistan in its sweeping irredentist claims to the Baluch areas East of the Durand Line. In some maps defining their demand for Pushtunistan, they have not only included the Pushtun areas of Pakistan, but also Baluchistan as southern Pushtunistan.

Moreover, in the ten years that Mohammed Daud was in power (1953-1963), his support for Pushtunistan was more than obvious that led to a severed relationship with Pakistan. Daud was in fact extremely bitter about Ayub's One Unit Plan as according to him, Pakistan had no jurisdiction over North-West-Frontier-Province and Baluchistan. His overthrow in 1963 toned down this policy only to be revoked again in 1973 with Daud coming back to power in Afghanistan. His announcement that Pakistan was the only country with which Afghanistan had a dispute made this reversal of policy more than evident.⁴ Afghanistan revived the Pakhtoonistan issue at international forums as

4. Shirin-Tahir-Kheli : "The Foreign Policy of 'New' Pakistan", Orbis, Fall, 1976, Vol. 20, No. 3.

the Algiers Meeting of the Non-Aligned Nations as well as in the Islamic Summit held in Lahore. What was however more serious was Afghanistan's exploitation of Pakistan's domestic difficulties manifested in their open support to the movements in North-West-Frontier-Province and Baluchistan that were demanding autonomy.

Initially, the whole of Baluchistan was not included in Afghan scheme for self-determination. Later she was compelled chiefly by geographical necessity to demand the right to self-determination. Acquisition of Baluchistan would have provided Afghanistan, a landlocked country, an access to the Indian Ocean.⁵ In addition, it is believed that Baluchistan is rich in mineral resources. For reasons as these, the issues of Pathan and Baluch autonomy have become synonymous and leaders as K.A. Gaffar Khan have become active proponents and symbols of the Baluchi cause.⁶

However, Afghan support to the Baluch cause can be viewed more as a direct function of its foreign policy towards Pakistan. Whenever relations between the two have been cordial, Afghanistan has reduced its open support to Baluchis. Conversely, when relations have been strained

5. Mehruunnisa Ali ; "The Attitude of the New Afghan Regime Towards its Neighbours", Pakistan Horizon, no. 3, 1974.

6. Nadder Entessar, fn. no. 44, Chapter III.

Afghanistan renewed its demand for Baluchi autonomy.⁷ During the last years of the presidency of Daod Khan, there was more of a cordiality existing between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Daod toned down his support for the Baluchis. The 1978 left wing coup which overthrew Daod almost immediately rekindled, the Baluch issue.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was however, far from unified in its approach to the issue. The Khalq and the Parcham factions of the Afghan Communist movement have followed radically different policies, reflecting the broader tactical differences that have divided the two groups. The Parcham faction followed a flexible line attuned to Soviet understanding which called for efforts to achieve Pushtun and Baluch rights within Pakistan, while the Khalq policy foreshadowed what was to become a 'Greater Afghanistan' approach.⁸

Once in power, the Khalq dominated People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan treated the Baluch and the Pashtun issue with ambiguity thereby keeping the 'Greater

7. Shahin F. Dil : "The Cabal in Kabul : Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan", American Political Science Review, June, 1977.

8. In 1966, the Khalq faction declared that the Durand Line was imposed upon Afghanistan against the wishes of its people and as a result a part of the territory of the country was detached from its body - implying that Baluchistan was part of the lost territory. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 143.

Afghanistan' option open. On assuming Office, Taraki called for the solution of the national issue of Pushtun and Baluch people "which gave cosmetic recognition to a separate Baluch identity but lumped Pushtun and Baluch aspirations together in a single 'national issue'".⁹

This equation of Baluch with Pushtun nationalism, together with the renaming of Pushtunistan Day to Pushtunistan and Baluchistan Day considerably raised the hopes of the Pakistani Baluch. At the same time he held the view that a solution to the dispute could be found within the Pakistani framework.

With Amin becoming the Prime Minister the rhetoric of Greater Afghanistan intensified. Addressing a meeting of Chaman and Bajaur tribal leaders he depicted Afghanistan "as reaching from Oxus River to the Abasin (Indus) which marked the border between Punjab State and the Pashtun majority North-West Frontier Province". At another place he included Baluchistan in the ambit of Afghanistan, and spoke of the injustice of the Durand Line.¹⁰ In an interview with Feroz Ahmed, he put his ideas of Greater Afghanistan more explicitly. Nizamani, the pro-

9. Ibid.

10. Nader Entessar : "Baluchi Nationalism", Asian Affairs : An American Review, Nov-Dec., 1979.

Soviet Baluch nationalist therefore soon realised that Amin actually envisaged a Federal Constitution for Afghanistan in which the Pushtun and Baluch areas of Afghanistan would be the national units, implying thereby that such a restructuring would facilitate the eventual incorporation of the adjacent Pushtun and Baluch areas of Pakistan into the 'homeland'.¹¹

Amin's eventual removal from power, seen more as a Soviet move to counter his overemphasis on Baluch and Pushtun issues, resulted in a softened attitude towards the issue. While Babrak Karmal reaffirmed the past Afghan denials of Durand/Line, he said that "the national issues of the Pushtun and Baluchi nationalists in Pakistan is entirely their own.... If the Pushtuns Baluchis or Sindhis are not satisfied with their regime, it is up to them to take any action.... Their problem is theirs".¹²

It is significant that by clubbing together the Sindhis with the Pashtuns and Baluch, Karmal signalled a shift from 'Greater Afghanistan' to the Soviet line of thinking.

As of today, with Khair Bakhsh Marri now in Kabul and Kabul becoming the vittual headquarters of the BPLF,

11. Selig Harrison: In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 145.

12. Quoted in ibid, from "U.S. Arming Pakistan", Kabul New Times, 20, February, 1980.

it seems difficult to predict the stand of the Afghan government. Whether the Afghan government has reconciled to Marri's new position of independent Baluchistan or whether they still hold the view of the Soviets is rather uncertain.¹³

Much of Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan is tied to the latter's relations with Soviet Union. It has been said that Afghanistan's policies as far as the Baluch and Pushtuns are concerned have changed according to Soviet change in strategy and tactics towards Pakistan. According to some, Soviets have used the Pakhtoonistan issue as a leverage to get Pakistan change its foreign policy and it is only after Pakistan joined the United States backed alliances did Soviet Union, in relation support Afghanistan's and India's claim on areas in Pakistan.¹⁴ Thus also came the Soviet backed Afghanistan's demand for a plebiscite in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan that would have allowed free expression of the political will of the former tribesmen.¹⁵

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13. B.K. Joshi : "Stepped up Baluch Activities Worry Pakistan", Times of India, 1 February, 1982.
 14. Shirin Tahir Kheli, fn. no. 4.
 15. Hannah Negaran : "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security", Orbis, Spring, 1979.

The importance of the Kabul-Moscow connection was demonstrated again when Soviet Union decided for reasons of countering Chinese influence, to enter into an era of improved relations with Pakistan.¹⁶ Moscow withdrew open support to Pakhtoonistan and Baluchistan. The 1971 crisis in Bangladesh and Pakistan's refusal to subscribe to Soviet collective security schemes or to any regional economic grouping sponsored by Moscow led Moscow to revert to its anti-Pakistan policies. A number of other considerations¹⁷ led to several suggestions of a possible military solution to the Pakhtoonistan problem.

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has provoked again the Soviet 'intentions' in Baluchistan. It is seen by some as a prelude to the achievement of a 'Greater Afghanistan' at most and at least Independent Baluchistan. The oft-repeated yet redundant accusation of Soviet search for warm-water ports have been raked up again. Others see it as a safety move for a possible fuel shortage in the Soviet Union.¹⁸ Still others doubt the Soviet move as

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16. Starting with the Soviet oil exploration in 1961 and terminating with the 1971 civil war.
 17. As Nixon's visit to China and Yahya's role as an intermediary in bringing it; Moscow's fears of Sino-American collision and Daod coming to power in 1973.
 18. Richard Pipes : "Soviet Global Strategy", Commentary, April 1980. This, however, seems more than exaggerated since the recent exploration of oil in Russia makes it more than secure for the next century.

expansionist but interpret it as a "defensive response to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the neighbouring countries."¹⁹

Whatever be the reason for the Soviet presence, the existence of the Baluch nationalist movement is seen by many as an enlarged option for "Soviet adventurism".²⁰ Whether this is so is rather doubtful. Yet while it has increased hopes of Soviet support for the Baluch, it has also reduced Zia's vulnerability as far as world public opinion is concerned over his repressive methods.

