

**THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY IN DIPLOMACY :
A CASE STUDY OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV**

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
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C E R T I F I C A T E

This dissertation entitled "THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY
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the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY, is an original work
and has not been submitted so far, in part or full, for
any other degree or diploma of any university.

This may be placed before the examiners for
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P R E F A C E

Although there is no dearth of work on Mikhail S. Gorbachev, but an analysis of the role of his personality is missing from the heaps of research work. It is not due to the deliberate ignorance of the subject matter by the scholars and experts. On the other hand, it was the self-imposed image of the Soviet diplomacy as a product of collective wisdom of the Soviet Communist Party and the government which apparently did not only overshadow the role of the individual but rendered it insignificant. But one wonders, why this was not taken into consideration by scholars after the abolition of Article 6 which put an end to the monopoly of the CPSU. Either it was understood that Mikhail Gorbachev's personality had nothing to do with Soviet diplomacy, i.e., steering wheel of diplomacy was not in the hands of Mikhail Gorbachev or he has got a Lilliputian personality, or his personality had virtually no significance while negotiating with towering personalities like Ronald Reagan, George Bush etc.

But everybody knows that Mikhail Gorbachev transformed the world in just six years. He turned his own country upside down. He woke a sleeping giant, the people of Soviet Union, and gave them freedoms they had never dreamt of. He also gave them their own horrific history which his predecessors had hidden and distorted for around sixty years. He loosened the ties with the allies in

Eastern Europe. He pronounced the message of peace by the signing away of many treaties, viz. INF, START, etc. He ended the Cold War that had dominated world politics. He inspired others for these things by his coin word 'New Thinking'. That is why, the investigation of personality of Mikhail Gorbachev becomes essential.

The present study is divided into five chapters. We begin by a theoretical framework. Here, interrelation of diplomacy and personality has been analysed. We have dealt with Marxist perception of personality. Simultaneously it has also been examined how has personality influenced the course of Soviet diplomacy so far.

The second chapter is concentrated on the base upon which Mikhail Gorbachev constructed the structure of diplomacy i.e. 'New Thinking'. The 'New Thinking' is no more really new for today but it enjoyed political significance during that time. He propelled his new ideas and views through 'New Thinking'. It displayed his state of mind, and concern for global peace etc. Apart from the philosophy of 'New Thinking', its historical background has also been examined. We have also dealt in brief with the development of Gorbachev's personality in the beginning of this chapter. His diplomatic style, norms of conduct and strategy etc. are the focus of discussion in this chapter.

The third chapter is on disarmament diplomacy of Mikhail Gorbachev. We have examined disarmament diplomacy chronologi-

cally i.e. from Geneva Summit (1985) to Moscow Summit (1991). INF Treaty and START Treaty are our special focus of discussion. Apart from these, many other treaties were also signed, e.g., Chemical Weapons Treaty and CPE Treaty. How far was Mikhail Gorbachev's personality responsible for the conclusion of these treaties has also been examined here.

The fourth chapter relates to Gorbachev's diplomacy with other countries. First we have examined Gorbachev's diplomacy with U.S.A. After that Gorbachev's diplomacy with Europe has been discussed. West Europe and East Europe have been separately examined. Germany has been discussed separately because Germany has remarkable significance on Gorbachev's diplomacy as well as world politics and also due to the fact that Germany has the potentiality of becoming a dominating power in future. His diplomacy with Third World has also been discussed. With the advent of Gorbachev, Third World started losing their patronage which was ultimately eroded by the disintegration of U.S.S.R.

In the last chapter, we have made concluding remarks. But before concluding our discussion, we have attempted a comparative analysis. Here, the personality of Gorbachev has been compared with stalwarts of U.S.S.R., viz., Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. In the second part of this chapter, positive as well as negative aspects of his personality have been discussed. Last but not least, Gorbachev's contribution to international relations

and diplomacy has been accounted for.


This study is primarily analytical in nature. It is based on primary as well as secondary sources. Books, articles from Journals and Newspapers constitute the chief source material.

This study would not have reached its culmination without fatherly treatment given to me and to the study by my supervisor, Professor Satish Kumar.

It would be embarrassing to me if I do not acknowledge the source material provided by various libraries. I am greatly indebted to the American Center Library, New Delhi. However, most of the source material was available in the JNU library.

I am greatly indebted to my friends, Manoj, Murari, Sumanji for their valuable suggestions and encouragement.

And finally, I remember my mother late Smt. Urmila Kumari and my father Shri Bharat Bhual Prasad who have been constant source of inspiration for this study.



(NARENDRA KUMAR)

Chapter I

PERSONALITY AND DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy is influenced and determined by a lot of factors. It is the result of the interplay of various, often competing, considerations and motives. Schelling rightly views diplomacy as mixed motive bargaining.¹ The leaders do not have a completely free choice of how they might pursue or interpret the goals and needs of diplomacy. Their priorities as well as manoeuvring abilities are influenced by the size of state and location, social and economic development, national interest, military strength, public opinion, pressure groups, ruling elite, prevailing international situation, the policies of near neighbours and distant powers.

Snyder has beautifully analysed the factors that influence the decision-makers which gave structure and content to their choices. He divides them into three main sets of stimuli; (i) internal setting, (ii) external setting and (iii) the decision-making process.² All these factors

1 For an excellent analysis of Bargaining Strategy, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York; Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 4-52.

2 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics", in Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, ed., Foreign Policy Decision Making; An Approach to the Study of International Politics (U.S.A.: The Free Press of Clenenceoe, 1962), pp. 60-74.

influence the policies of the leaders by providing opportunities or by placing limitations on what is feasible in both diplomatic motives and programmes. In addition to these general characteristics, it is however, important to note that the basic determinants vary in importance according to time-periods, situations and personalities of decision-makers.

Whether analytical perspectives employing personality and attitude influences are helpful in the study of diplomacy is an empirical question. It is true that psychological influences dominate the course of diplomacy. Their roles are decisive. They incline the actors to take one course of action rather than another. It has been confirmed by various researches that personality is an important determinant of political attitudes.³ Research on the relation of personality to diplomacy is less extensive, but findings turned up on this question are consistent with those from other parts of attitude research.⁴

Perspectives on Personality

Before going into other details, the meaning of personality must be understood. By personality, it is meant a readiness or disposition to respond in a patterned way to

3 For detailed analysis see T. Adoro, E. Frenket Brunswik, D. Levinson and R.N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York; Harper and Row, 1956).

4 For an excellent review, see B. Christiansen, Attitude Towards Foreign Affairs as Function of Personality (Oslo; Oslo University Press, 1959).

stimuli of many different types across the subject areas.⁵
 Let us now take a standard definition given by psychologists. Personality refers to "more or less stable, internal factors that make one person's behaviour consistent from one time to another, and different from the behaviour of other people that would manifest in comparable situations".⁶

A personality disposition may encompass more than one class of objects or behaviours and those objects need not be manifestly related. Personality is both a more general and more fundamental or genotypic term in the sense that it often underlies attitudes and furnishes the motive force that impels them. The use of personality means talking about such things as needs, motives, effects, defence mechanisms and the like. Persons of more appetitive disposition are characterized by their openness to experience, their acceptance and trust of others, their tolerance of human sympathy and their desire to relieve human suffering. Indeed, the question as to what is the basic element of personality, has been an enduring point of controversy. At various times, rivals to traits have included instincts, motives, goals, desires, beliefs and attitudes. Recently goals and motivational states have been favoured as alter-

5 Herbert Mc Closky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation", in James N. Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York; The Free Press, 1967), p. 56.

6 Sarah E. Hampson, The Construction of Personality - An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 1.

natives to traits. Nevertheless, the majority of past and present research in personality has centred on the trait concept. For the assessment of personality, "his/her effectiveness to elicit positive reactions from a variety of persons under different circumstance, is taken into account".⁷

Development of attitudes to and beliefs about the political life starts from the impressionable years of childhood and continues throughout adult life. When a child is born in a family, he is destined to be affected by the political awareness of his parents and other senior members of the family. In his school and university, he picks up values which shape his political thinking. For instance, "American education ... does tend to support major values apparent in the political system, encourages the moral of equality and democratic participation, and there are strong links with the parents which temper authoritarian tendencies on the part of the schools".⁸ Similarly, the voluntary organizations of which he becomes member and the mass media - all offer him with views which he chooses some and rejects others, and there is always the chance of being indoctrinated by political parties. On the one hand, while his

7 Calvin H. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1970), p. 7.

8 Allan R. Ball, Modern Politics and Government (London; Macmillan, 1977), p. 65.

interaction with these 'agencies of socialization' shapes his emotions, beliefs, values and attitudes to political life, on the other it also depends upon his overall personality development. As he gradually matures into an adult, he formulates his own views about the environment to which he belongs, be it political or social, depending upon the social design of his parents, economic status, type and quality of education and influence of persons close to him.

There are two theories in regard to the actions and motivations of individual actors. These are important because they attempt to explain and understand the course of diplomacy. They are non-rational and rational.⁹

Non-rational models assume that when an individual is faced with a choice situation in relation to diplomacy, a government decision-maker faced with a threat from an adversary nation, responds in terms of what is called non-logical pressures or influences. A non-logical influence acts upon the decision-maker in a manner of which he is unaware. Normally he does not consider a legitimate influence upon his decisions if he is aware of it.

On the other hand, rational models of individual decision-making are those in which the individual responding to diplomacy bases his response upon a cool and clearheaded

9 Sidney Verba, 'Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System', in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York; Free Press, 1969), p. 218.

means-end calculation. The rational decision-maker may, respond aggressively to an international event but the aggressive response will have its source in calculations based upon the nature of international situation. It will be directed against the real enemy and the decision-maker will have some reasonable expectation of achieving his ends through the aggressive response. Furthermore, the decision will either have no psychological side-effects on the decision-maker or if there are psychological effects, they will be irrelevant as far as the nature of the decision is concerned.

After the analysis of the perspective, we must account for the importance of personality. With the passage of time, leadership has gained prominence as a subject of profound interest in the realm of diplomacy and probably today "leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomenon on earth".¹⁰ It implies that the personality of leaders induce the "followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations - the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations - of both leaders and followers."¹¹ An exceptional individual is capable of playing a significant role 'in moving history' in the desired direction. If a political leader is entrusted

10 James M. Burns, Leadership (New York; Harper and Row, 1978), p. 2.

11 Ibid., p. 19.

with decision-making and policy-formulation, his beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics, whether these beliefs be referred to as 'operational code' ... 'cognitive map' or 'an elite's political culture' - are among the significant factors influencing that actor's decisions'.¹²

The discussion of the significance of personality will be incomplete without an account of the role of charismatic personalities in diplomacy. Charisma is the ability to inspire devotion and enthusiasm. The tool in the hands of charismatic leaders to derive obedience is direct emotional appeal. Under the present day democratic set-up of governments, where there is a fixed hierarchy of officials and where legal rules govern the organization of the leaders and the subordinates, charisma cannot supercede the constitutional norms. But within the constitutional framework a political leader can skillfully use his charisma to influence leaders of other nations in negotiating processes. Every leader does not have charisma, but those who possess it, they make it felt by others.

12 Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code; A Neglected Approach to the study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", International Studies Quarterly (Detroit), vol. 13, no. 2, June 1969, p. 197.

Marxist View-points on Personality

Karl Marx repeatedly stressed that the issue of personality could be analysed in terms of specific historical circumstances. He said that personalities were produced by history itself. In his view, "the people are represented as dull-witted mob, ordained by their own nature to submit to the will of others".¹³ Specific ideas were propagated in history in order to justify the right of an insignificant minority to oppress the majority. Such insignificant minority project the masses merely as passive factor in historical process.¹⁴ According to classical Marxists such a handful of exploiters suppress the majority population.

Marxism shows that historical necessity finds its main expression through the masses that play the determining role in social development. The production activity of the masses alone would suffice for them to be acknowledged by the real creators of history. In this context Marx has said that the only genuine revolutions are made without leaders, so much so that he has denounced any personality cult.¹⁵ Marx has concluded that the proletariat has no need for leaders.¹⁶ In his view, they often hamper real

13 Marxism-Leninism (Moscow, 1956), p. 125.

14 Ibid.

15 B.H. Hazan, From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Infighting in Kremlin (London, 1987), p. 1.

16 Ibid.

action instead of inspiring it.

Engels later modified this view. He maintained that even in the supposedly leaderless communist society a number of organizations, such as industrial enterprises, would still require persons to coordinate planning and other activities.¹⁷

Lenin did not share Marx and his predecessors' contempt for leadership. Lenin believed that leaders were to provide the spark to ignite the combustible social material and set off a general explosion.¹⁸ He doubted the abilities of the proletariat and its tendencies to act spontaneously. That is why he evolved the concept of the personality of leader of the party, whose function is to educate the proletariat, to raise the level of their consciousness through agitation and propaganda and to lead it toward victory by acting as mobilizers, organizers and strategists.

After the Russian revolution and the establishment of the Communist regime in the U.S.S.R., Lenin developed the theory of 'Dictatorship of Proletariat'. This theory when implemented soon developed into a system in which the personality of leader was not limited by the legal consti-

17 Ibid.

18 A.G. Meyer, "Historical Developments of Communist Theory of Leadership", in R.B. Farrell, ed., Political Leadership in E. Europe and Soviet Union (Chicago, 1970), pp. 14-15.

tutions, even not in diplomatic dealings. But still theoretically, this system did not give a sanction to any personality to affect the course of history significantly. At the best, it was collective leadership.

Role of Personalities in Soviet Diplomacy

However, the history of the Soviet Union is a witness that personality does play a role in foreign policy decision-making. There can be no better example of this than Lenin himself during the formulative phase of the Soviet foreign policy.

The basis of Soviet diplomacy i.e. peaceful coexistence and proletarian internationalism are synonymous with Lenin. Lenin himself derived the inspiration from Marx who argued for a transnational perspective concentrating specially on increasingly internationalist character of the forces of production.¹⁹ For Marx, diplomacy was an extension of the class struggle on the international level.²⁰ According to Marx, diplomacy is characterized by the nature of the ruling elite of that state. International relations for working class is a kind of struggle against bourgeoisie and is a part of general struggle for emancipation of the working

19 A. Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 10.

20 Zafar Imam, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1990 (New Delhi; Sterling Publishers, 1991).

class.

