

SOCIALIST FRANCE AND 'NEW COLD WAR'

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Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of
requirements for the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

**SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI—110067**

(INDIA)

1985

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In European history, France has not only been the mainspring of the "Revolutionary Spirit" but also of democratic republican institutions, and of diplomacy. Even though, France had succumbed to the Nazi aggression in June 1940, yet after the Second World, it emerged as one of the four Big Powers, one of the four occupying powers in Germany, and also one of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

Nonetheless, the Second World War had adverse consequences for France, as was the case, with the other major European powers. All of them had been reduced to the status of medium-ranking powers, grouped together in two antagonistic halves in Europe, each dominated by a Super Power. As a result, Europe became the epicentre of the Cold War. There was real or imaginary fear of Soviet expansion. But that was the perception of mutual mistrust in both the halves, and this led to the creation of the NATO in the West in 1949, and six years thereafter in 1955, Soviet Union set up the Warsaw Pact Alliance system. With the entry of West Germany into the NATO in 1955, the "German problem" became insoluble.

During 1949-1953, France continued to adhere to the security prescriptions of the Atlantic Alliance with no explicit challenge to its decision making apparatus. Even though the NATO decision-making was dominated by the US and the UK in as much as that there seemed to have emerged a kind of the Anglo-Saxon directorate,

In 1953, de Gaulle returned to power with the explicit mandate to solve the Algerian problem. He not only resolved the Algerian problem, but also founded the fifth Republic making the President as one of the most powerful heads of the Executive as well as Heads of the State in the entire Western bloc. With this new role, de Gaulle set out to restore national identity to France, by insisting on equal voice in the strategic decision-making process of the NATO. Its failure led to its withdrawal from the NATO military command in 1966. The Gaullist France set up its own national strategic force, pursuing the new strategy of Tous Azimuts, which was the French response to the US adoption of the flexible response strategy of McNamara. Besides, the Gaullist France also sought to clothe into reality the concept of European unity from the "Atlantic to the Urals". In this regard, he had proposed in 1964 a new plan for realizing "detente, entente and co-operation" with the USSR and other East European countries. The Gaullist France was the first western country to have

supported the Soviet proposal for convening the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). However, after the Soviet inspired Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, in 1968, there was reconsideration of the French strategy. But surely, France neither under George Pompidou (1969-74) nor under Giscard d'Estaing (1974-81) could return to the NATO military command.

With the advent of the Socialist regime in France in 1981, powerful support has been extended to President Reagan's modernization of the NATO plan as well as deployment of the Euro-missiles in Western Europe, but not in France itself. This, however, does not mean any kind of France's sell-out to the US. On the other hand, it has used its techniques of diplomacy to further dialogue between the two Super Powers on the SALT (START) as well as on the INF/SS-20s controversial issue. Then the Socialist France was in the forefront rejecting the US policy of viewing the North-South problem from the East-West confrontational perspective and also its aggressive military expeditions in Latin America to stall the process of political change in countries such as El Salvador and Nicaragua.

The present study aims at analysing various aspects of the Socialist France's approach to the "New

Cold War". Before examining this complex issue, it is necessary to review analytically evolution of the French policies towards the first Cold War, to detente, and then to the "New Cold War".

Chapter I focuses on the role played by Presidents de Gaulle and Pompidou in leading the two rival blocs from "Cold War" to "Detente". Chapter II traces France's quest for security and its role in the convening and the conduct of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Chapter III enunciates the Socialist approach to the NATO modernization with particular reference to the issues related to the security of France. Chapter IV analyses the East-West "New Cold War" and Socialist France's response to it. An attempt has been made at an in-depth and detailed analysis of the political and military issues on the Soviet's SS-20s and the US deployment of the 464 Cruise and 108 Pershing II missiles in Western Europe.


In completing this work, I have received help and support from many quarters. But before I express my gratitude towards them, I take this opportunity to thank most profusely my parents as well as my family for all the encouragement and spiritual inspiration that I have received from them. Without their valuable support, this modest research study would have been difficult to accomplish.

Then it is with pleasure that I record wholeheartedly my thanks to my guide Professor H.S. Chopra, without whose support and inspiration at all stages, work may not have seen light of the day.

May I also take this opportunity to thank the staff of the libraries of Sapru House and of JNU for all the help and assistance extended to me during the period of my (M.Phil.) research.

New Delhi,

10 September 1985.


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CHAPTER I

FRANCE'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN DETENTE (UNDER DE GAULLE AND POMPIDOU)

In 1969, when Nixon took over as the US President, and initiated the process of detente, he realized that real cause of friction between the United States and its European allies was Europe's quest for an independent identity. This was a difficult proposition, for the latter depended upon the US for its security.

In spite of super-power tensions due to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, supply of massive arms to North Vietnam, crisis in the Middle East (which could lead to a nuclear war), and threat to US nuclear superiority by the Soviet missile build-up in the 1960s, detente prospects were improving gradually. The US policy was being reviewed by Nixon and Kissinger and steps were being taken to initiate dialogue with the USSR and China so as to enable the USA to manage the crisis in South East Asia. It is this process which has been described by Kissinger as "a high duty to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war".¹

¹ Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), p. 125.

Even though detente became a phenomenon only during Nixon's term of office, yet its intermittent traces could be found in early 1960s, as it may be seen in the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence". Then it is also believed that detente began with the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. For it enabled the US to formulate its concept of "Crisis Management".

From among the Western powers, role of France in initiating detente is of significant importance. But then let it be said that to a considerable extent, it was the by-product of de Gaulle's Europe centred diplomacy, which carried the anti-Anglo-Saxon sting. On the other hand, the Super Power detente became a compelling necessity, for the US was making attempts to extricate itself from the deep morass in which it found itself caught up in South East Asia. During Nixon's second term, the US Foreign Secretary, Henry Kissinger, made a pertinent observation: "The purpose of the alliance in the late sixties was no longer defence- at least in public rhetoric; its principal justification was becoming the relaxation of tension."² And regarding the European willingness for detente, he says, "If we [US] were perceived to block detente, we would lose the support of our West European allies, who would then speed up their own contacts with the East."³

2 Ibid., p. 89.

3 Ibid., p. 94.

Without doubt, in 1960s, General de Gaulle, even though a right-wing statesman, played an important role in creating an environment propitious for detente. He believed that ideology for the Soviets was only an instrument of power. And he was also of the view that if the two Super Powers found their interests converging, they might reach an agreement and set up a condominium over the world. Western Europe through the French initiative had to escape such a distressing situation. Nonetheless, de Gaulle was candid enough in his analysis of the value of detente for Western Europe. Perhaps, he also realized that Super Power understanding on this issue may help speed up the detente process in Europe. Hence his advice to President Nixon and Kissinger, when they visited him in Paris in February 1969, that the US must initiate dialogue with the USSR and China to settle the intricate problem in South East Asia. In his White House Years, Kissinger affirms that it was de Gaulle who told Nixon 'Not to isolate China'.⁴ Later, during his famous trip to Beijing, Nixon popularized the idea of detente.

De Gaulle always argued that Europe's identity and unity depended on self-confidence of the traditional

4 Ibid., p. 107.

European national entities. To him,

It [was] only the states, that [were] valid, legitimate and capable of achievement, there cannot be any other Europe than a "Europe of States". The states are, in truth, certainly very different from one another, each of which has its own spirit, its own history, its own language, its own misfortunes, glories and ambitions; but these states are the only entities that have the right to order and the authority to act. 5

Furthermore, in de Gaulle's mind, containment of Germany was equally important. And in realizing this objective, it is only the USSR which could play a valuable role. Hence France's cultivation of detente with the USSR was expected to produce complementarity of interests, and the 'containment' of American influence in Europe to ensure world balance.

Since early 1960s, de Gaulle has been working assiduously to nourish the notion of detente. It is in this context that de Gaulle in 1964 spoke of detente leading to entente and eventually to co-operation embracing all Europe.⁶

On 3 November 1966 French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, told the National Assembly that

5 Press Conference of 15 May 1962, Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General De Gaulle, p. 170.

6 Kremlin Address, 20 June 1966, Speeches and Press Conference, French Embassy, New York, no. 247, p. 103.

France's relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe had been changing radically. He said, "From formal, infrequent and negative, they have become numerous, cordial, constructive, and all told, normal."⁷

De Gaulle asserted that the Cold War was, 'in the process of disappearing' and France would "continue to direct her action toward continental rapprochement".⁸

In this way President de Gaulle in June 1963 vetoed the British application for membership of the EEC,⁹ demonstrated his determination to prevent what he considered an Anglo-Saxon plot to maintain US hegemony over Western Europe.

The most significant policy of France's detente in Europe related to its withdrawal from the NATO's military organization and to multiply its bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

His visit to Moscow in 1966 marked a turning point in that it was a step in the direction of the

7 Notes et Etudes Documentaires (la documentation Francaise, Paris), 3384-7 (1967), p. 191. Speeches and Press Conferences, French Embassy, New York, no. 254.

8 Ibid., no. 255, p. 242, 31 December, New Year Message.

9 William C. Cronwells, "The United States", in W.C. Cronwell, ed., Political Problems of Atlantic Partnership (1969), p. 203.

'European Europe'. A unified western Europe was thus conceived by de Gaulle not only as an independent partner of the US but also as an integral element of a Pan European system in which by its own weight it could constitute a countervailing force vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

In 1959 when General de Gaulle had reiterated his grand design of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals",¹⁰ he actually spelt out his frame of European detente. Assuming that the forces of nationalism would prevail over communist ideology, he expected that the Central and East European countries would reassert their national identity, free from the domination of the Soviet Union. France on the other hand was moved by considerations of prestige and power, ignoring ideological barriers. De Gaulle on the other hand sought in detente an opportunity to bolster France's independent policy and minimize America's influence in Europe. France reduced its military commitments to NATO and chose to approach the East on a bilateral basis. France pictured herself as a power equal to Russia in matters of European politics. In addition, France envisaged the policy of "detente to entente and to cooperation" as a vehicle for exercising restraint on West Germany and

¹⁰ Surprisingly, this slogan "Europe from the Atlantic to Urals" is attributed to the French socialist leader, Guy Mollet. See for reference in Josef Korbel, Detente in Europe (New Jersey, 1972), p. 36.

for keeping a vigilant eye on its growing power.¹¹ In fact West Germany had no other alternative than to meet the Soviet Union on the latter's terms. Once the Cold War confrontation had abated, the desire for detente gained momentum.

The May to August 1959 meeting of Foreign Ministers of the 'Big Four' produced no agreement on Germany. But it paved the way for Khrushchev's visit to the United States in October. De Gaulle altogether was unenthusiastic about the proposal for a big Four Power summit meeting which emerged from Khrushchev's US visit. On 21 October 1959, de Gaulle agreed in principle to attend but insisted, and again repeated at his press conference on 10 November, that signs of a lessening of tension in East-West relations had to be a precondition for such a meeting.¹²

France's Detente Policy and Relations with Britain and NATO

Charles de Gaulle's policy of detente in Europe was followed by his meeting with the British ambassador Christopher Soames¹³ in Elysee Palace on 4 February 1969.

11 Ibid., p. 36.

12 Discours et Messages, loc cit., p. 131; see also J.R. Tournoux, Secrets d'Etat (Paris, 1960), p. 418, quoted in Herbert Tint, French Foreign Policy Since the Second World War (London, 1972), p. 141.

13 Christopher Soames, British Ambassador to France, son-in-law of Sir Winston S. Churchill.

Britain informed United States about the discussion with de Gaulle who said that it would be necessary for Europeans to free themselves from the encumbrances of NATO, with its, "American domination and machinery".¹⁴ Henry A. Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, admitted that on European integration the British views were closer to de Gaulle's than to ours.¹⁵

When in 1966, France declared its withdrawal from the integrated command structure of the Atlantic alliance, the NATO countries who were aware of progress in Franco-Soviet relations viewed it with alarm. Particularly when the French government stated that its troops would be withdrawn from NATO Command, and asked that NATO headquarters should move out of the French territory.

De Gaulle by withdrawing from the command structure of the NATO wanted to pursue the following aims:

- (a) To bring about a detente policy in Europe which could be considered as a pattern both for East and West European countries to free themselves from WARSAW as well as NATO Pacts.
- (b) To reduce the Anglo-Saxon domination over Western Europe.

¹⁴ Kissinger, n. 1, p. 87.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 90.

However from 1 July 1966 even though the French withdrawal from the NATO became effective, yet the French state radio maintained that France still depended on the US nuclear deterrent for its protection.¹⁶

After de Gaulle's resignation from the French Presidency in April 1969, Georges Pompidou took over as President. Later in early 1970s he agreed to the British membership of the EEC. But France did not rejoin the NATO.

France's Detente Policy and Relations with the FRG

In early 1960s, the West German Chancellor, Dr Konrad Adenauer saw France as a new factor, which, in addition to the United States, could play a useful role in defence of the German interests. There seemed to be a tacit understanding between Adenauer and de Gaulle according to which the former would help the French President in the assertion of European claims vis-a-vis the United States within the NATO, while de Gaulle would support West Germany in relation to the Soviet Union.¹⁷

While Adenauer resolutely rejected many temptations to exploit Germany's opportunities for manoeuvre

16 Tint, n. 12, p. 153.

17 Alfred Grosser, La Politique exterieure de la Ve Republique (Paris, 1965), p. 85.

between East and West,¹⁸ the "Grand Coalition" in late 1960s was divided in itself. Both Kiesinger and Brandt agreed on firmness over Berlin. Kiesinger favoured a strong line towards the East. He prized the French connection, but Brandt supported Britain's entry into the EEC.

De Gaulle believed that European unity should be based upon economic integration. But then he insisted that both the means and the aims of European unity should be in accord with the traditional political realities.¹⁹

In his approach on detente, de Gaulle focused his attention first of all on the FRG. According to him, Franco-German solidarity carried all hopes of uniting Europe on political and defence level as well as on the economic level.²⁰

The Franco-West German treaty (signed in January 1963) which was formulated for detente all over Europe created suspicion in the minds of different European leaders. The Czechoslovak government in an official note pointed to its "dangerous consequences". Polish government protested by viewing the pact with "profound disquiet".

18 Kissinger, n. 1, p. 97.

19 Alan Watson, Europe at Risk (London, 1972), p. 157.

20 Korbelt, n. 10, p. 47.

Izvestia termed de Gaulle's idea of "Europe from Atlantic to the Urals" as "pure adventurism".²¹

Alan Watson in his book "Europe at Risk"²² stated that de Gaulle (in the first volume of his "Memoirs of Hope" published shortly before his death in 1970) in his first meeting with Konrad Adenauer at La Boisserie in Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises on 14 and 15 September 1958 stated his terms for Franco-German reconciliation. Germany should in the long term, reject nuclear weapons and accept the present frontiers. De Gaulle explained to Adenauer that the difficulties facing the EEC related to agriculture as well as the British candidature, and added that France might oppose Britain's entry into the European Communities. On both these issues, the French Government was counting on the West German support.

Willy Brandt²³ in his well-known book, A Peace Policy for Europe, states

21 Le Monde, 17 February 1963. The Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. 15, no. 7, p. 15. The idea was not only adventurism; it was also a phantasy. Andre Malraux told C.L. Sulzberger that de Gaulle, speaking of a Europe from Atlantic to Urals, "implied partitioning the Soviet Union." New York Times, 21 January 1972.

22 Watson, n. 19, p. 163.

23 Willy Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe (London, 1969), p. 46.

For me it was no surprise that after the formation of the new Federal administration there was no difficulty in finding a close accord on those questions touching on Eastern policy. German as well as French policy desired a detente and consequently was bound to be interested in improved relations with the nations and states of Eastern Europe. Both of us, Paris and Bonn, envisage a joint European future.

But why did the Franco-German treaty not lead to extensive joint political action? In this regard Willy Brandt stated:

At the beginning of 1963 the German side regarded as necessary a statement of the Federal Parliament to make clear that the Franco-German Treaty must not diminish or even bring into question the other obligations and political aims of the FRG, such a statement excluded any mistaken interpretation of the treaty as being a special alliance at the expense of other vital interests.