Thus the Soviets, it is said, have not refrained from playing power politics in order to either wean away Pakistan from the joint US-China sphere of influence or to include Pakistan in setting up a joint South Asia and Persian Gulf economic group.²¹ When Bhutto visited Moscow in early 1972, the Soviet leaders candidly told him that not only did they not regret their intervention on behalf of the Bangladesh Liberation movement but they would act in the same manner if events were to repeat themselves.²² This

19. Quoted in Selig Harrison, fn. no. 9 Chapter II, p. 195. from U.S. Security interests and Policies in South-West Asia, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, 96th Cong., p. 87-120.

20. As Selig Harrison, *Ibid*, p. 196.

21. Their Asian Collective Security proposal in fact faced "considerable difficulties" primarily from Pakistan, Pravda, May 29, 1973.

22. Pravda, March 18, 1972.

was interpreted by the Pakistanis as a veiled threat of possible Soviet intervention in the Baluchistan and Pathan unrest in Pakistan. There however exists no evidence that the Soviet Union has so far directly intervened in these Pakistani domestic conflicts. The Baluchistan and Pathan rebels however have been getting moral support from Moscow²³ but only as far as working within a federation of Pakistan. The Sunday Times weekly correspondent Simon Winchester in fact noted that "There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is making a respectable propaganda effort, at least in the northern parts of this wild inhabited state".²⁴ However, if the Soviets ever come to back the movement, it will be because of the utter lack of understanding on the gravity of the problem, on the part of Washington which has for all practical reasons adopted the role as a backer of Pakistan.²⁵

The Baluch leaders, nearly all of them, categorise the Soviets as another of the super powers one should be wary of. Yet they have taken a relatively positive view of

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23. Bhabani Sen Gupta, Soviet Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond (Praeger New York 1976), p. 90.
24. B.K. Tiwari "Soviet influence in Baluchistan increasing" Indian Express, 2 February 1980.
25. Daniel Snieder : "Baluch Shadow over Pakistan" New Wave (New Delhi), 2 August, 1961.

them as allies. This may be more an outcome of their direct confrontation with the United States through the Pakistani State. Most of the leaders with partially Marxist bent of mind, do look to the Soviet Union for economic as well as military assistance.²⁶ According to Selig Harrison, what the Baluch leaders may have in mind may be an agreement to provide military facilities or bases to the Russians in exchange for "unfettered internal control over an independent Baluchistan and enough economic help to make independence viable".²⁷ Yet it seems unlikely that the Soviets would work through non-Communist forces. Soviet Union it seems may much rather see a change of Zia regime in Pakistan rather than risk have a fundamentalist regime on one side (Iran) and the reactionary regime on the other side (Pakistan) of an 'Independent Baluchistan'. Moreover, Communist forces in the ethnic minority groups in these neighbouring countries may not be strong enough to support a Baluch insurgency. Last, but not the least is the fact that Soviet Union has always sought stability of the region and specifically has always discouraged nationalities from breaking away from Pakistan. Its support to the Bangladesh movement came albeit at the eleventh hour.

26. Indian Intelligence sources stated that Soviet Army Officers Trained 3000-4000 Baluch tribesmen in the South-eastern Afghan province of Kandahar which borders Pakistan's volatile Baluch Province. "Russia said to Train Baluch Tribesmen", International Herald Tribune, 21 March, 1980.

27. For him this is risky for both parties, for the Russians might be ousted by the non-Communist nationalist

However, Soviet moves are almost always defensive by nature and a lot depends on the Americans and their ally the Iranian moves in the region.

Iran in fact, as well as Pakistan have always considered Independent Baluchistan as a direct challenge to their security.²⁸ Not only would both lose a part of their territory, the Soviet Union would also increase its presence since a new Baluchi State would in all probability be militarily and economically dependent on Afghanistan and by implication the Soviet Union. Evidence, however goes contrary to this as Soviet support has never been for an independent Baluch State. Nevertheless the joint Iranian and Pakistani worry exists.

In Iran the Baluch population has not been quite troublesome. Nor was it a major factor in the growing anti-Shah movement. This is because the Baluch areas constitute a relatively small corner of the country. Secondly, there has been no military challenge to Iran since their decisive defeat in 1928. Shah use of sophisticated military against his Baluch population as well as the largesse to the tribal

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forces in any eventuality and the Baluch may find their internal affairs dictated. Selig Harrison, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 197.

28. See S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy : A Historical Analysis (London- Oxford University Press, 1973).

chieftains along with minimal economic reforms have kept their Baluch population relatively quieter.²⁹ Moreover, unlike the British and the post-independence rulers of Pakistan, Tehran has done little to open up its Baluch areas to outside world. Consequently there exists practically no Baluch intelligentsia in Iran as compared to Quetta and Karachi. Thirdly, and consequently, Iranian Baluchistan have never had the political leadership as Pakistani Baluch have had, nor have they had quite their level of institutionalised opposition to Central government.³⁰ Tehran has in fact been acutely sensitive to the profound cultural tensions between the Baluch and Persian officials in tribal areas and extremely fearful of externally stimulated separatist activity.³¹

Referring to their own Baluch population and in an effort to play down any 'nationalist' upsurge, most of the Iranian officials even refuse to acknowledge the existence of any Baluch problem. The Late Prime Minister Amir Abbas

29. Nader Entessar, fn. no. 44, Chapter III.

30. However it has been reported that in the present circumstances they are "just waiting to hear a call from across the border", Chris Sherwell and Simon Henderson - "Waiting for a call over the Border", Financial Times (London), 28 April 1979.

31. Selig Harrison : Baluch Nationalism and Super Power Rivalry' International Security, Vol. 5 No. 3, Winter 1980-81.

Hoveida observed that "there are not many of them are there? But they happen to live in a strategic part of the country. Should we let them use this accident of Geography and History to provoke us into devoting precious resources to develop that wretched part of the country? Why not move them elsewhere?" This in fact was an acceptance that the Baluch need no development. "If it were not for the Soviet Union and its friends in Iraq we would not give such inflated importance to such a small part of our population."³²

Foreign Minister Mahmud Khalatbary who had served as the Director-General of the Central Treaty Organisation recalled their fear of Soviet support for an Independent Baluchistan. "so it was desirable to keep them as politically weak, disunited and backward as possible."³³

In Pakistan and Iran alike, the specter of an independent Baluchistan tends to discourage development expenditures not directly related to military needs "it would be a mistake to look on the development of Baluchistan as a particular economic challenge in, and of itself. No, we should look at the province in terms of the whole nation,

32. Interview with Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 159.

33. Ibid, p. 159.

concentrating on how we can reform the social habits of the people while improving their welfare. We must see how we can unite this area with other, more developed areas in such a way as to advance the country as a whole. For example, it may be of no use to have educated people here given the backwardness of the area but we can use them in other parts of the country."³⁴ This was indeed a clear indication of keeping the Baluch suppressed and divided.

Iran had rendered to Pakistan both moral and material support in the 1965 as well as the 1971 Indo-Pak War. The special relationship had given Pakistan a feeling of security especially in view of the American arms embargo imposed for ten years after 1965.³⁵ Apart from the commonality of interest as far as mistrust towards the Soviet Union as well as their dependence on the United States, Pakistan was extremely important for Iran. She, like Pakistan, fully appreciated implications for her own security inherent in the 'Greater Baluchistan' campaign directed from Iraq. Shah's basic interest was to prevent a situation from developing there that could have a spillover effect in the Baluch population in Iran.³⁶ It was

34. Ibid.

35. William Barnés : "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints in Foreign Policy" in (ed.) Lawrence Ziring : Pakistan : The Long View.

36. Ehabani Sen Gupta : Soviet - Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond : An Interperceptonal Study (Praeger Publishers, New York 1976), p. 167.

precisely for this reason that Iran has periodically aided its neighbour in suppressing its restive Baluch population.

Iranian assistance thus was very substantial. In 1975, Iran committed US \$ 76 million in aid for Baluchistan alone. Although to be spread over two textile mills, a cement plant and a new medical college, the amount still represents double of what Pakistan is contributing annually despite increased allocations from Central budget.³⁷

Shah's interest in developments in Baluchistan has been substantial for quite some time. The Shah and Pakistan's military share a common view that through Iran and Baluchistan the Soviet Union is out to gain a warm water port in the Gulf. Pakistan military too regards its principal external threat as coming from Afghanistan in the West and India in the East, both being backed by the Soviet Union.³⁸

The Baluch insurgents however regard Iran as the real expansionist power in the region. It is a well known

37. In the case of the cement plant 90 per cent of the production is to be exported to Iran. Lawrence Lifschultz ; "The Strategic Equation", Far Eastern Economic Review, May 28, 1976.

