

THE INDIAN PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE ON WEST ASIA PEACE PROCESS

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CERTIFICATE

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This is to certify that M.Phil dissertation entitled "**THE INDIAN PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE ON WEST ASIA PEACE PROCESS,**" submitted by **Mr. K. KARNAMAHARAJAN,** for the award of the **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is his original work. This has not been published or submitted to any other university for any other degree.

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Every effort has been made to enhance the quality and accuracy of the work. However, I owe the sole responsibility of shortcomings, if any in the study.


(K. KARNAMAHARAJAN)

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION :

PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE - AN ANALYSIS

There is no limit to the opportunities opening up as a result of the revolution in communication technologies. These are transforming the society so fundamentally that social scientists speak of the dawn of a new era, 'the information age'; many societies are already changing from being advanced industrial societies to 'information societies', in which computer technologies, their network and other enhanced forms of interpersonal and institutional communication are a major force.

What does the revolution in communication which is being widely debated, analysed and planned by the developed west, hold for the developing societies? Will it mean not only the continuation and even further strengthening current of the present dependence of the Third world countries on the developed Western nations in matters of communications? will the new communication technologies help the Third world countries to truly 'liberate' themselves? or will the communication revolution assist the forces of the so called neo-colonialism which is subtle and even more difficult to shake off?¹

There are any number of enthusiasts who will predict that the new communication technologies will enable the developing societies to leap frog directly into the 21st century without having to follow the long and arduous path, spanning a couple of centuries of painful development followed by the western developed countries. There are as many skeptics who describe it as neo-colonialism of information age², which will have far reaching and dreadful

1. J.S. Yadava, "Communication revolution, global stakes and national interests", Communicator, Vol. 23, No. 1-2, p.p. 47-50.

2. Ibid, p. 48.

consequences for the developing societies and cultures. The uncritical and unplanned adoption of communication technologies, they argue, would accentuate the hiatus between developed and developing nations globally, and the elite and masses at the national level. The apprehensions are based on the fact that the communication technologies tend to facilitate the spread of western consumerism globally, a value and habit not necessarily relevant and even desirable in the present state of development of many poor Third world countries like India. Because, with the communication technology as it is currently structured and operating, what people will be receiving is more of marketing messages.

All the same, the wheel of new communication technologies is looming large and moving fast. The coming of new communication technologies in the third world countries including India is inevitable. Each nation has been evolving its own response to the challenges of communication revolution.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATION AND ITS IMPACT IN INDIA:

India has completed about three decades of planned effort in development communications. It is time now to do some stock-taking for the future policy orientation. For the paradigm on which, consciously or unconsciously, we have based the planning and management of our communication systems has been inspired by western and particularly American scholars. Amongst the names to reckon with are Wilbur Schramm, Daniel Perner, De Sola Pool, Evert Rogers, Lucian Pye, Lazarsfeld, Elihu Katz and a host of others. Whatever their personal persuasions, they have one thing in common: all of them have worked

on the premise that communications would play a pivotal role in the development process. Their stress, of course, has been on different aspects of development such as the modernization, urbanisation, literacy, two-step flow, diffusion of innovations, politicization, etc.. But on one seem to be united on the belief that crucial new communication technologies would play a key role in peripheral states in their task of development and nation - building.³

In the Indian context, the new communication channels have hardly played any worthwhile role in development. On the contrary, the development process itself has disrupted, distorted, and obstructed the healthy flow of communication in society leading to serious aberrations in the life style and behaviour of individuals.

The experience of the past thirty years has shown that the emergence of communication media in traditional setting has played two chief roles both of which are negative: it has hampered the existing cultural, particularly the oral traditions and the strong motivations for dialogue and has superimposed, which is neither fish nor fowl, but altogether degrading and servile.⁴

In brief, the overall effect of the communication system, is quite the opposite of what we have been asked to believe by the earlier sociological thinkers. On the one hand, it becomes the main support of political shocks, in the emerging situation and on the other, of the increasing economic tensions. In the developing situation communication takes on perverted forms; either it

3. Krishan Sondhi, Communication growth and public policy, the Indian experience, (New Delhi : Breakthrough Publications, 1983) p.p. 1-8.

4. Ibid, p.6.

becomes an obstruction to genuine communication or a distortion and caricature of it. Therefore, the new communication media installed in a developing situation, if anything, add to the sufferings and setback all around, because these are "hybrid" systems uneven and unequal to the task.

The whole edifice of development communications which we have assiduously tried to build in the past three decades, lies shattered and in shambles. What is much more disconcerting, however, is that we seem to be oblivious of this national tragedy. Secondly, there is no attempt at innovative methods to build organisations suitable to rehabilitate the communications effort under changed modern conditions. We are rather shackled to outdated, out-worn, dilapidated, declining, stagnant organisation structures with obsolete, unworkable cultures.⁵

INDIAN PRINT MEDIA : AN OVERVIEW:

As we approach the close of the most momentous twentieth century, a new media age seems to be ushering in. There is ferment in both the print and electronic media. The size of the Indian print media has assumed enormous proportion in recent years. With so much happening around us, people are only too eager to keep themselves abreast with the developments and newspapers are their best guide to the news of the world. With the spread of literacy, a new, wide- awake class of readers has emerged and the newspapers are vying with each other to attract them.

5. Ibid, p.7.

The proliferation of television channels will in no way make the newspapers redundant and they will remain a competitive and credible vehicle of mass communication. With the expansion of television, it has become an indispensable medium for news. All the major channels have their own news programmes at prime time and for the first time, it has been proved that news can also be made a salable commodity. On television, for instance, it becomes evident from the rush of commercial sponsors to such programming. Television news bulletins are at best appetisers; they can stimulate hunger, but they cannot satisfy. Television has an advantage in the sense that it comes closest to putting the audience physically at the scene of the event as there is an element of emotion in television's chemistry. Newspapers have an impersonal approach in their reporting.

While comparing broadcast journalism with print, one has to bear in mind the fact the word content of half an hour news bulleting will work out to be less than a single page of Times of India or The Hindustan Times; and in half an hour, a reader can browse through a good lot of stories that can be communicated by a television news reader. He has the liberty to choose or skip a particular story, he can delve deep into an individual story that may be of interest to him but as a listener and viewer, he does not have this freedom to choose and he must accept the newscasters selection and presentation.

The circulation of the selected English dailies are as follows:

- | | | |
|----|---------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. | The Hindu | 5,86,438. (8 Editions) |
| 2. | The Hindustan Times | 4,91,476. (2 Editions) |
| 3. | The Pioneer | not known. |
| 4. | The Times of India | 9,88,676 (6 editions) |
| 5. | The Statesman | 1,54,136 (2 editions) ⁶ |

PRESS AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS:

The press which is called the 'fourth estate' in a democratic set-up has the responsibility of providing truthful, objective and accurate information to the people. An adequately informed public is a prerequisite for the effective and meaningful functioning of a democracy.⁷ Information is the basis of the public opinion formation. If the people are wrongly or inadequately informed the opinion they form will preclude them from understanding the social realities especially in a society that consists of different ethnic, linguistic and religious communities. The press is expected to play the role of a watch dog and present a true picture of the events to the people. But the way some of the major events of the country are reported in the press indicates that it has failed to be a truthful informer.

6. D.V. Gandhi, Advertisers Hand Book, (New Delhi: 1997) p.p. 1-5.

7. D.S. Poornananda, "Press and community relations", Communicator, Vol.32, No.1, p.p. 17-20.

PUBLIC OPINION : AN OVERVIEW:

There have been two approaches to the problem of public opinion. One is the speculative approach, predominant in the 19th century. Other is the empirical method, characteristic of the current era. Although both speculative and functional methods have been applied to public opinion research, the term has almost as many definitions as there are studies on the subject.⁸ What precisely is public opinion? Whose opinion constitute public opinion? what is meant by consensus? According to Dr. Samuel Johnson, "the majority of a society is a true definition of the public". This would mean, logically, that public opinion is the true expression of the majority, but it would also eliminate significant minorities.

According to Bernard Berelson, public opinion research today is the result of a process which began with the recognition that public opinion is a significant phenomenon and has moved forward to the present empirical or scientific method of approaching the whole area of the public opinion research. Public opinion is not easily amenable to scientific definition. It is an outgrowth of mass media. "In substance and the way it function in terms of the individual and the group are still described in terms of intangibles". According to Hans Speier, public opinion in terms of this historical review, is a phenomenon of middle class civilisation. It is a way whereby the citizens may communicate with their government. Walter Lippmann, in his volume on public opinion, was

8. A. William Bluem, Studies in Public Opinion, (New Delhi) p.p. 75-77.

probably the first student of this area to dwell on the importance of the stereotype short hand method of influencing opinion by reinforcing the pathway well-travelled responses to verbal and visual stimuli. Stereotyping is possible because of the tendency of the public to abstract symbols from the verbal environment. No expression of opinion stands alone. Its development involves an observable fact, plus imagined projection, along with an acceptance of the statements of others. Facts as such are illusory. They have facts only with reference to habitual perspective responses at the practicing time when data are revealed to our senses.⁹

THE SELECTION OF NEWSPAPERS FOR THE PRESENT STUDY:

The selection of Indian press was rather difficult, because of the size of the country and multiplicity of languages and newspapers, no newspaper can claim a national circulation. As such five leading English dailies have been selected for the study. The decision to confine the study of English dailies is made in view of the factors as underlined below;

1. English being the associative language for official communication and also for conversing and for intellectual exchange among the elite, the English dailies continue to occupy a significant place in the Indian press. (2) Though some of the language dailies command higher individual circulation than the English dailies selected for the study, their circulation is confined to specific linguistic regions only.

9. Ibid, p. 76.

With the world being converted into a global village through the mass media, every happening in any corner of the globe affects the rest of the world. Everyone is therefore interested in learning about its affairs. As far as the space allocation of Indian print media to foreign news forms approximately one fourth of the total news presentation. A major portion (87.3%) of the foreign news coverage in the Indian press is in the form of news stories.¹⁰ As far as the breakup of the coverage is concerned more number of editorials appear in Times of India, while The Hindu and The Hindustan Times published relatively smaller no of readers letters as compared to other newspapers. In case of Middle East coverage, The Hindu allocates approximately 14.3% of space, Times of India allocates 11.3%, Hindustan Times allocates 10.6%, The Statesman allocates 11.5% and the Pioneer allocates 10.3% of space for the Middle East coverage approximately.¹¹ So, a good amount of coverage is given in the daily newspapers to foreign news. Most of the time even two entire pages are devoted to world news.

Various newspapers have different policies in handling one particular piece of news. They also get it from different sources. A comparative content analysis is attempted to highlight the importance given to foreign news by the Indian print media.

10. J.S. Yadava and Abilasha Monhot, Foreign news in Indian Media, a study findings of IIMC survey, (New Delhi: 1982), p.p. 8-18.

11. Ibid, p.12.

In spite of such news being covered on television people like to read it on a printed page. Their willingness to go through news papers has not diminished with the coming in of visual medium. The popularity of the press is directly related to literacy levels of a country unlike television and radio. In 1990-1991, the literacy rate in India is 36.28%, and it rose to 42.48% in 1992-93. Correspondingly the literacy rate has risen by 4.6%, besides, the visible effect of revamp- the production values have improved. For instance Glazed newsprint is increasingly in use. As a result the reader is getting visual pleasure in some ways better than television.

The newspapers chosen for the study include Times of India, The Statesman, The Hindu, Hindustan Times and The Pioneer. These newspapers are selected on the basis of their wider coverage of the cross section of the society. The present study dates back from signing of Oslo Accord on September 13, 1993 and till date.

The major aim has been to identify the coverage of the Oslo peace process. The type of articles which came out during this period has been specified such as news analysis, news report and editorial comments.

In addition, the coverage given by the five different newspapers to the peace process has been looked into, such as whether the coverage is on International page or simply on an editorial topic. A detailed comparative content analysis has been done to find out how much light is thrown on important events of peace process by the Indian Print Media.

