

**U.S. POLICY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA,
(1950-1982) : A CRITICAL REVIEW ✓**

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DECLARATION

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is a record of the student's own work, carried out
by him under my supervision and guidance.

It is hereby certified that this work has
not been presented for the award of any other degree
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P R E F A C E

The understanding of US policy towards the Horn is of prime importance to understand the politics of the regions of Indian Ocean and Red Sea. US policy in the Horn acquired importance in the post Second World War period. This is due to the fact that the European economy had weakened after the European engagement in two World Wars. After the Second World War most European powers faced economic crisis. There was a collapse of European economy. This collapse created a vacuum in the colonies for the imperialist powers. America who never had suffered any direct loss in any of the World Wars became economically very powerful. With the result that America was the only country capable to fill the vacuum and overcome the crisis situation. She had the golden opportunity to mould the world economy in favour of its interest. This coincided with the efforts of the Western countries, looking for some stop-gap arrangement to bring them out of the economic bankruptcy. Therefore, compulsions of both the sides resulted in the emergence of America as the leader of Capitalist world.

During this period, Socialist and national liberation forces also emerged. These forces were opposed to imperialism, colonialism and racism. They were opposed by Asian, African and Latin American countries number of whom liberated in this period, i.e., 1950s and 1960s. The newly liberated countries emerged as a third force also known as third world. Both

third world and Socialist forces complemented each other and joined hands on most issues of international politics, effecting the non-capitalist world.

The emergence of the two contradictory forces, capitalists vs socialist and third world on the international horizon, turned international politics into a new phase. The capitalist world entered into the process of neo-colonialism to maintain their interests in newly liberated countries, while newly liberated countries sought economic independence.

The third world countries wanted a free hand in running their own affairs. When the capitalist world declined to help them, some of them turned to the Socialist camp for political, economic and military assistance. This action created reaction in the capitalist world. USA as the leading capitalist power, formulated a policy of anti-Sovietism, filling the vacuum created by the withdrawal of European colonial power from the colonies. The US policy in the Horn of Africa is the reflection of the above situation.

Secondly during 1965-1973, Horn's territorial problems emerged with wider international complications. The Soviet Union gained significant influence in this period. This Soviet influence was used by US for its advantage by gaining a military base in Diego Garcia. US President

argued that to counter Soviet base in Somalia they needed a base in the Indian Ocean. The US concentration was on removing Soviet influence in the Horn particularly in Somalia.

Thirdly in the last phase (1974-1982) US policy in the Horn made an about-turn in Somalia. This was after the Marxist assumed power in Ethiopia. The historical landmark was shifting its relation from Ethiopia to Somalia.

In this study, the effort is to understand the various measures of US policy of destabilisation, militarisation and aggressiveness in this region. These measures led to serve tensions and conflicts in this region, before USA could regain its position, which it lost after Ethiopian revolution.

I would like to avail this opportunity to acknowledge all those who helped me directly or indirectly in completing this research work. First of all I would like to express my gratitude to my Supervisor, Dr Vijay Gupta for guiding me; for giving coherence to my ideas and helping me in analysing the issues dealt in the dissertation.

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However, for all omissions, errors and shortcomings in this study, I hold myself responsible.

S.N. Malakar
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION OF HOEN

The Horn is a metaphor. Three sovereign nations (Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti) at the start of 1980s were scratching out a bare existence. Their destinies were inexorably interlinked. Religious, ethnic and political differences rendered life more precarious. The Horn carries 700,000 sq. miles of north-eastern African bush-land and desert forbidding mountains, volcanic plateau and rivers that rolled down to the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and Mediterranean. Horn's geographical location has a very peculiar position in Africa. In the North-East it is bordered by the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, in the North and West by the Sudan in the South by Kenya and South-East by Indian Ocean.

The Horn of Africa links three major continents of the world, Asia, Africa and Europe. Since time immemorial this link has been used for trade and commerce. After the opening of Suez with increased Navigation in the Red Sea the geo-political and geo-strategic importance of the HORN, turned the area into an arena of conflict. Most of the crises in the Horn are a creation of outside forces. Internal factors causing crises are local contenders in the power struggle who have tried to reshape the Horn's political contours by going out of their way to seek foreign alliance to buttress their military, technical and economic needs; this is the major reason why the area

became another cockpit of international rivalry.¹ For the Soviet Union the Red Sea provides warm water link between its eastern and western parts. For USA, after the Second World War it is an area of important political influence.

(A) Geo-strategic and geo-political importance: The Horn lies at the cross-roads of one of the important sea routes between East and West through the Suez. The historical events have demonstrated to what extent the Red Sea commands strategically the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Indian Ocean. This region is of crucial importance because Red Sea and Gulf on Aden provide connecting link between Vladivostok and Black Sea, Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean and the oil producing areas of Indian Ocean and Europe.

Construction of the Suez canal in 1968 led the Imperial powers to defend the routes that linked Europe with East and West Asia. They set up their separate bastions for the defence of their shipping at such crucial choke points as Suez itself, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at the Southern trip of Red Sea and along the coast of protruding Horn.²

Intermittent closures of the canal resulting from the Arab-Israel conflict made it essential for Western powers to

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1. Collin Legum and Bill Lee, The Conflict in the Horn of Africa. (London, 1977), p.9.
 2. Arthur Gav Shen, Crisis in Africa: Battle Ground of East and West, London, p. 60.

ensure the freedom of the Red Sea for use by tankers carrying West Asian oil to North Africa, Israel and Western Europe. Importance of Bab-el-Mandeb increased because at Bab-el-Mandeb, the Red Sea gets extremely narrowed. The Arab Peninsula and the African coast are only 22 miles apart from each other, they meet at Bab-el-Mandeb point through the Gulf of Aden. With Perim Island situated within the narrow Strait, the navigable area is reduced from 22 to $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles only. The Arab-Israel wars and closures of the Suez have proved that whoever dominates the strategic gateway to Red Sea¹ also controls the entrance to the Gulf of Suez, Shams-el Shaikh and the Gulf of Eilat. This vital area is vulnerable to blockades and strafing which can pose a real threat to the Red Sea traffic and consequently, to the world trade. Arab-Israel war of 1967 reflected growing importance of the route when Suez canal was closed due to the Arab desire to compel Israel to withdraw from areas occupied by the latter during the war and finally was reopened on 8th June 1975, after eight years of closure.

The Horn is one of the most important gateway for penetrating into the populated area of African countries. Historically, it has deeprooted cultural and political influence over the neighbours. It is also a meeting point of Arabian and African cultures as well as of the

1. For detail see, Pyotr Menchka, Problems of Africa Today, Moscow, 1979, pp. 111-12.

Western culture. Whereas the North Sudan, Egypt and Libya are under the strong influence of Islam, the other South and West African neighbours are influenced by indigenous African cosmology. In the complexity of international politics, since the onslaught of European colonialism, the unprecedented process of change in political system has been taking place in the area. The Horn's politics and its political system act as a challenge to the colonial forces and also as the source of inspirations to the rest of the neighbouring countries.

The changes in Ethiopia after 1974 leading to the establishment of socialist oriented State, pose a new challenge to the conservative governments of this region. At the same time, the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution is a source of inspiration for the progressive sections of these countries who are continuing efforts to change their political system.

Though Arabian countries are separated from the Horn by a narrow seaway, the political events and changes in the Horn influence them greatly. Actually there are three main political attitudes of the Arab countries leading to conflict and cooperation with the Horn-countries. One, dwells upon countries who are political allies of the West and who toe the Western policy towards the Horn, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc. Two, countries who play anti-American as well

as anti-Soviet role like Iran and Iraq. Three, countries who are consistently opposed to American policies and who want cooperation of the Soviet Union, e.g., South Yemen and Palestine. The political turmoil, in West Asia is also interlinked with the politics in the Horn. Not only the West Asian politics, but the hinterland and the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean have a direct political connection with the Horn. Since the opening of the Suez in the 19th century, the Horn became the playground for the major powers to pursue their own ideology, systems and interests. Since the seventies two forces have been actively at work in the Red Sea and the Horn, Soviet-Cuban and American-Arab.

The Western powers have learnt from the painful aberration of Suez adventure, Algeria and Vietnam, that their military power cannot stave off great historic changes in the third world.¹ They want Arabs to fight their (Western) cause. Thus the Arab strategy was part of global policy of the Western powers to curb the increasing shift to socialist orientation.

(B) Economic Features of Horn: Economy of the Horn is agriculture based. Industry and mining have a very small

1. Colin Legum and Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, op. cit. p. 4.

share in the total economy. The Horn's economic importance has increased due to large coastline. Sea resources also assist the economy of the Horn. Sea provides (a) minerals and salts (b) Ports and communication and (c) Fishery. For example, Djibouti has no independent indigenous resources and economically depends on the provision of port facilities to Ethiopia and earns by railway supply route to Addis Ababa - a shortcut to Ethiopian capital.

Ethiopia and Somalia have some indigenous economic resources such as agricultural, cash crops, manufacturing industry and mining. They export cash crops, raw materials and mineral ores. Ethiopia's minerals include : Gold, Platinum, Iron ores, Magnese ores, Copper ores, Potash Salt, Rock Salt, Marine Salt, Sulpher, Gypsum, etc. It has also developed the process of oil refining, manufacturing industries, metal ware production, tanning and shoe and wood working industries. It has developed the food and textile industry also. It has set up the thermo-electric and hydro-electric stations. Its cash crops include coffee, cotton, sugar-cane, tobacco, citrus fruits, etc. Ethiopian forests are the important economic sources and come under commercial use. Fisheries and cattle (camels and others) are of significant importance. Ethiopia also produces wheat, maize and other food grains.

Agriculture is the main stay of Somalian economy but of the total area of 62,134,000 hectares, only about 1,000,000

hectares are under cultivation. Forests and wood cover 8,650,000 hectares. Pastures used for live stock grazing take up 28,850,000 hectares. Rest are deserts, semi-arid areas, and mountains. Eighty per cent of the economically active population (i.e. 1,344,000 persons in 1978 according to FAO figure) are nomadic herdsmen.¹

The main wealth of Somalia consists of camels, cattle and goats upon which most of the inhabitants depend for their livelihood. It has developed textile industries, sugar industries, fruit and meat canning industries, flour milling, hide and skin works, and fish processing industries. The banana is the main export crop. Cotton is produced here on a large scale. There are some mineral resources but insignificant in number and quantity. Thus Somalia is mainly an agricultural country.

The chief imports of Djibouti are cotton, sugar, cement, flour, rice, benzine, the chief exports are hides, cattle and coffee. Originally, the port served mainly the railway to Addis Ababa. Till recently it was handling 82 per cent of imports into Ethiopia and good profits were being made in the railways. Recently bunking and repair facilities

1. The Nonaligned Countries, (The NAM Secretariat), published in London, 1982, Page 639.

have been greatly improved to attract vessels on route through Red Sea and it is now the best equipped port in the Red Sea.

In general, eighty per cent economy of the Horn is based on agricultural production. And twenty per cent on pastoral production, handicrafts, industrial production and sea resources. Industrial development has been most neglected. The existing industries cannot even meet the minimum domestic requirement of the countries, therefore, the economic prospects are totally based on traditional agricultural mode of production. Some lands of Horn's region are very fertile but due to the lack of scientific cultivation, the production is very low. The commercialisation of cash crops had been started during the colonial period but they remained on intensive labour basis and did not use new technology.

(C) Social Strata and Classes The people of the Horn have varying social strata along with nomads and tribals, the settled agricultured tribals and the people engaged in modern production. Before the penetration of European colonial powers, the Horn was ruled by small sultans, Kings and tribal chiefs. The mode of production was feudal in orientation almost till 1880s. The changes in 1880s led to weakening of the systems of serfs and slaves. The colonialists introduced capitalist production and created the capitalist class divisions in the Society.

The slow and uneven development of socio-economic condition restricted emergence of class forces. Never the less the mobility of colonial production provided condition for the emergence of the classes in contradictory manner. Indigenous bourgeoisie, including petty bourgeoisie, emerged on the eco-political scene on the one hand and the industrial working class emerged on the other. With the introduction of plantation economy peasantry and agrarian working class also came into existence. The contradiction within the social forces of the Horn remained uneven with the effect of uneven economic development. Previously contradictions were between the tribals and tribals, nomads and nomads, but now class contradiction emerged with the clash of class interests.

The character of the class contradiction in the Horn of Africa before the independence remained anti-colonialist which brought a very large section of the region into the national liberation movement. Since independence, the indigenous classes are conflicting with each other with the support of their international allies of socialist and capitalist forces.

(D) Historical Background of the Horn: Human presence on the territory of today's Ethiopia dates back to pre-history. Since then geo-political importance of the Horn has been ground for power rivalry making the area strategically important. In some parts of the country in the Omo river

Valley, Umm Hogor and Wollo-archaeologists have discovered remains of two to six millions years old men and which rank among the oldest known human societies. The emergence of the civilization in Ethiopia is a unique occurrence. It is an encounter and gradual merger of two different peoples with distinct cultures. They were Cushites, (probably the original inhabitants of the area) and semities who came mainly from the South of the Arabian peninsula. The result was the formation of a new civilization of multi-ethnic character.

History of Ethiopia: The people who came to the present day territory of Ethiopia in successive migration waves, settled in the high lying areas, as reported by Egyptian hieroglyphic inscriptions as long as at the end of 2nd millenium B.C., but it is estimated that this process of settlement lasted until opporximately the 4th century A.D. In these texts, the ancient Egyptian called these people "Habashat", a name given to the country, i.e., Abyssinia.¹ The people of Habashat were called Habshes in India.

The territories of present day Ethiopia and Somalia were from ancient days inhabited by two great peoples. Hametic (Cush, Galla, Somali) and Sudanese. Some of the Hametic tribes of this area strongly mixed with the Arabs,

1. The Nonaligned Countries, op. cit., p. 224.

who in earlier times, had migrated there in large number across the Red Sea from the Southern Arabia.

This mixture of the Hametics with the Arabs, which took place, however, not without absorbing a considerable amount of Sudanese blood, gave rise to those peoples which later on founded the Ethiopian state and constitute to this day the predominant element of the population of Ethiopia.¹ The people of Ethiopia always had a fighting spirit from 700 B.C. In about 1000 B.C. a dynasty that had lost its power in Egypt settled down in the land of Cush² and established a now independent state Napata³ which in the 9th century and 8th century B.C. extended its rule also over Egypt. In 688 B.C. the "Ethiopian troops" of Napata were driven out of Egypt by Assyrians. Following this the power in Napata came into the hands of Egyptian priests and the sovereigns of Napata transferred their capital city towards the South to Meroe. And when at the end of the 6th century the northern part of the country was invaded by the Persians who had conquered Egypt, the Southern part, continued to exist as the Meroe State". It lasted until

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1. Endre Sik: The History of Black Africa, Vol.1, VII Edition, Budapest, 1970, page 69.
 2. Ibid., page 68.
 3. Ibid., page 68.

about the beginning of our era, but we know nothing about its history during those five hundred years. At the beginning of our era, this State broke up into two parts. Southern part again appeared on the scene of history, as Nopata, or Nubia and was called Aksum. Aksum became the political and religious centre of the Horn between the 1st and 7th century B.C.

In the 4th century A.D., the emperors of Nubia embraced Christianity and after Egypt's conversion to Islam (639) Nubian became a refuge for the Egyptian Christians.

But at the same time Nubia began to be attacked from the east by Arabs, Pagan tribes first which had escaped Islam, and Moslem tribes later, which soon spread out over the entire Northern and Central region of the later Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, cutting off Nubia completely from the other Christian country Aksum and from the territory of the Sudanese tribes in the South, which was Nubia's economic basis. At that time the states capital city was already Dongola. For several centuries afterwards Nubia held out against the recurring attempts of the Egyptian Sultans to take possession of the country or at least to convert in to Islam. Dongola surrendered at last in 1275. Nubia became a territory of Egypt, and its emperors adopted Islam.¹

1. Andre Sik, The History of Black Africa, pp. vii., p.69.

A different course of development lay ahead in the eastern corner of Africa - Ethiopia. While Nubian States were founded by foreign immigrants, the Ethiopian State sprang from the Ethiopian soil.¹ The northern part of Ethiopia (Tigre) in the last centuries before our era belonged to the Nubian State of Meroe, and at the very beginning of our era owing mainly to the Arab influences--constituted a separate state. "Aksam" - This was the country of black Africans in which slavery as an economic structure reached the height of its development in ancient time. The decline of trade between the Mediterranean countries and India, as well as the change in trade routes in the 7th century led to decline of Aksam. It was definitely destroyed as a consequence of the rise of Islam and the creation of the caliphate in Arabia. Muslim Arabia took possession of the African coast of the Red Sea, too, and Aksam was completely shut off from the sea. As a result, Aksam forced its expansion towards the south and conquered more and more lands of the Cushite and Sudanese (Nilotic) tribes and the Gallas. This expansion of the small state of Aksam into the powerful Ethiopia lasted for several centuries and resulted in both quantitative and qualitative changes. The war leaders of the campaigns of conquest changed into feudalistic princes, the former slave--holding state gave way to feudal conditions - feudalism was

1. Endre Sik, The History of Black Africa, Op. cit., Vol.I, p. 69.

in the making. The feudal rulers fought for the throne, and the struggle ended in the 13th century when the feudal ruler of the Shea province, under the pretext of "restoring the dynasty of "Solomon", seized power over all other feudal lords. For a few centuries the history of new born feudal Ethiopia flowed under the sign of the "Struggle with Muslims". The entire Red Sea coast and East African coastal sections which later became outlets of Ethiopia to the sea, were in the hand, of the Moslems". In other places there existed small principalities of various Hamitic tribes (Somalis, Dankis, etc.) that had adopted Islam. These principalities were military tribal alliances established in the struggle for independence against the Ethiopian conquerors. The most important of them was Adel (in the place of today's Ogaden). They were all under strong Arab influence, and Arab trade capital, seeking control over Ethiopia, supported their liberation struggle in its own interest. The struggle became very acute early in 14th century, during the reign of Admasion in Ethiopia (1312-1342). The struggle continued, with some interruptions, to become important since the Second World War.