38. "The Triangular Rivalry of Washington Moscow and Peiping in South Asia - A Study in the light of the Relations between Communist China and Pakistan". Issues and Studies (English), Vol. 14, No. 1, Jan. 1978.

fact that the Shah of Iran was extremely unhappy with the election results in Baluchistan. He feared that if the National Awami Party succeeded in pushing through a set of radical reforms in the province or gaining a meaningful autonomy, the impact on Iranian Baluchistan would destabilize Iran as a whole. In an interview with New York Times, the Shah had stated that in the eventuality of a further disintegration of Pakistan, the Iranian army might be forced to intervene in order to prevent instability from enveloping the whole region.³⁹ "We encourage Pakistan to follow a policy of peace towards its neighbours. But we certainly could not sit back and tolerate an aggression against Pakistan ...by anyone".⁴⁰ The Shah's eastern concern mirrored U.S. strategic perceptions of south Asia and Persian Gulf region.⁴¹ In May 1973 Bhutto paid a visit to Iran where he was told straight that the Shah viewed demands for provincial autonomy exceedingly dangerous. In fact Bhutto himself admitted that "the Shah had been very insistent, even threatening and he promised us all sorts of economic and military help, much more than we actually got.

39. C.L. Sulzberger : "Belief in Crude Reality", New York Times, 22 April, 1973.

40. C.L. Sulzberger ; New York Times, October 5, 1975.

41. Bhabani Sen Gupta, fn. no. 23, p. 60.

He felt strongly that letting the Baluch have provincial self-Government was not only dangerous in itself, for Pakistan, but would give his Baluch dangerous ideas.⁴²

Thus the National Awami Party Ministry was overthrown; Mengal, Marri and Bizenjo were arrested and jailed and Iranian military help in terms of helicopters and the like rendered. Asked what role Shah had in the overthrow of the Ministry, Shutto replied that "The Shah wanted us to take strong action of course. It was a convenient way to please him, but we knew what we were doing. We knew what we wanted".⁴³

Four days before his arrest on August 16, 1973, the President of the Baluch Wing of National Awami Party Khair Bakhs Marri, described Baluchistan as being the focus for both great and regional power rivalry. He said that in the new pattern that is emerging, Baluchistan assumes vital significance. Americans and other Western powers have their eyes focussed on the Oil of Persian Gulf, which by way is a Baluchi Gulf all along the way with little 'Persian' about it. There is unlimited mineral wealth of Baluchistan and its long sea-coast tempting for many. Iran is trying

42. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 156.

43. Ibid.

to assume the role of a sub-imperialist power in the region and it is itching to make the best out of the chaos in Pakistan.⁴⁴

The tribesmen therefore, found themselves caught up in Cold War as well as regional feuds. Iraq's dispute with Iran is significant in this respect. Irritated by United States-backed Shah of Iran's blatant support of Kurdish rebels in Iraq's Northern mountains between 1968 and 1975, Iraq's Soviet-backed President Saddam Hussein countered by providing a haven for leaders of the pro-Soviet Baluch People's Liberation Front, and by supporting the appeal for 'Greater Baluchistan' in Baluchi language broadcasts over radio Baghdad as well as allegedly by supplying arms to Baluch guerrillas.⁴⁵

This provocative gesture towards Iran was a major concern for Shah and which explains Shah's support and assistance to Bhutto in quelling the rebellion.⁴⁶ The Algiers' Accord of 1975 did bring temporary resolution to the problem, but was soon abrogated by Iraq in 1980.

44. Lawrence Lifschultz : "The Strategic Equation", fn. no. 37.

45. Shirin-Tahir-Kheli : "External Dimensions of 'Regionalism' in Pakistan", The Contemporary Asia Review, 1, No. 1 (1977).

46. "Iranian and Pakistani Nightmares about Baluch and Pushtoon Secession", Organiser, 5 November 1978.

Infact the BPLF was fairly active until the Algiers agreement, when Iraq withdrew support to the Baluchis in return for Shah's promise not to provide help to anti-Iraqi Kurds.⁴⁷

In seeking security of its Eastern frontiers over the 'Pushtunistan' issue Iran also offered in 1975 to Afghanistan a \$ 2 billion aid package. However, in the wake of Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, Ayatullah Khomeini appeared visibly distressed at Iranian Baluch support of co-ethnic tribesmen fighting in Afghanistan and is as concerned as his predecessors were at keeping the country's lengthy and highly vulnerable Eastern boundary absolutely free of any provocation.⁴⁸ However as of today, the pre-occupation with its war with Iraq, has shifted this focus from the Baluch population in its country.

The Strategic Importance of South Asia for the United states is only too well-known. The area's proximity to the Soviet Union, China and the oil-rich Arab Gulf makes it too critical to allow for a policy of 'benign' neglect. For

47. The BPLF infact realised its mistake in relying heavily on support from Iraq and now seem determined to stand on their own. "with an open coastline which is poorly defended and guarded Baluchis (now) hope to receive a sizeable quantity of arms with funds raised by nearly half a million Baluchis employed gainfully in England and various countries of Europe as also the Gulf." The vulnerability of Iran after its war with Iraq is said to be exploited by the BPLF. It is now trying to contact ethnic minorities inside Iran for a coordination of their activities. Ahmed Malik : "Ideal Scenario for Baluch Struggle" Patriot, 9 October 1980.

48. Robert Wirsing, fn. no. 11, Chapter II, p. 14.

the West, therefore, the control of resources is not an economic but a military necessity.⁴⁹ Recent events in Pakistan have only proved the same. To recapitulate, Pakistan way back in the 1950s chose to become a "bastion of free world against Communism" without any real threat from it. Its 'reactionary role in international politics can be proved by its active membership of the SEATO and Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). From 1954 to 1965 the United States armed Pakistan and openly infiltrated its armed forces. On the name of 'defence against Communism', Pakistan was armed indiscriminately. The arms obviously were meant to be used against India. However, they were used more than once against Pakistan's own Baluch and Bengali population.

Not surprisingly therefore, Pakistan was viewed as a 'large US base' "designed to pressurize it into itself becoming a pliable client Republic, safeguarding Western interests".⁵⁰ The recent decision to equip Pakistan with up-to-date weaponry and resume aid on a massive scale can be seen as a security measure not just against India but more as a means of subjugating the recalcitrant 'tribesmen'.

49. Egbal Ahmed : "Pakistan's Role in the New U.S. Strategy", Frontier, August 25 and September 1, 1973.

50. Tariq Ali, fn. no. 29, Chapter I, p. 189.

The total aid now being earmarked for the rearmament of Pakistan's beleaguered and internally isolated military regime could well exceed past aid packages. American army and naval personnel have in fact made it clear that what the US needs above all is a number of military bases for its Rapid Deployment Force (RAF).⁵¹ Admiral Thomas Moorer, has even specified the name of the Port where the US would like a base. The US naval base sought is at Gwadar which would replace the facilities that the Americans have lost in Iran. By implication, Pakistan is the new policeman of the region and therefore acquired increased significance as far as US strategic interests are concerned. The strong demand for the reopening of Badaber base near Peshawar (used as an electronic surveillance centre earlier by the United States) establishes the same. There also seems the possibility that the Pakistani army could serve as a "proxy fighting force in the Gulf... provided once again that the United States undertakes to protect Pakistan from the consequences of such a decision."⁵²

Within Pakistan, the military-bureaucratic leaders view American military and economic aid as the instrument

51. Lawrence Lifschultz ; "Independent Baluchistan"⁷ fn. no. 69, Chapter IV.

52. Fukuyama, a State Department Strategist, Quoted in Lawrence Lifschultz ; "Ring Around the Gulf", Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 December, 1981.

which could restore discipline and stability, without realising that it could lead to a rapid move towards disintegration of the country.

The overriding regional obsession of the United States is not, Afghanistan but Iran and its oil. However it has vigorously used the Afghanistan issue for rearming Pakistan. The arms are obviously not going to be used against the Soviets nor against India. Such assistance would then be used internally against the Sindhis and the Baluch or would probably find its way to garrisons in Baluchistan alone, in anticipation of a "possible Soviet intervention". It could well add to the current polarisation of political forces in Baluchistan and would thus help create a more favourable attitude of the Baluch towards Soviet Union. Moreover, large-scale military inputs could accelerate the present tendency in the military-bureaucratic combine to think in terms of a military solution to the Baluch problem.⁵³ In a message to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bangladesh, the Communist Party of Pakistan wrote that "the whole of Baluchistan has been converted into a military contonment soon after the Revolution in Iran.... US troops (are) present near Makran in the Cha-Bahar, Gwadur and Ahmad Pasin Areas..."⁵⁴

53. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 201.

