THE CONTEMPORARY NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES OF JAPAN

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Certificate

Certified that the dissertation entitled **The Contemporary National Security Perspectives of Japan** submitted by **Sanjana Malhotra** is in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy,** and it has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university and is her work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgement

Illustrations and Tables

Appendix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

CHAPTER 1

SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL TRANSITION

The evolution of the security paradigm and the changes from `national security' to `international security' to `global security', each based on different theoretical and political assumptions, are closely linked to the historical evolution of the international system and the intellectual progress in its interpretation. Each concept of security corresponds to specific values, threats and capabilities to meet the perceived challenges. Its historical evolution linked to the extension of the boundaries of the international system - from one of regionally bounded nation-states, to the highly interdependent political systems of the industrialized world, to a global community of people.[1] Yet it has not been a simple linear progression, rather, as Helga Haftendron has recently argued, in each phase we find competing interpretations, one realist and the other idealist, based on different theoretical assumptions about the nature of man and the behaviour of states. Often there is a third interpretation, an attempt to bridge the

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1. See R.C. North `War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis' Boulder, Co: Westview Press (1990).

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gap and to develop converging concepts, building on the ability of man and states for rational behaviour.[2]

With the birth of the nation-state in the Seventeenth Century and its interest in survival, national security became a prominent concern. Taking its cue from Hobbes the realist design posits that in the international arena, struggle pits each state against every other. The system of nation-states lacks common rules and institutions of law enforcement. Diplomacy and war are the prime means to further national interest.

Against this, Immanuel Kant proposes a scheme of 'perpetual peace' based on the conviction that the system of nation-states and of dominating national interests can be restructured by an enlightened political order - a republican constitution, a federal state system and global citizenship - to forge a community of mankind. For him a compelling reason for nation-states to subsume their national interests under the rule of international law was the rational insight and the moral commitment of individual citizens to a community of mankind.

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2. Helga Haftendron, 'The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in International Security. International Studies Quarterly (35), 1991, pp.3-17.

In a third line of thought, De Grotius, like Kant, describes international politics in terms of a society of states. As opposed to the Hobbesian tradition he contends that states are not engaged in a simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules and institutions. But contrary to the Kantian or universalist perspective, Grotius accepts the Hobbesian premise that sovereign states, rather than individual human beings are the principal actors in international politics. International politics expressed neither complete conflict between states nor complete identity of interest. The Grotian prescription for international conduct being that all states in their dealings with one another are bound by rules and institutions of the society they form. Thus what these imperatives enjoin is not the replacement of the system of states by a universal community of mankind but the acceptance of the requirements of coexistence and cooperation in a society of states.

At first glance the paradigm of `national security' responds to political realism as taught by Hobbes, while the paradigm of `global security' follows the Kantian tradition, with its assumption of a community of mankind and political processes controlled by enlightened men. The paradigm of `international security' in turn becomes meaningful with the

formation of security regimes and the building of international institutions as Grotius recommended. However we find elements of realism, idealism and institution building in each period, wherein the history of security affairs is a story of achievements and failures, of progression and regression.

In this century, the League of Nations, founded under the impact of World War I, was to provide a radical alternative to the European balance-of-power system wherein the carefully calibrated balance of forces would be replaced by a system of collective security. Based on the premise that a threat to the security of one member was a threat to all that called for adequate response by each, in the new system all states would cooperate in the common cause of providing security and justice for all rather than engaging in competition and coercion.

On the other hand, realists such as Carr and Morgenthau challenged the Wilsonian scheme on the ground that it pre-supposed a harmony of interests among states and relations among them governed by ideas and morality, while in reality, they were ruled by national interest and power. Wilson had wanted to abolish the balance-of-power system and the political preponderance of a nation or group of nations (with its negative effects on small and weak nations). But

Carr argued in favour of the dominance of a superior power for international stability:

'The new international order can be built only on a unit of power sufficiently coherent and sufficiently strong to maintain its ascendancy without being itself compelled to take sides in rivalries of lesser units. Whatever moral issues may be involved, there s an issue of power which cannot be expressed in terms of morality.[3]

With the Atlantic Charter in the 1940s, two new elements were added to the old concept of national security; it was recognized that a security system would last only if it relied on both a renunciation of force and a respect for human rights. Built on these two pillars the United Nations tried to manage international conflict by creating global institutions for peacekeeping.

Both the League of Nations and the United Nations became inoperative because of the dominance of national over collective security interests. While the League of Nations failed to cope with the rise of Fascism and Nazism and collapsed on the eve of World War II, the United Nations

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3. E.H. Carr, 'The Twenty Year's Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations', (1966), New York: St. Martins Press, p.235.

became ineffective with the emergence of two preponderant powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their mutually exclusive claim for world dominance which gave rise to the Cold War.

As a consequence, the Hobbesian paradigm of national security regained prominence in international affairs. The requirements of national security dictated that states maintain military forces and a large array of weapons systems adequate to the perceived military threat. For the super powers the ultimate was nuclear weapons and the realist interpretation provided a simplified political context for concepts of nuclear deterrence and the strategy of massive retaliation. There was a search for more 'rational' means of making unclear weapons serve foreign policy as concepts like counterforce, first and second strike capabilities, competitive risk taking, and limited nuclear war were elaborated.[4] For the smaller, non-nuclear nations integration into military alliances under the leadership of nuclear powers was prescribed.

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4. See Bernard Brodie 'Strategy in the Missile Age' (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Albert Wohlstetter 'The Delicate Balance of Terror', Foreign Affairs, vol.37, no.2, January 1959; Herman Kahn 'On Thermonuclear War', (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Henery Kissinger 'Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy', (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Thomas C. Shelling 'The Strategy of Conflict, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Glenn Snyder 'Deterrence and Defence', (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

The structure of the international system consisted of a combination of alliance networks and a system of nuclear deterrence based on mutual assured destruction coupled with a policy of mutual political restraint.

In the 1960s with the Cuban Missile Crisis as a catalyst it was increasingly recognized that more than political restraint, patterns of partial or temporary cooperation were needed to prevent a nuclear holocaust. Accordingly a wave of theorising focused on `flexible response' `arms control aimed at the joint management of the risks associated with military deployments' as measures that could contribute to the stability of nuclear balance.[5] It was accepted that the `security dilemma' was not necessarily a zero-sum game but could be overcome by cooperative strategies.

This concept of `international security', based on a mutual interest in survival under conditions of nuclear deterrence, implies that the security of one state is closely linked to that of other states. States are interdependent in their security affairs such that the

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5.　See Donald Brennan, (ed.), `Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security', (New York: Braziller, 1961). Thomas C. Shelling and Morton H. Halperin `Strategy and Arms Control', (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

security of one is strongly affected by the actions of others and vice versa. This structure has been identified by Keohance and Nye as complex interdependence.'[6] They assume that the realization of mutual vulnerability leads to the formation of regular patterns and the evolution of regimes.

Security regimes are defined by regularized cooperative behaviour in issues relating to the national security of two or more states, governed by either explicit or implicit norms and rules which permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate.[7] They are patterns of security cooperation among states in a situation of quasi-anarchy where no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. In the words of Krasner, 'international regimes are defined as principal, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area'.[8] Rules and principles need not necessarily be

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6. Robert O. Keohane and J.S. Nye 'Power and Interdependence', (2nd ed. Glenview; IL: Scott Foresman), 1977/1989

7. Helga Haftendron, 'The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in International Security. International Studies Quarterly (35), 1991, p.9.

8. S.D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables', in 'International Regimes' (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p.1.

formally agreed upon by governments but should be observed over an extended period of time. Also, cooperation need not be an exclusive pattern; a structure will qualify as a regime if interactions are marked by a mixture of confrontation and cooperation as long as institutionalised procedures are followed.

According to James Keeley,[9] once a regime exists, at least four overall groups of actors may be found, depending on their status with respect to that regime. First are actors who accept and cooperate willingly with it. Their disputes may be technical or over relative positions. If the discourse and its associated devices prove incapable of coping with the issues - area simply in technical terms, this will produce pressures for attempts either change the regime or save it through new efforts. Second, are free riders who want others to support the regime but do not help maintain it themselves. These may erode the regime, reduce its capability or produce disputes over burden sharing. These two groups are community members who accept the legitimacy of the order. Third are deviants who challenge the order on the basis of alternative knowledges and alternate networks of relations but are contained within the

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9. James F. Keeley, 'Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of Regimes', <u>International Organization</u>, vol.44, no.1, Winter 1990, p.97.

regime's community and thus pressured to follow its dictates. Regime supporters may attempt to convert, punish or isolate them. Fourth are outsiders and communities organized in other public spaces. They may strain a regime by providing alternative associations.

Within a Foucauldian framework, he therefore argues that regimes are loci of greater or lesser but inevitable tension in which actors struggle to define the regime and the space it orders. Accordingly the essence of the situation becomes an increasing contestability of regime fundamentals wherein it runs less risk of becoming an analogy for 'the way things are'.

The liberal institutionalist belief that patterns of cooperative behaviour will lead to the formation of international institutions is however, challenged by many authors. Realists argue that 'interests and power relationships --- are the proximate, not just the ultimate, cause of behaviour in the international system'.[10] In a world of sovereign states seeking to maximize their interest, lasting commitments to rules and norms - and thus

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10. Susan Strange, 'Care! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis', in 'International Regimes', ed. by S.D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), p.345.

security regimes - are rather rare. Jervis and Oye[11] for example maintain that game theory models are more appropriate to explain most cases of 'Cooperation Under Anarchy' as narrow and short-run, self-interest accounts for cooperation and restraint, not common rules and principles. The obvious class of models is Prisoners' Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken, in which cooperation is desirable to reap the mutual benefit but is not automatic. Outcomes vary according to the strategies of mutual reciprocity used and the conditions of play prevailing.

Though a concept of international security offers a better prescription for current security affairs than a strategy of national security in its present form it has serious conceptional deficits and cannot be applied globally. It carries with it the notion of its origin, the preoccupation with nuclear weapons and deterrence and is highly ethnocentric, based on US prescriptions and values.

A search has thus begun for a new and common paradigm for global security. Global Security refers to a system of world order, a global security system which presupposes a

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11. S.D. Krasner, ed., 'International Regimes' (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) and K.A. Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies' in 'Cooperation Under Anarchy' (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1986.

universal concept of security with a shared set of norms, principles and practices which result in common patterns of international behaviour. In this context emphasis is being laid on the concept of 'common security'.[12]

The idea of common security is based on the recognition of the fact that the security of states in the present international system is fundamentally interdependent and that the escalatory aspects of military interaction tend to reduce, in the end, the relative security of all the states involved. In this school of thought the states have to reconcile their competing interests and to seek, in a cooperative manner, such relative shares of security that are mutually acceptable. The alternative to the mutual adjustment of security interests is absolute insecurity of one or both powers involved in a bilateral conflict. The doctrine of common security is thus largely compatible with political realism while rejecting its hidden agenda that absolute security might be attainable by unilateral measures.

As a metaphor common security hints to an alternate security system in which the reduction of military power and the peaceful resolution of conflicts have been substituted

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12. Radmila Nakarada, and Jan Oberg. (eds.), 'Surviving Together: The Olof Palme Lectures on Common Security 1988', Hampshire: Dartmouth, 1989.

for the accumulation of arms and the use of force. Importantly, in order to realize the metapor of an alternate security system, the doctrine of common security has also helped to specify a set of effective transition strategies, with theorists calling for a distinction between primary and ultimate objectives of common security. This is in contrast to the view that the process of transformation has an autonomous dynamics fostered by the interdependence of actors in the international arena that constraints actors to behave in a stable, predictable and peaceful manner.

Anatol Rapoport[13] on the other hand argues that the post-cold war pre-occupation with 'defense' is simply a justification for nurturing the war establishment wherein he calls for the abolition of the institution of war. Important within this perspective is Rapoport's analysis of ideas of peace, their underlying assumptions and their implications.

Peace through strength

This conception of peace in encapsulated in the ancient Roman dictum. *Si vis pacem, para bellum* 'if you want peace, prepare for war'. It reflects a distinctly defensive posture and prevails among successful conquerors, who have put a

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13. Anatol Rapoport, 'Peace: An Idea Whose Time Has Come'. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1992.

higher priority on protecting their gains that on further expansion. Thus, the devotion of peace inherent in this conception is often genuine, provided peace is indentified with an acceptance of existing conditions. No contradiction is seen, however, between this devotion and, at times, obsessive preoccupation with war. The self-image of a power so oriented is that of a peacekeeper, where peacekeeping is identified with the preservation of existing relations of dominance and submission. The terms Pax Britannica, and the suggested Pax Americana reflect this conception. They implicity identify the preservation of peace with the unchallengable military might of an empire.

The critical problem sighed out in the peace through strength paradigm is that of an external threat, usually from a specified source. In the case of Imperial Germany it was France; in the case of Soviet Union a coalition of 'capitalist states'; and in the case of United States, following victory in the World War II it was the Soviet Union. The solution of the problem of external threat is military superiority, and deterrence is regarded as by far the most important and, at times the only effective preventative of war.

