

JAPANESE RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

**Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the dissertation titled, **Japanese Response to International Terrorism**, being submitted to the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, **Jawaharlal Nehru University**, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university.


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To my Parents

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PREFACE

International terrorism is no longer a new phenomenon as far as the international community is concerned. The war against international terrorism is a different kind of war, new only in its increased intensity, but considerably older in nature. The first glimpses of terrorism appear in the Greek historian Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, though what he described was a sort of urban insurgency out of which terrorism travelling through various phases has acquired the present catastrophic form of international terrorism. Kautilya too, in his famous treatise, *Arthashastra*, talked about *tusnim yudha* or 'silent war'. The sphere of terrorism has since increased manifold. So too, has the concept of what constitutes terrorism.

An attempt is made in the following dissertation to assess the Japanese response to international terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Chapter 1 examines terrorism in its various forms and in particular the impact of terrorism across national frontiers and how other nations and non-state actors respond from time to time. Some of the tactics and motivations of terrorist organizations are examined. The differences between war and terrorism and between a terrorist and a soldier are also sought to be clarified. Brief outlines of the September 11 attacks and the nature of the Japanese response too are provided.

In **Chapter 2**, the history of terrorism on Japanese soil and against Japanese targets abroad and Japan's reactions are covered. The focus is in

particular on two main groups the Japanese Red Army and the Aum Shinrikyo – two homegrown groups that have had the greatest impact domestically as well as have had a substantial international presence at their peaks. Despite its low crime rates the weaknesses of Japanese society and the shortcomings of the Japanese laws have contributed in part to the rise of terrorism in Japan.

Chapter 3 concentrates specifically on the Japanese measures both domestically and on the international arena since the September 11 attacks. These include diplomatic and economic measures as well as international relief efforts undertaken in Afghanistan. This section also discusses how the Japanese government has used the opportunity presented by the tragedy in the US, to bring about changes in its own policy with regard to the deployment of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) and in domestic laws. The reactions within Japan to the changes being made in the security laws are also touched upon.

Chapter 4 is the concluding chapter and summarizes the findings of the preceding chapters. It traces the pattern of Japanese responses to the kind of terrorism heralded by the events of September 11. Japanese compulsions – domestic as well as international – as it charted its course toward a more proactive role on the international stage are examined. Japanese responses to international terrorism are thus studied against the background of the long-running Japanese economic recession, calls to review Article 9 of the constitution, and Japan's diplomatic balancing act. This final section posits that Japan has got opportunities now, to return to military normalcy and for gaining a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

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I would like to remember at this moment the tremendous love and affection of my parents and sisters, and my nephews.

Finally, I thank God for giving me constant motivation and the strength to work on my dissertation.

*New Delhi
July 23, 2003*

Rajesh Kapoor

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Terrorists produce, or aim to produce, terror – extreme fear – among their opponents. Although the word “terrorism” is of Latin origin (from *terrere*, to frighten), it entered modern western vocabularies only in the fourteenth century through the French language. The first English usage was recorded in 1528. The basic mechanism of terror was captured in an ancient Chinese proverb: “kill one, frighten ten thousand.”¹

International terrorism is not a new phenomenon as far as the international community is concerned. It is a war, new in intensity but ancient in nature.² The roots of modern international terrorism can be traced back to political developments in the Middle East after the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel in 1948. The Cold War between the US and the erstwhile USSR led to the world being divided into two hostile camps. Due to the huge expenditure on weapons and security and the memory of World War II which was still fresh, both superpowers avoided open confrontation. Therefore, they relied on covert warfare and the use of terror to achieve their political ends that resulted in the mushrooming of numerous state-sponsored terrorist groups, the world over.

A major problem of any student studying international affairs has, been in defining terrorism. There is no precise definition of terrorism or

¹ *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*, Vol. 1, New York: M E Sharpe, Inc., 1997, p. 12.

² Mahindra S, *Terrorist Games Nations Play*, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1993, p. 15.

international terrorism that is accepted by the world community. General acceptance of the definition of terrorism is yet to be achieved because of the fact that “[o]ne man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.³ International terrorism is that kind of “[t]errorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization or directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments. International terrorism has involved groups seeking to overthrow specific regimes, to rectify national or group grievances, or to undermine international order as an end in itself”.⁴ International terrorist organizations operate with their widespread global network, which make their operations and attacks easy.

Analyzing UN resolutions, passed from time to time provides a means of how the definition of terrorism has evolved over time. In 1972, the UN for the first time realized the threat of international terrorism and decided to adopt resolution for the prevention of international terrorism. Thus, on 18 December 1972, the first ever text of the UN on international terrorism was adopted at the 2114th plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

The subject of the text contained measures to prevent international terrorism which endangered or took innocent human lives or jeopardized fundamental freedoms. It sought to study the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and act of violence and identified these as lying in the misery, frustration, grievance and despair, which caused some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes.

³ Harold J Vetter and Gary R Perlstein, *Patterns of Terrorism*, California: Brooks Cole Publishing Company, 1991, p. 3.

⁴ Ranjit K Pachnanda, *Terrorist and Response to Terrorist Threat*, New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 2002, p. 4.

The inclusion of the right of self-determination was not accepted by colonial powers but many Afro-Asian countries that were reeling under colonial rule were also responsible for the growth of terrorism in international politics. An ad hoc committee to examine the matter was formed. Soviet Russia supported the resolution while US and its allies opposed it. The committee submitted its report without a unanimously accepted definition of international terrorism but it suggested a number of measures for prevention of terrorism and sought cooperation among members.

Finally in 1987, the Secretary-General convened international conference to define terrorism and differentiate it from freedom fighting. Taking note of the Secretary-General's report, the UN General Assembly condemned all acts of terrorism, except those fighting for right to self-determination against foreign and racist regimes, as 'criminal' wherever and by whomever committed including those which jeopardized friendly relations among states and their security. An overwhelming majority adopted this resolution. Israel and the US, however, voted against this resolution while Honduras abstained.

The UN could define international terrorism by 1987 because of the fact that by this time most of the colonies in Afro-Asian countries were either free or were on the verge of freedom. The international convention

against taking of hostages came into effect on November 29, 1978. Article 10 of the convention made it an extraditable offence.⁵

As is evident from the different attempts to define terrorism, terrorism is the phenomena of creating intimidation among the masses. The most simple definition of international terrorism states that it comprises acts of terrorism that have clear international consequences: incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select victims and target because of their connections to foreign state (diplomats, local executives of officers of foreign corporations), attack airliners in international flights, or force airliners to fly to another country).⁶

Today, terrorists operate mainly on three levels – intra-national, regional and international levels. Terrorism is no longer a largely domestic phenomenon, where a few disgruntled actors espousing leftist or capitalist ambitions committed acts of violence that were primarily aimed at gaining media attention, world publicity and showing the state in a bad light.⁷

A large number of terrorist groups are operating in different parts of the world be they cults like the Aum Shinrikyo or individual nihilists like Unabomber, or religious fanatics of well-organized terrorist organization with wide spread network like Al Qaeda. Some people often confuse terrorism to be war for freedom or liberation struggle. But freedom fighters

⁵ Prabha Kshitij, "Terrorism and the United Nations," in Verinder Grover, (ed.), *Encyclopedia of International Terrorism*, Vols. 1-3, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, Pvt. Ltd., 2002, p. 111.

⁶ David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, (eds.), *International Terrorism and World Security*, London: Croom Helm, 1975, p. 20.

⁷ Tara Kartha, "Countering Transnational Terrorism," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, February 2000, pp. 1831-32.

never use cheap means of killing and terrorizing ordinary civilians, to achieve their ambitious and dreadful goals. It is often seen that most of the terrorists who claim themselves to be freedom fighters are foreign mercenaries spreading terror for money or for other gains. The Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, distinguishes a terrorist from a soldier.⁸ Later on, the protocols of 1977 were added to Geneva Convention of 1949 through a General Assembly resolution enhancing the sphere of definition of combatant but making clear that situations of internal disturbances and tensions such as riots are not armed conflict. Since terrorists do not fulfil the norms of Geneva Convention of 1949 and protocols of 1977 and do not have any obligation as armed forces have, they might not be called as freedom fighters or soldiers.

Terrorism can be classified into several types: state sponsored, ideology-based, against the hegemony of a particular nation, against oppression or exploitation, for gaining power, religious, secessionist (often described as wars for liberation or independence) and so on.

Some states use terrorism as an extension of their foreign policies to achieve some calculated ends. As observed by Clausewitz, "terrorism is politics by other means, distinct from total war."⁹ One example of state sponsored terrorism is terrorism sponsored by Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan in India.

⁸ K R Singh, "International Terrorism as an Instrument of State Policy," *International Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1995, p. 123.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Ideology-based terrorist groups are on the decline after the Cold War because most of these groups were based on the Marxist Leninist-Leftist ideology – for instance, the Japanese Red Army (JRA). The nature, targets and rhetoric of international terrorism have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of globalization.¹⁰ In spite of the fact that the Soviet Union did not support many terrorist groups, Moscow along with several Warsaw Pact countries were prominent trainers of terrorists.

Religious fanatics of the Al Qaeda who are responsible for a number of terrorist attacks throughout the world, and headed by Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian of Yemeni origin and a multi-millionaire, proclaim themselves as *jihadi* (fighting a religious war). Harak-e-Jihad-I-Islami, the parent organization of all the groups operating as Islamic crusaders was launched in 1980 with headquarters in Pakistan by bringing together various Afghan dissidents.¹¹ That was the time when the struggle against the new pro-Soviet dispensation in Kabul was integrated. Later, due to rivalry between leaders a new group emerged as Harak-ul-Mujahideen but again brought together under a new name Harkat-ul-Ansar which then reverted to its original name after being banned by the United States Government.

A Rand Corporation database of terrorist incidents notes that while there were no groups that could be classified as religious from 1968 to 1980, the first “modern” religious groups appear in 1980 but only two of 64 have been counted. By 1992, this had risen six fold representing a quarter of

¹⁰ Michael Radu, “Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges,” *Orbis*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 276.

¹¹ D R Goyal, “Islamic Terrorism”, *World Focus*, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2000, p. 7.

terrorist organizations who carried out attacks in 1992 (11 out of 48). By 1994, a third (16) of 49 identifiable terrorist groups could be classified as religious in character or motivation, and in 1995 they accounted for nearly half (26) out of the 56 known terrorist groups that year. By 1999, at least 64 out of a total of 96 were clearly identifiable as being religiously motivated.¹² Thus, a clear change in the trends of terrorist activities is visible during and since the 1990s.

Although the volume of terrorist incidents world-wide declined in the 1990s according to the statistics of the US Department of State, the proportion of persons killed in terrorist incidents generally increased. Here, the important thing to be observed is the connections between religion and terrorism which is not new because until the nineteenth century religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror. However, while religion and terrorism do share a long history, until the 1990s, this particular variant had largely been overshadowed by ethnic, nationalist, separatist or ideologically motivated terrorism.

Today, terrorists act on greater scale and variety of motives than before. Not only to get publicity or to make their presence felt but also to gain money, power and sometimes territory. Even the sole superpower, the United States, is not spared as the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon show. With the changing patterns of terrorism the issue of countering terrorism has also come to the center stage. It is no more a police affair to handle or to check terrorism,

¹² Numbers of active terrorist groups derived from the RAND Chronology of International Terrorist Incidents. Bruce Hoffman, "Lessons of 9/11," Rand Corporation, 2002.

now armies that too multi-national armies are deployed or brought in action to check the menace.

By and large, terrorist groups are organized along structured lines in large hierarchical groups, and most of them depend almost entirely on transnational sources for their weapons, funding and even fighters. This is not just an aspect that is seen in a particular part of the globe but holds true for terrorism everywhere whether it be South Asia, Central Asia, the United States or Europe. For example, all of the groups operating inside India, Afghanistan, China, America, Central Asia are armed with weapons produced in any other country. Most have mercenaries within their ranks, and all are funded by transnational operations – money laundering, human trafficking, smuggling and drug trafficking.

Whatever be the nature, purpose, background or ideology of the terrorist groups one commonality shared by all is their reliance on the above-mentioned illegal and criminal sources of funding among which most prominently drugs. For instance, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) are by all accounts, the largest single producer of cocaine in the world, although they prefer to leave the distribution to traditional traffickers.¹³ The Taliban, when in power in most parts of Afghanistan, were the largest producers of heroin. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), known to be linked to both the Basque separatist ETA and the PKK Kurdistan Workers Party, control a major share of heroin trafficking from South Asia to Western Europe, usually via Thailand. “Thanks to globalization”, observes Michael Radu, “international criminal and terrorist

¹³ Radu, n. 10, p. 278.

organizations have become intrinsically linked.”¹⁴ Besides these sources, money is also collected by acts of kidnappings, hijackings and through the heavy donations given by rich fundamentalists for whom terrorists especially *jehadis* are fighting a religious war.

The religious groups and cults have come closest to taking the step towards weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the past, such acts included attempts to poison the water supplies of major American urban centers, dispersing toxic chemicals through ventilation systems, and recently in Japan, the actual use of chemicals to poison subway train commuters. It appears that the ideology which sustains such religious groups and cults considers the elimination of people who are alien to their belief system as not just pardonable, but desirable. During the ‘war against terrorism’ after the September 11 attacks on the US, it was feared that terrorists might also use biological or chemical weapons in subsequent attacks. Even civilian infrastructure such as public transportation are now often used to accomplish terrorist goals. Another important means of terrorists is to take innocent people hostages to negotiate with the respective governments of the various countries.

Suicide attacks were, in a sense, actually started by Japanese *kamikaze* pilots during the Second World War when they blew up enemy ships. Now, it is the most effective means to spread terror almost throughout the globe.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

The number of suicide attacks by various terrorist organizations is shown in the following table, for the period between 1980 to 2000.¹⁵

Terrorist Organization	Area of Activity	Number of Suicide attacks
LTTE	Sri Lanka	168
Hezbollah and Pro-Syrian groups	Lebanon, Kuwait and Argentina	52
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	Israel	8
Hamas	Israel	22
The Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK)	Turkey	15
Al Qaeda	East Africa	2
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	Croatia	1
Islamic Group (IG)	Pakistan	1
Babbar Khalsa International	India	1
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	Algeria	1

Terrorists always attack 'soft targets' or places easily vulnerable where less efforts are needed to create havoc, panic or intimidation among the masses and simultaneously, maximum attention of the media and the

¹⁵ Rohan Gunaratna, "Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4, April 2000, p. 53.

world community is won. In order to popularize the organization or maximize the impact of the attacks claims are made by various terrorist organizations for being responsible for the suicide or any general attack. The world of media also plays a major role in bringing demands of terrorists to common household through electronic or print media. Similarly attention of various governments is also drawn by pressurizing them by carrying out their attacks mostly on civilian targets and sometimes on military also. All the terrorist attacks are widely covered by print media as well as radio and television news channels. It has been said, with some exaggeration and in a lighter vein, that television is so ideally suited to terrorism that the medium would have invented the phenomenon if it had not already existed.”¹⁶

The September 11 attacks on the US: An Instance of Burgeoning International Terrorism

After understanding the organization, means, motives, financial sources, support-domestic and international the recent and most devastating example is September 11 attack on the US with the far-reaching implications and impacts. It exposed lapses in the US security system and challenged the world’s only superpower by using its own airliners. The global impact of the attacks included apparent threat for U.S and its allies, not to the exclusion of U.K and Japan.

¹⁶ Lawrence Howard, (ed.), *Terrorism, Roots, Impact, Responses*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992, p. 92.

What happened on September 11?

Four commercial airline jets on US domestic routes were hijacked, virtually simultaneously, and used in suicide bombings. The targets were the buildings symbolizing the US military and economic might. The whole world was shocked after the terrorist attacks on such devastating scale killing thousands and injuring numerous innocent people belonging to different nationalities.

Early morning on September 11 an American Airlines Flight II out of Boston, bound for Los Angeles, crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Centre in New York. Next, at around 9:03 A.M (10:03 P.M Japanese time) United Airlines Flight 175 also out of Boston and bound for Los Angeles, slammed into the south tower of the World Trade Center, Manhattan, New York. The impact of the aircraft and the subsequent fire eventually caused the collapse of both towers at approximately 10:00 A.M. At around 9:45 AM., American Airlines Flight 77 departing Washington, D.C. with a portion of the building collapsing and going up in flames. Those incidents were followed by the crash of United Airlines Flight 93, in route from New York to San Fransisco, into woods on the outskirts of Pittsburgh at around 10:10 A.M. The crashes claimed a total of 3,062 lives (as announced by US authorities on February 25), and left 24 Japanese citizens dead or missing, with 9 bodies confirmed (as of March 4).¹⁷

The US's own technology was used against it. It is beyond belief that a few Arabs and Afghans could master such advanced technology and could accomplish such a well-coordinated and high-precision task. They

¹⁷ *Diplomatic Blue Book*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, 2002, p. 11.

