


**ANTI-IMPERIALISM IN THE WORKS OF TWENTIETH
CENTURY IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS:
A Study of Fakhruddin Shadman, Jalal al-e-Ahmad, Ali Shariati
and Ayatollah Khomeini**

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of
the requirements of the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

CHIMAT LADOL



**CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAW AHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067**

INDIA

2014



Centre for West Asian Studies
School of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Delhi - 110067, India

Tel : +91-11-2670 4372
Email : jnucwas@gmail.com

Date 26/07/2014


DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation titled “**Anti-Imperialism in the Works of Twentieth Century Iranian Intellectuals: A Study of Fakhruddin Shadman, Jalal al-e-Ahmad, Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini**” submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.



CHIMAT LADOL

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


(Prof. Bansidhar Pradhan)

Chairperson, CWAS


(Prof. A.K. Ramakrishnan)

Supervisor

DEDICATED
TO
AMALAY AND ABALAY

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CHIMAT LADOL

LIST OF CONTENTS

Contents	Page No.
Chapter I: Introduction	1
Chapter II: Iran and the West	24
Chapter III: The West and the 'Self': Fakhruddin Shadman and Jalal al-e-Ahmad	49
Chapter IV: The West and Revolutionary Islam: Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini	68
Chapter V: Conclusion	97
<i>Appendix</i>	<i>105</i>
<i>References</i>	<i>109</i>

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Number	Figure Name	Page Number
1.	Ayatollah Khomeini's discourse on anti-imperialism	95

LIST OF APPENDIX

<u>Sr. No.</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Page Number</u>
1.	Fakhruddin Shadman	105
2.	Jalal al-e- Ahmad	106
3.	Ali Shariati	107
4.	Ayatollah Khomeini	108

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The term imperialism is derived from the Latin word *imperium* meaning absolute rule or authority. Even during the Roman Empire it carried an additional meaning of rule over extensive territory. In every age of human civilizations, empires have ruled over others. An 'empire depends upon the *idea of having an empire...all kinds of preparations are made within a culture...imperialism acquires a kind of coherence, a set of experiences...*' (Said 1994a: 10). An 'imperial policy' based on a system of control and governance promotes domination over extensive external territory by various means, social, economic, political, strategic, cultural and religious. Dominant powers have imposed, 'themselves, their structures and most important of all their conviction' on others and promoted the idea that they are superior to others and continued their exploitation (Thornton 1977: 3). Hegemonic control of others is, therefore, more than simply 'an act of accumulation and acquisition', it relies upon and is even driven by certain ideologies which include beliefs and convictions, that particular people and territories 'require and beseech domination as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination' (Said 1994a: 8). Along with the power to dominate, it is such beliefs and convictions that maintain, promote and sustain an imperialist system.

From the Roman Empire to America, imperialism continued to control and determine a large number of territories, peoples, cultures and their ways of life; in fact, it has sought to restructure other cultures according to imperialist needs. But it was at the end of the nineteenth century that anti-imperialism strengthened the negative connotation of the term (Bush 2006: 2). With the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, British and French empire redefined imperialism in a modern light and therefore led to 'modern imperialism'. The nineteenth century witnessed large territories and people spread thousands of miles across sea, being controlled by European powers. In 1800, 35 per cent of the earth's territory was controlled by them, which rose to 67 per cent in 1878, an increase at a rate of 83,000 square miles per year. By

1914, tremendous increase in the rate of expansion (240,000 square miles per year) resulted in almost 85 per cent of the world being dominated by Western forces in the form of colonies, protectorates or dependencies (Magdoff 1978). Modern empires (Britain, America) replaced the ancient empires of Rome, Athens, Persia, etc. But interestingly, Harrison (2008) points out that the ancient empire still resonates in the modern empires. In other words, the ideas on which ancient empires existed continue to provide the central tenets on which modern empires rests. For example, the universalising tendency of the West, especially America can be seen in the Persian imperialist model.

In Persians' case if you are with the empire, submitting to the king's power, you are in a world of order and 'truth', in which; each one is in his place' and the king expresses his gratitude for benefactions with formalized gifts; if you are on the outside, living in a state of 'commotion' and subscribing to the 'lie', a different fate may await you (Harrison 2008: 16).

Such a hegemonic universalising tendency today, works in isolating Islam as the threat and the Muslim world as the hub of terrorists. While the same tendency during the Persian Empire (as a superpower) isolated Athens and Sparta as terrorist states (Holland 2005). It is, hence, the powerful that has the use of narrations, the tenets of an empire. But modern empires are different from the ancient ones, for modern imperialism has global outreach. In an economic sense, modern imperialism is based on the expropriation of surplus available or attainable from states with weaker hard power, whereas ancient imperialism was based on direct loot, pillage and slavery (Magdoff 1978). Such extraordinary global reach of European empires laid the foundation stones for today's global world (Said 1994a).

Today, there is a range of theoretical debates about imperialism and therefore no one meaning of imperialism is in use (Owen 1972: 3), in fact, there are many conflicting meanings that are in circulation (Bush 2006: 2). Several ways to understand imperialism have been looked into, in the following discussion.

Imperialism as Economic Expansion

Imperialism is often understood concomitantly with colonialism and capitalism. Colonialism for the last five hundred years has been linked with the growth of the capitalist system (Magdoff 1978: 117). For Marxists, imperialism is associated with capitalism. The Marxist school understand imperialism as an expansion of capitalist enterprises in advanced countries that have resulted in the search for more markets and therefore export of capital to underdeveloped and developing countries. Kemp writes that the expansion of the productive forces resulted in a world market and international division of labour and the less developing states became dependent on capitalist economies. By the end of the nineteenth century, most of the world came under the influence of capitalist forces, a stage at which Marxists claim that 'capitalism has come to an end and the epoch of imperialism has begun' (Kemp 1972: 18). Kemp further argues that imperialism is used by Marxists in a 'technical sense' to mean not only the 'the relationship between the advanced, imperial country and the colonial or semi-colonial areas' but goes beyond to explain a 'special stage of capitalist development' (1972: 18). By this, he is referring to Lenin's understanding of imperialism as 'monopoly stage of capitalism' which is special as it is the 'highest stage' of capitalism.

Lenin argues that at this monopoly stage of capitalism the 'fundamental characteristics of capitalism began to change into their opposites...' displacing 'capitalist free competition by a capitalist monopoly' (Lenin 1999: 91). Fundamental characteristics of imperialism has been summarised by Lenin as follows:

- 1) the concentration of production and capital has developed into such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life;
- 2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this 'finance capital', of a financial oligarchy ;
- 3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; 4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and
- 5) the territorial divisions of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed (Lenin 1999: 92).

Kemp writes that for Marxists, imperialism is 'not a political or ideological phenomenon but expresses the imperative necessities of advanced capitalism' (Kemp 1972: 17).

Explaining an 'imperial policy', Thornton writes, that such a policy 'enable a metropolis to create and maintain an external system of effective control' and it is within imperialism that the power of metropolis expands (Thornton 1965: 3). Metropolis, he argues, has been imposing themselves and their structures to exploit the weak now and in future. This policy of development and exploitation has been dealt by Andre Gunder Frank in his Dependency Theory. Frank deals with the relationship between developed and under-developed countries which he refers to as metropolis and satellite respectively. He argues that under-development of satellite is largely due to the 'historical product of the past and continuing economic and other relations' between the two poles which forms 'an essential part of structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale' (Frank 1966: 18). He stresses on the historical colonial relationship between the two poles which continue to determine the relationship between the two based on exploitation of the weak. Immanuel Wallerstein further developed dependency theory in his World System Theory and look into hierarchies within capitalist system bringing in the concept of semi-periphery. These theories of underdevelopment see neo-colonialism as the worst form of imperialism.

Rosa Luxemburg is one among many to provide a critical analysis of traditional Marxist notion of imperialism. She believed that not just 'thirst for profits' and individual rivalry for maximisation of profits, as argued by Marx, but reduced scope of profit maximisation at home, is also responsible for economic expansion (Kowalik 2003: 12). She argues that a capitalist mode of reproduction is determined not only by production but also by circulation i.e. the 'process of exchange' (Luxemburg 2003: 6). This result in looking for markets outside home and with it begins the 'process of exchange between the capitalist and non-capitalist environment that acts as a feeding ground of accumulation, and is a *sine qua non* of the existence of the capitalist economy' (Kowalik 2003: 12). Imperialism, for her, is the 'political expression' of this struggle among capitalists to acquire 'non-capitalist environment' to

accumulate profit (Luxemburg 2003: 427). She argues that the expansion will not result in development of local industry in the non-capitalist nations as 'these lands were held by free trade in an artificial world division of labour as primary producers forever'. Unlike the Marxist understanding of class conflict leading to social revolution, she saw national consciousness overlaying class consciousness (Brown 1972: 51).

Though not a Marxist, Hobson (1902) sees economic needs of the imperial country as the root cause of imperialism. For him, like the Marxists, low consuming capacity of home country results in need for market for goods and investment which result in imperialism. The reason for low consumption capacity at home country, he argues, is not that home country have low consuming power but it is the distribution of wealth which gives only some people consuming power while others are left even without being able to satisfy their basic needs. He argues that it is useless to fight 'imperialism or militarism as political expedients or policies unless the axe is hit at the economic root of the tree and the class for whose interest imperialism works' (Hobson 1902: 64).

Imperialism beyond Economics

The Marxists tradition of understanding imperialism in the economic dimension alone has been critiqued by many scholars such as Kiernan, Edward Said, Thornton and Gramsci among many others. These scholars viewed imperialism not only in economic terms but also in its cultural, political and social aspects. V.G. Kiernan, a British Marxist historian believed that 'imperialism could never be reduced to one-dimensionality...to economic considerations and relations' (Kaye 1995: 5). Kiernan argues that 'imperialism is interwoven with all the discussion of past or present failures of development in the third world, which has only lately emerged from political domination by the advanced nations, while it is not yet free from their financial tentacles' (Kiernan 1995: 46). Looking into Gramsci's analysis of imperialism, he writes that his ideas could be used to cloth Lenin's 'bare economic bones with the flesh and blood of social activity, human thoughts and feelings' (1995: 172).

Cultural critique of imperialism has been provided by Edward, who look into 'how the processes of imperialism have occurred beyond the level of economic laws and political decisions...at...[the] level...of...national culture' (Said 1994a: 12). For Said, imperialism is the 'the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant colony' (1994a: 8). Imperialism, for him, rests on the 'idea of an empire' nourished within a culture- a culture that is embedded in its 'greatness', on 'hierarchies of race', on 'notions' of others as 'subordinate people', 'inferior race'. It is not only economics and politics, but culture and ideology that maintains and provides longevity to imperialism.

Thornton (1965) argues that imperialism is the establishment of spheres of influence in all spheres- social, political, economic, cultural and religious. He also goes on to consider communism as ideological imperialism and religion as an imperial force.

Imperialism as a Process of Development

Albert Lauterbach discredits the Marxists notion of imperialism as driven by industrialisation. Lauterbach writes that industrialisation has been an answer to 'scourge of underdevelopment, especially under the influence of ECLA, UN Economic Commission for Latin America'¹ (Lauterbach 1977: 328). He rejects understanding of industrial investment by foreign interests as imperialism and believes that with the coming of multinational companies (MNCs) the 'nature of investment-imperialism' has transformed. He argues that if imperialism is about economic domination and social and political influences, then MNCs are practising it. He called this 'present day version' of imperialism, as different from older ones. His critique of, critique of 'older types', of imperialism is that they do not look into how developing nations have no other option but to depend on developed nations for technology, industrial information etc.

¹ Economic Commission for Latin America was established in 1948 by ECOSOC with the purpose to contribute to social and economic development of Latin America. It was later broadened to include Caribbean countries. Hence, it is known as United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC) (<http://www.un-energy.org/members/uneclac>).

Justifying imperial control and domination, Gallagher and Robinson provide their argument that failure 'to provide satisfactory conditions for commercial and strategic integration' due to political weakness and collapse of peripheries results in the use of imperial power to provide those 'conditions' (Gallagher and Robinson 1953: 6). They then argue that with 'satisfactory political conditions', imperial authority is relaxed.

Imperialism as Nationalism

Imperialism is also understood as an extreme form of nationalism by scholars like Hannah Arendt, George Lichtheim, John A. Hobson and others. Hobson writes that 'debasement of genuine nationalism marks the passage from nationalism to spurious colonialism on the one hand, [and to] imperialism, on the other' (Hobson 1902: 127). He links nationalism to colonialism and imperialism. 'Overflow' of nationalism by extension of citizenship, identity and institutions in the colonies by the colonisers, he believed, results in colonialism. But, certain colonies where nationalism is not exported, he argues, represent the 'spirit' of imperialism rather than colonialism. For Lichtheim, imperialism is linked with nationalism as it provided a popular base for expansion. Or, he argues, that imperialism can also be understood as nationalism being transformed into imperialism, wherever possible (Lichtheim 1971: 81).

Range of arguments reflects diverse understanding of imperialism. But the above theories with their own differences, share a common sense that imperialism refers to hegemonic and dominant forces acting over territory other than its own- in all its forms- social, political, economic, ideological as well as cultural.

Today the US symbolises imperial force which makes Amy Chua (2007) call it a 'hyper-power'. Though direct forms of control over colonies have ended, imperial domination still continues to structure and determines the lives of people, especially in developing and underdeveloped countries. Magdoff says 'colonialism existed before the modern form of imperialism and the latter has outlived colonialism' (Magdoff 1978: 117). With decolonisation, the US replaced Britain as a global power. The structures created by colonialism made

it easy for the US to exist and sustain and, as Magdoff (1978: 139) argues, once social and political institutions have been reshaped, economic forces alone could penetrate and continue the dominance and hegemonic relation between the coloniser and the colonised. And where such structures do not exist (or have not been a colony), the US has time and again tried to reshape them according to its imperial needs and desires whether it is in Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan. Chomsky (2003) writes that with Iraq, the US announced its 'doctrine of resort to force at will'. This also marks that the use of force has not been given up by 'modern' imperialism, but still remains an important and powerful means.

The mission to civilise and to dominate has always resulted in resistance in various forms all over the world: decolonization movements against colonialism and anti-imperialist movements. This is because 'imperial encounter never pitted an active Western intruder against a supine or inert, non-Western native' (Said 1994a: xii). Such movements all over the world have critiqued and resisted domination of the West and they have been movements for self-determination. Hence, an important method to understand imperialism is by understanding anti-imperialism or resistance to imperialism. While narrations of the empire promote imperialism and narrations of the oppressed resist imperialism. It was 'the grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment [which] mobilised people in the colonial world to rise up and throw off imperial subjugation' (Said 1994a: xiii). Therefore, analyses of such narrations would help understand the elements that are being resented so as to seek liberation from them. Such movements have acknowledged social, political, economic and cultural hegemony of the West, and have resisted it. Liberation movements have been possible because the 'self' was recognised as different from and subjugated by the 'other'. Thornton argues that colonialism is 'only imperialism seen from below as it is the view of the controlled held by the controllers' (Thornton 1965: 6). He writes that as a concept colonialism comes into being only when the colonised recognizes their subordination. It is only after subordination is realised, that call for nativism takes place. Nativism is the 'doctrine that calls for the resurgence, reinstatement or continuance of

native or indigenous culture, customs, beliefs and values' (Boroujerdi 1996: 14).

Imperialism and Intellectuals

Works of intellectuals have played an important role in inspiring and materialising such movements. Intellectuals like Amilcar Cabral, Che Guevara, Edward Said, Eduardo Galeano, Frantz Fanon and Jamal ud-din-Al Afghani are among many whose anti-imperialist positions continue to influence such movements even today. But before going into such contributions, understanding who constitutes an intellectual is important.

According to Gramsci, every individual is an intellectual, but not all have the 'social function' of an intellectual. Among those who perform the function of an intellectual falls within two groups- the first group he calls 'traditional' intellectuals which comprises the professionals, the philosophers, artists, literary people, scientists and so on. The other group is the 'organic intellectual'. It is the organic intellectual, which performs the 'function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong' (Gramsci 1999: 131). He believed that intellectuals should be classified not according to their 'intrinsic intellectual activities' but according to the social relations in which their intellectual activities are performed. Intellectual as a 'stratum' does not exist independent of class relations. For him, it is the civil society where organic intellectuals of the dominant class generate consent and 'hegemony' and organic intellectuals of subordinate class produce 'counter-hegemony'. His organic intellectual is therefore 'perpetually innovating the physical and social world' and produces new base for 'new and integral conception of the world' for the class to which it organically belongs (1999: 142).

Unlike Gramsci, Edward Said is more specific of who an intellectual is. For Said (1994b), an intellectual is someone who represents the oppressed, the ignored, the weak. It is the intellectual who fights for freedom and justice and challenges the *status quo*. An intellectual is 'endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public' (1994b: 11). The intellectual

'represents' his/her public despite all challenges. Like Gramsci, he sees the ability of an intellectual to produce 'counter hegemony' but not 'hegemony' as for him the intellectual cannot be easily accommodated by the dominant hegemonic forces like the government, corporations. The task of the Said's intellectual, therefore, is to reveal narratives and destroy the images produced by the powerful. He argues that there is neither a 'private intellectual' nor a 'public' one because once an intellectual writes something it enters the public domain and whatever an intellectual does publicly always has 'personal inflection and private sensibility' attached with it (1994b: 12). Said romanticises intellectuals' 'abrasive style of life and social performances' which he says is unique (1994b: 14). An intellectual should refuse to follow routine norms or refuse 'domestication', should fight for freedom of expression or what he calls 'intellectual freedom' and should also continuously aspire to achieve 'intellectual fulfilment'. He draws these characteristics from following characters respectively: Bazarov in Turgenev's *Father and Sons*, Stephen Dedalus in Joyce's *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and Moreau in Flaubert's *Sentimental Education*. For him, it is the 'activity' of the intellectual which he/she 'represents'. Unlike Gramsci, intellectual for Said is not a 'consensus builder' but one who publicly challenge the conventional norms of the powerful.

For Julien Benda, intellectuals or 'clerks' are those who perform activities which are 'not in the pursuit of practical aims' and 'who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material advantages' (Benda 1928: 43). They used to keep a check on the 'the laymen'- bourgeoisie, the proletariat, kings, ministers, political leaders, etc. For him, intellectuals rise above national and class passions and fight for humanity. But by the end, 'the clerks began to play the game of political passions'. Those that acted as a 'check' by the end of the nineteenth century became the 'stimulators' thus the great 'treason' of the intellectuals. Analysing Benda's work, Said writes that for him

real intellectuals are supposed to risk being burned at the stake, ostracized, or crucified... individuals with powerful personalities and, above all, they have to be in a state of almost permanent opposition to the

status quo... Benda's intellectual are inevitably small, highly visible group of men (Said 1994b: 7).

Intellectuals, for Foucault comprises of those who speak against the *status quo* or the power that maintains the *status quo*. Intellectuals 'spoke the truth to those who had yet to see it... he was conscience, consciousness and eloquence' (Foucault 1977: 207). For him, intellectuals struggle against the forms of power that objectified them and resist and undermine power in order to overtake it.

Putting together all these meanings, an intellectual can be defined as those who perform the 'function' of an intellectual and may represent the class to which he/she 'organically' belongs. But it does not mean that intellectuals cannot sever their link with the class they (organically) belong to, if and when they want, based on their intellect. They may produce or resist hegemony. But the current study is concerned with those intellectual who reveals, challenges or seizes power from the hegemon (the West) and the state (under the Pahlavi regime), in other words, those who produces 'counter-hegemony', but did not necessarily continue doing so. These intellectuals were not only associated with letters, but many also contributed through their physical activity.

One of the major responses to imperial domination was the birth of a range of anti-imperialist scholars and through them, anti-imperialism. Intellectuals led the decolonisation movements and not only challenged the authority of the West but reversed the orientalist gaze and transformed the occident into 'evil' outsider. Revealing the forms of power, disrupting the logic of 'civilisation process', replacing the Western notion of 'other' as 'barbarians' and asserting the capability of the local oppressed people to govern themselves were major contributions of the intellectuals.

The twentieth century saw major events in the history of humankind. National liberation movements lead to decolonisation, decline of colonial powers at the end of World War II, the rise of new superpowers- US and USSR and transformation of the bipolar world system into a unipolar world. These major developments marked significant changes in international politics and they subsequently influenced domestic politics. While on the one hand, the

colonial empires were declining, on the other hand, a new empire was rising in the form of the US which continues to dominate even today. Though there were several reasons for decline of colonial empires, one driving force was 'intellectual activism'-active criticism of colonial policies and call for liberation by intellectuals both at home and in the colonies. A counter-discourse to imperialist discourse was important, as Said argues, narrations have 'the power to narrate or block other narratives from forming and emerging' (Said 1994a: xiii). Anti-imperialist discourses were produced by many, among whom Jean Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon and Ernesto Che Guevara are three intellectuals whose works are briefed in this study. All three can be considered Gramscian organic intellectual, but their functions varied. While Jean Paul Sartre called to revisit of the hegemony of his own class, the other two fought for establishment of counter-hegemony of their class. All three were staunch supporters of liberation movements and were against domination in any form- colonialism and imperialism. Jean Paul Sartre wrote for the French audience informing them of the colonial condition and cautioned the colonialists (French) of their behaviour and policies in the colonies. Frantz Fanon and Che Guevara addressed the oppressed to rise against the wrong. While decolonisation of Algeria and race were major themes of Fanon's work (that encouraged colonised people all around the world), Che Guevara called for unity among all the oppressed against imperialism. In their own ways, all of them struggled for the same cause- defeat of imperialism and end exploitation of the weak by powerful. These three intellectuals understood imperialism as a system.

Imperialism as a System

Jean Paul Sartre was a French intellectual who remained an apolitical writer till World War II in which France and Germany fought each other. It was his experience of the War that changed 'Sartre the naive individualist into Sartre the political figure' (Priest 2001: 7). After 1945, Sartre as a Marxist, 'an eloquent and committed revolutionary' was concerned with issues, particularly of the 'third world', and spoke for the oppressed against the colonial powers in Algeria, India and Morocco and against the Batista Regime, US imperialism in Vietnam and in favour of the Cuban revolution, the Basques in Spain and so on

(Priest 2001, Young 2001). Sartre understood colonialism as a system- a system of violence, a system that reduced human to sub-human or to the state of 'inauthenticity'. For him, it is a system which brings its own destruction, more the force the colonists use, the more its cost, more it move towards its destruction. Sartre argues that like the colonised, the colonists are also shaped by the system. The 'infernal cycle of colonialism is a reality' as much for the colonists as for the colonised. The colonist 'is made by his function and his interests' (Sartre 2001: 17). He differs with Lenin and agrees with Jules Ferry, whom he calls 'the new theoretician of colonialism' by bringing in his argument that it is the political predominance that brings economic dominance in a colony. For this reason, he argues, that the colonised segregated and deprived, attacks political dominance.

Sartre played an influential role in influencing Francophone anti-colonial intellectuals and activists; Frantz Fanon was one of them. Referring to Fanon's undying contribution to such movements, Baba says,

despite his historic participation in Algerian revolution and the influence of his ideas on the race politics of the 1960s and 1970s, Fanon's work will not be possessed by one political moment or movement, nor can it be easily placed in a seamless narrative of liberationist history. Fanon refuses to be so completely claimed by events or eventualities (Baba 1986: viii).

For Fanon, imperialism was a violent system governed by 'Others' who remain outsiders irrespective of their control and dominance over the colonies. Such a system, Fanon argued, sought destruction, humiliation and submission of the 'native' to the coloniser (Fanon 1963: 31). He writes 'colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state...' (1963: 48). A hegemonic imperialist system, he noted relies on brute force to divide the colony into two distinct zones, one belonging to the ruler and other to the ruled. The former zone is the well-fed and the well-developed, while the latter is the hungry, poverty stricken zone. But he is quick to bring out that violence and massacre as a means will not be used in the changed international scenario of capitalism because 'higher finance' need colonised people as a market. It is a system, he argued, in which the 'economic substructure is also the superstructure. The cause is the consequence. You are

rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich' (1963: 31). Fanon critiques the Europe for not being able to create the 'whole man' (referring to Sartre's sub-human) and the US of having become a 'monster in which the taints, the sickness and the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions' (1963: 252). Fanon (1963) argued that the post-colonial world is not different from colonised world. In the post-colonial era, the once colonised are subjected to economic pressure, subordinated by austerity measures, by the terms decided by those who were once the coloniser. He believed that ex-coloniser still dominates the world as imperialism and capitalism continue to oppress and dominate the developing world.