In 1520, Emperor Lebna Dengel (1508-1540) received an ambassador from Portugal which favoured Ethiopian domination of the Red Sea from where the Egyptians and Indians had been driven out. The subsequent Turkish invasion of Ethiopia in

the 16th century was facilitated by the contacts the Turks had with local Moslems who rebelled. However, an uprising among the inhabitants of the Southern part of the country provoked by interruption of trade with Egypt and India gave rise to long wars against Turks who again tried to invade the country in 1578 and 1579, but on both occasions were defeated by the Ethiopians. Till 1632-1667, Ethiopian history is known as Gondar period led by Emperor Pasillidas. Later on it weakened because it was forced to rely on Galla support. In 1775 Iyoas came in power who was half Gala. After that Shea tribes came in power and remained in power till 1847. The preceding era is a remarkable era of feudal growth and glory. In 1885 Kase proclaimed himself emperor assuming the name Theoder II and strove for the unification of the still fragmented country.¹ In 1848 Egyptian power had developed definite tendencies. In 1845, Egyptian forces took over the Port of Munsawa from the Ottomans, and also captured hereby Arkiko. Britain sent the emissaries to Ethiopia for some agreements. Having received emissaries from Great Britain, the Ethiopian emperor wrote to Queen Victoria seeking an alliance against the Muslim powers that were pressing against the northern periphery of the plateau.²

1. The Realigned Countries, p. 225.

2. John Markakis, Ethiopia. Anatomy of a Traditional Polity. Oxford, 1972, p. 21.

After waiting in vain for a reply, and suspecting collusion between the English and his Muslim enemies, the impetuous emperor had the English Consul put in chains, a fate later shared by the members of mission sent to obtain the Consul's release. To a series of notes from the English government demanding the release of its subjects, Tewodros replied with demands for craftsmen and equipment for his projects. Rather than meet these imperious demands, Britain launched a huge military expedition from India which disembarked on the Red Sea coast in 1867, climbed on to the plateau, and marched ponderously to Magdala, where it routed the small, ill equipped Ethiopian army and freed the hostages. Britain had no plans for a permanent occupation of the Ethiopian highlands.

The British invasion in Ethiopia was not extended to colonial Ethiopia. After the death of Theodor II, in 1872, the two key personalities appeared on the scene - Menelik, the King of the Shoa region and Kassa and the chieftain of the Tigre area. Both sovereigns worked for the political and religious unification of Ethiopia. In 1875 and 1876, Johanna, King of the Shoa waged a victorious military campaign against the Egyptians and in the next decade fought against Sudanese dervishes and the Italians. He had indisputable successes enhancing his prestige as unifier of the empire.²

1. Tewodros was the Emperor before 1872.

2. The Nonaligned Countries, op. cit., p. 225.

History of Somalia

The question of the origin of Somalia, or rather of their fate in the earliest times, is not clear. There is no doubt that the Somali coast was known to the ancient world. The Egyptians maintained trade contacts with African littoral of the Red Sea and with the Somali coast of the Indian Ocean long before our era. It was not unknown to the Greeks and Romans either and was visited by navigators who gave it the name "aromatic region". The town of Berbera undoubtedly existed already in the earliest times. Its name has in fact preserved the name "Berbera" given by the ancient Greeks to the south coast of the Gulf of Aden.¹ Ancient Somali history is closely tied with that of Egypt of the Pharaohs. Beginning in the period of the second dynasty, the Egyptians established their rule over the distant land of Scent, an area roughly corresponding to most of the present day Horn of Africa.²

In the first few centuries of our era, the Somali coast of the Red Sea belonged to the powerful state Axum and partook of its flourishing trade. The first reliable information of the appearance of Arabs on the Somali coast dates from the year 704. The territory, which had gained some degree of unity after its conversion to Islam in A.D. 760 was divided

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1. Endre Sik, The History of Black Africa, Vol.I, pp. cit., p. 75.
 2. The Nonaligned Countries, pp. cit., p. 636.

into countless small Kingdoms of tribal origin, which were usually independent. In the following period the Arab immigration continued steadily and owing to their influence a series of commercial towns emerged: Mogadishu was founded by the Arabs in A.D. 908.

In the course of 8th to 12th centuries, under the influence of Muslim colonizers a number of minor and major independent sultanates Adel, Dara, Zeila, etc., appeared between Ethiopia and the coast. In the 13th century almost the entire northeast corner of Africa was held by the "Muslims". Certain coast regions were the possession of Arab "Sultans" and "Sheiks" with a predominant population of Somali, Dankil and other Hamitic tribes that had embraced Islam.¹

A Chinese fleet appeared off the Somalicoast in 1560 with the objective of colonizing the area, but running into brave resistance by the native population the Chinese quickly abandoned their project. Years later a Persian colonization attempt was also beaten back. In 1880s and 90s Somali Sultans and their lands were brought under Britain and Italy. These powers did not touch Ethiopian controlled areas where too Somalies lived.

History of Djibouti:

The ancient history of Djibouti is linked with the history of Egypt of the Pharaohs, especially from the period

1. Andre Sick, History of Black Africa, Vol.I, pp. cit., p. 76.

of second Dynasty, where the Ethiopian began to penetrate the territory which was the relatively unpopulated as it was inhabited only by small scattered tribes. Between the 7th and 9th century Muslim merchants established settlements on the periphery of the Ethiopian realm and busily traded with the Christian Ethiopian empire. Islam forged a link between the dispersed population of the area, who rapidly embraced it. In the 11th century, several sultanates were established between the part of Zeila and the Ethiopian state. These Sultanates lived off commerce, trading in such goods as marble and gold, in addition to slaves. At a later date, the Ethiopian Empire subdued them and turned them into Vassal States. However, during scramble Africa Djibouti was occupied by the French, i.e., in 1886.

Crisis of the Western Countries

After the 1850s, a tremendous socio-political development took place in the Western countries. Where as once Britain was one of the most leading industrial power and captured the consumer market of the world and created the colonies throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. But the rate of development in the 1880s began to lag behind that of the younger capitalist countries - Germany and the USA. In the later part of the 19th century the various capitalist forces came in bitter competition with each other to capture the markets of the world. The crisis culminated into the throatcut clash of the interests. In the last thirty years of the 19th century, the old capitalism

which had been based on free competition of individual business man grew into monopoly capitalism and imperialism. The process of concentration of industry and capital, inherent in capitalism at large contributed to the formation of monopolies.¹

At the close of the 19th century the concentration of capital increased in Britain as elsewhere in the capitalist countries but her industrial monopolies were developing at a slower rate than those of Germany and the USA.²

The development of monopoly capitalism led to the capturing of world's market, which culminated in the division of the world. The division of the world among the capitalist countries, Britain, France, USA, Russia, Germany and some of the smaller ones such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal led to colonization of all the free lands. With the division of world the division of Africa was also done.

In pursuit of markets and sources of raw materials the governments of the capitalist countries had by the end of the century seized the greater part of Africa, Asia and Latin America and turned them into colonies or semi-colonies.³

In the course of 1880s and 1890s, there was a scramble for Africa and England, France, Germany and Italy seized

1. Modern History, Part Two, Leningrad, 1959, p. 100.

2. Ibid., p. 42.

3. Ibid., p. 102.

almost the whole of Africa. The Horn of Africa came under the attack of France, Britain and Italy. At the end of the last decade 19th century, the contradictions between Ethiopian ruler Menilik and Italy, invading the coastal area on the Red Sea, reached their climax.¹

In 1896, the Italians made an attempt to seize Ethiopia (Abyssinia). But the Abyssinians put up a tough fight near a little town Adua. They defeated the Italians and forced their hasty retreat. This victory of an African army over a well equipped European force demonstrated to the entire world their resolve to maintain an independent existence, which had always characterised the Ethiopian Nationhood. It checked the Italian advance into Ethiopian heartland, which laid claim to Italian attack on the region's mainstay of independence.

In 1906, the European powers with interests in the Horn of Africa—France, Great Britain and Italy wanted to force on Ethiopia a treaty which in fact would have given them the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the country and make it a colony. Menilik sensed the danger and refused to sign that treaty. This failed the Italian plan to colonize Ethiopia. Two years later, in 1908, Menilik signed a treaty with Italy on the frontiers of the so-called Italian Somalia, which eventually was used by the Italians as a pretext for invading Ethiopia in 1935.

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1. Modern History, op cit., 1959, p. 102.

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Between 1918 and 1930, the grandson and Lis -Liyabu (between 1913 and 1916), Menelik's daughter and Tafari Makonnen (1916 to 1930) and lastly since 1930, Haile Sellassie ruled Ethiopia. Meanwhile, since 1930, Mussolini's Italy had been preparing to invade Ethiopia as the key element in its plan to establish a large empire in the Horn of Africa. In 1935, already on the eve of the Italian operation against Ethiopia, Britain and France, which controlled the Sea and land approaches to the country, announced an embargo on the supply of armaments to the two parties in dispute, a move which favoured the already obvious Italian superiority in military equipment.

Wishing to acquire new and more profitable colonies Italy became a sharp antagonist of all colonial powers, especially Great Britain and France. When the Fascists had come into power in Italy with their yearnings for the restoration of the ancient Roman empire and their aggressive policy, the dreams of the Italian bourgeoisie about acquiring new colonies gained fresh vigour. The plans of Italian Fascism did not form the first excel in modesty. The point was no more and no less that (1) to take possession of the entire Mediterranean coast of Africa (2) to lay hold of whole northeastern portion of Africa by occupying first-Ethiopia as a support base and then the entire Red Sea coast of the continent with several points of the opposite shore of the Red Sea in order to snatch from Great Britain the hegemony over the Red Sea (3) to occupy the hinterland of Libya that is to central Sudan, then from there to secure Cameroons and Spanish Guinea, and to the

Red Sea to connect Libya with Ethiopia by occupying the Eastern Sudan.

On October 1935 without any declaration of war, Italy invaded Ethiopia. The League of Nations found Italy guilty of aggression but no agreement was reached on sanctions against it. In spite of Mussolini's declaration of war on France and Britain in 1940, the British first showed no sympathy at all for the Ethiopian rebellion against fascist invaders. It was not until 1941, when the allied forces finally launched an offensive against Italians that the British Army advanced into Eritrea from the Sudan while other British troops attacked from Kenya. Addis Ababa fell to the allies in April 1941 after five years of Italian occupation.

From the above references it appears that the entire Horn had been centre of attention for expanding empires of the world. In the 19th century the Horn became special target of outside forces and the prey of Western capitalist expansionism, where the competitions had conflicts are clearly visible.

The process continued from the end of the 19th century till the end of Second World War. Though the nature of competition and conflict as well as the balance of power have changed but the history of the Horn is the mirror of its own sufferings, due to the colonial penetrations. Before the Second World War America also tried to penetrate the Horn but was not able to achieve its goal. It, however, played a role from background, not coming in the leading position to capture the territory and

turn them into colonies but to consolidate and strengthen the economic position, being the allies of Britain France etc., keeping in view its own interests which led to the cause of the emergence of USA as one of the strongest leading forces in this region's politics after the Second World War.

(F) Historical Penetration of America in the Horn:

Two great powers, of the world who had not been party to the first partition of Africa, i.e., the United States of America and Japan set before themselves the aim of colonizing what they had missed by subjecting as many countries as possible to their economic influence.

The USA started to penetrate in the Horn from the beginning of 20th century, the contact began with Menelik family. Menelik's father visited USA some time before 1896.¹ An attempt was made by USA in 1899 to gain hold in Ethiopia. Conditions favoured USA since Ethiopia was being sought by France, Britain and Italy. It became therefore natural for Ethiopia to tilt towards the USA to face the challenge of others. In short it was the historic need of both the countries Ethiopia and USA with their own perspective of interests to come closer. In 1903 USA entered into trade relations with Menelik. Around this time the rivalry of six big powers (Britain, France, Italy, Germany, USA and

1. Smith Hempstone, The New Africa, London, 1961. p. 108.

Austria-Hungary led to an agreement in 1906.) The agreement provided for the partition of Ethiopia into "Spheres of economic influence" among Britain, France and Italy. USA also joined hands with other powers as it did not have the capacity to directly challenge the European powers.

Tafari later called Haile Selassie, who was cooperating in ruling Ethiopia with Menilik's daughter Zauditu (since 1916) came to acquire complete control over Ethiopia by 1926. Though it was clear to Tafari that Britain and Italy would not give up their Colonial possessions boldly declared that Ethiopia did not recognise any "economic influence" of the European powers; that the creation of such "Spheres of economic influence" he regarded as an infringement on Ethiopian independence. The representative of Ethiopia in the League of Nations said that the peoples of Ethiopia were ready to take up arms for independence. In order to strengthen his chances of resisting the pressure of the Anglo-Italian imperialists, he decided to widen the economic and other contacts of his country with other powers of the world that is the rivals of his actual opponents.

Therefore, in 1927, he granted the United States of America a barrage concession for the utilization of the water flowing out of Lake Tsana, in order to have in hand a triumph card against Britain.¹ Tafari's resolute foreign policy threatened Italy with the strengthening in Ethiopia of the influence of those powers who after the First World War had made their appearance in the

1. Andre Sik, History of Black Africa, Vol.II, pp. 511., p.2

country as new competitors. (The United States, Japan and Germany). Keeping this in mind Tafari continued a middle course of not annoying any of the imperialist interests - in order to save Ethiopia. He signed friendship pacts with the United States in 1929. In 1930, he resumed talks with United States on the Lake Tsana concession, just in order to have something in reserve to yield in case the British or Italian aggressors should renew their claims.¹

In 1932-33 there was an uprising in some parts of Ethiopia. The rebels were liquidated by the Tafari, the King of Ethiopia. With the result after the suppression of 1932-33 uprisings, the position of the King Tafari (Negus)² was very strong. The Negus rightly appraised the world situation and made a bold change in his foreign policy orientation. He chose Britain as the partner against the Italian menace. A gradual rapprochement was worked out between Great Britain and Ethiopia; they hastened up the old plan to build a dam on Lake Tsana by joint Anglo-American Capital. In order to avoid the conflict with Italy, the Negus made a desperate decision: he offered a joint Anglo-American cooperation (the standard oil and some British industrial interests) a huge concession in the eastern part of Ethiopia (to cover an area of more than 150,000 square miles) for oil and mineral prospecting for 75 years.

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1. Andre Sik, History of Black Africa, Vol. II, pp. 298-300.
 2. Negus - Head, leader of Young Ethiopians.

The contract was signed on August 29. But Italy violently protested. The Italian press stated openly that the realisation of the concession meant war between Italy and Great Britain. The British government to avoid the conflict, announced its non-participation in the concession and the United States government proposed the widening up of the concern.¹ For a number of years the United States carried on oil prospecting in Ethiopia, immediately before the outbreak of the Italo-European war in 1935, American interests tried to secure from the Ethiopian government a large oil concession. A contract had been concluded. But the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict compelled American capital to give up this belated design. American capital was hatching ambitious plans in Africa along other lines as well as for the exploitation of the water resources of Lake Tana in Ethiopia.² During the Italo-Ethiopian War, it tried, while giving some formal support to Ethiopia, to remain neutral declined Haile Selassie request for asylum in the USA. During the Second World War, it was the British who drove the fascist out of Ethiopia and they retained a dominant position in the country till after the war ended. Yet during the war USA had already acquired a foothold on which it was later to build its base. Ethiopia being the 'First to be

1. Andre Sik, History of Black Africa, op. cit., Vol.2, p. 303.

2. Ibid., p. 133.

Freed', qualified for aid under wartime lendlease programme and in 1942 the US armed forces established a communications station at Asmara in the Eritrean region of Ethiopia which was later to be greatly expanded. In 1945 Haile Selassie had a meeting with Roosevelt on a US ship in the Gulf of Suez, while the latter was returning to the USA after Yalta Conference with Stalin and Churchill.¹ Both discussed US role in Ethiopia.

