

Politics of Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa

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PREFACE

The objective of this 'Politics of Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa' is to study the present three regional co-operations, viz., CONSAS, SADCC and PTA, and to give a clear, comprehensive and critical account of these co-operations. Their origins, objectives, organizational structures and activities are the targets of study. What are the forces/factors behind their origin? Is it economic or political? What type of organisational structure they have adopted, what are the peculiarities and

Why? What are the constraints in their various activities? Is it due to economic or political reason, or both? - these questions are the main guidelines in this study.

But apart from this, what is the inter-connection between these co-operations among themselves? , how do they effect each other?, what problems have been arisen due to their overlapping membership? how they are trying to solve these?, and what is their future prospect? - are the main objectives of the study. My motto in this study is to prove the paramountcy of political factors in these regional economic co-operations of southern Africa.

Methodologically, the dissertation seeks to analyse the facts instead of confining to the theoretical aspects. But as the roots of present day facts also lay in past developments the over-all method of analysis is the historical-empirical.

The work is based on my study of secondary as well as some of the primary sources available to me. On almost all fundamental points I have either quoted from some original document or referred to the available secondary sources. Throughout the exposition of different organisations, their criticism and evaluation, I have tried to be fair and impartial to them and to present many difficult and obscure points in as clear and correct a manner as I could.

In preparing this dissertation, I am deeply obliged and indebted to my supervisor Prof. Anirudha Gupta, who despite heavy commitments, has not only spared time for me but also helped me as my 'Guru', guide, guardian and friend. It will also be unwise for me, if I do not mention his affectionate encouragement, which he has provided me at every stage of my work.

To Professor Z.M. Khan and Professor Vijay Gupta I owe my debt for their advice admonitions, kind help and encouragement.

I am indebted to a number of eminent scholars who or whose works have been a source of help and inspiration to me. I am thankful to the staff members of JNU Library, ICCR Library and ICWA Library.

Any amount of gratitude would be too little for my friends. Their kind help, advice and admonitions have strengthened my dissertation considerably.


A great amount of gratitude goes to my mother and other family members for their help and sacrifices.

However, I retain full responsibility for all remaining errors of commission or omission.

Mohd. Muslim Khan

(MOHD. MUSLIM KHAN)

Co-operation in Southern Africa



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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

In the present day international relations, the concept of 'Regional Co-operation has gained tremendous importance not only as a process of avoiding conflict among nations but also as a positive step for their economic and social development. However, there is controversy in the demarkation of regions. The common-sense, way of defining regions is on the basis of distinct land masses, such as Asia, Europe, North and South America, and Africa etc. But in this there is conceptual controversy that - should Eastern Europe be grouped with a cluster of nation states called Europe or with a different cluster called socialist countries ? Should Arab-speaking northern Africa be grouped in a region called the Middle-East, the Mediterranean, or Africa ? Is Turkey an Asian, or a European, a Balkan, a Mediterranean, a developing, or a NATO state ? Till now different criterias have been adopted for identifying regions which yield altogether different regional configurations. Some of the most commonly used criteria for grouping nation-states into regions are :

- (a) Geographical Criteria : Grouping nation-States on the basis of their locations in continents, sub-continents, archipelagoes etc., e.g. Europe, Asia etc.

- (b) Military/Political Criteria : Grouping nation states on the basis of their participation in alliances, or on the basis of ideological and political orientation - for example, the communist bloc, the capitalist bloc, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Third World etc.
- (c) Economic Criteria : Grouping nation-states on the basis of (1) selected criteria of economic development, such as gross national product (GNP) and industrial output, - for example, industrialized, developing, or less developed states etc., or (2) on Transactional basis; on volume and frequency of exchange of people, goods, and services, such as immigrants, tourists, trade and messages - for example, the United States, and Canada, the West European market area, the East European Soviet market area etc.

One can group countries into regions according to a number of other criteria as well - for example, language, religion, culture, population density and climate. So there is no hard and fast rule in the demarkation of a region, as well as, a region can be a combination of various criterias. Similarly, Southern Africa, on the basis of sub-continental character reflects geographical criteria while at the same time it also reflects economic criteria

on the basis of economic development (low industrial and agricultural output), exchange of goods, services, trade, etc.

The regional co-operations that have been created since World War II can be conveniently divided into two major types and also a third, hybrid type. The first type is regional defense organizations,¹ such as the North Atalantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact). The second type comprised economic organizations (also called, functional organizations), such as the European Economic Community (EEC), the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), and the Latin American Free Trade Association. In Southern Africa such type of organizations are Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC); the Preferential Trade Area (PTA, covering Southern as well as eastern African Countries); The Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) - though till now, confined to South African borders only, covering South Africa and four independent homelands. There are other such functional co-operations also, like

1. These are also called "Institutionalized Alliances".

Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) basically dominated by South Africa but both of these lack regional dimension. SACU is confined to Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and South Africa (including Namibia). It is also a colonial legacy as it was established in 1910 when BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) were under colonial rule. Though they became independent states in the late 1960s, but the close economic integration continued. This compelled these countries to re-negotiate the custom-union treaty in 1969. SACU is administered by South Africa and collects customs and excise revenues on all imports by the member-countries. These countries reap the benefits of membership because South Africa is one of their major markets and supplies 86% of Botswana's imports and 90% of Lesotho and Swaziland.² In 1982, Swaziland received 60% of its total government revenue from SACU. The figures for Botswana and Lesotho are 37% and 71%. But at present there are indications that it may break up soon. Article 16 of the agreement (of SACU) says, - contracting party shall afford freedom of transit without discrimination in goods consigned to and from the areas of the contracting parties. But early in June 1984, South Africa imposed an

2. Figures in 1984, Source. African Recorder, May 20-June 2, 1984, p. 6477.

economic blockade on Lesotho by imposing strict border controls and preventing free flow of traffic between the two countries.³ This caused chaos in Lesotho with food and other commodities running short. This type of blockade had also been done several times after June 1984.

Like SACU, RMA is also a colonial legacy and lacks regional dimension. Even when BLS countries had got independence, South African currency (rand) continued to be the sole currency in circulation, without any formal agreement. There were no payment restrictions between them, the residents of the three BLS countries had (though not their governments),⁴ unimpeded access to the financial services available in the South Africa; and the banks operated defacto as extensions of the South African banking system. Legally, the two large banks in the BLS countries, Barclays and Standard, were branches of the United Kingdom parent banks, but in practice they co-ordinated their business with their South African counterparts. Surplus funds were placed in Johannesburg (South Africa) and loans

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3. Africa Diary, Feb. 26-March 3, 1984, p. 11802. South Africa has also refused to transit arms brought by Lesotho from Britain and those donated from communist countries. These actions had been described by the Foreign Minister, Evaristus Sekhonyana, as - "South is committed to topple the legitimate government in Lesotho and replace it with puppet regime". He further said that South Africa "wants to coerce Lesotho into recognising South Africa's Homelands".
 4. J.W. Goedhuys, The Rand Monetary Area, Africa Insight, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1985.

exceeding their Deposits were funded from there. On the other hand, under the Custom Union, the South African exchange and control of customs and excise revenue had encompassed the whole area. So following the renewal of customs Union Agreement of 1969, negotiations began in 1973 towards a comparable treaty on currency and banking, in order to establish RMA which was finally established in 1974, by signing of the agreement by Swaziland and Lesotho with South Africa (Botswana was not a party to the agreement. As its economy was less dependent on South Africa than Lesotho and Swaziland, announced its withdrawal from the negotiations and its intention to set up its own Central Bank - the Bank of Botswana, and to issue its own currency, the pula). According to the provisions of agreement :

- (i) the rand remains legal tender in Swaziland and Lesotho (alongwith the lilangeni and the Maloti);
- (ii) The South African Reserve Bank manages the gold and foreign exchange reserves for the monetary areas as a whole;
- (iii) Within the monetary area there is free movement of funds, except that Swaziland and Lesotho may introduce measures for the mobilization of domestic resources in the interest of local development. Financial institutions in Swaziland and Lesotho are required to invest a portion of their funds locally. For South African financial institutions, however, government stock issued by two partner countries rank as prescribed investments upto 1.5% of

holding prescribed for every institution. By this provision, the Swaziland and Lesotho governments gain assured access to the South African capital market. The stock issues they make are decided in consultation with the South African government. The control over financial institutions is the responsibility of each individual government; (iv) Monetary policy in the two smaller countries is nominally independent, but in practice restricted by the basically similar exchange controls and the obligation to hold rand assets equal to the local currency issue; etc. At present, however, only Lesotho and South Africa are in RMA as the Swaziland had withdrawn from it on 18 April 1986. While announcing the decision the Swazi Finance Minister Mr. B.S. Dlamini, said that it "will give us greater freedom to manage our foreign exchange reserves and greater flexibility in our domestic credit policy".⁵ Thus even RMA is degenerating though this is also a *fact* that despite the withdrawal, the economy and currency of Swaziland remains closely linked to South Africa because of its membership of Custom Union which provided 60% of government revenue in 1986.

Hybrid regional co-operations carry out multifunctional activities. It is difficult to determine whether these are primarily political, economic, military, or cultural. Examples

5. The Citizen, 19 April, 1986.

of this type of co-operations are such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League and the British Commonwealth of Nations, Hybrid Organizations contain elements of political and economic and occasionally military and cultural co-operation.

Majority of these organizations were developed primarily as a response to the post World War II cold war environment and the shattering of the dreams of global collective security. And most of the regional defence organizations were the product of American "pactomania" during the Truman/Acheson and Eisenhower/Dulles administrations in the late 1940s and the 1950s. The establishment of the Inter-American Defence System (1947), NATO (1949), the Australia - New Zealand - United States (ANZUS) Pact (1952), and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO; 1954), are some of its examples. These pacts made the United States a mobile global power with the defence systems of non-communist nation-states in Latin America, Europe, and South East Asia respectively. In addition, the United States associated itself indirectly with British led Middle Eastern defence mechanism initially named the Bagdad Pact (1955) and later renamed CENTO (1959). To counter American and other non-communist states' mechanism of global security, the Soviet Union and Communist East European countries formed an elaborate regional defence organization, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in 1955.

However, it is more accurate, rather to view post-war collective defence organisations as institutionalized alliances, which reflect ideological and power bipolarity as well as the willingness of strategically positioned intermediate and small nation-states to seek or accept united states' or Soviet Union's military protection. These regional defence organizations have exhibited remarkable institutional persistence, even in times of detente among the superpowers. These have not stopped the occurrence of disputes between member states. The serious disputes between Honduras and El Salvador in OAS, Greece and Turkey in NATO, and Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact, are examples of such conflicts.

Judging from recent developments in the international system - the muting of the cold war, collective arrangements for arms control and disarmament, the increasing participation of communist countries (particularly the Chinese Peoples' Republic) in global bargaining - the regional defence organization seem to be gradually de-emphasized. However, these organizations might not atrophy completely, because of their institutions - especially the elaborate bureaucracies that have been established for administrative purposes - have remarkable durability. This asset allows a defence organization to be defended on economic, social,

scientific, or even cultural grounds - once the military grounds have been seriously questioned.

The developing countries of Southern Africa who formed various co-operations in 1980s, viz., - CONSAS, SADCC and PTA - have deliberately tried to avoid the creation of defence organizations and creation of supra-national institutions. Their emphasis is on the functional/ economic co-operation, showing that their primary aim is the economic development of member states and the region rather than the formation of any defence organization. But a close examination of these economic co-operations - CONSAS, SADCC and PTA, reveals the fact that with economic aspects the political aspects are also involved in their origins, objectives and functioning taking a lead to economic aspects. The politics involved is not only regional but also international influencing these co-operations at large.

The purpose of this dissertation is to study the present three regional co-operations (CONSAS, SADCC and PTA). Their origin, objectives, structure and activities will be the target of study. what are the forces / factors behind their origin ? , What type of structures they have adopted and why ? , What are their various activities and what are the constraints in achieving their objectives ? - These questions will be the main guidelines in this study. But apart from this, what is interconnection between these

co-operations among themselves ?, How do they effect each other ?, What problems have been arisen due to their over-lapping membership ? How they are trying to solve it ?, what is their future prospect ? - will be the main objective of the study.

However, before examining the regional economic co-operations in Southern Africa it is essential to understand some of the terms used in this dissertation and their different dimensions. The term - "Economic Co-operation" has been used here in a broad sense to embrace not only the different types of regional co-ordination of economic plans but also preferential arrangements ranging from granting partial preferential treatment to full economic 'integration'. The term 'integration' is employed here to indicate relatively more advanced forms of economic co-operation such as Economic Union or Customs Union or Free Trade Area. Economic integration is defined as the process by which discontinuities and discriminations existing along national frontiers are progressively removed between two or more countries.⁶ It has taken several forms representing varying degree of co-operation of which Economic Union, still an ideal, is the most advanced form. Under

6. David Robertson, International Trade Policy, p. 51.

Economic Union "goods, services and capital move freely without any restrictions and the economic activities and policies of the constituent countries are harmonized and co-ordinated.⁷ In a Common Market, trade barriers and restrictions on factor movements are abolished among the partners. In a Customs Union, there is "the substitution of a single custom territory for two or more customs, territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (i.e. tariffs, quantitative restrictions, outright prohibition of imports, licences, foreign exchange allocation, multiple exchange rates and other administrative and regulatory measures designed to curb imports) are eliminated with respect to substantially all trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories and (ii) ... the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to trade of territories not included in the union".⁸ In a Free Trade Area, tariff and quantitative restrictions among the participating countries are abolished, but each country retains its own

7. United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. XII, No. 1, June 1961, p. 3.

8. Article XXIV of GATT.

tariff against non-members. Finally, total Economic Integration presupposes the unification of economic, fiscal etc., policies and requires the setting up of a supernational authority, whose decisions are binding for the member states.⁹

The advanced models of regional economic integration have not been given favour by the developing countries of Southern Africa. Out of the three modern regional co-operations, it is only PTA which has adopted the slightly advanced model of tight integration and which obtains less favour and commitment by southern African Countries in comparison to SADCC. Actually in tight integration model southern African Countries, which have got independence recently and where the nationalist favour is high, fear the threat of sharing sovereignty with supra-national institutions. It is political and not the economic reason which is paramount. The political reason which has led to the creation of SADCC by Front Line States to Counter the South African Co-operation model of CONSAS. CONSAS is viewed by the independent states of Southern Africa as an effort of the racist government to dominate economically

9. Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration*, (Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Illinois, pp.2-7).

and eventually politically in the region and thus causing a threat to their economic and political independence. In Chapters II, III and IV, dealing with CONSAS, SADCC & PTA respectively efforts have been made to study the various political aspects while studying organizations' origins, objectives and activities. And in the Chapter V efforts have been made to draw a conclusion on the basis of all these studies, to prove paramountcy of political factors and to sketch the prospects of the co-operations.

CHAPTER-II

CONSTELLATION OF SOUTHERN
AFRICAN STATES (CONSAS)

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AFRICAN STATES (CONSAS)

'CONSAS' is the South African strategy to establish a regional co-operation in the Southern Africa. It was proposed by South Africa at the time when other independent African nations were trying to establish a regional co-operation in the region among themselves though not much progress had been achieved in that direction by that time.¹ By establishing 'CONSAS' South Africa, thus, wanted to make an economic co-operation under its own guidance which could enhance its formal contact with the neighbouring countries, help in socio-economic progress of the members and finally establish a confederation in the region. At present the members of CONSAS include : South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana Venda and Ciskei.

ORIGIN:

The idea of co-operation came in to the light for the first time in a speech of Mr. R.F. Botha, Minister of

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1. Over the period 1977-1978 a number of background and technical papers were prepared by Southern African Countries which dealt with regional issues, primarily concerning transportation. However, the serious effort for the creation of a regional co-operation (SADCC) by Southern African States started only after the proposition of CONSAS by South Africa.

Foreign Affairs and Information of South Africa, in a Parliamentary debate on 3rd April 1979. He announced that there would be a new era of closer co-operation under CONSAS by taking "the 40 million people south of a line from the Kunene and Zimbezi rivers" on a "new Great Trek" towards a southern Africa based on "an equitable division of power and land".² To establish CONSAS, was soon given much importance by the Prime Minister, P.W. Botha. The proposal was sent to, and agreed by, the heads of three independent states, viz., Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.³ Following this

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2. Republic of South Africa, Hansard, House of Assembly Debates, 4 April 1979.
 3. Although no country in the world, except South Africa, has recognised these so called independent states, they were initially recognized and created as "Bantustans" by South Africa under its territory, and later on given the status of independent states, - Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977 and Venda in 1979. Later on in 1981, Ciskei bantustan was also given independence which joined CONSAS in the same year. All these independent states are - within the boundary of South Africa. South Africa continued to impose citizenship of these states on large number of its own population (only on blacks) and then to classify them as foreigners, removing them from official population and other statistics. Source : Africa South of Sahara, Europa Publication Ltd., 1987, p. 904.

decision a meeting of senior officials from these states and South Africa, was held in Pretoria on 22 October, 1979, to discuss and formulate plans for closer co-operation in the fields of Agriculture, transport, telecommunications and Health. On the recommendations of this meeting and after its acceptance by the respective governments, a secretariat was established in Pretoria. The Secretariat, soon after its formation, started arranging inaugural multilateral technical meetings in the above four fields of co-operation. On 23 July, 1980, the first Summit meeting of heads of government of the member states, was held. The heads of the government affirmed their commitment to the success of co-operation in the summit and agreed to extend areas of co-operation to road planning, forestry, education and training. Thus the establishment of CONSAS was completed by this summit. It was, latter on, joined by Ciskei in 1981, which got independence the same year, thereby, the membership increased to five. Due to South Africa's control Namibia is also under the area of CONSAS.

The term "constellation" chosen for the co-operation, by South Africa, reflects the motive that as in a constellation stars remain in a fixed positions in relation to each other and planets of individual stars rotate round it in a fixed satellite relationship, for example, as the planets

of the sun rotate round it. Similarly, the South Africa as a major economic and political power in the region would act as sun in relation to other powerful states of the world, while the southern African states act as planets of South Africa having fixed economic and political relations with it under 'CONSAS'.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES:

According to the South African view point the 'constellation' initiative was taken for formalizing the ad hoc contact between the states of Southern Africa which had thus far taken place.⁴ The constellation, therefore, may imply a merging and rationalisation of existing and often divergent functional structures in southern Africa as a pre-requisite for meaningful economic development. However, J.A. Shaw⁵ contends this point by saying that the constellation does not denote a truly formal structure but rather a grouping of states in which no state will make laws or take decisions for

4. Dr. J.A. Shaw, "Functional Co-operation as a precursor to confederalism in Southern Africa", *Africa Insight*, Vol. 13, no. 1, 1983. The author is also a high rank official of the Republic of South Africa.

5. Ibid.

another state. The co-operation is voluntary, growing naturally and organically from within on the basis of sovereign equality of states. The possibility of a satellite relationship or fear of hegemonistic design or of do-mination are ruled out precisely because of the political autonomy of the constituent parts. The structure of the constellation, he says, is loose, to be likened to the structures of inter-governmental bodies, within the international community which are guided by confederal principles.

The second objectives of the constellation is to establish peace and prosperity in the region. It has been said by the Prime Minister of South Africa, P.W. Botha, that the "Peace and prosperity" are the 'twin pillars' on which the 'constellation' idea rests.⁶ Botha said that to achieve these ideals close socio-economic, technological and scientific co-operation were necessary. The primary thrust was therefore, economic with free enterprise system, aligned with democracy, human rights and justice for all and self-determination. Thus, he said that ideologically it should be viewed as anti-Marxist.

6. Mr. P.W. Botha, PM of South Africa, in a speech at the Southern Cross Fund Banquet, 3 October, 1979.

The final objective of the 'constellation' is to establish a confederation. In Parliamentary debates in 1980 and again in 1981 the Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, elaborated his government's view of the constellation of states and stated that the constellation could develop into a confederation.⁷ He also marked out four guidelines to this end, which were :

- (i) Sovereignty not to be affected;
- (ii) equal status for member-states;
- (iii) member states to have the right to withdraw from certain areas of co-operation or form the confederation itself; and
- (iv) the confederation is not to inhibit bilateral contact.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES:

The tight integration approaches like, customs Union, common market etc., have been avoided by the 'CONSAS'. It has adopted 'Functionalism' as a model for co-operation which offers loose structure and gives priority to functions rather than structure (or institutions). Whatever institutions are established, these are only to facilitate


7. No confidence debate on 6 February 1980 and 5 August 1981.

the functions of the organization. There is another important feature of the functional model that it does not seek to curtail national sovereignty of members. This reflects that, while establishing co-operation South Africa was well aware of the fact that in their search for material progress, states cannot ignore the deep roots of nationality. The CONSAS, thus, has formed some of the institutions essential for its functioning and efforts have been made to avoid them from becoming supra-national institutions. These are the Summit, the Secretariat and various Multilateral Functional Committees.

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(A) The Summit : It consists of the Heads of Government of member states. In the summit meetings recommendations of multilateral function committees are put for approval. In its first meeting (Pretoria : 23rd July, 1980), it appointed Gerhard de Kock as co-ordinator of Constellation to promote the constellation programme. It also adopted various policies and programmes of action. In the summit decisions are taken by concensus.

(B) The Secretariat : Established in Pretoria, it serves mainly as a co-ordinating body. It co-ordinates the activities of various multilateral functional Committees and put their recommendations in the summit meetings for approval by the member-states.



(C) Multilateral Functional Committees : Numerous multilateral functional committees (together with Working Groups) have been established till now to perform sectoral functions. They are : (1) Inter-state Transport Liaison Committee (ITLC), it has two working groups also, viz., Tourism Working Group and Civil Aviation Working Group; (2) Agricultural Liaison Committee (ALC), it has three working groups - Forestry working Group, Nature Conservation Working Group and Veterinary Working Group; (3) Education and Training Committee (ETC); (4) Post and Telecommunications Consultative Committee (PTCC), it has a Radio Broadcasting Working Group; (5) Steering Committee on Copyright and Exterritorial Transmission; (6) Multilateral Economic Committee; (7) Inter-state Health and Welfare Committee (IHWC). First meetings of all these committees adopted working principles and future guidelines for them.

(1) Inter-state Transport Liaison Committee (ITLC):

This Committee was formed on 26 May 1980 at the South African Railways (SAR) Headquarters, Johannesburg, under the Chairmanship of Mr. B. Mills, of the South African Department of Transport. This Committee would appoint ad hoc working groups as and when necessary. This Committee also keeps the details of the Transport Committee of the custom Union agreement between South Africa and BLS

(Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) states to avoid duplication. In its second meeting on 26 Nov., 1980, on the demand of member states a multilateral study group was created to visit each state in turn to identify its short-term transport needs in a regional context and its recommendations were placed before the third regular meeting of ITLC held in Windhock on 15 and 16 June 1981. In Windhock meeting recommendation was made that studies be undertaken on Master Transportation Plans which would survey transport needs, rural roads, railways, civil-aviation etc., and possible ways to stimulate the growth of economic and social development. The meeting of Windhock reiterated the purpose of the Committee as :

- (1) to identify needs in the field of transport and tourism;
- (2) to formulate joint solutions by way of direct technical contact in respect of common problems; and
- (3) to co-ordinate inter-state action in the field of transport and tourism to ensure economic and social development in the inter-state field.

It has two working groups, viz :

Tourism Working Group : This working group was recommended by the second meeting of ITLC and it studies

the great scope for co-ordination of tourist promotion in Southern Africa. Its first meeting was held in 1981 (14 April) in Pretoria and matter discussed included the grading by hotel boards consumer surveys for tourist potential, training facilities and in service training and the need for joint planning and joint action in tourist promotion.

Civil Aviation Working Group : Its first meeting was held on 26 and 27 Nov., 1981, in Pretoria. Its recommendations covered, uniform aviation legislation, search and rescue, accident reporting, the licensing of aerodromes, publication and information sheets, notice to airmen, navigation aid and manpower development.

(2) Agricultural Liaison Committee (AIC) :

This committee was constituted on 5 June 1980. Its main objective is promotion of closer co-operation among member countries in all matters pertaining to agriculture and rational development, control and utilisation of all related natural resources. Water affairs are also included in the meetings but as rivers normally concern no more than two states, the equitable division of scarce water resources fall within the purview of existing bilateral permanent water commissions and the need to discuss the allocation of water resources in a multilateral context.

does not arise. It has three main working groups viz., Forestry Working Group, Nature Conservation Working Group and Veterinary Working Group.

Forestry Working Group : Created on 14 Jan., 1981. It was initiated by the need for an overall regional forestry guide plan to cover a forty-year period. Such a long term plan will enable participating states to implement short-term plans and will create in investor confidence in future since the setting up of timber factories is a costly affair. The first meeting agreed to a Central computerised control and planning action. This will enable supply and demand of forestry products to be harmonised especially with reference to the export market. This group also discusses the fire preventive measures and eradication of plant invaders. Member-states assist each other through the exchange of information.

Nature Conservation Working Group : This was set up to co-ordinate nature and wild-life conservation among the participant countries, including the National Parks Board, the four Provincial Administrations and the Departments of Forestry, Agriculture and Co-operation and Development.

Veterinary Working Group : This group was created on 17th Sept., 1980 by ALC and discusses long term veterinary development, game cropping, animal disease control, veterinary health inspection and disease control etc.

(3) Education and Training Committee (ETC) :

It was established on 10 October 1980. In its inaugural meeting in Pretoria it was decided to split its activities into three sub-committees, viz., university and teacher training, pre-tertiary and tertiary vocational and technical training and public in service training and secondments. Before its Windhock meeting in 1981, the Committee visited several educational Institutions and recommendations were made to respective government.

(4) Post and Telecommunications Consultative Committee (PTCC)

It was inaugurated on 23 May 1980 at South African Post Office Headquarter, Pretoria, and meets annually in Pretoria. Its deliberations made it clear that a shortage of trained manpower was the main common problem and a co-ordinator for technical assistance including training was accordingly appointed. SAPO (South African Post Office) invited member-states to use its training facilities, while Transkei offered its training school for telecom electricians. South Africa gives grants for technical assistance to states which are inhibited financially. In its second plenary session in 1981, the shortage of trained manpower figured in the discussions along with ratification of the allocation requirements, standardisation of telecommunication equipment and the establishment of a steering committee to investigate

the position with regard to copyright and the relaying of programmes ex-territorially. It has a Radio Broadcasting Working Group.

