

**GEORGIA-US RELATIONS: IT'S IMPACT ON RUSSIA'S FOREIGN
POLICY, 1991-2005**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **“Georgia-US Relations: It’s Impact on Russia’s Foreign Policy, 1991-2005”** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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Dedicated

To

My Parents

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CONTENTS

	Page No.
PREFACE	i-iii
ABBREVIATION	vi
<i>Chapter One</i>	1-20
INTRODUCTION	
<i>Chapter Two</i>	21-45
GEOPOLITICS OF TRANSCAUCASIA	
<i>Chapter Three</i>	46-65
GEORGIA-US RELATIONS	
<i>Chapter Four</i>	66-86
GEORGIA: FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA	
<i>Chapter Five</i>	87-91
CONCLUSION	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	92-102

PREFACE

The year 1991 can be considered historic in ways more than. In 1991 some major events took place that led to considerable geopolitical changes and reconfigurations in the world, such as the downfall of the USSR and the entire Socialist block, the rapid enlargement of the EU and NATO to the East, the beginning of a large-scale campaign against terrorism, the growing influence of globalization or market mechanisms on the global economy, etc., most importantly, the transformation of Southern Caucasus into a transit region for transportation of energy resources, goods and provisions from East to West, and vice versa. Undoubtedly these series of events have major impact both on global processes and the Southern Caucasus region, making this one of the most significant regions in the world. The attempts made by the EU and the US aimed at diversification of sources and manners of hydrocarbon supply, The qualitative and quantitative changes in the military and economic structure of Southern Caucasus.

Georgia is critical due to its pivotal location on the energy corridor, Georgia lies in the middle of a web of pipeline routes that deliver oil from the Caspian Sea to the West. Here, in an amalgam of various ethnicities, religions and traditions, geo-strategic ambitions of actors are tangled into a struggle for spheres of influence.

This dissertation aims to analyse the increasing engagement between Georgia and United States and its impact on the relationships of Georgia with Russia with special emphasis on the Russia's foreign policy. The title of the topic 'Georgia-United States relations: its impact on Russia, 1991-2005' signifies the increasing engagement between Georgia and US. Georgia became key to success of US policy in Transcaucasia region. And this is only due to their geo-strategic location in Transcaucasia region. The study will also focus on at what extent relations between Georgia and United States reflects an impact on Russia. Now Georgia became the reason of ignoring of Soviet Union in to the transit routes of so many energy pipe lines. This research paper also focus on U.S. higher engagement in Georgia in order to make an influence sphere in Transcaucasia.

The introduction chapter aims to develop an analytical framework on the emerging dynamics of relations between Georgia and United States relations and its impact on Russia's foreign policy especially focusing from the period of 1991 to 2005. The chapter

will also provide an investigation of the events that took place during the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its impact on the relations of the three countries. It will also aim to evaluate the shift in their foreign policies.

The second chapter entitled, 'geopolitics of Transcaucasia' aim to draw the conclusion about the geopolitical significance of Transcaucasia region. Geo-strategic location of Transcaucasia give s important in the history of world politics. This region is well known for the ethnic conflicts and civil unrest. Moreover, this region has also become a strong factor in ignoring Russia in the energy transit corridor factors. So that it became important for West as well as EU for securing their energy needs.

The third chapter dealt the 'Georgia-Russia relations' will investigate the relations between Georgia and Russia from pre historical period till the October revolution since Georgia was part of the Tsarist Empire. This chapter also aims to focus on the souring of relations between both the countries during the post-Soviet Union after Georgia declared its independence. The chapter will also evaluate how these factors led to challenge to the security and integrity for both the countries. With ethnic crisis playing a vital role in the Caucasian region, Georgia on one side after the Rose Revolution has been trying to stabilise its economy consolidating itself with the west and Russia on the other side proving it might in the region after winning the two confrontations against Georgia. This chapter will also focus on the secessionist movement in South Ossetia ad Abkhazia in the wake of the wars that took place between both these countries. This chapter will also focus on that how Russia used ethnic problem of Georgia as an instrument to re-gain itself as an influential player in the Caspian region. This chapter will also take in to account of the role of NATO and United States in Transcaucasia region. This chapter also examine the most recent version of Russia's national security concept, which focuses on external threats to Russia, rather than on internal challenges, as in earlier versions of the security concept.

The fourth chapter examine the shift in Russian foreign policy in broad context of Georgia and United States relationships during the post-soviet era. This chapter will focus on the broad spectrum of Russian foreign policy, including all factors that influence foreign policy and with the special emphasis of conflict with Georgia and its impact on Georgia-Russia relations and kind of shifting in foreign policy of Russia during the 1991-

2005. This chapter also dealt with theoretical frame work of Russian foreign policy by using the concept of soft power and offensive realism, both the concept was introduced in Russian foreign policy during the post-soviet era. The last and fifth chapter will focus on the conclusions of Georgia-United States relations and its impact on the foreign policy of Russia. This chapter would also analyse changes in the Russian foreign policy from 1991 to 2005.

Methodology

The proposed study based on historical analytical and descriptive method of research. In this, both primary and secondary data are used for making reasonable and analytical view. The primary sources will includes, United States-Georgia charter on strategic partnership, signed in 2009 and other government documents, gazettes and government websites will extensively be used in this research work. Special emphasis would be laid on gathering government document, pacts or agreements that have been signed between Georgia and United States. Secondary source are mainly books, periodicals, journals and newspapers etc. will also be used internet sources, meeting minutes between delegates of United States and Georgia, ideas and views of think-tankers and policy making bodies taken in to account for research purpose. Special emphasis will be given to the systematic study and analysis of United States and Georgia relationships in the context of Russia.

ABBREVIATIONS

BTC	<i>Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan</i>
BTE	<i>Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum</i>
CIS	<i>Commonwealth of Independent States</i>
CFSP	<i>Council on Foreign and Defence Policy</i>
CSP	<i>Country Strategy Papers</i>
CSCE	<i>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</i>
EUMM	<i>EU Monitoring Mission</i>
FSU	<i>Federal Soviet Union</i>
GAP	<i>Georgian Action Plan</i>
GFSIS	<i>Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies</i>
GTEP	<i>Georgian Train and Equip Program</i>
MAP	<i>Membership Action Plan</i>
NAP	<i>National Action Plan</i>
PCA	<i>partnership and cooperation agreement</i>
IDPs	<i>Internally Displaced Persons</i>
IISS	<i>International Institute for Strategic Studies</i>
IMF	<i>International Monetary Fund</i>
ISAF	<i>International Security Assistance Force</i>
MoD	<i>Ministry of Defence</i>
NATO	<i>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</i>
SCO	<i>Shanghai cooperation organization</i>
SOCAR	<i>State Oil Company of Azerbaijan</i>
SSOP	<i>Sustainability and Stability Operations Program</i>
OSCE	<i>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</i>
UASID	<i>US Agency for International Development</i>
UN	<i>United Nations</i>
US	<i>United States</i>
USSR	<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of 1991, world-politics underwent a sea-change such as the downfall of the USSR, the rapid expansion of EU and NATO to the East, the beginning of campaign against terrorism, growing influence of globalization on the global economy and the transformation of South Caucasus into a transit routes for the transportation of energy resources, goods and provisions from East to West, and West to East, etc. Undoubtedly these series of events placed Caucasus region in one of the most significant regions in the world. The South Caucasus region has influenced by such as large-scale changes in the world politics. The major actors in international politics like the US and the EU have also try to influence the geopolitics of this region.

The disintegration of USSR was started in 1989, and some nations trying to be independent from that such as Georgia and South Ossetia. As South Ossetia and Abkhazia were part of Georgia in soviet regime but in the wake of soviet disintegration process, South Ossetia also had motive to regain their independent status. However, Georgians did not want to see South Ossetia as a neighbourhood independent state. When in 1991, the Soviet Union was collapsed and Georgian independence was recognized by the international community and South Ossetia became the part of Georgia, from that time South Ossetia rejected this autonomous status and continued tolerating Georgia.

As a newly independent state, the first priority of Georgia was to secure the independence status by enhancing the security measures and cooperation with Russia as well as the West. In previous years of independent, Georgia's was trying to develop cordial relationships with Russia in spite of Russian support to secessionist movement of South Ossetia. But instantly Georgia realized that this kind of relationships would not fruitful for both in a long run. By the critical assessment of relationships with Russia, Georgia looked ahead towards West, for support, in order to check the Russian hegemony. On the other hand West and particularly United States also interested in Georgia for securing western energy security and also due to geopolitical significance of

Georgia. Hence both, Georgia and US come close to each others. The increasing engagement between Georgia and United States, led serious consequence for Russian hegemony in Transcaucasia region. This would lessen in improving the relations of Georgia with Russia. This would also weaken in strengthening of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russia's aim to develop it as free trade economic zone (Asmus 2010).

From the strategic point of view, Georgia is one of the most critical country in the South Caucasus region, and that relates to the success of Western policy toward Transcaucasia region by linking the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan with the West. According to Vladimir Socor 'Georgia and Azerbaijan can only function as a tandem or not at all they stand or fall together' and weakness of these makes it the target of Russian assertive policies. Actually, control over Georgia either allows or prohibits the development of a West-East line connecting Europe with the Caspian in terms of energy, transportation, and consequently also economic and political stability. Hence, Georgia became crucial to Western energy and security interests of Eurasia (Socor 2008). In this sense, Georgia falls in the three 'baskets' of American interest's that include promotion of sovereignty and democracy, energy and trade, and security. Further Georgia is also crucial for EU in the wider project of building an East-West transportation corridor.

The location of Georgia towards the junction of Middle East and Eastern Europe, gives it leverage in comparison to other Transcaucasian countries. Georgia encircled by Black sea from West and to the north by Russia, Turkey and Armenia situated in south, Azerbaijan in south west. Tbilisi is capital of Georgia. Georgia covers a territory of 69,700 km² and its population is almost 4.7 million. During the classical era, Georgia was an independent kingdom. In 4th century, Georgia adopted Christianity in the period of Colchis and Iberia. In 11th and 12th century, Georgia reached at peak in its political and economic sphere during the regime of King David IV. In the wake of 19th century; Georgia was grabbed by the Russian Tsarist Empire. After a brief period of independence following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Georgia was occupied by Soviet Russia in 1921, becoming the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and part of the Soviet Union. After independence in 1991, Z. Gamsakhurdia was elected as a first president, he was

tried hard to modernize the Georgia and introduced the liberal policies in economy and express the belief in democratization of Georgia but as soon as he was expelled by a bloody coup. After the Z. Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, elected as a president of Georgia in 1995, at the same time two separatists region Abkhazia and South Ossetia posing problem for Georgian territorial integrity and that was supported by Russian army(CIA -2012). In this vulnerable situation, E. Shevardnadze government practicing three tier of strategy, which mainly focused on to stabilize the country, restoring the newly independent status and maintaining, developing the cordial relationships with neighbor's countries. At the same time Georgia also striven for the development and balancing Russian hegemony in the Transcaucasia region. By taking into account of all these situations, Georgia needs to develop more pro-western strategies for their development. This pro-western strategy captures the attention of United States and EUs.

During the 1999, Georgian grand strategy was based on three basic goals. The first was to balance against Russian hegemony; Georgians defined their prime security threat as a Russian effort to establish Georgia as a neo-colonial dependency. But in 1993, Georgia joined the Russian-led commonwealth of independent states and subsequently that permitted Moscow to retain four soviet era military bases in Georgia for 25 years. However, the new Georgian president Shevardnadze made moves to strategically distance his country from Russia. Together with Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, Georgia refused to renew membership in the CIS collective security treaty and also cancel invitation to host Russian military bases. Russian agreed to withdraw from two of the bases near Tbilisi and in the breakaway region of Abkhazia but delayed a commitment to withdraw from two others near Turkish border (Benjamin 2005).

Georgia also began to more actively pursue security and energy relationships with the United States, and its European allies. Although Georgian leaders called for Georgia's integration into NATO as soon as the USSR fell apart, they became serious about this appeal only eight years after Georgia withdrew from the CIS collective security treaty. Georgia supported United States policy on the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan energy corridor by which Caspian oil and gas was to transit directly through South Caucasus.

In addition to checking the Russian hegemony the second component of Georgian grand strategy was to restore the country's territorial integrity, Georgia lost de-facto control over two formerly autonomous territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, during and shortly after its struggle for independence from Soviet Union .A short war over Abkhazia resulted in the departure of virtually the entire Georgian community of the region-nearly half Abkhazia's population. The recovery of the lost territories, especially Abkhazia, was a primary goal of the Shevardnadze government stressed almost as much as establishing a bulwark against Russian hegemony. The third component of Georgian grand strategy was to keep the rest of the neighbors of the region together. Shevardnadze was careful not to alienate Aslan Abashidze, the feudal like head of autonomous Ajara, home to one of Russian bases. He also appointed presidential representatives to all the country's regions and incorporated the leaderships structures of Georgia's ethnic Armenia and Azerbaijani communities in to an overall system of patronage rule (Ibid).

ROSE REVOLUTION OF GEORGIA: A STEP AHEAD

Rose revolution could be considered as a demarcation in the history of Georgia. The root cause of Rose revolution lies in collide history of Georgia. The historical democratic tradition of Georgia distinguished this small country from its neighbors, starting from the 'Golden Age' and heightening during 1917-1921, at the time of the first Democratic Republic of Georgia. Throughout the Soviet regime, Georgia was the most sound among Federal Soviet Union (FSU) republics. Moreover, during the years following its independence from the USSR, the liberal atmosphere in Georgia amplified: independent media and freedom of expression along with discontent with the corrupt regime of Shevardnadze, provided favourable conditions for this small nation in the South Caucasus to undergo radical changes (Cornell 2007, 5). All of these rooted traditional norms were reflected in the rose revolution of Georgia.

In 2003, a Georgian people were boiled due to high corruption, incompetence, and criminalization of the Georgian govt.and thousands of demonstrators took to the streets to protest against the flawed results of a parliamentary election. People of Georgia had taken support of Georgian army by giving roses to the solders. This was known as the 'Rose Revolution' in the history of Georgia, led to the resignation of pro-Soviet leader Eduard

Shevardnadze and brought into power a young pro-Western M. Saakashvili, the opposition troika that led the revolution M.Saakashvili, N. Burjanadze, and Z. Zhvaniawere all former Shevardnadze's supporter who left the government due to Shevardnadze's unwillingness to part with the corrupt old guard and enforce meaningful reforms. Saakashvili then successfully marketed Georgia as a 'beacon of democracy' in the post-Soviet space (ibid).

The fall of Shevardnadze's regime and success of the Rose Revolution was attributed to a thriving civil society, role of NGOs, free media and Georgia's weak state authority. The Russian govt. blamed on the US Overall, although the Rose Revolution reinstated Georgia's democratic tradition and brought initial euphoria, it left Georgia with more questions than answers. Following the Rose Revolution, the new Georgian government, eager to follow its aspirations, even at the expense of damaging relations with Russia, established a very pro-Western regime. Discontented with Georgia's ambitions to pursue NATO membership and to restore its territorial integrity, Russia declared a diplomatic war, using political and economic sanctions to punish its noncompliant southern brother. Washington's support of Tbilisi in the Rose Revolution encouraged Mikheil Saakashvili to become overconfident through his reliance on US assistance, a quality that played a role in inciting the 2008 confrontation with Moscow. Georgia's Rose Revolution has succeeded in making positive changes in the country's economic and political direction. The 'Rose Revolution' has given Tbilisi much more visibility on the international scene, allowing it to look westward for political support and financial assistance as its relations with Russia grow increasingly strained. In the consequence of the Rose Revolution, a series of reforms were launched to strengthen the country's military and economic capabilities.

GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF GEORGIA

Since the collapse of the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991, United States and EU has been taking more interest in the Transcaucasia as a transit corridor of energy supply and others energy resources. The issues of energy security that gained central position in

international politics in the nineties of the last decade further enhance the role of Transcaucasian countries and Georgia is the only country which could break the Russian dominance in energy transit route section. Only through the Georgia, EU and West could secure their energy needs by bypassing the Russian territory. After considering all these factors, the United States and the EU are focusing to setup a cordial and meaningful relationship with the Transcaucasian countries particularly with Georgia. It's very necessary to diversifying the energy resources due to vulnerability takes place by Russian. In this sense Georgia could help more to the United States and EU.

On the other hand Georgia strive for regional security from Russian hegemony, in this sense Georgia using United States and NATO for check and balance of Russian hegemony over the Transcaucasia region. As newly independent Transcaucasian countries may choose the first priority to restore the independent and integrity. Prior to 1991, United States has not shown much concern about the Transcaucasia region. But after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the American symbol of sovereignty, Transcaucasia got important in the eyes of Unites States, and this is happened only because of the geopolitical importance of Transcaucasia.

On the other hand, Georgia was the part of former Soviet Union and this region is also important for Russia in the strategic point of view. Georgia's increasing engagement with US draws the attention of Russia. The engagement between Georgia and UStook place a vulnerable situation in front of Russia policy maker. By taking account of this situation, Russia needs to review their policy measures toward Caucasus, Georgia and United States. Now United States looks for strategic relations with Georgia and Georgia also planned to enhance cooperation with the United States to combat international terrorism and using this region as a transit routes for natural resources.

Thus US and EU are strengthening their relationships with Georgia. As after the demise of the Soviet Union, United States policy toward Transcaucasia was essentially non country specific. At that time the main objective of US was to manage a peaceful transition in the region as a whole, while the other areas of post-communist world took precedence. But during the course of time, this objective was change in many folds. In the beginning, the US relations with Transcaucasian states broadly aimed in constructing

market economies and promoting democratic value. However in the mid-1990s, the Caspian oil boom gave the region new strategic identities, and then Georgia became crucial for United States from energy security point of views (Nixey 2010).

The ethnic character of Georgia play an important role in the triangular relationships of Georgia-US and Russia. After the independence, Georgia faced a very typical situation due to the separatist movement in Abkhazia and south Ossetia, as the separatist movements were supported by Russia and Georgia's concern is how to secure its border areas and restore integrity of the country. The Russian secessionist policy has had serious consequences for Georgia's quest for political and economic development and its stability (Cornell 2007). The disintegration of Soviet Union gave an opportunity to US to make sphere of influence in Transcaucasia region, previously US have not any specific policy towards Caucasus region but, when US realized the strategic significance of Georgia in fighting with terrorism, then US giving weight to Georgia in foreign relations documents. The core interest in the region will more or less remain the same but United States policy making has to undergo a major change or paradigm shift in order to better grasp the changing scheme of things.

In order to better evaluate the nature of United States response to the evolving situation in the Georgia, one need to understand the nuances of United States policy that shape the kind of policy response the Washington decides upon toward the region. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union of socialist republics opened up phenomenal opportunities for United States to exercise and influence the on-going political process in Transcaucasia region. As all the three Transcaucasian countries including Georgia were the part of socialist economy but after the disintegration and in the wind of globalization they were accepting the liberal form of government and economy. In this political and economic transformation phase United States trying to help by providing aid and assistance. However, there are so many question arises that why United States interested in Georgia and why Georgia has strong motive to develop a relationships with United States rather than Russia. The United States relations with Georgia based on mutual cooperation and mutual understanding. In early 1992, United States established a diplomatic relationship with Georgia which stated that Georgia needs a strong support

from United States in order to check the Russian dominance. On the other hand, Georgia needs full assistance from US for their robust development, further, Russia and United States share mutual interests in Transcaucasia region First, energy security or constructing new alternative energy pipeline routes. Secondly, geo-political and lastly, democratic reform as well as promotion of free market economies. In this sense both countries working for strengthening their relations with each other (Nichol 2009).

