

**THE GEOPOLITICS OF INTEGRATION AND POLITY IN
PAKISTAN**

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Certified that the dissertation entitled "**The Geopolitics of Integration and Polity in Pakistan**" submitted by Bhushan Kumawat for the award of Master of Philosophy is his own work and has not been submitted so far, in part or full, for any other degree of this or any other University.

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
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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION

Understanding geopolitical theory's grasping of the nature of change in global politics is particularly difficult because of the atrophy of geopolitical theory in contemporary study of international relations.¹ Among the tradition of international relations theory, geopolitics is among the most ancient and extensive. Despite its antiquity geopolitics has largely disappeared as distinct position in contemporary international relations theory.

This withering of geopolitical theories is because of the intrinsic association between geopolitics and realism. Realists have assumed usually the primacy and indeed autonomy of the political sphere. In an anarchical world the global political process involves competition, conflict and cooperation between the representatives of the state. In such a world each one is guided by own self-interest called *national interest* and the supreme national interest is the security of the state. To secure oneself a state should seek more and more military power, which can be generated with more and more wealth. Hence the realists assertion that international relation is nothing but a recurring struggle for power and wealth among independent actors in a state of anarchy.

¹ . Olson & Groom, International Relations Then And Now, (Harper Collins Academic, 1991),p. 69-70.

assertion that international relation is nothing but a recurring struggle for power and wealth among independent actors in a state of anarchy. Therefore, the cause of war for realists is global structure of anarchy.² This approach is also called ‘billiard ball approach’ in which each state or a coalition of states confront others in an anarchical world. In such a situation economic considerations are subservient to the security consideration, relative advantage is consistently more important than absolute advantage. In such a system perpetual peace is virtually not possible, at best there can be stability through the dexterous management of alliance that counter balances potentials hegemons.

In such realist paradigm, the South Asian geopolitics has been under constant flux since cold war or after the end of imperial colonialism partly because of the faulty legacy inherited from the colonial masters. Indian subcontinent continues to reap the bitter harvest of colonial legacy. Following the World War II, many colonies of the world gained independence, some of them carved out on

² . K. Waltz. Reflections on theory of International Politics, (Columbia University Press, New York. 1986). p.301-329.

Meanwhile, a major political event took place in 1947 in South Asia. British India was to be divided in two parts- India and Pakistan (East and West Pakistan) on the basis of religion. Thus, began a new era in the geopolitics of South Asia with its two major actors, India and Pakistan. Though both the countries gained independence simultaneously. But Pakistan not only continues to suffer from the problems of integration both of its people and territory but also from the instability in the political process marred by failure of democracy and consistent military takeovers.

Pakistan after its formation faced problems of straddling between the two non-contiguous landmasses (East and West Pakistan). Both of them were separated by thousand miles of Indian Territory. Besides administrative inconvenience there were also dissimilarities of language, ethnicity, regionalism, etc and henceforth East Pakistan separated from West Pakistan to form a new state-Bangladesh following a liberation movement. Thus the very premise- 'two nation theory' on which Pakistan came into existence got redundant with the rump of original state.

Even after the creation of Bangladesh Pakistan opted for Federation with four units- Baluchistan, North West Frontier, Punjab and Sindh. These four units were supposed to work concomitantly under federal scheme for the integration and equal representation at the centre. However, this never happened. The centrifugal forces time and again overpowered centripetal forces exemplified by regionalism and subsequent separatist movements. This led to the weakening of federation and has prodded Pakistan to become more and more centralised. The centralization in Pakistan is concomitant with authoritarianism making the situations even worst for the germ of democracy to flourish.

In Pakistan democracy has been challenged from time to time since its inception. Till date there have been four military takeovers by Ayub, Yahaha, Zia and recently by Mussarraaf- each regime undermining the democratic forces in the country. Moreover, the elites continue to play the politics of vendetta against each other. Democratization in Pakistan is also suffering from what has been called 'exclusionary decision making', in which insulation of policy makers from popular pressure and successful pursuit of macroeconomic and

policies take place. In Pakistan such an attitude has generated problems at micro level. Where there has been rise of inflation, unemployment and the continuing recessionary trends in Pakistan economy, there have been political problems as well. The ethnic crisis in Sindh has worsened. In NWFP there have been trouble in Malakhand division as local autonomy was sought to be sabotaged by the government.³ Coupled with this are grave legacies of long exposures to military dictatorship. There has been deliberate erosion of institutions that promote democracy. Bhutto's populism and legacy of power consumption did more harm than good to Pakistan's democracy. The Zia's period will be remembered for its drug and 'Kalashnikov culture' that introduced into Pakistani society. Yet the Pakistani people have clearly voiced their desire for democratic change which keeps eluding them. They have come a long way, they still have a longer way to go. "The road ahead will be strewn with difficulties

³ . Amin Tahir, "Pakistan in 1994: The Politics of Confrontation", Asian Survey, Vol.35,no.2,February 1995, p.143-4.

and these obstacles must be seen as challenges to be met rather than excuses for abandoning the journey towards a more civilized politics.”⁴

Located in a strategic region of Asia, Pakistan has always been very much subject to the compulsions of imperialist geopolitics. One of the major factors behind the ongoing crisis in South Asia and Pakistan is that the geopolitics of this region has been continuously going under flux, since the end of cold war, and various powers maneuvering to establish their ascendancy here by manipulating the politics within and between various states in this region. During the cold war era, Pakistan had an important role in the US strategy in South and West Asia, as a part of SEATO and CENTO alliances which were aimed at encircling the Soviet Union/communism on the one hand and crushing revolutionary uprising of the people in Asia on the other. In the 80s, Pakistan also played an important role in the US strategy to embroil the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. While during the cold war, India was widely perceived to aligned with the Soviet Union, the situation is no longer the same. In the post-cold war era US is readjusting its policy towards both India and Pakistan as well as other

⁴ . R.R.Baksh. “Pakistan: Hope amidst Turmoil” , Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, April 1994,p.143.

states of this region. In the meantime, various European powers also have their imperialist aims in Asia, while India has made its intentions clear to emerge as the main power in Asia. The interest of these powers are clashing and each one of them looking for opportunity to gain an upper hand. The calculations and active interference by all these powers, particularly India and US are the major factors in the destabilization of Pakistan at the present time. They are factors hindering the emergence from within Pakistan of any solution to crisis in the interest of the masses.

CHAPTER II:
GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES AND THE
POSITION OF PAKISTAN

GEOPOLITICS AS A GENRE OF REALISM:

Decay and eclipse of geopolitical theory is puzzling because of the close relationship between geopolitics and realism, the currently dominant school of international relations theory. Most forms of geopolitics are types of realism, and many of the insights of realism were articulated by geopolitical theorists before the term “real politik” was coined in 19th century. But within the classic realist accounts of the origins and evolution of realist and international relations theory, the early literature of geopolitics is almost invisible.

Few words in the study of world politics are as widely used and vaguely defined as the term of “geopolitics”. As Robert Harkavy has observed, the “term geopolitics has come to be used in such a variety of contexts that it is no longer clear just what it means... it has come to mean almost everything and therefore perhaps almost nothing.”⁵ In short, the word “geopolitics” is overdetermined. It stands for several quite distinct theories or understandings of world politics. There are five overlapping but distinct clusters of ideas that have been advanced as geopolitical:

1. a primitive political naturalism,
2. an extreme realism couched in organic and Darwinian metaphors,

⁵ R.Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy, (Pergamon, New York, 1983), p.271.

3. a realist theory of interstate conflict that emphasis geographical features,
4. political geography, and finally
5. analysis written in late 19th and early 20th century of the global power system created by technologies of industrial revolution interacting with the largest geographical features of the earth.

1. Naturalist Social Science: Physiopolitics

By far the oldest and most heterogeneous clusters of geopolitical arguments concern the impacts of physical nature upon human affairs. Naturalist Political science begins with the ancient Greeks, extends to Jean Bodin and Montesque in early modern era and then takes new directions in the 19th century. The basic claim of naturalist social and political theory is that fundamental differences among human society are the product of different natural environments (particularly topography, climate, arable land and access to sea) in which these societies live and to which they must adapt. The appeal of this naturalism is the simple notion that the physical constraints and opportunities provided by nature significantly affect the performance of very basic functional task that are universal to human groups

(notably economic production and self preservation). Naturalist theory is not confined to world politics alone but also includes broad aspects of culture, economics and politics; it produces hypotheses that belong as much to anthropology, sociology and psychology, and economics as to political science.

Thus the term geopolitics is too narrow to capture the breadth of naturalist political and social science. The independent or causative variable in such arguments is nature rather than geography and the dependent variables encompass more than international or even political phenomenon. The term “physiocracy” literally the rule of nature would be most suitable, but it has associated with 18th century school of French economists who believed that natural endowments were the decisive factors in production—a school that more accurately could be called “physioeconomics”. The branch of physiocratic science concerning political outcomes might thus be “physiopolitics”—the study of impact of the nature upon politics. Thus we can say that physiopolitics and physioeconomics are branches of physiocratic sciences.

In looking for natural causes of social and political outcomes, physiocratic science is different from the main body of the 20th century

social science theory. The main tendency of social science is to look for the causes of social and political outcomes in social and political factors, whereas as physiocratic science looks for the cause of social and political outcomes in natural factors. Although arguments of the natural causation of social outcomes have not disappeared in social science, social science has marked its brake with natural history by downplaying the impact nature upon human affairs.

2. German Geopolitik

The second important cluster of geopolitical theoretical arguments is the extreme statist realism cast in Darwinian metaphors of German School of Geopolitik. Since the term was coined by Rudolph Kjellen in the early years of this century, most self-described “geopolitics” has been written by Germans.⁶ Although there are differences in emphasis among different theorists, there are six main ideas characteristics of German geopolitik. First, the primary political entities are states, and states are organisms. Second, the life of these state organisms is heavily dependent upon territory, thus making geography of paramount concern to statesmen and political

⁶ . For overviews of German geopolitik in English, see Strauz-Hupe, Geopolitics, (Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1942), pp. 142-169.

scientists. Third, the interaction state organisms is heavily competitive, making war or normal condition of world politics. Fourth, in the economic sphere state organisms strive toward Autarky. Fourth, because states are natural beings, their actions are beyond right and wrong, subject only to the judgement of success and not the standard of abstract law or morality. Finally, in the industrial era the optimum size of states is expanding, stimulating sharp competition and the creation of new empire. German geopolitik was thus extreme statism combined with an interstate social Darwinism emphasizing competition, material forces (particularly territory), and organic metaphors.

German geopolitik is now dead, in the sense that it has no living practitioners, and few scholars in the field of international relations study it works or make reference to its concepts. German geopolitik bears a striking resemblance to the extreme and simplistic versions of realism that gives almost complete paramountcy to the states and conceptualize the interaction of states in starkly conflictual terms. Although dead, German geopolitik played an important role in the formation of realist school in the US, and the term itself leaves on as a dimension of their newer and still lively intellectual tradition.