Radio Broadcasting Working Group : This group after its two meetings in 1980 and 1981, reported back to PTCC on their efforts to reach agreement that :

- (i) the rules, procedures and regulations of International Telecommunication Union (ITU) be accepted as the basis for co-ordination and planning of broadcasting services in Southern Africa;
- (ii) any deviation from the ITU's rules, regulations, procedures and practices be the subject of mutual agreement between affected administrations; and
- (iii) In the absence of any other agreed standards and practices the resolutions and recommendations of the Consultative Committee for International Radio Communications (CCIR) and the International Consultative Committee for Telephony and Telegraphy (ICCTT) be accepted.⁸

8. J.A. Shaw, 'Funcational Co-operation as a Precursor to confederalism in Southern Africa', Africa Insight, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1983, pp. 10-11.

(5) Steering Committee on Copyright and Exterritorial Transmission :

This Committee discusses copyright. In its 1st meeting in 1981 it was decided to work towards a Southern African broadcasting union and in 1981 a South African Committee under the Chairmanship of B.J. du Plessis, was established to negotiate with other Southern African governments on co-operation, regulation and rationalisation of broadcasting in the region.

(6) Multilateral Economic Committee :

This Committee was established to provide a channel for contact with the South African Special Constellation Committee (SKK).⁹ In its 1st meeting in 1980 it was decided to establish a multilateral Development Bank as one of the major institution of CONSAS. Prime Minister, Botha of South Africa explained this proposal of Development Bank as an inspiring opportunity to embark upon the system of multilateral co-operation in economic affairs among the governments of Southern Africa.¹⁰

9. SKK had been created to facilitate the establishment of CONSAS.

10. J.A. Shaw, op.cit., p.13.

No doubt, economic development in the less developed areas of the Southern Africa is the most urgent need particularly in black national states but there was the fear that the stimulation and financing of such economic development could fall under the control and management of South African agencies alone. So a new policy of multilateral control over development was formulated. This had three specific aspects : (1) support for the proposed multilateral Development Bank; (2) The promotion of development co-operation on a sub-regional basis, where necessary across the political borders of sub-regions and where necessary related to the consolidation of the national and independent states; and (3) the rationalisation of the various public corporations for small business which also involves the novel idea of entering into joint venture with leading private financial and other business institutions.¹¹

Support for the proposed development bank came unanimously from all member states in their meeting of 20 October, 1980 in Pretoria. Thereafter, meetings were held with the independent states and with SWA/Namibia to discuss the statute of the bank. A new committee to proceed

11. Ibid., p. 14.

with the formulation of the bank was formed on 17 Feb., 1982 and it was anticipated that the bank would be established during 1983 for which South Africa had already committed R 17 million initial sub-scription capital. J.A. Shaw describes the impact of this multilateral Development Bank as - "There can be no doubt about the tremendous impact the establishment of such a multilateral development bank can made on the rate of growth in the less developed areas of Southern Africa. It is also most powerful vehicle to attract financial, technical and entrepreneurial participation from abroad in these development programmes. There is throughout the non-communist world today a very strong movement towards constraining the influence of politics in economic growth. If this multilateral bank, established and controlled by the government of Southern Africa, can demonstrate that it is able to promote economic development without getting involved in diplomatic problems of the Southern African region, it will indeed become one of the major achievements of the present era."¹²

The policy of creating small business development corporation was materialised by the formation of Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) on 12 Feb., 1981,

12. Ibid., p. 14.

when the first meeting of shareholders took place. Till now several board meetings have already taken place and a Programme Advisory Board has been nominated by the Republic of South Africa to co-ordinate the activities of all agencies concerned with the promotion of small business enterprises. In this private companies have shown much interest, 82 companies in the private sector took up shares of R 63 million while initially it was thought that out of total capital of R 100 million of the corporation only R 50 million (half) would be taken by Private sectors while other half (R 50 m) by South African Government.

Effort at official (government) multilateral level is also enthusiastic. The Republic of South Africa, Trans-Kei, Boputhatswana, Venda and (SWA) Namibia participated in a private visit to Taiwan and Hong-Kong in 1981 (March) to study various small business enterprises.

For *regional* economic co-operation and the setting up of inter-state functional economic development regions, the heads of the governments met on 20 July 1981 in Cape Town. When the SKK was disbanded in Aug., 1981, the responsibility for regional economic co-operation and other multilateral economic matters were assumed by the office of the Prime Minister of South Africa. In Nov. (12) 1981 Good Hope Conference, the Prime Minister presented a special report containing amongst other matters, far reaching recommendations to decentralisation of industries. These

proposals were discussed further with representatives of the governments of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei and the matter was finalised in Cape Town Summit of heads of the government and the proposals were implemented in April 1982.

The registration of industrial property, trademarks, patents and designs are also discussed under the Economic Committee. Nov. 23, 1981 meeting of the Committee recommended to the members that a working Committee be set up to investigate the possibility of establishing a central office of similar facility which would facilitate registration of industrial property while reducing the expenses which were at that time involved in such registration.

(7) Inter-State Health and Welfare Committee (IHWC) :

Its inaugural meeting was held in Pretoria on 28 Jan., 1981 under the Chairmanship of Deputy Director General Health of South Africa, Dr. J. Gilliland. Discussions covered nutritional problems, a one day visit by member states to the Institute of Virology and immunology in Johannesburg, the possibility of multilateral health agreement to replace existing bi-lateral agreements as well as agreements on the destruction of food-stuffs not fit for human consumption on arrival at ports of entry, training the national health service plan, the covering of one day health workshop etc. The second meeting of IHWC at Mmabatho (Capital of Bophuthatswana) on 24 July 1981 discussed inter-alia a

a planned cholera programme, legislation governing homeopaths, herbalist, osteopaths, naturopaths and related health practitioners, welfare administration and problems. A working group was established to study matters related to nursing and nursing services. In Mmabatho it was agreed that the proposed multilateral agreement should be extended to include welfare services. As it was decided in inaugural meeting in Pretoria (1981), the Committee, rotates the venue of meetings to member-states to facilitate better understanding of health and welfare problems.

The above efforts of co-operation in various sectors under the constellation of southern African States, have proved to be significant. The first significance of the formation of CONSAS was that the ad hoc contact which had thus far taken place between South-Africa and the states of Southern Africa - viz., Bophuthatswana, Transkei, Ciskei and Venda - was formalised. On the other hand constellation provided an opportunity to develop mutual relationship and extend areas of co-operation by moving from bilateral contact towards more expensive and beneficial contact through multilateral treaty arrangements. However, such an arrangement is beneficial when the participating state are having free political will and adequate economic strength to be proved as partners of co-operation. The situation in CONSAS is just opposite. The four so called independent states

are very poor and heavily dependent on South Africa for national income, majority of which comes from the labour employment in South Africa (see Appendix). Politically these states are the puppets of South Africa. Actually they have been created by South Africa not because, it wanted to give black Africans civil and political rights, and end the burden of apartheid policy, but to remove them from towns and industrial areas by creation of Bantustans and later on from national politics by giving independence to Bantustans and classifying inhabitants as foreigners.

Multilateral functional meetings provide a forum at which participating states consult with each other and exchange information, thereby increasing each other's knowledge of common problems. The regular nature of the meetings ensures a continuous exchange and interchange of views and information, this on the otherhand ensures that the scarce resources of the region are fully utilised and particularly that they are not duplicated. But the great significance of the meetings is the other way also. As recommendations were made by the functional committees on the basis of consensus, this introduces a form of power-sharing which is a primary step towards the equitable division of power in the sub-continent.

Besides exchanging information the meetings of multilateral committees and their working groups provide a forum for advice and for the subsequent provision of

project and technical assistance. Though the multilateral functional committees have no financial powers, but they serve as a platform for the identification of projects, especially those with a regional focus, which can subsequently be pursued on a national, bilateral or multilateral levels.

The co-ordination and harmonisation of policies and practices is one of the primary objectives of CONSAS, so over and above the day-to-day bilateral contact, between the constellation states, CONSAS, through its summit and functional meetings provide a forum where an incipient common regional strategy can be formulated. The states of Southern Africa are economically inter-dependent. Among the members of CONSAS only 18 % of total domestic income is generated within Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda and only 23% of the increase in labour force can be employed within the domestic economy of these states. In this state of under development and dependency on South Africa for national income and labour employment, the standardisation and harmonisation of economic and technical endeavours is crucial if meaningful development levels are to be attained. So these states act as a unit with South Africa. Under constellation structure senior officials as well as their political leaders are meeting regularly and they have always stressed their support as a group, to resist and stop all attempts from outside to interfere in their affairs and

impose solution on southern Africa by force. In the foreign Minister's meeting on 15 Jan., 1981 all the foreign ministers of member states emphasised their desire to promote "political and economic stability in the sub-continent". The heads of the government of member states are also meeting under the constellation structure and they are putting possible efforts to provide support to the promotion of constellation. The appointment of Dr. Gerhard de Kock as a Co-ordinator of Constellation Affairs by 1980 (23 July) meeting of Heads of the Government, creation of multilateral Development Bank and small Business Development Corporation are some of the efforts for the same. But as except South Africa, no member provides technical experts who can impose the necessity and priorities of their low developed states. The technical committees are mainly dominated by South African experts who are more conscious of their own country's needs and priorities. So information and decision provide main benefit to South Africa and other members are only getting side benefits. In matters of advice and technical assistance as well as regional planning it is the South African Interest which dominates.

The CONSAS is the first large post-independence inter-governmental body in the region besides SARTC (Southern African Regional Tourism Council) Created in 1973, with membership confined to South Africa, Malawi and Swaziland.

No doubt, in Southern Africa there were three multilateral bodies set up during and after colonial era, viz., - South African Custom Union (SACU), the Rand Monetary Area and the Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil (Sarccus) - but as SARTC, all these three multilateral bodies lacked the sub-continental focus of the CONSAS. Though the present constellation includes South Africa and those states which gained independence from it forming "inner constellation". South Africa, today is providing development funds in excess of a billion Rand per annum to these states, in hope to make an impression of the donor of huge money for development and to create a more conducive political climate which will attract other states of Southern Africa to form "greater or outer constellation", and thereby solving its (RSA's) security problems. Frontline states, - the main opponents of South African apartheid policy and its illegal control of Namibia, who are also providing assistance to liberation movements - SWAPO and ANC - , if become allured by South African model and agree to co-operate with it, its (RSA) security threat will be minimum besides securing market for its goods in these countries. So benefits could be both economic and political for consas members and particularly for South Africa.

The primary thrust of the consas is economic co-operation, but as the founders have stated often, that the

constellation could develop into a confederation, so the existing non-aggression pacts on bilateral level would also eventually merge into a regional defence pact, including a sub-continental solidarity in which consas forms a separate regional power bloc in international sphere between East and West, and neighbouring states as well.

Consas has its revolutionary impact in the region otherway also. Other countries of Southern Africa feared Consas, that it could result in even greater South African economic dominance in the sub-continent - with obvious political consequences.¹³ Some observers perceived it as the "extension of apartheid to foreign policy" of South Africa,¹⁴ while others called it the setting up of a "neo-colonial empire".¹⁵ The black neighbouring states perceived an urgent need to counter Pretoria's move and within a few weeks (early May 1979) of South Africa's proposing Consas (3 April 1979) the foreign ministers of the Front-line states met in Gaboron (Capital of Botswana) where the idea of SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference) - an anti-constellation or counter-

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13. Deon Goldenhuys, *The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Council : towards a new regional stalemate ?*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1981, p. 19.
14. SADEX, African Bibliographic Center, Washington DC, Vol. 3, no. 2, March/April 1981, p. 2.
15. Seamns Cleary, *Two Views on SA's foreign policy and the Constellation of States*, SA Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1981.

constellation- was first mooted to reduce the economic dependence of these states on South Africa. SADCC, after its formation, has accelerated much the economic development and self-reliance of frontline states. The commitment of Front-line states to the success of SADCC would not have been such in the absence of Consas.

The success of Consas is, however, limited. Lack of constituent treaty and legal jurisdiction over members are the two aspects which provide internal self-restraint to it. The Consas has also created wide spread suspicion outside the borders of South Africa. The suspicion is less due to economic hegemony of South Africa, but more due to its pursuance of force and apartheid as national policy and destabilization of neighbouring states. This has resulted in keeping them away from the constellation. Let us discuss these aspects in detail.

Lack of Constituent Treaty :

The ultimate aim of Consas is to create a confederation, but at present it exhibits a functional typology. Functionalism offers equality and sovereignty while recognising the forces of nationalism and needs not the signing of an appropriate multilateral treaty. Consas is basically a regional co-operation (no doubt dominated by South Africa). It was created by the will of its members

but does not have the sanction of any treaty, while confederalism is a stage beyond functionalism and occurs with the signing of an appropriate multilateral treaty.

Lack of Legal Jurisdiction Over Members :

Its central authority viz., Secretariat, has only co-ordinating power and does not have independent powers because member states retain their own individual autonomy. This autonomy is only effected in so far as they are willing, so it has neither executive nor legal jurisdiction over member states who fail to fulfil their obligation. This deprives the secretarial and its multilateral functional committees any competence, fiscal or legislative, over individual citizens in the respective states. Common decisions are implemented by a member state only within its own territory and in respect of its own citizens and other states and their citizens are not bound except morally.

However, the above mentioned problems though provide self (inner) restraint, but they are not in any way a threat to the survival of Consas and the realisation of its aims. Due to greater dependence of other member-states on South Africa, even without creating confederation the situation is nearly like that and no state except South Africa (the proposer itself) can withdraw. On the other hand, though

Consas is mainly dominated by South Africa, due to its money, material and officials, no other states can dare either to withdraw or to show lack of moral obligation because not only for development but even for their national income and recognition, they are dependent on South-Africa. The labour employment in South-Africa provides a major share of the national income of these states. Even as far as recognition of these states are concerned, it is only the South Africa, who is their creator, which recognises them. So the inner threat to Consas is very little. Threat to it comes mainly from outside because it is viewed with suspicion by the large number of states in region.

Suspicion of the Frontline States :

The Great hinderance in achieving a wider constellation (greater or outer constellation) is due to the suspicion of Frontline states who view it as an effort of South Africa for economic as well as political dominance in the region. No doubt, even today the southern African states are economically dependent on South Africa but this is not a willing dependency, it is only due to inability to break the dependency link of colonial period quickly on the one hand, and due to the absence of alternatives. But since their independence, Front-line States are trying hard to break their dependency link. Their effort to create SADCC is one of the measures to become self-reliant and counter the "neo-colonial" approach of South Africa.

But more than economic dominance their (Front-line states) suspicion is of political dominance and extension of the policy of 'apartheid' by South Africa. Front-line states since, their beginning, are fighting for liberation of the region from colonial hands. Today they are fighting for the liberation of Namibia as well as South-Africa which are ruled by a handful of white racists. In this situation, any co-operation with white racist-government of South-Africa means nothing but either compromise or approval of the apartheid (For South Africa's relation with neighbouring states at the time of proposition of CONSAS and after: see Chapter-III,).

So in this situation of suspicion, the support of Front-line states to form wider constellation seems to be impossible. South Africa, today has to put the wider constellation idea in pending and is concentrating more on "inner-constellation". The greater opposition of the policy of Apartheid, and the demand of front-line states from the western countries to impose economic sanction against South Africa have created a severe threat to South African regime and its strategy of CONSAS.

CHAPTER-III

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATION CONFERENCE(SADCC)

CHAPTER - IIISOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC)

The most important regional cooperation in Southern Africa is being carried out by the SADCC. By this economic cooperation, nine southern African states - Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Tanzania are attempting to harmonize their economic development and reduce their dependence on industrialized and ex-colonial countries in general and South Africa in particular.

FACTORS FOR THE CREATION OF SADCC -

Born just a few days before (in April 1980) the end of Zimbabwean struggle of independence, SADCC was the reflection of the realization that national independence meant little without economic liberation. The economies of the Frontline states (at the time Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana) had suffered greatly as a result of their support to the Zimbabwean nationalists. In all five countries development projects were postponed to finance the liberation struggle and to build additional routes for the land-locked countries. For example, in both Zambia and Mozambique the closing of their borders with Rhodesia exacted such a high price that their economies are still paying. Even Tanzania's commitment to keep the

Tazara rail road and the Tazama pipeline operative as alternatives for Zambia, seriously diverted development funds from Southern Tanzania, and this rich agricultural area remains one of the least developed regions of the country.

The experience of the Frontline states during the Zimbabwean struggle, however, also taught them that unified action could achieve much more than individual efforts. Despite the high costs, they maintained their support for the Zimbabwean nationalists' demands for majority rule and for a government which could take control of the economy. Thus, Sir Scretse Khama (President of Botswana), who was the main figure in the creation^{of}/SADCC wanted to maintain and expand cooperative efforts of the FLS of Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique & Tanzania once it was recognised that Zimbabwe would be soon independent. Khama hoped to prevent their political energies from seeping away into "sterile confrontation" with South Africa once the war in Zimbabwe was over.¹ Rather he foresaw the development of a regional organization committed to the development of member-states. He may also have wished to draw Angola and Mozambique

1. C.R. Hill, Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa, African Affairs, 82(327), Apr. 1983, p.222.

closer to the west, and by creating a diversion from undiluted confrontation with South Africa, to avoid pressure to give greater support to the ANC.

C.R. Hill maintains that SADCC also has deeper roots in PAFMECA and more recently in a speech by President Kaunda in 1974; indeed it would be surprising if any new idea were not rooted in the past, given the immensely long time for which many of the region's leaders have been continuously in power, or striving for it.² Over the period 1977-1978 a number of background and technical papers were also prepared which dealt with regional issues, primarily concerning transportation.³

However, the real effort for the creation of SADCC had started only after the proposing of Consas (Constellation of Southern African States) by South African Minister of Foreign Affairs & Information on 3 April, 1979. Within a few weeks of proposing Consas, the foreign ministers of the Frontline States met in Botswana where the idea of a Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was born. This was described as a "pre-emptive step" by the President of Botswana, Quett Masire,⁴ since frontline states feared that the constellation could result in even greater South

2. Ibid.

3. David S. Cowrie, *Acurrent Bibliography on African Affairs*, Vol. 18(1), 1985-86, p. 26.

4. *Botswana Daily News*, 17 July 1981.

African economic dominance in the sub-continent with eventual political consequences. According to Geldenhuys "at least some of the black states perceived an urgent need to counter Pretoria's constellation moves for fear that it would formalize and deepen their economic dependence on South Africa and enhance the latter's economic dominance - with obvious political consequences".⁵

Why there was the fear of South African economic and political dominance under 'Consas' ? The explanation of this lies in the peculiarities of South Africa's relations with neighbouring countries which were mainly determined by four factors, viz. Black Africans' perception of the prevailing order in South Africa; South Africa's precipitation of its security; Ambivalent Western attitudes towards South and Southern Africa; Economic situation in Southern Africa and world at large.

1. Black Africans' perception of the prevailing order in South Africa.

Black Africans were widely condemning South Africa and there were feelings of personal offence among the leaders on account of its (RSA) racial policy (apartheid). Apart from this, South Africa had been illegally occupying SWA/Nambia despite the recognition of its independence by

5. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African Development Coordination Council: towards a new regional stalemate*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1981, p. 19.

the United Nations. This had led to the universal dislike of South Africa by black Africans and the country had served for many years as one of the unifying factors keeping the Organization of African Unity (OAU) together. There was unanimous demand by the southern African states and even by OAU. to Western countries to impose economic sanctions against South Africa for achieving objectives of political and economic liberations from it.

2. South African Security Perception:

South Africa's security perception was the another factor due to which the charges of destabilizing the region had been levelled against it. In contrast to the official assertions that South Africa had often expressed the wish to have peaceful, normal relations with neighbouring states and to see these states prosperous and stable⁶, it continued to provide assistance to UNITA in Angola to destabilize Benguala railway and overthrow MPLA government. It was providing such assistance to MNR in Mozambique against FRELIMO government, and to LLA in Lesotho. The country had

6. To quote, for example, the head of the RSA Defence Force, Gen. Constand Viljoen who have said that economic disruption and political instability in neighbouring black states could only be to South Africa's detriment. "Hunger is a great destabilizing factor... Unfortunately we cannot survive in isolation... we cannot cut ourselves off from the rest of Africa, especially not from southern Africa" (Source: "Black Africa troubles are concern of SA", Defence Chief, The Citizen, 21 August, 1982).

also attacked several times the neighbouring countries under the disguise that they were providing help and shelter to the ANC, PAC and SWAPO guerrillas against South Africa. These activities of South Africa reflected the fact that it wanted to keep neighbouring states weak and cowed for its own security and generated a hostile attitude of its neighbours against it. Even well disposed outsiders (esp. Western countries) were increasingly less inclined to accept the so-called protestation that it (RSA) defends western interest in Africa and stabilizes the southern African part of the continent by providing food, employment, transport and so forth to its neighbours.

3. Ambivalent Western attitude:

Southern Africa was a region of substantial though not foremost - importance to the leading Western powers, - the USA, Britain, France and Germany etc. The West was (as is today) interested in South Africa as well as in the rest of Africa - of which South Africa's neighbours were perceived as an integral part, and did not want to be forced into a position where it had to choose between white and black Africa. Secondly, the West was keenly interested in progress and stability in neighbouring countries as shown by its support for SADC latter on. Thirdly, the West was also anxious that peace and development should prevail in South Africa, and was looking to South Africa itself to

create the political and socio-economic order most likely to guarantee this. Fourthly, despite domestic issues Western countries were also facing mounting problems, viz., the Western alliances' relations with the Eastern bloc, in the Middle East, the Far East and Latin America. This had left correspondingly little energy and resources to be spared for southern Africa. In this situation the West could have welcomed it if South Africa, due to its economic progress, were to play the important role as a catalyst of economic progress and political stability in the region. But unfortunately, in the Western view, South Africa's role tended to be negative and embarrassing, if not a danger for Western interests, - particularly South Africa's domestic policies were believed to entail an acute threat to peace and stability not only within the country itself but for the region and even the world at large⁷; Secondly, South Africa's policies were seen as promoting Soviet penetration of southern Africa rather than lending it off⁸; thirdly, South Africa

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7. As the opposition had been shown by various Organisations including OAU, NAM and UN against South African policy of apartheid and its continued occupation of Namibia. Even some of the Western countries were identified as responsible for supporting South Africa.
 8. South Africa earlier, had argued that it actually represented Western interest and in American foreign policy's containment of communism, South Africa was regarded as bulwark. But as South African racial policy shook the Africans' sentiment, it served as a breeding ground for Communist influence.

was believed (though not by all) to be deliberately destabilizing neighbouring countries. Thus such ambivalent attitudes of Western powers had made the relations complex between South and Southern Africa and led to their unwillingness to press South Africa to free Namibia and end economic and political exploitation of black Africans at home plus its aggression and sabotage in neighbouring countries on the one hand, while on the other South Africa's proposition of 'Consas' did not get encouragement and favour from them.

4. Economic Situation in Southern Africa and World at large:

It is needless to say that the southern African countries (except South Africa) were too poor due to their industrial and agricultural underdevelopment. The current world economic recession had also detrimentally affected all efforts to accelerate development in southern Africa by diminishing not only the demand for the region's outputs but also the availability of financial resources from the aid giving countries. On the other hand South African hostility had diverted large parts of national budgets for defence purposes in the Frontline states, thus causing paucity of funds for development purposes. Besides these, South Africa often used to use its economic infrastructure to punish southern African countries for their support to

SWAPO & ANC by delaying the movement of their goods on its (RSA) road, railways and ports. This had caused further economic burden to them.

In above circumstances, south African proposition of 'CONSAS' was bound to be perceived negatively by Frontline States, both from political as well as economic view point. Politically, the constellation idea was seen to be aimed at securing 'control' rather than 'cooperation'. Because cooperation with South Africa under 'Consas' meant building up of friendly relation with it, by which FLS could be expected (a) not to give hospitality to exiled south African guerrillas, (b) not to demand, for the independence of Namibia and end of racialism in south Africa. The cooperation with it was regarded as an implied acceptance of the "much maligned and universally rejected apartheid policy".⁹

Economically CONSAS was seen as a cynical intention of South Africa to ensure neighbouring states' dependent on South African transport and port system which had enabled South Africa to use these as weapons to keep them

9. Mr. Sam Motswenyane, the President of the National African Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC, it is an organization of South African blacks), Foreign Powers in Africa. Presented to the South African Institute of International Affairs Second International Outlook Conference "Foreign Powers and Africa", 6 September, 1982 (roneoed) p.7.

crowed. For example South Africa tended to inhibit the movement of Botswana's beef whenever Botswana's representatives spoke against South Africa at the United Nations. There are other several examples of such South African cynical initiative. But south Africa had failed to consolidate its economic dominance because it required not only the extension of economic links but also the establishment of political relations of peaceful coexistence. In this situation 'consas' was regarded by neighbouring states as trying to ensure the dominance by creating the conditions of peaceful-coexistence. Apart from political circle, academicians regarded the policy as a continuation of the earlier outward policy under the Connie Mulder, Minister of Information, whose goals were dialogue and detente. The difference between present time and those earlier days has been well expressed by the Institute of African studies at the University of Maputo¹⁰: "whereas under the now discredited Minister of Information, Connie Mulder, the purpose was to influence particular decision makers, South Africa's current objective is the far wider one of altering the objective conditions in which decisions are made". This negative perception of CONSAS by the academicians of sothern Africa came in total contrast to some of the South African

10. Centro de Estudos Africanos, The Constellation of Southern African States: a new strategic offensive by South Africa in the region (Maputo, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, mimeo, n.d., p.4).

academicians who had emphasized that black Africa cannot survive without South Africa and that 'the North' should seek to persuade black Africa that its future must lie in cooperation with South Africa.¹¹

Thus, anticipating the consequences of CONSAS, the FLS immediately formed their own regional cooperation, the SADCC. However, a few authors have suggested that the SADCC emerged as a result of efforts by the Western powers, especially the United States, to implement a "Marshall Plan" for southern Africa.¹² This argument is less credible, however, as indicated by subsequent actions by the United States. The United States has been hesitant about giving aid on a regional level because the aid would go partially to Angola and Mozambique. This factor, coupled with the low levels of U.S. aid forthcoming, indicate that the "Marshall Plan" argument is less valid.

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11. For example, to quote noted Stellenbosch economist S.J. Terreblanche, "Finally, attempts to revive the dying part of the Middle Hemisphere can only succeed if the potential of South Africa is used to a far greater extent than is the case at present. Any long scale attempt to revive Africa without the strategic contribution South Africa can make is bound to fail". S. Terreblanche, *Interdependence of the South African Economy with the Economic Developments in Africa and in Western Europe or the Role of South Africa in the North-South Relationship of the Middle Hemisphere*, p.9(b).
12. Roger Leys and Arne Tostensen, *Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, Review of African Political Economy*, No.23, 1982.