The relations between Georgia and United States have included promoting the resolution of conflicts between Georgia and its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Some observers argue that developments in the South Caucasus are largely marginal to United States strategic interest. They urge great caution in developing relationships with South Caucasus region due to their ethnic nature. Some other observers also believe that United States relations with Georgia require more active engagement in the region. They urge greater United States aid and conflict resolution efforts in South Caucasus region. Developing alternative routes of pipe lines are could be considered as a central United States interest in the region, because this would lessen Western energy dependency on Russia and West Asia. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, whole things change and United States triggered 'Global War on Terror' campaign, and in this campaign Georgia emerged as a strategic partner and former Bush government obtained quick pledges from the Georgia to support operation enduring freedom in Afghanistan. Georgia also contributed about 50 troops during the Afghan elections in late 2004 and early 2005. The former Bush administrations strong support for Georgia was reflected in the US-Georgia charter on strategic partnership, signed in January 2009 (Daniel 2008).

Georgia establishes security and energy relationships with the United States in order to encounter the Russian dominance in the region. Georgia also supports United States for the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan energy corridor by which Caspian oil and gas was to transit directly through south Caucasus. Georgia emerged as a most committed regional ally in Transcaucasia region. In order to take the support of Georgia, US promotes the democratic norms and free market economies in and also try to maintain of a balance of power that pose threats to both Russian and Iranian interests. In

the eyes of Washington, Georgia as being critical to securing the transit routes through non-Russian controlled area (Gahrton 2010).

In the contemporary era Georgia and US still have strong understanding about the development of a better relationship with Georgia. In order to strengthening the relationships with Georgia, United States vice president Joe Biden visited in the month of July 2009 and expressed the Washington fully support on united Georgia but added that its leaders must do much more to strengthen democracy. He also gives a clear message to Russia that US relations with Russia would not come at the expense of Georgia. During Moscow summit in July 2009, US president Barack Obama expressed the firm determination on unified Georgia and marks a history in Georgia-US relationships. In Moscow summit, president Obama reaffirmed the US support for Georgia's independence, sovereign right to choose its alliance's and the principle of Georgia's territorial integrity. The President Obama took these positions publicly as well as his conversations with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. The Vice president Biden's visit to Georgia will provide a first test of the US approach to strategic relationships. However, the Biden will not announce any major decisions but express that Washington would not recognize South Ossetia and another pro-Moscow separatist region, Abkhazia, as independent and urged other countries to do the same. But he warned that there was no option to re-integrate the two regions by military force. However, some thinkers see a black shadow in U.S-Georgia relations because Obama's policy did not fulfill the security measures and the problems of Georgia, and still Georgia is continuing under the threats of Russian pressure (Socor 2009).

The United States (US) also supporting the development of democratic institutions and civil society. Democracy is one of the key priority areas of cooperation defined by the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership Charter, which was signed in January, 2009. The US policy towards Georgia has included promoting the resolution of conflicts between Georgia and its breakaway region South Ossetia. Since 1993, successive United States special negotiations for Eurasian conflicts have helped in various ways to try to settle the conflicts. Some observer argues that developments in the south Caucasus are

largely marginal to United States strategic interests. They urge greater cautions in making policies about South Caucasus region due to their ethnic nature.

The increasing engagement between Georgia and United State posed an alarming situation for Russian dominance region and also for their security. As Russia denote Transcaucasia as a region of Russian interest, it is obvious because of the close inter-connections with all the three countries. As all three countries were the part of former Soviet Union and share close geographical, economic, cultural, ethnic and historical link with each other's. In spite of all the things, both Georgia and Russian were fighting on the matter of separatist region like south Ossetia and Abkhazia. As part of Russia, south Ossetia is an autonomous region and on the other hand Georgia considered it as a part of Georgia. Russia has given the open support to the secessionist movement in Georgia. This would lead serious security concern for Georgia.

In 1999, Georgia had withdrawn her membership from the collective security organization and send troops to the Iraq in 2003 and in 2004-05 were adopted as member of NATO's individual partnerships action plane. The pro-western approach of Georgia make angry to the Russia. The Russia and Georgia relations became more worsen, when Russia were intervened in the matter of separatists movement in south Ossetia and supporting to them.

Since the signing of the Charter on Strategic Partnership between Georgia and US governments in January 2009, the Georgia and United States have strengthened their mutual cooperation in the field of economic, security and defense, trade and energy issues. Accordingly, the US supports for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and its commitment to further democratic reform. The United States has provided over \$3 billion in assistance to Georgia since its independence in 1991, including a \$1 billion post-conflict assistance package in the aftermath of the 2008 conflict. Recent US foreign assistance has been designed not only to address immediate recovery needs, both economic and humanitarian, arising from the 2008 conflict, but to consider longer-term development priorities that will assist Georgia in its on-going transition to a free, prosperous, market-oriented democracy firmly anchored in the Euro-Atlantic community. The majority of the post-conflict pledge targeted immediate stabilization and

reconstruction needs such as supporting reintegration of internally displaced persons and social recovery, and restoring peace and security through support for law enforcement and enhanced border security. As part of the pledge, the overseas private investment Corporation provided funds for new finance and insurance investments in Georgia's housing, finance, and agri-business sectors. (US Department of States, patterns of Global Terrorism 2001-2010).

The US government gives support to Georgia in the development of civil society, promotion of democratic norms, as well as in large-scale energy infrastructure projects, including rehabilitation of the East-West natural gas pipeline and reconstruction of the high-voltage Senaki power line, which will help to enhance Georgia's energy security. US government also assisting to internally displaced persons through providing housing infrastructure facilities as well as providing financial aid in capacity building in the security sector through enhancing the professionalism and capacity of the armed forces for strengthen Georgia's ability to secure its borders, improving law enforcement, and addressing cross-border challenges such as trafficking in persons and narcotics (US Department of state). The continuing United States support to Georgia angered Russia, because Russia considers this region as her sphere of influence.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE : GEORGIA-US RELATIONS

The recent history of Georgia-US relations began in the light of 9/11 terrorist attack on New York, after that the United States came surprisingly close to a country of little military or economic value only due to its geopolitical nature in Transcaucasia region i.e., Georgia. The Georgia-US partnership prior to, and immediate following, of August conflict raises interesting questions about the dynamics of asymmetric relations in international politics (Cooley 2005). Georgia not merely support the Bush Administration with limited military and economic benefits, but it carried with significant, and recognized costs, including a risk of war on the matter of territorial disputes and ongoing damage to relations with the Russian federation which emerged as an important regional and global player, particularly with respect to the Bush Administration's objectives in combating war on terrorism in Afghanistan. In this sense the Bush Administration treat Georgia as a significant strategic asset in the south Caucasus region.

In the consequence of the success of the 2003 Rose Revolution, reinforced by Tbilisi's public and strong support of Washington's democracy-promotion strategy, Georgia emerged as a highly specific asset for the Bush Administration. Many of US legislators presented Georgia as unequivocal success of the Bush Administration's Freedom Agenda. On the other side, President Saakashvili's government also reinforced and cemented this relationship by building close personal friendships with American politicians, political operatives, and national-security officials. However, the Georgia- US strategic relations have important implications in international-relations theory. In this regard, Tbilisi acted strategically with Washington in order to diminish the Russian influence.

BALANCING AND RELATIONAL-CONTRACTING THEORIES

The most prominent theories of international security tend to deal with broad outcomes, the formation and dissolution of alliances, the causes of war, and so forth rather than the nuances of bilateral give-and-take that mark strategic partnerships. The theories of relational contracting, first developed and used in economics but now days heavily applied in political science in order to search for alternative relations available to all states. The theory argued that, states is a firm producing security and whenever a state choose to manufacture security in association with others, must have to choosethat alliance, which is more reliable and beneficial for both parties (Lake 1996). The central idea of this theory is that all states of international politics choose that relationships, which to maximize benefits from exchange and minimize transactions costs. In another words, all actors choose the relationship that is most efficient for conducting the transaction so as to maximize the resources that can be used for other valued purposes.

Thus, the balancing and relational contracting theories of security cooperation lack sufficient granularity to make sense of puzzling features of US-Georgia relations. Specifically, accounts that downplay of symbolic and interpersonal factors have troubled in explaining the importance of the bilateral relationship between Georgia and US, as well as the particular forms and practices that it manifested. The theories of balancing account for much of Georgia's desire forever closer security ties with the United States. Georgia sought greater autonomy even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, while

Georgian nationalist movements proved a potent force during the disintegration process of the Soviet Union. Soviet Union and their demands forced Georgia to withdraw her membership from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The ascent to power of a hard-line nationalist, Z. Gamsakhurdia, and ensuing conflicts with ethnic minorities in the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia soon compromised Georgian statehood. After initial military gains in 1992, separatists kick Georgian forces and militias out of Abkhazia in 1993, along with about 200,000 Georgian residents of the region who became internally-displaced persons (IDPs). The Russian Federation brokered ceasefires, earlier with South Ossetia in June of 1992 and later with Abkhazia (De Waal 2011).

The price of Moscow's intervention was Georgian acceptance to Russian regional hegemony in South Caucasus region. New premier E. Shevernadze who was deposed Gamsakhurdia in a bloody coup in 1992 and would formally become President in 1995 had given consent over to enter into the CIS and to grant ultimate rights to Russian forces across Georgian territory. From the ceasefire in 1993 to August 2008, Russian peacekeepers were active in both breakaway republics, under a CIS mandate, as well as the head of international monitoring missions. Russia's stance certainly favored Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but Moscow maintained a public and official commitment to Georgia's territorial integrity. From 1996 to March 2008, Moscow led and enforced a CIS embargo against Abkhazia.

But Russia's relations with Georgia degraded decisively after the so-called Rose Revolution of 2003, which swept into power M. Saakashvili, a charismatic and enthusiastic pro-Western reformer and supporter of the United States. Saakashvili made building the Georgian state a public priority-including reclaiming Abkhazia and South Ossetia, rejecting Russia's regional security role, and pushing hard for Georgia's membership in NATO. As standard balancing theory would expect, Georgia sought Western security guarantees against its assertiveness policy of neighborhood, extremely powerful, and interfering neighbour (Nexon 2009). The strong relations of Georgia with US provide a basis of external security objectives and also supply a pathway toward economic development and domestic legitimacy in Transcaucasia region. They also

provide support to the existing government with economic, military, and cultural capital for development. The closer ties of Georgia with US and NATO constitute not only a means for securing Tbilisi's interests, but also an ends in themselves.

Although these considerations explain why Georgia sought, and continues to seek, a closer relationship with the US and NATO, they do not account for the emphasis US placed on the strategic partnership in the period of 2004-2008—let alone during the run-up to the August war. US policymakers were under no illusions that Georgia could effectively balance against the Russian Federation. Really, when US officials began to privately warn Saakashvili government against responding to Moscow's provocations throughout spring and summer 2008, they accentuated that Georgia could not defend itself against Russian military might (Fried 2008).

Some might argue that US policy makers viewed that increasing relationships of Georgia with US as a way of balancing against Russian influence in the South Caucasus. But despite extremely poor relations between Russia and US during Bush's second term, the United States never demonstrated a strong desire to balance against the Russian Federation. It is more accurate to characterize policies of US such as NATO expansion, the stationing of ballistic missile defenses, and support for the color revolutions, and involvement in Central Asia as indifferent to, or dismissive of, Russia's self-understanding of its geopolitical interests. Russia, in the eyes of the Bush Administration, presented a threat to US interests to the extent that it undermined pro-western governments in Moscow's 'sphere of privileged interest'. But in this respect the anti-Russian component of US support for Georgia reflected no generalized attempt to balance the Russian power.

To the extent, that the Bush Administration was motivated by balancing considerations, the exact nature of the threat posed by Russia is far from self-evident. Rather than a consequence of putatively 'objective' factors, the Bush Administration's interest in balancing against Russia emerged from its Freedom Agenda and its commitment to support for pro-western regimes such as Ukraine and Georgia. In fact, the US pushed Georgia for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) because Georgia has a counter productive capacity from balancing perspective in Transcaucasian region. As key

veto players in NATO resolutely opposed a concrete pathway for Georgian membership, US efforts merely undermined NATO cohesion in South Caucasus. Indeed, US officials, including the President Bush himself, decided to fight for the MAP even after it became clear that they could not overcome German and French opposition (Asmus 2010). From a balancing perspective, the August 2008 conflict is not play a critical role in Georgia-US relations. As US suffered heavy costs, including degradation in its relationship with Russia but Georgia remains committed to the strategic relationship and US-Russia cooperation has vastly improved in recent years. Even though Georgia vindicated a significant and complicated risk, the United States avoided escalation in its dealings with Russia. The Saakashvili regime remains intact roughly three years after it suffered a humiliating defeat at Russian hands.

Georgia-US relationship has never touched the hype of formal defensive alliances and relevantly, the US has avoided an actual commitment to defend Georgia's territorial integrity. Nevertheless, there has been a theoretical significance between Georgia- US relations by putting certain relevant questions. The connected questions are why US decision makers generally underestimated Tbilisi's willingness to use force, why they took steps that actually enhanced the risks of a Russia-Georgia conflict, why they accorded Georgia outsized strategic importance, and why Tbilisi overestimated Washington's commitment to Georgian security.

The relationship between Georgia and the United States is highly asymmetric in nature as Georgia purely depends on the US military, economic, and political assistance. The existence of US in South Caucasus region is to checking Russian hegemony over Georgia. The relative allocation of assets, credibility of exit, and other variables central to relational contracting theory all render the events surrounding the August war puzzling (Keohane and Nye 1989).

Georgia's strategic importance is a component of the close bilateral ties between Georgia and US. However, the US security interests in Georgia are far from reality. Thus, the Georgian partnership involves many benefits to US, but none of these meet the criteria for relational specificity. None of these strategic attributes provide Georgia with a

credible threat of exit from the relationship, nor should they confer Georgia with much leverage over other country of South Caucasus.

Further, Georgia provides assistance in the struggle against terrorism, particularly in the context of jihadist networks implicated in the North and South Caucasus. In 2002, at the height of Georgian state weakness, the Shevardnadze government allowed hundreds of US military advisors, with Russian approval; to train Georgian forces to remove Chechen and Islamic insurgents from the defacto territory of Pankisi Gorge (Tsygankov and Tarver-Wahlquist 2009).The Georgian border guard actively combats the smuggling of nuclear materials. Georgia deployed troops to Iraq in 2003 and sent nearly 1,000 troops to Afghanistan to join ISAF, though the United States both trains and funds this force. Georgia also constitutes a relatively convivial partner in the South Caucasus. Armenia, its southern neighbor, is a Russian client state that hosts Russian military bases under CSTO auspices. But because of the influence on Georgia, US enjoy little room to maneuver in its relationship with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Georgia is enthusiastic about building ever-closer relationships with Washington. Regardless of Georgia's presence as the primary US client in the South Caucasus, the region itself is geo-strategically less important than Central Asia, with its proximity to Afghanistan, or the Middle East (Nichol 2011).

Georgia also serves as a transit corridor routes for oil and natural gas, into Europe. Georgian and US officials frequently refer it to as a critical energy transit corridor for securing western energy security , as it offers the only route through which Central Asian oil and gas , reached in Europe, by bypassing Russian territory and Moscow's influence. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the first major new construction in oil pipeline routes in order to bypass Russia, runs as the name suggested, from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia. Construction of the BTC began in 2002 and it became operational in 2005, and construction of pipeline over initial Russian objections, is often portrayed as a major geopolitical triumph for US oil diplomacy. The smaller Baku-Supsa line terminates in Supsa, a well-known Georgian port (Levine 2007).

Recently, the Nabucco pipeline project is also signifies the importance of Georgia in South Caucasus region .Georgia is also a site for one of two feeder lines for the

proposed Nabucco natural-gas pipeline. If this crucial Nabucco project completed, then it will provide transit for natural gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq to Europe and thereby reduce European dependence on natural-gas pipelines that transit Russia. Thus, Georgia as situated at the junction of East and West, claim that the country is vital to satisfying Europe's energy security needs and, more broadly, to breaking Russia's hegemony over energy transit corridors in the former Soviet-space. Georgia's importance as a means of bypassing Russia in energy corridor sector is well-known by supporters of closer US-Georgian relations.

The strategic importance of Georgia suggested a highly asymmetric relationship favorable to the United States. The US always possesses exit options and substitutes with respect to both energy and logistical transit. The BTC and Baku-Supsa petroleum pipelines frequently go offline and carry insufficient supplies to make a major impact on energy security in Europe. The Nabucco pipeline does not All three routes marginally reduce Europe's energy dependence on Russia, but only indirectly impact the United States. Moreover, the economic benefits gained by Georgia from BTC and Baku-Supsa, which provide a steady source of transit revenues for the central government's offers, mean that they provide poor sources of leverage over the United States and European states. Georgia stands to lose much more from any shut down of BTC and Baku-Supsa, as well as from a failure to realize its feed into the Nabucco pipeline, than does the United States.

However, the Bush Administration assigned strong importance to the strategic partnership because of the political and symbolic benefits that brought to Washington, especially in a global context. Georgia's close relations with the United States did not initiate in the Bush Administration but the US and Western officials have supported Georgia since its independence, by giving the legendary status of former Georgian president Edvard Shevardnadze among US foreign policy makers as a key reform figure when he was the Soviet Union's Foreign Minister during the Gorbachev era. Since Georgia's independence, US aid has been an important stand point crutch for it, especially given the central government's weakness during the 1990s, ranging between \$90m and \$150m between 1993 and 2003 (Mitchell and Cooley 2010: 43-45).

The Bush Administration manifested much in a strong response against the Russian-Georgian dispute over South Ossetia, but decision makers immediately rejected provocative actions against that. In spite of that US expressed much concern over that matter and give the assistance to Tbilisi by other moves, like airlifting Georgian troops stationed in Iraq back to the country and sending humanitarian assistance to Georgia on board military transport. Facing increasing international pressure and with a ceasefire negotiated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Russia withdrew from Georgia without forcing regime change. Moscow lonely recognized the separatist region of Georgia as an independent state in international community while Abkhazia and South Ossetia signed agreements with Russia that codified its continued military presence.

Despite these cooperative initiatives and security ties with US, Tbilisi has not been able to reconstruct the close relationship that it enjoyed with Washington under the Bush Administration. During the Bush era, there were several high-level meetings takes place between Georgian and US executive-branch officials, in abundance and have decreased markedly after the Russian-Georgian war. As US had many proclamations about an inextricable relation between the two countries was based on their 'common values'. In a holistic way more dependence of Georgia on US has persists the public relationship between the countries at its lowest credibility.

US-Georgia relations prior to August 2008 fail to confirm traditional realist and rationalist expectations. In this context, Balance-of-threat theories suggest that Tbilisi should have agreed to Washington's calls for restraint, as any shift in the relationship constituted a much greater threat to Tbilisi than to Washington. Similarly, a relational contracting perspective focuses mainly on the material determinants of hierarchy which can't account for the breakdown in the authority of the US-Georgia relationship but despite their asymmetric power and various instruments of influence, dealing with military hostilities between one of its clients and a nuclear-armed great power. The US officials assumed that their previously strong bilateral relations and resulting relations of trust would suffice to restrain Georgian officials. At the same time, Tbilisi believed that those same factors would lead the US to provide significant support for Georgian military actions (Bowker 2011).