3. Realism plus Geography

The third distinctive way in which geopolitics is used is as a synonym for realism generally, and for realism with an emphasis upon geographical factors. In its broad uses, geopolitics is employed to mean “power politics between the states”. In a narrow meaning, it indicates “power competition between major states in peripheral areas”. As a synonym for power politics, the term geopolitics is used by realists and non-realists alike. Perhaps the most authoritative employer of geopolitics in broad sense was Henry Kissinger. In his earlier theoretical writings Kissinger used it frequently, more or less synonymously with “power politics”.⁷ Kissinger’s power politics is rooted in largely unchanging world of territoriality. It embodies suspicion of both the simplicities of social scientific modelling and ideological extremism, attitudes he shares with other post war American realist like Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan. The most recent claims for geopolitics have been made by Colin Gray: “Geopolitics is not simply one set of ideas among many competing sets that might help illuminate the structure of policy problems. Rather it is meta or master framework_ _ _ .”⁸

⁷ . S.Joseph. Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1986), p.19.

⁸ .Colin.S.Gray. The Geopolitics of Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Rimlands and the Technological Revolution, (Cranc, Russak & Co., New York, 1977), p.11.

In Gray's analysis geopolitics amounts to the claim that states are inevitably in competition and that the geopolitical analyst of the late 19th and early 20th centuries provide the best guide for understanding the Soviet-American strategic antagonism. In short, most of the contemporary public discourse of geopolitics is more thematic and rhetorical dimension of American state-centred realism and strategic studies than a distinctive and articulated theory.

4. Political Geography

The fourth cluster of ideas often referred to as geopolitics is political geography, the branch of the academic discipline of geography that concerns the spatial aspects of politics. Like physiocratic science, political geography encompasses more than claims about world politics. During the inter-war period, when German geopolitik was at its peak, but before the Nazi aggressions had begun, the few self-described realists in American academic life sought to distinguish "geopolitics" from "political geography". Several American writers suggested that political geography was scientific and value neutral, whereas, geopolitics employed a political commitment. Also recoiling from excessive ambitions and unsavory associations of German geopolitik, geographers have eschewed developing a political geography that

grapples with the major issues of the world security politics.⁹ Nor was political geography consolidated as sub-field of political science. In attempting to escape the larger theoretical questions, political geography became a flat and theoretically unfocussed enterprise.

TRADITIONAL GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS:

Finally the most important and most well known body of geopolitics is the extensive literature produced in late 19th and early 20th centuries on the relationship between world politics and the material forces unleashed by the industrial revolution. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer, Ratzel, H.G. Wells, Spykman, E. H. Carr, Blache and many less known employed a common set of general assumptions and approaches and grappled with a common set of contemporary problems.¹⁰ The global geopolitics was deeply divided in their political and national loyalties. The main goal of the global geopolitics was to understand how the material capabilities of transportation, communication, and destruction produced by industrial revolution (most notably rail roads, steamships, telegraphy, chemical high explosives, and

⁹ John Agnew, "Global Political Geography Beyond Geopolitics", International Studies Review, Spring 2000, pp. 91-99.

¹⁰ Collin.S.Gray, "Geopolitics, Geography & Strategy", Journal of Strategic Studies, June-September 1999, pp. 1-17.

airplanes) interacting with the largest-scale geographic features of earth would shape the character, number, and the location of viable security units in the emergent global scale security system. They brought into their analysis range of variables, from political culture and strategic leadership to natural resource endowments and population growth rates, but overarching frame was essentially materialistic in character.

Classical theory

The raw materials for geopolitical theory were assembled in a handful of pioneering works published at the close of 19th century and during the first two decades of 20th century. The principle founders of geopolitics were Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American historian of British naval strategy, and advocate of sea power as the part to national greatness; Fredrich Ratzel, the founding father of modern political geography. Sir Halford Mackinder, the British geographer and politician; James Fairgrieve, the British geographer who elaborated upon Mackinder's somewhat bare schematic theses; Rudolf Kjellen, the Swedish geographer and enthusiast for the self-realization of pan-Germanic destiny. Of later generation, Spykman, an American professor of international relations, also merits mention, although as much

for his insight into the enduring quality of international politics as for his specifically geopolitical theses. The theorists of (global) air power, offered a cul-de-sac. The geopolitical hypotheses of, say, Alexander de Seversky have not unlike those of Mackinder and Spykman-proven to be of lasting value, nor do they offer insights of policy relevance today. This it must be added, is not to depreciate airpowers in its many facets.¹¹

To begin with the celebrated writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan-The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (1890), both at the time of publication and the decades following, reflected the importance with which his message was seem to have for all modern states, which bordered the seas. So widespread did Mahan's general views become that it is possible to present a brief synopsis here. He claimed that 'the key to much of history as well as policy of nations bordering upon the sea would be found by a study of naval conflicts of 17th and 18th centuries, and he proceeded to illustrate by a historical example how certain immutable conditions (the geographical position and physical conformation of a country, the extent of national territory to be defended or extended, the size and the character of its population and the nature and wisdom of its government) were the real reasons for the steady rise to the world power of the British empire at that

¹¹ . Stephen Jones, "Global Strategic views", Geographical Review, Vol. 45, July 1995, pp. 492-508.

time and for the relative decline of those states such as Spain, the Netherlands and France which had opposed this. As such his writings were regarded as a tool with which to unlock and understanding of developments in international power politics or the preceding centuries. More important still-and this was the true ground for Mahan's immense influence at the official level in the two decades before 1914-he also appeared to offer important lessons and predictions to all those states which wished to maintain or to extend their influence in the world in future. It was not strictly as a historian, but as a prophet, that Mahan was respected at this time.¹²

This being the case, it is worthwhile to examine some of the military implications for the future which emerged from his works, or were in some cases read into them by his enthusiastic but one sided followers: that large battlefleets, and a concentration of force, decided control of oceans whereas a *guerre de course* strategy was always ineffectual, that the blockade was very effective weapon which would sooner or later bring an enemy to its knees, that the possession of selected bases on islands or continental peripheries was more valuable than control of large land masses, that overseas colonies were vital for a nation's prosperity, and that colonial trade


¹² . For details, see E.M.Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, (Princeton, 1952).

was almost treasured commerce of all; that travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land; that an island nation, resting secure upon its naval might, could with impunity ignore the struggles of land powers and adopt if necessary an isolationist policy; and that rise of the country to world greatness without seapower was almost unthinkable. Taken together, they formed the basic tenets of the pre- 1914 navalist philosophy, much of which endured well past that particular era; it centred upon the belief that seapower had been more influential than land power in the past and always would be so. Finally, while urging the need for strong American fleet fully expected and firmly hoped that Britain's naval predominance would remain unassailed in the future. He certainly neither contemplated nor wished for a decline of that British Empire whose foremost naval scholar he had become.¹³

Mackinder & Spykman

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Without doubt the most influential & perceptive geopolitical thinker was Sir Halford Mackinder. Unfortunately many of his critics and admirers both neglected the evolution of his views (his explicitly

¹³ . Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945, (Fontane Press, London, 1983), pp. 44-45.

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geopolitical writings span the period 1904-1943) and vulgarized, and even perverted, his arguments. As with most great conceptions, Mackinder's basic arguments were of devastating simplicity (rather like Mahan's "discovery" of seapower). The basic idea is that while Eurasia was for centuries properly considered a promontory, as a consequence of greater efficiency of sea as opposed to overland communication & the impenetrability of the Arctic Ocean, the rail-road revolution of the late 19th century foreshadowed such a change in the comparative advantage of land over sea communication that Eurasia- Africa should be considered a vast continent " World Island".¹⁴ The alleged comparative ease of land as opposed to sea transport (in the rail-road age) is of fundamental importance to a geopolitical theory. Mackinder observed, in 1904, there is what he termed a pivot area in Eurasia which is inaccessible to sea power. This pivot area was defined initially, as that region where the rivers drain into the ice bound Arctic ocean or into inland seas (the Caspian and Aral sea).¹⁵ Just as the pivot area was beyond the reach of (British) seapower, so the seapowers of his outer crescent, (Great Britain and Japan and the US) were invulnerable to the direct application of landpower. But Mackinder predicted that the coming of railroads, an eventually air routes, within the pivot area of world

¹⁴ . Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, (Norton, New York, 1962).

¹⁵ . *Ibid.*, p.241.

island, would alter the power relations between sea power to the disadvantage of former. Above all else, Mackinder feared that one or a combination of powers (Russia-Germany in particular) would utilize the new means of rapid overland communication, first, to create a vast imbalance of power in Eurasia, then to conquer the Eurasian world island, and eventually to utilize the resources of the world island in a bid for world conquest. He foresaw that such a bid, on the basis of the rival resource bases of the world island and the outer crescent, would succeed.

In his major work, "Democratic, Ideals And Reality", published in 1919, Mackinder redefined his pivot area along more expansive lines, and he borrowed the felicitous term heartland from Sir James Fairgrieve.¹⁶ But the basic opposition was the same-land power, which he held to have a growing advantage, versus seapower. Mackinder was not deterministic, nor was he an apostle of world conquest or of brutal real politik. Mackinder did not claim that land power, in the form of one power or tight axis of powers, must come to dominate the world island (or great continent as he sometimes preferred to call Eurasia), and hence the world. Rather did he claim that "the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways, in such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the end of a single world

¹⁶ . Ibid., p. 148.

empire. He foresaw a danger (to Britain in particular, his primary concern), not an inevitability; the insular powers of the outer crescent, should therefore seek to endure that no single power or alliance came to control all of the resources of world island.

It is paradoxical that Mackinder's world view was focused, in its formative years, upon a posited fundamental rivalry between British sea power and Russian land power- a focus entirely natural to British writer prior to 1907 (the year of the Anglo-Russian entente).¹⁷ Mackinder predicted that the ocean highways of the world, the interior lines of communication of the British empire, were about to be overtaken in relative strategic advantage by a railroad age in, an leading from Heartland. In short, Russia would enjoy superior access to the keys to British overseas wealth and influence around the inner crescent. Leaving aside for the moment some technical drawbacks weaknesses in Mackinder's theory, the paradox was that the danger to British power until the early 1940s did stem from a dynamic and aggressive Eurasian Heartland, but rather from the vulnerability of that Heartland to conquest by peninsular-EuropeanGermany. Indeed, in 1919 he urged most forcefully the construction of a tier of states in Eastern Europe that could serve as a buffer zone for protection of Soviet

¹⁷ . Christopher Fertweis, "Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics, and Policy Making in the 21st Century", Parameters. Summer 2000, pp.58-71.

Republic against a German attempt to control the Heartland. It was in this context that Mackinder coined his famous dictum:¹⁸

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;

Who rules the World-Island commands the world.

Mackinder was wrong; he had too little faith in the robustness of his own conception. In 1941-43, Nazis not only ruled East Europe but its armies stood on the banks of the Volga at the gateway to Asia-and yet the Heartland power recovered and secured total victory. By 1943, Mackinder de facto acknowledged the frailty of the dictum quoted above, for he sketched, though only in barest detail, the thesis that a North Atlantic region could balance the threat that might be posed by Soviet Union after the defeat of Germany.

Pride of place has been given to the theories of Mackinder because his conceptions are of greatest inherent interest, the most relevant to contemporary policy, and to have been the most influential in prodding the other geopolitical thinkers especially Spykman. Writing in early 1940s, an

¹⁸ . Ibid., .n.14, p.150.

American political scientist, Spykman, took over the geographical elements of Mackinder's theory and offered a strong critique that rested upon the historical facts of the first half of the 20th century. Spykman was highly critical of Mackinder's leitmotiv of the opposition between British sea power and Russian land power. Spykman reminded his readers that World War I and II were not simply land power-sea power struggles. Furthermore, Spykman was not convinced that Mackinder's Heartland had the potential, in the foreseeable future, to make the predictable bid for control of World Island.¹⁹ Indeed, Spykman offered a counter dictum to that offered by Mackinder in his 1919 book.

Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia;

Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.

Spykman observed the United States had twice this century entered a World War in order to prevent the domination of Eurasian (essentially European and, in 1941 East Asian also) rimlands by a single power. In short, Spykman did not challenge the fundamental thesis of Mackinder, that maintenance of balance of power on World-Island essential to the security of

¹⁹ . For details, see Nicholas.J.Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics, (Harcort, Brace & Co., New York, 1942).

Insular powers; rather did he agree as to the potential strength of Eurasian rimlands- if organized by a single power or axis vis-a-vis the Eurasian Heartland. Spykman must be judged to have overestimated the power potential of the Soviet Union. But looking at the world of 1970s the theories of Mackinder and Spykman yield a common logic for policy. The United States can not afford to tolerate the effective control of Eurasia- Africa by the Soviet Union. It must serve, in its own vital interest, as a functional successor to Great Britain as an active balancer of power on, and bearing upon, the rimlands of Eurasia. Such a geopolitical task is as essential as it should-given steadiness of purpose and an appropriate popular understanding of that purpose- be successful.

PAKISTAN VIS-A- VIS GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES:

Strategically, the most critical zone Eurasia is found by those states which lie along the periphery of the great continental power of Asia, that is erstwhile Soviet Union. A.T. Mahan, whose work on naval strategy has received universal recognition, was perhaps the first to emphasize the importance of this peripheral belt. In relation to Russia which is politically 'a vast interrupted mass.... whose centre can not be broken' , Mahan

considered lying between latitudes 30 and 40 degree north as the most critical and unstable 'debated and debatable' zone between the British seapower and the Russian land power.²⁰ The significance of this median belt was even fully brought out in 1904 by Mackinder in his brilliant paper, "The Geographical Pivot Of History", in which he interprets almost the history of world political power in terms of perpetual struggle between the Heartland and the marginal powers. According to him, the Heartland consists of those regions of Eurasia which have an Arctic or continental drainage and from which a dominant power can exclude any seapower, and the marginal powers are those which intervene between the Heartland and the open seas.

Mackinder continued to reaffirm his ideas all through the two World Wars and changes in political equations associated with them, and maintained that a union between the Heartland and the critically marginal zone of East Europe, for instance, it could become an invincible combination leading to the mastery of world.

In the more realistic opinion of Fairgrieve, another British geographer, the critical zone is by no means limited to Eastern Europe but covers the entire belt of settlement and movement along the borders of the USSR

²⁰ .Collin.S.Gray, Explorations in Stratcgy. (Greenwood Press, London, 1996),p.152.

which, Fairgrieve has elsewhere more expressively called 'the crush zone' of Eurasia.²¹

There is a considerable controversy as to whether the conflict between the continental and marginal powers is as inevitable as Mackinder held. Nevertheless any appraisal of strategic alignments being created today by the two most powerful and rival nations, the U.S.A. and USSR, would indicate that they conform very closely to the original theorem of Mackinder. Indeed the conflict between the two blocs is even more critical now, for in the words of Fawcett, one of the marginal regions, Eastern North America contains as many people as the inner (physical) Heartland and has probably greater natural resources and population capacity. The American geographer, Cressy, goes even as far as to suggest that if there is anywhere a world citadel or Heartland, it may well be in North America rather than Eurasia. Irrespective of whether Mackinder underestimated, or Cressy overestimates, American strength, the U.S.A. by its leadership and support of other marginal powers, has so far been able to block the USSR from substantiating Mackinder's premonition.²² It is this continuing importance of

²¹ . Geoffrey Kemp & Robert Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1997), p.5.

²² . Paul Nitze.H., "Deterring Our Deterrent", Foreign policy, no.25, Winter, 1976-77, p.207.

the 'Rimland' in the new context of Russo-American rivalry that highlights Pakistan's strategic location.

Pakistan lies in the middle of the 'crush zone' or 'Rimland', which extends from Finland in the northwest of the Heartland power to Manchuria in the northeast. It also lies at the junction of Russian, Chinese and Indian sphere of influence. Excepting India, which was devoted to the policy of non alignment, and China, which despite its disputes is ideologically and territorially adjacent to and associated with the Heartland power of the USSR, Pakistan is one of the most populous state of the Rimland, the largest single reservoir of manpower from the Baltic or Gibraltar to Singapore. As the power struggle for world supremacy became primarily an inter-continental struggle between the USA and Soviet Russia, any Russian plans to expand

on western flank were stemmed by the US with the formation of military block, the NATO. The chain of American bases and garrisons from the Aleutian to the Philippines similarly blocked the threat of expansion by Russia or its ally China into the sphere of Pacific ocean. In the north the series of radar detection lines across Canada was intended to serve the same function only the Southern flank by its physical and political fragmentation

East these loopholes are straits of Dardnelles and Bosphorus, the Persian Gulf, and the Indus lowlands and the passes which connect them to Central Asia.

After the Second World War Russia had acquired access to the Mediterranean sea, but the subsequent defection of Yugoslavia was a great blow to Russian strategy and accentuated the critical importance of the straits. Any possibility of effective penetration by Russia was also vitiated when Turkey and Greece joined the NATO. Subsequently, the Middle East Treaty Organization, commonly known as Baghdad Pact (now the Central Treaty Organization), was formed.²⁴ It allied Britain with Turkey, Iraq and Iran (and later Pakistan) and supported by the US as it was meant to serve as a military cordon along the borders of the USSR in Southwest Asia. The pact insulated the Persian Gulf and extended the NATO garrisons further east. The fourth loophole is the Indus valley. Here the gap between the Russian transport and Pakistan road system is only about a hundred miles. The nature of this section of the Hindukush which bisects Kafiristan, forbids all ideas of cross passage, unless a high road to Badakshan is made artificially through the head of Kafiristan mountains. If strategic and political compulsions demand, an airlift over a narrow Wakhan range could

²⁴ . Iraq withdrew from the Organisation after the revolution in that country in 1958.

quickly bring the hostile forces the very centre of army and civil power in Pakistan. It was very similar hypothetical threat that led the British to fortify the North West Frontier at the end of the last century, and who knows if similar consideration did not underlie the American intent to include Pakistan in the chain of bases allied to Western powers and extending along the Southern periphery of the USSR? Airpower and ballistic missiles have greatly reduced dependence on the bases but it is doubtful if it has eliminated altogether; if so Pakistan remains a critical area in the strategy of the post Cold War. The critical location could have been exploited by Pakistan for bargaining with the Western and Eastern power blocks at one and the same time, a technique which is not uncommonly used by other states in similar position of advantage. Pakistan could merely have waited to see which bloc offered most for this valuable 'strategic resource' but for many reasons this proved impractical.

The rising incidence of low intensity non-nuclear conflicts in which control of pivotal areas of land and sea is critical also contributes to a reassessment of geography. Pakistan fits perfectly into a politico-geographic paradigm. The geographic arc embracing Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to the west and Kashmir to the east may well be the next source of conflict in the world. It may originate in the west, in the east or in both places at once.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has created a geopolitical vacuum in central Asia. The resurgence of Islam in the Central Asian republics has provoked competing ambitions of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for influence in the area. The continued instability in Afghanistan and the dangerous ethnic violence in Pakistan increase the danger. Pakistani relations with China are friendly and cooperative; both share distrust of India. In any event, Pakistan is at epicentre not only by virtue of its geography, but also because of its history, religion and culture and ethnicity. Whatever fire may emerge from the tinderbox, Pakistan will be pivot.

CHAPTER III:
PAKISTAN DURING COLD WAR PERIOD

THE GENESIS OF PAKISTAN AS A NATION:

The origin of Pakistan can be traced back to the ‘Two Nation Theory’ and the subsequent Pakistani movement. The poet and political thinker Muhammad Iqbal is thought to be the originator of the idea of a separate Muslim state for the Indian Muslims and is believed to have given the necessary emotional content to the movement. Inspired by the spirit of Pan-Islamism Iqbal declared Allahabad session of All India Muslim League, held in 1930, “I have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the lines of his own and tradition in his own Indian homeland is recognized as the basis of permanent communal settlement_ _ _ I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self government within the British empire or without British empire, the formation of consolidated North West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North West India”.²⁵ The idea of separate homeland to be called Pakistan took a definite shape in the mind of a young graduate at Cambridge, Rehmat Ali. He visualized the Punjab, and NWFP., Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan as the home of Indian Muslims and he coined the term Pakistan in 1933. The word

²⁵ . B.L.Grover & S.Grover, A New Look at modern Indian History, (S.Chand & co., New Delhi, 1997), pp.578-580.

Pakistan was formed by taking the initials of the first four and the last of the fifth. The most unequivocal declaration of the Hindus and Muslims as a separate nationalities was made by Jinnah at Lahore session of the League in March 1940, "They (Hindus and Muslims) are not religious in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is the dream that Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures _ _ _ To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one of a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be built up for the government of such state".²⁶

Demanding of partition of India the Muslim League passed the resolution: "It is the considered view of this session of All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following principle, viz. , that the geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in North Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'independent state' in which the constituent units shall be

²⁶ . Ibid., p.579.

autonomous and sovereign _ _ _”.²⁷ This resolution did not specify the areas in the proposed state of Pakistan. In 1942, Jinnah explained that Pakistan would be “a Muslim state or states comprising N. W. F. P., the Punjab, and the Sindh on the one side of India and Bengal on the other”. He did not mention Baluchistan and Assam, nor did he claim Kashmir and Hyderabad. However, in a Memorandum to the cabinet mission on 12th May, 1946, the Muslim League demanded “ the six Muslim provinces (Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan, Sindh, Bengal and Assam) shall be grouped as one group”. Thus the Lahore session of the Muslim League gave it an ambition and programme. Henceforth the demand for Pakistan became an article of faith for Indian Muslims as their holy book Quran.

GEOGRAPHIC - STRUCTURAL DILEMMA OF STRADDLING BETWEEN THE TWO LAND MASSES:

It seems that the question of internal dynamics is a fundamental one and perhaps began with the creation of Pakistan. Other than Israel, Pakistan is perhaps the only nation of the 20th century whose birth resulted from the demand by religious community for political entity in which it would be

²⁷ . Ibid.. p.570.

dominant. During the early years, in the so called glow of freedom religion may serve as a binding force, but given the structure of polity, cracks had to appear sooner or later. This happened in the aftermath of the first ever general elections held under direct universal suffrage in 1970. The results were scuttled thanks to the inability of the political establishment, notably Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to accept Bengalis assuming leadership position. Consequently, the brutal and savage civil war, followed by the Indo-Pak war of 1971 generated two defining events that continue to haunt Pakistan even today: Succession of Bangladesh and Pakistan's humiliating military defeat at the hands of India. With the emergence of Bangladesh the frequently tom-toyed two nation theory, the very *raison d`etre* for Pakistan stood discredited and turned on its head.

Both the countries -India and Pakistan were new states after gaining independence in 1947, but in some respects 'new' was not true for India as it was for Pakistan. India retained its old name and its old capital; even the territory it occupies at present is not greatly different from the effectively ruled areas of India's largest empires prior to British. On the other hand Pakistan was a new state in all aspects, its newness being evident from its boundaries, its capital, its hastily improvised government, an even by its name and the unexpected manner in which it was born.

