

**NEW VILLAGE COMMUNITY MOVEMENT IN
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: RELEVANCE FOR INDIA
RURAL DEVELOPMENT**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY*

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2009

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “NEW VILLAGE COMMUNITY MOVEMENT IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA: RELEVANCE FOR INDIA RURAL DEVELOPEMENT”, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Khaiminthang Lunkim'.


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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT


In carrying out this work, I have benefited from a number of people who have helped me in several ways. My first indebtedness is to my supervisor, Dr. Jitendra Uttam, for his guidance and encouragement for the completion of this dissertation. I wish to thank Dr. Hwa Seok Oh for his continuous encouragement of my research in the field of rural development. I am very grateful to Professor Srikanth Kondapalli (Chairperson, CEAS) for his support and encouragement. I also address my sincere thanks to Jawaharlal Nehru University Library and the Office Staffs of Centre for East Asian Studies. I owe my gratitude to the University Grant Commission (UGC), for providing me scholarship during the course of my work.

Heartfelt thanks to my seniors and friends who have helped and encourage me in the course of writing this dissertation. Among many, special thanks to Mr. R. Subramaniam, Mr. Dominic T. Haokip, Mr. Lamthang Ngaihite and Mr. Tanpu Guite for their constant help and support. I also wish to thank JNU Prayer Cell for the support, encouragements and prayers.

I am deeply grateful to my parents, my sister Ruth and my brother Gou, for their never ending love, support and encouragement throughout my career.

For all the help and encouragement I have received, I am extremely grateful.

22nd July 2009


Khaiminthang Lunkim

To
My Mom
Kimthai Lunkim
And
My Dad
Janglet Lunkim

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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 General Background

Rural development as a concept and a series of experiments in alternative methods of organizing production, welfare and exchange in rural activities has a long history and is not the monopoly of any single system or country. Its recent popularity, however, is mainly symptomatic of the failure of technocratic and growth strategies pursued by most developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s.

The decades of the 1950s and 1960s were a period of over-optimism in the newly independent countries. Economic development policy makers confidently sought to increase productivity and per-capita income through rapid industrialization. They achieved successes only to find that most programmes generally benefited the rich and powerful. As a result, the gap between the rich and the poor at all territorial scales and in all sectors increased and economic growth, even when achieved did not 'trickled down' to the poorest sections of the community. The industrial and urban based programmes led to expanding bureaucracies, and projects addressed to the poor reached small target populations and often created vulnerable dependency relationships between the urban and rural centre. In short, the total number of the poor was rapidly increasing and inequalities of income, land, resources and access to services were becoming more marked. Therefore, by 1970s, it was obvious that a new developmental approach was necessary to achieve growth in productivity, employment and incomes while doing something about the potentially disruptive inequalities (Lea 1983:1).

In many developing or underdeveloped countries, various community development movements often turned into a failure. Much of the reason has to do with difficulties in gaining cohesiveness among residents. However, the New Village Community Movement (Saemaul Undong), in Korea makes an excellent example of successful community development projects led by the government and local residents. The key to success of this movement lies in its unique orientation and the process rather than outcomes.

Saemaul Undong, the Korean version of the New Community Movement (NCM), which had its peak in the 1970s, was launched to improve and advance the living conditions of rural life by motivating villagers' participation and cooperation with self-help development. It is interesting that this movement not only improved village environment and increased income in the rural area, but also it planted the confidence in people's mind. The Saemaul Undong's considerable contribution to the rural development and the nation's economic growth was the result of the combination of villagers' spontaneous cooperative participation and the government's strong commitment and effective leadership (Lee 2003:1).

Similarly, the Indian rural society has undergone considerable change in the recent past, particularly since the Independence as a result of a series of the land reform legislations that have accelerated the pace of this change. This explains why the changing agrarian relations constitute one of the basic intellectual concerns of social scientists, including sociologists in India.

India since time immemorial has been, still continues to be and will remain in the foreseeable future, a land of village communities. The predominantly rural character of India's national economy is reflected in the very high proportion of its population living in rural areas (see Table 1.1): as such no strategy of socio-economic development for India that neglects rural people and rural areas can be successful. Elimination of poverty, ignorance, diseases and inequality of opportunities and providing a better and higher quality of life have been the basic premises upon which all the plans and blue-prints of development are built. A serious challenge before rural development planners today is how to bridge the rapidly increasing income and wealth gap between rural poor and urban rich. Korea's Saemaul Movement can provide relevant policy lessons to India's ongoing rural development programmes.

**Table 1.1 Numbers and Percentage of Population below Poverty Line by States of
India-1999-2000
(30-day Recall period)**

| No. | States/Union Territories | Rural | | Urban | | Combined | |
|-----|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| | | No. of Persons (Lakh) | % of Persons | No. of Persons (Lakh) | % of Persons | No. of Persons (Lakh) | % of Persons |
| 1 | Andhra Pradesh | 58.13 | 11.05 | 60.88 | 26.63 | 119.01 | 15.77 |
| 2 | Arunachal Pradesh | 3.80 | 40.04 | 0.18 | 7.47 | 3.98 | 33.47 |
| 3 | Assam | 92.72 | 40.04 | 2.38 | 7.47 | 94.55 | 36.09 |
| 4 | Bihar | 376.51 | 44.030 | 49.13 | 32.91 | 425.64 | 42.60 |
| 5 | Goa | 0.11 | 1.35 | 0.59 | 7.52 | 0.70 | 4.40 |
| 6 | Gujarat | 39.80 | 13.17 | 28.09 | 15.59 | 67.89 | 14.07 |
| 7 | Haryana | 11.94 | 8.27 | 5.39 | 9.99 | 17.34 | 8.74 |
| 8 | Himachal | 4.84 | 7.94 | 0.29 | 4.63 | 5.12 | 7.63 |
| 9 | Jammu & Kashmir | 2.97 | 3.97 | 0.49 | 1.98 | 3.46 | 3.48 |
| 10 | Karnataka | 59.91 | 17.38 | 44.49 | 25.25 | 104.40 | 20.04 |
| 11 | Kerala | 20.97 | 9.38 | 20.07 | 20.27 | 41.04 | 12.72 |
| 12 | Madhya Pradesh | 217.32 | 37.06 | 81.22 | 38.44 | 298.54 | 37.43 |
| 13 | Maharastra | 125.12 | 23.72 | 102.87 | 26.81 | 227.99 | 25.02 |
| 14 | Manipur | 6.53 | 40.04 | 0.66 | 7.47 | 7.19 | 28.54 |
| 15 | Meghalaya | 7.89 | 40.04 | 0.34 | 7.47 | 8.23 | 33.87 |
| 16 | Mizoram | 1.40 | 40.04 | 0.45 | 7.47 | 1.85 | 19.47 |
| 17 | Nagaland | 5.21 | 40.04 | 0.28 | 7.47 | 5.49 | 32.67 |
| 18 | Orissa | 143.69 | 48.01 | 25.40 | 42.83 | 169.09 | 47.15 |
| 19 | Punjab | 10.20 | 6.35 | 4.29 | 5.75 | 14.49 | 6.16 |
| 20 | Rajasthan | 55.06 | 13.74 | 26.78 | 19.85 | 81.83 | 15.28 |
| 21 | Sikkim | 2.0 | 40.04 | 0.04 | 7.47 | 2.05 | 36.55 |
| 22 | Tamil Nadu | 80.51 | 20.55 | 49.97 | 22.11 | 130.48 | 21.12 |
| 23 | Tripura | 12.53 | 40.04 | 0.49 | 7.47 | 13.02 | 34.44 |
| 24 | Uttar Pradesh | 412.01 | 31.22 | 117.88 | 30.89 | 529.89 | 31.15 |
| 25 | West Bengal | 180.11 | 31.85 | 33.38 | 14.86 | 213.49 | 27.02 |
| 26 | A& N Island | 0.58 | 20.55 | 0.24 | 22.11 | 0.82 | 20.99 |
| 27 | Chandigarh | 0.06 | 5.75 | 0.45 | 5.75 | 0.51 | 5.75 |
| 28 | Dadra & Nagar Haveli | 0.03 | 17.57 | 0.03 | 13.52 | 0.33 | 17.14 |
| 29 | Daman & Diu | 0.01 | 1.35 | 0.05 | 7.52 | 0.06 | 4.44 |
| 30 | Delhi | 0.07 | 0.40 | 11.42 | 9.42 | 11.49 | 8.23 |
| 31 | Lakshadweep | 0.03 | 9.38 | 0.08 | 20.27 | 0.11 | 15.60 |
| 32 | Pondicherry | 0.64 | 20.55 | 1.77 | 22.11 | 2.41 | 21.67 |
| | All India | 1932.43 | | 670.07 | | 2602.50 | |

Source: Government of India (2001)

Rural development programs throughout the world can be grouped in terms of two basic approaches: the so-called community development approach, and those deriving from national economic development plans. The former places primary emphasis on local autonomy in rural communities while the latter treats central and local government institutions as main agencies for rural development. Both approaches have incurred frequent criticism, especially when attempts are made to develop rural areas in developing countries. The community development approach fails to enhance rural development when the subject area is not equipped with adequate financial resources and efficient personnel with needed technological ability. In this case, local autonomy might accelerate regressive tendencies and thus bring about increased central control of local administration. On the other hand, approaches deriving from national economic development plans tend to encourage highly centralized governmental control of every aspect of rural life which in turn, tends to alienate the positive support of rural residents. They then, become more dependent on the government and hence less creative; local initiative becomes stifled and voluntary participation becomes minimal.

Korean model of rural development was experimental in its nature because it was organized without an academic research base or theoretical reference. The strategies and program content of the Saemaul Undong have been adapted to fit into Korean society and culture through a continuous process of trial and error. The Saemaul Undong was initiated and advocated by the late President Park because of his personal zeal for rural modernization. Stimulus also came from the grass root level where some successful experiments of local development have been undertaken by villagers' initiative which seemed to provide a realistic base for its nationwide application. Design of a successful rural development strategy thus involves a combination of technical and institutional change.

During the past decades, Korea has changed remarkably in accordance with her strenuous efforts to achieve industrialization. But development in the rural sector which has been largely achieved by the Saemaul Undong is equally impressive or even more impressive from the perspective of some observers. About 40 years ago, one heard frequent voices to

the effect that the rural-urban gap was intensifying in the process of industrialization. As the Saemaul Undong has gained momentum, however, these voices have gradually disappeared with the transformation of rural communities, including the improvement of environmental conditions, social infrastructure, and community organization. Changes in values and attitudes, the increase of income, and a better quality of life have further underlined the development of rural society. It is worthwhile to look back and evaluate the change from an academic viewpoint, because its outcome can be expected to provide the sound basis for planning to bring more development and prosperity to rural life in the future.

Looking back upon the past, the New Village Community Movement (Saemaul Undong), which was started in 1970 in rural areas as a self-awakening campaign for better living, has made a great contribution to Korea's rapid development, as a result bringing about a new outlook and remarkable progress to every corner of the rural and urban areas, even to offices and factories. The movement, implemented with the people's nationwide participation and enthusiastic response, has not only contributed to improving the living environment in rural and urban areas, but also has created convenient and beautiful communities for the citizens. It has enabled farmers, in particular, to rid themselves of their centuries-old poverty through an epoch-making increase in income, promoting balanced development between rural and urban areas.

One important aspect of the Saemaul Undong was the effective use and mobilization of local resources in the modernization process of rural communities. This naturally helped to save capital investment. Of equal importance, is the fact that the Saemaul Undong effectively mitigated unnecessary rural to urban migration of labor force, which otherwise would have been lost as social cost to the national economy.

Among other things, this movement has provided a spiritual momentum for all people to participate shoulder-to-shoulder in the national modernization and the creation of a new history, and also has promoted a consciousness-reforming revolution among the people by developing the conviction that "we can do anything" and the sense of self-support and

self-reliance through the daily practice of the Saemaul spirit, that is, *diligence, self-help and cooperation*.

In the 1960s, the Korean government adopted an economic development plan whereby all rural development programs were dominated and controlled by highly centralized governmental machinery. On the other hand, the government had three general options for organizational adjustment which, in retrospect, can be postulated as follows. First is the integrative type of program designed to be country-wide in scope and to replace the existing administrative organization with a new one through which technical and financial resources can be channeled to achieve centrally planned development goals. Second is the project-type program limited in geographic scope to certain parts of a country and designed as a testing ground for techniques and practices. Third is the adaptive-type program which is country-wide in scope but involves some change in administrative organization. It seeks to impart financial and technical support of government to the tasks of stimulating community self-help. It is this third approach that formed the strategy for Saemaul Undong, as it combines government initiatives, technical assistance, and financial support with local self-determination and self-help decision making, on a nation wide basis, and has occasioned some change in government organization.

In the meantime, having been successfully implemented with the people's voluntary efforts, this movement has drawn the special attention of most of the developing countries, as well as various international organizations which are interested in rural development.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the New Community Movement (Saemaul Undong) as an integrated rural development programme in the societal, cultural, and political context of Korea mainly in the 1970s. Even though some of factors conducive to its success can be elucidated in the unique Korean context, the Saemaul Undong provided the evidence that the appropriate intervention of government towards rural development if supported by villagers' participation can have a positive influence on success of the

policy, and lessons can be drawn for other developing countries such as India, to adopt and tailor it into their own conditions.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

On a theoretical level, the study approaches the interplay between two distinct levels of rural development: the level of policies, or central intervention; and the level of local aspirations aimed at improving everyday rural life. Along these lines, two characteristic systems of rural development –the central bureaucratic and the local heuristic can be clearly identified. Ideally, the two should work in co-operation, complementing each other, forming an integrated development system, where rural policy serves to (i) channel resources, establish strategic aims and development models in a top-down mode, and (ii) convey information and mediate social, economic, political interests in a bottom-up mode. However, lack of integration and divergence of interest can lead to dysfunction, conflict and dissipation within the system. The argument posits that most rural development policies tend to fail because the central bureaucratic system imposes top-down control and objectives throughout the development process, thus failing to sufficiently promote the reconfiguration of local resources, which is better achieved through bottom-up processes and the local heuristic system. In other words, the tendency of disjunction between the two basic socio-political systems of rural development is the main reason for the failure of rural development policy.

According to Van der Ploeg et al (2000), “the concept of rural development is above all a heuristic device. It represents a search for new futures and reflects the drive of the rural population. It goes beyond modernization theory where the problems of agriculture and the countryside were considered resolved. Definitive answers, however, are missing and if offered should be mistrusted. Rural development theory is not about the world as it is, it is about the way agriculture and the countryside *might be* reconfigured” (Gusztav 2005:23).

Nevertheless, for a working definition, “*Integrated rural development is an ongoing process involving outside intervention and local aspirations; aiming to attain the*

betterment of groups of people living in rural areas and to sustain and improve rural values; through the redistribution of central resources, reducing comparative disadvantages for competition and finding new ways to reinforce and utilize rural resources” (Gusztav 2005:23).

‘Integrated rural development systems’, in this understanding, are particular setups of central and local institutions (such as: administration, knowledge, information and decision-making systems, social networks), working in coherence and so being able to realize the ideas of integrated rural development theory.

It is integrated in the sense that as opposed to central development - it is controlled and managed locally; but opposed to local development – besides local resources it also lean on the professional and financial support of the centre. In other words, integrated rural development tries to identify how local development and/or the reconfiguration of rural resources can be helped by the centre; for the benefit of rural localities; at the same time maintaining rural values for the future.

On the other hand, participation by the people primarily depends on two conditions: the uncompromised freedom of the target groups to make decisions and take independent actions, i.e. influence the political power structure, and sufficient administrative decentralization, i.e. “target group proximity” of central governments through strengthening local administration.