GENESIS OF SADCC -

After proposing the establishment of a regional cooperation in the name SADCC, Foreign Ministers of Frontline states, in Gaborone (May 1979) decided to convene in July 1979, the first SADCC meeting (SADCC) at Arusha in July 1979. In which they decided to invite:

1. Economic Ministers from the five Front Line States and also representatives from Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland & Malawi and
2. Representatives from a number of bilateral and multi-lateral aid agencies and aid giving countries.

Representatives from large number of southern African countries were invited due to the decision of Frontline states that the broad based regional economic development efforts should include all independent states in the region, regardless of the fact that how closely they might be tied to South Africa. Among the invited countries only Zimbabwe was not independent, but by that time, it was clear that it was going to get independence very soon. Representatives from aid giving countries and agencies were invited in order to obtain funding for development schemes. Development was perceived as the urgent need of these States, but it was realized that they were not in a position to raise locally the huge fund needed for regional economic development. Thus they decided to obtain funds from outside. Aid agencies and aid giving

countries were invited to get their opinion regarding the plan of action to be adopted¹³ and also to inculcate among them a feeling of partnership in the future organisation for encouraging aid donations.¹⁴

The first SADCC Conference, known as SADCC was held at Arusha, consisted of two meetings. The first was a meeting of Economic Ministers of the FLS (Front Line States) which formulated the basic programme of action in broad terms and required final ratification by the Heads of States of each of the participant countries. A second meeting was held between the Ministers of the Front Line States and representatives of various aid organisations. It was at the latter meeting that the role which foreign aid would play in the development of the SADCC member states was discussed. By the end of SADCC-I the Front Line countries had adopted a draft declaration expressing the main development objectives of SADCC. On 10 April, 1980 representatives of the nine southern African states gathered in Lusaka (Zambia) and adopted the 'Lusaka Declaration' previously outlined at Arusha, which laid-down the objectives, priorities and strategies of the SADCC. The Lusaka Summit

13. Africa Report, March April, 1983.

14. R.F. Weisfelder, The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), South Africa International, 13:2, p. 77, October, 1982.

was delayed to allow participation by newly independent Zimbabwe and also to provide time for consultation with the non-front line states - Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland -, to ensure their participation in SADCC. The goals of SADCC were expressed through the publication of a book entitled 'Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation'.¹⁵ This contained the Lusaka Declaration, dealing with objectives, priorities and strategies as well as sectoral papers prepared in two years period before the Arusha meeting.¹⁶ This book serves as the primary document of a future members have to accept the goals of the book in order to gain membership of SADCC.

OBJECTIVES -

In the Lusaka Declaration SADCC had adopted four objectives. They were:

1. the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
2. the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
3. the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, inter-state and regional policies; and

15. Edited by Tanzanian High Commissioner to England, Amon Nsekala.

16. Over the period of 1977 and 1978 a number of background and technical papers had been prepared which dealt with regional sectoral issues.

4. concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of SADCC's strategy for economic liberation.¹⁷

Apart from above objectives, implicit in the Lusaka Declaration and also in SADCC rhetoric was a fifth objectives, i.e. the commitment to "Complete" the struggle for "genuine political independence" in Namibia and ultimately in South Africa: "We, the majority ruled states of southern Africa" the SADCC members declared, "recognize our responsibilities ... to assist in achieving a successful cultivation of our struggle".¹⁸

However, the objectives and nature of the SADCC cannot be very much clear unless we examine the statements given by leaders at summits from time to time. For instance, the SADCC Chairman, Quett K. Masire, at Gaborone Summit in 1982 stated:

"Our determination to seek a peaceful, non-social and prosperous region in which our people can hope for the future develops naturally into a commitment to work together. It was out of this solidarity that SADCC was born. It was not conceived as a platform for rhetoric, nor a plaything for those who desire a large canvas on which to experiment. Rather, SADCC has grown out of a common awareness of common interest".¹⁹

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17. A.J. Nsekela, (ed), Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, Rex Collings, London, 1981, p. 3.
18. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
19. Colin Legem, (ed), Africa Contemporary Record, 1983- , p. A73.

In 1983 Maseru Summit, Chairman Peter Mmusi reacted on South African destabilization as:

"It is not much use to develop ports and pipelines, roads and railways and then to watch in silence as they are blown up.... We cannot ignore the continuing, indeed escalating, acts of sabotage which are being directed at our member-states".²⁰

Thus the SADCC is a peaceful, non-racial regional cooperation in southern Africa, aiming economic development and self-reliance of the member states and to reduce their dependence on South-Africa and other powers. But the SADCC is also an effort to counter escalating South African apartheid and destabilization in the region. It serves as a forum to reflect the voice of the majority of people of the region, against neo-colonialism, racialism and imperialism. It is an organization through which victims of human beings (especially Western civilized white men) are appealing to show humanity to them.

CONDITIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP:

The SADCC does not hope to be limited to the present members in region, rather other independent countries in the region of southern Africa can also become its member, by accepting its conditions. The conditions include

20. Ibid.

(i) geographical position, (ii) the need rather than mere desire to join, (iii) full acceptance of the SADCC's primary document, - Southern Africa: toward economic liberation - which states its goals and strategies, and, (iv) acceptance of a code of conduct concerning respect for the sovereignty of members, denial of bases to dissidents, acceptance of non-interference in internal affairs of other members.

Though according to SADCC's rules any independent nation in the region can join it but in practice the scope is very limited. In practice only an independent Namibia and non-racial majority ruled South Africa will be allowed to join it. As the SADCC countries do not recognize Boputhatswana, Venda, Transkei and Ciskei, so the question of their membership does not arise. While the application of Zaire has been refused. The insistence on confining SADCC membership to states clearly within the Southern African subcontinent is only one reason and not the major explanation, for the repeated setting aside Zaire's application for membership.²¹ Zaire's persistence in

21. Zaire's membership was considered by SADCC at Maputo (November 1980), Harare (July 1981), Blantyre (November 1981), Luanda (June 1982), Gaborone (July 82), and Masern (January 1983). Even a Zairean ministerial delegation attended SADCC & in Maputo in November 1980 as observers (Aloyssins Committee, London, 1981, p.264).

pressing its claim was embarrassing since on grounds of geographical propinquity and its economic dependence on South Africa. No doubt on these aspects Zaire's credentials are stronger than Tanzania's, but the real objections to its membership, though not openly admitted, are political and ideological. In Harare Summit in July 1981, a Code of conduct was adopted as a condition for membership which required, first, an "avoidance of territorial expansionism and occupation of each other's territory" and, second, a "refusal by each country to serve as a base for subversion and destabilization of another member country".²² The first condition was a reflection of members' grave concern over Zaire's provocative occupation of two villages in the Kaputa district of northern Zambia in 1980;²³ and the second condition reflected Angola's complaint that Zaire was harbouring alleged Angolan subversives (of UNITA). The Summit also expanded the criteria of membership to include the "need" to belong as against mere "preference or convenience".

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22. Record of the Southern African Development Coordination Summit Conference. Held in the Republic of Zimbabwe on the 20th July 1981, p.41.
23. Times of Zambia, 16 August 1980, p.1; Africa Research Bulletin: PSC, 1980, p. 5768; Africa Now (London) 14(June 1982), p. 38; New African (London) 158(Nov.1980) p.32. There are reports that on the eve of the SADCC Summit in Gaborone, where its application for membership was up for consideration, Zaire quietly hauled down its flag over the disputed territory (Herald (Harare), 15 July 1982, p.2; Zambia Daily Mail, 13 October, 1982, p.1]

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE:

SADCC, throughout its six-years history, has avoided the establishment of supranational institutions. Emphasis has been placed on the creation of a decentralized decision making process coordination of development plans, and functional model. This reflects that the members have learnt from the failure of regional integration schemes in Africa (and especially from the failure of EAC). As the countries have recently got independence and nationalism dominates in their policies, it is impossible to except the surrendering of any part of sovereignty to a supranational institution. However, certain minimum structures are necessary for the SADCC to function effectively. These were developed, approved and formalized according to the Memorandum of Understanding adopted at the Heads of State Summit, at Harare (Zimbabwe) in July 1981. Today SADCC consists of:

- (A) The Summit:- It consists of the Heads of States of member-nations. It is the supreme decision making body of SADCC, and is responsible for the general direction of its policies, and controls its activities. The members of the Summit elect a chair who presides over the annual meetings. In meetings decisions are made by consensus.
- (B) The Council:- It consists of one minister from each member country and is accountable to the Summit. It is

responsible for the over all policies of the SADCC, and also coordinates and supervises its institutions as well as supervises and executes SADCC programmes. The Council adopts a "work programme" for SADCC and designates a member state to take charge of coordination of activities in specific fields. Till now the various areas of activities have been covered (Table 1, For Division of Responsibility and Project Programme by 1984). The method of assignment of the areas adopted is such to reduce conflict between member-state on such issues. The areas which can best be served by a particular country due to the availability of natural and other facilities are assigned to it but at the same time it is also assured that it causes less conflict among the member-states. The Council meets at least once a year and decisions are made by consensus.

(C) The Sectoral Commissions:- The Sectoral Commissions are below the Council. However, at present only one Sectoral Commission is in existence, i.e., SATCC (Southern African Transport and Communications Commission). SATCC is responsible to the Council. Like any sectoral commission, which may be established, the SATCC, is governed by a convention adopted by the Council and ratified and accepted to by the member states.²⁴ SATCC has its headquarters in Maputo, Mozambique.

24. Tostensen, A., Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa. The case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), Research Report No. 62, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1982.

(D) The Secretariat:- It was established in Gaborone, Botswana, in July 1982. It is headed by an executive Secretary, and serves as a coordinating agency. It has four basic functions: (a) coordination of the execution of the tasks of SADCC, (b) custodianship of SADCC property, (c) general servicing of and liaison time to time be approved by the Council.²⁵ It has headquarters' staff of five apart from the executive secretary. The executive secretary has limited administrative duties and draws a gross salary of \$ 30,000. Thus Secretariat performs only the minimal functions necessary to keep the SADCC functioning efficiently and smoothly.


Annual Conferences:

These exist outside the institutional framework of the SADCC, however, these are very important and serve as important links between the SADCC member-states and donar agencies.

No doubt, the model adopted by the SADCC may be criticised particularly, from the view of one of its objectives: "The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration", but it has served the SADCC well. All the nine members have managed to maintain a high degree of agreement across a wide range of issues

25. Ibid.

and even the routine, daily work has been decentralized.²⁶



ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SADCC

ACTIVITIES OF SADCC -

The term "development co-ordination" in the little of SADCC gives false impression of its full scope that it may be concentrating fully on this. Creation of a regional integration, obtaining international co-operation for the strategy of development and economic liberation, and mobilization of resources for these are the main areas of its activities. But as the development of transport and communication, agriculture and industry, is viewed as a pre-condition to obtain self-reliance and greater co-operation of the members, SADCC concentrates mainly to these.

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26. (a) R.F. Weisfelder, The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), South Africa International, 13(2), October 1982, p. 80 &
- (b) Tostensen A., Dependence & Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference(SADCC) Research Report No. 62, Scandinavian, Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1982.

A. Creation of a Regional Integration:

To create a "genuine and equitable regional integration" SADCC has envisaged an innovative departure from classical models, like - Free Trade Area or Common Market. This is marked by two distinctive features in its manner of working as adopted by Lusaka Declaration and Programme of Action (1980). These are (a) the emphasis on sectoral coordination rather than economic integration and (b) the primacy conceded to national decision making. The above innovation is due to the skeptical views adopted by the leaders of SADCC regarding classical models of integration due to the failure of past experiments in the region and recently east African community (EAC) in 1977. For example, Seretse Khama explained: "intra-regional trade can increase without the creation of a free trade area or a common market. Each of our states in SADCC has experience with those models of trade creation. The federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Portuguese colonial 'economic union', the East African Common Market, the Southern African Customs Union - all were, or are, free trade areas or common markets. All have served to limit our development, to enrich externally based firms and interests and to hamper national planning".²⁷ The lessons,

27. Nsekela, Southern Africa, p.xii; also in, SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 28; and, Green, Southern African Development Coordination, p. 57, n4.

they had drawn from failures of common market and free trade areas, were (a) where sharp ideological differences in development strategies of nations existed, national priorities should be allowed to take precedence over regional goals, and (b) the search for innovative mechanism to promote "genuine regional integration" must be abandoned in favour of a national decision making, qualified only by a moral commitment to a measure of consultation and voluntary coordination, both at regional and bilateral levels. Keeping these lessons in mind, in the Lusaka Declaration leaders adopted deliberate decision to avoid any experiment in genuine regional integration. According to it, the members while accept a political commitment to consult and cooperate, they are under no compulsion to conform. The approach to the regional harmonization of national development plans is voluntarist.

At the regional level sectoral coordination, a number of projects are advanced by SADCC, like, the development of regional microwave network, the construction of an interconnected electricity power grid based on the present Zambia-Zimbabwe backbone, the explorations into the possibilities of achieving regional self-sufficiency in oil, the rehabilitation (when security conditions permit) of the ocean port facilities and interior rail links so essential to the welfare of the landlocked states, and the establishment

of regional research and training institutions. Apart from these, SADCC's Council of Ministers and Secretariat perform central coordinating functions. These have resulted in tremendous increase in trade and transaction among the members. In this SADCC countries are further helped by PTA's Payments and Clearing House opened in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. As an integrative model SADCC is not superior to PTA and in some respect, may even represent a retreat²⁸ but its voluntarist approach to the harmonization of national development plans has proved in practice more effective than might have been anticipated. Besides this, helpful attitude of members has also contributed much to the success of SADCC. Due to these achievements SADCC is "increasingly becoming perceived as a meaningful regional entity" both inside as well as outside the region".²⁹

SADCC mainly coordinates national development plans. It is not empowered to check or reduce the growing gaps between stronger and weaker states in the region. However, some corrective mechanism have been made to ensure equity in the distribution of the benefits of integration in the

28. See Chapter IV, PTA's Organizational structure. The final aim of PTA is to create a common market, a highly integrated system, though till now it is not materialised.

29. SADCC, 'Overview', pp. 11, 18.

industrial development sector on "regional market - oriented production".³⁰ Of the industrial projects currently up for international auction 36% (in terms of cost) are destined for Mozambique, 22% for Tanzania, 16% for Zimbabwe.³¹ In spite of above provisions however, in the final analysis the allocation of industries and markets will be determined mainly by availability of domestic resources plus approval and funding of overseas donors. Thus poor states are at less advantageous position. They cannot be even compensated by SADCC for their disadvantageous condition. Thus, when threatened with the economic might of a more developed member the only mechanism available to the less developed member is the avoidance of wasteful duplication of productive facilities.

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, one of the SADCC leaders, has declared that SADCC's "step by step approach to problems of economic union ... assures ~~that~~ there is harmony at every stage of development and that the gains from integration accrue to all member states".³² Despite this assertion, it is clear from the above paragraph that all members cannot get equal benefit as more developed

30. Ibid, pp. 7, 24.

31. Anglin, SADCC After NKomati, African Affairs, 84(335) Apr. 85, p. 174.

32. Susan Turner, ed., SADCC: Development in the Region: Progress and Problems: Conference Report', Commonwealth Institute, London, 1984, p. 4.

members are bound to get favour of the donors and availability of more resources is a plus point in that. Even Mugabe's assertion of "harmony at every stage of development" is also not supported by the fact. Parochial interests have always put obstacles in achieving a stronger cooperation. This, however, is more evident at the political level than among the government officials. Zambia has recently acquired a DC-10 plane, thus frustrating efforts of SADCC airlines to standardize on Boeing aircraft as a first step to reconstructing and expanding the defunct Central African Airways. Zimbabwe's restriction on the import of cheap Botswanian textiles and Mozambique's signing of Nkomati Accord (1984) with South Africa for non-aggression, good neighbourliness and economic cooperation are the setbacks to the regional panning & harmony of SADCC.

B. International Cooperation:

Since the inception of the idea of cooperation serious efforts "to secure international cooperation" for its "strategy of economic liberation" have been done with no such parallel by any other regional organization in Africa. The first step in this direction was the formation of London Steering Committee in May 1979 by the Frontline States foreign ministers. This committee was divided into two groups - (a) the 'diplomatic representatives' of SADCC states in London (or in nearby capitals) and (b) the

'invited individuals'. The group of 'invited individuals' actually consisted of those influential officials, African as well as expatriate, who had carried and actively lobbied for the creation of SADCC.³³ These two groups facilitated contacts with Western governments and aid agencies which otherwise were not easy. The second step in this direction of cooperation was the formation of SADCC Liaison Committee in November 1980. It was, actually, the reconstitution of London Steering Committee, and was assigned responsibilities for external publicity, secretariat and consultancy services, and liaison functions particularly in following up requests for assistance.³⁴ However, the major breakthrough in securing international cooperation was the institutionalization of overseas contacts. The contacts established by Liaison Committee with overseas governments and international aid agencies were institutionalized in the annual SADCC - Conferences. It is at these conference, that they seat with SADCC members and jointly survey results, evaluate performance, identify strengths and weaknesses and agree on future plans.³⁵

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33. SADCC, Record of the Ministerial Meeting, Maputo, 26 and 28 November 1980, Annex VII, p.2. Some of them were: David A. Anderson (Managing Director, Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation), Regional H. Green (Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex), Iddi Simba (African Development Bank, London), and Tim J. Sheehy (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London & Harare).
34. "Future of Steering Committee", SADCC Record of Ministerial Meeting, Maputo, 26 and 28 November 1980, Annex VII.
35. Nsekala, Southern Africa, p. 6.

Due to above efforts, today, SADCC is able to muster support and aid from large number of countries and aid agencies for its projects. EEC, United States, Nordic Countries, East European Countries and USSR via COMECON, India, Nigeria, Kuwait, Brazil etc. have contributed to SADCC projects. Despite the fact, that not wholehearted support has been provided to SADCC³⁶, and SADCC states reserve the right in the final analysis to set their own national and regional priorities, it is a contradiction that an organization dedicated to self-reliance and "the reduction of economic dependence... on any single state or group of states",³⁷ relies on foreign aid for development. This is also in contrast to the rhetoric in PTA-the other regional cooperation in the region, of which most of SADCC-states are member.

SADCC countries are, however, firmly convinced that a massive and sustained input of foreign aid is an indispensable ingredient for the success of their strategy of economic liberation from South Africa. As the region is highly underdeveloped SADCC sees development as a precondition for economic liberation, and foreign aid as a prerequisite. But here the paradox is that in the beginning

36. See 'Donors Attitude', p.

37. SADCC, Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, 1 April 1980, pp. 3,8; Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 July 1981, p. 44. The phrase "any single state or group of states" was an addition to the Arusha Declaration inserted in Lusaka, April 1980.

mainly Western countries have come out for SADCC's help. It is not denying the fact that they helped with self-interest. The United States even adopted discriminatory funding as initially none of its money should contribute to projects of benefit to three socialist oriented regimes in SADCC - Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania.³⁸ The self-interest of West becomes more clear by Maurice Forley's - (EEC deputy director for development) explanation at SADCC 3, - "... our commitment to the region is total and real... This region of yours in Africa has minerals and enormous riches. This region of yours has a potential for buying and looking for equipment and serving from the developed world for many years to come. It is in our interests for political reasons, for historic reasons, for economic and financial reasons, to support to the maximum..."³⁹

The embarrassing fact is that the Soviet Union and other East bloc countries have shown least interest in SADCC and even some suspicion. Soviet Union has never turned up to annual conferences, nor contributed any fund till 1986. China, though now attends regularly, but has financed very few (one, till 1984) projects. The Arab countries which

38. ARB: EFT, 1983, pp. 7142, 7327.

39. SADCC, Blantyre 1981, p. 41; "The EEC and Southern Africa", West Africa 3433, 30 May, 1983, p. 1275.

are capital surplus, have kept themselves out, though Kuwait Fund & BADEA have participated in recent years, and have financed a few projects. In such a situation if SADCC is unable to diversify its financial base it is not entirely 'its' fault. Due to this, even Mozambique and Angola, which were initially not ready to accept the "Berlin Clause" in 1980, accepted the clause in 1982 and started pressing their claims in EEC countries.⁴⁰

But the availability of limited alternatives is not the only factor due to which SADCC gives importance to Western aid and investment. The need to redress injustices of an inequitable global economic system and to counter Sough African aggression (economic and political) are the two other factors for it. Economic injustices like - recession in world market leading to cutting down export of African goods, inflation transfer through imported goods and monopoly control of markets etc., which have become basic features affecting African economy cannot be redressed without the help of Western countries which serve as main markets for African goods. By collaboration with these countries SADCC wants, indirectly, to secure indiscrimination

40. Bonn has insisted that all bilateral or EEC aid agreements should include a reference to "Land Berlin" (Annex 35 of Lome II; Financial Times, 25 Nov. 1980, p. 4). Despite East German objections, on 7 October 1982 Mozambique and Angola acquiesced in the Berlin clause.

with African goods in Western market and other financial support for its members. Western countries' enthusiasm for SADCC has played a positive role in furthering these expectations.

Western countries have tremendous investment in South Africa, thus, they do have substantial economic and political leverage on the country. SADCC, by collaborating with the Western countries wants them to use this leverage in the interest of the people of Southern Africa, as they do not have, by themselves, the strength to repel South African aggression. For example let us see SADCC's 1984 appeal for diplomatic support to the West, - "SADCC and its member states do not, by themselves alone, have the strength to repel South African economic aggression. SADCC's partners in cooperation do have substantial economic and political leverage on South Africa. In the interest of the welfare of the peoples of Southern Africa, SADCC again calls on them to make effective use of their influence to cause South Africa to cease its strategy of regional economic aggression".⁴¹ In this case, Western countries' cooperation with SADCC obliges them to use their economic and political leverage to establish peace in the region. Their encouragement, if not actual promotion, of

41. SADCC, 'Overview', p. 15; ARB: EFT, 1984, p. 7363.

South Africa's peace process obliges it to assist neighbouring states to cope with the consequences. However, the prospects of any effective diplomatic, let alone economic, pressure on Pretoria are small. Contact Group's role in this respect is hardly encouraging. Rather than disciplining the South Africa, Western governments are more likely to urge SADCC states to settle with South Africa on whatever terms they can get with a view to preserving their historic economic ties with the South.

C. Resource Mobilization for Development and Reduction of Economic Dependence:

Whether SADCC's dominant objective is the economic development or detachment particularly, but not only, from South Africa ? - In southern Africa it is a wrong question as the two are entwined. Though different spokesmen of SADCC give answer of varying emphasis⁴², the impetus behind

42. At SADCC 2 President Samora Machel of Mozambique emphasised the colonial legacy of underdevelopment and dependence on South Africa; President Quett Masire of Botswana did not see the effort to reduce dependence on South Africa as a signal for confrontation with RSA (Republic of South Africa) rather as an expression of Pan-Africanism; Dr. Bernard Chidzero, Zimbabwe's Minister of Economic Planning and Development, indicated greater aspiration when he said - "We have set ourselves the challenge and the task to change the course of history in Southern Africa" (See South, January 1981); while Simba Makoni, Executive Secretary of the SADCC, has said, - "SADCC is a prodigy of political struggle, it was launched as a liberation movement". (See Afric Asia, No. 32, Aug. 1986, p. 68).

SADCC is as much political as economic. No detachment is possible without the development in the poor states. On the other hand, no country can achieve genuine development by remaining heavily dependent on South Africa and others. Realizing this SADCC had established by 1980, two priority sectors: (1) Transport and Communication & (2) Agricultural Development.

In transport and communication sector it created in 1980, Southern African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC). SATCC's headquarters were based in Maputo, Mozambique, headed by Mozambian Minister of Ports and Land Transport, Mr. Luis A. Santos. Soon after its creation, it began to work on coordinating a number of project proposals related to transport and communications. It grouped projects into six-categories viz., roads, railways, ports, civil aviation, telecommunications and training. Sub-sectors were opened in member states. The sub-sector for shipping was opened in Mozambique, railway in Zimbabwe, telecommunications in Botswana, roads in Malawi, Energy in Angola and airways in Zambia. To identify projects and ensure project feasibility a Danish consultancy group of Hoff & Overgaard was hired. At the same time a pragmatic approach to fulfill development needs was adopted by a working-line based on a "four-stage priority basis:

- (a) Projects which were presently in progress and which did not require supplementary funding, were given top priority;
- (b) Second were new projects for which feasibility studies were undertaken and financing was promised;
- (c) The projects for which feasibility studies had been undertaken but which lacked financing, were given third priority;
- (d) The last were new projects which were without feasibility studies and also lacked financing.⁴³

SADCC's emphasis on transport and communication sector was a reflection of its strong will to reduce region's dependence on South African transport and communication systems. Since colonial days South African ports, rails and roads etc; had been serving as main means for export-import and inter-regional trade of Southern African countries. Thus, reduction of dependency in this sector was considered as a precondition for the reduction of dependency in other sectors.

43. Tostensen, *Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)*, Research Report No.62, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppasala, 1982.

Due to ^{the} dependence of large part of members' economy on agriculture, development in this sector was given second priority. A regional centre of the International Centre for Research on Agriculture in the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRASAT based in India) was established in Botswana whose work was to coordinate crop research and to submit proposals for future development of crops including the identification of projects.

Apart from the above two priority sectors emphasis were also given on training and harmonization of policy in the areas of industry, mining and energy. The aims in these sectors were to reduce the problem of reliance on expatriates, and to increase trade between member-states, of both mining and industrial products. Reduction of dependence on non-SADCC states was kept as the main target while identifying projects in these sectors.

When major projects were identified the main problem before SADCC was the lack of finance to materialise them. SADCC members called a pledging conference in November 1980 in Maputo (Mozambique) known as SADCC 2. In this 30 foreign governments and 18 international organizations participated who agreed to finance SADCC projects. By the time Conference had ended, U.S. \$ 650 million was pledged for next five years for 97 projects (all conditional upon detailed approval), with additional indications of

support from other sources. But the nature of money committed was different because, out of the pledges only less than 20% was "new"-money (money that was not already committed to SADCC countries earlier).⁴⁴

The large sum of \$ 384 million was pledged by the African Development Bank (ADB). EEC pledged \$ 100 m, USA \$ 50 m, the Netherland \$ 32 m, Sweden \$ 22 m, Italy \$ 15 m and West Germany \$ 2 m etc.⁴⁵ The major projects which included in SADCC 2 concerned to transport and communication viz, rehabilitation of the railway line from Ncala to Mozambique border and of the Botswana railway; upgrading roads in Lesotho, road construction in Tanzania; deepening and increasing the capacity of the ports of Beira and Maputo; and construction of new terminal facilities at Harare airport. These projects accounted for \$ 1,007 m of the total \$ 1,946 m estimated expenditure. But

44. Weisfelder has argued that the "old" and "new" Money distinction, however, is unnecessary. To quote him: "If regional initiatives help to trigger bilateral support to a member state for a project of recognized mutual significance, then the underlying objective is fulfilled even if no funds are credited to SADCC". Source: R.F.Weisfelder, The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), South Africa International, 13(2), October 1982, p. 85.

