

**SUPER POWER INTERACTIONS . A  
STUDY OF THE TRANSITION FROM  
DETENTE TO THE NEW  
COLD WAR**

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## INTRODUCTION

The failure of negotiated agreements between the Super Powers to reverse the race for nuclear weapons has posed anew the apocalyptic dangers of a possible thermo-nuclear war. The processes of detente and international cooperation have ground to a halt in the 1980s, and the structure of international security and confidence building measures built in the mid-sixties and 1970s has come crumbling down. The Cuban missile crisis posed an unthinkable disaster for mankind and was a reminder of the grave implications of the Cold War. The prospects of detente improved in the following period. On the global level by the seventies the United States and the Soviet Union shared a parity with regard to strategic nuclear weapons. The fundamental shifts in Soviet and United States foreign policies in the early 1980s led to the revival of mistrust and military-political stereotypes of confrontation and thus catalysed the Second Cold War. A serious problem at the theoretical level is that designations like the First Cold War and the Second Cold War may mislead us into dogmatically laying down prescriptions based upon obsolete dimensions of the East-West problems. The demands of conceptualisation of

the Second Cold War cannot be met unless we understand the specific nature of the rivalry which characterises international political and military relations in the 1980s and also underline the new forms of conflict-resolution which can make a fresh detente process both continuous and comprehensive. It is helpful to know the symptoms of change in the global regime between the First and the Second Cold War (Chapter I).

This study is primarily concerned with the attitudes of the Soviet Union and the United States to political and security problems but this is not to suggest that contexts and perceptions between the Super Powers can ever exclude the economic, technological and ideological stakes and interests. Both the Super Powers tend to display interest in stabilisation and security and also promote their respective socio-historical roles with specific forms of political offensives. The interaction between the Big Two after the Second World War has led to an accumulation of evidence on security interests and commitments which can help decision makers and negotiators to perceive Super Powers negotiations as a management process between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The probability is that an examination of political and security problems in the 1980s will help to think in new ways about the limits on military power (Chapter II).

The changing perceptions of Detente show a characteristic pattern. Since detente diplomacy remains a tool for the preservation and pursuit of national values, the influences which play upon diplomatic policy correspond to the paradoxical realities of the two political systems. The momentum towards detente can be maintained only if appropriate integrating forces can obtain further extension of the negotiations process. This process can, however, be severely limited if on account of scientific and technological developments, military and political decision makers start thinking in terms of preemptive nuclear weaponry. The pre-conditions of detente policy must, therefore be based on the creation, evolution and progress of consensual actions which provide a rationale for the continuation and widening of both disarmament and detente.(Chapter III).

The instability in United States - Soviet Relations effects the direction of any major effort to relate performance in achieving political detente to consensual views and approaches in the area of military relations. Both the Super Powers continue to build up their arsenals. In their contribution to world order, the Soviets and the Americans been guided by their overriding desire to preserve their narrowly defined and exclusive interventionism.

The instability in the Super Power relationship has encouraged policies disruptive of confidence building and peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter IV).

Our enquiry into the events and policies of the Second Cold War poses the larger question of task requirements in terms of the Super Powers' resources and relationships. The prospects for revival of detente can only be decided by taking into account the relevant aspects of elite values and decisional processes in Washington and Moscow. The experience of the 1980s suggests that doubts about the practicability of confrontationist policies have continued to grow. The Europeans have sought to preserve the advantages of detente in the face of serious deterioration of United States - Soviet relations. It would be misleading to suggest that there are definitive answers to the question whether the dynamics of Super Power armament policies can be influenced at all. The present study underlines the importance of direct talks between the Super Powers particularly to avoid first strike postures. In the final analysis, Super Power diplomacy must be broadened and idiosyncratic positions should be accommodated in larger negotiating frameworks. The military instruments of diplomacy have to be transcended if the conflict pattern is to be modified in favour of a general reduction of tension in the international system.

CHAPTER - ICONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE FIRST  
COLD WAR AND SECOND COLD WAR

The Soviet-American competition has effected the texture of international politics. Even where there have been marked asymmetries between the interests of the Super Powers in a particular region, the signals and sanctions emanating from Washington and Moscow have triggered of political reactions which suggest to the rest of the world a parallelism of interests. The Super Power globalism with which the world is familiar is not merely the posture of United-States or Soviet national interest. The antagonistic paradigms of two Super Powers which improve or worsen the climate of detente are extensive structures which encompass balances of power, balances of terror, conventional and nuclear arms races, and symbolic expressions of the paradoxes and limits of power in shaping divergent conceptions of international order. Political and economic developments within the Soviet Union and the United States affect the future of Soviet-American conflict and cooperation within the context of global interdependence. Much analysis and speculation has been directed to an examination of the factors that brought to an end the promise of detente in the early 1970s. It is



widely believed that the temptation to exploit regionalism as a cold war weapon has more than often initiated a downturn in Soviet- American relations. Soviet and American behaviour in the Third World had often been marked by a failure of either to respond to the real economic and security needs of the developing countries. The destabilising sequence of events in the Third World has often been the result of policy-makers in Washington and Moscow overestimating the appeal of the rival Super Power and thus failing to insulate local and regional crises from the Super Power competition.<sup>1</sup>

Ideology was a major factor in the Super Powers, postwar foreign policy. In fact apart from the military and economic strengths, it was the ideologies that made each of them "Super". From 1945 to 1965 in the protracted conflict the Soviet Union had the image of being centre of world revolution and anti-imperialism and the United States had the image of the Centre of free world.<sup>2</sup> The conflict of the two Super Powers was also a conflict between two systems - the Socialist system and the capitalist system. These broad generalizations, however, will have to be modified from place

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1. E.P. Thongson, Beyond the Cold War, (New York, 1982), p.84.
  2. K.P. Karunakaran, "War-motives: Ideology versus Geopolitics", World Focus (New Delhi), Vol. 1, No. 3, March 1980, p.9.

to place and from time to time - in some cases modified so completely as to conclude that ideologies were not factors in the making of foreign policies at all.<sup>3</sup>

First to note these areas where the ideologies made themselves felt. The establishment in various East European countries was simultaneously the extension of the Soviet State's influence and power and the expansion of communism. The splitting of Germany and Korea into two states had also an ideological flavour.<sup>4</sup> In 1950, after the establishment of the Communist-State in China, one also saw the extension of Soviet influence in the region. This was followed by the emergence of a powerful communist movement in Vietnam - a movement supported by both the Soviet Union and China.<sup>5</sup>

In Europe, the American thrust accompanied by the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan and the North Atlantic pact were powerful factors in favour of the retention of the liberal democratic system and in preventing the Capture of power by the communists. It seemed that the lines were drawn on an ideological basis.<sup>6</sup>

The present nature of United States and Soviet relations clearly indicates that geopolitics has superceded ideology as a factor in them. The Soviet action in Aghanistan is viewed

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3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 9.

5. William, T.R. Fox; "The Super Power then and now", International Journal (New York), Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer, 1980, pp. 417.

6. Ibid., p. 436.

in that light by a large number of countries, including China which has a long border with the Soviet Union and which does not want the Soviet Union to expand its territorial power near its borders.<sup>7</sup> The United States and United Kingdom do not want to the Soviet Union to thrust its power to the warm waters and to west-Asia where there is a reservoir of oil. In Iran, the United States is already weakened and in Pakistan it is losing its way. It is under these circumstances that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan becomes a threat to the United States.<sup>8</sup>

One of the significant features of traditional diplomacy was that it never ruled out war at one stage or the other. The most significant feature of new diplomacy is that war between the Super Powers is completely ruled out. The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States in the post war period was not less intense than that between Germany and France during the period between the two world wars.<sup>9</sup> World War II followed World War I after 20 years. Thirty five years have passed since then but no world war III is on the horizon. This is not due to any pacific trends in the United States and

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7. Ibid.

8. Karunakaran, op.cit., p. 10.

9. Ibid., p. 11.

in the Soviet Union, but due to the fact that there is a widespread realisation of the destructive nature of nuclear weapons.<sup>10</sup> Japan, Germany and Italy did make unconditional surrender; neither Super Power will do so in the future. The entire political manauaring will, therefore, have to be made by both the Super Powers within this framework- the framework in which total war is ruled out.<sup>11</sup>

This brings up a series of challenges to both the powers. No big power in an earlier period had to make its foreign policy in the basis that there are limits to its strength. In one sense, the Super Powers, but are no more super not only in bilaterial relations but in relation to the rest of the international community.<sup>12</sup> The United States would not use nuclear weapons in Vietnam. It was powerless to intervene in Iran when its diplomat were made hastages. The Soviet Union had also its diplomatic defeats in Indonesia Egypt, Srilanka and in a concealed manner than in India in relation to Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup>

The kind of military superiority that the United States once enjoyed over the Soviet Union is gone. The Russian, by squeezing their civilians wars have the capacity to match

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10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

United States missile for missile. They also have the will to do so. United States is playing from its weakest suit by choosing to engage them on that level alone. United States comparative advantage lies not in building weapons but in the strength of United States diplomacy and to maintain alliances with those who share.<sup>14</sup> A military fix, although tempting is a delusion.

The attempt to achieve it could also be economically disastrous. This perhaps is the greatest danger of Reagan's armsbuild up.<sup>15</sup> Laster Thurow points out that it was the enormous economic surplus of the United States which allowed a succession of post war American Presidents to pursue a policy of global engagement and military activism. That surplus has evaporated, partly as a result of the massive outflow of funds to pay for imported oil, but even more because of a loss of productivity and of competitiveness on world markets.<sup>16</sup>

Moscow misunderstood almost competing the rhetorical and political obligation of parity. The Soviet Union cannot expect the United States, without resistance, to grant it the benefits of recognized Super Power states if cheers on or promotes disruptive change in the international system. For

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14. Ronald Steel, "Cold War", News Week, (New York), Vol. 184, No. 5, April 11, 1981, p. 17.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

such a position requires some respect for the advantages of stability in a system that accords the Super Powers certain special benefits - defence from allies, a decisive voice in critical world issues and greater protection than other enjoy of key economic and security interests.<sup>17</sup> The Soviet Union completely misjudged Western sensibility surrounding the world's supply of oil by undertaking or supporting aggressive actions in Ethiopia, South Yeman and Afghanistan all geographically close to the West's vital oil life time.<sup>18</sup>

In both the Soviet Union and the United States technology in the form of even more accurate missiles seems to be driving both sides, fearful of a surprize first strike by the other, to consider a highly dangerous launch-on-warning stratgy. One miscalculation, in other words, could lead the two sides to use their full nuclear arsenals and plunge the Northern Hemisphere into its final war.<sup>19</sup>

Some Soviet observers, privately state that such a use them or lose them stratigy can be the only logical soviet response to United States plans to deploy a combination of highly accurate perashing II, MX and Trident II missiles. For together the new missiles could theoretically wipe out 75% of

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17. Charles William Maynes, "Old Errors in New Cold War", Foreign Policy (New York), No. 46, Spring 1982, p. 88.

18. Ibid.

19. O. Edmund Clubb., "Off limits for Super Powers", Nations (New York), Vol. 230, No. 21, May, 31, 1980, p. 646.

the Soviet nuclear deterrent, leaving the Soviet Union totally dependent on its technologically inferior nuclear submarine fleet.<sup>20</sup> American officials express fears that Soviet Union will soon have the capability to eliminate the entire land-based leg of the United States Triad which is the most accurate position of the American nuclear deterrent although it represents only 25% of the United States nuclear force. The primary danger for both sides is increasingly becoming less one of planned aggression than of a catastrophic war escalating almost by accident from an initially confined encounter.<sup>21</sup>

Today the long trends in the United States Soviet relationship are almost uniformly bad. Suspicion is now so great the pattern of arms acquisition is so threatening, the level of understanding is so low and the respective states are so high that no break through in the relationship will come easily more likely than success is an event such as Cuban missile crisis - a confrontation that comes close enough to the ultimate catastrophe that it shocks the two sides into alternative pattern of behaviour.<sup>22</sup>

The future management of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union remains one of the most important problem of contemporary international politics. Based on the

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20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 647.

22. Ibid., p. 648.

events of 1979 and 1980 there are reasonable grounds to be pessimistic regarding the immediate future. The optimism of the early 1970s has disappointed and a return to the Cold War of the 1950 and 1960s is a distinct possibility. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended the era of cooperative detente but other factors such as the steadily growth of Soviet military power and interventionist behaviour during the mid to late 1970s also contributed to the deterioration in Super-Power relations. From one perspective, therefore, 1980 may constitute a turning point in the conduct of super power diplomacy.<sup>23</sup>

Soviet attitudes to the outside world are likely to remain cautious in the 1980s. The Russians are militarily stronger than they were in 1970, but the world beyond their borders is no more favourable to them than it was a decade ago. The United States is still economically technologically and militarily their superior. Only in the awesome power to wreak unacceptable nuclear destruction in the other side is the Soviet Union equal to the United States. Neither side can win a nuclear war or even a nuclear arms race. That at least the Russians know. They remain committed to detente.<sup>24</sup>

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23. Leon Gordenker "The Perils of Super Powers diplomacy: detente, defence, and arms control", International Journal (New York), Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 1980, p. 520.

24. Ibid.



Crisis - Control in the Cold Wars

The efforts of the Super Powers to control and manage the political military and economic factors which produce crisis situations. The cost-benefit calculus in every such situation determines whether the Super-Power concerned will adopt a rigid or flexible stand. The Korean crisis, the Congo crisis and Suez crisis produced favourable outcomes when coercive techniques yielded to increasingly sophisticated tacit understandings to reduce the risk of war between the two Super Powers.<sup>25</sup> Despite several serious crisis since the end of the second world war, no test of arms has occurred between the major cold war competitors whenever one of the armed mamoths was so committed that the intervention of the second would have produced a world war, but the second abstained. This describes the position in Turkey and Greece in 1946 and 1947, the Berlin Blockade and air lift in 1948 and 1949, the Korean war from 1950- to 1953, the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the Lebnon-Middle East Affairs in 1958. In Korea, for instance, the United States was too deeply involved to desist, Russia, therefore abstained. In Hunday, Russia seemed too deeply involved. The United States failed to act. The restraint displayed by both camps suggest that the mighty instinct of self preservation was operating.<sup>26</sup>

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25. Louis Fisher & Harper Brother, Russia, American and the World (New York, 1961), pp. 4-5.

26. Ibid.

The Soviet backdown in Cuba was widely regarded as signaling a protracted set back to Soviet global ambitions. American predominance was taken for granted and American strategic superiority was blessedly portrayed as unchallengeable.<sup>27</sup> However, the new phase did not involve a return to the Mutual hostility of the fifties. Indeed, American global assertive was initially accompanied by a stepped up search for accommodation with the Soviet Union. The test ban agreement of 1963 and the establishment of the Washington-Moscow "hot line" represented major breakthrough, signaling the growing recognition on the part of both powers of their stake in somehow stabilizing the arms race.<sup>28</sup> Ultimately the Cuban missile crisis had an important effect on the political interactions between Moscow and Washington and created a tangible interest in the overall reduction of tensions.<sup>29</sup> The problems of global politics after the eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation over Cuba were perceived with a willingness to redefine the international agenda and to place detente as a Central item. It followed that the Super Powers would check the ascendancy of their ideological rivalry and develop relations in economic, political and cultural fields.<sup>30</sup>

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27. Ibid.

28. Even Luard, *Cold War* (London, 1963), pp. 6-7.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

The global dimension of the Afghanisshan crisis cannot be accounted for by an ideological resurgence. At the end of 1979 NATO decided to deploy American - made cruise missiles and the advanced Medium- range Pershing II missile in Western Europe from 1983. The decision was described as the West's answer to Soviet deployment of a powerful new medium range missile, the SS-20 targeted on Western Europe. The Russians argue that the new missile is only a modernized versions of premiers SS4<sub>s</sub> and SS-5<sub>s</sub> which were their answer to the British submarine based polaris missiles, French nuclear weapons, American F III K aircraft based in British and other American planes with a nuclear capability based in the mediterranean. The targeting of Soviet missiles on Western Europe or the installation of pershing and cruise missiles by the NATO have resulted in a vigorous bargaining process which in turn has spillover effects which work against detente.<sup>31</sup>

The Soviet Union and the United States will develop a series of specific understanding to keep their strategic relationship stable and to attempt to restrain conflict in areas where they cannot escape commitment, notably Europe and Middle East.<sup>32</sup>

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31. Jonathan Steele, "The Soviet Union: What happened to Detente?" in Super Powers in Collision (New York, 1982), p. 55.
32. Alistair Buckan, Change without War, (London, 1974), p. 99.

Washington and Moscow can recognize that their own control over key areas such as Eastern Europe or Central America will inevitably continue to decline precisely because the international system has witnessed a diffusion of power generally. But this loss of control is not only a question of power. Both the United States and particularly, the Soviet Union with their mounting economic and social problems, have become less attractive models for other countries, even close allies. Both super powers can expect and must allow more political deviation within areas sensitive to their interests. Otherwise, the international system can expect to enter a rising cycle of Super Power tension that through accident or miscalculation could bring on the ultimate catastrophe. Today, with their assertions that the machinations of the other Super Powers are primarily responsible for political unrest in Poland or Central America, Afghanistan. The Soviet Union and United States are moving in a direction that can become only more dangerous with each erupting crisis.<sup>33</sup>

At the same time, the super powers can agree not to exploit political deviation in sensitive areas when it occurs. Eastern Europe is of special concern to the Soviet Union

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33. George H. Quester, "Super Powers and the Atlantic Alliance" Diasia (Brooklin), Vol. 110, No. 1. Winter, 1981, pp. 24-25.

comparable areas of sensitivity are to avoid dangerous miscalculation. Today Soviet Foreign Policy experts will acknowledge timidly in private that Eastern Europe is entering a period of change. Bilateral discussions and understandings must calm fears that these changes will be destabilizing.<sup>34</sup>

One by product of Afghanistan is that it has reinforced the American resolve to emulate the basis of Super Powers diplomacy. This is essential because it is probably true that the Soviet Union has benefited more from detente than has the United States and this has contributed to the disillusionment within American circles. Nevertheless it should be remembered that during the 1970s the Soviet Union was also subjected to a series of diplomatic and political reverses.<sup>35</sup>

President Sadat expelled the Russians from Egypt in 1972 and that country is currently firmly aligned with the United States. His successor President Hosni Mubarak has re-established Ambassador-level representation in Moscow. In general Soviet influence in the Middle East has been circumscribed during the last decade. Somalia is another nation where events have not favoured the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet relations have remained in a state of tension and the

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34. Ibid.

35. Joseph W. Kastto "Detente and an adequate American Defence" Air University Review (Washington DC) Vol. 30, No. 61, Sept.-October, 1979, pp. 21-21.

current Chinese leadership has warned the world of the dangers of Soviet hegemony. Japan has become increasingly concerned over Soviet military capabilities and intensions in the Far East, and the Sino Japanese treaty of August, 1978 was signed, Over the objection of the Kremlin.<sup>36</sup> There have been major changes in the world environment during the 1970s which have adversely affected the influence of the Soviet Union- not all changes were directed against the United States. The realignment which have occurred will have important implications for the 1980s including the normalization of Sino American relations in 1979. The task now is to shape political environment in a manner which will avoid a return to the cold war.<sup>37</sup>

Both sides agree today that their relationship at its lowest point in decades, Both seem to feel that Afghanistan crisis while an important even in itself, did not come as a total surprrise but rather confirmed their worst fears about each other's motives and intensions. The sense of common interests that underlay them was limited to the avoidance of

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36. Ibid.

37. Hedley Bull, "The Great Responsibilities: the United States the Soviet Union & World Order", International (New York), Vol. 35, No. 3. Summer, 1980, pp. 435-436.

nuclear war. Projects for a more comprehensive detente - a general relaxation of the Soviet American struggle, leading to progress from coexistence to positive cooperation, as distinct from a mere understanding that the struggle would be conducted within certain limits - did not come to fruition.<sup>38</sup> ✓

It is true that sense of common interest in avoiding nuclear war was sometimes accompanied by a sense of common interest in resisting challenges to super power predominance, as from nuclear proliferation in France, China and (as a theoretical, but are with which the Soviet Union in its approach to the Non-proliferation Treaty displayed an abressive concern) West Germany.<sup>39</sup> It is true that the agreements about arms control and crisis avoidance were in fact followed up by the series of agreements normalizing relations and legitimizing boundaries in Europe initiated by West German ostpolitik but embracing the Super Power and others through the 1971 Berlin agreement and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. It is true that Nixon Kissinger programme for an era of negotiation, a structure of peace embracing many sided cooperation between the Super Powers aroused in the American public hopes of a comprehensive relaxation of tension and end of the cold war.<sup>40</sup>

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38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Rode Brojevic, "India and Super Powers" Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. 33, No. 784, December 5, 1982, p. 14-15.


The conduct of Super Power diplomacy virtually demands that a hierarchy of priorities be established. Fortunately both Super Powers have agreed that some form of cooperation in the military-strategic policy area is preferable to confrontation, and this goal should be allocated a pre-eminent position in any hierarchy. The consequences of military confrontation and the direct use of force could be catastrophic. This is readily understood in Washington and Moscow, yet the possibility of opting for peace through strength rather than peace through moderation becomes more likely if mutual satisfactory arms control regimes are attainable. This priority is too important to be jettisoned in the hope that pressure can be averted either by United States or Soviet Union for behaviour modification in the political sphere.<sup>41</sup>

The rising stakes in the new forms of Soviet American competition have created new patterns of insecurity the world over. Analysts and decision makers are not able to decide the form of crisis diplomacy which can cope with issues such as Afghanistan and central America and lead to easing of Soviet-American tensions inspite of irreconcilable adds, the situation calls for the revival of detente diplomacy to accommodate the conflicting perceptions of Super Powers policy options.<sup>42</sup>

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41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.





In the light of the historical record, more realistic attitudes have prevailed when military experts and strategic thinkers have not succeeded in isolating the strategic relationship from the overall political and economic relationship. The avoidance of nuclear brinkmanship ultimately depends upon mutually acceptable compromises all along the line which not only defuse explosive situations but also create confidence for coping with future contingencies.

#### Economic Consequences of Second Cold War

The high technology military capability which is a characteristic of the new competition between the two Super Powers results not only in a new spiral of armaments but also has a negative impact on the civilian economies.<sup>43</sup>

As Soviet troops fanned out relentlessly by across Afghanistan, Jimmy Carter treated harsh words with Moscow and ordered a tough new set of economic and political reprisal against the Soviet Union, including a stiff cutback on grain sales.<sup>44</sup> This was the most serious threat to world peace during the Administration, it was even more serious than Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union

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43. T. Mathew, "Chill of a New Cold War", News Week (New York), Vol. 95, No. 2, Jan. 14, 1980, p. 24.

44. Ibid.

was eager to return to brink-manship politics or to the hair raising confrontations of the Truman Eisenhower - Kennedy era. But rising tensions were snuffing out what was left of detente threatening another arms race and posting the two countries into a new cold war.<sup>45</sup>

The proposed United States action on grain and high technology was even harsher. Hurt by a bad harvest, the Soviet Union was trying to purchase 25 million metric tonnes of grain from the United States. United States reduced to 8 million tonnes to which it was entitled under the existing contracts. The administration also let it be known that it had received assurances from Canada and Australia, two other grain supplies, not to make up the shortfall. The President also ordered a close review of licences for high technological goods which now comprise an estimated 20 to 30 per cent of the \$ 700 million in non-agricultural exports from the United States to the Soviet Union. Oil drill bits and computers, electric equipment and machine tools all vital Soviet imports, are likely to come under the embargo quickly. Licences for \$ 155 million in high technology equipment had been turned down,<sup>46</sup> that was to be used in the construction of gas pipe lines from Siberia to Western Europe.

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45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

The hard currency debt of the Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia East Germany, Romania and Bulgaria had risen from a combined total of 5.8 billion dollars in 1970 to a current level of about, 4.8 billion dollars. Much of it went for rapid industrialization programmes received during the high growth years of the early 1970s and based on the idea of setting machinery and heavy industrial equipment to the West.<sup>47</sup>

Now in Second Cold War with their national growth rates dropping sharply, most east European economists believe that a heavy dose of Western technology and expertise is needed to boost productivity, improve the quality of goods and provide the basis for self sustaining growth.<sup>48</sup>

East Europe will also need continued access to Western money market. Poland which borrowed 550 million dollars from a consortium of Western Banks last year will broadly seek a similar loan.<sup>49</sup>

Whatever the eventual impact of the embargo on the Russians, the immediate effect on the United States form economy has been painful. The United States administration was

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47. The Times of India, Feb.11, 1980.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

being criticised by consumer interests for the inflationary impact on domestic prices of its decision to sell 25 million tonnes of grain to the Soviet Union. The decision to stop deliveries beyond 8 million tonnes is now criticised for opposite reason. It has meant not only a loss of \$ 5 billion in foreign aid but also an estimated cost of \$ 2.53 billion to the United States exchequer for purchase of excess grain to prevent a price collapse. The political cost of such a fall could have been disastrous to Mr. Carter but the promised price stabilization programme has assuaged sentiment sufficiently for him to win.<sup>50</sup>

As for the ban on export of technology the denial in dollar terms is insignificant both for the United States and Soviet Union. Such Export amounted to 200 million dollars out of a total non-agricultural export of \$ 700 million in 1979, which is itself a small fraction of the total United States exports to the Soviet Union. But a reversal in the trend of the seventies of increasing United States technologically involvement in the Soviet Union way, if continued for a long time and if the EEC and Japan play, have serious repercussions on Soviet technological ambition and the commercial hopes of United States business.<sup>51</sup>

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50. M.S.Jaganathan, "Economic Boycott", World Forces (New Delhi), Vol. 1, No. 3, March 1980, p. 23.

51. Ibid.

The American measures taken in retaliation to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan hurted Soviet Union economically (curtailment of grain exports and technology transfers) psychologically (withdrawal from Moscow of Olympic games) particularly (titing more towards China and militarily (United States arms build up) America's allies seems so far not to be undercutting her retaliatory measures. And although, France and West Germany and Japan seem unlikely to break with the United States on the issue. Moreover the Soviet Union has lost greatly in the Islamic world and in the third world in general on the Afghanistan issue and so has her ally Cuba.<sup>52</sup>

Economic forces are thus working to soften the hard time policies and cooperative economic arrangements established during the earlier period of elements cannot be dismantled without opposition. The approaches and themes of economic cooperation provide a major stimulus for the revival of detente diplomacy.<sup>53</sup>

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52. William G. Griffith, "Super Powers after Afghanistan", Survival (London), Vol. 26, July-Aug., 1980, pp. 25-26.

53. Ibid.

The State of Soviet American Relations and  
the Development of Non-aligned Strategies

The flows and consequences of the Soviet American Cold Wars have provided the backdrop for the examination of counter-strategies in terms of non-alignment. Non-aligned diplomacy makes a sharp break with coercive diplomacy. In this view detente does not mean only the status quo but an active international effort for disarmament, both conventional and nuclear.<sup>54</sup>

Non-alignment is the negation of "bipolar" and "multipolar" detente, pointing out to the world that the greatest part of mankind is cut off from the process of building peace. Non-alignment is therefore the expression and vehicle of "universal" detente. Nonaligned are involved in conflicts, part of the contradictions among them are national and of an objective nature, while others are the consequence of the transplantation of bipolar and multipolar concepts into the soul of nonalignment which, naturally enough, prompts the movement to defend and certain other countries are clamouring for their place and voice thus upsetting the bipolarity.<sup>55</sup>

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54. Bogdan Gsolnik, "Nonalignment Concept of Struggle for peace", Review of International Affairs, (Belgrade), Vol. 31, No. 718, pp. 12-13.

55. Ibid.

The struggle for peace, for international detente for halting the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and for halting the process of disarmament, is a most urgent task and one decisive for the future of mankind.<sup>56</sup>

The concept of the struggle for peace which has developed in the nonaligned movement in particularly noteworthy. This is an integral concept for stemming from the knowledge that in order to preserve peace it is essential to remove the roots of crisis and tensions in the world, and that international security cannot become a reality without changing overall international relations.<sup>57</sup>

In opposing the nuclear war, military intervention and bloc politics, nonaligned countries brought up their demand for democratization of international relations and the elimination of any kind of solution based on bloc domination and hegemony.<sup>58</sup>

Nonalignment has already provided the basic concept of a new system of international political and economic relations and opened a process of political struggle for its realization. As a world concept has been embraced not only

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56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

by state and political structure of nonaligned countries but also by their peoples. Thereby nonalignment is gaining new vital force and is becoming even more effective.

