

**United Malays' National Organization  
And The Alliance Politics  
In Malaya  
(1952—1959)**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the award of the Degree of  
**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**SUJOY KUMAR**

CENTRE FOR SOUTH, SOUTH-EAST SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC  
AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI-110067  
1987

**WAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

Telegram : JAYENU

Telephones : 652282

661444

661351

New Delhi-110 067

Chairman  
Centre for South, Southeast  
South Pacific & Central Asian  
Studies,  
School of International Studies.



21 July, 1987

C E R T I F I C A T E

Certified that the dissertation entitled :  
UNITED MALAY NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE ALLIANCE  
POLITICS IN MALAYA. (1952-59) submitted by SUJOY  
KUMAR in partial fulfilment for the award of the  
Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not be submitted  
for any other degree of this or any University. To  
the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend this dissertation be placed  
before the examiners for evaluation.

*Bhadrwan Das Bross*  
Supervisor

*[Signature]*  
CHAIRMAN.

Prof. Madan Lal Pradhan  
Chairperson

Centre for South, Central and Southeast  
Asian and South West Pacific Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi-110 067

C O N T E N T

			Pages
PREFACE	...	...	i
ABBREVIATION	...	...	v
CHAPTER I	INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.		1
CHAPTER II	THE MALAY DILEMMA		22
CHAPTER III	UMNO AND THE MALAY POLITICS		40
CHAPTER IV	UMNO AND THE ALLIANCE POLITICS		66
CHAPTER V	CONCLUSION		93
BIBLIOGRAPHY	...	...	99

## P R E F A C E

The problem of ethnicity is a dominant feature of Malayan politics. Although it is a common feature the world over, the ethnic phenomenon is more marked in Malaya. The evolution of a multi-ethnic polity in Malaya is derived from the British colonialism. The unrestricted migration in the initial phases was pregnant with the possibility of conflicts between the migrants and natives of Malaya who were considered 'Bhumiputra'.

The departure of the British raised the question of inheriting the reigns of powers. Because of their numerical as well as economic strength, the Chinese wanted to have some say in the governance of the country in order to protect and promote their economic and commercial interests. While on the other hand, Malays were reluctant to share political power with them. As a consequence, three political parties - United Malaya National Organisation, Malayan Chinese Association and Malayan Indian Congress - came into existence by the end of 1950s, with respective community interest representation. This widened the gap between the three ethnic groups in Malaya.

Even the formation of Alliance in 1954 could not bridge this gap. Malays had a constant fear in their minds that slowly but surely the power would slip into the hands of non-Malays and they would be deprived of all the powers in their own country. This became the major determining factor in the politics of Malaya. In the process, the UMNO came to play a dominant role on the alliance politics from the beginning. It succeeded in asserting itself because of its moderate policies better Organizational set up and able leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman. The MCA and MIC failed to compete with UMNO on an equal footing because of their inherent weaknesses. This primarily explains as to how UMNO emerged dominant in the Alliance Party.

The first Chapter deals with the introduction and the historical background. The Chapter subsequent to it is devoted to the Malay dilemma. In this Chapter various problems faced by Malays are discussed. The Third Chapter attempts to identify UMNO's position in relation to the numerous Malay political parties that emerged during the early 1950s. The fourth Chapter analyses the role of UMNO within the Alliance during 1952-59. The UMNO had not only to struggle against the forces

within Malay community, but it also had to face challenges posed by the non-Malay, i.e., the Chinese and the Indians. The concluding Chapter sums up the findings as to how UMNO succeeded in maintaining its predominant position within the Alliance.

I am highly obliged to Dr. B.D. Arora, my Supervisor, for his learned and able guidance. It is only because of his encouragement and affection I could complete this work in time. I am grateful to Professor Parimal Kumar Das who always showed a keen interest in my work. I also acknowledge the help by Mr. Ashok who helped me while analysing and discussing the Chapters. And above all I am indebted to my parents whose constant encouragement and love inspired me to accomplish this work. I am thankful to my friends who helped me at every step of my work.

I collected materials for the dissertation in various libraries. I am specially thankful for the help rendered by the Librarian and other members of the staff of the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library and the Indian Council of World Affairs,

Library, Sapru House, New Delhi, Tin Murti  
Library, New Delhi, American Centre Library  
New Delhi.

I am also thankful to Mr. J.C. Mongia  
who typed the work in a very short time and  
enabled me to submit this work in time.

New Delhi,  
20 July, 1987

*Subjoy Kumar*  
Subjoy Kumar 21/7/87

## ABBREVIATIONS

AMCJA	All Malaya Council of Joint Action.
AMMYC	All Malaya Malay Youth Congress.
CLC	Communities Liaison Committee.
FELDA	Federal Land Development Authority.
IMP	Independence of Malaya Party.
MARR	Majlis Amanah Raayat (Council of Trust for the Indigenous People)
MATA	Majlis Agama Tertinggi Sa - Malaya (Pan Malayan Supreme Religious Council).
MCA	Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association.
MIC	Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress.
MNP	Malay Nationalist Party
MPAJA	Malayan People's Anti Japanese Army.
MYC	Malayan Youth Council.
NAP	National Association of Perak.
NCP	National Convention Party.
NEP	New Economic Policy.
PAS	Persatuan Islam Sa-Tanah Melayn (Pan Malayan Islamic Party)/Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Party Islam).
PMM	Peninsula Malays' Movement.
PMU	Peninsula Malays' Union.
PN	Party Negara (National Party).
Putera	Pusat Tenaga Raayat (Centre of People's Power).
RIDA	Rural and Industrial Development Authority.
UMNO	United Malays National Organization.



CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction :

This is a study of the role of United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Chief Spokesman of the Malay Community in Malaya (Malaysia since 1963) during 1952-59 in the frame work of the Alliance which came into formal existence in 1954. This Alliance was originally composed of two parties, UMNO and Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). Later, in October 1954 the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) also joined it. This alliance, comprising of three political parties representing three different ethnic groups proved not so much a common platform to seek solution to the inter-ethnic problems, as a political expedient aimed at winning elections.

The 1957 constitution of independent Malaya was undoubtedly based on the principles of multiracialism and representative democracy. But even after three-and-a-half decades UMNO still has been continuing to play a dominant role in the Malaysian politics. During the years of this study (and even later years), although trappings of Parliamentary democracy were preserved, the country came to be

controlled and managed largely by the indigenous Malay elites to promote their sectional interests.

Before we go into the detailed study of the problem it is essential to have a brief insight into the historical traditions of Malaya, because it would enable us to understand the socio-economic and political problems the Malay Society had to face in Modern times. Malay people were influenced by all subsequent immigration, but specific socio-economic and political changes occurred in the British Colonial period. Hence here we intend to trace the historical developments in Malay Peninsula.

#### Historical Background :

Most of the earlier history of Malayan Peninsula is a subject of speculation. It is commonly held that racially, the Malays belonged to Indonesia, or that they were a proto-Malay group of people. They were believed to be descendants of migrants from Indo-China or Yunan.<sup>1</sup> A substantial

---

1. Sir Richard Winstedt. Malaya and its History, London. 1956, pp. 1, 14.

number of immigrants came to settle in Negri Sembilan from Menangkabau, a Kingdom in the Padang Highlands of Sumatra, in the course of the sixteenth century.<sup>2</sup> These immigrants formed the core of what came to be generally accepted as the Malay indigenous population.

Coming of Islam:

The coming of Islam in the fifteenth century and its spread through out the Malayan Peninsula reinforced Malays' racial identity with a sense of religious identity as well. Though as yet there was no overall sense of political identity, there was a common culture. Until the fifteenth century Malay had formed part of larger political units centred elsewhere in the Indonesian Archipelago, or on the Mainland.<sup>3</sup> The Indianized Kingdom of

---

2. C.H.K. Spate and Charles Fisher, The Changing Map of Asia. A Political Geography (U.S.A., 1971), p. 227; R.S. Wilkinson, ed., Paper on Malay Subjects (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), p. 22.

3. B.S.H. Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), pp. 27-28.

Champa in Indo-China and the Indian Kingdoms on the Coromandel coast of India maintained outposts in the northern parts of the Malay Peninsula.<sup>4</sup>

In the meantime the Buddhist Kingdom of Sri Vijaya of which the Malay peninsula had become a vassal, was overwhelmed by the Javanese Kingdom of Majapahit in the fifteenth century. In the first years of this century (A.D. 1400) a Malay prince from Palembang had established the Malacca Sultanate (A.D. 1400-1511)<sup>5</sup>, which was to transmit to other Malay Kingdoms a pattern of political organization and political culture.<sup>6</sup>

At the apex of the system was the ruler, the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong, embodying in his person the unity of the State. As the religious head he

---

4. Ibid., pp. 29-35.

5. The Malacca Sultanate was founded by Parameswara a Prince of Palembang. It became the heir to the Commercial powers wielded by the Kingdom of Srivijaya, in South-eastern Sumatra. It also became the centre for the diffusion of Islam throughout South-east Asia. see D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-east Asia (New York, 1968), p. 213.

6. Kiran Kapur Datar, n. 9, P.1.

served as a unifying force. The ruler stood at the head of a hierarchical order assisted by his Mentri (Secretary of State), the Bendahara (Chief Minister), the Temenggong (Commander of troops and Police), the Penghulu Bendahara (Treasurer) and the Shahbender (Harbour Master and Collector of Customs). The system was supported by muslim religious functionaries.<sup>7</sup>

Coming of Europeans :

The capture of Malacca by the Portuguese in A.D. 1511 exposed the Malay world to new influences. The immediate result was that the centre of Malay power shifted away from Malacca, and Sultanates came to be established at Johore, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Perak, maintaining the political traditions of the Malacca Sultanate.<sup>8</sup> Before the coming of the British thus, the Malay world did have an identity which, though not geographic, was

---

7. J.M. Grullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, (London, 1958), pp. 10-11.

8. D.S.M. Tate, n.3, pp. 43-45.

was racial, religious and cultural, and of course, political.

However, the British advance into Malaya strengthened, the integrative factor of religion.<sup>9</sup> The British followed a policy of non-intervention in matters pertaining to Malay religion and customs and for the preservation and re-inforcement of the traditional basis of authority. British policy was evident in the address of Sir Hugh Clifford (High Commissioner in Malaya) to the Federal Council in 1927: "These States were, when the British Government was invited by their Rulers and Chiefs to set their troubled houses in order, Muhammadan monarchies, such as they are today, and such they must continue to be. No mandate has ever been extended to us by Rajas, Chiefs or people to vary the system of government which has existed in these territories from time immemorial."<sup>10</sup>

---

9. Kiran Kapur Datar, n.s, p.2.

10. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven, 1967), p.11.

The special position of the Malay ruling class was maintained as a cohesive force for the Malay Community, which the British administration in Malaya accepted as the indigenous population.<sup>11</sup>

Sir Frank Swettenham (Governor of the Straits Colony and High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States) stated that the Malays "are the people of the country."<sup>12</sup> Another British administrator, Victor Purcell made the point that the Malays were treated as privileged children while the non-Malays were not encouraged to regard themselves as citizens of Malaya.<sup>13</sup> The British found it convenient to use the established Malay leadership in local administration. A Malayan administrative service was created as a subordinate partner of the Malayan Civil Service, founded in 1906.<sup>14</sup> A

- 
11. Kalyan Kumar Ghosh, Twentieth Century Malaya. Politics of Decentralization of Power 1920-29, (Calcutta, 1977), p. 303.
  12. Kiran Kapur Datar, n.9, p.4.
  13. Hua Wu' Yin, Class and Communalism in Malaysia, (New Delhi, 1984), p.31.
  14. Ibid.



conscious effort was made to create an administrative class from the traditional elite, which would work with the British. Through the early part of the twentieth century, British policy laid the foundations of a "bumiputra" policy (that is, the acceptance and recognition of the Malays as the sons of the soil), and accorded the Malays a pre-eminent position in government, and later on, in political participation as well.<sup>15</sup>

Formation of the Multi-Racial Society :

The exploitation of the rich natural resources of Malaya, such as rubber, tin and oil, needed labour. In the later half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese started coming into Malaya, lured by the prospects of employment on the estates and mines. In its early stages, immigration was unrestricted. Similarly the miserable conditions prevailing in India, caused large outflow of Indians seeking work abroad. In case of the Indian immigrants the British followed a conscious policy of

---

15. Alvin Rubushka, Race and Politics in Urban Malaya, (California, 1973), p. 31.

encouraging Indian labour in order to counter-balance the Chinese.<sup>16</sup> Sir Frederick Weld, the straits settlement Governor, in a despatch to the Secretary of State in 1837, stated: "I am also conscious for political reasons that the great preponderance of the Chinese over any other race in these settlements and to a less marked degree in some of the native states under one administration should be counter-balanced as much as possible by the influence of Indians and other nationalities".<sup>17</sup>

In 1957, when Malaya became Independent, the Malays formed 40.8 percent of the population, the Chinese 27.2 percent and the Indians 11.3 percent.<sup>18</sup> However, the Malays, Chinese, and Indians remained distinct ethnic groups.<sup>19</sup> Racially

- 
16. R.S. Milne Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston 1967), p.21.
  17. Kiran Kapur Datar. n.s., p. .
  18. 1957 Population Census Report of Federation of Malaya cited in Alvin Rubuska, n.15, p.21.
  19. Ethnic group is a term used to designate those groups which are distinct from others by characteristics such as race, religion, nationality or some combination of these which generate a strong in-group feeling. Franklin Edwards, "Race Relations" Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol.-13, 1968, pp. 269-76.

they were very distinct. They practiced different religions, the Malays were muslims, and the Indians and Chinese predominantly Hindus, and Buddhist respectively. They spoke different languages - Bahasa Melayu, Tamil, Hindi and Punjabi, and different dialects of Chinese respectively. Their habits, customs and cultural norms were distinct and these emphasized and reinforced separate ethnic identification. There were few levels of contact between them. Besides, superficial Colonial policies and distinct occupational structures also strengthened ethnic divisions.