The institutional framework in general and every government decision in particular, must fully reflect the interest of the targets groups. Any attempt on the part of the central or local governments to utilize people’s self-help groups for their own purposes, e.g. reaching regional or national planning targets without people’s identification, is bound to result in failure. No doubt, Dams (1969) argues that “Nothing is vital until it becomes local”.

The political intention to improve the socio-economic condition of target-groups is the core of the concept of integrated development. Economic growth is necessary however not necessarily the sufficient condition for social and economic integration. What is needed therefore is a transformation the whole system, in particular of the structure of economic and political power. Given a suitable political framework, “integration” in this respect means: (a) eradication of absolute poverty, (b) meeting basic needs beyond physical minimum conditions for survival, and (c) active participation by target groups for a full utilization of the development potential. “Integrated rural development” so defined, reaches a new quality of mutual efforts (top-to-bottom, bottom-up) between “developments from below” and “decision-making from above”, centered on the autonomous participation by the people.

From this theoretical framework, the New Village Community Movement (Saemaul Undong) provides a justification of the integrated rural development paradigm as it was launched to improve and advance the living conditions of rural life by motivating villagers’ participation and cooperation with self-help development initiated by the political will of the top national leadership in order to escape from poverty.

1.3 Methodology

The dissertation based its analysis on two main hypotheses; (a) the Saemaul Undong was a unique Korean way of community development program which was initiated by the political will of the top national leadership in order to escape from poverty, (b) the Saemaul Undong is a movement for the spiritual reform as it imbues people with the spirits of diligence, self-reliance, and cooperation. The dissertation also relies on a comparative and analytical approach of Saemaul Undong in Korea and rural development programmes in India, to the extent that it consists of the examination of primary sources such as governmental statistics and publications. Secondary sources of data such as books, journals and magazines are also use, so as to bring out a significant conclusion.

Moreover, in order to bring about a logical conclusion for the transferability and relevance of Saemaul Undong in Korea for Indian rural development, the study highlights

the characteristics of Saemaul Undong and its factors of success and achievements and analyzed the structural implication of the government involvement in Saemaul Undong projects as well.

The present study also address to one of the central issues of rural change in developing countries, namely that of the direction or motive power which best serves the ends of agrarian development and modernization, whether from “above”. Most precisely, the question relates to the relative advantages and drawbacks of rural developmental process that are initiated, nurtured and guided through governmental policies, programs and agencies, as against those which are undertaken and sustained autonomously by the farming community itself. Of special importance in this respect, and giving rise to the sharpest controversy, are of course situations in which accelerated and specifically focused changes are sought in the context of developing societies.

Finally, by looking into the important changes which have taken place in Korea since the 1970s with special emphasis on the role of the government in executing the Saemaul Undong, an attempt is made to provide a perspective and systematic exploration of rural development both from above and below, in a setting of accelerated change, in terms of modernity, motivation and household assets on the individual level, and of community integration and availability of leadership and of change-oriented elites, on the group one.

1.4 Review of Literature

Published sources on the Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement) are abundant. They can be arranged on an approximate variety. On one side are the Korean government publications, which are strongly eulogistic and normative in tone, but gives very little information (and even less accurate information) on what Saemaul Undong actually is. On the other, studies by Korean academics contain more concrete information, but are generally silent on the political aspects of Saemaul, on which only foreign scholars are free to comment. However, there does appear to be general agreement that it was only after the formal launch of Saemaul that an ideology was developed around it, and that it became the symbolic focus of the government's development efforts.

Most literature on Korean rural development can be seen from three perspectives: top-down, bottom-up and mutual efforts of both (top-down and bottom-up approaches). Moore Mick (1985) argues that, despite the exaggerations of official propaganda and the heavy bureaucratic push which lay behind Saemaul, the movement did indeed contain genuine elements of popular mobilization and enthusiasm.

Dams Theodar (1980) puts forth that “nothing is vital until it becomes local”, and that the concept of ‘planned development’ cannot be interpreted as a binding directive from above, rather as a guiding framework for development from below where government measures support the initiative of the target groups. And goes on to say that along with decentralizing political decisions it is necessary to strengthen local government so as to increase the influence of the people and their organizations. Even from the Indian perspective, Rao P.V.A Rama (2001) argues that effective rural development cannot be brought about without the people or the community participation.

On the contrary, Kim and Lee (1978) argue that Korea’s Saemaul Undong represents a model of integrated rural development programme in its ideals. Yet in its implementation, the Korean government has taken a leading role, first initiating it and later supporting it in terms of financial and technical assistance. Thereby, both asserted that the role of government has become almost universally significant in today’s world with no exception to Korea in particular.

In tune with Kim and Lee, Lea and Chaudhri (1983) stressed the importance of the role of the state in formulating, initiating, or even implicitly sanctioning policy changes. Accordingly, Aqua (1981) and Goldsmith (1981) stress on the fact that the success of any rural development resulted from a balance growth strategy pursued by the enlightened and sensitive national leadership and as such they placed much importance of the role of the government even in the bottom-up mode too.

Whang (1981) however, believes that rural development requires the deliberate effort of both the government and rural people for a period of a decade or more. And in view of the people's participation and government involvement in the Saemaul Undong, the Korean approach to rural development seems to be unique and innovative. Hence, affirmed that a successful rural development involves the management of coordinated innovations at the individual as well as organizational levels. With regards to its implication, Whang puts forth that the extent of transferability of the Saemaul Undong to other developing countries for their rural development depends on the adaptability of their socio-cultural systems. And not just that Saemaul Undong involved the cooperation of both the bottom-up and top-down, Salem (1981), believes that rural development in Korea did not begin with the New Community Movement, rather it accelerated.

On the whole, with all the different perspective of a successful rural development, one should however bear in mind that there had previously been no rural development program of any kind in Korea, that rural areas had been largely neglected by governments. In fact, the interpretation of the Saemaul experience itself, can be open to disagreement, it emphasizes more the political aspects of Saemaul in addition to the possible disagreement over which aspects of government policy should or should not be viewed as aspects of Saemaul movement. The literature reviewed shows Saemaul Undong as being characterized either by the top-down or bottom-up mode, though some authors gives emphasis to the new quality of mutual efforts (top-bottom, bottom-up) which is however sparse. Given the availability of sources, the study would approach Saemaul Undong as an integrated rural development, which would focus on a balance growth strategy between "development from below" and "decision-making from above" centered around autonomous participation by the people.

1.5 Organization and Chapterisation

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter gives a brief general background of the importance of rural development with specification of Saemaul Undong in Korea. The second part covers the theoretical framework wherein, Saemaul Undong, provides a justification of the concept of integrated rural development paradigm

as it was launched mainly to improve and advance the living conditions of rural life by motivating villagers' participation and cooperation with self-help development initiated by the political will of the top national leadership in order to escape from poverty. The objectives and methodology of the study are also well discussed in this chapter.

The second chapter traced the historical development of rural development programs starting from the late Yi dynasty to the late 1970s. The historical development of Saemaul Undong is then discussed in the second part of this chapter with a brief account of its characteristics and accomplishments in terms of its rural development programs.

The third chapter covers a discussion on the role of the government in Saemaul Undong projects with special emphasis on the importance of the role of the top political leadership and the government's support and assistances. This chapter posits that Saemaul Undong's considerable contribution to the rural development and the nation's economic growth was the result of the government's strong commitment and effective leadership role with the strong combination of villagers' spontaneous cooperative participation.

The first part of the fourth chapter highlights the structural problems of Indian rural development. An attempt is made in the latter part, to analyze the extent of transferability of Saemaul Undong and thereby draws out lessons for Indian rural development.

The fifth chapter is the concluding chapter wherein the findings of the dissertation are evaluated. It concludes that the Saemaul Undong; a unique Korean way of community development program, initiated by the political will of the top national leadership in order to escape from poverty, is indeed a movement for the spiritual reform and imbues the Korean people with the spirits of diligence, the self-reliance, and co-operation. Although, it remains doubtful that most open economies of Asia are either willing or able to create the preconditions for Korea's New Village Movement (Saemaul Undong), some technical aspects of lessons from the Saemaul Undong, for example, managerial techniques, monitoring and management information systems, would be transferable with little adaptation.

Chapter Two

Saemaul Undong: A Historical Overview

2.1 Introduction

'*Saemaul*' is a combined word of '*Sae*' and '*Maul*'. '*Sae*' in Korean means 'new' or 'refreshed' and '*Maul*' means a village which is the basic unit of community. 'Being new' involves emerging from the old customs and breaking off from the convention. While '*Undong*' means movement. It is inevitably accompanied with changes and reformations.

The Saemaul Undong was started under the leadership of the late President Park Chung Hee with its identifying slogan of "*Let's improve our livelihood*". The program was characterized by three basic principles: (1) *diligence*, (2) *self-help*, and (3) *cooperation*. These basic principles form a cornerstone in the modernization of Korea, reforming and revitalizing the spiritual as well as the materialization orientation of the nation and of its people.

The Saemaul Undong was launched mainly to improve and advance the living conditions of rural life by motivating villagers' participation and cooperation with self-help development. It is interesting that the movement not only improved the village environment and increased income in the rural area, but also generated confidence in the people's mind. It was launched as a rural community development project at first, was expanded later in scope and program to urban sector, and became a nation-wide movement for nation building and economic prosperity. It is interesting to note that, it was not only the rural community development project, but also the modernization project of Korea (Choe 2005:1).

This chapter focuses on Saemaul Undong, mainly during the 1970s that contributed to the development of rural community in Korea and transformed Korea into one of the leading developing countries. Since one of the stated objectives of this study is to specify the limitations to the application of the Saemaul Undong methods to other developing

countries, it is thus important for these countries to have an appreciation both of the obstacles faced by Korea in her development endeavors in the twentieth century and the problems removed by the inception of the Saemaul Undong.

2.2 Background

The history of the Korean peasantry has, until very recently, been one of continuing impoverishment. The plight of rural people did not improve with the defeat of Japan in 1945. In 1950 the Korean War began, leaving at its conclusion in 1953 a divided and devastated nation. One million people died in the war and 10 million were left homeless and the cities to which the peasants had fled during both pre-colonial and colonial times were completely destroyed. During the remainder of the decade under the Syngman Rhee regime, the major task was one of reconstruction. In 1961 Park Chung-Hee became head of state under a new regime of one-man rule which was to last until his assassination in 1979. During this period Korea was transformed from being among the poorest nations of the world with a per capita GNP of US \$76 in 1961 to one with a per capita GNP of US\$ 1600 in 1980 (Douglas 1983:187).

However, Korea's rural sector had suffered from official neglect prior to the 1970's. The increasing industrialization strategy was used to subsidize a massive agriculture and village modernization effort which came to be subsumed under the banner of the Saemaul Undong; the New Village Community Movement. Officials had little enthusiasm for programmes promoting agricultural innovation, and market arrangement generally worked to the farmers' disadvantage. The government's emphasis was on urban policies. As a result, Kim (1985:324), puts forth that, *"agriculture had rarely been very profitable; at times it has barely reached even subsistence levels ... low prices of agricultural products [were] compared poorly with the prices of manufactured goods the farmers purchased ... the lack of rural roads complicated nearly every farm chore and discharged the farmers from using agricultural machinery."*

It was not until the 1970s, however, that rural people began to partake of the benefits of Korean "miracle". Throughout the 1960s the national development emphasis continued to

be placed on urban-industrial growth. Rural areas were neglected. Rural underemployment, basic needs, poverty and high rural-urban income disparities remained beyond the concerns of national economic planning.

In the early 1970's executive attention turned to the imbalance between urban and rural Korea (Park 1979). President Chung-Hee Park, "son of the poor farmer" in his own expression, believed that spontaneous self-help efforts could produce striking transformation in the quality of rural life, and proposed a strategy: rural development through cooperative village self-reliance¹. That was the "Saemaul Undong". The essence of which was to promote cooperative development efforts by villagers, guided by competent and highly motivated village leaders (Saemaul leader) with government aid through technical and financial assistance and the training of the Saemaul leaders (Lee 1990:4)

2.3 Historical Overview

Rural development in Korea did not begin with the Saemaul Undong, rather it accelerated. This acceleration, however, could not have occurred had not the major barriers to agricultural development inherited from the dynastic past been eliminated. As will be discussed, Korea's development was not always straight-forward. The Colonial Period, in particular, both worsened and lessened the worst of the dynasty legacy (Salem 1980:27).

The late Yi Dynasty (1392-1910),

The usual description of the Korean rural economy in the late 19th century emphasizes high tenancy, over-taxation, rapacious local officials and landlords. It obscured a vital element in the history of Korean agricultural development. That is, Korean farmers were highly skilled practitioners of traditional agricultural techniques. The second half of the

¹ Some scholars argue that the basic motive was political one. According to them, the ruling party led by him was based on the popular vote of rural farmers, while the opposition party was based on the support of the urban sector. In 1970, he needed more solid supports from rural sector, and the Saemaul Undong was one of ways of doing that job (Whang 1981 ch.4).

Yi dynasty saw the adoption of new crops and the commercialized growing of crops such as cotton, tobacco, and ginger. Rice plantation and double cropping were widespread.

Yet, for all this, Japanese observers in the late 19th century noted that the Korean peasants produced about one-half as much rice as Japanese peasants. Studies available indicate that human and institutional factors, rather than a lack of skill on the part of peasants account for the depressed state of agriculture in the late 19th century.²

The Colonial Period (1910-1945)

The first years of annexation by Japan saw little substantive change in patterns of landholding and tenancy in rural Korea. Measures were taken that would eventually effect such a change. However, the Japanese aim was to turn Korea into Japan's rice bowl and have Korea serve as a market for Japanese manufactured products. In effect, the Japanese decision to turn Korea into a major source of food for domestic Japanese consumption resulted in the impoverishment of the Korean tenant farmer and, at the same time, increased the product contribution of agriculture to the economy. In order to fulfill her role as a major supplier of rice for Japan, Korean production had to increase. The only way that could occur without first radically transforming rural society was to create conditions favorable to investment in substantial land acreage. As was previously mentioned, at the outset of the Colonial Period steps were taken to make investment in agriculture as profitable as possible.

Several factors account for the increase in agricultural production during the Colonial Period. They include more advanced methods of rice transplanting, better irrigation and drainage facilities. Superior seeds, better methods of crop cultivation and use of fertilizers greatly raised production and indeed, appear to be primarily responsible for the improved yield. The increase in farm machinery noted by the Japanese was in fact minimal and the use of relatively sophisticated agricultural machinery was limited to a few rich farmers and landlords.

² Isabella Bird Bishop (traveling in Korea in the 1890s), attested both the depression and potential of agriculture and concluded, Korea, "is not necessarily a poor country. Her capabilities for successful agriculture are scarcely exploited"(Salem 1980:29)

In sum, under the colonial administration one saw considerable increase of production due primarily to the adoption of improved seed varieties, improved agricultural techniques and the use of commercial fertilizers. The only indisputable benefits of the colonial regime to Korean agricultural development-though not necessarily to the Korean farmers-were those institutions created to promote agricultural productions. The better seeds, new methods of rice planting, etc, introduced under the Japanese did facilitate agricultural development in the post-war years. Major policy decisions were necessary before the peasants could reap the benefits.

From Liberation to the 1970's

Liberation from Japan in 1945 saw the Korean Peninsula divided into two-North Korea and South Korea. In the South, measures enacted by the U.S. Military Government brought some relief to the Korean tenant farmers. The vagaries of politics delayed the enactment of a Land Reform Act until June 15 of 1949, almost a year after the establishment of the Republic of Korea Government on August 15, 1948. However, The Korean war of 1950-53, which uprooted both the tenant and landlord alike, presented new opportunities for implementing the bill, with the reforms largely accomplished in 1953. Under the land reform programme landlords were to turn over their land to their tenants with a compensation of 150 percent of the value of the average annual production. Maximum holdings were limited to three hectares.

