

ANGOLA: A DEVIATION FROM THE NEOCOLONIAL  
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## P\_R\_E\_F\_A\_C\_E

Angola, situated in West Central Africa, South of the equator, is richly endowed with various natural resources. It was colonized by Portugal in the 16th century and gained its political independence only in November 1975. Long after other colonizers had decolonized their Empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Portugal tenaciously hung on to its Overseas African Territories.

During the process of decolonization, the various colonial powers had successfully transformed the nineteenth century phenomenon of imperialism into a viable neo-colonial pattern of relations. Whereas Portugal pursuing classical imperialism in the second half of the twentieth century could not build similar relations with its African territories.

The purpose of this study is to examine this hypothesis. Further, to investigate what were the factors that inhibited the development of any viable relationship between Portugal and Angola when the latter became independent. Is there any relation between handing over of power to the colonies and the changes within the metropolis, viz., the politico-socio-economic and technological changes? How was it possible for Portugal, the weakest European power, to continue as a colonial power till 1970s?

The focus of my work is on understanding the Portuguese-Angola relations. Therefore, discussions on the

development of Angolan national liberation movements, the role of OAU and United Nations, and the question of foreign involvement in Angola are limited to this end. An attempt has been made to analyse the problem in its totality in the historical context and within the given national and international parameters.

The Introductory Chapter forms the theoretical part of the work. The concept of neo-colonialism has been further examined in the African context in the Second Chapter. The following chapters cover Portugal's policies in Angola, its clash with Angolan nationalism, and, Portugal's domestic conditions. The deviations are highlighted in the conclusion. The work is primarily based on the secondary source materials--Books and Articles in English. Primary sources used include publications, such as Africa Diary; Europa, United Nations, and OECD Yearbooks; US Congress Report, etc.

I wish to take this opportunity of thanking the Centre for International Politics and Organization, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, for granting me fellowship to pursue this study. I am particularly indebted to Professor Anirudha Gupta, Chairman, Centre for West Asian and African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, who

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Needless to say that for any shortcomings, only I am to blame. The graphs and diagrammatic illustrations have been done by the author.

*Harpreet Mahajan*

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( Harpreet Mahajan )

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CHAPTER I



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT NEO-COLONIALISM

Neo-colonialism or Neo-imperialism is the expression of a historically old phenomenon, imperialism. The meaning of the term imperialism has greatly differed through the ages, from the middle age to the present day. To the Romans 'imperium' signified moral as well as military superiority over cowardly Orientals and uncouth Germans.<sup>1</sup> Domination was an accepted rule at that time. But "if the Romans invented the concept of empire, they did not invent its reality".<sup>2</sup>

The first great wave of European "empire-building" began in the later half of the 15th century with the expansion of military and naval power and the sea-exploration of the Portuguese and Spaniards. The "doctrine of mercantilism"<sup>3</sup> formed the basis of expansion. The various European Powers-- Holland, Spain, Portugal, France and Britain--sought to reduce commercial competition amongst themselves. By the 18th century Britain had ousted most of her rivals. Its vast empire included much of North America, India, West Indies, parts of Africa and the Pacific.

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1 George Lichtheim, Imperialism (London, 1971), p. 23.

2 Ibid., p. 29.

3 Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism (London, 1974), p. 21.

But the year 1776 was a turning point. In that year Great Britain lost North America. Subsequently, Spain and Portugal lost their colonies in Latin America; and France lost Haiti in the Caribbean. By 1870, imperialism had taken a new direction. It was now characterized by political penetration in the interest of economic development instead of the earlier form of continental expansion or the acquisition of territory.

Towards the end of the 19th century "imperialism" was used synonymously with the term "colonialism". Various theoreticians have attributed different meanings to the term imperialism.<sup>4</sup> Hobson, an English economist, explained imperialism as a practical response to a certain maladjustment within the system at an advanced stage of capitalist development. He located the root cause as under-consumption of products due to the unequal distribution of a nation's income i.e. "the false economy of distribution".<sup>5</sup> Imperialism was occasioned by the superabundance of capital in the metropolitan countries looking for high profits overseas; led by a privileged group of financiers who were abetted in their machinations by a great horde of political, military,

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4 B.J. Cohen defines imperialism as an international relationship characterized by a particular asymmetry of 'dominance and dependence'. Cohen, *ibid.*, p. 15. Also see for the similar views, Lichtheim, n. 1; and A.P. Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism (USA, 1965).

5 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism : A Study (London, 1938), p. 87.

ecclesiastical and literary hangers-on.

In 1910, R. Hilferding, an 'Austro-Marxist' analysed cartelization of industry and the dominant role of banks. According to him, this development was primarily to prevent competition amongst industrial customers and also to search for foreign capital outlets.<sup>6</sup> Lenin, later on, substituted Hilferding's theory of finance capital for Hobson's theory of under-consumption.

Lenin defined imperialism as the "highest stage of Capitalism". It is "the monopoly stage of Capitalism".<sup>7</sup> This period marks the transition from free-trade to cartelization, development of monopoly houses, syndicates, trusts and associations. It is a product of the colonial policy of the search and struggle for sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, and for spheres of influence together with the development of banks. This leads to the striving for dominance and exploitation of the weaker nations by a few rich or powerful nations.<sup>8</sup> It also marks the "eve of socialist revolution".<sup>9</sup>

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6 Encyclopaedia Britannica (USA, 1969), vol. 14, Li-Max, p. 990.

7 Lenin, Imperialism : The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow, 1970), p. 85.

8 Ibid., pp. 118-19.

9 Ibid., p. 7.

Bukharin held similar views to those of Lenin, to whom capitalism and imperialism were identical.<sup>10</sup> Rosa Luxemburg radically differed on this point. She believed that imperialist ventures of the capitalist countries result because these countries are threatened with over-production of consumer goods. She tried to prove that capital accumulation becomes impossible within "a closed capitalist system". Therefore, the non-capitalist consumers are drawn into the capitalist system for the realization of surplus value. Furthermore, tariffs are used by each country to prevent its rival countries from penetrating its internal non-capitalist market.<sup>11</sup>

Others read political overtones in the concept of imperialism. Fieldhouse observed that fear and rivalry in Europe interacted to such a degree, that "imperialism may best be seen as the extension into the periphery of the political struggle in Europe....Colonies thus became a means out of the impasse".<sup>12</sup>

Thus, the economic factor became subordinate to the political manoeuvres. Material gains were not an end

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10 Encyclopaedia Britannica (USA, 1969), vol. 12, Imm-Ji, p. 6.

11 See Michael Barratt Brown, "A Critique of Marxist Theories of Imperialism", in Owen and Sutcliffe, ed., Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972), pp. 50-52; Paul M. Sweezy, The Theories of Capitalist Development (London, 1962), pp. 202-7.

12 Fieldhouse, Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision, pp. 205-6; as reproduced in Cohen, n. 3, p. 78.

by themselves but were conceived of as a means for an end.<sup>13</sup>  
 In Richard Hammond's words, it was "the good old game of power politics".

In the period that followed, the contradictions inherent in capitalism began to manifest in the form of (a) further inter-imperialist rivalries, (b) conflict between the metropolitan countries and their colonies, and (c) by the unprecedented upsurge of the national liberation movements.<sup>14</sup> The heightening of the inter-imperialist rivalries led to the Second World War. At the end of which, subjectively and objectively, a new situation developed.

The spread of nationalism in the Asian and African continents forced the imperialist powers to give their colonies political independence. At this time the Soviet Union had emerged as a successful socialist country which openly supported the anti-colonial movements. America too, in the early post-war years, took an anti-colonial stand, thus forcing the pace of decolonization.

At independence, the newly liberated countries faced the problem of 'nation-building'. Nation-building includes "creating coherent political forces that can make meaningful

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13 Cohen, *ibid.*, p. 79.

14 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow, 1960), vol. 22, pp. 300-4.

a people's feeling of association with its polity".<sup>15</sup> Lucian Pye observed that British power had been creating peace and order throughout the world.<sup>16</sup> Pye further added that "now that colonialism is ended we see the United States and others through various forms of foreign aid and technical assistance continuing the effort to shape numerous loosely structured societies into reasonable facsimiles of the modern nation-state."<sup>17</sup> In this context, to most American political scientists, the process of nation-building was a "prolongation of the politics of the European colonial rule".<sup>18</sup>

Thus, a new situation was created by the imperialist powers. While handing over political authority to their colonies, they manoeuvred the new situation to protect their economic, political and strategic aims. Whereas Great Britain and France had dominated the scene before, in the post-war period, the USA emerged as the supreme protector of the Western Capitalist societies.

On the other hand, the confrontation between world capitalist and socialist camps began to manifest itself in the form of the "Cold War". Some of the newly independent

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15 L. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (USA, 1966), p. 132.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 8.

18 Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Modernization, Order, and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal : American Political Science 1960-70", Journal of Development Studies (London), vol. 8, no. 4, July 1972, p. 365.

countries tried to break away from the capitalist path of development in favour of the socialist mode of production and development--a fact that worried the West. In response, the Western countries began their search for allies amongst the ex-colonies. America, joining the quest for allies or the "foster-elite"<sup>19</sup> pursued a policy which required close co-operation from those who rose to prominence under colonial rule.<sup>20</sup>

This new strategy of the imperialist powers to control, manipulate and manoeuvre the economies of the under-developed countries behind the facade of aid, trade, assistance and co-operation became prominent in the post-war period. In essence it was still imperialism but under a new guise. It was a strategic tactic to prevent the collapse of capitalism and to prevent the countries from leaving the Western orbit of influence.<sup>21</sup> This new development came to be called "Neo-colonialism" or "Neo-imperialism".

Whereas earlier imperialism was an alliance between the external imperialist and local pre-capitalist forces, neo-colonialism is generally an alliance between external imperialism and sections of the local bourgeoisie and the

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19 H. Bretton, Power and Stability in Nigeria (New York, 1962), p. 56.

20 Donal Cruise O'Brien, n. 18, p. 365.

21 Jack Woddis, Introduction to Neocolonialism (London, 1967), p. 52 ff.

petty-bourgeoisie.<sup>22</sup> Although it is more complex in Asia, where even the old relations with the pre-capitalist are exploited.

Neo-colonialism is the subtle use of new methods and manoeuvres by which they propagate and consolidate capitalism and at the same time impede the progress of national liberation movements and derive large profits. Finance capital is exported and utilized in such a way as to impoverish the less developed countries. Is neo-colonialism then only economic exploitation through indirect means? Or, is it a result of power politics?

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22 See *ibid.*, p. 56; Andre Gunder Frank, On Capitalist Underdevelopment (Bombay, 1975), pp. 18-19; Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, C. Farrington, trans. (Harmondsworth, 1974), chapter 3, pp. 119 ff; Gavin Williams, "The Social Stratification of a neo-colonial economy: Western Nigeria", in C. Allen and R.W. Johnson, ed., African Perspectives (London, 1970), pp. 233-7; Emile R. Braundi, "Neocolonialism and the Class Struggle", International Socialist Journal (Milan), vol. 1, no. 1, January-February 1964, pp. 57-59 and 63-65.

The indigenous entrepreneurs are dependent on the state for financial assistance. Under a colonial rule they organize national liberation movements. Once they gain state power, they become 'junior partners' in the neo-colonial economic system. They aid the liberation movements in the first phase but later on become an obstacle to the development of their own country. It is a result of the compromises made by the colonial bourgeoisie with the local bourgeoisie. In effect, the latter replace a certain strata of 'archaeo-colonialism' to create a situation where they themselves are defending against those forces in which they had initially participated.



## WHAT IS NEO-COLONIALISM

According to L. Goncharov, a modern Soviet academician, neo-colonialism followed seven guiding principles. The colonialists wanted to maintain the domination of foreign capital in the new states and to prevent the break up of the colonial structure of their economies. They wished to preserve their political bonds with their ex-colonies; by drawing them in alliances, associations and co-operation agreements.

Further, the imperialists wanted to undermine the sovereignty of the independent countries by maintaining military bases, by using the colonial administrative structure left behind, and by wielding ideological influence. In order to maintain the ex-colonies as a source of profit, they wished to keep the newly liberated nations backward for the production of raw materials only.<sup>23</sup>

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23 L. Goncharov, "New Forms of Colonialism in Africa", Journal of Modern Africa Studies (London), vol. 1, no. 4, December 1963, p. 468. On economic neo-colonialism, see Reginald Herbold Green, "Political Independence and the National Economy : An Essay on Political Economy of Decolonisation", in C. Allen and R.W. Johnson, ed., n. 22, pp. 288-98.

A majority of the writings--both communist and non-communist--highlighted the ex-imperialists as the common enemy of the Third World countries. In the eyes of the latter, neo-colonialism is an unmitigated evil. Thus, Kwame Nkrumah, an African leader, sees neo-colonialism as the final and most dangerous stage of imperialism.<sup>24</sup>

According to him, an independent and internationally sovereign state whose economic system and political policy is directed by outsiders is in the clutches of neo-colonialism. It "is an attempt to export the social conflicts of the capitalist countries." It "is based upon the principle of breaking up the former large united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable States which are incapable of independent development."<sup>25</sup> Nkrumah's analysis can be put in a mathematical equation: Richest resources + foreign development = poorest living standards = neo-colonialism.

Africa has important mineral resources and raw materials for basic industries, yet it has not industrialized. Instead, the continent is exploited by the foreign investors. They not only export important products to their countries but also profit by it. They only develop those industries that directly assist in the production of metals or other

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24 Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism : The Last Stage of Imperialism (London, 1965), Introduction.

25 Ibid.

raw materials. Thus, leaving all other sectors underdeveloped.<sup>26</sup> The wages of the workers are maintained at the minimum sustenance level.

On the other hand, the indigenous population has to import consumer articles, finished goods, food and such other things, at an inflated cost. Since the workers are paid low wages, they cannot afford to buy luxury items. Hence, their living standard remains low. At the same time the economy of the country is strained more and more,

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26 See Gavin Williams, n. 22, pp. 229-32. In a neo-colonial situation, the trade is to the advantage of the metropolitan country. "Neo-colonial economies are characterized by the expatriate monopolisation of opportunities and resources."

A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York, 1967), pp. 177-8. He analyses the shift in relation between the metropolitan and its 'satellite' economy. While in the first half of twentieth century the satellites did not have the "freedom to establish their own capital and intermediate equipment industry." They were "dependent on the monopoly of the metropolis"; in the second half, the metropolitan monopoly increasingly shifted to technology together with increased penetration of the 'satellite' economy by its corporations.

Gavin Williams, *ibid.* As a result of 'colonisation' of protected consumer goods industries by metropolitan 'parent' companies the 'satellites' have excess productive capacity installations which prevents the development of more basic capital goods industries. The surplus is not directed to the agricultural sector. And, annual outflow of funds generally exceeds the inflow. Thus "reducing the funds potentially available for investment".

leading to an increased dependence on foreign investments.<sup>27</sup>

Whenever the term 'neo-colonialism' is applied, it is meant to describe the designs of the Western world. However, one finds that many actions of Russia--a Socialist State--too have been termed imperialistic.<sup>28</sup> China calls it "Soviet Imperialism" or "Social Imperialism". During the Indo-Pak war in 1971, the Chinese Ambassador said to the United Nations: "This (Russia's arm supply to India) is a naked revelation of the role played by Soviet social imperialism. This is exactly the same tactic it has used in the Middle East. The Soviet social imperialists are carrying out aggression, control, subversion and expansion everywhere."<sup>29</sup>

Is this then the first stage of imperialism of the socialist world comparable to the imperialism of the Western industrialized and developed countries? And, the tactic being the same as that of the Western neo-colonialists?

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27 Nkrumah's detailed study highlights the above mentioned facts. It gives an insight into the working of finance investment and the corresponding development of the African continent.

28 See Cohen, n. 3, pp. 99-92; See M. Barratt Brown, The Economies of Imperialism (Harmondsworth, 1974), pp. 285-304. He has analysed the Soviet form of Imperialism. According to the neo-classical view, it is non-economic, only political. His conclusion, however, is that although this problem requires a different kind of analysis (than that of Western Imperialism), yet it "does seem to have something in common with economic imperialism in the capitalist world."

29 Quoted in the New York Times, 7 December 1971, p. 16.

If we were to read international politics into this situation, perhaps we can answer the above question to some extent. Both the United States and Soviet Russia are the two Super Powers and they represent two different social systems--Capitalist and Socialist. At the international level, both are competing for a more dominant position than the other. As a result, like the USA and other Western countries, Russia has to fall back on "neocolonialistic tactic": aid, trade, assistance, supply of arms etc.

Another question is: that if the ex-metropolitan countries break off all their relations with their ex-colonies completely, including economic relations, would the ex-colonies be able to survive, especially, in the initial stages of stabilization? It is well for the Marxists to point out that reliance on ex-imperialist powers would make an independent country into a dependent country; but in any case, what other options would be there for a country which finds itself economically underdeveloped and politically unstable? It would, therefore, have to choose either a socialist country to get assistance or fall back on its ex-imperialist masters. But, of course, one cannot forget that the underdevelopment of these countries is directly related to the development of the

highly industrialized nations.<sup>30</sup>

The process of modernization of the underdeveloped countries and their links with the developed countries have been viewed differently by the different schools of thoughts. The view no longer holds that the West is the inevitable model of development for the developing countries--a linear teleology. Fred Riggs has talked of a "prismatic" model<sup>31</sup>

30 A study of colonial rule highlights the fact that the metropolitan countries used their colonies as a market for their manufactured products. To further their own interests, they took special measures to hamper the growth of indigenous industries of their colonies. Thus, increasing the dependence of the colonies on the mother country, and, at the same time extracting important raw materials and capital from the colonies for the metropolitan country. Samir Amin describes this 'colonial-type trade' as "the exchange of agricultural commodities provided by a peripheral society shaped in this way, against the products of a central capitalist industry, imported or produced on the spot by European enterprises."

Thus, strengthening the forces in the markets which were already working towards internal and international inequalities. Even in the post-independence era, one finds that the highly developed countries have been making spectacular progress, whereas the poorer, underdeveloped countries, with rapid growing population are developing more slowly. See Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London, 1969). Andre Gunde Frank, n. 26. Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa - Origins and Contemporary Forms", Journal of Modern Africa Studies vol. 10, no. 4, December 1972, p. 521.

31 Fred W. Riggs, "Administration in Developing Countries : The Theory of Developing Politics", in World Politics (USA), vol. 16, no. 1, October 1963, pp. 147-71.

of development which describes a transitional stage or a mix of two analytically distinct categories of development and underdevelopment.

Another school of thought bases its analysis around the division of labour between capitalist and anti-capitalist ideologies, seeing in the third world a variant of proletarian revolution. Yet another view has given a new interpretation of world history. It sees Western socio-political history as a series of necessary crisis or stages which must be passed through to attain modernity.<sup>32</sup> The world is an historical abstraction of functional 'events', which all the countries aspiring to modernity must cope with.

The fifth school of thought dismisses the model and history of the existing developed world as only marginally relevant to today's Third World in terms of any general theory of development. J.P. Nettl contributes to this view, although, he admits that the two 'worlds' are linked with one another in terms of "interaction, exchange, influence and even control in empirical terms".<sup>33</sup>

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32 S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ed., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives (London and New York, 1967), pp. 1-64.

33 See J.P. Nettle, "Strategies in the Study of Political Development", in Colin Leys, ed., Politics and Change in Developing Countries (London, 1969), pp. 20 ff.

The stage of development and the modernization process can be understood only if we link it to the historical past of the Third World countries. In case of a colonial situation, the process of modernization is linked with the dominant imperatives of imperialism. The intrusion of market economy and the imposition of a modern administration and tax structure--the inaugural mechanisms of modernization process are the basis of the creation of underdevelopment within the framework of the political economy of imperialism.<sup>34</sup>

The policy of imperialism generally destroys indigenous economic enterprise, outlets are denied, surplus is appropriated for the metropolitan purposes. Cheap, unskilled labour develops to work for the Europeans. Urbanization means creation of racial segregation and development of parasitic centres of administration and expatriate dominated mercantile activities. An illusion of industrialization is created in colonies; usually allowing consumer goods industry to develop but not the producer goods industry. A structural gap<sup>is</sup> created because colonialism perpetuates a socio-economic system in which there is no connection between the structure of needs of the population

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34 Martin Kilson, "African Political Change and the Modernization Process", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, December 1963, pp. 425-40.



and the structure of production within the colony.<sup>35</sup>

"Dualistic Economy" is another feature rendered possible by imperialism. For example, in the case of British Guiana, the country was economically underdeveloped only for the Guianese people but, it was technologically highly developed for the export and exploitation of natural resources.<sup>36</sup>

The imperialist powers began to subsidize their colonies in the 1920s including Portugal. If the colonies did not pay, then why did they pay so much to hold them? An answer to it lies in Lenin's work on imperialism. The profits from investment from the colonies or semi-colonies make it possible for the imperialist countries to give their own workers a high wage and also provide for their welfare. The workers in fact expect to have a share in the profits. Eric Williams in Capitalism and Slavery writes that these profits provided one of the mainstreams


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35 See Frantz Fanon, n. 22; Michael Barratt Brown, After Imperialism (London, 1963); Andre Gondre Frank, n. 26; C.Y. Thomas, The Transition to Socialism: Issues of Economic Policy in Tanzanian-Type Economies (mimeo) (Dar-es-Salaam, 1972).

36 See Philip Reno, The Ordeal of British Guiana, Monthly Review (New York), vol. 16, nos. 3 and 4, July 1964; Samir Amin adds that in general the underdeveloped countries have had concentration in export-processing industries and more recently luxury-consumption goods industries. See, The Theoretical Model of Capital Accumulation and of Economic and Social Development (mimeo) (IDEP, 1970), pp. 2-3; David Slater, "Colonialism and the Spatial Structure of Underdevelopment - Outline of an Alternative Approach with Special Reference to Tanzania" (Amsterdam, n.d.).

of capital accumulation leading to the Industrial Revolution.<sup>37</sup>

The resulting relation between the colonizer and the colonized nation was the first stage of colonialism, wherein centre of the Periphery was physically occupied by the people from the centre of the Centre. The relationship reflects the alliance between the centre and periphery of the Centre in the exploitation and domination of the Periphery. Diagrammatically Galtung has illustrated the harmony and disharmony of interest in the respective groups as follows:<sup>38</sup>



37 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 121.

38 Johan Galtung, "The Structure of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), vol. 8, 1971, pp. 83-84. Galtung adds that the total arrangement (alliance) is largely in the interest of the periphery of the Centre. Although the two (periphery and centre of the Centre) may form the opposing forces but in this game they act as partners.

## CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATION

The consequence of accumulation of capital in the metropole was decapitalization of the population of the peripheral country together with development of social, economic, political and cultural structure of underdevelopment.<sup>39</sup> At the time of independence a new relationship developed. The independent countries were drawn into and integrated into the world capitalist economy. The implications of the colonial economy--exploitation of the developing countries as a source of cheap raw materials, labour and foodstuffs--were ignored in assessing the developing potential of these countries.<sup>40</sup> The powerful section of the Periphery were linked with those of imperialism. The centre of Periphery acts as the "transmission belt for value".<sup>41</sup>

Although the process of import-substitution had begun during the inter-war and Second World War, partly due to the disengagement of metropolitan investors, the

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39 Andre Gunde Frank, n. 22, p. 27.

40 J.F. Rweyemamu, "International Trade and the Developing Countries", The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge University Press), vol. 7, no. 2, July 1969, p. 212.

41 Galtung, n. 38, pp. 83-84.

periphery remained dependent on the metropolis for the import of technology, which in turn facilitated control of the Centre over the Periphery. Foreign ownership, trade, aid, banking, insurance facilities, shipping etc. tended to reinforce the tendency of imperialism. By establishing subsidiaries in the Periphery, the international oligopolies led to greater economic integration of the Periphery with the metropolis and to concentration of finance capital.<sup>42</sup>

Therefore, the problems facing the developing countries are of political and economic nature.<sup>43</sup> Jalee has noted that the trade and aid have been important for the perpetuation of continued economic exploitation of the Third World countries.<sup>44</sup> Many other writers have also

42 P. Jalee, The Pillage of the Third World, Mary Klopper, trans. (New York, 1968), p. 78; F.H. Cardoso, "Dependency and Development in Latin America", New Left Review (London), no. 74, July-August 1972, p. 94; J. O'Connor, "The Meaning of Economic Imperialism", in R.I. Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader (New York, 1970), p. 162; Stephen Hymer, "The Internationalisation of Capital", in Bandhayan Chattopadhyay, ed., Imperialism in the Modern Phase (New Delhi, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 19-42.

43 See Maurice Doff, Economic Growth and Underdeveloped Countries (London, 1963); R.H. Green, n. 23; Klochkovsky, Economic Neocolonialism, John Williams, trans., (Moscow, 1975); Rweyemamu, n. 40, pp. 214-19.

44 Jalee, n. 42; Jalee, The Third World in World Economy, Mary Klopper, trans. (New York, 1969), ch. V and ch. VI.

theorized on the same line and have made a case for the socialist mode of development.

Edwin Charle's comparative analysis of the "inherent market power" shows that there is nothing to suggest that the underdeveloped countries would enjoy an advantageous position in trade with the socialist countries rather than the capitalist countries.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, "an 'a priori' condemnation of capitalism as the institutional womb of 'neocolonial exploitation' seems unjustified."<sup>46</sup>

Moreover, he adds, that the competition for the support of "uncommitted nations" is a "conflict between opposed nationalistic ideologies".<sup>47</sup> On the question of socialist state sharing its profits within the appropriate international limits, he writes, "By withholding full access to its capital from foreigners who are less well endowed is not a socialist country engaging in "economic exploitation" in the same sense that a private capitalist is presumed to exploit non-capital owners from whom he buys and to whom

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45 E. Charle, "The Concept of Neocolonialism and its Relations to Rival Economic Systems", Social and Economic Studies (Jamaica), vol. 15, no. 4, December 1966, p. 336. He adds that instead trade with the capitalist world may be preferred, except for the possibility of their succumbing to pressures for import restrictions.

46 Ibid. Also see Barratt Brown, n. 28, chs. 11 and 12.

47 Charle, *ibid.*

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he sells?" And the questions on loans, rates of repayment etc. must be answered in the light of answer to the above question - on the "morality of international property rights."<sup>48</sup>

Repercussions of specific acts, laws and institutions must be evaluated because the international political controls are not exclusively associated with the capitalistic institutions. A case against the working of monopolies does not become a case against the contemporary capitalism. Nor does he ignore the potential market power of the socialist states. But, he cautions against total condemnation of either "system".<sup>49</sup>

Economic development of the underdeveloped nations involves foreign investments, which has increasingly gone to manufacturing rather than in primary production. This has provided the necessary link of the Periphery to a Centre. Studies reveal that the latter are interested in retaining the productive processes within the capitalist frame of development rather than expanding markets.<sup>50</sup> The present phase of imperialism has become internationalized. US hegemony in the present era has been a rival for the ex-metropolitan countries. For example, US replaced Belgians

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48 Ibid., pp. 336-7.

49 See *ibid.*, p. 337.

50 For example, see Barratt Brown, n. 28.

and, of course, it has penetrated virtually all over the globe, especially the areas which were once the monopoly of French or British. EEC, IBRD, IMF are other examples of international organizations for the perpetuation of neo-colonial exploitation.

According to Galtung the present phase of imperialism--neo-colonialism--is one in which the centre of the Centre interacts with centre of Periphery through the international organizations. He visualizes another phase of neo-colonialism where the centre of Centre will interact with the centre of Periphery through international communication.<sup>51</sup>

"Internal colonialism"--a manifestation of development--underdevelopment on the national level between regions and economic sectors needs to be focussed on.<sup>52</sup> For example, the Northeast of Brazil became the Coastal Northeast's cattle producing and supplying underdeveloped periphery. The coast was a regional or national sugar producing metropole, which in turn was colonized as the periphery of the European metropole.<sup>53</sup>

Once more borrowing from Galtung one can diagrammatically illustrate the development of a multi-empire


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51 Galtung, n. 38, p. 94.

52 See Andre Gunder Frank, n. 22, pp. 72-80, for a detailed discussion on capitalism and internal colonialism.

53 Example has been taken from Frank's study. See *ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

world as a result of the complex working of the interacting neo-colonial mechanisms.<sup>54</sup> Empire word is used not in the traditional sense of physical conquering of lands and its people, but in reference to the invisible empires that emerge due to economic control of the underdeveloped world by the developed world.



[ (1) a, b, c occur within one empire; certain element of defeudalization takes place. Horizontal links between periphery nations develop.


54 Galting, n.38, p.106.



- (2) d, e, f situations are advantageous from the Periphery point of view. Periphery have vested interest in protecting the conflict and rivalries amongst different Centres.
- (3) g, h, i develop when Centres co-operate to help the Peripheral nations; e.g. EEC.]

#### MULTI-EMPIRE WORLD

The resulting exploitative relations are characteristic of neo-colonialism. Henry L. Bretton adds another dimension to this system. New states are not merely single systems. The dual economy gets transferred into triple economy concept--that is, it is an interaction of the modern and traditional sector of the new state and a sector of the external power.<sup>55</sup>




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55 Henry L. Bretton, Power and Politics in Africa (London, 1973), ch. 2.

After independence, the weakness of the domestic sector impresses itself, power struggle shifts to the modern sector and retreats to the foreign sector,<sup>56</sup> thus increasing their dependence on the metropolis or the new centres once more.

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56 Also see Frantz Fanon, n. 22, ch. 3; Barratt Brown, n. 35; Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (London, 1973) on the role of comprador bourgeoisie.

CHAPTER II

## CHAPTER II

### NEO-COLONIALISM IN AFRICA

Neo-colonial relation includes continuation, modification, and adaptation of the policies in the absence of direct political control. Therefore, it is essential to know and understand the colonial policies pursued by the various imperialist powers in order to understand the neo-colonial relations that developed later on. Keeping in view the subject of the thesis, the study is being made of colonial policy/ies in the African continent in particular.

The colonial situation in Africa has varied with the ruling imperialist power. The different modes of control and the conditions of the colonies have been a result of the policies pursued by these powers. Of the various powers, British, French and Belgian rule were important,

### COLONIAL POLICIES

The British pursued a policy of indirect rule. They realized the need to 'democratize' the existing traditional institutions and to control society through the native tribal chiefs. It was thought to be a policy of paternalism and improvement of native civilization. In the post-1920s, Lord Lugard's "Dual Mandate" became a treatise on the British policy in Africa. This policy bolstered

effete and corrupted the chiefs at the expense of their people. In West Africa, British policy was to prepare the colonies for "self-government" for the future. But in East Africa, the white settlers considered themselves to be the rulers.

The French, on the other hand, had "integration and assimilation" as their policy. It originated from the concept of Greater France and hoped to satisfy demands for emancipation with cultural assimilation, administrative co-ordination, the grant of citizenship and representation in Paris parliament.<sup>1</sup>

Belgian policy was a mixture of the policies of France and Britain. Its aim was neither integration nor granting the right of self-government to its colonies. By following a policy of paternalism it hoped to avoid the question of decolonization. Till the First World War, Belgium had adopted no systematic policy. It had considered the chiefs as the supporters of the administration, and it chose to pursue the policy of indirect rule.

