

**CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL: ITS IMPACT ON
PALESTINIAN WOMEN**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of the*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SANGEETA KUMARI



**CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
JULY 2005**



CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110 067, INDIA


Phone Off. : 26704372
Telegram : JAYENU
Fax : 91-11-26165886
91-11-26162292

July 2005


Certificate

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “**CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL: ITS IMPACT ON PALESTINIAN WOMEN**” submitted by SANGEETA KUMARI, is in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY from this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree from this University, or any other University.

We recommend this dissertation to be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Prof. Gulshan Dietl
(Supervisor)

Centre for West Asian and African Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067


Prof. Girijesh Pant
(Chairman)

Chairman
Centre for West Asian and African Studies
SIS, JNU, New Delhi-110067

*Dedicated
To
My Parents*

Acknowledgements

I feel deeply indebted and obliged to my supervisor Prof. Gulshan Dietl, with whose indispensable guidance, constant encouragement and unwavering support my work has taken the present form.


I am grateful to the faculty of the Center for West Asian and African Studies for inciting and nurturing my interest in the Study of West Asian Politics. I am grateful to the staff members of my center and the library staff of JNU for their kind help and cooperation.

I owe my special thanks to Prof. V.K. Tripathi, Naresh and Bhaiji for their kind assistance and advice throughout my research work. I would also like to thank my friends, especially Ayem, Badap, Aparajita, Savita and Shaheen Bhai whose support, by way of physical help and prayers, have contributed much to this research work.

I would like to express my profound gratitude to my Parents and my sister, Sunita for their continuous support and prayers.

Most importantly, I thank God for being good to me throughout.

*Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi, July 2005*



Sangeeta Kumari

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

IDF Israel Defence Force

LP Liberation Party

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East

UNSCOP United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

CONTENTS

Chapter I	1
Introduction	
1. Historical Background	
2. Palestinian Women and the State of Israel	
3. Political Status	
4. Status of Refugees	
5. Resistance Movement	
Conclusion	
Chapter II	16
Historical Background	
1. Introduction	
1.1. <i>Early History of the Region</i>	
2. Was Palestine the Only or Preferred Destination?	
3. World War I and the British Promises of Independence to Arabs	
3.1. <i>The Balfour Declaration and British Mandate</i>	
3.2. <i>The British Administration and Civil War in Palestine</i>	
4. The United Nations Resolution of November 1947 and the Partition of Palestine	
5. Statehood and Expulsion 1948	
6. Why was the Arab Armies Defeated?	
7. US Policy towards solving Palestinian Refugee problems	
Conclusion	
Maps	37

Chapter III 41

Socio-Economic and Cultural Aspects of Palestinian Women Refugee
during late 1940s and early 1950s

1. Introduction
 2. Pre 1948 Situation
 3. The War of 1948 and Aftermath
 - 3.1. *Refugees of 1948 War*
 - 3.2. *Arab Census Problem*
 4. Palestinians and the States of Israel, Jordan and Egypt
 5. Women and Inheritance Practice
- Conclusion

Chapter IV 62

Political Status of Palestinian Women under Israel, Jordan and
Egypt during late 1940s and early 1950s

1. Introduction
 2. Palestinians' Political rights and the States of Israel, Jordan and Egypt.
 - 2.1. *Jordan*
 3. Brotherhood: A Comparative Study
 - 3.1. *Leadership and Brotherhood*
 - 3.2. *Politics of Periphery*
 4. Other Political Parties
 5. Refugee Gatherings and Committees
 6. Arab Unity of Action and the Palestine Question
 7. Palestinian Women and National Movement
- Conclusion

Chapter V Conclusions 83

Bibliography 89

CHAPTER I

Chapter I

Introduction

The turbulent political conditions that prevailed in Palestine during the period 1920 up to 1948, significantly contributed to the displacement of approximately 750,000¹ Palestinians from their homes to become refugees, living in camps in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Jordan. The year 1917 marks a turning point in the history of Palestine, not only because of the end of Turkish rule but also because of the issuance in that year by Britain of the Balfour Declaration. This declaration also changed the course of history in Palestine and the rest of West Asia. The Balfour Declaration and the partitioning of Palestine resolution, adopted in 1947, worsened the situation in the region. Thus by 1920 the forces that were to create the dilemma of Palestine for long were in place. The basic issue was and remains, which group has the right to the area. The study will first focus on the circumstances/events leading to the creation of the state of Israel, and the impact it had on the Palestinian women living under Jordan (West Bank), Egypt (Gaza Strip) and Israel as a result of events of 1947-48. The focus is not to create a new territory called women's history but rather to change the direction of historical attention by posing the question of the relationship between the sexes as central to the development of a society, nation. If a nation is to rise how can it do so if half the nation, if the women kind lag behind, remain ignorant and uneducated. In case of a territory (of a nation) that is being taken over by some other nation, the issue of women's rights becomes more important.

¹ Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 4-28. and Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel*, (New York, 1987), pp. 75-76.

(1)

The objectives of this study are to understand the repercussions of the creation of the state of Israel on the Palestinian families and women as a whole, to comprehend the significance of the resistance put up by the Palestinian women and its contribution to the national movement and to understand the extent of the British attitude to the situation which added to promote political turmoil of the area.

1. Historical Background

The origin of Palestine is derived from the Philistines who lived in the southern coastal part of the country in the 12th century B.C. The Israelites were not the earliest inhabitants of Palestine. They came and settled after their exodus from Egypt. When the Israeli tribal people invaded land of Canaan in the 12th century B.C., they found a settled population. The population in the country then included the settled Canaanites, the Gibeonites and the Philistines. Gradually the Israeli tribes became influential in some of the areas and thus established a kingdom, which lasted for two centuries. Between 733 B.C. and 721 B.C. the Assyrians overran the territories of the kingdom and in 721 B.C. After the Assyrians and Babylonians, the country was occupied in turn by the Persians and they allowed the return of Jews and Greeks and the Romans. Subsequently in the 4th century A.D Palestine came under Christian influence and remained so until the 7th century. The Muslim Arabs conquered Palestine in 637 A.D. and thus the changed political situation favoured the Arab Muslims, though the Christians continued to live in the area. Later there was Christian resurgence during the Crusades but Saladin's victory over the Crusaders in 1187 A.D., once again tilted the power balance in favour of the Arab Muslims.² In 1518

² For more on this, see Maxime Rodison, *Israel and Arabs*, (London: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 215-217.

A.D. the Turks conquered Palestine and remained in occupation till 1917. But Turkish conquest did not alter or affect the basic Arab character of the country. Its inhabitants, language, customs, and culture remained Arab in character.

Apart from Muslims and Christians there existed other small communities, which lived in the midst of the people of Palestine. These included Jews, Armenians and Assyrians. The Jews did not integrate into the ethnic stock, formed by the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine. They represented a small community. At the time of Balfour Declaration, the Jews represented less than 10 percent of the total population of Palestine. During the nineteenth century and following the Balfour Declaration, there was a wave of Jews immigration into Palestine. The state of Israel was born in the midst of war with the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring Arab states. This war, which Israelis call the war of independence and Arabs call al-Nakba or the disaster, had two phases. The first phase lasted from the 29 November 1947 when the UN passed the partition resolution until 14 May 1948 when the state of Israel was proclaimed. The second phase lasted from 15 May 1948 until the termination of hostilities on 7 January 1949. Both phases of war ended in triumph for the Jews and tragedy for the Palestinians.

2. Palestinian Women and the State of Israel

Women's voices all over the world are still not heard. Therefore, the position of Palestinian women during the period of the study plays a difficult role in the midst of this situation, where their lives and that of their loved ones are constantly at risk. Palestinian women sought to achieve their rights and to secure a dignified life for themselves and their children. Constantly threatened by Israeli aggression, the harsh life conditions led to

an economic, social, physical and mental disruption of Palestinian society. Infact the suffering of the Palestinian women was part of the suffering of the whole society; their pivotal role in the society indicates that such suffering had an enormous impact on all aspects of life.

Before this study focuses on the conditions of Palestinian women refugees, it is imperative to define the status of a refugee as defined in international law. Who can be termed as refugee? Refugees are a distinct legal category recognised in public international law. The definition, rights and the status of the refugee are set in the United Nation convention on the status of refugees 1951. This general international convention has been signed and ratified by a number of countries and provides the details related to the legal status of the refugees. Under international law, a refugee is a person outside his or her country of origin, who is unable or unwilling to return there owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion.

In order to understand the life experiences of Palestinian women refugees and appreciate the specific conditions, needs and aspirations, a brief history of women's life experiences prior to the creation of their status as refugees, is in order. Before 1948, Palestine was an overwhelmingly agrarian society. Social and gender relations were organized around a system of production and reproduction known as the village or Hamula system. Around this system, cultivation, land redistribution and inheritance were organised and internal village conflicts were resolved. The important role played by the village in organising Palestinian social relations of production is evident throughout the literature on Palestine, where the village was considered as basic unit of the society and

the system was a hierarchical based on gender, age and class differentiation. During the latter part of the 19th century and the early 20th century, the village began to acquire different characteristics as the Palestinian economy was being transformed from a relatively self-sufficient economy into a market economy involving the production of commodities for sale. The introduction of private properties laws began with the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 and later, the Land Reforms of 1872 aimed at curtailing the role of head of the village through individual land registration and by increasing direct Ottoman supervision over the extraction of surplus production.

The laws relating to private property placed tremendous pressure on the peasants. While only minority of the peasants responded to these changes by registering their lands and acquiring the registration papers, the majority adopted more stringent means to maintain control over the land they traditionally inherited and tilled. The most important aspect of such measures came in the responses of the peasants and was expressed in prohibiting land parcelisation and in the retaining of tract of land as one piece. Such measures resulted in the emergence of two forms of social discrimination, gender discrimination and class discrimination. Moreover, the popular notion that, as Muslims, the Palestinians followed the Shari'a which included all members of the family, including women, in the inheritance system, does not stand up to a reality check. Women were excluded or at least discouraged from inheritance in order to keep the land within the agnatic based family structure. The exclusion of women from inheritance was reinforced by other socially and culturally constructed norms and traditions such as endogamous marriage, particularly the marrying of first cousins which itself was promoted as a means

to solidify the economic and political power of the head of the village-keeping land under close control.

Despite the important role played by the women peasants in the production process as direct agricultural producers, the patriarchal norms and values constructed by the Palestinian peasant society marginalized the value of women's work and contributions. The marginalisation and further devaluation of the women's work increased with the emergence of a new ideological and cultural dimension, namely encounter between foreign culture (European) and indigenous (Arab culture). The impact of this encounter was epitomised in 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel.

The marginalisation and further exclusion of Palestinian women refugees from the productive and public spheres, was further enhanced after 1948. As camp dwellers, whether in Palestine or in the host countries, Palestinian refugees lost access to land as their major means of survival. They, instead, became dependent on UNRWA for their basic needs. While life experiences of camp refugees varied according to the political and economic conditions under which they found themselves, there were some common experiences which most camp women shared. These experiences concerned their very life conditions, rights, roles and access to the public sphere, particularly with regards to labour, education and health.

Palestinian refugees camp women, whether in Palestine or in host countries, often found themselves without the male breadwinner or 'head of the family'. The economic reasons that forced many men to leave the camp to seek the employment as migrants labourers- whether in Israel, in the Gulf or elsewhere, in addition to the political circumstances that resulted in men leaving the camp to join the struggle for the

nationhood or be taken prisoners by Israel, constructed special social reality for women. Women were often left alone to attend to the family, assuming the roles of providers for children, the sick and the elderly. These roles were further complicated by the high fertility rates among Palestinians as well as the culturally constructed norms that privileged men's education over that of women.

Early marriage, whether for economic, political, social or cultural reasons also influenced women's lack of educational, labour and other opportunities. Palestinian refugees, while influenced by this culture also had to face additional political constraints such as restricted movements from the camps.

Palestinian women, who remained in Israel after the creation of the state of Israel, were affected by every aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and actively involved in both protests and peace building since the clashes that preceded Arab-Israeli war of 1947-48. Millions of Palestinian women and their families were dispossessed and displaced in the world that followed the creation of the state of Israel. Punamaki's work with Palestinian women experiencing military occupation has demonstrated the clear linkages between the experience of political oppression and well-being. Sexual violation is an endemic yet poorly visible facet of violent conflict. In Arab culture, the honour of a family is located in the house and women dwellers of the house and thus the rape of a woman by soldiers or others, is a way of penetrating to the inner sanctum of her entire family's honour. Under reporting of rape by victims is probably unusual because of the associated stigma. Sexual violence within the camp must also be understood in relation to the sexual and political structures within the societies of origin and countries of asylum.

The act of torture is not, as is so commonly misunderstood, an isolated attack on a person. Torture is a highly sophisticated social construction used by many governments to control a section of population of the country so as to maintain the status quo. At the time of war women generally become the easy targets of warring factions. In many cases soldiers target women and children so to break the enemy's morale as it happened in the village of Deir Yasin on 9 April 1948 where 250 Arab women, children and men were massacred. After few days of above incidence, similar kind of act was repeated at Haifa where panic-stricken women and children were blown up. These kinds of acts have immense psychological impact on the people witnessing or hearing the incidence as it happened during the period under consideration. Out of fear the flight of the Palestinian Arabs got hastened which created the Arab refugees problem. Infact, a systematic policy of deportation and forced migration continued for several years after the war. Thus, the repeated resurgence of unrest and armed conflict increased the burden on women in refugee camps by reducing their access to food, clean water and medical care and by subjecting them and their families to physical danger and psychological stress. From 1953 onwards, women and girls have made up 48.6 to 49.5 percent of the refugee registered with the United Nations Relief Work Agency (UNRWA).

3. Political Status

Those living in the Gaza Strip became acquainted with Egyptian military rule, which was indifferent to their problems. Those in the West Bank were still in their homes had to face the changed political situation. Thus Palestine was divided into three entities. The West Bank was under Jordan and Gaza Strip under Egyptian rule and its inhabitants were

prevented from entering Egypt proper. The third entity was Israel that is, the Jewish community of Israel and those Palestinians who remained in Israel (those who lost their means of livelihood in many cases but not the residence). While political space was very limited, basic education was accessible whether in Jordan, Gaza Strip or Israel but social and cultural factors favoured men's education over women's. Education was essential for Palestinians who were anxious to escape from economic and social hardship but opportunities were not always available. In the Gaza Strip there were no real opportunities for work. In Israel and Jordan the problem was different. In both countries due to discriminatory laws Palestinians could never hope to work in jobs that matched their qualifications. Even though the Palestinians had been given greater freedom under Jordan, they felt that they were discriminated and that their competence within a number of different areas was not recognised.

From the beginning Palestinians in Jordan were allowed greater occupational freedom. While Jordan welcomed the Palestinians within the state, it still regarded all the Palestinians, whether refugees or residents of the West Bank, as a potential threat to Jordan and thus the community had to be supervised. At the same time, Jordan was much more welcoming host country than Lebanon, Egypt or Syria. The Jordan Government pursued a two-sided policy with regard to the refugees' political status. It wanted to affect the political integration of the refugees, doing away with any notions of Palestinians separatism. The main instrument was granting of citizenship and its rights, which gave refugees the right to be employed and to acquire land until the final settlement in Palestine. On the other hand, in order to ensure the permanent economic and general responsibility of the international community for the refugees, it had to preserve the

refugees' status in the eyes of the International community. This suited the Jordanian government, with little to offer economically, since it was an indirect way of providing employment. For their part, the refugees faced a serious dilemma and thus their reactions were various. Most of them were uneasy that Jordanian citizenship would contradict their right to return.

4. Status of Refugee

In order to understand the life experiences of Palestinian women refugees and appreciate the specific conditions, needs and aspirations, a brief history of women's life experiences prior to the creation of their status as refugees, is in order. Before 1948, Palestine was an overwhelmingly agrarian society. Social and gender relations were organised around a system of production and reproduction known as the village or Hamula system. Around this system, cultivation, land redistribution and inheritance were organised and internal village conflicts were resolved. The important role played by the village in organising Palestinian social relations is evident in the literature on Palestine, where the village was considered as basic unit of the society and the system was hierarchical based on gender, age and class differentiation. During the latter part of the 19th century and the early 20th century, the village began to acquire different characteristics as the Palestinian economy was being transformed from a relatively self-sufficient economy into a market economy involving the production of commodities for sale. The introduction of private properties laws began with the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 and later, the Land Reforms of 1872 aimed at curtailing the role of head of the village through individual land registration and by increasing direct Ottoman supervision over the extraction of surplus production.