This renders even more necessary a comprehensive elaboration of the policy of nonaligned and of its role as a force inspiring countries and peoples to action for peace, independence and development.<sup>59</sup>

The activity of the nonaligned countries has brought about favourable conditions for the United Nations action in solving global problems such as decolonization, international economic relations, disarmament, settlement of crisis and face of crisis etc. They have also shown a continuous resistance to the attempts to draw the crucial problems away from the United Nations and to deal with them within the framework of bloc relations.<sup>60</sup>

Non-aligned movement has lived through a variety of crisis situations in the past and in fact, cronicly enough, it is the environment of crisis from time to time that has been responsible for its survival over the past 21 years. Even the origin of Non-aligned movement cannot be traced

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59. Josip Vrhovel; "Nonalignment in Eighties", Review of International Affairs Vol. 32, No. 719, Sep. 5, 1981 p. 11.

60. Ibid.



to an environment of critical concern for anticolonialism; preservation of independence and sovereignty of states, dangers of military dominance of one or the other Super Powers. The anti-colonialism movement began with the Bandung Conference of 1955 led to the formation of Nonaligned movement as a positive institution for fostering the common interests of the newly independent states of the world community.<sup>61</sup>

Most of the non-aligned are associated closely or remotely, in one way or the other, with one Super Power or the other. In other words proximity of the so called non-aligned countries to one of the two Super Powers has been of a degree and nature that it cannot unequivocally be said that they are nonaligned in the real sense of the words.

Can it then be said that most of the nations of the third world have not been allowed willingly or otherwise to act as independently in the constant adjustment and readjustment of power politics as pursued by the Super Powers ? The capacity to manoeuvre and manipulate on the part of the nonaligned countries is so limited that the concept of the nonaligned movement ends up to as a doubtful proposition. However the picture is not altogether so dismal.<sup>62</sup>

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61. V.R. Panchmukhi, "A Turning Point for NAM", YOJANA (New Delhi), Vol. 27, No. 7, April 16, 1983, p. 15.

62. The Hindustan Times, March 24, 1983.

On issues like Afghanistan and Kampuchea, there are sharp differences. This in turn leads to hush hush conversations at summits reflexive of rigid national interests. In still other cases, a search for active military support in order to preserve their national viability is no less a point of dismay. The alliances involving group interests among member nations are also a disturbing and an uneasy dimension of the nonalignment movement.<sup>63</sup>

Next comes the economic difficulties. The economic variables and the structural models conditioned by their different geographies, natural resources, gross national products or per capita incomes and their differing demographic output make the nonaligned nations somewhat problem oriented in the sphere.<sup>64</sup>

The Third World Countries feel they have a role to fulfil in the institutionalising of detente, at both the global and regional levels. The key technique used by the Non-aligned countries is to reject the Super Power arms race and bringing economic questions of Third World Development into sharp focus. The articulation of third world demands creates a general political impact by emphasising the need for a peaceful international environment in which the

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63. Michael Manley, "Why Nonaligned is not Neutral", Nation, (New York), Vol. 35, No. 54, April 30, 1983.

64. Ibid.

developing countries can pursue their aims apart from the Third World countries, there are European Countries which find the increasing military burdens counter productive and these countries also wish to deny the two Super Powers the role of global police man.<sup>65</sup>

The Decline of Alliances and Independent Decision Making

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan signified the end of the United States - Soviet relationship. Both sides talk about Afghanistan as a watershed and as representing a qualitative change in each other's policies. Both pledge toughness and proclaim that they are not going to be pushed around. Their respective pronouncements are more of an effort to influence the West-Europeans and the third world than an exercise in bilateral diplomacy.<sup>66</sup>

Moscow is trying as in the late 60s to develop selective detente with Western Europe in order to widen the gap between the United States and its allies. In this respect, the recently announced second stage of Soviet troops withdrawal promised by Brezhnev in East Berlin in October and a softening

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65. Ibid.

66. Dimitri K. Simes, "Death of Detente", International Security (New York), Vol. 5, No. 1, Summer 1980, p. 3.

of the Soviet position on the conditions of TNF negotiations announced by Gromyko are example of Moscow advances in Western Europeans.<sup>67</sup>

The allies clearly are not buying the administrative rationale. They share neither its assumption about Soviet behaviour nor its prescriptions for how to deal with it. They are dragging their feet, doing only what they must be to keep the Americans from becoming angry. The Americans public supports the policies for moment because it has been disillusioned by the events. It naturally believes in a strong defence, and it wants to believe that this will reverse what it sees as the decline of the past few years.<sup>68</sup> Some national assumptions have been badly buffeted lately. First came the oil shocks that dramatized the nation's vulnerability. Then came the daily humiliations of the hostage drama in Iran. And immediately following the Tehran episode came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, raising new anxieties about the ground rules of the Cold War.<sup>69</sup>

Soviet repression in Eastern and Central Europe and Soviet domination of the warsaw pact have created serious economic and military problems for Moscow. Western experts

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67. Ibid., p. 25.

68. Ronald Steel, "Cold War", Foreign Policy (New York), Vol. 189, No. 15, April 11, 1981, p. 17.

69. Ibid.

exerts that significant portion of Red Army forces stationed in Warsaw pact countries is not directly available for strategic tasks because they are needed to control and discipline, the population and troops of the host countries.<sup>70</sup> Most of Moscow's Comecon partners have accumulated nearly debilitating debts, owing nearly \$ 70 billion to the West in 1981 and having received almost another \$ 70 billion in indirect trade subsidies from the Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s. About 90% of the Soviet financial subsidies accumulated after 1974. A feeling among East and Central Europeans that political and economic dependence upon the Soviet Union offends their national self esteem exacerbates Moscow's problem. Such resentment can only help damage Soviet security interests.<sup>71</sup>

United States - Soviet relations were to revert to a Cold War footing, east Europeans fear it could mean that a country like Hungary which is experimenting with liberal economic reforms similar to those tried out in Czechoslovakia before the Soviet led invasion of 1968, might have to abandon them in favour of the more orthodox Soviet model of centralised planning.<sup>72</sup>

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70. John W. Holmes, "Freedom for Europe", Foreign Policy, (New York), Vol. 48, No. 50, Spring 1983, p. 20.

71. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Super Powers and the Northern Tier", International Security (New York), Vol. 4, No. 3, Winter, 1979/80, p. 7-8.

72. Ibid.

Poland, which had bought relative autonomy in its domestic affairs by faithfully, adherence to Soviet foreign policy, had ultimately to crackdown on its own dissident movement. The government was loath to do so for fear that a crack down could boomerang in popular discontent.<sup>73</sup>

Relations between the West and the Soviet Union's six European allies - Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia East Germany, Rumania and Bulgaria have changed dramatically since 1969, when negotiations from the two Super Powers sat down for talks on limiting strategic arms and East West-thaw began. Trade has risen with special concession agreements, joint equity ventures and loans to Eastern Countries from Western banks. By 1977, the six countries obtained almost one-third of all their imports from the industrial democracies. By the end of 1976 more than 2,3000 east west industrial cooperation agreement had been signed.<sup>74</sup>

With the other national growth rates dropping sharply, most east European economists believe that a heavy dose of Western technology and expertise is needed to increase productivity, improve the quality of goods and provide the basis for self sustaining growth.<sup>75</sup>

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73. Adam Bromke, "Detente or Cold War II: East-West Relations after Afghanistan", Behind the Head Lines, Vol. 38, No. 2, June 1980, p. 23-24.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

A sharpening split in relations among European Communist parties reflects expectations that the Soviet Union is returning to Cold War with the West and that Moscow is trying to reassert its dominion over the whole. European Communists movement at a time of rising east-west tensions. The interparty quarrel became public with the refusal of the Italian, Spanish and Yugoslav Communists to attend a meeting of European Communist parties. The decision to hold the Paris meeting which is being sponsored by the French and Polish parties - could only have been taken on Moscow's instructions. While the Italian Communists were trying to maintain their independence from Moscow by forging wider alliance with other leftist parties, the French Communist party had moved conspicuously closer to Moscow and the unyielding Soviet line.<sup>76</sup>

When French Communists sent a delegation to Belgrade to announce the conference, the Italian Communists promptly sent a delegation of their own to persuade the Yugoslav to reject the plan on the ground that it could undermine the European communist parties independence in their relations with the renewed solidarity of the Italian and Yugoslav communist with support from the Spanish Communist Party was a rebuff to Moscow Italian Communist say.<sup>77</sup>

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76. The Times of India, 9 April, 1980.

77. Ibid.

Economically, the Soviet is a burden on the Soviet Union. Militarily, the size of the Soviet forces that in case of war would have to keep Eastern Europe subjugated is probably already larger than the size of the elite units of the Western pact countries, which would be trusted to participate, effectively and offensively in a Soviet strike against Western Europe. Incidentally, one of the most important and overlooked consequences of the Polish events was the creation, for the foreseeable future, of a power vacuum in the Central link of the Warsaw pact forces confronting NATO. Politically, the situation in Eastern Europe is more and more an embarrassment to the Soviet Union, casting them such of whatever influence they have left over Communist parties abroad and potentially endangering their detente with Western Europe.<sup>78</sup>

In the 1980s, the economies of Eastern Europe will undergo a harsh test, their growth will be drastically cut and they will require austerity programme Economic difficulties in Eastern Europe have a way of being translated into socio-political unrest.<sup>79</sup>

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78. Seweryn Bialer, "The Soviet Union and the West in the 1980s: Detente Containment and Confrontation", Orbis, (Philadelphia Pa ), Vol. 27, No. 1, Spring 1983, p. 47.

79. Ibid.



The East European situation in the 1980s will therefore be a stalemate in which the Soviets cannot and do not want to add anything new to their policies and will promise only more and more of the same; the economic conditions under which such policies will be pursued be significant worse than in the 1970s. As a result of East European stalemate will be full of dangers for the Soviet Union.<sup>80</sup>

The support from Western Europe for the strengthening of United States resolve in the face of Soviet provocations in both instructive and encouraging. European allies are especially sensitive to America's leadership capacity. If the United States itself seems phlegmatic under Russian pressure, if it vacillates on defense strategy, Washington can hardly expect London, Bonn and Paris to behave otherwise. Western Europe also understands its stake in Eastern Europe. If the Soviets grip is secure there it may seek to extend its sway toward the Atlantic.<sup>81</sup> With Tito in the deep dusk of his life, Yugoslavia soon will offer the Soviets an almost irresistible opportunity to consolidate their power in the Balkans. The independence of Yugoslavia has been a fostering offence to Russians for a generation. How today's confrontation

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80. Ibid.

81. "After Dente", (ed.) New Republic (New York), Vol. 182 No. 7, Jan. 1980, p. 8.

is handled is likely to decide what happened and there and elsewhere in the future. Having put Yugoslavia outside the parameter of our concerns when he was a candidate in 1976, Jimmy Carter must be quite clear about reversing course in 1980.<sup>82</sup>

The cohesiveness and internal discipline of each side's alliances in Europe were weakened as states in Eastern and Western Europe increased their contacts without referring back to, Moscow and Washington.<sup>83</sup>

West Germany has been resisting the United States pressures to cut economic ties with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries in East Europe. The Soviet Union in FRG's major trade partner and this nation of a million unemployed galloping inflation and unease over the prospects of a zero growth in 1980-81 and some uncertainty about the Arab oil, does not want to cut the flowing trade with the Soviet Union. GDR and other socialists states and block the project for greater supply of Soviet gas to West Europe through a pipeline.<sup>84</sup>

French was the first West European country to confront the United States publicity on the issue of the

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82. Ibid.

83. Spergeon M. Keeny and Povorsky "The mutual hostage relationship of the Super Powers" Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 60, No. 2, Winter 1981-82, p. 69-70.

84. Ibid.

Siberian pipeline and breach the Reagan's embargo.<sup>85</sup> Washington's inability to impose a ban on its own foodgrains exports to the Soviet Union while it attempts to force an embargo on West European exports of pipeline equipment to Russia has earned it sneers and deision here. The Siberian pipeline is considered advantageous by the West European government in the long and short terms.<sup>86</sup>

The reluctance of East European countries to see their national situations to terms of Soviet global strategy is also evident although the operative goals provided by Moscow cannot be avoided if the issue is forced. Although of most proportions independent initiatives by smaller powers who have a greater sense of interdependence can identify a wide variety of detente promoting enterprises.<sup>87</sup>

Several consequences flow from the decline of alliances and the revival of independent decision making. Even small states have raised the question of the damaging consequences of the political goal of Super Power hegemony. The manifestation of a Cold War has a corressive effect on the efforts of small and middle powers to deepen economic and diplomatic relations in the region to which they naturally belong.

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85. The Hindustan Times, Nov. 28, 1983.

86. Ibid.

87. Karl W. Dutsch of Managing International Crisis in Managing International Conflict ed. (London, 1982) p. 11.

Instead, the decline of the mood of detente automatically leads to a general temptation to apply military solutions to political problems. New tensions and insecurities are felt by states which are forced to relate their national security problems to the military and strategic balance between the Super Powers. Regional interests when filtered through global Super Power interests and no longer seen in terms of feasible and flexible policies but become the prerogative of Washington and Moscow and thus demonstrate ambiguities and contradictions which need not have arisen if there had been wide-ranging consultation on an intra-regional basis.

Super Power States in the  
Global Political Order :

Having been in full swing in the first half of the 1970s which saw the staging of the European security and cooperation conference and the adoption of a 'Charter to govern relations among European states - the Helsinki Act - detente suffered serious set-back in the second half of the decade the stand still in the progress of detente has in recent times assumed the characteristics of a down sight crisis that has affected the whole gamut of international relations.<sup>88</sup>

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88. Bran L. Hol; Super Powers and International Conflict. (1979), pp. 35-36.

The big powers and advanced countries in general have upto now shown no readiness to face the numerous problems and set about finding effective solutions for them. They have been detente as a process of quantitative growth of forms of mutual and interbloc cooperation based on bloc dimensions rather than as a question of substantial, qualitative changes in all fields of International relations and in parts of the world. It is clear that a detente which is universal neither geographically nor by content which did not provide a basis for solving the accumulated problems of international economic and political relations which did not encourage the process of democratising international relations; that such a detente could not but fail the test of time.<sup>89</sup>

The narrow conception of detente was based on the mistaken belief of both sides that it is possible, even desirable, to the process of detente to East West relations and even to limit it further to bilateral relations between the two Super Powers and to the field of arms limitation, in the first place. While no one can deny that without negotiation and agreement between the big powers and blocs, there can be no detente, it is also true that detente between

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89. Ibid.

the big powers cannot evolve into a stable and big lasting process if the principles which under lie the policy of detente, and there are above all, the principles of non-interference and sovereign equality, are not respected in relations among all states, irrespective of the size socio-political system and geographical position.<sup>90</sup>

Many western countries have been dependent on the Russian equipment for the Siberian pipeline. On the other side also eastern European needed western technology and expertise to improve the quality of their goods and to make themselves self-sufficient. East West technological relationship is perforce bringing them to interdependent economic relations.<sup>91</sup>

In Europe the Soviet Union joined West Germany in a treaty recognizing the inviolability of each other's borders and renouncing force. It ratified a four power agreement on Berlin, and saw its eagerly desired project for a European security conference come to fruition with a meeting of thirty five heads of government in Helsinki.<sup>92</sup>

Detente seemed to offer the Kremlin political as well as military reassurance. A new government in the Federal Republic of Germany was pushing an Ostpolitik which openly

90. Ibid.

91. Vukadinovic Podovan, "New Dynamic Within the Triangles of Great Powers", Review of International Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 783, Mar 20, 1982, pp. 21-23.

92. Karsten Voigt, "Detente": A Dual Carriage way to peace", Socialist Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 66-67.

recognized the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The German Democratic Republic - East Germany - was finally recognized by Western states after twenty years of isolation. The order Neisse line was accepted as Poland's western border. The new Western attitude of formally admitting what the Russians called the territorial and political realities that resulted from the second world war was enshrined on a continent - wide basis at the European Security Conference in Helsinki in 1975.<sup>93</sup>

Detente also gave Russia the opportunity to step up their trade with the West obtain western credits and import technology. The Russian knew they were behind in certain fields and hoped to short cut their development by detente was important to Moscow as a counter weight to the West's opening to China. Faced with a hostile China on its eastern flank Russia was anxious to have a relaxation of tension in the West. They wanted to present themselves being further isolated, get on an equal footing with the United States and perhaps eventually push China back into a corner.<sup>94</sup>

The Soviet Union and the United States may soon be approaching a point where they will be over extending themselves both military and economically, if they persist with their rearmament plans. Bugged down in Afghanistan stem

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93. Ibid.

94. P.S.Jayaramy, "Super Powers and the Changing International System", India Quarterly (New Delhi), Vol. 38, No.2, April-June 1982, pp. 142-43.

and reduced to a pitiful giant on its own door step, the Soviet Union could itself become vulnerable to polish style domestic social tensions if, in the quest for greater and greater military security, it neglects the economic well being of its citizens. The Reagan Administration in the United States emerging from a tax cutting spree has now discovered that it is unlikely to have all the money it wants to spend on a vast- new war machine that will give it military superiority over, not just military parity with Moscow. The coincides with strong signals from its allies in Western Europe which are getting increasingly alarmed by its arms build up and the resultant domestic and foreign policies neither Moscow nor Washington may much attention to the fall out their confrantation is causing in the third world, but economic burden they impose on West Asia, South Asia, South Africa and Central America are bound to come back.<sup>95</sup>

The West European have a special responsibility in seeing that this first exercise in negotiations between Moscow and the Reagan administration does not get side trached into irrelevant rhetoric. There is some hope that it will

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95. Ibid.



not be because West Europe and more especially Mr. Schmidt's West Germany which will be bearing the burden of locating the persuing and cruise missiles on its territory does not want to become hostage to the Soviet SS 20. And if Mr. Reagan who has until now been busy talking at the Russians talks, time to reflect he will realise that this may be the last good chance to talk to them with any hope of success.<sup>96</sup>

The task of maintaining stability in East West relations can only be achieved through new forms of detente diplomacy. A global political order requires that freezing of relations should be overcome by a diplomacy which promotes confidence building measures and settlement of disputes.<sup>97</sup>

#### Transformation of International Organisations:

The current and potential political roles of the Soviet and the Americans do not provide much hope that they could create a new institutional framework for peace. The acquisition of modern weapons system by the Third World results increasingly in these countries becoming pawns in the military strategies and doctrines of the Super Powers.<sup>98</sup>

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96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

Under Khrushchev there was the naive belief that because the third world was moving away from political dependence on the West it would move into the Soviet Camp. Very few countries have done so, and Russians who have served in the third world often express disappointment and sometime their attitudes bordering on racism about their relations with Africa. The Soviet elite opinion is also bringing to question the value of aid. In many terms it gives an enormous amount to the developing countries in weaponry and technical assistance.<sup>99</sup>

It is concentrated heavily on key countries like Vietnam, Cuba and Ethiopia and is not across the board. But it is a great deal of money from the point of view of the Soviet man in the street, who has to tighten his belt for it. Aid is really wasted unless it goes to socialist governments who have the development interest of their country at heart. One must wait socialism emerges in the third world before expecting real development. Concerning his argument in terms of the effect of aid upon the working class of West, the another wrote that sacrifice is no way to resolve the complex problems of economic development. Any one who propounded such beat tightening austerity programmes would not meet with

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99. Ibid.

understanding in the working class and could find himself isolated. No doubt he was also talking about the Soviet working class who are not well informed about foreign policy and display a degree of xenophobia which includes grumbling about aid not only to the third world but to eastern Europe.<sup>100</sup>

Super Powers behaviour in the United Nations system has always had mixed qualities whatever the cause of the cold war, it intensified the latent behaviour of unevenness of the Super Powers in the United Nations System. To begin with it was generally understood that the post war peace settlement would be sought outside the United Nations structure. At the special urging of the Soviet Union, the Super Powers reserved the right to act against the resurgence of former enemies without submitting themselves to the New Limits on the use of force.<sup>101</sup>

If the Super Powers have not surrendered their ultimate autonomy neither have they used it generally and deliberately to destroy the international institutions. Indeed the United Nations has contributed enormously to their growth, despite variations in its approach. At the very least, the Soviet Union has used international organisations to protect its position and sometimes by extending its influence has promoted their use.<sup>102</sup>

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100. Ibid.

101 Leon Gordenker, "Super Powers Organisation", International Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 1980, p. 455.

102 Ibid.

The growth of institutions has taken shapes different from the original. Expectations of both the Super Powers and the lesser powers. Their structures owe a good deal to the necessity of adjusting to Super Power positions whether competitive or alike. East of the Super Powers in its own way, has also staked out territory forbidden for international organization.<sup>103</sup>

In one important aspect, the Super Powers simply made obvious what cannot help being a component of the approach of every government to international organizations. All member states seek some sort of benefits. In this respect the Super Powers behave alike. They differ sharply, however, on the degree of institutionalization and the range of international administration. They will support. The depth of their commitment to international organization as a political technique always remains a question, too partly because of their inherent ability to manage for themselves, partly because of their separate vision of satisfactory world politics.<sup>104</sup>

The coercive diplomacy practised by the Super Powers in turn encourage Third World militarisation. The starting

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103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

point for a new diplomatic effort could therefore be provided by a new institutional setting through which third world countries are encouraged to implement self-reliant development strategies and the diversions to non-productive military spending is checked both at the Super Power and third world level. Detente diplomacy could work through realistic alternatives for transforming the contemporary global system through integrated processes which can save mankind from immense economic and social costs of the second Cold War.<sup>105</sup>

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105. Ibid.

CHAPTER - IIPOLITICAL AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF THE  
SECOND COLD WAR

The main aims of Soviet and American foreign policies are related in a most complex and contradictory manner. It is not enough to speak of national survival and national security in a context where America's legal-moralistic approach bears hardly any similarity to the inexorable course of Soviet foreign policy as it seeks to work out the changing correlation of power between capitalism and socialism. In order to discern the totality of the detente process the relevance and comprehensiveness of Soviet and American political practices must be related to specific historical events giving rise to acute problems in East-West relations. A general review and evaluation of the political and security dimensions of the Second Cold War in the 1980s must examine the conflictual cooperative relationship between the Super Powers which emerged with compelling force in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The enhancement of the prospects of detente in 1960s must, therefore, be seen against a complex background of power relationships which were conditioned by historical and ideological ingredients. The impact of the Helsinki Conference and the

CSCE process and of the SALT process, however, could not sustain the optimistic belief that the arms race would be halted. The 1973-74 OPEC oil embargo effected United States and Western interest adversely and American policy-makers' attention was increasingly directed towards interventionary diplomacy. The humiliation suffered by Americans by the holding of their diplomats as hostages in the American Embassy compound in Tehran during 1979-81 stimulated United States anxiety about the pursuit of national political aims. The linking of the Helsinki agreement to the observance of Human Rights inside Soviet Union also circumscribed the effect of the detente process. The deterioration of the strategic nuclear environment produced vexing dilemmas. Proposals for reducing strategic weapons were not taken very serious.<sup>1</sup>

During the 1970s we were living in the Decade of Detents and could stop worrying about the bomb while the Super Powers coexisted in peaceful competition. Then we approached the 1980s, the authoritative voices of politician, strategists and editorial writers began to assume harsher tone. Detente, said one of President Carter's men was

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1. Bill Maynes, "New Cold War", International Security (New York), Vol. 6, No. 2, Feb. 1981, p. 15.

'a foreign word which people confuse with entente' and the President had now decided that 'peace through strength' was a better way of putting it. China invaded Vietnam; the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan; the United States refused to sign the SALT II agreement on limiting strategic nuclear weapons and made new plans for tactical nuclear war in Europe.<sup>2</sup> The Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that the chance of a United States - Soviet military confrontation 'will increase significantly' in the first half of the 1980'. The Super Powers face of benevolent dispotism, promising as global stability if we behave, was hideously distorted in the mirror of a new cold war and now threatened a horrible fate. What had we done to deserve it? Like an eclipse which the on-lookers can only observe in owe a new shadow has passed over the world. The Decade of Detente has effortlessly given way to the dangerous decade.<sup>3</sup>

The new Cold War of the 1980s is much more threatening than the Old Cold War of the 1960s. Not only has the size of the Nuclear arsenal held by the Super Powers vastly increased, but nuclear war has begun to be seen as fightable

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2. John Gittings, "What the Super Powers say" in Super Powers in Collision (New York, 1982), p. 9.

3. Ibid.



and winnable by strategists on both sides. The sheer quality of nuclear devices, the complexity of their new technology, and fallible sophistication of the early warning methods of detection also increase the possibility of eventual use, by accident or design.<sup>4</sup> These military developments reflect a much more significant heightening in those features of the international political scene which raise tension and increase the risk of war.

The most important development has been the growth in the power of the Soviet Union relative to that of the United States. This is dangerous not because the Soviet Union is inherently more aggressive than the United States, but because - American leaders refuse to accept the Soviet quest for parity between the two Super Powers. Particularly under President Reagan, although the process had already begun under his predecessor Mr. Carter, the assumption that Moscow and Washington could maintain a rough balance has been repudiated. Another development has been the emergence of China as a significant force on the East-West equation. John Gitting says that the Chinese leaders have reacted to the Super Power threat in the only way they know how - by playing off one against the other. A positive relationship

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4. Brezezinski, "Outlook for Detente Alliance", US News & World Report (Washington DC), Vol. LXXXIX; No. 5, 15 Aug. 1980, p. 26.

with both at the same time has so far been beyond their reach. This has had a disastrous effect upon the already fragile United States - Soviet relationship of the early 1970s and yet the basis for a real understanding between Washington and Peking is still very shaky.<sup>5</sup> The Cold War is not only a contest for power but a mechanism through which each maintains control over the clients and allies within its own empire. Their tactical assessments may vary, and they may disagree on strategy, but the goal is never questioned and in the closed world of foreign policy establishment where they operate there is never any genuine debate over real options.<sup>6</sup>

Political dimensions of the Second World War:

Russia and United States have been driven in the direction of Detente by their growing recognition that nuclear war should be tantamount to mutual suicide - and that both share an over riding interest in minimizing that danger.

It was President Nixon in his inaugural address on Jan. 26, 1969, who launched the latest phase of the search for an accommodation between the Super Powers. "We are entering an era of negotiations".

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5. John Gitting, "What the Super Powers say", in Super Powers in Collision (New York, 1982), p. 10.
6. "Back to Cold War (Edt.), US News and World Report, (Washington), Vol. LXXX, No. 4, Jan. 26, 1976, p.22.

Nixon and Brezhnev are the two leaders signed the first strategic Arms Limitation Agreement together with other accords to promote economic cultural and scientific relations.

After Mr. Nixon's resignation in September 1974, a quick mini summit was arranged between his successor Gerold Ford and Mr. Brezhnev to demonstrate that Super Power detente remained in course despite the change of leadership in Washington since that meeting in Vladivostok detente has run into troubled waters.<sup>7</sup>

As the Soviet decision - makers see it expanding military power enables them to press for advantages unilaterally while the continuation of detente enables the Kremlin to expand its relative military strength as a national option while preserving the highly centralised direction of Soviet interest and Commitments.<sup>8</sup>

In his address to 26th Party Congress (Feb. 1981) President Brezhnev called for a Soviet - American summit without preconditions. But a Soviet interest in detente which is based in technical considerations can never work its way toward realization. It has become too obvious that Soviet's objective for detente is to prevent the United States - in particular - from significantly increasing its

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7. Ibid.

8. Stiver William Winter, "Doves, Hawks and Detente", Foreign Policy (New York), No. 48, Winter 1981, p.27.

military strength, to gain access to Western technology and financial resources, and to make use of the European interest in detente to put indirect pressure on the United States to be more accommodations towards the Soviet Union.<sup>9</sup>

Soviet spokesman claim that detente with the United States remains on the diplomatic agenda, it would be strange if the Soviet leadership did not got through a process of disillusionment and knowing of expectations similar to the one developed in Washington. But it would be equally out of character for Brezhnev and his associates to admit that detente with the United States in which they invested to much effort and personal prestige, has been damaged beyond repair. Nor would further increases in United States - Soviet confrontations serve Moscow's interests. It would make a dialogue with the Western Europeans more difficult, and the danger of Super Powers revalry in the third world getting out of hand would grow. The Soviet's also seem to fear, as do some American observers, that growing multipolarity can allow Moscow's and Washington's clients to manipulate their patrons into a nuclear holocaust.<sup>10</sup>

Detente has allowed Moscow to move closer to America's friends in Europe and Japan. Since 1972, many of America's

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9. Socastro Hadi "The US and the USSR in the Second Cold War and its implications for South East Asia", Indonesian Quarterly (Jakarta), Vol. 10, No. 1, p.57.

10. Dimitri K. Simes, "Death of Detente", International Security (New York), Vol. 5, No. 1, Summer 1980, p.25.

industrial partners have developed strong trade links with Russia. With commercial ties have come more accommodating political views. As a result Russia feels a day is coming when the United States no longer can count on leading a bloc willing or able to stand up to firm Soviet political pressure.