But it was left for Lenin to develop Marx's understanding of diplomacy into coherent ideas which served as a sound foundation for shaping the Soviet diplomacy.

Marx restricts himself to capitalism whereas Lenin goes beyond. To him imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism that is to say capitalism in transition or more precisely moribund capitalism.²¹ His analysis focussed on dynamics of internal contradictions of capitalism. He explained that the international political behaviour in diplomacy is merely a resolution of these contradictions. The economic factor is dominant. It is the character of individual unit which gives the essence of diplomacy.²²

Lenin found three forces, the capitalist imperialist continuum, proletariat movement and national liberation movement. Lenin said that it is the contradiction and harmony among these that really determine diplomatic activities.²³

Under Joseph Stalin all decisions of the politbureau were in one form or another his own. The role of the other members could best be described as consultative.

21 V.I. Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 26.

22 A. Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations (Cambridge, 1987), p. 14.

23 Ibid.

The Soviet political superstructure prior to 1953 was a complicated mosaic of shifting and interlocking institutions resting on an entrenched foundation of one-man-rule.²⁴ All powers were delegated from above. The institutions of both party and state as well as their relationship to one another were essentially the creation of Joseph Stalin and were designed not to limit his own power but to limit that of his subordinates and rivals. Both institutions and subordinates were liquidated with remarkable dispatch when occasion demanded.

It is during Khrushchev's tenure that the Soviet diplomacy passed from the passive phase of peaceful co-existence to active phase.²⁵ The first phase was marked by a process of building and consolidating socialism in the face of extreme hostility from the capitalist world. The second phase was known by the acceptance of the Soviet Union as the ascendant historical force. This was marked by a realisation on the part of the Soviet ruling elite that in the new third stage of capitalism's general crises, it was no longer the case that the international system was a rigidly hierarchical order headed by a single power

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- 24 V.V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy", in R.C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 178.
- 25 Robbin F. Laird and others, 'From Cold War ... Soviet Foreign Policy', in Hoffman and Fléron, ed., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York, 1980), pp. 290-1.

and now there were two leaders - USSR and USA.²⁶

Nikita S. Khrushchev was very dynamic. He himself had great interest in foreign policy matters. But he could not muster monolithic support for his initiative. In his time, Politbureau encouraged Central Committee to become most important organ of power and authority in determining foreign policy decisions.

Leonid Brezhnev was a consensus builder unlike N. Khrushchev who was a confrontationist in his nature and approach. Leonid Brezhnev was very cautious in the beginning. It is because of this reason that peaceful co-existence which was in Khrushchev time, cornerstone of the Soviet foreign policy, was reduced to equal status with other goals and principles as it had been under Stalin and Lenin.

If Brezhnev era was marked by competitive peaceful coexistence Mikhail Gorbachev replaced it by cooperative coexistence.²⁷ Gorbachev gave a new direction to the Soviet diplomacy. He was neither a theoretical innovator like Khrushchev nor a conservative as Brezhnev was. At the most, he can be called a reformist who knew that the Soviet economy was lacking confidence and its institutions were

26 W. Zimmerman, Soviet Perspective on International Relations (1936-71) (Princeton, 1973), p. 277.

27 G. Mirsky, "Deideologisation of Inter-State Relations: Perestroika", Soviet Monthly Digest, 2, 1980, p. 15.

crumbling - a person more down to earth, pragmatic one. That is why he was more concerned about global interdependence.²⁸ He wanted that the Soviet Union must share the fruits of scientific-technological Revolution to fight out the ecological hazards and to save the world from nuclear catastrophe. Despite emphasis on U.S.-Soviet relations, Gorbachev focussed upon multipolarity in diplomacy. He advocated that local and regional conflict be more effectively insulated from the East-West rivalry. He condemned the arrogance of omniscience in relations with the Soviet allies especially socialist states. He was against 'Brezhnev doctrine' and did not believe in export of revolution.

He relied more on his interpretation, pragmatic judgement than on doctrinaire formulation of the Marxism than his predecessors did. Ability to adjust to new realities was what distinguished him from any Soviet leader in the past.²⁹ It was the charisma of his personality that within a short period of six years he had changed the world, specially socialist bloc.

From the above discussion, it is clear that the personalities of the leaders of former U.S.S.R. played very significant and remarkable role in Soviet diplomacy.

28 B. Bklof, Soviet Briefing, Gorbachev and The Reform Period (London, 1989), p. 2.

29 David Remnick, 'Comrade Personality', Esquire, February 1990, p. 78.

Especially, M. Gorbachev is more important because he managed to change the course and direction of Soviet diplomacy. The most crucial element in his personality was his 'New Thinking' which served as the basis of diplomatic negotiations. We shall examine his 'New Thinking' in the next chapter.

Chapter II

NEW THINKING AS A REFLECTION OF GORBACHEV'S PERSONALITY

We cannot have a clear-cut image of Gorbachev's personality unless we comprehend and grasp his 'New Thinking'. Mikhail S. Gorbachev constructed the structure of diplomacy upon it. As the name specifies, 'New Thinking' was novel in connotation which gave a U-turn to the Soviet diplomacy. It modified each and every concept, e.g., Soviet security, policy on disarmament, realisation of the current situation and methods to tackle them, negotiating style, ideologization of the Soviet foreign policy, stand on UN and its role, uses of science and technology, stand on environment, human rights, freedom of travel and information etc. Definitely, the 'New Thinking' produced metamorphic changes which were of considerable significance.

Development of Gorbachev's Personality

Before going into details of Gorbachev's 'New Thinking', we must discuss the development of Gorbachev's personality. Mikhail S. Gorbachev was born of peasant stock in the village of Privolnoye, in the territory of Stavropol. Symbolic, as it might be - Privolnoye was a derivative of the Russian word 'volya' meaning freedom. "In the year of his birth 1931, Stavropol, like most rural regions of the country, was crippled by the great famine caused by

Stalin's terroristic collectivization. Undoubtedly, he heard about famine's horrors while growing up".¹ In his youth, Mikhail Gorbachev had an enviable experience in the hard work of farming and at the age of eighteen he won the prestigious 'Order of the Red Banner of Labour'. When he was studying Law at Moscow University he met a student of philosophy, Raisa Titorenko, who later became his wife. "Zdenek Mlynar, Gorbachev's room-mate in Moscow ... believes that part of Gorbachev's success in Stavropol Krai (a large territorial subdivision of Russian Republic) was due to his wife's influence and advice".² In his youth, Mikhail Gorbachev became a lawyer but link with the land and farming was never lost and in 1967 he completed a course in agrarian economics.

As far as ideology is concerned, there is no doubt in his adherence to Communist doctrine. From his Komsomol days Mikhail Gorbachev was a committed party activist scrupulously working his way up the political ladder. In Tismaneanu's opinion, "he advocates a return to 'true Leninism' and his references to Lenin and Leninism are always reverential He remains a radical Leninist at heart, faithful to his career above all, and convinced that

1 Robert C. Tucker, Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1987), p. 144.

2 Zhores Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), p. 47.

future of mankind lies in communism".³ But at the same time, Gorbachev evidently considered policy-initiatives and tactical flexibility to be a more effective strategy for attainment of Soviet objectives than a defensive, ideologically rigid approach practised in the past; and in extreme cases, even departure from Leninism depending upon the exigencies of the situation was not completely ruled out. After five years sharing a room with a Czech intellectual Zdenek Mylner in Moscow, Gorbachev was thoroughly influenced by him. Czechoslovakia was traditionally a 'western' nation in its culture and attitude and 'if' Gorbachev has become 'westernized' in his appearance, manners, dress and the image he projects of tolerance and cordial behaviour, all the small signs which marks him as different from the usual Komsomol and party boss, it was probably Mlynar's doing.⁴

Mikhail Gorbachev in his political behaviour was closer to Yuri Andropov than any other. Yuri Andropov too had a desire for change and he introduced into Soviet Union the term 'glasnost' which became a reformist watchword when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. "What probably impressed Yuri Andropov about Mikhail Gorbachev, apart from the youngman's commitment to change, was his unusual capacity for fulfilling two cardinal policy-making functions of an

3 Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Is Gorbachev a Revolutionary", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 32, no. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 423-25.

4 Zhores Medvedev, no. 2, p. 43.

effective leader; incisive analysis of problem situations and devising creative ways of dealing with them.⁵ When Yuri Andropov died, Mikhail Gorbachev was already the chosen leader-to be but as an apparent compromise with old guards - the Brezhnevites - ailing Konstantin Chernanko was made the General Secretary. But once Mikhail Gorbachev was elected to the top post after Konstantin Chernenko's death, he wasted no time in emerging as a reform leader.

Soon after coming to power, Gorbachev started propagating his new vision of the world. These new ideas were given a definite shape in the 27th CPSU Congress of February, 1986.⁶ The study of 'New Thinking' would be incomplete as well as meaningless if it is not dealt with in a historical perspective.

Historical Background to 'New Thinking'

It was none but Mikhail Gorbachev who had a clear vision of the fundamental realities of the world. A key conclusion was drawn in 27th CPSU Congress that "the real dialectics of development of today's world is determined by a combination of competition and contest between the two systems, on the one hand, and a growing trend towards

5 Robert C. Tucker, no. 1, p. 144.

6 For details, see, Documents and Materials, 27th Congress of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow; Novosti, 1986).

interdependence of the world community, on the other".⁷

The analysis of the 27th Congress is as follows:
Nuclear militarism emerged in the international arena as a social reaction to socialism's consolidation, to the development of revolutionary processes and democratic movements in the world. Naturally, due to political, military, strategic and technological factors nuclear weapons could not remain a monopoly of only one country or a group of countries. Socialism had to defend itself. It is known that in the late 1940s and in the 1950s, Washington was feverishly drawing up scenarios of an atomic bombing of the Soviet Union. It was only the appearance of a nuclear shield in the Soviet Union that frustrated these designs.⁸

The 'New Thinking' on international relations took into account the following realities of the nuclear age. One-twentieth of the arsenal of either U.S.A. or former U.S.S.R. would be enough to cause irreparable damage to the other power by hitting targets on its territory. Adding the fires that nuclear blasts would spark off, less than one percent of the nuclear ammunition would suffice for the 'guaranteed destruction' of the largest industrial country. Taking into account the effect of a 'nuclear winter' (a sharp

7 Spartak Beglov, "New Political Thinking and Present Day Realities", International Affairs (Moscow), November 1987, p. 58.

8 Yuvgeni Akersandrov, 'New Political Thinking; Genesis, Factors, Prospects', International Affairs (Moscow), December 1987, p. 88.

increase in temperature all over the planet due to the blanket of ashes and other emissions that would envelope it), this would wipe out life everywhere. The first nuclear strike would doom the striking country itself to painful death, not necessarily as a consequence of retaliation, but due to the effects of the explosion of its own warheads.⁹

The yield of the ammunition detonated during World War II totalled roughly 2.5 million tons of TNT. At present, however, one U.S. Poseidon-class submarine carries 16 missiles each of which is equipped with 14 nuclear warheads (each with a yield of 50 kilotons). It follows that the yield of one Poseidon broadside exceeds 11 million tons, or four or five times as great as the yield of all the shells, mines and bombs that exploded in the World War II. And each U.S. submarine of the Ohio class is to have a total yield scores of times greater than total.¹⁰

These facts were ignored for four decades after the Second World War. Instead, there appeared various theories and concepts called for by the idea of the inevitability of uncompromising struggle for the sake of one's country. These theories were based upon the strategy of deterrence which gave rise to the concepts of 'flexible response', 'balance of fear' or 'mutually guaranteed annihilation' and the like.

9 Spartak Beglov, no. 7, p. 60.

10 Ibid.

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Due to many historical circumstances, these concepts determined the mechanism and dynamics of strategic confrontation between two military and political coalitions for a long time. The idea of a victorious nuclear war was substantiated both on the military and political plane. Nuclear blackmail was supplemented by the 'liberation of the peoples of Eastern Europe and Soviet Union from communist tyranny' and 'rolling back socialism'.

Harsh political confrontation combined with the arms race turned the entire planet into a nuclear crematorium. Confrontation could not but poison the entire range of interstate relations and, for that matter the very psychology of international contacts. Thus, the problem was outgrowing its original military, strategic and bloc framework and was turning into a global political issue vital for all mankind.¹¹

It was essential to build bridges between the main opponents before the damage. It was realised that polemics about the degree of each other's fault should be moved to the background; These were totally inexpedient and only strengthened the existing stereotypes of the opponent. The goal of reaching consensus between the opposing parties on the senselessness of risking a nuclear conflict, which could not be justified on any rational political considerations, was brought to the front.

¹¹ Yevgeni Aleksandrov, no. 8, p. 87.

The revision of old notions in the space age has some fundamental objectives. It should be recalled here that back in 1955, a group of renowned scientists headed by Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell and Frederic Joliot Curie published their famous manifesto in which they stressed that nuclear war was absolutely irrational and unwinnable. They added that under new conditions new norms of international conduct were needed. That is why they concluded that nuclear weapons should not be used as instruments of politics. They also pointed out that general human values should be placed on top of the international list of priorities so that all nations feel they were members of a united family of nations. In those years the scientists' appeal could not receive a due response from the leading powers, but nevertheless, their ideas continued to live and became more and more relevant.

Soon attempts to revise international practices were made at the state level. In Bandung, the first forum of newly free nations proclaimed the principles known as Panchshila aimed against war and violence. The socialist countries made a special contribution to reassessment of the postulates of the prevailing international behaviour. In this respect, the 20th CPSU Congress should be mentioned. Here, the conclusion was made that peace-loving forces can prevent a nuclear war by joint efforts and that such a war is not fatally inevitable.