Even though, de Gaulle was conscious of the German question and its implications for European security, he did not recognize the GDR. On the other hand, he publicly supported the idea of German reunification. Yet, it did not mean that in his view a reunified Germany could ensure peace in Europe. In other words, de Gaulle's support to German reunification was only tactical, to lure them away from the embrace of the US, and bring them round to the view that the German question must be resolved through the European efforts, and there must not be

re-imposition of Yalta type decisions upon Europe. To illustrate, when Erhard took over as the FRG Chancellor, de Gaulle publicly expressed displeasure over Erhard's Atlanticist policy. As a result, relations between France and West Germany became strained in mid-1960s.

In December 1966, when Kiesinger became Chancellor, he unlike his predecessor, turned towards the East in his attempt to seek a solution of the German problem in co-operation with Moscow. De Gaulle welcomed such an idea, and was prepared to help in deliberations on reunification as a "historical necessity". De Gaulle considered Germany's division to be an "abnormal situation" which "must be settled by the Germans themselves within the framework of an agreement of Western-Central, and East Europe".²⁴

In 1962, the German-French society was established in East Berlin, with the aim to offer to the French as well as the GDR citizens to know better about each other.

The German problem, in any case, formed an integral part of de Gaulle's policy. But de Gaulle's effort for Franco-German collaboration to create a pillar of European power under the French leadership did not succeed.

²⁴ Die Welt, 19 December 1966, quoted in Korbelt, n. 10, p. 51.

When Georges Pompidou took over the French presidency in 1969, there were fears lest the EEC should increasingly come to be dominated by West Germany, particularly after the French economic crisis of 1968. This led Pompidou allow Britain enter into the EEC as a counterweight to Bonn's new strength.²⁵ Both France and West Germany during the SPD-FDP coalition led by Willy Brandt (which won the election in October 1969) profited from their economic collaboration.

The relative flexibility shown by President Pompidou at the Hague (1969) was also evident in his dealings with the United States and NATO. But this however did not mean the reversal of de Gaulle's withdrawal from the NATO.

France tried to use Soviet Union as a diplomatic tool with which it pressurized Germans to seek greater cooperation with France. On the other hand, Bonn needed Soviet support not only for its reunification, but also for better relations with the GDR. Besides, it was understood that the FRG could derive economic benefits from improved relations with the East. The FRG often had nightmares about a Franco-Soviet cooperation at Germany's expense.

²⁵ This idea was given by Andre Fontaine in Le Monde, 11 March 1969.

The French on their part became increasingly touchy about Bonn's negotiations with the East as well as FRG's growing economic strength.

Altogether, French supported Brandt policy towards the East. When Pompidou visited Bonn in July 1970, the final communique stated that the FRG had the full backing of France in its attempts to normalise its relations with the East.²⁶

France's Detente Policy Towards Eastern Europe

France succeeded in exploding its first atomic bomb six weeks before Khrushchev's visit to Paris in 1960. Surely, the Soviets could not be happy about it. Yet they understood de Gaulle's game, and believed that France's new status as an atomic power could add to the intra-NATO contradictions which in any case, the Soviets would welcome.

Nonetheless, the Soviets were unhappy over the French refusal to sign the nuclear test ban treaty, and its refusal to participate in the eighteen-nation disarmament conference. Khrushchev was unhappy about the Franco-German cooperation. Soviet fears of a Franco-German entente were strengthened in January 1963 when the

²⁶ Le Monde, 7 July 1970 (Report from Bonn).

Paris-Bonn Treaty was signed. On 5 February 1963, the Soviet Government officially protested against the treaty.²⁷

Initially the Soviet feared lest the Germans should benefit from the French atomic weapons. But when the French Government announced in March 1963 that the Franco-German treaty signified no change in the military situation in Europe, the Soviets became silent.²⁸ The Russians then tried to convince de Gaulle that France and the USSR were natural allies. They added that if the two countries could get together, then "no force could arise to change the new map of Europe".²⁹

In early 1960s, when President Kennedy seemed inclined for a direct understanding with Moscow, de Gaulle's mistrust towards the West increased due to separate negotiations between the US-UK and the Soviets, the US inclination for a direct understanding with the USSR. These factors were most important in changing de

27 Quoted in Notes et Etudes Documentaires, Les Relations Franco-Soviétiques, 1953-1966 (La Documentation Française, Paris, 1966), p. 18. Also in Herbert Tint, n. 12, p. 148.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

Gaulle's attitude towards the Soviets. He recognized the communist regime in China on 27 January 1964 which added to his weight with Moscow. During the year both countries exchanged official delegation as well as goodwill messages on every conceivable occasion.

Once de Gaulle at his press conference in November 1959 said that one day the Soviet Union would regard itself as an European power whose fate was closely bound up with that of the Europe.³⁰

After Khrushchev's removal from power in October 1964, the Soviet leader, Alexai Kosygin told the Supreme Soviet on 9 December 1964 that "our policy toward France is guided by the fact that the Soviet Union and France are the two most powerful nations on the European continent and therefore have a very great responsibility for the security of Europe."³¹

A five-year commercial agreement in October 1964 was the first result of Franco-Soviet rapprochement. But even after Gromyko's visit to Paris in April 1965 the final communique³² showed that the major policy differences had not been removed. The Soviets were not prepared to

30 Ibid., p. 140.

31 Ibid., p. 22.

32 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

accept the application of the free national self-determination in East Germany.

Ultimately in March 1966 Franco-Soviet relations reached their most exalted state when it was announced that de Gaulle was to pay a state visit to the Soviet Union. The same year France declared its withdrawal from the NATO military Command, and asked the NATO headquarters to leave the French territory.

The bilateral interests of France and those of the Soviet Union appeared to be complementary as well as conflicting. De Gaulle minimized the latter. Moscow welcomed de Gaulle's efforts to reduce United States presence in Europe but certainly not his call for the independence of the Soviet allies in Eastern Europe.³³

In June 1966 when de Gaulle was in Moscow he referred to East Germany as "the zone of occupation". The French-Soviet declaration, issued at the end of his visit, mentioned only that the two countries exchanged views on the German question. But they agreed that their prime objective was normalization and then "a gradual development of relations between all European countries".³⁴

33 Korbelt, n. 10, p. 40.

34 Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, vol. 17, March 1964 to 16 May 1967, p. 103.

In early 1960s, de Gaulle still recognized the division of Europe into two blocs and spoke of Russian hegemony, its empire, and its control of satellites. But later on, his terminology changed as he expressed warm regard for the great Russian people. In his policy on "detente, entente and co-operation", he set the new trend towards liberalization of the East European nations. The governments of the East European countries responded to de Gaulle as an opportunity for asserting at least some prerogatives of sovereignty.

In July 1964, the Rumanian Prime Minister Gheorghe Maurer began the pilgrimage of East European political representatives to Paris. It was followed by the other East European Ministers. In Spring and Summer of 1966, Couve de Murville was the first Foreign Minister of France to have visited the capitals of East European countries since World War II. The policy of detente appeared to be moving toward success. One Czech daily newspaper considered de Gaulle's policy "reasonable". A Polish publicist characterized him as "a man of 21st century with features of a man of the 19th century".

De Gaulle condemned Cold War as "silly". Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian Communist Party Chief valued "very highly the efforts of France and particularly of

de Gaulle to strengthen peace in Europe and in the world". Hungarian Prime Minister, Jeno Fock, spoke of the prospect of "institutionalizing the friendship" by signing a treaty with France. Even Willi Stoph, the Head of the GDR Government considered de Gaulle's policy "realistic".

The Economist (London) wrote, "In East European eyes, General de Gaulle [was] the meesiah of the detente and Couve his prophet".³⁵

But at least on one important question the visiting French statesmen found themselves in disagreement with their hosts, and that was the question of recognition of GDR by de Gaulle. The East Europeans insisted on its recognition. But de Gaulle did not budge an inch from his officially stated position.

De Gaulle in his drive for detente sought Moscow's acquiescence. De Gaulle would like to see "the start of the implementation of new relations with East European states towards detente, ontente and cooperation". To avoid Soviet suspicions that this policy in East Europe was designed to infringe on the Soviet role. De Gaulle

35 Quotations are in sequence, from Le Monde, 31 July 1964; 27 November 1964; 27 April 1965. Christian Science Monitor, 30 March 1965. The Guardian 19 May 1966, quoting from Trybuna Ludu Times, 11 November 1966, Le Monde, 31 March 1968, 6-7 June 1965. The Economist, 30 July 1966.

expressed that "Russia [was], indeed and in all respects, the leading power in the part of the world where she [was] located".³⁶

During de Gaulle's visit to Poland and to Rumania, Polish leaders felt gratified by his repeated assurance that France had stood for a long time - in fact since 1944, for Poland's boundary on the Oder-Neisse line. He expressed his support to the normalization of Poland's relations with the FRG, the second German state, when its official policy would accept as a starting point now and realistic principles.³⁷

It has been argued that after the signature of the Moscow-Bonn Treaty in August 1970 which confirmed the status quo in Eastern Europe, France was no longer the leading power in the pursuit of detente. But there is no doubt that it had for long advised the FRG to seek rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

De Gaulle's visit to Rumania in May 1968 met with with the same pleas as in Warsaw: recognition of the GDR. But again it was rejected by de Gaulle. Soviet invasion

36 Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, n. 34, p. 123.

37 Voyage en Pologne de General de Gaulle, Textes et Notes (Paris: La Documentation Francaise), no. 216, pp. 20, 22. Extract from Korbel, n. 10, p. 56.

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of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 seriously checked the entire movement towards an East-West detente. While the PCF (French Communist Party) expressed its reprobation, de Gaulle's new foreign Minister, Michel Debre, was trying to pass it off as a minor accident. Debre voiced that 'detente is built on liberty and leads to liberty'.³⁸ The communique issued after the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 23 October 1968 stressed that "French policy must continue along the lines it has followed, which means detente. But at the same time, it entails the determination to bring about the recognition that each country must have the possibility of determining its fate".³⁹

French Government showed renewed interest in the EEC. De Gaulle also showed a friendlier attitude towards the NATO.

De Gaulle postponed the projected visit to Paris in November 1968 of the Rumanian Prime Minister Nicolae Ceausescu in order to register his disapproval of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.⁴⁰

³⁸ Le Monde, 9 November 1968.

³⁹ Ibid., 25 October 1968.

⁴⁰ The idea was suggested by a journalist Michel Tatu Le Monde, Extract from Herbert Tint, n. 12, p. 160.

In April 1969 he resigned from the French presidency. He did not succeed in reaching any agreement on the German problem. He also could not change the position of the East. Le Monde said, "Three years of flirting with the Kremlin did not make the Soviet policy deviate one inch in regard to the German problem, the key to a European settlement 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' of which Elysee continues to dream".⁴¹

President Pompidou continued to pursue the path set-by de Gaulle, but with a different outlook. Maurice Schumann (Pompidou's Foreign Minister) in his speech to the United Nations (in 1969) stated that "France had an equal interest and respect for all countries of eastern Europe".⁴²

In fact there were at least three reasons why the French felt the need for a continuing policy of detente with the Soviet Union:

First, the US had not interrupted its own detente policy; Secondly, the economic benefits of relations with the Soviet Union were considerably. And thirdly, the FRG under Chancellor Brandt was making rapid progress in forging collaboration with the Soviet Union which could not be ignored by France.

41 Le Monde, 21 February 1968.

42 Ibid., 15 October 1969.

Pompidou's administration therefore worked for good relations with the Soviet Union. He also significantly softened on his predecessor's attitude towards the United States. Even he came to support Britain's entry into the EEC, and discontinued the illusion that France could act independently from other West European powers as equal of the Soviet Union in European affairs.

In August 1970 the Bonn-Moscow non-aggression pact was seen by the French leaders with suspicion that FRG was preparing a deal with Moscow which could harm France. There was also the fear that the reunification of Germany might come off if Bonn and Moscow worked in good partnership which ultimately could harm the French security.

But in 1970 the increasing political importance of the FRG might have initiated a significant change in Franco-Soviet relationship. When Maurice Schumann, the French Minister, stated in November 1970 that "without the European Community and Atlantic alliance, we would not count for much",⁴³ it showed some change in the French attitude towards the Soviet Union, for the increasing political importance of the FRG seems to have softened France towards strengthening the Western linkages.

⁴³ Le Monde, 3 November 1970.

De Gaulle worked for reducing the Anglo-Saxon hegemony in Western Europe and tried to initiate his detente with Eastern Europe through separate bilateral relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. But after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Warsaw Pact forces, and the Ostpolitik initiated by Willy Brandt as well as the growing economic strength of the FRG, there appeared some softness in the French approach towards the US and the NATO in as much as French seemed to be moving away from its strategy of TOUS AZIMUTS formulated in 1967 in response to the US initiated new policy of 'flexible response' in the same year. But then equally true may it be to say that there was no substantial change in the French policy, as it became evident from the way the high-powered Soviet trade delegation was received in Paris in January 1969. During Pompidou's term of Presidency, there was more of continuity than change. As a result, apart from the French willingness to let Britain enter the EEC, there was no reversal of the French policy towards the NATO.

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CHAPTER II

FRANCE, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT (1975) AND THE FOLLOW-UP

The idea of European Security Conference had been debated since 1950s. But it was not until the general climate of the East-West relations had improved as a result of West Germany's Ostpolitik, and the US-initiation of dialogue with the USSR, and China on modalities of peace in South-East Asia that it could take the shape that it did eventually. As such detente became practicable when tensions were sufficiently relaxed to dispel a feeling of political or military insecurity. It is through the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which dealt primarily with the political questions, that the Soviets wanted to secure the Western acquiescence in the inviolability of the post-war European borders. The West could not accept it as the primary goal of the CSCE. Furthermore, despite the Soviet assertions that ideological debate would be further sharpened even in an era of detente,¹ the West insisted that the CSCE would gradually

¹ Speech by Leonid Brezhnev, 14 October 1975, Survival (London), January-February 1976, p. 30.

lead to the diminution of the hiatus if it focused on humanitarian aspects and human contacts.

France's proposals for a conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were closely linked to its objections to the MBFR proposals. Despite its support for the principle of detente, France expressed concern that CSCE, like MBFR, might promote the continued pre-eminence of the Super Powers and perpetuate the division of Europe into two mutually hostile military blocs.

The idea of Security and Co-operation in Europe had its origins in suggestions made by Molotov the then Soviet Foreign Minister, at the Berlin Four Power Conference in 1954 which aimed at a Pan-European system of collective security. The Soviet objective then was neutralization of Germany and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory. As the Soviet leaders showed their unwillingness to hold free general elections in the whole Germany, the FRG became a member of the NATO the next year in 1955. In July 1966, following the visit of General de Gaulle to Moscow, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States met at Bucharest, and made detailed proposals for the convening of an All-European Conference on Security and Co-operation.² These proposals seemed to

2 R.K. Jain, Detente in Europe : Implications for Asia (New Delhi, 1977), pp. 24-26.

carry approval only of France from among the Western powers, which generally gave cold reception and considered them as propaganda stunt. In March 1969, the Warsaw Pact states meeting at Budapest reiterated their appeal for convoking a conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The French Government had already played a significant role in creating conditions for European detente through bilateral discussion with the East European countries and responded favourably to such an idea during the visit of the Rumanian President Ceauseescu in June 1970. The latter proposed that the CSCE should intimately be initiated primarily between the individual states rather than by blocs.

The French came out more openly during President Pompidou's visit to Moscow in October 1970, when a detailed Franco-Soviet declaration was made. This stated that "the holding of a properly prepared European Conference... would mark the beginning of permanent co-operation between all interested states, outside the framework of bloc politics."³

The USSR had evinced keen interest in the CSCE with two-fold objectives. First, to facilitate dissolution

³ Michael Palmer, The Prospects for a European Security Conference (London, 1971), pp. 38-39.

of the rival military alliances in Europe; and secondly, to gain legitimacy for the post-war settlements in Eastern Europe. Obviously, in this exercise, the Soviets were to play a key role. And the added expectation was that such a conference would result in some kind of Peace Treaty for Europe.⁴

The Western countries had different intentions. They emphasized upon the human rights (with far-reaching political implications), and increasing contacts between the peoples of the European states, something which could hardly be welcomed by the Soviets.