Moscow sees as a boon the anti-war movement sweeping across Western Europe and emerging in the United States. The anti-nuclear backlash, plus Reagan's cut in social spending and the harshing in congress over the 1983 budget, are viewed here as catalyst for western compromises that will work in Moscow favour.<sup>11</sup>

Moscow is trying as in the late 1960s to develop widen the gap between the United States and its allies. In this respect, the recently announced record stage of Soviet troops withdrawal provided by Brezhnev in East Berlin in October and softening of the Soviet position on the conditions of INF negotiations announced by Gromyko are examples of Moscow's advances to the Western countries.<sup>12</sup> Kremlin counter strategy is to sow division among United States allies in Western Europe and in Japan while keeping a light rein on its sattelites and Elient States.<sup>13</sup>

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11. Nicholas Daniloff, "Decade of Detente", US News and World Report (Washington DC), Vol. XLI, May 24, 1982.

12. Thomas J. Watson, "US-Soviet Relations", Vital Speeches (New York), Vol. XLXIII, No. 5, Dec. 15, 1981, p. 141.

13. "Super Powers Scratch for Support" (Ed), US News & World Report, (Washington, DC), Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 6, Feb 18, 1980, p. 32.

With regard to the Third World the Soviets have conducted numerous theoretical debates and revaluations but the criteria for Soviet action in support of a government or movement do not appear to be dictated by theoretical or ideological considerations. Rather, the criteria appears to be simply satisfaction of Soviet political strategies and for economic interests, regardless of the ideological nature of the State or movements. These interests may be to weaken the United States or the West in general within the area, to weaken the Chinese to achieve bases, facilities to positions against the West or China or pure and simple economic profits. In pursuit of these interests, the Soviet have supported political leaders as varied in ideological coloring as Assad and Nasser and Qaddafi and Khomeini, to mention just there in the Middle East - all at the expense of local communists and then more 'progressive' movements while Soviet interests presumably can best be served by installation of Marxist regimes. Soviet policy since Stalin has been wise enough to realise the risks involved in trying to install such regimes, so long as they promise stability for Soviet interests.<sup>14</sup>

Soviet analysts counted privately that they are reaping the advantages to the Soviet Union of promoting turmoil in the Third World. While the Soviet Union was weak and West was strong, Soviet support for national

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14. Golan Golia, "The Soviet Union, Detente and Area of Crisis", The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations (Hebrew Press, Jerusalem), No. 4, 1981, p.68.

liberation movements, they argue was an important if indirect way to weaken the West. Now the Soviet Union has more equal strength and as a Super Power must worry more than before that change in the International system could get out of control.<sup>15</sup>

In the concern of the Third World countries, the Soviets are attempting to present the United States as a major threat to the interests and sensitivities of developing nations especially Moscow exploitation of the Iranian hostage crisis is one avenue in this efforts. Rationally more serious is the Soviet campaign to portray the United States as the principal patron of Israel. The Soviets argue that the Palestinian problems not Afghanistan, should be the subject of principal concern for the Arabs. Similarly, the Kremlin warns Third World states that a return to a more activist American global is a greater danger to them than is the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup>

The Soviet intervention by proxy in Angola represented an important yardstick in Soviet foreign policy which significantly accelerated an action - reaction process in Moscow's and Washington's mutual anger. The Kremlin correctly calculated that there would be no effective American

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15. Secretary Shultz, "US-Soviet Relations in the context of US-Soviet forces policy", Current (New York), No.492, June 15, 1983.

16. Dimitn K. Simes, "Death of Detente", International Security, (New York), Vol. 5, No.1, Summer 1980, p. 24.

opposition to its efforts to achieve victory for MPLA. But Moscow seemed to underestimate the indignation its successful operation provoked in the United States. What the Soviet leadership did not realize was that there was a difference between American unwillingness to face the challenge and its approval of the Soviet Union's acting as a brutal Super Power thus heightening the relative importance of the United States.

Whatever the specific reasons for its major state in Angola, the success of the venture on the ground probably provided momentum toward the gradual development of a new pattern, of Soviet diplomacy of force in Third World areas of instability. It is questionable whether the Soviets would have gotten involved in the Ethiopian Somali conflict without their prior victory in Angola.<sup>17</sup>

The most important aspect of United States and Soviet involvement in Africa. The Soviet Union has continued to follow the lead of the front line states on the Zimbabwe - Rhodesia problem and has been prepared to let the negotiation process go forward. Soviet political and military support for the patriotic front forces has remained steady but has not grown substantially.

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17. Frigges Puja, "The Perils of the Arms race and the countervailing power of detente", New Hungarian Quarterly, (Budapest), Vol.23, No. 8, September 1982, p. 12.



Similarly, Soviet Union has remained in the background while efforts are underway to resolve the problem of independence for Namibia. Nevertheless, the potential for escalation of violence in Southern Africa remains the most serious potential problem on the horizon in United States-Soviet relations.<sup>18</sup>

Soviet and Cuban military assistance to the Mengisth government has continued, but the Ethiopian have been unable to silence the insurgency in either Eritrea or the Ogaden. Moscow has moved to consolidate its position, and premier Kosygin was the ranking the fifth anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution. Despite outward signs of close cooperation however, Soviet Ethiopian relations have been troubled by Mengisth's refusal to agree Soviet were reported to be unhappy with his decision to cooperate with the United Nations plan for Namibia and his policy of establishing ties with the West, Neto's successor Jose Edecardo dos sentos, appears intent on continuing these policies, and it remains to be seen how Soviets will react. Meanwhile the level of Soviet and Cuban military assistance has remained constant, as has the challenge from insurgent groups which operate freely in major areas of the country.<sup>19</sup>

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18. Marshall D Shulman, "An Overview of US-Soviet Relations" Department of State Bulletin (Washington DC), Vol.79, No. 2033, p. 42-43.

19. Ibid.

During Spring 1977, Cuba stationed 400-6000 additional troops in Angola, Moreover Cuba began providing military and technical aid to Mozambique and Ethiopia. The Soviet Union also began to supply Ethiopia with with massive military aid for use against Somalia by the end of February 1978, Cuba had stationed 10,000 troops in Ethiopia and the Soviets had doubled their normal deployment of ships in the Indian Ocean. Even arms controls proponents realised that the Indian ocean talks could not continue under these circumstances.<sup>20</sup>

There are two aspects of the Soviet Cuban relationship that recently have burdened United States-Soviet relations first the use of Cuban troops supported by Soviet logistics and using Soviet weapons to fight in regional conflicts elsewhere in the World, particularly in Africa, second the provision of military assistance to Cuba as well as the construction of military facilities to Cuba, which could constitute a threat to American security to the security other countries in the sphere.

Apprehensive have been raised on three occasions over the past year in the context of Soviet activities in Cuba, second when an expanded naval facility was noted under construction at Elenfuegos, third when the presence of a Soviet-ground force combat unit was detected.<sup>21</sup>

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21. Ronald Steel, "Cold War, Cold comfort", New Republic (New York), Vol. 184, p. 15-16.

Following the end of border hostilities in March, relations between North and South Yemen have focussed on talks, so far unsuccessful, aimed at achieving unity between the two countries. Soviet relations with South Yemen were high lighted by Premier Kosygin's stopover in his return from Ethiopia. Although Soviet military assistance has continued, as has a Cuban presence, there has been no recent indication that the Soviets are encouraging aggressive behaviour on the part of their South Yemen continues to go forward with the intentions of keeping the Sona Government to better provide for its own security.<sup>22</sup>

Before long, however, stirrings of discontent with the new relationship with the Soviet Union began to make themselves felt. This was true not least within the Nixon administration itself. In October, 1973, Nixon did not hesitate to put American forces on alert in the face of a threatened Soviet intervention in the Middle East. By the Spring of 1975, however, the executive was crippled by water gate and by Nixon's forced resignation to the point of being obliged to stand idly by as Soviet supported North Vietnamese forces launched their successful conventional invasion of South Viet-nameese. Massive Soviet shipment to the North Vietnamese in 1973 not only violated the Paris peace agreement but also enabled the communists in the early months of 1975.

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22. Ibid.

It is such Soviet behaviour that facts a growing debate in the United States over the meaning of detente - and the risks of playing by what some observers see as the Kremlin rule of "What is mine I keep what is yours is up for brass".<sup>23</sup>

In the past year we witnessed Vietnamese troops, with extensive Soviet support, invade the nonaligned state of Kampuchea where they sentenced the existing rulers to death in absentia installed a puppet government, drove hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighbouring Thailand, and then positioned themselves to threaten and pressure Thailand a longtime friend of the United States.

The earlier Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea had occurred with Soviet acquiescence and logistical support. While United States concerned both the Vietnamese action against Vietnamese, the potential escalation of the situation that could have arisen if the Soviet Union had initiated direct action against China was averted, largely because both Moscow and Beijing seemed aware of the great risks involved.<sup>24</sup>

The Asian countries do not reject a Soviet presence in South East Asia. But a presence through a proxy is to be avoided at all costs, largely because such a situation will

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23. Gerold Von Brannmuhi, "Relations between West and East in Europe in 1983", Aussen Politic (Humberg FGR), Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 286.

24. Mimetz Mathew, "Future of US-Soviet Relations", Department of State Bulletin (Washington/DC), Vol. 80, No. 2039, June 1980, p. 34.

invite other powers to come and play one South East Asia country against the other. The belief also is that the PRC will have no excuse to mingling in South East Asian affairs as long as the Soviet presence remains limited as it is today.

The Asian countries do not discount the danger of Soviet intentions and observe with some concern certainty differs from one Asian country to another, but on the whole Asian is rather relaxed in facing the Soviet menace, which is considered to be largely military in nature. For one thing it is believed that this instrument cannot be effectively translated by the Soviet Union into Pol objectives at least vis-a-vis Asian countries. But in case the threat materializes, it is believed that the burden to face it lies primarily with the United States, because the character of the issue will be global, not regional. For another thing, it is believed that Chinese provocations will be responsible for bringing the Soviets into the region to the degree that it might endanger South East Asia.<sup>25</sup> The main factor allowing the present Soviet posture in Southeast Asia is Moscow's use of Vietnam as an instrument in the Soviet confrontation with China. It would be unrealistic to

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25. Soesastro Hadi "US and USSR in II Cold War and implications in South East Asia", Indonesian Quarterly (Jakarta) Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1982, p. 57.

assume that the Soviets will emerge as a hegemonial power in the same way as in Eastern Europe. The United States has been endorsing the Chinese view of Vietnam as a satellite of the Soviet Union, but there is every likelihood in the future of an attempt by Washington to clarify and redefine American policy. Already there are indications that the Americans would like to distance themselves from the Chinese confrontationalist views and support the emergence of ASEAN's leverage for a diplomatic settlement in Indo China and Southeast Asia.<sup>26</sup>

United States relations with China are based on the interests in normalizing these relations and are not aimed against any other country. Nevertheless this remains a matter of sensitivity to the Soviet Union perhaps; the strongest source of concern to the Soviet Union remains whether the United States will enter into military supply relationship with China, United States has made it clear that it does not intend to supply military equipment to China, but it has not attempted to speak for its allies on this matter. The Soviet Union sought to implicate the United States in the Chinese military incursion into Vietnam,

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26. H.J. Sipro "World Politics" in The Global System (Homewood, Dorotery Press, 1967), p. 27.

arguing that the visit to the United States by vice Premier Dengxioping in some way represented tacit United States acquiescence in the invasion. This line of argument served Soviet propaganda needs but seemed more designed to divert attention from Soviet involvement in Vietnam than a real assessment of the circumstances by the Soviet leaders.<sup>27</sup>

Soviet restraint in Poland at first seemed to provide some, including the President with a new focus through which Soviet actions in other parts of the world could be judged the lifting of the United States grain embargo against the Soviet Union was in past, justified by this restraint; new Soviet support for the military crackdown in Poland has revived earlier harsh judgement in Soviet behaviour.<sup>28</sup>

In 1973, Soviet leaders know the Egypt and Syria, using Russians arms, involved to attack Israel. Despite the danger that the Super Power confrontations would develop, Moscow failed to consult Washington, a violation of an agreement by the two nations to do so. Russian not only encouraged the Arabs to use the oil weapons" during the war but prodded them to prolong the boycott against the United States.<sup>29</sup>

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27. Marshall Shulman "Europe; an overview of US-Soviet Relations" Department of State Bulletin (Washington DC), Vol. 29, No. 2033, December 1979, p. 46.
28. Ibid.
29. F.M. Kaplan; "Our Cold War Policy" (New York Times, (New York), Vol. 54, No. 1, May, 18, 1980, p. 34.

The winds of political change that brought down the Shah of Iran were largely internal in origin; this was not a movement instigated or substantially supported by outside powers. Although Moscow has sought to work with the new Islamic Republic and cost no opportunity to blame the evils of the post on United States involvement in Iran, there are signs of strain between the Soviet Union and Iran, the Soviet have openly criticized the Islamic movement that has emerged.

It is difficult to predict how things might go in the future, but for the movement it is notable that the setback to United States interests in the P<sup>ol</sup>h<sup>al</sup> transition in Iran has not been accompanied by a corresponding gain for Soviet interests.<sup>30</sup>

The Afghan invasion followed a similar pattern. This time Soviet forces themselves invaded the non-align state of Afghanistan, executed the existing ruler, installed a puppet government forced hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighbouring Pakistan, and one positioning themselves to threaten and pressure Pakistan, a long time friend of the United States as well as other countries in the region.<sup>31</sup>

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30. Nicholas Daniloff, WRussia US Stalemate, US News & World Report (Washington DC), Vol. XLIII, Oct. 11, 1982, p. 43.

31. Ibid.



In both the Kampuchea and Afghan situations Soviet power has been used to enter a relative by weak, non-aligned buffer state, with the result that strong Vietnamese and of Soviet forces are now deployed right-up against the border of a traditional friend of the United States.<sup>31</sup> The West bears not only the humanitarian burden of the refugees but must face new security problems for its friends like Thailand. These two invasions are a clear lesson to the world about the dangerous situation we are all in.<sup>1</sup>

It is noteworthy that both victims - Kampuchea and Afghanistan - were nonaligned countries. Although, it is not fashionable in many parts of the world to be "aligned." These days it is instructive that the Soviets have not chosen to attack United States allies but rather to direct their forces against weak nonaligned countries with vaguely Marxist Government.<sup>32</sup>

The cause of events unfolding after Afghan coup of 1978 brought this primarily neutralist Government into close alignment with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union eventually feels committed to defending what it terms the "Afghan revolution" and is providing substantial military assistance to the Kabul Government, consisting of modern equipment and military advisers numbering several thousands.<sup>1</sup>

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32. J.D. Doencke "Legacy of Cold War" isolationism"  
USA Today (New York), No. 109, July 1980, pp. 64-65.

As the insurgency threat to the Central Government has become more acute, the Soviet Union has faced a dilemma. Some indication of acuteness of this dilemma can be seen in President Taraki departure from office just a few days after he met with Soviet President Brezhnev.<sup>33</sup>

Soviet policy toward Afghanistan remains unchanged. Moscow has been talking with United Nations and Pakistan officials since May 1982 through its satrap in Kabul. In February 1983, United Nations Deputy Secretary General for special political problems Diego Gordovez spent several weeks talking with officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The hints of progress have so far not materialized into any solid steps toward a settlement. The discussion, which are to be resumed in Geneva, are confidential and no breakthrough seems imminent.<sup>34</sup>

Violence in the Caribbean Basin and the Middle East brought the Super-Power confrontation into still sharper forces. The invasion of Grenada Reagan claimed prevented Marxist from turning that island into a Soviet-Cuban colony. Elsewhere in the region, however no such quick or decisive victory for Administration policy seemed in sight. United

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33. Ibid.

34. Karen Devisha, "Super Powers in Eclipse" Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 61, No. 2, Winter 1982/83, p. 439.

States aid to the conservative government of Elsalvador in its fight against a leftist and to the rebels battling the Marxist - led government of Nicaragua did little more than sustain grim guerrilla wars. Just as the United States moves but did not so much as hint at military action in retaliation This underlined a rule of United States - Soviet Union competition that neither side will ever acknowledge publicly each has a sphere or interest that the other respects.<sup>35</sup>

The Soviet 'threat' to the Persian Gulf remained, and American policy was increasingly orientated toward countering Soviet Military action (e.g. operation bright star in Egypt, United States, Israel strategic cooperation, the provision of Saudi AWACS). Soviet influence among the more radical elements in the Middle East and Africa was growing, manifest in the new triple alliance of the clients, Libya South Yemen and Ethiopia. Similarly its support for the Palestine Liberation organisation was demonstrably strengthened by the opening of an official representation in Moscow. For the first time since 1973, there was a possibility that the collapse of the camp David process might lead to security of the Soviet Union in the diplomacy of the

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35. Church J. George, "Man of the Year", Time (new York), Vol. 123, No. 1, January 2, 1984, p. 9.

Arab Israel conflict. Moscow still provided the necessary support to Vietnam and the Cambodian regime. And finally, the Soviet Union and the United States seemed to be adging toward a serious confrontation over the carribbeas and central America. The Soviets were giving Nicaragua more and more political and material support including new arms shipments through Cuba.<sup>36</sup>

As a major power with global interests, the motives and pressures behind Soviet foreign policy in the Carribbean would push it towards over involvement if it perceived a favourable convergence of several developments. If overt action was ruled out recourse could be had to surrogate actions which would avoid risky direct confrontation reminiscent of the Cuban confrontation. In any case the Soviet Union has a naval force capable of projecting its power on a worldwide basis including the Carribbean. Intrinsic to Soviet decision-making, however, is a constant effort to relate the potential costs of a military adventure to the likely benifits in terms of its ascendancy as a global power.

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36. Nicholas Demiloff, "Decade of Detente," US News & World Report (Washington DC), Vol. XLI, May 24, 1982, p. 28.

37. Lawrence Coldwell, William, Diebold Jr., "Super Powers Politics in 1980 and East West Trade", in Soviet American Relations (Ed.) (New York), 1980, p. 23.

SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF THE SECOND (COLD WAR)

Both United States and Soviet Union use arms transfer as levers to gain influence in the developing world. At times they secure tangible benefits such as military facilities in a Third World country. Basically, both super powers seem to value greater influence or steps that they see as potentially convertible into increased influence in their own right and for their own sake. The recipients dependency on the donor for maintenance, spare parts and replacements is seen to provide leverage in difficult situations. The arms donor need not actually threaten to curtail supplies because the two super powers know that this dependency will influence the recipients decisions long before the donor would need to contemplate such threats.<sup>38</sup>

When the Super Powers sell arms to rival nations, each conflict that erupts between Super Powers client status carries the potential for involving the United States and Soviet Union militarily on opposing sides. During conflicts the donors armed forces may assist in transporting urgently needed weapons by delivering them into the war zone. Although such involvement does not actually commit the donor to fight, its armed forces are just a short step from involvement in the conflict itself.<sup>39</sup>

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38. Blechman Berry Nolah E. Jamme Plait Alan, "Pushing Arms" Foreign Policy (New York), No. 46, Spring, 1982, p.142.

39. Joseph M. Siracusa & Glan St. John Barclay, Impact of the Cold War, (Washington: Kenniket Press, 1977), pp. 65-66.

At the other times and in other situations, circumstance, ambition and perceptions of national interest have combined to expand arms sales relationship into dangerous confrontations between the Super Powers. From 1967 through 1973 a clear pattern of escalating involvement, emerged in four crisis in the Middle East, each of which cautioned the potential for Super Power conflict. In 1973 both Super Powers took actions that brought them closer to actual involvement in the fighting than they had ever been.

Although the Soviet had desired certain types of weapons to Egypt and Syria prior to 1973 Arab Israeli war, Moscow quickly began massive arms deliveries when hostilities broke out. These deliveries continued through out the war and rose to such high level that they clearly implied continued throughout the war and rose to such high levels that they clearly implied continued Soviet support and encouragement to the belligerent. When Israeli air strikes on Syrian & parts damaged Soviet merchant ships delivering munition, Moscow deployed its Navy along the air and sea routes between Eastern Europe and the Middle East to signal Soviet willingness to defend these lines of communication. Further more when Israel threatened major strategic defeats for Soviet clients - the possibility of an attack on Damascus on Oct. 17 and the possibility of destroying the encircled Egyptian Third Army on Oct. 24 -

the Soviet Union threatened by word and by active military preparation to intervene with its own forces after the United States rejected a joint United States-Soviet Union force.<sup>40</sup>

At the most dramatic point of the confrontation, the United States responded to a threatened Soviet intervention by advancing the readiness of all its armed forces and by taking other actions that indicated a willingness to counter Soviet moves in a manner that could result in nuclear war.

Thus in 1973, routine decision to sell arms in peacetime led gradually to a real risk of conflict between United States and the Soviet Union. The confrontation ended only when United States pressured Israel to conform to the terms of the cease-fire arranged by the Super Powers, relieving pressure on the besieged Egyptian army. Given the instability of politics in the Third World, the possibility that situations similar to the 1973, crisis will develop can be ruled out only rarely. Moreover the problems caused by arms transfers during crisis cannot be separated from those caused by routine, peacetime deliveries. The former follow inevitably from the latter. The kind of confrontation in the Middle East in 1973 will very likely occur again elsewhere. This prospect is particularly worrisome in the current tense state of United States-Soviet relations.<sup>41</sup>

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40. Ibid.

41. R.S. Mullikan, "Cold War", Bulletin of Atomic Science (Chicago), Vol. 36, 4 March, 1980, p. 13.

It has been the practice of the Soviet Union to respond to opportunities for the expansion of its influence thrown up by local disruptions wherever the balance of risks and gains appeared to offer advantages to the Soviet Union. The heightened pace of turbulent change in parts of the World has resulted in an increase of such opportunities in recent years. There are three new factors in this realm of Soviet behaviour. One is the Soviet military build up, which allows the Soviet Union to project its military power over very long distances. Second, the Soviets have increasingly supported Vietnamese aspirations to dominate South-East Asia and the third the Soviet have engaged in arming, training and transporting Cuban soldiers to participate in local conflict situations.<sup>42</sup>

These interventions against the background of a continued improvement in Soviet conventional military capabilities, have resulted in some gains for the Soviet Union, it appears probable that these gains may prove as transitory as were earlier position won and subsequently lost in the force of local nationalist resistance to the spread of Soviet control. Whole United States cannot be complacent about such Soviet gains in strategically important parts of the world, however, transitory they may prove to be in the

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42. Ibid.



further, United States can have confidence in its ability to compete effectively if it address itself to the interests and concerns of the people of the areas affected and do not think of them as abstract elements is an East West game.<sup>43</sup>

The 4 to 1 advantage the United States held 10 years ago in strategic missiles and bombers has disappeared. At latest count Russia had 2,537 long range bombers and missiles, against 2,142 for the United States.

America still retains a 4 to 1 edge in the total number of nuclear warheads that these weapons can fire as a result of its lead in developing MRV's multiple, independently targetted reentry vehicles. But the Russian are driving to achieve superiority in this field, too, by installing new missiles with vastly, increased power - a mark that secretly of state Kissinger assured congress was precluded by the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement and a unilateral declaration.<sup>44</sup>

Overall military forces, since 1970, the United States has reduced the size of its armed forces, by nearly 900,000 while the Soviets have expanded their by 275,000. Result the Soviets have 3,575,000 men, with arms today compared with 2,130,000 in this country, Russian spending on defense,

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43. Ibid.

44. "Back to Cold War" (Edt.) US News and World Report (Washington), Vol. LXXX, No. 4, January 26, 1976, p. 25.

According to United States intelligence officials, is heavier than Americans in real terms. This also represents a much greater proportion of their more limited resources - 15 per cent of the Soviet gross national product on defence, compared with about 5 per cent for the United States.

On the high seas: Russians using their new 11 blue water Navy, demonstrated their challenge to American domination of the world's ocean's last April by staging the most extensive air and sea exercise in their history from the sea of Japan to the Caribbean and from Norway's North Cape to the Azors.

Further dramatic proof that the Soviets drive to shift the strategic balance is not inhibited by detente. In the past year Moscow has consolidated its position in the Indian Ocean by building a base at Berbera in the Somali Republic and it hopes to require a south Atlantic base in Angola.<sup>45</sup>

The current Indian Ocean build up contrasts sharply with the situation in 1977, when the United States and the Soviet Union had only minimal military presences in the region. Moreover, the Carter administration wanted to keep the United States presence small, not augment it. To achieve his goal, Carter proposed in March 1977 to conclude a treaty

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45. Ibid.

with the Soviet Union demilitarizing the Indian Ocean.

For the Soviets the United States Scheme provided a satisfactory framework for discussion, and further sessions were convened in Bern, Switzerland, in December 1977 and Feb. 1978. After the fourth meeting the talks were suspended in the wake of the large increase in Soviet naval activity during Somali, Ethiopian conflict over Ogedan. Although the Soviet rapidly reduced their abnormal presence, the progressive deterioration of region stability notably in Iran, delivered the final blow to any lingering thought of Indian Ocean Naval arms control.<sup>46</sup>

From the hawk's perspectives sheer geography offered compelling reasons for distaining restrictions on United States maritime power. Because of the Soviet Union's geographical proximity to the Indian Ocean area, the primary components of Super Power would be intruded by a treaty constraining naval arms. Proximity meant that the Soviet could maintain a massive troop presence on the border of the northern tier states, particularly Turkey and Iran. Soviet medium range bombers could strike into the Indian Ocean region from bases within the Soviet Union and Soviet air borne divisions enjoyed similar advantages of position. Moreover, airlift support operations would prove an

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46. William Stiver, "Doves Hawks and Detente", Foreign Policy (New York), No. 45, Winter 1981-82, p.126.

easier undertaking for the Soviet Union than for the United States.<sup>47</sup>

Had this been the extent of the Soviet global threat, however, it would have been quite manageable with the traditional instruments of the 1970s and 1960s. But in the Regan view, Soviet policy had gone well beyond geographical maneuvering. The Soviet Union had become a military giant. It was able and determined to project its power to distant areas, to intervene in regional military conflicts to extend its position through a complex of foreign bases and a corps of proxy troops, and to seek and encourage new treaty relationships and regional alliances.

It was strenuously argued by the Reaganites, was a direct consequence of a significant shift in the balance of military power at every level. While America had allegedly put its confidence in the agreements and negotiations that comprised detente, the Soviet Union had not only failed to reciprocate, but had invested massive resources of its military establishment.

This accumulation of military power was not a product of the momentum of a massive bureaucracy. Rather, the Reagan

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47. Ibid.

believed it was a systematic and purposeful effort to meet the requirements laid down by Soviet doctrine which described (a) overall strategic superiority; (b) the necessity to prepare forces for both deterrence and actual war, fighting; (c) the possibility of achieving victory in a general nuclear war; and (d) the decisiveness of striking first.<sup>48</sup>

This was the challenge as seen by the Reagan Administration. As it was relatively simple and straight forward, so the American response had to be similarly simple and straight forward.

- to restore the military balance, achieving or preserving at least a time equality and preferably superiority in key equations (e.g. naval power). The Soviets were developing a nuclear war, fighting capability, and United States is going to have to develop the same.

- to contain soviet expansion and reverse it, secretary of State Alexander Heig warned that Moscow was the greatest source of International Security.

- to negotiate only from a position of genuine strength, refurbishing America's nuclear arsenal was a necessary prerequisite for negotiation, the new secretary of Defence concluded.<sup>49</sup>

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48. William G. Hyland, "US Soviet Relations", Current (New York), No. 242, May 1982, p. 46.

49. Ibid., p. 53.

SALT II is an important step for the United States however, because it will slow the momentum of Soviet strategic deployment in Soviet crucial areas - The agreement will last until 1985, and United States could will be facing a more dangerous strategic environment in that year without the controls that SALT II will provide. The SALT II agreement will enhance our ability to meet the challenge of rising Soviet defence expenditures. It will do so without constraining any significant military programme that United States plan to inaugurate during the term of the agreement it will be a useful complement to our regular defence programs, and it will add us in predicting the future course of Soviet decision making.

The Soviet military build up continued unabated. As Secretary of Defence Harold Brown has noted, the Soviet Union, commitment to decreasing defence budgets has been unaffected by the decisions United States has made with regard to defence budget. As United States budget have gone down, their defence budget have increased again.<sup>50</sup>

In the field of strategic nuclear weapons the President has decided to improve the survivability of United States land based inter continental ballistic missile

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50. Pierre Lelloche, "Salt and European Security", Survival, Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan., Feb., 1980, p.45.

force through the development and deployment of the new, mobile MX missile system United States is currently in the process of deploying the improved Trident (Submarine-launched ballistic missile).<sup>51</sup>

Williamsburg summit, a "Senior Soviet Official threatened that the Soviet Union would adopt a policy of "automatic" massive retaliation against all potential enemies if the new Medium range missiles were deployed in Western Europe.

