

THE BENGAL ARMY, 1858—1895

Recruitment, Composition and Discipline

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



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DECLARATION

This is to certify that this dissertation entitled " THE BENGAL ARMY, 1858-1895 RECRUITMENT, COMPOSITION AND DISCIPLINE " submitted by VIVIEN ASHIMA KAUL, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University. This is her own work.

We recommend this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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C O N T E N T S

		<u>Page No.</u>
PREFACE	i to iii
INTRODUCTION	1 to 16
<u>CHAPTER I</u>		
SOME APPROACHES TO THE MILITARY WRITINGS OF THE PERIOD	17 to 39
<u>CHAPTER II</u>		
COMPOSITION AND RECRUITMENT	40 to 75
<u>CHAPTER III</u>		
DISCIPLINE : INCENTIVES AND DETERRENTS		76 to 113
CONCLUSION	114 to 121
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	122 to 130
APPENDICES	131 to 157

P R E F A C E

In the domain of military history, the pre-mutiny phase of the Bengal army has evoked more interest among historians. While interesting and enriching accounts have been written on the formation and development of the Bengal army, there are fewer accounts of the post-mutiny Bengal army in itself. Most of these have been integrated into general histories of the Indian army, or specific regimental histories of regiments that were raised during those years.

During its first hundred years, the 'sipahi' of the Bengal army had been through his baptism of fire and glorified himself on the battlefield. But the once famous 'Poorbeah' soldier who formed the heart and core of this system became suspect and infamous after his participation in 1857. Instead, other ethnic groups like the Sikhs, Gurkhas, Jats etc., were assiduously favoured by the British for their military qualities.

This study has been undertaken to examine certain issues pertinent to the Bengal army from the post mutiny years till the abolition of the presidential commands (1858-1895). These issues will be viewed from the perspective of the social milieu of the troops, which became a matter of prime

importance in the reorganization policies of the Bengal army in 1861 and thereafter. Linked to this aspect was another issue of equal significance, that of the code of conduct, that the men lived by and upheld.

The British in India inherited to a certain extent the aristocratic, military traditions of Mughal rule. They then made full use of the existing social structures to perpetuate their rule. This reflected the reactionary, conservative facet of colonial rule. But the situation also presented a paradox, for the British were amongst the foremost liberal, democratic, progressive nations. The colonial army would project elements of this dichotomy through characteristics of conservatism versus liberalism and progress. The issues of 'Mai Baap' expressing the paternalistic image the British created for themselves in relationships with the 'jawan' (the soldier, youth), the theory of the martial races and caste norms, will be some aspects analyzed in the writings of this period.

Sir Henry Durand in 1860 pointed out that the truth was seldom grasped, that they had struck no roots in the country and that the only certain and permanent source of power and influence was the military hold of the country. The British were required to reorganize the colonial Bengal army to suit the needs of 'Empire'. Imperial dictates

envisaged expansion both internally and externally. In the post-mutiny period, the appearance of a European foe, Russia, in the North West, increased the complexities of the Indian situation. Besides a large and efficient fighting force, the British required a quiescent, content mass of troops, recruited from within the country. They attempted to acquiesce, assimilate and manipulate the prevailing social norms into the requirements of the Bengal army, as perceived in the post-mutiny, reorganisational policies.

The fundamental premise of military organization, 'Discipline', required a re-evaluation. 1857 had been quite shattering to the British. Until and unless the Bengal army was well disciplined and efficiently trained, the constant threat of rebellion would hang in the air. Obedience, loyalty, honor, were essential components of discipline. Were the British to achieve this through an extremely harsh code of punishments or through a system of rewards, or by fostering a feudal code of honor, of izzat, will be some of the queries posed.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

INTRODUCTION

Soldiers and soldiering were as much part of the Indian social fabric as were ascetics and asceticism, agriculturists and agriculture, traders and trade. Each occupational group, unique in an identity of its own yet forming a composite and esoteric unity that was the Indian social structure, was held together by the ubiquitous phenomenon of caste. The Kshatriyas to whom were ascribed the warrior vocation were a superior group in this hierarchical system. Nevertheless, the norms, ideals and beliefs of this warrior caste did not influence or dominate societal beliefs or activity.

Numerous battles had been fought, lost and won, and right through the ages there had been some form of a military establishment in the country. According to Indian teachings, should occasion demand, it became 'duty' to undertake battle even against family members. War was not merely an economic or political necessity, its social connotation encompassed a sense of moral values also.

However, militarism as such did not permeate the Indian ethics. Alfred Vagts suggests that militarism denoted an undue preponderance of military demand, an emphasis on military considerations, spirit, ideals and

scale of values.¹ Despite answering to military needs, or having a military establishment, Indian society was not militaristic, but a definite pattern of military values and traditions evolved from within the Kshatriya group. The Indian martial traditions found its roots in the indigenous setting. This system merged with the norms of the modern British mass military system. Together they coalesced into a mighty fighting force.

THE GENESIS

The creation of a strong and modern military institution arose on account of the British conquest of India. Under the aegis of the British Indian Army and the military system that developed from 1757 onwards, the British created an excellent instrument of coercion. The Bengal army as part of it, with a large 'native' component, aided the British in becoming the paramount power in India.

The value and economy of native troops were discovered early when Dupleix saw that the natives of India, under European Commanders, could be formed into armies, such as Saxe or Frederic would be proud to command.²

1 Alfred Vagts, "A History of Militarism", p.42.

2 Col. S. Rivett.Carnac, "Presidential Armies of India", p. 194.

Captain Stringer Lawrence, called 'Father of the Indian Army', right from 1748, demonstrated that permanent companies consisting of native troops led by British officers were extremely effective.³

The 'Sipahi' then, was the backbone of the military system that showed a remarkable potential for professionalization. They were reliable, effective and inexpensive.⁴ The first of the sepoy units were formed in the Bombay Presidency in the eighteenth century, followed by the Madras Presidency and then Bengal, where a few local levies were raised by 1757.⁵

The succession of Siraj-ud-Daulah to the Subedari of Bengal created an unprecedented situation for the British,⁶ for Siraj-ud-Daulah in 1756 stormed and captured the English settlement at Kassimbazar and threatened Calcutta.⁷ The Calcutta Council felt compelled to arm themselves and prepare military defenses, Colonel Robert

3. Stephen Cohen, "The Indian Army, Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation", p. 8, henceforth referred as "The Indian Army", Also Philip Mason, "A Matter of Honor", pp. 61-63.

4. Stephen Cohen, "The Indian Army," p.32.

5. Amiya Barat, "The Bengal Native Infantry, Its Organization and Discipline," p. xi henceforth referred to as 'The Bengal Native Infantry'.

6. Ibid., p.1.

7. Ibid., pp. 1,2.

Clive, earlier a writer of the East India Company and later an Officer of its army, was sent from Madras with a detachment of troops to Bengal. After dislodging Siraj-ud-Daulah from Calcutta in January 1757, Clive, complying with the urgent request of the Calcutta Council of having armed forces, set about the task of obtaining recruits from within the Bengal Presidency, as it was not feasible to summon them from England immediately.⁸ The Bengal Army, or at least its infantry arm, was principally recruited from a limited number of districts in Southern Oudh, the eastern part of the North West Provinces, and West Bihar where Rajputs and Brahmins formed large proprietary brotherhoods of petty landholders.⁹ The first battalion of the Bengal Native Infantry was formed in 1757, and was referred to as the 'Lal Paltan', because of the red coats the men wore. These men were duly armed, trained and drilled on the European model.

The constitution of the Indian army was based upon the historical division of British India into three Presidencies. Since no centralization policy of the army existed, each of the Presidential armies developed characteristics of their own. "There are still three Indian armies each composed of European and Native troops, and

8. Ibid., p.4

9. Eric Stokes, "The Peasant Armed", p.51.

each with its own Commander-in-Chief and separate staff, though the Commander-in-Chief, Bengal, exercises supreme authority over all. The Punjab Frontier Force until 1885, was under the orders of the Lieut. Governor of the Province."¹⁰ The Bengal army garrisoned Bengal proper, Assam, The North West provinces, Oudh, portions of Central India, Rajputana and Punjab.¹¹ Sir John Stratchey, G.C.S.I. suggested that the term 'Presidency of Bengal' required some explanation, because at different periods it held different meanings. It was originally applied to the tract sometimes called Lower Bengal including the Delta of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra and inhabited by the people who speak Bengali. The earliest factories and settlements on that side of India were established in Bengal and as British authority went on extending, the name Bengal was applied to all those territories administered from Fort William, the official Headquarters of the East India Company. Thus the Presidency of Bengal, or according to its official designation Fort William in Bengal, came to include not only Bengal and the neighbouring provinces of Bihar and Orissa but the whole of the British territories in Northern India.¹²

10. Sir W.W. Hunter, "The Indian Empire, Its People History and Products, pp. 470-

11. Ibid., p. 471.
In 1877-78, total strength was 104216 officers and men. Of that number 63,933 were 'native' troops. In 1882-83, total strength was 105,270, officers men of which 66081 were 'native' troops.

12. Sir John Stratchey "India", p.30.

COMPOSITION AND CHARACTERISTICS

The term 'Bengal Army' has long been a misnomer since there was not a single native of Bengal proper in its ranks and only a small part of it was stationed in Bengal.¹³

The so called Bengal army was the most important not only numerically, but because, being chiefly recruited from the more vigorous races of the Northern provinces, it was, as a fighting machine, incomparably more efficient.¹⁴ Equipment wise also, it was definitely more superior. Madras and Bombay pointed to unfair comparisons. Also, troop wise or finance wise the Bengal army remained favoured. When money was required by the Bengal army reductions could be made by Madras.¹⁵

Besides the organizational differences between the three armies, in the Bengal army the pattern of recruitment also differed. The sepoy held a unique relationship with the British, as well as his own society.¹⁶ He shared the social and cultural background of his fellow countrymen. The Bengal army as part of the British Indian army was a product

13. Stratchey, India, p.61.

14. Ibid..

15. Anon, 'Indian Army', Calcutta Review, Vol. 89, 1889, p.236.

16. Ellinwood, Pradhan, The Indian Soldier and World War I, p. 178, henceforth referred to as The Indian Soldier.

of customs, traditions and local practices, as much as, or really more than it was of a monolithic and rationalized central design.¹⁷

Apart from the use of force and economic manipulation, cultural and ideological intervention were also part of colonial strategies to enter the Indian consciousness. The colonial power was successful in obtaining the collaboration of the people. "Now if the history of British India demonstrates one fact more clearly than another, it is this, that the British Empire in India has been founded, extended and held for the last hundred years with the aid and consent of the people for if the people had not tacitly acquiesced in the territorial aggrandizement of John Company what could a handful of British soldiers which Clive had under his command do?"¹⁸

Although it was to the Kshatriyas that the sacred laws assigned the role of warrior, the armies of India, from the earliest times consisted of men of different castes.¹⁹ The Brahmins were so numerous that only a small proportion could be employed in sacerdotal functions and charity towards

17. Roger Beaumont, Sword of the Raj : The British Army in India 1747-1947, p.192.

18. Hindu Patriot, Nov. 7, 1864.

19. T.A. Heathcote, "The Indian Army : A Garrison of the Indian Empire", p.82.

them was not adequate to generate a living. They were found in almost every occupation. They were very numerous in the old Bengal army and the name of one of their subdivisions 'Pande' became the generic term by which the mutineers of 1857 were commonly known to the English in India.²⁰

Major General J.B. Hearsay, K.C.B. Commanding Presidency Div., (1858) Bengal Army reported that the three armies were composed differently. The Bengal army was of high caste Brahm̄ns, Kshatriyas, Rajputs, Koormees or cultivators of the soil, Kaets or water caste, Gualas or cowkeepers, Ah̄ers or herdsmen and but very few of the lower castes of Hindus, Muhamedans, Sheeks, Sayeds, Moghuls, and Pathans.²¹

In the Bengal army then, the victory of caste was complete.²² The 'Brahmanization' of the army indicates the larger induction of upper castes distinct from lower castes into the Bengal army. If the British were to govern India as a temporal and sovereign power its army should have better roots among its people. Then the fiat went forth that the real folk of the countryside and the yeoman peasantry and the landowners were to be encouraged to enter the Company's ranks wherever men of heart and therr could be found.²³

20. Stratchey, India, p.216

21. Maj. Gen. J.B. Hearsay, Papers Supplementary to the Report of the Commissioners, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, 1859, C.2541, p. 177 (Henceforth referred to as P.P.H. of C., 1859).

22. Philip Mason, A Matter of Honor, p. 125.

23. Gen. George Mac Munn, Martial Races of India, p.170.

This was a typical characteristic of modernized societies. In fact, armed forces organizations are frequently elite organizations whose members are likely to come from a single elite class, and if they are not elite organizations and recruitment is open class, the vast majority of the individuals are likely to come from agrarian social backgrounds.²⁴

Recruiting was carried out within the clan, so that certain regiments looked like one large family group. The social institutions prevailed over the necessities of the military. In fact the European element became half Hindu and instead of being taught to pride themselves on their soldiership, the soldiers were taught to pride themselves on the absurdities of caste.²⁵

The Brahmanized Bengal army drew the attention of officers and administrators who cautioned against the dangers inherent in such a recruitment policy. Sir Henry Lawrence suggested that, "our sepoys are too much from the same parts of the country; Oude, the Lower Doab and the Upper Behar. There is too much of clanship among them and the evil should be remedied."²⁶

24. Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies, pp. 595-96.

25. Brig. Gen. John Jacob, The Views and Opinions, pp. 118-19.

26. Sir Henry Lawrence, Essays, Military & Political Written In India, Pp. 24-25.

Brig. Gen. John Jacob who carried out a thorough investigation of the Bengal army argued that the faults which had led to the lamentable state of the army were those of the system and not of individuals.²⁷ Maj. Gen. Birch suggested that the native troops should be taught to rely on European troops.²⁸ The indiscipline among the regiments was far too rampant and remedial measures ought to be expedited.

THE AFTERMATH OF 1857 : REORGANISATION

1857 spelt the virtual extinction of the old Bengal army. The Hon'able J.P. Grant reported that if the British were to hold Hindustan, the Bengal army had to be reorganized without any delay. "What is true of the whole Indian army is true of the Bengal army which is a greater part of the whole".²⁹

A Royal Commission headed by Sir Jonathan Peel was appointed to carry out a thorough investigation of the multifarious problems. An army commission, and the famous 'Punjab Committee' offered numerous suggestions. Scores of officers were interviewed.³⁰

27. Op.cit., pp. 112, 113.

28. Maj. Gen. Birch, Report of Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Organization of the Indian Army, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, C. 2515, App. 61, p. 80.

29. Hon'able J.P. Grant, President of the Council in India. Report of Commissioners appointed to Inquire into the Organization of Indian Army (Peel Commission) Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, C. 2515, p.53 Henceforth referred to as Peel Commission

30. Ibid.

The earlier attempt to reorganise the regimental system was in September 1859. It sought to remove from army list those regiments that had revolted against the British and announced the names of those corps that had remained loyal to the British.³¹ By 1861, orders had been issued reorganizing the confused mass of regiments. The Artillery and Corps of Engineers were transferred to the Royal Corps.

Some of the most significant changes that took place were the abolition of the native artillery, the transfer of the Company's forces to the crown involving the amalgamation of the local and line forces.³² The reorganization, though of great importance politically affected the native army in little more than name and in the conditions of service of its British officers.³³

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31. G.O.G.G. No. 1277 dated 8th Sept, 1859. Memorandum of Viscount Canning Peel Commission, App. 55, 1857. (At the outbreak of the mutiny, the Bengal army had approximately 119,000 native troops of all arms).
32. Amalgamation Orders. G.O.G.G. No. 332 dated 10th April 1861, G.G.O. No. 161-A dated Oct. 29, 1863, Adj. Gen's Circular No. 117-N dated Sept. 1864. Also published in 'Friend of India' Jan.- Dec. 1861. Local forces were troops recruited by the Company for service in India and were thereafter stationed permanently in India. The other category were the British regiments of this Line. They were the Crown troops and posted to India on a temporary basis.
33. Col. F. Cardew, "Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army", p. 303. Henceforth referred to as The Bengal Native Army.

A fundamental restructuring in the composition of the army had been necessitated by the events of 1857. The subsequent orders in respect of the composition of the army was dominated by the lietmotif of 'Divide et Impera', 'Balance and Counterpoise'. The colonial authorities attempted to demolish/demysticize caste structures, by completely ignoring the "Poorbeah" soldier who hailed from the upper echelons of society. These new levies, especially of low caste men, were raised in place of the old disbanded regiments. The zone of recruitment also shifted towards the North West and the Punjab. The Doab and Bihar were no longer considered feasible as recruitment zones. Sir William Mansfield pointed out, "It was not because they loved us but because they hated Hindoostan and hated the Bengal Army that the Sikhs have flocked to our standards instead of seizing again the opportunity to strike out again for their freedom. They wanted to revenge themselves and to gain riches by the plunder of the Hindoostanee cities. They were not attracted by mere daily pay. It was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and of stamping on the heads of their enemies."³⁴

FURTHER CHANGES

The "Eden Commission", 1879 was next in the chain of major reorganization commissions to keep the army an

34. Sir W. Mansfield, Peel Commission, 1859. App. 62, p.97 He also suggested, that with regard to the Hindoo castes, it may be expedient to adopt into the army they could hardly be too liberal. The spirit of exclusiveness, in favour of the high and cleanly castes, was the forerunner of all mutinies.

effective fighting force.

The Commission was required to investigate matters of security, the elements of danger, the strength and distribution of the police, question of compulsory enrolment and the volunteer system, and the "general military requirements of the province for garrison purposes and the maintenance of order, and for internal and military purposes."³⁵ Reductions in the strength of the Army were not recommended by all officers.³⁶ Apprehensive of the threat to British hegemony in India, the Commission of 1879 said "we must at all times be prepared to hold with the sword, the country we have won, from a warlike population by the sword."³⁷

Maintaining the trend of the Peel Commission towards native officers, it was further suggested that they should shoulder more responsibilities. A proportion of the vacancies in the ranks of the native officers could be allocated to 'direct cadets' of 'good families'. Much debate was generated over the appointment of Indians to the commissioned ranks in the European Grade. The outcome was the bestowal of Honorary commissions to some Indian princes as a mark of special favour.

35. Report of the Army Organization Commission, 1879, pp. 1,2.

36. Report No. 2449, Army Organization Commission, 1879. pp. 1-12. The possible elements of future danger existed, mainly on account of the rigid revenue system, judicial system, taxation etc.

37. Report No. 34, Army Organization Commission, 1879, p.6.

Areas of recruitment were defined within the limits of the 'provincial system'. This was suggested with the dual objective of preventing the development of a 'community of feeling' that could arise from a close association of races, and the elimination of discontent and alienation of the service that had arisen because the Hindustani soldier was required to serve far from his home. This indicated further structural changes in the composition of the army.³⁸

During the 1880's Field Marshal Roberts, Lords Lytton, Lord Ripon, amongst many others, lobbied very determinedly for a change in the system.³⁹ In 1891, a Royal Warrant decreed that the three Staff Corps of the Presidency armies be amalgamated into the Indian Staff Corps. In 1893, the British Parliament passed the Madras and Bombay Armies Act. Accordingly the officers of the Commander-in-Chief of those armies were abolished and the power of military control exercised by the Governor in Council of those Presidencies was withdrawn. The Presidential armies were abolished with

38. V. Longer, "Red Coats to Olive Green", pp. 121-123.

39. Hira Singh, The British in India, p. 159. In 1893, Lord Kimberly told Parliament that a very important consideration, which necessitated the reform was the proximity of Russia, to the frontiers of India. In the early nineteenth century, Malcolm had advocated the amalgamation of the armies

effect from April 1, 1895, and the combined armies designated the "Army in India".⁴⁰

OPERATIONS

A lengthy chapter in the history of the Bengal army had been brought to an end. Through those years, its men has been action from Kabul to Mandalay, from China to the Nile".⁴¹ Between 1860-1888, numerous expeditions had been sent to the N.W.F. Bengal troops had been sent to China (1860), Bhutan (1865) Aden (1865-66), Abyssinia (1867-68), Malta 1878, Egypt (1882) Burma (1865-87), Sikkim (1888) Manipur (1891).⁴²

The 2nd Afghan War saw hectic military operations, defeats and victories. It was also through the course of this war that the use of Khaki was popularized. Although it had been used earlier, it now served^{as} an excellent camouflage colour amidst the rugged mountain terrain of the North West. The red coats were dangerously conspicuous and were later discarded.⁴³ The N.W. Frontier remained

40. General Order, G.O.I., Army Dept., No. 981, October 26, 1894, The use of the term 'Indian Army' was avoided, for the British officers with the Indian force were subject to the Army Act, and not Indian Articles of War.

41. V. Longer, "Red Coats to Olive Greens", p. 132.

42. Col. F. Cardew, The Bengal Native Army, 487-496.

43. Op.cit., p, 117.

a sensitive zone that required additional defences and increases in troop strength. The Bengal Army continued to see action there. Amongst the various operations undertaken, the Black Mountain expedition in 1888, the Miranzai expedition in 1891, Hunza Nagar expedition in 1891, operations in Waziristan and Chitral, saw numerous hard fought battles.⁴⁴ Regiments of the Bengal army, bestowed with honors and titles, proudly emblazoned on their colors, continued to uphold the same traditions of valour in the future.