Accordingly, in this conception of peace, the role assigned to international cooperation in the establishment

or preservation of peace is negligible. For example the pharse 'blood and iron' coined by Bismark at the time when Germany was attempting to establish its hegemony in Europe referred to what, in Bismark's opinion, was and out to be the decisive factors in international relations, rather than diplomacy and treaties. Contempt of obligations under treaties has been has repeatedly demonstrated by the 'great powers'. In sum, peace through trength paradigm regards the ability and the readiness to resort to violence as the only reliable guarantee of peace.

Balance of Power

The problem singled out in the 'balance of power' conception of peace is disequilibrium in the distribution of power among major states. Solution of the problem requires, according to this conception, a careful tuning of the opposing forces with the aim of reducing temptations to go to war in the hope of achieving a victory. Since, as in the case of the peace through strength paradigm, power ascribed to the states is still a key concept in the balance of power paradigm, threat still plays a major role as the envisaged mechanism of control. However, emphasis how shifts to trade as the dominant modality of interaction.

By definition, vying for power in the balance of power paradigm takes place among perceived equals. Thus the

balance of power idea is most compatible with the philosophy of political realism. First, because of the identification of power as the supreme value in international politics and second, because 'prudence' and 'rationality', the central political virtues, point to balance of power as a guarantee of stability and, presumably of peace.

There is some room for international cooperation in this paradigm since considerable political (as opposed to military) activity is expected to be involved in creating a credible balance of power system. The qualification 'credible' is crucial, since it is not the 'objective' power relations but the perceived power relations that determine the stability or instability of the international system. It follows that actors in the international arena must share modes of perception and assessment. They must get to know each other thoroughly, understanding each others predilections and aspirations. Such understanding entails a certain level of cooperation.

Collective Security

The 'collective security' paradigm envisages every state potentially allied with every other. Thus, the image of an 'obvious' or 'natural' adversary disappears. International cooperation replaces rivalry a the 'normal'

mode of interaction between states. The main business of international relations becomes the initiation and development of cooperative projects. Conceptions of national security give way to conceptions of international security as military alliances of blocs of states are dissolved.

However, the collective security conception of peace, as evident in the failure of the League of nations and the ineffectiveness of the United Nations, has consistently failed to be realized in practice whenever an participant in a collective security pact felt that 'national interest' was jeopardized. Violations were by no means always by the strongest states, but collective sanctions against violators could not be applied as the principle of solidarity was never internalized by sovereign states.

Moreover, the military aspects are still prominent in this paradigm. The conviction that force must be countered with force remains intact. The role of international cooperation in the preservation of peace is envisaged as the readiness and ability to resort to collective violence. Hence, armies, arsenals, and all the adjuncts of the military machine are presumed to remain in-dispensable for preserving peace.

Peace through Law

In this conception, world peace is pictured as an extension, to global scale, of the internal peace that reflects a modern, civilized society. International peace is a consequence of an general respect for law as the arbiter of all conflicts and renunciation of violence as a means of imposing one's will on others or 'protecting one's interests. Renuciation of violence necessitates a degree of imposed self control. Such control has infact 'become a feature of civilized life in consequence of widening, impersonal economic activity.

The most conspicious feature of a civilized society is internal disarmament. The concept of peace through law envisages the extension of civilization to the international arena. The abolitior of state sovereignty or the creation of a 'world government' is not necessarily envisaged any more than the surrender of individual autonomy is envisaged as a feature of civilized society. Only one aspect is abolished - the right to make war.

The most explicit formulation of a plan designed to replace the present international anarchy by a global system based on peace through law was proposed by Clark and Sohn (196). Essentially the plan involves a restructuring of the United Nations aimed at creating an institution in accord

with the image of a peaceful society on a global scale. It contains a carefully constructed program for the elimination - not mere reduction or limitation - of all national armaments. A world police force is provided for - the only military force permitted anywhere in the world.

It is clear that the central problem singled out by the peace through law paradigm is th persistence of international anarchy in a progressively more interdependent world. The solution of the problem is envisaged as the abolition of the right to make war and the implementation of this abrogation by general and complete disarmament, relegating peacekeeping to a supranational authority. The level of cooperation required in the international arena to implement this plan is extremely high as what is demanded is the transcendence of 'national interests' as understood conventionally.

Of the four conceptions of peace talked about the first three are compatible with the war system, the last one is not. Rapoport arranges them in the order of increasing importance of integration as a mode of social control. In the Hobbesian world envisaged by the advocates of peace through strength, integration does not cross national boundaries. In the balance of power paradigm it may do so to the extent of welding military alliances. Collective

security implies the extension of the integrative process to a world community that is nevertheless still conceived of as a military alliance. The enemy is now potentially any state that becomes an 'aggressor'.

The Persian Gulf crisis demonstrated the limitations of collective security as a peacekeeping system in two ways. First, there is no guarantee that deterrence (i.e., threat as a mode of control) will always work. When it fails, war becomes a near certainty. Second, it leaves intact the global war machine, which can continue its parasitic existence even without a permanently designated enemy. Its continued existence is an unsurmountable obstacle to the global integration on which global peace depends.

It is in this context that the 'world law' concept of peace should not be dismissed out of hand as idealistic or Utopian. Important in this regard is the fact that on occasions, states have been observed to acknowledge the futility of engaging in a power struggle in the conventional sense of political realism.

Mueller[14] believes that this process can accelerate. He calls it 'Hollandization' in honour of Holland which

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14. J. Mueller, 'Retreat from Doomsday', New York: Basic Books 1989.

deliberately gave up its status as a 'great power' in 1713 and there after devoted its energies to economics instead of war. Sweden followed suit in 1721. Similarly Japan was deprived of its 'great power' status as a consequence of defeat, but its turn away from war is universally recognized as a dramatic success.

Mueller, further distinguishes between two levels of recognition of this phenomenon, the rational and the sub-rational. Rational recognition results from a cost-benefit analysis wherein the costs of a major war, both to victor and to vanquished, exceed any possible benefits. Far more can be gained by trade and cooperation than by conquest and exploitation of the vanquished. For example the dissolution of the colonial system was spurred by the realization that the colonies had become a liability instead of an asset. On the sub-rational level the war option is not 'rejected' it simply is not considered i.e., a warless world would be one in which the war option no longer occurs to any state. It would disappear, as the option of fighting duels to settle a quarrel has disappeared, as gladiatorial combats have disappeared.

Evidence of this development is presented by Maoz and Abdolali[15] who examined the levels of war activity (defined

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15. Z. Maoz and N. Abdolali, 'Regime Types and International Conflict: 1816-1976', Journal of Conflict Resolution (33), 1989, pp.1-35.

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by a number of criteria) among democratic states with those among states that are not democratic. Democracy is also defined operationally by a number of criteria (eg. legitimacy, nature of executive selection, independence of the executive, type of political competition or opposition, scope of government functions) Maoz and Abdolali then examine instances when a regime changed from a democratic to an authoritarian one or vice versa and compare the 'war levels' before and after the change. The results are unambiguous. The changes in type of regime are associated with changes in levels of war activity in the direction hypothesized i.e., democratization is associated with a decline and authoritarianism with an increase of war activity.

A similar confirmation emerges in dyadic comparisons of interstate wars. Wars between democratic states are significantly rarer than wars between states at least one of which is not democratic.

When we take into account that these states are predominantly more affluent than non-democratic states, we can surmise that affluence and a proneness to peace tend to reinforce each other. Finally, the observation that, at present the trend among the states is toward democratization can be taken as support for the conjecture that war is on

the way out as an institution. The ending of the cold war in Europe following the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and dramatic political changes in the direction of democratization in Russia lend further support to this conjecture.

At the same time, however, the disappearance of war in the First World would not guarantee its automatic disappearance from the developing world. During the Cold War, the military establishment of the two Superpowers thought in terms of geopolitical and its associated strategic and logistic problems. Hence, the importance of maintaining a foothold on the Horn of Africa, Philippines or the Indian Ocean etc. The demise of the cold war may make geopolitical considerations less pressing, but one has to be careful not to fixate on unidirectional causal relationships. As events have shown, even as tensions in the West attenuate, their decisionmakers have not revealed a lessening interest in securing traditional strategic advantages.

In sum, the dismantling of neocolonialism - both economic and military which has sustained the institution of war in the developing world is a prerequisite to the establishment of peace through world law.

Chapter 2

THE EAST ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Recent transformations in the global balance of power have generated extensive debate on how best to ensure international security after the cold war.[1] Much of the discussion has evolved around ongoing changes in what was the Soviet Union and the future politico-economic structure of a Europe largely devoid of ideological divisions. Far less attention has been devoted to the Asia Pacific region as the other major area of traditional superpower competition.

In part, this can be attributed to the continued intractability of Asian conflict zones compared with those in Europe. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula, continued conflict in Afghanistan, the lingering dispute over control

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[1] Most of this debate has evolved with a Eurocentric bias. See, for example, the debate about US grand strategy found in articles by Stephen M.Walt, Steven R.David, Michael C.Desich and Robert h.Johnson comprising the subsection, 'Defining and Defending American interests' International Security 14, 1 (Summer 1989) pp.1-160; 'America's role in A Changing World' Adelphi Papers 256 and 257 (winter 1990/91) and Samuel Huntington, 'America's Changing Strategic interest's Survival 33,1 (January/February 1991) pp.3-17. The question of a European postwar order is discussed by John J.Mearscheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War' International Security 15,1 (Summer 1990), pp.5-56; Jack Snyder. 'Averting Anarchy in Europe' International Security 14,4 (Spring 1990), pp.5-41.

of islands in the South China Sea and other sources of regional conflict compare unfavourably to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of a divided Germany. Strategic 'asymmetries' prevail in Asia which complicate the negotiation of comprehensive multilateral security arrangements of the type now prevailing in Europe and military capabilities are not readily conducive to implementing the mutually balanced force reductions which have underscored the European process of 'confidence-building in arms control and conflict resolution.

Yet discussion is intensifying over what role East Asia will assume in any emerging international security order. This can be attributed to two key factors. One is that regional powers like Japan, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and ASEAN are now integral players in an increasingly interdependent global economy.[2] This is critical because traditional measures of power are rapidly shifting in today's world from exclusively military indices to a much wider array of technological, managerial and natural resource criteria, collectively what Joseph Nye has labelled as 'soft power' in international relations.[3]

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2   William T.Tow, 'Northeast Asia and Interanational Security: Transforming Competition to Collaboration' <u>Australian Journal of International Affairs</u>, vol. 46, n. 1, May 1992, p.1.

3   Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990) especially chapter 6.

A second consideration underscoring East Asia's role in the changing global security system is a declining willingness and capacity of the United States to project and sustain military superiority in the region. The USSR's sovereign disintegration, along with Washington's worsening economic plight, have combined to relegate the East Asian Region to a position of comparatively lesser importance in the United State's global strategy. Replacing the Soviet Union is a number of loosely - associated sovereign states, intent upon achieving only 'reasonable sufficiency' in their defence capabilities and evidence is growing that the once formidable Soviet Pacific fleet is shrinking in numbers as a result of the ongoing Russian domestic crisis. While the United States has announced (in late September 1991) its intention to eliminate all American land and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and served notice that during the 1990s 'the size, disposition, and rationale for our forward deployed forces (in the Asia Pacific) will be increasingly scrutinized.[4]

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4   US Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century (Washington, DC: USDOD, April 1990), pp.8,10. The Eishenhower Centenary lecture given at the Royal United Services Institute, London, England, 5 December 1990 and reprinted as 'Military Realities and Future Security Prospects RUSI Journal 136, 1 (Spring 1990), p.20.

Russian and American military deployments in East Asia, of course remain formidable even as prospects for a direct superpower confrontation taking place in that theatre are becoming negligible. More important and uncertain is how the regional actors will respond strategically in what has become one of the world's most prosperous centre of economic development and trade. The extent to which East Asia can move toward a new security set-up emphasizing 'collaboration over competition' will be of critical importance for future international stability.

Initially this chapter will discuss the changing strategic perceptions of the main actors in the East Asian region, an analysis which is not only the first step towards recognizing the diversity of the region but also a pre-requisite to making the complex more manageable. The impact of realistic security policies being increasingly adopted by these nations in the context of what they perceive to be a 'strategic vacuum' even as they commit themselves to regional cooperation political and economic) to ensure regional security and stability will then be discussed. A concluding section weighs the prospects for establishing confidence building measures in the wider Asian Pacific region to avoid dangerous power confrontation leading to regional conflict.

Changing Strategic Perceptions

CHINA

As China evaluates its strategic situation in East Asia, it perceives the region in transition. First, it recognizes and welcomes the collapse of Soviet hegemonism, and its policy towards Indo-China and other countries reflects this diminished perception of 'Soviet threat'. Secondly, China shares with the rest of the world an understanding of the growing importance of economic strength and technological capabilities as the foundation of national political power and the growing importance of economic factors in international strategic competition.[5] Thus China's East Asia policy is not simply a function of the decline of the post-war order and the relaxation of regional polarization but, rather an urgent need to stabilize regional detente so that it can focus its efforts inwards.