The laws relating to private property placed tremendous pressure on the peasants. While only minority of the peasants responded to these changes by registering their lands and acquiring the registration papers, the majority adopted more stringent means to maintain control over the land they traditionally inherited and tilled. The most important aspect of such measures came in the responses of the peasants and was expressed in prohibiting land parcelisation and in the retaining of tract of land as one piece.

The marginalisation and further exclusion of Palestinian women refugees from the productive and public spheres, was further enhanced after 1948. As camp dwellers in the host countries, Palestinian refugees lost access to land as their major means of survival.

They, instead, became dependent on United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for their basic needs. While life experiences of Camp refugees varied according to the political and economic conditions under which they found themselves, there were some common experiences which most camp women shared. These experiences concerned their very life conditions, rights, roles and access to the public sphere, particularly with regards to labour, education and health.

Dependent
of UNRWA

The conflict and displacement of 1948 caused the break down of the extended family as well as frequent separations which had its wearing on women. Palestinian women, who remained in Israel after the creation of the state of Israel, were affected by every aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and were actively involved in both protests and peace building since the clashes that preceded Arab-Israeli war of 1947-48. Millions of Palestinian women and their families were dispossessed and displaced in the world that followed the creation of the state of Israel. Sexual violation is an endemic yet poorly visible facet of violent conflict. In Arab culture, the honour of a family is located in the

house and women dwellers of the house and thus the rape of a woman by groups involved in the conflict or others, is a way of penetrating to the inner sanctum of her entire family's honour. Two cases of massacres and rapes occurred in Safsad and in al-Dawayima. Both massacres were carried on 29 October 1948 during army operations. The act of torture is not, as is so commonly misunderstood, an isolated attack on a person. Torture is a highly sophisticated social construction used by many governments to control a section of population of the country so as to maintain the status quo. At the time of war women generally become the easy targets of warring factions. These kinds of acts have immense psychological impact on the people witnessing or hearing the incidence as it happened during the period under consideration. Out of fear the flight of the Palestinian Arabs got hastened which created the Arab refugee problem.

5. Resistance Movement

During the period of the British Mandate, Palestinian movement organised petitions to the British Parliament and held a mass demonstration against British and Zionist policy in 1920. In 1929 the first Palestine Arab Women's Congress was held in Jerusalem and decided to support their men in the resistance movement against Jewish immigration and acquisition of land. They also participated in general strike in 1936 and the 1936-39 revolts. They continued to resist in various forms. ✓

Anti-Jewish Arab riots in the streets of Palestine in 1920-21 and the events of 1929 aptly demonstrated the growing hatred of the Palestinian masses against Jews.³

³ Major riots and disturbances occurred in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933 and almost continuously from 1936 until 1939 when they took the form of rebellion. ✓

Arab fears of displacement, intensified by the mass Jewish immigration from Europe of the mid 1930s (flared by the rise of Nazism) and the Jewish land purchases for new settlement led to the 1936 general strike and the 1936-39 Arab revolt. The strike and revolt was directed, in the first instance, against the British and then against the Zionists. It spread from the towns to the countryside and gave the platform for the Hussains and their allies the undisputed leadership of the national movement. In the course of the revolt which was eventually firmly suppressed by the British military, the opposition which in 1930s had collaborated with the British in crushing the revolt ceased to be a major political force.⁴ At this time Zionist policy was confined to strengthening and supporting the Zionist presence in Palestine, in particular by creating *fait accompli* at every opportunity. Infact the Zionist leadership does not seem to have had any clear perception of the nature of relations between Zionists and Palestinians until after the creation of the Zionist state.

The event of 1948 gave an ambivalent result changing the status quo of the Arabs, now becoming a minority in their own soil and to the Zionist giving an opportunity to establish a predominantly Jewish state on that part of the land where the Arabs had stayed. But the very presence of that minority and the fact that the government had to deal with it eventually forced a definition of the Israeli position.

Conclusion

The Palestinians on whose land another national state was to be superimposed, whose destiny was consequently to undergo an overwhelmingly change, were not consulted. In

⁴ For detail on this issue see Y. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929-1939: From Riots to Rebellion*, (London: Frank Cass, 1977).

Palestine the initial response to Jews immigration, particularly prior to the Balfour Declaration, was one of indifference, the Arab world had in the ~~oast~~ accepted settlement on its land by foreign people who wished to preserve their language, culture and traditions. However, when it became clear that the newly arrived Europeans were the vanguard of people that harbour intentions of being not just foreign settlers but occupiers, the Zionists came face to face with hostility from both the local population and the Arab world in general. Jewish immigrants nevertheless continued to arrive in Palestine in large numbers, although they formed a small percentage of the population.

Further the Palestinians were condemned to be crushed beneath the collective pressure of the pragmatic interests of particular Arab rulers, British interests,⁵ their own disunity and weakness and the outcome of the war. But what hampered the Arabs in Palestine from developing a united front on the future of Palestine? Why and how were they denied a say as to their political future? Although the 1936-39 Arab rebellion contributed immensely to raising the spirit of local Arab patriotism, it failed to outweigh the individualistic bias of the Palestinians. The antagonism between different factors inevitably resulted in strong suspicion, fluctuating loyalties and continued competition and considerably weakened the cohesive forces within the Palestinian community. The Palestinians were tired by their political feuds, fragmented internally and lacked a recognised leadership since many of their leaders were either deported or jailed. The renewal of the struggle in Palestine following the Second World War was marked by the shifting of the political initiative from the Palestinian Arabs to the Arab states.

⁵ Sami Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest: Palestine Between 1914-79* (New York: The Caravan Books, 1979), pp. 30, 40, 46, 48.

ref to p. 7

Palestinian women were affected by every aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and therefore got actively involved in both protest and peace-building since the clashes that preceded Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49. Millions of Palestinian women and their families were dispossessed and displaced in the war that followed the creation of the state of Israel.

CHAPTER II

Chapter II

Historical Background

1. Introduction

The situation of the Palestinians is unique in the annals of the modern history, since the majority of the population of a country has been deliberately and forcibly uprooted by a minority of foreign origin with the object of taking over its lands, homes for the purpose of living there. It is not the first time in history that partition has been resorted to as a solution to a problem. During the same period India was partitioned (1947) to solve the communal violence however, partition of countries against the will of the people is not only wrong in principle but it has been proved to be inhuman too. Wherever applied, partition has brought tragedy, destruction and suffering to millions of human beings.

The standard Zionist position is that Jews came to Palestine in the late 19th century to reclaim their ancestral homeland. They bought land and started building up the Jewish community there. They were met with violent opposition from the Palestinian Arabs, presumably stemming from the Arab inherent anti-Semitism thereby forcing the Zionist to defend them. However, the available sources illustrate that this explanation is questionable and therefore open to deliberation. What happened was that the Zionist movement, from the beginning, looked forward to a practically more or less complete dispossession of the indigenous Arab population so that Israel could be a wholly Jewish state or as much as was possible. Land bought by the Jewish people, could never be sold

or even leased back to Arabs¹.

The Arab community, as it became aware of the Zionist intentions, opposed further Jewish immigration and land buying because it posed a real and imminent danger to the very existence of Arab society in Palestine². Because of this opposition, the entire Zionist prospect never could have been realized without the military backing of the British and later support from the USA.³ “The unstated assumption of Herzl and his successors was that the Zionist movement would achieve its goal not through an understanding with the local Palestinian but through an alliance with the dominant great power of the day. The dominant great power in West Asia changed several times in the course of the 20th century; first it was the Ottoman Empire, after World War I it was Great Britain, and after World War II it was the United States. But the Zionist fixation on enlisting the support of the great powers in the struggle for statehood and in the consolidation of statehood remained constant”.⁴

1.1. Early History of the Region

The origin of Palestine is derived from the Philistines who lived in the southern coastal part of the country in the 12th B.C. The Israelites were not the earliest inhabitants of Palestine. They came and settled after their exodus from Egypt. When the Israeli tribal

¹ Sami Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest: Palestine Between 1914-79*, (New York: The Caravan Books, 1979), p.45.

² For wider view on Zionism how it developed from spiritual philosophy to a political movement and the extent of Arab opposition to increasing Jews immigration, see W.A., Kayyali, *Palestine: A Modern History* (London: Croom Helm, 1980).

³ For methods and extent of Zionist pressure groups on the US Government to support the Zionist objective, see Isaac Zaar, *Rescue and Liberation: America's part in the Birth of Israel*. (New York: Bloch Publishing Co.,1954), pp.112-116 and Alfred Lilienthal, *What Price Israel?* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), pp.206-209.

⁴ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, (London: Penguin, 2000), p.5.

people invaded the land of Canaan in the 12th century B.C., they found a settled population. The population in the country then included the settled Canaanites, the Gibeonites and the Philistines. Gradually the Israeli tribes became influential in some of the areas and thus established a kingdom, which lasted for two centuries. Between 733 B.C. and 721 B.C. the Assyrians overran the territories of the kingdom. After the Assyrians and Babylonians, the country was occupied in turn by the Persians and they allowed the return of Jews and Greeks and the Romans. Subsequently in the 4th century A.D. Palestine came under the Christian influence and remained so until the 7th century A.D. The Muslim Arabs conquered Palestine in 637 A.D and thus the changed political situation favoured the Arab Muslims, though the Christians continued to live in the area.⁵

Later there was Christian resurgence during the Crusades but Saladin's victory over the Crusaders in 1187 A.D. once again tilted the power balance in favour of the Arab Muslims. In 1518 A.D. the Turks conquered Palestine and remained in occupation till 1917. But Turkish conquest did not alter or affect the basic Arab character of the country. Its inhabitants, language, customs and culture remained Arab in character.

2. Was Palestine the only or Preferred Destination?

In the 19th century, following a trend that began earlier in Europe, people around the world began to identify themselves as nations and to demand national rights, foremost the right to self-rule in a state of their own (self-determination and sovereignty). Jews and Palestinians both began to develop a national consciousness and mobilised to achieve

⁵ For more on this, see Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and Arabs*, (London: Penguin Books, 1968), pp.215-17.

national goals. Because Jews were spread across the world, their national movement, Zionism, entailed the identification of a place where Jews could come together through the process of immigration and settlement. Palestine seemed to be the logical place as Jewish claims to this land are based on the biblical promise to Abraham and his descendants, on the notion that this was the historical site of the Jewish kingdom of Israel (which was destroyed by the Roman Empire), and on Jews need for a safer place from European anti-Semitism. The Zionist movement began in 1882 with the first wave of European Jewish immigration to Palestine. At that time, the land of Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. Palestinian Arab claims on the land are based on continuous residence in the country for hundreds of years and the fact that they represented the demographic majority. They rejected the notion that a biblical-era kingdom constitutes the basis for a valid modern claim. On the other hand, Arabs maintained that since Abraham's son Ismail is the forefather of the Arabs, then God's promise of the land to the children of the Abraham includes Arabs as well. They do not believe that they should forfeit their land to compensate Jews for Europe's crimes against them.

3. World War I and the British Promises of Independence to Arabs

By the early years of the 20th century, Palestine was becoming a trouble spot of competing territorial claims and political interests. The Ottoman Empire was weakening and European powers were entrenching their grip on areas in the eastern Mediterranean, including Palestine. During 1915-16, as World War I was underway, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Henry MacMahon corresponded with Sharif Hussain of Mecca (king Hussain of Hedjaz). Mac Mohan convinced Sharif Hussain to lead an Arab revolt

against the Ottoman Empire, which was aligned with Germany against Britain and France in the war.

MacMohan promised that if the Arabs supported Britain in the war, the British government would support the establishment of an independent Arab state under Hashmite rule in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine. Thus the Arab saw their chance to rid themselves of Turkish domination and regain their political independence. The Arab revolt, led by T.E. Lawrence and Hussain's son Faisal, was successful in defeating the Ottomans, and Britain took control over much of this area during the World War I. But Britain made other promises during the war that conflicted with the Hussain-MacMohan understandings. Thus the Arabs were betrayed not only because these promises were not kept but also because Britain, after its promises to the Arabs, made an incompatible promise to the Zionist Jews concerning the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.⁶ Jewish Zionism was championing the desire of the Jews of Eastern Europe to escape the discrimination, and at times the persecution, from which they suffered in Eastern European countries. Theodor Herzl became the strongest exponent of Zionism. In 1896 he wrote a pamphlet, *The Jewish State*, in which he advocated the establishment of British sponsored Jewish Nation in Palestine with a view to the eventual creation of a Jewish State.⁷ Herzl arrived at the conclusion that assimilation and emancipation could not work, because the Jews were a nation. Their problem was not economic or social or religious but national. It followed from these

⁶ Anthony Nutting, *The Arabs*, (New York: New American Library, 1965), p.289.

⁷ A.R.Taylor, *Prelude to Israel*, (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1959), p.3.

premises that the only solution was for the Jews to leave the Diaspora and acquired a territory over which they would exercise sovereignty and establish a state of their own.⁸

In 1897, he convened the first Zionist Congress in Basle where he proclaimed that the aim of Zionism was to create a home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This objective of Zionism (creating of Jewish state in Palestine) was the root of the trouble and the source of the Palestine tragedy, as it was in obvious conflict with the rights of the people of Palestine who has inhabited the country since time immemorial.

3.1. *The Balfour Declaration and British Mandate*

On November 2, 1917 the British Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour wrote a letter to Edmond de Rothschild in which he declared that the British government viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and stated that it is being understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of 'existing non-Jewish communities' in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. This letter was, in terms, no more than a unilateral statement of British foreign policy, in the form of a declaration of sympathy with the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people. Palestine was not at that time under British control. The limitation upon that policy, as expressed was that the rights, civil and religious, of existing non-Jewish communities already in Palestine, were not to be prejudiced.

⁸ for details on this see, T. Herzl, *The Jewish State*, translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Herzl Press, 1970).



TH-12341

Diss
305.489605694
K9607 Cr

TH12341

By the Treaty of Sevres of August 1920, Turkey declared, in Article 16, to renounce its sovereignty over the whole of Palestine but the treaty was never ratified by Turkey and never came into force. The Palestine Mandate, as confirmed by the council of the League of Nations, came into force in September 1922. This event occurred at a time when Palestine was subject to the British military administration and before Turkey had concluded an effective peace treaty with the Allied Powers. By the Treaty of Lausanne the terms of the earlier Treaty of Sevres were repeated, including Article 16, renouncing Turkish sovereignty over its former provinces, including what became Palestine. The Treaty of Lausanne was concluded in 1923 and came into force in 1924, after the British Mandate over Palestine had become effective.

When one reads the text of the Balfour Declaration, one finds three important elements, which are as follows:

- The first element is applicable to the Jews, which provides the British Governments' commitment which favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.
 - The second is regarding the rights and position of the Muslims and Christians inhabitants, which declares that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.
 - The third refers to the position of Jews outside Palestine. The rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country shall not be prejudiced by the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.
- The protective clause, in a way gave the Jews the homeland of another people

while safeguarding their own rights in their countries of origin. Although Muslims and Christians constituted, in 1917, almost 90% of the population, they were referred to as the existing non-Jewish communities of Palestine. This tended to give the impression that they were an insignificant minority occupying a position subordinate to the Jews. Infact, this clause, instead of protecting the rights of the Arabs as the 'existing non-Jews communities', it aimed at taking away their right to the country as owners and inhabitants. The British Government should have known that what the Zionist wanted would have constituted an encroachment on Arab rights in Palestine.

The Arabs were unaware that the British Government, after promising to support Arab independence, had concluded two secret agreements which conflicted with Arab aspirations. The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), dividing Arab territories between Britain and France and the Balfour Declaration (1917), signing away to the Jews Arab rights in Palestine. When the Arabs learnt of it, they were caught by surprise and shock and protested to the British Government. The British government immediately gave assurances to the Arabs that the Balfour Declaration would not affect their civil and religious rights or their political freedom but the assurances were not kept.