The British protected the Malays, giving them a pre-eminent position in government and administrative employment. The Indians, primarily, worked on the estates, while the Chinese were allowed a free hand in trade and business.

In education, there was no over-all national system catering to Malays, Chinese and Indians. The Winstedt Report on vernacular education laid the foundations of this policy. It emphasized a strong manual and agricultural base for education for the Malays, with a small privileged group going in for

higher education in English.<sup>20</sup> Chinese Schools were patterned on schools in China, run by China-born and educated teachers. Kuo-Yu (Mandarin) was generally the medium of instruction.<sup>21</sup> The Indians were mostly educated in estates schools run by their employers. A pattern of education with English as the medium of instruction was available in the urban areas, but patronized only by the urban non-Malays. Educational pattern, therefore, served to separate rather than to unify the ethnic groups.<sup>22</sup>

Before the Second World War, associations and groups formed in Malaya were also along ethnic lines. Malay associations such as Kaum Muda (Youth groups), <sup>Kaum</sup> Tua (old aged group) were formed on the issue of Islamic reform. The Indians came together in association such as Sanathan Dharma Sabha, Dravida Sangam, Young men's Indian Association and the Indian coastal Association.<sup>23</sup> The Chinese organized

---

20. William Reff, n. 10, P. 140.

21. Victor Pureell, The Memoirs of a Malayan Official, (London. 1965) p. 155.

22. Kiran Kapur Datar, n9, p4.

23. For a detailed account of the Indians in Malaya, See R.K. Jain, South Indians on the Planatation Frontier in Malaya (New Haven, 1970) and Karnial S. Sandhu, Indians in Malaya : Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement , 1786-1957 (London, 1969),

themselves on the basis of secret societies or associations of employers and workers. They were organized generally on the basis of associations of territory and dialect.<sup>24</sup>

The pattern of settlement of the immigrant population further separated the Malays and non-Malays. The non-Malays, particularly Chinese, settled primarily in the Urban areas of West Malaya, in the West Coast States of Johore, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, Penang, Perak and Selangor. The Malays, predominantly engaged in agricultural activities, were concentrated in the east coast states of Perlis, Pahang, Kelantan and Trengganu.<sup>25</sup>

Ethnic differences between the Malays, Chinese and Indians were, therefore, re-inforced by differing patterns of residence, occupation, language, religion and association. In 1957 when Malaya achieved independence, it had become a multiracial society. The indigenous people, the Malays constituted only about half of the total population of Malaya, the rest being non-Malays.

---

24. Kiran Kapur Datar, n.9, p. 5.

25. Alvin Rubushka, n. 15, p. 20.

The Japanese Occupation of Malaya :

The Japanese occupation of Malaya beginning in December 1941 stirred Malayan political consciousness to a considerable degree. While stimulating nationalism among the Malays, the Japanese resorted to the "articulation of communal antipathy" - another form of divide-and-rule-policy. It highlighted the differing aspirations, needs and roles of the Malays, Chinese and Indians. It also tried to stimulate the anti-British sentiments among the Malays and Indians, and played on the fears that the Malays had about the Chinese. It caused tremendous physical destruction and virtual disintegration of the governmental structure and civil services, and hardened the communal hatred.

Malayan Union Proposals :

The ethnic antipathies, reinforced by the Japanese policies and the MCP's actions, led the Malays to welcome the British re-entry in August, 1945. After the end of the second world war, when the British returned to Malaya, they were faced with immediate problems of tensions in the Malay community, insurgency, and the need to unify the diverse Malay

states and to democratize the form of government. The recommendations of Harold Lee Michael, who visited Malaya from October 1945 to January 1946, eventually formed the basis of the proposals for a Malayan Union on April 1, 1946. The proposals for a Malayan Union comprising the nine Malay States of Peninsular Malaya and the British settlements of Hongkong and Malacca, with Singapore remaining a separate crown colony were contained in the "Lee Michael Report".<sup>26</sup> He proposed a form of common citizenship for all irrespective of race and regarded Malaya as their home and as the source of their loyalty, and a centralized government to be established under the direct rule of the British.

The Malayan Union could not be realized because of the insoluble communal conflicts in various states of the Union. The Malays, fearful of the increasing political power of the Chinese and Indians, were unwilling to give up their privileges which they had traditionally enjoyed, and the non-Malays called for equal status with the Malays in the context of socio-political rights and citizenship.<sup>27</sup>

---

26. Jan M. Pluvier, n. 30, pp. 394-96.

27. Victor Purcell, "A Malayan Union : the proposed New Constitution," Pacific Affairs, 19 March, 1946, pp. 35-40, and General Hawkins, "Reactions to the Malayan Union" Pacific Affairs, September 19. 1946. pp. 279-85.

The proposals evoked a very hostile response from the Malays. The creation of a centralized union meant that the sovereignty of the Rulers would be adversely affected as the Malay states would now come within the ambit of a centralized authority. Also because the rulers would lose their sovereign power, which would now be vested in the British Crown. The liberal citizenship proposals accompanied by the promise of democratization and self-government were seen as a threat to Malay privileges and political power. The British move to open the Civil Service to all Malaysians was resented as it had earlier been a British and Malay preserve.<sup>28</sup>

In January 1946 Dato Onn bin Jaafar organized the Peninsular Malay Movement at Johore to defend and protect the privileges traditionally enjoyed by the Malays. Eventually, under his leadership various Malay associations came to form the United Malays National Organization which was formally

---

28. The Malay rulers had consistently resisted the entry of non-Malays to positions in the services. In November 1940, the rulers of the Federated Malay States were invited to a conference to discuss the appointment of non-Malays to technical, senior positions. The rulers were firm that non-Malays should not be appointed. See C.M. Turnbull, "British Planning for Post-war Malaya", Journal of South-east Asian Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, September 1974, pp. 239-54.



inaugurated in May 1946.<sup>29</sup>

UMNO was the first effective Pan Malay Association with political overtones. Over the years it became the Chief Spokesman of the Malay interests.

The Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, which replaced the Malayan Union conceded and incorporated the basic Malay demands, Malay special rights, the constitutional position of the Sultans as Sovereign, and qualified citizenship rights to non-Malays.<sup>30</sup>

The non-Malays remained generally apathetic during this important formative period. But the rejection of the Malayan Union proposals and the growing strength and unity of the Malays created the need for unifying the Malayan Chinese in order to fight for their own interests. As a result the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was formed on February 27, 1949 under the leadership of Tan Cheng

---

29. K.J.Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1965) p. 144.

30. Jan M. Pluvier, South-east Asia from colonialism to Independence, (Kuala Lumpur, 1974), p. 401.

Lock as a spokesman for Chinese interests.<sup>31</sup>

The Indians, though lacking both the numerical strength of the Malays and the economic power of the Chinese, have always been playing an important role as a balancing factor in the politics of Malaya. They formed the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) in 1946 under the leadership of John A. Thivy. Over a period of time the MIC grew to be the major spokesman of the interests of the Indian Community.<sup>32</sup>

#### Formation of Alliances :

Thus, by early 1946, three political parties with distinct ethnic orientation had come into existence representing the interests of their respective communities. However, it was obvious that without inter-communal harmony and peace, it would be difficult to negotiate for independence. To create conditions for independence, it was found necessary to demonstrate inter-ethnic co-operation and understanding. In the late 1940's and early

---

31. R.K. Vasil. Ethnic Politics in Malaysia (New Delhi, 1980), p. 77.

32. K.J. Ratnam, n. 29, p. 77.

1950s as the talks for independence opened up vistas of power, the major ethnic groups in Malaya tried to consolidate their own position in order to gain concessions for themselves. The solution thus formed was unique in character- UMNO, MCA and MIC, while maintaining their organizational structure and independent identity, came together at the national level to form the Alliance Organization. Initially, the UMNO and MCA came together in an electoral understanding to contest the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Elections in January 1952. The election results showed the great success of the UMNO-MCA Alliance, which won 26 seats as against only one seat for the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), which contested the elections as a major opposition Party led by Dato Onn bin Jaafar.<sup>33</sup>

In subsequent municipal as well as National elections the massive victory won by the Alliance showed it up as a viable political organisation. The UMNO-MCA Alliance was formally inaugurated at a national convention held at Kuala Lumpur on

---

33. Dato Onn bin Jaafar was the first President of UMNO. When his proposal to open UMNO was vehemently opposed by the rank and file of UMNO, he left UMNO and founded Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) on September 16, 1951.

August 23, 1953.<sup>34</sup> Initially, the MIC had reservations about joining the Alliance. However, after considerable debate the MIC joined the Alliance in October 1954.<sup>35</sup> In 1957, the Alliance got itself registered as independent political party changing its name from the Alliance organization to the Alliance Party.<sup>36</sup>

The Alliance represented a unique compromise between the leaders of the Malays, Chinese and Indians. In this way inter-ethnic harmony was created and this became the characteristic feature of the Malayan Political System. The 1957 constitution reflected the compromise that had taken place amongst the Malays and the non-Malays in the Alliance framework. The Alliance formula had proved successful in avoiding ethnic strife during the sensitive period of constitution making. It had taken cognizance of the separate ethnic identities in Malaya and had created this politico-ethnic framework to lay the foundations of a unique political system in Malaya—Management of issues by means of inter-ethnic adjustment and

---

34. R.K. Vasil, n. 31, p. 94.

35. Ibid.

36. Kiran Datar <sup>Kapur,</sup> n. 9, p. 7.

compromise, rather than allowing issues, especially sensitive ones of race, language, citizenship and special rights etc., to boil up in inter-ethnic violence.

However, the stresses and strains within the Alliance were considerable. The Malays did not constitute even half of the total population of Malaya. Their reaction to the Malayan Union Proposals had revealed their fears of being dispossessed in their own land by the non-Malays, especially the Chinese. But the Malays did not think of 'Malay Supremacy' in terms of confrontation with the Chinese and Indians - instead they followed the Alliance approach of accommodation. In the given circumstances - terrorist activity, emergency and the attitude of the British Government - the compromise formula was the only viable and workable solution which did not place the Malays at a disadvantage. However, the new generation of Chinese began to challenge the compromise formula of 1957 and were unwilling to concede a pre-eminent position to the Malays. Since 1957 there were challenges to the system, but this did not lead to abandoning it. On the other hand, it was sought to be


strengthened by the conservative Malay and non-Malay leadership as the only viable system for Malay multi-racial society.

However, the stresses and strains within the Alliance were considerable. Each of the two main partners, the UMNO and the MCA, had to meet the challenge of competition from opposition parties representing extremist views on ethnic issues and appealing to the two major communities, the Malays and the Chinese, while simultaneously trying to keep in step with one another in the Alliance. This was bound to result in pressures which might tend to disrupt the Alliance.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse, as to how in the face of such overwhelming odds, UMNO, one of the component partners in the Alliance, managed to maintain its predominant position, keeping other parties in the Alliance under manageable control, while at the same time serving the interests of the Malay community.

TH-2234

DISS  
320.90595  
K9606 Un



TH2234



CHAPTER - II

THE MALAY DILEMMA

After the Second World War the Malays found themselves in a precarious position. Throughout the colonial period, the British had consolidated their hold over all the important spheres of Malayan economy. But when independence drew near and the departure of the British became imminent, it were the non-Malays (mainly Chinese and the Indians) who came into direct confrontation with the Malays.<sup>1</sup> These three groups differed sharply from one another in the fields of religion, culture and language, customs, food habits, etc.<sup>2</sup> The Malays found non-Malays as posing a strong political threat to the former's own privileged position.<sup>3</sup>

- 
1. Victor Puyall, "A Malayan Union, the Proposed New Constitution," Pacific Affairs, 19, March 1946, pp. 35-40; and Gerald Hawkins, "Reactions to the Malayan Union", Pacific Affairs, 19, September, 1946, pp. 279-85.
  2. K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1965), p.1,
  3. R.K. Vasil, Politics in A Plural Society (London, 1971), p.5.



Economically, they found the non-Malays prospering in their country while they themselves (Malays) lagged behind, and culturally they found non-Malays largely unassimilated. Therefore, it were the Malays' and non-Malays' arguments concerning the legitimacy of their respective positions and claims, and the Malays' fears of increased non-Malays' economic power and their own comparative economic and social backwardness, which shaped the future course of politics.