Che Guevara understood imperialism as a capitalist system. Guevara (1961) defined it in terms of the economy, giving an incisive Marxist understanding of imperialism, though he also believed that politics cannot be separated from economics. He defined imperialism as a system governed by foreigners that subordinates 'a nation's market, its economy, which also means subjugation of entire governmental machinery to foreign powers' (Guevara 1964). It 'is the invasion of foreign capital to the point where it controls a country's economy for its own ends' (Guevara 1964). Therefore, in such a system, economic dependence is a tool used to exploit dependent countries on onerous conditions. The means of establishing this dependence is an inflow of capital (a prerequisite for the establishment of economic dependence) in various forms

loans, investments, that place a given country in the power of the investors; almost total technological subordination of the dependent country; control of a country's foreign trade by the big international monopolies; and in extreme cases, the use of force as an economic weapon in support of the other forms of exploitation (Guevara 1964).

He called the country penetrated by imperialism as the 'country under attack or aggression'. International developments, particularly the Cold War shaped his understanding as he saw the agendas of imperialism as dual object of blocking the socialist camp and strengthening the exploitation of the underdeveloped countries. He argued that the international financial institutions are nothing but weapons for effective penetration of imperial powers, especially the US. He further stated that the 'rules and principles' that govern these institutions are

'merely hocus-pocus masking the subtlest kinds of institutions for the perpetuation of backwardness and exploitation'. Imperialism, Che argued 'has waged war' everywhere against those who claim sovereignty over their own territory- Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, Tunisia and Korea.

Resisting Imperialism

A staunch supporter of liberation, Sartre argued that freedom is needed to reconstitute oneself back into the agent. He argued that where oppression (slavery) is the set order, freedom appears as disorder (Bernasconi 1998: 107). He showed that retreating colonies would be displaced by imperialism where nominal 'natives' would govern more or less according to colonial interests (Haddour 2001). Sartre justified violence as a tool for liberation, as he argued that the system is violent and both the colonialist and colonised are 'trapped' into the 'colonial tyranny'. Sartre believed that revealing violence that sustained social institutions is needed in order to legitimise the violence directed against those institutions. The World War II revealed to Sartre the hypocritical nature of European powers, especially France- resisting and condemning German aggression on one hand and inflicting the same aggression over colonies- revealed the stark distinction between the oppressor and the oppressed. Through his own works, he condemned colonialism and encouraged resistance against the same by clearly differentiating 'between the rights of the oppressed and the wrongs of the oppressor' which, Priest argues, 'is a moral distinction that informs nearly all his post-war political commitments' (Priest 2001: 8).

Fighting the Algerian National Liberation movement, Fanon wrote to dispel the racial and civilizational superiority of the West and called for a revolution. For Fanon, a violent colonial system can only be overpowered only by violence. Fanon emphasises that,

decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon...destruction of colonial world is no more and no less than the abolition of one zone, is burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country...violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect (Fanon 1963: 27, 31, 74).

In order to generate a revolutionary force against the imposed system, he considered consciousness of being equal to the 'settler' as the first and foremost step. He brought forth among the 'native' the idea that human beings are equal irrespective of race, colour, place, etc. Fanon believed that while violence expelled coloniser from 'native's' land, the developing countries still have to ask the capitalist and the imperialist countries to pay for the 'crime' they committed in the colonies. He argued that the West has for years killed, enslaved, plundered and looted the developing nations and therefore should pay reparations without any terms and conditions. If the West fails to do so, he called upon the developing world to close their markets for Western products and stop circulation of capital, in order to shatter the capitalist world. He called upon all the 'third world' to stand against imperialism and create a new world. But, he highlights that the developing world 'does not mean to organise a crusade of hunger against the imperialist and the capitalist nations... (if they)...wake up and shake themselves, use their brains...' (Fanon 1963: 84).

Jean- Paul Sartre described Che Guevara as 'the most complete human being of our age'. He played an influential role in the Cuban revolution (1953-1959) and believed that a revolution 'destroy (s) all of previous forms of structure maintained by the dictatorship of an exploiting class over the exploited class' (Guevara 1961: 1). A revolution against imperialism, Guevara argues, will 'reaffirm national sovereignty, recover territories lost'. Therefore he declared Cuban revolution to be an anti-imperialist, agrarian, anti-feudal revolution. Arguing the need for recognition of different social, economic systems of the 'third world countries', he argued that the treatment should be 'equitable' and 'equity...needed to enable the exploited peoples to attain an acceptable standard of living' (Guevara 1964). As an internationalist, he believed that 'proletarian internationalism' is an inescapable necessity and called upon the oppressed to unite in their fight against imperialism:

we fight anywhere in the world where the powerful oppress the weak, so that the weak may gain their independence, their self-determination, and their right to govern themselves as sovereign states' as 'each time a country is torn away from imperialist tree, it is not only a partial battle won, but also contributes to weakening of the enemy and one step towards final victory. There are no borders in this struggle (Guevara 1965).

As a 'third world' intellectual, Guevara called for solidarity among all the oppressed- oppression of one is oppression of all- to defeat the common enemy, imperialism. He also believed that the struggle against imperialism is also the struggle against poverty and backwardness, since imperialism has caused both. Guevara points out two ways to end imperialism: first, formation of a 'union' of the oppressed people i.e., formation of alliance of all socialist and Latin American countries. Second, to 'preserve the revolutionary character of the union, preventing the admission into it of governments or movements not identified with the general aspirations of the people, and creating mechanisms that permit the separation from it of any government or popular movement diverging from the just road' (Guevara 1965).

The three intellectuals discussed above were not just 'men of letters' but also played significant roles in order to resist imperialism through their works. Their critique of imperialism encouraged many to assert their own sovereignty, especially in the case of Iran. Algerian and Cuban revolutions were major inspirations and Fanon was a popular name for many in Iran. Iranian intellectuals translated many of their works especially that of Fanon's and Sartre's. These three are among many other such intellectuals who have contributed to anti-imperialist movements throughout the 'third world'. Many intellectuals in Iran also played a similar role in generating 'self consciousness' among Iranians about the penetration of the West and its effects on Iran.

Imperialism in Iran

Iran has a long history of imperialist influence and intervention. Iran has been dominated by Western forces undermining the sovereignty of the state and thereby challenging what West itself stood for- sovereignty and equality. Iran's strategic location on the one hand never let colonisation become a reality as powerful forces balanced each other, its natural resources on the other hand did not let the West give up on it. Thus, the country remained a ground for collision, cooperation and exploitation by foreign forces. Iran's history of Western intervention is generally traced back to the Qajar dynasty, during which first major European incursions occurred in forms of wars and treaties. Two wars that Iran fought with Russia took away in the form of treaties not

only important territories but also resulted in major concessions in tariffs and laws. But the major implication of the treaty with Russia was opening up of Iran for further European interventions. Growing Russian influence raised Britain's concern over its control of the Gulf which was important in maintaining its control over Indian markets. Thus continued exploitation of Iran in the name of major European powers balancing each other until the US became the sole imperialist power dominating Iran.

Though Iran has never been turned into a formal colony, foreign interventions in domestic and political affairs resulted in limitation of political freedom, destruction of Iranian economy and an attack on Iranian culture and civilisation. Wars, treaties, loans and concessions were major tools which, Thornton argues, 'enable a metropolis to create and maintain an external system of effective control' and they are effective means of imperial penetration (Thornton 1977: 3). Expansion of commercial and industrial capitalism, import of manufactured goods with low tariffs, fluctuations in international markets, selling of Iranian resources to the foreigners with little amount and giving huge concessions led to destruction of local markets, social dislocations, impoverishment of the lower classes and so on. Implications of the two World Wars further deteriorated the conditions of Iranian masses. While the economy was destroyed, politically Iran's 'sovereignty' was subjugated to the imperial forces. Not only did the treaties established 'areas of influence' (for example the Treaty of 1907), the Shah was easily disposed if he failed to satisfy imperialist needs. While for Britain, its need of Iran expressed the imperative necessities of its capitalism and for Russia Iran was needed to extend its imperial boundaries. But what was it that the rulers of Iran gained out of it? Keddie (2003) writes that the Europeans 'guaranteed' the Shah's rule, apart from the money given to the Shah and the aristocrats in the form of bribes and gifts. Though the Shah could be deposed off easily by external forces, he could also be brought to power by them and this made the Shahs a stooge in the hands of Western powers. The royal king was seen as an extension of imperial rule. Use of public treasury and the loans for Shah's own personal desires, heavy expenditure on the army (to suppress resentment) never let the Shah rise above Western debts.

Economic crises, Western intervention, the Shah's Western-orientation and the corrupt aristocracy all led to resentment and discontent among Iranian masses culminating in two major revolutions in Iran- the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979, both re-establishing the agency of the masses. The Constitutional Revolution of 1905 was preceded by 'Tobacco Protest' of 1890-92. The protest was significant in many ways: it was the first mass protest in the history of modern Iran, it proved that the powerful forces can be challenged and it also proved a major encouragement to the masses in their protest against domination. Though the Constitutional Revolution was mainly against authoritarianism, the Iranian revolution of 1979 was clear about its Western enemy and viewed authoritarianism as inextricably linked with imperialism.

Edward Said (1994b) writes that no major revolution or counterrevolution has taken place in modern history without 'intellectuals'. Understanding the role of intellectuals therefore become necessary in the case of Iran- a country which has seen two revolutions in its modern history. Hence, analysing the 'trajectory of modernisation and nation building' becomes impossible without understanding 'social significance of the intelligentsia' (Boroujerdi 2003: 14). In Iran, an intellectual is called *rowshanfekr* - a Persian term which the Iranian Academy came out with in the early 1940s. The term, many scholars argue, can be traced to Aqa Khan Kermani's references to intellectual as *monavvar al-'oquol* which became *monavvar al-fekr* and eventually *rowshanfekr*. Religious intellectuals are called *rowshanfekr-e dini*. Defining an intellectual as someone who is able to 'recognise and articulate problems of the society' and provide solutions and create new discourses, Jahanbegloo (2000) differentiates between two types of intellectuals in Iran- secular-oriented reformers and religious intellectuals. The former dominated the period after the Constitutional Revolution with Western lifestyles and secular orientation as signs of intellectuals and the latter emerged with Ali Shariati as a 'religious intellectual' in the later part of twentieth century. Kamrava (2008), drawing largely on Ramin Jahanbegloo, classify intellectuals into four generations. The first generation emerged prior to the Constitutional Revolution and played a crucial role in it. The second generation came up with

the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty in the mid-1920s and lasted till the 1960s. This generation conceptualized modernity largely in economic and industrial terms. The third generation belong to the 'charged decade' of 1960s and 1970s. He calls the third generation as 'revolutionary generation of intellectuals' which gave the slogans and aspirations to the Islamic Revolution. The new fourth generation of intellectuals call for abandoning the notions that the third generation of intellectuals have promoted.

Reference to imperialist ambitions of the West and oppressive governance of the rulers remained a major theme in the works of intellectuals in the nineteenth and the twentieth century. The 'Tobacco Protest' of 1890-92 was an important movement against Western intervention in Iran. Though role of *ulema* in resisting tobacco concessions found its greatest expressions in the movement, intellectuals like Mirza Malkum Khan and Sayyid Jamaluddin al-Afghani also shaped the narrative of the movement. In fact, Sayyid Jamaluddin al-Afghani is seen as the pioneer of anti-imperialist discourse and as an advocate of pan-Islamic unity. These two intellectuals with several others like Ayatollah Mohammad Tabataba'i, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, Mirza Hossein Nai'ni and others also contributed to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. These intellectuals are referred to as modern intellectuals. As a social group, they were able to encroach upon the spaces of their powerful traditional contenders-the *ulema*, in their discussion about interpretation of world, of modernity, of West and of Iran in particular. This group of intellectuals is referred to as first generation of intellectual by Ramin Jahanbegloo (Kamrava 2008). This first generation of modern intellectuals were mostly secular, but one also has to keep in mind that embracing modernity by Iranian intellectuals never meant giving up tradition and culture. This is because intellectuals wrote within political context of the time, keeping in view the status of the state within it and its interaction with the West. This group was then followed by the second generation of intellectuals that was active until 1960s and then the third generation of intellectuals also known as the 'revolutionary generation' (2008: 46).

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is seen as the 'triumph of anti-imperialism' and it was the culmination of anti-imperialist understanding and

activities of the intellectuals in general and of twentieth century intellectuals in particular. 'Revolutions are acts of communal denial that begins with a 'no'', revolutions are unleashing of collective discontent (Dabashi 2006: 3). In Iran, the 'no' was no to the West, no to the Shah. Twentieth century intellectuals in Iran have been successful in actualising anti-imperialist resentment that has been simmering for so long with frequent but small breakouts but could not burst out loud as it did in 1979. Among large number of 'revolutionary generation' of intellectuals- Fakhruddin Shadman (1907-1967), Jalal al-e-Ahmad (1923-69), Ali Shariati (1933-1977) and Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989) contributed significantly to the Iranian Revolution and anti-imperialist discourses in Iran. These intellectuals saw destruction of Iranian identity and subversion of selfhood as major consequences of imperialism. Losing Iranian identity especially by Western educated intellectuals was seen as one of the most dangerous consequence of Western influence. Fakhruddin Shadman's concept of *fokoli*, Jalal al-Ahmad's *gharbzadeh*, Ali Shariati's differentiation of intellectual and enlightened ones and Ayatollah Khomeini's reference to *xenomaniacs* reflect their concern for the loss of Iranian identity. Therefore, regaining one's identity and identifying oneself with the oppressed subject of imperialism and not with the West, has been major focus in the works of all the four intellectuals.

Another major concern in addition to regaining identity was to take pride in that identity and to reject the 'inferior statuses' imposed upon Iran by the West. Therefore, reference to great Iranian civilisation, its culture and religion was another important aspect of their work. Importance of attaining confidence in 'Self' as a challenge to imperialism can be best understood by Frantz Fanon's argument that revolutionary assurance of the oppressed stems once he/she is convinced that the ruler and the ruled are at par with each other. Fakhruddin Shadman believed that language was the basis to revive Iranian civilisation. He believed that to challenge the West it is important to capture it by bringing modern technology, scientific knowledge to Iran and becoming a *farangshenasi*- expert on the West, while at the same time it was also important to be an *Iranshenasi* –an expert on Iran, in Persian language. Jalal al-e-Ahmad argued that *gharbzadegi* (disease from the West, variously translated as

Westoxification, Weststruckness) can be resisted by revival of Shi'a Islam and alliance between clergy and intellectuals. Ali Shariati appealed to revolutionary Islam and its leaders *Mojaheds* and believed that the task of carrying forward Islamic revolution to create a 'free, just and classless' society rest on intelligentsia (*rowshanfekran*). Ayatollah Khomeini believed that all the problems in Iran have been created by the West- Europe earlier, now America and Israel. For him, the reason for promotion of separation of politics and religion by the imperial forces has been done to suppress Islam. He therefore saw creation of Islamic state, rule of constitution based on Quran and Sunna and *Vilayat e-faqih* translated as 'guardianship of Islamic jurist' as an answer to imperialist aggression.

The current study is an attempt to analyse the critique of imperialism in Iran in the works of the above four intellectuals. The study is informed by the need to analyse anti-imperialism in Iran through the works of Iranian intellectuals especially by establishing a coherent and continuous link between them. An attempt has also been made to enquire into how the 'self' has been defined by intellectuals in the context of debate on Islam and modernity. Providing answers to the following questions have been attempted in the study; what is the nature of imperialist onslaught on Iran? What role do intellectuals play in resisting imperialism? What are the major elements of imperialist assault expressed in *Westoxification* by Jalal al-e-Ahmad? What role language and civilisation play in resisting imperialism according to Fakhruddin Shadman? How is Ali Shariati's concept of sociology of religion linked to anti-imperialism? What is the nature of Islamic revolution and the state advocated by Ayatollah Khomeini against Western hegemony? How has the four intellectuals contributed to anti-imperialist discourse in Iran? The study seeks to know whether these four intellectuals apart from resisting the West have also challenged the knowledge that sustains Western imperialism by providing counter-discourses. However it does not seek to classify intellectuals neither is comparative in nature.

Contributions of the four intellectuals have been studied using vast source of literatures. English translations of primary literature as well as secondary sources available in the form of books and articles on the subject matter have

been used. Apart from these, electronic sources like internet have also been consulted.

There are three core chapters. Following this introductory chapter (Chapter I) the historical aspects of Iran's experience with the West from the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century are discussed in Chapter II. It provides a brief background of imperialist intervention in Iran as well as the role played by intellectuals during the same period and also the major themes that dominated intellectual writings. The chapter briefly discusses the intellectual environment in which the four thinkers wrote. Chapter III analyses anti-imperialist views of Fakhruddin Shadman and look into his concept of *fokoli*, *farangshenasi* and *Iranshenasi*. It also analyses Jalal al-e-Ahmad's idea of *Westoxification* and the nature of imperialist onslaught in Iran. The chapter overall gives a detailed analysis of anti-imperialist understandings of both these intellectuals. Chapter IV looks into Ali Shariati's anti-imperialist views through his ideas of Islam, revolution and reconstruction of self (*khud-sazi-e-enqelabi*), historical determinism (*jabr-e-tarikhi*), etc. The chapter also deals with Ayatollah Khomeini's notion of Islam and revolution, his concept of Islamic governance as a solution to imperialist hegemony. In brief, the chapter analyses their understanding of imperialism, its consequences and their idea of 'return to roots'. The last chapter concludes the analyses with general observations.

CHAPTER II

Iran and the West

Units in the international system have always 'interacted' with one another, even though there have been different methods of the interaction at different points in time. Most scholars agree with the anarchical nature of international system but differ on how units interact within it. Though cooperation and coordination have been part of world politics, it is also true that it has always been dominated by powerful units. Therefore 'interactions' between units have always been uneven and in several occasions the system has been dominated by imperialist powers. Barbara Bush (2006) talks about two types of empires that dominated the world: ancient and modern. The ancient empires include Old Babylonia, the Greek Empire, the Persian Empire, the Roman Empire and the Islamic Empire founded by Umayyad dynasty. The modern empires were based on the premise that Europe was the 'heart of civilisation' and the world unknown to Europe was there to be conquered. The 'age of discovery'² saw domination by Spain and Portugal, which was later challenged by the French and the British. European colonial expansion dominated by British Empire governed world politics in eighteenth and nineteenth century and the period marked the first stage of global imperialism (Bayly 1998) and it was also a transitional period between ancient and modern imperialism (Bush 2006: 19). The end of World War II saw Britain replaced by two major powers US and USSR competing for global supremacy, a rivalry finally culminating in the US leading world politics. Modern empires made possible and established global imperialism (Said 1994a: 4).

The ancient empires and pre-modern societies (until 1500 C.E.), were based on what Samir Amin calls a 'tributary system' rather than economy as in modern societies. Their power was the root of wealth as opposite to wealth as source of power in modern capitalism (Amin 1993: 248). Though they were imperial in character, it was only after the industrial revolution which made possible tremendous expansion of capital that formed the base of modern

² It was a period when the oceans of the world were linked up through maritime exploration into a single system of navigation and which became the basis for 'eventual extension of European influence' (Arnold 2002).

imperialism. Though there are various theories about modern imperialism, it was Marxist theory that dominated the field (Brown 1972: 38). As the theories of imperialism have been dealt with in the previous chapter, the emphasis here will only be to highlight what imperialism means. The domination of strong over the weak, Marxists argue is driven by economic needs. The need for raw material earlier and market later has resulted in industrial countries colonising more and more territories. This expansion of capital to developing and under-developed nations eventually resulted in bringing the whole world under capitalist influence. It is at this stage that capitalism enters into its 'monopolistic stage' that is the 'highest stage' of capitalism which Lenin argue is imperialism. It is this monopolistic stage at which cartels hold monopoly of finance-capital and mark the 'predominance of financial oligarchy and separation of small financially powerful states from among all the rest' (Lenin 1999: 69). Providing a critical understanding of Marx's idea of expansion of capital, Rosa Luxemburg (2003), argues that not merely a drive for more profits but also 'the process of exchange' result in expansion of capital. Imperialism, she argues is the political expression of the capitalists to acquire non-capitalist environment. Hobson (1902), though not a Marxist, understood imperialism as 'debasement of nationalism'. Aggressive nationalism either result in colonialism or in imperialism. He saw economy as the 'taproot of imperialism'.

Imperialism is also understood as domination, exploitation and underdevelopment of the underdeveloped or developing periphery by the metropolis or the developed economies, as argued by A.P. Thornton, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein. Other than profit making, Edward Said argues that there is a 'commitment' which has been circulated and re-circulated that the 'inferior races' have to be subjugated and imperialism is made to understand as 'metaphysical obligation' to rule the inferior (Said 1994a). This is continued even today and is reflected in US policies. He emphasises that imperialism 'is not simply about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, forms, images and imaginings' (Said 1994a: 6). Even though brutal means of conquest has been an explicit and direct means employed, 'cultural technologies of rule' have been the most subtle and dangerous form used throughout the ages and even today. Colonialism marked one of the most important events in the

history of world politics because European colonialism was based not only on direct domination but they were also able to produce the knowledge justifying and therefore legitimising the domination. Edward Said writes that dominant discourses such as Orientalism was part of such domination:

The Orient was almost a European invention, and has been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences...and therefore have had a long tradition of Orientalism (Said 1978: 1).

This intertwining of 'power and legitimacy', writes Said, is 'a characteristic of classical imperial hegemony' (Said 1994a: 352) and European colonialism was first to achieve it.

Iran was never turned into a colony but foreign interventions in domestic and political affairs resulted in limitation of political freedom, destruction of Iranian economy and an attack on Iranian culture and civilisation. Iran's strategic position, its boundaries with India, Russia and the Gulf, its large oil reserves and other natural resources made Iran the base for many struggles for domination. Its 'history of victimisation by outside powers' is usually traced back to the invasion of Arabs in 650 A.D., followed by pillage of the Mongols six centuries later (Clawson and Rubin 2005: 2). This was then followed by British and Russian intervention and in the second half of the Twentieth Century, the US has become the imperialist power for Iran.

Iran has a very long diplomatic and trade relations with the West. Keddie claims that Iran's interaction with the West increased under the Safavid dynasty but declined subsequently. She writes,

Safavid Shah Abbas (1587-1629) encouraged international trade through building roads, caravansaries and workshops...produce luxury textiles and ceramics demanded in the West...This declined due to...disruption by military tribes, low level of agricultural production, gradual change of Western trade route to far east from overland to overseas (Keddie 2003: 12).

The declivity in interaction with the European forces was revived under the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925) from which the history of modern Iran is traced. It was under Qajar ruler, Fath Ali Shah, that 'first major nineteenth century European incursions in Iran occurred' (Keddie 2003: 37). It was from then on

that the major powers retained their imperial control over Iran. Hobson writes that while 'diplomacy and the arms of Great Britain was used in order to compel the owners of the new markets to deal with us...the safest means of securing and developing such markets is by establishing 'protectorates' or by annexation' (Hobson 1902: 53). In case of Iran guarantee of the regime and bribes to the aristocracy were diplomatic means while treaties, concessions, loans etc. were the 'safest means' for expansion of capital for Britain. Guevara (1964) believed that inflow of capital in the form of loans and investments as the pre-requisite for economic dependence i.e., imperial exploitation. These were the means employed not only to protect Iranian markets but also to protect Indian markets through Iran against Afghanistan and Russia. Differentiating Russian imperialism from European imperialism, Hobson writes that 'it has proceeded by direct extension of imperial boundaries, partaking to a larger extent than in the other cases of regular colonial policy of settlement for purposes of agriculture and industry' (1902: 17). For Russia, war followed by treaties were major tools for expansion of its imperial boundaries as reflected from two major treaties signed with nineteenth century Iran- the Treaty of Gulistan signed in 1813 and the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828, under both the treaties Iran lost large portions of its territories to Russia. The two major characteristics that marked modern imperialism- rivalry for profit and expansion of capital were nakedly visible in Iran. Russia's growing influence after the Anglo-Russian war was challenged by Britain which was concerned about retaining control of the Gulf to keep hold of India and similarly Britain was kept in check by Russia. It was this mutual desire to keep each other away from gaining more power in Iran, argues Keddie (2003), that helped Iran maintained its formal independence. Strategic, economic and political interests in Iran by both Britain and Russia significantly influenced Iran as it became an important ground for both the powers to balance each other or the ground for balance of power in The Great Game. Achieving concession or blocking the other from receiving it reflected balancing strategies employed by Britain and Russia as Morgenthau argues that 'balancing process can be done either by diminishing the weight of the heavier scale or by increasing the weight of lighter one' (Morgenthau 1948: 134).