Pakistan is not only a new but also was very unusual state, owing to both- the separation and geographical dissimilarities of its constituent units. The contrast and duality introduced by this unusual situation have evoked considerable criticism of Pakistan in India as well as abroad. O.H.K. Spate, the first geographer to study the situation at close hand, has made this critical statement: "The great weight we attach to political factors, the more difficult does it become to accept the racial and ideological aspects of the two nation theory".²⁸ Similarly, Van Valkenburg states that "the present separation of India and Pakistan is so illogical from a geographical point of view, especially because of the two widely separated parts of Pakistan, that how long these conditions will continue".²⁹

These two non contiguous units of Pakistan had differences in - location, shape and size, climate, natural vegetation and soils, in types of crops grown and rural economy and differences in cultural trades, etc which made the things worse for a United Pakistan. Historically and geographically West Pakistan may be considered a continuation of the Near East, and to some extent central Asia. Politically, West Pakistan may be new, but historically it is an area whose civilization was contemporary with

²⁸ . O.H.K. Spate, "Geographical Aspects of the Pakistan Scheme", Geographical Journal, September 1973, p.129.

²⁹ . Van Valkenburg, Elements of Political Geography, Cambridge University Press, London, 1971) p.138.

East, and to some extent central Asia. Politically, West Pakistan may be new, but historically it is an area whose civilization was contemporary with Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilization of five thousand BC. The archaeological finds of Mohenjodaro and Harrapa at least to an advanced culture parallel to an in communication with cultures of the Euphrates and Tigris. Subsequent and continual influxes of peoples from the Near East and central Asia have left their stamp on ethnic composition, on language, and above all on the religions and social structure of West Pakistan. In history and literature, in customs, manners, and even in prejudices the influence of Arabia and Iran on the people of this unit is apparent. West Pakistan and the Near East also exhibit many similarities in the physical, economic, and political aspects of their geography. Arid or semiarid plains, dependence on rivers, limited resources, growing economic needs, and the serious strategic weaknesses were some of the features were common to both areas.

East Pakistan was younger than West Pakistan. In the early times it served mainly as a refuge for those India aboriginal who fled from the middle Gangetic plain to escape the capture and enslavement by the Aryans. Later Buddhists from Bihar also took shelter in the delta to escape retribution at the hands of militant Hinduism. Buddhism had greatly decayed and Hinduism had not reestablished itself when the Muslims arrived

in Bengal in 13th century AD. The bulks of people embraced Islam, the faith of their conquerors, and have remained religiously distinct from the up-country peoples. While religion set them apart from Hindus, their language separated them from other Muslims of the sub-continental. Therefore, just as West Pakistan is akin to the Near East in many respects, so East Pakistan is similar in many respects to Muslim Southeast Asia. Its location on the eastern Indian Ocean, and to some degree, its climate, natural vegetation, crops, agricultural methods, dense population, and pronounced poverty, all resembled the conditions in many parts of Southeast Asia. There is similarity even in religious outlooks.

The birth of Bangladesh is in many ways a unique phenomenon and poses a number interesting questions to students of political development. Pakistan is the first among the new states of Asia and Africa, with illogical boundaries and plural societies, to breakdown. Bangladesh is the first country to emerge out of a successful struggle against “internal colonialism” in the Third World countries. The emergence of Bangladesh, especially the decisive Indian involvement in the last phase of the liberation movement sent shock waves to the developing countries, many of whom were engaged in their own struggle to built nations out of disparate subnational groups. The question naturally arises: Was Bangladesh a special case or would it

have a “domino” impact on the other, similar movements? As this analysis has tried to show, the emergence of Bangladesh was indeed the result of configuration of a number of forces, which may not necessarily be repeated in other cases. Several examples may be cited why the Bangladesh movement succeeded while similar movements in other countries have failed or are likely to failed.

First, the Bangladesh movement a truly a nationalist as well as democratic struggle. The Bengalis formed the majority of Pakistan’s population, but their efforts to participate in the decision-making process of the country through the democratic electoral processes were thwarted repeatedly, in 1954, 1958 and 1971. The actual liberation started in Bangladesh in March 1971, when the Pakistani army tried to reverse with bullets the gain of Bengalis achieved through the ballot box in the election of 1970. Unlike Biafara, where the liberation struggle was led by military general, the Bangladesh movement was led by political party, the Awami League, which had won and overwhelming election victory. The movements involved extensive mass participation and mass support, which was spontaneous. What the movement lost in organization from these spontaneous actions, it gained in numbers and popular support.

Second, the savage brutalities of Pakistan army and the genocidal nature of their killings aroused a keen sense of unity among the Bengalis, broke down primordial sentiments, and stiffened their resistance. It was looked upon not only as a struggle for liberation but in fact as a struggle for survival of the people. It is true that Pakistani army had a number of selected target groups, that is, students, slum dwellers, intellectuals, Hindus, Awami League supporters, Bengali members of the army and police, etc, but the burning of villages *en masse* and mass graves justified the Bengalis apprehension over their survival as a group. Between one and three million people were reportedly killed during the nine-month struggle. The brutalities of Pakistan army created world wide sympathies for Bengali cause, and the regime found a difficult to replenish its depleted defence budget from foreign sources. The brutalities of the army proved counterproductive.

Third, the separation of East and West Pakistan by a thousand miles of Indian territory created insurmountable logistic problems for Pakistan, which played a decisive role in the struggle. The cost shipping men and arms across the Indian ocean for nearly nine months bankrupted and when the actual war broke out at the end of November Pakistan was not able to

supply its army in Bangladesh because of an effective Indian naval blockade.

Finally, the India sanctuary and India help played a key role. It would have taken Bangladesh several more years to emerge had India not joined with the Mukti Bahini in the third phase of struggle. An India unfriendly to the cause of liberation movement would, off course, have spelled disaster for the movement. Thus the birth of Bangladesh was not only the culmination of long struggle; it was the result of combination of factors, which might not be present elsewhere.

With the birth of Bangladesh, the major problem of Pakistan's integration is removed from the scene. The two successor states, Pakistan and Bangladesh, however, still face their own problems of national integration. For Pakistan it is the task of national building a national community out of four remaining sub-national groups; for Bangladesh it is the task of building a national political system. One hopes that the policy makers in both states have learned from the blunder of late 60s; and that in the 70s, they will give priority to the task of nation building through political participation.

CHASM IN FEDERATION:

Pakistan, from the very beginning, was created constitutionally as a federation. As long as East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was a part of Pakistan, a federal system was regarded as the 'dictate of geography', because of the separation of East and West Pakistan by more than one thousand miles of foreign territory. Pakistan sought to achieve national unity and integration by offering federal solutions to a geographically unique country. But the federal solution was not adequate to prevent the ultimate separation of the two wings of the country in 1971.

Even after the emergence of Bangladesh, the 1973 constitution of Pakistan opted for a federal system. At the time of framing the 1973 constitution, it was pointed out that 'Pakistan has to have a federal structure. There are different provinces: different peoples; people with different culture; different script; different language; different habit, economies are slightly varied.' Pakistan therefore, continued the federal form of government assuring autonomy to the provinces, maximum autonomy in consonance with one United Pakistan under the 1973 Constitution.

Federalism is a device to unite diverse cultural and ethnic groups under one general government and various regional governments for the purpose of accommodating their conflicting pressures of unity and diversity. What necessitates the adoption of the system is the existence of federal society. A society is a federal when it is composed of different ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups and where groups are geographically concentrated. Michael Stein calls that society federal which is polytechnic and multilingual in its make up. Livingstone, on the other hand, considers geographical grouping of these diversities essential to characterize the society as federal.³⁰

On the basis of the above definition Pakistan could be considered a state having a federal society. It is multiethnic and multilingual and its component entities, that is, Punjabi, Baluchi, Sindhi, and Bengali (till 1971) can be easily identifiable. Although none of these regions can claim to be the exclusive domain of one ethnic group (East Bengal was only homogenous province in the United Pakistan), These communities are to a large extent geographically grouped.

The forces of unity and diversity creating a federal union can differ from society to society. Fear of a common enemy and a desire for territorial

³⁰ Paula Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan, (Cambridge University Press, Delhi 1995), p.246.

expansion as the forces inducing national and regional leaders to strike to a federal balance. K.C. Wheare lists common historical experience, desire for independence from colonial masters, economic benefits and common religion as factors for unity, while linguistic and ethnic differences and desire to retain local autonomy as divisive forces.³¹ In the case of Pakistan, common historical experience, Islam, fear of Hindu dominated India economic benefits and the leadership of Jinnah were the unifying forces in the initial years for communities divided by geography, ethnicity and language. Whatever may be the unifying and diversifying forces, they must be fairly balanced in order to maintain and continue the system. The federal equation could not be maintained in Pakistan, because of the central hold over the provinces and the domination of one region over the others. Being a fragile mode of balancing centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, federal system rarely remains constant in a society where cultural and linguistic differences are acute. In the process it fluctuates tending either towards centralization or increased regionalism. Centralization in Pakistan is due to following factors:

- Constitutional grant of powers to the centre.
- Federal practices of assuming more powers.

³¹ . K.C. Wheare. Federal Government, (Cambridge University Press, London, 1953), pp.253-4.

- Absence of constitutional safeguards to restrain encroachments into regional domain.
- Lack of resilience on the part of federating units to protect their autonomy against central high handedness.

Regionalism on the other hand is deep-rooted because-

- Acute ethnic variations in federal society.
- Excessive centralisation accompanied by authoritarian rule. This has been the major factor behind growth of regionalism in Pakistan.
- Weakening hold of unifying forces such as religion or the desire to continue to live as an integral part of one political unit .The separation of East Pakistan is a case in point.
- Wide economic disparities between regions.
- Domination - political, economic and administrative- of one region or part over other units due to its size, population and richness in natural resources such as Punjab in Pakistan.
- Presence of regionally based political parties as exists in Pakistan.

In Pakistan the conflicting forces of unity and diversity could not be balanced due to the prevalence of ethnic and linguistic variations and lack of mutual interdependence of national and regional subsystems. Being exposed to conflicting pressures of centrifugal and centripetal forces, the federal system as established under the constitutions of 1956, 1962, and 1973 was consistently subject to stresses and strains. The frequent outbreak of federal provincial and inter-provincial crisis such as on the language issue in East Bengal in 1952, the One Unit Act, the Pakhtoon-Baluch struggle for maximum autonomy and the Sindhi-Urdu controversy in Sindh continues to disturb the federal equilibrium. In the process, the ruling elites, in a bid to keep the union intact, tended more and more towards centralisation.

1972-1990: POLITICS OF TURMOIL

Z.A.Bhutto and his populist regime (1972-1977)

Power was transferred to Bhutto in January 1972 after the Pakistan army was mauled by India in 1971 Indo-Pak War, and after East Pakistan had succeeded in forming a new sovereign country called Bangladesh. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the army quietly and unconditionally handed over power to the democratically elected

government. The time was opportune to carry out the consolidation of democratic process in Pakistan to an extent. However soon after Bhutto assumed power, his highly ambitious and personalised politics hampered any such development. Though he established representative, democratic and political institutions through the constitution of 1973, and carried out economic reforms including land reforms, however, he soon went astray and was carried away by populism, which he enjoyed in the beginning. Soon he was undoing whatever he had accomplished till then.