These people had generally lived apart. During the period of the British rule the different ethnic groups hardly came together.<sup>4</sup> The immigrant peoples were made to feel that they were aliens and did not belong to Malaya. No attempts were made to bring them together. The process of integration of these people into a new Malayan nation was seriously hampered by the colonial power. Therefore, there had been constant fear in the minds of the Malays that economic power coupled with the political power might threaten the very existence of the Malay people, who

---

4. Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Singapore, 1970), pp.6-8.

considered themselves as the only 'Sons of the Soil' in Malaya,<sup>5</sup> that slowly but surely things would continue to slip into the hands of non-Malays and they (Malays) would be deprived of their political as well as economic rights, and the Malay culture would be jeopardized in their own country.<sup>6</sup> By virtue of being the indigenous people, the Malays had been demanding 'Special Position' throughout the formative stage of the Constitution in order to make themselves eligible for a certain amount of preferential treatment.<sup>7</sup>

It is to discuss the issues concerning the Malay economic and political dilemma as it was manifest during 1952-59 in the country, that this Chapter is devoted.

#### Economic Dilemma.

The difference in the economic position of the Malays and the Chinese tended to aggravate the situation and came to have a serious impact on the politics of the country. A precise view

---

5. Ibid

6. Ibid, p.141.

7. Ibid, p.140.

of the extent of control by the non-Malays over Malayan economy would enable us to understand the gravity of the situation.

Non-Malayan Share

In the Economy :

Throughout the colonial period all key Sectors of the Malayan economy were dominated and controlled by Europeans.<sup>8</sup> This domination was to the extent that over 83% of rubber estate lands were under their control, run by public limited companies with large-scale operations. In comparison a very low proportion of these were in Asian hands, owned by individuals or private limited companies.<sup>9</sup> Most of the rubber, Oil, Palm and coconut resources were controlled by the Europeans through Agency Houses.<sup>10</sup> Not only this, the Directors of the Agency Houses were also in the Board of Directors of nearly two hundred rubber companies which owned nearly a million acres of rubber plantations in Malaya.<sup>11</sup>

---

8. Peng, Khor Kok, The Malaysian Economy  
( ) p.39.

9. Ibid

10. Hua Win Yin, Class and Communalism in Malaysia Politics in a Dependent Capitalist State (New Delhi, 1984), p.113.

11. Ibid.

Another dominant economic activity, i.e., tin mining industry, was under the Europeans to the extent of 62% of total Malayan tin output.<sup>12</sup> In any comparison an European company was producing about twelve times that of its Chinese counterpart. Though Chinese were the second most dominant group, they were far behind the Europeans in economic activities.<sup>13</sup> Even they had too limited capital to bypass the Europeans. Of course, compared to Indians and Malays, the Chinese areas of activity and capital had an upper hand.<sup>14</sup> In this sense the Chinese were the most important Asian capitalists in the Malayan economy.<sup>15</sup>

Chinese were also active in the subsistence economy, i.e., agriculture, next only to Malays.<sup>16</sup> Chinese activities in agriculture were remarkable. Out of the total of 5.2 million acres under agriculture, Chinese cultivated 1.4 million acres.<sup>17</sup>

- 
12. Federation of Malaya, Annual Report (Kuala Lumpur, 1955), p.171.
13. Ibid, p.175.
14. J.J. Puttucheary, Ownership And Control in The Malayan Economy (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), p.123.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid, p.126.
17. Ibid. P.127.

But here again as far as land ownership was concerned, Europeans had 1.8 million acres in their account.<sup>18</sup>

In the pineapple industry, it was the Chinese who dominated. This sector was particularly important because it accounted for a major portion of Malaya's exports. Probably, this was the only industry where the Chinese had overpowered and replaced the Europeans.<sup>19</sup>

The timber industry, rice mills, <sup>rubber mills</sup> and oil mills were also dominated by the Chinese. Out of 120 Oil Mills in the country only three were in the European hands and one in Indian. All the rest were under Chinese ownership. Out of the 21 soap factories 20 were Chinese owned producing about 60% of the total output.<sup>20</sup>

Chinese had also their share in significant rubber exports. In 1956, there were about 2500 licenced rubber dealers, of whom 79 were Europeans, 600 were Malays and the rest Chinese.<sup>21</sup> The trend

---

18. Ibid.

19. F.J. Moorhead. A History of Malaya, vol. II (Kuala Lumpur, 1963), p. 137.

20. Federation of Malaya Report of the Industrial Working Party (Kuala Lumpur, 1957), p.57 and Federation of Malaya Annual Report (Kuala Lumpur, 1955), p. 171.

21. Federation of Malaya Rubber Statistic Handbook (Kuala Lumpur, 1956), p. 57.

clearly showed that in a few spheres of economy - Chinese enjoyed overall control and dominance, despite being small operators. Not only these, even in the entertainment and transport industries, the Chinese were having a dominant position.

The overall picture of Malayan economy showed that though all foreigners came into the economy with the same interest but the Chinese overcame all others including Indians. However, this was a fact that they could not supersede the Europeans. A significant part was played by the Indian money lenders who participated in the country's economy providing credit to European and Chinese entrepreneurs alongwith Indian traders and Malay aristocracy and also Malay peasantry. But Indians could not play a role equal to that of the Chinese.<sup>22</sup>

Malay Share in the Economy :

A substantial majority of them being engaged in agricultural pursuits, the Malayas remained at the lowest ebb of the Malayan economy.<sup>23</sup> More than two-thirds of the gainfully occupied Malay

---

22. Hua Win Yin, n. 10, p.56.

23. J.J. Puttucheary, n. 14, p.23.

population were engaged in 'Subsistence' activities. Of those engaged in subsistence activities, about 90 per cent were engaged in agriculture. Almost all the rest were wage earners, about half of whom were employed on plantations and a quarter of them in government service. Thus subsistence, plantations and government services absorbed about 90 per cent of the gainfully occupied Malays.<sup>24</sup>

Governmental Attitude:

It should, however, be noted that even during colonial period reforms in the peasant sector had been considered to provide them with the opportunity to have larger say in the economic activity and to improve upon the financial position of the Malays. Precisely, the Chief measures adopted by the government had been the extension of credit, establishment of vocational and commercial training facilities, provision of technical advisory services, development of marketing facilities, encouragement of cooperative societies, establishment of Banks and improvement of rural health and education.<sup>25</sup>

The gravity of the tenancy situation among padi farmers had resulted in the 'Padi' cultivation

---

24. Ibid.

25. Mahathir bin Mohamad, n.4, p.23.

control of Rents and Security of Tenure Ordinance of 1955 to help the tenants,<sup>26</sup> The First Five Year Plan (FFYP) of 1956-60 was meant for more infrastructural facilities for the private sector in industry and for increasing the productivity of the rural sector.<sup>27</sup> The Rural and Industrial Authority (RIDA), a Public Corporation, had been in existence since 1953 to look-after the interests of the Malays. MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat) came into existence in 1959 with the wide and complex purpose of serving the Malay interests. Already in 1956 FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority) had been formed to improve upon the conditions of the Malays. All these schemes had, however, failed to produce the desired improvement in the Malays' condition.<sup>28</sup>

Despite all these efforts Malay's conditions remained the same and it were the Europeans and the Chinese capitalists who continued to exercise control over a sizeable part of the economy. In most of the industries Chinese were subsidiary to European capitalists. In capitalist agriculture

---

26. Hua Win Yin, n.10, p.131.

27. Mahathir bin Mohamad, n.4, p.41.

28. Hua Win Yin, n.10, p.132.



their share was small. This was also true in the export-import trade. But they had a larger share in the mining industry. In minor industries such as manufacture, transport and entertainment, they held the dominant position. In all it could be said that if the top position was held by Europeans the middle sector of the economy was captured by the Chinese and the Malays were relegated to the lowest position in the Malayan economy.

Undoubtedly, the Chinese owned a large part of the wealth. More significant was that most of the Malays and their leaders believed this to be so and this determined their attitude towards non-Malays, particularly the Chinese. To the Malays, therefore, it was important that they must have a pre-eminent position in the administration and government of the country in order to replace the dominant non-Malay control over the economic and commercial life. This feeling among the Malays gave rise to the political dilemma.

Political Dilemma:

The Malay dilemma is not only economic but political as well. There is no doubt that the existence of a multi-racial society in Malaya was the product of the British colonial policy.<sup>29</sup>

---

29. R.K. Vasil, n.3 , p.4.

The immigrant races, Chinese and Indians were allowed mainly to help in the exploitation of the country's natural resources. Their presence was never expected by the British or the Malays to be permanent until after the Second World War. But the long years of War and the Japanese occupation changed the entire pattern of immigration, with the result that the non-Malay community became permanent settlers in Malaya.<sup>30</sup>

On their return in 1946, British imposed military rule until April, 1946 and in an attempt to centralize British rule over the entire Malay Peninsula, the British proposed the Malayan Union Scheme.<sup>31</sup> The scheme was a negation of all the past British promises to the Malays as its implementation would lead to a dilution of the powers of the Sultans, of Malay Special rights, and the elevation of the immigrant communities to equal status with the Malays.<sup>32</sup>

---

30. Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (London, 1984, p.247.

31. Richard Allen, Malaysia - Prospect and Retrospect (New York, 1968). p.82.

32. Ibid, p.83

Citizenship Issue:

The most important issue which caused serious concern to the Malays during this period was the question of citizenship which was granted to the non-Malays, on equal terms with the Malays.<sup>33</sup> The difficulties regarding citizenship legislation arose from a conflict between Malay and non-Malay interests. The former were reluctant to let their political identity diluted and feared the implications of placing the Chinese and the Indians on an equal footing with themselves. The liberalizing trend in citizenship had produced two apprehensions in their minds. First, they had very strong doubts regarding the professed loyalty of the non-Malay communities. For this reason they considered liberalization to be a political risk of the first order. Secondly, they realized that since the non-Malays were now admitted to citizenship on a large scale, their own community would, have to relinquish gradually all the privileges which it had hitherto enjoyed.<sup>34</sup>

Thus the Malays emphasised that citizenship

---

33. B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism 1945-1963 (London, 1969), p. 177.

34. K.J. Ratnam, n.2, p.67.

qualifications should never be more liberal than was necessary to guarantee a person's assimilation to the country's way of life, which meant that the immigrant communities must have sympathy for Malay culture - language in particular - and undivided loyalty towards the Malay nation.<sup>35</sup>

The non-Malays, on the other hand, maintained that the traditional claims of the Malay community were both irrelevant and obstructive. Their arguments mainly revolved around the demand that every person born in the country should be made a citizen by operation of law and that they should be given an equal share in the country's political life.<sup>36</sup>

Besides making this claim, the non-Malays (particularly Chinese) also emphasized certain practical considerations, such as their economic power and numerical strength which, in their opinion, qualified them for unrestricted acceptance as Federal citizens. In countering the Malay assertion that the non-Malay communities had not shown an allegiance, sufficiently enough to warrant an unreserved grant of citizenship

---

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

privileges, they pointed out that it was difficult for them to exhibit the faith worthy of citizens as long as the Malays regarded them as aliens.<sup>37</sup>

Special Position for the Malays:

The second most important political issue and a major cause of concern for the Malays had been their claim for 'Special Position' in relation to the non-Malays. The policy of preserving Malay rights, and of excluding the non-Malays from the country's political life, was not a very complicated problem, as long as the non-Malays constituted only a transient population which regarded Malaya as a foreign country ideal for material gain. But the 1930s and 1940s changed the basic character of these communities.<sup>38</sup> They now became a part of the settled population. They demanded local rights and a share in local politics. With this change, the question of special Malay rights became a very live political issue.<sup>39</sup>

The old policy of strictly and effectively maintaining the special position of the Malays

---

37. B. Simandjuntak, n.33, p. 179.

38. K.J. Ratnam. no.2, 0.104.

39. Ibid.

was now placed in direct conflict with the need to make concessions to the non-Malays.

Political advancement made the situation more difficult as the introduction of wide democratic measures (such as the liberalization of citizenship qualifications, the introduction of elections, and so on) made it difficult for special rights to be reserved for a single community. But the same political advancement made the Malays more dependent on guaranteed rights, because it made their position in the country less secure.