On the economic front, it was only after the First World War, that a systematic policy of development emerged. Productivity increased in British Africa. For example, cocoa on the Gold Coast, Palm and coconut oil in Nigeria,

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1 Rudolf von Albertini, Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919-1960 (Carden City, Double Day, 1971), trans. by Francisca Garvie, p. 524. The colonial policies dealt here are based on this study.

cotton in Sudan and Uganda, coffee in Kenya, and copper in the Northern Rhodesia. But Britain did not commit itself to buying their produce nor privilege its exports to the colonies by tariff system. By 1880, Britain had committed herself to "free trade" at home and in her colonies.<sup>2</sup> During the 20th century, however, British policy in Tropical Africa became an exception to the increasingly protectionist trend of British tariff policy.

The colonies had the financial sovereignty. The poor colonies suffered when in 1930s, a wave of crisis engulfed these colonies, the reduced colonial budgets were insufficient to meet the situation. In East Africa, a Royal Commission stated that "unless the Imperial Government is prepared to assist liberally in this matter (financially), little or nothing can be done."<sup>3</sup>

Slowly the British colonial office began to expand its functions. The "new policy" meant making available budget resources for "aid to development". It also implied more state intervention in the future. The traditional policy of free trade had turned into a "combination of

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2 Ibid., p. 100; also see David K. Fieldhouse, "The Economic Exploitation of Africa : Some British and French Comparisons" in Gifford and Louis, ed., France and Britain in Africa (London, 1971), pp. 601-2.

3 Report of the East Africa Commission, Commonwealth Documents 2387 (1925), p. 182.

private initiative and state intervention which conformed more closely to the complexity of modern economic and social life."<sup>4</sup>

According to Frankel, the total foreign investments in Africa, up to the end of 1936, amounted to some £ 1,322 million.<sup>5</sup> Most of the money loaned in the inter-war years was invested in the mining industry. Gold, copper and diamond mining fetched high profits. Northern Rhodesia in 1949 realized a net profit of £ 24 million, two-thirds of which was transferred to the United Kingdom.<sup>6</sup>

As mentioned above, agricultural productivity had increased since the 1920s. For example, the output of Gold Coast cocoa crop in 1935-36 amounted to 285,351 tons, nearly 1/2 of the world supply.<sup>7</sup> This enabled Gold Coast to pay for imports of cements, machinery, flour etc. In contrast to India where the railway line construction had begun in the early 19th century, in Africa it began between 1880 and 1920. By the end of the 1930s about 32,000 miles of rail road track was in operation, two-thirds of which served South

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4 Albertini, n. 1, p. 114.

5 S.H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa: Its Course and Effects (London, 1938), pp. 151-153 and 174.

6 For more details see Phyllis Deane, Colonial Social Accounting (London, 1953), p. 37.

7 Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara (London, 1938), pp. 906-9.

Africa, Rhodesia, Congo and the Portuguese colonies.<sup>8</sup> Steam locomotives too helped in bringing about further revolution in the trade relations.

French policy differed from that of British. Firstly, a relatively small part of French Africa was committed to the "open door" policy by treaty. It was more for political than economic reasons. Secondly, France deliberately organized her African empire to conform to the concepts of "national economy", and thus, it pursued an intensely protectionist policy.

Agricultural productivity in French colonies too rose dramatically. In the 19th century, peanuts had been introduced in Senegal. Its production between 1924-28 was 600,000 tons in shells annually, of which 410,000 tons was exported.<sup>9</sup> French Administration further tried to raise the level of productivity. When the world crisis hit the French West Africa, France for the first time came to the rescue of a colonial crop and, at least temporarily, sacrificed the interests of the metropolitan consumers in favour of the African producers.

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8 Frankel, n. 5, p. 374.

9 Jean Suret Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 1900-1945, Till Gottheiner, trans. (London, 1971), pp. 219 ff. For a detailed study of the economic policies in the French Africa see this book.



Even when the principle of guaranteed price and marketing for peanuts<sup>1</sup> was generally respected after the early 1930s, the pressure of French interests limited peanut imports or guaranteed price at a low level, provoking bitter protests from the Senegalese producers and exporters.<sup>10</sup>

In the French-speaking Africa, the Africans were pressurized to cultivate commercial crops. For example, in Senegal millet became a secondary crop and rice had to be imported. The result of cash farming in Africa created new problems. Exploitation and development was left more in the hands of private groups rather than France providing funds for the treasure.<sup>11</sup>

After the First World War, France became more dependent on its colonies for raw materials and goods since the war had caused deficits in foreign trade and weakened the Franc. Between 1919 and 1929, production and export of various French colonies arose: peanuts in Senegal, and Sudan, coffee and cocoa in the Ivory Coast, rubber in French Equatorial Africa, rice and minerals in Indochina, wheat and phosphate in Morocco, wine in Algeria and Tunisia etc. But no industrialization followed.<sup>12</sup> Only those

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10 See Virginia, Thompson and Richard, Adloff, French West Africa (California, 1957), pp. 311-14.

11 W.A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (London, 1969), p. 81.

12 Albertini, n. 1, p. 272.

'industries' were tolerated which were indispensable for the treatment of export products. For example, pressing of palm oil, shelling of groundnuts, and sifting of coffee, which, indeed, were very few.

Belgian Congo made similar developmental progress. In 1910 a southern railway--Elizabethville, provided the necessary outlet for mining products like copper, diamonds, gold and uranium. Copper production arose from 20,000 tons in 1958. It had also become world's greatest producer of industrial diamonds and one of Africa's largest suppliers of hydroelectric power.

In the inter-war years, each of the metropolitan powers embarked on economic and social reforms. This period was characterized by the successive advance of inland traders, miners, the farmers, and manufacturers from the coastline into the interior.

In regard to the education policy, both the British and the Belgian left it to the missionaries to educate the people of their colonies. The British, however, realized the possibility of intellectually and politically influencing the subjects of their empire. At the lower level vernacular was used, but at the higher level English was the media of instruction.

Education was a part of the "civilizing mission" of French policy. The colonial school system was centralized

like that of the metropolitan country and was organized from Paris. State-run schools dominated. Instructions were given in French. Mostly the teachers were imported from France, with the aim to make the Africans into Frenchmen.

Education in Belgian Congo was largely restricted to the junior grades for training a lower cadre for the economy and administration. University education was discouraged; though training in Catholic theology was given instead. However, the rate of school attendance in the Congo went up from 56% in 1946 to 77.5% in 1958 whereas it was only 34.8% in the French territories.<sup>13</sup>

Colour bar was an integral part of the colonial policies. But Belgians liked to stress that unlike the British, there was no colour bar in the Congo. Although no jobs were reserved for the whites in Congo, it was almost an unwritten law. Further, there were modern towns and progressive welfare measures with a strict colour bar. Only in the late 1950s, did discrimination on the basis of colour began to lessen.<sup>14</sup>

#### TRANSITION FROM COLONIALISM TO DECOLONIZATION

As a result of the education, economic and social conditions, an educated African elite began to emerge. A

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13 Ibid., pp. 345-6 and 502.

14 Ibid., p. 502.

group of wage earners also emerged who migrated to the towns or urban areas causing partial exodus from the villages. Most of the town migrants had left education at the elementary level, but they formed welfare associations. Another group of cash crop producers emerged whose number varied from country to country according to the occupational opportunities.<sup>15</sup> Gradually, conflict of interests began to manifest itself.

The source of conflict lay in numerous factors. First, although the new techniques, institutions, and machines introduced in Africa were welcomed, they were inadequate and unequally distributed. Secondly, the colonial government frequently made over extensive mineral rights to powerful metropolitan companies. And the companies did not pay adequate dividends to their shareholders. Third, discontent over the question of forced labour and in French Africa, over conscription and the harshness of the "indigent", while in Southern Africa and Eastern Africa over the irritating pass laws and segregation were a potential source of conflict.

Fourth, a wave of discontentment and dissatisfaction engulfed the entire continent over the neglect of industrialization, the high prices of imported goods and

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15 A. Abu Boahen, "The Colonial Era : Conquest to Independence" in Gann and Duignan, ed., Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960 (London, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 505 ff.

especially in the 1930s, over the low prices for agricultural products.<sup>16</sup>

This grievance later on became an important legacy for the newly independent countries. Before the Second World War, the demand of the upper-echelon elite in Africa was for Africanization of the civil services and representation of the Africans in the legislatures. But after the war, dissatisfaction and discontentment got intensified despite the accelerated pace of economic and social developments. Nationalist mass movements and various political parties emerged, demanding independence.

As a consequence of the aftermath of the Second World War, the economy of the European countries had to be rejuvenated by an influx of American capital. The former

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16 Ibid., pp. 508-9. It is evident from the following speech made at the Legislative Assembly of Ghana in 1939:

"Now Your Excellency, as industries are the mainstay of any country, I desire to emphasize the necessity of fostering native industries such as soap, salt, tobacco, sugar, rice, pottery, cloth-weaving, fishing and palm-oil with a view to establishing good internal trade in this country. Why should crafts that have held the people from time immemorial be made to give way for a foreign cargo? Home weaving with all its beauty, for example, make way for Manchester and Japanese goods?...are we to understand, Sir, that our Agricultural Department is incapable of helping us to produce locally the articles mentioned (above)? Surely, they are capable, unless, in order to protect the European trade, it is not intended to help us to develop economically. It may be...a misconception, but I say, Sir, that this is what really exists in the minds of the people of this country."

structures of world power gave way to the two Super Powers-- USA and USSR--each the centre of global constellations. And since both favoured anti-colonial movements, the other European powers were forced to hand over the governance of the colonies to the colonial leaders. Between 1955 and 1968 most of the African countries, excluding the Portuguese Africa, became independent.<sup>17</sup>

#### NEO-COLONIALISM AT WORK

The roots of neo-colonial network are embedded in the colonial situation of the developing countries (emphasis added). It is a continuation of imperialism but with new tools. The techniques, methods, and the manoeuvring capacity of the neo-colonial powers are used to weaken or strengthen the newly independent countries. In many cases new masters replace the old. Although political independence to colonies ended direct political domination, in the new situation an indirect manipulation in political, ideological, military, and above all, economic fields became the chief expression of neo-colonialism.

Britain's insistence on drawing up the constitutions of the countries about to get independence or using regionalism within a particular territory, for example,

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17 See Chapter I, supra pp. 4-6.

Nigeria, or playing up religious cleavages etc. are some of the new techniques of the new era. The French used the same technique in breaking up French Equatorial and French West Africa into yet small fourteen groups territories.<sup>18</sup>

Manuel Bridier has classified imperialist counter-offensive in the newly liberated countries into four categories.<sup>19</sup> First, where neo-colonialist governments have been overthrown by popular insurrections, the latter did not hold power for long but lost power to the new representatives of neo-colonialism. Second, where neo-colonial interests have been strong enough to fend off any direct attack; for example, Gabon, Malawi, Lesotho, and Botswana.

A third situation is the result of the inter-imperialist rivalries and a product of conflicts among local patronage groups. A change of guard among government 'equipes' takes place in the absence of popular unrest. For example, in the Republic of Central Africa, and military coup in Bangui. And, the fourth measure is to resort to

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18 Nkrumah, Neocolonialism ; The Last Stage of Imperialism (London, 1965), Introduction, p. xiii; Jack Woddis, Introduction to Neocolonialism (London, 1967), p. 71.

19 Manuel Bridier, "Notes on Imperialist Counter-Offensive", International Socialist Journal (Rome), vol. 4, no. 22, August 1967, pp. 541 ff. Manuel Bridier (under the pen name Emilie R. Braundi) wrote on African Affairs in the Paris weekly France Observateur from Marxian point of view.

counter-revolutionary coups d'etat, wherever a country chose to pursue socialist road of development, as in Ghana.

Another remarkable feature of Neo-colonialism is the high degree of inter-imperialist rivalry for influence between the USA and the other developed Western countries, such as Great Britain, France, and West Germany. Against the general background of competition is also the inter-bloc rivalry between the USA and the USSR. After the Second World War, the European countries had been left militarily and economically weak. At this point, the USA found an opportunity to penetrate the former British colonies, since American capital had penetrated the British economy itself. In the beginning, the USA played a secondary and restrained role, but later on disagreement between Britain and America became apparent. Similarly, in 1966-67, the American and the French interests clashed, opening up another arena of neo-colonial rivalry.<sup>20</sup>

An illustration of Anglo-American rivalry at the political plane can be seen in East Africa. Kenya is a

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20 E.A. Tarabrin, The New Scramble for Africa, Kenneth Russell, trans (Moscow, 1974), pp. 197 ff. Also see Editors' Review of the month, "Imperialism in the seventies: Problems and Perspectives", Monthly Review (New York), vol. 23, no. 10, March 1972, pp. 4-7; Maximova, Economic Aspects of Capitalist Integration, Bryan Bean, trans. (Moscow, 1973), pp. 262-96.



region of military and strategic significance, linking sea and air routes of the metropolis (Great Britain) with its Asian possessions; protecting the flanks in the "east of Suez" strategy; and also as a "gateway" to Central Africa, besides being the high prized land of the British migrants. However, the situation changed after Kenya got independence. In 1961, Mennen Williams, US Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, paid a visit to Kenya. As a result of the talks, Kenya was put on the US priority list, receiving "Most Favoured Nation" treatment when it applied for loans, aid, etc.

Kenya is further supported by the United States Information Agency, schools, libraries, and televisions. "Americanization" of the government personnel at the training institute, financed by US funds, helps America to propagate American "ideology". The armed forces too have been an object of this Anglo-American rivalry.

An important practice of neo-colonialism has been to influence the key personnel in the new States. Most of the states find themselves unable to staff the civil services with trained people of their own country. Therefore, they retain a part of the bureaucracy of the ex-metropolis. Even today in Kenya and Malawi, British intelligence officers are employed by the independent governments.

Britain has been one of the international centre of learning for educating and moulding the outlook of the

bureaucrats of the colonies; the "allies" from among the local population--a method of "Anglicisation" of the selected persons from the colonies. In 1970, over 70,000 foreign students studied in Britain of whom 11,000 approximately were Africans.<sup>21</sup> At the same time, the number of teachers sent out from Britain too increased. About 1,300 teachers serve abroad every year.

French effort is comparable to the British. In 1968, about 28,000 French African colonies, controlled by some 260 different organizations active in the field. The number of the African students in France too had been increasing from 3,000 in 1959-60 to 6,000 (13% of the total of foreign students) in 1968-69. Education is mainly to indoctrinate the French ideology. This process of "Gallicisation" is a direct continuation of the policy of assimilation.<sup>22</sup>

France gave special attention to its colonies' military personnel. In 1968-69, 2,600 African servicemen, including 673 Algerians were being trained in French military colleges. In 1969, about 18 missions and 2,500 commissioned and non-commissioned officers were stationed in French Africa

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21 Tarabrin, *ibid.*, p. 246.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 247 ff; William B. Cohen, Rulers of Empire : The French Colonial Service in Africa (California, 1971), ch. 5; Gifford and Weiskel, "African Education in a Colonial Context : French and British Styles", in Gifford and Louis, ed., n. 34, pp. 663-711.

to render "aid on the spot" to build African countries' armed forces. In 1963, France created "volunteers for progress" to compete with the USA's "Peace Corps".

Another concept that developed, to prevent or block America from penetrating the French speaking African territories, was "Francophonie". A West German journal Afrika heute writing about 74 "Francophonie" institutes, including associations, societies, foundations, centres, described them as "foreign policy vehicles" of France "that is not available to other countries" and forms a "weapon system" against her competitors.<sup>23</sup>

America has been a serious rival in all the fields. US expenditure on African education has increased 11 times over the past 15 years, now running almost over 200 million dollars a year. Besides giving them special training, about 77% are used by AID missions. The number of students has gone up from 1,234 Africans (3.6% of the total foreign students in USA) in 1954-55 to 6,865 (8%) in 1964-68 and approximately 15,000 (18%) in 1968-69.<sup>24</sup> Mostly the students come from the former British colonies. Under the ASPAU programme, over 1,306 places were provided for African students in America in 1967-68. This increasing number of output of African students from the USA is bound to have a

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23 Reproduced in Tarabrin, *ibid.*, pp. 234-5; Afrika heute, nos. 2-3, 1969.

24 Tarabrin, *ibid.*, pp. 251-2.

cumulative effect on their outlook and subsequently, on certain aspects of their national life.

In order to gain influence, the USA created "peace corps" whose function was to assist the developing nations in building their societies. Their basic ideological plane is anti-communism. "Peace corps" as an important instrument of US foreign policy, has been unconsciously assisting CIA of USA.<sup>25</sup> The increasing demand for such assistance from the various countries including the former French territories, like Chad, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Gabon, Niger etc. has been a bone of contention between USA and France and Britain. Similar attempts have been made by West Germany. In 1963 an organization of development aiders--a German Development Service--was set up. By 1965 it aimed at having over 1,000 members working overseas, with a budget of 10 million marks.

The US military too has played an important role in the neo-colonialist manoeuvres. Various acts of aggression, such as intervention, assassination, and coups d'etat, became a common feature. Provocation of civil conflict between the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus; intervention in Cuba, Guyana, Ghana, Chile etc. are some such illustrations. In many cases the CIA of US acted as the main instigator of these acts of aggression.

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25 Nkrumah, n. 18, pp. 249 ff; Jack Woddis, n. 18, pp. 73-74.

The NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS are some of the politico-military complexes that have been used by the West to protect their imperialist interests. For example, NATO was the main source of arms supply to the Portuguese Government in its war against the Africans. The US gave support to such military organizations that have found themselves getting deeper and deeper in the colonial wars.<sup>26</sup> Military bases, air bases and naval bases are important means of entry into various nations. Such bases stretch across the African continent. In 1960 the NATO countries had over 60 bases in Algeria, Libya, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Chad, Ethiopia, Eriteria, the Republic of South Africa, Kenya, Mozambique, Malta etc.<sup>27</sup>

Neo-colonialism is usually seen as the subsequent outcome of the economic forces of the imperialist capitalist world in the Third World developing countries. When a colony attains its political independence, its economic ties with the metropolis remain unaffected. After independence in 1967, out of the 39 African nations 31 were either in the sterling area \*(14) or in the France zone \*(17).

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26 Stewart Smith, US Neocolonialism in Africa (Moscow, 1974), pp. 152 ff.

27 V. Vakhrushev, Neocolonialism - Methods and Manoeuvres, Katherine Judelson, trans. (Moscow, 1973), p. 128.

\* Refer to the number of countries in that particular area.

Liberia, Ethiopia, and French Somaliland are frequently referred to as being in the dollar area. While some of the Southern African/countries are either the members of the South African monetary areas or of the Portuguese peseta.

EEC (European Economic Community) formed "Eurafrica" in 1958 drawing 17 of the former French colonies and Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire into its group, and thus, opening up Africa to other non-colonial powers, such as West Germany. "Horizontal" African co-operation and regionalism developed such as OAU, African Development Bank etc. Because "Vertical" integration of the ex-colonies with ex-imperialist powers failed to overcome economic fragmentation and dependence of the former on a few cash crops, to mobilize greater resources for development and to broaden markets. This helped in promoting US interest and in cutting across rival groups.<sup>28</sup>

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28 Stewart Smith, n. 26, pp. 47 ff; Goncharov, "New Forms of Colonialism in Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies (London), vol. 1, no. 4, December 1963, p. 473. The African states were granted preferential customs to sell their farm crops. These were later on reduced and also the exports remained subject to the fluctuations of the world market. The African countries were further granted subsidies, worth \$ 230 million out of the total development fund of \$ 730 million for the five years (1963-67). Thus, cuts in preferences reduced the foreign currency obtained from exports, which in turn effectively reduced the purchasing power of these countries. Therefore, they could not import the necessary capital goods for the development of their own industry. The compensations allotted were to be spent on agriculture as determined by the concerned board.

Emile R. Braundi in "Neocolonialism and Class Struggle" International Socialist Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, January-

Independent English speaking states that chose to remain in the sterling area found the system advantageous and without any added obligation. They could leave if their interests dictated so. As a result, their currency got linked to the sterling, and they maintained balance in London for international transactions, and adhered to the rules imposed by the UK on its own nationals for controlling transactions with other areas. An important part of the private assets and foreign exchange transactions with countries outside the area were held at or through London.

Although Britain has been unable to retain a decisive influence over their internal monetary and fiscal policies, yet its influence is felt since the commercial banking is concentrated in the hands of a small number of British institutions with extensive branches. Of late, British influence is being undermined by the American and other European financial institutions.

On the other hand, in the post-war period, France had to incorporate its colonies into the tight French monetary system. Thus developed a Franc Zone under which it increased its protectionist features, including import

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February 1964, pp. 60-63 deals with a similar question. The analysis highlights the feeble propensity of the local bourgeoisie to invest while the archaео-capital/colonial capital is disinvesting and leaving the country; leaving behind neo-colonial capital. Also see, Vakhrushev, n. 59, pp. 280-305.

licensing, quantitative restrictions and exchange controls. It also maintained guaranteed markets for a significant part of its exports and obtained assured supplies of essential raw materials. It also paid more than the world prices (called 'surprix') for certain primary products, imported from Africa into France. An advantage of this system was that the French individuals living in the French African territories could make unlimited transfer to France at a favourable rate of exchange.

Trade, foreign investments, aid, and assistance are the various other important economic linkages between the newly independent countries of the Third World, more especially of the African continent, with their ex-metropolitan countries. The USA, EEC and Japan too have joined the global trade war along with the ex-imperialist masters.

In the post-independence period, Britain's trade with her ex-colonies mostly remained unchanged. The 1960-1970 decade saw Britain lose its position as the main trading partner; its share in the world capitalist trade fell by almost 3% in exports and 2.5% in imports. It, therefore, increased its trade with the developing capitalist countries instead. Between 1955 and 1969, its exports rose from 64% to 75% and the imports from 63% to 70%. Thus, averting the decline in the system of imperial preferences in the 60s that had begun during the post-war period as a part



of the "general process of trade liberalization".<sup>29</sup>

As mentioned above, the existence of the Sterling area, and its structure of tariff preferences have helped to maintain its trade relations with the African Commonwealth countries. Despite the devaluation of pound in November 1967 and its worsening monetary situation, London introduced a dollar clause with regard to the foreign exchange reserves held by the central banks of the member countries, to prevent disintegration of the sterling area.

Britain's trade with Africa is of secondary importance to Britain's trade with the rest of the world. It absorbs 6% of its exports and is a source of 8% of its imports. While Britain's trade with the developed world increased 75% in volume between 1958 and 1966, its trade with the less developed countries increased only 9%. Figures of import-export between Africa and Britain for the period 1963-67 highlight: (a) South Africa became Britain's second largest export market as large as Tropical Africa which was a moderately strong market for Britain, both for exports and imports. And (b) trade with Rhodesia declined as a result of the sanctions imposed against Southern Africa to get political effects.<sup>30</sup>

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29 Tarabrin, n. 20, pp. 126-7.

30 See Appendix I, Table 1.1.

Britain's trade with the French speaking Africa stepped up during the 1960s. In 1968, export of Algerian products rose by 38% and imports by 50%. British exports to Zaire grew by 14%, to Morocco by 37%, and to the Ivory Coast by 48%. Similarly trade with Malagasy Republic, Tunisia, Cameroon, Burundi, Togo, Chad, Ruanda, and Dahomey was affected.<sup>31</sup> West Germany, Japan, and USA's trade threatened to dislodge Britain and also France as trading partners in Africa.<sup>32</sup>

As mentioned earlier, many countries stayed within the Franc zone. Major elements regarding quotas, reciprocal tariff preferences, and price subsidies remained same as before. In absolute terms, French trade with Africa has increased only moderately in the recent years. Between 1962 and 1967 French world trade expanded rapidly, thereby causing a decrease in the imports to Africa from France from 20.3% to 14.4% of the total French exports. And, at the same time, a corresponding decrease in exports from Africa to France took place; from 21.6% to 14.9%.<sup>33</sup>

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31 Tarabrin, n. 20, pp. 126-8.

32 See Appendix I, Table 1.2.

Since in this thesis my concern is only to bring out the relations between the ex-imperial metropolitan countries and their colonies, the details of trade between the other powers pursuing neo-colonialism and African countries will not be discussed.

33 See Appendix I, Table 1.3.

In 1968, once more the importance of the African markets for France was felt. It was observed that France was using export of capital to boost the process, alongside arranging direct or indirect export subsidies. African countries received 54% of the French pharmaceutical products, 47% of instruments, 43% detergents, 40% metal products plus output of the cotton industry, 30% of sugar and railway equipment, 20-30% of clothing, paper and cardboard, and knitwear, and about 20% of electrical equipment, footwear and cars of the total French export.

During the same year France imported from Africa 80% of all the sugar imported, 65% of wine and cocoa, 50% of coffee, tea, fruit, edible oils, oil producing crops and vegetables, 41% of lead, 30% of metallic ores etc.<sup>34</sup> For example, Algeria had voted to become independent in co-operation with France. Despite its exports to Russia, in 1967 its need of the French markets was apparent, especially in the field of oil production, wine distribution, and technical and educational assistance.<sup>35</sup>

As against competitive marketing of products elsewhere in the world, subsidizing the exports from Africa is a disadvantage from the French point of view. But France

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34 Tarabrin, n. 20, pp. 124-5.

35 David Gordon, "Algeria, 1962-1967 : An Essay on Dependence in Independence", in Gifford and Louis, ed., n. 2, pp. 749-76.

directly benefits from access to agricultural commodities and raw material, including petroleum from Algeria and Uranium from Gabon, payable in French Francs, which means France saves foreign exchange. The aid contribution to Tropical Africa by the other five EEC members of the European Development Fund (EDF) in the form of lira, Deutsche marks etc. provides additional foreign exchange in France.

Although immediately after the war, African members of the Franc zone ran into trade deficit with the non-Franc area and France had to cover up, in the recent years they have contributed to the French currency reserves; surplus ranging from \$ 200 million to \$ 300 million per year. France has also attempted to loosen its Franc zone structure and to reduce cost to itself by scaling down and trying to eventually eliminate certain of the 'surprix' paid for African products or to transfer the burden of some of these payments to the common market.<sup>36</sup>

Another aspect of trade that needs some attention is arms trade. It has been determined by the following factors: (a) The rising cost of developing and producing more complex weapon system has led to the increased concentration of the means of arms production in the hands of a few rich nations. Between 1950 and 1972, an average of 86% arms supply came from just four countries--USA, UK, USSR, and France. (b) Most of the dealings are controlled by the

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36 Nielsen, n. 11, pp. 100-2.

governments, less than 5% is in the hands of private dealers. And (c) USA, and USSR generally supply weapons free of charge or at subsidized prices and low interest rates. Consequently, the Third World countries are dependent on the goodwill of these countries (governments) for the purchase of major sophisticated weapons. The pattern of such supplies is hegemonic, industrial or restrictive.<sup>37</sup>

The arms supply policies of Britain and France are the examples of the industrial pattern. Britain also represents a country that was forced to undergo a transition from an arms supply policy which served to reinforce its position of hegemony, to one dictated by the requirements of the domestic defence industry. British supply to Africa, including South Africa, totalled 14.4% of the total British arms supply between 1950 and 1972. Supplies to the Sub-Saharan region became only significant after 1958 when weapons were supplied as a part of the aid to the British colonies gaining independence.<sup>38</sup>

Britain is the second largest supplier<sup>to Sub-Saharan Africa</sup> after USSR; <sup>arms only worth</sup> it supplied total \$ 7 million a year during 1960-72. However, Africa's demand for arms is small. With the exception of Kenya, other countries have diversified their purchasing

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37 SIPRI, Arms Trade with the Third World (London, 1975), pp. 28-29; also see Michael Kidron, Western Capitalism since the War (Penguin, 1970). He shows how the 'arms economy' acts as the factor in offsetting the crisis in the capitalist system.

38 SIPRI, *ibid.*, pp. 100 ff.

markets, opening new vistas for the European and Commonwealth countries. In North Africa, Libya was its main buyer. Since 1957, Britain had proffered \$ 3.7 million in military aid.<sup>1</sup> In 1968-69 Libya, with the aid of its oil revenues, had ordered large quantities of weapons from Britain including Chieftan tanks and anti-aircraft missiles. However, after the coup, the orders were cancelled and British were not allowed to install their troops in Libya. Instead, Mirage planes and later on, in 1972 AMX-30 were ordered from France.<sup>39</sup>

The bulk of French arms supplies to its colonies in the first two years after independence was estimated at \$ 80 million, and in the late 60s about \$ 2 million per year. French supplies are limited but at the time of independence, the ex-community countries received one or two light liaison planes, one helicopter, some armoured vehicles, and one or two patrol boats. The 1969-70 credits included provisions for aircrafts and armoured vehicles for Tunisia.<sup>40</sup>

South Africa became a buyer of French weapons in 1961. In 1964, it had become France's fourth largest aerospace customer. And, between 1961 and 1969, France supplied almost 55% of South Africa's total major weapons

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39 Ibid., pp. 105-6.

40 Ibid.

imports. Arms supply to the African continent accounts for 34% of the total French weapon exports between 1950 and 1972. USA, USSR, and other supplied about 46% of the total arms supply to Africa in the same period; France supplied about 31% and Britain supplied approximately 23%.<sup>41</sup>

In the post-world war period, the development of science and technology have changed the pattern of relations among nations. The structural changes in material production brought about by technological progress have altered the position of the former colonies, now independent developing countries, in the world capitalist economy. The developing countries of the Third World remain an important source of raw material for the industrially developed countries, especially those of the Western Europe.

As a result of the dependence of the ex-metropolitan countries on their colonies, the latter invested heavily in the colonies and held major shares both in the agricultural and the mining industries--mostly in the extractive sectors. Since the developing countries got independence, the situation has changed. Britain and France still hold large shares in their ex-colonial territories'

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41 See Appendix I, Table 1.4.

monopoly investments, unlike Belgium.<sup>42</sup>

A glance at the following table (Table 1.5) would highlight the development of the extractive sector and it also explains the underdevelopment of the African continent, despite its possession of world's 53 important basic industrial metals and minerals.

If one were to study the nature of foreign investments in Africa, which also reflects the pattern of control, Goux and Landeau's classification becomes relevant. They have classified the "host countries" into five categories: 'Colonies', 'independents', 'protectorates', 'condominia', and 'countries on the road to annexation'.<sup>43</sup>

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42 Belgium does not hold 70% or more foreign investments, in any country. USA, Japan and West Germany have in the post-war years tilted the balance. Many countries have been positively influenced by USSR, e.g. Somalia.

43 See Helge Hveem, "The Extent and Type of Direct Foreign Investment in Africa", in Widstrand, ed., Multinational Firms in Africa (Dakar, 1975), p. 67. Also see R. Green, "Political independence and the National Economy: An Essay on the Political Economy of Decolonisation", in C. Allen and R.W. Johnson, ed., African Perspectives (London, 1970), pp. 290-8.