The reform, once enacted, transformed the Republic of Korea from a nation of tenant farmers to a nation of small proprietors. Land reform also effected a major redistribution of rural income. On the other hand, it was accompanied by only minimal increase in productivity. It has been suggested that the government's failure to design program that would compensate for the loss of landlord investment in capital improvements is primarily responsible for this.

Despite generalized poverty, Korean peasants were able to make a major investment in their future during those years. The persistence of traditional values into the post-war years and a continued and greatly accelerated expansion of educational facilities during

the 1950's, have provided the nation with a basically literate rural population by the time substantial efforts at rural development have begun. By 1970 some 87.7 percent of the rural population was literate (Salem 1980:39).

From the early 1960's onwards, rural development in Korea can only be discussed in the context of general economic advancement if one is to fairly evaluate the changes in rural life brought about the Saemaul Undong. Governmental efforts in the early 1960's were centered on the establishment of the Office of Rural Development and the recreation of the research and extension facilities that had virtually been abandoned since 1945 cannot be discounted.

Far more vital to the rural sector, however, was the primacy the government placed on accelerated industrialization and an export drive. A case has been convincingly made that, in Korea, overall economic development was both a prerequisite for and corollary to agricultural development (Salem 1980:39). Accordingly, Korean agricultural development could not begin to modernize until the country was capable of building such essentials as fertilizer plants and road networks. That same study posits that the economic advancement provided the government with both the resources and the will to turn sustained attention to improving rural living standards in the early 1970's.

In fact, it can be argued here that, the Saemaul Movement had begun at an opportune time. By the early 1970's the major obstacles to rural development inherited from the Yi dynasty and Colonial Period had been removed. The Korean farmers were a literate, though impoverished, small proprietors. Previous barriers to social and economic advancement had disappeared. Industrialization in the 1960's provided the previously lacking employment opportunities in a land where the agricultural sector had been overpopulated. That is to say, general economic growth had created conditions favorable to agricultural development.

2.3 Historical Development of Saemaul Undong

The basic unit of the Saemaul Undong is the “village”. The principle of private ownership was strictly maintained, but with the relatively equal distribution of land, it was thought that co-operative efforts would result in equal sharing and that the movement would not be dominated by rural elites. In principle it was advertised as a ‘movement for spiritual revolution’ and ‘a training ground in the practice of democracy’. As part of the movement villagers elect leaders, select various village projects and carry them out through voluntary participation. Minutes of meetings, records of projects, development plans and other documents are kept in the newly constructed Saemaul Community Hall erected in each village.

As an effort towards initiating a process of ‘planning from below’, the movement has been summarized as, *“A nationwide self-help program to improve the rural standard of living.... (with) economic as well as social and political objectives. It aims to modernize thought and social patterns in the villages, impart to the people a greater sense of participation in the development process, and to improve the quality of life in the rural areas.... On a more fundamental level, the creation of a genuine grass-roots organization like the Saemaul constitutes a major departure from the past and will bring about fundamental social change in the rural areas (Doughlas 1980:198).*

According to Doughlas (1980:199), the Korean planners proclaim the Saemaul Undong to have been a movement without a theory. By this they seem to mean that it began by giving each of the Korea’s approximately 35,000 villages, 335 bags of cement, leaving the village with strong suggestions but essentially to their own devices concerning how the cement was to be used. However, there does appear to be a general agreement that Saemaul Undong had modest and almost accidental origin and that it was only after it was formally launched that an ideology was developed around it (*“Diligence, Self-help, and Cooperation”*, as the three guiding doctrine of the movement), and became the symbolic focus of the government's development efforts (Moore 1984).

In order to improve the living conditions of the residents of rural communities, President Park Chung-Hee, instructed at a national conference of governors and ministers of the central government to study ways and means to promote rural self-help efforts based on cooperation among farmers, government agencies concerned, and farm leaders. Based on this instruction, the national government drew up an experimental project, named "Saemaul Undong". The national government issued working guidelines of "Ten Projects for Constructing Better Villages" as a pilot program. Guidelines were published in October 1970 and all the county mayors (appointed by the national government) received special instructions and a short training course on how to launch the projects. The pilot program was evaluated as very impressive by the national government. Based on this evaluation, the national government gave 335 bags of cement each to all rural villages in the country to improve farmers' immediate living environments such as village water supply facilities, community laundry areas, common compost plots, etc. in early 1971. According to the statistics, the government provided \$ 8.5 million and the projects completed were worth \$ 25 million (Choe 2005:2).

The historical development of the Saemaul Undong can thus be explained in four consecutive stages:

1. Foundation Stage: 1971-1973
2. Self -Help Development Stage: 1973-1976
3. Spiritual Enlightenment of the rural people:1977-1979
4. The National Council of Saemaul Undong: From 1980 onwards

(a) Foundation Stage: 1971-1973

The Foundation Stage focused on the improvement of the farmers' immediate living environments. Included programs are replacements of straw-thatched roofs of traditional farming house with concrete slates or steel tins, widening and strengthening of in-roads or in-alleys, improvements of fences of farming houses, and building foot-bridge. These projects did not immediately increase income, but they benefit the villagers themselves, and require some sacrifice and cooperation from everyone.

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Of 35,000 villages, one-third of them responded positively (Rondinelli 1983). The next phase was the method of trying to encourage further development through the selection of model villages from among those which had responded most positively and constructively in the use of the cement. Some villages; primarily those with minimal social divisions, strong leadership and a favourable attitude toward the local bureaucracy had acted eagerly to use the materials for such activities as improving wells, making laundry places, and repairing bridges and roads. Others had expressed resentment at, for example, providing voluntary labour in the cold of winter for government projects and at donating without compensation pieces of land required for road-widening. In 1972 those villages which the government deemed to have attained laudable results were selected for another round of more intensive government support. Thus, 16,600 villages were this time given 500 bags of cement and 1 ton of steel rods with the hope that by concentrating support in the progressive villages, a demonstration effect would spread to other villages, making them want to take part in future Saemaul projects. This made the government to recognize that rural development cannot be achieved simply by the maximum influx of resources into rural communities without the proper response or broadly based community initiative of rural people (Whang 1981).

On the basis of this experience, Saemaul Undong had since focused on encouragement of village initiatives and concentrated its supports on those villages that display the will and the competence to carry out development projects in accordance with the program's ideals of self-reliance and cooperation. In this period, a system for village classification which decided the level of government support and Saemaul Leaders Training Institute were established. It was the period of (i) building Saemaul institutional arrangements within government organizations and at local level; and (ii) the Saemaul experiment (Rondinelli 1983). Saemaul Undong Consultative Council was established and organizations patterned after it were set up at each level of local administration: Province (do), County (Kun), township (myon), and Village (maul).³ National government offered all villages a

³ At that time, there already existed one institution for rural development called National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF). But, unlike its name, it was nothing more than a government agency from which the poor could not receive good services. It had nothing to do with the success of Saemaul Undong, and it was "nothing more than the agent for the fertilizer company" (Chang, 1987).

limited amount of building materials with which to launch small self-help projects such as common well and roads.

(b) Self Help Development Stage: 1973-1976

Foundation Building stage was followed by the so-called Self-Help Development stage. Having successfully completed the projects for the improvements of living environments, the villagers were encouraged to take up income-generating projects such as joint farming, common seedbeds, off-season vegetable cultivation, pig farming, pasturage, community forestation, building Saemaul factories and common marketing facilities. Based on the initial experimentation, the movement was expanded on a nationwide scale in 1973, villages were divided into three categories depending on their capacity for and level of development: 18,415 were designated as ‘basic’ villages, 13,943 were termed ‘self-help’ villages, and the 2,307 which were the most advanced were categorized as ‘self-reliant’ villages. In general, the self-reliant villages were those which had been able to complete 70 percent of these adopted projects during the 1971-2 period. Self-help villages were those which had the material and financial capacity for rapid improvement but which had been unable to achieve it. The basic villages were those without either resources or enthusiasm. All villages were given until 1981 to reach the ‘self-reliant’ level.

Table 2.1 The Changing Distribution of Villages up to 1977

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Category (%)</i> | | |
|-------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | <i>Basic</i> | <i>Self-help</i> | <i>Self-reliant</i> |
| 1972 | 53 | 40 | 7 |
| 1973 | 31 | 57 | 12 |
| 1974 | 18 | 62 | 20 |
| 1975 | 11 | 60 | 29 |
| 1976 | 1 | 54 | 45 |
| 1977 | 0 | 33 | 67 |

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1977

Table 2.1 indicates the changing distribution of villages up to 1977, the year in which all of the ‘basic’ villages had moved to higher categories (Doughlas 1983).

This stage aimed at improving rural living standards and rural infrastructures -houses, roads, drainage, mountain woodlands, electrification and running water supply (Park 1979). More important, village-level informal organizations, including Women's Leagues and Youth Clubs, were recognized and encouraged by the government. It was believed that informal ties between villagers were critical in sustaining cooperative efforts.

(c) Spiritual Enlightenment of the rural people: 1977-1979

The third stage of the Saemaul Undong also focused on spiritual enlightenment of the rural people. As a matter of fact, the spiritual enlightenment program had been started since the beginning of the 2nd stage of the Saemaul Undong. However, the Spiritual enlightenment program in this period was aimed at inducing and internalizing the development will of the people based on innovative motivation. The program purported to infuse the “we can do, we will do it” spirit with three components of *diligence, self-help, and cooperation*.

This stage had been concerned with reinforcing self-help incentives other than government's supports. By 1977, Korea achieved self-sufficiency in food and the gap between rural and urban sectors was reduced, and agricultural policy began to be changed. Unassisted, spontaneous development efforts were emphasized. Villages were encouraged to accumulate capital by designing and managing project independently. Further, the government allowed the import of agricultural products and started to freeze government purchase prices of major grains.

(d) The National Council of Saemaul Undong: From 1980 Onwards

The final stage of the development of the Saemaul Undong began in 1980, just after the President Park Chung-Hee was suddenly assassinated by one of his men. Under the administration of the successive government (Chun Doo Hwan), the Saemaul Undong, which was previously under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs during the 1970's, has been taken over by the government-affiliated private, administrative body, the National Council of Saemaul Undong. From then on, the activities of the Saemaul Undong have been transferred gradually from the direct control of governmental agencies

to the hands of private organization and people. The privatization of the Saemaul Undong does not necessarily mean a complete separation from the government. Rather, it means a division of labor between the government and the private sector. It can be said, however, that the vitality of the Saemaul Undong had been decreased since the end of the 3rd stage due to the rapid economic development of the nation.

By the year 1980, as the national fundamentals of industry were established, the movement started to spread from rural villages to cities. During the decade from 1981 to 1989, the model cases of Saemaul Undong Movement in rural areas were introduced and followed in the factories, working places, towns in large cities. By that time, the role of government in the Movement started getting reduced and the civil parts like the group of community leaders took greater role. The Movement ended the stage of led-by-government and turned into joint-operation of government and civil leaders. The focus of the Movement shifted from the income enlargement to moral reformation.

After change in Administration in 1980, Korean new President, Chun Doo-Whan, proclaimed that Saemaul Undong should be revitalized (Republic of Korea, 1984). Under the flag of civil stewardship and revitalization of Saemaul Undong, as a result, Saemaul Undong Central Consultative Council was changed to Headquarter of Saemaul Undong. The total amount of budget of it was almost doubled compared to Park's Administration, and the total capital which was publicly known was almost US \$ 70 million by the end of 1985 (Lee 1990:6). It was even called "the 4th Branch of the Government" or "the untouchable". But, it failed to revitalize the *Saemaul Undong*. More precisely, it turned out that it was used politically.⁴ After the change of Administration, the president of the Headquarter of Saemaul Undong, the younger brother of ex- President Chun⁵, was sentenced to imprisonment for corruption and misuse of power (Yoon 1987).

⁴ It was publicly known that the Headquarter of Saemaul Undong forced big companies to donate political fund called "Saemaul Donation". Under the name of civil stewardship, it could receive government support without being under the control of formal audit process.

⁵ The fact that the movement was then directed by President Chun's younger brother is sometimes taken as an indication of the political importance attributed to control of Saemaul. It seems certainly true that Chun had done his best to identify himself with Saemaul in the way that Park did. But rather fragmentary evidence suggests that the president's brother controls the Saemaul headquarters and little else. His position

By then, Korean farmers suffered from extreme poverty. The ratio of income from farming to cost of living, which used to be 120% in the middle of 1970's and 90% in 1980, is below 70%. Considering the absence of alternative employment opportunity in the rural community, it means that most Korean farmers have debts (Kim 1986). In 1988, the national total debt of Korean farmers' was about US \$ 5.7 billion, and it was 35% of the national total income of the farmers' (Lee 1990:7).

Since the government would not for a minute admit to the fact that Saemaul is in severe recession, it is very difficult to find evidence to explain the movement's decline. However, perhaps the more important factor behind the movement's decline was that the motivation to undertake village-level projects or to cooperate with government more generally had been seriously worn out by changes in the general economic and political environment. It has been plausibly argued that political stability and the conservatism and quiescence of the family-farm-based rural population have made important contributions to the rapid postwar economic growth of Korea.

From 1990s, as Korea entered into higher stage of industrialized country, the Saemaul Undong Movement transformed from the movement of well-being to the movement of harmony and unity of community. Since then, the Saemaul Undong Movement is led by pure civilian leadership and it is interesting that it becomes all-court player in the civil movement, from daily life reformation to national agendas.

2.4 Characteristics of the Saemaul Undong and Its Achievements

2.4.1 Main Characteristics of the Saemaul Undong

The Saemaul Undong can be characterized by several features. First, it can be said that the Saemaul Undong was conducted by so-called integrated approach, that is a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches, although it started without a well-defined formal or theoretical framework at first. In fact, government officials themselves did plan and facilitate rural villagers in order to implement the Saemaul Undong without

is more symbolic than substantial, and at regional and local levels the Ministry of Home Affairs plays the major controlling role-insofar as there is anything to control (Moore 1984)

any support from academicians who might have had useful and related technical knowledge in its early stage. However, it does not mean that the Saemaul Undong had been projected with no framework. Recent studies show that the Saemaul Undong was conducted by a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches.

Second, the implementation strategy of the Saemaul Undong is a pure Korean way of community development. The mottoes, slogans, and terminology used for the program are based on the Korean way of thinking. It means that the implementation of the Saemaul Undong was based on the positive aspects of Korean culture and tradition.

Third, the most important intention to pursue the Saemaul Undong is to escape from poverty. At the time of the inception of the Saemaul Undong, there was a strong need to overcome a seasonal problem of hunger. Each year during the months of April through June many farm households suffered an extreme shortage of food. It is called “the barley hump.” Because poverty was a fact of life, the initiation of the Saemaul Undong was a means to challenge the situation. The Saemaul Undong as a better-living movement emphasized diversification of income sources of farm households that were largely limited to rice production. As a result, the production of main grains (rice and barley) reached sufficiency by 1975. This was considered an overwhelming achievement of the Saemaul Undong.

Fourth, the Saemaul Undong was, in a sense, a movement for spiritual reform of Korean people, and has achieved a lot in this respect. It changed people’s attitude from idleness to diligence, from dependence to self-reliance, and from individual selfishness to cooperation with others so as to be dubbed as “Social Revolution of Korean Rural Society” (Choe 2005). The drive toward better cooperation was intended to restore Korea’s old tradition of Doo-re (a form of community savings and sharing union), Poomasie (a custom of farm-hand sharing among neighbors), and Hyang-yack (community codes of ethics and cooperation).