45. Source of data: Zimbabwe Project, News Bulletin, Salisbury, January 1981.

the pledge (\$ 650 m) offered was not even half of the estimated money. On the other hand, ADB and EEC which pledged major sum was taken from funds already granted for the region earlier. In the pledging meeting some of the countries, specially rich-countries were seen more interested in safeguarding their investments in South Africa and adopted the policy of not antagonizing RSA (Republic of South Africa) than assisting the wider development programmes of Southern Africa. In the Conference U.K., France and Japan did not pledge at all, while USSR and China refused to attend the meeting.⁴⁶ Some of the countries made excuses for not contributing due to national interests, while some donors pledged money but at the same time pushed their own interests.⁴⁷ These

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46. Hill, Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa, African Affairs, 82 (327), April 1983, p. 224.
47. Monsieur C. Cheysson, EEC Commissioner for Development, referred to the advantages of Lome membership, the British Minister of Overseas Development, Mr. Neil Marten avoided any mention of South Africa, bravely expressed the hope that the private sectors would not be forgotten and referred to the contribution that could be made by British companies; Belgium's representative emphasized the part Zaire could play in SADCC, if only as observer; while the French representative made clear that French interest in Africa now extended beyond the formal colonies; Austria and Canada emphasized their railway expertise and offered to carry out study and supply of the necessary wagon etc. Swiss representative changed his earlier mind from what he earlier had said that \$ 3 m would be given to the Africa Development Bank. He made it clear that Swiss banking was usually not short of means. He emphasized the contribution to be made by the private sectors and the Office for the Promotion of Swiss exports (Source: Kgarebe, ed., SADCC 2 - Maputo: The proceedings of the Second Southern African Development Coordination Conference, held in Maputo, Peoples Republic of Mozambique on 27/28 Nov. 1980 (SADCC Liaison Committee 1981)

activities of big-states and donor-agencies were the serious shock to SADCC members who had hoped SADCC as an important forum not because where its projects could be presented and promises of aid given, but politically and symbolically. It was their effort to escape from the frustrations of the north-south dialogue. It hoped to provide an opportunity to the world to show by taking SADCC seriously, as a potential economic unit in the region. Finally, it also wanted to provide big-powers and donor-agencies, an opportunity to demonstrate their disapproval of South African racism by approval of multi-racial SADCC.⁴⁸

Among SADCC members also we find that, not all were involved in SADCC 2 to the same extent. Zambia was disappointed because no major new projects had been included in pledging conference related to it. It was eager to establish a railway link with Indian Ocean but did not get hopeful favour. Angola showed a little interest because the major projects were related to transport, but it had poor transport links with rest of the region due to destabilization of Benzuala railway by

48. Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 12 Dec., 1980. M. Claude Cheysson's interview the then Commissioner for Development, Commission of the European Communities.

UNITA. It's attention was also engaged in the internal problem of civil-war with UNITA. But it is a fact that, besides these shortcomings, all the members wanted successful progress of SADCC projects. To quote President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama:

"The strength and effectiveness of coordinated action in the political liberation struggle encourages us to believe that a similar dynamics of co-ordination is attainable on the economic front. This is not to ignore or to gloss over national economic interests or differences of opinion There must be a perception of common regional interests but the pursuit of these common interests must provide for the real and immediate needs of each cooperating state".⁴⁹

Most of the money pledged in SADCC-2 over the period 1980-85 went to transport and Communication projects of which Mozambique was the great beneficiary. Due to its geographical location, with ports serving Swaziland, mbabwe, Malawi, and also but to a lesser extent, Zambia and Botswana. Mozambiquan rail-road was chosen as an alternative to South African. The percentage of distribution of proposed fund to the various member states for transport and communication projects were as follows:

49. Nsekela, ed., Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, Rex Collings, 1981, p. ix & x.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Mozambique	47.8
Lesotho	12.9
Tanzania	11.6
Zambia	9.6
Malawi	5.4
Botswana	3.7
Swaziland	3.6
Zimbabwe	3.1
Angola	2.0
Regional	0.3

Distribution of Transport and Communication
Projects' Projected money.⁵⁰

Blantyre Conference (19 & 20 Nov. 1981)⁵¹ - Donors had made promises and pledging at Maputo (in 1980) but even after one year, only \$ 273 million out of \$ 650 million pledged had been committed. So member states called at Blantyre, a meeting of all donor agencies and governments to remind them of their promises at Maputo. As one official noted: "Some countries made promises in Maputo and then

50. Tostensen A., Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa, Research Report No. 62. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1982, p. 104. (A complete list of projects in all sectors is given in, African Economic Development, 21, Jan. 1983, pp. 30-36).

51. This was in fact the third major SADCC meeting but not known as SADCC-3, as the custom of numbering the meetings has been dropped.

went home and forgot. This meeting is to remind them".⁵² Though attendance was smaller than at Maputo, it was attended by 20 governments and 12 development agencies. This approach of reminding donors was successful. The EEC and the African Development Bank sent teams to study the measures for rapid commitment of pledged money. Even further pledges were promised, e.g., Kuwait Fund promised \$ 37 m, Portugal \$ 30 m and West Germany increased its pledge to \$ 15 m from earlier \$ 2 m. SADCC in this meeting adopted more pragmatic approach. It presented only those projects which it felt had the best chances of attracting funds immediately. It was in this conference that the decision to establish secretariat at Gaborone was taken and it was decided that the host government would not benefit from the taxation of secretariat officials' salaries, which were contributed by all member states (in proportion agreed by the Council of Ministers).⁵³

In this conference a paper was presented viz., "From Dependent Poverty Toward Economic Liberation", which identified five areas of problems as well as five challenges facing the SADCC - states:

52. Africa Research Bulletin, Nov.-Dec., 1981, p. 6237.

53. The Herald, 25 March 1982.

The five Problem areas were:

1. their historic inheritance,
2. South African destabilization,
3. the international economic situation,
4. national resource mobilization,
5. & Management constraints.

And the five challenges were:

1. to refrain from allowing regional planning to be pushed aside by short term national considerations;
2. to reject doubts about the possibility of cooperation and overcome divisive issues;
3. to overcome the tendency to see problems in national terms;
4. to improve the communication of information essential to regional planning;
5. & to enhance the training of personnel for SADCC projects.

In the light of above problems and challenges, the members again showed their commitment to SADCC. The ministers of the nine Southern African states condemned South Africa for its destabilization policy,⁵⁴ with specifying reference to its incursions into Angola, and destruction of a part of the port of Beira a few days Blantyre meeting. But once again big powers and donor agencies showed their policy of not-antagonizing South

54. SADCC Blantyre, 1981, pp. 23-4 and 30-1.

Africa. They objected to the condemnation words of SADCC resolution against South African destabilization stating: "Representatives of several invited Governments and agencies expressed views sharing SADCC's concern at South African destabilization and sabotage actions affecting regional transport and communications development". However, they were retained by SADCC.

In this conference, with earlier transport and communication projects, the food and agriculture projects were given weightage. The nine projects presented conc with (1) coordination and cooperation to facilitate the interchange of ideas & personnel (2) establishment of an early warning system of food shortages, (3) the exchange of information, (4) an inventory of the resource base, (5) establishment of regional food reserves (& of seed, fertilizer and pesticides), (6) the reduction of post harvest food loss; (7) establishment of a regional institute of food technology, where the question was whether to build on existing facilities or start a new institute (8) a study of the food marketing infrastructure (9) & food aid. No doubt, most of these projects of regional coordination in food and agriculture were presented by Zimbabwe, but contrast appears at the problem of how to continue, despite the exodus of the necessary skilled personnel from Zimbabwe, to develop new strains of wheat in

order to combat wheat rust, was also nowhere mentioned.⁵⁵ There was also a contrast that proposals presented by Botswana for the control of foot and mouth disease and tse tse fly; the establishment of a training school for meat inspection at Lobatse and of a centre for the study of tick-borne disease in Malawi were given no favour of funding; while at the same time the development of an agricultural management college at Mananga, Swaziland (building on existing facilities) was agreed.

Maseru Conference (Jan. 1983). - It was the fourth major conference of SADCC members, donor nations and agencies. Before this conference a Summit of SADCC Heads of State was held in Gaborone which reviewed the progress. The progress-report noted the rapid coming of pledged money and also noted that SADCC was in full operation and praised its work. The Maseru conference of 1983 was called on its recommendation for adoption of industry and agriculture as the focus of further development together with transport and communication. Maseru conference was joined by 28 donor nations and 22 aid agencies. This conference was important because, after Maputo (1980) this was the first major pledging conference. Here 85

55. C.R. Hill, Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa, African Affairs, 82(327), Apr. 83, p. 232.

projects were identified in the areas of agriculture and industry. Donors committed \$ 180 million for these projects and also the promises were made for further aid. However, industry was given less favour, out of \$ 180 m, \$ 147 m went to agricultural projects. This was mainly because donors were not happy with most of the industry projects and complained about the project list as a "Shopping list" and also the lack of specialization" in African countries.⁵⁶

The two conferences which had taken place latter on, one in Feb. 1984 in Lusaka (Zambia) and another at Mbabane (Swaziland, Jan. 1985), were both unfortunately dominated by the serious drought problems throughout southern Africa. In both conferences requests were made for the food aid and aids in the form of seed, implements, fertilizers and agricultural credit for rehabilitation of farmlands devastated by the severe drought. But, despite the request of \$ 268 million aid only \$ 100 m has been given by the donors and even most of which is in the form of food aid.⁵⁷

So the more than six years' history of SADCC has been dominated mainly by the focus on three principal

56. Africa Research Bulletin, Jan-Feb. 1983, p. 6717.

57. Pledges to SADCC Fall Below Target, The Herald, (Harare), Feb. 4, 1984.

sectors, viz., transport & communication; agriculture; and industry. Over the years 'trade' has not been given much importance under SADCC programme, while according to a recent SADCC - handbook,⁵⁸ the "enlargement of intra-regional trade", is "an essential component of SADCC strategies for reducing external dependence". But until mid 1984 trade was not officially designated as a regional area of interest. It was only in July 1984 that the trade was given some importance and coordination of trade sector was assigned to Tanzania but progress in this field is still too slow. However, SADCC - secretariat has given ^{its} declaration that the less importance to trade is not due to neglect of this sector but due to the "precaution". It has given "two reasons" for this:⁵⁹

1. It is due to "a concern to avoid overlapping or conflicting with the basically complementary tariff reduction and clearing union programmes" of 'PTA of East and Southern Africa', having its offices in Lusaka and Harare. PTA includes six SADCC states (all except Mozambique, Botswana and Angola), so overlapping of programmes were necessary to avoid.

58. "Southern African Development Coordination Conference: A Handbook", Gaborone - SADCC, 1984, p. 17; Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical (ARB: EFT), 1984, p. 7337.

59. SADCC, 'Overview', p. 11.

2. The second reason was the need to avoid replicating the mistakes of limiting national sovereignty and development as in former regional trade-promotion organisations.

The issue of migrant labour is another sphere which is not on SADCC's agenda till now, due to which the members are bound to keep interaction with South Africa and be dependent on it. In 1983 alone, RSA recruited more than 1,40,000 miners from five SADCC labour exporting states⁶⁰ [Table XVII-B, Appendix: for figures of employment of foreign black workers from southern African countries in South Africa in 1981].

In the field of transport and communication, agriculture, Industry and other sectors, however, more than 350 projects have been identified and approved by July 1984, half of which are in the process of being implemented and others are under review by donors. Out of estimated \$ 4.6 billion money \$ 1.1 billion has already been committed and spent while SADCC is negotiating for for \$ 1.25 billion currently (Table 1 , SADCC Projects) Till 1984 of the funds obtained, more than 64% has been

60. The Employment Bureau of Africa Limited, Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31st Dec. 1983, p. 9; Nsekela, Southern Africa, p.6.

TABLE 1: SADCC Project Programmes by sector in 1984:
allocation of responsibilities for regional
coordination of sectoral activities

Coordinator	SADCC Sectors	No. of Projects in 1984	Cost (in US \$ millions)			SATCC Sub sectors	Administrative Structure
			Estimated	Foreign	Secured		
Mozambique	Transport & Communications	127	2,935	2,373	740	Shipping	Technical Unit, SATCC
	Mozambique Ports	32	1,489	1,170	314		
	Dar es Salaam Ports	11	382	314	83		
	Lobito Port	4	210	205	83		
	Intra-Regional surface Transport	22	407	304	67		
	Civil Aviation	11	107	87	48		
	Telecommunications	25	325	278	189		
	Coordination & Training.	22	15	15	6		
Zimbabwe	Agriculture	62	312	297	63	Railways Telecommunications Roads.	Administrative Support Unit, Ministry of Agriculture.
Botswana	Food Security	28	177	163	16		
Malawi	Animal Diseases Control Research	22	127	126	46		
Lesotho	Fisheries, Wildlife and forestry.	11	6	6	-		
	Soil and water conservation & land utilization.	1	2	2	1	-	Technical Unit, Ministry of Agriculture.
Tanzania	Industry (and Trade)	88	1,304	943	221	-	Technical Unit.
Angola	Energy	30	34	C.30	4	Energy	Technical Unit, Ministry of Energy.
Zambia	Mining	37	15	9	1	Airways	Working Group, Ministry of Mines.
	Southern African Development Fund	-	-	-	-		
Swaziland	Manpower development	9	n/a	n/a	n/a	-	
	Total	353	4,600	\$ 1,029 (79%)	\$ 1,029 (22%)		

Source : *African Affairs*, Vol. 84, no. 335, Apr. 1985, p. 169.

International Organization, Vol. 37, no. 4, Autumn 83, p. 694.

spent on transport and communication. Ten projects in this sector are already complete and the large project of \$ 195 million Nacala-Cuamba railway reconstruction is in the process of implementation. Despite all these efforts till now, SADCC states today, are not only very poor but also dependent more on South Africa, than they were in 1980, when SADCC was created with the high hopes of economic liberation from RSA and development. The population of SADCC states is increasing fastly while a comparative study of mining and agricultural production in 1980 and 1984 shows that the production has decreased even from 1980 level (Table 2,3,4,5: Comp. of Agriculture & mining production and live stocks in 1980 & 1984). In some sectors where the production has not decreased, it is also not sufficient to cope with the rise in population of member states. In some countries, the continuous drought for many years has reduced the agricultural production to such a level that today they are importing even food grains from foreign countries of which major portion is coming from South Africa (Table 6 , Cereal requirement of Southern Africa for 1984-85). The reduction in mining production as well as cash crops has reduced the export and created severe balance of payment problem. Due to increased import and less export the balance of Trade is negative in some countries. This is further effected by the import of services. The balance of payment on goods

Table 2 : COMPARISON OF SADC STATES' AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
IN 1980 & 1984 (Staple Foods).

COUNTRY	STAPLE FOODS (1000 metric tons)											
	MAIZE		SORGHUM		WHEAT		MILLET		RICE (PADDY)		CASSAVA (MANIOC)	
	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984
ANGOLA	320	260	--	--	10	10	50	50	20	22	1850	1950
BOTSWANA	12	2	29	6	1	--	2	1 ^b	--	--	--	--
MALAWI	1100	1400 ^b	120	147 ^b	1	--	--	--	50 ^b	33	90 ^b	90
MOZAMBIQUE	250	330	150	180	3	--	5	--	--	55	--	3150
LESOTHO	112	90 ^a	65	26	32	5 ^a	--	--	--	--	--	--
TANZANIA	800 ^b	1131 ^b	220 ^b	450	48 ^b	80	160 ^b	285 ^b	180 ^b	400 ^b	4600	5600
SWAZILAND	95	110	1	--	1	--	--	--	1 ^b	3	--	--
									(in 1979 → 5)			
ZAMBIA	800	857	35	14	7	11	60	-13	--	25	177 ^b	210 ^b
ZIMBABWE	1600	1501 ^a	74	12 ^a	155	100 ^a	180	120 ^b	--	--	--	80

a. Unofficial estimates.

b. FAO estimates.

Source: I. FAO Production Yearbook, 1981 and 1985.

II. Africa South of Sahara, Europe Pub. L+4, 1980-87

TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF SADC STATES' AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
IN 1980 & 1984 (CASH CROPS)

COUNTRY	CASH CROPS (1000 metric tons)																					
	COCONUT		CASHEW NUT		BANANAS		PINEAPPLE		COTTON SEED		COTTON LINT		ORANGES		GRAPEFRUIT		SOYABEANS		GROUNDNUTS (in shell)		PULSES	
	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984
ANGOLA	--	--	--	--	300 ^b	280	20	35	22	22	11 ^a	11	--	--	--	--	--	--	20	20 ^a	--	--
BOTSWANA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1 ^b	--	15 ^b
MALAWI	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	27	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	170 ^b	180	--	--
MOZAMBIQUE	--	400	--	20.3 ^a	--	70 ^b	--	--	15	35 ^a	6 ^a	17	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	70 ^b	--	55 ^b
LESOTHO	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TANZANIA	310 ^b	320	46	48.8 ^a	780	1000 ^b	47	50	98	91 ^a	51	47 ^a	--	--	--	--	--	--	75	59	--	--
SWAZILAND	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	15	21 ^b	8	11 ^b	59	58 ^b	--	45 ^b	--	--	--	--	--	--
ZAMBIA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7 ^b	26	3	15	--	--	--	--	7	7	80 ^b	19	14 ^b	5 ^b
ZIMBABWE	--	--	--	--	--	62 ^a	--	--	117 ^a	163	61 ^a	85	29	33	--	--	--	90 ^a	84	70 ^a	--	--
																			(in 1979 → 105)			

a. Unofficial estimates.

b. FAO estimates.

Contd...

Source: FAO Yearbook, 1981-1985

10. Africa South of Sahara, 1980-87

COMPARISON OF SADC STATES' AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
IN 1980 & 1984 (CASH CROPS)

C O U N T R Y	CASH CROPS (1000 metric tons)											
	SUGAR CANE		SISAL		COFFEE		TEA		TOBACCO (Leaves)		SEED COTTON	
	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984
ANGOLA	450	360	20	20	40	27	--	--	3	3	33	35
BOTSWANA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	--
MALAWI	1480	1670	--	--	1	--	30	34	58 ^a	70 ^a	23	27
MOZAMBIQUE	2150	1000	18	4 ^b	1	--	18	15	3	--	54	52
LESOTHO	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TANZANIA	1304 ^b	1477	115	40 ^a	52	50	17	18	18	10 ^a	--	--
SWAZILAND	2800	3500 ^b	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	31	--
ZAMBIA	1150	1100 ^b	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	3	10	--
ZIMBABWE	2700	3600 ^a	--	--	4	10 ^b	3	11 ^b	114	118	180	--

a. Unofficial estimates.

b. FAO estimates.

Source : I. FAO Production Yearbook, 1981-85.

II. Africa South of Sahara, 1980-87.

TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF MINING PRODUCTION OF SADC STATES* in 1980 & 1984

COUNTRY	DIAMOND (carats)			NICKEL (1000 metric tons)		ZINC (1000 metric tons)		COPPER (1000 metric tons)		IRON (1000 metric tons)		COBALT ORE (metric tons)		COAL (1000 metric tons)		CHROMIUM ORE (1000 metric tons)			
	1980	1981	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984		
	ANGOLA	1485	1400	M	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
BOTSWANA	5146	--	12904	15.14	18.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	M	M	371.5	392.8	--	--		
LESOTHO	105.2	--	M	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
MALawi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
MOZAMBIQUE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	M	M	400 ^b	M	--	--		
SWAZILAND	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	M	M	1	--	176.0	M	--	--		
TANZANIA	274	M	--	--	--	M	M	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
ZAMBIA	--	--	--	--	--	M	M	--	--	--	--	736	633	576	470	--	--		
ZIMBABWE	--	--	--	15,074 ^a	10	367	478	949	893	1622	925	27 ^a	22.7 ^a	115	78	3134	3110	553.5	476.5

- a. Figures refer to the metal content of ores and concentrates.
 b. Estimates.
 M - See tables below, due to unavailability of required year's figure.
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Contd....

COUNTRY	DIAMOND (1000 carats)			COBALT (metric tons)			COPPER (1000 metric tons)		COAL (1000 metric tons)				IRON (1000 metric tons)		GOLD (Kg) (including content & concentrates)				
	1980	1981	1984	1977	1978	1982	1977	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
ANGOLA	1485	1400	1400 ^b																
LESOTHO	105.2	52.3	--																
BOTSWANA				165	261	254													
MOZAMBIQUE							3.0	0.2	400	350	380								
SWAZILAND									176.0			101.7	1265	493.5					
TANZANIA															8	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
ZAMBIA																n/a	41n	316	

Source: Africa South of Sahara, Ew. Pub. Ltd., 1980-87.

**COMPARISON OF MINING PRODUCTION OF SADC
STATES' IN 1980 & 1984**

COUNTRY	ASBESTOS (1000 metric tons)		TIN ORE (metric tons)		LEAD ORE (1000 metric tons)		ZINC ORE (1000 metric tons)		PETROLIUM CRUDE (1000 metric tons)		NATURAL GAS (Terajoules)		MICA (1000 metric tons)	
	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984
ANGOLA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7420 ^b	40280	52000 ^b	M	--	--
BOTSWANA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
LESOTHO	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MALAWI	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MOZAMBIQUE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.2 ^b	M
SWAZILAND	31.6	26.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TANZANIA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
ZAMBIA	--	--	M	M	12.6	19.8	34.8	38.4	--	--	--	--	--	--
ZIMBABWE	250.9	165.3	934	1210 ^b	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

a. Figures refer to the metal content of ores and concentrates.

b. Estimates

M. See tables below, due to unavailability of required year's figure.

COUNTRY	NATURAL GAS ^b (terajoules)			TIN (metric tons)		MICA (including scrap) (1000 metric tons)		
	1980	1981	1982	1978	1982	1980	1981	1982
ANGOLA	52000	49000	48000	--	--	--	--	--
ZAMBIA	--	--	--	10	12	--	--	--
MOZAMBIQUE	--	--	--	--	--	0.2	0.2 ^b	0.2 ^b

Source: Africa South of Sahara, Europa Pub Ltd., 1980-87.

TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF SADC STATES' LIVESTOCK
IN 1980 & 1984

C O U N T R Y	LIVESTOCK (1000)					
	Cattle		Sheep		Goats	
	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984
ANGOLA	3120	3350	225	245	935	955
BOTSWANA	2911	2685	638	167	1250	889
MALAWI	3120	908	225	156	935	631
MOZAMBIQUE	1399	1320	106	144	335	355
LESOTHO	600	560	1100	1350	800	1020
TANZANIA	12673	14500 ^b	3790	4100 ^b	5680	6100 ^b
SWAZILAND	660	614	34	35	270	298
ZAMBIA	2151	2400 ^b	49	42 ^b	310	355
ZIMBABWE	5000	5500	590	450	1350	1100

b. FAO estimates

Source: I. FAO Production Yearbook (Rome), 1981-85. II. Africa South of Sahara, Europa Pub. Ltd., 1980-87.

and services of all nine-members of SADCC is negative. This negative balance has caused a fast depletion of foreign reserves. In 1982 and 1983, Angola's foreign reserve was \$ 265 m and \$ 141 million respectively. Lesotho's foreign reserve in 1984 was - \$ 19 m, Malawi's in 1982 was - \$ 19.9 m, Mozambique's in 1982, 1983 was - \$ 4,440 m & \$ 890 m respectively. While the foreign reserves of Swaziland in 1984 was - \$ 11.7 m; Tanzania's in 1979 and 1980, - \$ 60.8 m and \$ 54.5 m; Zambia's in 1983 and 1984, - \$ 34 m and \$ 91 m; Zimbabwe's in 1982, 1983 & 1984 was - \$ 23.9 m, \$ 183.8 m and \$ 63.3 m respectively. (Table 7 , Comparative study of Trade balance on goods and services and changes in reserves). The deficit in the balance of trade and shortage of foreign reserves has created heavy burden of debets on the states . On the other hand, South Africa still continues to be main partner in export and import of SADCC members (Table 8 and 9 , Total Export & Export to South Africa, Total Import and Import from South Africa). Thus it can be firmly said that till now SADCC has failed to achieve its goals of development and economic liberation.

