

**THAILAND AND ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF):  
A STUDY OF CHALLENGING ISSUES**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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2005**



11 July 2005

### CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled **“THAILAND AND ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF):A STUDY OF CHALLENGING ISSUES”** submitted by **ANONG KOWITSTHIENCHAI** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university.

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## Preface

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only forum for security cooperation founded by ASEAN countries in the year 1994. Presently, its operation is challenged by various factors. Many scholars have talked about the effectiveness of the ARF's operation under the "ASEAN Way" concept and the situation of internal diversity and the complexity of its surrounding environment.

In this regard, it is very interesting to learn about the ARF in great detail to understand its existing structure and capacity including the implementation of confidence building measures (CBMs), the development of preventive diplomacy (PD) and the scope for conflict resolution in order to explore opportunities to become a more formal structure and to recommend appropriate ways to develop security in future in solving existing problems.

The dissertation is organized into five chapters.

The first chapter highlights the idea of theoretical framework on the concept of security and examines the main schools of thought in evolving ARF, the establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to prove as the distinct "ASEAN Way" and ASEAN Model of regional security. It also addresses the objective of ARF, especially Confidence Building Measures, Preventive Diplomacy, and conflict resolution.

The second chapter focuses on the establishment of ARF since July 1994 as a new forum of multilateral cooperation, the structure and operation of the ARF, the organization of the ARF and the ARF Meetings. It also examines the role played by the Regional organization in the region and also how the emergence of ARF strengthened regional security.

The third chapter focuses on Recent Issues and Concerns. This chapter handles study of conflict issues like instability that affect Southeast Asian region including problems of Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor, Korean Peninsula and

disputes in the South China Sea. Then considering the threat impact on Thailand and ASEAN and in that how does it go; how ARF can solve these problems and what role Thailand played in the affairs of the ARF.

The fourth chapter examines transnational crimes, economic security, environmental security and terrorism. As there is a need to promote regional cooperation in dealing with regional security issues, it also discusses both the positive effects and the repercussions of globalization, including greater economic interdependence among nations and the multiplication of security threats.

The fifth chapter recapitulates the major findings in the study with concluding observations. The study finds that the role of Thailand in ARF is crucial for its success.

## Acknowledgement

In the completion of this dissertation, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Ganganath Jha, for his advice and constant support throughout. I also extend my gratitude towards all of the teachers Prof. P.Mahaviro, Dr. Man Mohini Kaul, Dr. Shankari Sundararaman in the Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian and South West Pacific Studies for their warm behaviour and for providing valuable advice from time to time.

I am thankful to library staffs in the Central Library of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Library of Chulalongkorn University, Library of Thammasat University and Thai National Library for their assistance.

I also take this opportunity to thank Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) for granting me scholarship to study at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Many thanks to my friends and my classmates especially to Mr. Suwanich Prasomsee who helped and encouraged me to work constantly.

I am forever greatly indebted to my mother and father for their kindness and their love and for everything in my life. My dissertation and my knowledge is sincerely and heartily dedicated to promote Indo-Thai friendship.

*Anong Kowitsthienchai*  
Anong Kowitsthienchai

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# Chapter 1

## Conceptual Framework

The issues of peace and security in Southeast Asia must be considered in view of the Islamic resurgence, secessionist movement and extend interference. The leaders in the region are concerned to cope with various threats to the security system and ASEAN is trying to evolve ways and means to resolve it. As Thailand is centrally located in the region keen to contribute in the regional boom, it wants to share extra burden to solve the problem of security and prosperity. Hence its role in the ARF is considered important and this dissertation is endeavored to examine and explain constraints existing in the region.

The growth of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as an independent forum has opened opportunities for dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern. The ARF aims at making significant contributions to Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) Preventive Diplomacy (PD) and Conflict Resolution in security and operation among countries in the Asia-Pacific Region.

Thailand is an important member of the ARF and has been playing an important role in its nurturing. Under the strategy of using peaceful means for national security, the policy aims at solving conflicts that threatens national security by creating security networks in all parts of the country. Thailand's commitment to working cooperatively with regional countries on security issues. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will retain its position as a key forum for security dialogue. Thailand sees the ARF continuing to make an important contribution to regional security through facilitating frank and comprehensive dialogue amongst member states, including in times of tension, and through Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). The ARF has consolidated its confidence-building role and Thailand would like to work with other members to enable the

ARF to begin developing a preventive diplomacy capacity. The countries of the region will need to remain alert to emerging regional problems and be willing to respond, in addition to drawing on the gradually evolving mechanism of ARF.

The objective of this dissertation is to examine the role of Thailand and ARF to solve the specific issues which challenge and threaten the security in the region. As well as to analyze and suggest the implementation of strategy and policy of Thailand and ARF to prevent and tackle new challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The analysis is guided by the use of the concepts of security, School of thought, ASEAN Way and ASEAN Model, Global Policy, CBMs, PD and Conflict Resolution.

The end of The Cold War has transformed the study of security. This has forced rethink about the basic assumption underlying security studies. At stake are some of the key concepts in security studies in particular and international relations in general which are security, power, conflict and the nation state.

## **The concept of security**

As states by **David Baldwin**, Security has not been an important analytical concept for most security studies scholars. During the Cold War, security studies were confined mostly to scholars interested in military statecraft. If military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue and if military force was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics.<sup>1</sup> The concept of security has undergone a major evolution from collective security to comprehensive security and finally cooperative security. According to one group of scholars, cooperative security is based on three main ideas. First is an attitude towards society which focuses on security with one's neighbors as compared to security against them. Second is the conceptual proclivity to

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<sup>1</sup> David Baldwin, "The Concept of Security", *Review of International Studies*, Vol.23, No.1 (January 1997), p.9.



broaden the meaning of threats to security, which beyond were traditional military threats. Threats to security now include violation of human rights, environmental degradation, irregular population movements, piracy, terrorism, international drug trade, etc. Third is an emphasis on multilateral institutions and processes as a necessary part of the institutional structure for managing regional issues and promoting habits of dialogue and cooperation.<sup>2</sup>

The Post-Cold War Era has probably created some conditions more conducive to peace through regionalism than through internationalization. It would be appropriate to anticipate that the issue of security could be turned from defensive, military aspects focused on national survival in a hostile world to a system of safety for nations as a group at the global level (collective security) or as grouping at the regional level. In this sense, cooperative security is characterized more by attempts to and accommodates other nations in ways that are viewed as more productive proactive.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, there are strong ties between cooperative security and the concept of regionalism. Regionalism is taken to mean a complex set of collective ideas and attitudes shared by foreign policy leaders and perhaps even the citizens of several countries who have a notion of being in a distinctive region comprised of an observable set of states.

Regional arrangements might vary in strength according to the issue area. For example, as an economic grouping, ASEAN has defined the non-communist parts of Southeast Asia since 1967. The decision to admit Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Vietnam into ASEAN shows that by the 1990s, ASEAN now presumes that all members are working towards creation of market economies. In the issue area of trade and economic cooperation, regionalism in Southeast Asia shows a clear set of shared attitudes and ideas. Of

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<sup>2</sup> Amitav Acharya, David B. Dewitt and Carolina Hernandez, *Sustainable Development and Security in Southeast Asia : A Concept Paper*, CANCAPS, Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security, paper number 6 August 1995, (North York, Ontario, Canada, 1995), p.22.

<sup>3</sup> Liselotte Odgaard, "Conflict Control and Crisis Management between China and Southeast Asia", paper presented at the Workshop on ASEAN and the EU in the International Environment, 15-16 February 1999, Bangkok. p.1

Course, ASEAN may not be as distinct a regional actor in the international system as the European Union, for example. There are a number of issue areas where the identity is not truly regional, and traditional military, security issues are the most important. While traditional concept of security makes regionalism difficult to create, the broader conception of cooperative security could make regionalism easier. At the same time, regionalism may not be explicitly constructed by a group of nations; instead it could evolve as a practical matter, especially when the universalism of collective security embodied in the United Nations does not work effectively in practice. <sup>4</sup>

It is also important to see how cooperative security might be linked to peacekeeping. In order to understand peacekeeping or other related operations, one has to realize that peace is not a static condition. It is a complex situation involving dynamic processes. Having peace does not mean being free from conflict or even crisis, but it could be considered as successfully avoiding the worst case scenario of armed offensive action.

One issue to be considered is whether peacekeeping and its military implications could be linked to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution which are political and diplomatic activities. This is important since the spectrum of peacekeeping options involves deploying and using combat forces. This view of the issue could be challenged because peacekeeping can involve a wide range, including peacemaking and peace-building. Both involve non-military activities which include political, diplomatic and humanitarian activities, among others. When forces are deployed in cases such as preventive deployment, peacekeeping itself or even peace enforcement, requires that forces be maneuvered simultaneously with political, diplomatic efforts and other organizational support.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Charles E. Kegley, Jr., "International Peacemaking and Peacekeeping : The Morality of Multilateral Measures", *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol.10 (1996), pp.25-45.

<sup>5</sup> Refer to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York, United Nations, 1992.

Peacekeeping is thus a combination of military and non-military activities, depending on the situation and the intensity of each component. On one side of the spectrum, military operations are the major activities, but this does not exclude other means, including diplomacy. On the other hand, diplomatic means may have no explicit military element, although it is important to remember that many international actions and diplomatic measures require military back up.

When two or more conflicting parties have military strength that is even or significant enough to make them listen to one another, they might then resort to peaceful discussions and deliberations. That is not to say that forceful diplomacy is recommended, but it might serve as a demonstration to actors (states or non-state) that makes them tend to choose the negotiation table. If they know that military choices could be adopted, they might instead accept a common regional view that any threat to regional peace and stability is a shared problem. States would be more ready to cooperate on a multilateral basis to resolve a problem likely to lead to conflict. Political and military leaders might be more open to the logic that security is with neighbors and not against neighbors. This coincides with the first idea of cooperative security developed by **Acharya and his colleagues**.

The second idea of cooperative security relates to the broader concept of security with links to the concept of sustainable development and increasingly sustainable human development.<sup>6</sup>As first defined by **the World Commission on Environment and Development** in 1987, sustainable development means the ability to ensure that development meets the needs of the present without comprising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. As analyzed by **Acharya and his colleagues**, the relationship between security and sustainable development includes the demands for economic development as balanced against choices that could degrade the environment, displace people or

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<sup>6</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York, United Nations, 1994, p.13.

mismanage industrial development. Where governments make the wrong choices, conflict, political instability and insecurity may result.<sup>7</sup>

As defined by **UNDP**, sustainable human development takes development to mean that all individuals must be enabled to enlarge their human capabilities to the fullest and then put those capabilities to the best use in the economic, social, political and cultural fields. Human development must also be sustained so that the same opportunities are available to future generations. Simply put, this means that people are the ends when governments make policies and plans for development people are not the means (or inputs) for national development. By 1999, UNDP added the concept of human security to sustainable human development by arguing that not only should the range of people's choices be widened, but people must make their choices freely and safely and be confident that the opportunities available today will not be lost tomorrow.<sup>8</sup> This is probably now the broadest concept of security, and has almost no resemblance to the traditional concept of merely keeping the national territory and the citizens safe from outside threats from other states.

The logic behind the third idea contained in the concept of cooperative security, according to **Acharya and colleagues**, is that nations are being challenged from above and below such that sovereignty may be at risk or in retreat.<sup>9</sup> In effect, by the 1990s it has become clear that governments at the national level cannot carry out many of their responsibilities towards the citizens. The force of globalization from above is most often cited as the major factor weakening the state and its sovereignty. Development policies and plans can no longer help guarantee employment, for example, when global corporate strategies of transnational corporations and international market conditions determine where investments and jobs are located worldwide. Governments have lost much

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<sup>7</sup> Amitav Acharya, et al, n.2, pp.6-7.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 1999*, New York, United Nations, 1999, p.36.

<sup>9</sup> Amitav Acharya, et al, Reference is also made to John G.Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond : Problematizing Modernity in International Relations" *International Organization*, Vol.47, No. 1, (1991).

of their control over this part of human and economic security, which in turn has effects on other complex parts of national security. According to **Acharaya et al**, the nations cannot meet the challenges by acting alone, then the logic of cooperative security becomes even stronger.<sup>10</sup>

Cooperative security could be considered as the best concept for explaining trends towards regional security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The paradigm of security may be shifting from perceptions of common enemy or security as defense against some other state to a perception of security with neighboring countries against common problems. One important element of the concept of collective security which is becoming clearer is the view that many current national security problems, are actually transnational in nature and not intentionally created by one nation-state to harm another. Such transnational problems include drug trafficking, arms smuggling and piracy. While the important element of cooperative security is the development for habits of dialogue and cooperation among regional states. The integral parts of this process are second track or unofficial security dialogues to discuss various security issues.

This analysis was intended to show how complex and broad the concept of security has become for each nation, such that the government and the military may not be able to adequately play their traditional security roles on a unilateral basis. Neighbors may no longer be seen as threats, but they face more powerful challenges from the global system. In this situation, cooperative security may be one way to face the challenges; because maintaining peace and stability in the region are vital to sustainable development at the national level and sustainable human development for the people in the region. Within this framework, regional peacekeeping through cooperative arrangements takes on added urgency for the countries and the people in Southeast Asia.

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid.,p.23.

## School of Thought

**Realism** is a school of thought that explains international relations in terms of power. The exercise of power by states to each other is sometimes called realpolitik or power politics.<sup>11</sup> The English philosopher **Thomas Hobbes** in the 17<sup>th</sup> century described the free-for-all that exists when government is absent and people seek their own self-interest as a “State of War” or what we would call the “Law of the Jungle”. He believed that states are less vulnerable than individuals in the state of nature, and are therefore able to coexist with other sovereign bodies.<sup>12</sup>

After World War II, **Hans Morganthau** argued that international politics is governed by objective, universal laws based on human nature. The core elements of realism also involve the ‘Three s’s’<sup>13</sup>. First, Statism is the centerpiece of realism, wherein the state is the preeminent actor and all other actors in world politics are of lesser significance. State sovereignty signifies the existence of an independent political community. Second, the primary objective of all states is survival, the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must adhere. Third is self-help, in that no other state can be relied upon to guarantee the survival. Thus, the structure of the system does not permit friendship, trust and honor. Coexistence is achieved through the maintenance of the balance power.

**Neo-Realism** views the international system as a set of interrelated parts, which connect together to form a whole. It defines a domestic system as hierarchy and the international system as anarchy.<sup>14</sup> **Kenneth Waltz** argued that the international system in an anarchic structure, which causes conflict and prevents sovereign states from entering into cooperative agreement, and those

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<sup>11</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, (New York : Harper Collins College Publisher, 1994), pp.47-49.

<sup>12</sup> Timothy Dunne, “Realism,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steven Smith, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.113.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 114-119.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p.122.

states have no power to shape the international system.<sup>15</sup> **Waltz**, systemic functionalist theory of the passive 'military-adaptive' state<sup>16</sup> also explained that states are in an international anarchic system. They are different in power and they look after themselves because there is no world government. In order to survive, states adopt two strategies. First is emulation by imitating the successful practices of leading states, and second is balancing the power of strong states; as a result, the power gap between states reduces.

**International regimes** were identified by **Stephen Krasner** in 1983; he defined a regime as more than a set of rules and higher level than institutions. Regimes are the sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles represent the coherence of theoretical statements about how it works; norms specify the standard behavior and identify the rights and obligations of states; rules operate at a lower level of generality to principal and norm, and they are often designed to reconcile conflicts which may exist between principles and norms; and decision making procedures identify specific prescriptions for behavior.<sup>17</sup> Under concept of regime from **Oran Young** in 1980, regimes are defined as social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specific activities. He also views regimes as structures that may be more-or-less formally articulated and may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizational arrangements.<sup>18</sup>

A regime is a framework of rules, expectations and prescriptions between actors in international relations. This framework is based upon recognition of commonly perceived need to establish cooperative relations based upon the principle of reciprocity. The regime operates within a clearly defined issue area

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.113.

<sup>16</sup> John M.Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, (United Kingdom:Cambridge University Press,2000), pp.24-28.

<sup>17</sup> Richard Little, "International Regimes," in *The Globalization of World Politics : An introduction to International Relations* ed: John Baylis and Steven Smith, (New York: Oxford University Press), p.235.

<sup>18</sup> O.R. Young, "International Regimes," *World Politics*, Vol.32, No.3, (1980): pp.331-56.

and behavior patterns will be regulated through common membership of a special purpose organization.<sup>19</sup>

**Liberal institutionalists** and realists have developed competing approaches to the analysis of regimes. For liberal institutionalist, the need for regimes arises because there is a danger in the anarchic international competitive system that competitive strategies will trump cooperative strategies. Therefore, they focus on ways of deterring competitive strategies that would be a national response within an anarchically structured system. Power may be used by a hegemony to pressure other states to collaborate and conform to a regime.<sup>20</sup>

For realists, by contrast, they link the emergence of regimes to situations where there is a mutual desire to cooperate, but where anarchy generates a problem of coordination. Power is seen to play a crucial role, not as a threat to discipline states caught defecting but in the bargaining process to determine the shape of a regime.

## **ASEAN Way and ASEAN Model**

The ASEAN Way is embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which provides the framework for the grouping. The TAC's principles generally reiterate norms from the UN declarations and other documents on friendly relations and cooperation between states. The ASEAN Way emphasizes:<sup>21</sup>

- 1) Non-use of force in inter-state relations and peaceful settlement of disputes
- 2) Non-interference by one member in the internal affairs of another
- 3) Use of consultations and accommodation
- 4) Use of the principle of consensus

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<sup>19</sup> Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London : Penguin Books Ltd., 1998), p.471.

<sup>20</sup> Richard Little, n.17, p.245.



ASEAN has two security roles, an internal and external one. The internal role is related to its function of inter-member confidence building and preventive diplomacy. On the other hand, the external role refers to establishing a diplomatic community holding more or less a uniform view on Asia-Pacific security.

The internal role of the ASEAN or “ASEAN Way” is a distinct pattern of consultation and consensus building, which has developed within ASEAN as the organization has matured. The flexibility of the “ASEAN Way” has enabled ASEAN to survive by not pushing the organization beyond what its corporate solidarity can endure. Decisions are made within ASEAN on the basis of consensus. If a consensus cannot be reached on an important issue, the ASEAN states agree to disagree and go their separate ways, and ASEAN assumes no corporate position on the issue. ASEAN has also conditioned its members to work around conflicts. While intra-ASEAN issues may not be resolved, they can be put aside so that they do not interface with cooperation on other matters. This non-confrontational approach to corporate decision-making has become the model of diplomacy. This approach of ASEAN has been successful in reducing tensions and solving major conflicts within ASEAN in various periods of time.

