

# United States Policy Towards The Arab League

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
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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled  
"United States Policy Towards The Arab League" submitted  
by Miss PULLA LAKSHMI, in partial fulfilment of the Degree  
of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) in Jawaharlal Nehru  
University, has not been previously submitted for any other  
degree of this or any other University. To the best of  
our knowledge this is an original work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed  
before the examiners for evaluation.

  
Professor R.P. Kaushik  
Supervisor

  
Professor R. Narayanan  
Chairman

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## PREFACE

The Arab World has witnessed several changes in its long history. The region has been rich in its oil resources, and as a result it has always attracted outside forces to exploit its liquid wealth. Since the end of the Second World War, the two Super Powers have vied with each other in wooing the region. The interest of the United States and the Soviet Union has further been accentuated by strategic and ideological considerations. The establishment of Israel as a Jewish State and the hostility of the Arab countries towards the former has always led to tensions and acrimonious reactions of the States in the region.

The Arab League which came into existence in 1945 has been a positive response of the Arab people for their common objectives towards the solution of the Arab problem. The Arab League has been a kind of amalgamation of Arab aspirations as well as their desire to coordinate mutuality of interest. The United States on its part has pursued the policy which has somewhat favourable to the state of Israel as against the interest of the Arab countries.

The US foreign policy as a result has been viewed with apprehensions and suspicion by the Arab countries. The present dissertation is an attempt

towards studying the under-currents of US foreign policy in regard to the Arab League. It examines in some details the involvement of the United States in the region, the formation of the League as also the US approach towards the plans and programmes of the Arab League.

This dissertation consists of four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter deals with the American economic and strategic, global interests in the Arab region and the formation of the Arab League.

The second chapter deals with the United States' role in Camp David Agreement and how the Arab countries rejected the Camp David Accords and suspended Egypt's membership from the Arab League.

The third chapter has analysed President Reagan's foreign policy towards the Middle East and his peace plans and the Palestine question. The Soviet interest in the Middle East are also discussed.

The fourth chapter deals with Israel's strategic, military development with U.S. and its ally relationship in the Middle East region. Jordan and Lebanon problems are also discussed in this chapter.

The last chapter - conclusion - concludes the overall evaluation of the U.S. policy towards the Arab League.

I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to my esteemed supervisor, Professor R.P. Kaushik, who guided and encouraged me throughout this work. His suggestions went a long way in making this study a little less inadequate.

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I am thankful to my parents, brother Murali for their silent encouragement and moral and financial support which helped me to complete this work.

I am thankful to all my friends, generally for everything for all those moments of light-heartedness.

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I take full responsibility for the drawbacks of the study.

P. Lakshmi  
PULLA LAKSHMI

19 July 1991

CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### Objectives of the U.S. Foreign Policy in the Arab Region:

With the end of the Second World War, there emerged a strong Pan-Arab movement in West Asia. The world was divided into two blocs - the East and the West, and showed no signs of reconciliation with each other. The cold war phenomenon brought about an intense rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The spheres of influence were identified. Their strategic and economic importance were evaluated and assessed. Middle East was no exception to this rule.

The Arab world had been changing constantly since the United States first began to assume responsibilities toward it at the end of the Second World War, both in its internal and external relations. The U.S. role in the Arab world was essentially that of a policing function, responsible for keeping communism under control, preserving law and order and intervening to prevent or end conflict.<sup>1</sup>

The principal long term U.S. objective in West Asia is to limit Soviet influence in the region. The second U.S.

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1        Boudeau S. John, The American approach to the Arab World(New York: Harper & Row Publications 1968), p.2.



long term interest in the oil-rich Persian Gulf area is clearly to ensure that billions of petro-dollars that have become available to those countries, especially Saudi Arabia, are recycled to the West in a mutually acceptable manner.

Kissinger's plans for an Arab-Israeli settlement the late king served the third important U.S. objectives which is to ensure that setbacks like the recent failure of the Secretary of States mission do not undermine the Egyptian and the larger Arab world.(2)

The interest of the United States in the Arab world have relatively been few and direct. The strategic position of the Middle East in relation to global security and the international order has been major factor that has influenced the U.S. interest there. Arab nationalist envisaged the role of America as an ally of the Arab cause, identifying their interests with a strong, free and progressive Arab world.

U.S. concern for stability in the Middle East was also guided by the possibility of a Soviet threat and the need for Gulf oil. This could be in major statements. On the U.S. presidents four such statements or doctrines have

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2      The Times of India (New Delhi), April 2, 1975.

advanced this factor with varying degrees of clarity and effectiveness; viz. (1) The Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947); (2) The Eisenhower Doctrine (January 18, 1957); (3) The Nixon Doctrine (February 18, 1970); and (4) The Carter Doctrine (January 23, 1980). Of these the Truman, the Eisenhower, and the Carter Doctrines prescribed a direct U.S. involvement", whereas the Nixon Doctrine called for partnership, strength and willingness to negotiate peace through partnership.<sup>3</sup>

The above four statements also indicated that successive presidents had perceived the Middle East to be vital to U.S. national interest, that stability must be maintained in this region, that the U.S. would not be oblivious to any threat to its stability in the area.

The Truman Doctrine was implemented successfully in Greece and Turkey through U.S. economic and military aid. The Eisenhower Doctrine was never implemented, primarily because no Middle Eastern country ever called on the U.S. to invoke this doctrine. The application of the Nixon Doctrine in the Middle East was dramatically illustrated in Washington support to the Shah of Iran as the policeman of the Gulf. However, the collapse of the Shah, as a result of the revolution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

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3      Nakhleh A. Emile, The Persian Gulf and American Policy  
(New York: Praeger Publication, 1982), pp.15-20.

have convinced U.S. policy makers that protection by proxy is unpredictable, and that to protect its strategic interest in the Gulf, the U.S. might become increasingly involved directly. This experience from 1947 to 1980 connected the consecutive U.S. presidents of an increasing need to clearly define the area that they perceived as vital to U.S. national security and strategic interest.<sup>4</sup>

The general objective which it shared with them were access to oil and defense against Soviet expansion. The first of these had been to contain Soviet-Communist expansion wherever it may threaten.

This containment has been based on both military, political and ideological factors. Harry S. Truman became president on April 12, 1945, after the death of (Franklin Roosevelt) the new president had inherited a policy toward Palestine in which Rooseveltian platitudes and vague promises had been offered the Zionist in public. Truman had sympathetic to the plight of the Jew's, particularly the homeless Jewish refugees who had survived the holocaust.<sup>(5)</sup>

By the end of 1945, Truman and his national security advisor's had come to believe that the Soviet Union sought to dominate the Middle East. The Russians were putting pressure upon the Turk's for territorial concessions and

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4 Ibid.

5 Badeau S. John, The American Approach to the Arab World (New York: Harper & Row Publications, 1968), p.17.

control of navigation in the Dardanelles; they were fomenting disorder in Iran, and they were perceived as a possible threat to American oil holdings in Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf.

Bureaucratic interests can be major determinants of foreign policy, given a lack of presidential interests in a specific issue on the Palestinian issue the "White House" took an active part in deciding both strategies and tactics.(6)

The U.S. foreign aid became a dimension of foreign policy, economic assistance was administered under a variety of programmes "such as the Point Four Public Law 480" etc. The preponderance of U.S. assistance, however, was earmarked for military purposes. Thus in the years 1947-1959 U.S. military assistance to the Middle East was \$ 1.93 billion of which about 90 per cent went to Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan - countries either sharing borders with Soviet Russia or very close to it.<sup>7</sup>

American policy towards the Arab-Israeli dispute involved three levels of decision making.- the global, the regional and the actual. Any administration would always have global aims (e.g. containment of the Soviet Union, human rights, free trade). These aims relate directly to the Middle East, as in Eisenhower's and Dulles's pursuit of

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6 Abramson C. Arthur, "Truman's Middle East Policy 1945-48", Middle East Review (New York), vol.xvii, no.2, Winter 1984/85, p.113-19.

7 William Polk, The Arab World (London: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp.278-80.

the Baghdad Pact and Carter's pursuit of stability for energy supplies. At other times Middle East is peripheral to the administration's main concerns as it was to Truman's containment policy or Kennedy's multiple options doctrine. There would also be regional aims, such as the promotion of a pro-American Arab unity around the favourity of the moment or the attempt to built Iran as a protector of the Persian Gulf. Finally, there may be specific plans for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as Eisenhower's Johnston plan, Kennedy's Johnson Plan, and Nixon's Rogar's Plan.

Hence any administration would have global perspective Regional objectives could sometimes conflict with goals related to Arab-Israeli differences but neither regional nor Arab-Israeli policy would contradict global objectives knowingly as a result; "Arab-Israeli dispute temporarily became part of a global ideological conflict".<sup>8</sup>

The U.S. government's Middle East policy therefore was largely shaped by the fear of a growing Soviet influence even dominance - in this region. The Middle Eastern countries situated on or near the border of Russia, Turkey, Iraq and Iran have received most of the attention and aid of the U.S. A strong Israel has usually been considered the best

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8 Spiegel L. Stevan, The other Arab-Israeli Conflict making America's Middle East policy from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985), p.4.

instrument for keeping the stability of the rest of the region. Moreover, the U.S. seemed to have adopted the policy of arms sales to all parties in the Middle East as the easiest way to make friends and the most efficient means for paying for the increasing price of its oil imports.

The picture changed dramatically in the 1970s. Palestinian nationalism emerged as an international factor, oil became a political weapon. Oil companies were replaced as policy makers by the producing states through OPEC. The continued availability of oil to the industrial world at reasonable prices became problematic and an Arab desire for an accommodation with Israel emerged.

The three-way linkage and United States concern for Persian Gulf stability since 1972, have been persistent themes not only in presidential statements but also in practically many "Congressional Hearings" and in several official statements on the Middle East.

In 1973, the Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco enunciated the broad principles that would guide U.S. policy in the Gulf. Four such U.S. objectives were: First, support for indigenous regional collective security efforts to provide stability and to foster orderly development without outside interference. Second, peaceful resolution

of territorial and other disputes among the regional states and the opening up of better channels of communication among them. Third, continued access to Gulf oil supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities. Fourth, Enhancing our commercial and financial interests.<sup>9</sup>

By late 1975, it became apparent that new policies were required in three of these areas: energy, the Palestinian conflict; the Gulf security. These areas thus became the focus of the Carter Administration's Mideast Policy.

In 1978 alone the U.S. sold Saudi Arabia over \$ 5 billion worth of military hardware. However, the Iranian experience has revealed the possible disastrous long-term effects of such a policy to U.S. interests.<sup>10</sup> The petro dollars which were accumulating in the oil rich Arab countries could be invested with great productivity in the Middle East once the explosive political and military situation in the region was defused.

The advent of 1980s marked a continuation of the Palestinian conflict and Israeli occupation of Arab lands, a persistence of chaos in Iran, a tenacious Soviet occupation

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9 Department of State Bulletin(Washington D.C.)  
vol.69, July 2, 1973, pp.30-31.

10 Abraham S. Becker, The Economic Policy of the Middle East (New York: American Elsevier Publications, 1975), p.4.

of Afghanistan, and a destructive border war between Iran and Iraq. U.S. foreign policy makers began to reorder their policy objectives toward the Gulf to take Soviet expansionism into consideration. The new decade began with president Carter's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, stating among other things that resisting Soviet expansionism had become a major policy goal.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in 1980 identified Washington's interests in the Persian Gulf as follows: to promote stability in the region, and to advance the Middle East peace process, while insuring the continued security of Israel.<sup>11</sup>

Arab-Israel conflict frustrated successive U.S. administrations the shortcoming of the Soviet policy coupled with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 provided new opportunities for the U.S. These in short are the U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Arab region.

#### Formation of the Arab League:

The formation of the League of Arab states in 1945 was largely inspired by the Arab awakening of the 19th Century. This movement sought to recreate and reintegrate the Arab community which, though for four hundred years was a part of the "Ottoman Empire", had preserved its identity

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11 See also, Harry S. Allen, Iran, Israel, the Middle East, and U.S. Interests (New York: Praeger's Press 1983), p.30.



as a separate national group held together by memories of a common past, a common religion and a common language, and with a common cultural heritage. The leaders of the Arab movement in the 19th Century revolted against Turkey during the First World War and sought to achieve these aims through secession from the Ottoman Empire into a united and independent Arab state comprising all the Arab countries in Asia. However, the 1919 peace settlement divided the Arab world in Asia (with the exception of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen) into British and French spheres of influence and established in them a number of separate states and administrations namely Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, under temporary mandatory control.

By 1943, however seven of these countries had substantially achieved their independence. An Arab Conference therefore met in Alexandria in the autumn of 1944, it formulated the Alexandria protocol which delineated the outlines of the Arab League.

It was found that neither a unitary state nor a federation could be achieved, but only a League of sovereign states.

A Covenant, establishing such a League, was signed in Cairo on 22nd March 1945 by the representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen. There were (1980) 21 members of the League: Algeria,

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Bahrain, Djibouts, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine Liberation Organisation, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, P.D.R. of Yemen and Yemen Arab Republic, now there are 22 states. (12)

The Arab League was formed in Cairo on 22 March 1945. It was laid primarily by the external factors. The four important factors that accounted for its growth were: The first was the growing Arab solidarity concerning the Palestine problem and wider issue of inter-Arab cooperation. The second factor was the increasing role of Egypt in Arab affairs. Egypt entertained no territorial ambitions in Arab Asia, and was not involved in the dynastic rivalries which had frustrated all past efforts towards Arab unity. It was, therefore, in a better position to play a conciliatory role. Third, the Arab revolt in Palestine between 1936 and 1939 further heightened the Arab federation. Fourthly, the war for the promotion of economic regionalism, and for the end of French domination over Syria and Lebanon heightened.<sup>13</sup>

The confrontation among the local factions and the pressure generated by the external forces in the Arab world brought about the formation of the Arab League.

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12 John Paxton, "League of Arab States", The Statesman Yearbook (London), 1 89-90, p.57.

13 Ahmed M. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States: war-time diplomacy and inter-Arab politics 1941-45 (London, New York: Longman Chaucer Press, 1977), pp.ix,x.

The first article of the "Alexandria Protocol" emphasized that "a League (of the Arab states) will be formed of the independent Arab states which consent to joint the League. It will have a Council which will be known as the 'Council of the League of Arab States' and will be represented on an equal footing".<sup>14</sup>

In his inaugural speech the Egyptian prime minister, Mustafa an-Nahhas, gave a brief account of his efforts for Arab unity and said:

The Plan, as you know, has successfully passed the first stage of consultations. Today we are in the second stage of the preparatory committee which we hope will lead to the final stage of a General Arab Conference.<sup>(15)</sup>

The talk had already led to important result. These with the Arab states, were concerned only with collaboration, there was no reason why another name, such as Arab union alliance or federation, should not be chosen later, according to the results of the discussions, to describe more accurately the situation as it finally emerges.<sup>16</sup>

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14 Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States; A study in the dynamics of Regional organisation (London: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.38.

15 Mohammed Shafi Agwani, The U.S. and the Arab world 1945-1952 (Aligarh: Institute of Islamic Studies Muslim University, 1955), p.24.

16 The Times (London), 9 August 1943.

The preparatory committee held eight meetings which lasted from September 25 to October 7, 1944. The discussions centred round the nature of cooperation among the Arab states the machinery for such cooperation and the formation of a central government for all the Arab countries. At the end of its first session, on October 7, the Committee published a protocol along with a brief statement. "The protocol contained decision of the Committee and called for the establishment of a League of Arab States. This protocol later came to be known as the Alexandria protocol".<sup>17</sup>

Once the choice of political organization had been made, the conference could move to a consideration of internal structure and functions. This work was done in six committees concerned, respectively, with political, social, economic, health, cultural and communication problems. The subjects of joint defense and foreign policy proposed in Nuri's "Blue Book" were eliminated from consideration and one or two other categories were absorbed into other subject headings. The Committee framework thus stressed technical or "functional" activities including the provision of economic and cultural ties emphasized by Eden in 1941 and 1943 and endorsed by the U.S.