At the initial stage of Saemaul Undong, the projects were focused mainly on improving the living environments of villages. But as Saemaul projects were accomplished one by one, the sense of frustration among villagers was reduced and pride and a sense of dedication among soil tillers had increased. Farmers use more and better inputs in order to increase soil fertility for more and better crops and livestock. Love of the soil thus has led tillers of centuries-old land to love their own community and nation as well.

2.4.2 Achievements of the Saemaul Undong

The better understanding of the idea and essential concept of the Saemaul Undong during the 1970s requires a close examination of its actual performance, in terms of its expansion and accomplishments of the numerous Saemaul activities and programs. Achievements of the Saemaul Undong in the 1970s have been well documented.

Table 2.2
Achievements of the Major Saemaul Projects in 1970s

| <i>Project Name</i> | <i>Unit</i> | <i>Objective</i> | <i>Performance</i> | <i>Growth</i> |
|------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Expanding Village Road | Km | 26,266 | 43,558 | 166% |
| Constructing New Agriculture Roads | Km | 49,167 | 61,797 | 126 |
| Installing Small Bridges | Unit | 76,749 | 79,516 | 104 |
| Constructing Village Centers | Unit | 35,608 | 37,012 | 104 |
| Building Warehouses | Unit | 34,665 | 22,143 | 64 |
| Housing Improvements | Unit | 544,000 | 225,000 | 42 |
| Improving Village Layout | Village | | 2,747 | |
| Constructing Sewage Systems | Km | 8,654 | 15,559 | 179 |
| Supplying Electricity | Household | 2,834,000 | 2,777,500 | 98 |
| Operating Saemaul Factories | Unit | 950 | 717 | 75 |

Source: National Council of Saemaul Undong (1999), *Saemaul Undong in Korea*. p.24

Table 2.2 shows the achievements of the major Saemaul Undong projects conducted in 1970s. As shown in the Table 2.3, the income of rural households increased sharply in 1970s as a result of the various Saemaul Undong projects. It was possible by the introduction of modern agricultural technologies with the internalization of hard-working spirit among rural people. Thus, the share of agriculture income in the total household incomes for each year had been more than fifty percent. Table 2.4 shows achievements of the physical rural infrastructure. Although not shown in the table, capital-intensive infrastructure, such as educational programmes and income augmentation programs were also an important part of the movement. The Saemaul Undong was very successful in developing rural economy of Korea.

Table 2.3 Farming Household Income in 1970s

(Unit: Korean Won)

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Household Income</i> | <i>Agricultural Income</i> | | <i>Non-agricultural Income</i> | |
|-------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|--------------------------------|----------------|
| | | <i>Amount</i> | <i>Ratio %</i> | <i>Amount</i> | <i>Ratio %</i> |
| 1970 | 255,800 | 194,000 | 75.9 | 61,800 | 24.1 |
| 1973 | 480,700 | 390,300 | 81.2 | 90,400 | 18.8 |
| 1976 | 1,156,300 | 921,200 | 79.7 | 235,100 | 20.3 |
| 1979 | 2,227,500 | 1,531,300 | 68.7 | 696,200 | 31.3 |

Source: National Council of Saemaul Undong (1999), Saemaul Undong in Korea. p.25

For the period of Foundation Building stage, farming household income was increased from 255,800 Won (approximately \$243) to 480,700Won (\$457). For the Self-help Development stage lasting for 3 years from 1974, farming household income increased to 1,156,300 Won (\$1,101) in 1976. In 1979, the last year of the third period (Achieving Self-support stage), rural household income reached to 2,227,500 Won (\$2,121). In sum, farming household income in Korea increased six times for 10 years (Choe 2005:5-6).

Table 2.4
Accomplishments of Saemaul Projects per Village, 1970-79

| <i>Projects</i> | <i>Unit</i> | <i>Completed by 1979*</i> |
|--|------------------------|---------------------------|
| Rural Roads; | | |
| Village Roads | Km | 1.24 |
| Farm Feeder Roads | Km | 1.26 |
| Bridge Construction | No. | 2.10 |
| Irrigation Facilities; | | |
| Small Reservoirs | No. | 0.31 |
| Small Irrigation Channel | No. | 0.81 |
| Raceway | M. | 120.4 |
| Embankment of Rivers | M. | 263.3 |
| Communal Facilities; | | |
| Village Halls | Bldg. | 1.03** |
| Public Warehouse | Bldg. | 0.56 |
| Public Workshops | Bldg. | 0.13 |
| Public Compost Pits | No. | 2.01 |
| Common Use Barns | Bldg. | 0.12 |
| Rural Electrification and Communication Networks; | | |
| Electrification | % to all households | 98.9 |
| Telephone | % to all villages | 100.0 |
| Rural Water Supply and Sanitary Improvement; | | |
| Water | No. | 0.52 |
| Public Wells | No. | 3.45 |
| Public Bath Houses | No. | 0.20 |
| Public Laundry Places | No. | 1.91 |

Source: Sung-Hwan Ban, "Development of the Rural Infrastructure and Saemaul Undong," 1980.

* Total number of Villages as of 1979 was 34,871.

** In some cases, an administrative village consists of more than two natural villages. Therefore there could be more than two village halls in an administrative village.

The programs of the Saemaul Undong are reflected not only in the visible achievements quantified above, but also in the even larger sphere of projects undertaken, all of which demonstrate how the Saemaul Undong had grown in its scope and impact on rural development. Up to 1973, the Saemaul movement was largely carried out in rural areas, but since 1974, it had been extended to urban areas including industrial plants and schools, and even to the military bases. The factory Saemaul Undong and the school Saemaul Undong are both important examples of the urban Saemaul movement.

2.5 Conclusion

Saemaul Undong earned its fame of today from the rapid growth of Korean economy which turned the poor agricultural country into highly developed industrial country within two decades. When Saemaul Undong first started in 1970, Korea was much poor and it could hardly be anything more than a movement to escape from starving. But by the end of 1970s, people were saying the words of 'Miracle in Han River' and from 1980s Korea was called as one of the Four Dragons in Asia. However, this does not mean Saemaul Undong made all of the miracles possible rather it did one of the most essential parts in the whole process of the country's growth and development. The real fame of Saemaul Undong Movement lies not in the outcome of economic growth. It was earned from the struggles and spirits of the innumerable nameless who challenged the fate of poverty shouting the faith of "we can do it! We will do it" and supported the era of high growth all the way just with their bare hands and fights. It can also be said that economic growth of Korea was a process of creating wealth from nothingness. There was no role model and the material resources were hardly available. The only one thing that Korea could depend on was the "power" of the people. Saemaul Undong was the national agenda that united that power of the people under the flag of economic development.

Saemaul Undong, as a Korean version of integrated rural development, has contributed considerably to rural development during the 1970s. It is also clear that Saemaul Undong, as an integrated process of significant changes in values and attitudes of individual farmers, community organizations, the rural infrastructures and village economies provided a firm basis for self-reliant development in the rural sector. It is in this sense that the extent of transferability of the Saemaul Undong as a rural development model seems to be a subject of academic inquiry.

Chapter Three

The Role of the Government in Saemaul Undong

3.1 Introduction

It has often been mentioned that the Saemaul Undong of Korea, is to date one of the most successful cases of integrated rural development. Besides having made an enormous impact upon villages in Korea, like changes in values, modes of village organization and development of community based leadership, it is important to examine the extent of the role of Korean government role in making Saemaul projects achieved satisfactory results in terms of rural development. In this respect, it is equally important to bear in mind that rural development cannot take place simply by planning or the formal announcement of rural development programs and policies without continued support and real commitment from the government to rural development in the country. It almost is a truism to point out that the extent of commitment of the political leadership and government of a country to rural development is a significant determinant of its success in raising the standard of rural living. In a way, one can firmly say that it is particularly true in contemporary developing countries in which socio-structural, cultural, and attitudinal barriers to rural change are sufficiently strong.

Thus, with limited data available, Korea's Saemaul Undong is examined as an example of integrated rural development. In its ideals, this movement indeed represents a model of integrated rural development program. Yet in its implementation, Korean government has taken a leading role, first initiating it and later supporting it in terms of its financial and technical assistance terms. Therefore, the role of the government has become almost universally significant in today's world, whether in the more or less developed parts of the globe. In case of Korea, the structural features, primarily traditional in its origin, have made it more feasible, if not entirely inevitable, for government to take an active role in this respect.

Regardless of one's predilections, it has generally become apparent to social scientists that government is pervasive in social change everywhere. As such, exhaustive

documentation is scarcely needed “to demonstrate that major changes in both the developed and developing nations are inconceivable today without the massive intervention of government” (Kim 1978:21-22).

Nevertheless, the role of government is not always positive, especially in social change. Government can be a barrier to, as well as a driving force for change. The determining factor in this regard may be found in the basic orientations of the government, the political elite and in the structural characteristics of the society. For instance, a government may represent the interest of the most powerful and the most privileged of the society. In this case, it may resist any significant change in the structural change in the structural power and resource allocation, which may threaten the status quo.

On the other hand, however, examination of history also indicates that government has never been the disinterested bystander in social change, sometimes taking an active role of initiator and sometimes a passive role of supporter of various change efforts in diverse spheres of social life by divergent groups in society. The activity of the government may often have benefited some select segments of society, but it is a potent source of change and much of the nature and direction change in a society with a strong central government must be understood in terms of the activity of that government. This in fact has aroused a debate about whether a strong centralized state is necessarily an authoritarian state or it could be a democratic one (Kim 1978:22).

Authors have suggested certain factors necessitating a strong government which is authoritarian to be more effective than a democratic state to achieve modernization. For instance, a need for authoritarianism is recognized in the early stage of Saemaul Undong (Kim 1978:23). The essential functions of which are creation of the physical and social foundations for development, overall planning and integration of development or to bring about larger and more efficient production and distribution of goods and services.

Moreover, the development program in itself may embrace inculcation of socio-political change conducive to democratic structures while pursuing other more urgent changes. In

a case like this, then, a strong central government, with an authoritarian orientation, may be more effective in initiating and implementing major development program without necessarily sacrificing the socio-political transformation entailing democratization. This certainly requires an “integrated” approach to development (Whang 1981:39).

Korea’s *Saemaul Undong* (the New Community Movement) offers an intriguing case material for analysis in this respect. Therefore, the main purpose in this chapter is: 1) to examine the structural factors affecting the active involvement of the central government in integrated rural development; and 2) to analyze the structural implications of the government’s involvement in such a program.

3.2 The Saemaul Undong as Integrated Rural Development

The concept of integrated rural development entails, several essential characteristics, largely conceived in terms of ideal goals. This goal-oriented approach is taken on the ground that development as a general concept is a value-laden concept. First of all, integrated development is a comprehensive change. It is to enhance change in all of the social, economic, cultural, and political spheres of institutions. In fact, it should involve all segments of the community system. Second, it is a balanced change. It must encourage change in all of the strata, sectors, and regions of the society, an even or similar pace within the community as well as among the communities in the larger society. Third, integrated development, it follows, is to be a change with meaningful linkages among these diverse strata, sectors, and regions. All of the above, of course, require a coordinated and concerted effort to development. And finally, on a different dimension, it calls for active voluntary participation by the members of the community and the larger society.

In a perfectly fitting way, Korea’s *Saemaul Undong* embodies all of these integrated developed goals. And it is also a fact that in this nation-wide movement, Korean government played a crucial role. An attempt is made in this chapter to examine the sociological factors which have led to active government involvement and assess the indicators that define the extent of government commitment to rural development in the Korean context.

In the nutshell, Korea's Saemaul Undong has been defined as, "a community development aimed at improvement of the economic, social and cultural life of the people and their environmental conditions, through inculcation of attitudes and values of diligence, cooperation, and self-help, cultivation of grass-roots, leadership, and through the active voluntary participation of the people in the community"(Kim 1978:25). As such, it is a comprehensive social movement which is an integral part of the national modernization effort to achieve stable and balanced development of the nation.

Obviously, this definition covers almost all of the goals of ideal integrated development as defined above. But in the actual process of realizing these goals, there are practical considerations to be made in terms of priorities, sequences, and adjustments. In the initial stage of this movement, therefore, there was an interesting combination of priority choices. For instance, on 22nd April 1970, in a gathering of provincial governors and mayors to discuss the policies to deal with drought disaster, president Park Chung Hee, of the Republic of Korea delivered a speech which was to become the original kindling for the Saemaul Undong. He asserts that farmers who lament over their miserable fortune, who rebuked the government for their poverty, can never stand up; "*...if we all work hard to nurture our own village with our own two hands, with the spirit of self-help and self-reliance, I am confident that all our village will soon turn out to be prosperous and tidy communities... We might as well call this movement the Saemaul Undong*" (Kim 1978:25-26).

With the question of the implementing of these ideas into action, since the most urgently needed goal of immediate concern was to close the income gap between the rural and urban sectors. The very first pilot project proposed and executed on a nationwide scale was to mobilize the idle rural populace during the off-season to engage in village improvement tasks with respect to tidying up the physical environment for the sake of utility and convenient living and creation of productive bases. The pilot program was evaluated as very impressive by the national government. Based on this evaluation, the national government gave 335 bags of cement each to all rural villages in the country to improve farmers' immediate living environments such as village piped water supply facilities, community laundry areas, common compost plots, etc. in the early 1971.

Reflecting the lesson learned from the trial project, one of the first main features of this movement was to establish the Farmers Training Centre, later-named as the Saemaul Leaders Training Institute in January 1972. The principal objective of this institute is to induce changes in the attitudes and values of Saemaul leaders by infusing the Saemaul spirit, rather than imparting of technical information regarding agriculture.

The next central consideration that entered into the plan was to mobilize human and material resources without coercive measures: it required an organizational strategy. Since the study touch upon the administrative apparatus of the government in the next section, it is necessary to focus on the grassroots of organization in this context. This involves two aspects of organization: cooperative community participation and grassroots democracy, on the one hand, and cultivation of indigenous leadership, on the other.

However, in order to assure cooperative and voluntary participation, the planners of the Saemaul Undong positively exploited the indigenous traditional community organization. It was recognized that the family and kinship ties are still very strong and intact, despite the rapid socio-economic transformation experienced in the past few decades. Korea has a long and persistent tradition of cooperative efforts in the social, political, cultural and economic spheres. *Hyang-Yak*, a community contract system, was used to handle the community-wide issues of ethical and moral nature, and in some cases, various social problems. A variety of voluntarily formed mutual aid cooperatives have existed for economic and financial exigencies; these were called *Kye* for diverse purpose. Labour exchange and cooperative farm and non-farm activities have been quite prevalent. Village assemblies (*Dong-Hoe*) managed political matters, while villages' rituals (*Dong-Je*) and kinship-oriented ancestor worship ceremonies have been responsible for religious, social integrative functions (Kim 1978:28).

Yet, in order to utilize such indigenous structural bases for the purpose of social mobilization, a new approach to grass-root leadership was required. As such, Saemaul leaders were selected from among the village themselves by an assembly of electors representing every household in the community, they become the center of voluntary participation and democratic decision making on the grass-root level. In effect, this

arrangement reflected the traditional, though rudimentary, form of village democracy and cooperation. Most importantly, direct contact is available up to the provincial governors and ministers in case certain urgent grievances or business matters are needed to be heard.