(terrorists) were reasonably educated and technically competent enough to master airliners. They were highly motivated too, and had strong belief in their cause. At the same time they were fanatics. No organization took responsibility or claim for the attacks, nevertheless, the US held Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization, Al Qaeda responsible for the attacks several videotapes, recorded telephonic conversations and other documentary proofs were produced by the US intelligence services.

The foreign media interviews in Afghanistan with captured Al Qaeda members and other “Arab” volunteers whom Afghans call, “touris Khareji” meaning foreign tourists, reveal that most of them fully expected to kill Americans, came from middle class backgrounds, were relatively better educated and believed the Taliban version of Islam is the ideal form for their own countries. The known backgrounds of the September 11 terrorists suggest that they were not the poor, unfairly treated and marginalized masses of the Islamic world. But most of them were radicalized university graduates who have lost their traditional employment in government-paid universities and other public sector positions and found their carrier aspirations blocked. The same is the situation with young, well-educated, and usually second-generation Muslim immigrants in the West. The problem with them is they never assimilate with the western culture. They rejected the Western, secular, democratic, and individualist environment and joined the terrorist groups not for the economic but to fight the increasing interference and threat of western culture. Samuel Huntington’s theory

‘Clash of Civilizations’ held true to some extent after analyzing biographies of such terrorists available on a website.¹⁸

Further, blaming a particular religion for spreading terrorism cannot be justified. Religion can be seen as both an identity and a faith. Most of the terrorists coincidentally happened to be Muslims and use religion as an identity but not as faith since no religion tells its believers to go against humanity. Though the terrorists claimed they were fighting a religious war or *jihad* in the name of Allah, most Muslim countries criticized the attacks on U.S. Osama bin Laden himself was thrown out from Saudi Arabia, much before the September 11 attacks. Even in Afghanistan all Afghans did not agree with him and a civil war was going on between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, at that time.

“Taliban’s Islam is an Islam of the fanatical fringe and any violent group is always in need of such a fanatical interpretation of religion to bind its followers together,” according to Asghar Ali Engineer.¹⁹ Most of the Muslims Ulema and the leaders of Islamic movements condemning the attacks issued statements which say, “we have unequivocally condemned the dastardly terrorist attack on establishments in New York and Washington, whose victims belong to some forty countries and major religions of the world. Islam upholds the sanctity of human life as the Qur’an declares that killing one innocent human being is like killing the entire human race. The tragedy of September 11 is a crime against humanity and Muslims all over

¹⁸ <http://www.azzam.org>. Huntington’s theory has been challenged and criticized by many scholars. As observed by Edward W. Said, countries like America do not have any particular culture because so many people from all over the world reside there.

¹⁹ Asghar Ali Engineer, “September 11: Many Messages”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 42, October 20, 2001, pp. 3982-83.

the world mourn all the victims of this aggression as a common loss of America and the whole world”.²⁰

Scholars the world over condemned the terrorist attacks. A few scholars believe that the attacks are the retaliation of the U.S. policy of hegemonizing the world: “[t]he impact of the droppings of atomic bombs on two cities were of much greater impact than the September 11 terrorist attacks.”²¹ However, though what America did in Japan was wrong and a barbaric act against humanity, it was part of a full-fledged war and state policy and the difference between war and terrorism has already been discussed earlier.

American policies in various parts of the world, namely, in Latin America, Vietnam, West-Asia, Central-Asia and Iraq, where numerous innocent people were killed by the American forces, are attributed as reasons for the September 11 attacks, by few scholars. “It is absurd to imagine that the US is putting together an anti-terrorist coalition when it is itself the greatest terrorist and provides of the largest number of non-state terrorists”.²² But, the September 11 attacks have significance because the targets were the two symbolic structures of American global hegemony: one, the financial hub of its industrial empire located in its commercial capital; and the other, the military headquarter of the world’s only remaining super power. It is also said that the presidential mansion was also one of the target of the terrorists.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ N D Jayprakash, “Terrorism: Hiroshima to New York,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 42, October 20, 2001, p. 3988.

²² Vaskar Nandy, “War Against Terrorism: Perspective on Protest”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 43, October 27, 2001, p. 4061.

All the terrorist organizations share some common features most prominent being a hatred for western democracy and capitalism. This hatred is especially acute for the United States, where it goes far beyond mere traditional ideological differences. The reaction of various established insurgent and terrorist groups to September 11 attacks is significant. The larger or more successful of such groups – the IRA and LTTE – expressed “sympathy” with the victims, while the marginal ones such as the Mexican People’s Revolutionary Army (EPR) and the Peruvian Maoists of the Communist Party (the Shining Path) did not.²³

US President George W Bush announced the ‘War on Terror’ and pledged to bring ‘criminals to justice or justice to criminals’. With its allies, US opened war with Afghanistan – the shelter of Osama bin Laden under the Taliban regime. Taliban were defeated and a new transition government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai took charge of the country. More than one year has passed but Osama bin Laden and most of the key Al Qaeda operatives who planned and financed the September 11 attacks remain at large. Osama bin Laden is still the man the United States most wants to find – dead or alive.²⁴

However, the activities of Al Qaeda are contained by US retaliation and so is the case with its ability to carry out well-coordinated attacks like September 11, because the training camps have been eliminated and while structures has been disrupted. The possibility of future attacks by terrorists can not be denied. As many as 5,000 training camps are still active.

²³ Radu, n. 10, p. 278.

²⁴ Mark Hosenball, “A War Yet to Be Won,” *Newsweek*, Vol. CXXXIX, No. 32, September 9, 2002, p. 20.

Japan, a key U.S. ally also reacted to the September 11 attacks very promptly, making its intentions clear to the world that terrorism in any form will not be spared. Japan has shown its commitment to maintain world peace and has supported the US action against the Afghanistan whether it be Koizumi's 7-point plan announced on September 18, 2001 or the refueling of U.S. warships, Japan joined the 'War against terrorism' wholeheartedly. Interestingly, Japan resolved to pursue rear echelon support during the war.

Japan too had faced the menace of terrorism in the past and the most prominent terrorist groups that operated on its soil and expanded their area of activities to several countries were the Japanese Red Army (JRA)²⁵ and Aum Shiurikyō.²⁶

Motivated by the 1996 seizure of the Japanese ambassador's residence in the Peruvian capital of Lima, Japan reviewed its position on international terrorism and worked to strengthen its crisis management and information gathering systems. It hosted several international counter-terrorism conferences. New laws were passed to counter cult like organizations. More powers are provided to the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to check the menace and also to act more freely.

²⁵ An international terrorist group formed in 1969 after breaking away from Japanese Communist League – Red Army Faction mainly led by Fusako Shigenobu who was later arrested in November 2000 in Japan, "the group was organized to overthrow Japanese Government and monarchy and to help foment world revolution. The group was mainly active in 1970s. At present, it is based in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon. See Chapter 2.

²⁶ Aum Shinrikyo is a Japanese religious cult obsessed with the apocalypse. The previously obscure group became infamous in 1995 when some of its members released deadly sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 commuters and injuring nearly 6,000 others. See Chapter 2.

A great change can be observed in Japan's defence and national policy in the post-September 11 period. A hastily passed law, the anti-terrorism special measures law, was implemented providing the SDF with powers to support non-combat and humanitarian operations, including the transport of weapons and ammunition, to the US-led coalition in the Indian Ocean, and to carry, and if necessary, use weapons. The Japanese Coast Guard was also authorized to fire on the suspicious vessels in Japanese waters, by separate legislation.

Japan's response this time to the international crisis following the terrorists attacks was faster than any time before. Though, it learned from its previous experiences when its contribution, especially during the Gulf War, was termed as 'too little and too late' by international community. Japan contributed US\$13 billion during the Gulf War. It participated in several peace keeping operations through out the globe, every time it was primarily non-combat in nature and post-conflict role especially those restricted to maintaining peace, reconstruction work and providing relief works to the affected countries, like Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Rwanda and Honduras. It is worth noting here that during the East Timor crisis of 1999-2000, Japanese forces were withheld, as there were chances of getting involved in the conflict.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon, Japan pledged full support to the U.S. and allies, financially as well as militarily, to some extent. For the first time in the post-Occupation era, Japanese forces ever participated, though it provided only rear echelon

support of refueling ships, transferring ammunitions and ration in the war operations.

Japan's foremost concern is to safeguard its overall economic interests. Therefore, Japan continued its relations with Iran – one of the countries termed as being part of the axis of evil by the US president. Japan, on the one hand, is supporting the US 'war on terrorism' while also maintaining amicable relationship with Iran, on the other. Due to its own vested interest of getting oil from Iran – the biggest provider of oil for Japan's major industries. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J Samuels in their article, 'Japan's Dual Hedge' wrote, "Many wondered if Japan might become a U.S. ally more along the lines of the British". The authors further state that, "in the weeks after Koizumi's speech it became clear that the fundamental approach of Japanese foreign policy had not changed". To them, Japan's contribution is much less than that of Italy or Germany, given the fact both the nations have constitutions repudiating war. The reasons given are the pragmatism of the Japanese leaders for whom economic and military security are equally important. They (Japanese) believe in 'comprehensive security', which is clearly manifested today in an evolving strategy that can be called "dual hedging."²⁷

In addition to all its financial, diplomatic and military contribution Japan decided to play a key role in rebuilding Afghanistan and now in Iraq. There was mild opposition that Japan faced within its boundaries from several intellectuals, for showing an eagerness to assist US in the 'war

²⁷ Eric Heginbotham and Richard J Samuels, "Japan's Dual Hedge," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 5, September-October 2002, p. 111

against terror.’ Despite these, the Japanese government made its contributions acknowledged by the world community, and with the support of senior politicians like Kiichi Miyazawa, Yasuhiro Nakasone and many others. The foremost reason given in support of Japanese policy of assisting US and its allies was the presence and hence the death of 24 Japanese citizens in the WTC attacks. The protection of the Japanese citizens, was of course, a prime concern of the government.²⁸

Since 1996, Japan has publicly stated its willingness to host an international conference in Tokyo to contribute to peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan. After the September 11 attacks and the ousting of Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Japan attended the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group meeting in Brussels on December 20-21, 2001 with the United States, the European Union, Japan and Saudi Arabia acting as joint chairs. In response to the Donor Alert issued by, the UN Secretary-General, an amount totaling US\$580 million was provided to support the assistance activities for Afghan refugees undertaken by UN agencies and other international organizations, Japan announced on October 4 that it was prepared to provide a maximum of US\$120 million, or around 20 percent of the total funding requirements, to meet specific funding requests.²⁹ Thus, in order to better understand and analyze the dimensions of Japanese reactions to terrorism per se – national as well as international – the following chapters have been designed and made available.

²⁸ 416 economists of the Japan Society for Political Economy signed the appeal “Appeal from Japanese Scholars of Political Economy to All the People and States of the World - Call for the Rational Actions to Eradicate the Vicious Cycle of Indiscriminate Terrorism and Military Actions,” on 8 October, 2001. <http://www.ne.jp/asahi/homepage/otani/english.htm>.

²⁹ *Diplomatic Blue Book*, n. 17, pp. 20-21.

CHAPTER 2

DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN JAPAN

It is difficult to believe that a country like Japan, which has completely denounced war for whatever reasons, cannot boast of a society free from terrorism. The menace of terrorism in Japan can be traced back to the late 1960s when a radical left student movement faction broke away from the Japanese Communist League to form what became known as the Red Army Faction.



The Japanese Red Army (JRA)

The stated goals of Japanese Red Army are to overthrow Japanese government and monarchy to help foment world revolution. Its organization is rather unclear but it may control or at least have ties to the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB). It may also have links to the Anti-war Democratic Front – an overt leftist political organization within Japan. In 1987, when its leader Osamu Maruoka was arrested, information revealed by him indicated that JRA might be organizing cells in Asian cities such as Manila and Singapore. Since its inception, the JRA has in addition, had long-standing relations with Palestinian terrorist groups based and operating outside Japan.¹ The JRA was later removed from the list of international terrorist groups listed by US Department of State. Collin Powell, the US

¹ *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, Department of State, Government of the United States of America, 1995, p. 49.



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Secretary of State announced it while releasing the list of international terrorist groups redesignated 25 groups including Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo as terrorist groups, while dropping JRA from the list.²

Formed in 1969, the Red Army Faction was an offshoot of Japan's radical left student movement of the period. In 1971, the Red Army Faction merged with another group to form the United Red Army. Some of its members left to set up the Lebanon based Red Army. The Japanese Red Army was formed in 1971 in Lebanon by Fusako Shigenobu, a senior member of the Red Army faction of the extreme left wing United Red Army, who left Japan to build bases overseas.³ From its bases in eastern Lebanon, the Red Army has aided several groups in their fight against Israel.

Following are the activities of the JRA: the group drew international attention in May 1972 when three of its members, including Kozo Okamoto, fired automatic rifles indiscriminately into the crowd at Tel Aviv's Lod airport that killed 24 people.⁴ The group later seized the US Embassy in Malaysia in 1975 in what has become known as the "Kuala Lumpur incident". It forced the government to release five Red Army members, including Kazuo Tohira, after the group threatened to kill a number of hostages.

² <http://home.Kyodo.co.Japan/all/display.jsp?an=20011006049>.

³ <http://ap.tso.com/ap/breaking/MGAKI28A4.html>

⁴ <http://www.Jef.Or.Jp/en/jti/200101020.html>

In September 1977, the group hijacked a Japan airlines aircraft flying over India and demanded the release of jailed Red Army members and a ransom payment of US\$6 million. The government handed over six prisoners, including Junzo Okudaira, through extralegal means, after the group threatened to kill hostages. The decision was severely criticized by the media both at home and abroad.⁵

In April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples, Italy, and a suspected JRA operation that killed five Americans, including a service woman. He was convicted of these charges and is serving a lengthy prison sentence in the United States.⁶ The group has kept a low profile since then.

Shigenobu Fusako, the founder of the Japanese Red Army was arrested in Osaka in November 2000 for a series of terrorist acts committed or planned throughout 1970s. She had secretly returned to Japan and was in hiding with the support of her sympathizers. She was arrested for charges of conspiring to confine the French ambassador and 10 others during the group's seizure of the French Embassy in The Hague in 1974, as well as attempted murder in connection with the incident.

In 1997, in Lebanon, the secret base of JRA, Lebanese authorities arrested five of their members. One of them was Kozo Okamoto, the only

⁵ "The History of Japanese Red Army," *The Daily Yomiuri*, March 19, 2000.

⁶ n. 1, p. 50.

JRA member to survive the Lod airport attack. Shigenobu, however, narrowly avoided being arrested.

After the 1988 bombing attack on the American club in Naples, the group had found it difficult to find a safe place in the Middle East to continue to operate from. In response, the group started to look elsewhere, setting up bases in South America and Asia. Shortly before her arrest, Shigenobu apparently made frequent trips between Japan and Beijing.

The Japanese government had made successful efforts to bring home the four Japanese Red Army militants expelled from Lebanon after having completed their prison terms for using forged passports and other international crimes. As a result of careful and secret operations conducted by the government with relevant authorities, their arrest at Narita airport on March 2000 was possible. In order to prevent other militant groups from trying to recapture the leftists, the Japanese and Lebanese governments are said to have secretly planned the deportations.

Information about the deportation of the militants was released by Lebanese authorities when these militants were already on the way to Japan. The deportation was well timed. Arab nations, including Lebanon, had entered an important religious period called the *Eid-al- adha* (the feast of sacrifice), which lasts from Thursday to Monday. This was the time when Lebanese public is least concerned about the news because most return to their hometowns to spend the holiday with relatives. Many of the Arab newspapers also remain closed on Saturday. Even the national police agency

in Tokyo refused to comment on the deportation saying it was too early to issue a statement.

The Lebanese government gave Kozo Okamoto political asylum by explaining that he was involved in the battle against Israel, and that he had serious handicaps, both mental and physical, as he was tortured while serving a prison sentence in Israel. Though rest four also applied for the political asylum in Lebanon, their pleas were rejected. The Lebanese authorities had earlier detained them at a hideout in Beirut, in February 1997.