44. F. Cardew, 'The Bengal Native Army,' pp. 493-495.

CHAPTER I

SOME APPROACHES TO THE MILITARY WRITINGS OF THE PERIOD

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SOME APPROACHES TO THE MILITARY WRITINGS OF THE PERIOD

Traditionally military historiography has dealt with the writing of regimental histories, of the study of the armed forces, of the conduct of war, of logistics, strategies, weapons, of battles and campaigns.¹ Wars and soldiers were insular subjects to be studied in confidence, apart from other spheres. Crisp precise reports were embodied in war diaries. Committees and Commissions held inquiries to study the requirements of the army and they were duly lodged at headquarters to remain a concern of the top army brass. This narrow and technical military history was to be expected as most of its practitioners were either serving or retired soldiers, who had been trained, and conditioned to function in relative isolation from their societies.²

Clausewitz, one of the greatest generals and military strategist of the Russian army of the eighteenth century suggested that the elemental processes of war were too uncertain and too riddled with chance and the unforeseen, to

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1. J.C.A. Staff, "What is Military History?" History Today, P.9. Dec, 1984.
 2. John Childs, I bid, p. 10

be wholly or even mostly captured by past formulae and engineering calculations. He perceived that wars not only brought about changes, but that they were related to the political and social structures.³ Hans Delbruck, perhaps one of the most eminent among modern military historians, suggested that war be studied within the framework of political and social history. By the nineteenth century, historians were aware of the fact that social political and technological changes would transform the nature of war. Nevertheless, the only change that could be conceived of was one of scale. Future campaigns would be bloodier and larger.⁴

Michael Howard suggested that the two world wars changed notions of military history. "It might still be on the battlefield that decisions were reached but the nature of a decision was so clearly determined by a multiplicity of factors: economic, technological, social, moral that the history of those wars could not possibly be told purely in terms of campaigns."⁵

Campaigns and battles differ from games of chess and football, that are conducted in total detachment from their environment according to strictly defined rules. They are not tactical exercises writ large. They are, as Marxist military analysis quite rightly insist, conflicts

3. Ibid, Michael Howard. p.6.

4. Ibid., p. 6.

5. Ibid., p.6.

of societies and they can be fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them. The roots of victory and defeat have to be searched for, far away from the battlefield in political, economic, social factors, which explain why armies are constituted as they are; why their leaders conduct them in the way they do.⁶

Military history as part of the broad spectrum of historical study is in the simplest terms, the study of 'Man in War'.⁷ The military, being a living institution comprised of people, is a system, that is linked to all aspects of societal development. Military developments are inextricably linked to the affairs of the past and their repercussion are felt on developments in the present and future. This broad based perception of military history indicated, then, a radical alteration in the approaches to military history.

From the ancient Greeks through to the end of the nineteenth century, the study of war, its causes and consequences has been a principal preoccupation of historians. This concentration of effort suggests, then, the importance of war in human affairs."⁸

6. Michael Howard, "Military History, Its Uses and Abuses" Journal of the United Service Institution, July 1962, p.48.

7. David Chandler, "What is Military History", History Today, p.7.

8. J.C.A. Stagg., Ibid., p.9

Indian military historiography of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries appear to be adjuncts of colonial historiography. The expansion of the British Empire, and of the military forces required to administer, patrol or protect it, called for more officers specialized in the technique of Indian battlecraft and diplomacy. Military academies in England and India and general public interest in Indian military affairs created a demand for books on Indian warfare and political administration. Thus, the commissioning of Indian military historiography with the works of Orme, Bruce, Wilks, and the writings of officials like Brigadier-General John Jacob, Sir Bartle Frere, Sir John Lawrence amongst others.⁹

The Indian military was a collaborator and a product of the state system. The historical works of the period resound with the successes and victories of the volunteer British force, fighting overseas, against incoherent native armies, whether they were skirmishes at Plassey, or the hard contested, Maratha, Carnatic, Sikh, Afghan or foreign wars. The imperialist role as conqueror, Savior and liberator, was spelt out loud and clear. The British were the morally superior and civilizing power, bringing peace


9. Adrian Preston, "The Indian Army and Indo-British Political and Strategic Relations, 1745-1947", Journal of the United Services Institution Centenary No. Vol. 100, 1970, p.366.

and stability and converting a force of ruffians to an organized, regimented, military institution modelled on the European pattern. General histories or memoirs are replete with minutiae of organization, distribution and location of troops, campaigns and battles. The fidelity of the sepoy has been lavishly acclaimed, but the social origin of the troops, their traditions and customs have not figured too prominently. By the mid twentieth century, both Indian and Western scholarship on military matters, transcended the specificities of the military domain, linking up essentially military matters with other non military affairs.

Orme's magnum opum, Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan holds a title which is in itself indicative of the predominance of military transactions in the relations between the British and the Indians. Dedicated to His Majesty, George III, this masterpiece, was "an attempt to commemorate the successes of the British armies in Indoostan."¹⁰ It was through a policy of conquest that British rule attempted to gain a legitimacy in "Industan". In itself a rich storehouse of voluminous factual and numerical data, it narrates, in great detail, various negotiations with Indian princes, and the innumerable campaigns under British leadership.

10. Orme, Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan From the Year MDCC XLY. Title page.

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WORKS ON THE BENGAL ARMY

The classic accounts of the Bengal army were written by Captain Arthur Broome in the nineteenth century. Captain Broome's history was to be a two volumes project, but the second volume was not published. In Vol. 1, the introduction has a quaint little 'advertisement' which reads, "in its present form it contains the only available detailed narrative of military events of an important period and the only special record of the early deeds and conditions of an army which by the varied and brilliant nature of its services during a century of active and successful operation, has established a prominent position in public estimation."¹¹

According to Capt. Williams, the Bengal Native Infantry had long been noticed for their good conduct and gallantry in the field; as some of the battalions had upon all occasions distinguished themselves in a particular manner. Many old officers had expressed their concern that no minute account had been published of them.¹² Therefore the object of his brief narration was to "record the characteristic features of the native troops and the prominent services of the sepoy battalions on the

11. Captain Arthur Broome, History of the Rise and progress of the Bengal Army. 2nd page.
12. Capt. J. Williams, Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Native Infantry, down to the year 1796, p.1.

Bengal establishment."¹³ He praised the qualities of the sepoys whom he rated as the best soldiers in the world."¹⁴

The achievements of the Bengal Army were updated right till 1895 in Cardew's extremely informative account A sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army. Besides providing information on organizational changes in the post-mutiny period, he offers lucid battle accounts. He has included excellent tables on the chronology, raising, disbanding, renumbering, location of battalions, and the battle honors of regiments. Capt. A. Buckle's work on the "Royal Bengal Artillery takes us from its inception to 1850. The artillery was a favoured and honoured arm of the service and the Indian troops gave a good account of themselves. Amiya Barat's work on the "Bengal Native Infantry, Its Organization and Discipline, 1757-1796" marks a radical departure in the content and trend that had been the pattern hitherto. The exhaustive chapter on the 'Native Solidiery' investigates the social milieu of the sepoys, recruitment norms, salaries, pensions, privileges, housing, rewards and honors.

13. Ibid., p. 320.

14. Ibid., "We cannot but sufficiently admire the Bengal Sepoys : such gallantry, submission, temperance and fidelity, were perhaps never".

SOME DISCERNIBLE TRENDS

The Military as an Instrument of Policy: Histories, like "The Presidential Armies of India," do not attempt to be like Gibbon's work on Rome, or Kaye's account of the mutiny. Nevertheless, this is a detailed account, that endeavours to inform the British public of the successes and glories of each of the Presidential armies.¹⁵ A prophetic remark made by Clive to the Select Committee of the Court of Directors that the importance of their possessions in Bengal would compel them to send out an early and large supply of troops and good officers, but also of young gentlemen for the civil branches of business."¹⁶ "Peace," he observed, "is the most valuable of all blessings; but it must be made sword in hand in this country; if we mean to preserve our possessions."¹⁷ Field Marshal Roberts, almost a hundred and fifty years later, reiterated this stand, when he said, "our rule in India to begin with was established by conquest and could not for generations to come dispense with the support of military against outbreaks, local or general."¹⁸

15. Lt. Col. Rivett-Carnac, Presidential Armies of India, p. 210.

16. Lt. Col. Rivett - Carnac, p. 245.

17. Maj. Gen. John Malcolm, "Life of Robert Lord Clive", Collected from the Family Papers, communicated by the Earl of Powis, p.142.

18. Field Marshal Frederic Roberts. "Fallacies and Facts" pp. 67.

The colonial power had to create a military to support its imperialist objectives from within the very ranks of those whom they conquered by utilizing native manpower. Capt. Arthur Broome writes, "Another point to which Clive turned his attention, with that wonderful discrimination and foresight which peculiarly marked his character, was the organization of an efficient, native, regular force, and at this period he had commenced the formation of a battalion of sepoys, and had already raised some three or four hundred men selected with a due regard to their physical and other military qualifications. Hitherto, the native troops when employed at Calcutta, when required, designated Buxarries were nothing more than Burkandaz, armed and equipped in the usual native manner, without any attempt at discipline or regularity. Clive wisely determined to make the experiment of assimilating them as far as practicable to the European battalion, and not only furnished the new corps with arms and accoutrements, but with clothing of European fashion, drilled and disciplined them as regular troops and appointed European officers to command."¹⁹

The European soldier provided the leadership through the qualities of bravery and discipline. Nevertheless mere

19. Capt. Arthur Broome, "History of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army", p. 92. Buxarries or Burkandaz or matchlock men recruited from Buxar, Shahbad district, which upto 1857 was a great recruiting ground for sepoys.

bravery of the English soldier was not an assurance of the conquest of India, for numerically they were just a handful. It was imperative that they be assisted by the bravery and devotion of the native armies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras.²⁰

Amongst the various battle accounts that deal with the British conquest and expansion moves, the Decisive Battles of India by Col. G. Malleon is an outstanding study. He points out that, "in no other history was the story of how we have won India told with more attention to the real causes of our action and with a greater resolve to tell the whole truth without respect of persons".²¹ He wrote about battles, "not necessarily bloody or spectacular, but battles whose outcome were decisive."²²

Sir John Kaye's volumes on the Indian Mutiny are an official version of the event. They also cover the military aspects very exhaustively and are based on various documents and correspondence of the period. It was given an excellent review by the press of those times. His work on the "Lives of Indian Officers", though interesting, does not delve into the social background of the soldiers.

20. G.W. Forrest, C.I.E., Wellington to Roberts, Sepoy Generals, 1901. Preface, p. xiii.

21. Col. G. Malleon, Decisive Battles of India, Preface.

22. Ibid.

In the post-mutiny period, the British survival in India was contingent upon the augmentation of European troops. Sir Colin Campbell, writing in his memoirs on the reorganization of the Bengal Army, said,

I conceive it absolutely necessary for the sake of discipline and example that all the arms of her Majesty's regular army shall be largely represented in India, and that the British shall have an army at least double the strength of the native army as to render resistance hopeless. 23

The purpose of the Indian army was enforcement of British rule and defence of India against local outbreaks of violence and invasion from without. "If we are to fulfil our obligations to Afghanistan we must take advantage of the present breathing time, otherwise, Russia will be at the foot of the Hindukoosh".²⁴ The establishment was unequal to the task of holding India and defending Afghanistan. An increase in the Gurkha, Sikh and Muhammedan regiment was required. The increase in native strength was to have a corresponding British counterpoise to avoid another "1857".²⁵

23. Ed. Shadwell, "Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde", p. 385.

24. Elsmie, ed., "Field Marshal Donald Stewart," , p.415.

25. Ibid.

EMULATION AND DEPENDENCY ON EUROPEAN MILITARY SYSTEM

The Indian sepoy was expected to emulate the European. The objective of cultivating a spirit of confidence and self reliance was within the parameters of British military requirements only.

The sepoy was to be trained systematically always to act in dependence and leaning on European support, never to be permitted to lead an assault or to make the first attack, always to follow and to be made to look up to the Europeans, as being very much superior to them in personal gallantry, in endurance, in solidarity.²⁶

Captain Buckle, in an article in the Calcutta Review, on the "Bengal Artillery" was apprehensive of the danger of teaching the natives the use of artillery. In their endeavour to enhance their security, native troops were not to be trusted with such weapons, or should be supervised only by European artillery men, barring exceptional circumstances, when such arms be entrusted to them.²⁷

PATERNALISM

The attitudes of the military towards the nature of

26. Maj. General J.B. Hearsay Commander, Presidency Division, Bengal, PP. H. O. C. 1859, . 174.

27. Sir John Lawrence, Ibid., p. 6.

their obligation to India faced some problems which were not entirely on account of an imperial relationship. The very nature of Indian society demanded a paternalistic autocratic rule.²⁸

The sepoy was then called 'Jawan' (youth) reflecting the 'Mai-Baap' relationship, between the "Captain Sahib" and the "jawan", which searched for leadership and paternalism from the British officer.

In the classic first-hand account of active service in the Bengal Army, From Sepoy to Subedar, Subedar Sita Ram Pande, in the Foreward refers to the "fatherly kindness of the Government". "When I was a sepoy the Captain of my company would have some of the men at his house all day long and he talked with them."²⁹ After the mutiny the situation changed. "One sahib told us that he never knew what to say to us. The sahibs always knew what to say, and how to say it when I was a young soldier."³⁰ The British officers used to treat the sepoys kindly but they turned against their master. They will never find as good a master again." He concludes, "And now, with profound respect for one who has always been to me as a

28. Stephen Cohen, "Officer Traditions in the Indian Army" Journal of the United Services Institution, Jan. 1964, Vol. 94, pp. 32-38.

29. Sita Ram Pande, ed. by James Lunt, "From Sepoy to Subedar" p.25.

30. Ibid., p. 173.

father, I make my most humble obeisance.³¹

Brig. General John Jacob's contention was that the native officers and men felt the greatest devotion towards their European commander who succeeded in raising their character and position. The more the European was able to improve them the greater did he appear in their estimation. In the vision of a new modern India, the 'jawan' should be called upon to identify himself with the noble undertaking of a paternal government, devoted to public service, officered by professionals of good character and social bearing in which Indians of all classes and races found opportunity and honour at all levels. The development of this feeling would be the first step towards the conversion of a mercenary into a patriotic army.³²

31. Ibid., p. 178. The first English edition translated by Lt. Col. Norgate was published in 1873. Its Hindustani edition served as a text book for British officers to take their Hindustani language exam. failing which they did not get their permanent commissions. The authenticity of the book is very controversial, nevertheless, it offers a delightful experience into the world of the Subedar. To date, it is perhaps, the only narration in print, by an Indian Officer of the Bengal Army of these years.

32. Col. S. Hodgson, Opinions of the Indian Army, p.53.

According to Sir Charles Napier,

"the old Indians say there is no respect for you in India without magnificence and trumpery. A greater fallacy than this does not exist. The European officer is loved by the sepoy for he is honourable and just. He is the man to lead him in battle, the man to keep him in discipline, he is capable of making the Indian army march to Moscow, but he must have fair play... the sepoy must have a Captain to look up to." 33

Field Marshal Sir Frederic Roberts, was a firm admirer of the soldierly qualities of the Jats, Sikhs, Gurkhas, Dogras and Rajputs. But his constant refrain was that they required to be led by British officers.³⁴

The military rulers' ability in drawing out the best from the native soldier also stemmed from postures of benevolence and friendliness. Lord Robert Napier of Magdala who was admired by his troops, cared not a 'straw' for what the papers would say. He only cared to do his duty.³⁵ In so doing he was prepared to try and cause every native, high and low to look upon the British as friends, be ready to take an interest in all that effected their welfare and happiness.³⁶ Reposing the greatest confidence

33. Lt. Gen. Sir. W. Napier, K.C.B., "The life and Opinion of Sir Charles Napier", Vol. III, pp. 336-38.

34. Field Marshal Sir F. Roberts, V.C., K.C.B., "41 years in India", p. 534. Henceforth referred to as Roberts, Forty one years in India.

35. Ed. By. Lt. Col. the Honorable H.D. Napier, "Letters of Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala", p. 176 (Probyn Col. B).

36. Ibid., p.35.

in the native troops. he was not prepared to accept the reports, of their restlessness in the long wars, in the North Western Frontier, for that could be remedied.³⁷

SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND THE MILITARY'S ADAPTATION

In attempting to understand Indian Society sufficiently to rule it, the colonial administration accepted that caste was an essential feature of the Indian social system.³⁸ Perhaps their policy was dictated by administrative needs and the safety of British domination.³⁹ It also served as an ingenious solution to the basic problem of a group who see themselves as rulers as distinct from the people they ruled.⁴⁰ The martial caste system was very flattering to the British who were able to see themselves as the supreme caste able to command all races.⁴¹

37. Ibid., p. 64.

38. Lewis Carroll, "Colonial Perceptions of Indian Society and Emergence of Caste Associations", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXXVII, No.2, Feb.1978, p.248.

39. Ghurye, Caste and Race in India, p. 197.

40. Philip Mason, "Patterns of Dominance", p.156.

41. Col. T. Heathcote, "The Indian Army, A Garrison of British Imperial India, 1822-1922", p.156. Henceforth referred to as The Indian Army.

One of the glories of British memories was the sepoy, flocking to the Company's services. In the Bengal army, the granadiering of the line became very popular and before long the British army was composed of the 'Hindoostanee' sepoys from Oude and Behar; Rajputs and Brahmans making a fine soldier, or the Moslems of the same province, either Turks or men of Afthan origin or Sheiks.⁴² The Rajputs, the flower of the army, were born soldiers and prided themselves on being so considered.⁴³

The ideal soldier was the sturdy independent yeomen farmer, be he Rajput, Sikh, Jat or Mohammadan. The Madrassi soldier was smallish, blackish, and rather low caste, Marathas also were not high caste, but the Bengal soldier was generally high caste. He was fair and looked the cleanest with the most handsome looking build. He proved to be reliable and "were men of bone and muscle."⁴⁴

The circumstances and requirements of the post-mutiny period called for numerous changes. The birth-right hitherto enjoyed by the Poorbeah soldier seemed to pass henceforth "to ranks of our native army, who might confidently be trusted to take their share of fighting against a European foe."⁴⁵ The best races were needed in

42. Major Mac Munn, "Martial Races", p. 172-73.

43. Dharam Pal, "The Poorbeah Soldier", p.30.

44. Chenevix Trench, "The Indian Army and the King's enemies, 1900-1947", p.11.

45. Roberts, "Forty One years in India", p. 532.

the ranks.⁴⁶ And so, if the British temporarily suspended their support of upper castes in the Bengal Army, they found new methods of circumventing the regulations through the creation of the 'martial races'.⁴⁷

THE MARTIAL RACES

Field Marshal Lord Frederic Roberts, of Kandhar fame, and Commander-in-Chief from 1885-1893, in India, who was a great protagonist of the causes, observed, that men from a particular ethnic group, coming from places with severely cold winters were better equipped to bear arms than those hailing from the hot humid regions who had not the physical courage to bear arms. In the course of the numerous campaigns he had fought he had the peculiar opportunities of judging the relative qualities of the Natives and no comparison could be made between the martial value of a regiment recruited among the Gurkhas of Nepal or the warlike races of Northern India vis-a-vis the ones recruited from the effeminate people of the south.⁴⁸

46. Lt. Gen. Sir George F. Mac Munn, "Martial Races of India" India", London, p. 221.

47. In an interview with the 95 year old, General A.A. Rudra, the oldest surviving Indian Army Officer, who served in the British Army, and then the British Indian Army, on asking him his opinion of the 'martial races', he chuckled, and said, "Golly, Golly, I am a Bengali, The British did not include them amongst the martial races".

48. Roberts, Forty one years in India, p. 531-32.

Nevertheless the danger existed of the likelihood of people losing their martial habits, for want of use thereby justifying the participation of all races in their share of the defence of the Empire.⁴⁹ Gen. Frederic Haines' assurances that the Madrassis would make excellent soldiers, with adequate training,⁵⁰ Sir Bartle Frere's reminders that there were no bad soldiers only bad officers⁵¹, or General Robert Napier of Magdala's faith in the fighting qualities of the Indian soldier⁵² went unheeded, and "Bob Bahadur"s (Field Marshal Roberts) reasoning on the military races won the day.

Theorising on the genesis of the martial races, Gen Mac Munn identified the essential difference between the East and the West with certain exceptions being that only certain castes and classes could bear arms because others had not the physical courage of the warrior. The argument was that only certain races were permitted to bear arms and in course of time only certain races were fit to bear arms.⁵³

49. Anon. "Indian Army", Calcutta Review, Vol. 89, 178. October, 1889, p.245.

50. Robert S. Rait, 'Field Marshal Sir Frederic Paul Haines', p. 319.

51. Heathcote, 'The Indian Army', p.81.

52. G. Elsmie, ed. Field Marshal Donald Stewart, p. 446. "While recognizing the superior fighting qualities of the Sikh and Gurkhas, he discussed with the eye of a statesmen the inexpediency of relying exclusively upon those races for filling the ranks of our army" Sir Alex Arbuthnot, member of the Indian Council said this of Robert Napier of Magdala.

53. Gen. George Mac Munn, 'Armies of India', p. 129-130.

Whether fable or myth, MacMunn suggested a strange medley of causes for the same. Among them the impact of prolonged years of varying religions on their followers, to early marriages to malaria and hookworm and other ills of neglected sanitation in a hot humid climate and the deteriorating effect of aeons of tropical sun were responsible for such behavioural patterns and characteristics.⁵⁴ "The term 'martial races' is applicable to descendents of warriors who carried forward the Aryan, influx, for example the Rajputs and the Jats. They were generally small land-owners and yeoman, and were very good classes, too, since in India the exodus to the towns was limited."⁵⁵ "The peasant is a well born man distinct from the mere helot of low birth who in some parts help on the land."⁵⁶

54. Gen. MacMunn, "Martial Races", p.2.

55. Ibid., p. 223.

56. MacMunn, "Armies of India," p. 130.
His deduction was that with the reconstruction which gave to the Punjabi the birthright hitherto enjoyed by the Hindustani, the new classes were drawn from;

1. Tribesmen from the N.W. Frontier, both from within and without the border.
2. The cultivating classes from the Punjabi Plain viz, Sikhs, Muhammadans, Hindu Rajputs from the Punjab hills known as Dogras.
3. Certain of the classes of Hindustan as listed in the old army but to a lesser extent.
4. Men of Nepal and the adjoining hills viz., Gurkhas, Garhwalis, Kumaonis.
5. The Madras and Bombay armies, with Tamil and Telugu peasants and its parish class and Christians and the Muslim descendants of Afghan, Turk and Arab settlers. The latter with its Mahrattas, Dekhand Muslims of descent similar to those in Madras. The new regrouping clearly showed how the older races had lost their martial characteristics.

A great deal of interest was evoked in studying the 'military' races. As part of official policy the compilation of 'Caste Handbooks' on each of the 'military races' was published.⁵⁷ This literature described the origin, locale, social milieu, customs, traditions, religion, recruitment practices, leave and furlough of each of these ethnic / caste groups. They were and remain a rich source of information on the men who were recruited, for each of the 'martial races' were ascribed specific characteristics, moulding them into stereotypes that were acceptable for years to come.