Such theories often forget the plight of states which are used as a pawn by powerful forces to balance each other. While foreign powers desired a weak government and one which cater to their needs, the ruling Shah sought favours from Europeans reducing Iran to a mere entity in the struggle for power. Though some rulers did bring some reform but their authority was determined by the Western powers. Abbas Mirza, for example, assayed to reform Iran's military on European model and hired Western trainers to introduce Western equipment to his troops. He was the first to sent Iranians to Europe for Western education. Also for the Shah the Europeans brought in money and guaranteed the continuation of his rule as Nikki Keddie writes regarding the Qajar Dynasty:

From the early nineteenth century...many observers...expected the dynasty to be overthrown soon...the main reason why the dynasty lasted so long in the face of universal discontent was that it was in essence propped up and its position guaranteed by Great Britain and Russia (Keddie 1966: 2).

On the one side, the ruling Shah welcomed European intervention, and on the other side, major section of the society like the merchant class, a section of religious class and common masses resented European involvement. While Western involvement did benefit Iran, its imperial character resulted in large scale protests. Significant encroachments by foreign powers resulted in increasing dependence of Iran on them, more the encroachment and intervention, more was the dependence and more the dependence, more was the underdevelopment as argued by Dependency school thereby curtailing a balanced growth of its economy (Andreeva 2007) and shrinking sovereignty of Iran both in domestic as well as in external affairs 'with real politics often occurring not only, behind the scenes, but even behind the seas' (Keddie 2003: 36). This resulted in growing frustration among Iranians leading to the outburst of resentment in the form of a series of protest against the state which was increasingly becoming a stooge in the hands of foreign powers.

History of Imperialist Involvement in Iran

'The past is the past' is a famous quote to break off the past completely from the present. But the continuity of the past in present or the presentness of the past continues to shape one's present and therefore future. Edward Said (1994a) writes that there is 'no just way' to 'quarantine' past from the present as each informs the

other and co-exists. History is a 'dialogue between the events of the past and progressively emerging future ends...it is a belief of having come from somewhere and going somewhere' (Carr 1961: 123,132). Thus, understanding the history of Iran becomes imperative to understand how foreign powers penetrated Iran and under what conditions anti-imperialist efforts were carried out and which aspects of imperialism was challenged by Iranian intellectuals. History of Iran, therefore, in the context of the current study is characterised by the belief of being 'imperialised', exploited and by the belief of moving towards liberation. History is also important to understand the events that shaped intellectual discourses and vice-versa.

Europe and the Qajar Dynasty

The Napoleonic conquest of Egypt in 1789 made British Empire fearful of its expansion towards India. Napoleon together with Russian Emperor Paul (1754-1801), wanted to conquer India-the jewel in the British crown. Since Iran held a strategic position because of its location between Russia and India, the fear of losing India to Napoleon (Keddie 2003) and growing influence of Russia (Hiro 1987) resulted in the dispatch of British John Malcolm to Tehran in 1800 to sign a treaty in 1801. The treaty assured British military equipment in return for Iranian support if France or Afghanistan moved towards India or Iran. This in turn led French and Russia setting up embassies in Iran thereby converting Iran into a centre for international rivalry.

Wars have been a form of direct intervention. Wars have often been culminated by treaties which were basically 'terms of surrender' and direct expansion of imperial control. Iran fought two wars with Russia under Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834) of Qajar dynasty. The first war in 1804-13 ended with the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813. Under this treaty, Iran lost important Caucasian territory and gave exclusive rights to Russia to have warships in the Caspian. To regain what Iran lost, it unleashed an attack on Russia in 1826 again ending in its defeat. The Treaty of Turkomanchai of 1828 further embarrassed Iran by ceding more territories to Russia, granting cash indemnity for the cost of the war. Russian conquest of Central Asian territories and north-eastern territories of Iran in the second half of nineteenth century provided the base for Russia to expand itself

southward (Andreeva 2007: 18). Moreover, Iran could not demand more than 5 per cent on tariff with no internal tax on imports. Both wars ended with treaties in which Iran had not only ceded territory to Russia but also gave to Russia several other provisions like extraterritorial and tariff concessions and exemption from Iranian laws.

Subsequently, increasing encroachment by Russia also resulted in Britain signing series of treaties with Iran. British influence over Iran was reflected in assuring Mohammad Mirza (1834-1848) to crown with Russia's consent in 1834. Among the treaties that were signed, an important treaty was the 'British Treaty' of 1841 signed under Mohammad Shah. The treaty included the 'Most Favored Nation' clause which could be extended to other countries. It meant that the privileges guaranteed under one treaty will be subsequently extended to other foreign countries in treaty with Iran, thereby meaning that their privileges extended to Britain. Thus British trading companies were given trading privileges similar to the Russians under the Treaty of Turkomanchai. The treaties thus were major means of capital expansion, maximising profits and destruction of local industry. The effects of the war and treaties on Iran have been pointed out conclusively by Ervand Abrahamian as 'military defeat leads to diplomatic concession...produced commercial capitulations...paved way for economic penetration...by undermining traditional handicrafts...cause drastic social dislocations' (Abrahamian 1982b: 52). He writes that by the end of the nineteenth century, Iran was 'well on the way toward incorporation into the European network of international commerce'. It was thus the expansion of commercial and industrial capitalism under Mohammad Shah that Bazaaris later known as the propertied middle class, sent their first petition against Western influences (Keddie 2003: 44). Large scale social dislocation under Mohammad Shah also resulted in internal revolts from the Isam'ili Shi'i community and the Babis. With the death of Mohammad Shah in 1848, Naser ad-Din Shah(1848-96) succeeded the crown. Despite internal revolts succession of Naser ad-Din was made possible by the British and Russians who favoured Qajar kings (under whom they have attained many concessions) over any other.

Under Nader Shah, major developments in the course of Iranian history took place. It was his chief minister Mirza Mohd. Taqi Khan Farahani (1848-

1851) - known as Amir Kabir, who introduced reforms on Western lines, e.g. reorganisation of army, strengthening European style education, introduced first official gazette and first higher school based on scientific, technological and military instruction. Threatened by his growing influence, he was assassinated in 1852 by the Shah, but his process of modernisation was carried forward by him. During the period, Iran became increasingly dependent on Western forces as exports did not grow enough to pay for the imports and the cost of wars. Land converted to cash crops like cotton and opium hit by fluctuations in the international markets were further hit by the famine of 1869-72. Nevertheless, Iran was progressing in terms of statistical records of imports and exports and the poor were further marginalised.

The Shah rather than looking for internal reforms, sought more Western intervention into the economy. This was because the Shah was not willing and possibly unable to bring necessary reforms (Keddie 2003). Also, the Shah's quest for foreign investors coincided with the 'concession-hunting era' (Abrahamian 1982b).

Loans and concessions did not only have economic value but also were tools for political control. Two major concessions were the Reuter Concession and the Tobacco Concession both of which sparked protest against Western involvement in Iran. The Reuter Concession of 1872, writes Curzon, 'involved the complete abrogation of a nation's birthright in favour of foreign speculators' (Curzon 1966: 482). The concession gave absolute monopoly to Reuter for seventy years of road and tramways, exclusive right of working of mines except gold and silver, all government forests, all uncultivated land for that designation. It also included clause regarding exclusive construction of canals, irrigation works, other enterprises related with the construction of roads, telegraphs, mills, factories of Iran for a period of twenty five years. In return, the Shah would be paid for initial five years a fixed amount and for the next twenty years, an extra sixty percent of the net revenue will be paid. He further writes that 'it contain(s) the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has probably ever be dreamt of, much less accomplished, in history...Persia...will never be able to stand if she voluntarily surrenders the use of all her limbs' (1966: 483). The agreement fell upon Europe

as a 'bombshell'³. Not only was the concession a bombshell for Europe, it also had the same effect among Iranians. Local protest at home and Russian hostility towards the concession forced the Shah to cancel. The protest brought together Russia and local protesters; it also set the precedent for local demonstration against foreign loot. Though Reuter concession failed, sale of concessions and contracts continued in the form of concession for Imperial Bank of Persia 1889, contracts to Indo-European Company to extend communications to India through Iran, to Lynch Brothers for shipping the Karun Rivers and so on for the British. The Russians also obtained contracts regarding telegraphs lines, pavement of roads, monopoly over fishing industry and so on. Such was the greed for loyalties and bribes that the Shah and high officials were eager to sell Iranian resources for relatively small sums (Keddie 1966: 6). Another major concession that followed the Reuter concession that was to mark the course of Iranian history was the Tobacco Concession. The concession was granted to Major G.F. Talbot in 1890 which gave him full monopoly for fifty years for production, sale and export of tobacco. In return, the Shah was to be paid yearly rent, a quarter of the 'annual profits after the payment of all expenses and five percent dividend on the capital' (1966: 35). Tobacco played an important part in the lives of Iranians and had gained cultural significance. Therefore, the concession was resented on nationalist and religious grounds as it had large and direct effects on the social life and livelihood of the people.

The concession was followed by the "Tobacco Protest" of 1891-92. The protest reached its culmination with the boycott of tobacco in December 1892 when a fatwa was issued by Shirazi which read out as follows-'In the name of God, the Merciful, the Forgiving. Today the use of tanbaku and tobacco in any form is reckoned as war against the Imam of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!)' (Keddie 1966: 95).

It was the first mass protest in the history of modern Iran that led to defeat of the government and the foreign forces exploiting Iran. Such a large

³ Curzon writes that it was a bombshell for Europe because for Russia her rival gained what she always eyed for and for Britain though the concession would put Europe at 'position of political preponderance but would have been at the expense of Persia'. This may not be true for Britain because concession was given to Reuter and Reuter was not British Government. It achieved what the government could not do.

scale protest was made possible because of the innovation of the telecommunication lines. It saw for the first time coming together of *ulema*, modernising reformers and discontented populations of Iran which were later to transform the course of Iranian history (Keddie 1966: 90). The protest not only proved that powerful forces can be defeated but also helped shrink the Shah's legitimacy. The protest reflected successful alliance of Iranians with one imperial force against the other and also guided Iran's external policy as the Shah could no longer resist Russia's growing influence.

The protest also demonstrated the influential power of the *ulema* over the masses, which will subsequently be used by the intellectuals to get to the people. But it is also important to mention that not all *ulema* were against the state. Moreover, many *ulemas* accepted bribe, disliked cancellation of concessions as they would have to give back what they received. The *ulemas* favoured the Shah but would side with his opposition as soon as Shah's favour stopped. Sayyed Abdollah Behbehani was one such 'less principled' *ulema* who accepted bribe and opposed the tobacco movement. He helped the Constitutional Revolution against the Shah when he ran out of Shah's favour (Keddie 1966: 79). Though the tobacco concession was cancelled, it did not prove to be an answer to the large scale resentment of the people.

Resentment grew under Mozaffar ad-Din Shah (1896-1907) who succeeded Naser ad-Din Shah. Increasing loans to fulfil his personal needs, growing concessions, discrimination of local merchants in favour of Russians, reactionary Prime Minister Ain ad-Dauleh add up to their demand of not only dismissal of Ain ad-Dauleh but also creation of a representative body-The *Majles* (Parliament).

The Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909 was Iran's first major revolution and was in many ways inspired by international developments. The war against Russia by Japan (Russo-Japanese War 1904-05) was an encouragement that imperial forces can be fought and defeated, and Japan was seen as the only Asian power with a constitution defeating the West (Ahmed 2006) and the Russian Revolution of 1905 provided a chance for the Iranians to voice their dissent and demand a constitution. It was a product of a 'powerful

social, political and religious intervention, the Iranian society has witnessed in the previous century' (2006: 10). The revolution succeeded in establishing the *Majles* and marked an important event in Iran's history in terms of challenging the arbitrary power of the Shah by a democratic institution. But soon the *Majles* was closed down by Mohammad Ali Shah through a coup in 1908. The religious clergy denounced the attack on the constitution as irreligious and declared that 'those who oppose the Assembly are outside religion, like Yazid, son of Muawiya' (Clawson and Rubin 2005: 47). The Shah's success was short-lived. The constitution was restored and the *Majles* was reopened but was reduced to mere instrument of the Shah.

Even when masses were carving out spaces for themselves in the form of protests, concessions continued. Early twentieth century also saw the signing of Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 which divided Iran into spheres of influence. Under the agreement, the country was demarcated into three zones—the northern provinces as the Russian zone, the south-eastern region as British zone of influence and the rest of the country (in which the British already exerted influence over local tribes) as neutral zone. The result was catastrophic for Iran: with the complete collapse of central authority, Britain landed its forces in the South and the Russians, waiting for slightest pretext to enter Iran, invaded the north.

Though Europe continued to influence Iranian politics, the reign of the Qajar ruler, Ahmad Shah (1909-1925) also saw entry of Americans in Iran. Many scholarly work trace American intervention in Iran only from Pahlavi era (Cook and Roshandel 2009, Ganji 2006), it is important to note that America's diplomatic relations with Iran was established in 1883, continued during Qajar rule and subsequently increased under the Pahlavis (Ramakrishnan 2008). It was after demarcation of Iran under spheres of influence, growing tribal disorders and disrupting finance that the Shah called for a foreign treasurer, Morgan Shuster, an American. Russian protests and threat eventually drove him out. Shuster supported the Constitutional Revolution and like him many Americans supported it. Howard C. Baskerville was one among them, who supported the Revolution and had to part ways with the American government in his endeavour (2008: 63). Ramakrishnan further notes that American intervention in

Iran, during World War II, has been ‘multifaceted’ and it increased as soon as the War was over (2008: 64).

The end of World War I had severe consequences for Iran including crisis in food security, high prices and increasing tribal revolt, especially in Azerbaijan. Also, with the end of World War I, the Bolshevik Russia renounced its concessions and cancelled loans. But the British government was trying to consolidate its influence with the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919⁴ which resulted in large scale protest. The agreement was, as Ewalt (1981) argues, a product of Britain’s diplomatic preoccupation with oil, as by 1915 the use of coal has been replaced by oil. Oil was discovered in commercial amounts in 1908. The importance of oil and the ‘civilising mission’ of Britain is reflected in the following statement of Lord Curzon, ‘we are not going to send all our money and men in civilizing a few people who do not want to be civilized. We will protect Batum, Baku, the railway between them, and the pipeline’ (1981: 1). The agreement was criticised as ‘protectorate’, ‘annexation of Persia’, grabbing Persia and so on. A French newspaper, *Echo de Paris*, declared, ‘If these various stipulations don't constitute a protectorate, in the fullest sense of the word, words no longer have any meaning’ (1981: 1). Due to large scale protest the Treaty could not be ratified in the *Majles*.

The end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century therefore saw discontentment against increasing rise of prices of daily items, humiliation, bribery among high officials, deteriorating economic conditions, despotic royalty and loot by foreign penetration. While European powers have become entrenched in the lives of Iranians, American influence was to grow in the coming years.

⁴ The treaty stipulated ‘supply’ of advisers-- officers nominated by Britain and given adequate powers; supply of military equipment by Britain and construction of railways and for these it will provide loan to Iran of 2,00000 sterling at 7 percent interest rate payable monthly. It further states that the securities for the loan were all the revenues and customs receipt of the Persian Gulf ports. In addition, it also proposed joint ‘committee of experts’ to examine and review customs tariff. Also indemnity for any loss, damage caused by British troops on Persian land cannot be claimed. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-agreement-1919>

From Europe to the West: the Coming of America

The end of World War II saw two major players in the international politics- the US and the USSR. America's growing influence was also reflected in Iran. The influence of war on Iran was that Reza Shah (1925-1951) - who overthrew Ahmad Shah in a military coup- was forced to abdicate his throne and was replaced by his son Mohammad Reza (1941-1979). Growing influence of Hitler's Germany over Iran resulted in the Allies throwing Reza Shah (thought to have good relations with Hitler) out and the country was again divided into spheres of influence. The period under Mohammad Reza Shah was significant because of his 'modernisation from above'. The Shah reformed military, whittled away clergy's power, built up bureaucracy, modernised education, minimised the power of influential religious schools, enforced ban on veil and modernised the transportation system. Under him, foreign intervention became more indirect (Keddie 2003) as he avoided foreign loans and expanded government budget by it back under government's control (Clawson and Rubin 2005). Though the Shah was trying his best to modernise and become independent of foreign powers especially in terms of trade, he was becoming increasingly despotic and decisions were monopolised. His was a government though able to assert its power but unable to assert its legitimacy. His being absolute and arbitrary made him lose his entire social base and made his overthrow easy.

American intervention rose during Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Americans were seen as an alternative to the British and the Russians by the Iranians. The US, unlike British and Russians, never sought to undermine Iran's territorial integrity and did not have significant commercial contracts that could raise nationalist animosity (Clawson and Rubin 2005) and therefore were often looked upon for advice and aid. American presence in Iran was increasing in Iran particularly with World War II. There were 28,000 US servicemen in addition to many advisers in Iranian government branches (Ramakrishnan 2008). Ramakrishnan (2008) highlight that with the Second Millspaugh mission seventy more Americans arrived in Iran working in various branches of the Iranian government like finance, food, treasury, food and price stabilisation, the national

bank and police. The Second Millspaugh mission⁵ of 1942 helped American control of Iranian finances, economy, and the 1942-43 US mission to advise army took substantial control of it. While the Russians and the British still had control over their respective spheres of influence, the Americans held advisers to key government departments. The reflection of Cold War was also seen in Iran (which played the role of a client of America) when US supported Iran to go to UN against Russian involvement in supporting Azerbaijan and Kurdish autonomous governments in northern provinces. But, the Americans supported the British as it was playing an important role in resisting Soviet influence. Through a negotiation in 1946, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw troops, a move through which its influence declined in Iran. Only through the pro-Soviet policy of the Tudeh (masses) Party, formed in 1941, and its allies, could it maintain its influence in Iran⁶. The US gained major influence with the agreements of 1947-48 which extended American military mission and provided military aid worth a million dollars to Iran (Keddie 2003: 114).

But the image of America as an ally of Iran was altered with the coup which overthrew Mohammad Mossadeq (1952-53) in 1953 by a CIA-backed operation AJAX known in Iran as 28 Mordad 1332 Coup. American involvement was an open secret till 2013, when US formally accepted it. The CIA in-house historian wrote:

...the military coup that overthrew Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government (CIA Document- The Battle for Iran 2011: 26).

⁵ Dr. Millspaugh was an advisor of American Economic Mission. The first Millspaugh Mission was sent in 1927. The primary objective of the second mission was to assist Iran in solving its long-standing problems. The Mission was to be executive rather than advisory in nature. Mission was given partial authority and he served as executive official of the Ministry of Finance. It was also allowed to attend the *Majles* on financial issues, though the final say would be of the *Majles*. There were several objections against the mission, it was finally in 1945 that the *Majles* passed a bill and withdrew all his powers. He resigned later and went back to America. http://www.fouman.com/Y/Get_Iranian_History_Today.php?artid=907.

⁶ The Tudeh Party of Iran (TPI) was formed to continue the works of the banned Communist Party of Iran (founded in 1925) openly. The foundation of the party was laid by Dr Taghi Arani's group, the group of fifty-three, when they were released from prison after the abdication of Reza Shah. On 29 September, the founding conference of the TPI was held in Tehran under the chairpersonship of Soleiman Mohsen Eskandari (Omidvar 1993).

Cook and Roshandel says that the role America played in the 1953 Coup 'will forever be viewed by the Iranians as a concrete evidence of American imperialistic intentions towards the Middle East in general and Iran in particular' (Cook and Roshandel 2009: 15). It not only restored imperialist aggression in Iran but also dealt a blow to the democratic aspirations and national sovereignty as it took place in the wake of the nationalisation process initiated by Mossadeq. Three days after becoming the Prime Minister in 1951, Mossadeq pushed an oil nationalisation bill through the *Majles*. It was because there was growing resentment against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on many grounds: the royalties paid was one-third of the profit earned, Iranians had no say in the company, huge amount of money in form of taxes were paid to the British government and increased of nationalist and radical sentiments in the post War years inflamed Iranian resentment over political and economic control exercised by the AIOC (Keddie 2003). Also in 1952, he pronounced Britain as an enemy and ceased all diplomatic links with it. The nationalist government of Iran became a major obstacle in capitalist expansion and capitalist loot. The penetration of imperialism- the taproot of which is economy- needed smooth 'flight of capital' which was possible only with the bourgeoisie or the capitalist class at the helm of political control. Therefore Mossadeq was bound to go. Following the nationalisation, the AIOC called for oil boycott and the US until then seen as a neutral party, grew hostile to nationalisation and joined the boycott. Iranian economy was affected badly as oil was not sold in the international market and revenues were lost. This came at a time when Iran was suffering from post War problems, socially and economically. Social unrest grew in the cities with the growing middle class demanding economic stability, groups suppressed under Reza Shah like the clergy were rising and recreating the space it lost. The intelligentsia and the trade unions all spoke for an Iran free of foreign intervention. The deteriorating economic system was further plagued by British restrictions on Iranian trade. The boycott, with US unwilling to give loans, further deteriorated economic conditions but all these made Mossadeq increasingly popular. Keddie writes:

Mossadeq's defense of Iran's independence, his defiance of AIOC, his charisma, and his overthrow with the American and British support helped make him an enduring national hero (Keddie 2003: 131).

The intention of the coup were many- control over oil, support to an ally who fought communism till US took over, political control and therefore need of a pro-Western government in Iran so that it was not left open for Soviet aggression at the time of cold war. The coup was successful in bringing the Mohammad Reza Shah back to power, who was now viewed as an American stooge. Two months after the coup, there were more than 13,000 political prisoners in Iran (Fakhreddin 2008). The Shah began his modernisation process with American and British help. He saw development as dependent on loans and direct aid from the US (2008: 135). He embarked upon reforming Iran which came to be known as the White Revolution. The six major points of the revolution were:

agrarian reform; nationalisation of forests and pasture lands; transformation of state enterprises into companies; the shares of which would serve to guarantee agrarian reform; workers share in company's profits; electoral law reform- universal suffrage and particularly votes for women and the creation of an Education Corps made up of bachelor conscripts who render a civil service by teaching in the villages (Pahlavi: 1980: 73).

This was further complemented by thirteen points. The results initially were positive with increased economic growth rate, improved infrastructure and improvement in the status of women; educational and social gains were also achieved. But eventually, with growing authoritarianism and open capitalism, Iran was moving towards crisis. While in the beginning, several positive changes were seen, no positive transformation in political system took place. In fact, other than the three bases of power for the Shah- the armed forces (he went on to strengthen it and by 1977 Iran had the largest navy in the Gulf, most up-to-date air force in the WANA region and the fifth largest military force in the world), the court patronage network and the state bureaucracy- the fourth major pillar of his power was added in 1977- one party state. The Resurgence Party or Hibz-i Rastakhiz was established as a major political tool to increase his power. Two major implications of the one party state system, according to Abrahamian, were: intense control of the state over salaried middle class, the urban working class and the rural masses and systematic penetration for the first time of the propertied middle class especially the bazaaris (Abrahamian 1982b). Economic base of the bazaaris was threatened by state corporations that distributed even the basic food items. Also was the fear that if the Shah was allowed to go

forward, he would destroy the Bazaaris. 'The banks are taken over. The big stores are taking away our livelihoods. And the government will flatten our bazaars to make space for state offices', told a shopkeeper to an American journalist (Kendell 1979: 1). Ministries, particularly the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Mines, Housing and Town Planning, Health and Social Welfare, and Rural Cooperatives and Village Affairs, Ministry of Information and Tourism, Art and Culture, Science and Higher Education, as well as the National Iranian Radio and Television Organisation were controlled by the state. The state-controlled media now began to talk about uprooting the old inefficient bazaar for highways and efficient supermarkets (Abrahamian 1982b). These are 'political expression of imperialism' wherein the state will become a minimal state in the market sense and deep state (maximum state) in the political sense (Ramakrishnan 2014).

The reforms under the Shah thus contributed only to capitalist type of agriculture and of industrial growth, with emphasis on state capitalism. Though purchasing power of the poor increased, the gap between the rich and the poor was also increasing. All these transformation of Iran was fuelled by oil revenue. But after 1973, as Clawson and Rubin (2005) argue, Iran also fell under oil curse. Too much expansion of output made it hard to extract oil and economy was badly mismanaged. Recession in the West and therefore reduction in its energy demands added to Iran's woes. Growth declined and shortages of basic necessities like food, water resulted in popular discontent. Moreover, the Shah invested heavily in the military and the government had to seek loans from America to fund it. At this time in 1964 another act of Shah that created disaster was the granting of capitulatory rights to Americans. Under this American personals were granted immunity from Iranian judiciary for any act of crime committed on Iranian lands. This resulted in huge uproar led especially by Ayatollah Khomeini. With this not only did America gained influence in Iran, Shah's rule was increasingly becoming dictatorial which he termed 'imperial democracy' in order to suppress peoples' resentment. He reduced the parliament to a mere facade by electing those chosen by him and excluded those who opposed him. Those elected were mere 'loyal servants and bootlickers' and no matter who becomes the Prime Minister, the decision will be of the Shah's. The

Shah's Western-orientation, an economic system dependent on oil revenues, authoritarian rule made the implications of the coup that overthrew Mossadeq worse. Fakhreddin writes that the coup 'would be ingrained in the collective memory of the most politically discerning Iranians as an imperialistically induced defeat, a humiliating violation, and a stark reminder that Iranians were not in control of their own fortunes' (Fakhreddin 2008: 157). The rule of the Shah thus became a painful reminder of imperialist aggression.