France among the other members of the European community, together played a novel feature of the CSCE negotiations, which started in November 1972. The close co-operation of the nine states, of the European community was also prevalent in this regard.

From among the member states of the European Community, France played an effective role in the commencement of the CSCE negotiations at the Ambassadorial level, to begin with, in November 1972. In 1970, when the foreign ministers of the six member states of the EEC approved the Luxemburg Report in Munich and created

4 Malcolm Macintosh, "Moscow's View of the Balance of Power", The World Today (London), March 1973, pp. 109-10.

the European Political Co-operation (EPC), they also decided to initiate new organizations in two other problem areas, such as relating to the conflict in the Middle East, and the European Conference.

The nine (EC) states acted together at the preparatory meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki on 15 January 1972. As the USA was not particularly interested in the CSCE, the leading role was left to the nine states of European Community. In the CSCE deliberations at Helsinki in 1972, the French representative declared that "The CSCE must not be an encounter of blocs, but a great round table of the interested states, prepared through an equal discussion among all".⁵ France approbated the May 1972 Soviet-American agreement to separate the CSCE from the MBFR, a decision promptly ratified by the NATO Council, which confirmed the French view that the Super Powers enjoyed too preponderant a role in determining Europe's Security and arms control agenda. The French Government held that no reduction of forces could be considered under CSCE auspices, but France would be prepared to examine 'appropriate measures...including certain military measures aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability'.⁶

5 Gerard Andre, cited in Le Figaro, 30 November 1972, p. 2.

6 North Atlantic Council communique of 31 May 1972, cited in Klein, "European and French Point of View on MBFR in Europe: Historic and Current Perspectives", Stanford Journal of International Studies (California), vol. 14, spring 1979, p. 60.

These themes--criticism of superpowers pre-eminence and the MBFR, yet support for detente and confidence-building measures (CBM)--were reaffirmed in Foreign Minister Michel Jobert's intervention at the CSCE meeting in Helsinki in 1973. He said:

Several states have judged it fruitful to begin negotiations in another capital (i.e. Vienna) on the reduction of armaments in Europe. I hope, without believing it that this will be in their interests, because it is not thus that one proceeds towards a security more real, more truly European and determined by Europe, since it is evident that the negotiations will be defined and controlled from without. Then let us restrict ourselves to recommendations on confidence-building measures...which could attenuate the suspicions and disarm the mistrust. 7

When de Gaulle's concept of TOUS AZIMUTS did not gain success, Pompidou reviewed the French strategy, particularly taking into account the factors of uncertainty, bearing implications for European security, such as the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. He admitted that the defence of Europe depended upon American nuclear power when he said: "It would be an absurd idea to create a Europe against it...that it means that the European personality must maintain itself vis-a-vis the US,"⁸

7 Michel Jobert's speech of 4 July 1973, cited in *ibid.*, p. 65.

8 Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: The European-American Relations since 1945 (New York, 1980), p. 264.

France welcomed the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, because it continued with the Gaullist tradition of accommodating Eastern Europe, promoting detente all over Europe. Moreover the French objectives tallied with those of the conference so as to "end the division of the Europe into blocs".⁹

France was aiming for a political as well as economic detente in Europe rather than a bilateral detente between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.¹⁰ In this regard France opposed the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) in Europe which it felt would be advantageous only to the Soviet Union. Maurice Schuman in the French National Assembly rejected the MBFR, for it would only hinder the multilateral process being initiated at the CSCE, and it would change the spirit of the CSCE from a meeting of equal independent nations with differing economic and political structures into a conference of two rival military and ideological blocs.¹¹

9 Guy de Carmoy, "France and the Atlantic Community", Current History, vol. 53, no. 345, May 1970, p. 270.

10 Dorothy Pickles, "The Decline of Gaullist Foreign Policy", International Affairs (London), vol. 51, no. 2, April 1975, p. 223.

11 La Politique Etrangere de la France : Textes et Documents (Paris), June 1972, pp. 184-6.

Generally speaking, the French have consistently been opposed to the negotiations between blocs and/or super powers. They also objected to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) fearing lest the agreement concluded should end up in the victimization of the smaller powers.¹²

France had its own priorities in implementing detente with the USSR and Eastern Europe. Its first interest was in promoting economic co-operation. And it is only at the next ripened stage that there could be steps taken to realize military detente. The French concept had two-fold significance. First, any military detente between the two Super Powers would weaken the European role in advancing detente to entente and then to co-operation. Secondly, it was essential to see a discernible progress in the evolution of East-West relations in political as well as economic fields so that negotiations on military questions had an assurance of success.¹³

When the Final Act of the CSCE was completed in 1975, Giscard d'Estaing's speech at Helsinki stressed on the spirit of detente and military equilibrium and deplored

12 Schuman's interview with "Die Welt" on 4 January 1972, La Politique Etrangere de la France : Textes et Documents (Paris), December 1972, 1er semestre 1972, p. 41.

13 Ibid.

MBFR as an endeavour "to create in Europe a zone, controlled from the outside, where forces would be subject to certain restrictions and such regional arrangements would naturally generate disequilibrium".¹⁴

Europeans in their attempt to bring detente to the Mediterranean region sought to have Mediterranean problems included in the agenda for the Conference on European Security and Co-operation. But the Mediterranean countries then managed not only to promote their own security and co-operation between themselves but also made a contribution to finding answers to the European questions.

Helsinki meeting was the result of two-year discussions involving fifteen members of the NATO and twenty other Warsaw Pact, neutral, and non-aligned (NNA) European nations. The first phase of the CSCE was held in Helsinki from 3 July to 7 July 1973. The second stage was conducted from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975 at Geneva. The Third and final phase opened in Helsinki on 30 July to 1 August 1975.

14 Address by Giscard d'Estaing at Helsinki, 31 July 1975 in Le Monde, 1 August 1975, p. 3.

The CSCE was broadly concerned with finding ways and means of easing tension in Europe and increasing co-operation among the participating thirty-five European and North American states,¹⁵ which was concluded with a Final Act signed by Head of States or Governments. The Final Act contains four sections or baskets:

Basket 1 affirms certain principles concerning relations between European nations. It includes aspects such as: respect for sovereign equality, right to change frontiers by peaceful means and agreement; non-use of force, respect for territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, confidence building measures, notably prior notification of major military manoeuvres and the exchange of observers at these manoeuvres, as well as certain aspects of security and disarmament.

As in Final Document is mentioned, "Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a

15 Participating states were: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, FRG, GDR, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, San Marino, Turkey, USSR, UK, USA and Yugoslavia.

total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components.¹⁶

Basket 2 deals with measure aimed at furthering co-operation in the fields of economic, science, technology and environment.

Basket 3 deals with increased human contacts. This basket also calls for a recognition of the basic rights of individuals as family visits, the reunion of families, greater freedom of travel and increased contacts between peoples.

Basket 4 stresses the resolution of the parties to give practical effect to the results of the conference. It also provides for a follow-up meetings of representatives designated by Foreign Ministers to be held in Belgrade in 1977.

In the final document of Helsinki there is also a text concerned with relations between the participating states and non-participating Mediterranean countries. As it reads:

16 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki, 1975. Vanderbilt Journal of International Law (Tennessee), vol. 13, nos. 2-3, summer 1980, pp. 575-642.

Recognising the importance of their mutual economic relations with the non-participating Mediterranean states, and conscious of their common interests in the further development of co-operation, the security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole.... 17

The principal aim in this regard was to seek by further improving relations with non-participating Mediterranean states, to increase mutual confidence so as to promote security and stability in the strategically important Mediterranean area.

In Helsinki, the French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing said:

These documents do not, in themselves, guarantee peace....History has taught us that the balance of power is a prerequisite for progress on detente and peace...the spirit of detente must bring us to a point where we can set a limit on the harshness of this competition and this limit must be the tolerant, interference-free competition of ideologies.... 18

The President of France then also indicated that to realize the aforesaid objectives France would press

17 During the meetings of the second stage of the conference following Mediterranean states participated: Democratic Republic of Algeria, Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, Kingdom of Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia.

18 Address by Giscard d'Estaing at Helsinki, 31 July 1975, in Le Monde, 1 August 1975, p. 3.

ahead with efforts to make its own independent defence arrangements in accordance with its commitments to the Alliance.

For Belgrade meeting there was a preparatory discussion from 15 June to 5 August 1977 which drew up the agenda and rules of procedure. The main meeting began on 4 October 1977.

The review conference in the non-aligned Yugoslavia which was held in 1977, aimed at providing a fresh opportunity for the non-aligned countries to find common ground for a joint policy on the Mediterranean problems and to strive for the creation of an environment in which peace and co-operation would prevail.

The special ambassadors of the thirty-five CSCE member-states met in Belgrade from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978 to study the interim results. The meeting however did not bring about the desired improvements in the amelioration of tensions in the overall political climate and confrontation over human rights. Nonetheless, the European Community played a significant role in facilitating constructive dialogue between the East and the West on various complex issues, such as the Human Rights. As a result, there came about a certain clarity regarding different perceptions held by different participating states at the conference.

France was interested in easing the tension between East and West. France looked at the CSCE as an institutionalization of the detente process at least in Europe. The French believed that the object of the CSCE was to involve the peoples at different levels in actualizing detente. The French delegation at the Belgrade Meeting made clear its official policy as follows:

An open dialogue between those ruling and those ruled continues despite the fact that those involving the Final Document are encountering difficulties here and there and are being silenced by means which France does not approve of. France is convinced that a Europe in which detente and genuine peace will prevail cannot be a Europe in which people will be kept silent. 19

The main Eastern reaction was to invoke the (Final Act) principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. The West in turn pointed out that that principle concerned non-legitimate acts such as the threat or use of force. At Belgrade, the Western countries proposed the implementation of the existing Final Act into practice. The European neutral and non-aligned nations tabled a wide variety of new proposals on similar lines. The East also listed a considerable number of proposals

19 Head of French Delegation to the Belgrade Meeting of CSCE, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), 5 November 1977, pp. 12-13.

encouraging trade and industrial co-operation, no first use of nuclear weapons, non-expansion of military alliance. Out of hundred proposals which were listed, hardly any of them was adopted. The West hoped to use the opportunity provided by the Belgrade meeting to encourage Eastern countries to improve this modest record of implementation. Although the Final Act to a large extent reflects the Western concept of detente, at Belgrade the Soviet Union accused the West of using the human rights issue in order to divert the meeting towards ideological confrontation.

A notable feature of the Belgrade Conference was the harmony of views among western countries. From the earliest days of the CSCE, the allies consulted together on goals and tactics and those exchanges continued even after Helsinki. The North Atlantic Council assisted by its political committee, has regularly monitored Eastern implementation of the Final Act and the reports were submitted twice a year to the Ministerial sessions of the Council. Even during the meeting in Belgrade, allied delegations met frequently to exchange views on the developing situation.

The Belgrade meeting confirmed that the prominence given by the Final Act to the human rights dimension of detente would remain as one of the major factors of East-West relations.

Different ideas exist about the result of the CSCE Review Conference though it did not create any major political advantage to either side, nor did it promote the cause of peace and security in the world as it was indicated in the Helsinki Final Act.

Furthermore, the USSR sparked off a controversy at the Review Conference in regard to the setting up of a permanent political organ to ensure security in Europe, but without the participation in it of the United States and Canada. The ideological confrontation remained unabated between the East and the West as the Soviet Union and its allies continued to claim that the imperialist countries had to swallow detente only because of the "political, economic and military might of Soviet Union",²⁰ then, there is no doubt that after the Helsinki the Warsaw bloc forces in Central and Northern Europe were further strengthened.

The Western powers expressed their opposition to the establishment of a permanent institutionalized mechanism. They, however, supported the review from time to time the implementation of the Helsinki resolutions so as to furthering the process of detente in the future.

²⁰ Erich Honecker's statement made in 1977, cited in Walter Laqueur, A Continent Astray - Europe, 1970-1973 (New York, 1979), p. 192.

As provided for in the Second Basket, it was expected that there would be a substantial increase in the East-West trade.²¹ Indeed there was a manifold increase in the commercial exchanges, and there was also increased co-operation in the scientific and technological fields. But the confidence building measures envisaged in the Helsinki Accord had been exceedingly modest in scope and little use was made of them. There was no noticeable progress in information exchanges. Exchange of books between the two blocs was only one sided, the Soviet books were freely sold in Western countries whereas the sale of Western books (particularly on social sciences) was discouraged in the Soviet Union. The latter argued that the Final Act does not involve an obligation to "fling open the door for anti-Soviet subversive propaganda",²² Though following the Helsinki Conference the human right groups came into existence in Eastern Europe but the question of human rights and dissent in the Soviet Union remained untackled.

Besides the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) (at Belgrade CSCE meeting),²³

21 Walter Laqueur, *ibid.*

22 Izvestia, 4 September 1975.

23 Statement by Philippe Richard at Belgrade of 17 February 1978, cited in Le Monde, 19 February 1978.

Giscard d'Estaing formally suggested a CDE in his UNESOP speech in May 1978. In memorandum subsequently sent to the thirty-five countries of the CSCE and to Albania, France proposed a two-stage CDE. In the first stage, new CBMs (confidence-building measures) for conventional, air and ground forces, including prior notification of certain military activities, would be negotiated. Unlike the CBMs provided in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which are almost entirely voluntary and which extend only 250 km into Soviet European territory, these new CBMs would be mandatory, verifiable, militarily significant and applicable all over Europe. In the second stage, negotiated limitations and reductions would be pursued in conventional, air, and ground forces--especially those equipped with major offensive capability, such as tanks, artillery and fighter aircrafts. The CDE was only one of the proposals designed to facilitate France's return to multilateral security dialogues to enable it to have a say on the attempts at promoting all-European security. At the same time, Mitterrand's December 1977 proposals for a new European Security Conference included discussion on nuclear weapons as well.²⁴

Behind the well-articulated case made out by the French for the CDE, there was an underlying

²⁴ Francois Mitterrand's article in Le Monde, 14 and 15 December 1977.

motive, and this was that the CDE could absorb the MBFR and/or mitigate its effects as it was dominated by the Super Powers. The official French position, as stated by Francois-Poncet, was: "Our intention is obviously not to interfere in these (MBFR) negotiations and we see no reason why the two should not be conducted simultaneously".²⁵ Some political commentators considered that the French Government's proposal for CDE was indeed a veritable challenge to the on-going MBFR negotiations.

As the East-West controversy over the Human Rights had arisen at the Belgrade Conference, the French had foreseen that the East-West discord over human rights and other related issues might prevent progress on a CDE. Therefore, they envisaged CDE as an autonomous negotiating forum, with no link to the CSCE. However, by the summer of 1979, France had agreed, as a result of deliberations within the Atlantic Alliance as well as consultations with the neutral and Non-aligned (NNA) states, that its CDE proposal could be linked to the CSCE process, and that the CDE negotiations might occur within the broader framework of human contacts, and economic exchanges. Even then the US President Carter

²⁵ Address by Jean Francois-Poncet at Geneva, 24 January 1979 (New York: French Embassy Press and Information Division, 1979), p. 10.

did not decisively support the CDE proposal as such.²⁶

Under the Reagan Administration, the US extended support to the French CDE proposal only to avoid the convening of a European disarmament conference without the Alliance cohesion and setting out constructive preconditions. Security principles encompassed by the CSCE, the CDE proposal which the French introduced at the Madrid Review Conference in December 1980 considerably differed from the one mooted in May 1978 in that the CDE was firmly tied to the CSCE process. The Western Alliance supported the French CDE proposal and it became a common position of the allied powers at the CSCE. The earlier US objection to the CDE proposal had arisen because of the suspicion about the practicability of the second stage discussed earlier.