While the ASEAN could not alter great power rivalry, it was able to moderate and largely avert intra-ASEAN power conflicts. The founding members of the ASEAN sought from the outset to reduce each member state’s desire to use force against one another in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The ASEAN then became an instrument of membership solidarity against Vietnam in 1975. Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia provided the main focus of ASEAN security related multilateralism until the late 1980s. The ASEAN members agreed to respect mutually each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and not to interface in each other’s affairs. Members also agreed to mediate the

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<sup>21</sup> John Garofano, “Flexibility or Irrelevance : Ways Forward for the ARF,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.21, No.1,(April,1999), p. 256.

peaceful resolution of inter-ASEAN disputes. These norms were codified in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).<sup>22</sup>

Although the TAC principle used in ASEAN has helped to manage conflict among its members, such as the dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah and its role in the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements on Cambodia, there were other unresolved outstanding territorial disputes, which have been referred to the International Court of Justice.<sup>23</sup>

The TAC also set in place norms to moderate great-power rivalry within the ASEAN region. The ground rules for great power involvement in ASEAN affairs were established. ASEAN served as a mechanism that could diffuse the conflicts resulting from the power balancing practices within the area covered by the Association. The ASEAN was able to codify “norms and procedures that were already in use” in the TAC and in other declarations. This approach to the management of great powers on ASEAN terms rather than to project ASEAN norms further afield. ASEAN’s achievement was to create a sub-regional security instead of promoting democracy and human rights security architecture for its members bound by common norms.

Thus, it can be assumed that TAC is not a complete tool for conflict management even within ASEAN itself. ASEAN’s success as a ‘security community’ uses common political will to avoid and manage conflict among members, but the challenge for ASEAN is how to transplant its process of the “ASEAN Way” into the broader and more diversified Asia-Pacific region.<sup>24</sup>

ASEAN members continued to work on a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty that signed in Bangkok on 15 December

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<sup>22</sup> Michael Leifer, *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia*, (London:Routledge,1995), p.238.

<sup>23</sup> John Garofano, n.21, p.257.

<sup>24</sup> Shuan Narine, ASEAN and the ARF : the Limits of the ASEAN Way , *ASIAN Survey* ,Vol.16,No.10, (October ,1997), p.973.

1995.<sup>25</sup>The ARF realized this contribution of Southeast Asian countries toward the security and the maintenance of world peace and stability.

The ARF has no permanent professional staff or Secretariat. ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Way concept to the ARF as an approach to manage security issue in the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF is the venue where participating countries can voice their legitimate interest, based on ASEAN. It is hoped that the constructive dialogue process would build trust, confidence and engage the habits of cooperation and consultation. For the ARF, the ASEAN Way can build a level of comfort among participants before embarking on ambitious initiatives.<sup>26</sup>

Since the creation of ASEAN, it has comprised a diverse set of states with a variety of bilateral tensions. Within ASEAN, security has always been addressed through consultation and dialogue rather than through conventional collective security and formal mechanisms for settling disputes. This is the essence of the so-called ASEAN model.

The ASEAN Model of development is a contested phrase in political economy. For purposes of this analysis, the key predicates of the model, as applied in Southeast Asia, are defined as follows:<sup>27</sup>

- 1) Political stability, in some cases in the context of authoritarian political structures; social harmony; and state-guided economic growth and modernization as a model of development more suitable to Asian countries than Western democratic free-market models;
- 2) Multilateral cooperation, primarily but not exclusively through informal ASEAN mechanisms, as the preferred path to resolution of regional conflicts and disputes;
- 3) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

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<sup>25</sup> Amitav Acharya , *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia :ASEAN and the problem of regional order* , (London : Routledge ,2001), p.:72.

<sup>26</sup> Chairman's Statement in ASEAN Regional Forum, (1995), p.2.

<sup>27</sup> Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia*, (Santa Monica, California, USA : Rand , 2001), p.5

ASEAN model was particularly appropriate for the post-Cold War era in which regional tensions were no longer expressed in a tangible and imminent common threat that called for a countervailing military coalition. Furthermore, a regional arrangement rooted in respect for sovereignty and consensus did not pose high political risks for any member. ASEAN emerged as the most acceptable partner for major powers in the Asia-Pacific. Notwithstanding the rapprochement after the Cold War, suspicions lingered and tensions erupted intermittently among China, the US, Japan and Russia. A regional arrangement led by either one of these powers would surely be viewed with reservation by other major powers as well as by smaller states.

Finally, on practical note, ASEAN maintained cordial relations with these major powers and had an extensive network of contacts with various Asia-Pacific countries through its dialogue partnerships. Following the ASEAN model, the ARF therefore was created not as a collective defense organization. The predictability of relations of the participants visualized is not to be provided through the development of a security arrangement that draws on concepts connective with cooperative security.

## Global Policy

The theoretical framework for global policy studies as explained by **Marvin Soroos** (1990) was a framework for analyzing and evaluating the collective effort of both governmental and non-governmental actors to address global problems in the context of international institutions. These global level problems are determined by how the world is concerned about it and by the number of international institutions involved.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Marvin S.Soroos, "A Theoretical Framework for Global Policy Studies," *International Political Science Review*, Vol.11, No.3, (1990), pp.309-10.

The Global policy process is composed of a series of stages beginning from the identification of a problem, proceeding to policy development and implementation, and finally review and the decision making on whether to continue such policy. Global policies are made through international governmental organizations. Most of these institutions have multiple mechanisms in the policymaking process, including assemblies, councils, standing or ad hoc committees, commissions, sub-commissions and working groups.<sup>29</sup>

International organizations are structures of global politics to produce distinct policies. They are structures for political communication as well as system that constrain the behavior of their members. Actors enter a political process with resources and seek particular goals. **Peter Willetts** suggests that it is possible to move from a state-centric to a pluralist model, in which governments and transnational actors interact with each other bilaterally and multilaterally. However, he says it depends on how wide or narrow the concept of power is.<sup>30</sup>

In order to study the ARF position, the focusing area of study about the ARF is its three development steps that are Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution. These three steps are relevant to the ARF future development.

## **Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)**

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) have various definitions from narrow to broader interpretations about anything that builds confidence, including formal and informal measures, whether unilateral, bilateral or

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp.311-15.

<sup>30</sup> Peter Willetts, "Actors in Global Politics," in *The Globalization of World Politics : An introduction to International Relations* , ed. John Baylis and Steven Smith, (New York : Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.303-305.

multilateral, that address prevent, or resolve uncertainties among states, including military and political elements.<sup>31</sup> In this regard, the ARF has endorsed CBMs, for example, in sharing and voluntary exchange of information and dialogue on security perception by defense representatives, and voluntary circulation among the ARF members of data submitted to the United Nations (UN) Register of Conventional Arms.

The historical development of CBMs in the ARF began in the year 1993.<sup>32</sup> The ASEAN-PMC SOM discussed CBMs concerning information exchange among defense officials, prior notification of military exercises and ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality). In 1994, The Inter-Sessional Group on CBMs (ISG-CBMs) in Australia proposed a multilateral framework for CBMs based on time scales for implementation. In the short term, the ARF would focus on promoting dialogue on security cooperation, enhancing military contacts and exercises, and participating in the UN Conventional Arms Register (UNCAR). For the medium term, the ARF would explore establishing a regional arm register, developing regional security studies, cooperating in information and databases, and publishing a Defense White Paper. In the long term, practices should include notification of military developments and maritime surveillance cooperation.

## **Preventive Diplomacy (PD)**

Preventive Diplomacy (PD) have also slowly developed over the years primarily through Track II efforts. The definition of PD appears to be general consensus that PD is consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between states, to prevent such disputes from

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<sup>31</sup> Ralph A. Cossa, "Asia-Pacific Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security," in *Global Confidence Building : New Tools for Troubled Regions*, ed. Michael Krepon, et al. (London:Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000),p.27.

<sup>32</sup> Tan See Seng, et al., *A New Agenda for The ASEAN Regional Forum*, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2000),pp.27-31.

escalating into armed confrontation, and to prevent such disputes from spreading geographically.<sup>33</sup>

The Principles to guide the practice of PD are necessary to increase understanding of the scope and mechanisms of PD, and to provide consistency and reasonable expectations of the process. Applying PD would be useful to contribute to ASEAN's success and resilience. This includes the non-use of force in interstate relations, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of members, pragmatism, flexibility and consensus, consultation and accommodation.

The evolution of thinking and approaches to PD began in 1995,<sup>34</sup> Track II members held a PD seminar in Seoul. Participants considered whether the definition of PD by the UN Secretary-General in his 1992 Agenda for Peace addressed the needs and concerns of the Asia-Pacific region by focusing on:

- 1) How the ARF members could most usefully define a concept of PD that would provide a workable solution to regional problems
- 2) Whether specific threats to regional peace and stability amenable to PD could be identified
- 3) Whether the seminar could identify specific mechanisms, frameworks and measures which enable efforts at PD

The practice of PD relies on non-coercive diplomatic methods and on peaceful means as described in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. The practice of PD includes the offer of good offices by third parties to a potential conflict or acts as simple as telephone calls. They extend to fact-finding missions and mediation during a crisis. The critical elements of PD are timeliness and

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<sup>33</sup> "Preventive Diplomacy: Charting a Course for the ASEAN Regional Forum," Issues & Insights No.3-02 (Hawaii: Pacific Forum CSIS, 2002), Appendix B.

<sup>34</sup> Tan See Seng, et al., n.32.

trust.<sup>35</sup> PD measures may be taken before and/or during crisis. Pre-Crisis preparation includes:

- 1) Confidence-building efforts: transparency and information exchanges on military exercises and arms purchases
- 2) Institution building: formal and informal institutions for consultation, exchange and interaction among personnel
- 3) Norm building: the idea that accepted codes or norms guide institutions and the relationships they build up
- 4) Early warning system: monitoring of developments in political, military and other areas that may lead to peace or humanitarian actions

The measurements at the onset of a crisis include:

- 1) Fact-finding: reliable collection and analysis of information on the potential conflict situation
- 2) Goodwill mission: a visit by an envoy to express concern of the regional or international community
- 3) Good offices of a third party, or mediation: a neutral third party facilitates negotiation between disputing parties, or in mediation actively manages the crisis between the parties

The ARF practice for PD still remains at the formative stage as given by the United Nations Charter or by other scholars. The PD measures for the ARF are considered for peacetime or pre-crisis times rather than crisis time responses while the Asia-Pacific region is an area that contains many flashpoint and ongoing conflicts and crisis time responses would be needed.<sup>36</sup> PD for crisis time response is more complicated. In this regard, for effective undertaking of PD activities, the ARF should prepare a more institutional structure.

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<sup>35</sup> Amitav Archarya, "Preventive Diplomacy : Issues and Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region," in *Managing Security and Peace in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Bunn Nagara and Cheah, (Malaysia: ISIS 1996).

<sup>36</sup> Tan See Seng, et al., *A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum*, (Singapore : Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002),p.42.



The ARF is composed of both ASEAN and non-ASEAN members who want the ARF to strengthen cooperation for more urgent issues; the US and EU's experiences in building multilateral security institutions would be useful for the ARF in developing and consolidating CBM and PD mechanisms.

## Conflict Resolution

Conflict Resolution is defined as a challenging approach to the analysis of the causes of and solutions to conflict situations. In order to achieve resolution, it is necessary for parties to redefine their relationships, either so they can realize their goals without conflict or redefine their relationships to make their goals no longer conflicting.<sup>37</sup> Peaceful approaches for conflict resolution have been available. Chapter VI of the UN Charter<sup>38</sup> lists comprehensive methods for resolving or moderating disputes, such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement.<sup>39</sup>

The implementation of CBMs and PD measures lead to conflict prevention, and conflict resolution involves finding ways to resolve existing disputes among the ARF members that threaten regional order. As such, the ARF need to develop its structure in order to implement these methods in conflict resolution as the ARF norms, which rely on the ASEAN process, and its characteristically soft integration in the form of forum may not be appropriate to solve disputes and conflict among members.

In conclusion, the evolution of ARF traced back to the conceptual framework as our study. The idea at the first theoretical framework is the concept of security. The different approaches, which influenced to ARF, are collective

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<sup>37</sup> Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, (London : Penguin Books Ltd., 1998), p.94.

<sup>38</sup> Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Allen Moulton, *Managing International Conflict : From Theory to Policy*, (New York : St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997), p.59.

<sup>39</sup> "Survey of Social Science," in *Government & Politics Series*, Vol.1 ed. F.N. Magill, (Pasadena, Cal : Salom Press, 1995), p.399.

security, comprehensive security and cooperative security. One important element of the concept of collective security which is becoming clearer is the view that many current national security problems are actually transnational in nature and not intentionally created by one nation-state to harm another. In part of comprehensive security, the ASEAN members through the concept of national resilience pursue comprehensive security.

While cooperative security attempts to change state behaviors from being competitive with other states to cooperation with those states. It also combines military and non-military components of security. The important element of cooperative security is the development for habits of dialogue and cooperation among regional states. The integral parts of this process are second track or unofficial security dialogues to discuss various security issues.

The main schools of thought have influence upon ARF as the contemporary thought. They are involved in broadening and deepening the concept and the relationship between the definitions of the concept of security. Realism is used to study the background of the ARF and the causes of its establishment. From the analysis, the capabilities of the ARF institutional development will be explained. Its past and present performance and characters in the view of realism will also give directions for the future of ARF position.

Since the establishment of ARF in 1994 it has dealt with security dialogues in Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of the ARF is to promote confidence by encouraging frank discussion on security issues and build an understanding of the different points of view and concerns. The ASEAN has played a key role as a leader among Asian States. The evolution of the ARF and the principles based on the "ASEAN Way," and ASEAN Model of regional security.

The concept of the three development steps of the ARF, we will use them to study the form of the ARF. The ARF is a consultative forum for political and security matters with focus on confidence building and cooperation among its

participants. The forum aims to develop preventive diplomacy to prevent the occurrence and escalation of conflict. When ARF participants are ready, the ARF could evolve into a forum for conflict resolution is the third step. It presently serves as a forum to enable its participants, mainly drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military, to exchange views and seek avenues for cooperation.

ARF has been recognizing the role of Track II in policy debate and analysis, especially the policy recommendations that can be integrated into ARF policy formulation. ARF has acknowledged the important contribution it has made reinforcing in confidence-building measures in the region and thus, moving toward strengthening ties between the Track I and Track II. The expectations of ARF have been growing, and it is placed directly in the political commitment and institutionization of ARF. The expectation have been that without formal institutionization of ARF, it would be difficult for ARF to remain responsive to the increasing number of challenges on the political and security fronts of the region today. In addition to the regimes, global policy structure framework is used to study and recommend the ARF.

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## **Chapter 2**

### **Thailand and ARF Cooperation**

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was formed in July 1994, which resulted from the decision of the ASEAN Leaders at their Fourth Summit in Singapore in 1992. The first ARF Ministerial Meeting was convened in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has given birth to the ARF, which has stimulated multilateral dialogue on regional security issues and has substantially raised the region's profile in global forums, as well.

The ARF is modeled on ASEAN and promotes the TAC as the code of conduct for regional state behavior. It is means to employ techniques of diplomacy developed within ASEAN to the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF includes all of the great powers and provides regional states with an opportunity to build social and political connections and, hopefully, defuse conflict situations before they become dangerous.<sup>1</sup>

### **Evolution of ARF**

The ARF has neither an institutionalized structure nor a secretariat part. As such ASEAN is the repository of all ARF documents and information and provides support to sustain the ARF activities. In this regard, the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee provides the secretarial support and coordinates the ARF activities. The rules of procedure of the ARF meetings are based on prevailing ASEAN norms and practices. Decisions are made through consensus, not by voting.<sup>2</sup>

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Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and Regional Security", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.71, No.2, (summer 1998), p.209.  
<sup>1</sup> ASEAN Secretariat, "The ASEAN Regional Forum : A Concept Paper", <http://www.aseansec.org/3635.html>

The ARF does not have a separate Secretariat and a Secretary General. It is more a forum than an institution with considerable staff who handles ongoing work between ministerial meetings and policy implementation. Main problem being weak, non-continuous institutional presence and lack of an independent administrative structure.

In this regard, they were encouraged by and supported the establishment of an ARF Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat, which would, among others, regularly update the ARF Register of CBMs and serve as the repository of ARF documents.<sup>3</sup>

In November 1989, a new form of multilateral economic structure, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), organized in the form of institution. It reflected regional concerns about developing restrictive trading blocs outside Asia as well as building a sense of self-confidence among Asia-Pacific states. The senior officials of ASEAN and its Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) dialogue partners were intent on creating a regional security structure similar to APEC. The way to a stable regional environment that contributed to economic growth would in turn be used to strengthen the foundations of security. APEC's successful cooperation confirmed ASEAN's belief in the relation between national and regional resilience. "The economic underpinnings of security and the need for continued dialogue and firm links with global and regional partners were also stressed".<sup>4</sup>

The changing of global and regional scenario required a cooperation relation for managing security problems that may occur both in Southeast and North-east Asia that were beyond the capacity of ASEAN alone. Non-ASEAN countries led the idea of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>5</sup> One idea

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<sup>3</sup> Chairman's Statement, Eleventh ARF meeting, Jakarta, 2 July 2004, <http://www.aseansec.org/16245.html>

<sup>4</sup> Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum : Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security.", *Adelphi Paper 302*, (Great Britain : International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p.25.

<sup>5</sup> Tan See Seng, et al., *A new Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum*, (Singapore : Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), p.19.

came from the former Soviet Union under Gorbachev; in 1990, the foreign ministers of Australia and Canada proposed an Asia-Pacific conference on security and cooperation effected by the Cold War experience in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Australian External Minister, Gareth Evans, proposed for the creation of a new region wide security institution based on CSCE. He proposed that 'a future Asia security architecture involving a wholly new institutional process that might be capable of evolving, in Asia just as in Europe, as a framework for addressing and resolving security problem'.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the Canadian notion of 'Cooperative Security' proposed by the External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, called for the establishment of a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (PCCSD) which encouraged a process of confidence-building and dialogue.<sup>7</sup>

In ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (ASEAN-PMC) in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. Japan's Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, forwarded a similar proposal to ASEAN-ISIS, the regional Institutes of Strategic and International Studies; his initiative was an attempt to encourage a new structure of regional relations that would perpetuate U.S. military engagement.<sup>8</sup> Japan feared the U.S. military withdrawal from East Asia might create a competition for regional hegemony, as Tokyo would not be able to distance itself.<sup>9</sup> Nakayama's proposal was received with agreement by ASEAN foreign ministers at that time. ASEAN took the next step in the Fourth Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government at Singapore in January 1992, where Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong took the decision to address security cooperation through 'external dialogue' reasoning that ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters using the ASEAN-PMC.<sup>10</sup> The decision taken at the ASEAN

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<sup>6</sup> Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia : ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London : Routledge, 2001), p.170.

<sup>7</sup> Tan See Seng, et al., n.4, p.19.

<sup>8</sup> Michael Leifer, n.3, p.24.

<sup>9</sup> Yoshihide Soeya, "The Evolution of Japanese Thinking and Policies on Cooperative Security in the 1980s and 1990s," *Australia Journal of International Affairs* , Vol.48, No.1, (May 1994).