The Shah was criticised by intellectuals for being a puppet in the hands of the US and selling Iran to foreign powers. Third-Worldism based on socialism and anti-Western stand was the trend in Iran. All this would then lead to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The Revolution of 1979 differed from the Constitutional Revolution in a ways: first, the former overthrew the Pahlavi regime, while the later sought to limit its rule. Second, the former restructured the state institutions along indigenous Islamic lines, the latter sought to restructure the state along modern European lines. Not only was the enemy clearer in 1970s, the discourse behind the revolution consisted of nationalist, socialist and religious strands, all rallying behind the banner of Islamic Revolution (Clawson and Rubin 2005).

Role of Iranian Intellectuals

History of modern Iran has been the history of external intervention and revolts against it. Iranians have revolted against Western intervention either directly as against concessions and loans or indirectly by going against the Western-backed Shah. While Iran was exploited by foreign forces economically, politically and socially; it was also being enriched, as a by-product, in terms of ideas and knowledge. The Ottoman Turkey and the British brought in ideas of nationalism and liberal democracy, Russia brought in the concepts of communism and socialism. Like intellectuals all over the third world, intellectuals in Iran also played significant role in organising protests and discontentment not only through their writings but also through their active physical involvement in protests and organising it. In Iran, an intellectual is called *rowshanfekr* as discussed in Chapter I.

In the first half of nineteenth century, corrupt, despotic state, the gap between *Mellat* (the people) and *Dowlat* (the state) were the main source of discontentment for Iranians. Political structures depended upon the ruler, which continued for a long time in Iran. The rules of governance, writes Gheissari, 'were so closely related to the person of ruling sovereign that any change in leadership was bound to result in lawlessness' (Gheissari 1998: 61). Authoritarianism, corruption and lawlessness resulted in demand for reduction in the Shah's power and setting up of political institutions on Western model. To bring such a change, as Ann Lambton argues, nationalism was evoked to combat ruling classes even though such feelings were still weak (Lambton 1957: 17). It, as Jahanbegloo (2000) points out, was the time of political conservatism, economic weakness, and intellectual censorship. But increasing Western penetration gave rise to the belief that the Shah was not just being despotic but was also selling the nation to the foreigners who were major cause for the problems in Iran. Therefore, by the end of nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Iranians resented not only the state but also Western penetration and tried to provide solution to the resentment prevalent in the society. The West and the state constituted 'the other' for the intellectuals as both became so 'inextricably bounded' that the Iranian regime was perceived as an extension of the West (Boroujerdi 1996: 53).

Debating modernity was a general theme, but condemnation and critique of the state dominated the works of intellectuals in nineteenth and early twentieth century. Intellectual understanding of 'modernity' stood in close conformity with the 'country's political standing' therefore while intellectuals (both modern secular and religious intellectuals) 'embraced' the West for its liberal, democratic ideas they also made it sure to maintain a 'critical distance' from it (Boroujerdi 2003: 12). Hence, Iranians opted for 'guarded, qualified, and utilitarian embrace of Western modernity' (2003: 12). Not only did intellectuals maintained 'critical distance' from the West, they also condemned imperial aggression over Iran. Criticising the state and tobacco concession, Jamal-ud-din Afghani (1838-1897), a staunch anti-imperialist and an advocate of pan-Islamism, wrote that Naser ud-Din Shah 'has sold to the foes of our Faith the greater part of the Persian lands and the profits accruing therefrom...Madness

and infidelity are leagued together, and folly and greed are allied to destroy religion, to abrogate the Holy Law, and to hand over home of Islam to foreigners...without least resistance' (Browne 2002 : 17-19, 26). While Afghani criticised both the West and the state, the literatures of pre-Constitutional Revolution were mainly against authoritarianism and about reforming the structure of the state. Mirza Malkhom Khan's (1833-1908) *Qanun* (Law), considered to be one of the most important newspapers of that time, sought reform in existing system and a need for *Qanun* to rule the country. Though it attacked Amin ul-Sultan in the bitterest terms, the attack was in general of the lawlessness, tyranny and corruption and preached the virtues of a fixed legal system. It also essayed to bring together Iranians irrespective of any differences because he believed that lawlessness and chaos affect everybody from the *ulema* to princes to common masses (Algar 1973). He called for reform and codification of the Sharia into a state system based on modern principles (Northrup 1995). The content of many literatures during this period was criticism of the Shah because of which they were printed outside the state. Such was the state's repression, prohibition and crack down that many clandestine organisations or secret societies called the *anjomans*⁷ were formed. The *anjomans* discussed radical concepts that threatened the state and also distributed anti-governmental leaflets called *shabnamehs* (night letters)⁸. Literature critical of the Shah and those dealing with the socio-economic conditions of the Iranian society were distributed and they formed the ideological basis of criticism of the state such as Zain al-Abidin Maragha's *Travel (Siyahat-nama) of Ibrahim Beg*⁹, which is 'a bitter satire on Persian method of government and social conditions...with the definite objective of arousing discontent in order to bring about reform' (Browne 2002: 467). Another reformer who used his sonnet as battleground to fight against despotism was Farrokhi Yazdi (1887-1939). He was one of the first promoters of politics and economic justice in Persian literature. Describing resentment against the use

⁷ An *anjoman* is a group of like-minded people who would gather to discuss event, ideas and reforms needed. These *anjomans* would discuss the atrocities of the state and the ways and means to challenge it. The growth of *anjomans* swelled near the turn of nineteenth century.

⁸ *Shabnamehs* were distributed at night because of their suppression by the state.

⁹ The book appeared on the eve of Constitutional Revolution and was influential in determining the latter's character. It appeared in three volumes first published in Cairo, second in Calcutta and the third in Istanbul.

of treasury of the state earned from people's hard work for the Shah's own welfare, he wrote:

Our ruler who softly drinks strong pottle
Tramples people's labo(u)r for his desires
Not recalling Iranian peasants' penury,
In Paris, the face of fair ladies he admires (Nosrati 2014: 50).

Literature of the pre-Constitutional Revolution period also included writings of Fath Ali Akhuzadeh's (1812-1878) *Kamal ad-Sauleh va Jalal ad-Dauleh* describing conditions in Iran, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani's (1853-1896) books and articles and works of Talebzadeh and Zain al-Abidin Maragha (1840-1910). The culmination was the constitutional movement. The *Mashruteh* movement based on the concept of *Mashrutiyat* (constitutionalism) that challenged *motlaqiyat* (absolutism) and *estebdad* (despotism) and echoed the need for democratic and liberal institutions. The major supporters of the movement were the intelligentsia- both reformist and revolutionary, progressive merchants, and the enlightened clergy. The secular intellectuals based their conception on Western notions of liberalism, democracy, but were also careful in their approach towards religion. While some, such as Mirza Fath-Ali Akhounzadeh, rejected religion in general and Islam in particular, the overall attitude of modernists towards Islam was a 'combination of acceptance, caution, tolerance and pragmatism' also reflected in the works of Mirza Malkham Khan, as he commented that he was 'determined to clothe my material reformation in a garb which my people would understand, the garb of religion' (Gheissari 1998: 27).

The post-constitutional movement years were dominated by literature described as 'Literature of Revolt' by the Times Literary Supplement of 5 August 1955 (Kamshad 1966). *Yadegar-e Enqelab* (Memorial of the Revolution) founded by Mo'tamed al-Islam Rashti in Qazvin, followed by *Asr-e Enqelab* (Age of Revolution), and later *Ahd-e Enqelab* (Epoch of Revolution) were popular periodicals. Leading newspapers published poems almost every day on internal and external politics to such an extent that they formed 'a versified chronicle of the main political event'. Ali Akbar Dihkhuda (1879-1956) under the name Dakhaw wrote series of satirical articles in the columns titled *Charand-Parand* (nonsense) of *Sur-i-Israfil*. 'It was a mockery of ...all the elements...inhibiting

social progress: the Shah, corrupt courtiers, the ministers who paid lip service to new national assembly and reactionary divines' (1966: 38). Sadeq Hedayat (1909-53) considered to be Iran's greatest modern prose writer, in *Hajji Agha*, his masterpiece (a novel) disclosed political, financial, religious and personal hypocrisy by men of title, which he believed hampered Iran's progress. Criticising the 1919 Treaty, the Shah and Britain, Farrokhi Yazdi writes:

Fire on the evil demon (Satan) that wasted Jamshid's land
On artlessness due to his oppression
He ratified¹⁰ treaty, provoked unrest
And a great outcry in the nation
O' you, be careful not be cursed for
Enriching himself and begging us (Nosrati 2014: 51-52).

While discontentment against the Shah continued, increasing role of imperial forces in Iran's political, economic life, losing sovereignty of Iran led to criticism of both the ruler and the West. In a *Mosammat*¹¹, Farrokhi Yazdi writes:

A despotic with Zahak's¹² wont, causes to lose home
Now, due to English and Russian just like Salm and Toor
Iraj¹³ of Iran is confined and captive.¹⁴ (Nosrati 2014: 51).

Such writings reinforced the need of resistance not only against the regime but also for regaining Iran's sovereignty and against 'selling' of Iran to 'farangi'¹⁵. Freeing Iran from foreign domination and from despotic state became the popular mobilising slogan. As Iran became more modernized or Westernized, the evils of indiscriminate Westernisation became more obvious, it became natural for Iranians to blame evils on Westernisation and turn to the past for salvation. Writings therefore included romantic account of country's glorious past. *Kaveh*, *Tufan*, *Iranshahr* and *Ayandeh* were other popular nationalist papers creating such views.

¹⁰ This should be read as 'signed' as the treaty was not ratified by *Majles*.

¹¹ A form of poems having several threads.

¹² An Iranian mythological evil figure and a tyrant ruler

¹³ An Iranian mythical character, Fereydu'n's youngest son who inherited his father's 1/3 territory- Iran; he was killed by his brothers: Salm and Toor

¹⁴ It reflects entanglement of Iran with Britain and Russia.

¹⁵ After World War I, Boroujerdi writes, that the undifferentiated category of Farangi referred specifically to America, Britain, France, Germany and the like.

Dihkhuda writes

Still there is the atmosphere of past glories
And I memorise the old warrior's life
Who went and narrate about his journey all over the world
The moment he faced the tyrant rulers!
And then consider it is a saga and nothing
Meanwhile I think it is like orchard and palace in paradise! (Alam 1991: 25).

The past was thus glorified and rejoiced. The past was also looked upon not only for resistance but also for recreating the Iranian self. Both *Iraniyat* and *Islamiyat* were used in order to construct 'authentic' Iranian (Holliday 2011). She highlights that broadly, *Iraniyat* was used to refer to pre-Islamic Iran and *Islamiyat* to refer to Islam as a political religion, but she emphasises that both have no one meaning (Holliday 2011: 23, 24). In the period mainly preceding the Constitutional Revolution, the broad source of an 'authentic identity' for most intellectuals was *Iraniyat*, while in the twentieth century, *Islamiyat* became the source to construct one's identity. In both the cases narrations of the past (pre-Islamic and Islamic) were used against the West to restore the nation, as Edward Said writes, narrations have the power to produce or block other narratives from forming and emerging because 'nations are narrations' (Said 1994a). It was also important for the potential impact it could have in shaping the nation's future and for, as Frantz Fanon points out, bringing out change in the 'native' in the sphere of 'psycho-affective equilibrium' (Fanon 1963: 169). In the case of Iran, therefore, it became important, as a solution to the 'psychological blow' that Boroujerdi (2003) argue was delivered to Iranians particularly with the overthrow of Mossadeq and to bring in people's mind that past meant absence of Western forces, freedom from oppression and tyranny.

Recreating Iranian identity also brought in the question of modernity as Iranian self was defined against the West and Western modernism. For example Boroujerdi mentions of Hasan Moqaddam's play written in 1922 entitled *Ja'far Khan az farang amadeh* (*Ja'far Khan is back from Europe*) mocking a Westernized Iranian named Ja'far Khan, who after seeing what Europe has to offer become contemptuous of his own indigenous culture. He praised Western developments and opposed native culture and represented superficial Iranian

who slavishly imitated Westerners but lacked knowledge of the West (Boroujerdi 2003). The play highlights what is not an Iranian identity. The return to the past in the play, in Fanon words, reflects ‘the anxiety of the native to shrink away from Western culture in which they all risk being swamped...thus will be lost with their own people’ and therefore have a determination to renew contact with the glorious past (Fanon 1963: 168). The play, Boroujerdi argues, have ‘unfailing popularity’ among educated Iranians as it resonate with them for two main reasons: ‘first, because it addresses through art the questions of ‘identity’ and ‘uprootedness’, themes that have consistently preoccupied and engaged intellectuals; and second, it deftly portrays the dominant feeling of ambivalence that Iranians have exhibited toward ‘modernity’ and ‘modernism’ (Boroujerdi 2003: 12).

The question of ‘uprootedness’ has also been dealt with by Fakhruddin Shadman. He refers to ‘fokolis or the bow-tied ones’ as ‘shameless Iranians’ who have no ‘identity’ and merely imitate the West and knows neither Western culture nor Iranian. Similarly, Jalal al-e-Ahmad talks about the ‘*gharbzadeh*’ (‘Westoxicated’) people in his famous *Gharbzadegi*, variously translated as ‘Westoxification’, ‘Weststruckness’, or ‘Occidentosis’. He sees revival of Shi’a Islam as most important ‘vaccine’ and clergy as most qualified ‘doctors’ against *gharbzadegi*.

The dilemma continued among intellectuals as to what has to be taken from the West and what not, as Iran’s experience of ‘century of humiliation’ with the West transformed its image of the West from a ‘nebulous entity into a real concrete political adversary, a cultural opponent, and an ideological threat’ (Boroujerdi 2003: 13). The past therefore was looked back in search for an Iranian identity driven from an ‘authentic’ Iranian culture i.e. a culture different from the regime’s¹⁶. Works of Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini apart from critiquing the West have provided deeper insights into Iran’s identity and ‘authentic’ culture.

¹⁶ The state by 1960’s-70’s started promoting culture by setting up museums, celebration of cultural festivals and so on in order to co-opt resentment against the Shah.

Thus, in the nineteenth and twentieth century, major developments took place in Iran, both politically and intellectually. The resentment against the regime was subsequently directed against the West and eventually against as both the state and the West, which were seen as the two sides of the same coin. Two major trends developed in intellectual discourses in Iran: firstly, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century major intellectual works were mainly anti-imperialist in nature i.e. concentrated on critique of the state and the West. Secondly, in mid-and late twentieth century, intellectuals went beyond and sought solutions to imperialist domination.

Chapter III

The West and the 'Self': Fakhruddin Shadman and Jalal al-e-Ahmad

It is a pity that in all of Iran there are not even ten *farangshenas* for us to get acquainted with *farangi* civilisation, we need thousands of enlightened, Persian speaking Iranians who are [both] *Iranshenas* and *farangshenas* (Shadman 1965: 620-21).

We now resemble an alien people, with unfamiliar customs, a culture with no roots in our land and no chance of blossoming here...The only things Western that have penetrated this region are the transistor radio and the draft, and these with more deadly effect than dynamite (Ahmad 1984: 64).

Twentieth century intellectuals in Iran inherited a century of popular resentment against autocratic and centralised Iranian state. From the Qajar days onwards, the Shah and the state represented corruption and external dependence. Economic crises, in addition, had accentuated peoples' resentment against the Shah, who un-hesitantly commissioned Western forces to siphon off wealth from Iran in the form of loans, concessions, treaties and agreements. Increasing foreign penetration had turned Iran into a 'dependent state' and Iranians into a condition of loss of self esteem. Western intrusion in all aspects of Iranian life, Shah's Western orientation, corruption among the aristocrats, economic crises, etc. had made life miserable for the Iranians. The Shah was identified as Western lackey in Iran and so, curbing the Shah's power meant curbing Western influences. Hence, Iranian intellectuals revolted against the Shah in order to resist not only the ineptness of the government but also the West.

Though Western notions of democracy and liberty were endorsed by many Iranian intellectuals, the West was also held responsible for the crisis in Iran, cultural alienation being one of its major effects. Cultural alienation was understood as destruction of Iranian culture by the West and therefore the past was relooked to reconstruct the 'lost Iranian self'. Of course, when 'self' is constructed it is as opposed to the 'other'. In case of Iran, the West and the regime were constructed as the 'other' by Iranian intellectuals (Holliday 2011). They were regarded as the external and the internal 'other' respectively. Intellectuals in Iran therefore consistently produced and reproduced the notion of

an Iranian 'self' or the 'authentic' Iranian identity through discourses of the self and the other. This was important because there wasn't and isn't one notion of Iranian identity. Discourses can 'transmit and produces power, reinforces it, but can also undermine and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it' (Foucault 1978: 101). Hence, a discourse can be an 'instrument and an effect of power' as well as 'a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy' (1978: 101). Discourses produced by Iranian intellectuals were to 'undermine and thwart' parallel dominant discourses produced by the West, the Shah and the '*Westoxicated* in order to reconstitute Iranian identity derived from its 'authentic' culture. This challenge to undermine dominant discourse or to establish one's own ideology as 'common sense' also involves alternate sites of power, as 'ideologies are closely linked to power' (Fairclough 1989: 2-3).

An attempt has been made in the present chapter to look into the anti-imperialist works of Fakhruddin Shadman and Jalal al-e Ahmad. It will also deal with their idea of an authentic Iranian self.

Fakhruddin Shadman

One of the most important intellectual of twentieth century Iran was Fakhruddin Shadman (1907-1967). He was born in Pamenar to Hajdi Abu Torab, a cleric, and mother Masoum, an enlightened woman well-versed in Persian classics and the Quran. He belonged to a rich merchant clerical family with powerful influence. His mother, together with her economic independence also had a powerful presence as matriarch of the family (Milani 2004: 298). Like children from all clerical family, Shadman was also taught in traditional curriculum in *madrasa* of Mirza Hayat-Sahi and Sheikh Mohammad-Taqi Modarres Nahavandi. There he learned the 'principles of Arabic and Persian language and literature, jurisprudence and logic' (Boroujerdi 1996: 54). He was later enrolled in many secular schools in Tehran with a modern curriculum like *Sarcesma-ye Kamal*, *Tadayyon*, *Dar-al Fonun*, *Darolmo'allemin-e Markazi* (Teachers' Training College) and *Madreseh-ye Ali-ye Hoquq* (School of Law). As a student at the Teachers' Training College, he published his first essay under the pen name of *Amuzegar* or 'Teacher'. He graduated from the college in 1925 and

from Law school in 1927. While teaching at *Darolmo'allemin-e Markazi*, he served as the editor of *Toufan-e Hafetegi* (Weekly Toufan)¹⁷.

One of his most important achievements was his successful prosecution of Lindenblat case in which German advisor to the Iranian National Bank, Kurt Lindenblat, was charged with financial fraud. His success earned him great reputation and he was sent to London as Commissioner to represent Iranian interests in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. He obtained doctorate in law from the Sorbonne (1935) and in history from the London School of Economics and Political Science¹⁸. His dissertation was an analysis of British- Persia relations during 1800-1815 (*Encyclopedia Iranica*¹⁹). He also taught at the School of Oriental Studies (later known as School of Oriental and African Studies). Shadman was also a member of the Iran Society along with other prominent British scholars like Basil Gray²⁰ and Reynold A. Nicholson²¹.

After returning to Iran, he held important positions like Director of the Iran Insurance Company, Vice Delegate of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Minister of Agriculture, Director of the General Office of Propaganda, Radio and Press, member and later head of the Supreme Council of the Plan Organization and was also in charge of administering U.N. aid to Iran. He played a significant role in founding Abadan's Oil College that provided Iran with professional technicians and managers to operate oil industry. He was also a member of *Farhangestan* (Iranian Academy), *Showra-ye Farhangi-ye Saltanati* (Cultural Council of the Imperial Court of Iran), to name a few. In the later period of his life, he gave up all public offices and taught courses such as philosophy of history, evolution of Islamic civilisation and methodology in history.

¹⁷ Shadman's second essay was part of the inaugural issue of the journal. There is doubt regarding who founded *Toufan-e Hafetegi*. While Encyclopaedia Iranica mentions Shadman as the founder (<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/farroki-yazdi>), Gheissari (1998) writes that Farrokhi published it with initial collaboration of Shadman.

¹⁸ Milani (2004) writes that he earned his degree in political science while Boroujerdi (1996) writes his Ph.D. was in history.

¹⁹ <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/shadman>.

²⁰ He was an art historian, Islamist and studied eastern Asian Art and was largely responsible for Asian collections at British Museum. He headed Islamic Art in Cairo in 1969, in Beirut in 1974. His *The Arts of Islam* looked into the role of princely patronage in the paintings of eastern Islamic cultures.

²¹ Nicholson was an English orientalist, scholar of Islamic literature and Islamic mysticism and a Rumi scholar.

He was also a novelist, a translator and an essayist. His works included *Ketab-e bi-nam* (in memory of his late friend Hasan Alavi), *Dar rah-e Hend, Tarifi va rowsana*, translated Albert Malet's *Histoire Moderne* (1498-1715), Jean-Pierre Claris de Florian's *Galatee* and so on (Boroujerdi 1996). It was *Taskhir-e Tamaddon-e Farangi* (The Conquest of Western Civilisation) in 1948 that became his most important and popular work and proved a major contribution to anti-imperialist discourse in Iran.

The West, Language and Iranian Identity

Shadman understood Western civilisation as indefinable and considered all imperial forces as Western civilisation²². For him, it was the 'vitality of science and arts' that takes a nation to development and progress (Gheissari 1998: 86). The central theme that Shadman addressed was Western imperialism and the impact it had on Iranian society. Considering Western (European) attack on Iran as different from all others before, he believed these are difficult and powerful enemy, defeat at the hands of whom will be Iran's 'last defeat' as he believed no Iranian will survive to endure another enemy. This was because external forces were penetrating Iran through various means- threats, bribes, presents, etc. and were replacing Iranian way of life, culture and identity with theirs. Iranians, he argued

were obliged to learn new methods in dealing with Europeans, to speak the same political language which was entirely new to them and master to the best of their ability the intricacies of a novel life that their relations with foreigners has forced upon them. Within a short time they had to contend with the overtures, the presents, the bribes, the friendliness and the threats of the British, the fears and the promises of the French and the overwhelming force of the Russians. They paid dearly for their ignorance, weakness and for relying at times almost too sincerely upon foreign support and counsel (Shadman 1939b: 9-10).

Russia and the West constituted two enemies of Iran and for Shadman, the West constituted the major threat. The danger from the West, for him, is further augmented by presence of the *fokolis*, the alienated Iranians who have lost their identity and who merely imitate the West. In *Tashkir-e Tamaddon-e Farangi* (The Conquest of Western Civilisation), he brought in two fictitious characters

²² Gheissari (1998) writes that Shadman includes ancient Greece, contemporary America, Portugal of four hundred years ago and Japan in Western civilisation.

namely, Sheyk Vahab Ruf'ay and Hushand Hanavid. These two characters represented two groups, traditionalist clerics and pseudo-modernists 'infatuated' with the West. In reverse order, Sheikh Rufay becomes Sheikh *Yafur* used in theology to refer to blockheads and Hanavid becomes *divanah* meaning insane (Boroujerdi 1996: 56). The names he used are important in terms of constituting one's identity because 'the misuse or appropriation of names and stories can be both an insult and an attack on identity' (Edwards 2009: 3). Therefore, he selected these two names in order to reject such characters.

The first group represented radical *mullas*, whom he criticised for misinterpreting teachings of the Prophet. But his major criticism was directed towards the *fokolis* who is represented by Hanavid. His reference to *fokolis* fall within three categories: those working with *Farhangestan* (an academy established by Reza Shah to standardise the Persian language), those who have just returned from abroad and those who support new style of Persian poetry (Boroujerdi 1996: 57). The first category is criticised for their specious coinage of 'pure' Persian term. Speaking of them, he says, '*fokoli* is an ignorant or ill-intentioned Iranian who thinks that if the Persian alphabet is replaced by a Latin one, all Iranians will suddenly be able to read and write' (Shadman 1948: 14). The second category, he believed had given up their national culture and religious roots in order to become superficially Westernised. He criticised them for being unaware of Western missionaries who relegate Islam as the root cause of Iran's problems. He argued that those who consider Islam as the source of Muslim ills are ignorant, egocentric and prejudiced. The third category is criticised for deserting classic Persian poetry for unconventional Western styles (Boroujerdi 1996: 57-58). The *fokolis*, therefore, for him, are those who try to 'superficially' Westernise important aspects of Persian culture, Persian identity and thereby destroy Persian 'authentic' self. *Fokolis* represented Iranians who have 'lost' their true Iranian identity by mimicking the West. They, he believed, had failed to differentiate between what is to be learned and what is not to be learned from the West. He called them 'dirty enemy' from within.