The fact is that France had become isolated from most of the East-West arms control forums and was subjected to criticisms, owing to its non-participation in the MBFR and the disarmament committee at Geneva as well as having not signed treaties like the 1963 partial test ban and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus the CDE proposal was

26 David S. Yost, "Arms Control Prospects at Madrid", The World Today, October 1982, pp. 387-94.

part of a set of proposals calculated to re-instate France in the multilateral security dialogues in a constructive fashion.²⁷

In the period leading up to the Madrid conference East-West relations deteriorated seriously, especially between the two Super Powers, and towards the end of 1978 a new problem arose. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was construed to have violated the principle of the Final Act.

Soviet intervention may not have affected the territorial integrity of a CSCE signator, but one of the principles of the Final Act, such as non-interference in other's internal affairs had to be honoured in relations even to the non-signatory countries as well.

The Madrid follow-up meeting took up for discussion in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and its implications for European security.

But at the Madrid follow-up meeting as at the Belgrade, the participants agreed to deal with those issues on which a consensus had been reached. Proposals were submitted on military aspects of detente, such as

²⁷ Ibid.

a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons, non-expansion of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and additions to the catalogue of confidence-building measures. Other items related to economic co-operation between East and West.

At Madrid, there was a sharp division, block-wise, on the issues to be discussed. While the Soviets wanted sharp focus on security issues, the West insisted on consideration of the Human Rights as well as the Afghanistan issue. Because of the absence of any accord on these issues, the Madrid follow-up ended in a fiasco. But Western European neutral, non-aligned, and East European countries were all keen to avert failure at the Madrid conference.

Unlike the USA, the West European nations tried to expand their economic co-operation with the East European and in particular with the Soviet Union. One important example is the pipeline project, related to the supply of the natural gas contracts. In fact, West Europeans differed from the US also on how to transact economic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union. West European countries were interested in continuation of detente and if the Madrid meeting were to prove a failure, they would lose more than the Soviet

Union,²⁸

As it was proposed by the Soviet Union that it would not agree to hold any more CSCE follow up meeting unless a decision was reached to hold the disarmament conference. So the starting point for negotiations in this regard in the military sector was the French proposal to convene a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The EC member states had endorsed the French proposal on 20 November 1978, and their aim at Madrid was to obtain a clear mandate to hold the CDE negotiations.

At the Madrid meeting there came up other proposals, such as those mooted by the neutral and non-aligned nations (NNA) which also supported the French CDE proposal. But the Polish proposal was aimed at convening a Conference on Military Detente and Disarmament (CMDD), to avoid the CSCE-CDE linkage. In the end the East-West controversy led the negotiations to focus on the French proposal and the Polish proposal which carried approval of the Soviet Union.

After the Soviet-encouraged imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981, which violated various provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, it became

²⁸ Jurgen Notzold, "The Second CSCE follow up Meeting in Madrid", Aussenpolitik (Hamburg), 2 quarter 1982, p. 160.

difficult for the Western powers to proceed on a 'business as usual' basis.

In September 1983, the Madrid CSCE deliberations reached a consensus on a concluding document, including a mandate for a CDE. The first CDE deliberations began in Stockholm in January 1984, and was known formally as the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In this conference, as the French had proposed in the beginning nuclear issues were not included. The results of the Stockholm conference will be assessed by the participatory states at the next review meeting of the CSCE to be held in Vienna in November 1986.

The principal aim of the CSCE and the follow-up conferences is to build up confidence-raising mechanisms with a view to removing or reducing the risk of war in Europe. France is also trying through its CDE initiative to bring about a kind of disarmament in Europe, which may ensure productive peaceful co-existence, but without any fear of the two Super-Power condominium. Uptil recently, even though the Super Power negotiations have been resumed on the SALT on the START, yet there has not been much progress registered on any of the

control negotiations, whether on the strategic, or the MBFR or on the INF. One has only to be cautious in forecasting on the CDE negotiations. But then what is good of it is that debate to prevent war is continuing with the involved parties participating in it.

CHAPTER III

THE FRENCH SOCIALIST APPROACH TO THE NATO MODERNIZATION

It is by a quirk of history, so to say, that the two Super Powers happened to view unsympathetically (each for its own reasons) the installation of the Socialist government in France. As a leading power in Europe, suspicion arose in the minds of both the Superpowers, lest it should turn out to be a factor of turbulence in European politics. Both the Super Powers have been unhappy with the critical disposition towards them shown by the French socialists since early 1970s. The French socialists on the eve of elections in mid-1981 had openly condemned the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and then the Soviet-inspired Polish suppression of the "Solidarity" Polish Workers Union. Then it was also apprehended in the US that the Socialist Communist coalition in France might turn against the NATO Modernization Plan. Here in this regard, one has only to recall the "Left-Unity" programme drafted in 1972 by Francois Mitterand, which had stressed on general and verifiable disarmament,

abolition of the "Force de Frappe" and the discontinuation of arms sales to the colonialist, racist and fascist regimes in the Third World.¹ Even earlier, at the time of the Presidential elections in France in 1965, Francois Mitterrand had condemned the notion of independent French nuclear force describing it as "ineffective, costly and dangerous".²

Even in his recent book Ici et Maintenant Mitterrand says, "Nothing disposes me to postulate the necessity of the Atlantic alliance, and I would be satisfied with a situation which would make it defunct..."³

Notwithstanding the fact that France, due to its special status within the Alliance, had no hand in drafting the two-track NATO decision of December 1979, Francois Mitterrand assured the US that France would remain a firm supporter of the Atlantic alliance and of its December 1979 decision to instal cruise and

1 Michael Kreile, "French Security Policy under Mitterrand", Aussenpolitik (Homburg), 1/1984, p. 59.

2 From Mitterrand's "Seven Options" of the 1965 Presidential Campaign, given in Pascal Orly, et al., Les Chemins de L'unité (Paris, 1976), p. 100, cited in unpublished dissertation of Arshiya Bawa, The Socialist France and European Security (JNU, SIS, 1984), p. 77.

3 Francois Mitterrand, Ici et Maintenant (Paris, 1980), pp. 242-3, cited in Robert V. Tucker and Linda Wrigley, eds, The Atlantic Alliance and its Critics (New York, 1983), p. 6.

Pershing II Missiles in Western Europe (though not in France) unless the Soviet Union agreed to scrap its new SS-20 missiles.⁴ Such a move by Francois Mitterrand encouraged Reagan to indicate happily in July 1981 Ottawa Summit, that he had been pleasantly surprised by "Mitterrand's resoluteness" in the face of the Soviet threat.⁵

When the Soviet delegation walked out of the plenary session of the thirty first MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations in Vienna on 15 December 1983, the last of the three arms control talks had been broken off. In fact competition of the arms race between the two Super Powers is not a new phenomenon. Its history goes back to 1954 (when theatre nuclear weapons, 'TNW' were deployed in Europe) and was the result of the Dulles doctrine of "massive retaliation".⁶ It is in the wake of such a development that the Soviet Union-led Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) came into existence in May 1955.

4 D.L. Aenley, A.P. Kerr and N.H. Waites, Contemporary France: Politics and Society since 1945 (London, 1984), p. 244.

5 Lord Saint Brides, "Foreign Policy of Socialist France", Orbis, vol. 26, no. 1, spring 1982, p. 36.

6 David M. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: Brookings, 1982).

A week earlier, the Federal Republic of Germany had also become a member of the NATO. Fearing new challenges to its own security, Soviet Union developed in late 1950s its capability to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons of its own. As a result, credibility of "massive retaliation" began to erode. Robert McNamara, President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense proposed in May 1962 a policy of "flexible response"⁷ for the NATO which was ratified by the NATO ministers in December 1967. The new strategy sought to deter aggression through the NATO triad comprising conventional, theatre nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. At about the same time, there was reconsideration of military strategy in France, which responded by withdrawing from the NATO military command as well as framing its own strategy, namely TOUS AZIMUTS. The new French strategy aimed at meeting with any challenge from any quarter. Such a disposition was new in the sense that it did not specifically aim at the USSR, as was the case with the NATO. Then also there was intense debate such as on Mike Mansfield's move regarding reduction of American troops in Western Europe. In other words, the hegemonic bipolar structures of the two Super Powers were giving

7 General Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, 1960).

way to multipolarity.

In late 1960s apart from the Harmel Report, which stressed on detente, defence and deterrence, there was no new major development. But then while debate was going on in both the blocs on the modalities of detente, the NATO felt concerned over three parallel developments:

- (1) Introduction by the Soviet Union of a new generation of theatre nuclear weapons.
- (2) Increasing obsolescence of NATO's long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF).
- (3) Achievement by the Soviet Union of Strategic nuclear parity with the United States.⁸

The most disturbing factor for the NATO at this time was the deployment of SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers in the GDR, which was regarded as a new challenge to the western alliance. The SS-20s enabled the Soviet Union to target on Western Europe and parts of Asia with longer-range, highly accurate multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVd) mobile, land-based systems, allowing NATO's LRTNF force

8 Jed C. Snyder, "European Security, East-West Policy, and the INF Debates", Orbis, vol. 27, no. 4, winter 1984, pp. 919-20.

to become obsolete.⁹

TABLE I

Rate of SS-20 Deployments*

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Number of missiles</u>	<u>Number of warheads</u>
December 1977	10	30
December 1978	70	210
December 1979	140	420
December 1980	200	600
December 1981	270	810
March 1982	300	900
March 1983	351	1,053
December 1983	369	1,107

* Exact figures are classified; these numbers are based on the most reliable unclassified estimates. The last figure of December 1983 was confirmed by the US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on 13 December 1983.

Sources: US Department of State and Department of Defense cited in Jed C. Snyder, *ibid.*, p. 925.

⁹ *Ibid.*

It is worth noting that in the process of detente, principle of equal security for all the States in both the blocs was mutually agreed to guide the SALT negotiations. Though then an amendment was mooted by the Senator Henry Jackson in 1972 that the aforesaid principle would not make the US strategic force inferior to that of the Soviet Union.¹⁰

Although the SALT II agreement has not been ratified, but it is possible that United States might cease to respect its principles after 31 December 1985, when treaty expires. It is premature to discuss the possible outcome of the Super Power dialogic resumed recently on the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks).

Ironically enough, the Reagan Administration is generally blamed for having initiated the arms race for it deployed new missiles in Europe. These missiles had been made during the Nixon Administration. But evidently it was the Carter Administration which provoked the "New Cold War". In 1978, President Carter had initiated "a new look" at conventional operations. The US 'Assault-Breaker' programme proposed the development of non-nuclear missiles to check the Soviet second-echelon

¹⁰ This amendment was suggested by Senator Henry Jackson (Democrat) (Washington 1972).

forces and to provide the eventual alternative to the NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces as an interim solution.¹¹

As stated earlier, it is President Carter who had formulated the NATO modernization plan in 1978. But it is Caspar Weinberger the present US Defense Minister who not only supported the idea and endorsed it at the NATO summit of June 1982, but also sought to implement it. Between late 1979 and October 1981, the NATO modernization plan was given the look of a new doctrine, "Deep Strike" by General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.¹² Rogers believed that the NATO could only counter the Warsaw Pact at the theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear levels. He stressed that the NATO needed to be able to face the adversary challenge at the conventional level as well. This was not so because the lack of an effective conventional capability would force NATO into an early nuclear release and thus undermine the 'flexible response'. Rogers's

11 Hew Strachan, "Conventional Defence in Europe", International Affairs, vol. 61, no. 1, winter 1984/5, p. 36.

12 Per Berg and Gmilla Herolf, "Deep Strike: New Technologies for Conventional Interdiction", in World Armaments and Disarmament, SPIRI Year Book, 1984 (London, 1984).

Plan "Follow - On Force Attack" was to direct 1,200-10,000 deep-strike missiles carrying conventional war-heads against the Soviet second-echelon formations.¹³

Rogers plan is seen as an alternative to first use of theatre nuclear weapons,¹⁴ and must force the Warsaw Pact to disperse and not to concentrate on the attack.

In 1979 the Atlantic Alliance agreed on Euro-strategic armaments which led to the "dual track" decision: First, to deploy 462 Cruise Missiles and 108 Pershing II Ballistic Missiles in Europe; and secondly, to seek negotiations with the Soviet Union for mutual reduction of intermediate range missiles within Europe.

The effectiveness of the plan persuaded the Russians to show willingness to negotiate when Brezhnev asked the alliance to drop their plans.¹⁵

In November 1981, US in concert with its

13 Roger's ideas can be found in Foreign Affairs, vol. 60, no. 5, summer 1982, pp. 1145-50.

14 Boyd D. Sutton, John R. Landry, "New Directions in Conventional Defence?" Survival, March-April 1984, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 50-70.

15 Pravda, 7 October 1979, cited in A. Bawa, n. 2, p. 124.

allies suggested the zero option strategy,¹⁶ according to which US was prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles, if the Soviets would remove their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.¹⁷ In return, the Soviets argued that they had acquired medium range missiles only in response to the US forward based nuclear weapons in the 1950s.¹⁸ Then further, the Soviets came up with their "nuclear freeze" proposal suggesting the stopping of deployments, in which case the Soviets would retain 162 SS-20s with 486 warheads in Europe, while the US would have no long-range missiles there.

As a result, there came about a deadlock. The Soviets seemed neither willing to do anything about the Polish crisis now in relation to the Russian "Permanent intervention" in Afghanistan. The Americans retaliated

16 Reagan's speech at National Press Club (Washington), on 18 November 1981, in Samuel F. Wells, "A Question of Priorities : A Comparison of the Carter and Reagan Defence Programs", Orbis, vol. 27, no. 3, Fall 1983, p. 652.

17 H.J. Newman, Nuclear Forces in Europe : A Handbook for the Detente (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 60.

18 Russian Handbook, How to Avert the Threat to Europe (Moscow, 1983), p. 27.

by deploying the NATO missiles in Europe, even when half of its allies were unwilling to be helpful in the matter. Added to it, the Reagan Administration has now commenced a new debate on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), which may naturally invite Russian counter-measures in the form of the new Soviet missiles SS X-28 (as designated by the Pentagon).¹⁹

Here we may look back and briefly review the French approach towards the arms reduction talks. As noted earlier, the French had refused²⁰ to participate in the MBFR talks, for the latter in their view, could invent some areas, such as Central Europe, of special importance for arms control or reduction. Such a step could in itself be inconducive to peace. However, they welcomed the initiation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, for they did not affect the French strategic force.

But as the SALT negotiations proceeded, the French Foreign Minister noted in 1971, that the SALT I

19 The new Soviet missiles have been designated as SS-X28 by the Pentagon International Herald Tribune, 10 April 1985.

20 French Government believed that such a negotiation would promote the continued dominance of the two Super Powers over European Security.

agreement was designed to keep within specific limits the Super Powers strategic arsenals. But then there was apprehension lest the two Super Powers should reach an accord on the condominium so as to perpetuate their hegemony over Europe. And this objective could be realized easily because the small and medium ranking European powers had to rely for their security on one of the two Super Powers.²¹ The afore-cited fear, then found expression soon thereafter in Pompidou's statement that the two Super Powers may set up their "shared hegemony" over Europe.²² This in itself, as Michel Debre noted, constituted a 'brilliant justification' for the French nuclear deterrence. This also reflects the obvious precariousness of the potential protection of Europe by the United States.²³

In 1966, the USSR had sought to allay the French fears during President de Gaulle's visit to

21 Maurice Schumann's statement of 9 June 1971, cited in Jean Klein, "Les SALT et la securite en Europe", Revue Francaise de Science Politique, vol. 23, August 1973, p. 851.

22 Georges Pompidou, cited by Ruell, La Politique Militaire de la Cinquieme republicue (Paris: Foundation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, 1976), p. 851, cited in David S. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe: Part II: Strategic and Arms Control Implications", Adelphi Papers (London), no. 195, winter 1984-85, p. 50.