<sup>10</sup> "Singapore Declaration of 1992," (ASEAN Head of Government Meeting), Singapore, 27-28 January 1992, p.2.

Heads of Government Meeting at this time reflected a growing regional consensus over the expansion of cooperative security.

Security issue was also discussed during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 1992 and the ASEAN-PMC meeting in Manila. It was the turning point in ASEAN's decision to play a direct and important role in Asia-Pacific security multilateralism under an expanded PMC framework.<sup>11</sup> At the 1992 Singapore Summit, the ASEAN leaders declared "ASEAN shall move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity." In May 1993 at Singapore, the ASEAN-PMC members held a Special Senior Official's Meeting (SOM) to discuss regional security issues. The recommendation of additional membership of China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea to join ASEAN and its dialogue partners within the framework of the ARF which would be held in Bangkok in the following year was approved by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in the same year. Thus, in 1994, ASEAN and its dialogue partners decided to create the ARF which included the ASEAN members; the other Southeast Asian states that were not yet ASEAN members; ASEAN's seven dialogue partners; Papua New Guinea, an ASEAN observer; and China and Russia, the consultative partners of ASEAN. India became a participant on becoming a dialogue partner in 1996. Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) joined the forum in 1999 and 2000 respectively. At the 27<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1994, the Foreign Ministers agreed, "The ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia-Pacific."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Amitave Acharya, n.5, p.171.

<sup>12</sup> ASEAN Secretariat, "ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1994," <http://www.aseansec.org>.

The two main objectives of the ARF were outlined in the First ARF Chairman's Statement in 1994 at Bangkok as follows:<sup>13</sup>

- 1) To foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern;
- 2) To make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and PD in the Asia-Pacific region.

In the Second ARF Meeting at Brunei Darussalam in 1995, participants agreed to set goals for members that:

- 1) The ARF will continue to work closely to ensure and preserve the current environment of peace, prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific.
- 2) The ARF will continue to be a forum for open dialogue and consultation on regional political and security issues, to discuss and reconcile the differing views between ARF participants in order to reduce the risk to security.
- 3) The ARF will recognize the concept of comprehensive security, not only military but also political, economic, social and other issues.

The Concept Paper in 1995 also gives the direction for the ARF's operation, which can be concluded as below:<sup>14</sup>

- 1) The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing an unprecedented period of peace and security, prosperity and economic growth. There is a growing trend in the region to enhance dialogue on political and security cooperation. As these challenges, the ARF is to sustain and enhance these situations.
- 2) This region is a remarkably diverse region. There are cultural, ethnic, religious and historical differences to overcome. Thus, cooperation is not deep-seated in some parts of the region.

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<sup>13</sup> ASEAN Secretariat, "Chairman's Statement," <http://www.aseansec.org>.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.aseansec.org/3635.html>



- 3) ASEAN has a pivotal role in the ARF. It has enhanced regional cooperation, fostered habits of cooperation and encouraged the cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific region.
- 4) A successful ARF requires the active participation and cooperation of all participants. ASEAN must always take into account the interests and concerns of all ARF members.
- 5) The ARF must analyze the key challenges in the region. First, it acknowledges a period of rapid economic growth; second, it recognizes and accepts the different approach to peace and security and tries a consensus approach to security issues; and third, the ARF should gradually defuse unsolved territorial and other difference problems.
- 6) The ARF is required to evolve in three stages:
 

Stage I	: Promotion of CBMs
Stage II	: Development of PD Mechanisms
Stage III	: Development of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
- 7) The ARF needs to develop a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF also should concentrate on enhancing trust and confidence among its participants and thereby foster a regional environment to maintain the peace and prosperity of the region

However, the aims of founding the ARF as stated by Amitav Acharya, imply that, through ASEAN, the ARF was aimed to manage regional order in five ways:<sup>15</sup>

- 1) To offset the strategic uncertainties of the Post-Cold War period
- 2) To engage China in a system of regional order to reduce the threat to regional stability posed by its economic growth and

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<sup>15</sup> Amitav Archarya, *The Quest for Identity : International Relations of Southeast Asia*, (Singapore : Oxford University Press, 2000) , P.147.

- military build-up
- 3) To ensure the continued engagement of the US in regional security affairs
  - 4) To pursue through the ARF to ensure that intra-regional conflict could be managed peacefully through multilateral norms and principle
  - 5) To build a coalition of small power to develop a set of ideas and principles which might persuade the region's major powers with the principal means of regional equilibrium

The Foreign Minister of Australia, Gareth Evans, also defined the key principle of the ARF; that the ARF was the notion entity of cooperative security and an effort to build security with others rather than against them. It can be concluded that the goal of the ARF is to create a “more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia-Pacific region” as defined in the founding statement.<sup>16</sup>

## **The Structure and Operation of the ARF**

It can be concluded that the need for security structure in the Asia-Pacific to manage regional tensions comes from the uncertainty about the American commitment to Asia-Pacific security, the rising power of China, the question about the future role of Japan and the territorial disputes and political tensions in the region. Thus, Southeast Asian countries attempted to create the ARF after the end of the Cold War. ASEAN countries are considered as weak states in a threatening regional environment because of their political differences and unsolved intra-state conflicts. ASEAN has used a method of interaction to reduce their tensions among member states, referred to as the “ASEAN Way” or the

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

“ASEAN process”, involving the use of extensive consultation and consensus building to increase their solidarity.<sup>17</sup>

As the changing global and regional circumstances required a different and wider structure of cooperative relations for managing security problems, ASEAN decided to open security cooperation through external dialogue by using the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC).<sup>18</sup>

## 1.1 Norms

In the First ARF Meeting in Bangkok 1994, members agreed to endorse the main purposes and principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), as a code of conduct for governing relations between members for regional confidence building, PD and political and security cooperation. The TAC's goals are to promote perpetual peace, everlasting unity and cooperation among the people, which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationships.<sup>19</sup> In this regard, the “ASEAN Way” concept is embodied in the TAC. The ASEAN Way is emphasized as the norms and practices of the ARF. It is composed of:

- 1) Non-use of force in inter-state relations and peaceful settlement of disputes
- 2) Non-interference by one member in the internal affairs of another
- 3) Use of consultations and accommodation to emphasize resilience in ASEAN
- 4) Use of the principle of consensus

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<sup>17</sup> Shuan Narine, “ASEAN and the ARF : the Limits of the ASEAN Way,” *Asian Survey* ,Vol.37, No.10, (October, 1997) , p.962.

<sup>18</sup> Michael Leifer, n.3, p.24.

<sup>19</sup> Amitav Acharya, *The Quest for Identity : International Relations of Southeast Asia*, (Singapore : Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 147.

## 1.2 Principles

From the ARF's Second Meeting at Brunei in 1995, we can conclude that the methods and operational approach of the ARF can be cited:

- 1) The main challenge of the ARF is to sustain and enhance peace and prosperity
- 2) A successful ARF requires active, full and equal participation and cooperation by all members, and ASEAN has a pivotal role as a driving force
- 3) The ARF approach should take place in three stages : promotion of confidence building, development of PD and conflict resolution
- 4) The decisions of the ARF are made through consensus after careful and extensive consultations among all participants

## 1.3 Organization of the ARF

The ARF has annual ministerial meetings in an ASEAN capital after the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference. The host country chairs the meeting. The annual meeting will be preceded by an ARF Senior Official Meeting (ARF-SOM), the meeting of ministerial senior officers of country members. The process of the ARF is composed of two tracks.

**1) Track One:** Track One activities consist of three stages beginning with CBMs, moving to PD and then conflict resolution agreements. The ARF government carries out Track One activities and the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee chairs these activities. Proposals made by Track One activities will be submitted to ARF-SOM in the form of Summary Reports, which are prepared by:

- a) The Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG): The Inter-sessional Support Group on CBMs : ISG on CBM. It is concerned with information sharing on dialogue and other activities of the ARF participants on a voluntarily basis including defence policy

publication, enhancing contacts and exchanges among defence staff colleges, and training.

b) The Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM)

-The Inter-sessional Meeting on Search and Rescue (SAR) Coordination and Cooperation: ISM on SAR. This session focuses on increasing facilities and expertise to enhance the capability of SAR

-The Inter-sessional Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): ISM on PKO. It supports UN peacekeeping operations in order to respond effectively to crisis situations. This session also involves the promotion of peacekeeping in the region and regional training programs

-The Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (DR): ISM on DR. This session involves discussion on national and international delivery of disaster relief, and enhancing cooperation in disaster relief among the ARF members.

ISG and ISM are co-chaired by ASEAN and non-ASEAN participants. They are held between ARF-SOMS.

**2) Track Two:** Track Two activities are carried out by strategic institutes and relevant non-governmental organizations such as the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Their work, including the writing of papers on transparency and peacekeeping issues, is discussed at the ARF meetings. The ARF carries out all Track One and Track Two activities through the current chairman of Track One activities, who is the main link between Track One and Track Two activities.

The participants of the ARF are composed of the ASEAN member states, observers and consultative and dialogue partners of ASEAN. All ASEAN members are automatically participants of the ARF. The current participants in the ARF are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russian, Singapore, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam. Applications to participate in the ARF are submitted to the Chairman of the ARF in order to consult with other ARF participants at the SOM and ascertain whether a consensus exists for the admission of the new participant. The Ministers approve actual decisions on participation.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> ASEAN Secretariat, "The Participants in ASEAN Regional Forum," <http://www.aseansec.org/>

## Table of Armed Forces of ARF Participants 2003 – 2004

ARF Members	Total Armed Forces		Army	Navy	Air Force
	Active	Reserves			
Australia	53,650	20,300	16,200	2,100	2,000
Brunei Darussalam	7,000	700	4,900	1,000	1,100
Cambodia	125,000	--	75,000	3,000	2,000
Canada	52,300	36,900	19,300	9,000	13,500
China	2,250,000	500-600,000	1,700,000	250,000	400,000
European Union	1,864,010	3,226,530	1,141,360	256,980	379,100
India	1,325,000	535,000	1,100,000	55,000	170,000
Indonesia	302,000	400,000	230,000	45,000	27,000
Japan	239,900	47,000	148,200 (Ground SDF)	44,400 (Maritime SDF)	45,600 (Air SDF)
DPRK	1,082,000	4,700,000	950,000	46,000	86,000
ROK	686,000	4,500,000	560,000	63,000	63,000
Laos	29,100	--	25,600	600 (Army Marine Section)	3,500
Malaysia	104,000	51,600	80,000	14,000	10,000
Mongolia	8,600	137,000	7,500	--	800
Myanmar	488,000	--	350,000	16,000	15,000
New Zealand	8,610	10,800	4,430	1,980	2,200
Pakistan	620,000	513,000	550,000	25,000	45,000
Papua New Guinea	3,100	--	2,500	400	200
Philippines	106,000	131,000	66,000	24,000	16,000
Russia	960,600	20,000,000	321,000	155,000	184,600
Singapore	72,500	312,500	50,000	9,000	13,500
Thailand	314,200	200,000	190,000	79,200	45,000
United States	1,427,000	1,237,700	485,000	400,000	367,600
Viet Nam	484,000	3-4,000,000	412,000	42,000	30,000
<b>ARF Total (Active)</b>	<b>12,612,570</b>				
<b>World Total (Active)</b>	<b>20,370,600</b>				
<b>ARF Shares of World Total</b>	<b>62%</b>				

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 2003-2004*.

## The ARF Meetings

To date, there are eleven ARF meetings. The first one was held in 1994 and the eleventh ARF Meeting was held in the year 2004. The Foreign Ministers and Senior Officials of ARF countries meet on an annual basis, usually in July and May in the country that serves as the ARF Chairman. After the ARF Ministerial Meeting, a Chairman's statement is issued to reflect the results of the meeting. The ARF Chair is given to the ASEAN country that holds the position of the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC). The ARF Chairman rotates among ASEAN countries alphabetically on a yearly basis.

The First ARF Meeting was composed of 6 ASEAN countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei and Thailand; and their counterparts from ASEAN's seven Dialogue Partners: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States and the European Union (EU); Consultative Partners China and Russia; and ASEAN Observers Laos, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam. By the Second Meeting, Vietnam had been added to ASEAN, and Cambodia was a new member, so the Meeting was composed of 18 countries and the EU. Myanmar and India were added as new ARF members in the Third Meeting, Mongolia was added in the Sixth Meeting and the DPRK in the Seventh Meeting. Pakistan joined the ARF process as its 24<sup>th</sup> participant in July 2004. Now, the ARF is composed of 24 countries and the EU.

From the First to the Eleventh ARF, the meetings involved discussions about many issues, mainly focusing on their process and working principles, existing performance about peace and security and particular regional issues, including the situations in Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor, South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula. As well as in the challenging issues are Transnational Crime, Economic Security, Environmental Security, terrorism and so on. These can be summarized into the following Table:



## ARF Meetings

ARF Meeting	Date	Place
1	25 July 1994	Bangkok, Thailand
2	1 August 1995	Brunei Darulsalam
3	23 July 1996	Jakarta, Indonesia
4	27 July 1997	Subang Jaya, Malaysia
5	27 July 1998	Manila, Philippines
6	26 July 1999	Singapore
7	27 July 2000	Bangkok, Thailand
8	25 July 2001	Hanoi, Vietnam
9	31 July 2002	Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei
10	18 July 2003	Phnom Penh, Cambodia
11	2 July 2004	Jakarta, Indonesia

The process of the ARF is continually discussed in all meetings. The First Meeting of the ARF was the first time representatives from states in the Asia-Pacific region came together to discuss political and security cooperation issues and they realized the importance of peace, security and cooperation as working principles. It was agreed that the ARF could enable countries in the Asia-Pacific region to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues and would contribute to confidence-building and PD in the Asia-Pacific region. The Meetings were a place for participants to exchange their ideas on the current political and security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. They recognized the importance of regional security and believed that the ARF could enable countries in the Asia-Pacific region foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues. They agreed to convene the ARF on an annual basis and use the purpose and principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as code of conduct in order to govern

the relations between states and the difference in diplomatic instruments for regional CBMs, PD and political security cooperation.<sup>21</sup>

The Second ARF Meeting was the time that ASEAN produced a document to the regional forum namely, A Concept Paper. The adoption of proposals in the context of the Concept Paper included goals and expectations, method and approach, participation, implementation of ideas and working process of the ARF. It identified confidence-and security-building nuclear nonproliferation, cooperation in peacekeeping, exchange of unclassified military information, maritime security issues, and preventive diplomacy. An Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on confidence building measures was set up. Malaysia and Canada were tasked to chair the Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM) on peacekeeping operations while Singapore organized a seminar on search and rescue coordination and cooperation. Moreover, criteria for new participants, concerning commitment, relevance, gradual expansion and consultations, were adopted in the Third Meeting.<sup>22</sup>

The Third Meeting in 1996, the ARF drew up the criteria for membership of the organization. The ARF adopted the following criteria for participation:<sup>23</sup>

- Commitment – All new participants, which must be Sovereign State, must subscribe to, and work cooperatively to help achieve the ARF key goals. Prior to their admission, all new participants should agree to be respectful and abide by the decisions and statements already made by the ARF. All ASEAN members are automatically participants of ARF.
- Relevance – A State should be admitted only if it can be demonstrated that it has an impact on the peace and security of the “geographical footprint” in terms of membership which covers Northeast, Southeast and Oceania of key ARF activities.

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<sup>21</sup> Chairman's Statement, First ARF meeting, Bangkok , 25 July 1994, <http://www.aseansec.org/3621.html>

<sup>22</sup> Chairman's Statement, Second ARF meeting, Brunei Darussalam , 1 August 1995, <http://www.aseansec.org/3617.html>

<sup>23</sup> Chairman's Statement, Third ARF meeting, Jakarta , 23 July 1996, <http://www.aseansec.org/3612.html>

- Gradual expansion – Efforts must be made to keep the number of participants at a manageable level to ensure the effectiveness of the ARF.
- Consultations – All applications for participation should be submitted to the Chairman of the ARF, who will consult all the other ARF participants at the Senior Official Meeting and ascertain whether a consensus exists for the admission of the new participant. The Ministers will approve actual decisions on participation.

