# MEMBERSHIP NORMS AND EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS:

THE CASE OF TURKISH ACCESSION

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

LESLIE KEERTHI KUMAR S.M.

Centre for European Studies
School of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Delhi 110067
2009

Date: 22/07/09

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"Membership Norms and EU Enlargement Process: The Case of Turkish Accession"** submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

LESLIE KEERTHI KUMAR S.M.

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROF. RAJENDRA K. JAIN
Chairperson, CES

PROF. UMMU SALMA BAVA
Supervisor

Membership Norms and EU Enlargement Process: The Case of Turkish Accession

Contents   Page

Acknowledgements

Preface

Turkey's accession process has generated a lot of interest and debate. It raises questions about the enlargement process of the European Union. If the enlargement process was driven by power and material factors then the accession process of Turkey would have stopped by now as two powerful member states in the form of France and Germany are in opposition to Turkish accession into the European Union. The continued progress of Turkey's membership bid calls for an alternative explanation involving norms. Membership norms constrain the options of member states by limiting their legitimate options through their normative power and thus preventing them doing anything that is not in line with the existing norms. It is this constraining which over rides power and material factors that is allowing Turkey's membership bid to progress further and further.

The first chapter introduces the topic generally while the second one lays out the theoretical background of the dissertation. The following chapter gives a brief historical outline of the accession process of Turkey while the next one details the issues of the accession. The fifth chapter shows how norms constrained the options of member states in the case of Turkey's accession. A concluding chapter follows.

This study utilizes social constructivist theoretical formulations to explain the role of membership norms in the case of Turkish accession process. It is hoped that this study would be helpful for those who are interested in understanding the nature of the enlargement process of the European Union.

List of Illustrations

List of Graphs, Figures and Tables

Chapter 1: Introduction

From its founding, the European Community has undergone many rounds of enlargement. The European Coal and Steel Community which was founded in 1951 with only six states has since then enlarged and modified itself such that now there are a whopping 27 states in the European Union. The largest enlargement occurred on May 1st, 2004 when 10 new countries acceded to the European Union. The most recent enlargement took place on January 1st, 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Even now accession negotiations are taking place with several countries. Enlargement has been one of the most important policies of the European Union as through the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, enlargement contributes to the spreading of democracy in the European sphere and thereby contributing to its peace and prosperity. The Copenhagen criteria are the rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the European Union (Zaborowski 2006: 106). The criteria require that a state which wants to accede to the European Union must have the adequate institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, have a functioning market economy, and accept the obligations and intent of the European Union. These membership criteria were laid down at the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen, Denmark, from which they take their name.

This progressive enlargement of the European continent has been one among the most important geopolitical events of the last 50 years. Who would have believed at the end of the Second World War that barely a few decades from then, war would have become outlawed in Europe and France would have open borders with Germany. The immensity of this transition is often missed because this improbable transition occurred through peaceful means, which again is another marvel. After all if another Napoleon had risen to integrate Europe by conquest, it would have been more exciting as war-driven expansion does not fail to catch the attention. European integration reduced the possibility of conflict in Europe by achieving several security objectives. Prior to European integration, the European regional structure was characterized by severe anarchy. There were a number of middle level and great powers that were in constant friction with each other. In fact this had been the case since the erosion of the Roman Empire. Thus the classic 'Security dilemma' condition prevailed in the European sub system till the end of the Second World War (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991: 114-115). After the Second World War, European integration slowly started

and it reduced the anarchical characteristic of the structure by building common institutions, pursuing common interests and trying to develop a common European identity. Two factors helped this endeavour. The presence of a common European external threat in the form of Soviet Union and the sustained support of United States who wanted to keep European unity intact against the Soviet threat. Propelled by these factors and also a desire to overcome their conflictual pasts, the European nations developed common rules, common civil and political space and identified common interests such that the anarchical nature became less pronounced. Thus, the instable multi-polar European subsystem was transformed into a stable system with a supra-national European community acting as an overarching single pole that brought the European states together.

The excitement apart, a conquest and integration by sword by a Napoleonic figure, would have been easily explained by the dominant power-based International Relations theoretical formulations like realism and neo-liberalism. After all, throughout history, Europe was united only through war. Instead, the peaceful nature of this transition into a European Community creates unique theoretical difficulties to explain and understand European enlargement. Enlargement has always been a complicated task for the European Union as it involves a variety of challenges on all the spheres be it social, economic, institutional or security. These pluralities of challenges have in effect made the work of theorizing about Enlargement, a difficult one. Answers for important heuristic questions about the driving factors of the enlargement process, the role of member states and role of the European Union institutions have not been positioned satisfactorily in a theoretical canvas. That is the reason scholars point out that the European enlargement has been happening in a theoretical vacuum (Brennan 2001: 173).

International Relations theoreticians have been trying to explain the enlargement of Europe for a long time now. The central question that is to be asked when one attempts such an explanation is 'What drives the European enlargement?' A materialist explanation would lay emphasis on factors like power and economic gains as motivating factors for the enlargement. It can be said that rational institutionalism and its various variants form the most dominant theoretical premise through which many look at European Enlargement. It is also critical to understand the difference

3

between European Integration and European Enlargement even though these two terms are used in an interchanging way by some. For the purposes of this dissertation, European Integration is defined strictly as the processes through which the European Union furthers deepening between its already existing member states. The creations of Euro, Common Visa processes etc are examples for this. On the other hand, European Enlargement is defined strictly as the inclusion or the joining of new member states into the European Union.

Out of these two, it is true that many theoretical models have been advanced to define and explain European Integration as a process. Many theoretical models like Transactionalism and neo-functionalism have come up to explain European Integration (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 1-2). However, with regard to the enlargement of the European Union, the debate has been much underdeveloped and many a times clubbed along with the debate about European integration.

The debate with regard to European Enlargement has largely been restricted to a question of whether rationalist motives drive the enlargement of European Union or ideational motives. In that sense one can say that the debate is still primitive. It percolates down to the question of which logic operates in case of the enlargement of the European Union. Rationalist theories of enlargement argue that it is the logic of consequentiality that lies underneath the European enlargement process. Logic of consequentiality explains European enlargement from the utility maximizing premise and says that the European Union enlarges because it is beneficial in the rational sense (economic/political/strategic) to enlarge. So it implies that if an enlargement is not beneficial in the rationalist sense, then European Union will not pursue it. Thus, simply put, the logic of consequentiality identifies the material considerations to be the driving forces of the Enlargement of the European Union. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis of an enlargement in terms of materialist terms is the decisive factor for the European Union to enlarge.

Such a simplistic and materialist explanation for the European enlargement has been challenged for a long time by constructivist/sociological scholars (Moravsick 1999: 669). They argue that the European Union being a densely institutionalized space is a natural entity for the application of constructivist precepts. They criticize neo-realist

4

and neo-liberal explanations for European enlargement. They say that neo-realism would say that states would join an international institution only to balance a superior power. This is contradicted from the several rounds of post cold war European Union enlargements which have taken place without any need to balance any security threat. If power and interest had been the only motive, then the accession of Central and East European countries was totally not needed. Neo-liberal explanation centering on absolute gains has also been criticized. If the European Union was just concerned about absolute gains, then with its tremendous bargaining advantage it would have been better off for it to have had a preferential trade agreement with the Central and East European countries rather than to have bared the costs of the enlargement (Brennan 2001: 168).

Liberal inter-governmentalism argues that the European project as a whole is fuelled by the domestic economic interests of the member states. This has been criticized by saying that while this may be true to an extent as far as European integration is concerned but enlargement would be unexplainable by that logic as enlargement means more economic aid to the joining countries and thereby more economic burden on the member states. Neo-functionalism with its central arguments of 'spill over' effect and incremental 'transfer of loyalties' due to 'functional' reasons is not sufficient to explain enlargement as it does not clearly explain why and how the spillover effect happens. There is also no empirical evidence to show that people have transferred their loyalties to the European Union (Brennan 2001: 173).

On the other hand, Social Constructivism hold the view that norms, ideas and other such social factors play a key role in the behavior of states and thus institutions develop their own norms and procedures (Ruggie 1998: 862-863). Thus, starting with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 the European Community has been building its own enlargement norms which obligate it into enlargement. Once such a norm is laid down then it leads to rhetorical entrapment and thus constraining the options of the European Union member states even if the enlargement is costly in practice. These norms acts as a 'community trap' (Schimmelfennig 2001: 47). Thus, the sociological scholars argue that it is the ideational factors like norms, ideas that play a decisive role in the Enlargement. Hence, for them it is not the logic of consequentiality but the logic of appropriateness that is action. The logic of appropriateness implies that states

5

when they have to make choices do not have a freehand in following up a cost-benefit analysis but are constrained by what is appropriate as defined already by existing norms about what is good behavior. Norms once established constrain behaviour of states. Even though the popular view is that states act based purely on self interest and power calculations, many times states are constrained by the logic of appropriateness. When certain norms get internationalized, then they constrain the action and options of states. United States does not invade Bahamas not because of power based calculations but because of the feeling that it is not appropriate (Wendt 1999: 289). Its behaviour is constrained due to already established norms about legitimate international behaviour. Thus states gets socialized into certain norms, it becomes part of their behaviour such that norms become an end in themselves instead of 'rational' self interest.

This research intends to investigate the role of norms in the Enlargement process by taking up what some call as the most difficult enlargement ever and that which is yet to run its full course, the accession of Turkey into the European Union. Turkey's candidacy to the European Union is unique in many ways. Turkey indeed has had a long relationship with Europe. It was one of the founding members of the Council of Europe in 1949. It was and still remains as an important ally of the west and a full fledged member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952. Turkey formally applied for associate membership of the newly founded European Economic Community in July 1959. An association agreement between Turkey and the European Economic Community was signed on September 12, 1963 and it came into effect on December 1, 1964. This came to be known as the Ankara Agreement and it became the door to Customs Union and full membership. It envisaged a stage by stage integration process. The preparatory stage was completed on January 1, 1970. The Additional Protocol was signed on November 23, 1970 which came into effect on January 1, 1973 with the ultimate aim of establishing a customs union by the end of 1995. On March 6, 1995, Turkey signed the Customs Union Agreement with the European Union which came into effect from the beginning of 1996. In the Helsinki European Council of 1999, the European Union agreed to treat Turkey in the same manner as the post communist states although it continued to recognize that Turkey fell short on the Copenhagen Criteria and, thus, was not eligible for immediate

negotiations. At the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, Turkey was given an exact date, namely December 2004, with the prospect of opening accession talks on the condition of proper implementation of reform packages and meeting the Copenhagen political criteria. Eventually, in December 2004, the European Union agreed that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and thus accession talks were to be opened in October 2005. From October 2005, accession negotiations have been going on between Turkey and European Union.

However, Turkey's candidacy has started considerable debate within the European Union and is emerging as a polarizing issue amidst the member states. For the first time in the history of European Union enlargement, cultural issues are being cited as a major hindrance (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 93). The manner in which the whole Turkey's accession is unfolding also raises questions over the nature of European enlargement itself. Is the European Union enlargement progressing based on interest based calculations? Or is it progressing based on norm based 'logic of appropriateness'? The European Union opened its accession negotiations with Turkey despite the fact that two of its core member states in the form of France and Germany are opposing the eventual accession of Turkey. The public opinion across Europe as portrayed by various surveys has been consistently against the accession of Turkey. The Euro barometer September-October 2006 survey indicated that 59% of EU-27 citizens are against Turkey joining the EU. Despite all these, the accession process of Turkey has been progressing, albeit at a slow pace. This provides a good opportunity to investigate the role played by norms in the accession process of Turkey.

This study will facilitate such an inquiry into the Turkish accession by highlighting the role played by norms and institutional procedures. Thus, it would also shed light on the dynamics of European project itself by contributing to a better understanding of the enlargement process. It would try to understand whether and how norms and procedures constrain the behaviour of actors while making decisions. This study will also ask the question whether there can be a clash between the interest of European Union as an institution and some powerful member states. So far from the example of Turkish accession bid, the European Union's institutional interest has had the better of the interests of the member states, then does it mean that the European Union has reached a stage wherein its institutional identity and interests are so strong that it can

7

restrain and make conform even the behavior of even its powerful members? And also does the European Union membership process show signs of being path dependent?

The study would start with the following hypotheses that the fact that the accession process of Turkey has proceeded so far even with strong opposition is chiefly due to the constraining effect of the norms and standards of appropriate behaviour which makes member states to conform and act according to the logic of appropriateness rather than interest driven logic. Thus, the enlargement process exhibits a tendency to become path dependent. If these are proven true then the study would conclude that European Union has evolved into such a coherent and strong institutional actor that its norms have become inviolable even for its powerful member states, atleast with regards to enlargement. Thus, this research would shed light on the dynamics of European project itself by contributing to a better understanding of the enlargement process by bringing out the role played by norms and procedures while making decisions.

Chapter 2 gives a broad theoretical outline about norms and how they are perceived by major theories of International Relations. Chapter 3 gives a historical outline of the Turkey's accession so far while Chapter 4 highlights the major issues that are the causes of friction and hurdle for Turkish accession. Chapter 5 would try and identify the role played by norms in the case of Turkish accession. Chapter 6 is the conclusion.

Chapter 2: Norms and International Relations

It is necessary to give a theoretical background about norms before analyzing how they have influenced the accession process of Turkey so far. This chapter examines the relevant theoretical background about norms.

One needs to define norms first and spell out what they are. Norms are essentially socio-cultural phenomena. Hence, in order to fully appreciate them and understand what they are, one has to start with the human society. It would not be an exaggeration to say that human society is governed by norms and they constitute the foundations of any human society.

Our everyday life is regulated by norms which we have imbibed from our childhood through socialization. They influence our decisions and values regarding what are socially acceptable and what are not. Hence, norms effectively limit our options of legitimate behavior by creating the fence of societal acceptance which is very difficult to violate. Many legal scholars acknowledge that those laws which have their origin in societal norms are better observed (Etzioni 2000: 157-158).

Even primitive tribes had their own organizing principles. These organizing principles were the rules of acceptable behavior, not always written down or explicit but were the ones that held the society or tribe from falling into anarchy. That rules of acceptable behavior are what we call now as norms. It is to be kept in mind that our modern legal system came into prominence only in the last few centuries. However, society was orderly and non-anarchic even from the ancient times. Even when not written down or explicit, norms had significant power over the actions and attitudes of the people of a society or a tribe and made them to conform to its standards. Non-compliance resulted in social out casting and in some cases even meant execution.

Over the period of time, as human society evolved, many of such norms got written down and with the advent of modern legal system, many found their way into the books of law as well. However, even today there are many norms which have not been written down or explicitly recognised by a formal body but still are as binding as laws. Social Scientists have long acknowledged the role played by norms in ensuring the smooth conduct of societal life.

So, Norms can be defined as the behavior that is expected from someone. Social Scientist Todd Jones calls norms as the "what's done" notion. For him societal norms are those which people believe that lot of others do or expect them to be done. It is the thing that usually happens and so people start to think that it is the thing that ought to happen all the time. So if an actor, in the society's case an individual, behaves in this usual, accepted, recognised way then the society bestows approval on him and his action. On the other hand, if an actor breaks the norms, it creates disapproval and stigma in contrast to the norm conforming behavior that generated praise and approval (Jones 2006: 255). This is not to say that norms cannot be breached but since the society punishes those who break norms a, the likelihood of it getting breached is less.

Norms and the International Political System

Much like in the society of humans, norms also do exist in the society of nations. Similar to the way human beings socialize among themselves, States also socialize with each other during the conduct of international affairs. This socialization naturally leads to the development of norms between states. As noted earlier, social norms play an important role in the conduct of the society and in very much the same way, international norms play a crucial role in the conduct of the international society.

The volume of norms that exist between two states depend upon their unique relationship and shared history. For instance, two neighboring countries would have developed a larger set of norms between each other because of their need to engage each other constantly due to their geographical proximity. Similarly, states which are large trade or strategic partners would also have developed a large volume of working norms with each other. On the other hand, two states which are neither geographically closer nor significant trade or security partners would have developed very little norms between them.

Some tend to think that norms have just arrived on the international society. On the contrary, it is a mistake to think that norms are new phenomena in International Relations. Norms are as old as international relations. In fact, the very first international norms were established by intertribal relations (Encyclopedia Britannica 2009). It is now known that tribes had established inviolable norms and regulations about hunting grounds, marriages. One can even find a rudimentary form of the now

universal diplomatic immunity norm amidst them as messengers in the tribal society were sacred and carried emblematic symbols like the 'message stick' (Encyclopedia Britannica 2009). There were also mutually respected norms about each tribe's territory which are in many ways proto-typical of modern notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation states. There is evidence to indicate that treaties existed between Mesopotamian city states from as far back as 2850 B.C (Encyclopedia Britannica 2009). Similar evidences have also been found in ancient Greece, China and India. Thus, it can be safely concluded that norms are not a modern phenomena in International Relations.

Modern European nation state system itself was established on the norm of state sovereignty at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. By that, European states acquired complete territorial integrity, border inviolability and supremacy over their domain. Since then this norm of state sovereignty has spread across the world and is today universally accepted as one of the cornerstones of modern international relations. It is generally agreed that modern international relations started from that year as states started to see each other as sovereign entities. So much so that one scholar refers to state sovereignty as a towering feature on the landscape of world politics (Jackson 2000: 86).

The advent of industrial revolution resulted in increased contact between states as the discovery of modern means of transport increased trade and other relations between states. This increase in the level of socialization further contributed to development of more norms between states. As states engaged each other more frequently, they developed more and more norms. With the advent of international institutions, which became especially prevalent in the 20th century, norms became more pronounced and formally institutionalized.

Development of Norms

How do norms develop? Norms evolve over a period of time due to the interaction between two entities. Two people or societies or nations interacting with each other for a significant amount of time are bound to develop specific practices and a culture of interaction. It is these practices which in turn become more and more pronounced and emerge as the rules of acceptable behavior between the two entities, two humans

or two societies or two countries. These behavioural rules arise chiefly based on the convenience of the interacting parties and hence norms at that time when they are formed have a positive pay off (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004: 185). These rules get strengthened with the passage of more time and they are what we call as norms. Norms even though evolving due to the demand based on convenience, show a remarkable tendency to persist even when the original convenience is lost.

Norms, once evolved perpetuate themselves through socialization. When a child arrives into the world, it is born without any culture. This child is then transformed by its parents, teachers, and others into a cultural and socially adept animal. This general process of internalizing culture is referred to as socialization (Wendt 1999: 170). A child growing up is rebuked by its parents or other adults when it breaches some norm and thus they act as norm educators to that child, who socializes that child into the society. Children are taught about the proper way to behave in public places and also appropriate manners from an early age and it is through this passing on from one generation to another, norms perpetuate themselves among the human societies. That is how socialization works from an early age. This socialization happens throughout life as social norms prevail everywhere be it family, a peer group, an organization (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004: 185). Similarly, states which do not conform to the norms of the international system are punished by other states and through that norms perpetuate themselves in the international system. The recent sanctions against Iran for not conforming to the international nuclear norms are an example.

Formal and Informal Norms

While there are many ways through which norms can be classified based on from what angle one is looking at them, for the purposes of this dissertation, norms would be classified into two categories based on their status at any given point of time: Formal norms and Informal norms.

Formal norms are those norms which have been codified by law or any institutional set up such that it exists in a written/institutionalized format. Not to commit murder is an example of a formal norm that has been codified by Law. However, it has to be clear that not all laws are norms as some of the laws may be based on not so popular

elite ideas which do not necessarily resonate with the majority of the society and their norms. For example, the law banning dowry in India is not a social norm as the system of dowry still thrives in India. Nobody is made an outcaste for practicing it. The point is, not all institutionalized guidelines or rules are norms as many of them do not trace back to norms that preexisted the creation of those guidelines or rules.

Informal norms are also very much present in societies. For example, what a society thinks as rude behavior is something which is an informal norm because it has not been institutionalized yet. This does not mean that formal norms are more established and binding and informal norms are less so. Informal norms can also be equally binding if not more. To cite an example, in patriarchic societies, traditional norms make women to be treated less equal than men. This practice goes on unabashedly even if there are laws present in the land proclaiming equality of men and women. Informal norms thus are as powerful and coercive if not more than their formal counterparts.