Gorbachev was confronted with serious economic crisis in the Soviet Union. That is why it would not be

out of place to say that "foreign policy crisis that Mikhail Gorbachev faced in March 1985 was only part of a broader economic and social crisis affecting the country. The buildup of Soviet military power had been accompanied by the erosion of the economic and technological basis of that power, and by a general demoralization of society, as evidenced in such social ills as alcoholism and corruption".¹²

It is further illustrated by E. Shevardnadze who said that the main requirement in foreign policy "is that our country should not bear additional expenditures in connection with the necessity of supporting our defence capabilities and the defence of our legitimate foreign policy interests. It means that we must seek paths to the limitation and reduction of military rivalry, to the removal of confrontational moments in relation with other states, to the dumping down of conflicts and crises".¹³

The Philosophy of 'New Thinking'

'New Thinking' was nothing but the reflection of Gorbachev's personality. 'New Thinking' was a new way, which turned the direction of the Soviet diplomacy. It displayed Mikhail Gorbachev's courage, wisdom and understanding of the problems of the world. More important to

12 David Holloway, 'Gorbachev's New Thinking', Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 68, no. 1, 1989, p. 77.

13 Ibid., p. 85.

it was Mikhail Gorbachev's realization of the economic crisis of former U.S.S.R. The basic contents of 'New Thinking' must be scrutinized.

As far as the philosophical aspect of the new political thinking is concerned, its concept of the world as a united but socially heterogeneous organism must be understood. Naturally the world has internal contradictions but they are insignificant compared with the common interest of all nations to preserve civilization and ensure its progress. If we regard all such states and their interrelationships as a system, the main feature of such a system would be its incompatibility with a nuclear war which would lead to the system's disintegration, i.e., the annihilation of mankind. That is why Mikhail Gorbachev says, "nuclear war cannot be a means of political, economic, ideological or any other goals Nuclear war is senseless, it is irrational. There would be neither winners nor losers in a global nuclear conflict; world civilization would inevitably perish. It is a suicide, rather than a war in the conventional sense of the word".¹⁴ His efforts towards nuclear disarmament has been emphasized by many writers, such as T.N. Kaul. He says, "New Thinking shows his constant initiatives and indefatigable efforts for Nuclear Disarmaments, and his

14 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika New Thinking for Our Country and the World (London: Fontana/Collins, 1988), pp. 140-41.

patient attempts to reduce conventional armaments, military budgets and personnel".¹⁵

Apart from this most important sphere, the 'New Thinking' seeks interdependence in the entire range of common interests; development of world economy, environmental protection, aid to the hungry who constitute the majority of the planet's population, the fight against disease and natural disasters, the search for new energy sources, the conquest of outer space and the World Ocean in the interests of raising living standards worldwide.

In this context the new political thinking could be seen as a universal concept, the scientific rationality of which is obvious. It was asserted by Gorbachev that only this concept can save mankind from death and ensure conditions for its further natural progressive development.

An important component of the new political thinking is the recognition that human life should be in the centre of the universal system of values. A case in point is not only the biological aspect of the problem which deals with ensuring the survival of the human species. The new political thinking views man as a main subject of a historical process, and the personality as a primary unit of a society, as a creator of spiritual and material benefits. The new

15 T.N. Kaul, Stalin to Gorbachev and Beyond (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991), p. 104.

political thinking incorporated the norms not as a tribute to some abstract moralisation but as an expression of the feeling of social responsibility inherent in mankind. The moral approach corresponded to the ethical principles and goals of all nations and in the most natural way appealed to an 'international person' uniting in the name of peace millions of people, irrespective of race, religion or social status.¹⁶

The key political element of this philosophy was negation of violence as a method of resolving conflicts which was one of the most important characteristics of Mikhail Gorbachev's personality. The use of military force and nuclear weapons would mean the total and absolute deprivation of man of all his rights, above all, the right to live. It would result in chaos and the end of civilization. A wilful political act of violence of one subject of international life with regards to another would in this case flagrantly contradict the law of metabolism between man and environment, which is an indispensable condition of human life. Just like a natural disaster, a social conflict, involving in its sphere the material environment of human habitat, is capable of disrupting the chain of life, the most delicate and vulnerable and at the same time unique form of existence of the matter.¹⁷

16 Yevgeni Aleksandrov, no. 8, p. 90.

17 Ibid.

Man has long been known to do harm to nature on a local scale. Today his destructive activities have become the subject of a careful analysis. But revealing the socio-economic essence of man - nature relationship in the light of the problem of war and peace is an absolutely new and political conclusion which was arrived at by philosophical materialism in the nuclear space age.

The new political thinking also predetermined the appropriate conduct of states on the international scene by expressing the objective laws and needs of social progress, by taking into account the role of subjective factor, the dialectics of possible and the probable the desired and the real. One can speak here of an integral foreign policy doctrine which rests on the fundamental provisions of the new political thinking.

The leading role in this system is played by innovative provisions of the new political thinking which dealt with the renunciation of political confrontation, of conduct which nurtures enmity and hostile competition. It is necessary to be sensitive and open to the signal emanated by the international community and by the strategic opponent. Such openness required not only goodwill but also the establishment of a balance of interests and criteria of values. The common denominator in all instances should be the common resolve to prevent crisis situations resulting from attempts at mutual 'test of strength'. This demand

required learning and great art of living together in peace, combining interests and adapting to contradictions.

Gorbachev's Diplomatic Style,
Conduct and Strategy

After the analysis of the tenets of 'New Thinking', we shall discuss the diplomatic style, conduct and strategy of Mikhail Gorbachev. He was the man for open diplomacy instead of secret diplomacy which had been adopted and pursued by earlier leaders of the former Soviet Union. He laid great emphasis on dialogue. He writes, "Dialogue is the first thing I must mention. Once we had embraced the principles of the new thinking, we made dialogue a basic instrument to test them out in international practice".¹⁸

It is noteworthy that personal diplomacy became a firm element in the diplomatic style of the new leadership. Gorbachev himself took the onus of voicing goals, aspirations and concerns of the U.S.S.R. in the international arena. "Whatever the surviving realities of the collective leadership at home, Gorbachev clearly now speaks as primus inter parus at least on foreign policy".¹⁹ To gain greater personal control over the Soviet foreign policy making and its implementation, Gorbachev initiated a restructuring of concerned personnel and institutions. Gromyko's departure

18 Mikhail Gorbachev, no. 14, p. 157.

19 Donald R. Kelley, Soviet Politics from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (New York: Prager, 1987), p. 207.

from the Foreign Ministry (which had virtually become an independent organization under him) meant a restoration of party leadership over the foreign policy establishment. The appointment, among others, of Anatoly Dobrynin (who is known for preaching 'peace first, socialism later' strategy) as Central Committee Secretary with responsibilities for foreign policy or more importantly of Gromyko's successor Eduard Shevardnadze gave Gorbachev the required team and apparatus. Shevardnadze, it was observed, "has scant experience in foreign affairs and owes his elevation entirely to Gorbachev. He stood as an executor rather an architect of foreign policy, giving Gorbachev even greater leeway to shape the Soviet world role".²⁰ The same situation was repeated under A. Bessmertnykh.

Gorbachev's diplomatic style predominantly rested on policy initiatives, and it increasingly became politically detrimental for the Americans to dismiss his initiatives as meaningless propaganda techniques. In the very beginning, when his unilateral moratorium expired on 31 December 1985, he extended it by three months and declared that such a moratorium would remain in force even longer if the U.S. for its part agreed to discontinue nuclear tests.²¹

20 Stephen Larrabee and Allen Lynch, "Gorbachev; The Road to Reykjavik", Foreign Policy (New York), no. 65, Winter 1986/87, pp. 10-11.

21 Ibid., p. 11.

It is also necessary to consider Gorbachev's norms of international conduct because they reflect the basic values and character of the leader. Gorbachev determined his norms of international conduct on the basis of 'New Thinking' which are as following; First, the other side a priori must be viewed as an enemy, as "Martians from outer space" or as an 'evil empire' deprived of positive human impulses. Second, the psychological warfare based on national and ideological differences, slander interference in domestic affairs must be prevented. The 'export' of revolution and counter-revolution must be fought against. Third, international problems should not be viewed only through the prism of military-political confrontation of the two systems. Fourth, there must be a more careful and benevolent study of a partner and opponent, taking into account his legitimate interests, national peculiarities, reaction and assessments aimed at achieving a maximum identity of views on the cardinal issues of peace and security. This kind of cognitive activity, known in psychology as 'empathy' or 'sympathy' should play a very important role in dispersing antagonistic stereotypes.

It should be added that such an approach would hardly be successful without a new methodology of thinking, political culture of mutual relations and a respectable psychological attitude. To establish constant positive contacts with a partner, one's thinking should meet several

simple, yet fundamental conditions: it should be based on creative rather than reactive (negative) images. It should be of collective rather than individual nature so that illusions of one another can be dispelled, global problems should be placed above regional and local ones, and should be based on intellect and logic and not on emotions and traditions. The conduct of the subjects of international life should be assessed objectively using same 'rules of game' and excluding double standards and double morals from international relations.

On the basis of 'New Thinking', Gorbachev determined his strategy in international relations. At the beginning of his keynote speech before the 27th CPSU Congress, Mikhail Gorbachev said, "Acceleration of our country's socio-economic development is key to all our problems",²² thus signaling that improving the Soviet economy was indeed his number-one objective. But, his basic principles of diplomacy as developed by 'New Thinking' were - "peace, peaceful coexistence, equality, and mutually beneficial cooperation".²³ In Mikhail Gorbachev's words, "the Soviet Union seeks neither foreign territory nor foreign resources. We have enough of everything. Besides, the Soviet people know the horrors of war and its tragic aftermath only too well from their own bitter experience".

22 Thomas H. Naylor, The Gorbachev Strategy Opening the Closed Society (Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1987), p. 24.

23 Ibid., p. 35.

We can illustrate his strategy from his diplomacy with other countries. His strategy was reflected by his Third World diplomacy when he not only stopped the economic and military aid to the Third World countries but also withdrew the military from there such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Cuba. He encouraged democratic principles and socialist self-government in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Right from the beginning, Mikhail Gorbachev became increasingly vocal in his advocacy of the concept of Europe for Europeans. To achieve his objective of revitalizing the Soviet economy, Gorbachev needed a stable international environment - particularly a stable relationship with the United States. He must avoid another major round of the arms race that would tie up enormous amounts of scarce resources needed to strengthen the civilian economy. This economic explanation provided at least part of the rationale for what appears to be a major shift in Soviet diplomacy under the personality of a great leader like Mikhail Gorbachev. We shall discuss Gorbachev's disarmament diplomacy in details in the next chapter.

Chapter III

GORBACHEV'S PERSONALITY AND DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY

Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" provided a new dimension to the concept of global security which was ultimately responsible for totally different perspective of the arms race. It was the influence of his personality which did bring fundamental changes in the realm of disarmament. Slowly and steadily, Mikhail Gorbachev put one proposal after another and tried his best to ward off the nuclear catastrophe. Gorbachev did not believe in reciprocal blaming tactics. Hence, he says, "we say that Americans are to blame. The American say the Soviet Union is to blame. Perhaps, we should seek out the reasons behind what happened, because we must draw lessons from the past, including the past 'record of our relations'".¹ In the 27th CPSU Congress, he enunciated the Fundamental Principles in the military sphere which were following;

- (i) "renunciation by the nuclear powers of war - both nuclear and conventional - against each other or third countries;
- (ii) prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and the total destruction

1 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (London: Fontana/Collins, 1988), p. 211.

- of such weapons, a ban on and destruction of chemical weapons, and the renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation;
- (iii) a strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to limits of reasonable sufficiency;
 - (iv) disbandment of military alliances, and as a step toward this, renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones;
 - (v) balanced and proportionate reduction of military budgets".²

On the basis of these principles, several proposals were made at summits between Mikhail Gorbachev and other leaders and thus historic arms control treaties were signed. Here, we shall examine these things in details.

Geneva Summit (1985)

The first summit between Ronald Reagan, then President of U.S.A. and Mikhail Gorbachev was held in the Swiss city, Geneva on November 19 and 20, 1985. It became feasible due to Gorbachev's initiatives and timely response by Ronald Reagan. Arms control, as we find ranked high in Gorbachev's 'New Thinking', and by 1985 Ronald Reagan realized that unless a compromise was arrived at with Mikhail Gorbachev, it might give Soviet Union much hoped for propaganda advantage

2 Ibid., p. 231.

and as a result undermine the American negotiating strength in the future. 'Defence with diplomacy' and 'preparedness for war with the search for peace' soon became Reagan administration's favourite monologue. Moreover, "for the United States, the ensuing large-scale anti-nuclear demonstrations in Western Europe ... made the INF issue primarily a political competition with the Soviet Union over the loyalty of NATO and the capacity of NATO governments to make defense decisions".³

Interestingly, at the summit, Ronald Reagan showed more inclination to discuss human rights, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and other peripheral issues. The possibility of any limits on SDI research was rejected and that is why, total renunciation of the programme was out of question. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had made it clear in the beginning that an agreement on SDI was vital to the solution of either START or INF. Though Ronald Reagan tried repeatedly to convince Mikhail Gorbachev of the utility of SDI as a defensive system, Mikhail Gorbachev maintained that it could be used for offensive purposes too. An offer by Ronald Reagan that the technology could be shared once SDI became operational, could not satisfy him. No wonder, the summit failed to produce results. Despite that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev made a joint statement

3 Jonathan Dean, "Gorbachev's Arms Control Moves", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 43, no. 5, June 1987, p. 37.

about the nuclear war; "The sides ... have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'. It represented a progress of a kind. It indicated some measures of success for all those bodies and organizations which over the years had tried to spread the 'nuclear weapon allergy'.⁴ The issue of US naval activities was suspended till the next stage of conference on the advice of Gorbachev.⁵

Mikhail Gorbachev made SDI the key issue to the solution of the arms race. By doing so, Gorbachev had hoped to generate enough public pressure to stop Ronald Reagan from going ahead with his plans. He understood that once operational, the SDI would create gross strategic disparity, and hence, must not be allowed to be developed fully. Moreover, in the summer of 1985, Garfinkle rightly observed, "the Soviet Union's sensitivity to what it believes to be U.S. efforts to create a first-strike posture is real. Despite the administration's botching of the MX programme, the combination of a potentially counterforce-capable Trident Fleet, the Pershing IIs deployed in Western Europe, Midgetman under development, the cruise missile programme, and one or even two new manned bombers - all added to the not inconsiderable Minuteman force - must comprise a very

4 Frank Blackabay, 'Introduction', SIPRI Yearbook 1986 World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 1.

5 Ibid., p. 14.

formidable challenge in Soviet eyes".⁶

Continuing the pace, on 15 January, 1986, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev presented a three-stage plan to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The first stage, lasting for five to eight years, was explicitly concerned with U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons systems. On strategic offensive weapons it appeared to embody the following proposals. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. should renounce the development of space-strike weapons and also that they both should agree to stop all nuclear weapon tests. This proposed first stage did embody a new suggestion on intermediate-range missiles, an important new proposal from the Soviet side.