Throughout the region, Arabs were angry by Britain's failure to fulfill its promise to create an independent Arab state, and many opposed British and French control as a violation of their right to self-determination. In Palestine, the situation was more complicated because of the British promise to support the creation of a Jewish national home. The rising tide of European Jewish immigration, land purchases and settlement in

Palestine generated increasing resistance by Palestinian Arabs. They feared that this would lead eventually to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Palestinian Arabs opposed the British Mandate because it thwarted their aspirations for self-rule and opposed massive Jewish immigration because it threatened their position in the country. Through its Foundation Fund the Zionist organisation raised large sums from Jews in the USA and other parts of the world for the purchase and development of agricultural land and industry in Palestine.

There was serious outbreak of violence arising from Jewish religious practices at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem and at Hebron in 1929. Communal violence was more persistently caused by the rising rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine and corresponding Arab frustration*. The policy of the British administration fluctuated during the years preceding the World War II from promoting to restricting Jewish immigration.⁹ The number of Jews entering Palestine increased considerably after Hitler's advent to power in Germany in 1933.

The implementation of the policies of the Balfour Declaration as part of the Mandatory's obligations under the Mandate, presented the British administration with formidable difficulties. The demographic and economic changes brought by the increased Jewish immigration led to further Jewish Arab disturbances (1936). These disturbances led to the establishment of the Peel Commission (1937) by the British Government. It recommended a partition of Palestine between a Jewish and Arab state with Jerusalem

* Major riots and disturbances occurred in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933 and almost continuously from 1936 until 1939 when they took the form of rebellion.

⁹ Hadawi, no.1, pp.30,40,46,48.

and Haifa remaining under the control of the Mandatory. Both the Jewish and Arab communities rejected the partition proposed by the Peel Commission.¹⁰

Palestinian resistance to British control and Zionist settlement climaxed with the Arab revolts 1936-39 was suppressed by Britain with the help of Zionist militia. After crushing the Arab revolt, the British reconsidered their governing policies in an effort to maintain order in an increasingly tense environment. They issued a White Paper (1939) limiting future Jewish immigration and land purchases. The Zionists regarded this as a betrayal of the Balfour Declaration and a particularly egregious act in light of the desperate situation of the Jews in Europe, who were facing extermination. The 1939 White Paper marked the end of the British-Zionist alliance. Arab reaction to the new policy of the 1939 White Paper was mixed. A certain section of the population was willing to accept it but doubted the sincerity of the British Government; the rest decided to reject it as not meeting fully the aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs- the end of the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate and the granting of independence to the Arabs. But on the outbreak of World War II both Arabs and Jews decided to side with Britain as they wanted to support the democracy which was being propounded by the British. While acts of violence against the British administration did cease, Jewish Agency operations in the field of illegal immigration continued and intensified. More and more illegal immigrants began to arrive. At first, the Palestine Government turned these back, later; they were

¹⁰ In 1938 King Abdullah proposed a United Arab Kingdom constituted from Palestine and TransJordan. This Kingdom was to have an elected administration for the Jews in the Jewish districts and in Parliament. The Jews were to be represented in proportion to their numbers and might serve as ministers. The King further proposed that these arrangements last for ten years and continuing Jewish immigration was to depend upon whether the intention of the Jews would prove to be good in that they intended to live together with Arabs. But the Jews rejected this proposal of King Abdullah.

directed by the British Navy to Cyprus where the inmates were interned. This infuriated the Jewish community in Palestine and violence against the British once again broke out.

The Nazi persecution of the Jews during the World War II evoked deep sympathy for the displaced Jews of Europe and gave rise to 'guilt feeling', particularly among Americans. This 'guilt feeling' was prompted by the feeling that the American refusal to open the gates of the USA to Jewish immigration before 1939 had contributed to the Jewish tragedy and the American now felt an obligation to recompense for the horrors which the Jews of Europe suffered at the hands of the Nazis. But this recompense was to be offered at the expense of the people of Palestine, who were not responsible for the crimes committed against the Jews in Europe. In addition to the Bible and Nazi persecution, the Zionists also took advantage of the 'Jewish vote' in the American elections. Thus, there developed a strong American pressure upon the British Government to secure a large Jewish immigration to Palestine.¹¹

This matter became a bone of contention between the American and British Governments. A joint Anglo-American Committee was established in 1946 which recommended a substantial increase in Jewish immigration. It further recommended that 'Palestine should ultimately become a state which creates the rights and interests of Muslims, Christians and Jews alike'. It continued by asserting that attempts to establish an independent Palestinian State or States would result in civilian strife which might threaten the peace of the World. The committee therefore, concluded that the British Mandate should continue. Unable to permit any further Jewish immigration into Palestine against the wishes of the majority population, plagued by Zionist demands for more and

¹¹ John H. Davis, *The Evasive Peace*, (London: John Murray, 1968), pp.35-38.

more immigrants, subjected to considerable pressure by the United States and faced by the Zionist campaign of violence, the Mandatory Government in 1947 referred the question of the future government of Palestine to the United Nations. The Mandate was thus coming towards an inglorious end.

3.2. The British Administration and Civil War in Palestine

On 14 May 1948, the Mandate which had been awarded to Britain by the League of Nations to govern Palestine expired. The aftermath of the end of British rule was marked by months of a Palestine civil war between Jews and Arabs, which significantly affected the manner in which Britain concluded its mission in Palestine. The war which lasted from December 1947 until May 1948 was inevitably influenced by the fact that British rule continued to exist formally until the middle of May. Some scholars have argued that the British supported the Arabs though others believed that they backed the Jews. Whatever the case may be, all agree that Britain exercised a significant impact on the events.¹² The agreement put forward by Avi Shlaim seems to be plausible. He says that during the war the British pursued a policy in Palestine that was neither anti-Zionist nor anti-Arab but pro-British. Further, Avi Shlaim explains that it was an attempt to conduct a policy that assumed, in view of the unique circumstances, the possibility of pursuing an exercise in damage control.¹³

¹² For details on this see, R. Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951*, (London: Croom Helm, 1984). I. Pappé, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1951*, (New York, 1980). M.J. Cohen, *Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-1948* (Princeton, 1982) and Avi Shlaim, "Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (Berkeley) Vol.16, no.4 (Summer 1987), pp.50-76.

¹³ Shlaim, *Ibid*, p.52

Once the war broke out and concurrently, the evacuation plan was signed, Britain lost its ability to act independently in Palestine. Britain's problematic international standing in the aftermath of World War II, particularly in West Asia, naturally affected its Palestine Policy. "Britain had more soldiers in Palestine than on the Indian subcontinent and had been constantly involved in direct clashes with both political leaderships and civilians. The number of British casualties had also risen, mainly due to a terror campaign waged by a Zionist extremists, the most notorious being the Stern Gang. This terror campaign accelerated with the blowing up of British headquarters in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946. But it was not terror that forced the British out. A particularly bad winter in 1946-47 and a harsh American attitude towards Britain's debt to the United States created an economic crisis in Britain that served as an incentive for a limited process of the decolonisation mainly in India and in Palestine."¹⁴

Few questions need to be asked while dealing with the British policies during Mandate period. What generated the feeling of chaos in those final months of the Mandate? Why were the British accused by each side of backing the other? Considering that the overall policy was determined in London, it is legitimate to question the independence of the British to make policies in Palestine at that time.

It can be said that whatever policies the British had formulated the Mandatory Administration was not in a position to implement owing to the surging war. Hence, the British reaction to events in Palestine has to be understood not in terms of how the Administration carried out the policy of the government in London but precisely in terms

¹⁴ I. Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples*, (Cambridge, 2004), pp.121-122.

of its inability to implement that policy or any other policy. The determining factor for the outcome of the civil war in Palestine was the practical collapse of the British government in the country rather than the collapse of the Palestinians who were in an inferior military position throughout the fighting. The separate statement issued by London and by the Palestine Administration to the effect that Britain would not be able to assist in implementing the position, solution, and the readiness of the Great Powers to delay the end of the evacuation from the beginning of May 1948 until the beginning of August were poor compensation for the empirical power.¹⁵

The vacuum that Britain was creating was filled by the United States. This basic fact was recognised even at the time by both Jews and Arabs. Indeed, it was also the working assumptions of Britain. In fact, Britain's helplessness in Palestine in the face of American intervention was evidenced even since 1945.¹⁶ The low, to which Britain's status in West Asia had fallen since the end of the war and more since the outbreak of the Civil War in Palestine in December 1947, was reflected in London's inability to arrive at an agreed approach with the United States over the defense of the region and in its dependence on its own creation, Transjordan, with respect to events in Palestine.

Following the adoption of the partition resolution by the UN and even before London approved its evacuation plan, violence erupted in Palestine. Within days the Administration was surprised to see the order collapse in Jerusalem and to be aware that it could do nothing. In the first months of the war not only did attacks by the two sides on

¹⁵ On the pressure exerted by the Great Powers on Britain during the UN deliberations in the fall of 1947 and Britain's reactions, see G. Cohen, *British Policy on the Eve of the War of Independence*, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp.140-145.

¹⁶ Britain's dependence on the United States over the Palestine question during the civil war is strongly emphasised in Louis, no.11.

each other increase to the point where life in the city was paralyzed, they also deliberately targeted each other's holy places. The violence also spread quickly to the roads leading to Jerusalem as transportation came under attack of both Jews and Arabs. Nor did the violence stop there.

Because British policy held that the Administration must not be a party to the conflict, not even as a mediator, the British endeavored in the beginning of the war, to divide Jerusalem between Jews and Arabs. However, the effort proved unsuccessful, as neither the Jews nor the Arabs heeded the British. The complete disregard of British order was not confined to Jerusalem alone. Further the British civil and military authorities in Palestine were apprehensive of growing Jewish strength. Gearing Jewish military proves that they feared that it would endanger the evacuation plan and put at risk the safety of British soldiers and civilians in Palestine. The initiative, mobility and organisational capability demonstrated by the Jews as hostilities intensified often and placed the British security forces in a serious situation both politically and physically.

The most crucial event of the civil war took place not in Jerusalem or on the road to the city, or in the Galilee but on its fringes, Haifa. The special place occupied by Haifa in the British deployment in particular and in Palestine overall, the unprecedented Arab flight from the city after its capture by the Haganah transformed the events of 21-22 April in Haifa into a clear turning point of the war. Finally after the Haifa events, without an orderly decision making process but in view of the severe constraints it faced, the British Administration in Palestine decided to terminate its rule and demanded immediate reinforcement from London to secure the evacuation.

4. The United Nations Resolution of November 1947 and the Partition of Palestine

In May 1947, the UN General Assembly in a Special Session established a special committee on Palestine, United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) to investigate the situation in Palestine and to recommend solution. In November 1947, by which time the situation had further deteriorated, the majority recommendation of UNSCOP was embodied in a Resolution of the General Assembly 181(11), concerning the future government of Palestine. This Resolution recommended a partition plan and that the proposals be implemented by a Commission, thereby established. The Commission was to take over on the withdrawal of the Mandatory power, and to initiate implementation of the partition plan. The UN Partition Plan divided the country in such a way that each state would have a majority of its own population. The territory designated to the Jewish state would be slightly larger than the Palestinian state, 57 percent and 43 percent of Palestine respectively on the assumption that increasing number of Jews would immigrate there. According to the UN Partition Plan, the area of Jerusalem and Bethlehem was to become an international zone.

Though the Zionist leadership accepted the UN Partition Plan, they hoped somehow to expand the borders allotted to the Jewish state. The Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding Arab States rejected the UN Plan and regarded the General Assembly vote as an international betrayal. The Arabs also rejected the partition on the grounds that it violated the provisions of the UN charter, the principles on which the Universal Declaration of Human Right were, later based, international law and practice and the right of a people to decide its own destiny. The UN resolution to partition Palestine was

an injustice to the original inhabitants of the country both in respect of the principle of partition and the way the country was divided. As regards the principle of partition, there can be no doubt that the very concept of the partition of the country between its original inhabitants and the people who had been since the late 19th century to settle therein against the wishes of the people of Palestine was fundamentally wrong and unjust. The manner of the partition of the territory between the two communities was unfair to the Palestinians.

With disregard of the fact that the Palestinians constituted the majority of the population and despite the predominance of Arab land ownership, the partition resolution recommended that an area equivalent to 57 percent of the territory of Palestine, be given to the proposed Jewish State as against 43 percent to the proposed Arab State.¹⁷

5. Statehood and Expulsion 1948

The Mandatory administration and British armed forces withdrew from Palestine on 14 May 1948. The National council for the Jewish State, on the same day, made a declaration of statehood at Tel Aviv. After the Israeli Declaration of statehood on 14 May 1948, the armed forces of neighbouring Arab States except Lebanon entered the West Bank and Gaza Strip. After the adoption of Security Council Resolution of 15 July 1948, a ceasefire between the contestants was concluded. Negotiations at Rhodes under UN auspices led to a number of armistices between Israel and Jordan. Jordan had played a

¹⁷ UNSCOP had originally proposed that 3,600 square miles be assigned to the Arab State as compared with 6,400 square miles to Jewish State, that would have been more than 60% of the total Palestinian territory to the Jewish State

prominent part in the fighting. At its conclusion the armed forces of the Arab States excluding Egypt and Jordan, withdrew from the Palestine. Egypt remained in effective control of Gaza Strip. Jordan was in effective control of West Bank (of the Jordan River) and of the Eastern (old) city of Jerusalem. None of the Arab States recognised the State of Israel. The USA recognised the new state of Israel within a matter of hours of the declaration at Tel Aviv on 14 May 1948 and a number of States accepted the State of Israel in due course. The Armistice between Israel and Jordan also provided the 'demarcation lines' for the divided city of Jerusalem. These Armistice lines, sometimes wrongly referred to as 'borders', were temporary and military in nature and did not establish permanent borders. Thus the Mandate ended with a tragedy of major proportions. The major outcome of the fighting that accompanied the ending was a massive displacement of Palestinian Arabs from their homes. They became refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and other Arab states. The exact figures are not known but they are thought to be around 750,000.¹⁸ The majority of these refugees have never returned to Palestine.

6. Why were the Arab Armies Defeated?

The military defeats proved that the Palestinian Arab armies were no match for the Haganah. Ill-equipped and numbering not more than 5,000 – 7,000 men in a region, without defined or coordinated command, the Arab armies could not fight the organised, well-equipped the Jewish army. Politically, the Jews were more cohesive than the Arabs.

¹⁸ Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugees Problem, 1947-1949*, (Cambridge, 1988) pp.4-28. and Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel*, (London: Croom Helm, 1987) pp. 75-76.

Militarily, they were better equipped and trained for an armed conflict as they had enforced a compulsory military training for all Jews able to carry arms, for several years. Financially, the Jews had more resources than the Arabs. Unlike the Jews, the Palestinian population was not mobilised nor did the Arabs possess military training.¹⁹

7. US Policy towards solving Palestinian Refugee problem

During the initial years following the 1948 Palestine war, the United States endeavoured to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict by settling Palestinian Refugees in Syria. At the height of US-Syrian negotiations in 1952, the US contemplated giving the Syrian government aid in exchange for settling upto 500,000 Palestinians in the fertile Plains of the Jazira that lie between the Tigris and Euphrates rives.²⁰

Despite the failure of US attempts to settle the majority of Palestinian refugees in Syria, it is an important chapter in US foreign policy. It was the first joint effort by the West to settle the Palestine issue after the 1948 war. It helped defined US attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the Truman administration dropped the idea of inducing Israel to compromise with the Arabs, either by returning land to the Palestinians or by allowing for the return of refugees, the state Department asked the Arab countries to resettle the refugees. In doing so, the US accepted the idea that the solution to the Palestinian problem was to assimilate the refugees into the neighbouring Arab countries.

¹⁹ For details on the Arab and Jewish armies, see Larry Collins and D. Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* (Simon and Schuster, 1973), pp-288-95 and S.N.Fisher, *The Middle East*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 579 and G.Kirk, *The Middle East 1945-1950*, (London: Oxford University Press, , 1954), pp.194-195

²⁰ For detail on this see Moshe Ma'oz, *Syria and Israel: From War to Peace Making*, (Oxford, 1995).

This meant denying the force of Palestinian nationalism and embracing the notion that economic assistance and development could solve the political problems of the region.