SOURCES UTILIESED BY THE NEWSPAPERS:

There are some differences in source utilisation by individual papers. The statesman relied on Reuters (27.7%) The Hindustan Times on Home Country Agency (32.4%), The Times of India and The Hindu on staff reporters and own correspondents (25.2% & 23%) respectively.¹² The major events covered on the Middle East has been mainly on political independence and religious antogonism (8.5% & 6.5%) respectively, which is doubtless, concomitment to the peace process.¹³

THE PALESTINIAN CRISIS : AN ANALYSIS:

The crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the palestine problem. The problem is a struggle between two national movements, the Zionist movement and the Palestinian national movement. Since its inception in 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organisation has had an anamolous history. On the one hand, it appears to be the embodiment of national aspirations of large numbers of Palestinians. On the ohter, it appears to be fraught with division and to be incapable of coordinated or consistent poliitcal action. At one level of analysis, this anomaly can be understood as the result of number of factors,¹⁴ the organisation makeup of the PLO, a composite of a number of independent

12. Ibid, p. 15.

13. Ibid, p. 17.
For more details on national movements of Arabs and Jews read, Albert Mommi, Jews and Arabs", A.Howard Greenfeld Book, p.p. 99-113.

14. Peter J. chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, Ideology and Power in the Middle East, (LONDON: Duke University Press, ~~London~~ 1988). p.p. 365-369.

Palestinian organisations operating is a very uneasy coalition political ideologies,¹⁵ with their emphasis on continued struggle, and the linkages between the PLO and its member organisations and the surrounding Arab governments. Taken together, these factors combine to produce a "PLO politics" that is extremely complex and fluid and, in many respect, is a Microcosm of the politics of the region.¹⁶

The ebb and flow of PLO history reflects the interactive dynamics of two themes. The organised PLO failed to garner any widespread political support because it was too pragmatic. Its leadership was replaced by that of dynamic youngmen with a collective charisma. This new leadership rapidly became aborbed in attempts to create a systematised power structure. After 1970 those leaders in turn were challenged by even younger militants on the ground that they had become "professional revolutionaires" and "arm chair guerillas". This challenge initially was beaten back but remerged in the wake of 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

The context of PLO politics and ideology is the Palestinian diaspora.¹⁷ From 1948 onward Palestinian populations were scattered throughout the Arab world. The largest of these populations is now located in Jordan, followed in size by population in Syria and Lebanon, with even smaller communities in the Gaza strip, Kuwait, Egypt and Gulf states, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Other

15. Ibid, p.366.

16. Ibid, p. 368.

17. Ibid, p.369.

For more details on Palestinian refugees problem, See, Benny Morris, "1948 and after", (New York, Oxford university Press, ~~New York~~ 1982) p.p. 173-190.

palestinian enclaves are distributed throughout Europe. Latin America and United States : Between 1948 and 1967 Palestinian communities on the borders of Israel were exposed to constant war. During and immediately after the 1967 war a second wave of refugees moved outward from the West Bank, in the face of Israeli occupation, to the east bank of Jordan river and beyond. A smaller group moved away from Golan heights as the area was occupied.

When the mandate ended in 1948, Palestinian were left without citizenship or other identifiable legal states. They eventually acquired a melange of legal status in a number of Arab countries, Jordan granted its Palestinian population including those in Gaza strip, citizenship after 1950. Other Arab states granted a combination to full or partial citizenship on a selective basis. Elsewhere Palestinians have the residentt aliens.

The prospect of a Jewish state, completely dependent for its survival upon American patronage and therefore inevitably devoted to U.S. interests in the region. The United States is the most powerful voice at the United Nations. Its plan for Palestine could easily be manoeuvred through that flimsy based organisation. A semblence of 'fairness' to both sides was proposed in the U.S. backed U.N. scheme for partition.¹⁸

The partition plan granted 55 per cent of Palestine to the Jews who were 30 per cent of the population but owned only 6 per cent of the land.

18. John Rose, Israel : The Hijack State, ^{(London!} Bookmarks Publications, ~~London~~ : 1986), p.p. 48-50.

Infact the partition agreement, signed in November 1947, was with legal figleaf which immediately triggered the Zionist Hijack of Palestine.¹⁹ At the heart of the Zionists scheme lay terror on a monumental scale. They would bounce the Palestinian out of their own country by creating such a climate of blood letting and violence that a fever of fear would sweep the land.

OVERVIEW OF OSLO PEACE PROCESS:

The reluctant handshaken between PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin that marked the signing of Declaration of Principles (DOP) and mutual recognition statement on september 13, 1993, was seen as a sign of new dawn, the start of a new chapter that would enunciate a historic change and covert a perceptual conflict to peaceful coexitence.²⁰

Nearly five years later peace has become so elusive that significant voices in the U.S. the declared sponsor are openly admitting a near failure. The remarks made in sep'97 by the outgoing American ambassador to Israel, Indyk and the secretary of state Ms. Madeliene Albright during her first vist to the area same month underscore the diplomatic paralysis and the grim prospectus. The negotiations have been at a virtual standstill since the spring of 1997, with each party claiming that the other has failed to meet commitments under the 1993 agreements. Periodic revision of these agreements has become virutually routine

19. Ibid, p.50.

20. Naseer Aruri, "Oslo's Muddled Peace", Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, Vol. 97, No.615, p.p. 7-12.
See for details on Israeli occupation, "Israeli-occupied territories and emerging Palestine Autonomous Area, The Middle East & North Africa, Europa Year Book, 1997, pp. 583-585.

since their signing. Each suspension of the talks has led to the resumption, which in turn has produced a new and more complex agreement. The net result has been a multiplication of the problems arising from the influx of new arrangements and the inevitable emergence of new conflicts over interpretations.²¹

A PRELUDE TO OSLO :

The strategic imperatives of the negotiated settlement, largely on US terms and auspices, were created in 1991 by the effective collapse of USSR and the destruction of Iraq. The USSR was transformed from chief diplomatic backer and arms supplier of the Arab states to US appendage in the peace process. Iraq was reduced from the champion of strategic balance with Israel to an impotent nation preoccupied with the preservation of its sovereignty. For the US this was the first opportunity to reshape the strategic balance in the Middle East without the counter veiling influence of the USSR and in the absence of a single Arab power that professed responsibility for mutual deterrence vis-a-vis Israel. For Israel, this was the first time since the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt that a number of Arab states seemed ready to conclude peace with it outside the context of an international peace conference and the direct bilateral negotiations, as it had long insisted. The Persian Gulf war had demolished the official Arab Consensus on Palestine, eroded Arab solidarity and exposed regime insecurity in the region.

21. Ibid, p.7.
See for more details of mediators in Arab-Israel conflict, Saadia Towal *The Peace brokers, mediators in Arab Israel Conflict* (New Delhi: 1992), pp. 191-207.

These negotiations, which opened in October 1991, scheduled the implementation of Palestinian self-governance one year from the start of the conference that is October 1992. This did not happen because the Madrid process seemed to go nowhere after 11 round of talks between Palestinian and Israeli delegations in Washington, Rome and Moscow. They took it for granted that the Israeli occupation is a self-evident phenomenon that would be reversed by the implementation UN security council resolution 242. Similarly, the Palestinian saw the settlements in the occupied territories as illegal and invoked security council resolution 682, which declared unanimously in 1991 that the fourth Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilians in time of war applied to the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, the Palestinian delegation insisted on linking its acceptance of the concept of an interim period, preceding final status negotiations, to an Israeli decision to come to terms with Israel's legal status in West Bank and Gaza.

To their dismay, the Palestinians discovered the jurisprudence of the Palestine question, based largely on international law, was not the same jurisprudence that Israel was willing to apply. Nor was it the same Jurisprudence that governed the Madrid Process.²² The deliberate ambiguity of America's diplomacy had, in effect, suspended these precepts of international law. Consequently, all the Palestinians could do was struggle to prove that they have rights.

22. Naseer Aruri, "Oslo's Muddled Peace", op.ct. p.8.

OSLO PEACE PROCESS:

The startling reports circulating in late August 1993 that the crippling impasse would soon be replaced by an agreement between Israel and the PLO raised the question of: Why then? Why Oslo? And why the sudden change?

A proposed Declaration of Principles was announced by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on June 30, 1993. Three elements in that declaration were crucial: first, the implication that the west Bank and Gaza are disputed rather than occupied territory, thus implying that Israel has an equal right to lay claims to the land: Second, the conspicuous absence of any reference to the exchange of land for peace: and third, the requirement that the Palestinians agree beforehand, that all matters relating to sovereignty are outside the scope of the negotiations for the interim phase- hence discussion of Jerusalem, the still expanding settlements and the land issues is to be deferred for several years.²³

This manifest public departure in US policy was the real context for the PLO-Israeli agreement at Oslo. Moreover, after the Oslo agreement was concluded in September 1993, disagreements over its meaning and implications began to surface. Four major factors have rendered the Oslo accords vulnerable to disagreements, causing new stalemates and creating new agreements.

The first is the issue of security-internal and external-and its relationship to occupation. For the Palestinians, security would be assured by the phased dismantling of the occupation, the exchange of land for peace and eventual implementation of national human rights. For Israel, Rabin's concept of security would enable Israel to keep the occupation intact, reorganise it, and repackage it under a new label.

23. Ibid, p. 8.

Second, Israel recognized, in the preamble to the declaration, "Mutual legitimate and political rights," but not the national rights of the Palestinians or their right to return to enshrined in UN resolutions. Also, in the exchange of letters, Israel recognised the PLO but qualified that recognition by limiting the context to the task of representing only to those Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza in talks to be held within the framework of the Madrid Process.

The third issue, withdrawal is referred to in the declaration as withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank city of Jericho, but not from the West Bank, where only redeployment from population centres would take place. Moreover, this partial and limited withdrawal would not abolish the military government, which, because Israel did not acknowledge its status as occupier, has meant that it would remain sovereign under international law even in Jericho and Gaza. It also meant that the code of military orders, which constitutes the basis for the legal systems in the West Bank and Gaza, would remain in force except in six spheres: education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism.

The fourth crucial issue is the source of authority, which remained vested in the occupation regime. The Palestine Parliament was granted quasi-legislative power only over the six spheres mentioned earlier. This excludes the Israeli settlements and the network of roads connecting these settlements with each other and with Israel proper, Jerusalem and military locations.

These four factors have contributed to the inevitable fragility of all of the succeeding agreements.²⁴ The imbalance of power, which produced highly unbalanced agreements, has left Israel in the driver's seat. The lack of consultative decision making by the Palestinian Authority has predictably led to opposition by disgruntled constituencies, some of which have expressed their opposition by resorting to violence, including suicide bombing, thereby setting the stage for the next impasse.

INDIA'S WEST ASIA POLICY :

The major objectives in India's policy towards West Asia and North Africa since the 1950's had been to befriend, encourage and extend support to those countries which opposed the western sponsored military pacts. We also came to establish closer ties with secular nationalist regimes in the area, especially with Egypt under Nasser. Our close ties with Nasser to some extent neutralised the Pakistani offensive against India in the region, especially over the Kashmir issue as also during the 1965 Indo-pak war.²⁵ Israel through the 1967 war and occupation of Arab territories, harsh treatment of Palestinians, its subsequent refusal to withdraw from occupied Arab territories and instead the establishment of Jewish settlements on them led to its isolation. Israel's refusal to withdraw from Arab lands made several of Israel's supporters abandon it just before and after the 1973 October war and the subsequent Arab oil embargo

24. Naseer Aruri, "Oslo's Muddled Peace", op.ct. p.9.

25. A.K. Pasha, "India" West Asia Policy : Community and Change", Strategic Analysis, (September 1993, p.p. 783-802.

against supporters of Israel. India did not have to make such utterly opportunistic changes. The Arab states, due to our unequivocal support for the Arab and Palestinian cause, assured uninterrupted supply of oil and treated India as a "friend"

In addition India's consistent support for the Arab countries had opened up significant possibilities for our exports. It had also led to a large presence of Indian workers in these states. But after 1973, India's economic contacts widened, especially with the oil rich Gulf states. The Saudis who consider themselves leaders of the Arab and Islamic world with their huge financial power also wished to play a more active role in the non-aligned and other Third World forums. Since 1982, India and Saudi Arabia have decided to work together closely. Thus, towards the end of the Eighties India, in the wake of the rapid changes taking place at the global and regional levels, initiated a gradual but necessary change while at the same time continuing its basic policy towards the region. It is much more realistic as well as practical in terms of its objectives.

INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL:

For India, the Jewish state has been rather unique. India does not maintain diplomatic relation with or have resident missions in a number of far off and small states due to the absence of vital, cultural, economic or political interests. And such absence does not draw any serious attention or controversy.

The US emerged as the sole leader during and after the Gulf crisis and India could not ignore the fact because of the view of our dependence on the

national interest. As J.N.Dixit, Foreign Secretary said, "The nature of national interests in all categories changes according to political and economic realities when these interests change, the foreign policy of the country has to change."²⁷ However, it is difficult to see how India could influence Israel when its close ally, the US, finds it difficult to pressure Israel. Of course, India was anxious to attend the West Asia peace talks, for which the Israel condition was full diplomatic ties. One should not forget an additional area of cooperation mentioned i.e. defence cooperation-particularly military technology. Israel's experience of fighting in stony and military technology, Israel's experience of fighting in stony and sand dune waste areas is also cited as an area where interaction with Israel would be productive.