He also criticised *fokolis* for their shallow understanding of both Western and Persian civilisation. He says, '*fokoli* is a shameless Iranian who knows a little of some European language and even less Persian, yet claims that he can

describe to us the European civilisation of which he has no knowledge and through a language he does not know' (Shadman 1948: 13). He mocked them as 'the bow-tied ones'. Narrow minded *fokolis*, he mocked, is ignorant of Western achievements and 'think that Western civilisation amounts merely to dancing cheek to cheek, gambling and going to smoke filled pub'' (1948: 18). *Fokoli's* praise for the West, Shadman believed, rests on his/her ignorance about the West's history of the Dark Ages and crusades and their belief that Islam is responsible for Iran's backwardness stems from their lack of knowledge of Iran's glorious past, its history and its contribution to scientific knowledge (Milani 1988: 141). He argued *fokolis* are nothing more than Western agents seeking to destroy Iran and therefore must be exposed (1988: 141). Shadman's introduction of *fokoli* not only reflects an attack and insult of superficial identity of *fokolis* but also reflects his effort to establish a common sense of what is not a 'true' Iranian identity.

Shadman put forth two options in the wake of attack on Iran- either to capitulate to the onslaught of Western civilisation unconditionally or to capture it with 'guidance of reason and prudence' (Shadman 1948: 30). He advocated the latter solution and believed that embracing Western positive achievements does not necessarily involve embracing Western way of life and their ethics, thereby proposed maintaining what Boroujerdi (2003) calls, a 'critical distance'. Shadman believed that a critical distance can be achieved by becoming knowledgeable and being an expert on Western civilisation as well as on Iranian civilisation. That is in his own terms becoming a *farangshenas* as well as an *Iranshenas*. He critiqued superficial Iranians by saying that while most are acquainted with *farang* civilisation only few are *farangshenas* (complete knowledge about the West). The task of *farangshenas* becomes more difficult as they also should have knowledge of Iran, therefore, should also be *Iranshenas* (Shadman 1965). Hence, for him a 'true' Iranian is one who is both *farangshenas* and *Iranshenas* and not a *fokoli*. He talked about such an Iranian about in his *Tariki va rowshana'i* (Darkness and Light) (Boroujerdi 1996: 58).

Shadman believed that if the West is not captured, it will transform Iran into a mere imitator of the West, with superficial knowledge of the West. He

compared the West with an army of soldiers and provided ways to defeat them. Shadman says,

we can compare Western civilisation to an army made up of one hundred million soldiers. Every valuable book that we bring to Iran, every accurate translation that we give to our countrymen, and every blueprint of a factory, a building, a machine...that we gather in Iran is as if we have captured one soldier of this huge army and made him into our own servant (Shadman 1948: 75).

Shadman believed in indigenous application of Western knowledge. For Shadman, books were a 'complete manifestation' (Gheissari 1998: 87) of all European knowledge through which the 'fundamentals of European civilisation' can be introduced to Iranians (Gheissari 1998: 87, Boroujerdi 1996). Therefore, he proposed a systematic policy for translating into Persian, modern European books, classical works of Greek and Latin (Gheissari 1998: 87). This, he believed can be done only through Persian language. He considered Persian language a 'great apparatus' and the 'only means' to capture Western civilisation (Shadman 1948). Shadman rejected the mediation of both *fokolis* and Westerners to interpret Western civilisation to the Iranians as he considered the former 'an ignorant wrongdoer' and the latter 'a wise ill-wisher' (Shadman 1948: 56).

Shadman's works reveal that while he acknowledged and appreciated Western achievements, he was fearful that shallow and superficial understanding and implementation of Western elements would reduce Iran to a mere imitator. He believed that the West as enemy from without and the *fokolis* as 'enemy from within' were superficially transforming Iran. He considered such transformation as an attack on Iran. It was an attack because for him, it endangered Iran's national identity, culture, religion and all those elements that constitute a 'true' Iranian self. With a relentless attack by the West and the *fokolis* to superficially Westernise Iran, he called for a cultural revolution (Milani 2008) and saw language as the saviour of Iranian identity and authentic Iranian self. Shadman's insistence on use of language as a saviour in wake of Western onslaught is criticised by Boroujerdi (1996) on the ground that he had failed to explain the case of nations like Japan and Arabs, who vehemently protected their language but failed to escape Western attack. But this criticism becomes less relevant if Shadman's idea of imperialism is understood as cultural imperialism. Because

language plays an important role in order to resist cultural imperialism. Language in any society under cultural attack, help people identify themselves as one and can become, what Dei (2005) calls, a powerful instrument of identity and belonging. Japan and Arabs have resisted cultural imperialism to a large extent and are still able to relate themselves to their culture through language. Shadman's emphasis on language, therefore, was not merely on the communicative aspect of language but also on its symbolic aspect, 'language as an emblem of groupness, a symbol, a psychosocial rallying point...the historical and cultural associations that it had accumulated' (Edwards 2009: 55). His reference to language therefore was his reference to the power of the language to preserve identity, as struggles (political and social) occur not only in language but also over language (Fairclough 1989: 23).

Thus, Shadman was among the first to provide systematic criticism of imperialist attack on Iran. Shadman's critique of the West, Westernised pseudo-modernist and the traditional clergy marked a significant 'toward a more home-grown version of modernity' (Boroujerdi 1996: 62). Thus, he was among the first to argue that Westernisation was not to be rejected or accepted completely (Ahmed 2006, Milani 1988). Shadman's was the forerunner of many works on anti-imperialism, Jalal Al-e Ahmad's work being another significant one.

Jalal al-e-Ahmad

Born into a religious family in northern Tehran, Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969) was sent to Najaf to become a theology student. However, he returned within few months and got enrolled in the Teachers' Training College from where he graduated. It was during and after his university days that he broke with religion and joined the *Tudeh Party* in 1944. Due to some internal issues, he left the Party in 1947 and remained dormant for some time in his political life. In 1950, he again became active in politics and joined *Zahmatkeshan-e Melat-e Iran* (Iran's Toilers Party). He played an influential role during Prime Minister Mossadeq's nationalisation process and also helped an intellectual movement

called the *Niru-ye Sevom* (The Third Force)²³. He severed all his ties from politics after the coup of 1953 that overthrew Mossadeq. Boroujerdi (1996) notes that 1940s and 1950s were the formative years of Al-e Ahmad's intellectual life, learning from many other contemporary intellectuals; he learned rationalism from Ahmad Kasravi, short-story writing from Hedayat, new styles of poetry writing from Nima Yushij and political activism from Khalil Maleki.

Using the power of both written and spoken words to guide and motivate people towards the 'reality' was what Jalal Al-e Ahmad did and what he believed an intellectual does. In his *Dar Khedmat va Khidnat-e Rowshanfekran* (The Intellectuals: How They Serve and Betray Their Country), he defines an intellectual as one 'free from prejudice and [blind] imitation...and who puts the result of his work at the service of the populace...solving a social problem'. His works, whether his essay, prose, etc. were all oriented towards bringing the 'reality' of the West and its influences in front of the people.

He was never a historian nor an ideologue, but a man who had discovered an important and fundamental truth concerning his society- its disastrous subordination to the West in all areas- and was in a hurry to communicate this discovery to others (Algar 1984: 14).

His ideas of the West was shaped significantly on the one hand, by effects of the World War II, which did not involved Iran directly but had severe consequences for Iran in form of typhus, famine and heart-wrenching presence of foreigners (Al-e Ahmad 1984), and on the other, by Mohammad Reza Shah's 'determination to give his Iranian subjects a European look' (Dabashi 2006). Apart from the above two factors, Mirsepassi (2003: 101) gave few other factors which inspired him to critique the West: his involvement with the radical movements, disillusionment with secular political culture and his own reading of European literature and critical intellectuals like Sartre, Camus and so on.

Al-e Ahmad translated several books into Persian from French which includes Camus's *The Stranger and Misunderstanding*, Sartre's *Dirty Hands*, Gide's *Return to the Soviet Union*, Dostoevski's *The Gambler*. His interest in translation reflected his desire to introduce alternate views to the Iranian public

²³ 'The Third Force' was founded by Khalil Maliki. It advocated a 'social democratic revolution' and fought against the West, Western backed Shah as well as the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party (Vahdat 2000: 58).

(Hanson 1983: 8). He was also an essayist, short story and fiction writer, an ethnographer, a journalist, a translator of French literature and a political activist (Dabashi 2006, Mirsepassi 2003).

He published series of short stories such as *Did-o bâzdid* (Exchange of visits), *Az ranji ke mibarim* (From our suffering, 1947), *Seh-târ* (Sitar, 1949), and *Zan-e ziyâdi* (The superfluous woman, 1964). *Sargozasht-e kanduhâ* (Tale of the beehives, 1955), *Modir-e madraseh* (The school principal, 1958), *Nun va 'l-qalam* (By the pen, 1961) and *Nefrin-e zamin* (Curse of the land, 1968) are his novels which are basically political allegories. In *Sargozasht-e kanduhâ* (Tale of the beehives, 1955/58), the analogy of the beehive was used to refer to the oil industry, the bees to refer to the people of Iran who own the oil. The ant that stole honey represented the British companies which 'robbed' Iranians of their resources. The analogy also dealt with oil nationalisation. In *Nefrin-e zamin*, an economy dependent on oil revenue has been severely criticised as an inhibition to internal growth and infrastructure build up. *Nun va 'l-qalam* mocked the Shah and his Westernising tendencies. Though most of his works have been rooted in criticism of the West, his best known work on Westernisation is *Gharbzadegi*. So much was its popularity, that the word entered permanently into Persian vocabulary and was used by subsequent intellectuals of the 1979 revolution (Algar 1984, Dabashi 2006).

'Westoxification' and Iran

Gharbzadegi was published in 1962, initially as a report to be presented to the Council on the Aims of Iranian Education, sponsored by the Ministry of Culture. But due to its 'overtly' critical tone and controversial content, it wasn't presented (Boroujerdi 1996, Gheissari 1998). Early chapters of *Gharbzadegi*, then appeared in the literary journal *Ketab-e Mah* (Book of the Month) published by the daily newspaper *Keyhan*; Al-e Ahmad unfortunately was not able to witness open publication of the complete work. *Gharbzadegi*, as a term was originally coined by Ahmad Fardid (1912-1994), but it was Al-e Ahmad who acknowledged and made use of the term, or else, the word probably would have lapsed into obscurity (Algar 1984). Today, *gharbzadegi* has been variously translated into English as 'plagued by the West', 'Weststruckness',

‘Westoxification’, ‘Occidentosis’, ‘Westernisation’ and ‘Euromania’. Al-e Ahmad referred to *gharbzadegi* as ‘infestation of weevils’, an ‘attack’ on the inside wherein ‘the barn (of wheat) remains intact, but it is just a shell, like a cocoon left behind’; it is a ‘disease: an accident from without spreading in an environment rendered susceptible to it’ (Ahmad 1984: 27). He, in the above few phrases addressed the external and internal dimensions of the otherness, the West (the disease) and the superficial Iranian (the shell, cocoon) (Boroujerdi 1996). In opposing the Western ‘other’, he creates two kinds of ‘self’. First is the broader self, among the exploited developing nations. Al-e Ahmad (1984) brings up this ‘self’ in his idea of the world as divided into two ‘extremes’ or ‘poles’, one inflicting ‘disease’ and other receiving. One pole or the one inflicting, for him, is the Occident, i.e., Europe, Soviet Russia and North America. The other pole or the one at the receiving end of the ‘illness’ is Asia and Africa i.e. the developing or non-industrial nations, which have been consumers of Western goods and among which Iran falls. The second ‘self’ (though within the first self) is the Iranian ‘self’ which is the one being destroyed by the ‘illness’ as well as by the Shah’s regime. The illness, he argued, ‘attacks’ Iranian culture, identity and renders people rootless, identityless and leaves with just an outer Western ‘shell’ like an ‘ass going about in a lion’s skin’ (Ahmad 1984: 31). His idea of an Iranian with an outer Westernised shell is a critique of superficial Iranian, similar to that of Fakhruddin Shadman’s concept of ‘fokolis’. He called them ‘occidentotic’ people. Such critique is also found in Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of The Earth*. Fanon says,

we must find something different, we can do everything so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe... if we want to turn... into a new Europe...then let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us (Fanon 1963: 252-254).

Similarly, Al-e Ahmad aimed to redefine Iranian self, culture according to one’s own criteria. His intention was to provide ‘cultural self analysis by victims of imperialism’ (Algar 1984: 15).

In *gharbzadegi*, he dealt with Western imperialism as an ‘illness’ inflicted upon Iranians and implored its treatment. Bringing in economic aspect of imperialism, he argued that the world today is no longer governed by ‘isms’ and

ideologies but by commerce. He asserted that for him, the 'East' and the 'West' are 'economic concepts' rather than 'geographical or political concepts'; as he regarded commerce the 'foremost determinant of the politics of state' (Ahmad 1984: 29). Hence, the conflict in the world, is the conflict between the two worlds, the world of the rich or 'sated' nations and the poor or 'hungry' nations- 'one producing and exporting machines, the other importing, consuming them and wearing them' (1984: 28). He believed that international organisations like the UNESCO, the FAO, the UN, etc. are weapons of the West to colonise the 'hungry' world (1984: 30). The conflict, he referred to, is the modern economic conflict, which is being fought even today by the capitalist states to control and govern the global market. The entry of the 'machine' and its impact on the local economy has been brought into consideration by him. He referred to the West as 'machine' and 'machine civilisation' and openly criticised the destruction of local economy in many of his writings. One such is *Karg: Dorr-e Yatim-e Khalij* (Kharg: The Orphaned Pearl of the Gulf). Kharg was an almost deserted part of Iran but was restored to life due to oil installations. He believed that though oil installations would bring economic growth to Kharg, but will isolate the area, its culture and economy from the rest of the country as half of its population is still underdeveloped (Ahmad n.d.). He compared Iran to 'a weak, exhausted body of a sick man with an unnatural big and strong head that was the oil industry, artificially dragging the country just to feed the West' (Dabashi 2006: 59). His emphasis, through the comparison, was on superficial Westernisation of Iran in order to meet Western needs. Such ideas also help understand that the 'development' that accompanies capitalism and Westernisation, is not to develop the 'underdeveloped' but to facilitate Western penetration.

Like Marxists, he too believed that economy is the root cause of imperialism. Hanson (1983) writes that his work is though less systematic but is an 'Iranian version of dependency theory'. Kohn and McBride (2011) argues that Al-e Ahmad developed arguments that are similar to other Marxist and post-colonial critiques by 'bringing in the concepts of division of poles, knowledge and ignorance, power and desolation' and by arguing that the division is increasing as a result of global economic system. According to Al-e Ahmad, the

drive for imperial expansion has been raw materials; however, he argued that the garb in which imperial powers penetrated differed. He writes

first it came in the garb of pilgrims to the Christian holy places of the East (Bethlehem etc.), then in the armor of the crusaders...in the dress of merchants, then, under cover of cannon, as shippers of goods, and most recently as apostles for civilisation (Ahmad 1984: 32).

The ambassadors and advisers, he believed, are agents of imperial expansion. Imperialism, he argued, needed the Shah in the form of a strong central government in order to advance imperialist ambitions, referring especially to the *coup* that overthrew Mossadeq and brought in the Shah.

In talking about the onslaught of the machine and machine civilisation, he made it clear that it cannot be 'rejected or banished' because the world has 'fallen prey' to the 'machine' and neither does he intended to do so. In fact, he proposed ways to 'encounter the machine and technology' (Ahmad 1984: 30) or 'to break the spell' by putting 'this jinn back in the bottle' (1984: 79). This is important because he argued that the onslaught (production and exportation) of the 'machine (machinisme)' and 'machine civilisation' on the developing nations and on countries so new to it like Iran have been devastating. He argued that these countries have been unable to 'take a considered stand in the face of this contemporary monster' and therefore have been unable to 'preserve historico-cultural character' (1984: 31). Al-e Ahmad's work on *gharbzadegi* is though is 'rooted in political economy, his project is ultimately an exercise in the critique of ideology' (Kohn and Mcbride 2011: 42). Going beyond economics or 'enforced trade' he wrote that occidentosis even extends to 'cultural matters, to letters, to discourse'. He therefore, drew attention towards the role discourses play in order to produced and alter the conception of an 'authentic' Iranian self into 'occidentotic' self. The earliest signs of 'toxification or illness' he believed were the 'spirit of worshipfulness' and helplessness that Iranians feel towards the West. Also, evaluation of different aspects of Iranian life according to Western standards of good and bad, desire among Iranians to live and dress like them, follow 'the West-the Western states and the oil companies', were signs of 'supreme manifestation of occidentosis', argues Al-e Ahmad (1984: 61-62). But he is quick to distinguish between universal knowledge and Western knowledge.

He considered scientific knowledge as universal and asserted that it knows no national boundaries and considered social sciences and humanities Western (Ahmad 1984).

While not discarding the positive effects of the West, he argued that the machines have even though 'liberated' people from traditional oppression, they have been suppressed by another more dangerous form of oppression. This is because 'the entire local and cultural identity and existence will be swept away just to operate a factory in 'the West' or that workers in Iceland or Newfoundland are not jobless' (Ahmad n.d.). He argued that farmers are though freed from feudal lords, machines would become feudal lords in itself, while children working in local industries will be saved, but local industry and economy would be destroyed, though societies will be urbanised but slums would swell, insecurity and crime would grow, women would be 'emancipated' in terms of 'right to parade themselves in the public' but would not bring change in terms of equal value and equal pay and will only succeed in 'swelling army of consumers of powder and lipstick-the product of West's industries' and poor will turn to religion to make their life 'bearable'. These, for him constituted the 'contradictions' of machine and 'machine civilisation'. The corporations and the middle men (government, aristocrats), he argued, are the people who benefit from *gharbzadegi* and it is the poor (who have no role in shaping his/her destiny) who has to pay the price.

Like economics, the politics of the nation, he argued, is governed by the West as those into 'leadership apparatus' of the country 'see it as their moral duty to serve ultimately as interpreters for the Western advisors, as administrators and executors of their decisions and goal'. He critiqued the state and argued that those who are at the helm of power serve merely as 'interpreters'. This was because their 'sovereignty' and power was guaranteed by the West. He argued that even if the leaders go beyond to act according to their opinion, they no longer hold the position. He was referring to the Shahs, most of whose throne were guaranteed by the West and to Mossadeq who was overthrown for asserting his sovereignty. The destiny of the country is thus left in the hands of the West and 'occidentotic' intellectuals. Like Shadman, he brings in the domestic aspect of the 'other', variously translated as

'occidentotic', 'West-struck', '*gharbzadeh*', 'Westoxicated' intellectuals. The 'self' is therefore destroyed twice as 'we are re-stuck with occidentotic leaders' (Ahmad 1984: 93). An 'occidentotic' intellectual is one

standing on thin air...a particle of dust suspended in the void...has severed ties with...society, culture, and tradition...is a thing with no ties to the past and no perception of the future...is a hypothetical point on a plane...like that suspended particle...has no character...is a thing without authenticity (Ahmad 1984: 92).

Here he draws distinction between the culturally authentic and inauthentic self, and some Iranians falling within inauthentic self (Mirsepassi 2006). Therefore, Al-e Ahmad's analyses of Westoxification revolve around two points:

first the Western corporations and Western governments infiltrated the economic and cultural markets of Iran in order to extract resources, mainly oil and produce a system of consumption in which Iranians would look to the West for all forms of technology and goods. Al-e Ahmad's second and closely related point is that Iranian-Islamic subjects themselves perpetuate the penetration of Western machine because reception of Western economic and cultural goods makes Westoxification possible (Deylami 2011: 251-252).

His reference is to the Pahlavi Shahs, whose modernisation process has resulted in Iran's dependence on the West, rejection of Iranian culture; and to the 'occidentotic' intellectuals who have rejected their indigenous culture and willingly accepted the West. Al-e Ahmad believed because of such adverse conditions, people are 'awaiting the Imam of the Age...because none of our ephemeral governments have lived up to the least of its promises' (Ahmad 1984: 71).

The solution to 'occidentosis' he argued lies in controlling the machine and 'to break it into harness like a draft animal' (Ahmad 1984: 79). This could be done by building indigenous machines to make economy independent of the West, i.e., the subordination of technology to the power of authentic traditional culture (Mirsepassi 2006: 42). This traditional Iranian culture, for him, was rooted in Shi'i Islam. Though he did not embrace Islam in his early years, his solace in Islam, as his wife Simin Daneshvar writes, was a result of

his wisdom and insight because he had previously experimented with Marxism, socialism and to some extent, existentialism, and his relative return to religion and the Hidden Imam was toward deliverance from the

evil of imperialism...preservation of national identity, a way toward human dignity, compassion, justice, reason, and virtue (Daneshvar 1982: xi).

He disapproved religion in the beginning but then accepted it as a powerful tool against the West after undergoing ‘personal religious questioning’ (Hanson 1983: 19). Islam, for Al-e Ahmad, was not in his own words, that ‘relies on superstitions’ or on ‘the criteria of the middle ages’ but a dynamic Islamic thinking would be a way of life, a way to assert one’s own identity especially when the identity is being threatened. It was the ‘instrumentalist view of Shiism’, that Al-e Ahmad used as a ‘mobilising political ideology’ (Boroujerdi 1996: 75). He argued that Islam has been able to liberate people from bondages of traditional structures like caste system and have given people freedom to study sciences (Pistor-Hatam 2007). Mirsepassi writes that for him, ‘Shi’i romanticism was more an embodiment of the self-realisation of a modern intellectual lost in the plight of modern life than a return to traditional Islam where such concepts as the self do not play a focal role’ (Mirsepassi 2003: 105). His belief that the religious group would be able to protect Iran from being ‘struck’ by West was proved by the roles that religious clergy played during Tobacco Protest, Constitutional Revolution, Uprising of 1963 and so on. But he also lamented that being a ‘secret state’ or a state within a state (referring to the power of clergy), they did not perform what they could have.

It should be noted that Al-e Ahmad prioritises religious leadership over secular intellectuals. The reason for considering them as the ‘doctor’ for the ‘illness’ is because of four reasons: they are by nature of their profession ‘men of learning’, they have a radical mindset, they are trusted by the people because of their class background (usually of lower class) and their ability to speak ‘language of the masses’ (Boroujerdi 1996: 72). The ability of clergy to communicate to the people and their traditional powerful role may have been reasons for Al-e Ahmad to see in the institution of the clergy the potential to protect Iran and cure it from *gharbzagedi*. Al-e Ahmad also believed that mythologies constitute ‘the most essential and immediate frames of reference within which members of a common culture assume their measures of social action. Myths were important for disposition of his final political agenda’ (Dabashi 2006: 62).

In order to thwart imperialism on a global scale, he called for solidarity among the exploited, developing nations of the East, as he believed that, 'we have more points in common than difference'. In fact, Hanson argues that his work is

harbinger of north-south debates of 1960s and 1970s like those on New International Economic Order, New Information Order...third world recognition of, and plans to combat, the often more subtle forms of cultural imperialism (Hanson 1983: 12).

Al-e Ahmad's perseverance to accord a sense of self-respect and dignity in being an 'Easterner' reflects his idea that the East is equal to the West and therefore capable of challenging and charting an identity and modernity of its own.