The participants were aware of the diversity among members and need to focus on confidence building. In the following year, the working scope of the ARF was noted at the Fourth Meeting that the ARF had developed into a forum for a multilateral security dialogue and cooperation for discussion and making decisions by consensus. The Ministers emphasized that an approach to nuclear nonproliferation, which is universal, comprehensive, and non-discriminatory, was urgently needed if the international community was to achieve the objective of comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation. The Ministers reiterated their determination to continue to contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and urged the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to pursue vigorously negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament with the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. At the same time, the ARF also enhanced trust, promoted greater transparency and maintained an evolutionary approach. It enhanced close cooperation and assistance by countries in Southeast Asia in promoting a peaceful community of nations, including ASEAN's efforts at constructive engagement with Myanmar and the expansion of positive relations among the Asia-Pacific major countries, i.e. China, Japan, Russia and the United States.<sup>24</sup>

The Ministers were still satisfied with the strong foundation of trust and transparency among members in order to develop the ARF as an important

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<sup>24</sup> Chairman's Statement, Fourth ARF meeting, Subang Jaya , 27 July 1997, <http://www.aseansec.org/3602.html>

forum for dialogue on political and security issue. The Ministers called on all States to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and urged the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) to intensify and complete its work as soon as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference. They asked the countries concerned to refrain from undertaking weapons development programs, and to prevent any transfer of nuclear weapon-related materials, technology, and equipment to third countries. In the interest of peace and security in the region, the Ministers called on the countries concerned to resolve their dispute and security concerns through peaceful dialogue. However, they agreed to a step-by-step development and decision-making approach through consensus and ASEAN contributed the primary driving force. Moreover, at this Fifth Meeting, defense and military officials were welcomed to participate in the Meeting for greater interaction at appropriate levels in all relevant ARF activities and afterwards, this idea was continually emphasized in all later meetings.<sup>25</sup>

At the Sixth Meeting, there appears to be some concern on the future directions of ARF. Some members felt that the process was moving too slowly. These sentiments were probably related to the Asian Financial Crisis and the lack of new initiatives from the forum at that time. The Meeting also noted that the usefulness of TAC as a key instrument for strengthening regional security. For ASEAN, getting the ARF members to consider acceding to the TAC as a region wide code of conduct was an important step. The Ministers called on all States to accede to the NPT and CTBT, urged the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to immediately begin and swiftly conclude Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty(FMCT) negotiations, to require States to exercise restraint in the development, testing, and export of ballistic missiles and other Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

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<sup>25</sup> Chairman's Statement, Fifth ARF meeting, Manila , 27 July 1998, <http://www.aseansec.org/3595.html>

delivery means, and called for speedy and successful conclusion to the negotiations on a verification protocol for the BTWC.<sup>26</sup>

The participation of the major powers and the improvement of relationships with them were recognized in the ARF Meetings as an important tool to strengthen and stabilize regional security in all aspects. They enhanced the role of the ARF Chair in expanding relationships with external parties. In the Seventh Meeting, they appreciated the Chair from Thailand who had initiated informal contact with the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe (OSCE) as well as the Chair from Vietnam in the Eighth Meeting. In this meeting, the ministers welcomed the participation for the first time of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) at the Seventh ARF Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok. The Ministers reaffirmed the decision taken at the Fifth ARF Meeting, which should focus on consolidating the process of dialogue and cooperation within the Asia Pacific region. The Ministers emphasized the importance of CBMs to the overall ARF process and agreed that such efforts be intensified. They also welcomed the progress in the implementation of the proposals in the overlap between CBMs and PD as well as the continued efforts to develop concepts and principles of PD applicable to the ARF context. In this regard, the Ministers agreed that these developments had enhanced the continuity and relevance of the ARF process. The Ministers discussed issues pertaining to transnational crime especially the issues of piracy, illegal migration, including trafficking in small arms. They recognized that these transnational issues not only could pose challenges to regional peace and stability, but also impair individual countries' efforts in promoting national economic development and improving people's livelihood. Hence, cooperative approaches were necessary to deal with these problems. They also noted the seriousness of the implications of drug production and trafficking as well as the need to address other issues such as money laundering, corruption, and computer crimes. The Ministers underlined the importance of greater

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<sup>26</sup> Chairman's Statement, Sixth ARF meeting, Singapore , 26 July 1999, <http://www.aseansec.org/3587.html>

bilateral, regional, and international cooperative efforts in this regard and expressed support for the ongoing negotiations on the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, as well as the convening of the International Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001. They nonetheless noted that the extent of the impact of transnational crime problems differs across regions and, in this context, the Ministers agreed that the ARF should continue to address transnational issues, which affected security of the Asia-Pacific region, and explore how the ARF could increase regional surveillance awareness and complement the work undertaken in other existing fora. In addition to the ARF working process, the Ministers also encouraged the participation of defence and military officials in the ARF and the contribution of active interaction among them toward the promotion of mutual understanding and transparency. Moreover, the ARF Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs) was established to be used by the ARF members in the Seventh Meeting on a voluntary basis and the Paper on the Terms of Reference for ARF Experts/Eminent Persons was adopted the year after.<sup>27</sup>

The Eighth ARF meeting in Hanoi on 25 July 2001, there was consensus on the need to move towards the second stage of preventive diplomacy while recognizing that there was some overlap with the first stage of confidence building. The meeting reiterated the importance of confidence building as the primary focus of the ARF and the need to move at a pace comfortable to all. The Ministers noted that the situation in Southeast Asia on the whole has been peaceful and stable. They exchanged views on the recent developments in the South China Sea and welcomed the progress in the consultations between ASEAN and China to develop a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The Ministers encouraged self-restraint by all countries concerned and the promotion of CBMs in this area, and welcomed the commitment of the countries concerned to resolve disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the recognized principles of

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<sup>27</sup> Chairman's Statement, Seventh ARF meeting, Bangkok, 25 July 2000, <http://www.aseansec.org/3576.html>

international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as to ensure the freedom of navigation in the area. The Ministers welcomed the progress toward the implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty and the NWS regarding the latter's accession to the Protocol to the Treaty. The Ministers discussed issues relating to proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery as well as the implications of the missile defense systems. They noted expressions of support for the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime and called on all States to sign and ratify the CTBT and to accede to the NPT, as well as urged all States to maintain existing moratoria on nuclear testing.<sup>28</sup>

The 9<sup>th</sup> Meeting agreed on the concept and principle of PD adopted at the 8<sup>th</sup> ARF Meeting and regarded it as a major achievement in the evolution of the ARF. At the meeting, the Ministers expressed satisfaction with the ARF's progress and addressed administrative concerns before turning to security-related issues. They discussed the impact of 11 September on the security environment and encouraged accession to or ratification of relevant Conventions and Protocols relating to terrorism, committing to "strengthen bilateral, regional and international cooperation in combating terrorism." The Ministers recognized their threat to regional security interests and stressed the importance of multilateral cooperation in achieving arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. The Ministers also addressed the preparations for the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), agreeing that the NPT is the "cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime". Moreover, they decided that ISG would continue to discuss PD as mandated by the ARF Ministers. They agreed about the challenge of terrorism dominated the ISG's agenda discussion on PD which would be further discussed. The Meeting took note of the Workshop on PD co-hosted by CSCAP and the Institute for International Relation of Vietnam, which would be a good source of

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<sup>28</sup> Chairman's Statement, Eighth ARF meeting, Hanoi, 25 July 2001, <http://www.aseansec.org/3560.html>

reference for ISG-CBMs deliberation on PD in the future.<sup>29</sup> In the 10<sup>th</sup> Meeting, regarding the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the Ministers urged the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) to resume its cooperation with the IAEA and to reverse its decision to withdraw from the NPT. They supported the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner for the sake of durable peace and security in the region. They were of the view that the ARF has played a useful and constructive role and agreed to support further efforts by the ARF Chair to help ease tensions on the Peninsula. In this meeting, the Ministers placed important on implementing on the concept of PD. They considered that the ARF's work on PD was being advanced through the action that it had taken to address the situation on the Korean Peninsula and to enhance confidence and cooperation in addressing common security threats, including international terrorism, transnational crime, piracy and other maritime crime, and the support given to the ARF Chairman in carrying out the enhanced role of the Chair.<sup>30</sup>

In the 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting, the Ministers stressed the importance of the adopted Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy in guiding the ARF in its actions and works in Preventive Diplomacy (PD) thus far, noting that some of the concepts have been translated into actions. The Ministers requested the ISG on CBMs to continue its efforts in discussing PD. In this regard, the Ministers underlined that the present work in tackling terrorism represents a milestone in the ARF's development of a preventive role. In this meeting, they discussed the various security challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region, specifically addressing issues such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the need to take steps towards its denuclearization there, and commenting positively on the 23-26 June Six Party Talks in Beijing. Other regional concerns addressed included the transfer of sovereignty and continued violence in Iraq. The Ministers also adopted a Statement on Strengthening Transport Security Against International

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<sup>29</sup> Chairman's Statement, Ninth ARF meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, 31 July 2002, <http://www.aseansec.org/12000.html>

<sup>30</sup> Chairman's Statement, Tenth ARF meeting, Phnom Penh, 18 June 2003, <http://www.aseansec.org/14845.html>



Terrorism, an action recommended at the Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, which was held on 30-31 March in Manila.

The paper on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair, they agreed to extend further cooperation and support for the ARF Chair in carrying out the mandates. In this regard, they were encouraged by and supported the establishment of an ARF Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat, which would, among others, regularly update the ARF Register of CBMs and serve as the repository of ARF documents.<sup>31</sup>

In conclusion, the ARF works for the security of the Asia-Pacific region by focusing on peace building and peacemaking efforts. Working principles for all members rely on equal participation and cooperation of all participants. The ARF will have to take into consideration both the views of all the participants and the special needs and interests of the ASEAN states. The Ministers in the ARF meetings remarked the working process of the ARF as a key forum for participating countries to address, actively and constructively on key political security issues. A leading role for ASEAN in the ARF process was still supported as well as the enhancing the role of the ARF chair. An emphasis on decision by consensus and on the basis of non-interference into one another's internal affairs and the principle of consultative and cooperative forum were reaffirmed in every later Meeting.

## **Thailand's Role in ARF**

Following the 11 September 2001 attack on the US, the role of the ARF, as the only forum in the region to discuss political and security issues, in combating terrorism became more urgent and vital. ARF participants agreed that ASEAN

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<sup>31</sup> Chairman's Statement, Eleventh ARF meeting, Jakarta, 2 July 2004, <http://www.aseansec.org/16245.html>

countries would be in the driver's seat of the ARF. Thailand served as the ARF Chairman in 1994 and 2000.

During the sessional years 1996-1997 and 1997-1998, Thailand together with New Zealand served as Co-Chairman of the Inter-sessional Meetings on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) on 19-20 February 1997 in Wellington and on 18-20 February 1998 in Bangkok. Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, opened the Meeting. He commended the activities of the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief, noting that they contributed towards confidence-building, and constituted a concrete manifestation of the ARF countries' will to cooperate on matters of common interest affecting the comprehensive security of states. He expressed the hope that ARF activities in this field could complement those of ASEAN and other existing bodies and avoid duplication so as to provide an impetus for a more structured framework for formulating regional responses to disasters. He was confident that the activities of the ISM-DR would serve to strengthen the institutional vitality of the ARF process as well as assist in the fulfillment of the objectives of the United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 1990-2000 (IDNDR).<sup>32</sup>

All participants agreed on the importance of discussion of disaster relief as an aspect of comprehensive security, and a confidence building measure for the ARF. Country presentations underlined the enormous capacity of natural disasters to damage local economies and social stability and hence the security of states. In addition, participants recognized that major natural disasters do not respect political boundaries, but are a common problem for all states of the region. Partnership and cooperation among states are essential in dealing with disasters.

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<sup>32</sup> <http://www.aseansec.org/3596.html>

The Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG on CBMS), Thailand and the United States served as the Co-Chairmen and convened meetings in Honolulu on 4-6 November 1998 and in Bangkok on 3-5 March 1999. Thailand highlighted ASEAN's commitment to strengthening its engagement with those outside the region and the priority it attached to making ASEAN more "people-oriented." Thailand also noted the collective effort within ASEAN and on the bilateral level to enhance border cooperation, thus contributing to overall peace and security in the region. As well as the Workshop on Approaches to Training for Peacekeeping on 19-23 October 1998 was held in Dublin where Thailand held the post of Co-Chairmen along with the Republic of Ireland, representing European Union.<sup>33</sup>

During the sessional years 1999-2000, Thailand presented a report on the informal meetings of Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan of Thailand, who was then ARF Chairman, had with the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. They agreed that such a role for the ARF Chairman in liaising with external parties should be further encouraged as it was carried out informally with prior consultation with all ARF members obtaining their consent. At the same time, the participants noted that there were many complexities if the ARF is to reach consensus on principles and procedures for enhanced roles for the ARF Chairman in good offices and coordination in between ARF meetings and agreed to further discuss these issues at the 2nd ISG meeting in Singapore. In this Meeting, Thailand successfully persuaded the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the ARF.

For the sessional years 2001-2002, Thailand hosted the 2<sup>nd</sup> Seminar on Law of the Armed Conflict on 7-10 August 2001. Thailand and Australia invited all participants of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) met in Bangkok on 17-19

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<sup>33</sup> <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/4380.html>

April 2002 in the Workshop on Prevention of Terrorism to consider how the ARF could enhance, cooperation to counter terrorism.

The ARF Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy was held on 16-17 March 2004 in Tokyo, co-chaired by Japan and Thailand. Thailand presented report on how to enhance the role of the ARF Chair. The Workshop emphasized the importance of achieving common understanding of and recognizing the importance of “New Threats”, with focus on transnational problems, *inter alia*, international terrorism, illicit trafficking in arms, drugs and persons, and diseases such as HIV/AIDS, piracy and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which require global and regional cooperation and responses. They agreed on necessity to promote international cooperation such as information sharing and networking among executive branches of governments, law enforcement agencies and customs, in addition to traditional diplomatic efforts, as well as increase public awareness and the role of civil society, The Workshop explored ways to reflect in the ARF process the existing and new initiatives in the areas of counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and other regional security cooperation efforts to respond to new threats arising from intense domestic instability.<sup>34</sup>

Thailand and Canada were Hosts in the Third ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM CT -TC) on 6-8 April 2005 in Bangkok. This Meeting is a continuation of the First and the Second Meeting held on 21-22 March 2003 in Malaysia and 30-31 March 2004 in Philippines.

Some of the key recommendations of the meeting were:

1. To deliberate more on timely and systematic sharing of information and intelligence, including through expanding bilateral cooperation

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<sup>34</sup>[http:// www.aseansec.org/16338.html](http://www.aseansec.org/16338.html)

2. To work towards implementation of document security in accordance with the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization
3. To consider collaboration among law enforcement agencies and encourage mutual legal assistance among ARF participants
4. To strengthen cooperation on capacity building through training and technical assistance on threat recognition and operation skills

Participants identified three key areas are interagency coordination in each country, the need for enhanced international cooperation, and capacity building in order to disrupt the movement of terrorists without restricting the flow of travelers that are a vital part of international economic, political, and cultural links. Members agreed that September 11th was a catalyst for change, as it highlighted the threat of terrorism poses to all ARF members. It was noted that transnational criminals seek to exploit the gaps between countries, jurisdictions, and bureaucracies. Participants were of the view that because terrorists were able to exploit these weaknesses, there is a need for broad and comprehensive cooperation and coordination.

Sharing immigration data is one of the most important examples of interagency coordination. Because of the diversity of terrorist operations - moving money, manpower and materiel through banks, borders and brokers - participants agreed that each country's agencies must work closely together. Border security authorities and domestic law enforcement and immigration agencies must share information about visas, and the use - or abuse - of those visas by visitors while in a given country. Visa regimes are only as good as their enforcement, and there is a continuing need to ensure that visitors do not exceed the activities authorized by their visas. It is also important to be able to record when the individual has left the country. Several members voiced the opinion that there must also be enhanced cooperation between the military and police departments; especially in the area of information sharing. They suggested ways

to improve border security capacity, such as installing a system linking all ports of entry with online data and installing machine-readable passport systems.<sup>35</sup>

They were in agreement that the nature of terrorism has evolved through the years and the world has seen how terrorists have adapted to new situations including the use of information technology to perpetrate attacks against soft civilian targets. Some participants shared their own experiences as victims of terrorist attacks. It was shown that coordinated efforts among government agencies can be effective in preventing attacks and mitigating their impacts. Such strategies resulted in the apprehension and eventual conviction of many of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism in recent years. It was recognized that a strong international regime against terrorism is essential.

Participants were of the view that domestic efforts to support internationally agreed security standards such as the ISPS Code and various UN security conventions and protocols as well as the signing of bilateral agreements on cross-border terrorism and other forms of regional cooperation arrangements, should be pursued by individual countries. Participants also cited the efforts of their respective governments to deal with terrorism in terms of establishing new institutions and/or strengthening existing ones to coordinate their overall national counter- terrorism efforts as well as enacting new legislation to enable such institutions to carry out their respective mandates. It was recommended that both domestic and international counter-terrorism measures must complement each other. The Meeting emphasized the need to find an appropriate balance between improving transport security while ensuring the smooth flow of goods and people, as well as the need to avoid higher and more burdensome costs.

The role of Thailand on ARF stage became more remarkable such as in the First and the Seventh Meeting, Thailand served as the ARF Chairman. In the Seventh Meeting, Thailand welcomed the DPRK to join and participate in the

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<sup>35</sup> <http://www.aseansec.org/15133.html>

Meeting and emphasized the importance of CBMs to the overall ARF process and agreed that such efforts be intensified. And also welcomed the progress in the implementation of the proposals in the overlap between CBMs and PD as well as the continued efforts to develop concepts and principles of PD applicable to the ARF context. In this regard, the Ministers agreed that these developments had enhanced the continuity and relevance of the ARF process.

In addition, Thailand played an important role as coordinator to compromise in the region by proposing ARF to hold the informal meeting and facilitate in dialogue, exchange and cooperation in the region. Thailand as a pioneer member in ARF has been a consistently strong supporter of and contributor to the ARF's operational activities to the maintenance of regional security - pointer of outstanding successes of Thailand's Role in the ARF over decade.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Thailand and ARF on Specific Regional Issues**

International conditions after cold war have changed to stability focusing on the traditional security in order to maintain sovereignty and integration of land as the first thing to do. Economic and social issues – non-traditional security - are the second one. Now, it turns out that the attention was paid to economic benefits. The political issue has lost its importance. The attention is still on the importance of sovereignty and integration of land. Danger occurring now is different from that of the cold war period and in that there were intense limitations of geography. Besides, the influence from outside which produce changes, in that linkage between Thai economy and global economic influence and globalization have played an important role making political issues and stability different from the former one. New threat is concerned with instability affecting human security.

Countries including Thailand and those of Asian group cannot escape from the impact arising from the change of these international conditions. Therefore, Thailand and Asian countries should adapt and resolve problems through ASEAN Regional Forum. This chapter handles study of political issues like instability that affect Southeast Asian region including problems of Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor, Korean Peninsula, and on South China Sea. When considering the threat impact on Thailand and ASEAN and in that how does it going; how ARF can solve these problems; and how Thailand take part in the affairs of the ARF.



## Cambodia



In December of 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and deposed the governing Khmer Rouge. In taking this action, Vietnam violated one of the central tenets of the TAC : the principle that states would not use force to settle their disputes. Its behavior was a direct challenge to the principles of regional interaction that ASEAN claimed to represent. For the next twelve years, removing Vietnam from Cambodia became the central focus of ASEAN's international diplomacy and internal activities, and the most important test of its ability to manage its regional security environment.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict" *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.46, No.2 (winter 1993), pp.439-67.

ASEAN opposed the Vietnamese action through diplomatic initiatives. It rallied opposition to Vietnam's actions in the United Nations and was largely successful in denying international recognition to the new Cambodian government. It was effective in cutting Vietnam off from economic assistance, especially foreign aid. It created the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) as an alternative to the Vietnamese-appointed regime in Cambodia. In the late 1980s, ASEAN sponsored the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs), which contributed significantly to building the diplomatic basis for the eventual settlement of the Cambodian conflict. Ultimately, however, the conflict was ended by the decline of the cold war and through the intervention of the great powers.<sup>2</sup>

Thailand relies on ASEAN in resolving problems until the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989. The Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia was signed at the end of the second sitting of the Paris conference on October 23, 1991.<sup>3</sup> leading to the election in Cambodia in May 1993.<sup>4</sup> Results of election gave the mandate for the government to rule the country with the parties namely: United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), in which Ranariddh was the leader who became the first prime minister and the leader of CPP (Cambodian People's Party) .Hun Sen was the second prime minister.

Conflict within government between two component parties had been on, all the time. Besides, the tension of Khmer Rouge caused separation within Cambodian Government due to the political strategy of Ranariddh, the first prime minister who want Khmer Rouge to be in his side in order to balance the military power of Hun Sen and hope for the victory in the general election at the

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<sup>2</sup> Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and Regional Security", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.71, No.2, (summer 1998), p.205.

<sup>3</sup> Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order*, (London: Routledge, 2001), p.95.