54. Cited in "US troops in Military camps in Baluchistan" Patriot, 6 March, 1980.

In its turn, Islamabad has used the Afghan crisis, not only to bolster its position vis-a-vis India but also to acquire more weapons from the United States, as well as aid to house the 'refugees'. America's own stands on Afghanistan has had the effect of accentuating the crisis which is what she wants - to bring down the Soviet Union in world public opinion - without giving a cursory glance at its own policies all over the world especially in Latin America. It has definitely had the effect of tying the Soviets down in Afghanistan, without seeking a more political solution by suspending its crusade against Soviet Union. Its military aid to the resistance in Afghanistan is indeed a risky gamble with the effect of an accentuating of Cold War in the region.

Thus the implicit excuse for increasing the garrison strength not only in Pakistan in general but Baluchistan specifically, has been given as the worsening situation in Iran and the revolution in Afghanistan, as also a defence against the anti-national elements in Baluchistan. However, most of the suspicion in Baluchistan may be officially inspired to create a smokescreen for a new type of defence treaty in which China may play a pivotal role instead of the CENTO and America.⁵⁵

55. Newspaper accounts on the presence of Chinese experts in the Makran coast to build a major naval base in corporation with America and the Gulf, have it seems

Indian policy towards the Baluch has never been very specific. During periods of tensions she may have tried to manipulate the non-Punjabi minorities in Pakistan or supported the Baluch Sindhi or Pushtun, as a means of exerting pressure on Pakistan. However its support has been primarily verbal and has been on a decrease since mid-1970s. Some are of the view that should joint US-China-Pakistan military ties increase, India would 'renew' its efforts at 'destabilizing' Pakistan.⁵⁶ Yet this seems unlikely since India would at present much rather have a single regime in the neighbourhood rather than be bothered later with a number of small states each susceptible to imperialist pressures and domination.

cont...

been reported. A report in Blitz also noted that Pakistan is in close touch with the major countries of the subcontinent except India and Afghanistan to form an Asian Treaty Organisation for defence and development. Dewan Berindranath, "Pakistan s New Bangladesh", Blitz, 4 November 1978.

56. Selig Harrison : In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 204.

C O N C L U S I O N

The issue which remains to be established is whether the problem in Baluchistan is a nationality problem or a class question. It is rather difficult to distinguish between genuine questions of nationality from mere nationalist obfuscation quite rampant as of today. For, the creation of a 'nation' is a historical phenomenon belonging to a particular period in history when a new mode of production and consequently new relations of productions are established. It was the demand as well as a necessity therefore of rising capitalism to cut out spheres of interests corresponding to cultural linguistic and economic ties, Nations have developed in the present phase too, yet by the very logic that they develop at a late stage when capitalism in the world as such is in its decadent form, goes to highlight the consequent distorted formations of most of these late comers (as seen in Chapter I). The Baluch case may seem some what similar, yet, one cannot overlook the impelling factors behind their demand. What however needs to be established in the light of the given circumstances, of forces of production within Baluchistan is, as to whether their claim as a nationality is justified. Or is it just simply another demand by a nascent deprived

bourgeois-feudal group. For this one must necessarily analyse the Baluch case with the help of certain indicators. But before this, it is imperative to first investigate the level of economic development/neglect brought about by the Punjabi military-bureaucratic combine in Baluchistan.

Baluchistan occupies two-fifth of the land area of Pakistan, while its population is barely 3.7 per cent of the total population of the country. It contributes 6.3 per cent of the total cultivated area in the country and its share in national production of major crops is hardly one per cent, as against 88 per cent in North-West-Frontier Province, 32.9 per cent in Sind and 66.3 per cent in Punjab. Baluchistan contribution to large scale manufacturing stood at 0.4 per cent as against 6.8 per cent of North-West-Frontier Province, 50 per cent of Sind and 42.8 per cent of Punjab.¹

Baluchistan today, is Pakistan's most impoverished province. In 1976, the per capita income of the province was only \$ 54 per year compared to \$ 80 for Punjab, \$ 78 for Sind and \$ 60 for North-West-Frontier Province.²

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1. A.T. Chaudri, "Baluchistan under Federal Rule", Dawn (Karachi 4 January 1976).
 2. Shohid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto (New York: St Martin's, 1980), Table 5.1, p. 94, See Appendix Table 6.

However, its share in gross domestic product of mineral resources is as much as that of Punjab and eight times that of Sind and North-West-Frontier Province.³ Its literacy rate is only 6 to 9 per cent while the national average is 16 per cent.⁴ Life expectancy in rural Baluchistan was only forty-two years in 1977 as against the national average of sixty.⁵

Apart from this gloomy picture, neglect combined with 'exploitative' development is rampant in Baluchistan. The most controversial issue is the Sui gas fields. Originally developed by the British firms in 1953, they are for all practical purposes controlled by the central government. It provides more than 80 per cent of Pakistan's total gas production, 30 per cent of the country's energy requirements and saves an estimated Rs. 2,000 million annually in foreign exchange.⁶ Yet royalties to Baluchistan from the Sui gas production is only \$ 1.23 million during 1978-80.⁷ Most

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3. A.T. Chaudri, fn. no.1.
 4. Census of Pakistan, fn. no. 3 Chapter II.
 5. Robert G. Wirsing, "South Asia: The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan" in Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives (ed.) R. Wirsing (New York Permegon), p. 18.
 6. "Sui Gas as a Source of Fuel and Energy", Public Opinion Trends Analysis and News Service, Vol. IV, Part 165, Dec. 11, 1976.
 7. Cited in Selig Harrison, fn. no. 9, Chapter II.

of the gas from these fields have been piped either to Punjab, North-West-Frontier Province or to Sind. Similarly the Pirkoh gas fields have been earmarked for these very centres.

As far as the ten coal mines in Baluchistan is concerned, all of them are owned by non-Baluchis. Most of the coal again is supplied elsewhere with the Baluch having to buy coal at exorbitant rates since within the province the commodity is near scarce. The resultant use of open kerosene lamps has resulted in a high rate of accidents, highest in the world.⁸

However, marble quarrying in Baluchistan is the only industry which is a Baluch monopoly. It is held by the Baluch entrepreneur, Nabi Bahsh Zehri who is for all practical purposes a pro-Islamabad henchman. There are however some other Baluch businessmen, like Akber Y. Mustikhan who support the nationalist movement and are increasingly turning political. After assuming office one of the first announcements of the NAP-JUI ministry was to nationalise this sector and shift carving operations to several new factories within Baluchistan itself.

8. Cited in *Ibid*, from Mir Khuda Bahsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan, (Karachi, Royal Book Company 1974), pp. 269-71.

For the Baluch therefore development exists but is almost entirely exploitative in nature and the Punjabis more than any one have monopolised the rapidly depleting resources in Baluchistan.

This discrimination exists practically at all levels. The Baluch are grossly under represented in civil service jobs and therefore can exert only very minimal influence on government's economic policies towards the province. There was one Baluch among the twenty state officials holding the rank of departmental secretary and one Baluch was a director; none among the four local commissioners and only one among the sixteen deputy commissioners.⁹ The inspector general of police and his four deputies were non-Baluch as also 70 per cent of the police force.¹⁰ Even in the army despite Zia government's claim that a large number of Baluch have been recruited yet closer examination reveals only minimal representation of both the Sindhis as well as the Baluch.¹¹

9. Usmila Phadnis, fn. no. 2, Chapter II.

10. Even this figure may be exaggerated as many of the Baluch in the civil services are actually Baluchistani Pashtuns.

11. This is practically a continuation of the British policies followed in the region. The British considered Baluchis to be traitorous and 'namak-haram'. Thereafter while Baluch regiments continued to be prominent in the British-Indian Army, they did not have any Baluchis in them, only Punjabis and Pathans. Rakshat Puri; "The Baluch Cockpit", Hindustan Times, 13 August 1981.