But although China welcomes regional detente, it is uncertain about the longer-term future of Asia. The ambiguity surrounding great power relations, in particular the rise of Japanese power, suggests to Beijing the need to

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5.   Robert S.Ross 'China's Strategic View of Southeast Asia: A Region in Transition', Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.12, no.2, September 1990, pp.101-119.

prepare for greater regional instability. Beijing is especially apprehensive about Japan's regional and global techno-economic attributes which it feels Tokyo could rapidly convert to strengthen its military capabilities. Infact the majority of Chinese policy analysts have assumed a 'worst case' analysis of the recent increase in Japanese defence spending, viewing it as a a probable first step of a long-range Japanese plan to incorporate an offensive military strategy for power projection far beyond Japan's own shores.

China is also apprehensive that insofar as economic influence often precedes political influence and even military influence, the extension of Japanese economic influence into Vietnam will undermine its security. One Chinese analyst, observing the recent increase in Japanese trade with Vietnam, reported that in Japan this trend is interpreted as an effort to prepare for Tokyo's "future influence in the region". Others have interpreted Japan's anxious interest in developing trade with Hanoi as part of Tokyo's strategy to 'contain' Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Thus, while most of the world sees the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the prospects for diminished tension in the context of declining Soviet power, China views post-cold war developments from the standpoint of the

emergence of a new Asian strategic order with the prospect of a strategically powerful Japan.

Hence, Beijing not only seeks to stabilize the region in order to be able to focus its resources on economic development, it is, in fact, eager to maintain an influential regional political role so as to be better prepared for an era of enhanced political, and perhaps military competition.

In this respect China's response has been two pronged. First, it has supported the regional moves towards relaxation of tensions in it's attempt to prevent the emergence of a regional anti-China coalition. For example it made it clear that it would not be an impediment to an agreement in Cambodia if all the other local and regional actors were satisfied with a prospective peace package. Similarly, it did not attempt to coerce Thailand to abandon its interest in seeking improved relations with Hanoi as such a move would have further aroused the suspicions of the ASEAN states of China's regional ambitions.

Secondly, China has continued with its military modernization programme, wherein it is expected to use its improved power-projection capability as a political instrument in trying to offset Japan's increasing regional presence. Thus Beijing has been assembling the power-

projection arm of its armed forces by developing a blue-water navy and highly mobile marine forces. The objective being to raise the attack and defense capabilities of its naval forces up to world level'.[6] China is also developing its military air-transport capabilities and although the primary focus of military air-transport remains on China's outlying areas, rapid force mobility is the sine qua non of power projection.

Such military and strategic response to long-term security considerations assumes great significance in the East Asian security environment while the various territorial disputes that China is involved in continue to remain unresolved. As Gerald Segal has recently noted: 'It is not that China acts irrationally or even erratically as much as it genuinely feels it has scores to settle in the region.[7]

JAPAN

Contemporary Japanese perceptions and correspondingly its policies with regard to the regional security environment are being increasingly shaped by two main

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6   Xinhua, 16 August 1989, p.6.

7   Segal, 'Why Pacific Needs US Punch' <u>The Australian</u> (27 September 1991), p.11.

31

factors. First, the economic power on which the Japanese rest their case for an enhanced political role in the international arena has significant regional dimensions. Through a combination of factors such as the rising yen, increasing labour costs at home and the growing industrial sophistication of the newly industrializing economies in South-East Asia, Japan has accumulated considerable investments in the region which have to be protected.[8] Second, the growing perception that the American propensity to increasingly link trade and security issues is indicative of the region's declining importance in the United State's scheme of things.

From a Japanese perspective, at the regional level the country finds itself in a complex security environment. At present North Korea's persistent efforts to become a nuclear state overshadow all other security issues in the region. Another question very much on the mind of Japanese policy planners, apart from their suspicion of China's regional ambitions, is the possibility of regional conflicts within China in the event of a battle of succession once Deng Xiaoping departs from the scene or because of growing

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8   Reinhard Drifte, 'Japan's Security Policy and Southeast Asia', Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.12, no.3, December 1990, pp.186-197.

economic disparity between the provinces benefiting from opening up to the world and those which feel left out in the cold. Then there exists the potential for conflict over islands in the South China Sea which hold the key to exploitation of potentially rich oil deposits in the area and which are contested by many nation's including China.

With Washington pressuring Tokyo to assume a greater share of the regional security burden, Japanese diplomacy vis-a-vis China and North Korea has intensified. Japan has also been negotiating with Russia to resolve the dispute over sovereign control of the so-called Northern territories. However, in the context of the failure of a majority of diplomatic efforts aimed at exercising financial leverage to gain compliance, there is growing debate within Japan about its international security policies.

The foundation of the US-Japan alliance still remains in place from Tokyo's perspective: Japan provides for its self-defence while the United States provides the offensive strike power and the extended deterrence guarantees needed to stabilise East Asia if Japan's self-defense capabilities prove to be insufficient in a future regional or global contingency. There is considerable debate among policy planners in Japan, however, over what really constitutes sufficient or legitimate 'self-defense'. While Japanese

diplomacy remains sensitive to Asia's resentment over Japan's legacy of wartime imperial expansionism, Japan has nevertheless recently increased its defense budgets and is strengthening its maritime and air capabilities. Admittedly, Japan's military power projection capabilities, over the short-term remain limited, however these moves have led many southeast Asian nations to fear a 'potentially destabilishing change in the regional balance of power'.[9] Further, the recent beginning of plutonium deliveries reprocessed from Europe - for use in Japan's fast breeder reactors, has added a hitherto unthinkable option for Japan - the Nuclear one. Although being a signatory to the NPT, the Japanese approach in the near future is likely to remain that of possessing nuclear power as a technology deterrent i.e., making it known that they have the capacity to quickly 'weaponise' if the circumstances so demand.

NORTH KOREA

Since the latter half of 1991 North Korea's nuclear weapon's programme has surfaced as the region's most urgent security issue. The growing strategic isolation of the country as one of the last bastions of hard-line Marxism-

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9   Amitav Acharya, 'The Association of Southeast Nations: Security Community or Defence Community' Pacific Affairs 64,2 (Summer 1991) p.171.

34

Leninism and the uncertainty over the security guarantees extended to Pyongyang by the Soviet Union and China, as those two traditional allies move toward more comprehensive politico-economic ties with the prosperous South have provided incentive to North Korea's efforts to develop its own nuclear force. As North Korea's economy can no longer sustain the crushing burden which conventional armament places on it: (it has been estimated that at a minimum North Korea spends 25% of its GNP on military spending.[10]), nuclear power can help to refurbish North Korea's military superiority and give it the diplomatic clout necessary to force South Korea to sign a unification agreement that is largely to its advantage.

Moreover, guided by the perception that the maintenance of its regime is endangered by the rapid advances South Korea has made in its economic, political and international standing, North Korea has increasingly resorted to a tactical use of its nuclear armament programme n diplomatic negotiations.[11] Infact the greatest achievement of North

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10   <u>Asian Security</u>, (1992-1993), p.29.

11   On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, increasing fears of an East Asian arms races wherein it has increasingly faced an atmosphere of conciliation in negotiations.

Korea's manuverings has been in having obtained a nuclear ambiguity, which is particularly helpful if in actual fact it does not possess the requisite know how and materials for building its alleged weapon's capability.

Regional concern is further heightened by the realization that North Korea is also engaged in a programme to upgrade its 'Scud Missile' inventory. One of the tests conducted by the North Korean's in the Sea of Japan, in late May this year, demonstrated the Rodong-I missile which, with a range of 1,000 km, would be capable of hitting many Japanese, Chinese and Russian cities with or without nuclear warheads.[12]

ASEAN

The winding down of the Cambodian conflict and the termination of the cold war have resulted in a less predictable environment wherein the ASEAN states now perceive the need of organizing a compensating security arrangement, once the US military presence is withdrawn from the Philippines.

The most salient security issue for ASEAN is China. Within southeast Asia there is the belief that China regards

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12   Harvey Stockwin 'US Bows Low to North Koreans' The Times of India, 23 June 1993, p.8.

the region as an area of influence with which relations should be structured hierarchically.[13] Yet Southeast Asia lacks the political unity to resist the natural and historical tendency of the Chinese to push south-ward. While countries such as Thailand and the Philippines feel they can assimilate or work with China's influence and accommodate its presence, the Islamic countries of Malaysia and Indonesia, faced with problems of assimilating their own Chinese minorities, have perceived China in threatening terms.

It is the outcome of the issue of islands in the South China Sea that will define, in this context, the region's relationship with its more powerful neighbour. The hope is that China can be engaged in a dialogue with ASEAN and other affected states through which it would become aware of their views. The first efforts in this direction were the workshops on the South China sea organized by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry in Bali in January 1990, which brought together China, Taiwan, Vietnam and ASEAN.

A similar need has been expressed within ASEAN circles to develop a security dialogue with Japan as a country whose

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13   Leszek Buszynski 'Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War: Regionalism and Security', <u>Asian Survey</u>, vol.32, no.9, September 1992, p.834.

actions could transform the region dramatically. The key issue is that Japan should be firmly integrated in a multilateral arrangement to remove the temptation for unilateral action. There is also a widespread view that Japanese involvement in multilateral security arrangements, in the Asia Pacific context, might act as a counterweight to China.

As a direct response to the need to develop a mechanism, to influence the actions of Asia-Pacific actors such as Japan or China and to ensure that their behaviour does not have a detrimental impact upon Southeast Asia, the ASEAN countries have settled on the proposal to convert the post-Ministerial Conference into a security forum. The establishment of a regular dialogue that would link ASEAN with external powers, however, is regarded as only a partial solution to the regions security needs. While there have not been many takers for the argument that an ASEAN military pact[14] should provide the necessary deterrence to offer an incentive for dialogue or build a basis for regional stability that would prevent the outbreak of conflict, the ASEAN leader have nonetheless proposed an expansion of security cooperation as a way to boost the regions confidence in the uncertain future.

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14   For example the proposal by Rafael Ileto, Philippine
      National Security Adviser, in the wake of an American
      withdrawl from the Philippines. Strait Times, 29 March
      1992.

38

A popular analogy for ASEAN security cooperation has been Indonesian Army Commander Try Sutrisno's idea of a 'spider web' of bilateral and trilateral security relations, as well as the continued modernization of the armed fores of individual countries. Examples in the first category include the bilateral security cooperation between Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia, the Singapore -Indonesia relationship and the Singapore United States defense arrangements. At the individual level Malaysia has announced budgetary increase of upto 11% in its defence spending and an ambitious programme of procurement to enable it to protect it EEZ and maritime access between its eastern and western territories.[16] The Philippines also intends to purchase 18 Israeli-built KFIIZ fighters at a cost of $446 million or 18 Czech L-39 Albatross air superiority aircraft.[16] Further,

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15   The increase accomodate the MOU negotiated with the UK in September 1988, which, amended included: 4 contracts for 28 Hawk 100 and 200 fighters, c^3I Systems, long range air detection radar, and the purchase of two frigates. An additional two contracts for the construction of military bases in Mersing and Geanas will follow. Malaysia also intends to purchase an air supremacy fighter to equip two new suuadrons. Also on the agenda is the purchase or manufacture of 18-24 offshore patrol vessels. FEER, 9 April 1992; Leszek Buszynski, Asian Survey, vol.32, no.9, September 1992, p.842.

16   'The Modernizaton of th Philippine Navy' International Defense Review, no.1 (1990) pp.87-89; Reuters in Business Times 28 February 1992; Buszynski, Asian Survey voo.32, no.9, September 1992, p.842.

Singapore will purchase a second squadron of F-16S and will upgrade the avionics and other systems of the existing Skyhawk squadrons while Indonesia has examined the purchase of the British aerospace Hawk in view of the possibility of joint production with the firm Nusantara.[17]

For the time being, therefore, the major regional actors have followed the lead of the United States in sustaining merely a `balance of power strategy', which in its case is underscored by pressing financial limitations and by a navy still determined to continue exercising its offshore deterrence posture in Asian waters.[18] The attempt is to forge limited defence links with geostrategically important countries, arrive at low-key military arrangements and build loose alliance systems in order to meet the emerging security challenges in the region. Infact the changing US position on Asia Pacific security is limited to the use of regional multilateral fora such as the APEC and ASEAN-PMC for security related discussions, rather than depend exclusively on the present bilateral arrangements.

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17   FEER, 25 July 1991; Buszynski, Asian Survey, vol.32, no.9, September 1992, p.842.

18   William T.Tow `Northeast Asia and International Security: Transforming competition to collaboration'Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.46, n.1, May 1992, p.17.

The problem with this `crisis management approach is that is gives primary importance to military-strategic responses which in turn create an environment of pervasive insecurity. The example of the ASEAN states is a case in point where the heightened arms build-up has exacerbated relations - between Malaysia and Singapore in particular, apart from being an economic burden. Individual survival and relative gains thus remain the core security interests of states, leading to the traditional 'security dilemma' of international politics.[19]

On the other hand optimists envision East Asia as following Europe in forming a regional security network based on `complex interdependence'.[20] According to the proponents of this view, military power in the region would

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19   The security dilemma occurs when a state arms itself or forges alliances to create power balances against potential adversaries and its potential enemies compensate by doing the same. Accordingly, neither side's security is enhanced; instead, prospects for miscalculations and war increase. Robert Jervis, `Security Regimes' International Organisation 36,2 (Spring 1982), pp.357,360-2.