On March 1, 2000 the Japanese government's demand to extradite the five, was rejected by Lebanon. Japan had insisted that the domestic penal code could be applied to certain crimes committed by Japanese overseas. Finally the deportation was made possible through a co-operative effort by Lebanon, Jordan and Japan, according to internal sources.⁷

This shows that the Japanese government checked the increasing influence of the Red Army not only inside the nation but was also successful in negotiating the deportation of Japanese terrorists from countries like Lebanon. The important thing to note here is that the two countries do not have any extradition treaty between them.

⁷ <http://burn.uscd.edu/archives/ats-1/2000.03/msg00017.html>.

The JRA could not achieve much success inside Japan because of ideological differences and the extremist posture adopted by the group. Even the popular farmers' movement that opposed the construction of New Tokyo International Airport at Narita, refused to allow the members of JRA to participate in their movement. David E Apter and Nagayo Sawa observe,

“when the defending farmers were joined by representatives of new left sects, some of whom had elaborate supporting networks reaching out to various trade unions and citizen protest groups Sanrizuka became a ‘mobilization space’. The movement remained hospitable to all opposition forces that supported its cause as long as they did not try to dominate Hantai Domei. The main supporting group that did try to interfere, the Japan Communist Party, was expelled from the site. The movement also eschewed terrorism: it refused to allow members of the Japanese Red Army or other violent terrorist factions to participate in the struggle. Within these limits, all opposition groups were welcome”.⁸

Though, some sympathizers are still found within Japan and in a few countries like Lebanon, Palestine and North Korea where some of the hardcore members are staying it is nevertheless without any international recognition. With the arrest of Shigenobu Fusako and a few other permanent members, the JRA appears to have declined in its power to make even a reasonable impact at least as of now. Several scholars as well as others concerned have written it off altogether.

⁸ David E Apter, and Nagayo Sawa, *Against the State Politics and Social Protest in Japan*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 7.

Chukaku – Ha⁹ (Nucleus or Middle Core Faction)

An ultra leftist radical group with origins in the fragmentation of Japanese Communist Party in 1957, is by far the largest domestic militant group. It has a political arm plus a small covert action wing called the Kansai Revolutionary Army.

Its activities include participation in street demonstration and sporadic attacks using crude rockets and incendiary devices usually designed to cause property damage rather than human casualties. It also protests Japanese imperial system, Western imperialism and other events like the Gulf War and the expansion of Tokyo airport runways at the cost of local farmers. It had launched rockets at a US military facility within Japan. The group is largely insignificant and membership is limited to a few radical youths carrying out activities to mark their presence on the Japanese soil. No US causality has been reported so far.

Aum Shinrikyo

The Aum Shinrikyo shocked entire Japan and the world as well on March 20, 1995, when its members deliberately released the deadly and dangerous sarin gas more or less simultaneously in several Tokyo subway railway network during the morning rush hours. Twelve people died and more than five thousand were injured. With this, the myth of Japan as one of the world's safest country had been shattered. Though all the culprits

⁹ *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, Department of State, Government of the United States of America, 1998, p. 44. See also http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm.

including the cult's leader were arrested subsequently, the incident ignited a debate about several issues like: the role of religion in Japanese life, criminal activity in Japan, social economic and legal factors responsible for the emergence of cults, the effectiveness of laws dealing with religious groups and the role of media in promoting such activities by highlighting them unduly.

Emergence

The Shinrikyo grew from a small religious group *Aum Shinsen-no-kai* in February 1984 in Tokyo's Shibuya ward. Aum (Om in Sanskrit, Hindi and Tibetan) means essence of the universe and Shinrikyo means the teaching of the supreme truth. As one of the many new religions¹⁰ or religious movements created in the 1970s and after, Aum did not have major religious influence. The group centred its activities mainly on imparting yoga and the marketing of health drinks. About the emergence of new religions, Metraux observes "students of Japanese religion identify two surges of new religion – those that grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s (shinrikyo), many of which have pre-war groups, and the new-new religions (shin shinrikyo) that have emerged since 1970s."¹¹

Aum introduced such new elements into the history of Japanese religions as for example: the demand for complete obedience to the leader, together with implanting this subservience through severe ascetic practice,

¹⁰ Kitabatake Kiyoyasu, "Aum: Shinrikyo, Society Begets an Aberration," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. XLII, No. 4, Oct-Dec 1995, p. 376.

¹¹ Daniel A Metraux, "Religious Terrorism in Japan: The Fatal Appeal of Aum Shinrikyo," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 12, December 1995, p. 1141.

and the physical infusion of the leader's power, energy and knowledge into the believer so that the believer becomes one with the leader, physically, mentally and spiritually. The form of guru worship that emerged from these beliefs resembles religious cults on the rise in advanced countries throughout the world – the case of the Osho communes in many development countries, for example. However, worship of the leader does not become truly dangerous unless he possesses unrestricted power, as in the case of Aum.

It is worth mentioning that the Aum Shinrikyo was a cult started by a blind man whose real name was Matsumotuto Chizuo. He had ten thousand disciples in Japan at one point of time in 1995. The cult had about thirty branches within as well as outside Japan. Foreign branches included ones at Moscow, New York, Bonn and Sri Lanka. Aggressive propagation in Russia, where the cult proved especially successful, began in 1992-1993. Its membership in Russia reached thirty thousand at the peak of its popularity, according to one estimate in 1995, but the police closed the branch that March of the same year. It is also said that as early as 1991 Aum contacted officials in Russia about the possibility of buying certain military equipment and paid out a great deal of money to facilitate such purchases.

In a very short span of time, Aum Shinrikyo became popular not only within Japan but also in several other countries as mentioned earlier. Though the membership remained low as compared to the other new religions, the influence and popularity grew due to publicity in newspapers, magazines and in the electronic media, marketing skill and organization.

Now the question arises as to how a cult like Aum Shinrikyo grew so fast and that too in a society like Japan, where people were mostly secular in nature or believe in syncretism.

First and foremost, a part of the answer lies in the leadership quality of the chief of the cult, Asahara Shoko. He was born in 1955 in Kumamoto Prefecture, and had glaucoma at birth and thus was graduated from the Kumamoto prefecture's school for the blind. He moved to Tokyo in the late 1970s. After failing to enter Tokyo University, he opened a small acupuncture business in the nearby Chiba prefecture and in 1982 was arrested on charges of selling bogus medicine. Ashara took up yoga when he was 22, and formed *Aum Shinsen no Kai*, the predecessor to Aum Shinrikyo, in 1984 with barely 15 members. At that time he also adopted the name Asahara Shoko from Chinese characters that have stroke counts leading up to a lucky number. In 1986, in the Himalayas, Ashara completed what he called the final stage of "acquiring the supreme truth" or emancipation, and changed the name of his group to Aum Shinrikyo, the following year. The group was designated as a Religious Corporation in 1989 by the Tokyo metropolitan government as required by law.

Ashara had a burning ambition and endeavoured to compensate for his shortcomings and disabilities by making the rest of the world to follow him. As Kitabatake Kiyoyasu observes, "In psychology, working hard at excellence to overcome one's inferiority complex is called compensation".¹²

¹² Kiyoyasu, n. 10. The examples of Demosthenes and Socrates who compensated for their shortcomings are well known. Demosthenes conquered stuttering to become a renowned orator. Socrates' not so becoming looks earned him the nickname 'electric ray', after the fish. Lack of glamour on the outside made him work even harder and made him the great teacher that he was.

But in fact, what Asahara did is called overcompensation in psychology, meaning to resort to anti-social acts or committing crimes. The fact of the matter behind his emergence as a religious leader was his ability to turn his inferiority complex into positive energy. Overcompensation for the deprivation of his childhood manifested itself in many ways. His obsession with money is one of them; when he was arrested he was lying beside a bag filled with ¥10 million in cash. Most of his elite staff were good looking people who had graduated from famous universities – the winners of the education war in which Asahara was branded as loser. Kitabatake describes him as, “the man who as a nearly blind, poor, homely boy told people he wanted to rule a robot kingdom finally realized his dream in his fanatic circle of followers. His was the absolute authority, and the cult became an extension of his ego”.¹³

How many young, intelligent, and well educated Japanese would be attracted to a person like Asahara could be judged by reading of Aum literature. The Aum literature depicted Asahara’s meeting with many of leading figures of the Tibetan Buddhism including Khamtul Rinpoche, Kalu Rinpoche and the Dalai Lama. Noah S Brannen, a scholar on modern religions, writes in one of his articles that after the meeting with Dalai Lama and obtaining a photograph of himself with the holy man, shaking hands with each other. Asahara claimed that his organisation had received the endorsement of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama ultimately publicly disassociated himself with Aum. Quoting his interview in a newspaper

¹³ Kiyoyasu, n. 10, pp. 378-79.

Branen further writes, “he (Dalai Lama) laughed off Ashara’s prediction that the world would end in 1997 by saying that the only thing he knew about that year was that Hong Kong is scheduled to revert to the People’s Republic of China and insisted that it is absolutely wrong for a religion to take up arms to defend itself”.¹⁴

Secondly, Aum Shinrikyo’s philosophy, drawing heavily on other religions, especially Hindu yoga and Tibetan Buddhism, attracted the Japanese people considerably. Asahara’s syncretistic approach intermingling few selective principles of various religions matches Japanese society and religious behaviour of the people. Their approach towards the religion is secular. They practice Shinto rituals for celebrations and during festivals, the Christian style of marriages and Buddhist rituals after the death. Asahara who was desperate to rule Japan made several prophecies including inevitability of future wars in 1997, said that there would be massive war between the West, led by the United States and the Buddhist world led by Asia. According to him “the combatants would be completely destroyed by American air attacks but those who achieve enlightenment through Aum would survive”.¹⁵

Asahara believed in armageddon – the end of the world due to final conflict between good and evil. He started releasing predictions publicly after the humiliating defeat of all twenty-five candidates of his political party, the Shinri Party, fielded in the elections to the House of

¹⁴ Noah S Branen, “A Religious Response to the Aum Affair,” *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. XLII, No. 4, Oct-Dec, 1995, p. 388.

¹⁵ Metraux, n. 11, p. 1152

Representatives of the National Diet. The group now turned back to their own world that they often called the “millennium kingdom”. Speculation abounds that the gas attacks were Asahara’s way of fulfilling his own prophecies of doom.

The cult’s theology was endorsed by the alleged shamanistic sacred powers of its leader, Asahara. His followers in order to attain the supernatural powers to levitate and fly through the air and also to get enlightenment looked upon him because he claimed that he could teach these feats to others.

A third reason for the group’s rise were the socioeconomic changes taking place in Japan due to economic policies of the government after the occupation period. In 1960 the government, started its income doubling plan, promoting urbanization that eventually led to the collapse of the family and the people’s sense of community. The emphasis on self gratification at the expense of others, the sense of powerlessness in the course of day to day living and the spread of violence as a result of devaluation of human life were other results. All of these factors have left people feeling empty without direction and like other advanced nations, the feeling of competition is growing in all walks of life including education in Japan. The competition is rising to enter prestigious universities hence resulting in the numbers of disillusioned dropouts from the academic race. Asahara as discussed earlier was one of them. Due to the movement of rural population towards cities seeking jobs as a result of industrialization, the cities not only become

overcrowded but also were unable to meet the religious needs of the people who had migrated from the villages.

Nobuo Noda, a professor of political history at Kyoto University, endeavored to explain the rise of Shinrikyo and Shin Shinrikyo. He wrote that the religious void created by the industrialization and urbanization led to the emergence and popularity of new religions like Aum Shinrikyo. He says, “the young people who succumbed to Aum Shinrikyo are the children of the generation that left the rural religious milieu for the cities in the high growth period. Most grew up in families devoid of religious feeling, families without even any nominal religious affiliations. The schools, of course, gave these children no in-depth knowledge of religion. Raised in such an environment they could hardly be expected to have developed any resistance to questionable religions and thus are easy targets for the groups like Aum Shinrikyo. In the United States for example young people who become entrusted in religion are probably first aware of the religion which their family belongs, and they may be drawn into fundamentalist groups. But young people growing up in the average home in urban Japan become interested in religion they can find nothing in their immediate surroundings to give them an introduction to it. If they happen to come in contact with a cult like Aum Shinrikyo with its dubious Buddhist rituals and terminologies, they easily become enthralled.”¹⁶ In this sense, Aum affair has given a glimpse of the spiritual fragility of many families in Japan’s major cities.

¹⁶ Nobuo Noda, “Apocalyptic Cults and Japanese Religiosity,” *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring, 1996, pp. 124-25.

Fourthly, Asahara cleverly but successfully exploited the spiritual needs, professional frustrations and in many cases the lack of self-esteem, of well-educated youths from renowned universities and tamed their potential to fulfil his own catastrophic ambitions. Though, according to a scholar who studied Shinrikyo found that, ninety percent of the Japanese youth had nothing to do with religion but if a majority of the rest had gone with a cult like Aum, they surely had formed a significantly big group. They found the free atmosphere to bring out their innovative ideas, which was otherwise quite impossible in a society like Japan where seniority and paternalism were primary concerns of educational and business institutions. “Many of the senior members” observes Kitabatake, “studied science or engineering it was these brilliant young people whom Asahara entrusted with orchestrating his version of Armageddon; they manufactured the cult’s supply of sarin.”¹⁷

Finally, the government policy of non-interference in religious matters was another prominent factor that led to the emergence of the cult. From the Meiji era (1868-1912) until the end of World War II, state Shinto was elevated to a special status in connection with the emperor system exercising considerable control over spiritual life of people. With the war’s end, however, Shinto’s ties with the state was severed. Shinto was driven out of the public arena and its activities were confined to the private sphere, just like those of other religions. Reaction to the past evils of state Shinto give rise to strong sentiment for the strict application of the principle of separation of religion and state. At the same time, in reaction to the pre-war

¹⁷ Kiyoyasu, n. 10, p. 380

persecution of religions other than state Shinto, the Religious Juridical Persons Law provided generous protection for religion.

The principle of freedom of religion under the above law led mechanically to the glorification of the principle of maximum freedom to conduct religious activities of all kinds, large and small, regardless of their nature and practices. As a result, religious organizations with long traditions and sophisticated doctrines were obliged to occupy the same value plane as upstart groups whose teachings were strongly esoteric in nature, as if their values were equivalent or differed only in a relative sense. Under such circumstances, the large traditional organizations inevitably suffered some degree of stagnation and corruption. Meanwhile, small and new religious groups Aum emerged taking advantage of the shelter of the religious law and the relatively declining popularity of the traditional organizations.

In the post-war constitution, the provision of religious freedom is given under Article 20 that states, “freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the state, nor exercise any political authority. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice. The state and its organs shall refrain from religious, education or any other religions.”

This meant that the state adopted a hands-off approach to the religious affairs of its citizens and also to religious organizations. In the case of the Aum Shinrikyo, the case was no different though there were people who had complained about the cult’s activities. The authorities took severe, albeit late

action only after the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subways. The cult's leaders including Shoko Asahara, were arrested – the latter on May 16, 1995. The Japanese government revoked its recognition of Aum Shinrikyo as a religious organization in October 1995, but in 1997 a government panel decided not to invoke the Anti-Subversive law against the group, which would have outlawed the cult.¹⁸ Few of the convicted members were given death penalties and still few of them have been given life long imprisonment. The cult's teacher Shoko Asahara is still under trial and in a Japanese prison, the Kasumigaseki in Tokyo.

The prominent reasons for the emergence of the cult also reflects the increasing problems of the industrialized countries where people are more inclined towards materialism and the resulting spiritual void among citizens, can be easily misused by people like Asahara to fulfil their own unholy desires without bothering about the price society might have to pay.

Activities of the cult

Aum Shinrikyo is not only a cult with a skillful propaganda apparatus, it is also the only organization in the world that has perpetrated deadly chemical and biological terrorist attacks. Aum Shinrikyo's activities also included abduction, murder of innocent people, robbery, illegal production of weapons and poisonous chemicals, mental and physical torture of and extortion from the people especially of its members in the name of enlightening them, and appropriation and accumulation of huge wealth and

¹⁸ *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, Department of State, Government of the United States of America, 1998, p. 10.

real estate property all over Japan through illegal means under the banner of a religious corporation. Aum's assets were estimated at between 300 million and one billion dollars.¹⁹

It was also brought to light that Aum had once arranged for the mass-production of a thousand Russian K-74 rifles. Twenty-five Aum followers were arrested in July 1995 on this suspicion. Aum also purchased a helicopter and made repeated attempts to enter the plant facilities of major private sector enterprises with a view to spying and stealing advanced military technology. It had equipment capable of cultivating bacteria for weapons on a large scale and for biochemical testing.²⁰ Documents seized after a police raid in April 1995 suggest that Aum was considering the cultivation of botulism bacillus, a poison, 5,000 times stronger than sarin – a gram could kill everybody in Tokyo.²¹ The cult also had plans to cultivate the extremely neurotoxic *clostridium botulinum* for dispersion, using vaporizers.