<sup>4</sup> Sorpong Peou, "Cambodia in 1997: Back to Square One?", *Asian Survey*, Vol.38, No.1, (January 1998), p.69.

end of 1998. At the same time, Hun Sen has tried to obstruct the building of political base for Ranariddh. Conflict between Hun Sen and Ranariddh escalated to such an extent that forces of both sides have to fight since July 4, 1997 because there was warning that the forces of Hun Sen would catch Ranariddh and pronounce that Hun Sen was in control of power. Hun Sen confirmed in July 7, 1997 that he was still the legitimate prime minister and refused the request made by King Narodom Sihanouk who wanted both Hun Sen and Ranariddh to meet him for consultation in Beijing in order to solve the conflict to obtain outside recognition for Cambodia government and at the same time accepting Ranariddh and Khmer Rouge.<sup>5</sup>

The reaction from other countries to the situation in Cambodia was that they were worried about the problem and tried to request for resolving problem peacefully. The United States supported Hun Sen who used forces to abolish power of Ranariddh because the United States fully opposed the use of force in changing election results in 1993 and the use of force by Hun Sen amounting to violation of the Paris Agreement. However, the United States has still not considered the canceling of aid provided to Cambodia in spite of wanting free and fair election in 1998.<sup>6</sup>

Conflict that took place in Cambodia affected the membership of Cambodia in ASEAN as well. The ASEAN requested Hun Sen and Ranariddh to solve conflict peacefully and follow the Paris Agreements of 1991. And in the conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers at Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia in July 10, 1997, had a special agenda to review the possibility of admitting Cambodia as the ASEAN member for which joint statement focusing on the principle of intervention in the enterprises of other countries were made. Admitting Laos and

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<sup>5</sup> U.N. Centre for Human Rights, "Memorandum to the Royal Government of Cambodia : Evidence of Summary Executions, Torture and Missing Persons Since 2-7 July 1997," Phnom Penh, August 21, 1997.

<sup>6</sup> Taylor & Francis Group, *The Far East and Australasia 2003*, 34<sup>th</sup> Edition, (London : Europa Publications, 2002), pp. 231-40.

Myanmar still was in the same schedule till the end of July, 1997 during which there was a conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers.

However, attempts of several countries to pressure Hun Sen failed. Hun Sen told the press in July 14, 1997 that if ASEAN still interfered with internal affairs of Cambodia, he would withdraw from being member of ASEAN. He warned the major powers not to take aid matter to control and discipline the countries the way they want. Hun Sen wanted to bring Ranariddh to courts by issuing warrant returnable throughout the world. At the same time, he had tried to create political discipline by announcing general election minus date and other relevant details. It stated that the election would be fair and free. Political democracy would mean having many parties and candidates as well as the other interested groups, the right to express political opinion unhindered.<sup>7</sup>

Later, in May 5, 1998, Hun Sen said that he agreed to talk with Ranariddh. This is the first time within 10 months Opposition turned down the conference proposal in order to solve election problem through pressure tactics within the confines of legal framework. Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and Ranariddh's United National Front for Independent Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) decided to form a government with Hun Sen at the helm as its prime minister. There was also a Senate being inaugurated in March 1999 comprising half its members from three key parties namely: CPP, FUNCINPEC and the official Opposition, the Sam Rainsy Party.<sup>8</sup>

For resolving Cambodian conflict, Thailand relied on the ASEAN framework in conducting negotiations and dealings from the beginning. It can be seen from the suggestions of Thailand for setting up the coordination group of ASEAN calling "ASEAN Troika" by the third unofficial ASEAN summit conference in Manila in November, 1998 in order to resolve key problems

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<sup>7</sup> Amitav Acharya , n.3 , pp.103-127.

<sup>8</sup> Irene Langran, "Cambodia in 1999 : Year of Hope," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 55, No.1, (January/February 2000), p.26.

affecting region. The conference has approved the setting up of ASEAN Troika consisting of foreign ministers with powers to mediate and give suggestion to the ASEAN that would set the mechanism to help promote peace and security in this region.

In resolving conflict situation of Cambodia within ASEAN, ASEAN has assigned Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia to play a key role as the ASEAN Troika. Thailand did the job of harmonizing every side in Cambodian politics and helping one another. In May 6 – 7, 1998, Hun Sen, the second Prime Minister, had visited Thailand on an invitation from Thai Prime Minister, Chuan Leekpai. He consulted on various matters on the procedure of harmony of Cambodia. In February 12, 1998., The Thai prime minister recommended Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC to start fighting for democracy in Cambodia. Meeting between Chuan and the Cambodia leader helped in resolving political crisis in Cambodia at that time, leading to the election that set up new Cambodian government.

The results of the maneuvers of Thailand helped political development in Cambodia greatly till Cambodian general elections being held in July 26, 1998 for which Thailand sent 65 members forming part of the international observers for the event. Mr. Sukhumbhan Paribatra, the Deputy of Foreign Minister of Thailand, had visited King Narodom Sihanouk at Siem Riep and also met Ranariddh at Phnom Penh between 13 – 14 of September, 1998. Being the representative of the prime minister and his group representing Cambodia in coordination, reduced the conflict situation between various sides of Cambodia preventing the worsening of the political crisis arising out of July election, 1998 that made Cambodia set up a government. After the political conflict situation in Cambodia being ended, the ASEAN made preparations to induct Cambodia as ASEAN member officially in April 30, 1999 at Hanoi, Vietnam.

Cambodia was admitted to the ARF at the second ARF Meeting held in Brunei Darussalam on August 1, 1995. Since then, Cambodia has actively

participated in the ARF activities in contributing to peace and stability in the region. Cambodia commits itself to the constructive and important role of the ARF Chair, enabling the ARF Participants to exchange information relevant to the ARF in a timely manner and on voluntary basis. The ARF Chair's activities are as follows: <sup>9</sup>

- ARF issued a Statement condemning the bombing on innocent tourism in Bali, Indonesia, by Islamic extremist group.
- Cambodia in its capacity as the ASC/ARF has made every efforts in facilitating the dialogue with the concerned parties in order to find a lasting and durable solution to the Korean peninsula, such as the proposal to establish the Friends of ARF Chair.
- As the ARF remains an important forum for constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues, such as the Korean peninsula, Cambodia, in its capacity as the ARF Chair, will try every possible effort to engage in the talk between the involved parties.
- Cambodia is of the view that the ARF Chair should continue to play an important role in exchanging information and experiences, and seeking cooperation with other international organizations.

According to the Paper " Enhanced role of the ARF Chair" adopted at the 8<sup>th</sup> ARF in Hanoi, the ARF Chair could perform, among others, a role in liaising with external parties, such as heads of international organizations. To this effort, Cambodia in its capacity as the ARF Chair has committed itself to the above role.

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.mfaic.gov.kh/AMM/Bangkok%20papers/ARF.htm>

## Myanmar



Myanmar is in the neighborhood of Thailand, which has changed its foreign policy after curbing freedom and democracy. Cause of students and the people can be considered to be on the downward trend in Myanmar, which was not successful as a developing country, by any measure of social and economic standards. It suffers from economic recession considerably. Myanmar Government being aware of this changed the policy to open doors to accept foreign investments and capitalist economic system for developing the country. It can be said that the foreign policy of Myanmar during 1988 – 1997 mainly focused on economic policy such as accepting investment from abroad, increasing trade with foreign countries, promotion of tourism industry from abroad, permission for foreign bank to conduct business in Myanmar, and join the ASEAN.

Western countries opposed Myanmar's military rule, under the leadership of General Saw Maung who did not accept the election result of May 1990 that gave victory to National League for Democracy or NLD of Aung San Suu Kyi. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) permitted to hold general election.<sup>10</sup> Refusal to give power to set up the civil government brought about the strikes of students and people making SLORC to get rid of the party in office, arrest members and leader of NLD imprisoning them. This and the violation of human rights have caused severe tension widely resulting in lot of pressure by western countries to restore democracy-making Myanmar isolated and cut off from outside world.

Relationship between ASEAN and Myanmar was positive but as far as the Western countries are concerned, it was in conflict in respect of foreign policy. As the western countries had definite standing to the opposing of dictatorship government of Myanmar and had cut aids and used economic sanctions to pressure Myanmar. However, ASEAN considers that this measure cannot work in Myanmar because Myanmar is accustomed to living alone without depending on any other country since the closure of the country since 1960's. Myanmar shared border with Thailand, which unavoidably affected the latter. And there are political reasons making China have more connection if it is separated from the international community. Mr. Asa Sarasin, the Foreign Minister of Mr. Anand Panyarachun Government, then announced the conference of ASEAN-EEC at Brussels in July, 1991 that Thailand and Myanmar can not be separated and announce the Constructive Engagement Policy to Myanmar in order to have stability and security along the Thailand-Myanmar Border. Later, this policy had been put to be the policy of ASEAN in conducting relationship with Myanmar.<sup>11</sup>

In implementing the policy of Constructive Engagement after 1991, emphasis was placed on quiet diplomacy and confidence-building measures,

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<sup>10</sup> Martin Smith, *Burma : Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, (Dhaka: The University Press, 1999), p.412-418.



aimed towards encouraging the Myanmar government to see the benefit of integrating the country into the region and the mainstream of the international community. After the introduction and the subsequent regionalization of the policy, relations between two countries improved steadily, with the co-operation being extended to include a broad spectrum of issue-areas. Last year, Myanmar accepted ASEAN membership in spite of misgivings on the part of some members of the Myanmar leadership that Myanmar's joining ASEAN would make it easier for Western countries to put pressure on her.

By the time when the Chuan Leekpai government took office in November 1997, the policy of "Constructive Engagement" had been in place for over six years. Looking back to this period, we felt that, while Thailand could point to various achievements of engagement, including the ending of Myanmar's isolation and increased linkages between her and her neighbors in the region. However, the policy had its limitations.

After the end of cold war, the ASEAN has expanded its membership of the organization to comprise every countries in the region especially 3 countries namely: Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. Although the western countries would oppose accepting Myanmar as the member of ASEAN wanting Myanmar to be more democratic and eliminate human right violation. However, Myanmar and Laos then came to be members in the order of 8 and 9 during the annual conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers during July 24 – 25<sup>th</sup>, 1997. And Cambodia had postponed becoming a member until the situation in Cambodia became positive. After Myanmar becoming ASEAN member during 30th conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in July 1997. It seemed that Thailand had achieved the goal in implementing Constructive Engagement Policy in bringing Myanmar into ASEAN. Even so, according to the real membership of Myanmar that obtained from support of Malaysian prime minister who had

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<sup>11</sup> Taylor & Francis Group, n.6, pp.716-17.

target to incorporate 10 countries in South East Countries to be members of ASEAN during the 30<sup>th</sup> conference held at Kuala Lumpur.

One aspiration was the extension of the association's membership to all the ten countries of Southeast Asia was to further the cause of regional co-operation. Another was the hope that all regional states can make their full contributions to the progress of the region. These aspirations meant that Thailand would like to promote Myanmar's active participation in the region's affairs, her integration with ASEAN, and the realization of her potential as both a regional partner and a member of the international community.

Myanmar is now an ASEAN member. The clock can not be turned back, at whatever cost. Moreover, in the midst of severe financial crises and sharp economic downturns, there may be a natural and perfectly understandable tendency for the regional states to seek individual salvation. This in turn raises questions concerning the future of regional co-operation, particularly in the areas of trade and investment. Thailand initiated "Constructive Engagement", because it became an established regional policy based upon regional consensus, that the possibility is only for change or rejection, lest differences in this issue put further strains upon ASEAN unity at this critical juncture of Southeast Asia's history.

Since then, Thailand has endeavored to translate her commitment into action by pursuing various approaches for enhancing interactions with Myanmar. Approaches being:<sup>12</sup>

- To strive for more extensive cooperation in preventing and suppressing trade in narcotics;
- To draw up framework for surveying and demarcating the land boundary between the two countries;

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<sup>12</sup> [http://www.thaiembdc.org/pressctr/statemnt/others/dfm\\_1198.htm](http://www.thaiembdc.org/pressctr/statemnt/others/dfm_1198.htm)

- To address the dilemma posed by the influx of displaced persons and migrants from Myanmar, allowing the UNHCR to have a greater role in the management of displaced persons on the Thai border and encouraging Myanmar to do likewise on its own side.
- To strengthen cross border ties through discussions concerning ways and means of promoting economic activities in border areas, including investment in manufacturing and agricultural projects on Myanmar's side of the border to provide more employment to local workers and to generate greater income for those relatively poor and those located in remote areas;
- At the regional level, Thailand supported the extension of membership of BISTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Co-operation) to Myanmar and encouraged the implementation of a variety of projects planned for the group, now renamed BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation), in collaboration with the other three members, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka.

The task of engaging Myanmar has been rendered more urgent by two factors. One is her deeply troubled economy, with World Bank loan repayments being in arrears and sharp decline in both foreign exchange reserves and value of the currency. The second is the political tension and impasse between the military government and the NLD of Aung San Suu Kyi, reason being the NLD's setting up of a committee to represent the National Assembly that formed after 1990 election. These developments suggest that a great deal of uncertainty lies ahead.

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As a close neighbor and a fellow ASEAN member country, Thailand is naturally concerned. For uncertainty or, worse, instability, in neighboring countries sooner or later have a way of affecting her, not only through border incidents but also with massive influx of displaced persons. Already faced with enormous financial and economic problems, she can scarcely afford to bear additional security burdens and undertake more humanitarian responsibilities.

Greater time and efforts should be invested in using ASEAN and/or ASEAN-related regional co-operation as both a framework and mechanism for reintegrating Myanmar into the mainstream of international society. One venue of great potential, is Myanmar, which is a member of ASEAN as well as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Purpose of the ARF is to enhance mutual confidence and understanding through frank exchange of views. The underlying assumption is that greater mutual confidence and understanding should help to lessen tension and to encourage the countries concerned to resolve their differences through peaceful means. The ARF is now the most comprehensive framework for promoting political and security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Myanmar began participating in the ARF since 1996 after obtaining observer status in ASEAN.<sup>13</sup> With her entry into ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar has begun to attend ARF meetings and participated in ARF inter-sessional activities such as workshops for confidence building, search and rescue disaster relief, etc. The range of these activities should be expanded to encompass other issues, especially where such transnational crimes as drug-trafficking, migration and illicit trade in small arms, and Myanmar's active participation in both the ARF meetings and the ARF inter-sessional activities must be encouraged. Thailand, as a close neighbor of Myanmar's and a country irrevocably committed to the causes of democracy and human rights, shares these concerns.

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<sup>13</sup> Taylor & Francis Group, n.6, p.716.

In the 11<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting, member countries talked into forum about Myanmar underlining the need for the involvement of all stratas of Myanmar society in the on-going National Convention and repeating last year's call for the military government to lift restrictions on democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. However, the EU sharply criticized the ARF's stance, calling for increased pressure on the military junta.<sup>14</sup>

For Thailand, being the promoter of Constructive Engagement Policy with Myanmar converted the entire ASEAN to embrace the same policy in respect of the country. Thailand considered that the former principle of ASEAN being not to interfere with internal affairs of other countries is outdated and not appropriate in dealing with future situations after economic crisis. Thailand Foreign Minister Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, proposed the concept concerning Flexible Engagement in the 31<sup>th</sup> conference at Manila in July, 1998 which was necessary to face the problem arising out of dependence on one another in the region, confidence of investors, and social changes. As the reform of internal procedures in one country being delayed, can affect all region, especially if such country has major investment and is involved with other countries in the region. Flexible Engagement Concept means giving an opportunity for ASEAN members to express opinion straightforward on various issues that may impact positively on other countries in the region in respect of narcotics, environmental problem.<sup>15</sup> Such concept did not negate the original approach of "not interfering with internal affairs" being the fundamental principle of ASEAN, but it focused on having relationship and cooperation and consultation with one another more directly in ASEAN countries. However, before the official conference, the conference agreed not to accept the proposal of Thailand but accept that the members can have freedom in Enhanced Interaction with one another.

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<sup>14</sup> <http://english.dvb.no/news.php?id=1523>

<sup>15</sup> Taylor & Francis Group, n.6, p.1111.

Besides, Thailand proposed new values in ASEAN namely: acceptance of caring society, political participation, and pluralism that would occur in the next two decades more in Asia. Such proposal has become a part of ASEAN vision for 2020 to be focused on open to become caring society.

## East Timor



Problem began with the commencement of East Timor being incorporated as the 27<sup>th</sup> province of Indonesia on July 17, 1976 after Indonesia using military force from December 7, 1974. Fresh situation arose at Santa Cruz cemetery on November 12, 1991 when Indonesian soldiers closed the entry of cemetery and shot at the crowd killing hundreds of people. This became known all throughout the world. The ASEAN had not taken part in it due to it being internal affairs of Indonesia. The United Nations could also not intervene there. But when the

massive violation of human rights in East Timor being reported, the United States announced the cancellation of aid on military cooperation to Indonesia.

The important political change in Indonesia in May 1998 was Deputy of President Habibie becoming the President with the results of the election in 1997. This happened after President Suharto deciding to resign due to economic crisis making it mandatory on the new president to implement political reform on economy to follow strictly the conditions of International Monetary Fund (IMF).

At the end of January, 1999, the Indonesia Government stated that Indonesia was ready to let East Timor consider that it is the special district but forming an integral part of Indonesia or would separate as a sovereign state. On May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1999, Indonesia had made an agreement with Portugal that it would allow the United Nations to do a survey on the opinion of East Timor nationals. Under this agreement, there has been the establishment of UNAMET (UN Mission for East Timor). The results appeared that most citizens of East Timor prefer sovereign state. There had been tense situation in East Timor where the militia supported by Indonesian soldiers burned the houses and buildings. There were many people who were in fear and were evacuated out of Di Li. In the mid of September, there had been APEC summit conference at Oakland, New Zealand with US President Bill Clinton making a speech attributing the Indonesian forces to have directly caused riots in East Timor.

Finally, the President Habibi stated on September 12 that he asked United Nations to send the forces to keep peace instead of allowing Indonesian forces in East Timor to do that UN peace keeping force had 8,000 troops from 20 countries called International Forces in East Timor: INTERFET.

Three Scenarios are found in the role of INTERFET. Australia has agreed to lead the multinational force for East Timor, to be known as INTERFET

(International Force for East Timor) whose presence may produce three risk levels: <sup>16</sup>

First being Low Risk, the operation would be straightforward, and is manageable with the resources of INTERFET. TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia- the Indonesian Armed Forces) is authorized to remain in the territory and maintain security. At whatever condition INTERFET has the potentiality to successful military operation without casualties if TNI did not involve against them.

But at the medium risk level there would be casualties. Government sponsored TNI could attack INTERFET from the bases in West Timor. In a medium threat environment, 8000 troops in multinational force of INTERFET could be fully engaged in securing vital access points like the sea port and airfield in spite of TNI attacks.

In high risk situation, if the UN force (INTERFET) proved to be unfair, then more terrible violence, surpassing that of 1974-75 civil wars could occur. Anyway INTERFET produce only a marginal military threat. They could create a very difficult situation at the ground level.