Table 3.1

Goals of the Saemaul Undong

| <i>Spiritual Development (Attitudinal Change)</i> | <i>Economic Development (Modernization of Agriculture and Industrialization)</i> | <i>Social Development (Cultural Change)</i> |
|--|--|---|
| 1. Inculcation of upright values | 1. Income rise | 1. Nation-wide electrification, road pavement & complete communication facilities |
| 2. Materialization of the spirit of self-reliance, self-help & cooperation | 2. Innovation of agriculture and fishery structure | 2. Equipment of cultural facilities (home) |
| 3. Establishment of firm national concept and national identity | 3. Technical innovation & mechanization of production | 3. Equipment of cultural facilities (community) |
| 4. Rationalization or scientific way of life | 4. Re-adjustment of cultivating land and enlargement of the cultivation scale | 4. Innovation of the community structure |
| 5. Cultivation of wholesome and fresh attitudes of life | 5. Processing of agricultural and fishery products | 5. Expansion of social security and welfare system. |

Source: National Agricultural Economics Research Institute, *op.cit*, p.22

Under the broad goals of spiritual development or attitudinal innovation, economic development or modernization of agriculture and industrialization and social development or cultural innovation, this movement encompasses a horde of specific action program. Table 3.1 shows demonstrate the comprehensiveness of the movement in substantive terms. It is truly a multipurpose multifaceted programme.

3.3 The Role of the Government

Korea, historically, has been an agrarian society, with much of its social structural and cultural ramifications. The mass of peasantry, which have been the mainstay of productive force, seems to have always been the most suffered element of the society. They were exploited by the ruling-gentry class in the pre-modern era, again by the Japanese colonial policies during the pre-war period. Despite the unprecedented effort by the independent republic to reform the traditional-colonial land tenure system, the war of 1950-53 and the hasty recovery from its aftermath still had left the rural sector in the backwater of change. The sixties have been marked by a frantic attempt to industrialize the economy and in fact, Korea has achieved remarkable growth in this decade. This had been led by the manufacturing sector of the industry, which in turn, was supported by the rise in export. In the heat of tremendously rapid industrialization, however, the agricultural sector and the rural communities have once more been left behind. Therefore, it is necessary to understand why, in Korea, the government, in part, has to take the initiative and in part, has been the most appropriate agent for such an active role.

Korea's experience with concrete forms of rural development action programs actually dates back to the Japanese period. In 1932, the Japanese colonial authorities launched a movement called the "Self-help Movement for the Revival of Agriculture" under the banner of leading the farmers by spiritual teaching and careful and kindly guidance in forming their methods of livelihood. Evidently, it was never able to mobilize the farmers despite their coercive, militaristic techniques¹. It was only in the beginning of the seventies when the economy has reached a level of take-off and been ready for more balanced development that the political leadership has been able to pay serious attention to the urgency of comprehensive rural development.

Korean government has not merely been the igniting force and active initiator but also a helpful partner in the movement. By the definition itself, Saemaul Undong is a comprehensive social movement, a development program, and a community organization

¹ In brief, the Japanese aim was to turn Korea into Japan's rice bowl and have Korea serve as a market for Japanese manufactured products. In effect, the Japanese decision to turn Korea into a major source of food for domestic Japanese consumption resulted in the impoverishment of the Korean tenant farmer and, at the same time, increased the product contribution of agriculture to the economy.

effort. For all of these reasons, it would have require leadership, ideology or code of values, resources, both human skills of planning and material, organizational capacities, recruitment, mobilization, and participation of members. So, besides the structural pre-conditions examined earlier, the only viable source till lay in the government (Kim 1978:33).

What indicators then define the extent of government commitment to rural development in the Korean context? Government commitment according to Whang (1981) means the public promise of government to undertake to make certain types of commitments to rural development. It includes the manifested interest of government in rural development which leads to specific action programs for the realization and completion of their explicitly or implicitly announced promise, policies of program. In Korea, the Saemaul Undong itself demonstrates the great concern of government as well as its commitment to rural development (Whang 1981:39).

In any case, the extent of government commitment to rural development is determined by the state authority as well as by the finance of government. The extent of the government commitment can be analyzed in terms of two major elements: (a) political leadership commitment made on the basis of state authority; and (b) financial aid backed by the government's support and assistance such as financial, material, technical and institutional assistance.

3.3.1 Political Leadership Commitment

Political leadership commitment tended to be made by explicit expression of the leadership's personal interest and concerns about rural development in formal or informal statements, by manifested action such as specific instructions for identification of problem and/or monitoring of program performance, and by exercising personal influence on the power elite in various sectors of society in favor of rural development.

The rural poverty in Korea had been one of late President Park's major concerns during his presidency, as the poverty in rural villages had improved little until his initiation of

the Saemaul Undong. It was especially so during the 1970's when the popular support for the presidency tended to be challenge and skeptical, partly because as a consequence of rigorous implementation of the First and Second Five-Year Plans of rapid industrialization preceded rural development. The deteriorating rural situations widened the gap between industry and farm, and became a major cause of the rapid rural-to-urban migration. Regardless of the level of his motivation, his strong personal as well as institutional support and commitment to rural development were reflected in his inauguration of the Saemaul song and the Saemaul flag. The song has been popular among various categories of people. During working hours the Saemaul flag has been hung together with the national flag at all kinds of office buildings throughout the country.

As pointed out that the Saemaul Undong was personally initiated by the late President Park. The leadership commitment to rural development was also demonstrated by the contents of statements made on rural issues and by the frequency of these speeches. The President often stressed the philosophy and importance of rural development in order to encourage people's participation in Saemaul Undong. He did that on various occasions, for example at the New Year Press Conference and National Conference of Saemaul Undong Leaders and at the Seoul National University Graduation Ceremony. Through his speeches, he also elaborated on the standard of government support and promised specific assistance, as shown by the following statements:

“The decisive factor is how the farmers and fishermen respond, and how actively they participate in the program. The key factor is whether they are inspired by a desire to help themselves, whether they make a systematic effort to help themselves, and whether they are really fired by a productive spirit. Provided they have the confidence that they can achieve better living if only they strive hard enough, we can achieve rural modernization and upgrade the living standard of farmers and fishermen.” (Congratulatory Message at the Second Special Competition of Farmers and Fishermen in Income Boosting Skills, November 11, 1970).

The President also expressed his great concern about rural development by personally visiting rural villages. His frequent field visits also served as a mechanism for

identification of problems, and provided opportunities to make specific instructions and guidelines for program design as well as for monitoring program performance.

President Park's personal interest in and concern for rural development tended to be institutionalized in terms of the organizational setting and reporting system. The president used to personally award prizes to the two best Saemaul leaders at the monthly meeting with economic ministers of his cabinet where the Monthly Economic Situation Report was presented to the President. It is also interesting to note that the Annual National Conference of Saemaul Undong Leaders, in which he encouraged, motivated and stimulated Saemaul Leaders from all the villages of the nation to make their best endeavor for rural betterment.

"All these outstanding results are a crystallization of the sweat and labor of all the Saemaul Leaders and the rural population who have worked in unity and were inspired by the Saemaul spirit of diligence, self-help, and teamwork. In my view, the Saemaul movement is the driving force behind the conquest of difficulties and the creation of a new chapter of national history.... The responsibilities and missions assigned to you (Saemaul Leaders) are heavy and important beyond comparison."
(Message at National Conference of Saemaul Leaders, December 18, 1974)

Using his formal authority, the late President Park also intentionally exercised his influence to get the power elite to form favorable attitudes toward, and to give moral support and commitment to, rural prosperity. Due to the influence of the President, a social mood was created which was favorable to rural development, so that the ruling elite including religious leaders, business elite, journalists, and other intellectual elite were motivated to participate in the Saemaul Leaders Training Course. They were trained together from the countryside.

"The Saemaul movement is not intended for farmers alone....nationwide bases. University students and intellectuals should also voluntarily join in, and play the leading role in this movement." (Address at Seoul National University Graduation Ceremony, February 26, 1972)

One of the movement's remarkable effects is the reorientation of government administrators toward inter-ministerial or inter-agency coordination which is an administration prerequisite for the success of change-introducing development projects involved in Saemaul Undong.

“All problems arising within your respective areas of jurisdiction should be tackled under joint responsibility of all government agency concerned, with the city mayor or the county commissioner taking primary responsibility, and with the local tax office, the police station or other related agencies providing whatever assistance or cooperation may be called for... it seems to me things would not have come to a head had the chiefs of responsible local government agencies cooperated with each other more closely. In the future, the local city mayor or county commissioner should take the lead in solving all local problems of importance, after sufficient prior consultation with the heads of related government agencies, and seeking the understanding and cooperation of the local inhabitants. Once the policy is set, the matter should be pushed vigorously under joint responsibility.” (Message to Comparative Administration Conference of City Mayors and County Chiefs, September 17-18, 1971)

3.3.2 Government Support and Assistance

The commitment of the top political leadership and in turn, the reorientation of the system of government to rural development was reflected in all kinds of the governmental assistance and support to rural villages. The extent can be defined in terms of the appropriateness as well as the varieties of services². The government support and assistance to rural development can be analyzed from the perspective of; (i) *structure*, which includes organizational and institutional arrangement within the government system and also particularly a local government support system in terms of functional and structural innovations; (ii) *resources*, made available to rural development, which include

²Kim (1978) puts forth that though the government provides necessary financial and material investment for the projects of this movement, when it comes to the actual process of selection and implementation of specific projects, resources mobilization, and particularly organizational dynamics which are the most essential element of this whole movement, the role of government rapidly fades away.

budgetary and financial support and also manpower development for improving both village and officials' capability; (iii) *output or process*, which covers rural support projects, programs and strategies adopted by the government for development support (Whang 1981:47).

(i) Structure

The planning and management of activities in support of rural development requires organizational and institutional reform as a manifested consequence of real commitment by the government. As such, in the central government, the Saemaul Undong Bureau, which is responsible for development of overall strategies and policies regarding the Saemaul Undong, was newly established within the Ministry of Home Affairs. At the provincial level, the Saemaul Planning Division was newly established in the provincial government to support and guide the activities of local governments at the county level. A deputy County Chief was newly appointed to every county office with the sole responsibility of managing specific support and assistance to Saemaul Undong. An administrative unit was also added within each township to assume duties for the planning and guidance of Saemaul projects in rural villages within its jurisdictional boundary.

In addition to the setting of line organization, the government also made special arrangements for the planning and coordination of Saemaul projects. These included (a) the Saemaul Central Consultative Council, chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs and several vice ministers and heads of national federations of cooperatives and other agencies related to rural development; (b) the Saemaul Provincial Consultative Council, chaired by the governor, and whose members include university professors and heads of regional offices of the central ministries; (c) the Saemaul County Consultative Council, chaired by the County Chief and members of relevant officers; (d) the Saemaul Township Promotion Committee, chaired by the Myeon Chief and whose members include Saemaul leaders; and finally (e) the Village Development Committee, chaired by the Saemaul Leaders and five members selected from among the villagers. These series of councils and committees from among the central level down to the village level was set up with a

view to facilitating between the ministries and the agencies concerned with rural development and to providing diversified perspectives for solid planning of Saemaul projects. Here it is to be noted that, the Saemaul leaders participate as members in both county and township-level councils, to positively represent their interest and ideas³. They played a role of facilitators.


The improvement of local government support also seems to be essential requirement for the successful implementation of Saemaul projects. In fact, the organizational reform of local governments becomes more conducive to the performance of development support administration at the community level. Although the coordination and integration of resources and inputs for rural development is primarily a role of community leadership, the package of government support is one which is coordinated between different agencies of government and integrated into the total scheme of village development. The coordinating effort of local government makes avoidable the unnecessary duplication and conflicts in the village level activities and helps in providing services complementary to each other.

One of the significant strategies of the Saemaul Undong was the pooling of resources from the delivery organizations to provide efficient services in the wide range of activities undertaken in the communities. To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the project, officials of local governments frequently met with community leaders, and sometimes participated in the community meetings. This leads to increased managerial confidence of the government delivery services. The strong commitment of high credibility of local government was arranged so that each government official was assigned responsibility for the efficient implementation of the project. Hence each local official as a changing agent frequently visited the assigned villages to identify problems, to monitor progress of the project, to deliver proper services and to encourage villagers. The authority provided training and technical services to accelerate its efficiency.

³ Moore (1984), "The creation of Saemaul units within the existing administrative structure, but partially separated from it, appears to have been part of a broader drive to turn Saemaul into a kind of mass political party supporting the Park administration. There is certainly political space for such a party in Korea, especially in the rural areas".

Figure 3.1 describes the structure of interaction among national government, local government, and rural people in the process of the Saemaul Undong (Choe 2005:7).

Figure 3.1 Structure of Interaction among National Government, Local Government and People



The managerial capability of local government is another dimension of the development of supporting the administration. The managerial competence in senior officials in terms of planning of service delivery, monitoring of work performance, communication and coordination and other techniques was improved through the extensive management training throughout the 1960's and 1970's. Most importantly, the managerial and technical competence of the local government system tends to bring about a synergetic effect as the government officials at the county office are highly motivated and committed to the achievement of certain results in rural transformation.

(ii) Resources

Although, it is commonly held that Saemaul Undong has been implemented with the people's strong motivation, enthusiasm, participation and contribution in kind, one of the significant inputs is undoubtedly a package of government support and assistance. The extent of actual commitment of government in terms of assistance and support is explicitly manifested in the allocation of budgetary resources.

Table 3.2, shows that financial support for the Saemaul projects from both central and local governments increased at a higher rate than the development expenditures of the general government sectors. The expenditure of the general government allocated to national economic development increased by about 7.4 times during the 1971-1978, while the government budget in support of Saemaul projects increased by 82 times during the same period. This indeed indicates that the government made a very favorable allocation of its financial resources toward rural development. During 1978, government support to Saemaul Undong reached the scale of 338 billion won which was equivalent to 38 % development expenditure of the General Government Sector Budget (Whang 1981). The material as well as technical supports of the government was clearly effective in inducing the voluntary contribution of idle labor, materials, and lend small amounts of cash for rural village development projects. Thus a multiplying effect was brought about by the government assistance.

Another significant input supporting Saemaul Undong in Korea was the consistent and extensive arrangements for training both private and government manpower resources. The government has organized a Saemaul Leaders Training Centre at the central level and similar institutes in each province. The Saemaul training course was designed especially for changing values and the world outlook of Saemaul Leaders.

Table 3.2
Government Support /Expenditures for the Saemaul Undong
Unit: billion won

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Development Expenditure of Central Government*</i> | <i>Expenditures for Saemaul Projects**</i> |
|-------------|---|--|
| 1971 | 111.7(21.4) | 4.1(n.a) |
| 1972 | 240.2(36.2) | 3.6(-12.7) |
| 1973 | 176.8(-26.4) | 17.1(378.4) |
| 1974 | 301.1(70.3) | 45.5(165.4) |
| 1975 | 522.3(73.5) | 165.3(263.4) |
| 1976 | 669.5(28.2) | 165.1(-0.1) |
| 1977 | 729.9(9.0) | 246.0(49.0) |
| 1978 | 873.0(19.6) | 338.4(37.7) |

Numbers in parentheses indicate increased percentage from the previous year.

Source: * Economic Planning Board, *Major Economic Indicators*, 1978, pp. 90-91

** Ministry of Home Affairs, *Saemaul Undong*, 1978

(iii) Output or process

Strategies for efficient support towards self-reliant development of rural villages could be analyzed in terms of standards of operation in rural support administration, methods, and criteria for the allocation of available resources, and technology related to stimulation and inducement.

As already mentioned in the earlier chapter, the government's classification of rural villages into three categories on the basis of the degree of development at the initial stage of Saemaul Undong; underdeveloped, developing and developed villages provided a psychological basis for competition between villages in promoting their villages' improvement. It also provided a criterion by which government could apply different package of support and assistance to villages depending on their level of development. In

this respect, it should be noted that the priority of government support is given to more developed villages rather than less developed ones. This principle of the “better village the first support” became an effective stimulator of people’s motivation to better achievement in Saemaul projects.