Aum Shinrikyo plotted to produce and use about 70 tons of sarin. For this purpose, a large-scale chemical plant was built and the chemicals required for the synthesis of sarin were purchased. The cult's involvement with chemical warfare also included an assassination attempt with the nerve gas VX (a substance far more lethal than sarin), released in the car of a religious enemy of the cult, and the experimental pilot-plant production of poison gases such as tabun and soman.

¹⁹ Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman and Bradley Thayer, *America's Achilles' Heel*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 19.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-26.

²¹ Hiroshi Fukunaga, "Aum Sweet House," *Japan Times Weekly*, July 24-30, 1995, p. 5.

On a number of occasions in the early 1990s, Asahara ordered the use of these weapons to strike at enemies and to try to create disasters that would confirm his prophecies. In April 1990, Aum attacked the Japanese parliament building with botulinum toxin aerosol, and in June 1993, it targeted the wedding of the crown prince. Later that month, Aum reportedly also attempted to spray anthrax spores from the roof of a building in Tokyo. There were no casualties as a result of these attacks.²²

Aum's intention in possessing chemical and nuclear weapons remained unclear but scholars speculate that after his failure to capture political power through democratic means, Asahara, who as a youth once predicted that he would be prime minister of Japan one day, was trying to capture power by waging war against Japan. The possession of awesome weapons and poisonous gas would have given him the power to shake the government. The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway was a step in the direction of creating a situation of large-scale fear and confusion in society. Asahara could use the advantage of the ensuing public panic and government paralysis to take power in an armed coup.

Conclusion

Both the Japanese terrorist organizations – the Japanese Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo, did not get enough support from the Japanese public,

²² Falkenrath, n. 19, pp. 19-26.

though both were successful in establishing their branches nationwide and overseas. The Japanese government, on its part successfully, countered as well as checked the enhancement of destructive activities on its soil and outside also. It brought down the terrorist activities carried out by these organizations.

Nevertheless, such organizations and groups were the part and parcel of Japanese society in the past as well. The overemphasis on economic development and raising standard of living could not satisfy all the needs of the people. Homelessness, unemployment, an aging population, rising crime—especially juvenile crime—and many other problems common in advanced societies, have affected Japan also. But none of these problems can be attributed as reasons for the emergence or growth of terrorism in Japan. Left-leaning terrorist groups born on Japanese soil were against the Japanese imperial system as well as western imperialism. Aum Shinrikyo, on the other hand, was based on the religious philosophy. Indeed, the members and sympathizers of these terrorist groups were often from well-to-do families, well-educated and sometimes had the capacity to give several millions of yen in donation.

Moreover, several ideological and spiritual questions remained unanswered and these led to the emergence of the JRA, Aum Shinrikyo and cult-like organizations. The inability or indecisiveness of the authorities to interfere in religious corporations activities on time was misused by religious leaders like Asahara and his followers to realize their goals through wrongful methods.

The Japanese Red Army almost ceased to exist or operate after the arrest of its leader Shigenobu Fusako in 2000 in Japan. While the group continued to operate from Lebanon, it did not enjoy much support in Japan. But Aum Shinrikyo, although stripped of its legal status and tax privileges as a religious organization, following the poison gas attack, revived its activities in early 1997. The government, concluding it was no longer a threat, stopped short of using the anti-subversion law to ban it. However, according to the Japanese Public Security Investigation Agency, the cult should remain under close surveillance.

The number of Aum followers is leveling off, not decreasing. Currently, Aum has nearly 2000 followers, including more than 500 live-in members. The latter live in 15 cult bases across Japan. The cult owns 28 facilities in 18 Japanese prefectures for religious training, missionary work and other activities. Out of some 400 Aum disciples arrested in crackdowns on the cult since 1995, a total of 155 have returned after being released.²³

Aum has significantly increased its fund-raising activities. Thirteen Aum-associated businesses, including a host of restaurants and five stores earn billions of yen each year. The cult's specialty, as before, is selling cheap computers. In 1997, its computer sales earned it more than \$57.5 million. The cult also continues to collect large sums from followers. The police reported that in the last four months of 1998, it earned more than 200,000 dollars from 310 seminars near Tokyo that drew about 200 followers, who

²³ *Japan Times*, March 19, 1998.

paid 100,000-200,000 yen to join and participate.²⁴ Thus, once again Aum has acquired energetic young members as well as the financial resources to advance its religious, ideological and political objectives.²⁵ It continues to remain active in Japan at least and is in open defiance of state regulations and social conditions.

With Asahara on trial, the cult is headed by Reiko Matsumoto, his teenage daughter, followed in command by Chorobu, a group of senior advisors . One of Asahara's closest and most charismatic disciples, Fumihiro Joyu, who served as the cult's spokesman before his arrest, was freed in November 1998 after serving a short time for forgery and other minor charges. His return has proved to be a boost to Aum.

The Aum Shinrikyo was the creation of drawbacks and weakness of Japanese society and Japanese people respectively. The cult was basically a religious corporation which later on organized itself like a parallel state with a whole complement of ministries. Its leaders had official sounding titles of minister of education, minister of health and human services, and so on that perhaps spoke to the egos of Aum officials, but Asahara might also have created a miniature government to prepare his seizure of power in Japan. People joined the cult because they wanted to know the true purpose of life, to get enlightenment, to get the answers of the questions which science was unable to give and to forget their past. One of the members had, for example, killed a person in an accident and joined the cult to wash away his sins.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Associated Press*, March 14, 1999, <http://ap.tbo.com>.

Loneliness or a desire to make new friends also brought people close to the cult.

After joining the cult members had to live in big communes. The cult displayed a considerable degree of totalitarianism in dominating the lives of its members. Aum followers, most of them are in their 20s and 30s, donate all of their assets to the cult and move into Aum communes as adherents who completely cut off their association with outside society for a communal life of more medication, mind control exercises, little sleep and meagre meals.

In return, the followers also get the promises of spiritual exercises and lessons in extra sensory perception through a version of Tibetan style mysticism as a path to personal happiness and salvation. However, the reality was far from promises made by Aum. It has also been revealed that certain extreme measures were resorted to in handling inmates as for example observes Kitabatake: “[a]t the communes, the cult stopped at nothing to inculcate followers with the Asahara’s teaching. It kidnapped people, locked them up, starved them, refused them sleep, forced them to listen to endless incantations and pushed them to near breakdown both mentally and physically. Often people were given drugs to induce hallucinations, which were then explained as holy inspiration.”²⁶

Several questions were raised about the effectiveness of the Religious Corporation Law of 1951 which provides designated religions with various privileges including tax incentives for business activities, but the state

²⁶ Kiyoyasu, n. 10, p. 378.

virtually had no control over what the corporations actually do. Conservative critics feel that the law's liberal interpretation of what constitutes a real religion allows groups like Aum Shinrikyo to take advantage of and sometimes abuse it.

CHAPTER 3

JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: POST-SEPTEMBER 11

The attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon were considered to be attacks against the symbols of the economic and military might of the only superpower in the world. The WTC towers had more significance as it represented the globalized economy and business houses from many countries had their offices and people working there. In the resulting crisis, Japan which itself enjoyed the status of an economic superpower and had amicable economic and security relations with United States, could not stay away like in the past notably the Gulf war, when Japan's reaction as well as contributions came in quite late.

As has been explained in the previous chapter that the menace of terrorism is not a new challenge for Japan. Besides domestic terrorism, Japan has also been the victim of international terrorism, the prominent example of which was the seizure of the Japanese ambassador's residence in Peru in 1996. Before the Japanese government's reaction to the September 11 attacks is discussed, it is perhaps important and instructive to look at Japanese response to international terrorism before this event.

Japan's Response to International Terrorism: Pre-September 11

Japanese citizens abroad have been abducted by terrorists several times. In August 1999, four Japan International Cooperation Agency experts engaged in a resource development study in Kyrgyzstan were abducted by armed rebels, but were safely released sixty-four days later.

Japanese citizens were caught up in the seizure of the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok in 1995, the hijacking of an Egypt Air airplane en route from Istanbul to Cairo in October, the same year, as well as a bombing incident in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Japanese citizens were also on board when an Indian Airlines airplane en route from Kathmandu to Delhi in December 1999 was hijacked to Kandahar in Afghanistan.¹

Perhaps the most spectacular exposure Japan had to international terrorism was the seizure, on December 18, 1996, of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in the Peruvian capital of Lima.² It was seized by the Revolutionary Movement of Tupac Amaru (MRTA) terrorists. However, later on, Peruvian forces carried out a successful rescue operation at the cost of only one hostage and two members of the special forces. All the hostages including Japanese citizens were rescued. Motivated by this incident, Japan started reviewing its responses to international terrorism and work to strengthen its crisis management, information gathering and security systems. For Japanese citizens travelling abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued in publication entitled "Travel advice and warning", telling

¹ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/II-3-c.html>.

² *Diplomatic Blue Book*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, 1997, pp. 30-32.

them about the world's danger spots. Japan also started strengthening its information gathering and provision capacities in countries in which Japan had no diplomatic mission following the abduction of the Japanese citizens in Kyrgyzstan. It also established emergency communications equipment in such countries.

Japan utilized international platforms like ASEAN, G8, and other international organizations to firmly combat and condemn all forms of terrorism. The Government has signed all twelve terrorism-related international conventions and is moving quickly with legislation to approve the sole treaty that Japan has still not ratified, namely, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.³ Japan also hosted the Japan-ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Conference in October 1997 and then the Asia-Latin America Counter-Terrorism Conference in December 1999.

The September 11 Attacks

Realizing the enormity of the damage and future implications of the attacks, the Koizumi government's immediate reaction included political, economic and strategic measures. The government's decisions, role of media, implication on foreign and defense policy, Japan's contribution in the US 'war on terror' and also the Japan's role in the reconstruction of

³ *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, Department of State, Government of the United States of America, 2001, p.18.

Afghanistan constitute the structure and content of the chapter. The shift in Japan's defense and foreign policy is also analyzed critically.

Japan, after the attacks, made increased efforts to shore up security to its citizens. In order to respond actively to the crisis situation, Japan, along with the international community, condemned the attacks and also extended support in several forms to the United States. In particular, Japan has participated in initiatives to strengthen international solidarity, and to prevent and eradicate terrorism through diplomatic efforts directed at the countries surrounding Afghanistan, and other Islamic States.

Immediate Response

Within 45 minutes of the attacks a liaison office and Head Quarters was established within the Prime Minister's office. The next day an emergency meeting was called by the Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, attended by all the cabinet members. Emergency Head Quarters were also set up with in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Embassy of Japan in the United States, and the Consulate-General of Japan in New York. Efforts were made to assess the situation accurately.

The foremost concern was the security of Japanese citizens, as always. Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Taimei Yamaguchi along with others were sent to the US as early as international flights recommenced. Their job was to set in place emergency response measures, to make sure the security and safety of Japanese citizens. The whereabouts of the Japanese

students studying in various US Universities were confirmed. Other measures included checking of passenger lists of aircraft, verification of safety of Japanese staff at Japanese embassies and the Japanese affiliates' offices in or around the World Trade Center, as well as other Japanese citizens in New York. Japanese tourists visiting New York were checked with the various travel agencies and all the 62 emergency hospitals were visited directly or telephoned to check for the presence of Japanese victims. The help of Japanese newspapers published in New York and Japanese language television was taken to appeal for information from related parties, and more than 1,000 inquiries placed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and consulate General in New York was individually investigated and answered.⁴ A telephone counseling hotline was established, doctors and medical officers were also sent for providing medical and psychological care to the relation of the victims or those who went missing. All possible arrangements were made to provide information and assistance to the Japanese citizens.

On September 12, a day after the attacks, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi addressing a press conference stated that there was a threat of terrorism to the entire world community and not only to a particular nation, such as the US. He also expressed all support for the United States and pledged necessary assistance and co-operation to check the menace of international terrorism.⁵ A meeting of the National Security Council was also convened to look into the situation and take necessary steps including the dispatch of a Japanese Disaster Relief Team. In addition, Koizumi came

⁴ *Diplomatic Blue Book*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, 2002, p. 15.

⁵ "Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press Conference" (Provisional Translation), September 12, 2001. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e.html.

out with a 'seven point plan',⁶ just over a week after the attacks. While addressing a press conference, on September 19, he made a statement on Japan's response to the attacks, laying out a basic policy and the steps to be taken.

The basic policy comprised three important points:

1. Japan will actively engage itself in the fight against terrorism, which it regards as part of its own security issue.
2. Japan strongly supports the United States, its ally, and will act in concert with the United States and other countries around the world.
3. Japan will take concrete and effective measures that will clearly demonstrate its firm determination. These measures will be implemented in a swift and comprehensive manner.

The seven point plan of Koizumi was more comprehensive:

1. The government of Japan will promptly take measures necessary for dispatching the Self Defense Forces (SDF) for providing support including medical services and also transportation and supply to the US Forces and others taking measures related to the terrorist attacks, which have been recognized as a threat to international peace and security in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368.
2. The government of Japan will promptly take measures necessary for further strengthening the protection of facilities and areas of the US forces and important facilities in Japan.
3. The government of Japan will swiftly dispatch SDF vessels to gather information:

⁶ "Announcement of Seven Measures, by Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi on September 19."

4. The government of Japan will strengthen international co-operation, including information sharing, in areas such as immigration control.
5. The government of Japan will extend humanitarian, economic, and other necessary assistance to surrounding and affected countries. As a part of this assistance to Pakistan and India, which are cooperating with the United States in this emergency situation.
6. The government of Japan will provide assistance to the displaced persons as necessary. This will include the possibility of humanitarian assistance by the SDF.
7. The government of Japan, in cooperation with other countries, will take appropriate measures in response to the changing situation to avoid confusion in the international and domestic economic systems.

All the measures taken by the Japanese government in response to international terrorism were primarily based on the above-mentioned statement of Koizumi. The immediate measures and announcement made by the Japanese Prime Minister were welcomed by the United States and other countries. They welcomed the Japanese response and termed it as comprehensive, prompt and appropriate.⁷

Diplomatic Measures

At both levels, bilaterally and multilaterally, Japan engaged in active diplomacy with related countries. Prime Minister Koizumi visited the United States on September 24 to 26 for talks with President Bush, where he conveyed condolences from the Japanese Emperor and outlined Japan's

⁷ *Diplomatic Blue Book*, n. 4, p. 17.

policy with regard to the contribution announced on September 19. The leaders of both nations affirmed that the United States and Japan would reinforce their diplomatic efforts, toward the countries surrounding Afghanistan, as well as in the efforts in building up international opinion.

Japan also made appeals to the Islamic countries and Afghanistan's neighbours. Initially, Koizumi sent letters to the Islamic countries, asking them to join in the fight against terrorism while stressing that it was not a fight against Islam. Later on, Koizumi's special envoys visited various relevant countries to affirm their cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Given below is a table showing the various countries visited by the Japanese Prime Minister's envoys, as part of the diplomatic measures taken by the Japanese government to fight international terrorism.⁸

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

	Dates of Visit	Designation and Name	Country(ies) visited
1.	Sep. 25-28	Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seikin Sugiara	Pakistan
2.	Sep. 30- Oct. 5	Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Masahiko Koumura	Saudi Arabia and Iran
3.	Oct. 7-8	Former Director-General of the Hokkaido and Okinaka Dev. Agencies, Muneo Suzuki	Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
4.	October 7-12	Former Prime Minister, Ryutaro – Hashimoto	Egypt and UAE
5.	October 28-30	Former Prime Minister and Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoshiro Mori and Sugiura	India
6.	Nov. 22-27	Minister for Foreign Affairs, Makiko Tanaka	Pakistan
7.	Oct. 8	Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi	China
8.	Oct. 15	Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi	Republic of Korea (ROK)

Multilaterally, Japan's initiative to make use of the opportunity provided by multilateral fora is worth mentioning: the Asia-Pacific Economic Leaders' Meeting held in Shanghai on October 20-21, and the Association of South East Asian Nations, Japan, China and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) summit held on November 5.

In addition, former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa attended the 56th session of the UN General Assembly as the representative of the government of Japan, delivering an address on November 11 at the general debate in which he offered a broad overview of Japan's efforts against terrorism.

Endorsing the International Effort

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was passed by the Japanese Diet in order to strengthen the SDF and to enhance the Security of Japan. The purpose of the Law was to endorse international effort to fight terrorism, to answer the request of the UN, and to assist the US and its allies which would enable Japan to contribute actively thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan's own.