TABLE 1.5

PERCENTAGE PRODUCTION OF AFRICAN PRIMARY  
PRODUCTS COMPARED TO USA

Country	Year	Agriculture, Forestry, fishing	Mining	Industry and Manufac- ture	Cons- truc- tion	Trans- port & Communi- cation	Commer- ce	Public Admini- stra- tion	Others
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Algeria	1958	21	3	11	6	6	19	22	12
Congo (L)	1958	26	16	12	6	9	7	14	16
Kenya	1958	42	1	10	4	9	13	10	11
Morocco	1958	34	6	18	4	*	15	10	13
Nigeria	1956	63	1	2	11	1	4	6	3
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	1958	20	14	11	8	9	10	4	24
Tanganyika	1958	59	4	7	6	7	5	7	5
Republic of South Africa	1958	12	13	2	5	8	12	10	20
USA	1959	4	1	30	5	8	17	13	22

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Source: Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London, 1965), p. 3.

'Colonies' refers to the "host country" in which the direct foreign investments are 30% or more of the GNP of that country. While if the corresponding percentage of investment is below 1, they would fall in the 'independent' category. In 1967, according to this scale, Gabon, Congo RP; and Mauritania, Swaziland; and Zambia; Liberia; & Libya, and Zaire were the 'colonies' of France, UK, USA and Belgium respectively. Only UAR and Lesotho qualified as 'independents'.

By 1971 Lesotho, however, seemed to be 'on the road to annexation'. That is, foreign investments began to accede the GNP of the country. Congo PR moved towards becoming a 'protectorate'. 'Protectorate' refers to the country in which the ratio of foreign investment to the GNP of the country falls by more than 50%, yet the foreign investment remains, just more than 30% of the GNP. Algeria is an example of 'condominium' where French investments fell from 17% of the GNP to 4%. 'Condominium' reflects an appreciable fall in the ratio of foreign investment to the GNP of the country. The foreign investments here are less than 25% of the GNP.

Direct private investments from the various capitalist countries have penetrated the interior of the African continent, openly competing where interests have clashed or merging when necessary. In case of Britain, investments in the South Africa increased between 1960 and 1965, while in Commonwealth Africa they grew moderately till 1962, after

which they declined.<sup>44</sup>

In French Africa, capital from the metropolis came to dominate banking and sectors in commerce, manufacturing and agriculture. In some Francophone states, however, French interests suffered. Algeria nationalized French business firms, driving out 90% of nearly 1 million French residents. In Guinea and Mali French business were similarly affected.

But elsewhere these interests were protected by special "establishment" agreements, making it difficult for other investors especially US from poaching on French interests. Private investment has generally increasingly gone to the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Senegal for the mining of iron ore, copper, uranium, petroleum and gas. Decline in direct investments has been offset by a marked increase in export credits. The following table illustrates the importance of Africa to France.

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44 See Appendix I, Table 1.6.

TABLE 1.7

DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN AFRICA (MINUS DEPRECIATION EXPENSES) BY USA, UK, AND FRANCE (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Country	1960	1968	% of total foreign investments in 1968
USA	586.2	1,477	3.9
UK	959.2	1,408	8.8
France	614.1	1,295	32.0

Source: Tarabrin, The New Scramble for Africa (Moscow, 1974),

Africa supplies important metal ores, minerals, oil, gold, diamond, and platinum to the USA, UK, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Japan and Canada. Although American capital is quantitatively less than British capital in Africa, it has a wider field of investment. Almost 30% of the bulk investment in Africa in 1967 was in the petroleum production sector. And, approximately 20% in mining and smelting, and 56.5% of the stock of foreign investments, including in agriculture, was in the raw material extraction.<sup>45</sup>

Foreign investments in manufacturing sector accounts for more than 50% of the total stock of foreign investments in Gambia, Swaziland, Chad, Somalia, and Brundi--a surprising

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<sup>45</sup> See Appendix I, Tables 1.8 and 1.9.

fact considering the low share this sector occupies in the GDP of these countries.<sup>46</sup> For example, if we note the type of manufacture industries established by these investors in Chad, it would show the direction and, also show how far these countries are benefitting. Two-thirds of the foreign investment is in cotton ginning, textile work (a going venture), a brewery, sugar and flour mills, assembly plants for bicycles, and transistors, brick and tile factories. However, they do not represent a high level of processing. Many other countries like Nigeria, have in the recent years promoted high processing industries.

Raw materials are an urgent need of many industrial nations and of the war industry in particular. Therefore, raw materials are being accumulated and stockpiled. USA, Britain, Japan, France and FRG, are pursuing a programme of creating strategic reserves of raw materials, and as a result, are importing raw materials from all over the world, including Africa. Supply of raw materials and minerals from Africa has given rise to a new phenomenon--the "rediscovery" of the continent.

The inter-imperialist struggle for the various resources and control over them led to the development of monopoly houses and cartels. Earlier, British and French monopolies dominated the scene, in 1960s American capital

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46 Hveem, n. 43, p. 74.

was well on its way to replacing them. Subsequent mergers took place, placing the monopolists in a better position; at other points of history, bitter rivalry forced the hands of the monopolists to make concessions to the "host countries".

As is evident from the tables referred to above Mauritania represented a case of extreme investment--92% in the mining sector and 0.4% in manufacturing sector. But almost the whole of mining was controlled by one firm, MIFERMA, accounting for 1/3rd of the Gross National Product of Mauritania and 80% of Mauritania's total export. LAMCO of Liberia is another example of monopoly control by the foreign powers; a Liberian-American-Swedish Minerals Co., where 62.5% of the shares belong to the foreigners and the investments are relatively and in absolute terms larger than the "host country" economy.<sup>47</sup>

BP/Shell's investment in Nigerian petroleum is an example of the single largest corporate holding in the African extractive business, excluding South Africa. In 1967, it alone accounted for 7% of the stock of foreign investment in Africa. "Oppenheimer empire" appropriately describes the three-fold scale investments in South Africa, and through its associated companies, spreading the tentacles

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47 Ibid., pp. 69 ff., Tarabrin, n. 20, pp. 162-96; Andre Gunder Frank, On Capitalist Underdevelopment (Bombay, 1975), pp. 64-65.

of its interest into Tanganyika, Uganda, Congo, Angola, Mozambique, West Africa and even into Sahara and North Africa.<sup>48</sup>

Zambian copper has been important for Britain. It is the third largest copper producer after USA and Chile. To avoid competition both in price and quality, USA wanted to oust British monopolies. When Zambian Government took an uncompromising stand against Ian Smith's Government of South Rhodesia in 1966, the rail-road through Rhodesia to the port of Beira in Mozambique could not be used to convey copper. Therefore, to prevent interruption in work, Americans and British came together. Anglo-American co-operation of South Africa and Roan Selection Trust control Zambian copper mining.

Potential uranium reserves, oil, manganese and natural gas in Gabon have been a source of conflict between France and USA. US-French struggle for power is further seen in CAR's changing orientation; leaving UDEAC for UEAC and later on returning to the former. There are a number of such examples which show the changes taking place as a result of inter-imperialist rivalry in the form of either a merger, a joint venture of the neo-colonialists, or a change of the old imperialist by a new neo-colonialist.

When in 1968, American oil company concluded an agreement with Algerian SONATRACH Company, surrendering 51%

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48 See Nkrumah, n. 18, pp. 127 ff. He has dealt with this aspect throughout the book.

of their Saharan oil shares to get the right of selling Algerian oil at a higher rate, it once more brought to the fore US-French clash of interest. In 1966, SAFRAP--a French oil company obtained permission to survey and drill for oil in Nigeria, a clash of interest between Britain, America and France was highlighted. However, in the end BP-Shell, Anglo-Dutch group benefited at the cost of the French.

What becomes relevant from this study is to understand how the "host countries" have been affected. As is apparent it is mostly exploitation of economy of these countries. Most of them have mono-cultural economies as a result of the colonial rule. Even if the country is in a better position or to sell its produce at a higher rate, it does not benefit. It not only has to buy food and other consumer items but also has to import technical know-how. Thus, the Third World countries remain highly dependent.

Although after gaining independence, the emphasis came to be on industrializing the country, in order to become less and less dependent and eventually free of the foreign mercenaries; to prevent disintegration or 'disarticulation' of the economy; and to raise the standard of living of people and to reduce the gap between the rich and poor in cultural and political sense. These countries were faced with the problem of developing the industrial and the manufacturing sector. Because they lacked the necessary technology. The continued presence of the monopolies works negatively.



They continue to repatriate profits to the metropolitan countries.<sup>49</sup>

Another factor that must be noted is that wherever the share of foreign investments is low, as in Ethiopia, transfer of technology is used by the neo-imperialist powers as a weapon to maintain their domination. The use of the term 'transfer of technology' is very misleading. Because it is the finished products manufactured abroad that are merely assembled in any developing country.

In this way, the centres control and penetrate the economies of the periphery without losing profits. At the same time, investments in the periphery for the manufacturing corporations is the means of capturing local markets. As H. Hveem puts it: "The African pattern is mostly that of being the last link in the 'product cycle'."<sup>50</sup>

State "aid" is another new weapon in the hands of the neo-colonialists, in their struggle for power and influence. It is generally given to those countries whose internal political arrangements, foreign policy alignments, treatment of foreign private investment, debt-servicing record, export policy/ies etc. are considered desirable, and are acceptable

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49 Hveem, n. 43, pp. 74-75; G. Arrighi, "International Corporations, Labour Aristocracies, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", in Arrighi and Saul, ed., Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (New York, 1973), pp. 105-51.

50 Hveem, *ibid.*, p. 77.

to the country providing aid.<sup>51</sup>

President Kennedy in 1961 said: "Foreign aid is a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world, and sustains a good many countries which would definitely collapse, or pass into the Communist bloc."<sup>52</sup> This introduces an ideological aspect to the existing power rivalry.

The concept of aid, according to Tarabrin, is linked with the collapse of the colonial system. He quotes from a West German Journal "Internationales Afrika Forum" that the idea of one state investing its own resources to develop another country or its colony would not have occurred to anyone before the World War II. It was born in the "minds of the ruling circles of the former metropolises and their imperialist partners and competitors when the need arose to preserve the capitalist system in vast regions of the world."<sup>53</sup>

Aid, according to Hayter Teresa, can be considered as a concession by the imperialist powers to enable them to continue their exploitation of the semi-colonial countries. While aid helps the Third World countries to find short-term solutions to their economic problems, it allows or makes

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51 Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Harmondsworth, 1974), pp. 15-16.

52 Reproduced in *ibid.*, p. 5.

53 Tarabrin, n. 20, pp. 98-99.

an assured passage for the continued flow of private profits and interests on past debts. Thus, creating a class within the Third World which is an ally of imperialism.<sup>54</sup>

Aid from the ex-metropolitan countries has continued to rise. For example, between 1963 and 1969, British aid increased from 14% to 22.7% with Africa taking 89% of the total allocation for technical 'aid'. "Technical aid" acts to some extent as the "equivalent of the colonial superstructure."<sup>55</sup> While French aid for "cultural" and "technical collaboration" rose from 36.2% to 15.7% in the same period.

An analysis of British aid for the period 1963-69 shows approximately 33% was allocated to supporting the monetary systems of the recipient countries, 19% to financing imports, 17% for technical co-operation, 15% on the development of the infrastructure, 9.3% to develop industry and 6.7% on social measures.<sup>56</sup>

France relies more than Britain on her programme of aid. As Rene Gendarme has pointed out, development aid has become a most effective component of foreign policy and that it is a convenient way of carrying out decolonization without detriment to traditional economic ties and without

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54 Teresa Hayter, n. 51, p. 9.

55 Tarabrin, n. 20, p. 101.

56 Ibid., p. 106.

modifying the balance of forces.<sup>57</sup> French aid is concentrated on Afro-Malagasy group. France gives 40% of the total Western "aid" to Africa, and 87.5% of the French aid to the developing countries goes to Africa.

An average of 1,300 million NF 'assistance' flows from France to its former colonies through FAC (the Fund for Aid and Co-operation). An analysis of the fund allocation (sector-wise) highlights the biased character of French aid-- in favour of developing the primary production in the economy of her former colonies. For example, in 1962 almost 20% of the funds were allocated to Cameroon for the development of agriculture, fishery and forestry; over 40% for the development of 'infrastructure'; about 15% for general expenditure, and about 20% on public health and education. The large allocation for the development of infrastructure was to reduce the costs of production and distribution of the foreign companies operating in that area, and thereby, to increase their profits; while measures for creating national industrial base were ignored.<sup>58</sup>

Despite the high supply of "aid by the ex-imperialist Britain and France, this strategy is an important

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57 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 106.

58 Goncharov, n. 28, p. 471.

component of USA and FRG policies. USA, and FRG have been successfully trying to displace Britain and France.<sup>59</sup> US "aid" increased three times since 1959, while that of European non-metropolitan countries increased four times. In 1961 the former metropolises accounted for approximately 60% of all "aid" but by 1967 they accounted for 47% only; US aid had become half of the "aid" from the colonial powers in 1967 as against one-quarter in 1960.

This highlights the highly competitive nature of "aid" and its increasing importance. It has come to act as a "partner" of the monopolies involving itself even more deeply in the vicissitudes of the inter-imperialist rivalry. Moreover, USA has begun to manipulate the World Bank, the International Development etc. as its neo-imperial weapons.<sup>60</sup>

A rough estimate of the total of debts of the developing countries in 1970 was 60,000 million dollars. Repayment of such large debts becomes a problem for the recipient countries. Reginald Prentice, the former British Minister of Overseas Development said at the Commonwealth conference in January 1969 that nearly all the money that Britain had supplied to Zambia as "aid" returned to Britain in one

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59 See Appendix I, Table 1.10.

60 See Hayter Teresa, n. 51; Stewart Smith, n. 26; and Hensman, Rich vs Poor: The Reality of Aid (London, 1971); also see A.G. Frank, n. 47, pp. 64-65. An example of IMF loan to Liberia emphasizes the manipulation of the Western powers. The loan was given on the understanding that Liberia would enact fiscal reforms in return.

way or another.<sup>61</sup> This only goes to explain why the donors benefit while the underdeveloped and poor countries become poorer.<sup>62</sup>

Furthermore, the Western monopolies penetrate the economies of the developing countries yet in another way: by their "invisible trade".<sup>63</sup> For example, 90% of the world ocean shipping is controlled by the imperialist countries. By increasing the rates, they earned over \$ 1,600 million as net annual freight expenses from the developing countries between 1951 and 1961. And about \$ 370 million as insurance payments in 1961 alone.

In fact, neo-colonialists use very refined tactics like aid, trade, monopoly investments, to name a few, to gain a better position for themselves, or to displace the older imperial masters. Aid is a kind of "bribe" which helps the donor country to be in a position to dictate terms and also guide the course of development of the recipient country; also an area of inter-imperialist rivalry.

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61 Tarabrin, n. 20, p. 101.

62 Nkrumah, n. 18, pp. 241-3. His analysis highlights the fact how 'aid' becomes another means of exploitation. For example, in 1961, \$ 6,000 million was given as aid to the developing countries. In return they extracted \$ 5,000 million in profits, \$ 1,000 million in interest, and \$ 5,800 million from non-equivalent exchange. In other words, the neo-colonialists extracted \$ 11,800 million as against \$ 6,000 million aid put in these countries.

63 *Ibid.*, pp. 143-4.

The purpose of this Chapter has been to highlight the developments and the continuities in the relations of ex-metropolitan countries and their ex-colonies. The continuities, depending on the need and capability of the individual metropolitan country, have led to the continuation of imperialism in a new guise. A comprehensive study has been made to enable one to compare relations of other former metropolitan and their ex-colonies. This is to serve as a kind of "ideal" or "model" of neo-colonialism, from which any deviations that occurs can be illustrated.

The study essays to bring out the inter-neo-colonialist rivalry in the various spheres--political, economic, ideological etc. USA is a symbol of neo-colonialism and of the highest stage of capitalism at work. Therefore, reference has been made to USA, and wherever necessary to other neo-colonial powers to explain the contemporary phase of development of neo-colonialism.

CHAPTER III



## CHAPTER III

### PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM IN ANGOLA

#### Portuguese Expansion into Angola : Till the End of 19th Century

The overseas expansion of Portugal began in the 15th century. It hoped to extract profits from East through trade, and thereby sustain its economic system. From 1482 to 1560 developed a period of close contact between the kingdoms of Kongo and Portugal in terms of maximum economic returns. Jan Vansina describes the attempt of Portugal to send teachers, missionaries, craftsmen, builders and other skilled men to Kongo as "massive acculturation".<sup>1</sup> David Birmingham describes this long term investment as a "neo-colonial search to achieve economic takeoff".<sup>2</sup>

The Portuguese expansions at sea had a revolutionary impact. It provided much of the initial accumulation and founded the extensive networks of international trade, thus making possible the Industrial Revolution in Europe.<sup>3</sup> Yet,

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- 1 Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna (Madison, 1966), p. 37.
  - 2 David Birmingham, "The African Response to Early Portuguese Activities in Angola", in Ronald H. Chilcote, ed., Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil : Comparative Studies (London, 1972), p. 21.
  - 3 Jay O'Brien, "Portugal and Africa : A Dying Imperialism", Monthly Review (New York), vol. 26, no. 1, May 1974, pp. 20-21.

the Portuguese empire was superseded by other European Powers, especially by Great Britain. The latter represented expansion of a dynamic new type of economic system. Unlike the conservative intent and origin of the Portuguese expansion, the initial expansion of Great Britain was revolutionary in impulse, aim and effect.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, expansion at sea led to the increased and regular process of exchange and trade of the Portuguese with the Kingdom of Kongo which slowly spread to its neighbouring areas. Subsequently, there developed trade between Portugal and Angola beginning from 1520. Portugal's increasing trade with the West Africa was, perhaps, because the latter had evolved the political means of fostering and controlling long distance trade to an extent that West Central Africa lacked.<sup>5</sup>

The Portuguese enterprise in Angola was moulded by the following five factors: (a) high mortality from tropical disease, (b) African hostility, (c) arid climate on the Luanda Coast unsuitable for agriculture, (d) domination of slave trade, and (e) the inferior quality of the European 'colonists' that Dias, the Portuguese Governor, had brought with him to Angola.<sup>6</sup>

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4 Ibid., p. 21.

5 David Birmingham, n. 2, p. 20.

6 David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola (Oxford, 1966), p. 47; and Wheeler and Pelissier, Angola (London, 1971), p. 35.

In 1580, for a short period, Portugal came under the Spanish domination. And during this period, Portugal lost its maritime supremacy that was basic to its commercial empire in the East.<sup>7</sup> In the meanwhile, other European Powers had become Portugal's rivals. At the end of the wars in 1640s, Portugal realized that only commerce in human-beings offered prosperity for the Portuguese in Angola.<sup>8</sup>

While other European Powers acquired slaves by barter, the low quality of the Portuguese trade cloth led the Portuguese to take slaves through warfare.<sup>9</sup> These campaigns were conducted unofficially and justified by excuses, such as punishing the chiefs for having failed to pay tributes etc.<sup>10</sup>

A system of "donatarias" (territorial proprietorship) came to be established in the 16th century. It gave the favoured proprietors of the crown a right to administer jurisdiction over large expanses of land in exchange for the

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7 See James Duffy, Shipwreck and Empire (Cambridge, 1955). For other reasons of the Portuguese decline, see H. Morse Stephens, Portugal (New York, 1891), pp. 177-83; Charles E. Nowell, A History of Portugal (Princeton, 1952), pp. 105-7.

8 David M. Abshire, "Early History, European Discovery, and Colonization", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., Portuguese Africa: A Handbook (London, 1969), p. 42.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 42; Birmingham, The Portuguese Conquest of Angola (Oxford, 1965), p. 2.

10 Birmingham, *ibid.*, p. 25.

responsibility to defend and settle that land. An idea that was revived by Salazar later on. The three-fold purpose of this scheme was: (a) to relieve internal population pressures of Portugal and economic poverty; (b) to achieve cultural integration; and (c) to ensure political hegemony.<sup>11</sup>

By 1600, the Portuguese had imposed a system of vassalage--a paternalistic system of subservience--over its African allies. They were obliged to pay tribute or taxes to the Portuguese--a military-commercial group--in the following forms: slaves, ivory, use of porters or later in currency.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the Portuguese were able to compete with the Dutch by constantly imposing monopoly conditions and by forcibly excluding foreign competition because they could not economically outbid them. Moreover, gradually the slaves came to be acquired not in return for the intangible benefits of "Lusitanianization", but by trade.<sup>13</sup>

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11 R.H. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa (New Jersey, 1967), pp. 7-8.

12 Wheeler and Pelissier, n. 6, pp. 36-37.

13 In the beginning, the Portuguese began to acquire slaves in return for the palm cloth purchased by the Africans. But as their position as trading partners deteriorated they tried to gain more advantages, without trade, by imposing sovereignty and expecting tribute in a tradable commodity, such as slaves. Until, once more, the slaves came to be acquired by trade based on military attempts to impose monopoly conditions and forcibly oust rivals. Birmingham, "The African Response", n. 2, p. 24. Also see, Jay O'Brien, n. 3. He adds that the relationship between the Portuguese and the Africa was not that of a colonizer and the colonized, but one of gaining influence and trading advantages--mutually beneficial, and thus forming commercial monopolies.

The competitiveness of the Portuguese traders increased as a result of the economic growth of Brazil in the 17th century. Brazilian tobacco and rum, 'gerebita', became essential items of commercial exchange. At times the British and the Portuguese traders co-operated so as to offer better range of wares to their customers.<sup>14</sup> Slave trade flourished in the early period because Angola became a source of labour supply to Portuguese Brazil.

When other European Powers threatened African societies, the latter looked up to Portugal for politico-military support. In the process, the internal dynamics operating within the African societies got subordinated to the forces deriving from the development of the capitalist system in general and, to the integration of the Portuguese economy into the African societies.<sup>15</sup>

Towards the end of the 17th century, Portugal was facing financial crisis. Portugal signed a number of commercial treaties with Great Britain, leading to the Methuen Treaty of 1703, which was clearly more advantageous to Great Britain than Portugal. The 'type' of international division of labour--'wrought'--primary: vs. 'unwrought' - manufactured goods--forced on Portugal led to the latter's

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14 Birmingham, n. 2, p. 24.

15 Jay O'Brien, n. 3.

dependence on Great Britain.<sup>16</sup>

Consequently, Portugal began to export cloth and wine to Great Britain. The Brazilian gold, however, saved Portugal from becoming financially solvent. The outflow of Brazilian gold between 1700 and 1760 from Portugal to Britain especially, contributed to the industrialization of the latter at the expense of the former. And, therefore, Portugal's manufacturing sector could not develop as they had to concentrate all their efforts on developing and producing better and greater quantity of wine.<sup>17</sup>

Portugal's desire of colonial expansion was thwarted by the French in the early 19th century. Portugal faced another setback in the form of Brazil's independence in 1822. And, finally the abolition of slave trade and decline in slave export to Brazil reduced the Portuguese income from Angola.

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16 S. Sideri, Trade and Power (Rotterdam, 1970). This theme is developed throughout the book. In summary form see pp. 4-7. Also see H.E.S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade : A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce 1700-1770 (London, 1971).

17 Ibid. Also see Jay O'Brien, n. 3. He adds that thus Britain had turned or made Portugal into a kind of appendage, to be manipulated at will. The British bourgeoisie tried to maintain the old political and economic systems in Portugal and, therefore, while they transformed the content of their relation and dynamics of its development, they wished to maintain their authority and supremacy over the Portuguese bourgeoisie.

A problem that always confronted the Portuguese was how to colonize their African territories. Up to the end of the 19th century, the Portuguese did not willingly want to migrate to the African continent. A large number of migrants went to Brazil instead. Portugal shipped its criminals, and political exiles known as degradados, to its colonies. Rarely women accompanied them. The peasant families of Portugal too were pressed to migrate to the Portuguese African territories. Furthermore, they were expected to achieve success in civilizing the barbarous savages of African continent. But in 1900, Portugal finally abandoned its vision of direct colonization of Angola.<sup>18</sup>

Although in the administrative field, Portugal did little to justify its effective occupation, one thing must be said in its favour. Africa as the Portuguese found it was useless as a port of call. But "between them the Arabs and the Portuguese introduced most of what are now the staple African crops, maize, yams, manioc (cassava), the sweet potatoes, besides sugarcane, pepper, ginger, citrus, tomatoes, pineapple and tobacco".<sup>19</sup>

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18 James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (London, 1959), pp. 80 ff. Also see Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: The End of an Era (Paris, 1974), p. 32. He quotes from the Commercial Association of Luanda that in the last quarter of the 19th century, the colony was still short of "centres of permanent civilized [i.e. white] population".

19 James Duffy, *ibid.*, p. 102.

Throughout the three centuries, following Portuguese overseas expansion, the colonial municipal councils played an important role.<sup>20</sup> The Crown and the colonial governors, both largely depended on the Camaras (the municipal councils) to raise and administer funds, for a variety of purposes, including the maintenance of naval and military establishments. It must be noted that the latter was not the responsibility of the civic bodies in other contemporary empires.

Financially, the expenditure of the Camaras outran their receipts. Money that should have rightfully been spent on public works, and for the construction and upkeep of roads and bridges etc. was spent instead on the Feast of Corpus Christi in 1719, and such other occasions, on the instructions of the Crown.

The Camaras were advantageous from the Crown's point of view. They provided an element of stability and continuity in the administration of the colonies where the governors served usually for a period of three years. The Camaras were generally administered by pure Portuguese or by mesticos.

The attitude of the Portuguese living in Africa has been an anomaly. Multi-racialism and miscegenation were common. The writings of George Tam, Sa' da Bandeira,

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20 C.R. Boxer, Portuguese Society in the Tropics (Madison, 1965), pp. 110-49.



and Livingstone highlight the difference in the attitude of the Portuguese towards the natives as compared to the attitudes of other Europeans. Interaction between the Portuguese and the natives was of high order. Irrespective of race, colour, or religion, all enjoyed equal rights.<sup>21</sup>

However, in the last decades of the 19th century, racialist tendencies together with economic discrimination against the backward masses of Portuguese Africa were observed. In the 1890s developed the concept of "indigenato", or the policy of dual citizenship. On the one hand, the Portuguese followed policies of forced labour and indulged in slave trade, on the other, tolerance, co-existence and willingness to make compromise was a characteristic factor of their relation with the natives.<sup>22</sup>

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21 David Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (New York, 1858), pp. 399-400. He wrote: "Instances so common in the South, in which half-caste children are abandoned, are here (in Angola) extremely rare....The coloured clerks of the merchants sit at the same table with their employers, without any embarrassment....Nowhere else in Africa is there so much goodwill between Europeans and natives as here." Also see, Hammond, "Race Attitudes and Policies in Portuguese Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries", Race, vol. 9, no. 2, October 1967, pp. 206-7.

22 Archibald Lyall, Black and White Make Brown (London, 1938), p. 190. After his trip to Portuguese Guinea in 1936, he commented on the remarkable capacity of the Portuguese for getting on with the natives.

Portuguese expansion was largely military expansion. It included achievement of tribal alliances, pacification, and occupation. In the process, many times the alliance between Portugal and Great Britain was strained over the question of borderline of Portuguese Africa.<sup>23</sup>

In the last quarter of the 19th century, the European Powers once more turned their attention towards Africa; annexing various territories. But the lack of manpower, financial resources and heavy public debts prevented Portugal from gaining more than what it possessed after the Berlin Conference in 1884. Moreover, Portugal was asked to justify its effective presence in its claimed colonies. For the first time, Portugal was thus forced to exercise systematic control and expand its presence in Africa. In Angola alone, it had to fight wars from 1906 to 1919.

During this period another interesting development took place. The British expected the Portuguese empire to crumble and disintegrate under heavy debts. As a result they thought of themselves as presumptive heir to Portuguese Africa. In 1898 when Portugal sought loans by pledging its colonies as collateral, Great Britain and Germany secretly agreed on to claim their areas of spheres of influence if

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23 Abshire, "From the Scramble for Africa to the New State", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., n. 8, pp. 68-70.

Lisbon defaulted. But Portugal was able to raise necessary funds and save partitioning of its colonial possessions in Africa.<sup>24</sup> In the next year, the outbreak of the Boer War brought Portugal and Great Britain close once more. The secret treaty of Windsor in 1899 once more affirmed the earlier treaties of friendship between the two nations which included Great Britain's promise to defend and protect Portugal's colonies.

#### Colonial Policies in late 19th and 20th century

Portugal's administration of Angola can be divided into three phases. First, till 1926--the phase of military invasion, establishment of effective control and consolidation of Portuguese suzerainty, followed by pacification and repression of African resistance and protest. Second, till 1960--the phase of nature colonialism under the Salazarist regime. Third, from 1961 onwards till 1975--this phase marks the development of nationalism in Angola and its clash with the colonial administration.

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24 Ibid., p. 75; Duffy, n. 18, pp. 221-4; William Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New York, 1951), p. 529. He shows that Britain did not want to share the Portuguese territories with any power.

## FIRST PHASE

Administration

From 1895 to 1910, Portugal attempted administrative and economic reforms. And, from 1911 to 1919 it showed humanitarian concern for its African subjects. The important administrative change in the colonies was transition from military rule to civil rule. Governor-General Antonio Enes suggested that the provinces be "administered and governed from within the province, following rigid norms established and financed by the metropolis".<sup>25</sup>

Eduardo da Costa and Enes sought greater powers to administer and formulate policies and to take decisions on local matters. Costa defended division of the provinces into districts and desired to perfect circumscription into a workable unit of colonial government. He believed that there must be two different administrative statutes--one for Europeans and the other for Africans--thus, rejecting the notion of equality. He added that the native code should be modified from region to region. He did not accept any division of the authority of the administrator. The administrators were to be appointed by the governors.<sup>26</sup>

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25 Antonio Enes, as quoted in Abshire, n. 23, p. 81. Also see Duffy, *ibid.*, pp. 245-7.

26 Duffy, *ibid.*, pp. 242-3.

In Angola, military rule was replaced by civil circumscriptions (administrative divisions or districts) after 1911. Governor Norton de Matos circulated a directive in 1913 to the Portuguese administrators which was an important step in the direction of emancipation of the Africans. It also established the circumscription as the "principal agent for Angola's regeneration".<sup>27</sup>

### Economy

Portugal had realized long before the turn of the century that its colonies were a liability. It could not establish the usual metropolitan colony relation with its African territories after the loss of Brazil. Unlike the other colonial rulers it could not use the available infrastructure of its colonies, which was suitable for the exploitation of natural resources made easy by available cheap labour to establish a complementary role to its metropolitan economic imperatives.

As mentioned earlier, Portugal had become dependent on Great Britain. And the treaty of 1899 once more affirmed it. It was almost an equivalent of Portugal becoming economically colonized by Great Britain because the former never

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 249. He describes the reaction of two colonial theorists in 1912 who wrote that military rule had never been necessary. "In our archaic process of colonial administration we began from a false point of view...."

achieved any significant degree of industrialization. Therefore, it was unable to transfer its imperial enterprise to its colonies. In this case, therefore, both the rationale and the means of exploitation of the colonies for the development of the metropolis were absent. The African market, therefore, could not be used to provide economic incentive.