Before Second World War, rest of the part of the Horn remained untouched because, Somalia was under the control of Italy, Britain and France and Djibouti was under the control of France. But during the World War period, USA had emerged as a vital force on the world scene. The invention of Atom bomb and its explosion made America a dominant power in the world. American tended to dominate the Horn, seriously considering it as one of the most strategic location of the world.

1. Fred Halliday, 'US Policy in the Horn' Review of African Political Economy, London, Number 19, Sept-Dec. 1977, p.10.

CHAPTER II
GENERAL PERSPECTIVE OF US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE HORN

(A) Perspective in a glance before 1950:

The American perspective of foreign policy has been varied according to the nature of Socio-economic development. Since President Monroe (1789) till today the stress of American foreign policy had been on acquiring a dominant place in the world politics. In Africa American presence was connected with the freeing of the slaves and their settlements in West Africa. It was around this time that US penetrated African markets with rough cloth called Amerikini (Marken) and through investment in mining and plantations. However, USA did not acquire colonies in Africa. Its central mechanism operated through finance capital.

American investment continued to increase in the African continent. As Endre Sik writes - American capital during the first world war years had showed increased interests in the African colonies. In the first year following World War I the exports of the United States to Africa increased considerably. The value of US exports to Africa in 1923 was \$ 45 million, (2.6 per cent of the total export of the United States) by 1929 this figure arose to \$ 151 million (2.5 per cent of the total exports). The most important buyer of American goods was the Union of South Africa. American exports to the Union of South Africa averaged \$ 12.9 million in 1910-14 and \$ 53 million in 1926-30. The amount of US capital investments in Africa arose still more rapidly.¹ Already in 1919

1. Endre Sik, History of Black Africa, Vol.II, op.cit., 1972, p. 133, also see for details, Pyotr Manchka, Problems of Africa Today, Moscow, 1979, pp.111-123.

there were 105 American companies operating in the African colonies. The total of American capital investments in African mines, plantations, commercial and (mainly oil) prospering enterprises was \$ 10 million in 1912, \$ 102 million in 1929 and \$ 116 million in 1931. This rapid growth of American interest in the African colonies was largely due to the fact that European powers, which were heavily in the debt of US as a result of the war began transferring their African possessions by handing over to the United States huge quantities of shares of African companies. US capital thus started penetrating into the Congo and Northern Rhodesia, the gold industry of the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, the Gold Coast and the Congo, the diamond industry of the Congo and Angola, etc.¹

In oil prospecting alone, American capital made great effects in both Portuguese colonies, i.e., Angola and Mozambique. In Angola alone the Sin-Clor oil company by 1952 had invested \$ 10 million.

In the Horn, American perspective was carried with the American-Ethiopian agreement of 1903, after a long endeavour since 1899. Penetration of American capital was possible in Ethiopia because it was an independent monarchist state. However, it was very difficult for America to have economic relations with any of the other countries of the Horn because these countries were colonies of Britain, France and Italy.

1. Endre Sik, History of Black Africa, Vol.II, op. cit., 1972, p. 133.

First World War increased the importance of Red Sea and through Ethiopia USA saw an opening into the Horn. After the war importance of Ethiopia was further enhanced as Ethiopia became a member of the League of the Nations and thus an important participant in the world politics. American leaders noted this development in the Horn politics point of issue of the American perspective.

(B) Perspective of US policy after 1950:

(1) Introduction:

America did not participate directly in the first world war as did the European countries that is why America did not face the consequent economic problems. The economic position of America continued to be consolidated.

Soon after the end of World War II USA apparently emerged as the most dominant economic power in the world. It was primarily the weakening of the major colonial powers like Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan as a result of heavy destruction they had sustained in the World War II, that created favourable conditions for the USA to emerge as the leading power of the capitalist world. Thus United States became a leading power in its industrial development, foreign investment, foreign trade and economic activity.

The weakening of its competitors subsequently induced the United States to gear its foreign policy along with two major tasks. The first task was to strengthen the hold on world economy to save the capitalist world and protect it against

probable popular rebellions. The second task was that of protecting the interests of monopoly circles which had emerged on a large scale due to the weakening of other capitalist countries. In carrying out these tasks USA stepped up its political and economic expansion to such an extent that it emerged as the most dominant and leading imperialist power in the world. In 1947 the US administration came under the influence of anti-socialist elements. This group was deadly opposed to the emergence of Soviet Union and Socialist bloc as the second centre of power. The main task of the US leaders became one of opposing Communism,¹ two of stifling and of possible weakening of the anti-colonial and freedom struggles which were going on in Asia and Africa. Hands of the colonial powers were strengthened with enormous amounts of U.S. dollars. Military treaties were concluded and US military bases set up in various regions and countries.

The US leaders laid down strategic plans to prevent the spread of communism and if possible to destroy it completely. This was the inception of the cold war policy, formulated by President Truman.

With the new situation emerging on the world scenario the British were unable to continue playing the leading imperialist role in many of the countries of which they had been assigned primary responsibility during the war itself.²

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1. Pyotr Manchka, gives detailed description of this problem in Problems of Africa Today, pp. 141, p. 142.
 2. Fred Halliday, "US Policy in the Horn", Review of African Political Economy, London, 1977, p. 10.

Horn's importance did not count on the basis of its own economic resources because it had little raw material to offer. Ethiopia hardly had mineral resources and Somalia was basically pastoral area, therefore, as such the Horn was not an economic attraction but geo-politically and strategically important area. Its geopolitical setup, its surrounding areas and their economic resources are of great importance, as mentioned earlier. It is a route to Asia and Europe. It is the only warm water contact between Europe and Asian routes of USSR.

After the defeat of colonial powers USA made an attempt to penetrate into newly liberated countries in the name of filling the vacuum. It began to supply military aid to Iran on a considerable scale. A similar change came a little later in Ethiopia from where the British military mission completely withdrew in 1952 and in 1953, the USA set up its own mission.¹

Since 1953, US policy in the Horn got a new perspective which was basically the expansion and maintenance of eco-political-strategic domination in this region. The Horn was such a crucial place that it was believed that the loss of crucial Horn could prove to be very harmful and dangerous for the western powers particularly to the US. Its loss could lead to a setback to the US in the world economic, political and strategic field. US credibility and status

1. In 1943 Butan had leased to USA the Kamgnew base but final withdrawal took place in 1952. *loc. cit.*

in the world politics would have gone down if the Horn was lost by the region becoming socialist or even independent. This arena had to be of prime consideration in the perspective of US foreign policy. US felt that the independence of the Horn meant its going under the Soviet influence.

During 1950-1982, eight Presidents came in power in US from Truman to Reagan. Almost all of them have given their own doctrine for the international politics.¹

1. The Truman doctrine was issued on March 12, 1947. The main perspective of Truman policy was to prevent the underdeveloped countries from adopting the Socialist path by means of US economic assistance. The creation of vacuum by European powers signified the danger to the entire capitalist world when Socialist forces were coming quickly to fill that vacuum. To give the practical shape to Truman Doctrine George Marshall Secretary of State at that time in June 1947 chalked out a plan that is called Marshall Plan. Further the "Point Four" programme was proposed by President Truman to maintain the underdeveloped countries in the clutches of neo-colonial powers and prevent them from building free and independent national economies. The programme proposed expanded technical assistance for and private investment in the underdeveloped countries. Truman gave the next perspective of US policy that is policy of containment. Its aim as regards Europe or the underdeveloped countries were to preserve capitalism by the containment of socialism, liberation movements and revolutionary struggles. Thus the US resolved to take a hardline against Soviet Union. Lastly Truman's aims of American policy was to increase the sea, air and military base in the Asia, Africa and Latin America.

President Eisenhower perspective emphasised the two main perspective of Truman that is first anti-Soviet and second to introduce the sophisticated weapons like atomic bomb to protect US interests in the world. John Foster Dulles the Chief Republican spokesman on foreign policy later Secretary of State intensified the process of cold war to fulfil the perspective of President Eisenhower.

Footnote cont...

With slight modifications they have all followed the same doctrine - the Truman Doctrine, i.e., to fight increasing socialist influence in the world politics; leading the

Footnote cont...from pre-page.....

The strong anti-Sovietism perspective can be observed in the speech of Dulles that "we shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism dominates. One third of all the people's that there are and is in the process of trying at least to extend its rule to many others.... It is only by taking advantages of that whenever opportunity arises that we will end this terrible peril". (Some Silent features of US foreign policy: Maskeran, Addis Ababa, Vol.4, No.15, p. 34). Dulles view became guiding principle in subsequent government policy and aggravated the cold war on March 9, 1957 the US officially made a new declaration of foreign policy towards the Middle East following the beginning of Egypt's struggle to bring the Suez canal under his control. In this time Eisenhower doctrine proposed the policy. According to this policy the USA would grant military and economic assistance to Middle East countries with the view to controlling Soviet "intervention" and the spread of communism in the general area of the Middle East.

Kennedy who came in power after Eisenhower took the instance of opposing cold war, nuclear armament and supporting peaceful co-existence with Soviet Union. But this deviation was in his pronouncements. Because he continued to fight communism in Vietnam, Korea and Cuba. He continued to aid massively to those countries who stood against socialism.

After the assassination of Kennedy Lyndon Johnson came into the White House. The Johnson strategy towards Africa was to conduct a holding operation until time and circumstances would allow Washington to become more active. Johnson also carried anti-communist of Kennedy's policy.

After Johnson Richard Nixon was elected president in 1969 who on behalf of the US Government reasserted the old perspective of anti-communism to maintain the US interests. Although Nixon announced that "...the era of confrontation must yield to one of negotiation in relations with

Footnote cont..

capitalist world against popular upsurge, protecting US monopoly circles.

During the entire period the Horn came to acquire great importance. From 1945 to 1969 Western, including US influence remained dominant on the Horn. Full Western support was extended to the various regimes till Somalian coup in 1969. After a political change in Somalia, US-Somalia relations were constrained.

After the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, US perspective changed drastically towards the Horn. Ethiopian socialist leadership posed a challenge to the so called US interests

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the Soviet Union and the entire socialist world". (Maskeran, Vol.IV, No.15, Addis Ababa, Sept. 1983, p.44.) Nixon apparently realized that going against Soviet Union, which possessed nuclear weapons would indeed be hazardous to the United States. That is why he signed the agreement on peaceful Co-existence and detente with the Soviet Union.

President Ford's coming to White House did not bring the change in US foreign policy towards Africa.

Carter's perspective was the landmark in US policy. He concentrated much on Africa and particularly in Horn of Africa. He again intensified the process of cold war. He again further escalated the process of anti-Soviet and arms race in the Gulf and Indian Ocean. The establishment of new military base, polarization of forces in this area and destabilisation of the region remained the main perspective of Carter's policy.

Footnote ends.

in managing the close relations with other progressive regime of the Asia, Africa and Europe. The success of Ethiopian revolution was likely to be the source of inspiration to other left forces of African continent which disturbed the political system in pro-American countries. The success of socialist forces in Ethiopia changed the entire American perspective in regard to policies in the Horn, Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

After Carter came to power in 1977, he emphasized the need to win over Somalia¹ at any cost for US. And soon millions of dollars were spent to try to change the politics of Somalia. Conditions had also become favourable to USA as Somali dream of Greater Somalia had been frustrated after declaration of adherence to socialism by Ethiopia. By 1977 it was clear that Ethiopia, the enemy of Somalia had also become friend of USSR Somalia either had to give up its claim for greater Somalia or break friendship with USSR and continue fighting Ethiopia.

The main perspective of US foreign policy will be seen in the following points of discussion:

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1. On June 11, 1977, Mr Carter said that he was 'quite concerned' about the tensions in the Horn of Africa, involving Somalia and Afars and Issas, Sudan and to some degree Ethiopia. He said that this administration was seeking to improve relationship with Somalia and was trying to understand the Eritrean movement in Ethiopia (Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux The Ethiopian Revolution, 1981, London, p. 226.

(11) Economic Perspective of US in the Horn:

Economic importance of Horn is to be judged in the light of its geopolitical importance. It overlooks the water way to Europe from Gulf and West Asia and vice-versa. Thus the total economic activities, particularly those, which are conducted against the interests of the countries of the region are inter-related. The little investment which USA had in Ethiopia before 1977 this should not be seen without relating them to US investment in the Gulf and west Asia.

Horn is directly related with economic resources of the African continent, West Asia, Indian Ocean and Europe. These regions are of immense importance for USA. That is why, Horn is the nucleus of all these economic regions.

(a) Horn in the context of West Asia and USA: West Asian oil profits from an industry where American companies have the controlling and consistently expanding interests, were an important stabilizing factor for the American economy. Back in 1920s, the big American (Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, SOCL and Gulf) had joined hands with British petroleum and Anglo-Dutch Royal-Dutch-shell to form an international oil cartel and began developing the oil riches of dependent and colonial countries.¹

From the 1950s, to 1970s, the big five strengthened their positions among the leading American industrial cooperations in total sales, assets and net profits. Most

1. Prinskov, Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict, Moscow, 1979, p. 158.

of their fabulously high profits came from being able to exploit cheap manpower and to enjoy the best natural conditions. But the mid 1970s the position of the international oil cartels and of the big five oil companies had changed radically. Their profits slowed down. Profits of Major US oil companies were as follows:

Million dollars

Company	1975	1976	1977	1978
Exxon	2503.0	2640.00	2443.00	2716.00
Texco	830.6	869.70	890.00	852.00
Mobil	809.9	942.00	999.00	1124.00
Gulf	700.0	716.00	752.00	792.00
SOCL	772.5	880.00	1004.00	1106.00
Total	5616.0	6047.7	6088.00	6590.00

Besides, the profits of the Big Five, the United States is receiving a great deal of money in the form of short-term credits and long-term investments from the oil producing countries. The income of the 13 OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) member rose from \$12,500 millions in 1970-1972 to \$ 113,000 millions in 1976 and it reached \$ 128,000 millions in 1977. In 1976, they conducted

1. Y.M. Primakov - Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict, Nauka Publishing House, Central Dept., Oriental Literature, Moscow, 1979, p. 158.

Source: Fortune May 1976, p. 316, Petroleum Economist March 1977, p. 92.

foreign commercial transactions worth \$ 122,000 millions.¹

To move the oil USA needs free passage through the Red Sea. And in their perspective, free passage is possible only if states on both sides of the Red Sea are friendly to the US, if not under its control.

(b) Economic relation of USA with Horn

Ethiopia was the first country in the Horn for the US economic penetration and this continued till 1975 on an increasing scale. Somalia was not open for investments because it was, even after independence, under the economic control of Italy and Britain. And after 1969 coups, Somalia came in close relations with the Soviet Union. Djibouti, however, continued to remain under French economic and political dominance. The USA provided massive economic and military aid to Somalia in 1977 after the latter abrogated Soviet - Somalia treaty.

Djibouti attained its independence from France in 1977 and continued to serve as French Naval base. Besides Djibouti, Ethiopia railway construction, the French have no big investment in Djibouti. In the Horn it is impossible to point out exact areas of economic investment of US but the cash crops (like cotton, coffee, banana) some region of oil and minerals have been the areas of investment and export.

American economic interests are also being served through the various forms of economic aid and loan, through

1. Chase Manhattan Bank International Finance, Feb. 21, 1971, p. 8.

IMP, World Bank, etc. It is very difficult to get the economic data about US investments aid and grants to countries of the Horn.

In Ethiopia, America started its economic relations from the very beginning of the century but after w1950 it accelerated the process of economic interests. It established its multinationals. It bought shares in industry and banks. It penetrated through various aids and projects though according to the data of 1976, the export of Ethiopia was \$ 150.6 millions to America and import was \$ 53.1 millions,¹ but this gap of export-import has been filled by the various loans, aid, conditions and other means of economic benefits from Ethiopia. US had provided Eth \$ 21 million loan for road improvement repayable over 40 years at 2% interests, Eth \$ 9.9 million loans for agricultural projects in 1973-74.² IDA had approved US \$ 100 in 1973 for the development credit.³

Even after Revolution on 25th April 1975, the US agreed to lend to Ethiopia Eth \$ 31 millions for agricultural development programmes including some provision for assistance to small farms and the building of roads. Again IDA agreed to

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1. Africa Guide, England, 1978.
 2. Collingon editor Africa Contemporary Record, New York, 1973-74, p. 13-166.
 3. Africa Contemporary Record, London, 1975-76, P.B-210

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provide \$ 16 million for the Fifth Telecommunication Project in 1975.¹ Direction of trade can be seen where US in 1970 supplied \$ 14.61 millions, in 1974, \$ 15.52 million in 1975, \$ 52.51 million in 1976, \$ 86.59 millions.² Ethiopia, which had signed a long-term lease with US for the base at Asmara received \$ 43 millions in military assistance from USA during the 1952-61 period of a total of \$ 127 million of American aid.³

The World Bank had granted loans (direct and indirect) up to mid 1966 totalling almost Eth \$ 140 millions. Loan and credits, directly received from US in the same period (Eth \$ 238758398) had been examined for various projects, including the purchase of jets, aircrafts, building of new ports, education health and transportation.⁴

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1. Africa Contemporary Record, op. cit., p. B-210.
 2. Ibid., 1977-78, p. B₂- 260.
 3. Ibid., 1975-76, p. A - 199.
 4. Ethiopia, Patterns and Progress. Past and Present published by the Ministry of Information, Addis Ababa, 1977, p. 43-44.