The second stage, which should start no later than 1990, would bring in other nuclear weapon powers; it would involve, inter alia, the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons - those with ranges upto 1000 km. Stage three beginning no later than 1995, should complete the elimination of nuclear weapons.⁷

Definitely these plans displayed the genuine efforts being pursued by Mikhail Gorbachev. Had he been in power for more years, he would have taken more sincere and serious

6 Adam M. Garfinkle, "Obstacles and Optimism at Geneva", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 29, no. 2, Summer 1985, p. 272.

7 SIPRI Yearbook World Armament and Disarmament 1986 (New York; Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 74.

efforts to achieve his goals.

Reykjavik Summit (1986)

Mikhail Gorbachev met Ronald Reagan at Reykjavik on 11-12 October, 1986. On the insistence of Gorbachev, the agenda of Reykjavik summit included START, SDI and nuclear testing, besides INF. Regarding INF, the Soviet leader suggested that the American and Soviet intermediate range land-based missiles should be withdrawn from Europe. He agreed to lower the number of Asia based SS-20 warheads from 513 to 100 which was to be equally matched by U.S.-based missiles. He became also ready to freeze SS-21 and SS-23 shorter range missiles in Europe and to negotiate their reduction. Approving these offers, Ronald Reagan proposed intrusive verification measures including on site inspection and suggested not removal but destruction of the missiles. Do veriyai no proveryai (Trust but verify) was Ronald Reagan's favourite proverb. Mikhail Gorbachev on his part agreed.

However, this summit too collapsed on the question of SDI though there was a significant shift in the Soviet position. Ronald Reagan was not inclined to accept Mikhail Gorbachev's interpretation of the ABM Treaty, nor was he ready to withstand any effort to 'kill' or do away with his favourite 'Star War' programmes. The problem was that the Soviets kept moving toward U.S. positions. The Reagan administration's solution, apparently, was to keep raising

the minimum.⁸

Mikhail Gorbachev took a tough stand. The Soviets "did not want to allow Ronald Reagan's supporters to claim, as they had after the Geneva meeting that standing tall and holding firm had paid off and that Mikhail Gorbachev had kunkled under the President".⁹ The Reagan administration's negotiating strategy came under sharp criticism. The summit took place almost entirely on Gorbachev's terms. Thus, "the Reykjavik encounter was, in a sense, Gorbachev's revenge for the Geneva Summit of the previous year".¹⁰ To put it bluntly, "the encounter at Reykjavik was an elaborate minuet, part propaganda, part negotiating manoeuvre. Both nations approached the meeting in an attempt to put the other on the wrong foot in the eyes of the most important target audiences, the people, legislators and the news media of Western Europe and North America".¹¹ But many scholars did not support Gorbachev's diplomatic style and charged Mikhail Gorbachev with lack of farsightedness which could not be dismissed totally. "Nevertheless", as Pick maintained, "Gorbachev has tried. At least, this is the impression he

8 P. Eduard Haley, "You Could have said Yes: Lessons from Reykjavik", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 31, no. 2, Spring 1987, p. 95.

9 Michael Mandelbaum and Stronbe Talbott, "Reykjavik and Beyond", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 65, no. 2, Winter 1986/87, p. 219.

10 Ibid., p. 217.

11 P. Eduard Haley, no. 8, p. 95.

has managed to convey".¹²

INF Treaty (Washington Summit 1987
And Moscow Summit 1988)

The pace of disarmament increased slowly but steadily year after year. 1987 marked a breakthrough in the history of the arms-control efforts. A key move was that, for the first time in history, an entire class of already deployed weapons (plus non-deployed ones) was eliminated from the arms arsenals. "Since the super powers could not agree on limits for strategic or space-based weapons, the INF agreement was held hostage, though the two sides were not far apart on this issue. Gorbachev's concession broke the logjam".¹³ Mikhail Gorbachev repeatedly asserted "the task of ensuring security is increasingly seen as a political problem, and it can only be resolved by political means".¹⁴

A treaty was signed between the U.S.A. and erstwhile U.S.S.R. on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF treaty) in Washington on December 8, 1987. It was ratified in the Moscow Summit of 1988. The INF treaty required the U.S.A. and former U.S.S.R.

12 Otto Pick, "How Serious is Gorbachev about Arms Control", World Today (London), vol. 45, no. 4, April 1989, p. 68.

13 Bruce D. Berkowitz, "An INF Treaty Discredits Arms Control and Promotes Conflict", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 32, no. 2, Winter 1988, p. 119.

14 Mikhail Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Committee to the 27th Party Congress (Moscow; Novosti Press, 1986), p. 81.

to throw into history's wastebin 2695 intermediate-range ground-launched missiles with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometres and ground-launched shorter range missiles between 500 and 1000 kilometres. The U.S.S.R. had to scrap 1836 missiles and the U.S.A. had to destroy 867 missiles.¹⁵

Although the treaty did not require the elimination of any warhead per se, a result of the treaty nevertheless was the removal of some 2200 warheads from deployed missiles, including 100 U.S. warheads on the 72 West German Pershing 1a missiles.¹⁶ The treaty ruled out the right 'to produce, flight-test or launch any intermediate-range missiles', 'any shorter-range missiles' or any stages of such missiles (Article VI). But it prohibited neither research nor development. Thus on this point the INF treaty was not comprehensive and radical. It was significant for following reasons;

- (1) The treaty represented a fundamental change in the Soviet foreign policy towards the Atlantic alliance in general and its West European component in particular. Gorbachev considered the situation in need of redress and acted accordingly. In doing so he not only corrected a profound mistake of his predecessors, but he also exploited the situation for breaking new ground

15 For details of the treaty see, SIPRI Yearbook 1988 World Armament and Disarmament (New York; Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 395-469.

16 Arms Control Today, vol. 18, no. 11, 1988, INF Supplement, p. 1.

- in arms control.
- (2) He also accepted the fact that "the Soviet Union had more to reduce than the U.S., thereby acknowledging that it is capabilities that count rather than numbers".¹⁷
- (3) The acceptance of most comprehensive verification scheme, at the centre of which lay very intrusive and discriminate on-site inspection arrangements and the exchange of all available data, marked a genuine breakthrough in arms control. Gorbachev broke the traditional deeply rooted Soviet preference for safety.
- (4) In almost dramatic way, the INF testified to Gorbachev's leadership over the military. With Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev (then Chief of General Staff of U.S.S.R.) serving in that function, Gorbachev's intentions became even more tangible since Akhromeyev was not known to be supportive of a bold arms control approach.¹⁸
- (5) With the INF treaty, Mikhail Gorbachev strengthened his position vis-a-vis critics of his new course in that he could claim to have turned originally anti-Soviet and anti-arms control policy of President Reagan and the U.S.-Soviet arms control impasse into a productive arms control approach.

17 SIPRI Yearbook 1988 World Armament and Disarmament (New York; Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 4.

18 For details see, D.R. Herspring, "Marshal Akhromeyev and the Future of Soviet Armed Forces", Survival, 28(6), pp. 524-35.

In agreeing to the INF treaty, Mikhail Gorbachev could claim to have turned a major mistake of his predecessors into a maximum political advantage at minimal cost. While for some, "the INF treaty would result in a missing rung in the ladder of the escalation"¹⁹, for others "it is useless as the INF negotiations address only a fraction of each other's nuclear forces. Concessions have been made with the knowledge that the INF treaty will not fundamentally alter the overall super power military balance".²⁰ However, the treaty was an acknowledgement of the fact that nuclear doctrine could never be "tuned finely enough to permit a specially detailed response to any level of actual conflict".²¹ We are not initiating a debate here on how good or bad was the INF treaty. But in simple terms - as a Frenchman would say - 'Les mieux est l'enemi du bien' - we should not neglect anything good that has been achieved simply because of the reason that our desire to achieve something better has not been materialized.

Post-INF Developments

During 1988, there was a significant downgrading and shift in the Soviet long-range cruise missile programme.

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- 19 W.K.H. Ponofsky, "Limited Success, Limited Prospects", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), vol. 44, no. 3, March 1988, p. 35.
- 20 Michael R. Gordon, "INF : A Hollow Victory", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), Fall 1989, p. 160.
- 21 E.P. Petrunin, "Commitment to 'Star Wars' has thwarted Reyjavik's Achievements", The Telegraph (Calcutta) Dec. 9, 1989, p. 9.

e.g. two ground-launched missiles under development, the subsonic SSC - X-4 and supersonic SSC - X-5 were banned by the INF treaty and their developments were halted.²²

Continuing the pace of disarmament, President Mikhail Gorbachev on 7 December, 1988 told United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet armed forces would be unilaterally cut by 500,000 soldiers and 10,000 tankers by 1991. In this speech, Gorbachev announced a number of specific and general changes:

- (a) removal of six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and removal of 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks from Eastern Europe;
- (b) removal of assault - landing and river crossing troops and their equipment from Eastern Europe;
- (c) reduction of 5,000 tanks in Western Soviet Union;
- (d) reduction of 8,500 artillery guns;
- (e) reduction of 800 combat aircraft;
- (f) restructuring of the remaining forces in Eastern Europe into a defensive posture;
- (g) removal of a major portion of forces from Mongolia, and
- (h) conservation of two or three defence plants from military to civilian use in 1989.

22 SIPI Yearbook 1989 World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 21.

The new defence posture and the unilateral cuts, followed the adoption of a new military doctrine by the Soviet Union. In his 27th Party Congress speech in February 1986, Gorbachev had espoused a new concept of military 'reasonable sufficiency' a concept which came to mean achieving 'parity at a lower level'. The concept of reasonable sufficiency as a new military doctrine was formally unveiled at a meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation on 28-29 May, 1987 in East Berlin. The new doctrine was advanced as purely 'defensive' with forces to be maintained that are sufficient for defence to 'reliably repel' aggressors. While continuing to call for a 'counter-defensive' in the face of attack, it included a pledge not to be the first to use military force.²³ During Marshal Akhromeyev's visit to the United States in 1988 he "insisted that the new doctrine means the Soviet Union will initially remain on the defensive for about twenty days while trying to negotiate peace. If that fails, Soviet forces will have to launch a 'counter-offensive'."²⁴ The doctrine also identified no specific enemy and introduced a major component - 'a system of basic views on the prevention of war' - an aim not mentioned in previous doctrines and

23 Ibid.

24 W.E. Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 67, no. 2, Winter 1988/89, p. 130.

considered to belong to the sphere of diplomacy.²⁵

As per conditions of INF treaty, by the end of 1989, all the land-based shorter-range (500 to 1000 km. range) missile systems were removed and destroyed.²⁶ 1989 was important for one more thing. Mikhail Gorbachev's first meeting with Ronald Reagan's successor, George Bush, at Malta in December 1989 officially announced an end to the cold war.

Both sides fulfilled the elimination target for 1990 comfortably. As on 1 December, 1990, of a total 1846 Soviet missiles only 66 remained for elimination while equivalent figures for USA were 180 out of 846 missiles. Mikhail Gorbachev persuaded U.S.A. to cease the production of plutonium for its nuclear arsenals.

On 1 June, 1990, the United States and Soviet Union concluded an agreement on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multi-lateral convention on banning chemical weapons. Both countries pledged to begin the destruction no later 'than 31 December 1992' (Article VI) and to 'reduce and limit (their) chemical weapons' so that 'its aggregate quantity does not 'exceed 5,000 tons' by no later than 31 December 2002 (Article VI).

25 L. Goure, "The Soviet Strategic Review", Strategic Review, Fall, 1988, p. 83.

26 For details see Stephen Iwan Griffiths, "The Implementation of the INF Treaty" in SIPRI Yearbook 1990 World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 443-58.

The agreement also provided for data and verification.²⁷

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty which was signed on 19 November 1990, represented the first major international agreement on reduction of conventional armaments. The treaty covered battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery combat aircrafts and attack helicopters deployed by 22 NATO and WTO countries on land territory between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural River/Caspian Sea. NATO and the WTO (which was dismantled later) comprising a vast majority of the world's strongest industrial powers made the treaty a unique step forward. Together with the CSBM (Confidence and Security Building Measures) Document signed in Vienna, the 22 states succeeded in providing for reduction and transparency and thus inputting military substance to the political commitment of letting military reality reflected under the renunciation of force principle. Had Gorbachev not actively participated, the negotiation would not have become feasible.

START Treaty

The START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) Treaty was signed between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush on July 31st, 1991 in Moscow. This treaty was significant from several angles. It was the first arms-control treaty that

27 SIPRI Yearbook 1991 World Armaments and Disarmament
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. xxxiii.

reduced long-range offensive nuclear weapons. The U.S. strategic nuclear warheads declined by 20-25 per cent and the Soviet strategic nuclear warheads by 30-35 per cent. Ballistic missiles warhead reductions amounted to 35 per cent for the U.S.A. and some 50 per cent for the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union's 308 SS-18 heavy ICBMs were cut by half, leaving 154 SS-18s with 1540 warheads in place. The treaty also foreclosed options for expanding the Soviet heavy Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force by banning new types, mobile missiles and downloading. These measures plus the 4900-warhead limit on ballistic missiles and a cut in Soviet ballistic missile throw weight by 46 per cent were intended to encourage both sides, but especially the U.S.S.R. to reduce reliance on Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicled (MIRVed) ICBMs that made attractive targets. In addition, the treaty promoted a shift to strategic bombers because they were considered unsuitable for a first strike. The liberal counting rules for bombers with gravity bombs and SRAMs (Short Range Attack Missiles) and the heavy discounts granted for Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) carrying bombers, expressed this desire to limit the growth of ICBM forces.