On the other hand, the colonies served as an outlet for the increasing Portuguese population. The petty traders indulged in crude exploitation of both the natural and the human resources. By holding down the price of labour power, including use of force and violence, the Portuguese ossified the historical conditions. And, thus were able to maintain the colonial wage structure.<sup>28</sup>

Keeping in view the above mentioned factors, Portugal granted "financial autonomy and decentralization compatible with the development of each" to Angola in 1920. But, unfortunately, Angola was almost on the brink of bankruptcy by the end of the 1920s.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, it lacked capital for investment. Transport was another problem.<sup>30</sup> And, trade deficit had increased between 1910 and 1930 to 10-12%.<sup>31</sup>

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28 V.G. Kiernan, "The Old Alliance : England and Portugal", Socialist Register (London), 1973, pp. 261-79. He adds that under the cover of "protector" Britain was building something like a "neo-colonial" relationship with Portugal. (p. 263); Jay O'Brien, n. 3.

29 Duffy, n. 18, p. 250.

30 Wheeler and Pelissier, n. 6, pp. 67-68. Railroads were yet to be built.

31 Duffy, n. 18, p. 264.

Labour Policy

The Governors were faced with yet another problem; the problem of reconciling a native policy, which was to humanize the earlier repression of the Africans, and to develop a "new colonial mentality"--of protecting the native and treating him as a "man of the same nation", with the need for exploitation of the human resources.<sup>32</sup>

Before the Portuguese came, the Africans operated within their own indigenous economies and had no pressing need to sell their labour power. But the Portuguese could not have earned profits had they to compete for labour in the market. Hence, it became necessary for them to device means by which they could siphon off labour from the agricultural sector to the new sectors of community production.

Therefore, in 1899 a decree was passed which made it morally and legally obligatory on the part of all the Africans to work for the Whites "to acquire by labour the means of subsisting and of bettering their social condition". In this way slavery was transformed in name to wage labour, which was nothing but forced labour.

The workers were sent out under contract labour. Women and children who were left behind had to work for their

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32 Ibid., pp. 253-4.

living. The colonial worker was paid below the "historically determined value" of his labour power. In other words, as compared to the metropolitan worker or labourer, a native was paid the barest minimum possible.<sup>33</sup>

### Missions and Education

During this phase, various foreign missions came to Angola. Whereas Catholics had been predominant before, now Protestants too came on the scene, bringing with them new ideas. According to the Portuguese, to be "civilized" meant being assimilated to Portuguese norms; the latter including being a Roman Catholic. However, it was possible for one who professed another faith to become assimilated.<sup>34</sup>

After 1845, provisions for education at two levels were provided. First, elementary schools wherever necessary, and second, principal schools only in the capitals. The

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33 This is also discussed by Jay O'Brien, n. 3; Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People (Harmondsworth, 1975), pp. 114-22. He quotes Norton de Matos over the lamentable state of affairs in 1921. "A veritable leprosy of corruption covered almost everything that touched on native labour...." Duffy, n. 18, pp. 254-5. He quotes Freire de Andrade, which sums up the attitude of the Portuguese towards the Africans in the early 20th century. "The education to give the native must be, above all, one which will make him a worker...who will contribute to the progress richness of the country....But now can we keep him from...being bossed to become a boss?...only...by a labor law which, badly interpreted.../is/ slavery."

34 Stephen Neill, Colonialism and Christian Missions (New York, 1966), p. 293.



remarkable feature of this policy was absence of racial discrimination at schools. Missions too continued to teach. Education at the elementary level was given in the African languages.

A decree in 1921 forbade teaching in schools in the vernacular. This affected the Protestant missions more than the Catholics, since the former were ill-equipped to teach in Portuguese. It was an excuse to forestall the attempts of other colonial powers to enter Angola and other Portuguese territories through the backdoor, the Protestant missions.<sup>35</sup>

By the end, corruption was widespread in Portuguese Africa. At home, the country was facing political and economic crisis; finally culminating in the coup d'etat of 1926. In the following years Antonio de Oliveira Salazar became the Prime Minister and a dictator of Portugal. His concern was to stabilize and balance the national budget. The policies that Salazar pursued in Portugal led to corresponding changes in Africa.<sup>36</sup>

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35 Accounts of education policy are given in Abshire, n. 23, pp. 79-80; Duffy, n. 18, pp. 257-60; see Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, n. 18, pp. 47-63; for details about the curriculum etc. and the government's policy.

36 See Antonio de Figueiredo, Portugal : Fifty Years of Dictatorship (Harmondsworth, 1975). He traces the conditions of Portugal and the problems facing Portugal. He then shows the rise of Salazar as a political figure in the Portuguese Government. Also see Basil Davidson, n. 33, pp. 126-30.

## SECOND PHASE

Administration

From 1926 to 1961, the colonial administrative framework took its concrete shape, which was further modified in the 1960s. In the following pages a study of Portugal's colonial policy and of institutional development, with specific reference to Angola, will be made. Wherever necessary, changes during 1960s will also be discussed to show continuations in the colonial policies till decolonization of Angola.

Angola, like the other Portuguese African territories, was a colony of Portugal till 1951, when its official status became an "overseas province". There was no legal counterpart of an overseas province in metropolitan Portugal. Lisbon Government reserved the right to legislate by decree in the interest of the nation, applicable to both the metropolis and the overseas territory. The Overseas Minister could legislate only for the overseas territories by decree after consulting the Overseas Council.

Angola was administered by the "regime do indigenato" headed by a Governor General who was in turn assisted by the Legislative Council. Its purpose was to maintain 'status quo' and to protect the African people. It was an extension of

Portugal's traditional policy of paternalism.<sup>37</sup>

There existed a highly decentralized administrative structure in Angola.<sup>38</sup> Each colony was divided and subdivided into administrative units--districts and circumscriptions and posts. The circumscription remained the basic unit of government. In 1963, under the terms of the new Organic Law, economic and social councils were established. Many of the former circumscriptions were elevated to "concelhos".

The legal structures were modified to suit the peculiar character of, and to accommodate, the native or tribal laws. The Portuguese Civil Code was applicable to all the Africans who preferred to be governed by it besides the "assimilados". In case of clash or conflict between the Portuguese and the Native Law, the former prevailed. The process was kept simple so as to be comprehensible to the natives.

### Native Policy

Much of the legislation governing the Angolan natives was a continuation of the "Estatuto politico civil e

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37 The Study of Administration during 1921-1960 is based on Norman A. Bailey, "Government and Administration and the Political Process & Interest Groups", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., n. 8, pp. 133-51. Duffy, n. 18, pp. 280-8; Gann and Duignan, Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960 (Cambridge, 1970), vol. 2, p. 181.

38 See Appendix II, Fig. 2.1.

criminal dos indigenas das colonias de Angola e Mocambique" of 1926. One of the important idea of the new law was: "to lead the natives, by the means appropriate to their rudimentary civilization--so that the transformation from their own customs and their own habits may be gentle and gradual--to the profitable development of their own activities and to their integration into the life of the colony, which is an extension of the mother country".<sup>39</sup>

Laws by decree of 1929, 1933 and 1954 modified the statute of 1926. While professing and echoing the sentiments of racial equality, the Portuguese Government was devising a policy founded on theories of cultural inequality. The process of assimilation of the natives was slow through the 1930s and 1940s. By 1950, only 30,000 out of a population of 4 million Africans in Angola had become assimilated.<sup>40</sup>

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39 Silva Cunha, "O Sistema Portugues", pp. 140-41, quoted in Duffy, n. 18, p. 293. The distinction that the Portuguese made between "civilized" and "non-civilized" in itself reflects a racist attitude. Because they tolerated and accepted miscegenation it does not prove that the colonial society was free of racial prejudices. This idea of tolerance was stretched at times. For example, Eduardo de Azevedo in "Terra da esperanca : romance duma viagem a Angola" (Lisbon, 1954), pp. 114-15 wrote: "Negroes will fight to the last drop of blood for the liberty of being Portuguese, for the greatest pride of the Negro is to belong to a country of men who are brothers. Quoted in Gann and Dugnan, n. 37, p. 180.

40 Norman A. Bailey, "Native and Labour Policy", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., n. 8, pp. 165-7; Gann and Dugnan, *ibid.*, pp. 179-80; Duffy, *ibid.*, pp. 189 ff.; Ferreira, n. 18, pp. 114-16; Wheeler and Pelissier, n. 6, pp. 129-36.

Assimilation of a native meant being regarded as belonging to the "civilized" population. The standard of judgement for his admission to the assimilated status was: attaining a cultural level where he could read and write Portuguese; and prove his good character. In case he was employed in the colonial administration, or had exercised a public charge, or had a secondary school education, or was a merchant etc., the regular procedures of assimilation were waived aside and he was issued a "bilhete de identidade". Thus giving the "assimilados" the right of unrestricted free movement in the province.

In 1961, a new status was introduced for more advanced Africans who did not wish to become "assimilados". They were provided with a "caderneta" for identification. And they too could move through the province unrestricted. In September 1961, the Native Statute was repealed. As a result all the citizens had equal rights and duties. Under the 1960-62 reform provisions, any African could by simple declaration choose to be governed by the Portuguese civil code and assume full Portuguese citizenship.

#### Missions and Education

As before, the Catholic Church co-operated in limiting and controlling acculturation. Christian principles were indoctrinated in the natives to the extent of making them obedient and disciplined but not skilled, independent.

minded individuals or active. From the Portuguese point of view, only minimum degree of Europeanization was necessary for the imposition of a social order that would facilitate economic exploitation. They did not want their colonial domination threatened by the development of an intellectual elite in the colony.<sup>41</sup>

Education and religion were two pillars of the Portuguese policy of assimilation. In the 1930s, once more the future of native education was left in the hands of the missions. Government financed the Catholic missions, but these failed to achieve much. According to the 1950 census the rate of illiteracy in Angola was 96-97%.<sup>42</sup> This low rate of literacy was a result of the number of problems posed by age limitation, admission to schools etc. and by natural rural hindrances.<sup>43</sup>

The education pattern of the metropolitan country was duplicated for the Portuguese and the assimilated children

41 Ferreira, n. 18, p. 112. Also see Figueiredo, n. 36, p. 179. "Education had retained many of its feudal characteristics as an instrument of privilege and discrimination."

42 Ferreira, *ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

43 Although there was lack of racial discrimination, yet first preference was given to white children. For the course of education and the problems facing the Africans in detail see, *ibid.*, pp. 66-73; Samuels and Bailey, "Education, Health and Social Welfare", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., n. 8, pp. 178-82; Duffy, n. 18, pp. 312-16; Gann and Duignan, n. 37, pp. 188-9.

in Angola. For the rest of the Africans there was education for adapting (*ensino de adaptacao*) and rudimentary education (*ensino rudimentar*). The three-year primary course was given to acquaint the Africans with the Portuguese language and culture. Besides making the natives into "true Portuguese", education served to produce good agricultural workers and craftsmen who served the interest of the colonial economy.

Moreover, education for the natives was viewed with disfavour by one school of thought in Lisbon. A luminary speaking at Coimbra University in 1954 concluded: "the better the schooling we provide, the more demoralized and disintegrated becomes the social grouping that one is claiming to civilize." Either he becomes a potential threat in the form of developing "native proletariat" or he "regresses to tribal mentality".<sup>44</sup>

In 1961, the Government abolished the legal distinction between citizens and indigenous inhabitants. Thus it hoped to accelerate the process of "Portuguezation" or acculturation of the natives. The number of schools increased during 1960s. But the quality of teaching remained poor, even at the primary level. Mostly the difficulties arose because the students were taught in Portuguese.<sup>45</sup>

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44 Vicente Ferreira, Estudos Ultramarinos (Lisbon, 1954), vol. 3, p. 56, quoted in Davidson, n. 33, p. 136.

45 See Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, n. 18, pp. 66-106; Duffy, n. 18, pp. 312-16.

Although the number of students at the primary level increased due to free education, only a few passed the primary level and practically none got to university.<sup>46</sup> Yet, there developed a small group of African elites who provided an African petty bourgeoisie, and encouraged alignment of the African officials and small-scale managers with Portugal.<sup>47</sup>

### Social Welfare

As in the field of education, both the government and the missions collaborated in the field of medicine and social services. As is well-known, Africans suffer from tropical diseases. Mortality rate is high. Medical and hospital care improved in the 1960s. There were 492 doctors in 1965 and 1,787 auxiliaries, such as nurses, in 1963. By 1966, there were 338 hospitals and institutions for in-patient care, and 865 locations for out-patient care.<sup>48</sup>

Leprosarium in Angola has been an important project for the Angolans. According to WHO, between 1960 and 1964, over two million people were immunized against smallpox,

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46 Ferreira, *ibid.*, p. 95; Wheeler and Pelissier, n. 6, p. 135. Also see Appendix II, Table 2.2. Separate figures for Africans are not given. In 1970, only about 15% were studying at University.

47 Ferreira, *ibid.*, p. 105.

48 Samuels and Bailey, n. 43, pp. 191-2.



poliomyelitis, yellow fever, etc. Bilharzia and tuberculosis, however, occurred most frequently.<sup>49</sup> In 1964, inhabitants were served with sewage system, both in the urban and rural areas. 3.2% of the budget expenditure went to provide health services in 1964.<sup>50</sup>

Besides governmental services, private and semi-private enterprises offer medical, educational, and recreational services for their workers and their families.<sup>51</sup> Rural welfare activities were taken up by the so-called psycho-social service group. Their activities were brief and scattered. Under urban welfare programme, orphanages and old people's homes were instituted in Angola.<sup>52</sup>

#### Labour Policy and Economy

In the 1940s especially after the coffee boom a wave of Portuguese immigration started. Consequently, the demand for cheap African labour went up in Angola. Labour shortage had been a chronic problem for the Angolan

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49 World Health Organization, Third Report on World Health Situation, Nineteenth World Assembly A 19B and b/4 Part II, 7 April 1967, (mimeo), Review by Country and Territory, pp. 1-3.

50 Ibid., p. 3.

51 See Samuels and Bailey, n. 43, pp. 191-2. For example, the Benguela Railway, Diamang, the Zobito Mining Company, and the Cassefuel Agricultural Corporation offer above mentioned facilities to their workers.

52 See *ibid.*, pp. 194-7.

high commissions, governor-generals, and ministers. Poor wages, primitive working conditions, corporal punishments, malnutrition, poor health of the workers, continued export of contract labour, and their preference to work on their own land for subsistence rather than in some strange country "for remuneration maintained at an artificially low level by a system of maximum wages" led to the chronic labour problem.<sup>53</sup>

In 1928, recruiting of native labour by the administrative officials for private companies was forbidden. In 1955, detailed legislation in regards to the hours and conditions was passed. Yet the abuse of labour continued. Despite numerous legislations, government officials intervened to secure labour for the whites. A labour market existed but the Africans had no voice in

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53 Ibid., p. 168; Wheeler and Pelissier, n. 6, pp. 137-40; Davidson, n. 33, p. 135. He discusses the situation when African workers demanded a raise in their wages, Diamang Company tried to make compromise because they did not want to add a bigger figure to their list. But in the same year they paid ten times as much in dividends to its shareholders.

See Appendix II, Table/<sup>Fig.</sup> 2.3 for immigration figures of the Europeans into Angola.

it about their fate.<sup>54</sup> By 1960, it could be classified in the following categories: (1) correctional labour, (2) obligatory labour, (3) contract labour, (4) voluntary labour, (5) forced cultivation, and (6) emigrant or export labour. The violence of the system pervaded all the

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54 See Duffy, n. 18, pp. 318-28. He gives details of the different legislations passed and their administrative operation; also see Basil Davidson, *ibid.*, pp. 123-6, and 131-5. Henrique Gatvao in 1947 told the parliament that in Angola the situation was worse than in Mozambique "...the State acts as recruiting and distributing agent for labour on behalf of settlers who, as though it were quite natural, write to the Department of Native Affairs for 'a supply of workers'. This word 'supply' (fornecer) is used indifferently of goods and of men." - Quoted in Davidson, *ibid.*, pp. 133-4.

A.T. Steele, writing in New York Herald Tribune (15 February 1948) echoed similar sentiments. "When an Angolan plantation owner requires labour, he notifies the government of his needs. The demand is passed down to the village chiefs, who are ordered to supply fixed quotas of labourers from the communities. If the required number is not forthcoming, police are sent to round them up."

Basil Davidson in his interviews with employers of contract labours found similar situation. "The Governor-General allocates 'contradados' (contract workers) according to a theoretical calculation of the number available for conscription at any one time. Approved demands for labour...are sent to local administrators...and the 'chefe de posto'... is then obliged to conscript the number of men required by the indent..." In 1955 an advertisement read: "Licensed contractor offers duly legalized personnel at Esc. 1,000 each." Discussed in Davidson, *ibid.*, pp. 134-5.

Also see Figueiredo, n. 36, pp. 174-5.

aspects of social relations and, consequently, deformed them.<sup>55</sup>

According to Rene Pelissier, after 1961, "detente in the bush" set in Africans began to take up jobs if they needed money. They could stay at home if they so desired, provided they paid taxes. Contract labour affected less than one-eleventh of the economically active workers, which had further reduced by one-tenth in 1964.<sup>56</sup>

Economic development of Angola and other Portuguese African Territories was affected by the "metropolitan factor".<sup>57</sup> In fact, the colonial economies were neither

55 Jay O'Brien, n. 3; Perry Anderson, "Portugal and the end of Ultra-colonialism, Part - 2", New Left Review (London), no. 16, July-August 1962, pp. 88-99.

56 Wheeler and Pelissier, n. 6, pp. 226-7. Of the 241,351 workers in 1964, 102,851 were contract labourers. In 1960, 115,904 had been contract workers, and overall percentage of wage-earners had been 27.2% in Angola as against 32.3% in Ghana. This further decreased in 1964. Against 299,861 workers (non-specialists) in 1960, only 241,351 were on the list in 1964.

57 See Basil Davidson, "Pluralism in Colonial African Societies; Northern Rhodesia/Zambia", in L. Kuper and M.G. Smith, ed., Pluralism in Africa (California, 1969), pp. 211-25.

isolated nor autonomous organization but the projection of its governing metropolitan country. For example, under liberal influence, supremacy of the majority interest and possible reforms to African advantage were witnessed elsewhere in Africa in the British and French Africa respectively. This attitude of British and French helped them to accept decolonization of their colonies in 1950s.

But in Portuguese Africa it was the influence of a dictatorial government - which combined the ideas of Italian facism and medieval Catholicism - under Salazar. His first concern for balancing the national budget brought about drastic changes in the Portuguese economic structure. Taxes went up; social services and real wages went down. The elitist structure of the economy increasingly became more extractive at the expense of the ordinary masses. Its economy became stagnant and needed foreign investments for rejuvenation especially after World War II. Portugal became a semi-colony in relation to the rest of the Europe and USA, in the orbit of Western capitalism.<sup>58</sup>

African territories became important for Portugal. In the words of Marcello Caetano in the 1930s: "Africa is more than a land to be exploited....Africa is for us a moral justification and "raison d'etre" as a power. Without

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58 See Basil Davidson, n. 33, pp. 127-9.

it we would be a small nation; with it we are a great power."<sup>59</sup>  
 Hence, once the need of maintaining African territories was realized, Portugal began to pursue a systematic policy.

#### Overseas Development Plans

Under Salazar began the program of balanced budget for the overseas territories in 1930s. Yet the concerted effort of the metropolitan country and the provincial governments to increase the per capita income and the standard of living of the masses did not take any concrete shape till 1953 when the First Six-Year National Development Plan was enacted. The First Plan (1953-1959) earmarked development of the basic economic structures--agriculture, mining, greater saving and investment etc. It also included plans for social welfare, education, labour rights and so on. But the goals remained unfulfilled. Provincial revenue remained the source of financing developmental plan. Portugal gave \$600,000 as long-term loan to Angola.<sup>60</sup>

National Development Bank was established in 1959, during the Second Plan (1959-1965). Portugal was to

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59 Perry Anderson, n. 55, p. 116.

60 Data from Leonard Rist, "Capital and Capital Supply in Relation to the Development of Africa", in E.A.G. Robinson, ed., Economic Development for Africa South of the Sahara (New York, 1965), pp. 446 and 457.

provide half the funds for development both in the private and the public sector. Under the Transitional Development Plan (1965-1967) Portugal was to give additional finances for overseas projects, and supplementary funds were to come from development bonds and some non-Portuguese sources. Whereas under the Third Plan it envisaged \$1.6 billion total overseas investment--approximately 54% increase over the Transitional Plan for overseas territories.<sup>61</sup>

Between 1953 and 1962, gross domestic product per capita increased at an average annual rate of 5% in Angola while between 1963 and 1965 it fell to 4%. Major criticism levied against finance allocation in favour of the infrastructure is that it neglected the development and improvement of the social structures.<sup>62</sup>

Angola was developed to suit its budgetary needs rather than fulfil the needs of public administration. The National Planning Commission in Portugal guided the provincial government budgets. The local governor had to submit the annual budget for approval to the Legislative Council. The provincial budget was supposed to exhaust the taxes to

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61 Frank Brandenburg, "Development, Finance, and Trade", in Abshire and Samuel, ed., n. 8, p. 227. Also see Appendix II, Tables 2.4A and B.

62 Brandenburg, *ibid.*, also see L.M. Teixeira Pinto and R. Martins dos Santo, "Problems of Economic Development of Angola: Poles and Prospects", in Robinson, ed., n. 60, pp. 198-221.

meet the expenditure, yet there was excess of surplus during the 60s. It does not include the public debts.<sup>63</sup> Taxes provided most of the provincial revenue. Both direct and indirect taxes were levied. Indirect taxes included import-export duties and excise taxes. It was a complicated, cumbersome and regressive method of taxation.<sup>64</sup>

### Agriculture and Mining Sector

Portuguese Africa was mainly an agrarian and rural society despite the growth of urban areas. Crops, livestock, forestry, and fisheries formed the primary production sector of the Angolan economy, contributing about 20-25% of the GNP in the 1960s. Secondary sector contributed 4.7% and the tertiary sector about 69%-72%.<sup>65</sup> Yet only about 2% of Angola was cultivated and exploited. The ownership structures included private, co-operative, corporate and state proprietorship. Under the Transitional Plan \$ 157.5 million was allocated for the improvement of the primary sector and

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63 See Appendix II, Fig. 2.5.

64 See Brandenburg, n. 61, pp. 234 and 237 for details of direct taxation.

65 Irens S. van Dongen, "Agriculture and Other Primary Production", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., n. 8, p. 254. Mining, manufacturing, construction and energy production make up the secondary sector. While the tertiary sector encompasses transport, trade and finances (28%), services (36%), and administration, defense (9%).



development of the agricultural settlement projects.<sup>66</sup>

Crops in Angola fall under three categories: (1) of major export significance, (2) of some significance either on the export list or for internal consumption, and (3) of minor importance. Coffee, sisal, maize, sugar, cotton, oil palm and manioc are the crops of major export significance. Tobacco, beans, grains such as wheat, rice, sorghums, and millets, oil seeds other than *Elaeis* palm fruit, and bananas fall under the second category. And, the crops of minor significance include European-type potatoes, vegetables, cacao, olives, cashew nuts, sweet potatoes, yams and formerly important wild rubber.<sup>67</sup>

Mining sector was mainly developed by private entrepreneurs and private capital investment. Government frequently participated as a minority shareholder and named directors to corporate boards. Iron ore, manganese, oil, diamonds, asphalt rock and marine salt formed the major mineral production sector in Angola.<sup>68</sup>

Power production in Angola built up steadily, at a rate of 14.5% between 1958 and 1967. Thirteen towns were completely electrified. SONEFE, an autonomous state entity,

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66 Ibid., p. 255.

67 Ibid., pp. 255-76.

68 See Brandenburg, n. 61, p. 22. Abshire, "Minerals Manufacturing, Power and Communication", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., n. 8, pp. 298-301.

controlled half of the Angolan power production. Cambambe, Mabubas, Lomaum, Biopio and Matala are its other important hydroelectric plants.<sup>69</sup>

In the manufacturing sector, government rarely accepted an equity position. Although it played a supportive role and offered incentives to the new units, Manufacturing sector has developed rapidly, at a rate of 13% annually since 1962. Until 1945, it processed simple raw materials for export. Most of its industrial produce was locally absorbed. About 12% of it went for export.<sup>70</sup>

Food-processing, beverages and tobacco, textiles, cement, paper manufacturing are some of the major manufacturing industries located in Angola. Varnish and paints, automobile batteries, bricks and glassware, chemical products--industrial alcohol, pesticides, and explosives, plastics and rubber goods, metal drums and hoes, and electric cables and conductors formed its minor industrial sector.<sup>71</sup>

#### Construction, Communication and Trade

Building industry flourished especially in the 1950s and 60s in Angola as a result of the continued influx

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69 See Abshire, *ibid.*, pp. 301-2 for more details.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 303, Brandenburg, n. 61, p. 222.

71 Abshire, *ibid.*, pp. 304-6.

of population for the urban areas. Telecommunications were controlled by the government. Private interests, like Diamang and others, too, maintained communication networks.<sup>72</sup> Transport facilities include ports, railroads, roads and air facilities. Most of these were under state ownership. However, certain private or semi-private ownership also exist, such as Benguela Railway, Porto Amboim Railway and so on.<sup>73</sup>

As mentioned earlier, economic control from Lisbon over its overseas territories had grown intense during this phase. Trade discriminations in favour of Portugal together with artificial barriers to prevent influx of foreign investment were maintained to a high degree. "Banco Nacional Ultramarino" in Portugal controlled and issued currency in Angola till 1965, when the "Banco de Credito Comercial Industrial de Angola" was established. Escudo was the basic unit of currency; Angolan escudo was on par with the Portuguese ecudo in official transactions. Till 1966, commercial banks were not allowed to term deposits for over a year and hence, could not give long-term loans.<sup>74</sup> Thus, economic advance was affected. Moreover, stringent

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72 Ibid., pp. 306-8.

73 Brandenburg, n. 61, pp. 221-2; Brandenburg, "Transport System and Their External Ramifications", in Absire and Samuels, ed., n. 8, pp. 320-7.

74 Ibid., no. 61, pp. 230-1.

control of the metropolitan government prevented natural development of its overseas territories.

Angola's exchange system was based on the economic integration policy adopted by Portugal in 1963.<sup>75</sup> There are two kinds of exchange systems - the Portuguese exchange and the foreign exchange. The former worked through compensation and reserve funds, while the latter was handled through working balances.<sup>76</sup> As a consequence, this system benefitted the foreign corporations.

In the 1920s Portugal had to overcome Angola's trade deficit. In the following years, Salazar's protectionist policy made foreign investments difficult both in Portugal and its African territories. Portugal was still highly agro-based.<sup>77</sup> In the industrial sector large

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75 Ibid., p. 233. It operated through 4 main mechanisms-- (1) Provincial exchange Board which authorized and coordinated all official exchange transactions; (2) Exchange Fund, consisted of all provincial exchange holdings; (3) Compensation Fund allowed monthly clearance of interterritorial transactions; and (4) FMZE (Escudo Zone Monetary Fund) facilitated stabilization of the exchange position of these territories both in respect to each other and to Portugal.

76 Ibid., p. 233. For example, if Angola had surplus foreign exchange with the non-Portuguese areas it was credited to Angola's "working balances". When it reached a maximum level it was transferred to the Reserve Fund to offset Angola's deficits in that account. Therefore, exchange for the non-Portuguese was readily available.

77 Andrew Wilson Green, "Portugal and the African Territories : Economic Implications", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., n. 8, p. 345; Robin Blackburn, "Lisbon - The Fall of Fascism", New Left Review, 1974, pp. 87-88 (special double issue).

consortia like CUF (Companhia Uniao Fabril) dominated which owned 1/10th of all the industrial assets. But the cartels were unable to mobilize money for the development of both the metropolis and its colonies.<sup>78</sup> However, just before World War II, under Salazar's directions, the near solvent Portuguese empire once more overcame its financial crisis; Angolan exports exceeded imports and resulted in budget surplus.<sup>79</sup>

Portuguese African territories absorbed about 24% of its exports and supplied about 13% of imports during 1959-64.<sup>80</sup> It also gained from the favourable balance of international payment of its overseas territories to offset its own traditional deficit with foreign countries. On the other hand, its overseas provinces looked upon it for markets, investment capital, economic, political and military aid.

Angola's total annual value of provincial trade during the First Plan doubled. Coffee accounted for nearly half of all exports. 43% to 49% of all imports to Angola came from Portugal during the 60s. It decreased in 1965-66,

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78 Robin Blackburn, *ibid.*

79 Hammond, Portugal's African Problem : Some Economic Facets (New York, 1962), p. 24.

80 Andrew Wilson Green, n. 77, pp. 346-7.

but once more rose to 35% as diamond was sent to Lisbon for cutting instead of London.<sup>81</sup> The United States of America became its first trading partner after Portugal in the 1960s. The United Kingdom, West Germany, France and Belgium-Luxembourg and to a degree the Netherlands, Congo (Kinshasa), Spain and Italy were its other important trading partners.

As a result of trade, private transfers of return on investments, and services balance-of-payment favoured Portugal in the 60s while balances favoured Angola with regards to the current inflow of government and private funds.<sup>82</sup> By 1972, Portugal was importing 7.8% of its total imports from Angola and exporting 6.5% of its total exports to Angola.<sup>83</sup>

Portugal was one of the most backward nation of the developed European countries with lowest per capita income, and insufficient finances for investments in its colonies. It, therefore, was faced with the need of foreign capital for development. Moreover, it lacked a strong industrial base at home.

The study of foreign investments will be made in the following chapter. The theme of this chapter has been

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81 Brandenburg, n. 61, pp. 239-41. See Appendix II, Figs. 2.6 and 2.7 and Table 2.7<sup>^</sup>

82 Ibid., p. 246.

83 Overseas Business Reports (USAO, October 1974, OBR 74-52, p. 5.

to analyse the colonial policy of the Portuguese in their overseas territories. Portugal's varying policies are linked to the character of the regime in Lisbon. Before 1926, there was a liberal government but it had failed to develop any systematic and progressive policy for its colonies. Dissatisfaction at home, and failure to shoulder responsibility had led to the murder of king and his heir. The republic, born as an aftermath with violence, leading to the coup in 1926. In this period, Portugal had witnessed the fall of nine presidents, forty-four governments, twenty-five uprisings, and three counter-revolutionary dictatorships.

The aftermath of 1926 coup was institutionalization of repression. Law and order posed the biggest problems. Once more, an authoritarian government came to power. Salazar worked his way up from the position of Minister for Finance to become the Prime Minister, constitutionally secondary to the President. But, in fact, Salazar exercised a dual dictatorship with the President Carmona, until the latter gradually receded to the background. Salazar was a brilliant economist, who exercised tight budgetary control and saved both Portugal and its empire from crumbling financially. On the social and administrative front, Portugal and its empire came under a totalitarian government, following colonial development policies late in the 1950s

which other colonial powers had pursued two and a half decades ago.

Most of the reforms, as is apparent from the above study, were carried out in the 1960s. In 1960s began the Third Phase which was marked by the growth and development of Angolan politics. In the next chapter an analysis of the Angolan nationalism, the consequent problems facing Portugal and the measures adopted by Portugal to overcome crisis will be made.