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17 William Polk, n.7, p.24.

The Pact of the League of Arab States:

The pact of the League of Arab states, in preparation for the general Arab Congress envisaged by the Alexandria protocol, a Committee of Arab foreign ministers and other experts met in Cairo during February and March 1945 to draft the Constitution of the Arab League. Two days after the approval of the Alexandria protocol, Nakhās Pasha was relieved of his position as Prime Minister of Egypt; Egyptian political leaders denounced Nakhās and his followers as traitors and castigated the proposed Arab League as unworkable. The Syrian and Jordanian Prime Ministers, who led their delegations to the Conference, were also dismissed from their posts. Reaction was particularly violent in Beirut where the Christian Arab Community, led by the Maronite Patriarch and the Falangists, denounced the Alexandria protocol as an attack on Lebanese sovereignty. The pact lays emphasis on its retention desirous of strengthening the close relation and numerous ties which link the Arab states and anxious to support and strengthen these ties.<sup>18</sup>

The main features of the pact of the League as evolved during the meetings of in subsidiary committee, the preparatory committee, and the general Arab Congress, were

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18 Cecil A. Hourani, "The Arab League in Perspective", The Middle East Journal (Washington D.C.), vol.1, no.2, April 1947, p.128.

as follows: (1) General purpose and functions;  
 (2) Membership and relations between members; (3) Council;  
 (4) Secretariat.

General Purpose and Functions: The aims of the preamble was copied from Article 2 of the protocol, with a significant addition specifying that the achievement of these objectives would be on basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states. This principle was embodied in both the Iraqi and the Lebanese drafts, and was endorsed by the Saudi delegate.

The preamble of the pact protocol concerning the general Arab protocol concerning the general Arab nature of the activities and interests of the League. It stated that the League had been formed in response to the wishes of Arab public opinion "in all the Arab lands". Its purpose was to concert efforts towards the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status; the security of their future, the realization of their aspirations and hopes.<sup>19</sup>

(2) Membership and Relations between members: Membership is restricted by Article 1 to independent Arab states; subsequent to the establishment of the League, any such state may apply

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19 Ahmed M. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy And Inter-Arab Politics, 1941-1945 (New York: Longman, 1977), p.241.

for membership members pledge themselves by Article 8, to respect the sovereignty of other member states and not to take any action "calculated to change established systems of government".<sup>20</sup> Iraqi draft stated that any independent Arab/state should have the right to join the League if it wanted to this procedure for admission proposed in the Lebanese draft was accepted.

Egypt's membership of the League was suspended, in accordance with a resolution passed at the Baghdad Summit. In March 1979, at which time it was also agreed that the League Secretariat should be moved from Cairo to Tunis. This action was taken in response to the signing of a bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

(3) The Council: The supreme organ of the Arab League consists of representatives of 22 member states, each of which had one vote, and a representative for Palestine unanimous decision of the Council shall be binding upon all member states of the League, majority decisions would be binding only on those states which had accepted them. The purpose of the League was to supervise the execution of agreements, among the member states. It was also to decide upon the means of co-operation with future world organization (Article 3). It was empowered to mediate in any dispute which might

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20 Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States: A study of the dynamics of regional organisation (London: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.44.

lead to war, and to arbitrate in any disagreement referred to it by the parties concerned (Article 5). It was also authorized to decide upon the action to be taken to repel any aggression against a member state (Article 6) it was to appoint the Secretary-General his assistants, and the main officials in the Secretariat. It was to approve the annual budget (Article 13), and to decide on the cases in which representatives from the non-member states could participate in the activities of the specialized committees (Article 4).

(4) The Secretariat: The Secretariat carried out the decisions of the council and provides financial and administrative services for the personnel of the League. There are a number of departments: economics, political, legal, cultural, social and labour affairs, petroleum finance, palestine, health, information, communication protocol. The most recently formed department deals with African affairs. Nuri Pasha suggested, Secretary General should have an assistant from among the nationals of each member state, and "the Secretary General would be the most important element in the whole organization."<sup>21</sup> The Secretary General was appointed by League council by a two-third majority of the member states, for a five-year term. He appointed the assistant secretaries and principal officials, with the approval of the council. He had the rank of ambassador, and the assistance secretaries have the rank of ministers. (I see the chart on next page).

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21      Ibid, p.244.



SECRETARIATE

Secretary General: Chedliklibi (Tunisia)

1. Arab Affairs : Asad Al-Assaad (Lebanon)
2. Legal Affairs : Muhammad Ben-Salamah (Tunisia)
3. Economic Affairs : Dr. Abdul Al-Hassan Zalzalalah (Iraq)
4. Political : A Dnan Omran (Syria)  
Affairs
5. Palestine : Dr. Muhammed Al Faars (Jordan)  
Affairs
6. Information : Lakhdar Al-jbrabimi (Algeria)  
Affairs
7. Social Affairs : Ibrahim As-Saad Al Ibrahim  
(Saudi Arabia)
8. Technical : Mustafa Al-Hadi (Sudan)  
Assistance Fund

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The Joint Defense and economic cooperation treaty:

The original seven members of the League of Arab states completed a supplemented treaty in 1950 officially known as the joint defense and economic cooperation treaty between the states of the Arab League. The treaty usually known as the Arab collective security pact, was signed by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen on June 17, 1950. Iraq signed it on February 16, 1952. The treaty became effective on August 23, 1952.

The treaty was somewhat unique in its juncture of functional and security problems, though the ostensible reason for the treaty was to bring the Arab League in line with the United Nations charter in matters of collective security. The preamble stated that the participating governments desire to cooperate for the realization of mutual defense and the maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the Arab League pact and the United Nations Charter. The treaty also restated the objectives of the pact of the League which related to consolidation of relations between members, maintenance of independence, and development of economic and social welfare.

The strategic aspects of the Arab world were three: Geographical position, manpower and oil; the third strategic resources of the Arab world, its oil deposit was both actual

and potential; actual in that these deposits were being utilized, and potential in that no one knew definitely their extent, nor how far one could count on them in time of war. (Iran illustrated oil as a permanent interest in these areas, even to the exclusion of all others, this was certainly a narrow approach to the Arab world, but nevertheless oil was a matter upper most in their minds these days and therefore deserves detailed attention.

#### United States and the Arab League:

The establishment of Arab League was publicly welcomed by the British Government, <sup>and later by the American government</sup> The United States became the principal western actor on the Arab world.

Since the new pact bypassed Arab League and was based in Baghdad whose government was hostile to president Nasser, it brought about an immediate deterioration of American relations with those Arab states where President Nasser had strong influence--Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. This development coupled with the growing tension along the Arab Israeli frontier, with the U.S.' willingness to supply arms on terms acceptable to Egypt, and possible with internal pressures in the Egyptian army, caused Nasser to conclude the arms purchase agreement on September 27, and on September 28 an American emissary was sent to Cairo to reactivate and make more acceptable the earlier American arms offer.

During the 1950s, the U.S. policy of employing or withholding foreign aid to reward its friends and punish its enemies led to further fragmentation of the Arab region, although the U.S. earlier had encouraged "the formation of the Arab League for the purpose of promoting regional, economic, social and cultural integration specifically the withdrawal in 1956 of the American offer to collaboration in the Egyptian project for a high dam of Aswan",<sup>22</sup> not only led to the Suez Crisis, and Great Britain, but also opened the door for the unrestrained development of Soviet bloc influence in the area and thereby destroyed the utility of the Baghdad pact.

The Palestinian problem remains today, a focal point of all the separate problems of the area and, therefore, of American efforts to assist in the achievement of peace and stability there. To the council on Foreign Relations on August 26, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles had set out one possible approach to this complex issue. "Dulles suggested that an international loan might enable Israel to pay the compensation which is due and which would enable many of the refugees to find for themselves a better way of life".<sup>23</sup> He further offered American assistance in determining satisfactory frontiers which the U.S. would then guarantee against aggression.

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22 Hourani, C., "Some reflections on regional organization", Middle East Journal (Washington, D.C.), vol. 1, no. 2, April 1947, pp. 125-36.

23 William Polk, n. 7, p. 325.

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Eric Johnston had been appointed in 1953 as a special representation of the President to work on the problem of the Jordan River waters and was then in the midst of protracted negotiations with the Arab states and Israel these did not produce any agreement but did lay the basis of American aid efforts in effect the U.S. indicated that it was willing to assist both the Arab states and Israel to complete projects which were in accord with the Johnston proposal, thus though the Johnston plan was not in principle, accepted, it was in practice largely implemented. In 1954 the water plan developed by a U.S. presidential envoy the late Eric Johnston Arab and Israeli technical experts agreed that Israel would get 40 per cent water. (the largest collection of Arab leaders had assembled in Cairo at the invitation of U.A.R. president Gamal Abdel Nasser to decide how to cope with the nation they all regard as an enemy Israel). "For us the water plan is of vital importance any attempt to obstruct the implementation of this plan will be considered an act of aggression and will be dealt with accordingly".<sup>24</sup>

In 1961, the Kennedy administration established friendly ties with the Arab countries. The new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had been an intimate friend and adviser

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24 C. G. Pepper, "Moderates in Cairo", News Week (New York) January 27, 1964, p.28.

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of John Foster Dulles and shared with him many of the conceptions of American role in the world area. "In April 1961, Secretary Rusk announced that the U.S. would continue the policies of the previous administration in regard to the CENTO alliance".<sup>25</sup> While the U-2 flights no longer set aid and political standards for American policy in Pakistan and Turkey, continuation of other intelligence and military activities and facilities closely hedged in American policy in those areas i.e. Iran, Libya and Morocco. These activities and commitments were profound consequences for American policy in the Arab countries.

When the Saudi Arabian government in April 1961, asked the United States to move its military units out of the Bahran Airfield, the U.S. was quick to consent so quick, in fact, as to surprise and apparently to disappoint the Saudi Arabian government. The American government was somewhat more disturbed by General Qasim of Iraq in June to have his hegemony over Kuwait. Since Kuwait was more important to the British than to the Americans, Great Britain undertook the initial steps to preserve Kuwaiti independence.

One aspect of the problem of the Middle East had been dilemma of Palestine. In September 1961, the president was determined to try a new approach by arranging for the United

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25 "Secretary Dulles meets with representatives of Arab States", Department of State Bulletin (Washington D.C.), vol.36, March 18, 1957, p.434.

Nations to send Joseph Johnson, the President of the Carnegie Foundation and a former member of the policy planning staff. He was to consult with the government's in the area on the means to settle the refugee problem.

Johnson's plan involved giving priority to the wishes of the refugees within limited areas of choice, and under the active supervision of the United Nations. His plan called for the expression of preferences by the refugees on whether to "return" or not then, under United Nations auspices, for the processing of individual refugee families through security clearances, travel to Israel, or payment of compensation for settlement outside of Israel.

As Johnson pointed out, neither the Arabs nor Israel would get what they want. Both would have to give up something. Israel he pointed out, would have to take in some refugees she did not want, without any prior agreement on the number (which parenthetically but most importantly, "I am convinced would, under the procedures I purpose be very small, fewer than one-tenth of the total of true refugees and their descendants)". He subsequently pointed out, "if the American government which of course means the President decides to pursue such a course as I have proposed, it must at the same time anticipate and be prepared to meet a well-organized, efficient, determined, president, pervasive effort to alter that course." The American government was not willing to make such an effort, nor did either the Israeli government

give the plan serious consideration as the means of settling the conflict.<sup>26</sup>

The crisis at once brought the super powers into the dispute. On 23 May 1967, in a broadcast to the nation, President, Lyndon B. Johnson said that the closure of the Gulf of Agaba had added a "new and grave dimension" to the crisis. He declared that the U.S. considered the Gulf to be an "international waterway" and that the blockage was "illegal" and "potentially disastrous" to the cause of peace. He emphasized that the right of "free and innocent passage" through an international waterway was of vital importance to the international community. He made it clear that "the U.S. was firmly committed to the political independence and territorial integrity, of all the nations of the region. He affirmed that the U.S. would "earnestly" support the efforts of the United Nations to reduce tensions and restore stability in the area".<sup>27</sup>

During the 1960s the internal social revolutionary changes took place. 1967 war and October 1973 wars bringing about peace between the Arab states and Israel. Before the

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26 William Polk, n.7, p.338.

27 "For the text of president, Lyndon B Johnson's statement of 23 May 1967", Department of State Bulletin (Washington D.C.), 12 June 1967, vol.56, 12 June 1967.



Nixon administration took office in 1969, the President elected a new foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, established an office in New York and advisers on virtually every aspect of American foreign policy. President indicated that he would welcome negotiations aimed at reducing tensions in the Middle East and leading towards the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. Toward that end, he said, he was prepared to agree to demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, opening of the Suez Canal and, in due course, exchange of diplomatic representatives between Egypt and Israel. The political atmosphere was not conducive. Nasser's war of attrition had only just begun to take effect and the bitter memory of Nasser as the man who falsely excused the U.S. of initiating the air attack on Cairo in June 1967 still rankled in Washington. The U.S. opted for initiative limited to four-power discussions at the United Nations during 1969.

In a speech Secretary Rogers reaffirmed the policy of the Johnson administration opposing unilateral alteration of the status of Jerusalem by Israel, and reaffirmed that "there can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 had made homeless".<sup>28</sup>

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28 William Polk, n.7 p.343.

Kissinger was widely reported as having said:  
"Washington wanted to 'expel' Soviet combat force (from Egypt). Though he made it clear that he hoped to achieve this as part of a peace settlement, not by force".<sup>29</sup>

The most tangible outcome of the Roger's plan was the agreement, ultimately effected on August 7, 1970, for a 90 days ceasefire. The Sunday Times gives an excellent background by Henry Brondon on the negotiations. The agreement called for a military standstill on the "Suez front" and the recommencement of talks with Ambassador jarring on the basis of security council resolution 242. The agreement was at the time regarded, at least by the administration as having made a significant contribution to peace in attaining both Egyptian and Jordanian public expression of consent to Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders, and Israeli commitment to accept negotiations. The U.S. gave assurances to Israel that if the ceasefire standstill terms were violated, the U.S. would act to compensate any disadvantage which Israel might suffer, to Egypt, the U.S. promised restraint in further delivery of military aircraft to Israel.<sup>30</sup>

The period from 1973 to 1980 under three presidents in the context of four major issues relating to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The October war and the oil

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29 International Herald Tribune, July 19, 1970.

30 The Sunday Times (New Delhi), August 2, 1970.

embargo (which occupied the attention of president Nixon from 1973 to 1974), the disengagement agreements (which concerned president Ford from 1974 to 75). The Camp David Accords and the Egyptians Israeli peace process which involved president Carter from 1977-79, and the collapse of Iran, the holding of the U.S. hostages, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which also preoccupied president Carter from 1979 to 1980.<sup>31</sup>

Although the Reagan Administration had attempted to create a new image of U.S. concern and its resolve in the Gulf, by early 1982, the Reagan administration had not developed a comprehensive political programme for the region throughout 1981, the administration did respond to urgent developments in the region such as the assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. However, such response was only through military aid and the deployment of U.S. forces. As of the spring of 1982, no diplomatic programme was articulated by the administration to complement the military commitments that had already been made to the Saudis and Jordanians.

Of course the policies of the U.S. in the Arab world were only one part, and not necessarily the leading part, of the bilateral and multilateral relationships that constituted the U.S. relations with the Arab world during these years.

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31 Weekly compilation of presidential documents  
(Washington D.C.), vol.4, 1978, pp.1977-80.