Once in a powerful position as Prime Minister of Pakistan, he went on to consolidate his personal power at the cost of democratic institutions and culture. For a very short time, Bhutto did implement some part of his socialist economic thinking, and nationalised the banks and industries, and started land reforms. However, soon around 1974, he began to abandon such populist policies and instead laid more emphasis on roping in the support of the large landlord elites of the Punjab and Sindh. Soon a personalised and centralised regime came into being instead of democratic one that Bhutto had promised.

Opposition began to be muffled. A new force, Federal Security Force (FSF) was created by him ostensibly to act as paramilitary force to counter riots and insurgencies, however, soon FSF became an instrument for curbing

Bhutto's dissenters.³² It was extensively used to disrupt the opposition political rallies and to liquidate his opponents both within and outside the Pakistan Peoples Party (P.P.P.). Therefore, Bhutto soon started constitution of 1973 that he himself made, by amending it to curb democratic activity .

In April 1974, he amended Article 17 of the constitution which limited the right of freedom of associations, political parties and organizations. In 1975, he severely curtailed the civil liberties guaranteed by constitution and introduced draconian preventive detention laws, thus by passing the judiciary. These provision were then extensively used to detain his political opponents .The High Courts were banned from granting bail to the individuals detained under preventive detention. Similarly the Press was shifted and censored through bodies like National Press Trust.³³ All this was clear about turn from the earlier pro-democracy and civil liberties propaganda that he carried out to depose Ayub.

Bhutto dismissed the democratically elected NAP government in Baluchistan on the pretext of unrest and sent the army under General Tikka Khan to mercilessly quell the resistance demanding local autonomy. The army did all sorts of atrocities and mercilessly killed thousands of people

³² .K.B.Syed, The Nature and Direction of Political Change in Pakistan, (Praeger, New york. 1980), pp. 329-330.

³³ . Omar Norman, Pakistan and its Economic History since 1947, (Kegal Paul International. London, 1990), p.69.

that its commander General Tikka Khan earned the notorious title 'Butcher of Baluchistan'.

However, the significance of Bhutto regarding the democratization process in Pakistan should not go unnoticed. It was he who at a very critical time provided leadership to nascent movement for democracy and shaped and steered it into a strong movement in West Pakistan, as mentioned earlier.

After coming to power, Bhutto can be credited with only two major steps, which favoured democratic process. First being the making of 1973 constitution and the second being, radically curtailed the powers and privileges of the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan. New recruitment and promotion policies were introduced, thus taking away the immense immunities and unaccountability that bureaucrats enjoyed earlier. To an extent he can also be credited with the populist economic measures which were abandoned half way, as the democratic process itself. Therefore, to conclude the Bhutto period, it can be concurred that Bhutto, the demagogue and feudal authoritarian character that he was, talked democracy as when suited him and snubbed it when it did not. The undesirable medley of democracy and authoritarianism exploded in the end and finished him.

Zia's Coercive Model (1977-88)

The democratic movement did not die in Pakistan even as army moved in after deposing Bhutto in July 1977. The strong manifestation of democratic forces made Zia shudder, and he gave second thoughts to his plans (earlier he released Bhutto temporarily in 1977). Bhutto was executed and as a result all political activities came to a standstill. However, after the failure of Zia's Islamic legitimacy endeavors he was more and more isolated. The compulsions of legitimacy forced him to seek a military dominated semi-represented arrangement. However, Zia proved to be much shrewder than Ayub. He went in for local bodies' elections in 1979 and then tried it out with a nominated National Assembly called *Majlis-e-Shoura*. However, there was not much success. He then thought of having partyless elections and formed a buffer set up between the army and civilian populations. The opposition sensed his game and protested in the form of Movement For The Restoration Of Democracy (MRD) in 1983. This was primarily led by PPP and was not a much success except in Sindh where it generated wide scale anarchy, and a lot of violence took place. This, however, was quelled by the armed forces. Zia held the partyless and campaignless elections in 1985. These elections "provided an opportunity

for the major land owning families and large industrialists to gain direct access to the government and thus reap the benefits that success in such a contest would provide”.³⁴

Zia was in a way moving on the game plan of Ayub, only he was being much more manipulative and cautious. However, as later events shall prove he was to meet a similar fate. “The sheer magnitude of turnout (52%) was surprise to all groups: the military, the candidates and the boycotting opposition”.³⁵ Obviously, the latent democratic forces were at work, trying to fight back.

Zia chose an obscure figure, Mohd. Khan Junejo, to be the Prime Minister and soon withdrew martial law. However, strains began to appear soon between Junejo and Zia. “A contradiction was inherent in the institutional structure created in 1985. The powers that the military were willing to grant to legislature made its position untenable. The large turnout was seen as a mandate to terminate military rule, albeit, in stages”. The phased nature of the process imposed constant pressure on the legislature to be seen to be acting with a degree of independence and to take steps towards

³⁴.Omar Norman, “Pakistan and General Zia”, Third World Quarterly, Vol.2,no.1, January 1991, pp. 28-54.

³⁵ . ibid. p.38.

the gradual transfer of power to the civilians. From the army's point of view, it was the structure, which required sensitive handling, if it was to deliver benefits.³⁶

In the beginning the army was successful, as a part from other things the international environment provided by the Afghan issue was not conducive enough for the democratic forces to strike immediately. However, as the environment showed signs of mutation towards the end of 1987 things also began to change. Martial law had already being withdrawn, the press was given relatively more freedom, the political parties were allowed to function more freely and even Benazir Bhutto was allowed to return by then. The Army began to feel the pressure as it started coming under "increasing public apathy and pressure to the point of persistent demand for public accountability and cuts in defence expenditures. In 1987 the entire annual budget had to be hastily withdrawn under intense public agitation against the defence tax"³⁷ and the PM spoke of cutting down the expenditure on army.

Another latent but significant development, which was becoming a headache for Zia, was ethnic upsurge. Probably the greatest single development within Pakistan in the last ten years had been the heightened awareness of the rights of the smaller nationalities. The open military

³⁶ . Ibid., p.39.

³⁷ . VT.Joshi, Pakistan: Zia to Benazir, (Konark, New Delhi, 1995), p.81.

conflicts in Sindh in 1983 and 1986, the consistent increase in the unity among the Pakhtuns and their escalating conflict with the centre and the wait and see and prepare strategy of the Baluch were significant developments in this regard.³⁸ Thus the pressure for democratization was firmly building up in Pakistan.

However, Zia under pressure from the army dismissed the Junejo government. It is here that the situation is comparable to Ayub, as like him, Zia after dismissing the government came face to face with the masses. This did more damage than good to the army's interest, because the democratic sentiments were once again stirred up in the wake of dismissal of the government. The global environment too had changed after the Geneva accord and subsequent Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. So Zia's Afghanistan legitimacy was also fading out.

To conclude Zia's phase it can be said that eleven years of army rule, though for some time, mainly due to external reasons, blocked the democratic sentiments, but were unable to roll it back. The slow albeit steady growth of democratic movement, that continued during the Bhutto period got more strength. The Pakistani economy improved. The entire opposition remained united even though with less success, against Zia. The

³⁸ . Baber Ali. "Pakistan's decade of the Generals", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.22, no. 28, July 1987, p. 1125.

pressure was always on Zia and he tried to cap it through elections to local bodies in 1979 and 1984 and through the Junejo experiment of 1985. All these in the long run proved detrimental to Zia and favourable to fragile democratic forces. This was clearly proved by the post-Junejo scene in Pakistan till the death of Zia in air crash on August 17, 1988.

POST- ZIA PHASE: POLITICS OF *ELITES*:

The case for democracy is ill served by the élites will be amply displayed in the post-Zia phase. The élites, as in the dilemma faced by the process of democratisation in the entire third world, still play a stronger role, according to power distribution in the societies. The parties revolve around the élites, due to power distribution in these societies. These élites stir democratic movement to bargain for their share of power, of and once they have reached that stage, both those who are successful, and the failing contenders do not mind undermining democratic movements and institutions for their personal consolidation. This one of the major reasons that the democratic movements, in most such countries after making a good start, were slowed down and failed to properly in institutionalised and consolidate.

In Pakistan general elections took place after Zia in 1988, 1990 and 1993 with apprehensions about 1988 elections, the elections of 1990 and 1993 were fair and free. In 1988 Benazir and in the 1990 elected governments not only suffered confrontation with the army and bureaucratic set up, but got dismissed as a result of that confrontation.³⁹ Obviously élites power play was at work. Though some positive steps towards the consolidation of democratic movements have taken place, the things can not be said to have stabilised. Commenting upon the developments, Ziring remarked, "Pakistan's prospects for a stable political future have seldom been higher, but the times do not call for euphoria. The country confronts domestic and external dilemmas of significant magnitude, and the hard realities are bound to demand difficult and not always popular choices".⁴⁰

³⁹ . Lawrence Ziring, "The Second Stage in Pakistan politics: The 1993 Elections", Asian Survey,

Vol.33, no.12, December 1993, p. 1178.

⁴⁰ . Ibid., p. 1185.

CHAPTER IV:
POST COLD WAR SCENARIO

Pakistan faces a difficult situation in the Post Cold War period. Its strategic importance has diminished and its ties with major powers have grown “perilously thin”. These very changes necessitate a thorough reappraisal of Pakistan’s position vis-a-vis global and regional affairs. Pakistan’s situation is that it is imperative for it to review and revise the standard of its foreign policy while most of the problems from earlier period remains unresolved and defy easy solution.

The relative stability and predictability of the cold war had vanished: regional alignments have lost their former significance and attempts are being made to redefine their roles. Some like Warsaw Pact, have been disbanded and new economic groupings are emerging. The transition has caused confusion and anarchy, accentuating the problem of management. These and other developments have enabled the relatively powerful states to assume a more powerful role in their vicinity. In certain instances, the major powers have encouraged the regional influential states to assume an active role in the hope that this would ensure stability. However, this has given rise to greater tension in the regions where the concern states have divergent perspectives on regional security arrangements. The state structure in large number of developing states is under stress from within. Ethnic and linguistic differences, dissident-separatist movement and the growing

demand for political participation and economic justice by different groups and regions are threatening the very fabric of polity. For many states, internal order in security has become no less important than security against external threats. These issues have attracted much attention in the post-cold war period because, first, mostly ethnic affiliation cuts across territorial limits, thereby creating transnational linkages which help in transaction, including support to such movements on the other side of the fence. This in turn may have serious repercussions in other states and the states may end in becoming hostile towards each other. Secondly, the global community has shown a greater proclivity in intervention/mediation in intra-strife of states as it sustains over time and becomes intense vis-a-vis human rights, humanitarian aid and peace keeping. The states can no longer get away with the brutal suppression of their human rights under the cover of state sovereignty.

The exclusiveness of the domestic domain of a state is further shrunk by modern technology in general and communication in particular. The trends towards economic; specially privatization, deregulation, free global trade and investment, and regional economic groupings; have made difficult for any state to stay aloof in global structure any longer. Most of the developing states are trying to ride on global capitalist bandwagon. The first

wave of liberalization and globalization has weakened the traditional authority and control of the state apparatus and accentuated the problem of political and economic management. However, there are hardly any prospects of reverting, at least in the near future. The state will have to renegotiate its relationship with the people and society in the backdrop of these changes and give greater attention to absorb the initial shock of the so-called 'open environment'.