On October 8, Japan established the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters by a Cabinet decision and passed its own Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on October 29 in order to provide as much assistance and cooperation as possible in the military operations undertaken by the US and other forces against the Taliban to the extent permitted under the

Japanese constitution.⁹ Japan also froze suspected accounts and in addition maintains a watch-list that contains nearly 300 groups and individuals.

On November 16, the basic plan on Japanese activities to support the US assistance under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was decided by the Government of Japan.

After that implementation guidelines were drafted by the Defense Agency which were approved by Prime Minister Koizumi on November 20. The Minister of State for Defense ordered SDF to implant the activities, upon the formulation of these plans. After six months, on May 17, 2002 the government of Japan extended the duration of the implementation guidelines by six months.

A contingency unit consisting of six vessels including the *Sawagiri*, supply vessel *Towada* and minesweeper tender *Uraga* were organized by the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), to carry out the prescribed Response Measures in accordance with the implementation order. Three vessels out of six, the destroyers *Kurama* and *Kirisami* and supply vessel *Hamana* were dispatched earlier for information gathering activities. The other three vessels, including the *Sawagiri*, left their designated ports for the Indian Ocean on November 25. These vessels started the prescribed cooperation and support activities of fuel supply for US naval vessels in the Indian Ocean on December 2. From January 29, 2002, the fuel supply activity was also extended to UK naval vessels.

⁹ <http://www.gda.jp/e/pab/wp2002/0301.html>. The law entered into force on November 2.

The unit to implement assistance to the affected people, which consisted of the *Uraga* and the *Sawagiri*, delivered about 200 tons of aid material such as tents and blankets to the UNHCR local office to Kalach port in Pakistan on December 12. The *Uraga* returned to Yokosuka Base on December 31, 2001 to complete its mission. The *Sawagiri*, along with *Towada*, met the *Kurama* and other vessels to engage in cooperation and support activities in and around the Indian Ocean. In addition, on February 12 to 13, 2002, the destroyers *Harama* and *Sawakaze* and the supply vessel *Tokima* left their designated ports for the Indian Ocean to take over the mission. On March 16, the *Kurama*, *Kirisame* and *Hamana*, which left at the beginning of November, returned to Saseba Base to complete their mission. The *Sawagiri* and *Tomada* also returned to their designated ports to complete their mission on April 25. By the end of June 2002, the SDF unit's cooperation and support activity of proving refueling operations for US Naval vessels amounted to 87 refuels for approximately 1,53,000 Kl. Besides the above activities, the SDF has been providing port services to assist the port entry and exit for US vessels at the US Navy base in Yokosuka and other places.

The Air Self Defense Forces also participated actively in providing assistance including transportation with C-130 H aircraft from the ASDF First Transport Wing (Komaki Base) between United States Forces Japan (USFJ) bases. It was started on November 29, 2001. On December 3, the ASDF started the overseas transport between USFJ base and or US base in Guam.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Diplomatic Blue Book*, n. 4, pp. 15-16. See also <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/ny2002/0301.html>.

Japan's Anti Terrorist Special Measures Law helped Japan not only to assist the coalition forces but also in providing humanitarian assistance during the war, as will be seen later.

Domestic Measures

After the September 11 attacks, the possibility of more terrorist strikes could not be ruled out anywhere in the world, including Japan. Consequently, the Self Defense Forces Law was amended to enable SDF units, to be called upon to guard SDF facilities as well as USFJ facilities and areas and to give the SDF statutory authority to guard SDF facilities even under normal circumstances under the amended law, in case of attacks or possibility of acts of destruction at SDF facilities or USFJ facilities and areas within necessity to prevent damages that will be caused by such acts, the Prime Minister may order SDF units, into operation, to guard the facilities and areas. When the Prime Minister orders SDF units, etc. into operations, he or she must designate in advance facilities and areas to be guarded and the period of the operations after hearing views from governors of the prefectures concerned and having the Minister of State for Defense's consult with the National Public Safety commission.¹¹

Under the amended law, use of weapons for guarding SDF Facilities were also allowed to the SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding such facilities which have installations for storing, accommodating or maintaining weapons of the SDF. Those who are guarding installations for quarters, ports airports may use weapons to an extent reasonably judged necessary in a

¹¹ <http://www.jef.ur.jp/en/jti/200201004.html>.

given situation within the facilities when they reasonably consider that such use of weapons is necessary for executing the duties of protecting themselves or others.¹²

In accordance with the law, efforts were made to get prepared for any sort of threat and to provide security to the facilities of the SDF and USF bases in Japan by deploying necessary personnel and equipment.

No doubt that Japan's contribution diplomatically as well as militarily (non-combat and humanitarian) were appreciated by the US and other nations of the world, but scholars like Gavan McCormack who studied the other side of the picture have another explanation of the Japan's response to international terrorists. He observes, "for several days after September 11, the Japanese government did not respond other than by expressions of shock and sympathy. It was suddenly galvanized, however by the blunt advice of US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage on September 15 that it make sure that the Rising Sun Flag be visible in the coming war....."¹³ This would imply that Japan acted under American pressure. September 11, also provided Japan with the possibility of reviving and consolidating its Self Defense Forces without any resistance from outside or inside the nation.

While passing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the total number of debate hours were quite less in comparison to what was taken while passing previous Laws. McCormack notes that the legislation was subjected to a debate that was almost perfunctory, amounting in total only to

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Gavan McCormack, "Japan's Afghan Expedition," speech at the Australian National University, 5 November 2001, <http://www.iwanani.co.jp/jpworld/teet/afghanexpedition01.html>.

62 hours, against 179 hours for the peace keeping operations law of 1992 and 154 hours for the guidelines legislation of 1999.¹⁴

The active Japanese participation in the post-September 11 activities especially sending vessels to the Indian Ocean can be seen as part of the gradual process of the Japanese Self Defense Forces taking up actual military responsibilities in the international arena. Providing teeth to bite, by giving SDF personnel the right of using weapons, though only in self-defence, is another step towards military normalcy. Military normalcy means ability to possess and project military force for self-defence as well as for collective security and global peace and security.

McCormack further notes that, “at a crucial White House meeting on 25th September Koizumi committed the SDF without Bush even asking for them.” Koizumi was later asked during the press conference, about the extent of Japan’s financial commitment to the war, and answered by saying, “everything”.¹⁵

Japan’s test reaction and active participation reflects a clear-cut shift in its defence and foreign policy. “Last fall, just eight days after the terrorist attacks” say Heginbotham and Samuels, “..... Koizumi announced that his country would provide military support to the United States for the war in Afghanistan. His statement seemed to signal a long-awaited shift in Japan’s foreign and security policy.”¹⁶

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Eric Heginbotham and Richard J Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” *Foreign Affairs*, , Vol. 18, No. 5, September-October 2002, 2002, p. 110.

Japan's initiative was lauded by American strategists. Many wondered if Japan might become a US ally more along the lines of Britain. Heginbotham and Samuels continue, "In the weeks after Koizumi's speech, however, it became clear that the fundamental approach of Japanese foreign policy had not changed. Japan hastily backtracked on the bolder elements of Koizumi's plan and ended up contributing very little militarily to the Afghan war – much less than did Germany or Italy, which also have constitutions repudiating war."¹⁷ Given the fact that Japan's leaders are neither hawks nor doves but pragmatists for whom both military and economic security are equally important, it was obvious that it could not leave behind its own interests by blindly following the US.

Japan takes the shelter of its constitutional restraints under Article 9 which states:¹⁸

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Constitution of Japan*, <http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>.

Under Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan completely denounced war. Though it was the US that imposed the restraints, the Japanese people accepted it without much opposition. While conservatives deplored, and radicals, by and large, embraced the constitution since its inception, policy makers in Japan have often bypassed Article 9, and under the pressure of successive US administrations, upgraded and expanded its military.¹⁹ The US pressure became conspicuous to the world, when Richard Nixon, visiting Tokyo as US vice-president in 1953, referred to Article 9 as a mistake.²⁰

The words of Article 9 notwithstanding, a 'National Police Reserve' was established in 1950, which in 1954 became the SDF. Their role and functions were slowly upgraded and expanded, till by the end of the 1990s Japan possessed the world's fourth largest defense budget and the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) were of a size and technological sophistication to compare with the defense force of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, Japan does not possess nuclear weapons or deploy aircraft carriers on nuclear powered submarines.²¹

The SDF now has about 236,000 volunteer soldiers, about 4 percent of whom are women, and one of the world's largest military budgets. The SDF is a full-fledged military establishment complete with the latest military technology (albeit no nuclear weaponry), and all of the organizational

¹⁹ Gavan McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 185-6

²⁰ Glenn D Hook and Gavan McCormack, *Constitution Documents and Analysis*, Routledge, London, 2001 p. 14.

²¹ *The Military Balance, 1999-2000*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

accompaniments common to armed forces (territorial divisions, brigades, and training methods).²² The Japanese government is taking measures to popularize the SDF among its citizens. Initially the Japanese people did not have a very good opinion about the SDF and were quite hesitant to join military services. But now, the role of SDF has been enhanced considerably allowing it to take part in search and rescue operations during natural disasters like earthquakes, and participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations abroad also. The people of Japan have more or less accepted the limitations of Article 9 as well as the existence of the SDF.

Japan's contribution to UN peacekeeping efforts has in fact, mirrored its role in the UN as a whole. As a member of the UN, Japan has an obligation to assist in peacekeeping and indeed the first principle of Japan's 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense is to support the activities of the UN and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace. Yet, support for peacekeeping activities has largely materialized in the form of financial rather than physical human contribution. In 1997, Japan provided US\$195 million, which constituted 15 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget. Personnel involvement began only in the late 1980s and even then in relatively small numbers.²³

The Gulf crisis is generally seen as a turning point in Japan's role in peacekeeping activities. Japan's contribution in the Gulf War was seen as 'too little too late', by the international community. Given the fact that US

²² Sabine Fruhstuck and Eyal Ben-Ari, "Now We Show it All!: Normalization and the Management of Violence in Japan's Armed Forces," *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2002, pp. 9-10.

²³ Inoguchi Takashi, and Purnendra Jain, *Japanese Foreign Policy Today*, New York: Palgrave, 2000, pp.124-125.

\$13 billion Japan contributed was 20 per cent of the total cost of war, Japan's physical presence was for 'non-combat and post-conflict' activities. In response to US criticism that Japan was not making a "physical" contribution, the LDP had introduced the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to the Diet in October 1990. The bill was withdrawn due to insufficiency of majority in the Upper House and strong opposition as well. However, the changing reaction of the people to the SDF paved the way for the reintroduction of the peacekeeping bill in September 1991 and its successful implementation as the International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992, which enabled the overseas dispatch of SDF personnel as part of a UN peacekeeping mission for a period of up to two years.²⁴

Caroline Rose writes, "Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping activities could develop beyond its current limited role, and represents one way in which Japan could play a greater political role in regional and global affairs". It is interesting to note that, Japan's legislation prohibits SDF personnel from participating in UN peacekeeping operations where use of force would be involved, although civilian personnel are under no such restrictions, provided they are involved in non-combat operations. After rejecting UN requests for Japanese personnel assistance in 1958 for the UN observer Group in Lebanon and the United Nations Operations in the Congo in 1961, Japan faced the criticism of shirking responsibility, by the world community. Japanese leaders argued that the authors of the Peace Constitution did not intend it to be interpreted in such a way that would

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.127-128.

prohibit Japan from fulfilling its responsibilities as a member of the UN as stipulated in Article 43 of the UN charter.²⁵

Today, Japanese contribution to the UN is being recognized and acknowledged by the whole world. Japan is the second largest donor to the UN after US and enjoys a high profile role in the UN. Deployment of SDF personnel in UNPKO, first in post-conflict roles in non-combat situations and then by active participation in providing rear echelon support to US and allies during the actual war (Afghanistan) have compelled scholars at least to speculate that Japan is returning towards 'military normalcy'. It also appears to be a step forward in order to stake claims for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

Nevertheless, it has not been all smooth sailing for Japan in its bid to legislate for its SDF a more active role. While for Japanese right-wing forces the September 11 tragedy and the US anti-terrorism measures seemed to be a godsend that allowed them to argue for Japan's collective security rights and promote the formulation of the anti terrorism act, which brought the SDF overseas under the pretext of an active and independent involvement in the international community, there were also doubts and critics both at home and abroad.

The SDF not only made its debut overseas in wartime, but also had its army, navy and airforces simultaneously dispatched overseas, both of which are actually Japan's strategic objectives. The anti-terrorism special measures law also relaxed the limitation on the weaponry of the SDF and removed the prescription that the overseas activities of the SDF should be confined to

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.130-131

United Nation's peace keeping missions. In April 2002, the Japanese government passed the armed attack contingency bills, and amendment on the setup of security guarantee council and an amendment on the SDF law. According to the bills Japanese Prime Minister is authorized to directly order the SDF overseas without going through the procedure of a Security Council.

However, this is a state of affairs led to considerable unease even within the ruling coalition. The chairman of the LDP General Council, Mitsuo Horiuchi, contended that, in situations involving crossing the borders of another country, the SDF should only be allowed to do so to provide arms and ammunition if consent from the sovereign nation is obtained. Said Horiuchi, "[t]he government should (make the necessary legislative arrangements) so that the SDF could at least transport arms and ammunition to (U.S. or multinational) bases in case the SDF provides rear-echelon logistic support activities (in the event of antiterrorist military campaign)." But, New Komeito leader Takenori Kanzaki was cautious about the SDF's role in transporting arms and ammunition, saying that it ought to be confined to logistic support in areas that were clearly separated from combat zones. Former LDP Secretary General Hiromu Nonaka was also wary about the government's proposed support for then impending American military retaliation saying that the Japanese government should be careful of the legislation it enacted. Nonaka stated, "While I'm well aware of the importance of cooperating with Japan's ally, I can't help but think that the government shouldn't jeopardize the foreign policy it has worked long and hard to formulate." Former LDP Secretary General Koichi Kato also questioned the issue of revising the SDF law to allow it to guard important

facilities and areas.²⁶ More concerns would arise later, during the Diet debate on the bill to allow the sending of SDF forces to Iraq. While the bill limited the scope of SDF activities to non-combat areas the opposition Democratic Party of Japan argued that it would be difficult to distinguish combat from non-combat zones amid the unsettled Iraqi situation.

Foreign critics also see Japan as utilizing the opportunity to remove impediments in the implementation of foreign military strategies. The definition of “contingency in areas around Japan,” involving the situation in which Japan is under attack and the potential danger of Japan being attacked, for example, is considered as extensive and ambiguous. In the so-called contingency, Japan can dispatch its troops for defensive combat.²⁷ Japan had earlier given its neighbours cause for concern when it sank a suspected North Korean vessel that had intruded into its waters on December 22, 2001. The ship was however, attacked and sunk in the East China Sea, well outside Japan’s territorial waters. The Japanese employed 25 ships, 14 planes and a destroyer for the purpose.²⁸

Economic Measures

As the world’s second largest economic power, Japan after assessing the damage caused by the terrorist attacks, took along with diplomatic and security measures also noticeable economic measures. Shigemitsu Sugisaki,

²⁶ “Coalition leaders split on SDF bill,” <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.htm>.

²⁷ Wang Baofu, “Japanese Military Expansion Underway,” *Beijing Review*, Vol. 45, No. 21, May 23, 2002, p. 12.

²⁸ Sun Cheng, “Will the Ship Sunk by Japan Affect Asian Stability?,” *Beijing Review*, Vol. 45, No. 3, January 17, 2003, p. 14.

the Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, while addressing a seminar organized by IMF External Relations Department, gives a pessimistic assessment of the situation of the world economy. He says, "The events of September 11 made an already very difficult global economic situation worse. The slow down that began most prominently in the United States had, by mid-2001, become a synchronized downturn across almost all major regions of the world." Just prior to the attacks, there appeared a reasonable likelihood of recovery in late 2001, but prospects for global growth have since been set back significantly. As a result of the deeper and more prolonged global slowdown that is now envisaged, the fund (IMR) has reduced its projection for world growth this year by one percentage point, to 2.4 per cent, the lowest since 1993.²⁹

Announcement of the Seven Measures made by Koizumi on September 19 included the clear mention of measures to be taken in cooperation with other countries, in response to the changing situation to avoid confusion in the international and domestic economic systems. As far as financial contributions is concerned, Japan provided a total of US\$10 million to assist search and rescue activities at the site. In response to the Donor Alert issued by the UN Secretary-General totaling US\$580 million to support the assistance activities for Afghan refugees undertaken by UN agencies and other international organizations, Japan announced on October 4 that it was prepared to provide a maximum of US\$120 million, around 20 per cent of the total funding requirements to meet specific funding requests. Following is the break up of money that Japan decided and provided to various UN agencies. Approximately, US\$6 million were provided to the

²⁹ <http://www.imf.org/external/speeches/2002/012502.htm>.