20   For how the politics of security regimes apply to Asian security, see Muthaih Algappa (ed.) In Search of Peace: Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific (Kuala Lumpur/London: Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia/Kegan Paul International 1989; Algappa (ed.) Building Confidence, Resolving Conflicts (Kuala Lumpur/London: ISIS/Kegan Paul, 1990).

count for less; monetary stability, a liberal trading order and the effective integration of domestic priorities with foreign and national security policy, interests would become paramount concerns. Regional and international security cooperation would result from multilateral efforts to define norms for and to negotiate constraints into, each state's behaviour in the interest of every state's survival. States participating in such a regional security framework would identify and implement non-military solutions to the regions security problems. Arms control, territorial negotiations and economic development would increasingly override regional conflict and prevent hegemonic competition.[21]

However, it is virtually impossible to duplicate the unified approach of Europe, in the diverse political environment of Asia where serious threat perceptions remain concerning traditionally hostile power's ultimate intentions toward each other. Without a perceived lowering of threat shared by both North and South Korea, for example, prospects for a Korea-wide demilitarization still remain problematic. Instead North Korea's large army will remain as a juggernaut poised to launch a blitzkrieg against Seoul, while the North

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21   Tow, `Northeast Asia and International Security: Transforming Competition to Collaboration', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.46, n.1, May 1992, p.13-14.

Korean's will regard themselves as a target of coalition warfare as long as the US-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty is still operative. The potential build-up of Japanese military power also complicates the strategic calculations of both Korea's. North Korea has long viewed Japanese military forces as comprising a logical addition to the American-led coalition against itself. Even South Korea's latest Defence White paper expresses concern that any Japanese military buildup, far from relieving the US security burden in East Asia, will only further destabilise the regional calculus of threat.[22]

Similarly, China's steadfast refusal to enter into regional and global nuclear arms control talks leading to a reduction in its own nuclear force capabilities may well reinforce a regional security dilemma. If incentives for China to involve itself in such talks are not found, both Japan and South Korea could justify future military build-ups of their own. And, if the Japanese, in particular were to engage in such a more China could easily rationalise sustaining its nuclear forces against a renewed Japanese military threat.

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22 'South Korea's Fears outlined', 'Jane's Defence Weekly 16,20 (12 December 1991), p.937.

Thus it is very necessary to understand that while contemporary issues of concern for regional stability in East Asia are mostly relics of the cold war, they differ from those generated by the Bipolar-standoff in Europe in that they contain elements of geopolitical struggles specific to the region. And, the collective security initiatives emerging in East Asia not only continue to be guided by the concept of deterrence but also bank on anticipated sanctions by collective action which in turn presuppose a high degree of common interests.

Neither can progress in shaping Asia-Pacific multilateral economic fora be regarded as inherently leading to breakthroughs on regional military security issues. Moreover it is doubtful that a regional community can be established solely on the basis of economic development and trade expansion. Because economic relations are inevitably based on principles of advantage and disadvantage the growing interdependence will not lead immediately to relations of trust. Infact, in some case, it may also result in political tensions and in the context of unresolved political issues may then led to military confrontation.

CONCLUSION

East Asia's security context has largely shifted from management of superpower competition in the region to more emphasis on identifying and reconciling sources of heightened intra-regional competition. Revised threat perceptions, intensified economic competition, and the lack of a cohesive multilateral framework for conflict resolution underscore the dangers of miscalculating or ignoring the area's emerging security challenges. It is the contention of this analysis that if the objective is 'positive peace' then not only is the realist paradigm' of power balancing not suitable for East Asia, regional security can also not be enhanced by attempts to create 'regimes'.

More specifically, limited and flexible multilateral initiatives need to be undertaken to cultivate strategic reassurance as the region moves from 'conflict avoidance' to 'conflict resolution' and accommodation of previously hostile actors like the Indo-Chinese states. It is only in the context of confidence-building security measures that any attempts to reconcile the security interest of the regional actors can become effective. The daunting challenge this task represents for regional policy makers is indisputable.

CHAPTER 3

JAPAN AS A GLOBAL CIVILIAN POWER

It is widely accepted that since the Meiji Restoration a wealthy nation and a strong military have been the traditional objectives of Japanese security policy and that since 1945 military security has been embedded in a broader definition of national security. The ideology of economic security has since focused largely on reducing Japan's dependence on the import of critical raw materials, such as oil and on the development of technology. Indeed the idea of Japan as a small and isolated island nation, easily held hostage in a hostile international environment, still retairs a very powerful hold over Japanese thinking.[1] Japan's commitment to increasing its technological autonomy is similarly uncontroversial. Technology is desirable because it opens up the prospect for sustained long-term growth. It may also help to reduce Japan's economic vulnerability by leading to sustained economic growth that is less dependent on importing raw materials. '...Indegenization, diffusion and nurturing combine the

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1.   Peter J.Katzenstein and Nobu Okawara, 'Japan's National Security: Structures,   Norms   and   Policies', International Security, vol.17   n 4, (Spring 1993), pp.98-99.

belief that Japan is more secure when it achieves independent scientific and technological capabilities to design, manufacture and innovate.'[2]

At the same time, while the state in post-war Japan underwent a process of ideological transformation (dictated by both domestic and external factors) reconceiving state and society in the name of democracy, pacifism and economic progress, certain basic perceptions have remained unchanged. Among the dependent clauses of the Meiji ideological utterance that have continued to influence Japanese interpretations of the political and social world they live in "...post-war Japanese can scarcely be said to have discarded their belief in progress. The sense of nation, of being Japanese... is not much diminished today. Nor is the pride in the national achievements and international status of 'our country' Japan."[3]

As William Nester has observed, although the means have changed Tokyo has continued to pursue four interrelated

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2. David Friedman and Richard J.Samuels, 'How to succeed without Really Flying: The Japanese Aircraft Industry and Japan's Technology Ideology'. (Cambridge; Japan Program, Centre for International Affairs, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), pp.4-5.

3. Carol Gluck, 'Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the late Meiji Period (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey) 1985), p.286.

47

foreign policy goals since the country was forced into the world economy by Commodore Perry's gunboats in 1853: 1) economic and military security 2) rapid modernisation 3) great power status and 4) world recognition of its accomplishments.[4] Convinced that militarism was a bankrupt means of achieving the nation's foreign policy objectives, post-war Japan instead embarked on a peaceful pursual of economic progress. This is in keeping with the dictum that 'economic progress is in the end more decisive,[5] a conclusion fully shared by the First Diplomatic White Paper in 1957, 'the only way to raise living standards and to increase national power lay in the peaceful development of economic strength."

It is in this context that one must place the current Japanese debate on their role in the world after Pax Americana. Increasingly faced with the realisation that economic strength does not translate automatically into political power in the international arena, there is widespread feeling in Japan that the country will have to redefine its identity so as to find itself a place in the new world order.

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4. William Nester, 'The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy', Millennium: Journal of International Studio, vol.18, n 3, 1989, p.377.

5. Reinhard Drifte, Journal of East Asian Affairs (Winter-Spring 1992), p.86.

Japan's rise to economic prominence has led Edward Olsen[6] to assert that with the end of the cold war, at the global level, the United States must adjust to Japan's mounting economic challenge. For example he speaks of 'Japan's challenge to US leadership', 'Japan's central adversarial role in the post-cold war struggle for global economic power' and 'Japan's quest for unequivocal economic dominance of the world'.

US interests in Asia, at their most fundamental level, have been, first to preserve peace and thwart any threat to the United states and second, to protect continued US access, economically and otherwise to the region. America has sought in particular to prevent any one power from dominating the region to the point of constituting a threat to the United States and to its access to the area.[7]

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6.   Edward Olsen, 'Target Japan as America's Economic Foe', Orbis, Fall 1992 pp.491-803. Also see, S.Huntington 'America's Changing Strategic Interests', Survival, vol.23, n 1 (January/February 1991) and Edward Luttwak 'From geo-politics to geo-economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammer of Commerce' National Interest, n 20 (Summer 1990), pp.17-23.

7.   Richard L.Sneider, 'U.S. Interests and Policies in Asia and the Western Pacific in the 1980s' in 'The Common Security Interests of Japan, The United States and NATO' ed. U.Alexis Johnson and George R.Packard, (Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts) (1981), pp.64.65.

An ideological continuity is thus apparent when Olsen posits that 'certain cultural factors as well as politico-economic methods give the Japanese an edge over Americans when dealing with Asian countries i.e. this ability of Japan to secure economic leadership in Asia constitutes a threat to the United States. Analysing post-cold war international relations in terms of a contest for world economic leadership, contemporary arguments that the US must beat back challenges for economic dominance are, moreover, couched in terms of zero-sum competition and positional advantages. The claim is that now as in the past, the anarchic nature of international politics requires states to be deeply concerned not only with how various policies and outcomes directly affect them, but also with the question of whether they are gaining more than others.[8] The reason is a pre-occupation with power which in most formulations has an element of comparison built on it.

However, it is precisely this ability to secure leadership in Asia that has the potential to be utilised by Japan in playing a primary role in the transition to an alternate security system in Asia. It would be a radical departure from the prevailing balance of power system

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8.   Robert Jervis 'International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle', International Security (Spring 1993), vol.17 n 4), pp.52-68.

sponsored by the United States to primarily serve its strategic interests - to prevent any single power from dominating the area and excluding the US - wherein stability is maintained but an environment of pervasive insecurity prevails.

Rather than singlemindedly focusing on economics as Olsen does - Japanese cheap-riding on defence is a de facto US subsidy for Japanese economic competitiveness - it is in the wider interest of peace and prosperity that a case can be built for an enhanced role for Japan in issues relating to security in Asia, in the post-cold war era. The proposition being that not only is the Japanese role in defining and moving towards an alternate security system in Asia critical for comprehensive regional security it also has positive implications for Japan's global status.

This need not be a radical process but rather a conscious effort on the part of the nation to develop itself incrementally - the active response focusing primarily on the creation of a co-prosperity sphere and a constructive role in conflict resolution.

Despite its detestable implementation by the Imperial Japanese State, the theoretical construct of the concept of a co-prosperity sphere is far from negative. In keeping with

the widely held assumption that the achievement of overall stability and security in Asia hinges largely on a framework of economic development, it envisions an Asian economic community with Japan as its main engine. Yet it is not proposed to be a closed economic bloc on the lines of EEC or NAFTA with its main thrust on giving Asian countries a bargaining chip in negotiations with other trading blocs in the West, wherein Asian nations bargain collectively instead of individually.[9]

Initially extending to East and possibly South Asia, the purpose of this multiplex mechanism, composed of bilateral and multilateral frameworks of cooperation would be to 'secure economic intercourse in the region, ranging from trade and services to technology transfers'.[10] Obviously Japan, as the greatest economic power in Asia, has an important role to play in this, wherein it can act as a model for and lend assistance to developing countries in their own efforts for economic and democratic development. Infact, since 1986 MITI has been advising Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan, Srilanka and

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9.   Concept of an 'East Asian Economic Group' proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad at the end of 1990.

10. Nobuo Matsunaga, 'A Japanese Perspective on the Pacific Rim in the 1990's, Japan Review of International Affairs (Special Issue 1992), p.70.

Bangladesh on the development of export-oriented industries,
often clashing with American economic doctrine opposing
intervention in the market. In the words of Tamamoto
`...Japan has inspired Asia in a fundamental way, luring its
neighbours by way of example to embrace the politics of
economic growth.[11]

At the same time however, Japan needs to replace its
one dimensional economic strategy with a more multi-faceted
values oriented policy.[12] For Tokyo has singlemindedly used
access to the markets and resources of the Third World with
minimal costs and maximum benefits in its rise to economic
prominence.[13] While diversifying its sources of foreign
markets, cheap labour, energy and raw materials and reducing
Japan's dependence on any single source, Tokyo in turn has
attempted to make its sources dependent on Japanese goods,
services, capital and technology. For example Tokyo's
foreign aid programme is especially criticised for being
used essentially as an export subsidy for Japanese firms, as

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11. Tamamoto, `Japan's Uncertain Role', World Policy
     Journal (Fall 1991), p.593.

12. Yoichi Funabashi, `Japan and the New World Order',
     Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991/1992, p.66.

13. William Nester `The Third World in Japanese Foreign
     Policy', Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
     vol.18 n 3, (1989), p.377.

most aid remains tied to the purchase of Japanese goods and services. There are also widespread complaints that Japanese firms refuse to transfer technology to their partners and completely control decision making.

Further, for many years an important aspect of Japan's economic cooperation with developing countries has been the official development assistance (ODA), the principal objectives of which include: a) helping to raise the standard of living of the recipient nation by supporting self-help efforts for economic and social development; b) improving friendly relations with the recipient; c) contributing to the development of the world economy as a whole through cooperation in the economic advancement of developing countries; and d) contributing to the peace and stability of the international community.