CHAPTER II

CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT

A. Terms and Objectives of the Agreement:

The U.S. sponsored Middle East Summit at "Camp David" concluded on September 17, 1978. Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met Jimmy Carter, President of United States of America, and agreed to a framework for a peace treaty between the two countries and for a settlement of the border issue of Arab-Israel issue of West Bank and Gaza Strip. This came to be known as the Camp David Agreement.

The Camp David Accords - The Camp David negotiations produced two major agreements between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat: (1) The "Framework for peace in the Middle East" set forth the general principles for the establishment of self-government for the Arabs on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip over a five-year period; (2) The "Framework for the Conclusion of Peace Treaty between the two countries for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and return of that area to Egypt."<sup>1</sup>

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1 Philip, L, Groisser, The United States and the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), p.208.

The U.N. Resolution 242 was the basis of settlement. The document constituted a framework for future peace negotiations, and affirmed that "peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area...The settlement of the issue of the West Bank and Gaza in three stages: (a) a five year period during which the Israeli military authorities will turn over authority to a freely-elected self-governing body; (b) Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza including definition of Israeli security and the nature of joint patrols; and (c) it is only after the self-governing authority is established that the five-year interim period will begin, and to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbours and also to conclude a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.<sup>2</sup>

The Camp David agreements were considered an extraordinary diplomatic achievement and the agreements brought new hope for an end to thirty years of a state of war between Israel and Egypt.

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2 William R. Polk, The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the Twentieth Century (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 157.

President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin felt that President Carter deserved the maximum credit for bringing about the agreements and 'complemented' him highly for his successful endeavors. "Begin and Sadat were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1978 for their efforts".<sup>3</sup>

The Egyptian cabinet approved the agreements unanimously. The Israeli cabinet and Knesset (Parliament) voted to support the agreements by a wide margin after Begin convinced them that given the alternatives of peace or continued war, there was little option but to accept them.

Most of the other Arab states and the Soviet Union denounced the agreements as a complete surrender to Israel and as going against basic Arab rights. The leaders of Syria, Algeria, South Yemen, and Libya severed relations with Egypt and pledged to work for the "fall" of Sadat's peace policies.

The second document is the Framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This framework essentially provides: (a) the parties should have concluded peace treaty within three months after signing of the framework; (b) the negotiations should be conducted under the United Nations; (3) the Resolution 242 and 338 should govern all resolutions between Israel and Egypt. This framework

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3 Philip, L, Grosser, n.1, p.208.

provides that Israel will withdraw from Sinai and Egypt will regain sovereignty over the Sinai. It calls for each parties to recognize the other's international borders, enables Egypt to have non-military use of abandoned Israeli airfields in Sinai, and gives Israel free passage through the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Suez, the strait of Tiran, and the Gulf of Aqaba. The framework further provides for construction of a highway between Egypt and Jordan and for the specific stationing of military forces. (UN troops should not withdraw unless approved by the five permanent members of the Security Council).<sup>4</sup>

"This second framework of peace-treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel six months after the Camp David process began. The 1979 peace treaty, the major instrument of this phase of the Camp David process, between Egypt and Israel does not directly involve the U.S."<sup>5</sup> The treaty contains provisions concerning Security arrangements following the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Begin prepared a detailed plan that included a framework for a peace treaty with Egypt and an approach to the Palestinian problem and the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It offered an

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4 Hassan Foroq, "Legal status of U.S. involvement in the Camp David Peace Process", Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol.16, no.1, Winter 1983, pp.780-1.

5 Peace treaty, March 26, 1979, between Egypt & Israel. The treaty composed primarily of a preamble and seven articles, Paul, A. Juriedini R.D., M. Claurin, Beyond Camp David (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981), p.122.



Israeli withdrawal to the internal border and Egyptian sovereignty over a demilitarized Sinai. Begin's autonomy plan was a partial response to the fact that would not agree to a bilateral peace treaty unless the Palestinian issue was addressed.<sup>6</sup>

The Camp David framework Accord was also marked by two significant features; one was recognition of need to resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects; and to take account of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The other was the device of a "transitional period during which the complicated stages of negotiation to agreement on the final status of occupied territories would take place."<sup>7</sup>

#### Camp David and the Palestinian Question:

Throughout the Egyptian Israeli peace negotiations, Sadat maintained the need to demonstrate that he had achieved something for the Palestinians. He repeatedly said he was not prepared for a "separate peace", what he wanted from Begin was a simple statement that Israel was willing to return Arab territory captured in the 1967 war in exchange for peace recognition and security from the Arabs;

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6 Paul, A, Juriedini R.D. McLaurin, *ibid*, pp.127-8.

7 Michael Curtis, "Camp David and Beyond", Middle East Review(New York), vol.20, no.1, Fall 1987, p.3.

and his commitment from Israel to Palestine right including the right of self-determination. This commitment of course Begin would not give.

Americans became involved much more because of Begin's refusal and the Israeli proposal for self rule in the West Bank and Gaza with Sadat's desire for a set of general principles to settle the Arab conflict. The three stages of negotiations agreement took place at Camp David:

- (1) Egypt would launch the process by reaching an agreement with Israel on a transitional period. Then Jordan would be invited to join the talks, and toward the end of the transitional period, the Palestinians would also be included in the negotiations to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. It is clear that Sadat and Carter both over-estimated the role that Egypt could play in laying the ground work for a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian issue;
- (2) If the idea of the self-government for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza could have been given a real context, e.g. if Carter had succeeded in getting Begin's agreement to a freeze on settlement activity; if the self-governing authority had been given control over land and water resources; if genuinely free elections, including the right to vote for Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, had been promised, and if the military occupation authority had been abolished, then it might have been possible to attract Palestinians into the negotiating process; and
- (3) Carter was slow to recognize the depth of Begin's

attachment to the West Bank and Gaza. He was also slow to understand the linkage issue.<sup>8</sup>

Considering the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel on the matter of secure boundaries, the U.S. believed in minor adjustments in the pre-1967 war; the Israel sought border changes and the establishment of defensible borders. The Palestinians provoked the most direct clashes and Carter involved the Palestinians and talked of the need for a Palestinian homeland or entity.

Begin was optimistic as a result of their meetings in Washington. He said -

I think I can say that we established a personal rapport...I can assure and reassure all the friends of Israel and of America. There is not any confrontation between our two countries. Friendship between the U.S. and Israel has been deepened and we will be helpful in the future.(9)

During his visit, June 27, 1977, Carter appeared optimistic, as did Begin and stated: "I believe that we have laid the groundwork now, barring some unforeseen difficulty, that will lead to the Geneva conference in October".<sup>10</sup> During the

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8 William B. Quandt, Camp David Peace-making and Politics (Washington D.C.:Brookings Institution, 1986), pp.322-3. Also see, William B Quand t, "Camp David", Political Science Quarterly(New York),vol.101, 1986, p.363.

9 Bernard Reich, The U.S.-Israel (New York: Praeger Press, 1984), pp.51-2.

10 Washington Post, July 21, 1977.

visit Begin presented a plan for peace that was outlined at a Press Conference and dealt with the various aspects of a settlement. The "plan" was rejected by the Arabs. After Begin's return to Israel the government recognized on July 26 1977 three previous illegal settlements on the West Bank (Kudum, Afra, and Maale Adumin) as permanent, legal entities. The U.S. reacted sharply. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated that the settlements were illegal and an obstacle to peace. They had consistently stated and reiterated during their discussions here in Washington that we are of the opinion that the placing of these settlements is contrary to international law and presents an obstacle toward peace.

Begin rejected Vance's criticism and defended his government's decision:

We left no doubt in our talks on our position. Jews have the right to live anywhere in Judea and Samaria (on the West Bank) and Gaza strip. During an interview on July 29 Carter said I think it is an obstacle to peace... These settlements are illegal... we think it is wrong to establish these settlements it is wrong to insinuate that they are legal, its certainly wrong to ever claim that they are permanent.(11)

Vance's visit to the Middle East in early August included stops in Egypt, Leganon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. His basic purpose was to meet with regional leaders and to assess the situation as well as prospects for a meeting in Geneva. In a report by Vance to Carter,

a White House statement said that -

President Carter remains determined to do all that is possible to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East" and in that process, the U.S. "will use its influence, offer its advice volunteer its suggestions, and work to bring parties into fruitful negotiations. (12)

B. Role of United States:

The turmoil in the Middle East has been tragic not only for the states in the region but for the prospects of world peace. Because of this, the United States has been both directly and indirectly involved in the crises that have erupted there from time to time. A major milestone was reached when, largely due to the personal efforts of President Carter, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David agreements on September 17, 1978, in Washington, D.C. The U.S. played a key role in the execution of these agreements and consequential instruments. The main aim of these agreements was to secure the peace and the legal status of the United States involvement in the process initiated at Camp David in 1978.

The overwhelming defeat of 1967 marked the beginning of changes in Arab perceptions. By 1971 there were clear signs that Egypt and Jordan were thinking about Israel as a fixture; the 1973 war forced Israel to face its position without the customary euphoria. The Carter administration

came out forcefully for the first time for a comprehensive Middle East peace. The need for peace and the advancement of U.S. interests suggest part of the rationale for involvement, but U.S. became the central role also because of its special relationship with Israel and its developing links with the Arab states. The U.S. move in the direction of the Arab states was because of oil and the strategic value attributed to Egypt. U.S. military sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to encourage their pro-U.S. attitudes seemed to raise the possibility of an erosion of Israeli's military position U.S. vis-a-vis the Arab states and in the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship.

Carter expressed optimism, based on Israel's positions "moderation of Arab leaders", the deescalation of the civil war in Lebanon, and the fact that all parties had indicated a willingness to go to Geneva: "There was a fine opportunity for dramatic improvements there underlying the Carter approach was the view that the time had never been more propitious to work for peace, and to lose the opportunity could be disastrous for the region as well as the international political and economic order."<sup>13</sup>

During the crucial (1977) and the administration was hopeful it could achieve an overall settlement that would

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13 New York Times, January 13, 1977.

be implemented through a step-by-step process. The self identified U.S. role was to act as a catalyst to bring about negotiations between the parties and to establish a set of principles for successfully negotiating a settlement. And the U.S. as sufficiently important and intractable for it to act as more than a mediator to bring the parties together, and it became an element of the process. Despite protestations that would not impose a settlement, the administration increasingly began to identify its views, and facilitate movement toward peace, in our interview in May 1977 Carter said:

It would not hesitate if I saw clearly a fair and equitable solution to use the "full strength" of our own country and its persuasive powers to bring those nations to agreement. I recognize, though, that we cannot impose our will on others, and unless the countries involved agree, there is no way for us to make progress.(14)

By October the position had become more precise, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, stated:

The United States has a legitimate right to exercise its own leverage, peaceful and constructive, to obtain a settlement. And that's exactly what we will be going.(15)

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14 Department of State Bulletin, May 30, 1977, vol.76, (LXXVI), no.1979, p.547.

15 Washington Post, October 3, 1977.

The U.S. has undertaken the burden of "full partnership" on its own. "While U.S. credibility may have been limited with respect to the conflict earlier, the two are now directly and extensively associated the U.S. to propel the talks and to assist both sides in making the sacrifices required for a viable compromise by "assist". We mean the U.S. must establish incentives to support a settlement that will be acceptable to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinians".<sup>16</sup>

The United States main aim was to peace in Middle East. The progress that had been achieved and the progress that due to their realization and Arab goals were achieved best in the framework of U.S.-Arab cooperation and not through confrontation. Immediate aftermath of 1973 events, the U.S. began to assume the activist role in peace-making which continues to this day. The U.S. move in the direction of the Arab States because of oil and because of strategic value attributed to Egypt. U.S. military sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to encourage their pro-U.S. attitudes seemed to raise the possibility of an erosion of Israel's military position vis-a-vis the Arab States and the U.S. Israel bilateral relationship.

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16 Paul, A.Jureidini, R.D.Mclaurin, Beyond Camp David (New York: Syracuse Press, 1981), p.99.



The agreements emerged in the shape of two "frameworks". These bear the date of September 17, 1978 and are entitled; i) "a framework for peace in the Middle-East"; and ii) "a framework for peace treaty between Egypt and Israel". The comprehensive Middle East, has direct involvement of United States. Egypt and Israel agreed to "invite" U.S. participation whereby implementing the agreements and the "timetable" and modalities this agreement related to the future of occupied territory both parties wanted to consult U.S. in that process to assist the parties in outlining a framework for a lasting peace, Carter and Vance identified three elements: (1) Definition and assurance of permanent peace; (2) Definition and establishment of territory and borders; and (3) and the palestinian issue.

The U.S. role was the effort to develop a consensus or a framework for an Arab-Israeli settlement on February 1977 the visit of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to the Middle East and his discussions with Senior officials and decision-makers of six countries - Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia, was oriented to lay the groundwork for the administration's efforts White House spokesman Vance convened to the regional leaders the importance to make significant progress for lasting peace in the Middle East. During spring 1977 Carter received

leaders from the Middle East in Washington. The definition of peace involved a comprehensive approach expressed by Carter at Clinton, Massachusetts, in March 1977:

The first pre-requisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years...The borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitions wars and death that have afflicted that region so long. (17)

A second central element was territory, withdrawal, and borders. The crucial problem was to provide permanent borders that were secure, acceptable, and recognized by all parties. Resolution 242 refers to the recognized borders, Israel has talked in terms of "defensible" borders. The U.S. has generally relied upon the words of Resolution 242. However, on March 7, during welcoming ceremonies for Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Carter spoke of Israel having "defensible" borders. Carter mentioned Vance's recent trip, during which he had tried to explore some common ground

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17 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,  
March 21, 1977, p.361.

for future permanent peace there, so that Israel might have defensible borders so that the peace commitments would never be violated, and that there could be a sense of security for country in the future.<sup>18</sup>

The third ultimate requirement for peace was to deal with the Palestinian problem. The Palestinians claim up to this moment that Israel has no right to be there, that the land belongs to the Palestinians, and they've never yet given up their publicly professed commitment to destroy Israel, that has to be overcome. There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years.

It was clear that without the participation and intervention of President Carter in the negotiation no treaty would have been signed. He was praised by both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat for his role and personal assistance in resolving difficult issues. The U.S. was determined to significantly increase its military presence in the Middle East, President Carter gave important assurances of military and economic assistance to both nations. The following were among the specific economic and military promises made by the U.S. to Egypt and Israel.:

- (1) Loans and grants amounting to at least \$ 5 billion

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18 Ibid, p.361.

in military and economic aid will be given by the U.S. to Egypt and Israel over the next three years in addition to \$ 2.5 billion already earmarked for these two countries for 1979. (American help in financing Israel's plan to build two new air bases in the Negev region to replace air bases in the Sinai that will be given up .

2. The U.S. guarantees to supply oil to Israel for fifteen years if it is unable to buy what it needs from Egypt or elsewhere (give Israel insurance against any future Egyptian boycott of Israel).
3. U.S. promises active American participation in the negotiations for Palestinian self-rule;
4. If the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is violated, the U.S. will take appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military measures to deal with the situation;
5. If Israel's security is threatened, the U.S. will urgently consider "the strengthening of its presence in the area" It will also provide emergency supplies to Israel and exercise its maritime rights to end any naval blockade.
6. The U.S. will take steps to prevent the unauthorised transfer of U.S.-supplied weapons for use in an armed attack to Israel; and
7. To promote full treaty observance, Washington will make surveillance flights over the Sinai.<sup>19</sup>

C. Arab League's Reaction:

The entire Arab world angrily responded to the signing of the Camp David Agreement. It viewed the agreement as the betrayal of the great cause and the Arab world except Egypt, got united despite their internal differences, against the Agreement. Arab League leaders, meeting without Egyptian representation for the first time since the creation of the League in 1945, opened an Arab-Summit Conference in Baghdad, Iraq, to discuss a plan to deal with the Egyptian peace efforts. In Baghdad, Arab leaders approved a \$3.5 billion annual war aid to strengthen two other Arab states. Conference source reported that on the signing of an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty the following steps will be taken automatically: (i) Egypt will be suspended from the Arab League; (ii) Arab League headquarters will be moved from Cairo to Baghdad; and Egyptian companies that might deal with Israel will be boycotted.