In the arena of international relations as well, there is the difference between formal norms and informal norms. Formal norms are those which have been institutionalized by treaties between two states or a group of states or institutionalized by an international body like the United Nations. However, there is also a wide set of informal norms that operate between states that are also important and useful. Much of today's international law was informal norms once.

An important question that needs to be probed is how formalization of a norm comes about. Broadly, two scenarios can be observed.

Firstly, formalization is used as a tool by special interests and elite bodies to create or to strengthen or to spread a norm. Institutions like legislature enact laws that sometimes create norms which they feel as important for common good. The ban against public smoking that was recently enacted in many countries across the world is one such example. Similarly, institutions may also enact norms to strengthen and spread an already existing norm which may be weak or less prevalent. For example, the League of Nations was established to strengthen the norm of peace between the nations, even though peace as a norm had not been established in the international society at that time. Thus, such formalization is intended to develop some norm which

is seen as ideal or good for the human society or international society. The history of such formalizations shows that such efforts may succeed at times but also can fail. The League of Nations could not prevent the Second World War and the subsequently created United Nations has not been able to prevent war entirely either. In such cases, formalization was a method or means to develop and spread norms. Since formalization techniques like laws have punitive aspect to them as well in case of digression, it is expected that over a period of time new norms can be created or existing ones strengthened.

Secondly, formalization can also be the result of a norm being so prevalent and established. The law against murder is a case in point. In primitive tribal societies, murder initially was not considered to be a crime. Slowly however, the norm that murder is a crime started to evolve and today it has been formalized in all the countries of the world as a sign of its strength and the culmination of its evolution. Diplomatic norms are also another example. It was already well established before it got institutionalized.

How Norms Work

Even though norms have always existed between states, the visibility of norms in international politics increased with the growth of international institutions since the Second World War. This visibility of norms has given rise to a debate among scholars of international relations about the impact of international institutions on the conduct of international relations (Keohane 1988: 380). Even though it is not so obviously stated, in essence the debate is on the impact of norms on the conduct of international relations as international institutions are mere norm propounding and enforcing bodies. If one looks around the international society, one can find a plethora of international institutions which are involved in almost all aspects of international relations.

The question actually is why norms produce a conforming effect. What makes people or states to follow norms even when some of them are not compulsory? Scholars, standing at different vantage points have tried to attribute reasons for the conforming effect of norms. They have come up with a varied set of explanations. They can be broadly classified into two categories.

Scholars with a neo-classical, rationalist bent argue that norms form and sustain themselves because of the material or utilitarian benefits of it. So for them norms have a conforming effect because it is rational and sensible to conform to them. Norms are one of the many factors an actor comes across in his external environment which he has to take into account while making decisions. Thus, they see norms as one other cost or benefit which the rational actor has to tally before acting (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 889). To give an example, one of the universal norms across the world is that of not to kill another human being without a good enough reason like self defense. This norm gradually came in existence as primitive tribes slowly realized that killing each other is not beneficial for anyone and hence started punishing those people who did not heed to the view of the majority and went on killing others. They were branded as offenders and imprisoned or executed. Thus the cost of non-compliance to the norm was the factor that prevented people from killing others. Thus they argue that norms constrain behavior by raising the costs of non-compliance and rewarding compliance. A norm gets breached when the costs of non-compliance are outweighed by the perceived benefits of that act. That is the reason even the norm of not killing others is relaxed in case of self defense or in the case of a war. So for these scholars, norm compliance by a majority is because of the rationality attached to it.

Realist School

Having neo-classical, rationalist foundations, the realist school of international relations theory also takes a similar viewpoint on international norms. They have long argued that material factors decisively influence international politics. Kenneth Waltz in his seminal work 'Theory of International Politics' argues that anarchy is the defining feature of the international system and because of that states have to help themselves to survive as there are no centralized security guarantors (Waltz 1979). Thus, the realists call the international system as a self help system wherein survival is the ultimate aim for every state. In order to do that, states try to maximize their military power and thus security becomes the prime concern for all states. Hence for the realists, hard military power is the most effective currency in the international system to get things done. States with great military power have their way in the system and thus for realists international relations are nothing but the exchange between great powers.

Realists are also very skeptical of the scope of cooperation between states in the international system. They argue that since there is no arbiter between states, there is severe mistrust between states that generally see security as a zero sum issue. Hence, states will cooperate with each other only on issues which do not have a security bearing and thus the realists argue that cooperation is very difficult between states as even seemingly neutral issues can have an indirect security bearing. This view naturally leads the realists to believe that the international system is a war prone system as states usually assume the worst case scenario about their rivals as they cannot trust each other which leads to frequent wars and conflicts. The only reasonable way in which peace can be attained in the international system for the realists is through the maintenance of a balance of power between two rival states or rival state groupings. Balance of power refers to the condition in which two rival states or rival state groupings match each other in their power capabilities such that any armed conflict between them would lead to nearly equal destruction on both sides and hence this deters both sides from engaging in aggressive wars. This is known as the theory of deterrence. For the realists this is the only means to achieve a meaningful peace. They cite the Cold War era as a classic example of a balance of power condition in operation.

Having such a viewpoint, the realists unsurprisingly argue that norms and international institutions have or can have little or no impact on the international relations. They consider international efforts to create international institutions to develop peace and to regulate behavior as futile and ultimately subservient to power equations and hence some realists have even called the promise of international institutions as false (Mearscheimer 1994: 5-6). For them it is idealistic and naive to believe that international institutions can alter the underlying power equations. This criticism of international institutions and regimes is nothing but a criticism of norms as international institutions are nothing but norm creating and enforcing bodies. Thus, for the realists norms are futile unless backed by some power motive. They say that an international institution will flourish as long as it acts as a tool for the great powers in the system. To put it in simple terms, international institutions are nothing but facilitators for great powers to exercise their power and accomplish their purpose. So, by extension, for the realists, norms are nothing but garbs under which the great

17

powers push their agenda. Norms are followed because of rationalist, materialist factors.

Liberal Institutionalism

Liberal Institutionalism has been the chief competing paradigm to realism in the last two decades. Liberal Institutional theoreticians challenge some of the realist conclusions however they agree with much of the basic premises of the realist school. Like realism, neo-liberal institutionalism is also utilitarian and rationalist (Keohane and Martin 1995: 39). They too see the international system as a self help one and acknowledge that power is a prominent factor therein.

However they tend to see the international institutions more positively. For them, such institutions prevent the mistrust between states due to the lack of a higher authority and thus the liberal scholars encourage the building of institutions to help states to have better communications between each other (Keohane 1988: 386). States assume the worst case scenario mainly due to the lack of information about what the other side is doing and hence International Institutions by serving as channels of communication enable the state to overcome the worst case scenario fear and engage with other states in a constructive manner. Hence, the norms created or facilitated by international institutions do have an impact on the international system. They cite the success of international economic institutions like the World Trade Organization to argue their case as International monetary norms are highly binding to even the most powerful of states.

In short, the Liberal institutionalist scholars believe that it is a question of payoff and absolute gains can be achieved as against the realist thinking that only relative gains are possible. The debate has narrowed to the question of payoff and norms are useful in helping states trust each other by keeping communications open and thereby enabling states to verify each other. They share the realist notion of anarchy being a central principle of international system and hence see norms and international institutions as means through which anarchy can be better managed. They do not see the international institutions as having the ability to constitute identities and interests (Wendt 1999: 34).

Even though, there is significant difference between the way realist and the neo-liberal scholars perceive the role of norms, it is to be noted that both of them are viewing norms from the rationalist/utilitarian vantage point. The difference between the two paradigms is in how useful norms are in the end. Realist scholars see norms as having no independent use and thus having zero impact on the outcome which for them is decisively influenced by power equations. The Liberal scholars see norms as more useful and having the ability to influence the outcome to a particular degree based on the way payoffs were constructed. This difference notwithstanding, both these competing paradigms perceive only a utilitarian role for norms in the International Relations. Realists believe that norms can have no impact on the power-interest based international system. Liberals argue that interests in a globalised world are interlinked and hence norms are in the interests of states who want to make absolute gains. Both do not say that norms can fundamentally alter the power-interest based structure of the international system (Wendt 1992: 392). Norms and international institutions thus cannot alter the fundamental dynamics of the international system as they remain captive to power and interest based calculations. This view is comparable to those of the rationalist scholars about societal norms who argue that social norms arise and are adhered because of the material benefits of following such norms.

Sociological Theories and Norms

On the other hand, some other social scientists argue that norms have a much deeper effect on actors. They too agree that certain norms may have formed due to their utilitarian value. However, they point out that many norms like religious and cultural norms exist in our societies which seem to have no material benefits at the present time even though they may have fulfilled some social function in the distant past. Yet, regardless of their present lack of value even they continue to persist and are followed with reverence by many people across the world. Thus, they argue that norms arising out of history get perpetuated as people follow it as a tool of group identification. That is the reason for many norms which may appear outwardly ridiculous for others, are piously observed by the people of that particular society. This persistence by an actor in observing even trivial norms is said to be because norms over a period of time tend to shape the actor itself such that they are not just an external factor but become a

constitutive part of the actor itself. Thus, they manufacture the predispositions of the actor by decisively influencing his wants and needs. The formation of a self in the society happens through the process of socialization which is nothing but learning and imbibing of social norms (Cooter 1993: 426-27). Hence, once that self is formed, even if a particular set of norms are not rewarding or beneficial, the actor tends to follow it because they have become a part of him.

Thus, returning to our previous example, a person does not commit murder not necessarily because of a calculated cost/benefit analysis. It could be because the thought of killing someone never crosses his mind at all. Such an act is not a part of him. It never even occurs to him even if it is a rational action. It has been observed that many people would not go to the extent of killing someone even if it was in self defense. Norms can have such a deep impact such that they prevent actors from being able to think of certain options. Faced with a hostile boss, how many people would even think of killing him off as an option even if they have the means to commit a perfect murder and get away. This certainly is an extreme example but it illustrates the point that due to the imbibing of norms certain options do not even come into the thought process (Etzioni 2000: 163). However, it definitely does depend on the extent of socialization i.e. the level of internalization of that set of norms. One cannot expect a child to be quiet in a Library because of the extent of socialization of a child is low and he or she has not yet imbibed the norm of keeping silent in a Library to the fullest extent.

However, sometimes even grown up people end up shouting in the Library (Similarly, some bosses do get killed). Such a norm breach happens not necessarily because the pay offs of that action outweigh the costs. Many end up in jails after murdering, regretting what they did. Such breaches happen as mistakes or rare anomalies. They are generally results of extreme carnal behavior due to some extraordinary situation in which the actor finds himself or herself in such that for a short period of time, he or she forgets who he or she is and does something which he or she later regrets. Many people kill in moments of anger or depression or frustration and hence that act is uncharacteristic of their nature. Another reason could be that the actor never originally imbibed that set of norms and may in fact have probably imbibed an opposite set of norms. It has been observed that some criminals due to their specific

set of experiences in life (socialization) do not consider killing as something inappropriate. On the other hand, there are those who regret killing someone due to some momentary rage or drunkenness (carnal behavior due to an extraordinary situation) for the rest of their lives. Thus, such a view of norms sheds light on the deeper impact norms have or can have on actors. People thus follow norms not only to maximize their material interest but because they themselves feel that it is appropriate to do so. Hence, these scholars define norms as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors which the actors have imbibed so deeply that they themselves cannot ignore.

Sociological International Relations theories and Norms

Much like their societal counterparts, sociological international relations theoretical paradigms like Constructivism ascribe a deeper role for norms in the conduct of international politics and differ significantly with the rationalistic utilitarian theories like realism and liberalism. They argue that the conforming effect of norms on states is not only due to material considerations but because the states feel it is the appropriate thing to do. Hence, states sometimes can be seen conforming to norms at the expense of certain material considerations even. Thus, they argue that power may not be the most important factor (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 14-16). Some have dubbed this as the logic of appropriateness. This logic stands in stark contrast to the logic of consequentiality which underlines the rationalist paradigms like neo-realism and liberal institutionalism.

The logic of consequentiality demands that actors behave or negotiate with other actors with only their interests being their sole guiding force and the outcome is determined by the power capabilities of a particular actor with respect to the others involved. On the other hand, the logic of appropriateness sees actors perceiving their interests within the limits of the norms of appropriate behavior. Norms are followed not because they give a payoff but because they are seen as legitimate, rightful and appropriate. Sometimes a state may even forego some of its interests in order to do the appropriate thing. Human beings do this all the time within our communities and states too who are members of the international community try to appropriately/properly follow the obligatory norms that accompany that membership.

However, what is appropriate should not be confused with what is moral. It is the most common mistake. In a human society, an individual imbibes his normative standards from his range and type of socialization. So for instance, if an individual grows up in a violent atmosphere, in times of crisis, he may see violence as an appropriate or legitimate behavior. Even today, in some parts of the world, there are tribal societies wherein the appropriate way to settle disputes are through violence. While for others with a different socialization, violence may not be moral and appropriate but rather unacceptable. However for an individual that was brought up with that tribal socialization it appears appropriate. It all depends on the norms a person has imbibed through socialization. What needs to be understood is that norms in themselves do not have a universal, absolute moral value. They are just set of practices that have developed which may or may not be moral in the eyes of a third party observer. Owning slaves was an acceptable norm at one point of time in history.

In the same way, states also acquire their norms through their socialization with other states. And this socialization process is different for different states and hence what one state considers as appropriate may be deemed by another state as immoral and illegitimate. Hence appropriate here is not a moralistic term but the perspective, which an actor sees appropriate based on its socialization and imbibed norms.

Constructive scholars argue that such a norm conforming behavior by a state over a period of time results in the changing of the identity and interests of the state itself and the state sees its interests and identity based on the norms (Wendt 1999: 170). As a result, it conforms to the norms even if it meant a lack of benefit in terms of material interests and in some cases, even at the expense of some of its material interests. This happens because the interests of the state are perceived only based on how they perceive themselves i.e. their identity. And constructive scholars claim that state identities depend on two things: Firstly, how a state sees itself, i.e. self understanding and also how other states see it. Thus it has an intersubjective quality (Wendt 1999: 160). Thus, Wendt argues that identities are constituted by the interaction between these internal (self understanding) and external (perception of others) factors.

Drawing from there, Wendt while identifying several identities, says that two kinds of identities are specifically important for the states in the international system: type

identities and role identities (Wendt 1999: 227, 292). Type identities are social categories like: capitalist state, democratic state, Islamic state, European state. It is to be kept in mind that a state can have multiple type identities at the same point of time. A state can be Islamic as well as democratic. The international social environment also plays a major part in shaping the type identities of states. For example democratic states are encouraged by the international community as opposed to dictatorial states and as a result, the numbers of states that identify themselves as democracies increase.

Role identities are the result of history and relationship between and among countries. It exists only in relation with another state or a group of states. For example, a state may see itself as a rival or an enemy to another state based on this identity. Wendt makes the argument that if the material forces alone are the deciding factor, then why does the nukes of Britain are not threatening or creating a case of prisoner's dilemma to the United States unlike the nukes of say the erstwhile Soviet Union or present day Russia or China. He argues that nukes in themselves mean nothing without the inter-subjective understanding between the two countries that possess them. If they see each other as friends, the nukes do not threaten, otherwise they do (Wendt 1992: 397).

These identities which are formed based on the international social structure and the inter-subjective understandings resulting from the interactions between the states shape the interests and actions of states. International social structure and inter-subjective understanding are nothing but norms, both formal and informal. So, for the constructivists, norms have a great impact on the conduct of international relations. They shape the sphere by constituting the identity of actors and thereby shaping their interests.

Change and Norms

It is also necessary to understand how norms can change. Again, depending on at from what vantage point one sees, the contours of the explanations vary.

Rationalist scholars would argue that norms change when their underlying cost-benefit equations change. For example, many of the familial norms that were present in western societies have disappeared today in favor of individualistic norms because of the fact that latter are perceived to be more beneficial than the former. Similarly,

the rationalist theories of international relations would argue that norms will change when the material factors underlying them change. Realists would argue that norms change whenever the interests of the great powers change. Hence according to the realist interpretation, the great powers of the international system create, spread and even change norms based on their needs. Liberal Institutionalism would stress the material payoffs as being the factor.

On the other hand, if norms are imbibed and become the constitutive part of a person or a state as sociological theories claim then a change in norm is possible only when the nature of the person or state itself changes. This can happen only if the already imbibed socialization is replaced by a new one. This process is slow and tough and hence that is the reason norms once established show a remarkable tendency to persist for a very long time. Societal norms withstand even dramatic changes in society and persist for centuries. Hence, with regard to the example regarding the change in the familial norms in western societies, the sociological scholars would argue that this change did not come about overnight but came about due to socialization that started to happen since the enlightenment period in 17th century. Industrial revolution, Colonialism and other such social changes driven by economic and political changes across the west, naturally resulted in a new set of practices and that challenged the already existing norms of the society. Similarly, international norms also persist for a long time and they can be replaced only when a new set of norms emerge and challenge them. The norm of state sovereignty is an example. Despite globalization and the benefits of an inter-linked world, this norm still persists.

International Organizations

International Organizations are the chief normative structures of our times. It is necessary to understand their nature and also their role in the international system. Sociological scholars argue that much like states, international organizations also develop their own identity and interests over a period of time (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). This identity formation in international organizations has to be understood in order to appreciate how the type and role identities are formed in the case of international organizations.

Sociological scholars say that international organizations are not just a forum where states meet but develop a life of their own by becoming 'live collectivities' (Cho 2008: 4). Hence, they become an actor themselves, much like states and henceforth start developing their own identities and interests. Just as states have their interests to take care of, international organizations also have their own interests to take care of. They are not just the sum total of their member states. These interests flow from their identity which as in the case of states is shaped by the formal and informal norms that surround them. They also can have type and role identities. The development of the identity of international organizations happens due to several factors. Three major factors contribute to the creation of the identity of an international organization: its history, its objective/purpose and the environment in which it operates.

The history of an international organization is a great influence in the development of its identity. History tends to form the internalized past and creates an institutional heredity (Cho 2008: 9). Thus, history has the tendency to determine and influence the behavior of the international organization in the present and the future as it defines the rationale and character of an organization. What it has been so far plays a major role in determining what it will be and how the organization will react to a particular challenge or crisis. History also serves the purpose of being the interpretive criteria to determine the appropriate behavior of member states in case of a controversy or confusion. This burden of history and past precedent makes it tough for an organization to change itself drastically even if some aspects of it have become ineffective. That is the reason for some scholars to argue that even the reform of an institution tends to be path dependent. Significant changes and radically different behavior is highly improbable in an institutional setup.

Secondly, the objective and purpose for which an organization was created also has an influence in the creation of the identity of an international organization. The objective and purpose of an organization is given at the time of its creation by the member states that form the organization. These objectives and goals greatly influence the identity of an organization as they are said to be both 'cultural-cognitive and normative' (Scott 1992: 22). The espoused goals of an organization steer, regulates and control the activities of it. They also serve as a source of reference when an international organization determines whether a particular action is appropriate and

acceptable. Thus, the goals of an international organization serve in effect as ideological compulsions which the organization cites to and uses to make the member states conform and comply.

Lastly, the environment in which an international organization operates also has a great influence in the formation of the identity of an organization (Cho 2008: 10). Environment includes the member states, the means and nature of interaction between them and the organization and also the role of the international organization in the larger international system. The interaction and the dialogue with the environment provides the international organization, the necessary ingredients, which go into the formulation of the identity and thereby the interests of an international organization. For instance, a restrictive environment can result in an international organization developing a limited identity and thus aiming little as it knows that it has only limited capabilities. On the other hand, a generous and conforming environment can result in the development of an identity with greater interests and bigger aims.

Sociological scholars argue that the International Organizations while developing its own identity, can swallow the states that created them such that they make them conform to its identity (Cho 2008: 10). This can be understood as a three step process.


Figure 1: States and International Organizations 1 (Cho 2008:10)

Figure 1 symbolizes the first step when an international organization is created. An international organization is generally created at a historical juncture when a group of states feel the need for an organization to address or to handle a particular issue that

26

troubles them at that point. For example the League of Nations was created when many states felt the need to have an international organization that promoted peace and discouraged war. Similarly, the United Nations was created after the Second World War for pretty much the same reasons as the League of Nations. Hence, an international organization generally is created as a result of the action of a group of states. It is the states who agree upon and provide the charter of an international organization. It is them to who provide it with the rules and powers it has at its disposal. It is them who provide it with objectives and purposes. Henceforth, at the time of its creation, an international organization is nothing but an entity which is created within the system of states, in accordance with the interests of the states who are involved in the process. However, as time moves on, slowly international organizations start moving outside of the system of states as shown by the next diagram (Figure 2)...