The GURKHAS were considered to be the best soldiers in Asia, keen sportsmen and happiest when tiger hunting. A famous saying amongst them was 'Kafar hunnu bhanda, marnu ramro',⁵⁸ (it is better to die than to be a coward). Tall, of aquiline appearance, the SIKHS fought with the majesty that the British soldier did and possessed the physical courage that was unusual in 'their class'.⁵⁹ The DOGRAS were considered chivalrous but keenly sensitive to
⁶⁰affront. The RAJRUTANA CLASSES were associated with

57. Details provided in the Bibliography.

58. Lt. Col. Eden Vansittart, Caste Handbooks, Gurkhas, p.68

59. Gen. MacMunn, Martial Races of India, pp. 251-252.

60. Lt. Col. W.S. Cunningham, Caste Handbooks, Dogras, p.88
 "In no part of the world has the devotion of soldiers to their immediate chiefs been more remarkable than among the Dogras. They have a natural respect for authority and have their military fidelity and loyalty".

bravery, undemonstrativeness, and great pride of race. They would never subordinate military efficiency to religious prejudices.⁶¹ "The Rajputs are par excellence the military caste of Hindustan".⁶² Appreciated for their natural cleanliness, fine physique and soldierly bearing, the BRAHMINS, weak point lay in their adherence to caste norms.⁶³ The JATS, essentially farmers, were stolid, thrifty and free from caste prejudices especially in the preparation of foods. They entered the service from a love of soldiering rather than as a means of earning a livelihood.⁶⁴ The MARATHA, although no swashbuckler was gallant and brave.⁶⁵ The KUMAONIS made good in the various regiments they joined, as can be estimated from the awards granted to them on field service, and this bears out their old saying, "Rana mukh chhatri tiratti mukh Brahmin".⁶⁶ (The Rajput's face towards the battle, the Brahmin's face towards the shrine). Essentially hillmen, of cheerful disposition, the GARHWALI was of good physique, with great powers of endurance and if kept up to the mark, capable of great energy and alertness.⁶⁷

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61. Maj, B.L. Cole, Caste Handbooks, Rajputana Classes, p.29.
 62. Edmund Candler, The Sepoy, p. 112.
 63. Capt. A.H. Bingley, Caste Handbooks, Brahmans, pp. 51-52.
 64. Capt. A.H. Bingley, Caste, Handbooks, Gujjars, Jats, Ahirs,
 P.
 65. Edmund Candler, The Sepoy, p. 110.
 66. Lt. Col. A. Lathan, Caste Handbook, Kumaonis, pp. 37-38.
 67. Capt. J. Evatt, Caste Handbooks, Garhwalis, p. 37.

The PUNJABI MUHAMMEDAN included Rajputs, Jats, Gujjars, and foreign Tribes.⁶⁸ Hailing from a peasant milieu, the more well to do enrolled in the cavalry. There were also large numbers in the infantry.⁶⁹ Of the HINDUSTAN MUSALMAN not all were of the same ethnic origin, but the Pathans, Moghuls, Shekhs, Sayads, Musulman, Rajputs (Khanzadas) Musulman Jats (Mula Jats) Mewatis (Meos) were categorized as the 'fighting classes'.⁷⁰ GUJARS and AHIRS could also make good soldiers. They were recruited in the army among the Rajputana classes and in the Punjab as Punjabi Muhammedans. The AHIRS tend to keep to themselves⁷¹ Although wanting in initiative, they were conscientious and capable of great endurance.⁷² The GUJARS generally cheerful were free from intrigue and vice.

From this amalgam, then, of men of fire, bone and muscle, roll out stories of battles, of honours and of defeats. Western scholarship's obsession with the mythical formulation became quite unpopular through the two wars, for men from all communities were recruited with success. Perhaps the war situation rationalized the erstwhile chimerical categorization, nevertheless the magic and romance of the 'martial races' lingered.

68. Lt. Col. J.M. Wikeley, Caste Handbooks, Punjabi Musalmans, p. 1.

69. Gen. MacMunn, Martial Races of India, p.246.

70. Maj. W. Fitzbourne, Caste Handbooks, Hindustans Musalmans, p. 47.

71. Capt. A.H. Bingley, Caste Handbooks, Gujjars, Jats, Ahirs, p. 39.

72. Lt. Col. J.M. Wikeley, Caste Handbooks, Punjabi Musalmans, p.6.

CHAPTER II

COMPOSITION AND RECRUITMENT

CHAPTER II

COMPOSITION AND RECRUITMENT

Indian soldiers did not arise like Lakshmi from the foam of the Indian Ocean. They emerged from the conflicts of history. 1

1857 was the crucible from which the new Bengal Army emerged. It no longer favoured the Poorbeah, but was to be composed of "an entirely new set of men, with none of the old leaven to impregnate the new mass".² The enlistment of all fighting classes whether Muhammedans, Hindus, Sikhs, in the proportion was advocated. The British used the term "classes" in referring to ethnic group or caste which was recruited to the army. The term was not used in the sense of a social level, but rather as a synonym for the cultural, ethnic or caste groups which were recruited.³ "The motto of the regimental commander and therefore the Commander-in-Chief must be for the future; Divide et impera"⁴ This principle was adopted in the army to structure the formation of regiments, on a "class regiment" pattern, which remained an extremely important feature of the Indian Armies of the British period especially after the Mutiny.⁵

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1. Yeasts Brown, "Martial India", p. 52.
 2. Col. Burns, Punjab Committee, P.P.H. (C. 1859, p.182.
 3. Stephen Cohen, "The Indian Army and Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation", p. 42.
 4. Maj. Gen. Sir William Mansfield, P.P.H. (C. 1859, App. 62, p. 100
 5. K.M.L. Saxena, "The Military System of India", p.86.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Peel Commission in 1858, the strength of the army underwent a drastic reduction. After two major reorganisations there were to be 19 cavalry regiments and 44 infantry regiments under the Commander-in-Chief.⁶ The 45th Native Infantry Regiment (Rattray's Sikhs) was formed in 1864.⁷

In this chapter I have attempted to study the reorganization of the Army after 1858, in the context of recruitment, the composition of regiments, and subsequent changes.

INDUCTION OF LOW CASTES

In the pre-mutiny Bengal Army, "the high caste Brahmin and the Kshatriya Rajpoot were mustered very strongly. They almost formed a close borough of a regiment and maintained a monopoly on the service."⁸ These sepoys took no

6. G.O.G.&No. 1277 of 1859; No. 400, 3rd May 1861; No. 494 of 31st May 1861; No. 990 of 1861; provide details on the reduction of numbers, whereby an infantry regiment was to have 600 sepoys, and a cavalry regiment a total of 499 natives of all ranks; as also the renumbering of the regiments.

7. G.O.G.G. No. 326, 1864.

8. Anon, "The Indian Army", Calcutta Review, Vol. 89, 178 Oct. 1889, p. 237.

pains to disguise the fact that their presence was imperative and the 'Brahmanized' colonels conformed to their caste requirements.⁹

The admission of low castes and the exclusion of high castes was part of the argument of the new recruitment policy after 1857. In itself it was not novel, because Lord William Bentick as Commander-in-Chief had made similar though unsuccessful attempts earlier.¹⁰ Col. James Skinner of Skinner's Horse had also suggested that the Kunjar (Gypsies), Nutts and Sweepers could be employed with great advantage.¹¹ A "Precis of Report on Low Caste Levies"¹² presented in June 1860 concluded that low caste men could be as brave as high caste men.¹³ These men were as easily drilled and disciplined as the higher castes. Jats, Ahirs, Lodhs, Gujars, Gureyah, Pasis, Doms, Dhanuks made good soldiers.¹⁴ These men, who were almost equal to the men of the earlier high caste sepoy regiments, could undergo stress and were very persevering, despite having

9. Sir William Mansfield, P.P.H.O.C., 1859, App. 62, p.99

10. Col. Mayhem, P.P.H.O.C. 1859, p. 181.

11. Ibid. pp. 181, 182.

12. Mil Dept. Consultation, Oct. 1860, Nos. 1479-94, Proc A. Nos. 547-62. These Levies had been raised hurriedly from the low castes during 1857, when the Bengal Army had risen up in arms and had to be replaced.

13. Lt. Gen. Sir George Pollock, G.C.B. P.P. H.O.C. p. XI, X.

14. Ibid. Brig. J. Wheeler, Commanding Saugar Division, Allygurh Levy.

been subject to degradation from youth.¹⁵ The Ahirs were not very attractive in appearance but were extremely faithful to their employers and had the potential of being good marksmen.¹⁶ Their weakness lay in their love for drinking.¹⁷

The caste issue could not be ignored for that was part of the social structure but the recruitment from low castes had accompanying dangers and problems. There was a likelihood of breach of discipline in the instance of a low caste sepoy crouching with his forehead to the ground before a Brahmin sepoy. "If low caste men e.g. sweepers be enlisted in our ranks, our great political object which we have in view, i.e. the counterpoise of races will not be attained."¹⁸

A group of officers suggested soldiers had to possess specific qualities other than that of caste. Their only bond of union was duty to the state, none else, and such had been experienced earlier.¹⁹ Sir Patrick Grant,

15. Ibid., Brig. Dennis, C.B., Cawnpore Levy.

16. Ibid., Lt. Col., Bruce, Chief of Qude Policy

17. Ibid., Maj. Gen. Campbell C.B., and Brig. Gordon who inspected the 'Levy' States.

18. Recommendations of Pubjab Committee, P.O.H.O.C. 1859, App. 71, p. 180.

19. H.B.E. Sir Bartle Frere, P.P. H.O.C. 1859, p.5.

Commander-in-Chief Madras Army, 1857 suggested that every man, physically fit, should be eligible for enlistment without distinction of caste, race or tribe.²⁰ It was felt that the army should be open to men of all castes, even, low castes and that they would rise in their own esteem and become more enlightened. According to Sir Hugh Rose, Commander-in-Chief (1860-65), "there are no better means for this purpose than opening to them the ranks of a well disciplined regiment under a just and good commanding Officer".²¹

CLASS vs MIXED REGIMENTS

The caste factor was to be subsumed under the rubrics of homogenized regiments, consisting of men belonging to the same caste group in 'class regiments'. For example, corps composed entirely of Sikhs, Rajputs, Gurkhas, Punjabis, etc., or their companies constituted thus, in the 'class company' regiments.²² A grave objection to the 'homogenized' principle was the occasion of festive celebrations, when the entire regiment would demand leave : "Too many men of one mind congregating together was an insuperable objection itself".²³

20. Sir Patrick Grant, P.P.H.O.C. 1859, p.126.

21. Sir Hugh Rose, C-in-C, India. Mil. Dept. Consultations Oct. 1860, Nos. 1479-94 (proceeding A. 547-62).

22. Col. Keith Young, P.P.H.O.C. 1859, p.143.

23. Maj. Gen. Sir. Mark Cubbon, P.P.H.O.C. 1859, P.105.

A 'mixed composition in the personnel of all the native corps of cavalry and infantry was considered advantageous by a section of officers. "It is a guarantee for the suppression of any spirit of disaffection or conspiracy that might be attempted in a native corps".²⁴

"Men should be taken from every caste and every district. There could not be too great a diversity!"²⁵ Citing the incident of an encounter with certain Muhammedan tribes in the mountains, Brigadier General N.B. Chamberlain, C.B. commanding the Punjab Irregular Force and Lt. Col. H.B. Lumsden, C.B., Commandant of the Corps of Guides, discovered their men who were mainly Muhammedan, on the verge of absconding with the enemy. To prevent such an occurrence in the future these officers saw the wisdom in opting for mixed regiments.²⁶

After a very lengthy, mature consideration (some three or four years) on the question of the 'composition of regiments', Sir Hugh Rose, Commander-in-Chief, India came to the conclusion that "although there is but one opinion that it is indispensable for the good conduct of the Native Army that its composition should be a thorough mixture, yet on the other hand the opinions are so varied and different,

24. Mil. Proc dgs., Nov. 1862, Procdg. No. 72.

25. Lord Clyde, P.P.H.G.C. 59, App. 58, p.63.

26. Mil. Procdgs., Nov 1862, Procdg. No. 724.

as to the mode or system of that mixture of composition that it would be better and safer that the Government of India should not adopt for the Army any one particular mode or system of composition, but allow the general application of all these systems of mixture."²⁷

Accordingly, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Gurkhas and the 23rd and 32nd Pioneers were structured on the class regiment pattern. Regiments modelled on the District corps system were the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 17th., Bengal Native Infantry, or the Hindustani regiments, and the 14th and 15th Bengal Native Infantry or Sikh regiments. The 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th and 31st, Bengal Native Infantry also called the Punjab Regiments and the 42nd, 43rd, 44th or the Assam and Syhlet were composed on the basis of the 'General Mixture' or 'Plum Pudding' system. The Class Company composition was adopted by the 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th (Hindustani Regiment), the 13th (the Shekhawatee Regiment) the 18th, (the Alipore Regiment), the 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st Bengal Native Infantry (which were Levies that had been raised in 1858).²⁸

27. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1862., Procdg. No., 725.

28. Mil. Procdgs., No.v 1862, Procdg. No., 20.

It was deemed judicious, that the composition of the Native Army be enunciated in the form of a circular, rather than a General Order, lest it become the target of press attack, whether European or Indian, which was likely to be prejudicial, "was such that it would be impossible to disguise that the mixed composition recommended to be introduced to the Native army is based on a policy that policy being, in fact, one of mistrust of the native character, and to neutralise the chances of combination and conspiracy of native soldiers against the Government by means of a mixture in Regiments of antagonistic races and classes."²⁹ It was decided to publish Permanent Orders to this effect only after the experiment had been tried out.³⁰

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLASS COMPOSITION
SCHEME AND RECRUITMENT

Recruitment for the army was to be carried out immediately³¹ as it was imperative to bring the army up to the required strength and to choose the best men available.³² The antecedents of all recruits had to be strictly verified lest the men from disbanded regiments join.³³ The earlier

29. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1862, Procdg. No., 726.

30. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1862, Procdg. No., 729.
Adjutant Generals Circular No. 117 N, 9th Sept. 1864 dealt with the new scheme for the composition of Bengal Native regiments. Further details are contained in Appendix 2.

31. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1862, Procdg. No., 730.

32. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1862, Procdg. No., 729.

33. Mil. Procdgs., Dec. 1862, Procdg. No., 101.

practice of sending men home on leave to carry out recruiting continued. Also, recruiting parties attended Melas to enlist men. Various incentives were provided to the recruiting parties, for example, 'Bringing money' - free rail travel etc. The recruits were also granted an allowance.³⁴ Later, Recruiting Depots and Recruiting Officers were appointed, to improve the system. Medical Officers were cautioned to carry out the examinations thoroughly.³⁵

The 'class' composition of the native army was a subject that drew the attention of the Commanders-in-Chief. In 1871, it was reported that the General Order of 1864 dealing with the constitution of regiments was not strictly adhered to.³⁶ In some regiments there were men of unauthorized castes. Apparently they had been recruited prior to the passage of the Orders. The serious problem however was the violation of the prescribed proportions of 'castes' to be inducted.³⁷

34. Index to Mil Procdgs., June 1864, Procdg. No., 804-806.

35. G.O.G.G. No. 890, 1875. p. 190. Also see Appendix I for other details.

36. Mil. Procdgs., Aug. 1879, Procdgs. No., 570.

37. For details See Appendix 2

Lord Napier, while regretting the practice, believed that in most cases it was unavoidable. According to the mixed constitution of regiments, some corps had nearly as many classes as companies of troops. This created complications and difficulties in recruiting. It was difficult to procure recruits of a particular class when the regiment was quartered at a distance from their homes. The Commanding Officer was then compelled, either to permit his regiment to fall under its prescribed strength or to fill up vacancies with men of other authorized castes; until such time as recruits of the deficient 'class' could be obtained.³⁸

Another source of embarrassment was the absence in many cases of representatives in the commissioned grades of those 'classes' from which recruits were required. This however, was to be rectified by having 'class' ~~distinctions~~,³⁹ which while removing one evil, would occasion another in the discontent which would arise from frequent supercessions which would take place among individuals of the same standing in the same regiment. During the years 1870-74 the average recruitment rate of each of the nineteen Bengal Cavalry regiments ranged from 18 to 96 recruits, per year. Consequently on 1st Jan. 1875, most of these

38. Mil. Procdg., Aug. 1872, Procdg. No., 400.

39. Mil. Dept. Consultations. Aug. 1872, Procdg. No. 392-402
Bundle No. 1166-1176.

regiments were upto their authorised strength. However, in the case of regiments where the deficiency exceeded 4% of the establishment, the non-availability of the required 'class' at the station of posting of the regiment was offered as the major reason. For example, the 4th Bengal Cavalry, that was stationed at Sewgowlie and Meerut during 1870-74 experienced problems in recruiting Sikhs, Pathans and Jats at Sewgowlie. The Commanding Officer "hoped to recruit an improved class of Hindoos".⁴⁰ Similarly, in the case of the 6th Bengal Cavalry stationed at Kanpur and Morar, it was found that Sikhs and Pathans were not prepared to leave the Punjab.⁴¹ The quality of recruits was appreciably reasonable though a few Commanding Officers expressed that "the men did not come up to the old stamp".⁴² By 1889 the enhanced prices of grain and forage and extra expenditure incurred for equipment and clothing, deterred men from joining.⁴³ The 'razi bazi' feeling was fast disappearing. The Commanding Officer of the 1st Bengal Cavalry, enquired of a native officer, that should he be questioned by the General if the men were as 'razi' as formerly, what his reply would be. The native officer replied, "You know everything, what can I say".

40. 4th Bengal Cavalry, Ibid.

41. 6th Bengal Cavalry, Ibid.

42. 1st Bengal Cavalry, Ibid.

43. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1889, Procdg. No. 714.

This indicated that something had best be hidden, for it was useless to be talked about.⁴⁴ The sowar was losing his 'izzat' at home for instead of being a man in good circumstances as in former days, " he was now a poor thing unable to send money home".⁴⁵ Col. R.M. Clifford, Commanding Officer of 2nd Bengal Cavalry said, "It is all a question of pay" :⁴⁶ and the Cavalry service was losing its popularity.⁴⁷ The great apprehension that arose then was that the fighting instincts of the people were gradually diminishing and that the only 'amedwars' were the ones for whom the service was a means of subsistence and not those who cherished an inborn love for soldiering.⁴⁸

The native infantry of 50 regiments in comparison with the cavalry found recruiting much more difficult. The Commanding Officer of 41st Native Infantry remarked, "when my old regiment the 61st Native Infantry, marched from Lucknow to the Punjab, some 50 fully trained supernumeraries accompanied it. Recruits had now mostly to be sought for, and many are anxious to get away as soon as the 3 years are complete !" ⁴⁹

44. Col. R. Morris, 1st Bengal Cavalry, Ibid.

45. Col. J.H. Green, C.O. 12th Bengal Cavalry, Ibid.

46. Col. R.M. Clifford, C.O. 2nd Bengal Cav., Ibid.

47. Sir Frederic Roberts, C-in-C, Ibid. p. 259.

48. Capt. E.H. Rivett Carneç, 19th Bengal Lancers, Ibid. p. 319.

49. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No. 20.

Regiments admitted of diverse difficulties in recruiting. There were problems of physique, health, stamina, appearance, and also 'class', and salary. The men found it very difficult to maintain themselves on their pay, especially when there had been a large increase in prices.⁵⁰ That the men made rapid physical improvement once they joined the battalion, merely proved that none, but those in the poorest circumstances enlisted. In India as elsewhere, the labour market bid against the State for able bodied men and the inducements offered by the State were not adequate to attract the best men to military service.⁵¹ Also, it was difficult for recruiting parties to enlist when the regiment was far away. "Good Dogras are now difficult to obtain; the military spirit seems to be leaving the class", bemoaned the Commanding Officer of 26 Native Infantry.⁵²

The overall demand for recruits was immense as all regiments of both the Bengal and the Bombay armies recruited heavily from the Punjab.⁵³ The 34th and 35th Bengal regiments experienced problems in obtaining Mehtars, or low castes. Enlisting Chhutress, Ahúrs and Koormies for

50. 12th Native Infantry, Ibid.,

51. 23rd Native Infantry, Ibid., This regiment was composed of Muzbee Sikhs.

52. 26th Native Infantry, Ibid.

53. 31st Native Infantry, Ibid.

the 38th Bengal Native Army, posed problems. It was not just the distance of 'Buxa.' from the recruiting districts, that appeared intimidating, but 'Buxa' itself did not enjoy a good reputation.⁵⁴ The 42nd Native Infantry encountered a paucity of Gurkhas and Jurwahs. The 45th Native Infantry that recruited primarily from the Mangha Sikh districts, had difficulties in recruiting because the opening of canals enriched the people far more than military service could !

By 1876, the number of recruits enlisted annually was 3743 for the 50 regiments of the Bengal Army under the Commander-in-Chief.⁵⁵ "The result is that the whole Bengal Army and Frontier Force consisted by the last returns of the following proportion of each of the great divisions, namely 22,256 natives of Hindustan, 19,719 natives of Punjab, 4,797 men from Trans-Indus and 9,166 Goorkhas and hillmen, besides 260 Christians. The Hindustanis again were divided into 6,432 Mahommedans, 8054 Brahmins, and Rajpoots, 1,907 Jats and 5,863 of other (mainly low) castes; the Punjabis into 5,955 Mohammadans, 874 Hindus, 11,701 Sikhs, 1,169 Muzbee Sikhs and 20 men of other castes; the Trans-Indus men into 2,311 Afghans and 2,486 of various tribes, and the hillmen into 5188 Gorkhas, 3126 Dogras, and 852 hillmen of other classes".⁵⁶

54. 38th Native Infantry, Ibid., This regiment was to have 2 companies of Jats. They were difficult to procure, "owing to an admitted disinclination on the part of these men to military service".

55. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No. 1, 19.

56. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No., 52.