Arab Summit in Baghdad - On November 6, United States expressed strong support for the Shah's decision to impose military rule. The Shah moved to appoint a military government under his authority when it became apparent that another civilian government could not be formed to restore public order essential to moving toward elections, the State

Department said. Carter held a meeting on November 6 with senior foreign policy adviser's and other cabinet level officials on the situation in Iran.<sup>20</sup>

Arab League concluded a four-day Summit meeting in Baghdad, Iran (November 5) with the issuance of a communique calling on Egypt not to sign a peace agreement with Israel. The meeting, which had been called by Iraq to counter the Camp David Accords, was attended by representatives of Twenty of the twenty-one League members; Egypt was not invited.

The Arab League, meeting in Baghdad between March 27 and 31, 1979 expelled Egypt from membership and rejected any cooperation with the peace treaty or the autonomy talks. The 18 Arab League countries that participated (Egypt, Sudan, and Oman did not attend) and the PLO severed diplomatic relations with Egypt and voted to impose an economic boycott. Saudi Arabia had joined the "radicals", and U.S. hopes that it would seek to minimize the anti-Sadat measures did not materialise, although a proposed oil embargo against the U.S. was forestalled. Sadat's first public criticism of Saudi Arabia came in his May Day speech: The majority of the Arabs who severed their relations (with Egypt) did so out of courtesy to Saudi Arabia. In response to Sadat's allegations,

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20 Facts on File, Weekly World News Digest with cumulative index, 1978, p.859.

Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan announced on May 14, that the consortium that operated Egyptian arms factories would go out of existence because the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel clashes with the purposes of establishing company.

Palestinian Questions - Turning to the question of Palestinian representation, Sadat said that the PLO should not be included in the Jordanian delegation; instead he proposed that the Palestinians be represented by the military assistant to the Secretary General of the Arab League, who just happened to be Egyptian; Sadat said he thought he could convince the Palestinians, but answering Vance's question about Syria's attitude, he said, Asad would be furious. "Fahmy added that this would mean a delegation from the Arab League representing the Palestinians, within which there would be Palestinians but no prominent PLO member".<sup>21</sup>

Sadat then stated that he could not accept a single Arab delegation at Geneva. If there was one delegation, "we shall explode". Sadat did not like anyone else dictating Egypt's position. Returning to the question of minor border ratifications, Sadat said that these could apply only to the West Bank. On Golan and Sinai, where there had been inter-

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21 William B Quandt, n.8, p.88.

nationally recognized borders, there could be no minor ratifications at all. Sadat went on to say that Egypt and Israel were to meet Sadat to dissuade him from continuing with the peace negotiations, but the Egyptian president refused to meet it. Instead, he publicly referred to the Summit participants as "cowards and dwarfs". He would not pay any attention, he said, to 'the hissing of snakes'.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, the agreement was reached in discussions between Syrian president Hafez al-Assad and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Iraqi president and premier. A joint communique had agreed to establish a bilateral committee of foreign and defense ministers and military chiefs of staff to promote military cooperation. The committee would draw up a draft joint defense agreement that would serve as the basis for a full military union.

U.S. and Arab talks on Palestinians: President Carter discussed current Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan, king Khalid of Saudi Arabia and president Anwar Sadat of Egypt. The talks centred largely on Israel's proposal for self-rule for Arabs in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

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22 Ibid, p.280.



Carter said that the terms for a comprehensive settlement must also include normal relations among the parties of the peace, Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands occupied in 1967 and acceptance by all sides of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 providing for secure and recognized boundaries for all parties. Hussein was further critical of the West Bank-Gaza proposal he said, "I can't see what is positive in the plan as such" since it failed to meet the Arabs basic demands for total Israeli withdrawal and "self-determination for the Palestinians under conditions of total freedom".<sup>23</sup>

Arabs cut ties with Egypt: The foreign and finance ministers of 18 Arab League countries and a representative of Palestine Liberation Organization, March 31, adopted resolutions, Geneva had value, to bring the Palestinians into the peace process, the question of Palestinian representation was uppermost in Sadat's mind and he communicated with Carter's beginning days. And he had reason to believe that he had found a formula for Palestinian representation at Geneva that would be acceptable to the PLO, to the United States, and to Israel.

As tensions rose in the U.S.-Israeli relationship, largely over the perception that Begin was diluting his commitments concerning the Palestinians, pressure was mounting on Egypt to adopt a tougher position in support of Palestinian rights. "The Arabs had held a Summit meeting in Baghdad, and on November 5 they announced their conclusions. They criticized the Camp David Accords, and they decided that the headquarters of the Arab League was to be moved from Cairo if Egypt and Israel reached a peace treaty. The conference participants sent a small delegation to Cairo to incapable of reaching anywhere together. To much distance existed between them turning again to Soviets, Sadat said they wanted to strangle him. Syria and may be Jordan, were also against Egypt there was no problem with Palestinians, but king Hussein still wanted the West Bank. The King's idea was of a United Kingdom, linking Jordan and the West Bank, but that should not be mentioned now.

Sadat was ready to agree with American procedural proposal for Geneva. But if the question of Palestinian representation could not be solved as the United States was proposing, Egypt would agree to include Palestinians in the Egyptian delegation. Syria and Jordan would protest, but Sadat would handle the situation provided Carter took into account the need to establish a Palestinian State, which should be linked to Jordan. Sadat repeated his suggestion

that the Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League could represent the Palestinians at Geneva. Finally, "Sadat said this be suitable for the Rhodes 1949 talks imposing a total economic boycott of Egypt and severing diplomatic relations with Cairo in relation for its signing for a peace treaty with Israel. The action was taken at a League meeting that had opened in Baghdad , March 27.

The Egyptian membership in the Arab League was suspended and the League's headquarters was transferred temporarily from Cairo to Tunisia. Iraqi foreign Minister Sadun Hamadi announced that "all the resolutions were binding except the one on cutting ties with Egypt, which he said, was contingent on the constitutional procedures prevailing in the respective countries."<sup>24</sup>

PLO leader Yasir Arafat demanded an economic boycott of the U.S. for its sponsorship of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty, and suspension of oil shipments to the U.S. and Egypt.

The Saudis also favoured suspending Egypt from the Arab League and shifting the League's headquarters from Cairo. Ghali said: Egypt was prepared to counter "any

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24 Facts on File 1979, 341. See also New York Times 3 October 1977.

measures they may take against us", expressing confidence that Egypt "is not isolated diplomatically and economically".<sup>25</sup> Arab League called economic boycott of Egypt negative and unhelpful.

Egypt recalls seven members: Egypt announced on April 17 that it was recalling its ambassadors from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Tunisia and Morocco. The Arab League decision in Baghdad , March 31, to sever economic and political ties with Egypt because of the peace treaty it had signed with Israel. The seven states already had withdrawn their envoys from Cairo in compliance with the Baghdad resolution.

Premier Mustafa Khalil also told a joint meeting of two parliamentary committee that his government would resist Arab League attempts to move its headquarters from Cairo.

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25 Ibid. See also Newsweek, November 15, 1979.

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CHAPTER III

REAGAN'S ADMINISTRATIONA. Reagan's Foreign Policy Thrust:

The Administration of Ronald Reagan initially did not place the Arab-Israeli conflict, or its relationship with Israel, at the centre of its foreign policy (or even its Middle East policy) when it came to office; it had no precise plan nor policy for that region. Israel and the Arab-Israeli problem were of marginal interest; domestic concerns had the highest priority. This changed, but slowly. By early 1983 the concept of strategic consensus which focused on the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia and the Arab-Israeli conflict had resumed its centrality in U.S. Middle East policy.

/of Reagan Administration

The initial foreign policy hallmark/was a strong anti-Soviet posture, particularly in rhetorical terms. It included an anti-terrorist and anti-radical component. The administration was committed to the restoration of U.S. power and prestige in the international system, and regaining the confidence of its allies and the respect of its adversaries through a clear, consistent, coherent and realistic foreign policy.

The administration would, as Reagan suggested during the campaign, eliminate perceptions of indecisiveness,

ineptitude and vacillation, and speak

with a single and powerful voice in foreign policy. The intention was accompanied by a dramatic increase in military spending and a search for bases or facilities. Reagan's campaign was strong and consistent in support for Israel and its perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He was opposed to dealing with the PLO until that organisation dramatically changed its policies by renouncing terrorism, accepting Resolution 242, and acknowledging Israel's right to exist. He perceived Israel to be strategically significant, and an important ally and asset to the U.S. in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Israel was the only stable democracy American could rely on a spot where Armageddon could come. The greatest responsibility the U.S. had to preserve peace and a need for ally in that area. America must prevent the Soviet Union from penetrating the Mid-East if Israel were not there, the U.S. would have to be there.<sup>1</sup>

Reagan supported some Israeli actions that had been criticized by previous administrations such as its settlement policy and its actions with regard to Jerusalem. An undivided city of Jerusalem meant sovereignty for Israel over the city... The West Bank a decision could be worked

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1 Hedrick Smith, "Reagan, what kind of leader?" New York Times Magazine (New York), November 16, 1980, pp.174-5.

out by Jordan and Israel. "I would never have supported dismantling of Israeli settlements on the West Bank".<sup>2</sup> Reagan saw the Palestinian issue as less than the political problem identified by the Carter Administration and more as a question of refugees: Palestine was never a country. It was a territory, an area and it was a British mandate. And it was the British Government that created the Kingdom of Jordan, which is 80 per cent of what used to be Palestine. The Israelis have less than 20 per cent of what was Palestine. The Palestinian refugee problem it seems to me than, is an 80 per cent - 20 per cent problem of Jordan and Israel.

The foreign policy orientation of the administration was dictated by the estimate of intense Soviet threat held by senior officials and their closest allies in Congress. In their view, the Soviet threat would be met by the restoration of American prestige in the international community. This in turn required an increased military capability so that the U.S. could reverse the humiliation of recent years and prevent Moscow's expansion.

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2 Ibid, p. 175.



During the campaign Vice Presidential candidate George Bush expressed views similar to those of Reagan. "It is in the strategic interest of the U.S. to maintain Israel's strength and security. The security and freedom of that small democracy are fundamental to American strength and Middle East stability".<sup>3</sup> He also argued for the maintenance of the U.S. position concerning the PLO and suggested the need to encourage Jordan to support the Camp David process and to negotiate with Israel concerning the West Bank.

Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, advocated a more assertive foreign policy and saw himself as its "Vicar" with responsibility for the 'formulation, conduct and articulation' of U.S. foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> The National Security Adviser Richard A Allen and Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese, contributed to Haig's assertiveness. Haig's foreign policy background was mixed with Soviet-focused global issues and the centrality of Europe. Haig described the Soviet threat as relentless, and was suspicious of detente and of Soviet intentions. His Middle East background was limited and the Republican presidential nomination, he spoke of Israel as a strategic asset whose very existence serves to deter Soviet aggression.<sup>5</sup>

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3 Quoted in Near East Report, January 9, 1980, p.7.  
See also Near East Report, March 19, 1980, pp.51-2.

4 New York Times (New York), January 29, 1981.

5 Washington Post (Washington D.C.), December 23, 1980.

The Reagan administration's foreign policy was set during the presidential campaign at the "White House" press conference. Reagan's ideological framework included an active, aggressive Soviet Union bent on "expansionism", which required the U.S. to think in terms of containment and perhaps, confrontation. The enhancement of U.S. military capability, the restoration of U.S. decisiveness, and the mobilization of other states against the Soviet danger. The administration believed it could capitalize on regional anxiety about the Soviet Union to establish strategic alliance under U.S. guidance. In the Middle East the administration spoke in terms of a "strategic consensus".

Strategic Consensus: The slow trend toward increased awareness of the Persian Gulf sector started at the beginning of the 1970s with the British withdrawal from the Gulf, and was given impetus by the October War of 1973, the accompanying oil price increase, and related factors that ensured the politicization of oil. This trend was accelerated by the Iranian revolution, the increase in oil prices 1979, the Iraq-Iran War, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The combination of influence and counter-influence in the Gulf was a major element in the "strategic assessment" of the area. It included concern for oil, the stability of

the smaller Gulf states, the relationship with Saudi Arabia and ultimately, the future direction and alignment of Iran.

The administration gave first priority in the region to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula and the Soviet threat there. The general view was that the U.S. position in the vital Gulf sector had to be restored and U.S. power enhanced to counter the threat.

The new administration focused early on an anti-Soviet strategy that sought to link moderate, anti-communist Middle Eastern states that would subscribe to the notion of an anti-Soviet strategic consensus. The belief was that Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia could and would form the basis of such a strategic consensus. Israel's strategic utility was identified.

In March 1981, Haig told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there was a need to establish a "consensus", in the strategic-regional sense, among the states of the area, stretching from Pakistan in the East to Egypt in the West, including Turkey, Israel, and the other threatened states.<sup>6</sup> The goal appeared to be the construction of a geo-political grouping, not a formal alliance to contain the Soviet Union and its threat to the region. In April, 1981, Haig visited

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6 New York Times, March 20, 1981.

Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in an effort to secure support for strategic consensus.

The post-1982 period was a replay, more potential danger for the United States, of a scenario that had occurred many times in the previous thirty-five years. The partnership grew stronger when Congress in November 1982, inspite of Israel's categorical rejection of the Reagan Peace initiative, appropriated more funds for Israel than the administration had requested, appearing to reward the Jewish state for its adventurism in Lebanon and its defiance of the administration. A year later, in November 1983, the administration itself forged a formal military and strategic alliance with Israel (actually a re-instatement of a 1981 accord that had been suspended when Israel annexed Golan Heights.

#### War in Lebanon - 1982:

The Reagan administration's approach to peace-making in the Arab-Israel conflict from its episodic dimension to a more comprehensive framework, was the war in Lebanon.

The Reagan administration, which assumed office in 1981 was immediately faced with another Saudi request for arms, specially equipment to upgrade its F-15. In the context of concern about "instability in the Arabian Gulf,

threats to Western access to oil, and increased Soviet influence in the region, the administration announced on March 6, 1981 that the U.S. was prepared to sell Saudi Arabia all of the equipment that it requested, except for bomb racks".<sup>7</sup>

In April 1981, the administration announced that it would sell Saudi Arabia five AWACS of its own, delivery to be scheduled for 1985 pending delivery, the four American-manned AWACS sent by Carter, would remain. The provision of the F-15 equipment and the AWACS became an important policy objective for the Reagan administration, which recognized the utility of having a positive relationship with a pivotal Arab state of such importance in OPEC, significant in geo-strategic location and fervor against communism.<sup>8</sup>

The AWACS had a fundamentally political rather than military significance. They were intended to provide the Saudi's with concrete evidence of America's friendship, to give an incentive for Riyadh to continue its pro-Western economic policies; and to encourage the Saudi to support Secretary of State Alexander Haig's plan to forge a "strategic consensus" against Soviet penetration in the region. The plans in no way altered the military balance

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7 New York Times, March 7, 1981.

8 Ibid, April 16, 1981.

between the Arabs and Israel. Ronald Reagan would never have permitted such a shift, since both he and Haig were committed to the absolute military superiority of Israel. Haig, a former top aide to Henry Kissinger, strongly advocated the thesis that Israel was an indispensable strategic asset to the U.S. in containing the Soviet Union.