Figure 2: States and International Organizations 2 (Cho 2008:10)

This happens chiefly because of the fact that the interests of states are dynamic. What a state wanted at a particular historical juncture may not be the same throughout the rest of its history. For example, a state which may have signed on United Nations

charter outlawing war after the Second World War may discover later that a particular war would be beneficial for it. Thus, the interests of states are changing and dynamic. International organizations on the other hand have a charter and have a fixed role to play in the international system. As noted earlier, since the objective and purpose of an international organization is usually spelt out in the charter of it, the interests of an international organization do not undergo the fluctuations that are common with regard to states. Hence, with the passage of time, international organizations start moving outside of the system of states that created it because of the change in the interests of the states. In the diagram (Figure 2), the overlapped area between the two circles shows the number of states who still share the interests of the international organization. The next step may not happen in the case of all the international organizations because some may die out because of severe contradiction of interests and weak institutional set up, while some others may remain albeit weak players. However, some international organizations which have a strong institutional structure and long history achieve what is shown in the following diagram (Figure 3).

Figure 3: States and International Organizations 3 (Cho 2008:10)

Astounding it may sound, some international organizations manage to swallow the states that created them by making them conform to its interests and thereby smothering the individual interests of the states. This usually happens when the organizational strength and coherence of an international organization is strong which

28

is influenced by the institutional set up and the history of that international organization. As a result, a collective identity develops and states identify themselves as a part of a society of states. It is argued that hence such states follow the norms of that society of states, not because of interest based calculations but because they have internalized them (Wendt 1999: 242-243).

Thus, sociological theories of international relations argue that norms and international institutions which are normative structures have a significant role in the functioning of the international political system. Norms shape the member states and form their identity and interests. International Institutions as well develop their own identities and interests and due to their normative power, engulf the identities and interests of its member states.

Chapter 3: Turkey's long road to the European Union

The relationship between the Turks and the Europeans is more than a thousand year old. It was not always cordial and more often than not the Europeans and the Turks found themselves as rivals in a conflict. It would not be wrong to say that for most part of their history, at least from the medieval period, Turkey and Europe were shaped by different cultural, religious and social factors. This does not mean that they did not have common meeting points. As a matter of fact, Turkey is and has always been the point where the East and the West meet. Thus, it has a set of unique elements in it as a Eurasian country. Yet, it is not Eurasian in the same way as Russia. Russia, even though Eurasian is more European than Asian as its history developed along with that of Europe. Russian royal families and nobles married into European nobility and the reverse also was happening. Christianity, though different forms was another common factor between Europe and Russia. Turkey, however was more Asian and to be more precise, more middle eastern than European. Hence, the cultural, social and even historical differences that exist between Turkey and Europe today are real and present. These differences have developed over centuries of interaction between both of them.

It is these differences that have made the prospect of Turkish accession into the European Union, a difficult one as the classic fear of 'other' makes many Europeans hesitant in welcoming Turkey into their fold with open hands (Yilmaz 2007: 293). Centuries of socialization has engraved the image of Turkey as an enemy of Europe and that is proving difficult to overcome. This has in effect made the Turkish journey to the European Union a long one with lots of twists and turns and the final outcome of it is still not clear. It is however a wonder of history that Turkey even wants to join the European Union as even just a century ago, this would have been unthinkable. It is a turnaround of sorts which needs to be understood to be able to appreciate what is happening with regards to the Turkish accession.

The Turks and the European powers were almost evenly matched for most part of their history with the natural ups and downs of fortunes and a balance existed between the two. The industrial revolution that swept through Europe in the 18th century and 19th century changed all that and tilted the balance heavily towards Europe. Industrial Revolution impacted all spheres of human activity with major changes in agriculture, manufacturing, production, mining, and transportation. These changes naturally had a

profound impact on the socio-economic conditions of Europe and enriched their capabilities resulting in increased colonization of the world by the European powers and thereby huge accumulation of wealth. Turkey, then the Ottoman Empire used to be the geographical entity through which much of the trade between the East and the West took place due to its prime location. This position has already been largely compromised after the discovery of Cape of Good Hope in 1488. But with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, Turkey's position deteriorated further as faster means of navigation came up with the invention of Steam powered engines that resulted in steam ships which made viable alternate routes to the East for the Western nations through the oceans. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire was also stagnating due to lack of innovation and progress as a result of the rigidity of its political and socio-economic structures (Ahmad 1993: 23).

Beginning of Europeanization

Thus, after the industrial revolution, the Europeans were marching ahead in prosperity and power and the Turks fell behind. The Turks gradually understood this gap and at least from the middle of the 19th century, there was a realization among the Turkish elite that to compete and succeed in the then modern world, the best way was to emulate the European nations (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 2). However, during the period of the Ottoman Empire, this trend of Europeanization was limited to the Ottoman elite and did not gain currency outside of them as reforming was not easy (Ahmad 1993: 23-30). The country and the people needed a rude awakening to be able to be ready to reform and change. That awakening came in the form of the First World War. Following years of decline, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I through the Ottoman-German Alliance in 1914, and was ultimately defeated. After the war, the victorious Allied Powers sought the dismemberment of the Ottoman state through the Treaty of Sèvres of 1919. It was a humiliation of the highest sorts for the Turks.

The occupation of İstanbul and İzmir by the Allies in the aftermath of World War I prompted the establishment of the Turkish national movement. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a military commander who had distinguished himself during the Battle of Gallipoli, the Turkish War of Independence was waged with the aim of

revoking the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. By September 18, 1922, the occupying armies were repelled and the country saw the birth of the new Turkish state. Kemal and his associates were not least interested in restoring the Ottoman Sultanate. On November 1, the newly founded parliament formally abolished the Sultanate which ended 623 years of Ottoman rule. The Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, led to the international recognition of the sovereignty of the newly formed "Republic of Turkey" as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, and the republic was officially proclaimed on October 29, 1923, in the new capital of Ankara (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 3).

Period of Reform

The dawn of the Turkish Republic after the First World War resulted in radical changes in the Turkish socio-political system. Mustafa Kemal Pasha who became the republic's first president subsequently introduced many radical reforms with the aim of founding a new secular republic from the remnants of its Ottoman past. The reform movement began with the modernization of the constitution, including the adaptation of European laws and jurisprudence to the needs of the new Republic. This was followed by a thorough secularization and modernization of the administration, with particular focus on the education system. The development of industry was promoted by strategies such as import substitution and the founding of state enterprises and state banks. Central to these reforms were the belief that Turkish society would have to westernize itself both politically and culturally in order to modernize.

Thus, the Kemalist period saw the restructuring of the Turkish system along the European lines. They concluded that they were lagging behind in terms of development and decided to establish and attain the 'contemporary level of civilisation' in Turkey by establishing the necessary structures that it requires like an independent nation-state, accelerating industrialization and creating a secular, national identity for Turkey (Aydin and Keyman 2004: 3). Thus, the Turkish elites realized that a nationalist, secular polity is the means to catch up with the European countries. Ever since that, Europeanization has remained as a mainstream ideology in the Turkish Republic. It acted as the goal behind the remaking efforts of the Kemalists during the 1920's.

Europeanization was carried out in a fierce and bull headed manner. To give an example, in November, 1925, when the republic founded by Mustafa Kemal Pasha was still young, the Government ordered the prohibition of wearing the turban and fez, the red felt cap which had been the traditional headgear of the Turks for a long time. It was to be replaced by a European Style cap or hat. This move was unpopular in the beginning as the traditional headgear carried religious significance and people resented the cap to be of the tradition of Christian Europe. However, the government stood firm and elbowed any protest with force. The insistence on such a small and symbolic issue by the secular elite highlights the fervor for Europeanization and modernization among the Kemalists. It also puts into historical perspective the recent controversy in Turkey regarding wearing head scarves which for someone who does not know the history of Turkey may look like a trivial issue. The next year saw the switch to the European Calendar from the traditional one. Also, the Turkish government adopted the Swiss Civil Code and the penal code of Mussolini's Italy. On October 4, 1926, Islamic courts were closed. The Kemalists even went to the extent of complete secularization of family laws such that religious marriages and polygamy were abolished (Zurcher 1997: 173).

On November 1, 1928, the new Turkish alphabet was introduced by the Language Commission at the initiative of Atatürk, replacing the previously used Arabic script. The adoption of the new alphabet, the modernization of language by removing adapted words was part of Mustafa Kemal's program of modernization. The removal of Arabic script was defended on the grounds that it was not appropriate for the authentic Turkish phonology, which needs a new set of symbols to be correctly represented. The abandonment of the Arabic script was not merely a symbolic expression of secularization. It broke the link to Ottoman Islamic texts to which only a minor group of Ulema had access. Latin script would make reading and writing easier to learn and consequently improve the literacy rate.

Thus it can be said that the Kemalist regime Europeanized Turkey in the fields of state, education and law by taking on Islamic strongholds. These efforts were unprecedented in human history as never before such a huge country with such long traditions and history embarked on a mission to change its core identity self

consciously in a very short span of time. It is to the credit of the Turkish elites that they succeeded to a very large extent in doing this.

Even in the issue of Foreign Policy, the new Turkish elite while not ceding its core interests adopted a more friendly approach to the European nations. They wanted to be recognised as a European State (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 69). Thus, the ultimate goal of the new Turkish republic was to engage the European nations as an equal with a foreign policy guided not by religious or emotional euphoria but by enlightened national interest. The Second World War would come as the major test for this policy of pragmatism. In the 1930s, Turkey was very much concerned about the possibility of Italian aggression against it. However, it also did not want to get embroiled in a European War which it foresaw coming and hence did not rush to take sides as alliances were being formed in Europe. It wanted desperately to avoid the fiasco of the First World War.

However, when the Soviet Union and Germany cemented their non-aggression pact in 1939, Britain and France made huge efforts to secure an alliance with Turkey which was strategically important. Hence in October, 1939, a mere three months after the signing of the Soviet – German pact, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty was concluded. It was a treaty of mutual support. As part of the treaty, Turkey also received huge sums of money to modernize its army. Turkey also got itself an excuse clause with regard to the Soviet Union as it did not want to get into a war with it.

However, the war did not unfold as it was foreseen. The rapid collapse of France changed the military and political equations and Turkey was not in a hurry to fulfill its commitments as per the treaty and successfully resisted British efforts to get it into the war. So much so that Turkey declared war on Germany only in February, 1945, more as a symbolic gesture than as an outrage. Even though, Turkish refusal to join the allied efforts more actively was seen by the allies as immoral and selfish, it was a tremendous victory for Turkish diplomacy especially after the disaster of the First World War. That it managed to not get into any serious harm at all during the Second World War was a major success for the pragmatic approach of the young republic. After the war, Turkey became one of the founding members of the United Nations.

Turkey becomes an ally of the West

Meanwhile, one side effect of Turkey's non-interventionist policy during the Second World War was a falling out with the Soviet Union with which Turkey previously enjoyed very close relations. On the other hand, as the Western European powers and the United States slowly started realizing the long term goals of Stalin for Eastern Europe, they started looking upon Turkey as a much needed strategic partner. Difficulties faced by Greece after the war in quelling a communist rebellion, along with demands by the Soviet Union for military bases in the Turkish Straits, prompted the United States to declare the Truman Doctrine in 1947. The doctrine enunciated American intentions to guarantee the security of Turkey and Greece, and resulted in large-scale US military and economic support (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 20-21). Hence, Turkey received significant aid, in terms of both finances and defense. It was the start of a strong alliance between the West and Turkey, an alliance based on mutual interests and calculations arising out of the then nascent cold war. An alliance, which would stand the test of time and would be beneficial for the West and also for Turkey (Larrabee 2003: 45-47).

Thus, Turkey rapidly got integrated into the world capitalist system in the post war years. It became a part of the political, economic and military structures of the West. This was in sharp contrast to the cautious neutralism, it had adopted during the Second World War. The reason for this was partly due to the fact that Turkey felt that there was now an opportunity to blend in with the European and Western nations and thus be recognized as one of them which was the goal of Turkey from the start of its republic. Turkey became a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and also of the Council of Europe. Far more important was Turkey becoming a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. It was celebrated by the Turks for both strategic and emotional reasons. Strategically, it guaranteed help in case of a Soviet aggression against Turkey. Emotionally, many Turks saw it as a dividend of their nearly three decades old painful efforts to modernize and Europeanize Turkey. It was taken as a sign that finally Turkey was treated as an equal partner by the Western powers. This feeling was widespread in Turkey as a celebration 'NATO Wine' was served in Turkish restaurants as late as the 1970s (Zurcher 1997: 235).

Europe begins to unite

Meanwhile, Europe which was devastated during the Second World War was designing means to prevent any such future wars. They decided to integrate the continent such that peace could be sustained in the future. Thus, in 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed, creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This was an international community based on supranationalism and international law, designed to help the economy of Europe and prevent future war by integrating its members together. In the aim of creating a federal Europe two further communities were proposed: a European Defence Community (EDC) and a European Political Community (EPC). While the treaty for the latter was being drawn up by the Common Assembly, the European Coal and Steel Community parliamentary chamber, the European Defence Community was rejected by the French Parliament. Jean Monnet, a leading figure behind the communities, resigned from the High Authority in protest and began work on alternative communities, based on economic integration rather than political integration. After the Messina Conference in 1955, Paul Henri Spaak was given the task to prepare a report on the idea of a customs union. The Report of the Spaak Committee formed the cornerstone of the intergovernmental negotiations at Val Duchesse castle in 1956. Together with the Ohlin Report the Spaak Report would provide the basis for the Treaty of Rome. In 1956, Paul Henri Spaak led the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and EURATOM at the Val Duchesse castle, which prepared for the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The conference led to the signature, on 25 March 1957, of the Treaty of Rome establishing a European Economic Community (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 22-23).

Turkey which was getting integrated into the other Western institutions saw the European Economic Community as the next target. The formal application of Turkey to become an associate member of the newly founded European Economic Community came in July, 1959 based on the article 238 of the European Economic Treaty which gave non-member states, an option of becoming an associate member (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 23). This was not unexpected. Turkey as noted earlier was already a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

And it was also seen by many commentators as the logical conclusion of Turkey's conscious efforts since the end of First World War to transform itself into a European country (Aydin 2003: 163). If it became a member, then Turkey would finally be a member of a European Community and thus European and would be recognised by the European nations as an equal. It made sense even economically for Turkey as it would open up European markets for Turkish goods and thus provide stimulus to Turkish economy.

Four years later, an association agreement between Turkey and the European Economic Community was signed on September 12, 1963. It came into effect from December 1, 1964. This came to be known as the Ankara Agreement and became the predecessor to Customs Union and full membership. The terms of this agreement were not broad as it did not cover the trade of agricultural products and also the free movement of labour. However, it envisaged a stage by stage integration process that would follow the successful completion of preparatory and the intermediary stages. The preparatory stage was completed on January 1, 1970. The Additional Protocol was signed on November 23, 1970 and it came into effect from January 1, 1973. Its ultimate aim was to establish a customs union between Turkey and the European Community by December 31, 1995. This method of having a prolonged integration time frame was chiefly due to concerns about the adapting capacity of the Turkish economy on exposure to the European economies and the accompanying competition (Önis 2000: 6). Turkish economy was not seen to be ready at that time for immediate integration with the European economy.

Hiccups on the way

However, everything did not sail smoothly as the 70s proved to be a troubled period for Turkey-European Community relations. The reasons were many. On the one hand, the domestic politics in Turkey was quite unstable. On the other hand, the European Community itself was struggling hard for internal cohesion and was not highly successful in formulating common European policies. On the domestic front, Turkey was affected greatly by the 1973 Oil crisis which led to internal political and economic instability. This culminated into political fragmentation and anarchy and as a result Turkey came under military rule in 1980 which was a setback for the Turkish

democratic system. However, this takeover lasted only for 2 years. (Özbudun and Tachau 1975: 460-80).

Another issue which strained the relationship between Turkey and the European Community was the Cyprus conflict (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 75). The Cyprus dispute is a territorial conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots over Cyprus, an island nation in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Since the arrival of the British on the island of Cyprus, the "Cyprus Dispute" was identified as the conflict between the peoples of Cyprus and Great Britain as a colonial ruler. The core of the dispute was the Cypriot demand for self determination. Britain shifted the "Cyprus Dispute" from a colonial dispute to a dispute between Turks and Greeks although Britain had denounced the agreement between herself and Turkey over Cyprus. Today, the problem is compounded by the involvement of Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom, USA, the United Nations and the European Union (Kalaycioglu 2005: 110). Since 1974 the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus has been divided. The dividing line which cuts across the country has created a physical and social barrier between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities. The Turkish Cypriot community declared itself as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This entity is not recognized by the international community and also is condemned by the United Nations Security Council Resolution No: 541 as legally invalid. Currently it is recognized only by Turkey.

The Cyprus issue had been a flashpoint between Turkey and Greece for a long time. Turkey's invasion and occupation of Turkish Cypriot regions in 1974 escalated this conflict with Greece. European Community was dragged into this conflict and it was unsure of how to handle it as all the parties involved, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus were all associate members of the Community. Turkey felt that the European community was biased towards the Greek positions. As an outcome of this, in September 1978, Turkey resorted to the Self Protection clause in Article 60 of the Additional protocol and suspended its relations with the European Community. Turkey started doubting the commitment of the European Community to the Association agreement and anti European sentiments began to spread in Turkey.

The European Community was also unsure whether to put Turkey under its Mediterranean policy or as an associate member. Further complicating the matter, Turkish military took over Turkey's regime on September 12, 1980. Also, Greece became a full member of the European Community in 1981 and thus this further strengthened the doubts of the Turks about the European Community. Thus, the Cyprus issue, combined with the internal political turmoil of Turkey meant that it failed to improve its relations with the European Community and it was a decade of deteriorating relationship. Turkish prospects of becoming a full member of the European Community were set back because of all of this. Becoming a full member of the European Community was not a high priority for the Turkish governments of this time as internal instability and the Cyprus conflict held their attention.

Turkey applies for full membership

However, both the European Community and Turkey underwent massive transformations during the 1980s. From early 1980s, Turkey began to shift its economic policies and started implementing neo-liberal, market oriented economic policies. Though the process of liberalization of the financial markets and the privatization of the state enterprises were not an easy task to deal with, the steady transformation process began to flourish after the holding of democratic elections in 1983. Turgut Özal became the Prime minister and becoming a full member of the European Community was a centre piece of his foreign policy agenda (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 14). On April 14, 1987, owing to the initiative of Prime Minister Turgut Özal, Turkey applied for full membership to the European Union on the basis of the Rome Treaty, which gave right to any European country to apply for full membership; then started the accession journey of Turkey.

On the other hand, Europe also went through a radical transformation during the 80s. In the first few years of the 1980s, the Cold War intensified after a period of détente due to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and also the tough posturing of the Reagan led United States administration. However, by the end of the decade, the Cold War was over with the West achieving a decisive victory. Soviet Union was beginning to crumble like a pack of cards. Europe heaved a sigh of relief and optimism was in the air. However, when Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, the European

Community was not ready to accept it with open hands due to lot of reasons. It was said that the Turkish record on human rights and the nature of polity was not yet up to the mark (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 31). The European Community was increasingly deepening itself at that time and hence was not ready for a big enlargement. Hence, the European Commission declared on December, 1989 that Turkish accession in near future was out of question and subsequently, the continuation of pursuing full Customs Union with Turkey was recommended.

Creation of the European Union

In the next few years, Europe was kept busy with the great deal of transformation that was happening (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 31). The Cold war ended and the unification of Germany, at least initially, raised fears in some sections of Europe (Leiby 1999: 51). This acted as a catalyst to integrate the European Community further as integration was seen as the best way to contain a unified Germany and eventually the European Community was transformed into the European Union with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Maastricht Treaty (formally, the Treaty of the European Union, TEU) was signed on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, the Netherlands after final negotiations on December 9, 1991 between the members of the European Community and entered into force on 1 November 1993 during the Delors Commission. It created the European Union and led to the creation of the euro and was a landmark in the post second world war history of Europe.