RECRUITING ZONES

Bihar and Oude had long since ceased to be the fashionable recruiting grounds, for after 1857, the army extended its sphere of enlistment to the 'North' (West) supposedly, improving the fighting quality of the soldier. Infact, there was scarcely a regiment in the Bengal, or even Bombay Army, that did not send its recruiting parties to the Punjab :⁵⁷ Before the Mutiny the percentage of Hindustani soldiers from 'Northern India' in the Army was nothing less than 90%. Since then, however, their percentage began to come down with the result it was just 23% in 1893 . This drastic drop in the recruitment of 'Northern Indianmen or Hindustani s as they were called in these days', was compensated for by a rise in the numbers of men from the Punjab, N.W.F.P. Kashmir, the Kumaon, Garhwal, and Nepal.⁵⁸ Officers anticipating changes in the composition of their regiments, promptly proposed, having Sikhs, Gurkhas, Pathans.⁵⁹

57. Mil. Procdg., May 1876, Procdg. No., 23.

58. D.H. Limaye. Some Aspects of Indian Military Defence p. 87.

59. Op.cit., Procdg. No., 52..

S.No.	Part of Country	1856	1858	1888	1893	1905
1.	Punjab, N.W.F.P. Kashmir	Less than 10	47	48	83	47
2.	Nepal, Garhwal, Kumaon	Less than 1	6	27	25	15
3.	Northern Indian except 1 & 2	90	47	35	25	22
4.	South India	Negli- gible				18
5.	Burmah	Nil				

The figure are percentages of the total.⁶⁰

60. Limaye, p. 86.

For details of Recruiting Zones, See Appendix 3

SOME INDIVIDUAL CASES

The 5th Bengal Cavalry asked for a change in its composition from that of a 'general mixture' regiment to one of a 'class troop' regiment.⁶¹ The existing composition was a mixture of Mussulmans 165, Sikhs 101, Rajputs 38, Dogras 47, Jats 36, Brahmins 66, other castes 5.

The regiment was reaching the proportions of each 'class' authorised and the C.O. Lt. Col. E.O. Gough, found a strong tendency among the men to form themselves by a system of exchanges into 'class' troops, which tendency, unless officially sanctioned would need to be repressed.⁶² Aware of the merits of such a formation especially because the men so formed would be happier and content than when mixed up with others of different castes and prejudices, he proposed.

"2 troops of Mussulmans, because in old times this class formed the mainstay of the corps and still predominate; their conduct has always been good and they were good soldiers undoubtedly.

1 troop each of Dogras, Sikhs, Jats and Rajpoots with a proportion of Brahmins of each of these classes intermixed in their respective troops."

61. Mil. Procdgs., July 1875, Procdgs. No., 104.

62. Ibid.

The changes were sanctioned, and were to be gradually introduced.⁶³

34th and 35th Native Infantry faced the problem of inducting 'low and menial castes'. The Commanding Officers reported on the non-viability of the 'Sweeper and Chumar' castes in their battalions and pressed for their exclusion.⁶⁴ In the case of the 35th Native Infantry Lt. Col. G.C. Rowcraft stated that it was difficult to obtain men of the Mehter caste of the physique required for military service, and when enlisted to imbue such men with military pride and martial ardour. The antecedents of the whole caste as such, prevented them from shedding sentiments of racial inferiority, which acted as a great impediment in their discharge of duties.⁶⁵

Jemadar Madaree, the only one man of his caste to have obtained a commissioned rank in the 35th Native Infantry until then, was a case in point. His performance as pay Master was satisfactory, but on being promoted to the rank of Jemadar, recorded a marked decline. It was obvious from his manner and bearing that he acknowledged his own social inferiority according to native estimation. He was thus found unfit for position and rank and duly transferred on medical grounds to the Pension Establishment.⁶⁶

63. Ibid.

64. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1878, Procdg. No., 1051.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

In order to improve the standards of the regiment Lt. Col. Rowcraft suggested the introduction of company of Sikhs, Brig. Gen. J.L. Nation, who had earlier commanded this regiment agreed with Rowcraft that it was difficult to find Chumars and Mehtars of military calibre. He, however, felt that Aheers, Lodhs, Dhanooks, and Pasis were of good physique and could make reasonable soldiers subject to a test of their fighting abilities.⁶⁷

The merit of the 'Sikh' as a soldier was not circumspect but the request was not granted on the grounds that Sikh presence in a low caste regiment, rather than raise the standards, was likely to have a reverse effect. The only remedy appeared to be a retention of all men from the same 'low' caste, wherein inferiority complexes would not develop. Moreover, Sikhs were being recruited into other regiments, and it was just as difficult to obtain them. Should Chumars and Mehtars not fulfil the requirements, Lodhs, Dhanooks, Pasis etc. could be inducted.⁶⁸

In 1878 orders were issued to increase two hundred men per regiment.⁶⁹ The Commanding Officer of the 34th Native Infantry requested that these companies should be composed only of Rajputs, Brahmins, Dhanooks, Lodhs,

67. Ibid..

68. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1878, Procdg. No., 1052.

69. G.O.G.G. 7th Dec. 1878.

Aheers, as he could not procure men of the sweeper caste of proper height and good physical development. The Commander-in-Chief concurred with the proposals of sweeper & Chumar exclusion, though he did not sanction the increase of Brahmins and Rajputs.⁷⁰

The 18th BENGAL CAVALRY had difficulties in procuring Hindustani Mussulmans from the North Western Provinces. Malik Jehan Khan, one of the chieftains who had participated in 1857 at Kanpur, and was devotedly attached to the British, impressed upon them the feasibility of recruiting 'Tewannahs', an isolated 'race' from the remote part of the Punjab who were not likely to make common cause with any other faction. Consequently the 18th Cavalry was authorised 2 troops of Hindustani Muhammedans, 2 troops of Sikhs, 2 troops of Punjabi Muhammedans and Tewannahs.⁷¹

The 42nd, 43rd and 44th Native Infantry or the Assam Regiments were not subject to any specific class constitution.⁷² The Hindustani element was not to exceed 1/4 of the strength.⁷³

70. Mil. Procdgs., March 1879, Procdg. Nos., 121-122.

71. Mil. Procdgs., August 1879. Procdgs. No., 590.

72. Mil. Procdgs., April 1882, Procdgs. No. 1902-03. Ibid.

73. Standing Orders, 1864, Ibid.

and the Poorbeah element was to be excluded.⁷⁴ Vacancies were to be filled by Gurkhas, Nepalese and Jurwahs.

The 42nd Native Infantry continued to have two companies of Sikhs that had been introduced by the late Col. Rattray C.B.C.S.I., in 1865. The regiment was then at Dibrugarh, where the men could procure milk and other necessaries to which they were accustomed. Later when they were in the Naga Hills such items were not easily available. Notwithstanding attractive rates of compensation for dearness of provisions, the men were not happy in view of the vast distances from their homes, heavy travel expenses and the onerous furlough.⁷⁵

Brig. Gen. J.L. Nation's (Commander, Eastern Frontier District) observation was that "Sikhs are a mistake in a regiment permanently quartered in this province. Physically they are not fit for marching in a hilly country where short sturdy men are far better than tall lanky man who quickly succumb to the fatigues of hill marching. Climate as a rule does not suit the Sikhs, they eat atta in preference to rice and have more than once been a source of trouble...."⁷⁶ Therefore, he recommended that the Sikh element be substituted by Gurkhas. The Jurwahs, a useful class of men,

74. Ibid., Mil. Dept. Letter No. 1347, dated 28th March, 1871.

75. Mil. Procdgs., April 1882, Procdgs. No. 1902.

76. Ibid.

skilled in making huts, could also be recruited, maintaining their strength at about 100 men.⁷⁷ The elimination of the Sikhs from the 42nd Native Infantry and its substitution by Gurkhas and Jurwaha was sanctioned, to be carried into effect gradually.⁷⁸

MODIFICATIONS IN THE CASTE-CLASS COMPOSITION

The British, desiring to follow a policy of friendly relations with tribes on the North Western Frontier, were prepared to enlist them into military service. One of the suggestions forwarded was for inclusion of Afridis, a tribe of the North Western Frontier, Lt. Col. H.W. Gordon, of the 20th Punjab Infantry, expressed his admiration of their physique, courage and intelligence, and recommended that the prohibition against their enlistment be withdrawn.⁷⁹ Lt. Col. Low, C.B., 13 Bengal Lancers, to the contrary cautioned against desertions from within the ranks and pilferage of arms and ammunition. He felt that it was neither practicable to enlist them in the cavalry, for as a race they were quite penurious. Should they be recruited, their horses and weapons were to be retained while they

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., Procdg, No. 1903.

79. Mil. Procdgs., Jan. 1882, Procdg. No., 373, 374.

were on leave.⁸⁰ After much controversy, it was decided to enlist them, only in regiments that were desirous of having them. However, they were to be formed in a distinct company or troop.⁸¹

Accordingly, the caste returns were required to be modified in order to give therein, a place to the various class of Afridis for which the form did not provide. It was also necessary to expunge certain other classes as the Government had recently approved of measures proposed by the Commander-in-Chief for simplifying the classification of the numerous castes of Hindus of Hindustan as well as for ceasing enlistment of certain low castes. The sub-division listed within the Sikh race appeared redundant and was also simplified.⁸²

Superceding all previous orders on the subject,⁸³ the General Order of the Commander-in-Chief No. 9, 20th Jan. 1883, Simla, laid down the 'Caste Constitution' of the 'native army'.⁸⁴

The following are some of the important contents of the Order:-

The constitution of regiments from a 'general mixture'

80. Ibid.

81. Mil. Procdgs., Sept. 1882. Procdg. Nos. 2579-2584.

82. Mil Procdgs., Jan. 1883, Procdg. No. 329.

83. Adj. Gen. Circular No. 117-N, 9th Sept. 1864, and and Standing Orders, 1864, pp. 239-41.

84. Mil. Procdgs., March 1883, Procdg. No. 377. Details given in the Appendix 4

to that of 'class troops' was to be undertaken gradually. General Officers forwarding promotion rolls were requested to furnish the necessary information regarding the caste of the men recommended, or reasons for supersession.

The enlistment of men from menial classes such as the Khuteeks, Mehters, Chumars, Dhanoeks, Pasis, Lodhs, Gararias, Baniahs, Kaithas, Kurmis, Bhatha and others inferior to them were to cease. However, the Commanding Officer was empowered to exercise his discretion in enlisting other castes which were of an inferior order, but not absolutely the lowest. Gujars, Ahirs, and other classes of 'Hindoostanee Hindoos', could be enlisted under the head of 'other Hindus', subject to their being fit for military service.

Afridis were to be recruited only in the 11th Bengal Lancers, 19th Bengal Lancers, and 20th, 21st and 26th Native Infantry and to be quartered together in one troop or company.

Punjabi Hindus or 'Moonahs' could be enlisted in Sikh or Dogra troops or companies, to the extent of 1/10th of their normal strength. All Punjabis, i.e. Punjabi Muhammedans from Hindustani regiments and all such Hindustanis from Punjabi regiments were to be eliminated by gradually ceasing the recruiting of such classes for corps in which in future they would not be authorized to join. Districts such as Delhi, Gurgaon, Jhajjar, Karnal,

Rohtak, Hissar were not to be considered as in the Punjab and men enlisted from them were to be reflected as Hindustanis and not Punjabis in the Caste Returns.

The four Gurkha regiments were to be composed of Goorung, Megar, Khaas and Thakoor classes. 5% of other castes and 'Line Boys'⁸⁵ could be enlisted.

The Assam regiments were permitted to enlist any class of Gurkhas, excluding recruits from any part of Nepal to the West of Khatmandu.

The officers commanding regiments that enlisted hill men, i.e. Garhwalis, Newars, Kumacnis, would do so in communication with the Resident at Nepal, or the Commissioner of Kumaon, who would assist them in obtaining suitable recruits. It was not permissible to include Gurkhas under 'hillmen'.⁸⁶

SUBSEQUENT CHANGES

Consequent to the order on the Caste composition, recruiting in some corps, for example the 12th Native Infantry had to be checked. Henceforth they would abandon the Punjab as a recruiting field and turn to Hindustan; regiments that had hitherto recruited men of inferior

85. The progeny of Gurkha soldiers, born and brought up in the regiment.

86. Mil. Procdgs., March 1883, Procdg. No. 377, 378 and 380.

castes, could not, suddenly procure men from the classes which they would in future recruit from. Regiments enlisting Garhwalis and hillmen were also likely to encounter some impediments. Considering these problems, the new constitution orders would require some time in their implementation.⁸⁷

The Kayastha Literary National Association appealed against the general order of the Commander-in-Chief, No.9 1883, prohibiting the enlistment of the 'Kaistha' in the native army.⁸⁸ They established that they were a Kshatriya caste. The error was corrected by duly expunging their name from the list. Nevertheless, the Commander-in-Chief did not advise the enlistment of Kayasths in the native army, not on account of any question of their social standing, but because they were not supposed to be a military class.⁸⁹ After careful consideration, the Government of India had decided to restrict enlistment in the Bengal Army to only those classes which were universally recognised as military.⁹⁰

87. Mil. Procdgs., March 1883. Procdg.No. 1351, 1352.

88. Mil. Procdgs., Jan. 1884, Procdg. No. 2282-85.

89. Mil. Procdgs., Jan. 1884, Procdg. No. 2284/8.

90. Mil. Procdgs., Jan. 1884, Procdg. Nos. 2282-85 B.

Gurkhas serving with the 18th and 38th Bengal Native Infantry were transferred to Assam regiments, and Hindustanis in Assam regiments were transferred to the 18th and 38th Native Infantry regiments.⁹¹

Proposals for changes in the eight regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force were forwarded by Brig. Gen. Kennedy. The hitherto 'mixed' troops' or 'companies' were to be structured on the pattern of class troops or companies⁹² to increase the efficiency of the regiments.

The proposed changes would not affect the proportion between the religious elements in the infantry which would remain as Hindus and Sikhs in 52 companies and Muhammedans in 36 companies. In the Cavalry, they would be equalized by the substitution of a Hindu in place of a Muhammadan troop in order to increase the preponderance of the Hindu element on the fanatical Moslem border.⁹³

The composition of the 7th Bengal Cavalry was scheduled for change. The Brahmin troop was to be substituted by a Rajput troop. The Brahmins were admittedly good soldiers, but those qualities were tarnished by the innumerable religious prejudices that beset them⁹⁴ and was likely

91. Mil. Procdgs., Feb. 1884, Procdg. Nos. 838-A.

92. Mil. Procdgs., Feb. 1884, Procdg. No. 230.

93. Ibid.

94. Mil. Procdgs., June 1885, Procdg. No. 948.

to produce unhealthy repercussions within the regiment. The Commander-in-Chief recommended an amendment of General Order of the Commander in-Chief No. 9 of Jan. 1883, to aid the requirements of the regiment and thereby accorded sanction.⁹⁵ Sometime later the C.O. Col. Graham, considering the good service rendered by the regiment during operations in Burma and the manner in which the Brahmin troop conducted themselves requested that the above orders be rescinded, and the Brahmin troop reestablished. According to him, the Brahmins in former days did good fighting and there was not really much to choose from between the Rajput and the Brahmin. As the 7th Bengal Cavalry was composed chiefly of classes from the North-West, the Brahmin who formed a large proportion of the population was faced with stiff competition and it would be very hard on them if they were to be debarred from military service, particularly in respect of the Cavalry. The order was rescinded and the Rajput troop substituted by the Brahmin troop.⁹⁶

The 16th Bengal Cavalry was to be raised at 'Umbala', with a caste composition of four troops of Sikhs, two troops of Dogras and two troops of the Jats of Hindustan.⁹⁷ The 17th Bengal Cavalry was to be raised at Meer Meer, with four troops of Punjabi Muhammedans, two troops of Muhammedans

95. Mil. Procdg., June 1885, Procdg. No. 949.

96. Mil. Procdg., March 1887, Procdg. No. 565-66.

97. G.O.C.C. 18th Sept. 1885, pp. 433-34.

who were independent tribes such as the Baluch and the Afghan.⁹⁸ The 'class' constitution of the two additional troops for each regiment was also sanctioned.

The Army Reorganisation Commission had been appointed in 1879, "with a view to assist Government in determining what share of this unavoidable reduction can be borne by the military changes without injury to the general efficiency of the army".⁹⁹ It was difficult to sustain such a policy. The strained relations with Russia posed a threat to British security. Also, British commitment to the Afghan Kingdom rendered it imperative that the military forces in India be commensurate with the needs of the defence of the Indian Empire.¹⁰⁰

Therefore, the Bengal Native Infantry with its existing 55 regiments, each consisting of 980 men would total to a strength of 53,900 men, which would further be augmented by the raising of 1 Pioneer regiment, 3 new Sikh regiments and 5 new Gurkha Regiments, then bringing the total to 62,720 men.¹⁰¹

The Bengal Army could be conveniently considered under the three heads of 'Punjabi, Hindoostani and Goorkha'.¹⁰²

98. Ibid.

99. Army Reorganisation Report (Edn. Commission) 1879.

100. Mil. Procdgs., August 1885, Procdg. No., 2822-29.

101. Ibid., Procdg., No. 2829.

102. Ibid., Para. No. 40.

Of the 40 Line regiments of the Bengal Army, 23 regiments belonged to the Hindustani portion of it inclusive of the 42nd, 43rd and 44th Native Infantry, that were largely composed of Gurkhas, with only a minute Hindustani element, and were always stationed in Assam. These 23 regiments, would be organized as 7 regiments of 3 battalions each, and 1 regiment of 2 battalions, which could be converted to Pioneers, should such a change be acceptable to the men.¹⁰³

The new Pioneer regiment, of Muzbees, was to be numbered the 34th, which had been reduced in 1882. This Battalion would be linked to the 23rd and 32nd Pioneers,¹⁰⁴ to be raised at Mean Meer, with a similar caste composition.¹⁰⁵

The three new Sikh battalions were to be organized in one regiment. They were the 35th, 36th, 37th in place of these reduced in 1882. The 35th was to be raised at Ferozepore, and the 36th at Jullunder, both to be composed of Jat Sikhs, from North of the Sutlej. Caste formation of the 37th was to be intimated later.¹⁰⁶ It was also suggested that one of the three Sikh battalions also enlist Dogras as they were adaptable, and both served well together.¹⁰⁷

103. Ibid, para 41.

104. Ibid. Para 43. In 1882, 5 Infantry regiments, i.e. the 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th and 41st were broken up.

105. G.O.C.C. 227a, 20th April 1887, Also, Mil. Proceedgs., July 1886, Procdg. No. 116-176-B.

106. G.O.C.C. 20th April, 1887, 227p.

107. Indian Army Circular, Special, 23rd March, 1887.

The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Gorkhas, was to be raised in Garhwal and constituted "Upper Garhwalis". However to form the nucleus of this new battalion, all Gorkhas serving with other corps were permitted to volunteer. Native officers were to be carefully selected from the 1st Battalion 3rd Gorkhas, and other Gorkha Battalions.¹⁰⁸

The 'Linked Battalion' system was another important proposal. All regiments were to be linked as 'sister battalions' with 2 or 3 battalions per regiment. Those located in the field could draw on those in cantonments, for support. Apart from ensuring a supply of trained soldiers, to bring the Battalion up to war strength and replace casual ties,¹⁰⁹ it would foster a proper degree of military spirit and esprit de corps in both officers and men, whereby the army would feel that all parts of it had an equal chance of achieving distinction.¹¹⁰

108. Mil. Procdgs., May 1887, Procdg. No. 1804 and 1801 G.O.C.C., 227c, 20th April 1887. The battalion was to be composed of pure Garhwalis from Upper Garhwal, to the exclusion of all Kumaonis, Brahmins and other hill tribes. His Excellency the C-in-C, had forbidden the transfer from existing Gorkha Battalions of any men except 'Upper Garhwalis', Also Garhwalis were not yet to be enlisted in the 2nd Bn. of the 5th Gorkhas because of financial reasons. Mil. Procdgs. June 1887, Procdg. Nos., 1444-48 A.

109. Mil. Procdgs., Aug. 1885, Procdg. No., 2822, para 29,

110. Mil. Procdgs. Aug. 1885, Procdg. No., 2835, Details given in Appendix No 5.

The question of substituting the category of 'other Hindoos' in the 19 regiments of Infantry by the Jats, Rajputs, Hindustani Muhammedans, Hillmen came up for discussion in 1887. Some changes were sanctioned,¹¹¹ and the case of Ahir recruitment was forwarded. In fact, a proposal was afoot to nominate as native officer, an Ahir in one of the cavalry regiments. Sir Frederick Robert's consultations with Commanding Officers resulted in recommendations for Rajputs and Jats, rather than Ahirs, who they felt did not make very good soldiers. The hillmen were considered the backbone of the corps in which they served especially when in the hills. Their retention in the regiment was accepted.¹¹²

For the Bengal Army, the proposal was mooted to convert four Hindustani regiments of Bengal Infantry into one each, of Punjabi Muhammedans, of Mohammedans raised from the Cis and Trans frontier Tribes, of Dogras and of Gorkhas. The 38th, 39th, 40th Bengal Infantry had been raised hurriedly after the mutiny from men of low caste. Belatedly, they had been allocated a proportion of men from high castes, yet, they were inferior to the older Hindustani regiments, and were not a very effective part of the Bengal Army.¹¹³

111. Mil. Procdgs., February 1888, Procdg. No. 2155, Details in Appendix No.

112. Ibid., Procdg. No. 2156.

113. Mil. Procdgs., April 1890, Procdg. No., 817.

The proposed changes in the caste composition of the Bengal Sappers and Miners was negatived, on the explanation that the suggested constitution of 9/10, or 10/12 of the corps to be composed of Sikhs, Funjabi, Muhammadens and Pathans, would virtually convert them into a Punjabi corps, thereby forfeiting their identity as a Bengal corps.¹¹⁴ Considering the Punjab army already had three Pioneer corps, it was not deemed prudent to reduce either a small proportion or to alter the organization of the Bengal Sappers and Miners.¹¹⁵

By 1890, the changes effected in the Hindustani regiments of the Bengal Army, had proved very effective. The distribution of troops had been changed, and the army was increasingly employed on the frontier, rather than as a garrison for protecting British possessions. Experience had shown that not only did a better recruit apply for a Class regiment, but that all ranks were happy and content. According to the merits of such a composition, the proposals for the whole of the Hindustani portion of the Bengal Army to be converted to Class regiments was underway. The groups selected to form the 'class' regiments were Brahmíns, Rajputs, Jats, Hillmen. In order to achieve a proporcionate representation of these groups, seven regiments were to be

114. Mil. Procdgs.. January 1891, Procdg. No., 1301.

115. Ibid., Procdg. No. 1302.

composed of Rajputs, four regiments of Hindustani Muhammedens, two all Brahmin regiments, two regiments of Jats and one regiment of hillmen.¹¹⁶

CONCLUSION

In the British Indian Army, imperial policy did not restrict itself to recruiting from local inhabitants at random, but undertook to explore and to understand the social milieu from which these men hailed, not merely in terms of economic categories but in terms of caste and ethnic groups. The bonds of caste and clan were strong, almost sacred. It was within this subtle framework that regiments based on such norms i.e. 'class regiments' were formed. Experience proved the efficacy of 'class' regiments which became increasingly the norm.