The treaty limited the number of warheads on deployed mobile ICBMs to 1100; the number of non-deployed missiles flight-tested rail-mobile launchers to 110 of which not more than 18 might be used for rail-mobile ICBMs. In

addition, the treaty imposed detailed limitations on the movement of deployed mobile ICBMs.

The START treaty set a series of major monitoring tasks, such as monitoring by number and type of:

- (a) deployed silo-based ICBMs,
- (b) both deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBMs, and their launchers,
- (c) deployed ballistic missile launching submarines, their launchers and deployed SLBMs,
- (d) deployed heavy bombers that could and could not carry ALCM;
- (e) previously nuclear equipped heavy bombers that no longer carry nuclear weapons, and
- (f) missiles, launchers or bombers eliminated in accordance with treaty limits. In addition, verification included monitoring the aggregate number of warheads on treaty-linked ballistic and cruise missiles, and their aggregate throw-weight.

The Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities governed all activities related to regular inspections, suspect site inspection and continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production facilities. It determined the rights of the inspecting party and the duties of inspecting side.

The START verification regime proved invaluable for verifying the present treaty. Its provisions could be expanded with relative ease. This would increase the tasks of

inspectors but would make it more complicated in principle.

The START treaty was the last cold war strategic nuclear arms control treaty, but the first treaty of a new era. A few rationales are offered in support of this view. First, the START treaty encapsulated the principle of strategic force reductions. Despite the fact that the START treaty or cut forces largely considered to be redundant, it did introduce the idea of cutting, rather than limiting strategic forces. With the START treaty in place, it would be extremely difficult for one side to justify growth in strategic forces in a post-cold war environment. Second, the treaty provided transparency of existing and predictability of future strategic forces in the former Soviet Union at a time when the new republics are undergoing profound changes at all levels. Third, the treaty could serve as a springboard for larger nuclear reductions. A successor treaty START-II was quickly negotiated and its provisions were accommodated in the START verification regime.

From the above discussion, we can say that Mikhail Gorbachev had largely been successful in the fulfillment of his objectives set up by New Thinking, with the tools of disarmament diplomacy. Undoubtedly, Gorbachev's personality was responsible for making the West to accept him as a messiah of peace. Simultaneously, he brought the West to the negotiating table. His programmes of world peace were not hollow. It had genuine meaning and content. Explicitness and openness were the hallmarks of his disarmament diplomacy.

Mikhail Gorbachev's diplomacy with other countries had the basic aim of disarmament, global peace and security. A clear and transparent analysis of his achievements must be made with reference to his attitude toward different sets of countries.

Chapter IV

GORBACHEV'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS U.S.A., EUROPE AND THIRD WORLD

For a more adequate understanding of Mikhail Gorbachev's contribution to international relations, it is necessary to examine his attitude towards the rest of the world. Gorbachev believed that a major acceleration of Soviet Union's socio-economic development was needed to avoid falling further behind the West. He clearly identified technological backwardness as the main threat to the future of the Soviet Union. He stressed that the problem could not be resolved without reform and attacked earlier efforts to improve the situation without making real changes. Gorbachev's attitude towards the developed countries was determined by these considerations.

Gorbachev and U.S.A.

The basic aim of Mikhail Gorbachev while dealing with U.S.A. was to maintain the peace and tranquility in the world. At the same time, he had in his mind economic aid from U.S.A. But, first of all, there was the problem of communication. Hence, he writes, "we do not communicate enough with one another, we do not understand one another well enough, and we do not even respect one another enough. Certain forces have done a great deal to bring about such a state of affairs. Many misconceptions have built up to

hamper cooperation and stand in the way of its development".¹ He further says, "Attempts to build relations on dictatorial practices, violence and command hardly succeed even at this point. They soon would not succeed at all. The process of grasping the new realities is not a simple one. It requires everybody's time and effort. But once started, that process will go. We must learn to listen to one another, and to understand one another".²

To narrow down this gap in mutual understanding, several summits were held between Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. Presidents, Ronald Reagan and George Bush. During these summits, the issue of disarmament was discussed in details. We have already examined disarmament issues as discussed at these summits in the preceding chapter. Disarmament was not the only contentious issue. Leaders of both countries differed on other issues, such as, human rights, economy, etc.

From the beginning, Mikhail Gorbachev displayed the willingness to cooperate with the West. The Communist Party Politbureau allowed joint ventures in December, 1986. It stipulated that at least 51% of the capital was to be Soviet controlled. U.S.A. appreciated this step of U.S.S.R.³

1 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (London: Fontana/Collins, 1988), pp. 211-12.

2 Ibid., p. 213.

3 Daily News, 20 January, 1988.

The Washington Summit (1990) between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev was a failure of the economic diplomacy of Mikhail Gorbachev. He had been hoping to return with an economic package but this hope was dashed by Lithuanian crisis. Earlier, Bush was ready to announce an economic package for U.S.S.R. But, he later indicated that he was not willing to drop trade barriers against the Soviet Union until Gorbachev made a deal with Lithuania.

On the issue of economic aid, there was a debate. Ultimately, U.S.A. agreed to provide grain worth of \$ 1.5 billion to U.S.S.R. to avoid the total collapse of the Soviet farm system.⁴ In June 1991, President Bush announced relaxation of legal constraints on Soviet trade to Moscow's new liberal emigration law. On the other hand, U.S.A. sought concrete action on introduction of a market economy and major reforms such as the recognition of private property and overhaul of Soviet distribution and pricing systems.

U.S.A's persuasion led to pledge of \$ 24 billion assistance to U.S.S.R. through the international organisations and the World Bank. At the London Summit of G-7, repeated plaintively, "we want to be properly understood We are going through tough time".⁵ Here, U.S. President George Bush tried to mitigate the disappointment of Mikhail

4 International Herald Tribune, 3 September, 1991.

5 Times (London), 18 July, 1991.

Gorbachev. He said that Gorbachev was trying more to explain himself, to explain the pressures that he was up against - the pressures of history. He promised that industrialized nations would try to help in every practical reforms.

The issue of human rights was a contentious matter between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. in the initial days of Mikhail Gorbachev. The Soviet Union and U.S.A. clashed at Ottawa human rights conference (1985) over how much the issue should be considered a country's internal affair. Soviet delegate Vsevolod Safinsky told the meeting that the Soviet Union rejected attempts to interfere in Moscow's internal affairs. He said, "we have paid with our lives against any intervention in country".⁶ The U.S. representative Michael Armacos told delegates; "we have still here echoes of the view rights so that practices should not be the subject of international concern and discussion".⁷

One of the guidelines which was supposed to fulfill by the U.S.S.R. while negotiating with U.S.A. was - Soviet adherence to international agreements such as Helsinki - that guarantee human rights, including emigration, religious worship and expression.⁸

6 Banladesh Observer (Dacca), 12 May, 1985.

7 Ibid.

8 International Herald Tribune, 28 April, 1989.

Emphasizing upon economic diplomacy, Mikhail Gorbachev says, "we have failed to do many good things together because of suspicion and lack of confidence. Alienation is an evil. Besides, economic contacts provide the material basis for political rapprochement. Economic contacts create mutual interests helpful in politics. If we boast our trade and economic relations and continue the cultural process currently going on, even if it is slower than we would like, we shall be able to build confidence between our countries. But the United States has created many obstacles in the economic field".⁹ Hence, we see characteristics of explicitness in Gorbachev's personality. He did not hesitate in passing adverse comments if it was required.

Gorbachev, by the influence of his personality made U.S. policy makers to learn many things. It would not be out of place to quote Huber who enumerates the following influences;

- (1) "The advantages of a renewed emphasis on U.S. ideological hostility in conducting relations with the Soviet Union were outweighed by its disadvantages, particularly while the prospects for reducing tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union were improving.

9 Mikhail Gorbachev, n. 1, pp. 22-23.

- (2) The conduct of foreign policy in a framework dominated by East-West considerations overestimated both U.S. and Soviet influence in the international environment, particularly in the developing world, and thus led to unproductive uses of military power that actually may have undermined U.S. foreign policy objectives.
- (3) The President's ability to obtain domestic consensus on the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union has become increasingly difficult. Such a consensus requires the active support of the legislature, which in the 1980s did not endorse many of the President's strategies for achieving his articulated foreign policy goals. Congress' own analytic capabilities, as well as its willingness to exercise broad foreign policy powers, extended to dealing directly with Soviet foreign policy elites.
- (4) Personal diplomacy between U.S. and Soviet leaders is an important element in the resolution of differences and the expansion of possible parameters of cooperation. If formal policy objectives are to be more fully achieved, a network of leadership communication is required."¹⁰

10 Robert T. Huber, "Perestroika and U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Five Year Plan No One Devised", in Harley Balzer, Five Years That Shook the World: Gorbachev's Unfinished Revolution (Boulder, U.S.A.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 170-71.

In this way, we find that Gorbachev's diplomacy with U.S.A. was a mixture of ups and downs. Most of the time Gorbachev showed yielding tendency. Though, he faced boldly in early days, however, he could not do it for long.

Gorbachev and Western Europe

Mikhail Gorbachev's diplomacy with Europe witnessed many ups and downs due to geo-political changes in Europe. There was erosion of socialist ideology in U.S.S.R's bastion i.e. Eastern Europe, West Germany and East Germany were united.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU, he was aware that Europe had become a rather different place from the Europe depicted in official Soviet pronouncements and writings. Indeed, he had begun this learning process well before becoming the Soviet leader. As a result both of his discussions with specialists at the various institutes of the Academy of Sciences and of his own personal travels in Western Europe, his understanding of European developments was considerably more sophisticated than that of his ageing predecessors. He knew that the unprecedented military build up under Leonid Brezhnev, out of all proportion to reasonable Soviet security needs, had significantly damaged Soviet interests in both halves of Europe and that this aspect of Soviet policy had to be addressed immediately.¹¹

11 Angela Stent, 'Gorbachev and Europe: An Accelerated Learning Curve' in, Harley D. Balzer, ed., Five Years That Shook the World Gorbachev's Unfinished Revolution (Boulder: USA: Westview Press, 1991).

Gorbachev paid great attention to the two big powers of Western Europe, viz., France and United Kingdom. The great significance of France is proved by his first trip abroad as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to France in October 1985. But a year earlier he had visited Britain in December 1984 as the head of a delegation of U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.¹² During that time Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, then British Prime Minister had said of him; "You can do business with him".¹³ Unlike his predecessors, he had not tried to bully the West Europeans but tried to convince them of his reasonableness.

France had been a special target of Mikhail Gorbachev's attention. Commenting on his Paris visit, the Economist (London) noted; "There were touches of flattery; while Mr. Gorbachev quoted Victor Hugo and Saint Exupery, his wife Raisa displayed her penchant for Parisian chic. There was bravado, may be even bravery in his willingness to face off-the-cuff questions by Western journalists in a televised interview on the eve of his visit, and in the press conference at its end. Mr. Gorbachev was presenting himself as a European among Europeans. All in all, it was well done".¹⁴ So, in this way, he tried his best to improve relations with France. He had acknowledged the power and capacity of

12 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika New Thinking for Our Country and the World (London: Fontana/Collins, 1988), p. 190.

13 Francis T. Miko, "Twenty-Seventh Party Congress and the West", Survival (London), vol. 28, no. 4, July/August 1986, p. 293.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 293.

France.

Now, we must talk about disarmament in Europe for which Mikhail Gorbachev is still remembered. After Reykjavik, he met with the heads of government of a number of West European NATO countries, namely Paul Schluter of Denmark, Rudolph Lubbers of the Netherlands, Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway, Steingrímur Hermannsson of Iceland, and with Amintore Fanfani and Giulio Andreotti, representatives of Italian leadership to discuss Europe and disarmament. The Soviet Union and its allies proposed in June 1986 measures for drastic cuts in men and material of NATO and Warsaw Pact - a reduction of 1,00,000 to 150,000 men and a 25% cut in air and land forces. In February 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed an initiative to resolve the Euro missile tangle. By embracing zero option Gorbachev challenged the commitment of the West to the zero option. Later on, he proposed to withdraw those shorter-range missiles which had been deployed in GDR and Czechoslovakia in response to American Pershing and Cruise deployment. In nutshell, he did his best to erase the line that divided West Europe from East Europe.

Mikhail Gorbachev also recognized the significance of European integration and the success of the European Community (EC), despite official Soviet disparagement and non-recognition of the EC as an institution. Since 1957, Soviet commentators had been predicting the imminent demise

of the Community, and Brezhnev's grudging recognition of the EC in 1972 and the subsequent desultory and intermittent talks between CMEA and the EC had done little to change Soviet policy. Gorbachev viewed the EC as a potential model for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in two ways. First the success of economic integration, despite tensions within the Community, was a striking contrast to the weakness of CMEA. Second, the prospect of a thriving single market made him aware that the U.S.S.R. and its partners would become increasingly isolated both from West European economic developments and from the revolution in high technology if the relationship between the Soviet Union and the EC did not improve. "Gorbachev also viewed the EC as a political model, thus demonstrating that countries which for centuries had been adversaries could reconcile politically. France and Germany were the obvious candidates in this respect, in sharp contrast to the fostering national hatreds within and between the CMEA nations".¹⁵

Mikhail Gorbachev apparently learned a third lesson before he became the leader of the Soviet Union that the attempts under Leonid Brezhnev to drive wedges between the United States and its European partners, especially over the issue of intermediate nuclear force (INF) deployments, but failed. Despite all the endemic tensions, within the Atlantic

15 Angela Stent, n. 11, p. 143.

Alliance it was much stronger than its communist counterpart.