Though, the rate of economic growth since 1980 has fallen below the population growth⁶¹, however, the region

61. Before 1980 the rate of population growth in Southern Africa was not below the rate of economic growth.

Table 7: Comparison of Trade Balance, Balance on goods & Services & changes in the reserves of S/DCC States

		Merchandise export f.o.b. (Free on board)	Merchandise imports f.o.b.	Trade Balance	Export of Services	Import of Services	Services (net)	Balance on goods & Services	Private unrequited transfers (net)	Government unrequited transfers (net)	Unrequited transfers (net)	Current balance	Direct Capital Investment (net)	Other Long Term Capital (net)	Short Term Capital (net)	Capital Balance	Net errors and omissions	Total (net monetary movements)	Allocation of IMF Special drawing rights	Valuation changes (net)	Exceptional financing	Monetization of gold (net)	Official financing	Changes in Reserves
Angola (in million on Kwacha)	1982	--	--	11021	--	--	-19007	--	--	--	794	-7192	--	3026	3901*	6937	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-265
	1983	--	--	17785	--	--	-19792	--	--	--	986	-1021	--	1628	-466*	1162	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-141
	1984	--	--	20850	--	--	-23613	--	--	--	1047	-1716	--	6103	-2557*	3546	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1830
Botswana (in US \$ million)	1982	460.6	-575.0	-114.4	181.9	-226.7	-44.8	-159.2	-0.2	95.8	95.5	-63.6	21.1	84.7	-1.9	--	14.6	54.9	--	-15.3	--	--	--	39.5
	1983	640.3	-609.3	31.0	191.0	-139.3	-148.3	-117.3	-0.4	122.5	122.1	4.8	25.1	41.5	23.2	--	29.0	123.6	--	-20.9	--	--	--	102.7
	1984	673.9	-554.8	119.1	188.2	-344.3	-156.1	-37.0	-5.8	101.8	96	59.1	47	-27.6	-26.3	--	16.9	124.3	--	-45.7	--	--	--	78.6
Lesotho (in US \$ million)	1982	37	-451	-413	393	-58	335	-78	2	49	51	-27	4	25	-11	--	18	8	--	-4	--	--	--	4
	1983	28	-500	-472	463	-61	402	-70		62	64	-6	4	23	4	--	2	27	--	-8	--	--	--	19
	1984	24	-426	-402	401	-51	350	-52	2	71	73	21	3	15	-36	--	6	9	--	-28	--	--	--	-19
Malawi (in US \$ million)	1982	242.1	-213.6	28.4	62.2	-189.8	-127.6	-99.2	-8.7	35.2	26.5	-72.7	--	-15.8	0.6	--	50.6	-37.3	--	-2.3	19.6	--	--	-19.8
Mozambique (in million on meti- als)	1982	8650	-31570	-22920	--	--	3440	-19480	--	--	3000	-16480	--	--	--	12650	-610	--	--	--	--	--	--	-4440
	1983	5280	-25570	-20290	--	--	3540	--	--	--	3600	-13150	--	--	--	12760	-500	--	--	--	--	--	--	-890
	1984	4060	-22900	-18840	--	--	1740	--	--	--	7120	-9660	--	--	--	10930	-110	--	--	--	--	--	--	840
Swaziland (US \$ m.)	1984	271.8	-350.5	-78.8	101.8	-95.0	6.8	-72.0	0.1	60.7	60.8	-11.2	-0.7	17.3	2.2	28.3	13.9	21.3	--	-31.4	--	--	--	-11.7
Tanzania (US \$ m.)	1979	545.7	-960.7	-415.0	151.5	-257.8	-106.3	-521.3	29.5	145.3	274.8	-346.5	--	225.2	-75.1	150.6	24.0	172.3	7.4	-11.2	115.3	--	--	-61.8
	1980	507.6	-1068.7	-561.1	202.9	-337.1	-134.2	-695.3	26.4	144.6	161.0	-531.3	--	138.4	-76.8	61.6	229.1	243.6	7.6	4.2	177.4	--	--	-54.5
	1981	688.3	-1037.9	-349.7	220.3	-266.5	-68.2	-417.9	27.4	111.5	138.9	-279.0	--	113.7	105.5	219.2	82.0	22.2	7.1	8.5	-16.7	--	--	17.1
Zambia (US \$ m.)	1982	942	-1004	-61	134	-657	--	-594	-56	26	--	-614	--	224	77	--	-77	-390	--	35	453	--	--	98
	1983	923	-711	212	106	-543	--	-225	-49	39	--	-234	--	132	-43	--	-308	-453	--	23	306	--	--	-3
	1984	914	-612	302	85	-491	--	-104	-85	10	--	-139	--	27	22	--	-135	-225	--	13	121	--	--	-91
Zimbabwe (US \$ m.)	1982	1312.1	-1472.0	-159.9	261.9	-728.3	--	-626.3	-128.2	45.4	000000	-709.2	-0.8	371.5	233.9	--	92	-22.4	--	-4.3	--	2.0	--	-22.9
	1983	1153.7	-069.6	84.1	221.4	-692.5	--	-387.0	-114.2	41.1	-----	-480.2	-2.1	162.9	91.0	--	34.5	-174.0	--	-49	--	60.0	--	-160.6
	1984	1173.6	-989.3	184.3	205.0	-588.9	--	-149.0	-38.5	88.2	-----	-100.0	-2.3	171.2	-100.1	--	44.9	-46.3	--	-39.7	-----	22.7	--	-63.3

* Including errors & omissions.

Sources: 1. IMF International financial Statistics
2. Banco de Mocambique, Maputo
3. Banco Nacional de Angola.

TABLE 6: Cereal requirement for
1984-85 (in '000 tonnes)

	Estimated Commercial imports	Food Aid requirement	Total cereal import requirement
Angola	217	83	300
Botswana	152	43	195
Lesotho	120	60	180
Mozambique	100	520	620
Zambia	129	206	335
Zimbabwe	288	162	450
Southern Africa	1,006	1,074	2,080

Source: Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 22,
31 Jan, 1985.

TABLE 8 : Total Export and Export to South Africa

SADCC Members	1980		1981		1982		1983		1984	
	Total export	Export to	Total Export	Export to	Total Export	Export to	Total Export	Export to	Total Export	Export to
Angola										
Botswana					494,242 ('000UA)	SACU 55,973 ('000UA)	707,395 ('000UA)	SACU 58,586 ('000UA)	969,127 ('000UA)	SACU 65,277 ('000UA)
Lesotho	1979 37,916 ('000 maletl)	SACU(79) 12,955 ('000 maletl)								
Malawi					248,986 (K'000 K=Malawi)	S.A. 14,943 (K'000)	265,167 (K'000)	S.A. 21,987 (K'000)	436,541 (K'000)	S.A. 32,348 (K'000)
Mozambique										
Swaziland								323,689 ('000 ema- langeni)		S.A. 104,937 ('000e)
Tanzania										
Zambia*	1,023,276 (K'000)	S.A. 5,687 (K'000)	936,496 (K'000)	SA 5499 (K'000)						
Zimbabwe					807,144 (Z\$'000)	S.A. 137,817 (Z \$'000)	1,025,708 (Z \$'000)	S.A. 191,790 (Z \$'000)	1,271,070 (Z' \$000)	S.A. 232,179 (Z' \$000)

U.A. = Unit of Account, used by the Southern African custom Union. This is equivalent to the South African rand. Its average value was: 1.0571 pula in 1982; 1.0151 pula in 1983; 1.455 pula in 1984. Pula is the Botswana's currency.

S.A = South Africa

SACU = Southern African Custom Union

Source: a. IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1980-1986.

b. Africa South of Sahara, Europa Pub. Ltd., 1980-1986

TABLE 9: Total Import & Import from South Africa Comparison

SADCC Members	1980		1981		1982		1983		1984	
	Total import	Import from	Total import	Import from RSA	Total import	Import from	Total Import	Import from	Total import	Import from
Angola				na	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Botswana					744,040 ('000UA)	643,600 ('000UA)	818,275 ('000UA)	680,125 ('000UA)	1,016,412 ('000UA)	793,357 ('000UA)
Lesotho	(1979) 303,613 ('000 Maloti)	(1979)SACU 295,763 ('000 Maloti)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Malawi	356,200 (K'000)	South A. 132,773 (K'000)			322,099 (K'000)	South A. 117,131	363,752 (K'000)	South A. 141,111 (K'000)	381,574 (K'000)	South Afr 154,228 (K'000)
Mozambique					31,573.7 (Million meticais)	S.A. 2,552.6 (m.m.)	25,571.4 (m.m.)	S.A. 2,448.2 (m.m.)	22,903.3 (m.m.)	S.A. 2,686.7 (m.m.)
Swaziland					n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	526,961 ('000 maloti)	S.A. 530,981 ('000 maloti)
Tanzania						n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Zambia*	876,588 (K'000)	S.A. 136,485 (K'000)	924,444 (K'000)	S.A. 139,631 (K'000)		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Zimbabwe**					1081,789 (Z \$'000)	S.A. 239,448 (Z \$'000)	1061,619 (Z \$'000)	S.A. 259,892 (Z \$'000)	1200,608 (Z \$'000)	S.A. 231,792 (Z \$'000)

SACU = Custom Union of South Africa, of which Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa & Swaziland are members.

* Provisional

** Figures exclude petroleum products of unknown origin.

S.A. = South Africa

Source: a. IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1980-1986. b. Africa South of Sahara, Europa Pub. Ltd., 1980-86.

is not over-populated. On the contrary, development is hindered in most of the part by a low population density. Such as in Angola where the average is only five persons per square kilometer. Although scarce in some areas, there is sufficient arable land for seven out of the nine countries to be food exporters (all except Botswana and Lesotho). The region has abundance of resources other than agricultural land. Minerals necessary for industrial growth are available in great quantity: for example; iron ore, Gold, Diamond, Uranium, Cobalt, Chrome, Lead, Nickel, Zinc, Copper and many other minerals are available in abundance, and many of which have not been fully evaluated. There is no dearth of hydro-electric capacity, which leaves power for irrigation and industrialization. As a group SADCC has a capacity to become an energy exporter, for its members produce twice as much oil, & more electricity and coal than they need. So, what are the factors behind the depressing trend of economic growth and increasing dependence on foreign countries in general and Republic of South Africa in particular ?

Factors for slow Development & Dependence: The major factors which can be traced are:

1. Prolonged drought in the region;
2. The impact of global economic recession;
3. Regional destabilization by South Africa;
4. & Donors' attitude.

1. Prolonged drought : Southern Africa has been affected by the wide spread three years drought. In some parts, viz., in Botswana, parts of Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, the drought has continued for 5 years. As a result most of the countries, including Zimbabwe which normally records large food surplus, have been compelled to take emergency maize supplies from South Africa.⁶²
 2. The Impact of Global Economic Recession: The global recession is the another factor which has taken its toll in the form of adverse terms of trade, & continuously and rapidly mounting external debts. This recession in the world market has decreased the demand of African goods, in turn affecting mineral, cash crop and industrial production. This is also the cause of high inflation in southern Africa.
 3. Regional destabilization by South Africa: It is not that only southern African states are dependent on south Africa for transport, import of consumption goods, petroleum, machinery etc. But more than them, it is the South Africa which is dependent on Southern Africa for the market of
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62. Though in 1984 South Africa too was a net grain importer.

its goods and revenue from its transport services.⁶³ Thus, SADCC's objective of economic liberation from South Africa has caused a threat, of loosing market and revenue, to South Africa, while its (RSA) effort to dominate the region and secure its interest through 'Consas' has failed (except 4 independent 'homelands' within its borders). Due to this failure, South Africa has adopted the strategy of regional destabilization to impose its economic hegemony in southern Africa by dislocating the economies of SADCC-members. In pursuing its purposes, South Africa has indulged in sanctions, sabotage, subversion and open aggression. It has preferred to operate through allies, UNITA in Angola and at one stage the LLA in Lesotho,

63. South Africa exports more than what it imports from Southern Africa. The largest African import by South Africa in 1983-84 was of textile and food stuff. Of 54 million rand textile & 53 million rand food stuff was exported to South Africa which constituted only 8% & 14% respectively of pretoria's import requirement. Except gems & jewellery there is no significant supply to South Africa from Southern African countries. While Southern African countries can import the materials provided by South Africa from other countries of the world, but they prefer South African goods because these cost them less (due to less transportation cost). But South Africa lacks the market for manufactured goods outside Africa, so it is heavily dependent on Southern Africa for market. In transport services also, the South African Transport Services (SATS) operates 75% of the regional rail network. So if there is a **boycott** of South Africa, or improvement in southern African transport system the revenue coming from SATS will be reduced tremendously.

surrogates - MNR in Mozambique, but it has not hesitated also in open attacks for many times. It has found excuse of protection to SWAPO & ANC activists by these countries, to attack. The major targets, it has selected for this purpose of destabilization are Angolan and Mozambican rail routes and harbours; and Zimbabwe's oil pipeline from Beira, which are vital for the economic liberation of SADCC members and also provide quick transport and reduce cost of transportation. For example, for the port facilities the rail distance from Blantyre (Malawi) to Durban (South Africa) is 3,342 Kms. but to Ncala (Mozambique) it is only 840 Kms. Therefore, South African supported bandits bomb the Ncala line to maintain pretoria's economic grip. Bombing Zimbabwean goods traffic through Mozambique raises costs, which inhibts growth and deters potential investors who might choose the stability of the Zimbabwean economy over the chaos of apartheid. Due to the same reason the Benguela Railway has been effectively inoperative for nearly a decade. Similarly, despite the positing of Zimbabwean troops inside Mozambique as guards, the Beira - Feruka pipeline and port instalations have regularly suffered from sabotage. As a result, the freight which cannot be diverted to Dar es Salaam and Tazara (itself severely crippled by inadequate locomotive power) has had to rely on South African ports and transport facilities.

SADCC documented (at 1985 OAU Summit) the cost of South African military aggression and sabotage as \$ 10.1 billion during 1980-84,⁶⁴ which is more than all the bilateral and multilateral aid to the members in the same period. Till the end of 1985, the loss was running to \$ 4 billion per year (or \$ 70 per capita) for a group of countries (whose average annual output was approximately \$ 500 per capita). The human cost of destabilization is 250,000 dead, with more than 100,000 displaced persons crossing borders to seek refuge. By the June 1986, Zimbabwe decided to establish a fifth camp for Mozambican refugees while Agolans' coming into Zambia is still continuing.

The sanctions, which South Africa has imposed on its neighbours, is of different forms. Since Mozambique's independence in 1975, it (RSA) has reduced its traffic through Maputo port by more than 85%. In 1981, it withdrew locomotives loaned to Zimbabwe. After this South Africa has adopted the technic of delaying and interrupting the flow of essential goods of SADCC - countries through it.

64. The same cost of destabilization, i.e. more than \$ 10,000 million over past five years, was estimated at sixth Summit's of SADCC on 9 Aug. 1985, in Arusha (Tanzania). Source: Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. xxxii, April 1986, p. 34277.

Zimbabwe and Botswana have frequently been told that there were 'technical' problems with moving their steel & beef exports. By January 1986, South Africa had imposed a total economic blockade on Lesotho, creating condition for a coup-d' -etal.

The contrast appears when South Africa states that its invasions and sabotage are in response to its neighbours' support for ANC (African National Congress) and SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organization) guerrillas who infiltrate South Africa. However, this is a mere disguise, the main purpose is to destabilize the economy of SADCC countries and secure its economic and political hegemony over them. Due to its poor - economy and guerrilla war (of MNR) ranging in all 10 provinces and even within 10 Km of the capital, which has caused Mozambique to invest \$ 3800 million by 1984, was compelled to sign a non-aggression and co-operation pact with South Africa in March 1984, viz., the Nkomatic Accord. The accord was a humiliation to Mozambique because it was mainly dictated by South Africa. According to the Accord any fresh injection of capital in Mozambique would have to come from South Africa or be funnelled through South African based multinationals. In accordance with the accord, Mozambique reduced the ANC presence to 10 in a diplomatic mission. Yet, even after two years South Africa continues

unabated in its support of MNR. This proves the real intensification of South Africa.

4. Donors' attitude: Donors of SADCC have adopted dual attitude - to show concern for the independent states and at the same time to maintain economic links with South Africa. Both United States and the Britain have chosen this path. During the years 1980-1985, United States has provided more than \$ 80 million to SADCC and in 1986 it made new commitments of \$ 15 million. But at the same time in early 1986 it also gave aid to UNITA (fighting against MPLA government in Angola, engaged in civil war and sabotage). This behaviour of U.S. runs counter to its determination of friendship and cooperation with SADCC and makes it clear that it (U.S.) is in league with South Africa in fomenting instability in the region. On this one SADCC official has rightly commented: "The U.S. gives us money to build one SADCC rail-road (for the Beira line) and then gives money to have another blow up (UNITA's sabotage of the Benguela line)".

Another aspect of U.S. aid is that it does not always follow SADCC's objectives. In 1983, the original grant of Sorghum and millet excluded Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique from receiving any benefits from it. Angola and Mozambique were prohibited due to political reason while Tanzania was in arrears on debt repayment. The SADCC

Council of Ministers rejected the exclusionary clause; the grant was rewritten and other donors picked up the cost of the three, after more than a year delay.

Some of the donors are more concerned for their own interest than SADCC, of creating market for their goods in southern Africa. For example, in 1986 Zimbabwe wanted to purchase wheat from the U.S. and wanted to pay for it by shipping its surplus white maize to Mozambique which could then become part of the U.S. food aid to Mozambique. After much bargain and reluctance, the U.S. agreed only for 7,000 tons of Zimbabwean white maize which is only one-tenth of the yellow maize sent directly from the U.S. The argument given for this by U.S. makes clear its intention of creating market in Southern Africa. It was said by U.S. AID Official in Harare:

"The goal of food aid is to make the people of Southern Africa change their preference from white maize to yellow maize in order to create a market for U.S. yellow maize".⁶⁵

Despite these problems and the generally depressing prospects for significant progress towards economic liberation, some success has been achieved, especially in the communication field. Today every SADCC capital is linked to every other one by national air carriers, though

65. Africa Report, July-August 1986, p. 63.

it is still more convenient to travel through South African airports. Earlier, in 1980, a greater proportion of inter-state telecommunications had to pass via Europe or South Africa or both but today all nine members have functioning groundsat stations and there is direct communication link among all members by satellite. SADCC has survived its first six years despite all the problems of a world recession, a drought and continuing attacks from the apartheid regime of South Africa, this is not a less achievement. It has established region-to-region accords with Nordic states and with EEC. The Nordic-SADCC programmes include a transfer of technology and increased trade and cultural exchanges. EEC has increased funds supplied for regional projects and according to SADCC priorities the bilateral aids has also been increased. SADCC has also started diversifying its link in recent years (several non-Western countries have come out for its help. All its members are in the Non-Aligned Movement and seek alternatives not only to their historical subordination to South Africa, but also to their ex-colonial masters. After the visit of SADCC Executive Secretary, Makoni, to the several East European countries and USSR in 1986, the council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) has agreed to provide region - to- region aid to SADCC. The non-aligned states such as India, Nigeria and Kuwait have contributed to SADCC to show support for its goal of

economic liberation. India is assisting in agricultural research and has expressed interests in industrial projects. The other developing countries are also coming to support SADCC. Brazil helps to fund the technical unit in Angola which coordinates the energy sector while the Arab nations are financing 20 SADCC projects in Transport, agriculture and mining.

At the 1986 SADCC Conference in Harare (Zimbabwe) five year plans (1986-90) were presented for each sector - agriculture, transport and communications, industry, energy, mining and manpower. This is the first time when large numbers of targets were set against which progress will be measured. In 1985, economists from SADCC states did the economic survey of the members to provide basic information about their economies for future planning. This survey was the first attempt to create an analytical data base for the region. Prior to this attempt they had to rely on IMF and other agencies for information and collection of data. By the information of economic situation according to its own priorities and criteria, SADCC could reduce the influence of outside agencies which might try to impose their own criteria for collection and information of data. The planning of SADCC is for the development of entire region. No doubt in transport and communication most of the funds have been provided to Mozambique for developing its rail and port facilities

but this has been done for the benefit of entire region. Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and other countries will be able to reduce their dependence on South African port and transport facilities. Due to shorter distance they will also be benefited by low transport cost. SADCC-energy sector is proceeding with the inter-connection of national electricity grids to distribute surplus supplies more equitably. Other several projects are working towards the goal of substituting the region's abundant coal for wood resources and the erosion of soil. Other several measures have also been adopted by SADCC to stop the continuous attack of drought. And a regional master plans will be written for the energy sub-sector (including petrol, coal and renewable resources).

In accordance with the commitment to "complete the struggle for genuine political independence", SADCC has provided observer status to ^{the} liberation movements - SWAPO (South West African Peoples' Organisation) and ANC (African National Congress), which are fighting for the liberation of Namibia and South Africa respectively. Anglin argues, however, that it has never been clear whether economic disengagement from dependence on the South Africa is intended to free members to engage South Africa more effectively in battle, or whether economic disengagement implied political disengagement and the abandonment of the liberation

struggle?⁶⁶ Both these arguments are, however, improper in the case of SADCC. One should not forget the basic nature of the co-operation. It is not a political organisation though it shows commitment to the political liberation. It is basically a regional economic co-operation and it is not its objective to accept the obligation and responsibility of liberation struggles. This becomes more clear when Seretse Khama assured South Africa in 1980 : "It is not our objective ... to plot against anybody or any country". Samora Machel was even more explicit when he said: "We are not declaring a war against South Africa".⁶⁷ Even ANC was excluded from SADCC-V (Lusaka) in February 1984, in a gesture of conciliation to Pretoria.

On the other hand, SADCC also does not aim at the economic disengagement leading to political disengagement and the abandonment of the commitment to liberation. SADCC by emphasising its non-political nature, has become an alternative to the liberation strategy of the Frontline States rather than a complement to it. By securing international co-operation with such countries having economic and eventually political leverage in South Africa, SADCC tries to influence them to use their leverage against the racist government.

66. Douglas G. Anglin, "Economic Liberation and regional Co-operation in Southern Africa : SADCC and PTA", International Organization, Vol. 37, no. 4, Autumn, 1983, pp.701-2

67. SADCC Blantyre 1981, p. 60; Record of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Summit Conference, 1 April, 1980, pp. 20, 30.

CHAPTER-IV

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AREA FOR EAST
AND SOUTHERN AFRICA - (PTA)

CHAPTER - IVPREFERENTIAL TRADE AREA FOR EAST
AND SOUTHERN AFRICA - (PTA)

Founded in 1981, with the aim of improving commercial and economic cooperation in the region and ultimately to form a common market and economic community, the PTA includes at present 15 countries from East and Southern Africa. Countries from East Africa are: Burundi, the Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda. While its members from southern Africa are : Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. PTA includes six SADCC members out of the nine, viz., Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Malawi, Lesotho and Tanzania. But it becomes more important for most of its objectives and functions are complementary to SADCC in the region.

ORIGIN :

Unlike SADCC¹, the PTA has a long history of its origin. Its origins can be traced to the early 1960s when

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1. The roots of SADCC are obscure, though Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has traced its roots to the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA-1958-68) and the Conference of East and Central African States between 1966-74) (Source: SADCC Blantyre, 1981, p. 15). But it was only after the proposition of 'Consas' by South Africa, that the effort for the creation of SADCC started and within a year it was established with haste.

the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has promoted the idea of a wide economic co-operation in Eastern Africa, in trade, transport and industry through sub-regional co-ordinating bodies. In 1965 a meeting was held in Lusaka, on Economic Cooperation in East Africa. It was also attended by the Central African Countries. Ten states from eastern and central Africa ratified a draft treaty and established an Economic Community for East and Central Africa (EC-ECA) with headquarters in Lusaka.² A provisional council was set up to work out details, while agreements were made on the co-ordination of transport and communication services, operation of multilateral and balanced trading patterns, and allocation of industries. After this two more meetings were held³, but the agreement remained only

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2. Ten-nations ratified the terms of cooperation: 3 from central Africa (Malawi, Zambia, Zaire), 6 from East Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania - but not Uganda), and Madagascar (Source: ECA Subregional Meetings on Economic Cooperation in East Africa, Lusaka, 26 October - 6 November 1965, UN doc. E/CN. 14/LU/ECOP/RES/L and Annex).
 3. Two subsequent meetings were held: first Interim Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, 2-5 May 1966; Meeting of Interim Committee, Addis Ababa, 30 October- 7 November 1967 (Source: Africa Research Bulletin EFT, 1967, p. 853).

on paper, especially due to the formation of the East African Community (EAC) in 1967, comprising Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The creation of EAC had no linkages with Lusaka meeting of EC-ECA 1965⁴, but it had the scope of membership to neighbouring countries, who were attracted to EAC, virtually responsible for abandoning their earlier effort of EC-ECA creation.

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4. The EAC(East African Community) created in 1967, had its origin in the EACSO(East African Common Services Organization) established in 1961. Actually in the colonial period of British rule there was a common Services Authority, comprising Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Though Uganda and Tanganyika were not satisfied with the working of Common Services and severely criticized it, when Tanganyika first got independence in 1961 a new agreement was made with the British High Commission, called East African Common Services Organization (EACSO), with the hope that economic cooperation would lead to political unity after the independence of Uganda and Kenya. But by the time Uganda and Kenya got independence, it became clear that independence of member states was to be a pre-condition for the economic and social development of the people & future cooperation. This was due to the fact that the three countries of East Africa got independence separately as a result of people's struggle in each for independence and the nationalist feelings were too high to compromise. Having failed in their effort to create a Pan-African political federation of East Africa, each territory now decided that any future cooperation in the region would have to be on an economic basis alone. After the call made by Kenya in 1965, a review to EACSO Agreement was made which culminated in the Treaty for East African Cooperation in 1967 creating East African Community (EAC). The "Treaty" formalized the existing arrangements for regional cooperation while at the same time new institutions and procedures were introduced to maintain, strengthen and modify certain imbalances in trade & industrial growth. It established an East African Common Market(EACM) as an integral part of the EAC & provided for the continuation of common services, and harmonization of monetary, balance of payments, fiscal and economic planning policies.

The EAC Treaty (Treaty for East African Cooperation) provided for full or associate membership to the countries other than original signatories - Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Ethiopia, Somalia, Zambia and Burundi applied officially for full membership while Zaire and Swaziland wanted to become associate member. A "Negotiating team" was formed to consider the application for membership and a number of meetings were held over 1968-1971, but no agreement was reached due to competitive pressure and dissatisfaction on unequal reaping of benefits by Kenya.⁵ This reached a crisis situation in mid-1970s with a unilateral break of the provisions of the Treaty by Tanzania and Uganda. The Idi Amin Coup had aborted the effort of larger cooperation and no meeting of the Negotiation Team was held after 1971, while the Community itself collapsed in April 1977.

But, before the EAC collapsed Tanzania started another effort for co-operation and with Mozambique, in 1976 formed Tanzania - Mozambic Permanent Commission of Cooperation. The Commission resulted in the formation of

5. A detailed analysis of this process is available in; Mwese, Ngila, "Regional Economic Integration and Unequal sharing of Benefits: Background to the Disintegration and Collapse of the East African Community", Africa Development, Dakar, Vol. IV, No. 2/3, 1979, pp. 1-28. Also in Hazlewood Arthur, Economic Integration: The East African Experience, London, 1975.

the Ruvumba Free Trade Area (RFTA) between the two countries. Its objective shows, the learning of lessons from the failure of EAC. This time the main objective was complementarity and not competition. For example while in EAC's case both Tanzania and Kenya established competitive tyre factories⁶ in Ruvumba Free Trade Area, tyre factories in one country manufactured tyres for trucks, while the other manufactured tyres for vans and autos. So the cooperation was not only at the level of exchange but at production also, according to their priority set up.

The Collapse of EAC in 1977 rejuvenated the ECA initiative. The ECA's sub-regional 18 nation Multi-national Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOC) based in Lusaka had carried out studies in this regard. Studies in this regard had also been carried out by the predecessor of MULPOC - the United Nations Development Advisory Team (UNDAT-(1970-75))⁷. The MULPOC Council of Ministers meeting held after a few months (Nov.1977) of EAC collapse called for a joint meeting of the ministers

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6. Kenya had established Firestone Tyre Company in competition to the Arusha (Tanzania) based General Tyre (East Africa) Company.
 7. The UNDAT initiative responded to the UN General Assembly's adoption in May 1974 of a Declaration and a Programme of Action for a New International Economic Order.

of trade, finance and planning from member states, to formulate principles for the establishment of a Preferential Trade Area (PTA) and a clearing and payments system for the sub-region, whose need was felt for a long time, specially after 1971 the sub-region had experienced the deterioration of trade as well as adverse terms of trade.