The British attempts at introducing low castes into the army stemmed not merely from a sense of egalitarianism, but mainly from a need to obtain the obedience and loyalty of a social group hitherto ignored by the Bengal Army. Nevertheless their experiment was not entirely successful. The reports of the 34th and 35th Native Infantry, pressed for the exclusion of the Mahtars, because of their lack of

116. Mil. Procdgs., June 1892, Procdg. Nos., 1325-1330, Details in Appendix 6

initiative, low morals, poor physique, and poor performance.

Simultaneously, the animosity towards the upper varnas tended to disappear and a gradual approval of their abilities and qualities took place. Apparently the Brahmins were successful in redeeming their earlier reputation for being 'caste adherents'. In fact, two regiments consisting solely of Brahmins were raised. The democratic liberation traditions of the British did not attempt to challenge the age old social mores of the Indian people. On the contrary, by upholding hierarchical caste structures within the broader context of recruiting for the Indian army, the British were successful in creating caste barriers and divisions. Each of the castes or ethnic groups in the garb of fighting classes or martial races developed a sense of pride and competitiveness amongst themselves; therefore the greater self assertion, and self penetration and non combination with the other. This trend provided a sense of security to the British and a sense of achievement and esprit de corps to the 'class' regiment. This parochialism suited the colonial power, for they obtained a faithful ally in the army. Simultaneously, the military fulfilled its duty in keeping with the Kshatriya traditions of bravery and chivalry, besides offering an avenue for employment.

The "Brahmanized" Bengal Army may have been ousted with 1857 but caste norms played a vital role in the policy

making of the administrators. The British Indian Army was not a caste army, nevertheless the 'class' regiments composed of caste and ethnic groups reflected the potency of 'caste' in the Indian social system and the colonial endeavours to conform to them. The recruitment policy for the Bengal Army after 1858 aimed at preventing a repetition of the trauma of 1857. As a matter of fact, they were successful in creating a colonial army that remained loyal and obedient to them.

CHAPTER III

"DISCIPLINE : INCENTIVES AND DETERRENTS"

CHAPTER III

"DISCIPLINE : INCENTIVES AND DETERRENTS"

"Theirs not to reason why; theirs but
to do and die : "

-Tennyson

Prompt and implicit obedience is one of the grand principles of military discipline.¹ Soldiers are not to judge the action of their superiors but implicitly to obey any orders that may^{be} communicated to them.² Loyalty and obedience are the highest military virtues that mould the soldiers into unique, special beings. Oftimes summoned to march through arctic snows or fiery jungles, rugged mountains or sandy deserts, to encounter the inhospitalities of man and nature, they respond with courage and faithfulness, upholding the Izzat of their arms, Their goal is to perfect the virtue of obedience.

For the British, the dialectics arising from the creation of an army of indigenous manpower and the constant apprehension of 'alarming circumstances' was perceived as early as 1767. In his correspondence to one of the members of the Committee of Directors, Robert Clive, attempting to assuage such fears wrote, "I allow that the Company's chief danger

1. Capt. Shipp, "Memoirs of the Extraordinary, Career of John Shipp." p. 194 and p. 202.

2. Samuel Huntington, "The Soldier and the State", p.73

arises from thence and from discipline. But I am of the opinion that so long as they are regularly paid, treated with humanity and not flattered with promises never meant to be performed, no danger is to be apprehended. Sepoys are the most faithful and attached people in the universe."³ By utilizing the instrumentality of discipline and the power that it emanated, the colonial authorities attempted to maintain their aura of dominance. Discipline, inherent and essential to any military system in the world, was in the British Indian military context directed by a dual pronged approach in the transactions with Indian troops. It implied the exercise of power and authority tempered by a touch of the paternalistic.

This chapter is an analysis of 'Discipline', imbibed by the Indian soldier through a system of rewards and punishments. In Part I of the chapter I have examined some of the incentives and rewards that could inculcate a sense of commitment and loyalty. Part II of the chapter deals with various aspects of discipline.

3. John Malcolm, "Life of Lord Clive", p. 143.

PART IINCENTIVES

Coercive methods to subjugate an alien people was far too onerous a task. Adopting a more positive approach where possible, the policy endeavoured to build up a sense of attachment at all levels. In the Army the policy was directed to improving facilities for the men within the financial constraints of service. These incentives included monetary benefits, housing, rewards, titles and honors.

HUTTING

According to the conditions of service for the Native Army the housing arrangements of troops was entirely a personal affair of the sepoy who defrayed the cost of his hut⁴. But in 1845 for the first time a 'hutting allowance' was granted to the sepoy, solely to assist him in the construction of his hut. The allowance was equivalent to the full batta of rank when new lines were to be erected and half batta when a regiment took possession of existing lines.⁵

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4. Mil. Dept. Consultations, April, 1872, Procdg. Nos. 20-27 Bundle Nos. 60-77.
 5. Mil. Procdg., April 1872. Procdg. No., 30, Government General Order No. 266 of 1845, dealt with the new hutting allowance. These huts being the property of men, were purchased by one regiment from another, on behalf of native officers.

In spite of the hutting allowance, the old lines were miserable hovels. The earth for walls was taken from pits close by which were never filled up except with rubbish and rain water, these being fruitful causes of sickness. The case for the construction of permanent barracks initially did not meet with success.⁶ But on grounds of discipline, sanitation and rising prices⁷ government relented and some increases were granted.

The augmented rate of hutting allowance was then,⁸

	Full Allowance			Half allowance		
Subedar	45	0	0	22	8	0
Jemadar	22	0	0	11	4	0
Havildar, Naick	15	0	0	7	8	0
Private and 1st Class Followers	8	0	0	4	0	0
2nd Class followers	5	0	0	2	8	0

Although most of the families of Indian troops stayed in the villages, there were some, who lived with their

6. Mil. Dept. Consultations, April 1872, Procdgs. Nos., 20-37 Bundle No. 60-77.

7. Ibid., In respect of Bengal the rise between 1845-68, in pucca brick work, Kutchha Pucca brick work, roofing etc. varied from 100% - 125%. The average rise for other provinces in the same period was N.W.P., 20%, Punjab 30%, Oude 25%.

8. G.O.G.G. No. 73, 2nd Jan. 1872 and Mil. Dept. Consultations April 1872. Procdg. No., 20-37, Bundle Nos. 60-77.

husbands, in the lines.⁹ This practice would help in cementing the bonds to the service.¹⁰ Field Marshal - Frederic Roberts, Commander-in-Chief 1885-93, suggested that the proportion of married soldiers in Gurkha regiments, should from the peculiarity of their service and enlistments be far greater than any other regiment.¹¹ This was not to say that every Gurkha soldier should be married, but the basic objective in encouraging matrimony was to stem the restless disposition of the soldier who, if unmarried would, take his discharge promptly, should he feel slighted or rebuffed. A married man on the contrary would not be so impetuous, and would tend to settle down. "The wife makes the home, therefore, if we have to keep the men, the Gurkha womankind should be encouraged to come freely and settle down in India".¹² Apart from providing incentives to Gurkha women, married Gurkha troops were allocated a double hutting allowance, a family allowance of Rs. 2/- per mensem, free passages for families from Nepal as well as for families of deceased men, who may like to return.¹³

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9. Mil. Dept. Consultations, January 1869, Bundle Nos. 2351-52. (In the native regts, provisions for married quarters at the rate of 5% was permitted).
10. Brig. Gen., John Jacob, Views and Opinions, pp. 213, 214.
11. Mil. Procdgs., March 1891, Procdgs. Nos., 427, 428, 429.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

In the case of the 1st Bn, 3rd Gurkhas, stationed at Almora, the limit on the number of married men was lifted. This exception was made to prevent the contraction of venereal disease, whose incidence was high in this area, anticipating that marriage would serve as an antidote in this situation.¹⁴

By 1892, proposals for further improvements in the structure of the lines were underway. These were to be constructed on the barrack model, with verandahs to provide sleeping space for the men in the summers. Special cookhouses were to be constructed and area allocated for married accommodation. The allowance of the full hutting money would be inadequate for such improvements. But the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Frederic Roberts) was "quite convinced that nothing short of such accommodation as that now asked for is adequate to the sanitary requirements, health, comfort and discipline of our native troops in the present day. Moreover, an approach to the proper housing and improvement of the surroundings of native regiments, while in their lines in cantt., will doubtless strengthen the esprit de corps, and not only have a beneficial effect in recruiting but also effect an improvement in the general health and tone of the army".¹⁵

14. Mil. Procdgs., March 1891, Procdg. No., 430.

15. Mil. Procdgs., Jan, 1892, Procdg. Nos., 372.

FINANCIAL BENEFITS

A Bengal Trooper received as pay proper Rs. 6-8 in Cantt. and a batta of Rs. 1.8.0 which was forfeited when he was on leave.¹⁶

The monthly pay was initially adequate for a cavalry soldier, for the upkeep of his horse, pony and self. Advances from the cash chest could be drawn, to be repaid in instalments. However, after his many deductions, the sowar had very little to spend on himself. In spite of this, in 1862 the service was popular and sought after by men of good families.¹⁷ The infantry soldier's pay ranged from Rs. 7-25 for the rank and file and non-commissioned officers, and Rs. 50-150 for commissioned officers. Generally the sepoy's pay was Rs. 7/- per mensem, as had been fixed in 1796.

As recognition for services rendered the 'Good Conduct Pay' was one of the measures adopted.¹⁸

There would be three rates of good conduct pay. The first would be instituted after six years of service, at Rs. 1/- per mensem, a total of Rs. 28/- The second would be granted after 10 years of service, at Rs. 2/- per mensem, making a total of Rs. 29/- and the third was to be granted after 15 years of service, at Rs. 3/- per mensem, totalling

16. Mil. Deptt Consultations, Aug. 1862, Bundle Nos. 1883-85, Procdg. Nos. 821-23.

17. Maj. Gen. Gordon, "Native Armies of India", Asiatic Quarterly Review, July-Oct, Vol. 6, 1888. p.21.

18. G.O.G.No. 494, of 30th May, 1861.

to Rs. 30/-¹⁹

The approximate cost of this benefit was difficult to determine, for the number of men from each service varied from time to time, and "also the number of men who, by reason of misconduct are ineligible for the boon, though the latter number in the Native Army always bears a very small proportion to the number of well conducted men."²⁰ The pay of the native officers of the infantry, as in the cavalry, would also be regulated by merit, so that the most deserving would enjoy the superior rates, whilst in matters of duty the rank and position of all remained unaffected. They were to be placed in classes on the following rates of pay including Batta at the Cantt. rate,²¹

Subedars	2	at Rs. 100 per mensem
Subedars	2	at Rs- 80 per mensem
Subedars	4	at Rs. 67 per mensem

19. 'Good Conduct Pay' could be awarded by the Commanding Officer, after the prescribed period of service, provided that the person had not been convicted by a Summary trial, within two years of the date on which he became eligible for the reward. Nevertheless, if tried by a Court Martial, or summary trial, he should serve two years before becoming eligible, for restoration of the good conduct pay. This could be halted or restored, according to the discretion of the Commanding Officers, and the rules issued by the C-in-C. This amount was to be included in the pay proper, and it would be included in calculating the amount of gratuity on discharge (if necessary) but it would not tend to increase the pension or merit pay.

20. Mil. Procdgs. May 1876, Procdg. No. 52, Appendix U.

21. G.O., G. No. 280, 1864.

Jemadars	4 at Rs. 35 per mensem
Jemadars	4 at Rs. 30 per mensem

In so far as regular amount of salary was paid to the Sepoy, constant proposals for increment were forwarded.²² Strangely, the pay of the sepoy was still at Rs. 7/. per mensem as it was in 1796. Despite having to defray the entire hutting cost, for the sepoy could then put aside a little saving, but by 1876, when, a hutting allowance was provided by the Government, his salary could barely cover his expenses. The 13th Bengal Native Infantry serves as an excellent case in point, having been stationed in Benaras, both in 1848, as well as in 1876, whereby clear comparisons can be drawn.²³ The cost of living for a native soldier in 1848 was Rs. 2-4 per mensem, while in 1875, exactly the same quantity and quality of food cost Rs. 5-8-0. Regimental necessaries which were purchasable for Rs. 7/. then, cost Rs. 15-3-0.²⁴

The decreased value of the rate of pay appeared to contribute to the unpopularity of military service. A fact which appears to have a special bearing on this question is, that, of an army of 37, 036 men, under the orders of the C-in-C., 17, 465 were under six years of service showing that a very large number did not find it worthwhile to remain

22. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876. Procdg. No., 20.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

long enough to entitle them to the first rate of good conduct pay.²⁵

Allowances for Indian officers, non-commissioned officers and men of cavalry and infantry regiments employed in transport and other duties connected directly with relief operations and working independently, were sanctioned.²⁶

A compensation for dearness of provisions was also provided.²⁷ This compensation was to cover all the staple articles of a sepoy's food. There were many other items of expense for which no compensation was allocated, but it was hoped that the increased hutting money would ease the situation. The compensation allowed for the Bengal Army was Rs. 7,60,236 in 1868-69 and Rs. 7,37,306 in 1870-71 and Rs. 13,95,101 in 1869-70. It was under 3 lakhs of rupees, between 1871-74, and in 1874-75, it was approximately 2 lakhs. Presuming that there was a drastic drop in prices in the generally expensive cantonments, the sepoys also must have experienced relief.²⁸

25. Ibid., Procdg. No. 20, Appendix. E.

26. Mil. Procdgs., July 1874, Bundle No. 1106-B, 580 B. Mil. Index. Feb. 1864 Bundle No. 74-76. G.O.C.C. 19th April, 1875 Felicitating the officers and men of the Bengal Army, during the Famine Relief Operations, Sir Richard Temple, Secretary of State, pointed out that "the native officers and soldiers were brought to duties new to them, but they, fulfilled their duties with a will. They are so thoroughly open and honest, that the Circle Officers feel they can depend on them with the most complete confidence. The C.in.C will be glad to learn that the services of his nominees are so appreciated, and that they have succeeded so completely in winning the approbation and esteem of those under whom they are serving.

27. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdgs., No. 52.

28. Ibid.

PENSIONS

Pensions were granted to soldiers for length of service, on account of wounds, and to heirs of all killed in action, or those who died in service out of India.²⁹ The age of pensionable service had been increased from 10 years to 15 years of service. Indian Officers could not be removed from the Pension List unless invalidated or by orders of the Commander-in-Chief provided the man had served for 40 years.³⁰ In Bengal the Invaliding Committees enjoyed a great deal of latitude.³¹ Soldiers who were injured, or incapacitated while carrying out their duties could be granted a 'Special wound or Injury' Pension, or an Invalid Pension after their case had been scrutinized by the Invaliding Committee.³² However they should have completed 20 years of service. The amount of the pension depended upon the intensity of the wound or incapacitation.³³

29. Gen. Gordon, 'Native Armies of India', Asiatic Quarterly Review, July-Oct. 1888, p.21, Also Mil. Index, April, 1864, Bundle Nos. 421-29.

30. G.O.G.G. No. 582, 1st Sept. 1862,

31. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No.,7.

32. Art. 74, 76, Pay Code, 1849.

33. Mil. Procdgs., May 1862, Procdg. Nos., 311-312.

The number of native soldiers pensioned, as distinct from invalids, during the year 1873-74, were:³⁴

	<u>Pensioned</u>	<u>Invalided</u>
Bengal Army	17	3170
Madras Army	44	1656
Bombay Army	4	1800
	-----	-----
	65	6626
	-----	-----

The lower pension was given after 15 years of service to a man who was declared medically unfit for further service and no higher pension was given until the termination of 40 years of service.³⁵ Consequently, many soldiers on completion of 15 years service and having no further increase of pension to look forward to for many years, took to malingering and resorted to hospital, until they were successful in being removed to the pension list. In a few cases, they were detected, but in more than many, they escaped unscathed although the evil example of malingering was bound to have a deleterious effect on the discipline of the men.³⁶ Accordingly special boards were

34. Mil. Procdgs. May, 1876, Procdg. No.,5.

35. Pension Rules, 1857 and 1864, Art. 194 of Jameson's Code.

36. Procdg. No. 5. The G.O.G.G. No. 96, 1878 provided improvements in the Pension Rules. The superior rate of pension could be granted after 32 years of service instead of 40 years and The grant of a higher rate of pension both ordinary and superior to N.C.O.

appointed to study such cases. Considering services rendered, the suggestion to grant them 3/4 or full pension was however negatived on the grounds of maintenance of proper discipline. Soldiers found medically unfit could have their cases forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief.³⁷

The plea for transfer to the Pension establishment, or a discharge for certain disgruntled elements was not acceded to either. Native officers were to distinctly understand, that good and proved conduct and length of service alone, would entitle them to the benefit of the pension establishment or to compassionate treatment. Stupidity, indolence or misconduct could be punished by summary removal.³⁸ Family pensions were granted to the family of the deceased soldier only after their authenticity had been established by the District Officer,³⁹ to avoid

37. Mil. Procdgs., Feb. 1891, Procdg. Nos., 547-550-A.

38. Mil. Procdgs., Oct. 1878, Procdg. No. 618-620. Jemadar Tullub Hoosain, 5th Punjab Cavalry, had served well as a Kot Duffedar, but on promotion to Jemadar, turned quite indifferent. Summoned by the Commanding Officer to give an explanation for the poor quality of grass being procured, he replied that only God knew where it was coming from, not he ! Considering his earlier record of service which was good, his C.D. recommended he be transferred to the Pension List, or be discharged, since his retention in the regiment would not be in the interest of the service. However, that was not granted in the interest of discipline and efficiency, for, punishments were forthcoming for those who would not mend their ways.

39. G.O.G.G. No. 227, 19th June, 1858.

illegitimate claims being established. The family was required to report to regimental headquarters in most areas.⁴⁰ To render the service more attractive, the 'fighting classes,' especially the Gurkhas were granted special assistance, for example, free railway passages to Headquarters to make reporting inexpensive and simpler.⁴¹

Measures to enhance the desirability of the military service amongst the recruiting classes of India by enabling pensioners to earn an additional income besides their pension, was sanctioned by the Government and given widespread publicity. Pensioners were offered re-employment in various departments, such as the Ordinance, Commissariat Departments, the Railways, the Public Works Dept. Jails District offices etc., in the capacity of Darwans, Chowkidars, Chaprasis, Messengers, Pointsmen, Gatekeepers, Postmen and Wardens. However only those names that had been recommended by the Commanding Officer were forwarded to the respective organization.⁴²

PROMOTIONS:

"If the development of the fighting power in the army is the goal to be striven for, aged inefficiency must be r

40. G.O.G.G. No. 530, 14th May, 1862.

41. Mil. Procdgs., May 1892, Procdg. No., 2205.

42. Mil. Procdgs., May 1892, Procdg. No., 709, 713, 714, 733.

removed. Throw open everything to competition and let the best man win. This is the style of justice, which sepoy and all men like best in their hearts, let there be no favouritism.⁴³

Promotions were to be granted without reference to caste or race, the senior, fit men, whoever they may be, obtaining it. This was made applicable even in the Hindustani corps to be formed in class company regiments and would, for sometime to come, cause companies of one class to have officers or non-commissioned officers of another class.⁴⁴ In its application, however, such a ruling appeared to have been accepted as a direction to adopt the old method of seniority promotions, even in instances where class promotions were made.⁴⁵ In the maze of confusion since no clear criteria appeared applicable, fresh instructions were issued on October 31st, 1871, directing that vacancies in the commissioned and non commissioned grades of a regiment having class troops or companies should be filled with men of the same class, as that in which vacancies arose. In the following years, further instructions were issued, authorising the direct

43. Brig. Gen. Joh Jacob. Views and Opinions, pp. 211-13.

44. Mil. Procdgs., Nov 1862, Procdg. No., 729.

45. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No., 23. In the 18th Bengal Cavalry a decline in the recruitment rate of Jats occurred, because the newly promoted officers were not of the nationality of the troops, causing the Commanding Officer to seek a change in the composition of his regiment.

appointment of native gentlemen of war like races to the commissioned grades of the army.⁴⁶

Lord Napier of Magdala, Commander-in-Chief 1870-76 was suitably impressed with the performance of the Indian officers. Apart from proving their ability to manœuvre the battalion on parade, they were well acquainted with the field exercise book, and had attempted to translate that into the vernacular. Provided with fair opportunity the Indian soldier could become an efficient troop or company commander under careful selection, education and the training of his European Officer.⁴⁷ The officering and organization of troops and companies under Indian officers, particularly in the Bengal army, had been reasonably successful; but the status of officers of the native infantry was not particularly attractive. To enable the Indian officers to identify their interests with those of the British and inculcate a spirit of loyalty, an improvement in the service conditions was necessary.⁴⁸ For example, Indian officers

46. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No., 23.

Inquiries revealed that the trend for promotions were :

In the cavalry, 11 regiments adopted the seniority/
fitness criteria.
6 regiments adopted the selection method
2 regiments had no decided system.