With such a transformed a global situation Pakistan can not sustain the overarching role it had played in the context Soviet Military intervention in Afghanistan (1979-89). Pakistan, therefore, in the post-cold war era faces three realities - its diminished geopolitical and geostrategic significance, the fast changing global environment marked by uncertainties and the last but not least , a host of problems inherited from earlier past which can no longer be dealt with obsolete strategy .

The Security Dilemma

The search for security continues to haunt Pakistan in the post - cold war period. With diminished strategic edge, Pakistan no longer enjoys the international support as it had during Afghan War. The U.S. stopped military

sales to Pakistan in October 1990 (Pressler Amendment). This caused a major setback to the programme of modernization of the three branches of armed forces. Pakistan lacked hard cash to obtain new equipment from other sources. Even the maintenance of the hitherto purchased military equipment from U.S. made the situation for Pakistan worse as these have to be now purchased from the open market which proved expensive. Though Pakistan made negotiations with other countries like France, China and Ukraine but it was partly successful.

As no major upgrading of the defence system was done after the late 1980s, military asymmetry in South Asia further increased to the disadvantage of Pakistan. And this in fact provided a convenient ground to the pro-bomb elements in Pakistan to pressure more strident approach to the nuclear option. Some went to the extent of suggesting that Pakistan should manufacture a bomb in order to resist the growing threat from India. This simplistic argument did not recognise that India enjoyed an edge over Pakistan even in the nuclear field. The production of a few bombs does not necessarily enhance the security unless a reliable delivery system and a second strike capacity is available. Pakistan is not expected to outshow India in these matters in near future. The nuclear issue continues to figure prominently in Indo-Pak diplomacy.

Washington based sources reported in December 1995 that India was preparing for another nuclear test in Rajasthan desert.⁴¹ Despite India's denial, most of the western states, including US, made their concerns known to India. Pakistan was particularly disturbed by this information and its leadership pointed out that any resumption of nuclear testing by India would accentuate tension in the region. The dust of India's possible nuclear test had hardly settled when a news flashed from an official source in Washington in February 1996 alleging that China had supplied ring magnet to Pakistan for use in latter's uranium enrichment program.⁴² Shortly afterwards, the Washington based press claimed that Pakistan had also obtained M-11 missiles in an unassembled condition from china in violation of the existing restrictions on the transfer of such technology.⁴³ These kinds of accusations were not new. The issue was earlier raised during 1992-93 and again in 1995 when the US, applied 'category II' sanctions against Pakistan and China, which lapsed in September 1995, because the US could "not find any solid evidence that Pakistan had acquired M-11 missiles from china".⁴⁴ In 1996,

⁴¹ . New York Times, 15 December 1995.

⁴² . New York Times, 8 February 1996.

⁴³ . New York Times, 13 June 1996.

⁴⁴ . News, 3 September 1995.

the issue of supply of M-11 missiles was revived along with the news about the Chinese ring magnets. In all, 127 stories were printed on these two issues in American press to coincide with initiation of the process for implementation of the Brown amendments. These developments led to the flurry of diplomatic activity between the US, Pakistan and India.

Pakistan and India diverged on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) whose draft was finalised in Geneva in 1996. Traditionally, India supported the comprehensive and global elimination of nuclear weapons. However, when the negotiations were resumed for CTBT India shifted its policy. Instead of extending unqualified support to a comprehensive test ban, India insisted that it would sign such a treaty only if it included a time bound framework for the elimination of the nuclear arsenals of the existing nuclear powers. Unless such a commitment was made, India would not accept any restrictions on its nuclear program. India's refusal to sign the CTBT at disarmament conference blocked the treaty. When it came up for the vote in the UN General assembly, India along with Bhutan and Libya voted against the treaty.⁴⁵ Pakistan shared the goal of global denuclearisation and voted in favour of the CTBT in UN general assembly, but maintained that such a treaty should, include the existing nuclear powers and the 'threshold states'.

⁴⁵ . New York Times, 11 September 1996.

Pakistan would not sign the CTBT if India stayed out of it since Pakistan could not accept the restrictions on its nuclear program that did not equally apply to India.

Pakistan and India also continued their ballistic missile development programs. Pakistan was working on different versions of *Hatf* missile, in addition to its reported acquisition of M-11 missile component from China. However, its missile program could not match India's missile program, which was much more advanced. India has been working on different versions of the short-range ballistic missiles, *Prithivi*, and has tested it more than fifteen times since 1988. Later India came up with an intermediate range ballistic missile *Agni* with range of 2,000 to 2,500 kms.

Pakistan's security predicament also arises from the ever-growing scarcity of resources. As economic crisis deepens, the government finds it extremely difficult to maintain the existing level of defence related expenditure. It is quite obvious that, in the absence of military equipment and weapons, which are currently available on deferred payment, the military procurement could hardly be met from the domestic resources. Moreover, with the collapse of Soviet Union and the break up of Yugoslavia, security is no longer perceived in terms of defence of territory against external threats. Attention is being given to the internal dimensions

of the security. Socio-economic development, ecological environment issues, population and human resource development are viewed as integral parts of security. Global financial institutions and donor states have urged Pakistan to give priority to education, health, and over all development human resources. The IMF has insisted Pakistan on a reduction on defence expenditure. Though the government expressed its determination to maintain at the existing level, the military has been faced with increased competition for obtaining resources.

The U.S.

There was a major shift in the perception of US towards its former ally Pakistan during the post-cold war era. It all started on October 1, 1990, the US suspended economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan by invoking the Pressler amendment as a punitive measure against Pakistan's nuclear program. In 1992-93, the US threatened to declare Pakistan as a 'terrorist state'. This was the ebb in the US-Pak relationship since 1979 when the US imposed similar embargo on Pakistan. Later, fresh bilateral relations began in 1994-95 that set the stage for a relatively balanced view towards Pakistan that was neither as unreasonably close as was during the

Afghan war nor as distant as was in early 1990s. This marked the beginning of issue-oriented relationship, which varied from one issue to another and reflected both convergence and divergence in their relationship.

In the post-cold war period the US evolved a new policy for South Asia in the backdrop of changes taking place in global relationship and also there was no longer the threat of communist Soviet Union. In various policy statements, the US has identified its major interests in South Asia as: promoting peace and stability in the region; achieving non-proliferation of nuclear and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); restraining the nuclear arms in the region and transfer of missile technology to and from South Asia; supporting democracy and development and more tolerant societies; encouraging economic liberalization; greater share of US in trade and investment; and increasing cooperation between states in order to find solutions to a wide range of issues from environmentalism to trans-border terrorism.

The expansion and cooperation in political and military fields between US and the states of South Asia and the promotion of dialogue between India and Pakistan on their contentious issues are also important American considerations.⁴⁶ But the US faces the problem of putting Pakistan and India

⁴⁶ .Sherin Tahir Kheli, "Agenda 2000: Time to end the neglect of South Asia", *Orbis*, Vol.41, no.1, Winter 1997, pp. 83-90.

on equal footing since the event seems to be mutually exclusive. There are policy makers in the US who perceive India as a potential power in south Asian region. On the other hand, though Pakistan may have lost some of its strategic significance due to the end of cold war yet it continues to be strategic important due to its proximity to Central Asia and the gulf region. As China and Russia gear up to resist American influence in their vicinity, Pakistan's strategic location is relevant to this power game as well. It was not, therefore, surprising that the study published in *Foreign Affairs* recognised Pakistan as pivotal to American interest in the region.⁴⁷

The most irritant issue in Pakistan-US relationship is the nuclear issue. The break point came when on October 1, 1990, the US imposed Pressler amendment, passed in 1985, by which US suspended all military sales and economic assistance to Pakistan as retaliatory step against nuclear stance of Pakistan. The US administration claimed that Pakistan's nuclear program had reached such a level in the 1990 that it was no longer possible for the US to certify that Pakistan did not possess the nuclear device, an annual requirement under the Pressler amendment for economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ .Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and US Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, no. 1, January-February 1996, pp. 35-71.

⁴⁸ . For details, see Hasan Askar Rizvi, "The Nuclear Freeze Controversy", *Nation*, 27 November 1993, p.43.

Pakistan described these sanctions as discriminatory and uncalled for since it had already froze its program. The US outrightly refused the freeze argument unless could be verified through inspections or other reliable means. Initially, the US asked for the total surrender of the nuclear devices. However, since the visit of the deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbot in April 1994, the US began to talk about graduated approach of first capping, the reducing ultimately eliminating nuclear and other WMD. This was to follow with an offer of package of incentives (economic assistance, military equipment and weapons, and security guarantees in return for Pakistan's acceptance of comprehensive safeguard on its nuclear program. The US also recognised that India should be brought into the process of denuclearisation was to be achieved in South Asia, something that Pakistan always asked for.

The efforts to win over Pakistan on the nuclear question continued during 1994-1995. The US Defense Secretary William Perry during his visit to Pakistan in January 1995 reaffirmed the graduated approach to nonproliferation in South Asia. It was during this visit that the two governments decided to revive the consultative group, which held several meetings in 1984 and October 1990, for maintaining a regular dialogue on security and other regional and bilateral issues. The first meeting of the

revived Consultative Group was held in 1995. Further, the US agreed to reopen and training/education to military personnel (suspended in 1990) on the condition that Pakistan would bear all the cost. Moreover, the official visits of the top brass of military personnel of the two countries increased. Pakistan was also able to procure the private investment especially in the energy sector.

The other issues, which adversely affected Pakistan -US relationship, are, first, the activities of the militant Islamic groups linked with Afghan resistant groups, and secondly, narco-trade. The US accused Pakistan of harbouring terrorists and for harboring extremist ideologies in its territory along with the military training of some of the militant group. The genesis of the problem can be traced back to the Afghan war (1979-89) when a number of Arab soldiers belonging to various militant Islamic movements joined the Afghan resistance based in Pakistan and fought along with Pakistanis in Afghanistan. But after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, these soldiers stayed on with the Afghan resistance movements and used their bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan as an asylum for themselves and other militants who later joined them. A number of them (Afghan war veterans) periodically returned to their home countries and engaged in violent activities against their respective home governments

which they often considered un-Islamic and corrupt. They also targeted American interest in their home countries and elsewhere as retaliation against what they viewed as anti-Islamic policies of US administration. It was a strong inkling for US that it had created a Frankenstein Monster. Likewise, the governments of Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey, and the Philippines, with whom Pakistan had good friendly relations alleged Pakistan for harboring and training militant group. The US threatened to declare Pakistan as a 'Terrorist State' on grounds that its territory was being used by transnational terrorist groups.

Similarly, the chaos in Afghanistan turned parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas into a safe refuge for opium cultivation and its subsequent processing into heroin which was exported to West, including US.⁴⁹ The American government put pressure on Pakistan to take effective steps to contain both the problems. In 1993, Pakistan took a tough line towards the foreign elements associated with Afghan resistant. From time to time security forces conducted operations against them; and some were asked to leave its soil. However, it was not easy to completely contain them because their activities were partly based in Afghanistan. The Arab militant elements based in Pakistan could cross the border whenever Pakistan

⁴⁹ . Ibid., p. 42.

authorities checked their travel documents or tried to round them up. Moreover, the government effort to control the militant Islamic elements were opposed by various Pakistani Islamic groups which felt that Pakistan should not come down hard on the militant elements from other Muslim countries.