**CHAPTER IV**

## CHAPTER IV

### PHASE OF COLONIAL WAR

#### Politics of Decolonization

During the post-War era, the African continent underwent considerable changes. The imperialist powers had heavily relied on the African military man-power during the two world Wars. At the same time, parts of the African continent had achieved economic development.<sup>1</sup> The new African elite began to gain economic power as well as imbibe revolutionary ideas. Further, the discontent arising out of the process of modernization, technological impact and social change, was widespread throughout colonial Africa.<sup>2</sup>

The process of decolonization was delayed by referring to the lack of "maturity" or "fitness" for independence on the part of the colonial people. Although the colonizers reluctantly granted concessions and reforms, "they

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1 During the Two World Wars, the Allies had come to depend on the African and Asian continents for their wartime requirements. As a result, Southern Africa underwent an industrial revolution. Angola and Mozambique too benefitted greatly. Similar increase in productivity occurred in the French Africa (after the initial shock was over). See, Introduction in Gann and Duignan, ed., Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 (London, 1970), vol. 2, pp. 6-23.

2 Ibid. Also see Albertini, Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919-1960 Francisca Garvie, trans. (New York, 1971), pp. 523-5, and Introduction.

followed certain definite principles and tended towards a corresponding conversion of the imperial structure".<sup>3</sup> However, the growth of mass parties, and (in the areas where there were no organized mass parties), the cumulative impact of nationalism was increasingly felt.<sup>4</sup> Devolution of power during decolonization was further affected by the character of the nationalist movements.<sup>5</sup>

In the process of handing over power, the colonial powers tried to transplant their institutions in their respective colonies. Thus in British Africa, a traditional elite emerged under indirect rule. This elite controlled locally the political infrastructure in British Africa. With gradual development of political institutions around the bureaucratic core, Britain evolved the idea of self-governing dominions within the British Empire or the Commonwealth. It offered "an honourable exit, which placed imperial withdrawal within a context of fulfilment

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3 Albertini, *ibid.*, p. 524.

4 Crawford Young, "Decolonization in Africa", in Gann and Duignan, n. 1, p. 450. Ghana, Tunisia, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Malawi and Tanganyika had developed mass parties. Where as states like Nigeria, Chad, Sierra Leone, Congo and Uganda had no organization comparable to the CPP of Ghana, for example. Yet the concessions won by Guinea or Mali were extended to Chad and Mauritania.

5 Relatively effective and coherent leadership of Neo-Destour in Tunisia, for example, was able to pave way for independence under stable conditions. Because they had two years autonomy period before independence. While, on the other hand, in Congo, the colonizers could not hand over power in the same manner. See Young, *ibid.*

rather than liquidation".<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, it became a framework for future partnership.

France, on the other hand, partially integrated its overseas territories under direct rule. It destroyed the power of the traditional authorities by replacing the chiefs with bureaucrats. The traditional elite, however, gained political influence during the post-war years. France, like Britain, developed the idea of a federal French community at the time of decolonization, to prevent complete break of ties with its ex-colonies.

Except in the case of Algeria, where the militant guerrillas took over power, under conditions of near chaos, transfer of power was successfully smoothed by the highly trained and competent elite. Yet a large number of ex-administrators were retained to assist the newly independent states.<sup>7</sup>

In the case of Belgian Congo, a crisis arose. Despite the fact that the Belgians had made Congo economically and socially advanced, there was hardly any attempt to train the Africans for self-government. Belgians had kept the administrative machinery completely in the hands of Europeans. Finally in 1959 Belgium Government decided to hand over

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6 Crawford Young, *ibid.*, p. 482. On elites, see Martin Kilson, "The Emergent Elites of Black Africa, 1900 to 1960", in Gann and Duignan, n. 1, pp. 351-98.

7 See Young, *ibid.*, pp. 494 ff; W.B. Cohen, Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa (California, 1971), pp. 194-206.

internal self-government to the Congolese, before giving them complete independence.

The event was precipitated by the outbreak of violence and riots in Leopoldville; followed by talks between the nationalists and Belgium on the issue of total independence. In the end, Belgium withdrew from the Congo without properly handing over power to any nationalist leaders, while the nationalists wielded power without responsibility.<sup>8</sup>

### Portuguese Policy

By contrast, Portugal had a different outlook on the colonial question. As shown in the last chapter Portugal tried to integrate its colonies by turning them into "overseas provinces" in the post-war years. At the beginning of the 20th century, Africans could voice their demands for reforms through the Liga Nacional Africana (LNA), Gremio Africano and Anangola. As LNA organization began to gather momentum, unrest began to spread which was suppressed by the Salazarist regime by the use of police.<sup>9</sup>

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8 For details and discussion on decolonization of Belgian Congo, see Young, *ibid.*, pp. 474 ff; Albertini, n. 2, pp. 506-13.

9 LNA was founded in 1929 by the existing illegal and semi-legal organizations. Its demands were for reform till 1940s when LNA began to acquire mass base and talked of need for new methods of righting grievances which required the direct participation of the urban masses. (Anangola = Associaçao Regional dos Naturais de Angola).

Under Salazar's "Estado Novo" in 1932, the authoritarian and racist policy became enhanced, both in Portugal and in its overseas territories. Despite their policy of assimilation, they did not think of allowing any form of African participation in politics; self-rule by Africans was not a part of their policy. It is apparent from Salazar's speech: "We will not sell; we will not cede; we will not surrender; we will not quit one fragment of our sovereignty....Our constitutional laws forbid it, and even if they did not, our national conscience would do so."<sup>10</sup>

In the same vein, Salazar actively pursued the policy of "civilising mission". Egerton is of the opinion that there exists that something called "Portuguese soul".<sup>11</sup> It is closely related to the Portuguese civilizing mission. Although they lost track of this aim at times, yet their progress through the centuries was guided by this underlying

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See, P.M. Pinheiro, "Politics of a Revolt", in Angola, A Symposium: Views of a Revolt (London, 1962), pp. 106-7; Basil Davidson, "In the Portuguese Context", in C. Allen and R.W. Johnson, ed., African Perspectives (London, 1970), p. 33.

10 Quoted in Davidson, *ibid.*, pp. 331-2.

11 F.C.C. Egerton, Angola in Perspective (London, 1957); see Prologue, "Portuguese Soul" is a metaphysical reality = Portuguese character + Something else. Egerton spent some months in Angola in 1951 before writing the book.

principle. And with Salazar at the helm of affairs, the Portuguese were able to recover their 'soul' and pursue it with greater vigour.

Looking back, one finds that the Portuguese neither had the British ideal of self-government for their colonies, nor did they attempt to follow the French pattern of satisfying political emancipation with cultural assimilation, administrative co-ordination and the grant of citizenship and representation in the Paris parliament, nor could they pursue Belgian model of paternalism by concentrating on economic and social development and relegating the political questions to the background.

Portugal instead followed a policy of integration and cultural assimilation. While "France by contrast, shrank before the grave consequences of consistent integration, yet still hoped that it could avoid dissociation and safeguard a Greater France by institutional means".<sup>12</sup> Portugal, however, believed that consistent assimilation was its right answer to the problem of decolonization.

Despite its much proclaimed policy of assimilation, the rate of literacy in Angola was 2-3%. Its labour policy too differed markedly from other powers. Economically backward, it could hardly develop its colonies like the Belgian Congo. Moreover, before the Second World War, its

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12 Albertini, n. 2, p. 524.

protectionist policies did not make available foreign funds for the development of its colonies.

In the immediate post-war period, when political uprisings were gathering momentum in the rest of the colonial Africa, Portuguese administration in Lisbon was preparing its draft for Overseas development plans. As the Great Powers processed to decolonize Africa, Portugal launched its reform policies.

Already Belgian decolonization of the Congo was being seen as ten years behind Great Britain and France. Yet, Portugal chose to ignore the signs. Salazar expected Congolese nationalism and the spreading wave of African nationalism to stop at the borders of Angola. In the late 1950s, PIDE, the secret police modelled on the German Gestapo, was sent to Angola to suppress the growth of nascent nationalism. In spite of the ban on the political parties, some underground activities were preparing to wage a national liberation war. As PIDE intensified repression, many nationalists were forced to flee from Angola.

Once outside Angola, "elite : vs. : masses" dichotomy began to shape Angolan nationalism.<sup>13</sup> As a result of

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13 The Africans studying in Lisbon realized the futility of their expectations; of change in attitude towards freedom for the Africans, especially when the Portuguese themselves lived under a dictatorial regime, unable to voice their grief. Therefore, they realized the necessity of returning to their homes and to "re-Africanise" themselves, in order to lead successful liberation movements. This led to their later emphasis on indigenous analysis and indigenous solutions. See Davidson, n. 9, p. 333.



interaction and reaction of class, region, and ethnic divisions, three streams of nationalism developed: (1) "Luanda-Mbundu (predominantly urban elite leadership), (2) Bakongo (with rural, peasant orientation), and (3) Ovimbundu-Chokwe (with rural-peasant orientation).<sup>14</sup> Each party was able to mobilize sufficient following outside its regional base. Thus claiming to be the nationalist party. Yet none united (except temporarily) to form a common front and fight the enemy.

Without going into the details here, suffice it to say that finally in the 1960s, three national liberation parties emerged: MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola), FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola), and UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola). Each party was a culmination of a number of parties and factions. Defections were not unknown. Another party-- FLEC (Frente de Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda) continued as a Cabindan separatist movement.<sup>15</sup>

It has been noted above that the authoritarian and repressive character of the Portuguese Government, and the recourse to repressive measures in the colonies were not conducive to the growth of the political parties in the

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14 See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962) (USA, 1969), vol. 1. Part I of the book deals with the development of Angolan nationalism.

15 See Appendix III, Fig. 3.1 and Table 3.1.

colonies. Therefore, they were necessarily underground movements, or developed in the neighbouring states. There was no constitutional freedom for their development within Portuguese Africa.

In such circumstances, the various political factions had their headquarters in the neighbourhood of Angola, such as in the Leopoldville, Brazzaville, Lusaka in Congo, Zaire and Zambia respectively. For their financial, military and other related assistance, they began to depend on the sympathetic countries. Thus, involving the members of OAU (Organization of African Unity). Although OAU failed to create a permanent united front by reconciling the different liberation movements, OAU's positive contribution lay in the fact that only due to the assistance and recognition from its members could Angolan Nationalism attain strength and maturity. The three liberation movements also received financial and military aid from foreign powers, viz. MPLA from the Soviet Union, FNLA from the USA, and UNITA from the PRC.<sup>16</sup>

Angolan rebellion against the Portuguese first began in 1960 with the Baixa de Cassange Cotton Revolt,

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16 In 1973, FNLA was getting military aid from China also, while UNITA got aid from USA too.

followed by an attack on the police barracks in Luanda in February 1961 under MPLA; resulting in near dislocation of its network. March saw the Congo uprising under the leadership of Roberto Holden of UPA (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola; which later became a part of GRAE and yet later of FNLA). It was a planned armed revolt which led to the massacre of both the Portuguese settlers and the Africans. This was followed by repressive and atrocious reaction by the Portuguese settlers and the Portuguese troops. Systematic military operations against UPA and MPLA began from May.<sup>17</sup> This was the beginning of confrontation that haunted Angola throughout the decade. The catastrophic events finally shattered the myth of multi-racial society.

On the international scene, two important developments occurred in the late 1940s and 1950s. Firstly, Portugal became a member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1949. It was a regional security arrangement by the West. Portugal's importance to the NATO allies was in its strategic bases for controlling maritime routes around Africa or in influencing submarine activities in the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Portugal

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17 Accounts of the armed revolt can be seen in; Marcum, n. 14, Part II; Wheeler and Pelissier, Angola (London, 1971), pp. 173-92; Davidson, n. 9, pp. 336-7; Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (London, 1972), pp. 168-209; Angola, a symposium, n. 9, George Martelli, "Conflict in Portuguese Africa", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., Portuguese Africa (London, 1969), pp. 406-15.

lacks both naval and air forces of any consequence. Therefore, as a NATO member a considerable amount of US military assistance came to Portugal for the defence of Azores base. Thereby releasing military hardware which Portugal would otherwise have needed to defend herself.

Portugal also benefitted in the form of foreign currency from both USA and France in return for the use of Azores bases, besides receiving assistance in the form of military equipment. Similar assistance came to Portugal from its other NATO allies. Britain and West Germany supplied bombers and frigates to the Portuguese air force and navy. West Germany also gave specialized medical assistance to the Portuguese soldiers mutilated in the colonial wars.<sup>18</sup>

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18 See Basil Davidson, "Arms and the Portuguese", Africa Report (New York), vol. 15, no. 5, May 1970, pp. 10-11; USA has supplied 50 Thunderjet fighters since 1952, some 30 Cessna aircrafts for training and security work, of which only 12 were paid for by the Portuguese, a large number of Harvard trainers, 18 Lockheed bombers (PV-2 Harpoons), and 12 other Lockheed bombers. USA had already provided Portugal \$ 300 million for NATO defence purpose by 1961, though it reduced its planned delivery from \$ 25 million to \$ 3 million. By mid-1961 Washington had imposed a ban on sale of arms to Portugal.

Furthermore, the Azores agreement in 1971 made available to Portugal in exchange for the continued use of Azores base, an unprecedented 'quid pro quo' from USA; \$ 400 million in grants and loans from the Export-Import Bank of the US; \$ 15 million a year in PL 480 grain shipments; \$ 5 million worth of drawing rights from Government lists of surplus non-military equipment; the loan of a hydrographic survey vessel; \$ 1 million in educational assistance from the Pentagon budget; and, the waiver of

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It must be noted here that NATO allies made either verbal stipulations or no stipulations on the question of use of NATO equipment by Portugal.<sup>19</sup> For example, Great Britain and West Germany only made a verbal stipulation that the military equipment should not be used in the colonial wars. France, however, made no such condition. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Nogueira, at the United Nations surmised that the Western Powers, whether in concert or otherwise, would always rally behind Portugal--Britain and USA for their economic and strategic considerations; France and West Germany to prevent Anglo-American hegemony in Africa in case the African nationalism became successful.<sup>20</sup>

Although the NATO allies at first pretended ignorance over Portugal's use of NATO equipment in its African

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Portuguese support payments for the US military advisory assistance group in Lisbon.

France has supplied Nord Atlas transports and Alouette helicopters. In 1967-69, it supplied 4 frigates + 4 submarines, worth \$ 100 million and financed by a long-term credit guarantee by the French Government. Britain has also supplied military equipment and frigates; the latter were used for patrolling the Angolan Coast. West Germany in 1966 supplied 40 Fiat G-91 fighter-bombers designed for NATO, equipped with 100 light aircrafts carrying wing-fixed air-to-ground rockets.

Also see Marcum, n. 14, pp. 181-9; Hearings before the 93rd US Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, 2nd session, 14 March, 8, 9 and 22 October 1974, The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup (Washington, 1974), pp. 1-33.

19 Davidson, *ibid.*

20 Antonio de Figueiredo, Portugal: Fifty Years of Dictatorship (Harmondsworth, 1975), p. 212.

territories, later on they confessed knowledge and asked Portugal (under pressure) to stop using such equipments that were specifically given to Portugal for its defense under NATO. Portugal, on the other hand, maintained that it could use the above mentioned equipment in its African territories because the latter were a part of Portugal. And, hence, Portuguese sovereignty was threatened. Moreover, they added that France had set a precedence by using NATO-equipped troops in Algeria.

Portugal's colonial policy raised much debate. On 27 June 1961, London announced suspension of licenses for the export of military equipment for the use in Portuguese overseas territories. Similar position was adopted by Norway in regards to licenses for the sale of arms to Portugal. Sweden, amongst the European countries openly favoured the national liberation movements.<sup>21</sup> Holland too stopped its purchase of coffee and petroleum. Yet Portugal pursued colonial wars for nearly a decade and a half, which would not have lasted had no NATO assistance come in. Despite the arms embargo and suspension of licenses by some governments, Portugal received assistance which was not

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21 Marcum, n. 14, pp. 182-9.

necessarily disclosed to the public.<sup>22</sup> Thus, Portugal heavily depended on its NATO partners to maintain its colonial 'status quo'.

Secondly, in the post war years United Nations was formed. It defended the right of self-determination of the colonies. It became a forum to raise voice against colonialism. In 1955 Portugal was admitted to the United Nations. Despite the protestations of the colonial powers, the United Nations had been able to hasten the process of decolonization. But Portugal refused to comply with the Chapter XI of the Charter.<sup>23</sup> It argued that since its African territories were

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22 USA continued breach of the arms embargo. It supplied 12 helicopters in 1972 including the Bell range models which are fitted with spraying equipments, partly financed by Export-Import loans. In November 1972, the Ex-Im Bank extended a \$ 7.5 million line of credit to a Portuguese institution. Sociedade Financeira Portuguese which in turn granted Mocambique a loan of \$ 1.9 million for the purchase of 12 helicopters. In 1974 too there was an announcement of signing of another 12 Bell helicopters. See Statement of Jennifer Davis, Research Director, American Committee on Africa, in US Congress House Report, n. 19, pp. 28, 30 and 38.

23 See Appendix II, cf. 3.2. Report of the Committee of Six on Chapter XI of the UN Charter, Article 73e.

an integral part of Portugal, they did not fall in the "non-self-governing territories" category. And, Portugal, therefore, was not obliged to supply any information on them to the United Nations.

Later on it rejected the report of the Committee of Six and the General Assembly Resolution on the grounds that the United Nations had no right to discuss Portugal's national affairs and its constitution, which in other words would be interference in its internal affairs (which is forbidden by Article 2(7) of the Charter).<sup>24</sup> Moreover, argued Nogueira, "...no organ had been created for the system of non-self-governing territories....The role of the United Nations concerning the latter was evidently intended to be passive, and it was the Member States alone who determined their respective policies."<sup>25</sup>

Till 1960 Portugal relied on the presence of its NATO allies in the UN to prevent any drastic resolution against itself. But Portugal felt threatened by the evolution of the idea that a "colonial situation" is an

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24 Article 2(7) reads as follows: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

25 Franco Nogueira, The United Nations and Portugal (London, 1963), p. 82.



aggression in itself. Therefore, it negates the administrative power and justifies any action taken against it. In the 1960s the situation changed drastically with the admission of 18 independent states to the United Nations. This gave a clear majority to the Afro-Asian and Communist countries.

During the discussions, a resolution on granting independence to the colonial countries was passed, with USA, UK, France, Belgium, Australia, South Africa, Portugal, Spain, and the Dominican Republic in absentia. It was also pointed out that Portugal was not preparing its colonies for self-determination. In 1962 the Secretary-General of the Special Committee was instructed to collect information on the non-self-governing territories; to which only Portugal raised any objections.

Debate on Angola began on 15 March 1961 following the riots in Luanda. A number of resolutions were passed, condemning Portugal's overseas policy. The United States, at this point, voted for the resolution, thus changing its stand for the first time. In the discussions that followed, the United States and Britain - acting in concert except on two occasions - sometimes voted for, at other against the motion, or abstained from voting.

In order to avoid causing offence or endanger ties with Portugal, USA and UK absented from voting. The change in policy was meant to accommodate the rising African attitudes,

which demanded strict sanctions to be adopted against Portugal. However, it was found that most of the countries were reluctant to adopt such measures. As a result the Afro-Asian countries agreed to modify their earlier harsh stand, and tried to make the Western countries play a more active role. During the debate, all countries were asked to refrain from making any sales of arms and military equipment to Portugal.<sup>26</sup>

On the one hand NATO allies, especially the US and Britain wanted to maintain their relations with Portugal, while on the other hand, they did not want to be discredited in the eyes of African nationalists. At the same time civil wars in independent Africa -- Congo, Sudan, Nigeria, and in others, like Ghana, Algeria, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, the military coups - tended to disillusion most, reflecting the consequences of too precipitate a decolonization.

The war in Biafra too echoed similar sentiments: "It is better for Africans to live under a benevolent colonial rule than to put themselves at the mercy of neo-colonialist rivalries."<sup>27</sup> But already Angolan nationalism was fighting a

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26 For detailed Debate on Angola at the United Nations, see George Martelli, "The Issues Internationalized" in Abshire and Samuels, ed., n. 17, pp. 380-5.

27 Quoted in Marvin Howe, "Portugal at War : Hawks, Doves and Owl", Africa Report, vol. 14, no. 7, November 1969, p. 21.

battle with the colonial rulers. The Angolan issue became internationalized and its implications posed a threat to the Salazar regime, greater than that of internal opposition. As a result, a number of reforms were introduced in the 1960s to harmonize and redeem the character of its colonial administration.<sup>28</sup> It is evident from Adriano Moreira, Overseas Minister's comment: "We are living in an age where self-sufficiency is no longer possible...no people can survive without the aid of reliable allies."<sup>29</sup>

The Portuguese began to look for economic co-operation besides military security from its NATO allies. It was a much needed reform. Salazar's earlier protectionist policy had made entry of foreign capital almost impossible. After the Second World War, Salazar had remained suspicious of America's Marshall Plan. But in the 1960s he overcame his 'xenophobic policy of national capitalism' and Portugal embarked on the new phase of 'imperialism on credit'.<sup>30</sup>

Following which, foreign capital began to penetrate both Portugal and its African territories on a large-scale.

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28 Reforms in the Portuguese administration have been dealt with in Chapter II, Second Phase. It must be noted that no reforms were made with regards to freedom of press, speech or ballot, and needless to say, concessions to rising African nationalism. Also see Marcum, n. 14, pp. 190-3. On Information and Press, See Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: The End of an Era (UNESCO, 1974), pp. 129 ff.

29 Adriano Moreira, The Extent of Europe (Lisbon, 1962), Quoted in Figueiredo, n. 20, p. 214.

30 Ibid., p. 212.

In the First Overseas Development Plan, external finance investments were comparatively small, while in the Second Plan (1959-64) they rose to 25%, and in the Third Plan (1968-73) the Portuguese envisaged approximately 36% non-Portuguese investments.<sup>31</sup> Another aspect of liberalization was the possibility of operating foreign enterprises within Portugal and in its overseas territories without the participation of Portuguese.

Consequently, foreign investments in the 60s accelerated the rate of growth and exploitation of natural resources and cheap labour available. For example, joint ventures were established by companies like Ford, Timex, ITT, Grundig, Renault, British Leyland, and Plessey, whose plants were designed to be assembled for the Portuguese market including the colonies. Furthermore, under the Third Plan, Portugal hoped, or rather expected that the Europeans and American co-operations would provide \$ 283 million of the total investment target for Angola. While Portugal's investments stood at \$ 70 million.<sup>32</sup>

British investments predominated in 1910-1928. In 1902 and 1912, Benguela Railway and DIAMANG enterprises were

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31 William Minter, "Portuguese Africa and the West", in U.S. Congress House Report, n. 18, Appendix 43, p. 523.

32 Jennifer Davis, "Allies in Empire : Part I - US Economic Involvement", Africa Today (Denver), July-August 1970, p. 7. See Appendix III, Fig. 3.3 for US Investments.

established respectively; both had close ties with London. In 1972, Benguela Railway accounted for 45% of the total British investments. Over the years, British assets rose from 1.5% in 1960 to 27% in 1970.<sup>33</sup>

In the 1960s USA displaced Britain. Portugal was given loans between 1962 and 1968 worth \$ 73,300,000 by the Export-Import Bank, and for \$ 18 million in 1970. Many private American sources too invested. American banks became involved in Portuguese Africa with the Portuguese Totta-Allianca and Standard Bank of South Africa.<sup>34</sup>

Foreign investments could be seen in various sectors. Portuguese co-operation with South Africa in the Cunene River resources, was one such example. Foreign capital has been drawn for the exploitation of minerals in Angola. Diamond, Iron, Phosphates, Copper, Gold and Mica are some of the minerals where Germans, Danish Austrian, Japanese and Americans jointly invested.

Petroleum production in Angola too had involved large foreign investments. Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of US Corporation, had invested \$ 209 million by 1972. ANGOL-PETRANGOL, representing French, Belgian and South African interests also controlled oil production in

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33 Robin Blackburn, "Lisbon - The Fall of Fascism", New Left Review (London), 1974, pp. 87-88.

34 Minter, n. 31, p. 523.

Angola. These companies paid 1,000 million escudos as taxes on petroleum production.<sup>35</sup>

Foreign investments and revenues from these companies provided finances for the provincial budgets. As a result, dependence of Portugal and its colonial territories kept increasing on the Western countries. Thereby, reinforcing the role of foreign capital for the Portuguese world, and, in the process, the latter got more and more entrenched in the colonial economies.

Within the overall perspective, it can be concluded that Portugal was forced, out of necessity, to embark on a reformist policy for Angola in the 60s. Angola flourished economically. All sectors - industrial, commercial, agricultural or bureaucratic - expanded but within the existing structures. Resettlement programmes between 1950 and 1970 were undertaken with the aim of creating conditions favourable to the Portuguese for the long-term maintenance

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35 See *ibid.*, pp. 524-5; "Foreign Economic Exploitation in Angola", Objective : Justice, January-February 1974, in US Congress House Report, n. 18, Appendix 45, pp. 530-41; Kinter, "Imperial Network and External Dependency : Implications for the Angolan Liberation Struggle", Africa Today, Winter 1974, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 28-31; Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "Foreign Economics Involvement in Angola and Mozambique", The African Review (Dar-es-Salaam), vol. 4, no. 2, 1974, pp. 299-314.

of the colonies.<sup>36</sup>

But did these reforms help the development of Angola from the African point of view? Reforms in labour regulations, education, social conditions, press and so on were a reflection of compromise to a degree - by the Portuguese Government in the face of growing hostility. While the extractive system continued to operate and flourish.

What then was the need of this society, which was undergoing reformism? It needed, above all, unity to develop

36 See Davidson, n. 17, pp. 298-314; Ferreira, "The Present Role of the Portuguese Resettlement Policy", Africa Today, vol. 21, no. 1, Winter 1974, pp. 47-55. For specific reforms, see Chapter III. Also see Gerald J. Bender, "The Limits of Counter Insurgency: An African Case", Comparative Politics (New York), vol. 4, no. 3, April 1972, pp. 331-60; Portuguese Government had intensified its resettlement programmes after 1965, as a counter-measure to break relations between the insurgent groups and the civilian population. The Portuguese did not expect any threat from the peasants and diverted their troops along the borders. Taking advantage of this, the insurgents with the help of internal peasant groups began to liberate Eastern Angola in 1966.

Bender, after his study of situation in Portugal and Angola, found that the Portuguese were following the same suicidal path the French had followed in Algeria. The resettlement programmes undermined and completely broke down the traditional structures and the mode of life. People were taking refuge in the cities. The administration failed to integrate them all into the modern sector. Traditional equilibrium had given way to a chaotic situation; separate identities were reinforced. Thus leading to conflict and strife. Moreover, it became more favourable to the national insurgencies.

nationalism. In reality, however, Angolans were divided, as discussed above. Instead of fighting colonialism, they spent their energies and resources to stop the other parties (equally nationalistic in outlook) from progressing.

It must be noted that the wave of reformism had negative impact for the development of Angolan nationalism. Therefore, it becomes necessary to analyse and understand what the two contending nationalist parties--UPA and MPLA achieved in the 1960s?<sup>37</sup>

UPA claimed over 10,000 armed soldiers. Between 1961 and 1970 it appeared to have built a small fighting force in the Western Congo, to prevent entry of MPLA. And had retained a small guerrilla presence in northern Angola south of Bembe. Its forces were equipped from the funds received from America and with arms smuggled in through Congo-Leopoldville. Till 1964 GRAE (the exile government of FNLA) was recognized, and FNLA as the sole national party capable of gaining Angola liberation. With the emergence of MPLA as a competitive rival party, OAU granted equal recognition

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37 It is not intended to write details of the struggle of national liberation parties and the reaction of the Portuguese as it goes beyond the scope of this thesis. It is only in brief to summarize the activities of these parties. Details can be seen in: Davidson, n. 17, pp. 165-293; Marcum, n. 14; and Bernard Rivers, "Angola: Massacre and Oppression", Africa Today, vol. 21, no. 1, Winter 1974, pp. 41-45.

However, while examining facts it must not be forgotten that at times figures and gains made public by these parties were or could be inflated, just as the details given by the Portuguese sources were or could be deflated.



to both FNLA and MPLA after 1964.

MPLA had passed into the hands of Agostinho Neto, a doctor-cum-poet turned politician, from Mario de Andrade. MPLA's activities were revived in 1963. It developed guerrilla warfare in the Cabinda enclave, though it failed to make much impact there. It was further obstructed from gaining assistance in Angola south of the Congo river by the UPA. But in 1966, MPLA found new guerrilla fronts in eastern Angola. By 1968 it had strong position in the provinces of Mexico and Cuando Cubango, and was moving towards the central provinces of Malange and Bie. By the end of the year, it was firmly positioned astride the Lobito-Dilolo railway, heading north-west. Its troops were equipped with Soviet and Chinese weapons.

The third party--UNITA--developed in 1966 as a result of defection of Jonas M. Savimbi from UPA. Its guerrilla attacks were based on out-of-date traditional methods, like drugging men before launching an attack. The 1967 blow-up of the railway line made the Zambian Government apprehensive, and Savimbi was expelled from Zambia. It like UPA followed terrorist methods. It had to fight MPLA for areas of influence.

The three parties continued guerrilla warfare in the 70s. In the beginning, the Portuguese settlers retaliated by massacring the African population and burning

their villages. The Portuguese army was small, manpower was drawn from within the territories.<sup>38</sup> But the situation became increasingly critical with increased Portuguese reprisals. To bring back the situation to normal, Portuguese troops had to be sent from Lisbon. As a result of continued reinforcements, the number of army in Angola had reached approximately 50,000 by 1967-68 - almost 15-16 times the number of European troops in the pre-1961 period. Almost 75% of the entire Portuguese metropolitan army was abroad in 1967.<sup>39</sup>

It integrated most of its African units, especially Bakongo guides for the bush guerrilla warfare in the north. The army was further aided by the volunteer crops in performing guard and police duties in the war zones and periphery. Besides aiding in the maintenance of order and security, it assisted the 'psycho-social' programme and gave logistic aid. The 'psycho-social' programme was pursued with the aim of improving relations between the authorities and the African population.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, the army had the mission

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38 The Portuguese maintained a small army overseas to prevent the development of military opposition to the regime in Lisbon.

39 Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1967-1968 (London, 1967), p. 26.

40 Wheeler, "The Portuguese Army in Angola", The Journal of Modern African Studies (London), vol. 7, no. 3, October 1969, p. 432, based on Valahu, L'Angola, clef de l'Afrique (Paris, 1966), pp. 219-20.

of "re-educating the natives" in the northern Angola and of "attracting" the African population which had fled the country.<sup>41</sup> As mentioned before, resettlement programme was then actively pursued.

The presence of European army in Angola gave boost to the Angolan consumer economy. It was followed by stabilization of the military situation in 1963. The army was composed of over 75% white. Therefore, it could hardly achieve much beyond maintaining order.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, army tended to fulfil the Portuguese desire of colonization.<sup>43</sup> This came in conflict with the army's role as a "semi-neutral", 'benevolent protector' of the African rural masses (against reprisals by Europeans settlers) [after 1964]... in effect, the Portuguese psycho-social benefactor of today can become the competitive Portuguese settler-farmer of tomorrow."<sup>44</sup> This contradiction seemed to jeopardize the harmony amongst the army.