27. Ibid, p. 791.

The origin of the pro-Arab attitude in India's policy towards West Asia in general and Israel in particular can be traced in India's nationalist struggle. India of course did not endorse the Arab approach to the Palestine whereas India advocated a federal Palestine as a solution. Similarly India's policy on the recognition of the Jewish state was quite different from that of the Arab. But for the basic thrust of its policy has been pro-Arab. Moreover, Israel has often been a centre of controversy and this made normalisation difficult and complicated. More often than not, establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Israel was not a bilateral affair. It often had regional and global implications.

CHAPTER - II

A PRELUDE TO THE SELECTED NEWSPAPERS & THEIR COVERAGE ON OSLO ACCORD

There has been an intense worldwide debate on the patterns of news flow between developed and developing nations. The 1970's witnessed articulation of the third world criticism against the western dominance and bias and of the demand for a new world information and communication order. Their imbalance is not in terms of quantity and bias and of the demand for a new world information and communication order. The imbalance is not in terms of quantity and volume alone. It is also in terms of quality of news and information. The western media give their own angle of news about the third world. Their coverage has invariably been negative and unappreciative of the achievements and views of the third world countries.

The western countries claim that their media are efficient and objective in their portrayal of world events. The major news agencies produce an enormous amounts of news every day and on all kinds of topics and themes including development. It is upto the media managers in the third world countries to make their selection to suit their own requirements.

In order to find out the credibility of Indian media especially print media, the coverage of Oslo accord and its aftermath are taken as the spheres of the present study. The findings will follow in the subsequent chapters.

THE PROFILE OF THE NEWSPAPERS:

THE HINDU:

It was founded by six young men all in their twenties in Madras on September 20, 1878. Two of them G.Subramania Aiyer and M.Veeraragavachariar, stayed on later to become joint proprietors of the paper

which started as a weekly and became a daily in 1889.¹ The immediate reasons for starting the paper was the criticism by the British owned newspapers on the appointment of T.Muthuswami Aiyer as judge of the Madras High Court. At the time when The Hindu appeared, the public opinion in Madras presidency was stagnant and there were very few recognised forums to voice the feelings and grievances of the Indian population. It filled the vacuum and has become instantly popular.²

From its inception, The Hindu clashed with the officialdom and exposed its misdeeds and abuse of power. The Hindu changed hands in 1905, when S.Kasthuriranga Iyengar, a lawyer brought it and became its editor, within a year he reorganised the paper, improved its getup and news service and made it a commercial proposition.

A.Rangaswami Iyengar became the editor in 1928 and he performed the duties of both an editor and a congressman. The Hindu had many distinguished correspondents abroad, among them Subhas Bose in Vienna and V.K.Krishna Menon elsewhere in Europe.³ After the death of Rangaswami Iyengar, Kasthuri Srinivasan son of Kasthuriranga Iyengar took over as managing editor of the paper in 1934 and remained in the post till his death in 1959. His stewardship was the golden era of the paper when it forged ahead and established its reputation and fame not only in India but also abroad. After his death C.Narashimham and C.Kasturi took over the editorship.

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1. Rangaswami Parthasarathy, Journalism in India from the earliest day to the present day. (New Delhi; Sterling publishers) pp. - 262-277.
 2. Ibid. p.264.
 3. Ibid. p. 264.

The Hindu has many firsts to its credit. It was the first Indian newspaper to have its own plane service for distribution of the paper to its far-flung readers. This was done in 1963 and in 1969. It achieved another first when it launched its facsimile editions in Coimbatore and later extended it to Bangalore, Hyderabad and Madurai. It was the first to introduce phototypesetting for printing the paper.⁴

THE STATESMAN:

Robert Knight, who founded the Statesman in 1875, was one of the early British journalists who like Silk Bukingham, encouraged critical review of the governments actions and policies which set him apart from other British-owned papers which while supporting the government steadfastly also indulged in denunciation of Indians specially the nationalists.

The Statesman, which was described as the Manchester Guardian of the East, has had a long line of able and dedicated editors who have left their mark deep on to it. There were two great editors of the Statesman, Arthur Moore and Ian Stephens, who earned the admiration and gratitude of the Indian people by their sympathy and support for their political aspirations and for highlighting their legitimate grievances.

Eventhough its opinions have not always been popular, but it has almost always been respected. Its technical standards have been high; for many years, for instance, either the Calcutta or the Delhi edition annually carried off the

4. Ibid. p. 264.

Presidents award for printing; several of its features, including the correspondence columns, have been rated by many competent judges as the finest in the country.

The Statesman, was one of the papers which suffered during the emergency period for its anti-government postures. Today, it is a vigorous independent paper, fearlessly voicing its views on all questions affecting the common man and some of its investigative stories have achieved national prominence.

THE TIMES OF INDIA:

The Times of India is the oldest English daily in India and it is also a great newspaper which has played an important role in the development of journalism in this country. It belonged to the class of British-owned newspapers which were not "a model of sobriety and good manners, their slighting and supercilious tone towards educated Indians wounded and alienated sensitive people."

Robert Knight became the editor of Bombay Times and merging it with two other newspapers and renamed it as Times of India in 1861. Under the editorship of Thomas.J.Bennett, who later became the sole proprietor of Times of India, the paper maintained close relations with Indians many of whom contributed to its columns. Bennett vastly improved the paper by bringing talented people from England among whom was a master printer, F.M.Coleman, who had wide experience of daily newspaper production.⁵ With its high class

5. Ibid. p. 273.

printing and news service (it was the earliest newspaper in India to subscribe to Reuters), the Times of India made rapid progress and in 1890, it printed daily 3000 copies.

Bennett and Coleman combined and formed a company called Bennett Coleman company which continues even today although it has changed into Indian hands.⁶ Bennett brought experienced journalists from England to edit the paper and they included Lovat Fraser and Sir Stanley Reed.

It was a complete paper, Rama Rao wrote, "carrying the highest prestige in particular for its sports and commercial coverage. It carried more Indian news than many Indian papers. The two basic principles which governed the Times of India, according to Rama Rao were that the kings government must be carried on and the political susceptibilities of the Indian people must be respected.

THE NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS:

Ever since the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, the region had seen periodic violent flare ups apart from three wars (1948, 1967, 1973). Despite Israel's overwhelming military might, its control over territories occupied since 1967 June war, has been challenged by the Palestinians fighting for an independent state.

The signing of Oslo accord in Washington on 13 September 1993. The deal was made possible by the familiar Israeli modus operandi. In public both the Israeli Prime Minister Mr. Yitzak Rabin and the foreign minister Mr.

6. Ibid. p. 274.

Shimon Peres had reportedly ruled out any negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organisation.⁷ Using this official smokescreen, Israel has been working out a secret accord with its "archrival". The Accord for Israel is an awakening from stupor in which its people were led to believe in the creation of "Greater Israel", with permanent sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, the occupied West Bank for the Palestinians. It is just a continuation of the process that began with the belief that could return to the PLO - the 1967 boundaries.⁸ For Israeli radicals and likeminded Jews in the U.S., the accord signing ceremony will mean burial to the idea that the Palestinians already have a land, Jordan and that is where they must depart for.

Nobody has any illusion that the Israel and the PLO plus the Arabs will become friends overnight. They have merely graduated from being sworn enemies to identified foes worthy of negotiation with. Though, it has not used the term 'sole' Israel, by recognising the PLO, has acknowledged that Palestinians outside have as much say as those within the occupied areas.

A number of reasons underlie why Israel and the Palestinians have decided to share the destiny of such a small piece of land. The most fundamental one is, to geographically juxtapose to West Asia. Israel's arch peacenik, the former foreign minister, Mr. Abba Eban, prefers to put in this way: "Men and Nations often behave wisely, once they have exhausted all other alternatives."⁹

7. P.R. Kumarasamy, "Gaza-Jericho Plan: Gimmick or harbinger of a new era?," The Times of India, 31 August 1993.

8. F.J. Khergamvala, "Israel must remove distortions", The Hindu, 13 September 1993.

9. Ibid. 13 September 1993.

Mr. Arafat had insisted on recognition from Israel and the U.S., of this before signing the interim self-rule deal and all credited to the Rabin-led government which began in January to prepare the Israeli public for this reality. But now Israelis publicity machine has to begin recognition in Israeli eyes of Mr.Arafat, as a freedom fighter, not murderer as has been the refrain. Mr.Shimon Peres was big enough to admit, we (Israelis) have brought about a revolution and have they.

Only the U.S., can lead the Gulf Arabs to somehow find funds for the self-rule deal. Their coffers may be depleted by they certainly had the money to pump into the process of invigorating the Hamas. The Americans were not displeased that the Hamas growth was only aiding their policy of weakening Mr.Arafat's mainstream PLO. The revolution cannot succeed without Mr.Arafat and labour led coalition joining hands while remaining apart. Mr.Arafat is interested to help Mr.Rabin ensure a labour led win in next elections. Similarly Mr.Rabin probably realises that as of now, in the interest of peace Mr.Arafat's life is critically valuable. There is no other Palestinian figure who has the experience, stature or charisma to reduce the opposition, nor the courage to do a secret deal.

The Israeli cabinet accepts the mutual recognition of the PLO on the eve of the peace deal. However, Mr.Rabin said, Jerusalem will remain always united under Israel's sovereignty and our capital forever.

Shimon Peres said, there would not be a full withdrawal, as the Palestinian side have demanded and Jerusalem would remain the capital of Israel.¹⁰

10. Ibid, 13 September 1993.

"We are living in truly revolutionary times" said Mr. Bill Clinton. Israel and PLO will sign a courageous and historic accord that will be the first step in replacing war with peace and giving the children of the Middle East a chance to grow up in the normal life, said Mr. Clinton in his weekly radio address. Also, Mr. Jimmy Carter, Mr. George Bush and the Russian foreign minister, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, were the audience who witnessed signing of the accord, said one U.S. official on the eve of the accord signing. The European community foreign ministers held talks in Alden Biesen, Belgium, on a major aid package for occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza.

Mr. Nabil Shaath, who on behalf of Mr. Arafat has instructed the negotiations in the Madrid process, in an interview to global view point said, the Americans made an error of judgement about what the Israelis would or the Israelis were willing to accept far more than the U.S. mediators who were speaking to us on their behalf.¹¹

However, much will depend on the detailed negotiations that follow a statement of principles and mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. The signing atmosphere in Washington is more an atmosphere of hope mingled with doubt and uncertainty. Developments could lead to peace, economic prosperity and even confederation.¹² They could also lead to tragedy. It must be recalled that despite the problems and at times the bloodshed, Israelis and Palestinians have been living side by side for the last two decades, meetings with Palestinian

11. F.J. Kergamvala, "Rabin in Rabat, on way to Tunis?," The Hindu, 15 September 1993.

12. "Israel-PLO to sign accord on self rule", Editorial, Times of India, 13 September 1993.

leaders who had grown up in the West Bank and Gaza were frequent and despite officially hostile relations many prominent Palestinians mingled freely in Israeli society.

Thus while Israel is guaranteed complete control of security and foreign affairs in territories that will be autonomous, a point of major conflict could be any attempt to implement the so called "right to return" from abroad by possibly by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians.¹³

In the path breaking decision, that will change the realities in West Asia from all time to come sworn enemies Palestinianians and Israeli's committed themselves to live peacefully, recognising the inevitability of each others existence at a ceremony in white house witnessed by people around the world through the live telecast of the event.¹⁴

Clearly the agreement will be judged primarily by the ability of the PLO to rule the areas to be handed over to them and to put a stop to the so called Intifada. Israel entered these negotiations from a position of considerable strength, with most of the cards in its hands. The Palestinians entered them from a position of extreme weakness.

If as envisaged in the principles of agreement the ultimate responsibility for security rests with Israel - in other words, if Israeli military intervention is allowable than threatening situations will develop - the gamble will be more acceptable to Israeli public.

13. Chaim Herzog, next a drawn-out and dangerous process, International Herald Tribune, 13 September 1993.

14. R. Akileshwari, "Israel PLO sign historic accord burying enemy", Deccan Herald, 14 September 1993.

Had the original proposal reflected only to the Gaza, perhaps 80-90 percent of the Israeli public would have supported it, including much of labour's political opposition. The inclusion of Jericho enclave, has hugely complicated popular assesment.¹⁵

THE FOLLOW UP ARTICLES ON PEACE PROCESS:

The accord was signed in a historic ceremony, held in the white house lawn presided by the president Bill Clinton and witnessed by over 300 special invitees.