Ethiopia's External Debt
Including both Public and Private Sectors
Thousands

Multilateral	Loan for Credit Amount 30.6.67	Amount Disbursed 30.6.67	Balance Undi- sursed 30.6.67	Repay- ment up to 30.6.67	Indebt- edness
IBRD	141,750	116,460	25,290	26,548	19112
IDA	51,750	26,232	25,518	-	26232
Internatio- nal Finance Co.	3,750	3,750	-	-	3750
Total	197,250	146,442	50,808	26,548	120094
Bilateral US	244,782	156,560	91,022	46,122	110438 ¹

The pattern of US investments changed after the Ethiopian government's decision to nationalize all large business, trade and production units.

Besides the investments, America had cultivated Ethiopia as a big arms market. The USA sold large quantities of arms to Ethiopia. Since 1955 when military assistance accord with Ethiopia was signed until 1974 the United States provided \$ 220 million arms in 1975.² USA was not willing to continue its arms supply. It had other plans to win over Somalia.

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2. D. Ottaway, "Aids to Economic Assistance" International Herald Tribune, Paris, 4 Feb., 1975.

America had no direct links with Somalia before 1977. Its financial interests in Somalia were through the World Bank and IMF loans. It was in 1977 that after a shift in its policy, America gave Somalia \$ 15 million for a five year agricultural research and training programme.¹ Agreement was signed in March 1978 for \$ 7 million loan to enable Somalia to pay American food supplies, the US had previously agreed to provide \$ 6 million worth of food aid. The first 10,000 tons of a US gift of 2300 tons of food and cereals arrived in Mogadishu on 31 December 1978.²

The United States provided \$ 11 million in refugee assistance to Somalia in 1980 and had budgeted for 1981.³

Though US has no direct economic involvement in Djibouti, USA tried to keep Djibouti with it through indirect methods, such as permission to US sailors in Djibouti and procuring the supplies from there. The USA has tried to win over first Ethiopia and later Somalia to its side. Its investments do not provide high profit but they are meaningful.

Overall American investments in the Horn are not large from the point of view of its own economy but they are big

1. Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-78, p. B-384.

2. Loc. cit.

3. International Herald Tribune, Paris, 20 August, 1980.

enough to build and destroy the economies of the countries of the Horn. The economic perspective of USA in the Horn appears to be directed to dominate the area and keep it under its umbrella for eventual, political, strategic and military use. US policy makers are always conscious of the fact that the Horn is one side of the Red Sea and this is important for navigation through the Suez.

(iii) Strategic Perspective of USA and Horn:

The Horn being at a very important location of Indian Ocean, attracts international attention. The Indian Ocean, in the post Second World War era has acquired main focus on international politics and strategy for the newly independent nation of Asia and Africa. Indeed it is frequently called the "ocean of future", while the Atlantic and the Pacific are regarded as the "oceans of past".¹

The importance of the ocean lies not only in its strategic location and in its vital sea lanes but also in the possibility that it affords for the control of the landmasses that surrounded it and of its ingresses and egresses. Its water also wash lands that are rich in raw material, especially oil - the vital life blood of modern economics. As stated earlier for Soviet Union, Indian Ocean provides all weather passage between its Western and Eastern regions through Black Sea and Vladivostak.

1. Alvin, J. Gott Bell, "Indian Ocean of Tomorrow" Navy Magazine (USA), March 1971, p. 10.

US strategy in the Indian Ocean, a prominent defence and foreign policy issue both home and abroad, is seen as a primary determinant of world events and raise important questions for US foreign policy. These include the real nature and objectives of the Soviet presence; the repercussions of implementing the expansion project on Diego Garcia, the Nixon doctrine¹ as it affected US strategy in that part of Asia; the costs and constraints of US naval build up in terms of an escalating arms race, the politico diplomatic costs of Indian Ocean build up in the face of the Vietnam experience. Thus if US interests are to be protected, it is essential that American defence planning be geared to the Indian Ocean area.²

The Indian Ocean has today acquired a prominent place in the current US Strategic Planning. Although the increasing US concern about the area is a recent phenomenon, US interests in the water, begins much earlier. United States

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1. The Nixon doctrine argued for "a reorientation of US involvement. Under it the security arrangement of 1950s would be recast to provide a more balanced Washington role in the shape of increased sharing of national and personnel costs of security. A corollary of this doctrine is that the US foreign policy would not be governed by ideological concerns; instead, a non-ideological pragmatic approach accommodating the diversity of the World Community" is to be the key stone of his new policy.
 2. Anthony Harigan, "America's deteriorating defence Posture". Modern Age, 15, No.2, Spring 1977, p. 160.

leased in 1943, from Britain Kagnow base, in Asmara-Ethiopia. The Middle East forces stationed in Bahrine, were also retained, providing the US with a strategic spot for deployment of Sea based missiles aimed at Soviet Union. The geographic location of the waters, especially around the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea provide some of the best locations for US sea-based missile deployment as deterrent against the Soviet Union.

The Horn has a considerable geopolitical importance in the context of the politics of the middle East and the Persian Gulf. Any actor dominating one side of the Red Sea would have the potential to exercise influence over the usage of the Suez Canal, which is part of larger issues of entrance and egress from the north-east Indian Ocean. Also in the context of oceanic shipping, some observers argue that control of the southern tip of African continent (The Cape route) is another point of geopolitical importance because part of the oil shipped to Western Europe and America goes around the Cape.¹

The entire strategic perspective in the Horn will be dealt with Chapter four. But it is very clear that American strategic perspective cultivates the entire area of Indian Ocean. The Horn being the gateway of the African continent also provides the way to enter into the countries of Africa. That is why the Horn is an important strategic location in the perspective of the US foreign policy.

1. Larry Bowman and Ian Clark, (Ed.), The Indian Ocean in Global Politics. "African Conflict and Super Power involvement in the Western Indian Ocean" by W. Bowman, Westview Press, 1981, p. 90.

(iv) Armsrace and Military Base Perspective:

The 40% economy of America is based on arms production and arms sellings. The entire African continent and the countries of Indian Ocean are the best resources for the raw material used for the production of arms. Africa is one of the biggest consumer of American arms. America accelerates the process of Arms race through the various techniques, e.g., by creating confrontation between the States, by suggesting modernising of the military equipment by creating the fear of socialist expansion.

In the Horn till 1976, America sold the arms to Ethiopia and when the political system changed in Ethiopia, America tilted towards Somalia and sold it large quantities of arms. Dumping of arms in Somalia led to Somali attacks on Ethiopia even after 1977 conflict. Supplies of arms to Somalia helped USA on one hand Somalia continued its aggressive activities on the other it entered into an understanding with USA, providing the facilities of Somali ports for military purposes. Although USSR also supplied arms to Somalia and used port facilities yet during days of Somalia-Soviet Friendship, Somalia did not launch any armed attack on Ethiopia.

Somalia now provides USA a convenient platform for arial surveillance of the northern part of the cape see route Somali port Berbera also has the advantage of being

closer to the Strait of Hormas than Deigo Garcia.¹

(v) Political Perspective of US in the Horn:

Political perspective of US is a reflection of US economic crisis. The reality of world eco-politics lies in the harsh struggle between socialist and capitalist world economy.² If capitalist economy collapses or loses its hold in a single arena of the world, American economic balance is also likely to get effected. Presently, America is working as an axis of life of the capitalist world economy. In this respect Horn occupies a key position for economic consolidation for America ensuring facilities of Asian and African countries. Consequently America cannot allow even the slightest concession to anti-capitalist forces, i.e., it must in order to maintain its present dominant position, control the Horn.

It is well known that world competition between Socialist and capitalist forces brought the great powers in to operation to strengthen their influence in the Horn. Before the Second World War, the competition remained among the capitalist forces but the Second World War changed the character of the economy of most of the capitalist countries. As a result of this a large number of politically independent

1. Loc. Cit. /The Problems of Africa,

2. Pyotr Marchkha, op. cit., 1979, p. 124-126.

countries emerged in Asia and Africa. These countries tried to delink themselves from the old colonial economic relations and enter into new relations with the Socialist world.

The emergence of an economy independent of the capitalist system created imbalance in the old economic order. The historical recording of the change shows that in 1950s the ratio of socialist and capitalist world economy was respectively 12 per cent and 88 per cent, but today it is 35 to 40 per cent and 60 per cent respectively.

Horn's politics is the outcome of the crises of its political system, socio-economic development, territorial disputes and relations with African countries and international forces. In Horn the political movement against rulers, secessionist movements, territorial disputes have constantly been taking place. American perspective is to use these difficult conditions and turn the situation in favour of its own interests. American politics sees its own future in these territorial disputes and political upsurges in terms of the balance of power in this region. To lessen the influence of socialist forces, it always helps the nationalist forces. But in the Horn Ethiopia has proved a big challenge to America after 1974 because it became a socialist state.

Therefore, the entire perspective of US foreign policy has been in a direction which serves the interests of American

monopoly capitalism. In its perspective the Horn is to be used, like other regions of the world, to make USA the single most dominant power - a super power - in the world. This perspective was carried further after the 1950s when the US launched on global scale planned and vigorous neocolonial offensive¹ through the use of puppet counter-revolutionary movements and creation of aggressive military alliances like NATO and SEATO. These methods were also instruments in projecting US interests in the Horn.

1. For see, Anatoly Gromyko, Africa: Progress, Problems, Prospects, Moscow, 1981, p. 206-226.

Pyotr Menchikha, Problems of Africa Today, op. cit., Pp. 124-158.

CHAPTER-III

US POLICY IN THE HORN AFTER 1950 to 1982

(A) Framing and Consolidation of US Foreign Policy in the Horn (1950-64) :

The newly acquired situation, after the Second World War, posed a tremendous challenge to European powers in Africa. The crisis appeared from the two sides. Firstly, the entire European economy started to collapse, secondly, the national liberation movements were gaining momentum against colonialism. With the result, the European powers were not in a position to continue their rule in the colonies. The circumstances were forcing them to make new arrangements to safeguard their investments. They promised to liberate the colonies. This step of the European powers created in some cases conditions of open door, also referred as the vacuum. The national liberation forces were not regarded by Western powers as competent alternative to colonial masters. This vacuum was not the 'absence of alternative' but the absence of imperialist domination. This vacuum was generally filled by the Americans with similar socio-economic system or by USSR with Socialist system. Naturally to continue their interests, European capitalism expected Americans to pull them from the crisis of new situation. But the newly liberated countries opted the path of non-alignment.

But wherever political and economic linkages with former colonial powers were deep, America came forward to fill the vacuum, giving life to the collapsing economy of imperialism.

USA formulated its foreign policy in a manner to manage the future, direction of international politics. In this course, with the immediate effect, President Truman with Marshall Plan appeared with a concrete proposal for US foreign policy to save the decaying economic situation and check the influence of expanding communism.¹

Although, President Truman had occasions reaffirmed the Rooseveltian objectives of economic and political advancement for the colonial areas of the world, Africa was of the little direct concern to the Truman administration. And yet, the programmes of economic and military assistance to Europe had highly significant side effects upon Africa. An American policy towards Africa therefore existed, but it was derivative and not particular.

In terms of economic development, the war itself as well as American Lend Lease programme had resulted in an infusion of resources, the scale of which had never previously been known. Military supplies flowed in a steady stream to African territories; modern roads and railways were constructed, airbases were developed in many places, and ports were enlarged and improved.

1. For detail, See, Pyotr Manchka, Problems of Africa Today, op. cit., p. 124-158.

A. Zhukov, L. Delyusin, A. Iskenderov, L. Stepanov, The Third World, Problems and Prospects, Moscow, 1970, p. 235-36.

Truman Doctrine, issued on March 12, 1947, entailing the policy of filling the vacuum in case the colonial power granted freedom to their Colonies, was given objective shape in the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plans contribution to the development of these areas was provided, in part from regular programme funds, which could be freely employed for this purpose.

Truman had to assert in his inaugural address of January 1949 Point Four Programme. He said, "we must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of undeveloped areas...."¹ In President Truman's view, the programme had strategic and economic as well as idealistic purposes. "The 'Point Four Programme', he wrote in his memories, was a practical expression of our attitude towards the countries threatened by communist domination. It was consistent with our policies of preventing the expansion of communism in the free world, by helping to ensure the proper development of those countries with adequate food, clothing, and living facilities."²

President Truman stated the economic objective in the following terms "common sense told me that development of

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1. Waldemar A. Niel Sen, "The Great Powers and Africa", London, 1969, p.254.
 2. Ibid., p. 255.

these countries would keep our own industrial plant in business for untold generations.¹

American interests in more difficult issues of political advancement for the colonial areas was also flickeringly manifest during the Truman years, particularly in connection with a series of problems concerning the disposition of the former Italian territories in Africa and Libya, Somaliland and Eritrea. In these discussions the United States attempted simultaneously to placate its European allies, especially Britain and Italy; to counter Soviets to exploit the issue for the benefit of the Italian communist party; to safeguard American strategic interests and facilities; to keep the friendship of Ethiopia; and to satisfy the reasonable aspiration of the colonial populations.²

By 1950 the effort of the United States to maintain generally United front with its Western European allies and at the same time identify itself with the aspirations of the colonial populations of the world was becoming almost unmanageable.

An address on American policy in mid 1950s by Mc Ghee then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs³ goes on to identify the objectives of the American policy:

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1. Waldemar A. Nielsen, "The Great Powers in Africa", London, 1969, p.255.
 2. Ibid., p. 255.
 3. Ibid., p. 256.

First, to see that the peoples of Africa advance towards full independence and in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. In the attainment of this objective, however, the United States could play "only a cooperative role with the administering powers.

Second, to assure the development of mutually advantageous economic relations between Europe and Africa in the interests of contributing to restoration of a sound European economy and the aspiration of the African peoples.

Third, to pressure the right of the United States to equal treatment and access in the development in the continent.

Fourth, to help provide, "an environment in which the African peoples will feel that their aspiration can best be served by continued association and cooperation with nations of the free world".¹

Mc Ghee's statement was an interesting synthesis of earlier American objectives in Africa, such as access to markets and raw materials, the preoccupation of 1950 with communism and the cold war and the anticipation of coming problems of independence and economic development.

President Truman's statement of the Union Message to Congress on January 7, 1953, summed up the record of eight years. After describing the military efforts he had taken

1. Waldemar A. Nielsen, "The Great Powers in Africa", London, 1969, p. 257-258.

to confront the Soviet influence, the President asked: Did this mean we had to drop everything and concentrate on armies and weapons? of course it did not: side by side with this urgent military requirement, we had to continue help to create the conditions of economic and social progress in the world.

US foreign policy under Truman can be summed in the policy of containment.

The first major policy statement on Africa was delivered on October 30, 1953 by Henry A. Byroade, at that time Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African affairs. Professor Vernon McKay, then a state department official, subsequently wrote a classic analysis on Byroade address:

1. It will be one of the great tragedies of our time if the peoples of Asia and Africa, just as they are emerging from generation of dependence, should be deluded by the total lure of the new (Soviet imperialism) and return thereby to an age of slavery infinity more miserable than they have ever known before.
2. It is a hard inescapable fact that premature independence can be dangerous retrogressive and destructive.
3. Unless, we are willing to recognise that there is such a thing as premature independence, we cannot think intelligently or constructively about the status of independent peoples.

4. Premature independence for these peoples would not serve the interests of the United States nor the interests of the dependent peoples themselves.
5. let us be frank in reorganizing our stake in the strength and stability of certain European nations which are allies. They share many common interests with us. They will probably represent for many years to come, the major source of the free world defensive power outside our own. We cannot blindly disregard their side of the colonial question without regard to our own security.¹

The above analysis clears the perspective of the US foreign policy to dominate the African continent and to replace European powers making them allies in countering the Socialist influence (Particularly of the Soviet Union).

Early 1957 made it appear that the American government, both in Congress and Executive Branch, was beginning to be more Africa conscious. In February Senator Green, Democrat of Rhodesia, issued a report calling for a revision of American policy. Nothing that the drive for political independence in Africa was gaining momentum, the Senator called it a "Continental infernet" and said that American policies had failed to keep pace with developments. He called for a new assessment of American interests in the continent and urged that these be adopted".

1. Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics, New York, p.321; Walde Mar A. Nielsen, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959, London, p. 261.

In February and March of the same year Vice President Nixon paid a month-long visit to eight African countries, Ethiopia was one of them.¹

Before dealing with the US policy in this period, i.e., 1950 to 1964, we must make note of Main characteristics of this era and observe the newly acquired trends in the international politics, which contributed in the formulation of above dealt American policy towards Africa. The following main points require special considerations:

- (a) creation of vacuum due to the collapse of European powers.
- (b) Spreading of Socialist (communist) powers particularly Soviet Union as a challenge to Western powers.
- (c) Polarisation of powers.
- (d) Emergence of military blocs like NATO (1949) SEATO (1954), CENTO (1955) and Warsaw Pact (1953).
- (e) Stormy wave of national liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
- (f) Emergence of third world politics under the direction of Non-aligned Movement (1961). Before that the process was started by the Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung (1955).
- (g) And the emergence of OAN (1963) and its contribution to the NIM (National Liberation Movement).

1. Waldemar, The Great Powers and Africa, op. cit., p.265. Economic Aid and Technical Assistance in Africa (Washington; US Govt Printing Office, 1957.)

The above situation left a deep impact on the US foreign policy in the Horn during the period 1950-64.

In this period, the countries of the Horn had been passing through different development stages. In Somalia, where the independent movement was at the peak of the point in 1950s and in the late fifties, it reached a decisive stage. Ultimately it attained independence and started to search for the international support for their economic development. On the other side in Djibouti, the national liberation movement was weak. However, the forces of liberation were getting international support which inspired the Djibouti people to continue their movement against the French. At the same time Ethiopia actively participated in and supported the Afro-Asian unity, Nonaligned movement and the Organisation of African Unity.

The direction of Horn's politics drew the attention of international forces. The contradiction of capitalist and socialist forces in this region grew sharper. As a result of this contradiction, Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea (Suez Canal) Gulf area of the Indian Ocean (the littoral and hinterland countries of the Indian Ocean) became the focal points of strategic competition. The Horn became one of the most important targets of world politics.

The British military left Ethiopian in 1952 and in 1953. USA took over¹ and British base as a mission to fill up the

1. Fred Hally Day, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa", Review of African Political Economy, op. cit., p. 10.

vacuum. Likewise in Somalia, Italian forces had to withdraw in the late fifties because of the increasing pressure of Somali Youth League and other liberation forces.

The period of 1950 to 1964 can be described as an era of close relation of America with Ethiopia. Ethiopia was used as the central point for dealing with the politics towards Indian Ocean. Previously entire Indian Ocean was under the British and French, who lost their capacity to continue their rule in this region, and the responsibilities were taken over by America.

Soviet Union on the other hand was very active in helping the leftist forces of the region of West Asia and Arab world so that at the time of transfer of power from Europe it could win friends, favouring socialist forces. Soviet Union on the issue of Arab-Israel conflict, tried to persuade the Arab countries (Egypt, Syria, Libya, Jordan, etc.) to take posture of opposition to US-Israel axis. This move of the Soviets posed a threat to US interests as well as to European interests in the Red Sea region. The Soviet Union, however, supported the national liberation movement of Somalia and left, and democratic forces of Ethiopia and Djibouti. This endeavour of Soviet Union was regarded as a challenge to America in the Horn's as well as in the Middle East.

In 1960 Somalia attained independence, from Italy and Britain. The emergence of this new state brought a stormy

wave in Horn's politics. Somalia was looking for the prospects of an all round development. It tried to get economic assistance from USA, but USA was not ready to assist because its close friendship with Ethiopia. USA attached great importance to Ethiopian role in the independent Africa. Haile Selassie was highly respected in Africa. This could be useful to USA. Asmara base was no doubt important for USA. Forced by the unfriendly attitudes of US, Somalia approached USSR, for assistance. Soviet Union who was looking for a friend in this region immediately accepted the proposal of Somalia and came forward with economic help to Somalia. This changed the power relations in the Horn and pushed Horn into regional as well as international politics.

In the 1950s, Somalia was given less importance than Ethiopia by USA. American Administration considered Ethiopia, as one of the most important place of political and strategic interests, in Asia, Africa and Europe. Until 1960 when the Somali Republic became independent and in fact for another three years, US influence in the Horn was practically unchallenged. Throughout the 1950s, two of the NATO allies - Italy and Britain were in effective control of the Somali politics. France was firmly ensconced in Djibouti. Moreover during the initial years of Somali independence, Mogadishu was primarily dependent upon its erstwhile colonial masters, Italy and Britain, for the

external political support and for the supply of the limited quantity of military hardware, it was able to obtain.¹

The instruments of the US policy in Ethiopia were two agreements signed on 23 May 1953. One of these was a military assistance agreement which provided for US aid in equity and training the Ethiopian forces. According to the terms of Agreement the US was the main supplier of Ethiopian equipment, and in addition 2813 Ethiopian officers and pilots were trained in the USA at a cost of \$ 66.8 millions. The US Military Advisory Army Group (MAAG) also arrived in Ethiopia in 1953. Between 1953 and 1960 the MAAG trained three Ethiopian army divisions of 6000 men each. With alleged threat from a newly independent Somalia after 1960 a fourth division was trained and original ones expanded. As a result by mid 1960s, the Ethiopian army had 40,000 men. In 1964 the US provided twelve US Jet fighters to Ethiopia. In military terms these were the first supersonic jets provided to any state in Africa.

The other agreement signed in 1953 was on Defence Installations. In this case the installation was the communications base at Asmara, renamed 'Kagnew' after an Ethiopian contingent which fought with USA, in the Korean war. Kagnew was ideally situated for the USA's global radio

1. Mohammed Ayoob, The Horn of Africa, "Regional Conflict and Super Power Involvement", Canberra Papers No. XVII, 1978, p. 12.

communication net work, since it was far from the north and South magnetic poles and in a zone comparatively free of magnetic storms. From 1953 onwards it formed part of a world wide circuit running from Arlington Virginia, through the US bases in Morocco to Asmara, and then onto the Philippines. It also acted as the link up in the Indian Ocean to the Radio communications base in North-West Australia. Which the US maintained. However, keeping in view the Ethiopian role in the independent Africa and despite the importance of the base, the United States declared publicly that it would not use the base for activities inside Ethiopia.

In 1960 the USA and Ethiopia signed a new military agreement terms of which were only partly revealed; this agreement stressed USA's commitment to Ethiopian territorial integrity. In 1960, USA increased its aid after Haile Salassie faced a goup attempt to overthrow him.

The increase was also due to new developments in Somalia which had become independent and whose rulers were asking for unity for all the areas inhabited by Somalia speaking people. Somalia had demanded parts of Kenya, Ethiopia and whole of Djibouti. It had already united the British and Italian Somaliland. Somali leaders were disappointed when Britain refused to partition Kenya and hand over its area which was inhabited by Somali speaking people. Somalia broke all relations with Britain on this question.

The increasing idea of Ethiopia in the early 1960s in African Politics demanded guarantee attention from USA. Ethiopia also supported US politics by sending a military contingent of over 3000 troops with half an air squadron to support UN in the Congo in 1960. Again in 1963 Haile sellassie mediated in the war between Morocco and Algeria. Ethiopia also maintained close relationship with Israel. USA valued this relationship very much.

In 1963, Addis Ababa was chosen as the centre for the Headquarters of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) a factor that gave Ethiopia a special diplomatic weight. It, therefore, seemed to have been realized in the US State department that support for Ethiopia had a number of advantages both vis-a-vis Arab world and vis-a-vis Africa.

While Ethiopia maintained a general policy and tried not to clash with other African States, there were two specific policies on which Haile Selassie was insistent and on which the USA, in order to provide him with maximum support, cooperated. These were the issues of Somali demand for Ethiopian areas and secessionist Extreme demand for independence. Haile selassie's fear of Somalia was enormous and hence when Somalia became independent in 1964, he was quick to sign his afore-mentioned military agreement with USA. He also seemed to have ensured that the USA denied Somalia any military aid, despite the fact that the rulers in Somalia were of pro-Western orientation. The details are not available, but it appears from unofficial reports that Kennedy

Administration, pressed by Ethiopia, rejected Somali requests for aid. Somali wanted to train an army of 20,000 but the West would agree to only 5000. Disappointed Somalia turned to Soviet Union for help and supply of arms.¹

This move of Somalia alarmed Haile Selassie who thought of invading Somalia to weaken it. To prevent a major destabilization of the Horn situation the USA intervened in 1964 to stop Ethiopia invading Somalia.

US took some time to formulate its policy on Eritrean question. Eritrea was colonized by Italy in 1880 after then in 1941 by British administered it as a separate colony; and when World War II negotiations began, the US first supported the idea of Italy taking it over as a trust territory as Italy also took over (Italian) Somaliland. The US reasons for this approach was rooted in immediate electoral manipulation required for Truman to win the Italian American vote in 1948 presidential election.²

This move also helped USA in fostering pro-American sentiments in the general elections being held in Italy that year. By 1950, when Haile Selassie agreed to send his forces to fight with USA in Korea, Washington backed the federation

1. Fred Halliday, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa", Review of African Political Economy, 92. cit., 1971, p. 9.

2. Ibid., p. 12.

of Eritrea with Ethiopia and the resolution to that effect could pass through the UN General Assembly. From then onwards USA endorsed the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and refused support to any demand for Eritrean Separation. The US did not protest at calling for a settlement of the dispute through Ethiopian government. Since then the USA has refrained from a front-line involvement in Eritrea. It has left the main work of counter insurgency to the Israelis. But even this was less than the truth since 1964, after the Eritrean guerrillas had been active for three years, 55 members of a counter-insurgency team were sent to Ethiopia in 1966, 164 counter insurgency advisers were brought for two to three years training under a scheme known as 'Plan Delta'.¹ The US official policy towards Eritrean region of Ethiopia stood firm but unofficial under-land help to Eritrean rebel's for separate entity continued.

During the 1960s Washington made some attempt to encourage the Addis Ababa regime to introduce political and economic reforms in Ethiopia.²

The philosophy behind these reforms was to forestall revolution in undemocratic countries in Latin America and Middle East monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.

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1. Fred Halliday, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa", Review of African Political Economy, op. cit., 1971, p. 12.
 2. David Newsom (Assistant Secretary for African Affairs), 'US Security Commitments' p. 1909 and Fred Halliday, 'US policy in the Horn of Africa', Review of African political economy, op. cit., p.12.

Kennedy and Johnson administration prompted administrative shake ups and some sort of land reforms in order to stabilise regimes that would otherwise have been swept away by popular opposition. Under the pressure of events in Cuba and Vietnam, it was believed that preemptive reforms were the only way to prevent revolutions. In this light, no country was more obviously in need of such reforms than Ethiopia and between 1963 and 1967 the US embassy in Addis Ababa suggested reforms under the scheme of stability - with progress. These included land reform, legal modernisation, decentralisation with greater rights to Eritrea, and a greater role for the Ethiopian parliament. But the Ethiopian rulers were so conservative that even these reforms were not implemented.

The story of how and why ordinary reforms in feudal structure were not carried through in Ethiopia in the 1960s, would require an analysis of the Ethiopian state itself. But, in the light of what happened later, it is of utmost importance that the USA which was in a position to influence events to a considerable extent, succeeded so little, and failed to get through the very elementary reforms which were essential in the long-term interests of the ruling circles and Ethiopia US cooperation.

Washington tried to use the Horn for lobbying in the OAU, so that the African politics could be controlled. Ethiopia was thought to be a successful tool for this lobby.

During the period 1950 to 1964, America tried to project the importance of military groupings like NATO, SEATO and CENTO. The polarization of forces emerged on the scene during this period. America successfully held the Horn despite the newly emerged situation. We can, therefore, say that the era of 1950 to 1964 was the era of formation and consolidation of US policy which is reflected in the various American actions in the Horn.

(B) From Continuation to Process of Change in US Policy
(1965-1973)

During 1965-1973 the USA had accelerated the process of expansion of military bases but major direction of its policy did not change in this region. America remained consistent in its policy but the trends of international politics of this era influenced the process of change in the US policy. The international situation was affected by the following events:

- (i) Growing movement of Non-aligned movement;**
- (ii) Beginning of Detente;**
- (iii) Growing role of OAU and other regional organisations;**
- (iv) Conflict in the Middle East;**
- (v) Expansion of military base and escalation armrace.**
- (vi) Soviet-Somali cultural treaty and start of US reaction to it.**

The first conference of nonaligned countries was held in Belgrade in 1961, this caused the emergence of a third current of politics on the international horizon, which formulated the objectives of anti-imperialism, anti-racism, anti-colonialism and supporting the national liberation movements of the world. Consequently it proved difficult for the US to carry on the cold war policies. It was very difficult for US to antagonise entire nonaligned movement.

Moreover various developments of marked significance took place among the third world countries in general and Africa in particular. To consolidate the national liberation movement and to enhance mutual economic cooperation among African states, various regional organisations merged into the OAU. This proved a great challenge to the political monopoly of the great powers. The emergence of these organisations lessened the pressure of international forces. Therefore, these powers adopted new methods of neo-colonial domination over African economics and politics. Promoting territorial disputes these powers started to destabilise the continental politics. For this purpose they promoted the Middle East conflict. When they succeeded in this plan they started rapid supply of arms and ultimately established their military bases. Moving towards the strategic points of this region like Indian Ocean (Dodge Garcia) Kenya, Ethiopia, North Yemen, Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc. They aimed at the countries of the Horn as their major target due to obvious geo-political importance.

US played as an axis of great powers. The early 1970s in general, are characterised by the shift of US foreign policy from the cold war to that of detente in its relations with the Socialist countries and a relative restraint from direct intervention in its relations with the underdeveloped countries. Detente was not born out of Kennedy's or Nixon's altruism or their "concern" for humanity. As the developments in world

politics outlined above clearly indicate, detente was essentially a phenomenon whose emergence was inseparably linked with the growing crisis of US capitalism. The dislocation in the US economy apparently forced many ruling circles to hold back on their expansionist endeavours, tone down their exaggerated claim of the country's potentials, slash down the enormous resources they forked out in their drive to suppress the liberation struggles the world over and focus on the solution of internal problems. "Businessmen were showing great caution and concern about the future."¹

Gordon Sherman, President S of Midas-International was even more explicit: "We dare no longer deflect our means and deplete ourselves in profitless ventures based on imaginary dangers when all that we hold dear is at stake."² The most eloquent admission came from Lois B. Lundberg, former chairman of the Board of the Bank of America, the biggest bank in the United States: "I would like to be able to say to potential aggressors all over the world; if you want to profit, if you want to own the world, don't dissipate your energies in wasteful warfare - follow the example of Japan and Germany since World War II and be economically aggressive."³

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1. Congressional record, Washington, June 3, 1970, p.8208.
 2. "Impact of the War in South-east Asia on US economy", Hearing Before the committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 91st Congress, Washington 1970, p. 86.
 3. Ibid., p. 86.

All these changes in US policy took place as the change in tactics but not as changes in interests and objectives. Nixon doctrine initiated his change of tactics from cold war to detente.

During this period the three basic issues come to limelight on which USA had to formulate its policies in the Horn.

- (i) The ongoing struggle in Eritrea;
- (ii) Change in government in Somalia;
- (iii) Revolution in Ethiopia and shaping of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ogaden region.

It is necessary to deal with the various important problems of the Horn, so that Horn's politics and US policy can be seen in the interconnected perspective. It is very clear that the territorial conflict in Horn is because of the colonial legacies, e.g., Eritrea's separate apparent identity due to Italian colonization and false Somali claim over Ogaden.

Various historians and politicians have held different views on these questions. Those who give the logic of historical roots of separate territorial identity of Eritrean region of Ethiopia and Ogaden, are trying to look at history from a narrow angle of last hundred years. Their interests lie in pursuing the imperialistic policy of divide and disintegrate Ethiopia. Over looking the ancient history of Ethiopia these historians start their account since last.

decades of the 19th century when the colonialism spread throughout the world and divided the world into the areas of influence. These people deliberately ignore the objectivity of integrated ancient Ethiopia where Somalia and Djibouti were an integral part of the area called Ethiopia and governed through different tribal chiefs living in different regions. Gradually according to resources of livelihood, people of Ethiopia settled in different regions and established their own identity. Later on the colonialists separated them and colonized them as separate entities.

The conflict in the Horn, dramatically symbolises the problems of post-colonialism faced by the third world countries and particularly by the African continent. The roots of conflict go back both to the colonial experience which this part of Africa underwent in the last half of the present century. The integrity of the Horn was balkanised by the European powers on the basis of their eco-political and strategic interests.

Problems of Eritrea and USA in 1965 to 1973:

As stated earlier USA had set up the Kagnew base in the Asmara, the Eritrean region of Ethiopia. The Eritrean, who had lived separately for 50 years under colonial rule of Italy preferred to continue to remain separate from Ethiopia. When this was refused they launched a struggle for separation from Ethiopia. USA opposed this separatist movement. Because it valued its friendship with Ethiopia more than with Eritrean rebels.