In 2009 the Obama Administration implemented its 'Reset' strategy in an order to improve US-Russian relations. Tbilisi, and many of its US backers, frightened that the Reset would weaken US support for Georgian territorial claims. Although the Obama administration continued to allocate bilateral aid to Georgia and support its bid for NATO membership, Washington has yet to make a public commitment to military assistance for Georgian territorial defense. In an effort to enhance its status with Washington, Tbilisi has provided active combat forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and accepted an effort to improve in the transit of Afghanistan supplies across the country (Cecire 2012).

Nonetheless, unexpectedly, the Obama administration also seized upon the new US-Georgia Strategic Partnership agreement, signed in January 2009 (just a few days before the end of the Bush Administration), to create a set of regular institutionalized meetings and discussions covering security, democracy, and other policy issues (Mitchell and Cooley 2010: 17-22). Rather than rely on ad hoc visits by officials well-connected to Tbilisi, the administration has generally embedded US-Georgian contacts in these institutional contexts. A striking feature of these meetings is the asymmetric character of the agenda and, specifically, how US principals have used them to pressure Georgia on domestic political reforms. On the security front, the Obama Administration also tried to anchor its military assistance and training in the requirements of Afghanistan training and elevating Georgian forces to NATO interoperability standards. At the same time, US officials have refused to grant an alliance commitment to Tbilisi, reflecting, again, the asymmetric nature of the Strategic Partnership.

Indeed, the Obama Administration scaled back military assistance to Georgia and, despite vigorous lobbying efforts by Georgian officials, defies transferring equipment that would enhance Georgian territorial defense. Such moves have not prompted Georgian exit from any aspect of the strategic partnership instead, they have pushed Georgia to find ways of increasing its value in to eye of the United States. In 2010 Georgia triggered to combat forces of ISAF. Tbilisi has provided assistance to the United States, including Georgia as a significant transit hub for Afghanistan. In sum, the causal relationship between Georgia's 'relationally specific assets' and as relationship with the

United States runs in the wrong direction and Georgia's specific assets did not play a key role in generating the US-Georgia partnership (Lake 1999). Rather, Tbilisi has sought to play key roles and functions for Washington in order to maintain and deepen its existing asymmetric strategic partnership.

Again, in February of 2012, Obama finally met with Saakashvili at the White House. The White House pre-meeting statement noted that the President 'will underscore the importance of our defense cooperation with Georgia' including its contributions to ISAF, but rather than effusive discussion of common values, it concluded that the 'President also looks forward to discussing upcoming elections in Georgia and the reforms that ensure Georgia's continuing transformation into a vibrant and stable democratic state'. However, the US-Georgia relationship has number of implications for international relations in general, and the new hierarchy studies in particular.

CHAPTER TWO

GEOPOLITICS OF TRANSCAUCASIA

The Transcaucasia Region is well known for its geo-strategic and geopolitical location. The region is situated at the cross-road of the energy transit corridors that connect East to West. This region is also known for its conflictual multi-ethnic character. Because of these strategic reasons, global powers such as US, EU, Russia, China and other regional powers are interested in the Caucasus in general for geo-economic, geopolitical reasons, military intervention for its energy resources and transport capacities. Among all the regional and global players, Russia has a strong historical, cultural political bond with Georgia (Doster 2012). In all the states of Caucasus region, only Georgia has democratic government and situated at the junction of East and West. Except Russia, the two other regional powers, Turkey and Iran also interested in Caucasus region. They try to build their relationships with Georgia and other Caucasus countries and geographical proximity of Turkey towards Georgia, play an important role in this approach.

When, Georgia got independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, immediately joined with the CIS in 1993 for asserting unity within pro-Soviet states. But as soon as Georgia realized that CIS would not help more in the development of Georgia due to its internal conflicts, weak economic conditions of CIS countries. On the other hand, Transcaucasian countries such as Georgia, also has motive to join with the West for the development and security purpose. In this sense, US emerge as a strategic partner of Georgia in the Caucasus region.

From ancient time Transcaucasia was considered as a buffer zone between great powers. Russia, Iranians, Turks, who made boundaries with Caucasus states, always had a closed interest in Caucasus region. Therefore the region comes under the dominance umbrella of various forces in same time. The region generally considered as heart of Eurasia and Georgia as a heartbeat, it is all due to geo-strategically location of Georgia in

Caucasus region. Therefore great powers compete with each other's for capturing their stake in Caucasus region.

CONCEPT OF GEOPOLITICS

Geography has played a vital role in South Caucasus and has often determined the course and nature of its involvement with other nations. The South Caucasus is a vital region because of its geopolitical position, especially as a crossing point between the Middle East, Europe and Asia. Hegemonic powers have used this region as a base from which they could influence neighbouring areas (Hass 2006). In the contemporary era, Russia and the US are engaged in performing a similar strategy. Russia regards the South Caucasus as its traditional backyard of influence and counters increasing involvement of West, in order to securing monopoly over energy security routes. For the US, with its heavy military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly with the withdrawal of Uzbekistan to the Russian camp and the SCO adopting an anti-Western stance, Transcaucasia region has become crucial for success.

The term 'geopolitics' came into prominence during the late nineteenth century and referred to the way in which ideas relating to politics and space could be used within national policy. Geopolitics is concerned with political relations between states, the external strategies of states and the global balance of power (Jones 2004: 173). Geopolitics concerns the political and strategic significance of geography. More specifically, geopolitics is comprised of the distribution of political and military power. It analyses the links and causal relationships between political power and geographic space. In addition, it explains how factors such as the size of territory and population, geographic position, the availability of resources and a state's dependency on foreign trade determine the status of a state or region and its behavior in the international arena (Haas et al. 2006).

Few modern ideologies are usually treating, it as a concept in order to predict the start of third world war as the theory of geopolitics. The term 'geopolitics' was popularized by the British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder at the beginning of the twentieth century, geopolitics argued that the earth will forever be divided into two naturally opposite spheres: land and sea. In this model, the natural depot for global land

power is the Eurasian 'heartland' -the territory of the former Russian empire. Whoever controls the heartland, will control the world (Clover 1999).Another definition- Geopolitics is the analysis of the geographic influences on power relationships in international relations (Encyclopaedia Britannica).

The eminent thinker, Ratzel, a geographer developed the organic theory of the state, which treated the state as a form of biological organism-territory being its body and alleged that states behaved and lived in accordance with biological laws. According to the organic theory of state, every state is a living organism and growth is inheritance phenomena of it. The naturally growing state would tend to absorb less successful and smaller ones. Thus it measured the growth of the state by its expansion and alleged that expansion and political growth is healthy for a state since it adds to its strength. In this context, Ratzel argues that each geographical part of the world was in relation with other parts and thus they all together constituted a whole. That whole is shared among the states that are living organisms and are in need of expansion. Because the total amount of space is limited all political extensions of territory had to stop at some point, so risk of war is unavoidable (Gokmen 2011: 20-40).

Ratzel, also applied Darwinian Theory of 'natural selection and survival of the fittest' in defining the geopolitics. He analysed the relationship between people and its land is fundamental. For Ratzel, people are rooted to their land, over the course of history people are known by their land and with the passage of time it becomes impossible to separate the one from the other. On the other hand, Kjellen argues that states had to apply five complementary types of policies in order to be powerful. Those policies were Econopolitik, Demopolitik, Sociopolitik, Kratopolitik, and finally Geopolitik. He argued that the feet of geopolitics are literally on earth and geopolitics is not legalistic or idealistic, but realistic (Ibid).

Kjellen also propagated the new idea that states were dynamic entities that are naturally grown with greater strength. The engine for growth is culture. The more vigorous and advanced culture, the more right it had to expand its in domain or control more territory. For him, it was only natural for advanced cultures to expand into the

territory of others. Sir H. Mackinder laid out his famous Heartland theory, in which he analysed the relation between geography and politics in a historical context. In a nutshell, Mackinder treated history as a struggle between land-based and sea-based powers. On the other hand Haushofer also considered Political Geography as an essential part of Geopolitics. He defined geopolitics as a tool and guidance for political action. For him geopolitics is the theory of political events integrated into their geographical setting. Haushofer put Mackinder's idea of Heartland into the centre of his theories. For Haushofer, it was Mackinder's Heartland that would provide Germany with the necessary Lebensraum, Autarky, and pan regional success. He believed that the notion of Heartland really has the capabilities to demonstrate the heart of the world (Ibid).

A. T. Mahan argued that sea power is superior to the continental power and each empire, attempting to rule the world, must first control strategically placed straits or islands. In contrast to Mahan, Sir H. Mackinder argues that the so-called Heartland, constituted by the core of the Euro-Asian 'super continent', and containing crucial sources such as oil, coal, metal ores etc., is due to the development of railway network and land forces able to become a threat to the 'marginal' crescent of Eurasia and potentially become the world's superpower. Western sea forces were able to marginalize the Heartland for certain time, but now the sea power is declining. The control of the Heartland is crucial for any power attempting to rule the world, whereas the control of the Heartland is possible by limiting Heartland's access to the seas and by means of possessing Eastern Europe, the key to the Heartland (Kopecek 2010: 100-135)

According to John Agnew, geopolitics is about visualizing the world in terms of advanced geographical areas, natural resources, and sea access by the state as a supreme form of organization in competition with the other states for these areas and resources. The geopolitical policies 'seek to establish national or imperial control over space and the resources, route ways, industrial capacity and population the territory contains'. He explains geopolitics giving the examples of 'tightly controlled geopolitical states' from history such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea. These states wanted to take over the strategic territories, and their resources. Another

notion of geopolitics is given by Dugin, who states that geopolitics is a 'reconsideration of the history of international relations'. He bases his understanding of geopolitics on the law of dualism which is reflected in the geographical construction of the planet and historical typology of civilizations. That is the continental power is standing against maritime power(Cahnman 1943).

Thus, geopolitics is more or less is a concept of geographical location of a country. The location of a strategic position increased the value of that particular country in the eyes of power seeker states. As Georgia situated at cross road of West and East sand sharing border with Russia give the importance to them. In holistic ways, the existence of common and diverse national interests and international situation in world politics concluding the geopolitical importance of the region.

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a change in the geopolitical situation in the Caucasian republics, as well as to a breakdown in the ties formed within the framework of the united Soviet state and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, the republics situated in the southern part of the Caucasus, acquired their independence. Georgia is the most critical country in the South Caucasus or in strategic terms, this relates to the crucial role it plays in linking the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan with the West. The pre-soviet states, Georgia and Azerbaijan can only function as a tandem or not at all, they stand or fall together and its very weakness makes it the target of Russian policies. Ostensibly the control over Georgia either allows or prohibits the development of an East-West line connecting Europe with the Caspian in terms of energy, transportation, and consequently also economic and political stability. Georgia hence is crucial to Western energy and security interests in Transcaucasia(Socor 2003).

Moreover, the increasing Western emphasis on freedom and democracy and the 2003 Rose Revolution added an ideological element to Georgia's role in Eurasia, namely a stake in the survival and development of Georgian democracy. In this sense, Georgia is important in the three 'baskets' of American interests that are discernible in the region, from the 'softer' to the 'harder,' these include sovereignty and democracy, energy and trade, and security.

In geo-economic terms, Georgia also is crucial in the wider project of building an East-West energy transportation corridor. This corridor is associated most widely with oil and gas pipelines, but carries much larger significance. Indeed, the Caucasus for the past decade has been viewed as a major opportunity to create a transit route connecting Europe to Central Asia, China, and India via the Black Sea, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea. While presently limited, the potential for continental trade to develop across this route is enormous. Georgia and Azerbaijan are the key bridge countries in this regard, on which the East-West corridor depends. The Caucasus' proximity to Iran raises its significance in the eyes of the West, particularly the US, for which the confrontation with Iran has become the main issue of its foreign policy strategy. The US and Russia are currently acting as the leading players of Caucasian geopolitics. The US's strategic initiatives in the Caspian region are aimed at preserving its global leadership, while its European allies in the form of the EU cannot compete on equal terms with Russia in the Caucasus and the leading countries of continental Europe are too dependent on Russian energy deliveries.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the pace of the geopolitical game is markedly increased due to higher involvement of US in Caucasus region and the emergence of Russia as a new power. There are two types of players such as global and regional powers or minor and major powers involved in geopolitical game of Transcaucasia region. US, Russia China Iran Turkey and EU are global powers and Armenia, Azerbaijan Georgia are regional powers.

THE ROLE OF THE MAJOR PLAYERS IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS

In 1991, Transcaucasia region became the one of the most important region for analyzing the great game of most world powers. The decline of the Soviet Union witnessed an intensification of international rivalries as new players who sought to gain influence in the former Soviet space entered in the competition. The strategic value of Transcaucasia region and particularly Georgia is determined by a number of factors-

The Caspian Sea region which comprises South Caucasus and Central Asia contains about 3-4 % of the world's oil reserves and 4-6 % of the world's gas reserves in

itself the Caucasian share of global oil and gas reserves is not considerable. However, in view of the uncertainty over the reliability of Persian Gulf supplies, as well as the possibility that Russia may use energy delivery as a power tool, the transport of Caspian and Central Asian (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) energy supplies to the West via the Caucasus has gained vital importance. This makes the South Caucasus a vital area for geo-strategy and energy security (Hass et al. 2006).

Oil and natural gas resources factors play a most important role in international relations. It defines the strategic importance of a region and historically determine political environment there. Most of the world powers are historically involved in oil and gas rich sectors to control and exploit them. The situation is complicated by the fact that, hydrocarbon resources are not renewable and not evenly distributed over all around the world.

Figure: Location of Georgia



(<https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>, CIA World Factbook.)

The Caucasus has always been places where the interests of worldpowers like Russia, United States, EU, Iran and Turkey are clashed due to which Georgia also face difficulties from its own neighboring states. In order to get more benefit from the south

Caucasus, Russia placed it into the near abroad concept of foreign policy. Although Georgia working hard to get out from the sphere of Russian influence. The key point in Russia's striving for the control over the Near Abroad was to incorporate the South Caucasian states into the Russia-dominated CIS states. It required little effort with Armenia, but it was rather difficult with Azerbaijan and Georgia, however, neither Armenia was a reliable Russian ally at the beginning of 1990s as it used to be later (Cornell 2001:355-356).

RUSSIA

The Southern Caucasus is important for Russia because it shares border with Russia that adjoins an ethno politically problematic part of the Russian Federation. Its geographic proximity determines the extremely important role in the Russian economy and politics. This region is of key importance for Russia with respect to ensuring not only its territorial integrity, but also its presence in itself. The Russian Federation is playing a convoluted role in the Southern Caucasus, trying to preserve its influence in the territories it used to control, on the one hand, and to ensure the stability of its southern borders.

Russia is one of the major players in the Transcaucasia region. Its presence in the region forms a long history and closed historical and cultural link with newly independent states placing it's in a beneficial situation in the region in comparison to others active players. In early 1990s geopolitical, not economic factors, largely determine the policy of Russia in the region. Russia tried not to lose further its influence and to maintain geopolitical positions in the region, and often at the cost of its economic interests (Aydin 2000). But in 1991, Russia was facing problem of economic development and not focusing more on to the Transcaucasian states. Russia also strongly opposes the creating of international oil consortium with the participation of west and United States. Russia has a strategic position in the new great game not only because of its own huge resources and actual production and export but also because of its control over transport routes from the other producer in the region.

The Russian political and socio-economic influence in the region is much more than any other external and internal actors. All being former Soviet republics, has also been significant after the fall of the Soviet Union. The links and connections between the former partners in the thoroughly organized and centrally planned Soviet system were so

complex that after the 20 years of independence they are still strong enough to affect the situation in the whole region. Thus there has been struggle between two countervailing forces. One is the ambition of US and, to a lesser degree, the EU, to break the Russian monopoly over the energy resources and the means of their delivery westwards, and to secure access routes to the Caspian oil and gas that are outside Russian influence. This trend is supported by the natural wish of the central Asian and south Caucasian states to improve their political independence by diminishing their social and economic dependence on Russia (Gahrton 2010:5-6).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has meant substantial change in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Instead of the Foreign Ministry of the former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic appeared as the new key player, led by Andrei Kozyrev. This ministry constituted a part of Yeltsin's power clique and on that accounts it implemented Yeltsin's policy of democratization and cooperation with the West (Cornell 2001:335).

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a geopolitical vacuum in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which has been attracting worldwide attention. Russia, the West and other major powers are closely studying hydrocarbon resources in the region (Xu 1998). The collapse of the Soviet Union has dramatically, putting the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus firmly into geopolitical calculations. This is both because it was discovered that some of them sit on vast natural resources, notably oil and gas, and because some of them were immediately engulfed in what was described as ethnic conflicts. Even in those newly independent states that so far have avoided unrest and conflicts, the competition between various outside powers for influence threatened widespread disagreements, hostility and possible armed interventions (Aydin 2000).

After the disintegration of the USSR and the short period when Russia focused on creating a good partnership with the West, the traditional rivalry resumed. Both Iran and Turkey were perceived as actual or at least potential threats. According to Russian analyst and pragmatic nationalism supporter A. Migranyan, Turkey was competing with Iran to

fill the geopolitical vacuum that emerged when Russia left the Caucasus. Turkey was backed in doing so by the West. As Migranyan described a widely shared apprehension of Turkey that could gain influence in the Caucasus, and then gradually also in Central Asia since it is mostly populated by the Turkic nations. As a result, a big ethno-confessional entity could emerge that would incline to Turkey. In the opinion of many pragmatic nationalists and others, the long term goal for Russia should be to prevent Turkey from penetrating to the Caucasus and then possibly to Central Asia. The fear of Turkey and Iran was connected with a more general and very widespread fear of Islamic fundamentalism spreading from the South into Russia. Overtime, Russia started to perceive penetration of any outside power as a threat to its national interests, because it feared a 'security vacuum' in this region. This fear shifted gradually also to penetration of the West, specifically the US or NATO (Holmerova 2007).

Further, Russia consider it as a part of their influence zone, and not interested in to sharing its resources with any countries of the world including United States and others major powers. So preventing any other power from getting into the geopolitical space of the post-Soviet region as one of the reasons why Russian troops were sent to the conflict zones. Russia wanted to avert the situation in which other powers would take the role of mediators in the conflicts, thereby weakening the influence of Russia in these affairs. The geopolitical factors also included a Russian interest to control the strategically important Black Sea Coast with the Batumi and Sukhumi ports and the marine base in Poti and control railway links with Russia-friendly Armenia, which was almost entirely on Georgian soil.

The geopolitical proximity of the South Caucasus is the key factor that determined Russian endeavor to dominate the whole region between the Black and Caspian Seas. There were two ways of attaining this goal. The first strategy was a traditional 'divide and rule' policy. In history Russia has been trying to strengthen its influence in the Caucasus by inciting hatred among local leaders and then acting as an arbiter, whom local sovereigns addressed in case of any conflict or dispute. Therefore, one possibility for Russia was to pick up the thread of this policy and back the

disintegration of Georgia. The other possibility was to try to create from the former Soviet states a zone of states amiable to Russia, with which Russia could develop military and economic co-operation (Trenin 2008)

In the second phase of Great Game or New Great Game, Russia`s policies had changed in a more constructive way. It started to cooperate with neighborhood states and also with Georgia. The sign of cooperation is with Georgia and Transcaucasian states looked in the new foreign policy document as including concept of ‘Soft power’ in that before that it was not in there. Nevertheless, it continued to resist construction of alternative pipelines routes to keep monopoly position in transportation of energy resources as in case of BTC pipe line.