23 Letter by Michel Debre to Le Monde, 23 January 1973.

Moscow with the setting up of a 'hot line' communication channel between Kremlin and the Elysee Palace. In July 1967, France signed a more detailed agreement with the USSR to prevent "accidental or unauthorized release" of nuclear weapons.²⁴

SALT II concluded in June 1979 was perceived by French President in a much more negative light than SALT I when Giscard d'Estaing evaluated that 'Is it an effectively balanced agreement between the Superpowers? And what consequences will it have for the security of Europe?'²⁵ SALT II was carefully supported as an identification of East-West continuation of detente as well as fear of the implications of SALT II's possible failure for the Alliance cohesion. And it had been considered that the SALT II codified shifts in the strategic nuclear balance favouring the USSR. In an article written by an official of the French Defence Ministry, it was suggested that SALT II

24 Franco-Soviet Agreement of July 1967, published in Documents d'Actualite Internationale, nos. 35-36, pp. 699-701. It should be noted that Debre's interpretation of the June 1973 US-Soviet agreement misrepresents both in the final text's content and US policy. The USSR proposed an agreement that would rule out nuclear weapons use against the US and Soviet homelands and permit it in the territory of third parties, but the US rejected this as inconsistent with US guarantees to allies. For details see Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London, 1982), pp. 274-86.

25 Giscard d'Estaing, Press Conference of 15 February 1979.

would mean that the threat to have recourse to American strategic nuclear system may become less credible and the probability of a limited conflict in Europe greater.²⁶

It was natural that any modernization or restrengthening of NATO will be welcomed by France but under Giscard d'Estaing, France's policy on the December 1979 two-track decision was limited to 'private support', while insisting that Soviet INF could not threaten the 'Sanctuarized' France. It was firmly stated:

It makes no difference if 5, 10, or 50 SS-20s have French targets as long as (French) Strategic Force keeps a capacity to cause unacceptable damage in response... At the same time, while it is vital that our deterrent remains credible, it is desirable that NATO's deterrent is not weakened. 27

But soon after becoming President, Francois Mitterrand reiterated his position clearly that "the equilibrium in Europe was broken by SS-20s...It is

26 Article was written by a deputy director, in Defence Ministry's planning department, Col. Guy Levin, "L'avenir des forces nucleaires transcaises", Defense Nationale, May 1980, p. 14.

27 Jean-Louis Gergorin, "Les negociations SALT et la defense de l'Europe", Defense Nationale, June 1978, pp. 55-56.

therefore, necessary to rearm to re-establish the point of equilibrium. After which we will be able to negotiate."

Mitterrand has reportedly said that France "needs an equilibrium between the blocs...remain as free as possible...concentrate totally on nuclear deterrence for her own territory".²⁸

Before the French socialists assumption of power in France, it was surmised in the right-wing political circles that if the left parties returned to power, their policy position will directly influence the defence and foreign policy of France.²⁹

A comparison of the attitudes of the French left parties on defence and foreign relations when they were in opposition with their policies when they have assumed the reins of the French Government shows their flexibility and the gap between the precept and practice.

In June 1971, the new Parti Socialiste emerged as a result of the merger of several socialist

28 Le Monde, 25 August 1981.

29 Ciro Elliott Zoppo, "The Left and European Security: France, Italy and Spain", Orbis, vol. 26, no. 2, summer 1980, pp. 289-90.

left-oriented parties in 1971. Its major objective was to fight the electoral battle and achieve power under the institutional framework inherited from de Gaulle.³⁰ Furthermore, the new Socialist Party (led by Francois Mitterrand) aligned itself with the Communist Party, and drew up together a common programme known as the "Left-Unity" programme, which gives a Marxist analysis of international relations that demigrated the importance of political-military threats and focused attention on the dangers of international capitalism led by the United States and West Germany.³¹ Aversion to the American Atlantic order, either in its military or economic guises continued till 1977, when there was a moderation due to the Socialist rupture with the communists. At this stage there came about a growing realization in the socialist circles that they would have to work for their distinctive socio-economic goals within rather than against the international capitalist system dominated by the US.³²

30 D. S. Bell and Eric Shaw, eds, The Left in France: Towards the Socialist Republic (Nottingham, 1983).

31 Richard Gombin, "Le Parti Socialiste et la Politique étrangère", Politique étrangère (1977), pp. 199-212.

32 Michael M. Harrison, "Consensus, Confusion, and Confrontation in France: The Left in Search of a Defence Policy", in William G. Andrews and Stanley Hoffmann, eds, The Fifth Republic at Twenty (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981).

There was adverse impact of the oil crisis in 1970s on the economies of European nations, particularly those which had no domestic energy resources. Change in the Socialist thinking was the result of patient work done by Charles Hermu³³ who advocated a minimum deterrent force for protection against unknown future threats as long as the blocs have not disappeared.³⁴

Though ideology played very important role and brought coherence to the leftist positions on the relationship between the global politics of the American Super Power and the US role in the Atlantic Alliance, yet two factors impinged seriously upon the consonance between the left's ideology and the explanations about the realities of international politics: They were

- (1) Nationalism
- (2) Pluralist structure of the French politics.

Nationalism has sanctified patriotism that has clashed periodically with the mandate of the Marxist

33 Later on Mitterrand Supported him and at present is Defence Minister of France.

34 Charles Hermu, Soldat - citoyen : Essai Sur la defense et la Securite (Paris, Flammarion, 1975), p. 55.

internationalism. The dissonance between these ideologies has been politically troublesome for the Marxists. Jean Jaures, a socialist, argues that the organization of national defense and international peace are mutually reinforcing and in harmony whenever the armed forces are democratically constituted to include the working class, without class or caste prejudice in their organization.³⁵

French Pluralism has forced the communists into an attempt to prove their independence in foreign as well as domestic policy from the Soviet Union, and it has forced the Socialists to renounce their traditional bent toward neutralism and pacifism.³⁶

Francois Mitterrand led the group within the socialist party that was troubled by moral reservations.³⁷ The CERES group within the PS favoured the deterrent as a means of ensuring French Independence. The anti-nuclear lobby insisted on the demuclearization of the French national territory, but conceded to the importance

35 Jean Jaures, L'ame nouvelle (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1977).

36 Ciro Elliott Zoppo, n. 29, p. 292.

37 Dominique Laddeis in Le Monde, 7 January 1978.

of the submarine part of the deterrent. This group remained hostile to the concept of an independent nuclear force and preferred to depend on the Atlantic Alliance and the US nuclear guarantee.³⁸ In early 1978, the Socialist party meeting rejected any breach with the Western economic or security orders, and insisted that in the event of a clear aggression against its allies the Socialist France would fulfil its obligations under both the Brussels and North Atlantic treaties.³⁹ And Mitterrand himself insisted that "the Americans ought to know that we will be loyal allies, if there is a war and if this war is provoked by the desires of outside powers".⁴⁰ He made it clear that France would remain a loyal ally but not an integrated ally.⁴¹

The Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956) and in Czechoslovakia (1968) had compelled the socialists to rethink on the French attitude towards the Soviet Union.

38 Le Monde, 8, 9 January 1978.

39 Michael N. Harrison, "Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System: A Foreign Policy of Accommodation", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 99, no. 2, summer 1984, p. 227.

40 Le Monde, 10 January 1978.

41 Ibid.

The French President was critical of the Soviets when he noted: "It seems to me that the US has been able to preserve a world wide superiority but, in Europe, Soviet superiority is established."⁴²

Before his assumption of the French Presidency, Mitterrand was a vigorous critic of the "Yalta" organized division of Europe and a strong supporter of the French peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the 1981 elections, Francois Mitterrand vociferously criticized Giscard d'Estaing's conciliatory approach towards the USSR, particularly after the latter's intervention in Afghanistan. He viewed disapprovingly Giscard d'Estaing's meeting with Brezhnev in Warsaw in May 1980 and vowed not to meet the Russian leaders while their troops were present in Afghanistan.⁴³ But it seems he could not keep up his vow, for he visited Moscow in June 1984. He regarded the developing imbalance of forces in Europe as a major threat to peace. He identified the Soviet SS-20 missiles as a weapon of decouplage its aim being to divide US from its

42 Le Monde, 22 December 1979.

43 Neville Waites, "France under Mitterrand - The First Year: External Relations", The World Today, vol. 38, no. 6, June 1982, p. 229.

European allies.⁴⁴ In his campaign he supported the "zero option", and asked for the dismantling of the SS-20s, in return for the non-deployment by the US of the cruise and Pershing missile installations in Europe. Mitterrand also felt worried lest the Soviet Union does blackmailing if the SS-20s remain unmatched by the NATO in Europe.⁴⁵ But, once in power, Mitterrand surprised Moscow by giving full support to the NATO policy to install new missiles in Europe from 1983 onwards. He also dropped his 1978 idea of a referendum on the retention of the French nuclear force, and announced his plan for a seventh nuclear submarine and pursued neutron bomb tests while explaining that a decision on its development had been postponed.⁴⁶

44 Johnthor Marcus and Bruce George, "The ambiguous Consensus : French Defence Policy under Mitterrand", The World Today, vol. 39, no. 10, October 1983, p. 372.

45 Stanley Hoffmann, "Gaullism by any other Name", Foreign Policy, no. 57, winter 1984-85, p. 46.

46 Le Monde, 16 September 1981; Financial Times (London), 15 December 1981, stressed the increase in defence spending to 3.9 per cent of GNP for 1982, and keeping conscription at 12 months would help control of unemployment; apart from adjuring French participation in a forward battle, government statements on defence are virtually identical with their predecessors', even tending towards keeping the neutron bomb; Defense Nationale, September 1981-April 1982; Y. Bourges pointed out that even the seventh submarine was proposed to be discarded early in 1980, Le Monde, 15 September 1981.

Mitterrand had to harmonize divergent views of the different factions within the Socialist Party, such as those of the Atlanticists, the Centre d'Etudes de Recherches et d'Education Socialistes (CERES) group led by Pierre Chevenement, whose support Mitterrand needed in order to remain in control of the party. The CERES was more eager to denounce an imperial America than a totalitarian Soviet Union. The Jacobin-nationalist group was led by the French Defence Minister Charles Hermu, who, not only because of his political career and his expertise on the French defence policies, had been close to Mitterrand since early 1960s. So, in 1981 Defence Minister Hermu attached priority to the further strengthening of France's nuclear forces as:

- (a) Defence of France through the use of nuclear and conventional arsenals.
- (b) Contributing to the conventional defence of Europe.
- (c) Raising a Rapid Deployment Force of 48,000 troops to honour commitments of the allied states (particularly in Africa).⁴⁷

⁴⁷ H. S. Chopra, "Europe: A New Cold-Warrior", World Focus (New Delhi), no. 61, January 1985.

In this regard, the French Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, stated in his address to the National Institute for Higher Defence Studies on 16 September 1981:

Because of our status within the Alliance, we did not have to subscribe to the NATO decision of 12 December 1979, which, it is too often forgotten, provides that, in the event of failure of the Geneva negotiations, the Allies will deploy in Europe... 108 Pershing II launchers and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles, all with a single warhead. We are nonetheless convinced that it is essential to establish the conditions for balance in Europe which is an integral part of the Alliance area. This balance has been upset by the deployment from 1957 of the new Soviet nuclear weapon, the SS-20. 48

French policy since de Gaulle has been based on the premise that France needs a "balance" of power in Europe in order to pursue its interests. The difference is that the East was considered to be weaker during de Gaulle's period, and now there has come about parity between the two Super Powers. The French socialists

48 Speech of Pierre Mauroy at the National Institute for Higher Defence Studies (IHEDN), 16 September 1981. Complete text published in Defence Nationale, October 1981, cited in NATO Review (Brussels), no. 5, 1983, p. 23.

want the Atlantic Alliance to become stronger so as to maintain balance in Europe. This, however, does not mean that the socialists envision a change in their relationship with the alliance.

In May-June 1981, the socialists inherited responsibility for a triad of nuclear weapon systems based on the original Gaullist design of the 1960s.⁴⁹

Its oldest component is some thirty six aging Mirage-IV aircrafts dispersed over seven bases. The second component of the Force nucleaire Strategique (FNS) consists of eighteen S-2 IRBMs (Intermediate-range ballistic missiles). The third and the most important part, designated as the Force Oceanique Strategique, are the five missile-launching nuclear submarines now in service.⁵⁰ A submarine is equipped with sixteen missiles, each with a range of 3,300 km. and armed with a one-megaton thermonuclear warhead. Plans for modernization envisage that by early 1990s the French land and air forces will be equipped with pluton tactical nuclear weapons.⁵¹ In

49 Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).

50 Harrison, n. 39, p. 232.

51 Ibid.

this domain, it is worth mentioning that Giscard d'Estaing pursued policies which became highly controversial for they seemed to make a shift in budgetary priorities to favour conventional force development over improvements in the nuclear force, and also his failure to gain parliamentary approval for the construction of the Sixth Nuclear Submarine until September 1978, which meant that it could not enter into service before 1985. Then in July 1981, Mitterrand approved the construction of a seventh missile-launching submarine to enter into service by 1994. He further decided to go ahead with plans initiated under Giscard to create a mobile land-based IREM force.

The socialist attention to defence and military security was also reflected in the government's first defence budget for 1982, which increased defence spending by 17.63 per cent over 1981, amounting to a planned 4 per cent real increase after accounting for inflation. Defence was to account for 3.89 per cent of France's gross national product (GNP) in 1982, and this figure was to be increased to 3.94 per cent for the 1983 budget.

In fact, French Security interests were directly affected by the SS-20s deployment. This is seen in Andropov's suggestion that the French strategic force be counted as part of the NATO intermediate-range potential at the Geneva talks. Andropov seemed willing

to reduce the Soviet INF potential to the level of the British and French arsenals, combined, which was rejected by the French socialists while their communist colleagues approved of the Soviet proposal. This partly explains Mitterrand's move towards Atlanticism, for he could not imagine America's withdrawal from Europe, which would be totally detrimental to the French doctrine of "Balance of Power" in Europe.

Prime Minister Mauroy reiterated the reasons that made the Soviet proposal unacceptable to France. He considered the French modernization of its nuclear force as necessary to deter all systems capable of threatening France's security. In this regard, he said;

France currently has 132 strategic delivery systems: 80 submarine launched missiles (M-20); 18 surface-to-surface missiles (S-3) sited on the Albion plateau; and 34 Mirage IV aircraft. This fire-power cannot be compared with the 351 SS-20 missiles (243 targetted on Europe, each with three warheads, making a total of 1,053 warheads; our 98 missiles and 34 aircraft (total 132 nuclear warheads), cannot compare with over 10,000 nuclear warheads which could hit our country. 52

Pronouncement made by the Socialist statemen indicate that French nuclear weapons could not be

52 Speech of Prerre Mauroy to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale, Paris, September 1982, published in Defence Nationale, n. 48, p. 24.

included in the agenda for negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces. For these discussions aimed at restoring balance of deterrence in Europe following the deployment of SS-20s.

Francois Mitterrand apparently supported the deployment of cruise and perashing II (by NATO) in Europe for three reasons:

- (a) Superiority of Warsaw Pact over NATO after the deployment of SS-20s.
- (b) The reduced credibility of the US, and its adoption of the "flexible response" strategy, which makes limited nuclear wars in Europe possible.
- (c) Trend in the FRG towards neutralisation (through peace movements).

Furthermore, Mitterrand offered Paris as a venue for the Super Power negotiations which would create a global and verifiable balance of capabilities between the two.⁵³ Even Claude Cheysson reiterated that "in no case will we accept the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance - not geographically, functionally, toward

⁵³ Neville Waites, "France under Mitterrand - The First Year: Internal Relations", The World Today, vol. 38, no. 6, June 1982, p. 229.

other regions like the Third World, or for economic issues."⁵⁴ During the Atlantic Council meeting in June 1983, first such meeting in Paris since 1966, Mitterrand expressed French commitment to NATO, but he reminded that NATO had no jurisdiction over the conditions of East and West Trade.⁵⁵

The French "sensitivity" with regard to imbalance in Europe and its suspicion about resuming negotiations between the two Super Powers obliged it to modernize its conventional defence forces as well. President Mitterrand on different occasions expressed that "balance of power" is the guarantee of peace. He said:

If there is imbalance, there will be war
I am therefore in favour of preserving
this balance, and if it is upset to the
detriment of the Western powers, then it
has to be restored. All this supposed,
of course, that one is still willing to
negotiate disarmament. 56

54 Claude Cheysson, cited in Rodney Robert S., "Mitterrand's New Atlanticism: Evolving French Attitudes Toward NATO", Orbis, vol. 27, no. 1, Spring 1984, p. 86.