Australia sent 4,500 soldiers and Thailand sent 1,057 soldiers. Indonesia removed the military forces out of East Timor on September 17<sup>th</sup> but there was a remainder of forces of 3,600 soldiers. Case of East Timor since 1975 arising out of the seizure of East Timor by Indonesia was the single case study that ASEAN had not paid attention from the start by considering that it is the internal business of Indonesia. Thailand had played a large part in resolving problems; for example, allowing Indonesia to open interest Section at their embassy in Lisbon in 1999. Participation to and be a member in operation forces of the United Nations in order to prepare for the voting directly in that the residents of East Timor can choose their own future in August, 1999. Later, on June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1999, the committee

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<sup>16</sup>[http:// www.apf.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib03.htm](http://www.apf.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib03.htm)



approved on the principle proposed by the Foreign Minister to send Thai official to act in the operation plan of the United Nations in East Timor. Thailand had joined in resolving the tense situations in East Timor by conducting various programs that are as follows:

- (1) The Thai foreign minister, who was the ASEAN president, visited Jakarta, Indonesia to consult with the Indonesia leaders concerning their problem.
- (2) Thailand sent 1,581 soldiers to join international forces in East Timor (INTERFET)

After January 2000, INTERFET authorized UN Transitional Administration in East Timor-UNTAET to have mission to take care concerning security in East Timor setting up the force protecting sovereignty and tightening the ties with Indonesia.<sup>17</sup>

The situation in Indonesia was discussed in the Seventh Meeting. The Meeting supported Indonesia's territorial integrity and welcomed cooperation between Indonesia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Moreover, they stressed the need for the international community to help East Timor to promote peace, stability and prosperity, which would lead to the overall stability of the region. They also supported efforts to resolve the problem of East Timorese refugees in East Nusa Tenggara province in a comprehensive manner in order to ensure peace and harmony in the area. The ARF Meeting in Phnom Penh recognized the efforts of the Indonesian Government to restore peace and order in Aceh and expressed their beliefs that peaceful solution would be based on special autonomy.

In Co-Chairmen's summary reports of the Meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum and Inter-sessional Support Group on confidence building measures emphasized support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of Indonesia. Participants congratulated East Timor on its

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<sup>17</sup> Taylor & Francis Group, n.6, p.1151.

independence, noting that its integration into regional country grouping would be crucial to future stability and stressed the need for continued international support. The Meeting noted that East Timor had approached participants regarding its application for ARF membership. This matter was referred to the ARF Chair for consultations with ARF participants ahead of the ARF Senior Officials' and Ministerial meetings. The meeting welcomed Timor-Leste's (The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste known as East Timor until its accession to independence on 20 May 2002) adherence to democratic values, the rule of law and human rights etc., and encouraged further regional integration of Timor-Leste.<sup>18</sup>

ARF stance was to perform no critical role in solving crisis for ARF members looking at the situation as an internal problem in keeping with the ASEAN concept substantial of non-interference. The ARF did not play any tangible role other than reaffirming their support for sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Indonesia.

East Timor can become a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2005 at the earliest because the group handles applications on a case-by-case basis and Pakistan will be admitted at annual ARF meeting in Jakarta. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told 23 members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that he would like if East Timor - Australia's tiny neighbor - be allowed to join the forum. Australia sees East Timor as an easy target of terrorists, pirates and organized international crime syndicates operating in the region.

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<sup>18</sup> [www.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/25479.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/25479.htm)

## Korean Peninsula



There are two issues which are important to this region namely: Korean reunification and nuclear proliferation. The South attempt to absorb the North through by expanding North-South exchanges in political, cultural and economic areas. And then there is the nuclear issue. North Korea is constrained to resist the South Korean absorption strategy. This is the context in which the North has purportedly been pursuing a nuclear option, not allowing international inspection of all so-called nuclear facilities in spite of being bound to abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which it signed in 1985. The refusal to allow inspections may be to cover a genuine weapons program, or it may only a bluff used as a bargaining chip to break its international isolation and resist the South's absorption strategy. However US is very much concerned in bringing

about an end to nuclear proliferation plan of North Korea. The North has tested a modified nuclear-capable Scud missile that can strike the South. If South Korea believes that the North is having nuclear warheads, then one or the other may feel compelled to develop a nuclear deterrent capability.<sup>19</sup> But the fact remains that both countries are ethnically bound with each other.

The 2002 ARF Chairman's Statement emphasized the importance of the implementation of the June 15, 2002 North-South Joint Declaration, and full implementation of the 1994 framework. In a departure from the previous year's text, it did mention that the United States, as saying: "The Ministers hoped that prospects for dialogue between the DPRK and the United States would improve." At the ARF, another breakthrough occurred when Japan and North Korea agreed to hold their first round of talks in normalizing ties after two years.

It will be interesting to observe whether the US and DPRK were brought together in June 2002, when ARF meet held in Cambodia. At meeting of the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, Australia's Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said that the two countries had agreed to push for a meeting of senior officials at the ARF hoping to diffuse the North Korean issue.

The ARF meetings recognized the Korean issue that has a direct impact on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. The Meetings requested to work on dialogue between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for successful maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through agreed framework. They also recognized the importance of international support for the Korean Peninsular Energy Organization (KEDO) through agreed framework.

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<sup>19</sup>David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy", in *Post-cold war security issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, eds. Colin McInnes and Mark G. Rolfs, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1994), p.51.

In the ARF Meetings, the Ministers usually called for further efforts by all parties concerned within the framework of inter-Korean dialogue, the planned US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK talks, the Four-Party Talks (among the DPRK, ROK, China and the United States). In the case of DPRK and ROK, the ARF Ministers usually acknowledged positive developments on the Korean Peninsula, called for cooperation from all parties concerned to maintain peace in this area supporting the Four Party Talks. However, the ARF Meetings failed to mention the relationship between the DPRK and US. The Bush Administration characterized North Korea as part of an "Axis of evil."<sup>20</sup> The US and DPRK relationship is main factor in the maintenance of peace and security in the region. The working process of the ARF concerning the Korean Peninsula has been criticized as it is nothing but an escape route from the realities and does not promote the process of peace and stability in this regard.<sup>21</sup> The ARF has been requested to ensure stability in this area.

The ARF was also concerned with problems of security and well being of people especially in respect of food shortage in the DPRK, and welcomed all recent developments which could pave the way to a permanent solution in the Peninsula. In the Third Meeting, the ARF Ministers stressed the need to establish a peace mechanism including further financial and political backing to the KEDO.

The 1953 Armistice Agreement for the Korean Peninsula was reaffirmed again in the Fifth ARF Meeting in 1998. A call for more international contribution was needed when the KEDO was facing financial difficulties. Positive development of the relationship between ROK and DPRK was continually supported by the Meetings, as in the Seventh Meeting, when the Ministers welcomed the historic summit between the leaders of the ROK and the DPRK held in Pyongyang on 13-15 June 2000. June 15 North-South Joint Declaration

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<sup>20</sup> "Annual PEDS Letter to ARF Foreign Ministers," 15 May 2002 Source : <http://www.island.net>

<sup>21</sup> "North Korea Wants' Equal Dialogue' with US," Agence France-Presse ,(25 July 2001).

accommodated first agreement signed by the two representative leaders since the division of the Peninsula in 1945.


Efforts of the international community in this regard were welcomed at the Eight Meeting, coupling the visit by Mr. Goran Persson, the President-in-Office of the European Council and Prime Minister of Sweden to both the DPRK and the ROK. In the Ninth Meeting, the Ministers expressed concern over the recent naval clash in the Yellow Sea which produced tensions in the Korean Peninsula. They also emphasized the importance of holding a second Inter-Korean Summit. In the Tenth Meeting, the Ministers supported the denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and urged DPRK to resume its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to reverse its decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They agreed to support the further efforts of the ARF Chair to help ease tensions in this regard.

## **South China Sea**

South China Sea and its Paracel and Spratly Islands are in the center of conflicting territorial claims involving by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei. China is the focus of attention because it claims both island groups using force to remove Vietnamese deployments on the disputed territories of Paracel and Spratly Islands in March 1988. This created a certain amount of tension, while other claimants became eager to stake out their possessions.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Chang Pao-Min, 'A New Scramble for the South China Sea Islands', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.12, No.1, (June, 1990), pp.20-39.



- ☆ Main Actors
- Indirect Actors





'irreproachable' claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The law gave the Chinese military the right to remove by force any incursion into these territories.<sup>23</sup> In May 1992, China leased an undersea section to a US oil exploration firm in an area that is geographically a part of Vietnam's continental shelf.<sup>24</sup> Chinese officials pledged to use force if necessary to protect the firm's personnel.<sup>25</sup>

The following table depicts the military strength of each of the three main actors in the Spratly disputes – China, Vietnam and Philippines.

Main Actors' Military Strength			
	China	Vietnam	Philippines
Tanks	9,200	2,000	126
Submarines	51	0	0
Destroyers and Frigates	55	7	1
Patrol and Coastal Aircraft	870	55	44
Combat Aircraft	5,845	190	43
Armed Forces	2,930,000	572,000	106,500

The ARF Meetings expressed their concern about seeking solutions for the South China Sea by peaceful means under international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. They encouraged the exercise of self-restraint by all countries concerned and the promotion of CBMs in this area, and welcomed the commitment to resolving disputes by peaceful means under the principle of international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

<sup>23</sup> *FBIS Daily Report-China*, 'New Law Claims Sovereignty over Spratly Islands', 27 Feb.1992,p.15.

<sup>24</sup> Mark J.Valencia, 'The South China Sea : Potential Conflict and Cooperation', in Rohana Mahmood Rustam A. Sani (eds.), *Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific* ,(Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Strategic and International Studies, 1993),pp.55-69.

<sup>25</sup> Nicholas D.Kristoff, 'China Signs US Oil Deal for Disputed Waters', *New York Times*, 18June 1992, A8.

The meetings welcomed dialogue, continual consultation among members in this regard and the on-going efforts between ASEAN and China to develop and adopt a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The Declaration contains important principles and practical areas for cooperative activities among the parties concerned. It aims to build trust and confidence among them through

- Holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defense and military officials;
- Ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress;
- Notifying, on a voluntary basis, other parties concerned of any impending joint/ combined military exercise; and
- Exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information

In the Seventh Meeting they welcomed a dialogue on the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Consultations and the Informal Workgroup on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea and welcomed the ASEAN resolve to work closely with China in this matter. In the Tenth Meeting, they welcomed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which ASEAN and China signed in Phnom Penh on 4 November 2002 which would help create peaceful settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea.

The building of relationships would lead to the ARF membership to expand, which means issues discussed in the forum would not rely only on the geographical footprint. Increasing the number of the ARF members increases the number and diversity of issues to discuss in the forum. For example, in Korean Peninsula, there are many relationships between Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and those of outside Asia. It is an area where the interests of major power, China and the United States, and also the DPRK, the ROK and Taiwan is likely to clash. Thus, the ARF framework is not strong enough to handle security issue in Northeast Asia. Creation of dialogue with external actors on this issue may be

more appropriate than relying on the forum only. The ARF need to develop suitable inter-institutional mechanisms to deal with them.<sup>26</sup>

The stability of the ARF member states was addressed in the Meetings, especially regarding Cambodia and Myanmar. The Ministers expressed their support for the Royal Government of Cambodia to achieve security, and promote national stability and economic recovery. They encouraged developments in Myanmar, the process of national reconciliation and human rights. They also appreciated all efforts of the Government of the Union of Myanmar as well as those of ASEAN, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Right in Myanmar and the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General in Support of this development. The Ministers were briefed about the current situation in Myanmar and urged Myanmar to resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned which lead to a peaceful transition to democracy.

The situation in Indonesia was discussed in the Seventh Meeting. The Meeting supported Indonesia's territorial integrity and welcomed cooperation between Indonesia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Moreover, they stressed the need for the international community to help East Timor to promote peace, stability and prosperity, which would lead to overall stability of the region. They also supported efforts to resolve the problem of East Timorese refugees in East Nusa Tenggara province in a comprehensive manner in order to ensure peace and harmony in this area. The ARF Meeting in Phnom Penh recognized the efforts of the Indonesian Government to restore peace and order in Aceh and expressed their beliefs that peaceful solution would be based on special autonomy.

Moreover, the Meeting talked about the US-Japan and China-US relationships and the continued presence of the US military in the region. The

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<sup>26</sup> G.V.C. Naidu, Multilateralism and Regional Security : Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really Make a Difference?," *Asia Pacific Issue*, East-West Center, Issue No.45, (August,2000),p.6.

ARF also discussed other security issues such as transnational crime, piracy, illegal migration including trafficking in humans, particularly women and children, and illicit trafficking in drugs and small arms. The Meetings were underlined the importance of greater bilateral, regional and international cooperative efforts.

In conclusion, the performance of the ARF toward regional issues in relation to peace and security in respect of Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor, South China Sea and Korean Peninsula, implication of newly developed CBMs, the relationship between CBMs and PD, the leading role and expansion of ASEAN, and nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear tests. ASEAN countries have played leading role in making the ARF believe that a multilateral approach can enhance confidence among countries in the region, ensuring the involvement of major powers to help moderate their interaction in way that can involve of major powers and help moderate their interaction in way that can contribute to the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.<sup>27</sup> The ARF working process which relies on a soft institutional structure operating under the ASEAN norm and under the general concepts of non-use of force, non-interference, consultations, accommodation, and consensus.

The ARF uses soft integration, based on continued dialogue and consensus, and it is extremely difficult to apply or engage them to areas where sovereign, social and political interests are intervened, such as direct attempt to solve territorial claims on the South China Sea.<sup>28</sup> The nature of the ASEAN process is designed to work around contentious issues not confronting conflicts direct. This does not help the ARF to address and resolve conflict between member states because it has not developed an effective conflict resolution mechanism. Need to

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<sup>27</sup> Tan See Seng, et al. *A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum*, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), p.19

<sup>28</sup> R. James Ferguson, "New Forms of Southeast Asian Regional Governance: From "Code of Conduct" to "Greater East Asia", in *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* eds. Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin, (Singapore.: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,2001),p.135.

avoid conflict within ASEAN is the limit of cooperation within the institution.<sup>29</sup> That apart, the ARF is not in a position to apply effectively the conflict resolution approaches.

The ARF work in practicing PD remains questionable vis-à-vis the concept of the ASEAN Way. The use fact-finding missions and the offer of good office are against the internal affairs of the state and the 'non-interference' concept established by ASEAN would not interfere with internal affairs like human rights, democratization of domestic politics and ethnic conflicts. This means the ARF cannot deal with such issues in spite of them having impact on regional security. Moreover, the lack of consensus between countries is also an obstacle to reaching an agreement on ways and means to deal with many challenges. The ARF has become an entity that lacks political substance and the grouping finds it difficult to speak with one voice.

It is not easy for the ARF members to discuss problems on security and sovereignty of other members outside the Southeast Asia region, except for CBMs because those non-ASEAN ARF member countries may not fully accept the consensus-based process of conflict resolution. This implies that the ARF is still far from solving outstanding disputes or countering conflict among its members. Therefore, the ASEAN is the most suitable core organization to guide activities in cooperation with its dialogue partners through the ARF. However, they may need civilized the well-meaning involvement of external agencies such as the UN, UNDP and / or other nations like the United States and/or Australia. For this, new models of regional security governance need to be developed.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Shaqun Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF : the Limits of the ASEAN Way," *Asian Survey* Vol.37, No.10, (October ,1997), p. 962.

<sup>30</sup> R.James Ferguson, n.28, p.136.

# **Chapter 4**

## **Thailand and ARF on Challenging Issues**

With the rapid expansion of economic globalization in the last two decades, traditional security threats and non-traditional ones are getting more intertwined than ever before. Each country has to face non-traditional security challenges of different degree, ranging from financial crises, epidemics, narcotics, piracy and illegal migration to disastrous terrorist attacks. Southeast Asia is faced with serious non-traditional threats within the region. In this regard, deepening regional cooperation has become an urgent and arduous task for all Southeast Asian countries.

The ARF has become the most important formal mechanism for security dialogue, including non-traditional security. It has built up some 80 programs on confidence building, which play a significant role in promoting mutual trust and non-traditional security dialogues. In practice, ARF has carried out a series of fruitful dialogues in anti-terrorism and fought against transnational crime, by way of conducting seminars and finding new working groups. These measures are conducive to resolve mutually non-traditional security problems in Southeast Asia.

Challenges of globalisation. The Seventh ASEAN Regional Forum observed that although the security outlook for the region remains positive, uncertainties and challenges-particularly those posed by globalisation-would increasingly require ARF's attention.

The Seventh ARF also considered the economic, social and human components of security and the need to promote regional cooperation in dealing with regional security issues. It discussed both the positive effects and the repercussions of globalisation, including greater economic interdependence

among nations and the multiplication of security threats like transnational crime. In responding to globalisation, ARF felt it necessary for nations to strengthen their individual and collective capacities to meet the challenges affecting their common security.

ARF has reaffirmed the need for Southeast Asian countries to continue efforts, through dialogue and cooperation at national and international levels, in dealing with the economic, social and political impacts of globalisation so as to ensure sustained economic and social development.

In Co-Chairs' Summary Report of the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG on CBMs) in Beijing from 20-22 November 2003 and in Yangon, Myanmar from 11-14 April 2004 discussed on non-traditional issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, money laundering, cyber crimes and infectious diseases that posed serious challenges and continuing to pose threats to the peace and security of the region and it should remain as one of the priorities on the ARF agenda.

## **Transnational Crime**

It is the heightened danger to countries with the trend to expand the limits and its level. In the past that was the struggle by negative forces and the newest addition is crime by manipulation of information technology. Money laundering, piracy and trafficking in drugs, people and small arms are issues of particular concern. Better management of these issues requires greater regional coordination by way of information exchanges, cooperation between national law enforcement agencies, and greater alignment at higher policy decision levels. Transnational crime could be usefully considered in ARF confidence building measures.

The problem of transnational crime has extended its tentacles to global politics. Terrorists attacked World Trade Center Building and Pentagon Building in the United States on September 11, 2001 and in South East Asia region, there had been explosion that killed hundreds of people in Bali on October 12, 2002. Most of the dead are of foreign origin. Not long after that, the similar incident occurred in Philippines, It was an explosion inside a bus in Manila in October 2002. The Philippines authorities suspects that it was an operation by Abu Sayyaf rebels. These incidents indicated that the security to the humanity in general, was threatened and in that it was the duty of the government to maintain security of throughout the state. Besides, military force being an effective tool that can be applied for effective security policy implementation. The problem of transnational crime was so pressing that it must be resolved immediately. Besides, the activities of transnational criminals has undermined the society affecting lives and properties of Thailand, It could also affect the political issues. Resolving the problem means harnessing the cooperation of many establishments inside and outside the country. In this respect, Thailand relied on ASEAN, which had the coordination in solving transnational crime, which threatened the stability, and security for which wide scope is given since 1976. On December 20<sup>th</sup>, 1997, there was an ASEAN ministerial meeting on transnational crime for the first time at Manila, which among others made a Declaration on the same.