Apart from this, the Pakistani governmental sources claim that several development projects have been started, costing the government \$ 1.97 billion. The special Development Plan as it is called, includes \$ 165 million in road construction; \$ 147 million in railroad construction; a \$300 million copper mining project at Saindak; a \$ 200 million iron mine at Chagai; a \$ 67 million natural gas pipe line providing Sui gas to Quetta as well as many other projects in the fields of education, irrigation and rural electrification. World Bank assistance was sought yet the fate of most of the projects remain uncertain and the Baluch nationalist question the returns these would bring to Baluchistan in terms of money as well as jobs. Also they want an assurance that smelting and processing facility for the Saindak project be set up in Baluchistan itself which does not quite seem acceptable to the Islamabad planners.¹²

According to a United Nations study, the Saindak ore deposits are likely to yield not only 412 million tons of copper but also gold, silver, pyrite, magnetite and other minerals. Yet there seems to be little effort at any

12. "Riches on a Troubled Border" Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 March, 1980.

any exploration worthy of mentioning.¹³

As far as road construction is concerned, this is the only area where the government has shown 'spectacular success'. The effort was in continuation of past rulers as well as the British. Their location ran contrary to the economic priorities of the province. As mentioned in Chapter III, they have been built to suit the needs of the non-Baluchi industrialists as well as to penetrate the inaccessible guerilla strongholds.

In the field of power generation, in 1972 the total electric power generation capacity in Quetta and the surrounding thirty square mile area was 17.5 million watts and in the rest of the province only 15 million. By 1976, this increased to 40 million watts with the installation of a 25 million watt gas turbine in Quetta.

In the sphere of education (as mentioned in Chapter III) Islamabad authorities quote that between 1948 and 1978, the number of primary schools rose from 186 to 2,372; secondary schools from 23 to 426; with 19 junior colleges, 9 colleges 5 technical colleges and the Baluchistan

13. Cited in Selig Harrison, *et al.*, from "A Note on the Resource Development Corporation's Saindak Porphyry Copper Deposits, Chagai District, Baluchistan", U.S. Embassy, Rawalpindi.

University being established. The number of educational institutions has increased to 2,848 with 18,500 students enrolled in them.¹⁴

However, most of these as mentioned before were hurried projects to remove doubts from the minds of Baluch of neglect of the province. As a result of this the conditions in which some of these institutions are functioning is pathetic with hardly any basic facilities being provided.

The fact is therefore established, that Baluchistan does possess adequate natural resources to base its demand for independence. Yet exploration has not been extensive enough to establish, definitely the viability of an independent Baluchistan. Pakistani official sources claim that the province has been getting more than its share of developmental assistance.¹⁵

Ridiculing such a patronising attitude of the centre and reiterating their economic capacity, should Pakistan agree to form a confederation, Mengal stated that each of

14. Selig Harrison, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 167.

15. The Report on the achievements of Baluch government stated that Islamabad has always adopted a preferential treatment towards Baluchistan. In 1975-76 it stated that the central government gave Baluchistan special subventions totalling \$ 5 million. In 1976-77 this rose to \$ 19 million. By 1978-79 it again rose to \$ 24.8 million with an annual budgetry deficit covered by Islamabad reaching to \$ 28.2 million. Achievements of Peoples Government 1972-76; Baluchistan (Islamabad Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1976), p. 6-7. and White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 33, fn. no. 25, Chapter. III.

Pakistan's four provinces would have to raise most of its revenues which would vary in accordance with their respective population, size and natural resources" Baluchistan would make up for its little returns from income tax by the exploitation of its resources, Sui gas being the most important source and which could yield \$ 35 million annually.¹⁶ Another major source of income the Baluch point out are the Saindak copper deposits which could yield \$ 100 million annually in foreign exchange. Similarly the Gadani ship repair yard could also provide a source of income. There is also the 750 mile long Baluch coastline which could provide the growth of modern fishing industry. What however could also be advantageous to the Baluch is the fact of a low population density in the province.

However according to Harrison, geological evidence available may not go that far, as far as resources in the province is concerned. Even in the event of possible discoveries, the cost of exploration and transportation of mineral deposits may prove to be too high for an 'Independent Baluchistan' to afford. Foreign assistance would lead to mere replacement of Punjabi rulers to Imperialist domination in the new state.

16. Interview with Selig Harrison in Selig Harrison, fn. no. 9, Chapter II.

However the fact remains that for most of the projects started in Baluchistan foreign assistance was necessarily required. This was so especially in the case of oil drilling when AMOCO the American oil drilling company was given the lease to drill oil in the province. Prospects seemed good, yet the AMOCO withdrew from the project primarily due to the instability that rocked the region in the 1970s. Most other companies in fact are reticent in investing in the region for precisely the same factors. They required a complete stable infrastructure of roads, pipelines, electricity, housing and water supply which could not exist given the guerilla's attempts to stall any such operations.

Apart from the Bambore-Pirokh - Dhodak golden triangle given to AMOCO, Murphy Oil has held a 10,500 - square mile concession area, exploration of which was again suspended. Nationalist Leaders blame this suspension on the imperialists. The Khan of Kalat argued that drilling of oil in Baluch areas would make the Iranian oil fields run dry since they are located at a lower level and are linked to the Baluch oil fields. This would obviously hamper American interest in Iran.¹⁷

17. Ibid, p. 171.

Thus a number of regional global as well as other internal factors have determined the state of affairs in Baluchistan today. Conflicting reports on the possession/non-possession of adequate resources for an Independent Baluchistan have ridden the issue and has led many to analyse other factors essential for the development of an independent state.

Secondly, another serious setback to the nationalist dream is the widespread dispersion of the Baluch population as mentioned in Chapter II. The majority of the Baluch live outside Baluchistan, most conspicuously in Karachi and Western districts of Sind. Apart from this they have even migrated to countries in West Asia, the Gulf and East Africa.¹⁸ The reasons for migration are several. Many of the Baluch migrated in search of jobs to the industrial areas of Sind and Karachi. Others were forced to flee during the 1973-77 insurgency. There was also the conscious policy of Islamabad to dilute the Baluch population, partly to house the growing Punjabi population and more specifically to dilute nationalist feelings of the Baluch.

18. According to some nationalists, migration of Baluchis from Baluchistan began way back in the sixteenth century when the thirty-year old tussel between the Rind and Lashari led to a complete disintegration of the Baluchi tribe who were then compelled to migrate over to the interior of Sind, Punjab and Delhi as well as to Junagarh Mysore and Deccan in the South. Sir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, Royal Book Company 1975), p. 67.

Figures showing the rate of migration as well as the number of Baluch population staying within the State and outside are a matter of controversy (See Appendix 4 & 5). A large discrepancy exists between the official figures and those quoted by the nationalists. The Khan of Kalat while reiterating that the Baluchis are a single communal unit despite the dispersed nature of their settlement, quoted a figure as high as 30 million Baluch in the world.¹⁹ Other sources claim that the figure does not rise above 18 million. By contrast, official estimates in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan refuse to acknowledge a Baluch population of more than 3.2 million, and within Pakistan about 55 per cent or 1.257 million.²⁰

Ridiculing the nature of the census taken in 1961 as well as 1971 (see Chapter II) nationalists claim about 2.2 million Baluch population within the province and as many living in other parts of Pakistan. Mir Ali Ahmed Talpur²¹ infact raised this optimism by stating that thirteen of the twenty-seven members elected to the Sind State Assembly in 1970 were of Baluch origin though they

19. Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, Ibid, p. 207.

20. Cited in Selig Harrison, fn. no. 9, Chapter, II, p. 176.

21. Who served as defence minister in Zia's cabinet.

may not ^{have} known the language. Punjab too holds a significantly large Baluch population especially after the uranium discoveries in Dera Ghazi Khan district. Selig Harrison estimates an overall Baluch population of 3.65 million people with 2 million Baluch in Baluchistan, 1.4 million in Sind and about 25,000 in Punjab, "who identify themselves as Baluch, speak Baluchi and function politically as part of the Baluch community."²²

Thus although their number seems sufficient to establish a full fledged state, yet the fact that almost half of them have begun to reside outside the province casts a disquieting shadow over their nationalist potential. It is difficult to reverse history not only by the logic of its advancement but also by the determination of the Islamabad authorities to prevent any further dismemberment by resettling the Baluchi population back in their province. There would obviously emerge a paucity of labour force in most of the industrial areas of Karachi and Sind. But more than that it would require a whole industrial infrastructure within Baluchistan - something not desired nor feasible with the present state of the Pakistani economy. Despite Baluch nationalist optimism that those who have migrated would return due to the near poor

22. Selig Harrison, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 177.

conditions in which they stay as labourers in the industrial areas there seems little possibility as the new situation in a new Baluch state would be able to offer no better conditions. Moreover most of those who have migrated have become more a part of the place where they have come to reside and have little Baluch left about them. This is especially so of those who migrated to Sind two or three decades ago, who have adopted the language and culture of Sind. Border areas where the Sindhis and Baluch mix freely could also be a bone of contention for both provinces especially since the Guddur Banage is located in the Jacobabad district and where any plans of partition can be stalled.