Thus Russia, has taken an approach to the region that seeks to build on previous glory. In 2009, Russia formed a oil consortium with the help of other two pro-soviet countries and in October last year President Putin give the concept of ‘Eurasian Union’ that would coordinate ‘economic and currency policy’ while also being open to new members presumably drawn from the former Soviet space. So, Russia has strong motive to develop a mechanism for Transcaucasia region which, help Russia to regain its past glory. In Georgian context Russia, would not allowed it to integrate with the West especially with US and NATO at any cast.

UNITED STATES

The security and success of Georgia is very important for US and EU’s interest in the region. Beyond the hope that Georgia represents for successful state-building and democratic development in both the former Soviet Union and the wider Middle East, this country is a key strategic pivot for the transportation of Eurasia’s energy resources, as well as for western access to Central Asia and Afghanistan. In fighting with terrorism, US have declared the Caucasus a zone of its strategic interests and also begin to carry out a corresponding policy in the southern part of this region. The US’s current geopolitics in the Caucasus is economically substantiated. It is based on the Caspian energy project,

that is, plans for bringing the oil and gas lying in the subsurface of the Caspian region to the world energy market (Cornell 2007).

Initially the US policy towards the South Caucasus was to defer to Russia and avoid entering into security arrangements with the three states. However, in the mid-1990s, as American firms' interests in Caspian energy supplies grew Washington started to follow a more active policy. Over the years, US policy towards the South Caucasus has been vested in three priorities: energy, democracy and political stability. These priorities can be diversified into energy, political, security and social-economic objectives.

In the *energy perspective*, by 1998 the US had adopted a multiple pipeline strategy to carry Caspian energy to Western markets, intended at bypassing Russia and Iran. The focus was especially on the then planned BTC oil pipeline, but also on other East-West pipeline routes to transport Caspian oil and gas to Turkey. The US has repeatedly maintained that its policy is aimed at breaking the Russian monopoly over energy transportation routes, but that it is not anti-Russian in itself. As to *political objectives*, one is the containment of Iran to prevent influencing the Caucasus and Central Asia with radical Islam.

Furthermore, the US has been actively promoting democracy and market principles. Since September 9/11, its political objectives have been supplemented with *security objectives*, comprising security cooperation programmes with all three South Caucasus states, of which the arrangement with Georgia is the most encompassing. These programmes are aimed at enhancing antiterrorism and border guard capabilities and to promote modernization of the military. In addition to this, the US has also pursued endeavors to resolve regional conflicts, especially the one on Nagorno-Karabakh. However, these attempts have met little success so far. Finally, on *social-economic objectives*, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has initially provided humanitarian aid but later on with the changing needs of the region – also promoted the development of the economy and democracy. The aid levels of the US to Armenia and Georgia have been among the highest per capita in the world (Hass et.al 2006).

MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCES

The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the South Caucasus and Central Asia region in the American security. Over flight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. Therefore the security dynamics in each of these areas are of heightened importance to US policy.

Until September 2001, the United States was widely presumed to lack vital interest in Central Asia. The attention paid to the Caspian energy after the collapse of Soviet Union did not appreciably change central Asia's low ranking in United States strategy priorities and public awareness. Although United States trade with the region increased and many oil companies of United States hastened to join the multinational oil consortia emerging in and around the Caspian region, Central Asia was hardly becoming critical to the United States economy. The development of limited political and military relationships with former Soviet republic did little to alter this situation (Menon 2003).

In February 2002, the US and Georgia reached agreement to deploy American military advisors in Georgia. This agreement took the form of the so-called US Georgian Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which was a two-year program in which US Special Forces would provide support to the Georgian military in antiterrorism activities. The US argued that there were likely some Al Qaida elements in Georgia's Pankisi Valley along with Chechen fighters, which connected the GTEP with the '9/11' war on terrorism. In addition to this, the US provided ten combat helicopters GTEP laid the foundation for reshaping Georgia's armed forces into a better equipped and trained army. In 2004, the GTEP program was followed by a 16-month Sustainability and Stability Operations Program (SSOP). The SSOP was to train Georgian military battalions, preparing them for multinational peace stabilization operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The US-Georgian military cooperation, however, has not been one-way. In return for, or as a result of US

Assistance, Georgia has deployed military units in NATO and US-led operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. In July 2006, the SSOP was prolonged for a further 12 months(Cornell, Yalowitz 2006).

At the NATO Istanbul Summit held in June of 2004, a decision was taken regarding the strategic importance of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia regions for NATO. Readiness to pass from the Partnership for Peace level of cooperation to a closer cooperation based on individual action programs, and the establishment of the institute of special representatives in Central Asia and Southern Caucasus were declared. In December of 2005, Georgia and Armenia, and later Azerbaijan, signed the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) with NATO. Georgia openly poses the question of NATO membership, having passed to the level of an intensive dialogue (ID) in its cooperation with the Alliance (Grigoryan 2008).

EUROPEAN UNION

The increasing demand of energy supply compels EU to focus on South Caucasus region, and in South Caucasus region Georgia became crucial for success due to its strategic importance in the South Caucasus region. Its location between Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan and its proximity to Middle Asia, Caspian Sea & Black Sea increases its importance as a Euro-Asian corridor. As a global power EU, is interested in diversification of energy resources and in that case Georgia play a key role. The EU's policy mainly focusing in four key areas as of exploiting energy resources, security interest, geopolitical location and last is economic interest. The EU promotes its values and interests by operating as a global economic and political player, using various external policy instruments, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), financial assistance and preferential trade arrangements, as well as through the external dimension of the EU's internal policies.

In particular, the EU strives to promote prosperity, solidarity, security and sustainable development worldwide. This Country Strategy Papers(CSP) has been drafted with a view to identifying the most appropriate 'policy mix' as a whole for southern

Caucasus region and particularly for Georgia, which implies ensuring coherence between all available EC external instruments in dealing with southern Caucasus region and Georgia, in the light of the EU's strategic external relations objectives. The bilateral relationship of Georgia and EU is governed by the partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) which entered into force on 1 July 1999. The agreement is based on common values such as the respect of democratic principles, of the rule of law and human rights, as well as on adopting a market oriented economy. The PCA provides the legal framework for wide-ranging cooperation in the areas of political dialogue, trade, investment, economic, legislative, and cultural cooperation (EU Commission 2007-2012).

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSCAUCASIA

Both global strategic objectives and regional and country-specific objectives shape the EU approach to cooperation with Trans-Caucasian states and Georgia. In Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the EU and Georgia committed themselves to establishing a partnership which provides for close political and mutually beneficial trade and investment relations together with economic, social, financial, civil scientific, technological and cultural cooperation. The partnership is intended, in particular, to promote Georgia's transition to a fully-fledged democracy and market economy.

European Neighborhood Policy

The concept of expansion without enlargement has been manifested in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The objective of the ENP, is to share the EU's stability, security and prosperity with neighboring countries, including Georgia, in a way that is distinct from EU membership. The ENP is aimed at preventing the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe by offering neighboring countries closer political, security, economic and the European Security Strategy of December 2003, namely to bolster security in the EU neighborhoods. ENP partners expect to gain closer cooperation with the EU, the chance to participate in EU programmes and a stake in the EU's internal market, lending strong support to their own political and economic reforms. In the case of

Georgia, specific objectives for strengthening bilateral relations under the ENP have been established.

Security Interest

As Georgia fall in the category of EU neighborhoods states, so that Georgia gained important in the European Security Strategy of 12 December 2003, in that EU focusing on to 'promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations'. In this sense, the Strategy clearly acknowledges the importance of promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. In this context, the EU has intention to play a major role in solving the conflicts of Georgia and its two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU is also assisting Georgia in improving its border management capacity with a view to increasing security at Georgia's external borders (Ibid).

Interest in diversification of energy supply routes

The main aim of EU's is to diversifying the energy routes but the presence of Russia and holding the large share of natural gas deliveries to Europe poses significant challenges. Most notably, it gives an increasingly authoritarian Russia substantial leverage over countries that are important US allies. The EU launched two projects for access to the Caspian resources, TRACECA in 1993 and INOGATE in 1995. TRACECA is described as the renaissance of the 'Great Silk Road' its aim to create a transport corridor on road and rail that starts in Eastern Europe, crosses Turkey and the Black Sea to the Poti and Botumi in Georgia, further using the transport network of the Southern Caucasus, and by means of Caspian ferries, reaches the railway networks of the Central Asian states and the border of China and Afghanistan.

In the context of securing European energy Security, Georgia looked as an important transit country for oil and gas from the Caspian basins. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline, connecting the Caspian basin with Turkey through Georgia, will progressively become a strategic

alternative energy corridor. As Caspian energy sources and Georgia, as a transit country of these resources to Europe is of a bigger interest. This interest has become more significant after finalizing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline project. Besides, the EU aims to decrease its dependency to Middle East in regard of natural resources (Gahrton 2010).

On the other hand, the main dividend of EU is to develop a free market economy around the border to achieve of this Union has to open the border and integrating the market with south Caucasus countries. EU perceives that economic liberalism and democratic development policy fulfill the aim of EU. For this reason EU gives financial support to Georgia.

Thus if US and Russia strive for extending their political influence in Transcaucasian region, the EU is actively involved in the region in economic sphere. Being a close ally of the US, does not necessarily that EU copewith American interest in Transcaucasian region and get involved in geopolitical game of Transcaucasia. As in the perspective of EU, Russia is important oil and gas supplier regarding the transportation issues, construction of alternative pipe lines routes by passing the Russia is not a priority for EU. Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline project is regarded by the EU as an opportunity to relieve Turkish channel and benefits to the Turkish economy. So EU has a multiple set of interest in the Transcaucasian region.

CHINA

China also emerged as global player in Transcaucasia region for many reasons. Georgia, located between Caucasus and the Black Sea, has had traditional links with China, since the time of 'Silk Roads'. China cannot ignore the new Great Game played in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. All major powers have their varying motivations and advantages to gain by exerting their influence on the landlocked region. China, advantageously positioned on the border of Central Asia, sees an opportunity to broaden its geo-economic role in the region and beyond to become a more important geopolitical force. At the turn of the century, China will give higher priority to market penetration and aggressive diplomacy toward this region (Xu 1998).

An admirable goal maybe, but one that directly clashes with China's aims to try to integrate the broader region, and it is not only the Chinese and Russian strategies that are seemingly at odds with one another. As Chinese analysts in Urumqi were quick to highlight, the American and Chinese strategies also differ: America's aim is to tie Afghanistan into its broader region, with paths largely going north-south across the region, while China's is a grander east-west ambition enabling direct trade with Europe. China also is developing different infrastructure plans across Afghanistan, opening up an east-west path across the country to Gwadar, the Pakistani port it has been helping develop. While not necessarily contradictory, different end goals drive the respective projects. The result is a series of strategies for tying together Central Asia--with each focusing on priorities dictated by the varying interests of Beijing, Washington and Moscow. China is promoting its development and trade, America wants to leave a more stable and prosperous Afghanistan, and Russia wants closer ties with the former Soviet space. These are fundamentally divergent approaches that contradict each other and leave the region torn between competing capitals.

Since 2006, the Georgian government has been supporting China on all major issues of China's concern such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. The Chinese Government, while appreciating Georgia's support on several issues of their national interest, has offered over the year's economic support and in categorical terms support to Georgia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. In April 2006, China persuaded Georgia to renounce official relations with Taiwan, in turn, agreeing in a 'Joint Statement of the two presidents' that 'Abkhazia and South Ossetia are internal affairs of Georgia and should be properly handled through peaceful negotiations based on respect of Georgia's state sovereignty and territorial integrity.'

For China, whose overriding priority is to develop Central Asia and Caucasus to help stimulate prosperity and stability in its restive Xinjiang province, the approach of tying the region together using trade and transport links is an old one. As early as 1994, then prime minister Li Peng declared in Central Asia that 'it was important to open up a modern version of the Silk Road For China, whose overriding priority is to develop

Central Asia to help stimulate prosperity and stability in its restive Xinjiang province, the approach of tying the region together using trade and transport links is an old one. As early as 1994, then Prime Minister Li Peng declared in Central Asia that ‘it was important to open up a modern version of the Silk Road. In 2004 the principle was expanded to include a ‘land bridge’ between China and Europe, a network of train links that would make up a so-called Iron Silk Road and provide an alternative to lengthy and sometimes treacherous sea routes.

Since then, China has moved this strategy forward, developing its own rail infrastructure at a surprising rate, while also investing in regional train systems linking Central Asia together. In June 2007, the two countries celebrated the 15th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations. At this occasion, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yang Jiechi, stated, ‘We are happy to see the smooth growth of bilateral ties since the establishment of diplomatic relations. Believing in equality of all countries regardless of their size, China and Georgia treat each other with respect and sincerity. We render each other understanding and support on major issues concerning national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity (ibid).

Greater coordination and discussion is needed on what is essentially redevelopment of the Silk Road. The end state desired by all is a prosperous and stable region brought about by economic development rather than the barrel of a gun. But until there is greater coordination, the result will be a confused latticework of competing strategies that leave everyone the poorer.

IRAN

Iran also has motive to emerge as regional power in Caucasus region by participating in the geopolitical game of Caucasus region. The collapse of Soviet Union and establishment of new weak states created a power vacuum that led to active involvement of extra-regional states. Iran tried a lot to benefit from the power vacuum of Caucasus region. It was unavoidable for Iran not to be included in the economic process of Transcaucasian states and due to its proximity with EU and also due to the nature of the Iranian political

system or being a Islamic republic required Iran to pay careful attention to the new states of Transcaucasia because of their Muslim populations .

Iran, which has the world's second largest gas reserves after Russia, is eager to find a new customer for energy exports and to expand its economic ties, even at the expense of straining relations with Russia. Over the past decade, Tehran has also signed agreements with Tbilisi for elimination of double taxation and encouraging investment in, air, surface, and sea transportation, and customs and trade cooperation. The volume of trade between the two countries has been rising. Seeking to diversify transit routes for its cargo shipments, Iran has an interest in Georgia's transit capacity and considers the country to be a viable alternative route for shipping freight to Europe. Tehran has offered to assist Tbilisi build a new hydroelectric plant, made good on a plan to reopen a long-abandoned Iranian consulate in western Georgia, and sent thousands of Iranian tourists on chartered planes to Georgia's Black Sea resorts (Kakachia, 2011).

The interest of Iran is to weaken the West interest in Georgia, as well as its desire to expand its room for manoeuvring, politically and economically. Tehran and Tbilisi's apparent new partnership and Iranian expect to play superior role in the Caucasus region for the foreseeable future. With unstable relations with Azerbaijan and strategic links with Armenia, the real economic and geopolitical dividends of Iranian diplomacy in the South Caucasus are mostly theoretical at this point. Particularly in dealing with Georgia, Iran has to take into account Russian interests in the South Caucasus and has acted very cautiously not to anger Moscow over its cooperation with Tbilisi. Moreover, Iran's ability to be an influential actor in Georgia is limited by geography (there is no direct border between the two countries) and other factors such as the dominant Western and Turkish influence (ibid).

From Iran's perspective, the advantage of a Georgian-Iranian rapprochement is that Tehran can assert itself more strongly in the region. Iranian side expressed its interests with hydropower sphere, agriculture, farming, construction of enterprises that are engaged in production in these spheres.

TURKEY

Since the early 1990s, Turkey has supported developments and regime changes throughout the Caucasus region and hope that they do not cause instability in the region. Ankara has tried to manage the changing processes by developing cooperation opportunities and has politically and economically tried to fill the power gap that emerged after the disintegration of the USSR.

Turkey is very much a key player in this geopolitics of Transcaucasian region, only it appears to have changed sides and could be considered as a most important regional player in the geopolitical game of the Transcaucasian region. Regarding the strategic dimension, Turkey considered Georgia as a key buffer zone with Russia. Any instability in Georgia would have negative impact on Turkey's ability to get to Azerbaijan and the rest of the Central Asia. Georgia was also essential to the success of the East-West energy corridor. Due to this aspect, Turkey is eager to incorporate Georgia in its initiatives aiming at stability of the region. The importance of Georgia for Turkey can by no means be underestimated. Developing its relations with Turkey has helped Georgia strengthen its independence. On the other hand, with the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border, Georgia became Turkey's gateway to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey as a major neighbour country can't stay aloof to the internal dynamics in the region. Instability across the border will necessarily affect Turkey (Punsmann 2012).

Turkey has become a geopolitical state that is in a position to tilt the Eurasian power equation towards Washington or significantly away from it, depending on how Turkey develops its ties with Moscow and its role regarding key energy pipelines. Turkey is the key link in this complex game of geopolitical balance of power between Washington and Moscow. If Turkey decides to collaborate with Russia, Georgia's position becomes very insecure and Azerbaijan's possible pipeline route to Europe is blocked. If Turkey decides to cooperate with Washington and at the same time reaches a stable agreement with Armenia under US guidance, Russia's entire position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe becomes available, reducing Russian leverage against Western Europe (Engdahl 2009).

Georgia is the only neighbor of Turkey towards whom the 'zero problems' policy has been successful. Turkish-Georgian economic ties have boosted, political relations are free from disputes, and it seems that the two countries understand importance of regional interdependence. The policy of 'zero problems' with neighbors has two aspects - firstly, the solution of existing disputes and conflicts with the neighbouring countries, and secondly, to maintain peaceful relations with them. It is argued that Turkey is able to fully use its potential only in a situation of peace in the region. The lack of stability in the region causes a decrease in Turkey's importance not only in this area, but also at the international level.

Developing a relationship with the neighbouring regions is associated with Turkish active policy in the region and making use of its potential stemming from geographic localization of the country. As stipulated in the Strategic Depth doctrine, Turkey should strengthen economic and political relations with the countries of the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia. These relations should be based on the win-win principle, meaning that both parties can benefit from cooperation. Turkey is Georgia's biggest trade partner, what means that it has replaced Russia. Additionally, Turkey is the second biggest investor in Georgia. Turkish companies became important investors in Georgia and only American firms have a larger market share than them. Because of Georgia's strategic location on an energy and Transport corridor, Turkish officials will seek to remain on good terms with it (Glogowska 2011).

The crucial factor in Turkish-Georgian energy cooperation is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. An agreement supporting construction of BTC was signed in 1998 by Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The BTC pipeline started to operate in May 10th 2005 and the first oil reached the Ceyhan terminal on May 28th 2006. The pipeline travels from the Sangachal terminal near Baku through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and then Turkey to the Ceyhan marine terminal on the Turkish coast of the Mediterranean. When oil reaches the Turkish coast, it is further shipped via tankers to European markets. The pipeline, which is buried along its entire length, is 1,768 km in total: 443 km in Azerbaijan, 249 km in Georgia, and 1,076 km in Turkey. The pipeline throughput capacity is one million barrels of oil per day. Parallel to the BTC oil pipeline runs the

South Caucasus (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, or BTE) gas pipeline. BTE transports gas from the Shah Deniz field on the Caspian Sea into Turkey. It follows the route of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey, where it is linked to the Turkish gas distribution system. Turkey also play a major role in the construction of Nabucco Pipeline, which is supported by US.