At the beginning stage, ASEAN focused on drug trafficking, smuggling of drugs etc. However, due to transnational crimes being on the increase, linking with terrorism, weapon smuggling, money laundering, illegal migrating to cities, piracy, and setting up crime network was also done. The ASEAN resorted to the following to handle the new situation.

- ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference: ASEANAPOL being placed in charge of prevention, suppression and measures opposing transnational crime.



- ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters : ASOD being placed in charge of handling Drug offences
- APEC Finance Ministers Meeting : AFMM being entrusted to follow and check the transnational crimes of finance and customs such as drugs smuggling
- Meeting of ASEAN ministers of Interior/ Home Affairs concentrating on transnational crime.

The Tenth ARF Meeting convened in Phnom Penh on 22 June 2003, The Ministers adopted an ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security, under which the participants endeavor to achieve effective implementation of the relevant international instruments and recommendations for the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf; and the International Maritime Organization's recommendations and guidelines for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed-robbery against ships at sea; the International Convention for the new Chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS Code); and to enhance their coordination and cooperation to that end. Besides, the Ministers expressed concerns about the threat posed to commercial and general aviation by man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) in terrorist hands and the importance of curbing the proliferation of these weapons. There has also been cooperation between partner countries in resolving transnational crime by way of joint development of measures and programs.

Another type of transnational crime that is of an increasingly grave concern not only to Thailand, but to many countries in the region, is human trafficking. In August 2004, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared a renewed fight against this threat by placing it high on the national agenda. Being

a country of origin, transit and destination of trafficked victims, Thailand is convinced that joint international effort is vital to any successful fight against this crime.

The Thai government has provided approximately 2.5 million US dollars as a special fund to assist and rehabilitate victims of trafficking in addition to the annual budget allocation. Thai national long-term plan to combat human trafficking aims to tackle this problem in a comprehensive manner. The plan outlines measures on legal and legislative reforms to enable authorities to better respond to the current situation, including making human trafficking and related activities a criminal offence, imposing more severe punishment on traffickers, and ensuring that trafficked persons are treated as victims rather than offenders. On prevention, the government has carried out awareness raising campaigns in all sectors of society and implemented social programs to improve the living conditions of women and children in target areas to prevent them from being lured into the sex business because of their poverty.

## **Economic Security**

Economic growth strengthened the legitimacy of governments in the Asia Pacific countries. The ending of the Cold War resulted in an overall relaxation of tensions in the region with the end of the security threat from Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Southeast Asia was at peace at this time and the economies of most ASEAN countries were booming and moving toward liberalization.<sup>1</sup> Economic modernization caused both a short and long term effect. In the short term, a peaceful environment was the result of economic development, but in the long term, a rise in costs and of the threshold for using force to protect stabilization of

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<sup>1</sup> Daljit Singh, "ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia," in *ASEAN in the New Asia : Issues & Trends*. Eds. Chia Slow Yue and Marcello Pacini, (Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian studies, 1997), p. 119.

economic growth and industrialization of nations related to military modernization.<sup>2</sup>

The results of economic development on the domestic level would impact national identity, legitimacy of governments and political systems and the maintenance of law and order. On the other hand, poor economic conditions could reinforce political and cultural antagonism inside the country by ethnic groups or minorities as in the case of Malay-Muslim minorities in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.<sup>3</sup> The economic development in East and Southeast Asian countries during the 1990s have made the Asia-Pacific region dynamic zone in the world, which has made regional states develop their interdependence, 'multilateralization' of economic relations which led to a growing interest in regionalism and cooperation. They believed that economic power has become a key ingredient of security.<sup>4</sup>

The relationship between economics and security is complex. The economic links between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia have been balanced by security interdependence with outstanding problems in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the growing hegemony of China and Japan. As a result, economic bilateral and sub-regional approaches were not adequate for ensuring regional security.<sup>5</sup> Thus, Asia-Pacific countries realized that multilateralism was a long term alternative to a balance of power plus security and deterrence based security strategies.<sup>6</sup>

Sustained economic growth could build self-confidence and it was a desire for Asian countries in becoming less dependent on the West for capital and

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<sup>2</sup> Muthiah Alagappa, "System Change, Security, and Governance in the Asia-Pacific," in *The New Asia-Pacific Order*, ed. Chan Heng Chee, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), p.54.

<sup>3</sup> Muthiah Alagappa, *The National Security of Developing States : Lessons from Thailand*, (Dover, Massachusetts : Auburn Publishing House, 1987), pp.198-236.

<sup>4</sup> Muthiah Alagappa, n.2, p. 56.

<sup>5</sup> Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia : ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, (London : Routledge, 2001), p.168.

<sup>6</sup> Geoffery Wiseman, "Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Pacific Review*, Vol.5, No.2, (1992).

technology.<sup>7</sup> ASEAN promoted cooperation to meet the challenges of the international economic environment. ASEAN's success in political cooperation needed to be matched in the area of economic cooperation.<sup>8</sup> The ASEAN had objective economic reforms in member countries and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), was seen as an appropriate mechanism for member states in responding to regional groupings in Europe and North America. Thus, ASEAN realized the importance of regional cooperation mechanisms like AFTA.<sup>9</sup>

After Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia became part of ASEAN, it opened the possibility for new economic and political cooperation not only with the establishment of AFTA in 1992, but with developments of sub-regional cooperation, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1994 as a new form of multilateral economic structure and understanding. It assumed the form of a regional restrictive trading bloc, which created a sense of self-confidence among Asia-Pacific states from their economic achievement. With the increase of economic and political power in East Asia, ASEAN reviewed that conflict within states and within East Asia could arise the same conflict situation if economic conditions went wrong. APEC could make economic security and thus contribute to overall security.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the senior officials of ASEAN and its PMC dialogue partners intended the idea of a regional security structure to be analogous to APEC as they believed that a stable regional environment contributed to economic growth which would in turn strengthen the foundation of security.<sup>11</sup>

The ARF Meetings realized that economic development is the main focus for all countries as it leads to political stability in the region. This issue had been

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<sup>7</sup> Janadas Devan, *Southeast Asia Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 17.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p.15.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p.18.

<sup>10</sup> Daljit Singh, n.1,p.136.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum : Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security*, *Adelphi Paper 302*, pp.5-6.

first officially mooted in the Fifth Meeting when the region faced an economic slowdown. Cooperation among members in maintaining security was seen as a favorable security situation linking to the increase of trade and investment. They agreed for individual, bilateral and multilateral work to restore financial stability. In this regard, they welcomed the assurance of Japan and China to revitalize the economy and maintain the Yuan's value. They supported the ARF to play an important role in addressing these concerns, emphasizing that current economic difficulties should not undermine the process of the ARF and other regional security dialogues and cooperation. They also commended efforts at economic reform, integration and cooperation in the region.

The significance of economic issues was discussed again in the Sixth Meeting. A cooperative arrangement was sought to reduce the effects of the financial crisis. The individual countries' efforts in promoting national economic development and improving people's livelihoods were also recognized as part regional peace and stability.

## **Environmental Security**

Environmental problems range vastly in scope from the local to the global. The bush fire that blanketed a large part of Southeast Asia in thick haze during 1997 and 1998 and they were the most visible sign of the environmental crisis that loomed over the region, threatening to stifle the economic growth and rising living standards of the past few decades. A combination of drought conditions brought about by a particularly unfortunate occurrence of the El Nino - Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a periodic climatic phenomenon that affects the Pacific Ocean. With the use of fire in land preparation by rubber and oil palm plantations, set standing forests on the islands of Sumatra and Borneo ablaze. Fires raged uncontrollably between September and November 1997, and again in February and March 1998 after an abnormally short wet season. The pall of smoke extended over much of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, southern Thailand,

and the Philippines. At its heights, on September 23, 1997, the Air Pollutant Index in the city of Kuching, in East Malaysia, recorded a staggering 839, when a reading of over 100 is regarded as unhealthy and one of over 300 as hazardous. In all, it is estimated that fire-produced gases and particles seriously affected the health of over 20 million people and caused damages in excess of US\$ 4 billion.

Southeast Asia faces major environmental challenges and shares many of the problems caused by population growth, resource depletion, and global warming in other major regions of the world. These issues are becoming matters of local, national and international politics, for ecosystems operate regardless of any political borders. The most notable environmental initiatives in recent years have been at the international level, where governments have engaged sufficiently in diplomacy and dialogue to influence each other's domestic policies. This represents a major departure from previous norms of behavior in the region. ASEAN has a history of environmental cooperation stretching back to 1977, but a more proactive approach was not implemented until 1989, when annual meetings of ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment (ASOEN) began.<sup>12</sup> The trend was confirmed with ASEAN's adoption of the Strategic Action Plan on the Environment in 1994. The Indonesian forest fires of 1991, 1994, and 1997-98 have given the impetus for it encouraging member states to agree in June 1995 to an ASEAN Cooperative Plan on Trans-boundary Pollution, with separate programs for atmospheric, ship borne and hazardous waste. In December 1997, Regional Hazard Action Plan providing for enhanced monitoring mechanisms has improved fire fighting capabilities. Subsequently, in December 1998, the menace of forest fires persuaded ministers to adopt the Hanoi Plan of Action, in which they pledged to take all necessary steps to protect the environment.

ASEAN began to provide cooperation on environment since 1977. ASEAN has outlined the ASEAN Sub-regional Environment Program: ASEP in the first

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<sup>12</sup> Patrick Heenan and Monique Lamontagne, *The Southeast Asia Handbook*, (London :Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers,2001),pp.179-190.

stage by being helped from United Nations Environment Program: UNEP; later, by the ASEAN Committee on Science and Technology (COST). The COST has proposed ASEAN Experts Group on the Environment (AEGE) for the first time on December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1981 at Jakarta; and finally in 1989, AEGE has been given enhanced member status as ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment (ASEON) in which Thailand was represented by the Secretary of Ministry of Science and Technology who once became its president during September, 1999-2001.

ASEON had tried to adjust the structures of organization in correspondence with current environment policy, which was subject to rapid change. Later, ASEON has changed the structure at its ninth ASEON meeting held in September, 1998 at Singapore by using important environmental issue affecting environment at global level and ASEAN level as the criteria. In 2002, the number of areas that has been burned in Southeast Asia has been considerably increased while the smoke layer being quite heavy periodically affecting even the neighbor countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and the South of Thailand as well. In 2002, the ASEAN members signed and declared the ASEAN Agreement on Trans-boundary Haze Pollution; this Agreement was the first to deal at regional level. Welfare, human rights, freedom and security are important integral part of good governance and there still be the hesitation to accept these concepts. Thailand is in the group called human security.

Chuan Leekpai Administration 2 had foreign policy that supported the human security, so it had become a member of Human Security Network-HSN initiated by Canada and Norway. In 1999, Canada and Norway had jointly set up the HSN group by inviting 13 countries to join in with the purpose to support the human security and arrange the activities in this connection. The HSN has also paid attention to AIDS problem, educational human rights, and law in respect of weapon production. Thailand attaches great importance to the issues of HIV/AIDS, poverty eradication and people-centered development, which have been incorporated into the Network's agenda and its Mid-Term Workplan for 2003-2005.

The 9th AMME, held in Yangon, Myanmar on 17- 18 December 2003, adopted the framework for Environmentally Sustainable Cities in ASEAN to address the challenges of environmental sustainability. The framework, developed at the Environmentally Sustainable Cities (ESC) Workshop held on 2-4 December 2003 in Singapore, contained a regional perspective in addressing environmental sustainability challenges in the areas of clean air, clean water and clean land. The Framework also offers implementation approaches through a set of best practices based on the lessons and experiences of ASEAN Member Countries.

Following the adoption of the Framework, ASEAN Member Countries have been invited to nominate city/cities in their respective countries to participate in implementing the Framework. A conference on environmentally sustainable cities will be held in the later part of 2004 to help participating ASEAN cities to identify and prioritize environmental areas of concern in their cities, as well as allow invited international organizations and developed countries to showcase their best practices on urban environmental management.

ASEAN is developing a Program of Action on Integrated Waste Management. A report entitled "State of Waste Management in Southeast Asia 2002" is being published in cooperation with the United Nations Environment Program's International Environment Technology Center (IETC).

Ministers 11<sup>th</sup> Meeting on security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was held at Maastricht, Netherlands between 1 – 2 December, 2003, Thai representatives who participated in this meeting was Mr. Sorajak Kasemsuwan, the Deputy of Foreign Minister. The majority of the meeting focused on danger of terrorism and problem of human trading that amount to a form of slavery. It is considered that both issues are very serious that threatens the safety of life and property. It considers how to make human being live without fear, without starvation the main ingredients of human existence. To recognize the human



security is its multi-dimension, Thailand has program to help the neighbor countries producing security on economic front starting with stability around the border of Thailand ensuring the border to be free from poverty and other risks.

Declaration was made on the ASEAN Environment, on 29<sup>th</sup> November 1984, at the First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment held in Bangkok. Meeting of the ASEAN Experts Group on Environment recognized the need for cooperation amongst ASEAN countries in order to safeguard the ASEAN Environment and in particular its natural resources and they implemented of projects under the ASEAN Environment Program (ASEP).

The ASEAN countries have established national environmental protection agencies, and these agencies have now accomplished the important task of in defining their missions, understanding of how environment protection can feasibly be accomplished within the context of the socio-cultural patterns by initiating programs aimed at implementing feasible protection measures, and developing national capabilities on environmental technology.

The ASEAN Agreement on Trans-boundary Haze Pollution was signed in June 2002 by all the ten ASEAN Member Countries. The agreement is the first legal ASEAN regional environmental accord to have gained legal force. The United Nations Environment Programme considers the Agreement to be a global role model for tackling trans-boundary issues since the 1997/98 hazardous haze episodes. The ASEAN Haze Agreement also calls for the establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Trans-boundary Haze Pollution Control to facilitate cooperation and coordination in managing the impact of land and forest fires in particular haze pollution arising from such fires.

In the Second ASEAN Regional Forum's Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief was held on 18-20 February 1998 in Bangkok, Thailand.<sup>13</sup> There

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<sup>13</sup> [http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/intersessional/arf5\\_B.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/intersessional/arf5_B.html)

was a further exchange of information on sub-regional cooperation in delivering disaster relief. Usefulness of developing common approaches to disaster management was considered. In this regard, the Meeting underlined the importance of better coordination to facilitate the exchange of information in a neutral fashion and help reduce delays in providing a regional response to emergency situations. The Meeting agreed that specific areas of national expertise and national centers of excellence should be identified so as to further promote the sharing of expertise among the participants.

A case study presentation was made on the subject of regional responses to the haze problem in Southeast Asia in late 1997, with recent examples of regional disaster management in many ARF countries. The Meeting agreed given the seriousness of its impact on local environment and ecology, early coordination of information would be valuable on similar situations occurring in the future. An exchange of views was held on the most appropriate mechanisms for coordinating such activities. The Meeting welcomed the contributions of various countries and organizations in helping to resolve this problem, including ASEAN's Regional Haze Reduction Action Plan, ADPC's sponsorship of the El Nino Conference on 2-6 February 1998, and the United States' Southeast Asian Environment Initiative.

Since Sunday the 26th December 2004, the tragedy of Tsunami has brought us to see the world from a different perspective. We have made efforts to prepare ourselves to meet present-day threats confronting us, traditional and non-traditional, military and non-military. But while we have standby arrangements to support UN peacekeeping operations to deal with military conflicts, we build up in every possible way to defend our countries. In this part of the world, have nothing remotely similar to deal with the threats to human security posed by natural disasters. Against such natural disasters like the Tsunami, our communities are but completely defenseless.

Thailand will continue to extend every possible facility to serve effectively as a regional hub for the delivery of UN disaster relief as well as humanitarian operations of friendly countries like the United States. We therefore welcome the plans of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA, creating a regional office in Thailand, hoping to facilitate the ongoing and future relief operations. We are keen to explore how this role as regional hub for humanitarian relief operations could be developed further, in close cooperation with other stakeholders.

Early warning system on tsunami arrival in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, plus mid and long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts include the following elements: <sup>14</sup>

1. Emergency Relief
  - a. Urgent mobilization of additional resources to meet the emergency relief needs of victims in the affected countries.
  - b. Request the United Nations to mobilize the international community to support the national relief programs in the affected countries, and welcomed in this regard, the flash appeal by the United Nations. In this connection, further request the United Nations to appoint a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the above purpose; to convene an international pledging conference for the sustainability of humanitarian relief efforts; and to explore the establishment of “standby arrangement” at the global level for immediate humanitarian relief efforts.
  - c. Strengthen coordination and cooperation of the national, regional and international relief efforts, to ensure effective and immediate distribution of assistance.
  - d. Support the efforts of the affected countries, as national coordinators, to ensure an effective channeling and utilization of assistance as offered by donor countries, international organizations and non-governmental relief organizations.

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.mfa.go.th/web/35.php?id=11378>

## 2. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

- a. Support and emphasize the importance of national rehabilitation and reconstruction programs given the devastation of the basic infrastructures and services in the affected countries. Reconstruction and rehabilitation phase should link seamlessly with the humanitarian relief efforts.
- b. Call on the international community, in particular the donor countries, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, European Investment Bank, and related international financial institutions to provide the necessary fund for the viability and sustainability of those programs.
- c. Establish a partnership, upon request and the leadership of the country concerned, involving donor countries and regional as well as international financial institutions, to support the respective national programs of the affected countries.
- d. Welcome the initiative of several countries on the moratorium of payments of the external debt of the affected countries to augment their national capacity to carry out the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.
- e. Promote and encourage private sector participation in and contribution to the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.

## 3. Prevention and Mitigation

- a. Support ASEAN's decision to establish regional mechanisms on disaster prevention and mitigation, inter alia:
  - i. The utilization of military and civilian personnel in disaster relief operation and an ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre, as provided for in the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action;
  - ii. ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communication Network, as provided for in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community component of the Vientiane Action Programme;
  - iii. A regional instrument on disaster management and emergency response.
- b. Establish a regional early warning system such as Regional Tsunami Early Warning Center on the Indian Ocean and the Southeast Asia region.
- c. Promote public education and awareness as well as community participation in disaster prevention and mitigation through inter alia a community based disaster

preparedness and early response.

d. Develop and promote national and regional human and institutional capacity, transfer of know-how, technology, and scientific knowledge in building and managing a regional early warning system and disaster management through international cooperation and partnership.

## **Terrorism**

Terrorism is one of the most serious security challenges facing the world today. Despite intensive global campaign to fight terrorism, the crime against humanity continues unabated. We need to further strengthen our collective efforts in combating terrorism, in whatever form and wherever raises its ugly head. While actively pursuing close collaboration with all allies, Thailand believes that terrorism can be effectively addressed through multilateral cooperation. Terrorism is like a disease. It attacks those who are weak, those who lack immunity and those who lack preparedness. So to be strong, to be immune, and to be well prepared, we must turn deprivation into opportunity, diversity into strength, disputes and differences into understanding and cooperation.