By the early 1970s, Italian and Israeli capital, US military and intelligence services and corrupt local top officials, were given virtually complete control over Eritrea, where the Pentagon had one of its largest overseas radio centres and a naval base controlled by it in Massawa, leading industries and big plantations and branches belonged to Italian and Israeli companies. All the top administration and military posts were occupied by people closely connected with the feudal-bureaucratic elite and Imperial House. The poorer sections of the Eritrea were exploited and ill-treated. This situation helped in creating conditions for stimulating the rapid growth of separatist sentiments and organisations. In 1961, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was organised on the basis of various subversive and terrorist activities. In 1971, the Peoples Liberation Forces (ELF - PLF) left the ELF to form a separate group. Later the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front was formed which was yet another separatist organisation. ELF remains then began to call themselves the revolutionary groups - (ELF - RC).

The Eritreans rebels were suppressed and no efforts were made to integrate Eritreans into the social and economic life of Ethiopia, USA, did not support the rebels. It supplied arms to Ethiopian monarchy to crush the Eritrean rebels. The rebels received help from anti-Ethiopian regimes and they continued

their guerilla warfare attacking Ethiopian armed forces and administrative units.

Problem concerning Djibouti and U.S. attitudes

Behind apparent peace Djibouti is full of crises and conflicts. It is one of the territories claimed by Somalia for forming greater Somalia. Djibouti provides Ethiopia with its only rail link to the Sea. And if Ethiopia loses Massawa and Assab to the Eritreans (or even if the corridors to these ports were seriously threatened) Djibouti would suffer economically. The 490 miles rail line, built by the French under concession from Menelik at the turn of the century, carries 60 per cent Ethiopian's export-import traffic. Thirdly,

Djibouti is the only point between Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean where there is still an open western military presence. The territory's strategic importance increases concern of European interests in the Red Sea. The Americans to keep their commitments in the middle east regard control over Red Sea as necessary. Fourth, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel do not tolerate the presence of Soviet influence in Red Sea area. If Aden and Djibouti were to be controlled by Marxist regimes, then socialist regimes will control the traffic through the Red Sea eastward to the Persian Gulf, south-west into Indian Ocean and westward through Suez canal. In this situation Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel will be in a difficult situation. The interests of American could be only beneficially served through having friendship with these

countries otherwise the danger could emerge for the US interests in the region. US is also aware of the growing economic and strategic importance of Indian Ocean.

Somalian government, again and again claimed the part of Djibouti. During the later period of 1965-73 Somalia remained under the influence of Soviet Union. It was one of the main opponents of US policy in the Horn. Somalia reiterated its earlier position of Greater Somalia and tried many times to attack Djibouti. French vehemently opposed the actions of Somalia. Time and again attacks by Somalia proved harmful for the French interests in the Horn. In this situation, United States backed French to prevent Somali domination by doing everything possible to establish independent Djibouti Government with as much international recognition as possible. United States to show its presence opened a consulate (with the approval of French Government)¹ in Djibouti. It may be mentioned that Soviet Union did not support the Somali claim over Djibouti.

The United States for its part seemed to be acting as a kind of diplomatic buttress to French and Saudi policy.

Washington was not directly involved, but was tempted to pick up the colonial reins where France was in danger of dropping them as had happened before in Indochina. In an intercontinental politics a place as complex and unstable

1. David Ottaway, 'The Claim before the Vote' International Herald Tribune, Paris, 7 May, 1975.

as Djibouti was unlikely to escape the general pattern; no one has named it yet somewhere in the Pentagon the Djibouti dossier is moving to the top of the file.¹ Any day Djibouti can become a trouble spot.

Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict and USA

In 1960, when British and Italian, Somali lands were granted independence, the two joined together to form one country. According to the Somali leadership, they had to free the French occupied Djibouti, Kenyan region of North Frontier District and Ethiopian region of Ogaden. The claim of Somalia was rejected by all the three Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti (French). Kenya and Ethiopia argued that in their lust for African land, the European powers arbitrarily divided the continent separating people of one tribe by state boundaries drawn in Europe. They argued that if they sat down to revise national boundaries according to ethnic groupings, they would have to break every country of Africa. They asked if the OAU countries were prepared for it.²

The Somali rejected the arguments. They incorporated their Greater Somalia aspiration into their constitution and pledged to work for "the Union of Somali territories". Similar sentiments were incorporated again when the constitution was

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1. Fred Hallyday, "Djibouti, Africa's new trouble spot that could bring in the US and Russia" Times, London, 20 Jan, 1976.
 2. Vijay Gupta, "The Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict and the Role of External Powers" Foreign Affairs Report, Vol.2, XXVII, No. 3 March 1978, (p. 40-41).

reshaped in 1970. This was the background of Ethiopia-Somalia conflict.

Somalia-Soviet Treaty:

During this period, socialist influence increased in almost all the countries of the Horn. Particularly in the period of 1973-74 Somalia was under the influence of Soviet Union, and its economy was developing on Socialist orientation which posed a vital threat to America's interests. In Eritrea the Guerrillas were indirectly supported by the Soviet Union against the Haile Selassie's regime. In Djibouti there was some French Communist influence on the struggle of independence and in Ethiopia leftist were launching the movement against Haile Selassie. And this growing influence of Communism in the Horn worried USA. Those political trends worried not only USA, but also the west and Islamic countries.

Besides criticizing Somali-Soviet cultural pact USA tried to work out a programme to change the trend of Horn's politics.

The USA was not prepared to loose one side of the Red Sea to the enemy camp. The second question was if the socialist regime in Somalia succeeded, it would mean the overthrowing of feudo-burgeois system of other Arab countries also. This posed a particular danger to Shah regime in Iran and other conservative regimes in the Gulf. Shah's regime remained one of the most vocal mouth pieces of US policy in the Gulf. USA

viewed the influences of communism in these areas, as a matter of great loss to itself and Western countries. Therefore, the US administration sought the help of its ally Saudi Arabia to achieve its aims. US sent messages to Somalia promising them economic and military help. USA supported Islamic world and on this basis. It wooed the Islamic supporters of Somalia. In the meanwhile Somalia had completely identified itself with Arab's heritage. Association with the Arabs and later on membership of the Arab league helped Somalia to come closer to the reactionary Arab governments. USA paved its path to penetrate in Somalia through Arab regimes. Once Somalia was agreeable USA started directly negotiating with Somalia, but this happened only after the overthrow of monarchy in Ethiopia.

We find that during the period of 1965-1973 the US continued to keep its friendship with Ethiopia while trying to win over Somalia.

(C) From Dilemma to Fixness in US Policy (1974-82):

During 1974-82, a new chapter opened in the political life of the Horn. Social and economic crisis in the Horn were consistently increasing and had reached a stage where political changes became imperative. The changes in Ethiopia had already begun in 1974 and eventually Ethiopia adopted socialism. In Somalia also, where economic changes had not fully taken place on socialist lines, the economy was in crisis. To resolve the problem of economic crisis, Somalia adopted narrow nationalist measures and reiterated its demand for Greater Somalia. Through this slogan it expected the support of Somali people at home and anti-Ethiopian regimes outside. Siad Barre moved to receiving funds for his campaign against Ethiopia from USA and Saudi Arabia. In the meanwhile, the national liberation movement was getting stronger in Djibouti. The French colonialism in the Horn was coming to an end. These changes increased the concern of the Western powers and they changed their policy exploiting the changed situation. America directed its efforts to completely disorientate Somalia from socialism and use it as a surrogate state.

Ethiopian Dergue and USA:

Ethiopian changes included dethroning of Haile Selassie, an old ally of USA. The Ethiopian soldiers took over power and told Haile Selassie that he was no longer emperor of

Ethiopia. After a period of uncertainty a military government took control as the Provisional Military Administrative Committee, better known as PMAC or the Dergue. This body was the creation of a democratic movement which had begun within the armed and police ^{/forces} and students. The leftists in the Dergue, initially were locked in a power struggle with the rightist forces. This resulted in a series of purges and eventually the left emerged as the victor. Under Mengistu Haile Mariam the Dergue moved increasingly to a Marxist orientation. This direction is clear from the following issues which were included in Dergue's perspective of Socio-economic changes.

Land Reform, freeing of political prisoners, held by Selassai regime, free education, and prosecution of those ministers involved in corruption.¹

The most important was the land reform.² The land reform was very important for the Ethiopian life where peasant had to part with up to 75 per cent of their products in lieu of the use of land. The reforms knocked out the hold of feudal-bourgeois system, a system which was the biggest supporter of

1. K. Essack, Economic Times, New Delhi, 16 August 1974.

2. Before revolution land ownership was in the hands of a few. 15 per cent was owned by the Royal family, 20 per cent was owned by the Church, 20 per cent was owned by the aristocracy and 25 per cent was owned by the government. Loc. cit.

western powers and had permitted the western countries to invest in Ethiopia making high rates of profits.

Though America supported Haile Selassie, but after his collapse immediately, it turned to Dergue. Initially Dergue's composition was such that it had some American supporters also in it. But it was very difficult for America to change the main perspectives of the Dergue. The entire land and foreign companies were nationalised. Americans were in dilemma. They did not want to oppose the Dergue as long as there was some hope. The dilemma was soon resolved when Dergue started taking more socialist position and thus clashing with the economic policies preferred by America. Despite the fact that Ethiopia asked for economic assistance with the intention of continuing economic relations, America charted its course differently. This was the beginning of slow poisoning of the US-Ethiopia relations and poisoning of the atmosphere of the Horn, therefore, thereafter we see the increasing destabilisation of the polity of the Horn at the US instance.

It was, however, not easy for USA to make a somersault in its policy in the Horn. Because, Horn, as earlier stated was deeply connected with the events and happenings in the neighbouring Red Sea, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. America could not support the rebels in Eritrea. Because the change in the Eritrean position was not favourable to American interests.

The USA saw that the free Eritrea could become independent and aligned with the Arab world, and that this would give the

Arab states control over both shores of the Bab-el-Mandeb, the narrow mouth of the Red Sea through which Israeli-bound tankers and other ships pass and Arabs could unilaterally stop Israeli shipping. Secondly, if Eritrea broke away and if the USA was seen to be permitting this, it would have a negative impact through out Africa where the permanence of existing borders was a matter of cardinal diplomatic and political importance. Thirdly USA did not want to change its policy towards Somalia and Ethiopia without any valid reasons. The US Public pronouncements were that since Somalia was under Soviet influence, and was armed by Soviet Union, the US would continued backing Ethiopia as a counter to Somalia. This was also a guarantee of US credibility in the world as a whole, that is why US military aid to the Ethiopian Government continued throughout 1974 and 1975.

In fiscal year 1974 the Dergue received from USA \$ 11 millions in military assistance, half of all such aid for the whole of Africa, and a further \$ 11 millions in purchase credits. In fiscal year 1975 the figures were \$ 11.5 millions and eight F.5A fighter bombers and as late as summer 1976 Washington committed itself to \$ 6 millions in military equipment aid for 1977. The US Government also authorised, in addition to this aid, the sales of US military equipment.

In November 1974 Ethiopia's new regime launched a massive offensive against Eritreans. As the offensive

failed eliminating Eritreans rebels, the Dergue made a request for arms worth \$ 39 millions to the USA. Anxious neither to antagonise the Arab States, nor to see Dergue collapse USA agreed to sell \$ 7 million worth of arms in early 1975. Sales continued at a greatly increased level through 1975. Sales continued at a greatly increased level through 1975 and 1976. Training also continued in 1976-77, one hundred ninety Ethiopians were trained in the USA. This policy, therefore, continued the level sustained prior to 1974. It was designed to keep the Dergue friendly with the USA, and responsive to US policy.

Only a disjointed picture is available of the policy which the US tried to adopt after Haile Selassie was overthrown in 1974. In Public Washington continued to make cautious remarks about the Dergue, while, distancing itself from what it considered to be the unacceptable of the Dergue policy.

According to Fred Halliday in his article "US policy in the Horn of Africa", the US embassy had friendly relations with Brigadier Andom, the head of the State in Ethiopia in the period up to November 1974.

When Brigadier Andom and dozens of other leading officers were killed on 23 November 1974, US aid was suspended for a while. But in February 1975, military aid was reauthorized

after a renewed Ethiopian request. In late February 1975 a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group chaired by Secretary of State Kissinger agreed to provide more aid and on 17 March 1975 it was announced that at least \$ 7 millions in small arms would be supplied. At the same time, Ethiopia turned to other suppliers for extra weapons getting some P5 AS from Iran and further material from private arms dealers.¹

In January 1976, after months of deliberation under the impact of events in Angola, and with a confrontation looming with Somalia after France had announced that Djibouti would become independent, the Pentagon asked Congress for \$ 22 millions in military aid and declared that it would intensify its programme of modernising Ethiopian army. Later in the summer of 1976 the US embassy seems to have exerted strong pressure on the Dergue not to go ahead with the planned peasant march in Eritrea to end Eritrean rebellion and US officials claimed that they had a role in getting the Dergue to stop the march.

However, until the end of Administration of the Republican Party in January 1977, Washington officials were prepared to defend their policy of support to the Dergue by evoking the strategic reasons, by stressing the politically inchoate form of the Dergue's policies. The secretary of State

¹. Fred Halliday, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa", Review of African Political Economy, op. cit., p. 16.

Kissinger's policy seems to have been that as long as the Dergue retained some pro-western orientation it was imperative to back it in the face of the Soviet diplomatic and military relations both in Southern Africa and Angola.

There were however, people inside USA who raised their voice against this policy. The paradox was that it was the rightist element inside US State who favoured continued support for the Dergue, for the anti Soviet strategic reasons, while it was liberals who tended to oppose aid to the Dergue, either on the grounds that the Soviet threat was exaggerated, or could not be continued in this way, or on the grounds that the Dergue, by supressing the Eritreans, and by its summary executions of opponents, was not to be supported on humanitarian grounds.¹

The situation in which the USA found itself in late 1976 was therefore still a fluid one, in which rivalry with Soviet Union and a degree of optimism about the eventual character of the Dergue combined to justify some continuation of the USA's traditional policy in Ethiopia. While, there was criticism inside USA, this was probably not a major factor in alerting policy; few congressmen or state officials felt close to Dergue, yet there was no strong movement against the Dergue as had been, for example against aid to Turkey

1. Fred Halliday, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa" Review of African Political Economy op.cit., p. 17.

after the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, when Greek-Americans had played an active role. The problems while the USA did face were of another kind. First they were not in any systematic way able to influence the Dergue's policies: The Dergue has been at best a loose executive body and with the death of Andome the Americans lost an influential supporter. In any elementary tabulation of US interests both economic and strategic interests were at the base, it was obvious that the US had far more reason to align with the Arab states now increasingly opposed to Ethiopia than with a beleaguered Dergue. Within a few months of 1977, a major shift had taken place in the US policy and the long-standing link with Ethiopia had, apparently been broken.¹

The course of events were as follows: In February 1977 the new Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told a Senate Committee that as a result of 'human rights' violations by the government concerned, US military aid to Ethiopia, would be reduced as from the fiscal year beginning on 1 October 1977. There was no immediate Ethiopian reaction but on 23 April 1977 the Dergue ordered all US-run installations in the country to close with the exception of the US embassy and KID office. Within four days the remaining MAAG officers, as well as the last remains of the Kagnew garrison had to go.

1. Fred Halliday, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa" Review of African Political Economy, op. cit., p. 18.

Explaining the issue the Radio Addis Ababa criticised President Carter's decision on arms pointing out that no military aid had been withdrawn when human rights were violated under Haile Selassie. Then on 27 April, the Pentagon announced that all US arms supplies to Ethiopia had been suspended. None of the FSE fighter-bombers, M-60 tanks and ammunition approved under an early \$ 65 million request had been in fact delivered. A further request for more ammunition made in the preceding two months had also been turned down. The break was now complete except for the rupture in diplomatic relations. Within two months the USA had gone on to announce that it was prepared, by contrast, to sell arms to Ethiopia's rivals, Sudan and Somalia, and the new US policy of cooperating with Saudi Arabia to wean Somalia from the socialist influence was underway.¹

In so far as it is possible to separate out the many strands involved here, it would seem that four different developments in early 1977 combined to produce this change.

(1) In the first place, in January 1977, the Arab states took up a much more active and aggressive stand towards the Dergue. On January 30, Sudanese President Numeiry declared that Sudan supported the Eritrean movement in terms more explicit and committed than he had ever adopted before.

1. Fred Halliday, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa" Review of African Political Economy, 92, 93, p. 18.

In May there were reports of clashes along the Sudan-Ethiopia border. While Sudan had given considerable support to the Eritreans off and on since 1961, Numeiry had agreed to suspend aid in 1972, and before this break with the Dergue in early 1977 he had been engaged in negotiation with Ethiopian Authorities.