Various accounts of military encounter between the Portuguese and the Angolan nationalists give shocking details of the genocide committed by the Portuguese troops. The

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41 Ibid., p. 433, based on Helio Felgas, Guerra em Angola (Lisbon, 1961), p. 171.

42 Ibid., p. 437; Racial Problem would have tended to neutralize any positive contribution of the army.

43 Ibid., p. 435.

44 Ibid., p. 438.

modernized Portuguese troops had recourse to criminal weapons of herbicides and arboricides.<sup>45</sup> The terrorist movements of UPA and UNITA too exhibited atrocious behaviour, violence, massacre, genocide, atrocities towards children and women, burning, use of napalm, bombs by Portuguese troops were the frequent events in 1960s and early 1970s in Angola. Thus the wars in Angola for liberation have been one of the bloodiest wars after Algeria in the post-war era.

With the growing help and assistance of different powers, the national liberation parties were able to take up arms against the colonial power which had controlled and administered them for nearly 500 years. The situation showed the double-role of the Western countries. On the one hand, they maintained extensive relation with Portugal, and, on the other, they defended the right of self-government of the colonies. Yet they refrained from taking any drastic step to force the hand of Portugal for decolonization.

The Angolan question had got internationalized. The struggling Angolan nationalism could not be ignored. Portugal, still clinging to its century old notions, tried to crush resistance and thereby involved the Western world in its bloody colonial wars in Africa. The nationalists

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45 See Bernard Rivers, n. 37, pp. 41-45; Agostinho Neto, "The Liberation Struggle in Angola", in Stokke and Widstrand, ed., The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa (Oslo, 9-14 April 1973) (Uppsala, 1973), vol. 1, part III, Sec. B, p. 90.

themselves had divided the world opinion in favour of individual national parties. What should have developed as one National Liberation Movement, had crystallized into a number of movements, handicapped by ethnic, racial, class and zonal factors, each fighting for supremacy over the other, and, fight for power overshadowing struggle against colonialism.

Yet it must be said that the cumulative effect of the national liberation movements together with favourable world opinion was tremendous. The desire to achieve freedom and liberation had emerged victor and proved its tenacity in a gruelling fight with its colonial oppressors.

CHAPTER V

## CHAPTER V

### POLITICS OF COLLAPSE

In September 1968 Europe's last and the oldest fascist dictatorship faced a crisis. Portugal's Prime Minister, Salazar, developed a cerebral stroke and was incapacitated for the rest of his life. Salazar had maintained a balance between the various groups within the power elite. Therefore, his absence from the political field created a vacuum. However, Portugal continued as a fascist state under Marcello Caetano.<sup>1</sup> Salazar's "Estado Novo" continued with certain modifications. Yet, writes Pedro Soares, "Caetano's 'social' state resembles Salazar's 'new' state."<sup>2</sup> He tried to reconcile the various political factions--centre, right and left.

PIDE--the major instrument of repression was transformed into DGS (Directorate General of Security). DGS was relatively more liberal than PIDE. However, its task was made

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1 Caetano, a military fascist, had drafted the constitutional laws of Salazar's "Estado Nova". He was linked and identified with the regime's repressive legislations. His pragmatism and flexibility of approach together with right-of-Salazar position in politics had earned him the reputation of being a "liberal fascist" and "forward-looking traditionalist".

2 Pedro Soares, "Portuguese Fascism and its Contradictions", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 24, no. 566, 4 November 1973, p. 19. Pedro Soares was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Portugal.

difficult by the younger generation which had grown up under a dictatorial regime. Clandestine groups and illegal Communist literature appeared criticizing the Government. Only superficial reforms occurred; names of the institutions were changed but their structural functioning remained unchanged.

Mario Soares, a political exile (during Salazar regime), on his return commented: "More important than words would be institutional changes....We have passed the stage of accepting promises and concessions."<sup>3</sup> In fact Portugal was nowhere near achieving a parliamentary-democratic form of government. But it had moved on to a higher phase of political evolution; "Fascism with a human face".<sup>4</sup> Some changes slowly evolved. Amongst them was the gradually reduced role of Church. It had bolstered up the regime both at home and abroad in its overseas territories during Salazar's reign.

Within Portugal workers continued to be exploited. Monopolies were strengthened. More and more Portuguese left for France and West Germany. By 1975, a million and a half Portuguese had emigrated (700,000 to France and 115,000 to West Germany). An illusion of "development" was created; the decline of the work force in the agricultural sector was misinterpreted. Actually it was caused by the exodus of Portuguese immigrants. Furthermore, between 1953 and 1964,

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3 Quoted in Figueiredo, Portugal ; Fifty Years of Dictatorship (Harmondsworth, 1975), p. 224.

4 Ibid., p. 225.



the regime's agrarian policy of concentrating land holdings left a reduced number of farms. The corporative system extended the control of the capitalists, the big landowners and foreign imperialists. Government's policy, thus pushed the small and medium sized landholders towards collapse.<sup>5</sup>

Consequently food import arose as agriculture production went down. On the other hand, population pressure in North was reduced which otherwise would have led to subdivisions of land. The wages of the workers remained low, and, therefore, food prices too had to be maintained at a low level. While the prices of consumer goods remained beyond the purview of the common man,<sup>6</sup> discontent, dissatisfaction and inflation rent the country.

The remittance of overseas Portuguese represented 70% of the country's merchandise exports. Money was invested in land or used to negate fuel inflation.<sup>7</sup> Industrial sector had developed in the post-war period. Foreign investments helped its growth; the latter being linked to the policy of the State. Foreign capital was both susceptible and

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5 Kenneth Maxwell, "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution", Foreign Affairs (USA), vol. 54, no. 2, January 1976, pp. 253-4; and Pedro Soares, n. 2, pp. 19-20.

6 Kenneth, *ibid.*, pp. 254 ff; Pedro Soares, *ibid.*, p. 19.

7 Maxwell, *ibid.*, p. 254.

vulnerable to the changes within Portugal and at the international level. No trade unions existed. Freedom was curtailed, censorship continued. There was no change in the list of voters. In 1969 election, approximately 7% of the population voted (i.e. 1.5 million out of the total of 22 million, including its overseas territory).<sup>8</sup> Only an illusion of change was created by holding elections for the colonial assemblies.

In 1959, Portugal had joined EFTA (European Free Trade Association). It was given special and exclusive tariff advantages to protect its 'fragile commercial structure' from competition,<sup>9</sup> followed by opening up of Portugal and its overseas territories to the Western capitalism. By 1967, foreign capital financed 263, new enterprises worth

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8 Figueiredo, n. 3, p. 224; for example, out of 60,000 inhabitants of the archipelago of St. Thomas and Principe, only 5,900 voted (i.e. 1/10th of the population). It was to present to the world that despite the liberation wars being fought in the Portuguese Africa, the latter were having a "normal political life". See Mustafa Resulovic, "Lisbon's moves in Africa", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 24, no. 565, 20 October 1973, p. 11.

9 Basil Davidson, "Arms and the Portuguese", Africa Report (New York), vol. 15, no. 5, May 1970, p. 10. Portugal had to classify its industrial products, such as tinned fish, tomato juice and cork, as agricultural products in order to gain access to the markets of the Ten.

700 million escudos, the latter rose to nearly 2,000 million escudos in 1970 and over 4,000 million escudos in 1974. Six hundred of the most important companies in Portugal alone were controlled by foreign imperialists.<sup>10</sup>

The availability of foreign funds helped Portugal to modernize its industrial sector. Caetano was more receptive than Salazar to foreign investments; Caetano Government also had a stake in the industrial expansion.<sup>11</sup> Many small and medium-sized industrial units were liquidated and big units created or reinforced and linked to monopoly capital. Thus, finance capital penetrated and got concentrated in the industrial sector of Portugal.<sup>12</sup>

The intensity of increased production (48% between 1960 and 1966) failed to give the workers a better wage, it

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10 Pedro Soares, n. 2, p. 19.

11 Many ministers had shares in the various industries. For example, Nogueira, the Foreign Minister during Salazar regime, when sacked by Caetano had joined the board of directors of several companies, including the British owned Benguela Railway Co. of Angola. Caetano jokingly commented that Nogueira, an 'ultra' was only 'transferring to a new trench in the national battle'. Quoted from Figueirido, n. 1, p. 223.

Caetano himself a monopolist, was a member of the Board of the Overseas National Bank, Chairman of the Assembly of the Society of Cotton Producers for Colonial Development, and as a stockholder, he held a responsible place in "Portuguese Ammoniac" - a chemical products company and in various insurance companies. See Pedro Soares, *ibid.*, pp. 14-19.

12 Pedro Soares, *ibid.*, p. 19.

remained 4-5 times less than a French or a German worker. Thus, in the words of Pedro Soares, "The working class and people of Portugal are compelled to suffer the inflation provoked by the colonialist war, the financial crisis of the capitalist system, economic stagnation in Portugal and the omnipotence of the monopolies."<sup>13</sup>

Portugal joined EEC (European Economic Community) in 1972. Its trade deficit recorded in 1972 was 23,000 million escudos. Its public debt came to 50,000 million escudos, for which the Portuguese paid over 3,000 million escudos a year as servicing charges.<sup>14</sup> These figures reflect Portugal's increased dependence on and subordination to its Western allies - the foreign investors. Portugal thus became highly indebted to them and fell in the clutches of foreign imperialism.

In the 1960s there emerged a class of strong industrial bourgeoisie demanding greater freedom and liberty of action, for example, elimination of the industrial controls, and, closer links with Europe and international capital. Therefore, economically dominant industrial bourgeoisie became a rival class to the "old bourgeoisie" who still held great political power. The former were reluctant to accept a

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13 Ibid. Inflation rate recorded in 1973 was 21%.

14 Ibid.

"compromise government", thereby making Caetano's task as an arbitrator difficult. This led to confrontation between the two factions. Both groups viewed Caetano with suspicion and, therefore, he found himself isolated. Thus, he was unable to continue as an arbitrator.<sup>15</sup> There was no "line of colonial policy" and each colonial problem was resolved casually.

On the question of colonies, Caetano like Salazar, was apprehensive that Portugal without its colonies would be reduced to a province of Spain. His speeches in Africa on the colonial policy included: (a) Reorganization of the armed forces to provide greater operational effectiveness, (b) Progressive administrative autonomy of the local governments within the Portuguese nation, (c) Increased participation of the Africans in political and administrative sectors to give substance to Portugal's principle of a multi-racial state, and (d) Acceleration of economic development through opening the door to foreign capital and skills.<sup>16</sup>

In fact these points reasserted the Portuguese

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15 During Salazar's regime both the industrial bourgeoisie and the landed proprietors were weak. Therefore, Salazar regime had been a compromise between industrial and agrarian capital. Salazar had acted as an "arbitrator" to prevent weakening of the either class which might bring the non-privileged classes to power. See Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, "An Analysis of the 'Spinoza Affair'", Africa Today (Denver), vol. 21, no. 2, Spring 1974, pp. 69-70.

16 Quoted in Marvin Howe, "Portugal at War : Hawks, Doves and Owl", Africa Report, vol. 14, no. 7, November 1969, p. 17.

conviction of staying in Africa, undaunted by the growing national liberation wars in the Portuguese Africa. Caetano like Salazar, was convinced that it was their "right and duty" to stay in Africa. Colonies have been the mainstay of Portuguese economy. Caetano continued to equate and identify the interest of "Western civilization" with those of the Portuguese colonialists.<sup>17</sup> He chose to pursue the programme of "continuation and renovation".

This policy inevitably led to reinforcement of the Portuguese troops abroad in Portuguese Africa. The colonial wars proved costly both in terms of manpower and economy. According to Portugal's Government "defense and security" alone consumed 44% of the annual effective revenue--6-7% of the GNP. It cost the lives of over 10,000 Portuguese and nearly 17,000 million escudos by 1972. The Lisbon regime completely relied on its armed forces.<sup>18</sup> Therefore,

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17 Caetano in a speech said: "Europe needs, like bread to eat, the raw materials and natural energies existing in Africa", quoted in Ferreira, n. 15, p. 70.

Further, Caetano considered Europeans essential for the development of, and to organize the Blacks. Blacks in his view were merely productive elements organized and necessary auxiliaries. See Marcello Caetano, Os Nativos na Economia Africana (Lisbon, 1954).

18 See Davidson, n. 13, pp. 10-11; Marcum, "Three Revolutions", Africa Report, vol. 12, no. 8, November 1967, pp. 9-17; Howe, n. 16, pp. 16-21; Pedro Soares, n. 2, p. 19; Resulovic, n. 8, p. 9; and Anirudha Gupta, "Implications of the Lisbon Coup", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 25, nos 582-83, 5-20 July 1974,

Caetano awarded "guarantees to the army" for their support against pressures from the extreme right.

Despite the heavy losses, Portugal claimed to have achieved success in suppressing the Angolan rebels.<sup>19</sup> They continued to allude themselves that they could continue to

pp. 23-24. See Appendix III, Table 3.4 on military expenditure.

The drastic and tragic consequences of Portuguese colonial war were very accurately summed up by an opponent of the Caetano regime, J.P. Silva at the Aveiro Congress in April 1973.

It involves: "(1) Mobilization of Portuguese youth into one of the longest and most arduous military conscriptions in the world; (2) 10,000 dead; (3) 20,000 wounded and mutilated; (4) immeasurable psychological consequences; (5) heavy increase in taxation; (6) substantial rise in the cost of living; (7) loss of markets in countries opposed to colonialism; (8) piecemeal sale of the country to foreign enterprises; (9) reinforcement of the political power of certain economic groups which benefit from the continuation of the wars. The Government's policy is thus anti-patriotic." Quoted from Figueiredo, n. 3, p. 229.

- 19 Portuguese army successfully pushed back the Angolan national insurgents between 1961 and 1964. It however did not signify that the national liberation movements had been crushed, only temporarily made to retreat to the neighbouring borders. After 1966, Portuguese settlers accused the army for their 'soft' attitude towards the national insurgents. Many believed that the army had no will to win and "was too slow to eradicate totally the guerrilla threat and to end the war." And threatened to form a civil militia. See Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Portuguese Army in Angola", The Journal of Modern African Studies (London), vol. 7, no. 3, October 1969, pp. 431-9; Wheeler, "Reflections on Angola", Africa Report, vol. 12, no. 8, November 1967, pp. 58-62; and Howe, n. 16, pp. 18-19.

fight for an infinite period. Although their expenditure on army was nearly \$ 400 million a year, yet it had reserve of \$ 1.3 billion foreign exchange in gold untouched.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, it began to use NATO equipments to equip its troops. Heavily reliant on the Western allies, Portugal allowed them the use of its strategic bases in exchange for their military, political and economic support. Portugal's institutionalized commitment to rule in Africa towards the end of 1960s exceeded all its previous attempts.

Portugal had extensive trade with its colonies, and the colonies were its major source of foreign currency.<sup>21</sup> The industrial bourgeoisie in Portugal realized the inevitability of conceding liberation to Angola, and therefore,

20 Howe, *ibid.*, p. 16; according to Maxwell, total reserves stood at \$ 2.8 billion at the end of 1973. Maxwell, n. 5, p. 261. Portugal has always tended to maintain its gold and foreign exchange reserves which was largely responsible for the stability of the Portuguese currency. It was not used to offset Portugal's trade deficit. Only a part of it was used during the 1960s to buy military weapons.

21 The African colonies functioned within the special, closed "common market" of Portugal exclusively as exporters of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods. The balance of trade between the mother country and the colonies was always negative while that of colonies with outside world was always positive. Thus, in 1967, 33.4% of the total exports of Angola went to Portugal and 61.2% to the third countries outside Portugal's privileged market, and the rest to the other Portuguese African territories. See Resulovic, n. 8, pp. 9-10; Green, "Portugal and the African Territories: Economic Implications", in Abshire and Samuel, ed., Portuguese Africa (London, 1969), pp. 345 ff. See Appendix III, table 3.5.



visualized a fast solution in which they would be able to compete successfully with international capital. While, the agrarian based "old bourgeoisie" too realized the inevitable end of the Portuguese empire but wanted a slow devolution of power and autonomy, arrived at through reforms.<sup>22</sup>

A group of liberals suggested that the only course open to Lisbon was through development and not by "provoking" the military. For example, by developing savannah land.<sup>23</sup> Another group of economists led by Francisco da Moura propagated a neo-colonial solution. They highlighted the fact that the benefits derived from the colonies were being neutralized by the continued expenditure on military. Therefore, by increasing the rate of capital investment in the colonies, Portugal could raise its income. This could be successfully channellized to transform its economic character, from a "backward, peasant based economy into a modern industrial one".<sup>24</sup>

Portugal with its colonial empire intact in the 1960s belonged to a developed capitalist camp, but its socio-economic structures were far behind that of other developed countries. According to MES, "Portugal is a country in which capitalist relations of production dominate

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22 See Ferreira, n. 15, p. 70.

23 Howe, n. 16, p. 20.

24 This view point has been discussed by Anirudha Gupta, n. 18, p. 24.

in a quasi-absolute form."<sup>25</sup> Besides the class of wage-cum-salary workers and the monopolistic bourgeoisie there had emerged a number of classes - "characteristic of capitalist countries at a comparable stage of development".<sup>26</sup>

An intermediate industrial and commercial bourgeoisie overlapping with upper class of salaried workers; professionals; government bureaucrats; petty bourgeoisie related to the lower class of salaried workers; sub-proletariat - comprising of criminals, prostitutes, hustlers, and of under- and unemployed emerged in the city. While in the countryside developed: latifundists (big estate owners especially in the south); modern capitalist farmers; commercial farmers,<sup>27</sup> semi-proletariat including the minifundist of the north.

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25 MES stands for the Movement of the Socialist Left. Quoted in Paul M. Sweezy, "Class Struggles in Portugal", Monthly Review (New York), vol. 27, no. 4, September 1975, p. 3.

26 Ibid., pp. 4-5. The following class analysis of the Portuguese society is based on Sweezy's article.

27 The latifundists practised very inefficient type of agriculture. While the modern capitalist farmers were good businessmen, their agricultural practices from the societal point of view were often disastrously irrational. See *ibid.*, p. 5. Also see Marcel Mazoyer, "The Cumulative Process of 'Underdevelopment' in the Irrigated Areas of Southern Portugal" in Rene Dumont with Marcel Mazoyer, Socialisms and Development, Rupert Cunningham, trans. (London, 1973), pp. 277-90.

As discussed earlier, the disintegrating rural life added to the regime's problems. The working class began to organize strikes and demonstrations against the fascist regime. The peasants, petty urban bourgeoisie, and parts of the middle class joined the struggle as the contradictions of Portuguese fascism began to crystallize. In the face of growing tension and breakdown of traditional fascist authority, foreign imperialists began to wind up their business and leave Portugal hastily. Others who could go nowhere, were held by the rising working class and forced to concede the workers' demands. This led to rise into credits, which created pressures for the nationalization of the banks.<sup>28</sup>

In 1973, Lisbon faced yet another problem because of the large number of skilled workers leaving Portugal (approximately 34% of the total migrants). Continued manpower drain by the military services abroad compounded the problem of labour shortage. Hence, Lisbon had to import workers from Cape Verde Islands, and thus, developed a black minority group in Portugal.<sup>29</sup>

During the 1960s, Portugal had greatly benefitted from tourism. Construction and real estate operations had

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28 Kenneth Maxwell, n. 5, p. 257.

29 Ibid., p. 254. Since the end of 16th century there had been no blacks in Portugal till mid 20th century, despite its multi-racial policies.

been launched on a large scale; consuming 11.7% of the non-agricultural labour force. But the rising militancy and radicalization of politics deflated the tourist boom. It affected the overseas workers most who lost their savings. Take over of the vacant houses further alienated them from the regime.<sup>30</sup>

Amidst growing political and economic conflicts in Portugal, the Lisbon regime found itself being criticized by the Catholic Church hierarchy for its colonial policies. The Church which had once played an important role as its supporter, adopted a stance of silence in the face of growing hostility. Yet, it must be noted that during the phase of colonial war, Portugal benefitted from the increase in trade and development of Angola. Modest credit expansion followed the outbreak of rebellion, thus increasing the pace of economic development of Angola.

It coincided with a process of accelerated change within Portugal. Despite censorship and repression - characteristic features of the fascist regime, reports on industrialization and Portugal's involvement in Africa began to filter through. Need for better educated soldiers and nurses etc. in the auxillary branches contributed to modernization of Portugal; influence of Western culture was

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30 Ibid., pp. 254-5 and 257.

felt especially.<sup>31</sup> The overall milieu was changing; the public was realizing and reacting to the necessity of ending colonial wars.<sup>32</sup>

Within the military divisions, confrontation began to take shape as conscripted and non-commissioned officers were promoted and sent to Africa. The Armed Forces Movement (AFM) got together to protest against this new decree which gave equal status to all officers.<sup>33</sup> This marked the beginning of the growing anti-thetical forces to the Lisbon regime. It was further reinforced by their realization of the futility of the colonial wars. The army became desirous of ending the treacherous 13-years old colonial wars. In Spínola, the Deputy Chief of Staff for all the armed forces, the AFM found its leader. Towards the end of 1973 rumours of "Captain's Movement" of "Armed Forces Movement" were afoot, but no one paid much attention to them.

In 1974, Spínola's book Portugal and the Future created a sensation in Portugal. But it also led to the

31 Figueiredo, n. 3, p. 226.

32 Amílcar Cabral summed up the changing attitude of Lisbon; "In the very heart of the Portuguese Government a realist tendency is showing itself, taking adequate means of making the extremists understand that the colonial war is not only useless but is irremediably lost in our country." Speech at Dakar, 3 March 1968. See Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (London, 1971), p. 104.

33 Robin Blackburn, "Lisbon - The Fall of Fascism", New Left Review (London), nos. 87-88, September-December 1974, pp. 43 ff; Kenneth Maxwell, "The Hidden Revolution in Portugal", New York Review of Books, 17 April 1975; Paul Sweezy, n. 25, p. 8.

dismissal of General Spínola and his superior, General Costa Gomes who had allowed the publication of this book. Spínola's book offered a neo-colonial solution to the problems facing Portugal with its African territories.<sup>34</sup> He believed that the social crisis would only be solved by liberalization. A policy of concession or repression would lead to limited and temporary results or to violence. The lack of industrial expansion was the cause of economic crisis and the military had failed to understand the nature of guerrilla war. In view of these crisis, the solution would have to be political, rather than military.

The only viable solution according to Spínola was to build a "Lusitanian Commonwealth". It would help to give the Africans the right to self-determination, progressive autonomy, and an expression to African institutions. It would develop as a result of popular referendum held in all the Portuguese African territories. In his hypothetical political structure of the nation, Spínola visualized the reestablishment of Pax Portuguese and creation of a "pluri-national State" with the consent and willing adherence

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34 The following analysis of Spínola's book is based on: Douglas P. Wachholz and Paul F. Wachholz, English Language synopsis of Antonio de Spínola's book entitled Portugal E O Futuro, in Hearings before the 93rd US Congress House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on Africa, 2nd Session, March 14; October 8, 9 and 22, 1974, The Complex of United States - Portuguese Relations : Before and After the Coup (Washington, 1974), Appendix 5, pp. 222-30, and Ferreira, n. 15, pp. 69-73.

of its member nations. Federation would develop gradually by conciliating a system of progressively greater autonomy, while insuring central authority by providing for federal judicial review of the laws.

The industrial bourgeoisie of Portugal favoured this "federal state solution". Because this would open up the African territories for direct foreign capital investments. Already the industrial bourgeoisie were co-operating with the international capital for the exploitation of available resources in the Portuguese African territories. They hoped that this solution would give them enough time to strengthen their base and become competitive with respect to the international capital.

Spinola, further added, that the myth of our civilizing mission must be given up. Only by changing our slogan from "Come near, but don't raise yourselves" to "Raise yourselves and come close" would the Portuguese be able to reassert their claim of multi-racial co-existence; not by exerting that only European Portuguese have the priority of exercising power.

The publication of this book had jolted Caetano. A number of army officers were replaced. Spinola was not a revolutionary, but envisaged himself as de Gaulle of Portugal. Before the coup, he went to give Caetano the ultimatum of the armed forces and between the two of them

it transpired that power would be transferred to Spinoia and his companion, Simao, as President and Prime Minister respectively. President Thomaz, however, discovered the plan and forced Caetano to continue.<sup>35</sup> This was followed by arrests of officers at the emergency Co-ordinating Committee meeting in Lisbon on 15 March 1974. By 24 April PIDE was ready to arrest more members and was certain of the coming coup, but it was too late to stop the AFM who marched in on 25 April to take over power.

Lisbon witnessed a bloodless revolution under the aegis of its wartime hero Spinoia and the AFM.<sup>36</sup> The "3-D program" of AFM; democratization, decolonization and

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35 Jane Kramer, "Letter from Lisbon", New Yorker, 23 September 1974.

36 See *ibid.*, pp. 215-21; Figueiredo, n. 3, pp. 232 ff; Sweezy, n. 25, pp. 6-34; Sweezy, "Class Struggles in Portugal - Part 2", Monthly Review, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 1-15; Maxwell, n. 5, pp. 258-65; Rui Pedro "Portugal's Revolution", New World Review (New York), vol. 44, no. 2, March-April 1976, pp. 14-17; Anirudha Gupta, n. 18, pp. 24-25; Anirudha Gupta, "Collapse of the Portuguese Empire and Dialectics of Liberation of Southern Africa", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 14, no. 1, January-March 1975, pp. 5-10; Gil Green, Portugal's Revolution (USA, 1976).

Details of the revolution and the following crisis in the Government can be seen in the above-mentioned sources. Also see, Facts on File, 1974-76; Editorials on File 1974-75. They will not be dealt here except in passing, since they go beyond the scope of this study.



development--which had united the AFM--led to its split soon after the coup. The conflicts became noticeable soon after the coup. The conflicts became noticeable when the first nationalizations and agrarian reform steps took place. Various factions from moderates to radicals of Socialists and Communists operated on the political plane. Spínola himself backed by the right groups, wanted to pursue the policy of slow and orderly disengagement from Africa.<sup>37</sup>

He wanted to "stay" in Angola for as long as possible because surplus of earnings in Angola was essential for the development of Portugal. Unemployment in Portugal had increased; a number of industrial units closed. The country was "isolated" amidst political and economic chaos. Washington too disapproved of the new government which included Communists.<sup>38</sup> Political discord at the central

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37 Spínola's views coincided with those of an economic group--SEDES; "a more equitable distribution of wealth in Portugal and the phased withdrawal from the country's territories in Africa." Therefore, Spínola began to consolidate his own political base through SEDES. See, John La Rose, "Africa and Portugal", Race (London), vol. 16, no. 1, July 1974, p. 23.

38 To control and exert moderate influence on the workers upsurge, and to fulfil the compromises made, Spínola included Socialist and Communist groups in the coalition government.

level finally forced a show down and Spínola had to resign.

In the following months, Portugal witnessed struggle for power amongst the different political groups. Extreme Left and Right realized the threat from the emerging "popular power" at a local level which tended to undermine the linkages among the central authorities. Economic crisis were prevented temporarily by the gold reserve. A sense of unreality and of pending disaster marked the atmosphere. Initially, radicalism of the AFM, was underestimated; later on, too much hope had been placed on its staying in power. It made special efforts to control the structures for propaganda and for indoctrination of "cultural dynamization". Alvaro Cunha, Secretary General of the Portuguese Communist Party expected that power could be achieved by seizing institutional structures. But the institutional elements disintegrated most rapidly, and in the process, affected the Communists. Civil strife became marked. Coalitions broke down.<sup>39</sup>

The November 25 uprising led to reimposition of traditional military discipline. AFM had taken a swing right-wards. The revolutionary forces began their attempt to build and consolidate an anti-fascist, progressive, democratic form of government to ensure the continuance of

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39 Maxwell, n. 5, pp. 260-5.

the gains gained by the working class, in order to start Portugal on a socialist path of development. Thus, the Sixth Provisional Government came to power in Lisbon.

Portugal had emerged a "new" nation once more in 1974 by overthrowing its 48 years of fascist rule. But did the AFM succeed in destroying the Portuguese colonial state? Portuguese fascist colonial state, despite the concessions won by the opposition forces and the latter's emergence, continued to threaten the gains won by the opposition.<sup>40</sup> Economically, the class structure remained unchanged. Politically, the industrial bourgeois replaced the "old" bourgeoisie, which supported Spinoia.

The colonial policy of Spinoia caused split and bitter infighting. It came to the forefront when Mario Soares, the Foreign Minister, announced that Portugal would respect "the principle of self-determination with all its consequences, including national independence".<sup>41</sup> Premier Goncalves further added that it must be a just process of decolonization which would not lead to neo-colonialism.<sup>42</sup> The process of decolonization was further stepped up by President Costa Gomes who replaced President Spinoia.

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40 La Rose, n. 37, pp. 20-21.

41 Africa Diary (New Delhi), 20-26 August 1974, pp. 7094-5.

42 Ibid.

Although considerable progress was made with regards to transfer of power in Guinea-Bissau, Mocambique, Cape Verde Islands and Sao Tome's Principe Islands, Portuguese obstructed recognition of any one party as the sole legitimate representative of the Angolan people. Instead, they sought to transform the character of Angolan political parties, from illegal, clandestine, rebellious forces in exile to legal, electoral competing parties.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, in January 1975, the three Angolan parties signed an accord at Alvor in Portugal to participate in the Transitional Government that would operate till Angola was granted complete independence. Grant of Independence was scheduled for 11 November 1975. The agreement also aimed at aiding integration of the guerrilla armies of the three liberation movements into a single national army, from which the Portuguese troops were to be withdrawn later on.

The process of decolonization of Angola was complicated by the intervention of the foreign powers. In mid-1974, the FNLA received Chinese arms and instructors, which continued and increased in 1975. MPLA received arms from the USSR in October-November 1974. The assistance had been given to the Chipenda-faction for some time before giving the Neto-faction. Chipenda-faction later on joined FNLA.

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43 John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola", Foreign Affairs, vol. 54, no. 3, April 1976, pp. 412-13.

USA's involvement was more complex. It had given \$ 431 million in aid to Portugal for war against the Angolan masses in 1971. At the same time it had extended support to FNLA, including a CIA retainer of \$ 10,000 a year for Roberto Holden.<sup>44</sup> It also extended assistance to UNITA, giving \$ 14 million arms to FNLA and UNITA, which increased to \$ 32 million by the end of 1975.<sup>45</sup> In 1975, the 40 committee authorized aid worth \$ 300,000 to FNLA but decided against aiding UNITA.<sup>46</sup> Further, in order to ensure US operation in the North of Angola against any government that would be challenging their interests, USA extended support to FNLA.

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44 Anthony Monteiro, "Angola : Key to Freedom for Southern Africa", New World Review, vol. 44, no. 2, March-April 1976, p. 10.

45 The Times (London), 6 June 1976. Although the figures published for American aid are \$ 32.3 million, Senator John Tunney announced in February that the data collected by his aides showed "much larger and more pervasive" American involvement than he had realized or the Administration had acknowledged.