The Maastricht Treaty also created what is commonly referred to as the pillar structure of the European Union. This conception of the Union divides it into the European Community (EC) pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. The latter two pillars are intergovernmental policy areas, where the power of member-states is at its greatest extent. Under the European Community pillar were the Union's supra-national institutions — the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. All three pillars were the extensions of pre-existing policy structures. The European Community pillar was the continuation of the European Economic Community with the "Economic" being dropped from the name to represent the wider policy base given to it by the Maastricht Treaty. Coordination in foreign policy had taken place since

the beginning of the 1970s under the auspices of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). European Political Cooperation had been written into the treaties by the Single European Act but not as a part of the European Economic Community. While the Justice and Home Affairs pillar introduced cooperation in law enforcement, criminal justice, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters, some of these areas had already been subject to intergovernmental cooperation under the Schengen Implementation Convention of 1990.

The creation of the pillar system was the result of the desire of many member states to extend the European Economic Community to the areas of foreign policy, military, criminal justice, judicial cooperation to the European Community and the misgiving of other member states, notably the United Kingdom, to add areas which they considered to be too sensitive to be managed by the supra-national mechanisms of the European Economic Community. The compromise was that instead of renaming the European Economic Community, as the European Union, the treaty would establish a legally separate European Union comprising of the renamed European Economic Community, and of the inter-governmental policy areas of foreign policy, military, criminal justice, judicial cooperation. The structure greatly limited the powers of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European court of Justice to influence the new intergovernmental policy areas which were to be contained with the second and third pillars: foreign policy and military matters and criminal justice and cooperation in civil matters. This deepening meant that further enlargement was more complicated as there were more rules and more complications as the country which entered had to be accommodated in more number of institutions and spheres.

Moreover, the disintegration of Soviet Union resulted in the creation of new sovereign states in Central Eastern Europe who wanted to return to the fold of 'Old Europe'. The European Union also saw that as a means to stabilize these countries. This paved the way for further enlargement movement to flourish within Europe. The former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe applied for the European Union membership and the European Union recognized them as potential candidates. Sensing that the enlargement process should be more regulated as the volume was set to increase; European Union introduced the Copenhagen Criteria in the Copenhagen Council of 1993 which are the minimum prerequisites for the candidate countries to

become a member of the European Union. The criteria for membership were set as (i) Stable institutions, democracy, respect for human rights, and rule of law, (ii) A functioning market economy and a capacity to cope with competitive pressure and (iii) An ability to take on the obligations of membership such as the adherence to aims and policies of the Union (European Council in Copenhagen 1993).

In light of the developments taking place in the European Union and also due to the optimism of the times, Turkey-European Union relations were revitalized in the early 1990s. Hence, on March 6, 1995, Turkey signed the Customs Union Agreement with the European Union. Due to the poor human rights record of Turkey at that time, the likelihood of the European Parliament's assent to the Customs Union was seen as rather low. Nonetheless, in contrast to expectations, the European Parliament gave its consent to the Customs Union. The Agreement came into effect on January 1, 1996. This heightened the euphoria in Turkey and encouraged her membership aspirations. However, at the Luxembourg European Council of December 12, 1997, the European Union decided that several post Communist states were ready to begin membership negotiations, having sufficiently met the Copenhagen Criteria. That is to say that the European Union set the time table for the accession negotiations with six candidate countries - Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus for the next year. Turkey was excluded. This was said to be due to opposition from several member states and concerns about human rights in Turkey and also the role of military in Turkey's political culture (Rumford 2000: 334).

This led to widespread agitations in Turkey. In response to the Luxembourg decision, Turkey froze all political dialogue with the European Union and declined to participate in the European Conference convened in March 1998 for candidate countries. The next two years were a period of stunted political dialogue and mistrust between the European Union and Turkey (Rumford 2000: 334). Turkey was upset that the newly formed Eastern European countries which were neither cold war allies nor strategically important were being given preference over it.

Turkey granted Candidate Status

Consolation came to Turkey in the Helsinki European Council of 1999. The European Union agreed to treat Turkey in the same way as the post communist states although it

continued to recognize that Turkey fell short of the Copenhagen Criteria and thus was not eligible (as some other states were) for immediate accession negotiations (Commission of the European Communities Report 1999). In other words, the small chiding notwithstanding, the European Union granted an officially explicit candidate status to Turkey which once again produced hope in Turkey about a possible integration with the European Union. Despite the difficulties lying ahead for Turkey on its road to the European Union, the conferring of candidate status turned into a powerful catalyst and paved the way for Turkey firmly anchoring itself to its European bid.

The Helsinki decision encouraged the Turks to improve their democratic and political credentials (Tocci 2005: 74). Turkey initiated the 'National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis' in 2001. Post-Helsinki reforms taking place in Turkey strengthened the cards in Turkey's hands in its way to the Copenhagen Summit in 2002. However, this did not equal to mean that efforts to implement the reforms were sufficient enough to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria. The European Union, thus, clearly stated that Turkey's efforts were not sufficient enough to open accession talks. Subsequently, the European Union demanded to see a further progress in line with the practical implementation of all the previous reforms initiated by the Turkish government since 2001. At the Copenhagen Summit, Turkey was given an exact date, December 2004, with the prospect of opening accession talks on the condition of proper implementation of reform packages and meeting the Copenhagen political criteria.

By setting a certain date for the start of accession talks between Turkey and the EU, the Copenhagen European Summit paved the way for acceleration of the pace of Turkey's reform process, which had already been initiated in 2001. Eventually, in December 2004, the European Union agreed that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria; thus, accession talks were to be opened in October 2005 between Turkey and the European Union, subject to certain conditions. The opening of accession talks on 3 October 2005 sealed the decision taken on December 2004 and thus Turkey-European Union relations entered into a new phase. It is to be noted that much of the debate over Turkey's application until December 2004 revolved around whether Turkey had done enough to meet the political criteria of Copenhagen. The

debates about the impact of Turkish accession into the European Union started in a profound way only after the European Union accepted Turkey as a candidate country. In sum, a new phase in Turkey-European Union relations has started with the beginning of accession talks in October 2005.

On 3 October, 2005, the European Union opened Six Chapters out of the thirty five that need to be addressed during the accession negotiations. The chapters that were opened were Right of Establishment and Freedom to provide Services, Company Law, Financial Services, Information Society and Media, Statistics and Financial Control. In the June of 2006, another chapter on Science and Research was opened. However, there was a major setback in December, 2006. The Council, on the recommendation of the Commission suspended the membership talks with Turkey on eight chapters. This decision was made as a result of Turkish refusal to open its ports to Greek Cypriot traffic. Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement stated that the suspension would mean that 'the train will slow down but not stop' (Watt and Traynor 2006). This decision has been heavily criticised by many world leaders as sending negative signals to Turkey and also as a harsh decision. In Turkey, this decision resulted in understandably strong reaction against the European Union.

However, the chapter on Enterprise and Industrial Regulations was opened on 29 March 2007. Despite the re-opening of negotiations the psychological effect of the suspension continues to have an impact on relations between Turkey and the European Union, and may continue to do so for some time. However, there was a serious setback on the June of the same year when French President Nicholas Sarkozy who is opposed to Turkish accession into the European Union blocked the opening of the important chapter on Economic and Monetary Policy (Bilefsky 2007). However, progress continued to happen in other areas as the Chapters on Health and Consumer Protection and on Trans- European Transport were opened on December, 2007. More recently, in December 2008, the Chapters on Economic and Monetary Policy and Information Society and Media were opened.

Unclear fate of Turkey's membership prospects

Even though, the accession negotiations have been going on with Turkey for the past few years, it is still not clear what the outcome will be. The present governments in

France and Germany are strongly against the full accession of Turkey and have repeatedly expressed their opposition (Vucheva 2009). Turkey on the other hand while being keen to join the European Union as a full member is also apprehensive of the sweeping nature of some of the reforms demanded by the European Union. It is also insecure about the prospects of getting rejected in the end because of opposition from countries like France, Germany or Greece each of which have the veto over any accession, after doing all the painful work of reforming. A less tangible but present undercurrent is the rest of the world seeing the developments in the case of Turkish accession as a test of the espoused secularism of the European Union which so far has been largely a Christian club.

If one looks at the European Commission's progress reports on Turkey, the most significant impediment to progress since 2004 has been the poor human rights record of Turkey which has so far prevented Turkey from meeting the political elements of the Copenhagen Criteria. Having said that, it is also to be noted that Turkey's accession bid has also been greatly influenced by international and European politics.

A mere look at the composition of states that are in support and against the accession bid of Turkey reveals the complexity of the issue. United Kingdom and the United States have strongly welcomed Turkish accession as they continue to see the cooption of Turkey as a way to build a bridge with the Muslim world. They also believe that the prospect of becoming a member of the European Union would entice Turkey to reform itself into a progressive, liberal democracy which can be a role model for other Muslim countries. The European Union bureaucrats have long said that Turkey will be treated no differently than other states who are trying to accede. The European Union's Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, has vehemently insisted that full accession remains the endgame of negotiations with Turkey (Vucheva 2009). However, as noted before as well, several key member states have made their opposition to Turkish membership clear. The new French President Nicolas Sarkozy is a well-known opponent of Turkish membership and so is the German Christian-Democrat Chancellor Angela Merkel who has advocated a 'privileged partnership' for Turkey instead of full membership. Many other European Union member states such as Austria, Portugal, the Netherlands and Cyprus also oppose Turkish membership.

Chapter 4: Issues of the Accession

As noted earlier, ever since the deeper integration of the European Union in the early 1990s, the accession process has become a lengthy and a painstaking one for any country which is in the process of joining the European Union as a full member as the candidate country has to prune and fine tune many of its socio-economic and political institutions to align with that of the European Union. Apart from these technical aspects, politics also comes into play by a large measure as in the case of the Central and East European Countries when it is said that political reasoning trumped over socio-economic logics. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the accession process of the European Union is highly complex. This complexity is naturally heightened in the case of Turkey as it is the first big Muslim and also Eurasian country to be involved in accession negotiations with the European Union. Heinz Kramer says that the issue of Turkish accession 'is highly complex, multi-faceted and not easy to handle' (Kramer 2004: 1). This chapter will do a review of the various issues that have come up in the accession negotiations and are seen as potential hurdles to the accession of Turkey into the European Union.

The Copenhagen criteria are the cornerstone of the accession policy of the European Union. It can be divided into the aspects which deal with the economic and political arena. This chapter will analyze where Turkey stands as of now on those two fronts and point out the areas which are meddling with the progress. However, as mentioned earlier, the accession process is not just about the technical aspects enunciated by the Copenhagen criteria but also about the political and in the case of Turkey even the cultural ground realities that impact and influence both Turkey and the European Union. Hence, this chapter will deal with these issues as well in detail to understand and appreciate the intricate complexities of the accession process of Turkey.

The Cyprus conflict

A good issue to start with is the Cyprus conflict, an issue which has in the past resulted in the freezing of accession talks between Turkey and the European Union. It is all the more important because Greece and Cyprus who are parties to the conflict are also full members of the European Union and hence hold a veto with regard to eventual accession of Turkey. The conflict between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus intensified after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and since then has influenced

the development of Turkish-European Union relations (Suvarieol 2003: 55). The influence of this issue over Turkish-European Union relations was further aggravated when Greece became a member of the European Union in 1981 and later on when Cyprus became a member in 2004. Hence, the scope of Turkish-European Union relations have been necessarily censored or limited by the goodwill and interests of Greece and Cyprus despite Turkey's efforts to keep the Cyprus issue and the accession process in two different tracks.

The Helsinki European Council of 1999 declared that the resolution of the Cyprus issue is not a precondition for the accession of Turkey but that declaration is to be recognized more of a rhetoric than a fact. Turkey is expected to play an active role in bringing the conflict to its end, especially because Cyprus is a member of the European Union now and the internal cohesion of the European Union will be compromised if two of its member states are at logger heads with each other. Hence, as one author puts it *'Cyprus issue is a sine qua non for Turkey's membership'* (Suvarieol 2003: 52). However, solving the Cyprus conflict will not be easy as it touches the sensitivities of Turks and Greeks alike. The conflict of interests between the two parties appears too strong to get diluted easily.

In the perspective of Turkey, Cyprus was a territory of the Ottoman Empire and hence has historical and cultural significance. Hence, there is solidarity among the mainland Turks for the Turkish Cypriots. Apart from this emotional and nationalistic significance it is also to be noted that Turkey also sees its presence in Cyprus as of strategic importance as Turkey has many other Aegean disputes with Greece (Ayman 2004: 213). Cyprus is only about 40 nautical miles from the Anatolian coast and hence it offers Cyprus the possibility of blocking Turkish mobility in the seas from the gulf of Iskenderun. Hence, Turkey sees Cyprus as a possible launching pad for aggression against it. There is also a fear that if Cyprus becomes Greek, then the Anatolian coast would be surrounded by a string of Greek islands and Greece has been a historical enemy of the Turks and thus that plays on their psyche. Thus, this strategic importance made Ecevit, the then Prime Minister of Turkey to comment in 1998 that even if there were no Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, Turkey cannot still withdraw (Brey 1999: 111).

Thus, having these considerations, Turkey has long shown extreme unwillingness to compromise on the issue of Cyprus. When Cyprus applied for the membership of the European Union, Turkey tried its best to convince the European Union that it is not appropriate for it to incorporate Cyprus into its fold as it would further bias the European Union against Turkish position on the Cyprus issue. Turkey has always stood against the European Union's efforts to settle the dispute, arguing that since Greece which is a party to the conflict is also a member of the European Union; the Union cannot be impartial as an arbiter.

With regards to the European Union, it is severely influenced by Greece on this issue ever since the accession of Greece in 1981. Greece has exploited all the avenues available to push forward its interests in the Cyprus conflict within the European Union which is not unnatural as all the member states try to do that. The European Union has always tried to play a balanced and neutral role in the relations between Turkey and Greece. That is why an Association agreement with Greece was followed by a similar Association agreement with Turkey. As both of them were key NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies during the Cold War, the European Union did not want to have strained relationships with either of them. This was the reason that when Greece applied for the membership of the European Community, Turkey was also encouraged to do so but the then Turkish government was not keen and thus Greece became a member in 1981 and that complicated the relations between Turkey and the European Union. However, the European Union has consistently tried to leverage Greece's interest with regards to Cyprus to exact concessions for advancing Turkish accession process (Suvarieol 2003: 62-64).

The Cyprus conflict is a critical aspect which needs to be fixed before eventual Turkish accession. Turkey's reluctance to move away from a traditional strategic outlook to a peaceful and post sovereign outlook on the Cyprus issue is seen as a potential hurdle at which the talks can break. In response to Turkey's refusal to open up its ports to Cypriot ships and goods, the European Union has frozen its talks with Turkey on some key chapters. Turkey wants the European Union to open up trade and give aid to Turkish Cypriot which Cyprus; a member of the European Union is not allowing the European Union to do. Hence, there has been a kind of stalemate. Since, Greece and Cyprus both being full members of the European Union have a veto over

any eventual Turkish accession, the Cyprus issue almost most definitely needs to be settled before Turkey can accede.

Absorption capacity of the European Union

Another term one often hears while debating about the accession of Turkey is 'absorption capacity' of the European Union. Before we go into the specifics with regards to the Turkish case, one need to define what absorption capacity means with regards to the European Union. The concept first appeared in official texts in the conclusions of the Copenhagen summit of 1993, which stated:

> *'The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries' (European Council Meeting in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93, p. 14).*

The large and strenuous enlargement of 2004 intensified the debate about the absorption capacity of the European Union and at the June, 2006 European Council, the following conclusions were reached:

> *'The European Union reaffirmed that it will honour its exiting commitments and emphasised that every effort should be made to protect the cohesion and effectiveness of the Union. It will be important to ensure in future that the Union is able to function politically, financially and institutionally as it enlarges, and to further deepen the Europe's common project. Therefore the European Council will, at its meeting in December 2006, have a debate on all aspects of further enlargements, including the Union's capacity to absorb new members and further ways of improving the quality of the enlargement process on the basis of the positive experiences so far. It recalls in this connection that the pace of enlargement must take the Union's absorption capacity into account. The Commission is invited to provided to provide a special report on all relevant aspects pertaining to the Union's absorption capacity, at the same time as it presents its annual progress reports on enlargement and pre-accession process. This specific analysis should also cover the issue of present and future perception of enlargement by citizens and should take into account*

*the need to explain the enlargement process adequately to the public within
the Union'(European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 June 2006, p.
18).*

Thus, the term absorption capacity is one which is being used in official European
Union texts and thus discussing it is vital with regard to any future enlargement. Some
argue that this concept itself has been created mainly keeping an eye the accession of
Turkey (Emerson *et al.* 2006: 2). However, the term itself is not clearly defined in the
European Union texts. It is generally said to be the institutional, financial and political
limits of the European Union but discussions with regard to Turkey have also
wandered along to include cultural and social limits. One of the reasons for this
debate getting started with regard to enlargement in general is that the whole
enlargement idea itself is becoming more and more unpopular with the European
public as shown by the figure below.

Support for further enlargement in the EU

Source: Eurobarometer.

Graph 1 : Support for further Enlargement (Emerson *et al.* 2006: 5)

It is to be noted from the graph above that the support for further enlargement lies
below 50 percent level. Eurobarometer conducted a special survey across the
European Union in March-May 2006 to find out the attitudes of the European Union
citizens towards enlargement. The results show that there is common appreciation of
the political benefits of enlargement in maintaining peace and stability in Europe.

52

However, many were worried about the economic impact of successive enlargements on the national markets. They were apprehensive of the labour inflow from new enlargements and that leading to decreased job opportunities and also fear the shifting of companies and industries to those places where cheap labour is available. These perceptions about enlargement while not withstanding the scrutiny of various studies that have shown that the enlargement has benefitted the European Union economically, does carry political weight and highlight the failure of the European Union to create awareness about its successes (Eurobarometer 2006: 41-46). The following figure shows the fear across the European Union because of further enlargement on the national job market.

Perceived consequences of further enlargement on the national job market in 2006

Source: Eurobarometer data.

Graph 2 : Perceived Consequences of Enlargement on job market (Emerson *et al.* 2006: 6)

Thus, the European public while understanding the political and strategic benefits of the progressive integration of the European continent are not so sure about the economic benefits of it. This perceived fear among the European public is getting increasingly utilized by right wing xenophobic parties to whip up frenzy and this has led to the coming to power of or increase in the vote share of many right wing parties in many countries across Europe. Moreover, a significant percentage of Europeans also see a correlation between increase in crime rates and immigrants from newly

joined member states of the European Union. This irrational fear acquires a distinct socio-cultural element in the case of Turkey because of it being a Muslim majority nation. Turkey as shown in the figure below tops the chart for having least support among the European public. A whopping 55 percentage of the people of the European Union do not approve of the accession of Turkey and only 31 percent of the population is in favour of Turkey becoming a full member of the European Union.

The choice of future EU member states - Support for enlargement in 2005

Source: Eurobarometer data.

Graph 3 : Support for Enlargement (Emerson *et al.* 2006: 7)

It is no coincidence that the countries which top this unpopularity chart are all characterized by sizeable Muslim populations within them. It is as a result of such public unhappiness and resentment against the enlargement as a whole that the European Union floated the idea of absorption capacity.

Based on these data that reveal the perceptions about enlargement amidst the European public, the concept of absorption capacity can be developed and it is necessarily can be only hypothetical because of the fact that unlike the Copenhagen criteria, the official European Union texts do not explicitly and unambiguously define what absorption capacity is. Hence, this paper defines it based on the broad guidelines

given in European Union texts i.e.... 'political, financial and institutional' and adds 'Socio-cultural' as the fourth element because of the correlation between socio-cultural elements and support for a country to become a member amidst the European public as shown by the previous graph.

Political Aspects

With regards to the political sphere, the absorption capacity of the European Union can be defined as the ability of the European Union to maintain its political and strategic coherence and security even after the accession of a country. Turkey borders the volatile Middle East and hence if and when Turkey accedes to the European Union, the borders of the European Union will also extend till the Middle East and that in it will bring forth a new set of political and strategic challenges for the European Union. Turkey is situated in a place called by some as a 'geo-political minefield' surrounded by Iraq, Iran and plagued by the Kurdish question involved in the Middle East conflict, energy supply security and also Central Asian issues (Emerson *et al.* 2006: 20).