Furthermore, Gorbachev talked of cooperation in each and every field. He highlighted the economic, scientific and technological potential of Europe which according to him was tremendous. "It is dispersed, and the force of repulsion between the East and the West of the continent is greater than that of attraction. However, the current state of affairs economically, both in the West and in the East, and their tangible prospects, are such as to enable some parts of Europe to the benefit of all".¹⁶ He did not stop here. He talked of "European home". The building of the "European home" required a material foundation - constructive cooperation in many different areas. "We, in the Soviet Union, are prepared for this including the need to search for new forms of cooperation such as the launching of joint ventures, the implementation of joint projects in third countries etc."¹⁷

In one of Gorbachev's first pronouncements on European question, he stressed that the Soviet Union was a European power and emphasized a phrase taken from Leonid Brezhnev, "our common European home". The concept of a

16 Mikhail Gorbachev, n. 1, p. 197.

17 Ibid., p. 204.

common European home had elicited much analysis in both the East and the West.¹⁸ Mikhail Gorbachev endeavoured to clarify the concept of a common home. He said, "the home is common, that is true but each family has its own apartment, and there are different entrances too. But it is together, collectively and by following the sensible norms of co-existence that the Europeans can save their home, protect it against a conflagration and other calamities, make it better and safer, and maintain it in proper order".¹⁹ In the first few years, the Soviets viewed the concept as a means of encouraging Western Europe to contribute to the economic development of Eastern Europe, implying that there would be a gradual rapprochement between both halves of Europe that might culminate in the unification of Germany. As events in Europe unfolded, officials' statements on the United States changed. In July 1989, during his landmark speech to the Council of Europe, Gorbachev declared, "the USSR and the United States are a natural part of the European international political structure. And their participation in its evolution is not only justified, but historically conditioned".²⁰ Moreover, his chief foreign policy adviser, Aleksandr Yakovlev, had hinted even earlier

18 For discussion of the evolution of this concept, see Neil Malcolm, "The Common European Home and Soviet Policy", International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 4, Autumn 1989, pp.659-76.

19 Mikhail Gorbachev, n. 1, p. 195.

20 Angela Stent, n. 11, p. 144.

that there should be Eastern rooms in common home.

Hence, we can say that Gorbachev used his skill in making good rapport with Western Europe. He was successful in his ambition. Now, we shall examine Mikhail Gorbachev's relationship with Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev and Eastern Europe

The crumbling East European house proved impossible to put in order. Gorbachev's learning process vis-a-vis Eastern Europe was much slower and more painful than the learning process in Western Europe, for the obvious reason that the Soviet stake in Eastern Europe was much greater. Learning meant, in effect, giving up Soviet control and reversing a forty-year old definition of Soviet security. "Soviet leadership correctly perceived that whereas it had everything to gain by changing its relationship with Western Europe, it had much to lose by redefining its ties with Eastern Europe".²¹

Initially, Gorbachev's comments on the relationship between the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were cautious. Then in February 1986, at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, Gorbachev by implication indicted the systems in Eastern Europe as he criticized the Soviet system. He failed to mention 'socialist (or proletarian) internatio-

21 Ibid., p. 145.

nal' in his speech, emphasising "unconditional respect in international practice for the right of every people to choose the paths and forms of its development".²² Nevertheless, until the middle of 1987, Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe continued along traditional lines. By then, Gorbachev apparently understood that his own hopes of restructuring the Soviet economy could not succeed unless his allies began to implement similar measures. During his April 1987 visit to Prague, where he was glorified as a hero by the disaffected population, he reiterated that although the former Soviet Union recognized each socialist country's right to pursue its own path of development, it was necessary that the entire socialist alliance system be restructured.²³ This point was emphasized in his book, *Perestroika*: "It goes without saying that no socialist country can successfully move forward in a healthy rhythm without understanding, solidarity and mutually beneficial cooperation with other fraternal nations, or at times even without their help".²⁴

From 1987 to 1989, the political, military and economic situation in Eastern Europe deteriorated. The old leaders became fearful because they thought that Gorbachev's style of reforms would undermine their power. That is why they refused to liberalize and their economies

22 Mikhail Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee.

23 Angela Stent, n. 11, p. 146.

24 Mikhail Gorbachev, n. 1, p. 161.

later became crisis-ridden. Economic problems and growing ethnic difficulties within the Soviet Union increasingly occupied Gorbachev's attention. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union had little choice but to move from its commitment to controlling Eastern Europe to the realization that Eastern Europe would either have to reform or face the danger of civil war. Moscow was no longer willing to use its military to keep the unpopular governments in power.

In the fall of 1989, Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadu Gerasimov somewhat disingenuously termed this new outlook the 'Sinatra Doctrine', implying that the Soviets would permit any Eastern European country to develop its way. In fact, Gorbachev himself intervened at a number of strategic points in Eastern Europe - in Poland during the formation of the Mazowiecki government; in Hungary during September, when Hungarians decided to open their border with Austria to allow 15,000 East German refugees holed up in the West German Embassy to emigrate; and in the East Germany itself, to push reluctant communists toward reform. He was not willing to allow his allies to go 'their way' if that meant continued repression and adherence to Brezhnev-style rule. By the end of 1989, erstwhile Soviet Union had both passively and actively allowed the old regimes in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Romania to be overthrown by popular movements. Gorbachev did not engineer the revolutions of 1989, but neither did he take a hands-off policy toward them.

By the spring of 1990, after the elections of GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Mikhail Gorbachev had learned yet another lesson, possibly the most difficult and important lesson of his entire time in office. Soviet style communism had failed so badly in Eastern Europe that it could not be salvaged. And if communism could not be reformed, it would have to go. As Eduard Shevardnadze said in his remarkably frank address to the 28th Party Congress in July 1990, "Is the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe a failure of Soviet diplomacy? It would have if our diplomacy had tried to prevent changes in the neighbouring countries. Soviet diplomacy did not and could not have set out to resist the liquidation of those imposed, alien and totalitarian regimes".²⁵

Besides the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded in Prague, Czechoslovakian capital, on July 1, 1991. Thus, the military umbrella provided by U.S.S.R. was no more available to East European countries.

Gorbachev and Germany

We must discuss Gorbachev's diplomacy with Germany because it was divided into two parts as well as blocs and became one of the major powers of Europe after unification.

25 New York Times, July 4, 1990.

Perestroika and glasnost had its wide-ranging impact in Eastern Europe. East Germany was not untouched by its influence. Old leadership was substituted by new leadership. Mikhail Gorbachev sent congratulatory telegram to Egon Krenz when he replaced Honecker. Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov implied that Mikhail Gorbachev had warned the GDR leadership during his visit to East Berlin for the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR that he had to 'go with the times'. This understatement indicated what others had confirmed - namely, that during his visit, Gorbachev, who was the object of adulation by many demonstrators in East Berlin, gave his approval to the ouster of the old regime. However, he anticipated that reformed communism would replace the Stalinist system and that the GDR would remain a separate state.

There was every indication that no one around Mikhail Gorbachev believed that unification would come as quickly as it did. Indeed, the Soviets were surprised by the opening of the Berlin Wall and were not directly involved in that decision. The initial Soviet belief seemed to have been that reformed communism, in the person of Hans Modrow (who replaced Krenz in December 1989) would survive in the GDR for some time. When FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl proposed his ten-point plan for unification on November 29, 1989 envisaging a three-step process of contractual community, confederative structures, and finally federation, the Soviet reaction was negative. Even E. Shevardnadze had

stressed that two German states were necessary for the security of Europe. The official Soviet view began to soften in late January and by February 10, 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev had assured Helmut Kohl that he would do nothing to block German unity.²⁶ Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership reluctantly adopted this position only when it realized that the rapid movement toward unification was unstoppable. Ultimately, Germany was unified on October 3, 1990 and the first free all German election since 1932 were held on December 2, 1990. After diplomatic negotiation, Gorbachev accepted united Germany to be in NATO. By this, Gorbachev in essence admitted that he preferred to have Germany firmly anchored in the Western alliance, rather than an unrestrained major power in Europe.²⁷

Thus, Mikhail Gorbachev at times willingly and sometimes unwillingly accepted the things which normally he would not have accepted. Sometimes he seemed to be victorious in his goals but at times he had to compromise. Anyway, he carried away the carriage of diplomacy with him. Now, we must examine his diplomacy with Third World countries.

Gorbachev and Third World

There was no disagreement among scholars about the

26 Washington Post, January 31, 1990, February 11, 1990.

27 Angela Stent, n. 11, p. 151.

fact that there has been a change in the Soviet policy towards the 'Third World'. However, there are two groups of scholars. One group argued that although Moscow's policy had undergone some modification, the Soviet approach to the Third World remained fundamentally the same as before. However, members of this group disagreed as to which factors explain the perceived continuity. Some traced it back to the tsarist policies that had been reinforced in the Soviet era.²⁸ Others viewed it as the product of lingering ideological commitments on the part of the Soviet elite.²⁹ Still others saw it in terms of recurrent patterns of Soviet behaviour towards developing areas.³⁰

A second group asserted that the alterations in the Soviet policy reflected a basic change in the Soviet approach to the Third World, yet there was also no unanimity within this group about the reasons for this shift. Some maintained that it resulted from the declining impact of ideology on the Soviet perceptions of the Third World.³¹ Others contended that it had stemmed essentially from

28 See, for example, Alwin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

29 A typical illustration is David S. Papp, Soviet Perception of the Developing World in 1980s: The Ideological Basis (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1985).

30 See, for instance, Francis Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), vol. 35, no. 3, Sept/Oct. 1987, pp. 1-13.

31 Jerry Hough, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options (Washington, D.C., 1986).

domestic considerations-particularly the need to improve the performance of U.S.S.R's economy.³²

The diplomatic deals of Gorbachev with the Third World proved beyond doubt that there had been metamorphic change. Since Gorbachev's advent to power in early 1985, the percentage of Soviet resources going to 'revolutionary democracies' declined. For instance, the economic credits that Moscow offered to 16 revolutionary democracies during the period 1982-86 amounted to only a little more than half of the total that it extended to the whole of the Third World in these years. On the other hand, the same number of 'revolutionary democracies' had received a substantially larger share of Soviet commitments to the Third World during 1980-84 (\$ 7.6 billion of \$ 9.7 billion).

The Third World debt continued but the amount was reduced. But at times Gorbachev was soft. This soft cornered attitude of Mikhail Gorbachev was explicit when Syria got its \$ 15 billion (approx.) debt rescheduled during a visit by Hafez al-Assad to Moscow in April 1987, in addition to receiving commitments for supply of more advanced weapons. Nicaragua and Libya both received new commitments for arms supply during Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary, the latter getting SA-5 long range

32 Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism", International Security (Cambridge), Winter 1987-88, pp. 93-131.

missiles in December 1985. Despite Ligachev's criticism of Vietnamese management, the Soviet Union increased its subsidy to Hanoi.³³

Before going into further details, we must have a glance of the official sanction of the new party programme adopted at the 27th CPSU Congress in February, 1986. The programme stated as: "The practice of the USSR relations with the liberated countries has shown that there are also real grounds for cooperation with young states that are travelling the capitalist road. These grounds include a common interest in the preservation of peace, the strengthening of international security, and the termination of arms race. They include the sharpening contradiction between the interests of the peoples and the imperialist policy of diktat and expansion. They include the understanding by the young states of the fact that political and economic ties with the Soviet Union facilitate the strengthening of their independence".³⁴

Gorbachev's period saw disenchantment of Soviet Union with active involvement in attempts to bolster 'revolutionary democracies' militarily when these undertakings entailed high costs of the U.S.S.R. or antagonize the

33 Francis Fukuyama, n. 30, p. 11.

34 The Communist Party Programme and Party Statutes 'Final Versions', The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Special Supplement, December 1986.

Western powers. Not only did Soviet forces leave Afghanistan in February, 1989 in line with the decision that Gorbachev had announced in 1988, but Moscow also actively promoted the accords that Angola, Cuba and South Africa concluded in December 1988. These led to departure of Cuban forces from Angola in July 1991 in return for South Africa's acceptance of Namibia's independence.

Despite these withdrawals, Mikhail Gorbachev sought to resume diplomatic relationships with those countries which had either broken diplomatic ties with Moscow on account of rivalry/discord or had not yet started them. Carrying forward this idea, the Soviet leadership played host to Foreign Minister Saud who ostensibly headed a group invited by Cominform. The loyalty of some allies was suspected. Even much seemingly close allies as Vietnam cooperated with Moscow on the basis of political calculation rather than fealty to the socialist homeland. Third World Marxist-Leninists were also a rather weak group. Only Cuba and Vietnam had strong communist bastions.³⁵

We must pay special attention to the Asia and Pacific region because this region has always been the most important for U.S.S.R. In order to develop the Soviet Far East, Mikhail Gorbachev offered foreign companies the opportunity to engage in joint ventures, in establishing industrial enterprises, e.g., in Vladivostok which was a

35 Francis Fukuyama, n. 30, p. 12.

closed city to foreigners earlier. In that context, Japan being the region's economic super power, became most attractive potential partner. But due to Kurila islands dispute, it could not be translated into reality.

India was the main trading partner of Soviet Union in Asia. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was the first foreign head of state to pay an official visit to U.S.S.R. following Mikhail Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary. Gorbachev paid the return visit in November 1986 and issued the famous 'Delhi Declaration'.³⁶

Shevardnadze's peace offensive in May 1987 took him to Australia, Indonesia, Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam to establish a nuclear free zone in South Pacific.

Soviet Union's relationship with China also improved. Solution of Cambodian tangle led to the improvement of relationship between China and Vietnam.

Mikhail Gorbachev's public diplomacy revealed a politician who recognized the futility of seeking military goals in the Third World in competition with U.S.A. He improved relationship with Sudan after the overthrow of President Gaafar Numeiri in a coup in 1985. The relationship with Zimbabwe also improved. Between 1985-87, the Soviet

36 Peter Shearman, "Gorbachev and the Third World: An Era of Reform", Third World Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 4, October 1987, p. 1086.