On the eve of Summit, Tass issued another statement warning that if the cruise and pushing II weapons were deployed in Western Europe, the Soviets would retaliate by placing their SS-20 in satellite countries, and would threaten the territory of the United States directly.

The Tass statement in particular made it clear that the Soviet leaders have finally got the message that detente's deed.<sup>52</sup>

Detente was an attempt to spin a web of agreement in arms control, trade and scientific and cultural exchanges that would give both sides a tangible state in maintaining correct, if not exactly friendly relations. Nixon and Brezhnev formalized the concept in 1972 by signing an agreement

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51. Ibid.

52. Brien Crozier "The Burial of Detente", National Review (New York) Vol. 14, No. 37, July 8, 1983, p. 804.

pledging each side not to seek a "unilateral advantage at the expense of the other", The Soviet's have long accused the United States of violating the spirit of detente by encouraging Egypt to switch from Kremlin client to United States ally - for which there is no evidence - and by inacting the Jackson Venik amendment of 1974 which made a United States-Soviet trade agreement contingent on free emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. Moscow regarded that as unwarranted interference in its internal affairs.<sup>53</sup>

Soviet violations of detente however were so much more blatant as to appear systematic. In the analysis of Adam Ulam head of Harvard's Russian Research Centre, the Kremlin leaders always took it for granted that the two sides would continue their competition for power and influence in the Third World, and after the water gate scandle broke they saw little reason to be cautious about doing so. They judged the political authority of Nixon and his successors to be too gravely weakened for them to shape any vigorous response to Soviet prases. Among other things, the Kremlin sent guns and cuban troops to help Marxist movement seize power in Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen.<sup>54</sup>

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53. Adrian Gjaolke, "Southern Africa and the Super Powers", International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 54, No. 4, Autumn 1980, p. 649.

54. William P. Linberry, "Controlling Nuclear Weapons", Arms Control (New York), Vol. 51, No. 1, 1979, p.33.



Most destructive of all, Moscow continued its relentless piling up of arms. In 1977 the Kremlin started emplacing mobile, accurate, tripe warhead SS-20 nuclear missiles in the Far East and in the Western Soviet Union, those in Europe vastly increased the destruction power aimed at United States NATO allies. The SS-10 were supposedly intended to counter the threat based to Moscow by British and French nuclear weapons. But by the end of 1975, they already exceeded the British and French forces in the number of warheads.

In retrospect, it seems incredible that the politburo thought it could pursue such a course while still proclaiming, as Brezhnev often put it, that Detente is irreversible". Yet for a long time, it seemed that the Soviets really could make major gains at the West's expense, as United States and West European leaders struggled to preserve what remained of detente. As late as 1979 Jimmy Carter was publicly embracing Brezhnev in Vienna to celebrate the signing of the SALT II treaty, which set limits in the number of nuclear launchers that the United States and the Soviet Union could build. Then came the invasion of Afghanistan. In the Soviets eyes, they only prevented the overthrow of a communist regime on their borders. To the West and especially the United States, the invasion was a supremely menacing use of Soviet troops, for the first time since World War II to

expand the Soviet empire by force.<sup>55</sup>

Suddenly it was all too much. Though the Soviets had nothing to do with it, the nearly simultaneous seizure of hostages by Iranian revolutionaries added to an impression among tens of millions of American voters that the United States was tilting itself be humiliated around the World, and that it was time to fight back. By the end of his presidency, Carter had retuctantly given up trying to persuade the senate to ratify the SALT II treaty, reversed his earlier policy of holdingdown military spending embargo grain sales to the Soviet Union and called for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. The voters saw it all as too little and too late. Other factors, of course, influenced the election of 1980, notably rampant inflation and unemployment. Still the popular appeal that carried Reagan to decisive victory was enhanced not a little by the fact that he had proclaimed an uncompromisingly hard-nosed anti-Soviet Line long and load.<sup>56</sup>

For all his tough talk, Reagan initially gave law priority to foreign affairs. He preferred to concentrate on his economic program. Equally important, he felt he need to get a military build up in high gear so that he could

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55. Martin Soeter, "West Germany, Europe and the Super Powers Between Detente and Confrontation", Bulletin of Peace Proposals (Washington DC), Vol. 13, No. 2, 1982, p. 94.

56. Ibid.

later negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength. Nonetheless, the President was soon faced with an urgent issue. In 1979, the NATO countries had approved what came to be known as the two track decision. The United States would install Pershing II missiles in West Germany and cruise missiles in five European countries, beginning at the end of 1983 to counter the menace of the Soviet SS-20s. Simultaneously, Washington would try through negotiations to limit or even eliminate the deployment of all such intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. At the same time, fears of nuclear war, fanned in part of remarks from members of his administration and Reagan himself, dictated a new attempt to negotiate reductions also in "strategic" weapons the inter-continental missiles that the United States and the Soviet Union aim at each other.<sup>57</sup>

Reagan, according to his closest aides believes fervently in reducing nuclear arms. Nonetheless he has held to his belief that the United States must first remove what he felt had become a frightening Soviet superiority in some categories of atomic weaponry, a goal for the INF talks that began in Geneva in late 1981, he embraced the Zero option: the dismantling of all Soviet SS-20 in Europe all Asia in return for no deployment of the new United States-

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57. Church J., George, "Man of the Year", Times (New York), Vol. 123, No. 1. Jan. 2, 1984, p. 12.

medium range missiles. In the separate strategic arms reduction talks (START) got going in June 1982, Reagan proposed one-third cut in nuclear warheads. The trims however were structured in such a manner that the Soviets would have had to destroy a disproportionate share of their heavy land-based missiles that the United States most fears.

When Andropov succeeded Brezhnev, the deadline for installation of United States missiles in Western Europe was approaching rapidly. The Kremlin had already begun diplomatic and propaganda campaign to stop the deployment by trying to turn European public opinion against it. Andropov raised that effort to a fever pitch says one Soviet observer, I have never seen such sustained propaganda over one issue.<sup>58</sup>

Although it would be unrealistic to assume that Chernenko's assumption of leadership would mean any radical departure from Andropov's political agenda on most issues of the Second Cold War, yet it may well be his ambition to ease world tensions and thereby project his own name as a personality who played a historic role in leading the Super Powers to a genuine and relaxed detente. The image of the Soviet Party in the post-Andropov phase is generally described

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58. Ibid.

as one which is affected by the competing goals and aspirations of the Brezhnev faction and of the Andropov loyalists. It remains to be seen whether Cheenenko will have the ability to exert potentially decisive influence for reasserting the logic of peaceful co-existence and offer a fresh insight for the conduct of Super Power diplomacy.<sup>59</sup>

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59. The Statesman, 14 April, 1981, p. 6.

## CHAPTER - III

### II. CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF DETENTE

#### Towards Detente

The "failure" of detente must be understood in relation to the operative concepts in relation to the structural and political changes in the Super Power system which in turn are effected by political, military and psychological factors. Neither the orthodox Marxian perspective of the Soviet Union nor the United States' leaderships of the "free world" provide the logic to deal with the dreadful choice of nuclear escalation. The confrontation and hostility expressed in the "new" cold war is not merely the resurrection of position of strength strategies but rather an attempt at raising the level of military confrontation with far reaching consequences on the internal and external power structures on opposite sides. The global danger of a nuclear holocaust has not led to reassuring steps to develop beneficial international cooperation; on the other hand national security assumptions are used to preclude any checks on the qualitative improvement of armaments. The MX and Trident II weapons systems symbolise

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1. Robert Conquest, Present Danger (California, 1970), p. 32.

definitions and approaches to first strike strategies which can in turn introduce the threat of force on an unprecedented scale as an instrument of foreign policy. While opinions differ on the ultimate test of detente relationships, the structural dimensions which led to detente have as their basic rationale disengagement from military instruments of diplomacy. The legitimate concerns which detente expresses can only be given credibility through the negotiation of reductions in American and Soviet weaponry.

Even since the Stalin's death in 1953, hopes have arisen in the United States negotiation with the Soviet Union could overcome cold war rivalry and drastically reduce the danger of a direct Super Power clash. Particularly after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, diplomatic contacts to the Soviet Union were intensified, and the first steps towards strategic arms control were undertaken. But only after the changes in world politics predicted by De Gaulle collapse of the domestic consensus brought about by Vietnam did detente become the crux of American policy toward the Soviet State. This policy stated neither on a benign interpretation of Soviet Power nor on the view that the Soviets had abandoned their declared ideological objectives. Rather, the American administration proceeded from the assumption that

the two Super Powers could through closer consultations and a greater willingness to negotiate, defuse potential areas of conflict and, above all, reduce the danger of an atomic exchange.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet and American policy makers agreed in the reasons for the change. After strenuous efforts to build up their nuclear forces, the Russians had managed to achieve a rough equivalence of armaments with the United States by 1969.<sup>1</sup> Faced with a nuclear stalemate both sides now had an interest in stabilizing the arms race. Neither of them could outgun the other, and it made little sense to try since the other side would never allow a significant gap to develop.<sup>3</sup>

A period - spanning part of 1960s and part of 1970s has been designated in the annals of the struggle for peace as the Decade of Detente. It was a time when the concerted efforts of the people brought about a change in their favour. This in turn relaxed tensions thawed the cold war and fostered an atmosphere conducive to normal, stable relations among states. It encouraged the solution of international disputes by negotiations rather than by force or threat of force.<sup>4</sup>

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2. Stephen J. Arins, "Detente Policy Before and After Afghanistan", Aussen Politik, (Humberg FBG), Vol. 32, No. 2, 1982, p. 138.
  3. Jonathan Steel, "What happened to Detente", in Super Powers in Collision (New York 1982), p. 43.
  4. John Pittman, "Detente the Only Option", Political Affairs (New York), Vol. LXI, No. 5, May 1982.



The present tensions in the world in all its economic, military and social complexity has shown that the possibilities for bipolar detente have been exhausted. A way out of these difficulties is seen by some to be in multipolar detente, that is in widening detente by bringing into the game of the big powers some other actual or potential powers (Europe, Japan, China ).

While conceding that multipolar detente can alleviate the crisis of bipolar detente, it still remains that the world can arrive at the indispensable relations of stability only within universal detente.<sup>5</sup>

Detente as a process of quantitative growth of various forms of mutual and inter bloc cooperation based on block division rather than as a question of substantial, qualitative changes in all fields of International relations and in parts of the world. It is clear that a detente which is universal neither geographically nor by content, which did not provide a basis for solving the accumulated problems of international economic and political relations under a new system of relations, which did not encourage the process of democratising international relations that such a detente could not but fail the test of time.<sup>6</sup>

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5. Alexander Glicker "Crisis of Detente", Review of International Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 718, March 5, 1980, p. 15.
  6. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Kastle, "Detente an adequate American Defence", Air University Review (Washington DC), Vol. 30, No. 6, Sept. Oct. 1979, p. 21.

Detente ought to become a framework within which full democratization of international relations could be achieved in a peaceful and gradual way and positive changes could be introduced in the international system.<sup>7</sup>

#### Brezhnev on Detente

The struggle to consolidate the principles of peaceful co-existence, to assure lasting peace, and to reduce and in the long term to eliminate the danger of world war has been and remains the main element our policy towards the capitalist states.<sup>8</sup>

Considerable progress has been achieved in the past five years. The passage from the Cold War, from the explosive confrontation of two worlds, to detente was primarily connected with changes in the correlation of world forces. But much effort was required for people especially those responsible for states politics - to become accustomed to the thought that the natural state of things is not brinkmanship but negotiation, not confrontation but peaceful cooperation.

Though world peace is by no means guaranteed yet, we have every reason to declare that the improvement of the

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7. Ibid.

international climate is convincing evidence that lasting peace is not merely a good intention but entirely realistic objective. And we can and must continue to work tirelessly to achieve it.<sup>8</sup>

Congress Report, March 1976

Detente is the Soviet Union's need to develop its economy. The Soviet Union remains far behind the United States in a number of key areas and the technological gap is accross the board one from ICBM system to electric razars. The recognition in the Soviet Union that Economic strength is the base for all other power including continued great power states, led the 24 Congress of the Communist Party in 1971 and those drafting the ninth five year plan to think in terms of upgrading science, technology and agriculture by expanding trade with the West and by increasing scientific and space cooperation. These decisions in terms required easing Russian tensions with the United States as well as Western Europe.<sup>9</sup>

The other factor in which detente is based is the recognition by both Super Powers that victory in War and survival afterward are not reasonable possibilities for either side. Although the United States is far ahead of the Soviet Union in almost all types of military security rests on the degree - a significant one to which their capability of

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8. Jonathan Steele "What happened to Detente in Super Powers in Collision (New York, 1982), p. 45.

9. Ibid,

destroying the United States balance American superiority in weapons.<sup>10</sup>

### Reagan on Detente

"So far detente's been a one way street which the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims. I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution and including the present leadership, that has not more than once repeated in the various Communist Congress they hold, their determination that their goal must be the promotion of world revolution and a one world socialist or Communist state, whichever word you want to use. Now as long as they, at the same time, have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve the right to commit any crime, to be, to cheat in order to obtain it, I think that when you do business with them - even in detente - you keep that in mind."<sup>11</sup>  
(30 January, 1981).

Dr. Kissinger, writing his memoir in 1978, described the American attitude to detente as a carrot and stick

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10. John M. Swomley, Jr. "Detente and Disarmament", The Christian Century (Chicago), Vol. XLIII, No. 9, March 17, 1976, p. 538.
  11. "Reagan on Detente", (edt) International Herald Tribune (Zurich), 31 January, 1981.

approach, ready to impose penalties for adventurism willing to expand relations in the context of responsible behaviour.<sup>12</sup>

The significance and content of detente has altered with time. It has gone through a number of phases (United States and Soviet Union) each of which has been important in different ways and to different interests.

Initially there a number of almost trivial confidence building measures (e.g. the hot line agreement) which convinced the leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union that neither side wanted a nuclear holocaust.

There were a number of moves to clear up outstanding political problems. The lead here was taken by West Germany ostpolitik policy which culminated in 1975 - The non-proliferation treaty and strategic Arms limitation talk were intended to control the nuclear arms race to end between the two major powers.<sup>13</sup>

For the advocates of detente with the United States, detente has been an instrument of stability, designed to reduce the risk of an unwanted nuclear war and to show political change. It has involved formal treaties and informal understandings to regulate international behaviour.<sup>14</sup>

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12. Ibid.

13. John Cox, "Good Bye to Detente", Marxism Today(London), Vol. 24, No. 9, Sept, 1980, p. 8.

14. Ibid.

Detente is measured increasing communication between United States and Soviet Union, both at the policy level and across a broader range. Detente is a matter of atmosphere, an alteration in the psychological climate, a reduction in the state of permanent alarm on both sides, a devolution in the harshness of rhetoric.<sup>15</sup>

Detente involves making somewhat more explicit than implicit rules of the Cold War - that neither side will push too hard in areas of other's vital interests; that some efforts will be made to contain crisis, that both sides will cooperate in avoiding nuclear war. These rules have been recognised since the Berlin Blockade of 1948.<sup>16</sup>

It involves projects that might be called cooperative. The most important of these growing out of the first concern, is arms control - the introduction of more stability into deterrence, restraint in further acceleration of the arms race, perhaps even reductions in the arsenals. Collaboration in such matters as nuclear proliferation is also of great importance. Also significant in the development of economic limits.<sup>17</sup>

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15. Daniel Yergin "In Praise of Detente", The New Republic, Vol. 124, No. 32, May 29, 1976, pp. 17-18.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

In some ways Washington and Moscow had remarkably similar views of ~~detente~~. Both saw it as a device for reinforcing the status quo and pressing the other power to act predictably. Kissinger argued that if the United States could build up a web of relationship with Moscow, through trade political dialogue and nuclear arms control, the Russians would be locked into a collaborative pattern of behaviour with the West. This would make it harder for them to break out in a wild, adventurist way. The Americans used several words which imply catching or trapping a dangerous animal. The Russians for their part saw the Americans as aggressive and bullying. Theyk hoped to modify this by accustoming Washington to regular consultation and agreement with Moscow. They talked of 'making detente irreversible', a frequent phrase in Brezhnev's speeches of the period.<sup>18</sup>

According to Raymond Aron, the aim of Detente is the establishment of an "order" and stability "which precludes all further revolutionary changes. Kissinger distinguishes between a political and a revolutionary approach to order", the first - the policy line followed by the United States creating in his view, international security and the second -

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18. Jonathan Steele, "What happened to Detente", Super Powers in Collision (New York), p. 47.

the Soviet approach - "jeopardizing" international security. This opinion is also shared by Willy Brandt who holds the view that Western Europe must support the policy of detente and cooperation because it could "contribute not only to a substantial mitigation of the present tensions but also to channelling, in a decisive way, the inevitable revolutions with tragic consequences for all in a controlled course of progress"<sup>19</sup>

Soviet attitude to the outside world are likely to remain cautious in the 1980s. The Russians are militarily stronger than they were in 1970, but the world beyond their border is no more favourable to them it was a decade ago. The United States is still economically, technologically and militarily superior. On the awesome power to wreak unacceptable nuclear destruction on the other side is the Soviet Union equal to the United States. Neither side can win a nuclear war or even a nuclear arms race. That at least the Russians know. They remain committed to detente.<sup>20</sup>

International detente is a tendency like process in a double sense. On the one hand, it is a gradually objectivizing International relationship in which the means of an

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19. Josef Bapaz, "Theoretical & Political Aspects of Detente" Development and Peace (Budapest), Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1981, p. 19.

20. Richard Rosecrans "Detente or Entente", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 53, No. 3, April, 1975, p.



agreed reconciliation based on the equality of interests take shape and in which a modusvivendi established. On the other hand, the geographical limits of detente also experience a gradual expansion. In the present situation, the preservation and a moderate growth of the achievements of European detente attained so far constitute a very important element of general detente. A decrease in the current tension in Soviet American relations and - atleast - the restoration of the norms of detente may induce the further development in world wide detente and its extension over the regions where the conditions for stopping the present acute tensions and for a negotiated settlement will only be created if detente becomes a dominant political tendency in International relations.<sup>21</sup>

#### Political Detente:

During the late 1960s and early 1970s President Nixon and President Brezhnev indicated that confrontation should be replaced by some form of accommodation. This suggested that Super Power Diplomacy could become a non-zero game in which both parties would benefit. The initial tangible indication of cooperative detente emerged during

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21. Robert S. Jordan, Detente in Europe and Super Powers (Edt.) (Boston, 1971), p. 67.

the May 1972 summit. The two leaders signed a series of communiques and agreements which were to establish a new basis for the conduct of relations, while the strategic Arms Limitation Agreement was deemed the most significant accomplishment, the agreement on Basic principles constituted the foundation of detente.<sup>22</sup>

One of the current phase of United States-Soviet relations is the unprecedented consultation between leaders either face to face or through diplomatic channels.

The channel between the leaders of the two nations has proved its worth in many crisis; it reduces the risk that either side might feel driven to act or to react on the basis of incomplete or confusing information. The channel of communication has continued without interruption under President Ford.<sup>23</sup>

Political relations improved to address the economic aspect of the relationship and to seek the removal of long standing barriers to expanded trade.

Negotiation on the problem of Berlin the source of recurrent crisis in Europe began in 1969. So did SALT, only

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22. R.B. Byers, "Peril of Detente", International Security Vol. 24, Summer 1980, p. 522.

23. Henry Kissinger, Deptt. of State Bulletin (Washington DC), Vol. LXXI, No. 1842, Oct. 3, 1974, p. 512.

in 1971, after substantial progress had been achieved in both sides, these negotiations did the administration consider it possible to look towards summit meeting between America and Soviet leaders.<sup>24</sup>

The leaders of the two countries have lodged in an agreement signed at the 1972 summit to govern their conduct in Foreign Affairs by agreed basic principles. Under this agreement, they undertook an obligation exercise restraint in their mutual relations to do their utmost to prevent situations that could lead to military confrontation and to refrain from efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other. Under a separate agreement, signed at 1973 summit. They agreed to develop their relations with each other and with other countries so as to exclude outbreak of nuclear war.<sup>25</sup>

The basic principles served primarily as an overall statement of declaratory policy which was to guide the conduct of Super Power diplomacy. Yet they were based on a number of important assumption which constituted a rejection of the post and perception of a need for mutual accommodation.<sup>1</sup> The confrontation behaviour of the cold war should be replaced by a mix of cooperative and competitive patterns of

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24. Hartman, A.Arthur, Department of State Bulletin Vol. LXXI, 1942, p. 398-399.

25. Ibid.<sup>1</sup>

diplomacy with the emphasis on the former. At the same time it was not sufficiently appreciated by most observers that the underlying and fundamental divergence of United States and Soviet objectives remained unaltered.<sup>26</sup>

From American perspective, detente was a modified form of containment in which the primary aim was to limit the range of policy instrument and the behaviour of the Soviet Union within a framework of negotiation and accommodation. In the American desire to implement detente however, this longer range objective was often down played - particularly during the early part of the Carter administration. Both Nixon and Kissinger acknowledged, retrospect, the ultimate Soviet intentions would not be modified by detente. For their part, Soviet leaders consistently noted that detente had not changed the basic nature of the struggle between the capitalist and Socialist system.<sup>27</sup>

Soviet objectives were, in the first instance, political - that is, the attainment of defect recognition as a Super Power - and detent was a means for achieving this objective with less risk than had been the case during the cold war. To some extent unstated Soviet policy objectives conflicted with the American objective of modified containment

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26. Leon, Gordenker "Perils of Super Powers Diplomacy", Internationals Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 1980, p. 422.

27. Walter F. Mandal, "Beyond Detente", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 53, No. 1, Oct. 1974, p.

and the United States emphasis on achieving tangible results in the military sphere. In effect the pace of political detente exceeded the pace of military detente during the early and mid 1970s.<sup>28</sup>

The signing of the SALT, treaty and the proclamation of principles of conduct during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow in May 1972 contributed to mood of Europhobia within the United States which was further compounded by Nixon's repeated assertions that the world had moved from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation. Nixon intellectual opponents felt vindicated in their belief that the anti-communist attitudes of the 1950s were no definitely outmoded and the war weary congress, set about further reducing the Pentagon budget and dismantle the intelligence agencies covered operations capabilities as immoral vestiges of the Cold War.<sup>29</sup>

The Ford-Brezhnev summit at vladivostok on Nov. 23-24, 1974 reaffirmed the principles of peaceful co-existence and the military parity of the two powers as the basic premises for further agreements. The parties reiterated their intentions to conclude a long-time agreement on

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28. Ibid.

29. George F. Kenan, "The USA and Soviet Union", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 4, July 1976, p. 17.

limiting strategic offensive weapons.<sup>30</sup>

It was the CSCE final Act of August 1975 represented the high point of political detente and in the short constituted in major political gain for the Soviet Union without the need for any meaningful military accommodation in the Europe theatre.<sup>31</sup>

From a United States and Western perspectives it was never entirely clear how or what extent political objectives and priorities would be established. The European objectives in reaching political accommodation with Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were partly achieved at the CSCE as well as through expanded contacts and relations. These activities produced tangible benefits for both sides. The United States was indifferent situation because the European factor was not as important as political consideration. In one sense, therefore, the political content of detente was not as significant for as United States and it was for the European nations.<sup>32</sup>

The importance of the Helsinki accords was not confined to the framework of Europe. They made it clear to limit and eliminate dangerous conflicts invigorate and

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30. Charles L. Robertson, International Politics since World War II, (New York, 1975), p. 91-92.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

and enriched bilateral and multilateral cooperation between states and helped to shape a new International atmosphere. They also made it possible to switch resources and efforts from the arms race and preparation for war to the shaping of new and fair International economic relations and the joint solution of vital regional and global problems. Finally set a valuable example for other regions of the globe, showing that the most complex problems can be solved by peaceful means rationally and constructively.<sup>33</sup>

Since the Soviet Union and the United States are a permanent threat to each other's survival, the only way to prevent a thermonuclear disaster is through a political relationship which "normalises" their relations inspite of contradictions. In order to negotiate on common ground, ideological differences should not be exaggerated and the search for reasonable choices should not be given up.

#### ECONOMIC DETENTE:

Of paramount significance for the world wide process of detente is the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. The good Soviet-American economic relations constitute an organic part of detente and that

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33. Jones Nagy, "Continuing the policy of Detente", The New Hungarian Quarterly (Budapest), Vol. XXI, No. 19, Autumn, 1980, p. 46.

their deepening precludes the return to the political climate of Cold War. Owing to the Cold War and its economic projection, the embargo policy, cooperation between the leading process of the two socio-economic systems was reduced almost to nil, and it was only in the late 1960s that it began to display a serious recovery. The golden age of "thawing in Soviet American relations falls into the first part of the 1970s. In the period 1971-76, Soviet trade with the developed capitalist region rose about 3.7 fold and with the USA 12 fold.<sup>34</sup>

The development and expansion of economic ties between the two countries from an integral part of the framework of cooperation. The political momentum developed at the 1972 summit resulted in a formula to settle the stubborn problem of land lease account, which led in turn to the extension of Export Import Bank Credit guarantees needed for sustained trade expansion with the Soviet Union. They have concluded a maritime agreement under which 40 ports in each country have been opened to prompt access by merchant and research vessels of the other. They have signed a carefully balanced trade agreement designed to take into account the structural asymeteries.<sup>35</sup>

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34. V.N. Andreyev, "Materialization of Detente", Economic Aspects, ORBIS, Vol. 2, Spring, 1981, p. 250.

35. Lawrence Freedman, "Requiem for Detente", World Today, (London), Vol. 36, No.2, p. 44.



In 1973, they concluded a tax treaty and signed protocol opening commercial offices in their respective countries and establishing a joint trade and economic councils to foster the development of United States and Soviet Trade.<sup>36</sup>

The Soviet Union's aim its economic cooperation with the USA is to import the top achievements of scientific and technical progress.

Among the new, more upto date forms of technological - economic relations, the Super Power Cooperation has evolved joint - policies in project like the joint Soy U.S-Apollo Space Programme, common research on the application of computers in solving economic tasks, the possibilities inherent in Oceanic research, and the exchange of specialists in various fields on the basis of mutual benefit. They also point out that these cooperation forms - just as the compensation deals as the most important scheme of production cooperation are very sensitive to cyclical changes in political detente.<sup>37</sup>

Normalization and expansion of Economic relations between the two countries constituted an important part of the core of detente. In the months following the Moscow summit,

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36. Thomas Frank, "Edward Wais Baird, "World Politics" in World Strategy among the Super Powers (Edt.) (New York) 1971, p. 76.

37. A Soveter "Detente and the Modern World", International Affairs (Moscow), No. 6, June 1979, p. 5-6.

negotiation continued. On 14 Oct. 1972, the countries signed a three year maritime agreement which established premium rates for American ships carrying Soviet grain purchases. Oct. 18 the United States and Soviet Union reached an agreement on three year pact in which the United States promised to secure congressional authorization for a reduction of duties, thus virtually offering MFN status to the Soviet Union. It also promised assistance to the Soviet Union in obtaining credits and guarantees from the Export Import Bank of the United States for purchase of commercial goods in the United States.<sup>38</sup>

The two countries signed two protocols - one leading to the establishment of a United States-Soviet Chamber of Commerce and the other expressing the willingness of the two countries to provide space in their capitals for each other trade centres and to enlarge the commercial staff. Both sides declared their intentions in a joint communique to increase their mutual trade upto \$ 2 billion or even \$ 3 billion over the next three years. President Nixon declared that the United States would give serious consideration to any project of getting out Siberian oil.<sup>39</sup>

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38. William J. Quirk, "Dollars for detente", New Republic (Washington DC), Vol. 180, No. 13, March 31, 1979, pp. 18-19.

39. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

In 1979, the United States exported grain and other agricultural products worth \$ 2.9 billion and non-farm products worth \$ 749 million to the Soviet Union, a total of \$ 3.49 billion worth. Imports from the Soviet Union amounted to \$ 570 million. The \$ 4.5 billion total exchange was a mere fraction of the potential trade between the world's two leading economic powers.<sup>40</sup>

Detente gave the Russians the opportunity to step up their trade with the West, obtain Western credits and import technology. The Russians knew they were behind in certain fields and hoped to short-cut their development by buying licences or factories from the West.<sup>41</sup>

Soviet confronted a number of serious problems both domestically and internationally which required a more constructive relationship with the United States. On the domestic front, there was growing recognition of "need for developing ties with America. An influence of Western credits and technology was becoming increasingly important as the Soviets were coming to the end of an era of easily available and cheap labour and resources."<sup>42</sup>

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40. H.J. Holsti, "Detente and Peaceful Co-existence", Co-existence (Scotland), Vol. 17, 1981, p. 13.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

Although, it sometimes threatens to seek the capital and technology it requires in Western Europe and Japan, the Soviet Union has no viable alternative to the United States because it is only here that the capital and productivity it needs are available in sufficient quantities furthermore, United States corporations central worldwide rights to the most -advanced technology. Part of the strategy of detente is to exploit the need of the United States economy for raw materials and markets so as to induce it to help with a fundamental modernization of the Soviet Union. Last but not least because the United States is the only country able to deal with the Soviet Union as an equal in any contest of wills, other potential investors have been reluctant to commit large sums in the Soviet Union without United States participation for fear of ultimate expropriation a fact which makes American economic cooperation valuable to the Russians.<sup>43</sup>

Detente is cooperative co-existence in the most important fields of International life i.e. in economic, political, diplomatic, cultural, scientific and personal fields. It is a co-existence which is based, on the one hand, on mutual interest and helps in theother, to build up a system of relations which by means of mutually advantageous economic,

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43. Richard Pipes, "US-Soviet Relations in the era of Detente" (Boulder, Colorado, 1981), p. 47.

trade etc. links, diminishes the interests in returning to the norms of contact of the Cold War period. Currently the development of East-West-economic and trade relations as an important pillars of detente on easing political and military. Tensions and also promotes the creation of a favourable international atmosphere.<sup>44</sup>

#### MILITARY DETENTE:

Despite the problems of 1980 the basic principles instituted a fundamental breakthrough for Soviet American relations in the Military sphere-particularly in the agreement to avoid the use of military force for bilateral conflict resolution and the agreement to pursue arms control. In light of the past era of confrontation this decision was of considerable consequence. While declared intense were overtaken by subsequent behaviour, the rejection of clausewitzian with respect to the use of military force between Super Powers constituted a step in the direction of a more peaceful world environment. Both Super Powers have placed considerable emphasis on the achievement on pursuit of military detente in the years since 1972.<sup>45</sup>

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44. Ibid.

45. William P. Lindsay, "Reigning in the Race, Controlling nuclear Weapons", Arms Control, Vol. 51, No. 6, p.32.

Detente objectively presupposes the practical implementation of the principle of equal security with the respective military forces kept at a much lower level. A lasting detente is impossible if the armaments spiral continues to grow. Detente presupposes the freezing of the arms race, the mutuality of the limits to armaments and gradually, on the basis of agreements and guarantees, the actual reduction of weapons, on which negotiations have been going on for a quite a long time, though without any tangible results so far. Military detente is an elementary requirement of the stabilization of and the most important guarantee for expanding overall, international detente.<sup>46</sup> At the same time it would be illusion to suppose that military detente alone could lead to a complete and final elimination of a world war; what it can achieve is a decrease in the danger of war. This also a very important, aspect in the new system of International relations Military detente is a tendency - like process unfolding in the wake of political detente, whose essence is the realization - one the basis of mutuality and equal commitments - of such military measures as may bring arms race to an end and significantly diminish military confrontation and the danger of war between the two systems.<sup>47</sup>

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46. William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfattzgraft Jr. SALT Implications for Arms Control: (New York) 1973, p.17.

47. Ibid.

In the early 1960s and for the foreseeable future, no rational being could expect to benefit from a nuclear war. So the risk of war by accident or misunderstanding was reduced by the Hot line and its associated treaties.<sup>48</sup>

The agreements achieved at the United States-Soviet Union summits sounded out a substantial body of International law favoring disarmament. Negotiations during early 1960s and 1970s had produced the Antarctic Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the outer space treaty of 1967, Tlatelolco Treaty - prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, the non-proliferation treaty and Sea Bed Treaty. These treaties, designating areas in which nuclear weapons are prohibited, prove the effectiveness of the process of negotiation and its superiority to confrontational methods of setting disputes.<sup>49</sup>

A respect for each others territorial integrity can produce a cooperative pattern and avoid the direct use of military force. In other areas of the world where both have an vested interests such as Europe, Competitive behaviour will remain the order of the day even though

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48. John Cox, "Good Bye to detente", Marxian Today (London), Vol. 24, No. 9, September, 1980, p. 9.

49. C.R. Urban Sovereignty, Appeasement and detente, in Detente (Edt.) (New York), 1977, p. 20.

direct military confrontations, can be avoided, because of preservation of the political and territorial status quo is the interest of both Super Powers.<sup>50</sup>

SALT became one means by which United States and Soviet Union could enhance stability by setting mutual constraints and by gradually reaching an understanding of the doctrinal considerations that underlie the deployment of nuclear weapons. Through SALT the two sides can reduce the suspicion and fears which fuel strategic competition. SALT, in the American conception, is a means to achieve strategic stability by methods other than the arms race.<sup>51</sup>

The most significant achievement of the United States and Soviet Summit was a treaty limiting the strategic defensive anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and a five year interim agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons. The treaty provided that neither country would have more than the ABM systems - one defending the national capital and the other defending one of the ICBM complexes.<sup>52</sup>

The agreement provided that after 1 July 1972 there would be no more construction of fixed land-based ICBMs

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50. Ibid.

51. Henry Kissinger, "Dents with Soviet Union", Department of State Bulletin (Washington DC), Vol. LXXI, No. 1842, p. 512.

52. Ibid.



that land Based Missile launches would not be converted into light ICBMs, and that older type ICBM deployed before 1964 would not be converted into heavy ICBMs. The agreement further provided for the limitation of submarine - launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and Modern Ballistic Missile submarines. Their number was never to exceed the number of missiles which were operational and under the construction on the day the agreement became effective.<sup>53</sup>

The SALT talks and their agreement represent the only disarmament activity to emerge in the changed atmosphere under detente. The Chief accomplishment here has been the decision not to build extensive anti-ballistic missile systems. Other agreements have set limits on the number of missiles and weapons in general. At so high a level that no reduction was brought about some United States analysts think the chief value of the SALT agreements lies not in any aspect of disarmament but in the negotiating process itself - this is, in their contribution to detente and to confidence in future negotiations.

The agreement on principles of peaceful existence and equal security stimulated further successful negotiations. The convention on the prohibition of the Development, production and stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin weapons and on

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53. Ibid.

their destruction entered into force on March 26, 1975. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was concluded by the two powers in 1976, setting the upper limit for nuclear weapons tests at 150 kilotons.<sup>54</sup>

The convention on the prohibition of Military or any other hostile use of Environmental Modification. Techniques entered into force in 1980. The convention on prohibition or Restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons, was opened for signing on April 10, 1981.

The high point of the process was, the strategic arms limitation talks which eventuated in SALT-I 1972 and in SALT II, signed by President Brezhnev and Carter at Vienna in 1979, and the understanding to proceed with work in SALT III. The culmination of this process would promise securing from the threat of a nuclear world war.<sup>55</sup>

Political leaders in both countries agreed with the underlying objectives of the SALT, and both parties accepted the assumption that a strategic arms race existed and should be curtailed, even though no consensus emerged regarding the causes of the arms race. Given United States qualitative superiority during the 1970s the issue of responsibility

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54. David Carlton and corlo Shaerf, "The importance of Agreements" in Dynamics of the Arms Race (London, 1975), p. 68.

55. Ibid.

for the arms race phenomenon was not particularly important. From the American perspective, it was deemed more important to negotiate restraints which would enhance strategic stability capabilities against steady state ceiling.<sup>56</sup>

#### East-West Detente:

Since the 1960s, the United States and Western Europe have supported detente in their relations with the east. As a policy, it included treaty arrangements and normalization of relations between the FRG and communist states, the Berlin agreement, negotiations on arms reduction CSCE and the final act, and an expansion of trade contacts. As an atmosphere it meant talks on the peaceful reduction of East-West tensions by mutual consent. Though the danger of war has not been completely eliminated, both sides felt that they should reduce it by accepting the territorial and political status quo and by continuing negotiations on other issues. Both sides are aware of the limits of detente. The Military blocs remain and European security still depends on mutual deterrence. However, detente in the sense of mutual desire not to increase the risk of armed conflict or to revise the excess of the Cold War.<sup>57</sup>

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56. William Epstein, "Mounting International underline need for disarmament", International Perspectives, (New York), March/April, 1980, p. 13.
57. Anita Madwade, "Detente & Euro Communism", Janata, (New Delhi), Vol. 35, No. 3, May Day 1980, p. 12.

The overall strategy towards the East is the policy of detente. The first aim of this policy is, by means of a continuous political dialogue, to curb, check and reduce East West differences. In this way the policy of detente is intended to supplement the policy of equilibrium, which remains central, as an additional element for safeguarding peace.

The policy of detente does not mean that a relaxed state of affairs between East and West has already been attained. Rather it shows that tensions exist owing to the different values and objectives and that one must strike to check, reduce and overcome as far as possible these tensions.<sup>58</sup>

Combined with this aim of reducing conflicts is the second aim of the policy of detente aim of fostering East West Cooperation whenever it is of mutual benefit and of promoting and increasing the human contacts and the exchange of information. In this context economic cooperation also has a political function. It is designed to create a net work of mutual interests and hence provide incentives for a policy of mutual restraint. In this manner it is intended to provide stable relations.<sup>59</sup>

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58. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Europe role in World", Assen Politik (Humberg FRG), Vol. 33, No.2, 1982, p. 117.

59. Ibid.

In an era of increasingly powerful and accurate nuclear weapons and a continuous arms race, the danger to both the East and West has increased dramatically, and so has their need for managing and regulating both their conflict and their cooperation. For the first time in history, as a direct result of the nuclear revolution and despite the fact that the differences and the conflicts between alliances are so great a relatively high level of conflict management and cooperation exists. Under conditions of nuclear revolution, strategic parity, and mutual assured destruction, detente between West and East in one form or another is simply unavoidable. The scope, intensity, and forms of detente relations between East and West might differ in particular periods, but if both the Soviet Union and the Western alliance want to avoid a highly dangerous runaway arms race, unstable and unpredictable conflict, and to promote cooperation, where their interests overlap - detente, as a relatively stable and many sided relation between East and West, which includes both conflict and cooperation, is necessary in the remaining decades of the twentieth century.<sup>60</sup>

Detente, from its start had to assume the equality of the two Super Powers. "Equality" translated into

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60. J.K. Miettman, "Detente in 1979", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Chicago), Vol. 35, No. 1, January 1979, pp. 8-9.

acceptance of nuclear parity - a condition that President Nixon went along with as the basis for Soviet American strategic arms limitation negotiations". Essential equivalence" in strategic arms was the theme of a diplomatic device that eventually involved broadened context and exchanges between East West in other areas as well, most notably commercial and culture affairs.<sup>61</sup> The value of East West trade grew four fold from about \$ 13 billion in 1969 to over \$ 54 billion in 1977. These very factors - the Soviet desire for American validation of their Super Power status and their growing need for Western technology owing to an "extensive" mode of economic development to an "intensive" mode largely explain the Soviet motive for seeking detente with the United States.<sup>62</sup>

Soviet growth rates have been declining since at least the late 1950s - 1979 the Soviet Union registered the lowest annual growth rates since the second world war and the slow down was marked then might have been expected from an expectation of past trends. The combined effect of all these factors is the pressure in favour of East West detente, which alone can provide an atmosphere under

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61. Ibid.

62. Magstad Thomas, "Toward Detente II", World View (New York) Vol. 25, No.7, July 1982, p. 4.

which the building of channels facilitating the east ward flow of technology can progress with relative ease.<sup>63</sup>

The East West Technology transfer as it has evolved in the past decade cannot be fully evaluated. Simply in terms of trade and employment statistics, however, beneficial of it has been in their respect. The problems of its management gave rise to the creation of unconventional channels - industrial cooperation agreements - which bridge the ideological and systematic barriers between East West and foster permanent and continually expanding ties based on mutual advantage.<sup>64</sup>

The East European countries hard debt currently amounts to some \$ 65-76 billion (\$ 18.7 billion of which is taken by Poland and 17.5 billion by the Soviet Union) and the management of its servicing and repayment demands continued cooperation by all the parties concerned, as they all now have a vested interest in avoiding the collapse of COMECON industry strategies. These factors have already exhibited their capacity to act independently in favour of at least commercial detente and they may undoubtedly be expected to continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

Kremlin peaceful co-existence and the white House branch of detente have much in common. West European and

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63. Sobestovskiy Vladim "East West detente and Technology" World Today, (London), Vol. 38, No. 10, Dec. 1980, p.369.

64. Ibid.

perhaps East-European perceptions are different. For obvious reasons, the European have less confidence in military power. Hesitating and grouping and far from United, the West European seem to have settled for a policy of detente in which interdependence is considered a means for changing political attitudes. This functionalist approach to East West relations is based on the assumption that the basic conflict is somehow, soluble.<sup>65</sup>

This policy is a long term one, Interdependence is created by commercial relations and commercial relations take time to develop. They have to be independent of the vagaries in the East West political relations for many years to come before interdependence is really felt. That is why it is impossible for West Europeans to follow the American embargo without giving up their whole notion of detente.<sup>66</sup>

The Soviet Union presented, in De Gaulle's view a serious threat to European security in the early post war period could not go on indefinitely. The Soviets themselves would become increasingly pre-occupied with internal problems as well as with the Chinese threat and would therefore

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65. Sparsing Ake, "Detente and Economic Interdependence", The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations (Hebrew Press, Jerusalem), Vol. 6, 1982.

66. Ibid.



demonstrate growing interest in a relaxation of tension in Europe. France was able to exploit the Soviet readiness to negotiate in order to expand its own diplomatic flexibility, withdrawing from the integrated military structure of NATO and establishing new contacts were designed to lead first to detente, ultimately to entente and cooperation. At the same time French initiative was to lead Europe, from its disunity and dependence to a new position of global strength, thus contributing to the emergence of an increasingly multipolar world and gradually overcoming the division of Europe.<sup>67</sup>

The Ostpolitik of the Brandt School Government differed in both its pre-suppositions and its objectives from the Gaulist strivings towards a global detente.<sup>68</sup> Most significant its dependence in a firm German Commitment to NATO was explicit. The new Ostpolitik indeed, the attitude of the Western allies virtually forced a new Eastern policy initiative on the part of the Federal Republic the other NATO partners, which stopped during the 1960s to improve their relations with the eastern bloc, showed themselves and less willing to pay a diplomatic price for purely German concerns such as claim to exclusive representation and

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67. Stephen, Arine, "Detente Policy Before and After Afghanistan", Aussen Politik (Humberg FRG), Vol. 33, No. 2, 1982.

68. Ibid., p. 136.

the Order Neisse border. At the same time they remained committed to the Federal Republic's military defence, which alone made possible a credible West-German negotiating position toward the East.

Europe has occupied a specific place in Detente for a variety of reasons, it was virtually in a privileged position with regard both to onset of easing tensions, and to the result which ensued, contrary to certain pessimistic claims, therefore, what is needed now is to engage all organised forces in Europe in strengthening their activity and activating the process of European security and cooperation.<sup>69</sup>

#### Non-Alignment and Detente:

Detente first steps in the late sixties. The process running from Cold War to detente began with several years of negotiation between USA and USSR, between East and West, leading to a number of agreements concluded by the two greatest powers and other European states as well and culminating in the passage of the Final Act of CSCE in Helsinki in 1975.

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69. Ibid.

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The 1973 summit in Algiers adopted a position of principle in support of detente and the CSCE in condition that detente be extended to all other regions. That such a stand was assumed was due to the insistence of "small number of non-aligned countries and the solidarity with them demonstrated by other non-aligned countries which in fact expected no good to come of bloc elements. On the contrary, what they anticipated was heightened pressure."<sup>70</sup>

It was only at Colombo that the non-aligned countries took the determined decision to rank struggle for detente among the most important goals of the movement. The non-aligned conception of detente was then defined in its entirety. What the non-aligned countries called for was the extension of detente to all the regions of the world and all areas of International political economic and military, cultural and so on.<sup>71</sup>

Between Algiers and Colombo Yugoslavia pursued a two pronged approach. On the one hand, it worked for the acceptance of detente by non-aligned countries as a vital issue both for non-aligned movement and for all non-aligned countries because, in effect detente means the solution of

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70. Milos Minic, "Non-alignment and Detente", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. 30, No. 3, July, 5, 1979, p. 4.

71. Indian Express, March 1983, p. 6.

all problems considered pressing by the non-aligned countries in the spirit of new International economic and political relations and on the grounds of the principles of non-aligned and of the charter of the United Nations.<sup>72</sup>

The other direction of its thrust was Europe and CSCE. Yugoslavia together with the rest of the non-aligned neutral and other countries stroves preserving to have the 35 countries of Europe, USA. and Canada accepts the premise that all principles and agreements adopted and concluded at Helsinki should likewise be respected in the relations of these countries with other countries in other parts of the world. This was a link forged between detente in Europe and detente in other regions. What in fact evolved from this was a platform of struggle from the conception of unilateral detente, the kind of detente the nonaligned countries aim for.<sup>73</sup>

To counter the weight of the Super Powers, it would be better to expand the movement to include France, Canada and West Germany as associate members to observers. To quote the Indian external Affairs Minister "They are convincing a lot of interest in the non-aligned movement and want it to stay as a force in favour of peace". May be the definition of non-alignment can be enlarged to include all those who are against war and are ready to work for peace. The West European

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72. Ibid.

73. Jogoslovenke SJV arnost "Detente and CSCE" Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. 31, No. 4, Oct. 20, 1981, p. 28.

countries own though strategic allies of the USA, have experienced the agony of war and do not want it in any shape. President Tito also felt that more nations should be allowed into the non-aligned conferences.

According to Dr. A.J.R. Groom, coordinator of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, University of Kent, England the laudatory role was played by the nonaligned movement in the conflict in Korea and Indo-China, Dr. Groom said that in the New Cold War situation today every country must develop a traditional non-aligned foreign policy. He said European countries can contribute much more to their own feeling to security and to world peace if they place more stress on the negotiations. By following a policy of concerned independence Europe can work much better towards being detente back.<sup>74</sup>

As a composite of principles and objectives, the non-aligned movement nevertheless does contain certain elements of security, in solidarity with the victims of aggression in given security situation and the elaboration of certain standards of international law, on the general level, nonalignment affects overall international relations, this shifting the ratio of forces in favour of peace strengthened resistance to use of force.<sup>75</sup>

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74. Tribune (Chendigarh), March, 3, 1983(Edt.),

75. Miljan Kematina "Non-alignment and Security", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade) Vol. 37, No. 796, June 5, 1983, pp. 14-15.

With the framework of its doctrine non-alignment provides the answers to the central issues of how to protect peace, guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and create conditions for altering International relations in the direction of bolstering a new concept of the International community implying the condition of all its members in the realization of these objectives.

Nonalignment has prevented the world's complete division into blocs and spheres of interest through the constant expansion of belts of independence" primarily in the areas of the most direct bloc confrontation, through the spread of island of equitable - cooperation and solidarity, and through striving for the peaceful settlement of political and existing disputes problems and conflicts.<sup>76</sup>

The nonaligned countries provided a powerful incentive to detente, seeing it as a universal process, encouraging positive tendencies in international relations and a movement towards peace which should encompass all regions and which should lead to the settlement of crucial problems, with the participation of all countries on a footing of equality. The nonaligned countries helped detente to acquire the implementation of eliminating the causes of international tensions, instead of merely reducing its intensity.<sup>77</sup>

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76. Ibid.

77. Miljen Kramatic, "Detente disarmament and development", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. 31, July 5, 1980, p. 726.

Non-aligned has not hesitated to offer its mediation and good services in the quest for compromise solutions, as was the case with the drive of the non bloc countries in the United Nations in connection with the Korean war, the drive to encourage a peaceful solution of disputes between big powers in 1960s or the actual five in the United Nations.<sup>78</sup>

Detente in its practical application, should encompass all aspects of international relations. The policy and movement of non-alignment are in their independent and non-bloc nature and peace minded philosophy a factor actively helping to ease tensions and find peaceful solutions to controvercies. Non-aligned countries base their doctrine in world unity and solidarity in the defence of peace, as the common good of mankind. At the first conference of nonaligned countries, they rejected the idea of inevitability of war, appealed to the big powers to settle their mutual problems by negotiation and underlined the need a universal detente. Recognition of this factor, together with establishment of equal relations and cooperation with non-aligned countries, is a precondition for the universal application and stability

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78. Ibid.

of detente. Powerful and independent, the non-aligned movement steadily removes the boundaries of inter bloc. Conflicts, narrows the latitude for creation of spheres of influence, broadens the area of International cooperation and is therefore, an irreplaceable factor in detente.<sup>79</sup>

#### Super Power and the United Nations

More than any other aim, maintaining international peace provided and remains the rationale for the wave of International institutions created after the Second World War. These include the United Nations, the specialized agencies associated with it the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, several regional organisations and various temporary agencies to deal with the aftermath of the war. Among them United Nations plays the important role in maintaining International Peace and Security. In technical agencies were expected to support attempts to avoid and control the use of violence in international relations. Both the Super Powers helped to impel this creative burst but the United States gave especially strong leadership to institutionalization. Both agreed on new institutions and explicit procedures designed to suppress war to settle disputes before they become violated. Super Powers also formally accepted and supported economic and social cooperation which was expected to provide an international environment in which peace could prevail.

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79. Ibid.



In a related respect, the security council mirrored the recent experience of the Super Powers in using their capacities. They were expected to work together they had during the II World War in order to check aggression.<sup>80</sup>

The design of the Security council made it an instrument primarily for dealing with crisis in the short term, in permanent session, it was to be equipped with coercive means for arresting international violence. While the Security council role in a crisis had a fairly sharp definition, this clarity dulled as the parties were returned to peaceful behaviour.<sup>81</sup>

Long term factors that were thought to provide peaceful conditions and the promotion of a peaceful international environment in which the usual equipment of the national status could act in an optional setting because the responsibility of the General Assembly and a growing corps of specialized agencies. The General Assembly and other global organisation to latter received mandates for promoting economic and social cooperation entailed general pledges on the part of government to cooperate. It also had the overall

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80. Leon Gordenker, "Perils of Super Powers Diplomacy", International Journal (New York), Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 1980, pp. 453-84.

81. Ibid.

responsibility for directing the system of global technical organizations but was given neither the legal capacity for issuing orders nor the administrative and political tools for imposing the will of its majorities on organisations which some member state deal with separately.<sup>82</sup>

Super Powers in the United Nations system has always had mixed qualities whatever the cause of the Cold War it intensified the content behavioural unevenness of the Super Power in United Nations system. To begin with, it was generally understood and the post-war peace settlement would be sought outside the United Nations structure. At the special urging of the Soviet Union, the Super Powers reserved the right to act against the resurgence of former enemies without submitting themselves to the new limits on the use of force.<sup>8</sup>

As the disagreement grew over Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, Korea, the Super Powers relied on them on their means, rather than on the new machinery. Only the relatively minor matters of Korean wars introduced into the United Nations machinery by the United States, over the student objectives of the Soviet Union Berlin Blockade of 1948 in eventually got some attention in the United Nations,

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82. Ibid.

in part as a result of institution by United Nations, in part as a result of initiative by the Secretary General and the denial of civil war and political rights in Eastern Europe brought American complaints.

The cold war period and later competition between the Super Powers neither excluded some common behaviour nor halted headlong expansion of international institutions. The United States and Soviet Union agreed that three majority enterprises should be undertaken by the United Nations. The initial attempt at peace keeping in the Suez crisis of 1956, the large scale operation in the Congo and the replacement of a force between the warring communities of Cyprus.<sup>83</sup>

All these incidents represented institutional invasion and constitutional evaluation. In the Suez and Congo cases, the Super Power soon disagreed sharply about the management and the implementation of the peace keeping forces. In the course of the Congo operation Security General Dag Hammarskjöld, came under the same crippling pressure from the Soviet Union and that his predecessor Trygve Lie had to endure as a result of his instance in favour

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83. Alessandro Corradine, "Organizing for Peace"  
International Journal (New York), Vol. 35, No. 2,  
Spring 1980, p. 295.

of United Nations involvement in Korea. In the Cyprus case the price of Soviet agreement was firm control of the peace keeping by the Security Council, which had to renew the force mandate at intervals as short as three months. Despite these experiences, the Super Powers could not reach full agreement on establishing permanent peacekeeping capacities for the United Nations. The Security Council decision to set up an emergency force in South Lebanon in 1978 provided a recent reminder that peacekeeping still needed case by case decisions. The Soviet Union acquiesced in the setting up of UNFIL, which the United States positively backed, but specially rejected any sphere in financing it.<sup>84</sup>

Both Super Powers have warmly endorsed efforts to stimulate economic development in the less developed countries. But again their specific approaches were so different as to generate yet more friction. Each viewed the methods recommended by the other as endangering peace and leading away from the desired end. The United States provided vastly more financial assistance through the United Nations system than did the Soviet Union and strongly favoured building up international administrative facilities for technical assistance for economic development. The United States favoured the

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84. Georald Segal, "United States and Great Powers Triangle", Journal of International Studies (New Delhi), Winter 1979-80.

financial institutions, which it helped to expand, and long term development in which private business could play a role. It specifically apposed the concept of a new International order, although it soon adjusted its policies to accord with some aspects of the demands from the developing countries and their declaration in the sixth special session of the General Assembly in 1974. The Soviet Union continued to avoid the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and consequently had no influence there. It stoutly supported calls for a new International economic order presumably because taking such a direction would tend to weaken capitalism.<sup>85</sup>

Both Super Powers participated in various attempts at developing international law. They were able to agree on treaties regulating the use of outer space of America, and of bacteriological weapons. They accepted a codifying convention on diplomatic stations. They were major participants in the series of conferences on the law of the Sea. And on a number of other lesser matters they were able to decide on congruent policies. Both professed a strong interest and desire to promote the codification and

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85. Ruth B. Russel "United Nation at Thirty five International Journal (New York), Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1980, p. 231.

effectiveness of International law and their representatives frequently employed legal arguments, especially about the obligation of others. At the same time they left no doubt about their refusal to accept compulsory legal procedures to settle disputes on matters they deemed would tend their vital interests, however they defined them.<sup>86</sup>

Super Powers are always busy in the deliberate process that forms an integral part of international organization with its provision for majority voting on recommendations and decisions, the United Nations system encourages a parliament like spirit lobbying, long rattling and a general deal of negotiating over textual formula. At the same time, the deliberate process produces evidence of alignment or divergencies of policies and commitments by the Super Powers. Thus, the institutional framework created by international institutions, operates to encourage some similarity in Super Powers behaviour even when styles differ sharply.<sup>87</sup>

The Super Powers in their relations leaves little doubt that they rely ultimately in their abilities to absorb any costs attaching to going their own ways. Their reservations at the beginning of the period suggested that they have

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86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

picked and chosen their opportunities to work in an organized manner within a larger, if primitive, world community.<sup>88</sup>

If, however, institutionalization at the International level is a virtue in its own right, the Super Powers have not obviated its growth. They have contributed separate and sometimes coincident or emergent manners. If they have not surrendered their ultimate autonomy, neither have they used it generally and deliberately to destroy the International institutions. Indeed the United States has contributed enormously to their growth, despite variations in its approach. At the very least, Soviet Union has used international organisations to protect its positions and sometimes by extending its influence has prompted their use. The growth of institutions has later shapes different from the original expectations of both the Super Powers and the lesser powers. Their structures owe a good deal to the necessity of adjusting to Super Power positions, whether competitive or alike. Each of the Super Power, in its own way, has also staked and territory forbidden for International organization.<sup>89</sup>

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88. Robert W. Cox, "The crisis of World order and the problem of International Organization", International Journal (New York) Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 1980, p. 376.

89. Ibid.

Improving the effectiveness and role of the United Nations shapes up as an imperative. In spite of all shortcomings some consequence of assessments made when the United Nations was being founded, this organization is the focus of the deepest aspirations all the world's peoples. The United Nations is the most universal organization in the history of International relations, to which more functions and goals have been entrusted than has ever been the case with any other international organization or institutions. Frequently, the role of the United Nations has been suppressed, it has been relegated to the background or even ignored altogether especially when inter bloc relations worsen. This tendency is not only dangerous in itself but damaging for detente.<sup>90</sup>

The role of the world organization is irreplaceable when the world is pregnant with tensions and dangers. But recourse to the United Nations should not be had only when danger is inevitable, its possibilities should be developed and utilized in every critical and uncertain situation. Deterioration of the situation in the developing countries which are two fold victims - of the crisis of the world economy and the unjust system of the tension in the world. Detente can

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90. Walter Michel Just and Unjust War. (New York), 1982, p. 49.



therefore exist as a permanent process only if attended by endeavours to bring about positive changes in the solving of economic problems of developing countries.<sup>91</sup>

The Super Powers have faced an important historical imperative in discerning the need for mutual satisfaction of strategic and political interests. Since neither side could have its own way, the search for detente is part of the adjustment process to a new international order. The perception of detente however depends upon the willingness to apply self-restraint and in the final analysis on the requirement of not taking unilateral advantage in crisis situations. These criteria were recognized in the Basic Principles of 1972 and were meant to curb unbridled Super Power competition. The widening of the gap between the Soviets and the Americans in the 1980s has been chiefly on security issues. Realistic political settlements can help to keep Super Power policies on a responsible course, and the underlying purpose of any detente process can only be to encourage moderation of behaviour. Finally, there is no natural harmony of interests between the Super Powers but both can adopt a learning process which will keep tensions and uncertainties within a rationale and coherent framework of detente.<sup>92</sup>

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91. Ibid.