While some believed that what Al-e Ahmad did are 'attempts to reinvent global modernity in Iranian Islamic terms' (Deylami 2011: 247), many believed that he represented an age of intellectual ambivalence in the wake of 'Western modernity'. Though Al-e Ahmad is being criticised for historical inaccuracy, he is also considered as 'one among earliest postcolonial thinkers' (Vahdat 2000). Disturbed by imperialism, Western domination and dashed by Soviet communism, Al-e Ahmad formulated an Iranian conception of 'self'. In defining the 'true' self, Al-e Ahmad also looked into the process of creation of 'inauthentic' self. Al-e Ahmad succeeded in bringing together modernity and local Islamic culture, by confirming that modernity is not synonymous with Westernization. In fact, Al-e Ahmad employed, though implicitly, modern concepts of 'freedom of subjectivity' through his concept of *rowshanfekri* as intellectual free from Western influences (Vahdat 2000). In creating a discourse on Western imperialism, no one has been able to produce what Jalal al-e Ahmad could (Dabashi 2006) as his *Gharbzadegi* became 'intellectual staple of an entire generation of revolutionaries' (Deylami 2011: 248). Boroujerdi (1996) argues that in the fight against 'occidentosis', the major achievement of Al-e Ahmad was bridging of the gap between secular intellectuals and religious cleric as an effective means against the West as well as against the Shah. Al-e Ahmad, therefore, tried to bring together all the forces in the struggle against Western inflicted 'disease'. In a scenario where Iran was exploited by the West, its culture being destroyed, its economy in crisis, fuelled by corruption among the

ruling aristocracy, *gharbzadegi* provided an answer to ‘attack’ and a word which itself was enough to convey resentment against the oppressor.

Al-e Ahmad, like Shadman, also considered Persian language as an important aspect of Persian identity (Dabashi 2006). Though Al-e Ahmad continued Shadman’s concept of ‘inauthentic’ self produced as a result of Western influence, he also went beyond to produce what subsequently will prove to be Iran’s greatest tool against Western, especially American, imperialism i.e. return to Shi’i Islam as the most ‘authentic’ culture from which an authentic ‘self’ can be reproduced. They condemned and critiqued superficial imitation of the West. His idea of *gharbzadegi* were invoked by Ali Shariati as well as by Ayatollah Khomeini in their works on anti-imperialism, leading successfully to the most important anti-imperialist movement in the history of modern Iran in the form of the Revolution of 1979.

Conclusion

The context in which the above two intellectuals lived significantly influenced their work. Western imperialism, the authoritarian Western-oriented Shah, the Constitutional Revolution and its failure, etc. are the context in which both intellectuals wrote. Resentment with prevailing conditions and efforts to resist and reorder them are therefore apparent in their work. The challenge these intellectuals posed were not only ontological but also epistemological in nature. Not only were the economic destruction and societal dislocations were addressed, the above intellectuals also redefined the discourses produced by the West, West-oriented Iranians and condemned them as ‘inauthentic’. Destruction of culture and identity, therefore, constituted the biggest threat endangering Iran. Therefore, both Shadman and Al-e Ahmad produced an ‘authentic self’ rooted in culture (which varied for both) and redefined and tried to undermine the ‘inauthentic’ Iranian self represented by *fokolis* and *gharbzadeh*. In reconstructing the self, the ‘other’ (both external and domestic) is viewed as dangerous ‘other’ set to destroy the ‘authentic’ self. The solution, therefore, lied in capturing positive Western knowledge like science and literature and thus in maintaining ‘critical distance’. Hence, both addressed the debate of modernity and local Iranian culture and thwarted the notion of modernity as purely

Western. Therefore, the power of their discourse is to challenge imperialism in order to reveal and resist not only ontological realities of Iran under imperialism, but also to redefine oneself according to one's own criteria.

CHAPTER IV

The West and Revolutionary Islam: Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini

My conceptions of myself are not as I actually am in reality, but as 'they' are; that is I am alienated...Western societies have been able to impose their philosophy, their way of thinking, their desire, their ideas, their tastes and their manners upon non-Europeans countries to the same extent that they have been able to force their symbols of civilisation... (Shariati 1979d).

If the Muslim states and peoples had relied on Islam...they would not be enslaved today by Zionist aggressors, terrorized by American Phantoms, and be at the mercy of the satanic cunning of the Soviet Union...Our triumph will come when all forms of foreign control have been brought to an end and all roots of the monarchy have been plucked out of the soil of our land (Khomeini 1981: 210).

The decolonised states fought two types of war against Western imperialism as Edward Said argues in *Culture and Imperialism*. One 'primary resistance' which is physically resisting the outsider and another is 'ideological resistance' which means to resist the attack on identity and preserve a community's sense of self. As Iran has never been officially 'colonised', the fight that Iranians undertook was the 'secondary' or 'ideological resistance'. Such a resistance needed an ideological basis for wider unity, which Said believed was found in 'rediscovery and repatriation' of things that has been suppressed by imperial forces (Said 1994a: 210). In Iran, as discussed earlier, the rediscovery was the rediscovery of an authentic Iranian Self and repatriation was to an authentic Iranian culture. There existed deep seated animosity against the West and the authoritarian Shah and hence an alternative was sought by intellectuals, clergy, bazaaris and the masses. However, what constituted 'authenticity' was debated by intellectuals and had various versions.

In the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, secular pre-Islamic past was the popular base on which secular intellectuals sought united resistance against imperial forces, a move that was supported by clergy to an extent. But later in the twentieth century, Shi'i Islam became the popular

ideological base against the West as well against the Western-backed Shah. Jalal al-e Ahmad contributed significantly to this shift in ideological base and hence he can be considered either a link between the two popular ideologies or a point at which the shift in popular ideological base took place. Ramakrishnan notes that it was the recognition of the 'oppositional political potential of the Iranian brand of Islam' by intellectuals like Al-e Ahmad which has been turned into 'a revolutionary force capable of overthrowing the imperialist-supported monarchist regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi' (Ramakrishnan 2008: 13). The Revolution of 1979, as the most successful anti-imperialist revolution of the late twentieth century, marked the triumph of Shi'i Islam as an ideological base for wider unity against all other ideologies against imperialism and imperialist backed Shah. Shi'i Islam, hence, became 'an ideology par excellence, capable of social functions as granting identity and legitimising upon and integrating and mobilising the masses' (Boroujerdi 1996: 77).

Two important intellectuals whose works contributed mainly to the success of the transformation of Al-e Ahmad's 'brand of Islam' into potential revolutionary Islam were Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini. But before going into their works, it is important here to understand some salient features of Shi'i Islam.

Shi'i Islam became prominent in Iran in 1501 when the Safavid²⁴ Shah Ismail united Iran under his centralised rule and proclaimed Shi'i Islam as the state religion. This led to conversion of Iranians into Shi'ism. The origin of Shi'ism is traced to the death of Prophet Mohammad in 632 A.D. when crisis of legitimate successor arose. The caliphate was adopted as the legitimate system to take forward the Prophet's message. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq, Umar ibn al-Khattab and Uthman ibn Affan became the first three caliphs or legitimate successors, but small sections of Muslims demanded Ali, a cousin and son in law of the Prophet, to be the legitimate descendant. Though legitimacy crisis persisted throughout the first three Caliphs (Ja'fari n.d.), Ali was made the fourth Caliph in 656 A.D. and ruled until his assassination in 661 A.D. Following his death, his elder son was chosen as the successor, but was forced to abdicate with the rise of a strong Umayyad dynasty under Mu'awiya. With Mu'awiya's death his son Yazid was

²⁴ Safavids trace their lineage from Safi al Din (1252-1334) who claim descent from the Seventh Imam Musa al Kazim.

pronounced the legitimate Caliph and ordered to exact homage from Hussain – the younger son of Ali. But Hussain refused to pay homage to Yazid, an act that eventually led to the Battle of Karbala on the 10th day of the month of Muharram, killing Hussain and his supporters. Today, the day is known as Al-‘Ashura by the Shi’i Muslims. Many scholars like Philip Hitti and Ishtiaque Ahmed consider this day as the day of birth of Shi’ism; while others, like Fyzee and Ja’fari reject this and argue that Shi’ism as a doctrine was apparent right after the death of Prophet and that Hussain’s death marked an official pronouncement. Even within Shi’ism numerous sects exist, one of which is the Twelver Shi’ism. The Twelvers believe in the doctrine of Imamatus and consider the Twelve Imams as the divine successors of Prophet Mohammad. The twelfth Imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi went missing in 872 A.D. after which believers rationalise it by claiming that the Imam has gone into occultation i.e. alive but hidden from humankind but believe that he will reappear to bring justice and peace in the world. It is this sect of Shi’i Islam that was declared as the state religion by Safavid dynasty and continues to remain even today as Iran’s state religion.

Ever since the advent of Islam, the clergy played an influential role in state politics. But with the Pahlavi regime, the power of the clergy declined. Less representation of clergy in the *Majles* and other governmental organisations, the shift in source of legitimacy from religion to monarchical legacy, control of lands donated for religious uses, setting up of regime’s own endowments to look into distribution of revenues, etc. were reasons for the clergy to oppose the Shah. Moreover, with an environment of Western exploitation, a Western-oriented Shah was an ideological threat to Islam- the basis of Iran’s identity for many, especially the clergy and religious intellectuals. In fact, the Shah was often compared with Yazid by many scholars which finally drove him out, Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini being two most popular among them.

Ali Shariati: A Guide to Resistance

Ali Shariati is referred to as ‘Voltaire’, ‘the main ideologue’, ‘philosopher’, ‘teacher’ of the 1979 Revolution. He was born in 1933 to a religious family in Mazinan in Khorasan province to Mohammad-Taqi Shariati and Zahra. His

father Mohammad also became his teacher and have taught 'him method of scientific and logical thought, and imbued him with an ethical and political spirit' (Rahnema 1994: 35). Both father and son joined a small group called *Nahzat-i Khoda Parastan-i Sosiyalist* (the Movement of God-Worshipping Socialists). Abrahamian argues that the group was significant intellectually, as it made the 'first attempt in Iran to synthesize Shi'ism with European socialism' (Abrahamian 1982a: 25). In the 1940s, his father founded the Centre for the Propagation of Islamic Truths in Mashhad and Shariati was one of its products along with many other well known personalities. After doing his schooling in Mashhad, he obtained Bachelor of Arts from Mashhad University in Persian language and literature. Shariati also taught at a school and founded Islamic Students' Association until he received a fellowship from France to pursue his doctorate in sociology from Sorbonne University. During his stay in Paris, he supported Algerian National Front, met Frantz Fanon and translated several of his works into Persian. He also joined organisations formed by followers of Mossadeq, like the Iranian Student Confederation and Liberation Movement of Iran.

His was inspired by the writings of Jean Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara, Giap, Roger Garaudy and translated into Persian many of their works like Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*, Sartre's *What is Poetry?* and so on (Abrahamian 1982a). On his return, due to his involvement in Algerian movement as well as pro-Mossadeq activities, he was apprehended and imprisoned for months. He then taught at Mashhad University and later moved to Tehran, where he took up lectureship at a religious meeting hall, *Hussaineh-i Ershad*. His lectures became so popular that they were transformed into pamphlets, booklets and tapes. But the hall was soon closed down in 1972 due to various reasons, Shariati's popularity among masses being one. Shariati was arrested and kept in prison until 1975 after which he remained under house arrest till 1977 when he left for London. Just after one month in London, he died mysteriously at an early age of forty three. The cause of his death remains uncertain till date.

The West and Return to the *Self*

Shariati's works has been appreciated by Hamid Algar as religion-oriented, but with 'sound epistemological, philosophical, historical and sociological bases, and evolve from a constant dialectic of practice and reflection' (Algar 1979: 28). Because of multidimensionality of his work, one can understand Shariati's works with reference to anti-imperialism in two ways: either that his major focus was on defining the Self and articulating one's authenticity but critiques the West and the existing order whenever he gets the opportunity; or that his major focus was the West and the Shah and hence refers to the Self rooted in religion and culture to thwart them. The study follows the second view to understand Shariati's work. Also agreeing with the second view Hanson (1983) writes that Shariati presupposes his audiences' knowledge about earlier critiques of the West as those done by Al-e Ahmad and therefore put all his effort in mapping out his 'path to salvation'.

Shariati compared the onslaught of West with a 'fire' that 'has started and is spreading', a 'destructive flood' and 'one that pulls towards hidden enslavement'. He saw in imperialism a system that dominates the world and destroys human subjectivity in order to reduce it to a mere imitator of the West. Shariati, in his critique of the West, addresses Iranian Self in the broad context of the oppressed third world. In his *Reflections of a Concerned Muslim: On the Plight of Oppressed Peoples*, he writes, imperialism 'controls half of the universe or may be all', have subjected humankind to 'slavery...in name of freedom', has transformed people into 'empty pots which accommodate whatever is poured inside them' (Shariati 1979b). The reason imperialism has succeeded was that masses were still not 'awake', 'asleep under black bed of abjectness', under 'ignorance and blasphemy' (Shariati n.d.). He used these adjectives to refer to ignorance of the masses of the true nature of Shi'i Islam and therefore, their true self rooted in it. Speaking of the nations under dominance of colonialism and imperialism, Shariati calls for two types of revolution: a national revolution to put an end to imperial dominance and to revive nation's culture and identity; and a social revolution to end all kinds of exploitation, oppression, poverty, capitalism and modernise the economy in

order to establish an equal classless, just and dynamic society (Abrahamian 1982a: 26).

Shariati (1979d) believed that modernisation has been ‘imposed’ upon Iran by ‘certain artificial factors’ that have entered Iran and has ‘alien spirit’, referring to the Shah and other Westernising tendencies. The oppressive system of domination in Iran, he argued, is based on three pillars which he called ‘the trinity of oppression’- *zar-zur-tazvir* (gold-coercion-deception) or *tala-tigh-tasbih* (gold-sword-rosary) referring to capitalism, authoritarian state and conservative *ulema* and offered his concept of *azadi-barabari-erfan* i.e. freedom, equality and spirituality (Shariati 1982). Popular in the 1970s and even today, his works reflected his disillusionment with the contemporary system under Mohammad Reza Shah and believed that Iran’s values were ‘at present subject to cultural, intellectual and social onslaughts’ (Shariati 1980a). For him it was impossible to revolt against the Shah without attacking Western ideologies (Milani 1988). The ‘artificial factors’ and ‘the alien spirit’ he argued sought to destroy Iran’s culture, religion and Iranians sense of ‘real self’. Shariati says:

these artificial factors wipe out any real culture and substitute a false culture suitable for different conditions and an altogether different historical stage, a different economy, and a different political and social setup...and bemoaning troubles not mine [Iran’s] at all (Shariati 1979d).

With the imposition of an ‘alien’ system, the ‘real’ Self becomes the ‘alien’ Self, who then harbours aspirations that are European; and the indigenous system suffers problems that belong to Europe which is ‘in the final stage of capitalistic and materialistic success’ (Shariati 1979d). His rationale for imposition for such an alien system is a Marxist understanding of imperialism, which is provided in his *Machinism*. He has developed the ‘most explicit critique’ of imperialism in this essay (Kohn and McBride 2011). The title, Kohn and McBride (2011) observe, resembles modern industrial capital wherein critique of capitalism-based on private property, overproduction resulting in furious competition, consumerism- is provided. *Machinism*, for him, was a universal phenomenon, the ill effects of which are apparent only in the East in two ways- first, the East fails to attain economic development like the West but faces all its negative effects creating a wide gap between the East and the West; second, economic

gap is also created within Eastern countries between traditional and Westernised masses (Kohn and McBride 2011: 46). Providing an argument similar to Marxist tradition, he argued that with industrial revolution, machine arrived in the hands of capitalists and the rich. Increased production of machine and failure to consume the products domestically at same rate resulted in the need of exporting the products outside Europeans boundaries. But non-consumption of European products by natives in the East, due to non-European style and way of life (that thrived on local production) resulted in Europe coercing consumption of European products upon them, by transforming the native itself.

Shariati went beyond mere economic critique of imperialism and provided a cultural critique of the same. Linking economic domination with cultural domination, he argues that consumption was imposed by ‘changing the man himself in order to change his clothing, his consumption pattern, his adornment, his abode and his city’ and native society was remodelled along European lines (Shariati 1979d). This change was done by changing his/her thinking and morale and the task was carried out by enlightened European intellectuals to make the world uniform and to make the native live like them and think like them (1979d). Modernisation, therefore he argue, is ‘modernisation of consumption’ and modernity is ‘to become thirsty suckers of what Europe was eager to trickle into our mouths’ (1979d).

Shariati briefly reveals cultural impacts of Western civilisation in his speech *Civilization and Modernization*. With the imposition of new ways of life, a new ‘formless aimless, shapeless, directionless society’ and a ‘mosaic civilisation’ is created since both traditional and modern elements are mixed together and the native losses ‘all the I’s he feels within’ (Shariati 1979d). For him such a society is one without identity, without any direction as to where the society is moving and such a native is one dispossessed of all its subjectivity. Condemning on a serious note, of mere ‘imitation’ of the West done by westoxicated intellectuals or *fokolis* and the regressive traditional norms which conservative clergy espouses and Western onslaught, he in *Philosophy of Supplication* says, ‘My Lord, liberate me from the poverty of translation, and inferiority of imitation so that I may break out of the inherited moulds...resist the new moulding of the West’ (Shariati n.d.). The ‘moulding of the West’, for him meant attack on Iran,

its identity, which is being done by attacking religion as 'inferior' since it accords any society a distinctive identity and individuality and is also the reason for Western civilisation to base itself upon the notion of 'superiority' (Shariati 1979d). Thus, Shariati not only critiques the West, deals with its effects but also diagnoses the reason for Western critique of Islam and Iran. His critique of modernity did not bar him from borrowing modern concepts from the West.

Shariati's solution to imperialism lies in his concept of 'Return'. Boroujerdi (1996) writes that Shariati went beyond Jalal al-e Ahmad, in fact 'complemented' Al-e Ahmad's discourse, by providing a solution to *gharbzadegi* through his concept of *bazgasht beh khistan* i.e. return to the Self. The answer to *gharbzadegi*, for Shariati, is to be sought neither in the regressive past nor in Westernisation. He propounded a middle path between the traditional past and Westernisation, but through radical means of revolt. This becomes clearer when he speaks about his concept of true Self in *Art Awaiting the Saviour* (Shariati 1979c). He asks to which 'self we seek return to?' It is not to a Self that seeks 'revival of superstitious, frozen traditions, fanaticism and uncivilised indigenous traditions' (Shariati 1979c). It is the 'return to one's own character. It means to breathe with the spirit, seeking the constructive, active and progressive aspects of culture which have, in the past created societies, civilisation and urbanisation', to a Self free from the attack of foreign alien values (Shariati 1979c). He says true Self is not a static but a dynamic Self. His dynamic Self, is the Self that meets the challenges, the ontological realities of the present, as he says 'we should return to ourselves as the reality and truth demands, to our national and ethical character' (Shariati 1979c). Though it is not clear whether he judges these values of the past according to Western concepts or in accordance with Islam.

To seek the truth or the true Self, according to Shariati, one has to go back to Shi'i Islam, which for him is a religion for the oppressed, a religion that seeks justice and humanity, a religion that is revolutionary and progressive in nature. Shariati believed that religion is a source of identity as he believed that religion accords identity to any society (Shariati 1979b).

The major achievement of Ali Shariati was his ability to relate Islam with contemporary society and his ability to find solutions to contemporary ills of Islam. Abrahamian writes that Shariati was able to 'synthesise socialism with traditional Shi'ism' (Abrahamian 1982a: 24). For Shariati, the need of religion in some societies like that of Iran is because religion plays an important role in culture and therefore in defining one's identity. His emphasis on religion comes from his understanding of religion as fundamental means of drawing boundaries between the identities of orient and occident. Also to fight imperialism in such a society one has to revive religion so as to revive and reassert one's cultural identity which is attached with religion. Asserting the need of religion in societies rooted in religious identity, he says 'religion can, through its resources and psychological effects, help the enlightened person to lead his society toward the same destination toward which Fanon was taking his own through non-religious means' (Shariati 1980a).

Shi'i Islam was the religion for him to take people along the lines Fanon was taking the oppressed. But for him, Shi'i Islam was different from what conservative clergy had to say, as they have betrayed the cause of Islam and their religion has been (mis)used by bourgeoisie as mass 'opiate' (Abrahamian 1992: 112). He believed that Shi'i Islam (Karbala, martyrdom etc.) have to be understood in their historical context so as to grasp its true meaning. Therefore, he took up the task of rewriting the history of Islam through a revolutionary interpretation. His reference to history was not the 'history as the cumulative measures of actual shared experiences' but to 'history as the ideological reconstruction of a revolutionary self around which every other experience is forced to redefine itself' (Dabashi 2006: 104).

Shi'i Islam, Shariati argues, starts with a 'no'. A 'no' to a history that remained in 'ignorance', it negates the path followed by history under leadership that betrayed the masses, rejects 'opulent mosques and magnificent palaces of the caliphs and turn towards mud house of Fatima'(Shariati 1980b). It is a religion that rebels against oppression, deceit and ignorance.

Relating Islam and the conditions that prevailed under Mohammad Reza Shah's tyranny he writes, Shi'ites

choose the principle of awaiting to protest against the existing conditions, where the ruling government, religious leaders and aristocracy try to show everything to be in accordance with the Will of God, the Divine Law and the satisfaction of God and creatures. Everything, to them, included their conquests, plundering formation of mosques, associations, schools, gifts, trusts, charities and the observance of religious ceremonies and practices (Shariati 1980b).

He further says that the 'present Islam', is a criminal Islam in the dress of 'tradition' and the real Islam is the hidden Islam, hidden in the red cloak of martyrdom' (Shariati 1980b). For him, Alavite Shi'ism (Shi'ism of the first Shi'i Imam Ali) is revolutionary in character and has revolted against oppression under dictatorial regimes of Omayyids, Abassids, Ghazanvids, Seljuks, Mongols and so on. Alavite Shi'ism's 'cry' has been for justice for the downtrodden and oppressed masses. The revolution against Mongols was a wave of Alavite Shi'ism against 'foreign domination, internal deceit, the power of feudal lords and large capitalists' and it arose 'for salvation of the enslaved nation and deprived masses, led by peasants seven hundred years ago, under the banner of justice, and culture of martyrdom' (Shariati 1980b). This Shi'ism, he says is 'Red Shi'ism' and under Safavids, Shi'ism was subsequently transformed into 'Black Shi'ism' i.e., Shi'ism of mourning. It was under Safavid and post-Safavid periods that Shi'ism became a tool of oppression for the powerful and true Shi'ism was hidden behind 'the dust of opportunism, vacillation and misinterpretation' (Algar 1979). Summarising Shariati's idea of Islam in Iran, Hanson (1983) highlights the following points: first, he reinterprets Quran and Islamic history through sociological and psychological viewpoint; second, Islam is put forward as a 'political' religion that seeks justice, freedom, equality; third, it is the only means to save Iran from imperialism because of its indigenous character and fourth, it prioritises individuality over the *ulema*. Shariati's preference for subjectivity over *ulema* reflects his dismissal of *ulema* as the interpreter between God and the masses. Also, rampant corruption among the clergy and the nexus that existed between the clergy, the Shah and the West is a reason for him to denounce clergy. Islam, for Shariati, was more than a religion or a culture, it was a way of life, a belief system to govern societies. The former

(Islam as a culture), he argues, produced only clerics while latter will produce intellectuals and warriors (Boroujerdi 1996). He drew largely and used terms from Islam and Quran what Richie Khatami (n.d.) calls 'organic terminology' to arouse masses against the oppressor. Use of such an organic terminology was reflected in his popular slogan, 'Every day is Ashura; every place is Karbala!'

Shariati bring Sartre's existentialism into Islam and separates human from history, society or any existing system. He accord agency to human being and makes him/her responsible for all their action. Shariati prioritise human beings over everything in order for them to define their destiny. He argues that human beings have been prioritised by God over 'angels'. This is because Shi'i Islam, he emphasised, considers 'man' (referring to human) as superior from other animals as 'man has its will and choice' and therefore his 'fate must be fashioned by himself' (Shariati 1981). He also reconstructed the image of women as revolutionary through Fatimah Zahra (daughter of the Prophet and Ali's wife) and called women to reassert themselves along her model, for Shariati feared women being either lost in the traditional model of 'passive and virtuous' or being absorbed by the Western model. The nature of human beings, he notes, according to Shi'i Islam is determined by one's 'knowledge and intelligence'. Adding to this view, in *An Approach to Understanding Islam*, he says that human beings are responsible for themselves and their own society. He quotes Quran to prove his point: 'For them is the reward which they have earned and you shall have that which you earn, (2:134). Verily God does not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves (13:11) (Shariati 1979e).

However, he argues that only 'consciousness' can reveal one's true Self. But to be conscious of self requires being conscious of who the 'other' is. Consciousness is important because only a conscious human being is aware of its agency as 'I' (Shariati 1979c). For Shariati, therefore, the Self is rooted in Alavite Shi'ism which is revolutionary in character and revolt, when needed, against oppression, for justice. Shariati also brings out the Self rooted in religion. Keeping in view the oppression by autocrat Shah together with imperial onslaught which have been discussed in Chapter 2, one can clearly make out that Shariati's was a call for a 'revolt' against oppression and the revolt of 1979

would not have been a surprise had Shariati lived to witness it. The popularity that Shariati gained was because he addressed directly to the individual human being, to their inner conscience that had experienced exploitation at the hands of the oppressors. He invoked his listeners to activism by politicising several important concepts of Shi'ism like *tauhid* and *entezar* (Milani 1988). He re-defined the meaning of *entezar* as rejecting what is present. He argued that one who is satisfied with the present is afraid of the future and therefore is not awaiting the Imam (Bayat 1982).