The Malayan Union Scheme in April 1946 represented a complete abandonment of the pre-war policy of recognizing Malaya as a Malay country. Indirect rule was to be abandoned in the interest of a centralized and democratic administration. The Malays found that they could no longer take their privileged position for granted, as they had done before the War.<sup>40</sup>

The Federation of Malay Agreement which followed in February, 1948, represented a successful

---

40. Karl Van Vorys, Democracy without consensus-Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (London, 1975), p.65

attempt to return to the pre-War policy. Though the Special rights of the Malay Community were once again given recognition, the claims of the non-Malays were not ignored. It was stated, for example, that the responsibilities of the High Commissioner were to include the Safeguarding the "Special Position" of the Malays and the "legitimate interests" of the other communities.<sup>41</sup>

By virtue of being the indigenous people, the Malays had been given a 'special position' which made them eligible for a certain amount of preferential treatment in the framework of the 'Federation' constitution. In the absence of these provisions, the Malays might not have enjoyed the priorities constitutionally granted to them. With the advent of independence, the Malays concentrated their efforts on establishing the political supremacy of their own community. They argued that since it was the Malays who had originally surrendered authority to British hands, they should also be the one to inherit the power that was now being relinquished.<sup>42</sup>

---

41. Kiran Kapur Datar, Malaysia: Quest for a Politics of Consensus (New Delhi, 1983), p. 11

42. Ibid.

That was why right upto 1952, the "legitimate interests" of the non-Malays did not entitle them to enter the Malayan Civil Service. They had, however, for a long time been admitted to the other branches of the Public Service where they in fact outnumbered the Malays.<sup>43</sup>

To ensure the political supremacy of the Malays provisions were made in the Constitution. Article 153 of the 1957 Constitution provided:

- (a) the reservation for Malays of four-fifths of all appointments in the Malayan Civil Services,
- (b) the reservation of Malays of three-fourths of all university scholarships; and (c) the prerogative of the king to issue new permits of licences as required by federal law to Malays in whatever proportion he deems reasonable. A fourth guarantee in Article 89 provided for a system of Malay reservations - land reserved for Malays that could not be alienated to non-Malays. Articles 149 and 150 of the Constitution provided for the infringements on civil liberties such as "preventive detention" when hostility between the races might arouse violence and "proclamation of emergency" which permitted among other things, the suspension of elections.<sup>44</sup>

---

43. K.J. Ratnam, n.2, p.110.

44. Kiran Kapur Datar, n.41, p.11.



An important thing of critical political importance which was not specified in the Constitution was the ethnic composition of the military and police forces. The Malayan Army was mainly Malay and the same was true of the police. Malay dominance in the army and the police was a form of insurance in defence of their constitutional privileges and guarantees.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, together with the opening up of citizenship, and the recognition that the non-Malays had "legitimate interests" in the country a new phase was introduced in the politics of the country much of the country's politics during the period of this dissertation, that is from 1952 to 1959, revolved around efforts at definition, by the Malays on the one hand and the non-Malays on the other aimed at enhancing their own interests.<sup>46</sup>

---

45. Ibid.

46. K.J. Ratnam, n.2, p.102.

CHAPTER - III

UMNO AND THE MALAY POLITICS

1952-1959

As a prelude to a detailed analysis of the role of UMNO in the framework of alliance, it would be necessary to examine the internal mechanism of the party activities. Questions as to how it operated in the then political situation, the way in which its influence operated in decision making, both within and without, the tactics it adopted to mobilize support in favour of its programme, the manner in which it faced challenges from other Malay Political Parties (during freedom struggle) etc., would enable one to understand the position of UMNO in a correct perspective. This would also help in the understanding of the background that led to a gradual ascendancy of UMNO in Malay politics.

The first half of this chapter attempts to trace the origin of UMNO and to study its internal politics. The second half is devoted to identify UMNO's position in relation to the numerous Malay parties that emerged during the early 1950s. Besides it also examines the major political issues which occupied the attention of the Malay community.

In order to have a fuller understanding of the intricacies of the role of UMNO in the Malayan

politics it would be essential to comprehend the level of politicization in Malaya. There is a general opinion that the Malay community had remained politically disorganized during the colonial period and, therefore, had no role in politics.<sup>1</sup>

One cannot categorically rule out the possibility of the Malays having played a political role although it remained dormant. In the period preceding the Second World War the British had been providing protection to the Malay Community against the Chinese and Indians.<sup>2</sup> However, after the Second World War the situation changed. The publication of the white paper on the Malayan Union by the British, aroused the strong opposition of the Malays and they found themselves in the political ferment of Malaya.<sup>3</sup> They considered the new constitutional arrangement as

- 
1. R.K. Vasil, Ethnic Politics in Malaysia (New Delhi, 1980), p.63.
  2. Victor Purcell, Malaya : Communist or Free? (Stanford University Press, 1954), p.40
  3. John W. Henderson, Helen A. Barth, Tudith M. Heimann, Philip W. Moeller, Francisco S. Sariano, Jhon O. Weaver, Area Handbook - for Malaysia (Washington, 1970), p.300.

amounting to complete annexation of their country and endangering their cultural and national identity. Consequently, a number of Malay associations and organizations came into existence during December 1945 and January 1946, to protect and promote the interests of the Malay community. It became obvious to the leadership of the Malays, especially Dato Onn bin Jaafar, then Chief Minister of Johore State, that the strength of the community depended on its unity.<sup>4</sup> On his initiative thus consequently, a Pan Malayan Malay Congress was convened at Kuala Lumpur from March 1 to 4 1946 at which 41 Malay organization from all over the country were represented. The aim was to broach the possibility of forming a central body of all Malay Organizations. There was little controversy over this proposal and the delegates promptly resolved to establish a central organization. Dato Onn suggested that it be named the United Malays Organization. Instead the name United Malays National Organization was preferred as it was thought that the insertion of the word "National" would emphasize the fact that the Malays were not only a race but a Nation.<sup>5</sup>

---

4. R.K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society (London, 1971), p.7.

5. Quoted in Ishak bin Tadin, "Dato Onn 1946-1951" Journal of South East Asian History, Vol.1, No.1, March 1960, p.61.

UMNO was inaugurated on May 11 1946 and its founder Dato Onn bin Jaafar became the President. It was the only Central Malay Organization at this time with a number of Malay associations as its affiliates.

Dato Onn held UMNO on a very tight leash from the very beginning. He frequently threatened to resign in order to force his way on major issues.<sup>6</sup> He was not, however, always successful. His attempts to persuade UMNO members to allow Malays to take seats in the National Advisory Council before the inauguration of the Federation Agreement was rejected.<sup>7</sup> Finally, the party members forced him to acknowledge their views - especially regarding the opening of UMNO to all irrespective of race. When these proposals came before an emergency meeting of the General Assembly of the UMNO held at Kuala Lumpur in June 1950, it was vehemently opposed by Sardon bin Haji Jubir, President of the Singapore Malay Union. He was criticised by the left-wing Malays for his

---

6. Hua Wu Yin, Class and Communalism in Malaysia (New Delhi 1984), p.100.

7. Ibid.

conservatism, particularly his failure to urge Britain to make concessions to the movement for independence. Under these circumstances Dato Onn left UMNO on 26 August 1951 and founded the Independence of Malaya Party.<sup>8</sup>

After the resignation of Dato Onn in 1951, Tunku Abdul Rahman became the President of UMNO. Initially, he adopted a narrow communal policy,<sup>9</sup> but the considerations of independence soon became important and he swiftly changed course, supporting the formation of the multi-communal alliance as a means of uniting all races in the struggle for independence.<sup>10</sup> From the time of the founding of the Alliance 1954 Tunku Abdul Rahman became the undisputed leader of the Independence Struggle in Malaya which provided him added power and greater say in his own party, decision making. In the beginning he indicated a desire that the rank and file be allowed a greater say in the process of decision making in

- 
8. Straits Times (Kualalumpur) May 30, 1949 and November 21, 1950.
  9. Straits Times, September 18, 1951.
  10. John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), p.113.

the Party.<sup>11</sup> But very shortly a centralizing tendency began to take over the UMNO's six-monthly General Assemblies reverted to an annual arrangement, and the General Assembly agreed to confer power on the Supreme Council to close any State Division whose activities were considered prejudicial to UMNO and to further appoint a committee for each State to deal with Politics and elections.<sup>12</sup> This denoted a tendency towards greater centralization. Further, the party leaders developed a technique, which continued to be used extensively for sometime, of requiring General Assemblies to pass what was virtually a vote of confidence on all steps for the present and on unspecified initiatives for the future.<sup>13</sup>

The party leadership continued to demand and receive unrestricted votes of confidence, and following the 1955 elections added the demand that party members should not in any way criticise the Alliance

---

11. Straits Times, March 25, 1952

12. Straits Times, September 19-15, 1953.

13. John Fumston, on 10 p.173.



Government.<sup>14</sup> When the Supreme Council of UMNO dissolved the Kedah State committee and appointed a care-faker body in its place in October 1958, it demonstrated that the new powers accorded to State Organizations were strictly limited. The annual General Assemblies had little influence over the executive. During December 1955 - March 1957 when negotiations for independence were in high gear the assemblies were dispensed with.<sup>15</sup> These measures were further evidence of centralization.

Obviously, however, the power was not being concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Council, so much as in the hands of one man. A scholarly study on UMNO noted that "the working dynamics of UMNO's whole organization is influenced by the personality and modus operandi of Tunku Abdul Rahman."<sup>16</sup> At his own personal initiative he negotiated the Anglo Malayan Defence Treaty in 1957 giving Britain extra-territorial rights and an important influence on

---

14. Straits Times September 14-15, 1958.

15. D. Moore, The United Malays National Organization and the 1959 Malayan Elections; A Study of a Political Party in Action in a Newly Independent Plural Society, Ph.D. thesis, (Berkeley, University of California, 1960), p. 103.

16. Abid.

on foreign policy, and personally made a gift of "Carcosa", the former official residence of the colonial Secretary, to the British, which was made the residence of the British High Commissioner.<sup>17</sup> Tunku Abdul Rahman refused to entertain strong party objections on both these counts. He justified his stand on the first count by explaining that in democratic countries such matters were decided by the Cabinet alone<sup>18</sup> and threatening resignation if he failed to gain his own way. In the 1950s these authoritarian trends reached a culmination with the Tunku's intervention in the UMNO-MCA conflict of 1959, when he personally selected the MCA candidates for the national elections that year.<sup>19</sup>

There were occasional voices of dissent and opposition from the UMNO rank and file, but these were ignored. The dissatisfied groups gained some support from the Malay Press.<sup>20</sup> Yet their dependence on and obedience to the Prime Minister was complete. No doubt the Tunker was the most dominant figure in the party activities, but his

- 
17. Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, 'Problems of Democratic Nation Building in Malayasia', Solidarity (Manila, 1971), p.12.
18. John Funston, n.10, p.174.
19. R.K.Vasil, n.4, pp.30-31.
20. Straits Times, August 4, 1954.

dominance did not, of course, bring party activities to a complete halt. While the rank and file were seldom consulted in making decisions, UMNO branches sought mass support for the party by undertaking local welfare projects or conveying grievances to a higher level, organizing for elections, and giving information to the branches on UMNO and government policy.<sup>21</sup> State organizations were mainly relaying centres for national directives. According to the Party Constitution, the Central body stood far above other local bodies.<sup>22</sup>

However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the Tunku was completely independent in the party's decision-making. He had to work under certain pressures. To an extent he was influenced by certain forces outside the party, viz., the civil administration, and foreign interests.<sup>23</sup> These two strong pressure groups were able to significantly influence UMNO's Policies. UMNO's policy in such areas as economy education and language was seen to be highly favourable to non-Malays and foreign interests.

---

21. John Funston, n.10, p.177

22. Ibid.

23. D.Moore, n.15, pp.43-46.

The youth and women's sections in UMNO were seldom more successful than the rank and file in making their influence felt. Of the two, the youth Movement (Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO), which emerged in 1949 out of the earlier Department of youth affairs, showed by far greater independence, generally taking a more strong communal line than its parent body.<sup>24</sup> In the early 1950s the UMNO Youth Wing figured prominently in important party decisions relating to the issue of independence. The decision in 1951 to change the slogan from *Hidup Melayu* (long live Malaya) to *Merdeka* (Independence) was sponsored by the Youth and carried despite considerable opposition, even from Dato Onn himself. Similarly, it sponsored the resolution to demand independence not later than August 31, 1957 at the 1955 General Assembly.<sup>25</sup>

The Women's Movement (Pergerakan Kaum Ibu) which emerged in 1949, had its beginning as a Department and later as a Secretariat within UMNO. From 1951 onwards this organization had ceased to be active and hence towards the end of 1954, some

---

24. John Funston, n.10, p.177

25. Ibid.

steps were taken to revive it. Apart from the time of elections, when the women's group played a valuable role in mobilizing the support of Malay women to the party, the main functions carried out by the organization were of the nature of social welfare.<sup>26</sup> For sometime it attempted to strengthen its position by gaining opportunities for its members to contest in elections. In this field, however, it was conspicuously unsuccessful. The primary reason which hampered this organization from playing an important role in UMNO was the near absence of education.<sup>27</sup> Ironically, even in the late 1960s when this organization accounted for over half the membership of UMNO, it yet remained inarticulate.

There were no other organizations related to UMNO in the same way as the Kaum Pemuda or Kaum Ibu.<sup>28</sup> However, it might be expected that the various committees attached to the Supreme Council - particularly those concerned with such crucial

---

26. Abdul Majid b. Ahmad Khan, 'An Analysis of the UMNO Kaum Ibu as a Women's Political Organization', (Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya, 1969/70), pp.13 and 17).

27. Ibid.

28. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (London 1971), p.197.

areas as Politics, Education or Religion - Would, by virtue of their specialization and the nature of their membership (nearly all senior Supreme Council figures) served as important additional centres of power.

In practice, however, this did not prove to be so, because such committees seldom met and any reports compiled by them were generally ignored by the Tunku.<sup>29</sup> The one partial exception was the Committee on Politics, constitution and Elections headed by Tun Abdul Razak. The advice given by Tun Razak on issues where Tunku had no firm stand were often accepted.<sup>30</sup>

It has earlier been suggested that the tight control exercised by the Tunku did not, however, prevent the emergence of divisions within UMNO. At the lowest level mass defections to Party sa-Islam Melayu - PAS (and occasionally other parties) took place which were generally caused over trivial issues such as family quarrels,

---

29. John Funston, n.10, p.178.

30. Ibid

traditional intra-village jealousies and the like. Factionalism that emerged at higher (Particularly state) levels of the party, however, seems to have been prompted mainly by straight forward power struggles, waged usually to obtain coveted nomination for state or national elections. Ideology was seldom an issue in such conflicts.<sup>31</sup>

Thus a comprehensive understanding of the growth of UMNO and its significant bearing on Malay Politics, along with a brief understanding of its style of functioning, and the nature and role of its leadership and its affiliate organizations, etc., helps one to comprehend its role in proper focus.