US Policy toward the Palestine question following the 1948 war was directed by two main concerns: domestic concerns, in particular, President Truman's inability or unwillingness to push the Israelis to allow the return of Palestinian refugees; and foreign concerns, in particular, the emerging cold war and the policy of containment. The United States might have ignored the refugee issue altogether had it not been committed to helping Britain organise some framework for defending West Asia against the influence of communism and possible attack by the Soviet Union. The successful organisation of such a defense build-up required a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that was souring relations between the Western powers and the Arab States.

At the Lausanne conference, which ran from April to September of 1949, the UK and U.S. attempted to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is there that President Truman made his last attempt to pressurise Israel to accept the return of Palestinian refugees.

In 1951, however, UK and particularly US officials' belief in the likelihood of settling refugees in Syria was positive.²¹ President Truman recommended increased aid of various types to West Asia. Point Four money which was earmarked for technical assistance was continued. The Foreign Aid Bill of 1951 authorized \$160,000,000 for economic assistance to West Asia with increased levels for Syria.²²

Though the government of Jordan was the most moderate country in relation to Israel; the Syrians were Israeli's most uncompromising and implacable enemies. At least

²¹ Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israel Conflict, 1947-1951*, (London: IB Tauris, 1992), pp. 216-218.

²² *Ibid*, pp. 226-235.

that was the popular perception in Israel. It is often forgotten that Israel enjoyed a year and a half of peaceful relations with Syria after the conclusion of the armistice agreement in July 1949 and that the first military clash, in 1951, was a Syrian response to an Israeli attempt to change the status quo in the border area.

The Israeli-Syrian armistice line was conducive to conflict because it crossed the sources of the Jordan River that were vital to Israel, because of the geographical location of the area and it also contained three demilitarised zones (DMZs), whose status had not been clearly defined in the armistice agreement. The crux of the dispute between Israel and Syria and of their armed clashes was the question of sovereignty in the DMZs. Syria maintained that these zones must remain under UN supervision until the conclusion of a peace treaty. On the other hand, Israel insisted that they lay within its sovereign territory. The armistice agreement itself merely called for the resumption of normal civilian life in these zones, pending the conclusion of a final peace settlement. It did not mention anything about Israeli sovereignty over them. The UN officials were, therefore, broadly in agreement with the Syrians and in disagreement with the Israelis about the legal status of the DMZs.

Conclusion


The war of 1948 resulted in a defeat for the Arab armies at the hands of the Zionists. The territory that had not been lost to the new state of Israel came under the control of either the Jordanian government who formally annexed the West Bank or Egypt, which placed

the Gaza Strip under military administration. The Palestinians living in captured areas became refugees. Over 750,000 fled their homes and lands for Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Egypt.²³ The war had also compounded the virtual dissolution of the Palestinian community. The Palestinians who remained in what became known as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip faced the huge task of rebuilding their society.

The political framework of both the Jordanian and Egyptian administrations was each reflection, not of the needs of the Palestinian community but of the respective political orientations of King Farouq and Nasser of Egypt and King Abdullah and King Hussain of Jordan. These orientations were often in competition with one another. If Nasser's rule over the Gaza Strip was characterised by increasing secularisation of society and the rise of both Arab nationalism and Nasserism in politics, then the opposite was true in the West Bank. Both Jordan and Egypt fought in the 1948 war but this did not necessarily make them allies over the Palestinian issue. Rather this period saw the subjugation of the Palestinian cause under the wing of Arab nationalism and inter-Arab State competition for hegemony over the area. At the same time Palestinians enjoyed more freedom in Jordan than in other Arab States and in Israel.


²³ Morris, no.17 and also B. Morris, *1948 and After Israel and the Palestinians*, (Oxford, 1994).

MAP-1




Source: <http://www.middleastinfo.org>

MAP-2



Source: <http://www.middleastinfo.org>


MAP -3



The Palestinian/Arab Exodus, 1948-1950

Source: <http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees>

MAP -4



Israel/Palestine, showing 1949 Armistice frontiers

Source: <http://www.un.org/peace/jenin>

CHAPTER III

Chapter III

Socio-Economic and Cultural Aspects of Palestinian Women Refugee during late 1940s and early 1950s

1. Introduction

Changes in the socio-economic and cultural landscape generally occur slowly. Unless there are good reasons for altering the visible appearance of a place, it continues to preserve its original features. Having invested effort, money and time in these livable places inhabitants are usually unreceptive to radical change. Landscape thus may be conceived as the outcome of a struggle among conflicting interest groups seeking domination over an immediate environment. When one group imposes its well-being over the places of another, the former completely or partially replaces the landscape symbols of the latter.

The case under study here is the exodus/expulsion of the Palestinian people during the 1948 war that preceded the establishment of the state of Israel. The act of expulsion is conceptualised as part of an Israeli strategy of 'total war' that targeted both Palestinian civilian population and their landscape. In a total war, an entire society is mobilised economically, politically and ideologically in support of the military struggle.¹ As the term implies, total war involves unrestrained violence that often produces large

¹ M. Shaw, "The Rise and Fall of the Military Democratic State: Britain 1940-85", in C. Creighton and M. Shaw (ed.), *The Sociology of War and Peace*, (U.K.: Macmillan Press, 1987) pp.143-158.

scale devastation.² The concept thus contains elements of both ethnic cleansing and place annihilation. Historic buildings and other treasures of civilisation are subject to destruction. Civilian population is often directly targeted because military leaders regard them as decisive for the collapse of the enemy. The essentially inhumane method of warfare has its greatest impact on non-combatants, especially the weak and the old; it functions to undermine the resistance of the opposing armies by inflicting misery on their families.³ “Ethnic cleansing” is a key component of total war. It targets specific population groups and it can take many forms such as in the Middle Ages, religious cleansing sought to ‘purify’ the society of ‘non-believers’. In modern times, cleansing has targeted ‘unreliable’ segments of the population for forced resettlement or expulsion. Sometime expulsion orders may be issued without warning and implemented within a short time. Some of these orders may be aimed at terrorising the largely unarmed and defenseless civilian population. In such situations massacre and rape of women are not uncommon and may be carried out by civilian combatants or the regular government force.⁴ Due to the inhumane aspect of such atrocities, governments and military leaders usually decline to admit war-crime responsibility once the war is over. The 1948 Israeli-Palestinian war, described in Israeli writing as ‘Israel’s war of Independence’ and in Palestinian or Arab writing as ‘al-Nakba’ (the catastrophe or disaster) convincingly offers an example of total war characterised by ethnic cleansing and place annihilation i.e. destruction of landscape. In this case, Jewish forces were mobilised on behalf of a total war against the majority Palestinians populations. Palestinian places consequently

² B.H. Liddell-Hart, *The Revolution in Warfare*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967) p-9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp-60-64

⁴ Z.M. Szaz, *Germany’s Eastern Frontiers*, (Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1960), pp.90-95.

experienced significant destruction and depopulation during the 1948 war and subsequently.

2. Pre-1948 Situation

Pre 1948 Arab Palestine was essentially a peasant society. While it is true that the attitudes and orientations of most Zionist settlers towards the indigenous Arab populations in Palestine exhibited a sense of superiority characteristic of white settlers in Africa and Asia, the main structure had other more important features. The pre-1948 situation resembled more a dual society with one party, the Zionists deriving benefits from the sponsoring imperial power at the expense of the other, namely the indigenous Palestinians. Thus, the goal of Zionist settlers was to displace through land purchase and expropriation as many Palestinians as possible.

Still the basic question remains, how is one to account for the development of the

- The importation of capital and technology by the Zionists which together with the already on-going European capitalist penetration of the area made it difficult for indigenous Arab industries to survive in the face of a more advanced European economy.⁵
- The policies of the British government, in particular its tax policies, tended to favour and give concessions to an industrially oriented economy and intensive agriculture both of which were prevalent in the Jewish than they were in the Arab sector.
- In spite of sporadic clashes and disagreements concerning tactics and not principles between Zionist colonisers and British imperial interests in the area, the thrust of pre-1948 events, particularly during the crucial Arab rebellion from 1936-39, was characterized by an Anglo-Zionist alliance.
- The influx of Jewish immigrants, with or without the consent of the British, proceeded without taking into account the wishes of the indigenous Arab population and the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine.
- A rigid adherence by the Zionist settlers to an exclusivist set of institutions and ideology enabled Jewish workers to secure higher wages and better working conditions contrasted to Arab workers.

⁵ For a wider view of the impact of European capitalist penetration in the eighteenth and nineteenth century West Asia, see I.M. Smilianskaya, "From Subsistence to Market Economy, 1850" in Charles Issawi ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914*, (Chicago, 1966), pp.225-248.

- Unwillingness of Arab landlords to invest money earned from land transactions into other Arab sectors.
- The Arab leadership failed to establish a meaningful link with the masses in which national goals transcended sectarian and familial aspirations. It should be mentioned that the internal factors typical of Arab village life such as religious influence, traditional familial, and kinship systems and inheritance and land tenure cannot be discounted.⁶

What is problematic in the study of pre-1948 Palestine is the role of political and economic forces played in maintaining a traditional social order. Consider the Hamula as one such institution. Its perpetuation during the mandate and later on in Israel is due, in large measure, to the manipulative policies exercised by the British and Israelis toward the Arab sector and the distorted form of urbanisation and class transformation according to which peasants were forced off the land to become rural proletariat. Concerning the latter factor, Arab urbanization in Palestine resembled more a process of partial ruralisation of cities, a phenomenon encountered in many Third World cities nowadays, with two important exceptions; firstly the bulk of the proletariat remained in the village; secondly, city-based industries were mostly non-Arab controlled, either by the British, Zionist settlers or international concerns. There is one important feature of Palestinian class structure which is worth mentioning. Contrary to the claim made by Western and

⁶ According to Rudolfo Stavenhagen, no serious writing on Colonialism and the Third World in general would attribute a uni-causal trend to underdevelopment, attributing it solely to imperialism and colonialism. Traditional aspects such as 'family and kinship relations, village community structure, social hierarchies and stratification cognitive orientations and so forth, play an important role in maintaining a backward economy, but equally important is how such traditional social elements dating back to pre-colonial times are often actually reinforced by the imported capitalist system as their traditional function changes', Rudolfo Stavenhagen, *Social class in Agrarian Societies* (New York: Doubleday, 1975), pp-5-8.

Israeli writers, Palestine did not exhibit a system of feudalism similar to that which was present either in European or other West-Asian societies. In any case, less than 10 percent of the populated area of Palestine came under the direct control of large landlords. It was this relative autonomy of the peasants and their lack of dependency on feudal lord, compared to Europe, which enabled them to participate on a large scale in the Arab rebellion from 1936 to 1939.

3. The War of 1948 and Aftermath

The war of 1948 had two main consequences. First, it saw the exodus of a large segment of the Palestinian population to become refugees and displaced persons in the Arab countries and other parts of the world. Second, it reduced the status of the Palestinians in their own homeland to that of a minority who, until 1967, lived under Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian rule. Since 1948, when thousands of Palestinians were forced to flee from their homes during fighting between the newly founded state of Israel and its Arab neighbours, Palestinian families, in particular Palestinian women, have experienced powerful forces of social change. Socio-economic, religious and political upheavals have influenced much of the Palestinians population living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For example, religious movements such as the revival of Islamic fundamentalist groups have significantly affected the Palestinian families through efforts to reinforce traditional family roles as enumerated by conservative interpretations of Quran and Shariah or Islamic law. Further, changing attitudes and behaviour regarding women's education and employment have possibly led to changes in family role, behaviour and attitudes such as

rising expectations of women who anticipated their husbands to participate in child care and other domestic duties, once considered to be the role responsibility of women.⁷

The traditional Palestinian refugee family is characterised by the patrilineal and patriarchal extended household or Hamula. The Hamula is a combination of extended family members related through a common progenitor, with each member mutually responsible for the behaviour and welfare of other members. The leader of the Hamula normally the eldest male is the primary decision-maker in the family issues such as the selection of marriage partners for the children. The residence of the Hamula is patrilocal, with new member wives and children being added to the traditional Arab home. Consequently the power and authority of the extended family rest with men, especially older men. Further, men are responsible to economically support and protect the family and the honour of individual family members notably women. Y. Haddad argues that male honour within Palestinian society is dependent upon men's ability to control and supervise the behaviour of their female. Further, a woman's sexual purity and the honour of one's family are one and the same. Thus Palestinian women are often seen as the primary bearer of family honour.⁸

Thus the traditional patriarchal family had assigned women a subordinate position, although its manifestation may vary according to class and socio-economic conditions. For instance, the upper class families have placed greater emphasis on

⁷ For detail on this see I.W. Ata, *The West Bank Palestinian Family* (London: Croom Helm, 1986) and H. Barakat, "The Arab Family and the Challenge of Social Transformation", in E. W. Fernea (ed.), *Women and the Family in the Middle East: New Voices of Changes* (London, 1984) pp. 25-29.

⁸ For wider view on this issue see Y. Haddad, "Palestinian Women: Patterns of Legitimation and Domination" in K. Nakhleh and E. Zureik (eds.), *The Sociology of the Palestinian* (New York, 1980), pp. 145-178 and P. C. Dodd, "The Effect of Religious Affiliations on Women's Role in Middle Eastern Arab Society", *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, (London), 1974, Vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 115-128.

arranged marriages, the selection of women and the mahr (the bride price), while lower class families have not been able to support female seclusion and excessive bride prices due to economic deprivations.⁹ It appears however; that women had started to participate in activities which were considered departures from traditional family behaviour. Indeed, women's participation in activities like the labour market and protest movement might have helped to create a climate in which changes in their family roles could occur.¹⁰

3.1. Refugees of 1948 War

According to United Nations records the number of persons who left their homes in 1948, was somewhat about 900,000. The years which followed saw more and more Arabs expelled. This figure, however, does not include Palestinians who have lost their means of livelihood but not their homes and as such, do not qualify for relief under the United Nations definition of 'refugees'. They also do not include persons who have been able to re-establish themselves in the host countries and therefore not in need of relief or Palestinians who are now scattered throughout the world.

From the beginning of 1946, the Zionist leadership has been preparing itself for what it saw as a final showdown of the indigenous population. There was no clear blueprint until 1948 but there was a clear mindset that went back to the 1930s, when Zionist leaders had, as one of many options to achieve its goal, begun identifying with the idea of an enforced eviction of the indigenous Palestinian population.¹¹ The difference

⁹ See W. J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, (New York: Macmillan, 1963).

¹⁰ Dodd, no. 8, p. 129.

¹¹ For more on this see Benny Morris, "The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence Service Analysis of June 1948", in I. Pappé, *The Israel-Palestine Question* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 192-211 and Nur Masalha, "A Critique of Benny Morris", in I. Pappé, *ibid*, pp. 212-220.

now was that the Palestinians' refusal to accept a UN solution provided a pretext for implementing a systematic expulsion of the indigenous population within the area allocated for a Jewish State, areas already demarcated in the UNSCOP report. Villages that were near vital routes or in proximity to Jewish settlements had very bleak chance of remaining intact after being occupied by the Jewish forces!¹²

The Palestinian nationalist notable, although more alert than before to the Zionist mobilisation, were helpless, even when the will to act was there. Once they had surrendered diplomacy to the Arab League, the diplomatic battle was no longer in their hands. They still boycotted the UN, joining in with the Arab League's general handling of the crisis, which consisted of a policy of brinkmanship between war like and secret negotiation at postponing any resolution. This policy was further complicated by the independent approach taken by king Abdullah of Jordan* who, with British support began serious negotiations with Jewish Agency over his partition plan of dividing Palestine between his kingdom and the Jewish state. The plan was accepted in principle by the Jewish side and implemented during the war itself, ensuring a safe annexation of eastern Palestine to Jordan in return of limited participation by the King Abdullah in the overall Arab war effort.¹³

Several massacres were committed near the mixed towns, sometimes in retaliation to Palestinian attacks on Jewish convoys but quite often they were unmitigated acts of brutality. They may have been meant to, as they eventually did, force Palestinians living

¹²See Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, (Cambridge, 1988).

*Transjordan became Jordan in March 1948.