55 Ibid., pp. 86-87.

56 BBC interview with Francois Mitterrand Broadcast on the "Nationwide" programme, 11 September 1981. Note d'Actualite (London: French Embassy), 14 September 1981.

In fact, France by modernizing its nuclear force tried to assure balance in Europe in favour of the Western powers. Under the socialist government, France has tried to pursue a pragmatic and generally sensible policy on the defence equation between the two adversary blocs. However, the paramount consideration in the French mind has been the French national security. Whether such a policy must also be beneficial to the NATO has been a matter of coincidence.

It is well known that the French have the most powerful army in Western Europe. Its defence modernization programme is contained in its recently adopted Loi de Programmation Militaire (1984-88) with a projected budget of 830 billion francs (approximately \$ 100 billion).

In the new defence programme which is designed to ensure flexibility, nobility and fire power of conventional forces a new element has been introduced in the form of a Force d'Action Rapide (FAR) of 43,000 men. It includes the Eleventh Parachute Division, the Ninth Marine Division, the Twenty-Seventh Alpine Division, one light armored division, and a large air-mobile units comprised of 120 anti-tank helicopters, forty support helicopters, and eighty manoeuvre helicopters. This combat force will be armed with 600 of the most

sophisticated anti-tank weapons and will have the capacity to be transported 200 kms from the initial zone of deployment.

According to Hermu, Defence Minister of the French Socialist Government, "FAR will be able to deal with an armored invasion by engaging in defensive action against it at points decided by us."⁵⁷ This highly mobile (FAR) force will be entrusted with the mission of stopping the Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups Penetrating deep inside German territories.⁵⁸

The existing Pluton nuclear missiles in 1990 will be grouped into a single nuclear division, and around 1988, the Pluton will be replaced by the Hades missiles, with a 580 kms radius, which will most certainly carry the reduced blast warhead (neutron bomb) at present being developed in France.⁵⁹

In September 1984, the new French Prime Minister M. Laurent Fabius reviewed the current security policy, and said:

57 Hermu interview in Le Monde, 18 June 1983.¹

58 Jacques Isnard, Le Monde, 25 October 1983.¹

59 Defence Correspondent, "Shield and Sword for Europe? The French Army", The Economist, vol. 291, no. 7347, 23 June 1984, p. 23.

In the strategic context, achievement of strategic parity by the USSR and increase of its capabilities in Europe, resulting in greater difficulties of maintaining the 'coupling' between United States and Europe. 60

Another point of anxiety for the French statesmen is about Reagan's 'Star War' project. In this regard (military use of space), France made realistic proposals in June 1983 which aimed at getting negotiations under way to avoid a new spiral of the arms race. France made it clear that it wants "Star Peace",⁶¹ and more important than all, the French believe that the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) would make arms control negotiations even more difficult and as a result crisis intensity will increase.

France is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. But it reserves the right to decide when and where its military forces have to be used. De Gaulle sought to liberate France from the constraints of the Yalta system and the socialist France is initiating a

60 Speech of Prime Minister M. Laurent Fabius to the Higher National Defence Studies, 17 September 1984, in Survival (London), vol. 26, no. 6, November-December 1984, p. 281.

61 Ibid.

process so as to secure balance of forces in Europe. For this reason, France is opposed to the decoupling of the US from Europe. In any case, if that were to happen, the French responsibility to maintain power equilibrium in Europe will increase manifold, and this may be beyond its capacity.

CHAPTER IV

THE EAST-WEST 'NEW COLD WAR' AND THE SOCIALIST FRANCE'S RESPONSE

In 1981, when the Socialists assumed power in France, the East-West confrontation which came to be known as the "Second Cold War" had reached its high point. Soviet's concern with Mitterrand's support for NATO's two-track decision and the French defence modernization, hardened its attitude towards the INF negotiations. Mitterrand's condemnation of Reagan's Latin American policy, France's arms supplies to that region, Middle East and its presence in Africa plus establishment of Force d' Action Rapide (FAR) and its intention to include the FRG in its defence plan against any Soviet nuclear threat, not only contributed in a small way to reducing tension between the two Super Powers, but also lowered in their view the credibility of Mitterrand because of his political independence, and defiance on strategic issues.

There are divergent views on the exact starting point of the 'New Cold War'. The United States has also resisted public debate about the realities surrounding

nuclear weapons and deterrence.¹ The former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in his book says that the Administration missed an opportunity in April 1978 to express concerns — "more sharply"² when the Soviet-inspired radical political change came about in Afghanistan. In August 1982, the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshall Dimitri Ustinov, said that the Soviet Union's deployment of more than 1,000 warheads in Europe as against the NATO's Forward Based Defence systems (and the 162 French and British systems) represented a situation of "approximate policy". The American analysts then believed that even if the French and British systems were included in Ustinov's force calculations, his statement was absurd. They then added that more than two-thirds of the Soviet land based LRINF missile force is within the range of NATO's borders and the remaining forces could reach the allied territory in virtue of the SS-20's mobility and transportability. Further it is argued that roughly 25 per cent of the SS-20 deployments had occurred since the INF talks began in November 1981.³

1 Jed C. Snyder, European Security, "East-West Policy, and the INF Debate", Orbis, vol. 27, no. 4, winter 1984, p. 963.

2 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1983), p. 386.

3 US Department of Defence, Soviet Military Power (Washington, March 1983), edn 2, p. 37.

The Reagan administration realized soon after its advent to power that Soviet Union was unlikely to negotiate until it was convinced that the alliance would deploy some of the 572 new missiles prescribed by the NATO ministers four years ago. In contradistinction thereto, the Soviets believed that the United States would like to secure a monopoly by deploying next to the USSR nuclear weapons capable of hitting targets deep inside its territory, whereas the USSR did not have, and of course according to the American logic, it should not have a comparable nuclear force potential holding out any threat to the USA.⁴

It is argued in the Western circles that the USSR, by taking undue advantage of detente, had escalated the "New Cold War".⁵ But then there is no denying the fact that the Carter Administration had initiated the new cold war. Evidently it was the Carter Administration which had reversed its predecessors (Nixon and Ford) policies aimed at detente. Its major emphasis was upon Human Rights with its provocatively designed focus on the Soviet Union which

4 Yuri Andropov's conversation with Helmut Kohl, News and Views from the USSR (Washington: Embassy of the USSR), 5 July 1985, p. 2.

5 Gebhard Schweigler, "Carter's Detente Policy: Change or Continuity?" The World Today, vol. 34, no. 3, March 1978, p. 81.

contributed not only to the deterioration of US-Soviet relations, but also affected the on-going processes of detente.

The US detente policy was formulated by Henry Kissinger whose goal had been to overcome the stagnation of the Cold War through a 'new Look' policy with a view to reaching a 'more constructive relationship' with the Soviet Union.⁶ In order to reach that goal Kissinger sought to involve the Soviet Union in political, economic and cultural 'linkages' with the West, thereby neutralizing the ideological adversarial differential.⁷

And the main element which was excluded from this long-term international bargain between the Soviet Union and the United States was Soviet concessions in domestic policies. As Kissinger argued, any attempt to seek a change in Soviet domestic affairs would pose a threat to detente and thus risk peace itself; "where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny is concerned, we are not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes in foreign countries ... The preservation of human life and human society are

6 Simon Serfaty, "The Kissinger Legacy : Old Obsessions and New Look", The World Today, March 1977, pp. 81-89.

7 Henry Kissinger, The Process of Detente : American Foreign Policy (New York, 1977), edn 3, pp. 144-5.

moral value, too...."⁸ He took special care against any 'temptation to combine detente with increasing pressure on the Soviet Union', for "such an attitude would be disastrousWe will finally wind up again with the Cold War and fail to achieve either peace or any humane goal."⁹ It is the opposite of what the Carter Administration tried to do by over-emphasizing and sloganeering on "Human Rights".

The Soviet Union seemed to have misjudged the opportunity professed by Kissinger's "no more Vietnams" and sought to score over the US in Angola; this added to mutual suspicion in the two camps. In early 1970s, the USSR had agreed to negotiate on the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) only after the US had acquiesced the former's proposal for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

Brezhezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter well before the now election rejected Kissinger's basic premise that the alternative to detente would be nuclear war. In his view reducing the alternatives to detente or war meant a reduction of US's freedom of manoeuvre: "If you predicate your entire foreign policy

8 Ibid., p. 145.

9 Ibid., p. 169.

on the assumption that any determined move you make in American-Soviet relations is fraught with the dangers of nuclear war, you are, in fact, declaring yourself unequal to the game Moscow is playing."¹⁰ Brezezinski accused Nixon and Kissinger of having "elevated amorality to the level of principle".¹¹ He demanded an end to ideological hostilities which constituted a direct threat to the spirit of detente and an end to the Soviet violation of human rights which outraged a significant section of the Carter electorate and thereby complicated and exacerbated Soviet-American relations.¹²

Brezezinski left no doubt that detente implied substantial changes within the Soviet Union. "If detente is to become more than a transient and fundamentally unstable relationship, it will have to be much more comprehensive than it is envisaged to be at the present, and that means a possibly gradual but nevertheless fundamental change in Soviet positions at home and abroad."¹³ Such a challenge

10 Zbigniew Brezezinski, "From Cold War to Cold Peace", in G.R. Urban, ed., Detente (London: Temple Smith, 1976), p. 269. Brezezinski's remarks were made in the course of an interview with Mr Urban for Radio Free Europe, in late 1975.

11 Ibid., p. 268.

12 Ibid., p. 270.

13 Ibid., p. 264.

to the Soviet Union could be successful only if Soviet military superiority could be prevented and that could be achieved by dealing with the Soviet Union.

When Brezezinski says, "Only America has the power to shape a hostile world for itself",¹⁴ carried the implication that the Soviet-American relationship was no longer the predominant one for the United States. Carter made this approach his own during the election campaign.¹⁵

The dynamics of the election campaign and the take-over of government had created a strong domestic linkage between human rights and detente. But ultimately his universal commitment of human rights which led him to help the Shah of Iran led to his failure in the subsequent election due to the Tehran hostages crisis.

Even though it is said that without some sort of human right policy Carter would not have been able to pursue any kind of policy of detente.

Carter wanted both detente and human rights but Brezhnev wanted only detente without human rights. This divergence was a good plea for the Carter Administration for the deterioration of detente and the Reagan Administration

14 Zbigniew Brezezinski, "America in a Hostile World", Foreign Policy, summer 1976.

15 Carter's speech of 23 June 1976 to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, which was written largely by Brezezinski. Cited in Schweigler, n. 5, p. 84.

transformed it into the "New Cold War".

Brezhnev through the French President conveyed that had one-sidedly changed the rules of conduct of detente,¹⁶ There are hints that Carter employed a policy of strength and deliberate uncertainty.¹⁷

It was during 1976-80 that both the Super Powers were silently misusing detente, but in this process the Soviet's policy was much more sophisticated; there emerged several pro-Soviet governments in different parts of the world, particularly in Africa. Both Russians and Americans with the support of their respective alliances were wooing dangerously the third world somewhat against the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. There is no denying the truth that outside of Europe the Helsinki spirit did not influence the Super Power behaviour.

The post-war Cold War differs from the "New Cold War" in one essential way that the latter was the by-product of inter-adversary Super Powers misdemeanour, and in it their alliance partners had no role. Furthermore, in the new cold war, more than the ideological and/or territorial

16 Gebhard Schweigler, n. 5, p. 87.

17 So argued Victor Zorza, claiming information received from 'high-ranking government officials'. See "On the Sudden Soviet-US Thaw", International Herald Tribune, 6 September 1977.

issues (as they figured in the case of the earlier cold war) was the contention on the quantitative build up of the INF forces in Europe. The "first Cold War" was the result of the struggle for world leadership whereas the "Second Cold War" was based on the question of parity or its erosion in the relations between the two Super Powers. Then the "New Cold War" came to the lime-light and figured high on the Super Power agenda for dialogue owing principally to the alleged Soviet political behaviour and the resultant changes in South West Asia, West Asia, Angola and the Horn of Africa, which were construed as detrimental to the US interests.

It is often argued that the process of "New Cold War" began when the Soviets initiated a proxy war through the Cuban troops in Africa. The Carter Administration was concerned with the tremendous growth of Soviet arms and military assistance and the Cuban troops presence in Angola.

In fact, Soviet and Cuban entry into Angola was legitimized in African eyes because Angola was being attacked by South Africa. As Kenya's Foreign Minister observed: "The Cubans have changed the history of Africa. On the question of racial subjugation in Southern Africa, no one can convince me that the Azanians (South Africans),

Zimbabweans and Namibians should not get assistance from elsewhere if they are denied assistance by the West."¹⁸ Later on Soviet and Cuban troops entered Ethiopia to get back Ogaden province from Somalia. It was due to these activities, which affected relations between the two Super Powers as well as their detente policy. It even threatened the SALT II negotiations when Zbigniew Brezezinski said: "SALT lies buried in the sands of Ogaden."¹⁹ The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1978 and then the emergence of the "pro-non-aligned" and Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979 compelled the Carter Administration to adopt an aggressive posture towards the USSR. He warned that "Any attempt...to gain control of the Persian Gulf" would be "regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States" and would be "repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force".²⁰

Carter announced on 5 December 1979, the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). One week after the

18 Robert Price, U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1978), p. 38.

19 Zbigniew Brezezinski in Power and Principle, cited in K. Subramanyam, "The Second Cold War", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi: IIDS&A), vol. 7, no. 2-3, May-June 1983, p.73.

20 New York Times, 20 January 1980.

creation of the RDF, President Carter revealed his defence budget which amounted to a 5 per cent increase in defence spending. These figures were \$ 13 billion, or 8.9 per cent higher than that projected by Carter himself a year earlier.²¹ The Democrats blamed eight years of Republic priorities and mismanagement for the gap between US capabilities and commitments. Carter's supporters claimed, somewhat confusingly, that the President had fulfilled his 1976 promise to cut the defence budget by \$ 5 billion, while carrying out his 1977 pledge to the NATO allies to increase defence spending by 3 per cent a year.²²

Carter in his campaign statements stressed the limitations as well as the uses of military power. SALT II, in his view, retained a position of central importance; it represented the only alternative to a massive arms race, but by the circumstances of the events which were totally unwelcomed by the Carter Administration he boycotted US participation in the 1980 summer Olympic Games in Moscow, imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union and withdrew

21 SIPRI Year Book, 1981.

22 Towell Patrick, "Carter vs Reagan Defense Debate Turns on State of Mind", Congressional Quarterly Defence Policy Report, 8 August 1980, pp. 3-4.

the SALT II Treaty which had been submitted for ratification by the Senate.²³

Though President Reagan pursued the defence programme as outlined during the "later Carter Administration", yet he alleged that the US military preparedness under Carter had declined to "its lowest ebb in a generation".²⁴ Reagan in fact was not wrong, for even though the Carter Administration had earned credit on account of its success on the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel, yet the hostages problem in Iran and failure of the military expedition therefore resulted in his defeat for second term.

Among the West European statesmen, Helmut Schmidt, the West German Chancellor, known for his expertise on military strategy, and also known for being a supporter of removing the Thors and Jupiters, was the first, who, in a critical speech in London called for the new American deployments in Europe in response to the SS-20s. In 1977, he said, "SALT neutralizes (the Super powers') strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe, this

23 Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "A Question of Priorities : A Comparison of the Carter and Reagan Defence Programs", Orbis, vol. 27, no. 3, fall 1983, p. 646.