However, since the 1980s, cold war considerations have increasingly had a bearing on the formulation of Japan's aid policy. Within the conceptual framework of 'comprehensive security increasing amounts of aid were given to strategic countries bordering conflicts which did not necessarily have large markets or resources. Accordingly the Japanese government stepped up its assistance to neighbouring Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It also started building up its assistance to Thailand and

Turkey which were similarly defined as `countries bordering on areas of conflict'.[14] And in 1981, it declared its intention to strengthen its assistance to `those areas which are important to the maintenance of peace and stability of the world. That Japanese aid is disbursed in accord with U.S. strategy is clear from the fact that since 1978, Japan and the United States have undertaken repeated policy planning talks on assistance, supplemented since 1985 by Japan-US consultations between vice-ministers in charge of political affairs.[15]

Tokyo has now placed four criteria---level of military expenditure; potential for atomic, biological and chemical weapons; arms trade and democratization - on future aid to developing countries. Although posed as `points to be noted' and not as `conditionalities', they however are commonly viewed as a facet of US human rights diplomacy.

Japan's active engagement in the economic development of Asia receives widespread support, even from China which

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14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko Seisho (Diplomatic Blue Book), 1980, p.220; Juichi Inada `Japan's Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic?', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol.18 n 3, (1989), p.401.

15. Juichi Inada `Japan's Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic?', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol.18 n 3, (1989), p.402.

has traditionally harboured deep suspicions about Tokyo's regional intentions. Japan however has to develop a more positive and comprehensive strategy for economic cooperation. Towards this end it can support regional prosperity by absorbing its products and open its market for Asian investment. In doing so it will also offer leadership in escaping the growth of exclusionary world economic blocs and protectionism. And in the case of aid a case-by-case approach following in-depth consultations with the recipient country is suitable, for regional partnership.

Yet, as pointed out in the previous chapter, in the context of a complex regional environment, economics alone cannot from the basis of a stable and secure community. Efforts in this direction have be supplemented by regional dispute settlement and security related confidence-building measures.

At the intra-regional level, historical rivalries and antagonisms, geopolitical and ideological imperatives, and the overlay of these factors on a number of domestic disputes have made for tension and conflict. While external support was a factor in the precipitation of some of these conflicts, its primary impact has been in the vertical and horizontal escalation of these conflicts. Exclusion of major

powers rivalry from the region cannot, therefore, in itself
be expected to lead to the resolution of regional conflicts.
In some cases it could even exacerbate local rivalries which
have remained dormant with the imposition of the dynamics of
major power competition.[16]

Apart from a few exceptions, 'intermediary
intervention' has received little attention in the study of
international politics. Most of the works are inspired by
superpower tensions in the cold war period and focus on the
position of the United States. Recently Princen[17] has put
into perspective the role of intermediary intervention as a
conflict resolution mechanism. According to him, in a
conflict situation intermediaries are able to tip the
balance from confrontation to cooperation, the mediators
impact being a consequence of three attributes (a) the
ability to change bargaining dynamics by refiguring the
structure of the bargain; (b) the capability to precipitate
movement by making proposals; and (c) the competence to pool

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16. Muthiah Algappa 'Regional Arrangements and
    International Security in Southeast Asia: Going beyond
    ZOPFAN', Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.12 n 4,
    (March 1991), p.277.

17. Thomas Princen 'Intermediaries in International
    Conflict' Princeton, (NJ: Princeton University Press)
    1992. Review by Marieke A.Kleiboer, International
    Journal of Conflict Management, vol. 4, n 1, (January
    1993), pp.77-81.

information. Intermediaries must, however, take care not to play a three way bargaining game as it amounts to power politics as usual. In the words of Princen 'an intermediary must walk a thin line between being a neutral catalyst and a power broker.[18] Mediators are especially useful in disputes where institutionalization is impractical by providing a low risk negotiating environment in which confidentiality is assured and parties feel at ease.

In this context, moving away from the concept of 'conflict avoidance' to that of 'conflict resolution' Japanese diplomacy can emerge as an important outside force for mediation and collecting the peace dividend in Asia. Operating within the framework of its pacifist self-defense posture and with none of the stigma's attached to the superpowers, Japanese diplomacy is today in a unique position to assert itself as a partner in political dialogue on specific issues that relate to peace and stability in the region.

Important in this context is the fact that by concentrating on economics, Japan has developed important contacts with both parties in many bilateral adversarial

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18. Thomas Princen 'Intermediaries in International Conflict' Princeton: Princeton Univesrity Press, 1992, p.214.

relationships. For example, Japan first began playing both sides of regional fences in the early 1950s when Washington forced Tokyo to sever diplomatic ties with Beijing and recognize Taipei. Instead Japan continued to trade and conduct diplomacy with both countries and by 1960s was China's largest trade partner. Also, regardless of human rights abuses Japanese companies increased the value of their investments in China in 1991, some 69 percent over 1990. Since then, to varying degrees, Tokyo has played the same intermediary role in conflicts between North and South Korea, ASEAN and Vietnam, the Arab states and Israel and Iran and Iraq. Infact Japanese diplomacy has, over the years, displayed a tendency towards moderation. For example, unlike the United States which responded to the energy crisis of 1973 with 'Project Independence', and the creation of a military 'Rapid Deployment Force' for times of crisis, Japan attempted to ameliorate its vulnerability through diplomatic initiatives of the government, seeking to provide more stable energy supplies in an unstable world. This flexible 'policy adjustment' response is evidence of an ability to 'adapt to the changing world order' on part of Japan, wherein a positive thrust towards compromise and reconciliation emerges as a significant Japanese diplomatic trait. Some analysts have even suggested that Japan should 'encourage the peaceful resolution of problems by offering

inducements in the form of economic assistance to the parties concerned.[19] But the failure of such financial diplomacy in North Korea is evidence of its limitation.

Related is Japan's role within the United Nations framework. There are four aspects to the security functions, in the broad sense of the term that are now being sought of the United Nations. One is what might be termed as a 'gulf-war-style' system. This means repelling aggression with the use of military power. The second aspect is that of peace-keeping operations, such as keeping opposing military forces separated and overseeing cease--fires. Another important aspect, the development of which is proposed, is that of peacemaking operations and involves investing the Secretary General with greater authority to provide early warnings and undertake preventive diplomacy to avert disputes. The fourth aspect concerns the creation of UN emergency relief capacity so that the United Nations can move into action to cope with large scale disasters.[20]

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19. See, Makio Miyagawa, "The Employment of Economic Strength for Foreign Policy Goals", Japan Review of International Affairs, Fall, 1992, p.275-299.

20. Nakanishi Terumasa 'The United Nations and Japan's Place In It', Japan Echo, vol.19, (special issue, 1992), p.68.

The last two aspects have been lacking thus far, but they are beginning to attract attention as ways to enhance the future role of the United Nations and they seem highly suitable areas for Japan to play an active role. A distinction is also being made between `pre-accord' and `post-accord' activities in the realm of conflict resolution -- while `pre-accord' activities focus on dialogue, negotiations and diplomacy, `post-accord' activities focus on enforcing the terms and maintaining peace. Japan can complement the `pre-accord' activities by playing an important role in pre-negotiations i.e. preparing the scene for a formal and meaningful dialogue, within the framework of the United Nations and supplement its efforts in the direction of conflict resolution.

Yet, there remain serious obstacles inhibiting the enactment of an active Japanese role in conflict resolution and peacemaking. First, is the `mercantilist image' wherein widespread doubts remain that Japan has any universally attractive ideas to offer. Despite the fact that Japan has played an intermediary role in many regional conflicts, the image of an `economic animal' persists. For the chief purpose of its intermediary role in various regional conflicts was to solidify and justify its continued economic

links with both sides, rather than contributing positively in the settlement of disputes.[21]

Second, is Japan's serious `legitimacy deficit' in Asia stemming from the legacy of the second world war. Despite increasing military expenditures, for the most part mainstream Japanese politics and society have yet to exhibit a trend reminiscent of the militaristic nationalism associated with pre-World War II Japanese expansionism. And although, the country has begun to take over more military and strategic roles from the United States in the Asian Pacific region, Japanese military power continues to be an instrument of a conservative foreign policy to maintain the existing East Asian order. Nevertheless, misgivings about, Japanese intentions abound.

Not only is there a widely shared perception, that `unlike the Germans, the Japanese do not have a strong sense of having done wrong' and that `Asia continues to be for Japan a temptation to bare its chauvinism and conceit', regional apprehensions are exacerbated by the fact that even as they have tried to convince the world and the Japanese people that national security is more a matter of economic

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21. William Nester, `The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol.18 n 3, (1989), p.379.

advantage than the maintenance of a `war potential' successive Japanese governments, guided by strategic perceptions, have resorted to a liberal interpretation of the Constitution in order to justify the realistic security choices they have adopted.

After pledging `we have determined to preserve our security and existence trusting in the justice and faith of the peace loving peoples of the world' the authorities interpreted the constitution's renunciation of war as not prohibiting a war for the exclusive purpose of self-defense and the ban on the maintenance of war-making potential as not prohibiting the possession of self-defense potential. The defensive nature of these measures was sought to be underlined by four informal restraints - the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (Japan will not produce, possess or introduce nuclear weapons), the ban on the export of arms, the limitation of defence expenditure to 1% of GNP, and the refusal to deploy Japanese troops outside the country. But all have been breached,[22] leading critics to warn of the

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22. The first, by homebasing an American aircraft carrier at Yokosuka and by the importation of plutonium, the second by the 1983 agreement to transfer to the United States military related technologies and by agreeing to participate in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the third by the Nakasone Cabinet and without a Diet vote, and the fourth by the deployment of SDF personnel in a peacekeeping role in Cambodia in 1992.

dangers of 'creeping militarism' in Japan and for most victims of Japan's expansionist policies, the US-Japanese Security Treaty continues to be the only guarantee against the revival of Japanese hegemonism in Asia.

The challenge confronting Japan, therefore is how to overcome its reflexive isolationism and emerge as an independent political power without arousin'' those who are already deeply anxious about its economic might.

However, Japan has interpreted its contribution to the 'order building efforts' in the post-cold war era as requiring an enhanced response in the area of international security. Officially referred to as 'burden sharing' and 'contributing to peace' important actions in this regard include the decision of the Japanese government to dispatch two minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1991, the passing of the PKO Bill in the Diet in May-June 1992 and the deployment of the SPF in a peacekeeping role in Cambodia in September 1992, while taking increased responsibility for its security in military terms, at the regional level.

On the contrary, this analysis argues that Japan's 'unorthodox power portfolio ('economic giant' and 'military dwarf') should not be viewed as an unstable and transitional phenomenon; its deep rooted pacifism should not be treated

as mere escapism,"[23] for this very portfolio presents Japan with the opportunity to define its identity in the international arena.

Here it important to point out that this attempt to define an enhanced political and economic role for Japan should not be interpreted as a loosely articulated hegemonic vision. The main structural impediment in this regard is the increase in the power of regional actors such as India and China, a limitation not only on Japanese potential but also on the concept of hegemony as well. 'As regional powers become stronger they limit the capacity of any one nation to exercise dominance, forcing international politics further into the realm of bargaining and increasing the number of players.[24] 'Infact not only does China possess more 'military will' to halt any move towards hegemony on part of Japan, but also the independence many countries were willing to forgo in return for economic assistance under Pax Britannnica and Americana has become somewhat a thing of the past.

Even in terms of self-image, hegemony or domination is

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23. Yoichi Funabashi, 'Japan and the New World Order', Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991/1992, p.65.

24. Deborah L.Haber 'The Death of Hegemony; Why 'Pax Nipponica' is Impossible', Asian Survey, vol.30 n.9, (September 1990), p.906.

not the objective of Japan. Rather the Japanese response to what they perceive to be important structural developments in international relations - the end of cold war and relative decline in US power, has been to expand their own power of expression in the context of a joint control of the world by the major powers - evident in the demand to increase the permanent membership of the Security Council, so that Japan may take its rightful place in the body. Phrases like 'half way to hegemony'[25] are a contradiction in terms for 'hegemony is an all-or-nothing situation in terms of domination; a country either is or is not a hegemon.'[26] And the lesson drawn by post--war Japan is that military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored lest it threaten the peace and prosperity the nation has enjoyed since 1945.

Instead of responding in an ad hoc fashion to increasing western criticism, Japan could offer active leadership, based on a recognition of fundamental equality and cultural affinity, in the development of an 'Asian

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25. Kent Calder, a Princeton Political Scientist is cited with Bradley Martin et al in Larry Martz 'Hour of Power?' Newsweek, February 27, 1989, p.15.

26. Deborah L.Haber 'The Death of Hegemony; Why 'Pax Nipponica' is Impossible', Asian Survey, vol.30 n.9, (September 1990), p.906.