The Egyptian-Iraqi relations warmed in the context of the war, with Egypt supplying Iraq substantial amount of military equipment - "some \$ 1.5 billion worth in an agreement concluded in April 1982 alone. In return Iraq eased its boycott against Egypt, upgraded its diplomatic representation in Cairo and boosted economic ties between the two countries."<sup>9</sup>

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, like the Iranian revolution, was a significant event in terms of the linkages between great powers relations and the Middle East regional context. The invasion, which was prompted by the loss of power of a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul as a result of popular opposition to its extensive social reform measures. The Carter Doctrine, committing the United States to protecting the Security of Arabian Gulf oil producing states if they were 'externally threatened'.<sup>10</sup>

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9 Christian Science Monitor(Boston), April 14, 1982.

10 "Congress Joint Session meeting," New York Times, January 24, 1980.

By the time Reagan became the President, detente was frozen and the new administration rapidly rekindled the cold war. Regional problems were again viewed exclusively in the context of great power politics, and the world was divided into the forces of good and the forces of evil, /reduced to a simplistic view of American-Soviet competition. It with every regional conflict/was Kissinger's view of the world, except that the perception of the Soviet Union was no longer one of a traditional great power pursuing its interests in the context of power politics, it was a reversion to the earlier perception of George F. Kennan, of a Soviet Union as a world revolutionary state .<sup>11</sup>

In the Middle East the priorities for the Reagan administration were decreasing Soviet influence and safeguarding the freedom of access to the area's oil. The Reagan-Haig team expanded the Carter Doctrine and gave great stress to the development of the Rapid Deployment force. The major thrust of Haig's regional strategy was the attempt to create an anti-Soviet security screen termed a "strategic consensus" - extending from Pakistan to Egypt and including such dispatiate nations as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. This was like a John Foster Duller's Middle East policy.

The new strategy included an increased programme of military assistance to a number of Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan.

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11 DAWN (Karachi) May 10, 1981.

B. Reagan's Perception of the Arab League:

On September 1, 1982, after the end of the successful evaluation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut, Lebanon, U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced a new Middle East peace initiative. This peaceful step could never have been taken without the good offices of the U.S. and, especially, the truly heroic work of a great American diplomat, ambassador Philip Habib (president's special emissary to the Middle East). (see Appendix 1).

And the Second Peace Plan on September 9, 1982, 20 Arab League states approved an eight point peace plan excepts from both the plans follows:

Fez Summit Peace Proposal: The summit adopted the following principles:

1. The withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 including Arab Al Gods (East Jerusalem).
2. The dismantling of settlements established by Israel on the Arab territories after 1967.
3. The guarantee of freedom of worship and practice of religious rites for all religious in the holy shrine.
4. The reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's right to self determination and the exercise of its inalienable and inalienable national right under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), its role and legitimate representative, and the indemnification of all those who do not desire to return.
5. Placing the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the control of the United Nations for a transitional period not exceeding a few months.
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Al Qods as its capital.



7. The Security Council guarantees peace among all states of the region including the independent Palestinian state.
8. The Security Council guarantees the respect of these principles.(12)

Arab League Delegation meets the President Reagan:

The delegation headed by the King Hāssan II from the Arab League, met President Reagan on October 22, 1982: their main aim was to achieve peace in the Middle East. It was (the delegation) an important milestone along the road toward a common objective, a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Peace in the Middle East meant achieving security for troubled region - security for the Arab states and security for the Israel and a sense of identity for the Palestinian people.

And our mutual goal should achieve through negotiations, that we will find in the framework of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and your programme - your plan for peace and the decisions of the Fez Conference, we will find in all these which will save us in order to achieve our noble aim and objective which is, peace and coexistence and construction for the welfare of the region and all mankind.(13)

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- 12 Sherman, Stevens, "The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1967-68", Middle East and North African Yearbook, 1988, p.81.
  - 13 "Arab League Delegation meets the President Reagan", Department of State Bulletin(Washington D.C.), vol.82, no.2069, December 1982, p.43.

The representative of Arab League said that, "Arab League had been one of the first regional organizations to be established; the draft resolution was being submitted under article 3 of the League's Charter, which provided for strengthening cooperation between the two organizations to reinforce international peace and security, with a view to resolving problems."<sup>14</sup> And they asked Secretary General to attend and take part in Fez in November. For he had always encouraged and urged cooperation between the League and UN.

Escalating violence and attend United States Perception:

In the month of May 17 agreement, the prospects of a Syrian reversal on withdrawal of its forces appeared increasingly remote. At the same time Israel decided, in the face of this impose and mounting casualties, to redeploy its troops in Lebanon to more defensible positions along the Awali River. This sparked increasing speculation that the partition of Lebanon between Israel and Syria was fast becoming an accomplished fact. Israel's redeployment also marked the beginning of a new phase in the role of American forces "with the Arab League" in Lebanon. The war in Lebanon had disturbed the relative power balances among the warring Lebanese factions. United States forces

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14 U.N. Chronical, vol.xix, no.1, January 1982, p.23.

were caught in the crossfire in the ensuing struggle among these groups to assert their claims to both territorial dominion and political coverage. As members of a multinational peace-keeping force it was not the mission of this United States forces to intervene directly. However, by providing support to the duly constituted government of president Amin Gemayel, the United States was identified with some of the parties to the Lebanese struggle, thus becoming an adversary to others.

As the American contingent suffered growing numbers of casualties, the administration clashed with Congress on the relevance of the war powers Resolution. Reagan reiterated his view that the marines were "a stabilizing force there as Lebanon tried to reinstate itself as a sovereign nation with control of its own territory".<sup>15</sup> Concerns for the safety of the marines, together with a desire to make their presence more effective, led and administration to strengthen its naval force off the West of Lebanon and declared its readiness to return hostile fire. At the meeting with regional news media on September 21, 1983, Reagan explained:

The multinational force is there to help in this achieving of stability and control by Lebanon and I think

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15 Reagan's Interview, Newsweek, September 26, 1986, p.27.

the mission still goes on. But how the very first, I said we will never send our men any place where they will not be allowed to defend themselves if they come under attack, and that recently has happened, and they have been defending themselves. (16)

A key stumbling block to the Reagan administration's policy in Lebanon remained the unwillingness of Syria to withdraw its troops. By the fall of 1983 the administration's understanding of Syria's position had altered significantly from the optimism which had been sounded at the time that the Israel Lebanon agreement had been concluded the previous May. By October 1983, Reagan was clear in his evaluation that the Syrian refusal to cooperate in the withdrawal of forces was directly linked to the negative influence of the Soviet Union. "Reagan described the Soviet Union as a 'hostile influence' in the Middle East as a whole and especially in Lebanon. He noted that the Soviet Union was bent on imperialism, on expansion and aggression, where there was trouble they loved to stir the pot, and this they were doing".<sup>17</sup> In a press conference on October 19, 1983 Reagan stated that the United States would not allow Syria "aided and abetted by 7,000 Soviet advisers and technicians" to destroy the chances of stability in Lebanon. He said that the Syrians were seeking to obstruct peace by foot-dragging.<sup>18</sup>

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16 Washington Post, October 25, 1983.

17 Newsweek, September 26, 1983, p.27.

18 New York Times, October 20, 1983.

The identification of the Soviet Union as a central factor in the continuing presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon laid the foundation for a shift in emphasis in the administration's rationale for the American mission. The need to redefine this mission was made urgent by the bombing of United States marine headquarters in Lebanon on October 23, 1983, causing the loss of over two hundred lives. This single shocking incident led to increased opposition in the U.S. to the American presence in Lebanon and provoked further questioning of the administration's policy. The bombing only increased the president's resolve ("the U.S. will not be intimidated by terrorists) and his determination to pursue his plan for peace in the Middle East.

In his comments to journalists on October 24, 1983, the day after the bombing, Reagan asserted that the U.S. must keep its forces in Lebanon until the situation is under control because "we have vital interests in Lebanon and our actions in Lebanon are in the cause of world peace".<sup>19</sup> He defined the role of the marines in these terms: "with our allies England, France and Italy, we are part of a multinational peace force, seeking a withdrawal of all

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19 Washington Post, October 25, 1983.

foreign forces from Lebanon and from the Beirut area while a new Lebanese government undertakes to restore sovereignty throughout that country".<sup>20</sup> The relevance of Lebanon to the future of the whole region was re-affirmed: "peace in Lebanon is the key to region's stability now and in the future...if Lebanon ends up under the tyranny of forces hostile to the west, not only will our strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean be threatened, but also the stability of the entire Middle East including the vast resource areas of the Arabian Peninsula."<sup>21</sup>

Reagan identified Lebanese autonomy as a vital interest of the U.S. in the face of a Soviet threat was now identified, as the Arab-Israel sector as opposed to the Gulf.

In an address to the nation on October 27, 1983, Reagan clarified his year-old initiative for peace in the Middle East in the context of the deteriorating military predicament in Lebanon. A peace initiative for the entire Middle East, consistent with the Camp David Accords and UN Resolutions 242 and 338, still offers the best hope for bringing peace to the region....

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20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

If America were to talk away from Lebanon, what chance would there be for a negotiated settlement producing a unified democratic Lebanon? The specific operational mission in Lebanon, Reagan explained was:

To secure a peace of Beirut, to keep order in their sector, and to prevent the area from becoming a battle field. We have another reason to be involved since 1948 our nation has recognized and accepted a moral obligation to assure the continued existence of Israel as a nation. Israel shares our democratic values, and was a formidable force in invader of the Middle East.

The immediate aftermath of the bombing of U.S. marine headquarters, Reagan reiterated his objective of encouraging more Arab nations to enter into direct negotiations with Israel. The idea of US continuing to help, as they did at Camp David, in furthering that process, bringing more nations into the kind of peaceful arrangement that occurred between Egypt and Israel, producing more Egypt.<sup>22</sup>

Emphasized a specific Soviet threat to the Middle East especially through Soviet backing of Syria, the administration identified a convergence of its objectives with those of Israel, and sensing a new level of tension in the region, it made that convergence an explicit basis for cooperation with Israel. The terms in which Reagan described the broader principles at stake in Lebanon indicated

the extent to which the administration had come to see its involvement in the search for peace in the Middle East as a vital United States interest.

C. Soviet Reaction to Middle East:

Soviet policy toward the Middle East since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war had been essentially reactive in nature, as Moscow had reacted to events in the region that it neither caused nor had much ability to control. Moscow had benefited from some events, such as the fall of the Shah, the formation of an Arab anti-Camp David alignment, and U.S. policy errors in Lebanon. Moscow's position in the Middle East had suffered from regional events, such as movement of Egypt into the American Camp, the outbreak and continuation of the Iran-Iraq war, and the numerous internecine splits in the Arab world. The arms that Moscow had poured into the Middle East had not given Moscow much influence in the region. Thus Moscow could not prevent Egypt's exit from the Soviet Camp, the signing of the Camp David agreements, or the reestablishment of relations between Egypt and Jordan. Despite continued efforts, the USSR had been unable to bring about an end to the Iran-Iraq war or the rift between Assad and Arafat, not had it gained solid support for the various versions of fits Arab-Israeli peace plan.



In its efforts to promote Soviet influence while weakening and ultimately eliminating western influence from the Middle East, particularly from the Arab world, Moscow important has been the provision of military aid to its clients in the region. (For economic aid, the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Euphrates Dam in Syria are prominent examples of Soviet economic assistance, although each project had had serious problems. In recent years, Moscow had also sought to solidify its influence through concluding long-term friendship and cooperation treaties such as those with Egypt in 1971, Iraq in 1972, Somalia in 1974, Ethiopia in 1978, Afghanistan in 1978, South Yemen in 1979, Syria in 1980, and North Yemen in 1984. Repudiations of the treaties by Egypt in 1976 and Somalia in 1977 indicate that this has not always been a successful tactic.<sup>23</sup>

The aftermath of the Yom Kippur war, Moscow increasingly found itself on the sidelines of Middle Eastern diplomacy. Having intervened on the side of Egypt and Syria during the war and having encouraged the Arab oil embargo against the U.S. during and after the conflict, the Soviet leadership subsequently saw its fortunes decline.

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23 Anderoy, V., Shomikhin, "Soviet perceptions of U.S. Middle East Policy", Middle East Journal, vol.43, no.1, Winter 1989, pp.16-9.

First, Egypt and then Syria restored diplomatic relations with the U.S.; the oil embargo was lifted; U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger mediated two Israeli withdrawals in the Sinai, in January 1974 and August 1975, and one on the Golan Heights in May 1974. Egypt gradually moved into the American Camp, despite billions of rubles in military and economic aid and the considerable risks Moscow had incurred on Egypt's behalf both during the war of Attrition in 1970 and the Yom Kippur war. While Syria did not follow Egypt into the American Camp, it became increasingly embroiled in a conflict with Iraq, with which Moscow was also seeking close ties, and with the PLO as well by 1976.

Some achievements and failures:

The Geneva conference in December 1977 would have created momentum in favour of its peace plan, these expectations were not realized. Indeed, the joint Soviet-American peace statement became moot because the surprise visit of Sadat to Jerusalem in November, 1977 and the subsequent Camp David agreements changed the face of Middle Eastern diplomacy. Since September 1978, Moscow had been constantly preoccupied with the dangers of an expanded Camp David process. Consequently, one of the central thrusts of its Middle Eastern Policy had been to try to isolate Egypt in the Arab world and thereby prevent any explosion of Camp David.

Fortunately, for Moscow, there was almost universal Arab antipathy toward the Camp David agreements and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March, 1979. Indeed, Moscow had hopes that the large Arab coalition that had come together at Baghdad in November, 1978 to denounce Camp David - a coalition highlighted by the rapprochement between Syria and Iraq-might form the anti-imperialist Arab bloc the USSR had sought for so long.<sup>24</sup>

Moscow then moved to prevent any rapprochement of Iran with the U.S. by quickly coming out in support of the terrorists who seized the U.S. embassy in Iran in November, 1979 and spreading disinformation that the U.S. was about to attack Iran during the final stages of the hostages - release talks in January 1981.<sup>25</sup>

Moscow's response to these negative trends was three fold. First, on a December declaration advocating the neutralization of the Persian Gulf, a proposal was repeated at the Twenty-sixth Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1981.<sup>26</sup> Second, Brezhnev also stated at the Congress that the USSR was taking steps to promote a rapid end to the war, a goal Moscow repeatedly urged. Finally, Moscow began to turn two key nations, Kuwait and Jordan, in an effort to show the rapprochement between the centrist Arab States and Egypt.

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24 Robert, O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle Middle East since 1970 (New York: Praeger Press, 1982), pp. 315-35.  
 25 Ibid, p. 399.  
 26 Ibid, p. 398.

In the case of Jordan, "King Hussein also drew somewhat closer to Moscow out of concern over Ariel Sharon's growing influence on the Israeli government--sharon had repeatedly said that Jordan should be the Palestinian State<sup>27</sup>. Despite small gains with Kuwait and Jordan, Middle Eastern trends continued to move against the USSR. Consequently, Moscow which had embargoed arms shipments to Iraq at the onset of the war, resumed small scale shipments in late 1981. At the same time things appeared to be going from bad to worse in Egypt, where Anwar et Sadat expelled the Soviet ambassador and a number of other officials in early September of 1981. Three weeks later Sadat was assassinated, but any Soviet hope that Egypt would rapidly reorient its foreign policy seemed dashed as Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, affirmed the continuity of his regime's policies with those of Sadat's albeit with a somewhat more neutralist. Mubarak's Egypt, like Sadat's remained a major recipient of American military and economic aid and regularly carried on joint military exercises with the US.