The joint meeting of the ministers was held in March 1978 which issued a "Declaration of Intent and Commitment to the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States". The meeting set up an INT (Inter governmental Negotiating Team) to negotiate the PTA-Treaty. Before its last meeting held in Maseru (Lesotho) in January 1981, INT had convened a series of seven meetings (including its first meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 1978) to overcome the hurdles in agreement. The main hurdles in negotiation were (a) differences vis-a-vis protocols on "rules of origin", & (b) "harmonization and co-ordination" of agricultural policies.

The "rules of origin" define the type of commodities which would be accorded preferential treatment in inter-state trade and to discriminate against goods manufactured outside the PTA-region. To achieve this goal it had stated (a) the degree of indigenization - determined by the level

of equity⁸ held by nationals in export enterprises, and (b) the quantity of "value added"⁹ in manufactured exports produced among the member states. The level of equity fixed at 60% by some of the nationals or their government was considered too high by some of the potential members. After much negotiation it was reduced to 50%. But still some countries considered it high and called themselves unable to meet PTA criteria. To accommodate these countries the INT reduced equity level to 30%. The 'value added' rule was also modified to allow the minimum of 25% as demanded by some countries.

The countries having reservations on the protocol on "harmonization and coordination" of agricultural policies gave the justification that it "implies a degree of commitment, and might impinge on national sovereignty

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8. Equity - is the goodwill and residual assets of a company (or state) after allowing for all liabilities. The ownership of the equity is laid-down in the ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, and usually belongs to the holders of ordinary or DEFERRED SECURITIES. Such SECURITIES (qv) are frequently referred to as equities (Source: Philip A.S. Taylor, A New Dictionary of Economics, R&K Paul, London 1969).
9. Value added is the contribution made by a firm, involved with others in the production of a goods or service, to the value (monetary) of that goods or service. That is, the cost of materials, or the cost of the part-finished goods as purchased from another firm, is deduced from the MARKET PRICE of the goods when it leaves a given enterprise. The enterprise 'adds value' to the ultimate product. (Philip A.S. Taylor, A New Dictionary of Economics, R&K Paul, London, 1969).

when it comes to formulating such policies".¹⁰ No doubt the above problems in the agreement on proposed PTA - Treaty had reflected the unequal development of member states but more than this was a reflection of pressure of the dominant & exploitative international finance capital and especially the Transnational Corporations(TNCs) in member states.

However, by its eighth meeting at Maseru, January 1981, INT was able to convince the members. The same year it called second and third joint meeting in May and October to resolve the remaining differences and approve draft PTA-Treaty. Thus after four years of vigorous work INT got complete success in negotiation and drafting of the PTA - Treaty. This Treaty was signed by 9 members' heads of state in Lusaka in December 1981, and PTA for East and Southern Africa was established¹¹, marking a

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10. Nabudere, Dan. "Tanzania and Regional Integration in East Africa: Old and New Patterns", The African Review, Dar-es-Salaam, Vol. 8, No. 1&2, 1978, p. 152.
11. Other closest parallel of PTA are (a) ~~the establishment~~ of 16 members ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa) in 1975. Like ECOWAS, PTA is the brainchild of Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, United Nations Under Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the UN's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Like ECOWAS, PTA likes to encompass a broad spectrum of political and economic systems not easily reconcilable, and like ECOWAS, the PTA promised to be a long time getting off the ground (Africa Research Bulletin, Dec. 15, 1981-Jan. 14, 1982 p. 6264)(b) The Central African Economic Cooperation agreed in 17-19 Dec. 81, at the 17th Summit of Central African Customs & Economic Union (UDEAC) held in Libreville (Gabon).

historic success-in regional cooperation in Africa.

The eligibility for membership is defined by the territorial scope of ECA's Eastern and Southern African sub-region. However, at the time of signing PTA-Treaty only 14 out of the 18 countries attended the meeting in Lusaka, and out of them only 9 countries signed the 'Treaty'. The nine-signatories were: the Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe sent delegations to the signing ceremony, but did not sign, while Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles and Tanzania did not attend. Tanzania's delaying the decision to join PTA, and its absence in Treaty signing ceremony was surprising if not a set back to PTA. It had played a full and constructive role throughout long and difficult negotiations leading upto the final establishment of PTA. It had even actively convassed support for PTA among skeptics, notably Mozambique. It was on its encouragement that Burundi and Rwanda, which had been assigned to ECA's central African subregion, expressed interest in joining and which latter on joined. Though Tanzania had not signed the 1978 Lusaka Declaration of Intent and Commitment, but it gave every support and indication to join PTA. Even in June 1981, the cabinet formally sanctioned the membership and Tanzania was first to accept President Kaunda's

invitation to the signing ceremony. However, it was a few weeks earlier to the December Summit, that Tanzanian President sent his apologies, saying that his cabinet had over-ruled him. Though no explanation had been given but there was the speculation that Tanzania might have feared the reopening of its borders with Kenya by signing the Treaty, (the borders were sealed after the collapse of EAC in 1977)¹². While the Nairobi Weekly Review claimed that Kenya's alleged involvement in the abortive coup attempt in the Seychelles on 25 November 1981, was the main reason for Tanzania's last minute volte-face¹³. Tanzania might have also feared that PTA would overshadow or undermine SADCC or its bilateral cooperation with Mozambique, concluded only a month earlier. Besides the above fear the major reason, however seems to be as Douglas G. Anglin

12. According to Agence France Presse, Tanzania's decision the pull out of the PTA was considered by financial experts in Dares-Salam as a "big blow" to neighbouring Kenya's export drive to the South. If Tanzania had signed the agreement Kenya would have had an automatic transit facilities, through Tanzania to markets in Zambia and the remaining Southern African countries, "but this will be impossible as long as the border between Kenya and Tanzania remains closed". (Africa Research Bulletin, Dec. 15, 1981-Jan.14, 1982.pp.6265-66).

13. African Business 44, April 1982, pp. 9-10.

has said¹⁴, that due to economic constraint it did not want to impose constraints on the pursuance of socialist or protectionist policies nationally. However, Tanzania had given indications to join PTA some time latter. President Nyerere explained (in public) that "the implications of the Treaty for Tanzania's existing commitments for intra-African cooperation have not been adequately studied".¹⁵

Angola and Mozambique were hesitant to become PTA member because both had signed formal Treaties of Friendship and cooperation¹⁶ with the Soviet Union and subsequently with other East European states. They feared that the use of national currencies in PTA would cut their convertible currency earning in the East bloc countries, while the use of liberal economic institution might anger them (East bloc) to decide to stop assistance. The second reason was the shortage of personnel to assess the implications of membership, while the third reason was the

14. Douglas G. Anglin, "Economic liberation and regional cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA", *International Organisation*, 37(4), Autumn 83.

15. *Financial Times*, London, 21 December 1981, p. 2.

16. Angola in 1976 and Mozambique in 1977.

suspicion of PTA's functions. They viewed it as a threat to the survival of SADCC. As they were committed to SADCC for reduction of dependence on South-Africa as well as the political liberation of the continent, they tried to avoid haste, because most of the provisions of the Treaty were not yet published.

Like other SADCC states (except two signatories of PTA) Zimbabwe also delayed the decision of joining PTA. In spite of insistent Kenyan and Zambian urging, as well as urge from business community - who feared that PTA would be unviable without the participation of Zimbabwe,¹⁷ Zimbabwe took its own course. It was doubtful, like other SADCC-members, about the usefulness of PTA and its impact on SADCC, but the major reason was the threat of South Africa's ultimatum. After its (Zimbabwe's) joining of SADCC in 1980, South Africa (in 1981) had served the notice of its intention to terminate the 1964 preferential trade agreement between the two countries. Since South Africa was the major trading partner than PTA could hope to be for Zimbabwe, it delayed joining PTA until South

17. Who thought that Zimbabwean economy would substitute the loss of South Africa as well as could gear the trade in region.

Africa (under the pressure from Britain and the United States) had withdrawn its termination threat.¹⁸

The BLS-countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) faced rather more complicated problem in joining PTA, as they were under the South African Custom Union (SACU) agreement since 1969, which needed South African approval before entering into any other trading agreement. No doubt the PTA had recognized their situation by granting "temporary exemptions" from the full application of certain provisions till the BLS states remain parties to SACU. But when these governments jointly asked for approval to the South Africa in 1981 (Dec. 7), South Africa objected that the PTA- Treaty was discriminatory for it called for a reduction of (BLS) dependence on South Africa."¹⁹ It was

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18. Financial Times, 19 March 1982, p. 6; Economist, 16 January 1982, p. 43. South Africa agreed to renew the agreement of 1964 Preferential trade with Zimbabwe in 1983 and withdrew its termination threat in 1982.
19. Botswana Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Press Release, 16 Dec. 1981. According to the Economist, 22 January 1983, p. 60: At the end of 1981, South Africa agreed to a new revenue - sharing formula more favourable to them (BLS). The concession was granted at roughly the same time as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland decided not to join a new Pan-African Preferential Trade Area - (though at latter stage Lesotho & Swaziland joined PTA).

only in 1982 that South Africa indicated that it had no objection provided there was "no conflict in any way" with the SACU. After this Lesotho and Swaziland joined PTA. But like Angola and Mozambique, Botswana is the third SADCC member which till now had not joined PTA. Though it is one of the reason that Botswana does not give much importance to PTA, due to its major role in the creation of SADCC & precaution of not to promote a potential rival (though this is denied), but the major reason is that the Botswana cabinet in 1982 decided to postpone its decision (to become PTA members) indefinitely in order not to prejudice the continuing negotiations over the revision of the SACU Agreement.

The modest response to the signing was seen as something of a rebuff although Enos Nakala, the Zimbabwe Finance Minister, said his government intended to commit itself once it had studied the treaty, and President Kaunda of Zambia said that Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi had all expressed an interest in joining.²⁰

On the other hand the treaty and its 12 protocols had not yet been published. They were delayed, as said by ECA officials, to include specific proposals for the reduction and elimination of trade barriers, the creation

20. Africa Research Bulletin, Dec. 15, 1981-
Jan. 14, 1982, pp. 62-65.

of a clearing and payments mechanism, rules on transit trade, origin of goods, and other trade matters.²¹ This could be another reason for countries becoming hesitant in signing PTA-Treaty.

OBJECTIVES :

The first extra-ordinary joint meeting of ministers of trade, finance and planning of the ECA' sub-regional 18 nation MULPOC which held in March 1978 to formulate principles for the establishment of a Preferential Trade Area (PTA) and a clearing and payments system for the sub-region, laid down following objectives which are embodied in the Treaty:

- i. The reduction and elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers;
- ii. The relaxation and eventual abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions;
- iii. The gradual evolution of a common commercial policy;
- iv. The gradual harmonization of financial, monetary and fiscal policies;
- v. The "fair and equitable" distribution of benefits;

21. Ibid.

- vi. And offering compensation and development assistance to member states incurring losses suffered as a result of the trade liberalization arrangements.

However, the objectives and provisions of the PTA-Treaty signed in Lusaka in December 1981 go beyond a normal "preferential trade area". It provides not only for the liberalization and promotion of intra-sub-regional trade, but also for inter-state cooperation and specialization in the development of basic and strategic industries, production of food crops and livestock, science and technology, human resources, and creation of inter-country transport and communications network. Article 30 of the Treaty provides for the establishment of a sub-regional common market and an eventual economic community in a decade of its formation.²²

The PTA does not restricts its members from becoming member of other sub-regional organization. Article 43 of the Treaty permits its members to become member of any

22. This provision is in accordance with the Lagos Plan of Action target of forming a sub-regional Preferential Trade Area in respective MULPOC areas by 1985, and the creation of an African Economic Community by the year 2000 - an economically unified and self - reliant continent (Organization of African Unity, The Lagos Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia strategy for the Economic Development of Africa, Lagos, April 1980).

other sub-regional organization. Thus, six SADCC countries have joined PTA. Even provisions have been ensured to make PTA's activities complementary to SADCC and not competitive. But unlike SADCC, it is not PTA's objective to fight against South Africa's alleged imperial design - the constellation of Southern African States, - and therefore the disengagement from apartheid & South African tutelage. Instead, PTA advocates a positive approach to the problem (of dependence on South Africa), contending that, - to the extent it succeeds in promoting intra-regional trade and development, the present dangerous dependence on South Africa will decrease.

Though, PTA has recognized the special position of BLS- countries vis-a-vis South Africa (Article 30, Annex XIII) and has established a Technical Committee of Experts to advise on "ensuring economic restructuring of the BLS-states and reduction of their dependence on South Africa" (Annex XII). In March 1982, the Ministerial Council of the Lusaka-based MULPOC prepared contingency plans to help South Africa's neighbours withstand UN economic sanctions against Pretoria.²³ The special position of BLS- countries has been provided not by the choice but due to

23. Times of Zambia, 27 March, 1982, p. 1.

the lack of alternatives. Even PTA views the Nkomati Accord of March 1984, between Mozambique and South Africa on the same line, as an accord due to hopelessness and lack of alternatives.

The scope of PTA is not also restricted to "Lusaka MULPOC" orbit. Article 46 of PTA - Treaty says that other neighbouring African states can join PTA as "full" or "associate" members. In case of associate membership they would participate only in that activities which has been mutually agreed. Thus while the Treaty in 1981 was signed by only nine states, by 1987 it has 15 members. Zaire has expressed an interest to join PTA and has even attended some of PTA - meetings as an observer, while its partners in the Economic Community of the Great Lakes - Burundi and Rawanda - have already become members. There is the hope that the three remaining SADCC- countries will also join PTA in near future.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE:

The organizational structure of PTA shows resemblance with SADCC. This comprise:

1. The Authority: It is the PTA counterpart of the SADCC Summit. It consists of the Heads of member-nations and is the supreme decision-

making body of PTA. It controls activities of other organs and is responsible for the general direction of its policies. It takes decision by consensus;

2. The Council of Ministers: Like SADCC Council, it consists of ministers from each country and is accountable to the Authority.
3. The Inter-governmental Commission of Experts: It is roughly equivalent to SADCC- Standing Committee of Officials.
4. The Technical Committees: It can be compared to the Sectoral Sub-Committees of SADCC. These are governed by a convention adopted by the council of Ministers and ratified and accepted by the Authority.
5. The Secretariat: The secretariat of PTA has been established in Lusaka, Zambia. It has a secretary-General and 35 staff²⁴ (unlike 5 staff of SADCC).

The Preferential Trade Area has two major functional organs, to fulfil its functions of trade promotion and liberalization of trade barriers. These are:

24. The staff of PTA have been reduced from the initial 55 (1983).

1. The Payment and Clearing House: It has been established to provide an avenue, for financial arrangements and multilateral settlement among other banks; for other transactions for goods and services within PTA; to enable the countries to pay for their imports from PTA member-states in their own currencies; to utilize local currencies for sub-regional trade and other related transactions. This payment and clearing House established in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Harare, has been functioning since February 1984.

2. The PTA Trade and Development Bank: Based in Bujumbura, Burundi, was to begin operations in 1986, with initial capital of US \$ 400 m. This financial institution is established to assist the PTA sub-region in mobilization of resources for the promotion of multi-national projects. The Bank can play a leading role in filling the resource-gap,²⁵ especially the long-term financing.

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25. (a) The World Bank has estimated the resource gap (or investment-saving gap) for PTA Sub-region, over 1985-1990 as the average 9.5% of GDP. (Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983, Washington DC, 1983, p. 38).
(b) The ECA has estimated the resource gap over 1985-1995, for PTA sub-region as the average 7% of GDP, (ECA "Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa, 1980-1981", D.O.No. E/ECA/CMS/17, Addis Ababa, 1982, p. 203).

Chapter 9, Article 33 of the PTA- Treaty has enumerated four objectives of the bank as:

- (a) to provide financial and technical assistance to promote the socio-economic development of the member states;
- (b) to promote, through financing, the development of trade and trade related activities;
- (c) to finance projects designed to make the economies of the member states increasingly complementary to each other ; and
- (d) to engage in joint financing operations in partnership with national development agencies.

Admitting that PTA's institutional framework bears a certain resemblance with SADCC's however, it also differs significantly in its philosophical foundations and operational code. For example, there is nothing comparable to the deliberate diffusion of its initiative and responsibility characteristic of SADCC. On the contrary, the central organs of PTA are expected to exercise close and continuous control over the full range of its functional activities.

The distinction in approach of PTA & SADCC becomes more striking if we compare their secretariat. In PTA the bureaucracy is intended to be relatively large, influential, and unified whereas SADCC's has been

deliberately kept small, weak and fragmented. The secretary General in PTA has been constitutionally empowered to act "on his own initiative" on large number of important matters. He draws a salary²⁶ of \$ 71,000 which is \$ 41,000 in excess of SADCC's and heads a staff of thirty-five. While in SADCC the Secretary General has a limited mainly coordinatory administrative duties. He draws a gross salary of \$ 30,000 and heads a staff of only five. Even in budget matters PTA takes the lead, the budgets of PTA secretariat for its first year was \$ 1.8 million while that of SADCC remains less than \$ 300,000.

However, due to the above distinction and importance which PTA attaches to its secretariat, it should not be mis-understood that SADCC's functions are of less importance or it performs less functions. It is due to decentralization of activities and its performance by member - states, most of the administrative operations and overhead of SADCC are hidden. For example, Zimbabwe's Administrative Support Unit has its own executive secretary and staff, and anticipates the need to create technical sub-units for each of its 28 current projects (of food security) not

26. To the base salary of \$ 40,000 is added a post adjustment of \$ 11,000 as well as a housing allowance of about \$ 20,000 (PTA Treaty, p.10; UN Doc. ECA/MUIPOC/Lusaka/PTA/CM.1/1).

only in Harare but also in the capitals of each participating country. However, the constraints under which SADCC's secretariat at Gaboron, Botswana, functions will affect the performance and cost-effectiveness of the organization, specially when compared to PTA's which is better endowed financially and manually. Press Quett Masire, SADCC chairman Harare Summit 1981, has expressed quite an optimistic view by predicting that:

"deliberately business like approach in which institutions follow achievement, surely promises greater dynamism than a system in which member governments merely react to proposals put forward by technocrats lodged in a centralized bureaucracy".²⁷

ACTIVITIES

Like the term "development" in the title of SADCC giving a false - impression of its full scope, which performs a range of activities, the term "trade" in PTA indicates (falsely) that it might be concentrating fully on trade. This is a misleading impression, PTA performs a large number of functions. Besides the promotion of trade and liberalization of trade barriers, its other functions are: the development of agricultural, industrial and communication bases; reduction of dependence on non-PTA

27. Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 July 1981, pp. 19-20.

states and then forming a community which is self reliant and integrated regionally. But as in Southern Africa the SADCC does these functions specially in matters of development of transport and communication, agriculture and industry, PTA tries to concentrate more on complementary work. So while SADCC concentrates more on building roads, rail-roads and ports, PTA concentrates more on promoting trade on/through them and liberalizing trade barriers.

A. The Liberalization of trade barriers & promotion of trade: For the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers among the members, PTA has established a 'Payment and Clearing House' which started functioning in February 1984, while the proposed 'Trade and Development Bank' was to begin its function by 1986. In 1984, after the creation of Payment and Clearing House, it(PTA) launched the progressive reduction of tariffs vis- -vis a number of selected commodities. It has made a "common list" of 209 items to be traded by members. The 'list' of items can be revised from time to time, according to the PTA Treaty, and more items can be included on every three years until 1992 when the regional common market is expected to be fully established, in that case goods will be able to move freely among member-states. From 1 July 1984, the various import and export

duties on the "common list" items have been reduced by various percentage ranging from 10% for luxury goods to 70% for food and other essential commodities.²⁸ This has served as a catalyst in promoting trade in eastern and southern Africa. The intra-PTA trade has been estimated to US \$ 1 billion by 1986 from US \$ 760 m in 1982, showing a 5% normal growth rate.

However, the above figure of growth in trade, though favourable but cannot be said as a good progress. The trade-experience in PTA has shown that trade is hindered more by non-tariff barriers:

1. Slow information flow,
2. Slow and inefficient bureaucratic controls,
3. Shortage of foreign reserves, etc.

Aware of the fact of slow information flow, PTA is going to establish a "documentation Centre". This documentation centre will computerize information on individual countries' markets and supply conditions, prices, costs and distribution channels which would be provided on request. PTA is also making effort to divert

28. The tariff reductions are as: Luxury goods, 10% food items and "highly competing consumer goods", 30%; non-durable consumer goods, 40%; Agricultural raw-materials, 50%; intermediate goods, 65%; "Capital goods" and "consumer goods of importance to economic development", 70% (Source: PTA, Legal Notice No. 1, of 1984 Lusaka).

trade-transactions day by day from bureaucratic to business channels. For these purpose it has already established a "Payment and Clearing House" in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Harare. On every two months, the Clearing House totals up the bilateral transactions. Countries in overall deficit have to pay the difference in foreign exchange. The intra-regional trade in PTA is expressed in terms of the PTA unit of Account (UAPTA) which is equivalent to one US dollar. This Clearing House hears to complain to minimise the utilization of dominated currencies in import and export. The Clearing House provides an avenue for financial arrangements and multi-lateral settlement among the banks and it enables countries to pay for imports and exports in their own currencies.

Most of the PTA countries, particularly in Southern Africa are suffering from deficit in the current account (Table 7, *Chiu*, For deficit in current account and shortage of foreign exchange reserves). The economic hardship among members is increasing day-by-day due to the continuation of prolonged drought, reduction in the production of mining and industrial products due to the recession in world market. The reduction in the production of export goods has deteriorated the terms of trade. The economic hardship has further been accentuated due to the destabilization of vital economic installations, particularly the southern African transport and communication links, by

South Africa. However, to end the current foreign currency limitation, the PTA has established the "PTA Trade and Development Bank" which is going to start its functions by 1986. The bank will assist the PTA in mobilizing resources for the promotion of multilateral projects and help in filling the resource-gap. The several options on the nature of the Bank are under consideration. Some of these are: (a) starting first a trade-financing bank to be followed by the development financing facilities later/or starting both arms at the same time.²⁹ (b) the second consideration is the capital stock for the bank. This is very contentious issue specially in "Technical Committee" meetings. According to Dr. Nagila Mawase³⁰ the stronger economies such as Zimbabwe and Kenya want both a higher paid in and callable capital for substantial credit offers, while the weaker PTA states, aware of the burden of subscriptions want a low capital stock. However, the bank is going to start with an initial capital of US \$ 400 m³¹

29. The Preferential Trade Area, Draft Report of the Second Meeting of the Intergovernmental Team of Experts from Ministries of Trade, Finance and Planning, and from Central Development Banks, Lusaka, Zambia, 28-30 May, 1984, PTA/ITE/II/4.

30. Dr. Nagila Mawase, "The Preferential Trade Area", Journal of world Trade Law, 19(6), Nov-Dec. 1985, p. 631. Nagila Mawase has attended most of the PTA Technical Committee Meetings as an observer.

31. Africa South of Sahara 1987, Europe Publications.

though which has been considered by a PTA Study Team as "too low to make any appreciable impact".³² The bank will make loan offers to the different PTA countries on the basis of equity participation, and not on differential basis attempted earlier in the region at the time of East African Community.³³ No doubt, this type of arrangement (i.e. loans on equity basis) boosts the trade and the countries with greater industrial production and trade will not feel sacrificed for poor countries, but at the same time this is bound to create regional imbalance. While the PTA-Treaty has been signed on the basis of "sovereign equality" of member-states, the larger share of loan will go to rich countries, and which is bound to create dis-satisfaction among the poor countries.

B. Development of Agricultural and Industrial bases: The PTA founding fathers recognized that intra-sub-regional trade and subsequently establishment of a sub-regional

32. Dr. Nagila Mawase, "The Preferential Trade Area", Journal of World Trade Law, 19(6), Nov.19(6), Nov. Dec. 1985, p. 631.

33. In East African Community the EADB (East African Development Bank) provided loans on differential basis, the less developed partners - Tanzania and Uganda were receiving 38½% each, while the more developed Kenya received 22½% of loans. The motive behind this differential loan was to boost industrial production so as to redress the industrial and therefore trade imbalances experienced in inter-state trade.

trade and subsequently establishment of a sub-regional common market, will depend on adequate industrial and agricultural production sectors and thus gave due importance to these. The importance of such a wider perspective of the PTA has been described by the Zambian Commerce and Industry Minister as: "... the imminent relaxation of tariff and non-tariff barriers per se will lead neither to effective, economic integration nor increased intra-sub-regional trade. There are numerous impediments to sub-regional trade which must be simultaneously solved with the gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. These impediments include inadequate supply of goods and services, poor transport and communication facilities and lack of information especially on what is being produced or potentially available and the demand within the sub-region".³⁴

PTA develops the agricultural and industrial bases and is engaged in increasing the production of exportable raw-materials and minerals, food materials and other consumer goods to meet the region's demand. The plans are under-way

34. L.S. Subulwa, Minister of Commerce and Industry, of the Republic of Zambia. In his speech at the opening of the Third Meeting of the PTA Committee officials on Industrial Cooperation Transport and Communication, Lusaka, Zambia, 23-25 May 1984, p. 2 [Source: Journal of World Trade, 19(6), Nov-Dec. 1985, p. 633].

for inter-country specialization in fertilizer productions. The iron and steel production is also getting support from the PTA. However, the policy adopted by PTA for the the production of these materials is based on achieving complementarity among production units and inter-country specialization so that each national plant can virtually count on the entire PTA market.

However, the policy of complementarity on the basis of specialization in production country-wise may pose a serious problem specially in matters of food production. For example, if reliance is placed on a single country or zone, in case of drought or crop failure the region would have none of the crop or food material. The second hurdle is the lack of specialization in agricultural production which limits the expansion of trade in agricultural commodities. Whatever little trade occurs in agricultural products is much more a result of surpluses and deficits among the countries, rather than a result of specialization in particular commodities. For example, in Southern Africa, the main staple food comprises - Maize, Cassava, Sorghum and Millet, and almost all countries were producing these materials more than that was needed for the domestic consumption, but in recent years due to prolonged drought in the whole region all countries are importing these staple food materials. Thirdly, despite the commitment of all

member countries to the Pan-African ideals of OAU Charter, different countries follow different ideologies even antagonistic to each other, for national development. Experience has proved that antagonistic ideologies are serious threat to unity. In this condition, it might be dangerous for one country or a group of countries to rely on another country(ies) for some important staple food(s). However, effort in the direction of increasing production by PTA, is still in incipient stage and much of its energies are diverted mainly to trade promotion.