However contrary to this, some have even toyed with the idea of a Sindhi-Baluch federation which according to them could be a plausible alternative, given the already existing industrial base, a thriving established port in Karachi and the abundance of natural resources in Baluchistan. Recent events in Pakistan have heightened the hopes of those who think that this is possible. Mengal himself claimed to be closely associated with the Sindhi nationalists and, should hopes of a federation fail, he stated that the Baluch would rightfully claim areas of Sind and Dera Ghazi Khan in Punjab.²³

23. Lawrence Lifschultz, Independent Baluchistan, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XVIII, Annual No. 1983.

Thirdly, experience of nationalist movements elsewhere, as also in the Indian case, shows that it has been easier to unite against a common enemy during an independence struggle than it is to consolidate that unity afterwards in a new state. This seems more than applicable in the Baluch case since the extent of tribalism goes beyond the division of the Baluch society into seventeen distinct tribes in keen competition with one another. Politically this is seen for instance, in the lack of agreement over the symbolism to be adopted by the nationalist movement. One group places Mir Chakar Rind as the most 'nationalist' among the heroes. Another group (Brahuis) regards Nasir Khan as the principal symbol of Baluch nationalism. Still others throw in a few more heroes in the fray.

The question of Baluch-Brahuis relationship also is a problem which the Baluchi nationalists are keen to resolve. Brahui identity is regarded as separate by some, but more by the Islamabad authorities who according to the nationalists has sought to create a wedge between the two. By and large the Brahuis are regarded by most as a part of Baluchistan and as one of the original Baluch tribes that migrated from Aleppo²⁴ (as mentioned in Chapter II)

24. This view is held by the last Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, fn. no. 18.

Other nationalist historians view that the Brahuīs were among the early Baluch tribes and have close ethnic links with the Baluch.²⁵

Evidence however exists that the Brahuīs have assimilated to a large extent into the larger cultural, social and political stream of Baluch life and have started to regard themselves as Baluch. Many similarities in culture, tradition and political organization between the two exist and the only distinction is the linguistic difference. Some controversy exists as to whether the Baluch language and the Brahui counterpart could be classified into a single language or not.²⁶ The Brahui speak a language which is far advanced in terms of script than the Baluches and which contains Dravidian syntactical and lexical elements not found in Baluchi. On the other hand many point towards a tradition of heavy borrowings by the two from each of their languages. For them, Brahui

25. Feroz Ahmed, Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon Question, Lahore, People's Publishing House 1975, p. 16.

26. Nina Swidler, "Brahui Political Organization and the National State" in Pakistan's Western Borderlands (ed) Ainslie T. Embree (Durham NC. Carolins Academy Press, 1977), p. 112. The language issue provoked a brief controversy during the NAP regime in Baluchistan. Mengal it seems agreed to the designation of Urdu as the official language of the state government thus temporarily setting aside the choice between Baluchi, Brahui and Pashtu.

is gradually converging with Baluchi and has lost its separate identity.

Conversely, the Baluch nationalists intellectuals have started to develop a standardized Baluch language and a commonly accepted script as part of their nationalist activities. Dialectical (in terms of dialect) differences between tribes has resulted in a linguistic confusion reflected in Baluch literature, journals and newspapers. As mentioned in Chapter II, six major regional dialects are discernable ; the eastern Hill, Rak Shani Sarawani, Kachhi, Lotuni and Coastal, although each of them are similar in many respects. Apart from this, there is also the use of Brahui as well as Arabic Persian and Urdu. Since the latter languages are far more developed literarily, Baluch literary circles therefore depend on heavy borrowings much against the chagrin of the advocates of 'pure' Baluchi. Yet institutions like the Baluchi Academy in Quetta and Baluchi broadcasts from Radio Karachi Radio Quetta, Radio Zahedan in Iran and Radio Kabul in Afghanistan have exerted some pressure towards standardizing the Baluchi language.²⁷

The main difficulty in this standardization efforts lies in the fact that the Baluchi script developed very late and more often than not, the Persian or Arabic

27. Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, fn. no. 9, Chapter II, p. 186.

alphabets were used to write. Baluchi. In 1969 however, as an outgrowth of the nationalist movement, Baluchi alphabets was evolved consisting of thirty seven letters plus diacritics and special symbols known as the 'Nastaliq' script by some nationalist scholars.²⁸ It was described by them as a modified form of Persianized Nastaliq style of the Arabic alphabet adapted to the sounds of Baluchi. Problems again cropped up when a few Baluch[†] writers rejected the script. Other nationalists advocated the use of Roman script, first attempted by M. Longworth Dames in his anthology of Baluch literature (1907). Protests against this even came from the National Awami Party sources.

Fourthly, as mentioned in Chapter II, religious differences between the Sunni Baluch majority and Zikri Baluch of the coastal areas of Makran and Karachi exists and has led to Sunni repression of the Zikris since about the fifteenth century.²⁹ The late 1970s saw religious riots between the two in parts of Makran. Yet most of the Zikris

28. These were Mengal and Barker whose book was known as A Course in Baluchi.

29. The Zikris believe in the Messiah Nuo Pak whose teachings are believed to supercede those of Prophet Mohammed's. Stephen Pastner "Power and Pirs among the Pakistani Baluch, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 13 Nos. 3-4 (1978).

are equally nationalist and pro-Baluch in their attitudes and in times of crisis have more willingly than not sided with the nationalists.

Fifthly, ever since the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, many have begun to compare Baluchistan to Bangladesh, predicting an inevitable emergence of an independent Baluchistan. This comparison could be valid if the psychological alienation and anger from and towards Islamabad is taken into consideration. Yet a closer examination highlights the dissimilarities as well as the impossibilities of any such solution.

(a) As mentioned before within Baluchistan the Baluch are in a minority and there is a widespread dispersion of population elsewhere to the other provinces. By contrast, the Bengalis had a relatively homogenous society; they constituted nearly 98 per cent of the population in erstwhile East Pakistan and very few Bengalis lived in West Pakistan.

(b) Linguistically, the Bengali language was rich, and highly developed and was the spoken language of almost all in East Bengal. They had a well developed script, and was considered as the most advanced language even as far back as in United India. The Baluchi dialect is more confined and is heavily borrowed from Bzahui and other

regional dialects. Moreover, there exists some parochialism in language usage between the Baluchi and Brahui. The Baluchi was till late, written in either Roman or Arabic script and it is only as late as 1969, that a script called Nastaliq has been developed. It has yet to become popular, given the controversy around it of whether it should be accepted or not.

(c) The Bengalis have a high level of cultural and literary life, apart from a standardized language. The Baluchi on the otherhand are culturally beset with tribal loyalties which more often then not proves them to be highly disorganized. Antagonism between tribal and cultural heads still continues to divide the Baluch society, which has a severe impact in their capacity to organize politically. The nationalist movement itself is divided on the basis of tribal loyalties.

(d) Because of the nature of development perpetrated by the Pakistani military-bureaucratic elite, and also because of the social structure, that faced very few changes with the changes in political rulers, the level of political consciousness of the people remained extremely low. The object poverty which the Baluch masses had to face resulted in almost nil mass participation in political life. Until recently nationalist rhetoric was voiced by only those

from the feudal aristocracy who could well afford to have their education either abroad or in other provinces, as a result of which they were exposed to many progressive ideas and ideologies. At the same time it was imperative for this nobility to remain a nobility, and for this the politicization of the masses was dangerous. It is precisely for this that there emerged no mass participation or even an organised nationalism^(as mentioned in Chapter IV). Moreover, the tribal nobility could not transform themselves into full fledged capitalists due to several reasons (discussed a little later). There emerged no middle class or indigenous Baluch bourgeoisie capable of spearheading a movement or presiding over a new nation. Their weakness as a class was a regressive feature.

On the other hand, although the policies followed by the Pakistan national elite was by far the same, productive forces in Bangladesh were much more developed albeit owned by non Bengalis. The fact that Bengal was the province from which the British began their activity (the time factor) explains the development in the area in terms of industrialization. As a result of this, there also existed a significant Bengali middle class which faced a keen competition from the Punjabi entrepreneurs. Also because of this was the general high level of political consciousness since the anti-imperialist movement was

strong here. Antagonism against the Punjabis was therefore at a mass level. Political consciousness and participation was consequently very high. There also arose several bourgeois parties, the National Awami Party spearheading the movement against the Punjabis.