#### Reagan and Fez Plans:

On 1 September, the eve of a long delayed Arab summit conference--President Reagan announced his plan for a Middle East peace settlement in a clear effort to gain centrist Arab support, Reagan called for a stop to Israeli settlement

activity on the West Bank and announced U.S. refusal to accept any Israeli claim to sovereignty over the West Bank. In his most controversial statement, he also called for a fully autonomous Palestinian entity linked to Jordan. To satisfy the Israelis, Reagan emphasized US concern for Israel's security, asserted that Israel's final borders should not be the boundaries that existed before that 1967 war, called for the unity of Jerusalem and direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, and reaffirmed U.S. opposition to a Palestinian state on the West Bank.<sup>28</sup>

The Arab summit of Fez, Morocco, which not only indicated that the Arab world had regained a semblance of unity but which also brought fourth a peace plan that, except for its lack of explicit charity as to "Israel's right to exist, was quite close to the long-standing Soviet Peace Plan in that it called for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries but no normalization of relations."<sup>29</sup>

The Soviet Peace Plan on Fez, Brezhnev evidently sought to prevent the Arabs from moving to embrace the Reagan Plan. Nonetheless, with the U.S. clearly possessing the diplomatic initiative in the Middle East and Arab leaders, including Jordan's king Hussein and PLO leader Arafat, expressing interest in the Reagan Plan, Moscow was on the diplomatic defensive.

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28 Legum, Shaked and Dishon, The US and the Middle East in Middle East Contemporary Survey (New York: Holmes & Meire, 1984), pp.30-3.

29 See, Middle East Journal, vol.37, no.1, Winter 1983, p.71.

Arafat had publicly stated in November 1982 that he was resigned to dealing with the U.S. as the dominant "superpower" in the Middle East thereby indicating his willingness to negotiate on the Reagan Plan.<sup>30</sup> During a visit to Moscow in January 1983 he had clashed with Andropov by calling for a Palestinian - Jordanian confederation. While Moscow was in favour of an independent Palestinian State, linking it to Jordan, a centrist state, not only seemed to associate the PLO partially with the Reagan Plan but also appeared to signal its defection from the steadfastness. Front, which had already been badly weakened by the Israeli invasion.

Fortunately for Moscow, Arafat's position soon weakened. Syria and Libya, which shared the Soviet interest in preventing a PLO turn to the U.S., actively moved to undermine Arafat's position, National Council (PNC). The PNC formally stated its refusal to consider the Reagan Plan as a sound basis for a just and lasting solution to the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>31</sup>

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30 Washington Post, 13 November 1982.

31 New York Times, 23 February 1983.

On 10 January before the PNC meeting, King Hussein declared he would decide by March whether or not to join Israel in peace talks. As sentiment within the PLO hardened against the Reagan Plan, King Hussein began to back away from the talks. On 10 April, claiming that Arafat had reneged on an earlier agreement, Hussein said that Jordan would not enter into the peace negotiations. Hussein's statement was greeted with great relief by Moscow, which had long feared that Jordan would be attracted to the Reagan Plan, considered by the Soviet leadership as an extension of Camp David.<sup>32</sup>

U.S. aid in the Gulf:

Egypt's relations with Arab nations improved, Syria appeared to remain isolated, despite its victory in Lebanon. Thus, not only was its influence insufficient to prevent the Islamic Conference from readmitting Egypt; it was against in isolation when the Arab League foreign ministers, in a meeting in mid-March that Syria and Libya boycotted, took a strongly anti-Iranian position. The meeting condemned Iran for its continuing "aggression against Iraq" and warned Iran that the continuation of the war would force the Arab States to reconsider their relations with it. Indeed, as this episode showed, the war in the Gulf was again causing problems for Moscow.

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32 Washington Post, 11 April 1983.

The U.S. moved to supply Saudi Arabia with short-range stinger anti air-craft missiles and another KC-10 tanker to help keep its air defence system of U.S. AWACS air-craft and Saudi F-15s in the air for longer periods. Saudi Arabia responded by shooting down an Iranian fighter bomber, with the help of information provided by AWACS air-craft. Kuwait, whose relations with the US had long been strained, also turned to the US for support and asked for stinger missiles. After the US offered improved Hawk anti-aircraft missiles instead, the Kuwaiti minister of defence went to Moscow--The trip had been planned in advance of the stinger request--and signed a military agreement with the USSR. Kuwait did later sign a military training agreement with the US also, as Kuwaiti-American relations improved.<sup>33</sup>

Soviet Peace Plan of 29 July, 1984:

While the American building in the Gulf was of concern to Moscow, the possibility of a revived Reagan Peace Plan continued to trouble the Soviet leadership as well. King Hussein of Jordan announced in mid March 1984 that he would not enter into talks with Israel, even if the Israelis halted the construction of settlements in occupied territories. The reason given was that the US had lost its

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33 Ibid, 1 December 1984.



credibility and was no longer a "trusted mediator - just the message that Moscow was trying to convey to the Arab world.<sup>34</sup> Two weeks later Hussein made clear in a statement about the just announced Israeli election scheduled for 23 July that he was keeping his options open. He indicated that a healthy change would result from a victory by the labour party, which opposed annexation of the West Bank, advocated territorial compromise with Jordan, and whose leader, Shimon Peres, had spoken favourably of the Reagan Plan

During the spring and summer of 1984, therefore, Soviet diplomacy had a special Jordanian focus. The Soviet leadership prepared a new variant of its Middle East Peace Plan, one that might prove more amenable to King Hussein. While the Jordanian monarch had long shared the Soviet goals of an international conference to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, he also had long desired a link between any Palestinian entity or state on the West Bank and Jordan, whose population was more than 60 per cent Palestinian. Therefore, the Soviet Plan Peace Plan of 29 July, which mentioned such a link, can be considered a major gesture to Hussein.

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34 New York Times, 15 March 1984.

The Brezhnev Peace Plan of 15 September 1982, which had combined the basic three-point Soviet Peace Plan with his major components of the Arab Programme announced at Fez, the new Soviet Plan had one additional key element; the acknowledgement that the new Palestinian State could form a confederation with a neighbouring country. Given the previous clash with Arafat over this issue during his visit to Moscow in January 1983, the Soviet leadership's inclusion of this element in its peace plan may also be seen as a gesture to the PLO leader. Arafat was then engaged in a prolonged political battle to win over the Marxist elements of the PLO - the so-called democratic alliance of the popular front for the liberation of Palestine, and the Palestine Communist Party - while struggling to isolate the so-called National Alliance of Palestinian factions controlled by Syria.<sup>35</sup>

Moscow's satisfaction, however, its peace initiative was warmly received in the Arab world, especially by such centrist Arab states as Jordan and Kuwait; Arafat's wing of the PLO also accepted the plan, as did Lebanon, and it received favourable comment from North and South Yemen, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. The positive Arab reaction for the Plan although the Arab States tended to be more supportive of the international conference than of the

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35 Paul Marantz & Janice Gross Stein, Peace-making in the Middle East (London, Sydney:Groom Helm, 1985), pp.188-96.

specific elements of the Soviet proposal - Moscow moved ahead during the summer of 1984 to garner increased backing for it. It appeared doubtful that the Soviet leadership really thought a Middle East Conference was obtainable in the near future, given the opposition of both Israel and the U.S. Indeed, it seemed as if Moscow was capitalizing on their opposition as it put forth a basic framework or which both the steadfastness front and Centrist groupings in the Arab world could agree. While this might not reunite the two Arab Camps, it would at least show the rapprochement between Egypt, which was at best lukewarm about the Soviet Plan, and the Centrist Arab States, while at the same time highlighting the U.S. as the opponent of the Arab consensus on the peace programme.

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CHAPTER IV

UNITED STATES, ISRAEL AND THE LEAGUEA. Permutations and Combinations:

Reagan Administration was an important watershed in United States-Israel relations. Reagan set forth the position of his administration on some of the central elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was not a "Plan" for resolution of the conflict - the administration was careful to distinguish it from a specific and detailed blue-print for action that would include methods and time-tables. It was argued that Resolution 242 and the Camp David accords provided an appropriate "Plan". Reagan sought to take advantage of the strategic alterations in the region. "It seemed to me that with the agreement in Lebanon (to evacuate the PLO fighters from Beirut) we had an opportunity for a far-reaching peace effort in the region, and I was determined to seize that moment".<sup>1</sup> He believed that the United States bore special responsibility for dealing with the problem .

The view reflected a peculiarly American trait - a neat package syndrome that suggested the need to try to resolve disputes and prevent their delirious internal

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1 Alan J. Kreezko, "Support Reagan's initiative", Foreign Policy, no.49, Winter 1982-83, pp.140-53.

effects. Reagan articulated general conception when he said:

U.S. involvement in the search for Mid-east peace was not a matter of preference, it was a moral imperative. In calling upon the parties to recognize each other's needs and aspirations, and he said, I recognize that the U.S. has special responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the peace process.(2)

He stated that the U.S. would put forward their own detailed proposals and would support positions that it saw as fair and reasonable compromise.

A sense of need and of responsibility was thus combined with a perception of a special opportunity. The President spoke of a fresh start as well as of continuity with the Camp David process, which the initiative was intended to re-invigorate, and he noted that the proposals were in keeping with Resolution 242. He reiterated a long-held U.S. position that negotiations between the parties were the only method to resolve the conflict. Reagan recalled for Israel to withdraw from occupied territory but not fully to the 1967 lines. The right of Israel to exist within secure and defensible borders was re-asserted, and it was stated that America's commitment to

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2 Christian Science Monitor (Boston), September 2, 1982.

the security of Israel was Ironclad.<sup>3</sup> Reagan altered his perspective of the Palestinians by saying that they had strong feelings that their cause was more than a question of refugees and further, that he agreed with that perspective. The Palestinian people had to exercise their legitimate rights. Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians were invited to join the negotiations on the future of the West Bank and Gaza strip.

Reagan did not identify exactly what role the Palestinians might play in the negotiations process nor who, other than Hussein, might represent them, but the PLO was not included. It was not mentioned (except in the context of withdrawal from Beirut) in the initiative and, in an interview on September 2, Shultz reiterated the long-standing U.S. policy with regard to the PLO. Reagan envisaged a five-year transition period during which the future of the West Bank and the Gaza strip would be worked out, as had been discussed in the Camp David accords. He said these territories should constitute neither an independent Palestinian state nor fall under Israeli sovereignty; rather, they should become a self-governing entity in association with Jordan. The city of Jerusalem should remain undivided, but its precise final status must be negotiated. Reagan's view of Israel's settlements in the West Bank and Gaza was modified when

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3 Steven Sherman, "The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1967-88", Middle East and North Africa (London, 1989) p.80.

he called for a freeze; he added that they were in no way necessary for the security of Israel. Further for the West Bank and Gaza was more precise than previously discussed.<sup>4</sup>

The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give and take of negotiations. But, it was the firm view of the U.S. that if -government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable just and lasting peace.

Initial Reactions: (Israel's Reaction)

On September 2, 1982, the Israeli Cabinet rejected the Reagan proposal as presented on U.S. television and as conveyed to Prime Minister Begin. There were specific objections and a general perception that it sought to deny Israel many of the benefits it could reap from the war. A major argument was that it departed from the conceptual framework agreed to at Camp David. The proposal seemed prematurely to determine the outcome of negotiations on several points, including the status of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel and the future of the West Bank and Gaza.

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4 See, Text of the 'Reagan Initiative'; "A New Opportunities for Peace in the Middle East", Current Policy, no.417, September 1, 1982.



The Camp David accords deliberately left open the final status of these areas and contained no provision concerning Jerusalem. There were, instead, letters attached to the accords stating the positions of the parties. Since the proposal represented a shift in the U.S. role from that of honest broker to that of advocate affecting the outcome of the negotiations. Commenting on the initiative, former U.S. negotiator Ambassador Sol Linowitz said:

President Reagan's peace proposal sharply changes the role of the U.S. in the Middle East negotiations. Until now the U.S. has acted as a mediator seeking to find common ground between the parties. The plan advanced by the President, however, sets forth American positions on some of the most controversial aspects of the negotiations. (5)

The very fact that the U.S. articulated its position prior to an agreement by the Arabs to negotiate seemed to Israel to reduce the chances for negotiations. Reagan called for a unilateral freeze of settlements by Israel without any quid pro quo from Jordan. This was not included in the Camp David accords but addressed in a separate letter, and was a matter of significant controversy, given the divergent U.S. and Israeli interpretations of the length of time Israel had agreed to forge settlement

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5 Sol Linowitz, "An old pro's view", Newsweek, September 13, 1982, p.31.

construction. Israel was concerned that the U.S. had defined autonomy to include the land and its resources; which had been left nor for negotiation because the Camp David accords specified that the inhabitants of the areas would enjoy full autonomy.

Begin preferred the Camp David process within the new context created by the war in Lebanon, particularly the decreased capabilities of the PLO. Israel was also concerned in advance but that the initiative was presented as a fait accompli to Israel. In the Knesset, on September 8, 1982, foreign minister Yitzhak Shamir said: "The U.S. government did not see fit to consult with us on this new program, which concerns our borders, our security and our positions".<sup>6</sup> Israel viewed this as a violation of the spirit of the Sinai II pledges, in 1975, to consult concerning the peace process and of the general spirit of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

The concern of the proposals seemed to deviate from the Camp David process, despite Reagan's assertions to the contrary, and to focus on points deliberately avoided at Camp David, the initiative seemed to generate a new procedure with a Palestinian focus and an approach to the West Bank that the Begin government had sought to avoid. The proposal seemed to embrace the views of Shimon

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6 Interview with Henry Kissinger, The Economist, November 3, 1982, p.28.

Peres, Begin's major opponent and leader of the opposition Labor Alignment, who had advocated Jordanian option both in the 1981 election campaign and subsequently.<sup>7</sup>

The Israeli cabinet unanimously rejected the initiative, but Peres suggested that it had "positive points" and was a "basis for dialogue", with some reservations. The Reagan administration indicated that it was not surprised by the rejection but did not consider Israel's final and irrevocable word. The Arab summit meeting at Fez, raised questions about U.S. motives. Some observers felt that it would help to prevent a strongly anti-U.S. tone at Fez and might help to secure the needed backing for Hussein to participate in the process.

The Arab reaction was, on the whole, a move more positive, partly as a result of the fact that their expectations of the Reagan administration were. The Arab world rejected the proposal, others identified "new" and "positive" elements, and were pleased with Israeli discomfort are the changes that could be identified in U.S. policy, even if they were denounced as insufficient.

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7 Shimon Peres, "A strategy for peace in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, no.58, Spring 1980, pp.887-90.

Implementing the Initiative:

Ambassador Philip Habib was appointed the President's special representative for the Middle East ( a super-ambassador), with overall responsibility for implementing the initiative as well as for coordinating the negotiations concerning Lebanon. He was to be assisted in the first task by Ambassador Richard Fairbanks and in the second by Ambassador Harris Draper.

The administration's resolve to continue with the initiative became increasingly obvious over time. December 23, 1982 reporters asked Reagan, what he considered his greatest foreign policy accomplishment, Reagan responded:

I think that the initiative that we have taken in the Middle East is probably the greatest accomplishment, and I have great hopes for that. If we can bring peace to that very troubled area, I think we will have made a very great accomplishment.(8)

In his 1983 state of the Union address Reagan said:

All the people of the Middle East, should know that in the year ahead, we will not flag as our efforts to build on that (Camp David) foundation to bring them the blessings of peace.(9)

Shultz similarly suggested continued and increased

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8 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, September 6, 1982.

9 New York Times, January 26, 1983.

implementation of U.S. policy took two forms: The administration waited for Hussein to agree to join the process, and it concentrated on the immediate problems of Lebanon. This primary efforts of the U.S. peace team worked to secure the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and to provide for the reconstruction of the country and the improvement of the capability of the Lebanese armed forces. Reagan and Shultz reiterated the view that a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations for the withdrawal of foreign forces was a necessary first step. They also recognized that the process was going far more slowly than they wished. This was Shultz conference of November 18, 1982. At the same time the U.S. continued its efforts to improve the situation in Lebanon. U.S. economic and military aid, as well as the presence of U.S. marines as part of a multinational force and of U.S. advisers to help train the Lebanese military to assume greater responsibility for internal security, became visible parts of a comprehensive efforts to respond to the situation created by the 1982 war restored Lebanon's position as a sovereign and prosperous state.