Because of Turkey's concerns stemming from the possibility of Russian interference in Georgia, Turkey has tried to strengthen the Georgian military by training and equipping it as necessary. In 2001, the two countries signed three agreements on defence cooperation. Furthermore, the Turkish army completed the modernization of Georgia's Marneuli airbase south of Tbilisi. Together with the United States, the Turkish and Georgian militaries have formed a Caucasus Working Group seeking to improve cooperation and provide training for the Georgian military(Ibid).

Turkey has become Georgia's main source of imports. Turkish businesses have invested heavily in the energy sector in Azerbaijan, and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) has acquired a 51 per cent stake in the Turkish petrochemicals company, Petkim. The projected opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway in 2011 could boost trade and facilitate the transportation of goods from Central Asia to Turkey. This would enhance the strategic importance of Georgia for Turkey (Winrow 2009). In response to the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were launched in 1990s, Turkey pursues the policy of respect to the territorial integrity of Georgia and peaceful settlement of these problems within Georgia's internationally recognized borders. The autonomous status of the Adjara region was determined by the Moscow and Kars Treaties.

As a result of their geographical affinity, Turkish and Georgian nations also enjoy close relations. The Meskhetian Turks act as another cultural bridge between the two countries. Turkey attaches importance to repatriation of Meskhetian Turks to Georgia, who were exiled from their homeland to Central Asia by the Soviet regime in 1944, and supports Georgian Government's activities to this end.

With the invasion of Georgia, it seems that Russia has now moved to an assertive policy in the region, claiming a zone of influence. Instead of confronting Russia bilaterally, the Turkish response has been to propose multilateral diplomacy by suggesting a Caucasasia Stability and Cooperation Platform.

ARMANIA AND AJERBAIJAN

Among former Soviet republics, the Transcaucasian nations of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan have special character in the geopolitical game of Transcaucasia region. Despite Georgia's obvious cultural and religious affinities with Armenia, relations between Georgia and Muslim Azerbaijan generally have been closer than those with Christian Armenia. Economic and political factors have contributed to this situation. First, Georgian fuel needs make good relations with Azerbaijan vital to the health of the Georgian economy. Second, Georgians have sympathized with Azerbaijan's position in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh because of similarities to Georgia's internal problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both countries cite the principle of 'inviolability of state borders' in defending national interests against claims by ethnic minorities (Aydin 2006).

In December 1990, Georgia under Gamsakhurdia signed a cooperation agreement with Azerbaijan affecting the economic, scientific, technical, and cultural spheres. In February 1993, Georgia under Shevardnadze concluded a far-reaching treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual relations with Azerbaijan, including a mutual security arrangement and assurances that Georgia would not export Azerbaijani oil or natural gas to Armenia. In 1993 Azerbaijan exerted some pressure on Georgia to join the blockade of Armenia and to curb incursions by Armenians from Georgian territory into Azerbaijan. The issue of discrimination against the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia, a serious matter during Gamsakhurdia's tenure, was partially resolved under Shevardnadze.

In the early 1990s, Armenia maintained fundamentally good relations with Georgia. The main incentive for this policy was the fact that Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenian transport routes and pipelines meant that routes through Georgia were

Armenia's only direct connection with the outside world. Other considerations in the Armenian view were the need to protect the Armenians in Georgia and the need to stem the overflow of violence from Georgian territory. The official ties that Georgia forged with Azerbaijan between 1991 and 1993 strained relations with Armenia, which was in a state of virtual war with Azerbaijan for much of that period. Nevertheless, Gamsakhurdia signed a treaty with Armenia on principles of cooperation in July 1991, and Shevardnadze signed a friendship treaty with Armenia in May 1993. With the aim of restoring mutually beneficial economic relations in the Caucasus, Shevardnadze also attempted (without success) to mediate the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in early 1993(Ibid).

In this chapter, we have mainly reviewed all the theories regarding Geo-politics. The common theme which runs through all these theories is that Geography plays an important role the conduct of its foreign policy. It also is a decisive factor in determining how a strategically located nation-state formulates the modalities of its foreign policy. However, what is important in the context of Russia-Georgia bilateral relation is that Georgia has become an issue of contention between major players of the international community mainly for US and Russia. While for Russia, on the one hand, there is an element of nostalgia, a feeling of being able to exercise the same amount of leverage as it had once done in the Soviet era. But on the other hand, Russia does not want to let Georgia slip away from the Russian grip altogether. For Georgia, this is the right time to engage in multi-level talks with other countries as it serves as a major transportation channel for the energy resources. In the long run, this healthy economic engagement is bound to boost the economic growth of the country. However, this might not be such an easy task. Georgia's willingness to align with the West and with European Union has not gone down well with Russia. It has only emboldened the Russian objective of keeping Georgia under its grip. In view of these constraints, what contours and shapes will the Russia-Georgia bilateral relationship take in near future? Can diplomacy be the answer to this question- this we cannot predict; only time holds the key to this complex and contentious issues.

CHAPTER THREE

GEORGIA-US RELATIONS

Since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia became an independent state. After gaining its independence, it made impressive progress in fighting corruption, developing modern state institutions, and enhancing global security and regional security. The United States is committed to help Georgia by establishing profound Euro-Atlantic ties and strengthen the institutions of Georgian democracy, and remain steadfast in support of Georgia's territorial integrity' (GeorgiaUpdate Weekly Edition 2012). However, Georgia's key priority has been accepted by the international community as a full-fledged member, both politically and economically. In order to attain this goal, there was a long way of democratization and economic reforms ahead. In the first place, Georgia had to get rid of rampant corruption and create an attractive business environment to invite much-needed foreign capital and escape poverty. This was critical because without domestic peace and national consensus it would be impossible to start destroying the Soviet-type governing bodies and build new political institutions.

On this hard road, the US has been one of the strongest supporters for Georgia both politically and financially. Being the second biggest per capita recipient of the American financial aid, Georgia continues to enjoy Washington's non-recognition policy for breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia despite the growing pressure from Russia. This important friendship, while inspiring hopes among the Georgian people for the prospects of NATO membership a major foreign policy goal of the Saakashvili administration - has served as a catalyst for Russia's increasing aggression as well. Russia has never conceived its ambitions to maintain or regain influence in the former Soviet space and never allow NATO to enter its 'backyard.' It was during the tenure of George W. Bush that the US-Russia relations hit rock bottom. However, the Bush's freedom and democratization agenda was a high priority and Georgia, being an exemplary country for the White House, was becoming an apple of discord between

Washington and Moscow. Following the August war as well as the change in the US administration grew cloudier for Tbilisi. As Obama tries to build good relations with Russia to settle the issues of Iran, energy, and non-proliferation, his handling of the anti-missile system in Central and Eastern European countries remains in the balance. There are many increasingly concerned of the fact that all over the world's contested areas, an American tilt towards autocratic foes inevitably comes at the expense of freedom-loving friends (Edilashvili 2010: 52-69)..

This made a question mark in Washington's future strategy on the Eurasian continent, including Georgia. With this fact, there is both a rational and moral dimension in the relationship of the United States and Georgia, the task for the Obama administration seems quite controversial and challenging (Ibid).

THE NEW PERSPECTIVE IN US -GEORGIA RELATIONS

Since the attainment of Georgia's independence, the US has actively supported Georgia's sovereignty, territorial integrity, the strengthening of its democratic institutions, the development of its market economy, and the country's full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Georgia continues to deepen its partnership with the US. By accentuating the implementation of concrete decisions by working groups, both Georgia and US wanted to develop mutual relations in defense and security; economy, trade, and energy, democracy and intercultural exchanges. In this regard, the support of the United States is inevitable for Georgia (National Security Concept of Georgia).

The increasing of economic and trade relations of Georgia with the United States, attracting US investments, and growing Georgian exports to the US are important for Georgia. The preferential trade regime with the US advantages on import tariffs to Georgia. At the same time, the Georgian Government is determined to complete a free-trade agreement with the US. Financial support from the US since the restoration of independence has been very important for Georgia. Projects within the framework of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation have assisted in strengthening democratic institutions, developing infrastructure, and advancing humanitarian projects. Educational

and scientific programs are also important as they promote education and raise the qualification levels of Georgian students and scientists. Georgian defense capabilities have been significantly strengthened through US assistance programs. Georgia is interested in further deepening cooperation in this area. Georgia actively continues to provide military and political support to the coalitions led by the United States. Georgian units, trained under US assistance programs, successfully participate in the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Georgia and the US also closely and successfully cooperate in the fight against nuclear smuggling (Ibid).

The US-Georgia relationship is also viewed in a larger context; Georgia is the only democratizing country in the Caucasus. It has made big strides as compared to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia is a role model in the region, especially for its neighbors, its energy transit function is important, as seen in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The Bush administration put a great emphasis on Georgia for cooperating in the field of energy transit corridor in securing energy needs of US (Round Table Summary 2012).

A. Rondeli, President of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), the leading think tank in Tbilisi, is among the optimists and describes the current US-Georgia relations as being ‘more studious, more concentrated, less personified, less irritating for Russia and most importantly, productive’ (Rondeli 2010).

Nonetheless, the key change in US-Georgia relations is that they no longer have a personal nature, which they enjoyed in the previous years. Amid the growing unpopularity of President George W. Bush, this could have worked against Georgia at some point. In 2005 due to the low rating of President Bush, and his slogan ‘beacon of liberty’ compliment for Georgia coined would raise doubts among influential politicians and think tank figures. In the 2007 crackdown of opposition demonstrators by the Saakashvili government, the announcement of the state of emergency, and shutting down the opposition’s key mouthpiece Imedi TV station only strengthened those doubts. By this time, (Mitchel 2009: 96). He also pointed that personal factor has been as important as political issues in forming Washington’s relationship towards Georgia.

This made Georgia a partisan issue in US politics, which is never good for any country. For Rondeli, the excessive personal factor in the bilateral relations could have been really harmful. ‘In the relationship between the United States and Russia Georgia has become a kind of third angle, which is not good for both countries. Georgia should not be used as a change in their relations. So the new obama administration’s policy is a very wise choice for it serves as a cover for Georgia.’

‘The only deterrent to Russia [not to attack Georgia] would have been a unified and powerful signal of NATO commitment that enlargement was indeed inevitable. ... I doubt that granting MAP in Bucharest by itself would not have sent that signal,’

In fact, there have been three choices for the US to support Georgian membership during the Bucharest Summit: relentless lobbying for MAP, concrete steps to further deepen bilateral cooperation without granting MAP, and just verbal assurance. The US opted for the worst one – empty words rather than actions (Asmus 2010: 138). For instance, an account of the Summit discussions suggests that in the run up to the summit a different compromise so called ‘MAP without MAP’ was under discussion. That was a package that would have granted Georgia and Ukraine the practical benefits of the MAP program but with different labels, either the NationalAction Plan (NAP) or even the Georgian Action Plan (GAP). This option would have allowed Georgia to embark on a higher level of relations with NATO without having to further irritate Russia. On the contrary, Russia would have been feeling satisfied -it achieved the veto of the MAP issue. It was not until after the war that Georgia received ‘MAP without MAP’ benefits – the NAP as well as NATO-Georgia Commission and NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi (Ibid : 139).

GEORGIA AND NATO

The present tool for (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) NATO to regulate its relationship with Georgia is the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) (NATO 2010). A cooperation mechanism was set up in September 2008 with the aim to oversee NATO assistance to Georgia in the aftermath of the August conflict with Russia as well as to oversee the process launched at the Bucharest Summit. The latter replaced the Individual

Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which had guided NATO-Georgia partnership since 2004. Apart from the IPAP covering political, security, military, economic, social, and administrative fields, Georgia received the Intensified Dialogue (ID) format with the Alliance in 2006. In the framework of ID, Georgia started political consultations with the alliance on a number of priority issues including the ongoing reforms.

By that time, it had been more than a decade that Georgia started cooperation with the alliance. The highlights are as follows:

- In 1992, Georgia became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). After two years later, Georgia joined Partnership for Peace (PfP).
- Since 1995, cooperation has been underway in the education field under which Georgian experts undergo annual trainings in the NATO School in Germany and NATO Defense College in Rome (Italy) (Information Centre on NATO 2010).
- In 1996, Georgia submitted to NATO the first Individual Partnership Programme (IPP).
- In 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created and Georgia was among the founding members.
- In 1998, a diplomatic mission of Georgia to NATO was opened.
- In 1999, Georgia joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the Partnership for Peace Programme, which helped Georgia to achieve integration with NATO and ensure successful participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations.
- The year 2001 saw the launch of high-level regular political consultation with NATO. The consultations were held between the Georgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of the Political Directorate of NATO. The high-level meetings are organized on the issues of arms control and disarmament within 26 member states of NATO and Georgia. In 2001 and 2002, Georgia hosted large-

scale multinational military trainings organized by NATO and the partner countries.

- The NATO Summit of 2002 in Prague, Georgia officially announced its aspiration to NATO membership and expressed its desire to participate in the IPAP.

However, the significant area of cooperation is the assistance in NATO-led operations. Georgia is actively contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and also supports Operation Active Endeavor in NATO's anti-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean Sea. Since 1999, Georgia has been participating in KFOR, a NATO-led international force responsible for peace and security in Kosovo. In 2004, a Georgian contingent took part in an ISAF operation in Afghanistan, where the Georgian troops' task was to ensure security during the election period (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2010). In spring 2010, Georgia sent additional soldiers to Afghanistan and an infantry battalion without national caveats, who will be deployed together with the US Marines in the province of Helmand. After sending the battalion, the number of Georgian troops in Afghanistan increased to 950, making Georgia the largest per capita contributor to the Afghan operation (Civil Georgia 2010).

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN GEORGIA AND US

The US-Georgia Partnership was signed at the end of the Bush administration, pointing the goal of fully integrating Georgia into European political and defense institutions. The Charter lays out the following four major themes in the US-Georgia strategic relationship: Defense and Security; Economy; Democracy; and Cultural Exchange (Round Table Summary, 2012). However, the US-Georgia partnership is based on four pillars.

First, US support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The ongoing US-Georgia security relationship forged by the US-Georgia charter which helping Georgia for accessing membership in NATO. However, the NATO enlargement is something that has to happen. Right now, the US is assisting Georgia with defense reform in military sections, which is something that will be front and center during NATO's upcoming meeting in Chicago. There has already been extensive cooperation in the US-

Georgia defense relationship, and Georgia is the single most active non-NATO partner in Afghanistan which has fought and suffered real losses. Georgia will be increasing its deployments in Afghanistan and Saakashvili's visit also outlined a discussion of how to broaden efforts to help Georgia improve its self-defense capabilities and interoperability in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Georgian Defense officials are working closely with NATO officials to improve the real situation in Afghanistan. Further, recent high-level meetings have shown that the US-Georgia trade relationship escalating in all fields of cooperation.

Secondly, the US supports Georgia's democracy and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, both of which are fundamental to the country's success. Again the US is committed to support Georgia's democratic development by encouraging Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the country and observing Georgian elections.

Thirdly, the US is fostering people to people contacts between the two countries. There are growing numbers of exchange students and the Georgian government has an English education program, which brings teachers from the US to Georgian schools.

Fourthly, the US supports Georgia with regard to the occupied territories and encourages outreach to bring people together from both sides despite the political challenges. Finally, the US-Georgia relationship has accomplished a lot, especially in terms of economics and trade, defense, and people-to-people contacts. It cannot rest on its laurels. US-Georgia relations are more complex now than previously. President Saakashvili's recent visit to Washington was important, not just for the visual aspects of an Obama-Saakashvili meeting, but more so for the political decisions that were made for cooperation.

Nonetheless, the relationship between the two countries is developing in a steady way. The strategy is to embed Georgia into the Western community of democracies. With all of the corrupt and other forms of authoritarian governments around Georgia, it is not good to be a democratic state in the region. However, this has not yet been true for Georgia, more democracy is not appreciated by its northern neighbor. The US and others have to support Georgia's development as a democratic country not only for its own

future, but also to make Georgia appealing to the Caucasus region as well as the larger Middle East. All aspects of Georgia's development are very important. Georgia cannot choose that road to democracy without security and economic paradigm. These issues are intertwined, and Georgia is learning how to work in this complex world. (Round Table Summary, 2012).

Since the rose revolution, the US officials working with Georgia in tostrengthening democratic roots in Transcaucasia.All of These reforms will have impacts well beyond the political realm, especially with regard to Georgia's economy, because these reforms will also help foster economic growth. Georgia's reforms, including economic reforms, have won international praise and rising standings in global business rankings. The Georgia continues to strengthen accountability, transparency, and the rule of law. The United States is proud to have been Georgia's partner in this critical period.

The US wanted to help Georgia in expanding economic opportunity for all Georgians, especially for women, minorities, and others who are often left out of economic progress. In the regional and global security Context, Georgia and the United States already have strong bilateral defense cooperation, and President Saakashvili and President Obama pledged to deepen that cooperation even further in three areas: furnishing comprehensive assistance to support Georgia's continued defense reform and modernization; providing the training and equipment necessary for Georgian troops to effectively participate in the operations of Afghanistan; and improving Georgia's self-defense capabilities with NATO. Subsequently, the USsharesthese four strategic goals with Georgia.

1. Georgia already helps to protect regional and global security.
2. Georgia also contributed and sacrifices as the largest non-NATO contributor in to the SAF mission in Afghanistan.
3. And US also agreed that Georgia would continue to develop warm relationships toward NATO.
4. Fourth and finally, both Georgia and the US think that cultural exchange between

people is the greatest strength of relationship.

Thus, the United States has taken steps to make it easier for Georgians from across the country to travel to America. All these steps helped to achieve a constructive and a peaceful resolution to the conflicts within Georgia. This is the main aim of US policy towards Georgia. Along with, the United States remains steadfast in supporting Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and US also reject Russia's occupation and militarization of Georgian territory; US wants that Russia should fulfill its obligations under the 2008 ceasefire agreement, including withdrawal of its forces to pre-conflict positions and free access for humanitarian assistance.

GEORGIA-US COOPERATION: VARIOUS DIMENSIONS

The strength of US-Georgia cooperation is codified in the US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. The first meeting of the Strategic Partnership Commission, held in Washington, launched four bilateral working groups on priority areas identified in the Charter: democracy; defense and security; economic, trade, and energy issues; and people-to-people and cultural exchanges. Senior-level US and Georgian policymakers lead yearly meetings of each working group to review commitments, update activities, and establish future objectives. Since the signing of the Charter, the United States and Georgia have strengthened their mutual cooperation based on US support for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and its commitment to further democratic reform.

US ASSISTANCE TO GEORGIA

The United States has provided over \$3 billion in assistance to Georgia since its independence in 1991. The US assistance is critical to supporting Georgia's progress toward democratic governance, a stable market-based economy, and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, the US assistance is designed to sustain, leverage, and build upon prior programs--especially those launched with the \$1 billion assistance post-conflict package--and to further institutionalize gains made to ensure strong democratic and economic foundations for Georgia.