## II

Mere understanding of the emergence of UMNO and its political maturity, coupled with an examination of its party structure, etc., is not enough for the study of the emergence of UMNO as a dominant political party in the Malay Politics. In this context it would be essential to analyse the dynamics of the UMNO vis-a-vis other Malay Political Parties.

---

31. Harun Hassen and Subky Latiff, Siapa Selepas Tun Razak? (Kuala Lumpur, 1975), pp.47 and 137.

After the Second World War the first national organization of Malays to be established was the Malay National Party (Partai Kebangsaan Sa-Malaya or MNP). It was founded in October 1945.<sup>32</sup> After some initial hesitation, it became a "founder member" of UMNO in order to oppose British Post-war attempts to introduce a Malayan Union Proposal (aimed at unifying the country under direct British rule, and establishing equality between Malays and non-Malays).<sup>33</sup> But after three months of Malay unity, by which time the objective of defeating the Malayan Union proposal had been accomplished, the MNP withdrew from this Alliance. The apparent reason <sup>for</sup> withdrawal was its disagreement over the issue of the party flag, but ideological differences went much deeper and were grounded in the different socio-economic background of the respective leadership.<sup>34</sup> UMNO's conservatism contrasted with MNP's advocacy of socialism and its vehement anti-colonialism. As far as the socio-economic background of the leaders of the two parties were concerned, UMNO leaders were drawn from the aristocracy/bureaucratic elite while their MNP counterparts were from a much lower class.<sup>35</sup>

---

32. John Funston, n.10, p.179.

33. Williard A.Hanna, Sequel to Colonialism The 1957-1960 Foundations for Malaysia (New York 1959), p.58.

34. John Funston, n.10, p.30-39.

35. Hanna, n.33, p.60.



- 34 -

No doubt, in the post-war years MNP grew popular and in 1947 it had a number of allies. Most important amongst its allies was the Majlis Agama Tertinggi Sa-Malayu (Pan Malayan Supreme Religious Council or MATA), an organization representing Islamic reformism. This alliance was further cemented in 1948 when MATA gave rise to Hizbul Muslimin (Islamic Party), the first political party representing Islamic reformism, while it was doubtful whether MNP gained much from a union of the various left-wing Malay groupings. Within Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Centre of People's Power, or Putera) in early 1947, there could be little doubt that the influence of MNP and its allies significantly increased by a subsequent alliance effected between Putera and the All Malayan Council of Joint Action (AMCJA).<sup>36</sup> The AMCJA had been established in December 1946, and it was a coalition of various political groupings. It did establish a precarious unity of all existing non-Malay parties for about eighteen months.<sup>37</sup>

Despite its constant efforts to bring unity among the various small sections of the Malay

---

36. V.Thompson, and R.Adloff, The leftwing in Southeast Asia (New York, 1950), p.144.

37. K. J.Ratnam. communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (London 1965), pp. 155-58.

Community, the MNP did not succeed in its mission.<sup>38</sup> The colonial authorities also never allowed a chance to these groups to consolidate. The result was the gradual decay of the Party. In Mid-1947 the MNP's Youth Wing, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API-literally, Aware Youth Corps), was banned, and with the onset of the Communist revolt and subsequent imposition of Emergency in 1948, many Putera/AMCJA member organizations met the same fate. Large members of Putera officials were arrested and its activities were reduced to a standstill well before the official banning of the MNP in 1950. This led to a disintegration of the Party. Some of them joined the communist Party in open revolt, while some continued their struggle through the medium of literature, and a majority of them joined UMNO.<sup>39</sup> Most of them drifted into the various anti-UMNO groups that emerged during the 1950s.

Thus the MNP's departure from the political scene provided UMNO with the opportunity to emerge as a dominant party and to play a vital role in Malay

---

38. John Funston, n.10, p.40.

39. Ibid.

politics. But the UMNO's President Dato Onn bin Jaafar's proposal for a substantial liberalization of citizenship requirement to obtain loyalty of all races, which was accepted in principle on May 9, 1950. In the executive Committee of the UMNO, had its far reaching consequences. This led the Malays, outside UMNO to attempt to create an alternative focus for Malay political loyalty.<sup>40</sup>

Opposition outside UMNO made itself manifest with the formation of the Peninsular Malays Union (Persatuan Melayu Semenanjung or PMU) in September 1950.<sup>41</sup> The party adopted as its major policy the rejection of UMNO demands for the liberalization of citizenship requirements. PMU was supported by the Johore Malays Union, Malay notables, such as the Raja and Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Perlis and NIK Mahmood b.Hj Abdul Majid (a descendant of the traditional elite in Kelantan), and Tunku Abdul Rahman (later President of UMNO and National leader).<sup>42</sup> Tunku Abdul Rahman who was a guest at the ceremony

---

40. R.K.Vasil, n.1, pp.72-74.

41. Gordon. P.Means, n.28, p.125.

42. John Funston, n.10, p.41.

marking the opening of the party headquarters, expressed his happiness that people of his race had now established a political organization that would be of real benefit to them.<sup>43</sup> But this party could not hold popularity for long. The Malay Press community and the Malay were alienated by the party's initial rejection of independence as an immediate goal. It could not regain its initial momentum, although it continued in existence for some years.

Another political group (which was earlier an affiliated religious Section within UMNO) which succeeded in uniting many of the anti-UMNO groups and rose to challenge UMNO for leadership of the Malays was Pan Malayan Islamic Party (Persatuan Islam Sa-Melayu).<sup>44</sup> Its first objective was stated to be the achievement<sup>of</sup> independence and the second was to secure the promotion of Islam in general and in the field of government in particular. Its success in being the only non-alliance Party to win a seat in 1955 federal elections placed it much more in the public limelight.<sup>45</sup> In 1959 PAS grew so popular that UMNO had to suffer a stunning defeat at the

---

43. John Funston, n.10, p.41.

44. John Slimming, Malaysia: Death of a Democracy (London 1969), p.51.

45. Williard A. Hanna, n.33, p.60.

hands of PAS in two States of Kelantan and Trengganu. In Kelantan UMNO won only two of the thirty seats; in a three-cornered contest in Trengganu it won seven, party Negara four and PAS thirteen.<sup>46</sup>

The other group to leave UMNO was the early leadership of the party, including the then President Dato Onn bin Jaafar.<sup>47</sup> Their exit was precipitated because they considered that concessions given to non-Malays were not sufficient. UMNO's rejection of an open-door policy on the issue of party membership led to the resignation of Dato Onn and most of his executive committee members in August 1951. As a result, a new Independence of Malay Party (IMP) was founded as a genuinely non-communal party. It, however, gradually drifted to the narrow Malay Nationalism of the early UMNO when they did not receive the initially expected non-Malay support.<sup>48</sup>

Of lesser significance was the regionally-based National Association of Perak (NAP) founded

---

46. Williard A. Hanna, n.33, p.60.

47. K.J. Ratnam, n.37, pp.165-71.

48. John Funston, n.10, p.42.

by members of the breakaway group of UMNO. This party closely identified itself with the struggle of Dato Onn, but ceased to be an important political force after a heavy defeat in the 1955 State elections. After having been defeated in elections, the breakaway groups of UMNO tried to steal the show on the issue of independence and snatch away the position held by UMNO. They started cooperation with each other and adopted an united approach to this issue in order to influence the course of politics.

To facilitate a united approach to the problem of independence, the IMP, in co-operation with the Menteri Besars, sponsored an united front known as the 'National Conference' in early 1953; but this failed to gain significant Malay or non-Malay support. In February 1954, at a meeting of the National Conference, Dato Onn announced the launching of a new political organization, called 'Party Negara' (National Party), which adopted the narrow communalism of the early UMNO.<sup>49</sup> Non-Malays were denounced as 'aliens' and the prophecies of the ouster of Malays from their own country were

---

49. Williard A. Hanna, n.33, pp.58,59,64.

frequently made. But Party Negara failed to gain popular support and became disfunctional after Dato Onn's death in 1962.

The IMP sponsored National Conference was in fact the first of a number of attempts to create an organization to unite all groups in the country in the pursuit of independence.<sup>50</sup> There were three other attempts outside the UMNO - An All-Malays National Congress (AMNC) under the sponsorship of PMU, which met early in 1954; the All-Malaya Malay Youth Congress (AMMYC), sponsored by PMU and Party Negara, which met in April 1955, and an All-Malayan Malay Congress, sponsored jointly by PAS, PMU and UMNO dissidents, held in May 1957. The principal demands of these conferences were that independence be obtained quickly and that the form of independence should preserve Malay Sovereignty and acknowledge the special rights and privileges which were due to Malays as the rightful owners of the country. This latter demand, expressed more specifically, meant a restricted nationality to be known as 'Melayu' (Malay), Malay as the sole national and official language, and Islam as the official religion.<sup>51</sup> Besides these

---

50. R.K. Vasil n.1, pp.37-38.

51. Ibid.

conferences, participants were often bitterly critical of the failure (according to them) of UMNO in protecting the basic Malay rights. Despite their united effort, however, they did not succeed in displacing UMNO as the chief spokesman for independence. Then they came to adopt their role as that of a pressure group, presenting their demands in the most extreme form in the hope thereby of gaining at least small concessions.<sup>52</sup>

The first of the three organizations mentioned, the AMNC, was of relatively little political importance, gaining support only from minor radical Malay parties. The AMMYC, however, united virtually all Malay groups in opposition to UMNO and attracted representatives from 44 Malay associations. Prominent among the participants were Dato Onn, Ustaẓ Zulkiflī b. Mohammad (later Deputy President of PAS), and a number of ex-MNP leaders, including two former presidents, Ishak Hj. Muhammad and Dr. Burhanuddin Al. Helmy. But perhaps because of rumoured divisions between its more radical and conservative wings,<sup>53</sup> it ceased all operations after Dr. Burhanuddin left it to head

---

52. R.K. Vasil n.1, pp. 37-38.

53. Williard A.Hanna, n.33, p.59.



PAS in December 1956.

The All-Malayan Malay Congress was the final attempt by this loose alliance of anti-UMNO forces to influence the course of politics. Participants were generally the same as those associated with the AMMYC, with the additional brief inclusion of one new group, the party Rakyat (People's Party), formed in November 1955. But the need for future loosely constructed alliances after independence seemed futile when PAS emerged as a major power and viable opposition to UMNO.<sup>54</sup>

There were two other relatively minor groups which stood outside this anti-UMNO consensus. These were socialist Party Rakyat and Ultra conservative Malay associations established in Johore and Kalantar. Party Rakyat shared most of the ideas on Malay nationalism adopted by the anti-UMNO group,<sup>55</sup> it also adopted a rather dogmatic interpretation of its official ideology, Marhaenism (Socialism a la Sukarno), which made it difficult to work with the mainstream

---

54. John Funston, n.10, p.43

55. R.K. Vasil, n.1, p.168.

in opposition to UMNO. In August 1957 it joined with the leftwing Labour Party to form the Socialist Front, but it did not make a very substantial impact on the political scene and secured only nominal parliamentary representation.<sup>56</sup>

The remaining anti-UMNO parties which existed only briefly, were the persatuan Kebangsaan Melayu Johore (Malay National Association of Johore) and the Persatuan Kebangsaan Melayu Kelantan (Malay National Association of Kelantan), both formed in 1955 by groups close to the respective Sultans.<sup>57</sup> They supported the vesting of political power in the hands of the Sultan's, opposed the early granting of independence, and urged that independence should be given to their States as a separate unit. The NAP (National Association of Perak). Shared many of these views, including the policy of State autonomy which it voiced during the 1959 elections. Such views do not appear to have gained any popular following, and they were strongly rejected by all remaining political parties.

---

56. K. J. Ratnam, n.37, p.171.

57. John Funston, n.10, p.44.

Thus through the discussion above, it becomes clear that various political parties came into existence more or less contemporaneously with UMNO, adopted different policy approaches in order to achieve freedom and influence the course of Malayan Politics during the 1950s. But none of the Malay Political Parties (except PAS), which to some extent, provided (in some states) a challenge to the position of UMNO as a national political party before and after the achievement of independence, could pose a serious challenge to the UMNO. The Malay Parties could not play a significant role in the Malay politics because of their narrow, communal and extremist policies which failed to flourish in a multi racial country like Malaya. Most of the parties were local, regionally-based group. The occasional unity and short-lived cooperation of numerous Malay Associations could not replace UMNO as the Chief Spokesman and the dominant National Organization of the Malay community.

UMNO succeeded in projecting itself as the chief spokesman of the Malay community and rose to be a national organization because of its role in the freedom struggle, favoured treatment given by the

British, liberal and moderate policies adopted (after 1952), and the formation of Alliances. All these led UMNO to occupy an unchallenged position in the Malay politics.