UNHCR. Likewise, on November 16, it decided to provide a total of US\$36.85 million to the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Furthermore, it decided on January 18, 2002 to provide a total of US\$59.5 million to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the ICRC.³⁰

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, while the New York Stock Exchange was closed and the dollar threatened, the Japanese government committed a staggering ¥3 trillion to foreign exchange markets to support it. This sum alone was more than double the US\$13 billion contribution to the Gulf War, and it was considered mere down payment.³¹

The government of Japan also supported refugee assistance activities performed by Japanese NGOs within the framework of the Japan Platform (JPF). On September 28, the JPF decided to assist Afghan refugees in Pakistan, with NGOs working under JPF auspices launching their activities using a fund of ¥7580 million provided by the Japanese government.³²

As part of the fight against terrorism, it was critically important for the international community to support Pakistan, which took a resolute stance against international terrorism as a responsible member of the international community. From that viewpoint, Japan gave top priority to

³⁰ *Diplomatic Blue Book*, n. 4, p.20.

³¹ Gavan McCornack, "Japan's Afghan Expedition", speech at the Australian National University, November 5, 2001, <http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/Afghanexpedition01.html>.

³² *Diplomatic Blue Book*, n. 4, p. 21.

supporting Pakistan and duly carried out its pledge. On September 21, Japan announced emergency assistance to Pakistan comprising ¥4.7 billion in bilateral assistance (grant aid) ¥3 billion of which was for emergency budgetary assistance and ¥117 billion for refugee assistance. It also comprised official debt rescheduling (¥64.6) million rescheduled and assistance through international' financial institutions. Moreover, Japan also lifted the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan and India following the nuclear tests by both countries in 1998.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks, Pakistan faced serious economic difficulties, including a heavy slump in economic activities and a growing fiscal burden. Accordingly, the Musharraf administration made a number of requests to Japan for further assistance recognizing that Pakistan's stability and cooperation were critical in the fight against terrorism and that assistance needed to be extended to Pakistan in response to the major difficulties it faced, Japan decided on additional measures on November 16, comprising US\$300 million in grant aid over approximately two years (including the assistance provided in September). Further, with the cooperation of Japan as a major creditor country, Paris club member countries agreed in December to reschedule approximately US\$12.5 billion in debt for a maximum of 38 years.

Japan's economic assistance was not only limited to Pakistan but was also extended to the Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These countries made an extensive contribution to the fight against terrorism by, for example, allowing access to their military bases by US forces. These countries already faced economic difficulties due to

drought and other problems, and the burgeoning cost of policing their borders put extra pressure on the already fragile economies.

In October, Japan responded to these circumstances by extending to Tajikistan ¥240 million for the care of Afghan refugees.³³ Preceding the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, which was held in Tokyo, Japan announced the provision of ¥1 billion in grant aid to both countries. ¥50 million of the assistance for Tajikistan was extended as emergency assistance to deal with drought, while ¥950 million was extended as sector program grant aid to assist in areas such as education and health care. For Uzbekistan, ¥50 million was extended as emergency assistance to deal with drought, and ¥950 million was supplied as a non-project grant aid to assist market economy and poverty-alleviation efforts.

Japan took major diplomatic, security-related and economic measures, in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Japan's contribution, especially financial support, was appreciated the world over. But Heginbotham and Samuels are critical of Japanese support and policies during the Afghan war. They state that Japan's stance of using comprehensive security was evolving into a strategy that could be called "double hedging".³⁴

"On the one hand, Japan has relied on its alliance with the United States as a hedge against military threats. On the other hand, Japan has cultivated different partners – including some that the United States identifies as present or potential security threats – to hedge against economic

³³ Yamauchi Masayuki, "A Japanese Perspective on the Afghan Problem," *Japan Echo*, Feb, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2002, p. 18.

³⁴ Heginbotham n. 16, p.111

dangers” write Heginbotham and Samuels. In order to secure its economic interests particularly in Middle East and simultaneously to prove its active participation in the war to the US and world, Japan acted in a way that convinced both sides. In the context of the war in Afghanistan, Japan accomplished this by sending its Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) to Diego Garcia, far outside their usual range – but still far enough from the battlefield that Japan’s envoys to oil exporters and other economic partners could deny Tokyo’s active support for the campaign.

Japan’s primary concern was to maintain good relations with Iran, within the Muslim world. After Mohammad Khatami came to power, Japanese businesses agreed to invest \$6 billion to \$12 billion. Despite getting involved with Iran later than its European competitors, Japan’s Iranian deals are so big and well supported politically that they promise to provide it with strategic advantages in the Gulf far in excess of any it once enjoyed with Saudi Arabia. After September 11, Japan thus became very intensely involved with helping Iranian officials alleviate problems associated with the expected influx of Afghan refugees. Iran reciprocated by assuring Japan a steady flow of oil throughout the course of military campaign.³⁵ This maneuvering put Japan in an ideal position. Thus, Japan maintains friendly business relations with Iran irrespective of the fact, that US President, Bush called it as one of the nation of ‘axis of evil’.³⁶

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.115

³⁶ <http://www.terrorismanswers.com>

Japan's Role in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan

After the Afghan war was over, the international community took steps to rebuild the war ravaged nation. In order to bring in peace to Afghanistan and to stop terrorist and fundamentalist to take control of the nation again the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1378 on peace in Afghanistan. From November 27 through December 5, Afghanistan leaders representing various factions gathered in Germany held talks on national reconciliation with UN representatives. On December 6, they signed the famous Bonn Agreement, laying a path toward peace and stability. At about the same time, a donor meeting of the Afghanistan support Group chaired by Germany was underway in Berlin. Two weeks later, on December 22, the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was established in Kabul in accordance with the Bonn Agreement, with Hamid Karzai as chairman.³⁷

Within six months of the establishment of the AIA, an emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) was opened by the former king of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zaheer Shah, to decide issues related to the Transitional Authority, including the appointment of a national leader.

Since 1996, Japan had publicly stated its willingness to host an international conference in Tokyo to begin peace and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, and in March 2000 individual Afghan factions were invited to Japan to engage in talks towards this end.

³⁷ Kenzo Oshima, "Aid for Afghanistan: Immediate Needs and Long-Term Considerations," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 73.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, Japan continued these efforts, and on November 20, 2001, the Senior Officials Meeting on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan was held in Washington, D.C. with Japan and the United States serving as joint chairs. The need of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance was affirmed felt with the active involvement of International community and Afghan citizens.

On December 20-21, the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group met in Brussels with Japan, the United States, the European Union (EU), and Saudi Arabia acting as joint chairs. A report was given on the Asian Development Band (ADB), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and World Bank preliminary assessment of Afghanistan reconstruction needs, while participants also discussed means of providing funding for reconstruction assistance from the international community to Afghanistan.

On December 23, Japan dispatched the Economic Cooperation Mission to Kabul and on January 7, 2002, mission headed by Special Representative of the Prime Minister Sadako Ogata was sent to Afghanistan as part of preparation for the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan. Based on mission findings, Japan, the United States, the EU, and Saudi Arabia Jointly chaired the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo on January 21-22. The meeting was attended by 61 countries and 21 international institutions, with many participants communicating strong

messages in regard to reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. In their first appearance before leaders of the international community, chairman Karzai and other members of the Interim Administration presented their vision for a “new Afghanistan” and made passionate plea for international assistance. The donors responded generously, pledging some \$4.18 billion for 2002 and more than \$4.5 billion over the next two years. Notably, several countries that are normally viewed as aid recipients – such as China, India, Iran and Pakistan came to Tokyo instead as donors and announced considerable pledges. “The conference was rightly hailed as historic,” says Oshima because “indeed, it was the largest pledging conference to have taken place in recent history for a single country, both in terms of participation and amount pledged.”³⁸

Carrying out reconstruction and humanitarian assistance activities was very difficult. There were number of challenges to be subdued, which included a population of about 25 million people; unfavorable geographical conditions and strategic importance including in relation to energy resources, a history of interference and intervention by neighboring countries and big powers; and the long civil war that devastated the country’s infrastructure. The complex ethnicity of the population, the deep-seated rivalries that divide different groups, the existence of entrenched warlords and militias and the remnants of a feudal system further exacerbated problems stemming from underdevelopment and poverty. More than one in three Afghans – about 9 million people were dependent on aid from international agencies for food and basic medicine; over one million people had become internally displaced, and as many as 4 million refugees

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74

(the majority of them women and children) remained in Pakistan, Iran and other neighboring countries.³⁹

The main purpose of the Tokyo conference, however, was not to address the immediate issue of humanitarian aid but to focus on the medium to long term reconstruction needs. As the co-chair Sadako Ogata, stressed, the conference was first to find ways to “reinforce the political process” that began with the Bonn Agreement, and second to achieve “a seamless transition from ongoing humanitarian assistance to recovery and reconstruction”.

The conference in Tokyo brought forth pledges of US\$4.5 billion in aid to Afghanistan, including commitments to provide at least US\$1.8 billion during 2002. Japan promised US\$500 million, also within a year. One of the biggest reasons for the success of the gathering was Prime Minister Koizumi’s appointment of the former Commissioner of the UNHCR, Sadako Ogata, for overseeing preparations for the conference and co-chairing the sessions. Due to her presence all other countries sent high-ranking delegates thereby increasing the political significance of the event. The conference was the biggest political event after the Second International Committee on the reconstruction of Cambodia hosted in 1994 and third session of the conference of the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP3), held in Kyoto in December 1997.

³⁹ Yamauchi Masayuki, “Counterterrorism and the New World Order: Japan’s Role in Afghanistan,” *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 90.

Japan could not use Bonn Conference effectively to prove itself to the world but Tokyo conference paved the way for Japan to mark its presence of a major player in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Japan not only managed to fulfill its responsibilities to Afghanistan as a fellow Asian country, but did so while avoiding the pitfall of checkbook diplomacy – that is, letting the United States and Europe call the shots while picking up a major part of the expenses.

Japan's critics are however concerned about the hidden geopolitical competition in Afghanistan beneath this financial aid. Nearly half of the donations accepted by the provisional Afghan government came from EU countries, the United States and Japan. These countries will naturally have a greater say in the establishment of Afghan regime in the coming years. What also attracts the attention and financial support of Japan and the other western nations are the oil and gas resources found in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Statistics indicate that the region has about 200 million barrels of oil reserves and 7.9 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves. It is the last untapped oil and gas patch, thus highlighting the great geo-economic importance of controlling Afghanistan.⁴⁰

Koizumi stressed on the need to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. He emphasized on rooting out the conditions that allow terrorism to grow. He also appreciated Sadako Ogata's efforts to bring relief to the people of Afghanistan. It was not only the world community as whole that acknowledged and appreciated Japan's contribution in the peace in the

⁴⁰ Fu Xiaoqiang, "The Reconstruction of Afghanistan And China's Role in It," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 45, No. 16, April 18, 2002, p. 6.

peace building and reconstruction efforts but also the chairman of AIA on behalf of Afghan Chairman of AIA on behalf of Afghan people who was full of praise for Japan's efforts. He also, during his speech, mentioned that they would take lessons from once war-ravaged Japan itself, to reconstruct their nation and to emerge as a donor nation instead of recipient of assistance.

Role of Japanese NGOs

The Japanese government together with the US moved quickly for the reconstruction process in Afghanistan to demonstrate the firm commitment to the long stability of the country. The role of Japanese NGOs in the reconstruction process was also quite important to convey the support voice of Japan to the new administration of Afghanistan.

Japanese NGOs, with the support of Japan Platform, are even now deployed in Afghanistan for carrying out humanitarian assistance activities for the IDPs and for the reconstruction process of Afghanistan. To assist the refugees and IDPs resulting from the retaliatory attacks by US forces, the Japanese NGO, JEN prepared 150,000 packages of winter relief materials in Pakistan for Afghan refugees. In cooperation with the UNHCR and local NGOs, JEN also distributed the packages in Kabul district as well as three other neighboring districts in Afghanistan.⁴¹

Since January 2002, another Japanese NGO, AAR Japan has been carrying out mine/UXO risk education programs and surveys of mine contaminated areas in northern Afghanistan in conjunction with another

⁴¹ "Relief Assistance to Afghan Refugees," November 29, 2001, <http://webclub.kcom.ne.jp/ma-jenhq/english/index-e.html>.

NGO. It has helped in mine clearance operations in Parwan Province in the north of Kabul while also working with the United Nations Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA) to develop methods and materials suited for use in mine risk education programs in Afghanistan. The NGO has also set up two physiotherapy centers in Takhar Province in northern Afghanistan for those who have been disabled as a result of mine accidents or diseases such as polio.⁴²

Also in 2002, Japanese NGOs in Afghanistan responded to the earthquake in the Nahrin district of Baghlan province in the mountains of northeastern Afghanistan. Japanese NGOs in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif worked closely with UN agencies and other international NGOs and coordinated their relief activities with them. Peace Winds Japan in Mazar-i-Sharif office sent the survey staff to assess the needs of the site and sent trucks and other vehicles for the transport of the relief goods. MERU (Medical Emergency Relief Unit) in Mazar-i-Sharif, with other international NGOs, dispatched the emergency medical team with the emergency health kit. JEN and AAR in Kabul also prepared relief goods for distribution. From Japan, the Japan Rescue Association dispatched the rescue team with the rescue dogs.⁴³

⁴² http://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english2/act_e/act01_e.htm.

⁴³ <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/c7ca0eaf6c79faae852567af003c69ca/a75929e1b4a0b26a49256b8b000-1727a?OpenDocument>.

Conclusion

According to Tomohito Shinoda, several factors existed that allowed the Japanese Prime Minister to react more quickly than any of his predecessors ever did to a global crisis situation.⁴⁴ First, there were the lessons learned from the Gulf War. A massive contribution of \$13 billion provided in economic aid did not save Japan from the criticism that it was “too little, too late.” Providing monetary support alone, Japan realized was insufficient could be perceived as inadequate in a crisis. Next, Japan also learned that it was important to act quickly. Within forty-five minutes of the attacks on the US, Koizumi had called a meeting of Japan's National Security Council.

Another factor was the personality of Koizumi himself. Shinoda notes that besides being a strong and decisive leader, the present Japanese Prime Minister was also supported by a competent cabinet and staff members who are not hesitant to make important decisions and provide Koizumi with well-informed political advice.

There was in addition, a strong visible public support for a more decisive leadership. As government leadership was found wanting in the several crises that Japan experienced in the late 1990s, such as the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system and the Lima embassy hostage crisis, reforms were introduced that reinforced crisis management procedures in the Cabinet Secretariat and enabled a quick response and

⁴⁴ Tomohito Shinoda , “Japan's Response to Terrorism”, prepared for the seminar, *Japan's Role in the Fight against Terrorism*, Woodrow Wilson Center, October 16, 2001.

strong display of leadership. Moreover, the strong public mandate that Koizumi enjoyed at the time the attacks on the United States occurred allowed him to take decisive action.

There have also been changes in the domestic legal environment since the Gulf War. After the Gulf War and Korean Peninsula crisis of 1994, Japan established a new legal framework by revising the Self Defense Forces Law and passing a new Regional Crisis Law that allowed the provision of military support to U.S. forces during times of crisis.

Thus, all the above factors laid the groundwork for the quick and decisive Japanese moves that were on display in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Defining international terrorism continues to be a problem fraught with difficulties for scholars and institutions dealing with the phenomenon. Though several attempts have been made and continue to be made by various scholars, governments and international organizations such as the United Nations, a universally accepted definition is still a long way off.

Such an impasse is due to various reasons. First, vested interests exist of nations using international terrorism as an extension of state policy but covertly. Second, terrorism is the best alternative to an openly declared war as it costs less both in terms of money and lives. Third, a clear distinction between a freedom struggle and terrorism is hard to make. Fourth, terrorist organizations and their well-knitted network spread all over the world, often act as a counter to the will of national governments and may even influence government policies in many countries. Last but not least, the changing trends of international terrorism – from being a part of superpower rivalry during the Cold War to the religious terrorism of the present day.

The whole world faces the menace of international terrorism today. No single country can boast of being immune from international terrorism. Even a country like Japan, where the crime rate is very low, cannot claim itself free from the threat of terrorism. With the advancement of the technology and science, life has become very easy, comfortable and luxurious. It has been so also for terrorists who have more sophisticated

technology at their hands to spread destruction and fear. Yet their basic method remains much the same. By killing innocents, and striking at public places – soft targets – terrorists try to convey their message whether ideological or otherwise.