Another point to be made is the strategic shift of priority in supporting projects. During the period of 1970-1973, the priority of government commitment was given to the area of improvement in rural infrastructure, namely to environmental improvement projects such as the construction of small bridges, a village entrance road, farm roads, electrification, sanitary water supply, etc. However, since 1974 priority was shifted to the income-boosting projects of farmers including special crops, livestock, and marketing facilities. The priority of government support to improvements in rural infrastructures had a strategic implication in view of the fact that people’s participation in cooperative action for rural infrastructures would bring about tangible and visible results immediately after their contribution. Such experimentation especially at the initial stage had enhanced a sense of participation and confidence. It also made rural people recognize the values of self-help, diligence, cooperation and participation.

In connection with the firm commitment of government to rural development, specific policies and program were also adopted. One of the significant policies is the high-rice-price policies which have been predominant during the 1970s. The policy has boosted farmers’ incomes substantially. The government commitment was also manifested in the heavy investment in research and development in the agricultural sector, particularly the development of High Yielding Varieties (HYV). Indeed, the development as well as nationwide distribution of HYV of rice eventually made Korea self-sufficient in rice, thereby, reinforcing the process of change in rural economy.

The government also provided some follow-up measures to the innovation process. For example, the Saemaul Technical Service Corps was organized with participation by scientists in various fields, such as agriculture, food processing, cottage factories, engineering, health, etc.

3.4 Implication of the Government's Commitment

Needless to say, as rural development implies profound changes in major policy aspects of rural villages, top political leadership commitment to the Saemaul Undong is of an essential importance to its success. In fact, actual commitment of top political leadership tends to affect resources allocation as well as the legal/administrative framework in favour of the rural sector. The support and commitment of top political leadership also influenced the ruling elite to form favourable attitudes toward rural development and to commit themselves to the Saemaul Undong. The societal support tends to reinforce the values and ideas of rural development. The strong commitment of the top political leadership to the success of Saemaul Undong tends to remove bureaucratic inertia which could be obstacles to the efficient coordination and to the administrative innovations at the local level.

It is also found that government has a synergetic effect on rural development. The deliberate, consistent and solid package of government support and commitment tends to have multiple impacts on rural innovation. An adequate level of government assistance and support to villages tends to stimulate a positive response from rural people's view of their greater contributions and their extensive participation. Nevertheless, one should note that the universal application of government support and stimulation tends to be accompanied by undesirable consequences because of the lack of flexibility to fit into the village specific situations.

In view of the mobilization and allocation of all types of resources in favour of the rural sector, and the success of the Saemaul Undong, one can firmly say that change-introducing projects require commitment of the top political leadership. However, it is nevertheless, felt that without the positive participation of people in the decision-making process and their active cooperation in the project implementation, the government support alone would not bring about any effective results in rural development, as seen in Saemaul Undong. The mutual stimulation between government machinery and rural people is the key to the Saemaul Undong's success. That is to say, Saemaul Undong can be viewed both as a part of the government (if not during certain period) as well as a discrete force in its own right.

Chapter Four

Relevance of Saemaul Undong for Indian Rural Development

4.1 Introduction

Rural development has always been an important issue in all discussions pertaining to economic development, especially of developing countries, throughout the world. In the developing countries, rural mass comprises a substantial majority of the population. Although millions of rural people have escaped poverty as a result of rural development in many Asian countries, a large majority of the rural people continue to suffer from persistent poverty. The socio-economic disparities between rural and urban areas are widening and creating tremendous pressure on the social and economic fabric of many developing Asian economies. These factors, among many others, tend to highlight the importance of rural development. The policy makers in most developing economies recognize this importance and have been implementing programs and measures to achieve rural development objectives. While some of these countries have achieved impressive results, others have failed to make a significant impression in the problem of persistent rural underdevelopment.

According to the survey conducted by the United Nations, many nations carried out regional community development projects under the name of "rural community development" or some similar name. Although their applications of the projects principles are very similar, the form, the contents and motivational techniques differ according to differences in the goals and policies of each nation (Kim 1981:576). The community development projects of each nation not only differ according to social and economical conditions, but are also operated and conducted differently under various institutional arrangements. In general, newly developing nations or developing nations have national development plans and policies for rapid development through efficient use of their resources. It is frequently noticed in underdeveloped nations that this community development projects is driven forward by the government rather than through the self - help efforts and positive participation of the people.

The accent of development has suggested that the newly emerging nations must move through a series of stages on their way toward modernization. Usually leaders realize that to achieve economic goals more quickly, large numbers of people, especially in the rural areas, have to be modernized. However, the principal problems in using democratic methods in community development is that the central government puts pressure on village-level workers to achieve national goals within a given time period. When the program is highly formalized, the focus sometimes tends to be upon the program rather upon what is brought about by the people involved in the program. These statements implies that many community development programs are national in scope and are geared to over-all government plans for improving living and economic conditions.

Hence, the purpose of this chapter to highlight the structural problems of Indian rural development, analyze the factors responsible for the success of Saemaul Undong and examine its extent of transferability and thereby draw out lessons for Indian rural development.

4.2 Indian Rural Development

“India lives in its villages” - Mahatma Gandhi

Literally and from the social, economic and political perspectives, the statement is valid even today. The rural economy, as much as urban economy, is an integrated part of the overall Indian economy. Any talk of overall development without rural development, particularly in a country where about three-quarters of people below the poverty line reside in rural areas, is flawed. Rural development which is concerned with economic growth and social justice, improvement in the living standard of the rural people by providing adequate and quality social services and minimum basic needs becomes essential.

Poverty, particularly rural poverty, has been one of the enduring policy challenges in India. Surely the most important objective of the reforms process would have been to make a significant dent on rural poverty; a program of accelerated growth must draw its

rationale. These include expenditure on food, housing, health and education. In the Indian context, another important rationale is to meet expenses for a variety of social obligations and rituals.

4.2.1 Pre-Independence Rural India

Before independence the picture of India could have been seen in the wrinkled faces, flushed cheeks, concavo bellies, folded hands in praying posture and wet eyes of its rural mass residing in the wide spread rural sector and constituting more than 70 % of India's total population. The real India resided in their deprivation, poverty, starvation, helplessness, wretchedness and mass unemployment. Some sentimental citizens, having realized this situation of their nation, stepped on the way of freedom movement since the foreign rule was taken as the sole causal factor of that pitiful state of India. The movement went on advancing and ultimately in 1947, India became independent, free to decide its own course of development.

4.2.2 Rural India after Independence

India has been a welfare state ever since her Independence and the primary objective of all governmental endeavors has been the welfare of its millions. Planning has been one of the pillars of the Indian policy since independence and the country's strength is derived from the achievement of planning. The policies and programmes have been designed with the aim of alleviation of rural poverty which has been one of the primary objectives of planned development in India. It was realized that a sustainable strategy of poverty alleviation has to be based on increasing the productive employment opportunities in the process of growth itself. Elimination of poverty, ignorance, diseases and inequality of opportunities and providing a better and higher quality of life were the basic premises upon which all the plans and blue-prints of development were built.

As rural development implies both the economic betterment of people as well as greater social transformation, increased participation of people in the rural development programmes, decentralization of planning, better enforcement of land reforms and greater

access to credit are envisaged, in order to provide the rural people with better prospects for economic development,.

Initially, the main thrust for development was laid on agriculture industry, communication, education, health and allied sectors but later on it was realized that accelerated development can only be provided if governmental efforts are adequately supplemented by direct and indirect involvement of people at the grass root level. After the independence, Community Development Programme was started in 1952. The community development programme inaugurated on October 2, 1952, was an important landmark in the history of Indian rural development. This programme underwent many changes and was handled by different Ministries¹. However, as it was not attached with the people, it couldn't prove to be a success story. People took it as a burden put on them by the government. No wonder, Gandhi, the father of the nation, in 1946 had aptly remarked that the Indian Independence must begin at the bottom and every village ought to be a Republic or Panchayati having powers.

A. Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru Views' on Rural Development

Indian history during the first half of the 20th century is inconceivable without the two worthy sons of India; Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, who were instrumental in laying the base of a modern Indian state and giving shape to ideas in the realm of education, culture and democracy. As such, to write about one of them in isolation from the other is to distort the realities of the times and to fail to comprehend the country's recent history.

¹ In October 1974, the Department of Rural Development came into existence as a part of Ministry of Food and Agriculture. On 18th August 1979, the Department of Rural Development was elevated to the status of a new Ministry of Rural Reconstruction. That Ministry was renamed as Ministry of Rural Development on 23rd January 1982. In January 1985, the Ministry of Rural Development was again converted into a Department under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development which was later rechristened as Ministry of Agriculture in September 1985. On July 5, 1991 the Department was upgraded as Ministry of Rural Development. Another Department viz. Department of Wasteland Development was created under this Ministry on 2nd July 1992. In March 1995, the Ministry was renamed as the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment with three departments namely Department of Rural Employment and Poverty Alleviation, Rural Development and Wasteland Development. Again, in 1999 Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment was renamed as Ministry of Rural Development. "*Ministry of Rural Development*"(Government of India)

Gandhi described self-reliance as one of the essential ingredients of the individual's character. Jawaharlal Nehru made self-reliance the pivot around which the entire programme of community development revolved. The economic policies² of Jawaharlal Nehru have been subject to much controversy in the past few decades. However, it is important to place Nehru's economic policies in context for a proper appreciation of his policies. Nehru's commitment to the cause of India's development remains unquestioned, and it is no doubt that much of his plans and speculations were jeopardized by the unexpected partition that came along with the independence of India, which brought about an unprecedented fissure in the economic resources of the Indian mainland.

Though, the economic policies of Nehru are often blamed for the poor economy of India in the subsequent years, it cannot be denied that his decisions were necessitated by the needs of the times. Nehru's policy towards the rural economy of India was significant. Nehru felt for the rural self-development of India very strongly. He tried to boost India's cottage industries. Much on the lines of Gandhi, Nehru believed that the rural and cottage industries of India played a major role in the economic fabric of the country. But most of his cottage industry development programs were meant as a part of community development. He was also of the belief that small scale industries and cottage industries were effective solutions to the massive employment problems that remained a perpetual issue of concern throughout his tenure.

On the other hand, Gandhi's dream has been translated into reality with the introduction of the three-tier Panchayati Raj system to ensure people's participation in rural reconstruction. Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of the Nation once stated, "*Independence must be at the bottom ... it follows, therefore, that every village has to be self-*

² The most distinctive, and often debated feature of Nehru's economic policies, was the high level of state and central control that was exercised on the industrial and business sectors of the country. Nehru emphasized that the state would control almost all key areas of the country's economy, either centrally or on a state-wise basis. His Socialist emphasis on state control somehow seemed to undermine his stress on industrial policies. The rigorous state laws and License rules put a great degree of restraint on the free execution of industrial policies. Even the farmers, along with the business personnel, found themselves to be at the receiving end of rigorous state control policies and high taxation. Poverty and unemployment were widespread throughout Nehru's governance.

sustained and capable of managing its affairs...” As such, April 23rd, 1993 holds an important landmark in the history of Panchayat Raj in India as on this day, the institution of Panchayati Raj was accorded constitutional status through the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992. Indian Panchayat Raj holds a distinctive stature and is a unique feature of the Indian Political system and adds to while talking on Facts about India. The Panchayati System is presided over by five eldest and most experienced and wise people of the village. The Panchayat Raj is more stringently followed in the villages of India. The members of the Panchayat Raj are endowed with the responsibility of looking in to and settling over the matter on any disputes between an individual and the whole village on a mutual basis.

Though an ancient method of operating is followed by the Panchayat Raj, Mahatma Gandhi often recommended the Indian Administration to follow the same methodologies to execute administrative operation even in the modern age. Mahatma Gandhi was the first to advocate the decentralized government system to empower the village authorities to move on for betterment in days to come. He also was of the view that the Panchayati System should be made the basis of any sort of administration functions to be carried on in Modern India (Rajvanshi 2007).

Keeping in view the needs and aspirations of the local people, Panchayati Raj Institutions have been involved in the programme implementation and these institutions constitute the core of decentralized development of planning and its implementations. The Government of India has come up with new and reformative forms to lay more power to the Panchayat Raj. The government has taken steps to decentralize several operations at the administrative level and in a way has empowered the Panchayat System in the villages of India. In the 1950s and 60s, the Indian Government enacted the law which supports the establishment of Panchayat Raj in various constituents of the state. Later in the year 1992, the law was officially recognized as per the 73rd amendment made in the Indian Constitution. This amendment speaks in support of power decentralization and empowering the Panchayat with several responsibilities. The decentralization of power as is said will definitely help in the betterment of the village both economically and socially

if all the twenty-nine subjects enlisted in the eleventh schedule of the Indian constitution is executed properly.

The Panchayat of a village receive funds from three main sources, which are funds for implementation of centrally-sponsored schemes, local body grants under and as recommended by the Central Finance Commission and funds from the state governments as per the recommendations of the State Finance Commissions.

Panchayat System in India also refers to a council of elected members, who take decisions on issues which are important for the village social. A panchayat is thus a body of elected representatives in the village. The panchayat acts as a means of expression between the local government and the people. In such a system each villager can voice his opinion in the governance of his village. With Panchayat included in the constitution of the Government of India, the system serves as a backbone in the present society at present (Palanithurai 2006).

Within the broad framework of policy, the Indian Government has also undertaken a wide variety of programs in agriculture to build up the physical and information infrastructures necessary for sustained development. There are programs for the betterment of India's rural population; research, education, and extension programs; irrigation development schemes; plans to increase the supply of agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides; plans to change the institutional framework of land ownership; plans to improve agricultural financing; better marketing techniques; and plans to improve technology. These programs are administered, financed, and run by the central government and by the state governments, and both levels encourage private-sector development through direct or indirect programs. However, further success has been limited by the lack of efficient administrative mechanisms, the limitation of resources, the magnitude of the task, and the lack of willingness to change the status quo. Many of the program results appear better on paper than the actual results in the field because of lack of implementation and poor monitoring. An ideal approach should

include the government, Panchayati and key village personals, NGOs and private companies (Rajvanshi 2007:19).

B. Performance of India's Planned Economic Development

India has started its planned economic development since 1951, having in its hands the experience, a wide literature of well proved strategies and variegated plans pertaining to, used by and created or formulated by the well developed western economies, apart from available natural resources. However India seems to have been over enthusiastic and over ambitious on account of having the ready and well proved strategies sought from the western world for combating the problem of development. Therefore, instead of starting from the very beginning and covering the whole path India, being enticed and allured by the surprisingly fascinating fruits of industrialization, started its efforts but having longed, for being developed and grabbing fruits thereof in a haste, thus, lost sequences in its development path. The planned economic development ignored agriculture that was the spine of the economy. Thereby, agricultural development in India lagged far behind the level required for feeding industrialization up to the mark. Agriculture based small and cottage industries became shattered and the villages became ruined. This raised a huge bulk of unemployed people in the widely spread rural sector. The unemployed persons started migrating to the urban areas in search of job. The urban development and industrialization there had no sufficient level to absorb the whole migrating mass and to provide them proper urban life facilities. As a result, thereof a mushroom growth of slums came about fast which eventually turned into big slum spots in cities and towns within a no longer period of 20 or 25 years. This hampered urban growth and urban life. On the other hand, in rural areas there emerged acute shortage of energetic workforce, service centre, infrastructure, intellectuals etc. On the whole, it hampered the rural development whereby agricultural development and rural life remained slang lower. That is why, even having traveled a long path of planned economic development, the state of affairs of rural India still remains almost the same as it was before planning. There is a big gulf between urban and rural people regarding wealth, wage, education and income. Moreover, the rural-urban migration, due to the pitiable state of affairs in rural areas,

resulted to unchecked urban growth. Thus, instead of overall development, an unbalanced and unfair development of the economy became inevitable.