The Israeli prime minister Mr.Yitzak Rabin, and the PLO chairman Mr.Arafat stood behind the table on which the Israeli foreign minister Mr. Shimon Peres and the PLO negotiator in Norway talks, Mr. Mahmood Abbas, signed the Declaration of Principles that emerged from the negotiations.¹⁶ Both the U.S., secretary of state Mr.Warren Christopher and the Russian foreign minister, Mr.Anderi Kozyrev, attested the agreement on behalf of their countries which are co- sponsoring the west Asia peace talks. These talks had begun 22 months ago in Madrid.

THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM:

There was however a note of controversy imparted in the proceedings when the Israeli prime minister affirmed that Jerusalem would remain the permanent capital of Israel.

15. Ibid, 13 September 1993.

16. R. Chakrapani, "Israel PLO sign historic accord", The Hindu, 14 September 1993.

Mr. Arafat whose turn came last deftly made it known that the future status of Jerusalem would be decided in the talks ahead. He referred to the agreement which provided for negotiations on pending issues to be begun in two years and said, "to implement all aspects of the U.N., resolutions 242 and 338 and resolve all issues of Jerusalem, the settlements, the refugees and the boundaries will be a Palestinian and Israeli responsibility.¹⁷ He said it is also the responsibility of the international community in its entirety to help the parties overcome the tremendous difficulties which are still standing in the way of reaching a final and comprehensive settlement."

The Oslo agreement signed is viewed as the first step towards a more comprehensive accord to be negotiated by the PLO and Israelis after two years. It provided limited self- government to three lakhs Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, some two lakhs refugees who fled during the war that devastated the area two decades ago are waiting to return after the issue is negotiated by the parties.

Among the invitees were the former U.S., president Mr.Jimmy Carter who broke the 1979 Camp David peace agreement between Egypt and Israel and another former president Mr.George Bush, who had set in motion the West Asia

17. Ibid, 14 September 1993.

See for details, the final agreed draft of Palestinian interim self-government arrangements, signed on 13 August 1993.

Resolution 242 emphasis on the Israel withdrawl to the pre 5th June 1967, position instead of pre 1949 armistice agreement. It legitimised the border at Israel on the line at 1949 and considered it as secured border. It virtually overruled the resolution 181 of general assembly and downgrade the question of Palestine to a mere refugee problem.

peace talks in Madrid.¹⁸ Also, present was Mr. Johan Joergen Holst, foreign minister of Norway which hosted the secret Israeli - PLO negotiations.

After the agreement signing Mr.Rabin said, "we who have come from a land where parents bury their children, we also have fought against you, the Palestinians, we say to you today in a loud and clear voice: "Enough of blood and tears enough." Mr.Arafat said, My people are hoping that this agreement which we are signing today will usher in an era of peace, co-existence and equal rights.¹⁹

Eventually the peace accord may reconcile not only the competition of two national movements for the same piece of land, but also the deeper struggle in which each people's identity has relied on the negation of the others.²⁰

On the eve of the signing of the peace accord Mr.Clinton urged the leaders to dedicate themselves to the next generation and said the children of Israel and Palestine should not be left prey to the parties of extremism and despair. He also offered economic assistance for the development of the Gaza and the West Bank which according the World Bank report would cost about \$ three billion over the next ten years.

Mr. Clinton said, he expected the U.S. economic contribution to be modest. He said he saw Washingtons job as providing seed money while most

18. Ibid, 14 September 1993.

19. Ibid, 14 September 1993.

20. David K. Shipler, "It's time the mideast partners got to know each other," International Herald Tribune, 21 September 1993.

of the aid would be contributed by Japan, the European countries, Scandinavia and Gulf Arab nations - all which have given him indicators of support.

Mr. Clinton described the signing of the Declaration of Principles of Palestinian interim self-government as a great occasion of history and hope. He said, "we are witnessing moment in one of the history's defining dramas and pledged the active support of the U.S., for the difficult work that lies ahead."²¹

Israeli's foreign minister Mr. Shimon Peres made the most moving speech. He declared, "What we are signing today is not an agreement. It is a revolution." He said that peace which was only a dream till yesterday had become a commitment today. He backed up his talk of peace by offering economic help to the PLO, saying that Israel would back its promises with economic aid. He said, "we will lower our barriers and widen our roads so that goods and travellers can move between us," and said, "let there be no more victims on either side." He told PLO, we shall negotiate with you a permanent settlement and with all our neighbours we will work for a permanent peace.

THE DETAILS OF THE PACT:

The accord envisions Israel withdrawing its troops from Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho within four months, making those regions the first to experience self - government. Israel will pull its troops gradually from other West Bank areas turning control over to a police force that includes former PLO fighters.

21. Bharat Bhushan, "Palestinians wake to the free dawn", The Indian Express, 14 September 1993.

By the end of the third year the two sides would be negotiating the sovereignty of the regions. The agreement leaves numerous details unresolved including perhaps the stickiest of all, the fate of the city of Jerusalem.

THE TIME - TABLE OF THE PEACE PROCESS:

The Declaration of Principles on Palestinian self-rule signed in Washington envisages a 10 month time table leading up to the elections for a Palestinian Council.

The Council will run the West Bank and Gaza Strip for an interim period of five years during which the Israel and the Palestinians will negotiate a permanent peace settlement.

Israel and the Palestinians are immediately to start negotiating the details of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho. The Declaration officially enters into force on October 13, and the time table are as follows.

THE ASPECTS TO BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY:

Authority transferred from the Israeli military government and civil administration to "authorized Palestinians" in five spheres, education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism.

Joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison committee to be formed.

Israeli-Palestinian economic co-operation committee established to work on, water, electricity, energy, finance, transport and communications including the port of Gaza, trade industry, labour relations, training, environmental protection and the media, an internationally supported economic development

programme for the West Bank and Gaza and a regional economic development programme.

Jordan and Egypt invited to join continuing committee to decide on procedures for admission on Palestinians displaced from West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and measures to prevent "disruption and disorder".

13 December 1993:

Israel and Palestinians sign agreement on Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and detailed arrangements established on Palestinian control on two areas.

Israeli's immediately begin withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho.

Five - year interim period of Palestinian self - rule begins.

13 April 1994:

Latest date for Israeli's to complete withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho.

13 July 1994:

Latest date for elections for Palestinians Council. An interim agreement reached by then will specify the Council's structure and powers, including its executive and legislative authority, arrangements for transfer of authority to the council and details of independent judicial organs.

Palestinians from East Jerusalem will be able to vote and perhaps run in the elections.

Israeli military forces, already withdrawn from Gaza and Jericho, will redeploy outside populated areas in the rest of the West Bank by the eve of the elections at the latest. Israeli forces will remain responsible for the security of the Israeli settlers.

Israeli military government withdrawn and civil administration dissolved.

13 December 1995:

Latest date for talks to start on permanent settlement.

13 December 1998:

Permanent settlement takes effect.

By signing the accord the Israel and the PLO put aside a century of bloodshed and enmity, embracing mutual recognition and peaceful co-existence and providing for limited Palestinian autonomy in Jericho and the Gaza Strip, that is expected to lead to peace in the Middle East. The two long time antagonists - Arafat and Yitzak Rabin - agreed to recognize the legitimacy of each others claim on a part of the world their people have fought and lost their lives over decades.

Before the ceremony Mr.Arafat has called the agreements the "first step" on the road leading to an independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital. But Rabin said on NBC: "I can assure chairman Arafat the Palestinian flag will not be over Jerusalem."²² As December 13, 1993, the target date for Israelis first withdrawl from the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, approaches, opposition to the Israeli - Palestinian peace agreement among both Jews and Arabs rose to crescendo.

Both Mr.Rabin and Mr.Arafat has to convince their own constituency that the risks and promises of the available peace are justified. Mr.Rabin has to demonstrate to Israeli's that their lives will be more secure and more prosperous that they are now. Mr.Arafat has to show Palestinians, inside and outside the occupied territories, that his road leads to sovereignty and self-respect.

22. Ludwina. A. Joseph, "Arafat Rabin seal peace with handshake", The Pioneer, 14 September 1993.

It will not be easy. In their campaign to sabotage the September accord, Palestinian extremists are attacking Israeli military and civilian targets on an almost daily basis.

The PLO is very much a secular nationalist force shaped on Western ideas. While it is true that liberal ideas have not worked very well in Arab countries, it was more because it was the implementation was faulty than that the ideas themselves were not acceptable.²³ This failure has led to vicious fundamentalism which poses itself as an alternative to the secular traditions of an organisation like PLO. Therefore, it is likely that Israel and west will have much in common with the PLO's ideology which can at worst be described as little too socialist for their liking.

Although there has been some progress, Israelis and Palestinian negotiations have not agreed on all the details of internal security. Israeli troops will withdraw from Gaza and Jericho. Palestinian Police will move in. But control of the roads, as well as jurisdiction in inter-communal crime or quarrels, have yet to be clarified. Some 1,800,000 Arabs and 1,30,000 Jewish settlers live in chronic disharmony in the West Bank and Gaza, satisfying the reasonable security concerns of both communities is taxing and intricate.²⁴

The Rabin government in Israel is not averse to the idea of giving up Golan heights for assured peace.²⁵ But it has to hasten slowly, making the offer

23. Lalitha Panikar, "Domino effect of peace in West Asia", The Times of India, 24 September 1993.

24. Eric Silver, "Peace the only option", The Statesman, 6 December 1993.

25. N.C. Menon, "No easy solutions," The Hindustan Times, 11 September 1993.

to vacate the Golan heights at this juncture will overheat the domestic politics in Israel, especially since it would come so soon after the proposal to install Mr. Arafat as leader of Palestinians self rule in Jericho and Gaza.

The other outstanding issues are; the area of Jericho to be transferred to Palestinian rule. The Israelis want to limit their evaluation to the 25 sq. km of the oasis town. The Palestinians are demanding the 380 sq km of the Jericho administrative district.

There is, it seems, a good deal of bluff on both sides, Mr.Rabin keeps saying that there is "nothing sacred," about December 13. What matters is the end of Israeli withdrawl from Gaza and Jericho on April 13. If the first step is delayed, the prime minister suggests, it will not be a disaster. It is important, he argues, to get the deal right.

Mr.Arafat on his part, is talking about an "impasse," if the December deadline is not honoured, PLO spokesman insisted, the whole peace process will be in jeopardy.

Both the sides are bidding up the crisis in order to get the best terms. Brinkmanship is a familiar bargaining strategy with all its advantages and dangers - especially in a volatile environment, which the respective leaders cannot control entirely.

THE ACADEMICIANS VIEW OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS:

Underlying the notion of holiness and redemption applied to the existing Israeli state, there is an irreducible attachment to the promised land.. To express

the intimate bonds the fundamentalists feel with the land, they invoke the images of the land of Israel as a living being. Surrendering territories or the destruction of settlements means severing of a limb from a living body. Thus, the question of borders automatically assumes cosmic proportions.²⁶

The Jewish fundamentalist assumptions about the world make it essentially impossible for them to recognise the legitimate rights of Palestinians. Nor can they acknowledge any real tie between Palestinians or any group other than the Jewish and the land of Israel. This obviously implies the eventual annexation of territories occupied during the 1967 war. For, they are not occupied but liberated territories and hence have become inalienable and non-negotiable. The West Bank in particular, is described as Judea and Samaria, the inseparable parts of the divinely ordained land.

The incorporation of Judea and Samaria is thus not just a political issue, but a theological necessity. The completion of Israel's inheritance of the whole land will precede the coming of messiah who would rule over the reunited people of Israel.²⁷

If the peace process is faltering today it has its roots in the very fortress outlook of Biniamin Nethanyahu government. Whether it is the opening a new entrance to an archeological tunnel near the Al-Aqsa mosque or the decision to restore economic incentivensess or Jewish settlements in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Harhoma all this a pointer of that outlook. The Harhoma

26. A.K. Mohapatra, "Jewish extremism, ideology behind Rabin's murder", The Statesmaan , 8 January 1996.

27. Ibid, 8 January 1996.

housing project in the contested site has hardened the public opinion further against the Oslo accord.