As has been seen in the previous chapters, terrorists are different from the regular soldiers of a particular nation and this has been further clarified by the Geneva Convention of 1949 and protocols added later on in 1977. The United Nations' help was also sought to distinguish a freedom struggle or right to self-determination from act of terrorism.

The similar warfare tactics or guerilla style of attacks used by the revolutionaries, freedom fighters and terrorists make the task of distinguishing between them more difficult. But, terrorist organizations have more than one ambition. They want to meet not just political ends but also financial and such other gains. Terrorists often are paid mercenaries compelled by socioeconomic circumstances to join terrorist groups. In order to make them commit the dreaded plans of violence masterminded and backed by self-proclaimed leaders like Osama Bin Laden, religious fanaticism is added to their mindset.

The Leftist-Marxist-Leninist ideology oriented terrorist groups have largely either disappeared or are on the decline. With the disintegration of the USSR, a source of covert but effective support has also gone. The terrorist groups supported by the US during the Cold War are reverting to religious fanaticism, often in most cases Islamic extremism. The only clear difference has been a shift in patronage.

Several other terrorist groups other than those based on religion or ideology also exist. One thing these terrorist groups have in common is anti-Americanism. The reason being the stoppage of aid and patronage to such groups that they used to get once from America. As the Cold War ended and the major threats to the US disappeared, it also started disassociating itself from these groups that were left with no option but to look for other sources of income to support their organizations and carry out their activities.

During the 1980s and 1990s religious terrorist groups emerged and multiplied to pose a serious threat not only to US but also to the world community as a whole. Though the numbers of terrorist attacks have decreased, their intensity has been quite high in the last decade. Terrorists now use the latest technology and weapons and are often funded by extensive drug trafficking, and smuggling of arms and other goods.

Some areas in Southeast Asia and Latin America are quite infamous for such activities. Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia are known as golden triangle for the above-mentioned activities. And in Latin America, the drug cartels of Colombia are among the most feared and dreaded in the world. In the present era of globalization, even terrorist groups have gone global with their widespread networks. Apart from using sophisticated means to carry out their activities, communication channels, mass and electronic media are also used by these terrorist organizations to make their presence felt. The fact that the *Al Jazeera* channel of Qatar has had sole access to bin Laden's interviews has been used to accuse it of being hand in glove with his organization.

Japanese terrorist organizations like the JRA and Aum Shinrikyo grew and spread their activities to other nations also. The former terrorist group reflects the Marxist-Leninist ideology while the latter reflects the characteristics of religion/cult based terrorist group. The Japanese government responded successfully in dealing with both groups. The activities of both the groups are curtailed and whatever is left is insignificant.

However, situations like the seizure of the Japanese ambassador's residence in Peru, in 1996 motivated Japan to strengthen its information gathering and cooperation building activities to tackle international terrorism. The September 11 attacks on Pentagon and WTC had a more symbolic significance than a physical one. US hegemony was directly challenged and Japan as an ally of the US could not stand by indifferently.

While the whole world sympathized with US and criticized the attacks, the Japanese in addition also responded differently from previous times of a similar nature. Speculation went around, that Japan was ready to go once again on military lines. For the first time a Japanese Prime Minister reacted so fast and pledged to do everything that was required to support US actions which at that time were unclear and only lay in the future.

Japan's gradual remilitarization process took a long jump forward when the Japanese Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, providing the SDF with extra powers to actually use weapons. Though, this was allowed only in self-defence it was nevertheless of great significance.

Before this the SDF could carry a weapon but its use was denied to them. For the first time Japanese SDF took part in providing assistance to fighting US armies during a war. Japan claimed it was logistical and humanitarian assistance, that it provided rear echelon support to US which included refueling of war ships. But it also meant that Japan had participated in a direct war, which its constitution had prohibited.

The fact of the matter was that the US and its allies wanted Japan to come out of the penumbra of Article 9 and to participate more actively and militarily in the war. Japan also seemed to have learned from its past experience of Gulf war when it failed to get its contribution worth \$18 billion acknowledged. In leaving behind passivism, Japan had taken a new step towards a more active participation in international security affairs.

At the same time, after receiving appreciation from the world community, Japan did not amend Article 9 but instead remained stuck to it. Japanese policy makers were smart enough to satisfy the US and its allies on the one hand, and safeguard their economic interests on the other. For them their economic interests came first. This time Japan's contributions were acknowledged by the world community. Consequently, they kept their economic interests in the Middle East especially with Iran unharmed.

Japan used international platforms like ASEAN and G8 Summits to criticize worldwide terrorism. It stressed on the need of taking measures to check the increasing threat of terrorism. It not only hosted a number of conferences on counter terrorism but also hosted and co-chaired the

International Conference on Reconstruction of Afghanistan held in Tokyo in January 2002.

Japan's contribution in the reconstruction of Afghanistan was not just in terms of financial support. The role played by its NGOs and the special envoy of the Japanese Prime Minister to Afghanistan Sadako Ogata also received praise. Around 20 per cent of the total contribution pledged by the international community for the reconstruction of Afghanistan was pledged by Japan alone.

The events of September 11 worsened the already very difficult global economic situation. The global economy including that of the US was suffering from a slowdown because of the bursting of information technology bubble. Japan was also responsible for this global slowdown because it had not carried out crucial structural reforms and could not take advantage of the ending of the long expansion in the US. Just before the attacks, there appeared a reasonable likelihood of recovery in 2001, but prospects for global growth had since been set back significantly. The IMF reduced by one per cent, its forecast for world economic growth, to 2.4 per cent, the lowest since 1993.

Japan at that time was in its third and deepest recession in a decade. As the September 11 attacks reduced the chances of global recovery, so it did also to the growth prospects of Japan. Though economic measures taken by Japan after the attacks to support foreign exchange markets were worth appreciation, they were not very sound.

Household spending had decreased due to the severe state of the labour market conditions and unemployment had reached an all time high. The GDP declined further. On top of all this, Japanese citizens were overburdened with more taxes. But this situation can be attributed not only due to September 11, but also due to Japan's own fundamental structural weaknesses.

While Koizumi gained in popularity and won the support of the Japanese people in the immediate aftermath of September 11, these were short-lived because of his failure to fulfill his promises of reviving the economy and carry out reforms. Koizumi's popularity fell further due to the resignation of foreign minister Makiko Tanaka in August 2002, over allegations that she had misused public funds. Another reason was probably her conflicts with former Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoshiji Nogami over the issue of the participation of non-governmental organizations in the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan.

As often seen, Japan always followed the US lead, no matter what the situation but with certain limitations. Japanese leaders are neither hawks nor doves but pragmatic. Japanese role of a more proactive nature after September 11 was based on the general public's increased support for Japan to be seen as doing something substantial. The long-standing demand of reviewing Article 9 by various individuals and agencies seemed to be fulfilled at one point of time. But, Japanese leaders as usual by passed Article 9 instead of getting it amended.

While opposition parties in general endorsed the government's move of taking various measures to counter international terrorism the changes in Japan's security strategy and policies especially those related to the SDF drew harsh criticism among parties and the public at home. By deliberately leaving the door wide open on the possibility of participation in future conflicts, the Japanese government also caused doubt among its Asian neighbours and the Koizumi cabinet has frequently been rebuffed in the diplomacy overtures it has made toward Japan's Asian neighbours. A few scholars like Francis Fukuyama have also added their share to the criticism of Japanese actions.

The security umbrella of the US is the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. For the US, Japan is a strategic power in the East Asian region. Their economic interdependence can also not be ignored even though, Japan maintains amicable relations with nations like Iran which US sees as a potential threat. Though, Japan has certain compulsions to follow and endorses the US action in many matters it has always been careful to keep its own interests at the front.

By responding to the international crisis caused by terrorist attacks of September 11, Japan made its intentions conspicuous that it could resort to its traditional check book diplomacy, and follow America in what is often termed karaoke diplomacy, but also respond in a more active manner. The whole background for Japan to go on military lines once again is an option available. If, at any point of time in the future it wishes to shed the restraints imposed by its pacific constitution, the Japanese response to the events of September 11, 2001 have provided a useful precedent. Already in possession

of one of the most sophisticated defense forces, Japan can emerge as one of the greatest military powers in the world.

APPENDIX 1

Major New Religions of Japan¹

Year founded	Organization	Denomination	Membership (1994)
<i>Shinshukyo</i>			
1814	Kurozumikyō	Shintoist	295,225
1838	Tenrikyō	Others	1,892,498
1859	Konkōbyō	Shintoist	433,340
1892	Omatokyō	Shintoist	173,653
1913	Honmichi	Others	318,173
1919	Reiyūkai	Buddhism	3,212,314
1924	Perfect Liberty	Others	1,234,457
1930	Seicho-no-ie	Others	872,198
1930	Sōka Gakkai	Buddhism	8,030,000
1938	Risshō Kōseikai	Buddhism	6,545,950
<i>Shin shinshukyo</i>			
1948	Shiunyoen	Buddhism	816,920
1956	Kyuseihukyo	Others	177,264
1958	Unification church	Others	463,991
1959	GLA	Others	16,384
1978	Agonshu	Buddhist	260,502
1986	Kohuku-no-kagaku	Others	71,340

¹ Daniel A Metraux, "Religious Terrorism in Japan : The Fatal Appeal of Aum Shinrikyo," *Asian Survey*, Dec, 1995, p. 1143.

APPENDIX 2

**Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press Conference
(Provisional Translation)
September 12, 2001²**

The series of terrorist attacks that occurred yesterday in the United States of America took a great number of precious lives. These extremely vicious acts of violence can never be forgiven. I am outraged by these acts which pose a grave challenge not only to the United States but to the entire free world.

I would like to express once again condolences for the victims and their bereaved families, as well as my heartfelt sympathies to the President and the people of the United States and to all who have suffered.

Japan strongly supports the United States and is resolved to spare no effort in providing necessary assistance and cooperation. We must stand firmly together with the concerned nations of the world to ensure that such acts are never repeated.

We established emergency headquarters in the Prime Minister's Office last night and efforts are being made to gather information and take necessary actions. Furthermore, the National Security Council had a meeting a little while ago with the attendance of all Cabinet members and decided on the following six-item policy.

1. All relevant ministries will work in concert to take every possible measure in order to gather accurate information on the situation including the safety of Japanese nationals concerned and to take all appropriate measures.
2. All possible measures will be put in place to assist Japanese nationals affected . At the same time, the preparations for such measures as the dispatch of a Japan Disaster Relief Team for all those affected will be made, so that actions can be taken promptly if requested.
3. The security of such facilities and establishments related to the United States in Japan will be enhanced, and necessary actions will be taken as appropriate, responding to the prevailing situation.
4. Efforts will be made to provide appropriate information to the people of Japan and to keep the people alert on the situations.
5. Japan will respond in cooperation with the United States and other concerned nations to combat international terrorism.

² http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e.html.

6. Appropriate measures will be taken to prevent confusion in the economic systems both in Japan and in the rest of the world.

The Government of Japan will do its utmost to respond to the situation based on this policy.

Thank you for your attention.

APPENDIX 3

**Resolution 1368
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th meeting
September 12, 2001³**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter,

1. *Unequivocally* condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington (D.C.) and Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security;
2. *Expresses* its deepest sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families and to the People and Government of the United States of America;
3. *Calls* on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable;
4. *Calls* also on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 of 19 October 1999;
5. *Expresses* its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations;
6. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

³ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm>.

APPENDIX 4

**Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
(Provisional Translation)
September 19, 2001⁴**

Japan's measures in response to the simultaneous terrorist attacks in the United States

1. Basic Policy

Japan will actively engage itself in the combat against terrorism, which it regards as Japan's own security issue.

1. Japan strongly supports the United States, its ally, and will act in concert with the United States and other countries around the world.
2. Japan will take concrete and effective measures which will clearly demonstrate its firm determination. These measures will be implemented in a swift and comprehensive manner.

2. Immediate measures

1. The Government of Japan (GOJ) will promptly take measures necessary for dispatching the Self-Defense Force (SDF) for providing support, including medical services, transportation and supply, to the US forces and others taking measures related to the terrorist attacks, which have been recognized as a threat to international peace and security in the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1368.
2. GOJ will promptly take measures necessary for further strengthening protection of facilities and areas of the US forces and important facilities in Japan.
3. GOJ will swiftly dispatch SDF vessels to gather information.
4. GOJ will strengthen international co-operation, including information sharing, in areas such as immigration control.
5. GOJ will extend humanitarian, economic and other necessary assistance to surrounding and affected countries. As a part of this assistance, GOJ will extend emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India, which are co-operating with the United States in this emergency situation.
6. GOJ will provide assistance to the displaced persons as necessary. This will include the possibility of humanitarian assistance by SDF.

⁴ http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/saigai/terojiken/taisyo_e.html.

7. GOJ, in co-operation with other countries, will take appropriate measures in response to the changing situation to avoid confusion in the international and domestic economic systems.

APPENDIX 5

Resolution 1373
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting
September 28, 2001⁵

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001,

Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and expressing its determination to prevent all such acts,

Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001),

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism,

Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism,

Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,

Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its declaration of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

⁵ <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/392a001f254b4b9085256b4b00708233?OpenDocument>.

1. *Decides* that all States shall:

- (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
- (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
- (c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;
- (d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;

2. *Decides also* that all States shall:

- (a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists ;
- (b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
- (c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
- (d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
- (e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;
- (f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;
- (g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;

3. *Calls upon* all States to:

- (a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or

falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;

(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;

(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;

(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;

(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);

(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;

(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists;

4. *Notes* with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard *emphasizes* the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;

5. *Declares* that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations;

6. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and *calls upon* all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to implement this resolution;

7. *Directs* the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support it requires, in consultation with the Secretary-General;

8. *Expresses* its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full implementation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter;

9. *Decides* to remain seized of this matter.

APPENDIX 6

Establishment of the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters

Cabinet decision

(Provisional Translation)

October 8, 2001⁶

1. In order to forcefully advance comprehensive and effective emergency measures against terrorism the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters (hereinafter referred to as "the Headquarters") will be established within the Cabinet Office.

2. The Headquarters will be comprised of the following members. However, when deemed necessary, the Chief of the Headquarters will appoint additional members.

Chief of the Headquarters : Prime Minister

Deputy-Chief of the Headquarters : Chief Cabinet Secretary

Members:

Minister of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications

Minister of Justice

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Minister of Finance

Minister of Education, Culture, Sport, Science, and Technology

Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare

Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries

Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry

Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport

Minister of Environment

Minister of State for Disaster Prevention, Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission

Minister for State for Defense

Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs, Science and Technology Policy

Minister of State for Financial Services Agency

Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy

Minister of State for Administrative Reform and Regulatory Reform

3. The Meetings of the Headquarters will be attended by the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries (both parliamentary and administrative), the Director-General of Cabinet Legislation Bureau and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management.

4. A Secretary will be appointed within the Headquarters. The Secretary will be a civil servant of one of the relevant administrative organizations and designated by the Chief of the Headquarters.

⁶ http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1008taisakuhonbu_e.html.

5. The administrative matters of the Headquarters will be handled by the Cabinet Secretariat with the cooperation of the relevant administrative organizations.

6. In addition to the matters stipulated in the above items, any matters pertaining to the operations of the Headquarters and any other necessary matters will be decided upon by the Chief of the Headquarters.

APPENDIX 7

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Tentative English Summary) October 2001⁷

1. Title

The Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on the Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations

2. Purposes (Pertaining to Article 1)

- (1) Recalling that UN Security Council resolution 1368 regards the terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in the United States (hereinafter referred to as "the terrorist attacks") as a threat to international peace and security,
- (2) And also noting that the UN Security Council resolutions 1267, 1269, 1333 and other relevant resolutions condemn acts of international terrorism, and call on all States to take appropriate measures for the prevention of such acts,

The purposes of the Law is to specify the following measures in order to enable Japan to contribute actively and on its own initiatives to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan.

- i. The measures Japan implements in support of the activities of the armed forces of the United States and other countries (hereinafter referred to as "Foreign Forces") which aim to eradicate the threat of the terrorist attacks, thereby contributing to the achievement of the purposes of the Charter of the UN
- ii. The measures Japan implements with the humanitarian spirit based on relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council of the UN or requests made by the UN, organizations established by the General Assembly of the UN, the Specialized Agencies of the UN, or International Organization for Migration (hereinafter referred to "the UN and Others")

3. Basic Principles (Pertaining to Article 2)

- (1) The Government of Japan (GOJ) shall implement Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities, Assistance to Affected People and other necessary measures (hereinafter referred to as "Response Measures") in an appropriate and swift manner, thereby contributing actively and on its own initiatives to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, and ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan.