In the Infantry, 34 regiments adopted the seniority/fitness
criteria.
10 regiments adopted the selection method.
5 regiments had no decided system.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

could be granted honorary ranks on retirement, if they were specially deserving of this honour.⁴⁹

FURLOUGH

Most of the men did not bring their families to regimental headquarters and left them behind in the villages. Since the men came from agricultural families there were occasions when the sepoy's presence at home was necessary for a lengthy period. But the proportion of Furlough for the Bengal Army was rather stringent. In fact, a sepoy got his turn just once in ten years. This was quite a demoralizing factor and could make the service unpopular. Sir Hugh Rose Commander-in-Chief (1860-65) proposed the liberalization of the furlough policy.⁵⁰ Furlough was granted to the whole of the Bengal Army to the extent where it was practicable to 10% of the effective strength of corps. The period of leave was determined by the distance of the sepoy's home and the nature of his work. Men whose homes

49. Index to Mil. Procdgs., July 1893. Procdg. Nos., 2551-53 B. Hasham Khan Subedar, Sham Singh, Subedar, 5th Punjab Infantry. Grant of honorary rank of Subedar Major on retirement and, Hira Singh Pensionsed Subedar Major, of 24th Bengal Infantry. Recommendation to Secy. of State for Honorary Capt.

50. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1862, Procdg. No., 793.

were 700 miles and above could draw the maximum benefit of furlough. Shorter periods of leave were granted to those whose homes were closer.⁵¹ Also warrants, were granted for free travel when on furlough only.⁵²

REWARDS

Long and distinguished service and bravery in action were graciously rewarded by the 'Orders' that were instituted specifically for such meritorious deeds. They were 'The Order of British India' and 'The Order of Merit'. Each of them also carried a money allowance. Good Conduct Medals, and other Medals and Clasps, were sanctioned for military operations, but could also be presented posthumously for those who fell in action. Sir Robert Napier of Magdala, urged the government on the desirability of sanctioning colours and bands to all corps, not already in possession of them, because the native soldiers associated with colours, a sacred veneration around which they rallied in hours of danger and followed on the tide of victory. Such feelings would provide sentiments to increase the esprit de corps

51. G.O.C.C., Simla, 1st March, 1882, p.81.

52. Mil. Procdgs., Dec. 1886, Procdg., No., 3201.

among troops,⁵³ for regimental colors represented the glory of the regiment.⁵⁴

Sir High Rose on relinquishing command of the army in 1865, in a General Order, bore testimony to the native army being 'efficient, obedient, and well-disposed', an army which though young had done good service in the field".⁵⁵ Certain regiments of the Bengal Army proudly carried the word "Abbyssinia" for their performance in that expedition.⁵⁶ In the Hazara expedition, both British and Indian troops exhibited some of the best qualities of soldiers by their discipline, their cheerfulness, and their active and willing exertions under all circumstances.⁵⁷

JAGIRS were granted occasionally for excellent and loyal behaviour. Such acknowledgement was bestowed on a few deserving men after the Revolt, or in the years that followed.⁵⁸

53. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg., No. 7., On the occasion of communicating to the 45th Native Infantry H.M. permission to wear on their colors "Bihar" and "Defence of Arrah" H.E. received an appeal from native officers and men, for the grant of colors, without which, there was nothing to show of honors won, nor H.M. approval of the regiment's distinguished services.

54. Ibid., Procdg. No., 52.

55. Ibid.

56. G.O.G.G. No. 365. 1868 para 4, "and I take occasion to request your excellency to express to the C-in-C in India and the Army of Bengal, the high sense entertained by Her Majesty of the very efficient manner in which the Bengal Contingent was equipped and despatched to the Red Sea."

57. G.O.G.G. No. 1181 of 1869.

58. Mil. Consultations, Aug. 1862. Nos. 595-96. Procdg. No. 215-16.

Forwarding the promotion of Rissaldar Major Man Singh Bahadur, of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, from the 2nd Class to the 1st Class 'Order of British India', the grant of a jagir for life and a special pension, Lord Napier of Magdala, Commander-in-Chief emphasized that liberality in awarding such valuable services would never be lost, and would bear good results in times of need, whereas insufficient recognition was remembered to the disadvantage of the government.⁵⁹ Rissaldar-Major Man Singh Bahadur was granted the 1st Class Order of Merit and a Jagir for life of Rs. 1000 per annum payable by assignment of the revenues of the province of Oude. However, in the case of Subedar Sirdar Bahadoor Habeeboolah Khan of the Viceroy's Body Guard, taking into consideration the long and meritorious service in lieu of the proposed jagir, was granted a special pension of Rs. 50/- per month and the allowance of a Sirdar Bahadoor of the 1st Class which was Rs. 2/- per day, to which he was entitled under the rules of the Military Department.⁶⁰

The land available for purposes of rewards was extremely limited. Accordingly grants of tracts of land were made very sparingly and were not to exceed five in a year. In fact only

59. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Vol. II, Procdgs. No., 381-99. Other Sirjars who were awarded after the Mutiny were, Jai Singh, Mohammed Buksh, Mohammed Shah, Ayodhia Prasad, Punjab Singh, Sher Singh, Mohammed Raza Khan, Sirdar Khan, Singh Dewa Singh, Mota Singh, letter No. 3368 A. 26th Sept. 1872.

60. Mil. Procdgs., March 1880. Procdgs. Nos. 135-144.

those cases of exceptional merit, and who had not already been suitably rewarded could be considered.⁶¹ The annual cash value of the grant required, was to be taken into account and not the specific number of acres. In fact, the value of the grant, with specific exceptions was not to exceed Rs. 300/- p.a clear of all charges and deductions.⁶² Also, the grant of a Jagir was to be generally made in the form of an assignment of charge on the revenue, rather than by grant of a 'village, wherever waste land was not available'.⁶³

PART II

DISCIPLINE

DISCIPLINE, DRINK, DISEASE

"Discipline is a power which infiltrates the very body and psyche of the individual".⁶⁴ "Bravery and endurance of soldiers alone do not ensure success, which owes a great measure to discipline, the foundation of all military virtues,

61. Mil. Procdgs., July, 1890. Procdg. Nos. 1789, 1795, 1791. and Mil. Procdgs. July 1891, Procdg. No. 70-71.

62. Ibid.

63. Mil. Procdgs., Oct. 1892, Procdg. Nos. 246-49. Table 8. The case of Subedar Jassa Rai, Late 16th Bengal Infantry, granted a village in Kheri Dist. yielding a rental of Rs. 352, clear of all charges, deductions instead of waste land valued at Rs. 250/- p.a.

64. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 113.

which should never be relaxed".⁶⁵ Although the soldier is inherently thought of as part of a disciplined military system, he has often been characterized as a hard drinking and hard swearing man. The soldier of the Bengal army was generally not addicted to drinking. This impressed the British tremendously. Quoting Sir William Mansfield, "with the exception of the occasional outbreaks of insubordination which occur in the native regiments, there is next to no crime among them and consequently no necessity for that schooling and training in the art of discipline which is indispensable for the disciplining of European troops. There is no drunkenness, that fertile parent of crime amongst European soldiers, in the native army".⁶⁶

Getting drunk was a punishable offence. Apparently, such cases among troops of the Bengal Army were not frequent. A study of the abstracts of General Court Martials only as recorded in the General Orders of the Commander-in-Chief seems to prove the point. In 1863, one case of drunkenness was tried,⁶⁶ there were three cases in 1864,⁶⁷

65. Shadwell, ed., 'Life of Colin Campbell', Vol. II, p.439.

66. Memorandum, by H.E. the C-in-C. Sir William Mansfield. Military Department Consultations. Feb. 1862, No. 1760-1763 Procdg. Nos. 609-12.

67. G.O.C.C., 24th April, 1863, Aga Singh of 25th Native Infantry;

G.O.C.C. 11th June, 1864, Jem. Jowahar Singh, 32 Native Infantry.

two cases in 1965⁶⁸ and in 1866,⁶⁹ one each in 1878,⁷⁰ 1879⁷¹ and 1890.⁷² Perhaps caste norms were responsible for stemming the practice. My observations are that consumption of intoxicating spirit was more popular amongst the Gurkhas and the Sikhs than amongst the others, nonetheless drinking was not a common practice with the sepoy. In such circumstances, disciplining the army was easier.

Col. Emerson, the Cantt. Magistrate at Dinapore thought it is a most remarkable circumstance that there was so little incidence of venereal diseases amongst Indian troops. Although most of them were married, they did not live with their wives. The fact that they could remain faithful to their wives did not occur to him.⁷³ In each cantonment there were 'chaklas' or assigned quarters or houses of prostitutes, that were located close to the regimental bazaars. Apparently the racial divide for such pursuits was also prevalent since Indian and British troops frequented different chaklas, British soldiers preferred establishments where they would not meet native men, lest

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68. G.O.C.C. 23rd Feb. 1865, Sub-Boota Singh, 32nd Native Infantry.
G.O.C.C. 11th Dec., 1865 Sub Moomber Khan, 18th Native Infantry.
69. G.O.C.C. 27th Nov., 1866, Sub Danee Singh, 1st Gurkha Regiment. 22nd May 1866, Sub Boota Singh, 32nd Native Infantry.
70. G.O.C.C. 1878 Sub Punjab Singh, 30th, Native Infantry.
71. G.O.C.C. 30th June 1879, Jam Boor Singh, 32nd Native Infantry
72. G.O.C.C. 1890 Sub Buta Singh 25th Native Infantry
The above were cases of General Court Martiable only.
73. Kenneth Ball Hatchest, "Race, Sex and Class Under the Raj" p. 54.

there be constant breaches of peace, destruction of property and probable ill treatment of women.⁷⁴ The terms and conditions of the 'native' chakla differed from the others, particularly in respect of medical examinations that were not compulsory for these women because they consorted with the 'natives'.⁷⁵

In a comparison of ratios of 1889 and 1890 within the army dealing with the incidence of venereal disease, Madras revealed the highest ratio followed by Bombay, Bengal, Hyderabad, Central India and Rajasthan. In Bengal the highest increase was at Silchar with 106.2% in 1890 as compared to 1889 and the largest drop was 128.3% in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In Bombay the highest increase was 34.8% at Kirki and the greatest decrease 59.6% in Burma. In Madras the highest was 23.5% at Mangalore and the lowest at Tounghoe.⁷⁶ An analysis of the report suggests that venereal

74. Mil. Procdgs., Aug. 1893, Vol. II, Procdg. No., 14701.

75. Mil. Procdgs., Aug. 1893, Vol. I-II.

76. Mil. Procdgs., June 1892, Procdg. No., 2376.

disease was infinitely more prevalent among British troops than 'native' troops; of 68,000 European soldiers there were 28,000 cases, as against the Indian rates of only 5,000 admissions from 127,000 Indian troops. Within the Presidential armies, the ratio of admissions for venereal disease per 1000 of strength figured as below:⁷⁷

	<u>In 1891</u>	<u>In 1892</u>
Bengal Army	35.5	37.5
Madras Army	42.7	45.5
Bombay Army	47.0	49.6

One assumes therefore, that Indian troops generally abstained from fraternizing with prostitutes. An interesting, though extremely rare case of a dismissal by a General Court Martial, occurred in the instance of Naib Ressaldar Zaptha Khan, 12 Irregular Cavalry who disobeyed orders and harbored in his tent, a native woman Chumpu, such conduct being subversive of military discipline and good order, and unbecoming the conduct of a commissioned officer.⁷⁸

ROUTINE AND INSPECTIONS

Discipline was also a mechanism and technique for achieving unity from the assembled ranks of individual

77. Mil. Procdgs., Dec. 1893, Procdg. Nos., 649-50 A.

78. G.O.C.C. 10th March, 1859.

soldiers enhancing coordination and skill and therefore the performance of the whole unit.⁷⁹ Techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets, tactics and strategies, required to be perfected. Precision and application with regularity were the fundamental basis of disciplinary times,⁸⁰ which was formulated into the daily schedule of the soldier.

Constant drills and exercise were part of the routine of a soldier's life. "Parade grounds were useful for preliminary instruction, but as soon as the rudiments of a soldier's education has been learnt, the troops should leave their nursery and try as far as possible to practice in peace what they would have to do in war. Brig. Gen., Sir Sydney Cotton, never tired of explaining that like all machinery, the machinery of war should be constantly oiled."⁸¹ Field Marshal Roberts insisted upon training and firing practices for the troops, because he was convinced that only those troops who combined superior individual marksmanship with a sound and thoroughly well mastered system of fire control and discipline would in future be the victors wherever armies met.⁸² The routines, and time tables, and the performance of soldiers and their units, necessitated constant and regular inspections and examinations in the search for accuracy

79. Barry Smart, "Foucault, Marxism and Critique", p. 111.

80. Foucault "Discipline, Punish", p. 51.

81. Roberts, "41 Yrs in India", p. 25.

82. Forrest, "Sepoy Generals", Field Marshal Roberts addressing the Bengal Rifle Association, p. 376.

and perfection.

As compared with the old Bengal Army, the new Bengal Army could claim credit on grounds of "greater efficiency, which may be claimed for the regiments of the present over those of the old organization, and from the achievement of these regiments in the fields and thirdly from their obedience".⁸³ The abstract of opinions of General Officers, from the confidential Reports of the Annual Inspections of the Bengal Cavalry and Native Infantry in 1873, 1874, 1875, indicate in broader terms that more than a majority of the units were in satisfactory condition.⁸⁴ The discipline and loyalty of the British and Indian Officers; the ability of the Indian Officers to command troops and exercise the regiment; the esprit de corps of the regiment; the field exercises and various movements; the skirmishing, outpost and patrol duties being well performed, the men, clean, smart, well drilled and well mounted; and instructions for officers and men as part of the routine, were given due acknowledgement and praise by the inspecting officers of the Cavalry regiments. The 1st Bengal Cavalry was perhaps the only regiment to receive a report that was not up to the mark. Exercises like the Neza Baaze were not popular. The extreme unsteadiness to regulate paces and formation appeared

83. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No., 52.

84. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No., 23.

in all ranks, and gave a peculiarly ragged appearance to the formation. However, attempts to rectify that were undertaken and the improvement in the drills and general field exercises was extremely conspicuous.⁸⁵

The Infantry regiments also obtained similar good reports for each of the three years. The manual and platoon exercises and bayonet exercises were performed to perfection, battalion movement well executed, officers and men, well drilled, smart and soldierlike; the interior economy, the arms and equipment of the men and outpost duties were well understood by all ranks. The skirmishing of corps was good, target and musketry practice admirable and the men very steady under arms.⁸⁶

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid. The 6th Native Infantry was commended for "being in an admirable state of order, an excellent regiment second to none in appearance. The 11th Native Infantry was particularly smart and soldier like in appearance on inspection parade; the setting up of the men and their steadiness under arms left nothing to be desired. Numerous men of the 12th had suffered from sickness, but inspite of it was found in good order, and the 13th was said to be in an excellent state of discipline and efficiency. Major Gen. MacDowell who had inspected the Native Infantry regiment consecutively for three years remarked, "This is my Third general inspection of the 14th Sikhs, and on this occasion as on former ones whichever way I turned, I perceived nothing, but a very high degree of efficiency and soldierlike bearing. The native officers are a very well selected and martial body of men whose real intelligence and smartness cannot be mistaken."

There were a few instances of regiments receiving unsatisfactory reports. But they made serious attempts to rectify the situation, so that the following annual inspection would be marked by success.⁸⁷

DETERRENTS AND PUNISHMENTS

Discipline entailed preventive measures to stop disobedience, destruction of property, desertions, etc. based on a system of punishments,⁸⁸ The power to punish took root from the growth of authority and domination. The justification to punish, was looking into the future, to prevent rebellion, mutiny and ill-discipline. It was necessary to punish just enough to prevent repetition. A crime is admittedly supposed to entail some benefits, for if the disadvantages in the committing of a crime were explicit, it certainly would be undesirable. The punishment therefore had to be more harsh than the nature of the charge, also the sentences should have the most intense effects on those who were innocent. Laws had to be published, should be

87. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No., 23, In 1873, the 22nd Native Infantry had returned from the Looshai expedition and was badly affected by sickness. The report for 1873 was not up to the mark, but by 1875, the marked improvement was visible. Similarly the 5th and 18th Native Infantry, reported on unfavourably on account of poor performance in drill made improvements. The 23rd and 32nd also made improvements. The 42nd Native Infantry was reported on poorly in 1875 because its European Officers appeared quite ignorant of their duties.

88. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.81.

inexorable, and the machinery of justice inflexible, for if one allows men to see that crime may be pardoned the hope of pardon is likely to be nourished. The truth of the crime, through investigations must be proved, Inhuman punishment nevertheless should be avoided, not because of a sense of profound humanity for the offender, but to regulate the effects of power.⁸⁹

The Native articles of War governed the code of conduct of Indian troops.⁹⁰ The Commanding Officer of a Regiment was vested with enormous disciplinary powers. The supreme authority remained the Governor General of India in Council, or the Commander-in-Chief of the Presidency, who was vested with the authority of dismissing or discharging the non-commissioned officers. The Commanding Officer of a regiment, could dismiss or discharge any soldier below the rank of a non-commissioned officer and to dismiss, discharge or reduce to the ranks any Non-commissioned officer belonging to such regiment or corps.⁹¹

A General Court Martial had the power to pass a sentence of death or transportation or imprisonment for

89. Ibid., pp. 93-96.

90. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1862. Procdg. No., 834, Also see Mil Procdgs., Sept. 1862. Procdg. Nos. 671-75 and Mil. Consultations Aug. 1872, Nos. 657-8, Bundle Nos., 1863-4.

91. Native Art of War, Art. 3.

any longer period than three years or the power to try a Commissioned Officer. A General Court Martial could also sentence a Commissioned Officer, who could be dismissed from the service, or be suspended from rank and pay and allowances or be placed one or more steps lower in his rank.⁹²

"A General or a District or a Garrison, or a Regimental Court Martial could sentence a non-commissioned officer or soldier, who could be reduced in the ranks, or dismissed or imposed corporal punishment not exceeding 50 lashes, or given imprisonment with or without hard labour and solitary confinement, not exceeding 14 days at a time or 84 days in any one year. A forfeiture of all advantage as to additional pay and claim to pension on discharge may also be imposed. Every soldier sentenced to confinement in the Quarter Guard or Defaulter's Room, or in a solitary cell, or in any other place of imprisonment shall forfeit all claim to pay and allowances during such confinement and shall be entitled to receive subsistence only according to the rates laid down in the Regulations."⁹³

Punishments awarded by Native Court Martials upon soldiers and officers of the Bengal Army under Indian Articles of War ranged from loss of service or accompanied by death, transportation and dismissal, imprisonment with hard labour

92. Native Articles of War, Art., 78.

93. Native Articles of War, Art., 78.

for life, or for 14 years, 7 years, 3 years, 2 years, 1 year 6 months and corporal punishment. Punishment not involving loss of services could be accompanied by corporal punishment, or hard labour with imprisonment under 3 months, mixed imprisonment exceeding six months or under, simple imprisonment exceeding six months and under, and other miscellaneous sentences, such as those involving suspension, reduction, or loss of rank, or a reprimand could also be meted out.⁹⁴

The general opinion was that native officers could not safely be entrusted with administering the law. By such maladministration of law, not only were the ends of justice defeated, but the discipline of the army was injuriously and dangerously compromised.⁹⁵ The sanction by Government to trial by a European Court Martial could be obtained easily by telegraph, so it was not expedient to alter the law. However, to train the Indian officers, the preparation of a manual of instructions for Indian officers in regard to Court Martial duties was proposed.⁹⁶

The nature of the charges ranged from absence without leave, insubordination, feigning disease, striking a superior,

94. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1872 Procdg. Nos., 161.

95. Mil. Procdgs., Nov. 1862, Procdg. No. 554-557. A Sepoy of the 22nd Punjab Infantry was attached to 27th Native Infantry, and was tried for striking a Havildar, his superior officer. Although his crime was proved, the Court Martial acquitted him on grounds that his case was inadequately charged.

96. Mil. Procdgs., Dec. 1862. (Dec. 15-13th)

abusive language, theft, desertion, indecent and insolvent language, selling regimental necessaries, disgraceful conduct, quitting post, sleeping on post, quitting hospital, receiving stolen property, disobedience of lawful command and conduct to the prejudice of good order.⁹⁷ In some instances these charges met with the sentence of corporal punishment. The crime of murder was punished most severely by hanging from the neck.

In 1870, the total number of men tried by Court Martial was 281, in 1871 it was 244, in 1872 it was 246, in 1873 it was 252 and in 1874 it was 290, bringing the total of 5 years to 1,313 and its average 26.2½ per annum, or about three fifths percent, on strength, which was less than 4 per regiment.⁹⁸ In the Punjab Frontier Force, the trials were 318, or 63.6 per annum, or less than half a per cent on strength, or 3½ per regiment. The dismissals, whether by Court Martial or by discharge without trial during the five years, averaged less than four per regiment under the Commander-in-Chief and over 5½ per regiment in the Frontier Force. The trials included those in which acquittals were granted.⁹⁹

97. Mil. Procdgs., Feb. 1865, Procdg. No., 64.

98. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No., 52, 42.

99. Ibid., Some of the Returns of Punishments awarded at Appendix 7

The Returns of Punishments awarded by Native Court Martial upon officers and soldiers of the Bengal Army during 1st July to 31st Dec. 1875, point to an increase by one case in total number of punishments with loss of service, an increase by five cases in the total number of punishments without loss of service.¹⁰⁰

Native Court Martials from 1st Jan to 30th June 1876, recorded a drop.¹⁰¹ There was a decrease by 5, in those punished with loss of service and a decrease by 8, for those merely punished.

In respect of summary court martials from 1st July to 31st Dec. 1875, there was an increase by 18 cases, for loss of service, and 47 cases, with no loss of service. Some of the cases being theft, insubordination, sleeping at post when on sentry duty, absence from lines, desertions, etc. In the second phase, i.e. 1st Jan. to 30th June 1876, there was a dip in numbers, the loss of service cases having decreased by 14, and 11 with no loss of service.¹⁰²

Of the General Court Martials held in 1876, there were three cases of Indian Officers being tried for conduct

100. Mil. Procdgs., Jan. 1877, Procdg. No., 269-272.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

unbecoming of an officer, prejudicial to good order and discipline.¹⁰³ In one case, Sepoy Zaman Khan, of the 21st Punjab Infantry, used criminal force against his superior officer, Lt. William Harris, by discharging at him a rifle loaded with gunpowder and a bullet, causing his death. He was found guilty and sentenced to be hanged by the neck till death.¹⁰⁴ This was an exceptional case of an Indian assaulting a European officer. In 1877, the case of Secunder Khan, Jemadar, 15th Bengal Cavalry was heard.¹⁰⁵ The charges against him were that he sent a letter directly to the Commander-in-Chief against his Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Guy Prendergast, and that he falsely and maliciously accused his Commanding Officer of having demanded from him a sum of Rs. 500/- offering to promote him to the rank of ressaider on payment of the sum. The court did not find him guilty.