C. Regional Integration: As PTA aims at the establishment of a "Common Market and eventually of an Economic Community for Eastern and Southern African States. The PTA - Treaty attempts to ease the problem of inherited inequalities by specifying a ten-year transition period for the elimination of tariff duties on the agreed common list of commodities, by permitting members to protect their infant and strategic industries and to adopt emergency measures to overcome balance of payments difficulties, and by extending "temporary exemptions" to the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS-States); the Comoros and Djibouti in view of their special economic circumstances. Besides this, even more promising as a corrective measures is the injunction that the proposed Trade and Development Bank "shall give preferential treatment to the programmes

and projects involving BLS States". However, there will be the problem of unequal access to the benefits of PTA. Swaziland and Lesotho, who are completely surrounded by South Africa, can never get equal benefit as the other members of the PTA whose borders are touching with each others and where there is continuous link of road, railroad or ship-communication. These countries must be given some compensation to counter-balance disproportional trade benefits. The PTA could set aside some funds preferably by proposed Trade and Development Bank to pursue some of these objectives.³⁵ While at the same time they cannot be expected to break their economic links with South Africa, which is impossible due to their peculiar existence. On the other hand, though the Treaty has considered the smaller states of BLS, the Camoros and Djibouti, however, it is silent about differences in benefit accruals between, for example Zambia and Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique or any other such combination.

Nevertheless, a number of devices has been mentioned to check and/or redress undue unequal access to the benefits of economic integration, the minor differences in this regard could be ignored in the spirit of Pan-Africanism.

35. A similar type of policy has been followed by the EEC, which has a special fund for regional development programmes and assistance to particular groups ("distressed areas").

CHAPTER-V

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER - VCONCLUSION

In Southern Africa, however, it is the SADCC, which not only dominates over all regional organizations and particularly the PTA programmes but also commands the political will of the leaders. It is not only because of the fact that it has a fewer number of members (in comparison with PTA) to satisfy and a large number of its short-term projects are ready to start functioning effectively (while PTA is still in its infant stage though it has seriously started functioning from 1984), but its leaders appear more committed to its success, personally and politically, than the case with PTA. For example, to quote the Vice President of Botswana who contended in a vigorous defence of SADCC and an implied criticism of PTA, by saying: "The critical factor is that the SADCC commands the political will of our leaders. In our short experience a strong political will is a sine-qua-non for any regional grouping".

This command of "political and personal" favour of southern African States by the SADCC (almost all nine states of SADCC) is due to several reasons. The first and foremost reason is the firm will of southern African independent states to end exploitation, political as well as economic, in the subcontinent, and to reduce their

dependence particularly but not only on the Republic of South Africa. For this objective, the SADCC is the best choice in the region. No doubt the PTA also aims at the establishment of a self reliant community through promotion of trade; formation of common market; and development of agricultural, industrial and transport and communication sectors. But merely "objectives" cannot bring self-reliance. It is possible only by the development of basic economic sectors in the region to prove as autonomous sectors regionally and if possible country-wise, and the development of these sectors in southern Africa needs immense fund (money) as well as expertize. No country in southern Africa (excluding South Africa) has these requirements. Though regionally there are more than enough resources in southern Africa but the lack of money as well as expertize to exploit these resources, are the main cause of their helplessness as well as dependence on South Africa and other developed countries. This lack of fund as well as expertize is a serious drawback of PTA, which runs mainly from contribution by member states so till now it concentrates mainly on trade promotion rather than development. SADCC fulfils this demand of funds as well as expertize by asking various international donor agencies and industrialized states to provide aid for its development projects. Some may regard this foreign help

as further dependence or dependent development but this path has been chosen due to hopelessness, and not choice. Further, by the development of projects with the help of foreign agencies, it cannot be concluded that this will only lead to economic or/and eventually political dependency. Political dependency comes only by the lack of firm will and strength in political and military circle to assert its policies over economic sectors. If the development policies are formulated by national government and then accepted by foreign agencies to lead to the development of resources and not dominance over the economic structure, it cannot lead to political dependence. For example, if the national government selects the projects according to its priorities and needs, makes their guide line policies and then lets the foreign aid agencies to select these, this cannot lead to economic or political dominance. The fear can again be minimised by diversification of reliance, i.e. by providing different responsibilities to different donor agencies or international governments. The SADCC does the similar functions. It selects projects according to its needs and priority and then put these in front of donors for selection. The aid agencies provide fund, expertize and guidance while it is the African national government which takes the responsibility of project construction and uses its sharing with other SADCC-states after construction or as agreed by the SADCC. Though PTA

has severely opposed earlier this foreign aid mobilization of SADCC, but now it is realizing the need of development fund with trade. Zimbabwe's Minister of Finance & Planning, Bernard Chidzero (a firm supporter of both SADCC and PTA), has responded to the criticism put by the PTA Secretary-General- who sharply criticized SADCC for seeking to mobilize foreign aid and promoting 'barter' (apparently defined as any form of preferential trade agreement or arrangement, other than one dependent on tariff preferences)¹ at the Zimbabwe Chamber of Commerce meeting, - by pointing out that mobilizing foreign finance within a framework of collective self-reliance was essential, and that there was near universal acceptance of the need for trade promotion measures well beyond simple tariff preferences.² Even the attitude of the ECA (whose effort created PTA) has taken a shift in 1983. Previously it had clearly seen a Southern Africa grouping (which established SADCC) as threatening its own effort to create a broader, loose regional cooperation. It apparently also misperceived it as, somehow, created by foreign aid organizations, especially EEC. However, in 1983 it cited

1. Reginald Herbold Green, "SADCC and South Africa in Confrontation", Colin Legum, (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-83. p. A 81.

2. Ibid.

SADCC-Maputo, as a successful link in the chain of sub-regional transport and communications pledging conferences. During its 25th anniversary celebrations, the ECA cited SADCC (along with PTA) as a major example of growing success of its long crusade for regional economic cooperation in Africa.³ The second factor is that the SADCC is less demanding to its members, and particularly in matters of national sovereignty. In SADCC, the national sovereignty of members is unrestrained. The SADCC administration mainly acts as coordinator, while in PTA the secretary-general is constitutionally empowered to act "on his own initiative" on a range of important matters. Even the budget of \$ 300.00 (for the first year)⁴ of SADCC secretariat was so modest, in comparison with PTA's \$ 1.8 million, that governments - in a further assertion of their commitment to the principle of sovereign equality - have readily agreed to share the cost on an equal basis, despite the inequalities in the size and wealth of member states.⁵ On the other hand, realizing the problem with

3. *Ibid.*, pp. A80-81.

4. SADCC, Record of the Council of Ministers, Blantyre 18 Nov. 1981, p. 10. "The secretariat's telecommunications budget is \$ 12,000 and its duty travel allowance \$ 24,000. The implication is that SADCC governments want the executive secretary to be office bound".

5. Though there are complaints that members are in arrears in their contributions (SADCC, Record of the Council of Ministers, Luanda 25-26 June 1982, pp.7-12; "SADCC; Roadshow without Cast", p.2). The PTA has also suffered from the same problem (Africa Research Bulletin, EFT, 1983, pp. 6680-81)....

excessive emphasis on the exercise of state autonomy which could prove a serious weakness of the organization the SADCC members have adopted pragmatic approach of necessary self-restraint. To quote President Masire of Botswana:

"We do not allow short-term national interest to interfere with the achievement of regional goals which are essential to our survival Perhaps the most dangerous (of the forces which make cooperation difficult) is our own bad habit of seeing our development plans in isolation... It is hard for us to think regionally."⁶

But despite the efforts of SADCC and also PTA, the southern Africa today shows more economic dependency not only on South Africa but also on other developed countries. No doubt, the prolonged drought and lack of adequate fund for development are partly responsible for continuing dependence, but more than these the member governments are also responsible, especially due to their deviation from firm-commitment particularly at the time of economic crisis to overcome it anyhow. It is this attitude which is responsible for Mozambique's signing of Nkomati Accord with South Africa. This accord will increase the cooperation

6. See "Economic Commission for Africa: Heart Searching at the Jubilee", *West Africa*, 3430, 9 May 1983, p. 1105; Record of the SADCC Summit, Harare, 20 July 1981, pp. 17-18.

in some selected fields (like telecommunication, tourism, fisheries and labour employment) but at the same time it has increased Mozambique's dependence on the South Africa because in conjunction with the accord Mozambique's new investment code virtually ensures that any fresh injection of capital will come from South Africa or be funnelled through South African based multinationals. On the other hand despite the agreement for peace & cooperation (which was the main cause) the South Africa is still continuing its destabilization effort and concealed help to MNR surrogates. Botswana is seeking renewal of South African Custom Union agreement while Lesotho and Swaziland have little option to reduce links with South Africa, and they are planning to develop the rail-road communication with South Africa to increase trade and development. So it cannot be denied that despite the claim of President Masire, the national interests dominate over the regional interests, which is a serious hurdle in achieving regional goals.

On the other hand, despite the efforts of SADCC and PTA to increase cooperation in the region and become complementary to each other, there is no clear stance on division of labour. While there is no necessary incompatibility (especially from a SADCC view point which positively encourages overlapping membership in regional economic

cooperation grouping), the emergence of an operational SADCC trade development programme of a non-traditional type, or of a PTA regional transport proposal in conflict with SATCC's members, could lead to clash, which will be damaging to both organizations. Thus both have to learn to coexist in the greater interest of the regional economic liberation and development.

The outside actors, namely international donor governments and agencies are playing a powerful role in arbitrating the fate of the two organizations. Their evident unwillingness to contribute wholeheartedly to either SADCC's projected Development Fund intended to provide concessional loans⁷, or even PTA's proposed Trade and Development Bank⁸ indicates the influence they wield. But the more critical is the apparent inability of SADCC to establish its own programme priorities. For quickest acceptance of projects by donors, SADCC leaves them free to choose items from the organization's priority projects on the basis of their own (donors') preferences. Even some of the donors have adopted the policy of not

7. SADCC hoped that non-member states and institutions would contribute 48% of the authorized capital stock of over \$ 1 billion [Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Fund (Blantyre: SADCC 1981) p. 30].

8. PTA's Trade and Development Bank was to begin operations in 1986, with initial capital of US \$ 400 million, based in Bujumbura, Burundi.

giving category-wise preference to projects but country preferences. While providing loans/aid donors did not have hesitated in fulfilling their own interest. Donors' dual-policy of not antagonizing South Africa while providing funds for SADCC's regional development plans, is the another aspect of their play of politics in southern Africa. Specially this aspect has led one African statesman to say that the United States gives SADCC money to develop rail-roads, roads and ports, while at the same time it gives money to South Africa to destroy these.

Finally, it is the well planned regional destabilization by South Africa which has proved more disruptive to SADCC and PTA. South Africa is less sanguine to PTA but as it destroys transport links, ports and oil-pipelines in SADCC states, the trade of PTA through them is bound to be affected. South Africa's action is due to the frustration of the failure of its own design of the cooperation, - "Constellation of Southern African States" when the Frontline State due to fear of further dependence on South Africa under the "Constellation", established the SADCC, it was resented by South Africa. In pursuing its purposes (of economic dominance and to secure market for its goods and transport services) South Africa indulged in sanction, sabotages, subversion and open aggression in SADCC states. It operates through allies (UNITA in Angola and at one stage, the LLA in Lesotho), & surrogates

(MNR in Mozambique). The concealed planned regional destabilization by South Africa becomes clear when it officially admires SADCC, while continuing to blow SADCC projects. The official statement of Pretoria takes a shift from earlier resentment, expresses the view that SADCC represents no particular threat to South African interest. On the contrary, it professes to believe that any improvement in the economic condition of neighbouring states will expand market opportunities for South African goods. To quote South African Counsellor in Malawi, J.A. Shaw, who attended the opening session of SADCC 3 in Blantyre⁹ (Malawi) in 1981:

"Though South Africa is saddened at the artificial division of the subcontinent, it welcomes the SADCC efforts to improve their own economic situation and circumstances.... If conditions improve and go well around us, then the same will apply to South Africa itself.... If these stages are successful, all the regional states will become more independent until a stage is reached where it will be too expensive to remain enemies and not to cooperate... Nor do we see SADCC as a deliberate move to isolate South Africa".¹⁰

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9. Financial Times, 20 November 1981, p. 4, and also, Africa Research Bulletin, November 15-December 14, 1981.
 10. J.A. Shaw, "The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the South African Response", International Affairs, Bulletin, Johannesburg, 5, 1981, p. 19.

Admitting the fact that in their more than 6 years history neither SADCC nor PTA could restructure the political economies of member states, however, it cannot be denied that in near future these are bound to play an important role in making the objectives of their members successful. In the light of severe hurdles their present achievements, - though very little, - cannot be undermined, rather a great success and firm steps towards economic and political "liberation" and self-reliance of the sub-continent. Though even today southern African States show dependency on South Africa but this is not a willing dependency, it is only due to the inability to break, the dependency link of colonial period quickly on the one hand, and on the other due to the absence of alternatives. However, since their independence they are trying hard to reduce dependence on racist South Africa and the Creation of SADCC & PTA are nothing but the reflection of their will to become self-reliant.

The future prospect^{of} CONSAS is, however, very bleak. It is surviving till the racist government of South Africa survives. This has been outrightly rejected by the southern African Countries. More than economic, the southern African Countries suspect it (CONSAS) as a model of political dominance and extension of the policy of 'apartheid'. Since their beginning, the Frontline

States are fighting for liberation of the region from colonial hands. Presently all nine independent states of the region are committed to the same goal and their aim is the liberation of Namibia as well as South Africa which are ruled by a handful of white racists of South Africa. In such situation, any co-operation with CONSAS, i.e. South African racists, means either compromise or approval of apartheid and colonial rule. So the suspicion has mounted in southern African Countries. They are opposing the apartheid policy of South Africa by tooth and nail. Their demand of economic sanction against South Africa has even created a threat to South African racist regime and its strategy of CONSAS. Increasing opposition of South Africa by southern African countries, is becoming a natural catalyst for their greater commitment and cooperation in SADCC - which is their direct effort to counter 'constellation'. If Namibia becomes independent and non-racist majority rule is established in South Africa both join SADCC, in that situation this cooperation will be very prosperous and of no parallel at least in Africa.

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OFFICIAL NAME	DATE OF IN-DEPENDENCE	CAPITAL	HEAD OF STATE/ GOVERNMENT	POLITICAL PARTY P = Party, F = Front	SEATS ¹	LAST ELECTION
ANGOLA, People's Republic of	1975	Luanda	Pres Jose dos Santos	MPLA/PT (Marxist-Leninist system)	226	None
BOPHUTHATSWANA, Republic of	1977	Mmabatho	Pres Lucas Mangope	Democratic P	96	1982
BOTSWANA, Republic of	1966	Gaborone	Pres Quett Masire	Democratic P National F People's P	29 2	1979
CISKEI Republic of	1981	Bisho	Pres Lennox Sebe	National Independence P	56	1980
LESOTHO, Kingdom of	1966	Maseru	King Moshweshwe II Premier Leabua Jonathan	National P Congress P Marematlou Freedom P United Democratic P (Constitution suspended)	34 19 5	1970
MALAWI, Republic of (since 1966)	1964	Lilongwe	Life Pres Kamuzu Banda	Congress P	87	1978
MOZAMBIQUE, People's Republic of	1975	Maputo	Pres Samora Machel	FRELIMO (Marxist-Leninist system)	226	1977
SOUTH AFRICA, Republic of (since 1961)	1910	Pretoria Cape Town	Pres Marais Viljoen Premier P W Botha	National P Progressive Federal P New Republic P Conservative P	127 27 8 16	1981
SOUTH WEST AFRICA/ NAMIBIA	Admini- stered ² by RSA	Windhoek	Dr W van Niekerk (Administrator-General)	DTA Nominated Others	38 14 5	1978
SWAZILAND, Kingdom of	1968	Mbabane	King Sobhuza II ³ Premier Mabandla Dlamini	No parties permitted	50	1979
TRANSKEI, Republic of	1976	Umtata	Pres Kaizer Matanzima Premier George Matanzima	National Independence P Democratic Progressive P	144 1	1976
VENDA, Republic of	1979	Thohoyandou	Pres Patrick Mphahlele	National P Independence P	61 27	1979
ZAMBIA, Republic of	1964	Lusaka	Pres Kenneth Kaunda	United National Independence P (em)	125	1978
ZIMBABWE, Republic of	1980	Harare	Pres Canaan Banana Premier Robert Mugabe	ZANU (Patriotic F) (ZAPU (Patriotic F) Republican F UANC	57 20 20 3	1980

1 Elected and appointed members.

2 The Administrator-General represents the South African Government. The leaders of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the majority party in the National Assembly, are Mr Kuama Ruvako (President) and Mr Dirk Mudge (Chairman).

3 King Sobhuza died in August 1982 and a successor has not been appointed at the time of compilation.

II:
INDEPENDENT AND SELF-GOVERNING COUNTRIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

COUNTRY	SURFACE AREA HA	DE FACTO POPULATION (million)	ECONOMICAL-			GNP R (million)	GROSS AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY PRODUCTION (R'000)		EDUCATION			COUNTRY	
			POPULATION	LY ACTIVE POPULATION	COMMUTERS		MIGRANT WORKERS	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	TERTIARY	ANNUAL EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA R		PUPIL/TEACHER RATIO
Transkei (independent 1976)	4 355 263 2 land blocks	2.3	553 789	9 100	336 000	1 271.5	121 712	582 090	150 720	560	113	1.48	Transkei (independent 1976)
Bophuthatswana (independent 1977)	4 000 000 7 land blocks	1.3	333 320	162 200	197 000	1 326.9	29 048	318 140	117 360	1 370	97	1.45	Bophuthatswana (independent 1977)
Venda (independent 1979)	619 763 2 land blocks	0.3	59 550	5 700	41 000	150.0	7 631	114 350	25 980	380	138	1.40	Venda (independent 1979)
Ciskei (independent 1981)	538 575 1 land block	0.7	136 220	38 400	60 000	340.7	8 355	174 310	46 070	280	133	1.40	Ciskei (independent 1981)
KwaZulu (self governing 1977)	3 015 135 10 land blocks	3.4	626 580	384 200	280 000	2 001.0	113 654	1 800 000	26 300	1 620	92	1.49	KwaZulu (self governing 1977)
QwaQwa (self governing 1974)	750 172 1 land block	0.2	17 520	9 500	51 000	138.3	1 473	63 800	1 000	100	144	1.31	QwaQwa (self governing 1974)
Lebowa (self governing 1972)	2 250 262 8 land blocks	1.7	230 380	72 200	186 000	730.2	32 045	972 000	11 400	780	81	1.49	Lebowa (self governing 1972)
Gazankulu (self governing 1973)	656 069 4 land blocks	0.5	48 720	9 700	58 000	187.0	11 406	303 000	2 000	180	96	1.45	Gazankulu (self governing 1973)
Kangwane (self governing 1977)	382 268 2 land blocks	0.2	25 400	40 000	57 000	226.5	5 200	90 600	280		113	1.42	Kangwane (self governing 1977)
Kwandebele (self governing 1981)	103 113 3 land blocks	0.2	19 100	8 700	63 000	n.a.	3 924	85 300	500	60	124	1.41	Kwandebele (self governing 1981)

Gross National Product

Source: 16

III: SOUTHERN AFRICAN DATA ON NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

REGION/ COUNTRY	GNP AT MARKET PRICES 1980 (Preliminary figures)		GROWTH RATES
	Total	Per Capita	Real GNP per capita, 1970-79
	\$ million	\$	%
Bophuthatswana ¹	596	432	12,3 ²
Botswana	730	910	12,0
Ciskei ¹	196	256	8,8 ²
Lesotho	520	390	9,5
SWA/Namibia	1 420	1 410	0,3
South Africa	66 960 ³	2 290 ³	0,6
Swaziland	380	680	4,4
Transkei ¹	945	374	8,1 ²
Venda ¹	138	358	7,8 ²
Southern African Customs Union	70 010	2 230	—
Angola	3 320	470	-9,6
Malawi	1 390	230	3,0
Mozambique	2 810	270	-5,3
Zambia	3 220	560	-1,9
Zimbabwe	4 640	630	-1,7
Southern Africa	85 390	1 280	—
Africa *	363 350	770	—


1 1977 figures

2 1970-1977

3 Comprising RSA, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, Venda

Source: 16, 19

IV:



V : SOUTHERN AFRICA – SECTORAL ORIGIN OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

Country	Year	Agriculture, forestry and fishing	Mining	Manufacturing and processing	Building and construction	Others	Percentage
		%	%	%	%	%	%
Angola	1979	48,0	1	3,0	1	49,0 ¹	100,0
Bophuthatswana	1977	10,5	41,5	10,8	5,6	31,6	100,0
Botswana	1979/80	10,9	31,6	4,2	5,3	48,1	100,0
Ciskei	1977	14,2	-	8,1	16,1	61,6	100,0
Lesotho	1977/78	36,4	3,5	1,8	9,2	49,1	100,0
Malawi	1980	42,6	-	12,9	5,2	39,3	100,0
Mozambique	1979	44,0	1	9,0	1	47,0 ¹	100,0
South Africa	1980	6,6	23,1	22,6	3,7	44,0	100,0
SWA/Namibia	1980	9,7	47,7	4,2	2,9	35,5	100,0
Swaziland	1976/77	30,8	4,0	21,5	4,8	38,9	100,0
Transkei	1977	45,0	0,1	8,3	3,8	42,8	100,0
Venda	1977	29,1	0,5	9,5	4,0	56,9	100,0
Zambia	1980 ²	14,3	17,0	16,9	3,6	48,2	100,0
Zimbabwe	1981	17,8	5,2	26,5	3,0	47,5	100,0

1 Mining, building and construction included under "others"

2 Provisional-estimates of the mining companies are based on their cost accounting procedures

Source : 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24.

VI : AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION OF SELECTED PRODUCTS AND LIVESTOCK IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1980

	CROPS (%)															LIVESTOCK (%)			
	STAPLE FOODS				OTHER CROPS				VEGETABLES AND FRUIT			CASH CROPS				Cattle	Sheep	Goats	
	Maize	Sorghum	Wheat	Miller	Cereals - total	Potatoes	Sweet potatoes	Dry beans	Vegetables	Fruit	Sugarcane	Sisal	Coffee	Tea	Tobacco (leaves)				Seed - cotton
Botswana	0,1	2,8	0,05	0,6	0,2	-	-	-	0,6	0,2	-	-	-	-	-	0,6	9,0	1,6	9,3
Lesotho	0,8	6,2	1,9	-	1,2	-	-	6,8	0,3	0,3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,8	2,8	6,0
SWA/Namibia	0,3	0,3	0,05	6,0	0,4	-	-	-	0,8	0,6	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,4	13,0	16,4
South Africa ¹	70,2	54,8	84,4	4,5	69,3	72,7	15,3	34,8	61,2	69,6	56,7	9,5	-	10,5	23,3	30,8	39,0	79,8	39,7
Swaziland	0,7	0,1	0,05	-	0,4	0,7	3,3	0,9	0,4	3,2	11,3	-	-	-	-	6,4	2,0	0,1	2,0
Southern African Customs Union	72,1	64,2	86,45	11,1	71,5	73,4	18,6	42,5	63,3	73,9	67,9	9,5	-	10,5	23,3	37,8	61,2	97,3	73,4
Angola	2,2	-	0,6	15,1	2,2	4,4	59,8	19,0	8,7	10,0	1,8	47,6	86,9	-	1,8	6,8	9,7	0,6	7,0
Malawi	7,5	11,4	0,05	-	7,1	12,8	-	28,1	7,8	5,1	6,0	42,9	2,2	52,6	-	4,8	2,5	0,2	4,7
Mozambique	1,7	14,2	0,2	1,5	2,7	6,7	15,0	-	7,2	7,2	8,7	-	2,2	31,6	1,8	11,2	4,3	0,3	2,5
Zambia	5,5	3,3	0,4	18,1	5,0	0,3	6,6	10,4	8,1	1,7	4,6	-	-	-	3,1	2,1	6,7	0,1	2,3
Zimbabwe	11,0	7,0	9,2	54,2	11,3	2,4	-	-	4,9	2,1	10,9	-	8,7	5,3	70,0	37,3	15,5	1,5	10,1
Southern Africa	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

¹ Figures for Bophuthatswana, Transkei, Ciskei and Venda included under South Africa

Source : 6.

VII: SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES CONTAINING ONE PERCENT OR MORE OF THE WORLD'S RESERVES

	Gold	Silver	Platinoids	Diamonds	Coal	Uranium	Arsenic	Antimony	Beryllium	Cadmium	Chromite	Cobalt	Tantalite	Copper	Iron Ore	Lead	Lithium	Manganese	Nickel	Tin	Vanadium	Zinc	Asbestos	Fluorspar	Gypsum	Phosphate	Vermiculite
Botswana				10																							
Lesotho																											
South Africa ¹	49	4	86	10	2	17	4				83			2	4	4		48	10	1	64	9	10	46	2	8	60
SWA/Namibia		2		5		5		5		1												1					
Swaziland					1																			5			
Southern African Customs Union	49	6	86	25	3	22	4	5		1	83			2	4	4		48	10	1	64	10	15	46	2	8	60
Angola				9					1																5		
Malawi																											
Mozambique					1				2				10														
Zambia									1			2		7													
Zimbabwe	1										10		2				1										
Southern Africa	50	6	86	34	5	22	4	5	4	1	93	2	12	9	5	4	1	48	10	1	64	10	25	46	7	8	60

Figures for Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda included under South Africa

Source: 18

VII: TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA¹

COUNTRY	Most recent year of data	ROADS		MOTOR VEHICLES IN USE		RAILWAYS		COMMUNICATION			
		Tarred roads ² km	Km road per 100 km ^{2,3}	Passenger cars 1 000	Commercial vehicles 1 000	Railways km	km railways per 100 km ²	Passenger kilometer millions	Net ton kilometer millions	Telephones 1 000	Telephones per 100 inhabitants
Botswana	1978	440	1.7	5.0	12.4	675	0.1		1 043	10	1.3
Lesotho	1976	200	5.4	3.0	6.2	3				4	0.3
Swaziland	1978	200	15.9	10.9	7.9	317	1.8			10	1.9
Basotho ⁴	1978	640	21.8			228	0.6				
Ciskei ⁴	1976	360				64					
Transkei ⁴	1976	750	19.7			209	0.5			5	2.3
Venda ⁴	1976	50	17.1			13	0.2				
SWA/Namibia ⁴	1980	3 500	3.9	18.3	26.6	2 340	0.3			49	5.0
PSA	1978	45 000	18.0	2 163.5	821.2	22 464	2.0		80 175	2 320	9.8
Angola	1974	8 000	5.8			3 000	0.3	418	5 461	28	0.5
Maliawi	1978	1 600	13.3	13.5	13.4	566	0.5	68	201	27	0.5
Mozambique	1973	3 200	3.3	89.3	21.5	3 696	0.5	396	3 400	49	0.3
Zambia	1978	3 000	4.6	93.5	78.4	1 297	0.2			57	1.1
Zimbabwe	1978	5 300	20.1	180.0	70.0	3 394	0.9		4 872	197	2.9

¹ Based on data for different years, usually 1974-1978

² Approximate figure

³ All roads including tarred roads

⁴ Served by South African Railways

Source: 1, 2, 14, 17.