Paradigm' in International Relations - the two pillars of which would be co-prosperity and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The proliferation of actors, the breakdown of rigid alliance patterns and the widening circles of interlocking economic interests would lead to the emergence of a world of 'complex interdependence' described by Keohane and Nye.[27] In this world the overt threat or use of arms as a means of statecraft recedes to the backstage of international relations. National Security defined in traditional terms of physical safety and territorial defence becomes obsolescent, as nations are increasingly self-deterred from the resort to military conquest as a consequence of the deepening ties of interdependence and of the emergence of mutual empathy.

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27. Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Power and
     Interdependence: World Politics in Transition', Boston:
     Little Brown, 1977.

CHAPTER 4

KOREA: A DILEMMA FOR JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY

In the Japanese language there exists an important distinction between the terms `tatemae`and `honne`. Tatemae refers to an individual's explicity stated principle, objective or promise, honne refers to what that individual is really going to do or wants to do. At one level, therefore, tatemae refers to the way individual in Japan know they are expected to behave. Honne, on the other hand, refers to the way individuals actually want to behave - in terms of self-interest . And since self-interest receives wide social disapproval in Japan, one presents ones actions in terms of tatemae, even if one is determined to fulfill them in terms of honne.[1]

This recognition of the difference between what one says one is doing and what one actually does is clearly of fundamental importance in Japanese society. It is with such pairs of terms in mind[2] that this analysis proposes to analyse Japan's policy towards the Korean peninsula.

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1. Roger Goodman and Kirsten Refsing, 'Ideology and Practice in Japan', (London: Routledge), 1992, pp.6-7.

2. The psychologist Doi Takeo uses one such pair -- `omote` (meaning `front`) and `ura` (meaning `rear`) as a shorthand for understanding Japanese society. Hendry (1989) invokes the use of `kao` (`face`) and kokoro (`mind or soul`) to make the same distinction.

   Roger Goodman and Kirsten Refsing, `Ideology and Praice in Japan' (London: Routledge) 1992, p.7.

The Korean peninsula is the one region in the world where Japan's geopolitical interests seem to exceed its geoeconomic interests. Often described as a 'dagger pointing to the heart of Japan' it is the most obvious launch pad for any ambitious continental invader. Perceptions and reality, however, are quite different---the only time the peninsula actually served such a purpose was in the 13th century when the Mangols twice attempted to invade Japan from Korea. Rather, at the turn of this century Tokyo used the excuse of potential Chinese and Russian threats to Korea to declare war on these countries, defeat them and incorporate the peninsula into the Japanese empire. In 1945 , a potential threat from the Korean peninsula emerged again with Japan's devastating defeat and liberation of its colonies, the Soviet empire's spread across Eastern Europe and imposition of a communist regime, and the threat of successful communist revolutions in China and Vietnam.

The 1945 agreement between Washington and Moscow to divide Korea at the 38th parallel into a communist North and non-communist South proved to be the perfect solution to Japan's potential security problem. The Washington- Seoul alliance has been Japan's first line of defence in Northeast Asia and serves as a vital buffer zone against possible aggression from the Soviet Union or China for without it Japan would have to divert far more of its resources,

engaged in the pursuit of economic strength to its military. Prime Minister Sato succinctly articulated the importance of the peninsula when in November 1969 he said that the 'security of South Korea is essential to Japanese security'.

But the creation of an American protected buffer in the South not only checked Soviet and Chinese ambitions, it also prevented the emergence of a powerful Korea that could pose a strategic threat or economically rival Tokyo. Divided against each other the two Koreas focus much of their foreign policy energies across the 38th parallel rather than against their traditional enemy Japan. A peninsula united under the Communist North would pose a serious security threat to Japan wherein Japan may need to undertake significant rearmament including possibly the employment of nuclear weapons. A peninsula united under the dynamic South would pose an even greater geoeconomic challenge than it already does, for with a huge domestic market of 60 million consumers, a unified Korea would be far less dependent on exported growth, could achieve economies of scale for its products much sooner and would thus have much more bargaining power vis-a-vis Japan.

Tokyo's relationship with the two Korea's is further marred by deep-seated racism toward the Korean people. The Japanese consider Koreans to be 'inferior people' prone to

crude and criminal behavior.[3] Annual Japanese government surveys reveal that Koreans continue to be the least liked nationality. Continued and unabashed discrimination against the 700,000 Korean residents in Japan, history and school textbooks that depict colonization as enlightened rather than exploitative, and freely expressed anti-Korean sentiments by Japanese officials and the public alike thus continue to strain the relationship.

Officially Japan is not against the emergence of a truly neutral and unified Korea unaffiliated with any major power, but Tokyo's policy on the Korean peninsula has thus far focused on enhancing stability and peaceful coexistence between the two while harnessing both the South's geoeconomic challenge and the North's geopolitical threat by using diplomatic and economic means. Referred to as Japan's 'two -Korea policy', whereby it limited official diplomacy to the South but carried on economic relations with both, it is aimed at containing the two Korea's within Japan's own geoeconomic sphere of influence and has been almost as successful as its policy toward China before 1972.

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3.   Evelyn Colbert, 'Japan and the Republic of Korea: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow', Asian Survey, vol.26, no.3, March 1986, p.278.

SOUTH KOREA

From its opening to the world in 1854 to the defeat in 1945, Tokyo considered outright control over Korea to be essential to Japan's security. Japan fought two wars for control over Korea against China (1894-95), and Russia (1904-05), then formally annexed Korea in 1910. Japanese rule was brutal, even by imperial standards. Tokyo's assimilationist policy attempted to force Koreans to abandon their language and culture to become second class Japanese. Millions of Koreans were also mobilized as slave labour during the war.

Given this tragic history it was not surprising that it took twenty years of tough negotiations to restore diplomatic relations after the division of Korea in 1945. Yet Tokyo was very skillful in preserving an avenue for eventual relations with Pyongyang. Although in 1965 Japan agreed to recognize Seoul as the 'sole legal' government of Korea as defined in UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (IIT) of 1948, which called the Republic of Korea 'the only lawful government of Korea in the United Nations General Assembly', Japan's foreign minister later said before the diet that 'the area of the treaty application is limited only to the area where ---the present jurisdiction of South Korea

extends'[4]. And in return for an aid package worth \$ 800 million over the following ten years, Japan obtained approval to maintain unofficial economic, social and humanitarian relations with North Korea.

Also as 'aid' was tied to grants or purchases of Japanese goods and services it proved to be an immense 'Trojan Horse' whereby Japanese industrial conglomerates rapidly achieved powerful positions throughout the South Korea economy In 1965, 60 percent of South Korea's trade and 75 percent of its foreign investment was with the United States. Only four years later. Japan had become South Korea's largest trading partner with 40.7 percent of the total compared to America's 30.2 percent share. Between 1965 and 1979 bilateral trade rose from \$ 221 million to \$ 10 billion. Japan not only remains South Korea largest trade partner today but continues to to enjoy a huge trade surplus whose commutative total between 1965 and 1989 was over \$ 40 billion.[5]

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4.   Evelyn Colbert, 'Japan and the Republic of Korea: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow', Asian Survey, vol.26, no.3, March 1986, p.280.

5.   William Nester, 'Japan and the Two Koreas: Neomercantilism, Prosperity and Dependence', The Korean Journal of International Affairs, vol.22, no.3, Autumn 1991, pp.460-461.

With the result as elsewhere in the developing world, Japan's rapid economic penetration of South Korea stimulated considerable criticism of its trade and investment practices. And, as elsewhere, Tokyo has successfully countered South Korean demands for balanced trade, significant technological transfers and untied aid. Tokyo's powerful economic position within South Korea enables it to turn a deaf ear to regular complaints about Japanese export subsidies and the web of non-tariff barriers that lock out most competitive Korean products. Most of these demands have been met with many promises (tatemae) but no significant action (honne).

In addition, Japan has adroitly diverted attention from these issues by periodic concessions on geopsychological issues. It has been prompt to deal with political issues like the text book controversy, while making only promises in regard to Seoul's demands for trade reciprocity or better treatment for Korean Japanese. For, concessions on such geopsychological issues as Japan's revision of history are extremely low cost and allow it to stonewall on substantive issues like trade.

For example during President Chun's visit to Tokyo in September in 1984, at the state banquet Emperor Hirohito said; 'It is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century,

and I believe it should not be repeated'.[6] Prime Minister Nakasone went even further;` The fact remains that there was a period in this century when Japan brought great sufferings upon your country and its people. I would like to state here that the Government and people of Japan feel a deep regret for this error and are determined firmly to warn ourselves for the future'.[7] Both the Emperor and Nakasone acknowledged Korea's profound cultural contributions to Japan;. Nakasone went so far as to admit that Japan had been the pupil and Korea the teacher for several thousand years. Yet the summit was all symbolism (tatemae) and no substance (honne). No progress was made on issues such as the growing trade deficit, technology transfers or the legal status of Korean-Japanese.[8]

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6.   Japan Times, September 7, 1984.

7.   Japan Times, September 8, 1984.

8.   The Korean Japanese suffer disadvantages in education, employment, political rights and participation, and marriage. The Alien Registration Law requires all foreign residents including Koreans to carry an identity card at all times and the regular fingerprinting of all foreigners over 16 years old residing in Japan over one year. Refusal to be fingerprinted could result in penalties of up to one year in prison and a 200,000 yen fine. Japan's Supreme Court has continually upheld this law despite the fact that Japan's Alien Registration law violates the Peace Treaty, Article 14 of Japan's Constitution promising that "All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin", and international law.

NORTH KOREA

Japan's links with North Korea date to the mid 1950s when trade ties began , and were expanded in the late 1950s as Tokyo repatriated Koreans desiring to go to the North. But it was only in Spring 1972, following the West's opening to China that Japan made a major effort to improve ties. The Tanaka government said it would welcome expanded unofficial relations in nonpolitical fields with North Korea because it `cannot help but recognize that there exist two Koreas on the Korean peninsula and the co-existence of the two is the goal we desire'.

But when Pyongyang responded by calling for equidistant relations, Japan firmly rejected the offer by saying that Japan had no intention of `treating the two countries equally. `Infact Tokyo has always guarded its more important relation with South Korea and Japan's Korea Policy was never more clearly articulated than on November 27, 1984 when Nakasone declared: ` Our policy is to place primary emphasis on our relations with the Republic of Korea while welcoming North Koreas emergence from isolation. But this welcome will not be extended at the cost of sacrificing our relationship with Seoul'.[9]

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9.   William Nester, `Japan and the Two Koreas: Neomercantilism, Prosperity and Dependence', The Korean Journal of International Affairs, vol.22, no.3, Autumn 1991, p.470.

The long - term success of this policy was evident when Premier Kim announced in November 1972 that normalization could occur even if Tokyo did not repudiate the 1965 treaty.

Vice Premier Pak Song-Chol said the reason for dropping the earlier demand that Japan repudiate its relations with the South before it established relations with the North was that this "would not impede the reunification of the two countries',[10] Accordingly, in December 1972, Japan's Export Import Bank extended $ 1.7 million to finance the export of two complete industrial plants - this was the first Japanese loan to North Korea.

Since then Japan has maximized its geo-economic interests in North Korea despite Pyongyang's erratic policies and occasional inability to pay its debts. It has carried on intensive negotiations via a range of groups including the Japanese Red Cross, Japan - North Korean Diet Leagues, business associations, LDP study groups etc. to negotiate a range of economic agreements and as in Vietnam, it is in the perfect position to rapidly expand its economic ties should North Korea ever launch the sort of sweeping reforms that China is undergoing.

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10. William Nester, 'Japan and the Two Koreas: Neomercantilism, Prosperity and Dependence', The Korean Journal of International Affairs, vol.22, no.3, Autumn 1991, p.468.

Seoul long ago gave up demands that Tokyo recognize it as Koreas sole legitimate government and tolerates Japan's extensive unofficial diplomacy with the North, Even after

Pyongyang terrorist acts like the Rangoon explosion which murdered most of president Chun's cabinet in 1983 and Korean Airlines jet explosion in 1985, Seoul did not press Tokyo to embargo its trade with North Korea. Importantly, Japan has also avoided any military commitment with Seoul. Although most Japanese officials admit their country's vital geopolitical interests on the Korean Peninsula they have repeatedly severed any link between economic and military ties and despite pressures from Washington refused to acknowledge any military commitment towards the Korean peninsula. In a significant example, when in September 1981 Seoul requested $ 4 billion with the 'bullwark argument' - that, as South Korea protects Japan, a large untied aid package was a fair way for Tokyo to reciprocate - Japan promptly rejected the request on the ground that it could grant no aid with military implications.

Despite squabbles with both side, therefore Japan's two Koreas policy has been immensely successful, wherein Tokyo's skillful diplomacy has managed to deflect the conflicting demands of both Koreas and maximized its geopolitical and geoeconomic goals on the peninsula without damaging ties

with either. It has played on the divisions between North and South to extract maximum gains from both.