Mr. Nethanyahu observes in his book, "a place among the nations," an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank would be like a hand poised to strangle Israel's vital artery along the sea.²⁸

For Israel the accord is not a big gamble. It is a risk which is more than worth taking - their gains are so great. For the Palestinians the accord is indeed historic. It is a historic gamble on whose worth it is not possible today to pronounce a verdict. It could turn out to be a great betrayal.²⁹ It could also turn out to be a decisive step towards achieving an independent Palestine.

Mr. Arafat observes as, "the phased plan," under which the PLO would take whatever territory it could get in peace accord with the idea that this is just the first step in the eventual destruction of the Zionist state.

It is remarkable that PLO, which has fought for 50 years for a sovereign Palestinian state, has eventually settled for autonomy in the occupied territories and that too, in three successive stages. It is no less remarkable that, except Iran which is not an Arab nation and his outside the geographical limits of the Middle East, no Arab regime has condemned the Washington accord.³⁰

28. A.K. Mohapatra, "Peace in West Asia, Fortress outlook of Nethanyahu", The Statesman, 17 May 1997.

29. Achin Vanaik, "The historic accord", The Hindu, 22 September 1993.

30. Babani Sen Gupta, "A gulf peace process wanted", The Observer, 22 September 1993.

The peace negotiations for Arab leaders is, "peace with security" means euphemism for retaining occupied Arab land including much of the West Bank and Jerusalem.³¹

Rabin and Shimon Peres viewed Oslo treaty as a trading territory for peace meant separating two unhappily intertwined people into neighbouring states. But for Mr.Nethanyahu and his coalition partners it is nothing less than a prescription for disaster.

Mr.Nethanyahu's "peace for peace," bargain which not merely denies an independent Palestinian homeland, but also excludes issues that the Palestinians consider central to their future, notably the status of east Jerusalem and expansion of Jewish settlements.

By portraying Israel as a victim of Palestinian aggression, the right wing elements would potentially influence decisive blocks of Israeli's against the existing peace accords.

Although the peace process has led each side to officially recognise the existence of the other and both are reconciled to exchanging land for peace. The ticklish issues of settlements and self - rule for Palestinians remain unresolved hampering the entire process, analysts say.

Prof.Efrain Inbar, of the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies says, "peace process is politically imperative in Israel." No politician can afford to win an election without proving that he has given peace a fair chance. Yet Israel continues to build its military might and is resistant over the degree of

31. Op.ct, No. 28, 17 May 1997.

self-rule for Palestinians for it feels that their security is at stake as Palestinian leader Arafat has not been able to contain terrorism.³²

Prof.Inbar says that, peace process has a reduced capacity to deal with terrorism and for if Israel were to cede parts of West Bank before violence is contained by Palestinians it would render the heartland of Israel which generates 80 per cent of the country's economy, strategically vulnerable. He also says, the fears of Jews are not misfounded as Palestinian terrorists had killed a number of Jews after 1993.

The present formula of peace is peace for territories, but the process threatens Israel's defence, hence is under question. He further says that at the cultural level too, the Arabs as well as Palestinians have not accepted the peace process. Jordan's educational system - its books still have an anti - Jewish content.

Prof.A.K.Mohapatra, Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University says, that, the Israelis want Arafat to disarm the terrorists, so that the threat in the region is contained. He also says that, Israelis has to man the borders along the areas of Palestinian authority.³³

Describing Prof.Inbar and those thinking like him as 'Security Hawks,' Prof.Mohapatra classifies the rest of the Israelis broadly as ideological hawks and doves.

32. Sudha Passi, "Limitations suspicions put brakes on peace process," PTI Copy, 6 April 1998.

33. Ibid, 6 April 1998.

Mr. Nethanyahu, according to Prof. Mohapatra, command the 25 per cent of the population, while the 'doves' - mostly labour party individuals who had hammed the peace accord with willingness to trade land for peace constitute the rest half of the population.³⁴

The Israeli government is against giving more land and withdrawal of forces because they are suspicious. While the Israelis now harp on maximum autonomy for Palestinians with maximum security for Jews. So the peace in the region is also dependent to a large extent on the kind of external pressures both on Israel and on the Arabs. He concludes saying that "extra-regional powers especially U.S., can exert a lot of influence."

Robert Newmann, Middle East Programme Director, at the Centre for Strategic Studies in Washington, commented on the Accord signed on 1993 as, "This is only a curtain-raiser for something bigger than Camp David." The Palestinians have to keep pace, or lose other things. Arafat for eg., would lose his job. And for Rabin, this is his first chance. They have no choice but to succeed."³⁵

Mr. Danny Rubinstein, a veteran Israeli analyst of Palestinian affairs, in the daily paper, Ha'aretz, says that, "they will almost certainly reach a compromise." For Israel and the PLO, the alternative of cancelling the peace agreement does not exist, atleast now.³⁶

34. Ibid, 6 April 1998.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

With respect to the media coverage the reaction of media persons, writers and intellectuals, it has been noticed that the majority see the Palestine question as a whole issue of Arab-Israeli conflict while the fact is that the Arab-Israeli conflict took place in the three stages.³⁷

The first stage was the Israeli occupation of part of Palestine in 1948. The second stage was the occupation of the rest of Palestine after the 1967 war. The third stage was the occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982, after Israel invaded Lebanon to reject Palestinians out - the Lebanese resistance did succeed in forcing Israel to withdraw from parts of southern Lebanon in 1986, but Israel is still occupying some territory which it has declared as a 'security zone'.

37. Ali Muhsen Hamid, "PLO - Israel accord only the first step", The National Herald, 16 October 1993.

CHAPTER - III

COMPARATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

The news papers are channels of communication. They are one of the means by which a person learns what people are doing and thinking beyond his immediate environment and what is happening in other societies than his own. The particular distinction of newspapers as a means of communication at the time when their numbers flourished most, was that they were the quickest method of communicating news of events and opinions to large numbers of people outside an area covered by the spoken word.¹ As looking at the power and functions of newspaper singly and together that they are simply one of the means of communication by which the members of society are related to each other.

Content analysis is a systematic technique for analyzing message content and message handling, it is a tool for observing and analyzing the overt communication behaviour of the selected communicators.²

It is a highly developed special purpose technique used by the experts and it is generally found within the disciplines of communication, political science, psychology and social anthropology. It is a technique which aims to improve the quality of inferences we make. It is based on analysing the verbal, written or even pictorial. Various attempts have been made to define the content analysis. The first attempt in this regard was made by Berelson, who defined it as "a research technique for the objective systematic and quantitative description of

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1. Lucian W. Dye, Communications and Political Development, (NEW YORK: Princeton Publishers, 1989) p.p. 59-65.
 2. Richard Wibudd, Robert Thorde, Lewis Donohew, Content Analysis of communications, The Macmillan Publishers, p.p. 182-93.

the manifest content of communication."³ However, communication has since come to be seen not as a separate messages held stationary for analysis by being 'frozen' into print or speech but as a flow of interaction. As Lasswell has tried to define it as "who says what, in which channel, to whom with what effect?"⁴

Budd, Thorpe and Donohow has defined it as "a systematic technique for analysing message content and message handling - the analyst is concerned not with the message per se, but with the larger questions of the process and effect of communication."⁵ This definition implies that a major concern of content analysis must be the drawing of inferences. Nobody can make a communication to its effects without making inferences. Infact it is precisely that concern which distinguishes content analysis from an index or a precis.

Content analysis always involves relating or comparing findings to some standard, norm or theory. It does so to discover latent attributes or infer characteristics. So, it may be defined as: "content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages".

Content analysis aims to help improve the quality of inferences made by analysis of communications.⁶ It concentrates attention on ways in which the

3. Ruby Ghosh, Content Analysis of Foreign News in Indian News Paper, Unpublished Work, IIMC.
4. Ibid.
5. Hage Tari, Coverage of Political Crisis By Newspapers, Unpublished Dissertation, IIMc, Delhi.
6. Richard. W.Budd, Content Analysis of Communication, No.2, p. 18o.

various stages of analysis affect the inferences to be drawn from each of them. It also provides strategies for checking on the validity of inferences finally make.

Content analysis, then, is a general purpose analytical infrastructure elaborated for a wide range of uses. It is intended for anyone who wishes to put questions to communication to get data that will enable him to reach certain conclusion.⁷ Some content analysis are more objective than others. All are more objective than impressionistic assesment of the same question and materials.

It is vital to the developing sciences of human behaviour. Communicators subjected to a single stimulus such as a news event may produce or handle messages about a news event in a number of different ways. Some may produce lengthy messages, others may produce short messages and still others may produce no message at all. Some may select one part of the event to report, while the others another part. Some may display the messages prominently, others may play them in locations where they are likely to attract little attention. These message producing and handling behaviours constitute a major area of communication for research.⁸ There is a need not only for analysis of the messages passed along the news chain of various communicators, but also for discovery and examination of the factors in the environment to which these different kinds of behaviour are related.

7. Saroja Panda, Content Analysis of Two Oriya Dailies. Unpublished Dissertation, IIMC, Delhi.


8. Ibid., Richard Budd, Content Analysis of Communications, p. 186.

The content analysis as a research technique began to be used frequently with scientific precision only after the world war II. It was used for the first time for the analysis of propaganda and military intelligence. The work of Harold Lasswell, in this respect as well as other provided new insights and direction. His book, "Language of Politics," proved to be a milestone in the development of technique.

The major development occurred in the fifties and sixties, Berelson's handbook on the technique - "content analysis in communication," brought its widespread attention and enabled systematic, focussed analysis to proceed. Issues and problems became starkly apparent. To facilitate discussion, which had by now become interdisciplinary, a full scale conference was held and its findings published.⁹

Content analysis allows the investigator to observe a communicator's public messages at times and places of the investigator's own choosing. The procedure also allows him to carry out his observation without fear that the attention will bias the communicator, something that would be more difficult if the analyst were trying to watch at the scene.

9. Lucian W.Pye, communications and political development, No.1, p. 62.



THE LIMITATIONS:

The technique of content analysis has some shortcomings. They are, firstly, the technique can focus only on some of their aspects in any one study. Scientific deduction is not normally possible and so the inferences of content analysis are probabilistic. These are constraints which apply to any form of analysis of communication.

Content analysis generally produces data in answer to question. But it does not produce the question. The techniques only makes the question operational.

Secondly, a content analysis can be conducted only when much is known about the subject matter and the background of the inquiry, as content analysis is sort of an art, it cannot be better than the craftsman who employs it.

THE ADVANTAGES:

Despite the limitations the content analysis has its own advantage. They are, firstly, one can be assured about the sources of the facts. Secondly, reader

10. Claudio Cioffi - Revilla, Richard L. Merriti, Dina. A. Zinnes, Communication and Interaction in Global Politics, (Delhi) Stage Publications, 1982) Delhi.

can check on how the facts are obtained, because the method of procedure is explicit. It is possible to rely on and built upon a study which has used content in a way which is not possible with impressionistic study. Thirdly, familiarity with this technique widens the range of questions which can be asked. Fourthly, those familiar with the content analysis can be much more clear headed about drawing inferences. A fair range of possibilities for processing each step in the analysis has been explored; each person does not have to invent these process for himself. Instead, one can put effort which would have gone into this devising the most effective combination of process.

The news papers selected for the comparative content analysis are "The Hindu" and "The Times of India". Though it is a known fact, that no newspaper can claim that they have a national ciruclation, the two newspapers selected for the study which have wider coverage of area and comparatively ahead of the other newspapers in their circulation. Their coverage of Oslo accord and its aftermath has been analysed in detail also a comparative analysis been attempted to trace the variations in their coverage.

THE HINDU'S COVERAGE:

The two most indispensible men to the peace process, the former Prime Minster of Israel Mr. Yitzak Rabin and the Palestine leader Mr. Arafat, have ended up demonstrating to the world how to run a peace process without aiming at peace.¹¹ The refusal or inability to recognize the primacy of the settlements problem while negotiation the Oslo deal in the single most glaring omission of

11. K.J. Khergamvala, "The Battle for Peace".

this process. While Arafat, without admitting his fault publicly, is trying to exploit the massacre to make settlements issue creep into the negotiating the process. Rabin is fiercely resisting reopening of the Oslo accord. Mr. Arafat had so obviously tried to regain his standing among his own people that he cannot afford not to use the massacre to draw substantive concessions from Israel from resuming the peace talks. Resume they will, because there is no alternative.

Characteristically alternating, between statesmanship and brinkmanship, Mr. Rabin continued to believe that there should be one law for the Israeli's and another for the Palestinians, one principle for the Israeli's another for the Palestinians. Thus, while in his own words, "there is nothing sacred about the Oslo deadlines". When the Palestinians are called for the inclusion of the settlements in a revamped Oslo agenda, his reply was that he will not reopen either the Declaration of Principles (DOP) reached at Oslo or the Cairo agreement.