On these diverse and complex issues and areas, it is an open question whether Turkey and the European Union can work together and find a common ground. Turkey which is at the forefront in many of the above cited issues needs to play an active European role while taking care of its national strategic and economic interests. Thus, if it becomes a member of the European Union, how Turkey's full plate will affect the interests and calculations of European Union as a whole remains to be gauged. If the political and strategic interests of Turkey and the European Union are to clash in a serious, fundamental way after Turkey becomes a member of the European Union, it will not only undermine the coherence of the European Union but also further complicate the emergence of an already hesitant common security and foreign policy within the European Union.

Hence, the question being asked is does the European Union have the political and strategic capacity to absorb the political and strategic interests of an actor as big and as different as Turkey. Of course, there are certain visible political and strategic benefits if Turkey becomes a member of the European Union. If Turkey joins the European Union, then the European Union will have a large and historically Muslim

country as its full fledged member and thus giving it political mileage in the Muslim world and improving its image in the world. Europe's relations with the Muslim world can improve with Turkish help and it may even finally put to rest any speculations about clash of civilizations (Müftüler Baç 2006: 22-23). Thus, the accession of Turkey can be a political gain for the European Union. Strategically too, Turkish accession can be beneficial. Turkey does possess one of the best armed forces in the world which can be of great benefit to the European Union (Yilmaz 2006: 51-64). Turkey is also situated at the energy crossroads of the world and hence can play a critical role in improving the energy scenario for the European Union by giving it more options. These are all the perceived political and strategic benefits of Turkish accession.

These are the debates that are taking place with regards to the political and strategic implications for the European Union on account of the Turkish accession. The pros and cons are well known but it is difficult to do an objective cost-benefit analysis and come to a definite conclusion. Hence, it mostly is a matter of perception which in turn is influenced by the political will. Political will depends on various factors like domestic support or opposition to Turkish accession, international scenario etc at a given time and hence is a variable. The manner in which factors like domestic support, international scenario play out at the time when the European Union needs to take a final call on the accession of Turkey would probably determine answer to the question of whether Turkish membership is politically viable or not.

Economic Aspects

The absorption capacity of the European Union with regard to the financial sphere in case of Turkish accession is also of some concern. There is apprehension about the ability of the service and labour markets of the present member states to accommodate the inflow of cheaper services and labour from Turkey which has a large population who are more than ready to work cheaper. European Union already receives about 70,000 Turkish immigrants every year (Erzan *et al.* 2006: 41). The already famous caricature of incoming migrant labourers, probably best symbolized by the often repeated phrase of the 'Polish plumber', as ones who take away the jobs and opportunities of local craftsman has fuelled the growth of this concern about

Turkey. The "Polish plumber", a symbol of cheap migrant labour, became a catchphrase of the French "No" camp in the run-up to the referendum on the European Union constitution - which the French voters rejected. Turkey is generally perceived by the European public to be too big and too poor. However, the problem with regards to the goods and service sector is almost negligible because Turkey already has a customs union with the European Union. The only sector which may get affected is the agricultural sector but the European Union can find suitable ways to negate that.

A real worry exists with regard to the absorption capacity of the European labour markets. According to a study conducted in 2004, if free mobility of labour is instituted between Turkey and the European Union, then an estimated 2.1 million migrants can flow into Europe by 2030 (Erzan et al. 2004: 1). This can cause serious economic concern to the European national governments apart from causing social and cultural problems which will be elaborated when dealing with the social and cultural absorbing capacity of the European Union. Economically, the migrant labourers can dry up the jobs in member states leading to unemployment among the natives which can start a political tailspin which can harm the European integration project as national governments may start closing their borders. This has been a real worry (Flam 2005: 341-342).

Even though such worst case scenarios do exist, it is not all negative. A recent study by the European Union, conducted in 2008 has shown that the results of the Eastern Europe enlargement on the labour markets of Europe were not negative (BBC News 2008). The report has found that the proportion of Eastern Europeans living in Old European Union member states increased only marginally during the period ranging from 2003 to 2008 i.e. from 0.2 percent to 0.5 percent which is far less than what was feared when their accession took place. Even these migrants the report found out that, contrary to initial apprehensions, did not drive down wages but only filled up the jobs which were vacant and thus helped the economy to progress. Hence, if one juxtaposes the results of these study in the case of Turkey as well, then the scenario need not be necessarily bleak as feared by many. Moreover, one should not fail to look at the positive aspect of Turkish labour too. The European Union's demographic decline problem is well documented and well appreciated and the following graph highlights the intensity of the problem:

Graph 4: European Union's Demographic Forecast (Emerson *et al.* 2006: 13)

As the figure shows, the actual numbers of working population within the European Union is declining and as the graph shows, the future projections are not that bright. Hence some argue that inflow of workers from new members like Turkey is not only beneficial to the European Union but also is critical for it to maintain its economic growth. From this perspective, the prospective labour inflow from Turkey is not a liability but rather an asset to the European Union.

On the other hand, some studies have shown that there will not be a migration of alarming proportions from Turkey to the European Union if the former becomes a full member of the latter. One part of such arguments are based on the studies of what happened after the Eastern enlargement of the European Union (BBC News 2008) and some also point out the projected decline Turkey's own demography in coming years. The following graph shows the projected decline in Turkey's demography up till 2030:

% change in working age population 25-64 years old

Graph 5: Turkey's Demographic Forecast (Emerson *et al.* 2006: 13)

As the graph shows, Turkey's own working age population is set to decline in the next two decades, although more moderately than that of the European Union. By most estimates, it will take at least about a decade for Turkey to join the European Union considering the pace and the complexities of the accession negotiations that are happening. Hence, by that time, Turkey's own demography will be on the decline and hence will be a lesser threat to the labour markets of the member states of the European Union. It is also to be noted that some argue that studies conducted on past enlargements have shown that effective and fruitful accession period which involves high growth and effective implementation of the reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures. There is no reason for this not happening in the case of Turkey as well (Erzan *et al.* 2006: 43).

The absorption capacity of the European Union also involves its budgetary capability to accommodate Turkey (Flam 2005: 346). The European Union has an already well defined policy in place which redistributes most of its budgets to poorer districts of

the Union in order to foster development such that there are no regional disparities leading to lack of cohesion and discontent. Thus, there is apprehension that if Turkey becomes a member, it will qualify for a large amount of the European Union's funds and hence can become a huge liability to the Union. However, there are those who point out to the rapid growth of the Turkish economy and argue that if it becomes a full member, this growth can only improve and thus over a period of time Turkey can become a net contributor. They cite the example of Spain and Greece in this regard (Esen 2007: 4).

Institutional Aspects

Moving over, there are also concerns about the absorption capacity of the European Union institutions. This concern is not limited to only Turkey. Every enlargement so far has give rise to institutional concerns. Commenting on the eve of the European Commission's decision to recommend the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007, the President of the Commission said...

> *'We are not in a position to further integrate Europe without further institutional reform. There are limits to our absorptive capacity'* (Emerson et al. 2006: 14)

Even though, institutional reforms have taken place within the European Union, Turkey being a large and populous country definitely offers problems. Naturally, Turkey because of its size and population will be entitled to significant representation in all the bodies of the European Union. This will add pressure to the already stressed decision making processes of the European Union. It is argued that the accession of the Central and East European countries in itself had weakened the Franco-German motor of integration as multiple voices with multiple interests have to be heard and accommodated. In this scenario, it would be even more complicated and cumbersome to accommodate the interests of Turkey. By 2020, on current population trends, Turkey is likely to have more than 90 million people, making it the largest single state in the EU. As population size determines representation and voting strength in the Council of Ministers, and in the European Parliament, it is argued that Turkey would be able to dominate EU decision-making and set its own agenda, to the disadvantage of existing members.

However, it is to be noted that every country tries to set its own agenda and take care of its own interests in the European institutions and hence Turkey doing so should not be seen as something fearful. Moreover, since the European Union is a large entity, no single country can dominate its decision making processes. Turkey is a large country in European terms, but even if its population would make it the largest single European Union member by 2020, this would still only give it some 15 percent of the total in an enlarged European Union. This is a much smaller proportion than what Germany used to represent and hence it is farfetched to argue that Turkey would dominate the decision making processes of the European Union. Studies have shown that Turkey's accession would not undermine the European Union greatly and it would not affect the 'capacity to act' of the European Union (Baldwin and Widgrén 2005: 334-337). Hence, some argue that the accession of Turkey would pose no greater institutional challenge than every other enlargement has posed so far and it is only a matter of political will whether the European elite wish to accommodate Turkey or not (Esen 2007: 4).

Socio-Cultural Aspects

Questions of identity are also put forth when talking about the accession of Turkey. Some say that Turkey is not European enough as according to them it does not share a common European identity. To understand this one has to ask what the European identity is in the first place.

European identity is difficult to establish as the meaning of Europe has changed all too often in the history of the continent. The continent is so diverse and so rich in culture and with varied peoples that a single idea of Europe is too difficult to conceptualize and even if such an idea is conceptualized it would certainly be challenged by the diverse forces within Europe. There are some who even say that such a European identity among the common people is yet to come (Kaitatzi-Whitlock 2007: 685).

If one looks back at history, the notion of Europe has been more of a mental construct rather than a concrete geographical or social or political fact. There is nothing geographically different about this Europe which makes it markedly dissimilar from the Eurasian landmass. Similarly even socially, Europe of the past was well divided

and nothing was obviously tying the continent together. Political divisions and even rivalries existed and thrived in Europe throughout its history. Thus it is difficult to pinpoint an exact moment in history when the European identity arose.

Some say that the identity may have risen from the times of early Christianity. Probably their common history began then as the entire continent was swept by Christian culture. Even though the nations of Europe were fighting bitter wars with each other, at least the common overarching structure of Christianity gave them a common pole. Hence, Christianity can be arguably cited as a pillar of European identity (Park 2005: 232).

Slowly a brand of aggressive mercantile capitalism also became a trademark of Europe. This gave rise to exploration and colonial conquest of rest of the world by European nations. Thus, it can be said that if one looks back at history, Christianity, mercantile capitalism, colonialism along with some other socio-religious phenomena like reformation and renaissance give shape to what can be called as 'Europeanness' (Lowenthal 2000: 314-321).

Yet this sense of common past was too broad and too general-like to be called as a political identity. Even though scholars and politicians of even eighteenth century talked about the community of Europe, this community feeling did not prevent them from continually fighting with each other. The two world wars were thus results of competing European nationalisms and stand as violent testimonies to the differences and the hatred that existed between the European nations.

Only after the end of the end of the Second World War that a conscious effort was made to capitalize more on their common past to say a final goodbye to destructive national rivalries. This effort was made possible also by the post second world war political context. The presence of an external threat in the form of Soviet Union helped the European nations to group together and moreover the uniting role played by United States also deserves mention. A united Western Europe was in the interests of United States during the cold war and hence it also wholeheartedly supported the integration efforts of Western Europe. Aided by all these factors, European integration progressed steadily with initial emphasis on chiefly the economic sphere even though elements of common citizenship and identity were there even from the

first initiatives of the European community (Olsen 2008: 40-57). European integration slowly developed during the cold war period fuelled by materialist motives as well as the idea of the united Europe (Parsons 2002: 47-84).

The end of cold war threw major challenges to the European project but the European community prevailed against them and emerged stronger. The Central and East European countries were welcomed into the European community despite the huge costs. Some scholars say that European identity played an important role in the accession of Central and East European countries as they were accepted as fellow European nations without taking into account the tremendous costs involved in their accession. Europe was 'becoming Europe' again after the artificial cold war partition of it into east and west (Bilgin 2004: 269-291).

Now, if one looks at the European Union, it has definite characteristics of a Supra-national state. It has a parliament, an executive in the form of European commission and European wide economic and other policies are implemented by it as European nations have willingly surrendered a certain amount of their sovereignty to the European Union. One of the strong symbols of European integrations today is the 'Euro' which as a common currency is creating a sense of identity among the Europeans. Same can be said about policies like open borders etc which create a sense of identity amidst the peoples of Europe. Thus it can be said with reasonable certainty that a kind of European society with a common identity is slowly emerging. Europe is also developing an external identity as an international actor in the international system (Manners and Whitman 1998: 231 – 249).

Despite all these positive developments, the European identity is still hard to define and trace. People still largely identify themselves based on their respective national identities rather than on a pan-European identity. Europeans do not feel their 'Europeanness' in their day today life. This is due to several factors like the severe linguistic diversity in the European continent which prevents people from inter-mingling freely. The integration efforts have also been too much of top down and elitist without involving the common Europeans and this also is said to be reason for the lack of a 'European awareness' among common Europeans. Also the cultural stereotypes and jealousies still continue among the various nationalities. The lack of a

clear 'other' also makes it difficult for the European Union to rally its people. However slowly a post national European identity is emerging which would take time to develop though (Fossum 2001: 400).

The relationship between European identity and European enlargement needs to be understood. It is indeed very difficult to chart a visible process like European enlargement with an invisible value like identity. It can be said that European identity as such only complemented the other motives of European enlargement like securing the peace of Europe and economic prosperity. European identity thus cannot be shown to have played a decisive role in integrating Europe. Questions about identity were however also raised during the accession of Central and East European countries (Laitin 2002: 55-56).

However the extent of the controversy over the accession of Turkey in recent times seems to indicate that a common European identity, defined in a broad way involving principles of Christianity and common past of reformation and renaissance is a pre requisite for European Union's membership. Identities are asserted only when threatened. Thus, Europe's Christian identity appears to be asserting itself in the face of Turkish membership bid from many quarters in Europe.

The major reason for Turkey being seen as an alien nation is the Islamic nature of the Turkish republic. A majority of the Turks are Muslim even though the republic itself is staunchly secular in nature. Muslims have long formed the 'other' for Europeans as Christian Europe frequently united itself against common Islamic enemies in the medieval times (Park 2005: 232-233). This sense of other is still preserved largely, thanks to the problems European society faces even today with regards to Muslim migrants. The Muslim population of Europe more than doubled in the last three decades and the rate of their growth is only accelerating (Savage 2004: 27). European countries actually closed their borders to labor immigration following the first Arab oil embargo and the economic recession that followed. Even then it is said that nearly 500,000 immigrants who are primarily family reunification cases and 400,000 asylum seekers arrive in Western Europe each year. Muslims make up a large percentage of both these groups. Moreover, many also enter Europe illegally as well. Muslims make up so much of all these immigrant groups that one scholar says that in a number of

European countries, the words "Muslim" and "immigrant" are virtually synonymous (Savage 2004: 27). By 2015, Europe's Muslim population is expected to double, whereas Europe's non-Muslim population is projected to fall by at least 3.5 per cent (Taspinar 2003: 77).

This growing population of Muslims in Europe is creating lot of societal problems and one of them is ghettoization which happens particularly in industrialized, urban areas within clearly defined, poorer neighborhoods such as Berlin's Kreuzberg district, London's Tower Hamlets, and the suburbs of major French cities. Near about 2/5th of Muslims in the United Kingdom reside in the greater London area. In the case of France, nearly one-third of Muslims live in or around Paris and nearly one-third of Muslims in Germany are concentrated in the Ruhr industrial area. Muslims also constitute a significant percentage of population of all major European cities like Marseille, Malmo, Brussels, Birmingham, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Oslo, and Copenhagen. Muslims are no longer temporary laborers as they have become citizens of European nations and hence form an integral part of European nations.

It is to be noted that Islam itself is undergoing a lot of change in Europe and is becoming more and more institutionalized. However this generalization does not mean that there is a single community of Muslims in Europe. There are many ethnic and sectarian differences within them very much like European Christians and Jews. But in recent times Muslims increasingly identify first with Islam rather than with either their family's country of origin or the European country in which they now reside (Savage 2004: 30). A process of re-islamization is happening which significantly is more pronounced among younger Muslims.

Younger generation of Muslims are learning European languages and acquiring greater skills but they are increasingly less willing to assimilate into the European society. They fear that assimilation, that is, total immersion into European society, will strip them of their Islamic identity. Studies in Germany have found that second and third generation Muslims are less integrated into European societies than their parents or grandparents were (Zachory 2003: 15).

This existence of a separate Islamic identity within Europe poses lot of problems for European integration. After all Europe cannot claim fully and functionally integrated

65

when a significant percentage of its population feel alien towards it. This perceived alienation among the Islamic community has given rise to the phenomena of home grown Islamic terrorists in Europe (Savage 2004: 33). Since September 11, 2001, European countries have arrested 20 times more terrorism suspects than the United States (Kempe 2003). Despite being at logger heads with the Muslim world due to its support for Israel and the Iraq war, United States has shown greater capacity to assimilate its Muslim population than Europe.

The growth of Islamic population in Europe has also led to radicalization of politics within the European nations and right wing nationalist parties with anti immigrant agenda are gaining in popularity and support. Parties like Belgium's Flemish Bloc, the British National Party, Denmark's People's Party, Jean-Marie Le Pen's French National Front, Italy's Northern League, and Switzerland's People's Party are gaining in popularity. Many of the right wing parties in Europe are also skeptical about the European integration project as well and hence their rise is problematic to the European project.

All these factors complicate the European enlargement process and the European Union is increasingly realizing that it has to first address this issue. Europe's very identity is challenged by these developments and Europe till now has not responded properly. It is in this context that the accession of Turkey has to be analysed. There are fears that with the already present Muslim populations within Europe, not integrating, the right of free movement of people which Turkey would get if it becomes a full member will trigger an increase in the Muslim population of Europe, resulting in further complications for the European society.

Hence, the start of accession procedures with Islamic Turkey has triggered emotional and charged discourses. The presence of an Islamic identity within the European identity is problematic as a Euro-Islamic identity is not emerging as of now. As noted before, many of the right wing parties which have risen across Europe due to this nationalistic fervour are critical of the European project and thus increase in their popularity harms European integration. They are specifically against the accession of Islamic Turkey into the European fold. And again if the European Union goes ahead with the accession despite public opinion being clearly against it, it could strengthen

the hands of the right wing parties and provide them more fodder against the European project itself.

However, there are others who say that the accession of Turkey would ease these social tensions within Europe as the Islamic citizens of Europe who are feeling alienated will see that as an example of a secular and inclusive European Union and they argue that it is an effective way to deal with this conflict of identities. It will also send out a signal to the Islamic world that western values like democracy and Islam can coexist and discourage the notions that a clash of civilizations in inevitable (Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey 2004: 16).They also point out that if the European Union comes across as mean and rude to Turkey, just because it is Islamic, it would only further alienate the Muslim population of Europe. Also, it would also undermine the spectacular successes of the eight decade long Turkish efforts to remake itself as a European country and may strengthen the far right elements within Turkey and thus leading to its instability. Europe has to appreciate the fact that Turkey is different from other Islamic states as it is a secular democracy. It also has to recognize that it cannot wish away its Muslim population and hence have to deal with them and co-opt them into the mainstream such that they do not get alienated. They argue that in that endeavor, the accession of Turkey can help by ending the Islamic suspicions about the European ruling elite.

Yet, it is to be acknowledged that much of the European public sees the Islamic identity of Turkey not as an asset but as a baggage (Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey 2004: 26). Hence, it is increasingly becoming politically costly for national parties in some European countries to support the accession of Turkey. In the last elections in France and Germany, the people elected leaders who were opposed to the accession of Turkey, replacing the existing leaders who were in support. If this trend continues to grow, then this issue could become the single biggest hurdle for Turkey to cross in its bid to become a member of the European Union as this is something it cannot influence much by its actions.

Armenian Genocide

Another issue which often comes up during the discussion of Turkey's accession into the European Union is the Armenian genocide of the World War I. The Armenian

Genocide, also known as the Armenian Holocaust, the Armenian Massacres and by Armenians, as the Great Calamity, refers to the deliberate and systematic destruction of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire during and just after World War I. It was characterised by the use of massacres, and the use of deportations involving forced marches under conditions designed to lead to the death of the deportees, with the total number of Armenian deaths generally held to have been between one and one-and-a-half million. Other ethnic groups were similarly attacked by the Ottoman Empire during this period, including Assyrians and Greeks, and some scholars consider the events to be part of the same policy of extermination (Schaller and Zimmerer 2008: 7-14).