Since the latter half of 1991, however North Korea's nuclear weapons programme has surfaced as the regions most urgent security issue. Of greatest concern is the Yongbyon nuclear complex, approximately 100 kms. north of Pyongyang. The site is suspected of having facilities capable of reprocessing plutonium and producing the enriched uranium needed to develop nuclear warheads. Regional concerns are further heightened by the missile tests conducted by the North Koreans in the sea of Japan in late May, as one of the test demonstrated the Rodong-I missile which, with a range of 1,000 km. would be capable of hitting many Japanese, Chinese and Russian cities, with or without nuclear warheads.[11] Accordingly South Korea is considering buying the Patriot missile system from the US to counter this threat; and Japan's Vice Defence Minister said that North Korea had now become his countries foremost security concern.[12]

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11. Harvey Stockwin, 'U.S. Bows Low to North Koreans', The Times of India, 23 June 1993, p.8.

12. William T. Tow, 'Northeast Asia and International Security: Transforming Competition to Collaboration', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.46, n.1., May 1992, p.7.

North Korea's incentives for developing its own nuclear force can be traced to its history of confronting a postwar American nuclear deterrence posture deployed in South Korea; its uncertainty over the security guarantees extended to Pyongyang by the Soviet Union aid China, as those two traditional allies move toward more comprehensive politico-economic ties with the prosperous South ; and to Kim II-Sung's awareness that the country's growing strategic isolation as one of the last bastions of hard-line Marxism - Leninism will become even more precarious as South Korea's scale of economy soon allows it to surpass his own country militarily.

In response to growing regional apprehensions about the North Korean nuclear threat, the Bush administration initially adopted a strategy of inducement to defuse tensions between the Korea's. It sought to remove the source of military threat to North Korea by announcing the withdrawal of US ground forces and tactical nuclear weapons from the South. It encouraged ROK officials to renounce any intent to develop an indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons capability. Finally, it enlisted broad regional support for the Koreas demilitarization and proffered diplomatic and financial inducements to the DPRK in return for exercising nuclear restraint.

A substantial break through that appeared to have been expedited by these pronouncements was the admission of North and South Korea as separate members of the united Nations in mid-September 1991. Officials from both sides hailed this development as a major step toward Korean unification. The North Koreans also reacted favourably to President Bush's announcement that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from South Korea. In October American defence officials announced that the US would scale down its military strength on the Korean peninsula by 6,000 troops, in accordance with the scheduled Phase II of the United States East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI) leaving just over 30,000 ground forces in South Korea. In November 1991 . Secretary of State Baker also proposed a four -power multilateral initiative whereby the United States , the Soviet Union, China and Japan would work jointly to resolve outstanding security problems on the peninsula. This declaration represented a significant policy shift for Washington which had previously resisted Soviet and Chinese involvement in the peace process.

At the same time, the United States made it clear that if a reasoned approach did not work, they were willing to employ other means at hand. At the end of the US-ROK security conference held in Seoul on 21 November 1992, a

joint communique was issued that reflected a strong sense of
crisis. The US Secretary of Defence Rechard Cheney announced
a postponement in the implementation of the second phase of
reductions, (stated for 1993-1995) in the number of US
troops stationed in South Korea, was the rapid deployment of
armed might of the US military and the stationing of high-
tech weaponry was approved. And in the US Congress, hearings
'concerning the Threat of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons to
North Korea were held by the Subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and
by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. 'The propriety of an American
military attack was publicly debated at these hearings,
while Stephen Solarz, reportedly stated that if North Korea
does not resolve the nuclear issue satisfactorily then we
ought to apply the lesson learned in Iraq to them.'

Similarly, the United States initially responded in a
conciliatory fashion to the crisis that was precipitated
earlier this year, by the issue of inspection of North
Korean nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) wherein North Korea threatened to withdraw
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A joint
statement, issued after the two countries had reached an
agreement on 10th June 1993 , said that the US and North
Korea agreed not to use the threat of force including

nuclear weapons. They agreed on the desirability of a nuclear free Korean Peninsula, and the peaceful reunification of Korea. A further concession made by the Americans was in agreeing to continue a dialogue with North Korea on an equal and unprejudiced basis.[13]

However, President Clinton while visiting the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, recently once again struck an aggressive posture and warned that 'if the Communists (North Koreans) ever develop and use nuclear weapons, it would be the end of their country'. Contending 'there is clearly a line below which we cannot go. Our armed forces must still be able to fight and win on a moment's notice', he said that as commander-in-chief he would make sure that US military strength is kept strong, despite the end of the Cold War and cutbacks in defence spending. In a similar vein US defence secretary Les Aspin has said that the United States plans to secure reliable military strength and support ability to crush North Korean forces if another war breaks out in Korea.[14]

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13. Harvey Stockwin, 'U.S. Bows Low to North Koreans', The Times of India, 23 June 1993, p.8.

14. Report 'North Korea hits back at U.S. on N-Issue', The Times of India, July 12, 1993.

It is in this context that Japan's role has become critical for comprehensive security and stability in Northeast Asia. The proposition being that Japan can play a fundamental role in order to prevent unexpected and irrational behavior on part of North Korea in the light of economic devastation and desperate international isolation. Towards this end, however it will have to alter one of its basic strategic perceptions that a divided Korea has positive implications for Japan's national security defined in economic and military terms, and recognize the limitation of exercising financial leverage.

Japan needs to recognize that if international efforts to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons fail, the next US move will be towards further coercion. Even if the US decides against a surgical air strike against suspected nuclear facilities in North Korea it would probably begin a new build up of military forces in and around Korea. And at a time of economic retrenchment this would lead to increased US pressure for greater burden sharing by its Asian allies. The US would also ask for economic sanctions against North Korea which would require Japan to cut off the flow of money and investment to that country. For, Japan imposing an embargo would entail a difficult domestic political decision.

Instead of making the signing of a nuclear safeguard accord, allowing for outside inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities, into a virtual pre-condition for further relations, Japan can utilize its extensive economic links with North Korea, which have flourished even in the absence of diplomatic contacts between the two countries, to actively assist the North Korean economic rehabilitation. Infact Japanese leaders are well aware that their own country's financial linkages would be a critical variable in any successful effort to persuade Kim II Sung or his successors to move toward a modus vivendi with South Korea and toward adopting constructive postures on issues of regional conflict avoidance.

Tokyo also needs to take the initiative to convincingly demonstrate that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons capability. The importance of this action lies in the fact that in strategic terms, North Korea continues to view Japan as a logical addition to the American -- led coalition against itself. The need for such a measure arises in the context of a re-examination of its security imperatives in the post-cold war era, that has been gaining ground in Japan since July 1992 when Kuna Kaneka, a retired Japanese diplomat, advocated. in the issue of 'Atoms in Japan a limited extension of NPT followed by its revision. The emergence of strains in trade relations with the US have

made the Japanese conscious of the need for more self-reliant security. Growing nuclear and missile asymmetry with China, heightened by its strategic assertiveness and its acquisition of Russian technologies should not, they feel be allowed to become permanent. Infact Japan seems to be preparing the ground for local reprocessing of nuclear fuel from its vast nuclear programme as a contingency measure and at the recently concluded G-7 Tokyo summit it revealed its reluctance to support permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Such balancing measures however only heighten insecurity and instaility, wherein Japan's initial failure to dissuade the North Koreans from continuing their nuclear programme[15] need not be viewed as a long-term trend. Japan could continue with its efforts to convince North Korea that nuclear status, rather than giving it advantage in terms of a favourable unification agreement, would probably drive the South Koreans to develop their own nuclear capability. While North Korea might gain some admiration in the Third World, the majority of the international community would react negatively. This would produce further isolation for a regime that is even now on the periphery of world affairs.

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15. Japan conditioned 'tacit' recognition of North Korea and future Japanese economic assistance to the North on the DPRK's willingness to comply with IAEA guidelines for inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities in October 1991.

Japan, therefore, has a critical role to play in avoiding conflict escalation on the Korean peninsula. Indeed the degree to which North Korea can be dissuaded from resorting to the use of force in a last desperate measure to unify the peninsula on its terms, will be a key test of Japan's capability and willingness to assume greater responsibility for comprehensive security and stability in Asia.

At the same time, apart from these confidence -building measures, the long-term Japanese diplomatic thrust could be toward autonomous and peaceful unification of the two Koreans. Rather than limiting its role to maintaining the status quo on the peninsula, Japan's comprehensive security strategy in Northeast Asia could focus on paving the way for a constructive North-South dialogue.

CONCLUSION

'Japan is in an era of transition. Behind a facade of confidence in their country's future, many Japanese feel adrift in the world of the late 20th century.' Faced with the realisation that economic strength does not translate automatically into political power in the international arena, there is widespread feeling in Japan that the country will have to redefine its identity so as to find itself a place in the new world order. The real debate in Japan is therefore political, revolving around two questions - How does Japan see itself in the changing global scenario? And, what kind of role should Tokyo seek in the post-Cold War international order? Infact, the choices that now must be made by Japan are of a critical nature as the options selected may be of epochal significance.

One very important factor in this context is the currently popular proposition that the United States is a declining hegemon, that both the sagging US economic performance, relative to the burgeoning economies of Japan, Western Europe and even some of the newly industrialising economies, and Washington's deteriorating ability to sustain its political ad security commitments overseas have caused a precipitous and probably irreversible decline in US global leadership. It is this 'declinist' thesis which has become a

popular proposition in Japan and is fuelling Japanese debate on their role in the world after Pax Americana.

Japanese scholars, almost without exception, share this assessment of US decline. They generally echo the theme developed by Paul Kennedy in the Rise and Fall of the Great Powers about excessive military commitments and their consequences for hegemonic decline.

The Japanese response to what they perceive to be an important structural development in International Relations has been to pursue in earnest a diplomatic strategy to expand their own power of expression in the context of a joint control of the world by the major powers. Thus 'relative decline in US power', 'burden sharing', and 'contributing to peace', have recently become part of the official vocabulary as Japan tries to play a 'normal' role in the international arena - one commensurate with its economic strength. Significantly, Japan has interpreted its contribution to the 'order building efforts' as requiring an enhanced response in the area of international security and has accordingly attempted to redress the balance. Important actions in this regard include the decision of the Japanese government to dispatch two minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1991, the passing of the 'PKO Bill' in the Diet in May-June 1992 and the deployment of the SDF in a peace-keeping role in Cambodia in September 1992.

At the regional level, however, after the end of the cold war, Japan finds itself in a complex security environment. Realising that while contemporary issues of concern for regional instability are mostly relics of the cold war, they differ from those generated by the Bipolar-Standoff in Europe in that they contain elements of geopolitical struggles specific to the region, Japan has responded with 'cautious optimism;. For example the Indochina conflict involves complex regional elements such as Vietam' traditional ambition to dominate the Indochina peninsula and the historical enmity between China and Vietnam. It is in this context of a regional environment composed of a more diffused power constellation and considerable potential for regional instabilities combined with the perception that the American propensity to increasingly link trade and security issues is indicative of the regions declining importance in the United State's scheme of things, that we must place Japan's security concerns.

In the light of the growing trend towards regionalisation and protectionism in the world - NAFTA and EEC, the economic power on which the Japanese rest their case for an enhanced political role in the international arena assumes significant regional dimensions. Through a combination of factors such as the rising Yen, increasing

labour costs at home and the growing industrial sophistication of the newly industrialising economies in Southeast Asia, Japan has accumulated considerable investments in the region which have to be protected. This is the factor that will increasingly shape Japan's security policy and perception of security towards the region.

Many recognizing the stabilizing influence of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at the time of fundamental change are seeking inspiration from the body to tackle the issue of maintaining political stability in the Asian Pacific region. However, it is virtually impossible to duplicate wholesale the unified approach of Europe in the diverse political environment of Asia, in the absence of a common military threat. It is also doubtful that a regional community can be established solely on the basis of economic development and trade expansion. Because Economic relations are inevitably based on principles of advantage and dis-advantage wherein the growing interdependence will not, immediately, lead to relations of trust. Infact, in some cases it may also result in political tensions.

For the time being Japan has confined itself to a supportive and cooperative role with the United States in order to maintain the existing East Asian order. The

problem, however, with this strategy is that by forging limited defense links with geostrategically important countries, arriving at low-key military arrangements and building loose alliance systems, the attempt is to create a regional balance of power which may be stable but creates an environment of pervasive insecurity eg. the sale of 150 F-16 fighter aircraft and 12 advanced anti-submarine helicopters to Taiwan last year appears to be part of the US strategy to balance off China's acquisition of 42 billion worth of arms from Russia including SU-27 Flankers, air defence systems and aerial refuelling technology. The proposition being that the changing US position on Asia Pacific Security is limited to the use of regional multilateral fora such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN PMC for security related discussions rather than depend exclusively on the present bilateral arrangements. That, crisis management continues to provide the rationale for this 'cooperative vigilance' which accordingly cannot guarantee on a long-term basis the peace, stability and security of the Asian-Pacific region.

This minimalist approach focusing primarily on the avoidance of specific regional conflicts eg. the Korean issue, complicated by North Korea's efforts to become a nuclear state or the problem of the islands in South China

seas which hold the key to the exploitation of potentially rich oil deposits in the area and which are contested by many nations including China, has to be necessarily part of a long-term comprehensive approach to security. It is in this regard that Japan has the potential to play a fundamental role.