Shariati's idea of an independent human being is also reflected in his concept of *Tauhid*. Shariati believed that Islam is based on *Tauhid*- Unity of God as against *Shirk* as promoting diversions and contradictions. *Tauhid* is the concept which means that there is only one power that humans should fear and answer to i.e. god and thereby grant human being freedom from all other kinds of oppression. It confers human the freedom to choose his/her own destiny both spiritual and material (Tariq 2013: 341). It was Shariati's world view of *Tauhid* which for him became 'the intellectual and ideological foundation of both a philosophy of history, uncovering the past fate of man and human society, and a prediction of their future destinies' (Algar 1979: 32). Shariati believed that *Tauhid* addresses all the questions relating to society and 'social relationships' like class division, social institutions, social, political and economic systems, role of individual in society. He therefore believed that *Tauhid* provides 'foundation for all affairs of society' and a *Tauhid*-oriented society is free from all contradictions of the society (Shariati 1979a: 32). His idea of 'contradictions of the society' and '*machinism*' brings us also to his Marxist understanding of class.

While some believed that Shariati's ideas were opposed to Marxism like R. Campbell, there are others like Hamid Algar and Ervand Abrahamian who believe that Shariati borrowed Marx's concepts. Hamid Algar (1979) believed that Shariati went beyond Marxism, Abrahamian (1992) writes that Shariati was inspired by 'Marxism particularly the neo-Marxist of Gurvitch for whom Marx was a social scientist'. But Ahmed (2006) argues that the contradiction between the two opposing views vanishes once Shariati's understanding of three Marx is looked into. Shariati, he argued talked about three Marx in his lectures on

Islamology: first, is the ‘young Marx, an atheist who viewed the world in ‘crude economic terms’, the second is ‘mature Marx’ who believed in ‘historical determinism’ and the ‘third Marx’ was the political leader who did not consider seriously ‘social science methodology’ (Ahmed 2006: 89-90). This view of three Marx is also noted by Abrahamian. It is the second Marx that Shariati endorsed and was inspired from (Abrahamian 1992, Ahmed 2006). This was reflected in his *jabr-e tarikhi* (historical determinism), *harakat-e dialektiki* (dialectical movement), or *dialektik-e tarikhi* (historical dialectic) (Abrahamian 1992). His historical determinism is his reading of Quran by bringing forth ‘the contradictions between haves and have-nots’ (Ramakrishnan 2008: 12). Shariati, like Marx, believed that history of humankind is the history of class struggle between the oppressors (*mustakbirin*) represented by Cain and the oppressed represented by Abel (*mustazafin*). The pole of Cain and the pole of Abel were also used to distinguish between good and evil in a ‘socio-political sense’ and he argued that Allah and the people *al-nas* belong to the *mustazafin* class (2008: 12). Religions throughout history, he argued, have been formulated according class giving rise to distinct rival *mazhabs* (religion) - the rulers propagated a religion which justified their oppression and the ruled seeking a religion of truth and justice. Apart from Shariati’s Marxist views or ‘fragments of Marxism’²⁵ that he employed, his concepts also revealed his non-Marxist views. For example, his belief that power shapes ownership and not vice-versa, his understanding that reviving the society through Islamic principles can help escape the contradictions of the society (Akhavi 1988), his rejection of Marxism for converting humanity into materialism, and so on. His ideas have let many scholars to conclude that they reflect a middle way approach between capitalism and communism with a major thrust on political Islam (Abedi and Abedi 1986, Akhavi 1988). Abedi and Abedi (1986) further argue that the political Islam that Shariati propounded was based on *Khoda-Parasti* i.e., worship of Allah.

Drawing from various sources, Shariati was trying to formulate a concept which his people could understand so as to liberate themselves from the ‘trinity of oppression’ and he believed that the responsibility lie on the ‘enlightened’ ones. His understanding of enlightened have resemblance to Said’s intellectual

²⁵ Milani (1988) writes that Shariati combined ‘fragments of Marxism with Shi’ism’.

as he believed that an ‘enlightened’ person need not be an intellectual but one who in Said’s words ‘represent’, ‘embody’ and ‘articulate’ the truth to and for oppressed masses. Such a person seeks justice and freedom of the masses from oppression. For Shariati, Ali Akbar Dehkhoda was both an intellectual and an enlightened soul. Abu Dharr was another enlightened one Shariati considered revolutionary who took the responsibility to change the established system of his time. He defines an enlightened soul as ‘a person who is self-conscious of his ‘human condition’ in his time and historical and social setting, and whose awareness inevitably and necessarily gives him a sense of social responsibility’ (Shariati 1980). It is the ‘conscious’ who feel responsible to give the ‘gift’ of ‘self-awareness’ (*khodagahi*) to the masses because only then masses can revolt. He was probably drawing from Frantz Fanon, as self-realisation for him was the first step to liberation.

Acknowledging Shariati’s contributions, many criticisms were also raised against him for various reasons. Khatami (n.d.) criticises him for lacking ‘foundational’ and ‘historical basis’ to support his claims, for relying on ‘story telling’, ‘myth making’ and ‘myth recounting’. Other criticism of Shariati includes his artificial and shallow understanding of Islam and the West (Sachedina 1983), for giving up commitment to find the truth for political impact (Akhavi 1983), for the dilemma of embracing of specificity along with his idea of universal nature of human kind (Lee 1997), and for not being able to explain the role of Islam in freeing people from *machinism* (Kohn and McBride 2011). Though not sidelining the criticisms, it is also true that Shariati laid down the path for a new Iran through revolutionary means. One cannot deny Shariati’s contribution to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, even though he died before the Revolution. Shariati’s impact was most visible among the youth as Shariati called for a revolution not only to overthrow the imperial forces, autocratic Shah and conservative clergy, but also to redefine the ‘Self’ by moving towards the ‘god like self’. His call for ‘revolutionary reconstruction of self’ (*khud-sazi-e enqelabi*) was a call to ‘link the theoretical qualities of Shi’ism with individual action’ (Gheissari 1998: 104) in search for ‘authenticity’ (Lee 1997). Shariati was also able to produce a modernist interpretation of Shi’i Islam and succeeded in invoking the ‘syntax, slogans, and imagery of a Shi’ism impregnated with

nativism' (Boroujerdi 1996: 114). He 'reideologized' Islam by incorporating secular political objectives into Islamic ideas (Dabashi 2006). Shariati was able to carve a space for lay-religious intellectuals by critiquing both secular intellectuals as well as traditional clergy and charted a path for emergence of a new discourse in Iran. Though Shariati was the 'Ideologue of the Revolution', it was actually led by another intellectual among the *ulema*, Ayatollah Khomeini.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini: Leader of the Revolution

For many he is the dark side of Islam...for others he is the defender of the faith, the man who restored power and puritanism to Islam in the face of decadence, corruption and Western hegemony (Moin 1994: 64).

Ayatollah Khomeini belonged to a religious family which trace its ancestry to the seventh Imam of the Ahl al-Bayt²⁶. His ancestors, originally from Iran, moved to Lucknow, India towards late eighteenth century and devoted themselves to religious teaching. It was his grandfather who in mid-nineteenth century visited Hazrat Ali tomb in Najaf Iran and settled in Khomein²⁷. In 1902, Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was born in Khomein to Seyyed Mostafa Musavi and mother Hajar. His father was the religious head of Khomein. He lost both his parents at a young age and since then was looked after by his brother Seyyed Mourteza. In 1923, Khomeini reached Qom to complete his preliminary education and completed his studies in 1927 attaining the status of *Mujtahid* (qualified jurist). Under the leadership of 'Abd al-Karim Ha'iri before and Ayatollah Boroujerdi later, he mainly taught Islamic sciences (*fiqh*) to students many of whom will later play important roles in the Revolution and gained popularity first as a teacher and then as a writer.

Khomeini has been critical of the Shah from his early years of learning. This was because, as Dabashi points out, his days of 'scholastic learning and writing coincided with two crucial decades of 1930s and 1940s' that saw forced Westernisation (Dabashi 2006: 41). Forced unveiling of women in 1936,

²⁶ Ahl al-Bayt refers to people of the House meaning members of family of Prophet (<http://islamqa.info/en/10055>).

²⁷ There he accepted the invitation to settle in Khomein by Yousef Khan an eminent citizen of Khomein and got married to Yousef Khan's daughter (http://www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/ayatollah_khomeini.php).

construction of Trans-Iranian Railway in 1934, establishment of Tehran University as secular alternative to *madrassa*, Allied occupation of Iran during the World War II, killing of Sheikh Fazlollah Noori, suppression of revolt by Reza Shah, dethroning of the Shah by the West, establishment of Tudeh Party in 1941 and the 1953 coup, shaped his ideas against the Shah and the West. The post-Mossadeq era under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's tyrannical rule further provoked his anti-Shah, anti-West views in defence of Islam. Dabashi (2006) claims that the events in the 1960s (attack on religious establishments) resulted in a 'sharp bend' towards Islam in his political discourse. Critical of the Shah's regime in his early days, Khomeini wrote against the Shah, the first being his *Kashf al Asrar* (Secrets Revealed) in 1941. The book is a 'detailed and systematic critique' of the Pahlavi rule in Iran (Algar 1981: 15). The book targeted Ali Akbar Hakimzadeh, who had published a book challenging Shi'ism's central ideals (Northrup 1995). It was with the death of Ayatollah Boroujerdi in 1961 that Khomeini assumed significant leadership position in order to fill up the gap that his death led to. He was soon accepted as the *Marja-e Taqlid*²⁸. Khomeini stood out as the deserving successor of Ayatollah Boroujerdi because of several reasons: his academic qualifications and his readiness and will to challenge the Shah's regime especially when few dared so²⁹ (Algar 1981: 15) along with his 'political efficacy, vociferous opposition to the Shah, and the ingenuity to attract popular support' (Milani 1988: 89).

His criticism of Shah's policies continued, now vehemently, both in 1962 against new policies of elections and in 1963 against Shah's White Revolution. After Mohammad Mossadeq, Khomeini was the strongest 'crises' that the Shah faced (Milani 1988). Khomeini launched series of attack against the Shah in his sermons which brought him to the popular realm as a leader. Khomeini in his

²⁸ *Marja-e Taqlid* means following the verdict of a *Mujtahid*, literally meaning 'source to follow'. It is based on the premise that *Mujtahids* have the authority to make legal decisions within Islamic law.

²⁹ After the death of Ayatollah Boroujerdi, sections among the *ulema*, who were against his conciliatory approach towards the Shah now openly expressed their views against his approach but feared challenging the Shah. Degrading economic conditions (austerity measures), political and social (land reforms, voting rights to women etc.) issues, de-facto recognition of Israel, pro-West approach of the Shah intensified resentment against the Shah (Milani 1988) and Khomeini's loud criticism against the Shah met the criteria of a much needed leader.

speeches compared Shah with Yazid³⁰ and warned the Shah of an attack that would end his rule. Khomeini along several other *ulema* issued a declaration condemning the referendum legitimising Shah's White Revolution. The Shah reacted violently by attacking Fayziye Madrasa in Qom. Several students were killed and beaten up and Khomeini was arrested. All this culminated into the June Uprising of 1963 wherein large number of people took to the streets carrying Khomeini's portrait and chanting anti-Shah slogans. The government responded violently, ordered martial law and many demonstrators were killed. The uprising 'established Imam Khomeini as a national leader and spokesman for popular aspirations, provided the struggle against the Shah and his foreign patrons with a coherent ideological basis in Islam and established a period of mass political activity under the guidance of religious leadership' (Algar 1981: 17). The uprising also boosted the morale of the *ulema*, 'symbolized the end of peaceful coexistence with the Shah and justified the start of the armed struggle against regime', finally leading to the 1979 Revolution (Milani 1988). Khomeini was released on 7th April 1964, but his continuous denouncement of the Shah through his speeches led to his exile to Turkey on November 4, 1964 and then to Iraq in September 1965 where he spent next thirteen years. His lectures were smuggled to Iran from Iraq, most popular was his lectures on *vilayat-e faqih*. Khomeini's influence through his works led to his deportation to France by the Shah with the help of his Iraqi counterpart. Khomeini's rejection of abandoning his activity against the Shah forced him to fly to Paris where he stayed and dictated the Revolution of 1979 until his return on 13th January 1979. Khomeini died in 1989 after ten years of ruling Iran under a theocratic state. Khomeini was not only a religious and political leader but also an intellectual. By 1979, he had around twenty-five books and leaflets excluding several thousands of declarations and *fatwas* to his credit (Milani 1988). Khomeini's role in liberating Iran from Western hegemony and the authoritarian Shah made him the most popular leader of Iran and is hailed as the 'Supreme Leader' even today by many.

³⁰ http://www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/ayatollah_khomeini.php.

Imperialism and Islamic Government

Ayatollah Khomeini today is known as the 'undisputed leader' of the 1979 Revolution and the 'founder' and 'charismatic leader' of Islamic Republic of Iran (Arjomand 2009). The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is one of the loudest resistances against the West in all its forms. It ended long period of imperialism in Iran. The Shah's coercive and dictatorial regime (Northrup 1995) and 'economic expansion, unequal distribution of the wealth, heightened social mobility, profound changes in the class structure, decline of agriculture' (Milani 1988: 106) contributed to the opposition movement. Milani further argues that the Shah's economic reforms did not coincide with political reforms and therefore a 'gap' was created which he tried to cover up with 'forced political participation and institution building, infusion of petro dollar in the economy' (Milani 1988: 105). Ayatollah Khomeini successfully articulated through his discourse the crises that Iran was undergoing by 'intertwining of the political economy logic with Islamic theology and vocabulary' (Ramakrishnan 2008: 14) and hence, rose as an 'undisputed leader' notwithstanding the 'gradual rather accidental course of development' which his revolutionary discourse followed (Dabashi 2006: 488). Masses of the pre-revolutionary Iran looked upon him as a leader who not only challenged the West and Western implanted Shah but would also establish a just society. His anti-imperialist stance gained him immense popularity.

The discourse of anti-imperialism which he provided mark a stark distinction with the other intellectuals discussed before as, unlike them, he discredited and rejected the West in every possible way. He believed that the West has 'nothing to teach' *Dar al-Islam*. Khomeini was most direct, open and straightforward in his critique of the West, the Shah and Shah's alliance with the West. Even though from the beginning he was strident in his critique of the Shah (especially after June uprising of 1963), it was his exile that made him vociferous and blatant critic of the West especially the US, Israel and the Shah. His exile, as against Shah's expectation, provided him the freedom of speech and clandestine circulation of his speeches in Iran provided the Iranian people with a leader. Khomeini's anti-imperialist discourse is a 'postcolonial political strategy' as it consisted of 'explanation of imperial subordination, provides a call to arms,

establishes the terms of independence, and lays out a blue print for the future' (Kohn and McBride 2011: 50).

One of the most important works of Khomeini was *Islamic Government (Hukumat-i Islami)*, delivered in the form of lectures in exile at Najaf between January-February 1970 and later converted into a book. The book provided with an alternative against the Shah's rule and against Western infiltration in Iran. But before discussing it, his anti-imperialist views have to be analysed.

In his anti-imperialist works, Ayatollah Khomeini concentrated on foreign onslaught on the Muslim World as a whole and exploitation of their resources for imperial benefit. He also appealed to peoples' resentment against the state of Israel which has occupied Muslim lands and has left thousands of Muslims (Palestinians) homeless and termed Israel as the 'enemy' of Islam. Khomeini considered these two forces- the West and Israel - as the *other* of Islam which seeks its destruction and he used *Gharbzadegi* to refer to Western onslaught. His anti-imperialism links all the problems of Iran (the Shah's monarchy, socio-economic problems, etc.) to Western intervention in Iran. He argues that the West and Israel are responsible for most of the problems of Iran. In order to achieve their desired goals, they attempt to destroy Islam. Khomeini (1981) argues that Islam and the *ulema* are their enemy because Islam is 'militant' and *ulema* are most 'active' against them and would never allow them to fulfil their desires. This argument was developed after the Fayziye Madrasa incident and in his lecture at Qom after the incident he wonders (the attack on religious institutions and students) 'whether all these...have been committed for the sake of oil...or...for the sake of Israel, since we are considered an obstacle' (Khomeini 1981: 174). While he critiques both the West and Israel in the two speeches in 1963, he charged Israel - 'the enemy of Islam and Iran' particularly with the assault on religious institutions and accused the Shah of being its 'sinister agent'. He says 'Israel does not wish Quran to exist...ulama to exist....It was Israel that assaulted Fayziya Madrasa by means of its sinister agents' (Khomeini 1981: 177). In his later speeches, he accused both the external forces of destruction of revolutionary Islam and 'active' *ulema* by using strategies like misinterpretation of Islam and attack on religious institutions and scholars.

The West, especially referring to America, Khomeini argues, has transformed Iran into an ‘official colony’. In his speech after the Shah granted capitulatory rights to the Americans³¹, he objected the Bill and excoriated the Shah for ‘selling’ Iran in return for few dollars³² and for bringing down Iran to ‘the level of colony’. Khomeini ‘warned’ the people of Quran, of Iran of the danger of being subjugated to the West whom he mocks as ‘signatory of the Declaration of Human Rights’³³. He says

Gentlemen, I warn you of danger!
Iranian army, I warn you of danger!
Iranian politicians, I warn you of danger!
‘*Ulama* of Iran, *maraji*’ of Islam, I warn you of danger!
cholars, students! Centers of religious learning’s! Najaf, Qom, Mashdah, Tehran, Shiraz! I warn you of danger! (Khomeini 1981: 181).

The ‘danger’ was of Iran being indebted by American loans, of being ‘enslaved’ politically, culturally by Americans and also of the ‘protector’ of Islam i.e., the *ulema* of Iran being ‘thrown out’³⁴ of the country. He averred that imperialism has gripped the ‘lands of the people of the Quran’ and exploited its resources, ‘its poisonous culture’ has infiltrated the Muslim world replacing the ‘culture of Quran’, and youth is being corrupted with Western deceptive formula. Hence, he argues ‘the cancer of imperialism’ has to be stopped. He reasoned that it is the ‘gulf’ between Quran and Muslims that has caused imperial forces to penetrate their lands and take control of their ‘destiny’ (Khomeini 1981). Like Shadman and Al-e Ahmad, he critiques the Western-oriented secular intellectuals as ‘xenomaniacs, people infatuated with the West, empty people, people with no content’. Condemning both ‘imperialism of the left’³⁵ and ‘imperialism of the right’ as enslaver of Muslim states and people, he argued that had Quran been relied upon they would not have been able to enslave Muslim lands ‘today by

³¹ Reference was to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18th April 1961. It granted ‘diplomatic agent immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state’ (Article 31). Immunity was granted in ‘civil or administrative proceedings’, only sending state can waive the immunity (Article 32), immunity was also extended to family members of the diplomatic agent (Article 37).

³² The Shah needed American loan for his modernisation process.

³³ He critiques them as signing Declaration on Human Rights but having nothing but only destruction and oppression to offer to humanity.

³⁴ Khomeini cites the instances from text books for school children wherein clergy and their influences are described as a threat and therefore they should be expelled from Iran.

³⁵ Khomeini considered Marxism as a misguided ideology.

the Zionist aggression, terrorized by American Phantoms, and at the mercy of the satanic cunning of the Soviet Union' (Khomeini 1981: 210). He argued that enslavement (imperial designs of the West) is carried on by 'installing' puppet regimes. He notes, 'naturally someone who is a puppet has to serve his masters; he cannot do otherwise' (1981: 203). For Khomeini, the Shah's was such a regime whose aim was to serve the 'real master' and to reduce Iran to abject poverty and backwardness.

Khomeini describes Mohammad Reza Shah as an 'agent' of the West as well as of Israel (itself being an agent of the West), 'self proclaimed servant of foreign powers', 'traitors guilty of high treason', 'blood thirsty' and his regime as 'medieval regime', 'police regime', regime of 'the bayonet', 'torture', 'imprisonment', 'repression', 'terror', 'thievery' and so on. Linking monarchical history with tyranny, he remarked that rule of Mu'awiya usurped Ali's rule i.e., the rule of Islam and therefore the battle of Karbala was fought against tyrannical rule of monarch and hence revealed the incompatibility of monarch with Islam. Comparing Pahlavi regime with Mu'awiya and his son, he noted such is the backwardness, poverty, oppression under the Pahlavi that the regime looks like hollow. He notes that 'Islam is fundamentally opposed to the whole notion of monarchy...Monarchy is the most shameful and disgraceful reactionary manifestation' (Khomeini 1981: 202). Since monarchy is based on oppression, enslavement of people for 'their passion', plunder of nation's resources on 'trivial amusement' and most importantly is an agent of imperialism, destruction of the monarchy he argued, is the aim of Islam. Revisiting the history, he points out that the struggle of Islam with monarchy since the age of Imam Hassan continues to the present and from the very beginning of history, 'the prophets and scholars of religion have always had the duty of resisting and struggling against the monarchs and tyrannical governments' (1981: 204). Therefore like in the past (battle of Karbala), he urged the 'people of Quran' to rebel against the tyranny of the Pahlavi's under guidance of religious scholars. Thus, discursive construction of continuation of Karbala is one of the 'macro-area' that guided Khomeini's discourse, the other being discursive construction of a foreign conspiracy and a dangerous *other* (Gholizadeh and Hook 2012).

Apart from the discursive strategies employed, a careful analysis of his speeches will reveal that his critique of the Shah became vociferous and the degree of opposition increased with passing of time. In his early political speeches in 1963, he does not challenge the Shah's rule but 'advise' him to refrain from his West-aligned policies. He reminds Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of his father's fate and warns him of the same. In his own words after the Fayziye Madrasa incident,

Let me give you some advice, Mr Shah! Dear Mr. Shah, I advise you to desist in this policy and acts like this. I don't want the people to offer up thanks if your masters should decide on day that you must leave. I don't want you to become like your father (Khomeini 1981: 178).

However, in his speech in 1967, he hints the Shah of rebellion, 'You and your like know that if the nation were to determine its own destiny, you would not last a minute and would be pushed aside completely' (Khomeini 1981: 191).

Subsequently, his book *Islamic Government* provided an alternative to the Shah's regime hinting at his replacement and 'death to the Shah' and 'Shah bayad beravad' (Shah must go) became popular slogans. This change in his approach was because of himself being in exile in addition to Shah's other reforms coupled with his oppression³⁶. Inside Iran, he stressed the battle against imperialism is the battle against its 'agent'. It is the 'agent' through which imperialism has penetrated all the affairs of the country-economic, military, and political. He observed that natural resources have been expropriated by the Shah to serve the foreigners- 'he has given oil to America; gas to Soviet Union; pastureland, forests and part of oil to England and other countries' (Khomeini 1981: 237). He further condemned the Shah's 'White Revolution' as 'the bloody revolution of imperialism' and called for the need to fight the Shah in order to save Iran from the West and Israel. The economic logic for Shah's reform was 'to create markets for America and to increase our dependence upon America' (Khomeini 1981: 257). He charged the Shah with all the ills Iran was undergoing- bankruptcy of the bazaar, poverty (that the poor hungry children 'graze grass'), unemployment of educated youth, poor state of agriculture and industry, Israel's domination of Iran's economy, its interference in educational

³⁶ In 1966, censorship on books was ordered, mosque libraries were raided, and new laws regarding divorce were passed (<http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch29ir.html>).

system, lack of basic necessities of life-clean drinking water, bathhouses and medical facilities, corruption, the severity of which further increase with illegal imprisonment, terror, threats unleashed on the people by the Shah and hence called the people to 'break the chains of captivity' (1981: 190,191,198) .

Khomeini highlighted that imperialism and its agent strives to maintain such a pathetic condition since they gain out of it. In a speech delivered on 23 November 1978 from Neauphle-le-Chateau, France, delivered a week before Muharram, he asked the masses to 'tear' the 'roots' of 'tree of oppression and treachery, for the month of Muharram is the month in which the forces of Yazid and the strategems of Satan are defeated'³⁷ (Khomeini 1981: 261). He also regarded the deposing of the Shah as 'the first step' towards the goals of Islam. Existence of a ruler so weak for the foreigners yet so oppressive and dominant for his people led to deep resentment internally as his presence itself was perceived as 'an insult' to Iran's dignity which was clearly reflected in Khomeini's words (Dabashi 2006: 422). While in the late 1960s Khomeini hinted the Shah of rebellion, but by August 1978 he was sure of the revolt to return Iran the 'dignity' it had lost and Islam was the means as well as the end.