Union reestablished ties with Liberia and increased economic and military ties with Nigeria and Tanzania.

With Latin America too, Gorbachev improved relationship by his diplomatic skill. When President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua visited Moscow in April 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev offered only 'diplomatic support' in defending the Nicaraguan revolution, a clear message to the Sandinistas that Soviet leadership is not prepared to offer any direct military assistance. Mikhail Gorbachev had told the Mexican Foreign Minister that he was the supporter of the Contadora peace process in Central America and had no desire to interfere in relations between U.S.A. and Latin America.

In this way it became evident that Mikhail Gorbachev's Third World policy was subordinate to and dependent on Soviet leader's other more important objectives. The Soviet national security and state interests took precedence over any commitment to socialism in LDCs, with Soviet policy towards the Third World indeed designed to further these interests.

Chapter V

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

So far we have analysed various aspects of Mikhail Gorbachev's diplomacy, viz., disarmament diplomacy, diplomacy with West (including U.S.A. and Western Europe), Eastern Europe and Third World countries. Prior to it we have seen his 'New Thinking', negotiating style, conduct and behaviour. We have also discussed how Mikhail Gorbachev was popular in the East as well as the West. It has been noticed how his personality was influential in inducing changes in the East as well as the West. But before we conclude our discussion, we must compare the personality of Mikhail Gorbachev with the personality of earlier political leaders of the U.S.S.R., viz., Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev to bring out distinctly the contribution of Gorbachev's personality to Soviet diplomacy.

Gorbachev and Lenin

Like Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov Lenin, Mikhail Gorbachev's diplomacy was based on peace and peaceful coexistence. "Lenin needed peace to consolidate the Revolution. His first act, therefore, was to sign the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany in 1918, and get out of the war, which had inflicted enormous damage to his people and country".¹

1 Kaul, T.N., Stalin to Gorbachev and Beyond (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991).

His slogan of 'No annexation and no Indemnity' caught the imagination of his people and of German soldiers - both of whom had been bled white by the war. Lenin's Peace Decree was a bold, courageous and realistic move in the circumstances then prevailing.

He had thought and worked out his long-term strategy and short-term tactics. But the allies, who did not like his Peace Treaty, started their intervention in the North, the South and the East - from Murmansk and Archangelsk to the Transcaucasus, from Siberia to Central Asia. They tried with the help of White Russians and local dissidents, to disrupt the new Socialist Republic. The intervention and the civil war lasted from 1918 till the end of 1920, but failed to destroy the new socialist state.

Lenin's diplomacy was based on maintenance of peace in Russia which later became RSFSR and peaceful coexistence. The voluntary association of various minority and ethnic areas, was different from the Czarist policy of oppression and forcible annexation and expansionism. This and their need for security, peace and development persuaded the various minorities and ethnic areas to join the RSFSR through treaties and agreements. (For example, Georgia joined because she had been subjected to constant invasions by Turkey and others). They felt more secure with the RSFSR. This was helped by the creation of the units of the Party in these areas, with the support of local communists

and others who had suffered under local despots (as in Central Asia) and from foreign invasions (as in Transcaucasia).

It was Lenin himself who dominated the diplomatic negotiations. Though he was criticised for the Brest-Litovsk treaty of 1918, he, however, surrendered territories and purchased peace at the altar of war. The same tactics were adopted by Mikhail Gorbachev who did not care for his East European allies as well as third world dependants. Peace and disarmament were two primary things for Mikhail Gorbachev. He had to pay a heavy price for peace in terms of disintegration of the Soviet Union and loss of political power.

Mikhail Gorbachev went beyond Lenin. Lenin accumulated arms to save the USSR from the Western attack but Mikhail Gorbachev destroyed the arms to get the hands of the West. Lenin's policies stood for the establishment of a socialist state in the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, Gorbachev's efforts not only ended the monopoly of the CPSU but they shook the roots of the communist ideology.

Gorbachev and Stalin

Joseph Stalin was much more obsessed with security means, both internal and external, than anything else. He concentrated therefore on building defence capability by his own emphasis on heavy industry and the rapid industrialisation of the country. *Stalin perhaps thought he himself would have been a better Czar than Ivan the Terrible. He

was a Czar by temperament though a communist by profession".²

Stalin wanted to buy time to prepare for an attack by Hitler which he did apprehend and anticipate but was not prepared for in 1939. He tried to persuade France and Great Britain, but the West was more interested in Hitler's plan to push eastwards against the U.S.S.R. Stalin had no qualms about entering into the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939. He might have had some justification for this on security grounds but, morally, and ethically this pact was indefensible. This pact was the denial of the right of self-determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Neither the people nor the elected bodies of these countries were taken into confidence before the signing of the pact. This pact was nothing but an attack on the sovereignty of these countries.

Stalin's invasion of Finland on 30 November, 1939 was justified by him on the ground that if he had not gone in, the Germans would have, but this was not convincing enough. He soon realized his mistake, both in military and political terms, and he had to enter into a Treaty with Finland in March 1940, getting part of what he wanted - eastern Karelia and the right to have a naval base on the Hanko peninsula. The incorporation of Latvia and Estonia

2 Ibid., p. 192.

in the Soviet Union might have been justified on security considerations but that of Lithuania was an after-thought of Molotov who added this to his list in the pact with Ribbentrop, a month after the pact had been negotiated.

Stalin's annexation of Eastern Poland, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile islands could be justified as a result of the allied victory in the Second World War. Germany and Japan started and lost the war and suffered its consequences. The Tehran (November 1943), Yalta (February 1945), and Potsdam (July-August 1945) agreements have become part of history and cannot be disturbed or changed except by another war or peaceful negotiations. War is out of the question and impermissible in the thermo-nuclear age of today. A durable peaceful situation is only possible, after complete attainment of nuclear disarmament, dissolution of military alliances and the removal of threat of nuclear holocaust. Instead through the increased pace of arms race Stalin consolidated the roots of U.S.S.R.

Hence, it can be easily said of Stalin's personality: "It was Stalin ... who built the Soviet Union into a super power. It was Stalin who industrialized a peasant country, took it from wooden plows to atomic weapons, thrust it into the twentieth century and made the West tremble at the might of Russia. Above all, it was Stalin who won the war (Second World War), destroyed Hitler, beat the Germans".³ Even

³ Smith Hedrick, The New Russians (New York: Avon Books, 1991), p. 132.

his opponents were influenced by the charisma of Stalin's personality. For instance, Winston Churchill who back in 1919 boasted of his personal contribution to organizing the military intervention by 14 foreign states against the young Soviet republic, exactly 40 years later was forced to use the following words to describe Stalin, one of his formidable political opponents: "He was an outstanding personality who left his mark on our cruel time during his lifetime. Stalin was a man of exceptional energy, erudition and unbending will power, harsh, tough, and ruthless in both action and conversation and even I, brought up in the English Parliament, could not oppose him in any way A gigantic force resounded in his works. This force is so great in Stalin that he seemed unique among the leaders of all times and all peoples His effect on people is irresistible. Whenever he entered the Yalta conference hall, we all rose as if by command. And strangely, we all stood to attention. He was a past master at finding a way out of the most hopeless situation at a difficult time He was a man who used his enemies to destroy his enemy, forcing us - whom he openly called imperialists - to fight the imperialists He took over Russia still using wooden plow, and left it equipped with atomic weapons".⁴

4 Nina Andreyeva, 'Letter to the Editorial Office from a Leningrad VUZ Lecturer', in Baruch A. Hazan, Gorbachev and His Enemies: The Struggle for Perestroika (Boulder, U.S.A.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 306.

The above quotation is not intended to put a curtain on his misdeeds. But it simply displays the influence of Stalin's personality in diplomacy. His diplomacy was a mixture of peaceful co-existence with the West-combined with an attempt to dominate over other powers, especially in its neighbourhood, in eastern and central Europe, Iran in the south, Mongolia and, to some extent, China in the East. His control of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe, through his nominees in their communist ruling parties, was almost total. They tolerated it more on security than on ideological grounds. Ideology was used by Stalin as a cover for domination. However, Yugoslavia which had not been liberated by Soviet forces, but mainly by its own patriotic guerilla resistance under Tito, refused to bow to Stalin's pressure tactics in 1948.

In this way it is apparent that Stalin's personality had dominating influence in the U.S.S.R.'s diplomacy during his time. But there had been significant differences between personality traits of Mikhail Gorbachev and Stalin. Stalin believed in underhand, closed and secret diplomacy, e.g. Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. But on the other hand, Mikhail Gorbachev's policies stood for open diplomacy. Stalin wanted U.S.S.R. to be a military super power and his efforts made U.S.S.R. a super power. But Mikhail Gorbachev realized the significance of global peace and thus propounded the historic principle of disarmament, i.e.,

'since nuclear war cannot be won hence it should not be fought.' Stalin was afraid of surrounding powers and created a fence of socialist powers around the U.S.S.R. Economically crippled, Gorbachev found it to be unfair to sustain the cost of socialist countries in Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev and Khrushchev

Nikita Khrushchev came to power in 1953. He denounced Stalin's cult of personality in 1956 and propagated the theory of peaceful coexistence between different political and social systems. He also dreaded that each country had the right to determine its own peaceful and constitutional path to socialism. Differences between the U.S.S.R. and China became acute when Khrushchev refused to give her a 'sample' atom bomb. In Suez crisis of 1956, Khrushchev's threat to send rockets and missiles against Great Britain to help Egypt showed that Soviet leadership would not allow the West to dominate the Middle East. U.S.A. also realized that the British, French and Israelis had overstepped the limit and exercised a sobering influence over them. However, this congruence between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. did not last long. Soviet intervention in Hungary in October/November 1956 caused widespread resentment throughout the non-communist world.

Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence was popular in the Third World, especially among the nonaligned countries which considered it to be a cardinal principle

of nonalignment. Cooperation between the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the U.S.S.R. increased in the political, cultural, economic and even in the defence spheres.

Relations between the two super powers further deteriorated during the Cuban crisis when Khrushchev sent nuclear missiles to Cuba which brought US territory within Soviet range. President Kennedy's meeting with Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961 had produced a softening effect on the Cold War, but the Cuban crisis almost brought the super powers to the brink of war. However, better counsels prevailed, both Khrushchev and Kennedy climbed down and peace was thus preserved. The Cuban issue is supposed to be a diplomatic defeat of the U.S.S.R. but we disagree with this view. This is a fact that Khrushchev had to withdraw missiles from the Cuban soil but he was successful in his ultimate objective of establishing the roots of socialism in Cuba. That is why Cuban issue added a feather in the cap of Khrushchev because it was diplomatic victory of U.S.S.R. He was successful in making a fort in the Pacific waters.

In this way, we find ups and downs in Khrushchev's negotiating strategy. At times, he was found making peace with the West while sometimes later he was found engaged in preparing for a war. Though he pleaded for a truce with the West, he could not achieve it for ever. On the other hand, Mikhail Gorbachev whole heartedly started for

peace and maintained it throughout his Presidentship. One personality trait was common to both of them. Both were against the Stalinist regime and never failed to criticise Stalin. Both Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev shared common views on disarmament. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prevented nuclear weapons tests in the air, outer space and under water. Mikhail Gorbachev carried it forward and INF and START were signed.

Gorbachev and Brezhnev

The diplomacy of Leonid Brezhnev was a continuation of Khrushchev's but less flamboyant. He did not threaten to 'bury capitalism' as Khrushchev had done. But he went on increasing Soviet military strength and acquired near parity with NATO in nuclear and a slight edge in conventional armaments by 1974. He was thus able to bring the U.S. to sign SALT I and SALT II agreements; although the U.S. Congress did not ratify the latter. It was more or less observed in practice, by both sides. He also went further than Khrushchev had in supplying military aid to the Arabs against Israel, and the national liberation movements in Africa. But he did not continue Khrushchev's adventurist policy in Latin America.

Brezhnev went much further than Khrushchev in consolidating and strengthening his military domination over Eastern Europe. His blatant invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Brezhnev Doctrine of 'limited sovereignty'

sowed seeds of discontent and resentment among the people of Eastern Europe.⁵

The new approach to the Third World was called 'selective approach'. The Soviet Union carefully chose its friends and allies. The aim of this approach was that Soviet aid and support must not be proliferated without desired results.⁶ It was indeed a modification of Khrushchev's policy for which domestic political developments were no less important. This was a phase when Asian countries were the main target of Soviet diplomacy. It was also the phase when the Soviet policy in Asia gradually began to acquire an autonomous character, away from the traditional prism of East-West relations. Vietnam proved to be a boon for Soviet diplomacy where U.S.A. was unable to make any progress. But the indirect involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East war proved a failure. In spite of it, Soviet supply of arms and ammunition to the frontline Arab States, like Egypt and Syria did help. Then in 1971 the U.S.S.R. came openly and unequivocally on the side of India in its conflict with Pakistan over Bangladesh. Similar pattern was also noted in the growing Soviet involvement during seventies in regional conflicts in Africa and later,

5 T.N. Kaul, Stalin to Gorbachev and Beyond (New Delhi; Lancer International, 1991), p. 199.

6 Zafar Imam, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1990 (New Delhi; Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1991), p. 101.

in Latin America. Above all, the quantum of Soviet economic aid jumped and became more concentrated on active non-aligned states like India, Iraq, Syria, Libya. Similar was the pattern of supply of arms and equipments.

Brezhnev was not able to give effective economic assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe. His over-concentration on defence and military production had ruined the Soviet economy. His reversion to Stalinist methods of 'command and administer' and the encouragement of his cronies and favourites led to bribery, nepotism and corruption in the party apparatus and the bureaucracy. He undid what good Khrushchev had been able to do in the Soviet economy and polity.

The detente period started during Brezhnev. But after a few years this detente was converted to New Cold War when Soviet forces marched to Afghanistan in 1979. The peace which was brought was lost.