92. William G. Hyland, *US-Soviet Relations*, *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 525-26.

CHAPTER IVINSTABILITY BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET RELATIONS

We have discussed the changing perceptions of detente both in relation to theoretical analysis and as political and organisational reality in Super Power relations. We shall now try to analyse the alternative explanations for the instabilities as reflected in the Super Power political system. There is every reason to suspect that the further militarisation of Soviet and United States' foreign policies constitutes an important source of self-deception and prevents fundamental shifts in favour of stabilisation of Soviet-American relations. The United States continues to complain about the refusal of the Soviets to agree to cooperative verification measures to implement arms control agreements. The Soviet Union points out time and again that the Americans continue to use military political stereotypes inherited from the time when the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly. We have already referred to the negative impact of developments such as the MX-missile on the future of arms control; the control of chemical weapons is even more important if misjudgements of the adversary's intentions are to be

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1. Tall BOH, "US Soviet Relations: From bad to worse", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 58, No. 5, September 1980, p. 515.

avoided. It is also instructive to recall that several plans for disengagement in Europe have proved abortive although there have been encouraging signs of reorientation of foreign relations in European countries on both sides of the dividing line. Since the influence of public opinion is crucial for the success of the negotiating process between the two Super Powers it is artificial to separate the domestic and international environment in outlining the structure of issues. Until open-mindedness and flexibility replace cynicism the political pressures on Soviet and American decision-makers can only increase the chance of rupture after an initial success in negotiation.

According to Possony, "the cold war began while the hot war was still ranging". A beginning of cold war was made even before the end of the Second World War when the Soviet Union imposed communist regimes in Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia. After putting the Eastern Europe behind the iron curtain, the Soviet Union turned her attention towards Western Europe. She also put considerable pressure on Turkey and Iran to extract some concessions. She even engineered a Communist revolution against Greek Government and expanded her influence in Italy. All these moves on the part of Russia were viewed with serious concern by the West and when Britain expressed her inability to check the Soviet

subversion and expansion, the United States of America assumed the responsibility of containing the onward march of communism. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were the steps to save the European Continent from further expansion of the Soviet Orbit. In response to the Marshall Plan for European recovery, the Soviet Union initiated the Molotov Plan and established the council of Mutual Economic Assistance. These moves and counter-moves constitutes the beginning of the Cold War.<sup>2</sup>

By 1949 the territorial limits of Cold War in Europe were more or less established. By 1950 the theatre of Cold War shifted from Europe to East Asia. The Korean war was mutually a conflict between the Super Powers. If North Korea was fighting with Soviet weapons and Chinese troops, the United States was fighting on behalf of South Korea under the United Nations Flag, with the result the Cold War for sometime turned into hot war. However, after the death of Stalin an armistic was concluded on 27th July 1953.<sup>3</sup>

Between 1955 and 1958 West Asia became the centre of the Cold War. In a series of Western Military Pact the Baghdad Pact was concluded in 1955, later *rechristened* the Central Treaty Organization (Canto) after Iraq left it.

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2. Kenneth Ingam, History of the Cold War (New York, 1955), pp. 3-4.
  3. Walter Lejeber, America Russia and Cold War(1945-1966), (New York, 1964), pp. 7-8.

During this phase the tension between East and West was somewhat relaxed. Eisenhower and Bulganin exchanged assurances that neither of them will start a nuclear war. But the German problem still remained intractable.<sup>4</sup>

On the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 both the Super Powers stood on the bad side and thus a major crisis was averted. However, the United States of America proclaimed the Eisenhower Doctrine on 5 March 1959 thereby extending the Truman Doctrine to Middle East. This age had an adverse effect on the relaxation.

After the Berlin crisis and the Cuban crisis were defused, the stage was set for a then in the Cold War. Under the impact of Cuban crisis bothsides realized that any nuclear show down would lead to mutual destruction. This awareness led both to believe in the inevitability of peace coexistence. This spirit of accommodation was reflected in the conclusion of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 followed by a Hot line Agreement between the Super Powers.<sup>5</sup>

There has not developed any replacement for the balance of terror, strategic parity, despite number of putative technological breakthroughs central systems imbalances or

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4. John Licas, New History of Cold War (New York) 1966, p. 17.

5. Etheridge Davis & Lynn, "The Cold War Begins" in Soviet American Conflict Over Eastern Europe (Edt.), (Princeton, New Jersey, 1974), p. 55.

windows of vulnerability, has remained remarkably dependable for a third of a century, and American and Soviet co-existence without war has withstood numerous crisis, challenges and insults which in earlier time would have been almost certain to provoke hostilities. The balance of terror has not turned out to be so stable by accident, on the century, the Super Powers have taken great care to avoid direct military confrontation, and have ultimately respected each other recognized Zones of influence areas of vital interest.<sup>6</sup>

In 1968, both the Super Powers started bilateral talks aiming at the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. Consequently SALT I was signed in 1972. Nixon visited Moscow in May 1972 and Brezhnev returned the visit in 1973. In 1974 President Ford paid a visit to Soviet Union and Vladivostok agreement was signed to form the basis of SALT II. These visits signified a sort of declaration of detente between the two Super Powers. President Jimmy Carter, who assumed office on 20 January, 1977, continued the process of detente. A summit meeting between him and the the Soviet President Brezhnev took place in 1979 at Vienna and SALT II treaty was signed, though it could not be ratified by the American Senate.<sup>7</sup>

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6. W.A. Harriman, America and Russia in a changing World (London, 1971), p. 73.

7. Akira Irika, Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York, 1977), p. 120.

The dramatic turn of events in the closing days of decade of 70's has again raised the spectre of a Super Power confrontation. American dis-satisfied with real Russian behaviour grew, it was inevitable that shock of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would mean throwing out the baby of strategic arms control alongwith the both Water of detente. Since that event the United States and the Soviet Union have been unable to pick up the pieces of the Shattered experiment or to resume the dialogue. The rhetorical exchanges between Washington and Moscow have however been considerably more hostile than behaviour of either and their operational policies much less confronted than their posturing. The following are the factors which led to the instability between United States and Soviet relations.<sup>8</sup>

Arms Build Up During the past three decades, the military establishments of the United States and Soviet Union have become the most powerful and most expensive institutions. The momentum of Soviet-American relations between 1969 and 1972 was toward a summit and a treaty. That is not a case now. Despite the change in climate and a certain amount of course correction on both sides, Soviet-American relations are in a state of drift.<sup>9</sup>

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8. J.M. Colling and A.H. Cordesman, Imbalance of Power Shifting US Soviet Military Strengthens (Macdonald & James, 1978), p. 12.

9. Geohannic Nicholas, 'Is a new detente possible' The World Today, (London), Vol. 38, No.6, June, 1982, p. 207.

The approach of the Soviet Union was limited by its concept of deterrence, which emphasizes that whatever can deliver the greatest blow first is more likely to remain dominant. This explains the Soviet pre-occupation with land based highly controlled, large ICBMs - inter-continent ballistic missiles. A main Soviet arms control objective has been to retain ICBM, forces and to ensure their modernization. The Soviets have resisted American efforts to use arms control to encourage Soviet reliance on their submarines, which they have regarded as an area of American advantage. At the same time, they have accepted a number of measures that do not reduce their own central forces, such as 9 series of bans and limitations on new weapons or weapons in the planning stage. The successful treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile defences was one of this sort.

The pre-occupation of the Soviets has been with what they call "equal security", which they have argued, requires more than an equal number of weapons. They use the term to justify claims of compensation necessary for geographical handicaps, for American nuclear weapons assigned to NATO, and for British French and Chinese nuclear weapons. They are not receptive to United States claims that they have an advantage because of their proximity to Europe. Their demand for equal security has complicated efforts to



negotiate reductions that maintain rough parity.<sup>10</sup>

In strategic nuclear forces, the clearcut worry is the increasing vulnerability of America's land based missiles to a Soviet pre-emptive attack. That is a specific situation in which the Soviets have an edge. America does not have a corresponding capability. But that vulnerability is only one piece of the strategic balance and, by itself not a decisive piece.

In submarines, the United States still has substantial superiority. In bombers and cruise missiles, the Soviets are also inferior each side is still able to destroy the other, but is unable to prevent itself from being destroyed.

Perceptions of vulnerability do have an effect in every area of strategic forces. The Soviets could be inclined to be more willing to take risks in challenging important United States interest. Failure by the United States to try to make its ICBM's survivability, or at least equal, would amount to a substantial political defeat at this time.<sup>11</sup>

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10. David Fre, "A East West Symposium" in International Crisis and Management (Edt.) (Hants, Saxonhan, 1978), p. 14.
  11. World Brown, "Super Powers Stand Now", US News & World Report (Washington DC), Vol. 92, No. 8, Jan. 10, 1983, p. 21.

As for as threat nuclear weapons in Europe, there is an imbalance from the mid-60, the Soviets have had an edge, which has grown in recent years with the deployment of the SS-20s. When SS-20 was first deployed early in 1977. It was a replacement for the SS-4s and SS-5s with which the Soviets had been menacing Europe for decades. SS-20 was therefore not a new threat in that its targets more or less matched those of the old SS-4s and SS-5s that were destined for retirement. But the SS-20 is an immensely more capable weapon.<sup>12</sup>

Arms control made the Soviets feel more secure in concrete way too. Long before a freeze became fashionable in the United States, the Soviets were pushing their version of the concept. No wonder, given their belief that more is better and most is best, since the late 1960, they have tended to lead in gross numbers and would naturally like to see their quantitative advantage frozen. The SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons, a five-year companion to the ABM Treaty of 1972, held the United States to 1710 launchers for inter continental and submarine

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12. Ander Son Kurt, "Playing Nuclear Paker", Time (New York), No. 22, January 31, 1983.

launched ballistic missiles (ICBM and SLBMs) that was about 700 fewer than the Soviet Union already had in place.

In SALT II, the Soviets relented somewhat and accepted equal ceilings, but they retained a monopoly in the largest category of missiles - the most Olympian of their God of War the so called heavy ICBMs of which they have just over 300. They also got the United States to accept numerical limits on air launched cruise missiles and the bombers. Because of their technical sophistication, cruise missiles were an American military advantage and therefore a valuable American bargaining chip. Despite the Soviets had in numbers, their advances in the technology of weapons have lagged behind those of the United States.<sup>13</sup>

In exchange for what they gained at the negotiating table the Soviets made concessions. In SALT II, they agreed not to count as strategic weapons the European based nuclear forces of the United States and its allies, even though some of those NATO missiles and warplanes could reach the Soviet Union. These are some of the weapons that the Soviets are trying to restrict in the INF talks under way in Geneva.

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13. William H. Kincaide and Jeffrey D. Parro, "The MX ICBM Debate" in Negotiating Security (New York, 1979), p. 71.

In SALT II, the Kremlin accepted restraints in the number of ICBMs with multiple warheads, or MIRVs and the number of warheads per type of ICBM. Those combined limits left the Soviets with an approximately 5 to 2 edge in land based ballistic warheads. They also left them with enough of those warheads to raise, the theoretical possibility of a crippling Sneak attack against American ICBMs. Land based missiles are the most menacing of all nuclear weapons because they are the most accurate and the most plausible instruments of a pre-emptive attack.<sup>14</sup>

Stability and deterrance have traditionally dependent on each side's having confidence that sufficient numbers of its own land based weapons would survive an attack and be able to strike back. Each must be exposed to retaliation if it were to strike first, yet at the same time, be free from the threat of a sneak attack and would deprive it of its own retaliatory forces.

The Soviets are largely to blame for casting doubt on both halves of that proposition and thus upsetting the strategic balance. The United States was the first to develop and deploy MIRVS but the single most destabilizing

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14. Bialer Seweryn, "The Soviet and the West in the 1980 Detente Containment, Confrontation", ORBIS (Philadelphia Pa), Vol. 27, No. 1, Spring, 1983, p. 34.

development in the recent round of military competition between the Super Powers was the seemingly open ended acquisition of more and more MIRVed ICBMs by the Soviets strategic Rocket Forces from the mid-70s on.<sup>15</sup>

The principal accomplishment of SALT II was that it slowed that juggernaut down. At the same time, the treaty left the United States free to narrow the gap in land based war heads when the joint Chief of Staff gave their endorsement to ratification of the SALT II treaty in 1979. They called it a "modest but useful gap". Critics on both the left and the right were not willing to go even that far. They stressed what the treaty did not accomplish, it failed to stop much less reverse, the arms race; it failed to close the "Window of vulnerability" by eliminating, the hypothetical possibility of first strike against the United States. More generally, the treaty entailed no accompanying restraint on Soviet adventurism and mischief making around the World.<sup>16</sup>

The Soviet moratorium on SS-20 deployment, they noted, was largely a fiction. Moscow had exempted more

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15. Karl E. Birnbaum, Confidence Building and East West Relations, (Lexempurg) 1982, p. 9.

16. Talbott Strobe, "Playing for the future", Time (New York), Vol. 121, No. 23, April, 1983, p. 9.

more than 20 launching sites currently under construction from its self imposed "freeze". Soviets nuclear attack submarines already patrol off United States coasts, and those vessels are probably equipped with short range nuclear cruise missiles. These submarines could be equipped with long-range cruise missiles, but that is not a matter of intence concern in the Pentagon, since an attack by such weapons would trigger a general United States nuclear retaliation before the bulk of Soviet missile forces, based in the Soviet Union, could reach the United States similarly, older short range nuclear weapons are already based in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The new longer range missiles are, in the United States, part of a modernization program that would have been undertaken in any circumstances.<sup>17</sup>

Soviet argues that both nations are very security minded, raising problems for a clear definition of mutual security. The only avenue that offers hope for resolving strategic issues was said to be the SALT process. The Soviet delegate placed blame for the hiatus in SALT negotiation on inconsistency in United States policy. If this were to be a chronic problem, the entire negotiating process would have to be scrapped.

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17. Russell George, "Arms Control", Time (New York), Vol. 122, No. 24, December 5, 1983, p. 14.

American side emphasized those elements in SALT II that would have to be revised to make the treaty acceptable (a) the treaty would need to run longer than 1985 to provide stability; (b) the issue of superior Soviet capabilities codified in the treaty would have to be addressed; and (c) to ensure stability, limits would be required on certain capabilities in order to rule out the danger of a pre-emptive first strike. It was argued that in the future, compensation for forward based system should go to the American rather than the Soviet side.<sup>18</sup>

America maintained that SALT II need not necessarily be revised the essential point was not whether both had an agreed treaty; instead, the issue was the maintenance of the Status quo or its improvement as a basis for negotiating a SALT III accord. Further Soviet programmes of SS-18 and other new programmes made the start of SALT III more difficult. A long term moratorium on testing the Soviet Union's heavy MIRV, ICBM and cautioned that once breached the qualitative limits on missile. Modernization in the SALT II treaty could not be retrieved. In addition it was strategic defence play an underestimated part in the SALT negotiation. That neither was comparable in the two

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18. Ibid.

countries would continue to impede the process of arriving at an agreement.

Americans warned against relying on estimates of Soviet intentions in negotiating the terms of strategic arms limitations accords. It is more prudent, to measure capabilities, thus by-passing conflicting estimates of intentions. The current SALT negotiation were said to be at a dead end, the only solution being a more selecting approach, involving the negotiation of particular rather than general issues, a lowering agreement more modest in scope than those of SALT I and II.<sup>19</sup>

In this view, the SALT negotiating process could not be relied on to overcome the asymmetries threatening strategic stability as a result of unilateral arms deployment. The Soviet threat to the vulnerability of United States land based forces would require in response, the kinds of United States strategic posture, the negotiating process had resulted in delay and distortion of needed strategic programs. Because the SALT process had not succeeded in devising methods of verification with respect to land mobile missiles, the United States had allowed itself to be driven in the direction of a long basing system for MX CIBM that was a monster and that might never be deployed.<sup>20</sup>

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19. Wessell H. Nils, "Soviet America SALT and Regional Conflict", Current (New York), No. 285, September, 1981.

20. Robert S. Jordan, "The outlook of Europeans toward Dominance of Super Powers" in Europe and Super Powers, (Darton, 1971), p. 24.



The Soviets maintained that the stationing of any new United States missiles was unacceptable because it would upset the balance that they claimed already existed in Europe. They proposed a freeze: the Soviet Union would halt further deployment on its side in exchange for NATO's cancellation of its plans to install a new generation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Moscow position was both bogus and broken. It was the Soviet Union that had upset the balance in the first place by deploying the mobile, triple warhead SS-20 while NATO the scales with some new weapons in its side. Nor did the Soviets quite while they were ahead. Despite declaration of moratorium on SS-20s they pushed ahead to complete new missile sites that had previously been under construction.

Underlying Soviet arithmetic and diplomacy was an attempt to undermine the very basis of the Atlantic Alliance by breaking an important bond between the United States and Western Europe. By opposition opposing the addition of even one new intermediate - range warhead in NATO countries. The Soviet hoped to deny the United States the right and the ability to treat the defence of Western Europe as an extension of American self-defence.<sup>21</sup>

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21. Ibid.

A number of other negative features could keep the Super Powers at arm's length. The most important is the overall climate of United States-Soviet relations, which has reached poisonous intensity. Another is the uncertainty about leadership on both sides, but most particularly in Moscow. A further reason is the stagnation of almost all nuclear arms - control efforts. The START talks have made no progress since they began. The unratified SALT II treaty of 1979, which both sides have agreed to comply with informally, is eroding as each side accuses the other of activities that violate the understanding. Meanwhile, new weapons systems under development by both sides are becoming harder and harder to deal with under arms control proposals.<sup>22</sup>

#### Interference in other Countries:

Increased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union results from charges by each side that the other does not abide by the rules of detente. The United States accuses the Soviet Union of continuing her strategic and conventional arms build up and of having a greater propensity to intervene in third world areas to upset the global balance. The Soviet Union charges the United States with not fulfilling her promises in the arena of trade and finance and with

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22. William Diabold Jr. "Super Powers Politics and East West Trade", Soviet American Relations in the 1980 (New York, 1980), pp. 21-22.

failing to ratify the SALT II.<sup>23</sup>

By the beginning of the 1970s the Soviet Union had build up a military capacity which made it possible for her to safeguard her influence in the Third World by direct means with help of a variety of political, economic and military tools. It was no accident that it was in the Middle East that the two Super Powers first came to face each other directly. The occasion was the fourth Arab Israeli War in 1973, when the American armed forces were put on alert in order to deter a possible Soviet intervention on the side of the Arab States. The Soviet Cuban intervention in Angola, which settled the power struggle among the rival liberation movement in favour of the Marxist MPLA, was the first indication of a new interest on the part of the Super Powers in development in the Third World. Since then the United States - after some years of non-involvement in the Third World as a result of Vietnam experience - has begun to show considerably more interest in Africa and elsewhere. The analysis of the sources of conflict in the Third World has taken on a new dimension in Super Powers rivalry is increasing, affecting what used to be simply regional affairs, and the rivalry is likely to intensify the conflicts which already exist. However, it is also

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23. William Phil, "Europe, America and Soviet Threat", The World Today (London), Vol. 38, No.10, October, 1982, p. 379.

true that became the Super Powers regard the Third World in the context of East-West relations, regional conflict is likely to increase the danger of a deterioration of relations between them because of their involvement.<sup>24</sup>

The revolution in Iran fundamentally altered the strategic situation in the Persian Gulf region. That event raised considerably fear in the United States of a Soviet military threat in the United States of a Soviet military threat to Iran and the surrounding oil States. Driven by their own need for oil states driven by their own need for oil by their desire for leverage over oil dependent Western Powers, the Soviets were expected to drive across their southern border toward the Iranian oil fields at Abadan Rugged terrain slow the invading forces, but were not expected, to alter their course or change their objective. Such became - and for many remains - the "Worst case" senario for American thinking about Soviet threat to the Gulf.<sup>25</sup>

There is historical precedent for such attacks in Soviet activities in Iranian Azerbaizen and Kurdistan at the end of World War II, and political circumstances motivating

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24. Bertram Christoph, "Third World and International Security" (London, 1982), p. 84.

25. Rubinstein Zalvin, "Super Powers Rivalry and the Third World" (Philadelphia Pa), Vol. 27, No. 1, Spring, 1983, p. 31.

and rationalizing a Soviet move into this region are more easily conceived than those that could rationalize a drive to the Gulf. Indeed, another phase of Iran's revolution or a series of events in northern Iran akin to those occurring in Afghanistan in 1979 might provide a purely defensive rationale for the attack.<sup>26</sup>

But is such an attack any less dangerous American interest for being limited? Such a move would extend Soviet air coverage Abadan and the northern half of Gulf. It would bring the Soviet logistics infrastructure over the first range of Iran's mountains and facilitate later moves further into Iran-Soviet forces would effectively flank Turkey (and hence NATO's Southern border) control the most densely populated portion of Iran and be in a position to bring greater pressure to bear on Iraq.

Significantly Iran's oil wells would go untouched in this scenario. But Western interest is in the flow and price of oil, not its source. To the extent that a limited Soviet attack would yield greater leverage over the key regimes whose choices affect the flow of oil it would yield increased Soviet leverage over western interests.<sup>27</sup>

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26. Yair Evran, "Great Powers Interventions in the Middle East", in *Great Powers interventions in the Middle East* (New York, 1979), p. 17.

27. *Ibid.*

The Soviet Union's military supply and build up of Syria's is Moscow's response to comp David and President Reagan's Middle East initiative. Moscow provides Syria with a credible military option and hopes thereby to foster Syria's opposition to United States efforts to fashion an Arab - Israel settlement and to encourage reliance on Soviet arms and protection; above all, it seeks to prevent any possible reconciliation between Syria and the United States.<sup>28</sup>

The rivalry between the Super Powers in the Third World varies. It is obvious by at its most intense where political or Economic interests are deeply involved. It is again no accident that it was in the Middle East threat the Super Powers first competed for influence. This is easily explained by the geopolitical significant of the region and especially for the West, its importance for energy supplies for the West. In the 'Northern Tier' in the Gulf and in the Arabian Peninsula there are very direct connections between fundamental regional instability and international interest. The potential for conflict is great, and the causes are likely to be extremely complex social and political conflicts, both open and below the surface, are present in Turkey, in Iran and Pakistan.

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28. Joseph M. Siracisa & Glam St. John Barclay, Impact of The Cold War (Kenniket - Press 1977), pp. 16-17.

Border incidents between Iraq and Iran were common place for many years and have now resulted in open warfare between them, and there is a great deal of speculation about the stability of the Arabian Peninsula in view of the increasing strains between economic modernization and social and political conservatism. Through the invasion of Afghanistan the Soviet Union has shifted the political and military balance of power in the whole region somewhat in her favour. Any further destabilization of any one of the countries of the "Northern Tier" could result in fundamental changes in the international power balance. The Soviet Union is interested in perpetuating this sense of crisis for she tends to favour the forces which want to abolish the existing political structure in favour of socialist-oriented systems.<sup>29</sup>

In the past there seems to have been some sort of unwritten agreement concerning the spheres of influence of the Super-Powers in the Third World. According to this Pact Latin America was just as much a part of the American sphere of influence as the Gulf or Saudi Arabia. Afghanistan on the other hand, seems to have been treated as if she lay within the Soviet sphere of influence long before the recent invasion.

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29. Henry Trofimenko, "Third World and US Soviet Competition", Strategic Digest (New Delhi), Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 1-3.

Africa was, to a large extent, an earmarked map. The West has been alarmed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, viewed as it were, against a backdrop of the Soviet interventions in Angola and Ethiopia, the long standing Soviet presence in South Yemen and the rapid destabilization of Iran.<sup>30</sup> It would seem, therefore that a new era is being ushered in, characterized more by rivalry than by accommodation; both sides appear to be seeking to increase their influence in areas which they consider politically and economically vital- no matter where. The possibility cannot be ruled out, therefore, that the Soviet Union will make efforts to exploit the growing instability in Latin America in order to expand her influence there.<sup>31</sup>

More than the West, the Soviet Union has used conflict in parts of the Third World as a means of exerting influence. The growth of Soviet Arms deliveries to Africa during the 1970, is a significant indication of Moscow determination to increase its influence over the regimes involved. The Soviet Union, in following this policy is prepared not only to accept the conflicts that arise but even to take some risks, for she sees conflicts as a way to promote the establishment of centralized, socialist-oriented states.

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30. Ibid.

31. Bertram Christoph, Third World Conflict and International Security (London, 1982) 0.52.



As for as the third world is concerned the Soviets are attempting to present the United States as a major threat to the interests and sensitivities of developing nations especially Maslem. Exploitation of the Iranian hostage crisis is one avenue in this effort. Potentially more serious is the Soviet campaign to portray the United States as the principal patron of Israel. The Soviets argue that the Palestine problem, not Afghanistan should be the subject of principal, concern for the Arabs. Similarly, the Kremlin warns third world states that a return to a more activist American global policy is a greater danger to them than is the Soviet Union.<sup>32</sup>

While emphasizing their power and self-confidence, Soviet spokesmen claim that detente with the United States remains on the diplomatic agenda. It would be strange, if the Soviet leadership did not go through a process of disillusionment and lowering of expectations similar to the one developed in Washington. But it would be equally out of character for Brezhnev and his associates to admit that detente with the United States, in which they invested so much effort and personal prestige has been damaged beyond repair. Nor would further increase in United States-Soviet

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32. Ibid.

confrontations serve Moscow's interests or would make a dialogue with the Western Europeans more difficult, and the danger of Super Power, rivalry in the Third World getting out of hand would grow. The Soviets also seem to fear, as do some American observe that growing multipolarity can allow Moscow's and Washington's clients to manipulate their patrons into a nuclear holocaust.<sup>33</sup>

#### Inference in Alliances:

The relations between the Super Powers and their alliances have so deteriorated that detente is moribund is more than a verbal quibble. Soviet threat to Western security is a major source of many of the current strains and tensions between United States and Soviet Union.

The danger assumed added urgency with the planned visit to Bonn of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev starting November 22. It was feared that the Kremlin leader would be able to exploit mounting anti-nuclear sentiment to weaken West Germany's ties to NATO.

With the backing of the new Reagan Peace strategy, West German Chancellor Schmidt was prepared to take the initiative in the talks with Brezhnev. He served notice

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33. Dinitri K. Simes, "Death of Detente", International Security (New York), Vol. 5, No. 1, Summer 1980, p.22.

that he would make it clear to the Soviet President that NATO would go through with its deployment of new nuclear missiles if there was no agreement in the Geneva negotiations.<sup>34</sup>

Brezhnev's main target was West Germany's powerful "peace movement which opposes new NATO nuclear missiles in German soil - Brezhnev and his colleague have been quicker to assess the new mood of West Germany. The Kremlin apparently sees in West Germany since West Germany straddles the the strategic heartland of NATO. To force the opening, Brezhnev had thrown himself into the battle. He met with a stream of a West German Official visitors to Moscow, sending them home with generally favourable impressions. West-Germany and Soviet Union agreed on plans for a multi billion dollar natural gas - pipeline from Siberia that would create thousands of West German jobs at a time when Chancellor Schmidt blames unemployment directly on high interest rate in the United States. The Soviet President had dispatched scores of Kremlin officials to Bonn, on West German speaking tones with Moscow peace propaganda.<sup>35</sup>

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34. Joseph Fromm, "President's Bid to Stem Neutralism", US News & World Report (Washington, DC), Vol. 98, No. 23, November 30, 1981, p. 30.
35. Stranger Theodoe, "The New Protectionism", New Week (New York), Vol. XCVIII, No. 227, Nov. 30, 1981, p. 15.

The warm relationship is developing despite the French President's disagreement with Reagan on other foreign policy and economic issues. Fundamental to Franco American cooperation is a shared conviction that Soviet Union poses a dangerous threat to the nations of West.<sup>1</sup>

He believes that Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers have upset Europe's military balance. "I will not accept this," he says and I agree that we must arm to restore the balance".

As a result, he is convinced that NATO's plan to station United States Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe should be implemented to give America a strong hand in arms reduction negotiations with the Soviets.<sup>1</sup>

Mitterand also criticizes the growing neutralist movement in nations such as West Germany and Netherland where there is public opposition to the NATO missile plan.<sup>36</sup>

Mitterand takes a tougher time than other Western European leaders on Russia's invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Following his inauguration for a seven year term last May, he dropped Moscow from a round of foreign visits made by Cheysson. No top Soviet Policy makers has yet been invited to Paris, even though Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko has visited Washington.<sup>37</sup>

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36. William Phil, "Europe America & Soviet Threat", The World Today (London), Vol. 38, No. 10, Oct. 1982, page 376.