In the wider interest of peace and prosperity a case can be built for an enhanced role for Japan in issues relating to security in Asia in the post-cold war era. Not only is this Japanese role in defining and moving toward an alternate security system in Asia critical for comprehensive regional security it also has positive implications for Japan's global status.

This need not be a radical process but rather a conscious effort on the part of the nation to develop itself incrementally - the active response focusing primarily on the creation of a co-prosperity sphere and a constructive role in conflict resolution.

Despite its detestable implementation by the Imperial Japanese State, the theoretical construct of the concept of a co-prosperity sphere is far from negative. In keeping with the widely held assumption that the achievement of overall stability and security in Asia hinges largely on a framework of economic development, it envisions an Asian economic

community with Japan as its main engine. Initially extending to East and possibly South Asia the purpose of this multiplex mechanism, composed of bilateral and multilateral framework of cooperation would be to 'secure economic intercourse in the region, ranging from trade and services to technology transfers'. Obviously Japan, as the greatest economic power in Asia, has an important role to play in this, wherein it can act as a model for and lend assistance to developing countries in their own efforts for economic and democratic development.

At the same time, moving away from the concept of 'conflict avoidance' to that of 'conflict resolution' Japanese diplomacy can emerge as an important outside force for mediation and collecting the peace dividend in Asia. Operating within the framework of its pacifist self-defense pasture and with none of the stigma's attached to the two super powers Japanese diplomacy is today in a unique position to assert itself as a partner in political dialogue on specific issues that relate to peace and stability in the region.

It is however critical to point out that these attempts to define an enhanced regional role for Japan in combination with the increased role it is already seeking to play at the global level, must not be interpreted as a loosely

articulated hegemonic vision. The main structural impediment in this regard is the increase in the power of regional players such as India and China, a limitation not only on the Japanese potential but also on the concept of hegemony as well. 'As regional powers become stronger, they limit of capacity of any one nation to exercise dominance, forcing international politics further into the realm of bargaining and increasing the number of players'. Infact not only does China possess more 'military will' to halt any move towards hegemony on the part of Japan but also the independence many countries were willing to forgo in return for economic assistance has become somewhat a thing of the past.

Yet, for all its yen power and its new position as the largest aid given Japan is in no position to 'buy' itself a political role in Asia. Japan has to earn it, and can do so only by shedding cold war conservatism, national parochialism and convert militarism. It has to demonstrate that it is for a new cooperative order in Asia and would strive to keep the region open, peaceful and democratic. Not only does such a role have positive implications for the security and progress of the Asian Pacific region, with which is tied the security and progress of Japan, but can also provide direction to the role Japan is seeking to play at the global level.

Instead of responding in an ad hoc fashion to increasing western criticism, Japan could offer active leadership, based on a recognition of fundamental equality and cultural affinity, in the development of an 'Asian Paradigm' in International Relations - the two pillars of which would be co-prosperity and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The proliferation of actors, the breakdown of rigid alliance patterns and the widening circles of interlocking economic interests would lead to the emergence of a world of 'complex interdependence'. In this world the overt threat or use of arms as a means of statecraft recedes to the backstage of international relations. National Security defined in traditional terms of physical safety and territorial defence becomes obsolescent as a nations are increasingly self-deterred from the resort to military conquest as a consequence of the deepening ties of interdependence and of the emergence of mutual empathy.

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NEWS PAPERS

The Indian Express

The Hindustan Times

The Pioneer

The Times of India

The Statesman

The Independent

The Financial Express

The Economic Times

Japan

GDP	1990:	¥ 425,735 bn ($2,940.36bn)		
	1991:	¥ 452,976 bn (3,362.73bn)		
Growth[a]	1990:	5.7%	1991:	4.2%
Inflation[b]	1990:	3.1%	1991:	3.3%
Debt	1990:	$425bn		
Def bdgt[c]	1991:	¥4,402.3 bn ($32.68bn)		
	1992:	¥ 4,4551.8bn($34.3bn)		
$1 = ¥	1989:	137.96	1990:	144.79
	1991:	134.71	1992:	132.70

¥ = Yen

[a]GNP
[b]Real Inflation is higher, national accounting not considering housing costs which are substantial.
[c]¥ 100bn were cut from the 1991 def bugt to finance contributions to various countries due to Gulf War.

Population: 124,593,000

	13-17	18-22	23-32
Men	4,562,900	4,798,800	8,6671,100
Women	4,370,900	4,589,700	8,329,100

TOTAL ARMED FORCES :
Active : 246,000 incl Central Staffs (reducing)
Reserves : Army 46,000; navy 1,300; Air 1,100

Japan: The Security of Its Sea Routes

TABLE
JAPAN'S DEFENCE BUDGET, FISCAL YEARS
1955-90 (billions in current yen)

	Budget (Yen, billions)	Percent change from previous year	Percent of GNP
1955	134.9	-3.3	1.78
1965	301.4	9.6	1.07
1975	1,327.3	21.4	0.84
1980	2,230.2	6.5	0.90
1981	2,400.0	7.6	0.91
1982	2,586.1	7.8	0.93
1983	2,754.2	6.5	0.98
1984	2,934.7	6.6	0.99
1985	3,137.2	6.9	0.99
1986	3,343.6	6.6	0.99
1987	3,517.4	5.2	1.00
1988	3,700.3	5.2	1.01
1989	3,918.8	5.9	1.06
1990	4,159.0	6.1	0.99
1991a	4,402.3	5.5	0.99

aBudget request submitted to Ministry of Finance by Japan Defense Agency, pending Cabinet approval.
Source : World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers

ASEAN Views of Japan: Survey Results, 1983–92 (single response, % of respondents)

Q1. *How will Japan develop militarily in the future?*

	Indonesia			Malaysia			Philippines			Singapore			Thailand		
	1983	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92
It will become a threatening military power	19	21	23	37	30	35	28	47	32	35	29	34	54	53	24
It will maintain its peace-loving stance and not become a major military power	65	68	68	48	45	40	60	46	43	46	46	37	22	37	53
Don't know	16	12	10	14	24	24	12	7	25	19	25	28	24	11	24

Q2. *By what policy do you think Japan safeguards its national security?*

	Indonesia			Malaysia			Philippines			Singapore			Thailand		
	1983	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92
An independent defense based on a powerful military	50	51	23	41	30	37	38	40	28	34	31	30	28	29	12
Limited self-defense capability and alliance with the U.S.	26	21	12	24	25	16	29	36	20	26	21	15	22	21	17
Complete dependence on U.S. with no military power of its own	4	2	6	4	3	2	7	4	5	4	4	3	5	3	4
Limited self-defense capability and maintenance of friendly foreign relations	—	—	43	—	—	16	—	—	24	—	—	18	—	—	29
No large military force and a neutral stance toward U.S., China, and Russia	11	18	7	13	16	4	14	17	10	13	12	6	21	35	20
Don't know	9	8	9	16	26	24	12	4	13	23	33	27	24	12	17

Q3. *Does Japan perform an international role commensurate with its economic power?*

	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand
Yes	88	56	48	27	58
Somewhat	8	30	34	35	20
No	1	1	2	12	2
Don't know	3	13	16	26	20

Note: This question was included for the first time in the 1992 survey.

Q4. *Is Japan today a trustworthy ally of your country?*

	Indonesia			Malaysia			Philippines			Singapore			Thailand		
	1983	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92
Yes	34	36	24	29	20	21	19	29	22	17	19	15	14	15	25
Somewhat	53	52	64	49	56	60	58	63	49	57	50	48	64	63	41
Not really	5	5	10	9	9	4	15	3	9	10	9	9	11	15	19
No	2	2	1	3	3	2	4	1	5	4	4	5	2	3	4
Don't know	6	4	2	9	12	12	4	4	14	12	19	22	9	5	11

Q5. *How do you feel about Japan's actions during World War II?*

	Indonesia			Malaysia			Philippines			Singapore			Thailand		
	1983	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92	83	87	92
Cannot forget its wrong actions	27	36	29	27	25	40	20	35	37	29	25	31	23	29	18
Wrong actions were committed, but I don't dwell on them now	28	36	52	42	42	33	41	54	37	34	37	44	32	40	36
Have never considered them an issue	36	27	18	25	28	19	36	7	11	29	30	19	27	26	27
Don't know	9	2	2	6	5	8	3	5	16	8	8	4	18	4	19

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ODA to Asian Countries from Japan and the United States

($ billion)

2.0

Japan

1.5

1.0

United States

0.5

0

1965 1970   1975   1980   1985

Table
Key Recipients of Japanese Aid (¥billion)

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Group 1									
Jamaica	0.05	0.03	2.18	0.03	16.24	0.22	0.17	0.30	0.19
Pakistan	14.99	30.76	48.18	37.84	39.57	10.06	42.13	9.44	44.98
Somalia	-	0.92	0.79	6.31	1.16	2.23	2.50	3.24	1.56
Sudan	1.85	1.49	3.86	7.73	5.90	7.05	7.18	7.07	9.74
Turkey	7.58	50.95	60.03	23.77	32.76	0.36	24.92	28.01	10.67
Group 2									
China	-	-	63.39	73.56	79.88	79.67	84.94	92.38	98.22
Indonesia	93.78	81.43	70.49	12.09	145.95	88.09	92.04	95.00	104.31
Malaysia	21.03	23.07	57.54	5.29	66.35	24.54	9.68	17.93	4.74
Philippines	4.40	44.12	52.25	61.23	69.28	56.44	62.43	15.52	136.61
South Korea	19.00	19.44	0.44	0.48	45.54	50.42	55.25	45.72	1.35
Thailand	46.37	65.00	72.89	89.26	87.53	89.58	92.25	18.78	102.29

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Table
Economic Groupings in the Asia-Pacific Region

	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum	East Asia Economic Caucus (proposed)	North American Free Trade Agreement	Sea of Japan Economic Zone (proposed)	South Pacific Forum
Australia	•	—	—	—	•
Brunei	•	•	—	—	—
Canada	•	—	•	—	—
China	•	•	—	•	—
Hong Kong	•	•	—	—	—
Indonesia	•	•	—	—	—
Japan	•	•	—	—	—
Malaysia	•	•	—	—	—
Mexico	—	—	•	—	—
New Zealand	•	—	—	—	•
North Korea	—	—	—	•	—
Pacific Island nations	—	—	—	—	•
Philippines	•	•	—	—	—
Russia	—	—	—	•	—
Singapore	•	•	—	—	—
South Korea	•	•	—	•	—
United States	•	—	•	—	—
Taiwan	•	•	—	—	—
Thailand	•	•	—	—	—

ª. Cook Islands, Fiji, Kinbati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, West Samoa.

Table
NET ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

(in percentage)

	87-90 average	90 net growth growth estimate	91 projection	GNP per capita (in U.S. dollars)
South Korea	10.7	9.2	7.4	5,500
Taiwan	9.0	5.2	6.2	8,000
Hong Kong	8.0	2.4	3.5	12,200
Singapore	9.9	8.3	3.6	11,900
Thailand	11.6	10.0	8.5	1.400
Malaysia	7.6	9.4	7.8	2.400
Indonesia	6.0	3.1	3.9	800
Philippines	6.0	3.1	3.9	800
Japan	5.1	5.6	3.8*	24,000

* The projection is for fiscal 1991.
Source : *Asahi Shimbun*, March 28, 1991 (based on data provided by the Mitsui Bank Research Institute)

On Japan's ODA in relation to Military Expenditure and other matters of the Developing countries.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese Government (unofficial translation)

1.   The ODA (Official Development Assistance) of Japan is provided based upon (1) humanitarian consideration toward such problems facing the developing countries as poverty and famine that cannot be ignored and (2) recognition of the fact of interdependence among the nations of the international community in the sense that stability and further development of the developing countries are indispensable to the peace and prosperity of the entire world.

2.   In the course of the Gulf Crisis and its aftermath, question on the armaments of the developing countries, the necessity of enhancing international efforts towards arms control and disarmament, etc., have attracted attention both inside and outside Japan, It is, therefore, considered appropriate and important to clarify the basic view of the Government regarding its ODA in relation to such questions.

3.   Based upon the basic ideas mentioned in para 1 above, the Government of Japan henceforward will pay full attention in the implementation of ODA to the following points:

- trend in military expenditure by the recipient
  countries from the viewpoint that the developing
  countries are expected to allocate their own financial,
  human and other resources appropriate to their economic
  and social development and to make full use of such
  resources.

- trend in development, production, etc., of mass
  destructive weapons by the recipient countries from the
  viewpoint of strengthening the efforts by the
  international community for prevention of proliferation
  of mass destructive weapons such as atomic weapons and
  missiles,

- trend in the export and import of weapons by the
  recipient countries from the viewpoint of not promoting
  international conflicts.

- efforts for promoting democratization and introduction
  of a market-oriented economy and situation on securing
  basic human rights and freedom by the recipient
  countries.

and make is decision on aid, taking into account
comprehensive such factors as bilateral relations with the
recipient countries, the international situation including
the security environment in which the recipient are placed,
aid needs, economic and social situation of the recipient
countries, etc.

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