Khomeini also used his speeches to encourage people by giving in them his faith and assured them of Islam's capability so as to make them carry on with the movement of resistance and resentment. He says:

I know the Muslim nation of Iran will never submit to abasement...the agents and servants of imperialism know that if the people of the World particularly the young and educated generation, become acquainted with the sacred principles of Islam, the downfall and annihilation of imperialists will be inevitable (Khomeini 1981: 208).

Khomeini promised that the nations' resources will be liberated from their control. Usage of such methods undoubtedly would have kept the spirit of anti-imperialism alive among people. Khomeini's anti-imperialist discourse, therefore, is based on knitting together his criticism of the West with contemporary politico-economic crises through religious ideology. Ramakrishnan argues that his 'Islamic vocabulary with contemporary political

³⁷ Khomeini's strategic use of religion.

meanings provided enough scope for Islam's function as a powerful ideology in the Iranian political scene' (Ramakrishnan 2008: 14).

Throughout the process leading to the Revolution of 1979, Khomeini presented two antagonistic images of evil and good, the former represented oppression and the latter liberation, referring to Mohammad Reza Shah and Islam respectively. The 'good' is Islam and Islamic government as against West and Western-installed regime of the Shah. As noted earlier, his concept of Islam and Islamic government was laid down through his speeches in Najaf in 1970, later published as a book under the titled *Islamic Government*, first in Persian and later in 1976 in Arabic as a part of *Kitab al-ba'i* (The Book of Purchase) which is a five-volume book. Martin (2003) places Khomeini's concept of Islamic state within the context of the larger debate on Islam and modernity that emerged since the nineteenth century. She argues that the debate between Islam and modernity was not simply a debate about Islam as a religion, its values, culture and identity and its reconciliation with the West but was also about Islam as a law, about its institutions as well as Islam as a political ideology. It is true that Khomeini was trying to replace the Shah (and he did) through his political Islam, but it is also true that he brought in a hegemonic rigid Islamic system. 'The Islamic political discourse in a sense was a reverse orientalist discourse which tried to replace the centrality of the West with that of Islam without undoing the hegemonic discursive enterprise' (Ramakrishnan 2008: 22). But notwithstanding its hegemonic character, Iran continues to remain committed to Khomeini's idea of Islamic Government. The present Islamic Republic of Iran, more than three decades after Khomeini's death, continues to operate within the structures and along the guidelines which Khomeini had defined. This is reflected particularly in its relations with the external world which is styled mainly to maintain and assert its ideological identity (Takeyh 2012). His concept of *vilayat-e faqih* today not only guides Iran's foreign policy but determines domestic politics as well.

Vilayat-e faqih is usually translated as 'guardianship of Islamic jurist' as '*vilayah*' mean 'guardianship' and *faqih* refer to jurist (Islamic). The 'guardianship of jurist' in Shi'i Islam means guardianship exercised over the

umma (Muslim community particularly Shi'i) explains Matsumoto (2010)³⁸. His concept of *vilayat-e faqih* emerged as an alternative to Western state system and its democratic ideals as well as against Eastern socialism. He urged people to demand the establishment of Islamic political order in order to undo the grasp of imperialism. Islamic political order was the just political order which, he argued, can be established only under the guardianship of *faqih* and when people are united. Unison of Muslims³⁹ was important to fight powerful West and its proxy and attainment of such unison is also sought through religious vocabulary as 'the hand of God is with the group', 'avoid all disagreement, for disagreement is the work of the devil' (Khomeini 1981: 205, 240). His pan-Islamic call was also an attempt to unite all Muslims especially of Iran under Islamic government. Non-cooperation with the Shah and the West, Khomeini argued was also an important tool to defeat them.

The establishment of an Islamic order was important for Khomeini due to the following reasons:

1. Peculiarity of Muslim states does not allow separation of state and religion. The idea of separation of both is an imperial strategy to exploit Muslim societies. This is because the West fears that Islam's potential may destroy them.

2. Reduction of secular constitution and *Majles* to mere instrument of the Shah and corruption among the people in *Majles*. The perception that Ayatollahs who contributed to the constitutional movement were later excluded.

3. Exploitation of the West as well as tyranny of the Shah together with lack of basic necessities prompt religious scholar to realise their duty to save and protect the *umma*. The exploitation of people by monarchical system where laws are designed according to the needs of monarch can be remedied only by establishment of government based on law and justice. Since Islamic political order is a just order, such an establishment require execution of laws and thereby executives. These executives need supervision by jurist. An Islamic order is

³⁸ One major reason for Khomeini to accord such high status to religious *ulema* was because of the oppression, humiliation that they underwent particularly under Reza Shah which continued under his son. Khomeini was 'embittered' by slumped position of clerical institution (Moin 1994) and refused to forget loss of clerical power (Arjomand 2009).

³⁹ Though Khomeini called for unity among all Muslims, Nomani (1985) argues that the tenets on which Iranian Revolution was based were essentially Shi'ism and it neglected Sunni Muslims.

needed to 'ward off aggression and to defend Muslims in attack' (Khomeini 1981: 61). For him, absence of Islamic government was equivalent to having left borders unguarded.

4. Only an Islamic government was the perfect government because he argued that Western styled constitutionalism would not only establish defective law but would also bring evils of Europe to Iran.

5. An Islamic government was also needed to preserve the ordinances of Islam in the time of Occultation. In such a time, the *fiqh* has the duty to perform the function of Prophet and the Imams. But he elucidated that in such a government the role of the jurist will be supervision and not execution of laws as discussed above.

Thus, the answer to imperialism for Khomeini lied in an Islamic government. In order to achieve it, he asked every Muslim to fight, not resisting is regarded as sin. He says, 'By God, whoever does not cry out in protest is a sinner! By God, whoever does not express his outrage commits a major sin' (Khomeini 1981: 185). In fact, he left people with no option as silence would mean 'aid' to the monarchical regime.

Khomeini's use of such kind of Islamic vocabulary coupled with the capability to address deeply held resentment among people against the Shah indubitably filled the streets with protesters. Though, there were many who did not completely adhere to his views but saw in him a leader against the Shah, the the proxy of America (Northrup 1995). Providing another insight into understanding Khomeini's Islamic Government, Martin (2003) argues that his idea of such a government changed according to his temporal and spatial conditions and therefore there wasn't one but several visions of Islamic government though meshed with each other. She notes three different stages of Islamic government envisioned by him. First, the Islamic government that he envisioned in the 1940s particularly in *Kashf al Asrar* (Secrets Revealed) is 'mildly pro-monarchical' and do not reject monarchy and that an unjust government was better than no government at all. Second, in the 1960s, he made few indications to a just society and economy, but did not provide an alternate government. Third, during 1969-70, with his speeches on Islamic government, his vision fully matured. In the first stage, even though he was in search for an

Islamic government, his ideas were not developed. However, in the second stage he talked about Islam (as a system having complete world view) and *tauhid* (oneness, pan-Islamic unity) as solution against oppression as pan-Islamic ideology was undoubtedly more effective for confrontation against infidels (Keddie 1994) and in the third stage his ideas fully matured. It is also interesting to note that Khomeini's work marked the culmination of shift from nationalism to Islamism as a response to imperialism, the beginning of which was marked by intellectuals like Jalal Al-e-Ahmad. In fact, he considered nationalism as an imperialist tool used to divide Muslim world. Khomeini's work is comparable to that of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani though a different character (one being liberal and the other radical) but with similar goal (Northrup 1995). Even though anti-imperialism and Islamic *umma* were central tenets for both, Islamic modernity for al-Afghani was the panacea whereas for Khomeini it was Islam without Western modernity.

Analysing Khomeini's works, Fischer (1983) reveals that his 'program' consists of three things: 1) critique of colonialism, imperialism, monarchy, bureaucracy, erosion of self confidence and cultural authenticity, coercion based on economic inequality; 2) an abstract moral vision constructed from traditional parables, mystical philosophy, faith in righteousness of Islamic jurisprudence and 3) strategic defences reflected in creation of a Council of Guardians. Ayatollah Khomeini, as the 'highest instance of authority and legitimacy' through his works provided the Iranian Revolution its very substance (Algar 1981). He was the first to successfully put into practice his idea of an Islamic government.

Khomeini has been criticised for creation of a hegemonic order led by hierocracy, prioritisation of one jurist over the rest and myth-based political thought. Ayatollah Khomeini today may be remembered as a staunch anti-imperialist than for many other political positions he took during his lifetime.

The figure below briefly summarises his discourse on anti-imperialism.




Figure 1 Ayatollah Khomeini's discourse on anti-imperialism

Conclusion

Intellectuals in Iran, either secular or religious, identified themselves with Third World struggles against imperialism. While Third-Worldism reverberated in their works, both Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini contributed significantly to the anti-imperialist discourse. Imperialism for both of them is penetration as well as destruction of economy, polity, society and culture by the 'other' i.e., the West for Shariati, and the West and Israel for Ayatollah Khomeini. The Shah, both of them argued, acted as the proxy of the West and aided it in exploitation of Iran. Though other aspects of imperialism have been considered, their work focussed mainly on cultural imperialism. They believed that imperialism sought to destroy Iran's culture and its identity which for both is rooted in Islam. Destruction of Islam by the 'other' forms the base on which they defined the 'self'. The 'self', though defined through the same means (Islam), had different connotations for both. For Shariati, the 'self' is the revolutionary self which can choose and determine its future; whereas the 'self' for Khomeini is the one

which is guided by the jurist. In a way, the 'self' liberated by Shariati is subjugated by Khomeini. Both believed that imperialism sought destruction of the true 'self'.

For Shariati, the reason why imperialists succeeded in Iran was because the 'true self' was not revealed by existing interpretation of Islam; hence he reinterpreted Islam and its history. For Khomeini, the 'gap' between Quran and Muslims was appropriated by outsiders to dominate them. The solution, for both, lied in return. For Shariati, the return was to the true Self that can resist imperialism through reinterpretation of Quran; for Khomeini creation of Islamic Government was the solution to imperialism.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The end of World War II “liberated” more than two dozen countries from European colonisation. But decolonisation failed to liberate people from the structures of colonisation. The basic premise on which nations were colonised was the economic drive for profit maximisation as well as the circulation of the products outside domestic boundaries of Europe. Colonisation was possible only with political and cultural domination of the external ‘other’. Such domination was born and has survived on the idea of “superiority” of the West against “inferior”, “backward” rest and has been reiterated through continuous production of knowledge asserting the same. Liberation movements have though succeeded in driving out the physical presence of the colonisers, they have failed to shed off their economic and cultural domination. In fact, economic domination has achieved the “highest stage” of capitalist exploitation at which the world itself is divided and governed by monopolist capitalist states. But it is also important to acknowledge that decolonisation movements clearly and boldly asserted that direct physical control of other lands is no longer tolerated. European colonisation today has been replaced with Western imperialism led by the US. The US emerged as the superpower after the demise of the Soviet Union and has established unidirectional international political norms and monopolist capitalist system.

Domination of any form has been resisted by decolonisation movements or anti-imperialist movements. Anti-imperialist movements have always been guided by intellectuals either through their works or physical contribution or through both. Works of intellectuals have proved significant in influencing the birth and course of anti-imperialist movements. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, one of the loudest revolutions against America, was also guided by various intellectuals. The revolution was a reflection of collective discontentment against the West as well as against the Western proxy, Mohammad Reza Shah, which brought Iranian masses on to the streets irrespective of their gender, sect and profession. There existed in the nineteenth and the twentieth century several reasons for mass discontent. History of external penetration of Iran from Arabs to Mongols followed by the European and Russian imperialist interventions and later the US involvement in

Iranian affairs, deteriorating economic and social conditions and erosion of political legitimacy of Western backed Shah constituted some of the major reasons. Historical analysis of Iran's relationship with the West reveals that the animosity of Iran towards the West has been the result of Western penetration of Iran, exploitation of its resources, subordination of its culture and religion by the West. In fact, it was not Islam but nationalism, which was invoked against the West in initial years of history of modern Iran, only to be replaced by Islam later.

Imperialism in Iran

Western incursions in Iran started under Qajar dynasty and increased subsequently. Iran's strategic location – trade route to India and its border with Russia -- never allowed Europe to colonise Iran. Europe never allowed Russian hegemonic expansion to overtake Iran. Iran remained a “free” country with its sovereignty turned into a mere tool by the external powers to balance each other. Guarantee of regime, bribes to the nobility, treaties, concessions, loans were means employed by Europe for capitalists expansion; treaties succeeded by wars and concessions were important means used by Russia to extend its imperial borders. Rivalry for profit, expropriation of capital, and control over Iran's natural resources remained important concerns for Russia and other European powers. If the logic of imperialism is expansion of capital and establishment of a dependent relationship of non-capitalist on capitalist economy, such dependency was established to an extent that self-sufficiency is completely destroyed in the case of Iran. Concessions and loans subjugated its economy to a dependent state and local economy was destroyed. Natural resources were sold by the Shahs at such low prices to external forces in such a manner that Iran had completely surrendered its resources. Shah's modernisation process, huge expenditure on military upgradation and the spending spree of various Shahs from the Qajars to the Pahlavis further increased borrowings from the West. Inability to pay back the loans due to decreased exports and famines resulted in huge debt which was paid in the form of political concessions, especially during the late 19th and early 20th century. . Hence, economic domination moved with political domination. The oil economy of Iran in the 20th century bettered its economic resources, but it did not reduce its dependency.

Political concessions included granting of immunity to Westerners, capitulatory rights to the US, erosion of territorial integrity, division of Iran among imperial forces under the Agreement of 1907 and the British Treaty of 1919. These not only eroded the Shah's legitimacy but also accorded inferior status to Iran, Iranian *bazaaris*, local economy, agriculture, culture and religion, which Iranians deeply resented. Animosity against the West particularly the US increased with overthrow of the nationalist leader Mossadeq in 1953. Mossadeq's nationalist policies proved a barrier to the capitalist penetration of Iran and safeguarded Iran's autonomy particularly with the nationalisation of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the life-line of Western capitalism in Iran. The *coup* of 1953 reasserted imperialist aggression in Iran and pushed back whatever little was achieved in terms of converting Iran to a viable constitutional polity. The *coup* exposed Western imperialist interests in Iran and revealed the Shah as a puppet of the West.

The situation in Iran worsened with the *coup* and the bringing back of the Pahlavi regime. Despotic governance under both the Pahlavi Shahs further alienated people. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, with centralised despotic tendencies, took control and authority of government ministries, media and army; he reduced the constitution and parliament to a mere facade and imposed Westernisation and forced economic reforms. The effects of the despotic character of the Shah were further aggravated with his Western orientation in the cultural and political fields. The results were destruction of local economy, traditional handicrafts and agriculture. Cash crops replaced food crops, inflation increased, social dislocations led to internal revolts and destruction of traditional institutions like the religious ones created anti-regime sentiments. The institution of the clergy which enjoyed tremendous power and influence in Iranian political and cultural life and formed the traditional power base (visible particularly during tobacco protest and Constitutional Revolution) were deprived of their traditional authority. Modernisation process under the Pahlavis launched an attack on Iran's culture that was presented as backward and inferior against Western values. The most significant impact this was felt by all Iranians as humiliation of the nation. Hence, traditional as well as secular intellectuals irrespective of their ideology and beliefs had one aim in common i.e., Iran stripped of the monarchy and Western influences.

Iranian Intellectuals

Western influences evoked different responses from intellectuals in Iran-acceptance of everything that the West represents, acceptance of selective elements of the West and complete rejection of the West. The last two responses contributed significantly in shaping the anti-imperialist discourse. Most of the works that were produced in Iran in the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century produced such anti-imperialist responses. While the West was critiqued and resisted by both secular and religious intellectuals, the former endorsed certain modern elements like democracy, liberty, constitution, secular laws etc, and the latter rejected modernisation as Westernisation. Debate on modernity therefore was a common theme in the works of intellectuals in the nineteenth and the twentieth century. Critique of the Western-backed Shah also resonated in their works. In the late nineteenth century, Iranian intellectuals wrote in support of an ordered society along a democratic model and critiqued the Shah for lawlessness; the twentieth century intellectuals not only criticised the Shah but also called for the overthrow of royal despot and his tyrannical, Western-backed regime, which for them meant overthrowing the West.

Seyyed Fakhruddin Shadman, Jalal al-e Ahmad, Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini cannot be classified neatly into definitions of an intellectual provided by Edward Said, Antonio Gramsci, Julian Benda or Michel Foucault, but they possess certain elements mentioned by all of them. Fakhruddin Shadman and Ali Shariati severed their ties with the class they ‘organically’ belonged to, Jalal al-e Ahmad revived his ‘organic’ links in later years of his life, and Khomeini represented the class he “organically” belonged to. The most important element that characterise them as intellectual is that they challenged the *status quo* and the power that maintained it. The four intellectuals studied, belong to the later phase of intellectual development i.e., the twentieth century, which called for revolt against the Shah and Western influences in Iran. They have not just resisted the West but have also produced counter narratives in order to challenge Western narratives that legitimise their domination. Anti-imperialist aspects of their works have been summarised as follows:

On Western Onslaught

While anti-imperialism was common in the works of all four intellectuals, they differ in their understanding of imperialist intervention in Iran. For Shadman, Western aggression on Iran constituted cultural and ideological aggression which sought to Westernise Iranians by making them speak their language and change their lifestyle according to Western needs. For him, *fokoli* represented a pseudo-modernist and superficial Westernised Iranian. Shadman believed that if Western aggression is not stopped, it will subjugate all Iranians by Westernising them. Jalal al-e Ahmad also understood imperialism as cultural domination but also examined economic dimension of imperialism and emphasised on political necessity to protect Iran. For him, Western onslaught sought destruction of Iranian identity and its culture in order to render Iranians rootless and to impose superficial Western culture and identity. This has being carried out so that the West could carry on economic exploitation of Iran. He draws on Marxist understanding of imperialism and regards economy as the root cause of Western aggression in Iran and condemned the trade relations between East and the West as “enforced trade”. The world system, he argued, is governed no longer by ideologies but by commerce.

Ali Shariati, like Al-e Ahmad, provides cultural and economic critique of the West. The West for him is an alien, materialist system that runs on consumerism. Such a system, according to him, leads to class contradictions i.e. creation of two antagonistic classes. He provides economic critique of imperialism but differs from the Marxist tradition in many ways. His theory is about dependent relationship that is established between the two poles- East and the West. Western capitalism, he argues, established relationship with non-capitalist Eastern states in order to promote capitalism. This relationship creates an economic gap between the two poles benefitting the West. The East is not only underdeveloped but has to face all the evils of the forced relationship and cultural and political crises. He links his economic critique with his cultural critique by arguing that the economic imperialism transforms cultural self in order to meet capitalist need. It is the proxy domestic government, he argues, that perpetuates smooth penetration of imperialism. Like Shariati, Ayatollah Khomeini also provides a comprehensive analysis of imperialism and provides a systematic solution. His theory intertwines political-economic logic with cultural critique of imperialism. He diagnosed

imperialism as the cause of all problems of the Muslim world. Imperialism, he argues, tries to distance Muslims from Islam as the West not only exploit their resources but also corrupt the youth in order to enslave Islam and Muslim lands. For him, like others above, imperialism penetrates through Western installed puppet indigenous regime.

Self and the Other in the Wake of Western Onslaught

In order to resist imperialist aggression, it is important to identify the Other and distinguish it from the Self. Recognition of the Self also becomes important in order to revive the dignity and agency that was suppressed by the West. All the four intellectuals have not just identified and critiqued the Other; they have also defined the Self. But there wasn't one conception of the Other and therefore no one conception of the Self. The Shah, for all the four intellectuals represented the 'internal Other', who was viewed as an extension of the external Other. While the West as an imperial force was common in the broader conception of external Other, the elements that constituted the Western Other varied for all. For Shadman, the West constituted both positive and negative elements. He called for imbibing positive aspects of the Other by having complete knowledge of it and rejected superficial understanding of it. He did not differentiate between modernisation and Westernisation as such. Jalal al-e Ahmad rejected the West as the evil Other. His understanding of Westernisation falls between modern and post-modern critique of Westernisation. On the one hand, he considered science a modern phenomenon and universal in nature, on the other hand, he believed that social sciences are not universal but are produced by nations to satisfy their needs. He believed the Western produced social sciences sought to dominate the the East and therefore the East should produce their own knowledge. For Ali Shariati, the Western Other was different from the modern Other. He believed in modernising Iran, but rejected Westernisation in all its forms. Shariati gave a modern interpretation of Quran as well as of the Self. But the same did not apply to Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini rejected Westernisation as a system of slavery and he did not differentiate between the modern and the Western. He. In defining and resisting the Other, the intellectuals redefined an "authentic" Iranian Self. The Self for Shadman was the one that is both *farangshenasi* as well as *Iranshenasi* and for Al-e Ahmad, the authentic Self is rooted in Shi'i Islam which can be revealed by the *ulema*. Ali

Shariati embraced Al-e Ahmad's critique of the West and added his own analysis but differ with him in his conception of the authentic Self. Shariati's Self is a "revolutionary self" that has its own agency to guide its way and does not need an *ulema* to interpret Islam and Quran. Such a Self, rebel against oppression, tyranny and imperialism. The Self, for him has the potential to interpret Islam according to the needs of the time and rejects *ulema* as the true interpreter of Quran. True Self for him is the "conscious self", the Self aware of Western aggression, of one's true nature and of true Islam. He termed such a Self as the enlightened one. He believed that it is the duty of the enlightened to spread consciousness among masses. True Self for Ayatollah Khomeini differs from Shariati's. Though for both, understanding of Self is rooted in Shi'i Islam, Ayatollah's conception of true Iranian is the one guided by *faqih* i.e., the jurist, and true Iranian government is the Islamic government. Fokolis, occidentotic, and xenomaniacs are terms used by them to define what is not the "authentic self". Reassertion of Self therefore is the major theme in their works.

Defeating the West

For Shadman, the West does have certain positive elements which can be adopted by Iranians but that would not mean adopting Western way of life. He called for "Iranisation" of fundamentals of Western civilisation. Therefore, in order to defeat the West, it was important to "capture" it by translating every valuable book and technology into Persian. Persian language, he argued, is the best tool against Western onslaught. Jalal al-e Ahmad too believed that language is an important aspect of one's identity, but believed that in order to defeat the West, Western "machine civilisation" needs to be broken down by establishing indigenous machines. This was important to break economic dominance of the West perpetuated through the machine. Subordination of Western technology to Iranian Shi'i culture was the solution for him. Al-e Ahmad believed that Western penetration has been made possible by occidentotic leaders; therefore to defeat the West it was important to defeat them. He argued that *ulema* can best replace them and protect Iran from Western aggression. For Shariati, the West can be defeated by Red Shi'ism i.e., the Shi'ism of Martyrdom. Red Shi'ism for him was the religion of revolt, against tyranny, oppression and hegemony. Ayatollah Khomeini, like Shariati, believed that the solution to imperialism lie in Islam as a political

phenomenon. His conception of Islam is the one guided by jurists and includes both Shias and Sunnis. Therefore for him, Islamic government is the solution and Islam is the means to resist imperialism.

But above all, the works of these intellectuals provide subaltern perspectives on imperialism that reflect their experiences of the West. The four intellectuals provide economic critique of imperialism to an extent but focussed majorly on cultural imperialism. While Shadman and Al-e Ahmad enunciated a critical discourse, Shariati and Khomeini provided a comprehensive ideology and theory of anti-imperialism by thinking about alternatives and they do not limit themselves to providing resistance to imperialism. Since Iran was not officially 'colonised' by Western powers, the resistance that the intellectuals provided against the West was therefore ideological. An ideological critique was needed in order to regain one's identity and culture, which they believed were under attack. Islam, therefore, was viewed by Al-e Ahmad, Shariati and Khomeini as the source to regain Iranian dignity, identity and as a force of unison. Therefore, Iranian intellectuals, in their own different ways, provided resistance to the Western civilizational dominance and used Islam as a political and ideological tool against Imperialism.

APPENDIX 1: FAKHRUDDIN SHADMAN




Photo Courtesy Seyyed Ziya'oddin Shadman
(From Mehrzad Boroujerdi (1996), *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The
Tormented Triumph of Nativism*)

APPENDIX 2: JALAL AL-E-AHMAD




Photo Courtesy Simin Daneshvar

(From Mehrzad Boroujerdi (1996), *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism*)

APPENDIX 3: ALI SHARIATI



Photo Courtesy <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/10/ali-shariati-and-the-ideologization-of-religion.html>.

APPENDIX 4 AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI



Photo Courtesy: Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Imam_Khomeini_in_Mehrabad.jpg.

Ayatollah Khomeini returning from exile on 1 February 1979.

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