¹³For detail on this see A. Shlaim, *Collision Across Jordan*, (Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1988).

in areas falling into Jewish hands to flee under the threat of death or eviction. These atrocities were not randomly committed; they were part of a master plan to rid the future Jewish state of as many Palestinians as possible.¹⁴ Palestinian and some Western scholars (including Jewish) have attributed the Palestinian 'exodus' to deliberate action on the part of the Zionist leadership in Palestine during the war. Most Israelis claimed meanwhile that Palestinians 'fled' in response to appeal by Arab leaders. The latter thus bore responsibility for depopulation for instance via radio messages broadcast from various Arab capitals ordering the eviction.¹⁵ Proof of this claim has never been furnished. In an attempt to document the Arab role in depopulation, Erskine Childers conducted a research of materials related to this issue. Childers concluded that there was not a single order or appeal from any Arab radio station, inside or outside Palestine in 1948. There is repeated monitored record of Arab appeals, even orders to the civilians of Palestine to stay put. A similar conclusion had been reached earlier by W. Khalidi.¹⁶

The Jewish forces thus opted to launch a war against the Palestinian masses with the aim of capturing territory inside the enemy frontier. The task was a formidable one given the relative weakness of the Jewish forces on the eve of the war. In order to overcome this disadvantage, Zionist leaders mobilised all able bodied Jews in Palestine to fight with the enemy army. The Jewish civilian population also performed two other types of military duties. These included the imposition of economic sanctions, the

¹⁴S. Sita Abu, "The Feasibility of the Right of Return", in Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cortran (eds.), *The Palestinian Exodus, 1948-1988* (London: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 170-195.

¹⁵S. Glazer, "The Palestinian Exodus in 1948", *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Berkeley, 1998), Vol. 9, no. 4.

¹⁶E. D. Childers, "The Other Exodus", in W. Khalidi (ed.), *From Heaven to Conquest*, (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), pp. 794-805 and W. Khalidi, "Why Did the Palestinians Leave?", *Middle East Forum*, (London, 1959), Vol. 35, no. 7, pp. 20-24 in Khalidi, *ibid.*

dissemination of war propaganda and with the assistance of the army, prevention of Palestinian villagers from harvesting their fields.¹⁷ Jewish military weakness is likewise reflected in the massacres committed in selected villages and towns. This calculated aspect of war was carried out in small villages for instance, the villages of Nasir al-Din and Khirbat-al-Wara, al-Swada in Tiberias sub-district and al-Husayniya in Safad sub-district and villages which had good neighbourly relations with the pre-1948 Jewish population and settlements e.g. Deir Yasin in Jerusalem sub-district. Such massacres did not reflect the level of local resistance but rather were intended to provide 'lessons' to the Palestinians so that other neighbouring villagers would panic and leave voluntarily. No less calculated a war crime than massacres was the rape of Palestinian women by Jewish soldiers. Two well-known cases of combined massacres and rapes occurred in Safsaf village in Safad sub-district and in al-Dawayima in Hebron sub-district. Both massacres were carried out on October 29, 1948 during army operations Hiram (for Safsaf) and Yo'av (for al-Dawayima). In these cases, gender was subordinated to the ultimate end of military triumph. Palestinian society like many other traditional societies places great value on the honour of their women.¹⁸ It is reported that a total of seventy men were massacred in a gully between Ayn al-Zeytun and Safad.¹⁹

¹⁷For wider view on this see N. Nazzari, *The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948* (Beirut: The Institute of Palestine Studies, 1978) and Benny Morris, "Yusef Weitz and the Transfer Committees, 1948-1949", *Middle Eastern Studies* (London), 1986, Vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 522-560.

¹⁸R. Sayigh, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries*, (London: Zed Press, 1979), pp. 74-77.

¹⁹Morris, no. 12, p. 102.

3.2. Arab Census Problem

The Arabs who remained in Israel were a small section of the Palestinian Arab population. However their number, especially during the first years, cannot be determined. In November, 1948, a census was conducted, in preparation for the election of the Knesset but it cannot be considered exact as far as the Arabs were concerned because it did not include Arab areas later added to Israel, Negev, and some of the Bedouin tribes in Galilee. The continuous movement of the Arab inhabitants within Israeli borders contributed to the difficulty in assessing their numbers. In addition to those who came back as a result of the family reunification programme, some were allowed to stay on the basis of their loyalty towards the state of Israel, however, many refugees infiltrated. Further the Israeli authorities' occasionally expelled Arabs to neighbouring countries even after they had been registered in the census. Thus the figures remained approximate until a second census in May 1961 was taken.

The Arab inhabitants of Israel live in three main areas. The majority are in Galilee in the North. The Triangle in the centre of Israel is the home of about 30 percent. Though rectangular in shape, this area is called the triangle because it was outside the boundaries of Israeli occupation. It was added to Israel after the cease-fire agreement with Jordan in April 1949. The remaining inhabits in Negev in the South.

4. Palestinians and the States of Israel, Jordan and Egypt

Although every Arab in Israel is considered a citizen, he or she is not an Israeli national because to the Zionists Israel is before everything else a Jewish state. This is clear by the fact that every immigrant Jew is granted rights that exceed those of an Arab even though the Arabs and their ancestors lived in Palestine before the State of Israel existed. Their very existence is a testament to the fact that it is Israeli policy to regard even the highest status Arab under Israeli control as a second class citizen. Security measures were the most significant aspect of Israel's policy toward the Arab minority after 1948. In 1950 the Israeli government organised a system of military government to handle its relations with the Palestinians in Israel. Previously the Israeli army had dealt directly with the Palestinian population in the areas it occupied both within the State of Israel as defined by the 1947 UN Partition plan and outside it. Army dealings with the Arabs did not differ very much from that of any occupation force in an occupied territory. Palestinians were attacked, their property was confiscated and they were forcibly expelled. "They take our land. Why? For security reasons! They take our jobs. Why? For security reasons! They take our jobs. Why? For security reasons! And when we ask them how it happens that we, our lands and our jobs threaten the security of the state - they do not tell us. Why not? For security reasons!"²⁰

It would be imprecise to deny that conditions have improved in many ways for the Arab minority but to attribute these changes to the existence of Israel and to its efforts

²⁰ Walter Schwarz, *The Arabs in Israel*, (London: Farber, 1959), p.15.

would be an exaggeration. Despite whatever progress has been made the standard of life of the Palestinians in Israel generally remains far below than that of the Jews.²¹

Further, if post 1948 life is compared with pre-1948 conditions, the improvement of Palestinians' life in Israel falls short in many ways, of what was enjoyed by a considerable proportion of Palestinians living outside Israel. The 1948 War and its lawlessness had dispersed a large number of teachers and thus the school system was paralysed. In 1949 the Knesset passed a law regulating elementary education for both Arabs and Jews. According to this law the state along with local authorities like municipalities and district councils pledges to provide eight years of free and compulsory education to children between the ages of five and thirteen. Secondary education consists of four years after elementary school and is taken care of by local authorities and private institutions with some form of state subsidy. Despite these arrangements there has been no significant improvement in Arab education in Israel.

Small number of school age Palestinian girls attends school. Infact, compulsory education is much more strictly enforced among the Jews. Failures at this level have a detrimental effect on Palestinian life. Of all the things that have hindered progress in Palestinian education, the most important has been a shortage of trained teachers. The absence of professional teachers was felt immediately after the establishment of the state of Israel. Thus the authorities were forced to appoint a large number of untrained people in Arab schools. There has been no pressing need on the part of the authorities to remedy the shortage. It was not until 1956 that a training college for Arab elementary and

²¹ For more on this see Simha Flapan, "National Inequality in Israel", *New Outlook* (New York), Nov.-Dec. 1964, pp. 24-36.

Kindergarten teachers was opened in Jaffa. Later it was moved to Haifa due to certain reasons. There is much pressure from the candidates themselves since the post of elementary school teacher is one of the few white-collar jobs open to a Palestinian high school graduate. This makes Palestinian teachers more vulnerable to the authorities who can take advantage of the scarcity of jobs to intimidate them and often dismiss them for political reasons. Other reasons for the low standard in Arab schools have been ineffective teaching programme such as vague and incomplete school curricula, which is subject to sudden change. In 1952 the ministry of education decided on a new Arabic-language curriculum for the first two grades. The other grades continued to use the old curriculum until 1957, when this programme was extended to other grades. Thus the serious shortage of Arabic textbooks during the first ten years was a big handicap. Teachers and students had to use old books or copy down the subject of a lesson from one of the few books available.

Lastly, inadequate buildings, services and equipment such as maps, furniture and laboratories contributed to the general decline in Arab education. This negligence can also be attributed to overall Israeli policy toward the Arabs.

The low standard of education in Arab elementary schools has directly affected the secondary schools with the result that a large proportion of students fail the examinations at the end of their secondary education. A large number of the candidates do not pass the examinations and cannot receive the diploma that would enable them to find work or go on to college.²²

²² Butrus Abu Mana, "Spotlight on Arab Students", *New Outlook*, March 1965, pp. 44-48.

The community has inexhaustible supply of labourers but even at the best of times only a small proportion of these are skilled labourers. In vocational and technical training, the standard of teaching among the Palestinians does not even measure up to the requirements of the Palestinian population and does not compare with similar training among the Jews. Training in some scientific fields is totally closed to Arab students. The schools of medicine rarely accept Arabs for enrollment. Only the humanities and the social sciences are open to the Arab students. Generally speaking, the acceptance of Arab students at Israeli universities is tied to political considerations and is done on a selective basis."²³

It is interesting to look at the curricula approved by the ministry of education for Arab Schools. Large-scale political themes are intermingled in the Arabic and Hebrew history and language programmes. A cursory study of the history programme will show that it is designed to glorify the history of the Jews, presenting it in the best possible light, whereas the view of Arab history is warped to a point bordering on falsehood. Arab history is represented as a series of revolutions, killing and continuous feuds in such a way as to obscure Arab achievements. Similarly the time devoted to the study of Arab history is very less.

The economic situation of the Palestinians differs from that of the rest of the population because it is directly dependent on two sectors of the Israeli economy: agriculture and wage labour. The Palestinians who stayed on in Israel were mainly agricultural people. The expropriation of vast areas of Palestine land was the major

²³ "Tawfiq Zayyad, "The Fate of the Arabs in Israel", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (Berkeley), Vol. 6, no.3, Summer 1977, p.100.

obstacle to the development of agriculture sector. As damaging as land expropriation, was the indifference of the government to Arab agriculture, which resulted in slumping of agricultural production. In the early years of the state when agricultural food crops were in great demand, marketing was put under strict government control. Palestinians were paid less than Jews for their produce with the full acquiescence of the controller of supplies. Although the government's policy is not deliberately planned to undermine Arab farming, it goes a long way toward blocking its development. Thus the obstacles mentioned above have had a devastating effect on Arab farming which has gradually become unprofitable and is practised only by those who have no other option. A sizeable number have moved into other occupations leaving their land untilled. This has probably been the government's long-term wish that the Palestinians would be reduced to selling what land remained to them after its maintenance exceeded its income so that more Jewish settlement could be established.

The position of Palestinian workers was no better. Apart from a few labour unions limited to particular sectors or places of work, Palestinian workers had not been organised to any effective degree under the British Mandate. The position of Palestinian workers was further weakened by the unfriendly and even hostile attitude of various Israeli authorities. There were other considerations such as security that shaped Israeli attitudes toward the Palestinian workers in the early years of the state. The military government and the system of travel permits made life more difficult. Permits were

consistently withheld from Palestinians seeking to travel to Jewish areas in search of work.²⁴

The 1948 war ended with a series of agreements between the two sides. While the Armistice Agreements signed with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon were made more or less on the basis of their armies position, the border with Jordan was altered to Israel's advantage.

The differing policies of each Arab country towards the Palestinian refugees and non-refugees rested on several factors. Apart from reflecting their basic positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict, they were the products of political rivalries within the Arab world together with social and economic problems obtaining within each Arab state.²⁵

Due to its poverty, limited resources and primitive agriculture practice, Transjordan depended for its development on British aid. Predominantly agricultural, the newly incorporated West Bank had few light industry of its own. The Palestinians believed that their skills acquired throughout the British Mandate should be utilised to develop the West Bank. But the government on the other hand wished to channel all its efforts towards the economic development of the East Bank. Further Jordan extended rights to Palestinians individually but refused to regard them collectively due to its own vulnerability. For the majority of Palestinians economic survival remained the priority. This could be witnessed in the daily routine of many of the refugee camp dwellers. In Jordan there was a strong possibility that the refugees arrival and the annexation of the

²⁴ For detail on this see Benny Morris, *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians*, (Oxford, 1990), pp. 120-136.

²⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 224-225.

West Bank would lead to the country's Palestinisation. King Abdullah of Jordan was fully aware of this danger and thus set out to assimilate the Palestinians. From the beginning, refugees in Jordan were allowed occupational freedom and were entitled to leave the camps provided they showed loyalty to the regime. Jordan granted citizenship to Palestinians and thus Jordan was a much more welcoming host state than Egypt, Lebanon or Syria.

5. Women and Inheritance Practice

Women were excluded or at least discouraged from inheritance in order to keep the land within the agnatic based family structure. The exclusion of women from inheritance was reinforced by other socially and culturally constructed norms and traditions such as endogamous marriage, particularly the marrying of first cousins which itself was promoted as a means to solidify the economic and political power of the head of the village – keeping land under close control.

Despite the important role played by the women peasants in the production process as direct agricultural producers, the patriarchal norms and values constructed by the Palestinian peasant society marginalised the value of women's work and contributions. The marginalisation and further devaluation of the women's work increased with the emergence of a new ideological and cultural dimension, namely encounter between foreign culture (European) and indigenous (Arab) culture. The impact of this encounter was epitomised in 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel.

The marginalisation and further exclusion of Palestinian women refugees from the productive and public spheres, was enhanced after 1948. As camp dwellers, whether in Palestine or in the host countries, Palestinian refugees lost access to land as their major means of survival. They instead, became dependent on United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for their basic needs. While life experiences of camp refugees varied according to the political and economic conditions under which they found themselves, there were some common experiences which most camp women shared. These experiences concerned their very life conditions, rights, roles and access to the public sphere, particularly with regards to labour, education and health.

Palestinian refugee camp women, whether in Palestine or in host countries, often found themselves without the male breadwinner or 'head of the family'. The economic reasons that forced many men to leave the camps to seek the employment as migrant-labourers – whether in Israel, in the Gulf or elsewhere – in addition to the political circumstances that resulted in men leaving the camps to join the struggle for nationhood or be taken prisoners by Israel, constructed special social reality for women. Women were often left alone to attend to the family, assuming the role of providers for children, the sick and the elderly. These roles were further complicated by the high fertility rates among Palestinians as well as the culturally constructed norms that privileged men's education over that of women. Early marriage, whether for economic, political, social or cultural reasons also influenced women's educational, labour and other opportunities. Palestinian refugees while influenced by this culture also had to face additional political constraints such as restricted movements from the camps.

Conclusion

From the beginning, the twin objectives of the Zionist movement have been the acquisition of land in Palestine and the attraction of Jews from all over the world to settle in that land. Indeed, the Zionist leadership does not seem to have had any clear image of even the nature of relations between Zionists and Arabs, including Palestinians until after the creation of the Zionist state. The creation of the new state in 1948 dramatically relieved them of the nightmare of an Arab majority in Palestine, for they were able to establish a predominantly Jewish state on that part of the land where the Palestinians had now become a minority. But the presence of that minority and the fact that the government had to deal with it eventually forced a definition of the Israel's positions. Thus the Palestinians were doomed to be crushed beneath the cumulative pressure of the pragmatic interests of particular Arab rulers, British interests, Jewish aggression, their own disunity and weakness and the outcome of the war.

CHAPTER IV

Chapter IV

Political Status of Palestinian Women under Israel, Jordan and Egypt during late 1940s and early 1950s

1. Introduction

Israel claims that it is the only democratic country in West Asia where all citizens enjoy full and equal rights without distinction based on race, colour or religion. Accordingly, Israel projects itself as a freedom-loving country, fulfilling all the requirements of the United Nations charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Partition Resolution which gave birth to the Jewish state. The fact that initially this claim has gone unchallenged does not substantiate it. While the Jewish majority in the country may enjoy full rights and liberties, it is debatable for the Arab minority – Muslims and Christians. A nation's democracy is assessed not by the form of government it has or by the method of its voting or the number of its political parties but by the manner and extent of the quality and freedom enjoyed by all of its citizens without discrimination. Thus, according to recognised principles of democratic governments and practices, minorities are free to form their own political parties and express their views. However, in the Israeli occupied territory of Palestine, the Arab minority is not allowed to exercise its political rights and express its views. As far as host countries like Jordan and Egypt are concerned, regarding the extension of political and other rights to Palestinians, it is determined by the political and economic conditions and interests of the particular host country.