⁷ http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html.

- (2) These measures must not constitute the threat or use of force.
- (3) These measures shall be implemented in the following areas:
- i. Japan's territory
 - ii. Following areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.
 - The high seas, including the exclusive economic zone stipulated in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and airspace above
 - Territory of foreign countries (Implementation shall be limited to cases where consent from the territorial countries has been obtained.)
- (4) The Prime Minister shall, representing the Cabinet, supervise and control government agencies based on the basic plan stipulated in Section 5 below.
- (5) Heads of relevant government agencies will cooperate with each other to implement these measures.

4. Measures To Be Taken (Pertaining to Article 3 and Tables 1 and 2)

(1) Cooperation and Support Activities

- i. Cooperation and Support activities are the provision of materials and services, convenience and other measures implemented by Japan in support of Foreign Forces.
- ii. Relevant government agencies, including the Self-Defense Forces, shall implement these activities.
- iii. The contents of materials and services that the Self-Defense Forces provide are supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, and base support. Nonetheless, the Self-Defense Forces shall not undertake the supply of weapons and munitions, the supply of fuel to or maintenance on aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties, and the land transportation of weapons and munitions in foreign territories.

(2) Search and Rescue Activities

- i. Search and Rescue Activities are the activities implemented by Japan to search and rescue combatants in distress due to combat in the case of the activities of the Foreign Forces. (Search and Rescue Activities include the transportation of the rescued as well.)
- ii. Self-Defense Forces shall implement these activities.
- iii. The contents of materials and services that the Self-Defense Forces provide in implementing Search and Rescue Activities are supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, billeting and decontamination. Nonetheless, the Self-Defense Forces shall not undertake the supply of weapons and munitions, the supply of fuel to or maintenance on aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties, and the land transportation of weapons and munitions in foreign territories.

(3) Assistance to Affected People

- i. Assistance to Affected People is transportation of necessities including food, clothing

and medicines, medical services and other humanitarian activities implemented by Japan, with regard to the terrorist attacks, based on resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the UN or on requests by the UN and Others.

- ii. Relevant government agencies including the Self-Defense Forces shall implement these activities.

(4) Other Necessary Measures

- i. An example is transportation of foreign nationals while providing transportation to Japanese nationals abroad with aircraft of the Self-Defense Forces.
- ii. Relevant government agencies including the Self-Defense Forces shall implement these activities.

5. Basic Plan (Pertaining to Article 4)

(1) The Prime Minister, when he deems necessary the implementation of any of the following Response Measures, shall propose to make a Cabinet Decision on such implementation on a draft of basic plan with regards to their implementation (herein after referred to as "Basic Plan"):

- i. The provision of materials and services by the Self-Defense Force as Cooperation and Support Activities
- ii. Other measures implemented by relevant government agencies as Cooperation and Support Activities that require involvement of the Cabinet for their coherent and effective implementation
- iii. Search and Rescue Activities
- iv. Assistance to Affected People by the Self-Defense Forces
- v. Other measures implemented by relevant government agencies as Assistance to Affected People that require involvement of the Cabinet for their coherent and effective implementation

(2) Matters to be specified in the Basic Plan include the following:

- i. Basic points with regards to the Response Measures
- ii. Kinds and details of the activities stipulated in (1) to (3) of Section 4 above
- iii. Sphere of areas to implement the activities stipulated in (1) to (3) of Section 4 above and designation of such areas
- iv. Size, organization and equipment of the units of the Self Defense Forces which implement the activities stipulated in (1) to (3) of Section 4 above in foreign territories, and the time period of the dispatch of the units

(3) (1) above is applied to a change of the Basic Plan.

(4) When Response Measures are implemented in foreign territories, the GOJ shall consult with the territorial countries in order to specify the implementation areas.

6. The Diet Approval (Pertaining to Article 5)

The Prime Minister shall put Cooperation Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities or Assistance to Affected People implemented by the Self-Defense Forces specified in the Basic Plan, within twenty days after their initiation, on the agenda in the Diet for its approval. When the Diet is in recess or when the House of Representatives is dissolved, however, the Prime Minister shall promptly seek for its approval upon convening of the first Diet session thereafter.

If the Diet disapproves, Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities or Assistance to Affected People must be promptly terminated.

7. Implementation of the Response Measures by the Relevant Government Agencies (Pertaining to Article 6 through Article 9)

- (1) In accordance with the Basic Plan, the Minister of State for Defense will decide guidelines with regards to the provision of services as Cooperation and Support Activities, to Search and Rescue Activities, and to Assistance to Affected People, and, with the Prime Minister's approval, order the Self Defense Forces to implement them.
- (2) The Minister of State for Defense will designate specific implementation areas in the guidelines.
- (3) In case all or a part of implementation areas no longer meet the criteria stipulated in this law or the Basic Plan, the Minister of State for Defense must promptly alter the area designation or order the cessation of the activities implemented in the areas.
- (4) The commander of the unit of the Self-Defense Forces in charge of the activities stipulated in i), iii) and iv) of Section 5 (1) above, which are implemented in the high seas and airspace above or in foreign territories, or the person designated by him, in case combat takes place or is expected to take place near the area where the activities are implemented, will wait for the steps stipulated in (3) above, while, for example, temporarily suspending the activities or evacuating in order to avoid the danger caused by the combat.
- (5) In addition to (1) to (4) above, the Minister of State for Defense and the Heads of other relevant government agencies shall implement Cooperation and Support Activities, Assistance to Affected People and other Response Measures in accordance with relevant laws and the basic plan.

8. Lending Without Charge and Transfer of Materials (Pertaining to Article 10)

The Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers or those entrusted by them shall be authorized, to the extent that will not affect their duties, to lend without charge or transfer materials (excluding weapons and ammunitions) under their supervision to Foreign Forces or the UN and Others, in cases where there is a request of them for such lending or transfer of materials to be used in their activities, when deemed necessary for the smooth implementation of such activities.

9. Report to the Diet (Pertaining to Article 11)

The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet without delay, (1) the content of the Basic Plan when a decision or change on it is made, (2) the consequence of the implementation of the Response Measures specified in the basic plan.

10. Use of Weapons (Pertaining to Article 12)

- (1) Members of the Self-Defense Forces in charge of Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities or Assistance to Affected people, may proportionately use weapon

when an unavoidable and reasonable cause exists for use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other members of the Self Defense Forces who are with them on the scene, or those who are with them on the scene and have come under their control while conducting their duties.

- (2) The use of weapons stipulated in (1) above, when a senior officer is present at the scene, shall be conducted only under the order of the senior officer, except for cases where offense or danger to lives and bodies are too imminent to wait for such order.
- (3) A senior officer present on the scene, in the case as mentioned in (1) above, must give necessary orders with a view to preventing the danger to the lives and bodies and also to preventing disorder by uncontrolled use of weapons, and to ensuring that the use of weapons is done, in accordance with (1) above and (4) below, in an appropriate manner and within the limit necessary to achieve the purpose.
- (4) The use of weapons stipulated in (1) above shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (act of necessity) of the Penal Code.

Note: Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Use of Weapons for Protection of Weapons) is applied.

11. Others (Pertaining to Additional Provisions)

- (1) This Law shall come into effect from the day of promulgation.
- (2) The Self-Defense Forces Law shall be amended so that the Self-Defense Forces are authorized to implement Cooperation and Support Activities and other activities, to the extent that will not affect their duties.
- (3) This Law shall, in principle, expire upon the passage of two years after its entry into force. If deemed necessary, however, the effect of the law can be extended by not more than two years as set forth by a separate law. (The same applies to further extension of the Law.)

APPENDIX 8

Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by the Diet of Japan (Provisional Translation)

October 29, 2001

1. Today the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was passed in the Diet. Ever since the terrorist attacks took place in the United States on September 11, the Government of Japan has devoted its utmost efforts to cooperate with the rest of the international community in our endeavors to prevent and eradicate international terrorism in order to ensure the peace and security of the international community including Japan itself. The passing of this bill today is of great significance in that it enables Japan to be even more proactive in advancing its efforts.

Vigorous debate has taken place on this law in both Houses of the Diet since the submission of the Government draft of the law on October 5. I would like to express my appreciation to all those concerned for their cooperation in ensuring the passage of this law.

2. We now need to implement our response based on this law as soon as possible. The Government now initiates necessary considerations and coordination with other concerned countries and parties in order to expeditiously compile a Basic Plan in accordance with this law and makes preparations to ensure that response measures be promptly implemented after the compilation of the Basic Plan.

3. The Government views the fight against terrorism as a challenge of its own, and with a view to securing the safety of the nation and its people, will take measures based upon this law proactively and of its own initiative, within the framework of international cooperation. Measures aiming for the eradication of terrorism, including measures based on amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and the Maritime Safety Agency Law, will be comprehensively advanced, and full efforts will continue to be devoted to countering terrorism within Japan.

4. Furthermore, the Government of Japan will continue to promote the peace and reconstruction of Afghanistan in cooperation with other countries concerned and the United Nations. Regarding conflicts in the Middle East and South Asian regions as well, the Government will also call upon the concerned parties to redouble their efforts for peaceful resolution of the problems and extend Japan's cooperation to the fullest extent possible.

5. Eradicating international terrorism is certainly not an easy task. I ask for the further understanding and support of the people of Japan to these policies of the Government.

APPENDIX 9

EU-Japan Joint Declaration on Terrorism 10th Eu-Japan Summit Brussels, December 8, 2001⁸

1. We strongly condemn the terrorist attack committed in the United States on 11 September 2001 as a direct challenge to the international community as a whole. We should like once again to express our sincerest sympathy and solidarity with the American people. The perpetrators, sponsors, and accomplices must be brought to justice.
2. The fight against international terrorism will not be effective unless it is based on sustained efforts, pursued in accordance with international law, in particular the UN Charter. It is essential to foster greater co-operation in international fora and to see that all existing international anti-terrorism agreements are put into effect as soon as possible. While stressing the role of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, in the fight against international terrorism, we fully recognise the necessity to reinforce solidarity at all levels - bilateral, regional and international.
3. We express our firm support for the military operations undertaken by the United States and other countries fighting against terrorism. We renew our determination to exert all our energy and resources to stand firm with the United States in the fight against international terrorism.
4. We will co-operate actively towards the realisation of peace, a viable political solution, improved humanitarian situation and reconstruction in Afghanistan, while supporting the activities of the UN and UNSGSR Brahimi.

We consider that the economic and political stability of all countries taking part in the international coalition against terrorism is extremely important. In this regard, we will actively engage in a concerted effort to assist Pakistan and other countries surrounding Afghanistan. We also acknowledge the valuable contribution those countries are making in the international campaign against terrorism.

Specific actions we are considering include:

- Strengthening policy dialogue and co-ordination aimed at ensuring the peace and stability of Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries in support of ongoing UN efforts intended to install in Afghanistan a legitimate, broad-based, multi-ethnic government committed to establishing human rights in Afghanistan.
- Active co-operation in providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Afghanistan and in its neighbouring countries;
- Assistance for reconstruction in post-war Afghanistan;
- Assistance to Pakistan and to other countries neighbouring Afghanistan;

⁸ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/terro0112.html>.

5. Stressing that there is no linkage between any particular religion and terrorism, we also reaffirm the importance of continuing to promote tolerance and understanding among diverse peoples and cultures.

6. We are both already working to minimise the impact of the events of September 11 on the world economy. The EU and Japan, both of which have an important responsibility for the world economy, will continue to consult and co-operate closely, and will each take appropriate measures in accordance with the evolving situation.

7. In order to give substance to our common fight against terrorism, we have therefore resolved to co-operate towards the prevention and eradication of terrorism. We are determined to protect our citizens from acts of terrorism, while safeguarding the rule of law, human rights and the right to equitable justice. We have considered together the various concrete measures which each has already taken. We express our determination to strengthen consultation, co-operation and co-ordination in fighting terrorism with each other as indicated in the Action Plan for EU-Japan co-operation.

Annex

Excerpt of the Action Plan

- Further promote co-ordinated international action to prevent and combat international terrorism by taking the following joint measures as first steps:
 - enhanced co-operation in all relevant international and regional fora;
 - early signature and ratification of relevant counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, and smooth and rapid implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions;
 - early finalisation of the UN Comprehensive Convention against International terrorism;
 - enhancing common efforts to stop the financing of terrorism, including freezing of funds and other financial assets of terrorists;
 - reinforcement of technical co-operation to developing countries for their capacity building in the field of counter-terrorism.

- Continue combating terrorism through:
 - early finalisation of the international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism;
 - strengthening of non-proliferation regimes of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies connected with terrorism;
 - cooperation between the European Police Office (Europol) and Japanese police authorities;
 - enhanced drugs control and active measures to reduce the supply and demand of drugs.

APPENDIX 10

Comment by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (On the Occasion of the Three-Month's Anniversary of the September 11 Attacks) December 11, 2001⁹

1. Three months have passed since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
2. I myself and the people of Japan are together with President George W. Bush and the people of the United States in that we shall never forget the September 11 tragedy and our common resolve to fight against terrorism.
3. Japan is resolved to continue to stand by the United States in its determined fight against terrorism, and to contribute actively, on its own initiative, to the efforts of the international community, in order to prevent and eradicate international terrorism and to ensure that such terrorist acts will never be repeated.
4. Further, Japan will continue to work on the diplomatic and other fronts to reinforce the international coalition against terrorism, to bring peace and reconstruction to Afghanistan, to provide assistance to the countries neighboring Afghanistan and to the displaced persons in and around Afghanistan, and to strengthen international legal frameworks against terrorism.

⁹ http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/1211tero_e.html.

APPENDIX 11

Opening Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan January 21, 2002¹⁰

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Assalam alaikum,

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan. Today, under the joint chairmanship of Japan, the United States of America, the European Union and Saudi Arabia, representatives from as many as 60 countries and 20 international organizations are meeting together. This clearly shows that the world regards peace and reconstruction of Afghanistan as a challenge that the entire world community has to tackle. Chairman Hamid Karzai and other leaders of the Interim Authority are also here with us today. They carry the tremendous responsibility of showing Afghanistan the way forward as it rebuilds. I look forward to hearing from them about their own vision for the future.

The future of Afghanistan has to be built by its people. The international community can proceed with its efforts for reconstruction, only when the reconciliation process is advanced smoothly by the people of Afghanistan themselves.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th changed the world. Such unforgivable acts challenge the dignity of humanity as a whole. The people of Afghanistan are also victims of the Taliban and al-Qaida. Today, overcoming differences of culture, religion and national boundaries, the international community stands united against the challenge of inhumane terrorists. In order to eradicate terrorism, we must eliminate conditions that allow terrorism to take root. To do so, it is essential that a peaceful and stable Afghanistan be built. This cannot be done in one or two years. The path is long and will require many years. But I am sure that we can make it.

The Bonn Agreement of December last year outlined a path for the political process that can lead to lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan. This conference in Tokyo is expected to indicate the way forward for the process of recovery and reconstruction. After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan is in a state of devastation. It is important more than ever that the Interim Authority in Afghanistan, with assistance from the international community, indicates a path to recovery and reconstruction. This will give hope to all the people of Afghanistan. I want these people to throw away their guns to take up farming tools and to shed their sense of insecurity to nurture confidence. Thus, they can proceed with the task to rebuild their own country. I call on all the nations and international organizations represented here today: we must demonstrate our firm determination to be united in support of the efforts by the people of Afghanistan.

¹⁰ http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/01/21afghan_op_e.html.

Japan will do its utmost to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Japan's assistance will focus on supporting the process towards peace and national reconciliation, as well as on people-building. The future of Afghanistan has to be built by its own people. We intend to contribute to such activities as "the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons," which is a prerequisite for reconstruction, "education," "medical and health care" and "empowerment of women." Now, for these activities to proceed, security on the ground has to be ensured. To this end, we will also focus on "de-mining." This will include providing equipment and materials that are urgently needed. We also intend to assist de-mining itself, as well as to support victim assistance schemes. Japan will mobilize its resources to develop de-mining technologies. With this vision, Japan will contribute up to 500 million US dollars over the next 2.5 years before the establishment of a permanent government based on the Bonn Agreement. To start, for the first coming year, we are prepared to provide a maximum amount of 250 million US dollars. We would like to work closely with the authorities of Afghanistan to ensure the effective implementation of assistance to meet the needs of its people.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me close by expressing my appreciation of the role played by NGOs. Together with their inputs, I am convinced that this Tokyo Conference will prove to be an important springboard for further progress. Thank you very much for your participation and support.

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