The Observer (London), 11 January 1976, reported that the US naval task force in the waters around Angola in December was led by the aircraft carrier Independence, supported by a guided missile cruiser and three destroyer escorts, which was to provide tactical air support, for strike over Angola. The Independence carried 90 F-4 Phantom jets - napalm, sidewinder missiles and anti-personnel fragmentation bombs in pools.

46 Marcum, n. 43, p. 414.

On the other hand, FNLA vs. MPLA war had begun three weeks after signing the Alvor accord. The result was collapse of the Transitional Government. FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA were at war with each other. In October South Africa entered Angola taking MPLA by surprise. In November, however, Soviet Russia landed Cuban troops (approximately 11,000 by late February). American estimates suggest that in the last 11 months Soviet material output was about \$ 300 million.<sup>47</sup> In January or at least in July, as John Marcum puts it, it became imperative for the USA to suggest to Moscow its readiness to "use our influence to bring about the cessation of foreign military assistance and to encourage an African solution if they would do the same."<sup>48</sup>

But already it was too late. Both USA and USSR were heavily involved. China had withdrawn strategically. MPLA assisted by Cuban troops was winning. In the face of the ban imposed by the Congress, USA could not continue to give aid to FNLA & UNITA. Its collusion with South Africa involved the Western powers in a disturbing pattern. Against this background of foreign involvement and internationalist fighting, the Portuguese High Commissioner folded his flag

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47 Ibid., p. 417. Shipments from USSR included ships and Antonov-22 transport planes disgorging tons of sophisticated arms, including T-54 and T-34 tanks, and 122-mm rockets.

48 Marcum, n. 43, p. 418.

at 12 p.m. on 11 November 1975 and set sail for Lisbon. In his speech he remarked on the political vacuum in the country. He was, therefore, unable to hand over power to any one party. Instead he gave it to the people of Angola. In the ensuing contest for power army became the sole determinant of Angola's future. OAU failed to resolve the different views of the Africans on Angola. However, by February 1976, 26 states had recognized MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola. Others soon followed suit.

Finally, one must analyse the underlying motives of the foreign intervention. What did the different powers hope to achieve by escalating a local conflict? Are there any safeguards to prevent or lessen the increased international tension in such a situation? Were the interests of America, Russia, South Africa and others so great and at stake that they justified their intervention in Angola?

One may begin with China. A Big Power but with no apparent strategic, economic interests in Angola. It has maintained trade relations with South Africa and Rhodesia, and is therefore aligned with the most reactionary forces. It commented that South Africa's aggression was "fully justified" and also justified US aid as a reaction to "Soviet arms build up".<sup>49</sup> It gave assistance to UNITA and FNLA. But perceiving the changes in military situation, it withdrew.

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49 Anthony Monteiro, n. 44, p. 10.

It has been extremely critical of Russian support to the Angolan liberation movement, MPLA. China is convinced that "the criminal aims of the Soviet revisionists" aggression against Angola are to plunder rich African resources, grab strategic positions and undermine the unity of African countries and their just cause of opposing imperialism".<sup>50</sup>

South Africa under Prime Minister Vorster entered Angolan battlefield against the Soviet-backed MPLA, on the side of the West-backed parties. Although its Prime Minister said that South Africa had no territorial ambition. But it was worried over the presence of Cuban troops and the future of Angola in the hands of Soviet-backed MPLA.<sup>51</sup> In fact, Vorster warned the West of the impending problems if Russia ever controlled the strategic Cape Sea Routes. He also added that South Africa recognized Angola. The only problem was due to the functioning of the two parallel governments - one of MPLA and the other of FNLA - UNITA.<sup>52</sup> South Africa felt threatened by Communist-dominated neighbourhood where its important interest is \$ 184 million Calueque-Ruacana Hydro-Electric Scheme in the Southern Angola.<sup>53</sup>

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50 "The View From China", Africa Report (New York), vol. 21, no. 1, January-February 1976, p. 10; excerpts from "What are the Criminal Aims of the Soviet Revisionists' Intervention in Angola", People's Daily (China).

51 "South Africa's Stand", Africa Report, vol. 21, no. 1, January-February 1976, p. 11.

52 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

53 Ibid., p. 12.



US policy towards Portugal comes in the broader context of US policy towards Southern Africa. It includes: (a) dominant role of the Western European powers in relation to their colonies and later ex-colonies in Angola; (b) The increasing dependence of the US and its allies on the "third world", especially Africa for raw materials, minerals, etc.; (c) Continued need of the industrial countries for new markets for trade and investment; (d) the underlying identification of US private interests with the continued existence and expansion of private enterprise; (e) US and its allies want stability in the Southern Africa; (f) Increased pressures from military strategies and economic resource planners necessitates a more active role for the US in the Indian Ocean; (g) need to strengthen sympathetic regional powers; and (h) the issue of narrow self-interest.<sup>54</sup>

US investments totalling \$ 1.6 billion and trade of \$ 1.1 billion in US exports in 1974;<sup>55</sup> with increasing investments in the oil, petroleum industry and uranium; supplying arms and military equipment to Portugal and anti-Communist factions of Angola Liberation movements; working in collusion with South Africa, it was drawn in the Angolan

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54 Statement of Jennifer Davis, Research Director, American Committee on Africa, in US Congress Report, n. 34, pp. 33-34.

55 Marcum, n. 43, p. 424.

crisis as in the pre-Vietnam situation.<sup>56</sup>

Was the US involvement in Angola an indirect consequence of US-Zaire and US-Zambia relationship? Both Zaire and Zambian prosperity depends on the export of copper. The Angolan crisis leading to the closure of the Benguela Railway affected both the countries adversely. Zaire had to divert its sale through the Zairois port of Matadi, and Zambia through Tanzania. President Kaunda of Zambia is the main hope of South Africa's desire for detente with Black Africa, while President Mobutu of Zaire is USA's main "ally" in Africa.

Another question arises over the Azores agreement. Under Kennedy and Johnson administration the bases were used without any agreement. Yet US signed Azores agreement in 1971 and agreed to give large assistance to Portugal. Why? As a member of NATO, Portugal contributes the smallest number of troops - short of its commitment. Also, the other NATO members had raised objection to Portugal's colonial policies. Azores base in fact has more a Middle East angle than the NATO angle.<sup>57</sup> It is primarily in the interest of USA and

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56 Statement of Jennifer Davis, n. 54, pp. 49-50, 53 ff.

57 Statement of Barbara Rogers, Research Consultant, in US Congress Report, n. 34, pp. 49-58; Maxwell, n. 5, p. 266. During the Yom Kippur War, US aircrafts used the Azores base and Lajes base for airlifting supplies to Israel when NATO allies and Spain refused refueling facilities.

Portugal. Portugal directly benefits from the money spent on Azores base. Therefore, Portugal would not have closed Azores base to USA. Portugal also offered US base facilities in Mozambique.

USA received large quantities of oil from Cabinda, Angola. It imported the heavy crude oil unsuitable for the Portuguese refineries (because of high concentration of wax and sulphur) and returned Portugal in Light Crude oil. Nevertheless, USA and other Western European countries depend on oil supplies from the Gulf region. As the Suez Canal was closed, the oil tankers had to take a longer route, passing around the Cape and through the South Atlantic. Also, the super-tankers up to 350,000 dead weight tons (dwt) cannot pass through the Suez Canal whose limit is 60,000 dwt.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, US and its Western allies wanted to maintain and ensure freedom of navigation along the Southern Coast of Africa. Hence, the Portuguese African territories assumed their importance.

Professor Mallakh of the University of Colorado stressed the need for USA to get the Suez Canal opened.<sup>59</sup> His analysis showed that it would reduce the distance and,

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58 SIPRI, Southern Africa : The Escalation of a Conflict : A Politico-Military Study (New York/London, 1976), p. 52.

59 Ragael El Mallakh, "The United States and the Suez Canal : A Study in Economic Mutuality of Interests", in US Congress Report, n. 34, Appendix 3, pp. 194-203.

consequently, will have an impact on the oil prices. Shipping rates too would be considerably reduced. In that case the importance of the Cape routes would have been reduced too. Any militarization of the Indian Ocean region using Southern Africa would have necessarily led to a counter-militarization of the region by USSR. As it is, the development of Diego Garcia base had made the Russian react strongly.

Furthermore, was USA's involvement to prevent the emergence of a successful communist regime? It did worry the Western European countries to have one in Portugal and other in its colonies. It would have given impetus to Communist parties in Italy, and France. At this point detente got involved because Kissinger, US Secretary of States, thought it would be easier to manipulate the Communist Party in Portugal through Moscow.

Kissinger in a Press Conference said that the reason for US involvement in Portugal's colonial war was not historical, neither did they want to repeat Vietnam. But America could not sit back and see Russia pursuing a proxy war some 8,000 miles away. US reaction was not inconsistent with detente. Detente was relaxation of relations between the Super Powers. Yet it did not mean that America should take no action to stop Soviet expansionism.<sup>60</sup> He further negated

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60 "The Kissinger Thesis", excerpts from Press Conference, Africa Report, vol. 21, no. 1, January-February 1976, pp. 13-15.

the view that USA had stepped in to fill up the vacuum left by China in Angola. On his silence regarding South African aggression against Angola, he said that it would be much easier to remove them than the Cuban troops, therefore, that aspect did not worry him. Was then USA merely reacting to Soviet involvement in Angola?

The question arises why did Soviets get involved in a local conflict? Russia has maintained that it supports the right of people to self-determination. And in its view MPLA represented them. Therefore, it felt ideologically sympathetic to their genuine plight and gave them support. Could Russian interest be labelled a reaction to Chinese criticism that they were going "soft" on the national liberation question? Therefore, USSR sacrificed peace for its ideology. Or, was it an extension of the international struggle for power? Legum suggests that the "Sino-Soviet rivalry with each other has become more important to them than either's rivalry with the West". He further adds that Russia was able to play an effective role in Angola because of:

- (a) the peculiar nature of power struggle within Angola, without a legally recognized government;
- (b) South Africa's interaction;
- (c) China's decision to remain neutral in the local power struggle; and
- (d) the paralysis of US foreign policy making in the aftermath of Vietnam, Watergate and the

CIA investigations.<sup>61</sup>

Angolan crisis created a dilemma for the two super powers. It became an extension of the "cold war" in the era of detente. America wanted to continue its profitable investments and trade through Portugal. Because it feared another Chile in an independent Angola. Western Europe, despite their criticism of Portugal's colonial policy, continued trade; investment and sale of military equipments to Portugal. South Africa tried to replace Portugal but failed. Nevertheless, it hoped to improve its relations with the neighbouring African States and, therefore, hoped victory of a pro-Western liberation group.

America continued to breach arms embargo and also continued assistance of varied kind to Portugal against the wishes of United Nations. Thus USA continued to support its NATO ally in isolation. On the other hand, it stood for the right of self-determination of the Angolan people. And, therefore, supported FNLA and Unita.

In Angola itself stalemate existed between the three liberation movements. Against the fast changing

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61 Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa", Foreign Affairs, vol. 54, no. 4, July 1976, pp. 745-53. Colin Legum is Africa correspondent and Associate Editor of the Observer (London), and Editor of the Africa Contemporary Record.

scenario of Portuguese politics and the conflicting international politics, Angola achieved independence, with no powerful or strongly viable group to take over the reins of administration. Continued struggle, however, bore fruits for the MPLA. At the end of 1975, the unilateral withdrawal of Portugal from its African territory leading to decolonization of Angola finally marked the end of 19th century phenomenon of colonialism.

CHAPTER VI



## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

An analysis of the African Continent since 1960 shows that political independence of Black Africa has not weakened the hold of Imperialism. It has not led to economic liberation or to reconstruction of the African states. Formal independence was in fact a compromise. The process of decolonization was a result of the growing mass-based national liberation movements and a reflection of the efforts of the colonial powers to adjust to the new situation.

Portuguese decolonization of its African territories is a strikingly unique phenomenon. Being the oldest colonial power in Africa, Portugal was the last to relinquish its colonial empire, approximately twenty years after the process had been initiated by the British and French. A comparison with the other ex-colonial powers highlights the differences in the Portuguese polity which together with its socio-economic conditions were responsible for the extension of 19th century colonial empire into the second half of 20th century.

After the Second World War, Labour Party had come to power in Britain. The Conservatives earlier had only conceded certain concessions and reforms. But the Labourites, while not hastening the process, had to give up their

theoretical positions in favour of gradual decolonization. Britain's colonial policies had been within the broad framework of preparing the natives for "self-government" in future. Therefore, when Britain had to eventually withdraw from its colonies, the process appeared to proceed within the Imperial legality, leading to the emergence of British Commonwealth.

On the other hand, French had pursued the policy of "assimilation and integration" with a hope to form a Franco-African Community with federal institutions and a common executive. After the Second World War, the Fourth Republic of France was organized under the Vichy regime. But it was unable to continue in the face of increased pressures and problems of decolonization, and the Algerian war especially. Therefore, to prevent a coup, de Gaulle was called back to power. His main concern was to disengage France from Algeria without a loss of face. Finally, France granted independence to its African colonies by 1960. French union was thereby transformed into a French Community; each State was given the right to vote and opt for or out of this new group.

Belgian rule in Congo had tried to keep colonial policies away from politics. It had developed Congo economically and hoped to indefinitely postpone the question of granting it political independence. With the emergence of liberal-socialist coalition in 1954, the Congolese were

given greater freedom of speech and of press. African participation in the local government, too, increased, followed by demand for political emancipation.

Decolonization of Congo was pursued by the Social Christian Party which came to power in 1958 elections in Belgium. Riots increased in Congo but there was no one predominant party to whom Belgium could transfer power. However, Congo emerged as a strongly centralized republic under Lumumba as Prime Minister in 1960. Trade and aid relations between the two countries continued to link Congo to its ex-metropolis.

Portugal unlike other colonizers chose to continue its policy of integration of the overseas territories with the metropolis. Defying the waves of liberation and decolonization, Portugal began to develop its African territories. In the post-War period Portugal continued to have the fascist regime, unlike other Western democratic countries. It refused to fix a time-table of independence for its colonies. Because it feared that the army would refuse to fight if they knew that the African territories would eventually become free. Moreover, the Portuguese population would have refused to pay taxes which made it possible for Portugal to fight in Africa.

During the inter-war period, USA had emerged as economically and technologically the most powerful nation.

Britain had lost its hegemony after the World War II, but it still remained economically stronger than the other imperialist powers. France and Belgium were affected to a much greater degree. While Portugal continued to remain an underdeveloped of the developed Western European nations. If we look at the time-table of decolonization, we find:

Britain decolonized from 1945-1960s<sup>1</sup>

France decolonized from 1958-1960

Belgium decolonized in 1960

Portugal decolonized in 1970s

Despite the fact that national liberation movements were gaining momentum in Asia and Africa, we find a relation between the time of decolonization and the stage of economic development of the metropole. Britain was the first to pursue this programme, probably because (1) it realized the inevitability of granting political independence to its colonies; (2) it hoped to continue its colonial policies despite the grant of political independence to its colonies - to maintain economic gains and have access to natural

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1 Decolonization was far from being confined to the post-war period. For example, South Africa had achieved independence in 1910. Egypt had restricted sovereignty in 1922 (full independence from 1954), and Rhodesia gained internal self-governance in 1923 (without obtaining a complete transfer of sovereignty).

resources of its ex-colonies; (3) it desired continued links with its ex-colonies to maintain its dominant position amongst them, such as through Commonwealth formation; (4) economically strong, it could assist the development of these new nation-States; and (5) Britain was losing its areas of interest to America, such as the Middle East.

Whereas France and Holland had lost their colonies in South East Asia during the war, Japan's occupation of Indo-China and Indonesia had severed the links between the metropolitan countries and these colonies. Nevertheless, at the end of the War, both the powers made abortive attempts to come back. In Africa, too, French reluctance to grant independence to Algeria could be seen. French territories were more important to France than the British counterparts had been to Britain.<sup>2</sup> In general, we find that the colonies rich in natural resources were the last to become independent. Once the process had begun, France, like Britain, accepted it.

Similarly Belgium was faced with demands for political emancipation after the war. Unlike Britain and France, Belgium did not have time to grant autonomy in stages and to "control" developments. It was pressed for decolonization. Its only hope of guaranteeing Belgium

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<sup>2</sup> Discussed in Chapter II.

economic interests in an independent Congo was to give in to pressures, and decolonize Congo.

Portugal, however, was the least developed of all the colonial powers. Without its overseas territories, Portugal feared it would be reduced to a province of Spain. It could not afford to give up these territories which offered markets for trade, benefits from investments and flow of foreign currency. They became outlets for population pressures within the metropole, and at the same time diverted discontent away from poverty and repression in the metropole. Portugal pursuing its age-old "civilizing mission" in Africa, continued its policy of assimilation. Despite the growth of aggressive nationalism in Africa, fascism at home refused to recognize it and continued to militarily suppress it. Furthermore, its NATO allies while condemning its colonial policies prevented the collapse of Portuguese Empire.

So far, the problems arising from decolonization had not threatened the internal political life of any of the metropolitan countries. Except in France, where the Fourth Republic had gone into voluntary liquidation on the question of Algeria, to re-emerge soon afterwards as a strong Fifth Republic under de Gaulle. In Portugal, the fascist Government was faced with a crisis. It was not possible for a repressive regime to talk of decolonization because it meant liberalizing its colonial policies - an unfeasible

possibility, which required grant of liberal concessions like freedom of speech, universal franchise etc. at home. Instead, Portuguese continued to pursue their 13-years old colonial wars. Added to this was the knowledge that the absence of charismatic leadership of Salazar from politics had not led to any meaningful structural changes. Discontentment and opposition to the existing regime finally culminated in a military coup.

In such a situation, decolonization could only take place, if: (a) negative relations were to develop between the two centres; (b) disharmony of interest between the periphery and centre of the centre were to increase; and (c) the goal orientation of the centre were to change.<sup>3</sup>

We find that in Angola interests of the Africans came to clash with those of the metropole, as Angolan nationalist gained stronger foothold. Secondly, disharmony between army and government intensified. Thirdly, the new government (after the coup) wished to pursue a neo-colonial path instead of the classical imperial-cum-colonial order, that is, goal orientation changed.

In the post-coup period, Spínola's plan of building a Lusitanian Community was thwarted because of the polarization

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3 Johan Galting, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), vol. 8, 1971, pp. 108-9.

of opinion and political forces within Portugal. Some wanted slow devolution of power, while others wanted to co-operate with international capital. Moreover, it was not possible for the Portuguese bourgeoisie to succeed in the face of competition from the US and other Western bourgeoisie. Also, Portugal could not choose gradual grant of independence in the face of mature national political forces within the colonies and the involvement of foreign powers, especially USA and USSR. Therefore the coalition of AFM, the Socialists and Communists once more broke down. Military became the vanguard of decolonization unlike the political parties in other liberal democracies, though it kept oscillating from Centre to Left to Right.

An important question, however, is: Was it possible for Portugal to pursue a neo-colonial path? Despite the expansion of investments and exports by 1973, Portugal had one of the highest rate of inflation amongst the OECD countries and lowest income per capita. Continuous pressure due to its colonial wars, in terms of both man-power and monetary resources, and emigration affected its production growth. Although the latter contributed to the inflow of foreign exchange, it had failed to achieve the 7% GNP growth in 1968-1970 plan. Its tourist trade was affected by the increased political instability within the country. Above all, Portugal was exhausting its revenues on the ordinary




and extraordinary military budgets in Angola and its other overseas territories.

Moreover, after the coup, Portugal had the option of pursuing a socialist path, following Western democracy, or going back to fascism. The nature of its economy with traditional agriculture sector and competition in the capitalist world market would have required a fascist regime capable of carrying on a high rate of workers' exploitation. It had virtually been on the point of collapse due to financial strain before the First World War. Systematic development of its African possessions, Angola especially, began in 1950s. While others were considering their colonies' right of self-determination, Portugal was just beginning the development of its colonies-- thirty years after the others, who had pursued their developmental policies in 1920s. The foreign companies like Cabinda Oil, DAMANG etc. provided an important part of the provincial revenues.

Portugal-Angola relation was a complex one. In fact similar position was also seen in Portugal-Mozambique relations. Portugal was a colonial power but it had become economically dependent on England as far back as in 18th century; exporting agricultural goods and also offering markets for the sale of <sup>foreign</sup> industrial goods, it had been reduced

to the state of being "colonized" by its rival and industrially well-developed colonial power. Only after the World War II, Portugal had developed its industrial sector. But being economically poor it had to largely rely on foreign investments.

We can perhaps reduce this complex relation diagrammatically as follows:



The dotted lines represent exploitation or access to Portugal and the colonies by the other Western Powers. Straight lines represent direct access of ~~Western nations to Portugal and~~ Portugal to its colonies.

It must be noted that in the diagram the dotted lines come from within the circle representing Portugal. In other words, the Western Powers did not have direct access to Angola or Mozambique or any of the Portuguese territories.

They penetrated the latter's economy through Portugal, in the process penetrating Portugal's economy. Portugal's role can be described more appropriately as that of a "rentier" rather than of an equal partner.<sup>4</sup> Portugal, in fact, let foreign investment come in to develop itself and its colonies and benefitted from them in the form of taxes paid by these companies and from other privileges it had as a shareholder.


For example, Portugal had received \$ 61 million in 1972 from Cabinda Gulf Oil Company. It had brought in \$ 140 million in foreign exchange, equivalent to 25.4% of all Angola's export earnings. It had paid for 60% of the cost of war in Angola. Moreover, the Government could take the 12.5% royalties in kind and had preferential access to another 37.5% of production. In addition, added Gulf's 'Orange Disk' magazine, "the Government has reserved the right to purchase their needs for domestic consumption as well as the right to take all production in the event of war or national emergency."<sup>5</sup>

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4 Mustafa Resulovic, "Lisbon Moves in Africa", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 24, no. 565, 20 October 1973, p. 10.

5 Barbara Rogers, "Background Papers on the Oil Situation in Portugal and the Colonies", in 93rd US Congress House Report, The Complex of United States - Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup (Washington, 1974), Appendix 2, p. 191.

Thus, Portugal because of its socio-economic conditions was reduced to the role of a middleman, falling into the 'dependence' syndrome. It had moved to the stage of a "semi-peripheral" nation in a "tri-modal" system.<sup>6</sup> It was caught up in the economic circle in the following manner:




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6 Immanuel Wallerstein has introduced this stage, modifying the use of terms like "subimperial" states (Marini) and "go-between nations" (Galtung) in a "bi-modal system". See Wallerstein, "Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy", African Studies Review (Michigan), vol. 17, no. 1, April 1974, pp. 1-26.

Portugal continued its "semi-peripheral development by invitation" - inviting direct investment across its frontiers and joining hands with the multinational corporations.

Transplanting Bretton's analysis for the African countries for the understanding of Portugal-Angola relation, we find that Portuguese elite leaders gained strength from the internal - modern and the foreign sector based on their private interests and opportunities. Due to absence of adequate funds, development was left to the foreign sector. Hence, we find Portugal and Angola being developed by Western capitalist countries; Portugal being the ruling power in Angola benefitting from the developed world and, in the process, getting its overseas territories developed.<sup>7</sup>

While, after the World War II, American capital had helped to rejuvenate the economies of the Western countries and to stabilize the capitalist system, it together with capital from other European countries infiltrated and pervaded the Portuguese economy and thereby permeated the economies of its peripheral African territories.

Therefore, we find that the time lag between industrialization of Portugal and other European colonizers had handicapped Portugal at the time of decolonization; reducing its manoeuvring capability. The problem of unequal exchange and further increased dependence on West would have only added to the exploitation of Portugal.

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<sup>7</sup> Bretton's model has been discussed in the Introduction.

Thus, the Portuguese position was different from the British, French and Belgian at the time of decolonization. The monopoly control of mining especially by the foreign companies had removed the vital direct link between Angola and Portugal. Hence, the bases of neo-colonialism shifted from Portugal to the other Western countries. Foreign involvement in Angola's national liberation war had further created conditions of alienation of Portugal from its African territories. In the British, French and Belgian ex-colonies, America and West Germany had become rival neo-colonialist powers, while in Portuguese colonies, Portugal was ousted by others: the former, of course, was incapable of offering any competition.

In general, the other variants of neo-colonialism include: (a) 'Credit-worthiness' of an ex-colony depending on the holding in the metropolises of currency reserves of the ex-colonies, as in the case of British and French colonies; (b) continued presence of metropolitan-based companies which repatriate profits to the metropole and also guide the growth pattern, and economic policies including taxation policy of the ex-colony; (c) The branches of metropolitan banks use local savings both for their own international operations and for financing the local operations of transnational companies.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Michael Barratt Brown, The Economics of Imperialism (Harmondsworth, 1974), p. 257.

In Angola, strained relations led to break of political links with the metropolis. Its economy was dislocated during the civil war following its liberation. MPLA coming to power embarked on a policy of "mixed" economy. To overcome the reduced production of coffee, oil, diamonds etc., it urged the Africans to take over the evacuated plantations. It nationalized agriculture. Playing up USA against West Germany, it managed to get back the Gulf oil to refraction in Cabinda with Angola holding 55% shares. The Portuguese shares were not nationalized but the Portuguese were not allowed to return because of the Portuguese Government's refusal to release Angolan deposits in Portugal or to back the Angolan escudo. Portugal's socio-economic situation did not allow it to extend aid, loans, credits, or the necessary infrastructure to the Portuguese settlers for forming new settlements and security especially. Thus, Angola turned to Russia and others for assistance to stabilize its nation-State.

Analysing the African situation, we find that in general Marxian class analysis cannot be applied to the political liberation movements in Africa. Tribal organizations and ethnic groupings blurred the social categories. In the absence of an industrial proletariat, urban petty-bourgeoisie (which includes intellectuals, employees etc.) offered leadership to the traditional-based peasant societies of

Africa. African nationalism, in general, lacked an ideology. But whenever an ideology of "African Socialism" developed it was put forward by the nuclear sections of the emerging African bourgeoisie with limited and basically neo-colonial objectives, divorced from social choices.<sup>9</sup> This weakness of the liberation movements at the outset allowed neo-colonialist penetration.

Neo-colonialism marks the beginning of an economic process which tends to draw and assimilate the ex-colonies into the capitalist economy, lending impetus simultaneously to development and accentuated underdevelopment, along with a partial disintegration of the old colonial structures.<sup>10</sup> The process of "Africanization" in the political realm, development of infrastructure, industrialization and urbanization, and the spread of education broke through the relative rigidity of the colonial structure, starting the process of social differentiation.

During the process of transformation, the comprador bourgeoisie<sup>11</sup> consolidated its position. The bureaucratic

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9 Romano Ledda, "Social Classes and Political Struggle", International Socialist Journal (Rome), no. 22, August 1967, p. 564.

10 Antonio Lettieri, "Rapporti economici internazionali problemi dello Sviluppo", Quaderno, no. 2, di Critica marxista, quoted in Ledda, *ibid.*, p. 565.

11 Comprador bourgeoisie develops within the colonial period and acts as "middleman between the domestic market and the large foreign import-export firms".



elite growing out of the nationalist elites institutionalized the colonial administrative structures in the post-independence era. The neo-colonial relations were further aided by the rural groups of native planters and feudal landlords who extended one-crop system of export production, thus linking Africa's economy to the foreign markets. In certain cases it is not possible to distinguish all three social groups, as in Ivory Coast. In others such distinctions can be observed, for example in the conflict of 1962 between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie represented by the President Senghor and the merchant classes represented by the Prime Minister Mamadou Dia.

National bourgeoisie<sup>12</sup> remained too weak to develop into a competitive class to the metropolitan bourgeoisie. For example, in Ghana the rural bourgeoisie demanded political autonomy but was never active in the national liberation movement. Merchants were the most ardent supporters of national cause. But after independence they did not invest in the industrial, banking and big commerce sectors vital to the development of their own country. An alliance between the rural feudal elements and weak bourgeoisie occurred allowing continued existence to foreign capital.

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12 National bourgeoisie refers to a social force capable of producing a high level of national development of its "productive forces on the basis of its own choices".

Neo-colonialism creates a gap between the masses and the upper classes. The privileges of the latter, however, become limited by the economic stagnation and the agricultural crisis - the imbalances between development and underdevelopment. Therefore, it becomes imperative to organize revolutionary parties and as Amilcar Cabral said the urban and rural working classes would need the support of petty bourgeoisie and the peasant to do so.<sup>13</sup> But the petty bourgeoisie is faced with the problem of making a choice between "betraying the revolution or committing suicide as a class".

In Angola the masses were divided into three different parties which in turn were made up of a number of factions. In such a situation could Portugal have transferred internal governance of Angola to its people through continued reforms? Had Portugal done this, the situation would have been similar to that of Rhodesia - a white minority rule, who might make reforms benefitting the Africans but would not change the political structures. Extractive system would continue undisturbed. But the Lisbon Government grudged every concession made to its colonies. The Portuguese settled in Angola did not control the politico-administrative machinery, nor did they desire to break ties with the metropolitan

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13 Amilcar Cabral, Quoted in Ledda, *ibid.*, p. 580.  
Cabral was the Secretary of PAIGC, Guinea-Bissau.

country.<sup>14</sup> Thus Rhodesian-type solution for Angola was ruled out. The Angolan masses, although divided, wanted to drive out the Portuguese and to end the colonial system. Portugal's hopes of furthering neo-colonial relations came to an end with the alienation of Angolan elites from the Lisbon Government. The subsequent involvement of USA, USSR and China especially further imparted the ideological content to these parties. FNLA and UNITA became identified as the parties of the neo-colonialists and only MPLA came to be recognized as the socialist and revolutionary party of Angola. Nevertheless, MPLA was also not united on one ideological position.<sup>15</sup>

What ideology will prevail in the post-independence era is yet to be seen. When MPLA came to power it turned to Russia for arms and economic assistance. Although Russia is opening its coffee markets to Angola, the latter remains dependent on the Western countries for the sale of its oil and import of technology. Nationalization of its oil-fields would adversely affect the Angolan revenues. American

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14 Anirudha Gupta, "Implications of the Lisbon Coup", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 25, nos. 582-583, 5-20 July 1974, p. 25.

15 Neto in 1970 observed: "We are bound together by the common will to fight against Portuguese Colonialism... /but/ while there is one organizational structure there is not one ideological position."

Quoted in Basil Davidson, In the Eve of the Storm (Harmondsworth, 1975), p. 326.

capital is also penetrating Angola through Brazil.<sup>16</sup> Although MPLA's aim is to build a socialist stage, it is not aligning itself with USSR against the Western bloc. Instead, it is trying to stabilize itself by remaining linked to both.

At present, a symbiotic relation<sup>17</sup> can be seen between the large transnational companies and the state in Angola. It only highlights the fact that although Angola does not have a neo-colonial relation with Portugal, it has fallen into the neo-colonial network of Western capitalism or that in Angola we can see an extension of "Social Imperialism" extended through the Cuban troops and Cuban personnel.

From the above analysis it becomes apparent that unlike its contemporary colonizers, Portugal could not build a similar pattern of relations with its colonies. Its failure to make a technological revolution by the turn of the century manifested in the form of weak industrial and backward agricultural sectors which could not compete with

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16 Brazil purchased Angolan coffee at \$ 90 per 50 kilos for its domestic market so that it could sell an equivalent amount of its own Arabica coffee at \$ 120 per 50 kilos. Africa Diary (Delhi), 6-12 May 1976, p. 7921.