IX : ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION¹ – FAO ESTIMATES FOR 1978 AND 1980

Country	Economically active population		Economically active population as % of total population		Economically active population in agriculture		Economically active population in agriculture as % of total economically active population	
	1978	1980	1978	1980	1978	1980	1978	1980
	1 000	1 000	%	%	1 000	1 000	%	%
Botswana	355	382	47.3	46.5	290	306	81.7	80.2
Lesotho	651	703	53.1	52.4	554	588	85.1	83.7
SWA/Namibia	313	323	32.4	32.0	156	157	49.9	48.5
South Africa ²	9 880	10 698	36.7	36.5	2 863	3 044	29.0	28.5
Swaziland	235	253	46.0	45.5	175	184	74.5	72.6
Angola	1 839	1 865	26.6	26.3	1 084	1 077	59.0	57.7
Malawi	2 386	2 746	45.0	44.6	2 026	2 299	84.9	83.7
Mozambique	3 826	3 953	38.4	37.7	2 538	2 546	66.3	64.4
Zambia	2 027	2 049	36.8	36.3	1 377	1 365	67.9	66.6
Zimbabwe	2 320	2 427	33.3	32.8	1 386	1 424	59.7	58.7
Southern Africa	23 832	25 399	36.7	37.3	12 449	12 990	52.2	51.1

1 Economically active population include the total of *employed* persons (including employers, persons working on their own account, salaried employees and wage earners, and, so far as data are available, unpaid family workers) and of *unemployed* persons at the time of the census or survey.

2 Economically active population of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda included in the figures for South Africa.

Source: 6, 23

X : PUBLIC FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT AID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

REGION/ COUNTRY	BUDGET		OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA), 1980			
	Total expenditure		Net receipts of bilateral ODA from DAC countries ²	Net receipts from all sources	Total recorded net flows of resources from all sources	Total recorded net flows as percentage of total budget expenditure
	Year	US \$ million ¹	US \$ million	US \$ million	US \$ million	%
Bophuthatswana	1980/81	424
Botswana	1981/82	416	83,4	98,8	46,7	11
Ciskei	1980/81	123
Lesotho	1980/81	233	59,6	85,1	85,0	37
SWA/Namibia	1981/82	1 011
South Africa	1980/81	16 840
Swaziland	1980/81	249	32,5	41,0	52,6	21
Transkei	1980/81	373
Verinda	1980/81	88
South African Customs Union		19 757	175,5	224,9	184,3	1
Angola	1980	1 063	35,8	47,1	194,4	18
Malawi	1979/80	356	75,6	122,7	152,4	43
Mozambique	1981	657	114,7	147,5	320,1	49
Zambia	1980	1 301	233,7	272,3	292,1	22
Zimbabwe	1980/81	2 054	110,4	127,7	128,9	6
Southern Africa		25 188	921,2	1 167,1	1 866,5	8

1 Exchange rates of April 1981

2 ODA = official development assistance (ODA)

Total flows: In addition to aid, include grants from private agencies (private aid) and transactions at commercial terms: export credits, bilateral portfolios, investment (including bank lending) by residents or institutions in DAC countries, direct investment (including reinvestment earnings); and purchases of securities of international organisations active in development

Bilateral flows are provided directly by a donor country to a developing country


Multilateral flows are channelled via an international organisation active in development (e.g. IBRD, UNDP)

DAC statistics exclude grants, loans and credits for military purposes and loans and credits with a maturity of less than one year


DAC = Development Assistance Committee. The DAC is a specialised committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Commission of the European Economic Community. Observers: the IBRD and the IMF

Source: 7,14.

XI :



SOUTHERN AFRICA % Electricity generated of total 1980



XIII :

ENERGY PRODUCTION, TRADE AND CONSUMPTION
 IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1980
 (Million metric tons of coal equivalent and in kilograms *per capita*)

REGION/ COUNTRY	PRODUCTION		CONSUMPTION			TRADE	
	Total production	%	Total Consumption	%	<i>Per capita</i>	Imports	Exports
SACU ¹	92 405	81.9	85 670	89.9	2 595	24 566	23 368
Angola	13 106	11.6	1 033	1.1	146	224	11 091
Malawi	45	0.0	228	0.2	48	263	0
Mozambique	2 067	1.8	1 017	1.1	97	481	1 959
Zambia	1 605	1.4	2 767	2.9	475	1 402	119
Zimbabwe	3 700	3.3	4 547	4.8	618	951	292
Southern Africa	112 928	100.0	95 262		27 887	100.0	36 829

¹ Figures only available for the Southern African Customs Union

Source: 17.

XIV: TRADE OF SELECTED SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH THE RSA

COUNTRY	YEAR	TOTAL EXPORTS	EXPORTS TO RSA		TOTAL IMPORTS	IMPORTS FROM RSA	
		R1 000	R1 000	% of total exports	R1 000	R1 000	% of total imports
Angola ¹	1979	558 112	-	-	396 625	-	-
Botswana	1980	399 380	26 462	6,6	548 644	477 354	87,0
Lesotho ²	1979/80	33,5	-	-	339 0	-	-
Malawi	1980	210 253	6 904	3,3	332 150	123 808	37,3
Mozambique	1977	69 393	4 297	6,2	149 389	29 148	19,5
Swaziland	1976	166 363	32 958	19,8	174 084	157 227	90,1
Zambia	1980	940 763	310 353	33,0	833 976	130 833	15,7
Zimbabwe	1981	1 082 731	234 302	21,6	1 240 772	340 951	27,5

1. It is estimated that in 1980 South Africa accounted for 80 percent of Angola's trade with Africa.

2. At least 90 percent of Lesotho's imports originate from South Africa.

Source: 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 15.

XV: SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO AFRICA, 1973, 1977, 1980, 1981
(According to sections of Brussels Nomenclature)

SECTION	DESCRIPTION	EXPORTS TO AFRICA: VALUES (R1 000)				EXPORTS TO AFRICA AS % OF TOTAL EXPORTS			
		1973	1977	1980	1981	1973	1977	1980	1981
01	Live animals, animal products	7 680	21 761	56 444	34 341	9,6	13,9	30,5	20,5
02	Vegetable products	28 984	32 191	253 499	156 445	12,5	7,5	31,2	16,1
03	Animal and vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products	923	2 920	8 485	17 066	7,3	9,8	23,0	27,3
04	Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits and vinegar, tobacco	16 804	27 181	35 266	43 215	6,1	5,3	4,9	7,4
05	Mineral products	6 171	25 381	39 337	83 676	2,8	2,9	6,9	4,2
06	Products of chemical and allied industries	48 269	81 863	125 766	152 189	55,6	35,4	32,2	41,2
07	Artificial resins and plastic materials and products, rubber, etc	14 235	26 102	41 946	43 661	91,1	85,6	58,1	64,8
08	Raw hides and skins, products	767	1 974	1 104	1 623	1,1	1,9	0,8	1,5
09	Wood and articles of wood and products	1 627	5 736	9 265	10 166	38,0	23,2	17,3	25,2
10	Paper-making material, etc	11 303	16 339	34 145	32 982	17,0	13,7	19,0	16,3
11	Textile and textile articles	11 490	17 321	32 239	31 511	5,6	6,3	9,0	8,0
12	Footwear, headwear and others	954	1 870	3 511	4 565	73,8	30,4	20,7	32,7
13	Articles of stone, glass, etc	8 208	14 819	23 341	21 800	76,3	63,4	42,1	50,3
14	Precious stones, metals, etc	376	1 947	3 940	931	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1
15	Base metals and articles	66 745	83 239	150 771	142 933	18,4	8,1	9,5	9,1
16	Machinery and equipment, etc	78 072	99 724	167 413	169 410	73,4	49,7	63,6	60,3
17	Vehicles, aircraft, etc	26 205	47 218	86 931	66 095	78,0	52,1	65,9	44,1
18	Instruments and apparatus, etc	3 902	5 505	10 019	13 348	40,6	31,3	41,3	47,1
20	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	1 180	1 807	3 738	3 751	55,1	42,9	13,8	15,9
21	Works of art, antiques, etc	49	51	42	35	5,2	1,1	0,6	0,7
22	Other unclassified goods	7 712	4 856	8 830	8 160	5,1	1,5	0,1	0,1
	Total	341 654	519 805	1 098 034	1 037 904	14,1	8,8	5,6	5,7

The statistical territory in respect of the external trade statistics of the Republic of South Africa does not coincide with its political boundaries, but includes Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and SWA Namibia. Statistics of trade between the Republic and these territories are not recorded. Since 1979 the exports of gold have been included in the export figures. The importation of defence equipment has since 1979 also been included under imports.

Source: 8

XVI :

SOUTH AFRICAN IMPORTS FROM AFRICA, 1973, 1977, 1980, 1981
 (According to sections of Brussels Nomenclature)


SEC- TION	DESCRIPTION	IMPORTS FROM AFRICA: VALUES				IMPORTS FROM AFRICA AS % OF			
		(R1 000)				TOTAL IMPORTS			
		1973	1977	1980	1981	1973	1977	1980	1981
01	Live animals, animal products	16 768	15 498	4 053	5 648	43,5	48,2	9,2	7,7
02	Vegetable products	21 579	73 153	46 274	35 122	28,5	41,5	23,2	12,6
03	Animal and vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products	3 985	6 469	5 074	3 814	15,6	15,5	8,1	5,7
04	Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits and vinegar, tobacco	23 024	39 009	33 886	64 991	39,9	39,3	21,2	22,4
05	Mineral products	17 540	22 821	22 237	25 770	45,4	21,7	9,2	11,2
06	Products of chemical and allied industries	5 817	5 655	4 560	5 479	2,3	1,1	0,4	0,4
07	Artificial resins and plastic materials and products, rubber, etc	293	1 478	2 240	1 387	0,2	0,7	0,5	0,2
08	Raw hides and skins; products	1 728	3 662	5 235	4 196	8,8	16,2	12,5	6,6
09	Wood and articles of wood and products	15 021	11 714	21 952	24 705	29,0	33,9	23,0	22,8
10	Paper making material etc	1 414	1 284	1 361	821	1,2	0,8	0,4	0,2
11	Textile and textile materials	37 709	46 285	40 060	36 474	11,5	14,2	7,5	4,7
12	Footwear, headwear and others	5 037	5 030	6 056	7 026	27,3	19,4	11,6	7,8
13	Articles of stone, glass etc	349	397	1 014	1 243	0,8	0,7	0,8	0,7
14	Precious stones, metals etc	5 771	8 433	6 760	12 710	18,0	16,8	11,2	15,6
15	Base metals and articles	17 682	28 759	53 460	56 668	7,2	8,9	7,6	6,5
16	Machinery and equipment etc	8 258	9 818	18 234	17 452	0,8	0,6	0,5	0,4
17	Vehicles, aircraft etc	3 640	2 987	5 779	5 968	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,2
18	Instruments and apparatus etc	803	731	1 368	1 263	0,6	0,4	0,3	0,2
19	Misc manufactured articles	3 378	3 778	5 964	6 835	10,8	8,8	5,8	4,5
20	Works of art, antiques etc	233	300	583	431	3,4	6,7	3,6	1,9
21	Other unclassified goods	63	69	1 371	358	0,1	0,6	0,0	0,0
	Total	190 693	287 329	288 123	318 360	5,8	5,6	2,0	1,7

The Statistical territory in respect of the external trade statistics of the Republic of South Africa does not coincide with its political boundaries, but includes Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and SWA/Namibia. Statistics of trade between the Republic and these territories are not recorded. Since 1979 the exports of gold have been included in the *export figures*. The importation of *defence equipment* has since 1979 also been included under *Imports*.

Source : 8

Flow of migratory labour to South Africa

1981



XVII : B :

EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN BLACK WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 30 JUNE 1981

Country of origin	Agriculture	Mining and quarrying ¹	Manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale and retail trade	Government services	Domestic services	Other	Total
Angola	21	10	2	4	2	6	18	6	69
Botswana	1 232	22 500	1 429	679	588	991	944	806	29 169
Lesotho	2 831	129 508	3 968	4 627	1 278	3 511	2 000	2 699	150 422
Malawi	3 689	19 691	1 411	422	731	686	2 799	1 173	30 602
Mozambique	4 743	51 745	819	347	319	234	773	411	59 391
Swaziland	693	10 713	719	90	191	195	518	299	13 418
Zambia	256	29	69	35	60	34	122	122	727
Zimbabwe	1 725	4 849	414	379	913	249	6 690	1 746	16 965
Other ²	420	49	110	62	88	127	97	42	995
Total foreign countries	15 610	239 094	8 041	6 645	4 170	6 033	13 961	7 304	301 758
South African blacks	1 106 000	647 000	855 000	265 000	576 000	1 463 000		289 000	5 201 000
Total	1 121 610	886 094	863 941	271 645	580 170	1 482 994		296 304	5 502 758

1 Including affiliated mines

2 Including South West Africa/Namibia

Source : 4

XV AFRICAN REGIONAL GROUPINGS: SUMMARY

	POPULATION, 1980			GNP AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES, 1980			FINANCE: Merchandise trade (million US \$), 1980		AGRICULTURE		TRANSPORT - COMMUNICATION			EDUCATION - HEALTH								
	Surface area (1 000 km ²), 1980	Millions	Population per km ²	GNP (million US \$)	GNP per capita (US \$)	Budget expenditure (million US \$), 1978/79/80	Exports	Imports	Labour force in agriculture (%), 1980	Cereal production (1 000 metric tons), 1980	Cattle (1 000 units), 1980	Tractors, 1979	Consumption of nitrogenous fertilizers (1 000 metric tons), 1978-80	Motor vehicles in use, 1972-78	Passenger cars (1 000 units)	Commercial vehicles (1 000 units)	Telephones (1 000 units), 1978	Tertiary education, enrolment, per 100 000 inhabitants, 1978	Population per physician (1 000), 1977	Population per midwife or nurse (1 000), 1977	Population per hospital bed, 1977	
CONSAS	1 221	29.3	23	66 960	2 290	14	1 896	15 025	29	12 470	12 575	180 000	401.8	163.5	821.2	2 320						CONSAS
SACU	2 662	31.4	12	70 010	2 230	15 723	23 925	17 311	35	12 891	19 770	187 770	404.3	2 182.4	847.9	2 349			2.1	0.3		SACU
SADCC	4 873	59.9	12	21 490	359	9 281	5 870	6 823	72	6 879	29 337	54 520	159.8	566.1	292.1	464			15.2	1.8		SADCC
PTA	6 917	126.7	18	37 610	292	14 666	7 935	10 426	77	17 592	81 586	61 620	215.7	739.1	441.3	793			17.4	2.6		PTA
ECOWAS	6 142	148.7	24	113 650	764	18 562	32 889	23 921	63	18 033	32 004	17 256	104.6	460.1	289.1	385			14.8	1.5		ECOWAS
CEAO	4 330	33.9	8	17 220	508	2 973	3 944	5 355	82	5 796	15 047	4 615	35.2	197.5	131.0	132			21.4	2.0		CEAO
ENTENTE COUNCIL	2 032	25.6	13	14 890	582	2 459	3 724	4 600	78	4 513	7 667	3 505	24.4	166.4	109.9	103			27.2	2.2		ENTENTE COUNCIL
NIGER BASIN AUTHORITY	6 384	141.0	22	111 450	754	12 501	32 644	23 087	65	18 100	33 709	13 620	103.4	411.9	273.9	276			16.0	1.8		NIGER BASIN AUTHORITY
OCAM	2 879	39.7	14	20 190	599	3 210	4 772	6 561	77	5 701	12 151	4 497	42.3	257.3	157.9	182			20.3	2.0		OCAM
OMVS	2 467	14.2	6	4 430	312	860	914	1 745	82	1 913	8 411	1 390	13.2	61.1	37.6	49			16.1	1.8		OMVS

Source: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26.

	POPULATION, 1980			GNP AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES, 1980				FINANCE AND TRADE			
	Surface area (1 000 km ²), 1980	Millions	Average annual growth rate (%), 1970-80	Population per km ²	US \$ million	US \$	Average annual real growth rate (%), 1960-80	Budget expenditure (million US \$), 1978/79/80	Exports	Imports	Labour force in agriculture (%), 1980
SACU :											
Bophuthatswana	40	1,3	4,8 ¹	33	596 ²	432 ²	12,3 ³	424			
Botswana	570	0,8	2,2	1	730	910	9,2	574	500	686	80
Ciskei	5	0,6	2,4 ¹	117	196 ²	256 ²	8,8 ¹	123			
Lesotho	30	1,3	2,4	45	520	390	9,5	192	42	424	84
South Africa (RSA)	1 125	23,1	2,7	21	66 960 ⁴	2 290 ⁴	2,3 ⁴	13 368	21 896 ⁴	15 025 ⁴	29 ¹
SWA/Namibia	824	1,0	2,8	1	1 420	1 410	0,3	616	1 279	958	49
Swaziland	17	0,6	2,6	33	380	680	6,2	145	208	218	73
Transkei	45	2,3	2,4 ¹	52	945 ²	374 ²	8,1 ³	373			
Venda	6	0,3	4,8 ¹	53	138 ²	358 ²	7,8 ³	88			
Total SACU	2 662	31,4	3,0	12	70 010	2 230		15 903	23 925	17 311	35
SADCC :											
Angola	1 247	7,1	2,4	6	3 320	470	2,3	1 063	1 000	1 250	58
Botswana	570	0,8	2,2	1	730	910	9,2	574	500	686	80
Lesotho	30	1,3	2,4	45	520	390	9,5	192	42	424	84
Malawi	118	6,1	2,9	64	1 390	230	2,9	418	317	439	84
Mozambique	802	12,1	2,5	13	2 810	230	-0,1	594	180	270	64
Swaziland	17	0,6	2,6	33	380	680	6,2	145	208	218	73
Tanzania	945	18,7	3,4	20	1 780	280	1,9	1 768	508	1 258	81
Zambia	753	5,8	3,1	8	1 220	560	0,2	1 294	1 700	1 000	67
Zimbabwe	391	7,4	3,3	19	4 640	630	0,7	3 733	1 415	1 278	59
Total SADCC	4 873	59,9		12	21 490	359		9 781	5 870	6 823	72
CONSAS :											
Bophuthatswana	40	1,3	4,8 ¹	33	596 ²	432 ²	12,3 ³	424			
Ciskei	5	0,6	2,4 ¹	117	196 ²	256 ²	8,8 ³	123			
South Africa (RSA)	1 125	23,1	2,7	21	66 960 ⁴	2 290 ⁴	2,3 ⁴	13 368			
Transkei	45	2,3	2,4 ¹	52	945 ²	374 ²	8,1 ³	373			
Venda	6	0,3	4,8 ¹	53	138 ²	358 ²	7,8 ³	88			
Total South Africa	1 221	29,3		23	66 960	2 290	2,3	14 376	21 896	15 025	29

AGRICULTURE

TRANSPORT —
COMMUNICATION
Motor vehicles in use, 1972-78

EDUCATION — HEALTH

Cereal production (1 000 metric tons), 1980	Cattle (1 000 units), 1980	Tractors, 1979	Consumption of nitrogenous fertilizers (1 000 metric tons), 1979-80	Passenger cars (1 000 units)	Commercial vehicles (1 000 units)	Telephones (1 000 units), 1978	Tertiary education, enrolment per 100 000 inhabitants, 1978	Population per physician (1 000), 1977	Population per midwife or nurse (1 000), 1977	Population per hospital bed, 1977	
568								9,2	0,4	4 550	SACU: Bophuthatswana
44	2 911	2 050	0,5	5,0	12,6	10	111	9,6	1,3	320	Botswana
184										2 080	Ciskei
210	600	620	0,4	3,0	6,2	4	131	18,6	3,4	490	Lesotho
12 470 ^d	10 191	180 000 ^d	401,8 ^b	163,5 ^d	821,2 ^d	2 320 ^d		2,0	0,3	152	South Africa/RSA
64	3 024	2 500	0,6					4,7	0,3	97	SWA/Namibia
103	660	2 600	1,6	10,9	7,9	10	255	9,2	0,6	288	Swaziland
	1 502					5		17,6	0,7	2 870	Transkei
	130							18,8	0,8	3 950	Venda
12 891	19 770	187 770	404,3	2 182,4	847,9	2 349		2,1	0,3		Total SACU
400	3 120	10 200	9,4	273	35,7	28		15,2	1,7	322	SADCC: Angola
44	2 911	2 050	0,5	5,0	12,6	10	111	9,6	1,3	320	Botswana
210	600	620	0,4	3,0	6,2	4	131	18,6	3,4	490	Lesotho
1 271	823	1 150	16,9	13,5	13,4	27	24	47,6	3,8	580	Malawi
478	1 399	5 700	10,8	89,3	21,5	49	8	34,0	4,1	770	Mozambique
103	660	2 600	1,6	10,9	7,9	19	255	9,2	0,6	288	Swaziland
1 430	12 673	7 700	23,0	43,6	46,4	82	15	16,3	2,2	460	Tanzania
905	2 151	4 500	40,7	93,5	78,4	57	106	10,4	2,0	270	Zambia
2 038	5 000	20 000	56,5	180,0	70,0	197	179	7,1	0,7	380	Zimbabwe
6 879	29 337	54 520	159,8	566,1	292,1	464		15,2	1,8		Total SADCC
568								9,2	0,4	4 550	CONSAS: Bophuthatswana
184										2 080	Ciskei
10 191								2,0	0,3	152	South Africa (RSA)
1 502								17,6	0,7	2 870	Transkei
130								18,1	0,8	3 950	Venda
12 470	12 575	180 000	401,8	163,5	821,2	2 320					Total South Africa

SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL GROUPINGS: FACTS AND FIGURES

		POPULATION, 1980			GNP AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES, 1980			FINANCE AND TRADE				
		Surface area (1 000 km ²), 1980		Average annual growth rate (%), 1970-80	GNP per capita		Merchandise trade (million US \$), 1980					
		Millions		Population per km ²	US \$ million	US \$	Average annual real growth rate (%), 1960-80	Budget expenditure (million US \$), 1978/79/80	Exports	Imports	Labour force in agriculture (%), 1980	
PTA :	Botswana	570	0.8	2.2	1	730	910	9.2	574	500	686	80
	Comoros	2	0.4	4.0	200	100	300	-0.1	10	9	16	64
	Djibouti	21	0.3	8.2		170	480	-4.9	68	19	104	
	Ethiopia	1 222	31.1	2.0	25	4 320	140	1.4	1 145	350	537	79
	Kenya	58.3	15.9	3.4	27	6 630	420	2.7	2 711	1 299	2 305	78
	Lesotho	30	1.3	2.4	45	520	420	6.1	192	42	424	84
	Madagascar	587	8.7	2.5	15	3 030	350	-0.5	501	480	770	83
	Malawi	118	6.1	2.9	64	1 390	230	2.9	418	317	439	84
	Mauritius	2	0.9		450	1 020	1 060	2.3	446	298	446	28
	Mozambique	802	12.1	2.5	13	2 810	230	-0.1	594	180	270	65
	Seychelles	0.4	0.1	2.6		120	1 770	3.1	68	19	95	
	Somalia	638	3.9	2.3	6				371	141	240	80
	Swaziland	17	0.6	2.6	33	380	680	6.2	145	209	218	73
	Tanzania	945	18.7	3.4	20	4 780	280	1.9	1 768	508	1 258	81
	Uganda	236	12.6	2.6	54	3 750	300	-0.7	628	450	340	81
	Zambia	753	5.8	3.1	8	3 220	560	0.2	1 294	1 700	1 000	67
	Zimbabwe	391	7.4	3.3	19	4 640	630	0.7	3 733	1 415	1 278	59
	Total PTA	6 917	126.7		18	37 610	297		14 666	7 935	10 426	77

SACU: Southern African Customs Union

SADCC: Southern African Development Coordination Conference

CONSAS: Constellation of Southern African States

PTA: Preferential Trade Area of Southern and Eastern African Countries

1 1970-1975

2 1977 figures

3 1970-1977

4 Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, RSA, Transkei and Venda

Contd.....

AGRICULTURE

TRANSPORT —
COMMUNICATION
Motor vehicles in use, 1972-78

EDUCATION — HEALTH

Cereal production (1 000 metric tons), 1980	Cattle (1 000 units), 1980	Tractors, 1979	Consumption of nitrogenous fertilizers (1 000 metric tons), 1979-80	Passenger cars (1 000 units)	Commercial vehicles (1 000 units)	Telephones (1 000 units), 1978	Tertiary education, enrolment per 100 000 inhabitants, 1978	Population per physician (1 000), 1977	Population per midwife or nurse (1 000), 1977	Population per hospital bed, 1977	
44	2 911	2 050	0.5	5.0	12.6	10	111	9.6	1.3	320	PTA : Botswana
21	78					2		15.3	1.7	460	Comoros
	33	48	0.7	11.8	3.3	4		1.7	0.4	110	Djibouti
4 404	26 000	3 900	29.1	52.5	13.1	80	41	73.0	19.4	3 310	Ethiopia
2 589	11 000	6 650	20.1	114.1	83.9	156	65	11.4	2.6	770	Kenya
210	600	620	0.4	3.0	6.2	4	131	18.6	3.4	490	Lesotho
2 455	8 800	2 600	3.4	57.4	52.3	29	196	10.9	2.4	430	Madagascar
1 271	823	1 150	16.9	13.5	13.4	27	24	47.6	3.8	580	Malawi
2	56	320	9.7	25.4	14.2	32	145	2.4	0.5	280	Mauritius
478	1 399	5 700	10.8	89.3	21.5	49	8	34.0	4.1	770	Mozambique
	2	32		4.1	1.2	5		2.8	0.4	190	Seychelles
217	3 900	1 600	2.0	8.0	8.0		84	15.6	2.9	570	Somalia
103	660	2 600	1.6	10.9	7.9	10	255	9.2	0.6	288	Swaziland
1 430	12 673	7 700	23.0	43.6	46.4	82	15	16.3	2.2	460	Tanzania
1 425	5 500	2 150	0.3	27.0	8.9	49	55	28.3	2.4	640	Uganda
905	2 151	4 500	40.7	93.5	78.4	57	106	10.1	2.0	270	Zambia
2 038	5 000	20 000	56.5	180.0	70.0	197	179		0.7	380	Zimbabwe
17 592	81 586	61 620	215.7	739.1	441.3	793		17.4	2.6		Total PTA

Source: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14,
15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26.

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