24 New York Times, 2 May 1980; "Is America Strong Enough", News Week, 27 October 1980, p. 50.

magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West."²⁵ Schmidt had expressed concern about the Carter Administration's agreement with the Soviet Union to exclude the Eurostrategic weapons from the dialogue on SALT II in 1978. He feared that its rejection would imperil detente, of which West Germany was its main beneficiary. It was a fact that the geographical vulnerability of the FRG in case of any confrontation between West and East, required not only detente with Moscow, but also West European unity as well as its continued security linkage with the NATO.²⁶

As compared to French Resident de Gaulle, his successor President Georges Pompidou's style revealed a less strident anti-American and a more pragmatic approach to European security in general and France's defence in particular.¹ European suspicions of Super Powers detente were expressed by Pompidou on 27 September 1973 when he said: "The law of politics and the life of states require

25 Speech of Helmut Schmidt at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 27 October 1977. Cited in Survival, January-February 1978, pp. 2-10.

26 William E. Griffith, The Super Powers and Regional Tensions: The USSR, the US and Europe (Massachusetts, 1982), p. 55.

one to consider all eventualities and therefore to see the dangers which this rapprochement might also entail if it were to lead to a kind of condominium, or to a kind of neutralization of Europe."²⁷ Two major international events were influenced by Pompidou's view. First, the US-USSR agreement on the prevention of nuclear war which was marked for discredibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe and the second was the US-USSR collaboration during the October 1973 Middle East crisis, which was responsible for the strained dialogue between France and America.²⁸ Pompidou also doubted about the sincerity of the Soviet Union in the name of detente. After de Gaulle's disappearance from the French political scene, there took place a broad review of the French concept of security. It appears that Pompidou realized that the Atlantic alliance was basic to European security, and also admitted that the defence of Europe depended upon the American nuclear power.

But then it is also clear that detente and ending of the inter-bloc adversarial confrontation were fundamental

27 Press Conference, Document No. D110/73, Ambassade de France en Inde, New Delhi, cited in Arshiya Bawa, The Socialist France and European Security (Unpublished Dissertation, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1984), p. 30.

28 William Safron, The French Policy (New York, 1977), p. 275.

features of the French approach to European security. This process could be facilitated only through co-operation between the East and West.

In this regard, Michel Debre was of the view that the pre-requisite for detente was the ending of the bloc system which restricted the freedom of decision of other countries.²⁹

There is no doubt that to accomplish a successful detente in Europe, France was very active particularly in reduction of tension between the two Super Powers, peaceful settlement of disputes and promoting confidence-building measures. One such measure was the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe which was given full support by France. But then the American reluctance to co-operate on the CSCE led President Giscard d'Estaing to disagree with the Carter Administration on the question of Human Rights which he felt, threatened detente. His basic policy was to pursue this national interest. Giscard tried to improve relations both with East and the West. After the advent of Reagan Administration, it appeared as if the Franco-American "honeymoon" had started anew.

29 Michel Debre, "Les Principes de Notre Politique de Defence", Revue de Defence National (Paris), August-September 1970, quoted in Deepak Gupta, Aspects of French Foreign Policy under Pompidou towards Western Europe (Unpublished Dissertation, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1973), p. 145.

One important aspect of Giscard's policy was his commitment to detente at least in Europe. According to Giscard's own recounting,³⁰ a key consideration in his reluctance to become involved was that by taking side with the Western allies he would leave France open to Soviets demand that the French nuclear force should be counted in the INF talks in Geneva. It is hardly conceivable, because problem of the French nuclear force inclusion in the Super Power negotiations was officially raised by the Soviets in the bilateral Franco-Soviet consultations held in Moscow in January 1978, one year before NATO took its double-track decision. Giscard thought if he does not support the NATO deployment officially, he could gain Moscow's support. Then he was also aware of the fissures in the "Left Unity" which had been nearly torn asunder at the general elections held in March 1978. With the result, Giscard felt reassured about his own victory in the French Presidential elections in May 1981. But then as we now know, his design failed miserably, and he lost in the elections. Giscard's May 1980 trip to Warsaw, and his meeting with Leonid Brezhnev, soon after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and his silence on the SS-20 issue, became key elements in the

30 Valery Giscard 'Entaing, "The Occasion Historique pour l' Europe", Le Monde, 19 February 1983.

Socialist critique of his "soft" foreign policy vis-a-vis Moscow. Giscard was wrong in his perception of getting concession from Soviets as the latter had constantly pressed for compensation against the French and British nuclear systems ever since the opening of the SALT negotiations in 1969.³¹

Giscard attached primacy to detente. He tried not to displease the Soviets. France wanted to keep as much flexibility as possible in its foreign relations, because a renewal of the cold war in Europe would again force it to go closer towards the US, devalue itself for the USSR as well as other West European states which showed some independence of the US. By inference, this could also mean a new wave of tensions imperilling peace in Europe.

Reagan's success in 1980 became possible because of a general desire for change in the US policy towards the USSR. In other words, Reagan was the beneficiary of the popular discontent with Carter's policies.³² The new Reagan Administration set about making changes in the FY

31 Pierre Lellouche, "French and the Euro-missiles", Foreign Affairs, vol. 62, no. 2, winter 1983-84, p. 327.

32 Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kaagen, "Assertive America", Foreign Affairs, vol. 59, 1981, p. 702.

1981 and FY 1982 defence budgets. After a little more than a month in office, Reagan and his Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger submitted formal revisions requesting an additional \$ 7 billion (4 per cent) for FY 1981 and \$ 26 billion (13 per cent) for FY 1982. "Taken together these revisions projected a 10.1 per cent real annual growth in TOA during fiscal years 1981-86, bringing defence spending to 7 per cent of GNP and 36.8 per cent of total federal spending by the end of that period."³³ Reagan decided to continue with the Carter programme that had cut Trident production from three submarines every two years to one per year.³⁴ While Carter Administration had developed an appreciation for the importance of the Middle East and Persian Gulf as a subsidiary theatre during a major war centered in Europe, the Reagan Administration hinted that any war with the Soviet Union -- whether begun in Europe or not -- would be of world-wide dimensions with central Europe being only one theatre. Weinberger wrote: "...if the enemy attacked at only one place, we

33 James W. Alallera, Roger P. Labrie, and Albert C. Pierce, The FY 1982-1986 Defence Program: Issues and Trends (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 4-9.

34 Lawrence J. Korb, The FY 1980-84 Defence Program: Issues and Trends (Washington, 1979), p. 38.

might choose not to restrict ourselves to meeting aggression on its own immediate front."³⁵

From Soviet's perspective of the East West confrontation, the collapse of detente was attributed to the Carter Administration, which is said to have done much "that was harmful and tended to position the international atmosphere".³⁶ According to the Soviet media, under Reagan matters have gone from bad to worse.

The Reagan Administration was being pilloried for allegedly returning to the attitude of the Cold War. "There is no justification for giving way to the blackmail of the arrogant and far from diplomatic statements of certain Washington politicians. Listening to the aggressive boasting of some of them one might think that it is not 1981 but 1950. However, since then the world has become different...."³⁷ The Reagan Administration is accused of "having opted for military supremacy over the Soviet Union, discarding the policy of peaceful co-existence and detente and relying on a sharp build-up of the US

35 Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudemaier, "Strategy for Survival", Foreign Policy, fall 1983, pp. 22-41.

36 Pick Otto, "Reaction to Reagan: Soviet Fears and Opportunities", The World Today, vol. 37, no. 7-8, July-August 1981, p. 265.

37 Moscow Radio Home Service, 26 March 1981 (SvB, BBC Monitoring Service, part 1, 30 March 1981).

military presence in different parts of the world, including areas along Soviet frontiers". It is also pointed out that NATO's arsenal of theatre nuclear forces 'approximately corresponds' to the Soviet Union's capability. It seemed that the Soviet Union was not reluctant to see the end of the Carter era when it watched the latter's grim heritage passing on to the shoulders of the incoming Republicans. But when President Reagan accused the Soviet Union of striving for world hegemony, the next day, TASS described this as 'deliberate distortion' promoted by a complete lack of understanding of the process of change in international affairs. Reagan's statements were attributed to his childish ailments brought on by accession to power.

The Soviet Union had an intense interest in maintaining a stable situation in Europe in view of its own economic difficulties and the alarming changes in progress in Poland. By claiming that it is the Americans who are trying to upset the military balance in Europe, they tried to maintain their temporary advantage to consolidate their relationship with their East-European allies. At the same time, the Soviets were intensifying their established policy of trying to drive a wedge

between Western Europe and the USA. Even Georgi Arbatov³⁸ on West German Television tried to justify the Soviet position. He took care to stress that the Soviet Union's "reasonable" attitude was based on strength and made some comparison between US opposition to the stationing of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 and the present Soviet concern over the proposal to place Pershing-II and Cruise missiles in Europe. Arbatov emphasized on the USSR's economic capability when he said: "We could achieve higher performance if needs be, if it were understood that it has been forced on us." Arbatov, in a widely publicized article in Pravda, on 9 March 1981 had summarized the Soviet view of the international situation:

The attempt to bring back the 1950s now, in the 1980s, is absolutely hopeless. If the United States failed to gain a decisive military superiority over the USSR which could be utilized in the political field at that time, how could that be achieved now? How can the unconditional obedience of the allies be secured if their political and economic standing has fundamentally changed? How can the people of Asia and Africa which have freed themselves from the colonial yoke be returned to their previous condition? How is the implicit obedience of Latin America to be ensured? 39

38 Reportedly influential Director of the USA and Canada Institute of the USSR, who is often used to explain the Soviet position to foreign audiences. He delivered a speech in winter 1983 in SIS, JNU, New Delhi.

39 Georgi Arbatov, cited in Pick Otto, n. 36, p. 268.

Georgi Arbatov, either has forgotten to refer to Afghan or Poland cases, or he was justifying Soviet view of international situation on the basis of "Brezhnev Doctrine".

There is no doubt that Soviet Union as well as United States follow and define the international situation as it suits their interests, as it was clear in the case of socialist government in France. Mitterrand believed that Europe's fundamental political and strategic interests were at stake. He was convinced that France had to intervene in the European debate in order to stop the risk of neutralist drift to non-nuclear Europe, and to help restore a "balance" of forces broken by installation of SS-20s. Mitterrand in his commitment to support NATO modernization considered the gravity of the internal evolution in Germany, and Soviet ambition for decoupling Europe from American nuclear deterrence, declared that any attack on France does not start when enemy enters French territories.

The time when Socialist France came to power was completely different from the time when Pompidou was in power. Pompidou tried to prevent the probable "condominium" formation of the super powers, whereas Mitterrand's task was to restore 'Balance' of forces in Europe. And naturally restoring Balance requires to participate in the Cold War of the Super Powers.

The years between 1977 to 1982 can be considered as the "years of New Cold War". During these years France was ruled by the right wing party of Giscard and then the Socialist Party of Mitterrand. Both these statesmen were supported by the US but there was qualitative difference in regard to the interest they evinced in the promotion of detente. Generally it is understood that Giscard tried to promote detente with the USSR. Both the US and the USSR seemed to be satisfied with Giscard. That is why they favoured his re-election, and were opposed to Mitterrand's election as the French President, because each of the two Super Powers had different apprehensions on his policy approaches.

If the previous governments in France tried to uphold the process of detente, the Socialist regime in France in many ways escalated the new Cold War which seemed to be brewing up between the two Super Powers. Due to the prolonged economic crisis in the West Mitterrand like his predecessors had to face for a long period grave financial instability exacerbated by the quadrupling of oil prices following an Arab-Israel war in 1973, and by the doubling of prices in 1979 during a second oil crisis associated with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. At the same time there were political upheavals; American defeat in Vietnam was followed by a

long war in Kampuchea; Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola led subsequently to South African military intervention against the Cuban troops presence in Angola; and the armed conflict in the Western-Sahara that took place following the Spanish withdrawal. Furthermore the divergence in Super Powers approach to detente created mutual suspicion resulting in the spiralling arms race, and in this regard, maintained its position in the forefront.

As a middle-ranking power, the French interests and activities were subject to three principal interpretations:

- (i) The classical liberal view emphasised the need for France to react flexibly to unpredictable forces and events in order to keep upright while awaiting a new world equilibrium.⁴⁰
- (ii) The reformist liberal view emphasized French links and comparisons with other states, le plus faible des forts et le plus fort des faibles "the weakest of the strong and the strongest of the weak" needing actively to seek unrestricted co-operation with all

⁴⁰ G.M. Lyons, "Expanding the Study of International Relations ; The French Connection", World Politics, October 1982, pp. 135-49.

parts of interdependent world to derive mutual benefits of peace and prosperity.⁴¹

- (iii) The Marxist view emphasized the need for France to adopt in a competitive but circumspect role befitting an intermediate position in a world structurally divided between dominant, semi-dependent and dependent states.⁴²

Mitterrand gave priority to economic revival and his awareness of the French position as a middle-ranking power with limited freedom of action led him to emphasize co-operation with allies rather than independence. Although his socialist colleagues recommended a Marxist policy of competitive protectionism; Mitterrand opted eventually for a reformist liberal approach.⁴³ He maintained Giscard's rearmament policy which began in 1978, but dispensed with his search for an East-West Convergence of interests in favour of a balance of power, which involved France to encourage US rearmament and installation of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe to counter Soviet's SS-20s.

41 M. Merle, Sur la "Problematique" de l'etude des relations internationales en France, La Revue Francaise de Sciences Politiques, June 1983, pp. 403-27.

42 S.D. Kragner, "Third World Vulnerabilities and Global Negotiations", Review of International Studies (Guildford, Surrey), October 1983, pp. 235-49.

43 D.L. Hanley, A.P. Kerr, N.H. Waites, Contemporary France Politics and Society since 1945 (London, 1984), p. 221.

Table I

Development of Defence Expenditure : 1977-1982

44

(In millions of Francs as proposed by the fourth military program)

Year	Research and strategic force	Total Army	Navy	Airforce	Gens d' armerie
1977	58,000 11,670	19,400	9,780	12,225	5,925
1978	66,460 13,145	21,080	11,355	14,050	6,730
1979	76,155 14,795	14,795	13,200	16,490	7,645
1980	87,260 16,470	16,470	15,450	19,405	8,655
1981	99,990 18,495	18,495	17,975	22,670	9,875
1982	114,575 20,570	20,570	20,955	26,850	11,000
Total	502,440	156,130	88,715	111,820	49,830

The growth of strength of French army, which created suspicion for the Soviet Union was significant. Among the operational forces, the army was partly re-structured in 1979.⁴⁵ By 1983 there were eight armoured divisions, each comprising 8,000 men divided into two tank regiments, two mechanized infantry regiments and two artillery regiments; there were also some four infantry divisions, each comprising 6,500 men - divided into three motorized infantry regiments, one armoured - car regiment and one artillery regiment (a fifth infantry division was also scheduled). In addition there were several specialized Alpine, marine and parachute divisions; and five regiments equipped with thirty pluton surface-to-surface missile for 'tactical' use, each carrying one 20-kiloton warhead equivalent to the power of the Hiroshima bomb. A number of other regiments were equipped with Hawk and Roland surface-to-air missiles. The navy was growing steadily in 1983 and it was expected that by the early 1990s France would be able to match Britain as a world naval power. The deployment of the army outside France was as follows: 48,500 in FRG, plus another 2,700 in West Berlin; 3,520 at Djibouti, 2,911 in Lebanon in Multi-National United Nations Interim Forces; 1,170 in

45 These and subsequent details of French forces are taken mainly from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance : 1983-84 (London), pp. 31-34.