CHAPTER - IV

UMNO AND THE ALLIANCE POLITICS

U.M.N.O. was one among several other Malay political parties in the struggle for freedom. In order to assert its position and project itself as the Chief Spokesman of the Malay community it struggled against forces within the Malay community, and also within the Alliance party.<sup>1</sup> The other two component parties, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), especially the MCA tried to assert itself in the process of decision-making in the Alliance. But it could not succeed and had to accept a secondary position and recognize UMNO as the dominant partner in the Alliance Party.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter is devoted to studying the gradual ascendancy of UMNO in the Alliance Party. Besides it includes an analysis of two federal elections held during July 1955 and August 1959 to gauge the dominance of UMNO.

#### Formation of Alliance

The Alliance was brought into existence in the early nineteen fifties (informally in 1951 and formally in 1954) as a result of a coalition of three communal organizations, the United Malays National Organisation,

- 
1. Milton J. Esman, Administration and Development in Malaysia (Cornell University Press, 1972), Cornell Ithaca, p.36.
  2. Ibid.

the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Malayan Indian Congress, representing the three ethnic groups in the country respectively. This Alliance was primarily an electoral arrangement, with the aim of winning elections.<sup>3</sup> But from July 1955 (when the first federal elections were held in the country and the Alliance formed the government) it began to be presented as a grand alliance or a coalition of all the three main racial groups designed to cope with the special problems of the Malayan multiracial society.<sup>4</sup> In the post-independence period it represented a sort of quidproquo arrangement between the Malay feudalelite in the UMNO and the Chinese bourgeoisie in the MCA. It worked well and existed for many years chiefly because it served the primary interests of the two main racial groups in the country, the Malays and the Chinese.

#### UMNO's view of The Alliance

A point to be borne in mind is that the Malay leadership was still largely feudal.<sup>5</sup> An entrepreneurial class was non-existent among the Malays which

---

3. K.J.Ratnam, Communalism and The Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1965), p.142.

4. Richard Allen, Malaysia, Prospect and Retrospect (London 1968), p.84.

5. R.K.Vasil, Ethnic Politics in Malayasia, (New Delhi, 1980), p.9.

otherwise could have shown some interest for financial gains. Under these circumstances the chief aim of the Malays was to establish their dominance in the field of government, politics and administration. These were the areas where their control would enable them to maintain the country as Tanah Malay -- the land of the Malays.<sup>6</sup> Thus the Malays viewed the Alliance as an instrument to protect and promote their political dominance in the country.

#### MCA's view of the Alliance

On the other hand, MCA which was formed on February 27, 1949 at Kuala Lumpur with Tan Cheng Loek as its President, was led by leading Chinese businessmen whose chief concerns were to protect and promote the Chinese economic and commercial interests.<sup>7</sup> Besides, a large part of the Chinese community was involved in business and was not very much interested in politics. Since their immigration into Malaya they had been treated as aliens. Although with the advent of independence they had gained some political rights through acquisition of citizenship, yet they were neither willing nor

---

6. Ibid.

7. K.J.Ratnam, n.3, p.153.



interested in asserting themselves to secure a reasonable share of political power.<sup>8</sup> Thus the Chinese on their part, expected that the Alliance would protect and promote their community's special role in the sphere of trade and commerce.

#### MIC's view of The Alliance

The MIC was founded, in August 1946, for the basic purpose of representing the interests of the Indian community and providing a medium for the expression of Indians' views in Malaya.<sup>9</sup> But since Indians constituted no more than about 11.3 percent of the country's total population, they were not in a position to play a significant role in the politics of Alliance.<sup>10</sup> They did not even form a sizeable portion of any Federal constituency. It would be no exaggeration to say that the MIC's importance in the Malayan political scene derived almost entirely from its membership of the Alliance.

Therefore, a convenient quid pro quo arrangement developed which formed the basis for the working of the Alliance. This arrangement implicitly envisaged that the Malays would exercise dominant control over government,

---

8. R.K.Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society (London, 1971), p.2.

9. K.J.Ratnam, n.3, p.154.

10. Ibid.

politics and administration, while the non-Malays would have a free hand in the economic and commercial spheres.<sup>11</sup> The arrangement further meant that there was to be no interference from one group to the other in their respective areas of interest. It was, however, not to be an absolute separation of political power and economic activity into watertight compartments. Each community was to be given considerable say in matters concerning the general problems, in order to keep them satisfied and maintain the working of the Alliance.<sup>12</sup>

Here it is important to note two aspects of the formation of the Alliance. First, the Alliance was brought into existence by leaders of UMNO who were firmly convinced that Malaya was to be governed by the Malays only and not by any other race or a combination of races, and certainly not by leaders like Dato Onn bin Jaufar, who were of the conviction that the stability and prosperity of the country desired a political organization which was representative of all the people of Malaya.<sup>13</sup> Tunku Abdul Rahman who assumed the leadership of UMNO after Dato Onn, and was instrumental

---

11. Milton J. Esman, n.1, p.36.

12. R.K.Vasil, n.5, p.62.

13. Straits Times July 1, 1952.

in bringing the Alliance into existence was firmly committed to the view that the Malayas, as the bumiputra (sons of the soil) alone had the right to rule Malaya and that Malaya was a Malaya country. According to him, the Malayas must safeguard their rights over this land which is ours for the benefit of our future generation.<sup>14</sup>

Secondly, the Alliance was not the outcome of any planned vision for the future, course of politics. It was started as a temporary electoral arrangement at the local level and its very success in the elections made possible its continuance.<sup>15</sup> Thus the three communal organizations representing three different races cultures and religions, came together for reasons of political expediency and immediate electoral gain. Although the Alliance contested elections as a single body, its partners (UMNO, MCA and MIC) continued to function on communal lines, being responsible to their

- 
14. In fact, Tunku Abdul Rahman had started making these extreme statements immediately after assuming the Presidency of the UMNO in late 1951. Tunku had gone to such an extent that Raja Ayoub bin Raja Haji Bok, Chairman of the Kuala Lumpur branch of UMNO, was forced to warn publicly on September 13, 1951 that the Tunku would be blocking all chances of UMNO's success in the municipal elections in the city, where a large part of the electorate was non-Malayas, if he went on making Malaya for the Malays statements. See Straits Times - September 14, 1951.
15. K.J.Ratnam, n.3, p.160

own members (community).<sup>16</sup> It was thus an inter-communal organization, and not non-communal as often claimed.<sup>17</sup> The main plank of the Alliance policy was its effort to reconcile communal interests with broader national interests. These aspects of the formation of Alliance were of utmost importance to determine the character of organization and its working methods. These left a permanent mark on the organization and its politics.

#### UMNO's Political Dominance

During 1950s when Independence drew near, a change began to occur in the intra-party relationship of the Alliance. UMNO, representing bumiputras, began to assume a dominant position and power within the Alliance.<sup>18</sup> The imminent departure of the British, whom Malays had seen as their protectors against the non-Malayas, brought to focus and even intensified the Malay fears about the intentions of non-Malays. Under these circumstances it was imperative that the UMNO should establish itself as the dominant partner in the Alliance, if it was to protect and promote Malay interests and in so doing maintain itself as the

---

16. Ibid, p.161.

17. Ibid.

18. R.K.VASIL, n.5, p.93.

representative organization of the Malay community.<sup>19</sup>

There was a deep-rooted feeling among the Malays that they alone were the bumiputras, and therefore, had a special right over the country. On June 30, 1952, a few months after the UMNO and the MCA had successfully contested the Municipal elections in Kuala Lumpur, which had laid the foundation of the Alliance, Tunku Abdul Rahman, then President of UMNO, had asserted, "Malaya is for the Malays and it should not be governed by a mixture of races".<sup>20</sup> Thus, the Malay leaders started looking for an arrangement that would safe-guard and sustain a special position for them, and maintain the Malay muslim character of the country.<sup>21</sup> This view was subscribed to by UMNO which began to assert its position in the Alliance.

On the other hand, MCA and MIC representing the immigrant non-Malay communities, were gradually relegated to the Secondary position. They accepted this position in the Alliance because they knew that in any negotiations with the British for independence it were the Malays who had to play the leading role. Under

---

19. Ibid.

20. Straits Times, July 1,,1952.

21. R.K.VASIL, n.8, p.7.

these circumstances MCA had to compromise with its earlier position and occupy a secondary role. This led to the further weakening of the bargaining power of MCA vis-a-vis UMNO.

This came to have a telling effect on its political fortunes. The more it lost its position of equality to the UMNO within the Alliance the more it lost its adherents within the Chinese community further shrinking its already small mass base.<sup>22</sup>

The Malayan Indian Congress representing the Indian community constituted only about 11.3 per cent of the total population. The Indians in Malaya were also fragmented among various uncoordinated and conflicting linguistic, religions, and occupational groups. Moreover, the MIC was a part of the Alliance more as a measure of expediency than as an expression of convictions. It received the allotment of seats, however, more as a favour than as a right. MIC's appeal to its own Indian community to cooperate with it had been much less effective. Therefore, MIC was never in a position to bargain in the Alliance.<sup>23</sup>

---

22. R.K.Vasil, n.5, p.93.

23. Williard A.Hanna, Sequel to Colonialism. The 1957-1960 Foundations for Malaysia (New York,1965) p.52.

### Federal Elections of July 1955

UMNO's dominance in the Alliance became obvious at the time of the first elections for the Federal Legislative Council in July 1955. The most peculiar feature of the Malayan electorate in 1955 was its uneven communal composition. Out of a total registered electorate of about 1,2800,000 approximately 84.2 percent were Malays, 11.2 per cent Chinese, and the remaining 4.6 per cent mainly Indians.<sup>24</sup> The main reason for this overwhelming preponderance of Malay voters was because malays formed a good majority of Federal citizens while about 75 per cent of chinese and Indians Federal Citizens were under twenty one years of age and hence ineligible to register themselves as voters. It was estimated that the number of chinese who were eligible to vote amounted to 600,000 or about half the community's adult population. Of this number, those who registered amounted only to 143,000 roughly one in every four. The result was that only one adult chinese in approximately every eight actually cast a vote. A lack of interest and insufficient confidence in the electoral process might be given as possible

---

24. Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian Minority and Political change in Malaya. 1945-1957 (Kuala Lumpur, 1981), p.121.

reasons for the low rate of Chinese participation in the elections.<sup>25</sup>

Of a total Indian population of about 650,000, those who registered as voters amounted only to about 50,000. If the Indian adult population were estimated at half the total figure, approximately one Indian in every seven cast a vote at the Federal elections. In the final bargain the number of Chinese and Indian voters got severely restricted resulting in a predominance of Malay voters.

Uneven distribution of Seats :

The non-Malays being electorally very small, (numerically they constituted only about ten percent of the total electorate) prompted many of the UMNO Members to demand that not more than 10 percent of the Alliance candidates for the Federal Legislative Council elections should be non-Malays and 90 percent of the Alliance candidates should be Malays.<sup>26</sup> Mercifully, however, this suggestion was not entertained by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then President

---

25. Straits Times, June 5, 1955.

26. Straits Times, June 5, 1955.



of the UMNO and the Alliance. He opposed this demand and succeeded in a reasonable distribution of seats among the three partners in the Alliance.<sup>27</sup> At first, the MCA had been allotted only twelve seats out of 52 nominations and probably no seat to MIC. Later on, this was revised and the UMNO was given 35 seats while MCA 15 and MIC 2.<sup>28</sup> This was accepted by MCA and the MIC gratefully. The important point to note was that they could secure the increased number of seats not through their own efforts and influence but because of the liberal attitude of Tunku Abdul Rahman.<sup>29</sup>

Pro UMNO Election Manifesto of Alliance Party :

The Alliance Manifesto for the 1955 Federal Legislative Council elections issued before the elections clearly reflected the upperhand of UMNO within the Alliance. Despite considerable controversy on some contentious issues such as citizenship and language and the concern of the non-Malays on the UMNO attitude to these, the Alliance Manifesto still reflected the UMNO view.<sup>30</sup>

---

27. Gordan P. Means, Malaysian Politics, London, 1970, P. 163.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Straits Times, April 30, 1955.

The Non-Malays demanded that the right to citizenship based on birth in Malaya must be made available to them. But the UMNO opposed this, and at its behest the Alliance took the decision to avoid the contentious issues during the elections. The Alliance Manifesto stated that "the alien problem must ... come under the scrutiny of the Special Independence Commission, for the appointment of which the Alliance has petitioned. Their Highnesses the rulers."<sup>31</sup> It asserted that the Commission's terms of reference must include this issue so that it could investigate the problem and recommend measures "whereby the position of alien population in the country can be satisfactorily resolved."<sup>32</sup>

On the question of language, the Alliance, under pressure from UMNO, openly rejected the demand. The Alliance however, stated that it "wants statutory recognition to be given to their languages by prescribing that citizens of Malaya,

---

31. R.K. Vasil, n. 5, p. 94.

32. Ibid.

whatever their race or creed, have a legitimate and fundamental right to preserve their own language, script and culture."<sup>33</sup> The manifesto maintained that a free country must have its own national language as it facilitated the working of democracy and fostered a more profound sense of common nationhood.<sup>34</sup> It insisted that Malay alone should be adopted as the national language and that this should be written into the constitution of independent Malaya.