That “Poverty is a multi dimensional problem” is a well-known cliché. The problems of poverty and impoverishment in Indian rural society is varied and multi faceted. In the Indian case, this problem is more important than probably anywhere else because of the vast numbers of people who are poor and the fact that poverty in India has been so well entrenched for so long. A number of studies have deliberated on the problem of designing an appropriate antipoverty strategy for India. Among many, an important contributory reason are the total lack of agricultural development under foreign rule, poor communication, roads and other infrastructure development in villages, lack of education and health facilities, and the destruction of the thriving Indian cottage industries on account of competition from the cheap machine made goods imported under British rule.

4.3 Summing up of a Needed Policy Reform

Much work needs to be done to push forward the reforms process - perhaps the most important of these is for the economic reforms begun at the central level to infiltrate to the level of individual states. To function well, public sector undertakings must have more autonomy. Further, much needs to be done to improve the efficiency of capital and labor markets so that resources can be accumulated more efficiently and factor markets can function more smoothly. India's infrastructure development – particularly roads, ports and electricity - is urgent if she is to grow fast. Public funds are scarce and developing a legal and industrial framework for the involvement of the private sector in such development is a matter of priority. To stimulate rural development and lower rural poverty on an emergent basis, public investment should be redirected toward the rural sector and well targeted in terms of regions – those with high poverty and rain fed areas– as well as people – the landless and small farmers. Rural, non-agricultural development is crucial for poverty reduction. Infrastructural investment would be crucial for this. Thus pressures for additional public investment continue. There is a serious paucity of public resources unless tax/GDP ratios and public savings pick up. There is ample scope for both in India. There is certainly a need for private investment but the private sector would not

be interested in the poorest areas of India without substantial inducement. Reform of price policy with regard to inputs is necessary to ensure that such investment is not mistreated. Deep structural and financial reforms of the state electricity boards are well overdue.

The whole length of the above discussion makes amply clear that incompatibility of the development process holds responsible for slackness in rural development in India. Therefore, to accelerate rural development the development process should be made compatible by rectifying the conceptual mistake in the development move and the high population growth should be checked by making the family planning programme strong and effective. As far as the question of rectification of mistake in development move is concerned, the time of making the mistake good by starting afresh has gone far back. Therefore, any rural policies should better take a drastic turn to re-fix priorities, reformulate strategies, re-select programmes and reconstruct plans so as to make the developmental move rural oriented, congenial to micro-level needs of the people, akin to the over all development and compatible to the extenuation of economic disparities. This will bring about fast agricultural development, uplift of village life and revival of village industries, artistry and handicraft to check the rural-urban migration.

No doubt, villages are in a state of neglect and under-development, with impoverished people, as a result of past legacies and defects in our planning process and investment pattern. But the potential in rural India is immense. What if every village in the country is provided with basic amenities, like drinking water, electricity, health care, educational transport, communication and other facilities, with only a smaller population of the village engaged in agriculture and the remaining in other gainful occupations? When this happens India will turn into mighty country. The purchasing power of the rural population throwing enormous demand for goods and services will boost the national economy tremendously.

4.4 The Extent of Transferability of Saemaul Undong

To what extent, is the Saemaul Undong transferable to other developing countries for rural development? This question begs two sub-questions: (a) to what extent did the Saemaul Undong contribute to rural as well as national development in Korea? (b) What are the factors and conditions which have been helpful to the success of the Saemaul Undong?

4.4.1 Performance and Impact of the Saemaul Undong

The first inquiry is related to the analysis of various impacts of the Saemaul Undong upon rural change and development in Korea during the 1970s. The analysis should deal with the extent to which Saemaul Undong has contributed to capital formation in the rural sector in the form of physical infrastructures, the improvement in rural employment and economy, changes in values and attitudes of rural people, the fostering of change agents, the promotion of participatory organization, and broadly the rural development and the nation building process in Korea.

The evaluation of the Saemaul Undong has been so far attempted by several other studies. They all conclude that the Saemaul Undong has made positive contributions to self-reliant rural development in Korea. The impact of the Saemaul Undong may be elaborated in terms of the following findings:

(a) Performance of Saemaul projects

Saemaul Undong has been widely expanded in terms of numbers of participating villages, mobilized manpower, and the amount of the total investment in the Saemaul projects. During 1978 alone, thirty six thousand villages which mean most rural villages in fact are involved in the Saemaul Undong, for which 634 billion won was mobilized both from rural people and the government. Thus, the government investment in Saemaul Projects has induced a greater mobilization of labor and funds as well as the voluntary participation of the village people in rural development. In other words, the initial contribution of government has had a snow-ball effect so as to bring about an accelerated mobilization of rural resources through self-help effort. During the early stage of the

Saemaul Undong, the investment in physical infrastructure was emphasized. However, the changing pattern of fund allocation shows that since 1975 the emphasis was shifted to projects aimed at increasing rural incomes and more recently, the emphasis on rural housing projects has also increased.

As a result, significant changes have taken place in various aspects of rural communities such as farm roads, small-scale bridges, agricultural production facilities, including nursery farms, agricultural mechanization, marketing and transportation, cooperative farming, rural housing and rural electrification.

(b) Impact on Farmers' Value System

The continued implementation of the Saemaul Undong has brought about significant changes in rural communities at the individual as well as the organizations levels. It is also found that a considerable part of farmers was considered change-oriented so that they tend to be more positive toward rural innovations and new varieties of rice. Their motivation level tends to be higher than in the early 1970s. Solidarity and cooperation between farmers also tend to be more intensified along with the successful implementation of the Saemaul Undong. The changes in values and perceptions of individual farmers as such seem to be a significant phenomenon in rural communities from the development point of view.

(c) Impact on Organizational Behavior

Organizational changes are reflected both in village leadership and in the participatory behavior of village people. In other words, the Saemaul Undong has contributed to fostering of community-based village leadership which efficiently played the role of development agent in the rural transformation process.

It is also interesting to note that the Saemaul leaders played a significant role in organizing and implement the Saemaul Undong at the village level as initiators, promoters, coordinators, educators, advocators or implementers of Saemaul projects. The

Saemaul Undong eventually contributed to the identification and fostered the village leaders as a source of self-reliant development in rural communities.

The Saemaul Undong also promoted a participatory pattern of interaction between village members with respect to decision-making, planning and implementation of Saemaul projects. Their positive participation in the decision-making process at the village level led them to close cooperation in the implementation of projects. The people's participation in decision-making has been further extended to the government decision-making at the township, county and provincial levels with respect to Saemaul Projects. It is also noteworthy that the Saemaul Undong has contributed to the development of "grass-root" democracy in Korean Society.

(d) Impact on the Village Economy

The more successful the Saemaul Undong at the village level, the more rapidly the village economy grows in terms of farm household income. In view of the extent of farm mechanization, the product mix of agricultural crops and the pattern of land utilization, the Saemaul Undong have also introduced change in the structure of agricultural technology in rural village.

(e) Impact on the National Economy

It is true that the Saemaul Undong has been an instrument for the ignition of people's will for rural development from its beginning. Through their self-help effort and voluntarily organizing of Saemaul Projects, rural people have mobilized their resources and energy to the maximum extent possible for increase in their income.

The gap between farm household income and urban laborer's household income has decreased since the inception of Saemaul Undong. One of the important economic achievements of the Saemaul Undong is the promotion of capital formation and the increase in employment opportunities in rural sector. It is also remarkable that technical learning classes as part of vocational training activities were organized by the Saemaul

Undong with a view to improving villagers' employment opportunities in the industrial sector.

The Saemaul Undong has, indeed, made the rural economy an integral part of the national economy and enabled it to perform its strategic role in the process of economic and social development. This contrasts to the situation before the Saemaul Undong was initiated, when the rural economy was viewed as a burden on the national economy in its process of industrial development.

4.4.2 Factors for the success of Saemaul Undong

As known well, the Saemaul Undong has been regarded as a successful community development movement and thereby many developing countries has studied its ways and key factors to success for applying their own cases. What then are the factors and conditions which are conducive to the sources of the Saemaul Undong? They can be grouped into three broad categories: (a) organizing strategies of the Saemaul Undong, (b) dynamics of political and governments systems, and (c) social and cultural conditions of rural communities in Korea.

A. Organizing Strategies of the Saemaul Undong

It is noteworthy that the Saemaul Undong was organized without an academic research base or theoretical references. The strategies and program content of the Saemaul Undong have been adapted to fit Korean society and culture through the continued process of trial and error. Some successful implementation rather provided a realistic base for the nationwide application of the Saemaul Undong.

(a) Village as a Unit of Community Action

The rural village was chosen as a strategic unit of community action in the Saemaul Undong in Korea. It has the unit primarily responsible for planning, organizing and implementing various kinds of Saemaul projects and activities during the 1970s. Hence, the rural village became the focus for coordination and management of all types of government support and assistance. The rural village was identified as a basic unit of

rural action in Korea because it was viewed as conducive to the pursuance of traditionally common interests, physically close interaction and cooperative action among villages.

As rural development involves far-reaching change in values and perceptions of village people, it cannot be achieved solely through pursuing calculated economic rationality. Therefore, the Korean approach was based rather on managerial criteria in terms of conduciveness to the perceptual and cooperation among community people, and the exercise of community-based leadership.

The identification of the rural village as the unit for community action in the initial stage of rural development in Korea seemed appropriate. However, in the later stage, when the village economy has grown and has more and stronger linkages to the external systems through arrangements of marketing, communication and transportation and also when the community people recognize the desirability of certain visible and invisible changes, it might be possible to expand the unit of rural community up to a more economically viable size such as the township or county.

(b) Integrated Objectives of Rural Development

One of the major objectives of the Saemaul Undong is to change farmers' values and perception toward developmental values such as self-help, diligence, and cooperation. Another objective is to introduce changes in community organization toward the more active participation of rural villages and the fostering of community-based leadership. The third objective is to improve rural infrastructures and the village economy by undertaking Saemaul projects. These three objectives of the Saemaul Undong aiming at individual, organizational, and environmental changes of rural village are well integrated into the overall strategies of rural development in Korea and are indeed well integrated into the total package of the Saemaul Undong system.

(c) Strategic choice of development projects

The Saemaul Undong is also characterized by a variety of development projects planned and implemented at the village level. It should be noted that the priority at the village

level was given to physical infrastructures in the initial period of the Saemaul Undong. The benefits of such projects completed by their cooperation and self-help efforts could then be immediately identifiable because they were visible and tangible. Therefore, the implementation of these projects tended to reinforce cooperative attitudes, a self-help spirit and motivation. Thus, the selection of physical infrastructure projects is viewed as strategic in the Korean context, especially at the early stage of its rural development.

However, at the latter stage, especially since 1975s, the emphasis has been placed more on income-boosting projects. This is because the small-scale projects for physical infrastructures had been most completed and rural people were becoming more interested in cooperating to improve their incomes and economic pay-offs. Thus, the selection of development projects should be realistic enough to meet the basic and felt needs of rural people so as to motivate their cooperation, self-help and participation.

(d) Saemaul Leadership Training for Resource Mobilization

Rural people, community-based leadership and government supports are identified as three major resources which have been mobilized to the fullest extent throughout the Saemaul Undong during the 1970s. The wise utilization of people's zeal and energy through their maximum participation could be realized through a proper mode of organization in rural village. The Saemaul leaders play important roles of introducing rural innovations and also manage the role in planning and in implementation of the community projects. The incorporation of women leaders in the village leadership made possible the utilization of their talents for community action programs within the given socio-structural and cultural context.

For, the optimum and coordinated use of these resources, leadership training was emphasized as a major part of Saemaul Undong. The Korean approach to rural development training is unique in view of its objectives, participant mix, curricula, training methods and eventual impact. The main thrust of Saemaul training was value change of village leaders, men and women, assuming that they will eventually introduce changes in farmers' values and attitudes. The mixture of participants provided different

sectoral elite with a common conceptual framework of the Saemaul Undong by which the nationwide mobilization of resources could be realized. It also induced the participants to make a collective commitment to the achievement of rural Saemaul projects. The training program has also facilitated the mutual communication and coordination between different policies and programs. Of utmost importance is that the training course enabled political and urban elites to understand in real terms the rural situation and its development needs.

B. Dynamics of Political and Government Systems

Political and government system also played important roles in stimulating rural development at the local level. Their roles are reflected in the incentive measures, government support and local administration in particular, and in the political leadership commitment.

As rural development implies profound changes in major aspects of rural villages, top leadership commitment the Saemaul Undong is of essential importance to its success. The strong commitment of the top political leadership, sometimes in the form of Presidential pressure on local government (Brandt 1977), has been reflected in the favourable allocation of resources to rural sector and the necessary changes in legal as well as administrative frameworks.

The President also expressed his great concern about rural development by personally visiting rural villages. His frequent field visits also served as a mechanism for identification of problems and for providing opportunities to make specific instructions and guidelines for program design as well as for monitoring program performance.

The functions of the local government which were the maintenance of law and order then became reoriented toward rural development. Local governments tend to be easily accessible to the community people. While encouraging village leaders to positively participate in the process of government policy-making, they became more concerned with the community needs and try to efficiently deliver their best services to rural people.

In delivery of their services, the coordination and integration of various kinds of development projects with respect to required to required developments inputs at the village level are promoted primarily by county-level local officials. The package of government support also tends to fit into the total scheme of village development activities so as to provide supplementary inputs.

Another element conducive to the developmental role of local government in the Saemaul Undong is the improvement in the mutual relationship between government officials and community people. A perceptual change toward inter-dependence as well as an attitudinal change toward cooperation and collaboration between officials and people is one of the critical indicators of improvement in the local support system.

The utmost importance of local government support to the rural community is related to the managerial capability of local government in delivery of required services and assistance. The strong commitment of the local government is also reflected in arrangement for special assignment of local officials, by which each staff member is assigned to take responsibility for efficient support for, and monitoring of, the implementation of Saemaul projects at the village level.

Most importantly, the principle of “better village the first support” became an effective stimulator of people’s motivation to better achievement in Saemaul projects. The competitive mood between neighboring villagers contributed substantially to the success of the Saemaul Undong at the early stage, even though the psychology of excess competition tended to be an obstacle to the implementation of inter-village Saemaul project which have been recently encouraged as a new thrust of Saemaul Undong.

C. Social Transformation in Rural Communities

Another set of reasons for the success of the Saemaul Undong is related to some significant social changes which have taken place in Korea since the liberation of the country from Japanese rule after World War II. They include changes generated and

affected by a series of major events: land reform, a massive educational drive, the Korean War of 1950-53 and industrial development in the 1960s.

The successful implementation of the land reform during the 1949-1953 had made significant impact on rural communities. The land reform promoted egalitarianism in rural communities in terms of land ownership and the disappearance of class consciousness between landlords and tenants of the past.

The Korean War which brought serious damage to Korean society and the economy led to the enormous expansion of the Korean armed forces. It had an important effect on socialization as many of the young men were exposed to a sense of strong national and ideological identity. As most farmers in fact served in the army as part of their national duty, their decision-making patterns, and mode of participation in projects implementation under the village leadership tend to be adopted from the military sub-culture. The basic technical training and the access of modernity during their military service indeed influenced farmers' perception and attitude toward cooperation, work ethic and participatory behavior.

The successful implementation of the First and Second Five-Year Economic Development Plans (1962-1971), facilitated the rapid economic growth and accelerated the industrialization process in Korea. In accordance with the rapid growth, the central government budget had rapidly increased. By the "trickle down" effect of the rapid growth of the industrial sector, a certain amount of the government energy accumulated during the 1960s could be generously reallocated in favor of the rural sector during the 1970s. The innovation in rice varieties contributed to a perceptual change of farmers with respect to the extension service of the government and thus enhanced the credibility of the government.