This issue was the result incidents that occurred after 11 September 2001, in the United States. In the Ninth Meeting, the Ministers recalled the Statement of October 2001 issued by the ARF Chairman on behalf of ARF participants and emphasized the need for the ARF to fight against terrorism. The Ministers reaffirmed the principles outlined in the relevant UNSC Resolutions related to Prevention and Suppression of Terrorist Acts. Enhanced cooperation against terrorism would strengthen the ARF Dossier, which includes on Counter-Terrorism Measure by Japan and on Cyber Terrorism by the ROK that were submitted to the ARF in addition to concept papers. They appreciated workshops on “Financial Measures Against Terrorism” in Honolulu in March 2002 and on “Prevention of Terrorism” in Bangkok on April 2002 and welcomed the “ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing” issued by the Chairman on

behalf of all participants, agreeing to review its implementation. The ARF Chairman's Statement stated: "The Ministers underlined the ARF's work in tackling terrorism that represented a milestone in the ARF's development of a preventive role". Finally, the Ministers called for commitment to strengthen bilateral, regional and international cooperation in combating terrorism.

Following the ARF meeting on August 2, Colin Powell emerged from a meeting with Indonesia's Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda, expressing that a strong Indonesian military is essential to cope with militant Islamic groups with ties to Al-Qaida and is eager to patch up military ties with Indonesia which had been sharply curtailed by the US Congress because of Indonesia's human rights abuses. Powell announced the Bush Administration's plans to spend \$50 million over three years on programs to help Indonesia to fight terrorism.

On 1 August 2002, the Chairman of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the United States Secretary of State signed the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. Among other things, they reiterated their common view of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever and by whomsoever, "as a profound threat to international peace and security, which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world."<sup>15</sup>

At the Tenth Meeting at Phnom Penh, the Ministers reaffirmed their resolve to strengthen further cooperation among their countries in the fight against international terrorism. The ARF issued the Statement on Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Action on Border Security emphasizing the multiple dimensions of terrorism linking it to transnational crime including money laundering, arms smuggling, human trafficking and narcotic production and trafficking. The meeting called cooperative actions for strengthening border security concerning the movement of people, movement of goods, document

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<sup>15</sup> <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpano11676.pdf>

security and general measures to review process of border security and information sharing.

The ARF also issued the Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security which endeavor to achieve effective implementation of the relevant international recommendations and instruments for the suppression of piracy and armed-robbery against ships and commit to work together for bilateral and multilateral cooperation among the ARF members. The ARF also welcomed the establishment of the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia and noted their satisfaction for the growing cooperation in the Asia-Pacific in dealing with transnational crime, money laundering, cyber crime, drug and arms trafficking plus human trafficking as well as piracy at sea.

The ARF Meeting in Phnom Penh talked about the US-Japan and China-US relationships and the continued presence of the US military in the region. The ARF also discussed other security issues such as transnational crime, especially piracy, illegal migration including trafficking in humans, particularly women and children, plus slave labor and illicit trafficking in drugs and small arms. The Meetings underline the importance of greater bilateral, regional and international cooperative efforts.

The ASEAN Regional Forum has urged all nations to support the full transfer of sovereignty to Iraqi authorities and push for a central role for the United Nations in the transition process. ARF chairman and Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda also said the region was concerned with the current security situation in Iraq and hoped that a durable solution would be attained. "The Foreign Ministers were concerned with the current security situation in Iraq and hoped a durable solution could be attained in order to achieve peace, security, stability and national reconciliation for the well-being of the Iraqi people. "We further emphasize the central role of the UN in the process of political transition from the sovereign interim government to a democratic

government, reconstruction and development of the country," said Wirajuda. ARF's strong stance on Iraq signaled the grouping's move towards having its voice heard as it attempts to play a larger role in shaping world affairs as it comes of age. In keeping with its aim of being a major player in world affairs, the ministers stressed the importance of strengthening the ARF, and the importance of the grouping as the main political and security forum in the region. ARF ministers also condemned the killing of civilian hostages and acts of terrorism against civilians in Iraq, while rejecting the identification of terrorism with any religion inclusive of Islam.<sup>16</sup>

For much of the first half of 2003 Thailand's foreign policy was dominated by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Officially, the Thai Government maintained a policy of neutrality, mindful, on the other, of the sizeable Muslim minority resident in southern Thailand, which was also generally against the war, and the opinion of Thailand's predominantly Muslim neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, the governments of which were extremely critical of the USA's actions against Iraq. In June Prime Minister Thaksin flew to the USA to meet President George W. Bush for discussion on counter-terrorism operations. In the aftermath of the devastating bombing of two night clubs in Bali, Indonesia. In October 2002, which had killed over 200 people, it had been alleged that members of Jemaah Islamiyah, the organization believed to have been responsible for the planning of the operation. Thaksin's meeting with President Bush coincided with the arrests, in the southern province of Narathiwat, of three suspected members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a move that provoked widespread criticism among religious leaders in the largely Muslim provinces of the south.<sup>17</sup>

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[http://www.emedia.com.my/Current\\_News/NST/Saturday/National/20040703111243/Article/indexb.html](http://www.emedia.com.my/Current_News/NST/Saturday/National/20040703111243/Article/indexb.html)

<sup>17</sup> Taylor & Francis Group, *The Far East and Australasia 2003*, 34<sup>th</sup> Edition, (London : Europa Publications, 2002), p.1113.



# **Chapter 5**

## **Conclusion**

The ARF was established in 1994, and the ASEAN collective security is not like other common security communities, grounded its military cooperation on mutual threat perceptions. Rather, it is deeply seated in the elitist perception of the ASEAN Way comprising non-interference, respect for each other's independence and territorial integrity. ASEAN Model of development being political stability and multilateral cooperation.

The evolution of ARF may be traced back to the conceptual framework on concept of security. Different approaches influenced ARF are collective security, comprehensive security and cooperative security. One important element of collective security concept is to become clearer in view of current national security problems being transnational in nature. It is not intentionally created by one nation-state to score points over the other. The ASEAN members through the concept of national resilience pursue comprehensive security policy.

While cooperative security attempts to change state behaviors from being competitive with other states to that of cooperation with them. It also combines military and non-military components of security. The important element of cooperative security is the evolution of dialogue habits and cooperation among neighboring states. The integral parts of this process are second track or unofficial security dialogues are to discuss various security issues.

The main schools of thought had influence upon ARF as the contemporary thought mechanism, which broadens and deepens the concept and relationship between the definitions of the concept of security. Realism is used to study the background of the ARF and is the foundation of its establishment. By this analysis, potentialities of the ARF for institutional development will be looked

into. Its past and present performance and characters in the view of realism will also give directions for future ARF position.

According to ASEAN Way concept, differences among the ARF members, some of who work in an anarchic environment make it difficult for the ARF to develop more effective formal security cooperation. It can be said that the existing ARF structure under the ASEAN Way concept is the successful optimal cooperation in building and enhancing peaceful atmosphere in the region. However, for more effective security management in future coupled with uncertainty situation, the ARF needs to develop operative mechanism.. With the differences among the ARF members, ASEAN is of firm view that the Asia-Pacific region is not similar to other regional forums incorporating European-style multilateral security cooperation. Because of the diversity of member countries whose historical and socio-economic background, make the ARF improve upon its current levels of trust and confidence among all members states. At the same time, the ARF also needs to revise its existing structure to meet the future uncertainties of international environment.

Regionalism gives reasons for cooperation in response to external anarchic environment and internal security complications and weakness. In the wider Asia-Pacific region, strong external influence causes soft regionalism to produce a limited mechanism for establishing norms affected by cultural differences between Asia and other regions. However, the ARF is already perceived as a regime for its existing mechanisms being established in the form of an international society in Southeast Asia. It could more effectively move towards PD and conflict resolution. Enforcement of such policies might need evolving existing policy framework enabling it to proceed more effectively. It may need to incorporate the well-meaning involvement of external agencies plus the assistance given by other nations like United States and Australia backing clearer regional diplomacy.

The global policy process is composed of a series of stages beginning from the identification of problems, proceeding to policy development, implementation, and finally to review and decision making on whether to continue such policy. Global policies are made through international governmental organizations. Most of these institutions have multiple mechanisms in the policymaking process, including assemblies, councils, standing or ad hoc committees, commissions, sub-commissions and working groups. As a result, the form of global policy can be expressed in laws, treaties, regulations and resolutions.

The implementation of CBMs, PD and development of conflict resolution mechanism, leads the ARF to develop its structure from soft integration to a more institutional character. The CBMs have made some progress, but this has been criticized for lacking substance. The ARF has been perceived by some members to be operative against the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. These measures lead to the slow development of the conflict resolution mechanism.

Because of the above-mentioned factors, ARF should develop the existing regime structure to be more formal by setting good offices and creating a Secretariat, promoting links with other international organizations and multilateral security cooperation functioning through CBMs, PD and conflict resolution. Concerning its working concept, the 'ASEAN Way' is suggested as a cooperation norm for countries in Southeast Asia to generate a peaceful environment between them. Moreover, the ASEAN Way can also be used to protect individual states' interests from external interference. Although this concept should be maintained for this region, at the same time, ASEAN could also learn to adjust some principles of its concept. The ARF needs to look beyond its current status as a forum for the exchange of views toward how to develop a more institutionalized structure in the future.

The reasons for the creation of ARF cooperation by ASEAN countries is explained by a realistic approach attributing to internal weakness and external

threats concerning security in Southeast Asia over long term, making Southeast Asian countries devote themselves to regional security and allied institution building. The internal weakness of ASEAN countries emanates from their own political, economic and security situations. In view of realism, cooperation among ASEAN countries, it can be seen as 'weak states' in terms of politics, ethnic divisions and boundary disputes occurring throughout Southeast Asia; reducing their ability to build stronger state structure.

Not only the above mentioned internal factors, but also the external factors concerning the uncertain environment that encourage security cooperation in this region. Factors being the dominance of the United States; threat from China and other new major powers; the new Asia-Pacific regional order includes a booming peace and economic power after the Cold War and a redefinition of security focusing on national interest, balance of power and international security cooperation. In order to make state interests and their internal weakness seated in an anarchic environment being part of realism, they built the security cooperation in the region; at the same time, develop and sustain norms that inhibit individual members from pursuing state-centric interests.

In addition, the ARF was created with hope that it would become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region and that ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about constructive pattern of relations in the Asia Pacific.

In the structure and operation of the ARF, The ASEAN Way is emphasized for its guidelines and follow up. Methods and operational approach of the ARF is to sustain and enhance peace and prosperity. For successful attainment of objectives, ARF requires active, full and equal participation and cooperation by all members, and ASEAN has a pivotal role as its driving force. The ARF approach should take place in three stages namely: promotion of confidence building, development of PD and the last being conflict resolution. The decisions

of the ARF are made through consensus after careful and extensive consultations between all participants.

It is far easier to raise sensitive political and security issues at Track II meetings. Such issues can first be tested within Track II and then, if feasible, be considered by Track I. However Track II should concentrate more on short term and feasible proposals and always consider the added value of such propositions. As in Track I, it is important to include military personnel also in Track II meetings. The main institutions in track II are the ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP.

Guiding force of the ARF is the annual meeting among the foreign ministers of member states. Outcome of the ARF ministerial meeting is not action, but a Chairman's statement adopted by consensus containing vital policy framework. The ARF does not have a separate Secretariat and a Secretary General. It is more a forum than an institution with considerable staff who handles ongoing work between ministerial meetings and policy implementation. Main problem being weak, non-continuous institutional presence and lack of an independent administrative structure. The ARF incorporates major powers like China, Japan and the United States, often acts as observers making the ARF a suitable location for dialogue and clarification but less effective in carrying out regional action plans. ARF's existing operational norms prevent both regional governance and genuine development of comprehensive security measures at the regional level.

The ARF has made significant progress during the last eleven years since its formation in 1994. Much has been achieved and progress has been made within the ARF framework through frequent meetings and various events covering issues on political and security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering its diverse membership, the ARF has considerably contributed to an improved understanding among the countries. Apart from the UN, the members of ARF usually do not meet in any other multilateral arrangement. Especially for

the smaller countries in the ARF the forum is an excellent opportunity to engage and interact with the major powers.

The Forum has by now progressed beyond being mere venue for dialogue to a kind of parliament for substantive discussions on sensitive issues of common concern in the region. Its present emphasis is on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), while exploratory work being on, on Preventive Diplomacy (PD). The enhancement of the role of the ARF-Chair and the assignment of the ASEAN Secretariat to assist the ARF-Chair with the cooperation of the ARF Experts/Eminent Persons are seen as positive developments in this direction.

Another improvement is the inclusion of defense ministry officials and military personnel in the ARF and the ISGs. ARF is still far away from its goal of conflict resolution. Progress can only be achieved step by step, at a pace comfortable to all members. The ARF seems to be split into two basic sides: Those who are comfortable with status quo within the ARF process and those who want to push the ARF forward more rapidly towards PD and conflict settlement. The CBMs of the ARF during the last eleven-year have noticeably contributed towards the foundation of an ASEAN Community, as the CBMs have assisted in overcoming the suspicion between old and new ASEAN members.

The Bangkok meeting established the ARF as the first multilateral forum for consultation on Asia-Pacific security issues at the government level. Role of Thailand on ARF stage became more remarkable like in the First and the Seventh Meeting, Thailand chaired ARF's Seventh Meeting who welcomed the DPRK to join and participate in the meeting emphasizing the importance of CBMs to the overall ARF process, agreeing that such efforts be intensified. She also welcomed the progress in the implementation of the proposals that overlap between CBMs and PD in addition to the continued efforts to develop concepts and principles of PD applicable to the ARF context. In this regard, the ministers agreed that these developments had enhanced the continuity and relevance of the ARF process.

In the area of multilateral cooperation, and Thailand's international commitments, the Government shall abide by its obligations under the United Nations Charter, international law, cooperation frameworks to which Thailand subscribes. The Government shall step up Thailand's role in the ARF to promote and support peace; security; democratization; international development cooperation in economic, social, technical and human security aspects; humanitarian assistance, in particular post-conflict rehabilitation; counter-terrorism cooperation, and the development of Thailand into a center for international conferences and activities.

Thailand has made substantial contribution in strengthening the regional and bilateral cooperation in security. At regional level, Thailand has been an active participant within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to promote discussions and to prevent any threats and contribute to security within the Asia-Pacific Region.

Thailand is also in the process of acceding to the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures to which the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Cambodia too subscribed. Cooperation provided under this Agreement includes better coordination through the exchange of information and use of standard communication procedures, with a view to combating and preventing international terrorism and transnational crime.

In addition, Thailand plays an important role in coordinating a compromise in the region proposing to ARF to sponsor an informal meeting in order to facilitate dialogue, information exchange and cooperation in the region. Thailand as a pioneer member in ARF has been, over a decade, a consistent supporter of the ARF's operational strategies to maintain regional security, which became outstanding success.

The ARF is considered Asia's major security forum developing a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Minimal institutionalization, consensus decision-making and the use of first and second track diplomacy characterize the ARF. Performance of the ARF on regional issues in relation to peace and security is mostly concerned with security relating to Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor, the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea. General implications of newly developed CBMs, relationship between CBMs and PD, leading role and expansion of ASEAN, and nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear tests. ASEAN countries have played leading role in making the ARF member believe that a multilateral approach can enhance confidence among regional governments, ensure the involvement of major powers and help moderate their interaction in way that can contribute to the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.

These issues were discussed through the ARF working process which relies on a soft institutional structure operating under the ASEAN norm and under the concepts of non-use of force, non-interference, use of consultations and accommodation, and use of consensus. Such a working pattern has both advantages and limitations on the ARF to handle the above mentioned issues.

The ARF is a forum that creates an opportunity for discussion of regional issues. The ARF help reduce tensions between members and improve regional atmosphere and Détente annually summoning foreign ministers and senior officials from neighboring countries to discuss security issues.

China is committed to discuss the South China Sea disputes in a multilateral forum, to use the UN Law of the Sea and to assist in all further development of structures in the South China Sea. This showed that the ARF could provide a venue for these two great powers in conflict namely: US and China and restore them to equilibrium. At the official level, the routine work of the ARF encourages cooperation between states having an unresolved confrontation.



In the study of Chapter 3 and 4 about Specific Regional Issues and Challenging issues concerns countries of the region, to date. In Specific Regional Issues we can refer to traditional security in Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor, Korean Peninsula and South China Sea. Some conflicts have been solved and the situation is better now but some conflicts are still raging and unsolved. Challenging Issues - non-traditional security - such as transnational crime, economic security, environmental security and terrorism have reached global dimensions producing major new threat to the existence of humanity. In order to face the new situation, the ARF not only handle in traditional security but also new major threat to tackle and resolve it urgently.

Conclusion is that most successful of the ARF operations is its ability to build a good atmosphere through the forum. It provides venue for country representatives to work through security issues peacefully.

At meetings of the ARF, they discussed many regional issues. The forum aims at facilitating discussion among member states on regional and political security as well as developing cooperative measures, which contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability and the avoidance of conflict. However, it seeks to address security issues and disputes through consultation and dialogue rather than through "conventional collective security arrangements and formal mechanisms for setting disputes". In this regard, many ARF issues have not been effectively handled under its existing working process.

In respect of other policies, the ARF does not perform a critical role in solving regional crises. In the case of East Timor, the ARF members looked on the situation as an internal problem going by the ASEAN working concept of non-interference. Other than reaffirmed their support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity, the ARF does not yet play any role.

The ability of the ARF to deal with security circumstances is limited due to its working process and principles. A number of criticisms on the forum relate to

the absence of structures in the ARF. The Forum is not a formal self-regulating institutional mechanism. It does not have a formal charter, a constitution, a central authority or even a dispute settlement mechanism. The development of the ARF working process in order to increase its working capacity has been emphasized. Requirement of the participation of defense and military officials in the Fifth and Sixth Meetings, the support for expanding relationships with external parties in the Seventh and Eighth Meetings, the idea to build relations with the major powers through constructive relationships such as exchange of visits and regular meetings of the Heads of State or Government, and the response to globalization and its positive effects in order to strengthen the ARF capacities to meet the various challenges affecting common security, imply that the existing working structure of the ARF needs development to increase its efficiency in dealing with these new events.

Although the ARF makes significant contributions of efforts toward confidence building and PD in the Asia-Pacific region, in spite of above-mentioned limitations, the ARF cannot play a pivotal role if it remains a kind of consultative forum. It does not apply conflict resolution techniques to settle conflict situations. This practice requires basic instruments such as early-warning procedures, good offices or fact-finding arrangements that the appropriate institutionalized normative structure is needed.

The regime pattern of the ARF would be institutionalized as a regional security regime through the development of its structure by creating good offices and strengthening the activities of CBMs, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. This means seeking other international organization links. Moreover, it needs to have a strong normative base, transparency and regime management with measurement mechanism and governed rule, - components of institutional development.

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