Lebanon issue became an apparent American efforts to secure the participation of King Hussein as the Arab interlocuter became an increasingly important aspect of U.S. policy.

Hussein's participation:

The administration recognized the need for the participation of King Hussein, Shultz stated that:

Absence of Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories from the negotiations had been the crucial missing link in the Camp David process. They hoped to recognize a just and durable peace.(10)

In October when Arab delegation visited Washington they offered a similar appraisal. Jordan participation not only because Jordan was indispensable, in its view for a discussion of the West Bank, a positive response from Hussein would help bring about a change in the Israeli position, thereby improving the prospects for peace. This prospective was articulated clearly by Shultz in an interview published in U.S. news and World Report on November 8, 1982. The next step in the process for King Hussein of Jordan with the support from the Arab world and the participation of some form of Palestinian representation, to express a willingness to sit down and negotiate with Israel on the future of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip areas.<sup>11</sup>

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10 Secretary of State George Shultz, "The quest for peace", Department of State, Current Policy, no.419, September 1982, p.3.

11 New York Times, September 15, 1982.

Israeli Defence Minister Sharon Larry Speaker said that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Jordan and their supporters did not agree that Jordan is a Palestine State.

Hussein visited the U.S. in December. In an interview prior to the visit, Reagan again displayed his optimism and said that:

Hussein sincerely desirous of peace in the Middle East. I think he will be cooperative and I think we can count on him for that. At the same time Reagan noted the priority of Lebanon and its linkage to the initiative. But the main thing right now...is to get what now constitute armies of occupation the PLO, the Syrians, and the Israel - out of Lebanon... that is the first step, and then we move to the peace process.(12)

This optimism remained the public face of the administration even though nothing productive emerged publicly as a result of Hussein's visit. Nevertheless, Reagan said that they had concluded productive talks and ...they made significant progress towards peace. It was during the December visit that Reagan reportedly promised Hussein that if he offered to enter the talks, the U.S. would try to halt the building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gazas, a pledge

acknowledged by the Department of State in mid-April. If the U.S. failed, it would not press Hussein to join in the talks.<sup>13</sup>

April 1983 the efforts of the Reagan administration both to negotiate a withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and to encourage King Hussein to come forward as a participation in peace negotiations on behalf of the Palestinians had failed. At the same time the existing American commitment was becoming more complex and dangerous as evidenced, in part, by the attack on the American Embassy in Beirut, with a substantial loss of life, Reagan decided to increase the level of personal involvement by sending the Secretary of State to the region in May 1983.

B. Israel as a Decisive Factor:

Recognition by the Arabs - The State of Israel became an accomplished fact. It was alleged that it should have a legitimacy within the community of nations but Israel's legitimacy had thus far been recognised by too few countries and had been denied by every Arab-state except Egypt. It had a right to exist, and it had a right to demand of its neighbours to recognize those facts - so ran the arguments of pro-Israeli faction.



After the extensive talks, the U.S. had restructured its 1985 aid package to Israel. Military assistance that Israel received on a loan basis would be grants; for this coming year we have proposed that Israel receive economic aid totaling \$ 1.4 billion for a total aid package of \$ 2.25 billion". America also committed to assisting in the development of Israeli economic self-efficiency.<sup>14</sup> In January 1970, Nixon sought to influence Israeli thinking by reassuring it American support. He sent a message to the National Emergency Conference on Peace in the Middle East in which he reaffirmed U.S. friendship for Israel. Nixon stated that the U.S. wanted to help the people of the region to achieve peace, which could be based only on agreement between the parties and that agreement could be achieved only through negotiations between them.<sup>15</sup>

The PLO had a record of sponsoring terrorism against the innocent civilians. They seemed to have boasted about murdering the Israeli athletes in Munich. They would also kill school children in Israel. It's common sense that in diplomacy and government or organization that embraces terrorism should be treated as an outcast. First among

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14 Toby Dershowitz, The Reagan Administration and Israel (AIPAC) papers on U.S.-Israel Relations Public Affairs, pp.34-55.

15 Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the special relationship (New York: Praeger Publication 1984), p.25.

these is the PLO. The PLO has an appalling record of sponsoring terrorism against innocent civilians, said President George Bush on December 15, 1985.<sup>16</sup>

In this Arab world where faith and politics were linked with the traditionalists as well as the radicals. Saudis and Libyans could unite in hostility of the State of Israel whose existence they refused even to acknowledge, whose name they refused to utter calling Israel, instead the "Zionist entity" or the "deformed Zionist". Thus, the Palestinian nationalism became centrally identified with pan/Arab nationalism, but the PLO, using fair means and foul, of Palestinian nationalism and radical politics that linked the struggle for the destruction.

Cooperation with Arab countries:

Prime Minister Peres has proposed Joint Economic Cooperation among Israel, Egypt, and Jordan under a new "Marshall Plan" style program. Already the U.S. provided more economic aid to these states than any others. We were determined to stand by this commitment. We hope that other states with an interest in the region -including the Europeans and Japan - will enlist in regional economic help.

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16 Ibid, p. 52.

Negotiations with Jordan:

Negotiations between Israel and Jordan could result the long and creative steps toward resolving these problems. Israel and Jordan are the two Palestinian states envisioned and authorized by the United Nations. Jordan was recognized as sovereign in 80 per cent of the old territory of Palestine. Israel and Jordan are the parties primarily authorized to settle the future of the unallocated territories, in accordance with the principles of the Mandate and the the provisions of Resolutions 242-383.

Thus, the autonomy plan called for by the Camp David Agreements must be interpreted in accordance with the two Security Council Resolutions, which remained the decisive and authoritative rules governing the situation. The Camp David agreements cannot and should not lead to fundamental changes in the security position or to the withdrawal of Israeli troops, until Jordan and other neighbours make peace.

Prime Minister Peres had made clear Israel's desire for direct negotiations without preconditions, and King Hussein stated here at the White House on September 30 that he welcomed the prospect of beginning

negotiations with Israel promptly and directly.

"This kind of determination and good faith gives the U.S. confidence that the hurdles to peace can be overcome. U.S. had a mutual obligation and strategic interest in supporting the forces of freedom and democracy around the world".<sup>17</sup> This was the foundation of their strong interest in the movement towards democracy in this hemisphere. For 40 years this had been the foundation of their relationship with Western Europe. And this was the foundation of their relationship with Israel. Israel is an foremost strategic friend in the Middle East. They had signed an agreement for strategic cooperation. As a result the U.S. and Israel engaged in regular, detailed discussion about how to cooperate to defend shared interest of military.

The development of the Levi fighter led to the sharing of critical technologies for the use in the fighter. The U.S. purchases Israeli weapons. They are also negotiating to jointly build missiles, submarines.

On February 14, Reagan, Mubarak and Hussein had a meeting. In a White House ceremony to bid the visiting leaders farewell, Reagan said that the U.S. was still

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17 Alan J. Krezko, n.1, pp.143-53.

committed to Reagan's Arab-Israeli Peace Formula put forward on September 1, 1982. He also stressed the basic need for Israel to exchange territory for peace. Reagan affirmed that the U.S. supported Israel's Camp David framework agreement and the Israeli peace treaty.

Settlements:

Reagan's statement on September 1, 1982 that U.S. will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel. And permit me to reaffirm a long standing American commitment. So long as the PLO refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist and to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the U.S. will neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO.<sup>18</sup> In Israel, free men and women are every day demonstrating the power of courage and faith. In 1948, when Israel was founded, pundits claimed the new country could never survive. Israel was a land of stability and democracy in a region of tyranny and unrest.

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18      Toby Dershowitz, n.14, p.19.

The U.S. particularly asked that the parties themselves not preclude possible outcome by concrete and perhaps irreversible actions undertaken before the process of negotiation was completed. While they support the right of Jewish to live in peace on the West Bank and Gaza under the constituted governmental authority there - Just as Arabs live in Israel -US regard the continuation of settlement actively prior to the conclusion of negotiations as detrimental to the peace process.

For the past five years Israel and Egypt had shared a peaceful, open border where no shots had been fired in the Middle East, with its history of conflict and confrontation. This was a historic achievement. The Palestinian people would support King Hussein's entry into direct talks with Israel together with representative Palestinians. They and the Arab governments most directly concerned know there can be no significant progress toward peace without direct negotiations. They acknowledge that prospects for bold steps; the peace table would certainly be brighter if Israel reversed its settlements policy. Settlement activity poses an obstacle for the peace process. As the President stated further settlement activity was in no way necessary for Israel's security and diminished.

Israel and Lebanon Agreement, May 1983:

There was an agreement that had been reached and signed between Lebanon and Israel in which Israel had agreed in writing that they would withdraw. Gemayel government was trying to bring these other forces in Lebanon and if they would remember that they were Lebanese also, and they wanted a Lebanon for the Lebanese people, they would come in at his request and join the government. The "existing international boundary between Israel and Lebanon" would be the border between the two states.

A joint Liaison Committee, in which the United States would participate, was to be established and entrusted with the supervision of the implementation of all areas covered by the present agreement. "All Israeli forces will have been withdrawn from Lebanon. This is consistent with the objective of Lebanon that all external forces withdraw from Lebanon".<sup>19</sup> The U.S. assured Israel that it was not obliged to begin a pullout until Syria and the PLO did. On May 17, Israel and Lebanon signed the U.S. - mediated agreement.

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19 New York Times, May 17, 1983.

The Lebanese representative, Antoine Fattel said: "They are signing the agreement it is because Lebanon is in need of urgent tranquility and order Lebanon wants to survive".<sup>20</sup> The Israeli negotiator David Kimche also said the accord marked a new chapter in their histories and called on Syrian President Assad to withdraw his forces from Lebanon.

Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir said that Shultz's shuttle diplomacy had "succeeded in bridging some of the differences which prevail between Lebanon and Israel. I believed that the agreement we reached with your aid, if it will be scrupulously kept by all parties, has achieved that "goal" of peace and sovereignty for Lebanon and security for Israel's northern borders, he also noted that "Israel for its part will implement this agreement as soon as possible" and that implementation will depend on the positions of the other camps, the PLO and the Syrian army".<sup>21</sup> Syria subjected to the Israeli security presence in southern Lebanon, claiming that it infringed on Lebanese sovereignty and Syrian security. Despite the professed concern for the future of Lebanon, Assyria's mothers seemed more Syria-oriented/Syria sought to regain

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20 New York Times, May 18, 1983.

21 Washington Post, May 10, 1983.



the Golan Heights, and if this was not possible through a process such as that proposed by the Reagan initiative, then it would play the "spoiler" by preventing negotiations.

The Soviet Union's negative reaction was multifaceted. On May 9, 1982 Tass issued a statement in which it charged that the U.S. and Israel were "grossly violating" Lebanese territory, and it demanded the "unconditional withdrawal" of Israeli troops from Lebanon as the first and foremost condition for bringing peace to that country. It insisted that U.S. and other foreign troops should be withdrawn so that Lebanon would be free of all foreign troops, and could be united and independent. The Soviets also charged that Israel was preparing another Middle Eastern war. Soviet support for the Syrian position took the form of statements as well as continued military supply and economic assistance. The agreement, accompanied by Syria's rejection of it with strong Soviet support, had a positive effect on U.S.-Israel relations.

The Visit of Menachem Begin to Washington at the end of July 1983 was cancelled by Begin, for personal reason. They reassured the redeployment would not lead to a de facto partition of Lebanon, and that it was the

first phase in a total withdrawal of Israeli forces that would occur with the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces from Lebanon.

The "fresh start" initiative was not particularly auspicious. No negotiations had begun under its auspices. The problem of Lebanon, which had become a surrogate for the initiative. The Israeli-Lebanon agreement was an important accomplishment, but it was virtually still born as a result of Syrian, PLO, and Soviet opposition. Progress was made on the Gemayel government beyond small sectors of Beirut, on rebuilding the Lebanese army to establish broader Central government authority, and on the reconstructions of Lebanon, but this was limited and slow.

The successful completion of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and the courage shown on this occasion by Prime Minister Begin and president Mubarak in living up to their agreements convinced. The time had come for a new American policy to try to bridge the remaining differences between Egypt and Israel on the autonomy process. Reagan statement - the Security of Israel was a principle objective of this administration. US regard Israel as an ally in their search for regional stability.

Strategic Cooperation with U.S.

Israel's value as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the U.S. can truly rely; other pre-western states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and the smaller gulf kingdoms are weak and vulnerable. Israel has the democratic will, national cohesion, technological capacity and military fiber to stand forth as America's trusted ally. Strong Israel is the America's self-interest. It's a strategic asset to America, Israel is not a client, but a very reliable friend, strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Israel has become a formal institutionalised process. They had established the joint political military group to improve cooperation so that they could resist threats to their common interest in the Middle East. President Reagan and Prime Minister Shamir agreed to enhance strategic cooperation between U.S. and Israel.

Israel Defense force: IDF in politics is natural. It is a small standing force with a sizable reserve. Israel's army is part of its society--its personal and political concepts and its ideology are a part of the Israeli national life style. In the military field, without repeat

any formal alliance, sees the level of exchange of information, the learning of lessons from one another, the training of Americans on some techniques which the IDF has perfected, the many visit of elements of the U.S. six fleet to the extraordinary hospitality of Halfa Harbor and the city of Haifa, the orientation trips in both directions by senior officials, and importantly access provided for the IDF to the most advanced technology that the U.S. had developed to assist Israel to defend itself against its enemies.

The level of institutional ties, the pentagon and the IDF are working more closely together than ever before in a whole variety of informal or formal ways the Washington appreciation of Israel as a strategic partner for the U.S. This came to a greater understanding of the potential contribution Israel can make to American strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. "Israel has a large, well trained and very experienced air force, army and navy and Israel occupies a very strategic piece of territory".<sup>22</sup> Since the formation of the U.S.-Israel

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22 Ibid, July 8, 1983.

Joint Political Military Group in January 1984, Israeli and American experts had identified some important complements. Previously there was little American military appreciation of the IDF's relevance to U.S. concerns in the theatre. Today, however, the U.S. defense planes are better aware of the possibilities of cooperating with Israel. In extermist against possible Soviet threats. Israel has now become much more important to U.S. strategic thinking, although still hardly central.

Israel Lobby:

Among the more prominent of these was a unanimous U.N. Security Council vote on March 1, 1980, in which the U.S. joined, on Resolution 465, calling on Israel "to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem".<sup>23</sup> Concern within the Israel lobby, the U.S. Jewish community, and in Israel was also generated by comments made during the debate by the President and others that raised questions about the motivations of those who sought to thwart the proposal.

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23 Bernard Reich, n.15, p.76.

There are numerous examples of the success of the Israel lobby, but few are as prominent as the letter of 76 Senators to the President in 1975. The failure of 1975 Kissinger Shuttle, the Ford-Kissinger team undertook a reassessment of U.S. Middle East Policy. "Senator Charles Mathias, Jr., wrote that seventy six of us promptly affixed our signatures although no hearings had been held, no debate conducted, nor had the Administration been invited to present . Its views".<sup>24</sup>

The Israel lobby had an influential role in the formation of attitudes and the formulation of policies concerning Israel and the Middle East. At the core is AIPAC, the only officially registered lobbying organization established for the purpose of influencing legislation on capital Hill to improve U.S.-Israel relations. It is registered under the lobbying law. Its officially stated purpose is to maintain and improve the friendship and goodwill between the U.S. and Israel.