With regard to the question of education, another controversial issue, the Alliance took a reasonable position and showed concern for the non-Malays' view point. It asserted that, inter-alia, its policy will be, "to allow the vernacular schools their normal expansion, to encourage rather than destroy the schools, language or culture of any race living in the country." With regard to national schools it stated: "The Alliance policy is to establish a type, of national school that will be acceptable to the people of Malaya and will

---

33. Straits Times, April 30, 1955.

34. Gordon P. Means, n. 26, p. 63.

meet with their needs in promoting their cultural, economic social and political development as a nation, so as to facilitate the fulfilment of the Alliance aim to adopt Malay as the National language of the Country."<sup>35</sup>

However, the manifesto did not make any mention of the special position of the Malays, even though it dealt in some detail with constitutional issues. For example, with regard to the position of the Malay Rulers, it stated : "As the Alliance had pledged that the special position of the Rulers as constitutional Heads of their respective states should be recognized, it recommends to the Special Independent Commission that this position should be upheld and should not be in any way impaired."<sup>36</sup>

In recognition of the inferior economic position of the Malays, the manifesto asserted that the Alliance would undertake the following measures : (a) To convince the Malays that they have the aptitude and capacity to become big and successful businessmen; (b) to encourage Malays

---

35. Alliance National Council, 1955, p. 37. cited in R.K. Vasil, n. 5, p. 94.

36. Ibid., p. 97.

to start business; (c) to give suitable Malays every opportunity, by scholarships and arrangement with merchants and industrialists, to receive training and acquire technical skill wherever possible from existing business, including banks; (d) to help malays already in business to expand with finance from the proposed Land Bank; (e) to start sino-Malay Joint business, and to encourage similar undertakings by Malays and other domiciled races.<sup>37</sup>

Thus the entire tone and the content of the manifesto was based on the feeling of the Malays that they alone were the bumiputras, and as such, had a special right over the country. Clearly, the Malays had a strong fear of being "reduced to the status of Red Indians striving to live in the waste lands of America." That was why an important UMNO leader and at present Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohammad, in his book, The Malay Dilemma, asserted that "the Malays are the definitive people of the Malay Peninsula, the real and original rulers and owners of Malaya. No

---

37. R.K. Vasil, n. 5, P. 97.

other race has any grounds to dispute this."<sup>38</sup>

---

38. Countering the argument that aborigines who lived in Malaya prior to the coming of the Malays, should alone be considered as the bumiputra, Dr. Mahathir asserted ...the presence of aborigines prior to settlement by other races does not mean that the country is internationally recognized as belonging to the aborigines. Aborigines are found in Australia, Taiwan and Japan, to name a few, but nowhere are they regarded as the definitive people of the country concerned. The definitive people are those who set up the first governments and those governments were the ones with which other countries did official business and had diplomatic relations. .... In Malaya the Malays without doubt formed the first effective governments. The Malay States have been internationally recognised since the beginning of Malayan History ....The Orang Melayu or Malays have always been the definitive people of the Malay Peninsula. The aborigines were never accorded any such recognition nor did they claim such recognition. There was no known aborigine government or aborigine State." See Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Singapore, 1970), pp. 126-27.

Regarding citizenship he wrote that "it is because the Malays consent to this." By saying so he meant that non-Malays were conferred citizenship on the condition that they were willing to conform to the Characteristics of the "definitive" race, the Malays. Their own rights concerning control and perpetuation of their own distinctive characteristics were to be limited.<sup>39</sup>

Suppression of Dominant Youth Within MCA :

Thus UMNO went on growing stronger and the MCA and the MIC were gradually relegated to a position of virtual insignificance within the Alliance. This was clearly evident in the crucial negotiations with regard to the constitution of independent Malaya during 1956-57. The MCA was forced to make substantial concessions to the UMNO on issues of vital interest to the Chinese community. As a result MCA was subjected to heavy pressures from within the Chinese community. A former President of the MCA in Perak, Lau Pak Khuan, threatened to withdraw from MCA if it failed to include the following four points in its Joint

---

39. Ibid.

memorandum (with the UMNO) to the constitutional Commission.<sup>40</sup> These four points were : (a) Equal citizenship rights for Indians and Chinese. They should be accorded the same rights as the Malays; (b) Those born in Malaya, irrespective of race or parentage, and those who have lived in this country during the last five years and are loyal to this country should be given citizenship rights; (c) Responsibilities and privileges of the citizens of independent Malaya should be equal; (d) Multi-lingualism should be adopted with the languages of various races regarded as official.

However, MCA failed to get these demands accepted by the UMNO. This caused widespread dissatisfaction among the Chinese. They came to believe that the MCA, as a member of the Alliance was no longer in a position to protect and promote the interests of the Chinese community. Some of the Chinese were so much dissatisfied that they went to the extent of leaving the MCA, which meant a further weakening of MCA.<sup>41</sup>

---

40. Straits Times, March 29, 1956.

41. Straits Times, March 3, 1958.



Under these circumstances a younger and more vigorous group within the MCA emerged. The primary purpose of this new group was to protect and promote the interests of the Chinese-Community. They believed that the older leaders of MCA in the Alliance had not bargained strongly enough for the interests of the Chinese. This younger group led By Dr. Lim Chong Eu and Too Joon Hing, began to assert right from the beginning within the Alliance. They were not ready to accept the secondary position for the MCA within the Alliance. On May 11, 1958, the Political, Organization, Election and Membership (POEM) Standing Subcommittee<sup>of</sup> the MCA demanded that "as a partner of the Alliance the MCA Headquarters should have complete authority in the selection of MCA candidates in all Federal, State, Municipal and local council elections, though, again as a partner the MCA Headquarters would always try to get agreement from the other two partners in such selections."<sup>42</sup>

Later on, on November 30, 1958, Lim Chong Eu stated : "Firstly, we want equality in this country. Secondly, we are for an assurance of our way of life, our language, and our schools. Thirdly,

---

42. Minutes of the Central Working Committee Meeting, July 6, 1957, cited in R.K. Vasil, n.5, p. 138.

we express the hope that we shall find economic advancement and economic equality."<sup>43</sup>

Emergence of Conflicting Groups within MIC :

Likewise, Malayan Indian congress was also subjected to vehement criticism within its own community. One group regarded the MIC as an "Indian organization wedded to the national purposes of the Alliance Government." This implied the subordination of communal interests where they came into conflict with the Government's national purposes.<sup>44</sup> That meant that as long as MIC was a component of the Alliance Government, loyalty to Government policies and priority for national interests must receive its top consideration. On the other hand, a second group considered the MIC as an organization independent of the Alliance and the Government. It criticized the MIC representative as an Alliance Spokesman. This group thus found the Alliance partnership a restraint rather than a source of strength.

Thus before the Federal elections of August 1959 the situation had considerably changed. New and strong

---

43. Straits Times, December 1, 1953.

44. Straits Times, February 19, 1958.

groups within MCA and MIC had emerged which were demanding parity on all levels among the Alliance partners. This assertion of equality was a clear challenge to the position of UMNO and the entire basis on which the Alliance had worked since 1951 and on which alone the Alliance concept was acceptable to the UMNO. But the whole situation changed dramatically when the Federal elections of 1959 came closer and once again UMNO proved to be the dominant partner in the Alliance.<sup>45</sup>

Federal Election of August 1959 :

Although the younger leadership of MCA was not ready to accept UMNO as a dominant partner in the Alliance, yet the elder members were still ready to accept UMNO as the senior partner. Therefore, they were being encouraged and assisted by UMNO to attempt to recapture power within the MCA.<sup>46</sup> The occasion was provided by the 1959 Federal elections.

---

45. R.K. Vasil, n. 5, p. 108.

46. Ibid, p. 108.

Earlier in the State elections the extremist Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS) had campaigned on the basis that after the parliamentary elections it would seek to amend the constitution to make it more pro-Malay with the help of other members of the Parliament (obviously meaning UMNO representatives).<sup>47</sup> This had caused serious concern among the new and younger leadership of MCA under the Presidentship of Dr. Lim Chong Eu which had emerged in 1958. They demanded that MCA should be allocated about 40 seats out of a total of 104 in the Federal elections of 1959. They wanted to make it sure that the constitution of the country could not be amended without the support of some MCA members of the Parliament. As a result, a serious crisis occurred in the Alliance.

Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, as the leader of the Alliance, reacted sharply and announced that the Alliance would contest all the 104 seats in the Parliamentary elections but without the MCA. Later on at a press conference, he announced that he was taking over all functions

---

47. Straits Times, July 10, 1952.

of the Alliance National Council and would personally make the selection of the candidates - and the allocation of seats.

The Tunku told, Lim Chong Eu on July 12, 1959 that the MCA would be allowed to remain in the Alliance only if it accepted his terms.<sup>48</sup> According to this condition, the Tunku was to have a hold not only over allocation of seats, but also the power to select the candidates from the MCA and MIC, although in consultation with Lim Chong Eu. Eventually, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's Tunku terms for the retention of MCA into the Alliance were put to vote and were approved by a majority of 89 votes to 60. The MCA found itself stripped of virtually all political influence. The Tunku announced the final distribution of seats among the Alliance partners on July 12. UMNO was given 70 seats and the MCA and the MIC were allocated 31 and 3 seats respectively. In accordance with the agreement, Tunku Abdul Rahman himself selected all the Alliance candidates including those from the MCA. However, contrary to the agreement the

---

48. William Shaw, Tun Razak, His Life and Times, (London, 1976), p. 121.

President of the MCA was neither consulted nor shown the list of MCA candidates prior to their filing nominations.<sup>49</sup>

Tunku Abdul Rahman's insistence on selecting the MCA candidates for the parliamentary elections ensured the selection of MCA candidates acceptable to the UMNO. This meant that candidates were selected mainly from the elder group of MCA members and the new and younger group of leaders were left out deliberately.<sup>50</sup> The UMNO feared that if the new leadership of MCA which insisted on equality, was allowed to select the party's candidates, it would use this power to strengthen its position within the organization. And it would become very difficult for the elder members of MCA who were favourable to UMNO, to re-establish their control over the MCA.

The whole incident, especially the way UMNO had treated the MCA, created a lot of dissatisfaction among the Chinese community. This was clearly evident in the result of the 1959 federal parliamentary elections. The MCA, which had won all the 15 seats

---

49. William Shaw, Tun Razak, His life and Times, (London, 1976), p. 121.

50. Ibid.

it had contested in the Federal Legislative Council elections of 1955 could secure only 19 out of 31 seats in the 1959 parliamentary elections. What is more important, the MCA candidates were returned only from those constituencies where the defection of large number of Chinese voters could be off-set by the votes of the Malays. In all the 19 seats won by the MCA, Malays constituted over 20 percent of the electorate. This position was very much suitable for the UMNO as it made the MCA dependent on the UMNO in winning the elections.<sup>51</sup> This further weakened the position of MCA vis-a-vis UMNO. The UMNO was afraid that having won a large number of seats on the basis of a solid backing of the Chinese voters, the MCA was bound to assert itself within the Alliance and make demands on their behalf.

Thus the issue of the relative position of the three partners in the Alliance was settled, more or less, once and for all.<sup>52</sup> UMNO established itself as the dominant partner in the Alliance.

---

51. R.K. Vasil, n. 5, p. 114.

52. Ibid., 115.

The new leaders of the MCA were all prosperous businessmen. Many of them were in politics not because of any deep political conviction but because they had found that political linkages were of immense benefit to their business interest. Their Chief interest had been to maintain the MCA as a member of the Alliance, at least as long as it was the ruling party, even if it meant a subordinate status partner in the Alliance. The quid pro quo arrangement which had begun taking shape at the time of independence between the UMNO leaders and the pro-Alliance MCA leaders was revived. Moreover, with the weakened position of the MCA, the dominance of UMNO within the Alliance was firmly established.



CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

A study of U.N.G.'s role in Alliance politics during 1952-59 - necessitates a broader understanding of the ethnic problems, because Malay society was multiracial in its composition. During the period of our study, 1952-1959, the ethnic dimension became more pronounced in Malay politics, because Malay politics came to be increasingly based on ethnic issues. The ethnicity in Malaya is unique and is non-comparable to any other country. The people of Malaya are a diverse composition of three ethnic groups i.e., Malays, Chinese and Indians. Each ethnic group has its own religion, language, food habit, and more particularly political affiliations with the country of its origin. Although the creation of multiethnic society in Malaya was the legacy of the British Colonial rule. The Chinese and Indians were always treated as aliens while the Malays received the most favoured treatment. The British considered Malays as the indigenous people - 'Bumiputras' (sons of the soil) of Malaya.

It is true that the Malays were the indigenous people of the country but their spirit of nationalism was latent and they remained widely inarticulate. Malay nationalism emerged only, during and after

the Second World War when the British Government initiated the Malayan Union Proposals. Prior to this, the Malays relied on the British for the safeguarding of their interests vis-a-vis the other ethnic communities, especially the Chinese. Granting of equal citizenship rights to all, irrespective of race, and the wresting of sovereign power from the Sultans were the two factors of serious concern arising from the Malayan Union Proposals. It is these two factors that alarmed the Malays and united them to oppose the same. A number of organizations sprung up to combat the Proposal.

UMNO was the out come of the fusion of several Malay Political, religious and cultural organizations which came together and gave birth to it. UMNO could be taken as the first political party at the national level which strongly advocated Malay interests. It was not a national party in the correct sense of the term, as it did not represent all the ethnic groups in the country. Yet it was national in the sense that it was the only Malay Political Party which was organized on a countrywide level and gave expression to the nationalist sentiments. Initially at least, it did not consider other ethnic groups, like the Chinese

and Indians as nationals and treated them as aliens because nationalism in Malaya got enmeshed with ethnic identity.