The period after the 1948 debacle was crucial in shaping a Palestinian concept of nationalism. Palestinian nationalist ideology bound the community together and played a major role in determining its collective decision to remain in those parts of Palestine that had not fallen to Israel. The concept of nationalism as it had developed by this stage was instrumental in keeping a sense of Palestinian nationhood alive, shaping the identity of the Palestinian people through their culture, historical heritage and common roots.

2. Palestinians' Political rights and the States of Israel, Jordan and Egypt.

Whatever political leadership existed among Palestinians, they moved outside Israel after 1948 due to Israel's crackdown. Meanwhile, the situation in Israel called for a general election early in 1949, even before the fighting had ended and the cease-fire agreements had been signed. The Israeli authorities had to define their political position to the Arabs. Despite the feeling against Arab involvement in Israeli politics, they were allowed to take part in the first elections. With some modifications, the inclusion of Arab lists attached to different political parties became the practice in the following elections. The Arab members were firmly bound to the parties patronising them though the assumption was that they represented the interests of the Arab voters. Arab nationalist organisations, when they existed, were carefully kept out of the scene. Many Arabs accepted their part in the election believing that they were exercising their civil rights and bringing to bear their influence on the government. In practice the system worked very differently.¹ The most influential party in Israel was Mapai and it claimed that there is no basic conflict between the interests of Arabs and Zionists in Palestine but that the differences existed because of the creation of a

¹ Sabri Jiryis, "Democratic Freedoms in Israel", New Outlook, (New York), Sept. 1964, pp.88-100.

conservative Arab leadership which detests Zionism. Mapai's decision to become politically active among the Arabs was accepted with reluctance. For a start, the party did not even accept Arabs as ranking members, on the grounds that no Arabs could be a loyal member of a Zionist Party. To solve this dilemma the experts suggested a solution regarding Arabs' participation in the election. Accordingly Arab participation would be in the form of special list drawn up before each election on the basis of residence and religious sect from among the Party's Arab dependents. Meanwhile the Israeli government embarked on isolating the Druze population from the rest of the Arab population and to treat it as a separate entity.

The main difference between Mapam and the other Zionist parties active among the Arabs was that it went beyond the conventional norms of Zionism and tried to win the Arabs ideologically, hoping to convert them to socialist Zionism. It started forming cells among the Arabs quite early and in 1951 began publishing a weekly newspaper in Arabic, *Al Mirsad*. In the mid-1950s it founded an Arab youth movement to deal with some of the problems of Arab youth.²

The Zionist parties soon had a rival for popularity among the Arabs in the Israeli Communist Party, the only non-Zionist party legally active in Israel since 1948. The Communist Party has played a significant role in the political history of Israel's Arabs. It has influenced large section of the Arab population even before the creation of the State of Israel. There had been a Communist group among the Arabs known as the League, which joined the Jewish Communists in 1948 to form the Israeli Communists Party for the purpose of national liberation.³

² For more on this see, Mahmoud Younis, "Arab Pioneer Youth Movement", *New Outlook*, Feb, 1968, pp. 53-56 and Abdul Aziz Zu' bi, "Discontent of Arab Youth", *New Outlooks*, Jan, 1968, pp 12-17.

³ A. Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), pp. 492-496.

To some extent, the Israeli government's policies consolidated the position of the Communists in Arab populated areas. As the government became more oppressive and the expropriation of Arab land all pervasive, the Arabs means of livelihood slackened and they felt crushed from all sides. Campaigning against these policies of Israeli government among Arabs, the Communist Party was soon leading the Arab Protest against domestic policy of the government. Unlike the other Israeli parties, the Communists had neither power nor financial resources with which to allure the Arab population. After the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Communist Party was constantly active, forming cells in every Arab group it could reach. In this process a relatively wide network of party newspapers and magazines were published in Arabic which assisted in enhancing its popularity. The oldest of these is Al Ittihad, which was first published in 1944 and became the party's most important publication in Arabic. A literary and cultural monthly, Al Jadid was first issued in 1953. A youth-oriented magazine, Al Ghad appeared in 1954. Thus the Communist press has kept record of almost all the experiences of the Arabs in Israel which is widely read by the Arab population.⁴

The communist members of the Knesset, especially the Arabs among them have shown great interest in any problem or case involving Arabs. They address hundreds of questions to the different ministers and officials, introduce several bills drafted to improve the circumstances of the Arabs in the region and take active part in any discussion on matters related to them. For Communist Party, support grew, as Soviet ties with Arab countries like Egypt and Syria were strengthened in 1950s.

⁴ Aware of this fact, the Israeli authorities have tried to hinder the work of the Communist papers by periodically banning them. In accordance with the emergency regulations the Communist papers have to be submitted to military censorship and thus the papers appeared with censored news.

The Israeli authorities were swift to perceive the important role played by the Communist Party in mobilising Arab population and thus tried to limit its activities by enforcing the military government restrictions against its Arab members. Travel permits were withheld and orders given for house arrests and administrative definitions. The authorities have been cautious to keep interference within bounds, disrupting the Communist Party's work without banning it completely. The idea behind such moderation is probably the desire to maintain relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc where many Jews still live and also to leave some room for protest among discontented Arab Youth, instead of forcing them underground.⁵

One thing all Israeli parties have had in common has been their aspiration to prevent the formation of an independent Arab organisation. So far their efforts have met with remarkable success, for although the Arabs have put their best efforts to form their own political party, the attempt has been doomed from the beginning.⁶ The Israeli government dealt firmly with all Arab political activists. Any group interested in politics or desiring to express its views had no way of doing so except by joining a party.

Due to some disturbances in Nazareth a number of unprecedented measures against the Arabs were taken by the Israeli government which made protesting through mass meetings invalid. Against this background it seemed mandatory to organise a permanent body that would voice Arab criticism and oppose specific government measures when the need be. After consultations between opposition groups, such as nationalist and communist, a meeting was held in Acre to form such

⁵ For detail on this see Walter Schwarz, *The Arabs in Israel*, (London: Faber, 1959), pp.26, 59-68.

⁶ This meant inducing officials to use Arabic while dealing with Arabs, since the Arabs themselves use Arabic when contacting government offices. A few departments like Revenue Service did use Arabic, which is an official language of Israel.

an organisation. The result of the meeting was the formation of the Arab Front which changed its name to the Popular Arab Front when the authorities refused to register the organisation. This organization consisted of a group of Arabs whose objective was to deal with the internal problems of the Arabs in Israel. Thus, the organisation wished to abolish the military government, to end the expropriation of Palestinian land, to introduce the use of Arabic in all government departments⁷ and to work towards the return of all refugees to their homes.⁸ But the government vehemently opposed the Front, imposing restrictions on many of its leaders and supporters.⁹

The Arab workers were not in an enviable position. They were often not allowed to work outside their villages or in the Jewish areas as job opportunities in the villages were shrinking rapidly because sources of agricultural income were falling and the population was increasing. Occasionally the government tried to solve the problem by setting up employment offices in the Arab areas. But these employment offices did not cover all the Arab regions and could only cover a fraction of the population. During late 1940s and 1950s the Arab workers were driven into the unskilled and manual jobs that were the most exhausting and least paid, jobs avoided by the Jewish workers such as mixing plaster, cleaning jobs, unskilled jobs in quarries and constructions and the like.¹⁰

Not satisfied with restructuring political activities among the Arabs, the Israeli government turned its attention to Arab religious matters. The authorities first decided to appoint leaders, under the guise of guaranteeing religious freedom to all sects and

⁷ For more on this see Habib Qahwaji, *The Arabs in the Shadow of Israel Occupation Since 1948* (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organisation Research Centre, 1972) pp. 437-352.

⁸ For detail see Jiryis no.1, pp. 88-100.

⁹ Cohen, no.3 pp. 528-532.

¹⁰ Jiryis, no.1.

later exploited those appointments for their own purposes. The situation was very different during the British Mandate period. Under the British Mandate the Muslim Community had complete freedom in the management of its religious affairs. In the beginning the Israeli were at a loss as to how to deal with the Muslims. The head of the Islamic department of the Ministry of Religions suggested the resumption of the former system. But the government, after some hesitation, seized Islamic Waqf property and took charge of setting up courts of Islamic law.¹¹

The differing policies of each Arab country towards the refugees depended on several factors. Apart from reflecting their basic orientation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, they were the product of political rivalries within the Arab world together with social and economic problems obtaining within each Arab state.

2.1. Jordan

The Jordanian government pursued a two-sided policy with regard to the refugees' political status. It wanted to carry out the political integration of the refugees, doing away with any notions of Palestinian separation. To affect the above mentioned policy the government granted citizenship and most rights associated with it to the Palestinians. However, to ensure the permanent economic security and general responsibility of the International Community for the Refugees, it had to preserve the refugees' exclusive status in the eyes of the world. The government feared of getting labelled as traitor by the other Arab countries since it had annexed the West Bank. This would have hampered the smooth process of the refugees' integration. This was

¹¹ Harry N. Howard, "UNRWA, the Arab host countries and the Arab refugees", Middle East Forum, (London), Vol. 42, no.3, March, 1966, pp. 24-42.

also a prerequisite for maintaining the status quo with Israel. The preservation of the refugee status was also used to pacify the refugees.

The refugees' special political status was also maintained for the huge economic benefits it offered, though this was a tacit aspect of a policy, which required that the government constantly emphasise its commitment to refugees' rights and return. Both the policies were contradictory and clashes between them were likely. Jordan's readiness to absorb the Palestinians and represent their case was followed by practical measures. But neither declarations of policies nor constituted law could bridge the gap between different strata of the population or between the annexing regime and its annexed subjects. Yet these practical steps were prerequisites for any further consolidation. Jordan demonstrated its willingness in this respect by being the only country to offer citizenship to its refugee population. The citizenship law provided for the refugees participation in the Parliamentary Elections that were about to follow, granting them equal political rights with other Palestinians or Transjordanians. It also permitted them to acquire a Jordanian passport, enabling them to travel between the Arab countries in search of jobs. Further the law gave every refugee the right to be employed and to acquire land and a home until the final settlement in Palestine. Thus, the Jordanian citizenship was designed to dissolve the differentiation between Palestinians, whether refugee or non-refugee and Jordanians. In view of the restrictions imposed by the other Arab countries on the movement of refugees, the Jordanian passport became a valuable asset enabling them to free themselves from many of these difficulties.

The other Arab countries started voicing against the Jordanian citizenship which was granted to the refugees. They argued that any step which provided for the

refugees absorption in their new country would weaken the claim to a right to return. Jordan's policy was attacked on the grounds that it forgot its holy duty of keeping the spirit of revenge alive in the Palestinians' hearts and that by granting citizenship it might kill their will to return to their homeland and thus help Israel to dissolve the Palestinian cause.

3. Brotherhood: A Comparative Study

The discrepancy between education and opportunity rekindled the fire of radicalism that had been lit by the events of the Nakbah. Under Jordanian government Islamic politics in the West Bank diverged along two paths: one Waqf and other official Islamic bodies, guided by the Jordanian government in Amman and the other represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Liberation Party in opposition to the government and the monarchy.

Following the 1948 war the traditional seats of religious authority in Palestine such as the Waqf, the post of mufti of Jerusalem and the heads of the Sharia courts underwent a radical change. The Waqf lost the political independence it had enjoyed during the period of the British mandate along with its financial independence as well. All religious functionaries became salaried members of the Jordanian civil service and their activities were monitored by the authorities. The Jordanians also appointed a new mufti to Jerusalem.¹² The Waqf in Gaza was separated from its Jerusalem base, ending the long tradition of cooperation and appointment that had always flowed between the two regions. The Muslim and Waqf authorities in Palestine were no

¹² For detail on this see Avi Shlaim, "The All Palestine Government", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.21, no.4 (Summer, 1991), pp. 37-53.

longer unified but under the authority of three different powers: Israeli in Israel, Jordanian in Jerusalem and the West Bank and Egyptian in Gaza.

Islam as institutionalised in the Waqf and other religious bodies was abridged as a channel through which the populations' frustrations and desires could be communicated following the refugee upheaval. Funds from endowments were enough to cover the salaries of preachers and other religious functionaries but with the loss of many properties to the new state of Israel, building of religious places and welfare work could not expand to meet the changed circumstances of a large proportion of the population.

For others, the detrimental power of the Jordanian authorities was felt at all levels. Preachers were forced to work within the system and therefore placed a seal of approval on its legitimacy. The Ministry of Religious Affairs in Amman maintained a vigilant watch over their activities in the West Bank. Preaching activity was further restricted when the Jordanian Parliament approved legislation under the title of the Sermonising and Instruction Law in 1955 permitting the censorship of sermons written for the Friday prayers.

While their Egyptian and Gazan counterparts were crushed during the 1950s and 1960s, the West Bank branches of the Muslim Brotherhood survived the period of chaos. Following its amalgamation with the Jordanian movement the West Bank Brotherhood emerged as one of the Jordan's most important political groupings. The amalgamation of the Jordanian and West Bank branches of the Brotherhood contributed to the growth of the organisation throughout the 1950s. Existing branches in the West Bank were enlarged and acquired important roles and new branches were opened. The decline of the prominent centre of the organisation in Egypt also gave the

Jordanian leadership greater significance, particularly when it was declared that the Muslim Brotherhood's headquarter would be shifted from Cairo to Jerusalem, following Nasser's crackdown in 1954.¹³ The Brotherhood filled a political vacuum in the Palestinian community after its defeat in the 1948 war.¹⁴ The message of the Brotherhood struck a chord with both the Jordanian and Palestinian refugee communities at a time when there was a noticeable clash between the forces of conservatism and modernism manifested in religio-political extremism.¹⁵ It was very active politically throughout this period and in the 1950s participated successfully in elections to the Jordanian national legislature.

The fortunes of the Muslim Brotherhood were attached to its political policies. Its reformist political programme was almost identical to that of the Brotherhood in Egypt and was influenced by Egyptian ideologues, particularly Hassan al-Banna. The organisation concentrated on promoting the revival of Islam in modern society.¹⁶ However, unlike its Egyptian counterpart which found itself at odds with the regime, the Brotherhood in Jordan never actively opposed the state or its claim to legitimacy.

The survival of the Muslim Brotherhood, when all other political parties and groups were banned, was because of its general traditional orientation, in keeping with the regime itself. The Brotherhood never sought to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy or bring changes through a revolution but instead sought change through the channels left open by the state. It was careful not to incur the wrath of the regime even when it opposed particular policies or acts.

¹³ For more on this see P.A. Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians 1876-1983*, (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.188.

¹⁵ A. Abidi, *Jordan: A Political Study 1948-1957*, (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 195-197.

¹⁶ no.15. pp. 197.

3.1. Leadership and Brotherhood

From 1948 and in subsequent period the leadership of the Jordanian Brotherhood underwent a number of changes stemming from the arrest and subsequent exile of prominent figures from Egypt. In the beginning, the movement was headed by a Jordanian, Abdal-Latif Abu Qura, who was its spiritual guide. He was succeeded by a young Jordanian lawyer named Abd-al-Rahman al-Khalifa in 1953. With the arrival in 1954, however, of the famous Egyptian Said Ramadan, Khalifa stepped down temporarily in favour of the more senior and experienced man. But Said Ramadan remained in Jordan for only a brief period of time. In 1955, having been stripped of his Egyptian passport, he was expelled by the Jordanian authorities and in this background Khalifa took over the leadership once again.

3.2. Politics of Periphery

The two decades of Jordanian control over the West Bank transformed the Muslim Brotherhood's role there. This change should be observed in the context of the political transformation that took place in Jordan following the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 and the succession of his grandson, Hussain, to the throne in 1952. Under King Hussain, Jordan experienced rapid political change: the introduction of constitutional government, the challenge and opposition of an array of radical nationalist forces and the subsequent repression of the majority of political parties.¹⁷ Most political forces were critical of the continuing British influence over Jordan and hostile to the policies of the young king. In 1948 and shortly after there was an initial expansion, with new branches and increasing membership rolls. After 1954 branches

¹⁷ Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan*, (London: Zed Books, 1993).

shrank or disappointed and membership dropped. The urban nature of the Brotherhood in Palestine before 1948 was undermined by the prominence of Jordan's capital city, Amman, assuming importance over Jerusalem in the post-1948 era. All sense of independence was lost and no Palestinian-Muslim-brother based in the West Bank assumed any high ranking role. The post of spiritual guide remained firmly in Jordanian hands.