His new policy, coincided with the change in US policy and with the renewed Eritrean offensive on the ground which had the backing of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with whom Numeiry had signed a defence pact in July 1976. The policy of these Arab states towards the Horn is linked to other issues of Middle East policy.

(ii) The second development was the advent to office of Carter Administration. Although Nixon, Ford and Kissinger had had doubts about Haile Selassie and the Dergue, they had continued to provide some aid to the Ethiopian state and had regarded the Emperor and the Dergue as counters to the Soviet presence in Somalia. The Republican Administration had not also been too concerned about the issues subsequently subsumed under the terms 'human rights'. Carter's policy marked a break with the previous tendencies. On the one hand, he was much less mesmerised by the Soviet-Somali connection; he hoped to win over Somalia, with Arab support, and he did not continue the Republican policy of aiding regimes just because they were in some way anti-communist.

His inauguration at the end of January also marked the stand on Washington's human rights campaigns and it was in terms of this issue that the initial break with Ethiopia was phrased within a month of Carter's coming into office.

(iii) The third development which occurred a week after the two already mentioned, was the latest in a series of disputes within the Dergue. On 3 February 1977, the controlling influence within the Dergue fell into the hands of Marxist Vice-President Mengistu Haile Mariam and the group around Tafari Banti, the President of Ethiopia which had, it appears, a less hostile attitude to the west was liquidated. The consolidation of power by Marxists in the Dergue opened the way to closer ties with the Soviet Union. For the above two reasons and even in the absence of the changes in Arab policy and in the US administration, it would have been more difficult for the previous relationship to have been maintained.

(iv) The most important change was the swift in Somalia's position. Somalia had for some time been under pressure from Saudi Arabia to break with the Soviets; and the regime in Mogadishu, whose attachment to the Soviet Union had always been ^{of} a rather pragmatic kind was known to be willing to change. Since 1974 Somalia had been

accepted as a member of Arab League, as part of the re-approachment with the Saudis and during his visit to President Ford in October 1974 Said Barre had actually offered the USA naval base facilities at Kismayu in the South of Somalia to balance the Soviet facilities at Berbera in the North. Around the same time the Saudis proposed to the Americans to oust the 'Russians' from the Horn, by offering large sums of aid to the impoverished Somalis. But "both these offers were rejected by Washington on the grounds that such success in Somalia would have weakened their case for the new US base in Diego Garcia".¹

Changes occurred in Ethiopia:

The entire economic interests of USA after the establishment of socialist government were cut off from Ethiopia because of the nationalisation of all American firms and multinationals. No country in the Horn till 1977, remained the strong supporter of USA. Therefore, USA tried to manage a favourable condition for the eco-political an strategic balance in this region. So it proceeded with the policy of destabilisation in Ethiopia by helping the dis-possessed Ethiopians to organize sabotage. After 1977 there was a major shift in American policy. The USA decided that it must make allies in this region to counter Soviet influence.

1. Loc. cit.

During this period, the climate was more favourable for USA. Somalia made moves to strengthen its ties with the west and later in March 1977 the door was open for a Western initiative. In May the west offered to provide arms to Somalia and later, in November the Somalis abrogated their treaty with the Soviet Union and expelled all the Soviet advisers. The Carter policy of enticement of Siad Barre's regime appeared to have been successful.

By the middle of 1977, the system of international alliances prevailing in the previous three decades had therefore crumbled. The course of US ties to the region in the following few months was only partly discernible, but it was closer to counter revolutionary position. The main component of Carter's Horn policy was anti-Sovietism. It was contained in a General foreign policy statement issued on 11 June 1977 President Carter stated "My own inclination, though, is to aggressively challenge, in peaceful way of course, the Soviet Union and others for influence in areas of the world that we feel are critical to us and or potentially crucial fifteen to twenty years from now".¹

As the speech indicates, Carter's policy towards the Soviet Union was in some respects a more aggressive one,

1. Review of African Political Economy, 1977, Sept.-Dec. 1977, p. 20.

or at least a more adventurous one than that of his Republican predecessors and the campaign to win over Somalia logically followed from this. Whereas previous US statements had in a critical way emphasised the Soviet role in Somalia, and specially the Soviet facilities at Berbera, Carter had made no secret of his desire, to wear the Mogadishu regime. In an article published by Time Magazine on a day in the life of Jimmy Carter, the president is quoted as calling up Vice President Mondale telling him to get in touch with secretary of State Vance and National security Adviser Brzezinski. He is quoted as saying: "I want you to tell CY (Vance) and Zbig that I want them to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our friend".¹

The US administration sought help of Saudi Arabia to achieve its aims. Somalia was to be won for five reasons (i) to free Red Sea zone from forces not friendly to US (ii) Somalia was becoming more important for US from the point of view base in Diego Garcia and South Africa. (iii) To cease Soviet influence from Somalia (iv) To reduce the socialist content in Somali economy (v) To divide and weaken, Ethiopia, so that the Marxist regime, could be replaced through the crisis.

Contacts were made with Somali diplomats in Washington and a US economic team was sent to Mogadishu to draw up an

1. Sunday Times, London, 17 April 1977.

aid programme. This was a remarkable development prepared in principle to grant limited military assistance to Somalia, 'to help' it defend its present territory.¹

American policy followed the policy of wait and see in this period. It did not move in a hurry. It threw a net on Somalia but kept an option open for Ethiopia. It kept a condition with Somalia that the help to Somalia will be on the condition that arms for Somalia will be only for the defence of its own territory. And that it had not to enter in the others' territories. This condition was for two purposes (a) a option to have relation with Ethiopia again and (b) to discourage Somalia from claiming some parts of Kenya and Djibouti. America did not take the risk of enmity with those countries.

(D) Somalia, Ogaden-Ethiopia and USA:

The USA switched its policy in the mid-stream, initially encouraging the Somalis to invade Ogaden as a counter-revolutionary measure. President Carter discussed the matter with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Saudi Arabian Crown prince Fahd and some European leaders. He called the Somali Ambassador Abdallah Ahmed Anden to Washington

1. Collin Legum and Bill Lee 'Conflict in the Horn of Africa' op. cit., p. 8.

and promised massive aid. Carter sent US economic aid team to draw up and economic programme for Somalia, to be incorporated in the US budget. From Carter's meeting with European leaders, emerged a conspiracy to provide military equipment to Somalia. France and Britain agreed in principle to supply the essential equipment.¹ America agreed to supply \$ 20 million in credits for the purchase of military equipment \$ 5 million in budgetary support.

Somali officials said that the US had not entered into any formal security commitment, one of the requirements originally put forward by the Somalis. In fact the Somalis seem to have scaled down their demands very considerably. Initially they were seeking up to \$ 2000 million in various forms of aid.²

The Somali Ambassador in Washington saw President Carter twice in May-June and reported favourably to his government and the USA sent a special envoy Dr Kevin Cahill³ who had experience of the Horn to Mogadishu to talk to Siad Barre.

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1. International Herald Tribune, Paris, July 27, 1977.
 2. Africa Research Bulletin, London, August 31, 1980.
 3. Cahill has described the Paul as "an experienced professional in the world of politics and diplomacy."

Cahill described by one acquaintance as 'a man who does not get messages wrong' gave Siad Barre two messages:

- (a) The USA would not resupply Ethiopia in the event of Somalia invasion of Ogaden;
- (b) The USA would not look askance at the Somali request for arms, and was not totally opposed to such a venture in Ogaden. The official US offer to consider arms sales to Somalia plus President Carter's speech of 11 June combined with these private meetings convinced Siad Barre that the West would support the Ogaden attack.¹

In any case, direct Western support to Somalia was not available. Despite the offer to sell arms to Somalia, no direct official arms sales were made. The reaction throughout Africa to the evidently aggressive Somali move was such that the USA was forced to proclaim that it opposed acquisition of territory by force. But Western arms supplies were sent to Somalia through other channels. The West Germans provided transport to Somalia to carry arms into the country. Saudi Arabia and Iran also provided equipment, some of that provided by the latter was probably of Soviet origin which had been purchased by Iran. Egypt also gave 30 million worth of Soviet equipments; and at least \$ 7 million worth of weapons are known to have been flown in a covert operation by the CIA towards the end of 1977.²

1. Review of African Political Economy, London, 1977, p.21.
 2. On the CIA Arms delivery, See '7 Days' Weekly, New York, 19 March 1978.

But no explicit support for the invasion of Ogaden was given; the major western or Iranian commitment to step up aid was premised in case of an Ethiopian occupation of Somali territory and not in the event of the Ethiopians stopped at the border.

A cautious policy was pursued in other respects too by Washington. If it had wanted to, it could have greatly increased its aid to other forces fighting the Dergue - the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), and the Eritreans - but although covert links no doubt exist between EDU and the US Government the USA had not aided them in the way, it had aided, for example, the UNITA forces in Angola. The USA had also, till then avoided any assistance to Eritrean rebels although Washington tempted to give some, not because it backed independence but as a spoiling operation against the Soviet and Cubans.

After USA had stopped military supplies, Ethiopia was in a difficult situation in regard to arms supplies. Ethiopia had to mobilise its army in Eritrea as well as on Sudan border. Thus it was left with a limited force to fight the Somalis.

Taking advantage of the situation, Somalia attacked Ethiopia's Ogaden region in late 77 and made deep advances

into Ethiopia. Somalia captured Ogaden within weeks. Although Americans were covertly helping Somalia in attack on Ethiopia, the Americans did not come out openly in support of Somalia, mainly due to two reasons. One any such support could lead towards wars in many parts of Africa. Two in an appeal from Ethiopia the OAU took the stand that both Somalia and Ethiopia should adhere to the OAU principles of non-violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other.

In the meantime, Shah of Iran jumped into the arena and warned that "his country would not remain ideal if Ethiopia violated Somalia's borders".¹ OAU reacted sharply and warned Iran against seeking to extend its sphere of influence in Africa. OAU statement said Iran's continued association with South Africa which received 90 per cent of its oil supplies from Tehran, did not qualify it to play any role in the African continent.²

On January 22, 1978 the conflict situation took a dramatic turn. The Ethiopian forces launched their long-awaited counter offensive to recapture the Ogaden region.³ The Somali had to run back while the Ethiopians, with Cuban piloted and directed Soviet military hard were, made

1. The Nairobi Times, Nairobi, 22 January 22, 1978.

2. Loc. Cit.

3. The Weekly Review, Nairobi, February 1978.

significant and rapid gains. Within a few days the Somali forces were driven out of the strategic Harar mountains and Jigga. Ethiopians made circling strikes against Somali groupings and on petrol and ammunition dumps, and captured American arms (122 m.m., 37 m.m.) anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank mines and ammunition crates with Pakistan, Iran and Egypt markings.¹

By March 10 the whole of Ogaden was recaptured by Ethiopian troops. Somalians feared that Ethiopia may cross the border and capture Somalia. Washington took initiative in the closing stages of the Ogaden War. It negotiated with Soviets on the term of a Somali retreat, the latter being agreed to in return for Ethiopian commitments not to cross the frontier. The Ethiopians had enough reason to stop at the border, and the Somalis to pull out, without having to be coerced into doing so by either of the two major powers. In general terms, however, the US response was one directed outside the Horn itself, since the massive influx of Soviet and Cuban forces placed the Horn conflict more thoroughly than ever before into context of global relations and detente.

In this perspective, two antagonistic approaches emerged within the US administration. One advocated by President Carter's national security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski,

1. Ethiopian Herald; February 14/15, 1978.

that position of Ethiopia be viewed in relation with other spheres, particularly in the fields of detente and negotiations on strategic arms limitations. The other, advocated by the US representative in the U.N. Andrew Young, who held that the Soviet presence in Ethiopia was a temporary one and was in certain respects, beneficial. Young expected that eventually nationalistic Ethiopians would grow resentful of Soviets and show them the door as Egyptians, Somalians, Nigerians had already done.

The beleaguered Brzezinski line on the above proposed linkage could not prevail in Washington. No overt relation through 'linkage' occurred and the USA decided to pursue a gentler approach. The gamble on Somali aggression failed and Washington was then hoping to insulate the Ethiopian Revolution and to protect Somalia, keeping whatever doors it could open within Ethiopia itself. It could in this way, play both sides of the game making propaganda out of its attacks on the Soviet Union and Cuba, while allowing the States to pay the price of helping Ethiopian rebels to destabilise the internal situation.

On March 15, 1978 President Carter announced that US arms supply to Somalia was contingent upon the renunciation of Somali claims to territorial integrity of other nations.

But the US President intentionally missed Djibouti thus his statement implicitly recognised the Somali claim on Djibouti.¹

The USA has never publicly abandoned its historical position of support for the territorial integrity of Ethiopia; President Carter's sympathetic remark about Eritrea in his June 1977 speech does not seem to have gone further. Relations with Dergue itself remained at a low level: two Congress men, Representatives Don Bonker and Paul Tsongas, met chairman Mengistu while on a visit to Addis Ababa in November 1977, and in late February 1978 the USA announced it was supplying a few jeeps and spare parts to Ethiopia, part of \$0 millions ordered the previous May. But the main emphasis of US policy in the Horn was denunciation of the Soviet and Cuban role and this left little room for an improvement in relations with the Dergue.

From 1978 US policy turned to the rapid deployment of arms and the establishment of military bases in the Indian Ocean mainly in the Gulf and around the Horn. The strategic area of Indian Ocean (Gulf, Arab Peninsula, Diego Garcia and Berbera) remained the main target for the establishment of military base. Though US claimed to defend the world

1. Vijay Gupta, 'US design fails in the Horn of Africa' Main Stream, April 15, 1978.

peace, with the arguments that Soviet Union is threatening the peace but it was an excuse to intervene in the Indian Ocean and African continent. Although President Carter announced a policy of restraint in arms transfer 'because of threat to world peace... and the special responsibility we bear as the largest arms seller'.¹ His administration drew up plans to spend some \$ 20 billion on the force by 1985. A somewhat improvised presence in the Gulf was hammered out; its main features were:

1. The US fleet in the Indian Ocean, consisting of two aircraft carrier battle groups.
2. Seven merchant ships with enough equipment, fuel and water to support a massive amphibious brigade of some 12,000 men and to sustain 12 American airforce fighter squadrons. The equipment includes more than 50 tanks, 95 armoured amphibious vehicles and nearly 600 trucks.
3. The negotiated facilities or bases for the fleet and future US forces in the Gulf. Agreements have already been signed for American use of the ports of Mombasa (Kenya) the ports and airstrips at Ras Banas (Egypt) Berbera and

1. Arthur Gavshan, Crisis in Africa. 'Arms Race' Penguin, 1982, p. 80.

Mogadishu in Somalia, and at Seeb and Muscat in Oman. The main US base in the Indian Ocean is Diego Garcia.¹

The Carter administration further planned for 12 specially built maritime prepositioning ships, capable of carrying supplies for a full marine division (13,000 men). The bulk of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) planning had been devoted to getting soldiers, upto a total of 300,000 to the region as fast as possible. To get them there by air a new strategic air transport capable of landing on short strips, the CX, which will cost depending on the final shape it takes \$ 6-12 billion is being designed. To get heavy equipment to the Gulf by sea, eight 35 knot SL7 fast container ships and one Sea-bee barrage-carrier have been bought.²

A document "US Foreign policy objectives and overseas military installations", prepared by the Congressional research service in 1979 for the ^{Committee} Foreign Relations of US Senate, said "The US has both conventional perhaps a strategic nuclear military interests in the Indian Ocean region. Military objective for US conventional forces include the capability to (1) protect US economic or threaten forces

1. Surendra Bhatani, United States, RDF Guardian, World Focus, Monthly, New Delhi, Vol. 25, September 1982, p. 22-23.

2. Ibid., p. 23.

in support of US diplomatic objectives in the middle East (2) secure the Indian Ocean air and sea routes against harassment or intimidation (3) intervene in support of other objectives in the littoral states, and related to all these (4) balance of Soviet forces in the region and attain superiority in a crisis. The US also possess a potential nuclear military objective of deploying, when necessary or conventional ballistic submarines targeted at the USSR.¹

◇ Carter Administration frequently supplied arms to Somalia. A small contingent of US troops was reported to have arrived at Berbera on 27 January 1980. On 23 January the US State Department confirmed that it had given Congress assurances that there were no Somali troops in the disputed Ogaden region of Ethiopia clearing \$ 40 million in military aid which has been deployed since August.

The Package which was additional to \$ 127 million in US economic aid will be used to provide defence weapon and equipment. Modernization of naval and air facilities at Berbera was expected to began immediately, the cost was estimated of about \$ 11 millions.²

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1. Surendra Chopra, 'US Strategy in South Asia', Patriot, Delhi, 4 May 1984.
 2. African Economic Development, Monthly, London, 30 January 1980.