It is widely acknowledged to have been one of the first modern genocides. Even the Council of Europe has recognised it to be so (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1998). Many Western sources point to the systematic, organized manner the killings were carried out to eliminate the Armenians as proof of it being genocide.

The date of the onset of the genocide is conventionally held to be April 24, 1915, the day that Ottoman authorities arrested some 250 Armenian intellectuals and community leaders in Constantinople. Thereafter, the Ottoman military uprooted Armenians from their homes and forced them to march for hundreds of miles, depriving them of food and water, to the desert of what is now Syria. Massacres were indiscriminate of age or gender. The Armenian Genocide is the second most-studied case of genocide after the Jewish Holocaust (Rummel 1998). Some European Union politicians who are politically sensitive to the Armenian Genocide issue have pressed Turkey into formally recognizing the Armenian Genocide as a precondition for joining the European Union (Danielyan 2005).

The Republic of Turkey's formal stance is that the deaths of Armenians during the "relocation" or "deportation" cannot aptly be deemed as "genocide". They have tried to justify this position with a plethora of diverging justifications. They argue that the killings were not deliberate and the Ottoman government did not orchestrate them with planning and intent.

In 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan invited Turkish, Armenian and international historians to form a commission to re-evaluate the "events of 1915" by using archives in Turkey, Armenia and other countries. However Armenian president Robert Kocharian rejected this offer. Hence, this remains as a burning issue and can be a factor as many European countries have recognised the event as genocide. Turkey's reluctance to do so is seen as an effort to cling and justify its past mistakes instead of coming to terms with it, something what Germany has done after the Jewish Holocaust (Lobjakas 2006). Thus, Turkey's stubbornness on this is seen as an evidence of Turkey not having the values that created the European Union.

Minority Rights

Another issue which is also turning out to be a hurdle for Turkey's membership bid is the question of minority rights especially with regard to the Kurds. Turkey does have a minority policy but it is generally perceived to be deeply flawed. It accepts as minorities only those groups which were recognised as such in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. By the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, all the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey were acknowledged as minorities and were given special rights. This mainly meant all the Jews, Armenians and Greeks who were in Turkey (Kalaycıoglu 2005: 55). However, the treaty failed to acknowledge the presence of non-Turkish Muslims in Turkey, notably the Kurds. The Kurds thus were not accorded with any special rights and are treated as full and ordinary citizens of Turkey. In effect, as one scholar points out, the problem is that Turkey forcefully attempts to make the Kurds see themselves as Turks (Kymlicka 1995: 132). Understandably, Turkey has not had much success in doing so.

Turkey is greatly apprehensive about any major concession to the Kurds especially because of its ongoing, three decades long conflict with the Kurdish Workers Party, also more popularly known as PKK. The Kurdistan Workers Party began in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist organization under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. In 1978 the organization adapted the name "Kurdistan Workers Party" and waged urban war between the years 1978 and 1980. The organization restructured itself and moved the organizational structure to Syria between the years 1980 and 1984, just after the 1980 Turkish coup d'état. Their campaign of armed violence began in 1984. Initially it was

a rural based insurgency. The rural-based insurgency lasted between the years 1984 and 1992. The PKK shifted its activities to include urban terrorism between the years 1993 and 1995 and later between the years 1996 and 1999.

Turkey achieved a significant breakthrough when the leader of the party was captured in Kenya in early 1999. After a "self declared peace initiative of 1999," the PKK returned to active stage in February 2004. With the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the United States and the subsequent defeat of the Iraqi army, much of the arms of the former Iraqi army fell into the hands of the Kurdish Peshmerga militias. This has been the pretext for numerous Turkish attacks on the Kurdistan region of Iraq (Park 2005: 241).

However, Turkey has tried to make concessions since 2004, owing to pressure from European Union accession negotiations. It has been trying to accommodate the legitimate demands of the Kurdish minorities. Following legislation, Kurdish language schools were opened for the first time in Turkey in 2004 but they were closed down in 2005 citing lack of demand as reason (Yigal 2005). Public schools do not teach Kurdish and no public service is also available in that language. Private schooling in Kurdish is legal but since they are expensive, it is not effective and prevalent. However, there were some progressive steps taken by the Turkish government in the year 2008. The broadcasting law was amended in June 2008 and the government started discussions about a state controlled Television broadcasting system in the Kurdish language. As a result, the state-run Turkish Radio and Television's (TRT) new Kurdish-language channel, TRT-6, went on the air on January 1, 2009 (Siddique 2009). While, this is a major step forward, huge progress needs to be made by Turkey in this regard to convince the Europeans and others that it is sincere in accommodating the rights and concerns of the minorities living within it.

Human Rights

There is also great concern in the European Union about the human rights record of Turkey. The 2005 EU Commission Progress Report referred to a large number of grave human rights problems in the realms of freedom of expression, torture and ill treatment, and the freedom of association and peaceful assembly (European Commission Progress Report 2005). The 2006 and the 2007 European Commission

Progress Reports contained even sterner criticisms of the human rights situation in Turkey. They highlighted the gap between reforms on the statute book and the actual practice. Many laws that had been enacted were found to be either blatantly not followed or circumvented.

With regard to torture and ill treatment, Turkey has taken certain efforts like reducing the pre-trial detention periods for prisoners. The detainees have been provided access to medical examinations and legal counsel. While these moves have been welcomed in European circles, they are not enough and some critics even say that they are just cosmetic. Turkey failed to agree to the much needed independent inspections of detention facilities in spite of a recommendation on this regard by none less than the Council of Europe's anti-torture committee (European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Report 2004). In 2006, Turkey enacted a new Anti-Terror law to amend the preexisting Law on the Fight against Terrorism enacted in 1991 (Act 3713). This new law removed the detainees' automatic right to access a lawyer. Article 9 of the law provides that the detainee's right to see a lawyer can be restricted for 24 hours, which is usually when the detainee is at the greatest risk of being tortured.

The 2008 progress report of the Commission did not say that there was any visible, significant progress made by Turkey against torture since 2007. The report says that while there is a decline in torture under detention by the police, torture exists outside of detention and such cases have increased which implies that the police have sophisticated their means of torture to avoid legal prosecution (European Commission Progress Report 2008: 69). Hence, a lot more is yet to be done by Turkey in terms of both legislation and stronger implementation mechanisms to be able to meet the European standards with regard to torture and ill treatment. European Union considers this issue to be of first-rate importance and hence unless Turkey takes credible steps to eradicate torture both in law and in practice, it is highly unlikely for it to get the assent of the European Union for accession.

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression in Turkey is also a cause of concern. In fact, there has been increasing concerns about this because of the fact that between the period 2005 to

2008 there has been a large increase in the number of persons prosecuted for expressing non-violent dissenting opinions. The number almost doubled between 2005 and 2006 (EU Commission Progress Report 2007: 15). The 2006 anti terror legislation was the chief reason for this increase. Freedom of the Press 2007 reported that 'constitutional provisions for freedom of the press and of expression exist, but are only partially upheld in practice and have been increasingly undermined by the more restrictive measures of the new Turkish Penal Code' (Freedom House Report 2007).

Articles 216 (incitement to hatred), 220 (propaganda made through media, about the goals of an organisation which has been established in order to commit crimes) and Articles 301 (denigration of Turkishness – amended to 'Turkish Nation') are some of the articles that are being widely criticised as curbing the freedom of expression and fostering an illiberal climate. Turkey did try to reform a few things such as in April 2008, after several years of criticism from human rights organisations and foreign governments, Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code was amended. However, the amendments were seen by many as largely cosmetic, and could in fact further politicise the judicial process and therefore lead to a worsening of the human rights situation in Turkey (European Commission Progress Report 2008: 15-16). Hence, even in this regard, Turkey has to make significant progress in order to be able to reach the standards of the European Union.

There are also severe curbs on the right of citizens to freely associate and assemble and little progress has been made on this regard even before 2004 or ever since. Non-violent criticisms and dissenting voices about sensitive subjects like the military, the Kurds or the Armenian genocide were met with oppression and suppression. Turkish government did not hesitate to use it's the several anti democratic legislative provisions it has under its command to prosecute the dissenters. Scenes of non-violent women demonstrators being beaten with truncheons and dispersed with tear gas in March 2005 were greeted by the European Union with shock and concern at the use of 'disproportionate force' (BBC News 2005). The question of whether Turkey will ever sufficiently reform itself both legislatively and practice wise in the case of freedom of expression to fully meet the European Union standards still remains and does cast a shadow on eventual Turkish accession.

Fulfilling the Economic Criteria

Another area where Turkey has to do more to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria is the economic sphere. According to a report prepared in 2008 by the General Directorate of the European Union Affairs, a subdivision of the State Planning Organization, titled "Economic Developments in EU Member and Candidate Countries:, Turkey has been able to fulfill the Maastricht criteria only partially so far (Today's Zaman News 2008). These criteria are the five basic standards that have been set out in the Treaty of Maastricht, that need to be met by a candidate country that seeks to become a full member of the European Union.

The European Union mandates that the candidate countries should have price stability and an inflation rate of no more than 1.5 percentage points above the rate for the three European Union countries with the inflation over the previous year. The candidate country is also required to have a budget deficit rate that is below 3 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. The public debt of the country must also not exceed 60 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. However, if the debt levels of a country show a steady decline, then that country may be allowed to adopt the Euro as its basic currency even if its current debt levels are higher than this rate. Another important standard which the European Union insists is that the long term interest rates of a candidate country should be no more than 2 percentage points above the rate in the three European Union countries with the lowest interest rates over the previous year. Lastly, the European Union is also conscious of the exchange rates of the currency of a candidate country. The exchange rate should have stayed within the pre-set margins of fluctuation for at least two years. Thus, in effect, the Maastricht Criteria calls for a healthy basic economic performance indicators from a candidate country. This is implemented strictly in the case of candidate countries despite the fact that even some of the member states do default in this regard.

In the case of Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR), Turkey has performed even beyond the European Union standards. However, in the case of interest rates and inflation, Turkey has been found wanting. Turkey has three times more inflation than the necessary European Union standards for inflation. The Maastricht criteria require the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to be at most 2.8 percent annually. For Turkey, the

Consumer Price Index stood at 8.8 percent for the year 2007 while the average inflation rate for the European member states standing at 2.4 percent with Malta having the lowest inflation rate of 0.7 percent (Today's Zaman News 2008).

There was deviation in the case of Turkey's long term interest rates as well. The European Union's criteria ask for a 5.3 percent compounded interest rate annually. In the case of Turkey, the annual compounded interest rate for the year 2007 stood at 18.3 percent. This inability to tackle high interest rates has become a recurring problem for Turkey despite showing credible growth in other areas. Annual interest rates stood at 14.9 percent in 2004, 16.2 percent in 2005 and 18 percent in 2006. A decline can be noticed in Turkey's performance in this regard. Germany and Sweden had the lowest interest rates of 4.2 percent for the year 2007 (Today's Zaman News 2008).

Turkey however showed remarkable fiscal discipline which resulted in a sharp decrease in the budget deficit as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This was also a result of the expanding sphere of the registered economy. This decrease in deficit had a positive impact on the Public Sector Borrowing Requirements as the government's need to borrow from the market through bond auction was lifted. As a result, Public Sector Borrowing Requirements as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product, fell to -1.2 percent for the year 2007. This has been a reduction from the -4.2 percent of the year 2004. This is a fulfillment of the European Union criteria which necessitates a candidate country to have at most -3 percent in this category (Today's Zaman News 2008).

Turkey also showed considerable success in reducing the rate of total debts stock over Gross Domestic Product. The European Minimum standard in this regard is 60 percent. Turkey stood at 59.2 percent in the year 2004 and that dropped to 52.3 percent in the following year and to 46.1 percent in 2006. This trend continued in 2007 as well with the rate standing at 38.8 percent. Among the member countries, Estonia has the lowest debt stock over the Gross Domestic Product with 3.4 percent, followed by Luxembourg which has 6.8 percent and Latvia which has a 9.7 percent debt stock over the Gross Domestic Product.

To conclude, the Copenhagen declaration says the following...

"Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union"

As we saw, Turkey has been making progress in implementing the political and economic criteria of accession with mixed results so far. In the political front, the issue of human rights and minority rights remain the biggest challenges for the Turkish government to deal with. They are finding it difficult to reform a police force which has got comfortable and in some ways dependent on human rights violations. The Kurdish issue invokes widespread sensitivity among the Turks and hence the question of minority rights also poses difficult choices for the government. These seem to be the major political challenges for Turkey to overcome. With regard to the economic criteria, as shown, Turkey has made significant progress in respect to having a functioning market. Further reforms need to be done to control inflation and long term interest rates. But it would be really difficult for the European Union to reject Turkey's application based on the economic criteria because not only has Turkey made significant progress but also the fact that the European Union admitted Eastern European Countries despite severe economic strain (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 93).

However, as noted earlier, issues like the Cyprus conflict or the question of Armenian genocide can still derail the accession process. Also, as discussed before, the somewhat ambiguous absorption capacity of the European Union also is to be taken into account. Whether the European Union institutions have the flexibility to take in a big country like Turkey or whether the European Union's labor markets will be able to accommodate Turkish labor inflow are questions that fall within the absorption capacity debate. Also, the political and security implications of Turkish accession are also being debated. May be, the issue which has the most resonance with the European public is the question of whether Turkey as an Islamic country is European enough to become a part of the European Union.

Chapter 5: Norms and the Accession of Turkey

This chapter will first spell out why a norm based explanation is being proposed in the case of Turkey. Then it will proceed to the explanatory part, basing itself on the theoretical background laid out in chapter 2. Hence, it would first identify both the formal and informal norms that play a role in the Enlargement process of the European Union. It would then proceed to show how these norms shape the identity of the European Union as a whole and also the identities of the member states and thereby restricting their scope for action in the case of the accession process of Turkey.

Firstly, one needs to ask why a norm based proposition is being propounded in the case of Turkey. Turkish accession is a unique case for the European Union to deal with, not only because Turkey is a Muslim majority country but also because of the fact that, for the first time in the history of the European Union, there is a situation in which many of the prominent member states of the European Union, including France and Germany are opposing the accession of a country. It has to be kept in mind that these two countries were often called as the motors of European integration. The startling aspect however is not their public opposition but the fact that the accession of Turkey keeps on marching ahead despite opposition from two of the most powerful member states of the European Union. The strangeness of this should not be underestimated. For instance, no country can become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) if the United States of America and the United Kingdom are opposed to it.

But in the case of Turkish accession, the accession process is progressing despite French and German opposition. It is also to be noted that it is not a silent and ambiguous opposition that France and Germany are exhibiting. The French President has repeatedly expressed his opposition towards the accession of Turkey into the European Union in public forums and to press. Same is true in the case of Germany as well (Vucheva 2009). Hence their opposition is unambiguous, tangible and well documented. And they have the means to block the progress of Turkish accession process as they can prevent the opening of new chapters or even be aggressive and scrap the whole process itself. Yet, despite their public posturing against the accession of Turkey, both Germany and France have repeatedly allowed the opening of new

chapters in the accession of Turkey and have so far never even made a serious attempt to derail and scrap the accession process of Turkey wholly.

For a neutral observer, this should be astounding. Realists argue that states only care about their interests and try to maximize them based on their power capabilities. In this case, France and Germany have already declared their opposition to the accession of Turkey and hence they definitely perceive it as not being in their interests. They, being prominent states of the European Union, do have the power capabilities to fulfill their interests. Despite all of these, they still do nothing to stop the progressing accession process of Turkey. Hence, a power based explanation is unable to explain this behavior from France and Germany specifically and the other states in the European Union which oppose Turkish accession.

However, it is not to be understood that a norm based explanation is being proposed in the case of Turkey alone for the first time. Some scholars had done the same with regard to the accession of the Central and East European countries as well. It has been argued that it was because of the community norms of the European Union that it had to give full membership to the East European countries despite the severe economic and institutional toll it took on the European Union (Schimmelfennig 2001: 47-48).

While that may be true, Turkey offers a still more solid case to observe the impact of norms because the major issue at which countries like France and Germany oppose Turkish accession is one of identity and that is something which cannot and will not change. In the case of the East European countries, it can be argued that the long term economic benefits of the accession facilitated the European Union to bear the short term costs.

However, the Islamic identity of Turkey is something which is not going to go away in the long term and is going to persist. The prospect that the Muslim population of the European Union would rise to around 20 percent of the overall population in the case that Turkey became a member is something that is not going to change, nor can it be changed with negotiations or legislations. Hence, this 'non-Europeanness' of Turkey being the central plank of the oppositional discourses to Turkish accession in France and Germany, it makes no sense for both of them to persist with the accession process of Turkey. Yet, they do. Thus it can be safely argued that the traditional

rationalist analyses fail to explain this persistence of France and Germany despite their well documented opposition.

This is the reason a norm based explanation is being proposed in the case of Turkish accession. In most of the previous enlargements of the European Union, there was no significant opposition from the governments of the member states. And even if there was some opposition, it was mostly regarding one or other of the technical aspects of the accession process but nothing that could not be negotiated and resolved. In the case of Turkey however, there is significant opposition from member states and the issue of identity is something which cannot be negotiated and changed. These aspects necessitate a norm based explanation to understand the continued progress of the accession of Turkey.

Membership Norms

Before attempting a norm based explanation, the various formal and informal norms that play a role in the membership process of the European Union need to be ascertained. Formal norms are those that have been institutionalized by the European Union treaties and practices.

The European Union Membership criteria are defined chiefly by two documents:

- The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (Article 49) — which outlines the geographical criteria and general policy criteria.

- The declaration of the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen, commonly known as the Copenhagen criteria— which describes the general policy criteria in clearer detail.

Article 49 of the 1992 treaty of Maastricht declares that 'any European state' can apply to become a member of the European Union provided that it adheres to the requisite principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. The Copenhagen council elaborated on this and laid out more detailed policy criteria involving the political, economic and legislative spheres.

Political Criteria

Political criteria involve conditions regarding democracy, rule of law, human rights and minority rights (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 151).

Democracy

The candidate country should guarantee that all the citizens of the country are able to participate on an equal basis in the political decision making system of the country at every single governing level i.e. from local municipalities up to the highest i.e. the national level. This would mean free elections with a secret ballot and the right to establish political parties without any hindrance from the state or law. Also provisions in the law for the existence of a fair and free press which is a necessary aspect of any democracy. It should also mean that the workers have access to organise and form trade union organisations without intervention and obstruction from the government. The freedom to have personal opinion must be respected and protected. And crucially the executive powers of the government must be restricted by laws that provide for the existence of judges who are independent of the executive.

Rule of Law

The rule of law is an important criterion that implies that government authority will not be unrestricted and is exercised only in accordance with documented laws, which were adopted through an established procedure of the legislature elected by the people of the country. The principle is intended to be a safeguard against the government becoming arbitrary and extra judicial.

Human Rights

Human rights are those rights which every person holds because of his/her quality as a human being and thus human rights should be made "inalienable" and belonging to all humans. If a right is inalienable, that means it cannot be bestowed, granted, limited, bartered away, or sold away. These include the right to life, the right to be prosecuted only according to the laws that are in existence at the time of the offence, the right to be free from slavery, and the right to be free from torture (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 161).

The requirement to fall in line with this formulation forced several nations that recently joined the European Union to implement major changes in their legislation, public services and judiciary.

Respect for and protection of minorities

Members of such national minorities should be able to maintain their distinctive culture and practices, including their language (as far as not contrary to the human rights of other people, nor to democratic procedures and rule of law), without suffering any discrimination. It includes any ethnic, linguistic or religious people that define itself as a distinctive group, that forms the historic population or a significant historic and current minority in a well-defined area, and that maintains stable and friendly relations with the state in which it lives.

Economic criteria

The economic criteria, broadly speaking, require that candidate countries have a functioning market economy and that their producers have the capability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. The European Exchange Rate Mechanism has been used to prepare countries for joining the Eurozone, both founding and later members (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 50-127).

Legislative Criteria

Finally, and technically outside the Copenhagen criteria, comes the further requirement that all prospective members must enact legislation in order to bring their laws into line with the body of European law built up over the history of the Union, known as the *acquis communautaire*. In preparing for each admission, the acquis is divided into separate chapters, each dealing with different policy areas. For the process of the fifth enlargement that concluded with the admission of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, there were 31 chapters. For the talks with Croatia and Turkey the acquis has been split further into 35 chapters.