The lobbying process gets an assist from its "client" - the government of Israel - in a number of ways. Clearly it is in the interest of the government of Israel

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24 Charles Mcc Mathies Jr., "Ethnic groups and foreign policy", Foreign Affairs, no.59, (Summer 1981), p.993.

in Jerusalem (and its embassy in Washington) to maintain close contacts with the various groups lobbying on its behalf and with Congress, which is no important to it, in addition to the traditional and ordinary linkages with the executive branch. The success and failure of the Israel lobby has been highlighted by events in recent years. The 1975 letter of 76 Senators to President Ford endorsing aid to Israel, the 1978 vote by a Senator majority that did not prevent the Carter administration's majority that did not prevent the Carter administration's sale of F-15 Jets to Saudi Arabia, and the 1981 vote not to prevent the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia.

C. Reagan and Thereafter:

The period of late 1980s began as a time of promise for the U.S. foreign policy in the Arab region and in many other parts of the globe. The Iran-Iraq war had finally come to an end. Soviet troops were to depart from Afghanistan by the middle of February. The U.S. had decided to open a dialogue with the Palestinian Organisation (PLO) and in Arab-Israeli peace making idplomacy. And the United States and the world awaited the inauguration of the forty-first United States President, George Herbert Walter Bush, who would lead his nation, its foreign policy and its engagement in the Middle East into a new decade.

The U.S. approach to the Middle East during the late 1980s was a development in the region that did not focus primarily on its age old problems. The changing perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Middle East had a definite impact on the calculations of the Bush administration about its own role in the region. It was only in South West Asia and in the Persian Gulf that the Bush administration particularly concerned itself about the Soviet objectives with these exceptional changes taking place in overall U.S.-Soviet relations, the Bush administration attempted to make new assessments about the relative importance of the Middle East.

The U.S. and Israel were not particularly anxious to include the Soviet Union in peace-making. The Bush administration thus showed remarkable signals for peace-making, as compared to the Reagan administration's efforts.

Before coming to office in January 1989, President Bush had apparently reached two conclusions based on his observations of the turmoil in Iran and the U.S. policy towards it during the Reagan years. First, was the independence and integrity of Iran, - this was the unrefuted strategic argument behind the "arms for hostages"--dealings of 1985-87; and the second was that the Iranian leaders be compelled to accept the importance of tolerable relations with the West after the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war.



In November, 1988, the PLO grabbed the diplomatic initiative by proclaiming a Palestian State in the West Bank and Gaza and reformulating its general position vis-a-vis Israel. Israeli Defence Minister, Yitzhak Rabin continued to search for the combination of military, economic and administrative pressures that would cause the intifada to collapse. As one expert commented: "A Palestinian State on the West Bank and Gaza represents a far more realistic goal than the long trumpeted military solution against Israel or the creation of a single secular binational democratic state in all of Palestine."<sup>25</sup>

Peace Process:

The Israeli initiative was judged to be a genuine effort toward a settlement. In September, 1989, Egyptian President Mubarak became involved in the process by presenting his 10-point plan to try to bridge the gap between the Israeli and Palestian position. Secretary Baker entered the process again with his own list of five point in October. Israelis thought Baker was giving the PLO too great a role in forming the Palestian delegation. The events of the past-year indicate at least a superficial change. But most Israelis were not convinced that the change in the PLO was more than superficial.

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25      Graham E. Fuller, "The Palestinians: The Deceive Year", Current History, vol. 89, no. 544, February 1990, p. 54.

Israeli politics had to take account of the fact that its principal patron was accepting a legitimate role for the PLO. At the same time, Palestinian politics also had to change, as the PLO found itself talking directly to the U.S. Through representatives in Tunis. For the first time in its history, the PLO leadership had to accept responsibility for its actions as an indirect but acknowledged participant in the peace-process.<sup>26</sup> To this end, the Bush administration became reluctant to see the violent acts committed against Israeli-styled terrorism.

Developments:

Although there were changes in the context within which avenues to peace were being debated, the Bush administration was not guided solely by perceptions of the relationship between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.S.-Soviet relations.

Other developments increased U.S. sensitivity to involvement, in addition to the traditional incentives provided by close American ties to and concern for the State of Israel. These developments included the proliferation within the region both of ballistic missiles and of

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26 Harold M. Waller, "Israel Continuing Dilemma", Current History, vol.89, no.544, pp.69-79.

unconventional weapons -especially chemical weapons. Israel had nuclear weapons and was cooperating with South Africa on the means of delivering them. The Bush administration decided that it could not adopt the passive role that had dominated most of the Reagan years.

Secretary of State James A. Baker called for "new ideas" on the part of the local parties and especially for concrete Israeli recommendations. The U.S. gesture was accepted by P.H. Yitzhak Shamir, who was under pressure in the face of the continuing Arab uprising. Finally Israel accepted the Palestinians as its negotiating partner. Bush Administration continued to play a modest role as a potential broker between Israel and its neighbours.

#### Jordan:

Turning to Jordan it was active in regional and international affairs, the Hashemite Kingdom has been increasingly preoccupied with its borders. When the driving forces behind Jordan's inter-Arab policy turned against the kingdom, the regime finally turned inward, where it began to deal with the problems and challenges that had been building during its years of high-profile international activity.

Jordan's principal foreign policy objectives in the mid-1980s were threefold:

Subordination of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to Jordan's peace policy; Arab solidarity with Iraq in its battle with non-Arab Iran, and restoration of friendly relations with Syria. (27)

By 1988, all three goals were met. First, a successful series of Jordanian initiatives had repaired ties with Syria, including a commitment not to flout Syrian interests in the peace process. Of course, Damascus was in no position to reject appeals for Arab unity, because Syria had been isolated from the Arab world for supporting Teheran in the Gulf war.

King Hussein of Jordan had been at his best on Arab unity under the banner of the Iraqi war effort. He had, offered his country's good officers as a conduit for the Egyptian-Iraqi arms supply network that was critical to Baghdad's war effort, he was the moving force behind the emergence of an exist of moderate Arab States (Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan). As the host of the Arab League Summit meeting in Amman in November 1987, the King used his diplomatic success by engineering unanimous approval for a strongly worded condemnation of Iran and by gaining Syria's acquiescence in the restoration of bilateral ties between Egypt and the other Arab States.

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27 Robert Satloff, "Jordan looks Inward", Current History, vol.89, no.544, p.57.

The Arab unity fostered by the Iran Iraq war lost in appeal with the approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 and the imposition of a Gulf Cease-fire with that approval Jordan lost its peculiar role as a small state rallying larger and more powerful states to action. The Gulf War permitted the Arab world to turn its sights once again toward the politics of Palestine.

Arafat's reemergence in the Inter-Arab stage at an extraordinary Arab League Summit meeting in Algiers in June 1988. His aim was not only to reestablish his imprimatur on all matters relating to Palestine but to avenge his humiliation at the Amman Summit meeting eight months earlier.

#### Inter-Arab Cooperation:

Jordan continued to be an active and engaged player in inter-Arab and peace process politics. The king was one of the formal establishment of the Arab cooperation Council (ACC) in February. The ACC members include Egypt, Iraq, North Yemen, and Jordan in an effort to build a common market encompassing half the Arab world's population. And the Jordan would not only provide a framework to face the growth of other regional economic units (i.e. the Gulf cooperation Council and the North African Union) and the single European Market of 1992, but that it would also offer a free home for the kingdom's excess skilled labour.

Jordan maintained support for the Palestinian uprising and for the PLO's diplomatic strategy. Thus the PLO was allowed to establish an embassy in Amman in January 1989, the headquarters of the Palestine National Fund was reopened Jordan was invited for a five-power international peace-conference of the best route to a solution of the Arab-Israeli Conflicts. Jordan had a vital role to play in the peace process as a confrontation state with the longest border with Israel, a role that did not end with the disengagement from the West Bank.<sup>28</sup>

#### Recent Middle East Crisis:

The recent crisis in the Gulf was also a crisis in the American search for an identity in the post-cold war world. The Soviet retrenchment from the global strategic arena, seemed to confirm the perception that America had won the cold war. Many analysts proclaimed the reemergence of a unipolar world dominated by the US.

At the end of the recent Gulf crisis the American media chailed the handling of the Gulf crisis by the President George Bush as "masterly".

Bush Said, "The American way of life" was at stake in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait". Indeed, at stake was the U.S. power and both, liberals and conservatives, were

slowly voicing their opposition to a massive American involvement to protect that oil. Moreover, the future of the region that had been embroiled in bloody territorial disputes for decades.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait brought in front the urgency of addressing the festering problems of West Asia. If long term peace was to return to the region, US policy makers would have to confront the whole gamut of problems and not just the threat to Saudi Arabia.

The transition from Jimmy Carter's rapid deployment to George Bush's massive deployment began, in retrospect, in 1987, when the US navy sent an armada of nearly 50 warships into the Persian Gulf to safeguard Kuwaiti tankers "reflagged" with the stars with stripes and to help Iraq again the upper hand in its long war with Iraq.(29)

During the mid-March "victory tour" of the Middle East the Secretary of State James Baker voiced the pious wish that "Desert storm might be the last great battle in the Middle East".<sup>30</sup> The U.S. military intervention in West Asia for all the aspects of success claimed by the Bush administration, illustrated the extent to which the political and economic costs of sustaining dominion over client regimes in the Middle East had become indispensably to the American policy planners.

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29 Joe Stark, "The Gulf war and the Arab world", World Policy Journal (New York), vol.8, no.2, Spring 1991, p.365.

30 Washington Post, 13 March, 1991.

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CONCLUSION



### CONCLUSION

No sooner did the Second World War come to an end, than the Arab Nationalism became a pivotal factor in West Asia and constituted a factor to be reckoned with in International Relations. The bipolar division of the world into the Eastern and the West Asian region blocs with strategic importance of the Arab region acted as a significant factor in shaping the U.S. policy in this region. The biggest oil reserves, located in the Arab world, made it further viable in the estimate of Big Powers.

In March 1945 the League of Arab States came into existence. The League of Arab States was born out of Arab nationalism and a general Arab desire for unity. These phenomena developed during the later part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth as a direct reaction against Ottoman domination and against the centralisation policies of the Committee of Union and Progress. The feelings gathered momentum during the First World War, and continued to grow until, in 1945. The Pact was signed by Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and The Yemen. Later the League was joined by all the other countries of the Arab world.

Thus, one can say that the confrontation among the local factions and a pressure generated by the external forces in the Arab world brought about the formation of the Arab League.

The League came into existence with the representatives of seven nations viz. Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen. These were 21 members of the League in 1980, now the Yemen is divided into two: Yemen Peoples Democratic Republic, and Yemen Arab Republics. So the League members have been twenty two.

Egypt's membership of the League was suspended, in accordance with a resolution passed at the Baghdad Summit. In March 1979, the Egyptians Israeli Peace Treaty, at which timing it was also agreed that the League Secretariat should be moved from Cairo to Tunis. This action was taken in response to the signing of a bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The composition of the League of a Council, a number of special committees and a permanent secretariat on the Council and each state had one vote. Its functions include mediations in any dispute between any of the League States or a League State and a country of the

League. The Council has a political committee consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States. In this 22 specialized agencies were there.

The permanent secretary of the League, under a Secretary General has its seat in Tunisia. The League considers itself as a regional organization within the framework of the United Nations at which its Secretary General is an observer.

The Arab countries were "determined" to end western monopoly of oil in their countries. Any attempt by the US to reverse this process would have had disastrous results. It was for them to decide as to how they sold their commodities. Although increase in oil prices had affected the economy of friendly countries like India, but the oil producing Arab countries had promised liberal assistance to the developing countries.

On the other hand, the U.S. interests continued to enjoy the access to the Arab oil reserves --the absence of which would have brought about negative effects to their economy. As a result, the U.S. continued its efforts to offset any propaganda that went against their interest. They also tried to cultivate the principal power centres in the Arab world for gaining a strong position for themselves.

American policy towards the Arab Israeli disputes involved three levels of decision making. The global the regional, and the actual. Any administration would always have global, aims. These aims related directly to the Middle East, as Eisenhower's--Dulle's pursuit of the Baghdad Pact and Carter's pursuit of stability in the region for energy supply. At other times, Middle East was peripheral to the administration's main concern as it was to Truman's containment policy or Kennedy's multiple options doctrine. There were also some regional objectives in the U.S. policy. One such aim was the promotion of a pro-American Arab Unity. Another being the build up of Iran as a protector of the Persian Gulf. Finally, there were significant moves towards resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict--Eisenhower Doctrine, Johnston Plan, Kennedy's Johnson Plan, and Nixon Rogar's Plan.

Hence the U.S. policy makers evolved a policy with goals relating to Arab-Israeli reconciliation. Neither regional nor Arab-Israeli policy would contradict global objectives that the U.S. pursued. Thus the Arab Israeli dispute temporarily became part of a global--ideological conflict.

When in 1978, Jimmy Carter resorted to the termination of the Arab Israeli conflict, he sponsored

the Middle East summit at Camp David, concluded on September 17, with Israeli premier Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat agreeing to a framework for a peace treaty between them for the settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

President Carter was rightly given much of the credit for promoting peace between these two powers. The achievements were widely seen of his major success in foreign policy. In June 1982, he showed the limits of the slogan of "no more wars" that had grown of Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977.

The results of Camp David Accords did not yield anything substantial. The Palestinian self governing authority could not be established. Sadat was criticised all over the Arab world for selling out the Palestinians. There was no such withdrawal of the territory and no self determination for the Palestinians. For any solution of the Middle Eastern problem, efforts would have to be employed to the question of Palestinians. The Camp David Accords went completely contrary to all these objectives.

The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 brought about some peace. That was true in large part because of



the enduring risks of a major Arab-Israeli conflict and, with it, the risk of United States-Soviet confrontation, as happened at least to some degree in the wars of 1948, 1956 , 1967 and 1973. At times, there was also the incipient threat of the so-called Arab oil weapon. The possibility that, in order to effect US policy toward Israel and related states, key Arab oil producers would use their economic leverage.

The Bush administration was apparently ready to become engaged in peace-making, in contrast to the Reagan administration. Thus the Bush administration continued to play a modest role as a potential broker between Israel and its neighbour, while working to make the basic principle of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue irreversible. The divided nature of the Israeli government, the departure of Jordan from the peace process and the opening of the US-PLO dialogue, the focus shifted on the minutiae of modalities. However, they were at least three levels away from discussions about critical issues of territory, people and the peace in the region. While several other factors have overtaken the West Asian region, the Arab League has also been subject of stresses and strains, as and when the situation has warranted.

The United States under different Administrations Ronald Reagan and George Bush, have responded to the collectivity of the situation with due caution. They have instead focused their attention more on bi-lateral relations in the region. The division amongst the members has further strengthened the hands of its adversaries.

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THE REAGAN PLAN

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, and the consequent evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, the US Government made strenuous efforts to continue the Camp David peace process and find a permanent solution that would ensure peace in the Middle East. On 1 September 1982 President Reagan outlined the following proposals in a broadcast to the nation from Burbank, California:

1. ...First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs. Due consideration must be given to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

2. The purpose of the 5-year period of transition, which would begin after free elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority, is to prove to the Palestinians that they can run their own affairs and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security.

3. The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transition period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way

necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.

4. I want to make the American position well understood: The purpose of this transition period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel's security requirements.

5. Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.

6. So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.

7. There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give and take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.

8. We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. This exchange is enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 242, which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David agreements. UN Resolution 242 remains wholly valid as the foundation stone of America's Middle East peace effort.

9. It is the United States' position that - in return for peace - the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza.

10. When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the security arrangements offered in return.

Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations.

In the course of the negotiations to come, the United States will support positions that seem to us fair and reasonable compromises and likely to promote a sound agreement.



We will also put forward our own detailed proposals when we believe they can be helpful. And, make no mistake, the United States will oppose any proposal - from any party and at any point in the negotiating process - that threatens the security of Israel. America's commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad. And, I might add, so is mine.

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