37. Margaret Murray, "France: US Ally Against Soviets" US News & World Report (Washington DC), Vol. 91, No. 24, Dec. 14, 1981. p. 15.<sup>1</sup>

France is expected to buy large amounts of Siberian natural gas from Russia in a multi billion-dollar pipeline project spearheaded by West Germany. The United States opposed the deal saying dependency on Soviet Gas could lead to political blackmail. Washington also maintains that this project, if completed, would provide Moscow with 10 billion to 12 billion dollars of hard currency to help finance its military build up and would make Western Europe dangerously dependent on Soviet every supplies.<sup>38</sup>

European contend that Reagan's policy will hurt them more than the Soviets. Despite this, Europeans and Reagan are going out of their way to keep disagreement.

With every crack in NATO unity, the credibility of his negotiating position is diminished, the threat of deployment looks more like a bluff and the vicious cycle takes mather turn for the worse. The Soviets have less and less incentive to give up anything in the negotiations. As the American Land gets weaker, the stakes get higher. For the Soviets the winner's pot includes the possibility of seriously, perhaps irreparably deviding NATO.

A European idea, the zero optian the Soviets to remove the SS-20s with which they were threatening- Europe as well as their older SS-4s and SS-5s, if NATO called off its planned, deployment of the Tomhawks and Pershing II's.

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38. Arenker Alfret, "Pipeline Crisis: Feuds Heats Up", US News & World Report (Washington DC), Vol. 92, No. 16, p. 25, Aug. 2, 1982, p. 25.

The zero option was intended to all SS-20s through out, the Soviet Union, including those in Asia. Since they are a potential threat to Europe even if aimed at China.<sup>39</sup>

The Soviets might happily accept would be for NATO to respond its deployment of the Tomhawks and Pershing II altogether as long as the IMF negotiations continue. Some West German politicians have floated idea of a postponement option" along these lines.

If NATO were forced to postpone deployment either because of the German election results or a further breakthrough in NATO solidarity, then the game would almost certainly be over and Soviet Union would have won the whole pot. Its negotiations could simply settle in for an interminably long and unproductive talk like the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations that have been dragging on in Vienna for ten years.<sup>4</sup>

The Russians obviously derive immense satisfaction from the spectacle of a spreading pacifist and anti-nuclear campaign in West Germany Britain and other nations. They reckon that even if those protests fail to sway Reagan, Moscow still will get a pay off in the form of weakening ties between United States and its European allies.<sup>40</sup>

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39. Ibid.<sup>1</sup>

40. James Chace, "A world of Multiple relationship" in US-Soviet relations after the Cold War (Edt), (New York) 1976, p. 86.

Despite a decade of disappointments in Soviet-American relations, failures that Russia blames entirely on the United States, Moscow has reaped an impressive harvest elsewhere in the world.<sup>41</sup>

During the state of relaxed tense the world detente seldom is used here - Russia launched a massive military build up, secured new commercial ties with Western European countries and extended its military and political reach by championing victorious leftist rebels in such places as Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.

Further more Moscow, rules for detente leave the Soviets free to support "ideological battles" in the Third World and also to invade Afghanistan.<sup>41</sup>

Russia is military muscle cannot be ignored. Huge strategic nuclear missiles, the SS-18s and 19s, threaten America and its land-based missile force. In addition, powerful medium range SS-20s imperil America's allies in Western Europe.<sup>41</sup>

Detente has allowed Moscow to grow closer to America's friends in Europe and Japan. Since 1972, many of America's industrial partners have developed strong trade links with

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41. Ibid.

Russia. With commercial ties have come more accommodating political views. As a result Russia feels a day is coming when US no longer can count on leading a bloc willing or able to stand up to firm Soviet political pressure.<sup>42</sup>

Moscow sees as a boon the antiwar movement sweeping across Western Europe and emerging in the United States. The anti-nuclear backlash plus Reagan's cuts in social spending and the harshing in Congress over the 1983 budget, are viewed here as Caterlyst for Western compromises that will work in Moscow's favour.

With Reagan in power, Russians complain of greater United States hostility. Instead of finding another Richard Nixon - tough talking, but ready to deal the Soviets have come up against a president who proposes an unprecedented arms build up, imposes economic and financial sanctions after the communist military crackdown in Poland and moves to curb Soviet expression in the Persian Gulf and Central America.<sup>1</sup>

There is still hope here that the climate may improve if United States and Soviet negotiators will buckle down to serious arms central talks, prospects for easing of tensions could be revived.

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42. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 15 Sep. 1983.<sup>1</sup>



The instability in Soviet American relations is reflected in the explosive arms race and in the trouble spots throughout the world where costly weapons systems have been supplied to proxies. Soviet and American military planning is often marked by over reactions which cause grave concern to their allies. The Europeans in particular have in this context perceived the Super Powers as working at cross purposes with their own interest in preserving detente. The negotiating process so far has not succeeded in coping with the jolts and jerks which are created as either Super Power makes the worst case assumptions about the intentions and military capabilities of the other.<sup>43</sup>

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43. Ibid.

CHAPTER - VCONCLUSION

The United States-Soviet conflict has continued for 31 years without erupting into war. The two Super Powers have avoided war for a period almost equal to the record of 43 years - from 1871 to 1914 - attained by the European balance of power system created by Ottovan Bismark. Unlike the drift toward war after 1900, United States-Soviet relations can indeed be defined and contextualised in a peace frame work. The Super Powers have cooperated through institutionalised mechanisms since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Nevertheless, a war scare has developed in Western Europe and in the United States. It would seem that the war fever results from inhaling a potent brew of recent vintage: the Irarian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish crisis, the failure to ratify SALT II treaty, and a new arms race resulting in a staggering defence budget. The succession of crises that followed inevitably provoked a backlash.

For Moscow, the United States-Soviet relationship is one of unremitting competition - from time to time there may be instances in which the interests of the two Super Powers coincide. When this happens, the Soviets will act in accord with their interests. The appearance

then, of cooperation, is coincidental and transitory. Moscow will cooperate in order to compete more effectively - sometimes to induce a mood of tranquility in the West, but not out of defence to Western interests or desires. Altruism is not a natural Soviet mode of behaviour.

From the Soviet tactic to enter agreement that appear cooperative - like the Hitler - Stalin Pact, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Treaty of 1950, or for that matter the Soviet - Egyptian Friendship Treaty of 1971, or the SALT I agreement - some officials have drawn the conclusion that the United States-Soviet relationship is a mixture of cooperation and competition. The confusion between the appearance of cooperation and the reality of competition has nurtured and sustained the illusions of detents for a decade.

In Brezhnev's view "Detente" is a process, rather than a specific agreement or sets a agreements it enables the two Super Powers, through increased contacts and more amicable discourse, to avoid the damages inherent in the previous are when both of them would resort occasionally to drastic measures, without any possibility of gauging whether they would trigger off a violent reaction on the other side, e.g. the Soviet Union sending missiles to Cuba

and to United States initiating the bombing of North Vietnam. The actual nature of the process depends entirely on the circumstances of, as it is likely, the West continues to decline the strength and cohesion, detent would enable the Soviet Union to keep this decline from being accompanied by violent convulsion which might set off a nuclear conflict. If the West recovers from its fattering course and there is a new spirit of realism and resolution in United States policies, then under the umbrella of detent Soviet can strike some mutually profitable deals.

Detente in the Soviet view has meant a new type of relationship with the United States but their relationship does not automatically put the Soviet Union under an obligation to pursue policies which Americans would approve. Detente was never assumed by Moscow to mean specific agreement or a series of agreement, an atmosphere conducive to political bargaining free from threats of war, enabling both sides to guage more accurately each others interests and intentions. But the mere existence of detente does not, Russian feel, put any restraint on their policies, even though they are pleased when the state Department feels it does put restrain on Americas.

The Soviets have admitted that they violated a protocol signed in 1974 by foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Kissinger. The protocol contains a number of procedure

related to the operations of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) the Joint United States-Soviet body set up by 1972 agreement to monitor their implementation and settle disputes. The protocol specifies that older SS-7 and SS-8 missile launchers which are replaced by modern submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLEM) launchers must be dismantled within four months after the new submarines enter. "Sea trails - i.e. four months after the time they first sail out to the Open Sea. The 1972 Interim Agreement permits the Soviets to replace all of the 210 older SS-7s and SS-8s with SLEMs on new submarines.

Sometime in mid-September 1975, the Soviets apparently sent the first such replacement submarines to sea. As a result, about 20 SS-7 and SS-8 missile launchers should have been dismantled by around mid-January 1975. The actual missiles had been removed from the launchers some months earlier, so the United States expected the launchers to be fully dismantled on line.

In late January, 1976, it appeared that the Soviets had not made the deadline, but the evidence was inconclusive. The Soviets had launched additional submarines after September launchers be fully dismantled.

The Soviets were scheduled to make the first formal presentation in the meeting of March 29. The American

Commissioner Sidney Graybeal, sat down with General Ustinov, the Soviet Commissioner and exchanged the usual opening pleasantries. Ustinov then began his report by presenting members which corresponded precisely with United States intelligence estimates. He readily and openly acknowledged that the Soviet Union had failed to meet the required deadline for dismantling the older ICBM launchers.

In a subsequent meeting, Graybeal responded by insisting that the Soviets halt deployment of further ballistic missile submarines until the dismantling program get quickly back on schedule. The Soviet Union accepted the United States demands, they promised to complete the dismantling by June 1 and more importantly, halted submarine launchings. The Soviets formally reported that by June 1 they had carried out the promised dismantling.

In other cases of alleged violations, the Soviets have been able to demonstrate that their activities are not explicitly in conflict with mutual agreement with regard to III-X silos, the Soviets claim that there are command and control facilities, not convened by SALT I. Several of these silos have been started before the SALT I Interim Agreement was complete, and United States intelligence confirms the likely command and control function. The SA - 5 radar testing which the Soviet promptly stopped when the issue was raised by the United States, was from a strategic

stand point, potentially the most significant activity. But this radar was almost certainly being used for range instrumentation purposes, and the United States had explicitly stated that range instrumentation radars should be excluded from the limitation of the SALT I ABM treaty with regard to heavy missiles, the definition of a "Heavy" missile was contained only in a United States unilateral statement rejected by the Soviets and even then the definition was ambiguous. Finally, there never was any widespread new Soviet concealment of their strategic system after SALT I and the Soviet have been able to point out similar United States activities.

Soviet Union is not relying only on the construction of the SS-20s compared with that of backfire bombers and shortrange missiles (SS-29 to 24) it also attempted to use the SALT negotiations, as a lever against the FBS systems. At the beginning of SALT I and again at the meeting between Ford and Breznev in 1974 it insisted on its definition of strategic parity, with all United States nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union included regardless of range but with only the Soviet intercontinental systems included Moscow completely rejected the inclusion of Soviet medium - range systems.

The American Government was not willing to accept this definition of strategic parity. However, the Soviet Union did manage to introduce a clause by which the USA committed itself not to undermine the existent balance of power by more FBS. The Soviet Union did not impose any similar restrictions on itself with respect to its Euro-strategic systems. As Soviet statement have since underlined, Moscow interpreted the agreement as a standstill agreement binding only on the USA. It clearly did not on this basis expect NATO to take any measures to counteract its SS-20 build up.

In the SALT II negotiations, the Soviet tried to combine ever further reaching demands with the non-undermine principle. It wanted the USA to commit itself not to pass on components and building instructions for strategic weapons, which would, though this was not stated, have excluded the use of American technology in the conventional arms of the allies of the USA. The Soviet Union wanted above all to prevent the use of the newly developed cruise missile technology. The Soviet negotiations did however, manage to gain unilateral Euro-strategic concessions from the USA. The United States submarines equiped with pareidon missile and assigned to NATO as part of the nuclear balance in Europe were reckoned against the global capacities of the



Soviet Union. And in the SALT II protocol which is valid until the end of 1980 the USA accepted a range limit of 600 kms for its cruise missiles on land and at sea.

The Soviets Union believed that by this ban they had eliminated a promising technology the development of which could have constituted a Euro-strategic counter weight to the build up of the SS-20. The time unit of the protocol, which according to the Americans excluded further validity of the commitment contained in it, did not in the Soviet view contradict this aim. The purpose of the temporary agreement was to enable the regulation of details not till then specified.

The USA's Euro-strategic self restrictions, which in the Soviet view constitute a central component of the SALT II treaty, contrast sharply with exclusion from discussion of the heavy Back fire bomber with a maximum range of 5000 km. From the Kremlin view point, this in equal treatment of medium - range potential on both sides is justified because of FBS coupled with the USA's global capacities constitute intolerable threat to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership has apparently concluded from American reactions at SALT that the USA is prepared to accept that this view point is justified.

The superiority which the Soviet Union is beginning to join on the Euro-strategic level has caused concern in

NATO. The Soviet could attempt to take military or political advantage of its superiority in the European theatre. When Moscow uses the threat of its military strength when pursuing foreign policy goals or even (as in case of Afghanistan) replaces attempts to achieve political influence by use of military force. This inevitably increases NATO disquiet.

Since the middle of the seventies there has been a growing realisation in NATO that West Europe is exposed to a massive Soviet threat. In conventional terms, the West fears that the Moscow pact could gradually acquire the capacity for surprise attack with good chances of success. And the widespread view is that the USSR's Euro-strategic weapons present the growing danger of a preventive strike at the West European defence system. In May 1978, NATO formulated a long term military programme to counter this danger. The Programme envisaged an annual increase of three per cent in the Western nations defence budgets. In December 1979 a programme of Euro-strategic nuclear modernisation was agreed. According to this plan, 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 cruise Missiles with ranges of 1800 and 2500 kms. respectively will be installed in West Europe.

The decision to modernise was intended primarily to underline politically the coupling of European threat with the USA's global strategic capacities. The deployment of

considerable nuclear potential on West-European soil had the purpose of committing the leading Western power even more closely to Europe. From the military view point, the medium range systems to be installed can hardly be used to combat the Soviet Union's Euro-strategic potential NATO did this deliberately so as not to create the impression in Moscow that it was trying to gain the capacity for a pre-emptive first strike against the USSR. The main emphasis was quite deliberately put on the installation of Cruise missiles, which fly so slowly that they allow the enemy to launch his own missiles he knows that they are on their way. Militarily, the planned medium range potential of NATO has assigned to it the task of destroying the Warsaw pact's conventional basis and thus countering to East Bloc Offensive strategy to the Kremlin if these seemed to be signs that, after the rapid elimination of West-Europe, Washington was wondering about whether to involve the USA in the holocaust of the world wide nuclear conflict.

The military problem has not been solved by the NATO modernisation decision. The principle of military stability should have made the invulnerability of the FBS and especially of the new systems the main priority. In this respect the progress promised by the NATO decision is modest. On the confined, densely populated and socially transparent territory

of West Europe the planned mobility will provide but small protection, especially as the total number of bases where these weapons could be installed is relatively small.

The Soviet past Afghanistan strategic objectives in South Asia are unclear. The historic Russian quest for access to warm seas could bring further military aggression against either Iran or Pakistan. More probably it may take the form of promoting ethnic uprisings by the Baluchis, Kurds or other minorities. Nevertheless the global implications of this new resort to naked military aggression by Soviet armed forces require not only urgent consideration of means of discouraging further armed aggression but the formulating and taking of concrete deterrent steps by the states priority concerned. But although the need for coordinated policies and actions on the part of the governments of the free nations, particularly those of the industrialized democracies, is great, the difficulties of achieving consensus and coordination are formidable.

The Afghan invasion is clearly related to the problem of continuing access to oil from Middle East. The revolution in Iran, itself a production of deep political, economic, social and religious forces, affords unique opportunities for Soviet exploitation. So does ethnic ferment there and in neighbouring countries. Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa, The Arabian Peninsula and along the shores that Middle East oil follows enroute to Europe, Japan and the United States give further opportunity for trouble making.

On the continent of Africa, the Soviet use of almost 40,000 Cuban troops in Ethiopia and the former portuguese territories of Angola and Mazambique, together with Soviet air and sea left to those troubled spots, added a further factor of instability to the scene. A chain of bases potentially available to the Soviets along the arc of oil transit is one of the result. Still another is the explosive potential of Soviet and Cuban support of radical African elements in the forthcoming struggle for the future of the Republic of South Africa, the Soviets are seeking.

In South and Asia, Vietnam and the Soviet Union have joined in a security treaty. Soviet arms supply sustained the vietnamese forces in their brutal subjection of Cambodia and their resistance to China, and the seizure of power in Laos by the puppet are now able to use Vietnamese air and naval installations to support their forces along this strategically important trade route from the Persian Gulf to the Pacific more recently, they have increased their military presence in the disputed islands off-shores of Hokkaido.

Nearer USA, much of Central America and the Caribbean is in the turmoil. Deep poverty and resentment against dictatorial regimes combine to produce social, economic and political turbulence a climate well suited to Soviet Cuban interference or penetration.

On the other hand, Soviet success in extending its influence in the third world has been spotty, marred by some failures and many difficulties, as Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Guinea, Syria and elsewhere. Its methods are often counter productive in the long run. It has failed to establish long term mutually helpful political and economic relations. Its occupation of Afghanistan has aroused strong new fears in many third world countries. Nevertheless, free nations cannot sit idly by and wait for Soviet mistakes to frustrate their own expansionist policies. There are dangers and costs, for both third world and Western countries, even in short-term in roads on third world independence and security.

The most - all embracing mechanism for coordinating the views of the countries of the Third World is the non-aligned movement, which has become an increasingly influential and respected forum. The Non-aligned Movement reflects the determination of sovereign countries to reach independent decision about their future. It reflects their wish to keep out of disputes between the super powers which they believe do not concern them. It reflects the desire to stabilize their Governments to develop their economies and to sort-out their own disputes without external influence. All the aspirations are perfectly natural. The growing importance of the Non-Aligned Movement is not explained by its size alone. It desires from a new confidence within the movement itself.

Until recently, the natural determination of newly - independent countries to demonstrate their independence has too, often led them to express an automatic rejection of Western policies and attitudes. The causes are bound up in history. Countries with highly developed cultures of their own have sometimes felt that the West was trying to force its own values upon them.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has caused many countries of the Third World to question still more closely whether independence from the West necessarily entails a tilt towards the East. Cuba has tried to argue that the interests of the Non-Aligned Countries and the interest of what Cuba calls the Socialist countries are convergent if not identical. Objectively, of course, this was never so.

The Soviet air record is abysmal. The Russians are ready enough to provide arms, military, advisers and secret policemen but they have rarely spent substantial sums on aid for economic development. Since 1975 indeed, there has been a flow of resources from the non-communist developing world to the Soviet Union.

It is a truism that it is with the West that the non-aligned countries conduct the vast proportion of their trade. It is to the West that they look for new technology; and it is with the West and they continue to discuss their

ideas for a new international economic order the north-south dialogue. They know well enough that there is little point in appealing to the Russians for any of these things.

The third world do not want or need lectures. They do not want to import a crude East West rivalry into their concerns. They do not want anyone to complicate their own disputes by seeming to give assistance to one at the expense of the other. At the same time they look to the West for support and assistance. West must give it to them. The arrival of strategic parity people argued, that the Russians now felt more free to seek out and exploit opportunities to project their new found military power into regions when they had never before appeared. Soviet and Cuban adventures in Angola, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere seemed be proof.

The West operated to one set of rules but the Russians operated to another. According to the Russian rules, it was quite compatible with the idea of detente that they should push their luck whenever opportunity presented itself, except where the times between East and West were firmly drawn.

In first decade after the war they probed in Europe, and they probed in the far East. The West organized itself to resist, and gradually lines were drawn and implicit rules were formulated which the Russians have shown themselves



continuously willing to accept. On this understanding, East and West were able to construct concrete arrangements, which benefited all concerned - particularly perhaps as in Western Europe.

But these arrangements have never been explicit with respect to the Third World, and now the Russians have begun to probe again. In Africa to in South East Asian and in South West Asia, their probing is in deadly earnest.

The crisis they have provoked in Afghanistan is a testing ground comparable to the crisis they provoked so many years ago around Berlin. It is the interest of the countries most closely affected, as well as the rest of the world, that this probing should be contained and that positive understanding should be built thereafter.

The present aura of discontent on both sides points to the desirability of disaggregating issues and decoupling unnecessary linkages - in short, of lowering expectations of what the two Super Powers can accomplish through explicit agreement on coercion. It may be time for the United States and Soviet Union to become less dependent on each other, in the positive as well as the negative aspects of their relationship. Perhaps they should recognize that they require less cooperation and collaboration than previously believed in order to provide for the well-being of their citizens, and that each one need not always counter the other efforts at aggrandizement in order to maintain its own international influence and states as a great power.

This prescription flows from the promise - confirmed by the frustration of the past five years - that both the powers United States and Soviet Union to impose their will on each other, or on weaker nations, is more likely to be constrained by the international system than by their bilateral relationship. The period of detente has coincided with a radical transformation of the rigidity bipolar world into a system of multiple and cross-on-thing relationship in which leverage of the Super Powers - over each other and over allies and clients - has been substantially reduced. More than ever would politics features a blurring of East-West lines of demarcation and disintegration of spheres of inference. The decline of global alliance systems has been accompanied by the emergence of important sub-coalitions within the old alliances and even cross-alliance. Coalitions on some issues. It is no longer clear who will be on which side of what issues or which interests the various parties will deem to be worth supporting with military force.

Given the dominant centrifugal forces of the period, it would be futile for either Super Power to attempt to resolidify its disintegrating sphere of control or to attempt to establish new spheres where the political ground is still highly unshakes. The futility would be compounded by incalculable dangers if either Super powers were to use

force to exploit the new international ambiguities. Any such move by one side, however irrational, would risk provoking the other - for in such circumstances an irrational act tends to breed an irrational response. Africa today appears to be the most fertile breeding ground for such temptations, but it can also be good testing ground for a new United States diplomacy less fixated on Soviet moves. The Middle East Countries to engage the prestige and resources of both Super Powers the ways that could yet transforms in local confrontation into a general conflagration.

Negotiations designed to reduce the likelihood of actual military conflicts, to provide controls on the escalation of such conflicts, and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and, of course, crucial in a world fraught with opportunities for gross political miscalculation. But it is unrealistic to think that by United States - Soviet agreements on these matters will be substantially effective in averting the dangers. Increasingly, it become evident that must seek to avoid doomsday more through multilateral politics than through the United States-Soviet military balance of power.

Since a regional conflict might well prove to be the source of an ultimate Super Power nuclear conflict, the Soviet and American aims to police the Third World adds to the risk of peripheral encounters between the Super Powers

while at the same time lending credence to the charge of military intimidation of the developing world. It is, therefore, very important that the course of international negotiations should move the Super Powers away from their obsession with their war-fighting capabilities and both are encouraged to adopt more relaxed postures in the grey areas of the globe and even jointly adopt embargoes of weaponry to the Third World.

During the 1970s and early 1980s a series of dramatic events signaled that international relations were undergoing a significant upheaval. Long-established and seemingly stable sets of relationships and understandings were summarily cast aside. Political leaders, academic observers, and the celebrated "man in street" were suddenly conscious of the fact that energy crisis, dramatic events in the Middle East, and tensions in the Communist World were novel developments of a qualitatively by different order from those of the preceding decade. These developments and many others in the political economic and military realms signaled far reaching shifts in the international distribution of power, an unshing of new socio-political forces, and the global realignment of diplomatic relations. Above all, these events and development revealed that the relatively stable international system that the World had known since the end of World War II was entering a period of uncertain political changes.

It is not a first age in which a sudden concatenation of dramatic events has revealed underlying shifts in military power, economic interests and political alignments. In the twentieth century, developments of comparable magnitude had already taken place in the decades preceding World War I and World War II. This awareness of the dangers inherent in periods of political instability and rapid change causes profound unease and apprehension. The fear grows that events may get out of hand and the world may once again plunge itself into a global conflagration.

The Soviet-American relationship has collapsed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has cut short the Super Powers fitful dialogue, waylaid the SALT II treaty, paralyzed a half-dozen other arms control talks, choked off trade, disrupted scientific and technical cooperation and restored a level of recrimination and military competition between the Super Powers not seen since the worst movements of Cold War.

In the deteriorating relationship Super Powers have to decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and then more on reductions.

Several criteria are critical to an evaluation of any arms control proposal. What effect would its implementation

have on the stability of the military balance. Would it be verifiable? Would it give either side any military advantage? Would it be negotiable within a reasonable period of time?

Stability remains the first measure of arms control. While disarmers yearn for a world in which nuclear weapons would somehow disappear altogether and, with them, all risks of nuclear war, that yearning is unlikely to be satisfied in the foreseeable future, if ever. In the meantime steps can be taken to reduce the likelihood that nuclear armaments will be used - steps to preserve a modicum of stability, however precarious.

When both sides are assured that each has a secure second strike capability - sufficient numbers of invulnerable nuclear weapons to threaten unacceptable damage to the other side even after suffering a nuclear attack - strategic stability exists.

In a crisis that could lead to war, that side might be tempted to launch a pre-emptive strike. If either side sees itself in such a situation, both sides are less secure for fear of pre-emption when either side has reason to fear a pre-emptive strike, crisis stability exists.

Strategic Stability: The conditions for strategic stability are presently met. Both sides have sizable SLBM

forces that for the immediate future will remain sufficiently impervious to enemy attack to provide a survivable retaliatory threat and is sufficiently accurate to pose a first strike threat. One Trident submarine alone carries enough nuclear warheads to destroy 192 Soviet cities or targets of comparable value. Three of the most modern class of Soviet submarines have an equivalent capability. This reciprocity satisfies the requirement in United States strategic doctrine for mutual assure destruction.

In the 1980s however, although the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves in political and ideological conflict, they share a powerful interest in avoiding nuclear war and stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, they also share certain economic interests and both countries have numerous economic conflicts with their political and economic allies. This intermingling of interests and conflicts is thus a source of stability.

Supplementing SLBM forces in each side's second strike arsenal are long-range Bombers nuclear-armed with gravity bombs as cruise missiles. These weapons are not a significant first strike threat because they require a long time to reach their targets. Although vulnerable to first strike attack, the bombers pose little problem for crisis stability. Unlike missiles, bombers could be recalled, even

if launched on warning. Yet bombers or the cruise missiles they carry, have to penetrate air defences to carry out retaliatory missions. Somewhat paradoxically, then a freeze on bombers and cruise missiles, if not extended to cover air defense as well, may have a marginally negative effect on strategic stability. A freeze on air defense would be exceedingly hard to verify. Moreover, existing bomber fleets are increasingly obsolescent and are unlikely to remain in service much longer. Thus an effective freeze would actually finish second strike capability. The difficulty should not be exaggerated, however. Bombers complicate the task of enemy defences, but they only supplement the retaliatory threat of SLBMs.

On balance, a freeze on deployment and testing would have at most a marginal effect on strategic stability, not all of it positive. Only developments in ASAT (Antisatellite) technology pose a near term threat to strategic stability, so the urgency for negotiating a freeze is somewhat relaxed if only strategic stability is considered.

Crisis Stability: A freeze is more urgent to preserve crisis stability. At present only the ICBMs of both sides are at risk. Not all United States or Soviet ICBM forces are vulnerable today, but the threatened portion will grow over the next few years. A freeze on new deployments and testing would thus leave some residual instability in a crisis in



as much as American Minuteman III's and some Soviet SS-18s are accurate enough to attack enemy ICBMs in hardened silos. Yet continued deployment and testing compound the problem.

A long list of future deployment could aggravate crisis instability. The American MX missiles has 10 warheads, each capable of destroying a Soviet ICBM in its silos. Instability is compounded when the basing mode for the MX leaves it vulnerable to Soviet attack, since its hard-target, capability against the Soviet Union increases the Soviet incentive to pre-empt in a crisis. The new D-5 missile to be deployed in Trident submarines has the same offensive capability as the MX, without the accompanying vulnerability. On the Soviet side, continued improvement in the accuracy of the SS-18 and SS-19s its most modern ICBMs, would at least theoretically jeopardize all United States land-based missiles in a first strike. The quality of new Soviet SLBMs is still unknown. Although their accuracy will no doubt be improved over that of existing system, it may not be improved enough to pose an immediate threat to United States ICBMs. A freeze on new deployments would have the benefits of precluding these threats from both sides to crisis stability.