Other Informal Norms

While these are the formal norms that apply in the case of accession, the European Union has also developed several informal norms that also come into play in the case

of accession. Specifically on the question of opening negotiations with a new member state and also on the question of the rate of progress of a particular candidate country towards accession, the member states depend on the recommendations of the European Commission and implement its recommendations almost all the times. This has become a norm. For example, if the Commission recommends that a candidate country has sufficiently implemented the requirements of a particular chapter and thus that chapter can be closed, then the member states generally agree to the Commission's proposition. Since this norm has become so established, the candidate countries and the international community also watch how this gets done, adding to the normative pressure on the member states not to contravene the recommendations of the European Commission.

Norms constrained Member States

Before going further, it is imperative to note how these norms played out in the case of Turkish accession so far.

The geographic criteria demanding that the applicant states to be 'European' geographically has been brought into highlight in the case of Turkey which has only 3 percent of its territory in Europe and the rest in Asia. However, the European Union by accepting Turkey as a candidate country has effectively closed this discussion as that is tantamount to accepting Turkey as a European state. Hence, no member state can anymore cite this criterion to push Turkey out of its membership bid.

Meanwhile, by opening accession negotiations with Turkey based on the recommendation of the European Commission, the member states have given explicit candidate status to Turkey which means the they recognize that Turkey has successfully fulfilled the pre-accession criteria. They cannot go back on that now.

Hence, it is to be noted that it was the norms that bound the hands of the member states that gave candidate status to Turkey and resulted in the starting of the accession negotiations. However, the framework of the accession process with Turkey does give the warning that it is an open ended process that can lead to a membership or rejection.

Some tend to argue that Turkey was accepted as a candidate country and accession negotiations were started with it at a time when the political climate was best suited for it. The ruling elite of France and Germany of that time were not in opposition to the accession of Turkey. Hence it can be argued that it was not norms but this favorable political climate that led to Turkey being accepted as a candidate country. While there is some credence to this argument, it is to be kept in mind that public opinion within many member states even at that time was in opposition to the accession of Turkey. However, even if one accepts the argument that the favorable ruling parties in member states only facilitated the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, the argument gets diluted and exposed when one looks at what the current ruling parties in France and Germany, which are openly in opposition to the accession of Turkey, have done with regards to the progression of the accession of Turkey. Their rhetoric notwithstanding, they have repeatedly allowed new chapters to be opened in the accession process. In fact, chapters were opened even during the French Presidency. Hence, it is clear that it is the membership norms that constrained the member states from preventing Turkey from becoming a candidate country or halting its progression in the accession progress.

What is to be understood is that logic of appropriateness came into play because of the normative framework that existed with regards to enlargement. Once the European Commission recommended that Turkey was ready to start accession negotiations, then the member states were left with no legitimate grounds to say no even though their material interests may have collided with it. It was not appropriate for them to say no and hence they did not. This was visibly true in the last few years when even governments which were publically opposed to Turkish accession allowed further chapters to be opened whenever the Commission recommended so, thus undermining their own stated positions.

Now, the only legitimate way the member states can ward off the accession of Turkey is if Turkey fails to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Even this failing should be adjudged by the European Commission and then the member states can legitimately deny Turkey full membership of the European Union. As of now, this does not seem to be happening as Turkey seems to be progressing decently with regards to its accession reforms.

Some argue that the notion of 'absorption capacity' which the European Commission floated in its November 2005 enlargement strategy can be used as a legitimate way to deny Turkey full accession. This is highly improbable because this term has not been defined unambiguously by the European Commission and since then, no procedural rules have been laid to evaluate the absorption capacity with regards to each particular enlargement. Moreover, absorption capacity as laid out in the November 2005 enlargement paper is defined only in terms of institutional, financial and political terms. The expected standard in all of these spheres has already been laid out by the Copenhagen Criteria and hence having that precedent it would be very difficult and inappropriate for the European Union to deny membership for a country that has fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria based on 'absorption capacity'. That is the reason the European Commission President Barroso remarked at that time that it was not a new criterion.

Member States

Having analyzed, how the member states are constrained by the European Union membership norms, it is pertinent to analyze why the member states did what they did based on how their identity has been formed. As noted in Chapter 2, every state develops two identities: Role and type identities. Role identities are created by the inter-subjective understanding of the shared history between states and type identities are created by the international social structure (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 399).

The type identities of the member states of the European Union are also shaped by the international social structure in which they exist. However, since they are part of the European sub system, the social structure of the European continent has the biggest impact on them. Thus, the member states being part of the European Union have in themselves the type identity of being a European state. Thus, their interests are defined by this identity. Hence, upholding the norms and practices of the European Union itself becomes an interest for the European states even if that clashes with some of their narrow, parochial national interests. A 'democratic state' cannot support authoritarian processes within it and similarly a 'capitalist state' cannot follow Marxist principle as these actions would be in contradiction with their identities even if they were beneficial at certain points of their history. They would not do so

because; they have internalized the norms that are associated with democracy and capitalism (Wendt 1999: 293). In the same way, the European States have internalized the norms of the European Union. So in the case of Turkey, the only way, the member states could have either blocked the opening of the accession negotiations or derailed the accession process is by going against the recommendations of the European Commission. They did not do it because it went against their interests as a European state as that would have ultimately undermined the European Union as an institution which the member states even the ones who oppose the accession of Turkey see as not in their interest in the long run.

Also, it has to be noted that much of the oppositional discourse in countries like France and Germany stemmed from the Islamic nature of Turkey. But this concern was not brought up within the European Union because the European Union has a secular identity and hence there was no legitimate way or forum which enabled the member states who considered the Islamic nature of Turkey as a problem to raise the issue. The membership norms as enunciated by the Copenhagen criteria do not talk about religion at all and hence it provides no scope for the member states to prevent the accession process of Turkey from progressing further on the grounds of the Islamic nature of Turkey. One should also note that the member states themselves also have a type identity of being secular states and hence even though they see the Islamic nature of Turkey as against their interests, it would be embarrassing and a contradiction of their own identities to derail the accession process of Turkey on the grounds of religion.

Till now, it has been shown that the type identity of being a European state prevents the member states of the European Union from taking actions that undermine the institutional coherence of the European Union. Hence, unless until they have some legitimate and appropriate way to prevent something, they would not prevent it as it would be illegitimate and inappropriate. A legitimate and appropriate way in this case would be if the European Commission recommends against the continuation of accession process of Turkey. Then the member states can stop the accession process of Turkey. Since, such a legitimate way has not been provided so far, the accession process of Turkey has been continuing.

Role identity also plays a role. In this case the relationship that is to be chartered is not between two states but between the member states and the European Union. The question to be asked is how the member states view themselves with respect to the European Union. This viewing is shaped by the history of the last fifty years. Specifically, the question to be asked is what role the member states perceive to be theirs with regard to the European Union, over the questions of the enlargement of the European Union. To answer this, one needs to look at the history of the past enlargements of the European Union and find out the common patterns which have given rise to these role identities in the member states.

Throughout the history of the European Union, member states have rarely blocked new countries from joining the European Union. French opposition to the inclusion of United Kingdom is a glaring exception but that was during the initial years of the European Community and also due to narrow political reasons. Apart from that, the member states have been facilitators of the enlargement of the European Union. Especially, no country has ever been blocked after the start of the accession process. Hence, it can be concluded that the member states largely see themselves as 'facilitators' and 'pushers' of the enlargement of the European Union rather than 'blockers'. They are 'friendly' to the enlargement of the European Union. That is how 'other' states of the world expect the European states to behave which results in what Wendt calls as 'reflected appraisals' or 'mirroring' which makes the states to play their role (Wendt 1999: 327). Thus, the European States tend to see the accession process as something which is ultimately in their own interests. That has been the subjective understanding as shown by the patterns in the historical role played by member states with regard to the enlargement of the European Union.

Hence, having developed such a role identity, it is difficult for any member state to break with the past and see themselves in a different role even if it is in their material interests. Because, firstly, it will be quite uncharacteristic of their own past behavior and will set a precedent and that may not be helpful in the long run. Secondly, since group dynamics and peer pressure play a role in a collection of states like the European Union, they will be hindered from coming out strong in a way which is different from the rest of the group and also past behavior, because of the fear of being seen as the odd man out, sort of similar to the fear of getting socially outcaste. It

is tough for a state to contradict its own role identity (Wendt 1999: 327). Therefore, even though, France and Germany and some other countries are personally not in favor of the accession of Turkey into the European Union, they did not push that opposition in the group setting of the European Union as that would call for them to change their role identity which is a difficult and extravagant step to take.

European Union's Identity

Having analyzed how the type and role identities of the member states created by the norms and practices of the European Union impacted the accession process of Turkey, it is also important to understand how the type and role identities of the European Union, impacted the accession process of the European Union. Even though the European Union is not a state, as we noted in Chapter 2 international institutions also develop identities and interests based on their history, purpose of creation and environment. It is important to know how these three factors: History, Objective/Purpose and Environment have interplayed in the case of the European Union in the area of Enlargement.

Even if one takes a short look at the history of the enlargement of the European Union, it will be clear that the European Union has always been favorable of enlargement. It has always encouraged the accession of new member states. It can be said that the European Union, generally identifies itself as a 'pusher' and a 'regulator' in the sphere of enlargement. Henceforth, in the case of Turkey, the identity of being a 'pusher' makes the European Union a strong supporter of the accession of Turkey and this has been the case. The European Union has always said that Turkey's accession process would be no different from that of other member states. Even when national leaders of member states like France casted doubts publicly on the possibility of Turkish accession, the European Union has always come out with reassuring words. Thus, this behavior of the European Union is in line with the 'pusher' identity it has developed in case of enlargements.

On the other hand, the history of the European enlargements also reveal that the European Union has also been the regulator of the accession process as it produces the periodical reports and takes care of the technical details of the accession. It is the one which recommends for or against the opening of new chapters. Thus, the European

Union identifies itself also as a 'regulator' of the accession process. True to this nature, the European Union has played the role of regulator even in the accession process of Turkey. But, this role of regulator is guided by the accession criteria and the other pre-existing norms of the European Union. The European Union has always acted and regulated the accession process based solely on these pre-existing norms in the past. That is the way the Union interprets its role as a regulator. Thus, from that vantage point, the European Union has had no reason to derail the accession process of Turkey as of now as Turkey has shown consistent progress with regards to the accession criteria. The European Union cannot entertain questions about 'Europeanness' or any such cultural-religious aspects as in the pre-existing norms, these aspects are not dealt with. They were not taken into account in the case of previous enlargements. Hence, the European Union's positive behavior with regards to the Turkish accession can be explained by the historical identities it has developed as a result of previous enlargements which prevents it from acting arbitrarily.

The espoused objective of an organization also plays a role in the formation of identity in an International Organization and thereby influences its behavior. The European Union was formed with the objective integrating the European Continent. That is the objective behind the European project itself: the progressive integration of the European continent. The term 'European Continent' was defined basically in geographical terms and not in any precise cultural or religious terms. That was how it was written down and that was how it was interpreted so far. Only after the accession process of Turkey started, questions of cultural-religious nature are being discussed. But the European Union because of its stated objective which does not have a cultural-religious aspect is oblivious to them and cannot act in accordance to something which it neither recognizes nor has practiced in the past. The European Union identifies itself as a secular and a non-cultural entity, operating based on espoused rules and norms which are binding in nature. Hence, it interprets its interests to be to defend the rules and norms on which it was formed rather than undermining them. Hence in the case of Turkey, it has been unable to stop the process because the objective, on which the European Union formed, provides it with no scope of doing so.

Lastly, the environment in which an international organization operates also plays a role in the identity formation of an international organization (Wendt 1999: 325-327). The environment of an international organization refers to the interaction with the member states and also the international system. The European Union has for long had a very conforming and complying environment, almost in all the spheres of its functioning and more so in the case of enlargement. The European Union has been allowed to act as a strong and domineering actor in all the spheres (excluding security and foreign policy) where its norms operate by the member states. This has been very true in the area of enlargement and henceforth the European Union has developed a strong independent identity and does not bend easily even if some powerful member states are in opposition to its moves. This has been the true with regards to the accession of Turkey. The environment also involves the international system. The international system views the European Union as a strong, liberal, rule based secular entity. This reinforces the pre-existing identity of the European Union and makes it more committed to guard its identity and the accompanying interests.

Thus, the identity that has evolved for the European Union based on the norms that it has internalized in the so many years of its existence does not provide it with any legitimate way to stop the accession process of Turkey, although it can delay it.

Path Dependence

It was also noted in Chapter 2 that some international institutions become so powerful that they engulf the identities and interests of their member states. One can argue that the European Union has reached a stage where its coherence and organizational strength in certain spheres (excluding the security and foreign policy spheres) have resulted in the swallowing up of the European states such that they have to conform to the normative compulsories laid out by the European Union. Wendt does identify the European Union as a society of states wherein a collective identity has developed (Wendt 1999: 242). The analyses of the Turkish accession process have indicated that this may be the case. What needs to be understood is that the European norms of enlargement which were created and signed by the European member states essentially resulted in a path dependent trajectory for the accession of Turkey.

Path dependency is created by the notion of self-reinforcement. That is, each step a particular organization takes up in a particular direction, reinforces the path trajectory, such that it make it more difficult for the organization to turn back and reverse the trajectory (Pierson 2004: 20-22). This is because the step which the organization takes gains a normative aspect to it and exerts pressure on it which is difficult to resist.

In the case of Turkey, the path was set many decades ago in the Ankara treaty (1963) itself, which made explicit that the relationship between these two parties should end up with full membership no matter how long it can take. This admission by the European decision makers of that time carries normative weight as this approval of the eligibility of Turkey has been used effectively used by Turkish negotiators during the various application negotiations to puncture the arguments against Turkey becoming a full member. Turkey has long considered this agreement as an approval of its 'Europeanness' (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 70). This normative step taken by the European elite back then also bound the hands of the European Union policy makers as the European Union itself would lose credibility and coherence if it went back on its promise. The Ankara Treaty itself provided a road-map by explicitly elaborating certain stages in the process. These stages have largely been adhered to, thus highlighting the path dependent trajectory.

The path however was not without its difficulties. At the Luxemburg Summit in 1997 when Turkey was denied candidate status, the relations between the European Union and Turkey started to deteriorate. For the European Union, the decision said to be mainly caused by the domestic opposition towards Turkish membership. Many regarded Turkey as too big, too poor, too agricultural, too authoritarian, too nationalist, and too Muslim to qualify for membership (Kubicek 2004). But spectacularly, despite the fact that such a public sentiment tended to remain, only two years later the European Union decided to accord explicit candidate status to Turkey. This was due to the various lobbying efforts of Turkey who managed to cite the past normative commitments of the European Union to successfully make the European Union come around. The European Union could not run away from the already preset normative path.

This step forward however further reinforced the preset path and now it has its own normative persuasion power. It will be doubly tough for the European Union to turn back from its commitment which amounted to a promise (Fierke and Wiener 1999: 22). The Turkish policy makers have effectively used such normative commitments towards full membership to eliminate from discussion alternative paths including partial or special membership from the menu of possible options.

After explicitly giving Turkey a candidate status, the European Union had no option but to start accession negotiations with Turkey. It was only a matter of time and so it happened. Now, the starting of accession negotiations with Turkey in itself reinforces further the full membership path that has been set for Turkey. It is an addition to the other similar normative commitments of the European Union towards full membership for Turkey. Hence, accession process of Turkey has been proceeding despite domestic opposition across Europe and opposition from key member states. The European Union has to defend and keep to its normative commitments if it has to have credibility and coherence and since it has the normative strength to swallow the opposing interests of some member states, the accession process has been going forward for Turkey.

Impact of Informal Membership Norms

A key question then is, does this mean that Turkey would definitely become a full member of the European because of the very many normative aspects that have been cited in this chapter. Not necessarily. The theoretical question underlying the above question is can norms change. They definitely can. Norms can be replaced by or defeated by other norms. Is there a possibility of that occurring in the case of Turkey is a question that needs to be probed.

It is widely accepted that the accession criteria will not be a deal breaker for Turkey as sooner or later; Turkey will be able to fulfill all of them. The accession criteria can only postpone the accession of Turkey and since by default these criteria lead only to full membership, they cannot lead Turkey to a partial or special membership. The only deal breaker is the Islamic nature of Turkey. Again, this is not a security issue, because Turkish Muslims are moderates and have not been involved in terror

networks. Turkey is not a Pakistan or Saudi Arabia by any stretch of imagination. It is a functioning secular democracy. Hence, the oppositional discourse is mainly cultural.

The argument being proposed is that Europe is and always has been a Christian entity, shaped by Christian values and ethics (Tacar 2007: 130-131). Hence, the European Union should not include a majority Muslim country like Turkey with such a huge population which will alter or dilute or cannot coexist with the Christian nature of Europe. Such a view necessarily presupposes that the European Union is predominantly a 'Christian club' and hence any non-Christian country should be excluded from being given a full membership into the European Union.

While discussing about norms earlier, it was noted that there also informal norms which at times can be more powerful than even the formal ones. This debate over the Islamic nature of Turkey being an obstacle to the membership of 'Christian' European Union is nothing but a clash between the formal norm of 'Secularism' which is present in the European Union, especially in the membership criteria which does not have a religious clause and the informal socio-cultural- religious norm of Christian values. European Union has been promoting itself as a spreader of liberal, democratic norms through its membership process (Schimmelfennig 2005: 106).

Thus, on the one hand, one has the European Union which does not define itself as a religious club by any means and its formal norms are oblivious to religion. Hence, secularism is the formal norm of the European Union. On the other hand, the Christian nature of the all the member states of European Union creates an informal norm which is trying to assert itself over the formal norm of secularism. The Christian nature of all the previous enlargements (as shown in Table 1) and the present uproar over the accession of an Islamic Turkey seem to suggest that Christianity is and was an informal membership norm.

Founding Members	1. Belgium 2. France 3. Germany 4. Italy 5. Luxembourg 6. Netherlands

1973 Enlargement	1. Denmark 2. Ireland 3. United Kingdom
1981 Enlargement	1. Greece
1986 Enlargement	1. Portugal 2. Spain
1995 Enlargement	1. Austria 2. Finland 3. Sweden
2004 Enlargement	1. Cyprus 2. Czech Republic 3. Estonia 4. Hungary 5. Latvia 6. Lithuania 7. Malta 8. Poland 9. Slovakia 10. Slovenia
2007 Enlargement	1. Bulgaria 2. Romania

Table 1: European Union's Enlargements so far

Elaborating on this point, ever since Turkey's accession became a real option, a competition to supersede between two contradicting identities of the European Union has started. One identity is based on liberal political norms and the other one is based on Christian norms.

The former considers that the identity of the European Union is based on secular institutions and a respect for freedom of religion and more importantly having no state religion as such. It has to be noted that only liberal values have institutional, formal legitimacy: For instance, the preamble to the Treaty of Rome claims to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty and not a single mentioning about Christianity. Similarly, the preamble to the Single European Act stresses the promotion of democracy and

human rights; the Maastricht Treaty refers to democracy while having nothing to say about religion. The Amsterdam Treaty talks about the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law while the Nice Treaty strengthens the protection of human rights and the recent reforms have introduced chiefly the Charter of Fundamental Rights, but lack any reference to European Christian heritage despite attempts by some elements to bring in the European heritage into official language. As a result, the Christian culture or aspect of Europe does not have a formal, institutional status. Hence, Turkey's accession would be clearly legitimate as long as it satisfies the existing polity-based membership conditions. There is no formal legitimacy to block the accession of Turkey into the European Union on the basis of religion.

In contrast, institutionalized or not, some would argue that European Union values have their roots in the Christian religious heritage and therefore it is unacceptable for those who do not share this heritage to become a member. If the European Union indeed is defined by underlying Christian norms, then it has a Christian identity which Turkey does not share (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 72). As according to this identity, Turkey is the 'other', a historical 'enemy' which can never become integrated with Europe (Kuran-Burçoglu 2007: 156-157).