The U.S. president, Mr. Clinton, seized the moment to signal direct American interest in the Israel - PLO talks by asking and getting the approval of both the sides to move their talks from Cairo to Washington.¹² Till then, Mr. Rabin had wished to keep the U.S. out and the Americans obeyed, saying they had done their own deal. Mr. Arafat is hardly a figure respected in Hebron now or before. At that moment he was to shelve plans to visit the West Bank as he has more to fear from his people than the Israeli on the street. The U.S. is trying to shore up his image as evidenced from the former secretary of state,

12. Ibid.

Mr. Warren Christopher's remark that he (Mr.Arafat) " is the flag and the star spangled banner all wrapped into one person".

Clearly Mr. Arafat needs some domestic gain, not U.S. or U.N. certificates to go back to the table. At the moment his envoy, Nabil Sha'ath is in Washington to determine exactly what the U.S. can promise to extract from Israel. The disbanding of private "settler Armies", the agreement to include settlements like Lebanon in or near heavy Palestinian concentrations immediately on the agenda, a commitment to observe a time bound Israeli pull-out date on Gaza and Jericho and an international civilian presence will be the minimal demands.

Under international pressure to ensure the safety of Palestinians, Mr. Rabin, has first moved to ensure his own survival and gamble with the future of the peace process. The issue of the Jewish settlers mean while had reached an impasse.¹³

While Mr. Rabin had moved to try and preserve his position, Mr. Arafat was in dire straits. He had very little room for manoeuvre. There was a desperate attempt even by the U.S. to bolster his standing. The one consolation he and Mr. Rabin had was that each of them had the other's and the U.S.'s support for staying in the office.

13. Khergamvala, F.J., "Rabin under pressure at home", 7 March 1994. It was assumed that any group that avenges Hebron will gain street popularity, at the expense of the PLO. It is because of this that the Fatah hawks, actually of Mr. Arafat's faction have taken the initiative in the post Hberon activism whereas the Hamas has itself indulged in more sophisticated propoganda, such as organising street plays reenacting the Heron massacre.

It is doubtful if the Palestinians in West Bank will be reassured by Israel's reported willingness to deploy armed international observers to guarantee security for them at Hebron where a large number of Arab worshippers were massacred by a Jewish extremist. Mr. Arafat had responded with admirable restraint and statesmanship to the Hebron devilishness in spite of the grave threat that had posed to his leadership. But his task is not being made any easier by the U.S. as its moves are inspired more by a sense of expediency and strategic self-interest rather than by the imperatives of ushering a lasting peace in West Asia.

It became obvious that the U.S. while seeking to promote the peace accord between Israel and the PLO is not influenced by considerations of equality as it cannot ignore pressures from powerful lobbies at home. It redounds to the credit of the PLO that their response to the proposals for resumption of peace talks is positive and is influenced by a sense of awareness of having to make the best of what has always been to them a bad situation. The Hebron massacre has put Israel also in predicament because of the sense of grave and perceptual insecurity it had spread among Israeli settlers in West Bank. Reports from West Asia reveal that the sense of despair over their government's ability to give them prolonged protection in making Israeli's in West Bank think of their settlements as another country separated from Israel proper.¹⁴ This could only further complicate the tangled situation in West Asia by leaving Israel to come to terms with the fractured psyches in West bank and Tel Aviv. The least that the other countries, principally the U.S. should be doing is to desist from making matters more difficult for the PLO and Israel.

14. "The PLO and Israel," Editorial, 29 March 1994.

The wages of rushing into a ceremony visited what should have a sober and dignified occasion for Mr. Rabin and Mr. Arafat to sign the agreement in Cairo, beginning the handover of few Israeli - occupied territories¹⁵ to the Palestinians.

The last minute hitch over the signing of the accord between Mr. Rabin and Mr. Arafat, in Cairo, actually extending to twelve hours should give some idea of how over four decades of hostility and bitterness could not be wished away despite the earnestness and goodwill which have been brought to the ushering in of peace in West Asia. Though the agreement was signed on 4 May 1994, the speech made by Mr. Rabin about the problems still before the two sides makes it quite clear that the issues in dispute between Israel and PLO could not be brought down in hard bargaining for a long time yet.

The twelve hours impasse in Cairo was the result of the hesitation felt by Mr. Arafat to sign the maps relating to the Jericho area since, Israel is yet to concede his demand for a far larger share of the territory.¹⁶

The many 'ifs' and 'buts' which the negotiations relating to Jericho, the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights indicated by the very different perceptions of the concerned parties make it clear that they will have to muster enough will to arrive at a lasting settlement, the longing for peace felt among the negotiating parties should help them make further headway.

5. Khergamvala, F.J., "Arafat Rabin sign accord", 5 May 1994.

5. "Historic Accord," Editorial, 7 May 1994.
Arafat was reluctant to sign the maps pertained to Jericho area. In the agreement, the size of the Jericho area was a major disagreement, despite which due to U.S. pressure

As regards the security aspects the most crucial part of the peace process, both principals have put in fairly serious efforts. Palestinian policemen appear willing to go beyond the limit considered sufficient by their political bosses in their containment of the Islamic resistance movement and other extremist groups.

Mr. Rabin has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction over the attitude of the Palestinian Authority as regards this matter though even these espousals have become relatively muted of late.

While Mr. Rabin thought that without this excessive stress on the security aspects the accord will not be palatable to his own citizens, this emphasis is causing much discomfort to the Palestinians.¹⁷ They feel that Israel is using its own security concerns as an excuse for being niggardly in the grant of more autonomy to the Palestinian authority and thus slowing the pace of normalization.

The handing over of control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho, the return of the PLO chairman Mr. Arafat to Palestine, the extension of autonomy over some additional spheres over the rest of the West Bank and several other measures have not taken place in accordance with the schedule originally envisaged.

Progress though tardy, had nevertheless taken place. Some form of synchronization between Israeli and Palestinian security forces took place and the Israeli's have significantly reduced their intimidating presence in the Gaza

17. Kesava Menon, "Israel-PLO peace holds amid hope and despair", 15 September 1994.

Strip and Jericho. Palestinians now control the educational system over the area under the control and are to be taking on burdens of looking after health, social services, tourism and direct taxation.

But a bigger problem is the desperate situation in the infrastructure field. Foreign donors have not come good on their promises, citing the lack of an accountability apparatus in the Palestinian authority.¹⁸ They also balk at conceding Palestinian demands, made from a sound basis, that aid is required not merely for the development and running of physical infrastructure but also for administrative costs, including salaries of policemen.

West Asian peace negotiators have finally been able to shift their focus from harder political issues to those which can be termed more humanitarian in nature. A resolution of these "softer" issues will, however, acquire real value only if there is some movement towards the breaking of the deadlock on the political issues.

The basic issue is to be settled is the number of Palestinians who will be given the right to return to the lands from which they were ousted. Arabs estimate that the total number is in range of eight lakhs, comprising who were forced out to Egypt and around six lakhs who went to Jordan.

As long as Rabin was alive there seems to be more reasons for the confidence that Israel would see the next phase through. The popular perceptions about his undoubted commitment to the security of Israel, combined with an increasingly probable abatement of Arab militancy, could have brought the

18. Ibid.

swing votes round to the view that the peace process would actually enhance their security. There is no doubt about Rabin's successors commitment to the policy. But Mr. Shimon Peres, by himself was not believed to have the credibility with regard to assurance of security which would be necessary to swing the extra votes - seemingly aware of this failing, Mr. Peres has moved swiftly to promote the 'Mr. Security'¹⁹ of the next generation.

Israel since its inception, has been a highly militarized state - keeping aside the philosophical questions about the merits of Zionism, it can be argued that this militarization was necessary if Israel was to survive. Now it has reached such a position of strength that the Israeli state cannot be destroyed by an outside power. For Mr. Rabin, Mr. Peres and others of their ilk, this position of strength gave the wherewithal to make peace with their neighbours. Right-wing Israelis would prefer to use this strength to impose their solutions on the region.

The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), has also sought to put itself under the Pan - Arab protection, that it too was combating a foreign force in occupation of their territories.²⁰ If Hamas intends this to mean the Israeli control over the large parts of the West Bank, then the statement holds

19. Kesava Menon, "Will peace rise from Rabin's ashes", 12 November 1995.

20. Kesava Menon, "Summit fails to define terrorism", 15 March 1996.
The Hamas is not a cohesive entity under the central command. So, PLO has had to face the problem of controlling the militancy unleashed by Hamas, to hold the peace process intact.

out some promise of an eventual understanding. But since Hamas also rejects Israel's right to exist this could also be a reference to what it would perceive as Israeli "occupation" of any part of the Pre - 1948 Palestine. Such a perception of being rejected by an ever increasing number of Arab countries themselves.

In Jerusalem in a joint conference with Mr. Peres, Mr. Clinton pledged \$100 to combat West Asian terrorism and promised stronger security ties with the Jewish state. Also, Mr. Dennis Ross, special U.S. envoy to West Asia, shuttled between Israeli and Palestinian leaders seal an agreement on Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank city of Hebron by the end of 1997. At the same time the Israeli Prime Minister Mr. Binyamin Netanyahu, grappled with right - wing backers increasingly incensed by the prospect of their government ceding most of the city they deem Jewish by birthright.

Since the start of what were then described as "urgent" negotiations in October 1997,²¹ the Israeli army has made the necessary preparations to rapidly transfer control over about 85 per cent of Hebron to the Palestine Authority.

The military headquarters has been virtually vacated, military posts and barriers have been moved or dismantled, a new bunkers have been set up around the anticipated perimeter of the Jewish enclave in the centre of Hebron.

The Israeli officials believed that Mr. Arafat could follow his past practice and create an eleventh hour crisis in a bid to extract a final concession from the

21. "Palestinian - Israeli resolve all security issues", Editorial, 1 January 1997.

Israelis and to demonstrate to his Palestinian constituency that he was extracting the best deal possible.

But Mr. Nethanyahu, already under severe pressure from his right wing was, expected to resist any further concession. The Israelis does not at all appear to be ready to accept pending proposals to move forward the negotiations with the Palestinians and neither the U.S. nor any one else appears ready to use anything more than a slightly stronger tone to persuade them. This despite the successful effort of the Palestinian authority to contain the militants atleast temporarily.

The U.S. proposal as is well known, calls for a three phase pull-out of Israeli forces from a further 13 per cent of the West Bank with the Palestinian authority implementing specific security measures in correspondence with each of these phases. Israel has so far refused to withdraw from more than 9 per cent insists that this will be the last pull- out before a permanent settlement and would like to have the final judgement on whether the Palestinians are fulfilling their security obligations or not.²² The Palestinians are willing to accept a transfer of 13 per cent in this phase provided there is atleast one more transfer (to be negotiated) before the permanent status talks begins. They would also like the U.S. to be a participant and there by have the final say, in a tripartite arrangement to monitor the implementation of the agreement if it comes about. Israeli protestations about their security fears contrast with the fact that no major

22. Kesava Menon, "U.S. needs to put Israel further", 9 May 1998.

act of terrorist violence have taken place in the recent past and more vividly with the fact that Israel appears to be using the time provided by negotiations to indulge in a frenzy of construction of housing units for Israeli Jews in the West Bank.

Political analysts believe that Mr. Nethanyahu has been pushed into a corner and is fighting for his political survival with the right wing hawks in his coalition threatening to pull the plug if he went ahead and agreed to a 13 per cent pull-out from West Bank as being insisted by the Clinton administration.²³ Washington has made it plain during the course of the London talks that there would be little point in the Israeli leader travelling in the U.S. and to start the West Asia peace process that has fumbled over the last year or so.

The U.S. has denied that Ms. Madeline Albright has issued an ultimatum to Israel hours after Mr. Nethanyahu refused to attend the West Asia peace summit. Claiming that Clinton administration was the best friend Israel had in 50 years, the state department spokesman, Mr. James Foley, claimed that Ms. Albright did not give any ultimatum at all that the Jewish state should be prepared to give up 13 per cent of the West bank territory to the Palestinians²⁴ as the price of the meeting with the U.S. president Mr. Clinton. Thus, making the picture very clear that U.S. is not intending to use stronger terms to persuade Israel to proceed the peace process.