Senegal; 3,000 in Chad; 450 in Gabon; 900 in the Ivory Coast; 16,500 in Overseas in Antilles-Guyana, South Indian Ocean, New Caledonia and Polynesia.⁴⁶ An estimated 55.60 per cent of all military equipment produced in France is exported. Out of 162 Mirage fighters produced in 1977, only 44 were delivered to the French Air Force, while the remaining 118 were exported.⁴⁷ Dassault Company is developing the new Mirage-4000 fighter, exclusively for use in Third World countries.⁴⁸ One of the largest deals ever made by France was the 1977 oil barter deal with Iraq worth \$2,300 million. In 1979 France began negotiating a thousand million-dollar deal with Saudi-Arabia while both are engaged in disputes in the Gulf war. In South East Asia, French competition for arms orders has resulted in the position as the third largest exporter to the region after signing the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. In Africa, France had to give way to the Soviet Union but remained the second largest arms supplier to this Black continent. In South America, France has become the third largest arms seller to the region, with Chile as the largest customer and

46 Ibid.

47 SIPRI Year Book, 1980, p. 75.

48 Ibid.

Ecuador the next largest. The Indian sub-continent receives an increasing share of French weapons, placing France as the second largest supplier to the area after Helsinki agreement of 1975.⁴⁹

With such a percentage of arms exporting, French President who was contesting Brezhnev's claim expressed that President Carter's emphasis on human rights had one-sidedly changed the rules of conduct of detente.⁵⁰ In his speech at UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, President Giscard d'Estaing presented an alternative proposal for arms sale, control, and suggested that third world countries also agree to self-restraint on arms purchases.⁵¹ But in Egypt, France conquered a big share of the major arms market, having sold Mirage-5 fighters, helicopters, the crocodile SAM system and the Euron missile MILAN.⁵² And in the second half of the 1970s, France supplied 53 per cent of the major arms transferred to the Republic of South Africa,⁵³ in fact skilfully circumscribing the embargo placed against the Pretoria regime.

49 Ibid., p. 76.

50 Gebhard Schweigler, n. 5, p. 87.

51 SIPRI Yearbook, 1980, p. 77.

52 Ibid., p. 98.

53 Ibid., p. 112.

Table II

Rank Order of the 5 Largest Major Weapon
Exporting Countries of the World, 1977-80

Exporting countries	Total value	Percentage of total exports	Percentage of total rate to Total world	Largest importer per exporter
USA	24,895	43.3	60.8	Iran
USSR	15,755	27.4	79.5	Syria
France	6,213	10.8	76.5	Morocco
Italy	2,273	4.0	76.6	South Africa
UK	2,141	3.7	81.7	India

Source: SIPRI COMPUTER - Stored data base.

Weapon Category

Country	Aircraft	Armoured vehicles	Missiles	Ships
USA	52	8	39	1
USSR	60	13	24	3
France	57	14	20	9
Italy	36	17	34	13
UK	33	19	14	34

Source: SIPRI Computer Stored Data Base
1981, p. 188.

During the years 1977-80, when Valery Giscard d'Estaing proposed for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), Helsinki follow-up was in progress and the East-West negotiations were moving for the SALT II agreement. At the same time France was the third largest weapon exporter to the third world countries.

During 1977-80, 76.5 per cent of French arms exports went to the Third World. In 1980 France won substantial new orders, following President Giscard d'Estaing's tour of the Middle East. Over the next decade, Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet was expected to produce at least 450 delta-wing Mirage-2000 fighters for Arab countries alone - including Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Then it was also reported that Saudi Arabia would finance development of the bigger Mirage-4000.⁵⁴

According to official statistics, French arms exports in real prices have more than doubled, from \$2,500 million in 1976 to an estimated \$ 5,200 million in 1980. By 1980, between 80 and 90 per cent of French arms exports went to wealthy Arab oil producing countries such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya and the United Arab Emirates, and in the same year French helicopters and transport aircrafts were supplied to Angola.⁵⁵

54 White, D., "Military Contracts", Financial Times, 4 December 1978.

55 SIPRI Yearbook 1980, p. 191.

France's economic turmoils and its dependence on foreign loans reduced its commitment to international peace as well as detente. Even if due to the French initiative European Disarmament Conference has been held in Stockholm in 1984, nothing substantial has emerged out of it.

French arms exports were the result of an official policy to maintain independence in defence and foreign policy ; arms sales were intended to serve the political purpose of guaranteeing an autonomous defence structure and making the French influence felt not only in Europe but in the world as a whole. Success of such a policy depended on French's arms market. To increase the political influence in Europe as well as in the world after the Helsinki accord, French competition with Super Powers in arms manufacture as well as arms sale began. The French objective was realized principally because in the New Cold War there were political rivals in all parts of the world. French expanding world armament market can be seen in terms of sales in billions of US dollars, given here below:

Year	Sale in US million \$
1974	1,388
1975	1,934
1976	2,436
1977	2,994
1978	3,819
1979	4,807
1980	5,775

In 1981, orders from abroad for French arms were worth nearly 40 billion francs, and in 1982 orders rose to about 53 billion francs.⁵⁶ In 1960s French arms sales were directed as much to developed as to developing countries; but during the 1970s there was an increasing bias towards the latter, amounting to 90 per cent by 1980. Soon after the Helsinki Meeting, and its follow-up, the French policy of arms supply shifted towards the Third World countries. The Middle East and North Africa took 79 per cent of all French arms sales in 1980, Europe and North America 7.5 per cent and Latin America 7 per cent.

⁵⁶ Hanley, Kerr and Waites, n. 43, p. 234.

In the first half of 1983 the Middle East and North Africa took 62,5 per cent while Latin America and the Caribbean took 25,6 per cent of French arms sales. The most important components of sales were aircrafts, helicopters, and tactical missiles, making up 59 per cent in 1979. Defence-related sections of French industry became export dependent. In 1970, arms production for foreign markets was only 14,8 per cent, but it rose to 38,1 per cent by 1977 and was still at the same level in 1983.⁵⁷

France's adoption in 1965 for "Empty chair" policy, its refusal to sign agreements such as the 1963 partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), as well as its non-participation in MBFR (NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations) and the UN Disarmament Committee at Geneva for whatever reason which they may justify, exacerbated the East-West tensions. France came to be considered as a troublesome and intransigent ally within the NATO, thereby stimulating the Soviet interest in the widening disunity in the West. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 fell even further short of French criteria for disarmament. The 'Empty Chair' policy was again followed even in 1972 for Biological and Toxin Weapons convention. The French

57 J. Klein, "Commerce des armes et politique : Pe-
cas francais", in Politique étrangère, no. 6,
1976, pp. 563-85; Le Monde, 13 October 1983,
pp. 1-6.

approach at non-participation in this conference was designed to register a protest against the US attempts at perpetuating its domination over the Western alliance, and also there was no adequate consultation with the allies. Giscard d'Estaing himself told some journalists (in June 1977)⁵⁸ that France did not exclude the possibility of returning to the Geneva Disarmament committee if the Soviet-American co-presidency were to be abandoned and if the Committee could offer 'perspectives of concrete results'. At the same time the Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand published two prominent articles on the subject in December 1977, and the national convention of the Socialist party in January 1978 approved a broad approach to disarmament in anticipation of the March 1978 legislative elections.

In Giscard's views, the world is divided into the nuclear-haves and nuclear have-nots. In the zone without nuclear weapons, France would continue to oppose nuclear proliferation and favour establishment of nuclear-free zones.⁵⁹ For resuming detente in Europe

58 Giscard d'Estaing statement of 24 June 1977, cited in Jean Klein, "Continuite et ouverture dans la politique franconaise en matiere de disarmament", Politique Etrangere, vol. 44, no. 2, 1979, p. 219.

59 Discourse prononcee par le president Giscard d'Estaing a l'assemblee generale extraordinaire (New York), 25 mai 1978, Document d'Actualite International, no. 25, 1978, p. 494.

France proposed a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in an attempt to deal with the conventional force as well as INF asymmetries favouring the Warsaw Pact.

While the CDE proposal remains by far the most significant of the 1978 initiatives, and it would be naive to expect that France's returning to the Geneva Disarmament Committee will make it more effective than the old one denounced by General de Gaulle,

From the first meeting of the renewed Geneva Disarmament Committee in January 1979, France has faced criticism for its opposition to a comprehensive test ban treaty.

France's role in Chemical Weapons (CW) negotiations has been to pursue what has apparently been among the most far-reaching and thorough proposals for verification provisions. The French Government has consistently rejected all suggestions at participating in the Vienna negotiations that began in 1973, and has emphatically disapproved of the forum's existence and the behaviour of its Western allies in sustaining it, because in France's view strengthening of the two alliances would clash with its declared policy regarding detente as it wishes that alliances must be gradually weakened in conjunction with the emergence of an East-West detente to reduce the Super Powers influence in Europe.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) dual-track decision calling for both negotiations and deployment has provoked reconsideration of the future of US-European security policy in dealing with the Warsaw conventional as well as INF forces.

And after "Jackson Amendment" which obliged the US to seek equal US-Soviet ceilings on strategic nuclear launchers in SALT II, the USSR continued to seek compensation for British and French forces to be included in the negotiations.⁶⁰ In April 1983, Andrei Gromyko stated that the French and British missiles formed part of the common forces of the North Atlantic alliance, then jocularly, he added: "Imagine a French Missile flying perhaps will also carry a tag saying, 'I am French', and I should not have been included in the count?"⁶¹

The US has its own reasons for saying that British and French forces can be no substitute for US forces as a guarantee for other West European non-nuclear members of the NATO.

But when Mitterrand announced his support to NATO's INF decision which exacerbated the East-West

60 Initially in SALT I USSR had made the same compensation.

61 Andrei Gromyko's press conference of 2 April 1983, in New York Times, 3 April 1983, p. 10.

tension, Soviet Union then reiterated its view that the French and British forces be counted with those of the US.⁶² Soviet Union then accused France of pursuing "contradictory" policies, in that while it claims to be a 'loyal ally' of the Atlantic Alliance, yet it "gives the impression that in the case of a military conflict between the two blocs, French nuclear forces could remain aside".⁶³

France naturally refused to permit its forces to be taken into account in a bilateral US-Soviet negotiations until after a significant reduction in Super Powers nuclear capabilities is made. They rather believed that their forces are central systems intended to provide an ultimate deterrent against Soviet nuclear strike against France.

As French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson noted, the USSR is attempting to shift the dialogue away from the true subject, and to conceal the magnitude of Soviet INF superiority.⁶⁴ Both Mitterrand and Herou held on to the view that acquiescence into the Soviet proposals would not only be 'detrimental for peace

62 Leonid Brezhnev's November 1981 interview with Der Spiegel, reprinted in Survival (London), January-February 1982, p. 34.

63 Vadim Zagladin, Le Monde, 26 January 1983.

64 Cheysson in Le Monde, 23 December 1982.

in Europe⁶⁵ but would also add to disequilibrium. As such, the Socialist France is not only opposed to the Soviet proposal to include the French nuclear force in the INF debate, but has set up its force d' Action Rapide (FAR) within its three concentric defence frameworks comprising France, Europe and the Overseas. Also it has renewed its commitment to the strengthening of the Atlantic alliance, but without rejoining its military command. It cannot break with the long-term Gaullist perspective of French national independence within Europe having regained its identity and unity from the "Atlantic to Urals". In other words, there seems to have emerged a long-term national consensual goal of seeing Europe free from the Super Power hegemony. This is what Francois Mitterrand had said soon after his investiture as the President of France: "Let us begin by putting a soul back in Europe."⁶⁶

65 Mitterrand's speech to the Bundestag on 20 January 1983, in Le Monde, 22 January 1983.

66 Interview in Le Monde, 2 July 1981.

CONCLUSION

Once de Gaulle had said, "If there was a voice that might be listened to and a policy that might be effective with a view to setting up a new order to replace the Cold War, that voice and that policy were pre-eminently those of France."¹ Whether at present the Socialist government in France represents the same view or not is a question to which an answer may have to be found in the way it conducts itself now on critical issues relating to European security and East-West detente.

Since the inception of the V Republic in 1958, France has given evidence of its grasp of political realism on European security, its own defence and East-West relations. To safeguard its security and to promote prospects of peace in Europe, France pursued the path of "Realpolitik" in relation to the two Super Powers. It expressed its opposition both to the Super Power condominium and or neutralization of Central Europe, which, it believed, could only imperil tranquility and security in Europe.

France played a key role in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its CDE proposal was a successful step to get into the Super Powers' arms

¹ Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, tr. Terence Kilmartin (London, 1971), p. 165.

negotiations. However, its approach to international peace and security bears contradiction. While on the one hand it was striving for peace and security in Europe, on the other hand, surprisingly it proposed a "Pan-African Collective Security Force" apparently to enable the African monarchs to suppress any movement for political change. This retrograde concept was approbated by the US. And, as a result it became concretized.² The dubious policy, such as it is, raised doubts particularly in the Third World, as to whether the French intended the CSCE to promote peace in Europe or to shift the conflicts to the Third World?

The strong support extended by the French Socialist regime to the NATO modernization plan complicated not only the process of detente, it further escalated the "New Cold War" between the two Super Powers. Its refusal to acquiesce into the Soviet demand to include its nuclear arsenal in the INF talks was an additional factor that added fuel to the fire.

Soviets believe that France is replacing its single-warhead M-20 SLEMs with seven warhead M-4 SLEMs and its ground based single-warhead S-3 missiles with

2 Jon Kraus, "American Foreign Policy in Africa", Current History, vol. 80, no. 463, March 1981, p. 100.

seven-warhead S-4 missiles. They even believe that the French defence apparatus is somehow an adjunct of the NATO. In reality, the NATO-managed defence of Western Europe provides a cover for France against any possible incursion from the USSR, and as such its own strategic force bears significance only as the second line of defence, primarily meant to safeguard its own security.³

As reported in the Western press France has already tested the neutron bomb. And for the period 1984-88, it proposes 2 per cent annual growth in its defence spending in real terms.⁴ Without doubt with its modernization plan dovetailed with that of the NATO (modernization programme), France feels reassured about its own as well as European security. But once the nuclear threshold is crossed, it becomes very difficult to imagine that the use of nuclear weapons would be limited. It is understood in the NATO strategic circles, as is also the case with France, that security policy can no longer be based on a nuclear response to a conventional attack.

3 Progress Publishers, How to Avert the Threat to Europe (Moscow, 1985), p. 29.

4 SIPRI Year Book, 1984, p. 84.

As explained earlier, France has directly or indirectly contributed to the "New Cold War". As stated recently in one of the Indian national dailies, France in 1984-85 has emerged as the largest exporter of arms (with sale proceeds amounting to 15 billion US dollars as compared to the US exports of 9 billion US dollars) to the Third World. Around 500,000 people are employed in the French arm industries and most of the arms produced are supplied to Third World countries. In passing, may it be mentioned that in the second half of 1970s, France was the major arms supplier to South Africa. Besides, France has also been a major supplier of arms to the Indian sub-continent, Africa, West Asia, South America and the Far East. This is a part of the political game played by France on the chessboard of international politics, of which the effect has been more of igniting rather than extinguishing conflicts in the Third World.

With this kind of background, is it not surprising that the French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing in his speech at UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 presented a proposal for control on arms sales by the arms suppliers, which also envisaged that Third World countries must agree to self-restraint on arms purchases.⁵

5 SIPRI Year Book, 1980, p. 78.

With all these patent contradictions in words and deeds, it is clear that a medium ranking power like France has to adopt a policy of national independence to protect its own interests while at the same time enhancing the prospects of peace in Europe. Without doubt, in this process the Western alliance benefits from the presence of a defence-minded ally, who supports strengthening of the alliance effort while maintaining its own significant defence capability.

Today in France, de Gaulle is no more to champion the cause of national independence. Yet no one, in practice, questions its validity. After all, it is this policy which has been adopted by the socialists on assumption of power in 1981. Let no one forget that while in opposition during 1970s they have been the principal antagonists of national strategic defence. It is this proposition which remains time-tested that whatever position the political parties (in opposition) may hold does not indicate their true position on critical issues such as national defence; rather it is only when they hold the reins of government that they in practice show where they stand. So, if the French Socialists have changed their views on national defence

and have become conformists a-la-mode Gaullist, this is very much in accord with the known political behaviour patterns in the West.

B_I_B_L_I_O_G_R_A_P_H_Y

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