This clash between the formal secular values and the informal Christian norms has been taking place for sometime now. Most of the European Union's institutional representatives so far, including the once President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, and the Secretary General of the Council, Javier Solana, maintained positions that were consistent with European Union's formal institutional rules. In contrast, the President of the European Convention, Vale'ry Giscard d'Estaing, stated in Le Monde on 9 November 2002 that Turkey was not part of Europe and its membership would represent the end of the European Union (Horsley 2004). In fact, many such minded people have been calling for the induction of the Christian heritage of the European Union into official European Union texts (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 72). If and when that happens, it can be concluded that the presently informal norm of European Christian values would have triumphed over the liberal-political norms of the present European Union. A change in norm would have happened for the European Union and as a result of this; Turkey would find itself outside of the European Union.

It is common knowledge that identities are asserted only when threatened. Hence, the Christian identity of the European Union flowing from its Christian norms seems to have awakened when threatened with the accession of Islamic Turkey. However, the European Union's formal norms do not provide any legitimate space for the Christian culture of the Europe. As a result, so far the institutional norms of the European Union have held their own despite increasing opposition from many quarters. However, it remains to be seen which norm will finally win this battle. If the Christian norms win, then it will result in the European Union justifiably being branded as a Christian club and nothing more. European Union would acquire a Christian identity rather than a secular identity. If that happens, Turkey would most definitely find itself outside of the European Union. On the other hand, if the secular, formal institutional norms of the European Union win, then Turkey will find itself as a full member of the European Union. And the European Union would be able to maintain its present secular and inclusive identity. Only time will tell which of these two norms will have the final say in deciding the ultimate frontiers of the European Union.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

It is not surprising that norms which play a vital role in the functioning of human societies also play a significant role in the functioning of the international society. Ever since states started interacting with each other, they have started developing norms of behaviour which in turn have become path setting precedents for present and future behaviour (Wendt 1999: 170). With the dawn of the industrial revolution, states started to socialize more and more with each other due to advancements in transportation and communication and that led to the development of more norms which started to acquire more visibility. Significantly, the evolution of International Law and the advent of International Institutions have resulted in norms getting formally institutionalized in the international system.

The positivist theories of International Relations largely ignore the role of norms. Realism, probably the most prominent of the International Relations theories, ascribes a prominent role for power and interest based calculations and sees almost no significant role for norms (Mearscheimer 1994). It sees norms as the means through which powerful states protect and enhance their interests. On the other hand, Liberal Institutionalism, another prominent International Relations theory, while giving more credit to norms, still limits itself within the constraints of power and interest calculations, staying true to its rationalist outlook (Keohane and Martin 1995: 39). On the other hand, sociological theories of International Relations like Constructivism have highlighted the role played by norms in the conduct of norms.

Norms develop or get created in order to fulfill a particular interest or interests of a state or a group of states. Diplomatic norms evolved to facilitate the smooth conduct of relations between states. Thus, norms enable states to carry out certain actions and fulfill certain interests. One can say that it is often the powerful states in the system that create norms to pursue some of their ends in order to have a better leverage with the other states. The realists point out to this fact and argue that norms are nothing but a tool used by great powers to pursue their ends.

Sociological scholars argue that norms, once created or established, be it formally or informally, acquire a normative power of their own which increases with the passage of time. A powerful state may have created a set of norms at a particular point of time in history to pursue a particular goal. It would have hidden its interests under the garb

of the normative aspects of the norm. With the passage of time however, the same set of norms may become useless or even harmful for the interests of the same state. But, since the norm has become established, its normative power which previously enabled the state to carry out its interests would now constrain it (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 14-16). Thus, norms have the tendency to enable as well as constrain the behaviour of states. It is true that at times the powerful states try to be selective about the norms they follow but if a norm has become well established, it would be greatly difficult for them to even attempt it.

International Institutions create, keep and enforce norms. Thus, based on the underlying norms that were the reason for their creation, international institutions acquire an identity of their own which gets strengthened with time (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). They start wielding normative power of their own which could engulf the material power of its member states and thus become binding. The European Union is the most developed international institution in international politics today and one of its chief policies is the enlargement process. The enlargement process is a very multi-faceted one as it involves political, social and economic challenges and also geo-political bargaining and adjustments (Kramer 2004: 1). However, the role of norms in the enlargement process of the European Union must also be acknowledged. The member states of the European Union created specific enlargement norms in the form of the Copenhagen Criteria to facilitate the enlargement process, at a time when the Central and East European Countries were knocking on the door. These norms, along with the procedural practices they have produced have created a normative framework for the enlargement process and they do exert significant influence on the member states as well as the accession countries.

This influence can be traced specifically in the case of Turkish accession. The Turkish case is unique because it is the first major Islamic country with the prospects of becoming a full member of the European Union. It has to be noted however that there are significant hurdles to Turkish accession, be it the Cyprus problem or the question of the absorption capacity of the European Union or the cultural factors or the ability of Turkey to meet accession conditionalities or the question of accountability over the Armenian Genocide. Hence, Turkey's accession to the European Union is by no

means a settled issue. There is also the possibility of Turkey pulling out on its own from the process after reanalysing the costs of membership.

At the moment however, the accession process of Turkey is progressing at a steady pace despite the fact that some of the powerful member states of the European Union including France and Germany do not see the accession of Turkey as being in their interests. The main reason for them not appreciating the inclusion of a fellow NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) member and a Cold War ally is cultural. Turkey's Europeaness is questioned (Kuran-Burçoglu 2007: 156-157). But, the membership norms as established by the Copenhagen criteria do not include any references about culture (European Council in Copenhagen 1993). If Turkey keeps up its reform drive then sooner or later it would be able to conform to the normative requirements of the Copenhagen criteria. If the realist argument that norms are only subservient to the interests of the state actors is to be followed then one would have expected France or Germany or both to have already stalled the accession negotiations with Turkey. Yet, they have not been able to derail the accession process.

That is because the membership norms of the European Union are constraining the behaviour of member states in this regard. As noted earlier, the formal membership norms i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria do not have explicit or implicit religious or cultural criteria. Hence those states which feel that the cultural and religious identity of Turkey does not suit the European Union are left with no legitimate means to oppose Turkish accession. They are not able to bring it up as a means to prevent Turkish progression towards membership as the membership norms do not provide scope for it. Moreover, informally, the member states have had the history of going by the recommendations of the European Commission with regards to accession. This pattern of behaviour has also emerged as a sort of an informal procedural norm which also tied the hands of the member states so far as they could not say no to the further progression of Turkish accession whenever the European Commission recommended it. This further reaffirms the constraining effect of norms on the member states. Meanwhile, the European Union, having been created with the objective of uniting /Europe and also with secular norms, was left with no other alternative but to engage positively with Turkey. Hence, the European Commission could not take into account the religious or cultural questions surrounding the accession of Turkey while

99

preparing the progress reports although popular opinion in many member states is against the accession of Turkey. Thus, a path dependent trajectory can be observed in the case of Turkish accession, one guided by preexisting norms.

It also has to be noted that even the opposition to Turkish membership arises from the cultural norms of Europe which are not espoused formally in the constitution of the European Union. But, informal norms can also be as powerful as their formal counterparts. Till now, even though the European Union's membership norms are secular in nature, no Islamic or non-Christian country has ever become a member of the European Union. So, in some ways 'Christianity' and the cultural elements were informal membership norms that guided the enlargement process and they are being challenged now with the possible accession of Islamic Turkey (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 72). With all other things like the political, geo-strategic and economic aspects remaining the same, the case of the Turkish accession would be determined as a result of the struggle between the cultural non-formalized norms of Europe versus the formalized norms of the European Union and so far the European Union's norms seem to be having the upper hand as Turkey is progressing steadily towards full membership.

The study has brought out the normative underpinnings of the enlargement process of the European Union and shows how membership norms constrain the member states and limit the legitimate options they can have. Thus states invariably conform to the preexisting normative framework which creates a path dependent trajectory. Each approval or step forward for a candidate state, in this case Turkey adds onto that normative framework and thus reaffirming the path and making it even more difficult in the future for the enlargement process to deviate. Even the present opposition to Turkey's membership is largely due to the informal membership norms of Christian/Cultural criteria which are trying to assert themselves over the secular and formally institutionalized norms. Thus, norms do play a major role in the enlargement process of the European Union and in fact as shown in this dissertation, they steer it to a large extent.

References

Primary References

Commission of the European Communities (1999), *Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession*: Composite: 13, October 1999.

Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993.

Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution, April 24, 1998.

Eurobarometer (2006), *"Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement"*, Special Eurobarometer survey 255, July 2006.

European Commission (2005), *European Commission 2005 Progress Report*, 9 November 2005, SEC (2005) 1426.

European Commission (2007), *European Commission 2007 Progress Report*, 6 November 2007, SEC (2007) 1436.

European Commission (2008), *European Commission 2008 Progress Report*, 5 November 2008, SEC (2008) 2699.

European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, *'Report to the Turkish Government on the visit to Turkey carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 7 to 15 September 2003'*, Strasbourg, 18 June 2004.

European Council Meeting in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93.

European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 June 2006.

Freedom House (2007), *'Freedom in the World 2007'* Report.

Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), *Turkey in Europe: More than a promise,* September.

Secondary References

Books

Ahmad, Feroz (1993), *The Making of Modern Turkey,* London: Routledge.

Ayman, S. Gulden (2004), "Negotiations and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power - Situations: The Turkish-Greek Case", in Mustafa Aydin and Kostas Ifantis (eds.) *Turkish – Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean,* London: Routledge.

Baldwin, Richard and Widgrén, Mika (2005), "The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting", in Bernard Hoekman and Sübidey Togan (eds.) *Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union,* New York: The World Bank.

Bozdaglioglu, Yücel (2003), *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach,* London: Routledge.

Brennan, J. (2001), "A Social Constructivist Perspective on Enlargement", in, Levrat, N. and Willa, P. (eds.), *EU External Capability and Influence in International Relations,* Geneva: Instiut Europeene de l'Universite de Geneve and ECPR.

Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John (1999), *The European Union as a Global Actor,* London: Routledge.

Delanty, Gerard and Rumford, Chris (2005), *Rethinking Europe: Social theory and the implications of Europeanization,* London: Routledge.

Faucompret, Eric and Konings, Jozef (2008), *Turkish Accession to the EU: Satisfying the Copenhagen criteria,* London: Routledge.

Flam, Harry (2005), "Economic Effects of Turkey's Membership on the European Union", in Bernard Hoekman and Sübidey Togan (eds.) *Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union*, New York: The World Bank.

Jackson, Robert (2000), *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kalaycıoglu, Ersin (2005), *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kuran-Burçoglu, Nedret (2007), "From Vision to Reality: A Socio-cultural Critique of Turkey's Accession Process" in Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jørgensen (eds.) *Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Larrabee, Stephen (2003), *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

Leiby, Richard (1999), *The unification of Germany, 1989-1990*, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Park, Bill (2005), "Turkey and the Eternal Question of Being, or Becoming, European", in Trine Flockhart (ed) *Socializing Democratic Norms: The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pierson, P. (2004), *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2005), "The EU: Promoting Liberal-Democracy through Membership Conditionality", in Trine Flockhart (ed) *Socializing Democratic Norms: The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2005), "The politics of EU enlargement: Theoretical and comparative perspectives", in Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds) *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical approaches*, London: Routledge.

Scott, Richard W. (1992), *Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems*, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Suvarieol, Semin (2003), "The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union" in Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin (eds.) *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic integration and International Dynamics*, London: Frank Cass.

Tacar, Pulat (2007), "Socio-cultural Dimensions of Accession Negotiations" in Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jørgensen (eds.) *Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Waltz, Kenneth (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Wendt, Alexander (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zaborowski, Marcin (2006), "More than simply expanding markets: Germany and EU enlargement" in Helene Sjursen (ed) *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in search of identity*, New York: Routledge.

Zurcher, Erik J. (1997), *Turkey: A Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris

Articles

Aydin, Senem and Keyman, E. Fuat (2004), "European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy", Centre for European Policy Studies, *EU-Turkey Working papers*, (2): 1-50.

Aydin, Mustafa (2003), 'Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 3 (2): 163-184.

Barnett, Michael N. and Finnemore Martha (1999), "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations", *International Organization*, 53 (4): 699-732.

BBC News (2005), "Turkish police beatings shock EU", [Online: Web] Accessed 8 Jan. 2009 URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4325347.stm

BBC News (2008), "EU thumbs-up for Polish Plumber', [Online: Web] Accessed 8 Jan. 2009 URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7735603.stm

Bilefsky, Dan (2007), "Turkish Entry into Europe Slowed by Sarkozy Move", *The Newyork Times*, Newyork, 25 June 2007.

Bilgin, Pinar (2004), 'A Return to 'Civilisational Geopolitics' in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era', *Geopolitics*, 9 (2): 269 – 291.

Brey, Hansjörg (1999), "Turkey and the Cyprus Question," *International Spectator*, 34 (1): 111-122.

Cho, Sungjoon (2008), "Toward an Identity Theory of International Organizations", [Online: Web] Accessed 15 Dec. 2008 URL: http://works.bepress.com/sungjoon_cho/45

Cooter, Robert D. (1993), "Book Review: Against Legal Centrism", *Cal. L. Rev. 417*, 81: 426-27.

Danielyan, Emil (2005), "Turkey, Armenia Miss Opportunity for Rapprochement", [Online: Web] Accessed 5 Nov. 2008 URL: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav060305.shtml

Erzan, Refik. et al. (2006), "Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU", *Turkish Studies*, 7(1): 33 – 44.

Erzan Refik. et al. (2004), "Growth and Immigration Scenarios for Turkey and the EU", Centre for European Policy Studies, *EU-Turkey Working Papers,* (13): 1-13.

Esen, Asli Toksabay (2007), "Absorption Capacity of the EU and Turkish Accession: Definitions and Comments", [Online: Web] Accessed 15 Jan. 2009 URL:
http://www.tepav.org.tr/eng/admin/dosyabul/upload/Absorption_Capacity_Of_Th e_Eu.pdf

Etzioni, Amitai (2000), "Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History.", *Law & Society Review*, 34 (1): 157-178.

Emerson, Michael. et al. (2006), "Just what is this absorption capacity of the European Union?", [Online: Web] Accessed 1 Nov. 2008 URL: http://shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item_id=1381

Encyclopedia Britannica (2009), "Diplomacy", [Online: Web] Accessed 20 Jul. 2009 URL: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/164602/diplomacy

Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs (2004), "Social norms and human cooperation", *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 8 (4): 185-190.

Fierke K.M., Wiener, A. (1999), "Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement", *Journal of European Public Policy,* 6 (5): 721-742.

Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998), "International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics", *International Organization*, 52 (4): 887-917.

Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn (2001), "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 4: 391-416.

Fossum, John Erik (2001), "Identity-politics in the European Union", *Journal of European Integration*, 23 (4): 373-406.

Horsley, Williams (2004), "Turkey's date with destiny", [Online: Web] Accessed 2 Nov. 2008 URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4091743.stm

Jones, Todd (2006), "We Always Have a Beer after the Meeting": How Norms, Customs, Conventions, and the Like Explain Behavior", *Philosophy of the Social Sciences,* 36 (3): 251-275.

Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Sophia (2007), "The missing European Public Sphere and the absence of imagined European Citizenship", *European Societies*, 9(5): 685-704.

Kempe, Frederick S. (2003), "Europe's Middle East Side Story," *Wall Street Journal*, New York, 29 July 2003.

Keohane, Robert O. and Martin, Lisa L. (1995), "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory", *International Security*, 20 (1): 39-51.

Keohane, Robert O (1988), "International Institutions: Two Approaches", *International Studies Quarterly*, 32 (4): 379-396.

Kramer, Heinz (2004), "Whither Turkey's EU Accession? Perspectives and Problems After December 2004", [Online: Web] Accessed 24 Jan. 2009 URL: http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/kramer_turkey.aspx

Kubicek, P. (2004), "Turkey's Place in the 'New Europe'", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 9(2): 45-58.

Kupchan, Charles A and Kupchan, Clifford A (1991), "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe", International Security, 16 (1): 114-161.

Kymlicka, Will (1995), "Misunderstanding Nationalism," *Dissent,* winter, 130-137.

Laitin, David D. (2002), "Culture and National Identity: 'The East' and European Integration", *West European Politics*, 25(2): 55 – 80.

Lobjakas, Ahta (2006), "Turkey: EU Says Ankara Must Come To Terms With Past", [Online: Web] Accessed 22 Jan. 2009 URL: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071664.html

Lowenthal, David (2000), "'European Identity': An emerging concept", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 46 (3): 314-321.

Manners, Ian J. and Whitman, Richard G. (1998), "Towards identifying the international identity of the European union: A framework for analysis of the EU's network of relationships", *Journal of European Integration*, 21(3): 231 – 249.

March, J., and Olsen, J. (1998), "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders", *International Organization*, 52, (4): 943-69.

Mearschiamer, John J. (1994), "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security*, 19(3): 5-49.

Moravsick, Andrew (1999), "Is something rotten in the state of Denmark? Constructivism and European integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 (4): 699-681.

Müftüler-Baç, Meltem (2006), "Turkey's Accession to the EU: its Potential Impact on Common European Security and Defence Policy", [Online: Web] Accessed 8 Jan. 2009 URL: http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_08.pdf

Olsen, Espen D. H. (2008), "The origins of European citizenship in the first two decades of European integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15 (1): 40 – 57.

Önis, Ziya (2000), "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations", paper presented on July 2-5, 2000 at the annual Conference of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES), University of Cambridge: London.

Özbudun, Ergun and Tachau Frank (1975), "Social Change and Electoral Behaviour in Turkey: Toward a Critical Realignment", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6(4): 460-480.

Parsons, Craig (2002), "Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union", *International Organization*, 56 (1): 47–84.

Ruggie, John Gerard (1998), "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", *International Organization*, 52 (4): 855-885.

Rumford, Chris (2000), "'From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the politics of EU enlargement and prospects for accession", *Contemporary Politics*, 6(4): 331-343.

Rummel R. J. (1998), "The Holocaust in Comparative and Historical Perspective", [Online: Web] Accessed 20 Jan. 2009 URL: http://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=17

Savage, Timothy M (2004), "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing", *The Washington Quarterly*, 27 (3):25–50.

Schaller, Dominik J. and Zimmerer, Jürgen (2008), "Late Ottoman genocides: the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Young Turkish population and extermination policies – introduction", *Journal of Genocide Research*, 10 (1): 7–14.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2001), "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization*, 55 (1): 47–80.

Siddique, Abubakar (2009), "Turkey's New Kurdish TV Hopes To Win Hearts And Minds", [Online: Web] Accessed 8 Feb. 2009 URL: http://www.rferl.org/Content/Turkeys_Kurdish_TV_Hopes_To_Win_Hearts_And _Minds/1365884.html

Suvarierol, Semin (2003), "The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union", *Turkish Studies*, 4 (1): 55 – 78.

Taspinar, Omer (2003), "Europe's Muslim Street," *Foreign Policy*, (135), 76-77.

Tocci, Nathalie (2005), "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?", *South European Society & Politics*, 10 (1): 73-83.

Today's Zaman News (2008), "Turkish economy falls far behind EU economic criteria", [Online: Web] Accessed 18 Mar. 2009 URL: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=153138

Vucheva, Elitsa (2009), "Turkey receives reassurance on EU membership bid", [Online: Web] Accessed 28 May 2009 URL: http://euobserver.com/9/28158

Watt, Nicholas and Traynor Ian (2006), "Turkey's EU hopes suffer Cyprus setback", *The Guardian*, London, 27 November 2006.

Wendt, Alexander (1992), ""Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, 46 (2): 391-425.

Yigal Schleifer (2005), "Opened with a flourish, Turkey's Kurdish-language schools fold", [Online: Web] Accessed 18 Jan. 2009 URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1005/p07s02-woeu.html

Yilmaz, Hakan (2007), "Turkish identity on the road to the EU: basic elements of French and German oppositional discourses", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 9 (3): 293 – 305.

Yilmaz, Suhnaz (2006), "Turkey and the European Union: a Security Perspective", [Online: Web] Accessed 8 Jan. 2009 URL: http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_08.pdf

Zachory, Shore (2003), "Uncommon Threats: Germany's Muslims, Transatlantic Relations, and the War on Terror," [Online: Web] Accessed 8 Oct. 2008 URL: http://www.aicgs.org/documents/shore.pdf