23. Sridhar Krishnasamy, "U.S. denies putting pressure on Israel", 9 May 1998.

24. Ibid.

THE TIMES OF INDIA'S COVERAGE:

Syria hinted that it may accept a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Golan heights, suggest that the indirect negotiations between Damascus and Tel Aviv may be entering a more substantive stage. Though it is too early to expect any major of breakthrough, Syria has been quietly setting a stage for a rapprochement by moderating its position on issues which it had previously declared to be non-negotiable.²⁵ The reasons of Mr. Hafiz Azad's flexibility are not hard to find. It has been his pet theme all these years that there can be no settlement unless Israel withdraws from all the occupied territories. The signing of the PLO - Israel accord, behind his back, disabused him of the notion that there was a greater Arab cause to be upheld. His anger against the "betrayal" by Mr. Arafat has not succeeded in derailing the process which has now led to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho.

Mr. Arafat too finds it ever more difficult to maintain his credibility as the sole leader of Palestinians. The foreign aid which was promised for development of the desolate Gaza and Jericho has been slow in coming and Mr. Arafat's dictatorial manner of functioning has alienated many of his able lieutenants.²⁶ The Palestinians unlike many other Arabs are highly educated and politically aware and they are chary of Mr. Arafat's style of functioning. The Israelis have so far not appreciated the very real problems Mr. Arafat faces in controlling the rebellious Gaza and Palestinians in other parts of the occupied territories who have waited too long for the peace dividend.

25. "Accord on the heights", Editorial, 21 May 1994.

26. "Bullets can't kill accord in West Asia", Editorial, 6 November 1995.

What Israel seems to overlook is that even with the mighty technology and resources Israel was not able to tackle along suicide bombers and other terrorists successfully. For all his faults, it is Mr. Arafat and his organisation, that Israel can do business with PLO is a moderate and relatively secular force and though Mr. Arafat has cracked down severely on fundamentalists every time they indulge in such violence, he is hampered from the fact that he still lacks the political legitimacy that can only be conferred through elections.

The assassination of Mr. Rabin may slow Israel's plans to withdraw from West Bank but it is not expected to halt the peace process.

Atleast initially, the slaying of Mr. Rabin has paralysed Israel, and it took weeks for Mr. Peres, the new leader to quell the internal turmoil.

Mr. Pares has a willing partner in Mr. Arafat, the PLO leader who made clear his concern that killing of Mr. Rabin would not be a pretext for freezing the process just as Israel was poised to withdraw the first major city on 19 November 1995.²⁷

When Mr. Rabin was assassinated the peace process was proceeding at smoother pace than ever before, the troop pull-out from the West Bank towns were being conducted without any glitches, a successful economic summit in Amman which opened up new avenues of co-operation between Israel and its former enemies had been concluded. However, contrary to the expectations from many quarters, the assassination did not hinder the peace process in any significant way. Mr. Rabin's successor Mr. Peres was if anything far more

27. Lalitha Panickar, "Delays hamper West Asia peace talks", 29 July 1995.

inclined to come to an accommodation with the Arabs than Mr. Rabin ever was. It was he who was the real architect of the peace process, through he lacked the political stature to implement it as effectively as Mr. Rabin.

The U.S. sponsored peace process has resulted in the creation of a Palestinian Authority (PA) ²⁸ and the notional withdrawal of the Israeli soldiers from major Palestinian urban centres in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. As per existing agreements, however, the PA has exclusive administrative control, but not sovereignty - over only about 5 per cent of the West Bank. Even here, this 'autonomy' can be enjoyed strictly on Israeli sufferance. Shortly after the Jerusalem bombing, in fact the Israeli government announced that hence forth, its troops would be free to return to the "self-rule" areas. If they haven't so far, this is only because of the enthusiasm with which the PA has itself been arresting suspected militants.

Meanwhile, the Israeli government has happily reverted back to its extremist ways last seen during the Intifadah. Entire Palestinian areas are being cordoned off and blockaded and curfews are kept in place for day on end. In a blatant violation of Article 53,²⁹ of the fourth Geneva convention relating to the protection of civilians in occupied territories, the homes of relatives of suspected territories are being dynamited. Oslo process - itself made possible by the heroic Intifadah of 1987-93, offered a historic chance to correct these horrible wrongs through a just settlement i.e., a Palestinian homeland, return of refugees, evacuation of occupied territories and eventually, Israel Palestinian conciliation.

28. "Soldier of peace", Editorial, 9 November 1995.

29. Siddarth Varadarajan, "Israel must accept the inevitable", 23 March 1996.

But the 1993-95 agreements failed to address the real issues fully, leaving asymmetries of power unchanged. Apart from removal of Israeli troops from parts of the West Bank and Gaza and recognition for the PLO, they represented no major gains. They transferred just 3 per cent of the territory to Palestinian Authority, quasi Bantustan powers and unequal integration into Israel's economy.³⁰ They did not even acknowledge the occupation. Today, Mr. Nethanyahu's coalition of religious and nationalist super hawks refuses to implement the accords. Oslo is virtually dead.

In the election Mr. Nethanyahu narrowly edged out Mr. Arafat's peace partner Mr. Peres. Mr. Peres was insisted from various quarters including that of PLO for resumption of talks of the West Bank and Gaza strip.

Mr. Arafat was disappointed by the defeat of Mr. Peres and feared that the hardline Mr. Nethanyahu, who opposes the land-for-peace concept, would not continue talks on the so-called "final status" of the West Bank and Gaza Strip³¹ which the Peres Government started on 5 May 1996.

Meanwhile, Palestinians are widely disappointed with the right wing victory in Israel. A government led by Mr. Nethanyahu may destroy any hopes the Palestinians had for an independent home land, was the feeling prevailing over the minds of Palestinian youths.

Any illusion that Washington would prod the new Israeli government into moderating its hostility towards Palestinian aspirations must now be buried quietly along with the prospect of a just and enduring peace in West Asia.

30. Praful Bidwai, "Unhappy at fifty, no peace sans justice for Israel, 5 May 1996.

31. "Palestinians urge Nethanyahu to go ahead with peace process", Editorial, 2 June 1996.

Through out his public appearances with Mr. Clinton and other U.S. leaders, Nethanyahu's men remained as uncompromising as ever rejecting the formula of "land for peace."³² Mr. Nethanyanu spoke of the need for `security'-nebulous term that has always been used by Israeli governments to avoid withdrawing from territories illegally seized from Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese.

The unseemly spectacle of U.S. Members of Congress lustly cheering Mr. Nethanyahu for promising that Israel would never relinquish control over east Jerusalem or end its policy of building Jewish settlements in occupied Arab lands proves that the U.S. is not an `honest broker'. Mr. Nethanyahu's `promises' were in contravention of international law, the Oslo accords and the official position of the U.S. government.³³

A major sticking point is Israel's allergy of discussing a date for troops withdrawal from the West Bank town of Hebron. The withdrawal is already overdue for a longer period raising suspicions about Israel's intentions. The only positive outcome of the meet was the promise of continuous and intensive negotiations to begin soon in the presence of a U.S. mediator. However, the situation on the ground does not generate optimism.

All hope is not lost, Mr. Nethanyahu knows only too well that his rigid position cannot pay dividends in the long run. The majority of Israeli's want peace. A new generation in Israel has become increasingly the promotion of a

32. "Not so innocent abroad", Editorial, 16 July 1996.

33. Ibid.

militaristic culture.³⁴ Many young people resent compulsory army service which disrupts personal life and the pursuit of individual careers. The killing of a popular prime minister Mr. Rabin at the hands of fanatical Israeli has altered many Israelis to the growth of a culture of terror within the country.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TWO NEWS PAPER COVERAGE:

The aspects which led to chaos and the hindering factors that prevail among two leaders, viz., Mr. Rabin and Mr. Arafat were highlighted with no bias.

Israel's sticking on to its security aspect was blamed by both the newspaper articles. Also, the impasse in implementing the scheduled envisage was clearly exposed in the articles.

The root cause for failure of Palestine self ruled areas ie., foreign donors failure to invest due to lack of infrastructure and the negligence of Israel to proceed peace process - the mask which was used by Israel in the name of security came under high criticism.

By and large the sporadic violence was traced as the outcome of non-implementation of the original envisaged schedule of 13 September 1993 by the reknown writers.

The role of the U.S. was a major factor which was highlighted, also the attitude of both the leaders who were showing no interest to pursue peace, but obliged due to keen efforts of the U.S. was assessed.

34. "Tunnel vision", Editorial, 5 October 1996.

Even though many flaws were criticised time and again after the agreement been signed, the Hebron massacre was a point where both the leaders diverted from the peace process, as Mr.Rabin fiercely closed the doors for negotiation. Also, Mr. Arafat's unwillingness to accept the fault of his on this issues came under severe criticism.

Mr. Arafat's inability to control the Palestinian militancy, especially that of Hamas and Mr.Rabin crying for the security aspects of Israel were not appreciated by the articles.

The present impasse in the process as the Israel does not oblige to pull-out more than 9 per cent as they want to see whether the Palestinians are fulfilling their security obligations. But U.S. urges for a 13 per cent pull-out which was acceptable for Palestinians - an indepth analysis on the proceedings were attempted in both the newspapers.

These articles and features are the contributions of scholars, academicians and foreign correspondents, who are credited with presenting unbiased views in their presentation. So, both the newspapers even though the quantity of coverage slightly varies, the quality of them were maintained very high, viz., they brought unbiased and quality articles by and large and they tends to do so as it is visible in the coverage of recent articles carried on these newspapers. Also, it should be taken in to account that both Israel and the PLO came under constant criticism whenever they failed to honour their commitment.

CHAPTER - IV

CONCLUSION:

**THE PEACE PROCESS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
ON INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

Both India and Israel are regional power in their own right .At the same time they are not equal powers. In terms of size , population and resources , India is much larger. The relations between the two can thus described as between a medium power and a small power.

A nation's attempt towards realization off its goals in the international arena becomes its foriegn policy. In its broadest sense foriegn policy can be defined as the part of the state policy which aims to enhance its influence beyond its geographical forntiers for the welfare of its citizens. In other words, a study of foriegn policy is concerned with inter-state relations in terms of decisions and actions.¹

As far as normalization of diplomatic ties with Israel is concerned, the most crucial decision was taken in 1952. According to Walter Eytan, as well as Nehru's Biographer S.Gopal, normalization was agreed in principle during Eytan's visit in March 1952.² Nehru promised Eytan to refer the issue to the cabinet for final approval. The issue was put up before the cabinet and it apparently failed to obtain unanimous support.

Therefore, while evaluating the determinants of India's policy, the 1952 decision becomes crucial. Several factors led to this decision of deferment while some factors strengthened this decision others favoured maintenance of the status quo.

1. Joseph Frankel, The making of foreign policy. (London, 1968) p.1.

2. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru : A biography, (New Delhi, 1979), Vol. II, p.170.

POLITICAL FACTOR:

A mixture of idealism in the form of commitment to principles and realism in the form of adherence to national interest can be said to have shaped India's Israel policy. There are three major aspects of the political factor, viz., India's perception of Jewish nationalism, its disposition towards the Arabs and increasing isolation faced by Israel. Because of its colonial past and subjugation, India became a staunch advocate of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and decolonization. Its support for various nations liberation movement testify to this commitment. Its support for the Arab cause in Palestine is part of this policy. Israel did not come under this category. India's national leadership did not perceive Zionism as a national liberation movement. On the contrary, Zionism's links with British imperialism aroused suspicious about its intention in the eyes of the Indian nationalists. This historical aversion continued after 1947 and as a result India did not look upon Israel as the culmination of the Jewish nationalism.

For India, Israel, was a small part of the Arab-dominated West Asia, while it refrained from interfering in Intra-Arab and intra-regional rivalries or differences. India has been sympathetic to the Arabs in their conflict with the Jews. Unlike, the West, India does not have the ability or necessity to adopt an independent and neutral attitude towards Israel.

Even when India was favourably disposed towards Israel, its support proved insufficient against heavy odds. India, for its own national self-interest, conceived and championed the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity. And it could not accept Israel as a part of third world.

RELIGIOUS FACTOR:

The partition of the Indian sub-continent on communal basis seriously affected the Indian thinking. Overtly or covertly, the proponents as well as opponents of the Indian policy on Israel have used the argument of 'religion-based state.'³

However, a closer examination would reveal that neither India's commitment to secularism nor the Jewishness of Israel affected India's policy. Strictly speaking none of the Arab states are secular; and even countries like Egypt, Iraq or Syria do not deny a pre-eminent status to Islam and Islamic values. Just as Israel, their secularism is within the religious paradigm. The Islamic laws more specifically the Shariat have been officially recognized as the source of law in the Arab world. A number of states are constitutionally named as Islamic Republics. In some cases like Saudi Arabia, religious discriminations are institutionalized. Therefore its commitment to secularism could have little influence upon Indian Israel policy.