At the local level, however, individual branches continued along the same lines as before 1948. The general guidelines for the organisation in the West Bank were set down in Amman. Branches focused on local activities while issues pertaining to the Palestinian question, though occasionally addressed, were for the most part ignored.¹⁸

Membership records were never appropriately maintained and files compiled by the Jordanian Intelligence Service at that time reflect a low membership during this period.¹⁹

In many ways the activities of the branches in the West Bank during this period exhibited their initial intentions of the movements founder, Hassan al-Banna, when he established the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailiya in 1928. He had not intended the Brotherhood to embark on a radical revolutionary role. His vision encompassed a movement that first liberated the Muslim mind through education and then encouraged the Muslim to play his role in an Islamic society. The seven point

¹⁸ For instance, in 1953 the Muslim Brotherhood published a small pamphlet entitled "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestine Problem".

¹⁹ The Jordanian Intelligence files were seized by the Israelis during the 1967 war and are held by the Israel State Archives, West Jerusalem. The files, however, have been closed and are not open for inspection. The only reliable source on these files is Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime 1949-1967* (London, 1982), pp. 148-149.

programme of the Brotherhood of this time had been the interpretation of the Quran in the spirit of the age, raising standard of living, unifying of Islamic nations, realising social justice, the struggle against illiteracy and poverty, the emancipation of Islamic lands from foreign domination and finally the promotion of universal peace and fraternity according to the precepts of Islam.²⁰ The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank embraced above mentioned principles. Only on the issue of the emancipation of Islamic lands from foreign domination did the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank appear less than zealous. Overshadowed by the rising appeal of the political parties of the Pan-Arab trend, the Muslim Brotherhood concentrated on the task of internal Islamic renewal of Palestinian society. The issue of natural liberation through the revolutionary Arab nationalist front did not concern it. There was no call to arms only a call on Muslims to return to the mosque and pray. The Gazan and Egyptian branches of the movement had, in contrast, established small paramilitary wing with the specific aim of conducting warfare against Israel.

The membership included male members in their early twenties or thirties who were attracted to the Brotherhood's new message and perspective on Islam. The leadership came from the educated urban elite and professions with a particular link to teaching. The members came from the educated urban middle classes, from the refugee community and also included farmers and skilled workers.

4. Other Political Parties

The Muslim Brotherhood was not the only politically active Islamic group in the West Bank. There were others, Islamic in ideology but with political orientations, different

²⁰ Abidi, no.15, pp. 196-197.

from that of the Brotherhood. Their development reflected the continuing trend of diversity within Palestine's Islamic movements. This heterogeneity was the product of an approach to political Islam that sought to break from a monolithic and static relationship with religious ideology to form a radical approach to Islam and politics.

The Liberation Party was founded in 1952 by Sheikh Taqi ad-Din an-Nabahani, a West Bank Palestinian. He was a school teacher. He had been associated with the Muslim Brotherhood but broke away from the group in 1950 as a result of ideological differences.²¹

The foundation of the LP added a new dimension to Islamic politics in Palestine and affected the development of Islamic political movements throughout the region. Although it was the first indigenous Palestinian Islamic party, its philosophy was pan-Islamic and anti-colonialist in orientation. Sheikh Nabahani did address the Arab-Israeli conflict but his priority was the need to overthrow corrupt Arab regimes whose leaders had departed from the Islamic path. If the Muslim Brotherhood was a conservative reform movement, the LP was its opposite: radical and dedicated to the revival of the Caliphate by overthrowing corrupt Arab states. If the Muslim Brotherhood could be described as a member of the loyal opposition in Jordan and supporter of the institution of monarchy based on lineage to the Prophet Mohammad, the LP was outspoken in its criticism of the Jordanian regime and the monarchy.

The LP however, was never a mass movement and its membership remained small. Any success in recruiting new members was always undermined by fierce repression from the Jordanian authorities. Thus, while the LP did organise large

²¹ Ibid, p.198.

meetings or capitalise on Islamic festivals to promote its message, it concentrated on the creation of small groups or cells throughout the West Bank. Its initial headquarter, in Jerusalem rather than Amman, was closed by the police on orders from the Jordanian government.

A principal theme explored in party publications and leaflets and discussed at meetings was imperialism. The LP was opposed to any manifestation of imperialism and its effect in West Asia.

5. Refugee Gatherings and Committees

The authorities observed with anxiety and caution any attempt by the refugees to form themselves into political bodies that would emphasise their separate status, thereby making it more difficult for the government to act on their behalf. It was presumed that during this period of unemployment in the late 1940s and early 1950s the refugees, especially the youth, would live in an atmosphere of political tension and disorder suitable for the development of feelings of hostility to the regime. Cautious to any activity amongst the refugees, the authorities looked with great suspicion at any application for licensing committees and conferences. These committees enabled refugees to air their demands and criticisms and to channel them to the government. They were also an instrument by which the authorities could know about the prevailing views among refugees. The possible reasons for allowing meetings were to give vent to the pressure of criticism, to show the refugees that the regime was on their side and to show the West that unrest existed in Jordan and Egypt. This would ensure continued pressure on Israel and the continuation of relief operations.

6. Arab Unity of Action and the Palestine Question:

The thought that joint Arab action could solve the Palestine problem dominated Palestinian Arab thinking from the beginning of the Palestinian struggle for independence. Until 1936, however, Arab and Islamic response to Palestinians' appeals for aid and support was minimal. The leaders of the national movements in the Arab world were engaged in their own national struggles and thus paid less attention to external problems. The mandatory Powers, Britain and France also discouraged inter-Arab relations and restricted Arab cooperation to technical issues such as border settlements and extradition agreements. Subsequently, general Arab interest in the Palestine conflict was negligible.

This state of affairs changed during the Arab Revolt which erupted in Palestine in 1936. Arab rulers responded positively to the Palestinian-Arab appeals for help and manifested a keen interest in mediating the Arab conflict with the British. British support was considered indispensable for the survival of the Arab rulers as well as for their regional influence, because Britain was the greatest power in the area. On the other hand, the British officials hoped that the Arab rulers would succeed in jointly pressurising the Palestinian-Arab leadership to negotiate with London on the basis of the British proposals to end the conflict. These expectations led to British approval of the Arab rulers' intervention in the Palestine conflict. Initially British expectations seemed to have been realised; a joint appeal by the rulers of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan formally ended the Arab general strike in Palestine. But once the British had allowed the Arab rulers' intervention in the minor issue of the strike, there remained no way for them to avoid Arab intervention in the broader issue of the conflict. Increasing tension in European relations also had an effect. By

increasing the strategic importance of West Asia, it added political weight to local Arab demands. Britain's policymakers were forced to rethink on this issue. Now they believed that they had to meet some of the Arab demands over Palestine if they were to garner the support of the peoples of a region whose strategic significance was growing. In this background in 1938 the British Cabinet adopted the changed attitude and invited the Arab rulers to a meeting in London to discuss a solution to the Palestine conflict. The London Conference, held in 1939, confirmed the position of the Arab states as a party to the conflict. But it failed to arrive at an agreed solution. The representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Trans Jordan were unified in a position, adopted during an earlier inter-Arab conference in Cairo, which supported the Palestinian Arab demands. Consequently, British concessions in the London conference were regarded as insufficient and the Arab leaders condemned the 1939 White Paper on Palestine. The Arab rulers continued to back Palestinian Arab demands for an immediate end to both Jewish immigration and sale of lands to Jews and for the creation of an independent Arab state to replace the British mandate of Palestine.²²

Inter-Arab cooperation over the Palestine question came to a halt upon the outbreak of the Second World War. The suppression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine on the one hand, and escalation of the fighting in Europe on the other, diverted Arab attention from the conflict.

From its inception, the Arab League devoted a considerable portion of its time to solve the Palestine conflict. In due course the league members decided to impose

²² Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929-1939* (London: Frank Cass, 1977) pp. 91-137.

an economic boycott on Zionist industry and trade. The initiative for this move was taken by Palestinians and was approved by the League Council in 1945. It was hoped that the imposition of a total boycott on Zionist products and manufactured goods would seriously damage, if not destroy, the stamina of the Jewish community in Palestine.²³ But the total Boycott was not followed strictly. Despite the boycott, Arab and Jewish merchants continued to maintain business links. Moreover, while the boycott regulations caused commercial damage to Arab and Jewish merchants alike, the Jewish community in Palestine, the target of the boycott, continued to prosper because its major part of the trade was with Europe.

7. Palestinian Women and National Movement

The salient characteristic of women's movement in Palestine and in exile has been its identification with the national movement against Zionism. It is this that distinguishes it from the women's movement in any Arab country or in Western countries. Among Palestinians there has never been a widespread grassroots movement for women's rights, the major efforts have been devoted to political and national ends and the emancipation of women has come as a consequence of their determination to carry out some political action such as a demonstration, which necessitated a flouting of conventional mores. The Palestinian women who first demonstrated against Zionist immigration in 1921 were heavily veiled. Then in 1929, two hundred delegates from all over the country attended the first Arab women's congress of Palestine. It was a bold step to take in view of the traditional restrictions which until then prevented the Arab woman in Palestine from taking part in any movement which might expose her

²³ Dan S. Chill, *The Arab Boycott of Israel*, (New York, 1976), pp 1-3.

to the public eye. Women continued to demonstrate present petitions, make bandages and cook for the wounded and die from bullet and bomb.²⁴

In their daily lives Palestinian women suffered from the social harassment and legal discrimination imposed on their sisters in every Arab country. The laws such as the “honour” killing which provides for the murder of a woman by her husband or any male related to her if she is suspected or accused of illicit relations with a man, the divorce laws, the Sharia law of inheritance, which accords the largest share to men and the law which forbids a woman to travel outside the frontiers of her country without written permission from her country and from her husband or other male guardian were the biggest obstacles in women’s participation in political activities.

Before 1948 Palestinian women enjoyed the relative freedom of a mountainous country, the necessity of sharing the work of the fields liberated them from the veil and allowed them to visit towns to sell agricultural produce. But after the exile two opposing trends appeared. First, based on the belief that their ignorance had contributed to the disaster, was a determination to acquire as much formal education as possible. The second was a nostalgic longing to preserve the old society’s structures and habits, which led to the metaphysical revival of the destroyed villages and urban neighbourhoods within the chaos of the refugee camps and to a strict enforcement of the old mores.

²⁴ For detail see Rosemary Sayigh, *From Peasants to Revolutionary*, (London: Zed Press 1979).

Conclusion

Israel is acclaimed for its democratic virtues, openness, high cultural values, secularism, equitable treatment of minorities and progress toward socialism. Such general acclaim is matched only by the no less general ignorance of the facts. There is no such thing as 'Israeli Nationality' in the state of Israel. There is a "Jewish nation" but no Israeli nation. Citizens are Jews, Christians or Muslims, their lives are governed by religious authority and religious law. In this respect, Israel is not unlike its neighbours which no one would think of calling secular states. Jordan and Syria are by law, Islamic states. Israel's subsequent actions and the means by which the Arabs have been contained both nationally and politically, leave no room for doubt that recognition of the national rights of the Arabs living in Israel would counter the basic principles of Zionism.

As far as Egyptian and Jordanian regimes are concerned in this respect, they were governed by their political framework. Each was a reflection not of the need of the Palestinian community but of the respective political orientations and agendas of King Farouq and Nasser of Egypt and King Abdullah and later King Hussain of Jordan. Both Egypt and Jordan fought in the 1948 war but this did not necessarily make them allies over the Palestinian issues. Rather this period witnessed the subjugation of the Palestinian cause under the wing of Arab nationalism and inter-Arab competition for hegemony over the area.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Contrived out of picture during 1930s, with no effective recognised leadership to direct them and more internally divided than ever before, the scattered Palestinians were given no real choice as to their political fate after 1948 war ended. A basic fact that emerges from a study of the history of Arab-Israeli conflict is that the Arabs in Israel have been 'different' citizens, 'non-Jewish' and thus, excluded from the rights enjoyed by Jewish citizens. This distinction which affects every aspect of Arab life was officially implemented at the time of the establishment of the state of Israel. With some periodic adjustment to suit the changes in the times, the early measures adopted with regard to the Arabs have remained in effect, with necessary additional provisions being drafted to protect the Zionist character of the country. "The Arab presence in Israel helped to bring into focus many Zionist attitudes towards the Arab in general and toward Palestinian Arabs in particulars."¹

The Palestinian refugees' problem was born of war and not by plan, either of the Jewish or the Arabs. It was primarily a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the prolonged, bitter fighting that characterised the 1948 war. The conception of the problem was inevitable, given the history of Arab-Jewish hostility from the time of British mandate. The resistance on both sides to a bi-national state, the outbreak and prolongation of the war for Israel's survival, the major structural weakness of Palestinian Arab society and Arabs' fears of falling under Jewish rule and Jewish fears of what would happen should the Arabs win and what would be the fate of a Jewish state born

¹ Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, (London: Monthly Review Press, 1976) p.3.

with a very large potentially hostile Arab minority, contributed to the unavoidability of the problem.²

What happened in Palestine/Israel over 1947-49 was very complex and unpredictable with the situation rapidly changing from place to place and from date to date. The single causal explanation of the exodus from most sites is groundless. At most one can say that certain causes were important in few of the areas at given time, with a general shift in the spring of 1948 from precedence of accumulative internal Arab factors – lack of leadership, economic problems, breakdown of law and order others such as Haganah/IDF (Israel Defence Force), attacks and expulsions, fear of Jewish attacks, atrocities and lack of help from the Arab world.

The law of return gives the Jewish immigrant merely on the basis of Jewish faith, rights exceeding those of the Arab who was born in the country and whose forefathers had lived there, in due course, it has been extended to include Jews who do not even wish to immigrate. Jewish living outside Israel can now acquire Israeli citizenship simply by making known their wish to hold such citizenship. On the other hand, Arab refugees living inside Israel, not to mention those who are not permitted to return to their villages, even when their present residence is only a few miles from their old homes, were not given any citizenship rights. The series of laws that legalised the expropriation of vast stretches of Arabs' properties, which were given to Jews, were considered insufficient because of the coming back of Arabs as hired labourers on their former properties. Convenient measures were soon passed to prevent even this contact between the Arabs

² For detail on the see B. Morris, *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians*, (Oxford, 1990).

and their land. When the government became acquainted with the coming 'threat' from the natural increase of the Arab population in Israel, it took quick measures. A special law was passed granting financial benefits to Jews who had large families. Arab families were excluded from this subsidy.

In addition to these measures, which affect such far-reaching aspects of Arab life, as the right to citizenship, personal freedom, ownership of property, work and ability to raise children, there was an almost continuous policy of benign neglect as far as the educational, social and economic problems of the Arabs were concerned.

The 1948 war uprooted the Palestinians from their places. Palestinians were radically and involuntarily separated from their habitats and sections of their homeland were totally evacuated. Some of the expulsion/evacuation orders were aimed at terrorising the largely unarmed and defenseless civilian population. In such situations, massacre and rape of women were not uncommon and might have been carried out by civilian combatants or the regular government troops. "No less calculated a war crime than massacre was the rape of Palestinian women by Jewish soldiers. Two well-known cases of combined massacres and rapes occurred in Safsal village (Safad sub-district) and in al-Dawayima (Hebron sub-district). Both massacres were carried out on 29 October 1948 during army operations Hiram (for Safsaf) and Yoav (for al-Dawayima). In these cases, gender was subordinated to the ultimate end of military triumph."³

The war of 1948 resulted in a defeat for the Arab armies at the hands of the Zionists. The territory that had not been lost to the new state of Israel came under the

³ Ghazi Falah, "The 1948 Israeli-Palestinian War and its Aftermath", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, (Cambridge), Vol.86, no.2 p.262.

control of either Jordanian government, who formally annexed the West Bank or Egypt, placing the Gaza Strip under military administration. The Palestinians living in captured areas became refugees and over 7, 50,000 of them fled their homes and lands for Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. The Palestinians, who remained, in what became known as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, faced the huge task of rebuilding their society.