The United States will continue to develop assistance projects that bolster democratic and participatory governance, develop institutions that uphold and enforce the

rule of law, improve the quality and delivery of social services, promote integration with NATO and increased regional cooperation, lay the groundwork for a sustainable resolution of conflicts with the separatist regions based on Georgia's territorial integrity, and achieve stable economic growth. Georgia was one of the first countries to receive a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact in September 2005. The 5-year \$395 million Compact focused on enhancing regional infrastructure and energy security.

The ongoing US support aims to help citizens exercise a more active role in their own democracy and to engage constructively in political dialogue and oversight over their government. Programs are designed to enhance the ability of civil society and independent media to enable informed civic participation and public debate, provide improved means of communicating citizen interests, and promote government accountability. US programs also strengthen democracy and governance by enhancing institutional checks and balances. This includes assistance to strengthen the rule of law; increase government transparency, accountability, and responsiveness; and promote political competition and democratic electoral processes.

The US assistance also supports economic growth by promoting private sector competitiveness and development of key sectors of the economy such as agriculture. Programs also provide technical assistance aimed at developing a business-enabling environment that will strengthen investor confidence and lead to widespread growth. Further, US programs continue to assist internally displaced populations and also seek to increase the standard of living of all Georgians through development and reform of the education and health sectors. This assistance works to build capacity in the security sector by enhancing the professionalism and capacity of the armed forces, furthering Georgia's ability to secure its borders, improving law enforcement, and addressing cross-border challenges such as trafficking in persons and narcotics (US Department of States 2012)

Nevertheless, the US can maintain its support for Georgia through the following means: military; education; training; capacity building; democratization; and liberalization. Georgia has greatly liberalized in the last 6-7 years. Expectations are high that the upcoming election will be freer and fairer. Georgia's integration with NATO is

not a bilateral security guarantees for Georgia's security challenges in Transcaucasia region. Significantly, NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen described Georgia as an 'aspirant,' grouping it with countries such as Macedonia. Russia may have thought it resolved the Georgia problem in 2008, but US policy has not changed (Round Table 2012).

FIELDS OF COOPERATION

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with the newly independent country Georgia, the US has provided immense political, military, financial and humanitarian assistance to Georgia. The United States has become one of the main international guarantors of Georgia's sovereignty. The US reiterated strong support of the territorial integrity of Georgia and its Euro Atlantic integration. In Washington DC the Charter on Strategic Partnership between Georgia and the United States was signed. The Charter is based on the principles of Strategic cooperation between the two states and support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and the strengthening of democracy and stability. It represents a very important framework for the enhancement of cooperation in the spheres of security and defense, economy and trade, energy, culture and education, as well as for the strengthening of democratic institutions and extension of people to people contacts.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION

The most important phase of the US-Georgian military and political cooperation was implementation of Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), followed by the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) in 2005, also, Military Education Programs, US Experts' assessment visits etc. All these programs were fully financed and supervised by the US, aimed at enhancing Georgia's military capabilities, stimulating military reform and raising the level of professional military education. Three Georgian brigades trained under the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) and the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) fulfilled their mission in Iraq in 2003-2008 under the command of the US Armed Forces. Also, from March 2010 one Georgian infantry battalion participates in the ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) Operation in Afghanistan under the US Marine Corps, contributing to the

insuring international security.

However, a renewed focus is needed on both sides of the Atlantic to help consolidate Georgia's security, democracy, and economic development, and enable it to become a valid example for other states determined to maintain their independence and integrity. Although the US administration has shifted its attention away from the Caucasus, the American connection remains a priority for Georgia. The two countries share several security interests, including regional conflicts, terrorism, and energy flows in the Black Sea-Caspian zone.

Georgia is strategically positioned at the intersection of several unstable regions where opportunities also exist for economic development. The US-Georgia Forum will assess Georgia's progress and identify potential initiatives that can strengthen the country's security, including the development of the US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership (Round Table Summary 2012).

Nevertheless, it still believes that NATO is the right destination, though security is a journey, not a destination. Georgia is not just a valuable partner, but also a contributor. The Atlantic Council of Georgia will try to have a similar discussion in Tbilisi in the month of May as this inaugural one in Washington. Georgia is facing major challenges in the spheres of security, economy, and democracy, and US engagement is very important. America is beloved around the world not due to its military power, but rather, its commitment to democracy and human rights (*ibid*).

However, the US efforts to strengthen security and defense cooperation with Georgia are critical in order to promote Georgia's regional security and to ensure that it remains on the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration. US officials should take the following measures:

- Advance Georgia's NATO aspirations:** US officials should use the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago to advance the Alliance's commitment to Georgia's membership aspirations by agreeing to an intensified package of cooperation, making clear that the NATO Georgia Commission and Georgia's Annual National Programme

(ANP) are the mechanisms through which Georgia can achieve membership, and hosting the first-ever leader-level meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission in Chicago.

•**Bolster the US footprint in Georgia**: Georgia's security strategy is premised on deterrence. In the absence of formal security guarantees, the United States should engage the Georgians to develop credible defense plans and to augment a small military footprint associated with its program to train Georgian forces for coalition operations, support to NATO's Partnership for Peace Training Center, and facilities and logistics to handle transit from Afghanistan and Central Asia.

•**Normalize military-to-military relations**: US officials should normalize military-to-military relations with Georgia, including restarting defensive arms sales and Special Forces training. The United States should link this decision to Georgia's continuing commitment to its nonuse-of-force pledge, coordinate implementation with NATO allies, and ensure transparency in all defense cooperation with Georgia.

•**Join the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)**: Working off the precedent of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), the United States should participate in the EUMM (Atlantic Council 2011).

Nonetheless, in military terms, Georgia has concentrated on financing and training its military. Since before the 2008 war, both have increased. Though US assistance has increased since before the war, it will hold steady in the next few years. Georgia is still the biggest recipient of aid in the former USSR. It also has strong congressional support - Congress sees Georgia as a model and helps sustain funding to the country. This relationship is supported by Georgia being not only a security consumer but also a producer, as seen through its contributions to the Afghanistan mission (Round Table 2012).

PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY

There are certain steps which are taken by the US for promoting democracy and security in Georgia which are as follows:

1. To continue to advance democracy, human rights, and the establishment of effective state institutions;
2. To further our economic development in the midst not only of a global crisis, but of the investment chill that comes with war;
3. To continue to work with our friends on how best to peacefully restore our territorial integrity
4. To accelerate our European and Euro-Atlantic integration;
5. To ensure security for all of Georgia, without which the previous goals are simply impossible to achieve (Vashadze 2009).

Without the assistance and support of the United States, these ambitions would be difficult if not impossible to meet. Georgia relationship with America has been fundamental for Georgia's democratic progress and security. The close partnership will help both nations to get the benefits of democracy and security in Georgia, as well as in the region as a whole.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Economic cooperation is an important aspect of the US Georgia relationship and critical to Georgia's continued economic transformation. The 1998 Baltic Charter Partnership, in which Georgia has to work with the US, that ultimately led to NATO membership. This could be seen as an encouraging example for Georgia. It is not clear if the US administration has a broader policy in the region. Georgia has a wide spectrum of agricultural products which tend to export to the US market. In the field of economics and trade, a free trade agreement (FTA) may be reached. Though this is not a new idea, it is worthwhile that it was raised by Obama during his recent meeting with Saakashvili (Round Table Summary 2012).

US Assistance Program

The US assistance in various spheres have been increased since the Rose Revolution in

November 2003, when the people of Georgia manifested to the international community its true desire to build a state based on the principles of democracy, market economy and the rule-of-law.

The US administration has designed a Millennium Challenge Program aimed at investing American capital in the Georgian economy. Georgia was one of the first countries to sign a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation over five-year period in September 2005. This compact totaling \$295 million is focused on different projects for rehabilitating regional infrastructure and promoting private sector development.

Following the Russian aggression, one billion US dollar assistance was pledged by the US Government to Georgia for the economic recovery. The two-year assistance package will be used to finance actions aimed at humanitarian assistance to the displaced persons, promoting democratic reforms and rule of law, stimulating economic growth and rebuilding the infrastructure.

GEORGIA'S SUPPORT IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The United States can bolster Georgia's economy by targeting its aid, investments, and diplomacy to:

- **Facilitate Western investment:** Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) financing should continue to buffer the political risk of long-term investments in Georgia, but US officials should make clear that tax disputes with investors and loose property rights endanger US efforts to facilitate greater investment into Georgia.

- **Support job creation:** The US donor agencies and international financial institutions (IFIs) should work with Georgia to strengthen agribusiness and reinvigorate its agricultural sector in order to tackle high rural unemployment. Georgia should redesign its Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) proposal for a university to ensure that it improves Georgia's educational system and generates skilled labor.

- **Launch a US-Georgia Free Trade Agreement (FTA):** The US Trade Representative (USTR) should launch negotiations for a US-Georgia FTA.

- **Back IFI investment along the lines of occupation:** The United States should wield its voting power in the IFIs to support projects that spur cross-border contact and commerce

on the Georgian-controlled side of the occupation lines with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While US leadership is critical to Georgia's success, ultimately Georgia's future lies in Europe. The EU's ability to influence domestic reforms in neighboring countries has been limited to neighbors with clear membership prospects. In order to articulate a policy for neighbors for whom membership is a distant goal, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP) with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Yet, EaP remains an underutilized tool, and EU officials have focused greater attention on its nearest neighbors (Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus), even though Georgia outperforms these countries on many counts.

Instead of wielding the EaP as a tool for deeper engagement in Georgia, EU officials dampen their influence with rhetoric that discounts Georgia's Euro-Atlantic ambitions. A more proactive EU policy toward Georgia that offers clear incentives could have a big impact on Georgia's reform process. The EU and European leaders should take the following measures to bring Georgia into Europe's fold, advance its security, and support its internal transformation (Atlantic Council 2011).

ENERGY COOPERATION

Energy cooperation is one of the main pillars of Georgia-US bilateral relations. The US is deeply interested in diversification of the world energy markets and continuously supports projects in this regard. Georgia is viewed as a favorable transit country for the Caspian oil and gas resources.

In the context of energy cooperation, the BTC pipeline has great importance. As Georgia is a small and troubled country but lies on one of the most significant energy transit routes of the post-Cold War era - the southern route for oil and gas exiting the Caspian Basin to Mediterranean, European, and global markets. The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey was one of the more significant infrastructural projects associated with exploitation of 'new' energy provinces early in this decade. The BTC oil line, which backed by the US, is now being paralleled by a gas pipeline from Baku through Georgia to Erzurum. These lines, and the access to Azerbaijan's energy product that they provide, make a small but significant difference to European energy security. This route will become a quite substantial source

of supply for Europe and international markets (MacFarlane 2008).

However, The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project is primary importance for Georgia, both from economic and political standpoints. From the very beginning, when the question of building the BTC pipeline was raised, Georgia had numerous obstacles to overcome of both a domestic and international nature. These included the weakness of the state, corruption, and Russia's policy towards Georgia. However, the 'Rose Revolution' that took place in November 2003, gave rise to new challenges and opportunities for the country's successful development. Against this background, the implementation of various investment projects, including the BTC oil pipeline, is expected to open new avenues for Georgia and US. In geo-economic terms, Georgia is situated along the quickest route linking Europe with Asia, a fact that has naturally led to the emergence of the idea of reviving the ancient Silk Road (Shevardnadze 1999).

US APPROACH TO GEORGIAN CONFLICT

There are certain comprehensive US policies on the Georgia conflicts which have five key objectives:

- Preventing a future outbreak of violence
- Improving the humanitarian situation on the ground
- Demilitarizing the conflict zone
- Reducing the conflicts' role as a roadblock to international security cooperation
- Facilitating over the long term a normalization of Russia-Georgia relations and a peaceful and just resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts within the context of Georgia's internationally recognized borders.

The US support for Georgia in military, diplomatic, economic, not merely able to resolve the conflicts. But the US's robust support for Georgia combined with heightened antagonism toward Russia because of its actions cannot resolve the conflicts (Charap and Welt 2011: 2-80).

Paradoxically, US also assume that Georgia is incapable or unwilling to take forward-leaning steps on conflict resolution. In fact, Tbilisi is doing or has committed to many forward-leaning conflict resolution steps. Further, conflict resolution is not on the Georgian government's agenda in conversations with US interlocutors does not mean they are not interested in pursuing it. Indeed, the Georgian government has two policy goals relevant to the conflicts that can seem contradictory to each other.

US POLICY ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION

In order to facilitate progress on these steps in the near term, the Obama administration should modify US policies to focus on conflict resolution. Specifically, the United States should:

- Rhetorically make conflict resolution and the normalization of the Russia-Georgia relationship a centerpiece of the US approach to the region
- Promote a narrative of the August 2008 war that focuses not on the parties' intentions but on the fact that all sides took actions that created a highly volatile security environment that ultimately led to the outbreak of hostilities
- Facilitate normalization of Russia-Georgia ties
- Minimize the extent to which disagreements in international forums on matters of principle impede progress on conflict resolution
- Develop a coherent policy on defensive arms provision that is consistent with conflict resolution
- Make any future engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia part of a conflict resolution strategy and work with the European Union to ensure it does the same The United States can and should be an effective broker for conflict resolution.

Thus, the US government must use rhetoric that is consistent with resolution and makes it clear that it is a central US objective.

Currently, in a state policy documents, the United States should emphasize that a peaceful and just resolution to the conflicts within Georgia's internationally recognized borders is a central priority for US policy. The administration should also endorse incremental progress acceptable to all sides. The officials of US should be vocally supportive of the Georgian government's commitment to peaceful engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The United States should continue to push for full Russian compliance with the ceasefire and push back against any attempts to revive sovereign diplomacy.

In addition, US should make normalization of the Russia-Georgia relationship a US priority as part of the emphasis on conflict resolution. US rhetoric approach on the conflicts is also often needlessly dismissive of some of the parties. At times, it is even inconsistent with the Georgian government's own policies. The US Agency for International Development map, for example, put the words 'Abkhazia' and 'South Ossetia' in quotation marks, which suggests the US government questions their existence entirely (Fy 2008-09). The US desire to be supportive of Georgia in international arena is understandable but this approach is unfortunate for both governments. It deprives the United States of the credibility it needs with other parties to be effective in helping the Georgian government achieve its goals. US officials should consistently emphasize that a resolution to the conflicts entails wide powers of self-government for Abkhazia and South Ossetia and that this is consistent with longstanding Georgian government policy.

Accordingly, the US government should refrain as much as possible from referring to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in ways that suggest they are merely 'regions,' 'areas,' or 'territories' of a unitary Georgian state. This does not imply a change in US policy on Georgia's borders or the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Ibid).

DEVELOPMENT OF A COHERENT POLICY ON ARMS SALES

The current US policy toward Georgia immediately raises the question of defensive arms sales arms race in the Transcaucasia region. Georgian officials have continuously repeated their requests for such hardware from the US.

The US policy on this issue is deliberately ambiguous. On the one hand, since the war there have been no government-to-government deliveries of any military hardware or export licenses granted for commercial sales. (It should be noted that the US government has never provided or sold Georgia major military hardware on a government-to-government basis (Tseluiko 2010).

According to Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon has said: *"We don't have an arms embargo on Georgia. We are pursuing security cooperation with Georgia. Georgia is making a very significant contribution in Afghanistan, which we value. ... and we are helping them with training for that mission.... Georgia's a sovereign, independent country.... we've said that all sovereign, independent countries in Europe and elsewhere have the right to self-defense"* (Gordon and Posener 2010).

It should go without saying that Georgia has the right to self-defense as a sovereign state. It can purchase whatever equipment it deems necessary for these purposes. This is not a relevant question for US policy. But US officials seem intent on restating Georgia's right to self-defense in part because the Russian government has taken actions such as threatening sanction to deny Georgia this right. Following a successful transformation of the conflicts, the side effects of the US-Georgia defense relationship need not be a concern. Until then the United States needs to acknowledge that Georgia is not just a strategic partner but a strategic partner involved in multiple dimension of internal and external conflicts.

However, the US's more proactive approach into the Georgian ethnic conflicts, diplomatic relations, economic ties, and military support are all components of US-Georgia policy, which aimed at understanding Georgia's sovereignty, prosperity, and democratic transformation. But they do not constitute a policy on conflict resolution.

CHAPTER FOUR

IMPACT OF GEORGIA-US RELATIONS ON RUSSIAN

FOREIGN POLICY

The thrust of foreign policy keeps on changing according to the changing international conditions. In the wake of the dissolution of Soviet Union and emergence of Russian federation as a major successor state of soviet empire, has changed the foreign policy of Russia as well as neighboring countries. During these time the Russian political system has undergone in a major restructuring, while its domestic and foreign policies have unexpected significant changes.

In the contemporary international relations, It can be seen that how a small state could achieve an important position in the foreign policy of an emerging super power by a tactical move. Georgia itself facing a big problem of ethnic conflict but situated at the strategic position in Transcaucasia region which impart value in the eyes of West as well as Russia. The strategic relationship of Georgia and the development of security concern with the United States and EU, pose threat to the specific interests of Russian in Transcaucasia region. Some political scientists argue that it is a sign of a New Great Game in Transcaucasia for capturing the valuable resources and dominating the region.

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

It would be imperative to understand the meaning of foreign policy before v analyzing the theoretical aspects of the Russian foreign policy. To begin with, Foreign policy can be understood as the study of the management of external relations and activities of nation-states, as distinguished from their domestic policies. Foreign policy involves goals, strategies, measures, methods, guidelines, directives, understanding, and agreements and so on, by which national governments conduct international relations with each other's and with international organizations and non-governmental actors. All national governments, by the very fact of their separate international existence, are obliged to

engage in foreign policy directed at foreign government and other international actors. Governments want to influence the goals and activities of other actors who they cannot completely control because they exist and operate beyond their sovereignty (Carlsnaes 2202:335).

In this sense Foreign policy of a state can be defined as actions of a state toward the external environment, according to Walter Carlsnaes 'foreign policies consist of those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments or directives, and which designed by governmental representatives.' In this sense foreign policy is the sum of total principles, interests and objectives which a country promotes while interacting with other countries.

After the disintegration of Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy felt a dilemma in choosing the realist approach in order to shape the new foreign policy goals. So in order to create theoretical framework for analyzing Russian foreign policy, it would be important to take into consideration set of theories, which draw particular importance to achieving a special status - hegemony. In this context, the simple meaning of Hegemony is the Russian efforts, in order to save their interests in pre-soviet states region. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation has been a complex phenomenon in the contemporary international relations. Facing the challenges of globalization and integration it has still been deeply anchored in the heritage of the USSR hegemony during the cold war. Besides, despite the problems with the economic and political transformation, the position of Russia as the biggest country in the world as well as its nuclear and raw material potentials have significantly influenced the Russia's place in the international system.

In a theoretical point of view, Russian foreign policy can be better understood by when seen through the perspective of Offensive Realism. It resembles the wider 'realist' branch of International Relations theory. And it is based on the idea of states' interests and security concerns rather than ideology which are the main influence on their policy.

Moreover, the realist framework offers prescription as well as description. A non-ideological pursuit of a nation's interests is likely to be the most effective policy, because

the world is such that a state's concern for its own survival must be paramount. Therefore, realism suggests that not only do states tend to act as if their own interests are the guiding values of their foreign policies, but that they ought to act this way, and are negligent if they diverge too greatly from this prescription.