Pakistan was able to avert the threat of being declared a terrorist state. Pakistan also adopted strident approach to check drug processing and trafficking by moving against opium cultivators and heroin processing laboratories in the tribal areas. In 1994-1995, Pakistan extradited some drug barons wanted in the US. These measures were appreciated by the US but its authorities still wanted Pakistan to adopt more strident measures. What disturbed them the most was the narco-nexus with the senior bureaucrats and politicians of Pakistan which compromised efforts to check drug-trafficking.

Russia

After the disintegration of Soviet Union, Pakistan and Russian federation maintained a regular dialogue on bilateral and regional issues but they could not overcome the legacy of the Soviet era during cold war. Though the tension of Afghanistan war period had eased, their relationship

in the political and security fields lacked enthusiasm. However, like the Soviet period, problems in the political domain did not affect their economic and trade interaction.

In December 1995, rupee-ruble parity was determined afresh so as to facilitate trade. The agreement also provided that the account would be maintained in US dollars but the repayment could continue in the form of Pakistani exports, and period for the repayment could be extended. The talks of the senior officials of the foreign ministers of the two countries held in May 1996 and April 1997 cover wide range of issues including trade and various industrial projects and development ventures in Pakistan. Russia also agreed to cooperate with Pakistan in building a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.

On other front, Russia sought Pakistan cooperation for securing the release of Russian soldiers, which were captivated by the Afghan militia groups including the Taliban. And Pakistan did secure the release of some Russian soldiers in 1990- 91 but, later, Pakistan's efforts were abortive. Subsequently, Russia complained the connection between Pakistan and Afghanistan- based Islamic movements with the insurgency in Chechnya and Tajikistan. It was on Russia's prodding that Pakistan hosted talks between Tajik government and the Tajik Islamic groups. However, Pakistan

denied any connection with insurgency in Chechnya but expressed concern over the happening in Chechnya and called for an end to hostilities and negotiated a peaceful settlement of the problem.⁵⁰

Pakistan and Russia agreed in 1997 on the need for an intra-Afghan dialogue in order to create a broad-based government in Afghanistan. However, it could not be put into praxis. Russia openly supported the ousted Rabbani regime as it moved to northern Afghanistan and Pakistan was sympathizer of Taliban. To the Russian concern was the Taliban victory of Afghanistan could aggravate the fluid situation in Tajikistan, which actually happened. Russian fears came true when Taliban ousted the ruling government and controlled chunk of territory of Afghanistan. Subsequently, Taliban victory strengthened the Islamic fundamentalist elements in Tajikistan and other Central Asian republics. Russian stance certainly changed after these events. Also Pakistan's efforts to obtain aircraft and other military equipment from Russia did not succeed as the latter gave way to India's objections to such a deal. However, Pakistan did manage to procure MI-17 Choppers from Russia as well as Russian tanks from Ukraine.

⁵⁰ . Dawn, 27 September 1996.

China

In the post-cold war period Pakistan and China have maintained a cordial and multifaceted interactions, although they made policy adjustments in order to deal with changed global scenario. The well established practice of frequent consultation on bilateral, regional, and international issues; swapping of top brass of military and civil administration and obviously the goodwill visits including cultural exchanges continued in the post-cold-war era. China extended economic and technological aid for Pakistan's industrial development and defense production. Moreover, China extended its cooperation in the production of K-8 trainer aircraft, it also agreed towards joint development and manufacturing of a fighter aircraft, Super-7 and other warships.⁵¹ China supplied a nuclear power reactor for the Chashma power station, as committed in 1989-90, and offered in 1996 to extend similar cooperation for another nuclear power station, if and when needed.

China moderated its stance on Indo-Pakistan disputes, especially Kashmir. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, China explicitly supported the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir, as set out in the UN resolutions. When it embarked on improvement of relations with India, it

⁵¹ . For details, see Far Eastern economic Review, 8 May 1997, pp. 15-16.

avoided the use of the term self-determination, although it often referred to the UN resolution. In the post-cold war period, while supporting Pakistan on Kashmir, China began to emphasize the need for bilateral dialogue for resolution of Indo-Pak problems, including Kashmir.⁵² Of late, China urged the two countries to diffuse the tension in the region by initiating a dialogue.

The Islamic world

The support of Islamic world was a diplomatic asset for Pakistan, which improved its bargaining power in the global system. The Islamic countries were either sympathetic towards or supportive of Pakistan in its dispute with India. The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) held an extra ordinary summit conference in Islamabad on March 23, 1997 to express solidarity with Pakistan on its 50th anniversary of its independence. A strongly worded resolution endorsed the right of self determination to the People of Kashmir and supported Pakistan's efforts to seek a peaceful resolution of this problem.

The conflict in Afghanistan has defied the effort of the UN, Pakistan and other states of the region to find a resolution. When Najibullah government collapsed in April 1992, it was hoped that Afghan resistance groups would be soon able to put together a viable government. Pakistan

⁵² . H .A.Rizvi, "China and Kashmir Problem", Regional Studies, Vol.12, no.3, Summer 1994, pp.91-99.

extended a helping hand by brokering the Peshawar Accord (April 1992) and Islamabad Accord (March 1993) among major Afghan groups which had envisaged interim governance arrangements leading to the setting up of a broad based government.⁵³ Burhanuddin Rabbani assumed power as part of interim arrangements. However, the Afghan group could not put together owing to mutual distrust and leadership jealousies and it had become clear that a broad based government established through the procedures led down in the Accords failed to set up. Rabbani, who had entrenched himself in violation of the Accords, rebuffed Pakistan and sought the support of Russia and India to strengthen his government within the domestic context. Meanwhile, Pakistan encouraged anti-Rabbani sentiments and supported a relatively new group, known as Taliban that surfaced in Kandhar in 1994. As the Taliban expanded their domain at the expense of Rabbani government, the latter became extremely critical of Pakistan for its support to the Taliban and accused Pakistan of interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs. The relations reached an ebb when in September 1995, the Pakistan embassy in Kabul was ransacked by a mob. Pakistan retaliated by expelling some Afghan diplomats and demanded compensation

⁵³ . Amra Saeed," Afghanistan: Peshawar Accords and After, Regional Studies, Vol.2, no.2, Spring 1995, pp. 103-108.

amounting to 14.8 million US dollars for damages caused to embassy.⁵⁴ It also downgraded interaction with Afghanistan.

Pakistan derived grudging satisfaction when Taliban dislodged the Rabbani government in Kabul in September 1996. However, the Taliban government could solve the country's problem because the ousted regime resisted the Taliban government with backing of Russia and Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Iran was also perturbed by the rise of a political force in Afghanistan, which it viewed as being ideologically very close to Saudi Arabia. The threat of consolidation of pro-Saudi group in the region adjoining Iran heightened Iranian fear of encirclement. Since Taliban was viewed as Pakistan's ally, and Iran was convinced enough that Pakistan was instrumental to their rise, it expressed its concern to Pakistan and openly supported the ousted government of Rabbani. There have been a number of diplomatic exchanges between Pakistan and Iran on this issue in 1996-97 as the two states tried to find a common platform to deal with predicament in Afghanistan.

In the absence of a satisfactory solution to the civil strife in Afghanistan, Pakistan continues to suffer from the spillover effects of Afghan crisis, including the presence of Afghan refugee on its soil. In

⁵⁴ . News, 13 October 1995.

January 1997, 1.2 million Afghan refugees were reported living on Pakistan territory.⁵⁵ Other adverse impact includes processing and trafficking, and proliferation of weapons which contribute to intensifying violence in the society. The unsettled conditions in Afghanistan have proved a major obstacle to developing meaningful relations with the states of Central Asia. Pakistan had enthusiastically welcomed the independence of the Central Asian states and approached their governments with offers of technological and industrial cooperation, trade, and economic interaction. A large number of agreements were signed for this purpose.⁵⁶ In 1992, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), was set up by Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. In 1995, it was expanded to include Afghanistan and Central Asian states to enhance cooperation. If the internal situations improved in Afghanistan, Pakistan could serve as a bridgehead to Central Asia and offer relatively short transit routes for these states (especially Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), thereby reducing their dependence on Russia.

With the Islamic countries of the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, Pakistan has maintained cordial relations. Its security related relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf kingdoms have included the sale of small arms, the supply of military personnel for training assignments, the use of training

⁵⁵ . Dawn, 24 February 1997.

⁵⁶ . Ahmed Rashid, "Central Asian Power Play", Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 April 1997, pp. 22-23.

facilities for foreign servicemen in Pakistan, the periodic exchanges of visits by senior commanders, and provision of consultations on regional security affairs. They also conducted joint naval exercises and the Saudis agreed to step up economic cooperation, including investing in joint ventures in Pakistan. Interactions with UAE has been marked by high level exchange visits, consultation on security affairs, joint efforts to control drug trafficking and economic cooperation.

Pakistan sent military troops to Saudi Arabia soon after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and supported military action against Iraq by the US led coalition in January-February 1991. However, in subsequent years, Pakistan had expressed concern on the plight of ordinary Iraqis due to continued imposition of UN sanctions against Iraq.

Pakistan relations with Iran faced several problems during 1995-97 including; divergent positions on the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistani militant attacks on Shia community in Pakistan. As discussed earlier, the Iranian government was perturbed by the rise of Taliban because it viewed it as an anti-Iranian force. Iran proposed a new regional grouping, especially because it included India. Though, there has been continued violence against Shia community in Pakistan, which at times irked Iran.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ . Dawn, 23 January 1997.

Yet the two countries have dealt with situation with patience and diplomatic skill, however, continue to support the rival groups in Afghanistan.

There was a perceptible improvement in Pakistan's relations with Syria, Libya, and Jordan. Pakistan signed agreements with Libya in September in 1996 to cooperate in narcotic control and extradition of criminals and fugitives. Pakistan also supported Syrian position on Golan Heights. Pakistan offered to expand trade and economic ties including soft loan and assistance to set up a power station. With Egypt, steps were taken to combat international terrorism and drug trafficking. These steps included the signing of extradition treaty, which eased fears stemming from the destruction of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad by a bomb blast in November 1995. In 1997, there have been signs that Pakistan and Egypt are contemplating military cooperation. Pakistan maintained its traditional support to PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) in its struggle for the creation of a Palestinian state and supported the PLO-Israel peace process. Similarly, Pakistan has supported Turkey on the Cyprus issue and endorsed Turkey's demand for establishment of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation in Cyprus. Pakistan has supported the Muslim government of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the beginning of civil strife, which followed the break up, of Yugoslavia.

South Asia and The Kashmir Imbroglia

Though the cold war has ended at the super power level, South Asia continues to suffer from a cold war between Pakistan and India. Both the countries have often traded the charges of interference and counter interference in each other's internal affairs, periodically expelling each other's embassy staff on espionage charges, engaging in negative propaganda and continuing with travel restrictions on each other's citizens. The arrangement for resolving the Siachen glacier issue, agreed to in 1989, were not implemented and the two sides have diverged on the ways and the means to create a nuclear nonproliferation regime for South Asia. Multilevel official interaction broke down in January 1994, when foreign secretaries had a brief and inconclusive meeting in Islamabad. At this meeting they sharply disagreed on the details on their agendas, especially on the inclusion of Kashmir issue in the discussions.