A freeze on the testing of warheads and missiles might inhibit marginal improvements in the accuracy of

already deployed weapons and severely constrain the development of new systems. While many aspects of the working of warheads and missiles can be simulated in a laboratory, neither side is likely to produce weapons in significant numbers without field tests. Comprehensive limits on test explosions and missile test launches would greatly inhibit technological improvements that undermine crisis stability. A total ban on testing might cause concern on both sides about the continued reliability of their existing weapons. But a comprehensive ban on warhead testing could be coupled with a numerical limit on missile test launches. The limit could allow enough tests to assure both sides that their existing missiles test launches. The limit could allow enough tests to assure both sides that their existing missiles still work, yet not enough test to develop wholly new weapons or to permit much confidence about improvement in the accuracy of existing missiles.

A freeze on deployments and testing might have some disadvantages, however, if it precluded all efforts to protect existing ICBM forces, or prevented trading in ICBM for SLEMs, then it would perpetuate its present crisis instability resulting from growing ICBM vulnerability. This residual instability, however is not as grave as the possible

elimination of all ICBMs in a pre-emptive attack, which becomes more possible in the absence of a freeze. A reduction in the number of ICBMs carrying accurate multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) would have to supplement a freeze to cope with this problem. Overall, when a freeze on deployment and testing which would be verifiable, would go a long way to ease concerns about crisis instability but would not go the entire distance.

The benefits of such an effort would like in transforming the international security situation. It is important to note at this juncture that the existing scope and character of weapons programmes of the Super Powers for the next ten years would undoubtedly enhance the "hairtrigger" readiness of both sides. It is obvious that balanced appraisal of different prescriptions to avoid a nuclear holocaust is rendered difficult on account of the prevailing heterogeneity in value-patterns. It is, however, only by overcoming the parochial character of contemporary theories and entrenched official attitudes that stabilisation of forces at lower levels can be achieved.

Negotiations: In today's situation, with the strategic stability and crisis stability, negotiation is *also* one of the important tool in the management of international relations. It has been an important, if not primary, tool of state craft because international conflict have been frequently and generally unpleasant, and consequently,

nations have made great efforts to avoid them. A Secondary use of negotiations have been to create relations between nations in order to advance those interests that could only be realised through regularized interaction.

The greatest good that could come from negotiation was stability, and the greatest threat to stability were those who sought radical change in the international status quo through military violence.

Nations use international negotiation to regulate a much wider range of human activities than previously and consequently the process has become politicized in a way that makes external relations indistinguishable from domestic politics in many countries. Global society has entered an era where the social environment has become profoundly more important to human life than the geographical environment. This has increased the amount of political activity within nations and has caused an increase in the size and scope of activity of governments within those systems. A similar phenomenon has occurred in international politics. International negotiation could be defined as politics conducted externally between strangers, as opposed to politics conducted internally between citizens, and the forces that have led to increase levels of political and governmental activity within nations have also led to increase levels of diplomatic activity between nations.

The mention of oscillation in the American-Soviet relationship raises more fundamental problem that tends to be slighted when SALT is viewed primarily as an exercise in bargaining at a table. Relations between the two societies appear to have a dynamic of their own which affects the underlying predisposition to negotiate. Since the death of Stalin, political detentes accompanied by arms control undertakings occurred in 1955, 1959-60, 1963, 1964, and 1972-1973. In the intervening years relations were marked by varying degrees of tension and an inability to enlarge the scope of collaboration. The amplitude of oscillation in American - Soviet relations has diminished since 1964, if a comparison is made with the ups and downs of the previous decade. Tension has on the whole been lessened. But so also has the prospect of breakthrough in cooperation. Nevertheless, within the confines of a relatively stabilized relationship the pattern of oscillation continues, with the conflict dimension clearly if gradually being accentuated since 1973. When the American and the Russians are on the own-side of the curve, as seems to be the case in September 1979, the task of realizing strategic arms limitation agreements becomes more difficult, just as it is eased when the relationship as a whole moving in the direction of restraint and cooperation.

Structural factors would seem to be at work in determining the pattern of fluctuation in American and Soviet relations upon which SALT negotiating depends. The Negotiation of Strategic arms limitation requires the development of a counter cyclical political strategy aimed at containing spontaneous fluctuation in American - Soviet relations and gradually directing the relationship toward higher levels of collaboration. This sounds like strategic Keynesianism, but in practice it may require the Americans and the Russians to engage in joint strategic planning. A begining may already have been made in so far as the agreements reached and the SALT process itself have obliged both sides to begin haltingly to modify and integrate their separate weapons acquisition processes, force postures, military doctrines and expectations of the strategic balance and the likelihood of nuclear war. In the meanwhile, a greater public awareness that American - Soviet relations are cyclical and that negotiation occur historically in a context of fluctuating relations may serve to avenge over-reaction when things are going badly as well as well.

What all of this suggests is that to do better at negotiation it is necessary to rearrange figure-ground relationships in the prevailing approach to strategic arms control. Rather than continue to focus with something like tunnel vision and without great success on the figure of SALT

both sides should be paying for more attention to processes and events in the extra-negotiatory setting as they lighten and diminish the predisposition to strike balanced and substantial strategic arms agreements. More should be known about the domestic political processes whereby the will to collaborate formed, about patterns in the way one side's moves across a spectrum of issues affect the propensity of the other to negotiate and thus about the opportunity for political action outside the negotiating forum to assist the cause of negotiation. An endeavour to improve the SALT performance of the Soviet Union and the US leads us away from generally accepted notions of what constitutes arms control, just as it directs attention away from an overriding concern with formal negotiations. In both cases, it is necessary to look more to the surrounding than to the figure.

The American Soviet relationship as a whole is marked by repeated variation within a limited range of outcomes, variation that to some extent occurs independently of the will of the American and Soviet leaders and lesser actors. Similarly the behaviour of either the US or the Soviet Union, when viewed separately is marked by oscillation between a similarly limited range of outcomes, oscillation that is again subject to at best imperfect control by the actors within. Accordingly we may identify three systems in American - Soviet relations: a dominant system represented by the relationship as a whole,

and nesting within it two national subsystems which are in turn whole systems from the stand point of the actors within them. To simplify matters, we may set aside the workings of the larger system, whose status and force are far from certain, and consider the behaviour of each of the two national systems as it forms the ground for a strategic arms control negotiating efforts on the part of actors within.

The task of bringing the two societies together on behalf of increasingly substantial and even handed measures of strategic arms control is one of simultaneous modification of the inner pre-disposition of both sides to the determinant of expansionism and towards an appreciation in the influence of the status quo and in collaborative tendencies. To negotiate is not to sit down and talk. It is to concern oneself with the overall behaviour of the other side, to mute one's own as well as the other's tendency to seek unilateral advantage, and to amplify the shared predisposition to collaborate upon which behaviour at the negotiating table substantially depends.

Formal negotiation was good for sovereigns but it is not so successful for systems. To stress formal negotiation as the preferred means of securing strategic arms controls agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States



is to persist in an anachronistic and impoverished response to the problem of securing simultaneous, equivalent substantial outcomes from the interdependent policy processes of dissimilar complex societies in the latter part of the twentieth century. What is required instead is a conception of collaboration among adversaries that is adopted to the task of creating the political will to strike increasingly for - reaching strategic arms agreements, if not in SALT III then in a successor negotiation that must sooner or later follow. Of the essence here is that identification of patterns of interaction in the extra-negotiation environment, domestic as well as international, which condition behaviour at the table. Once identified, they may be influenced to strengthen the predisposition to collaborate in ways that a tabular conception of negotiation will not allow. And in the longer term knowledge of structural factors that make for repeated fluctuation, in American and Soviet behaviour taken separately in the American Soviet relationship as a whole, may open the way to more radical change in the prospects for strategic arms negotiation.

The future of Negotiation: Diplomacy (or International negotiation) as it is now being conducted raises questions about the structure of the future international system. Diplomacy has been described as the art of restraining the

exercise of power, which is an accurate description of the peace-keeping sort of diplomacy that arose out of the traditional nation-state system. However, Modern diplomacy is exercised over a much broader range of governmental functions than just the maintenance of international security, and much of the diplomacy cuts deeper into the fabric of domestic politics than it did previously. Diplomacy today is policy making by another name, and at another level. What tends to be visible about the conduct of International negotiation is the politicization of the diplomatic function, but this is only a symptom of the change that is occurring. The real change is a shift of decision making from national to international structures. Nations now use international negotiation to accomplish policies that hitherto were achieved through domestic structures or else were not dealt with at all by government.

The international politics inherited from the European nation-state system was pre-occupied with an effort to maintain a separation between foreign and domestic diplomacy. This division was facilitated by the types of issues dealt with in both areas. International policies dealt with great issues of war and peace and these were considered fitting subjects for diplomacy; but other matters especially the management of domestic economics, were regarded as the

prerogatives of domestic policy. Nations jealously guarded their right of domestic jurisdiction and this concept is prominent in the charter of the United Nations. Today, with an expanded international agenda, nations regularly take up issues in negotiations on trade, energy and even arms limitations talks, that only a few decades ago would have been exclusively matters of domestic policy-making. The rhetoric of domestic jurisdiction is less important in international politics than it once was, and in some areas such as international trade policy, it no longer has any absolute meaning, whatsoever. The expanding in the national agenda has profoundly changed the task of statesmanship in the modern age. Formerly the test of statesmanship was the ability to manage external relations so as to protect the capacity of the domestic system for independent initiatives. Nations conducted diplomacy using the currency of power and the mechanism of Control was the balance of power system. The technology of the twentieth century has increasingly immobilized the exercise of military power in external relations. Once this occurred the protection of domestic jurisdiction became less necessary. Nations seem more pre-occupied today with the making of policy at the international level than they are with the protection of domestic jurisdiction. The important test of statesmanship has now become the ability to manage domestic politics in order to protect the capacity of the external system for independent initiatives.

An important requirement of diplomacy today is internal control over domestic politics in order to conduct negotiations abroad. How to achieve this without compromising democratic government will be one of the important practical and philosophical issues of the future. The dilemma is that, on the one hand, an increasing number of issues can no longer be managed adequately by national governments acting unilaterally while, on the other hand, citizens in democratic nations will likely resist a transfer of decision making power from national to international forums. The resolution of this dilemma, if there is to be one, will likely come in greatly improved capacity of governments to communicate with their own people, both to explain the decision that are taken in negotiations with other countries and to secure continued support for those decisions. It is quite true that the world is becoming more interdependent, but what is not usually recognized is that the mechanism that makes international politics more important to domestic publics also makes domestic politics more important in international politics. The irony for diplomatic establishments is that as the world rapidly enters on era of increasing international negotiation, the importance of internal politics to the diplomatic process will probably increase even afaster.

Our objective in this study is to make available certain new insights into some of the inter-related factors

which first led to the thawing of the Cold War and later produced a code of conduct between the two Super Powers based upon policies of detente, and in a still later phase catalysed international tensions to produce a new spiral of the arms race and escalation of conflict situations. The conflict pattern in the 1980s has had serious destabilising consequences for Soviet - American relations and the strident responses from Washington and Moscow appeared to vindicate those who spoke of a New Cold War. Notwithstanding these considerations, our analysis indicates that the negotiating experience of the Super Powers underscores a search for pragmatism leading to positive-sum approaches between the Soviets and the Americans. We conclude, therefore, with the following generalisations in the hope that our conceptual framework will be useful for a systematic enquiry into diplomatic theory and practice for promoting and maintaining stability in Super Power relations:

1. Bargaining Behaviour:

The self-contained model of negotiations which Henry Kissinger considered most appropriate during SALT negotiations was based on a vision of developing a common perception of the bargaining environment. The term "Bargaining Chip" turned out to be more problematic and ultimately hampered the historical progress and ultimately failed to control the

process of militarisation generated by the Cold War. There is little evidence that the Soviets and Americans interaction patterns have resulted in a shared definition of the bargaining situation. There are no definitive ways of assessing the political and military strategies of the two Super Powers; attempts can, however be made to chart views and orientations of negotiations and relate these to an emerging detente structure. It is necessary to understand the negotiating process not in terms of stereotypes of negotiating behaviour but with an explanatory frame wa of reference which takes into account adaptive processes which accommodate commitments and expectations. The non-aligned countries like Yugoslavia and India by their consistent activity in international disarmament negotiations, were able to suggest measures for consolidating detente and trust by taking into account the psychological impacts on Super Power negotiations. The requirements of secret negotiations and the needs of democracy and mass media have to be taken into account in any concrete analysis of negotiating behaviour. If the Super Powers are again to begin to move in the direction of detente, the negotiators must take into account the prospects of the influence of public opinion apart from scrutinising the interactions between the two governments. The public image of negotiations

is effected by the exaggerated fear in both the political cultures that their competitive position may be eroded. Flexibility in a negotiating position is often associated with the beneficial consequences of sounding out each other's intentions before formally beginning the negotiating process. The momentum for a detente policy can only be preserved if consillatory attitudes are interpreted as an expression of egalitarianism in international relations and negotiating behaviour is not irrevocably geared to the attainment of strategic superiority.

## 2. Negotiating Strategy:

In the conduct of Super Power diplomacy, threats and warnings have played an important part in the response to crucial problems although the perceived dangers of war and arms race suggested following the path of prudence. In the 1970s Soviet-American relations were conducted in a consistent manner to achieve considerable progress in achieving agreement on limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile systems, the narrowing of strategic doctrinal differences as indicated by the SALT I agreement, the serious attempt to codify rules for prevention of nuclear war and a flexible attitude by both the Super Powers on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests. Both the Super Powers adopted negotiating strategies in Europe which helped to improve security and stabilise their mutual relations. The

strategic choices open to policy makers were severely limited in Non-European areas such as West Asia and no serious efforts to widen detente could be made. The increase of military activities in the Indian Ocean also aggravated the international situation. In the early 1980s the global crisis situation took a turn for the worse and the area of uncertainty in the negotiating strategies of both Washington and Moscow demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the 1972 Basic Principles. Although in 1982 at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, the Soviet Union pledged itself to a policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons, the crucial policy dilemmas for both the Super Powers remained unchanged. To avoid uncontrolled hostility and confrontation, policy makers have to map out negotiating strategies to take into account each other's core interests and values and thus successfully regulate incoherence and uncertainty in mutual relations.

### 3. Rules for Communication and Signals

The global scale and complexity of negotiations between the Super Powers requires a broad framework, and strategic doctrinal differences can only be communicated and meaningfully managed if there is a common language among the negotiating parties. Ultimatums and threats do not augur well for creating substantive parameters for global peace. If the negotiating sides are to avoid getting locked



up in rigid militaristic positions they must signal to each other their willingness to seek solutions to difficult problems through political means and avoid a further spiral of armaments by creating tensions in the military sphere. The loosening of military alliances creates new patterns of foreign policy processes which can take advantage of a political will in favour of detente and disarmament. On the other hand a qualitative arms race reduces the mutual understanding of the Super Powers on major disarmament issues. The political aspects of confidence building measures must be grounded in a shared sense of realism which should rule out the possibility of direct military confrontation. It is natural that the negotiators should wish to signal firmness, but such tactics should not come in the way of systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the changing structure of political relations. The real problem in developing rules for communications and signals is to identify goal-oriented actions which can enhance the negotiability of issues which are crucial to the conflict pattern among the Super Powers. The unstable equilibrium between the Super Powers is inherently destabilising, but explicit or implicit the expectations of the Big Two can be brought closer together through the positive impact of social and political communication.

#### 4. Detente as an Irreversible Process:

In the 1980s the rearmament strategy of the Reagan administration brought to the surface the powerful anti-Soviet feelings which had been generated by the Soviet challenge to the United States' s role of World leader. Regardless of Moscow's exact intentions, which are difficult to identify, the Reagan administration's aggressive posture strongly suggested a principal contradiction in global political negotiations. The detente policies of both Moscow and Washington have sought to cope with the unpredictable environment by keeping all options open. The Soviets wish to marginalise the Americans in Europe and the United States wishes to play the China Card and pursue a policy of containment of Soviet influence in key areas such as the Persian Gulf. The NATO decision to deploy medium range theatre nuclear forces sharpened the dilemmas for the Soviet Union since it both narrowed its diplomatic freedom of action and blocked the road to military detente. Further the United States has geared its diplomatic and political practice to the concept of linkage by which for example it postponed the SALT II treaty on account of lack of agreement in other areas. If new possibilities of flexibility in negotiations between the two Super Powers are to be developed away from the imperatives of military - industrial complexes, a natural focal point would have to

be the irreversibility of detente as a general answer to militarisation of global politics. If international tensions are to be controlled through global negotiations, detente must emerge from zig-zagging policies towards greater emphasis on community of interests in preserving peace through flexible proposals.

5. Towards a realistic agenda for negotiating an international peace system

The catastrophic results produced by the Second Cold War can be seen in the deep shadows cast across the entire international scene. The military build-up on both is intended to frighten the enemy and thereby exert psychological leverage. Miscalculation could take the military activities over the threshold of prudence. One of the most convincing signs of the unsatisfactory nature of the Super Power relations is provided in the Arms Control agenda, where the bargaining chips, as far as can be judged from the public record, have uncertain implications for the emerging strategic environment. While it would be wrong to deny that the era of detente had political consequences over a broad spectrum, it must be admitted that the negotiating agenda did not aim at a maximum of conflict - resolution among the Super Powers. Specific analyses of the arms race point to the need for preventive diplomacy. The agenda for negotiating an international peace system must include the issue of intervention by either

of the Super Powers in the Third World. Similarly the control of the qualitative arms race requires certain arms options to be renounced. The normalisation of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot just be achieved by the renunciation of the aim of military superiority. As long as either Super Power is prepared to take risks in "grey zones" a negative impact on the international system cannot be ruled out. Similarly security alternatives have to be explored so that the risk of escalation in a limited nuclear war is avoided. Diplomacy must develop a new potential for tackling the fundamental aspects of the structure and dynamics of Super Power militarisation.

TABLE - 11

**UNITED STATES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC  
NUCLEAR FORCES, 1975-1982**

	1975	1982
<b>Delivery vehicles</b>		
<b>Strategic bombers</b>		
USA B-52 C/D/E/F	149	83
B-52 G/H	281	264
(FB-III	66	63
USSR Mya-4 'Bison	56	56
Tu-95 'Bear'	100	100
(Tu-22M 'Backfire'	-	84
<b>Long range bomber Total:</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>347</b>
USA	430	347
USSR	156	156
<b>Submarines, ballistic missile- equipped nuclear-powered (SSBNs)</b>		
USA With Polaris A-2	8	-
With Polaris A-3	13	-
With Trident C-3 conv.	20	20
With Trident C-4 conv.	-	11
With Trident C-4	-	1
USSR 'Hotel II' conv.	7	6
'Hotel III' conv.	1	1
'Yankee'	23	23
'Yankee II'	-	1

contd..

Contd. from..

	1973	1982
'Golf IV' conv.	1	1
'Hotel IV' conv.	1	1
'Delta I'	1	18
'Delta II'	-	4
'Delta III'	-	16
Submarine totals		
USA	41	32
USSR	44	71
Modern subs. USSR	34	62
SLEM (Submarine-launched ballistic missiles) launchers on SSBs.		
USA Polaris A-2	128	-
Polaris A-3	208	-
Poseidon C-3	320	320
Trident C-4	-	200
USSR 'SS-N-5'	21	18
'SS-N-6 mod. I'	534	374
'SS-N-6 mod. 2' conv.	-	
'SS-N-6 mod. 3' conv.	-	
'SS-N-8'	22	290
'SS-NX-17'	-	12
'SS-N-18'	-	256

contd..

contd. from

	1973	1982
SLEM launcher totals: USA	656	520
USSR	577	950
ICBMs (International ballistic missiles)		
USA Titan II	54	52
Minuteman I	190	-
Minuteman II	500	450
Minuteman III conv.	310	350
Minuteman III impr.	-	200
USSR 'SS-7 Saddler'	190	-
'SS-8 Sasin	19	-
'SS-9 Scarp'	288	-
'SS-11 mod. 1'	-	-
'SS-11 Mod. 2' conv.	990	520
'SS-11 mod. 3' conv.	-	-
'SS-13 Savage'	60	60
'SS-18 mod. 1/mod. 3'	-	308
'SS-18 mod. 2' conv.	-	-

contd....

Contd. from...

	1973	1982
'SS-19' conv.	-	360
'SS-17' conv.	-	150
ICBM total: USA	1054	1052
USSR	1547	1398
Total, Long-range bombers and missiles		
USA	2140	1919
USSR	2280	2504
Nuclear warheads		
Independently targetable on missiles: USA	5210	7032
USSR	2124	6848
Total warheads on bombers and missiles, official US estimates: USA	6784	9000
USSR	2200	7000



TABLE- 1.2

AIR - TO - SURFACE MISSILES

Country	Designation	Year first deployed	Range (Km) (high level launch)
USSR	AS-2 Kipper	1961	210
	AS-4 Kitchen	1962	720
	AS-6 Kingfish	1977	700
USA	AGM-69A SRAM	1972	160
France	ASMP	1985	300

TABLE - 1.3

**NOTIFICATIONS OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES IN 1981  
IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE**

State giving notification	Date of notification
Norway	19 February
USSR	14 August
FR Germany	21 August
USA	24 August
FR Germany	24 August
Canada	25 August
Denmark	28 August
Norway	28 August
Switzerland	9 September
FR Germany	9 September
UK	10 September
Belgium	18 September
FR Germany	21 September
Spain	5 October

TABLE - 1.4

MARGINAL LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT

Country	Designation	First deployed
USSR	MiG-23/27 Flogger	1971
Rest of WTO	MiG-23 Flogger	1971
USA	F-16 Fighting Falcon	1979
	F-4 Phantom II	1961
	A-7 Corsair II	1966
UK	Buccancer S.2	1962
	Jaguar GR.1	1973
	Harrier GR.5 (AV-8B)	1986
France	Jaguar A	1973
	Mirage IIIE	1961
Rest of NATO <sup>1</sup>	F-16 Fighting Falcon	1979
	A-7H/P Corsair II	1966
	F-4E Phantom II	1961
	F/CF-104G Starfighter	1958
	F-104S (Aeritalia)	1969

TABLE- 1.5

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, 1945-81 (Known and presumed)**I. 16 July 1945- 5 August 1963  
( the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty)**

USA	USSR	UK	France	Total
293	164	23	8	488

**II. 6 August 1963-31 December 1981**

a - atmosphere

u - underground

Year	USA		USSR	
	a	u	a	u
6 Aug. - 31 Dec.				
1963	0	14	0	0
1964	0	28	0	6
1965	0	29	0	9
1966	0	40	0	15
1967	0	29	0	15
1968	0	39	0	13
1969	0	28	0	15
1970	0	33	0	12
1971	0	15	0	19
1972	0	15	0	22
1973	0	11	0	14
1974	0	9	0	19
1975	0	16	0	15
1976	0	15	0	17
1977	0	12	0	16
1978	0	12	0	27
1979	0	15	0	29
1980	0	14	0	21
1981	0	16	0	21
Total	0	390	0	305

**III. 16 July 1945-31 December 1981**

USA	USSR	UK	France	China	India	Total
683	489	34	108	26	1	1321

TABLE -1-6

REDUCTIONS REQUIRED FOR THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE SOVIET START PROPOSALS

	US Forces	Soviet Forces
<u>US Proposal (Phase I)</u>		
Total warheads	7128 to 5000: - 2128	6735 to 5000: - 1735
ICBM and SLEM launchers	1564 to 850: - 714	2415 to 850: - 1565
ICBM warheads	2152 to 2500: - 348	5302 to 2500: - 2802
<u>Soviet Proposal</u>		
All delivery vehicles	1940 to 1800: - 140	2650 to 1800: - 850

TABLE- 1-7

ESTIMATED UNITED STATES AND SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILES  
WARHEADS ACCORDING TO THE REAGAN START PROPOSAL

<u>US Missiles</u>	<u>Number of warheads</u>	<u>Soviet Missiles</u>	<u>Number of warheads</u>
<u>ICBMs:</u> 420	2110	370	2500
<u>SLEMs:</u> 288	2880	472	2452
<b>Total</b> 758	<b>4990</b>	<b>842</b>	<b>4952</b>

TABLE - 1.5

LONG RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR MISSILES

Country	Missile designation	Year first deployed	Range (Km)
USSR	SS-4 Sandal	1959	1800
	SS-5 Skean	1961	3500
	SS-20	1976/77	5000
	SS-N-3 Serb	1963	1200
USA	Pershing II	1983	1800
	GLCM	1983	2500
UK	Polaris A-3	1967	4600
	Trident II (D-5)	(1990s)	10000
France	SSBS S-3	1980	3000
	MSBS M-20	1977	3000
	MSBS M-4	(1985)	4000

TABLE - 17

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON  
DELIVERY CAPABILITY AS OF END 1982

<u>Delivery vehicle</u>	<u>Number of delivery vehicles deployed</u>	<u>Number of warheads per delivery vehicle</u>	<u>Total delivery capability (number of warheads)</u>	<u>Total delivery capability (Mt)</u>
Land-based (ICBMs)	1051		2151	1429
Sea-based (SLBMs)	644		4960	314
Air-based (Strategic bombers)	316		2570	1745
<b>Total</b>	<b>2011</b>		<b>9681</b>	<b>3488</b>



TABLE - 1-6

SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON  
DELIVERY CAPABILITY AS OF  
END 1982

<u>Delivery vehicle</u>	<u>Number of delivery vehicles deployed</u>	<u>Total delivery capability (number of warheads)</u>	<u>Total delivery capability (Mt)</u>
Land-based (ICBMs)	1398	5678	5481
Sea-based (SLBMs)	937	2813	885
Air-based (Strategic bombers)	145	290	290
<b>Total</b>	<b>2480</b>	<b>8781</b>	<b>6656</b>

Source : Sipri Year Book (1982-83), Stockholm).

CHRONOLOGY

- 1945, February : Yalta Conference
- June : United Nations Charter
- June : First Test of American Atomic Bomb
- June : Potsdam Conference
- August : Hiroshima bombed
- August : Nagasaki bombed
- 1946, June : The United States offers the United Nations Bernard Baruch's Plan for the World control of atomic energy which the Soviet Union subsequently rejects
- 1947, March : "Truman Doctrine" for aid to Greece and Turkey promulgated
- June : Marshall Plan launched
- July : Soviet Union rejects the Marshall Plan. All the East European Countries as well as Czechoslovakia and Finland follow suit.
- 1948, March : Brussels Pact
- June : Berlin blockade begins
- 1949, January : Foundation of the COMECON
- April : Atlantic Pact signed
- 1950, June : Korean War begins
- October : United Nations Forces Cross 38th Parallel line
- December : Beginning of retreat of United Nations Forces in Korea

- 1952, November : American hydrogen bomb tested successfully
- 1953, July : The Korean Armistice was signed
- 1954, October : Paris Agreement on Germany's entry into NATO
- 1955, February : Middle East Treaty Organisation signed
- April : Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned States
- 1956, July : Nasser declared nationalization of Suez Canal
- October : Hungarian crisis
- 1963, June : Washington-Moscow "Hotline Agreement"
- October : United Nations General Assembly resolution urging all states to refrain from placing nuclear weapons on Celestia bodies
- October : Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed (including the US, the UK, the USSR)
- 1964, : United States and Soviet Union proposal for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- 1965, August : Indo-Pakistan War in Kashmir
- October : Johnson's speech on East-West detente
- 1968, July : Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
- 1970, April : China launched her first satellite
- 1971, December : Outbreak of Indo-Pakistan War

- 1972, May : Nixon's visit to Russia
- May : SALT II Agreement
- 1973, August : Agreement for Joint Space Flight  
between United States and Soviet  
Union
- October : Arab-Israeli War
- 1974, March : Summit Conference between President  
Ford and Brezhnev
- 1975, February : Wilson-Brezhnev Summit Meeting  
in Moscow
- April : European Nuclear Energy Conference  
held in Paris
- July : Helsinki 35 Nation Summit Conference  
on European Security and Cooperation
- 1978, October : Camp David Agreement signed
- December : Vietnam invaded Kampuchea
- 1979, February : China's attack on Vietnam
- : SALT II Agreement
- December : Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
- 1981, December : Marshall Law in Poland
- 1982, June : United Nations Special Session  
on Disarmament
- 1983, March : Reagan offers an "interim solution"  
to reduce the number of medium-range  
missiles in Europe
- May : Andropov offers to cut the number  
of SS-20s aimed at Western Europe
- August : United States and Soviet Union  
signed a five-year grain agreement

- 1983, September : Soviets shoot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, killing 269 aboard
- October : United States and Caribbean forces invade Grenada
- November : The West German parliament votes to accept new Pershing II missiles. Next day, the Soviets walk out of the Geneva INF talks
- December : The Soviets suspended START negotiations
- December : The Soviets suspend Vienna talks on conventional arms
- 1984, March : The talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on mutual and balanced force reduction in Central Europe (MBFR) resumed in Vienna

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