One of the distinguishing features of Mearsheimer's 'offensive realism' is its emphasis on regional hegemony. It argues that 'land power is the dominant form of military power in the modern world'. Offensive realism predicts that aspiring great powers will come into conflict with regional hegemonies in other regions of the world as those distant regional hegemonies will attempt to dominate all other regions than their own. In this case, as the regional hegemony of North and South America, the United States will attempt to dominate Europe and Asia, and Russia as an aspiring great power will oppose these efforts. Russia is not nearly as keen on multilateralism in the 'Near Abroad', where the country is militarily supreme, and where multilateralism would mean concessions of power and much more equality of status with her neighbours (Shearman 2001: 222-247).

Thus foreign policy of the states ought to be guided with its national interests. In this respect particular importance is attached to the Regional hegemony perceived as a state controlling other states in a specific geographical area and incorporating in foreign policy all available recourses for maintaining status quo. While Russia still uses a 'sticks and carrots' approach to secure its own interests, those sticks no longer comprise of brute force but 'in formal diplomatic influences and soft power'.

Thus, the Russian federation foreign policy is aimed to achieve regional recognition and influence in this region which is directly linked to ensuring security and creation of conducive environment for gaining economic benefits. In strategic sense, Georgia are presents an area where the interests of Russia and West coincide, control over this territory is highly linked to broader global recognition. As Georgia increasing engagement with US and Russia's strong interest in Georgia, is mainly caused by Georgia's geopolitical location and its proximity to black sea makes Georgia spot where east and west meets with each other's.

After the down fall of USSR, Georgia became more important for both Russia and United States for geo-strategic and geo-economic in this region or near abroad. But due to the historical and its geographical proximity towards the Russia, Russia has a leverage in comparison to others external and internal powers. Georgia's strategic position has ensured it is of vital military and economic significance to Russia. Its border with NATO member Turkey has always made Georgia strategically important and warranting the locating of numerous Soviet military bases within its territory. Georgia's opposite border is with the unstable North Caucasus region of Russia including the breakaway province of Chechnya. Georgian territory also contains vital Black Sea ports and sits astride potential routes for Russian controlled oil and gas pipelines. Additionally communications and pipelines linking Russia and pro-Russian Armenia run exclusively through Georgia.

Russia's policy towards ethnic conflict in Georgia had to take account of numerous geo-strategic factors. Conflict between Georgia and Russia remains unresolved after nearly a century. For many, the conflict is categorized as intractable; its roots run deep into the economic, social and political structure of both Georgia and Russia. In 1991, under international law, the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia belong to Georgia. Tbilisi alleges, with considerable evidence, that Russian meddling during the bitter civil wars that followed helped the two state win their de facto independence and that Moscow's support has been crucial to keeping them going ever since.

So from 1991, Russian foreign policies changed dramatically. Instead of the traditional Soviet approach which meant gaining military advancement and situating military forces in neighboring countries, it was promptly replaced by economic leverage, particularly energy resources.

YELTSIN ERA

In early 1990s Russian foreign policy had feature of pro-western pattern, which caused temporary deterrence of Russia's intention to regain influence over former Soviet States. Soon after realizing unwillingness of western world to accept Russia to the extent that

Russia intend to be accepted and treated, it realized that recapturing leading position in ex-soviet republics would be an appropriate countermeasure. Taking into account all situations, former president Mr. Yeltsin introduced the concept of near abroad as a basic tenet of Russian foreign policy.

The concept 'near abroad' refers to the republics of the former Soviet Union, towards which Russia has specific comprehensive policy. The incorporation of it in Russian foreign policy was to draw demarcation line between former Soviet states and the rest world. The increased western influence in former Soviet states is perceived by Russia as an attempt to isolate Russia from political 'playground' in west hemisphere through gaining control over the remains of 'Geopolitical bloc' once belonging to Russia. According to some nationalist thinker, Russia had to introduce active policy in the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, because Russian indecision and inconsistency led to the escalation of the conflicts, which in their opinion represented danger for Russia.

The Russian foreign policy during the Yeltsin period was mainly interested in maintaining internal security and territorial integrity of the country as one of the reasons why Russia was engaged in the local conflicts in the near abroad. It is an important instrument for them to portray Russia as an impartial participant in peace talks, interested only in peaceful regulation of the conflicts. However, Russia was never impartial and the real interest in the final solution of the conflicts is dubious. On the other hand, many Georgian sources claim that Russia was not interested in unlimited escalation of the conflicts, because it would be dangerous for Russian security and potentially for its territorial integrity as well. Unrest and instability could spread over to Northern Caucasus and aggravate ethnic disputes in Russia itself. Russian foreign policy based on an effort to get a rational analysis of what 'real' interests of Russia had in Caucasus (Gasimov 2006).

The geopolitical side is one of the factors that determined Russian endeavor to dominate the whole region between the Black and Caspian Seas. In the context of changing situation, Russia not only focused on coercive element but also gave the importance to the element of soft-power balancing in order to gain the support of Georgia. Moscow decided that instead of making Georgians unwitting hostages of the

Russian leadership relations with Mr. Saakashvili, it would be better to increase Russia's attractiveness in the eyes of Georgian society. In other words, 'Hard Power' should be changed to 'Soft Power'. Russia uses its compatriot's policy as a way of exerting soft power on neighbouring countries.

After 1993, the Russian domestic political situation stabilized allowing a coherent strategy towards Georgia and its ethnic conflicts to form. Specifically Russia's policy aimed at formalizing Georgia's position in the CIS, deploying Russian peacekeeping troops in the region with an international mandate and the application of pressure on Abkhazia to compromise with Georgia. Russia chose to secure and maintain its interests in Georgia through Shevardnadze. Relations between the two nations reached a peak in February 1994 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that provided for political, military and economic cooperation between the two. A joint air defence system and joint protection of the Georgia border were two of the products of the treaty. Russia however was left to fund the bulk of these and other security initiatives. The disarmament of the Abkhaz forces and the return of 250,000 internally displaced people to Abkhazia demanded by Georgia were largely ignored by Russia. Russia's policy towards Georgia followed a pattern of containment and cooperation during the mid and late 1990s (Rukavishnik 2011).

Containment however was all Russia could hope to achieve in Georgia's ethnic conflicts in the mid-1990s. With its continuing financial weakness Russia's military presence in the region began to decline both in numbers and in quality. The outbreak of full-scale war in Chechnya in December 1994 was an even more serious constraint. Russia had no will or ability to involve itself in a second major war in the Caucasus. Its policy of cooperating with the Georgians and largely leaving the Abkhazs and Ossetians alone ensured Russia's military and economic resources were stretched no further than Russia could manage. In order to reach as wide a group as possible, Russian policy-makers developed the concept of the 'Russian World.' In pursuance with this policy, the state has teamed up with the Russian Orthodox Church in promoting values that challenge the standard Western tradition. Russian television is popular in many neighbouring countries and serves as a vehicle for spreading influence. This policy

highlighted the Russian World concept immensely. Therefore, Russian interest lies in the existence of a belt of stable and economically efficient states on the whole perimeter of its borders (Nygren 2011).

After 1993, Russian foreign policy became, not hostile to the West, but colder towards it. There are a number of possible reasons for this shift. Firstly, the success of nationalists on the left and right in the 1993 parliamentary elections undermined the credibility of pro-Western forces within the Yeltsin regime. However, it is possible that the strong performance itself was a reaction against a pro-Western foreign policy.

PUTIN ERA

Shifts in Russian foreign policy from Yeltsin to Putin were mainly connected to developments in the sphere of domestic politics. With Russian politics strongly determined by small societal interest groups, the government's capacity to formulate and implement its own policy line was largely dependent on its financial situation and, thus, a function of the world oil price. Accordingly, the rise and fall of particular interest groups and their changing leverage over policy makers considerably shaped official foreign policy decision making (Kastner 2008).

Putin always seemed to be in favour of maintaining pragmatic relations with the United States as part of a larger strategy of seeking to ensure Russia a central role in managing global affairs, at least to the extent that Washington was willing to recognize and accept what he saw as Russia's legitimate security interests.

During his first term in office, Putin carried out an upgrading of national security, military and foreign policy concepts to ensure Russia's progress toward a multidirectional, balanced, and pragmatic external strategy. During his second term in office, Putin continued to implement his new policy without encountering any serious resistance at home. Addressing the Federal Assembly with his annual message at the start of that term, he said: 'It is important to make the foreign policy serve the comprehensive development and modernization of the country' (ibid).

In given Russia's geostrategic position and economic situation, the Russia could not afford to plunge into a new Cold War with the West, which Russia needs both as a valuable partner for the political and economic modernization of post-Soviet Russia as well as a balance to counter numerous security problems, which ranged from the real threat of terrorism to the potential challenge of the Chinese giant in the East. At the same time, Moscow realized that close cooperation with China would prevent US and NATO hegemony in world affairs and rebuff Islamic extremism in the south. The CIS zone also required a balanced policy in order to overcome conflicts and instability there.

At the beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin also recognized that internal reforms and the modernization drive required 'the widest possible integration of Russia into the system of global economic interactions.' Russia still needs the West as a valuable source of technology, capital, and management know-how. However, Russia's leaders realized that in dealing with Western partners, Russia could not expect preferential treatment or easy concessions. Instead, Russia faced stiff competition and tough bargaining on every economic issue. Putin also understood that the Russian Federation needed to increase economic cooperation in various directions with other countries as well. Putin continued his strategy to help Russia regain her 'great power' position. Putin's aim is to make Russian foreign policy more independent endorsing to the motive of Russian think tanker. Russia will seek the formation of a multi-polar system of international relations adequately reflecting the multifaceted nature of the contemporary world with its diversity of interests.' There is an element of nostalgia on the part of the Russian conservative elite to achieve the status that they once lost with the Soviet disintegration (kanet 2011).

The paradigm shift occurred in the Russian foreign policy in the year of 2005 due colour revolutions moments in CIS countries. The series of 'colour revolutions' in neighboring countries of the CIS had the aspiration of the new elites to integration without Russia's participation. It has become known that the victorious opposition received financial support from the West. Some of the new leaders took an anti-Russian position. They started a rapprochement with the US and Europe and started moving toward joining NATO. Using the resources available, Russia is striving to preserve her

influence in the neighboring states. It is the geopolitical aspect of Russia's foreign policy. During the 'colour revolutions,' the troops at the Russian bases did not interfere in the events in Georgia. Instead, Russia acted as an intermediary in the wake of political crises (Zakaurtseva 2007).

Vladimir Putin has continued to pursue the policy of clear ethnic discrimination by engaging and pressuring Georgia and implemented new changes in Russia's foreign policy in order to regain the status of a major international player. This policy quickly became defiant and assertive, with displays of force and provocations toward the West. This was how the 'multi-polar' concept unfolded in action, with measures that were supposed to provide Russia with a status equal to that of the United States and to allow it to realize its relative advantages.

The path chosen for implementing this concept was a dual approach that combined challenges to the Western system with proactive cooperation with the international community. This policy earned the support of the public at home, which largely identifies with the 'superpower' trend promoted by the leadership. The ideology that has taken hold among the Russian public combines the Russian imperialist tradition with Soviet geopolitical concepts, grounded in an assertive and manipulative approach in international relations such as strong opposition to expanding NATO eastward while bringing the regions of the former Soviet Union into the European Union and NATO, or opposition to democratization pressures. This new foreign policy was implemented during Putin's tenure and has been characterized by the following:

1. An effort in the international arena to upgrade Russia's status by combining defiance of the United States and NATO – by way of negation of the US-dominating unipolar concept – with proactive cooperation with the overall international system.
2. On the regional level, which is its preferred arena, Russia has used various levers of influence to push the United States aside and promote its own agenda (for example, agreements on cooperation with BRIC, OIC, and SCO).

3. In the space of the former Soviet Union, defined by Russia as an area of vital interest since it is a barrier for ensuring Russia's national security, an uncompromising struggle was waged to repel Western incursions and attempts to influence countries in the region, and to preserve Russian hegemony. This was done by diplomatic activity, and the use of coercive power or forces (Magen and Moldavsky 2011).

Russia's policy towards ethnic conflict in Georgia has achieved many of its goals. The Russian military still maintains an extensive presence in Georgia and the country remains firmly in the Russian sphere of influence. It has achieved this by ruthlessly manipulating ethnic conflicts in Georgia to its own advantage. Georgia has been left with few choices in the short run but to accept Russia's dominant role in its internal affairs (Oldberg 2011).

Permanent intervention of Russian Federation is not surprising, because she has strategic interests in this region, as follows:

1. Disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the loss of influence in the former republics, which traditionally considered alliances. More than ever this situation became sharp after Georgian denial to become a full member of the CIS and to sign Tashkent Pact. After the collapse of the USSR, Georgia has started to look for western alliance and investors for economic recovery and getting beyond the dominant control of Russia. Turkey and the European Union were interested in cooperation with Georgia, which had a strategic importance as a NATO neighbour and as a transit state.

2. The second strategic interest of Russian Federation is natural resources of Caucasus and Caspian Sea. It is understandable that Russia would like to control the oil and gas transportation as well as trade routes of the Silk Road.

And the last one, Russia has its military bases at the territory of the Caucasian states, which are used for the protection of Russian borders and securing the presence in the region. But Georgia and Azerbaijan called to the NATO for assistance in military reform. Moreover they would like to join the North Atlantic Alliance. Despite the proclaimed NATO-Russian cooperation, Russia still negatively thinks about the further Alliance influence wide spreading. As a result of difficult negotiations only in May 2005 Russia

and Georgia agreed on Russian army withdrawal by the end of 2008, despite that fact that in the beginning Russia had insisted that it would take 11 years(Graham 1996: 289-325).

In the long run, Russia has sowed the seeds for a decline in its influence over Georgia. Russia's duplicity in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is well known to Georgians who continue to tolerate it only out of necessity. However, Georgia's reliance on Russia cannot last forever. The West has taken an interest in the country and provided it with financial aid since the mid-1990s. Russia's focus on terrorism in Georgia has also attracted the attention of the United States already interested in the Caucasus for their potential energy resources. The US has stationed five military advisors in Georgia to train its armed forces to fight terrorism and provided it with ten UH-1H Iroquois helicopters. Both caused alarm in Russia and delight in Georgia. Russia's protection of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's de facto independence and manipulation of both conflicts for its own gain has undermined Shevardnadze's regime and badly wounded Georgian pride.

Thus, Russia has lost the historic opportunity that the collapse of the Soviet Union presented to forge a partnership with Georgia based on trust and mutual respect. Georgia whether realistically or not more than ever sees its future with the west and the United States in particular, a future that can only be at the expense of Russian interests.

Russia's policy towards ethnic conflict in Georgia has evolved over time in tune with changes in Russia's domestic politics and changes in external factors. The manipulation of these conflicts for short-term Russian gain has been a tremendous success with Georgia submitting to the majority of Russia's demands. Long-term Russia's tactics have served to alienate Georgia further increasing the chance Russia will have to accept growing western involvement in region. Events in Russia will however continue to determine Georgia's prospects for the near future, exactly what Russia always wanted (ibid).

In 2003, the pro-democracy 'Rose Revolution' brought Mr. Saakashvili to power on pledges to reunite the country and lead it into the premier Western military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Georgia claims that Russia, which brutally suppressed its own separatist uprising in Chechnya, backed the Ossetia and

Abkhazian rebels in order to keep Georgia weak and dependent upon Moscow. After that Saakashvili was elected, Russia began upgrading its relations with the two rebels state lets and issued Russian passports to the majority of its citizens – in preparation, Tbilisi says, for a showdown. It contends that this year, as NATO considered Georgia's application for entry, the Russian 58th Army – which roared into South Ossetia 10 days ago to blunt the Georgian assault – massed provocatively near Georgia's border.

Relations with Russia, which have been constantly deteriorating since the first Putin-Saakashvili meeting of early 2004, are currently at their lowest, following the breakdown imposed by Russia of all trade, communication and diplomatic links with Georgia and the expulsion of hundreds of Georgian citizens living in Russia. Georgia claims that the root cause for the deterioration of bilateral relations lies with Russian objections to Georgia European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Georgia blames Russia for providing economic and political support for the breakaway regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has called for replacing with an international presence the mostly Russian peacekeeping forces in conflict zones. Links made by Russia between Kosovo final status and secessionist aspirations in the two breakaway regions have also contributed to increased tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow. The increase of Russian gas and oil prices in 2005, followed by severe supply disruptions of energy supplies from Russia in January 2006, and a total import ban of Georgian exports ,imposed by Russia in early 2006 have highlighted the need for diversifying energy supplies and for finding alternative markets for exports. Against this difficult backdrop Georgia has called for dialogue and for normalizing relations (ibid).

Since the end of the Cold War, the policies followed by Russia towards the United States and the European Union have pragmatism as well emotional factor. Russian policy towards the United States and the European Union has been the use of the best means and diplomacy at the country's disposal to secure this power for Russia.

During the president Putin term, Russia started taking a keen interest in its neighbors. Although a clear foreign policy strategy was never defined for Central Asia, all developments pointed to Moscow making the five republics a priority and not wishing to risk losing them. After all, Central Asia was part of Imperial Russia, later the 1990s

were considered as a brief interval of lack of influence. It will need these assets to make sure that the interdependence between Moscow and its southern neighbors remains strong, especially now that other players will be more alert to Russia's actions in its near abroad.

One of most interesting recent development in Russian foreign policy has been claimed that Russia has a sphere of influence along its borders with former soviet republic, much as United States had made similar claims for almost two centuries concerning the entire western region. In the early 2000s, a combination of factors enhanced Russia's position towards its near neighbors. The country was recovering from the economic crisis and it acquired a new leader who defeated the Chechen insurgency, regional separatism, and the Moscow oligarchy and it had much more money to spend, as a result of steadily rising energy prices. Just after September 11, Putin used his new closeness to then-President George W. Bush to promote the idea of a strategic partnership between Russia and the United States.

Putin and Yeltsin both used different approaches in order to achieve their goals. While Yeltsin sought integration into the West, Putin aimed at integration with it. In July, 2008, President Medvedev published a new strategic concept for Russian foreign policy. It emphasized the importance of international law and the key role that the United Nations should play in resolving international issues of peace and security(Trenin 2008).

Russia's firm response to the invasion of South Ossetia by Georgia has become the first serious trial in Moscow's relations with the West after the March presidential elections. At the same time, the conflict in South Ossetia has represented the first major test for President Dmitry Medvedev. Leaving aside the origins and history of the frozen conflicts in Georgia, it should be recognized that the crisis in South Ossetia has been a product of differing geopolitical interests for Russia and the West, as well as a complex interplay of foreign policy and domestic interests of the parties involved, including external players. From the very beginning, President Medvedev's foreign policy agenda differed from that of his predecessor and Putin has accepted this. Medvedev is focused on cooperation with the West, rather than confrontation. Russia has won a military campaign

while complying with its peacekeeping responsibility to the South Ossetia people, but it has lost the information campaign.

Russia has drawn 'a red line', having shown NATO that its opposition to the Alliance's enlargement to the CIS space has not been simply words. At the same time, the fact that Russia found itself isolated in this conflict can't be neglected. None of its allies in the CSTO, SCO had clearly and unequivocally supported Russia in the South Ossetia conflict. The conflict in South Ossetia has shown that it is the European Union which has turned out to be Russia's only responsible international partner. The EU has taken on a difficult mission, not only to be a mediator in the conflict but, like after the Kosovo crisis in 1999, to seek to reduce the growing gap between Russia and the West. However, the Russian-Georgian conflict has increased differences inside the EU on how to deal with Moscow (Arbatova 2008).