Sepoy Bhunga Singh, of the 45th Native Infantry (Rattray's Sikhs) was charged with conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, inciting men through such sentences, "If the Guru Padshah will assist me, there will be seen what a row I will create."¹⁰⁶ In an insubordinate and anonymous letter to the Commanding Officer he threatened

103. G.O.C.C. for 1876.

104. G.O.C.C. 26th Dec. 1876.

105. G.O.C.C. in 6th June, 1877.

106. G.O.C.C. 27th April 1878.

him about the promotions that were disagreeable, and that, if they were not revoked, there would be bloodshed in the regiment. He was imprisoned with hard labour for 2 years.¹⁰⁷

In 1879, there were two punishments of death by hanging from the neck, meted out on account of use of criminal force towards the superior officer, causing their death.¹⁰⁸ However, in an analysis of the offences over the years, many of them were not of a very serious nature. "No army, but the Indian, could show such an absence of crime"¹⁰⁹ Between 1880 and 1882, there were about 22 cases of General Court Martial, which indicated very serious offences, or, those committed by officers. In 1882, 22 cases of General Court Martials among European Troops were summoned. In comparison only 15 cases from the native troops were summoned.¹¹⁰

The degree of the discipline of an army can be measured by the number of desertions that occur. The average annual number of desertions in the army under the Commander-in-Chief, from 1870-75 was 1/2 percent that is, seven men in every two years in an Infantry regiment, and a little over 2 men per annum in a cavalry regiment.¹¹¹ These desertions occurred

107. Ibid.

108. G.O.C.C. 6th Dec., and 2nd Dec., 1879.

109. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg No. 52.

110. These figures are entirely from my findings in the G.O.C.C. for the respective years.

111. Mil. Procdgs., May 1876, Procdg. No., 52, pp 344- 41.

among Jats, Sikhs, Pathans, Afghans and border tribes. There were some regiments, who prided themselves on no desertion between 1870-1874. In the Punjab Frontier Force, the desertions were minimal.¹¹² The conduct and discipline of the Bengal Army was extremely different from what it was in 1858. "In quarters the conduct of the troops, the British and Native has left but little to desire".¹¹³ "In the long winter in Afghanistan amid snow and ice, nowhere either in British or Native regiments has discipline deteriorated or morals fallen away".¹¹⁴ "The conduct and discipline of the Native portion of the Army has also been in the highest degree satisfactory during my tenure of this command."¹¹⁵

CONCLUSION

These statements made at the end of their tenures, by Commanders-in-Chief, for whom maintenance of discipline reflected a successful command tenure, indicated the character of the army. The military authorities imposed extremely

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112. Mil. Procdgs., for March 1874, Procdg. No., 17, which provides a Comparative set of Returns showing desertions in the Bengal Cavalry and Infantry regiments from October 1870 Sept 1873. Interestingly, besides the total number of desertions in each regiment the caste is also indicated. See Appendix No. 7 & 8 for details
113. Sir-William Mansfield, Farewell Orders, 1870.
114. G.O.C.C. Simla, 7th April, 1881, Farewell Order of Sir Fraderic Haines.
115. G.O.C.C. 8th April 1893. Farewell Order of Field Marshal Frederic Roberts.

severe and harsh punishments and in the case of general court martials, very few sentences were revoked or remitted. In this context, the fear of punishment and its repercussions, may have served as a deterrent, and therefore improved the quality of discipline and efficiency of the Indian Army. Simultaneously, the paternalistic attempts and welfare measures to improve the conditions for the troops facilitated the growth of a content army. Nevertheless, the military virtues of obedience and loyalty were inherent to the code of the warrior and the contribution of such values in the building of the discipline of an army cannot be discounted. The fact remains, however, that if the British were to remain in India, they would need the services of a loyal, disciplined army which they were successful in obtaining.

C O N C L U S I O N

CONCLUSION

"Khalk-i-Khudha, Mulk-i-Sarkar,
Hukm-i-Sahiban alishan", 1

The Bengal Soldier signed up under the British master, subjected himself to their disciplinary norms and took up arms under their domination. He recognized the fact that power belonged to the 'sahibs' who exercised authority and influence. The land was part of the state system, but mankind transcended the earthly bonds of power and authority, and had a universality attached to it. Beneath this acquiescence, the soldierly psyche vibrated with strains of military characteristics; on the one hand universal and on the other specifically Indian with a spirit that clung on tenaciously to the feudal notion of honor, all bound together by a code of discipline.

The spirit of silent and selfless devotion to duty in the service of the army is the substance of the military mind, of military attitudes and military values. The professional military ethic is non-dated and non-localized. As long as there is no basic alteration in the inherent

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1. Gen. George MacMunn, "Armies of India", An Urdu Couplet. translated it means "Mankind belongs to God the land to the Government, and power to the powerful sahibs.)

nature of the military function, there will be no change in the content of the professional ethic. The military profession organizes men so as to overcome their inherent fears and failings, because it is the soldier's duty to serve society or state. Because of the nature of the means which he employs to carry out his duty, the military man emphasizes the importance of the group as against the individual. Success in any activity requires the subordination of the will of any individual to the will of the group. Tradition, esprit de corps, unity and community, rate very high in the military value system.² The oriental traditions of allegiance to superiors and obligation of protection and service was closely linked to the twin ideas of 'Sarkar Ka Namak' and 'Namak Haram'.³ This military ideology which emerged partly from the traditional structure of Indian society and partly from the colonial rule created a well disciplined army.

The Indian army was a unique school of arms,⁴ because a foreign power, had raised and maintained this great army of volunteers, the largest the world has ever

2. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State", pp.60-63.

3. Philip Mason, "A Matter of Honor", p. 530.

4. Roger Beaumont, "Sword of the Raj", p.191.

seen. Not a man in it was conscripted.⁵ Raised by the British to meet their commercial and imperial needs, this army did not have a nationalist cause to serve for the first two centuries. There was no patriotic motive, for India was not a unified country prior to the British. When they assumed the title of Kaiser-i-Hind, the ordinary recruit was not impelled by service to the country.⁶ At best he may have felt a loyalty to the distant white ruler, but for generations Indian soldiers had served whoever held state power.⁷

It was an ironical situation of an army, whose men were termed mercenaries, because they served in return for pay and other material and moral rewards.⁸ The Company's European troops could also be classed as mercenary troops of the best kind, fighting for good pay and certain privileges, hardly serving the Queen or country before 1857.⁹ But the 'Bengal soldier' did not bear the marks of the mercenary, who was an individualist, who competed with the other, who possessed no common standards, nor corporate spirit.

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5. Chenevix Trench, "The Indian Army and the Kings, Enemies" Forward.
 6. Rajesh Kadian, "India and Its Army", p.10.
 7. Heathcote, "The Indian Army : A Garrison of British Imperial India", p.105.
 8. Ibid.
 9. "Mil. Reforms in India, Part I", J.U.S.I., Vol. 42, 1882, pp. 68-70.

For the mercenary, discipline and responsibility was absent, for war is a predatory business, and the ethics of the predatory business prevailed.¹⁰

The sepoy of the Bengal Army did not join up for pay alone. In fact, his salary, after the 1860's, shrunk to a pittance, and the earlier reputation he enjoyed of distributing largesse no longer held true. Neither was his pension particularly large. There was a fall in the recruitment numbers in certain areas, but not sharp enough to cause undue consternation. For the 'man' continued to join the army. Even if economic considerations were of importance, in years of surplus employment in the civil sector, the love of the service lured men to join. To some extent, it was familial ties and links that beckoned the young man into the service, for he desired to emulate his ancestors. Perhaps it was a limited form of caste occupation, because the Kshatriyas and Rajputs were considered the warriors of Indian society. "Being a man of the warrior class, It is your duty to fight."¹¹ But after the revolt this was not exactly the case, since official policy discounted high caste Brahman and Rajput fidelity, and preferred to make way for the lower castes also. The selection of the

10. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State", p.21.

11. Krishna to Arjun, The Holy Gita.

military races was a convenient ploy to induct men from different geographical zones, nonetheless, most of them, claiming Kshatriya ancestry and hailing from an upper class agricultural milieu. Admittedly, the glamour and the privileges of the service were attractive, and, in a limited way, offered scope for social mobility in an upward scale, since low caste men were being appointed even to the officer ranks. "He joined the army because it was an honorable profession, and he fought for his honor, which included that of his family, his community, his regiment and the region he came from."¹²

The Bengal soldier of peasant origin was rustic, sincere and not politically minded, which enhanced his value for the British.¹³ Although the soldier and the army were representatives of the traditional culture with elements of conservatism, there was a consciousness to move towards the changing social and economic milieu. Changes took place on account of the exigencies of war, of service overseas and of decisions imposed by superiors. This peasant soldier required to restructure his sense of time and time oriented discipline. He had to cope with reveille, drills, exercises, parades. In the area of sports, he could combine

12. Dr Rajesh Kadian, "India and its Army", Forward.

13. Ellinwood, Pradhan, ed. "The Indian Soldier and World" p. 177.

village level traditions of wrestling and feats of strength with British sports of football, soccer and hockey. Team sports called for a discipline and co-operation different from the village experience.¹⁴ The jawans were exposed to the powers of modern armament and technology and therefore had to improve their technical skills to master their weapons.

The Army attempted to be an instrument of modernization and change, but essentially it remained a conservative institution, perpetuating the system of hierarchy through an acceptance of caste. This was integrated into the organization of the army in the form of the class regiment, or class company regiment, wherein men of a particular community were grouped together. The objective was partly to foster a spirit of esprit de corps and camaraderie, so essential to the well being of any regiment, for the fraternity has to be so bound, to enable them to face the rigors of war collectively, bravely and successfully.

The martial traditions of the family or the class were upheld through the notion of honor and 'izzat'. The concept of 'izzat' which meant glory, honor and reputation, became part of his psyche, and inspired him into incredible feats of gallantry, moulding him into a well disciplined individual;

14. Ibid., p. 181.

unquestioningly obedient, endlessly enduring and fearlessly brave. If the Bengal Army recorded a low rate of crime, because it was well disciplined, I would attribute a large part of this discipline as a corollary to his belief in 'izzat'. It was 'izzat', all the way, that led the man to retain pride in the family, the clan, the regiment. He could not be an accomplice to a situation that would draw social disapprobation, even if it resulted in death.

British policy largely favoured the recognition and celebration of the men's festivals and traditions. Sikhs were encouraged to adhere to the Khalsa requirements, the Gurkhas celebrated Dussehra with great enthusiasm, each British officer in the regiment making a contribution; 'maulvi' and 'pundit' were employed to guide the men's spiritual needs. Interestingly, the attempts to christianize the army, in the hope that the Christian would prove a loyal subject, were not too frequent. On the contrary, it was through an acceptance of the Indian soldier's customs, traditions and caste norms, that the army legitimized its power. Undoubtedly, the steel framework of the 'Native Articles of War,' were forbidding and those who dared to disobey them would be punished severely. But the sepoy respected and cared for his 'Captain Sahib' in an indescribably affectionate manner. If the Officer was fair and just, the soldier would follow him to the end of the earth. Unafraid

of death, and fearless in battle, because of the belief that for a warrior there was nothing nobler than a righteous war, that death on the battlefield opened a door to heaven,¹⁵ having sworn his oath ('Kasam khaya') to serve 'Kaiser-i-hind' loyally, the sepoy, essentially cooperated in the maintenance of the discipline of the army, facilitating the tasks of the military authorities.

I conclude by narrating the incident of Bharatpur, that revealed the intensity of the ideological force that propelled the men into action of unequalled courage and valour. In 1805, the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Bengal Native Infantry (or the 31st Native Infantry) had thrice attempted to plant their colors on the bastion of the fort, but were compelled to retreat on all three occasions. Twenty one years later, in 1826, the Bharatpur fort was stormed and taken. Suddenly, the old colors, torn, tattered but fluttering proudly, appeared - The fragments had been secretly preserved by the men and the men's sons, so that someday they could replace them, on that bastion and redeem the honor of their families, their officers and their regiment.¹⁶

The British required an army tailored to colonial requirements. They procured soldiers for whom 'Izzat' sprang from the innermost recesses of their consciousness. The 'Bengal Sepoy' could not be corrupted by gold nor appalled by danger.

15. Maj. Gen. Chand Das, "Traditions and Customs of the Indian Army", pp. 29-30.

16. Philip Mason, "A Matter of Honor", pp. 128-130.

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B I B L I O G R A P H Y

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A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX -1MEDICAL STANDARDS

The following Chest Measurements were suggested for the guidance of the examining Medical Officer:

	<u>Height</u>	<u>Chest</u>
For Sikhs, Pathans, Funjabi, Musulmans of 24 years	5'-6" - 5'-8"	34"
For Sikhs, Pathans, Funjabi, Musulmans of 24 years	5' - 10"+	35"
For Hindoostanees, Musulmans Hindoos, Dogras, others, 24 yrs	5'6"-5'-8"	33½"
For Hindoostanees, Musulmans, Hindoos, Dogras, other, 24 years	5-10"	34½"
Young lads 16-20 yrs. with every appearance of further development		31½"
Young lads 22 yrs. with every appearance of further development		32½"

No standards were laid down for Gurkhas !

G.O.G.G. 1875, No. 890, p. 190. However, G.O.C.-in-C. No. 645, 1st Aug. 1893, abolished these special 'regimental' standards of Height and Chest measurement in all regiment of Bengal Army and Punjab Frontier Force. Alternations regarding "standard height and age of recruits, issued in Dec. Recruiting Officers were to exercise discretion in passing men into service and should use their best endeavours, to obtain the finest men. The C.O's were forbidden to reject on the basis of physique men sent to them by the Recruiting Officer. who had minimum standards of heights and chest measurements laid down for each Class in Para 2199 & 2200, Army Regulations, India, Vol. II.

[No. 399.]

Corps.	Under G. O., dated 9th September 1864, the undermentioned Regiments should be composed as follows:	STRENGTH ACCORDING TO CASTE RETURN, DATED 1ST AUGUST 1871.														Total number of unauthorised men shown by the Caste Returns.	Total strength of Regiment.	Total number of unauthorised men shown by the Officer Commanding.		
		Mooltanees.	Hindoostanee Mussulmen.	Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border.	Punjabee Mussulmen.	Hindoostanee Hindoos.	Sikhs.	Dogras and Hillmen.	Bundelas.	Jâts.	Mussulmen (Hindoostanee, Cis-Sutlej and Punjab.)	Rajpoots.	Brahmins.	Maharattahs.	Dooranee.				Belooch.	Fathans, &c.
1st Bengal Cavalry	Hindoostanee Mussulmen only	...	439	18	457	12
2nd ditto	Mussulmen, Dogras, Sikhs, Jâts, Rajpoots, Brahmins and Maharattahs in equal numbers.	78	4	...	12	240	94	23	3	454	2
3rd ditto	Same as 2nd Bengal Cavalry	62	2	...	22	217	87	38	30	458	9
4th ditto	Ditto ditto	77	36	...	2	236	27	26	52	456	4
5th ditto	Ditto ditto	119	8	...	12	149	42	62	61	453	5
6th ditto	Hindoostanee, Mussulmen, Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border Tribes, Hindoostanee Hindoos, Sikhs, Bundelas, Jâts in equal numbers.	...	182	64	...	105	86	...	19	456	11
7th ditto	Same as 2nd Bengal Cavalry	111	2	...	9	214	38	41	37	453	2
8th ditto	Hindoostanee, Mussulmen, Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border Tribes, Punjabee Mussulmen, Hindoostanee Hindoos, Jâts, Bundelas.	...	286	...	18	78	14	64	460	...
9th ditto	Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border Tribes, Punjab Mussulmen, Sikhs, Dogras and Hill-men.	75	73	...	141	55	103	447	69

NO. 399.

PROCEEDINGS FOR AUGUST 1872.

(6)

10th	ditto	...	Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border Tribes, Punjabee Mussulmen, Sikhs, Dogras and Hill-men, Jâs.	51	77	...	105	45	...	55	68	456	18				
11th	ditto	...	Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border Tribes, Punjabee Mussulmen, Sikhs, Dogras and Hillmen.	56	83	...	233	49	43	464	2				
12th	ditto	...	Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border Tribes, Punjabee Mussulmen, Sikhs, Dogras and Hill-men, Bundelas, Jâts.	61	90	...	182	33	...	10	86	462	56				
13th	ditto	...	Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border Tribes, Punjabee Mussulmen, Sikhs, Dogras and Hill-men.	60	70	...	171	35	122	458	30				
14th	ditto	...	Jâts only	300	68	458	74				
15th	ditto	..	Doorance, Mooltancee, Belooch, Pathar	...	148	180	119	30	32	459	91				
16th	ditto	...	Hindoostance Mussulmen, Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border Tribes, Hinduostance Hindoos, Dogras and Hill-men, Jâts.	...	91	6	...	157	...	62	...	45	88	449	...				
17th	ditto	...	Hindoostance Mussulmen, Trans-Indus, Punjab and Border Tribes, Punjabee Mussulmen, Hinduostance Hindoos, Dogras and Hill-men, Jâts.	...	79	143	12	92	...	1	...	65	68	460	68				
18th	ditto	...	Hindoostance Mussulmen, Punjabee Mussulmen, Hinduostance Hindoos, Sikhs, Jâts, including 91* Tewanâs.	...	89	...	*122	89	76	65	4	445	27				
19th	ditto	...	Mooltancees, Trans-Indus, Punjabee and Border Tribes, Punjab Mussulmen, Sikhs, Dogras and Hill-men, Jâts.	79	79	...	166	21	...	9	107	461	64				
Total				...	148	1166	595	624	521	1667	354	...	729	1056	288	190	...	130	119	30	1049	2666	544

Native Infantry.

Corps.	Under G. O., dated 9th September 1864, the undermentioned Regiments should be composed as follows:—	STRENGTH ACCORDING TO CASTE RETURN, DATED 1ST AUGUST 1871.																Total number of unauthorized men shown by the Caste Return.	Total strength of Regiment.	Total number of unauthorized men shown by Officer Commanding.			
		Brahmins and Rajpoots.	Hindoostanee Mussulmen.	Jâts.	Goorkhas and Hill-men.	Bundelas.	Aheers.	Passers.	Joodhs.	Dhanooks.	Koormecs.	Goojurs.	Chumars.	Mehters.	Hindoos of inferior castes.	Punjabee Mussulmen.	Trans-Indus and Border Tribes.				Dogras and Hill-men.	Sikhs, Trans-Sutlej.	Sikhs, Cis-Sutlej.
1st Native Infy....	Hindoostanee and Punjabee Mussulmen, Brahmins and Rajpoots (with a few Seikhs and low caste men.)	446	101	73	10	53	683	...
2nd ditto ...	Hindoostanee Mussulmen, Brahmins and Rajpoots, Aheers, Dhanooks, Goojurs.	677	104	92	878	78
3rd ditto ...	Hindoostanee Mussulmen, Brahmins and Rajpoots, and a small admixture of low caste men.	432	201	77	710	35
4th ditto ...	Hindoostanee Mussulmen, Brahmins and Rajpoots, with a small admixture of low castes.	352	170	95	647	57
5th ditto ...	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Jâts, Goorkhas and Hill-men, Bundelas, Hindoos of inferior castes, Sikhs, Trans-Sutlej.	152	103	75	31	80	45	82	105	706	...
6th ditto ...	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Jâts, Hindoos of inferior castes, Mussulmen, Punjabee, Trans-Indus and Border Tribes, Dogras and Hill-men, Sikhs, Trans-Sutlej.	112	107	140	88	82	69	73	3	674	...

No. 399.—(Contd.)

PROCEEDINGS FOR AUGUST 1872.

(8)

7th	ditto	...	Hindoostanee Mussulmen, Brahmins and Rajpoots, Sikhs Cis-Sutlej, Aheers, Koormeas, and there is a small admixture of low caste men.	325	148	73	...	163	712	...
8th	ditto	...	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Hindoos of an inferior class, Trans-Indus and Border Tribes, Dogras and Hill-men, Sikhs, Trans-Sutlej, all races and castes.	190	88	51	...	98	40	78	82	627	...
9th	ditto	...	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoos, Jâts, Goorkhas and Hill-men Bundelas, Dogras and Hill-men.	210	89	81	77	133	77	42	709	21
10th	ditto	...	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Jâts, Bundelas, Hindoos of inferior caste, Mussulmen, Punjabee, Dogras and Hill-men.	278	98	60	86	73	...	62	25	698	...
11th	ditto	...	Hindoostanee Mussulmen, Brahmins and Rajpoots, Aheers and a small admixture of low caste men.	463	138	55	36	692	...
12th	ditto	...	Hindoostanee Mussulmen, Brahmins and Rajpoots, Punjabee Mussulmen, Aheers, and a small admixture of low caste men.	20	2	83	132	293	530	...
13th	ditto	...	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Jâts, Goorkhas and Hill-men, Bundelas, Hindoos of inferior caste.	123	79	122	86	104	125	48	693	52
14th	ditto	...	Sikhs from the Cis-Sutlej State, with a small admixture of Punjabee Mussulmen and Punjabee Sikhs in equal proportion.	79	62	506	...
15th	ditto	...	Sikhs from the Cis-Sutlej States, some Punjabee Mussulmen, Dogras and Hindoostanee Mussulmen.	...	12	89	...	10	...	576	...	24	711	5
16th	ditto	...	Hindoostanee Mussulmen, Brahmins and Rajpoots; there are also a few Aheers and Sikhs, and a small admixture of low caste men.	419	113	102	4	...	8	64	117	822	...
17th	ditto	...	Hindoostanee Mussulmen, Brahmins and Rajpoots, Aheers, Sikhs and small admixture of low castes.	459	148	42	15	39	703	23

PROCEEDINGS FOR AUGUST 1872.
 No. 399.—(Contd.)