ECONOMIC FACTOR:

The economic factor affected marginally on India's policy towards Israel. India's official commercial interaction with Israel has been rather meagre and miniscule from the very beginning. There can be three possible explanations for this; the exports of both the countries are non-complementary in character, Israel

3. Theodore P. Wright, "Ethnic groups pressure in foreign policy : Indian muslims and American Jews", Economic and political weekly, Vol. 17, No.40, 9.10.1982, p.55.

offers little incentive for India because of its meagre market potential for Indian goods or the official figures are not real.⁴

PUBLIC OPINION:

Public opinion plays a vital role in the functioning of a democratic state. The question of Jewish state came up for discussion in parliament even five months before the formation of Israel. After May 1948, the constituent assembly was approached with the demand for India's recognition. Following the September 1950 decision, Parliament witnessed increasing demand for diplomatic relations and normalization of ties with Israel figured in all through the years.

PAKISTAN FACTOR:

Though the Indian policy on non-alignment, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism has been independent of Pakistan, it has influenced India's foreign policy rather significantly in other respects. This becomes apparent in the case of Israel. Indian leaders were always apprehensive of Pakistan's move in West Asia and as a result countering Pakistan often became the primary task of Indian missions in the region.

India's position on various issues regarding Israel can be attributed to the Pakistan factor. The delay in India's recognition of Israel is largely an outcome of the Pakistan factor. Indian mission in West Asia often warned the foreign office of the potential propaganda value of this move for Pakistan.

4. R.K. Srivastava, "India-Israel relations", Indian Journal of political science, Vol.31, No.3, July-Sept. 1970, p.p. 257-58.

INDIA AND ISRAEL AN OVERVIEW:

It is true that the Indian attitude towards Zionism prior to 1948, influenced and to some extent determined Indian policy towards Israel. Even if India were to perpetuate its earlier stand, the geographical legal and political realities of Palestine underwent a metamorphosis. India was quick to come to terms with the new situation and began to interact with Israel.

Within hours of its proclamation, the state of Israel began approaching other states for recognition. India took as long as 28 months to formally recognize Israel. Since, Israel had made a number of attempts to cultivate relationship with India and to establish normal ties with it, this approach gives an idea about the Israeli perception of India; also with the possible exception of K.M. Panikkar, most of the Indian scholars and diplomats had taken extra care in expressing their views on Israel.⁵ This led to the popular belief that Israel and India were basically antithetical to each other and enjoyed no common political ideas.

The Palestinian factor adds the crucial third dimension to the understanding of the Indo-Israel relations. Going by the official Arab pronouncements, Palestine includes the whole territory of mandatory Palestine inclusive of the present day Israel. The formation of the PLO gave institutional framework to this concept. The Palestinians objective was to create a state of their own encompassing the entire mandatory territory, keeping in tune with the Arab sensitivities, third world for like the non-aligned movement generally preferred the term Palestine to Israel.

5. K.M. Panikkar, "In two Chinas : Memoirs of a diplomat" (London, 1955) p.p. 12-13.

India's recognition of Israel marked a new trend. The establishment of Israel, its acceptance by both the rival blocks, the inter-Arab rivalry and the fragility of the Palestinian leadership convinced India to take this step. However, recognition did not come easily. It was a long-drawn-out affair, series of requests, meetings lobbying and mild pressure from Americans preceded the Indian action.

India has had to take the anti-Israel Arab league into account in which a third party maintained an overwhelming influence upon India's bilateral relations. For instance, its decision to recognise Israel was delayed partly due to the Arab opposition.

The possibility of India playing a mediatory role was given as an official explanation for India's recognition of Israel. But it is not convincing. India's favourable disposition towards the Arabs coupled with the absence of diplomatic relations with Israel, virtually eliminated the possibility of any such role.

THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 90's:

The political leadership in India due to its powerful pro Arab lobby had concluded that the interests of the Indo-Israel relations would be best served by going slow on the high profile facts of the developing ties.

Few of India's bilateral relationships, have been so directly linked to domestic factors as the ties between India and Israel.⁶ But the domestic factor in Israel has worked both positively and negatively.

6. K. P. Nayar, "India no more wary of accepting close ties with Israel" - Indian express, 7 November 1995.

The political leadership in New Delhi has always been wary of the reactions of the Arab and muslim lobbies to the growing friendship with Israel,⁷ a counterbalance of this has been the virtually unmatched reservoir of good will towards Israel among Indians.

India and Israel signed three agreements on avoidance of double taxation, customs co-operation and bilateral investment promotion. India and Israel have agreed that both the governments will seek to assist the development of joint ventures between Israel and Indian companies, particularly, in the fields of high technology industries, telecommunication, aviation industries, agriculture, agro technology, health care and medical equipment, chemistry, textiles, etc.,⁸

Israel is looking towards India as a growing market and production centre for high technology goods in the region. Both India and Israel are thriving democracies, with growing market economies.⁹ They share deep root in their own distinct, but ancient traditions and culture.

Israel believes that India can be a positive factor in encouraging the peace process as a trustworthy interpreter of the views of PLO.¹⁰ As such, India became a member of the five working groups dealing with the various aspects of the peace process.

7. Ibid.

8. Israel India sign three agreements, Editorial, Deccan Herald, 30 January 1996.

9. E.C. Thomas, "Israeli presidents visit to India", The Pioneer, 26 December 1996.

10. "Weizman visit may boost Indo-Israel ties", Editorial, New Times 28 December 1996.

Though Israel had set up a consulate in Mumbai way back in 1949, the unstinting support which India has been giving to the Palestinians led by Mr. Arafat had kept New Delhi and Tel Aviv very much away from each other until the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.¹¹ Despite the friendliness of Israel's often expressed pronouncements about India even during the years when they had no diplomatic representation in their capitals, New Delhi had to remain aloof because of its friendly relations with Arab world.

India has always been importing oil and petroleum products to meet its ever increasing demand. Even under British, oil was a major import. In spite of the drive for self-sufficiency, the increase in demand outstrips domestic supply.

Petroleum became a political weapon in the wake of the war when the Arabs used oil exports to further their political interest.¹² In spite of its short tenure, the Arab oil embargo brought about drastic changes in the policies as well as perceptions of states who hitherto either sympathetic towards Israel or indifferent towards the Arabs. Their dependence upon the Arab supplies exposed the vulnerability of the western country.

The political power of oil was never used against India but India became highly vulnerable since 1970's. It was during the post 1973 period that India's postures vis-a-vis Israel became vocal and unfriendly and compared to the earlier

11. Subha Singh, "Weizman presents another face", The Pioneer, 9 January 1997.

12. Peter R. O'Dell, Oil and world power: Background to the oil crisis. (New York 1974) 3 edn., p. 161.

phase, even hostile. This shift could be the effect of the Arab petro-power and the Arab determination to use it for political purposes.

India supported the cause of Arabs during the Arab-Israeli conflict because India felt that improved ties with Israel may affect our relations with Islamic Arab countries which are the main exporters of oil to the India. These misgivings does not hold good anymore with the West Asia peace process in progres

Pakistan may send wrong signals to Islamic countries through false propaganda that India is engaged in a military alliance with Israel, but it can always be countered with proper diplomatic public relations moves in the Islamic countries that India has been fighting for PLO's cause and has contributed one million for its development which is enough proof for countering such false propaganda.¹³

OSLO PEACE ACCORD AND ITS OUTCOMES:

The Oslo accord signed in Washington on 13 September 1993, with the belief that, for Israelis, the creation of "Greater Israel," with permanent soverign over Judea and Samaria, the occupied West Bank. For the Palestinians, it gave the hope that they could return to the pre-1967 boundaries. Whereas the Israeli radicals were of the view that the Palestinians have a land, Jordan and that is where they must depart for.

13. P.K. Vasudeva, "Indo-Israel military cooperation", National Herald, New Delhi, 12 February 1997.

Mr. Arafat needs the labour led coalition for the peace process being properly implemented. Even though the accord was signed, there were a lot of aspects which are left unsolved viz., the status of the Jerusalem.. On the very day after signing the accord Mr. Rabin made it clear that, the Jerusalem will remain as the capital of Israel. But the Palestinians are of the view that the issue be sorted out through negotiations based on the U.N. resolutions 242 and 338.

Another controversial aspect was that of the Palestinians long cherished desire to return to the home land "right to return". The Israeli's are not willing to admit hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled away during the 1967 war.

The other outstanding issue was that of transferring the area of Jericho to Palestinians rule. The Israeli's limit their evaluation to the 25 square kilo meter but the Palestinians were demanding about 380 square kilo meters of the Jericho administrative district.

At the outset the print media has played a role of indirectly shaping the cognitive aspect called "attitudinal prism".¹⁴ This in turn contributes to the process of policy making specially towards peace process.

14. M. Michael Bercher, The foreign policy system of Israel, (London, New York : Oxford University, Press, 1972) p.10.

The columnists including reknowned journalists and academician's together forms a group known as the "non - associational interest group",¹⁵ who provide the feedback as regards the environemnt (external to the decision maker and also demand specific policy decision in the national interest.

In brief it is the interpretation of information, by the opinion makers, which forms the attitudinal process and thus forms the contributions of peace process.

With reference to the break up of the coverage which was discussed in the earlier chapter, the coverage of evgentt as well as unbiased report of the development in peace process, an indepth analysis of the media coverage shows, the interpretation varies among newspapaers and among authors. But on the whole, the assesment is dispassionate, unprejudiced and a tinge of support for Palestinian cause, while bitter criticism being offered to Israel for being annexianist, hegemonic and imperialist.

In general, the articles portrays a pessimistic or greemy scenario in which the Israel leadership in partrayed as inconsistent, unyielding and uncampromising. More so, hellbent on building the South Africa type Bandustan for Palestinians.

15. Joseph Franker, The making of foreign policy : An analysis of decision making, (London : Oxford University Press, 1963), p.p. 70-81.

Additional prism - overall attitude of the decision makers which is sepped by their perception of the events unfolding in the region in West Asia. And thus determinants under policy decision especially in connection with India's bilateral relation with Israel.

The Israeli fanatics view the land as living being and surrendering territories or the destruction of settlements means severing of a limb from a living body. Thus, the question of borders automatically assumes cosmic proportions.

After the elections in which Mr. Peres was edged out by the Likud party coalition leader Mr. Biniamin Nethanyahu, the peace process started faltering. He opened a new entrance to an archeological tunnel near Al-Aqsa mosque, or the decision to restore economic incentives and Jewish settlements in the east Jerusalem neighbourhood of Harhoma - all this is a pointer of that outlook.

The peace process was viewed by Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres as a trading territory for peace meant separating two unhappily intertwined people into neighbouring states. But for Mr. Nethanyahu and his coalition partners it is nothing less than a prescription for disaster.

The security concern used by Israel and its urging on PLO to disarm the militants which Mr. Arafat was unable to do so, made the process more complicated.

The events like returning of occupied areas to the Palestinians and returning of Mr. Arafat to Palestine etc, which was originally envisaged and was not implemented as signed.

At the heart of the present stalemate in the situation that both the sides accuse each other of not being true to the letter and spirit of the September 1993 accord.

The PLO's few allegations are the frequent and long closures of Israeli borders with the West Bank and Gaza, thus depriving thousands of Palestinians of their livelihoods; Palestinian prisoners still in jails; and the opening of a safe passage linking the Gaza Strip with the autonomous town of Jericho in the West Bank. These promises have been made and their fulfilment is overdue. To make things worse the Israeli government built two new settlements and expanding the existing ones allegedly in an effort to broaden the boundaries of Jerusalem - an idea which was opposed by Mr. Rabin.

As for the Israelis, the single most important issue is Arafat's inability to check the terrorist attacks carried out by the Islamic militants like Hamas, who remained opposed to the peace process. The question is does Mr. Arafat have enough manoeuvring room to operate, given the old Israeli intransigence? It is common knowledge that the PLO chief had laid down all his trump cards while striking a deal with Israel despite tough internal opposition. He did it with the fervent hope that progress in gaining autonomy would gradually disarm the extremists within the Palestinian movement and ensure majority support for the idea of Israel - PLO co-existence after decades of war and violence. It is essential to note that the main argument put forward like Hamas and like forces is that Israel cannot be believed to be serious about peace with Palestinians.

So far the mediator of the Oslo accord, the U.S. have not used stronger terms to persuade the Israelis on the pull out and other implementations which were accepted by them. Also, the sporadic violence which was unleashed by the Palestine militants makes the peace process to have no solution within the reachable distance.

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