(e) As a result of the above reasons, the communist strength in East Pakistan was strong. There were Communist parties although most of them were divided and Marxist-Leninist in their ideology. Yet their support was very important and significant. In Baluchistan communists, are weak primarily due to the degree of obscurantism and conservatism they have to fight against. Individual leaders sound progressive and communistic in their thinking but this it seems stays at that level only and in practice most of them have still to overcome their tribalism. Moreover, Communist Parties here too are divided. This has prevented them from giving the impression of an organised force.

(f) Last but not the least, militarily, the Bangladesh independence forces were not only protected by the physical separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan by more than 1,000 miles of Indian territory, but they also received substantial assistance from the Indian army in the critical stages of their struggle. Baluchistan on the contrary is directly exposed to the adjacent provinces

of Pakistan and Iran, whose interest lies contrary to the creation of an independent Baluchistan. Aid from foreign sources for an independent state is yet to arrive.

Sixthly and another important aspect that should be taken into consideration is the fact that for some Marxist scholars³⁰ it is not the national question but more a class question involved in Baluchistan. Closely linked to this class question is the agrarian question, the roots of which lie in the British policies especially the Sandeman system, which had far reaching impact on the social structure in Baluchistan. Specific impact of the system has been dealt with in Chapter III. In general, the pull of the system was two-fold. One, the ability of the sardar to extend himself outside his own fief was severely curtailed. On the other hand, his stature was considerably raised within his own community. Not only was he liberally financed and given new rights, through the 'royal jirga' and Levies corps,³¹ he could^{also} extract all possible wealth. Hence there was a

30. Like Feroz Ahmed and Aijaz Ahmed.

31. 'Jirga' was the adjudicating assembly or a communal court to dispense participatory justice. This jirga was made into Shahi (royal) jirga by the British, in which only the Sardars and the aristocracy could sit. 'Levies Corps' was organized by recruiting tribal personnel under the power of the Sardars who were paid all the expenses to run this corps sometimes even without the Sardar paying them.

severe acceleration of class contradiction between the Sardars, who were allied mercenaries of British imperialism and the masses of Baluchistan who were exploited by them. Furthermore, since British interest in the area were not primarily economic in nature, the surplus was again appropriated by this. Semi-feudal aristocracy represented by the Sardars. Moreover, the anti-imperialist struggle became objectively speaking a struggle for greater power of the Sardars with the result that they became even more powerful.

Second, the only requirement of the British of stationing garrisons in Baluchistan created very many cities out of small principalities by displacing the native population, evicting them from land and as such forcing them to adopt nomadism as a way of life.³² This created a class of landless people who soon joined the lowest stratum of the 'new' proletariat in the servicing and construction sectors, if they did not migrate to Sindh and other places. Having neither skill nor experience and capital, they failed to join the rising entrepreneurial class of the new cities, which was more often than not

32. The principality of Shal, for instance is a good example where an entirely new city called Quetta arose within a few years. This could also be one of the reasons as to why migration occurred in Baluchistan.

imported, mostly from Punjab or Sind or the Hindu entrepreneurial class from Shikarpur. These external groups played a dominant role in Baluchistan's urban economy from the very outset.

Thus we had a class or social structure in Baluchistan, where on the one hand, the Sardar wallowed in his new found wealth in the agrarian sector, on the other hand non-Baluchis became the first bourgeoisie of Baluchistan. The Sardar himself was still caught between his transition from the tribal to the feudal and therefore could not master the resources and the techniques to become a bourgeoisie himself. Somewhere below this was the ordinary labouring Baluch.

As a corollary of this structure, Baluchistani agriculture stagnated under the Sardari system as against the urban dynamic sector of the Baluchi economy which was dominated by non-Baluchis. This pattern of pre-dominance by non-Baluchis over the economy of the area was first established by the British and has continued ever since. It is seen by many as a necessary consequence of the Sardari system which made the Baluchistan economy stagnate as a whole. "More specifically, it should be seen as a victory of the more developed feudal and entrepreneurial economies of adjacent provinces over the

underdeveloped feudalism of Baluchistan, the underdevelopment supervised by the Sardars them selves which rendered untenable the urban economy where the Sardars were absent as well as the rural economy where they were present. Impoverishment of rural Baluchistan and the dominance of urban Baluchistan by non-Baluchis are parts of an indivisible whole."³³ Accordingly, since the elite of Baluchistan is weak as a class, "if allowed to spearhead a nationalist movement it would still emerge as being dependent."³⁴

It is here then, that one can understand the developed bureaucratic capital of Punjab and Sind willing to accept them as junior partners rather than equal competitors; of the refusal of the sardars to accept this secondary role; of the attempts by the Sardars to mobilise the masses against the encroachment on their priveledges; and of the first organized manifestation of Baluch nationalism during the Ayub era.

Resistance in Baluchistan was therefore intially organized largely around the issue of the restoration of feudal corrupt backward state of Kalat, hence the

33. Aijaz Ahmed: The National Question in Baluchistan in fn. no. 25, pp. 26.

34. Ibid, p. 28.

resistance to the abolition of Jagirdari and the battles fought in the class interest of the Sardars - in the defence of feudalism.³⁵ The result - "propping up the leading Sardars of the insurrection as the leaders of Baluchistan today" by retaining their Sardaris and gaining political legitimacy too.³⁶

Closely related to this is the agrarian question in Baluchistan. It has already been established that there was no smooth transition from the rural to the urban structure in Baluchistan. Since cities were more artificially grafted agriculture simply became a supplier of these cities without any transformation of the Baluchi society as a whole. Secondly, because of the existence of such a market economy the Sardars could appropriate the maximum as well as displace or evict peasants from land. By the Jagirdari system, the majority of the population had practically no proprietary rights and were simple landless labour-tied to the Jagirdar-with extra economic links. Each Sardar and Jagirdar had the right to fix taxes in his own area, as a result of which there developed no uniform system of taxation which in effect continues to this day.

35. Aijaz Ahmed, "Baluchistan's Agrarian Question", in fn. no. 25, p. 54.

36. Aijaz Ahmed, fn. no. 25, p.31.

Thirdly, the class contradictions resulting from the increasing polarization between feudals and rural labour has affected Baluchis and non Baluchis alike. In Makran for instance the almost entire Baluch population possesses no rights and is wholly under the Sardar's command. Yet, in areas like Jhalawan, the Brahui chieftans relegated the non Brahui population to the status of serfs. Therefore there existed a system of oppression which went far beyond a simple national question and brought the class question to the fore. In the towns too, if the rising bourgeoisie was non Baluchi so were the workers, mainly migrants. Similarly just as Parchas (a non-Baluchi family) have substantial investments in the area and extract considerable profit, so also do the Baluch entrepreneurs especially in the mining sector where the Swatis and Hazarris are the most exploited groups.³⁷

However, the most fundamental fact about Baluch society as mentioned before is that it is still in a transition from tribalism to feudalism, "a transition wherein the productive forces have reached the feudal stage a little more fully than has the nomenclature, myth, ideology etc. that pertains to the reality of this maturing feudalistic tendency."³⁸ This produced certain contradictions pertaining especially to the agrarian sector.

37. Ibid, p. 34.

38. Ibid, p. 35.

Firstly, as a result of the fact, that neither the British nor the Pakistani authorities introduced any viable land reforms, land continued to belong to the tribe. Customarily, the Sardar leased out the land to an intermediary or 'lathband' who organized the rural labour 'Khet Mazdoor', for cultivation of the land. Portions of the produce was claimed by both the Sardar as well as this lathband. This ambiguity as to whether it was the Sardar or the intermediary or the Peasant who owned land was in fact never resolved in legal terms and constitutes one of the major contradictions today.

Secondly the use of intermediary^{and} the conspicuous consumption of the sardars of the surplus did not result in growth of the agrarian economy in terms of reinvestment of the accumulated capital/surplus back into the agriculture. On the contrary it resulted in absenteeism or a kind of absentee landlordism practiced by the Sardars, as also a very specific discrepancy between the forces of production and relations of production. The majority of the Baluchistani peasants and rural workers lived below subsistence level. The fact that the Sardars conspicuous consumption existed almost entirely outside the province, it resulted in the stagnation of the rural economy in general. Thus largely detached from productive process and existing merely as a parasite, the Sardar was incapable of propelling the next phase of development, that is, the bourgeois phase.