What contributed most to the deterioration of their relations and to break down of their official dialogue was eruption of insurgency in Indian administered Kashmir (often ostensibly called by Pakistani media *Maqbuza* - occupied Kashmir) in 1989. As the insurgency persisted despite a heavy

crack down by the Indian security forces, India began accusing Pakistan of masterminding the insurgency and sending infiltrators, supplying weapons, and offering them logistic support. Pakistan denied these accusation and charged Indian security forces with operations and human right violations in Kashmir. The Kashmir insurgency generated much enthusiasm in Pakistan administered Kashmir (euphorically called *Azad*- free Kashmir) and Pakistan itself. For obvious reasons: the disputed nature and the legacy of Kashmir; Pakistan's traditional support for Kashmir's right to self-determination as set out in UN resolutions; the Kashmiri population is divided by the Line of Control (LoC); and ethnic, cultural and religious linkages between Kashmir and Pakistan. Unofficial circles, especially Islamic groups, extended material support to the Kashmiri groups and few of them sent 'volunteers' across LoC for participation in what they call *Jihad*.⁵⁸ The government was cautious in its public posture and maintained that it extended moral, political and diplomatic support only. However, material support reached the Kashmiri insurgent groups through the transnational linkages that exist across the LoC.

Despite strong acrimony in their relations, there were two sets of positive developments between the two countries. First, number of

⁵⁸ . Times of India, 8 April 1997.

confidence building measures (CBMs) were adopted. Second, dialogue at an unofficial level, often described as ‘track two diplomacy’, began in the late 1980s and gained momentum in the post cold war era.⁵⁹ The first initiative came from outside of the region. The United States Information Agency (USIA) sponsored various track two ventures: the Nimrana dialogue, the Traveling Seminar, and the visitor’s program. Later, South Asian NGOs research centers and newspapers sponsored dialogue among leaders of public opinion, academicians, mediapersons. None of the participants were connected to the government, although some such dialogues included former civil and military top brass. These dialogues gained greater importance after the official dialogue was suspended in January 1994, when messages were sent to other side through the track two diplomacy.⁶⁰ The track two dialogue emphasise the need to normalise Indo-Pak relations, called for more interaction at the common man’s level, and urged the two governments to revive the official bilateral dialogue.

Following this, in summer of 1996 the official circles of the two nations began to talk about the need- the need for reviving the bilateral dialogue.

The reasons being:

⁵⁹ . S.Ganguly & T.Greenwood (eds.), Mending Fences: Confidence and Security building Measures in South Asia, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1996).

⁶⁰ . New York Times, 10 Junc 1996.

- There was a growing demand at the unofficial level in both the countries to improve the bilateral relations- track two diplomatic ventures.
- If India wanted to play a global role it needs to disentangle itself from the disputes with its neighbouring countries.
- A number of friendly countries to both India and Pakistan advised to improve on the status quo of their old rivalry, which was a major concern in maintaining stability in South Asia.

However, they were slow in adopting the follow up steps because the two governments were bogged down by their own domestic chaos. The traditional pattern of Indo-Pak diplomacy is characterise by simultaneous pursuit of positive and negative interaction continued.⁶¹

Pakistan enjoys tension free relations with other states of South Asia: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives, at the bilateral level and within SAARC framework. Trade and economic ties exchange visits of senior officials and periodic consultations on bilateral issues mark their relationships.

Two issues, however, remains unresolved between Bangladesh and Pakistan. These are the repatriation of Biharis still stranded in Bangladesh.

⁶¹ . Malocha Lodhi, "Talks about Talks", Ncws, 5 April 1997.

and the division of assets and liabilities of the pre-1971 situation. These and other regional issues remain unresolved. But the two countries did not let the lack of resolution to adversely affect their relationship.

Nepal and Bhutan have had very limited bilateral relations. Bhutan has its own limitations because in 1949 Bhutan signed a treaty of 'perpetual peace and friendship' with India which made Bhutan to seek India's advise on foreign policy matters. Pakistan and other South Asian states acknowledge the importance of SAARC as a regional organisation but its performance has been severely curtailed by the differences that exist among the different countries of the organisation in general and India and Pakistan in particular.

CHAPTER V:
CONCLUSION

The triune influence of militaryships, failed populism and insurgencies on the political development of Pakistan has sapped the strength of Pakistan and reduced the country to a state of permanent crisis. To its internal chaos must now be added the unpredictable and unstable situation that has developed on its frontiers. Since the fateful years of 1971-72, the elites who governed the country have attempted to rediscover an identity, which actually never existed. The fact that there are more Muslims in India than Pakistan illustrates the fact that the scale of dilemma that now confronts the self-appointed spokesman of the subcontinent's Muslim population. It is unlikely that any of its problems will be overcome by Pakistan's status as a frontline state.⁶²

The centralisation would have provoked strong regional reaction had it not been accompanied by political authoritarianism. It was the undemocratic regime of the regimes, be it of Ayub, Bhutto or martial law which deprived the provinces/units, particularly smaller one, of an effective voice in nation and state building task, thereby reducing their interest in the continuity in the union. However, the experience of the centralized federation under autocratic rule has proved the fallacy of the argument.

⁶² Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, (Penguin, London, 1983), p. 163.

National cohesion of a culturally diverse people can neither be achieved by force nor can it be strengthened by centralisation. It grows gradually in the atmosphere of goodwill and mutual trust with equal participation of union at federal policy making and decision making levels. Without these conditions centrifugal forces are bound to overwhelm the centripetal forces and therefore undermine the very basis of integration and threaten the nationhood.

Pakistan's overwhelming thrust on military security and India centric defence policy has resulted in military emerging as the most cohesive and powerful institution. Democratic institutions, therefore, have remained fragile due to self-serving politicians whose primary concerns have been to remain in power some how. They have manipulated, time and again, various democratic institutions, including the constitution, to perpetuate their rule. The military cooperated with these self-serving politicians to further their vested interests and the military as an institution got strengthened at the cost of democracy. The army defined security parameters of Pakistan have led the country to enter into various multilateral military alliances and the country spending enormous capital on defence at the cost of socio-economic

developments. The centralised character of Pakistan polity emanates from this security. The absence of greater provincial autonomy, and the growing dissatisfaction of various ethno-linguistic groups have made the state more vulnerable.

In the security centric state the role of opposition has been severely undermined. Instead of emphasising change through democratic means these parties have never hesitated to ask the army to intervene. The civil society has been marginalised and the press is hesitant to criticise the government forcefully, a natural outcome of security centric state.

Foreign policy can be successful only if it is anchored on solid realistic premises. On the other hand, a policy based on emotions and illusions can only lead to disaster. Unfortunately Pakistani policy makers have failed to take into cognizance this fact despite grave setbacks in the nation's chequered history spanning a little over fifty years. The emergence of fundamentalist groups sustaining on the government's Kashmir and Afghan policies has posed a new threat to an already insecure state.

The critical role of Pakistan as a factor in international stability and global politics can only be appreciated when it is placed in the context resurgence of Islamic identity. The preeminent characteristic of Pakistan is its Muslim *epistme*. When established in 1947 in the name of Islam it was

the most populous Muslim nation in the world. While the succession of Bangladesh in 1971 reduced it to third place after Indonesia and India, it remains one of the most conspicuous fervent of the fifty-four member states of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) that declared themselves constitutively Islamic. The invocation of Islam as its *raison d'être* places Pakistan as one of the few nations, along with Israel founded explicitly on religious doctrine rather than by historical accident or colonial invention.

The last fifty and odd years of this century have been indelible stamped by the remarkable resurgence of Islam as political force. The end of empire released powerful energies, which had been suppressed by colonialism. The effect of this explosion has been global and profound; benign and sinister. Since the creation of Pakistan and the establishment of Israel a year later, scarcely a week has passed without the world's attention being called to Islam. These activities have spend the spectrum of human condition: mass migration, war and peace, oil blockades, boycotts, political development and political disintegration, famine and abundance, catastrophe and relief, hostage taking, boundary disputes, aggression and successions. These events cover the globe : from Palestine to Philippines, from Kashmir to Kuwait, from Cyprus to Chechnya, from Bangladesh to Bosnia, from Central Asian Islamic republics to Morocco and the Sahara, from Turkey to

Brunei and Yemen. Pakistan has been critically involved in all these episodes.

The geopolitical realities in South Asia have undergone perceptible changes since cold war period. In the post cold war the strategic position of Pakistan gets devalourized and is no longer so important as it was during cold war for US policy makers. After the disintegration of Soviet Union remains a 'frontline state' to circumspect the threat of communism as was the situation in the cold war era.

One perceptible impact of the end of the cold war is that India was forced to go nuclear and Pakistan followed the suit. In the post cold war scenario, China therefore replaces Russia as the prime balancer of US. And since china continues to be the largest supplier of arms to Islamic world including Pakistan which is perceived as the greatest threat to the Euro-Atlantic civilization (NATO alliance). Therefore, Pakistan and China stands natural allies and Pakistan can no longer serve as an ally to the US for containing China and hence India emerges as the natural or Hobson's choice for US policy makers. Moreover, India's aspiration to see global and become big power within democratic framework has furthered its image in the West.

Pakistan support to Taliban has further alienated Pakistan from US because any kind of Islamic fundamentalism is perceived as the 'bug bear'

a potential threat particularly to the first world or developed world. This is evident from the fact that out of eight terrorist states declared by US (i.e. Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Cuba and North Korea) six of them are from Islamic world.

In 1999, Pakistan attempted a misadventure in Kargil with ulterior motive to attract the attention of the world over Kashmir dispute as well as to threat India with nuclear escalation. However, Kargil war ended in fiasco for Pakistan as it suffered humiliating defeat at the hands of India, which assumed a high moral ground, elevating its image globally.

One consequence of Kargil fiasco was the palingenesis of military under Pervez Musharraf sacking democratic forces. Military regime by definition is coercive because if militarism does not succeed beyond borders it tries its hands inside the borders; it is in the very nature of military regime. Pakistan today, is struggling both politically and economically. The military regime which seized power in October 1999; promised to introduce 'real' democracy in the country.⁶³ However, it was left grappling with problem of dealing with Nawaz Sharif, culminating into his controversial exile to Saudi Arabia. And when the government did initiate local elections it showed signs of lack of electorate enthusiasm and discriminating against religious

⁶³ .Iyas Khan, "Traditional Winners", The Herald, February 2001, p.44.

minority. Also, it did not succeed in its purported goal of keeping established political parties out and building a new, 'clean' breed of politicians.

On the economic front, Pakistan was on the verge of defaulting on its external debt obligations when IMF came to its rescue with ten months stand-by credit of \$596 million.⁶⁴ However, the IMF imposed stiff conditions for the country to be able lay its hands on a large part of the loan. Pakistan, with its record of hardly ever progressing beyond the first tranche of loan grants, struggling hard to meet these conditions.

Further, military regime is not able to fulfil the regional aspiration of its different sections of population and therefore discontentment in the state prevails (Baluchis, Sindhis, Mohajirs, Baltistanis, Pakistan Occupied Kashmiris) due to multiple disenchantment of Pakistani society. Given the internal contradictions and its compulsions to compete with India especially in arms is further going to bankrupt the state's coffers as because the share of military expenditure is going to chew more pie of the national budget than other sectors of the socio-economic development. This coupled with increasing debt of foreign loans will further crumple the economy, which could well be the cause of further rump of the state.

⁶⁴ . Ahmcd Rasul, "Borrowed Time", Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 Dcccmbcr 2000, p.28.

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