The readiness to accept the political costs of the war with Georgia clearly indicates that Moscow is now prepared to be more assertive in testing the ground when advancing its interests, especially close to its borders. In the aftermath of the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia at the beginning of August 2008, Russia is moving to recalibrate its foreign policy. Although the confrontation in the southern Caucasus was foreseeable, the five-day war has nonetheless pushed the post-Soviet world into a new level of tension.

For the first time since 1991, a post-Soviet neighbor has dared to challenge Russia militarily and for the first time since the frozen conflicts appeared in the Black Sea region, Russia has allowed itself to become entangled in an armed conflict outside its own territory, for which it was partially responsible (Lindner 2008).

The armed response to Georgia in South Ossetia has revealed the militarization of Russian foreign policy. This was the first offensive operation by Russian forces outside Russian territory in more than ten years. One significant cause of Russia's changed foreign policy coordinates is NATO's commitment to expansion including Ukraine and Georgia, made in Bucharest in April 2008. Unlike the Baltic States, Moscow regards

Ukraine and Georgia as its strategic sphere of influence, vital for both energy and security.

The war with Georgia amended the general foreign policy agenda, pushing confrontation with the West into first place. But in the long run, Medvedev's overall aim has not changed. Objectively speaking, Russia has simply no resources for a purely confrontational agenda. During the eight years of Putin's reign, the struggle against a mono-polar world was almost the leading motive for the country's foreign policy. Soon after the war with Georgia and in the midst of the diplomatic confrontation with the US and the European Union over Russia's unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Medvedev announced some new aspects of his foreign policy. Among those was the unequivocal proclamation that Russia has some special interests in some regions, which was very close to claiming 'spheres of influence (Matthew 2010).

Now the US has to assess the risks of renewing military ties with Georgia. The EU needs to hammer out a strategy of meaningful engagement with the South Caucasus. And Russia is taking stock of the new strengths and weaknesses of its position, perhaps discovering that the spoils that duly go to the victor are mostly damaged goods.

In the aftermath of the Caucasian war, the US expressed an intention to 'punish' Russia and NATO declared that there would be 'no business as usual', but the net result of these tough words was a greater failure of western policy towards Russia. In the Caucasus, Moscow now has every reason to believe that there is no effective containment of its power projection capabilities. The states of the region, including the Georgia, will have to adjust to the new reality of Russia's dominance and find ways to accommodate the obstinate quasi-state actors. As new channels open to transport Caspian energy towards Russia and China, the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus might decline, but for Moscow this region will continue to be of vital importance. Russia now has the ability to supplement its military might with economic strength and to put into play some other elements of 'soft power', so it is only the arrogance of supremacy that might derail its post-imperialist ambitions(ibid).

As a returning great power, Russia's new foreign policy is aimed at the 'development of the new world order' in the framework of a 'collective leadership' and dominated by national interests. Dmitry Medvedev's hope for a 'modern European architecture', outlined in his address to Russia's diplomats on 15 July 2008, and his sharp criticism of US foreign policy also show Russia's interest to strengthen the role of European and global institutions in security policy. The war in the southern Caucasus has changed the coordinates of Russian foreign policy and transformed European security architecture. Overnight, a new realism has entered Russia's relations with its post-Soviet neighbors and with the West. Russia's disproportionate response to the Georgian army's irresponsible strike in South Ossetia on 6 August 2008 has undoubtedly strengthened the new Kremlin leadership's power within Russia. But abroad the image of Russia as a great sovereign power has suffered. The states of the post-Soviet world are worried on the matter security and sovereignty.

This policy is based on commercialization, on securitizing international and regional relations, on the 'display' of power. And it is post-ideological. This new foreign policy is caused by-

(1) The perception of political and economic competition between the US, EU, China, and Russia.

(2) Growing opposition to Russian attempts to increase its influence in the post-Soviet space by national governments of the neighbouring countries and foreign actors and institutions.

(3) A greatly diminished role for Russia as dominant Partner for investments and foreign trade.

(4) Russia's lack of a project for integration that would be attractive to its neighbors and could compete with the 'European' way of integration. Since Russia has not developed a new framework for post-Soviet integration and is not being perceived as a model for future cooperation for CIS countries, Russia and the West have to create a stable neighborhood in Eastern Europe, both in terms of resources and security.

This coercive approach in foreign policy could not make Russia stronger, either in terms of raising its competitiveness against EU members or in terms of its integration attractiveness for CIS members. Russia, however, is not interested in cooperation on the basis of a neighborhoods concept in the Black Sea region. Russia will be more strongly involved in the post-Soviet world than in the past. This new involvement is determined by institutional changes following the change of leadership in the Kremlin and by new strategic considerations. Russia is switching to a post-ideological policy of influence strongly oriented on national and commercial interests(Prystayko 2008).

Armed conflict in the southernCaucasus, escalating differences with Ukraine over energy and security policy, and an interest-led policy toward Central Asia and above all the Black Sea region will all make the EU's neighborhoods policy toward Russia much more difficult.A 'strategic partnership' with Russia will only be successful if Europe's image of Russia is corrected and the interests of the EU and Russia are considered. This correction will be necessary not least because of the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region, which is the future area of competition and borders on both the EU and Russia. It is the Black Sea region rather than the Western CIS that is Russia's most troubling neighborhoods and permanent conflict with Georgia.

Russia does not have a declared common policy approach towards its CIS neighbors. The CIS neighbourhoods are not on the periphery, but are at the core of Russian foreign policy. In the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 28 June 2000 'ensuring conformity of multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States to promote national security tasks of the country' was determined as the leading priority for Russian foreign policy (ibid).

Russia government frames the foundation of the foreign policy for enhancing the role Russia as global super power. These are of five principles the foundation for work in carrying out Russia's foreign policy. These are follows, first is to believe in international laws, second is to world should be multi-polar and third is that Russia does not want

confrontation with any country and the last is that there are region ,in which Russia has specific interest.

Russian concern about the unacceptability of NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia underlined in the new Foreign Policy Concept's statement that 'Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian border as a whole'. This can be interpreted as an extremely aggressive stand point that was absent in the earlier foreign policies. In simple terms, this can be understood as a clear warning to the West to keep its hands off her neighbors in the near abroad. The earlier concept had not included such a strong message. Russian foreign policy reflects a combination of confidence and strength, but also weakness and insecurity. It is a foreign policy influenced by domestic concerns - most particularly by Moscow's apparent anxiety about foreign interference in Russia's electoral cycle and domestic politics – but also one which has become considerably more active during the last 18 months, both in defending Russia's 'national interests' in international affairs and reaching out to establish relationships with states across the world.

Thus, Moscow sees two main roles for Russia. To counter western influence, Moscow believes that Russia must respond by becoming attractive, politically, economically and culturally. In doing this, Russia proposed a legitimate democratic centre, one that offers 'Sovereign Democracy', a different, 'authoritarian capitalism' model of economic and social development, one that is particularly relevant to states in the former USSR and Asia. Although in some cases this has soured relations with Russia's partners, Moscow appears to consider its foreign policy to be successful. Moscow sees an evolution in its own position and role and seeks to make proposals for the resolution of international questions and problems. Moscow sees Russia's position as being one of a regional power with global horizons and ambitions, though the new foreign policy concept refrains from describing Russia as a 'Great Power' (Monaghan 2008).

In taking part in its five-day military conflict with Georgia in the beginning of August 2008, Russia opened a new page in its relations with the neighborhoods. Introducing a 'peace enforcement operation' in response to Georgia's bombing of its separatist South Ossetia city Tskhinvali, mean that Russia violated its own new Foreign Policy Concept which states that the Russian Federation 'firmly proceeds from the premise that only the UN Security Council has the authority to sanction the use of force for the purpose of coercion to peace' and that Russia 'will seek political and diplomatic settlement of regional conflicts on the basis of collective actions of the international community proceeding from the premise that modern conflicts cannot be solved by the use of force'. None of the neighbours has officially expressed support for Russia's actions towards Georgia and its subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At the same time, apart from Ukraine, none has condemned unilateral Russian recognition of these territories (ibid).

On the way of achieving its strategic objects, Russia implemented great diversity of mechanisms including 'hard' power and recently introducing 'soft' power tools. Activities ranging from coercive attitude to diplomatic relation included economic sanctions, intensive propaganda activities that from 2008 were joined by Humanitarian trend of Russian policy. Newly set aim to defend Human rights and protect the interests of compatriots living abroad reveals vague nature, which requires comprehensive analysis of Russian approach towards sovereign former Soviet Union states.

The conflict on Georgia between Russia and United States measured as the 'return of great game' or starting of 'new great game' in Caucasus. For the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was absent from the region. Now it is back and seeks to use its cultural, linguistic and economic ties to boost its influence in the area. It has an advantage over the EU in that it is happy to turn a blind eye to human rights violations. Russia wants stability and cheap energy supplies from the region. It will seek to increase its military presence partly to counter western involvement. Russia's comeback in the region poses problems for the countries there seeking to retain their independence. The EU needs to strengthen its presence in Central Asia so as not to leave the field open for Russia (Boonstra 2008).

Following August 2008, Russian officials often talk about ‘new relations’ with Georgia. Russia strives to create an image of constructive partner and to convince international community of its humanity and willingness of good neighborly relations. Obviously there are far-reaching goals. More than once Russian Federation has openly asserted its ambition to become main artist and architect of the new European security system. President Medvedev has presented his concept on this topic in 2009. However this initiative has not yielded desired response as yet. The West cannot accept a country that has annexed a territory of the neighbouring country as an architect of the new European security system. The mechanisms of Kremlin ‘Soft Power’ implementation toward Georgia today and what might they are in the nearest future. Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation singles out several mechanisms of humanitarian Foreign-Policy Orientation:

- ‡ Protecting the Interests of Overseas Compatriots
- ‡ diplomatic Issues.
- ‡ Human Rights Issues.
- ‡ Cooperation in Culture, education and Science.

All the above mentioned along with information support are brought together in the Moscow foreign policy diplomatic arsenal.

Thus after August 2008 war the key objective of the Russian Foreign Policy turned out to be the validation of the necessity of Russian military aggression in Georgia, legalization of their actions on the occupied territories, ‘settling’ on those territories, winning of international support in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia and to present Georgia to the international community in the image of unstable and aggressor country (Pkhaldze 2010:1-18).

In order to strengthening Russian position in the international world politics, the new Russian doctrine of foreign policy of July 2008, spokes about the need to enhance the role of international law and the UN, the reduction of the use of force as a method to resolve international disputes, the need for diplomacy and tools of soft power, and the

imperative of multilateralism and cooperation among marginal multi state organizations such as the EU. The war in the Caucasus might have strengthened the leadership at home, but it has also damaged Russia's image abroad. He tends to the Putin is really in charge' camp. Linder notes the potential influence of the new federal agency for CIS affairs. He suggests that Russian foreign policy is 'post-ideological' and very much based on interests, especially those of the energy sector. He concludes that EU security can only be had with Russia and not against Russia (Lindner 2008).

The analysis of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation is a difficult task as the policy has been based on different and complex determinants. There are different constraints which hamper the start of a smooth bilateral relation between Russia and Georgia. They include the heritage of the cold war and the legacy of the USSR on the systemic level but at the same time the political and economic transformation in the domestic field. Nevertheless, despite the present day globalization and integration processes the broad theory of realism in the international relations has remained an efficient tool to analyze the foreign activity of Russia. While the self-assertive standpoint of Georgia cannot be blamed for the deadlock, the same cannot be said for the revival of national glory and nostalgia of the superpower Soviet era among the Russian populace. The Russian foreign policy has for a long time been reflecting the fundamental features of classical realism. Moscow has focused on the principle of the state's interests, its power and especially military potential and is out to assert its place as a major global regional player in the international arena.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The disintegration of soviet communist bloc in 1991, created a power vacuum in Transcaucasia region. The collapse of soviet block was a tragedy for communism ideology but other handit brings new opportunities for newly independent states, because in soviet regime their identities were brutally suppressed by Soviet Union. Georgia declaredtheir independent in 9thApril 1991, shortly before the downfall of Soviet Union.After the independence, Georgia faced many problems such as secessionist movement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia which was backed by Russian, economic stagnation and so many others.By taking into account of these entire devastating situations, Georgia, in spite of having historical relations with Russia, try to open a new chapter in relationship with west, particularly with US.

In the beginning of the 1990s, Caucasus region was not on the strategic thinking of US. But after the demise of Soviet Union, US desire was to fill the power vacuum of Caucasus region by recognizingthe independent status of Transcaucasian states and supportingthe democratic development in that. Georgia also needs a strategic partner in Transcaucasus region who have capabilities to balance the Russian hegemony in this region. By the mutual need of both and after the 9/11 event,Georgia became mean of success in fighting with terrorism and reducing dependency on Russian energy resources by creating alternatives oil pipelines routes such as BTC.

The Russian perceptions and imaginations of the South Caucasushave changed during centuries three or fourtimes, though its behavior towards the southern neighbors has always been in a dominating style.The Russian aggressive attitude toward Georgia isnot changed and still relying on the classical geopolitical thinking and does not reflect the relevant nature of geopolitics. As eminent scholar Dmitry Trenin (2009) expressed that ‘The Caucasus richly displays the stark contrast between Great Game-style

confrontation policies and globalized soft power competition. Traditionally, Russian foreign and security policy has leaned toward the former, but Russia can be only successful if it learns the ways of the latter.'He argued that the recent August war is a good example of this approach, and that the confrontational style of Russian foreign policy, based on neo-imperial geopolitics can bring more losses than benefits.

As from the 1991, Russia playing hides and seeks game with US, on the matter of Georgia. In the view of US, Georgia is an independent states and could established relationships with any countries of the world, on the other hand Russian were cautions about US policy toward Georgia. The relations between Georgia and US never touched a hype, but it posed a threats to Russian interests in Transcaucasus region .In 1991, Russia adopted 'near abroad' as a basis of foreign policy, in which whole Caucasus and central Asian region introduced as a 'sphere of influence' of Russian federation. The increasing engagement of Georgia with US placed a vulnerable situation in front of Russia. Russia considered it as challenged for their hegemony in Transcaucasus region, and feel helpless in front of Georgian move.Georgia, a small country and has no relative value bothered a lot to Russian policies towards Caucasus region and this is happened only because of geo-strategically position of Georgia in Caucasus region and Russian hegemonies doctrine towards Caucasus region.

As during the 1991,Russian foreign policy was ambiguous by nature and have no set of principles according to which it could be implicated, or apparently in unfinished process of transformation, whereby still struggling to make sense of the country's role in the world. Andrew Monaghan suggests that Russian foreign policy reflects a combination of confidence and strength but also weakness and insecurity. He notes that the new foreign policy doctrine is critical of US involvement in Caucasus region. During the tenure of Yeltsin period,the prime goal of Moscow was to make Russia a more assertive pole, while claiming a right to be consulted on all international issues. On the other hand, more assertive policy toward the Caucasus region placed Russian in devastating condition that must be handled if Russia is really acted as a major foreign policy actor.

During the Yeltsin era, Russian foreign policy was based on 'near abroad' concept but when Putin came to power, the situation was different, Putin's Russia was not as weak as Yeltsin, and there was also a boom in energy sector, which strengthened the Russian economy. During the Putin era, Russia adopted a more assertive foreign policy toward West as well as Caucasus states. The assertive nature of Russian foreign policy agenda pushed Russia in an isolated condition in international politics.

The Putin aspiration is look as a revival of 'the great game' in Central Asia. For the first decade, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was absent from the region. Now it is back and seeks to use its cultural, linguistic and economic ties to boost its influence in the area. While Russia felt in grasp of fond-memories as it had once experience in the Soviet era. But on the other hand, Russia does not want to let Georgia slip away from the Russian grip altogether. For Georgia, this is the conducive situation to engage with other countries such as US and EU. The Russian desire is to take control over the region and ensure cheap energy supplies from the region and also seeks to maximize its military presence in Transcaucasia region to encounter western involvement.

In second term, Putin had continued the new policy without diluting that irrespective of international pressure. Putin's Russia always in favour of developing relations with the United States and others part of the world and in the global politics, Russian desire to play a big role as was the former Soviet Union. President Putin has continued to pursue the policy of ethnic prejudicing by the intervention in Georgian matter of ethnic conflicts. This policy quickly became aggressive by using the military's support to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This policy of Russia, led serious concern for West in to maintaining peace and security in the region. This kind of policy towards pre-soviet states reflects the strength of Russian states and also gives the sign of emerging new world order, in that were supposed to provide Russia with a status equal to that of the United States.

The entire pre soviet states must have to adjust themselves according to the new incarnation of Russia. The geopolitical significance of Caucasus might be decline due to new channels open to transport Caspian energy towards Russia and China, but for Russia this region will continue to be of vital importance. In contemporary era, Russia has

capabilities and capacity to influence the region by military might or with economic strength.

Nevertheless, Russian policy makers cannot ignore the western influence over the Caucasus region. But now they realized that, West could not treat Russia at par in international politics. Putin also known that Russian Federation needed to diversify its economic measures with other part of world. As energy is life line of every country, so it's almost impossible to ignore Russia. Due to the economic boom in oil and gas market, Russian had increased the reserve of foreign currency and by strengthens economic of Russia and Putin's aspiration to make Russian foreign policy more independent and assertive.

Thus, Russian ambition is to once again reconfigure the world by encountering the Western influence over the world politics. In doing so, Russian government again had worked to strengthen CIS. The new form of CIS would be more democratic than past. But the main aim of Russia is to prevent US in dealing with Russian territorial states. Although in some cases this effort of Russia may alienate from some neighborhood countries, but nevertheless they have no more choice. Russia has believed that this kind of foreign policy would be successful. As previously Russia only considered the coercive power as a method of persuasion but now Russia realized that in globalized world it would be very difficult to use it. So that Russia, introduced 'soft power' as a tool in developing relations with the neighborhoods states. This is happened only due the Georgia. Georgia as a newly independent country strives for development but no one effort were taken by Russian government. So in this situation attract towards western countries, which was ready to provide necessary imputes to Georgian economy. As Georgia's increasing relations with US, for only to balance the Russian hegemony in Caucasus region and for her development and economic aids, which was not provided by Russian government.

In order to strengthening Russian position in the international world politics, the new Russian doctrine of foreign policy of July 2008, spoke about the need to enhance the role of international law and the UN, the reduction of the use of force as a method to resolve international disputes, the need for diplomacy and tools of soft power, and the

imperative of multilateralism and cooperation among marginal multi state organizations such as the EU.

Nevertheless, the purpose of Russian foreign policy in Transcaucasia region is remain ambiguous, the only one things is certain thatthe expansion of NATO toward Russian border is not acceptable at any cast, this would be considered as a main aim of Russian foreign policy goal of Moscow. On the other hand US key policy is to prevent Russian in drawing demarcation line between Soviet states and non-Soviet states and to deny the Russian concept of 'sphere of influence'. President Medvedev has already demonstrated that he treats this problem as 'existential' for Russia. Security without Russia cannot be had. Security from Russia cannot be a European foreign policy goal in the 21st century. Europe can only ensure its political, military, economic, and ecological security with Russia.

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