According to Aijaz Ahmed, therefore, the Sardars feel a double pull. First they would like to complete their unequivocal transition from the tribal to the feudal stage, from a semblance of communal ownership of land to clear cut proprietorship.³⁹ On the other hand, they would like to become junior partners of the Karachi capitalists. "...they would like to consolidate their feudal status, would use this status to gain political power and use that power, in turn, to purchase their rights to profits by bartering manufacturing and mining rights in Baluchistan for partnership in industries for which the capital would have come from Karachi."⁴⁰

The need for capital from outside is of course a dire necessity, for if not from senior non-Bahchi capitalists, they would have to depend on capital from New York, or London. Either way they are going to be dependent, given the level of economy as well as their inability to produce large enough surpluses in the agricultural sector,⁴⁰ result in any viable reinvestment.

39. Hence, the Bill which the NAP government sent to the Central Government on the abolition of Sardari System. It was because of the wish to become legal proprietors that they managed to bribe the bureaucracy into entering their names into the revenue records as proprietors.

40. Aijaz Ahmed, fn. no. 33, p. 38.

It is precisely these options open for the Sardars. Because they lack cohesion as a class, they have adopted different ways of solving the problem.⁴¹ The inherent weakness and fragmentation has, in general, prevented them from unitedly fighting out their foes or unitedly chalking out a course of action.

The agrarian question and the Sardari system is therefore regarded as the root of underdevelopment in Baluchistan. This together with the fact, that the nature of class and state structure in Pakistan, has belied any hopes of a fair development in Baluchistan. The rural masses of the province therefore face a double oppression - from their own regional ruling elite and with the national elite as well. Subjectively, there exists a conflict between the two. Objectively as far as the oppressed are concerned, they share a common interest as allies.

Are the Baluch then going to be exploited and degraded by the Baluch tribal-feudal-capitalistic Sardars in a new Baluch state? Are they going to be further suppressed by imperial capital necessarily required by a small nascent state? Is the new Baluch state going to evict non-Baluchi workers that throng the Baluch industrial areas and displace them from their place of settlement? Will the new Baluch state create communal and regional

41. This explains that while Ataulh Mengal and Khaik Baksh Marri have given up working for a truly federal structure, Bizenjo and others have involved themselves actively in the Movement for restoration of Democracy signifying that they still see the solution within a

antagonism between the Baluchi peasants and industrial labouring classes and the Punjabi Pushtoon and Sindhi workers who are already poor and desperate? Or, is it possible to look at the Baluch² problem more humanly by including also those poor degraded non-Baluchi population who experience the same amount of humiliation and poverty as their Baluchi counterparts? With this last factor in mind, the probably solution could lie in an overall structural change with the combined efforts of three distinct yet complimentary structures, the agrarian labour (which is almost entirely Baluchi), the labour in the mines (predominantly non-Baluchi) and the Baluchi labour scattered all over Karachi, the western districts of Sindh and even parts of Punjab.

It must also be taken into consideration, that even if Baluchistan forms itself into a separate state, the jaws of Punjabi colonialism will obviously increase in Sind and Pashtun areas, which would give their already existing nationalist movements enough reasons for further dismemberment of Pakistan. The Bangladesh example has proved amply well that the military bureaucratic regime dominated by the Punjabis did not learn any lessons.

cont... federal Pakistan.

Infact the drive of capitalism in the Third World is such that unless completely destroyed, uneven economic development would continue and consequently successionist demands and breaking away of parts of territories as new states would continue. Would it then be advisable for progressive forces to have a number of small vulnerable state so prized by Imperialism? The choice, if one is allowed to make should be instead, of a struggle, opposed both to the regional feudal lords as well as to the overall military-bureaucratic-feudal elite of Pakistan as a whole, in order, that there emerges, as a result of this struggle, a truly democratic united federal Pakistan. Bizenjo's involvement in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy is a welcome signal. It shows the willingness of some of the nationalists to involve themselves in Pakistani affairs and as part of the Pakistani state. Bizenjo's demand for the restoration of autonomy of provinces as stated in the 1973 constitution, rather than working for an overall structural change, might not seem too encouraging. But if the present conditions in Pakistan persists, the movement for Restoration of Democracy might well turn increasingly radicle and work for a socialist Pakistan.

Table No. 1

POPULATION ACCORDING TO MOTHER TONGUE IN PAKISTAN, 1961

Language	No. of Speakers	Percentage of Total
Punjabi	26,186,000	66.39
Pashtu	3,340,000	8.47
Sindhi	4,964,000	12.59
Urdu	2,988,000	7.57
Baluchi	983,000	2.49
Brahui	366,000	0.93
Bengali*	46,000	0.12
Persian	26,000	0.07
English	17,000	0.04
Arabic	3,000	0.01
Others	523,000	1.32

TOTAL	39,442,000	100.00

*East Pakistan is excluded from this tabulation.

Source: Government of Pakistan, Office of Census Commissioner, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961.

Table No. 2

POPULATION ACCORDING TO MOTHER TONGUE
IN BALUCHISTAN (PAKISTAN), 1961

Language	No. of Speakers	Percentage of Total
Baluchi	420,431	33.50
Pashtu	351,041	28.00
Brahui	197,568	15.70
Sindhi	152,947	12.20
Punjabi	90,221	7.20
Urdu	21,521	1.70
Persian	15,663	1.20
Others	2,445	0.10

TOTAL	1,251,837	100.00

Source: Government of Pakistan, Office of the Census Commissioner, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961.

Table No. 3

POPULATION OF BALUCHISTAN (PAKISTAN), BY
DIVISION AND DISTRICT, 1961 and 1972

<u>Division/District</u>	1972	1961
<u>Quetta Division</u>	1,306,001	731,765
Quetta-Pishin District	494,928	267,400
Sibi District	402,977	224,696
Loralai District	184,997	110,720
Zhob District	161,127	87,686
Chagai District	62,172	41,263
<u>Kalat Division</u>	1,099,153	621,719
Kalat District	320,519	156,471
Kachhi District	266,041	184,949
Kharan District	75,509	42,483
Makran District	301,109	146,990
Las Bela District	135,975	90,826
TOTAL	2,405,154	1,353,484

Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division
Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1976.

Table No. 4

LIFE TIME INTERCENSAL MIGRATION IN PAKISTAN-1961
(FROM PLACE OF BIRTH DATA)

Region of Enumeration	Punjab	NWFP	SIND	Baluchi- tan	All Pakistan
Punjab	-	116,392	29,200	09,189	154,781
NWFP	067,705	-	04,340	00,720	072,765
Sind	292,042	132,857	-	62,984	487,883
Baluchistan	027,519	016,744	03,192	-	047,455

TOTAL	387,266	265,993	36,732	72,893	762,884

Source: Mohammed Afzal: The Population of Pakistan (Rawalpindi, Feroz Sons Ltd., 1974), Table 27 p. 63 as quoted by Urmila Phadnis "Ethnic Movements in Pakistan".

Table No. 5

INTERNAL MIGRATION 1973 (FROM PLACE OF BIRTH DATA)

Region	Punjab	NWFP	Sind	Baluchi- stan	FATA	Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas	All Pakistan
Punjab	-	291,244	130,002	447,578	049,338	025,937	10,44,099
NWFP	104,269	-	054,494	005,732	083,600	004,752	02,52,747
Sind	699,218	393,064	-	182,787	034,131	040,820	13,50,020
Baluchistan	040,937	020,299	021,551	-	007,302	002,440	00,92,519

TOTAL	844,424	704,597	206,047	635,997	174,371	173,949	27,39,385

Source: Housing Economic and Demographic Survey, 1973, Vol. 2, Parts II-V (Lahore, Caravan Press) Table 12, Quoted in Urmila Phadnis, Ethnic Movements in Pakistan (Unpublished)

Table No. 6

DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC POWER BETWEEN PROVINCES

	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchi- stan	Total
Population 1972 (Million)	37.5	14.0	10.8	2.4	64.7
Percentage of Total	58.0	21.6	16.7	3.7	100.00
Gross Domestic Product 1972 (Rs. Billion)	29.9	11.2	6.5	1.3	48.9
Percentage of Total	61.1	22.9	13.3	2.7	100.0
Per Capita Income (Rs.)	797.0	778.0	602.0	541.0	756.0
Foodgrain output (Million tons)	7.8	2.4	1.2	0.2	11.6
Percentage of Total	67.2	20.7	10.3	1.7	100.0
Value of Industrial Output (Rs. Billion)	3.8	1.5	0.3	0.2	5.8
Percentage of Total	65.5	25.9	5.2	3.4	100.0

Source: Cited in Burki *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, (see Bibliography for publication) from Development Statistics of the Punjab (Lahore Bureau of Statistics 1976) Statistics Handbook (Karachi Statistical Office 1974) NWFP statistics (Peshawar, Planning Department, 1976) Census of Manufacturing Industries (Islamabad, Ministry of Industries 1974).

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