Corps.	Under G. O., dated 9th September 1864, the undermentioned Regiments should be composed as follows:—	STRENGTH ACCORDING TO CASTE RETURN, DATED 1ST AUGUST 1871.															Total number of unauthorized men shown by the Caste Return.	Total strength of Regiment.	Total number of unauthorized men shown by the Officer Commanding.				
		Brahmins and Rajpoots.	Hindoostanee Mussulmen.	Jats.	Goorkhas and Hill-men.	Bundelas.	Ahcers.	Pasees.	Levodhis.	Dhanooks.	Koornees.	Goojuis.	Chunnars.	Mehters.	Hindoos of inferior caste.	Punjabee Mussulmen.				Trans-Indus and Border Tribes.	Dogras and Hill-men.	Sikhs, Trans-Sutlej.	Sikhs, Cis-Sutlej.
15th Native Infy.	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Goorkhas and Hill-men, Bundelas, Hindoos of inferior castes.	274	181	...	156	1	97	709	...
19th ditto	Sikhs and Mahomedans (Punjabee or Border) Dogras.	161	149	44	271	41	666	44
20th ditto	Same as 19th Native Infantry	95	255	138	176	48	712	16
21st ditto	Ditto ditto	165	173	67	260	37	702	16
22nd ditto	Ditto ditto	301	11	51	279	62	704	42
23rd ditto	*Muzbees, Ramdassees, Dhanooks, Mussulmen and Sikhs.	180	...	*470	71	671	6
24th ditto	Sikhs, Mahomedans (Punjabee Border) Dogras.	145	107	75	290	94	711	42
25th ditto	Same as 24th Native Infantry	244	15	52	231	104	646	16
26th ditto	Ditto ditto	76	182	121	141	73	593	1
27th ditto	Ditto ditto	191	93	79	237	90	693	12
28th ditto	Ditto ditto	252	45	74	284	55	710	57
29th ditto	Ditto ditto	124	125	64	324	66	703	32
30th ditto	Ditto ditto	160	96	99	294	56	705	13
31st ditto	Ditto ditto	149	81	77	364	41	712	21
32nd ditto	*Muzbees, Ramdassees and a few Christians* and Hindoostanee Mussulmen.	...	24	*13	2	700	22
33rd ditto	Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Ahcers, Pasees, Chumars, Hindoos of inferior castes, all races and castes.	...	117	589	5	711	...

34th Native Infy.	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Aheers, Loodhs, Dhanooks, Chumars, Mehters, Hindoos of inferior castes, all races and castes.	180	530	5	715	82		
35th ditto	Aheers, Loodhs, Dhanooks, Chumars, Mehters.	405	95	21	126	647	60		
36th ditto	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Jâts, Aheers, Koormees, all races and castes.	227	...	53	...	133	...	68	176	8	665	...		
37th ditto	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Jâts, Aheers, Koormees, Goojurs, Mussulmen, Punjabee, Trans-Indus and Border Tribes, Dogras and Hill-men, Sikhs, Trans-Sutlej.	101	83	74	...	91	...	78	131	10	5	36	603	32		
38th ditto	* Rajpoots, Jâts, Aheers, Koormees, all races and castes.	*229	...	124	...	157	170	12	692	43	
39th ditto	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Jâts, Goorkhas and Hill-men, Aheers, Chumars, Mehters, Hindoos of inferior castes, Sikhs Cis-Sutlej, all races and castes.	208	...	71	68	86	2	4	105	136	11	691	...	
40th ditto	* Rajpoots, Aheers, Hindoos of inferior castes, Sikhs Trans-Sutlej, all races and castes.	*331	106	...	257	17	711	138
41st ditto	Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Jâts, Goorkhas and Hill-men, Goojurs, Dogras and Hill-men.	98	...	150	6	158	...	274	686	53
42nd ditto	Brahmins and Rajpoots, Mussulmen, Hindoostanee, Dhanooks, Koormees, Goorkhas and Hill-men, and other low caste men.	87	120	...	370	12	320	891	...	
43rd ditto	Goorkhas and Hill-men (Assamees) and a few Brahmins, Hindoostanee Mussulmen and Rajpoots.	171	59	...	393	277	900	...	
44th ditto	Goorkhas and Hill-men, Rajpoots—There are a few Brahmins, Hindoostanee Mussulmen and low caste men	169	27	...	590	89	875	57	
45th ditto	Sikhs and Punjabees	156	432	...	122	710	11
Total		6796	2312	1049	1777	316	969	95	34	158	131	2	665	498	2754	1509	1369	4068	1119	2328	3571	31520	1090	

ADJT. GENL'S OFFICE, HD. QRS. SIMLA;

The 20th October 1871.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Col.,

Deputy Adjutant General.

RECRUITMENT ZONES

The following were some of the Constituent elements of the Bengal Army, and the respective geographical zones from which they were recruited.

*BRAHMANS	The Kanoujias	Cawnpore, Wnao, Lucknow, Rai Bareilly.
	Swarajiyas	Hardoi, Partabgarh, Sultanpur Gorda, Fyzabad, Basti, Jaunpur
	Gaur	Saharanpur, Bijnore, Moradabad Muzzafarabad, Bulandshahr, Aligarh, Meerut, Delhi, East Districts of Punjab.
*RAJPUTANA CLASSES	Rajputs	Jodhpur, Jaipur, Bikaner, Alwar, Dholpur, Karauli.
	Western Jats	Jodhpur, Jaipur, Bikaner, Alwar
	Eastern Jats	Bharatpur.
	Gujars	Jaipur, Alwar, Bharatpur, Karauli, Dholpur, Bundi.
	Ahirs	Alwar, Jaipur
	Minas, Padiyar	Bundi, Kotah, Mewar, Jaipur, Tonk.
	Minas, Ujla	Alwar, Jaipur.
	Mers and Merats	Ajmer, Merwars, Jodhpur, Mewar.
	Musalman, Rajputs	Alwar.
	Khaimkhanis	Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner.
	Khanzadas	Alwar
Meos	Alwar, Bharatpur.	

* Brahmans, Caste Handbooks, p. 13,18,54.

* Rajputana Classes, Caste Handbooks, p.64, 65.

*HINDUSTANI MUSULMANS	Musalman of the United Provinces i.e. Cis-Jumna.
Pathans	Oude, Partabgarh and Sultanpur.
Moghul	
Shekhs	
Sayads	
Musulman Rajputs	Oudh and Eastern districts of United Provinces.
Musulman Jats or Mula Jats	Meerut Division
Mewatis or Mees	Meerut Division
**MUSALMANS OF EASTERN PUNJAB	Musalman of Eastern Punjab including native states, bounded on the south by the Jumna and on the North by the Sutlej.
Pathans (make good soldiers for Infantry and Cavalry)	Village colonies in Rohtak, Gurgaon, Hissar.
Moghuls (few for Cavalry)	Southeastern part of Ambala Division
Shekhs (not recommended)	Village colonies of Ambala division
Sayads (few for Cavalry)	Village colonies, southern districts of Ambala division.
Awans (v. few for Infantry)	Ludhiana district.
Bilaches (Pathan, Biloches)	Southern districts of Ambala division.
Musulman Rajputs, "Ranghers"	Ambala Division
Musalman Rajputs	Ferozepur, Ludhiana.
Musalman Jats or 'Mula Jats'	Ferozepur, Ludhiana, Patiala, Faridkot.

* Hindustanee Musulmans and Musalman of Eastern Punjab
Caste Handbooks, P. 47-49.

** Ibid.p. 83-86.

*MUSALMANS OF EASTERN PUNJAB	Meos Musulman Gujjar Dog Dogars	Gurgaon Ludhiana, Ferozepure. Ferozepur.
@@ PUNJABI MUSALMANS	Rajputs Jats, Gujjars and Foreign Tribes (Arians or Pathans Badhal, Bangial, Baluch, Bhakral, Chib, Dhanial, Dhanial, Gakkar, Gordals, Gujjars Janjuas, Jasgam, Jats, Jethal, Jodhra, Junhal, Kahrwal etc. etc.	Portion of N.W.F.P. In the S.E. it does not extend beyond the Sutlej river. Includes Kashmir, and states of Poonch, Jammu. Best soldiers from that portion of the Punjab which lies between the Indus and the Jhelum rivers and the Gujrat, Shahpur, Jharg and Muttan districts.
@DOGRAS	Mians, Ranas, Rajputs, other than Mians, Thakurs, Rathir, Brahmans, Jats, Kanets, Ghirths, Kolis	Jammu, Sialkot, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Kangra, Mandi, Bilaspur.
£ GARHWALIS	Upper Garhwalis Brahmans, Kshatriyas, or Rajputs, Khasiyas, Doms.	Badhan, Nagpur, Dasoli, Chandpur, North and East at the greater attitudes, the better a soldier.

* Ibid. p. 83-86.

@@ Punjabi Musalmans, Caste Handbooks, p. 1, 3, 4, 97.

@ Dogras Caste Handbooks, p. 80 and App. 13.

£ Garhwalis, Caste Handbooks, pp. 42, 43, 44.

* KUMAONS	Bilths - Brahmans and Khas Brahmin, Rajput and Khas Rajput (Khasiya)	Northern patties provide better material. Best soldiers from area that lies to the north and east of lines roughly running east and west and north and south of Almora cantt.
** GURKHAS	Gurungs, Magars, Khas, Thakur, Newars, Damairs, Sarkis, Kamis.	Central Nepal, coincident with Central geographical division of Nepal or basin of Gardak river. and also from basin of Gogra river.
	Limbur, Rais, Sunwars, Lamas	Eastern Nepal, Basin of Kosi river.

SIKHS

* Kumonis, Caste Handbooks, P. 33, 39.

** Gurkhas, Caste Handbooks, P. 145, 147.

CASTE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIVE ARMY

referred to in GENERAL ORDER

no. IX. of 1883.

CORPS	Whether Class Regiment (C.) or Class Troop (C.T.)	MAHOMEDANS					HINDUS				REMARKS
		Hindustani	Punjabi	Independent tribes beyond north and N.W. frontier	Trans Indus and Border tribes from within British territory	Sikhs	PUNJABI		HINDUSTANI		
							Jats, Khuterias and etc	Ran dasis and Muzbees	Dogras	Other Hindus	
1st Bengal Cav.	C	6									
2nd " "	C.T	2									
3rd " "	CT	3				1					
4th " "	CT	3				1					1 2(a) of Jats of Hindustan
5th " "	CT	2				1					1 1(b) b) " " "
6th " "	CT	2				1					2(c) c) " " "
7th " "	CT	2				2					1 2(d) d) " " "
8th " "	CT	2				1					1 1
9th " "	CT	3				1					1 1 (e) e) ditto
10th " "	CT	2	2			1					1 1
11th " "	CT	1	1			2					1
12th " "	CT	1	1			2					2
13th " "	CT	2	1		1 (f)	3					1
14th " "	CT	1	2			3					1
15th " "	C	1	1			2					2
18th " "	C	2	4								6(g) 9) Jats of Hindustan
18th " "	CT	4				2					
19th " "	CT	1	1 (h)	1		2					1

h) Afridis permitted in this troop. If a complete troop of Trans. border tribesmen cannot be maintained, vacancies may be filled from Trans-Indus British subjects

Contd →

CASTE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIVE ARMY

referred to in GENERAL ORDER
no 1X of 1883

CORPS	MAHOMEDANS		HINDUS							N.E.F.	ASSAM	REMARKS				
	Whether Class Regiment (C) or Class Company (C.C.)	Hindustani	Punjabi	Independent tribes beyond north and n.w. frontier	Trans Indus and Border tribes within British Territory	Jats, Khattrees and etc.	Ramdasis and Muzbees	bogra	other Hindus				Brahmin	Rajput	Other Hindus	Gurkha
1st NATIVE INF.	CC	2							2	3	1					
2nd	CC	2							2	3	1					
3rd	CC	2							3	2	1					
4th	CC	2							2	3	1					
5th	CC	2							1	2	3a					a) 2 of these Co.s. should be Jats of Hindustan
6th	CC	2								2	4b					b) "
7th	CC	2							1	3	2					
8th	CC	2							1	3	2					
9th	CC	1							1	2	2c		2			c) Jats of Hindustan
10th	CC	2							1	2	3d					d) 2 of these Co.s. should be Jats of Hindustan
11th	CC	2							2	3	1					
12th	CC	3							1	2	2					
13th	CC	2								1	4e		1			e) "
14th	C	1			7f											f) Cis-Sutlej Sikhs chiefly
15th	C	1			7g											g) "
16th	CC	2							1	3	2					
17th	CC	3							2	3						
18th	CC	2							1	2	1		2			
19th	CC	2	1	1	4a											d) Cis-Sutlej Sikhs prohibited
20th	CC	1	2b	1	2c	2										c) "
21st	CC	2	1d	1	3e	1										b) Afridis
22nd	CC	3			4f	1										d) Cis-Sutlej Sikhs prohibited
23rd	C					8										e) "
24th	CC	2		1	3g	2										f) "
25th	CC	3			3h	2										may include 5/2 of Labannas
26th	CC		1i	2	4j	1										g) Cis-Sutlej Sikhs prohibited
27th	CC	2		2	3R	1										h) "
28th	CC	2		2	3L	1										i) Afridis
29th	CC	2			4m	2										j) Cis-Sutlej Sikhs prohibited
30th	CC	2			4n	2										k) "
31st	CC	2			4o	2										l) "
32nd	C					8										m) "
33rd	CC	2							2	2	2p					n) "
34th	CC									2	4q		2r			o) Cis-Sutlej and Trans Sutlej Sikhs
35th	CC								1	1	4s		2			May include 5/2 of Labannas
																p) Jats and other Hindus
																q) 2 of these Cos to be Jats of Hindustan
																r) To be chiefly Newars and Garhwalis
																s) Two of these Cos to be Jats of Hindustan

Contd →

CORPS	Whether Class Regiment (C) or Class Company (C.C.)	MAHOMEDANS		HINDUS				N.E.F	ASSAM	REMARKS
		Hindustani	Punjabi	PUNJABI	HINDUSTANI	SIKHS	Other Hindus			
40th	CC				1	3	4			
42nd	CC							7	1	
43rd	C							7	1	
44th	C							7	1	
45th	C	1		6t	1					d) Cis-Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej Sikhs
1st Goorkhas	C							8		
2nd "	C							8		
3rd "								8		
4th "								8		

BY ORDER OF H.E., the C in C in India

(Signed) G.A. GREAVES, MAJ GEN,
ADJT. GEN in INDIA.

APPENDIX -5DETAILS OF THE LINKED BATTALIONS OF THE BENGAL ARMY

Regiments	Station	Regiment Centres
1st, 2nd, 3rd	Meerut	Allahabad
4th, 5th, 6th	Gawnpore	Benares
7th, 8th, 9th	Lucknow	Lucknow
10th, 11th, 12th	Fyzabad	Bareilly
13th, 16th, 17th	Allahabad	Agra
14th, 15th, 45th (Sikhs)		
18th, 33rd, 38th	Benaras	Delhi
19th, 22nd, 24th (Punjabis)	Jhelum	Mean Meer
25th, 27th, 28th	Umbala	Rawalpindi
29th, 30th, 31st	Sialkot	Sialkot
20th, 21st, 26th	Rawalpindi	Peshawar
35th, 36th, 37th (Sikhs, Dogras)	Jullunder	Jullunder
23rd, 32nd, 34th	Lahore	Jhelum, Umballa Mean Meer.
39th, 40th	Dinapore	Jhansi

SCHEME FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE HINDUSTANI PORTION
OF THE BENGAL ARMY ON THE CLASS REGT. SYSTEM

BRAHMINS

1st Group	1st and 3rd B.I.	
	3rd B.I.	Formation
2 Cos. of Its own	3 Cos. of its own	
2 Cos from 2nd B.I.	1 Co. from 10th B.I.	
2 " " 4th B.I.	2 " " 11th B.I.	
1 " " 5th B.I.	1 " " 12th B.I.	
1 " " 7th B.I.	1 " " 16th B.I.	
1 " " 8th B.I.	2 " " 17th B.I.	
1 " " 9th B.I.	1 " " 18th B.I.	
Total	10 Companies	11

4th GROUP	JATS, RAJPUTS, 6th & 10th B.I.	JATS 13th B.I. RAJPUTS
6th B.I.	10th B.I.	13th B.I.
3 Cos of its own	3 Cos. of its own	3 Cos of its own
2 " from 5th B.I.	1 " from 1st B.I.	2 Cos from 9th B.I.
2 " " 9th B.I.	1 " " 7th B.I.	3 Cos. from 18th B.I.
1 " to be released	2 " " 13th B.I.	
	1 " " 16th B.I.	
8 Cos	8 Cos.	8 Cos.

G.G.O. 309, 1893.

5th GROUP	<u>RAJPUTS</u>	7th, 8th, 11th B.I.
7th B.I.	8th B.I.	11th B.I.
5 Cos. of its own	5 Cos of its own	4 Cos of its own
3 Cos. from 6th B.I.	1 " from 3rd B.I.	4 " from 12th B.I.
	2 " " 10th B.I.	
8 Cos	8 Cos	8 Cos.

6th GROUP	<u>HILLMEN</u>	9th & 39th B.I.
9th B.I.		
2 Cos of its own		
1 Co. from 13th B.I.		
2 Cos. from 18th B.I.		
3 Cos. to be raised		
8 Cos.		

7th GROUP:

MUSSALMANS

17th & 18th B.I.

17th B.I.	18th B.I.

3 Cos of its own	2 Cos of its own
1 " from 19th B.I.	2 Cos from 1st B.I.
2 " from 13th B.I.	2 Cos. " 2nd B.I.
2 " " 16th B.I.	1 " " 7th B.I.
	1 " " 8th B.I.
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8 Cos.	8 Cos.
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310.] Comparative Return of Punishments awarded by summary Courts Martial during the years 1869 and 1870, under the Indian Articles of War on Native Soldiers of the Bengal Army.

DEPT. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENL.'S OFFICE, SIMLA, the 25th April 1871.

	Total of convictions.	INFLECTED.								REMITTED.						SET ASIDE FOR IRREGULARITY.						
		INVOLVING DISCHARGE.			NOT INVOLVING DISCHARGE.					INVOLVING DISCHARGE.			NOT INVOLVING DISCHARGE.			INVOLVING DISCHARGE.			NOT INVOLVING DISCHARGE.			
		Dismissal.	Imprisonment with hard labor.	Corporal punishment.	Corporal punishment.	Mixed imprisonment.	Simple imprisonment.	Miscellaneous.	Dismissal.	Imprisonment with hard labor.	Corporal punishment.	Corporal punishment.	Mixed imprisonment.	Simple imprisonment.	Miscellaneous.	Dismissal.	Imprisonment with hard labor.	Corporal punishment.	Corporal punishment.	Mixed imprisonment.	Simple imprisonment.	Miscellaneous.
Totals of the year 1869	221	30	78	6	19	18	29	24	3	1	1	6	1	1	2	1	2
Totals of the year 1870	236	39	70	10	17	25	25	39	...	1	1	...	3	3	3	..
Increase	15	9	...	4	..	7	...	15	1	..	3	2	..
Decrease	8	...	2	...	4	...	3	1	2	1	1	2	...	2	

(Signed) G. C. HATCH, Col.,
 Depy. Judge Advocate Genl., Bengal Army.

RETURNS OF PUNISHMENTS IN THE NATIVE ARMY IN INDIA FOR THE 2ND HALF-YEAR OF 1870.

No. 310.

318

MILITARY DEPARTMENT

[JUNE 9.

ABSTRACT OF RETURNS showing number of
DESECTIONS from Regiments of
Bengal Cavalry and Infantry from
01 October 1870 - 30 September 1873.

PERIOD	NATIVES OF INDIA exclusive of the Punjab						PUNJABEES			NATIVES of Trans Indus			HILL-MEN		Total.					
	Mohomedans	Brahmins	Rajpoots	Jats	Mahrattas	Telingas	Other Castes	Mohomedans	Hindus	Sikhs	Muzabee Sikhs	Afghans	Border Tribes	Beloochies		Persians	Goorckhas	Dogra	Other Hill-men	Christians
01 OCT 1870 - 30 SEPT 1871	8	6	8	17			12	12	32	2	17	26				43	2		1	186
01 OCT 1871 - 30 SEPT 1872	8	8	3	12			2	2	05	22	1	26	27			28	4			166
01 OCT 1872 - 30 SEPT 1873	8	12	12	08			2	3	08	01	44	4	20	27		44	5		1	217
TOTAL	24	26	23	37			57	25	01	98	7	63	80			115	11		02	569

Proceeding for March 1874
 Proceeding number xvii.

Commanders-in-Chief of the Bengal Army, 1857-1895

	From	To
General Sir Colin Campbell, G.C.B., (afterwards Lord Clyde)	13th Aug. 1857	4th June 1860
General Sir Hugh H. Rose, G.C.B.	4th June 1860	23rd March 1865
General Sir William R. Mansfield, K.C.B.,	23rd March 1865	9th April 1870
General Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.,	9th April 1870	9th April 1876
General Sir F.F. Haines, K.C.B.,	10th April 1876	7th April 1881
General Sir D.M. Stewart, Bart., G.C.B.,	7th April 1881	28th April 1885
General Sir F.S. Roberts, Bart, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., V.C. now Lord Roberts	28th Nov 1885	7th April 1893
General Sir George Stewart White, K.C.B., V.C.	8th April 1893	1895

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

App.,	Appendix
Bn.,	Battalion
Capt.,	Captain
Cav.,	Cavalry
Co.,	Company
Col.,	Colonel
C.O.,	Commanding Officer
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
Dept.,	Department
G.O.C.C.,	General Orders of the Commander-in-Chief
G.O.G.G.,	General Orders of the Governor-General
H.E.,	His Excellency
H.O.C.,	House of Commons
H.M.,	Her Majesty
Inf.,	Infantry
J.U.S.I.,	Journal of the United Services Institution of India
Mil.,	Military
Mil. Procdgs.,	Military Proceedings
N.I.,	Native Infantry
P.P.,	Parliamentary Papers
Regt.,	Regiment
Tp.,	Troop