It goes on without saying that the donation of cement and steel to all the villages for the ignition of the Saemaul Undong at the beginning was possible in the 1970s because government resources had become relatively affluent. In other words, the rapid

industrialization in the 1960s made the government generous and/or capable of making a favorable allocation of budgetary resources to the rural sector.

From the above discussion, it is clear that the Saemaul Undong has contributed considerably to rural development during the 1970s. An integrated process of significant changes in values and attitudes of individual farmers, community organizations, the rural infrastructures and village economies provided a firm basis for self-reliant development in the rural sector. It is also clear that there are various factors and conditions which were conducive to the success of the Saemaul Undong. They include strategic aspects of the Saemaul Undong itself, government policies and supporting mechanism, and socio-cultural conditions provided by the preceding social change. It is in this sense that the extent of transferability of the Saemaul Undong as a rural development model seems to be a subject of academic inquiry.

4.5 Lessons from the experience of Saemaul Undong

The Saemaul Undong has been understood internationally as unique and very successful program and approach. No program of any other developing country has mobilized so much social, administrative and popular support, or brought about such a dramatic impact on community development and national integration as the Saemaul Undong of Korea. At this point, it is desirable to draw several lessons from the experience of the Saemaul Undong.

First, one of the factors to be pointed out is the package of government interventions and innovations. Government support for the Saemaul Undong was one of the most important factors of success. Some of them are as follows; the development of community organizations for greater people's participation, spiritual innovation for a self-help movement, people's motivation and commitment, facilitation of developmental roles of financial and other rural institutions, and nationwide mobilization of resources and support. Strong government interventions and support were a crucial factor of the success of the Saemaul Undong in the early stage.

Second, a particular attention should be given to the program of spiritual enlightenment which was in line with the human resource development endeavor through training and education. The so-called Saemaul Education may be considered one of the distinguished and unique features of the Saemaul Undong approach. It provided rural residents with not only basic and fundamental spiritual development, but also various technical knowledge and skills related to farming. Saemaul Education infused rural people with the development motivation and will, leading ultimately to changes in values, attitudes, and behaviors, conducive to fully active participation in Saemaul Undong.

Third, the Saemaul Undong has the characteristic of cooperative efforts for joint development and joint progress. It provided a ground for people to look for strong ties with other villagers under the concept of “we,” instead of identifying themselves only as individual self. This attitude spread to the point where people would seek better living together at the community level. Although people’s participation at the initial stage was largely by mobilization and enforcement through administrative channels of the government, it was evolved to the voluntary one as people realized the effect of the Saemaul Undong. For example, after the government encouraged the villagers to work together in the Foundation Building stage, much higher degree of cooperation and active participation of all the villagers were possible in carrying out income-generating activities in the self-help development stage and later.

Fourth, the step-by-step approach is considered one of the major reasons for the success of the Saemaul Undong. Many government-sponsored development projects failed in other developing countries, because the villagers were asked to do “too much- too fast”.

In sum, the Saemaul Undong has been started with tangible and visible projects at the early stage and continues to emphasize the income generating projects. The approach manifests that the tangible material improvement and economic pay-offs must be obtained to motivate people’s desire to change. Additionally it attempts simultaneously to change people’s behavior attitude change toward shared values for community development. Above all, Korea's experience does not provide an example of “quick fix”

policy packages, but of a long history of relatively consistent, stable, and sensible macroeconomic policies (Collins 1990). At the same time, Korea's history is not completely devoid of policy mistakes. For example, the 1973-79 "Big Push" to develop heavy industry is widely recognized as having contributed to a real appreciation and loss of competitiveness and to distorting allocation of credit and other resources. It is also clear that the poor are poor only because they have no assets like land, livestock, fish ponds or skills for working in the secondary or tertiary sectors. They are often also illiterate or semi-literate and have to survive on daily wages. As Bina Agarwal (1994) points out, even a small plot of one's own helps women to escape extreme poverty and deprivation; the basic approach to poverty eradication has to be asset building and human development.

In most developing countries, the strategies for integrated rural development tend to be concerned little with internalized values and attitudes of rural people as an integral part of integrated rural development. Most importantly, many developing countries tend to be concerned with a wide range of development projects without making a serious attempt to introduce changes in people and organization. Thus, India which has a very functional decentralized Panchayati Raj system and huge investments being made for rural development creates a lot of scope for diligence, self help and co-operation for village development. A certain changes in the development methodology that calls for community contribution to the project cost, community involvement in project planning and implementation, selection and training of village leaders, rewarding the village leaders and villages for their exemplary community action can help attainment of the goals of rural development effectively. As such, Saemaul Undong spirit is very much a desirable value for a developing nation like India.

Chapter Five

Summary and Conclusion

The dissertation analyses the New Village Community Movement (Saemaul Undong) as an integrated rural development, wherein a strong support from the government and the people, transformed successfully, the tradition bound rural villages into developing areas, and finally, earned an international reputation as a “success model” for community development in the agricultural sector. The Saemaul Undong has proved unique in terms of the modernization of a developing country, as no program of any other developing country has mobilized so much social, administrative and popular support, or brought about such a dramatic impact on community development and national integration as the Saemaul Undong of Korea. However, its two basic characteristic features might seem unusual to people outside Korea. First, unlike development programs about which many theories have been expounded and many pilot schemes which have been adopted, the Saemaul Undong started without a well-defined formal or theoretical framework. And that only recently, after much progress has been made, efforts to theorize the Saemaul Undong have been started. Second, the Saemaul Undong is a pure Korean concept, so the slogans and the terminology used for the program are based upon the Korean way of thinking.

The remarkable transformation of South Korea from one of the poorest countries in the world 40 years ago to the ‘industrialized country’ that it has attained today is rooted in historical developments which predate its current export-oriented, liberal policy regime. Amongst the countries which are held up as role models for India to follow in implementing economic reforms, South Korea's case of an export-oriented, liberal policy regime is being repeatedly emphasized. And reading between the lines, one does discern that the historical background, the social setting, and the nature of political governance, have all been of a type specific to South Korea. Apart from being a unified and independent country with no colonial exploitation for over thousand years until Japan annexed Korea in 1910, the philosophy of Confucianism, as in China, placed great emphasis on education and frugal living. Though Japan extracted rice from Korea, during

its occupation until the end of the Second World War, it encouraged investment in manufacturing and mining enterprises despite the fact that it emphasis to strengthen its own military power. After the country was partitioned in 1945 on Japan's defeat in the war and until 1953 when the Korean War ended, the country was in disarray. The post-war period nevertheless saw many economic measures which laid the foundation for future development. A revolutionary reform was the introduction of a fundamental land reform in 1948: land expropriated from landlords was given to the previous tenants and the size of individual holdings was restricted.

Of course, one of the most formidable challenges of Asia, the world's most populous and crowded continent, is the mobilization of the tradition-bound rural populations into nation building efforts. In order to increase agricultural productivity and to prevent rural societies from lagging too far behind industrial and urban modernization, most Asian nations have undertaken rural development programs marked by varying degrees of imagination and success.

India, during the 1950s, developed the Panchayati Raj (people's rule) system with its emphasis on the "block development officer," and several numbers of programs for rural development were implemented. But one hardly finds a policy of using a competitive system that would cause total involvement of the rural community. Moreover the methodology does not have any role for an inspired leadership; and the funding from the government mostly does not act as a stimulus for the villagers. Unlike Korea, India does not adopt any sustained policy of praising and rewarding villages for their community spirit. In the government driven programs, there is no thoughts of creating a dedicated cadre of community leaders for getting the total involvement of the villagers.

On the other hand, Saemaul Undong started by the South Korean government in the 1970s, caused a frontal attack on poverty. Until then, the Korean society was poverty stricken, with the per capita GNP of 85 dollars. The majority of Korean people did not have enough food. South Korea waited until the early 1970s to launch its version for mobilizing the rural sector into a national development strategy. Considering its results

already achieved, Korea's rural development experience in time may prove one of Asia's most effective programs.

The Korean experiences also suggest that the rural societies experiences changes with the industrialization of national economy. The pattern of rural change largely depends on the social and state structure. Saemaul Movement was the outcome of specifically South Korean state-society relationship: small farm dominance and the autonomous state. Major achievement of the Movement is said to be the elimination of absolute poverty from South Korean rural area. Participant villagers showed enormous voluntarism in the cooperative projects for the improvement of their living standards. Impressed by the success of the Saemaul Undong in the agricultural sector, the government extended the Saemaul Undong substantially into the urban sector beginning in the 1976, in the midst of rapid urbanization accompanied hand in hand with industrialization. Thus, the Saemaul Undong became a nation-wide movement to achieve the good life, mobilizing rural and urban citizens in the benefits of diligence, self-help, and cooperation, balancing the economic growth between industrial and agricultural sectors, and integrating national consensus on development and/or modernization.

That is to say, a society's transformation from a rural/agricultural base to an urban/industrial one accompanies its economy's industrialization. In many models of economic development, the transformation process requires the transfer of labor and savings from agriculture to industry without reducing agricultural output. Reduced agricultural output causes price hikes that lead to a worsening of the urban sector's terms of trade with agriculture. The rural transfer of labor and savings without reducing output can only be realized by the growth of agricultural productivity.

Economic progress in the Republic of Korea has been promoted by some as a model for the development of agrarian economies of the Third World. By providing what has so far proven illusive in other open, market-oriented Asian countries- accelerated rural development with a wide sharing of its material benefits- the Saemaul Undong has become the subject of similar praise. However, before the actual implication of the

movement, there are a number of outstanding questions in need of at least tentative answers. The first concerns the extent to which the Saemaul Undong has been a success, as enthusiasm for the Saemaul movement has tended to lead to a rather uncritical analysis of its achievements.

For instances, the three decades of Saemaul Undong Movement, shows many marvelous successes as well as many errors. In Korea, Saemaul Undong Movement got involved very deeply with government organizations, from the President himself to the low level civil servants. Though, it offered a strong driving force for the Movement in the early stage, but later became the source of negative influences. Moreover, the governmental organizations also tend to prefer strictness of procedures and orders from its nature. Thus, they forced uniform standardized working plans and emphasized showing results rather than long term progress. It turned out that government officials boasted a lot of numbers but villagers had little to take for them. Many plans were taken up only for showing off and frequently turned into destroying environments without consideration of the community under the pretense of modernization.

Most, if not all, of the problems and contradictions embedded in Korea's rural development are highly connected with continuing and overriding national development strategy of export-oriented industrialization. On the positive side this strategy has eliminated surplus labour, and has generated extraordinary economic growth which has 'paid' for rural development. On the other hand, interpreters of Korea's experience disagree widely about the causes of its economic success. Yet they would probably find themselves in broad agreement that it is in industrial policy that the main clues to this success are to be found. It is true that agriculture has grown fairly fast by international standard, but agriculture has grown far less rapidly than industry, and that the agricultural growth is most plausibly interpreted as a response to demand pressures from the fast-growing urban sector.

But, one can overcome and minimize negative impacts of such a kind if one knows and stick to the principle of self-help relying upon the power and resources of community.

Common experience of getting over trial and errors together would turn into a tradition and role as salt of the community. The limitations should not, however, be used to deny the overall conclusions that the vast majority of rural people have materially benefited from the Saemaul Undong and its associated rural development programmes. Rural people eat better, and have better housing and amenities than ever in their history.

As regards to the contradictions between top-down and from below exercise of power, these have been managed in the Korean case in a way which has had many unexpected outcomes. Corruption has apparently been reduced, and some of the socially undesirable activities such as drinking and gambling have at least gone underground if not been completely eliminated in the villages. These events have resulted from a strengthening of both top-down and grassroots levels of organizations. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that the Saemaul Undong has occurred in a vacuum of genuine political participation and open public discourse concerning fundamental issues related to public control over the economy.

Without diminishing the value of the obvious material success that have been the outcome of Korea's national and rural development policies over the past decades, it must be concluded that sectoral policies directed toward agriculture, and self-help activities to modernize rural villages do not separately or together comprise a viable strategy for accelerated rural development. The Saemaul Undong also proves that without a scale or local organization which can link rural and urban development at the local level to diversify rural production, without local control over budgets and resources to enlarge the capacity to plan effectively and without greater local collective control over production, the slogan of self-reliance, participatory development and self-sustaining rural development will remain substantially rhetorical. And despite the exaggerations of official propaganda and the heavy bureaucratic push which lay behind Saemaul, the movement did indeed contain genuine elements of popular mobilization and enthusiasm. But these can be understood only in the context of particular features of the South Korean socio-political tradition and, more importantly, in the context of a series of linked changes in rural policy which occurred in Korea in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The

enthusiasm for Saemaul is intimately related to a sudden, strong, but temporary upsurge in rural incomes and in the attention paid to agriculture by government. On the other hand, the willingness of Koreans to participate in collective village-level Saemaul projects was in part the product of a strong sense of village identity still in evidence today and, more concretely, of strong common material interests in family farming-especially in rice production.

It is also clear that there are various other factors and conditions which were conducive to the success of the Saemaul Undong. They include strategic aspects of the Saemaul Undong itself, government policies and supporting mechanism, and socio-cultural conditions provided by the preceding social change. Of these, one of the most crucial forms of input into the Saemaul Undong is the package of government interventions and innovations. Under the present circumstances in most Asian countries, in fact, community development can hardly take place without financial and technical support from the government. Government support for the Saemaul Undong covers various kinds of services and assistance intended to introduce the system to communities; the development of community organizations for greater people's participation, spiritual innovation for a self-help movement, people's motivation and commitment, and nationwide mobilization of resources and support.

However, it remains doubtful that most open economies of Asia are either willing or able to create the preconditions for Korea's New Village Movement, particularly land reform, and that it constitutes a model for accelerated rural development. Whatever the successes of the Saemaul Undong, as a development process, it has been one of hanging on the tail of export-led industrialization and, more recently, of adjusting to its vagaries. The inseparability of rural development from unparallel industrial growth suggests that the singularities of Korea's development outweigh the more general lessons to be learnt from it. As a catchword to be passed on to other settings, the Saemaul Undong is more likely to become a shibboleth among the open economies of Asia than a touchstone for accelerated rural development. It is in this sense that the extent of transferability of the Saemaul Undong as a rural development model seems to be a subject of academic inquiry.

As such, the implications and lessons drawn from the experience of the Saemaul Undong in Korea are enormous from both academic and practical points of view. And although, some of the mentioned conditions and factors would be applicable to or available in some countries, it might not be available in other countries. However, some technical aspects or lessons from the Saemaul Undong, for example, managerial techniques, monitoring and management information systems, would be transferable with little adaptation. The Saemaul training program could also be adaptable to conditions in other developing countries. The approach, methodology and subject matter of Saemaul Training could be applied to the village leaders as well as rural development field workers. An integrated process of significant changes in values and attitudes of individual farmers, community organizations, the rural infrastructures and village economies can provide a firm basis for self-reliant development in the rural sector.

In conclusion, the extent of transferability of the Saemaul Undong to other developing countries for their rural development completely depends on the adaptability of their socio-cultural systems, as some other factors which affect considerably the socio-psychological dynamics may not be easily reproduced in different cultural context. And finally, even if the Saemaul Undong is transferable, some mistakes like the excessive intervention and support by the government which in part created a dependency syndrome among rural people, the principle of uniformity of government support ignoring different local situations and the excessive emphasis on the immediately visible and tangible results of projects made by Saemaul Undong in Korea, should not be repeated. Rural development strategies should always be rooted in their own socio-cultural contexts at any point of time.

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