The political framework of both the Jordanian and Egyptian administration was a reflection, not of the needs of the Palestinian community but of the respective political orientations of King Farouq and Nasser of Egypt and King Abdullah and King Hussain of Jordan. These orientations were often in competition with the other. Both Jordan and Egypt in the 1948 war fought but this did not necessarily make them allies over the Palestinian issue. Rather this period saw the subjugation of the Palestinian cause under the wing of Arab nationalism and inter-Arab competition for hegemony over the area. At the same time Palestinians enjoyed more freedom in Jordan than other Arab states and in Israel.

The period after the war witnessed mainly international concern with regard to the refugees' problem. Gradually the concern took the form of pressures. These pressures put by Bernadotte and the Arab states in the summer of 1948, increased as the months passed and as the number of refugees swelled and their plight became physically more acute. Later, The United States started pressuring Israel to agree to a substantial measure of repatriation as part of a comprehensive solution to the refugees' problem and to the general conflict. But the time worked against a repatriation of the Arab refugees. In due course America's unwillingness or inability to apply persuasive pressure on Israel and the

Arab states to compromise meant that the Arab-Israel impasse would remain and that exiled Palestinian would remain refugees.

The war and displacement of 1948 caused the breakdown of the extended family as well as frequent separations. Large numbers of female-headed households were created by the absence of male family members because of detention, expulsion, imprisonment or death. Families in refugee camps were particularly affected by men leaving in search of work. From the beginning of the conflict, Palestinian women living in refugee camps had to endure hardships and instability and their daily lives had been a struggle against difficult living conditions like the insecurity of camp life, the deprivation of freedom and the lack of opportunity. The repeated resurgence of unrest and armed conflict only increased the burdens on women in refugee camps by reducing their access to food, medical care, and education and by subjecting them and their families to physical danger and psychological stress.

Women's stake in Nationalism had been both complex and contradictory. On the one hand, women were invited by Nationalist leaders to fully participate in collective life by interpreting them as 'National' actors: mothers, educators, workers and even fighters. On the other hand, the Nationalist reaffirmed the boundaries of culturally acceptable feminine conduct and exercise pressure on women to articulate their gender interest within the terms set by Nationalist discourse. While men and women both actively took part in what they perceive to be a movement for liberation, it was men as leaders and propagandists who defined both problems and solutions. Men were expected to give their lives for the cause of nation, women were to give birth to fighters, sacrifice sons and

husbands for the cause and bear their grief as a mark of honour. Repulsion of the enmity and necessity of self-defence was often measured by the level of perceived brutality to women.

As far as right of inheritance is concerned, it is not the nature of the property but gender, marital status, kin relation and the presence of contending heir which determined it. Despite the role played by women peasants in the production process as direct agricultural producers, the patriarchal norms and values constructed by the Palestinian peasant society had marginalised the value of women's work and contributions which was further diminished by the outcome of the 1948 war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Source:

The State of the World's Refugee: In Search of Solutions (UNHCR, Oxford University Press, 1995).

UN General Assembly Resolutions on UNRWA December, 1999, UN Division for Palestinian Rights

Balfour Declaration, 2 November, 1917
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm/>)

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 186 14 May 1948/ Appointment of a UN Mediator, ((<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.Org./jsource/UN/gatoc.htm#1947>)).

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194(III), 11 December 1948, Concerning Palesine Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator, (http://www.Palestine-un.org./2_194html/).

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 273 (III)11 May 1949/Admission of Israel to the UN/, (<http://www.jewishvirtullibrary.org/jsource.UN/unga273.html>).

United States General Assembly Resolution 181, 29 November, 1947/ Concerning Partition of Palestine, (<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.Org./jsource/History/partition/html/>).

Amnesty <http://www.amnesty.org>

Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information <http://www.ipcri.org/>

Domestic Politics <http://www.domesticpolitics.com>

From occupied Palestine <http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org>

Palestine History <http://www.palestinehistory.com>

Palestine UN Org. <http://www.palestine-un.org>

UN Org. <http://www.un.org/peace/jenin>

Secondary Source:

Books

Abidi, A., *Jordan: A Political Study 1948-57*, (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965).

Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, *The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971).

- Ager, Alastair, (ed.), *Refugees: Perspective on the Experience of Forced Migration* (London: Continuum, 1999).
- Agosin, Marjorie (ed.), *Women Gender and Human Rights: Global Perspectives*, (Indian Reprint, 2003, New Delhi).
- Al-Abid, Irahim (ed.), *Selected Essays on the Palestine Question*, (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1969).
- Alvin, Z. Rubinstein, (ed.), *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (New York: Praeger, 1984).
- Astor, David, *Peace in the Middle East*, (London: Corgi, 1978).
- Bialer, U., *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation, 1948-1956* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- Brand, L.A., *Palestinians in the Arab World*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
- Buehrig Edward, *The UN and the Palestinian Refugees*, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1971).
- Cattan, Henry, *Palestinian Question*, (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1988).
- _____, *Palestine, The Arabs and Israel*, (London: Longman, 1969).
- Chimmi, B.S. (ed.), *International Refugee Laws: A Reader* (Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2000).
- Cohen, Michael J., *The Origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict*, (California: University of California, 1987).
- Cohen, A., *Israel and the Arab World*, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970).
- Cohen, G., *British Policy on the Eve of the War of Independence*, (London, 1985).
- Cohen, M. J., *Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-1948*, (Princeton, 1982).
- Collins, Larry and. Lapierre D., *O Jerusalem!* (Simon and Schuster, 1973).
- Creighton. C., and M.Shaw, (ed.), *The Sociology of War and Peace*, (U.K.: Mac Milan Press, 1987).
- Davis, H. John, *The Evasive Peace*, (London: John Murray, 1968).
- Edward W. Said and Christopher Hitchens, (eds.), *Blaming the victims: Superiors Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, (London: Verso, 1988).
- Fisher, S.N, *The Middle East*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).
- Flapan, Simha, *The Birth of Israel: Myth and Realities*, (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
- _____, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
- Ginat, Joseph, and Edward J. Perkins, ed., *The Palestinian Refugees, Old Problems-New Solutions*, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2001).
- Goode, W.J., *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, (New York, 1963).

- Gujral, I.K. *Palestine, A Symposium*, (New Delhi: United India Press, First Edition, 1969).
- Hadawi, Sami, *Bitter Harvest: Palestine Between 1914-1979*, (New York: Caravan Books, 1979).
- Hathaway, James. *The Law of Refugee Status*, (Butherworths, Toronto, 1991).
- Herzl, T., *The Jewish State*, translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Herzl Press, 1970).
- Jiryis, Sabri, *The Arabs in Israel*, (London: Monthly Review Press, 1976).
- Kandiyoti, Deniz, *Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives*, (I.B. Tauris, London, 1996).
- Kayyali, W.A., *Palestine A Modern History*, (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
- Khalaf, I. *Politics in Palestine Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration 1939-1948* (Albany State University of New York Press, 1991).
- Khalidi, Rashid, *Palestine Reform*, (New York: Tauris and Co., 1992)
- _____, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, (NYC: Colombia University Press, 1997).
- Khan S., Aga and Bin Talal H., *Refugees: The Dynamics of Displacement* (London: Zed Books, 1986).
- Kirk, G., *The Middle East 1945-1950*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954).
- Liddell, Hart, B.H., *The Revolution in Warfare* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1967).
- Louis, R., *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951* (London, 1984).
- Mandani, M., *From Citizen to Refugee* (London: Pinter, 1973).
- Masalha, Nur, *The Politics of Denial*, (London: Pluto Press, 2003).
- _____, *A Land Without A People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians 1949-1985*, (London: Faber, 1997).
- Michael Prior, *Zionism and the State of Israel: A Moral Inquiry*, (London: Routledge, 1999).
- Morris, Benny, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988).
- _____, *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
- Najjar, Orayb Aref and Warnock, Kitty, *Portraits of Palestinian Women* (Salt Lake City: Utah University Press, 1992).
- Nazzal, Nafez, *The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee in 1948*, (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978).
- Nutting, Anthony, *The Arabs*, (New York: New American Library, 1965).

- Palumbo, M., *The Palestinian Catastrophe: The 1948 Expulsion of People From Their Homeland*, (London: Quartet, 1987).
- Pappe, Ilan, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951*, (London: I B Tauris and Co, 1992).
- _____, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1951*, (London: Mac Milan Series 1980).
- _____, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land Two Peoples*, (Cambridge, 2004).
- Porath, Y., *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929-1939*, (London: Frank Cass, 1977).
- Prior Michael, *The Bible and Colonialism. A Moral critique*, (Sheffield -- Sheffield Academic Press, 1997).
- Qahwaji, Habib, *The Arabs in the Shadow of Israel Occupation Since 1948*, (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organisation Research Centre, 1972).
- Rodison, Maxime, *Israel and Arabs*, (London: Penguin Books), 1968.
- Roy R. Anderson, Robert F. Seibert, Jon G. Wagner, *Politics and Change in the Middle East*, (New Jersey: Second Edition Prentice Hall, INC, 1987).
- Rubenberg, Cheryl A., *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*, (Chicago: The University of Illinois Press, 1986).
- Said, E.W., *The Politics of Dispossession*, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1994),
- Sakran, Frank C., *Palestine Still A Dilemma*, (Pennsylvania: Whitmore Publishing Company, 1976).
- Sayigh, Yezid, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- Sayigh, Rosemary, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries*, (London: Zed Press, 1979).
- Sazaz, Z.M., *Germany's Eastern Frontiers*, (Chicago, 1960).
- Schwarz, Walter, *The Arabs in Israel*, (London: Farber, 1959).
- Scott, M. James, (ed.), *Exile: Old Testament, Jewish and Christian Conceptions*, (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
- Shlaim, A., *Collusion Across Jordan*, (Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1988).
- _____, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, (London: Penguin, 2000).
- Smith, Charles D., *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1992).
- Smith, Pamela Ann, *Palestine and Palestinians 1876-1983*, (London: Croom Helm, 1984).
- Smooha, S., *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, (London: Routledge, 1981).

- Stavenhagen, Rudolfo, *Social Class in Agrarian Societies*, (New York, 1975).
- Strum, P., *The Women are Marching: The Second Sex and the Palestinian Revolution* (Brooklyn, New York, 1992).
- Sykes, Christopher, *Crossroads to Israel: Palestine from Balfour to Bevin*, (London, Collins, 1965).
- Szaz, Z.M., *Germany Eastern Frontiers*, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960).
- Taylor, A.R, *Prelude to Israel*, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).
- Tessler, Mark A, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, (Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies), (Indiana: University press, 1994).
- The League of Arab State, *The Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People*, (Morris: Outline books, 1985).
- Thornhill, Theresa, *Making Women Talk: The Interrogation of Palestinian Women Detainees by the Israeli General Security Services* (London: Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights. 1992).
- Watzal, Ludwig, *Peace Enemies: The Past and Present Conflict between Israel and Palestine* (Jerusalem: Passia, 1999).
- Whitelam, W. Keith, *The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History*, (London: Routledge, 1996).

Articles

- Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, "America's Palestine Policy", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.12, no.1 &3, Winter/Spring 1990, pp.191-201.
- Afshar, Haleh, "Muslims Women and the Burden of Ideology". *Women's Studies International Forum*, (New York), Vol 7, , 1984.
- Agha, Qamar, "Jewish Settler Colonialism," *World focus*, (New Delhi), Vol.23 no.3 March 2002, pp.3-5
- _____, "U.S.-Israel -Palestine" *World Focus*, Vol.20, no.9, September 1999, pp.8-10.
- Alnasrawi, Abbas, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East", *Arab Studies Quarterly* Vol.11, no.1, Winter, 1989, pp.55-281.
- Aruri, Naseer, "Looking for Justice in an Unjust World," *Middle East International*, (London), no. 8 February 2002, p.24.
- Ata, I.W, *The West Bank Palestinian Family* (London, 1986).
- Bishara, Ghassan, "The Human Rights Case Against Israeli: The Policy of Torture", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.8, no. 1, 1979.

- Bligh, Alexander, "Israel and Refugee Problem: From Exodus to Resettlement 1948-1952," *Middle Eastern Studies*, (London), Vol. 34, no. 1 January 1998, pp.123-147.
- Brynen, Rex, "International Aid to the West Bank and Gaza," *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Vol. 35, no. 2 (Winter 1996), pp.46-53.
- Fishchbach, Michael R., "Settling Historical Land Claims in the Wake of Arab-Israeli Peace", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 27, no. 1, Autumn 1997, pp.38-50.
- Fleischman, "Ellen to Emergence of the Palestinian women's movement, 1929-39", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 29(3), 2000 (Spring).
- Golan, Aron, "Lydda and Ramle, "From Palestine-Arab to Israeli Towns 1948-67," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.39, no.4, October 2003, pp.121-139.
- Hasso, Frances S., "Feminist generations: The long term impact of social movement involvement on Palestinian women's lives", *American Journal of Sociology*, 107(3) 2001 (Nov), the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA.
- Hourani, Albert, "Writing the History of the Middle East", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, London, 1991.
- Huntington, Ray L and others, "Assessing Changes in Women's family roles: The case of West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian Refugee Women", *International Journal of Sociology of Family*, 28 (2), 1998, (Autumn) Pratts India, New Delhi.
- Jad, I., "From Saloons to Popular Committees, Palestinian Women 1919-1989," in J.R. Nassar and Heacock (eds.), *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads*, (New York: Praeger.
- Khalidi, Walid, "The American Factor in in the Arab-Israeli Conflict", *Middle East International*, (London), no.566, 16 January 1998, pp.19-21.
- Lippert, Randy, "Rationalities and Refugee Resettlement", *Economy and Society*, Vol. no.4, November 1998, pp.380-406.
- Michael Adams, "Israel's Treatment of the Arabs in the Occupied Territories", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (Berkeley, University of California, Press), Vol. 6, no. 2, 1977.
- Nadera, Kevorkian, "Liberating Voices – The Political Implications of Palestinian mothers narrating their loss", *Women's Studies International Forum* (New York), 26(5) 2003 (Sept – Oct).
- Primakov, Evgeni, "The Problem of Palestine in the 20th Century: Origins, Evaluation, Prospects", *Oriental Studies in the USSR*, No.9, (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1984), p.8.
- Roy, Sara, "Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.30, no.4, Summer 2001, pp.5-20.

- Sayigh, Rosemary, "Palestinian Camp Women as Tellers of History", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 27(2) (Winter), 1998.
- Sooraya Antionius, "Fighting on Two Fronts, Conversations with Palestinian Women", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 8, no. 3, 1979.
- Sullivan, Denis J., "NGOs in Palestine: Agents of Development and Foundation of Civil Society", *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Vol.25, no.3, Spring 1996, pp.93-100.
- Tamari, Salim, "Palestinian Refugees and the Palestinian-Israel Negotiation", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.29, no.1, Autumn 1999, pp.81-89.
- Tami, Jacoby Amanda, "Feminism, Nationalism and difference: Reflection on the Palestinian Women's movement", *Women's Studies international Forum*, (New York), 22(5), 1999, Sept – Oct.
- Yuval Davis, Nira, "Women and the Biological Reproduction of the Nation", *Women's Studies International Forum*, Vol. 19, New York, 1996.
- Zunes, Stephen, "Hazardous Hegemony: The United States in the Middle East", *Current History*, (Philadelphia), Vol.96, no.,606, January 1997, pp.20-24.
- Zureik Elia, "Palestinian Refugees and Peace", *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Vol.24, no.1, Autumn 1994, pp.5-17.

Journals

- American Journal of Sociology* (Chicago)
- Annals of the Association of American Geographers* (Washington D.C.)
- Foreign Affairs* (New York)
- International Affairs* (London)
- International Journal of Middle East Studies* (New York)
- International Studies* (New Delhi)
- International Studies Quarterly* (London)
- Journal of Palestine Studies* (Berkeley)
- Middle East International* (London)
- Middle East Journal* (Washington D.C.)
- Middle Eastern Studies* (London)
- Women's Studies International Forum* (New York)
- World Politics* (Princeton)