The American Administration through its diplomacy and manoeuvres succeeded in removing the Soviet influence on Somalia. Since 1974, the American government had been disturbed on the developments in the Horn due to Socialist orientation shown by the leaders of the Dergue. From 1974 to 1976, America made numerous efforts to win over the Middle-landers in the Dergue. After the overthrow of Tafari Bente in February 1977 and the installation of Mengistu, Americans lost all hopes of regaining Ethiopia. The Carter Administration, realising the changed situation successfully moved to win Somalia on its side. It is not clear whether USA had any direct role in instigating Somalia to attack Ethiopia but it is a fact that war ravaged Somalia found itself more dependent on USA, than it was ever on USSR.

President Reagan who took command in 1981 not only continued the policy followed by Carter by also adopted new methods to create situation in the Horn/^{which} could benefit USA. Reagan reinforced Rapid Deployment Force, expanded Diego Garcia base increased American presence in the Indian Ocean, weakened Palestinian Liberation Organisation and set up large number of nuclear warheads all over the world, particularly in Europe. He very openly declared that American presence in the Gulf and Red Sea area was of great

military importance for USA's security and for the protection of its allies and the oil routes.

Reagan's new policy affected the Horn directly as this policy continued to destabilise the Ethiopian regime and its economy and re-establish its military advantageous position.

Reagan further escalated the conflicts in this region. He adopted the aggressive path under the slogan of US defence and security. He charged Carter, alleging that Carter passed through a policy of weakness inconsistency, vacillation and bluff. He said that "Carter administration is destroying the US margin of safety in national defence".¹ But Reagan further strengthened Carter's perspective of supporting Somalia campaign and he carried his campaign against socialism. In order to harass those African countries who were friendly to the Soviets. Reagan extended support to Somalia with heavy economic and military aid. It supported the Eritrean guerrillas with military equipments and experts to create problems for Ethiopia.

The USA State Department announced that \$ 42 million in "non-offensive" military equipment will be provided under the Berbera naval base agreement. The military aid included

1. Howell Raines, "Reagan asserts US must compete with Russia in arms Race" National Herald Tribune, Paris, 20 August 1980.

12 valcun and aircraft guns and three long-range air defence radar sets, together with spare parts, training and support. The equipment was committed to supply on concessionary terms over the years.¹

The United States and Somalia^{signed} an agreement on August 22, 1980 for the use of US forces of military facilities of the post of Berbera. The arrangement was completed after the months of intricate negotiation which several times appeared to have broken down because of the demands made by Somalia.²

The United States after the Somali consent for the use of the air and seabase at Berbera, had secure the final link in its rapid intervention capability in the Indian ocean and the strategic oil rich Gulf.

Somalia permitted the United States use of its military installations in exchange for economic and military aid. Military experts believe that Berbera, because of its geopolitical position and quality of its installations will be of great logistic value to US air and sea forces in the area.

1. (AED) African Economic Digest, Monthly, London, 13 February 1981. p. 12.

2. Africa Research Bulletin, p. 5764, August 1-31, London, 1980.

According to future plans the Pentagon experts are to travel to Berbera in the near future to direct expansion work and repairs to installations that had not been properly maintained. The cost of US armed forces was expected to run into several millions dollars.¹

Berbera, the Kenyan port of Mombasa and the Oman island base of Masirah will all provide essential back up to US air and sea unit in the area and to the rapid intervention force set up by President Carter to protect so called US interests.

The US fleet consisting of about 30 ships including two aircraft carriers, had been operating in the sea of Oman since November 4, 1979.² This fleet had had to be supplied from Saudi Bay in the Philippines.³

Reagan administration aired the process of anti-socialism and anti-sovietism. During a trip to Somalia, Kissinger categorically said that he would recommend to Reagan an increased military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. In Egypt, which he visited as a part of the same trip, Kissinger's statements were even more direct : 'It is not tolerable Soviet Union and its proxy forces

1. Africa Research Bulletin, p. 5764, Aug. 1-31 London, 1980.

2. Ibid., 5764-5765.

3. Loc. Cit.

engaged in expansion must be checked',¹ he said.

Reagan introduced a massive defence budget in 1981. He suggested to some foreign diplomats that he was seeking confrontation with the Soviet Union. Haig the Secretary of State was also determined to take a firm line with the Soviet Union. But Haig had nominated some experienced men to serve as assistant secretaries of State to suggest Reagan to adopt a firm policy towards the Soviet Union without bringing about a confrontation.²

Reagan told the Wall Street Journal "Let us not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlines all the unrest that is going on. If they were not engaged in this game of dominoes there would not be any hot spot in the world."³

The US President's approach was the restoration of the economic vitality and military strength of the US. This is a crucial to foreign policy as it is to domestic purpose. Without a healthy American economy, we cannot strengthen our leadership abroad. Without an improved American military ability we cannot restrain the Soviet

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1. N.C. Menon, Writes from Washington "The return of Super 'K'" Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 1981.
 2. Lois, Harren, Mr Haig 'A Soldier on the Defensive'. Time, London, 29 April, 1981.
 3. Haig puts forward
 3. National Herald Tribune, 7 May 1981.

Union. Restraint of the Soviets, reinvigoration of our allies was a new approach to third world.¹

Actually President Reagan and his aides have made it quite clear that first, they ant to build up, US defences to catch up, and then overtake what they consider to be the Soviet load. Only after that they will be ready to talk about arms control and more than that about the actual nuclear cut backs instead of the disarmament.²

Violent perspective of Carter and Reagan administration took a firm anti-Soviet and anti-socialist approach. This approach was the outcome of the crisis of American monopoly capitalism which appeared after 1977 and which forced both the administration to come in severe confrontation with the world socialist economy.

In the Horn and around during the period of 1977 to 1982, a large number of missiles and military equipments had been supplied by US to balance the area's politics which it were to use against the socialist forces in the Horn and around. These forces during the period of 1977-82 remained anti-socialist and anti-Soviet in the Horn of Africa.

1. Haig Puts forward Postulates of US foreign Policy, DAWA (Karnali) 15 May 1981.

2. 'Reagan's Beat Russia Policy' Statesman, New Delhi, 3 July 1981.

The entire period of 1974 to 1982 can be called 'the period of change in the equation of 'US Policy'. But this was only the change in equation but not in the change of perspective. Due to the internal crisis of the Horn, all the old equation were rapidly changing. Therefore, the vacillations were always seen in American policy. There were a lot of differences inside the American Houses (Senate and Congress) on these issues. But the Arab pressure on the USA for checking socialist forces in Somalia and the need to get Berbera base, brought US policy in support of Somalia.

Reagan administration further emphasised the need of rapid arms race in the Horn. It jumped into the most voluntary action of conflicts and turned the situation in severe competitions. Therefore, we see in the period of 1980 to, 1982 that American escalated the Arms and military base in the Horn and Indian ocean. America felt that it was necessary to escalate arms race and military bases in 1980 because two major developments took place in the littoral countries of Indian Ocean. The first change in Afghanistan in 1978 and secondly Iranian Islamic Revolution took place in December 1979 overthrowing Shah a strong supporter of America from Iran. These events posed a big

challenge to USA in the region of Indian Ocean. In the Horn, Ethiopia appeared as a strong opponents of USA and was influencing the left forces of the surrounding areas. It established friendly relations with Soviet Union and Cuba, which posed a challenge to the USA. Those were the reasons which led USA for the rapid arms race and increase in number of bases.

1980-1982 period remained the most aggressive period of US policy in the Horn. It remained successful in destabilising and polarising the forces in this region in favour of its interests.

CHAPTER-IV

CONCLUSION

In our description and analysis we see that the USA was not involved in the colonial partition of Africa. It did not directly exploit the continent's natural resources and cheap manpower. The situation changed after the Second World War and particularly after Africans attained independence. The former colonial powers gradually losing their exclusive hold on Africa and the fierce competition by the multi-national corporations reshaped the form and content of partition of Africa. U.S. capitalists were especially successful in bringing their economic might to bear on their west European competitors so as to weaken the latter's positions. During the 1950s when the Africans were fighting for their independence, USA gained some foothold in some of the African countries. The US slogan of the era was containment of Communism and independence filling the vacuum left by Western powers. After the second World War the USA had formulated a determined policy towards Africa. In the 1960s and 1970s the United States became the third largest trading partner and investor of government and private funds in Africa after Great Britain and France. Each year, Afro-American economic ties expanded, especially in areas of importance to US industry and agriculture. In 1980s, US entered into Africa with massive economic, political strategies and military involvement.

US policy in the Horn of Africa we find is a reflection of American world perspective. Among the most important places of world the Horn has been of prime consideration in the United States policy formulation. It has acquired the most prominent place in the African continent. Being an important gateway to African countries and the narrow strait of Gulf (through which thousands of barrel of oil pass from the Arabian countries to the west) it influences the politics of Africa, Asia and Europe. In the complicated situation of present international politics, Horn has become a place of crucial strategic importance for the USA.

Though American penetration in the Horn began in the last decade of the 19th century, it never succeeded in colonizing it. This was mainly because foreign powers such as Britain, France, Italy and other European countries had already settled their areas of influence. The Horn became the operation centre of competition for European monopoly powers. Consequently the division of Horn took place. A part of Somalia known as Djibouti came in the hands of France. A part of Somalia came to Britain and the largest part of Somalia was captured by Italy. Ethiopia continued uncolonized, but the British, French and Italian pressure always continued on her. America

economically operated in this region along with the Britain, France and Italy. The nature of the US policy continued to aim at acquiring the position of dominance in the strategically important Horn. It was not till 1943 that America got a hold in the Horn. It had acquired from the British an intelligence surveillance and communication base of Asmara in Ethiopia. In 1980-82, American administration succeeded in acquiring Berbera base in Somalia for military facilities.

After second World War the economic condition of all European colonial powers was such that they were at the verge of collapse, due to their direct involvement in both the world wars. Politically they were under great pressure of National Liberation Movements gaining momentum in colonial countries. Due to above two reasons the powers of the former two metropolitan countries was declining. These countries feared the growing impact of socialist forces world over. They felt that after their political withdrawal from the colonies, a vacuum would emerge. They found that this vacuum could be filled by either of the great powers, i.e., the USA or the USSR and obviously for various ideological and political reasons, they preferred USA. Thus the American firms were permitted to participate in the economic activities of the former colonial countries.

This phenomenon was theorised by president Truman in the form of the Truman Doctrine. The main framework of Truman Doctrine was:

- (1) To counter the influence of communism;
- (2) To provide the economic assistance to European capitalists;
- (3) To fill the Vacuum, created by European powers in the colonies;
- (4) To promote cold war.

The Truman Doctrine was the historical landmark in the US policy. In the Horn of Africa, Truman's policy is to be seen in the totality of the situation, where it maintained the anti-socialist posture consolidating its friendship with Ethiopia. It also supported time to time France and Britain in this region. These operations of US policy in the Horn were part of the chain of US foreign policy perspective.

The US policy passed through three phases:

- (1) Good relations with Ethiopia;
- (2) Somali-Soviet friendship necessitating change of policy, policy of breaking Somali-Soviet friendship;
- (3) Friendship with Somalia and a base in the Horn.

In Africa, 1950-64 was the era of achievements of national liberation struggles. It was the time when most

of African countries became independent. During this period (1961) British and Italian Somalilands attained their independence. Later Somalia raised the slogan of Greater Somalia, i.e., creation of one Somali, uniting all the people of Somali origin living in various parts of the Horn, e.g., as nationals of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Italian and British Somaliland. Above slogan of Greater Somalia emerged as the major political issue in the Horn in the post independence period. The colonial powers had united Italian and British Somaliland but the Ethiopians, Kenyans and Djibouti refused to accept the concept of 'Great Somalia'. This attitude of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti was supported by US administration. Fearing a break in US-Ethiopian relations, USA refused to economically and military aid Somalia. Consequently Somalia turned to Soviet Union for economic, political and military aid. The period of 1950 to 1964 can be observed in terms of good relations with Ethiopia.

The period 1964 to 1973, brought a new international situation. The emergence of OAU (1963) and the nonaligned movement (1961) brought the third world countries on a platform of anti-imperialist movement. Ethiopia and Somalia were the leading components of OAU to consolidate the OAU movement. First OAU conference took place in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) which made Ethiopia a leading actor of the OAU movement. The OAU and the nonaligned movement expressed their full solidarity with the African people

who were fighting against neo-colonialism and for their self-reliance. Soviet Union and other socialist countries were fully supporting both OAU and nonaligned movement countries. America foresaw in this a danger and moved tactically to introduce itself with anti-communist posture. US tried to use Ethiopia as a tool of US policy in the OAU.

It was during this period that Horn's internal situation took unexpected turn. In 1969, Siad Barre, the present ruler of Somalia came to power, like others he also projected the concept of Greater Somalia. He declared socialism as Somali goal. Somalia supported Eritreans who were refusing to become part of Ethiopia since they had been ruled for half of century by the Italians away from the Ethiopians. Somalian friendship with Soviet Union created a panic in the American administration.

USA sided with Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. It supplied massive arms and war equipments to Ethiopia. The US also started, in the most aggressive manner, its operations in the Indian Ocean, the Gulf and the Horn - which was considered as one of the most strategic point. Success came to US policy by getting under its influence the areas which were important trade and commerce routes for the world.

As against 1969-1973, the period of 1974-1982 can be regarded as an era of important landmarks in the US policy.

The social, economic, political and territorial problems worsened in the Horn in Ethiopia during 1974, a change of government and system took place led by Marxist leaders. Djibouti which was struggling for independence attained its independence in 1977.

Somali-Soviet relation changed and took an about turn. It was this period when the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia turned into conflict situation. Somalian economy was passing through severe crisis. Socialist oriented changes were taking place in Ethiopia also. US administration was in a dilemma whether to continue supporting socialist oriented Ethiopia or shift to crises ridden Somalia. By 1977 it became certain that Ethiopia had adopted the socialist path and Somalia was disturbed over this development.

In the meanwhile, Jimmy Carter was elected President of USA. He assumed power giving US policy a new direction. It was historical turn in the US policy after Truman. And President Carter succeeded in making Somalia a friend after it had lost Ethiopia. USA and its allies gave funds and arms to Somalia. The region become the centre of new conflicts. Soviet-Ethiopia-Cuba cooperation, sought to defeat Somalia, posed a challenge to US policy which was influencing the developments in the entire Indian Ocean. US negotiated for a base in Berbera.

After President Carter, President Reagan came into power in January 1981. He followed the policy of Carter. He also accelerated the process of aggressiveness and confrontation. He accused Carter for not having the strong anti-Soviet steps in this region. President Carter had started the process of hot tension. Reagan further adopted the policy of massive arms race and strengthening the military base in the Indian Ocean.

Reagan gave massive economic aid to Somalia. He enlarged the Berbera base in Somalia. The foundation of the US base at Berbera were laid by President Carter, who had vacated the US base of Asmara and shifted US equipment to Berbera. The main direction of US policy in 1977-82 remained :

- (1) Shifting the base from Asmara to Berbera;
- (2) To connect Berbera with the other strategic bases of Indian Ocean like Diego Garcia, Kenya, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt.
- (3) Massive economic and military aid to Somalia;
- (4) Destabilisation of the Horn;
- (5) Acceleration of arms race and military activities with sixth and seventh naval fleets in this region.

This period, therefore, was the historical landmark in the US policy which moved from dilemma to certainty.

Concluding all the periods, some common perspectives and nature of US policy can be easily visualised. The nature of US policy has varied according to changes in the internal developments in the US. And the perspective was the reflection of the changes which mainly remained hegemonistic and anti-socialist, these two directions can be seen in every turning step of US policy.

US Policy in the Horn: An assessment:

The USA had become a major power in the post-Second World War period. During the war itself, it had concentrated on the Horn. Since the Horn is an important strategic area providing the confluence of three continents Asia, Africa and Europe, the US gave it great importance in its foreign policy.

After the second World War, the emergence of third world and socialist community have changed the current of politics, which appeared as the challenge to the world capitalism. The newly liberated countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are looking for the path of independent economic development, which requires the basic changes in economy and new technology. But the western countries do not want to transfer their technology to the third world. In such a situation third world looks towards the socialist countries for help in building up independent economy. In

the Horn we notice that Somalia had one time and Ethiopia had another moved from the capitalist world to socialist world. This posed a big challenge to western capitalist world where America is a dominant partner.

Therefore, America, after 1946, accelerated the process of massive arms race in this region. Through this, American wanted to build up the pressure on Horn and its neighbour states. America understood that the militarisation of this region was a guarantee to counter the influence of socialism and particularly of the Soviet Union. US policy of militarisation pursued to combat resulted in weakening the economy in the Horn, creating instable political conditions and dependence of foreign powers. After 1977 America succeeded in polarising the forces of the Horn in favour of its interests making Somalia an ally.

The question now arises what will be the future of American Policy in the Horn and how far American's success will remain stable? The answer of this question will be determined by the potentialities of Horn's internal political forces which come out from the Socio-economic crisis of a country. It will be also determined by the striking potentialities of international socialist force.

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