The success of UMNO in opposing the Malayan Union Proposals, and its subsequent replacement by the federation of Malaya Act of 1948 added to its strength. The British too accepted UMNO as a true representative of the Malay community, and in any negotiations they took into account UMNO's views.

A number of Malay political parties emerged after the Second World War and tried to dominate the course of politics on the road to independence. These parties were highly communal besides lacking an awareness of the multiethnic texture of society and hence were doomed to failure. These splintered political parties could not pose a serious threat to the position of UMNO. Although some of the breakaway groups of UMNO, like IMP, formed in 1951 by Dato Unn bin Jaafar, tried to unite all the ethnic communities, opening UMNO for all races, in order to achieve early freedom, they failed in mobilizing all the communities under their banner and as a result they had a premature political death.

UMNO's electoral alliance with MCA during the municipal elections of 1952 and its success in these elections enhanced its position. The formation of Alliance party in 1954 and the inclusion of the MIC in the Alliance added to the prestige of UMNO. It was the success of UMNO which led it to play a dominant role in the decision making process in the Alliance.

The autocratic style of functioning of Tunku Abdul Rahman during 1952-1959 kept UMNO under his tight control and his moderate policies towards MCA and MIC kept the Alliance intact and strengthened the position of UMNO.

The nature of politics during the 1955 Federal election was the politics of compromise among all the three ethnic communities of the country in order to achieve freedom, which kept the Alliance going smoothly.

During 1958 the leadership of MCA slipped into the hands of the younger generation of the MCA. They posed a serious threat to the position and prestige of UMNO within the Alliance and demanded more political concessions for MCA.

But when the results of August 1959 Federal Elections came out the dominance of UMNO was established once and for ever.

Although the Chinese were in considerable number, they could not pose any serious threat to the dominant position of UMNO within the Alliance. The Chinese were divided into several groups and the group disputes became serious handicap to the MCA which prevented it from playing a more significant role in the politics of Alliance. The MCA could not even mobilize the support of the Chinese community. As a result, its own position weakened and made way for UMNO to gain an upper hand and assert its political ascendancy within the Alliance.

On the other hand, the MIC was in a precarious position because it represented a meagre percentage of the population, and this number was fragmented and divided on lingual, religious, and occupation issues. It could in no way assert itself and remained the most ineffective partner of the Alliance.

Cooperation between MCA and MIC within the Alliance could have provided them with an opportunity to assert themselves. At least it could have acted

as a check on the arbitrary style of functioning of UMNO. But they failed to co-operate with each other because of their own narrow interests and internal conflicts. As a result, UMNO by its able and stable leadership could assert its dominance over the two partners of the Alliance. Although time and again serious crises cropped up in the Alliance, which tended to disrupt the party, yet UMNO could handle the situation skillfully and maintain its dominance in the Alliance and keep both the MCA and MIC under manageable control.

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCE

Government of Malaysia Publication

Federation of Malaya

Report of the Education Committee 1956, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1956.

Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960, Government Press Kuala Lumpur, 1960.

Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1957, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1957.

Report on the First Elections of Members to the Legislative Council of the Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1955.

Report on the Introduction of Election in the Municipality of George Town, Penang, 1951, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1953.

Report on the Parliamentary and State Election, 1959, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1960.

Report, Mission Inquiry, Rubber Industry in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1954.

SECONDARY SOURCES

I. Books.

Allen, Richard, A Short Introduction to the History and Politics of South East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).



- \_\_\_\_\_, Malaysia Prospect and Retrospect. The impact and aftermath of Colonial rule. (London 1968).
- Andaya, B.W. and Andaya, L.Y., A History of Malaysia, (London, 1982).
- Barlett, Vernon, Report from Malaya, (London 1955)
- Bedlington, Stanleys, Malaysia and Singapore. The Building of New States, (London, 1978).
- Bhattacharjee, G.P., Southeast Asian Politics: Malaysia & Indonesia (Calcutta, 1976).
- Board, Research, ed., How Malaysia is Governed (Jaipur: Gopal Art Printers, 1972)
- Boyd, C. Schafer, Faces of Nationalism (New York : New Realities and Old Myths, 1972).
- Chatterji, B.R., ed. Southeast Asia in Transition (Delhi: Minakshi Prakashan, 1965).
- Clean Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, Resistance and Social Conflict during and after the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1940-46 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983)
- Cowen, C.D., Nineteenth Century Malaya, The Origins of British Political Control (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
- Dahn, Bernhard and Draguhn Werner, eds, Politics, Society and Economy in the Asean States (Wiesbader: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975).

- Dattar, K.Kiran, Quest for Politics of Consensus in Malaysia (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1983).
- Dartford, G.P., A History of Malaya. New York 1956.
- Deutsch, Karl W., and Wiehan, S.Foltz, Nation Building (New York: Alherton Gero, 1963).
- Emerson, Ruppert. Malaysia A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule. New York, 1937.
- Emerson, Mills, Thompson, eds. Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943).
- Esman, Milton J., Administration and Development in Malaysia (London: Cornell University Press, 1972).
- Funston, N.J., Malay Politics in Malaysia (Singapore: Chong Moh Offset Printing Ltd., 1980).
- Ghosh, Kalyan Kumar, Twentieth Century Malaysia (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1977).
- Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977).
- Gordon, Bunard K., The Dimensions of Conflict in South East Asia (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966).
- Gullick, J.M., Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya (London: The Athlone Press, 1958).

- Hall, D.G.E., A History of South-East Asia (London.1981).
- Hanna, Williard.A., Sequel to Colonialism. The 1957-1960 Foundations for Malaysia. (New York. 1965).
- Hunter, G., South East Asia: Race Culture and Nation (Institute of Race Relation, 1966).
- Ibrahim, Safi Bin, The Islamic Party of Malaysia: Its Formative Stages and Ideology (Malaysia: University of Malaya Press, 1981).
- Kahin, George Mc Turnan, Government and Politics of Southeast Asia. (New York 1959).
- Kassim, Ismail, Race, Politics and Moderation (Singapore: CMO Printing Press, 1979).
- Kearney, Robert N., ed., Politics and Modernization in South, South-east Asia (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975).
- Kennedy, J., History of Malaya: 1400-1959.
- Kessler, Clive S., Islam and Politics in a Malay State (London: Cornell University Press, 1978).
- Manderson, Lenore, Women Politics and Change (Malaysia) (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980).
- Means, G.F., Malaysian Politics, (London, 1970).

- Milne, R.S., and Mauzy, Diana K., Politics and Government in Malaysia (Singapore: Times Books International, 1980).
- Milne, R.S. and Ratnam, K.J., Malaysia: New States in a New Nation: Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia (London: Frank Lass, 1974).
- Milne, R.S. and Zochar Mark W., eds, Conflict and Stability in South East Asia (Gorden City: Anchor Books, 1974).
- Mohammad, Mahathir. Bin., The Malay Dillamma, (Singapore 1970).
- Moorhead, F.J., A History of Malaya Volume two, (Kuala Lumpur 1963).
- Moore, Joanna, The Land and People of Malaya and Singapore (Lond: Adam and Charles Black, 1957).
- Nam Tal Yul, Malaysia and Singapore: The Failure of a Political Experiment (Thesis: University of IOWA, 1969).
- Racialism and Nation - Building in Malaysia and Singapore (Meerut, 1973).
- Omar Asmah Haji, The Teaching of Bahasa Malaysia in the Context of National Language Planing (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Dewan Bahasa Dan Putaka, 1976).
- Palmer, J. Norman, Colonial Labour Policy and Administration A History of Labour in the Rubber Plantation Industry, 1910-1941 (New York, 1960).

Pant, Pushpesh Kumar, The Making of Malaysia, 1961-1963  
(Thesis: JNU, New Delhi, 1970).

Pluvier Jan, South East Asia: From Colonialism to Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).

Purcell, Victor., Malaya, Outline of A Colony, (New York, London. 1946).

----- The Chinese in South-east Asia (London, 1965)

----- The Memoirs of a Malayan Official, (London 1965).

Pye, Luncian W., Guerrilla Communism in Malaysia  
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956).

Rabushka, Alvin, Race and Politics in Urban Malay  
(California: Hoover University Press, 1976)

Rahman, Tunku Abdul, As a Matter of Interest (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1981).

Ryan, N.J., A History of Malaysia and Singapore (Kuala Lumpur. Oxford University Press, 1976).

Sandhu, Karnail Singh and Wheallys, Paul, eds., Malaka,  
Vols. 1 and 2 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983).

Sardesai, D.R., Southeast Asia, Past and Present  
(Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981).

- Slimming, John, Malaysia, Death of a Democracy (London: The Camelot Press, 1969).
- Singh, S.Nihal, Malaysia - A Commentary (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1971).
- Tate, D.J.M., The Making of Modern South East Asia: Vol.1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
- Thompson, Virginia and Alloft Richard, Minority Problems in South East Asia (New York: Russell and Russell, 1970).
- Tilman, Robert O., The Centralization Theme Malaysian Federal State Relation, 1957-1975 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976).
- Voryas, Karl Von, Democracy Without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
- Wadelall, J.R.E., An Introduction to South East Asian Politics (A delaide: John Willey & Sons Pvt. Ltd. Griffin Press, 1972).
- Winstedt, Sir Richard, Malaya and its History (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1958).
- Yong Mun Cheong, ed. Trends in Malaysia II (Singapore: Singapore University Press,
- Yusoff, Datuk Mohammad, Decades of Change: Malaysia 1919-70s (Kuala Lumpur: Arts Printing Works, 1983).

II. Articles

- Ahmat Sharom, "Nation Building and the University in Developing Countries: The Case of Malaysia", Higher Education, Vol.9, No.4, November 1980, pp.721-41.
- Arora, B.D., "India, Indonesia and the Emergence of Malaysia", International Studies, Vol.18, No.4, October-December 1979, pp.563-93.
- Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, "The Troubled Birth of Malaysia," Foreign Affairs, vol.41, pp. 673-93.
- Bradley, C. Panel, "The Formation of Malaysia", Current History, vol.46, February 1964, pp.89-94, 115-16.
- Bakar, Mohamad Abu, "Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia", Asian Survey, vol.21, October 1981, pp. 1040-59.
- Barraclough, Simon, "Communalism and Confusion : Towards a Clarification of Terms in the Study of Malaysian Politics", Ethnic and Racial Studies vol.7, No.3, July 1984, pp.413-21.
- Bob, Reece, "Malaysia: The Obstacle Race", Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 February 1970, p.5.
- Cham, B.N., "Colonialism and Communalism in Malaysia", Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol.7, No.2, 1977, pp. 178-99.

- Chang, David W., "Current Status of Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia", Asian Survey, Vol.13, June 1973, pp. 587-603.
- Das, K. "Changes in the Wind for Bumiputras", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.96, No.23, 10 January 1977, pp. 24-26.
- Freedman, Maurice, "The Growth of a Plural Society in Malaysia", Pacific Affairs, Vol.33, pp. 158-68.
- Hawkins, Gerald, "Reaction to the Malayan Union", Pacific Affairs, Vol.19, pp. 279-85.
- Harrison, Anthony, "Malaysia: Spiritual or Temporal", Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 June 1973, p.5.
- Indorf, Hans H., "Malaysia 1978: Communal Coalitions Continue," Asian Survey, Vol.19, No.2, February 1978, pp. 115-23.
- Indore, Hans, "Malaysia in Search of Affluence and Tolerance", Current History, Vol.77, No.452 December 1979, pp. 203-6, 219-30.
- Koon, Heng Pek, "Social and Ideological Origins of the Malayan Chinese Association", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol.14, No.2, September 1983, pp. 290-311.
- Krishnamurthy, S., "Federation of Malaysia", Foreign Affairs Report, Vol.11, February 1962, pp. 13-20.
- Leong, Stephen, "Chinese in Malaya and China Politics, 1895-1911", Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol.50, No.2, 1877, pp. 7-24.



- Morrison, Ian, "Aspects of the Racial Problem in Malaysia", Pacific Affairs, vol.22, pp. 239-53.
- Milne, R.S. "Politics Ethnicity and Class in Guyana and Malaysia", Social and Economic Studies, Vol.26, No.1, March 1977, pp.18-37.
- Means, Gordon, "Public Policy towards Religion in Malaysia", Pacific Affairs, vol.51, 1978, pp. 384-403.
- Milne, R.S. "Patrons, Clients and Ethnicity - The Case of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia", Asian Survey, vol.13, October 1973, pp. 891-907.
- Pillai, M.G.G., "Bumiputras - More Clout for the Malay" Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 November 1974, pp. 11-12.
- Ratnam, K.J., "Constitutional Government and the Plural Society", Journal of South East Asian History, Vol.2, pp. 1-10.
- Roft, Margaret, "The Politics of Language in Malaya", Asian Survey, vol.7, May 1967, pp.316-28.
- Siddique Sharon, Leo Suryadinoto, "Bumiputra and Pribumis: Economic Nationalism in Malaysia and Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, vol.54, Winter 1981-82, pp. 662-87.
- Stockwell, A.J., "British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-48", Journal of South East Asian Studies, Vol.13, No.1, March 1982, pp.183-92.
- Vishal Singh, "Recent Political Developments in Malaysia" Foreign Affairs Reports, Vol.5, January 1956, pp. 1-15.