17 Penrose, The Large International Firms in Developing Countries. The International Petroleum Industry (London, 1968), pp. 251-2.

other well-developed Western countries. Angola breaking away from its metropolis, broke through the neo-colonial pattern of relation that characterized the links of other ex-colonies with their ex-metropolitan countries. It was a deviation from the general rule that had developed during the process of decolonization.

APPENDIX I

## APPENDIX I

Table I.1

UNITED KINGDOM TRADE : TOTAL AND WITH AFRICA, 1963-1967  
(in millions of US dollars)

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
<b>Exports</b>					
World Total	11,855	12,342	16,711	14,662	14,390
To Africa (a)	1,412	1,510	1,690	1,593	1,600
Algeria	8	19	20	9	9
Libya	44	50	62	82	64
Morocco	15	15	13	15	19
Rhodesia	114	114	89	8	3
Sudan	80	57	47	46	49
Tunisia	8	10	11	8	5
Tropical Africa (b)	583	608	699	731	717
South Africa	560.4	637.3	749.2	694.2	726
<b>Imports</b>					
World Total	13,497	15,437	16,138	16,672	17,744
From Africa (a)	1,435	1,561	2,001	1,962	1,909
Algeria	21	24	50	64	42
Libya	119	178	207	171	182
Morocco	29	29	32	32	34
Rhodesia	274	282	84	13	--
Sudan	34	24	22	14	18
Tunisia	8	8	9	11	7
Tropical Africa (b)	574	595	1,007	1,023	933
South Africa	376.4	421.5	584.2	634.2	693

(a) Excluding UAR

(b) Including Malawi and Zambia

Source: Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa  
(London, 1969), p. 39.

TABLE 1.2

CAPITALIST WORLD TRADE WITH AFRICA, 1960-1971  
(in millions of dollars)

Year (1)	Africa's Total Imports (2)	Exports to Africa					Africa's Total Exports (8)	Imports from Africa				
		USA (3)	Britain (4)	France (5)	Japan (6)	FRG* (7)		USA (9)	Britain (10)	France (11)	Japan (12)	FRG* (13)
1960	7,860	750	1,360	2,024	350	-	6,350	565	1,260	1,418	120	-
1961	7,790	810	1,360	1,856	380	-	6,540	620	1,320	1,504	155	-
1962	7,510	970	1,280	1,498	330	-	6,730	680	1,310	1,621	175	-
1963	8,370	980	1,412	1,606	470	-	7,480	710	1,435	1,671	215	-
1964	9,656	1,200	1,510	1,644	600	-	8,658	810	1,561	1,808	285	-
1965	10,359	1,224	1,690	1,660	810	4,561	9,185	875	2,001	1,769	265	2,227
1966	10,504	1,320	1,593	1,680	720	4,940	9,888	820	1,750	1,909	350	2,283
1967	10,860	1,155	1,600	1,627	835	4,724	10,320	770	1,740	1,849	545	2,397
1968	11,460	1,245	1,540	-	920	5,900	11,900	855	2,010	-	640	2,645
1969	13,110	1,370	1,720	-	1,140	7,717	13,100	900	2,170	-	730	4,721
1970	14,556	1,626	1,830	-	1,400	-	14,751	1,114	2,390	-	875	-
1971	18,685	1,634	1,810	-	-	7,982	15,396	1,317	2,570	-	-	6,073

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\* In millions of Deutsche Mark, figures do not include that of South Africa.

Source: Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (London, 1969), pp. 39, 100 and 101;  
Tarabrin, The New Scramble for Africa (Moscow, 1974), pp. 123, 129 and 132.  
B.W.T. Mutharika, Toward Multinational Economic Cooperation in Africa  
pp. 172-3.



TABLE 1.3

FRENCH TRADE, TOTAL AND WITH AFRICA, 1962-67  
(in millions of US dollars)

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
<b>Exports</b>						
Total	7,365	8,087	8,997	10,055	10,907	11,836
To Africa (a)	1,498	1,606	1,644	1,660	1,600	1,647
Percentage to Africa	20.3%	19.9%	18.3%	16.5%	14.7%	14.4%
North Africa (a)	832	846	806	799	736	710
Francophone tropical Africa (b)	549	596	651	640	651	708
Anglophone Tropical Africa (c)	52	81	94	102	88	86
Southern Africa (d)	52	71	79	104	102	120
Other Africa	14	13	15	16	24	23
<b>Imports</b>						
Total	7,522	8,732	10,073	10,345	11,888	12,409
From Africa (a)	1,621	1,671	1,808	1,769	1,909	1,849
% to Africa	21.6%	19.1%	17.9%	17.1%	16.1%	14.9%
North Africa (a)	918	885	956	953	982	942
Francophone tropical Africa (b)	560	587	649	585	649	651
Anglophone Tropical Africa (c)	40	82	73	137	185	168
Southern Africa (d)	98	106	118	83	84	78
Other Africa	6	11	11	12	9	9

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(a) Excluding UAR. (b) of which: French export to Congo (Kinshasa) 1962 63 64 65 66 67

French imports from Congo (Kinshasa)

11 11 14 18 17 22  
34 31 35 34 55 58

(c) Before 1965, Zambia, and Malawi included with Rhodesia in Southern Africa.

(d) Apparent decline in imports from Southern Africa and an increase in imports from Anglophone Tropical Africa is largely a result of the reclassification of Copper-producing Zambia after its independence in 1964 from Southern Africa to Anglophone Tropical Africa.

Source: Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (London, 1969), pp. 100-1.

TABLE 1.4

SUPPLIES OF MAJOR WEAPONS, BY SUPPLIERS US \$ MN. AT  
CONSTANT 1968 PRICES

Supplies to	1950-72 annual averages	USA		UK		France		USSR		Other		Total	
		(1)	(2) %	(3)	(4) %	(5)	(6) %	(7)	(8) %	(9)	(10) %	(11)	(12) %
North Africa	1950-54	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0
	1955-59	0.1	2.1	0.1	1.9	5.1	95.8	-	0.0	0.01	0.1	5.3	100.0
	1960-64	1.5	11.3	0.3	2.7	2.3	17.7	7.3	56.0	1.6	12.3	13.1	100.0
	1965-69	9.2	19.4	7.2	15.1	2.6	5.5	24.6	51.7	3.9	8.2	47.5	100.0
	1970-72	9.6	10.8	5.7	6.8	56.9	68.6	6.9	8.4	4.5	5.4	83.0	100.0
	1950-72	81.1	14.0	55.8	9.5	220.8	38.2	180.3	31.2	41.1	7.1	578.6	100.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	1950-54	2.0	26.4	5.0	70.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	*	2.9	7.0	100.0
	1955-59	1.0	6.6	8.0	85.8	-	0.0	-	0.0	1.0	7.6	10.0	100.0
	1960-64	7.0	21.3	7.0	22.7	4.0	12.1	5.0	14.5	9.0	229.3	31.0	100.0
	1965-69	6.0	12.8	6.0	11.9	7.0	14.6	8.0	17.5	20.0	43.1	47.0	100.0
	1970-72	7.0	12.4	8.0	15.4	8.0	14.4	14.0	25.5	17.0	32.2	54.0	100.0
	1950-72	95.0	15.1	153.0	24.1	77.0	12.1	105.0	16.6	204.0	32.2	634.0	100.0
South Africa	1950-54	0.5	5.7	7.6	94.3	-	0.0	-	-	-	0.0	8.1	100.0
	1955-59	1.1	6.3	10.6	61.3	-	0.0	-	-	5.6	32.3	17.4	100.0
	1960-64	4.8	21.1	7.1	30.8	10.8	46.9	-	-	0.3	1.2	23.1	100.0
	1965-69	4.4	8.0	17.1	31.2	25.7	46.9	-	-	7.6	13.9	54.8	100.0
	1970-72	-	0.0	4.2	11.8	27.3	77.2	-	-	3.9	11.1	35.3	100.0
	1950-72	54.1	8.7	224.8	36.1	264.4	42.5	-	-	79.2	12.7	622.5	100.0

\* Less than one.

Source: SIPRI, Arms Trade with the Third World (1975), pp. 224, 102-3, 124-5, 231 and 252.

TABLE 1.6

UNITED KINGDOM'S PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA, 1960-65  
(In millions of Sterling Pounds)

Country	Investment						Rates of return (%)					
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Commonwealth Africa	280.3	315.5	327.3	323.4	300.0	309.5	11	9.2	7.9	9.5	12.1	8.5
South Africa	258.3	270.6	290.0	319.4	352.9	391.7	10.3	10.4	12.1	12.9	14.8	12.1
Central Africa	78.4	95.1	103.2	97.7	82.5	78.2						
East Africa	56.9	59.9	60.5	59.4	59.1	60.5						
West Africa	145.0	160.5	163.5	166.3	159.3	170.8						
Other Africa	82.5	85.4	89.3	92.7	94.1	98.8						

Source: Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (London, 1969), pp. 44-45.

TABLE 1.8  
MAIN SUPPLIERS AND CONSUMERS OF THE AFRICAN RAW MATERIALS AND AFRICA'S  
SHARE IN THE MINING OF THE MAIN RAW MATERIAL IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD

Raw Material (1)	Unit (2)	Africa's share						Suppliers (9)	(Consumers) (10)
		1960 (3)	% (4)	1965 (5)	% (6)	1970 (7)	% (8)		
Oil	m. t. <sup>†</sup>	13.7	1.5	106.9	8.7	294.	15.5	Libya, Algeria, Nigeria	Britain, US, France, PRG Italy
Gas	000m m <sup>3</sup>	0.6	0.1	5.9	1.1	15.5	1.9	Algeria, Libya	Britain, France, PRG, Italy
Coal	m. t.	43.2	3.9	53.6	4.9	54	4.9	-	-
Iron Ore	m. t.	15.8	4.6	39.5	9.8	57.8	12.2	Liberia, Mauritania	FRG, Britain, Japan
Uranium	t. t. <sup>‡</sup>	9.0	19.2	3.4	18.7	6.0	22.0	South Africa	USA; Britain; France; FRG
Manganese	m. t.	3.1	48.0	4.6	54.0	6.4	56.0	Niger, Zambia, Malagasy Rep.	USA; Britain, France
Chromites	m. t.	1.4	45.0	2.6	52.0	1.9	51.3	S. Afr; Gabon; Ghana	USA; Britain, France
Cobalt	t. t.	11.5	75.0	12.4	76.0	16.5	80.0	Morocco, Zaire	USA; Britain, France
Vanadium	t. t.	-	-	4.6	31.0	8.8	33.0	*	-
Copper	t. t.	977.5	26.9	1115	27.1	1280	26.9	Zambia, S. Afr; Zaire	Britain, France; Bel; Japan
Lead	t. t.	207.4	12.4	210	12.0	325	10.1	Morocco, Namibia	Britain; France
Tin	t. t.	20.7	15.0	20.7	13.4	22.5	13.1	-	-
Bauxite	t. t.	1600	7.4	2400	7.2	3200	7.7	Guinea, Ghana	Br; USA; Fr; Can; Italy; Japan
Antimony	t. t.	13.5	46.2	14.9	41.7	16.0	40.0	South Africa	USA
Lithium	t. t.	-	-	66.0	50.0	90.0	50.0	Rhodesia, Namibia	USA; Britain
Beryllium	t. t.	4.1	40.6	1.4	32.6	2.8	35.0	Uganda, Mozambique	USA; Britain
Phosphates	m. t.	10.7	35.2	16.1	34.1	22.0	34.0	Malagasy Republic	Br; Fr; Belgium; FRG
Asbestos	t. t.	297.9	21.0	409.9	21.4	550	20.0	Morocco, Tunisia	Britain
Gold	tons	726.5	69.0	1001	80	1300	80.0	S. & Central Africa	Britain
Platinum	tons	10.9	48.4	20.2	56.0	35.0	58.0	-do-	Britain
Diamonds	m. c.	26.1	98.5	31.7	98.0	35.0	98.0	-do- Ivory Coast	Britain
Germanium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	S. Africa, Zaire	USA
Zinc	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Zaire, Zambia, Algeria, Namibia	France; Belgium
Graphite	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Malagasy Rep.	USA, France

198

Source: Tarabrin, The New Scramble for Africa (Moscow, 1974), pp. 154-5, and 157-8.

† = million tons

‡ = thousand tons



Table 1.9SHARE AND TYPE OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT  
IN AFRICA

source: Based on Helge Hveem, "The Extent and Type of Direct Foreign Investment in Africa", in Widstrand, ed., Multinational Firms in Africa (Dakar, 1975), pp. 83-89.

TABLE 1.10

"AID" TO THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES (EXCLUDING SOUTH AFRICA AND UAR)  
(in millions of dollars)

Year	Former Metropolises Britain, France, Italy, Belgium & E.E.C.	International Organizations IBRD, UN, IDA, IFC	Others esp. FRG	USA total	Total
1959	791	80	40	185	1,096
1960	862	198	26	211	1,297
1961	1,003	64	169	460	1,697
1962	1,016	94	163	488	1,761
1963	890	95	155	490	1,630
1964	791	179	138	359	1,467
1965	818	258	218	330	1,624
1966	895	274	216	384	1,769
1967	729	271	223	388	1,611


200

Source: Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa, (London, 1969), p. 145.

APPENDIX II



Fig. 2.1



Angola Administrative Process : Flow of Information & Order

Source: Norman A. Bailey, "The Political Process and Interest Groups", in Abshire and Samuels, ed., Portuguese Africa (London, 1969), p. 147.

TABLE 2.2

## EDUCATION IN ANGOLA, 1960-61 to 1969-70

Type of School	No. of Students		No. of Teachers		No. of Schools	
	1960/61	1969/70	1960/61	1969/70	1960/61	1969/70
Infant Teaching	432	2,484	20	70	8	43
Primary <sup>1</sup>	105,781	392,809	2,890	8,961	2,011	4,211
Preparatory Course to Secondary Edu.	-	25,137	-	1,206	-	99
Secondary	7,486	11,321	382	936	40	61
Technical & Occupa- tional	4,501	10,946	307	826	17	45
Elementary Technical (Commercial & Indust- rial)	4,501	9,679	307	717	17	41
Commercial & Indus- trial	-	1,267	-	109	-	4
Agricultural Schools	-	377	-	44	-	5
Elementary Schools for Arts & Crafts	-	1,393	-	69	-	20
Eccelesiastical Schools (High & Secondary)	610	841	95	101	8	9
University	-	1,570	-	160	-	1
Teacher Training (Univ. level)	-	27	-	7	-	1
Teacher Training	294	1,402	13	126	2	15
School of qualification for station school teacher	294	1,177	13	69	2	11
Primary Teachers' Schools	-	225	-	40	-	4
Art Academy	130	304	7	12	1	1
Others (2)	-	4,204	-	496	-	40
<b>Total</b>	<b>119,234</b>	<b>452,815</b>	<b>3,714</b>	<b>13,014</b>	<b>2,087</b>	<b>4,551</b>


(1) Including functionaries

(2) Include social service, training for nurses, religion, civil servants etc.

Source: Based on Ferreira, Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: The End of an Era (Paris, 1974), pp. 82-84.

Fig. 2.3

## EUROPEANS IN ANGOLA (1900-1960)



Source: Wheeler & Pelissier, Angola (London, 1971), p. 138;  
Thomas Okuma, Angola in Ferment (USA, 1962), p. 7.

TABLE 2.4(a)

INVESTMENT ALLOCATION FOR ANGOLA UNDER THE  
THIRD PLAN (1968-1973)

(in millions of US \$)

Items	Amount
Agriculture, forestry & Livestock	69.4
Fishing	18.0
Mining & Manufacturing	508.6
Local Improvements	12.6
Power	42.1
Distribution network	4.7
Transportation & Communication	128.6
Housing & Urbanization	12.7
Tourism	3.9
Education & Research	46.2
Health	16.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>863.1</b>

Source: Based on Brandenburg, Development, Finance, and Trade, ed., Abshire & Samuels, Portuguese Africa (London, 1969), pp. 228-9.

TABLE 2.4(b)


## SOURCE OF FINANCING

Source	Amount	Source	Amount
National	494.5	(1) <u>State</u>	269.0
External	368.4	(a) Central Admn.	68.0
		(b) Provincial Admn	196.9
		(c) Local Admn.	4.1
		(2) <u>Credit Institutions</u>	18.5
		(3) <u>Industrial Parti-</u> <u>icipation</u>	207.0
		Total	494.5

Source: Based on Brandenburg, "Development, Finance, and Trade", in Abshire & Samuels, ed., Portuguese Africa (London, 1969), pp. 228-9.


Fig. 2.5

## GOVERNMENT BUDGET IN ANGOLA (1962-66)



Source: Based on data from Brandenburg, "Development, Finance and Trade" in Abshire & Samuels, ed., Portuguese Africa (London, 1969), p. 234.

Fig. / TABLE 2.6  
 TRADE OF ANGOLA (1952-1972)  
 (in million US \$)



Source: Based on data from Brandenburg, "Development, Finance and Trade", in Abshire & Samuels, ed., Portuguese Africa (London, 1969), p. 24; Data presented at the 93rd US Congress, Committee of Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. p. 178.

TABLE 2.7A  
 TRADE OF ANGOLA, BY COUNTRY, 1969-72  
 (Value of trade in millions of U.S. \$)

	Exports				Imports			
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1969	1970	1971	1972
DOT Total	326.942	423.441	497.998	478.785	328.412	368.594	421.900	392.262
Developed Areas	297.419	390.729	369.521	418.421	299.174	346.183	393.628	363.311
Industrial countries	167.654	219.339	221.680	261.159	166.119	198.357	236.169	245.798
United States	51.409	66.047	82.765	78.383	33.949	39.992	46.502	50.062
United Kingdom	5,986	14,529	6,203	17.591	29.118	34.516	37.988	35.089
Industrial Europe	79.547	102.412	70.731	70.607	88.142	107.148	127.469	137.357
Austria	--	.230	.020	.070	1.039	1.740	2.043	1.744
Belgium	2.631	4.375	6.003	5.282	11.941	10.612	13.701	14.735
Denmark	4.699	14.025	11.951	1.826	1.840	4.484	4.632	4.771
France	4.775	5.294	6.738	15.156	15.875	19.812	19.367	23.351
Germany	26.396	26.848	11.113	21.461	33.579	41.228	47.961	48.456
Italy	2.745	2.711	3.238	4.602	9.396	11.707	15.781	17.637
Netherlands	37.168	46.248	30.020	19.630	4.485	5.040	9.279	7.718
Norway	.282	.635	.286	.190	1.510	3.310	3.989	5.740
						....		




	Exports				Imports			
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1969	1970	1971	1972
Sweden	.100	.387	.287	.169	4.479	5.111	5.417	7.660
Switzerland	.751	1.209	1.075	2.221	3.998	4.104	5.299	5.544
Canada	5.473	8.644	20.500	46.335	.167	.724	.686	.671
Japan	15.239	27.707	41.481	48.243	14.743	15.977	23.434	22.619
Other Developed Areas	139.765	171.390	147.841	157.262	133.055	147.826	157.459	117.513
Other Europe	134.867	166.293	142.084	150.774	122.637	132.802	139.382	98.110
Finland	.509	.406	.019	.546	.175	.178	.157	.199
Greek	.732	1.052	.465	.112	.051	.009	.053	.072
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	.024	.229	.117	.289	.064	.011	.012	.013
Malta	-	-	-	-	.002	.003	.037	.035
Portugal	121.722	145.148	127.369	127.367	119.151	129.656	133.288	91.208
Spain	11.877	19.458	14.060	22.437	3.176	2.935	5.814	6.577
Turkey	.003	-	-	-	.011	-	.021	-
Yugoslavia	-	-	.054	.023	.007	.005	-	.006
Australia, New Zealand								
South Africa	4.898	5.097	5.757	6.488	10.418	15.024	18.077	19.403
Australia	-	-	.115	.763	.193	.413	2.653	1.400
New Zealand	.007	.012	-	.140	-	.004	-	.003
South Africa	4.891	5.085	5.642	5.585	10.225	14.607	15.424	18.000

Source: Data presented at the Hearing before the 93rd US Congress, Committee on Africa (Washington, 1974), pp. 178-80.

Fig. 2.7

TRADE OF ANGOLA --by country, 1969-72, % of the total



Source : Based on Table 2.7

APPENDIX III

## APPENDIX III

Table 3.1

## LIST OF ANGOLAN NATIONAL MOVEMENTS, 1940-1975

1. Luanda-Mbundu

AN	Angola Negra
CLA	Conselho de Libertacao de Angola
CLJCIA	Comissao de Luta das Juventudes contra o Imperialismo Colonial em Angola
CFA-PCA	Comite Federal Angolano do Partido Comunista Portugues
CVAAR	Corpo Voluntario Angolano de Assistencia dos Refugiadoes
DA	Democratas de Angola
ELA	Exercito de Libertacao Angola
EPLA	Exercito Popular de Libertacao de Angola
FUJA	Frente Unida de Juventude de Angola
MAJE	Movimento Angolano de Juventude Estudante
MINA	Movimento de Independencia Nacional de Angola
MPLA (or MLA)	Movimento para a Independencia de Angola
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola
PLUA	Partido da Luta dos Africanos de Angola
PCA	Partido Comunista de Angola

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Sources: John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, 1950-1962 (London, 1969), with special reference to Appendix E; and Wheeler & Pellissier, Angola (London, 1971), pp. 204-25.

II. Bakongo

AJEUNAL	Alliance Jeunes Angolais pour la Liberte
ALIAZO	Alliance des Ressortissants de Zombo
ASSOMIZO	Association Mutuelle des Ressortissants de Zombo
CNA	Cartel dos Nacionalistas Angolanos
CUNA	Comite da Unidade Nacional Angolana
FNA	Frente Nacional Angolana
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola
FPIKP	Frente Patriotica para a Independencia do Kongo Portugues
GRAE	Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio
MDIA	Mouvement de Defense des Interests de l'Angola
MNA	Movimento Nacional Angolano
NGWIZAKO	Ngwizani a Kongo
-	Nkutu a Nsimbani
-	Nto-Bako Angola
PDA	Partido Democratico de Angola
PPA	Parti Progressiste Africain
SARA	Servico de Assistencia aos Refugiados de Angola
UCLA	Union Congolaise pour la Liberation de l'Angola
UNEA	Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos
UPA	Uniao das Populacoes de Angola
UPNA	Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de Angola
UPRONA	Uniao Progressista Nacional de Angola

### III. Ovimbundu, Chokwe, etc.

ATCAR	Association des Tshokwe du Congo de l'Angola et de la Rhodesie
-	Chijilochalimbo
CSRSA	Comite Secreto Revolucionario do Sul de Angola
-	Grupo Avante - Bie
FUA	Frente de Unidade Angolana
JCA	Juventude Crista de Angola
OCA	Organizacao Cultural dos Angolanos
PNA	Partido Nacional Africano
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
-	Ukwashi Wa Chokwe
UNATA	Uniao dos Naturais de Angola
UNITA	Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola Vilinga Va Kambungo

### IV. Common Fronts

FCPPA	Front Commun des Partis Politiques de l'Angola
RDJA	Rassemblement Democratique de la Jeunesse Angolaise

### V. Cabinda

ALLIAMA	Alliance du Mayombe
CAUNC	Comite d'Action d'Union Nationale des Cabindais
FLEC	Frente de Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda

VI. Labour Movements


CGTA	Confederation Generale des Travailleurs de l'Angola
CSLA	Confederation des Syndicats Libres Angolais
LGTA	Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola
UGTA	Union Generale des Travailleurs de l'Angola
UNTA	Uniao Nacional does Trabalhadores de Angola

VII. Interterritorial


CONCP	Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas
FACCP	Front Africain contre le Colonialisme Portugais
FRAIN	Frente Revolucionaria Africana para a Independencia Nacional
MAC	Movimento Anti-Colonialista
UGEAN	Uniao Geral dos Estudantes da Africa Negra sob Dominacao Colonial Portuguesa

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
1  
Luanda-  
Mbundu




2  
Bakongo



3  
Ovimbundu,  
Chokwe,  
etc.



4  
Cabinda





**Fig. 3.1**

**DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, 1940 - 1975**

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SIX ON CHAPTER XI,  
ARTICLE 73e OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Table 3.2

1. Chapter XI applied to territories "of the colonial type" that had not attained "a full measure of self-government", and, under Article 73e, there was an obligation to transmit information on such territories.

2. Chapter XI embodied the concept of non-self-governing territories "in a dynamic state of evolution... toward self-government". Until this had been attained, the obligation to transmit information continued.

3. The obligation to transmit information was international and should be carried out with due regard to the fulfilment of international law.

4. There was prima facie an obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory that was geographically separate and distinct, ethnically or culturally from the country administering it.

5. If the effect of administrative, political, juridical, economic, or historical elements was to place the territory concerned in a subordinate position, they supported the presumption that there was an obligation to transmit information.

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Source: George Martelli, "The Issues Internationalized", in Abshire and Samuels, Portuguese Africa (London, 1969), pp. 375-6.

6. A non-self-governing territory could reach self-government by emergence as a sovereign independent state, free association with an independent state, or integration with an independent state.

7. Free association should be "the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes." The associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference.

8. Integration with an independent state should be on the basis of complete equality.

9. Integration should come about after the integrating territory had attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so that its "people would have the capacity to make a responsible choice"; it should be the result "of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change of their status."

10. The limitations required by security and constitutional considerations under Article 73e did not relieve a member state of the obligation to transmit economic, social, and educational information.

11. Responsibility for transmitting information under Article 73e continued until constitutional relations of the territory with the administering member precluded the latter from receiving statistical and other information


relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the country.

12. Only in very exceptional circumstances could such information have a security aspect.

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Fig. / TABLE 3.3

US INVESTMENTS IN PORTUGAL AND ITS AFRICAN TERRITORIES, YEAR END 1968-1973 (in million US dollars)



Source: Based on the data presented at the 93rd Congress (USA), to the Committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 14; October 8, 9 & 22, 1974, p. 157.

TABLE 3.4 (A)

MILITARY EXPENDITURES - PORTUGAL AND ANGOLA  
(in millions of US dollars)

Portugal					
Year	Budget Allocations \$	Actual Expen- diture \$	% annual increase in actual expendi- ture	% of current expenditure (Centre Government)	% of GNP
1964	-	235.7	-	50.4	6.9
1965	126	260.7	10.6	49.3	6.6
1966	143	285.7	19.6	49.4	6.82
1967	191	350	23	51.3	7.3
1968	200	382	9	50.2	7.2
1969	226	400	5	49.3	6.9
1970	227	453.57	12	46.2	7.02
1971	251	496.4	9.5	46.6	6.95
1972	271	543	9.7	45.1	6.5
1973	-	585.7	7.9	4.7	5.7

Source: Based on "Church Investments, Corporations, and Southern Africa" (National Council of Churches), in 93rd US Congress Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1974, Appendix 21, Chart II, p. 406; OECD Economic Surveys - Portugal (Paris), September 1972, pp. 50-54, 66-67 and 68; and July 1974, pp. 21-23, 37, 42-43; Africa South of the Sahara (Europa Pub.), 1971, pp. 135-6; 1972, pp. 147-8; 1974, pp. 139-40; Europa World Survey, 1975, vol. I, pp. 1059, 1064; 1976, vol. 1, pp. 1014, 1019; Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics (UN), 1968, vol. 1, pp. 555, 549; 1971, vol. II, pp. 250, 257, 258, 269, 266; 1973, vol. II, pp. 313, 321, 322, 331, 333; (~~\$ 1 US = 23 escudos~~), vol. II, 1974, pp. 331, 339, 353.

[Conversion scale: \$1 US = 28 escudos]

TABLE 3.4B

## Angola

Year	Army \$	Air Force \$	Navy \$	Total \$	% of annual change in total
1967	19.0	6.4	2.5	27.9	-
1968	24.2	7.1	2.6	33.9	+ 22
1969	34.8	7.9	3.4	46.2	+ 36
1970	48.4	9.7	4.3	62.4	+ 35
1971	58.4	10.4	4.4	73.2	+ 17
1972	54.2	10.0	4.5	68.7	- 6

Source: "Church Investments, Corporations, and South Africa", in 93rd US Congress Report, p. 406.

TABLE 3.5A

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF ESCUDO ZONE, 1964-73  
(in millions of US dollars)

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	provi- sional
Trade Balance	-182	-324	-391	-378	-444	-505	-646	-806	-766	989	
Services, net	120	178	270	282	224	163	223	335	375	437	
Private transfers	78	108	159	211	265	397	486	656	824	1082	
Long-term Capital	101	47	106	107	105	38	45	84	6	-132	
Current balance	16	-38	38	115	45	55	63	-185	433	530	
Short-term & unrecorded	-7	60	-10	-12	-7	-38	-20	88	-76	-78	
Balance on non-monetary transactions	110	69	134	210	143	55	88	357	363	320	
Private mone- tary insti- tutions	7	-25	- 5	-59	-8	- 5	-39	2	4	24	
Balance on official settlements	117	44	129	151	135	50	49	359	367	344	
Miscellaneous net	18	10	14	10	10	19	2	-	-	65	
Change in reserves	135	54	143	161	145	69	51	359	367	409	

Source: Based on OECD Economic Survey - Portugal (Paris),  
September 1972, p. 76; July 1974, p. 48.

TABLE 3.5B

ANGOLA'S TRADE BALANCE BY PRINCIPAL AREAS  
(1964-1972)

(in million escudos)

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
									(revised figures)
Foreign Countries	1627.3	708.1	636.6	-735.1	-349	-199.6	901.5	-57.5	1750.6
Portugal	-552.8	-638.3	-278.1	-518.1	497.8	75.8	444.8	-133.6	1147.2
Other Portuguese territories	-12.9	-28.9	-49.5	36.5	-14.4	73.5	20.9	-61.7	121.2
Others (incl. mainly to navigation)	91.7	105.3	102.8	145.8	189.3	176.8	210.3	272.2	176.1
=====									
Net Trade Balance	1153.3	146.2	411.8	-1070.9	-921.9	1260	1577.5	19.4	3195.1
=====									

Source: Based on Africa South of the Sahara (Europa Pub.), 1972, pp. 156, 1974, p. 151; 1975, p. 156.



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### Newspaper Clippings

Both from Indian and foreign newspapers have been used to understand the developments taking place within Angola and Portugal with reference to Angolan Nationalism, foreign involvement and Portuguese domestic politics, specially,

London Times

New York Times

New Statesman (London)

New York Times Magazine

New York Times Review of Books

New Yorker

Washington Evening Star

Washington Post

### Journals

Africa Quarterly (New Delhi)

Africa Report (New York)

Africa Today (Denver)

African Affairs (London)

The African Communist (London)

African Review (Dar-es-Salaam)

African Studies Review (Michigan)

Angola in News (New Delhi)

Bulletin of Institute of Statistics (Oxford)

Business Week (New York)

Comparative Politics (New York)

Conflict Studies (London)

Current History (Philadelphia)  
Economic History Review (Hertfordshire)  
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Foreign Affairs (USA)  
Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi)  
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International Socialist Journal (Rome)  
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World Marxist Review (Prague)  
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