In this way, we witness ups and downs in Brezhnevian diplomacy. He had a commanding position. He made the U.S.S.R. a power which was not militarily inferior to any power of the world. His diplomacy was designed to extricate the Soviet Union from capitalist encirclement by challenging the West's global alliance structure and offering large amounts of aid to selected developing countries. But Mikhail Gorbachev was opposite of it. He did not want to provide aid at the cost of Soviet economy. Brezhnev talked

of parity or equality with the West in the arms and armaments but Mikhail Gorbachev did never talk of parity. West was enemy for Brezhnev. Instead of it, Gorbachev made West the ally. Mikhail Gorbachev was for cooperation but Brezhnev was for separation.

In this way, we find that Soviet diplomacy has always been subject to the role of personality of its leaders. The personality of the leader has always been capable of moulding diplomacy. But the approach, way, style, conduct vary from one to another. If one was for storing arms, another was eager to destroy it to achieve peace. We have also seen that leading personalities did believe in spreading the socialist ideas, making friends in the Third World countries. But on the other hand we also find that there was another man who was determined to reduce the tentacles of the U.S.S.R. and stopped military and economic aid to the Third World countries. So, it can be easily said that Mikhail Gorbachev had quite different and distinct characteristics of personality as compared with others e.g., Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Concluding Remarks

First of all, we must make a clear distinction between the personality of a common man and the personality of a leader of a nation. The personality of a common man is the reflection of his own thinkings, beliefs, attitudes,

motives etc. The society in which he/she has been brought up does not play as much role in the making of his/her personality. But the same is not the case with the personality of the leader. A leader is not just a common man but he is an embodiment of the whole people to whom he represents.

Mikhail Gorbachev betrayed the aspirations and wishes of masses of U.S.S.R. During his accession to power, U.S.S.R. was at par with U.S.A. militarily. But in his six years' period he always made unequal cuts. Many a times he made unilateral declarations in regards to arms cut. Though he put stones in early summits, he yielded later on. He accepted whatever was told to him. But he could not get U.S.A. to move with the pace that he wanted. Star war issue remained as U.S.A. wished. Instead, Gorbachev continued his concessions. The result was U.S.A. remained an unrivalled military power. Now, Russia is incapable of challenging U.S.A. militarily.

Mikhail Gorbachev had a weak personality. He was not a strong leader. He used to yield very soon. He was credulous. He accepted whatever was told to him by the West, without weighing its pros and cons. His negotiating style and strategy made him submissive. This submissive nature of Soviet diplomacy did more harm than good to U.S.S.R.

The core of Mikhail Gorbachev's diplomacy was to get economic aid from the West. U.S.S.R. was admitted to global

economic network after a long persuasion. The West pledged economic aid but sizeable economic aid did not come. Had Gorbachev got sufficient aid, he would have been able to reform the economically torn society. Mere pledges and promises do not provide bread. So was the case with the U.S.S.R. Bread was promised but bread did not come. Thus U.S.S.R. dies of lack of economic aid. It was the failure of the Gorbachevian economic diplomacy.

The Soviet society had been a closed society. Had the same thing continued, U.S.S.R. would have continued for some more period. Loosening of screws made the society free from ideological inclinations. Too much of glasnost proved harmful for him. He might have thought of becoming a messiah or saviour. He became the saviour but he destroyed the base upon which he was standing.

He was not a far-sighter. He had never thought of a disastrous ruin. He did not recognize the intentions of the West. West wanted destruction of not only Soviet empire but of Soviet Union too. He was anticipating help to avoid this destruction at least of U.S.S.R. but he got nothing to save his country.

Sometimes one wonders how could so much happen in so short a time? The world that Gorbachev destroyed in six years had taken decades to construct, and until he started to dismantle it, there was no obvious sign that

it was as fragile as it proved to be. And yet it did crumble, as if shaken by a gigantic earthquake.

The amazing pace of change was an important clue. It was possible because energies had accumulated beneath the surface comparable to the natural forces that build up where two plates of earth's crust meet, finally erupting in a shattering earthquake. Once, the first tremors were felt, the Soviet Union's stale and rigid economic and political structures began to shake. Eastern Europe's false front - a slapdash facade of Stalinism forcibly and unnaturally attached to ancient Central European cultures - crumbled under the tremor's strength.

Events could only move so fast because as long as he was dismantling Stalinist system, Gorbachev was working with the forces of history, not against them. He knew from the outset that his country was in dire straits - this knowledge was the source of his urge to reform. The more he tried to put things right, the better he grasped how bad things were. He said time and again that plans had to be changed after he and others understood the seriousness of the problems they faced. What they thought they knew repeatedly turned out to be less than the full truth. At the Central Committee plenum of April 1989 Gorbachev admitted: "None of us had a good knowledge of the country we live in".

The truth was that the Stalinist model had long outlived its utility and was nearing collapse after doing

immeasurable damage to the country. The idea that a huge industrial economy could effectively be planned and controlled by relatively few officials in Moscow had proven false. The system this idea created was static, not dynamic, and was based on a simple-minded distinction between pre-industrial and industrial life. The planned economy would take Russia from backwardness to modernity - that was its authors' vision. But their vision left no room for the actual dynamics of technological innovation, improvisation, market mechanisms and so on. It was the vision of economic illiterates. It created a hapless economic monster that was backward, inefficient, and clumsy. Its managers did not know how to manage. Its workers did not know how to work. Its currency was worthless in any competitive market. This was Stalinist legacy.

The cost of sustaining super power status was immense. Shevardnadze acknowledged in the summer of 1990 that Soviet governments routinely spent a quarter of their resources on their military establishment - and more to sustain alliances with never-do-well Third World allies like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Ethiopia. The actual number might have been higher. The squandering of nation's wealth over more than forty years certainly hastened the collapse of the Stalinist system.

So did the worsening corruption of Soviet society. The corruption of a nation is a dynamic process; once begun,

it tends to gain momentum and accelerates. By the time Gorbachev came to power, it was common for a Soviet citizen to be asked for a bribe for the most basic services, even health care. The high-minded principles of the Bolshevik Revolution had lost all relevance; the society was rotting from within. This was obvious just from the statistics on life expectancy and consumption of alcohol, which showed a country that was killing itself.

By the time Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary, his country's economy could no longer grow, and was falling farther and farther behind the developed world. Conditions of life were deteriorating ominously. Either there would be change or there would be disaster. Even an anonymous writer's words can't be outrightly rejected. His identity was concealed under the pseudonym Z and whom people suspected to be a high official in the State Department. He got an article published in 'Daedalus' which was highly critical of the Soviet Union. The author asserted: "... the Soviet Union was never a great industrial power, and still less a modern society. The belief that it was such a power was among the great illusions of the century." He concluded "the system can't be restructured or reformed but can only either stagnate or dismantled and replaced by market institutions over a long period of time". He went on to caution the West "... any aid the West might render to the Soviet state to save or improve the existing system would be futile; on this score Gorbachev is

beyond our help.⁷

Understanding Mikhail Gorbachev means understanding the Soviet Union. It is important to see Gorbachev in the context of Soviet history and society. 'We are all children of our times,' as Gorbachev said often during his first five years in power. His times did not begin in 1985. Nor did the ideas for change that he embraced suddenly fall from the heavens after he became General Secretary.

Similarly, the trouble Mikhail Gorbachev encountered at the end of 1990 and the tragic events of early 1991 can also be understood only in the context of Soviet history. His reforms crashed into the realities of the Stalinist inheritance: an unnatural multinational state, a pathetic economy, and the enduring power of the core groups that had made the old system work, however feebly. The army, the KGB, the police, and the still hidden but still powerful military-industrial complex, and the remnants of Party apparatus pushed Gorbachev off course at the very moment when he seemed to be triumphant.

They pushed him toward a new, hard line that led directly to the clumsy showdown with the Baltic states and then to tragedy in January 1991. It was Gorbachev's own fear and ambition that made him susceptible to their

7 Z, "To the Stalin Mausoleum", Daedalus, Winter 1990, p. 312.

pressure. The blood of the fourteen Lithuanians killed when army troops stormed the television station in Vilnius was blood on Gorbachev's hands. For nearly six years he had avoided this; he had built a great international reputation and collected the Nobel Prize as an implacable foe of violence. Even as he plotted to bring the Lithuanians to heel, violently if necessary, he was working feverishly in the diplomatic arena to avoid war in the Persian Gulf - trying to fulfill the noble aspirations of his United Nations speech of December 1988. But this was window dressing. The real test of his moral position came at home, and he failed it. The wild, bucking horse he had been riding for several months finally threw him. When the paratroopers opened fire in Vilnius, the hopeful, high-minded Gorbachev era ended.

We know the least about the formation of Gorbachev's character - that combination of genes and reflexes, taught or absorbed, that defines a personality. The effects of his grandfather's arrests, his father's absence from home during the war, his close association with his mother's parents, his early expose to Russian orthodoxy, and other intriguing but inconclusive details from his early biography are well known. Gorbachev's own description of his boyhood home as a 'plague house' after Grandfather Gopkolo returned from fourteen months of imprisonment and interrogation - a jouse' where even relatives and close friends could not

visit' for fear of being associated with this 'enemy of the people', who had been the first chairman of the collective farm - is haunting.

It is clear from evidence of his adolescence that Mikhail Gorbachev emerged from childhood as a poised, confident, outgoing and ambitious person. In adolescence he learned theatrical skills that made him wary of more elaborate psychological interpretation. He has been acting for more than forty years. His was a masked personality, and he was a lonely man, who apparently shared that was truly personal with comrades and colleagues.

But if the formation of character cannot be divined, the character itself isn't so mysterious. It is formidable and has made Gorbachev stronger than those around him in Soviet politics. He intimidated and impressed everyone who worked near him. Yeltsin admitted this in his autobiography. "What he has achieved will, of course, go down in history of mankind. I do not like high-sounding phrases, yet everything that Gorbachev has initiated deserves such praise. He could not have gone on just as Brezhnev and Chernenko did before him. I estimate that the country's natural resources and the people's patience would have outlasted his lifetime, long enough for him to have lived the well fed and happy life of the leader of a totalitarian state. He could have draped himself with orders and medals, the people would have hymned him in verse and song, which

is always enjoyable. Yet Gorbachev chose to go another way. He started by climbing a mountain whose summit is not even visible. He is somewhere up in the clouds and no one knows how the ascent will end. Will we all be swept away by an avalanche or will Everest be conquered?"⁸

Mikhail Gorbachev cannot be understood apart from his membership of the caste of Communist Party officials. He grew up in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; it shaped him, taught him political analysis and political rhetoric. It gave him a style and a manner that he never gave up. He could not give them up even if he wanted to do so.

He embraced a flexible, moralistic and humane outlook that could have come from the mouth of an American Unitarian. Yet when his own moment of truth came in Lithuania, Mikhail Gorbachev could not fulfill his new definition of a Communist. Instead he reverted to an earlier type.

Although Gorbachev held on to his Communist identity, he was never hidebound. Once he committed himself to 'revolutionary changes' he was willing to accept wholesale revision of Party tradition, and to break nearly all the old rules that governed Soviet society.

He was overhauling Soviet communism to create a better Soviet Union, and better communism - that's how Gorbachev

8 Robert G. Kaiser, Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumphs and Failures (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 406.

saw his historical role. But communism held no appeal for large numbers of people, and the idea of the Soviet Union held no appeal for many, probably most, of the non-Russian citizens of the U.S.S.R.

The ability to change his mind made Mikhail Gorbachev a better tactician. In the case of Boris Yeltsin alone, Gorbachev changed his mind more than five times. In early 1986 he could speak harshly of Andrei Sakharov as a criminal; at the end of the same year he could make the dramatic phone call that led to Sakharov's release and eventual transformation into Gorbachev's political ally. One month idea of a multi-party political system was rubbish; the next month he was urging the repeal of Article 6 of the constitution to open the way for a multiparty system. He was such a good tactician that many of his liberal supporters refused to believe, in the fog end that he was abandoning them.

Perhaps the most egregious example of his overconfidence was his failure to confront the need to create a new system to replace the one he so successfully destroyed. Gorbachev seemed to convince himself that he could postpone this task for three years, then four, then five. In the sixth year his procrastination caught up with him.

It is true that Gorbachev's economic policies had been on the wrong track since the Central Committee plenum of June 1987. The budget deficit ballooned from 3 per cent of gross domestic product in 1987 to 10 per cent in 1989 and

higher still in 1990 and 1991. The money that had to be printed to cover these deficits had dramatically aggravated inflationary pressures. The antidrinking campaign went out of control when prices of Vodka were doubled, stimulating an enormous black-market - and the disappearance of sugar, which home brewers used to make their own white lightning.

Ultimately, the facts of Soviet life-objective reality, as a Marxist might put it were Gorbachev's greatest enemy. He could open up the Soviet Union, restore its history, initiate debate on fundamental issues, even convert a nation of sheeplike followers into a vibrant new political organism, but he could not overcome the fundamental terms of existence in his country. So, six years of experiment failed ultimately. He had thrown off the yoke of Stalinism, an astounding accomplishment, but even without the yoke the country was crippled by the consequences of its past.

As he dismantled the old system, Mikhail Gorbachev never eliminated the mechanisms that make dictatorship possible. The army shrank but never lost its influence, and the Soviet version of the military-industrial complex apparently retained its ability to commandeer the most desirable economic resources. The KGB survived at full strength - hundreds of thousands of agents. Many of the hard-nosed Party hacks who maintained discipline for the old regime remained available for service. Censors never forgot how to censor. Prosecutors and judges knew how to take arbitrary orders from above, and probably did not

know how to resist them.

In spite of all these, Gorbachevian diplomacy still has a dominating role. Though USSR dismantled on December 25, 1991, the successor republics did not say a farewell to his disarmament diplomacy. Instead, Boris Yeltsin concluded START II and other members of CIS and Baltic Republics are following the footsteps of Mikhail Gorbachev.

In this way, we find that like personality of other leaders of U.S.S.R. Mikhail Gorbachev's personality too played a significant role in USSR's diplomacy. Despite his failures, his achievements should not be brushed away in a single stroke.

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